Cicero, statesmanship, and republicanism in Roman historiography

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CHAPTER TWO

Cicero's republican virtue in the early Empire

Et nosse et animo semper agitare conveniet.[1]

1. *Exempla* in Roman historiography

1.1 INTRODUCTION

In a letter to Atticus from September 44 BC, written from Leucopetra, in the south of Italy, Cicero has to defend his plans for a departure from Rome—plans which he broke off when he heard that Brutus and Cassius had called a meeting and asked all ex-consuls and ex-praetors to be present.[2] Atticus had accused his friend of inconsistency and of abandoning his country, and requested that Cicero write a formal apology even though he had at first approved of Cicero's decision to leave Rome.[3]

> *Ergo id erat meum factum quod Catoni probare non possim? Flagiti scilicet plenum et dedecoris. Utinam a primo ita tibi esset visum! Tu mihi, sicut esse soles, fuisses Cato*.[4]
>
> So then, I would not be able to justify my action to Cato? It is obviously full of shame and disgrace. Would that you had said so from the beginning! You would have been, as you're wont to be, my Cato.

[1] Quint. *Inst*. 12.3.29.
[2] *Att*. 16.7.1.
[3] *Ibid*. 16.7.3.
[4] *Ibid*. 16.7.4. Cf. *Att*. 16.1.6, June 44 BC: *Quintus filius mihi pollicetur se Catonem*.

When Cicero wrote this letter, Cato was already dead; justification to Cato is not a serious but a symbolical act. In fact, Cato's name and person are adduced here to represent exemplary behaviour, and in a twofold way. First, Cicero's decision to leave Rome is measured against Cato's (*olim*) standards. Cato is the model of conduct who defines the integrity of Cicero's action; that is to say, his opinion would tell whether Cicero's choice did not oppose any conservative aims in protecting the Republican institutions. In this particular case, the idea that one would be able to defend oneself against Cato stood paramount to being able to defending one's love for the Republic. In other words, Cato's figure symbolizes all that the Republic represents. This shift from the individual person to a collective symbol for republicanism is even clearer in the expression that Atticus was, in fact, Cicero's Cato. Here, the name alone stands for certain moral values that are embodied in republican convictions. Cato, even Cato's name alone, exemplifies the defence and the fight for the Republic to which Cicero himself was also committed. He has become Cicero's republican conscience.[5]

In their mutual defence of the state, Cato and Cicero had chosen different paths. Cicero's letters tell us a lot about Cato's political conduct. If the institutions of the Republic were at stake, one Cato could achieve more than all the judges in a court together.[6] Cato the Younger, like his great-grandfather, was the kind of politician who dared to provoke, who dared to speak against a motion when everybody else was for it.[7] He would rather die than watch the Republic be destroyed by individuals.[8] However, this militant attitude was not always preferable. In the eyes of his contemporaries, his optimate mind, his perseverance, his irascibility and inflexibility also caused damage to the Republic.[9] His refusal to cooperate with Caesar or Pompey was regarded as one of the direct causes for the formation of the First Triumvirate.[10] As much

[5] Cato has also been called, by modern scholars, the 'conscience' of Rome (Russo 1974: 66–92), or the 'conscience' of the optimate party (Grimal 1970: 93).

[6] Cic. *Att*. 4.15.8.

[7] Caes. *BCiv*. 1.32; Cic. *Att*. e.g. 1.13.3 (*instat et urget Cato*), 1.17.9, 4.17.4 (*ibi loquetur praeter Antium et Favonium libere nemo, nam Cato aegrotat*); Liv. *Per*. 105, 107.

[8] Cic. *Att*. 4.18.4; Vell. Pat. 2.49.3; Sen. *Ep*. 95.70–72.

[9] Cic. *Att*. 2.1.8; 2.21.1, *Nam iracundiam atque intemperantiam illorum sumus experti qui Catoni irati omnia perdiderunt* (59 BC). Cf. *Fin*. 3.88; *Mur*. 75.

[10] Cf. Cic. *Att*. 2.9.1. For a historical analysis, see Drogula 2019: 102–156, and esp. 135; cf. Russo 1974: 41–65.

as Cato refused to bend, Cicero was prone to compromise. For example, instead of opposing Caesar in the debate over his introduction of a new agrarian law in 59 BC, as Cato did, Cicero supports Pompey and Caesar for the sake of *concordia*.[11] He flirts with the idea of making Caesar "a better citizen", which meant he would placate and support him in the final hope of winning him over.[12] Cicero even reproached Cato for displaying such an obstinate optimate spirit and refusing to compromise.[13]

This heroic model in which Cato displays almost superhuman qualities in remaining true to himself and to the Republic only intensified after Cato's death in 46. After his suicide, panegyrical pamphlets were written in his honour, which in turn invited anti-Catonian writings by the Caesarian party. Brutus wrote a biography of Cato and Cicero penned a eulogistic pamphlet; Caesar and Hirtius produced an *Anticato*.[14] With the *Conspiracy of Catiline* of 41, Sallust established an important literary memorial for Cato's virtus, as we have seen in chapter 1.[15]

If Cato was the ultimate symbol of republicanism, where did that leave Cicero, who was equally well known for his public defence of the state, the ultimate cause of his death in 43? In the present chapter, we will approach the question of the immortalization in early imperial historiography of Cato and Cicero as representatives of the Roman Republic. § 1 will focus entirely on the dynamics (and mechanics) of cultural symbolization, what modern scholarship has called the process of exemplarity: how does one person and even a single name come to exemplify specific Roman (republican) values or an entire political

[11] *Att*. 2.1.6–8.

[12] What it meant theoretically is much harder to grasp. Rendering someone a *melior civis* would mean something like winning the person over to the optimate party or to the cause of the conservative politicians. Cicero also uses the phrase in connection with Hirtius, consul of 44 BC: *Att*. 14.20.4 (*quod Hirtium per me meliorem fieri volunt, do equidem operam*), cf. 14.21.4.

[13] *Att*. 2.1.8. This letter contains the famous dictum that Cato debates as if he were living in Plato's *Politeia*, not in Romulus' cesspit: *dicit enim tamquam in Platonis πολιτείᾳ non tamquam in Romuli faece*. DROGULA 2019: 118 analyses the difference between Cicero and Cato's policy: "Whereas Cicero spoke about the need for a strong consensus among the propertied classes, Cato pushed for a society in which the old families that championed ancient values would be preeminent."

[14] Cic. *Att*. 12.4.2, 12.41.4, 12.44.1, 13.46 (Brutus' *Cato*), *Fam*. 6.7.4, *Or*. 35; App. *B.Civ*. 2.99; Cass. Dio 43.13; Plut. *Caes*. 3.4, *Cic*. 38–39; Gel. 16.8,13.20; Tac. *Ann*. 4.34; Juv. *Sat*. 6.337–338; Plin. *Ep*. 3.12; Quint. *Inst*. 7.9.12; Suet. *Jul*. 56.5; Servius *A*. 6.841.

[15] Cf. GOAR 1987: 18–21, who concludes his account of Sallust's Cato on the note that "We are well on the way to that canonization of Cato which we find in Lucan a century later." (21).

movement? For a Roman, exemplarity offered the most important lens through which to view history, and through the commemoration and memorialization of historical models it provided lessons and established norms and values for present generations.[16] In order to understand the portrayal of republican figures in Roman historiography, one first needs to grasp how this categorical thinking in *exempla* influenced the interpretation of their actions and the ways in which these were given historical value.

In §§ 2 and 3, I will discuss the image of Cato and Cicero in early imperial texts about the republican history, using the framework of exemplarity to explain how the imperial writers connect their historical *personae* to specific types of ethical and political virtue. As we will see, the stories about Cicero and Cato's career start to diverge considerably in the first century, portraying the former as a man who symbolizes the fall of the republican aristocracy and the latter as a final bulwark of republican liberty. In my discussion of the works of Valerius Maximus and Velleius Paterculus and of Lucan's historical epic, I will pay special attention to the ways in which Cicero and Cato are not just depicted as Roman moral exemplars or political symbols, but also as *leaders* of the Roman people, who magistrated the course of events in the final period of the Republic and whose lives were closely connected with its fall.[17]

1.2 THE CULTURE OF EXEMPLARITY

1.2.1 Exemplarity as a form of cultural discourse

The term exemplum derives from *eximo*, 'to take out' or 'sample' something. Its basic meaning divides into four main categories: 1) a 'sample' taken from larger material 2) an *example* which can be used to demonstrate or illustrate something; 3) a model (of excellence) which is worthy of imitation; or 4) a copy or an image.[18] During the last dec-

[16] A short, useful overview of how Roman historiography is rooted in exemplary thinking is Roller 2018: 17–23.

[17] Lushkov 2015 argues that, in fact, the actions of politicians (magistracy) are the pivot on which the discourse of exemplarity in Roman historiography revolves.

ades there have been many different approaches to exemplarity and the nature of the historical *exemplum*. I will first discuss the concept of exemplarity before turning to its manifestation in the *exemplum*.

Exemplarity can be defined as a cultural process,[19] as discourse or dialogue,[20] or as a mode of historical thinking and commemoration.[21] It is difficult to gauge how tradition and exemplarity functioned in daily life within the private lives of the Roman people. Historical individuals who are presented as having performed admirable deeds are almost exclusively elite and male, with the exception of a few female heroines.[22] To analyse the phenomenon of exemplarity we have (restricted) access to, for instance, coins, state monuments, and other features of the city space,[23] or to the genre of historiography, which was the most important literary form of historical commemoration.

The emphasis on the traditions and figures of the past was part of Roman state policy; the past was institutionalized and publicized to an extent that is now difficult to understand. The literary sources alone cannot offer us sufficient insight into the all-pervasive presence of the *mos maiorum*, and the way in which the memory of historical and mythological individuals contributed to a collective vision of Rome, a history in which all citizens were expected or could expect to share.[24]

[18] *TLL* s.v. *exemplum*. See also ERNOUT & MEILLET 1985: 204–205, "*Exemplum* est proprement l'objet distingué des autres et mis à part pour servir de modèle". Cf. KORNHARDT 1936 for an etymological and semantic study of the Latin term and concept *exemplum*.

[19] BELL 2008.

[20] ROLLER 2004–2018; CHAPLIN 2000.

[21] HÖLKESKAMP 2003 and 2006; LOWRIE 2007; WALTER 2004.

[22] Cf. BELL 2008; WISEMAN 2014; ROLLER 2018: 9–10. Teresa MORGAN and Rebecca LANGLANDS have made important attempts, however, to emphasize the broader impact of exemplary thinking on non-elite groups in society: MORGAN 2007 and LANGLANDS 2018. LANGLANDS does this (pp. 166–225) by introducting the concept of abstract 'sites of exemplarity', by which she does not mean physical locations or monuments (*lieux de mémoire*) in the cityscape, but the collective memory of the people.

[23] As Tonio HÖLSCHER and Karl-Joachim HÖLKESKAMP have done in their frequent studies on memorialization and monumentalization in Rome; seminal for our understanding of the republican and imperial (re-)construction of urban space is FAVRO 1988. HÖLSCHER 1984, 2001 discusses the presence of *exempla* in the public space by means of visual commemoration.

[24] I will not specifically engage here with the political ideological nature of *exempla*, but rather focus on its ethical aspects; for the 'institutional' interpretation of exemplarity, see e.g. LUSHKOV 2015; WALTER 2004; HÖLKESKAMP 2004a: 169–198; HALTENHOFF 2003; COUDRY & SPÄTH 2001. Aug. *RGDA* 8.5 (COOLEY 2009) illustrates this function of *exempla*: "By the introduction of new laws I have restored the examples of our ancestors which had grown out of use in our age, and I myself have exercised many model deeds for later generations" (*legibus novis me auctore latis multa exempla maiorum exolescentia iam ex nostro saeculo reduxi et ipse multarum rerum exempla*

The city was marked by triumphal monuments carrying inscriptions that related the achievements of great generals, and it was decorated by annual celebrations at temples featuring the names of the famous individuals who had erected or restored them.[25] One could view honorary columns and statues in the Forum of historical individuals who had died but were still present in the heart of the city. As well, one could visit all the theatres, circuses, and baths that carried the names of noteworthy statesmen who had built them for the benefit of Rome and her people. On top of these visual markers, the city rang with the continuous verbal appeal to valorous generals and virtuous statesmen in Rome's past (and present) in the speeches held in the Forum, the Field of Mars, or wherever the senate or people convened. During the Empire the building works of republican politicians still filled the public space, and their statues or *imagines* decorated the fora as well as private houses. Somewhere in the city were also the temples which Cicero and his family had renovated and honoured by public ceremony, or the houses they had built. In the residences of later admirers there were possibly portraits to be seen and perhaps even statues of Cicero.[26] Rome's cityscape was full of stimuli for recollection, meant simultaneously to demonstrate and preserve the connections between the past and the present.[27]

imitanda posteris tradidi). Note that the Greek translation has πολλῶν πραγμάτων μείμημα ἐμαυτὸν τοῖς μετέπειτα παρέδωκα ("I have handed myself down to future generations as a model of many actions"). Cooley 2009: 144 also usefully refers to Vell. Pat. 2.126.4 (Tiberius). Kraus 2005 demonstrates how in the writings of Caesar and Augustus, the discourse of exemplarity begins to be dominated by the autocrat.

[25] See Hölscher 2006: 101 on "monumentale Geschichte" and memorials as "Träger" of this history. On the permanence of monuments in relation to literary forms of commemoration, cf. Hölscher 2001; Bell 2008 (monuments transmitting *exempla*); Wiseman 2014; Popkin 2016; Favro 1984. In his study of the visual means of historical commemoration Peter Holliday 2002: 219 states quite firmly that "historical commemorations stand out by communicating with a visual language that could affect all viewers on some level and … remained etched in the memory more effectively than any written or oral treatment." Cf. Hölkeskamp 2014: 70, "the key concept is interdependence", i.e. of monuments, texts, and oral tradition.

[26] In 54 BC Cicero restored the Temple of Tellus in name of Quintus and probably also himself, and placed a statue of Quintus near or in the temple: Q. fr. 3.1.14. During his consulship he erected anew the Statue of Jupiter Optimus Maximus on the Capitol (*Cat.* 2). His house on the Palatine was famous, both for its previous owners and Clodius' demolition of it: cf. Vell. Pat. 2.14 and 45. Perhaps there hung or stood an *imago clipeata* of Cicero in the Bibliotheca Apollinaris on the Palatine among those of the other orators: cf. Tac. *Ann.* 2.37 and 83. We know that Cicero was donated a gilded statue by the people of Capua (*Pis.* 25) and statues for him and his family were erected in the Heraion at Samos: see Sehlmeyer 1999: 215–216. The emperor Alexander Severus would have had a *simulacrum*,

The culture of exemplarity has a twofold orientation: it is pragmatic as well as normative.[28] It offers the individual a concrete set of behavioural rules ('lessons'), and by de- and prescribing these rules confirms the norms and values of society as a whole. The discourse of exemplarity therefore enhanced social cohesion and stability, as has often been noted, although when used negatively *exempla* could equally have a destabilizing effect.[29] The emphasis on the ethical aspects of exemplarity and on *exempla* as predominantly moral stories (see below) has increased in recent decades.[30] Rebecca Langlands, in her influential study *Exemplary Ethics in Ancient Rome*, has demonstrated that exemplarity is above all a discourse of (Roman) morality, in which all members of the community participated in order to develop and reflect on ethical knowledge.[31] Although Roman exemplarity concentrates around the words and deeds of politicians and magistrates, it is good to realize that these were regarded, ultimately, as models for instruction and imitation. Within the world of Roman *exempla*, there was a very fine line between politics and ethics.[32] The discourse of exemplarity highlights 'heroes',[33] men who symbolize patriotism and (military or civilian) valour, and who acquired a form of distinction within the community that encompassed moral virtue, civic leadership, and political influence all at the same time.

One of the most influential reconstructions of the actual mechanics of exemplarity within the Roman world is provided by Matthew Roller. Roller presents the concept of an exemplary "loop", a process of exemplarity consisting of four "operations".[34] The first moment or 'operation' of exemplarity is the performance in the public eye of a deed (of valour or vice) by a Roman citizen. A second stage concerns the evaluation of this performance by his fellow citizens, who "convert it

portrait, of Cicero in his second *lararium*, as is recorded in the *Augustan History* (Alex. Sev. 31.4).

[27] Hölkeskamp 2006: 264 has described this as the "Erinnerungslandschaft" of Rome; cf. Rea 2012.

[28] See, e.g., Roller 2009: 216; Hölkeskamp 2003: 215–216; Stemmler 2000.

[29] See Stemmler 2000: 179–191.

[30] See Lucarelli 2007, and Skidmore 1996 for an ethical and social interpretation of Valerius Maximus' *exempla*.

[31] Langlands 2018; cf. Roller 2018: 13–17.

[32] Lucarelli 2007: 11; Langlands 2018: 70–74.

[33] Langlands 2018: 29–31.

[34] Roller 2004: 4–6, Roller 2009: 216–217, and most recently Roller 2018: 4–10.

into a 'deed' with implied or explicit normative force".[35] In a third step, the deed of valour is publicly commemorated with the erection of a monument, the consecration of a material space for its memory, in literary texts, etc. Lastly—and here the 'loop' is completed—these monuments in the public space generate a normative debate about recommendable Roman values, which leads (ideally) to the imitation of the historical deed;[36] and so the cycle continues.[37] Roller's theory works so well because it offers a solid framework for analyzing exemplarity *without* imposing a rigid scheme upon historical processes. Every battle, political conflict, or military success knew its own course and result, and Romans themselves did not have strict criteria for awarding valour to 'heroic' citizens. Instances of Roman *virtus* could be shaped by different qualities like *pietas*, *sapientia*, *clementia*, or *fortitudo*, which in turn could manifest themselves through many different kinds of behaviour.[38] This is what Martin Bloomer has called 'multiple exemplarity', the phenomenon that an *exemplum* can comprise several virtuous qualities, and the historical hero can take over several qualities from other famous Roman predecessors.[39] The centre of gravity within the whole cycle of exemplarity lies not with the criteria for evaluation, but with the evaluation itself. *Exempla* receive their value from being questioned, debated, accepted, and then appropriated by the community. The only person who has no influence whatsoever on the value attrib-

[35] Roller 2004: 6.

[36] While Roller 2004: 5 presents the final step to be 'imitation', Roller 2018: 8 adjusts this to 'norm setting', leaving the action of imitation out of the 'exemplary loop' and shifting the discussion to the ethical ramifications of exemplarity. Langlands 2018: 86–111 recognizes the importance of imitation (what she calls 'modeling' or 'replicatory imitation' [at 100]) and emulation for the process of exemplarity, but problematizes its results. According to her, in order to be successful imitation required a highly developed awareness of ethical principles, including knowledge of how to implement ethical rules in different social contexts; cf. pp. 8–9. Cf. also Langlands 2011 and Langlands 2020, which further theorizes the concept of imitation.

[37] Cf. Roller 2004: 7, "these ubiquitous opportunities for debate and contestation are the lifeblood of exemplary discourse".

[38] This approach has been further developed by Langlands 2018 with respect to the audience of the *exempla*; by the, as she calls it, 'multivalency' of *exempla*, the audience became familiar with the complexity of ethical thinking, and the fact that good and bad, basically all values, should be (re-) defined depending on the social context ('situational ethics'). On situation ethics see also Langlands 2011; Morgan 2007. For a seemingly exhaustive overview of the categories of virtue in *exempla*, see Alewell 1913 on Valerius Maximus. For other analyses of Roman virtues, see Litchfield 1914 on the entire 'national' exempla tradition; Morgan 2007: 122–159 on Valerius Maximus; Schmitzer 2011 on Velleius.

[39] Bloomer 2011.

uted to their deeds is, ironically, the ultimate creator of it, the historical individual involved in the action.

1.2.2 *The* exemplum *as cultural tool for thinking*

Whereas exemplarity could be described as a general commemorative discourse (both visual and literary) by which the relation of the present to the ancestors and traditions of the past is defined, the single instance of the historical *exemplum* is a concrete instrument for interpreting past events and individuals. Uwe Walter has defined the *exemplum* as the "wichtigste kognitive Grundfigur römischen historischen Denkens".[40] Within the framework of Rome's "Geschichtskultur", as Walter defines it, the *exemplum* is a "mode" or a "Modell", or even a "code", by which the Romans could interpret the past meaningfully and symbolically with respect to the present institutions.[41] In this and the next section, we will focus on the use of *exemplum* in its meaning of historical model: the commemoration of a deed or a personality is the first constituent part of an *exemplum*. The other two constituent parts are its strong moral-didactic quality and its narrative unity.[42]

In modern scholarship, there exist, roughly speaking, three main interpretations of the function of the Roman *exemplum*: the *exemplum* as role model—a conceptualization which I will reject—, the ambiguous conceptualization of the *exemplum* as *either* a rhetorical argument *or* a historical narrative, and the *exemplum* as a commemorative story about past individuals or events. First, then, we will examine the definition of the *exemplum* as a 'role model', the cornerstone of Henriette van der Blom's study of Cicero's models. In this case *exemplum* stands for an individual (or sometimes an event) whose qualities or actions constitute a source of imitation for others.[43] Weaker meanings

[40] Walter 2004: 5; cf. Roller 2004: 16 on the discourse of exemplarity as "cognitive framework", and Langlands 2018: 100–111 on two functions of *exempla* (of six in total) she calls 'cognition' and 'discernment'.

[41] Walter 2004, ch. 2, esp. 51–62 on the *exemplum* as "Modell des Vergangenheitsbezugs".

[42] Cf. Langlands 2018: 29–36 on the "core elements" of the *exemplum*, being the 'hero', the 'story', and the 'moral'.

[43] Van der Blom 2010: 68 defines the *exemplum* as "a specific reference to an individual, a group of individuals, or an event in the past…", but uses the term almost exclusively to refer to historical individuals.

are also possible, i.e. the *exemplum* merely as an exemplary figure, a person worthy of admiration.[44] This interpretation of the exemplum is related to and perhaps has its origins in the rhetorical argument of authority, the auctoritas exempli. The use of *exemplum* for 'authority' or 'role model' seems to be a derivation of the notion of the *exemplum virtutis*. The *exempla virtutis* provided the canonical list of exemplary deeds performed by Rome's most famous generals and politicians.[45] In Roman oratory, the virtuous deeds are frequently equated to the individuals who performed them; the characteristic virtue and the famous name could be employed interchangeably to illustrate morally correct conduct.

However, there is a difference between a role model and an *exemplum*, as Sinclair Bell has convincingly argued. The concept of the role model is reserved for individuals from recent history displaying very specific positive qualities, whereas an *exemplum* can denote a spectrum of entities or behavioural aspects; it can be derived from either past or present; and it is put in a certain narrative format.[46] Employing the term *exemplum* for an individual in their entirety is a simplification that is not justified by the ancient descriptions of the term, and reduces modern scholars to a rigidity of interpretation that creates more complexities than it solves.

Secondly, scholars like to distinguish between a rhetorical or 'logical' and a historical exemplum. In practice this distinction is not very useful. The first definitions we have from antiquity indeed concern the use of the exemplum in formal oratorical contexts, but these always include a historical component. For Aristotle, the *paradeigma* is a form of proof that resembles induction and therefore works by way of anal-

[44] Influential studies which adhere to this translation are Gowing 2005, 2013; Lowrie 2007 who discusses Cicero and Augustus' interest in 'making an exemplum of themselves'; Stemmler 2000.

