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Cicero, statesmanship, and republicanism in Roman historiography

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CHAPTER ONE

The consolidation of Cicero *consul* in Sallust's *Conspiracy of Catiline*

*Ego autem, ut semel Nonarum illarum Decembrium iunctam invidia
ac multorum inimicitii eximiam quandam atque immortalem gloriam
consecutus sum, non destiti eadem animi magnitudine in re publica ver-
sari et illam institutam ac susceptam dignitatem tueri.*

(Cic. Att. 1.19.6)

1. The roots of the *imago consularis*

In this chapter, we will examine how Sallust's *Conspiracy of Catiline* represents Cicero's consulship, the traditional summit of a Roman politician's career, against the background of political crisis in the late Republic. As a historiographer, one of Sallust's tasks was to assemble and negotiate (or, as Antonio La Penna has phrased it, manipulate)¹ the existing accounts of the history of the Catilinarian conspiracy. Of these, Cicero's consular speeches provide one of the most dominant accounts.² Cicero published the consular corpus, among which are the speeches against Catiline, about twenty years before Sallust wrote and published his *Conspiracy of Catiline* (probably in 41 BC).³ The *Catilinarians* (probably revised after 63 BC, but how extensively is unknown)

¹ LA PENNA 1968: 83. Cf. BALMACEDA 2017: 72; MCGUSHIN 1977: 296–297.

² Sallust had other sources to his availability than Cicero's writings (cf. RAMSEY 2007: 8–9), as for example Brutus' biography of Cato (cf. Cic. Att. 12.21.1) or the official records of the senate (the *acta senatus*).

³ Att. 2.1.3. The *Conspiracy of Catiline* was probably begun in late 42 BC; I follow RAMSEY 1988: 6; SYME 1964: 128.

emphasize a particularly positive, authoritative picture of Cicero's conduct, with the aim of defending his actions of 63.⁴ In the speech *In defence of Sulla* of 62 BC Cicero relates that he circulated official accounts of his consulate and the conspiracy, apparently to justify and defend his actions.⁵ Besides these documents he wrote up his *commentarii* and a Greek memoir of his consulship (ὑπόμνημα).⁶ This publicly disseminated Ciceronian version, then, functions as an important hypotext for Sallust's monograph.⁷ In this first section I will discuss in isolation Cicero's version of the conspiracy in order to better understand Sallust's later modification of the events and its protagonists.

In §§ 2 and 3, I will focus on Sallust's response to Cicero's own public negotiation of his consular image. This is particularly relevant given the later reception of the episode: Sallust's account stands between Cicero's speeches and the accounts of the imperial historiographers. While it is sometimes difficult to determine to what extent these later historiographers based their work on the accounts of Sallust and/or Cicero, it is a fact that the *Conspiracy of Catiline* is an important step in freeing the events from their peculiar Ciceronian lens. The alternative, still contemporary view offered by Sallust will certainly have been appreciated by later writers, who appear to have been aware of Cicero's use of the episode for reasons of self-promotion. In particular, Cicero's constant dwelling on his personal success of 63 BC would become a controversial theme in the imperial writers.⁸ The roots of this focus on Cicero's reputation lie in the consular corpus, the *Catilinarians* in

⁴ STROH 1975: 31–54 and more recently MARTIN 2011 argue that revisions were minimal. Common opinion is that despite possible later additions the speeches resemble relatively well Cicero's argument of those months; cf. CRAIG 1993: 256–258; DYCK 2008: 10–12. More sceptical are LINTOTT 2008: 142–148 and BATSTONE 1994: 214.

⁵ *Sull.* 41–43.

⁶ On the Greek account, *Cic. Att.* 1.19.10, 20.6; 2.1–2 (with LENDLE 1967) and *Plut. Crass.* 13.3–4, *Caes.* 8.3–4 (with PELLING 1985). Another important source, which according to some scholars Sallust's *Conspiracy of Catiline* was a direct response to (SYME 1964: 62–64), was the pamphlet called *De consiliis suis* ('On his policy'), which contained incriminating information against Caesar and Crassus about their involvement in the conspiracy and defended Cicero's own actions: *Cass. Dio* 39.10, cf. *Cic. Att.* 14.17.6.

⁷ In terms of source study, KREBS 2008: 686 presents Sallust as an "avid and attentive reader of Cicero"; LEDWORUSKI 1994 offers a comprehensive overview of Sallust's imitation of Cicero. In this chapter I will not concern myself with the question of to what extent Sallust based himself on Cicero but rather with his literary techniques for challenging the Ciceronian picture of the uprising.

⁸ *Plut. Cic.* 24.1 and *On Self-praise* 54of; *Cass. Dio* 38.12.6–7. Cf. *Quint. Inst.* 11.1.22–24; *Sen. Dial.* 10.5.1.

particular. It is expressed by three main motifs: the idea of civil war, which amplified the events in order to emphasize their urgency, and enabled Cicero to style himself as a military leader; the concept of the *dux togatus*, the general-without-arms who is able to participate in the republican contest for (military) glory; and the *invidia* against Cicero, the moral criticism and indignation over his actions from fellow senators and political rivals, which complicated the later memory of the conspiracy as well as the record of Cicero's personal *res gestae*.

1.1 THE 'WAR' AGAINST CATILINE

In the Catilinarian speeches, Cicero uses the term *bellum* (*domesticum*) to refer to the conspiracy led by Catiline.⁹ Sallust and the imperial authors vary but are generally more nuanced in their choice of terminology.¹⁰ Yet, the choice of *bellum* for the events of 63 BC was not as straightforward as it may seem; later views of the revolution are heavily influenced by the senatorial and conservative accounts of Cicero and Sallust. Based on historical facts, the plot Catiline and his fellow senators devised came closer to a revolt. Except for a final battle at Pistoria little fighting took place at all.¹¹ Remarkably, in the first speech against Catiline, Cicero uses very different words to describe other episodes of civic unrest in recent Roman history, when, like in 63, the emergency decree was issued (the *senatus consultum ultimum*).¹² In speaking of these historical uprisings, Cicero uses the common terms *novae res* (*Cat.* 1.3) and *seditiones* (*Cat.* 1.4).¹³ Moreover, while Cicero initially

⁹ On the topic, see VAN DER BLOM 2019: 123–128.

¹⁰ Sallust differentiates between the plot itself, cf., e.g., *Cat.* 4.3, 37.1, 48.1 (*coniuratio*), and war as the outcome of the plot as it was intended by the conspirators, cf., e.g., 21.2, 24.2 (*bellum* for the battle fought at Pistoria), 32.1; Flor. 2.12 (*bellum*); Vell. Pat. 2.34 (*coniuratio*); App. B. Civ. 2.7 (ἐπανάστασις); Cass. Dio 37.29.3 (ἐπιβούλευμα), 37.32.3 (νεωτερισμός), 37.33.2 (πόλεμος); Plut. Cic. 14.1 (συνωμοσία). On the use of *bellum* in the title of Sallust's monograph, RAMSEY 1988: 5 n. 9.

¹¹ GRUEN 1974: 416–433 states that “the portrait is distorted and misleading” (417). Cf. DYCK 2008: 7–8, “The conspirators’ plans need first be disentangled from C.’s rhetorical exaggerations ... probably no wholesale bloodbath of citizens was contemplated”. KONSTAN 1993 examines the rhetorical strategies behind the speeches against Catiline, and argues that “[Cicero] must decide the outcome by his rhetoric” (13).

¹² The *senatus consultum ultimum* was an important factor with regard to Cicero's political authority in suppressing the conspiracy; on the *s.c.u.* as emergency decree, LINTOTT 1968: 149–174. On the role of the *s.c.u.* in the execution of the Catilinarian conspirators, see DRUMMOND 1995: 79–107.

employs the more nuanced *coniuratio* to refer to Catiline's plans, at the end of the first speech, with increasing frequency, the plot is referred to as *bellum*, a term that would persist throughout the other speeches of that year against Catiline.¹⁴

There were political advantages in presenting the conspiracy as a (civil) war:¹⁵ the emphasis on war as the possible result of the revolt led to extraordinary powers to suppress it quickly, most notably the *senatus consultum ultimum*,¹⁶ and it created a situation in which Catiline and his supporters could be declared enemies (*hostes*) of the Roman state whose apparent dangerousness legitimized their removal from the city or punishment.¹⁷ By denouncing Catiline and his companions as *hostes* Cicero placed them outside the norms and values of the state:¹⁸ in Catiline's case, this rhetorical expulsion led to physical expulsion from the city (as is emphasized by Cicero in *Cat.* 2.1). An important rhetorical motif used to increase the feeling of alarm is the image of the city wall.¹⁹ Enemies naturally find themselves outside the walls of the city they are besieging; the Roman citizens form the threatened party within the city which they are protecting.²⁰ Although

¹³ Cf. *Cat.* 3.24: *civiles dissensiones* for episodes of civil strife in recent history.

¹⁴ Contrast *Ibid.* 1.1, 1.6, 1.12 with *Ibid.* 1.23 (*confer bellum*), 1.25, 1.27, 1.29, 1.33, followed by the introduction of the phrase *bellum domesticum* and of *bellum iustum* in *Cat.* 2.1. For further instances of *bellum*, see *Cat.* 2.11, 2.14, 2.24, 2.28 (where the phrase *bellum intestinum* is added to Cicero's rhetorical arsenal) 2.29, 3.3, 3.15, 3.16, 3.19, 3.22, 3.25 (*hoc autem uno post hominum memoriam maximo crudelissimoque bello*), 4.2, 4.22. Note that the term is much more frequent in the speeches held in the *contio* than those which were performed in the senate. Cf. *Har.* 49, *Planc.* 49, *Div.* 1.105.

¹⁵ ARENA 2020: 110 discusses the "descriptive" and "evaluative" function of the term *bellum* (*civile*). She moreover demonstrates that the term *bellum* became much more frequent in the first century BC as part of Rome's development from a society divided into factions into an autocracy. Cicero, who is the first to use the term *bellum civile* (*Leg. Man.* 66), marks the breaking point: before his time *dissensio*, *sedition*, *tumultus* would have been more common vocabulary to denote civil strife. For the vocabulary of *hostis* in the *Catilinarians*, see, e.g., *Cat.* 1.13 (*exire ex urbe iubet consul hostem*); 1.33 (*hostes patriae*); 2.1 (*palam iam cum hoste nullo impediante bellum iustum geremus*); 2.3 (*capitalis hostis*); 2.17; 3.22; 4.15. Cicero himself attests in his *Philippics* that terminology was a matter of contestation in the context of civil strife: *Phil.* 12.17.

¹⁶ Sall. *Cat.* 31.6 records that Cicero's angry first speech against Catiline speeded up the development into war.

¹⁷ MITCHELL 1979: 214 notes that the *hostis* declaration was often a direct result of a *senatus consultum ultimum*. LINTOTT 1968: 157 (with n. 2) rightly remarks that even though Cicero in *Cat.* 1 brands Catiline a *hostis rei publicae* he was in fact not officially declared a *hostis* until after his joining Manlius' troops in Etruria (Sall. *Cat.* 36.2–3).

¹⁸ For this technique, see FLOWER 2006: 100–103.

¹⁹ E.g. Cic. *Cat.* 1.10–12, 1.31–32; 2.11, 17; 3.17. Cf. KONSTAN 1993: 15; VASALY 1993: 52–53.

²⁰ HABINEK 1998: 73.

Catiline was driven from Rome, many of the conspirators were still in the city; their status as citizen-*hostes* made them even more dangerous, and a swift removal was vital.

By employing the concept of *bellum*, Cicero, especially in his public oratory, opens up possibilities for embedding his deeds in a military context in a way that suited his self-fashioning needs. In his speeches, Cicero emphasizes the extraordinary situation Rome is facing, and the special skills required of a consul managing a crisis like the present one. In the oratory, and to a lesser extent his political writings, he developed the image of the saviour of the state, who rescues her and her citizens from terrible dangers: fires, the swords of Catiline and his men, murder and devastation.²¹ Instead of merely governing the state, he now has to *save* it, he exclaims at one point in the second speech against Catiline.²² In line with this terminology of war, he presents the conspiracy as part of his *res gestae*, the term used to describe the—usually military—deeds of famous leaders of the Roman people.²³

1.2 THE *DUX TOGATUS*

Broadly speaking, the military terminology served one very particular end in Cicero's personal propaganda: he could style himself *dux togatus et imperator*, the general clad in toga; or the civil leader who is able to solve troubles, even suppress a revolt, by peaceful means.²⁴ The term *dux*, as Hellegouarc'h explains, refers in the first instance to a "chef de guerre".²⁵ Every *bellum* needs a general, and in the *Catilinarians* Cicero

²¹ For this image, see *Cat.* 3.1–2. Cicero presented himself as the sole rescuer of the Republic, e.g. *Ibid.* 3.25, *Sull.* 26, *Pis.* 6–7, *Sest.* 49, *Dom.* 99, *Red. Quir.* 16. Cf. NICOLET 1960: 240: "le seul véritable vainqueur, c'est Cicéron". HALL 2013 studies the image of Cicero as saviour of the Republic.

²² *Cat.* 2.14: *O condicionem miseram non modo administrandae verum etiam conservandae rei publicae!*

²³ E.g. *Sull.* 28; *Fam.* 5.7; *Sest.* 38; *Pis.* 72; *Dom.* 73–74. Cf. the use of *gerere* (*gessi*) *Cat.* 3.27, 29 and *Sull.* 83; for *gero* in the special meaning of conducting public affairs (civilian as well as military), see TLL s.v. *gero* II.D.3.b.

²⁴ See *Cat.* 2.28: "an internal and civil war has been prevented under my togate command" ([*ut*] *bellum intestinum ac domesticum ... me uno togato duce et imperatore sedetur*); 3.23. Cf. *Ibid.* 2.11, 4.19 and *Mur.* 84 (only *dux*). On the concept of the *consul togatus*, see the seminal article by NICOLET 1960.

²⁵ In addition, based on Cicero and Livy HELLEGOUARC'H 1963: 324–326 argues that *dux* could also refer to "principal members of the senate" who would instigate certain actions. Yet such seman-

gladly assigns to himself the function of *dux*. This is, firstly, an anchoring device. The orator takes care to fit himself into a long tradition of leaders saving the Republic. Killing Catiline, and giving him the severest punishment, was something that was demanded by the *mos maiorum*, ancestral tradition, and by the strict regime the Roman empire conducted against troublemakers.²⁶ Within this tradition, Cicero sees a special role for himself.²⁷

*Ceteris enim bene gesta, mihi uni conservata re publica gratulationem decrevistis. Sit Scipio clarus ille, cuius consilio atque virtute Hannibal in Africam redire atque Italia decedere coactus est; ornetur alter eximia laude Africanus, qui duas urbes huic imperio infestissimas, Carthaginem Numantiamque, delevit; habeatur vir egregius Paulus ille, cuius currum rex potentissimus quondam et nobilissimus Perses honestavit; sit aeterna gloria Marius, qui bis Italiam obsidione et metu servitutis liberavit; anteponatur omnibus Pompeius, cuius res gestae atque virtutes isdem quibus solis cursus regionibus ac terminis continentur: erit profecto inter horum laudes aliquid loci nostrae gloriae, nisi forte maius est patefacere nobis provincias quo exire possimus quam curare ut etiam illi qui absunt habeant quo victores revertantur.*²⁸

You have ordered a public thanksgiving to others due to their good management of the state, but to me alone for saving the state. Scipio, he may be famous, by whose counsel and virtue Hannibal was forced to return to Africa and retreat from Italy; the other Africanus may be celebrated with extraordinary praise, who razed to the ground two cities most inimical to this empire, Carthage and Numantia; Paulus, he may be considered an excellent man, whose chariot was honoured by the once most powerful and noble king Perseus; may Marius be with eternal glory, who twice liberated Italy from a siege and the fear of slavery; may Pompey surpass all others, whose deeds of valour and virtues are limited by the same regions and boundaries as are reached by the course of the sun: there will certainly be some kind of place for our honour among the celebrations of these men, unless it is of

tic adjustments obscure the fact that at least in the speeches against Catiline, Cicero is comparing himself with *duces* in the primary sense of the word, i.e. military commanders.

²⁶ *Cat.* 2.3: *idque a me et mos maiorum et huius imperi severitas et rei publicae utilitas postulabat*. Cf. *Cat.* 1.3–4 for the examples of severity Cicero has in mind.

²⁷ For Cicero's dexterous ways of 'inscribing' himself in the tradition, with or without the use of specific role models (like in the passage cited here), cf. PIEPER 2014; VAN DER BLOM 2010, esp. 297–300 on the consulship.

²⁸ *Cat.* 4.20.9–21.

more importance to open up paths to the provinces along which we can travel, than to ensure that also those who are absent have a place where they can return as victors.

This passage is typical of Cicero's self-representation in his consular and post-consular writings.²⁹ He presents himself as the saviour of the state,³⁰ an achievement that is unique to him, so he claims, in comparison to all the famous leaders who have gone before him: Scipio Africanus, Scipio Aemilianus, Aemilius Paullus, Gaius Marius, and Pompey. All are praised for their military feats, that is to say, for fighting foreign enemies and for protecting the empire. Cicero emphasizes the difference between these men and himself by adding quasi-modestly that he would take a place among these exemplary Romans if it is equally glorious to preserve the city of Rome (*curare ut illi habeant quo victores revertantur*) as expanding and protecting the Roman empire outside of Rome (*patefacere nobis provincias*).³¹ The idea, of course, is that the suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy makes Cicero, a civilian leader, just as capable as any famous military general of achieving the traditional honour (*gloria*) for deeds of valour (*res gestae*).³²

In line with the image of the togate general, Cicero often recalls the *supplicatio*, the official thanksgiving referred to by the term *gratulatio* in *Cat.* 4.21 above,³³ which he received due to his role in uncovering the plot devised by Catiline. The *supplicatio* was a ceremonial, public act of offering to the gods in order either to pray for good fortune or thank them for good fortune given. Traditionally, it took place in preparation for a war abroad, or after a successful military campaign. It was ordained (*decernere*) by the senate, and was consequently carried out by the magistrates. Especially in the first century BC, the *supplicatio* became increasingly frequent and a synonym for the celebration of particular generals.³⁴ Within this context, the ambitious Cicero saw the

²⁹ STEEL 2001: 168–170 argues that *Cat.* 4.20–24 is the culmination of Cicero's constant thematization of his 'military' oratory. Cf. *Phil.* 2.2, 13; *Pis.* 6; *Fam.* 15.4.

³⁰ HALL 2013 provides an overview of the theme in Cicero's speeches.

³¹ Cf. *Cat.* 3.26, where the *duo cives* mentioned represent Pompey and Cicero, the one expanding the limits of the empire beyond the skies, and the other safeguarding the empire in Rome.

