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CICERO, STATESMANSHIP, AND REPUBLICANISM IN ROMAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

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A NOTE ON THE ABBREVIATIONS AND TITLES OF ANCIENT WORKS

The references to ancient authors and texts as well as to modern reference books are in accordance with the conventions of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 4th edition.

In the footnotes, I have used additional abbreviations for the following titles of Plutarch's *Moralia*:

Advice = *Advice on Civic Life* (Mor. 798–825)

Old Man = *Whether an Old man Should Engage in Public Affairs* (Mor. 783–797)

Flatterer = *How to Distinguish a Flatterer from a Friend* (Mor. 48–74)

On Self-praise = *How to Praise Oneself Inoffensively* (Mor. 539–547)

I have chosen to render the titles of ancient works in English (except for the evident title of Plutarch's *Moralia*), which in my opinion slightly increases the accessibility of the thesis for non-classicists.

All translations of Greek and Latin texts are my own, unless otherwise noted.

Introduction

The eloquent statesman

Καὶ ὅπως γε μηδεὶς ὑμῶν ὑποπτεύσῃ με χαρίσασθαι τι τοῖς τὸν Καίσαρα ἀποκτείνουσιν, ἵνα μὴ δίκην δῶσιν, ὅτι ποτὲ ἐν τῇ τοῦ Πομπηίου μερίδι ἐγενόμην, βούλεσθαι, ἐν τι ὑμῖν ἐρῶ. Καὶ γάρ τοι καὶ νομίζω πάντας ὑμᾶς πεπεῖσθαι σαφῶς ὅτι οὔτε φιλίαν οὔτε ἔχθραν πρὸς οὐδένα πώποτε δι' ἑμαυτὸν ἀνειλόμην, ἀλλ' αἰὲ πάντας ὑμῶν ἔνεκα καὶ τῆς κοινῆς καὶ ἐλευθερίας καὶ ὁμονοίας τοὺς μὲν ἐμίσησα τοὺς δὲ ἠγάπησα.¹

And in order that none of you suspects me of wanting to grant Caesar's assassins some kind of favour, to prevent that they are punished—since I was once part of Pompey's party—I will tell you one thing. For I do think that you all have no doubt that I never adopted an attitude of friendship or hatred towards anyone² for personal reasons, but that I have consistently hated some people and loved others for your sake and for the sake of the common freedom and concord.

On 17 March 44 BC, M. Tullius Cicero delivered a public oration with the aim of obtaining amnesty for the murderers of Caesar. It was a plea for civic harmony and peace and an attempt to bring the relentless succession of civil wars in the first century BC to a halt. Placing the events of 44 in a historical perspective (going back as far as the Athenian amnesty of 403 BC), Cicero argued that it is the task of the senators, himself included, to deliberate justly and mildly, with only the benefit of the state in mind.

¹ Cassius Dio 44.33.1–2.

² For this expression I used the translation by CARY 1916.

This amnesty speech is not by the hand of the historical Cicero; it has, in fact, been carefully composed by the historiographer Cassius Dio (163/164–235 AD).³ Dio's detailed account of Cicero's career constitutes a much-encompassing chain in the imperial tradition of representing the words as well as the deeds of the famous Roman statesman. The passage above immediately demonstrates one of the most prominent themes within this tradition: Cicero's strategies to (re)present himself. A considerable part of his public self-promotion depended on the continuous emphasis on speech as a political instrument: eloquent and convincing rhetoric is presented as a weapon against factional strife and civic discord. Cicero was not a military man—he never desired to be—but he prided himself on the peaceful manner in which he was able to maintain the order in society. In Dio's version of the amnesty speech, he claims that he exemplifies the proper attitude in times of crisis, by refusing to let his personal emotions interfere with the interests of the public; above all, he is a defender of freedom and concord.

Dio shows a special interest in the ways in which the role of eloquence as a servant to political policy plays out for Cicero's career—or, perhaps better said, is played out by the man himself. For what the above passage illustrates well is Cicero's tendency to mask, rather than express, his true beliefs with the help of his rhetorical abilities. Every reader of Dio knows that in reality Cicero favoured the position of the optimates, whose wish to maintain the authority of the senate was represented by Pompey when he was still alive. They also know that he cherished similar ideals as the Liberators: a functioning Republic that was not ruled by dictators or dynasts like Caesar.⁴ However, in his public speeches, Cicero refused to choose a side. At moments of great impact, when Cicero could have professed his true political allegiance, he chose to defend the middle ground or to make compromises. In Dio's speech for Cicero, the orator identifies himself with essential republican values: *ἐλευθερία* or *libertas* as well as *ὁμόνοια* or *concordia*. His political record, on the other hand, raises the question of whether he truly personified those values.

³ More information about this speech can be found in chapter 4, n. 1.

⁴ The conspirators against Caesar are said to have called out Cicero's name when they had ac-

This thesis is devoted to that particular question of political representation: it examines the image of Cicero as a leader of the Republic, as it is constructed by Roman historical writers from Sallust to Cassius Dio (ca. 40 BC until ca. 230 AD). Cicero is perhaps best known for his eloquence and his contribution to the rhetorical tradition. From the Roman imperial period until our own age, his speeches have offered standard educational material for learning Latin as well as the art of rhetoric.⁵ As a model for public speaking, Cicero is unbeatable. However, not only was the ambitious newcomer from Arpinum an eloquent speaker, he was also, in heart and soul, a representative of the Roman state. As the example from Cassius Dio demonstrates, narratives about his life may indeed spotlight this eloquence, but they also contextualize and evaluate it as part of Cicero's political programme. This historical context was highly relevant for all writers of the Empire—not just historiographers like Dio—whose constant engagement with the republican past is a conspicuous feature of their work. The final, violent episode in the history of the Republic especially required some re-evaluation within the moral programme of the imperial regime.⁶ In order to come to terms with Rome's history, later generations also needed to come to terms with Cicero as one of the Republic's most prominent leaders.

In this study, I shall explore how Cicero's political leadership is represented within the new context of autocratic rule, and how imperial writers highlighted the civic context of Ciceronian oratory. I will do so by emphasizing the political rather than the rhetorical quality of his public performance. Apart from being an important cause for Cicero's literary, textual canonicity, his oratory also gained a great historical significance within the imperial narrative of the destruction of the Republic.

complished their goal: Cic. *Phil.* 2.28; Cass. Dio 44.20.4. Cf. Plut. *Cic.* 42.1 on Cicero supporting the cause of the conspirators.

⁵ On the rhetorical reception of Cicero from antiquity until the early modern period, see esp. LA BUA 2019; COX & WARD 2006.

⁶ GOWING 2005 and GALLIA 2012 are general studies of the commemoration in the Empire of republican figures and historical events, focusing in particular on the place of republican history within imperial cultural identity. LUCARELLI 2007 and WIEGAND 2013 examine the sociocultural function of the continuity and discontinuity of republican norms and values.

Scope

Cicero's reputation in antiquity (and beyond) has always been a popular subject, and has inspired a much greater amount of scholarly literature than the present book will ever be able to do justice.⁷ This introduction serves to highlight the landmark studies to which this study is indebted, and to argue how my approach is different from the approaches taken by previous scholars.⁸

With regard to the image of Cicero in antiquity, there has been a long-time awareness that this image was depersonalized and, to a certain extent, stripped of its historical and political value due to a process of textualization. This process is recognized especially in texts dating to the early Empire.⁹ Tadeusz Zieliński was one of the first scholars to note that the historical figure of Cicero became a 'legend' or a symbol, whose personality disappeared into the background and whose name came to be associated with stereotypical qualities.¹⁰ Much later, Robert Kaster argued in greater detail that this process of simplification took place in the rhetorical schools, where Cicero's life and oratory were a popular topic for declamation exercises.¹¹ This view has remained persistent throughout the last decennia, and scholars frequently point towards declamatory education as the bedrock of imperial portrayals of Cicero. As Thomas Keeline states in the introduction to his study of the 'schoolroom' Cicero:¹² "we see Cicero 'flattened' as he is textualized and transformed from a living man into words on a page, but

⁷ STEEL 2013 offers good starting points for the study of the reception of Cicero as a rhetorical and political symbol in antiquity itself. ALTMAN 2015 and VAN DEUSEN 2013 contain many case studies of Ciceronian reception in the medieval, early modern, and modern period.

⁸ For an overview of the scholarship, see also KEELINE 2018: 4–8.

⁹ SILLETT 2015: 38 draws the conclusion that "with the exception of Sallust's history of the Catilinarian conspiracy, most of the information that has come down to us gathers around the banal, the obvious and the unreliable". Cf. DRESSLER 2015, who argues for a cancellation of Cicero *politicus* in the early Empire; this creates a point of rupture in the tradition during which Cicero is reinvented as a 'harmless' icon of eloquence.

¹⁰ ZIELIŃSKI 1912: 9–15, and 280–288 on his concept of the "Cicerokarikatur", the negative portrait of Cicero which is influenced by the invective tradition.

¹¹ KASTER 1998.

¹² While KEELINE 2018 is in the end interested in cultural reception, LA BUA 2019 is entirely devoted to the role of Cicero's speeches in Roman imperial and late antique education and scholarship.

this very textualization also allows for a sort of reinflation by more sophisticated authors as they put to various uses the icon that Cicero has become.”¹³ In other words, during the early imperial period, the ‘legend’ of Cicero’s life was constructed on the basis of standard formulae and thematic categories dictated by declamatory practice. Keeline argues that from Seneca the Younger onwards, imperial writers engage in more creative and personal ways with Cicero’s reputation, but his own interpretation of these writers never strays far from the idea that Cicero is chiefly a literary and rhetorical icon.

Studies of Cicero’s reception only seldom allow for a more ‘complex’ Cicero, whose rhetorical and political qualities are evaluated on an equal level. In a recent dissertation, Andrew Sillett has presented a “holistic and book-length treatment of the beginning of the Ciceronian tradition in the early empire”, devoting especial attention to the Augustan poets, whose response to Cicero can only be discovered between the lines.¹⁴ While Sillett’s thesis offers a rich and valuable overview of the early imperial writers, its aim of providing a ‘holistic’ account is undermined by his decision to stop after the Tiberian period and by the exclusive focus on Latin texts.¹⁵ Overall, Sillett’s perspective is a fairly traditional one in the sense that it focuses on Latin literature alone and situates the historical accounts of Cicero’s career in the sphere of rhetorical education.¹⁶

Whenever modern scholars show an interest in Cicero’s political career, they discuss his violent death at the hands of his former client Popilius—a brief moment of heroism, as Livy called it.¹⁷ Of course, the proscription of Cicero, the fatal retribution which Antony demanded for the damage that the *Philippics* had done to his reputation,

¹³ KEELINE 2018: 9.

¹⁴ SILLETT 2015, citation at 31. For Horace’s response to Cicero, DRESSLER 2015 is essential.

¹⁵ SILLETT explicitly dismisses the Greek writers: “Although the insights of later writers such as Plutarch, Appian and Cassius Dio should not be wholly ignored (nor, indeed, should the cumulative wisdom of more modern scholarship), it would be difficult to make the case that they leave us substantially more informed about Cicero’s life than our predecessors in the early empire” (22).

¹⁶ Earlier book-length studies of Cicero that have a similar scope are GAMBET 1963 and LAVERY 1965 (often overlooked). GAMBET reviews and categorizes the Latin *testimonia* of the early Empire until the reign of Vespasian (79 AD); LAVERY’s dissertation traces Cicero’s reputation in Latin writers from the time of Augustus until Hadrian.

¹⁷ Sen. *Suas.* 6.22, “he bore none of his misfortunes in a way worthy of a man, except his death” (*omnium adversorum nihil, ut viro dignum erat, tulit praeter mortem*); cf. Livy’s account of Cicero’s death as it is preserved in *Suas.* 6.17.

became an essential episode in his later reception.¹⁸ As Rita Pierini has shown, the proscription plays a role in almost all the later accounts of Cicero's life, and turned Cicero into a martyr to the Republic.¹⁹ While the narratives of Cicero's death will not be discussed separately in this study, I will in fact demonstrate the sophisticated ways in which imperial writers represented this death as a metonym for the death of the Republic.

Pierini touches upon a part of Cicero's life which cannot be overlooked: his intense involvement in Roman politics, as a result of which his name was forever connected to the Republic. Arguing against the notion that the imperial Cicero was no more than a 'flat' figure or rhetorical icon, this study will examine in what ways the imperial narratives about the last century BC display an effort to reflect on the historical value of Cicero's political leadership. The literary portraits of his career will be approached from a cultural-historical angle, in particular from the angle of Roman virtue ethics. Ancient historiography, the genre we will chiefly focus on, had a strong moral and social function in serving as a teacher of Roman morals.²⁰ *Virtus* is a "theme, cause, and core in Roman historical writing";²¹ in the historiographers' commemoration of the past, the virtuous deeds and characters of individuals are placed centre stage in order to provide models and lessons for the present generations. The articulation of these lessons was predefined by the Roman discourse of exemplarity. *Exempla*, the compact moral-didactic narratives discussing virtue and vice, were the "lifeblood of ethics".²² They were the filter that the Romans applied to their view on history in order to determine which individuals and events were 'good' and 'bad', 'moral' or 'immoral'; in other words, they determined who deserved

¹⁸ ROLLER 1997 and WRIGHT 2008 discuss how the history of Cicero's death was adapted and 'rhetorized' in declamatory education.

¹⁹ PIERINI 2003. HOMEYER 1964 is similar in scope, but she treats only the major *testimonia*, and concentrates on the source question.

²⁰ This function is often summarized according to the Ciceronian maxim *historia magistra vitae* (*De Or.* 2.36); similar iconic statements of the moral-didactic value of historiography for the present are Polyb. 1.35.9–10; Sall. *Cat.* 1.3; Liv. *praef.* 8–10; Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 6.7, and *Ant. Rom.* 1.1.2–4; Tac. *Ann.* 4.32–33. Cf. Plut. *Alex.* 1.2–3 (who prefers biography over historiography as a source of insight into moral virtue). In my approach I have been much inspired by HAU 2016 and BALMACEDA 2017, who discuss the moralizing structure of Greek and Latin historiography, respectively.

²¹ BALMACEDA 2017: 9.

²² LANGLANDS 2018: 6. Cf. e.g. ROLLER 2004, HÖLKESKAMP 2001. The sociocultural dynamics of the discourse of exemplarity is explained further in chapter 2.

to be heroized or who ought to be collectively rejected. In the words of Thomas Wiedemann, “political history was perceived as a series of *exempla* of individual leaders who had a greater or lesser share of power ... and who exercised that power in different ways”.²³

At multiple times in his life, Cicero fulfilled a position of leadership in the Roman state. A first high point in his career was the consulship of 63 BC; a second *aristeia* came in 44–43 with his resistance against Mark Antony. In his political-philosophical writings and his public speeches, Cicero presents himself as a paradigm of the wise counsellor and intellectual leader.²⁴ However, there is some discussion as to the question of whether in the imperial period Cicero’s leadership also constituted an *exemplum* of civic virtue. It is often thought that Cicero’s sometimes morally questionable behaviour, his fickleness (*inconstantia*) and his vacillation between Pompey and Caesar,²⁵ made him unsuitable as a model. Recently, Giuseppe La Bua has argued that throughout the first century AD, Cicero’s political life did not offer any *exempla* worthy of imitation. Only with Quintilian’s elevation of Cicero as the personification of the *vir bonus*, then, his moral authority is restored; the Cicero presented at the beginning of the second century is an improved version of the historical man, who combines eloquence with an admirable sense of justice and patriotism.²⁶ La Bua’s argument relies heavily on the overview of Cicero’s imperial image by Alain Gowing, who states that in the early empire, “as a historical figure [Cicero] possessed little clout. This is not to deny him his importance in the course of events in the waning years of the Republic, but he had not earned through his actions a place in the Roman moral and ethical universe that manifested itself in the ever-evolving *exemplum* tradition.”²⁷ A solution to the problem signalled by La Bua and Gowing, which is that Cicero’s personal flaws and mistakes are perceived as a hindrance to his moral authority, has been to focus on his successful representation of the ide-

²³ WIEDEMANN 2000: 520. Cf. CHAPLIN 2000, ROLLER 2009.

²⁴ VAN DER BLOM 2010: 293–310; STEEL 2006; DUGAN 2005.

²⁵ The most famous testimony to these negative qualities of Cicero is Sen. *Dial.* 10.5.1; cf. e.g. Sen. *Controv.* 2.4.4 (no *constantia*); Sen. *Suas.* 6.22 (no *constantia*); Cass. Dio 39.63.5 (inconsistency); Plut. *Cic.* 37.2 (Cicero does not know which side to choose in the civil war between Pompey and Caesar).

²⁶ LA BUA 2019: 100–125.

²⁷ GOWING 2013: 236. The argument is already present in KASTER 1998.

als of the Republic. The stories about his patriotic defence of the state (against Catiline, against Antony) and his heroic death form a peculiar strand of discourse which, to a certain extent, remedies the negative characterizations of his political conduct.²⁸

By evaluating the imperial representation of Cicero's deeds within the context of the civil wars and Caesar's death, I intend to offer a more comprehensive picture. I will focus on the question of how the vicissitudes of his political career become an integral part of the imperial discourse on Rome's political history. What is especially important to remember here is that we need not look for absolute consistency. We may allow the image of Cicero to be ambiguous. His political leadership has always been a controversial subject. As Nicholas Cole has remarked, one of the constant factors in modern scholarship has been "the desire to pass judgement on Cicero as a politician and as a moral example."²⁹ Cicero's personal character, which was prone to emotion and at times unstable, was an important reason for doubts about his leadership abilities, and stimulated anti-Ciceronian sentiment; the opposite reaction is often to praise and defend his dedication to the Republic. This tendency is still clearly visible in present-day scholarship and popular culture, where portrayals usually concentrate on Cicero's flaws or his virtues.³⁰ Such a personal evaluation of Cicero's conduct as either a positive or a negative political model is not what is envisaged here. Contrary to what other scholars have argued, I believe that exemplary historiography does allow for complex portrayals of historical personalities.³¹ This study will demonstrate that ancient historical writers took an effort to outline, and even contrast, the good

²⁸ I have already mentioned PIERINI 2003. See also SCHMITZER 2000: 184–189 and WIEGAND 2013: 130–131 on Velleius Paterculus. WINTERBOTTOM 1982: 240 believes that Cicero's "life and career could provide a sympathetic *exemplum*". Slightly differently, in his study of Cicero's reputation in the Empire, RICHTER 1968: 197 presents Cicero as a timeless example of what it means to be human. Cicero would represent "in welchem Maße dieser eigentümlich oszillierende Mensch mit seinen Stärken und Schwächen, seinen liebenswerten und beklagenswerten Eigenschaften, seinem Glanz und seiner tiefen Verlassenheit die nachgestaltende Phantasie zu exemplarischer Profilierung des Menschlichen überhaupt—auch des Allzumenschlichen—über das geschichtlich Occasionelle hinaus anzuregen vermochte". Cf. ROLFE 1923.

²⁹ COLE 2013: 348. COLE reviews the development of Cicero's image in nineteenth-century scholarship. Cf. RAWSON 1975: 305–308.

³⁰ FOTHERINGHAM 2013: 364–370.

³¹ E.g. SPÄTH 2005: 35, "historiographische Texte lassen kaum ein Bild komplexer Personen erkennen".

and bad qualities in their protagonists—although they are perhaps less explicit about their literary method than we would like. In the imperial accounts, Cicero's fluctuating conduct as well as his flaws frequently function as a case in point for the challenges of civic leadership, in particular the clash between moral excellence and the often messy reality of politics.

Corpus

It is not the aim of this study to provide an exhaustive overview of every comment on Cicero's statesmanship in imperial literature. I will focus on historiographical texts and (historical) accounts of Cicero's political leadership, which have the explicit aim of situating him within first-century Roman republican politics.³² In chapter 3, this historiographical frame is complemented with an examination of the Roman concept of leadership and statesmanship in general.

As we have already seen in the previous section, especially the rhetorical strand of the Ciceronian tradition has been well researched in previous scholarship. Although (Ciceronian) rhetoric takes an important place in the chapters below, I will confine myself to the historical representation of Cicero's oratory, that is to say, the way that the performance of his oratory is embedded in the events of the final decennia BC. The declamatory context of these historical portrayals has been described quite recently and in detail by Keeline and Sillett.³³ More in particular, Keeline has illustrated the influence of the anti-Ciceronian, invective tradition (for which the Ps.-Sallustian invectives are our best source) on the development of Cicero's later image;³⁴ invective themes are, for example, clearly present in Cassius Dio's speech for Calenus.³⁵

³² HAU 2016: 7 usefully defines historiography as "the literary representation of historical events". Although I will make a distinction between the genre of historiography and the works of, for example, Valerius Maximus, Plutarch, and Seneca, the advantage of such a broad definition as HAU applies makes it easier to compare historiography proper with other texts that similarly aim at the representation of events (or figures) in the past.

³³ KEELINE 2018; SILLETT 2015.

³⁴ KEELINE 2018: 155–161, but see in general his discussion at 147–195.

³⁵ A historiographical text which scholars assume contributed greatly to this anti-Ciceronian tradition was the Roman history of Asinius Pollio, which is unfortunately lost to us. On Pollio, DRUM-

In my own discussion of this speech in chapter 4, I will add an extra layer to our interpretation of the influence of the anti-Ciceronian tradition, by pointing out how invective themes are employed as part of a response to Cicero's political programme and self-representation.

Similarly, for the important contributions to the Ciceronian tradition by Tacitus, Quintilian, and Pliny the Younger, I refer the reader to earlier studies by Gowing and Keeline.³⁶ Generally speaking, these imperial authors all profess a greater interest in Cicero's eloquence and his position within the tradition of Latin public speakers than in the development of his political career.

Finally, Asconius' commentaries on Cicero's speeches might contain more valuable material than I have presumed, but an examination of these texts did not match my decision to look further than the Cicero of the schools.³⁷

A combined Latin and Greek perspective

One particular aspect that distinguishes this thesis from earlier studies on Ciceronian reception is its equal treatment of Latin and Greek texts. It is an interesting feature of the imperial tradition that the Greek historical writers transmitted the most complete and influential accounts of Cicero's political career—I am thinking of Plutarch's biographies (not only the *Cicero*, but also the *Cato Minor* or the *Antony*), still a vital source for modern students of the Roman Republic, and of Cassius Dio's portrayal of Cicero's life, which basically brings together every anecdote about the republican orator that can be found in previous writers. The political and intellectual position of Greeks in Rome is a question that is often approached from an either/or perspective: the provincial Greeks under Roman rule actively protected their language,

MOND 2013. Seneca the Elder (*Suas.* 6) preserves several fragments from Pollio's history that deal with Cicero's life and death; see SILLETT 2015: 148–161, PIEPER 2019.

³⁶ GOWING 2013 and especially KEELINE 2018. In particular the discussion of Cicero's political speech and his defence of Roman *libertas*, as examined in chapter 3 below, invites a comparison with Tacitus' *Dialogus*. On freedom of speech in Tacitus' *Dialogus*, see most recently VAN DER BLOM 2020.

³⁷ Cf. KEELINE 2018: 13–72, and 42 n. 71 in particular. For Asconius' approach to Cicero, see BISHOP 2015, LA BUA 2019: 166–167.

their traditions and their cultural identity,³⁸ which would mean that their integration in Roman public life remained conditional and pragmatic, serving their professional ambitions only. With regard to Greek historiography under the Empire, it is frequently highlighted that these writers seem to have written for a Greek audience: they are, for example, inclined to explain Roman customs and political institutions.³⁹ However, several recent projects have now directed attention to the cultural integration of the Greeks in the Roman world; in particular the concept of intercultural contact, i.e. a mutual influence which manifests itself on the level of literature, scholarship and art, has been a worthwhile point of departure to understand imperial intellectual culture.⁴⁰

In fact, the intercultural contact between the writers examined in this book is an especially interesting subject since all of them came from different corners of the Roman Empire, and were often newcomers in Rome. In order to show how the writers discussed in the chapters of this book position themselves towards Rome and its history, I will briefly introduce each of them.

C. Sallustius Crispus (86–35 BC) came from a noble family in Amiternum, a town some hundred kilometers from Rome. We do not know anything about his entrance into Roman politics, but he certainly fulfilled the office of tribune of the people in 52 BC, and he took several posts under Caesar, whom he supported in the civil war. However, Sallust experienced, as he himself implies in the opening words of the *Conspiracy of Catiline* (*Bellum Catilinae*), several severe setbacks.⁴¹ After Caesar's death, he retreated from public life to write about the political crises of the Republic, which according to him were caused by the moral degeneration of the Roman aristocracy.⁴²

³⁸ The standard studies are BOWIE 1970; SWAIN 1996; WHITMARSH 2001. Cf. PALM 1959.

³⁹ As VAN STEKELENBURG 1971: 13, GOWING 1992: 292–293, and HOSE 1994: 360 note, Cassius Dio is unique in his insider perspective on Roman history. He designates the senatorial class as 'we' (e.g. Cass. Dio 73[74].12.2), and describes his personal experiences as a Roman administrator (e.g. 72[73].4.2, 78[79].8.4–5, 80.1.2–3). BURDEN-STREVEIS 2015b discusses this habit of Dio while defending the concept of complementary identities, the Greek cultural identity being shaped by the Roman political identity and vice versa.

⁴⁰ Important examples are ROSELAAR 2015; HUNTER & DE JONGE 2019; KÖNIG, LANGLANDS & UDEN 2020.

⁴¹ Cass. Dio 40.63.2 (expulsion from the senate); 43.9.2 (accused of extortion).

⁴² On Sallust's political career, SYME 1964: 29–42; MCGUSHIN 1977: 1–5; BÜCHNER 1982: 15–20; RAMSEY 2007: 2–5. Cf. LA PENNA 1968: 32–34 on the historical background of Sallust's work.

The Tiberian writers Velleius Paterculus (19 BC–after 30 AD) and Valerius Maximus (fl. 14–37 AD) were members of the Roman upper class. Velleius, like Sallust, was a *homo novus*; he came from an equestrian family in Campania.⁴³ After having held several military posts abroad, Velleius accompanied the emperor Tiberius on multiple campaigns in Germania.⁴⁴ His *Roman History* (*Historiae Romanae*) is a brief overview of Rome's historical development, divided into two books; it offers a rather personal evaluation of the great men of history, and leads up to a panegyric on Tiberius.⁴⁵ Similarly, Valerius Maximus wrote his compendium of *Memorable Doings and Sayings* (*Facta et dicta memorabilia*) in honour of the emperor, whom he addresses in the preface. Valerius' work provides an instructive overview of Rome's history through a collection of exempla that concern all aspects of Roman life (politics, religion, social custom, art, etc.).⁴⁶ Although we know nothing about Valerius' public career,⁴⁷ the *exempla* express "his moral, religious and political traditionalism",⁴⁸ and suggest that he was a long-time inhabitant of the city.⁴⁹

Lucan (39–65 AD) and Seneca the Younger (4 BC–65 AD) both came from Corduba; Lucan was Seneca's nephew. They were of equestrian stock, and came to Rome as boys to receive their education there and climb up the political ladder. Lucan belonged to the circle of friends (*cohors amicorum*) around Nero,⁵⁰ and had a successful career until 64 AD, when Nero issued a ban on his public performance.⁵¹ Lucan's major work, the *Pharsalia* or *Civil War* (*Bellum civile*), an epic poem about the battle at Pharsalus, has strong political overtones.⁵² The *Civil War*

⁴³ DIHLE 1955: 638; ELEFANTE 1997: 20.