[45] Cf. Litchfield 1914, still a seminal article on *exempla virtutis* in the Roman culture. In her influential analysis of the semantics of the term *exemplum*, Kornhardt 1936 in fact allows for such a shift of meaning, in which an *exemplum* can develop from a mere sample or individual token of someone's behaviour into a complete, exemplary personality ("Gesamtpersönlichkeit"), see 50–52, 55–59.

[46] Bell 2008: 3 suggests the term "template" for a role model rather than *exemplum*. Dressler 2015: 149 employs *exemplum*, 'paradigm', 'template' interchangeably for Cicero's historical figure. Cf. Langlands 2018: 31, "The core element of narrative is something that sets the Roman exemplum apart from the modern role model or the moral exemplar."

ogy.[47] He does make a distinction between different types of *exempla*, but the categories he mentions are the historical and the fictional *exemplum*.[48] The definitions offered by the Latin rhetoricians are equally historically oriented. The *Rhetor ad Herennium* defines an *exemplum* as a "representation of something someone has done or said in the past, with specific mention of the person's name" (*exemplum est alicuius facti aut dicti praeteriti cum certi auctoris nomine propositio*, 4.62). Cicero, in his *On Invention*, calls the *exemplum* "that what confirms or weakens the case by the authority or misfortune of a particular individual or event" (*exemplum est, quod rem auctoritate aut casu alicuius hominis aut negotii confirmat aut infirmat*, 1.49). According to Quintilian, an *exemplum* is the mention (or: reminder) of something that has been done or that could hypothetically have been done, and which is useful for making a persuasive point: *rei gestae aut ut gestae utilis ad persuadendum id quod intenderis commemoratio*.[49] Interestingly, in contrast to the definitions of the Rhetor and Cicero, Quintilian's emphasis lies on the deeds themselves, the *res gestae*, not on the individual performing these deeds.[50]

In these definitions, all examples are based on a certain analogy, and they are all constructed in relation to the past.[51] The distinction between 'logical' and historico-symbolical *exempla* is a matter of scholarship rather than a question inherent to the material, as Fuhrmann has shown.[52] In any case, the formal, rhetorical aspects of the *exemplum* have led modern scholars to define it as an "anecdote", a fable, or a story, with the aim of manipulating the audience rather than expressing historical truth. In Martin Bloomer's monograph on Valerius Maximus, for example, the attention is drawn away from Valerius' histori(ographi)cal aims by calling it a "collection of anecdotes".[53] However, the

[47] On the basis of the definitions in Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, Michael STEMMLER, in an extensive article from 2000, distinguishes between a logical and symbolical exemplum, between which the juridical precedent stands as a "Mischtypus". The symbolical example, then, works because of the charismatic and meritocratic force of a historical personality.

[48] Arist. *Rhet*. 1393a28–1394a18. Cf. ALEWELL 1913.

[49] Basic definition, at *Inst*. 5.11.6.

[50] *Contra* ALEWELL 1913: 26: "das historische Beispiel handelt im Gegensatz zu *eikon* und *parabole* stets von Personen, und zwar von historischen und bestimmten; von Sachen kann kein *paradeigma* genommen werden."

[51] Cf. also Arist. *Rhet*. 1368a29–31.

[52] FUHRMANN 1973 on the development of the historical *exemplum*.

rhetoricizing, ahistorical nature of *exempla* is disputable.[54] Despite the *exemplum*'s atemporal character, the historical deed or event it thematizes is still recognizable, otherwise the exemplum would lose its relevance. *Exempla* work because, by creating an analogy with real or semi-historical individuals and collective deeds in the past, persons and actions in the present are given a meaningful foundation.

The third and final interpretation is also the broadest: the *exemplum* as a *factum aut dictum memorabile*:[55] an *exemplum* is a deed or expression, usually by an influential historical figure, that is worthy of record because it teaches us something.[56] Within the context of historiography this is surely the best road to approaching *exempla*, and resembles the historiographers' own views on the use of *exempla*. The phrase *factum aut dictum memorabile* might sound rather Valerian, but it has a broader basis in Roman thinking.[57] The famous *dictum* of Livy, which in itself has become an *exemplum* for ancient and modern scholars alike, clearly explains the function of *exempla* within historiographical narrative.[58] In his monument of Roman history, Livy says, he has provided *documenta*, proofs, of each *exemplum*, which the reader should follow either for his own sake or for the sake of the state in order to avoid a wrong course of action. Although Livy does not specify the meaning of *exemplum* it is clear he envisages active behaviour (*quod imitere capias … quod vites*, 'choose something to imitate and to avoid')[59] and deeds

[53] Bloomer 1992 is concerned with illustrating the rhetorical background to Valerius' work, and argues Valerius' method was unhistorical. His final judgment of Valerius is worth quoting: "He rambles on like a sententious conversationalist who cannot stop stringing anecdotes together and yet never tells all the details, or never builds his stories to full yarns, but darts along to another instance while the listener entertained, if a little put upon, tries to catch the thread." (10) Cf. Alewell 1913: 40. Wiegand 2013: 150–155 discusses Bloomer's approach in relation to other scholarship.

[54] Bücher 2006: 152–161; Stemmler 2000: 165–179; cf. Walter 2004: 53–55; Wiegand 2013: 167–168 on the "Zeitdynamik" in Valerius Maximus. See also Wiegand 2013: 153–154 for the argument that the "Rhetorisierung der *exempla*" mainly aims to improve their readability. During antiquity and in the Middle Ages the *exemplum* became almost a synonym for the fable or anecdote: cf. Bremond, Le Goff & Schmitt 1982.

[55] See Lucarelli 2007: 31; Walter 2004; Roller 2004, 2009.

[56] Cf. Chaplin 2000: 3, the exemplum as a "guide to conduct".

[57] Val. Max. *praef.* 1; Quintilian uses the phrase *facta et dicta praeclare*, at *Inst.* 12.2.29.

[58] Liv. *praef.* 10. *Hoc illud est praecipue in cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te exempli documenta in inlustri posita monumento intueri; inde tibi tuaeque rei publicae quod imitere capias, inde foedum inceptu foedum exitu quod vites*. For further analysis of the use of exempla in Livy see Chaplin 2000.

[59] Cf. Chaplin 2000: 1.

rather than qualities (*inceptu* and *exitu* together referring to a completed action with a beginning and result). Ultimately, the fact or deed in question is *memorabile* for the purpose of instruction and imitation.

Through the process of evaluation and commemoration described by Roller's 'loop', all events from Roman history can be turned into *exempla*.[60] This means that the *exemplum* in itself is quite a flexible means of communication. I have spoken about the rigidity that can result from regarding the *exemplum* as a specific person instead of something said or done. Indeed, one individual can offer multiple *exempla*, which need not be consistent with each other. For example, the figure of Cato in Valerius Maximus is used to demonstrate several different Roman values, and not specifically the values for which he was, to our modern ideas, best known. His name or actions do not occur under the rubric of *severitas*, while his actions provide an *exemplum severitatis* in 2.9.[61] Similarly, he does not serve to exemplify the ethical quality of *constantia*, but he can be adduced as a figure of *continentia* and *moderatio*.[62] As we will see, one of his most brilliant performances is in Valerius' chapter on *maiestas* (2.10), a quality that is otherwise not popularly employed in describing Cato, but within the chapter's assemblage of historical events makes for a perfectly fitting illustration of Cato's historical comportment.[63]

Yet, with an eye to the literary texts discussed in §§ 2 and 3, it is good to note here that despite the flexibility of exemplary discourse the *exemplum* as a 'story' or narrative unit does run according to a certain pattern. Firstly, we have seen that Rhetor ad Herennium notes that a particular name should be connected to the *exemplum* in order to ensure its effect (something, in fact, which Livy above does not explicitly mention). Secondly, Quintilian's definition does state three basic elements of the historical exemplum, as Heinrich Lausberg also points out: the *exemplum* contains some historical (or pseudo-historical) content, it has a certain *utilitas*, and it is given some kind of literary

[60] Cf. Langlands 2018: 62–65; Roller 2004: 7; Bell 2008: 11; Lucarelli 2007: 29–33; Bücher 2006: 154–155; Hölkeskamp 2004a: 180; Stemmler 2000; Chaplin 2000 (*passim*).

[61] Cf. Cicero, who emphasizes Cato's quality of severity in *Mur.* 60–61, 74; Sall. *Cat.* 54.5 (*At Catoni studium modestiae, decoris, sed maxume severitatis erat*).

[62] Cf. Sall. *Cat.* 54.3; Sen. *Constant.* 2.2., *Dial.* 5.38; Val. Max. 4.1.14 (*moderatio*), 4.3.12 (*continentia*). The chapter on *constantia* is 3.8.

[63] On the variability in the presentation of virtues, see Roller 2009: 225–228.

form.[64] How much detail is conferred on the exemplary event or figure is entirely up to the writer: they can narrate the situation or event completely, or merely allude to it—this allusion can consist of only a name, with which the audience might associate certain deeds or virtues.[65] It is useful to make a distinction between these two forms of references; Francesca Mencacci has done this for the Roman *viri illustres* by suggesting a category of *narratives* or stories (*racconti*), and of reuses in various manifestations (*riusi*). According to Mencacci, narratives (*racconti*) make an attempt at characterizing the hero and establishing ('fixing') their cultural value or significance.[66] Short allusions to famous men or their deeds (*riusi*), however, do not invite such moral reflection, and are mainly used as arguments *ex auctoritate*. Consequently, the former category is seen mainly within historiographical or historical texts, and the latter in oratory or *testi di tipo retorico*.[67] One could debate the generic distinction Mencacci makes, but as a whole her theory works quite well to explain the different formats in which Romans could encounter and employ ancient *exempla*. Egon Flaig, in one of the best analyses of processes of commemoration and forgetting in the Roman tradition, has demonstrated that as a result of such fixed patterns in exemplary stories historical individuals eventually lose their multidimensionality, and only their best-known achievements are preserved in the collective memory.[68] As we will see, this has great influence on the reputation of Roman politicians, whose careers and characters are reduced to only the most salient aspects.

1.2.3 *Conclusion: defining the* exemplum

The ephemeral nature of the *exemplum* makes it a difficult and, obviously, popular subject of study. It has no clear format other than the three elements of historical content, narrative structure, and moral-didactic

[64] Lausberg 2008: 228, "Das *exemplum* hat also eine inhaltliche Quelle, eine *utilitas*-Funktion und eine literarische Form."

[65] So also Quint. *Inst*. 5.11.15–16.

[66] Cf. Alewell 1913: 95–96.

[67] Mencacci 2001, quotations at 421–422.

[68] Flaig 1990: 61–65.

value. There are no rules for the minimum that is needed to call something an *exemplum*. According to Quintilian a name is enough,[69] but does that really count as an *exemplum* in itself? The implicit assumption is that the name of one of the *maiores* would evoke the recollection of a historical deed or episode in the minds of the audience, who had heard the whole story as a child, in school, or wandering about one of the many heroic monuments in the city. This elusiveness is part of modern theories of exemplarity: the final responsibility for the interpretation of the *exemplum* is placed with the people, the beholders, who decide upon its value in continuous debate.

Yet, before we enter upon the works of Valerius, Velleius, and Lucan, we should fix some criteria for analyzing *exempla* in order to understand the hallmarks of Cato's and Cicero's political image. Therefore, to recapitulate the above, let us pose the following. For the Romans, an *exemplum* is an action performed by an admirable individual in the (semi-) historical[70] past that is preserved in some kind of narrative form, with the aim of confirming norms and values for the present. It functions as a concrete cultural symbol carrying specific Roman values, and therefore as a point of orientation in the wide range of conventions and traditions of the Roman people (*mos maiorum*).[71] All *exempla* serve to illustrate and establish the concept of 'Romanness',[72] either *ex positivo* or *ex negativo*. An *exemplum* offers a model for virtuous behaviour. Basically, *exempla* are military or political in nature, but always approached from an ethical perspective (an action is either 'good' or 'bad', 'right' or 'wrong'). Since *exempla* function on the level of society, they address the question of citizenship and offer a particular vision on the role of the Roman citizen within his community. All exemplary discourse is directed at instruction and imitation: in order to function normatively, the deeds and words of the ancestors are presented as possessing a didactic value. *Exempla* have rhetorical features in order to make them more convincing (with regard to right and wrong behaviour), but that does not undermine their historical value as interpretations of the Ro-

[69] Quint. *Inst.* 5.11.16.

[70] Cf. Roller 2004: 8, 'mythistorical'; Stemmler 2000: 168–179 on the tension between fiction and truth.

[71] Cf. Hölkeskamp 2004a: 178.

[72] This concept is not the same as our notion of 'identity', cf. Hölscher 2008.

man past. The meaning of an *exemplum* is created by a form of consensus between sender/originator and receiver(s); an *exemplum* does not exist outside a communicative setting. There is, however, a certain canon of *potential exempla*, based on the recorded deeds of famous politicians of the past and established as such by generations of Romans who have repeatedly employed the same *exempla*. This canon is nowhere written down nor is it fixed, but it exists by grace of literary texts and the monumental landscape ('memory-scape') of the Roman world. Finally, *exempla* are flexible in nature and possess meanings that remain open for discussion and reinterpretation; their ethical value is not regarded as limited to a particular period in time.[73]

1.3 CICERO AND CATO AS EXEMPLARY FIGURES IN VELLEIUS, VALERIUS, AND LUCAN

In the historiography of the (early) empire, writers continually engaged with the republican past. The discourse of exemplarity facilitates and funnels the commemoration of past events and people, as has been noted above. Valerius Maximus' collection of *exempla*, discussed below, is the culmination of the Roman obsession[74] with compartmentalizing and categorizing Rome's history according to particular moral values. Alain Gowing, in his comprehensive study *Empire and Memory*, has described the works of the early imperial writers as influenced by two main themes: the memoralization of the republican past and the continuation of republican traditions. With regard to Valerius Maximus and Velleius Paterculus, Gowing states that they "view the Tiberian regime as an extension of the now-restored Republic".[75] However, in order to make the republican past suitable for the present it needed to be recorded in such a way that it could offer "new paradigms" to the imperial community, and, ultimately, to the emperor, to whom their works are addressed.[76] The project of (re)writing history thus serves

[73] Cf. Roller 2004, 'ethical analogy'; Hölkeskamp 2004a: 180 speaks of a "static *Raster*" that transcends temporality.

[74] Flaig 1999: 62 calls it a "Manie, in alle politischen Fragen mit exempla zu argumentieren".

[75] Gowing 2005: 34.

[76] Velleius' work has a teleological outset, with all *exempla* leading to the greatest *exemplum* of Ti-

the construction of unity and continuity between the period before and after Actium. Within this continuous history, as Isabella Wiegand has shown, there is in fact room for the awareness of a 'break' in Rome's history, which is symbolized by Cicero and Cato as the two final conservative politicians.[77] However, at the same time, through the process of exemplarity by which historical figures were recontextualized and revalued on the basis of imperial interests and concerns, Cicero and Cato were turned into all-time models which transcend the particularities of their lifetime.[78] With regard to this concept of ahistorical models, the scholarship shows two routes in approaching these. Above I have already mentioned Martin Bloomer's thesis that Valerius Maximus' *exempla* demonstrate a rhetoricization of Roman history: the focus on the rhetorical aspects of Valerius' "anecdotes" leaves them devoid of (most of their) historical and political import.[79] In reaction to this argument about rhetoricization recent studies have emphasized instead the ethical value of exempla as instruments to teach and disseminate Roman morality.[80] However, this approach still tends to move away from the idea that exempla would have any political value. In the particular case of the commemoration of Cicero and Cato's career, a certain amount of "depoliticization" is thought to have been necessary in

berius' reign (cf. Schmitzer 2000 and 2011; Gowing 2007); of book 2, chs. 103–131 are filled with an account of Tiberius' career, culminating in a *laudatio* of the emperor in 126–131. Gowing 2007: 417 even goes so far as to say that *exempla* are not meant as "paradigms" for imitation by citizens anymore, but to "substantiate the unparallelled greatness of the emperor, the *princeps*". Valerius addresses the emperor in the preface of his work as the ultimate judge of the virtues and vice discussed in his work (*certissima salus patriae, Caesar, invoco*; cf. Weileder 1998: 45–50). It is also thought that he offers a kind of "mirror" of the imperial propaganda: Weileder 1998. Levick 1976: 82–91 discusses the key values (virtues) or 'slogans' of Tiberius' reign, and addresses the expression of these values in Valerius Maximus' work.

[77] Wiegand 2013: 168.

[78] *Ibid*. 169–173 frames this process of recontextualization and reevaluation as a form of "Überblendung", when historical figures are isolated from their historical contexts or stripped of any problematic features, and thus "made harmless" (169) in the eyes of the imperial readership.

[79] Bloomer 1992; cf. Carter 1975: 36, "In other words he has compiled the ancient equivalent of a Dictionary of Quotations." Cf. Weileder 1998: 16–20 on the prejudice that Valerius' work is mainly a rhetorical handbook. Indeed, Valerius as well as Velleius are often seen as representants of early imperial declamatory education, which is one of the reasons why their work is often analysed for its rhetorical features, and historiographical themes are thought to be derived from declamatory subjects. See most recently Keeline 2018 and Sillett 2015, who discuss Velleius and Valerius in the same breath as the Roman declaimers.

[80] This approach is illustrated by the work of Teresa Morgan (2007) and Rebecca Langlands (2011–2020). Cf. Skidmore 1996.

order to avoid a conflict between the description of their republican convictions and imperial ideology.[81]

I believe we should adopt a more comprehensive approach to *exempla*, which is neither completely political, purely ethical, nor exclusively rhetorical. In this chapter, I will approach the exemplary portraits of Cicero and Cato from the perspective of political ethics. 'Political' in the studies mentioned is often interpreted as political-ideological, i.e. the advertisement of political beliefs as part of a political agenda. Yet in its less pregnant meaning, political also simply refers to all that is related to government organization and engagement in public affairs.[82] It is this last meaning of political ('related to or concerned with public affairs') which I would like to explore in this chapter. While I will certainly highlight below the imperial historiographers' moralization of these optimate leaders, I argue that this moral reevaluation rather serves the propagation of public or civic norms and values. Moreover, in illustrating virtues and values that match the long-time morals and traditions of Rome's community, the Catonian and Ciceronian *exempla* do not interfere with the imperial politics of the time. Valerius and Velleius offer attractive moral vignettes of republican heroes whose actions have been transformed into more general forms of patriotism, and therefore fit seamlessly in their imperial ethics. Lucan, whose *Civil War* as a whole aims at the memoralization of a specially violent episode in the history of Rome and her citizens, records a more pessimistic view on the Republic,[83] but nonetheless adopts a similarly ethical lens as Velleius and Valerius.

In §§ 2 and 3, I will examine how the political careers of Cicero and Cato were interpreted in the context of the Republic's fall. I will do so by addressing the moralization of their words or achievements in exemplary narratives, but also by looking at the simplification of these achievements into singular ethical principles. As we will see, these principles sometimes belong to the realm of philosophy, especially

[81] Gowing 2005 develops this argument in multiple chapters, but see, e.g., 79 on the "depoliticized" nature of the imperial Cato and Cicero. On the silence about Cicero's republican beliefs in the early Empire, see Kaster 1998 ("an icon that is politically impotent"); Gowing 2013; Dressler 2015.

[82] The *OED* s.v. 'political' A.3 lists 6 meanings, among which only one is concerned with partisanship or ideology.

[83] See now Galtier 2018, who follows in the footsteps of Gowing 2005.

in Cato's case, but more often they relate to civic morality in general. One of the central questions is to what extent and on what level Cicero and Cato's republicanism is thematized, symbolized, and turned into a general frame of civic morals, which was applicable to imperial situations. Furthermore, this chapter will flesh out the relation between the icon-like figures in the works of Valerius and Velleius and the narrative reinterpretation of these icons offered by Lucan: while the Tiberian authors focus on singular virtues and heroic actions, Lucan's portrayal highlights political relations and addresses the nature of republican leadership.

It should be noted here that in line with this argument, I will argue against the idea, popular among modern scholars, that within the works discussed in this chapter, the figure of Cato is a symbol of the Stoic sage. The *Civil War*, in particular, is thought to be a response to this philosophical interpretation of Cato's historical figure.[84] I believe that, while the early imperial portrayal of Cato certainly includes or refers to key values within Stoic philosophy, these philosophical aspects ultimately contribute to the interpretation of his deeds as a statesman. In understanding Cato's political ideology as Stoic we are perhaps misled by the portraits of Cicero and Seneca the Younger, who especially contributed to the image of Cato as a practitioner of Stoic philosophy and the embodiment of Stoic ideals.[85] In *In defence of Murena*, Cicero presents Cato as a man whose every action is informed by strong moral principles, in particular the philosophy of the Stoa.[86] While nature has endowed Cato with the virtues of honesty (*honestas*), authority (*gravitas*), temperance (*temperantia*), greatness of mind (*magnitudo animi*), and justice (*iustitia*), Cicero says, Cato applies to these a "doctrine which is not moderate or mild, but, as it seems to me, somewhat too

[84] For the image of Cato as a "Stoic hero" in Lucan's poem (see BARTSCH 2009: 493), MARTI 1945 is seminal. See also JOHNSON 1987: 35–66; GEORGE 1991; SKLENÁŘ 2003: 59–100; HILL 2004: 213–236. RUSSO 1968: 93–106 opts for the more nuanced definition of "practicing Stoic"; cf. BARTSCH 1997: esp. 118–120. For a recent discussion problematizing Cato's status as a symbol for Stoicism, DROGULA 2019: 296–314 (but consider also MORRELL 2021 on the limits of DROGULA's approach); cf. PECCHIURA 1965: 79.

[85] Actually, Cicero alone sets forth the idea of Cato *Stoicus*; the thought that Cato himself was a Stoic does not even feature in Seneca: cf. Cic. *Parad. Stoic*. pr. 2.5, *Brutus* 118.5–6, *Mur*. 74.1; cf. Quint. *Inst.* 11.1.70 on the passage in *In defence of Murena*. Cf. *Fin*. 3.7.5–6 on Cato studying surrounded by books written by the Stoic philosophers. Cf. RUSSO 1974: 95–96.

[86] Cf. Cic. *Mur*. 61–64.

harsh and rigid for either truth or nature to bear" (*accessit istuc doctrina non moderata nec mitis sed, ut mihi videtur, paulo asperior et durior quam aut veritas aut natura patitur*).[87] In the ethical treatises of Seneca, Cato's behaviour provides the moral standard for the Stoic *sapiens*. To cite the words of Robert Goar, "Seneca, aware that Stoics must be able to point to a historical person who actually realized their austere ideal of the *sapiens*, in order to be able to offer some hope to their adherents; and sincerely believing that Cato was such a man, here defines him as the perfect Roman example of the *sapiens* and consistently uses him as such in his writings."[88] Seneca's description of Cato in the opening of *On the Constancy of the Wise Man* is often quoted as typical for the treatment of Cato throughout his treatises:

> *Pro ipso quidem Catone securum te esse iussi; nullam enim sapientem nec iniuriam accipere nec contumeliam posse, Catonem autem certius exemplar sapientis viri nobis deos immortalis dedisse quam Ulixen et Herculem prioribus saeculis. Hos enim Stoici nostri sapientes pronuntiaverunt, invictos laboribus et contemptores voluptatis et victores omnium terrorum.*[89]
>
> For Cato's own sake I commanded you to keep calm, for no sapiens can suffer injustice or insulting words; and that the immortal gods have given us a truer exemplar of the wise man in Cato than in Ulysses or Hercules in the previous age. For our Stoics declare these men wise who are invincible in labour, who look down on feelings of desire and who conquer all terrors.

