



Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

The emergence of democratic firms in the platform economy: drivers, obstacles, and the path ahead

Mannan, M.

Citation

Mannan, M. (2022, February 15). *The emergence of democratic firms in the platform economy: drivers, obstacles, and the path ahead*. Meijers-reeks. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3278843>

Version: Publisher's Version

License: [Licence agreement concerning inclusion of doctoral thesis in the Institutional Repository of the University of Leiden](#)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3278843>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

ABSTRACT

In recent years, there has been growing policy support for expanding worker ownership of businesses in the European Union. As preceding chapters have shown, debates on stimulating worker ownership are a regular feature of discussions on the collaborative economy and the future of work. Yet, labour-managed firms (LMFs) such as worker cooperatives remain marginal.

This chapter explains the appeal of worker cooperatives and examines the reasons why they continue to be relatively scarce. Taking its cue from Hansmann's hypothesis that organisational innovations can make worker ownership of firms viable in previously untenable circumstances, this chapter explores how organisational innovations, such as those embodied in the capital and governance structure of Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAOs), can potentially facilitate the growth of LMFs. It does so by undertaking a case study of a blockchain project, Colony, which seeks to create decentralised, self-organising companies where decision-making power derives from high-quality work. For worker cooperatives, seeking to connect globally dispersed workers through an online workplace, Colony's proposed capital and governance structure, based on technological and game theoretic insight may offer useful lessons. Drawing from this prefigurative structure, self-imposed institutional rules may be deployed by worker cooperatives in their by-laws to avoid some of the main pitfalls associated with labour management and thereby, potentially, vitalise the formation of worker cooperatives.

¹⁰³⁰ This chapter is an updated version of the article, Morshed Mannan, 'Fostering Worker Cooperatives with Blockchain Technology: Lessons from the Colony Project' (2018) 11 *Erasmus Law Review* 190-203.

7.1 INTRODUCTION

There has been a long-running policy-level discussion on the role of worker ownership and management of firms in the European Union.¹⁰³¹ Labour Managed Firms (LMFs) are firms in which the suppliers of labour, rather than capital, have ultimate control rights in the governance of a firm, including the right to collectively hire and dismiss directors.¹⁰³² The suppliers of labour also receive the residual earnings of the firm on the basis of their labour input.¹⁰³³ LMFs offer an appealing governance structure for firms due to their perceived positive effects on employee behaviour for firms¹⁰³⁴ as well as high survival rates during times of recession.¹⁰³⁵ From the workers' perspective, LMFs provide job security,¹⁰³⁶ 'positive energy'¹⁰³⁷ resulting from the knowledge that they work for their own benefit rather than non-worker shareholders and act as 'sites of solidarity'¹⁰³⁸ in a neoliberal economy where workers' rights are gradually being eroded.¹⁰³⁹ As a consequence, LMFs such as worker cooperatives have regained attention in recent times¹⁰⁴⁰ in view of the anxieties regarding job quality, income

1031 From improving working conditions to providing start-up support, administrative and accounting spaces as well as workspaces for self-employed persons, see European Parliament Resolution on cooperatives in the European Community [1983] OJ C128/51; Anne-Katrin Bock and others, *The Future of the European Collaborative Economy: Using Scenarios to Explore Future Implications for Employment* (Publications Office of the European Union 2016) 27.

1032 Gregory K Dow, 'The Theory of the Labor-Managed Firm: Past, Present, and Future' (2018) 89 *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics* 65, 65.

1033 Hansmann (n 362) 11. Workers also contribute capital, but their decision-making and financial rights are not predicated on the extent of their capital contribution.

1034 Imanol Basterretxea and John Storey, 'Do Employee-Owned Firms Produce More Positive Employee Behavioural Outcomes? If Not Why Not? A British-Spanish Comparative Analysis' (2018) 56 *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 292, 300, 302; Ross Brown and others, 'Buying into Capitalism? Employee Ownership in a Disconnected Era' (2019) 57 *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 62, 80.

1035 Virginie Pérotin, 'Worker Cooperatives: Good, Sustainable Jobs in the Community' (2013) 2 *Journal of Entrepreneurial and Organizational Diversity* 34, 40; Johnston Birchall and Lou Hammond Ketilson, *Resilience of the Cooperative Business Model in Times of Crisis* (ILO 2009) 7, 13–14.

1036 Iñaki Heras-Saizarbitoria, 'The Ties That Bind ? Exploring the Basic Principles of Worker-Owned Organizations in Practice' (2014) 21 *Organization* 645, 656, 658.

1037 Basterretxea and Storey (n 1034) 300.

1038 José Itzigsohn and Julián Rebón, 'The Recuperatio of Enterprises: Defending Workers' Lifeworld, Creating New Tools of Contention' (2015) 50 *Latin American Research Review* 178, 189–190.

1039 Paola Raffaelli, 'Social and Solidarity Economy in a Neoliberal Context: Transformative or Palliative? The Case of an Argentinean Worker Cooperative' (2016) 5 *Journal of Entrepreneurial and Organizational Diversity* 33, 34; Ximena de la Barra, 'Sacrificing Neoliberalism to Save Capitalism: Latin America Resists and Offers Answers to Crises' (2010) 36 *Critical Sociology* 635, 655.

1040 CICOPA-COOP, 'The Future of Work: Where Do Industrial and Service Cooperatives Stand?' (CICOPA-COOP 2018); Marisol Sandoval, 'Fighting Precarity with Co-Operation? Worker Co-Operatives in the Cultural Sector.' (2016) 88 *New Formations* 51, 62.

inequality, diminishing worker protections, and worker participation raised by the collaborative economy and the 'future of work'.¹⁰⁴¹

Yet, LMFs continue to be relatively rare in developed economies compared to capital managed firms (KMFs),¹⁰⁴² barring famous exceptions in regional economies such as that of the Basque country of Spain,¹⁰⁴³ the Emilia Romagna region of Italy¹⁰⁴⁴ and the Buenos Aires province of Argentina.¹⁰⁴⁵ While interest in worker cooperatives has surged in South Korea¹⁰⁴⁶ and certain states in the United States of America,¹⁰⁴⁷ their number in all of these instances still remain in the hundreds. The most common reasons attributed for their relative scarcity are acquiring start-up capital, workers' apprehension about not being able to spread their investment risk,¹⁰⁴⁸ the risk of absenteeism and free-riding on the efforts of other workers,¹⁰⁴⁹ the inability to meet the high ideological and economic expectations set when the LMF was formed¹⁰⁵⁰ and a perceived tendency to 'degenerate' into KMFs, by replacing retiring worker-members with employees in a bid to maximize individual member remuneration, thereby diminishing worker voice and losing its democratic character.¹⁰⁵¹ Degeneration is seen as a

-
- 1041 Thereza Balliester and Adam Elsheikhi, 'The Future of Work: A Literature Review' (International Labour Office 2018) Working Paper 29 20, 26–27, 33.
- 1042 Fathi Fakhfakh, Virginie Pérotin and Mónica Gago, 'Productivity, Capital, and Labor in Labor-Managed and Conventional Firms: An Investigation on French Data' (2012) 65 ILR Review 847, 850.
- 1043 Spencer Thompson, 'Is the Mondragón Cooperative Experience a Cultural Exception? The Application of the Mondragón Model in Valencia and Beyond' (2014) 47 Journal of Co-operative Studies 19, 19.
- 1044 Stefano Zamagni and Vera Zamagni, *Cooperative Enterprise: Facing the Challenge of Globalization* (Edward Elgar Publishing 2010) 58.
- 1045 Peter Ranis, 'Argentine Worker Cooperatives in Civil Society: A Challenge to Capital–Labor Relations' (2010) 13 WorkingUSA 77, 83.
- 1046 Minsun Ji, 'The Worker Cooperative Movement in South Korea: From Radical Autonomy to State-Sanctioned Accommodation' (2018) 59 Labor History 415, 428.
- 1047 California, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin being particularly prominent. See, Amy Johnson and Melissa Hoover (eds), *Democracy at Work: U.S. Directory of Worker Cooperatives & Guide to Democratic Business Resources* (US Federation of Worker Cooperatives & Democracy at Work Institute 2015) 10, 74–78.
- 1048 Jan M Podivinsky and Geoff Stewart, 'Why Is Labour-Managed Firm Entry so Rare?: An Analysis of UK Manufacturing Data' (2007) 63 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 177, 188; Jan M Podivinsky and Geoff Stewart, 'Modeling Proportions: Random Effects Models of Uk Firm Entry' (2009) 54 The Singapore Economic Review 367, 374.
- 1049 Basterretxea and Storey (n 1034) 302–303, 307–308.
- 1050 Saioa Arando and others, 'Efficiency in Employee-Owned Enterprises: An Econometric Case Study of Mondragon' (2015) 68 ILR Review 398, 417, 421. They find that LMFs can be highly demanding and stressful workplaces due to (self-imposed) high expectations of their work.
- 1051 This is an argument that has been made for over a century. See Beatrice Webb-Potter, *The Co-Operative Movement in Great Britain* (Swan Sonnenschein & Co 1891). An overview of the degeneration thesis is provided by Langmead. Kiri Langmead, *Exploring the Performance of Democracy and Economic Diversity in Worker Cooperatives* (Sheffield Hallam University 2017) 24–27.

particularly acute concern when a worker cooperative tries to internationalise its operations.¹⁰⁵²

Taking its cue from Hansmann's hypothesis that organisational innovations may make labour management and ownership viable in previously untenable circumstances,¹⁰⁵³ this chapter explores how organisational innovations, such as those embodied in the capital and governance structure of, can potentially facilitate the growth of LMFs. DAOs refer to organisations that rely on blockchain technology and smart contracts as their source of governance and respond to both digital and human input.¹⁰⁵⁴ In recent years, DAOs and platforms to create DAOs have emerged as ways to coordinate the supply of capital and labour in a globally distributed manner.¹⁰⁵⁵ An important aspect of creating such organisations has been the design of governance systems that align incentives in a manner that promotes high-quality input as well as active member participation. This has prompted an outpouring of interest in decentralised governance,¹⁰⁵⁶ and consequently led to proposals which employ game theory and technology to achieve, *in abstracto*, the formation of organisations, the financing of projects, and high-quality and active member participation. In essence, these proposals strive for *corporate governance by design*.¹⁰⁵⁷ This bears a strong resemblance to the start-up and coordination issues faced by LMFs. It is hypothesised that