⁴⁴ Vell. Pat. 2.104.3, 111.3 (quaestorship and *legatus Augusti*), 114.1–3 (on the *cura Caesaris* and Velleius' personal admiration for Tiberius). DIHLE 1955: 639–640; ELEFANTE 1997: 19–23.

⁴⁵ See esp. Vell. Pat. 2.126–131. The books were a gift of some sort to M. Vinicius, the addressee, perhaps in celebration of his consulship in 30 BC. For the date of composition and Velleius' relation with Vinicius, see ELEFANTE 1997: 23–28.

⁴⁶ On the moral-didactic nature of the work, BLOOMER 1992; SKIDMORE 1996; WARDLE 1998: 12–13; WEILEDER 1998: 20–21, "Er will seinen Leser bilden, unterhalten und moralisch beeindruckend sowie, falls möglich, bessern"; MORGAN 2007: 122–159; LUCARELLI 2007.

⁴⁷ On Valerius' background, WEILEDER 1998: 26–27, with bibliography.

⁴⁸ MASLAKOV 1984: 461.

⁴⁹ WEILEDER 1998: 177–179.

⁵⁰ Suet. *Vita Luc.* 33.9–10.

⁵¹ Lucan became quaestor in 62 or 63 AD. On his political career and the ban of 64, BARTSCH 2009: 492–493; AHL 1976: 35–47, 333–353.

⁵² Lucan's alleged involvement in the Pisonian conspiracy of 64 AD is often seen as evidence that

is an unsentimental portrayal of the civil war between Pompey and Caesar, opening up the question of what true Roman virtue means.

Seneca became a member of the senate, and was closely connected to the court.⁵³ In 49 AD he received the job of *magister* (or *praeceptor*; διδάσκαλος in Greek) of Nero,⁵⁴ in which he famously combined his ethical (philosophical) studies with political duties. Cassius Dio relates that Seneca and Nero's other tutor, the military official Burrus, were the wisest and most powerful men in the emperor's entourage, by virtue of which they were able to change or abolish existing laws, and introduce new ones.⁵⁵ Although Seneca is often seen as a philosopher,⁵⁶ his enduring public duties and the responsibility he felt towards his fellow citizens are visible in every page of his work.

A similarly dutiful Roman citizen was L. Mestrius Plutarchus (ca. 46–120 AD).⁵⁷ He was born in Chaeronea, Boeotia; in contrast to the other writers discussed here, he never moved to Rome. However, he visited Rome on 'diplomatic' missions in the 70s and 90s, where he also gave philosophical lectures for the elite.⁵⁸ Through his network of influential friends at Rome, he obtained the equestrian rank as well as citizenship, and he was possibly appointed procurator of Greece by Hadrian.⁵⁹ His *Parallel Lives* (Βίοι παράλληλοι/*Vitae parallelae*) as well as his moral treatises, the *Moralia*, are addressed to high-placed friends in Rome and the Greek provinces, alternatively.⁶⁰ The political treatises give the impression that he saw himself as an ambassador of the Greek cities under Roman rule.⁶¹

the *Civil War* was a form of protest against Nero's reign. See AHL 1976: 39, 54–61; BARTSCH 2009: 501; NARDUCCI 2002: 7–13. Cf. GAGLIARDI 1976.

⁵³ On Seneca's life and career, see GRIFFIN 1974 and HABINEK 2013.

⁵⁴ Tac. *Ann.* 12.8, 15.62; cf. Cass. Dio 61.3.3. On the date, GRIFFIN 1976: 420–421.

⁵⁵ Cass. Dio 61.3.3, 4.2.

⁵⁶ This was already his reputation in antiquity. Dio records the accusation that Seneca was unable to practice his own philosophical tenets: Cass. Dio 61.10.2 (τὰ ἐναντιώτατα οἷς ἐφιλοσόφει ποιῶν ἡλέγχθη).

⁵⁷ The best overview of Plutarch's life and work is still ZIEGLER 1964, but see also FLACELIÈRE & IRIGOIN 1987: xii–liv.

⁵⁸ On these visits, Plut. *On Curiosity* 522d–e; ZIEGLER 1964: 22–23.

⁵⁹ JONES 1971: 34. *Contra*, ZIEGLER 1964: 22–23, SWAIN 1996: 171–172.

⁶⁰ On Plutarch's Roman audience, VALGIGLIO 1992: 4020–4050; STADTER 2014. For Plutarch's mixed social network and the addressees of his treatises, see the overview in JONES 1971: 39–64.

⁶¹ See, e.g. *Advice on Civic Life* 824d–e, where he explains how a Greek city leader should behave towards his Roman superiors. HAHN 1906: 203–206 and PALM 1959: 30–44 regard Plutarch as a mediator between Roman and Greek culture; JONES 1971: 106–107, SWAIN 1996, and DUFF 1999:

The historiographers Appian (ca. 95 – ca. 165 AD) and Cassius Dio (163/164 – ca. 235 AD)⁶² lived in Rome for the greater part of their adult life. Appian was born in Alexandria, but left the city after the Jewish revolt of 115–117 AD.⁶³ In Rome, he worked as a lawyer (*causidicus*), as he tells us in the preface to his *Roman History* (Ῥωμαϊκὴ ἱστορία).⁶⁴ His 24-volume inquiry into the history of the Roman empire (of which 11 books are extant) was published between 148 and 161 AD, and targeted a readership that was, just like him, interested in the different stages of Roman imperial expansion.⁶⁵ Appian's intimate friendship and intellectual exchange with the senator Marcus Cornelius Fronto show that he was well integrated into Rome's cultural and literary circles.⁶⁶

Finally, Cassius Dio, whom we have already met above, was born in Nicaea, and became one of the many eastern senators in Roman government.⁶⁷ He probably moved to Rome as a teenager, in 180 AD, and completed a traditional *cursus honorum* there.⁶⁸ Dio's writing activity was closely connected with the rule of Septimius Severus, whose

287–309 emphasize his Greek identity. PELLING 1989 and 2002 offer more exploratory views on this question.

⁶² For Dio's birth date I follow MILLAR 1964: 13.

⁶³ Fr. 19, from book 24 on the *Arabian War*. GOWING 1992: 11–16 is a useful contextualization of Appian's life in second-century Roman Alexandria. Overviews of the scholarship on Appian can be found in WELCH 2015: 1–13, KUHN-CHEN 2002: 31–34. MCGING's 2019 Loeb translation also has a good introduction with bibliography. BRODERSEN 1993: 352–354 and KUHN-CHEN 2002: 41–43 give useful overviews of the biographical data that Appian himself provides.

⁶⁴ App. *praef.* 15.62: δικαῖς ἐν Ῥώμῃ συναγορεύσας ἐπὶ τῶν βασιλέων. There is some discussion about Appian's profession: some believe he was an *advocatus fisci* (WHITE 1913; GOLDMANN 1988: 2; GOWING 1992: 17), others, in accordance with the remark made by Fronto in *Ep. ad Pium* 9.2 (HAINES 1962), that he was a *causidicus* (GABBA 1958: viii; BRODERSEN 1993; FAMIÈRE 1998: 7–10). In view of the scant evidence we have, I believe it is best to rely on Fronto's information, and refer to Appian as *causidicus*.

⁶⁵ App. *praef.* 12.48–13.49 (νομίσας δ' ἂν τινα καὶ ἄλλον οὕτως ἐθέλῃσαι μαθεῖν τὰ Ῥωμαίων, συγγράφω κατὰ ἔθνος ἑκαστον). GOWING 1992: 283–287 argues that this readership was Greek, and FAMIÈRE 1998: 32–36 that it must have simply been a Roman readership.

⁶⁶ Cf. GOWING 1992: 275. An epistolary exchange between Fronto and Appian, in Greek, is extant: Fronto, *Ep. graec.* 4–5. In *Ad Pium* 9 (HAINES 1962), which is a request to the emperor (for the third time) to grant Appian a procuratorship, Fronto refers to a *vetus consuetudo et studiorum usus prope cotidianus* between them.

⁶⁷ He came from the province of Bithynia which had a long history of dealings with Rome: HARRIS 1980. HAMMOND 1957 states that, in the time of Septimius Severus, the number of senators from the provinces was even higher than the number of senators of Italian descent: 57.4 against 46.4 percent (see the table at 77).

⁶⁸ On Dio's career, see MILLAR 1964: 5–27; BARNES 1984: 241–245; RICH 1990: 1–3; KUHN-CHEN 2002: 131–132 (in reference to Dio's own remarks). Notably, he was consul twice, first in 205 and again in 229 AD, when he shared the consulship with Alexander Severus.

reign he took as the end point of his major work, the *Roman History* (Ἱστορίαι Ῥωμαϊκαί)—it begins with Rome’s foundation. The 80 books (of which we have only books 36–54 in full) took ten years to prepare and another twelve to compose,⁶⁹ and were published either around 220 or 231.⁷⁰ Septimius’ accession to the throne took place amidst civil wars, and Dio’s sceptical views of the late Republic echo the contemporary desire for a stable government.⁷¹

As these biographies show, the private and professional lives of the Latin and Greek writers studied here centered around the city of Rome; their literary output often reflected their public involvement. Moreover, this was the place where Cicero himself made a career, and where “every part of the forum showed some sign of his renowned performance”.⁷² For all these writers, Cicero was a celebrity from the past, an authoritative figure whose deeds and words potentially provided *exempla* for later generations. Despite their different backgrounds, they all actively contributed to shaping the Roman cultural discourse about the value of Cicero’s political achievements.

In reading the Latin and Greek writers side by side, I will highlight the similarities, not the differences. What characterizes them most is not their unfamiliarity with Rome’s past but their appropriation of it. I will demonstrate that the tumultuous history of the city, with its many remarkable protagonists, is consistently presented as being of a universal nature, offering vignettes of virtue and vice which have an ethical value that transcends specific groups or generations. By foregrounding the literary methods by which the Latin and Greek texts moralize Cicero’s political conduct rather than the distinctive features of each political portrait, we are able to regard Cicero’s imperial reputation as the product of a shared intellectual discourse on good citizenship and civic leadership.

⁶⁹ Cass. Dio 72[73].23.5.

⁷⁰ If Dio started collecting his material in the ten years before Septimius’ death, he would have started his project as early as 197 AD (cf. MILLAR 1964; VAN STEKELENBURG 1971) or around 200 (RICH 1990) and published it in the 220s; if he started the whole project after Septimius’ death in 211, he would have published it as late as the 230s (BARNES 1984, with a *status quaestionis* of the previous scholarship at 240–241).

⁷¹ MILLAR 1964: 27; RICH 1990: 4; MADSEN 2020: 20, 22. Cf. GOWING 1992: 21–25 on Dio’s portrait of the senate as a political body without agency.

⁷² I quote the words of the Tiberian historiographer Bruttidius Niger, in Sen. *Suas.* 6.21: *nulla non pars fori aliquo actionis inclutae signata vestigio erat*.

Structure

The following chapters are organized thematically, although they respect the chronological order of the material discussed. Each chapter is a case study that can be read independently, but the chapters also form one argumentative whole in examining the extent to which Cicero's career offered models for civic conduct. We have seen above that political morality and the exemplary nature of political actions is one of the main interests of ancient historiography. The chief point of departure for my analysis, therefore, will be the moral evaluation of Cicero's actions. This evaluation pertains to the statesman's personal character, but even more to his place within the community: the value of Cicero's leadership is judged on the basis of his service to the public—that is, the Republic.

Two factors appear to be of prominent value in the historical narratives of Cicero's life. First, his representation of the values of republicanism as an ideology believing in the freedom of all Roman citizens (*libertas*) and the honest and successful collaboration between magistrates, senate and people. The second is his place within the sociopolitical network of the republican elite, who, as members of the senate, were responsible for the proper functioning of the daily institutions. The increasingly violent struggle between the *optimates* and the *populares*, which eventually resulted in Caesar's dictatorship and the ensuing civil war, severely put the integrity of politicians to the test. Cicero's own exercise of power is judged according to his collaboration or competition with others and the capability to practice his political ideals.

The theoretical framework of this study is developed over the course of the four chapters and consists of four elements: cultural memory, the discourse of exemplarity (already mentioned above, under 'Scope'), the concept of ethical leadership, and public oratory as a site of morality.

Chapter 1 will explore the role of historiography within the Roman culture of commemoration (and forgetting); it illustrates how virtue (*virtus*) in political conduct is deemed an essential criterion for historical commemoration. In examining Sallust's *Conspiracy of Catiline*, the first chapter also functions as a prelude on the development of Cicero's

political image in the Empire. Sallust's account of the Catilinarian conspiracy, which occurred during Cicero's consulship in 63 BC, reads very differently from Cicero's own narrative of the events. It has often been noted that within the *Conspiracy of Catiline*, the consul plays a minor role, receiving little or no praise for his suppression of the revolutionaries. I will challenge the idea that we should see this as a dismissal of Cicero's political achievements by examining how Sallust moralizes the behaviour of the consul. Through a clever strategy of silence and omission, Sallust offers a positive corrective to Cicero's self-praise in the *Catilinarians*.

Although Sallust technically falls outside the proposed scope of this study, being a republican and not an imperial historiographer, his historical account of Cicero's consular year marks a pivotal moment in the reception of Cicero's statesmanship, which cannot be left undiscussed. It is the first extant historiographical text which responds to and openly breaks away from Cicero's self-constructed portrait of his consulship, and which places the orator's career in the wider context of late republican politics. Especially relevant in this regard is Sallust's renegotiation of what republican patriotism constitutes; while on the basis of the *Catilinarians* or other public speeches it seems unquestionable that Cicero is the perfect symbol of republican values, Sallust clearly testifies to a different tradition in which Cato the Younger is the ultimate representative of the Republic.

Chapter 2 introduces the framework of exemplarity in order to study the process by which Roman (republican) values are attributed to particular acts of leadership, and analyze how this process influenced the later development of Cicero's political image. The discourse of exemplarity is an indispensable hermeneutical tool for analyzing the imperial accounts of Cicero's political deeds.⁷³ By taking a nuanced view of what political exemplarity entails, I will show that controversial aspects of Cicero's life do not preclude his figure from being appreciated and deployed as a model of Roman (republican) citizenship. We will further explore the dichotomy between Cato and Cicero, as it is already established in Sallust's treatise. One part of chapter 2 focuses on the

⁷³ For exemplarity as a discourse, see esp. the work by ROLLER 2004–2018; CHAPLIN 2000 and LANGLANDS 2018 interpret it more strongly as a 'debate'.

works of Valerius Maximus and Velleius Paterculus, whose representation of republican statesmen is part of an attempt to formulate universal Roman values. The exemplary stories presented by the Tiberian writers illustrate the extent to which the memory of Cato and Cicero is reduced to several core values. A discussion of Lucan's *Civil War* in the other part of chapter 2 is meant to show how these heavily iconized figures come to life again within historical narrative, and how the importance of their actions is structurally interpreted in the light of their leadership of the optimate party. I will explain how the early imperial writers differentiate between the moral excellence of Cato and Cicero, and how the emphasis on absolute integrity as part of good statesmanship made Cato a more suitable candidate to become an exemplar of republican ideology.⁷⁴

Cicero's shortcomings as a republican leader are addressed in chapter 3. In this chapter, we will widen our view of exemplarity, and I will argue that ethical excellence and a capacity for ethical reflection were regarded by the Romans as prerequisites for exemplary statesmanship. In the first part, we will look at Cicero's controversial style of speaking, a negative element of his characterization that is already thematized in the accounts of Sallust and Lucan. I will explain why the attribution to Cicero of the traditionally admired quality of *parrhësia* (frankness of speech) is a problematic feature of his political personality in Cassius Dio's *Roman History*. With the help of Plutarch's and Seneca's ethical treatises we will then contextualize Cicero's excessive rhetoric against the broader background of his failure to be an ethical leader of his fellow citizens; we will also address the question of why he could not benefit from his philosophical skills in his political career. Finally, this chapter will question the idea that Seneca has little interest in Cicero as a public man.⁷⁵ As an extensive comparison with Plutarch

⁷⁴ For a summary of Cato's policy, see SYME 1958: 557, who states: "Cato was a political leader; he controlled a great nexus of alliances in the *nobilitas*; he possessed clear discernment and a policy—namely, the fight against those 'extraordinariae potestates' which, he so firmly proclaimed, would mean the end of the Republic."

⁷⁵ As an example, I quote GAMBET 1970: 178, "Seneca's contemporaries, and the writers of the Julio-Claudian period in general, had a stereotyped and somewhat limited view of Cicero's political career. This stemmed from their training in the rhetorical schools. Their view of Cicero the statesman was the schools' view." KEELINE 2018: 196–222 follows GAMBET in arguing that Seneca's works present the 'schoolroom Cicero', except for the letters to Lucilius where Cicero is acknowledged (but only to be rejected) as a model.

shows, Seneca's portrayal of Cicero as well as other republican figures is inspired by an imperial preoccupation with self-control and ethical competence, not just in the private but also in the public space.

Chapter 4 poses that in Greek imperial historiography, Cicero's public performance is framed as a negative *exemplum* of political conduct. It studies the speeches attributed to Cicero in Appian and Dio's historical narratives of 44–43 BC, in which compressed versions of Cicero's *Philippics* against Mark Antony are presented. I will explore the idea that these speeches are meant to convey a sample of Ciceronian oratory by making obvious references to the Latin *Philippics*. Moreover, we will situate the speeches within Appian and Dio's narratives of the violent period after Caesar's death: the historiographers portray Cicero as the tragic product of republican political competition and faction strife, and they interpret his oratory as a contributing factor to the escalation of the conflict with Antony at the beginning of 43 BC. In fact, as we will see, the *Philippics* are not simply regarded as a catalyst in the civil conflict, but also as an example of the destructive force of late republican oratory.

As the overview of the chapters shows, this study touches upon a wide range of subjects. In our inquiry into the model function of Cicero's political image, we will also examine the imperial conceptualization of republicanism, the question of virtuous leadership, and the symbolization of Cato the Younger. The first three centuries AD were a constitutive phase for the development of Cicero's posthumous reputation; it is the period in which Cicero's historical personality developed into a cultural symbol of the Roman Republic, a status he would maintain throughout the ages, and which he still has at present.⁷⁶ A proper understanding of the intellectual context of the Empire is crucial to understand how this process came about. Moreover, by framing the image of Cicero as a product of the imperial discourse about statesmanship and republican thought, this study will hopefully appeal to a larger audience than students of Cicero or Ciceronian reception alone.

⁷⁶ On 20 November 2014, in the U.S. Senate, the Republican politician Ted Cruz famously impersonated Cicero as the defender of republicanism, by addressing his own version of Cicero's *First Catilinarian* to Barack Obama, then president. The speech can be retrieved from Cruz' YouTube channel; search for 'The Wisdom of Cicero is Timeless'.

CHAPTER ONE

The consolidation of Cicero *consul* in Sallust's *Conspiracy of Catiline*

*Ego autem, ut semel Nonarum illarum Decembrium iunctam invidia
ac multorum inimicitii eximiam quandam atque immortalem gloriam
consecutus sum, non destiti eadem animi magnitudine in re publica ver-
sari et illam institutam ac susceptam dignitatem tueri.*

(Cic. Att. 1.19.6)

1. The roots of the *imago consularis*

In this chapter, we will examine how Sallust's *Conspiracy of Catiline* represents Cicero's consulship, the traditional summit of a Roman politician's career, against the background of political crisis in the late Republic. As a historiographer, one of Sallust's tasks was to assemble and negotiate (or, as Antonio La Penna has phrased it, manipulate)¹ the existing accounts of the history of the Catilinarian conspiracy. Of these, Cicero's consular speeches provide one of the most dominant accounts.² Cicero published the consular corpus, among which are the speeches against Catiline, about twenty years before Sallust wrote and published his *Conspiracy of Catiline* (probably in 41 BC).³ The *Catilinarians* (probably revised after 63 BC, but how extensively is unknown)

¹ LA PENNA 1968: 83. Cf. BALMACEDA 2017: 72; MCGUSHIN 1977: 296–297.

² Sallust had other sources to his availability than Cicero's writings (cf. RAMSEY 2007: 8–9), as for example Brutus' biography of Cato (cf. Cic. Att. 12.21.1) or the official records of the senate (the *acta senatus*).

³ Att. 2.1.3. The *Conspiracy of Catiline* was probably begun in late 42 BC; I follow RAMSEY 1988: 6; SYME 1964: 128.

emphasize a particularly positive, authoritative picture of Cicero's conduct, with the aim of defending his actions of 63.⁴ In the speech *In defence of Sulla* of 62 BC Cicero relates that he circulated official accounts of his consulate and the conspiracy, apparently to justify and defend his actions.⁵ Besides these documents he wrote up his *commentarii* and a Greek memoir of his consulship (ὑπόμνημα).⁶ This publicly disseminated Ciceronian version, then, functions as an important hypotext for Sallust's monograph.⁷ In this first section I will discuss in isolation Cicero's version of the conspiracy in order to better understand Sallust's later modification of the events and its protagonists.

In §§ 2 and 3, I will focus on Sallust's response to Cicero's own public negotiation of his consular image. This is particularly relevant given the later reception of the episode: Sallust's account stands between Cicero's speeches and the accounts of the imperial historiographers. While it is sometimes difficult to determine to what extent these later historiographers based their work on the accounts of Sallust and/or Cicero, it is a fact that the *Conspiracy of Catiline* is an important step in freeing the events from their peculiar Ciceronian lens. The alternative, still contemporary view offered by Sallust will certainly have been appreciated by later writers, who appear to have been aware of Cicero's use of the episode for reasons of self-promotion. In particular, Cicero's constant dwelling on his personal success of 63 BC would become a controversial theme in the imperial writers.⁸ The roots of this focus on Cicero's reputation lie in the consular corpus, the *Catilinarians* in

⁴ STROH 1975: 31–54 and more recently MARTIN 2011 argue that revisions were minimal. Common opinion is that despite possible later additions the speeches resemble relatively well Cicero's argument of those months; cf. CRAIG 1993: 256–258; DYCK 2008: 10–12. More sceptical are LINTOTT 2008: 142–148 and BATSTONE 1994: 214.

⁵ *Sull.* 41–43.

⁶ On the Greek account, *Cic. Att.* 1.19.10, 20.6; 2.1–2 (with LENDLE 1967) and *Plut. Crass.* 13.3–4, *Caes.* 8.3–4 (with PELLING 1985). Another important source, which according to some scholars Sallust's *Conspiracy of Catiline* was a direct response to (SYME 1964: 62–64), was the pamphlet called *De consiliis suis* ('On his policy'), which contained incriminating information against Caesar and Crassus about their involvement in the conspiracy and defended Cicero's own actions: *Cass. Dio* 39.10, cf. *Cic. Att.* 14.17.6.

⁷ In terms of source study, KREBS 2008: 686 presents Sallust as an "avid and attentive reader of Cicero"; LEDWORUSKI 1994 offers a comprehensive overview of Sallust's imitation of Cicero. In this chapter I will not concern myself with the question of to what extent Sallust based himself on Cicero but rather with his literary techniques for challenging the Ciceronian picture of the uprising.

⁸ *Plut. Cic.* 24.1 and *On Self-praise* 54of; *Cass. Dio* 38.12.6–7. Cf. *Quint. Inst.* 11.1.22–24; *Sen. Dial.* 10.5.1.

particular. It is expressed by three main motifs: the idea of civil war, which amplified the events in order to emphasize their urgency, and enabled Cicero to style himself as a military leader; the concept of the *dux togatus*, the general-without-arms who is able to participate in the republican contest for (military) glory; and the *invidia* against Cicero, the moral criticism and indignation over his actions from fellow senators and political rivals, which complicated the later memory of the conspiracy as well as the record of Cicero's personal *res gestae*.

1.1 THE 'WAR' AGAINST CATILINE

In the Catilinarian speeches, Cicero uses the term *bellum* (*domesticum*) to refer to the conspiracy led by Catiline.⁹ Sallust and the imperial authors vary but are generally more nuanced in their choice of terminology.¹⁰ Yet, the choice of *bellum* for the events of 63 BC was not as straightforward as it may seem; later views of the revolution are heavily influenced by the senatorial and conservative accounts of Cicero and Sallust. Based on historical facts, the plot Catiline and his fellow senators devised came closer to a revolt. Except for a final battle at Pistoria little fighting took place at all.¹¹ Remarkably, in the first speech against Catiline, Cicero uses very different words to describe other episodes of civic unrest in recent Roman history, when, like in 63, the emergency decree was issued (the *senatus consultum ultimum*).¹² In speaking of these historical uprisings, Cicero uses the common terms *novae res* (*Cat.* 1.3) and *seditiones* (*Cat.* 1.4).¹³ Moreover, while Cicero initially

⁹ On the topic, see VAN DER BLOM 2019: 123–128.

¹⁰ Sallust differentiates between the plot itself, cf., e.g., *Cat.* 4.3, 37.1, 48.1 (*coniuratio*), and war as the outcome of the plot as it was intended by the conspirators, cf., e.g., 21.2, 24.2 (*bellum* for the battle fought at Pistoria), 32.1; Flor. 2.12 (*bellum*); Vell. Pat. 2.34 (*coniuratio*); App. B. Civ. 2.7 (ἐπανάστασις); Cass. Dio 37.29.3 (ἐπιβούλευμα), 37.32.3 (νεωτερισμός), 37.33.2 (πόλεμος); Plut. Cic. 14.1 (συνωμοσία). On the use of *bellum* in the title of Sallust's monograph, RAMSEY 1988: 5 n. 9.

¹¹ GRUEN 1974: 416–433 states that “the portrait is distorted and misleading” (417). Cf. DYCK 2008: 7–8, “The conspirators’ plans need first be disentangled from C.’s rhetorical exaggerations ... probably no wholesale bloodbath of citizens was contemplated”. KONSTAN 1993 examines the rhetorical strategies behind the speeches against Catiline, and argues that “[Cicero] must decide the outcome by his rhetoric” (13).

¹² The *senatus consultum ultimum* was an important factor with regard to Cicero's political authority in suppressing the conspiracy; on the *s.c.u.* as emergency decree, LINTOTT 1968: 149–174. On the role of the *s.c.u.* in the execution of the Catilinarian conspirators, see DRUMMOND 1995: 79–107.

employs the more nuanced *coniuratio* to refer to Catiline's plans, at the end of the first speech, with increasing frequency, the plot is referred to as *bellum*, a term that would persist throughout the other speeches of that year against Catiline.¹⁴

There were political advantages in presenting the conspiracy as a (civil) war:¹⁵ the emphasis on war as the possible result of the revolt led to extraordinary powers to suppress it quickly, most notably the *senatus consultum ultimum*,¹⁶ and it created a situation in which Catiline and his supporters could be declared enemies (*hostes*) of the Roman state whose apparent dangerousness legitimized their removal from the city or punishment.¹⁷ By denouncing Catiline and his companions as *hostes* Cicero placed them outside the norms and values of the state:¹⁸ in Catiline's case, this rhetorical expulsion led to physical expulsion from the city (as is emphasized by Cicero in *Cat.* 2.1). An important rhetorical motif used to increase the feeling of alarm is the image of the city wall.¹⁹ Enemies naturally find themselves outside the walls of the city they are besieging; the Roman citizens form the threatened party within the city which they are protecting.²⁰ Although

¹³ Cf. *Cat.* 3.24: *civiles dissensiones* for episodes of civil strife in recent history.