Inspired by Cato's suicide, Seneca presents Cato as not only a figurehead of republican *libertas*, but as a man who embodied freedom to the extent that he is free mentally and emotionally.[90] However, although Cato is an inspirational model for Stoic *sapientia* in Seneca's treatises, he is also often portrayed in relation to the fall of the Republic.[91] Especially in the letters, Cato emerges as a political exemplar, a republican hero whose death constituted a statement about the importance of liberty and illustrated his refusal to choose the side of a(ny) dictator.[92] He

[87] Cic. *Mur*. 60.

[88] Goar 1987: 36; cf. Pecchiura 1965: 59–71.

[89] *Constant*. 2.1.

[90] For the narrative of Cato's death, see e.g. *Ep*. 13.14; 24.6–8; 71.15–17. On the popularity of Cato's suicide as a theme in rhetorical education as well as the historical tradition, Rauh 2018; Goar 1987: esp. 51–102; Tandoi 1965–1966; Ker 2009: 54–56; cf. Fehrle 1983: 279–302.

[91] E.g. *Prov*. 2.9–12; *Tranq*. 16.1–4. Cf. Ker 2009: 247–279, esp. 255–256.

[92] On Cato's politics in the letters, see Griffin 1968.

is depicted as a man fully devoted to the Republic.[93] The identification of Cato with the Republican or with republican ideology, as we will see, is a constitutive part of his image in the texts discussed below.

The early imperial concentration on singular deeds or sayings as illustrations of virtue or vice greatly affected the imperial legacy of Cicero and Cato's career. The most notable result is that the traditions around the careers of Cicero and Cato start to diverge considerably when it comes to their connection with the Republic and the methods by which they reach their political goals. Whereas the early imperial figure of Cicero is only occasionally identified with the Republic and with political virtue in general, the image of Cato functions as the personification of republican *virtus*. An extreme example of this distinction can be found in Tacitus' *Annals* book 4, his record of the trial of Cremutius Cordus in 25 AD.[94] Cremutius would have excessively praised Brutus and Cassius, and is accused of *maiestas*, an offence against the authorities. In a speech which according to the commentators reflects Tacitus' own concerns and interests,[95] the historiographer defends the separation of literature and politics, and places himself in a tradition of historical writing practiced by Livy, Asinius Pollio, and Messala Corvinus who all discussed Brutus, Cassius, Pompey, and other anti-Caesarians in a positive light.[96] And take Cicero, Cremutius says, "what has the dictator Caesar done in response to that book of him, in which he praises Cato to the heavens, other than write a speech in return, as if they were in court?" (*Marci Ciceronis libro, quo Catonem caelo aequavit, quid aliud dictator Caesar quam rescripta oratione, velut apud iudices, respondit?*) Cremutius' point is that a writer's political views can and should not be judged on the basis of one's choice of topic, which is why in this case Cicero is necessarily divorced from the republicanism Cato here stands for. Cicero offers the form, Cato the content. Cicero is only a vessel for the republican ideas that Cato, essentially, represents.[97]

[93] *Ep.* 14.13; 95.69–71, esp. 70 (*ostendit aliquas esse et rei publicae partes*); 104.30 (*cum alii ad Caesarem inclinarent, alii ad Pompeium, solus Cato fecit aliquas et rei publicae partes*).

[94] On Aulus Cremutius Cordus, see LEVICK 2013.

[95] MARTIN & WOODMAN 1989: 177; KOESTERMANN 1965: 118–119. WISSE 2013 is now the best study of the relationship between Tacitus' own historiographical reflections and the speech of Cremutius; the starting point, however, should be SUERBAUM 1971.

[96] Tac. *Ann.* 4.34.2–35.3.

[97] Cf. SUERBAUM 1971: 77 and n. 42 on the literary nature of the competition between Cicero,

While this example is a rather radical reduction of Cicero's career,[98] which disregards his defence of the Republic in 63 and against Antony in 44–43 BC, a similar disinterest in Cicero's political ideology can be recognized in the works of Valerius, Velleius, and Lucan, to the benefit of Cato's reputation as spearhead of the Republic. Yet, this thesis turns against the idea that Cicero was remembered in the early imperial period only for his oratory of eloquence and not for his historical value or republican ideals, an idea which is quite widespread and countered only on occasion.[99] Cicero *is* an exemplary Roman citizen, but his life offers a varied range of *exempla*. These are not always categorized under core Roman virtues, but they always do represent the central values of Roman society life.

2. Republican heroes in Valerius Maximus and Velleius Paterculus

2.1 CICERO'S (A)POLITICAL QUALITIES

2.1.1 Velleius' celebration of a statesman

Velleius' *Roman History* offers a portrait of Cicero who is at once an intellectual and political hero; it strongly emphasizes his contribution to the state.[100] The first time Cicero is mentioned is in book 1, in

who wrote the Cato, and dictator Caesar, who wrote an Anticato. However, he does point to the political implications of the Cato.

[98] It is also differently oriented than the fragments we have in Sen. *Suas*. 6.19 and 6.23, where Cremutius describes Cicero as the *princeps senatus Romanique nominis titulus* (19) and as an eminent *civis*, who experienced many private and public feuds (*simultates*) (23).

[99] Most explicitly voiced by GOWING 2013: 236, "as a historical figure [Cicero] possessed little clout. This is not to deny him his importance in the course of events in the waning years of the Republic, but he had not earned through his actions a place in the Roman moral and ethical universe that manifested itself in the ever-evolving *exemplum* tradition." Counter voices are, on Velleius Paterculus, SCHMITZER 2000: 184–189; on Valerius Maximus, WIEGAND 2013: 130 on the "beinahe symbolische Identifizierung Ciceros mit der res publica".

[100] The best study of Cicero's exemplary nature in Velleius is still GOWING 2005, who devotes only five pages to the subject (44–48); WIEGAND 2013: 130–131 continues along the same lines, but offers too little to be truly convincing.

a description of Rome's literary tradition. Cicero is presented as the summit of Latin eloquence, the master (*princeps*) of all oratory and prose.[101] In book 2 of his work, however, Velleius rather focuses on political *exempla*. One of the most important achievements in this regard is the disclosure of the Catilinarian conspiracy, which also gives us some insight into the main Ciceronian qualities the historiographer connects with this episode.

> *Per haec tempora M. Cicero, qui omnia incrementa sua sibi debuit, vir novitatis nobilissimae et ut vita clarus, ita ingenio maximus, quique effecit, ne quorum arma viceramus, eorum ingenio vinceremur, consul Sergii Catilinae Lentulique et Cethegi et aliorum utriusque ordinis virorum coniurationem singulari virtute, constantia, vigilia curaque aperuit. Catilina metu consularis imperi urbe pulsus est; Lentulus consularis et praetor iterum Cethegusque et alii clari nominis viri auctore senatu, iussu consulis in carcere necati sunt.*[102]
>
> During this period M. Cicero, who owed his career entirely to himself, a most noble newcomer, whose life was as brilliant as his genius was great, and who prevented that we would be surpassed in intellectual activities by those whom we had conquered in arms—when he was consul he disclosed with extraordinary courage, steadfastness, alertness and care the conspiracy of Sergius Catiline, Lentulus and Cethegus as well as other men of both ranks. Catiline was driven from the city by his fear of the consular power; the ex-consul Lentulus and Cethegus, praetor for the second time, and other famous men were killed in prison at the authority of the senate and the command of the consul.

Velleius explicitly praises the intellectual abilities (*ingenio maximus*) with which Cicero conquered the conspirators, in line with the Ciceronian image of the togate consul (see chapter 1, § 1.2). He revealed the conspiracy, and he did this with extraordinary courage (*virtus*),[103] constancy (*constantia*), alertness (*vigilia*), and care (*cura*). His role as consul is emphasized no less than three times; first juxtaposed with the names of the revolutionary senators Catiline, Lentulus, and Cethegus, secondly in reference to his consular power in expelling Catiline from the city; thirdly with regard to his responsibility for the execu-

[101] Vell. Pat. 1.17.3.

[102] *Ibid.* 2.34.3–4.

[103] Compare Velleius' praise of Cato's role in the debate on 5 December, where again the term *virtus* is used to define Cicero's ('the consul's') behaviour, in 2.35.4 (see below).

tion of Lentulus and Cethegus, in Velleius' account the leaders of the conspiracy in the city.[104] Velleius' concern with Cicero's consular status can be explained by his admiration for Cicero's success in Roman politics despite his *novitas*; the belief that this climb to the top was well deserved is illustrated in the phrase *vir novitatis nobilissimae* and the remark that "he owed all of this to his own efforts".[105] Velleius' *exemplum* distinguishes itself from Sallust's account by praising in explicit terms Cicero's *virtus* and *constantia*. It is rather in accordance with Cicero's own laudatory image of his consular achievements, which were reached solely through the powers of his intellect.

We also catch a glimpse of Ciceronian propaganda in Velleius' account of the Clodius affair and Cicero's exile.[106] As a result of Clodius' machinations, the historiographer notes, "a man who had served the state so well by saving the fatherland, got as a prize the misfortune of exile" (*ita vir optime meritus de re publica conservatae patriae pretium calamitatem exilii tulit*). Cicero is further portrayed as a victim of Caesar and Pompey's enmity against him, due to the fact that he did not want to assist in the execution of Caesar's Campanian law of 60.[107] Cicero's precarious position, taking the middle stance in political disputes, recurs at multiple moments in Velleius' *History*.[108] At the point when the civil war between Pompey and Caesar is about to erupt, Velleius reflects and confirms the Ciceronian ideal of protecting the Republic by mediation (see above, § 1.1). Velleius' account of 49 highlights Cicero's fight for concord; in nicely alliterating terms, the historiographer notes how Cicero was trying to maintain civic harmony in an unparalleled fashion (*unice cavente Cicerone concordiae publicae*).[109]

While it is Cicero's mediating skills which are praised in the years between the consulate and the death of Caesar, it is his protection of the Republic that marks Velleius' portrayal of Cicero in his final years.

[104] In Sallust's *Conspiracy of Catiline*, Cicero is connected only with Lentulus' punishment (*Cat.* 46.5, 55.2).

[105] Cf. 2.128 on the 'nobility' of *homines novi*, where Velleius also mentions Cicero.

[106] See now Sillett 2015: 196–197. Cf. Woodman 1983: 65; Elefante 1996: 321, ad 45.2 notes "il linguaggio è naturalmente ciceroniana". On Ciceronian stylistic features in Velleius, cf. Maslakov 1984: 458–459; Woodman 1975; Dihle 1955.

[107] Vell. Pat. 2.45.2.

[108] Cf. *Ibid.* 2.58.4 and 2.62.1 on Cicero's mediating role in the aftermath of Caesar's murder.

[109] *Ibid.* 2.48.5. On the importance of *concordia* and *consensus* as a theme within imperial ideology, see Lobur 2008, who separately studies Velleius and Valerius.

Moreover, while this fight is praiseworthy in itself, it also offers models of good and bad. The *Philippics* are discussed as a famous *exemplum* of both Cicero's fight to preserve republican liberty and to suppress Antony's vice:

> *Haec sunt tempora, quibus M. Tullius continuis actionibus aeternas Antonii memoriae inussit notas, sed hic fulgentissimo et caelesti ore, at tribunus Cannutius canina rabie lacerabat Antonium. Utrique vindicta libertatis morte stetit; sed tribuni sanguine commissa proscriptio, Ciceronis velut satiato Antonio paene finita.*[110]
>
> This was the time when M. Tullius in a series of speeches stigmatized Antony's memory forever, but he did so with a brilliant and divine voice, while the tribune Cannutius tore Antony apart with the rage of a dog. Their defence of liberty cost each of them their lives; but the proscription began with shedding the blood of the tribune, and it more or less ended with that of Cicero, as though Antony was satisfied.

In the final passage, 2.66, about Cicero's death, which "functions as an epitaph without actually being one",[111] Velleius rehearses and summarizes all the virtuous qualities he sees embodied by Cicero's career. This is the moment where the historiographer launches into his long complaint against Mark Antony.

> *Abscisa scelere Antonii vox publica est, cum eius salutem nemo defendisset, qui per tot annos et publicam civitatis et privatam civium defenderat. Nihil tamen egisti, M. Antoni … nihil, inquam, egisti mercedem caelestissimi oris et clarissimi capitis abscisi numerando auctoramentoque funebri ad conservatoris quondam rei publicae tantique consulis irritando necem.*[112]
>
> By Antony's crime the voice of the public was beheaded, while nobody stood up for him, he who had stood up all those years for the concerns of the state as well as of private citizens. You have achieved nothing, M. Antony … nothing, I say, have you achieved by paying a prize for that divine mouth and the severing of that most distinguished head; and by pronouncing a death contract for the murder of the one-time saviour of the Republic and such a great consul.

I will discuss only the elements most relevant to my argument, since this passage has been discussed elaborately in previous scholarship. Its

[110] *Ibid.* 2.64.3–4.
[111] Woodman 1983: 145. Cf. Pierini 2003: 33.
[112] Vell. Pat. 2.66.2–3.

content is usually considered to reflect the famous exercises *in Antonium* of the declamation schools.[113] However, regardless of the rhetorical features, Isabella Wiegand has also rightly pointed to Velleius' identification of Cicero with the Republic.[114] The historiographer calls Cicero *vox publica*, the voice of all citizens, which was perhaps somewhat of a topos in the early empire.[115] Moreover, he twice emphasizes Cicero's rescue of the Republic.[116] Again, here as in earlier passages, the terminology in the 'epitaph' recalls the slogans coined by Cicero himself. The idea that Cicero protected the fortune of both private citizens (*salutem privatam civium*) and of the Republic as a whole (*salutem publicam civitatis*) originates in the consular corpus. Furthermore, his main reputation is captured in the double epithet *conservator rei publicae* and *tantus consul*, in reference to both Cicero's self-fashioning slogans as well as Velleius' previous account of Cicero's consulship in 2.34.[117]

The term *virtus*, while present in the Catilinarian *exemplum*, does not occur in the final eulogy. It is rather immortality-through-eloquence that Velleius focuses upon:

> *Famam vero gloriamque factorum atque dictorum adeo non abstulisti, ut auxeris. Vivit vivetque per omnem saeculorum memoriam, dumque … rerum naturae corpus, quod ille paene solus Romanorum animo vidit, ingenio complexus est, eloquentia inluminavit, manebit incolume, comitem aevi sui laudem Ciceronis trahet omnisque posteritas illius in te scripta mirabitur, tuum in eum factum execrabitur citiusque* [*in*] *mundo genus hominum quam <M. Cicero> cedet.*[118]

[113] Cf. Woodman 1975: 11–13 on the similarities of the passage with the genre of the *suasoria*; Woodman 1983: 144–145. However, Schmitzer 2000: 185 believes that it is a "Zeugnis seines persönlichen Engagements", here directly in reaction to Gambet 1963: 135 who thinks that Velleius' sincerity is "suspect". The most elaborate, recent discussion of the (declamatory) topic of Cicero's death is Keeline 2018: 102–146; on Velleius specifically, see 118–125.

[114] As part of the technique to present a *res publica continua*, see Wiegand 2013: 122–132; 130–131 about Cicero as "Symbolfigur". Cf. also Balmaceda 2017 for Velleius' attempts to create a bridge between the Republic and Empire through the concept of virtuousness.

[115] See the *laus Ciceronis* by Cornelius Severus in Sen. *Suas*. 6.26, which according to Pierini 2003: 38 is perhaps the "archetipo" for all later 'stereotypical' descriptions of Cicero. See also Livy in *Suas*. 6.17 and Bruttedius Niger in *Suas*. 6.21. Cf. Keeline 2018, ch. 3 on Cicero's death and 138–140 on Cornelius Severus' poem; 84–90 for an excellent analysis of the theme of Cicero as *vox publica*, where Keeline also discusses *Mart*. 5.69.

[116] Vell. Pat. 2.66.2, *qui per tot annos et publicam civitatis et privatam civium defenderat*; and 2.66.3, *ad conservatoris quondam rei publicae tantique consulis irritando necem*.

[117] So also Schmitzer 2000: 186 and Keeline 2018: 123.

[118] Vell. Pat. 2.66.4–5. I follow the reading of Woodman 1983.

> But the fame and the glory of his deeds and words you have not taken away as much as intensified. He lives and will live in the memory of all ages, and as long as the universe … remains intact, which he, nearly alone of the Roman people, saw in his mind, comprehended with his intellect, and illuminated with his eloquence, the universe will take as its companion through the ages the praise of Cicero. And every later generation will admire his speeches against you, and they will despise your action against him; the human race will sooner disappear from the world than Cicero's fame.

The qualities Cicero displays, as we will see in § 2.2, are not equal to Cato's superior virtue. However, it is significant that Velleius explicitly acknowledges that Cicero provides *exempla* just as any other great Roman politician: it is his words (*dicta*) and deeds (*facta*) the glory of which will be remembered, and not (only) his eloquence. Eloquence is the medium, in Velleius' presentation of Cicero's political career, by which the statesman defended the Republic (cf. *fulgentissimo et caelesti ore* in 2.64.3, and *caelestissimi et clarissimi capitis* in 2.66.3). It is also the medium by which he has left to posterity the memory of Antony's deeds, which according to the historiographer made the memory of his own deeds even greater. This passage shows well that, even though for Velleius Cicero was the *princeps eloquentiae*, in the interpretation of the political history of Rome, the eloquence stood in the service of Cicero's civic aims.

From Velleius' compendium of Roman history emerges the picture of Cicero as a virtuous statesman. As a politician, he rescues the state, he mediates between political factions, and he tries to protect the *salus civitatis*. His intellectual abilities (*ingenium*) and his eloquence, praised in book 1, return in book 2 as instruments to represent the citizens and safeguard the constitution.[119] What is important is that Cicero's exemplarity is founded on relatively few episodes from his career: the consulship, his relationship with Pompey and Caesar, the Clodius affair, and his great contribution to Roman politics after Caesar's assassination. Moreover, his virtuousness is reduced to a couple of qualities (*ingenium, eloquentia, concordia, conservator reipublicae*) which are often

[119] CHRIST 2003: 66–67 has noted Velleius' special interest in the 'intellectual hero', himself examining Velleius' portrayal of Scipio Aemilianus.

based on Ciceronian slogans. Crucial Roman ethical concepts such as *constantia* and *virtus* occur only once and without much elaboration. Finally, the *Philippics* play a special role for Cicero's exemplary assets: not only because they attest of Cicero's divine eloquence and his defence of freedom, but also because they illustrate Antony's immoral conduct. With the *Philippics*, Cicero offered an important model of resistance against the anti-republican movement, and, in other words, a testimonium of republican virtue in opposition to Antony's vice.

2.1.2 *Cicero's* humanitas *in Valerius'* Memorable Doings and Sayings

About Valerius Maximus' portrayal of Cicero, Martin Bloomer has remarked: "The Cicero of Valerius' pages is … an ornamental figure, marched out to illustrate apolitical themes."[120] Although 'apolitical' is too strong an interpretation of Valerius' shift of perspective, the republican virtue of his Cicero is rather hard to catch, especially in comparison with the Velleian portrait. Cicero figures in 8 chapters of the *Memorable Doings and Sayings*; Cato the Younger, in comparison, features in 12.[121] The anecdotes about Cicero are of a dispersed nature. It is useful to give a quick overview of the stories where Cicero himself offers models of conduct:[122]

- *De somniis*, 1.7.5: Cicero, when in exile, has a dream about Marius, which is interpreted as an omen that he will be recalled from exile (and he is, shortly thereafter).
- The *arcana consilia* of the senators (*patres conscripti*), 2.2.3: Apollonius Molon, the first foreign visitor of a senate meeting, is introduced here as the one who "honed the studies of Cicero"[123] (*qui studia M. Cice-*

[120] Bloomer 1992: 191. Similarly, Maslakov 1984: 484, "What we see from the above sequence of exempla in Valerius (and Cicero) is that in the context of public political debate and in the courtroom these controversial characters became mere shadows of their disputed selves … they were transformed into mere allusions, verbal symbols conveying a single message."

[121] On Cato, see § 2.2.1 below.

[122] Compare the discussion by Sillett 2015: 219–223, which is very brief and is followed by an analysis of Valerius' use of Ciceronian sources; Cicero's political exemplarity is not Sillett's main concern.

[123] Translation by Shackleton Bailey 2000.

ronis acuit), who is called the "supreme power of Roman eloquence" (*summam vim Romanae eloquentiae*).
- *Qui ex inimicitiis iuncti sunt amicitia aut necessitudine*, 4.2.4: Cicero's extraordinary humanity (*humanitas praecipua*). He defended A. Gabinius on a charge of *repetundae*; P. Vatinius he defended twice.
- *Idem*, 4.2.5: Cicero inspired P. Clodius with his deeds of kindness, who himself defended one Lentulus after having been himself accused by this man.
- *De ingratis*, 5.3.4: Popillius Laenas murders Cicero even though the latter had defended him in the past, and without any personal cause. Valerius describes Cicero's death as a criminal offence.
- *De testibus*, 8.5.5: Cicero testified in the case of Clodius, but his testimony is rejected.
- *Quantum momentum sit in pronuntiatione et apto motu corporis*, 8.10.3: Cicero's *In defence of Gallio* illustrates how an orator can expose at the same time a fault in the oratory of the opposing advocate and make an argument (*pariter et oratoris vitium detexit et causae periclitantis argumentum adiecit*); Valerius quotes from the speech.[124]
- *De mortibus non vulgaribus*, 9.12.7: as praetor, Cicero oversaw the trial of C. Licinius Macer, who committed suicide in order to escape dishonourable punishment. Cicero refrains from pronouncing a verdict, thus saving the man's legacy and fortune.

Apart from these references to Cicero's public career, Valerius also used Cicero's writings as sources for anecdotes about other famous men.[125] In a chapter on old age, Valerius recounts that Masinissa king of Numidia was known for his power of endurance, the source of his information being, as he tells us, Cicero's *On Old Age*.[126] In contrast to Velleius, who frequently echoes Ciceronian phrases, Valerius is less keen on employing Ciceronian catchphrases.[127]

As the above overview indicates, Valerius pays little attention to

[124] Cf. Val. Max. 8.10.3, with Cic. *Brut*. 278. Valerius quotes only the first line of a long fragment in the *Brutus*: *tu istud, M. Calidi, nisi fingeres, sic ageres?* (Cicero has *istuc* for *istud*). Cf. Briscoe 2019: 172–174.

[125] It is generally known that Cicero's oeuvre was an important source for Valerius' compendium; an accurate overview of the bibliography on this subject is provided in Briscoe 2019: 6. Briscoe also gives us some idea of how pervasive Cicero's influence on Valerius' choice of *exempla* was at 7–8; cf. Wardle 1998: 16–18 and Sillett 2015: 223–236.

[126] Val. Max. 8.13 ext. 1.

[127] There is one notable instance in 8.5.5, see below. According to Keeline 2018: 129 this is what connects the works of early imperial writers with the rhetorical schools, where one recognizes the "declamatory pattern of talking about Cicero in Cicero's own words".