-
- 1052 Ignacio Bretos, Anjel Errasti and Carmen Marcuello, 'Ownership, Governance, and the Diffusion of HRM Practices in Multinational Worker Cooperatives: Case-Study Evidence from the Mondragon Group' (2018) 28 *Human Resource Management Journal* 76, 76–77, 81–82, 85; Patrizia Battilani and Harm G Schröter, 'Conclusion: The Decisive Factors of Cooperatives' Future--Their Nature, Longevity, Role, and Environment' in Patrizia Battilani and Harm G Schröter (eds), *The Cooperative Business Movement, 1950 to the Present* (Cambridge University Press 2012) 266–267.
 - 1053 Henry Hansmann, 'When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination, and Economic Democracy' (1990) 99 *The Yale Law Journal* 1749, 1816. These untenable circumstances are discussed in section 7.2.4 on the scarcity of worker cooperatives.
 - 1054 De Filippi and Wright (n 589); Hacker Philipp and Chris Thomale, 'Crypto-Securities Regulation: ICOs, Token Sales and Cryptocurrencies under EU Financial Law' (2018) 15 *European Company and Financial Law Review* 645, 651; Iris M Barsan, 'Legal Challenges of Initial Coin Offerings (ICO)' (2017) 3 *Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Financier (RTDF)* 54, 55.
 - 1055 Sinclair Davidson, Primavera De Filippi and Jason Potts, 'Blockchains and the Economic Institutions of Capitalism' (2018) 14 *Journal of Institutional Economics* 639, 643.
 - 1056 Wessel Reijers, Fiachra O'Brolcháin and Paul Haynes, 'Governance in Blockchain Technologies & Social Contract Theories' (2016) 1 *Ledger* 134; Marcella Atzori, 'Blockchain Technology and Decentralized Governance: Is the State Still Necessary?' (Social Science Research Network 2015) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2709713.
 - 1057 This is distinct from public regulation by design and privacy by design, as discussed by Mulligan and Bamberger, as it instead focuses on the governance of business organizations through the use of technology and crypto-economics. Deirdre K Mulligan and Kenneth A Bamberger, 'Saving Governance-By-Design' (2018) 106 *California Law Review* 697. Corporate governance by design is of legal and political interest as such technological innovations can shape public orders in lasting ways. Langdon Winner, 'Do Artifacts Have Politics?' (1980) 109 *Daedalus* 121, 128.

LMFs, particularly those operating online workplaces, may draw beneficial lessons from these experiments in decentralised governance. This is the first study that seeks to bridge the gap between worker cooperative and blockchain technology.

To explore this hypothesis, this chapter is structured as follows. The second section of the chapter elaborates on the governance structure of an archetypical LMF, a worker cooperative,¹⁰⁵⁸ their main advantages according to theoretical and empirical literature and the policy-level support for their growth, which has gained urgency with the emergence of the platform-mediated, collaborative economy. This section is concluded with a consideration of the central causes of the scarcity of LMFs. The third section of the chapter provides a brief overview of smart contracts and DAOs, as they are key to understanding the governance and incentive system of decentralised organisations. The fourth section presents a case study of one DAO platform, Colony, created by Collectively Intelligent Ltd. that seeks to create decentralised, open, self-organising companies where decision-making power is intertwined with high-quality labour input. The case study was conducted by reviewing Colony's legal & technical documentation, software development platform (Github), social media posts and presentations through which information about the project is shared. The author also had conversations with two of the authors of the Colony White Paper, Jack du Rose and Dr. Aron Fischer, about the project. First, the aspirations of the Colony project are mentioned, along with its proposed governance structure. Second, its governance features are assessed against that of a worker cooperative. This permits a tentative analysis of the Colony protocol's potential to address some of the perceived governance shortcomings of worker cooperatives, particularly when operating across borders. In view of this sample governance structure, self-imposed institutional rules may be deployed by worker cooperatives in their by-laws to avoid some of the main pitfalls associated with labour management¹⁰⁵⁹ and thereby vitalise the use of an alternate form of business organisation. The fifth section sums up and concludes.

1058 As with most corporate entity forms, there are jurisdictional differences in the characteristics of a worker cooperative. Therefore, this archetype is based on the Principles of European Cooperative Law (PECOL) which were published in 2017 and are derived from a synthesis of the cooperative laws of the UK, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the EU. Gemma Fajardo and others, *Principles of European Cooperative Law: Principles, Commentaries and National Reports* (Intersentia 2017) 2–4. It also incorporates the description of worker cooperatives set out by Pérotin. Virginie Pérotin, 'What Do We Really Know about Worker Co-Operatives?' (Co-operatives UK 2020) Resource 4ff.

1059 Dow, 'The Theory of the Labor-Managed Firm' (n 1032) 76.

7.2 LABOUR MANAGEMENT AND OWNERSHIP OF BUSINESS

7.2.1 The Archetypical LMF: The Worker Cooperative

In a bid to distinguish cooperatives from other legal entity forms, the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA), a representative body of the international co-operative movement, and the International Labour Organization (ILO) promote a set of core values and principles integral to the cooperative identity. All cooperatives, including worker cooperatives value 'self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity and solidarity; as well as ethical values of honesty, openness, social responsibility and caring for others'.¹⁰⁶⁰ This is implemented through seven principles: (1) voluntary and open membership, (2) democratic member control, (3) member economic participation, (4) autonomy and independence, (5) education, training and information, (6) cooperation among cooperatives and (7) concern for the community.¹⁰⁶¹ In particular, worker cooperatives seek to create and maintain sustainable jobs and wealth, which will dignify human work, improve worker-members' quality of life, allow democratic self-management and enable local and community development.¹⁰⁶² This is reflected in the capital and governance structure of worker cooperatives.

In a worker cooperative, most, if not all, of the capital of these firms are held by worker-members.¹⁰⁶³ While worker cooperatives are generally permitted to have non-member employees, this is usually set at a low threshold and employees are often given the option of becoming members.¹⁰⁶⁴ To become a member, an employee must not only complete a certain amount of hours of work (i.e., a probation period) but must usually contribute a 'buy in' to the cooperative as well, which may be redeemable at face value upon exit from the cooperative.¹⁰⁶⁵ As the purpose of the business is to undertake economic activities in the interest of its worker-members, rather than to make a profit for the cooperatives itself or external investors,¹⁰⁶⁶ cooperatives make allocations to mandatory and voluntary reserves from their cooperative transactions (i.e., surplus of revenue over

1060 ILO Recommendation 193 concerning the Promotion of Cooperatives, 2002, art. 3(a).

1061 International Co-operative Alliance, 'The Statement on the Cooperative Identity' (1995) <<https://bit.ly/3xLluor>>; International Co-operative Alliance (n 252).

1062 CICOPA-COOP, 'World Declaration on Worker Cooperatives' (ICA General Assembly, 23 September 2005) 2 <<https://bit.ly/3gTWwPp>>.

1063 PECOL, section 3.1. PECOL acknowledges the possibility that cooperatives can 'use shares, reserves, loans and other financial instruments as sources of capital, providing they are compatible with their cooperative nature'.

1064 PECOL, section 1.5(3). In some jurisdictions, like the UK, it is mandatory for individuals who are eligible (i.e. have worked a minimum number of hours) to be offered membership. Footprint Workers' Co-operative Ltd. and Seeds for Change Lancaster Co-operative Limited (n 147) 110.

1065 PECOL, section 3.2(2), 3.3.

1066 PECOL, section 1(1).

costs) and profitable non-cooperative transactions (e.g., holding shares in other companies).¹⁰⁶⁷ Most often, surplus, if discretionarily distributed as refunds, are received by members in proportion to their work (measured in hours worked) for the worker cooperative.¹⁰⁶⁸ In the event of a loss being incurred, they are first covered through the reserves of the cooperative before turning to the members, in proportion to 'the quantity and/or quality of their participation in cooperative transactions within the limit of the value of the goods and services received'.¹⁰⁶⁹ In case of business failure, as the assets and reserve of the worker cooperative are commonly held, if the worker cooperative is liquidated, the residual net assets are distributed according to the principle of disinterested distribution, i.e., to associated cooperatives or the community.¹⁰⁷⁰

These firms share the characteristic of providing worker-members a voice in governance,¹⁰⁷¹ either on a one-member, one-vote basis or based on the extent of their non-capital contribution.¹⁰⁷² In many of these firms, delegated management still exists, but the directors are elected by workers and the latter retain an extensive right to ask questions and be informed and consulted.¹⁰⁷³ In some cases, they may have the right to vote on issues of major corporate interest.¹⁰⁷⁴ In certain firms, members may be involved in a range of strategic decisions, from setting trading hours to exploring new markets to introducing a product.¹⁰⁷⁵ What is notable in the context of this chapter is that it appears that there is a risk for worker participation to become more shallow as cooperatives internationalise.¹⁰⁷⁶

1067 PECOL, section 3.6-3.7.

1068 PECOL, section 3.6(3)(a).

1069 PECOL, section 3.6(6)(b). This is in keeping with members' limited liability under PECOL, section 3.5.

1070 PECOL, section 3.8(2). *Also see*, Fajardo and others (n 1058) 94. This requirement has helped LMFs avoid the theorised problem of under-investment (i.e. a horizon problem) – workers choosing to maximize the firm's present value instead of pursuing long-term gain. Fakhfakh, Pérotin and Gago (n 1042) 855.

1071 PECOL, section 2.3(4)(b).

1072 PECOL, section 2.4(8)(a).

1073 Potentially extending beyond the minimum information and consultation rights ordinarily enjoyed by workers in the EU under Directive 2002/14/EC of 11 March 2002 establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community – Joint declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on employee representation [2002] OJ L80/29, industry-specific legislation and legislation concerning changes of corporate control.

1074 Baleren Bakaikoa, Anjel Errasti and Agurtzane Begiristain, 'Governance of the Mondragon Corporación Cooperativa' (2004) 75 *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics* 61, 68.

1075 Abby Cathcart, 'Directing Democracy: Competing Interests and Contested Terrain in the John Lewis Partnership' (2013) 55 *Journal of Industrial Relations* 601, 611; Sarah Hernandez, 'Striving for Control: Democracy and Oligarchy at a Mexican Cooperative' (2006) 27 *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 105, 122.