¹⁴ Contrast *Ibid.* 1.1, 1.6, 1.12 with *Ibid.* 1.23 (*confer bellum*), 1.25, 1.27, 1.29, 1.33, followed by the introduction of the phrase *bellum domesticum* and of *bellum iustum* in *Cat.* 2.1. For further instances of *bellum*, see *Cat.* 2.11, 2.14, 2.24, 2.28 (where the phrase *bellum intestinum* is added to Cicero's rhetorical arsenal) 2.29, 3.3, 3.15, 3.16, 3.19, 3.22, 3.25 (*hoc autem uno post hominum memoriam maximo crudelissimoque bello*), 4.2, 4.22. Note that the term is much more frequent in the speeches held in the *contio* than those which were performed in the senate. Cf. *Har.* 49, *Planc.* 49, *Div.* 1.105.

¹⁵ ARENA 2020: 110 discusses the "descriptive" and "evaluative" function of the term *bellum* (*civile*). She moreover demonstrates that the term *bellum* became much more frequent in the first century BC as part of Rome's development from a society divided into factions into an autocracy. Cicero, who is the first to use the term *bellum civile* (*Leg. Man.* 66), marks the breaking point: before his time *dissensio*, *sedition*, *tumultus* would have been more common vocabulary to denote civil strife. For the vocabulary of *hostis* in the *Catilinarians*, see, e.g., *Cat.* 1.13 (*exire ex urbe iubet consul hostem*); 1.33 (*hostes patriae*); 2.1 (*palam iam cum hoste nullo impediante bellum iustum geremus*); 2.3 (*capitalis hostis*); 2.17; 3.22; 4.15. Cicero himself attests in his *Philippics* that terminology was a matter of contestation in the context of civil strife: *Phil.* 12.17.

¹⁶ Sall. *Cat.* 31.6 records that Cicero's angry first speech against Catiline speeded up the development into war.

¹⁷ MITCHELL 1979: 214 notes that the *hostis* declaration was often a direct result of a *senatus consultum ultimum*. LINTOTT 1968: 157 (with n. 2) rightly remarks that even though Cicero in *Cat.* 1 brands Catiline a *hostis rei publicae* he was in fact not officially declared a *hostis* until after his joining Manlius' troops in Etruria (Sall. *Cat.* 36.2–3).

¹⁸ For this technique, see FLOWER 2006: 100–103.

¹⁹ E.g. Cic. *Cat.* 1.10–12, 1.31–32; 2.11, 17; 3.17. Cf. KONSTAN 1993: 15; VASALY 1993: 52–53.

²⁰ HABINEK 1998: 73.

Catiline was driven from Rome, many of the conspirators were still in the city; their status as citizen-*hostes* made them even more dangerous, and a swift removal was vital.

By employing the concept of *bellum*, Cicero, especially in his public oratory, opens up possibilities for embedding his deeds in a military context in a way that suited his self-fashioning needs. In his speeches, Cicero emphasizes the extraordinary situation Rome is facing, and the special skills required of a consul managing a crisis like the present one. In the oratory, and to a lesser extent his political writings, he developed the image of the saviour of the state, who rescues her and her citizens from terrible dangers: fires, the swords of Catiline and his men, murder and devastation.²¹ Instead of merely governing the state, he now has to *save* it, he exclaims at one point in the second speech against Catiline.²² In line with this terminology of war, he presents the conspiracy as part of his *res gestae*, the term used to describe the—usually military—deeds of famous leaders of the Roman people.²³

1.2 THE *DUX TOGATUS*

Broadly speaking, the military terminology served one very particular end in Cicero's personal propaganda: he could style himself *dux togatus et imperator*, the general clad in toga; or the civil leader who is able to solve troubles, even suppress a revolt, by peaceful means.²⁴ The term *dux*, as Hellegouarc'h explains, refers in the first instance to a "chef de guerre".²⁵ Every *bellum* needs a general, and in the *Catilinarians* Cicero

²¹ For this image, see *Cat.* 3.1–2. Cicero presented himself as the sole rescuer of the Republic, e.g. *Ibid.* 3.25, *Sull.* 26, *Pis.* 6–7, *Sest.* 49, *Dom.* 99, *Red. Quir.* 16. Cf. NICOLET 1960: 240: "le seul véritable vainqueur, c'est Cicéron." HALL 2013 studies the image of Cicero as saviour of the Republic.

²² *Cat.* 2.14: *O condicionem miseram non modo administrandae verum etiam conservandae rei publicae!*

²³ E.g. *Sull.* 28; *Fam.* 5.7; *Sest.* 38; *Pis.* 72; *Dom.* 73–74. Cf. the use of *gerere* (*gessi*) *Cat.* 3.27, 29 and *Sull.* 83; for *gero* in the special meaning of conducting public affairs (civilian as well as military), see TLL s.v. *gero* II.D.3.b.

²⁴ See *Cat.* 2.28: "an internal and civil war has been prevented under my togate command" ([*ut*] *bellum intestinum ac domesticum ... me uno togato duce et imperatore sedetur*); 3.23. Cf. *Ibid.* 2.11, 4.19 and *Mur.* 84 (only *dux*). On the concept of the *consul togatus*, see the seminal article by NICOLET 1960.

²⁵ In addition, based on Cicero and Livy HELLEGOUARC'H 1963: 324–326 argues that *dux* could also refer to "principal members of the senate" who would instigate certain actions. Yet such seman-

gladly assigns to himself the function of *dux*. This is, firstly, an anchoring device. The orator takes care to fit himself into a long tradition of leaders saving the Republic. Killing Catiline, and giving him the severest punishment, was something that was demanded by the *mos maiorum*, ancestral tradition, and by the strict regime the Roman empire conducted against troublemakers.²⁶ Within this tradition, Cicero sees a special role for himself.²⁷

*Ceteris enim bene gesta, mihi uni conservata re publica gratulationem decrevistis. Sit Scipio clarus ille, cuius consilio atque virtute Hannibal in Africam redire atque Italia decedere coactus est; ornetur alter eximia laude Africanus, qui duas urbes huic imperio infestissimas, Carthaginem Numantiamque, delevit; habeatur vir egregius Paulus ille, cuius currum rex potentissimus quondam et nobilissimus Perses honestavit; sit aeterna gloria Marius, qui bis Italiam obsidione et metu servitutis liberavit; anteponatur omnibus Pompeius, cuius res gestae atque virtutes isdem quibus solis cursus regionibus ac terminis continentur: erit profecto inter horum laudes aliquid loci nostrae gloriae, nisi forte maius est patefacere nobis provincias quo exire possimus quam curare ut etiam illi qui absunt habeant quo victores revertantur.*²⁸

You have ordered a public thanksgiving to others due to their good management of the state, but to me alone for saving the state. Scipio, he may be famous, by whose counsel and virtue Hannibal was forced to return to Africa and retreat from Italy; the other Africanus may be celebrated with extraordinary praise, who razed to the ground two cities most inimical to this empire, Carthage and Numantia; Paulus, he may be considered an excellent man, whose chariot was honoured by the once most powerful and noble king Perseus; may Marius be with eternal glory, who twice liberated Italy from a siege and the fear of slavery; may Pompey surpass all others, whose deeds of valour and virtues are limited by the same regions and boundaries as are reached by the course of the sun: there will certainly be some kind of place for our honour among the celebrations of these men, unless it is of

tic adjustments obscure the fact that at least in the speeches against Catiline, Cicero is comparing himself with *duces* in the primary sense of the word, i.e. military commanders.

²⁶ *Cat.* 2.3: *idque a me et mos maiorum et huius imperi severitas et rei publicae utilitas postulabat*. Cf. *Cat.* 1.3–4 for the examples of severity Cicero has in mind.

²⁷ For Cicero's dexterous ways of 'inscribing' himself in the tradition, with or without the use of specific role models (like in the passage cited here), cf. PIEPER 2014; VAN DER BLOM 2010, esp. 297–300 on the consulship.

²⁸ *Cat.* 4.20.9–21.

more importance to open up paths to the provinces along which we can travel, than to ensure that also those who are absent have a place where they can return as victors.

This passage is typical of Cicero's self-representation in his consular and post-consular writings.²⁹ He presents himself as the saviour of the state,³⁰ an achievement that is unique to him, so he claims, in comparison to all the famous leaders who have gone before him: Scipio Africanus, Scipio Aemilianus, Aemilius Paullus, Gaius Marius, and Pompey. All are praised for their military feats, that is to say, for fighting foreign enemies and for protecting the empire. Cicero emphasizes the difference between these men and himself by adding quasi-modestly that he would take a place among these exemplary Romans if it is equally glorious to preserve the city of Rome (*curare ut illi habeant quo victores revertantur*) as expanding and protecting the Roman empire outside of Rome (*patefacere nobis provincias*).³¹ The idea, of course, is that the suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy makes Cicero, a civilian leader, just as capable as any famous military general of achieving the traditional honour (*gloria*) for deeds of valour (*res gestae*).³²

In line with the image of the togate general, Cicero often recalls the *supplicatio*, the official thanksgiving referred to by the term *gratulatio* in *Cat.* 4.21 above,³³ which he received due to his role in uncovering the plot devised by Catiline. The *supplicatio* was a ceremonial, public act of offering to the gods in order either to pray for good fortune or thank them for good fortune given. Traditionally, it took place in preparation for a war abroad, or after a successful military campaign. It was ordained (*decernere*) by the senate, and was consequently carried out by the magistrates. Especially in the first century BC, the *supplicatio* became increasingly frequent and a synonym for the celebration of particular generals.³⁴ Within this context, the ambitious Cicero saw the

²⁹ STEEL 2001: 168–170 argues that *Cat.* 4.20–24 is the culmination of Cicero's constant thematization of his 'military' oratory. Cf. *Phil.* 2.2, 13; *Pis.* 6; *Fam.* 15.4.

³⁰ HALL 2013 provides an overview of the theme in Cicero's speeches.

³¹ Cf. *Cat.* 3.26, where the *duo cives* mentioned represent Pompey and Cicero, the one expanding the limits of the empire beyond the skies, and the other safeguarding the empire in Rome.

³² At *Off.* 1.74–78, Cicero similarly compares his achievements with those of Pompey, clearly "to his own advantage", as DYCK 1996: 206 notes, and with a strategic eye to diminishing the ill-will he suffered due to his continuous self-praise after 63.

³³ On the synonymy of *supplicatio* and *gratulatio* especially in the late Republic, cf. WISSOWA 1931: 947. The term *gratulatio* is also used by Cicero in *Pis.* 6.

conspiracy as an opportunity to participate in this contest for *gloria*. In the third speech against Catiline, Cicero emphasizes the extraordinary event of a *supplicatio* decreed in his name:

*Atque etiam supplicatio dis immortalibus pro singulari eorum merito meo nomine decreta est, quod mihi primum post hanc urbem conditam togato contigit, et his decreta verbis est: quod urbem incendiis, caede cives, Italiam bello liberassem. Quae supplicatio cum ceteris supplicationibus conferatur, hoc interest quod ceterae bene gesta, haec una conservata re publica constituta est.*³⁵

And also an official thanksgiving to the immortal gods for extraordinary service on their behalf has been decreed on my account, something that has happened to me for the first time since the foundation of the city, in toga, and it has been decreed in the following terms: because I have freed the city from fires, the citizens from murder, and Italy from war. When one compares this thanksgiving with other thanksgivings, this is the difference, that others have been awarded for good leadership, and this one alone has been awarded for the rescue of the Republic.

The context is again military, with the *toga* taking center stage in the presentation of the revolt. Cicero carefully emphasizes that the *supplicatio*, usually awarded to Roman generals returning victorious from battle, is now for the first time decreed in the name of a civilian leader. Moreover, it is the first time that it has been proclaimed after a successful rescue of the city; normally, it would concern a victory abroad against foreign peoples challenging Roman territory. The details of the ceremonial thanksgiving that according to Cicero's own writings was decreed in his name are difficult to pin down. In fact, Cicero's speeches are the only extant contemporary source of information about the *supplicatio* of 63.³⁶ Worse, the information he does give us in his public speeches is subjected to rhetorical hyperbole.³⁷

³⁴ WISSOWA 1931: 942–952.

³⁵ *Cat.* 3.15.

³⁶ See *Cat.* 4.5, 4.21; *Pis.* 6; *Phil.* 2.13, 14.22–24; *Fam.* 15.4.11. The “procession” described in Plutarch's biography (*Cic.* 22.3–5) right after Cicero has brought the conspirators to death, is perhaps a creative interpretation of the *supplicatio*, but he does not include any ritual element (but see *Cic.* 20.1).

³⁷ WISSOWA 1931: 948 sharply observes that Cicero's presentation of the thanksgiving fluctuated: in *Cat.* 3 he states that it was done in his name (*meo nomine*, *Cat.* 3.15), in *Cat.* 4 that the thanksgiv-

Another event that Cicero took care to include in his self-representation as Roman leader is the proposal of fellow senator L. Gellius to award him the *civica corona*, a crown made of oak leaves that was presented to Roman citizens who had saved the life of another Roman citizen.³⁸ Yet, Cicero never actually received it. What he did receive, was the title *pater patriae* in the aftermath of the Catilinarian episode, proclaimed by Catulus.³⁹ Andreas Alföldy has argued that this is only an honorary title, without political or juridical weight, which might be the reason why we have little information on any official proceedings connected with the proclamation of the title.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, the event offered a useful addition to Cicero's reputation, since the concept of fatherhood emphasized Cicero's leading position in the state and strengthened his image as a protector and saviour of all citizens. Cicero goes so far as to argue that "a crowded senate house has decided that everybody ought to thank me as a father, and that they owed their life, possessions, children, the whole state to me" (*frequentissimo senatui sic placuit ut esset nemo qui mihi non ut parenti gratias ageret, qui mihi non vitam suam, fortunas, liberos, rem publicam referret acceptam*).⁴¹

Glancing forward to the imperial era, the image of Cicero *togatus* keeps popping up but *without* the element of *dux* and with an exclusive focus on the *toga*. For instance, Lucan characterizes Cicero as the icon of Roman eloquence, "under whose law and toga savage Catiline brandished his harmless swords".⁴² Juvenal, on the other hand, connects

ing was held for him (*mihi*, Cat. 4.10), and in other speeches he presents the thanksgiving as having been decreed for him as sole civilian leader in history (*uni togato*, Sull. 85; Pis. 6; Fam. 15.4.11).

³⁸ Pis. 6; cf. Gellius NA 5.6.15.

³⁹ Sest. 121; Pis. 6; Phil. 2.12.

⁴⁰ ALFÖLDY 1971. See for a different approach, which questions Cicero's representation of the events, KASTER 2006: 353–354, who notes that Cicero nowhere speaks of a senatorial decree or the bestowal of this official title onto him by the senate; these are, according to him "significant silences". The title of *pater patriae* and the proposal for the *corona civica* are often discussed in one breath, while they were actually different honorary distinctions. The fact that almost all of our information about these awards comes from Cicero himself is not adequately addressed by Cicero's modern biographers: cf. RAWSON 1975: 80; STOCKTON 1971: 130, 135; BRINGMANN 2010: 96. It apparently became a popular anecdote in the literary tradition of the empire, attested by a diverse range of authors: Plin. HN 7.117; Juv. 8.243–244; App. B. Civ. 2.7; Plut. Cic. 23.3. Tradition is unclear about who proposed the title. Cicero himself mentions Catulus, but Plutarch and Appian write that Cato proposed it; I suspect Appian got his information directly from Plutarch, since the name of the initiator does not figure in other texts. Appian and Plutarch further note that Cicero was the first to get the title of "father of the fatherland" which in the imperial era was commonly bestowed upon emperors.

⁴¹ Phil. 2.12; cf. Dom. 94.

the *toga* and Cicero with regard to his political status of *eques* and *homo novus* from Arpinum.⁴³ Plutarch, who shows a preference for Ciceronian *dicta* (as we will see in more detail in chapter 3) paraphrases Ciceronian thought in his biography when he relates the events during the senate meeting of 8 November 63, where Catiline was present, and Cicero performed his first Catilinarian speech:

Ἀρξάμενος δὲ λέγειν ἐθορυβεῖτο, καὶ τέλος ἀναστὰς ὁ Κικέρων προσέταξεν αὐτῷ τῆς πόλεως ἀπαλλάττεσθαι· δεῖν γὰρ αὐτοῦ μὲν λόγοις, ἐκείνου δ' ὅπλοις πολιτευομένου μέσον εἶναι τὸ τεῖχος.⁴⁴

As soon as he had begun to speak, he was shouted down; finally, Cicero rose and ordered him to remove himself from the city; for there needed to be a wall between him who conducted politics with words, and that man who did so with arms.

Plutarch has combined multiple Ciceronian motifs into one indirect remark: the image of the city wall between revolutionaries and citizens, the antagonism between Catiline and Cicero (αὐτοῦ μὲν ... ἐκείνου δέ), and the civilian (peaceful) leadership (λόγοις πολιτευομένου) Cicero made part of his reputation.⁴⁵ The topos of Cicero *consul togatus* was continued into the late empire, as is shown by Ampelius' memorandum (*Liber memorialis*; the date of which ranges from the second until the fourth century):⁴⁶ Ampelius commemorates Cicero in a list of Romans who have done great deeds in toga (*Romani qui in toga fuerunt illustres*) together with, among others, Scipio Nasica and Cato;⁴⁷ this list comes right after a chapter on the *clarissimi duces Romanorum*, where, for instance, Sulla, Marius, Caesar, and Augustus are listed. Such categorizations serve as a striking correction to Cicero's self-portrayal in the speeches; famous in toga he was, but he did not fit the category of *dux*, like the famous Roman exemplars he compares himself with in his public oratory, regardless of how he styled himself.

⁴² Luc. 7.63–65: *cunctorum voces Romani maximus auctor / Tullius eloquii, cuius sub iure togaque / pacificas saevos tremuit Catilina secures*. Cf. Quint. *Inst.* 2.16.7: *divina M. Tulli eloquentia ... Catilinae fregit audaciam et supplicationes*.

⁴³ Juv. 8.237–238.

⁴⁴ Plut. *Cic.* 16.5.

⁴⁵ The topos of the 'wall' also features in Juv. 8.240–241: *tantum igitur muros intra toga contulit illi / nominis ac tituli...* See n. 19 above.

⁴⁶ On the date, CONTE 1994: 551.

⁴⁷ Amp. 19.

1.3 INVIDIA

The decisions Cicero made in his official function as consul, especially with regard to the execution of the conspirators, would haunt him for the rest of his life. This was partly due to his incessant bragging about his victory over the rebels, but, as Henriette van der Blom notes, the self-praise was also part of a defense strategy against those who relentlessly criticized him for his actions.⁴⁸ However, feelings of hatred and indignation are already thematized in the speeches of 63; more pointedly, they are used to amplify Cicero's self-sacrifice and magnanimity as a leader.

At the end of the fourth speech against Catiline, given in the senate on 5 December 63, during the debate about the fate and punishment of the conspirators, Cicero acknowledges the danger that came with the responsibility of governing a state in civil strife:

*Quamquam est uno loco condicio melior externae victoriae quam domesticae, quod hostes alienigenae aut oppressi serviunt aut recepti beneficio se obligatos putant, qui autem ex numero civium dementia aliqua depravati hostes patriae semel esse coeperunt, eos, cum a perniciē rei publicae reppuleris, nec vi coercere nec beneficio placere possis. Qua re mihi cum perditis civibus aeternum bellum susceptum esse video.*⁴⁹

However, one aspect of external victories are preferable over domestic ones, namely that foreign enemies will be conquered and serve as slaves, or, after they have received clemency, consider themselves under obligation; but those men from the rank of citizens, corrupted by some madness, who once start to be enemies of the fatherland, you

⁴⁸ VAN DER BLOM 2014: 49; cf. BATSTONE 1994: 219 on the *First Catilinarian*, which according to him precisely uses self-praise as a rhetorical strategy to establish Cicero's consular authority firmly. VAN DER BLOM usefully discusses the main themes of such attacks on Cicero; the ones most connected with his treatment of the conspirators are the charge of tyranny/tyrannical behaviour and the indignation over his 'endless' self-praise (cf. Sen. *Dial.* 10.5.1). The charge of boastfulness seems to concentrate mainly on the particular promotional 'slogan' (NICOLET 1960; HALL 2013) from the poem on his consulship, *De consulatu suo*: "let the arms yield for the toga, the laurel wreath for civic fame" (*cedant arma togae, concedat laurea laudi*). Cicero himself in *Off.* 1.77 mentions that he heard how this phrase was attacked by "impudent and invidious men" (*in quod invadi solere ab improbis et invidis audio*), among whom also Antony (*Phil.* 2.20). Cf. also DYCK 1996: 208–209, who gives most of the relevant references to the later reception of the phrase: Juv. 10.122; Quint. *Inst.* 11.1.23–24 and Plut. *Comp. Dem. et Cic.* 2.1–2, both in comparison with Demosthenes' lack of a desire for recognition; *Laus Pis.* 35–36; [Sall.] *Inv. in Cic.* 3.5.

⁴⁹ *Cat.* 4.22.

cannot, when you have prevented them from destroying the state, constrain them by force or placate them with a benefaction. For this reason I seem to have taken upon me an eternal war with pernicious citizens.

Framing his consular duties again as a military matter, Cicero explains that there is one particular problem with fighting against one's own citizens as opposed to fighting foreign enemies: while these can be controlled by either slavery or by the formation of alliances, internal enemies are not so easily placated, since, being citizens, they can be confident of relying on the Roman rules of justice and equality. Cicero, therefore, foresees an *aeternum bellum* with seditious citizens, which creates great problems for his own career and reputation.

The *bellum* Cicero describes in this passage ultimately became a war against his detractors. Loss of popularity and character assassination were a daily threat in Roman politics, where invective rhetoric was commonly accepted and frequently practiced.⁵⁰ It is already in the *First Catilinarian* that Cicero expresses fear for his reputation if he pursues his fight against the conspirators. However, when push comes to shove, unpopularity because of having been too harsh or violent in rescuing the Republic is better than unpopularity resulting from negligence which led to the complete devastation of Rome.⁵¹ To the Roman citizens, Cicero says that he would rather suffer a "storm of false and dishonest criticism", *invidiae falsae atque iniquae*,⁵² than take the risk that any harm comes to the city.⁵³ It is the great dilemma of his consulship: how fiercely were Catiline and the other conspirators in Rome to be punished?

Let us pause for a moment to consider the meaning of the term *invidia* in the context of the Catilinarian conspiracy and Cicero's consulate, especially since the usual English translation for *invidia*, "ill-will" or "envy", does not really cover the implications of this sentiment for Cicero's political career (it is why I have used different translations

⁵⁰ VAN DER BLOM 2014: 38–39 (with ample bibliography). But see in particular KOSTER 1980; ARENA 2007; POWELL 2007.

⁵¹ *Cat.* 1.49: *sed si quis est invidiae metus, non est vehementius severitatis ac fortitudinis invidia quam inertiae ac nequitiae pertimescenda.*

⁵² *Cat.* 2.15: *est mihi tanti, Quirites, huius invidiae falsae atque iniquae tempestatem subire.*

⁵³ Cf. also *Cat.* 3.3, where the *invidia* is said to result directly from the decision to cast out Catiline; when using the word *eicere*, Cicero states that he does not fear *huius verbi invidiam*.

above). The standard dictionary definition of *invidia* describes a (passive) feeling that rests somewhere between indignation and vexation.⁵⁴ The *OLD* poses that in an active sense, *invidia* can be “affecting the object of the feeling”, resulting in expressions of ‘dislike’, and that, thirdly, *invidia* can be “aroused against an opponent, as a way of contributing to his defeat”.⁵⁵ This third definition of *invidia* is most illustrative for our purposes: politically, it could be used against an opponent, functioning as a sort of weapon—for example, in elections or debates. However, the *invidia* Cicero is afraid he will receive from his fellow citizens is not so much competitive as vindictive; the risks he describes exist in the criticism that he has made the wrong choices in handling the conspiracy, for which retribution will be demanded.

Robert Kaster’s study of the emotion of *invidia* elucidates the purport and the consequences of the *invidia Ciceronis*. I will briefly recap those parts of his argument that are useful for mine, necessarily simplifying his sophisticated analysis. As he explains it, the Romans knew two kinds of *invidia*, which can be helpfully associated with the Greek terms νέμεσις and φθόνος (the distinction is based on Cicero’s own words in one of the letters to Atticus, *Att.* 5.19.3). When one experiences *phthonos-invidia*, one begrudges someone something which is good, either because you simply do not want him to have it, or because you want to have it yourself; this form of *invidia* is prominent within political competition. Take, for example, an election campaign (under normal circumstances). Candidates experience *phthonos-invidia* towards the person currently in the political position they aspire, because it gives them power. They experience a different kind of envy towards other candidates running for the same position, for they will not concede to others the power they want to have themselves.

When one experiences *nemesis-invidia*, on the other hand, a sense of righteousness comes into play. You feel spite because someone else enjoys a good which, according to you, is not supposed to be his/hers, either because you think it is proper that *you* should have it, or because it is against some societal rule or custom that they have it. The first group can be exemplified by the hatred of the patricians versus the *homines*

⁵⁴ *TLL* s.v. *invidia* 1; *OLD* s.v. *invidia* 1.

⁵⁵ *OLD* s.v. *invidia* 2 and 3, respectively.

novi in the late Republic; the old nobility of Rome regards it as improper if these non-native Roman men compete with them in the political arena, for they themselves have much older (and therefore much worthier) rights. The second group are those, for example, who publicly call shame on Cicero for his prompt execution of the conspirators in December 63, since this was against the principle that Roman citizens could be killed without the right to be heard in trial.

Importantly, *invidia*, featuring the stem *vid-*, 'to see', is an emotion that is felt *and* exercised in the public space.⁵⁶ The public expression of *nemesis-invidia*, which results from indignation against someone who unrightfully claims something to be his/hers, is basically a form of 'shaming' the person who is acting improperly; it can thus function as a corrective mechanism within political communities. In the case of Cicero's career, this underlying set of cultural expectations needs to be taken into account when analyzing the criticism, i.e. *nemesis-invidia*, targeted at his reputation, and his own reaction to that. In order to understand this contemporary criticism, one must not only ask the question: how did this *invidia* manifest itself, and what kind of criticism did Cicero receive? But it should also be asked which kind of (moral) boundaries was Cicero thought to have crossed, or what rules did he perhaps violate by acting the way he did? By asking these sorts of questions, Cicero's precarious position in 63, as the main person responsible for the killing of the conspirators, becomes clearer.