Cicero's *cursus honorum*. Cicero's political failures and successes chiefly provide the historical setting for more personal human experiences that Valerius wants to illustrate. The *exemplum* in chapter 1.7, on dreams (or on apparitions in dreams; *quam certis imaginibus multorum quies adumbrata sit*),[128] illustrates this tendency. The source for the dream about Marius is Cicero's *On Divination*, which Valerius does not mention, but he does contextualize the dream right away as happening "when Cicero was driven from the city by a band of his enemies" (*inimicorum conspiratione urbe pulsus M. Cicero*).[129] In *Div*. 1.59, the story about Marius' appeareance in Cicero's dream forms the climax of a series of exempla by which Quintus, the interlocutor in book 1, discusses the value of dreams as evidence for divination.[130] Valerius imitates the structure of the passage in *On Divination*,[131] which dramatizes the dream as a divine comment on Cicero's political exile and as an encouragement not to lose hope. Similarly, he interprets the dream as a turning point for Cicero, whose recall was proposed soon afterwards; Valerius closes the *exemplum* by noting that a proposal for Cicero's return was passed in "Marius' temple of Jupiter".[132] However, while the story clearly touches upon one of the crucial episodes of Cicero's career, the exile caused by his combat against the Catilinarian conspirators, this *exemplum* does not attribute to him any specific virtue.

The decision not to attribute particular republican virtues to Cicero's deeds forms a consistent pattern in the *Memorable Doings and Sayings*. Surprisingly, while Catiline and his conspiracy are mentioned multiple times as models of vice, they are not once brought into connection

[128] Val. Max. 1.7 *praef*.

[129] Cf. Wardle 1998: 225–227; Bozzi 1999 (non vidi). Val. Max. 4.2.4 provides another example of such 'nonchalant' political contextualization of exempla from Cicero's career (the trials of A. Gabinius and P. Vatinius).

[130] Schultz 2014: 110–111, 133–135; Wardle 2006: 206–208, 252–256.

[131] Several of the examples in Val. Max. 1.7 are also taken over from *On Divination*. For an overview, see Wardle 1998: 216–217.

[132] *Nam in aede Iovis Mariana senatus consultum de reditu est eius factum*. As Wardle 2006: 255–256 and Schultz 2014: 134 explain (but both too succinctly to be fully understandable), Valerius confuses two separate meetings where Cicero's recall was effected: a first in May 57 which exhorted a citizen's assembly at the temple of *Honos et Virtus*, erected by Marius, to support Cicero's restoration (*Sest*. 116–117), and a second in July 57, where the senate officially voted for his recall.

[133] Val. Max. 2.8.7, 4.8.3 (*Catilinae furor*), 9.1.9 (Catiline as a model for *luxuria* and *libido*), 9.11.3 (Catiline's phrase *ruina extinguam*); cf. 5.8.5 on the severity of A. Fulvius, whose son was one of the conspirators.

with Cicero.[133] Instead, in a chapter (2.8) on "military discipline", C. Antonius, Cicero's co-consul, is presented as the "conqueror of Catiline" (*Catilinae victor*), who brought back "swords wiped clean" to the camp.[134] Cicero's consulate, the most celebrated moment of his career, therefore remains in the periphery of Valerius' exemplary discourse. The same goes for Cicero's 'Philippic period', which is briefly touched upon in the story of his death. Contrary to expectation, perhaps, this story as a whole serves to exemplify the vice of ingratitude, which is impersonated by Popillius Laena, Cicero's murderer, whom the orator had once defended in trial "with as much scrupulousness as eloquence" (*non minore cura quam eloquentia*).[135] Popillius, shamelessly rejoicing in the task bestowed on him by Antony, is also the protagonist of the exemplum. Yet despite Cicero's secondary role in this *exemplum*, Popillius' vice is still amplified by the contrast with his extremely dignified victim:

> *Et virum mitto quod amplissimae dignitatis, certe salutari studio praesentis officii privatim sibi venerandum, iugulum praebere iussit, ac protinus caput Romanae eloquentiae et pacis clarissimam dexteram per summum et securum otium amputavit.*[136]
>
> And he ordered the man who should have been honoured by him, I won't say because of his complete authority, but at least because of the ready service and his care to save him privately, to offer his throat, and without further ado cut off the head of Roman eloquence and the very famous hand of peace, at the height of his secure leisure.

Valerius rounds off his *exemplum* with the familiar trope that "there are no adequate words to revile this despicable monster, since there is no second Cicero who can lament worthily enough such misfortune as Cicero experienced" (*invalidae ad hoc monstrum suggillandum litterae, quoniam qui talem Ciceronis casum satis digne deplorare possit alius Cicero non exstat*).[137] The virtue ascribed here to Cicero is his public eloquence. While in Velleius' compendium we saw that Velleius sub-

[134] *Ibid.* 2.8.7: *C. etiam Antonius, Catilinae victor, abstersos gladios in castra rettulit.*

[135] Note that the virtue of *cura* is also attributed to Cicero by Velleius, in his description of Cicero's consular achievements (2.34.3). On the (apparently declamatory) topic of Popillius killing Cicero, cf. Sen. *Contr.* 7.2; KEELINE 2018: 102–105, 111–114 and 125–127 (on Valerius).

[136] Val. Max. 5.3.4.

[137] This turn of phrase is perhaps modelled on Livy: see his epitaph of Cicero in Sen. *Suas.* 6.22. KEELINE 2018: 127 argues the trope is common in the declamatory schools.

ordinates Cicero's oratory to his goal of defending the state, Valerius' portrayal is more stereotypical in deploying the image of Cicero as the fountainhead of Roman eloquence. The addition that Popillius killed Cicero while he was enjoying *otium* (which seems to neglect Cicero's public action in 43 BC), strengthens the image of Cicero the intellectual at the cost of Cicero the politician.

If we look at other *exempla* where Cicero's public position is taken into account, one cannot escape the idea that Valerius was most interested in the orator Cicero. At one point he even imitates the Ciceronian imagery of militant oratory or eloquence as arms. In a chapter on authorative men standing witness (*De testibus*), the compiler notes that Cicero was rejected as a witness "in the camp of his own eloquence" (*in ipsis eloquentiae suae castris*), even though he had acquired the highest honours in his campaign on the forum (*forensi militia*) and the highest status in society (*amplissimumque dignitatis locum*)".[138] This interest in Cicero's advocacy is confirmed by the fact that, excepting Valerius' definition of Cicero as *caput Romanae eloquentiae*, the only virtue explicitly attributed to Cicero is *humanitas*. In an *exemplum* in book 4 about friend- and fiendship, which abounds in references to the inflammable political atmosphere of the first-century Republic, including Cicero's own contribution to it, the only conclusion Valerius draws on Cicero's conduct is that it attests of kindness and good manners. As he says, this manifested itself in extraordinary measure in his defence of Aulus Gabinius, who had expelled Cicero from Rome, and in his double defence of P. Vatinius, who always showed ill-will towards his reputation (*dignitati suae semper infestum*). Cicero's kindness did not result in a reputation for inconsistency (*sine ullo crimine levitatis*), Valerius says, but in certain praise (*cum aliqua laude*).[139] It even inspired his "archenemy" Clodius (*inimicissimus illi P. Pulcher*) to display similar kindness.[140]

In conclusion, Valerius is interested in different aspects of Cicero's career than Velleius, and has selected material from his life that emphasizes his general contribution to society instead of his political ambi-

[138] Val. Max. 8.5.5: *M. Cicero forensi militia summos honores amplissimumque dignitatis locum adeptus, nonne in ipsis eloquentiae suae castris testis abiectus est…*

[139] *Ibid.* 4.2.4.

[140] *Ibid.* 4.2.5. Note that Clodius is also mentioned 8.5.5, where Cicero is said to testify in his trial.

tions. There is no mention of specific republican ideals, and Cicero is not made to represent any particular virtues except *humanitas* and *eloquentia*. In fact, Valerius' remark that Cicero was killed *in otio* strongly favours an image of Cicero whose main value lies in his writing career. Valerius' *Memorable Doings and Sayings* thus paints a fairly limited picture of a very versatile man. He only mentions political events, like the exile or the fight against Antony, in passing, and presents a Cicero who can represent all kinds of values and activities connected with the life of a Roman aristocrat.

However, despite this eclectic portrait, one cannot deny the exemplary status Cicero has for Valerius' compendium.[141] There is no place in the works of Valerius (or Velleius, for that matter) where Cicero is *not* a public figure. Cicero's main value for Valerius' work does not lie in any particular virtues, but in the fact that his deeds, as a whole and on a more abstract level, illustrates Valerius' ideal of exemplarity: Cicero's life, in an implicit manner, exemplifies the experiences of a Roman elite civilian and intellectual, with which the imperial reader could identify, and which offered him a framework to think about his own public life. As I have discussed above, this is one of the main functions of the Roman discourse of exemplarity: to establish ethical norms and serve as a catalyst for reflection on morality. Finally, we should not overlook the fact that Cicero's leading role is also thematized in the final *exemplum* discussed above, where he inspires Clodius to adopt honest behaviour towards his rivals. He also explicitly guides and inspires others to adopt proper behaviour—a key feature of any model of exemplarity.

2.2 CATO AS THE DEFINITION OF ROMAN *VIRTUS*

2.2.1 Valerius Maximus on Cato's complete civic virtue

The *exempla* about Cato's life differ from those taken from Cicero's career in that Cato is presented, by both Velleius and Valerius, as the summit or the incarnation of Roman *virtus* itself. The early imperial writers, including Lucan who will be discussed in § 3, are remarkably

[141] Cf. Sillett 2015: 223.

unanimous when it comes to the analysis of Cato's republicanism and his contribution to society: key concepts are *virtus* and moral leadership (also as a form of exemplary modelling).[142]

As mentioned above, the *Memorable Doings and Sayings* has 12 *exempla* concerning Cato which commemorate him for several core Roman virtues, such as *maiestas*, *fortitudo*, or *dignitas*. I will list them here:

- *De maiestate*, 2.10.7: Cato filibusters in the senate against Caesar's agrarian law and is thrown into prison by Caesar. The entire senate sides with Cato, causing Caesar to change his mind.
- *Idem*, 2.10.8: Cato's behaviour at the *Ludi Florales* causes the Roman citizens to change custom with regard to the performance of the actresses; Valerius subsequently praises Cato as the ideal Roman citizen (see below).
- *De gravitate*, 3.1.2a: a story from Cato's childhood in which he refuses to recommend Poppaedius, the leader of the Latin people, to his uncle M. Drusus, which Valerius interprets as a token of his early-developed authority and perseverance (*perseverantia*).
- *Idem*, 3.1.2b: another story about Cato as a young boy. When frequenting Sulla's house, he is appalled by the dictator's deeds and expresses the desire to kill him, thus demonstrating his fearlessness.
- *De fortitudine*, 3.2.14: Valerius discusses Cato's suicide as a glorious deed, adding the maxim that noble men should prefer dignitas without life over life without dignitas (*quanto potior esse debeat probis dignitas sine vita quam vita sine dignitate*).
- on dressing contrary to ancient custom, 3.6.7: in presiding over a court case as praetor, Cato appears dressed only in the *toga praetexta*, without a tunic underneath.
- *De moderatione*, 4.1.14: Valerius tells the story of how the senate, after Cato's successful mission to Cyprus, offered him the chance to participate in the praetorian elections *extra ordinem*, with special privileges. He refuses out of modesty and reverence for the law.
- *De abstinentia et continentia*, 4.3.2: when in Asia, Cato, who was commissioned to retrieve money for the treasury at Cyprus, showed an extraordinary abstinence from luxuriousness and from profit. Valerius concludes by saying that Cato and continence were born from the same womb of Nature (*ex eodem Naturae utero et continentia nata est et Cato*).

[142] Goar 1987: 31–49 and Pecchiura 1965: 53–86 review Cato's presence in Tiberian and Neronian literature, but, especially in their analysis of the Tiberian texts, focus too much on the rhetorical aspects.

- *Idem*, 4.3.12: obeying ancient rules of modesty (*prisca continentia*), Cato the Younger possessed only twelve slaves.
- *Libere dicta aut facta*, 6.2.5: Cato is identified with the concept of *libertas*, in the sense of speaking one's mind freely.[143] Valerius relates an episode from Cato's career when he was on a jury and voided a testimonial by Pompey; what appears to be audacity in another is recognized as self-confidence in Cato (*quae in alio audacia videretur, in Catone fiducia cognoscitur*).
- *De repulsis*, 7.5.6: Valerius tells of Cato's failure to obtain the praetorship in 55, and comments that this was a grave error of the Roman people.
- *De industria*, 8.7.2: on Cato's arduous desire for learning (*doctrina*). He is said to have taken Greek books into the curia to read while the senate was assembling.

While these *exempla* as a whole could certainly profit from closer study, I will concentrate in this section on the two *exempla* in book 2. Here, Valerius thematizes his model function for other citizens, having included scenes from Cato's life where his moral excellence inspires and instructs others.

Throughout the *Memorable Doings and Sayings*, Valerius frames Cato as a statesman who stands in a long tradition of famous Roman military and political leaders. Cato's political authority becomes especially clear in chapters 2.9 and 2.10, two chapters which discuss the *nota censoria*, 'the moral control of the censor', and *maiestas*, the type of political authority which Valerius compares to a form of *privata censura*, 'private censorship'. In 2.9.3, Valerius reports an event that happened during the censorship of Cato the Elder, who took away the senatorship of L. Flaminius, an ex-consul, because of immoral behaviour. This action demonstrated how Cato the Elder was a "double model of severity, being Censor as well as Cato" (*et censor et Cato, duplex severitatis exemplum*). In the next chapter, then, which concerns similar but this time unofficial instances of severity, the reader encounters not one but two *exempla* regarding Censorius' great-grandson Cato. The reader is clearly invited to see a connection between the behaviour of the two Porcii; at the same time, Valerius thematizes familial ancestry as the basis for Cato the Younger's public career.

[143] Cf. e.g. Sen. *Constant.* 2.2; *Ep.* 13.14, 14.13, where Cato is connected with libertas as the republican institution instead of freedom of mind. See also § 1.3. Cato's exemplary freedom of speech will be developed further in chapter 3, § 2.3.

In 2.10, Cato the Younger is compared to Roman military heroes, whose achievements in war were crucial to the history of the Republic; the chapter has *exempla* from the lives of Quintus Metellus Numidicus,[144] Scipio Africanus the Elder, Aemilius Paullus, Scipio Aemilianus, Publius Rutilius, and Gaius Marius. Cato's military pursuits do not seem to measure up to those of the leaders mentioned here, but for Valerius the comparison lies in their immense public authority. Valerius explains the theme of chapter 2.10, *maiestas*, as a moral authority which is awarded to (states)men whose conduct is immaculous. Admiration is an important part of it: as Valerius says, "it flows into the hearts of men with a grateful and pleasing way of entering, clothed in the adornment of admiration".[145] The stories told in 2.10 deal with the honours paid to great Roman generals not by Roman citizens alone but also by foreign peoples. The story about the pirates that visited the house of Scipio Africanus not as *hostes* but as *virtutis admiratores* is as bizarre as it is illustrative for the effect of a great general's magnificence.[146]

In his introduction of Cato in 2.10.7, Valerius echoes his initial definition of *maiestas* in the preface: it was *admiration* for Cato's brave and honest lifestyle (*admiratio fortis et sincerae vitae*) that made him venerable (*venerabilis*) to the senate. A first *exemplum* of Cato's *maiestas*, then, concerns his role in the senate in 59 BC, during Caesar's consulship, where his filibustering prevented Caesar's new agrarian law from being accepted. Caesar became so annoyed by Cato's behaviour that he threw him into prison. The *maiestas* of Cato is proven not by his recalcitrant behaviour, but by the fact that the whole senate (*universus senatus*) followed Cato to the prison. This event, Valerius notes, even made Caesar's 'divine' mind waver; something, we can add, which did not happen often, and perhaps constitutes the reason why Valerius, who generally expresses an admiration for Caesar, included this story.[147]

[144] Cf. *Att.* 1.16.4.

[145] Val. Max. 2.10 *praef.*: *grato enim et iucundo introit animis hominum allabitur, admirationis praetexto velata*.

[146] *Ibid.* 2.10.2b.

[147] A remark in Val. Max. 2.1.10 gives a good idea of Valerius' opinion towards Caesar and his successors. After recalling the Camilli, Scipiones, Fabricii, and Marcelli, he checks himself, saying: "but before I take too long in running through every single luminary individual of our empire, from there, I say, the most splendid part of heaven, the divine Caesars shone" (*ac ne singula imperii nostri lumina simul percurrendo sim longior, inde, inquam, caeli clarissima pars, divi fulserunt Caesares*). Cf. 1.6.12–13 on Caesar's divinely sanctioned defeat of Pompey in 48.

The second *exemplum* of Cato's *maiestas*, in 2.10.8, illustrates Cato's function as a public, ethical model. The story tells how during the *Ludi Florales* Cato and his friend Favonius attended a theatre show.[148] The people wanted the actresses to take off their clothes, but were afraid to ask for this in the presence of Cato. As soon as Cato heard about this from Favonius he left the theatre, for he was afraid to interfere with the people's custom. The people, however, just like the senate in the previous *exemplum*, followed Cato outside with enormous applause. They moreover demanded that old theatrical customs were reintroduced (involving no nakedness) since they "admitted that they attributed more majesty to Cato alone than they would claim for their entire crowd (*sibi universo*)".[149] The key word *universus*, which in 2.10.7 was also used for the senate following Cato, returns here. It emphasizes the contrast between Cato as a unique individual and a very large group of 'normal' citizens (who remain unidentified). Secondly, *universus* signifies Cato's ability to unite whole groups of people by his singular virtuousness.

The plot of the Valerian *exemplum* illustrates rather well the exemplary loop described by Matthew Roller.[150] It describes an act by Cato, which is done in front of a public audience; it is openly admired and acknowledged,[151] and finally it leads to a reflection on the existing norms, which are adjusted in imitation of Cato's behaviour. Considered in this way, the *exemplum* about Cato's *maiestas* elucidates the process of exemplarity itself. It also leads Valerius to draw explicit conclusions on the importance of Cato as a political and ethical model. The description of the scene in the theatre culminates in an enthusiastic *laudatio* of Cato's *virtus* by the author:

> *Quibus opibus, quibus imperiis, quibus triumphis hoc datum est? Exiguum viri patrimonium, astricti continentia mores, modicae clientelae, domus ambitioni clausa, paterni generis una ill<ustris> imago, minime blanda*

[148] Cf. Sen. *Ep.* 97.8.

[149] Val. Max. 2.10.8: *Quem abeuntem ingenti plausu populus prosecutus priscum morem iocorum in scaenam revocarunt, confessus plus se maiestatis uni illi tribuere quam sibi universo vindicare.*

[150] Roller 2004: 4–6; see above, §1.2.1.

[151] Roller's model demands an official act of commemoration; we might say that this act is implicitly confirmed by its inclusion in Valerius' compendium. Cato's action became monumentalized in the literary exempla tradition. We do not have Valerius' source for this exemplum; Themann-Steinke 2008: 564 gives only later parallels.

> *frons, sed omnibus numeris perfecta virtus, quae quidem effecit ut quisquis sanctum et egregium civem significare velit, sub nomine Catonis definiat.*[152]
>
> To what resources, what military command, what triumphs was such credit given? The man's patrimony was small, his lifestyle sober due to his self-restraint, his number of clients modest, his house closed to canvassing, of his paternal family there was only one famous ancestor, his appearance was all but charming, but his virtue was perfect on all scores, a virtue which made everyone who wants to indicate a venerable and excellent citizen, to use the name of Cato as a definition.

In his usual rhetorical fashion, Valerius suggests there were no military resources or honours greater than the authority bestowed on Cato at the *Ludi Florales*. This remark seems to distinguish Cato explicitly from the previous examples Valerius had discussed, who were all important generals. Considering his place at the end of a line of *exempla* presented under *maiestas*, Cato seems to be the culmination of the category.[153] Valerius gives a striking account of the different constituent parts of this great personality. Everything that makes Cato into what he is, is actually rather simple and small, which is indicated by a group of words related to small size: he has an *exiguum* inheritance, his *mores* or way of life are *astricti*, confined, he has a *modica* clientele, and his house is closed to *ambitio*, the means by which Cato could win more political followers. He further has but one, *una*, illustrious ancestor, Cato Censorius, and his appearance is *minime* appealing. Rhetorically, Valerius could not have made the contrast any greater between these characteristics and what is now to come.[154] *Sed* marks the antithesis: for on all counts, *omnibus numeris*, Cato's *virtus* is *perfecta*, complete. In contrast to the lack and the modest size of many things, Cato shows a *complete* fulfilment of character. And Valerius continues to expand on this statement: all those who want to circumscribe an outstanding citizen (*quisquis sanctum et egregium civem significare velit*) could refer to the name of Cato by way of a descriptive category or definition (*sub nomine Catonis definiat*). From the historical individual Cato, in the story about

[152] Val. Max. 2.10.8.

[153] Bloomer 1992: 28 acknowledges this as a particular tendency of Valerius: "Within a chapter *exempla* are joined in a sort of hierarchy as if the individual anecdotes were steps leading to the perfect manifestation of the quality in question." Cf. Maslakov 1984: 472–475.

[154] On the rhetorical structure of this passage, Themann-Steinke 2008: 562–563.

the festival, Valerius extrapolates a general category of complete civic virtue. This line of thinking is familiar from Cicero's letters, who attests this phenomenon already for the republican period (see § 1): the name is used as a symbol for the ideals of the man. However, while Cicero's 'Cato' stood for ultimate republicanism, Valerius' 'Cato' represents the perfectly virtuous *citizen*. Political ideals have been exchanged for more general civic virtue(s).

Apart from being a good example of Roller's 'loop', the *exemplum* of Cato's *maiestas* illustrates the relevance of the model function of a Roman magistrate with regard to the people. While exempla, as § 2 has demonstrated, are often presented as showcases of ethical models of conduct,[155] Cato here displays a public type of action which goes beyond the (philosophically) ethical, and is inspiring on two levels. On a basic moral level, he inspires abstinence from the lower, carnal pleasures: the nakedness of the actresses would appeal to the desires of the flesh instead of the intellect. On the public level, Cato inspires the people to return to an ancient civic institution or custom (*priscum morem* in 2.10.8). Apart from being a stimulus for personal, moral behaviour, Cato can instigate his fellow citizens to rethink and alter collective regulations. By this line of reasoning the term *universus*, which is used both in 2.10.7 and 2.10.8, acquires a deeper meaning. It is the collective level that leads to Valerius' *laudatio Catonis* as a 'premium' citizen: the value of Cato is recognized and expressed from the perspective of the public sphere. The Cato of Valerius' chapter on *maiestas* is noteworthy because he is a *civis Romanus* and is capable of being a leader to other *cives*.