1076 Particularly if that host state does not have a solid, long-standing cooperative tradition. Bretos, Errasti and Marcuello (n 1052) 82.

While worker cooperatives continue to be marginal organisational forms in developed economies, the appeal of worker cooperatives endures. An estimated 11 million people worked in such cooperatives as worker-members in 2015-2016.¹⁰⁷⁷ Across the globe, they are present in a variety of industries, from sheet metal factories¹⁰⁷⁸ to media,¹⁰⁷⁹ from the cultural sector¹⁰⁸⁰ to software development.¹⁰⁸¹ In France¹⁰⁸² and Italy,¹⁰⁸³ there is a relatively high proportion of worker cooperatives in manufacturing and construction respectively. However, the predominant view is that capital-intensive sectors, involving tasks with a high degree of standardisation, will continue to be predominated by KMFs while those in which personal relations and human creativity feature heavily are more amenable to worker ownership and management.¹⁰⁸⁴ This coincides with the view of organisational theorists, who observe that those engaged in knowledge-intensive work tend to be less indifferent about hierarchical employment relations and believe that 'the locus of decisions has to coincide with the locus of knowledge'.¹⁰⁸⁵

1077 Elisa Terrasi and Eum Hyungsik, 'Industrial and Service Cooperatives Global Report 2015-2016' (CICOPA 2017) 9.

1078 Stéphane Jaumier, 'Preventing Chiefs from Being Chiefs: An Ethnography of a Co-Operative Sheet-Metal Factory' (2017) 24 *Organization* 218.

1079 In Greece, there are examples of cooperatives newspapers (e.g. Efsyn), online media (e.g. Alterthess) and radio stations (e.g. Flash FM). Eugenia Siapera and Lambrini Papadopoulou, 'Entrepreneurialism or Cooperativism?' (2016) 10 *Journalism Practice* 178, 185. In the United States in 2018, the Colorado Sun arose from the Denver Post as a journalists' cooperative on the back of a successful crowdfunding campaign and support from a blockchain-based journalism initiative, Civil. Nathan Schneider, 'Broad-Based Stakeholder Ownership in Journalism: Co-Ops, ESOPs, Blockchains' (2020) 7 *Media Industries Journal* 45, 46.

1080 One of the leading symphony orchestras in the world, the London Symphony Orchestra, is a LMF and has been so for over a hundred years. Catherine P Mulder, *Transcending Capitalism through Cooperative Practices* (Palgrave Macmillan 2015) 35–37.

1081 dOrg is a full-stack software development firm that builds blockchain and other Web3 products. It has generated US\$2 million in revenue through its 63 members. dOrg is registered as a Blockchain-Based Limited Liability Company in the US state of Vermont and operates as a collectively-run cooperative. dOrg, 'dOrg: Full Stack Web3 Development Collective' (2021) <<https://bit.ly/3vRkMom>>.

1082 Fakhfakh, Pérotin and Gago (n 1042) 852.

1083 John Pencavel, Luigi Pistaferri and Fabiano Schivardi, 'Wages, Employment, and Capital in Capitalist and Worker-Owned Firms' (2006) 60 *ILR Review* 23, 28.

1084 Vera Negri Zamagni, 'The Co-Operative Enterprise: A Valid Alternative for a Balanced Society' in Sonja Novkovic and Tom Webb (eds), *Co-Operatives in a Post-Growth Era: Creating Co-Operative Economics* (Zed Books 2014) 196; Dow, 'The Theory of the Labor-Managed Firm' (n 1032) 78.

1085 Anna Grandori, 'Knowledge-Intensive Work And The (Re)Emergence Of Democratic Governance' (2016) 30 *Academy of Management Perspectives* 167, 173.

7.2.2 The Appeal of Worker Cooperatives to Workers

From the non-executive workers' perspective, worker cooperatives hold the promise of lower wage differentials than KMFs¹⁰⁸⁶ and improved benefits, such as collective private health insurance.¹⁰⁸⁷ Based on cross-cultural evidence, it would appear that LMFs also provide stronger guarantees of employment stability, as LMFs tend to prefer reducing hours of work, rather than laying off worker-members, in response to recessions.¹⁰⁸⁸

An ideal-type worker cooperative allows workers an involvement in organisational decision-making that goes far beyond the voluntarist human resource management practices (e.g., agile management) used by KMFs.¹⁰⁸⁹ Along with being given a voice in production processes, workers are also given a say in key governance decisions, which reduces information asymmetry between labour and management. Instead of viewing workers as a monolithic group with uniform interests, individual preferences and views can be better communicated. In short, as workers hire managers, rather than the other way around, labour management and ownership avoids the dishonouring of workplace bargains¹⁰⁹⁰—such as the unilateral termination of certain rights to voice. This allows workers to develop, simultaneously, a sense of self-determination in how they work¹⁰⁹¹ and solidarity with each other.¹⁰⁹² This is manifested in how worker cooperatives, and LMFs

1086 Charlotte Heales, Mary Hodgson and Hannah Rich, 'Humanity at Work: Mondragon, a Social Innovation Ecosystem Case Study' (The Young Foundation 2017) 51; Dow, *Governing the Firm Workers' Control in Theory and Practice* (n 709) 76.

1087 Mulder (n 1080) 42.

1088 Dow, for instance, summarises evidence from the USA, Italy, and Uruguay. Dow, 'The Theory of the Labor-Managed Firm' (n 1032) 74.

1089 Tony Dobbins and Tony Dundon, 'The Chimera of Sustainable Labour-Management Partnership' (2017) 28 *British Journal of Management* 519.

1090 *ibid* 521–522; Paul Thompson, 'Financialization and the Workplace: Extending and Applying the Disconnected Capitalism Thesis' (2013) 27 *Work, Employment and Society* 472, 478–479.

1091 Having more decision-making powers allows workers to develop a feeling of being trusted. Bruno S Frey and Reto Jegen, 'Motivation Crowding Theory' (2001) 15 *Journal of Economic Surveys* 589, 601; Tore Ellingsen and Magnus Johannesson, 'Paying Respect' (2007) 21 *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 135, 139; Vilde Hoff Bernstrøm and Helge Svare, 'Significance of Monitoring and Control for Employees' Felt Trust, Motivation, and Mastery' (2017) 7 *Nordic Journal of Working Life Studies* 29, 43. The authors also note how worker perceptions of being monitored due to a managerial fear of shirking can engender unpleasant feelings and counter-productive behaviour.

1092 Martin Parker and others, 'Imagining Alternatives' in Martin Parker and others (eds), *The Routledge companion to alternative organization* (Routledge 2014) 32, 36–37. Parker and colleagues see worker cooperatives as one of the alternative organisations that can potentially embody the principles of autonomy, solidarity and responsibility.

in general, are able to account for quality-of-life issues and individual and team well-being.¹⁰⁹³

As a consequence, it is easy to understand why labour management and ownership has gained particular resonance in the context of the 'collaborative economy', given the effects it has had on the nature of work.¹⁰⁹⁴ The actors in this space include individuals providing services, users of these services and the online platforms that mediate their interactions by offering access and executing tripartite contracts.¹⁰⁹⁵ Economic theorists have characterised such online platforms as being multi-sided markets¹⁰⁹⁶ which enable value-creating transactions by facilitating service providers and users finding each other and developing inter-dependence. In a labour intermediation platform, such as Etsy or Uber, the greater the number of workers on the platform, the more that platform appeals to other workers (i.e., a direct network effect). Conversely, the presence of a large number of potential clients persuades more workers to join the platform (i.e., an indirect network effect).¹⁰⁹⁷

The collaborative economy accounted for 26.5 billion EUR in gross revenue in 2016 and created approximately 394,000 jobs across the European Union member states.¹⁰⁹⁸ While creating employment opportunities and consumer value, from the perspectives of those who work on, or through these platforms, they creates a downward pressure on permanent, full-time, subordinated employment relationships towards non-standard employment and self-employment.¹⁰⁹⁹ This creates new pressures on worker representation institutions, such as trade unions and works councils, that

1093 Maurizio Atzeni and Marcelo Vieta, 'Between Class and Market: Self-Management in Theory and in the Practice of Worker-Recuperated Enterprises in Argentina' in Martin Parker and others (eds), *The Routledge companion to alternative organization* (Routledge 2014) 56. The authors highlight how workers are able to modulate production in keeping with the needs of the team.

1094 Avner Ben-ner, 'The Life Cycle of Worker-Owned Firms in Market Economies: A Theoretical Analysis' (1988) 10 *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 287, 296. Ben-Ner hypothesized that organizational and technological innovations that affect the workplace would drive the demand for worker-owned firms. According to the EU Agenda for the Collaborative Economy, the term collaborative economy 'refers to the business models where activities are facilitated by collaborative platforms that create an open marketplace for the temporary usage of goods or services often provided by private individuals'. EC Communication, 'A European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy', COM(2016) 356 final, at 3.

1095 Vassilis Hatzopoulos, *The Collaborative Economy and EU Law* (Hart Publishing 2018) 7.

1096 David S Evans and Richard Schmalensee, *Matchmakers: The New Economics of Multisided Platforms* (2016) 8.

1097 Hatzopoulos (n 1095) 9–10.

1098 Technopolis, Trinomics and VVA Consulting, *Study to Monitor the Economic Development of the Collaborative Economy at Sector Level in the 28 EU Member States: Final Report* (Publications Office of the European Union 2018) 12.

1099 CICOPA-COOP (n 1040) 11.

have been built around the employment relationship.¹¹⁰⁰ This reversion to pre-20th century employment practices serves some well,¹¹⁰¹ particularly those who have highly-coveted skills and scope for job mobility, but it exposes many others to job precarity and income insecurity.¹¹⁰² This trend can also be seen as cynical exploitation of workers' own frustrated desires for freedom and self-determination.¹¹⁰³

Firms representing such cooperative qualities have begun to emerge in the *online* collaborative economy (which overlaps with platform economy) with the ambition of providing less precarious workplaces and more broadly accountable organisations.¹¹⁰⁴ These platforms put the interest of the user-members at the forefront, by involving them in the financing and management of the platforms. These range from cooperative-run platforms like Doc Servizi,¹¹⁰⁵ an 8000-person creative workers' cooperative in Italy, to Stocksy,¹¹⁰⁶ a multi-stakeholder platform cooperative for selling stock photos.