One of the first public expressions of indignation over Cicero's actions and his decision to execute the conspirators came already in December 63. It was customary that before resigning from their position, consuls gave a final speech and took a public oath. Cicero was prevented from delivering the speech by the tribune Metellus Nepos; he was, however, permitted to take the oath on legal grounds.⁵⁷ Nepos famously disagreed with Cicero's decision to execute the conspirators.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ According to KASTER 2005: 96, that goes especially for *nemesis-invidia*, since this functions on the level of the exercise of social and cultural conventions. Cf. *TLL* s.v. *invideo* I, which records the use of this term in religious contexts in reference to the evil eye.

⁵⁷ Cic. *Fam.* 5.2 to Metellus Celer, the brother of Nepos. Nepos had been a legate of Pompey's in the Mithridatic war, and actually proposed a bill that Pompey should return to make an end officially to the unrest in the city.

⁵⁸ A good overview of the enmity between Metellus Nepos and Cicero is CRAWFORD 1994: 215–220; cf. GELZER 1969: 105–106, and see also below.

Consequently, as Cicero himself relates, Nepos had publicly stated that it was not proper for someone who had put men on trial without the ability to speak, to speak himself.⁵⁹ His public shaming of Cicero and the reference to proper procedure fits Kaster's definition of *nemesis-invidia* well. To make things worse, Cicero defeated Nepos by swearing a novel oath in which he confirmed that he alone had saved the Republic (having the whole assembly chime in), only nourishing the feeling among his opponents that he was acting on his own behalf.

The speech *In defence of Sulla* gives us further evidence about the ways in which the *invidia Ciceronis* was connected with ideas of right and wrong in relation to Cicero's behaviour. The speech was held somewhere between May and October 62, not long after the conspiracy, and it was published in the same year.⁶⁰ In the speech, Cicero responds to the accusation from the opposing advocate, L. Manlius Torquatus, that he was the *tertius peregrinus rex*, the third foreign tyrant after Tarquinius and Numa (both of Etruscan origin).⁶¹ Certainly, the adjective *peregrinus* is a feature of *phthonos-invidia*, competitive envy, that was part and parcel of the Roman patrician treatment of *homines novi* like Cicero. The charge of *regnum*, on the other hand, was a more serious form of *nemesis-invidia*, since it touched upon the essence of the republican institution; acting king-like would imply a neglect of the social and political structure of the Republic. As the commentators duly note, the accusation formed a familiar trope in the invective tradition at Rome, and the complaint must therefore partly be a form of rhetorical sensationalism intended to blacken Cicero's reputation.⁶² However, the fact that Cicero elaborately defends himself, here as well as elsewhere, against this claim suggests that Torquatus' words reflect, to some extent, more popular thoughts about autocratic rulership or arrogant behaviour in his suppression of the conspiracy.

There were also more subtle acts of *invidia*, coming not from detractors but from Cicero's own *amici*. We have seen that Cicero places himself on an equal level with Pompey in the *Fourth Catilinarian*. Pompey,

⁵⁹ *Fam.* 5.2.8.

⁶⁰ See BERRY 1996: 14 (date), and 54–59 (publication), with ample bibliography.

⁶¹ *Sull.* 21–22. *Cat.* 2.14 already refers to this type of criticism (*me non diligentem consulem sed crudelissimum tyrannum existimari velint*). Cf. VAN DER BLOM 2014: 42 on this charge, which was brought against Cicero on other occasions, too (cf. *Att.* 1.16.10).

⁶² BERRY 1996: 177; MACDONALD 1977: 332.

however, did not necessarily seem to share these feelings in 63. A letter from Cicero to Pompey, dating to 62 BC (*Fam.* 5.7; the preceding letters are not extant), reveals some of the emotions at play. In this letter, Cicero shares his disappointment about Pompey's failure to congratulate him for his conquest over the conspirators:

*Res eas gessi quarum aliquam in tuis litteris et nostrae necessitudinis et rei publicae causa gratulationem expectavi; quam ego abs te praetermissam esse arbitror quod verere<re> ne cuius animum offenderes. sed scito ea quae nos pro salute patriae gessimus orbis terrae iudicio ac testimonio comprobari. quae, cum veneris, tanto consilio tantaque animi magnitudine a me gesta esse cognosces ut tibi multo maiori quam Africanus fuit [a] me non multo minore<m> quam Laelium facile et in re publica et in amicitia adiunctum esse patiare.*⁶³

I have conducted these affairs of which I expected some word of congratulation in your letter on account of our friendship and the state. I suspect that you omitted to congratulate me because you are afraid to cause offence to someone. I'd like to emphasize that those things I have done for the sake of the country's safety are sanctioned by the judgment and testimony of the entire world. When you arrive, you shall find that I have acted with such good counsel and such greatness of mind that you will accept that to you, a man much greater than Africanus, I, not much inferior to Laelius, am connected in state affairs and in friendship.

This letter has been regarded by modern scholars as evidence that Pompey suffered from feelings of jealousy,⁶⁴ but the interaction between Pompey and Cicero here is more complex than that. In the first instance, this letter is about *amicitia*; this is the first time Cicero uses the term for designating the relationship between Pompey and himself.⁶⁵ This is all the more interesting considering Cicero's rather imperative tone. The expression of Cicero's expectations, the imperative form *scito*, and the remark that their friendship (*necessitudo*) and even the state itself demand congratulation from Pompey all suggest that Pompey is, quite wrongly, endangering their relation with his silence, and should openly come forward as Cicero's *amicus*. As Jon Hall ex-

⁶³ *Fam.* 5.7.3.

⁶⁴ HOLLIDAY 1989: 18–22; RAWSON 1978: 93–97.

⁶⁵ RAWSON 1978: 97 n. 97.

plains, Cicero puts Pompey on the spot by openly asking for a confirmation of their friendship, which Pompey could hardly deny him without violating the rules of politeness.⁶⁶ However, Cicero is not only asking Pompey here to affirm their relationship, he is also asking his affirmation of his status as a great man (*animi magnitudine*) who has saved the country, by which act he becomes perhaps not entirely equal, but very close in hierarchy to Pompey (so much so that he imagines himself to be an advisor and direct friend of Pompey, as Laelius was to Scipio Africanus).⁶⁷ Perhaps Pompey was indeed suffering from a bout of typical *phthonos-invidia* over not having been able to quash the Catilinarian himself, and seeing Cicero receive all the honour. However, his silence may also signify a layer of moral reproof for Cicero's untimely habit of glorifying his own deeds and especially, of expecting others to do the same regardless of their own pride.

Not only the moral criticism, but also Cicero's own defensive strategies against this criticism became part of his post-consular programme. Before turning to Sallust's *Conspiracy of Catiline*, then, we should briefly discuss the Ciceronian argument that was most often employed to dodge the bullet of *invidia*. In the public speeches, Cicero emphasizes that, in fact, he did not act alone (as a *rex* would have done): he acted upon the *consensus bonorum omnium* and with agreement of all the Roman citizens.⁶⁸ Throughout the *Catilinarians*, Cicero argues that the consul, as leader of the people and president of the senate, needs to create transparency, and has to act fully on their behalf.⁶⁹ For example, *Cat.* 3 states explicitly that Cicero wants to convey precisely to the peo-

⁶⁶ HALL 2009: 48, 128. Cf. RAWSON 1975: 91–92.

⁶⁷ The comparison Cicero draws between himself, the other Scipio, Pompey, and other war generals in *Cat.* 4.21 moreover does not present the modest image of a man who wanted to be a mere advisor.

⁶⁸ E.g. *Cat.* 4.14–19 (an elaborate passage in which Cicero argues that all ranks (*ordines*) are joined together in harmony), 22 (*bonorumque omnium auxilio*), 24; *Fam.* 5.2.8; *Pis.* 7; *Dom.* 94; *Att.* 1.9.13.

⁶⁹ In the *Third Catilinarian* to the *contio*, Cicero expresses the belief that the memory of what he has done, i.e. saving the Republic and her citizens, will function as a type of victory monument that will protect his good reputation (*Cat.* 3.26); cf. PIEPER 2014: 49–50. See also STEEL 2006 on Cicero's self-positioning as counsellor who mediates between the different groups in society, and the “rhetorical manoeuvre” of giving advice. MITCHELL 1971 argues that this might be more than just a rhetorical strategy: MITCHELL demonstrates that it may also be a reflection of Cicero's political convictions about the proper procedure in the case of a *senatus consultum ultimum*, the emergency mandate given to the consuls of 63. I am much tempted to be convinced by his argument, which is well-grounded in the historical texts, for one thing because Cicero simply never had the kind of po-

ple how the conspirators were apprehended, in a way similar to how he has “explained, revealed, and evidenced” the matter in front of the senate;⁷⁰ later in the same speech, Cicero emphasizes that when he received the letters sent by the conspirators he refused to open them in the presence of his worried friends, for the reason that matters of public peril should be immediately and without interference brought before the senate (*negavi me esse facturum ut de periculo publico non ad consilium publicum rem integram deferrem*).⁷¹

The fragmentary speech *Contra contionem Q. Metelli*, delivered in 62 BC, illustrates even better how Cicero intended to divide the blame for the decisions made in 63.⁷² By then retired, he claims that, although he in fact approves of the punishment given to the conspirators, in the end it was not his decision:

Fr. 9 (Quint. Inst. 9.3.40) *Vestrum iam hic factum deprehenditur, patres conscripti, non meum, ac pulcherrimum quidem factum, verum, ut dixi, non meum, sed vestrum.*

Fr. 10 (Quint. Inst. 9.3.45) *Dederim periculis omnibus, optulerim obsidiis, obiecerim invidiae. Vos enim statuistis, vos sententiam dixistis, vos iudicastis.*

Fr. 9 Your deed now is understood here, senators, not mine, and though it was a most wonderful deed, yet—as I said—it was not mine, but it was yours.

Fr. 10 I have given myself to all the dangers, I encountered the obstacles, I bore the hate. You, for sure, have made the decision, you have voted for the bill, you have passed the judgment.

The emphasis on the formal procedure followed by the senate in sentencing the conspirators to death (*statuistis, sententiam dixistis, iudicastis*) corresponds with Cicero’s attempts in the *Catilinarians* to counter

litical leverage needed to push through his personal plans all by himself (like, for example, Pompey or Caesar had). Believing in the reality of the *consensus bonorum*, MITCHELL also does away with the idea that the invidious attacks on Cicero by Metellus Nepos and others are representative of society’s view in any way (60 n. 43).

⁷⁰ *Cat.* 3.3.

⁷¹ *Cat.* 3.7.

⁷² Ten fragments have been preserved, four of which by Quintilian in *Inst.* 9.3.49 (fr. 7 CRAWFORD), 9.3.50 (fr. 8), 9.3.40 (fr. 9), 9.3.45 (fr. 10); all citations are adduced by Quintilian in order to illustrate the use of rhetorical figures. The fragments are no more than two lines long, but CRAWFORD postulates the speech must have been quite popular in antiquity (219). Just like *In defence of Sulla*, the speech was probably published soon after its performance, which turned it into a more or less official *apologia* of Cicero’s consulship: CRAWFORD 1994: 215n.5. Cf. *Att.* 1.13.5.

possible and actual criticisms by claiming that he was only following the orders of the senate and the people. Cicero closes his *Fourth Catilinarian* by saying: “This is your consul, who does not hesitate to follow your commands or to defend your decisions, as long as he lives and as much as he is able to.” (*Habetis eum consulem, qui et parere vestris decretis non dubitet et ea, quae statueritis, quoad vivet, defendere et per se ipsum praestare possit.*)⁷³

Cicero’s energetic efforts to market himself are one of the most prominent aspects of his consulship; it was an important year for building and advertising a very specific memory of his leadership. Certain themes are repeated over and over again, in and after 63 BC, even until his death. On the one hand, Cicero thematizes the threat of civil war caused by Catiline and the conspirators, which quite naturally leads to an image of himself as *dux togatus*, an image which is able to compete with the reputations of great military leaders. (Though one of the leaders with whom Cicero compares himself, Pompey, seems not to have been particularly enthusiastic about Cicero’s success.) On the other hand, Cicero, well aware of the risks inherent in fighting fellow citizens (even if corrupt ones), designed several strategies to cope with and defend himself from expressions of indignation and moral criticism. While he shows himself to be extremely proud that the consulship was not only the culmination of his political career but also the ultimate chance to win a title of excellence and glory (in spite of a lack of military interests), at the same time his consular achievements increased his vulnerability to political rivalry and to accusations of bad behaviour in particular. In the next section we will examine how these critical voices intrude and leave their imprint on the account of Cicero’s deeds. It is time to turn to Sallust’s account of the conspiracy, which has had great influence on the later retelling of not only the year 63 BC and Catiline’s putsch but also of Cicero’s consulship and his subsequent career. Though not openly invidious, we will see that it is, in fact, a manifestation of the righteous, moralizing attempts to counter Cicero’s egocentric version of the political conflict, and an attempt to refocus the camera on those participants who eventually exerted a greater influence on the course of Rome’s history.

⁷³ *Cat.* 4.24.

2. Cicero consul in Sallust's *Conspiracy of Catiline*: contrast and modification

2.1 CICERO'S SILENCE IN THE CONSPIRACY OF CATILINE⁷⁴

Sallust was a contemporary and probably also an acquaintance of Cicero.⁷⁵ His historical monograph on the Catilinarian conspiracy is a valuable source document for modern and ancient scholars alike; the imperial historiographers built upon Sallust's account for their reconstruction of the events of Cicero's consular year.⁷⁶ As an independent writer⁷⁷ who was not directly involved in any of the events, Sallust is one of the first voices evaluating Cicero's consular actions and, at the same time, countering and modifying Cicero's account of the conspiracy. The *Conspiracy of Catiline* offers a remedy for the one-sidedness of Cicero's speeches and political writings, which were geared towards defending and legitimizing his own actions as well as maintaining his popularity.⁷⁸

The *Conspiracy of Catiline* addresses the conspiracy of Catiline from the perspective of the moral degeneration of the Republic. The account of the coup itself is preceded by a long historical analysis that portrays the (anti-)hero of the story, L. Sergius Catilina, as the product of a society suffering under excessive competition (*ambitio*) and avarice (*avaritia*) (*Cat.* 11–12), where personal virtue and love for the Republic have made way for corruption and civil discord. The historical mon-

⁷⁴ I will note here that I developed the following argument without previous knowledge of Andrew SILLETT's essential study of Cicero in the *Conspiracy of Catiline*. I regard his explicit conclusion that it is silence which best characterizes Sallust's approach to Cicero (SILLETT 2015: 101) as confirmative of my own results. However, the following pages will show that the details of our argument are quite different.

⁷⁵ See Asc. 37C for Sallust and Cicero being in opposite camps in the Milo affair. Sallust would also have been the second husband of Cicero's wife Terentia according to Jerome *Adv. Iovinianum* 1.48. See SYME 1964: 284.

⁷⁶ Plutarch, Appian, and Florus are all indebted to Sallust's account; cf. PAGÁN 2004: 27–49. URSO 2019 claims that Cassius Dio's version of the conspiracy shows no trace of the Sallustian (nor the Ciceronian) account; I think the subject is worth further investigation.

⁷⁷ Cf. Sallust's own claim of independency at *Cat.* 4.2.

⁷⁸ SILLETT 2015: 46 emphasizes the monumentality of the *Conspiracy of Catiline* for the Ciceronian tradition, by calling it "the single most important event since the publication of the *Catilinarians* after Cicero's death".

ograph can be divided into several parts—all such modern divisions are more or less arbitrary, but it serves the clarity of this argument to indicate briefly the structure of the *Conspiracy of Catiline*.⁷⁹ Chs. 1–4 reflect on the nature of virtue and thematize Sallust's transition from politics to writing, explaining that it is difficult to write political history (for a critical tone is often mistaken for malevolence or slander) but a pursuit especially suited for a man free from political ambitions. Ch. 5 then introduces the main protagonist, Catiline. Chs. 6–13 treat the historical background to the Catilinarian conspiracy and the moral degeneration of Roman society. Chs. 14–23 further introduce Catiline and the conspirators, describing a first (in 66–65 BC) and second (in 63) Catilinarian plot. In chs. 24–45, then, we have the actual account of the Catilinarian conspiracy, describing Cicero's method in unmasking the conspirators, the communication between the conspirators (in the form of letters), and finally the trick with the Allobroges, which led to the arrest of many of the conspirators. Chs. 46–55 handle the proceedings in the senate and the executions, with an interlude in 53.2–54 where the historiographer again reflects on the nature of virtue and provides a direct comparison (*synkrisis*) of Cato and Caesar. The final chapters 56–61 deal with the battle at Pistoia and the defeat of Catiline's army. Thus, the conspiracy narrative proper covers chapters 20–61, Catiline's first speech in ch. 20 being the grand opening of the events in 63.⁸⁰

In the introduction of the work, Sallust himself describes that he too, in the past, was a participant in the corrupt first-century political culture.⁸¹ As soon as he had retired from this life, he decided to write about memorable events in Roman history, among which the Catilinarian episode provided a particularly worthwhile subject due to the novelty of the crime and the danger it involved for the Republic (*nam id facinus in primis ego memorabile existumo sceleris atque periculi novitate*).⁸² His investment in Roman politics renders the monograph

⁷⁹ See also RAMSEY 2007: 22–23; WILKINS 1994: 147; VRETSKA 1976: 20–21.

⁸⁰ Pace VRETSKA, who situates the main part of the narrative between *Cat.* 17–54.

⁸¹ Cassius Dio (40.63.4; 43.9.2–3) records Sallust's tumultuous career; in 50 BC, Sallust was temporarily expelled from the senate, in 45 he was charged for mismanagement of the province of Africa Nova. See MCGUSHIN 1977: 1–5; SYME 1964: 29–42. A good overview of Sallustius' lifetime and a review of modern scholarship up until the present, in particular on the relationship between the politician and the historiographer, is BATSTONE & FELDHER 2020: 1–23.

⁸² *Cat.* 3.3–4; cit. at 4.4. For Sallust's reflection on his own life, see also KRAUS & WOODMAN 1997: 14–16.

on the conspiracy a personal and lively reflection on civic life in the late Republic and on the conduct (good or bad) of the main political players of that period.⁸³ Furthermore, Sallust's writing was affected by the civil violence between 49 and 43 BC and the proscriptions under the Second Triumvirate, when all key players of the conflict, including Cicero, had died. Catalina Balmaceda, for example, has argued that Sallust's portraits of Caesar and Cato were markedly influenced by Caesar's posthumous reputation for clemency, and by Cato's heroic death for the Republic.⁸⁴ Sallust's in-depth characterizations of his protagonists effectively exemplifies Rome's faded republican glory. The aim of the *Conspiracy of Catiline*, therefore, was not merely to document the uprising and its origins, but also to commemorate and, in some ways, heroize figures from the recent past.⁸⁵

The most important difference, then, between the Sallustian and the Ciceronian report of the conspiracy regards the conduct of the consul. In the Ciceronian speeches against Catiline, the consul, as we saw above, is the pivot of the events and the unique saviour of the city. In the *Conspiracy of Catiline*, however, the protagonist of the monograph is certainly Catiline.⁸⁶ Sallust does not praise or explicitly commemorate Cicero's behaviour as exemplary of virtue; nor does Cicero receive any special character portrait or speech part (in contrast to Catiline, Cato, and Caesar).⁸⁷ There are also similarities between the accounts of Cicero and Sallust that deserve to be mentioned: both emphasize the seriousness of the conspiracy for the history of the Republic as well as its military nature. Sallust's narrative of the final battle is essentially an account of the horrors of civil war—a civil war Cicero had thematized in his *Catilinarians*.

The first speech against Catiline is mentioned in one brief sentence (*Cat.* 31.6), but apart from this there is no reference at all to the speech-

⁸³ In the *Conspiracy of Catiline*, Sallust indeed presents himself as eyewitness, not necessarily of the events themselves, but of the conduct and importance of the political actors involved: *Cat.* 48.7 (*ipsum Crassum ego audiui*), 53.6 (*memoria mea*).

⁸⁴ BALMACEDA 2017: 59; already, SYME 1964: 114–115.

⁸⁵ This even goes, to a certain extent, for Catiline, whose villainy is not absolute, as shown by WILKINS 1994; cf. KRAUS & WOODMAN 1997: 20–21.

⁸⁶ In the words of WILKINS 1994: 2, “Catiline is the monograph's central figure historically and literarily.”

⁸⁷ FLOCCINI 1989: 38; LA PENNA 1968: 84–85 in response to SCHWARTZ 1897.

es of November–December. Sallust’s elaborate description of the senatorial debate on 5 December stages a competition between Caesar (then praetor) and Cato (tribune), and appears to deliberately omit the consul (!) Cicero’s contribution to that debate, which ancient and modern readers know as the fourth speech against Catiline. The lack of a speech by the ultimate leader of state is all the more surprising considering Sallust’s predilection for political speeches and the problematic nature of rhetoric, as modern scholars have noted.⁸⁸ Fully in accordance with this non-speaking Cicero, Sallust nowhere refers to the Ciceronian material he must have used as a source of information for his own narrative, save for the quick reference to the *First Catilinarian*. The choice to omit the Ciceronian voice presents a significant gap between what the audience knows—what the historiographer may even presume they know—and what is represented.

Modern scholars have offered several explanations for Cicero’s ‘silence’ in the *Conspiracy of Catiline*. The original theory by Eduard Schwartz, that Sallust, as one of Caesar’s partisans, intended to produce an anti-Ciceronian piece, has been largely discarded.⁸⁹ Current consensus is that Sallust’s primary concern was to sketch the political situation of the Late Republic regardless of his personal antipathies.⁹⁰ This means he would have selected those historical figures and those events that were most appropriate for illustrating the sociopolitical backdrop to the uprising. Departing from this line of perspective, the lack of a Ciceronian speech in the *Conspiracy of Catiline* is often explained by the notion that it would have been superfluous to reproduce Cicero’s words, which were already publicly available in the *Catilinarians*.⁹¹ As Martin Stone formulated it: “[Cicero] needs no noise

⁸⁸ See SCANLON 1980; cf. PÖSCHL 1970: 376 on Sallust’s wish to show the treacherous nature of the Roman *nobilitas* by means of the debate on the Catilinarians.

⁸⁹ SCHWARTZ 1897 is now reprinted and translated in English as SCHWARTZ 2020; see esp. 135–139 for the “literary destruction of Cicero the politician”. LÄMMLI 1946 argues in the same fashion. LA PENNA 1968: 68–83 gives an overview of the scholarship up until 1968; LEDWORUSKI 1994 also covers the years between 1968 and 1994; cf. BATSTONE & FELDHERR 2020: 1–23. Cf. SILLETT 2015: 80 who, in refuting the idea of Sallust *Ciceromastix*, frames his attitude as rather a “calculated bias”. Multiple views are possible: TANNENBAUM 2005 presents Sallust as an admirer of Cato instead of Caesar; FELDHERR 2012 argues from an historico-philosophical perspective that Sallust exemplifies the historiographer’s idealistic rejection of partisanship.

⁹⁰ SYME 1964: 111; cf. LA PENNA 1968: 76–83, who locates the roots of this view in the work of Karl VRETSKA.

in Sallust; he makes it himself outside this text in works of his own.”⁹² Similarly, it has been repeatedly suggested that Cicero’s silence in the account of the debate of 5 December 63 BC is simply a representation of historical reality: Caesar’s and Cato’s contribution would have been much more extraordinary and crucial than that of the consul.⁹³

Another strain of argument focuses on the literary relationship (competition) between the works of Sallust and Cicero, apparently with almost contradictory results. According to Ledworuski’s 1994 monograph, based on the principle of ‘Widersprüche’, modifications and contradictions in Sallust’s representation of the conspiracy (in comparison with the bare facts as well as other sources), opts for a reading of the *Conspiracy of Catiline* as completely founded on Cicero’s *Catilinarians* and *Philippics*.⁹⁴ Ledworuski goes so far as to say that the whole theme of the monograph is a “mistake” (*Fehler*) or a manipulation of reality, guided by Cicero’s exaggerated and manipulative account in the *Catilinarians*.⁹⁵ In general (and in accordance with Ledworuski’s literary reconstruction), Sallust’s portrait of Cicero would be “benign”, presenting an adequate statesman who acts selflessly.⁹⁶

An almost opposite conclusion about the literary relationship between Sallust and Cicero is the recent study of Cicero’s role in the *Conspiracy of Catiline* by Andrew Sillett, which highlights the ways in which he is marginalized: “Sallust, this text announces, is so original an

⁹¹ DRUMMOND 1995: 45–46; BÜCHNER 1982: 138–142; MCGUSHIN 1977: 185–186; LA PENNA 1968: 85; SYME 1964: 105.

⁹² STONE 1999: 53.

⁹³ Sallust might have used other (not extant) sources, which presented a similar picture and a less Cicero-focused account of the senatorial debate(s). However, as we will see in § 3, through applying specific narrative and rhetorical techniques, Sallust himself aggrandizes the role of Caesar and Cato in the debate on 5 December, at the cost of Cicero’s performance.

⁹⁴ LEDWORUSKI 1994: 66–68: Sallust’s Catiline would have been modelled after Cicero’s Antony, just as the former’s account of the conspiracy is modelled on Cicero’s ‘Philippic’ representation of the civil war of the 40s. Also widely shared is the idea that Cicero’s writings, especially the consular corpus, were the most influential source for Sallust’s portrait of Catiline and of the conspiracy: DRUMMOND 1995: 10; SYME 1964: 73; MCGUSHIN 1977: 8; RAMSEY 1988: 8–9. WILKINS 1994 pleads for more differentiation and a consideration of the testimonium in Cic. *Cael.* 12–14.

⁹⁵ LEDWORUSKI 1994: 71, “Schon die Wahl des Themas ‘Die Catilinarische Verschwörung’ war aus historiographischer Sicht letztlich ein Fehler Sallust (Thema-Fehler), da dieser Stoff durch Ciceros Schriften heillos manipuliert und die 63er Affäre in den Jahren nach 44 v. Chr. politisch längst überholt war.” At 100 and 308–309, Ledworuski speaks of an “Grund-, oder Elementarfehler”. Though this claim seems rather strong, the idea is already present in SYME 1964, see n. 97.

⁹⁶ LEDWORUSKI 1994: 238, 267.

historian that he can write an account of the Catilinarian conspiracy without Cicero.”⁹⁷ The “Cicero-less history” (of which the Roman audience would be acutely aware) that the *Conspiracy of Catiline* presents is a method for Sallust to claim his authority. Cicero’s silence, then, is a symbol for this act of literary independency. However, in analyzing the countervoice constructed in the *Conspiracy of Catiline* against Cicero Sillett focuses on the absence of speech as a rhetorical effect, not on the silence itself.

All these methods have in common that they focus on Sallust’s personal views on Cicero, either as a historical source, or as an opponent in the political or literary realm. Furthermore, they tend to focus exclusively either on the parts of the Ciceronian legacy that are neglected (cf. Sillett) or the parts of it that *are* taken over by Sallust (cf. Ledworski), which yields contrasting, rather confusing results. In this chapter, I propose a slightly different approach, believing that we should regard the text itself as a specimen of Ciceronian reception (or rather, one of the first steps in the development of Cicero’s political image) which does not intend to present either a negative or positive view of Cicero, but records a range of ideas that were circulating regarding the proper conduct of Cicero himself as well as of politicians generally in that period.⁹⁸ In Sallust’s treatise we encounter a Cicero who is clearly different from the persona that emerges from the *Catilinarians*, but who also differs from the imperial Cicero, whose consular eloquence and civilian heroism (not to mention the *Catilinarians* themselves) pervade later historiography, as has been demonstrated in § 1 of this chapter. I will argue that Sallust’s *Conspiracy of Catiline* serves as a mediating force between Cicero’s own construct of his political career and later interpretations of his position in society; it offers an alternative version of the conspiracy that moves the spotlight away from Cicero, and emphasizes his role as administrator, not hero.