2.2.2 *Superior Cato in Velleius Paterculus'* Roman History

In Velleius' History, just like in Valerius' memorabilia, Cato also appears prominently as someone who embodies Roman virtue. He first appears in the account of the Catilinarian conspiracy, and is included in

[155] With regard to Valerius, SKIDMORE 1996 is probably the best example of such an approach: he reads the *Memorable Doings and Sayings* as a handbook of ethics for Roman gentleman. For the more democratic view that Valerius' work is a much broader reflection of popular ethics and the idea that all Valerian *exempla* are imbued with a particular social and civic meaning, see MORGAN 2007: 122–159, by whose work I have been much inspired myself.

four other episodes of Velleius' *Roman History*.[156] In discussing Cato's performance in the senate on 5 December, Velleius presents, like Sallust had in Cat. 52,[157] his speech as an infectious display of patriotism:

> *Ille senatus dies quo haec acta sunt virtutem M. Catonis, iam multis in rebus conspicuam atque praenitentem, in altissimo culmine illuminavit. … Hic genitus proavo M. Catone, principe illo familiae Porciae, homo virtuti simillimus et per omnia ingenio diis quam hominibus propior, qui numquam recte fecit, ut facere videretur, sed quia aliter facere non potuerat, cuique id solum visum est rationem habere, quod haberet iustitiam, omnibus humanis vitiis immunis semper fortunam in sua potestate habuit … tanta vi animi atque ingenii invectus est in coniurationem, eo ardore oris orationem omnium lenitatem suadentium societate consilii suspectam fecit, sic impendentia ex ruinis incendiisque urbis et commutatione status publici pericula exposuit, ita consulis virtutem amplificavit ut universus senatus in eius sententiam transiret …* [158]
>
> That day in the senate, when these matters were discussed, the light of Cato's excellence, which had been illustrious and outstanding in many cases already, reached the sky. … He, a descendant of his great-grandfather M. Cato, that chief ancestor of the Porcia family, was a man with the greatest resemblance to Virtus, and through his genius nearer in everything to the gods than to men, someone who didn't act correctly in order to make an impression, but because he couldn't act otherwise. To him the only thing that held sense was that which contained justice, and immune to every human fault he always kept fortune within his own control. … With such strength of mind and genius he inveighed against the conspirators, with that fire of speaking he made the words of all that advertised mildness suspect by suggesting involvement in the conspiracy, he expounded in such a way on the impending danger of destructtion and fire in the city and a change in the current political situation, he contributed so much to the virtue of the consul, that it resulted in the entire senate taking over his motion …

[156] Vell. Pat. 2.45.4–5, Clodius more or less expels Cato to Cyprus, after getting rid of Cicero, but Cato fulfils this mission formidably, with *integritas* and a tinge of *insolentia* (refusing to disembark and greet his fellow senators when arriving in Rome with the treasury); 2.47.4–5 on the Milo trial (see below); 2.49.3, at the beginning of the civil war, Cato says he would rather die than accept that one citizen receives sole rule over the Republic; 2.54.3 on his Libyan march and his refusal to lead Pompey's troops.

[157] See chapter 1, § 3.3.

[158] Vell. Pat. 2.35.

This passage has been read variously as proof of the influence of the rhetorical schools on Velleius' structure and themes, or as a confirmation of the Stoic elements of Cato's imperial reputation.[159] Indeed, Velleius' remark that Cato "always seemed to keep *fortuna* within his own control" as well as his reference to Cato's *iustitia* (a cardinal virtue) could represent Stoic philosophical thought. However, the Stoic concepts are subservient here to the portrayal of Cato as a balanced and equitable statesman. *Fortuna* is a more generally used historical concept in Velleius' historiography;[160] and the *iustitia* that Cato is said to hold as his ultimate guiding principle is also very much a political idea. *Iustitia* was one of the central concepts for the *exempla virtutis* of the Roman historical tradition. Moreover, in Velleius' text it carries a particular political (imperial) connotation, since it was one of the values celebrated in Tiberian propaganda.[161] As a whole, this description of Cato's attitude towards the conspirators confirms the idea of Cato's excellent citizenship as it figures in Valerius' work. Note that again, as we have seen in Valerius 2.10.8, the *universus senatus* is said to place itself on Cato's side. One single man was able to convince the entire citizen body to follow his opinions.

It has been noted more often that the texts of the *Roman History* and the *Memorable Doings and Sayings* show signs of a common ideological framework, both moral and political,[162] and that Valerius' and Velleius'

[159] See Elefante 1997 *ad loc*. for an emphasis on the rhetorical structure. Goar 1987: 31–32 selects this passage for discussion because of the reminiscences of Sallust's portrait of Cato and of Cicero's *Cato* which he recognizes in the "Stoic ideas" of "Cato's equation of *ratio* with *iustitia*" and the ability to keep fortune in hand.

[160] *Fortuna* also figures dominantly in Velleius' description of Caesar's deeds, e.g. Vell. Pat. 2.51, 55. Cf. Balmaceda 2017: 140; for *fortuna* in Velleius, Schmitzer 2000: 190–225, with bibliography.

[161] On *iustitia* in Velleius, see Schmitzer 2011; for *iustitia* as a general Roman virtue in *exempla*, see Litchfield 1914. Levick 1976: 89 discusses *iustitia* as a central value within Tiberius' reign (and points to the fact that it was also one of the virtues commemorated on the *Clipeus Virtutis* set up in the curia for Augustus in 27 BC). Cf. Weileder 1998: 55–56 on Val. Max. 6.5, a chapter devoted to *iustitia*, "of which among all nations our state is the most eminent and surest example" (*eius autem praecipuum et certissimum inter omnes gentes nostra civitas exemplum est*). For *virtus* in Velleius, see Balmaceda 2017: 129–156, who does not suggest any philosophical reading of the characterization of Cato, at 135. In general, Balmaceda distinguishes two kinds of virtus in Velleius: the military interpretation, *virilis virtus*, and the moral interpretation, *humana virtus*. Cicero and Cato then possess both kinds of *virtus*. *Iustitia* as a central virtue is mentioned only four times in book 2: once regarding Q. Catulus in 2.32, once with respect to Cato's *virtus*, and twice in association with Tiberius' reign, 2.118 and 126.

[162] See Jacquemin 1998: 150; Wiegand 2013.

treatment of Cato is also remarkably similar in their emphasis on Cato's virtue.[163] I would add that the Tiberian image of Cato (as we have it) is also remarkably uniform in its emphasis on Cato's exemplary role as a model of conduct within Roman politics. Let us look at Velleius' report of the death of Clodius and the trial of Milo in 47.4–5, where he adds the following about Cato:

> *Quem quidem M. Cato palam lata absolvit sententia. Qui si maturius tulisset, non defuissent qui sequerentur exemplum probarentque eum civem occisum, quo nemo perniciosior rei publicae neque bonis inimicior vixerat.*[164]
>
> On his behalf then M. Cato publicly brought forward a motion of acquittal. If he had done so earlier, there would have been men who followed his example and approved of the murder of this citizen who knew no equal in being destructive for the Republic and hostile to the good men.

The language is Ciceronian: the *perniciosus rei publicae civis* and *inimicus bonis*, with the comparative forms lending extra force to the adjectives, reminds us of Cicero's words about Clodius (among others).[165] Indeed, for the portrayal of Clodius and of his trial, Cicero's speeches offered ample documentation, and the reader might have expected a comment about Cicero's involvement in it. Yet Cicero's figure is absent from this account. Instead, in Velleius' representation of events it is Cato who is said to denounce Clodius, and to vote for Milo's acquittal. As in Velleius' report of the Catilinarian debate, Cato is here described as the one who is able to persuade other senators into voting for his motion. Unfortunately, in this case his motion comes too late—but, Velleius says, if it had been brought forward earlier, some senators would definitely have followed his vote. Cato's conduct is presented as a model for others, an *exemplum*. Like Valerius, Velleius reflects in this passage upon the leading role Cato assumes, or rather, *receives* by his fellow citizens. Similar to the Valerian Cato, Velleius' Cato is able to unify groups of men into making a decision that serves the well-being

[163] Cf. Pecchiura 1965: 53–58; Goar 1987: 31–35.

[164] Val. Max. 2.47.5.

[165] Cicero on Clodius as *perniciosus civis*: *Mil.* 82, *Phil.* 8.16 (cf. Woodman 1983: 76); the phrase *inimicus bonis* is implicitly brought into relation to Clodius in *Red. sen.* 26–27 (there: *vocem inimicam bonis*). This also seems to be the only instance where Cicero uses the adjective *inimicus* with the dative plural *bonis*.

of the Republic. The entire senate's adherence to Cato's opinion in the Milo case refers back to the consensus he created in the senate during the debate on the Catilinarian conspirators in chapter 2.35. Velleius' use of the term *exemplum* here is an allusion to Cato's unique status as an exemplary protector of Rome.

As we have seen, the most important elements we distinguished for *exempla* and exemplary discourse in general, return in the characterization of Cato. His model behaviour ultimately pertains to (Roman) citizenship and civic ideals; and a peculiar mark of his leadership is that he knows how to create consensus among large groups of people. Moreover, the *virtus* he possesses is not an aim in itself but rather an inclination to act rightly and justly and to benefit the community. Several political episodes from Cato's career are especially suitable to illustrate his ethical superiority. The decisions Cato makes, or refuses to make, are commonly employed by Valerius and Velleius to demonstrate his integrity and other excellent qualities that flow from this. At the point in the narrative where Cato returns from Cyprus, his boat full of riches and received by a cheering crowd on the banks of the Tiber, which he duly ignores by sailing on to the allocated place of embankment, Velleius notes that this is the kind of *integritas* it would be wrong to praise:[166] it is so dominating and splendid that it rejects all possible judgment. This kind of superlative description of Cato is also part of Valerius' discussion of Cato's *maiestas*. Furthermore, though Valerius does not award Cato such elaborate praise after book 2, the reader is also reminded of it in stories about his childhood, the story of his death (which would have been a *clarissimus excessus*, done *constantissime* and with *gravitas*), his unusual dress, or finally his conduct as governor of Cyprus that showed him to be born from the same womb as *Continentia* herself.[167] These kinds of *exempla* turn Cato into an important figure in popular morality as well as in historical writing; the intertwining of ethical and political themes defines Cato's reputation as civic authority.

[166] Vell. Pat. 2.45.5: *cuius integritatem laudari nefas est*.

[167] Val. Max. 3.1.1–2, 3.2.14, 3.6.7, 4.3.12, respectively. See the list above in § 2.2.1.

2.3 CONCLUSIONS

In the Tiberian accounts of republican history, the exemplary nature of both Cicero's and Cato's deeds is often confirmed by reference to specific political behaviour or social status. It is noteworthy that the vignettes frequently thematize a kind of moral sensibility which is perfect on the level of individual action, but in such a way that it also offers models for other citizens. The *virtus* Velleius and Valerius describe is a synonym for patriotism and the concern for fellow citizens. While Cicero and Cato are equal representants of the aristocratic political culture of the Republic, there is a difference in the types of values with which they are identified. Cicero is in fact situated by Velleius and Valerius alike at the heart of Roman politics, but he is a versatile figure. Eloquence and advocacy are popular concepts by which his contribution to Roman society is framed, but even these do not cover all aspects of Cicero's performance in the Tiberian sources. This difficulty is made greater by the differences between the Velleian and the Valerian portraits of Cicero; Velleius still emphasizes Cicero's role as political mediator and *conservator rei publicae*, but Valerius seems more interested in Cicero's personal (and intellectual) life. A theme that *is* picked up by both authors is the Ciceronian trope about oratory as a weapon in civil strife, which preserves the political foundation of Cicero's rhetorical talents.

Cato's exemplarity, on the other hand, is situated much more explicitly in his illustration of the morality of political action. His decisive actions, as they are described, teaches fellow citizens how moral perfection leads to political authority. His position within exemplary discourse is further strengthened by his ancestry, which forms a narrative thread in the Catonian *exempla*. As we have seen, the *mores* of Cato the Elder function as an introduction to the character portrayal of his great-grandson.[168] The *severitas* and *continentia* which was already part of the reputation of the *gens Porcia* served as an anchor for *exempla* about Cato the Younger.[169]

[168] Much more implicitly, of course, in the case of Valerius, who handles Cato the Elder and the Younger in consecutive chapters (2.9 and 2.10).

[169] This works both ways: see BÜCHER 2006: 258–263 for Cicero's reviving of the *exemplum* of the elder Cato through the *exemplum* of Cato the Younger.

The consensus Cicero is at times said to have created, whether by his mediating skills, by his talent as an advocate, or by his overall intellectual superiority (*humanitas*), is not carried to the point that he really unites the Republic.[170] Instead, Cato receives this characteristic of being able to unite the senate and the people into a harmonious, republican citizen body. The *exempla* from Cicero's life do not discuss any interaction with large(r) groups; in contrast, the tales about Cato's political conduct often address his comportment towards his senatorial colleagues and give him a very marked position among the citizens of Rome. His exemplary quality is embedded in these tales themselves, as we have seen; the process of exemplarity is thematized, and the role of Cato as leading magistrate thus confirmed by the spectators within the account itself.[171] As we will see next, in Lucan's *Civil War* Cicero's exemplary status is further disconnected from republican ideology, whereas Cato's deeds as well as his oratory demonstrate how his whole being is devoted to the leadership of the Roman citizens.

3. Exemplarity as civic leadership in the *Civil War*

3.1 READING LUCAN

In the present analysis of Cato and Cicero, I propose to read the *Civil War*, like the works of Valerius Maximus and Velleius Paterculus, in a historiographical vein. While it is certainly not a work of historiography it does have certain historiographical aims. These aims are, concretely: 1) construing a moral-didactic framework for reflecting on the civil war(s) that caused a transition from republican to autocratic government; 2) inviting readers to use this framework for reflection upon their 'own' Roman history; 3) contributing to the historical commemoration of Rome's great men, by giving context and content to traditional exempla that were part of the Roman collective memory

[170] Cicero had presented himself as doing so. See chapter 1, esp. § 1.2.
[171] See § 1.2.1.

and cultural identity.[172] During the last twenty years or so, scholars have increasingly approached the *Civil War* from the perspective of cultural memory studies.[173] We can push this approach a bit further in comparing Lucan's representation of republican figures to the historical *exempla* in Roman historiography. The *Civil War* restages the Tiberian *exempla* discussed above. My focus will be somewhat different from that adopted by previous scholarship. The idea that the *Civil War* reflects exemplary discourse is not novel, but current attempts to analyse Lucan's treatment of *exempla* have been restricted to a type of reading which searches for a direct comparison between the *exempla* literature and the Lucanian epic. A popular method here is to highlight the rhetorical roots (in declamatory education) of Lucan's character portraits.[174] For the study of Lucan's epic as a more elaborate reworking of *exempla* the work of Joanne Mira Seo is of great relevance, which argues that in fact, through the figure of Cato, the *Civil War* shows the invalidity of the process of exemplarity and in particular of (ethical) imitation, especially in the context of civil war. However, her interpretation is heavily based on the paradigm of Cato *Stoicus*, and it bypasses the fact that Cato, as we will see, is capable of acting as a more general role model for republican patriotism and leadership.[175]

This chapter contends that the *Civil War* provides no passive reflections of the *exempla* tradition, but that the poet actively seeks to modify traditional images of the Roman past, and that he is interacting with

[172] Lucan's interest in the civil war of 49–48 is mostly described in terms of his obsession with libertas. Seewald 2008: 45 states: "der Verlust der republikanischen Freiheit und die Entstehung der Tyrannei durch den Bürgerkrieg ist das zentrale Thema des *Bellum civile*." Cf. e.g. Gagliardi 1976; Thorne 2011; Stover 2008; Narducci 2002: 116–137, 167–183. See also the political reading of the *Civil War* of Shadi Bartsch 1997, who argues that Lucan is trying to illustrate the importance and effect of political ideologies, in order to, at the same time, reject and refute them, vacillating between the two roles of "rebel and nihilist" (9). On the relationship between poetry and history in the *Civil War*, see Grimal 1970, an essential article which makes an argument for "la précision avec laquelle Lucain utilise ses sources historiques" (95); cf. Lintott 1971; Esposito 2018: esp. 39–40 for an 'essential' bibliography. Bartsch 2009: 494 provides a short overview of the question.

[173] Gowing 2005: 82–96 on Lucan's 'memorializing history' is followed by Thorne 2011 and the comprehensive study by Galtier 2018.

[174] See Bonner 1966; Lintott 1971: 498–500. On Cato specifically, Marti 1945: 360–361.

[175] Mira Seo 2013: 92–93, "In his studiedly conventionalized Cato and his numerous emulators, Lucan seems to interrogate the effectiveness of exemplarity, revealing instead the superficiality of imitation, and ultimately the bankruptcy of ideals in a civil war whose ethical boundaries were as uncertain as the boundless deserts of Libya." Cf. also Brouwers 1989 on Cato's status as *exemplar virtutis* in Lucan; he does emphasize the patriotic nature of his virtue.

the original historiographical sources that yielded them. The Lucanian image of Cato incorporates all the elements we have seen in Velleius and Valerius: the strong connection between Cato and *libertas*, his integrity and perfect virtus, his ideal republicanism, and his role as an exemplar for his fellow citizens. Yet whereas in the Tiberian compendia of republican figures and events there is often little elaboration and contextualization, to Lucan a wide range of narrative techniques was available by which he could imbue the traditional *exempla* with new meanings. In my analyses below, I will show how Lucan plays with the narrative potential of the exemplary stories. As noted in § 1.2, *exempla* are by definition a flexible and open genre; Lucan is seen to shift, subvert, and modify the main themes of the *exempla* in Velleius and Valerius. Moreover, each time the *Civil War* represents a major historical figure, it thematizes their public function and the (often disastrous) effect of their decisions on the Roman citizens. In general, this recontextualization—or renarrativization—of *exempla* has the opposite aim of a project like Valerius', who attempted to categorize *exempla* from the past according to specific values and therefore simplified the historical narrative. Placing the deeds of these republican heroes again into a historical context, as in the *Civil War*, breathes new life into the debate about the (political) meaning and complexity of past events.

In this second part of the chapter, I will continue my analysis of the virtues of Cato and Cicero in relation to each other, focusing on books 2, 7, and 9 of the *Civil War*. Cato is an important protagonist in book 2 and in book 9, which features the famous march through the desert of Libya. Cicero figures in book 7, but only for some thirty lines, where he is unhistorically placed in Pompey's army camp in Pharsalus (he had in fact stayed behind, with Cato, at Dyracchium).[176] Both Cicero and Cato are depicted as conservative politicians, members of the optimate party who stand opposed to Caesar's ideology and support Pompey's cause (though not always willingly). In the *Civil War*, there appears a novel point of comparison between the two men: their rhetorical abilities. Contrary to what would be expected, in this game Cicero is the person who draws the last straw. Within the *Civil War* Cato is shown to be the perfect orator, who is able, without exception, to convince his

[176] Lanzarone 2016: 148. Cf. Liv. *Per.* 111; Plut. *Cic.* 39, *Cato Min.* 55.

fellow citizens of the proper course of action. The speech Cicero addresses to Pompey in book 7, on the other hand, is flawed from start to finish, and offers a negative *exemplum* of public leadership. Just like in the material offered by Velleius and Valerius, Cato is used to illustrate exemplary virtue and leadership, and is presented as a model for imitation and instruction. Book 9 will function as a good example for the discourse of exemplarity which I have examined in the first part of this chapter; in addition to demonstrating the criteria for Roman exemplarity, however, it also shows, in a very Lucanian fashion, its limits.[177]

3.2 CATO AS A PARADIGM OF CIVIC VIRTUE AND REPUBLICANISM

Cato is a protagonist in books 2 and 9 of the *Civil War*. The other books feature brief references to his life and career, or his role in the war. Since the scholarly discussion usually focuses on book 2 and/or book 9, it is useful to give an overview of the passages in which Cato plays a role.

- Book 1.120–128. The narrator addresses Pompey and Caesar in a short introduction of these two protagonists of the epic poem. In asking the question of which side is right, the narrator mentions Cato as the 'arbiter' or 'judge' of the party who is conquered (*victrix causa deis placuit, sed victa Catoni* [128]). However, the third major protagonist of the epic, Cato, is placed above the contending parties, and connected with the cause of the Republic—the losing side in this war.
- Book 1.310. Caesar addresses a fiery speech to his army. In a description of the opposing side he mentions Cato explicitly as a member of the *partes in bella togatae*, civilian leaders. He refers to him as *nomina vana*, "empty names", referring to Cato's emblematic stature as protector of the Republic.
- Book 2.234–325. Brutus visits Cato and expresses his anxiety about the civil war, which he believes Cato should stay out of. Cato admits civil war is a crime, but posits that it is his duty and desire to protect Rome and Libertas.
- Book 2.326–371. Cato's sober marriage with Marcia, his former wife. Hortensius, the husband to which Cato himself had given her, has died,

[177] Cf. Johnson 1987, esp. 55–63, and Mira Seo 2013: 66–93.

and Marcia persuades her normally so inflexible husband to marry her again. The narrator describes the ascetic nuptials.
- this description leads to a characterization of Cato by the narrator, equally focusing on his ascetic lifestyle and appearance: 2.372–391. The depiction of Cato's *mores* passes into praise of his (fatherly) concern for the common welfare.
- Book 3.164: Caesar plunders the treasury in the temple of Saturn. The narrator recalls all the venerable treasures assembled here, mentioning also the money Cato brought back from Cyprus for the Roman treasury—a familiar *exemplum* (see § 2.2).
- Book 6 has two short references to Cato's life. In line 311, the narrator refers to 'sacred' Cato's death at Utica as part of all the slaughter that could have been prevented (*nec sancto caruisset vita Catone*). In line 790, as part of Erichto's necromancy, the shadow of Cato the Elder is mentioned, mourning the fate of his progeny, who did not want to end up in slavery (*non servituri maeret Cato fata nepotis*). This is again a reference to Cato's suicide at Utica.
- Book 9, throughout, special episodes being:
  - 9.19–30. Cato wants to continue Pompey's cause now that the Republic is leaderless; he is presented to lead the *partes Libertatis*, a party for Libertas.
  - 9.188–214: Cato gives a funeral speech for Pompey; he concludes by announcing that he will sooner die than live to serve Caesar.
  - 9.215–283: altercation between an anonymous soldier who tries to desert (together with many other Pompeian soldiers) and Cato. Cato convinces the soldiers to maintain the fight for liberty, and mocks their slavish attitude in being willing to fight only for Pompey.
  - 9.255–283: adhortative speech to Pompeian troops.
  - 9.303–949: the march through the desert in Libya, with at 379–406 a battle speech by which Cato prepares his men for the hardships that await them in the desert, and at 564–584 a speech at the oracle of Ammon.
- Book 10.397. The character Pothinus, responsible for Pompey's death, now exhorts his accomplice in that murder to assassinate Caesar; in his speech he refers to the *vota Catonum Brutorumque*, the prayers of Cato and Brutus, which will make them prosper.

In some passages, Cato's name pops up in exemplary fashion: the narrator makes short allusions to specific episodes or deeds, such as the

suicide (which is not represented in Lucan's epic), or the successful mission to Cyprus. In other passages, the *exempla* from Cato's life are represented much more elaborately, such as the relationship with Marcia, whom Cato himself had married off to Hortensius.[178] In books 2 and 9, however, Lucan went far beyond the image from the *exempla* tradition, creating a narrative out of these standard story patterns and integrating the popular subject of Cato's exemplary virtue in the narrative structure of the *Civil War*, where it is used to illustrate his extraordinary patriotism and leadership qualities.

3.2.1 The (re)public(an) man

Cato's performance in the *Civil War* has often been interpreted, in line with the frequent interpretation of his figure as a symbol of Stoicism,[179] as the behaviour of the ideal Stoic sage, who even seeks to transform those around him into fellow Stoics. In response to Cato's frequent experience of emotions, modern scholars have argued that there is something wrong with his Stoicism, whether or not with the purpose of drawing conclusions on Lucan's personal vision on (Stoic) philosophy and politics.[180] We can solve these inconsistencies by taking a different view on Lucan's Cato: I believe that rather than a Stoic sage, Cato is presented as a republican hero and a public man, whose life and identity are strongly connected with the Republic. Although there are clear indications that Lucan was inspired by certain Stoic concepts when he composed his characterization of Cato, the poet nowhere gives evidence that he views Cato's conduct from a perspective other than his political ideology. Within the *Civil War*, philosophy is subservient to the portrayal of political heroes.[181]

[178] On this story, Russo 1974: 100–103; Drogula 2019: 173–175. Cf. Quint. *Inst.* 3.5.11 and 10.5.13 on the marriage as a declamatory subject; Plut. *Cat. Min.* 52.3–5 (featuring a quotation from Caesar's *Anticato* in 52.4); Strabo 11.9.1.