³² At *Off.* 1.74–78, Cicero similarly compares his achievements with those of Pompey, clearly "to his own advantage", as DYCK 1996: 206 notes, and with a strategic eye to diminishing the ill-will he suffered due to his continuous self-praise after 63.

³³ On the synonymy of *supplicatio* and *gratulatio* especially in the late Republic, cf. WISSOWA 1931: 947. The term *gratulatio* is also used by Cicero in *Pis.* 6.

conspiracy as an opportunity to participate in this contest for *gloria*. In the third speech against Catiline, Cicero emphasizes the extraordinary event of a *supplicatio* decreed in his name:

*Atque etiam supplicatio dis immortalibus pro singulari eorum merito meo nomine decreta est, quod mihi primum post hanc urbem conditam togato contigit, et his decreta verbis est: quod urbem incendiis, caede cives, Italiam bello liberassem. Quae supplicatio cum ceteris supplicationibus conferatur, hoc interest quod ceterae bene gesta, haec una conservata re publica constituta est.*³⁵

And also an official thanksgiving to the immortal gods for extraordinary service on their behalf has been decreed on my account, something that has happened to me for the first time since the foundation of the city, in toga, and it has been decreed in the following terms: because I have freed the city from fires, the citizens from murder, and Italy from war. When one compares this thanksgiving with other thanksgivings, this is the difference, that others have been awarded for good leadership, and this one alone has been awarded for the rescue of the Republic.

The context is again military, with the *toga* taking center stage in the presentation of the revolt. Cicero carefully emphasizes that the *supplicatio*, usually awarded to Roman generals returning victorious from battle, is now for the first time decreed in the name of a civilian leader. Moreover, it is the first time that it has been proclaimed after a successful rescue of the city; normally, it would concern a victory abroad against foreign peoples challenging Roman territory. The details of the ceremonial thanksgiving that according to Cicero's own writings was decreed in his name are difficult to pin down. In fact, Cicero's speeches are the only extant contemporary source of information about the *supplicatio* of 63.³⁶ Worse, the information he does give us in his public speeches is subjected to rhetorical hyperbole.³⁷

³⁴ WISSOWA 1931: 942–952.

³⁵ *Cat.* 3.15.

³⁶ See *Cat.* 4.5, 4.21; *Pis.* 6; *Phil.* 2.13, 14.22–24; *Fam.* 15.4.11. The “procession” described in Plutarch's biography (*Cic.* 22.3–5) right after Cicero has brought the conspirators to death, is perhaps a creative interpretation of the *supplicatio*, but he does not include any ritual element (but see *Cic.* 20.1).

³⁷ WISSOWA 1931: 948 sharply observes that Cicero's presentation of the thanksgiving fluctuated: in *Cat.* 3 he states that it was done in his name (*meo nomine*, *Cat.* 3.15), in *Cat.* 4 that the thanksgiv-

Another event that Cicero took care to include in his self-representation as Roman leader is the proposal of fellow senator L. Gellius to award him the *civica corona*, a crown made of oak leaves that was presented to Roman citizens who had saved the life of another Roman citizen.³⁸ Yet, Cicero never actually received it. What he did receive, was the title *pater patriae* in the aftermath of the Catilinarian episode, proclaimed by Catulus.³⁹ Andreas Alföldy has argued that this is only an honorary title, without political or juridical weight, which might be the reason why we have little information on any official proceedings connected with the proclamation of the title.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, the event offered a useful addition to Cicero's reputation, since the concept of fatherhood emphasized Cicero's leading position in the state and strengthened his image as a protector and saviour of all citizens. Cicero goes so far as to argue that "a crowded senate house has decided that everybody ought to thank me as a father, and that they owed their life, possessions, children, the whole state to me" (*frequentissimo senatui sic placuit ut esset nemo qui mihi non ut parenti gratias ageret, qui mihi non vitam suam, fortunas, liberos, rem publicam referret acceptam*).⁴¹

Glancing forward to the imperial era, the image of Cicero *togatus* keeps popping up but *without* the element of *dux* and with an exclusive focus on the *toga*. For instance, Lucan characterizes Cicero as the icon of Roman eloquence, "under whose law and toga savage Catiline brandished his harmless swords".⁴² Juvenal, on the other hand, connects

ing was held for him (*mihi*, Cat. 4.10), and in other speeches he presents the thanksgiving as having been decreed for him as sole civilian leader in history (*uni togato*, Sull. 85; Pis. 6; Fam. 15.4.11).

³⁸ Pis. 6; cf. Gellius NA 5.6.15.

³⁹ Sest. 121; Pis. 6; Phil. 2.12.

⁴⁰ ALFÖLDY 1971. See for a different approach, which questions Cicero's representation of the events, KASTER 2006: 353–354, who notes that Cicero nowhere speaks of a senatorial decree or the bestowal of this official title onto him by the senate; these are, according to him "significant silences". The title of *pater patriae* and the proposal for the *corona civica* are often discussed in one breath, while they were actually different honorary distinctions. The fact that almost all of our information about these awards comes from Cicero himself is not adequately addressed by Cicero's modern biographers: cf. RAWSON 1975: 80; STOCKTON 1971: 130, 135; BRINGMANN 2010: 96. It apparently became a popular anecdote in the literary tradition of the empire, attested by a diverse range of authors: Plin. HN 7.117; Juv. 8.243–244; App. B. Civ. 2.7; Plut. Cic. 23.3. Tradition is unclear about who proposed the title. Cicero himself mentions Catulus, but Plutarch and Appian write that Cato proposed it; I suspect Appian got his information directly from Plutarch, since the name of the initiator does not figure in other texts. Appian and Plutarch further note that Cicero was the first to get the title of "father of the fatherland" which in the imperial era was commonly bestowed upon emperors.

⁴¹ Phil. 2.12; cf. Dom. 94.

the *toga* and Cicero with regard to his political status of *equus* and *homo novus* from Arpinum.⁴³ Plutarch, who shows a preference for Ciceronian *dicta* (as we will see in more detail in chapter 3) paraphrases Ciceronian thought in his biography when he relates the events during the senate meeting of 8 November 63, where Catiline was present, and Cicero performed his first Catilinarian speech:

Ἀρξάμενος δὲ λέγειν ἐθορυβεῖτο, καὶ τέλος ἀναστὰς ὁ Κικέρων προσέταξεν αὐτῷ τῆς πόλεως ἀπαλλάττεσθαι· δεῖν γὰρ αὐτοῦ μὲν λόγοις, ἐκείνου δ' ὅπλοις πολιτευομένου μέσον εἶναι τὸ τεῖχος.⁴⁴

As soon as he had begun to speak, he was shouted down; finally, Cicero rose and ordered him to remove himself from the city; for there needed to be a wall between him who conducted politics with words, and that man who did so with arms.

Plutarch has combined multiple Ciceronian motifs into one indirect remark: the image of the city wall between revolutionaries and citizens, the antagonism between Catiline and Cicero (αὐτοῦ μὲν ... ἐκείνου δέ), and the civilian (peaceful) leadership (λόγοις πολιτευομένου) Cicero made part of his reputation.⁴⁵ The topos of Cicero *consul togatus* was continued into the late empire, as is shown by Ampelius' memorandum (*Liber memorialis*; the date of which ranges from the second until the fourth century):⁴⁶ Ampelius commemorates Cicero in a list of Romans who have done great deeds in toga (*Romani qui in toga fuerunt illustres*) together with, among others, Scipio Nasica and Cato;⁴⁷ this list comes right after a chapter on the *clarissimi duces Romanorum*, where, for instance, Sulla, Marius, Caesar, and Augustus are listed. Such categorizations serve as a striking correction to Cicero's self-portrayal in the speeches; famous in toga he was, but he did not fit the category of *dux*, like the famous Roman exemplars he compares himself with in his public oratory, regardless of how he styled himself.

⁴² Luc. 7.63–65: *cunctorum voces Romani maximus auctor / Tullius eloquii, cuius sub iure togaque / pacificas saevos tremuit Catilina secures*. Cf. Quint. *Inst.* 2.16.7: *divina M. Tulli eloquentia ... Catilinae fregit audaciam et supplicationes*.

⁴³ Juv. 8.237–238.

⁴⁴ Plut. *Cic.* 16.5.

⁴⁵ The topos of the 'wall' also features in Juv. 8.240–241: *tantum igitur muros intra toga contulit illi / nominis ac tituli...* See n. 19 above.

⁴⁶ On the date, CONTE 1994: 551.

⁴⁷ Amp. 19.

1.3 INVIDIA

The decisions Cicero made in his official function as consul, especially with regard to the execution of the conspirators, would haunt him for the rest of his life. This was partly due to his incessant bragging about his victory over the rebels, but, as Henriette van der Blom notes, the self-praise was also part of a defense strategy against those who relentlessly criticized him for his actions.⁴⁸ However, feelings of hatred and indignation are already thematized in the speeches of 63; more pointedly, they are used to amplify Cicero's self-sacrifice and magnanimity as a leader.

At the end of the fourth speech against Catiline, given in the senate on 5 December 63, during the debate about the fate and punishment of the conspirators, Cicero acknowledges the danger that came with the responsibility of governing a state in civil strife:

*Quamquam est uno loco condicio melior externae victoriae quam domesticae, quod hostes alienigenae aut oppressi serviunt aut recepti beneficio se obligatos putant, qui autem ex numero civium dementia aliqua depravati hostes patriae semel esse coeperunt, eos, cum a perniciē rei publicae reppuleris, nec vi coercere nec beneficio placere possis. Qua re mihi cum perditis civibus aeternum bellum susceptum esse video.*⁴⁹

However, one aspect of external victories are preferable over domestic ones, namely that foreign enemies will be conquered and serve as slaves, or, after they have received clemency, consider themselves under obligation; but those men from the rank of citizens, corrupted by some madness, who once start to be enemies of the fatherland, you

⁴⁸ VAN DER BLOM 2014: 49; cf. BATSTONE 1994: 219 on the *First Catilinarian*, which according to him precisely uses self-praise as a rhetorical strategy to establish Cicero's consular authority firmly. VAN DER BLOM usefully discusses the main themes of such attacks on Cicero; the ones most connected with his treatment of the conspirators are the charge of tyranny/tyrannical behaviour and the indignation over his 'endless' self-praise (cf. Sen. *Dial.* 10.5.1). The charge of boastfulness seems to concentrate mainly on the particular promotional 'slogan' (NICOLET 1960; HALL 2013) from the poem on his consulship, *De consulatu suo*: "let the arms yield for the toga, the laurel wreath for civic fame" (*cedant arma togae, concedat laurea laudi*). Cicero himself in *Off.* 1.77 mentions that he heard how this phrase was attacked by "impudent and invidious men" (*in quod invadi solere ab improbis et invidis audio*), among whom also Antony (*Phil.* 2.20). Cf. also DYCK 1996: 208–209, who gives most of the relevant references to the later reception of the phrase: Juv. 10.122; Quint. *Inst.* 11.1.23–24 and Plut. *Comp. Dem. et Cic.* 2.1–2, both in comparison with Demosthenes' lack of a desire for recognition; *Laus Pis.* 35–36; [Sall.] *Inv. in Cic.* 3.5.

⁴⁹ *Cat.* 4.22.

cannot, when you have prevented them from destroying the state, constrain them by force or placate them with a benefaction. For this reason I seem to have taken upon me an eternal war with pernicious citizens.

Framing his consular duties again as a military matter, Cicero explains that there is one particular problem with fighting against one's own citizens as opposed to fighting foreign enemies: while these can be controlled by either slavery or by the formation of alliances, internal enemies are not so easily placated, since, being citizens, they can be confident of relying on the Roman rules of justice and equality. Cicero, therefore, foresees an *aeternum bellum* with seditious citizens, which creates great problems for his own career and reputation.

The *bellum* Cicero describes in this passage ultimately became a war against his detractors. Loss of popularity and character assassination were a daily threat in Roman politics, where invective rhetoric was commonly accepted and frequently practiced.⁵⁰ It is already in the *First Catilinarian* that Cicero expresses fear for his reputation if he pursues his fight against the conspirators. However, when push comes to shove, unpopularity because of having been too harsh or violent in rescuing the Republic is better than unpopularity resulting from negligence which led to the complete devastation of Rome.⁵¹ To the Roman citizens, Cicero says that he would rather suffer a "storm of false and dishonest criticism", *invidiae falsae atque iniquae*,⁵² than take the risk that any harm comes to the city.⁵³ It is the great dilemma of his consulship: how fiercely were Catiline and the other conspirators in Rome to be punished?

Let us pause for a moment to consider the meaning of the term *invidia* in the context of the Catilinarian conspiracy and Cicero's consulate, especially since the usual English translation for *invidia*, "ill-will" or "envy", does not really cover the implications of this sentiment for Cicero's political career (it is why I have used different translations

⁵⁰ VAN DER BLOM 2014: 38–39 (with ample bibliography). But see in particular KOSTER 1980; ARENA 2007; POWELL 2007.

⁵¹ *Cat.* 1.49: *sed si quis est invidiae metus, non est vehementius severitatis ac fortitudinis invidia quam inertiae ac nequitiae pertimescenda.*

⁵² *Cat.* 2.15: *est mihi tanti, Quirites, huius invidiae falsae atque iniquae tempestatem subire.*

⁵³ Cf. also *Cat.* 3.3, where the *invidia* is said to result directly from the decision to cast out Catiline; when using the word *eicere*, Cicero states that he does not fear *huius verbi invidiam*.

above). The standard dictionary definition of *invidia* describes a (passive) feeling that rests somewhere between indignation and vexation.⁵⁴ The *OLD* poses that in an active sense, *invidia* can be “affecting the object of the feeling”, resulting in expressions of ‘dislike’, and that, thirdly, *invidia* can be “aroused against an opponent, as a way of contributing to his defeat”.⁵⁵ This third definition of *invidia* is most illustrative for our purposes: politically, it could be used against an opponent, functioning as a sort of weapon—for example, in elections or debates. However, the *invidia* Cicero is afraid he will receive from his fellow citizens is not so much competitive as vindictive; the risks he describes exist in the criticism that he has made the wrong choices in handling the conspiracy, for which retribution will be demanded.

Robert Kaster’s study of the emotion of *invidia* elucidates the purport and the consequences of the *invidia Ciceronis*. I will briefly recap those parts of his argument that are useful for mine, necessarily simplifying his sophisticated analysis. As he explains it, the Romans knew two kinds of *invidia*, which can be helpfully associated with the Greek terms νέμεσις and φθόνος (the distinction is based on Cicero’s own words in one of the letters to Atticus, *Att.* 5.19.3). When one experiences *phthonos-invidia*, one begrudges someone something which is good, either because you simply do not want him to have it, or because you want to have it yourself; this form of *invidia* is prominent within political competition. Take, for example, an election campaign (under normal circumstances). Candidates experience *phthonos-invidia* towards the person currently in the political position they aspire, because it gives them power. They experience a different kind of envy towards other candidates running for the same position, for they will not concede to others the power they want to have themselves.

When one experiences *nemesis-invidia*, on the other hand, a sense of righteousness comes into play. You feel spite because someone else enjoys a good which, according to you, is not supposed to be his/hers, either because you think it is proper that *you* should have it, or because it is against some societal rule or custom that they have it. The first group can be exemplified by the hatred of the patricians versus the *homines*

⁵⁴ *TLL* s.v. *invidia* 1; *OLD* s.v. *invidia* 1.

⁵⁵ *OLD* s.v. *invidia* 2 and 3, respectively.

novi in the late Republic; the old nobility of Rome regards it as improper if these non-native Roman men compete with them in the political arena, for they themselves have much older (and therefore much worthier) rights. The second group are those, for example, who publicly call shame on Cicero for his prompt execution of the conspirators in December 63, since this was against the principle that Roman citizens could be killed without the right to be heard in trial.

Importantly, *invidia*, featuring the stem *vid-*, 'to see', is an emotion that is felt *and* exercised in the public space.⁵⁶ The public expression of *nemesis-invidia*, which results from indignation against someone who unrightfully claims something to be his/hers, is basically a form of 'shaming' the person who is acting improperly; it can thus function as a corrective mechanism within political communities. In the case of Cicero's career, this underlying set of cultural expectations needs to be taken into account when analyzing the criticism, i.e. *nemesis-invidia*, targeted at his reputation, and his own reaction to that. In order to understand this contemporary criticism, one must not only ask the question: how did this *invidia* manifest itself, and what kind of criticism did Cicero receive? But it should also be asked which kind of (moral) boundaries was Cicero thought to have crossed, or what rules did he perhaps violate by acting the way he did? By asking these sorts of questions, Cicero's precarious position in 63, as the main person responsible for the killing of the conspirators, becomes clearer.

One of the first public expressions of indignation over Cicero's actions and his decision to execute the conspirators came already in December 63. It was customary that before resigning from their position, consuls gave a final speech and took a public oath. Cicero was prevented from delivering the speech by the tribune Metellus Nepos; he was, however, permitted to take the oath on legal grounds.⁵⁷ Nepos famously disagreed with Cicero's decision to execute the conspirators.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ According to KASTER 2005: 96, that goes especially for *nemesis-invidia*, since this functions on the level of the exercise of social and cultural conventions. Cf. *TLL* s.v. *invideo* I, which records the use of this term in religious contexts in reference to the evil eye.

⁵⁷ Cic. *Fam.* 5.2 to Metellus Celer, the brother of Nepos. Nepos had been a legate of Pompey's in the Mithridatic war, and actually proposed a bill that Pompey should return to make an end officially to the unrest in the city.

⁵⁸ A good overview of the enmity between Metellus Nepos and Cicero is CRAWFORD 1994: 215–220; cf. GELZER 1969: 105–106, and see also below.

Consequently, as Cicero himself relates, Nepos had publicly stated that it was not proper for someone who had put men on trial without the ability to speak, to speak himself.⁵⁹ His public shaming of Cicero and the reference to proper procedure fits Kaster's definition of *nemesis-invidia* well. To make things worse, Cicero defeated Nepos by swearing a novel oath in which he confirmed that he alone had saved the Republic (having the whole assembly chime in), only nourishing the feeling among his opponents that he was acting on his own behalf.

The speech *In defence of Sulla* gives us further evidence about the ways in which the *invidia Ciceronis* was connected with ideas of right and wrong in relation to Cicero's behaviour. The speech was held somewhere between May and October 62, not long after the conspiracy, and it was published in the same year.⁶⁰ In the speech, Cicero responds to the accusation from the opposing advocate, L. Manlius Torquatus, that he was the *tertius peregrinus rex*, the third foreign tyrant after Tarquinius and Numa (both of Etruscan origin).⁶¹ Certainly, the adjective *peregrinus* is a feature of *phthonos-invidia*, competitive envy, that was part and parcel of the Roman patrician treatment of *homines novi* like Cicero. The charge of *regnum*, on the other hand, was a more serious form of *nemesis-invidia*, since it touched upon the essence of the republican institution; acting king-like would imply a neglect of the social and political structure of the Republic. As the commentators duly note, the accusation formed a familiar trope in the invective tradition at Rome, and the complaint must therefore partly be a form of rhetorical sensationalism intended to blacken Cicero's reputation.⁶² However, the fact that Cicero elaborately defends himself, here as well as elsewhere, against this claim suggests that Torquatus' words reflect, to some extent, more popular thoughts about autocratic rulership or arrogant behaviour in his suppression of the conspiracy.