⁹⁷ SILLETT 2015: 98. Cf. the much earlier remark by SYME 1964: 136: “Cicero and Cicero’s influence magnified Catilina unduly, as other writers in antiquity were aware (cf. Cass. Dio 37.42.1). Sallust took over and developed Cicero’s conception. That is his prime delinquency.”

⁹⁸ Compare SILLETT 2015: 95, who speaks of an “act of Ciceronian reception” (italics mine); and 101, an “act of silencing Cicero”.

2.2 COMMEMORATING OR ‘FORGETTING’ CICERO?

How exactly do we examine ‘silence’—the lack of speech, deeds left unmentioned, fame unattributed?

The concept of silence in Greek and Roman historiography has been recently explored in a volume edited by Corinne Jouanno. Presenting silence in the first instance as an “ideological tool”, the volume approaches the historiographer’s silence chiefly as a rhetorical strategy, in line with the rhetorical nature of ancient historiography.⁹⁹ Fabrice Galtier, however, in her discussion of Tacitus’ *Annals*, also addresses the moral horizon that extends beyond the rhetorical employment of these silences. By actively trying to avoid *taedium* and observing *pudor* in his report of the events, Tacitus would show himself well aware of the moral demands of his audience:¹⁰⁰

On comprend que le discours de Tacite s’inscrit dans un cadre normatif qui correspond à l’horizon d’attente supposé de son lectorat. Cet horizon d’attente concerne bien évidemment le contenu et la forme du récit historique. Mais à travers celui-ci, c’est aussi l’*auctoritas* de son auteur qui se trouve évaluée, en fonction de critères qui relèvent à la fois d’exigences techniques et morales. Les énoncés qui relèvent de la *reticentia* jouent de fait sur une connaissance partagée de ces normes, que l’historien ne peut se permettre d’ignorer.

I would like to do more than suggest that Sallust included or excluded certain information in order to observe the moral expectations of his audience concerning the freedom he, as a historiographer, was allowed to take with regard to his subject.¹⁰¹ Possibly, indeed, the silences in the *Conspiracy of Catiline* characterizing Cicero’s performance in the senate express a wish to avoid tediousness and observe modesty to-

⁹⁹ JOUANNO 2019: 7–16. See esp. the contribution by GALTIER, which examines the rhetorical figure of *reticentia* in Tacitus’ *Annals*. Useful here, for entirely focusing on silence as a cultural phenomenon, is also VINITZKY-SEROUSI & TEEGER 2010, which among other things distinguishes between overt and covert silence, the former being a literal absence of speech or narrative, the second a form where a silence is not a silence as such, but is covered by something else being commemorated (resembling ASSMANN’s category of ‘overwriting’).

¹⁰⁰ GALTIER 2019: 143.

¹⁰¹ For an example of Sallust’s observance of the Roman moral code (*pudor*) that would fit GALTIER’s argument, see *Cat.* 22, where the historiographer refrains from drawing a conclusion about the truth of the horrible anecdote about a blood sacrifice made between the conspirators, since it is ‘too serious’ to believe readily.

wards an audience well acquainted with Cicero's writings. However, I will illustrate that Sallust's concealment of Cicero's speeches, of the official thanksgiving (*supplicatio*) and of the proclamation of the title *pater patriae* serves as an ethical correction to Cicero's self-laudatory style—a correction which is reflective of the historiographer's rejection of the competitive political culture in late republican Rome. The 'rhetorical' choices, then, which were made to describe the action of Cicero *consul*, and the glaring omission of the fourth speech against Catiline will be addressed in more detail in § 3, which offers an inter-textual, rhetorical interpretation of the debate between Caesar and Cato. It uncovers the ways in which their speeches attempt to counter and overwrite the *Catilinarians* as examples of the rhetoric that characterized the civil conflict of 63.

A great variety of terms has been used to describe Sallust's method of presentation when it comes to Cicero's performance in 63, all of them taking as their point of departure either the structure of the narrative or the historiographical method. Cicero's portrayal would be "less prominent than that of Caesar and Cato",¹⁰² for he would not be a "decisive" personage in the story;¹⁰³ it is all a matter of "exemplary concentration".¹⁰⁴ Similarly, "his actions are related without emphasis; his personality is left unrevealed by an author who could use striking colors".¹⁰⁵ In addition to the frequently employed 'silence' or 'absence', Sallust's historiographical method is variably defined as "bewußte Umdeutung",¹⁰⁶ "Verkürzung",¹⁰⁷ a "dismissive treatment",¹⁰⁸ a "conscious distortion",¹⁰⁹ and an attempt to "diminish" Cicero's "part in history"¹¹⁰ if not "historical revisionism".¹¹¹ Ann Wilkins reminds us that Sallust's refusal to "capitalize upon" Cicero's fourth speech against Catiline

¹⁰² HELLEGOUARC'H 1972: 22.

¹⁰³ LA PENNA 1968: 92.

¹⁰⁴ FLOCCHINI 1989: 41.

¹⁰⁵ BROUGHTON 1936; cf. WILKINS 1994: 97, "Sallust's portrayal of him [...] is colorless."

¹⁰⁶ GÄRTNER 1986: 467.

¹⁰⁷ LEDWORUSKI 1994: 268.

¹⁰⁸ SILLETT 2015: 66.

¹⁰⁹ LA PENNA 1968: 83, "un deformazione cosciente"; cf. GRUEN'S (1974: 417) verdict quoted above, n. 11.

¹¹⁰ GOWING 2013: 234–235.

¹¹¹ SILLETT 2015: 79, 81.

does not necessarily mean a “denigration” of his person;¹¹² Hans Gärtner even claims that the historiographer attributes “*implicit* praise” to the consul.¹¹³

While all these judgments are certainly a colourful reflection of the many and diverse ways in which Cicero’s portrait in the *Conspiracy of Catiline* can be questioned and defined, I would like to abstain from this type of evaluative commentary. Instead, I choose to focus more on the strategies of silence themselves, and try to grasp the effects of Sallust’s selective account on the transmission of Cicero’s political legacy in the final years of the Republic. The main question of this chapter, therefore, concerns Sallust’s commemoration of Cicero, and the techniques employed in depicting his political leadership—including, of course, the actual deeds of his consulship.

As it happens, in recent decades a special subfield of memory studies has arisen that deals exclusively with strategies of silence and omission: the study of ‘cultural forgetting’, which is regarded as not necessarily opposed but complementary to the study of cultural memory or cultural commemoration.¹¹⁴ In her most recent compilation work “Forms of Forgetting”, Aleida Assmann distinguishes between nine ‘techniques’ of cultural forgetting: to erase, cover up, hide, hush up, overwrite, ignore, neutralize, deny, and lose.¹¹⁵ As the terminology suggests, ‘forgetting’ can be both active (e.g., erase, overwrite, deny) and passive (e.g., lose, ignore); it often happens automatically, but it

¹¹² WILKINS 1994: 99.

¹¹³ GÄRTNER 1986: 455. Italics mine.

¹¹⁴ For a useful overview of the recent (and less recent) scholarship on forgetting, see LAMERS, VAN HAL & CLERCX 2020: 5–29 and SCHULZ 2019: 201–205. See the studies by RICOEUR 2004: 412–452 and WEINRICH 2004, which take an historical view to the phenomena of remembering and forgetting; the volume by WEINRICH helpfully reviews diverse literary sources from archaic Greece to the Holocaust that deal with the (personal as well as collective) condition of forgetting. On the sociocultural context of forgetting (and remembering), with examples from the Roman world, see FLAIG 1999, who explains how commemoration, as the result of institutional canonization, concentrates on individuals, not collectives (peoples); cf. ASSMANN 1999: 33–61. HAVERKAMP & LACHMANN 1993 is a useful overview of commemoration and forgetting in the literary and visual arts. Also helpful to me have been SCHUDSON 1995, on ‘distortions’ in individual and collective memory, and VINITZKY-SEROUSI & TEEGER 2010 on silence in the cultural commemoration of historical events.

¹¹⁵ In German: *löschen, zudecken, verbergen, schweigen, überschreiben, ignorieren, neutralisieren, leugnen, and verlieren*; ASSMANN 2016: 21–26. Scholars tend to each design their own typologies: cf. SCHLIEBEN-LANGE 1984: 20 who lists similar strategies within the management of scholarly knowledge; CONNERTON 2008; SCHULZ 2019.

can also be controlled or managed. The reason for these mechanisms of forgetting can often be located in the problematic nature of historical events or figures. As Assmann discusses, the hushing up or covering up of difficult episodes in a society's past, such as civil war or genocide, can be therapeutic or constructive during the period when a community is still in the process of recovery.¹¹⁶ This approach seems particularly relevant with regard to Sallust's situation under the Second Triumvirate; the political turbulence in Rome reflected on his writing in multiple ways, which would benefit from further examination.¹¹⁷

While forgetting is often described by modern scholars as a phenomenon that operates in the public space, strategies of forgetting can also be recognized in literary texts.¹¹⁸ They help us understand the process of selection and rewriting that underlies a narrative. It is, in fact, narrative which plays a great role in communities in deciding what will be remembered and what will be forgotten. (Neuro)psychologists have shown that the brain itself tends to recollect things by means of narrative patterns.¹¹⁹ From a sociocultural perspective, narrativization, it has been said, is a way to "make the past interesting" for the present, i.e. to imbue past events with relevant meaning.¹²⁰ Writers and histori-

¹¹⁶ ASSMANN 2016: 57–68. Cf. RICOEUR 2004: 412–456. SCHLIEBEN-LANGE 1984—whose point of departure is the history of linguistics, but whose analysis can be extended quite well to the scholarly discipline of (ancient) historiography—emphasizes the relevance of the controversiality of cultural information (what she calls 'units of knowledge', "Wissensbestände"). Unproblematic information will be remembered, either emphatically or decoratively, in an antiquarian manner; or it will be forgotten completely (since it has no relevance anymore). Problematic information, however, will be evaluated positively or critically, resulting in the partial loss of details which are discarded; or it will be actively forgotten, i.e. tabooed. On SCHLIEBEN-LANGE's theory (which itself suffers from scholarly neglect), cf. LAMERS, VAN HAL & CLERCX 2020: 13–16, 19–20.

¹¹⁷ BATSTONE & FELDHERR 2020: 5. Cf. BATSTONE 2010b; SYME 1964: 214–239. It has indeed been argued that Sallust's ambiguous and at times evasive treatment of Cicero, Caesar, and Cato is a result of a repressive political atmosphere: see BROUGHTON 1936: 45–46; alternatively, PÖSCHL 1970: 385. WOODMAN 1988: 126 is worth quoting: "Sallust consistently treats [Cicero] with the studied ambiguity of one whose disillusionment embraces society at large". In general, the preoccupation with bloodshed and conflict is regarded as a feature of triumviral literature: see esp. GERRISH's 2019 study of the *Histories*; OSGOOD 2006 offers a wealth of literary reactions to the Second Triumvirate, but is not very well structured (see 290–291, 306–311 on Sallust).

¹¹⁸ SCHULZ 2019.

¹¹⁹ KEIGHTLEY & PICKERING 2012: 47 state: "Certainly, in our memory of the enduring past particular events, experiences, and episodes may have become condensed, fragmented, and disjointed, but it is then the task of recollection in its actively concerted modality to reassemble, reorder and reconfigure these memories in such a way that they contribute to and become a meaningful part of the discernible narrative pattern moving across time [...]."

¹²⁰ SCHUDSON 1995.

ographers, in particular, possess an important function in retelling and interpreting past events.¹²¹ But in order to tell of the past convincingly, the content of the writing has to be made subordinate to principles of simplification or embellishment, which results in the omission of certain information.¹²²

Such less conspicuous shifts of emphasis which are the product of a process of narrative selection should be distinguished from more active forms of forgetting, in which a deliberate attempt is made to *overwrite* or *change* the historical facts. This, as I will argue in this chapter, is the type of historiographical forgetting we are, at least partly, dealing with in the Sallustian Cicero. I will thus adopt a similar approach as Schulz, whose study of Tacitus, Suetonius, and Cassius Dio has proposed three specific rhetorical strategies of ‘forgetting’: to delete, thus creating a gap (*entfernen*), to emphasize (*Fokussierung*), and to replace (*ersetzen*). While Schulz’ discussion is very useful, her terminology overlaps with the concepts already laid out by Assmann. What is more, the dynamics of forgetting manifest themselves differently in every text. I can address these nuances best by taking recourse to the broader set of terms developed by Assmann, which is what I will do below.

One more preliminary remark before we turn to the Latin text. When a writer is of the same generation as his protagonists, as is the case with Sallust, some of the strategies mentioned above are impossible to employ plausibly: Sallust could not completely ignore or deny Cicero’s famous revealment of the conspiracy in the senate; he was further prevented from committing any conspicuous errors in his account of the conspiracy, if he did not want to alienate his audience, part of which was certainly familiar with the events of 63. The deeds of Cicero’s consulship could simply not be *forgotten*, if only for the publication of the published corpus of consular speeches documenting his performance.¹²³ Therefore, while the theory of cultural forgetting will

¹²¹ See GRABES 2010 on how historians and literary scholars are responsible for canons of history and literature; SAUNDERS 2010 focuses on the importance of life-writing (biography) in the commemoration (and forgetting) of figures from the past.

¹²² See also PAGÁN 2004 who studies conspiracy narratives in particular, and who terms this phenomenon “negotiating limitations”, i.e. filling in the factual gaps to create a continuous narrative (32–37).

¹²³ Cf. SCHULZ 2019: 219 on the suitability of the term ‘forgetting’, where she also discusses Umberto Eco’s famous manifesto against forgetting from 1987.

be consistently applied in this chapter in order to illustrate Sallust's method in portraying Cicero, the more passive forms of forgetting will dominate; Sallust's main strategies may be categorized as silence/-ing and omission, neutralization or neglect (ignoring). One active strategy of forgetting will be discussed in this chapter: for, as we will see, his version of the debate on 5 December is marked by a method of overwriting, which favours Cato over Cicero.

2.3 CICERO (ONLY) CONSUL

The Sallustian modification of Cicero's consular image is subtle and equivocal. Cicero makes a frequent appearance in the *Conspiracy of Catiline* both as a private individual and as administrator: he is present in 17 of the 61 chapters, which is considerably more than most of the protagonists. He possesses two characteristics which place him in a positive light: he is a good consul in his defence of the Republic, and a cunning opponent of Catiline and his men. However, he also lacks two major characteristics that were central to Cicero's self-construction: the valour of a military leader (*dux*) and the glory of a war hero. The duality of these characteristics is the subject of the first part of this section.

Furthermore, there is another ambiguity in Sallust's presentation of the consul: while Cicero's actions are not attributed any special significance, Sallust magnifies Cicero's internal experience of the events in order to emphasize the moral complexities of supervising a civil conflict. I will demonstrate that this is the result of two complementary strategies of forgetting: on the one hand, as we will see in § 2.3.1, Cicero's part in the conflict is diminished (neutralized); on the other hand, his experience as leader of the state is generalized to the extent that Cicero's conduct becomes primarily an example of good leadership (§ 2.3.2). As I will argue, this last feature is not so much a reflection of the historiographer's personal opinion of Cicero, but rather of his ideals concerning republican leadership.

Right from the beginning of the account, Sallust steers the reader's view of Cicero in an alternative direction from the one advertised in Cicero's consular speeches—a direction informed by the indignation surrounding Cicero's political reputation in Roman society. The very

first mention of Cicero's name at *Cat.* 22.3—at one third of the treatise, after the elaborate introduction on the state of the Republic as well as a character portrait of Catiline and a long speech by him (*Cat.* 20)—immediately associates him with the criticism (*invidia*) he harvested later (*quae postea orta est*), i.e. in the period after the conflict. Although no more than a passing remark (the actual subject here concerns the cannibalistic practices of the conspirators), it reactivates right away (the memory of) the importance of the conflict for Cicero's image-building and the negative repercussions it had on his career. The modification of this memory is part of the moral message of the *Conspiracy of Catiline*.

We have seen that in the introduction to his work, Sallust rejects the political competition and corruption in the first-century Republic.¹²⁴ In fact, he illustrates the corrupting effect of *invidia* on several moments in the narrative; every time, this *invidia* is either directed against or associated with Cicero.¹²⁵ Instead of interpreting these descriptions of *invidia*, as is usually done, as a means to either defend or attack Cicero's name, I will show that the thematization of *invidia* carries meaning on a metatextual level, setting the preliminaries for Sallust's portrayal of Cicero. What is more, I will argue that the strategies of forgetting in the *Conspiracy of Catiline*, the reduction and generalization of Cicero's achievements, constitute an expression of *invidia* themselves—not with the aim to slander the consul, but to offer an ethical corrective to Cicero's memory.

¹²⁴ At *Cat.* 3.5 he describes that while still in politics, he was haunted by a *cupido honoris* that came with a bad reputation (*fama*) and political rivalry (*invidia*).

¹²⁵ Not including the verb *invidere*, which is used in more general observations: e.g. 37.3, 51.38. Thrice, Cicero is the object of *invidia* from his fellow citizens (*Cat.* 22.3; 23.6; 43.1), once he allegedly evoked the ill-will himself, against Crassus (48.7), and once he refuses to become involved in a slander campaign against Caesar initiated by Catulus and Piso (49.1). *Cat.* 43.1 more or less picks up the criticism mentioned in 22.3: here, L. Calpurnius Bestia, tribune elect for 62 BC, is said to openly attack Cicero in a *contio* and blame him for the civil strife (*L. Bestia tribunus plebis contione habita quereretur de actionibus Ciceronis bellique gravissimi invidiam optumo consuli imponeret*). On the phrase *optumus consul*, which I believe must be taken as an indirect rendering of Bestia's words, see SILLETT 2015: 81–83; LA PENNA 1968: 92. FLOCCHINI 1989: 40 and STONE 1999: 57–58 interpret it as sincere praise by Sallust. In *Cat.* 23.6, Sallust uses Cicero to illustrate the antagonism between the Roman *nobiles* and *homines novi*, an important theme for the historiographer. Cf. EARL 1961: 32–40; HELLEGOUARC'H 1972: 17–21; BALMACEDA 2017.

2.3.1 *The astute consul*

There are multiple aspects of the narrative that contribute to the marginalization of Cicero's contribution to the quashing of the conspiracy; these aspects together have, moreover, the cumulative effect of generalizing Cicero's achievements (and his supervisory role in general, but for this see § 2.3.2). The first aspect regards the antithesis between Catiline and Cicero. In the first half of the *Conspiracy of Catiline* Cicero is consistently pitted against Catiline: the dutiful consul acts against the evil revolutionary.¹²⁶ This even relates to Cicero's own consulship, in the context of which Sallust mentions Cicero for the second time. He narrates that rumours about the conspiracy were spread by Fulvia, the wife of one of the conspirators, Q. Curius who was a bit of a blabbermouth.¹²⁷ These rumours, according to Sallust, made many people support the election of Cicero for the consulship of 63 BC (*ea res in primis studia hominum accendit ad consulatum mandandum M. Tullio Ciceroni, Cat. 23.5*).¹²⁸ The proper cause for Cicero's consulate, then, is located in Catiline's bad reputation and wicked plans, a narratorial addition which anticipates their relationship in the rest of the *Conspiracy of Catiline*.¹²⁹

The third time Catiline and Cicero are presented as two opposing forces is at a point when the conspiracy is fully formed: Cicero has to defend himself from Catiline's secret attacks (*Cat. 26*). In this passage, the historiographer makes one of his rare evaluations of Cicero's conduct. When Catiline is preparing "an ambush on Cicero using every means" (*omnibus modis insidias parabat Ciceroni*), Cicero responds immediately. Right at the start of his consulship he arranged that Curius, through Fulvia, would pass on all details of the plot to him. In Sallust's judgment, "he had no inability for deceit and slyness in defence either" (*neque illi tamen ad cavendum dolus aut astutiae deerant*). *Dolus* and *astutiae*, the terms which are used here, are proper synonyms,

¹²⁶ See esp. WILKINS 1994: 19 (with n. 22) on the "narrative alternation" between Catiline and Cicero in chs. 26–30.

¹²⁷ *Cat. 23.4*.

¹²⁸ For the concomitant remark about the *invidia* of the nobility (*Cat. 23.6*), see n. 125 above.

¹²⁹ This might well have been influenced by speeches like Cicero's own *In toga candida* which cultivates the narrative about the rivalry between Catiline and Cicero.

which traditionally possess a negative flavour, as my translation indicates. However, in a context that is clearly positive *astutiae* stands for “shrewdness” (*calliditas*) and prudence (*prudentia*);¹³⁰ in the present passage, it can be interpreted metonymically to denote a stratagem.¹³¹ The juxtaposition of *cavendum* (to be careful) and *dolus* moreover indicates that Cicero’s shrewdness was evoked by necessity; he needed to defend his life. Indeed, this remark is firmly embedded in a context where Cicero is the good leader and Catiline the wicked attacker. The historiographer could have defined Cicero’s qualities in a different way: *diligentia* (as Ramsey notes *ad loc.*) or *industria* would have been possible alternatives, also used by Cicero himself.¹³² However, it takes one to know one, and the historiographer represents Cicero and Catiline as worthy opponents. Sallust suggests here that without his cleverness, Cicero would not have been able to oppose Catiline so successfully. In the ensuing narrative, Cicero’s stratagems for countering Catiline’s attack are reported in detail: he is seen to haul Antonius, his fellow consul, over to the ‘good side’ by promising him the province *he* had been allotted for the proconsulship; he surrounds himself with a cordon of friends and clients; he thwarts the conspirators’ plans to assassinate him at his house using his informants; and, when hearing about Manlius’ troops, decides to bring the matter before the senate, which consequently declares a state of emergency.¹³³

The antithesis between Catiline and Cicero is further defined in the description of the public altercation in the senate on 8 November, where Catiline openly insults and threatens Cicero (*Cat.* 31.6–8). Here, Cicero for the first time receives the epithet *consul* (not counting the official moment of inauguration at 24.1), and he acts in the manner of a trustworthy, state-loving leader. He delivers a speech that is both irrefutable and useful for the Republic (*luculentus* and *utilis rei publicae*), while Catiline is the raging villain (*furibundus*, at *Cat.* 31.9).¹³⁴ This op-

¹³⁰ See *TLL* s.v. *astutia* II.1, 2. RAMSEY 1988 *ad loc.*, LA PENNA 1968: 86 and STONE 1999: 61 interpret it positively. This positive context might also undo the negative sound of *dolus*, which in its basic meaning is an act of deceit (*TLL* s.v. *dolus* I).

¹³¹ *OLD* s.v. *astutia* b, with a reference to this passage.

¹³² Cf. Liv. *Per.* 102; Flor. 2.12; Asinius Pollio in Sen. *Suas.* 6.24; cf. Vell. Pat. 2.34.3 (*vigilia curaque*).

¹³³ See § 2.3.2 for a discussion of this passage (*Cat.* 29.1).

¹³⁴ This passage will be handled in more detail in § 3.1.1.

position is enhanced by transposing a famous attack on Cicero by Catiline, which probably belonged to the consular election campaign of 64, to the moment of the *First Catilinarian*.¹³⁵ After Cicero has held his speech, Catiline is made to illustrate the typical patrician *invidia* against Cicero that Sallust had mentioned before in *Cat.* 23: it was ridiculous to think that he, a nobleman who himself and whose ancestors had greatly served the people of Rome, would destroy Rome, when currently a foreign citizen (*inquinus civis*) was leading the state—ironically suggesting that such ‘foreign rule’ was much more destructive. Sallust has situated the remark here to strengthen the dichotomy between Cicero and Catiline. What is more, he also adds another piece of well-known Catilinarian rhetoric to enforce his furious conduct in the senate, which actually antedates the meeting of 8 November: the threat that he would extinguish his own fire with ruin (*incendium meum ruina restinguam*).¹³⁶ Cicero himself tells a slightly different story in *In defence of Murena* 51: around the time of the consular elections Cato had threatened to prosecute Catiline for creating unrest in Rome; Catiline would have responded to this by saying that, in case anyone were to set fire to his property he would not extinguish it with fire but with wreckage (*non aqua sed ruina restincturum*).¹³⁷ In the *Conspiracy of Catiline*, Catiline’s rhetoric is a direct response not to Cato’s words but to those of Cicero: the result of placing the phrase here is that the revolutionary and the (good) consul are presented to stand directly opposed to each other.¹³⁸

This is the point when, after having carefully developed the opposition between Catiline as the angry revolutionary and Cicero as the good leader, the narrative takes a second step in diminishing Cicero’s personal achievements. In the second part of the account of the conspiracy (between *Cat.* 46–61) Cicero’s role changes: he is increasingly mentioned by the name of his official function as consul. While in the first half, prior to his disclosing of the conspiracy in the senate at

¹³⁵ App. *B. Civ.* 2.2.5; see RAMSEY 1988: 149.

¹³⁶ *Cat.* 31.9.

¹³⁷ Mur. 51: *si quod esset in suas fortunas incendium excitatum, id se non aqua sed ruina restincturum*.

¹³⁸ In imperial times, too, Sallust’s version would be used to characterize the rivalry between Catiline and Cicero: Val. Max. 9.11.3, Flor. 2.12.7.

Cat. 29, he is always indicated by his own name (which could partly be explained because he had to escape personal assassination),¹³⁹ in the second half he is, first and foremost, the consul, the leader of the city, whose administrative obligations are most urgent.¹⁴⁰ After the trap with the Allobroges in chapters 44–45, Cicero is able to offer proof of the uprising to the senate, and it is in chapters 46–55 that he is consistently presented in his official role as leader of state who has to take accountability for his actions towards the senate, and whose decisions are dependent on the will of his fellow senators.

The marginalization of Cicero's figure is most visible in Sallust's account of the crucial debate on 5 December, where Cicero's name completely disappears from the account.¹⁴¹ This disappearance marks a shift of perspective from the individuals involved in specific events to the senatorial proceedings and the political and social reverberations of the conflict. It is the consul who decides to place troops around the location of the senate meeting, and who calls them together to decide quickly what needs to happen with the men in custody.¹⁴² Similarly, it is the consul who invites the senators to give their opinions, as he would do according to the official procedure;¹⁴³ and the consul who decides, after the senate has decided in favour of Cato's proposal, that the conspirators need to be executed as soon as possible in order to avoid any further disturbances in the city.¹⁴⁴ Finally, the consul is the

¹³⁹ *Cat.* 22.3, 23.5, 26.1, 27.4, 31.7, 43.1–2, 48.1 and 8, 49.1 (*invidia* or attacks planned on Cicero's life); 28.1, 29.1, 41.5, 44.1, 45.1 (acting on his own devices, master plan for catching conspirators). At 24.1 and 36.3 Cicero's name is mentioned because both consuls are referred to directly.