[179] See above, §1.3.

[180] Mira Seo 2013: 66–67, n. 1 briefly sums up the argument. Cf. Sklenář 2003: 63–72, 78–79, 99–100; Bartsch 1997: 118–121 for the argument that Lucan-Cato's Stoicism is flawed (cf. Bartsch 2009: 500–501). Cf. Johnson 1987: 44–66 who asks "Can Lucan really have intended to give us a cruel cartoon of the Stoic saint" (45), and gives a positive answer by pointing to Lucan's apparent disappointment in the Roman political and moral system.

[181] Cf. also Sklenář 2003: 62–63; although he emphasizes the presence of the ideal (or even

Book 2: Cato professes his public engagement

Book 2 of the *Civil War* introduces Cato as an insomniac who cannot think of anything other than the *publica fata virum casusque urbis*.[182] In book 2 of the Civil War, when Cato is introduced in the narrative, one of the first qualities ascribed to him is that he is *securus sui*.[183] In his speech, Brutus, who has come to his uncle to try and stop him from joining the war, further characterizes his uncle as unperturbed and morally upright: Cato is said to possess a *certum robur*, his steps remain *inconcussa*, and he is *immunis* for the corruption of others.[184] In contrast, Pompey and Caesar mix everything up, and create a world of confusion.[185] Brutus attempts to dissuade his uncle from joining the war both because civil war is criminal (*scelus*, 2.266) and because Cato's participation will give Caesar all the more cause to continue it. In the final lines of his speech, Brutus prepares the transition between his and Cato's reply by anticipating that his uncle might choose the country over his own unshakable virtuousness:

> *quod si pro legibus arma*
> *ferre iuvat patriis libertatemque tueri,*
> *nunc neque Pompei Brutum neque Caesaris hostem*
> *post bellum victoris habes.*[186]
>
> but if it pleases you to carry arms
> on behalf of the ancestral laws, and to protect freedom,
> you will not have Brutus now as an enemy of Pompey
> or Caesar, but of the victor after the war.

Earlier, Brutus had emphasized the immorality of the war as incompatible with Cato's strong moral nature, but he now acknowledges that

'stereotype', 72) of the Roman statesman, he still interprets Cato's portrayal almost exclusively from the perspective of Stoic philosophy (and its subversion).

[182] Luc. 2.239–240.

[183] *Ibid.* 2.241. Lines 2.256 *durare* and 2.380 *duri Catonis* [*secta*] introduce the idea of a 'hard', consistent Cato for the first time.

[184] *Certo robore*, line 245; *inconcussa tenens vestigia*, 248; *immunem corrupti moribus aevi*, 256. For the idea that Cato is immune for the immorality of others, see also Vell. Pat. 2.35.

[185] Luc. 2.250 *cladibus immixtum*; 2.251 *rapiunt*; 2.252 *polluta domus*; 2.253–54 *ruinae / permiscenda fides*.

[186] *Ibid.* 2.281–284.

going to war might be part of the wish to protect the two pillars of state: the ancestral laws (the *mos maiorum*) and republican freedom. What is more, Brutus promises that he, too, will continue the defence of the Republic after this war, fighting the sole rule of either Pompey or Caesar. Indeed, Brutus cannot persuade Cato of his viewpoint, but Cato does persuade Brutus of his, since, as the narrator notes, with his reply Cato "applied the spurs of anger and in the young man stirs up a great hot passion for civil war".[187] With this remark, Lucan constructs a line of republican resistance running from Cato to his nephew Brutus, who, as the reader knows, would later erect an anti-Caesarian movement and kill the dictator. By making Cato responsible here for Brutus' "passion for civil war" Lucan suggests that Cato is the primary model of the republican resistance in the final phase of the Republic.[188]

Right from his introduction in book 2, Cato's thoughts are said to depend on the political situation in Rome; the first words he speaks in reply to his nephew concern the civil war, *civilia bella*. His moral trust in *fata* and in his *virtus secura* only come second, thus illustrating how his ethical philosophy, as it were, was subordinate to the true concern of his mind, the state:[189] "I agree, Brutus, that civil war is the highest crime / but wherever fate pulls, sound virtue will follow" (*summum, Brute, nefas civilia bella fatemur / sed quo fata trahunt, virtus secura sequetur*).[190] His speech will indeed invert Brutus' depiction of him as the traditional philosophical sage, as Fabrice Galtier has recently argued convincingly.[191] Moreover, in contrast to the exemplary stories

[187] *Ibid*. 2.323–325: *… acris / irarum movit stimulos iuvenisque calorem / excitat in nimios belli civilis amores*.

[188] The commentators *ad loc*. also note this future reference: see Fantham 1992 and Dreyling 1999. Such *prolepseis* to Brutus' involvement in the plot against Caesar occur on multiple moments in the *Civil War*: cf., e.g., 9.17–19, 10.397–398.

[189] Luc. 2.286–287. An example where the order is reversed (this time the thought runs from ethical to political behaviour) but the moral and political philosophy appear to be similarly intertwined is 2.380–383: *Hi mores, haec duri inmota Catonis / secta fuit, servare modum finemque tenere / naturamque sequi patriaeque inpendere vitam / nec sibi sed toti gentium se credere mundo*.

[190] *Ibid*. 2.286–287. The idea is both Roman (political) and Stoic (philosophical), as Dreyling 1999: 128 explains. However, according to Bartsch 1997: 120 with n. 55, this opening sentence clearly shows that, as a whole, it does not denote a Stoic attitude at all, since according to Stoic philosophy the willing are not dragged at all, but only follow.

[191] Galtier 2018: 247–266; cf. Narducci 2002: 395–401. Galtier argues that Brutus echoes the Senecan interpretation of Cato: "Inspirée en grande partie par la formulation sénéquienne, cette vision de Caton est soumise à une dramatisation qui en actualise les enjeux" (256). His argument fascinates all the more since if he is right, the speech given by Lucan's Cato could be regarded more

we have seen above, where Cato does not speak, in Lucan's epic he himself gets to place this *virtus* into the context of his political ambitions and patriotism. In the speech to Brutus, Cato paints a picture of the world falling apart, and Rome with it, while he alone stays uninvolved in the events (*otio solus agam?*).[192] Apostrophizing Rome and Libertas, he swears he will not abandon them unless they have utterly perished.[193] Cato's philosophy of life is strongly marked by a desire to participate in the battle over the Republic;[194] his personage, how Lucan has created it, cannot be disconnected from the Republic. The dialogue between Brutus and Cato creates the roots for an image of Cato as a public leader who openly shows awareness of his own exemplary role and of his responsibilities to the state—an awareness which especially marks his actions in book 9.

The narrator's 'eulogy'[195] of Cato in book 2 confirms this image of a patriot above all else. This character portrait evokes the image of Cato as Stoic *sapiens*, especially as it is worked out in Cicero's *In defence of Murena* (see above, § 1.3). However, the narrator refuses to depict Cato as a purely philosophical model, and shifts the discussion toward his civic and patriotic ideals:

> *hi mores, haec duri immota Catonis*
> *secta fuit, servare modum finemque tenere*
> *naturamque sequi patriaeque impendere vitam*
> *nec sibi sed toti genitum se credere mundo.*
> …
> *urbi pater est urbique maritus,*
> *iustititae cultor, rigidi servator honesti,*
> *in commune bonus; nullosque Catonis in actus*
> *subrepsit partemque tulit sibi nata voluptas.*[196]

generally as a refutation of the 'Senecan' Cato. Mira Seo 2013: 71–72 draws a similar conclusion on the dialogue, but appears to regard this observation as a distraction from her argument about Cato's exemplary status.

[192] Luc. 2.295.

[193] *Ibid*. 2.302–303: … *non ante revellar / exanimem quam te complectar, Roma, tuumque / nomen, Libertas, et inanem persequar umbram*.

[194] In any case, as Greta Reydam-Schils 2005: 83–113 explains clearly, Stoicism was not in favour of abstaining from political life at all. According to Reydam-Schils, practicing Stoics lived according to "two parallel sets of norms: philosophical and sociopolitical". Cf. Bartsch 1997: 117–119 on the Lucanian Cato's participation in public affairs.

[195] As Fantham 1992 *ad loc*. terms it.

> This is his character, this the unshakable doctrine
> of unbending Cato, to keep measure and stick to his goal,
> to follow nature and devote his life to the fatherland
> and to believe that he was not born for himself but for the whole
> ... ⌊ world.
> father and husband for the city he is,
> an admirer of justice, a keeper of strict honesty,
> good for the commonwealth; in none of Cato's actions
> does passion born in him overcome him or take part of him.

The idea of *durus* Cato, whose behaviour is in accordance with a strict set of principles (*secta*), is reminiscent of Cicero's words in *In defence of Murena*,[197] who, as quoted above, questioned Cato's *doctrina* because it would in fact be harmful, not only in the case of an individual like Murena but with regard to the republican institutions.[198] But while Cicero was sceptical about Cato's uncompromising devotion to the institutions, Lucan offers a different image in which Cato's public position is depicted as one of fatherhood and protectiveness. By placing Cato's strictness and stability explicitly in the context of the city (*urbi*), the community (*in commune bonus*) and justice (*iustitiae, honesti*), Lucan gives meaning to these stereotypical assets.[199] Cato's strictness and inflexibility are contextualized as qualities that help him serve the public cause.

At this point in the narrative, Cato still has a passive role. However, he will soon involve himself in the war, and the conversation with Brutus is an anticipation of his future task as Roman general. In sum, before Cato has yet done anything, he is characterized as a father of the city, an epitome of justice, a protector of rightfulness, and a man who serves the commonwealth. All these elements return in book 9—in a superlative fashion.

[196] Luc. 2.380–383; 388–391.

[197] Dreyling 1999: 164–165 further embeds this passage in the literary tradition.

[198] For the idea that Cato was not born only for himself, see also *Mur.* 83: *M. Cato, qui mihi non tibi, sed patriae natus esse <videris>*. Cf. Sen. *Dial.* 6.20.6. According to Dreyling 1999: 164 this was a topos in Latin literature.

[199] Cf. Fantham 1992: 152, "L. has transformed Cato from a narrow reactionary … into a citizen of the world." Goar 1987: 44–45, in his discussion of lines 380–391 believes that especially lines 384–386 evoke the image of Cato Censorius more than of his progeny.

Book 9: Cato's Party for Liberty

In his study of the concept of *libertas* in the Civil War, Donato Gagliardi describes how Cato reappears in book 9 as the "political and military antagonist of Caesar".[200] Book 9 is devoted to an elaborate portrayal of the republican leader and his ideals. Right at the beginning of book 9, the theme of Cato as protector of the state is picked up again. He is said to take on the guardianship of the state:

> *Ille, ubi pendebant casus dubiumque manebat*
> *quem dominum mundi facerent civilia bella,*
> *oderat et Magnum, quamvis comes isset in arma*
> *auspiciis raptus patriae ductuque senatus;*
> *at post Thessalicas clades iam pectore toto*
> *Pompeianus erat. Patriam tutore carentem*
> *excepit, populi trepidantia membra refovit,*
> *ignavis manibus proiectos reddidit enses,*
> *nec regnum cupiens gessit civilia bella*
> *nec servire timens. Nil causa fecit in armis*
> *ille sua: totae post Magni funera partes*
> *Libertatis erant.*[201]

> He, while the outcome hung in the balance, and it remained unclear
> who the civil war would make master of the world,
> also hated Magnus, although he had gone to war as part of his retinue,
> carried off by the authority of the senate and the orders of the senate.
> Yet after the bloodbath in Thessaly in his whole heart
> he was a Pompeian. He took pity on the fatherland which lacked a
> and he warmed the trembling limbs of the people, guardian,
> to insipid hands he gave back the swords they had laid down,
> and he did not lead the civil war in desire of kingship,
> nor in fear of becoming a slave. He did nothing in arms

[200] Gagliardi 1976: 152. He argues that Stoic terminology (theory) is transformed in the *Civil War* to suit the discussion of essentially civilian, political themes: "La frattura con gli intellettuali stoici e con Seneca, su questo punto, è enorme: la libertà dall'azione si è tramutata infatti in libertà di azione."

[201] Luc. 9.23–30.

> because of personal gain: after Pompey's death
> his was completely the party of Liberty.

The identification of Cato with *libertas* is a familiar theme from the *exempla* tradition. We are reminded of the famous dictum "no liberty without Cato, nor Cato without liberty".[202] Whereas this type of rhetorical maxim obscures the historical roots of this identification,[203] Lucan creates a narrative around this type of aphoristic thought. First, the passage above describes a certain psychological transformation in Cato's attitude.[204] While he first hated Pompey and wanted to belong to neither side in the civil war, after the battle of Pharsalus he recognizes how much the fatherland needs him. Just as Marcia in book 2 was in want of a husband and guardian, the collective body of Rome needs someone to guide them after Pompey's death,[205] and Cato cannot refuse. In describing how Cato warms the arms and legs of the soldiers and hands them back their swords, the narrator emphasizes the personal connection Cato creates with the soldiers. Lucan's second move in renarrativizing the *exempla* about Cato's *libertas* relates to the manner in which he frames Cato's taking over Pompey's army: this is presented as a conscientious decision. Due to his distrust of (the power of) single leaders and faction strife Cato will not merely follow Pompey's cause or even the cause of the senate (which, as we will see in § 3.3, is represented by Cicero), but he will take on leadership of the army on his own terms and in accordance with his republican ideals. There will be no Catonian army, but an army for the Republic: *partes Libertatis*. Finally, Lucan embeds the transformation of Cato as leader of the Republic into the historical background of Pompey's death: as his widow Cornelia relates, Pompey's last words concerned his successor. At the beginning of book 9, Cornelia returns from Egypt to the Pompeian army. Moved as always by a faithful wife's sadness, Cato—who has not

[202] Val. Max. 6.2.5; Sen. *Constant*. 2.2.

[203] Bloomer 1992: 190 argues that an "extraordinary rhetoricization—where the individual loses individual features and has as substitute a verbal classification—characterizes Valerius' treatment of Cato". Cf. Fehrle 1983: 24, 26; Goar 1987: 34, and Gowing 2005: 49–62 on the loss of Cato's symbolic political status in early imperial rhetorical schools.

[204] For the idea of a transformation at this point see George 1991.

[205] For *patria* in line 24 surely also stands for its citizens and, very concretely, for the leaderless troops of soldiers encamped at Pharsalus.

just become the guardian of the army but also of Pompey's widow and sons—allows her a long speech to expound on her grief.[206] Cornelia relates that Pompey had already sanctioned the establishment of an army for liberty by Cato. He had spoken to his son Sextus about the continuation of the war, concluding with the words "one man it will be proper to obey, if he will create a party for liberty: Cato" (*uni parere decebit / si faciet partes pro libertate, Catoni*).[207] Rather than commemorating Cato as a unique protector of Roman liberty, Lucan embeds his consistent defence of Roman institutions in the narrative about the anti-Caesarian party, adding the fictive element of Pompey appointing Cato as his legitimate successor. It is well noted that the concept of the *partes Libertatis* is also a fiction, since no such movement existed in the late Republic or the early imperial period. There must be cynicism in Lucan's choice to make Cato the representative of some kind of abstract ideal.[208] Yet the phrase actually makes clear how Cato could personify or express the concept of Roman liberty: his ideas about the Republic are collected in and symbolized by a specific citizen body, i.e. Pompey's army. In the course of book 9 the term *libertas* will return a couple of times; after the emphatic constitution of Cato's alleged 'liberal party' it becomes a catchword of his oratory.[209] We will see in § 3.2.4 how Cato makes *libertas* into a persuasive element of his leadership programme.

Halfway through the account of Cato's generalship in book 9, the narrator elevates Cato as the true leader of not just the Pompeian army but the entire Roman people. This passage repeats some of the motifs in the character description in book 2, but puts his actions in historical perspective, offering them as a model of perfect patriotism:

> *Si veris magna paratur*
> *fama bonis et si successu nuda remoto*
> *inspicitur virtus, quidquid laudamus in ullo*
> *maiorum, Fortuna fuit. Quis Marte secundo,*

[206] Compare Luc. 9.165–166, where Cato silences and reconciles Pompey's two sons who had been fighting over the right course of action now that their father has died.

[207] *Ibid*. 9.96–97.

[208] Perhaps an allusion to previous discussions of Cato's idealistic policy by republican and imperial writers. On Cato's 'Platonic' naivety with regard to state matters, see Cic. *Att*. 2.1.8.

[209] Luc. 9.193 and 205 (in the funeral speech for Pompey); 9.265.

quis tantum meruit populorum sanguine nomen?
Hunc ego per Syrtes Libyaeque extrema triumphum
ducere maluerim, quam ter Capitolia curru
scandere Pompei, quam frangere colla Iugurthae.
Ecce parens verus patriae, dignissimus aris,
Roma, tuis, per quam numquam iurare pudebit,
et quem, si steteris umquam cervice soluta,
nunc, olim, factura deum es.[210]

If great fame is won through true goodness
and if pure virtue can be seen after removing the success,
whatever we praise in any of the ancestors, it was Fortune.
Who has deserved such a great name through a favourable Mars,
who through the blood of peoples?
Him I would rather see lead a triumph across the Syrtes
and the outskirts of Libya, than thrice ascend the Capitol
in the cart of Pompey, or than break the neck of Jugurtha.
Behold, the true father of the fatherland, really worthy of your altars,
Roma, by whose name it will never cause shame to swear,
and who, if you will ever stand with your neck freed,
you will now, some time, make into a god.[211]

The narrator asks the important question: who really has a claim to fame on the basis of pure virtuousness? Who of the ancestors deserves the acclaim of the people for fighting in Roman wars? Cato he would prefer, he says, in a nice juxtaposition of *hunc* and *ego*, rather than Pompey or Marius. Behold the true father of the fatherland (*ecce parens verus patriae*), who is worthy to be honoured in Rome's sacred temples, who will be made a god as soon as Rome is free again.[212] The idea that Cato is a *pater* or *parens patriae* links the two passages in book 2 and 9.

[210] Luc. 9.593–604.

[211] Cf. Taylor 1949: 181–182 on the final four lines.

[212] Paratore 1976 discusses the political implications of the conceptualization of Cato as *pater patriae*. This admiration for Cato's republicanism is often presented as an element of (secret) resistance against imperial rule. Wilkinson 2011 gives an overview of this resistance (which is often seen as the 'Stoic' or philosophical opposition) in the early empire, and also discusses the ways in which Cato was used as a model (esp. 61–77); cf. Taylor 1949, ch. 8 on 'Catonism' vs. 'Caesarism'; Wirszubski 1950: 126–129 on the memory of Cato under the Principate; cf. Syme 1958: 554–562. We have no proof that Cato was included among the *summi viri* at the Forum Augustum, or that it was officially allowed to set up statues or display images of him: Sehlmeyer 1999.

Yet while in book 2, the narrator introduced Cato's paternal care for Rome as well as for its citizens as an individual character trait, in book 9 he has fully illustrated his patriotism and sense of public leadership in the march through Libya. His public value has been proven so clearly that he can be compared to the valorous *triumphatores* of Rome, and is also imagined to receive the honours of the title *pater patriae*. The following sections will examine the constitutive elements of Cato's civic heroism in the *Civil War*: his authoritative sanctity, his guiding virtue, and his exemplary leadership.

3.2.2 *Narrating Cato's sacredness*

An important element of Cato's portrait as hero of the Republic is his sacred or divine core. The idea of godliness supports the presentation of him as *pater patriae*, whose perfect morality makes him into a perfect leader of state. Interestingly, Cato's sacred morality manifests itself especially through his speech. The words he speaks emanate from his *sanctum* or *arcanum pectus*; he speaks *sacrae voces* that flow from his *os sanctum*; his mind is full of god, and the words he speaks are not inferior to oracles.[213] The sanctity of Lucan's Cato seems to have been based on an image that is supported on a broader cultural plain.[214] As we have seen, Valerius says Cato's name can define a *sanctus et egregius civis*; and Velleius remarks that in everything Cato is closer to the gods than to other human beings (see § 2.2).[215] Yet Lucan is the one who makes this standard epithet part of the narrative of Cato's participation in the civil war, by connecting on several different occasions Ca-

[213] Luc. 2.825 *arcano pectore*; *sacras voces*; 2.372 *sancto ore*; 9.564–65 *deo plenus*; *dignas adytis e pectore voces*.

[214] However, according to GOAR 1987: 41–49 it finds its full expression with Lucan. He argues that it is in the *Civil War* that Cato became truly "canonized, even apotheosized" (41).

[215] Velleius uses the term *sanctus* of several republican heroes in book 2 of his history, such as Ti. Gracchus (2.2), C. Marius (2.11), Livius Drusus (2.13), Pompeius (twice, in 2.29 and 53), and also of the father of Octavian (2.59). He does not apply the epithet to Cato. Valerius is less prone to use *sanctus* for individuals; except for Cato, other republican exemplary figures it is applied to are C. Valerius Flaccus, P. Scipio Nasica, and M. Scaevola. It is also used for Octavia, the sister of Augustus. Interestingly, Valerius likes to employ it for more abstract notions, like *pudicitia* (6.1) or the *res publica* herself (6.6.1). The translators render it as 'upright' (SHIPLEY 1924) and 'blameless' (SHACKLETON BAILEY 2000). The term *sacer* is generally not used by Velleius to indicate people.

to's divine quality with actual behaviour. Moreover, he adds the question of truth, and thereby of *fides*. In introducing the funeral speech that Cato gives in commemoration of Pompey, the narrator observes that it comes from "a chest that is full of truth".[216] As opposed to other prophets and oracles in the *Civil War*, Cato is the one who genuinely embodies the truth.[217] The terminology of *sacer*/*sanctus* evokes the association with a hero cult.[218] The suggestion might not be so far from reality. Pliny the Younger mentions in one of his letters a certain Titinius Capito who in his house has *imagines* on display of Cato, Brutus, and Cassius, about whom he even writes beautiful poems.[219] There is (late antique) literary evidence that already in the Augustan age, and by Augustus himself, Cato was upheld as an heroic ancestor, as Robert Goar has shown.[220]

The terminology of *sacer*/*sanctus* adds an imperial flavour to the presentation of Cato in the *Civil War*. During the Augustan period *sanctus* developed from a more general indication of divine qualities into a specific epithet for the emperor as well, stimulated by the habit of deification. At the same time, the term *sacer*, too, came to indicate a celestial, divine nature, and eventually became an epithet of the emperor.[221] Applying the terminology of *sanctus* and *sacer* to Cato, then, is a reference to the kind of worship the emperors would enjoy after his time and already enjoyed in Lucan's time of writing. In fact, in 2.604 this idea is confirmed by the hypothesis that Cato might once become *deus*. The divine aspects of Cato's personality, that make him such an

[216] Luc. 9.189: *verba sed a pleno venientia pectore veri*.

[217] Seewald 2008: 118–119, 284.

[218] Taylor 1949: 162–182 explains (at 182): "Instead of a party there was a cult of Cato, *sanctus Cato*, maintained, without opposition, in the houses of senators and nobles." Taylor discusses the ideals of Catonism and Caesaranism from the late Republic until the early Empire, and the question of whether we can regard these movements as official political "parties".