There were also more subtle acts of *invidia*, coming not from detractors but from Cicero's own *amici*. We have seen that Cicero places himself on an equal level with Pompey in the *Fourth Catilinarian*. Pompey,

⁵⁹ *Fam.* 5.2.8.

⁶⁰ See BERRY 1996: 14 (date), and 54–59 (publication), with ample bibliography.

⁶¹ *Sull.* 21–22. *Cat.* 2.14 already refers to this type of criticism (*me non diligentem consulem sed crudelissimum tyrannum existimari velint*). Cf. VAN DER BLOM 2014: 42 on this charge, which was brought against Cicero on other occasions, too (cf. *Att.* 1.16.10).

⁶² BERRY 1996: 177; MACDONALD 1977: 332.

however, did not necessarily seem to share these feelings in 63. A letter from Cicero to Pompey, dating to 62 BC (*Fam.* 5.7; the preceding letters are not extant), reveals some of the emotions at play. In this letter, Cicero shares his disappointment about Pompey's failure to congratulate him for his conquest over the conspirators:

*Res eas gessi quarum aliquam in tuis litteris et nostrae necessitudinis et rei publicae causa gratulationem expectavi; quam ego abs te praetermissam esse arbitror quod verere<re> ne cuius animum offenderes. sed scito ea quae nos pro salute patriae gessimus orbis terrae iudicio ac testimonio comprobari. quae, cum veneris, tanto consilio tantaque animi magnitudine a me gesta esse cognosces ut tibi multo maiori quam Africanus fuit [a] me non multo minore<m> quam Laelium facile et in re publica et in amicitia adiunctum esse patiare.*⁶³

I have conducted these affairs of which I expected some word of congratulation in your letter on account of our friendship and the state. I suspect that you omitted to congratulate me because you are afraid to cause offence to someone. I'd like to emphasize that those things I have done for the sake of the country's safety are sanctioned by the judgment and testimony of the entire world. When you arrive, you shall find that I have acted with such good counsel and such greatness of mind that you will accept that to you, a man much greater than Africanus, I, not much inferior to Laelius, am connected in state affairs and in friendship.

This letter has been regarded by modern scholars as evidence that Pompey suffered from feelings of jealousy,⁶⁴ but the interaction between Pompey and Cicero here is more complex than that. In the first instance, this letter is about *amicitia*; this is the first time Cicero uses the term for designating the relationship between Pompey and himself.⁶⁵ This is all the more interesting considering Cicero's rather imperative tone. The expression of Cicero's expectations, the imperative form *scito*, and the remark that their friendship (*necessitudo*) and even the state itself demand congratulation from Pompey all suggest that Pompey is, quite wrongly, endangering their relation with his silence, and should openly come forward as Cicero's *amicus*. As Jon Hall ex-

⁶³ *Fam.* 5.7.3.

⁶⁴ HOLLIDAY 1989: 18–22; RAWSON 1978: 93–97.

⁶⁵ RAWSON 1978: 97 n. 97.

plains, Cicero puts Pompey on the spot by openly asking for a confirmation of their friendship, which Pompey could hardly deny him without violating the rules of politeness.⁶⁶ However, Cicero is not only asking Pompey here to affirm their relationship, he is also asking his affirmation of his status as a great man (*animi magnitudine*) who has saved the country, by which act he becomes perhaps not entirely equal, but very close in hierarchy to Pompey (so much so that he imagines himself to be an advisor and direct friend of Pompey, as Laelius was to Scipio Africanus).⁶⁷ Perhaps Pompey was indeed suffering from a bout of typical *phthonos-invidia* over not having been able to quash the Catilinarian himself, and seeing Cicero receive all the honour. However, his silence may also signify a layer of moral reproof for Cicero's untimely habit of glorifying his own deeds and especially, of expecting others to do the same regardless of their own pride.

Not only the moral criticism, but also Cicero's own defensive strategies against this criticism became part of his post-consular programme. Before turning to Sallust's *Conspiracy of Catiline*, then, we should briefly discuss the Ciceronian argument that was most often employed to dodge the bullet of *invidia*. In the public speeches, Cicero emphasizes that, in fact, he did not act alone (as a *rex* would have done): he acted upon the *consensus bonorum omnium* and with agreement of all the Roman citizens.⁶⁸ Throughout the *Catilinarians*, Cicero argues that the consul, as leader of the people and president of the senate, needs to create transparency, and has to act fully on their behalf.⁶⁹ For example, *Cat.* 3 states explicitly that Cicero wants to convey precisely to the peo-

⁶⁶ HALL 2009: 48, 128. Cf. RAWSON 1975: 91–92.

⁶⁷ The comparison Cicero draws between himself, the other Scipio, Pompey, and other war generals in *Cat.* 4.21 moreover does not present the modest image of a man who wanted to be a mere advisor.

⁶⁸ E.g. *Cat.* 4.14–19 (an elaborate passage in which Cicero argues that all ranks (*ordines*) are joined together in harmony), 22 (*bonorumque omnium auxilio*), 24; *Fam.* 5.2.8; *Pis.* 7; *Dom.* 94; *Att.* 1.9.13.

⁶⁹ In the *Third Catilinarian* to the *contio*, Cicero expresses the belief that the memory of what he has done, i.e. saving the Republic and her citizens, will function as a type of victory monument that will protect his good reputation (*Cat.* 3.26); cf. PIEPER 2014: 49–50. See also STEEL 2006 on Cicero's self-positioning as counsellor who mediates between the different groups in society, and the “rhetorical manoeuvre” of giving advice. MITCHELL 1971 argues that this might be more than just a rhetorical strategy: MITCHELL demonstrates that it may also be a reflection of Cicero's political convictions about the proper procedure in the case of a *senatus consultum ultimum*, the emergency mandate given to the consuls of 63. I am much tempted to be convinced by his argument, which is well-grounded in the historical texts, for one thing because Cicero simply never had the kind of po-

ple how the conspirators were apprehended, in a way similar to how he has “explained, revealed, and evidenced” the matter in front of the senate;⁷⁰ later in the same speech, Cicero emphasizes that when he received the letters sent by the conspirators he refused to open them in the presence of his worried friends, for the reason that matters of public peril should be immediately and without interference brought before the senate (*negavi me esse facturum ut de periculo publico non ad consilium publicum rem integram deferrem*).⁷¹

The fragmentary speech *Contra contionem Q. Metelli*, delivered in 62 BC, illustrates even better how Cicero intended to divide the blame for the decisions made in 63.⁷² By then retired, he claims that, although he in fact approves of the punishment given to the conspirators, in the end it was not his decision:

Fr. 9 (Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.40) *Vestrum iam hic factum deprehenditur, patres conscripti, non meum, ac pulcherrimum quidem factum, verum, ut dixi, non meum, sed vestrum.*

Fr. 10 (Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.45) *Dederim periculis omnibus, optulerim obsidiis, obiecerim invidiae. Vos enim statuistis, vos sententiam dixistis, vos iudicastis.*

Fr. 9 Your deed now is understood here, senators, not mine, and though it was a most wonderful deed, yet—as I said—it was not mine, but it was yours.

Fr. 10 I have given myself to all the dangers, I encountered the obstacles, I bore the hate. You, for sure, have made the decision, you have voted for the bill, you have passed the judgment.

The emphasis on the formal procedure followed by the senate in sentencing the conspirators to death (*statuistis, sententiam dixistis, iudicastis*) corresponds with Cicero’s attempts in the *Catilinarians* to counter

litical leverage needed to push through his personal plans all by himself (like, for example, Pompey or Caesar had). Believing in the reality of the *consensus bonorum*, MITCHELL also does away with the idea that the invidious attacks on Cicero by Metellus Nepos and others are representative of society’s view in any way (60 n. 43).

⁷⁰ *Cat.* 3.3.

⁷¹ *Cat.* 3.7.

⁷² Ten fragments have been preserved, four of which by Quintilian in *Inst.* 9.3.49 (fr. 7 CRAWFORD), 9.3.50 (fr. 8), 9.3.40 (fr. 9), 9.3.45 (fr. 10); all citations are adduced by Quintilian in order to illustrate the use of rhetorical figures. The fragments are no more than two lines long, but CRAWFORD postulates the speech must have been quite popular in antiquity (219). Just like *In defence of Sulla*, the speech was probably published soon after its performance, which turned it into a more or less official *apologia* of Cicero’s consulship: CRAWFORD 1994: 215n.5. Cf. *Att.* 1.13.5.

possible and actual criticisms by claiming that he was only following the orders of the senate and the people. Cicero closes his *Fourth Catilinarian* by saying: “This is your consul, who does not hesitate to follow your commands or to defend your decisions, as long as he lives and as much as he is able to.” (*Habetis eum consulem, qui et parere vestris decretis non dubitet et ea, quae statueritis, quoad vivet, defendere et per se ipsum praestare possit.*)⁷³

Cicero’s energetic efforts to market himself are one of the most prominent aspects of his consulship; it was an important year for building and advertising a very specific memory of his leadership. Certain themes are repeated over and over again, in and after 63 BC, even until his death. On the one hand, Cicero thematizes the threat of civil war caused by Catiline and the conspirators, which quite naturally leads to an image of himself as *dux togatus*, an image which is able to compete with the reputations of great military leaders. (Though one of the leaders with whom Cicero compares himself, Pompey, seems not to have been particularly enthusiastic about Cicero’s success.) On the other hand, Cicero, well aware of the risks inherent in fighting fellow citizens (even if corrupt ones), designed several strategies to cope with and defend himself from expressions of indignation and moral criticism. While he shows himself to be extremely proud that the consulship was not only the culmination of his political career but also the ultimate chance to win a title of excellence and glory (in spite of a lack of military interests), at the same time his consular achievements increased his vulnerability to political rivalry and to accusations of bad behaviour in particular. In the next section we will examine how these critical voices intrude and leave their imprint on the account of Cicero’s deeds. It is time to turn to Sallust’s account of the conspiracy, which has had great influence on the later retelling of not only the year 63 BC and Catiline’s putsch but also of Cicero’s consulship and his subsequent career. Though not openly invidious, we will see that it is, in fact, a manifestation of the righteous, moralizing attempts to counter Cicero’s egocentric version of the political conflict, and an attempt to refocus the camera on those participants who eventually exerted a greater influence on the course of Rome’s history.

⁷³ *Cat.* 4.24.

2. Cicero consul in Sallust's *Conspiracy of Catiline*: contrast and modification

2.1 CICERO'S SILENCE IN THE CONSPIRACY OF CATILINE⁷⁴

Sallust was a contemporary and probably also an acquaintance of Cicero.⁷⁵ His historical monograph on the Catilinarian conspiracy is a valuable source document for modern and ancient scholars alike; the imperial historiographers built upon Sallust's account for their reconstruction of the events of Cicero's consular year.⁷⁶ As an independent writer⁷⁷ who was not directly involved in any of the events, Sallust is one of the first voices evaluating Cicero's consular actions and, at the same time, countering and modifying Cicero's account of the conspiracy. The *Conspiracy of Catiline* offers a remedy for the one-sidedness of Cicero's speeches and political writings, which were geared towards defending and legitimizing his own actions as well as maintaining his popularity.⁷⁸

The *Conspiracy of Catiline* addresses the conspiracy of Catiline from the perspective of the moral degeneration of the Republic. The account of the coup itself is preceded by a long historical analysis that portrays the (anti-)hero of the story, L. Sergius Catilina, as the product of a society suffering under excessive competition (*ambitio*) and avarice (*avaritia*) (*Cat.* 11–12), where personal virtue and love for the Republic have made way for corruption and civil discord. The historical mon-

⁷⁴ I will note here that I developed the following argument without previous knowledge of Andrew SILLETT's essential study of Cicero in the *Conspiracy of Catiline*. I regard his explicit conclusion that it is silence which best characterizes Sallust's approach to Cicero (SILLETT 2015: 101) as confirmative of my own results. However, the following pages will show that the details of our argument are quite different.

⁷⁵ See Asc. 37C for Sallust and Cicero being in opposite camps in the Milo affair. Sallust would also have been the second husband of Cicero's wife Terentia according to Jerome *Adv. Iovinianum* 1.48. See SYME 1964: 284.

⁷⁶ Plutarch, Appian, and Florus are all indebted to Sallust's account; cf. PAGÁN 2004: 27–49. URSO 2019 claims that Cassius Dio's version of the conspiracy shows no trace of the Sallustian (nor the Ciceronian) account; I think the subject is worth further investigation.

⁷⁷ Cf. Sallust's own claim of independency at *Cat.* 4.2.

⁷⁸ SILLETT 2015: 46 emphasizes the monumentality of the *Conspiracy of Catiline* for the Ciceronian tradition, by calling it "the single most important event since the publication of the *Catilinarians* after Cicero's death".

ograph can be divided into several parts—all such modern divisions are more or less arbitrary, but it serves the clarity of this argument to indicate briefly the structure of the *Conspiracy of Catiline*.⁷⁹ Chs. 1–4 reflect on the nature of virtue and thematize Sallust’s transition from politics to writing, explaining that it is difficult to write political history (for a critical tone is often mistaken for malevolence or slander) but a pursuit especially suited for a man free from political ambitions. Ch. 5 then introduces the main protagonist, Catiline. Chs. 6–13 treat the historical background to the Catilinarian conspiracy and the moral degeneration of Roman society. Chs. 14–23 further introduce Catiline and the conspirators, describing a first (in 66–65 BC) and second (in 63) Catilinarian plot. In chs. 24–45, then, we have the actual account of the Catilinarian conspiracy, describing Cicero’s method in unmasking the conspirators, the communication between the conspirators (in the form of letters), and finally the trick with the Allobroges, which led to the arrest of many of the conspirators. Chs. 46–55 handle the proceedings in the senate and the executions, with an interlude in 53.2–54 where the historiographer again reflects on the nature of virtue and provides a direct comparison (*synkrisis*) of Cato and Caesar. The final chapters 56–61 deal with the battle at Pistoia and the defeat of Catiline’s army. Thus, the conspiracy narrative proper covers chapters 20–61, Catiline’s first speech in ch. 20 being the grand opening of the events in 63.⁸⁰

In the introduction of the work, Sallust himself describes that he too, in the past, was a participant in the corrupt first-century political culture.⁸¹ As soon as he had retired from this life, he decided to write about memorable events in Roman history, among which the Catilinarian episode provided a particularly worthwhile subject due to the novelty of the crime and the danger it involved for the Republic (*nam id facinus in primis ego memorabile existumo sceleris atque periculi novitate*).⁸² His investment in Roman politics renders the monograph

⁷⁹ See also RAMSEY 2007: 22–23; WILKINS 1994: 147; VRETSKA 1976: 20–21.

⁸⁰ Pace VRETSKA, who situates the main part of the narrative between *Cat.* 17–54.

⁸¹ Cassius Dio (40.63.4; 43.9.2–3) records Sallust’s tumultuous career; in 50 BC, Sallust was temporarily expelled from the senate, in 45 he was charged for mismanagement of the province of Africa Nova. See MCGUSHIN 1977: 1–5; SYME 1964: 29–42. A good overview of Sallustius’ lifetime and a review of modern scholarship up until the present, in particular on the relationship between the politician and the historiographer, is BATSTONE & FELDHER 2020: 1–23.

⁸² *Cat.* 3.3–4; cit. at 4.4. For Sallust’s reflection on his own life, see also KRAUS & WOODMAN 1997: 14–16.

on the conspiracy a personal and lively reflection on civic life in the late Republic and on the conduct (good or bad) of the main political players of that period.⁸³ Furthermore, Sallust's writing was affected by the civil violence between 49 and 43 BC and the proscriptions under the Second Triumvirate, when all key players of the conflict, including Cicero, had died. Catalina Balmaceda, for example, has argued that Sallust's portraits of Caesar and Cato were markedly influenced by Caesar's posthumous reputation for clemency, and by Cato's heroic death for the Republic.⁸⁴ Sallust's in-depth characterizations of his protagonists effectively exemplifies Rome's faded republican glory. The aim of the *Conspiracy of Catiline*, therefore, was not merely to document the uprising and its origins, but also to commemorate and, in some ways, heroize figures from the recent past.⁸⁵

The most important difference, then, between the Sallustian and the Ciceronian report of the conspiracy regards the conduct of the consul. In the Ciceronian speeches against Catiline, the consul, as we saw above, is the pivot of the events and the unique saviour of the city. In the *Conspiracy of Catiline*, however, the protagonist of the monograph is certainly Catiline.⁸⁶ Sallust does not praise or explicitly commemorate Cicero's behaviour as exemplary of virtue; nor does Cicero receive any special character portrait or speech part (in contrast to Catiline, Cato, and Caesar).⁸⁷ There are also similarities between the accounts of Cicero and Sallust that deserve to be mentioned: both emphasize the seriousness of the conspiracy for the history of the Republic as well as its military nature. Sallust's narrative of the final battle is essentially an account of the horrors of civil war—a civil war Cicero had thematized in his *Catilinarians*.

The first speech against Catiline is mentioned in one brief sentence (*Cat.* 31.6), but apart from this there is no reference at all to the speech-

⁸³ In the *Conspiracy of Catiline*, Sallust indeed presents himself as eyewitness, not necessarily of the events themselves, but of the conduct and importance of the political actors involved: *Cat.* 48.7 (*ipsum Crassum ego audiui*), 53.6 (*memoria mea*).

⁸⁴ BALMACEDA 2017: 59; already, SYME 1964: 114–115.

⁸⁵ This even goes, to a certain extent, for Catiline, whose villainy is not absolute, as shown by WILKINS 1994; cf. KRAUS & WOODMAN 1997: 20–21.

⁸⁶ In the words of WILKINS 1994: 2, “Catiline is the monograph's central figure historically and literarily.”

⁸⁷ FLOCCINI 1989: 38; LA PENNA 1968: 84–85 in response to SCHWARTZ 1897.

es of November-December. Sallust's elaborate description of the senatorial debate on 5 December stages a competition between Caesar (then praetor) and Cato (tribune), and appears to deliberately omit the consul (!) Cicero's contribution to that debate, which ancient and modern readers know as the fourth speech against Catiline. The lack of a speech by the ultimate leader of state is all the more surprising considering Sallust's predilection for political speeches and the problematic nature of rhetoric, as modern scholars have noted.⁸⁸ Fully in accordance with this non-speaking Cicero, Sallust nowhere refers to the Ciceronian material he must have used as a source of information for his own narrative, save for the quick reference to the *First Catilinarian*. The choice to omit the Ciceronian voice presents a significant gap between what the audience knows—what the historiographer may even presume they know—and what is represented.