¹⁴⁰ *Consul*: *Cat.* 46.1, 46.5, 48.4, 50.3, 50.5, 55.1. The only place where Cicero's personal and consular qualities are combined is 31.6: *Marcus Tullius consul* delivers his speech against Catiline. VRETSKA 1976: 388–389 notes about this passage: "Hier bricht der Mensch im Konsul durch." Cicero's fear of Catiline probably resulted from both the danger he formed for Cicero's personal life, and the danger he caused to the Republic. The combination of the name and function could very well illustrate this double meaning. The phrase *consulente Cicerone* in 48.6 seems rather to signal Cicero's chairmanship (not so much the consulship itself) over the senate meeting in which the accusations of Crassus were discussed. For references to Cicero in the speeches of Catiline, Caesar, and Cato, see § 3.

¹⁴¹ Cf. SILLETT 2015: 75. Sometimes, there may have been rhetorical reasons for using the office for Cicero's name, as in *Cat.* 46.5, *consul Lentulum ipse manu tenens in senatum perducit*, where the juxtaposition of *consul* and *Lentulum* emphasizes the enormity of the event, Lentulus being an ex-consul himself.

¹⁴² *Cat.* 50.3: *Consul, ubi ea parari cognovit [...] convocato senatu refert quid de eis fieri placeat qui in custodiam traditi erant.*

¹⁴³ *Ibid.* 50.5.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 55.1.

one who leads the conspirator who was highest in rank, P. Lentulus Sura, into the Tullianum.¹⁴⁵ The subsequent announcement made by Cicero according to Plutarch and Appian, that the conspirators were dead, *vixerunt*, does not feature in Sallust's narrative.¹⁴⁶

This emphasis on Cicero's administrative tasks has several specific consequences: the *Conspiracy of Catiline* denies Cicero's construction of himself as *dux togatus*, and omits the special honours Cicero received for his rescue of the state (however controversial the word 'rescue' may have been). These two omissions are perhaps related. As discussed in §1 of this chapter, the *supplicatio*, the *civica corona*, and the title of *pater patriae* all have a military connotation: they are awarded for extraordinary valour and an outstanding performance in defending the Roman state. The *Conspiracy of Catiline* denies Cicero such heroic valour.

In the *Conspiracy of Catiline*, there is a clear division between the two consuls: Cicero is the *togatus*, Antonius (eventually) the *dux*.¹⁴⁷ Sallust strengthened this division even more by only designating Cicero by the term *consul*.¹⁴⁸ Antonius is always mentioned by his own name.¹⁴⁹ In fact, it takes until the final battle in Etruria, which is related after the debate on the conspirators who have been arrested at Rome, that Antonius fulfils his role in the events, as a commander of the army. Earlier on, when the senate pronounced Catiline and Manlius *hostes* of the Republic (*Cat.* 36.3), they ordered that Antonius should pursue Catiline with an army, and Cicero should remain in the city to defend it (*uti ... Cicero urbi praesidio sit*). Cicero, who handles the events in the city, is thus distinguished from Antonius, who handles the battle part (admittedly, not very heroically—due to physical weakness, he leaves the fighting to his lieutenant-general M. Petreius).¹⁵⁰ Cicero is respon-

¹⁴⁵ Similarly, in *Cat.* 46.5 the consul leads Lentulus into the senate.

¹⁴⁶ Plutarch reports Cicero's *vixerunt* in direct speech: *Cic.* 22.2 ἐξήσαν. Appian went for the oratio obliqua: ἐσήμυσεν [sc. Cicero] ὅτι τεθνᾶσιν. Florus 2.12, closely following Sallust's account, also omits the announcement.

¹⁴⁷ The term is not used so as to define Antony's role; in 52.24 Cato uses it to designate Catiline at the head of his army.

¹⁴⁸ There is also a shift of perspective onto Cicero as intended victim, when, in *Cat.* 32, the conspirators are said to prepare *insidias consuli*, instead of the earlier used *consulibus* (26.5, 27.2)

¹⁴⁹ *Cat.* 26.4, 36.3, 56.4, 57.4–5, 59.4.

¹⁵⁰ See *Cat.* 56.4 for Antony leading the army; cf. *Cat.* 59.4 for Antony's absence from the actual battle.

sible only for the forensic and judicial aspects of the uprising, being the driving force first, as a private individual, behind the discovery of the revolt, and then, as state leader, behind the arrest and execution of the conspiracy. We will see in the next section that the placement of the weight of the leadership onto Cicero's shoulders is not without reason.

The lack of Cicero's own name in the conclusion of the uprising is consistent with his performance as representative of the senate. Contrary to the Ciceronian image who single-handedly rescued the Republic out of the hands of evil bandits, the consul in the *Conspiracy of Catiline* is stripped of all uniqueness or heroism. The honours Cicero was so proud to receive are covered by complete silence: the *supplicatio* is left out of the narrative; the other senators are not seen to insist on giving Cicero the *corona civica*. Cato, who according to later tradition was the one proposing to crown the consul with the title *pater patriae*, does not even mention Cicero in his speech (*Cat.* 52). However, the omission of honours for Cicero is veiled by praise from another group in society. When the facts of the conspiracy have been revealed in the senate, the people (*plebs*) are said to praise Cicero to the skies:

*Interea plebs, coniuratione patefacta, quae primo cupida rerum novarum nimis bello favebat, mutata mente, Catilinae consilia exsecrari, Ciceronem ad caelum tollere: veluti ex servitute erepta gaudium atque laetitiam agitabat.*¹⁵¹

In the meantime the people, as soon as the conspiracy had been made public, while at first having sincerely supported the war in their desire for revolution, had changed their mind; they curse the plans of Catiline, and they raise Cicero to the sky. They cheered with joy and happiness as if they had been saved from slavery.

If this is an allusion to the third speech against Catiline (as Ramsey *ad loc.* "undoubtedly" thinks it is), then it is a rather vague one,¹⁵² and not necessarily favouring Cicero. Sallust has certain moral objections to the behaviour of the people, as his overview of the depraved and destitute group supporting Catiline's cause shows earlier in the monograph (*Cat.* 37). In the present passage, the phrase *mutata mente* appears to exemplify the fickleness of the Sallustian mob. There is certainly irony

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.* 48.1.

¹⁵² Cf. HELLEGOUARC'H *ad loc.* See also LEDWORUSKI 1994: 268, who does not even include this passage in her discussion of Sallust's response to Cicero's third speech against Catiline.

in the description of their reaction “as if they had been rescued from servitude”, since at first they clearly supported the idea of revolution.¹⁵³ The Roman people does not know what it wants except simply a relief from poverty. From this perspective, their glorification of Cicero seems to be a comment on the behaviour of the people rather than an acknowledgment of Cicero’s heroic saving of the state. Moreover, with regard to such glorification, there is a sharp contrast between Cicero and one of his younger fellow senators. When Cato has held his speech in the final debate, the senate is said to “raise the virtuousness of his soul to the sky” (*virtutem animi ad caelum ferunt*). The repetition of the phrase *ad caelum ferre/tollere* draws an unfavourable comparison between Cicero, who is praised by an untrustworthy mob, and Cato, who receives the best compliment there is for a Roman: he is admired for his virtue.

Thus, the special honours and the praise Cicero received in 63 BC are substituted by dubious praise from the masses and a celebration of Cato’s decisive contribution to the debate on 5 December.¹⁵⁴ The only striking qualities Cicero is explicitly said to possess are mental: the gift of cunning and deceitfulness. There is definitely an implicit message that Cicero has done well in leading the state through this civil conflict. It is, after all, in the Sallustian version, the result of his patriotic oratory that Catiline is exposed in the senate, and it is through his actions that the conspirators are caught and brought before the senate. However, the *Conspiracy of Catiline* slims down and neutralizes the persona of the valorous consul which is so prominent in the Ciceronian hypotext. Ultimately, the Sallustian Cicero is a servant, not saviour of the state.

2.3.2 Cicero (a)s ethical compass

Sallust’s strategy in diminishing Cicero’s part in the final stage of the conspiracy serves another strategy which is equally crucial to his modification of Cicero’s memory: the generalization of Cicero’s role as leader of state. In this section, we will examine how Sallust is able to

¹⁵³ Cf. DRUMMOND 1995: 18; SYME 1964: 254.

¹⁵⁴ See further below, § 3.3 of this chapter.

accomplish this by turning Cicero's personal experience into a professional dilemma.

It is through Cicero's eyes that the reader catches the ethical problems involved in accusations of treason against fellow citizens, especially high-placed ones. Although Sallust only sparingly ascribes direct emotions to individuals, he does comment upon Cicero's state of mind, and at three different moments in the narrative.¹⁵⁵ This stands in rather odd contrast to Cicero's overall silence in the *Conspiracy of Catiline*. However, I would argue that these passages attempt to modify Cicero's self-centred emphasis on his sacrifice for the Republic, illustrated in § 1.3, and to interpret his predicament more generally as one of the ethical challenges of being a political leader.

The first moment when Cicero's feelings are conveyed to the reader are right after the failed attack on his life, and the message that Manlius is recruiting an army in Etruria (*Cat.* 29.1). Interestingly, it is this final message which, according to the historiographer, filled him with apprehension about the pending disaster (*incipiti malo permotus*). Cicero realizes at that moment that he can no longer protect the city by himself (*privato consilio*), nor does he have the ability to correctly estimate the power and movements of Manlius' army. Thus, he brings the matter into the senate.¹⁵⁶ This is a turning-point in the account: when Cicero decides to relay the information he has received to the senate, the senate pronounces the *senatus consultum ultimum* (at least in Sallust's version of the events),¹⁵⁷ which meant de facto that the city would prepare for battle. Cicero's feeling of alarm anticipates the nervous atmosphere in the whole city and propels the narrative into a war account.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵ With direct emotions I mean anger, fear, happiness, sadness, etc. I do not count madness (e.g. *furibundus* at *Cat.* 31.9), or secondary emotions like *invidia*, arrogance, etc. (e.g. *orabat in audaciam* at *Cat.* 50.2). Cicero: *Cat.* 29.1, 31.6, 46. Other moments where emotions are explicitly mentioned are *Cat.* 28.1 (the conspirators), 31.2 (the city), 45.4 (Volturcius), 48.1 (the *plebs*), 49.2 (Catulus), 50.4 (D. Junius Silanus).

¹⁵⁶ *Cat.* 29.1: *incipiti malo permotus, quod neque urbem ad insidiis privato consilio longius tueri poterat, neque exercitus Manli quantus aut quanto quo consilio foret satis compertum habebat, rem ad senatum refert.*

¹⁵⁷ On the chronology (with further references), LEDWORSKI 1994: 228–234.

¹⁵⁸ One paragraph later, at *Cat.* 30, Manlius' army is official. At 31.1–3, then, as soon as the news about Manlius reaches the people, they are also overcome by emotions and are preparing themselves anxiously for war.

This episode creates the basis for an image of a state leader who does not act lightly, and who is also personally affected by the events. At *Cat.* 46, then, this image is further developed into a short psychological portrait:

*Quibus rebus confectis omnia propere per nuntios consuli declarantur. At illum ingens cura atque laetitia simul occupavere. Nam laetabatur intelligens coniuratione patefacta civitatem periculis ereptam esse; porro autem anxius erat, dubitans in maximo scelere tantis civibus deprehensis quid facto opus esset; poenam illorum sibi oneri, impunitatem perdundae rei publicae fore credebat. Igitur confirmato animo vocari ad sese iubet Lentulum, Cethegum, Statilium, Gabinium, itemque Caeparium Terracinensem ...*¹⁵⁹

These things having been done, they were reported hastily to the consul by messengers. But he was seized simultaneously by immense fear and relief. For he delighted in the knowledge that now that the conspiracy had been exposed, the state had been rescued from its perils. He was however also worried, for he was not sure what to do with such eminent citizens who were caught in a major crime. He suspected that the punishment of them would cause trouble for himself, but impunity would be devastating for the Republic. Thus, having made up his mind, he ordered that Lentulus, Cethegus, Statilius, Gabinius and just so Caeparius uit Terracina ... were brought to him.

By using the official term *consul* instead of Cicero's name, Sallust subtly turns his dilemma into a more abstract matter of political policy and leadership. The problem described here constitutes the nucleus of the whole controversy around the execution of the conspirators. On the one hand, the Catilinarians were manifestly dangerous (cf. *in maximo scelere deprehensis*) and needed to be stopped. It would cause every leader a sense of relief to know they were in custody and could do no harm. On the other hand, they could do just as much harm if unjustly executed, since they were prominent men (cf. *tantis civibus*). In other words, it was fundamental that they were punished as impunity would lead to a collapse of the state (cf. *perdundae rei publicae*), but their punishment could have very nasty consequences for their punisher, in this case Cicero—indeed, the historiographer has already informed us previously (*Cat.* 22) that the consul received a lot of criticism in relation to his performance in 63. However, there is no comment upon the

¹⁵⁹ *Cat.* 46.

self-sacrifice of the consul, and neither does Sallust evaluate Cicero's resolve in choosing to punish the conspirators regardless of the consequences (*confirmato animo*, 46.3). Cicero's much-emphasized self (here reflected in *sibi*) is generalized into a more impersonal vision on the complexity of the situation, confirming the necessity of making decisions in the interest of the country (not of oneself).

This move away from the personal is all the more interesting since it has been argued often that Sallust's historiography is special for its focus on individual virtue, with a preference for characterization and a great deal of direct speech.¹⁶⁰ Such 'dramatic historiography' does not really fit the display of Cicero's conduct, not even in this psychological portrait. The realistic analysis of the consul's leadership, in which emotions are quickly exchanged for decisiveness and steadfastness, offers an alternative perspective on the pathetic rhetoric of Cicero's own *Catilinarians*.¹⁶¹ In similar fashion, Cicero's performance of the first speech against Catiline (*Cat.* 31.6) is presented as a morally constitutive moment with regard to his leadership. Here again, his emotions are focalized: he is said to have held a speech against Catiline "either because he was afraid of his presence, or moved by fear" (*sive praesentiam eius timens, sive ira commotus*). Yet, while Catiline eventually bursts out in rage (*furibundus*), Cicero remains poised, channelling his emotions into a speech which is not only very persuasive (*luculenta*) but also of benefit to the state (*utilis*)—the ultimate goal, we might say, of public oratory.

Sallust presents a consul whose ethical behaviour is impeccable, even though he is personally affected by Catiline's plot. The *Conspiracy of Catiline* carefully reflects enough emotional involvement (anger, fear, gladness) on the part of the consul to illustrate the moral complexities connected with this civil conflict, but it also attempts to depersonalize Cicero's resolute action and sacrifice, which are solely viewed from the perspective of his office. Hence, in this version of the conspiracy Cicero's personal suffering, which was part and parcel of his consular image, is minimized, and the emotions ascribed to his character be-

¹⁶⁰ See GÄRTNER 1986; also KRAUS & WOODMAN 1997: 32–39 who summarize these three features all under 'characterization'.

¹⁶¹ The image of a steadfast Cicero is enhanced by *Cat.* 49.1, where the consul is shown to be impervious to the attempts of Catulus and Piso to form a plot against Caesar.

come rather exemplary of the ethical compass that is needed to handle a civil conflict.

2.4 IN SUM

The Cicero Sallust presents in the *Conspiracy of Catiline* is an idealistic version of the good consul. The historiographer has taken care to distinguish between the man and the consul, with the latter having an exemplary role in the events. The man has the cunning (*astutia*) to control the development of the conspiracy and counter Catiline's wicked plans; the administrator's main role is giving advice on the right course of action and directing the political debate. This administrator acts fully in accordance with the wishes of the senate. As one might recall, it was exactly Cicero's defensive strategy in the years after the conspiracy to emphasize the shared responsibility between him and the senate.¹⁶² It is Sallust, however, who confirms this shared responsibility for the historical record, by diminishing Cicero's achievements and generalizing his experiences and decisions as leader of the state. Normally, as will be explored further in chapter 2 of this thesis, the historiographical tradition magnifies the achievements of extraordinary individuals in order to parade them as examples of Roman virtue; Sallust shows this tendency in his analysis of Caesar and Cato's virtue in *Cat.* 54. In the case of Cicero, a reverse method is employed: his achievements are slimmed down in order to demonstrate virtuous leadership. The depersonalized portrayal also serves the higher goal of enlarging more abstract ethical problems. Without the wish to blame anyone in particular for the events of 63, the historiographer more generally aims to criticize the competitive culture at Rome and the civil war that resulted from this. From a moral-didactic point of view, foregrounding Cicero's achievement or allocating especial praise to his deeds would have been undesirable, since it would precisely confirm the importance of political *gloria*, while it is the obsession with *gloria*, driving political officials to corruption, that Sallust rejects. Instead, Sallust prefers to concen-

¹⁶² STONE 1999: 64 considers this similarity to be evidence that Sallust aims to "exculpate" Cicero.

trate on *virtus* as a positive force in society.¹⁶³ By neutralizing Cicero's achievements and turning his experiences into a general example of good leadership, the *Conspiracy of Catiline* illustrates a mechanism of forgetting which is much more effective than an outright attack on Cicero's conduct would have been (if Sallust had even wanted to do that, which I do not believe). The indignation and outrage over Cicero's perceived lack of propriety in praising his own success is channelled—not unlike the manner in which the Sallustian Cicero is able to channel his emotions—into the sober portrait of a consul who behaves properly in all respects.

3. Silent speech: Caesar & Cato (and Cicero) in the senatorial debate of 5 Dec. 63

3.1 CICERONIAN RHETORIC IN THE CONSPIRACY OF CATILINE

3.1.1 *The First Catilinarian*

In the previous section we have mainly discussed Sallust's representation of Cicero's consular performance, which is marked by a dual strategy of neutralization and generalization, and which ultimately foregrounds his (ideal) leadership. I would like to discuss one more prominent strategy used by the historiographer to counter and modify the memory of Cicero's consular deeds: the overwriting of his oratory. Before discussing this technique of forgetting, however, it is necessary to say a few words about two (hotly debated) ambiguous references to Cicero's public oratory in the *Conspiracy of Catiline*: the *quo usque tandem* reference in Catiline's first speech and the *First Catilinarian*.

In a rally at the beginning of Sallust's account, Catiline laments the uneven divide in power in the Republic and the great gap between the wealthy and the poor. At *Cat.* 20.9, he speaks the famous words: "How

¹⁶³ Cf. *Cat.* 1.4, the very opening of the work. See EARL 1961 and BALMACEDA 2017.

long do you still have to endure these things, ye brave men?" (*quae quousque tandem patiemini, o fortissimi viri*). In antiquity as well as now Cicero is regarded as the most conspicuous wielder of the *quo usque tandem* phrase.¹⁶⁴ Sallust presents a different scenario, in which Catiline is the *auctor*. It has been argued that, in fact, the expression *quousque tandem* came from Catiline in the first place, and was ridiculed by Cicero in his *First Catilinarian*.¹⁶⁵ Andrew Feldherr has explained that technically this is what is being confirmed by Sallust since, in the narrative of the *Conspiracy of Catiline*, Catiline's speech temporally precedes Cicero's *First Catilinarian* (at *Cat.* 31.6). However, as Feldherr also notes, from the perspective of the reader, Cicero's well-known first speech against Catiline lies between the historical events and Sallust's account of them, which was published in the 40s.¹⁶⁶ On a literary level, therefore, Sallust's use of *quousque tandem* is unavoidably also a reaction to Cicero's rhetoric. The modern debate about whether this is Catiline's or Cicero's phrase nicely illustrates how Sallust's rhetorical move confounds the memory of Cicero's oratory. Most notable for our purposes is that it is quite an explicit confirmation of the silence engulfing Cicero's performance. Sallust does emphasize the powerful effect of the *First Catilinarian* (see § 2.3.1), but at the same time minimalizes its impact on the narrative by refraining from any direct quotes. Instead, Catiline is made to perform the characteristic opening at a crucial point in the narrative (the start of Sallust's actual account; see above) and in the *oratio recta*.¹⁶⁷ In the *Conspiracy of Catiline*, the power language that

¹⁶⁴ SILLETT 2015: 53–58. INNES 1977 argues that Sallust uses the phrase against Catiline and in honour of Cicero, attempting to show Catiline's perverse use of rhetorical phrase used by good men like Cicero.

¹⁶⁵ MALCOLM 1979, followed by BATSTONE 1994, 2010a. I am much tempted to believe MALCOLM's argument, all the more since "it would be a neat and psychologically attractive irony that the man whose frequently proclaimed 'comperi' was being abused by others ... begins his attack by throwing back to Catiline one of his characteristic phrases", to speak with the words of William BATSTONE 1994: 228 n. 38. I do think that the patronizing, mocking tone of Cicero's *First Catilinarian* would be reinforced by such a taunting opening sentence. SILLETT 2015: 53–58 gives a good overview of the modern discussion on the subject, but FELDHERR 2013 is more comprehensive.

¹⁶⁶ FELDHERR 2013: 50 n. 5: "My assumption throughout will be that both intertexts were available to Sallust's readers: that Cicero's *exordium* quickly became notorious has been well established, and whether or not Catiline was in actual fact the source for the phrase *quo usque tandem*, Sallust retrospectively makes him its author by putting the words in his mouth at a moment in time before Cicero's speech."

¹⁶⁷ Cf. SILLETT 2015: 89–90 who concludes that Catiline similarly "steals Cicero's words" with regard to his use of *comperi* in *Cat.* 58.1. I generally agree with SILLETT's interpretation of Sallust's

is so characteristic of the *Catilinarians* is (re)placed in the mouth of Cicero's opponent.¹⁶⁸ What is more, we have seen that while Cicero's oratory is featured only indirectly and in silence, Catiline's rhetoric is used directly *against* the consul in the account of the senate meeting on 8 November.¹⁶⁹ Not only is the Sallustian Cicero without words, he also has to bear the attacks of others in silence. The incentive rhetoric of the *Catilinarians*, which in the Ciceronian narrative is presented as being so effective in frightening Catiline and expelling him from the city,¹⁷⁰ has been wiped from this account.

While Cicero's *First Catilinarian* is at least not completely passed over, his rhetorical contribution to the final debate on 5 December is entirely absent; as we have seen above, it is his administrative duties that are being emphasized. Where is the last of his Catilinarian speeches, which was held during the final debate on the conspirators' fate, and which also discusses the proposals of the consul elect Silanus and of Caesar? It would have been perfectly explainable, with respect to its published status, if the historiographer had not bothered or dared to represent it in detail,¹⁷¹ yet he does not even give it any mention. But the Catilinarian speeches are not so easily omitted from the narrative.

use of *comperi* as occasionally acerbic in Cicero's direction, who was apparently ridiculed for using the phrase by his fellow citizens (cf. *Fam.* 5.5.2). However, in line with my aim to go beyond singular expressions of blame or praise, and focus instead on the general image of Cicero's leadership in the *Conspiracy of Catiline*, I do not regard the *comperi* debate as particularly relevant to my argument.

¹⁶⁸ As LA BUA 2013 suggests, within imperial literature the phrase should perhaps rather be interpreted as a "Ciceronian-Catilinarian *incipit*", since the phrase is seen to embody and evoke the rivalry between Cicero and Catiline.

¹⁶⁹ See above, § 2.3.1.

¹⁷⁰ *Cat.* 2.1. The idea is continued in Velleius Paterculus 2.35.4 and Diodorus Siculus, 40 fr. 5a.

¹⁷¹ Cf. SYME 1964: 106, "S. rightly gives no sign of the *Fourth Catilinarian*. It was anything but a decisive contribution to the debate of December 5." Cf. VRETSKA 1976: 504; CAPE 1995: 255. Even if that were true, then the speech itself would still have historical value as a document on the development of the debate. BROCK 1995 argues that it is common for Roman historians not to include previously written speeches. The fixed formula to justify this, *ex(s)tat oratio*, does not occur in the *Conspiracy of Catiline*. At 212 BROCK mentions the absence of Cicero's speeches in the work, but he does not pursue the question any further. Worthy of mention here is also the judgment by STOCKTON 1971: 131, "Cicero's own speech that day is extant as the *Fourth Catilinarian*. But Sallust supplements this with a version of the debate in which the dominating roles are given to Caesar and Cato, whose opposed speeches engross his account. As SYME insists, this is not partisanship or long-cherished personal rancor against Cicero. Sallust's treatment throughout the biography is balanced, fair, even generous. His merit for us is that he helps us escape from the understandably self-centred writings of Cicero to a more objective view, and that he does so without minimizing Cicero's contribution." His final conclusion, of course, does not match my argument, which shows that Sallust was precisely trying to minimize Cicero's contribution as part of his moral programme.

Modern commentators have emphasized that the *Fourth Catilinarian* constitutes an—if not *the*—important source for Sallust's representation of the debate.¹⁷² I would like to go a step further here and explore the ways in which the *Fourth Catilinarian* functions as an intertext for Sallust's speeches.

Intertexts function as markers of silence. A writer can leave out something which is simply irrelevant to the story, and which will not be missed (we would call this a passive silence). However, when the reader becomes aware that something is missing because the narrative invites the reader, by means of allusions or by omitting salient details, to notice his alteration of the story, the silence becomes an active, marked strategy. For example, Sallust's silence about Cicero's *Second* and *Third Catilinarian* is inconspicuous since the narrative is constructed in such a way that they have become completely unnecessary additions to the events. However, the debate between Caesar and Cato engages constantly with the rhetoric of the *Fourth Catilinarian*; through the use of literary allusions, the historiographer signals to the reader that there is more history to be found behind the text. To speak with the words of Andrew Laird, I will explore the effects of the 'intrusion' of Cicero's voice in the debate, which Sallust decidedly prevented from dominating the account, but which is still one of the essential voices that constructed the political debate around the conspiracy.¹⁷³ In other words, the boundaries between what is openly communicated (i.e. Caesar's and Cato's contribution to the debate) and that which is concealed (i.e. Cicero's contribution to the debate) are blurred by intertextual references. Caesar's speech presents a reversal of Cicero's argument in the *Fourth Catilinarian*, while Cato's speech, in a way, is a continuation of it.¹⁷⁴ The Sallustian debate, therefore, illustrates a peculiar mechanism

¹⁷² VRETSKA 1976: 511–512; PÖSCHL 1970 (*passim*); DRUMMOND 1995: 41. The contributions of Silanus and Caesar, for example, are recapped by Cicero in *Cat.* 4.7–10. As STOCKTON 1971: 138 sharply observes, Cato's contribution does not figure in *Cic. Cat.* 4; his speech is added from a different source, probably Brutus' biography of his uncle, cf. *Att.* 12.21.1 and below, § 4.2.

¹⁷³ LAIRD 1999: 34–42 for the idea of texts as discourses that impinge on each other; this dynamic is what LAIRD understands under intertextuality. There are three gradations in the intrusion of another discourse or voice in a text: the most direct intrusion is constituted by direct speech; a middle form is found in focalization or indirect speech; and intertextuality is "the most remote form" (41).

¹⁷⁴ The interest of modern scholarship currently lies in the relationship between Sallust's political or moral thought and the self-presentation of Caesar and Cato, and in the complex nature of

of forgetting by which the memory of Cicero's oratory is recalled only to overwrite it with the memory of the public performances of Caesar and Cato.