7.2.3 Worker Cooperatives as Competitive Firms

In addition to these potential benefits for worker-members, worker cooperatives are also competitive businesses in their own right. Agency theory suggests that worker ownership aligns the economic interests of the organisation and individual workers, thereby promoting productivity and organisational loyalty.¹¹⁰⁷ This is in contrast to KMFs where information asymmetries and differing interests may lead to a fear that employment bargains will be reneged at a future date or that optimal firm-specific investments will not be made by either labour or management.¹¹⁰⁸ Providing feedback and suggestions on production processes allows firms to benefit from the workers' experience and knowledge of the technology, organisation and

1100 Jeremias Prassl, 'Collective Voice in the Platform Economy: Challenges, Opportunities, Solutions' (ETUC 2018) 14.

1101 Simon Deakin, 'The Contract of Employment: A Study in Legal Evolution' [2001] *Historical Studies in Industrial Relations* 1, 29.

1102 As mentioned in chapter 2, this can range from manual labourers to creative workers, cutting across generations and disproportionately affecting women. Standing (n 46) 59; Ursula Huws, 'ICapitalism and the Cybertariat: Contradictions of the Digital Economy' (2015) 66 *Monthly Review* 42.

1103 Peter Frase, 'Beyond the Welfare State' [2014] *Jacobin* <<https://bit.ly/3d3G5fS>>; Eve Chiapello, 'Evolution and Co-optation' (2004) 18 *Third Text* 585, 593.

1104 Schneider, 'An Internet of Ownership' (n 148).

1105 Francesca Martinelli, 'Innovative Cooperation's Model in Europe: A Solution to the Growing Uncertainty in the World of Work' (2018).

1106 Schor (n 173) ch 6.

1107 John P Bonin, Derek C Jones and Louis Putterman, 'Theoretical and Empirical Studies of Producer Cooperatives: Will Ever the Twain Meet?' (1993) 31 *Journal of Economic Literature* 1290, 1303; Graeme Nuttall, 'Sharing Success: The Nuttall Review of Employee Ownership' (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2012) BIS/12/933 22–28.

1108 Ben-ner (n 1094) 293.

market environment.¹¹⁰⁹ Moreover, the costs of monitoring diminishes, in comparison to KMFs, as workers are incentivised to monitor each other.¹¹¹⁰ Going beyond agency theory, motivation crowding theory suggests that feelings of independence and self-governance can act as intrinsic motivation to work in the interest of the organisation, even where there may be little or no direct financial reward on offer.¹¹¹¹ This is of particular relevance in knowledge-intensive and creative industries where workers may have to work extra hours, without compensation, to complete a project.¹¹¹²

The recent empirical evidence on this offers a nuanced picture of the commercial benefits of labour management and ownership and the conditions needed to achieve it. One study that compared sales per employee between 300 US firms that are majority or fully employee owned, with similarly sized comparator firms that are investor owned, substantiates the idea that growth in employee stake in firms and influence in decision-making lead to improvements in productivity.¹¹¹³ Another study, examining a panel of 7000 French firms, 500 of which were employee owned, reveals that worker cooperatives (SCOPs) in France are as productive, if not more, than KMFs.¹¹¹⁴ The fact that worker cooperatives prioritise job stability means that they are willing to introduce wage flexibility, if it will ensure the survival of the firm.¹¹¹⁵ However, in a longitudinal study of two of the largest employee owned retailers in Europe, the John Lewis Partnership and Eroski, it was found that the former had lower absenteeism and higher job satisfaction rates among worker-members than their capital-managed counterparts, while the latter had higher absenteeism rates and lower job satisfaction rates. The authors of the study attribute this to differences in the quality of management across the two firms; in balancing the need to respond to crises with agility and decisiveness, with the goal of invigorating and implementing a culture of shared ownership.¹¹¹⁶ While workers in

1109 Dow, 'The Theory of the Labor-Managed Firm' (n 1032) 77.

1110 This fundamentally differs from hierarchical monitoring as worker cooperatives preserve the right of individual members to challenge authority and commands. Jaumier (n 1078) 223.

1111 Frey and Jegen (n 1091) 595, 597–598.

1112 Ana Alacovska, 'Informal Creative Labour Practices: A Relational Work Perspective' (2018) 71 *Human Relations* 1563, 1585–1586. Alacovska offers a relational perspective on creative labour practices, emphasising how feelings of friendship and kinship motivate non/under-remunerated work.

1113 Brent Kramer, 'Employee Ownership and Participation Effects on Outcomes in Firms Majority Employee-Owned through Employee Stock Ownership Plans in the US1' (2010) 31 *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 449, 466–467.

1114 In the printing and publishing, paper and wood industries, worker cooperatives have been found to more productive (in terms of output) than KMFs. Fakhfakh, Pérotin and Gago (n 1042) 867.

1115 Gabriel Burdín, 'Are Worker-Managed Firms More Likely to Fail Than Conventional Enterprises? Evidence from Uruguay' (2014) 67 *ILR Review* 202, 226.

1116 Basterretxea and Storey (n 1034) 315–317.

LMFs may be willing to take on more responsibility, a lack of vigilance in monitoring performance and ineffectively communicating business needs – including engaged member participation – may hamper these goals.

It is for these perceived advantages that worker ownership has long received policy level attention at European level. During the 1980s and 1990s, the European Parliament recognised the role of cooperatives in improving working conditions,¹¹¹⁷ regional development through job creation and preservation in local communities¹¹¹⁸ as well as contributing to women's integration into the workplace.¹¹¹⁹ In view of this, the Parliament called for, *inter alia*, investigations into how the formation of worker cooperatives can help rescue distressed businesses¹¹²⁰ and for incentives to be “provided for innovative sectors and that steps should be taken to facilitate access by women to new technologies”.¹¹²¹ In parallel to these developments, the idea of creating a trans-national European cooperative was also promoted, the origin of which dates back to the earliest consultations on establishing a European commercial company in the 1960s.¹¹²² It was noted in policy discussions, and subsequently in the recitals of the European Cooperative Society (SCE) Regulation, that cross-border cooperation between cooperatives was inhibited by legal and administrative barriers – given the lack of harmonisation of national cooperative laws – and that the Community was ‘anxious to ensure equal terms of competition’ for cooperatives with limited liability companies.¹¹²³ Following the enactment of the SCE Regulation, the European Commission issued a far-reaching Communication¹¹²⁴ to promote the visibility and use of cooperatives. More recently, the role that cooperatives may have in providing start-up support, administrative and accounting spaces as well as workspaces for self-employed persons was particularly noted in a 2016 study commissioned by

1117 European Parliament Resolution of 13 April 1983 on cooperatives in the European Community [1983] OJ C128/51.

1118 European Parliament Resolution of 11 February 1994 on the contribution of cooperatives to regional development [1994] OJ C61/231, recital 12; European Parliament Resolution of 9 July 1987 on the contribution of cooperatives to regional development [1987] OJ C246/94, recitals 3–4.

1119 European Parliament Resolution of 18 September 1998 on the role of cooperatives in the growth of women's employment [1998] OJ C313/234; European Parliament Resolution of 26 May 1989 on the role of women in cooperatives and local employment initiatives [1989] OJ C158/380.

1120 European Parliament Resolution of 13 April 1983 on cooperatives in the European Community [1983] OJ C128/51, recital 3.

1121 European Parliament Resolution of 18 September 1998 on the role of cooperatives in the growth of women's employment [1998] OJ C313/234, recital 3.

1122 Chantal Chomel, ‘The Long March of the European Cooperative Society’ (2004) 291 RECMA - Revue Internationale de L'Économie Sociale 1, 2.

1123 Council Regulation (EC) 1435/2003 of 22 July 2003 on the Statute for a European Cooperative Society (SCE) [2003] OJ L207/1.

1124 European Commission Communication on the promotion of co-operative societies in Europe, COM(2004) 18 final.

the European Commission.¹¹²⁵ The European Parliament has also observed the interest in developing cooperative alternatives to collaborative economy companies.¹¹²⁶

Notwithstanding the appeal of worker cooperatives and their positive reception, it still remains difficult for entrepreneurs to establish cooperatives, nationally and especially transnationally, in comparison to KMFs. The next section discusses this further.

7.2.4 The Scarcity of Worker Cooperatives

There has been theoretical and empirical research on the reasons for the scarcity of worker cooperatives and other LMFs for at least 60 years.¹¹²⁷ Over this period, a number of hypotheses have been tested, most notably: whether worker-members tend to underinvest in the firm ('horizon problem'), whether workers are less productive ('shirking' and 'free-riding' problems), whether members seek to replace exiting members with employees so as to maximize individual refunds ('degeneration problem'), whether LMFs fail to retain good managers ('management problem') and whether there are fewer LMFs being born in comparison to KMFs ('birth rate problem').¹¹²⁸ As indicated by the empirical research described in section 7.2.3, it would appear that worker cooperatives are not inherently dysfunctional. They have the capacity to be as productive as KMFs and have high survival rates. In contrast to the shibboleth that worker cooperatives inevitably degenerate into KMFs, researchers have found that time-tested cooperatives undergo periods of cyclical degeneration and regeneration.¹¹²⁹ Even if they require particular attributes and commitment to the LMF, *it is* possible for LMFs to retain good management.¹¹³⁰ In areas where they do have shortcomings – such as lower average wages compared to peers in comparable KMFs¹¹³¹ – it can often be attributed to the fact that worker cooperatives are different by design from their capitalist counterparts. For instance, empirical research in Italy has found that worker

1125 Bock and others (n 1031) 27.

1126 European Parliament Resolution of 15 June 2017 on a European Agenda for the collaborative economy [2017] OJ C331/125, recital 11.

1127 Benjamin Ward, 'The Firm in Illyria: Market Syndicalism' (1958) 48 *The American Economic Review* 566.

1128 Oliver E Williamson, *The Economic Institutions of Capitalism* (China Social Sciences Publishing House 1985) 266.

1129 Chris Cornforth, 'Patterns of Cooperative Management: Beyond the Degeneration Thesis' (1995) 16 *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 487, 494; Yohanan Stryjan, 'Understanding Cooperatives: The Reproduction Perspective' (1994) 65 *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics* 59, 62–65.

1130 Mitu Gulati, TM Thomas Isaac and William Klein, 'When a Workers' Cooperative Works: The Case of Kerala Dinesh Beedi' (2002) 49 *UCLA Law Review* 1417, 1443, 1450.