Modern scholars have offered several explanations for Cicero's 'silence' in the *Conspiracy of Catiline*. The original theory by Eduard Schwartz, that Sallust, as one of Caesar's partisans, intended to produce an anti-Ciceronian piece, has been largely discarded.⁸⁹ Current consensus is that Sallust's primary concern was to sketch the political situation of the Late Republic regardless of his personal antipathies.⁹⁰ This means he would have selected those historical figures and those events that were most appropriate for illustrating the sociopolitical backdrop to the uprising. Departing from this line of perspective, the lack of a Ciceronian speech in the *Conspiracy of Catiline* is often explained by the notion that it would have been superfluous to reproduce Cicero's words, which were already publicly available in the *Catilinarians*.⁹¹ As Martin Stone formulated it: "[Cicero] needs no noise

⁸⁸ See SCANLON 1980; cf. PÖSCHL 1970: 376 on Sallust's wish to show the treacherous nature of the Roman *nobilitas* by means of the debate on the Catilinarians.

⁸⁹ SCHWARTZ 1897 is now reprinted and translated in English as SCHWARTZ 2020; see esp. 135–139 for the "literary destruction of Cicero the politician". LÄMMLI 1946 argues in the same fashion. LA PENNA 1968: 68–83 gives an overview of the scholarship up until 1968; LEDWORUSKI 1994 also covers the years between 1968 and 1994; cf. BATSTONE & FELDHERR 2020: 1–23. Cf. SILLETT 2015: 80 who, in refuting the idea of Sallust *Ciceromastix*, frames his attitude as rather a "calculated bias". Multiple views are possible: TANNENBAUM 2005 presents Sallust as an admirer of Cato instead of Caesar; FELDHERR 2012 argues from an historico-philosophical perspective that Sallust exemplifies the historiographer's idealistic rejection of partisanship.

⁹⁰ SYME 1964: 111; cf. LA PENNA 1968: 76–83, who locates the roots of this view in the work of Karl VRETSKA.

in Sallust; he makes it himself outside this text in works of his own.”⁹² Similarly, it has been repeatedly suggested that Cicero’s silence in the account of the debate of 5 December 63 BC is simply a representation of historical reality: Caesar’s and Cato’s contribution would have been much more extraordinary and crucial than that of the consul.⁹³

Another strain of argument focuses on the literary relationship (competition) between the works of Sallust and Cicero, apparently with almost contradictory results. According to Ledworuski’s 1994 monograph, based on the principle of ‘Widersprüche’, modifications and contradictions in Sallust’s representation of the conspiracy (in comparison with the bare facts as well as other sources), opts for a reading of the *Conspiracy of Catiline* as completely founded on Cicero’s *Catilinarians* and *Philippics*.⁹⁴ Ledworuski goes so far as to say that the whole theme of the monograph is a “mistake” (*Fehler*) or a manipulation of reality, guided by Cicero’s exaggerated and manipulative account in the *Catilinarians*.⁹⁵ In general (and in accordance with Ledworuski’s literary reconstruction), Sallust’s portrait of Cicero would be “benign”, presenting an adequate statesman who acts selflessly.⁹⁶

An almost opposite conclusion about the literary relationship between Sallust and Cicero is the recent study of Cicero’s role in the *Conspiracy of Catiline* by Andrew Sillett, which highlights the ways in which he is marginalized: “Sallust, this text announces, is so original an

⁹¹ DRUMMOND 1995: 45–46; BÜCHNER 1982: 138–142; MCGUSHIN 1977: 185–186; LA PENNA 1968: 85; SYME 1964: 105.

⁹² STONE 1999: 53.

⁹³ Sallust might have used other (not extant) sources, which presented a similar picture and a less Cicero-focused account of the senatorial debate(s). However, as we will see in § 3, through applying specific narrative and rhetorical techniques, Sallust himself aggrandizes the role of Caesar and Cato in the debate on 5 December, at the cost of Cicero’s performance.

⁹⁴ LEDWORUSKI 1994: 66–68: Sallust’s Catiline would have been modelled after Cicero’s Antony, just as the former’s account of the conspiracy is modelled on Cicero’s ‘Philippic’ representation of the civil war of the 40s. Also widely shared is the idea that Cicero’s writings, especially the consular corpus, were the most influential source for Sallust’s portrait of Catiline and of the conspiracy: DRUMMOND 1995: 10; SYME 1964: 73; MCGUSHIN 1977: 8; RAMSEY 1988: 8–9. WILKINS 1994 pleads for more differentiation and a consideration of the testimonium in Cic. *Cael.* 12–14.

⁹⁵ LEDWORUSKI 1994: 71, “Schon die Wahl des Themas ‘Die Catilinarische Verschwörung’ war aus historiographischer Sicht letztlich ein Fehler Sallust (Thema-Fehler), da dieser Stoff durch Ciceros Schriften heillos manipuliert und die 63er Affäre in den Jahren nach 44 v. Chr. politisch längst überholt war.” At 100 and 308–309, Ledworuski speaks of an “Grund-, oder Elementarfehler”. Though this claim seems rather strong, the idea is already present in SYME 1964, see n. 97.

⁹⁶ LEDWORUSKI 1994: 238, 267.

historian that he can write an account of the Catilinarian conspiracy without Cicero.”⁹⁷ The “Cicero-less history” (of which the Roman audience would be acutely aware) that the *Conspiracy of Catiline* presents is a method for Sallust to claim his authority. Cicero’s silence, then, is a symbol for this act of literary independency. However, in analyzing the countervoice constructed in the *Conspiracy of Catiline* against Cicero Sillett focuses on the absence of speech as a rhetorical effect, not on the silence itself.

All these methods have in common that they focus on Sallust’s personal views on Cicero, either as a historical source, or as an opponent in the political or literary realm. Furthermore, they tend to focus exclusively either on the parts of the Ciceronian legacy that are neglected (cf. Sillett) or the parts of it that *are* taken over by Sallust (cf. Ledworuski), which yields contrasting, rather confusing results. In this chapter, I propose a slightly different approach, believing that we should regard the text itself as a specimen of Ciceronian reception (or rather, one of the first steps in the development of Cicero’s political image) which does not intend to present either a negative or positive view of Cicero, but records a range of ideas that were circulating regarding the proper conduct of Cicero himself as well as of politicians generally in that period.⁹⁸ In Sallust’s treatise we encounter a Cicero who is clearly different from the persona that emerges from the *Catilinarians*, but who also differs from the imperial Cicero, whose consular eloquence and civilian heroism (not to mention the *Catilinarians* themselves) pervade later historiography, as has been demonstrated in § 1 of this chapter. I will argue that Sallust’s *Conspiracy of Catiline* serves as a mediating force between Cicero’s own construct of his political career and later interpretations of his position in society; it offers an alternative version of the conspiracy that moves the spotlight away from Cicero, and emphasizes his role as administrator, not hero.

⁹⁷ SILLETT 2015: 98. Cf. the much earlier remark by SYME 1964: 136: “Cicero and Cicero’s influence magnified Catilina unduly, as other writers in antiquity were aware (cf. Cass. Dio 37.42.1). Sallust took over and developed Cicero’s conception. That is his prime delinquency.”

⁹⁸ Compare SILLETT 2015: 95, who speaks of an “act of Ciceronian reception” (*italics mine*); and 101, an “act of silencing Cicero”.

2.2 COMMEMORATING OR ‘FORGETTING’ CICERO?

How exactly do we examine ‘silence’—the lack of speech, deeds left unmentioned, fame unattributed?

The concept of silence in Greek and Roman historiography has been recently explored in a volume edited by Corinne Jouanno. Presenting silence in the first instance as an “ideological tool”, the volume approaches the historiographer’s silence chiefly as a rhetorical strategy, in line with the rhetorical nature of ancient historiography.⁹⁹ Fabrice Galtier, however, in her discussion of Tacitus’ *Annals*, also addresses the moral horizon that extends beyond the rhetorical employment of these silences. By actively trying to avoid *taedium* and observing *pudor* in his report of the events, Tacitus would show himself well aware of the moral demands of his audience:¹⁰⁰

On comprend que le discours de Tacite s’inscrit dans un cadre normatif qui correspond à l’horizon d’attente supposé de son lectorat. Cet horizon d’attente concerne bien évidemment le contenu et la forme du récit historique. Mais à travers celui-ci, c’est aussi l’*auctoritas* de son auteur qui se trouve évaluée, en fonction de critères qui relèvent à la fois d’exigences techniques et morales. Les énoncés qui relèvent de la *reticentia* jouent de fait sur une connaissance partagée de ces normes, que l’historien ne peut se permettre d’ignorer.

I would like to do more than suggest that Sallust included or excluded certain information in order to observe the moral expectations of his audience concerning the freedom he, as a historiographer, was allowed to take with regard to his subject.¹⁰¹ Possibly, indeed, the silences in the *Conspiracy of Catiline* characterizing Cicero’s performance in the senate express a wish to avoid tediousness and observe modesty to-

⁹⁹ JOUANNO 2019: 7–16. See esp. the contribution by GALTIER, which examines the rhetorical figure of *reticentia* in Tacitus’ *Annals*. Useful here, for entirely focusing on silence as a cultural phenomenon, is also VINITZKY-SEROUSSE & TEEGER 2010, which among other things distinguishes between overt and covert silence, the former being a literal absence of speech or narrative, the second a form where a silence is not a silence as such, but is covered by something else being commemorated (resembling ASSMANN’s category of ‘overwriting’).

¹⁰⁰ GALTIER 2019: 143.

¹⁰¹ For an example of Sallust’s observance of the Roman moral code (*pudor*) that would fit GALTIER’s argument, see *Cat.* 22, where the historiographer refrains from drawing a conclusion about the truth of the horrible anecdote about a blood sacrifice made between the conspirators, since it is ‘too serious’ to believe readily.

wards an audience well acquainted with Cicero's writings. However, I will illustrate that Sallust's concealment of Cicero's speeches, of the official thanksgiving (*supplicatio*) and of the proclamation of the title *pater patriae* serves as an ethical correction to Cicero's self-laudatory style—a correction which is reflective of the historiographer's rejection of the competitive political culture in late republican Rome. The 'rhetorical' choices, then, which were made to describe the action of Cicero *consul*, and the glaring omission of the fourth speech against Catiline will be addressed in more detail in § 3, which offers an inter-textual, rhetorical interpretation of the debate between Caesar and Cato. It uncovers the ways in which their speeches attempt to counter and overwrite the *Catilinarians* as examples of the rhetoric that characterized the civil conflict of 63.

A great variety of terms has been used to describe Sallust's method of presentation when it comes to Cicero's performance in 63, all of them taking as their point of departure either the structure of the narrative or the historiographical method. Cicero's portrayal would be "less prominent than that of Caesar and Cato",¹⁰² for he would not be a "decisive" personage in the story;¹⁰³ it is all a matter of "exemplary concentration".¹⁰⁴ Similarly, "his actions are related without emphasis; his personality is left unrevealed by an author who could use striking colors".¹⁰⁵ In addition to the frequently employed 'silence' or 'absence', Sallust's historiographical method is variably defined as "bewußte Umdeutung",¹⁰⁶ "Verkürzung",¹⁰⁷ a "dismissive treatment",¹⁰⁸ a "conscious distortion",¹⁰⁹ and an attempt to "diminish" Cicero's "part in history"¹¹⁰ if not "historical revisionism".¹¹¹ Ann Wilkins reminds us that Sallust's refusal to "capitalize upon" Cicero's fourth speech against Catiline

¹⁰² HELLEGOUARC'H 1972: 22.

¹⁰³ LA PENNA 1968: 92.

¹⁰⁴ FLOCCHINI 1989: 41.

¹⁰⁵ BROUGHTON 1936; cf. WILKINS 1994: 97, "Sallust's portrayal of him [...] is colorless."

¹⁰⁶ GÄRTNER 1986: 467.

¹⁰⁷ LEDWORUSKI 1994: 268.

¹⁰⁸ SILLETT 2015: 66.

¹⁰⁹ LA PENNA 1968: 83, "un deformazione cosciente"; cf. GRUEN'S (1974: 417) verdict quoted above, n. 11.

¹¹⁰ GOWING 2013: 234–235.

¹¹¹ SILLETT 2015: 79, 81.

does not necessarily mean a “denigration” of his person;¹¹² Hans Gärtner even claims that the historiographer attributes “*implicit* praise” to the consul.¹¹³

While all these judgments are certainly a colourful reflection of the many and diverse ways in which Cicero’s portrait in the *Conspiracy of Catiline* can be questioned and defined, I would like to abstain from this type of evaluative commentary. Instead, I choose to focus more on the strategies of silence themselves, and try to grasp the effects of Sallust’s selective account on the transmission of Cicero’s political legacy in the final years of the Republic. The main question of this chapter, therefore, concerns Sallust’s commemoration of Cicero, and the techniques employed in depicting his political leadership—including, of course, the actual deeds of his consulship.

As it happens, in recent decades a special subfield of memory studies has arisen that deals exclusively with strategies of silence and omission: the study of ‘cultural forgetting’, which is regarded as not necessarily opposed but complementary to the study of cultural memory or cultural commemoration.¹¹⁴ In her most recent compilation work “Forms of Forgetting”, Aleida Assmann distinguishes between nine ‘techniques’ of cultural forgetting: to erase, cover up, hide, hush up, overwrite, ignore, neutralize, deny, and lose.¹¹⁵ As the terminology suggests, ‘forgetting’ can be both active (e.g., erase, overwrite, deny) and passive (e.g., lose, ignore); it often happens automatically, but it

¹¹² WILKINS 1994: 99.

¹¹³ GÄRTNER 1986: 455. Italics mine.

¹¹⁴ For a useful overview of the recent (and less recent) scholarship on forgetting, see LAMERS, VAN HAL & CLERCX 2020: 5–29 and SCHULZ 2019: 201–205. See the studies by RICOEUR 2004: 412–452 and WEINRICH 2004, which take an historical view to the phenomena of remembering and forgetting; the volume by WEINRICH helpfully reviews diverse literary sources from archaic Greece to the Holocaust that deal with the (personal as well as collective) condition of forgetting. On the sociocultural context of forgetting (and remembering), with examples from the Roman world, see FLAIG 1999, who explains how commemoration, as the result of institutional canonization, concentrates on individuals, not collectives (peoples); cf. ASSMANN 1999: 33–61. HAVERKAMP & LACHMANN 1993 is a useful overview of commemoration and forgetting in the literary and visual arts. Also helpful to me have been SCHUDSON 1995, on ‘distortions’ in individual and collective memory, and VINITZKY-SEROUSI & TEEGER 2010 on silence in the cultural commemoration of historical events.

¹¹⁵ In German: *löschen, zudecken, verbergen, schweigen, überschreiben, ignorieren, neutralisieren, leugnen, and verlieren*; ASSMANN 2016: 21–26. Scholars tend to each design their own typologies: cf. SCHLIEBEN-LANGE 1984: 20 who lists similar strategies within the management of scholarly knowledge; CONNERTON 2008; SCHULZ 2019.

can also be controlled or managed. The reason for these mechanisms of forgetting can often be located in the problematic nature of historical events or figures. As Assmann discusses, the hushing up or covering up of difficult episodes in a society's past, such as civil war or genocide, can be therapeutic or constructive during the period when a community is still in the process of recovery.¹¹⁶ This approach seems particularly relevant with regard to Sallust's situation under the Second Triumvirate; the political turbulence in Rome reflected on his writing in multiple ways, which would benefit from further examination.¹¹⁷

While forgetting is often described by modern scholars as a phenomenon that operates in the public space, strategies of forgetting can also be recognized in literary texts.¹¹⁸ They help us understand the process of selection and rewriting that underlies a narrative. It is, in fact, narrative which plays a great role in communities in deciding what will be remembered and what will be forgotten. (Neuro)psychologists have shown that the brain itself tends to recollect things by means of narrative patterns.¹¹⁹ From a sociocultural perspective, narrativization, it has been said, is a way to "make the past interesting" for the present, i.e. to imbue past events with relevant meaning.¹²⁰ Writers and histori-

¹¹⁶ ASSMANN 2016: 57–68. Cf. RICOEUR 2004: 412–456. SCHLIEBEN-LANGE 1984—whose point of departure is the history of linguistics, but whose analysis can be extended quite well to the scholarly discipline of (ancient) historiography—emphasizes the relevance of the controversiality of cultural information (what she calls 'units of knowledge', "Wissensbestände"). Unproblematic information will be remembered, either emphatically or decoratively, in an antiquarian manner; or it will be forgotten completely (since it has no relevance anymore). Problematic information, however, will be evaluated positively or critically, resulting in the partial loss of details which are discarded; or it will be actively forgotten, i.e. tabooed. On SCHLIEBEN-LANGE's theory (which itself suffers from scholarly neglect), cf. LAMERS, VAN HAL & CLERCX 2020: 13–16, 19–20.

¹¹⁷ BATSTONE & FELDHERR 2020: 5. Cf. BATSTONE 2010b; SYME 1964: 214–239. It has indeed been argued that Sallust's ambiguous and at times evasive treatment of Cicero, Caesar, and Cato is a result of a repressive political atmosphere: see BROUGHTON 1936: 45–46; alternatively, PÖSCHL 1970: 385. WOODMAN 1988: 126 is worth quoting: "Sallust consistently treats [Cicero] with the studied ambiguity of one whose disillusionment embraces society at large". In general, the preoccupation with bloodshed and conflict is regarded as a feature of triumviral literature: see esp. GERRISH's 2019 study of the *Histories*; OSGOOD 2006 offers a wealth of literary reactions to the Second Triumvirate, but is not very well structured (see 290–291, 306–311 on Sallust).

¹¹⁸ SCHULZ 2019.

¹¹⁹ KEIGHTLEY & PICKERING 2012: 47 state: "Certainly, in our memory of the enduring past particular events, experiences, and episodes may have become condensed, fragmented, and disjointed, but it is then the task of recollection in its actively concerted modality to reassemble, reorder and reconfigure these memories in such a way that they contribute to and become a meaningful part of the discernible narrative pattern moving across time [...]."

¹²⁰ SCHUDSON 1995.

ographers, in particular, possess an important function in retelling and interpreting past events.¹²¹ But in order to tell of the past convincingly, the content of the writing has to be made subordinate to principles of simplification or embellishment, which results in the omission of certain information.¹²²

Such less conspicuous shifts of emphasis which are the product of a process of narrative selection should be distinguished from more active forms of forgetting, in which a deliberate attempt is made to *overwrite* or *change* the historical facts. This, as I will argue in this chapter, is the type of historiographical forgetting we are, at least partly, dealing with in the Sallustian Cicero. I will thus adopt a similar approach as Schulz, whose study of Tacitus, Suetonius, and Cassius Dio has proposed three specific rhetorical strategies of ‘forgetting’: to delete, thus creating a gap (*entfernen*), to emphasize (*Fokussierung*), and to replace (*ersetzen*). While Schulz’ discussion is very useful, her terminology overlaps with the concepts already laid out by Assmann. What is more, the dynamics of forgetting manifest themselves differently in every text. I can address these nuances best by taking recourse to the broader set of terms developed by Assmann, which is what I will do below.