3.1.2 *Excursus: speeches in historiography*

A few words are in order, before we continue, about the practice of speech writing in ancient historiography. Direct speech will be a recurring topic in the subsequent chapters, and it will prove to be especially relevant in the historiographical representation of Rome's greatest orator (even in the *Conspiracy of Catiline*, where Ciceronian eloquence is practically absent but very conspicuously so). The literature on oratory in classical historiography is vast, so I will select a few themes that are particularly to the point here.¹⁷⁵ John Marincola, in his overview of the subject, assigns three main functions to speech in historiography: 1) historical explanation, 2) characterization, and 3) aesthetic/artistic considerations.¹⁷⁶ Speeches are often a means to offer commentary, evaluate, explain, or analyse the events in the main narrative from an internal perspective.¹⁷⁷ Set in a democratic (Athenian) or republican (Roman) context, they commonly problematize the nature of politics (and civil conflict) and/or reflect on the effects and limits of political deliberation. In order to enhance this feature, speeches are often clustered in twos or threes, in which different speakers show multiple sides of the issue at hand.¹⁷⁸ More often than not they bring to light the faults

these deliberative pieces of rhetoric in connection with Sallust's skeptical philosophy of history. Cf. GUNDERSON 2000 on Sallust's work as a demonstration of "the postmodern crisis of knowledge". It has been duly noted that the literary or even fictive quality of the speeches is high, since they are carefully written 1) after the model of Thucydides (cf. SKLENÁŘ 1998, SCANLON 1980, VRETSKA 1976), and 2) as a "complementary antithesis" (DRUMMOND 1995: 51; cf. SYME 1964: 120). See further BROCK 1995 on the ancient practice of reproducing historical speeches, with a special focus on Tacitus and Sallust. LEVENE 2000 offers an important study of the influence of Cato Censor, as one of Sallust's role models, on the language and interpretation of Caesar's and Cato's speeches. FELDHER 2012 is an indispensable analysis of the speeches as a commentary upon the practice of (Sallust's own) historiography.

¹⁷⁵ PAUSCH 2010, PITCHER 2009: 103–110, MARINCOLA 2007, MILLER 1975 offer good introductions on speeches in Greek and Roman historiography.

¹⁷⁶ MARINCOLA 2007.

¹⁷⁷ What LACHENAUD 2016: 398 has called the "opération sémiotique" of discourse.

¹⁷⁸ This was already a feature of Herodotean and Thucydidean historiography: LANG 1984, COGAN 1982.

in a political system or the corruptness of rhetoric itself.¹⁷⁹ Speeches were also a popular tool to highlight a historical figure's greatness or weakness of character, their style of speaking,¹⁸⁰ or their personal motivations, thus serving a strategy of 'Psychologisierung' as Barbara Kuhn-Chen has called it.¹⁸¹ Marincola's third category of 'aesthetic reasons' refers to the fact that speeches were always strongly fictionalized and adapted to the overall structure of the narrative. As Roger Brock has argued, historiographical speeches were 'versions' of the original, never a verbatim transcript.¹⁸² Rather, historiographers regularly tried to find and fill a lacuna in the works of their predecessors (write a speech of which there was no rendition yet), or they aimed to "write the speech that *should* have been given".¹⁸³ Finally, one aspect that is not discussed by Marincola deserves some extra attention here: the use of speeches as a conduit for moral dilemmas, questions, or lessons.¹⁸⁴ As we will see in the course of the next chapters, within the pervasive moral-didactic framework of the ancient historiographers, speech is an essential instrument for commemorating and defining (or negating) virtuousness and political leadership.

3.2 CAESAR'S ARGUMENT AGAINST CICERONIAN PATHOS

We have seen above that during the narrative of the conspiracy's revelation Sallust consistently pits Catiline and Cicero against each other to illustrate the oppositional forces of revolutionary and state leader. However, in the discussion of the final debate on 5 December Sallust has chosen a different antithetical pair: Caesar and Cato.¹⁸⁵ Caesar belongs to the party of the *populares*, and Cato represents the conserva-

¹⁷⁹ LEVENE 2009.

¹⁸⁰ MARINCOLA 2007: 315. Also according to the ancient rhetorical topos that style was a reflection of character; cf. MÖLLER 2004.

¹⁸¹ KUHN-CHEN 2002: 22–23.

¹⁸² BROCK 1995; MARINCOLA 2007: 317.

¹⁸³ BROCK 1995: 216.

¹⁸⁴ HAU 2016 offers examples of moralizing speeches in Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius, and Diodorus Siculus.

¹⁸⁵ See EARL 1961: 95–102; SYME 1964: 103–120; PÖSCHL 1970; VRETSKA 1976: 509–512; DRUMMOND 1995: 51–56; KAPUST 2011: 65–70.

tive *optimates*. They represent not only two different political convictions but also two different kinds of traditional Roman virtue. As the *synkrisis* in *Cat.* 54 makes clear, Caesar embodies the virtues of clemency and compassion (*mansuetudo, misericordia*) and Cato the virtues of integrity and sternness (*integritas, severitas*). Working in concert with the *synkrisis*, the speeches in *Cat.* 51–52 function as a rhetorical illustration of these virtues. However, on a higher level they also reflect on the complexity of civil conflict and the role of oratory (speech).¹⁸⁶

The contribution of Caesar constitutes a decisive turn in the debate: in contrast to his colleagues, who voted for the death sentence, he proposes life-long imprisonment. His speech starts with a plea for rationality: “All men who deliberate on dubious matters, men of the senate, should be free from hate, friendly feelings, anger and pity” (*Omnis homines, patres conscripti, qui de rebus dubiis consultant, ab odio, amicitia, ira atque misericordia vacuos esse decet*).¹⁸⁷ The Sallustian Caesar rejects all kinds of emotional interference in decision-making: his oration offers reason and historical awareness as the criteria for political judgment. Caesar warns against setting a wrong precedent for the future. A harsh punishment, decided upon under the influence of emotion, may be misused by those with less sensibility.¹⁸⁸ Moreover, Caesar’s warning against setting a bad *exemplum* is backed up by a reference to similar events in the past, where the decision to execute citizens led to complete mayhem. At this point, Caesar actually refers to the presence of the consul—a reference which is perhaps more of a warning.¹⁸⁹ He first recalls the reign of Sulla in 82 BC, when the dictator ordered the killing of specific traitors of the state; these proscriptions escalated into a serious blood bath. Then he remarks that he does not fear a situation like this under Cicero’s consulate (*ego haec non in M. Tullio neque his temporibus vereor, Cat.* 51.35), but the narration of this gruesome piece of history also functions as a warning to act moderately and observe the proper ethical code.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁶ As discussed in the excursus above, a rather typical feature of historiographical speech. See KAPUST 2011: 53–80, BATSTONE 2010b, BATSTONE 1988; cf. SCANLON 1980 with special attention to the influence of Thucydides.

¹⁸⁷ *Cat.* 51.1.

¹⁸⁸ For fear of setting a bad example: *Ibid.* 51.25–27.

¹⁸⁹ Cf. TANNENBAUM 2005: 215–216.

In his discussion of Caesar's speech, Andrew Drummond has spoken of the "mirror-image" Caesar constructs of Cicero's argument in *Cat.* 4.11–13, but the remark is made only in a footnote.¹⁹¹ Remarkably enough, as Drummond notes, the main thesis of Caesar and Cicero's speeches is similar: cruelty (*crudelitas*) should be avoided in political decisions.¹⁹² However, this thesis is worked out in completely different ways. At *Cat.* 4.12, Cicero describes the horrors of war, and asks his audience to imagine, in particular, a father who loses his whole family and his house by the hand of one of his slaves. If this man, he says, would not exact the strictest punishment possible on his slave, would he then seem to be merciful and compassionate or rather inhumane and really cruel (*crudelissimus*)?¹⁹³ The answer is obvious: revenge is the proper response. Similarly, seeing these horrors unroll before his eyes, Cicero can do nothing but act with severity and violence (*severus vehemensque*).

The example of the father who has lost his family shows the personal sphere of Cicero's argument, which forms a stark contrast with the historicizing approach of Caesar that demands emotional detachment. Caesar's argument runs along the lines that cruelty should be avoided at all times, and personal emotions should not get in the way of political deliberation. Cicero's example is based upon the assumption that cruelty is the failure to show emotion and compassion, either with respect to your family or your fellow-Romans. Yet at the same time, while the Roman people should strongly condemn the conspirators as attackers of their family, he himself tries to avoid being cruel to the conspirators by another kind of emotion. His whole justification for acting harshly (*vehementior*) toward the conspirators is that he embodies the feeling of *misericordia* toward his citizens, as he claims in *Cat.* 4.11.

In contrast to Cicero's practice, Caesar believes that any strong emotional appeal in deliberative speeches is inadvisable. He argues that the emotional or pathetic rhetoric his fellow-senators have employed, in

¹⁹⁰ VRETSKA 1976: 552 also sees here an allusion to the proscriptions under the Second Triumvirate, during which also Cicero died.

¹⁹¹ DRUMMOND 1995: 27n.26.

¹⁹² See *Cat.* 5.1.14: "What is called anger with others, is called haughtiness (*superbia*) and cruelty (*crudelitas*) with those in power."

¹⁹³ *Ibid.* 4.12. *Etenim quaero, si quis pater familias, liberis suis a servo interfectis, uxore occisa, incensa domo, supplicium de servis non quam acerbissimum sumpserit, utrum is clemens ac misericors an inhumanissimus et crudelissimus esse videatur?*

which they summarize the horrors of war, illustrates exactly the wrong approach to the situation.¹⁹⁵ His words interact closely with those of Cicero in *Cat.* 4.11–12:

*Plerique eorum qui ante me sententias dixerunt composite atque magnifice casum rei publicae miserati sunt. Quae belli saevitia esset, quae victis acciderent, enumeravere: rapti virgines, pueros, divelli liberos a parentum complexu, matres familiarum pati quae victoribus conlibuissent; fana atque domos spoliari; caedem, incendia fieri; postremo armis, cadaveribus, cruore atque luctu omnia compleri. Sed, per deos immortalis, quo illa oratio pertinuit?*¹⁹⁶

Most of those who have expressed their opinions before me have deplored the fate of the Republic in well-structured, magnificent language; they summed up the horrors of war, what befell the victims: the rape of maidens, boys, children torn from their parents' embrace, matrons subjected to the will of the victors, shrines and houses despoiled, bloodshed and arson; eventually, arms, corpses, blood and lamentation everywhere. But, by the immortal gods, where has that rhetoric brought us?

Caesar ironically adds that those who would not shrink back from doing these awful things will *surely* be moved by a speech (meaning, they will not). He warns the senators that their position requires restraint and a certain detachment, also in order to avoid possible criticism on their conduct.¹⁹⁷ The note that many before him have presented their opinion “coherently and magnificently” is probably ironical. The irony is enhanced by the meaning of *composite*, which can also mean “orderly”, “in composed fashion”; this forms a stark contrast with their frightening words and surely alarming performance.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁴ “For my wish to enjoy a safe Republic together with you is as genuine as the fact that, although in this case I am being rather severe, I am moved not by cruelty of the mind—for who is milder than I?—but by an exceptional humanity and compassion.” (*Nam ita mihi salva re publica vobiscum perfrui liceat ut ego, quod in hac causa vehementior sum, non atrocitate animi moveor —quis enim est me mitior?—sed singulari quadam humanitate et misericordia.*) VRETSKA 1976, MCGUSHIN 1977 and RAMSEY 1988 all refer to *Cat.* 4.11 by way of literary comparison or as a “Quelle”, but they do not explore the intertextual possibilities. Cf. DRUMMOND 1995: 41. PÖSCHL 1970: 370 does not exclude the possibility that Caesar is pointing his arrow at Cicero here.

¹⁹⁵ Actually, as TANNENBAUM 2005: 214–217 shows, in the end Caesar’s argument is also meant to instil fear in the senators.

¹⁹⁶ *Cat.* 51.9.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.* 51.12–15.

On a narrative level, *plerique dixerunt composite atque magnifice* certainly refers to the speakers who had expressed their opinion before Caesar; of these the historiographer only mentions the consul designate D. Junius Silanus (*Cat.* 50.4). However, since the reader knows about and has access to Cicero's contribution on that day, the reference to *plerique* also recalls Cicero's *Fourth Catilinarian*, particularly with regard to the catalogue of horrors Caesar mentions—for it was Cicero who had inserted such terrifying war catalogues in his orations against Catiline, especially in the fourth:

*Nunc si hunc exitum consulatus mei di immortales esse voluerunt ut vos populumque Romanum ex caede miserrima, coniuges liberosque vestros virginesque Vestalis ex acerbissima vexatione, templa et delubra, hanc pulcherrimam patriam omnium nostrum ex foedissima flamma, totam Italiam ex bello et vastitate eriperem, quaecumque mihi uni proponetur fortuna subeatur.*¹⁹⁹

If the immortal gods now want this to be the end of my consulate, that I save you and the Roman people from wretched bloodshed, your wives and children and the Vestal virgins from a most cruel abuse, the temples and shrines, this splendid fatherland of us all from the foulest flames, the whole of Italy from war and destruction—then, whatever fate is set before me alone, let it come.

While Drummond has focused on *Cat.* 4.11–13 as being the strongest intertext (or, in his words: source) for Caesar's speech, and *Cat.* 4.12 indeed offers a similar war catalogue as the one just quoted, the opening of the *Fourth Catilinarian* probably resounded more prominently in the minds of the historiographers and his readers. The repetition of these themes throughout the *Fourth Catilinarian* intensifies its character as the type of pathetic war rhetoric Caesar rejects. When Caesar describes the rape of maidens and boys, children taken away from their parents and mothers being abused, shrines and houses despoiled, fire

¹⁹⁸ In this phrase we can recognize the careful construction of the two speeches by Caesar and Cato. MCGUSHIN 1977: 261–262 points the reader to Cato's "weapon of irony": he remarks that Caesar spoke *bene et composite* about life and death earlier in the debate. PÖSCHL 1970 reads the words as part of Cato's argument about the changed meaning of words: what used to be *bene et composite* is not anymore. However, there is more to be said. Caesar had probably used the phrase *bene et composite* with irony when referring to the previous speakers, since he did not agree at all with their use of *pathos*. In applying the same phrase to Caesar's speech, Cato fires his own joke back at him.

¹⁹⁹ Cic. *Cat.* 4.2.

and bloodshed everywhere, the reader's memory of Cicero's rhetorical catalogues is activated, which contained similar elements (the attack on boys and Vestal virgins, children and mothers alike, the whole city destroyed and burning). The verbal reminiscences between Caesar's catalogue of horrors, which exemplifies the pathetic approach he criticizes, and the image Cicero constructs in the *Fourth Catilinarian* create a strong connection between their contributions to the senatorial debate on 5 December.

Vretska already observed that Caesar gives the debate a decisive ethical spin and sidelines the juridical aspects of the punishment.²⁰⁰ Yet it is also tempting to read Caesar's speech as a direct rebuke of Cicero's *Catilinarians* and, in general, of his style full of pathos.²⁰¹ While at first sight reflecting predominantly on the harmful aspects of public oratory for the future of the Republic, the concrete example Caesar adduces to illustrate the rhetoric of his fellow citizens also represents the main thrust of the *Fourth Catilinarian*.²⁰² It will be Cato's task to apply the final blow to this type of Ciceronian rhetoric.

3.3 CATO'S MORALLY IMPROVED RHETORIC OF WAR

Cato's contribution turns Caesar's argument around: it is not fear for *crudelitas* which will benefit them in the future. The danger is not that the senators will be too cruel; it is that they will act too leniently. Cato advises the senators "to be careful that that mildness and compassion, when they take up their arms, does not end in misery for yourself" (*ne ista vobis mansuetudo et misericordia, si illi arma ceperint, in miseriam convortat*).²⁰³ His argument closely approaches Cicero's in *Cat.* 4.11–13

²⁰⁰ VRETSKA 1976: 514. Overall, Sallust shows little interest for the legal aspects of the conflict: see DRUMMOND 1995. SKLENÁŘ 1998 explores how Caesar and Cato's language echoes Sallust's own moral views.

²⁰¹ It is also tempting, therefore, to interpret the speech as Sallust's rejection of Cicero's style. For the idea of Sallust's "anti-Ciceronian style", SYME 1964: 111, 257; cf. Woodman 1988: 120–127. However, I will not address this question further since it adds little to the analysis of Cicero's political image in the text.

²⁰² FELDHER 2012: 102–103 notes the irony (and ambiguity) in Caesar's denunciation of the catalogue of horrors; this kind of "graphic", emotionally impressive "tableau" is exactly what Sallust used in his *proemium* to demonstrate the decline of the Republic. Cf. KAPUST 2011: 68, "If Caesar's speech is designed to calm, Cato's [...] is designed to inflame."

(see above), who argues that compassion for the conspirators is paramount to cruelty against the country and will result in its destruction.²⁰⁴ Indeed, the solution, according to Cato, is not clemency but capital punishment. With a combination of reproach and exhortation, he assures the other senators that, if they would like to maintain their precious goods—their wealth, their joyful lives—they should stand up for the republic and claim it (*expergiscimini aliquando et capessite rem publicam*). This is no trivial matter, for their freedom and their lives are at stake (*libertas et anima nostra in dubio est*).²⁰⁵ The term *libertas*, which marks the *exordium* of the speech, captures Cato's republican ideals.²⁰⁶

Cato's defence of traditional republican values finds its expression in rhetorical strategies that strongly resemble the argumentation of the *Fourth Catilinarian*. All of them are designed to create a feeling of crisis that should enforce immediate action. Cato's speech shows a high frequency of imperatives and direct appeals to the senators; the feeling of urgency inherent in these imperatives is accompanied by exhortations to act fast.²⁰⁷ Furthermore, Cicero and Cato's speech emphasize in similar terms that the rebellion is not yet fully extinguished, and the enemy is encroaching upon the city (see also the quotation below).²⁰⁸ Cato, just like Cicero in the *Fourth Catilinarian*, treats the conspirators as enemies and traitors of the country; he, too, points out that they have been caught red-handed and have even confessed to their crime.²⁰⁹

²⁰³ Cat. 52.27. Cf. 52.11, where Cato claims that *misericordia* and *mansuetudo* have lost their true value anyway, for good deeds and selflessness are hard to find in Rome's corrupt society.

²⁰⁴ Cic. Cat. 4.12: ... *si vehementissimi fuerimus, misericordes habebimur; sin remissores esse voluerimus, summae nobis crudelitatis in patriae civiumque perniciē fama subeunda est*.

²⁰⁵ Cat. 52.5–6.

²⁰⁶ This subject will be treated in detail in chapter 2, § 2.2.

²⁰⁷ Compare Cat. 52.5 (*expergiscimini aliquando et capessite rem publicam*), 17 (*habetote*), 19, 26 (ironical), 32–33 (ironical), 35 (*properandum est*) with Cic. Cat. 4.3 (*consulite, prospicite, con-servate*), 4.4 (*incumbite ad salutem rei publicae*), 4.6 (*statuendum est ante noctem*).

²⁰⁸ Cat. 52.17 and 24 (*Gallorum gentem infestissimam nomini Romano ad bellum arcessunt; dux hostium cum exercitu supra caput est*) and Cic. Cat. 4.4 (*sollicitantur Allobroges, servitia excitantur, Catilina accersitur; id est initum ... imperi calamitatem relinquatur*), 4.6 (*huic si paucos putatis affines esse, vehementer erratis: latius opinione disseminatum est hoc malum ...*).

²⁰⁹ Cat. 52.25 (*hostibus*), 30 (*crudelissimis parricidis*), and 25 (*intra moenia deprehensis*), 36 (*con-victi confessique sint caedem, incendia ... de confessis, sicuti de manifestis rerum capitalium, more maiorum supplicium sumendum*); cf. Cic. Cat. 4.5 (*haec omnia indices detulerunt, rei confessi sunt, vos multis iam iudiciis iudicavistis*).

The final passage before the actual proposal sums up the different elements of Cato's argument quite well, and it is here in particular that we see verbal reminiscences of Cicero's incentive rhetoric against Catiline:²¹⁰

*Sed undique circumventi sumus; Catilina cum exercitu faucibus urget; alii intra moenia atque in sinu urbis sunt hostes, neque parari neque consuli quicquam potest occulte: quo magis properandum est.*²¹¹

But we are surrounded from all sides; Catiline is pressing our throat with his army; other enemies are inside the walls and in the heart of the city, and it is impossible to prepare or to deliberate in secret: all the more reason to make haste.

The idea of the enemy within the city, and Catiline and his army threatening from the outside, as well as an emphasis on the necessity of wiping out the roots of the conspiracy are very familiar from not only the *Fourth*, but all the *Catilinarians*. The rhetoric Cato is seen to employ here exactly matches the consul's urgent calls on the senate and the people in November-December to take measures against the conspirators.

However, although the language used here is provocative, Cato's contribution is free from the type of war catalogues that Caesar condemned in his oration, and which were so typical of Cicero's *Fourth Catilinarian*. The oration as a whole sounds rather like a lecture by an angry school master, in line with Cato's reputation for Stoic severity,²¹² who castigates the Roman senators for their corrupt manners: Cato compares the integrity and industriousness of the ancestors with the greediness (*avaritia*), extravagant living (*luxuria*), and indiscriminating ambition (*ambitio*) of the current generation. Virtue is measured according to success.²¹³ "It is not surprising," Cato says, "when you all lead your lives each for yourselves, when at home you are a slave of

²¹⁰ For examples, see § 1.1 and n. 19. Compare especially *Cat.* 2.2 (*hanc urbem, quam e suis faucibus ereptam esse luget*) and 3.1 (*[urbem] e flamma atque ferro ac paene ex faucibus fati ereptam*) for the term *faucibus*; *Cat.* 1.5 (*eorum autem castrorum imperatorem ducemque hostium intra moenia atque adeo in senatu videmus...*), 1.31 (*periculum autem residebit et erit inclusum penitus in venis atque in visceribus rei publicae*), and 2.11 (*domesticum bellum manet, intus insidiae sunt, intus inclusum periculum est, intus est hostis*) for emphasis on the enemy inside the walls. VRETSKA 1976: 603 gives most of these Ciceronian parallels, but does not analyse the effect of the similarities. For the use of *parricida* see e.g. *Cat.* 1.29, 33; 2.7, 22.

²¹¹ *Cat.* 52.35.

²¹² See chapter 2.

²¹³ *Cat.* 52.21–22.

your lusts, and here in the senate of money and favours, that an attack is made on the rudderless Republic.”²¹⁴ Thus, Cato’s rhetoric of crisis ultimately aims at remedying a moral crisis that surpasses the matter at hand. One aspect of this view is that nowhere in his speech is he concerned with his own reputation or the consequences of the harshness of his verdict—his proposal is presented as the result of a superb ethical awareness. His speech therefore lacks the personal tone of Cicero’s oratory, which divides society into good and bad, and which places himself in the center as both a possible victim of the events and the heroic leader of the state.

Cato and Caesar’s speeches are surely representative of the rhetoric that filled the forum and the senate in November–December 63; the speeches now extant must only be a small sample of the public oratory of that period. Cicero in his important function as consul will have contributed greatly to the rhetoric of war with his *Catilinarians*, making the people and the senate increasingly susceptible to deciding in favour of the capital punishment.²¹⁵ Yet the *Conspiracy of Catiline* presents a rather different view on the success of the speeches against Catiline, and especially the *Fourth Catilinarian*. As discussed above, speeches in historiography often reflect (on) political and moral problems. Salust uses the speeches of Caesar and Cato to present a specific picture of ‘virtuous’ oratory, an oratory that has a wholesome effect vis-à-vis the corrupted Roman political body. Moreover, while Cicero, in his published consular speeches, gave precedence to his own voice, Salust refocused the narrative on the importance of two different, equally prominent voices that add a new interpretation to the dominant Ciceronian discourse on the conspiracy.

In the antilogy, the historiographer at once counters, modifies, and overwrites Cicero’s speech of 5 December. As we have seen, Caesar’s speech constitutes a subtle response to Cicero’s *Fourth Catilinarian*; there are no direct references, but the terms in which he describes the speeches of his fellow senators strongly recall the pathetic rhetoric

²¹⁴ *Ibid.* 52.23: *Neque mirum: ubi vos separatim sibi quisque consilium capitis, ubi domi voluptatibus, hic pecuniae aut gratiae servitis, eo fit ut impetus fiat in vacuam rem publicam.*

²¹⁵ Cf. FLOWER 2006: 101. The tenor of the *Fourth Catilinarian* (though probably revised heavily after 63, as argued by Lintott 2008: 17–18, 147–148) is also pro-execution; but in fact, it was already in the first words of the *First Catilinarian* that Cicero suggested Catiline should be killed (*Cat.* 1.2).

characterizing Cicero's speech. Cicero's *Fourth Catilinarian* has thus been established as being one of the main intertexts for the Sallustian debate, but at the same time questions have been raised about the validity of its rhetorical techniques. In a next step, Cato's speech exemplifies a 'proper' rhetoric of crisis, applying similar arguments and imagery as found in the *Fourth Catilinarian*, but removing the rhetorical exaggerations and widening its scope to Roman society as whole. By taking the moral high ground, Cato's oration surpasses the *Fourth Catilinarian* in value and effect. This is confirmed by the internal audience of his speech: it is he who is praised to the skies by the other senators for his display of virtue, and it is his proposal that is finally accepted.²¹⁶ The rhetoric of the *Fourth Catilinarian* is evoked in the Sallustian debate only to be discarded by Caesar and overwritten by the contribution of Cato the Great.

4. Conclusions

4.1 CICERO STANDS CORRECTED

The un-staging of Cicero's rhetorical performances against Catiline is in line with Sallust's generalization and idealization of the consular figure in the narrative. We have seen that Sallust takes over certain prominent themes from Cicero's account of the uprising, such as a focus on (civil) war, the strong antagonism between Catiline and Cicero and the delicate position of the consul. However, while Sallust records many of the details regarding Cicero's achievements, he minimalizes them at the same time by leaving them without comment and stripping them from the public praise that was awarded to Cicero in 63. Furthermore, the focalization of Cicero's personal experience of the events, so crucial to the Ciceronian account, is formulated as the type of ethical challenge

²¹⁶ *Cat.* 53.1, "As soon as Cato takes his seat, all ex-consuls and a great part of the senate praise his proposal, and they praise his virtue to the sky; they chastise each other and call each other cowards. Everyone considers Cato to be brilliant and great; the senate decides in favour of his vote." (*Postquam Cato adsedit, consulares omnes itemque senatus magna pars sententiam eius laudant, virtutem animi ad caelum ferunt; alli alios increpantes timidos vocant. Cato clarus atque magnus habetur; senati decretum fit sicuti ille censuerat.*)

any political leader might face. While the imperial historiographers comment upon Cicero's excessive self-praise as one of the qualities that made him highly unpopular in the years after 63, Sallust has corrected Cicero's exaggerated view of his own deeds by giving him no special valour or virtue. Therefore, he is able to leave the controversy over the consul's attitude out of his account and present the consul that Cicero *should* have been. Sallust's account of the debate on 5 December continues the impression that the consul acted entirely according to protocol and in the service of the state, and adds a new layer of meaning in his modification of the consular image by evoking Cicero's Catilinarian rhetoric in the speeches of Caesar and Cato. These men, who are, contrary to Cicero, explicitly praised by the narrator for their virtue,²¹⁷ express principles that do not match the style or content of Cicero's *Catilinarians*. Again, as in the narrative, there are strong allusions to and concordances with Cicero's version of the events. But Caesar and Cato reject the more sensational rhetorical techniques used, in order to present a type of rhetoric that is informed by moral concerns rather than personal or populist ends.