1131 For evidence from Italy, the country with the greatest incidence of LMFs among market economies, see Pencavel, Pistaferri and Schivardi (n 1083) 23.

cooperatives have (marginally) lower and more volatile wages compared to peers in comparable KMFs. This is complemented with having more stable employment.¹¹³² It would therefore seem that worker cooperatives prioritise stability and retention of members over wage certainty.

Instead, at present, it would appear that the two major reasons for the scarcity of worker cooperatives are a very low birth-rate¹¹³³ and, if and when created, coordination problems as the entity scales.

The low-birth rate has three major factors: a lack of information about the worker cooperative option, the lack of a conducive legal environment and scarcity of financing options.¹¹³⁴ An example can illustrate how visibility continues to be a pertinent problem for potential co-operators. A recent study commissioned by the European Commission acknowledges the importance of digital tools in supporting the platform-mediated labour market and noted instances of good practices that include platform cooperatives,¹¹³⁵ yet the recent Directive regarding the use of digital tools and processes in company law falls short in making the cooperative form a visible and viable alternative for entrepreneurs. For instance, Member States are only required to provide online formation procedures and online templates of company constitution instruments for company forms mentioned in Annex IIA, such as the UK Private Company Limited by Shares or Guarantee.¹¹³⁶ The provision of templates for other limited liability company forms, such as a cooperative, remain optional.¹¹³⁷ This appears to be the result of path dependence – as entrepreneurs have shown a preference for the company forms specified in Annex IIA¹¹³⁸ – yet this may make such entities a default choice, especially for start-ups. In short, cooperatives and companies will no longer be in equal competition, as set out in the aforementioned recitals of the SCE Regulation.

1132 Pencavel, Pistaferri and Schivardi (n 1083).

1133 Dow, 'The Theory of the Labor-Managed Firm' (n 1032) 78.

1134 Ben-ner (n 1094) 289–290. This is particularly true when worker cooperatives are formed 'defensively' – as a last resort by workers to prevent business closure and maintain jobs. Timothy Kerswell and Surendra Pratap, *Worker Cooperatives in India* (Palgrave Macmillan 2019) 80. This makes the durability of Argentina's *empresas recuperadas* (worker-recuperated enterprises) all the more remarkable.

1135 Bock and others (n 1031).

1136 Directive (EU) 2017/1132 of 14 June 2017 relating to certain aspects of company law (codification) [2017] OJ L169/46, arts. 13(g)(1), 13(h)(1) [as consolidated on 1 January 2020]. The amending Directive was Directive (EU) 2019/1151 of 20 June 2019 amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132 as regards the use of digital tools and processes in company law [2019] OJ L186/80.

1137 Directive (EU) 2017/1132, art. 13g(1)(2nd para).

1138 This is also apparent from the platform cooperatives that have been registered in the past five years, as shown in Appendix No. 2. For instance, several of the platform cooperatives in the United Kingdom have registered as Private Companies Limited by Guarantee, although there is the option of registering as a Co-operative Society under the *Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies Act, 2014* (c. 14). The difference in formation costs between the two are not significant. I think Mark Simmonds for this point.

This lack of familiarity with the worker cooperative form also makes it difficult to finance their formation. In the absence of sufficient collateral, the workers' own savings or loans from friends and family, worker cooperatives traditionally have difficulty in obtaining debt financing. As a consequence of legal regulation and/or ideological principle, worker cooperatives can only accept limited non-member equity investment.¹¹³⁹ In any case, conventional financiers, such as private equity funds, are dissuaded from investing in worker cooperatives as they are not profit-oriented and the requirement to be majority member-controlled inhibits the grant of substantial equity positions to external investors. Instead, they often have to rely on a single, large private customer,¹¹⁴⁰ a sympathetic public authority,¹¹⁴¹ and/or community contributions, through mechanisms such as crowd-funding.¹¹⁴² (Admittedly, the quality and value of LMF membership is hard to estimate even for the most ideologically-committed capital contributor.¹¹⁴³) This financing challenge is also seen as one of the major deterrents to the formation of SCEs,¹¹⁴⁴ as a minimum capital of EUR 30,000 is required,¹¹⁴⁵ which is beyond the scope of many small businesses that may wish to operate across borders.¹¹⁴⁶

Turning to the coordination issues that occur upon the formation of worker cooperatives, collective action theory suggests that the heterogeneous preferences of equal worker-members make it difficult to arrive at decisions expeditiously.¹¹⁴⁷ Competing with capitalist firms means that there are time-constraints on decision-making and worker-members may not respond to the market rapidly enough.¹¹⁴⁸ This is borne out by the studies on the larger worker cooperatives, such as Eroski, discussed in section 7.2.3.¹¹⁴⁹ In view of this, worker-members have to work longer hours, under more stress, with serious consequences for their own health.

1139 Kazuhiko Mikami, 'Cooperatives, Transferable Shares, and a Unified Business Law' (2016) 87 *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics* 365, 374.

1140 Jaumier (n 1078) 219.

1141 Mulder (n 1080) 83–86.

1142 RP Burrasca and others, 'An Introduction to Financing for Cooperatives, Social Enterprises, and Small Businesses' (The Community Wealth Building Network of Metro Denver 2015) 12–14.

1143 Dow, 'The Theory of the Labor-Managed Firm' (n 1032) 79.

1144 Only 41 are in operation as of 2018. Libertas – Europäisches Institut GmbH, 'List Of European Cooperatives As Of 25 August 2018' (25 August 2018) <<https://bit.ly/3ji9kjh>>. This does not include The Mobility Factory SCE or pc polypoly coop SCE that were registered after this list was compiled.

1145 SCE R, art. 3(2).

1146 Antonio Fici, 'The European Cooperative Society Regulation' in Dante Cracogna, Antonio Fici and Hagen Henry (eds), *International Handbook of Cooperative Law* (Springer 2013) 120, 145, 149. However, see chapter 7 on this minimum capital requirement not being a deterrent for TMF. This may be because the formation of this secondary cooperative brought together primary cooperatives that had already been operational for a few years.

1147 Hansmann (n 1053) 1779–1782.

1148 Atzeni and Vieta (n 1093) 53.

1149 Basterretxea and Storey (n 1034).

This coordination problem is accentuated as cooperatives scale or internationalise. With advances in modern technology, such as those discussed in section 7.3 below, it is possible for workers to cooperate across borders even if their enterprise is small in scale. In certain sectors, like the creative and tech industry, it is difficult to avoid as the workplace is globalised.¹¹⁵⁰ However, coordinating such business practices in a distributed manner, without the use of a third-party platform intermediary, involves high transaction costs. The evidence from the few worker cooperatives that have grown in scale¹¹⁵¹ and internationalised¹¹⁵² their operations indicate a negative trend in participatory management, mutual monitoring and solidarity. It has been seen that contrasting cooperative cultures and restrictive legislation on worker organising in the host state inhibit the replication of cooperative practices.¹¹⁵³

Having canvassed the appeal and drawbacks of worker cooperatives, the remainder of the chapter explores how the organisational innovations developed by DAO platforms would potentially address some of these start-up and coordination problems. This analysis is predicated on the understanding of blockchain as an institutional technology which can coordinate economic activity in novel ways.¹¹⁵⁴ To do so, the next section sketches how smart contracts and DAOs work, before presenting a particular DAO platform and the governance structure it has designed for DAOs created through its platform.

7.3 UNDERSTANDING THE TECHNOLOGY: SMART CONTRACTS AND DAOs

Developers of DAOs and DAO platforms¹¹⁵⁵ draw inspiration from transaction cost economics and the nexus of contracts theory of corporations, where the corporation is viewed as a ‘complex set of contracts among managers,

1150 Vili Lehdonvirta and others, ‘The Global Platform Economy: A New Offshoring Institution Enabling Emerging-Economy Microproviders’ (2019) 45 *Journal of Management* 567.

1151 Tom Webb and George Cheney, ‘Worker-Owned-and-Governed Co-Operatives and the Wider Co-Operative Movement’ in Martin Parker and others (eds), *The Routledge companion to alternative organization* (Routledge 2014) 64; Ben-ner (n 1094) 297.

1152 Anjel Errasti, Ignacio Bretos and Enekoitz Etxezarreta, ‘What Do Mondragon Coopitalist Multinationals Look Like? The Rise and Fall of Fagor Electrodomésticos S. Coop. and Its European Subsidiaries’ (2016) 87 *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics* 433.

1153 Bretos, Errasti and Marcuello (n 1052) 85.

1154 Davidson, Filippi and Potts (n 1055) 641.

1155 Hence, why projects like Colony cite Coase’s seminal article on the Nature of the Firm on the first page of their White Paper. Alex Rea, Aron Fischer and Jack du Rose, ‘COLONY: Technical White Paper’ (Colony, 27 July 2018) 1 <<https://bit.ly/2SWTgZh>>. This has now been superseded, although the reference to Coase remains. Alex Rea and others, ‘COLONY: Technical White Paper’ (Colony, 2 October 2020) 3 <<https://bit.ly/3xXI4L1>>. While there are differences between these white papers, the launch of Colony v.2 in December 2020 was intended to issues with their software application while still being the “Colony as advertised” in the earlier whitepaper. Jack du Rose, ‘(Re)Introducing Colony’ (*Colony Blog*, 10 December 2020) <<https://bit.ly/3qILk08>>. Where there are significant differences between these two white papers, I will note them.

workers, and contributors of capital' that mediate relationships in a hierarchical structure to internalise and diminish transaction costs.¹¹⁵⁶ This is reflected in their belief that decentralised (autonomous) organisations can emerge from a complex set of 'smart contracts'. Smart contracts are software deployed on a blockchain (most famously, Ethereum) which, for a small transaction fee ('gas'), is capable of receiving and storing cryptocurrency (e.g., 'Ether') and tokenized representations of assets. They also contain conditions subject to which an exchange of assets and transactions will take place (e.g., passage of time, a certain event). As such, a smart contract can act as an escrow account, as well as automate certain functions of ordinary contracts. A simple example of a smart contract involves a transfer of cryptocurrency for an asset. Once the payment is made to the smart contract, for the contract to be executed, the nodes of the blockchain will verify that the transferees' wallets respectively hold the claimed sum of cryptocurrency and the asset. If validated, the smart contract will receive a message to automatically self-execute, and the exchange will take place. The blockchain will then be updated to reflect the transfer of asset ownership as well as the change in cryptocurrency amounts in the participants' wallets.¹¹⁵⁷ As a result, third parties – whether they be title registries or courts – are not required to enforce the transaction. Unless the smart contract has a dispute resolution 'safety valve' built in, the parties will not be able to stop the performance of the contract.¹¹⁵⁸ Moreover, smart contracts do not need to be triggered ('called') by human parties to a contract but can also respond to inputs from off-chain third parties (oracles) that a certain event has occurred.