One more preliminary remark before we turn to the Latin text. When a writer is of the same generation as his protagonists, as is the case with Sallust, some of the strategies mentioned above are impossible to employ plausibly: Sallust could not completely ignore or deny Cicero’s famous revealment of the conspiracy in the senate; he was further prevented from committing any conspicuous errors in his account of the conspiracy, if he did not want to alienate his audience, part of which was certainly familiar with the events of 63. The deeds of Cicero’s consulship could simply not be *forgotten*, if only for the publication of the published corpus of consular speeches documenting his performance.¹²³ Therefore, while the theory of cultural forgetting will

¹²¹ See GRABES 2010 on how historians and literary scholars are responsible for canons of history and literature; SAUNDERS 2010 focuses on the importance of life-writing (biography) in the commemoration (and forgetting) of figures from the past.

¹²² See also PAGÁN 2004 who studies conspiracy narratives in particular, and who terms this phenomenon “negotiating limitations”, i.e. filling in the factual gaps to create a continuous narrative (32–37).

¹²³ Cf. SCHULZ 2019: 219 on the suitability of the term ‘forgetting’, where she also discusses Umberto Eco’s famous manifesto against forgetting from 1987.

be consistently applied in this chapter in order to illustrate Sallust's method in portraying Cicero, the more passive forms of forgetting will dominate; Sallust's main strategies may be categorized as silence/-ing and omission, neutralization or neglect (ignoring). One active strategy of forgetting will be discussed in this chapter: for, as we will see, his version of the debate on 5 December is marked by a method of overwriting, which favours Cato over Cicero.

2.3 CICERO (ONLY) CONSUL

The Sallustian modification of Cicero's consular image is subtle and equivocal. Cicero makes a frequent appearance in the *Conspiracy of Catiline* both as a private individual and as administrator: he is present in 17 of the 61 chapters, which is considerably more than most of the protagonists. He possesses two characteristics which place him in a positive light: he is a good consul in his defence of the Republic, and a cunning opponent of Catiline and his men. However, he also lacks two major characteristics that were central to Cicero's self-construction: the valour of a military leader (*dux*) and the glory of a war hero. The duality of these characteristics is the subject of the first part of this section.

Furthermore, there is another ambiguity in Sallust's presentation of the consul: while Cicero's actions are not attributed any special significance, Sallust magnifies Cicero's internal experience of the events in order to emphasize the moral complexities of supervising a civil conflict. I will demonstrate that this is the result of two complementary strategies of forgetting: on the one hand, as we will see in § 2.3.1, Cicero's part in the conflict is diminished (neutralized); on the other hand, his experience as leader of the state is generalized to the extent that Cicero's conduct becomes primarily an example of good leadership (§ 2.3.2). As I will argue, this last feature is not so much a reflection of the historiographer's personal opinion of Cicero, but rather of his ideals concerning republican leadership.

Right from the beginning of the account, Sallust steers the reader's view of Cicero in an alternative direction from the one advertised in Cicero's consular speeches—a direction informed by the indignation surrounding Cicero's political reputation in Roman society. The very

first mention of Cicero's name at *Cat.* 22.3—at one third of the treatise, after the elaborate introduction on the state of the Republic as well as a character portrait of Catiline and a long speech by him (*Cat.* 20)—immediately associates him with the criticism (*invidia*) he harvested later (*quae postea orta est*), i.e. in the period after the conflict. Although no more than a passing remark (the actual subject here concerns the cannibalistic practices of the conspirators), it reactivates right away (the memory of) the importance of the conflict for Cicero's image-building and the negative repercussions it had on his career. The modification of this memory is part of the moral message of the *Conspiracy of Catiline*.

We have seen that in the introduction to his work, Sallust rejects the political competition and corruption in the first-century Republic.¹²⁴ In fact, he illustrates the corrupting effect of *invidia* on several moments in the narrative; every time, this *invidia* is either directed against or associated with Cicero.¹²⁵ Instead of interpreting these descriptions of *invidia*, as is usually done, as a means to either defend or attack Cicero's name, I will show that the thematization of *invidia* carries meaning on a metatextual level, setting the preliminaries for Sallust's portrayal of Cicero. What is more, I will argue that the strategies of forgetting in the *Conspiracy of Catiline*, the reduction and generalization of Cicero's achievements, constitute an expression of *invidia* themselves—not with the aim to slander the consul, but to offer an ethical corrective to Cicero's memory.

¹²⁴ At *Cat.* 3.5 he describes that while still in politics, he was haunted by a *cupido honoris* that came with a bad reputation (*fama*) and political rivalry (*invidia*).

¹²⁵ Not including the verb *invidere*, which is used in more general observations: e.g. 37.3, 51.38. Thrice, Cicero is the object of *invidia* from his fellow citizens (*Cat.* 22.3; 23.6; 43.1), once he allegedly evoked the ill-will himself, against Crassus (48.7), and once he refuses to become involved in a slander campaign against Caesar initiated by Catulus and Piso (49.1). *Cat.* 43.1 more or less picks up the criticism mentioned in 22.3: here, L. Calpurnius Bestia, tribune elect for 62 BC, is said to openly attack Cicero in a *contio* and blame him for the civil strife (*L. Bestia tribunus plebis contione habita quereretur de actionibus Ciceronis bellique gravissimi invidiam optumo consuli imponeret*). On the phrase *optumus consul*, which I believe must be taken as an indirect rendering of Bestia's words, see SILLETT 2015: 81–83; LA PENNA 1968: 92. FLOCCHINI 1989: 40 and STONE 1999: 57–58 interpret it as sincere praise by Sallust. In *Cat.* 23.6, Sallust uses Cicero to illustrate the antagonism between the Roman *nobiles* and *homines novi*, an important theme for the historiographer. Cf. EARL 1961: 32–40; HELLEGOUARC'H 1972: 17–21; BALMACEDA 2017.

2.3.1 *The astute consul*

There are multiple aspects of the narrative that contribute to the marginalization of Cicero's contribution to the quashing of the conspiracy; these aspects together have, moreover, the cumulative effect of generalizing Cicero's achievements (and his supervisory role in general, but for this see § 2.3.2). The first aspect regards the antithesis between Catiline and Cicero. In the first half of the *Conspiracy of Catiline* Cicero is consistently pitted against Catiline: the dutiful consul acts against the evil revolutionary.¹²⁶ This even relates to Cicero's own consulship, in the context of which Sallust mentions Cicero for the second time. He narrates that rumours about the conspiracy were spread by Fulvia, the wife of one of the conspirators, Q. Curius who was a bit of a blabbermouth.¹²⁷ These rumours, according to Sallust, made many people support the election of Cicero for the consulship of 63 BC (*ea res in primis studia hominum accendit ad consulatum mandandum M. Tullio Ciceroni, Cat. 23.5*).¹²⁸ The proper cause for Cicero's consulate, then, is located in Catiline's bad reputation and wicked plans, a narratorial addition which anticipates their relationship in the rest of the *Conspiracy of Catiline*.¹²⁹

The third time Catiline and Cicero are presented as two opposing forces is at a point when the conspiracy is fully formed: Cicero has to defend himself from Catiline's secret attacks (*Cat. 26*). In this passage, the historiographer makes one of his rare evaluations of Cicero's conduct. When Catiline is preparing "an ambush on Cicero using every means" (*omnibus modis insidias parabat Ciceroni*), Cicero responds immediately. Right at the start of his consulship he arranged that Curius, through Fulvia, would pass on all details of the plot to him. In Sallust's judgment, "he had no inability for deceit and slyness in defence either" (*neque illi tamen ad cavendum dolus aut astutiae deerant*). *Dolus* and *astutiae*, the terms which are used here, are proper synonyms,

¹²⁶ See esp. WILKINS 1994: 19 (with n. 22) on the "narrative alternation" between Catiline and Cicero in chs. 26–30.

¹²⁷ *Cat. 23.4*.

¹²⁸ For the concomitant remark about the *invidia* of the nobility (*Cat. 23.6*), see n. 125 above.

¹²⁹ This might well have been influenced by speeches like Cicero's own *In toga candida* which cultivates the narrative about the rivalry between Catiline and Cicero.

which traditionally possess a negative flavour, as my translation indicates. However, in a context that is clearly positive *astutiae* stands for “shrewdness” (*calliditas*) and prudence (*prudentia*);¹³⁰ in the present passage, it can be interpreted metonymically to denote a stratagem.¹³¹ The juxtaposition of *cavendum* (to be careful) and *dolus* moreover indicates that Cicero’s shrewdness was evoked by necessity; he needed to defend his life. Indeed, this remark is firmly embedded in a context where Cicero is the good leader and Catiline the wicked attacker. The historiographer could have defined Cicero’s qualities in a different way: *diligentia* (as Ramsey notes *ad loc.*) or *industria* would have been possible alternatives, also used by Cicero himself.¹³² However, it takes one to know one, and the historiographer represents Cicero and Catiline as worthy opponents. Sallust suggests here that without his cleverness, Cicero would not have been able to oppose Catiline so successfully. In the ensuing narrative, Cicero’s stratagems for countering Catiline’s attack are reported in detail: he is seen to haul Antonius, his fellow consul, over to the ‘good side’ by promising him the province *he* had been allotted for the proconsulship; he surrounds himself with a cordon of friends and clients; he thwarts the conspirators’ plans to assassinate him at his house using his informants; and, when hearing about Manlius’ troops, decides to bring the matter before the senate, which consequently declares a state of emergency.¹³³

The antithesis between Catiline and Cicero is further defined in the description of the public altercation in the senate on 8 November, where Catiline openly insults and threatens Cicero (*Cat.* 31.6–8). Here, Cicero for the first time receives the epithet *consul* (not counting the official moment of inauguration at 24.1), and he acts in the manner of a trustworthy, state-loving leader. He delivers a speech that is both irrefutable and useful for the Republic (*luculentus* and *utilis rei publicae*), while Catiline is the raging villain (*furibundus*, at *Cat.* 31.9).¹³⁴ This op-

¹³⁰ See *TLL* s.v. *astutia* II.1, 2. RAMSEY 1988 *ad loc.*, LA PENNA 1968: 86 and STONE 1999: 61 interpret it positively. This positive context might also undo the negative sound of *dolus*, which in its basic meaning is an act of deceit (*TLL* s.v. *dolus* I).

¹³¹ *OLD* s.v. *astutia* b, with a reference to this passage.

¹³² Cf. Liv. *Per.* 102; Flor. 2.12; Asinius Pollio in Sen. *Suas.* 6.24; cf. Vell. Pat. 2.34.3 (*vigilia curaque*).

¹³³ See § 2.3.2 for a discussion of this passage (*Cat.* 29.1).

¹³⁴ This passage will be handled in more detail in § 3.1.1.

position is enhanced by transposing a famous attack on Cicero by Catiline, which probably belonged to the consular election campaign of 64, to the moment of the *First Catilinarian*.¹³⁵ After Cicero has held his speech, Catiline is made to illustrate the typical patrician *invidia* against Cicero that Sallust had mentioned before in Cat. 23: it was ridiculous to think that he, a nobleman who himself and whose ancestors had greatly served the people of Rome, would destroy Rome, when currently a foreign citizen (*inquinus civis*) was leading the state—ironically suggesting that such ‘foreign rule’ was much more destructive. Sallust has situated the remark here to strengthen the dichotomy between Cicero and Catiline. What is more, he also adds another piece of well-known Catilinarian rhetoric to enforce his furious conduct in the senate, which actually antedates the meeting of 8 November: the threat that he would extinguish his own fire with ruin (*incendium meum ruina restinguam*).¹³⁶ Cicero himself tells a slightly different story in *In defence of Murena* 51: around the time of the consular elections Cato had threatened to prosecute Catiline for creating unrest in Rome; Catiline would have responded to this by saying that, in case anyone were to set fire to his property he would not extinguish it with fire but with wreckage (*non aqua sed ruina restincturum*).¹³⁷ In the *Conspiracy of Catiline*, Catiline’s rhetoric is a direct response not to Cato’s words but to those of Cicero: the result of placing the phrase here is that the revolutionary and the (good) consul are presented to stand directly opposed to each other.¹³⁸

This is the point when, after having carefully developed the opposition between Catiline as the angry revolutionary and Cicero as the good leader, the narrative takes a second step in diminishing Cicero’s personal achievements. In the second part of the account of the conspiracy (between Cat. 46–61) Cicero’s role changes: he is increasingly mentioned by the name of his official function as consul. While in the first half, prior to his disclosing of the conspiracy in the senate at

¹³⁵ App. B. Civ. 2.2.5; see RAMSEY 1988: 149.

¹³⁶ Cat. 31.9.

¹³⁷ Mur. 51: *si quod esset in suas fortunas incendium excitatum, id se non aqua sed ruina restincturum*.

¹³⁸ In imperial times, too, Sallust’s version would be used to characterize the rivalry between Catiline and Cicero: Val. Max. 9.11.3, Flor. 2.12.7.

Cat. 29, he is always indicated by his own name (which could partly be explained because he had to escape personal assassination),¹³⁹ in the second half he is, first and foremost, the consul, the leader of the city, whose administrative obligations are most urgent.¹⁴⁰ After the trap with the Allobroges in chapters 44–45, Cicero is able to offer proof of the uprising to the senate, and it is in chapters 46–55 that he is consistently presented in his official role as leader of state who has to take accountability for his actions towards the senate, and whose decisions are dependent on the will of his fellow senators.

The marginalization of Cicero's figure is most visible in Sallust's account of the crucial debate on 5 December, where Cicero's name completely disappears from the account.¹⁴¹ This disappearance marks a shift of perspective from the individuals involved in specific events to the senatorial proceedings and the political and social reverberations of the conflict. It is the consul who decides to place troops around the location of the senate meeting, and who calls them together to decide quickly what needs to happen with the men in custody.¹⁴² Similarly, it is the consul who invites the senators to give their opinions, as he would do according to the official procedure;¹⁴³ and the consul who decides, after the senate has decided in favour of Cato's proposal, that the conspirators need to be executed as soon as possible in order to avoid any further disturbances in the city.¹⁴⁴ Finally, the consul is the

¹³⁹ *Cat.* 22.3, 23.5, 26.1, 27.4, 31.7, 43.1–2, 48.1 and 8, 49.1 (*invidia* or attacks planned on Cicero's life); 28.1, 29.1, 41.5, 44.1, 45.1 (acting on his own devices, master plan for catching conspirators). At 24.1 and 36.3 Cicero's name is mentioned because both consuls are referred to directly.

¹⁴⁰ *Consul*: *Cat.* 46.1, 46.5, 48.4, 50.3, 50.5, 55.1. The only place where Cicero's personal and consular qualities are combined is 31.6: *Marcus Tullius consul* delivers his speech against Catiline. VRETSKA 1976: 388–389 notes about this passage: "Hier bricht der Mensch im Konsul durch." Cicero's fear of Catiline probably resulted from both the danger he formed for Cicero's personal life, and the danger he caused to the Republic. The combination of the name and function could very well illustrate this double meaning. The phrase *consulente Cicerone* in 48.6 seems rather to signal Cicero's chairmanship (not so much the consulship itself) over the senate meeting in which the accusations of Crassus were discussed. For references to Cicero in the speeches of Catiline, Caesar, and Cato, see § 3.

¹⁴¹ Cf. SILLETT 2015: 75. Sometimes, there may have been rhetorical reasons for using the office for Cicero's name, as in *Cat.* 46.5, *consul Lentulum ipse manu tenens in senatum perducit*, where the juxtaposition of *consul* and *Lentulum* emphasizes the enormity of the event, Lentulus being an ex-consul himself.

¹⁴² *Cat.* 50.3: *Consul, ubi ea parari cognovit [...] convocato senatu refert quid de eis fieri placeat qui in custodiam traditi erant.*

¹⁴³ *Ibid.* 50.5.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 55.1.

one who leads the conspirator who was highest in rank, P. Lentulus Sura, into the Tullianum.¹⁴⁵ The subsequent announcement made by Cicero according to Plutarch and Appian, that the conspirators were dead, *vixerunt*, does not feature in Sallust's narrative.¹⁴⁶

This emphasis on Cicero's administrative tasks has several specific consequences: the *Conspiracy of Catiline* denies Cicero's construction of himself as *dux togatus*, and omits the special honours Cicero received for his rescue of the state (however controversial the word 'rescue' may have been). These two omissions are perhaps related. As discussed in §1 of this chapter, the *supplicatio*, the *civica corona*, and the title of *pater patriae* all have a military connotation: they are awarded for extraordinary valour and an outstanding performance in defending the Roman state. The *Conspiracy of Catiline* denies Cicero such heroic valour.

In the *Conspiracy of Catiline*, there is a clear division between the two consuls: Cicero is the *togatus*, Antonius (eventually) the *dux*.¹⁴⁷ Sallust strengthened this division even more by only designating Cicero by the term *consul*.¹⁴⁸ Antonius is always mentioned by his own name.¹⁴⁹ In fact, it takes until the final battle in Etruria, which is related after the debate on the conspirators who have been arrested at Rome, that Antonius fulfils his role in the events, as a commander of the army. Earlier on, when the senate pronounced Catiline and Manlius *hostes* of the Republic (*Cat.* 36.3), they ordered that Antonius should pursue Catiline with an army, and Cicero should remain in the city to defend it (*uti ... Cicero urbi praesidio sit*). Cicero, who handles the events in the city, is thus distinguished from Antonius, who handles the battle part (admittedly, not very heroically—due to physical weakness, he leaves the fighting to his lieutenant-general M. Petreius).¹⁵⁰ Cicero is respon-

¹⁴⁵ Similarly, in *Cat.* 46.5 the consul leads Lentulus into the senate.

¹⁴⁶ Plutarch reports Cicero's *vixerunt* in direct speech: *Cic.* 22.2 ἐξήσαν. Appian went for the oratio obliqua: ἐσήμυσεν [sc. Cicero] ὅτι τεθνήσκουσιν. Florus 2.12, closely following Sallust's account, also omits the announcement.

¹⁴⁷ The term is not used so as to define Antony's role; in 52.24 Cato uses it to designate Catiline at the head of his army.

¹⁴⁸ There is also a shift of perspective onto Cicero as intended victim, when, in *Cat.* 32, the conspirators are said to prepare *insidias consuli*, instead of the earlier used *consulibus* (26.5, 27.2)

¹⁴⁹ *Cat.* 26.4, 36.3, 56.4, 57.4–5, 59.4.