[219] Plin. *Ep*. 1.17.3.

[220] Goar 1987: 29–30; the source is Macrobius, *Sat*. 2.4.18.

[221] See Brill's New Pauly s.v. *sanctus* (Wardle), *sacer* (Rives). The words *sacer* and *sanctus* derive from the same stem, but do not have identical meanings. The term *sanctus* is probably older (possibly from an Indo-European root) than that of *sacer*, and it refers in the first place to something safeguarded in its existence by a law or rule; while *sacer* denotes all that naturally belongs to the divine realm (Ernout & Meillet 1985: 586). Persons (and things) can be *sanctus* when they deserve a certain measure of respect, especially the dead and (historical) heroes. In a third step the word *sanctus* gained a similar meaning as the Greek ἅγιος, holy, when the person in question is thought to have qualities of divine origin; cf. Ernout & Meillet 1985: 587. For the meaning of *sacer* as especially applied to imperial rulers and their families, see *OLD* s.v. 7.

ideal leader (see below), turn him into a kind of proto-emperor, as it were.[222]

3.2.3 *Narrating* Virtus

I have shown above that in the Tiberian period, Cato as a person is equated to *virtus*, and that his name alone is said to denote perfect citizenship. Within the *Civil War* this metonymical relation is worked out further on the level of the narrative. Cato's *virtus* is portrayed as acting over him, defining his behaviour and his choices. This idea is first expressed in the maxim Cato himself presents in his very first speech: *quo fata trahunt, virtus secura sequetur* ("virtue will follow unwaveringly wherever fate leads it"; see also above, § 3.2.1).[223] The reader understands that Cato means to say that, in order to remain true to his morality, he should follow fate. But instead of declaring that *he* will follow fate wherever it leads him—which, in this context, would have been a more straightforward way of saying it—he offers the abstract, philosophical maxim that virtuousness adjusts itself to the will of fate. Cato, as he presents it here, is subordinate to his excellence, following the final guidance of ultimate virtue. The metonymy returns in book 9, each time illustrating Cato's impulse to cross the desert and reunite the troops in the province of Africa. At the beginning of the march, the narrator describes that "Cato's virtue, which could not bear staying, dared to send his troops to unknown tribes and to go around the Syrtes by land, having trust in his army" (*at impatiens virtus haerere Catonis / audet in ignotas agmen committere gentes / armorum fidens et terra cingere Syrtim*).[224] After a speech to his soldiers and a digression about the land the army is about to traverse, the narrative is resumed by another reference to Cato's virtus as the driving force: … *hac ire Catonem / dura iubet virtus*.[225] Similarly, right after Lucan's digression

[222] Hardie 2010 shows that the shared theme in epic and historiography of the single leader who is able to regulate a crowd must have had particular relevance in the imperial age. At 15–17 he discusses Scipio's performance in Livy book 28, which he likewise calls a "proto-imperial moment".

[223] Luc. 2.287.

[224] *Ibid.* 9.371–973. Cf. 9.301–302, where the same idea is voiced: … *sed iter mediis natura vetabat / Syrtibus: hanc audax sperat sibi cedere virtus.*

[225] *Ibid.* 9.444–445.

on the horrors caused by the Libyan snakes (9.700–838) and a plaintive speech by the soldiers (839–880),[226] Cato's virtue is presented as driving them forwards almost like an independent force:

> *Cogit tantos tolerare labores*
> *summa ducis virtus, qui nuda fusus harena*
> *excubat atque omni Fortunam provocat hora.*[227]
>
> The superb virtue of the leader forced them
> to endure such great pains, who slept naked lying in the sand,
> and who challenged Fortuna continuously.

The leading force of Cato's virtue has become a conjunctive element that forms the red thread in the story of the march, and drives the army on each time it encounters obstacles (either physical or emotional).

In these examples, we recognize the concept of Cato's *dura virtus*, a virtue so stable and inflexible it can endure any task and ordeal lying before him. Another conspicuous element is the narrator's subjectification of Virtus as being the agent instead of Cato himself; we are reminded of the exemplary Cato in Velleius' historiography, where he was *Virtuti simillimus* and therefore 'closer to the gods than to human beings' (§ 2.2.2). Lucan, however, nuances this static image of Cato as Virtue herself, whose behaviour is moral in a superhuman, godly way. In contrast to the characterizations by Velleius and Valerius, Lucan's Cato shows signs of human emotion and psychological development. At the moment when his relatives or fellow citizens are in want of something his passions overrule his reason, and he is seen to divert from his usual strictness. For example, at 2.350, where Marcia has returned to Cato begging him to take her back, her voice is said literally to "bend", or "move" her ex-husband: *hae flexere virum voces*. The verb *flecto* corresponds antithetically with the language of stability Lucan uses to describe Cato.[228] In book 9, then, Lucan develops the image of the human, emotional Cato. This time he is moved by his fellow soldiers. In an exchange with an anonymous deserter in 9.220–283 the words

[226] On Cato's notorious fight against the Libyan snakes, see Johnson 1987; Bartsch 1997: 29–35; Narducci 2002: 415–422; Malamud 2003; Tipping 2011: 232–236.

[227] Luc. 9.881–883.

[228] Compare Cato's sudden tears at Cornelia's arrival from Egypt in book 9.49–50.

are said to 'burst', *eruperunt*, from Cato's chest for indignation about the slavish attitude of Pompey's army. Furthermore, in the examples just discussed, his *virtus* is described as depending on human feelings. At 9.371–372, it is called *impatiens*, 'intolerant' and daring (*audet*), in its desire to cross the Libyan desert. The use of *impatiens* is a pun on the Stoic concept of *patientia*: patience and tolerance originally connote dispassionateness and a lack of disturbance,[229] yet Cato's virtue is so tough, so strong that his tolerance, *patientia*, of snakes, thirst, heat, and sand[230] becomes passionate and restless. *Impatiens* here highlights Cato's stormy and boundless desire for morality. Similarly, whereas *ira* is something a Stoic sage should avoid as much as possible, Cato is famously seen to burst out in anger (*concitus ira*) against one of his soldiers when the poor man tries to offer his general a bit of water in his helmet. Cato's anger is expressed physically by his beating the helmet out of the soldier's hand and spilling the water on the ground.[231]

In the attribution of *virtus* to particular actions of Cato we recognize the moral philosophy of the Roman exemplary tradition, where individuals or specific events always offered practical, concrete examples of particular values or virtues.[232] But whereas in collections of *exempla* the equation of Cato and *virtus* is the final goal, Lucan went a step further: Cato's *virtus* is made into a narrative device, a motif which helps structure the story. Cato's moral virtue, imagined as being a causal force, is made an integral part of the course of events.

3.2.4 Narrating Cato's exemplarity: the mutiny (Luc. 9.215–293)

In the passages taken from Valerius and Velleius presented above, Cato's actions were imitated by his fellow citizens out of respect and admiration for his high sense of morality; his exemplarity therefore lies for a great part in his ethical leadership.[233] In treating his soldiers Cato

[229] Sklenář 2003: 88 discusses the Stoic language in this passage.

[230] All joys for true manly virtue, see Luc. 9.402–403.

[231] Luc. 9.500–510. Alternatively, *excudere* in line 510 may mean something like 'shaking the helmet empty', but Cato is not said to accept the helmet that is being extended to him.

[232] Morgan 2007 has called this 'executive ethics', where behaviour instead of abstract values shapes and illustrates social rules. Cf. Langlands 2011 on 'situational ethics'; also Langlands 2018: 124–127.

knows how to direct their behaviour in the preferred moral direction: he is able to transfer his own ethical qualities onto his soldiers—not only by being such a virtuous general, but also by reflecting on his own position. In the adhortative speech given to the army before they will enter the desert, Cato presents himself as a *comes*, a *miles* rather than a *dominus* or *dux*. His call to the soldiers to "gather their courage for the great enterprise of virtus and the toughest labours"[234] is effective because he imagines himself thirsting, burning in the sun, and walking by foot rather than riding his horse just like the other soldiers.[235] That will make the difference, he says, between an authoritative leader, a *dux*, and a fellow soldier, *miles*.[236] Cato is the *primus inter pares*[237] of the Pompeian army.

Lucan gives an extra impulse to the image of Cato as an ethical leader by exploiting the special, didactic relationship between Cato and his fellow Romans; the *Civil War* breathes new life into the image of the 'censor' of Valerius' *exempla*. It focuses on his engagement with others, whom he corrects and upbraids in long passages of direct speech.[238] In other words, his superior sense of morality is illustrated in the narrative through his verbal interaction with secondary figures who serve as foils.[239] In book 2, it is Brutus and Marcia whom Cato guides and comforts in a fatherly manner. In book 9, it is the Pompeian army, which he has turned into a republican army, an army for Libertas.[240] At several moments in the narrative, Lucan introduces minor characters, either a named individual or anonymous soldiers, who can act as a foil for

[233] On Cato as a republican leader, see George 1991: 254–258.

[234] Luc. 9.380–381: *... componite mentes / ad magnum virtutis opus summosque labores*.

[235] *Ibid*. 9.394–398.

[236] *Ibid*. 9.401–402: *si quo fuerit discrimine notum / dux an miles eam*.

[237] Seewald 2008: 227.

[238] See Luc. 9.221 *hunc ... fugientem ... / litus in extremum tali Cato voce notavit*, with Seewald 2008 *ad loc*. Note that *notavit* calls to mind the theme of the 'censorship' of the two Catones (worked out by Valerius Maximus in 2.9–10, see above, §2.2.1).

[239] Twice Cato seems to act in reaction to no specific word or deed: the first time is when he decides to march straight through the desert (9.444–445), and the second time occurs during the army's first encounter with the Libyan snakes (9.611–618). The fact that Cato has no foil in these instances might also indicate that these choices were not exactly shared by the others.

[240] Luc. 9.29–30: *totae post Magni funera partes / Libertatis erant*, "after the death of Pompey he was completely on the side of Libertas"; *partes* has a political meaning, the plural often referring to the ancient equivalent of a modern political party. Taylor 1949: 1–24, on the exact terminology of *partes*, see 8–12.

Cato's grandness: a mutinous soldier (9.217–293), the lieutenant Titus Labienus (9.549–586), and the water carrier (9.500–510).[241]

In this section I would like to examine not merely Cato's moral-didactic relationship with his soldiers, but the way in which he builds this relationship through the use of oratory; it is particularly in his speech(es) that he shows himself to be the ethical leader of the army. His oratory marks the contrast between his own and Cicero's role in the *Civil War*: the speeches in book 9 offer a programmatic vision of patriotism and concern for the state that Cicero's speech lacks (see below, § 3.3). Ironically, it is Cato who openly emphasizes the importance of protecting the Republic against Caesar's monarchic plans, while historically speaking, Cicero had been the one who had documented the fall of the Republic and had produced a philosophy of republicanism.[242] In order to illustrate Cato's exemplary function I will examine the exchange between him and the mutinous soldiers.[243]

After Pompey has died, Lucan voices the soldiers' unwillingness to continue to fight; he does so by making one of these soldiers give a speech that represents the collective feeling. This anonymous deserter indicates that he has followed Pompey alone as his leader (*dux*) in the war: "I shall have a master, as defeat compels,[244] but no leader, Magnus: having followed only you in the war, I will follow fate now that you are gone" (*dominum, quem clades cogit, habebo / nullum, Magne, ducem: te solum in bella secutus / post te fata sequar*).[245] In the eyes of the soldiers, Caesar has already won, and the only thing left to do is submit to fate. Since the moment Pompey has died, civil war has become a crime (*Pompeio scelus est bellum civile perempto*, 9.248). The troops should rather try to side with a legitimate leader, with Caesar who was consul at the time:

[241] At Luc. 9.846–889, Cato is placed vis-à-vis the entire army; their long lament is followed by a description of Cato's fearless, tireless personal care for every individual soldier.

[242] Cf. Lintott 1971: 500, who argues that Cicero's thought provided the content for Cato's speeches.

[243] Ahl 1976: 254–262 is instructive for its comparison of Cato's leadership style in this passage with that of Caesar in book 5. At 257 he summarizes: "Cato draws men up to his own level; he invites them to emulate him; he ennobles them. Caesar reduces them to the level of minions."

[244] Following the translation of Braund 1992.

[245] Luc. 9.241–243.

Si publica iura,
si semper sequeris patriam, Cato, signa petamus
Romanus quae consul habet.[246]

If you always obey the public laws and the fatherland, Cato,
Let us seek the standards which the Roman consul has.

The reference to Cato's absolute faith in the Roman law alludes to the image of Cato as it appears from the exempla tradition. His inability to violate the laws is attested in, for instance, the exempla handling his mission to Cyprus or his refusal to endorse Caesar's laws.[247] The soldier appeals to this aspect of Cato which is known from popular tradition. If you are the constitutionalist we know you to be from the stories we have heard, the soldier seems to be saying, you would not condemn us for protecting ourselves by choosing a path that will at least be authorized by one official leader, Caesar. The view of the narrative shifts from one end of the spectrum to the other: from the history of great men—such as Pompey, Cato, and Caesar—to the perception and commemoration of their deeds by the common people.

In fact, the opinion of the anonymous soldier echoes in part the opinion Cato had voiced in book 2. The civil war is a *scelus*, and it is contrary to the *publica iura*.[248] The soldier's phrase *post te fata sequar* in 9.243, quoted above, further reminds of Cato's remark *quo fata trahunt, virtus secura sequetur*. However, the soldier misunderstands what it means for the Lucanian Cato to follow the fatherland. For, in order to do that, as he has also established in book 2, he must fight. It is not according to the laws or to *libertas* that the Republic would fall into the hands of one ruler. He has taken up the task of *tutor* and *pater patriae*.[249] The soldier's confusion over Cato's priorities thematizes the gap between the Cato of the *exempla* tradition and the epic Cato of Lucan's poem, whose patriotism defeats legal principle and consistency.

Now, the floor for debate has been opened: *actum Romanis fuerat de rebus*.[250] This is a difficult sentence, usually translated as "the Ro-

[246] *Ibid*. 9.249–251.
[247] Val. Max. 4.3.2 with Vell. Pat. 2.45; or Val. Max. 2.10.7.
[248] Luc. 2.286–288, 315–316.
[249] *Ibid*. 9.601: *ecce parens verus patriae*, and 9.24–25 *patriam tutore carentem / excepit*.
[250] *Ibid*. 9.253.

man state was/would have been finished".[251] However, within the context of the oratorical exchange between Cato and the soldier, *agere (de Romanis rebus)* could also refer to public speaking.[252] The narrator had framed the mutiny as a situation of discord (*discordia volgi*, 9.217), which Cato, as their new general, needed to resolve. The word *actum*, then, so emphatically placed at the beginning of line 9.253, also recalls the atmosphere of discord and debate within Republican politics. The phrase *actum Romanis fuerat de rebus* has a forensic ring to it, alluding to the idea that there had been put forward a motion on Rome's situation from the side of the soldiers. Subsequently, Cato, cast in the role of public orator at a Republican *contio* who needs to persuade the people of his course of action, brings forward a contrary motion.[253] He begins by mocking their slavish attitude: "So you have fought the war by equal vow, young men; you have been, too, on the side of the masters, and you were a Pompeian not a Roman army?" (*Ergo pari voto gessisti bella, iuventus, / tu quoque pro dominis, et Pompeiana fuisti, / non Romana manus?*). Cato's speech has a double strategy: it is both exhortation and accusation, its tone being ironical and biting. It presents a clear idea of right and wrong, and centres around the question of what is *honestum* for Roman citizens. Its thesis is clear: it is wrong, or *inhonestum*, to give up the defence of the Republic and give in to the prospect of a dictatorial reign. Cato reproaches the behaviour of the soldiers, and even goes so far as to call them "disgraceful servants" (*famuli turpes*).[254] The language of honour and reward, most densely used towards the end of the speech, exhorts the soldiers to weigh their own gain against that of the entire Republic.[255] Cato's exhortative rhetoric highlights the value of *kairos* in the struggle of the Roman people for *libertas*:

[251] Duff 1928; Braund 1992; Schrijvers 2013. For the expression *actum est* see *OLD* s.v. *ago* 21c.

[252] Compare the expression *cum populo agere*, *OLD* s.v. *ago* 39c; for forensic meanings of *ago*, see *OLD* s.v. 39–44. See also lines 215–217, where the narrator compares Cato's funeral speech for Pompey with the official *laus funebris* held from the rostra on the Roman forum (… *quam si Romana sonarent / rostra ducis laudes*).

[253] Seewald 2008 *ad loc.* is accordingly led to recognize Lucan the declaimer in this passage.

[254] Luc. 9.274.

[255] *Ibid.* 9.262–63 *causa digna*; 266 *pudeat*; 272–73 *meruistis iudice vitam / Caesare*; 275 *maiora mereri*; 280 *mercede*; 281 *pretio*; 282 *meritum*. For a rhetorical analysis of the speech see Seewald 2008: 255–283; cf. Ahl 1976: 254–257; Gall 2005.

Potuit vestro Pompeius abuti
sanguine: nunc patriae iugulos ensesque negatis
cum prope libertas? Unum Fortuna reliquit
iam tribus e dominis.[256]

Pompey could misuse your blood:
now you deny your fatherland your necks and swords
when liberty is near? Fortune has left but one
out of three masters.

Since only one Triumvir has remained, the opportunity has come to free the Roman state from its tyrants. Cato corrects the faulty view of the troops that they fought only for Pompey, and offers them a different perspective, in which they fight as free citizens, for the fatherland.

The political ethics Cato presents in his fiery speech has an impressive effect on the soldiers. In a poetic bee simile,[257] the narrator describes how the soldiers flock back to the shore where Cato stands, in the same manner in which bees performing their search for honey reassemble and return at the sound of the beekeeper's flute. The *securus pastor,* whose livelihood is secure because his bees work for him, resembles the general who is certain that his cause is just and his soldiers will help him achieve it:

gaudet in Hyblaeo securus gramine pastor
divitias servasse casae. Sic voce Catonis
inculcata viris iusti patientia Martis.[258]

Happy is the herdsmen, secure in his Sicilian meadow, that he
has maintained the riches of his cottage. Thus by the voice of Cato
the tolerance of a just war was inculcated in the men.

Pastor and *Catonis* are both positioned at the end of the verse, thereby enhancing the comparison. The beekeeper resembles the state leader because, apart from keeping his men in check, he also takes care of them. Whereas the beekeeper uses a musical instrument, Cato uses his

[256] Luc. 9.263–266.

[257] Such bee similes are rather topical in epic poetry: cf., e.g., Hom. *Il.* 2.86–94 and Vergil *Aen.* 1.430–436 about Carthage.

[258] Luc. 9.291–293.

voice to regroup and unite the troops of Pompey. It is this voice, which comes from Cato's sacred heart,[259] by which he can pass on his feeling for justice and his personal integrity to the men around him. His voice can inculcate into the Roman citizens an acceptance of the war and the belief that it is *honestum*, right. As in the *exempla* discussed in § 2, the civic ideals and the patriotism of the Lucanian Cato are contagious: they encourage his fellow citizens to imitate his conduct and adjust their moral values.

The rhetorical ability that is attributed to Cato in the *Civil War* is an enhancement of the image of Cato as it arises from Valerius and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Velleius. Whereas the Tiberian writers leave in the middle by what means Cato was able to convince others to imitate his exemplary virtuousness, Lucan has found a way to explain what made Cato's stature so impressive. From earlier sources it is clear that Cato had a talent for speaking; the stories about his filibustering prove this.[260] Lucan restores the orator Cato by planting multiple speeches in his mouth and illustrating the power of his oratory. In contrast, the speeches Caesar gives in the poem are effective because of the fear his soldiers feel of him; Pompey is obeyed by reason of the respect all the Roman citizens pay to him.[261] Of the three leaders in the *Civil War* it is Cato whose words actually present the *content* as vital. It is this content that goes beyond the interests of single players in the war. Cato's *virtus* may be reckless (*audax*),[262] but it is in fact the only *virtus* that is seen to have some positive (instructive) effect on normal citizens.

3.3 CICERO'S CALL FOR BATTLE

I have spent quite some time on Cato at the expense of Cicero's figure in the *Civil War*. In a way this accords with the poem itself: Cicero ap-

[259] Lucan introduces Cato's speech by saying that "the voice of the leader burst out of his sacred chest" (*erupere ducis sacro de pectore voces*), 9.255. See also § 3.2.2 above.

[260] Cf. Caes. *BAfr.* 22, *BCiv*. 1.32; Cass. Dio 39.34–35; Plut. *Cat. Min*. 5.2.

[261] Cf. Luc. 5.319–364, where Caesar also performs an angry speech to prevent his soldiers from mutiny. His solution is to execute the men who had started it; Caesar's reign of terror is diametrically opposed to Cato's moral leadership. In 2.531–595, Pompey gives a battle speech. Although the words are spoken *veneranda voce,* it is received *nullo clamore* and with no direct action from the soldiers.

[262] When the narrative is resumed after these speeches, Cato's *audax virtus* is called the central

pears only very briefly in book 7, where he is given a speech of 17 lines addressed to 'his' general Pompey.[263] Again, as in the Valerian *exempla*, Cicero's political value and contribution to Roman politics are being undermined. The speech of Cicero illustrates the difference between his and Cato's exemplary image. Velleius Paterculus and Valerius Maximus had still awarded Cicero the status of the most successful Roman orator.[264] Lucan, however, also negates Cicero's achievements in the field of oratory. The Cicero of the *Civil War* is a member of the aristocracy who is not able to represent the Roman people. His performance stands in stark contrast with that of Cato: while Cato shows what republicanism, i.e. support of the Republic, entails, Cicero highlights the self-interested, antagonistic attitude of the Roman elite.

Cicero appears unexpectedly at the beginning of book 7 in the army camp at Pharsalus.[265] The Battle of Pharsalus is looming, but Pompey does not want to fight for fear of his defeat; the narrator bemoans his tragic fate.[266] The army, however, is impatient to go to battle—for fate has ordained that they must,[267] and appeals to Pompey to pick up the standards. The narrator creates suspense by switching in line 58 to the first person plural in directing, on behalf of the Roman people, a desperate question to the gods, asking why it is possible that the army is destined for such a nefarious battle. At this point then, Cicero is introduced, the "greatest master[268] of Roman eloquence", who cannot bear the voices of the soldiers anymore and who is angry about the war:

> *Cunctorum voces Romani maximus auctor*
> *Tullius eloquii, cuius sub iure togaque*
> *pacificas saevus tremuit Catilina securis,*
> *pertulit iratus bellis, cum rostra forumque*

force in the decision to cross the Syrtes: 9.302.

[263] On the speech, see La Bua 2020; Roche 2019: 83–84; Esposito 2018; Narducci 2003; Ahl 1976: 160–164; Gambet 1963: 141–146; Malcovati 1953.

[264] Vell. Pat. 1.17; Val. Max. 2.2.3, 4.2.4, 8.10.3.

[265] See Esposito 2018 (with plenty of bibliography) for the common interpretation of Cicero's speech as a fictional *suasoria*, which would mirror the early imperial interest in the rhetorical Cicero taught in the schools.

[266] Luc. 9.29–42; Pompey's special bond with Rome is strongly emphasized here.

[267] *Ibid*. 9.45–55.