Following the creation of smart contracts, the idea soon arose of an algorithmically governed organisation which responds automatically to inputs from both digital and analogue sources.¹¹⁵⁹ The organisation would be composed of a collection of smart contracts which would have internal capital, discourage collusion among members, focus on automating transactions and, ultimately, have a peripheral role for human involvement. This idea was operationalised through the creation of The Decentralized Autonomous Organization (TheDAO), for the purpose of decentralised crowdfunding. TheDAO would allow participants to manage invested

1156 Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, 'Limited Liability and the Corporation' (1985) 52 *University of Chicago Law Review* 89, 89; Williamson (n 1128) 402.

1157 Ethereum, 'What Is Ethereum?' (*Ethereum Homestead Documentation*, 8 July 2018) <<https://bit.ly/3zPADqQ>>; Blockchain Hub, 'What Is a Smart Contract?' (*Blockchain Hub*, 2018) <<https://bit.ly/3gTseKs>>.

1158 De Filippi and Wright (n 589) 75.

1159 Quinn DuPont, 'Experiments in Algorithmic Governance: A History and Ethnography of "The DAO", a Failed Decentralized Autonomous Organization' in Malcolm Campbell-Verduyn (ed), *Bitcoin and Beyond: Cryptocurrencies, Blockchains, and Global Governance* (1st edn, Routledge 2018) 159.

funds directly and for governance rules to automatically self-execute, once certain conditions were met.¹¹⁶⁰

TheDAO set a minimum fundraising goal to be achieved within a defined period, failure to achieve which would have resulted in the funds being returned. During this 'Creation Phase', units of Ether could be sent to TheDAO's smart contract address, in exchange for which TheDAO would create and transfer 'DAO tokens'. These tokens conferred voting rights on their holders, in proportion to the number of tokens held. They would be freely transferable and divisible.¹¹⁶¹ As an entity, creating, storing and transferring tokens was the limit of what TheDAO could achieve autonomously.¹¹⁶² For creating and voting on funding proposals, it required human Contractors. The off-chain projects that would result from successful funding proposals would be directly governed by token-holders, in proportion to the tokens they held, and returns would be distributed pro rata. These tokens could also be sold for fiat currencies through exchanges.

The creation of TheDAO was met with a great deal of enthusiasm and during its initial creation phase, it raised US\$ 150 million worth of Ether.¹¹⁶³ It was intended that The DAO would be an archetype for future decentralised organisations and in a sense, it was successful. The successful crowdfunding of TheDAO – and the subsequent siphoning of over US\$ 50 million of Ether and investigation by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) – has served as a cautionary tale for everyone involved in the blockchain ecosystem. While its name is a misnomer, as key decision-making powers resided in certain humans, it continues to be the prime example of a decentralised organisation. The ambition of creating DAOs persist,¹¹⁶⁴ but tempered with the knowledge that they are exposed to governance risks endogenous to decentralised systems operating under the logic of smart contracts and are subject to an array of off-chain risk and regulation.

1160 Christoph Jentzsch, 'Decentralized Autonomous Organization to Automate Governance (Final Draft - Under Review)' (Slock.it, 2016) 3 <<https://bit.ly/3xJEmV8>>.

1161 Securities and Exchange Commission, 'Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO' (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 25 July 2017) 6 <<https://bit.ly/3zNYk2I>>.

1162 Jentzsch (n 1160) 2.

1163 Securities and Exchange Commission (n 1161) 16.

1164 See Colony, Aragon, MakerDAO, dOrg, among many others.

7.4 CASE STUDY OF COLONY

7.4.1 What Colony does

Colony is a platform that provides the infrastructure for creating an ecosystem of self-organising companies (i.e., ‘colonies’),¹¹⁶⁵ by lowering the costs of a diverse group of people coordinating their efforts and resources to realise shared goals, even when they do not necessarily know or trust each other. The ambition of Colony is that this coordination will occur in the organisation created through its platform in a meritocratic manner through the dynamic allocation of reputation.

Reputation is a number that is associated with a person, reflecting the value of their recent contributions to a colony. It may be earned by bootstrapping colonies, successfully completing tasks and constructively resolving disputes.¹¹⁶⁶ This figure affects the extent of a person’s control rights in the organisation as well as their share of rewards. Significantly, unlike currencies or securities, reputation cannot be transferred and is non-negotiable in crypto-capital markets.¹¹⁶⁷

Colony is still at an early stage of development and much of what is described below is based on its white paper, setting out the features the development team expects the layers of Colony to have. The development team have been building the Colony Network and Colony JS, a software library that enables independent developers to develop applications (dApps) that can interact with the underlying smart contracts. These colonies may be established to create software but also for tangible goods, such as jewellery. As one of the founders of Colony, Jack du Rose, began developing the platform as a way of solving problems he encountered while coordinating persons in a global, high-end jewellery supply chain,¹¹⁶⁸ the illustrative examples in the following sub-section draws from the jewellery industry.

7.4.2 The Governance of Colony

To understand the governance of the Colony platform, it is necessary to consider the Colony Network, the Meta Colony and individual colony layers separately.

1165 The name was inspired by the archetypical ant colony, a complex adaptive system that may be found in nature. Gideon Rosenblatt, ‘Is Colony a Glimpse of the Blockchain-Based Future of Work?’ (*The Vital Edge*, 13 December 2017) <<https://bit.ly/3wPyPfn>>.

1166 Rea, Fischer and du Rose (n 1155) 15; Rea and others (n 1155) 14. In the Meta Colony, reputation can also be earned through reputation mining.

1167 Rea, Fischer and du Rose (n 1155) 14; Rea and others (n 1155) 13.

1168 The Blockchain Review, *How Blockchain Technology Is Enabling The Future of Work* (2018) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o_erLhcDqMU> accessed 23 June 2021.

The Colony protocol¹¹⁶⁹ is built on the Colony Network, a collection of smart contracts deployed on the Ethereum blockchain by the Colony development team. These contracts provide the broad parameters in which colonies may be created, such as the fees charged to use the Network, upgrades of its functionality and the reputation mining mechanism.¹¹⁷⁰ Management of the Colony Network will be gradually ceded to a Metacolony, the first, parent colony to be created on the Network.¹¹⁷¹ When this has occurred, tokens in the Meta Colony (CLNY) will have been distributed and reputation can be earned in the Meta Colony through the completion of tasks, such as making updates to individual colony smart contracts. CLNY and reputation holders get to vote on the fundamental parameters of the Network (control rights) and receive a portion of the fee charged by the Network when individuals are paid.¹¹⁷² Moreover, CLNY holders act as reputation miners, calculating reputation scores off-chain and updating reputation scores on-chain, for which new CLNY tokens and reputation are conferred as rewards.¹¹⁷³ The functionality of CLNY tokens will be set initially by the Colony development team and the Ethereum community but eventually by the Meta Colony.

Individual colonies may be created to achieve a single goal or multiple goals, over a short or long timeframe. They are entities with discrete purposes but act within the broad parameters set by the Colony Network. Regardless the goal, they will substantially share the membership and governance rules described below due to the underlying smart contract code. As these rules are embodied in code, when they are being used they are much harder to skirt than institutional and social rules in a worker coop-

1169 In general, protocols are a set of rules and steps that facilitate effective communication between computers. A brief history of protocols is discussed in Chapter 7. As with the internet, the Colony protocol is one of several layers of protocols arranged in a stack through which information travels from one computer to another. The Colony protocol is in between the Ethereum decentralised data processing layer and the layer of applications that are deployed using Colony. In short, the Colony protocol provides the rules for the division of labour, decision making and financial management of decentralised organisations.

1170 Rea, Fischer and du Rose (n 1155) 5; Rea and others (n 1155) 35. Individual colonies can opt in to the upgrades.

1171 Rea, Fischer and du Rose (n 1155) 7–8; Rea and others (n 1155) 37.

1172 Rea, Fischer and du Rose (n 1155) 7, 46–47; Rea and others (n 1155) 35–36. If the Network fee is paid in CLNY tokens, it is burned. If it paid in white-listed external crypto-currencies such as Ether and DAI, it will be distributed to a reward pot and a working capital pot. If the Network fee is paid in a native colony token that is illiquid, monthly Dutch auctions will be held in which the native token can be acquired in exchange for CLNY tokens. These CLNY tokens are then burned (destroyed). I thank Jack du Rose for this information.

1173 Rea, Fischer and du Rose (n 1155) 7, 19, 22; Rea and others (n 1155) 36, 38. Calculating reputation scores off-chain saves costs incurred by Ethereum blockchain transactions.

erative, where they may be under-enforced.¹¹⁷⁴ When a colony is created, it will generate its own native token that may have financial or symbolic value.¹¹⁷⁵ To achieve its goal(s), the work needed can be broken down into tasks and (sub) domains (e.g. assembly), in which tasks can be clustered. This is analogous to departments in an organisation. Domains can also be nested within wider domains, with the widest domain being the colony itself. Along with allocating a task to a domain, tasks will be tagged with relevant skills needed for its completion (e.g., #casting, #soldering). This may be a specific skill within a broader skill set (e.g., #design). Thus, there is an organisational tree and a skills tree, with participants able to earn and lose reputation in both.

To create and define a task, a person with sufficient reputation must deposit ('stake') colony tokens proportionate to the amount of reputation in the domain.¹¹⁷⁶ Reputation and colony tokens may be initially assigned as control rights and working capital at the time a colony is created to allow certain persons to set up tasks.¹¹⁷⁷ Otherwise, usually, a task initiator will submit a funding proposal from the pot (wallet) of a parent domain.¹¹⁷⁸ The proposal will specify the amount of funds needed and can be denominated in the colony's own currency or in Ether. If there is only one funding proposal for a task, there are sufficient funds in the pot and there are no objections, the smart contract will begin to release funds to the pot of the task. This materialises Colony's emphasis on completing work efficiently rather than voting on every decision. Once the funds needed for payment are in place (the bounty), the manager will have to enter into a tentative agreement with a worker that has the necessary skill set and reputation.