¹⁵⁰ See *Cat.* 56.4 for Antony leading the army; cf. *Cat.* 59.4 for Antony's absence from the actual battle.

sible only for the forensic and judicial aspects of the uprising, being the driving force first, as a private individual, behind the discovery of the revolt, and then, as state leader, behind the arrest and execution of the conspiracy. We will see in the next section that the placement of the weight of the leadership onto Cicero's shoulders is not without reason.

The lack of Cicero's own name in the conclusion of the uprising is consistent with his performance as representative of the senate. Contrary to the Ciceronian image who single-handedly rescued the Republic out of the hands of evil bandits, the consul in the *Conspiracy of Catiline* is stripped of all uniqueness or heroism. The honours Cicero was so proud to receive are covered by complete silence: the *supplicatio* is left out of the narrative; the other senators are not seen to insist on giving Cicero the *corona civica*. Cato, who according to later tradition was the one proposing to crown the consul with the title *pater patriae*, does not even mention Cicero in his speech (*Cat.* 52). However, the omission of honours for Cicero is veiled by praise from another group in society. When the facts of the conspiracy have been revealed in the senate, the people (*plebs*) are said to praise Cicero to the skies:

*Interea plebs, coniuratione patefacta, quae primo cupida rerum novarum nimis bello favebat, mutata mente, Catilinae consilia exsecrari, Ciceronem ad caelum tollere: veluti ex servitute erepta gaudium atque laetitiam agitabat.*¹⁵¹

In the meantime the people, as soon as the conspiracy had been made public, while at first having sincerely supported the war in their desire for revolution, had changed their mind; they curse the plans of Catiline, and they raise Cicero to the sky. They cheered with joy and happiness as if they had been saved from slavery.

If this is an allusion to the third speech against Catiline (as Ramsey *ad loc.* "undoubtedly" thinks it is), then it is a rather vague one,¹⁵² and not necessarily favouring Cicero. Sallust has certain moral objections to the behaviour of the people, as his overview of the depraved and destitute group supporting Catiline's cause shows earlier in the monograph (*Cat.* 37). In the present passage, the phrase *mutata mente* appears to exemplify the fickleness of the Sallustian mob. There is certainly irony

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.* 48.1.

¹⁵² Cf. HELLEGOUARC'H *ad loc.* See also LEDWORUSKI 1994: 268, who does not even include this passage in her discussion of Sallust's response to Cicero's third speech against Catiline.

in the description of their reaction “as if they had been rescued from servitude”, since at first they clearly supported the idea of revolution.¹⁵³ The Roman people does not know what it wants except simply a relief from poverty. From this perspective, their glorification of Cicero seems to be a comment on the behaviour of the people rather than an acknowledgment of Cicero’s heroic saving of the state. Moreover, with regard to such glorification, there is a sharp contrast between Cicero and one of his younger fellow senators. When Cato has held his speech in the final debate, the senate is said to “raise the virtuousness of his soul to the sky” (*virtutem animi ad caelum ferunt*). The repetition of the phrase *ad caelum ferre/tollere* draws an unfavourable comparison between Cicero, who is praised by an untrustworthy mob, and Cato, who receives the best compliment there is for a Roman: he is admired for his virtue.

Thus, the special honours and the praise Cicero received in 63 BC are substituted by dubious praise from the masses and a celebration of Cato’s decisive contribution to the debate on 5 December.¹⁵⁴ The only striking qualities Cicero is explicitly said to possess are mental: the gift of cunning and deceitfulness. There is definitely an implicit message that Cicero has done well in leading the state through this civil conflict. It is, after all, in the Sallustian version, the result of his patriotic oratory that Catiline is exposed in the senate, and it is through his actions that the conspirators are caught and brought before the senate. However, the *Conspiracy of Catiline* slims down and neutralizes the persona of the valorous consul which is so prominent in the Ciceronian hypotext. Ultimately, the Sallustian Cicero is a servant, not saviour of the state.

2.3.2 Cicero (a)s ethical compass

Sallust’s strategy in diminishing Cicero’s part in the final stage of the conspiracy serves another strategy which is equally crucial to his modification of Cicero’s memory: the generalization of Cicero’s role as leader of state. In this section, we will examine how Sallust is able to

¹⁵³ Cf. DRUMMOND 1995: 18; SYME 1964: 254.

¹⁵⁴ See further below, § 3.3 of this chapter.

accomplish this by turning Cicero's personal experience into a professional dilemma.

It is through Cicero's eyes that the reader catches the ethical problems involved in accusations of treason against fellow citizens, especially high-placed ones. Although Sallust only sparingly ascribes direct emotions to individuals, he does comment upon Cicero's state of mind, and at three different moments in the narrative.¹⁵⁵ This stands in rather odd contrast to Cicero's overall silence in the *Conspiracy of Catiline*. However, I would argue that these passages attempt to modify Cicero's self-centred emphasis on his sacrifice for the Republic, illustrated in § 1.3, and to interpret his predicament more generally as one of the ethical challenges of being a political leader.

The first moment when Cicero's feelings are conveyed to the reader are right after the failed attack on his life, and the message that Manlius is recruiting an army in Etruria (*Cat.* 29.1). Interestingly, it is this final message which, according to the historiographer, filled him with apprehension about the pending disaster (*incipiti malo permotus*). Cicero realizes at that moment that he can no longer protect the city by himself (*privato consilio*), nor does he have the ability to correctly estimate the power and movements of Manlius' army. Thus, he brings the matter into the senate.¹⁵⁶ This is a turning-point in the account: when Cicero decides to relay the information he has received to the senate, the senate pronounces the *senatus consultum ultimum* (at least in Sallust's version of the events),¹⁵⁷ which meant de facto that the city would prepare for battle. Cicero's feeling of alarm anticipates the nervous atmosphere in the whole city and propels the narrative into a war account.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵ With direct emotions I mean anger, fear, happiness, sadness, etc. I do not count madness (e.g. *furibundus* at *Cat.* 31.9), or secondary emotions like *invidia*, arrogance, etc. (e.g. *orabat in audaciam* at *Cat.* 50.2). Cicero: *Cat.* 29.1, 31.6, 46. Other moments where emotions are explicitly mentioned are *Cat.* 28.1 (the conspirators), 31.2 (the city), 45.4 (Volturcius), 48.1 (the *plebs*), 49.2 (Catulus), 50.4 (D. Junius Silanus).

¹⁵⁶ *Cat.* 29.1: *incipiti malo permotus, quod neque urbem ad insidiis privato consilio longius tueri poterat, neque exercitus Manli quantus aut quanto quo consilio foret satis compertum habebat, rem ad senatum refert.*

¹⁵⁷ On the chronology (with further references), LEDWORSKI 1994: 228–234.

¹⁵⁸ One paragraph later, at *Cat.* 30, Manlius' army is official. At 31.1–3, then, as soon as the news about Manlius reaches the people, they are also overcome by emotions and are preparing themselves anxiously for war.

This episode creates the basis for an image of a state leader who does not act lightly, and who is also personally affected by the events. At *Cat.* 46, then, this image is further developed into a short psychological portrait:

*Quibus rebus confectis omnia propere per nuntios consuli declarantur. At illum ingens cura atque laetitia simul occupavere. Nam laetabatur intelligens coniuratione patefacta civitatem periculis ereptam esse; porro autem anxius erat, dubitans in maximo scelere tantis civibus deprehensis quid facto opus esset; poenam illorum sibi oneri, impunitatem perdundae rei publicae fore credebat. Igitur confirmato animo vocari ad sese iubet Lentulum, Cethegum, Statilium, Gabinium, itemque Caeparium Terracinensem ...*¹⁵⁹

These things having been done, they were reported hastily to the consul by messengers. But he was seized simultaneously by immense fear and relief. For he delighted in the knowledge that now that the conspiracy had been exposed, the state had been rescued from its perils. He was however also worried, for he was not sure what to do with such eminent citizens who were caught in a major crime. He suspected that the punishment of them would cause trouble for himself, but impunity would be devastating for the Republic. Thus, having made up his mind, he ordered that Lentulus, Cethegus, Statilius, Gabinius and just so Caeparius uit Terracina ... were brought to him.

By using the official term *consul* instead of Cicero's name, Sallust subtly turns his dilemma into a more abstract matter of political policy and leadership. The problem described here constitutes the nucleus of the whole controversy around the execution of the conspirators. On the one hand, the Catilinarians were manifestly dangerous (cf. *in maximo scelere deprehensis*) and needed to be stopped. It would cause every leader a sense of relief to know they were in custody and could do no harm. On the other hand, they could do just as much harm if unjustly executed, since they were prominent men (cf. *tantis civibus*). In other words, it was fundamental that they were punished as impunity would lead to a collapse of the state (cf. *perdundae rei publicae*), but their punishment could have very nasty consequences for their punisher, in this case Cicero—indeed, the historiographer has already informed us previously (*Cat.* 22) that the consul received a lot of criticism in relation to his performance in 63. However, there is no comment upon the

¹⁵⁹ *Cat.* 46.

self-sacrifice of the consul, and neither does Sallust evaluate Cicero's resolve in choosing to punish the conspirators regardless of the consequences (*confirmato animo*, 46.3). Cicero's much-emphasized self (here reflected in *sibi*) is generalized into a more impersonal vision on the complexity of the situation, confirming the necessity of making decisions in the interest of the country (not of oneself).

This move away from the personal is all the more interesting since it has been argued often that Sallust's historiography is special for its focus on individual virtue, with a preference for characterization and a great deal of direct speech.¹⁶⁰ Such 'dramatic historiography' does not really fit the display of Cicero's conduct, not even in this psychological portrait. The realistic analysis of the consul's leadership, in which emotions are quickly exchanged for decisiveness and steadfastness, offers an alternative perspective on the pathetic rhetoric of Cicero's own *Catilinarians*.¹⁶¹ In similar fashion, Cicero's performance of the first speech against Catiline (*Cat.* 31.6) is presented as a morally constitutive moment with regard to his leadership. Here again, his emotions are focalized: he is said to have held a speech against Catiline "either because he was afraid of his presence, or moved by fear" (*sive praesentiam eius timens, sive ira commotus*). Yet, while Catiline eventually bursts out in rage (*furibundus*), Cicero remains poised, channelling his emotions into a speech which is not only very persuasive (*luculenta*) but also of benefit to the state (*utilis*)—the ultimate goal, we might say, of public oratory.

Sallust presents a consul whose ethical behaviour is impeccable, even though he is personally affected by Catiline's plot. The *Conspiracy of Catiline* carefully reflects enough emotional involvement (anger, fear, gladness) on the part of the consul to illustrate the moral complexities connected with this civil conflict, but it also attempts to depersonalize Cicero's resolute action and sacrifice, which are solely viewed from the perspective of his office. Hence, in this version of the conspiracy Cicero's personal suffering, which was part and parcel of his consular image, is minimized, and the emotions ascribed to his character be-

¹⁶⁰ See GÄRTNER 1986; also KRAUS & WOODMAN 1997: 32–39 who summarize these three features all under 'characterization'.

¹⁶¹ The image of a steadfast Cicero is enhanced by *Cat.* 49.1, where the consul is shown to be impervious to the attempts of Catulus and Piso to form a plot against Caesar.

come rather exemplary of the ethical compass that is needed to handle a civil conflict.

2.4 IN SUM

The Cicero Sallust presents in the *Conspiracy of Catiline* is an idealistic version of the good consul. The historiographer has taken care to distinguish between the man and the consul, with the latter having an exemplary role in the events. The man has the cunning (*astutia*) to control the development of the conspiracy and counter Catiline's wicked plans; the administrator's main role is giving advice on the right course of action and directing the political debate. This administrator acts fully in accordance with the wishes of the senate. As one might recall, it was exactly Cicero's defensive strategy in the years after the conspiracy to emphasize the shared responsibility between him and the senate.¹⁶² It is Sallust, however, who confirms this shared responsibility for the historical record, by diminishing Cicero's achievements and generalizing his experiences and decisions as leader of the state. Normally, as will be explored further in chapter 2 of this thesis, the historiographical tradition magnifies the achievements of extraordinary individuals in order to parade them as examples of Roman virtue; Sallust shows this tendency in his analysis of Caesar and Cato's virtue in *Cat.* 54. In the case of Cicero, a reverse method is employed: his achievements are slimmed down in order to demonstrate virtuous leadership. The depersonalized portrayal also serves the higher goal of enlarging more abstract ethical problems. Without the wish to blame anyone in particular for the events of 63, the historiographer more generally aims to criticize the competitive culture at Rome and the civil war that resulted from this. From a moral-didactic point of view, foregrounding Cicero's achievement or allocating especial praise to his deeds would have been undesirable, since it would precisely confirm the importance of political *gloria*, while it is the obsession with *gloria*, driving political officials to corruption, that Sallust rejects. Instead, Sallust prefers to concen-

¹⁶² STONE 1999: 64 considers this similarity to be evidence that Sallust aims to "exculpate" Cicero.

trate on *virtus* as a positive force in society.¹⁶³ By neutralizing Cicero's achievements and turning his experiences into a general example of good leadership, the *Conspiracy of Catiline* illustrates a mechanism of forgetting which is much more effective than an outright attack on Cicero's conduct would have been (if Sallust had even wanted to do that, which I do not believe). The indignation and outrage over Cicero's perceived lack of propriety in praising his own success is channelled—not unlike the manner in which the Sallustian Cicero is able to channel his emotions—into the sober portrait of a consul who behaves properly in all respects.

3. Silent speech: Caesar & Cato (and Cicero) in the senatorial debate of 5 Dec. 63

3.1 CICERONIAN RHETORIC IN THE CONSPIRACY OF CATILINE

3.1.1 *The First Catilinarian*

In the previous section we have mainly discussed Sallust's representation of Cicero's consular performance, which is marked by a dual strategy of neutralization and generalization, and which ultimately foregrounds his (ideal) leadership. I would like to discuss one more prominent strategy used by the historiographer to counter and modify the memory of Cicero's consular deeds: the overwriting of his oratory. Before discussing this technique of forgetting, however, it is necessary to say a few words about two (hotly debated) ambiguous references to Cicero's public oratory in the *Conspiracy of Catiline*: the *quo usque tandem* reference in Catiline's first speech and the *First Catilinarian*.

In a rally at the beginning of Sallust's account, Catiline laments the uneven divide in power in the Republic and the great gap between the wealthy and the poor. At *Cat.* 20.9, he speaks the famous words: "How

¹⁶³ Cf. *Cat.* 1.4, the very opening of the work. See EARL 1961 and BALMACEDA 2017.

long do you still have to endure these things, ye brave men?" (*quae quousque tandem patiemini, o fortissimi viri*). In antiquity as well as now Cicero is regarded as the most conspicuous wielder of the *quo usque tandem* phrase.¹⁶⁴ Sallust presents a different scenario, in which Catiline is the *auctor*. It has been argued that, in fact, the expression *quousque tandem* came from Catiline in the first place, and was ridiculed by Cicero in his *First Catilinarian*.¹⁶⁵ Andrew Feldherr has explained that technically this is what is being confirmed by Sallust since, in the narrative of the *Conspiracy of Catiline*, Catiline's speech temporally precedes Cicero's *First Catilinarian* (at *Cat.* 31.6). However, as Feldherr also notes, from the perspective of the reader, Cicero's well-known first speech against Catiline lies between the historical events and Sallust's account of them, which was published in the 40s.¹⁶⁶ On a literary level, therefore, Sallust's use of *quousque tandem* is unavoidably also a reaction to Cicero's rhetoric. The modern debate about whether this is Catiline's or Cicero's phrase nicely illustrates how Sallust's rhetorical move confounds the memory of Cicero's oratory. Most notable for our purposes is that it is quite an explicit confirmation of the silence engulfing Cicero's performance. Sallust does emphasize the powerful effect of the *First Catilinarian* (see § 2.3.1), but at the same time minimalizes its impact on the narrative by refraining from any direct quotes. Instead, Catiline is made to perform the characteristic opening at a crucial point in the narrative (the start of Sallust's actual account; see above) and in the *oratio recta*.¹⁶⁷ In the *Conspiracy of Catiline*, the power language that

¹⁶⁴ SILLETT 2015: 53–58. INNES 1977 argues that Sallust uses the phrase against Catiline and in honour of Cicero, attempting to show Catiline's perverse use of rhetorical phrase used by good men like Cicero.

¹⁶⁵ MALCOLM 1979, followed by BATSTONE 1994, 2010a. I am much tempted to believe MALCOLM's argument, all the more since "it would be a neat and psychologically attractive irony that the man whose frequently proclaimed 'comperi' was being abused by others ... begins his attack by throwing back to Catiline one of his characteristic phrases", to speak with the words of William BATSTONE 1994: 228 n. 38. I do think that the patronizing, mocking tone of Cicero's *First Catilinarian* would be reinforced by such a taunting opening sentence. SILLETT 2015: 53–58 gives a good overview of the modern discussion on the subject, but FELDHER 2013 is more comprehensive.

¹⁶⁶ FELDHER 2013: 50 n. 5: "My assumption throughout will be that both intertexts were available to Sallust's readers: that Cicero's *exordium* quickly became notorious has been well established, and whether or not Catiline was in actual fact the source for the phrase *quo usque tandem*, Sallust retrospectively makes him its author by putting the words in his mouth at a moment in time before Cicero's speech."

¹⁶⁷ Cf. SILLETT 2015: 89–90 who concludes that Catiline similarly "steals Cicero's words" with regard to his use of *comperi* in *Cat.* 58.1. I generally agree with SILLETT's interpretation of Sallust's

is so characteristic of the *Catilinarians* is (re)placed in the mouth of Cicero's opponent.¹⁶⁸ What is more, we have seen that while Cicero's oratory is featured only indirectly and in silence, Catiline's rhetoric is used directly *against* the consul in the account of the senate meeting on 8 November.¹⁶⁹ Not only is the Sallustian Cicero without words, he also has to bear the attacks of others in silence. The incentive rhetoric of the *Catilinarians*, which in the Ciceronian narrative is presented as being so effective in frightening Catiline and expelling him from the city,¹⁷⁰ has been wiped from this account.

While Cicero's *First Catilinarian* is at least not completely passed over, his rhetorical contribution to the final debate on 5 December is entirely absent; as we have seen above, it is his administrative duties that are being emphasized. Where is the last of his Catilinarian speeches, which was held during the final debate on the conspirators' fate, and which also discusses the proposals of the consul elect Silanus and of Caesar? It would have been perfectly explainable, with respect to its published status, if the historiographer had not bothered or dared to represent it in detail,¹⁷¹ yet he does not even give it any mention. But the Catilinarian speeches are not so easily omitted from the narrative.

use of *comperi* as occasionally acerbic in Cicero's direction, who was apparently ridiculed for using the phrase by his fellow citizens (cf. *Fam.* 5.5.2). However, in line with my aim to go beyond singular expressions of blame or praise, and focus instead on the general image of Cicero's leadership in the *Conspiracy of Catiline*, I do not regard the *comperi* debate as particularly relevant to my argument.