[268] Cf. *OLD* s.v. *auctor* 8.

optaret passus tam longa silentia miles.
Addidit invalidae robur facundia causae.[269]

The voices of all men the greatest master of Roman
eloquence Tullius, under whose law and toga
cruel Catilina shivered before peaceful axes,
expressed, angry with the war, since he desired the rostra and forum,
having endured such a long silence as a soldier.
His fluent speech added strength to an invalid case.

With *cunctorum voces* placed proleptically at the beginning of this introduction Lucan alludes to Cicero's exemplary role as *vox publica*; modern scholars have pointed out that Lucan stages Cicero here as the 'portavoce' not only of the Roman soldiers but of Lucan himself.[270] We will return to this argument presently. The term *facundia* in line 67, which occurs only here, is clear evidence for the rhetorical context of Lucan's introduction. The image of Cicero as model orator is further developed by reference to the episode of the Catilinarian conspiracy and to Cicero's defence of the Republic. Lines 63–64 (*cuius sub iure togaque / pacificas saevus tremuit Catilina securis*) evoke the Ciceronian symbol of the *dux togatus*, which was also picked up in the Tiberian narrative about Cicero.[271]

However, this traditional model function of Cicero's political actions is immediately subverted, for the poem interprets Cicero's contribution to society as one of no effect. First, Cicero is said to long for the rostra and the forum, because in his duty as a soldier he has endured a silence for far too long (*longa silentia*). There is a double entendre in this line. The silence Cicero experienced refers *in concreto* to the situation of 49–48, when Cicero's duties as a politician-orator were suspended by the war. It also refers to his lack of military endeavours during his career; Cicero was not particularly famous for military exploits (his triumph in Cilicia being a singular instance of success). On a metapoetic level, moreover, the silence refers to the fact that Cicero

[269] Luc. 7.62–67.

[270] Lanzarone 2016: 148–149 and Narducci 2003.

[271] In his 2003 article, Emanuele Narducci demonstrated the intertextual parallels for the passage. He argues that Lucan here conflates the eulogies of Cornelius Severus (*Suas.* 6.26, *ictaque luctu / conticuit Latiae tristis facundia linguae*) and Sextilius Ena (*Suas.* 6.27, *deflendus Cicero est Latiaeque silentia linguae*); cf. already Malcovati 1953: 289 n. 1. Lanzarone 2016: 152 follows this argument.

only receives an opportunity to speak in book 7 of the *Civil War*; he has not been allowed to fulfil a role in the narrative—and he will not have one hereafter. Despite his aversion to the civil war Cicero now decides to appeal publicly to Pompey to take up arms. But when the silence is finally broken, and Cicero's oratory regains a podium, he will only defend or stimulate a cause that is principally wrong, remarks the narrator: *addidit invalidae robur facundia causae*. *Invalidus* should be read in its forensic meaning: the argument is invalid and the orator will only wrap words around an idea that is weak and unconvincing from the start.[272] The term also refers to the bad counsel Cicero is about to offer Pompey, which will be confirmed by the general's response.[273] This is what the orator says:

> *Hoc pro tot meritis solum te, Magne, precatur,*
> *uti se Fortuna velis, proceresque tuorum*
> *castrorum regesque tui cum supplice mundo*
> *adfusi vinci socerum patiare rogamus.*
> *Humani generis tam longo tempore bellum*
> *Caesar erit? Merito Pompeium vincere lente*
> *gentibus indignum est a transcurrente subactis.*
> *Quo tibi fervor abit aut quo fiducia fati?*
> *De superis, ingrate, times causamque senatus*
> *credere dis dubitas? Ipsae tua signa revellent*
> *prosilientque acies: pudeat vicisse coactum.*
> *Si duce te iusso, si nobis bella geruntur,*
> *sit iuris, quocumque velint, concurrere campo.*
> *Quid mundi gladios a sanguine Caesaris arces?*
> *Vibrant tela manus, vix signa morantia quisquam*
> *expectat: propera, ne te tua classica linquant.*
> *Scire senatus avet, miles te, Magne, sequatur*
> *an comes.*[274]
>
> Fortuna requests from you only this, Magnus, in return for so many rewards, that you will make use of her, and we, the elders of your

[272] The expression *invalida causa* might derive from Lucan's own rhetorical education; Roche 2019 *ad loc.* notes that this line contains only rhetorical terms. For the rhetorical meaning of *invalidus* see *OLD* s.v. 4.

[273] Esposito 2018: 45 calls him "un consigliere fraudolento".

[274] Luc. 7.68–85.

> camp, and your kings, together with the world as supplicant, prostrated at your feet, ask that you let your father-in-law be conquered. Will Caesar be the cause of war for humankind for such a long time? It is fair that the peoples subdued by Pompey racing by are indignant that he is taking a long time to gain victory. Where has your passion gone? where your trust in fate? Do you doubt the gods, ungrateful man, or do you hesitate to entrust the cause of the senate to the gods? Of their own will the troops will wrench up the standards and march forward: you will be ashamed to have victory forced upon you. If you are commanded to be our leader, if this war is waged for our benefit, then let it be their right to engage on whichever battlefield they please. Why do you keep away the swords of the people from Caesar's body? Their hands brandish the weapons, everyone can barely wait for the lagging signal: hurry, lest your trumpets leave you behind. The senate desires to know, Magnus, whether it should follow you as a soldier or as retinue.[275]

It is clear that this speech is quite unciceronian, in thought and style. It is short (not yet 18 lines), especially compared to that of Pompey which is twice as long (36 lines). Moreover, it does not concur with Lucan's introduction of Cicero as *iratus bellis* and a civilian leader without arms.[276] In the previous and the present chapter, we have often encountered the motif of Cicero's humane leadership and his tendency to compromise; Velleius identified Cicero's policy as one aiming at *concordia*, and Valerius praises Cicero as an inspiring model of *humanitas*. And yet, although Cicero was known for his peace-loving and diplomatic attitude, Lucan creates an orator who begs for war.

Furthermore, the speech seems to question Cicero's status as *vox publica*. Lines 69–71, 74, and 84–85 indicate that Cicero mainly represents the higher echelons of the army and particularly the Roman senate, the governmental body that had assigned this war to Pompey.[277] *Rogamus* in line 71 confirms that Cicero is acting as a political representative and including himself among the *proceres tuorum castrorum*

[275] For this difficult passage I made use of the translations by Duff 1928 and Braund 1992.

[276] Lanzarone 2016: 152 notes on the phrase *iratus bellis*: "Notevole, nel testo lucaneo, la paradossalità di un Cicerone che, 'adirato per la guerra', spinge Pompeo alla guerra".

[277] See Roche 2019: 84, "As a symbol of the constitutional authority of the senate, Lucan's Cicero dramatizes Pompey's obligations to a political community…". Cf. Vell. Pat. 2.49, *Pompeium senatus auctoritas, Caesarem militum armavit fiducia.*

regesque. The reference to the *causam senatus* (76), together with the remark "the senate wishes to know" (*scire senatus avet*, 84) signal his status as *consularis*, who would have been allowed to speak on behalf of other senators. Therefore, the remark that Cicero represents the "voice of all men" (*cunctorum voces*, 7.62) in the army acquires an ironical flavour; as an optimate politician, Cicero would sooner focus on the welfare of the aristocracy.[278] The final sentence of his speech also appears to ignore the fact that the largest part of the army consisted of farmers and veterans.

Pompey's reaction to Cicero's cry for battle is certainly not the desired one:

> *Ingemuit rector sensitque deorum*
> *esse dolos et fata suae contraria menti.*[279]
>
> The leader groaned and felt that it was the tricks
> of the gods, and a fate contrary to his own mind.

Pompey feels that this appeal to his sense of valour and steadfastness is a trick of the gods to engage him in the war, although he would rather keep out of it. It is striking to see that what the narrator calls the *dolos deorum* are voiced through the mouth of Cicero—him of all people, the *maximus auctor eloquii*.[280] The untrustworthy character of Cicero's rhetoric, which was already anticipated by the phrase *invalida causa* in 7.67, is confirmed by Pompey's reluctant response.[281] The general's awareness of the tricks which Cicero is playing (by, for example, asking him whether he is afraid, or has lost his trust in the senate or even the gods—things he could not possibly say yes to) only further weakens his argument. Pompey gives in to the orator's appeal without any sign that he is convinced by the cause of the senate: "The war will not be the crime nor the glory of Pompey; you win your case with the gods, Cae-

[278] Keeline 2018: 85 similarly notes this, and eloquently remarks: "He was a conservative politician with a convert's zeal, having raised himself up to the consulship from a family that could boast no senators among its ancestors, and at least from his consulship on he could not easily have been described as the voice of the people."

[279] Luc. 7.85–86. Narducci 2003: 85 sees an allusion 7.85 to the concept of the *rector* or *gubernator* in Cicero's political philosophy; cf. Ahl 1976: 162.

[280] We are reminded of Sallust's *Cat.* 26, where the historiographer mentions *dolus* and *astutia* as Cicero's prime qualities. See chapter 1, § 2.3.1.

[281] Narducci 2003: 82.

sar, with unjust prayers: the fight is on"[282] (*Pompei nec crimen erit nec gloria bellum. / Vincis apud superos votis me, Caesar, iniquis: / pugnatur* …). Moreover, in the speech he gives in response, Pompey immediately and subtly adjusts the perspective on his own leadership as it was established by Cicero. By asking whether the senate should follow as a *miles* or *comes* Cicero had put Pompey's leadership to the test; while a *miles* would follow a military general, a *comes* denotes a civilian escort.[283] The idea that Pompey, at the head of an entire army, would not pursue his military duties, is of course ridiculous. However, Pompey subtly responds to Cicero's ridicule, and even corrects him in the process: he will not fight as a *dux*, or a military leader, he says, but as a fellow soldier, a *miles*.[284] Cicero has framed his position in the army wrongly: Pompey will engage in the battle himself, as a *miles*. What is more, he will even engage in it despite the foreknowledge that he—or the Republic herself—will not see the end of it.[285] The ultimate self-sacrifice is a true sign of *virtus*; Pompey acts according to the responsibilities of a general, but one who sees himself as equal to his fellow citizens.

It is not just Pompey who is unconvinced by the *causa senatus*: the soldiers as well react anxiously to the discussion between the leaders of their camp.[286] The result is complete chaos. The narrator compares Pompey, in giving free rein to the people's anger, to a sailor overpowered by a storm who needs to give his ship over to the winds. Neither Cicero nor Pompey have succeeded in reassuring them of the justness of the war, and the "paleness of many faces as a foreboding of death"[287] indicates that all hope is lost.

[282] As BRAUND 1992 translates.

[283] See ROCHE 2019: 89, who explains *comites* refers to members of staff who travel with a provincial governor, or simply denote the escort on a journey. ROCHE believes Cicero's final remark is meant as a direct insult.

[284] Luc. 7.87–88: *si placet hoc, inquit, cunctis, si milite Magno, / non duce tempus eget, nil ultra fata morabor*. See above, § 3.2.4; part of Cato's leadership ethics is to present himself as a (fellow) *miles* among the soldiers.

[285] E.g. Luc. 7.91–92: *testor, Roma, tamen Magnum quo cuncta perirent / accepisse diem*; and 95: *quis furor, o caeci, scelerum?*

[286] FANTHAM 1992: 178–179 points out Pompey's earlier failure to persuade and exhort his army in book 2.

[287] Luc. 7.129–130: *multorum pallor in ore / mortis venturae faciesque simillima fato*.

Is Lucan's Cicero a mouthpiece of the Roman people and the poet, as some commentators have claimed? This is rather hard to believe considering the ambiguous portrait he renders of him. It is true that Cicero's speech voices part of the feelings in Pompey's camp, but the orator seems to have no idea of the real issues at stake here. Cicero's distant relation to the soldiers in Pompey's army suggests that he does not make an adequate (military) leader. Multiple times in his speech, he identifies himself with the senators. Historically speaking, there is no oddity in this: Pompey was acting on behalf of the senate, who according to the Roman constitution were still the two generals' equal colleagues. Yet considering the enormity of the battle itself, Cicero could have expressed some concern about the horrifiying nature of the war as a *crimen* against fellow citizens, or about the soldiers' position. His view is the view of the elite at Rome, for whose power Caesar was a great threat. At the beginning of book 7 the narrator takes care to emphasize the tragedy of the battle at Pharsalus and the misery of the collective people; Cicero's exhortation of Pompey, on behalf of the leading citizens of Rome, increases the feeling of unease about this war against one of the state's ex-consuls and her own citizens. What is more, it is not only warring against but warring *with* its own citizens. Dorothee Gall has pointed out that the relationship between general and troops is a crucial motif in the *Civil War*, in support of the overall theme of civil war as *nefas*.[288] By adducing Cicero as a representative of the elite republican party, and making Pompey comply to the senate's wish to fight, the narrator highlights the miserable position of the Roman soldiers, who were bound by oath to obey their generals.

The question remains why Lucan introduced Cicero at this point in the narrative. Why include him at all, especially if it is so 'uncharacteristically' unhistorical?[289] One reason may have been that Cicero, whom the poem's readers knew was intimately acquainted with Pompey *and* Caesar both politically and privately, adds dramatic weight to the final moment before the battle.[290] However, Lucan may also have been interested in Cicero's status as a figurehead of the Republic. In his study on the development of Cicero's figure in the early empire, Gowing ar-

[288] Gall 2005.
[289] Narducci 2003: 79.
[290] Cf. Ahl 1976: 162.

gues that Lucan "writes Cicero back into history".[291] Whereas Cicero's political standpoints had been precarious under Augustus and Tiberius, within Lucan's rather subversive tale of the civil war Cicero may reenter as an optimate republican opposing Caesar. Lucan's portrait of Cicero, although stereotypical in its focus on Cicero's iconic eloquence, does offer something of a historical interpretation of Cicero's role in the events around Pharsalus. Firstly, Lucan's Cicero is in fact a leader of the elite party that he has represented so staunchly throughout his career. Secondly, as we know from Cicero's personal letters to Atticus, he had a great distrust of Pompey and objected for a long time against sailing to Dyracchium; this disgruntled and antagonistic attitude is clearly represented in his speech in book 7.[292]

To turn to the exemplary aspects of Cicero's performance, at first glance Lucan's portrait is relatively familiar: Cicero is introduced as the togate general who defeated Catiline, whose eloquence is unparalleled, and who was a great representative of fellow citizens as a result of his oratorical services. However, almost as soon as Lucan has established the traditional image of Cicero as the salvation of the Roman community, he breaks it again. Cicero's famous negotiations for peace are distorted into a public demand for battle,[293] which disregards the needs of the Roman soldiers he is initially thought to represent. We might think the figure of Cicero is only as bellicose as he is bored, having no platform to exercise his skills. There is certainly some humour in this portrayal. Yet Pompey's response again thematizes the tragedy of the battle at Pharsalus; his awareness of the bloody prospects of this battle stands in uncomfortable contrast with the eagerness to fight represented by Cicero, who stayed safely away from Pharsalus, and whose own lack of military exploits was manifest.

[291] Gowing 2013: 244.

[292] From books 7–11 which deal with this period, good examples are *Att.* 7.14.2, 8.3.2–5, 8.11.2, 8.11D.5–8 (Cicero to Pompey), 9.7.3; cf. Esposito 2018: 40–42. Holliday 1969: 65–69 sees a direct correspondence between the attitude expressed in Cicero's letters and his speech in the *Civil War*. For the letters to Atticus as a possible source for Lucan, see Malcovati 1953: 293–297; Holliday 1969: 84–92 (including a direct response to Malcovati's article).

[293] On Cicero's role within book 7 as Pompeian partisan and a proponent of 'bellicism', see Fucecchi 2011 (esp. 246–247). The demand for battle might also be, in some way, a reflection of the tone of Cicero's *Philippics*, which as we have seen was of equal importance to the historical tradition and Cicero's exemplary function. However, I currently see no allusions to this period of Cicero's career. Malcovati 1953: 296–297 does recognize allusions to *Phil.* 2, but in Cato's eulogy of Pompey (9.188–214), and unfortunately she does not elaborate on this observation.

3.4 CONCLUSIONS

Looking at the portraits of Cicero and Cato in the *Civil War*, there could not be a greater difference between these two defenders of the Republic. In a nutshell, Cicero represents the interests of the Roman elite, Cato the interests of the state herself. Cicero is aligned with the *proceres* and the *reges* of Pompey's army camp as well as with the senate in Rome, who are anxious to be robbed of their power by Caesar. Cicero's plea for battle confirms and perpetuates the strife between the political factions in Rome.[294] Quite in contrast to Cicero's policy, Cato, in his exchanges with fellow citizens, propagates a type of devotion to the Republic that surpasses all individual concern.[295] Lucan presents us the ultimate citizen of the *exempla* tradition, whose love for the state is so incorruptible that it has become superhuman.

We have seen in § 2 of this chapter that Cicero's exemplary value is especially difficult to pin down. He is variously portrayed as a superb orator, a kind advocate, and a protector of the Republic. Within Velleius' historiography, his political virtue is explicitly stated, but in Valerius' collection of *exempla*, Cicero's republican ideals have made way for general scenes from the life of a famous Roman citizen, to which few specific values are attached. Though his ethical character is spotless, it is not comparable to the moralistic lifestyle of his fellow senator Cato. Cicero's life may offer models for conduct, but Cato's deeds and words are simply irresistable in their expression of undiluted patriotism: the stories about Cato's life differ most from those about Cicero's in their emphasis on the public admiration and imitation of his deeds. Consequently, the figure of Cicero becomes more one-dimensional in its general display of 'humanity', and the figure of Cato, whose actions are always described in relation to republican (or Roman) values, becomes more ideological in its expression.

In many ways, this picture is continued in Lucan's *Civil War*, as we have seen in § 3. To start with Cicero, he does not play a major role. The

[294] Alternatively, La Bua 2020: 83 goes so far as to argue that "… the man who prided himself for saving the city and preserving Roman aristocratic constitution [*sic*] is blamed for the death of Pompey and the beginning of Caesar's dictatorial regime". I think that is perhaps an overinterpretation of the effect of Cicero's speech.

[295] However, Cato, does create a strict opposition between his army and that of Caesar. This becomes clear from 9.274 onward.

poet presents him in the first place as an aristocrat and an orator, who is most at home on the Forum but seriously out of place—quite literally so—in the camp at Pharsalus. He does not possess any clout with Pompey, apart from being able to represent the feelings of the Roman senate. Moreover, in his only rhetorical performance in the *Civil War*, he fails to present a valid argument. Nothing remains of the 'summit of eloquence' apart from the slogan itself.[296] I do not believe that the *Civil War* is meant to paint a typically negative picture of Cicero. That is beside the author's point. The need of a senatorial personage led the poet to introduce one of the most famous figures from the Republic who was known to have co-negotiated the terms and outcome of the civil war. The Lucanian Cicero, who focuses only on the immediate power conflict instead of expressing any ideological wish to rescue the Republic, serves to demonstrate the tragic result of this civil war: a citizen body which was divided into factions, and forced to fight against itself. Quite some time ago, Frederick Ahl concluded that "Cicero, then, who makes here his one and only appearance in the *Pharsalia*, becomes symbolic of the senate, the whole theory of the republic, and its helplessness in the moment of crisis."[297] I would say that Lucan does more than just signal the senate's 'helplessness'; he also signals how in the late Republic, discord was cultivated rather than dissolved. In this respect, Cicero's angry rhetoric recalls the contentious atmosphere of first-century Roman public life.

Moreover, with regard to Ahl's mention of the "theory of the Republic", it is rather Cato who, more than anyone in the *Civil War*, represents what republican ideology constitutes. We recognize the morally superior Cato of the *exempla* recorded by Valerius and Velleius, who personifies *libertas* and civic *virtus*, and who teaches proper ethics to his fellow citizens. On the one hand, in the text of the *Civil War* we still very much encounter the traditional image of a Cato whose rigid morality defines his actions. It is even echoed intradiegetically, when one of the soldiers appeals to Cato in reference to his well-known respect for the laws. On the other hand, Lucan improves upon this image by making Cato's exemplary assets into *Leitmotifs* within the nar-

[296] Luc. 7.62–63.
[297] Ahl 1976: 162.

rative. The narrative explores the social and historical impact of Cato's archetypical *virtus* and *libertas*, and Cato himself is seen to undergo a psychological development: from *sapiens* to public man. Moreover, his political ideology gains further shape by his interaction with secondary figures such as Brutus and Cornelia or the Pompeian soldiers. In these interactions, the figure of Cato appears as the ethical leader par excellence, whose words cause some kind of ethical conversion on the part of his followers. One of the biggest novelties of Lucan's Cato, in comparison with the Tiberian image, is his talent for public speaking. Not only are his republican values illustrated by the narrative, they are expressed and even transmitted by the man himself. This oratorical strength is, of course, a continuation of the picture in Sallust's *Conspiracy of Catiline* (and possibly other late republican sources.). Velleius' presentation of Cato as a shining beacon of virtue under Tiberius is the first evidence of a tradition initiated by Sallust's antilogy in the *Conspiracy of Catiline*. Lucan's goal, however, went beyond characterizing Cato's oratory as an influential force. The *Civil War* thematizes Cato's sacred voice as the instrument by which he could be an inspirational model for his fellow citizens.

With regard to the effect of Cato's republican leadership in the *Civil War*, Shadi Bartsch observed: "Although he could not have known or expected it to be possible, Lucan's Cato did make a difference in the end; he taught Pompey's army to fight for *libertas* rather than for a master; and this transformation turned the struggle, however briefly, into one between republicanism and Caesarism."[298] Though it was successful, the impact of Cato's civic ideology is marginal. The text of the *Civil War* makes it clear that Cato's republicanism is a utopian ideal. The narrator leaves no doubt from the beginning (and every reader knew) that Caesar was going to win and Cato would die.[299] Therefore, with the demonstration of the tremendous influence Cato exercised on his fellow citizens the limits of his exemplary role become apparent, too. The *Civil War* is retracing, almost dissecting, Cato's moral exemplarity

[298] Bartsch 1997: 129. Cf. George 1991: 254–258.

[299] Had Lucan written the suicide of Cato we would have known the full contours of Cato's personage in the *Civil War*. I do not wish to enter into the discussion about the supposed ending of the poem; seminal is Ahl 1976: 307–326. For an overview of the scholarship on this complex question see Bartsch 2009. For the present argument, it does not really matter whether Lucan wrote the suicide or not.

by looking at the means and consequences of civic virtue in a Republic marked by conflicting ideologies and political self-fashioning. In presenting a complete identification of Cato with *virtus*, the *Civil War* appears to be dealing not only with the tragic fate of this republican hero—who would die during this war—but with the loss of political virtue itself.

In sum, Cato has definitely won something in Lucan's poem: a systematic rhetorical power to defend the Republic's values. Crowned with the title of *pater patriae* and *tutor* of the Roman citizens, Cato gets to be the spokesman of the Republic. Cicero, who had actually been crowned *pater patriae* for his achievements in 63, is 'only' the *maximus auctor eloquii*, and an unpersuasive one at that.[300] Cato fulfils the role of political representative, caring for and giving direction to the Roman citizens, a role which Cicero had so carefully laid out for himself in his public oratory. Why could Cicero, or at least his imperial figure, not represent or defend his own political ideals? Perhaps it was because Roman readers could peruse Cicero's oratory and philosophy for themselves that later writers did not venture to put his thoughts into words again. Perhaps the Latin historiographers did not want to measure themselves against his ultimate eloquence, and waited for their Greek colleagues to do this in a different language. Perhaps, at least as far Lucan was concerned, Cicero simply missed a connection to the common people, and lacked the instructive potential of a true political leader.

[300] Luc. 9.62.