1174 Reyes analogises these parameters with choosing a corporate statute: "The default rules in the realm of DBEs [decentralised business entities] are not defined by state corporation statutes, but rather by the rules of the underlying DLT [distributed ledger technology] protocol. Like a choice between corporate statutes, DBE creators choose the basic rules of their venture by selecting a DLT protocol from the menu of choices available" [citations omitted]. Carla L Reyes, 'If Rockefeller Were a Coder' (2019) 87 *The George Washington Law Review* 373, 405.

1175 Rea, Fischer and du Rose (n 1155) 12; Rea and others (n 1155) 10, 32. While tokenholders were given a vote on changing the supply of native tokens in a colony in the 2018 white paper, the 2020 white paper makes this right optional. In other words, root users (i.e., users whose accounts have been given higher-level administrative functions in the colony) can mint tokens unilaterally and at-will if they set up a colony in this way. Previously, tokenholders were also entitled to vote on arbitrary transactions, i.e., actions that are unforeseen by the colony and the Metacolony. However, the 2020 white paper clarifies that such transactions will require root user authorization. Rea, Fischer and du Rose (n 1155) 49; Rea and others (n 1155) 20.

1176 Rea, Fischer and du Rose (n 1155) 9; Rea and others (n 1155) 21. While the 2018 white paper made the staking of reputation obligatory, the 2020 white paper only requires the 'manager' role-holder is only required to have authorization permission and staking is optional.

1177 Rea, Fischer and du Rose (n 1155) 17; Rea and others (n 1155) 15.

1178 Rea, Fischer and du Rose (n 1155) 32–33; Rea and others (n 1155) 23.

When joining the Colony platform, workers would have tagged their skill-sets and managers can use this to search for one who is most appropriate for a task. After an agreement is reached, a task may be specified to them along with working guidelines, a due date and payment terms (for the worker, evaluator and manager).¹¹⁷⁹ While the manager may also act in the capacity of evaluator, this role can be delegated to a separate person as well. The evaluator may be unknown to the worker, as they may only be identifiable by their public key.

Following the completion and evaluation of task, there will be 3 days to raise objections (now called motions) and disputes regarding the quality of the task performed. When there are no objections, the worker gets paid in the colony's native token or another approved crypto currency.¹¹⁸⁰ If paid in native tokens, the workers' reputation in their domain increases, as well as all the wider domains of which it is part, including the colony itself (i.e., the top-level domain). Simultaneously, their reputation for performing the tagged skill increases, as well as any wider, parent skills of which the skill is a part.¹¹⁸¹ The sum of their top-level domain and top-level skills reputations determines their influence on decisions that affect the individual colony.¹¹⁸² To avoid disproportionate gains in reputation following the completion of a task, the bounty initially set could be tied to hours worked, rather than the rates charged by the worker.¹¹⁸³

If there is an objection (motion), an objector must be able to defend his/her objection. Its content should not only specify why a task is inadequate and what could be done better, but also suggestions as to the 'reputations' (i.e., Colony members with a certain level of reputation) that should vote if a dispute arises and reasoning for why these reputations should vote. This allows objections to be scaled to a larger group of peers, whether at a domain, colony or Metacolony level. This objection can only be made if an objector has a certain reputation score and stakes some of their own tokens.¹¹⁸⁴ If no one makes a counter-stake to object to the objection, then the objection will pass, and the worker will receive less/no pay. If someone does sufficiently counter-stake within 3 days, then a dispute will arise. The staking of tokens is needed, not only to avoid frivolous objections, but also to compensate the persons involved in settling a dispute through voting.

1179 Rea, Fischer and du Rose (n 1155) 9; Rea and others (n 1155) 21–22.

1180 Rea, Fischer and du Rose (n 1155) 10; Rea and others (n 1155) 22, 28.

1181 Rea, Fischer and du Rose (n 1155) 16; Rea and others (n 1155) 22. The manager's token-holding and domain reputation rises or falls in the same manner, but their skill rating is not affected.

1182 Rea, Fischer and du Rose (n 1155) 14–15; Rea and others (n 1155) 13–14.

1183 Rea, Fischer and du Rose (n 1155) 13; Rea and others (n 1155) 10.

1184 Rea, Fischer and du Rose (n 1155) 39, Annex A; Rea and others (n 1155) 28, Annex A.1.

The weight of their votes is contingent on a person's reputation in the skill and domain in dispute.¹¹⁸⁵ Being on the winning or losing side of a dispute has the corresponding effect of enhancing or diminishing reputation scores. The payment and reputational scores allotted to the worker or evaluator depends on the final score received after disputes are resolved. If the work is found to be inadequate, the worker will receive diminished payment and lose reputation in their domain and their tagged skill, as well as parent and child domains and parent and child skills.

In addition to payment for completed tasks to workers, managers and evaluators, persons in the colony holding native colony tokens and reputation are entitled to rewards from the revenue earned by the colony.¹¹⁸⁶ This means that a worker in a colony, waiting for the next task to be assigned to them, can continue to earn (for a while) from the revenue they had helped generate.

7.4.3 Worker Cooperatives: Learning from the Colony Project

A close reading of the governance structure of colony, reveals a startling resemblance to LMFs, such as worker cooperatives. Firstly, the economic activities are carried out primarily for the benefits of its participants. Secondly, most, if not all, the capital of the organization is held by the participants. This is indicated by the fact that tokens and reputation are issued exclusively to the participants of a new colony,¹¹⁸⁷ before gaining potential investors, and as such can only be gained through various forms of work: production, evaluation and management. This is akin to the common practice in the start-up technology sector of granting employees stock options,¹¹⁸⁸ but in this instance it is coupled with the right to have a voice in significant strategic decisions.

Thirdly, as currently designed, colonies have voluntary, open membership by default. Restricted membership is not mentioned in any of the Colony White Papers. This is characteristic of initiatives in open source communities, where objective peer-review is critical and where, instead,

1185 Rea, Fischer and du Rose (n 1155) 42; Rea and others (n 1155) 31.

1186 Rea, Fischer and du Rose (n 1155) 44; Rea and others (n 1155) 11.

1187 Rea, Fischer and du Rose (n 1155) 13; Rea and others (n 1155) 10.

1188 Index Ventures, *Rewarding Talent, a Guide to Stock Options for European Entrepreneurs* (Index Ventures 2017) 12.

there are concerns about keeping participants motivated and committed.¹¹⁸⁹ However, the key difference with open source communities is that colonies may not be limited to the private provision of public goods,¹¹⁹⁰ for which values such as the long-term striving for excellence may come into play.¹¹⁹¹ Colonies may be used for the production of private goods as well.

Fourthly, Colony has what can be broadly described as dynamic meritocratic governance, where the weight of one's vote is dynamically adjusted according to one's contributions to a task, domain or colony. In itself, this is not contrary to cooperative principles as there are cooperatives which weigh voting power according to e.g., production.¹¹⁹² Participants still have a voice in the governance and strategic decision-making of the colony, as exemplified by the fact that anyone can set up a task for the colony to complete.

Fifthly, it is clear from the White Paper that the assets of a colony are conceptually distinct from that of the participants, as they are escrowed in a smart contract and associated pots. Access to these pots is conditional on a successful funding proposal. Funds for rewards and (replenishing) working capital are kept separate.¹¹⁹³ Notionally, colony smart contracts can subsist indefinitely with tokens in escrow, even after it has been abandoned, indicating that it is technologically possible for the colony to have its own capital. Moreover, the payment of Network fees, which is reinvested to maintain the Network and to do useful supportive work (e.g., build applications) is also reminiscent of the cooperative practice of building financial reserves and investing in useful services (e.g., training) to sustain the mission of the business.

While taking these similarities into account, there are certain functionalities in Colony which can potentially overcome the start-up and coordination costs that worker cooperatives often face, especially when operating across borders.

Decentralised organisations prefigure ready-made governance structures that are easily accessible online and are native to globally distributed blockchains. While the governance mechanism is technically complex, as with other digital applications, once launched its use will be intuitive and user-friendly. As such, these organisations can provide capital and governance structures for digitally-native worker cooperatives to adopt.

1189 Georg von Krogh and others, 'Carrots and Rainbows: Motivation and Social Practice in Open Source Software Development' (2012) 36 MIS Quarterly 649, 664.

1190 Maria Alessandra Rossi, 'Decoding the Free/Open Source Software Puzzle: A Survey of Theoretical and Empirical Contributions' in Jürgen Bitzer and Philipp JH Schröder (eds), *The Economics of Open Source Software Development* (Elsevier 2006) 33. Rossi characterises open source software as public goods, but the openness of course depends on the particular type of license.

1191 von Krogh and others (n 1189) 661ff.

1192 PECOL, section 2.4(8)(a).

1193 Rea, Fischer and du Rose (n 1155) 44; Rea and others (n 1155) 11–12.

In terms of financing, worker cooperatives can consider implementing a system in which financial rewards and decision-making power are generated through useful patronage, represented as separate quantified units, but with only the financial rewards being exchangeable – as they are with native tokens and reputation on the Colony platform.¹¹⁹⁴ If the token gains use-value, then it can be sold or swapped for other, more widely-used cryptocurrencies, which can tide over those who only have intermittent work. The relative transferability of a token compared to a partnership interest, a standard cooperative membership, or an employee share held in a trust, allows workers to diversify their risks, in the event their cooperative fails. At the same time, this allows for a certain amount of external investment to flow into the business. As (most) decision-making rights are not attached to native tokens independent of reputation, it may be acquired and held by third parties without diluting the decision-making rights of worker-members, as is the predominant concern with non-member investment.¹¹⁹⁵ At the same time, this poses a dilemma for such cooperatives as it severely limits the available pool of investors, given that previous experience with non-voting investments in worker cooperatives (e.g., France's *titre participatif*) has been met with a lukewarm response.¹¹⁹⁶

In terms of collective action problems, a frequent criticism of worker cooperatives is time spent on meetings to reconcile heterogeneous interests,¹¹⁹⁷ and as such taking actions on the basis of tacit consent, rather than majority voting or unanimity, may in fact be preferable. Similarly, the requiring of staking of reputation and tokens in raising an objection, can help avoid trivial disagreements about the quality of work. Turning to the aforementioned cross-border coordination issues, the fact that workers are drawn from different backgrounds prevents them from having a shared, homogeneous background in terms of politics, work and culture, features

1194 Financial reward here refers to both a cryptocurrency for work done and a token from the revenue of the colony. Reputation, like labour, is inalienable from the worker-member. The development of online reputation systems allow skills, organisational contributions and organisational value to be represented more tangibly, homogenously and dynamically than capital shares and labour membership. On the limitations of a LMF membership market due to the inalienability of labour, see Gregory K Dow, *The Labor-Managed Firm: Theoretical Foundations* (Cambridge University Press 2018) 8.