¹⁶⁸ As LA BUA 2013 suggests, within imperial literature the phrase should perhaps rather be interpreted as a "Ciceronian-Catilinarian *incipit*", since the phrase is seen to embody and evoke the rivalry between Cicero and Catiline.

¹⁶⁹ See above, § 2.3.1.

¹⁷⁰ *Cat.* 2.1. The idea is continued in Velleius Paterculus 2.35.4 and Diodorus Siculus, 40 fr. 5a.

¹⁷¹ Cf. SYME 1964: 106, "S. rightly gives no sign of the *Fourth Catilinarian*. It was anything but a decisive contribution to the debate of December 5." Cf. VRETSKA 1976: 504; CAPE 1995: 255. Even if that were true, then the speech itself would still have historical value as a document on the development of the debate. BROCK 1995 argues that it is common for Roman historians not to include previously written speeches. The fixed formula to justify this, *ex(s)tat oratio*, does not occur in the *Conspiracy of Catiline*. At 212 BROCK mentions the absence of Cicero's speeches in the work, but he does not pursue the question any further. Worthy of mention here is also the judgment by STOCKTON 1971: 131, "Cicero's own speech that day is extant as the *Fourth Catilinarian*. But Sallust supplements this with a version of the debate in which the dominating roles are given to Caesar and Cato, whose opposed speeches engross his account. As SYME insists, this is not partisanship or long-cherished personal rancor against Cicero. Sallust's treatment throughout the biography is balanced, fair, even generous. His merit for us is that he helps us escape from the understandably self-centred writings of Cicero to a more objective view, and that he does so without minimizing Cicero's contribution." His final conclusion, of course, does not match my argument, which shows that Sallust was precisely trying to minimize Cicero's contribution as part of his moral programme.

Modern commentators have emphasized that the *Fourth Catilinarian* constitutes an—if not *the*—important source for Sallust's representation of the debate.¹⁷² I would like to go a step further here and explore the ways in which the *Fourth Catilinarian* functions as an intertext for Sallust's speeches.

Intertexts function as markers of silence. A writer can leave out something which is simply irrelevant to the story, and which will not be missed (we would call this a passive silence). However, when the reader becomes aware that something is missing because the narrative invites the reader, by means of allusions or by omitting salient details, to notice his alteration of the story, the silence becomes an active, marked strategy. For example, Sallust's silence about Cicero's *Second* and *Third Catilinarian* is inconspicuous since the narrative is constructed in such a way that they have become completely unnecessary additions to the events. However, the debate between Caesar and Cato engages constantly with the rhetoric of the *Fourth Catilinarian*; through the use of literary allusions, the historiographer signals to the reader that there is more history to be found behind the text. To speak with the words of Andrew Laird, I will explore the effects of the 'intrusion' of Cicero's voice in the debate, which Sallust decidedly prevented from dominating the account, but which is still one of the essential voices that construed the political debate around the conspiracy.¹⁷³ In other words, the boundaries between what is openly communicated (i.e. Caesar's and Cato's contribution to the debate) and that which is concealed (i.e. Cicero's contribution to the debate) are blurred by intertextual references. Caesar's speech presents a reversal of Cicero's argument in the *Fourth Catilinarian*, while Cato's speech, in a way, is a continuation of it.¹⁷⁴ The Sallustian debate, therefore, illustrates a peculiar mechanism

¹⁷² VRETSKA 1976: 511–512; PÖSCHL 1970 (*passim*); DRUMMOND 1995: 41. The contributions of Silanus and Caesar, for example, are recapped by Cicero in *Cat.* 4.7–10. As STOCKTON 1971: 138 sharply observes, Cato's contribution does not figure in *Cic. Cat.* 4; his speech is added from a different source, probably Brutus' biography of his uncle, cf. *Att.* 12.21.1 and below, § 4.2.

¹⁷³ LAIRD 1999: 34–42 for the idea of texts as discourses that impinge on each other; this dynamic is what LAIRD understands under intertextuality. There are three gradations in the intrusion of another discourse or voice in a text: the most direct intrusion is constituted by direct speech; a middle form is found in focalization or indirect speech; and intertextuality is "the most remote form" (41).

¹⁷⁴ The interest of modern scholarship currently lies in the relationship between Sallust's political or moral thought and the self-presentation of Caesar and Cato, and in the complex nature of

of forgetting by which the memory of Cicero's oratory is recalled only to overwrite it with the memory of the public performances of Caesar and Cato.

3.1.2 *Excursus: speeches in historiography*

A few words are in order, before we continue, about the practice of speech writing in ancient historiography. Direct speech will be a recurring topic in the subsequent chapters, and it will prove to be especially relevant in the historiographical representation of Rome's greatest orator (even in the *Conspiracy of Catiline*, where Ciceronian eloquence is practically absent but very conspicuously so). The literature on oratory in classical historiography is vast, so I will select a few themes that are particularly to the point here.¹⁷⁵ John Marincola, in his overview of the subject, assigns three main functions to speech in historiography: 1) historical explanation, 2) characterization, and 3) aesthetic/artistic considerations.¹⁷⁶ Speeches are often a means to offer commentary, evaluate, explain, or analyse the events in the main narrative from an internal perspective.¹⁷⁷ Set in a democratic (Athenian) or republican (Roman) context, they commonly problematize the nature of politics (and civil conflict) and/or reflect on the effects and limits of political deliberation. In order to enhance this feature, speeches are often clustered in twos or threes, in which different speakers show multiple sides of the issue at hand.¹⁷⁸ More often than not they bring to light the faults

these deliberative pieces of rhetoric in connection with Sallust's skeptical philosophy of history. Cf. GUNDERSON 2000 on Sallust's work as a demonstration of "the postmodern crisis of knowledge". It has been duly noted that the literary or even fictive quality of the speeches is high, since they are carefully written 1) after the model of Thucydides (cf. SKLENÁŘ 1998, SCANLON 1980, VRETSKA 1976), and 2) as a "complementary antithesis" (DRUMMOND 1995: 51; cf. SYME 1964: 120). See further BROCK 1995 on the ancient practice of reproducing historical speeches, with a special focus on Tacitus and Sallust. LEVENE 2000 offers an important study of the influence of Cato Censor, as one of Sallust's role models, on the language and interpretation of Caesar's and Cato's speeches. FELDHER 2012 is an indispensable analysis of the speeches as a commentary upon the practice of (Sallust's own) historiography.

¹⁷⁵ PAUSCH 2010, PITCHER 2009: 103–110, MARINCOLA 2007, MILLER 1975 offer good introductions on speeches in Greek and Roman historiography.

¹⁷⁶ MARINCOLA 2007.

¹⁷⁷ What LACHENAUD 2016: 398 has called the "opération sémiotique" of discourse.

¹⁷⁸ This was already a feature of Herodotean and Thucydidean historiography: LANG 1984, COGAN 1982.

in a political system or the corruptness of rhetoric itself.¹⁷⁹ Speeches were also a popular tool to highlight a historical figure's greatness or weakness of character, their style of speaking,¹⁸⁰ or their personal motivations, thus serving a strategy of 'Psychologisierung' as Barbara Kuhn-Chen has called it.¹⁸¹ Marincola's third category of 'aesthetic reasons' refers to the fact that speeches were always strongly fictionalized and adapted to the overall structure of the narrative. As Roger Brock has argued, historiographical speeches were 'versions' of the original, never a verbatim transcript.¹⁸² Rather, historiographers regularly tried to find and fill a lacuna in the works of their predecessors (write a speech of which there was no rendition yet), or they aimed to "write the speech that *should* have been given".¹⁸³ Finally, one aspect that is not discussed by Marincola deserves some extra attention here: the use of speeches as a conduit for moral dilemmas, questions, or lessons.¹⁸⁴ As we will see in the course of the next chapters, within the pervasive moral-didactic framework of the ancient historiographers, speech is an essential instrument for commemorating and defining (or negating) virtuousness and political leadership.

3.2 CAESAR'S ARGUMENT AGAINST CICERONIAN PATHOS

We have seen above that during the narrative of the conspiracy's revelation Sallust consistently pits Catiline and Cicero against each other to illustrate the oppositional forces of revolutionary and state leader. However, in the discussion of the final debate on 5 December Sallust has chosen a different antithetical pair: Caesar and Cato.¹⁸⁵ Caesar belongs to the party of the *populares*, and Cato represents the conserva-

¹⁷⁹ LEVENE 2009.

¹⁸⁰ MARINCOLA 2007: 315. Also according to the ancient rhetorical topos that style was a reflection of character; cf. MÖLLER 2004.

¹⁸¹ KUHN-CHEN 2002: 22–23.

¹⁸² BROCK 1995; MARINCOLA 2007: 317.

¹⁸³ BROCK 1995: 216.

¹⁸⁴ HAU 2016 offers examples of moralizing speeches in Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius, and Diodorus Siculus.

¹⁸⁵ See EARL 1961: 95–102; SYME 1964: 103–120; PÖSCHL 1970; VRETSKA 1976: 509–512; DRUMMOND 1995: 51–56; KAPUST 2011: 65–70.

tive *optimates*. They represent not only two different political convictions but also two different kinds of traditional Roman virtue. As the *synkrisis* in *Cat.* 54 makes clear, Caesar embodies the virtues of clemency and compassion (*mansuetudo, misericordia*) and Cato the virtues of integrity and sternness (*integritas, severitas*). Working in concert with the *synkrisis*, the speeches in *Cat.* 51–52 function as a rhetorical illustration of these virtues. However, on a higher level they also reflect on the complexity of civil conflict and the role of oratory (speech).¹⁸⁶

The contribution of Caesar constitutes a decisive turn in the debate: in contrast to his colleagues, who voted for the death sentence, he proposes life-long imprisonment. His speech starts with a plea for rationality: “All men who deliberate on dubious matters, men of the senate, should be free from hate, friendly feelings, anger and pity” (*Omnis homines, patres conscripti, qui de rebus dubiis consultant, ab odio, amicitia, ira atque misericordia vacuos esse decet*).¹⁸⁷ The Sallustian Caesar rejects all kinds of emotional interference in decision-making: his oration offers reason and historical awareness as the criteria for political judgment. Caesar warns against setting a wrong precedent for the future. A harsh punishment, decided upon under the influence of emotion, may be misused by those with less sensibility.¹⁸⁸ Moreover, Caesar’s warning against setting a bad *exemplum* is backed up by a reference to similar events in the past, where the decision to execute citizens led to complete mayhem. At this point, Caesar actually refers to the presence of the consul—a reference which is perhaps more of a warning.¹⁸⁹ He first recalls the reign of Sulla in 82 BC, when the dictator ordered the killing of specific traitors of the state; these proscriptions escalated into a serious blood bath. Then he remarks that he does not fear a situation like this under Cicero’s consulate (*ego haec non in M. Tullio neque his temporibus vereor, Cat.* 51.35), but the narration of this gruesome piece of history also functions as a warning to act moderately and observe the proper ethical code.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁶ As discussed in the excursus above, a rather typical feature of historiographical speech. See KAPUST 2011: 53–80, BATSTONE 2010b, BATSTONE 1988; cf. SCANLON 1980 with special attention to the influence of Thucydides.

¹⁸⁷ *Cat.* 51.1.

¹⁸⁸ For fear of setting a bad example: *Ibid.* 51.25–27.

¹⁸⁹ Cf. TANNENBAUM 2005: 215–216.

In his discussion of Caesar's speech, Andrew Drummond has spoken of the "mirror-image" Caesar constructs of Cicero's argument in *Cat.* 4.11–13, but the remark is made only in a footnote.¹⁹¹ Remarkably enough, as Drummond notes, the main thesis of Caesar and Cicero's speeches is similar: cruelty (*crudelitas*) should be avoided in political decisions.¹⁹² However, this thesis is worked out in completely different ways. At *Cat.* 4.12, Cicero describes the horrors of war, and asks his audience to imagine, in particular, a father who loses his whole family and his house by the hand of one of his slaves. If this man, he says, would not exact the strictest punishment possible on his slave, would he then seem to be merciful and compassionate or rather inhumane and really cruel (*crudelissimus*)?¹⁹³ The answer is obvious: revenge is the proper response. Similarly, seeing these horrors unroll before his eyes, Cicero can do nothing but act with severity and violence (*severus vehemensque*).

The example of the father who has lost his family shows the personal sphere of Cicero's argument, which forms a stark contrast with the historicizing approach of Caesar that demands emotional detachment. Caesar's argument runs along the lines that cruelty should be avoided at all times, and personal emotions should not get in the way of political deliberation. Cicero's example is based upon the assumption that cruelty is the failure to show emotion and compassion, either with respect to your family or your fellow-Romans. Yet at the same time, while the Roman people should strongly condemn the conspirators as attackers of their family, he himself tries to avoid being cruel to the conspirators by another kind of emotion. His whole justification for acting harshly (*vehementior*) toward the conspirators is that he embodies the feeling of *misericordia* toward his citizens, as he claims in *Cat.* 4.11.

In contrast to Cicero's practice, Caesar believes that any strong emotional appeal in deliberative speeches is inadvisable. He argues that the emotional or pathetic rhetoric his fellow-senators have employed, in

¹⁹⁰ VRETSKA 1976: 552 also sees here an allusion to the proscriptions under the Second Triumvirate, during which also Cicero died.

¹⁹¹ DRUMMOND 1995: 27n.26.

¹⁹² See *Cat.* 5.1.14: "What is called anger with others, is called haughtiness (*superbia*) and cruelty (*crudelitas*) with those in power."

¹⁹³ *Ibid.* 4.12. *Etenim quaero, si quis pater familias, liberis suis a servo interfectis, uxore occisa, incensa domo, supplicium de servis non quam acerbissimum sumpserit, utrum is clemens ac misericors an inhumanissimus et crudelissimus esse videatur?*

which they summarize the horrors of war, illustrates exactly the wrong approach to the situation.¹⁹⁵ His words interact closely with those of Cicero in *Cat.* 4.11–12:

*Plerique eorum qui ante me sententias dixerunt composite atque magnifice casum rei publicae miserati sunt. Quae belli saevitia esset, quae victis acciderent, enumeravere: rapi virgines, pueros, divelli liberos a parentum complexu, matres familiarum pati quae victoribus conlibuissent; fana atque domos spoliari; caedem, incendia fieri; postremo armis, cadaveribus, cruore atque luctu omnia compleri. Sed, per deos immortalis, quo illa oratio pertinuit?*¹⁹⁶

Most of those who have expressed their opinions before me have deplored the fate of the Republic in well-structured, magnificent language; they summed up the horrors of war, what befell the victims: the rape of maidens, boys, children torn from their parents' embrace, matrons subjected to the will of the victors, shrines and houses despoiled, bloodshed and arson; eventually, arms, corpses, blood and lamentation everywhere. But, by the immortal gods, where has that rhetoric brought us?

Caesar ironically adds that those who would not shrink back from doing these awful things will *surely* be moved by a speech (meaning, they will not). He warns the senators that their position requires restraint and a certain detachment, also in order to avoid possible criticism on their conduct.¹⁹⁷ The note that many before him have presented their opinion “coherently and magnificently” is probably ironical. The irony is enhanced by the meaning of *composite*, which can also mean “orderly”, “in composed fashion”; this forms a stark contrast with their frightening words and surely alarming performance.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁴ “For my wish to enjoy a safe Republic together with you is as genuine as the fact that, although in this case I am being rather severe, I am moved not by cruelty of the mind—for who is milder than I?—but by an exceptional humanity and compassion.” (*Nam ita mihi salva re publica vobiscum perfrui liceat ut ego, quod in hac causa vehementior sum, non atrocitate animi moveor —quis enim est me mitior?—sed singulari quadam humanitate et misericordia.*) VRETSKA 1976, MCGUSHIN 1977 and RAMSEY 1988 all refer to *Cat.* 4.11 by way of literary comparison or as a “Quelle”, but they do not explore the intertextual possibilities. Cf. DRUMMOND 1995: 41. PÖSCHL 1970: 370 does not exclude the possibility that Caesar is pointing his arrow at Cicero here.

¹⁹⁵ Actually, as TANNENBAUM 2005: 214–217 shows, in the end Caesar’s argument is also meant to instil fear in the senators.

¹⁹⁶ *Cat.* 51.9.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.* 51.12–15.

On a narrative level, *plerique dixerunt composite atque magnifice* certainly refers to the speakers who had expressed their opinion before Caesar; of these the historiographer only mentions the consul designate D. Junius Silanus (*Cat.* 50.4). However, since the reader knows about and has access to Cicero's contribution on that day, the reference to *plerique* also recalls Cicero's *Fourth Catilinarian*, particularly with regard to the catalogue of horrors Caesar mentions—for it was Cicero who had inserted such terrifying war catalogues in his orations against Catiline, especially in the fourth:

*Nunc si hunc exitum consulatus mei di immortales esse voluerunt ut vos populumque Romanum ex caede miserrima, coniuges liberosque vestros virginesque Vestalis ex acerbissima vexatione, templa et delubra, hanc pulcherrimam patriam omnium nostrum ex foedissima flamma, totam Italiam ex bello et vastitate eriperem, quaecumque mihi uni proponetur fortuna subeatur.*¹⁹⁹

If the immortal gods now want this to be the end of my consulate, that I save you and the Roman people from wretched bloodshed, your wives and children and the Vestal virgins from a most cruel abuse, the temples and shrines, this splendid fatherland of us all from the foulest flames, the whole of Italy from war and destruction—then, whatever fate is set before me alone, let it come.

While Drummond has focused on *Cat.* 4.11–13 as being the strongest intertext (or, in his words: source) for Caesar's speech, and *Cat.* 4.12 indeed offers a similar war catalogue as the one just quoted, the opening of the *Fourth Catilinarian* probably resounded more prominently in the minds of the historiographers and his readers. The repetition of these themes throughout the *Fourth Catilinarian* intensifies its character as the type of pathetic war rhetoric Caesar rejects. When Caesar describes the rape of maidens and boys, children taken away from their parents and mothers being abused, shrines and houses despoiled, fire

¹⁹⁸ In this phrase we can recognize the careful construction of the two speeches by Caesar and Cato. MCGUSHIN 1977: 261–262 points the reader to Cato's "weapon of irony": he remarks that Caesar spoke *bene et composite* about life and death earlier in the debate. PÖSCHL 1970 reads the words as part of Cato's argument about the changed meaning of words: what used to be *bene et composite* is not anymore. However, there is more to be said. Caesar had probably used the phrase *bene et composite* with irony when referring to the previous speakers, since he did not agree at all with their use of *pathos*. In applying the same phrase to Caesar's speech, Cato fires his own joke back at him.