1195 It is also less clear-cut that a crypto-token issued by a worker cooperative, with the properties described herein, will constitute a security as compared to tradable shares in a worker cooperative, which generally will. Mikami (n 1139) 501; Zamagni and Zamagni (n 1044) 87–88.

1196 I am grateful to Philippe Honigman for this point. Law n°83-1 of 3 January 1983 [France] introduced this long-term investment instrument into French law and cooperatives were eventually permitted to issue them.

1197 Gerald F Davis, 'Can an Economy Survive Without Corporations? Technology and Robust Organizational Alternatives' (2016) 30 *Academy of Management Perspectives* 129, 137.

which are usually associated with worker cooperatives.¹¹⁹⁸ Instead, reputation-weighted governance may be needed for organisations seeking to coordinate heterogeneous, pseudonymous group of actors that operate across a wide geographical territory with limited trust, state policing, and easily-enforceable regulation.¹¹⁹⁹ While blockchain communities have only emerged in recent years,¹²⁰⁰ history is replete with examples of such organisations. Examples range from the Amsterdam Stock Exchange in the seventeenth century¹²⁰¹ to modern Moroccan bazaars.¹²⁰² Contemporaneous examples include Usenet newsgroups, massive multiplayer online gaming and open-source software developer communities. A common theme appears to be finding counterparties with desirable qualities (e.g., a certain set of skills and experience), while at the same time coordinating these individuals to ensure contractual performance and the pursuance of the collective interest.

This does not necessary require external enforcement, through judges or regulators, but can be achieved through the threat of diminished reputation. The risk of losing reputation is sufficient motivation for performance by a party, especially when it is in their interest to have continuous transactions with a counter-party,¹²⁰³ on a regular¹²⁰⁴ or irregular basis.¹²⁰⁵ As such, the fear of lost reputation will “crowd in” honesty in the long run.¹²⁰⁶ This is true of online communities and project-based work, particularly in creative industries.¹²⁰⁷ This, however, assumes that parties have sufficient information and knowledge of each other’s reputations. Online reputations systems are able to address these information asymmetries somewhat, as

1198 Zelda F Gamson and Henry M Levin, ‘Obstacles to the Survival of Democratic Workplaces’ in Robert Jackall and Henry M Levin (eds), *Worker Cooperatives in America* (University of California Press 1984) 225.

1199 This article outlines some of the problems posed by cooperation in large groups with anonymous interactions. Iris Bohnet, Bruno S Frey and Steffen Huck, ‘More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding’ (2001) 95 *The American Political Science Review* 131, 131.

1200 DuPont (n 1159) 175.

1201 Edward Stringham, ‘The Extralegal Development of Securities Trading in Seventeenth-Century Amsterdam’ (2003) 43 *The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance* 321, 324.

1202 Clifford Geertz, ‘The Bazaar Economy: Information and Search in Peasant Marketing’ (1978) 68 *The American Economic Review* 28, 29.

1203 Stringham (n 1201) 323–324, 336.

1204 Robert C Ellickson, *Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes* (Harvard University Press 1991) 55–58, 214; David W Brown, *When Strangers Cooperate: Using Social Conventions to Govern Ourselves* (Free Press 1995) 18.

1205 Paul R Milgrom, Douglass C North and Barry R Weingast, ‘The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs’ (1990) 2 *Economics & Politics* 1, 7–8.

1206 Bohnet, Frey and Huck (n 1199) 132, 138.

1207 Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole, ‘Some Simple Economics of Open Source’ (2002) 50 *The Journal of Industrial Economics* 197, 218; Philip Schörfp and others, ‘Triangular Love–Hate: Management and Control in Creative Crowdfunding’ (2017) 32 *New Technology, Work and Employment* 43, 46.

user reviews and ratings provides granular information about a potential counterparty in a digestible form. Yet, peer-to-peer systems are vulnerable to manipulation by platforms that host them and biased reviewers, raising concerns about the system's own trustworthiness.¹²⁰⁸

However, the manner of its deployment in the Colony protocol makes the system less prone to cronyism. Managers of tasks are incentivised to intuitively and objectively choose workers based on a quantification of their demonstrated skills and recent contributions, rather than personal characteristics, as they stake their own tokens when initiating a task. This score is not generated through ratings by (potentially) anonymous individuals with little to lose. Instead, evaluators stand to receive diminished payment and a reduced reputation score for inadequate evaluations, while contesting a task or decision through the dispute resolution mechanism requires risking tokens and reputation. A teething concern about the democratisation of reputation systems is that it will ultimately not be sustained, with its growing complexity leading to the emergence of oligarchy. One empirical study has already observed this trend with regard to peer-production projects, leading to structural changes in authority and a re-orientation of organisational goals.¹²⁰⁹ A key distinguishing feature of Colony's reputation system, however, is its degradability, which prevents early movers from resting on their laurels and incentivises the continuous, useful engagement of all members in the governance of colonies. To embed such a system in a worker cooperative, a link to a user-friendly portal that provides up-to-date individual reputation scores and accrued financial rewards may be provided in the section of the by-laws concerning membership. Collectives such as dOrg have implemented a similar (though not identical) transparent reputation and reward system and future research can investigate whether this improves the governance of such organizations or contributes to new conflicts.

7.5 CONCLUSION

Colony is one of a handful of blockchain projects currently exploring how to design organisations that work in the interest of its multi-stakeholder constituents.¹²¹⁰ These decentralised organisations reconfigure ownership within firms, enabling greater rights to the residual profits of the firm and control rights. In doing so, they bear a remarkable resemblance in the crypto-space to the early pioneers of worker cooperatives.

1208 Sofia Ranchordás, 'Online Reputation and the Regulation of Information Asymmetries in the Platform Economy' (2018) 5 Critical Analysis of Law 127, 134–138.

1209 Shaw and Hill (n 507) 219, 229.

1210 DAOstack, 'Home Page' (DAOstack, 2021) <<https://bit.ly/3qi8wMy>>; Aragon, 'Home Page: Govern Better, Together' (2021) <<https://bit.ly/2TXpaVw>>; Bitcoin, 'About: Govern Bitcoin with GTC' (Quadratic Lands, 2021) <<https://bit.ly/35MwGFG>>.

Undoubtedly, such projects entail risks and pro-active co-operators should be wary of them when experimenting with blockchain technology. The regulatory status of crypto-tokens are still in flux¹²¹¹ and sudden classification as a security can have deeply unpleasant, costly securities liability consequences for members.¹²¹² This chapter has concentrated on the capital and governance structures of cooperatives, but it is still unclear which legal structure would be suitable for the goals of decentralised organisations while still providing the benefits of limited liability.¹²¹³ Moreover, for the promoters of such businesses, as well as interested participants, it is necessary to challenge and grapple with the complexity of these governance structures in which corporate governance-by-design is sought, as it potentially embeds power structures in new and unexpected ways. Decades of research on cooperative degeneration and regeneration highlight the importance of being alive to the possibility of oligarchy emerging.

On a more optimistic note, blockchain projects such as Colony provide considerable insight into the technological and theoretical possibilities (and limitations) of decentralised governance. The proposed capital and governance structure of colonies may hold lessons for LMFs, such as worker cooperatives, in the process of being formed and those confronted with cross-border coordination problems as they expand overseas. These decentralised governance structures allow us to imagine self-employed persons or small businesses in Bangladesh, Uzbekistan and the Netherlands collaborating together in a joint venture, where power is not distributed according to capital or bargaining power, but reputation tied to the quality of their non-capital contributions. As blockchain technology is adopted more widely, this may be a part of a broader movement to achieve a more engaged, more effective participatory democracy across nation states.¹²¹⁴ By providing the contours of how worker cooperatives may draw lessons from these blockchain projects, this chapter has sought to contribute to the realisation of alternative economies¹²¹⁵ in which there is greater scope for worker ownership.

1211 William Hinman, 'Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary (Plastic)' (San Francisco, CA, 14 June 2018) <<https://bit.ly/2TXApgZ>>.

1212 For a case involving securities classification of a purported utility token, see *In Re: Munchee*, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-18304, 11 December 2017, at 5-6.

1213 Reyes suggests the business trust. See Reyes (n 1174) 411, 414-415. dOrg, as mentioned previously, operates as a collective, while organized as a Vermont BBLLC. dOrg (n 1081).

1214 Maria-Lluïsa Marsal-Llacuna, 'Future Living Framework: Is Blockchain the next Enabling Network?' (2018) 128 *Technological Forecasting and Social Change* 226, 232.

1215 JK Gibson-Graham and Gerda Roelvink, 'The Nitty Gritty of Creating Alternative Economies' (2011) 30 *Social Alternatives* 29, 29-30.

Table 12: Abbreviations and Glossary

Blockchain Technology	A resilient, near-immutable, distributed and transparent database that can pseudonymously execute economic transactions. It can be public or private, thereby affecting who can interact with the blockchain.
CLNY	Meta Colony of the Colony protocol. The Meta Colony also has its own tokens referred to as CLNY tokens.
Crypto-Currency	Tokens that are a unit of account and are used as a means of payment.
DAO	Decentralised Autonomous Organisations that use blockchain technology and smart contracts as their primary or exclusive source of governance and respond to both digital and human inputs.
Investment Token	Tokens that have the characteristics of an equity instrument and embody expectations of future profit through the managerial efforts of others.
KMF	Capital Managed Firm
LMF	Labour Managed Firm
PECOL	Principles of European Cooperative Law
Off-chain	All transactions that are not represented on the blockchain
Oracle	A third party, trusted by parties of a smart contract, that relay information from the outside world to a smart contract
SCE	European Cooperative Society
SEC	Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States of America
Smart Contract	Software that embodies an agreement between parties and then (self) executes when certain conditions are met.
Utility Token	Tokens that give a right of access to an online platform, product or service.