¹⁹⁹ Cic. *Cat.* 4.2.

and bloodshed everywhere, the reader's memory of Cicero's rhetorical catalogues is activated, which contained similar elements (the attack on boys and Vestal virgins, children and mothers alike, the whole city destroyed and burning). The verbal reminiscences between Caesar's catalogue of horrors, which exemplifies the pathetic approach he criticizes, and the image Cicero constructs in the *Fourth Catilinarian* create a strong connection between their contributions to the senatorial debate on 5 December.

Vretska already observed that Caesar gives the debate a decisive ethical spin and sidelines the juridical aspects of the punishment.²⁰⁰ Yet it is also tempting to read Caesar's speech as a direct rebuke of Cicero's *Catilinarians* and, in general, of his style full of pathos.²⁰¹ While at first sight reflecting predominantly on the harmful aspects of public oratory for the future of the Republic, the concrete example Caesar adduces to illustrate the rhetoric of his fellow citizens also represents the main thrust of the *Fourth Catilinarian*.²⁰² It will be Cato's task to apply the final blow to this type of Ciceronian rhetoric.

3.3 CATO'S MORALLY IMPROVED RHETORIC OF WAR

Cato's contribution turns Caesar's argument around: it is not fear for *crudelitas* which will benefit them in the future. The danger is not that the senators will be too cruel; it is that they will act too leniently. Cato advises the senators "to be careful that that mildness and compassion, when they take up their arms, does not end in misery for yourself" (*ne ista vobis mansuetudo et misericordia, si illi arma ceperint, in miseriam convortat*).²⁰³ His argument closely approaches Cicero's in *Cat.* 4.11–13

²⁰⁰ VRETSKA 1976: 514. Overall, Sallust shows little interest for the legal aspects of the conflict: see DRUMMOND 1995. SKLENÁŘ 1998 explores how Caesar and Cato's language echoes Sallust's own moral views.

²⁰¹ It is also tempting, therefore, to interpret the speech as Sallust's rejection of Cicero's style. For the idea of Sallust's "anti-Ciceronian style", SYME 1964: 111, 257; cf. Woodman 1988: 120–127. However, I will not address this question further since it adds little to the analysis of Cicero's political image in the text.

²⁰² FELDHER 2012: 102–103 notes the irony (and ambiguity) in Caesar's denunciation of the catalogue of horrors; this kind of "graphic", emotionally impressive "tableau" is exactly what Sallust used in his *proemium* to demonstrate the decline of the Republic. Cf. KAPUST 2011: 68, "If Caesar's speech is designed to calm, Cato's [...] is designed to inflame."

(see above), who argues that compassion for the conspirators is paramount to cruelty against the country and will result in its destruction.²⁰⁴ Indeed, the solution, according to Cato, is not clemency but capital punishment. With a combination of reproach and exhortation, he assures the other senators that, if they would like to maintain their precious goods—their wealth, their joyful lives—they should stand up for the republic and claim it (*expergiscimini aliquando et capessite rem publicam*). This is no trivial matter, for their freedom and their lives are at stake (*libertas et anima nostra in dubio est*).²⁰⁵ The term *libertas*, which marks the *exordium* of the speech, captures Cato's republican ideals.²⁰⁶

Cato's defence of traditional republican values finds its expression in rhetorical strategies that strongly resemble the argumentation of the *Fourth Catilinarian*. All of them are designed to create a feeling of crisis that should enforce immediate action. Cato's speech shows a high frequency of imperatives and direct appeals to the senators; the feeling of urgency inherent in these imperatives is accompanied by exhortations to act fast.²⁰⁷ Furthermore, Cicero and Cato's speech emphasize in similar terms that the rebellion is not yet fully extinguished, and the enemy is encroaching upon the city (see also the quotation below).²⁰⁸ Cato, just like Cicero in the *Fourth Catilinarian*, treats the conspirators as enemies and traitors of the country; he, too, points out that they have been caught red-handed and have even confessed to their crime.²⁰⁹

²⁰³ Cat. 52.27. Cf. 52.11, where Cato claims that *misericordia* and *mansuetudo* have lost their true value anyway, for good deeds and selflessness are hard to find in Rome's corrupt society.

²⁰⁴ Cic. Cat. 4.12: ... *si vehementissimi fuerimus, misericordes habebimur; sin remissores esse voluerimus, summae nobis crudelitatis in patriae civiumque perniciē fama subeunda est*.

²⁰⁵ Cat. 52.5–6.

²⁰⁶ This subject will be treated in detail in chapter 2, § 2.2.

²⁰⁷ Compare Cat. 52.5 (*expergiscimini aliquando et capessite rem publicam*), 17 (*habetote*), 19, 26 (ironical), 32–33 (ironical), 35 (*properandum est*) with Cic. Cat. 4.3 (*consulite, prospicite, con-servate*), 4.4 (*incumbite ad salutem rei publicae*), 4.6 (*statuendum est ante noctem*).

²⁰⁸ Cat. 52.17 and 24 (*Gallorum gentem infestissimam nomini Romano ad bellum arcessunt; dux hostium cum exercitu supra caput est*) and Cic. Cat. 4.4 (*sollicitantur Allobroges, servitia excitantur, Catilina accersitur; id est initum ... imperi calamitatem relinquatur*), 4.6 (*huic si paucos putatis affines esse, vehementer erratis: latius opinione disseminatum est hoc malum ...*).

²⁰⁹ Cat. 52.25 (*hostibus*), 30 (*crudelissimis parricidis*), and 25 (*intra moenia deprehensis*), 36 (*con-victi confessique sint caedem, incendia ... de confessis, sicuti de manifestis rerum capitalium, more maiorum supplicium sumendum*); cf. Cic. Cat. 4.5 (*haec omnia indices detulerunt, rei confessi sunt, vos multis iam iudiciis iudicavistis*).

The final passage before the actual proposal sums up the different elements of Cato's argument quite well, and it is here in particular that we see verbal reminiscences of Cicero's incentive rhetoric against Catiline:²¹⁰

*Sed undique circumventi sumus; Catilina cum exercitu faucibus urget; alii intra moenia atque in sinu urbis sunt hostes, neque parari neque consuli quicquam potest occulte: quo magis properandum est.*²¹¹

But we are surrounded from all sides; Catiline is pressing our throat with his army; other enemies are inside the walls and in the heart of the city, and it is impossible to prepare or to deliberate in secret: all the more reason to make haste.

The idea of the enemy within the city, and Catiline and his army threatening from the outside, as well as an emphasis on the necessity of wiping out the roots of the conspiracy are very familiar from not only the *Fourth*, but all the *Catilinarians*. The rhetoric Cato is seen to employ here exactly matches the consul's urgent calls on the senate and the people in November-December to take measures against the conspirators.

However, although the language used here is provocative, Cato's contribution is free from the type of war catalogues that Caesar condemned in his oration, and which were so typical of Cicero's *Fourth Catilinarian*. The oration as a whole sounds rather like a lecture by an angry school master, in line with Cato's reputation for Stoic severity,²¹² who castigates the Roman senators for their corrupt manners: Cato compares the integrity and industriousness of the ancestors with the greediness (*avaritia*), extravagant living (*luxuria*), and indiscriminating ambition (*ambitio*) of the current generation. Virtue is measured according to success.²¹³ "It is not surprising," Cato says, "when you all lead your lives each for yourselves, when at home you are a slave of

²¹⁰ For examples, see § 1.1 and n. 19. Compare especially *Cat.* 2.2 (*hanc urbem, quam e suis faucibus ereptam esse luget*) and 3.1 (*[urbem] e flamma atque ferro ac paene ex faucibus fati ereptam*) for the term *faucibus*; *Cat.* 1.5 (*eorum autem castrorum imperatorem ducemque hostium intra moenia atque adeo in senatu videmus...*), 1.31 (*periculum autem residebit et erit inclusum penitus in venis atque in visceribus rei publicae*), and 2.11 (*domesticum bellum manet, intus insidiae sunt, intus inclusum periculum est, intus est hostis*) for emphasis on the enemy inside the walls. VRETSKA 1976: 603 gives most of these Ciceronian parallels, but does not analyse the effect of the similarities. For the use of *parricida* see e.g. *Cat.* 1.29, 33; 2.7, 22.

²¹¹ *Cat.* 52.35.

²¹² See chapter 2.

²¹³ *Cat.* 52.21–22.

your lusts, and here in the senate of money and favours, that an attack is made on the rudderless Republic.”²¹⁴ Thus, Cato’s rhetoric of crisis ultimately aims at remedying a moral crisis that surpasses the matter at hand. One aspect of this view is that nowhere in his speech is he concerned with his own reputation or the consequences of the harshness of his verdict—his proposal is presented as the result of a superb ethical awareness. His speech therefore lacks the personal tone of Cicero’s oratory, which divides society into good and bad, and which places himself in the center as both a possible victim of the events and the heroic leader of the state.

Cato and Caesar’s speeches are surely representative of the rhetoric that filled the forum and the senate in November–December 63; the speeches now extant must only be a small sample of the public oratory of that period. Cicero in his important function as consul will have contributed greatly to the rhetoric of war with his *Catilinarians*, making the people and the senate increasingly susceptible to deciding in favour of the capital punishment.²¹⁵ Yet the *Conspiracy of Catiline* presents a rather different view on the success of the speeches against Catiline, and especially the *Fourth Catilinarian*. As discussed above, speeches in historiography often reflect (on) political and moral problems. Salust uses the speeches of Caesar and Cato to present a specific picture of ‘virtuous’ oratory, an oratory that has a wholesome effect vis-à-vis the corrupted Roman political body. Moreover, while Cicero, in his published consular speeches, gave precedence to his own voice, Salust refocused the narrative on the importance of two different, equally prominent voices that add a new interpretation to the dominant Ciceronian discourse on the conspiracy.

In the antilogy, the historiographer at once counters, modifies, and overwrites Cicero’s speech of 5 December. As we have seen, Caesar’s speech constitutes a subtle response to Cicero’s *Fourth Catilinarian*; there are no direct references, but the terms in which he describes the speeches of his fellow senators strongly recall the pathetic rhetoric

²¹⁴ *Ibid.* 52.23: *Neque mirum: ubi vos separatim sibi quisque consilium capitis, ubi domi voluptatibus, hic pecuniae aut gratiae servitis, eo fit ut impetus fiat in vacuum rem publicam.*

²¹⁵ Cf. FLOWER 2006: 101. The tenor of the *Fourth Catilinarian* (though probably revised heavily after 63, as argued by Lintott 2008: 17–18, 147–148) is also pro-execution; but in fact, it was already in the first words of the *First Catilinarian* that Cicero suggested Catiline should be killed (*Cat.* 1.2).

characterizing Cicero's speech. Cicero's *Fourth Catilinarian* has thus been established as being one of the main intertexts for the Sallustian debate, but at the same time questions have been raised about the validity of its rhetorical techniques. In a next step, Cato's speech exemplifies a 'proper' rhetoric of crisis, applying similar arguments and imagery as found in the *Fourth Catilinarian*, but removing the rhetorical exaggerations and widening its scope to Roman society as whole. By taking the moral high ground, Cato's oration surpasses the *Fourth Catilinarian* in value and effect. This is confirmed by the internal audience of his speech: it is he who is praised to the skies by the other senators for his display of virtue, and it is his proposal that is finally accepted.²¹⁶ The rhetoric of the *Fourth Catilinarian* is evoked in the Sallustian debate only to be discarded by Caesar and overwritten by the contribution of Cato the Great.

4. Conclusions

4.1 CICERO STANDS CORRECTED

The un-staging of Cicero's rhetorical performances against Catiline is in line with Sallust's generalization and idealization of the consular figure in the narrative. We have seen that Sallust takes over certain prominent themes from Cicero's account of the uprising, such as a focus on (civil) war, the strong antagonism between Catiline and Cicero and the delicate position of the consul. However, while Sallust records many of the details regarding Cicero's achievements, he minimalizes them at the same time by leaving them without comment and stripping them from the public praise that was awarded to Cicero in 63. Furthermore, the focalization of Cicero's personal experience of the events, so crucial to the Ciceronian account, is formulated as the type of ethical challenge

²¹⁶ *Cat.* 53.1, "As soon as Cato takes his seat, all ex-consuls and a great part of the senate praise his proposal, and they praise his virtue to the sky; they chastise each other and call each other cowards. Everyone considers Cato to be brilliant and great; the senate decides in favour of his vote." (*Postquam Cato adsedit, consulares omnes itemque senatus magna pars sententiam eius laudant, virtutem animi ad caelum ferunt; alli alios increpantes timidos vocant. Cato clarus atque magnus habetur; senati decretum fit sicuti ille censuerat.*)

any political leader might face. While the imperial historiographers comment upon Cicero's excessive self-praise as one of the qualities that made him highly unpopular in the years after 63, Sallust has corrected Cicero's exaggerated view of his own deeds by giving him no special valour or virtue. Therefore, he is able to leave the controversy over the consul's attitude out of his account and present the consul that Cicero *should* have been. Sallust's account of the debate on 5 December continues the impression that the consul acted entirely according to protocol and in the service of the state, and adds a new layer of meaning in his modification of the consular image by evoking Cicero's Catilinarian rhetoric in the speeches of Caesar and Cato. These men, who are, contrary to Cicero, explicitly praised by the narrator for their virtue,²¹⁷ express principles that do not match the style or content of Cicero's *Catilinarians*. Again, as in the narrative, there are strong allusions to and concordances with Cicero's version of the events. But Caesar and Cato reject the more sensational rhetorical techniques used, in order to present a type of rhetoric that is informed by moral concerns rather than personal or populist ends.

Within historical narrative, silence is a tool that can have different consequences. It can be used to protect and defend the memory of historical individuals. As noted above (§ 2.2), within the political sphere the decision to cover something (up) can have therapeutic and constructive effects. Writing in the unstable political climate of 42 BC invited subtlety and carefulness in the choice of one's protagonists. This could be one reason why Sallust's description of Cicero's actions is less a testimony to his personal achievements than a general portrayal of good leadership. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the triumviral proscriptions, it might have been safe to conceal the eloquence with which Cicero had recently demonized Mark Antony and because of which he was allegedly killed. In this regard, silence can also be applied for the benefit of commemoration: in order to give Cicero his proper place in the narrative, Sallust needed to downsize the effects of his eloquence, which otherwise would cause controversy.²¹⁸ However, while this is a

²¹⁷ Cf. *Cat.* 53.6, where the historiographer confirms that the character and morals of Caesar and Cato ought not to be passed over in silence (*silentio praeterire non fuit consilium*).

²¹⁸ Cf. VINITZKY-SEROUSSI & TEEGER 2010 on 'bland commemoration', a type of forgetting which omits certain interpretations of historical events in order to construct a narrative that can be accepted and shared by a broad audience.

valid hypothesis that must in part be true, the silences in the text also appear to convey a moral message about Cicero's controversial self-praise. The *Conspiracy of Catiline* corrects several 'Ciceronian' features of the *Catilinarian* discourse, such as the consul's focus on self-sacrifice (which is generalized), and the sensationalist rhetoric of the *Catilinarians* (which is countered then overwritten). The moral criticism on Cicero's behaviour in and especially after 63 BC thus finds its expression in the chastening of his figure in Sallust's historiography.

4.2 THE START OF ANOTHER TRADITION

As mentioned before, Sallust's representation of the events of 63 BC was not based purely on the Ciceronian corpus. There were other interpretations and stories about the conspiracy, and one in particular seems to have influenced the *Conspiracy of Catiline*: the story of Cato's role in the debate of 5 December. In a letter to Atticus from 45 BC, Cicero complains about the recent biography of Cato written by Junius Brutus, Cicero's protégé and Cato's nephew, which, according to him, misrendered Cato's as well as his own role in the debate on 5 December. Cato, in fact, was not the first to propose the death penalty; this proposal was made by everyone except Caesar.²¹⁹ However, Cicero says, Cato's speech is given the spotlight (by Brutus) because he expressed the shared opinion more convincingly and elaborately (*quia verbis luculentioribus et pluribus rem eandem comprehenderat*).²²⁰ Cicero is even more outraged by Brutus' presentation of his own actions. I am praised, he says, "because I brought the matter before the senate, not because I have revealed it, or exhorted the senate to take action, or finally because I gave my own judgment before I opened the floor for their reactions" (*quod rettulerim, non quod patefecerim, cohortatus sim, quod denique ante quam consulerem ipse iudicaverim*). On top of this, Brutus only praises Cicero explicitly with the meagre words "optimus consul".

Cicero's short description of Brutus' version of the events strongly recalls Sallust's representation of the consul. The Sallustian consul also

²¹⁹ *Att.* 12.21.1.

²²⁰ Note that the term *luculentus* is also used by Sallust to evaluate the *First Catilinarian* in *Cat.* 31.6, as Ramsey 1988 also notes *ad loc.*

exclusively leads the debate and does not express his judgment either. Indeed, in the *Conspiracy of Catiline* as much as in Brutus' biography, Cato's performance overshadows the actions of the consul, and his inflammatory rhetoric even replaces the consul's famous oratory. As Robert Broughton has already observed long ago, the dominant role of Cato is a sign that in the Catilinarian episode, the two traditions on Cato and Cicero converge.²²¹ At the time of Sallust's writing, Cato had recently died a republican hero, and legends about his Stoic manners and staunch patriotism were spreading. In light of Cato's status as a newcomer on the political stage, his contribution to the debate and its effect were more noteworthy than Cicero's fifth speech that year concerning the revolt.²²² Biographically speaking, the Catilinarian uprising was an important event in both their lives, but for Cato, it meant his true inauguration into politics and the first attestation of his Republican spirit.²²³ The debate in the senate furthermore illustrates the tension between Caesar and Cato, the urgency of which was proven by Cato's suicide in 46 BC. With the *Conspiracy of Catiline*, Sallust provided an important testimonium for later historians and antiquarians on his eloquence and fame.

The *Conspiracy of Catiline* planted the seed for the theme of Cato surpassing Cicero as the symbol of republicanism.²²⁴ In the imperial historiography, the image of Cato protector of the state would be further developed at the cost of Cicero's own promotion of republican ideals. In the next chapter, I will examine the aspects of republican *virtus* in greater detail, and discuss how the development of Cicero's political image was further constructed in close correlation with the legend of Cato's patriotism.

²²¹ BROUGHTON 1936.

²²² Including *In defence of Murena*.

²²³ See Vell. Pat. 2.35.1, who argues that on this very day Cato's virtue shone at its brightest. Cf. STOCKTON 1971: 340–342 on the debate in the senate, who hypothesizes that Cicero might have omitted Cato's speech from his own fourth Catilinarian speech in the publication process of 60 BC as some sort of revenge for his having gotten all the credit.

²²⁴ And not only in the historical tradition: Vergil opposes Catiline and Cato as paradigms of good (law-giver) and evil (punished criminal) in the Tartarus in *Aen.* 8.667, without making any mention of Cicero.