Within historical narrative, silence is a tool that can have different consequences. It can be used to protect and defend the memory of historical individuals. As noted above (§ 2.2), within the political sphere the decision to cover something (up) can have therapeutic and constructive effects. Writing in the unstable political climate of 42 BC invited subtlety and carefulness in the choice of one's protagonists. This could be one reason why Sallust's description of Cicero's actions is less a testimony to his personal achievements than a general portrayal of good leadership. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the triumviral proscriptions, it might have been safe to conceal the eloquence with which Cicero had recently demonized Mark Antony and because of which he was allegedly killed. In this regard, silence can also be applied for the benefit of commemoration: in order to give Cicero his proper place in the narrative, Sallust needed to downsize the effects of his eloquence, which otherwise would cause controversy.²¹⁸ However, while this is a

²¹⁷ Cf. *Cat.* 53.6, where the historiographer confirms that the character and morals of Caesar and Cato ought not to be passed over in silence (*silentio praeterire non fuit consilium*).

²¹⁸ Cf. VINITZKY-SEROUSSI & TEEGER 2010 on 'bland commemoration', a type of forgetting which omits certain interpretations of historical events in order to construct a narrative that can be accepted and shared by a broad audience.

valid hypothesis that must in part be true, the silences in the text also appear to convey a moral message about Cicero's controversial self-praise. The *Conspiracy of Catiline* corrects several 'Ciceronian' features of the *Catilinarian* discourse, such as the consul's focus on self-sacrifice (which is generalized), and the sensationalist rhetoric of the *Catilinarians* (which is countered then overwritten). The moral criticism on Cicero's behaviour in and especially after 63 BC thus finds its expression in the chastening of his figure in Sallust's historiography.

4.2 THE START OF ANOTHER TRADITION

As mentioned before, Sallust's representation of the events of 63 BC was not based purely on the Ciceronian corpus. There were other interpretations and stories about the conspiracy, and one in particular seems to have influenced the *Conspiracy of Catiline*: the story of Cato's role in the debate of 5 December. In a letter to Atticus from 45 BC, Cicero complains about the recent biography of Cato written by Junius Brutus, Cicero's protégé and Cato's nephew, which, according to him, misrendered Cato's as well as his own role in the debate on 5 December. Cato, in fact, was not the first to propose the death penalty; this proposal was made by everyone except Caesar.²¹⁹ However, Cicero says, Cato's speech is given the spotlight (by Brutus) because he expressed the shared opinion more convincingly and elaborately (*quia verbis luculentioribus et pluribus rem eandem comprehenderat*).²²⁰ Cicero is even more outraged by Brutus' presentation of his own actions. I am praised, he says, "because I brought the matter before the senate, not because I have revealed it, or exhorted the senate to take action, or finally because I gave my own judgment before I opened the floor for their reactions" (*quod rettulerim, non quod patefecerim, cohortatus sim, quod denique ante quam consulerem ipse iudicaverim*). On top of this, Brutus only praises Cicero explicitly with the meagre words "optimus consul".

Cicero's short description of Brutus' version of the events strongly recalls Sallust's representation of the consul. The Sallustian consul also

²¹⁹ *Att.* 12.21.1.

²²⁰ Note that the term *luculentus* is also used by Sallust to evaluate the *First Catilinarian* in *Cat.* 31.6, as Ramsey 1988 also notes *ad loc.*

exclusively leads the debate and does not express his judgment either. Indeed, in the *Conspiracy of Catiline* as much as in Brutus' biography, Cato's performance overshadows the actions of the consul, and his inflammatory rhetoric even replaces the consul's famous oratory. As Robert Broughton has already observed long ago, the dominant role of Cato is a sign that in the Catilinarian episode, the two traditions on Cato and Cicero converge.²²¹ At the time of Sallust's writing, Cato had recently died a republican hero, and legends about his Stoic manners and staunch patriotism were spreading. In light of Cato's status as a newcomer on the political stage, his contribution to the debate and its effect were more noteworthy than Cicero's fifth speech that year concerning the revolt.²²² Biographically speaking, the Catilinarian uprising was an important event in both their lives, but for Cato, it meant his true inauguration into politics and the first attestation of his Republican spirit.²²³ The debate in the senate furthermore illustrates the tension between Caesar and Cato, the urgency of which was proven by Cato's suicide in 46 BC. With the *Conspiracy of Catiline*, Sallust provided an important testimonium for later historians and antiquarians on his eloquence and fame.

The *Conspiracy of Catiline* planted the seed for the theme of Cato surpassing Cicero as the symbol of republicanism.²²⁴ In the imperial historiography, the image of Cato protector of the state would be further developed at the cost of Cicero's own promotion of republican ideals. In the next chapter, I will examine the aspects of republican *virtus* in greater detail, and discuss how the development of Cicero's political image was further constructed in close correlation with the legend of Cato's patriotism.

²²¹ BROUGHTON 1936.

²²² Including *In defence of Murena*.

²²³ See Vell. Pat. 2.35.1, who argues that on this very day Cato's virtue shone at its brightest. Cf. STOCKTON 1971: 340–342 on the debate in the senate, who hypothesizes that Cicero might have omitted Cato's speech from his own fourth Catilinarian speech in the publication process of 60 BC as some sort of revenge for his having gotten all the credit.

²²⁴ And not only in the historical tradition: Vergil opposes Catiline and Cato as paradigms of good (law-giver) and evil (punished criminal) in the Tartarus in *Aen.* 8.667, without making any mention of Cicero.

CHAPTER TWO

Cicero's republican virtue in the early Empire

*Et nosse et animo semper agitare conveniet.*¹

1. *Exempla* in Roman historiography

1.1 INTRODUCTION

In a letter to Atticus from September 44 BC, written from Leucopetra, in the south of Italy, Cicero has to defend his plans for a departure from Rome—plans which he broke off when he heard that Brutus and Cassius had called a meeting and asked all ex-consuls and ex-praetors to be present.² Atticus had accused his friend of inconsistency and of abandoning his country, and requested that Cicero write a formal apology even though he had at first approved of Cicero's decision to leave Rome.³

*Ergo id erat meum factum quod Catoni probare non possim? Flagiti scilicet plenum et dedecoris. Utinam a primo ita tibi esset visum! Tu mihi, sicut esse soles, fuisses Cato.*⁴

So then, I would not be able to justify my action to Cato? It is obviously full of shame and disgrace. Would that you had said so from the beginning! You would have been, as you're wont to be, my Cato.

¹ Quint. *Inst.* 12.3.29.

² *Att.* 16.7.1.

³ *Ibid.* 16.7.3.

⁴ *Ibid.* 16.7.4. Cf. *Att.* 16.1.6, June 44 BC: *Quintus filius mihi pollicetur se Catonem.*

When Cicero wrote this letter, Cato was already dead; justification to Cato is not a serious but a symbolical act. In fact, Cato's name and person are adduced here to represent exemplary behaviour, and in a twofold way. First, Cicero's decision to leave Rome is measured against Cato's (*olim*) standards. Cato is the model of conduct who defines the integrity of Cicero's action; that is to say, his opinion would tell whether Cicero's choice did not oppose any conservative aims in protecting the Republican institutions. In this particular case, the idea that one would be able to defend oneself against Cato stood paramount to being able to defending one's love for the Republic. In other words, Cato's figure symbolizes all that the Republic represents. This shift from the individual person to a collective symbol for republicanism is even clearer in the expression that Atticus was, in fact, Cicero's Cato. Here, the name alone stands for certain moral values that are embodied in republican convictions. Cato, even Cato's name alone, exemplifies the defence and the fight for the Republic to which Cicero himself was also committed. He has become Cicero's republican conscience.⁵

In their mutual defence of the state, Cato and Cicero had chosen different paths. Cicero's letters tell us a lot about Cato's political conduct. If the institutions of the Republic were at stake, one Cato could achieve more than all the judges in a court together.⁶ Cato the Younger, like his great-grandfather, was the kind of politician who dared to provoke, who dared to speak against a motion when everybody else was for it.⁷ He would rather die than watch the Republic be destroyed by individuals.⁸ However, this militant attitude was not always preferable. In the eyes of his contemporaries, his optimate mind, his perseverance, his irascibility and inflexibility also caused damage to the Republic.⁹ His refusal to cooperate with Caesar or Pompey was regarded as one of the direct causes for the formation of the First Triumvirate.¹⁰ As much

⁵ Cato has also been called, by modern scholars, the 'conscience' of Rome (RUSSO 1974: 66–92), or the 'conscience' of the optimate party (GRIMAL 1970: 93).

⁶ Cic. Att. 4.15.8.

⁷ Caes. BCiv. 1.32; Cic. Att. e.g. 1.13.3 (*instat et urget Cato*), 1.17.9, 4.17.4 (*ibi loquatur praeter Antium et Favonium libere nemo, nam Cato aegrotat*); Liv. Per. 105, 107.

⁸ Cic. Att. 4.18.4; Vell. Pat. 2.49.3; Sen. Ep. 95.70–72.

⁹ Cic. Att. 2.1.8; 2.21.1, *Nam iracundiam atque intemperantiam illorum sumus experti qui Catoni irati omnia perdiderunt* (59 BC). Cf. Fin. 3.88; Mur. 75.

¹⁰ Cf. Cic. Att. 2.9.1. For a historical analysis, see DROGULA 2019: 102–156, and esp. 135; cf. RUSSO 1974: 41–65.

as Cato refused to bend, Cicero was prone to compromise. For example, instead of opposing Caesar in the debate over his introduction of a new agrarian law in 59 BC, as Cato did, Cicero supports Pompey and Caesar for the sake of *concordia*.¹¹ He flirts with the idea of making Caesar “a better citizen”, which meant he would placate and support him in the final hope of winning him over.¹² Cicero even reproached Cato for displaying such an obstinate optimate spirit and refusing to compromise.¹³

This heroic model in which Cato displays almost superhuman qualities in remaining true to himself and to the Republic only intensified after Cato's death in 46. After his suicide, panegyric pamphlets were written in his honour, which in turn invited anti-Catonian writings by the Caesarian party. Brutus wrote a biography of Cato and Cicero penned a eulogistic pamphlet; Caesar and Hirtius produced an *Anticato*.¹⁴ With the *Conspiracy of Catiline* of 41, Sallust established an important literary memorial for Cato's virtue, as we have seen in chapter 1.¹⁵

If Cato was the ultimate symbol of republicanism, where did that leave Cicero, who was equally well known for his public defence of the state, the ultimate cause of his death in 43? In the present chapter, we will approach the question of the immortalization in early imperial historiography of Cato and Cicero as representatives of the Roman Republic. §1 will focus entirely on the dynamics (and mechanics) of cultural symbolization, what modern scholarship has called the process of exemplarity: how does one person and even a single name come to exemplify specific Roman (republican) values or an entire political

¹¹ *Att.* 2.1.6–8.

¹² What it meant theoretically is much harder to grasp. Rendering someone a *melior civis* would mean something like winning the person over to the optimate party or to the cause of the conservative politicians. Cicero also uses the phrase in connection with Hirtius, consul of 44 BC: *Att.* 14.20.4 (*quod Hirtium per me meliorem fieri volunt, do equidem operam*), cf. 14.21.4.

¹³ *Att.* 2.1.8. This letter contains the famous dictum that Cato debates as if he were living in Plato's *Politeia*, not in Romulus' cesspit: *dicat enim tamquam in Platonis πολιτεία non tamquam in Romuli faece*. DROGULA 2019: 118 analyses the difference between Cicero and Cato's policy: “Whereas Cicero spoke about the need for a strong consensus among the propertied classes, Cato pushed for a society in which the old families that championed ancient values would be preeminent.”

¹⁴ *Cic. Att.* 12.4.2, 12.41.4, 12.44.1, 13.46 (Brutus' *Cato*), *Fam.* 6.7.4, *Or.* 35; *App. B.Civ.* 2.99; *Cass. Dio* 43.13; *Plut. Caes.* 3.4, *Cic.* 38–39; *Gel.* 16.8, 13.20; *Tac. Ann.* 4.34; *Juv. Sat.* 6.337–338; *Plin. Ep.* 3.12; *Quint. Inst.* 7.9.12; *Suet. Jul.* 56.5; *Servius A.* 6.841.

¹⁵ Cf. GOAR 1987: 18–21, who concludes his account of Sallust's Cato on the note that “We are well on the way to that canonization of Cato which we find in Lucan a century later.” (21).

movement? For a Roman, exemplarity offered the most important lens through which to view history, and through the commemoration and memorialization of historical models it provided lessons and established norms and values for present generations.¹⁶ In order to understand the portrayal of republican figures in Roman historiography, one first needs to grasp how this categorical thinking in *exempla* influenced the interpretation of their actions and the ways in which these were given historical value.

In §§ 2 and 3, I will discuss the image of Cato and Cicero in early imperial texts about the republican history, using the framework of exemplarity to explain how the imperial writers connect their historical *personae* to specific types of ethical and political virtue. As we will see, the stories about Cicero and Cato's career start to diverge considerably in the first century, portraying the former as a man who symbolizes the fall of the republican aristocracy and the latter as a final bulwark of republican liberty. In my discussion of the works of Valerius Maximus and Velleius Paterculus and of Lucan's historical epic, I will pay special attention to the ways in which Cicero and Cato are not just depicted as Roman moral exemplars or political symbols, but also as *leaders* of the Roman people, who magistrated the course of events in the final period of the Republic and whose lives were closely connected with its fall.¹⁷

1.2 THE CULTURE OF EXEMPLARITY

1.2.1 *Exemplarity as a form of cultural discourse*

The term *exemplum* derives from *eximo*, 'to take out' or 'sample' something. Its basic meaning divides into four main categories: 1) a 'sample' taken from larger material 2) an *example* which can be used to demonstrate or illustrate something; 3) a model (of excellence) which is worthy of imitation; or 4) a copy or an image.¹⁸ During the last dec-

¹⁶ A short, useful overview of how Roman historiography is rooted in exemplary thinking is ROLLER 2018: 17–23.

¹⁷ LUSHKOV 2015 argues that, in fact, the actions of politicians (magistracy) are the pivot on which the discourse of exemplarity in Roman historiography revolves.

ades there have been many different approaches to exemplarity and the nature of the historical *exemplum*. I will first discuss the concept of exemplarity before turning to its manifestation in the *exemplum*.

Exemplarity can be defined as a cultural process,¹⁹ as discourse or dialogue,²⁰ or as a mode of historical thinking and commemoration.²¹ It is difficult to gauge how tradition and exemplarity functioned in daily life within the private lives of the Roman people. Historical individuals who are presented as having performed admirable deeds are almost exclusively elite and male, with the exception of a few female heroines.²² To analyse the phenomenon of exemplarity we have (restricted) access to, for instance, coins, state monuments, and other features of the city space,²³ or to the genre of historiography, which was the most important literary form of historical commemoration.

The emphasis on the traditions and figures of the past was part of Roman state policy; the past was institutionalized and publicized to an extent that is now difficult to understand. The literary sources alone cannot offer us sufficient insight into the all-pervasive presence of the *mos maiorum*, and the way in which the memory of historical and mythological individuals contributed to a collective vision of Rome, a history in which all citizens were expected or could expect to share.²⁴

¹⁸ TLL s.v. *exemplum*. See also ERNOUT & MEILLET 1985: 204–205, “*Exemplum* est proprement l’objet distingué des autres et mis à part pour servir de modèle”. Cf. KORNHARDT 1936 for an etymological and semantic study of the Latin term and concept *exemplum*.

¹⁹ BELL 2008.

²⁰ ROLLER 2004–2018; CHAPLIN 2000.

²¹ HÖLKESKAMP 2003 and 2006; LOWRIE 2007; WALTER 2004.

²² Cf. BELL 2008; WISEMAN 2014; ROLLER 2018: 9–10. Teresa MORGAN and Rebecca LANGLANDS have made important attempts, however, to emphasize the broader impact of exemplary thinking on non-elite groups in society: MORGAN 2007 and LANGLANDS 2018. LANGLANDS does this (pp. 166–225) by introducing the concept of abstract ‘sites of exemplarity’, by which she does not mean physical locations or monuments (*lieux de mémoire*) in the cityscape, but the collective memory of the people.

²³ As Tonio HÖLSCHER and Karl-Joachim HÖLKESKAMP have done in their frequent studies on memorialization and monumentalization in Rome; seminal for our understanding of the republican and imperial (re-)construction of urban space is FAVRO 1988. HÖLSCHER 1984, 2001 discusses the presence of *exempla* in the public space by means of visual commemoration.

²⁴ I will not specifically engage here with the political ideological nature of *exempla*, but rather focus on its ethical aspects; for the ‘institutional’ interpretation of exemplarity, see e.g. LUSHKOV 2015; WALTER 2004; HÖLKESKAMP 2004a: 169–198; HALTENHOFF 2003; COUDRY & SPÄTH 2001. Aug. RGDA 8.5 (COOLEY 2009) illustrates this function of *exempla*: “By the introduction of new laws I have restored the examples of our ancestors which had grown out of use in our age, and I myself have exercised many model deeds for later generations” (*legibus novis me auctore latis multa exempla maiorum exolescentia iam ex nostro saeculo reduxi et ipse multarum rerum exempla*

The city was marked by triumphal monuments carrying inscriptions that related the achievements of great generals, and it was decorated by annual celebrations at temples featuring the names of the famous individuals who had erected or restored them.²⁵ One could view honorary columns and statues in the Forum of historical individuals who had died but were still present in the heart of the city. As well, one could visit all the theatres, circuses, and baths that carried the names of noteworthy statesmen who had built them for the benefit of Rome and her people. On top of these visual markers, the city rang with the continuous verbal appeal to valorous generals and virtuous statesmen in Rome's past (and present) in the speeches held in the Forum, the Field of Mars, or wherever the senate or people convened. During the Empire the building works of republican politicians still filled the public space, and their statues or *imagines* decorated the fora as well as private houses. Somewhere in the city were also the temples which Cicero and his family had renovated and honoured by public ceremony, or the houses they had built. In the residences of later admirers there were possibly portraits to be seen and perhaps even statues of Cicero.²⁶ Rome's cityscape was full of stimuli for recollection, meant simultaneously to demonstrate and preserve the connections between the past and the present.²⁷

imitanda posteris tradidi). Note that the Greek translation has πολλῶν πραγμάτων μείμνημα ἑμαυτὸν τοῖς μετέπειτα παρέδωκα ("I have handed myself down to future generations as a model of many actions"). COOLEY 2009: 144 also usefully refers to Vell. Pat. 2.126.4 (Tiberius). KRAUS 2005 demonstrates how in the writings of Caesar and Augustus, the discourse of exemplarity begins to be dominated by the autocrat.

²⁵ See HÖLSCHER 2006: 101 on "monumentale Geschichte" and memorials as "Träger" of this history. On the permanence of monuments in relation to literary forms of commemoration, cf. HÖLSCHER 2001; BELL 2008 (monuments transmitting *exempla*); WISEMAN 2014; POPKIN 2016; FAVRO 1984. In his study of the visual means of historical commemoration Peter HOLLIDAY 2002: 219 states quite firmly that "historical commemorations stand out by communicating with a visual language that could affect all viewers on some level and ... remained etched in the memory more effectively than any written or oral treatment." Cf. HÖLKESKAMP 2014: 70, "the key concept is interdependence", i.e. of monuments, texts, and oral tradition.

²⁶ In 54 BC Cicero restored the Temple of Tellus in name of Quintus and probably also himself, and placed a statue of Quintus near or in the temple: Q. fr. 3.1.14. During his consulship he erected anew the Statue of Jupiter Optimus Maximus on the Capitol (*Cat.* 2). His house on the Palatine was famous, both for its previous owners and Clodius' demolition of it: cf. Vell. Pat. 2.14 and 45. Perhaps there hung or stood an *imago clipeata* of Cicero in the Bibliotheca Apollinaris on the Palatine among those of the other orators: cf. Tac. *Ann.* 2.37 and 83. We know that Cicero was donated a gilded statue by the people of Capua (*Pis.* 25) and statues for him and his family were erected in the Heraion at Samos: see SEHLMAYER 1999: 215–216. The emperor Alexander Severus would have had a *simulacrum*,

The culture of exemplarity has a twofold orientation: it is pragmatic as well as normative.²⁸ It offers the individual a concrete set of behavioural rules ('lessons'), and by de- and prescribing these rules confirms the norms and values of society as a whole. The discourse of exemplarity therefore enhanced social cohesion and stability, as has often been noted, although when used negatively *exempla* could equally have a destabilizing effect.²⁹ The emphasis on the ethical aspects of exemplarity and on *exempla* as predominantly moral stories (see below) has increased in recent decades.³⁰ Rebecca Langlands, in her influential study *Exemplary Ethics in Ancient Rome*, has demonstrated that exemplarity is above all a discourse of (Roman) morality, in which all members of the community participated in order to develop and reflect on ethical knowledge.³¹ Although Roman exemplarity concentrates around the words and deeds of politicians and magistrates, it is good to realize that these were regarded, ultimately, as models for instruction and imitation. Within the world of Roman *exempla*, there was a very fine line between politics and ethics.³² The discourse of exemplarity highlights 'heroes',³³ men who symbolize patriotism and (military or civilian) valour, and who acquired a form of distinction within the community that encompassed moral virtue, civic leadership, and political influence all at the same time.

One of the most influential reconstructions of the actual mechanics of exemplarity within the Roman world is provided by Matthew Roller. Roller presents the concept of an exemplary "loop", a process of exemplarity consisting of four "operations".³⁴ The first moment or 'operation' of exemplarity is the performance in the public eye of a deed (of valour or vice) by a Roman citizen. A second stage concerns the evaluation of this performance by his fellow citizens, who "convert it

portrait, of Cicero in his second *lararium*, as is recorded in the *Augustan History* (Alex. Sev. 31.4).

²⁷ HÖLKESKAMP 2006: 264 has described this as the "Erinnerungslandschaft" of Rome; cf. REA 2012.

²⁸ See, e.g., ROLLER 2009: 216; HÖLKESKAMP 2003: 215–216; STEMMLER 2000.

²⁹ See STEMMLER 2000: 179–191.

³⁰ See LUCARELLI 2007, and SKIDMORE 1996 for an ethical and social interpretation of Valerius Maximus' *exempla*.

³¹ LANGLANDS 2018; cf. ROLLER 2018: 13–17.

³² LUCARELLI 2007: 11; LANGLANDS 2018: 70–74.

³³ LANGLANDS 2018: 29–31.

³⁴ ROLLER 2004: 4–6, ROLLER 2009: 216–217, and most recently ROLLER 2018: 4–10.

into a 'deed' with implied or explicit normative force".³⁵ In a third step, the deed of valour is publicly commemorated with the erection of a monument, the consecration of a material space for its memory, in literary texts, etc. Lastly—and here the 'loop' is completed—these monuments in the public space generate a normative debate about recommendable Roman values, which leads (ideally) to the imitation of the historical deed;³⁶ and so the cycle continues.³⁷ Roller's theory works so well because it offers a solid framework for analyzing exemplarity *without* imposing a rigid scheme upon historical processes. Every battle, political conflict, or military success knew its own course and result, and Romans themselves did not have strict criteria for awarding valour to 'heroic' citizens. Instances of Roman *virtus* could be shaped by different qualities like *pietas*, *sapientia*, *clementia*, or *fortitudo*, which in turn could manifest themselves through many different kinds of behaviour.³⁸ This is what Martin Bloomer has called 'multiple exemplarity', the phenomenon that an *exemplum* can comprise several virtuous qualities, and the historical hero can take over several qualities from other famous Roman predecessors.³⁹ The centre of gravity within the whole cycle of exemplarity lies not with the criteria for evaluation, but with the evaluation itself. *Exempla* receive their value from being questioned, debated, accepted, and then appropriated by the community. The only person who has no influence whatsoever on the value attrib-

³⁵ ROLLER 2004: 6.

³⁶ While ROLLER 2004: 5 presents the final step to be 'imitation', ROLLER 2018: 8 adjusts this to 'norm setting', leaving the action of imitation out of the 'exemplary loop' and shifting the discussion to the ethical ramifications of exemplarity. LANGLANDS 2018: 86–111 recognizes the importance of imitation (what she calls 'modeling' or 'replicatory imitation' [at 100]) and emulation for the process of exemplarity, but problematizes its results. According to her, in order to be successful imitation required a highly developed awareness of ethical principles, including knowledge of how to implement ethical rules in different social contexts; cf. pp. 8–9. Cf. also LANGLANDS 2011 and LANGLANDS 2020, which further theorizes the concept of imitation.

³⁷ Cf. ROLLER 2004: 7, "these ubiquitous opportunities for debate and contestation are the lifeblood of exemplary discourse".

³⁸ This approach has been further developed by LANGLANDS 2018 with respect to the audience of the *exempla*; by the, as she calls it, 'multivalency' of *exempla*, the audience became familiar with the complexity of ethical thinking, and the fact that good and bad, basically all values, should be (re-) defined depending on the social context ('situational ethics'). On situation ethics see also LANGLANDS 2011; MORGAN 2007. For a seemingly exhaustive overview of the categories of virtue in *exempla*, see ALEWELL 1913 on Valerius Maximus. For other analyses of Roman virtues, see LITCHFIELD 1914 on the entire 'national' exempla tradition; MORGAN 2007: 122–159 on Valerius Maximus; SCHMITZER 2011 on Velleius.

³⁹ BLOOMER 2011.

uted to their deeds is, ironically, the ultimate creator of it, the historical individual involved in the action.

1.2.2 *The exemplum as cultural tool for thinking*

Whereas exemplarity could be described as a general commemorative discourse (both visual and literary) by which the relation of the present to the ancestors and traditions of the past is defined, the single instance of the historical *exemplum* is a concrete instrument for interpreting past events and individuals. Uwe Walter has defined the *exemplum* as the “wichtigste kognitive Grundfigur römischen historischen Denkens”.⁴⁰ Within the framework of Rome’s “Geschichtskultur”, as Walter defines it, the *exemplum* is a “mode” or a “Modell”, or even a “code”, by which the Romans could interpret the past meaningfully and symbolically with respect to the present institutions.⁴¹ In this and the next section, we will focus on the use of *exemplum* in its meaning of historical model: the commemoration of a deed or a personality is the first constituent part of an *exemplum*. The other two constituent parts are its strong moral-didactic quality and its narrative unity.⁴²

In modern scholarship, there exist, roughly speaking, three main interpretations of the function of the Roman *exemplum*: the *exemplum* as role model—a conceptualization which I will reject—the ambiguous conceptualization of the *exemplum* as either a rhetorical argument or a historical narrative, and the *exemplum* as a commemorative story about past individuals or events. First, then, we will examine the definition of the *exemplum* as a ‘role model’, the cornerstone of Henriette van der Blom’s study of Cicero’s models. In this case *exemplum* stands for an individual (or sometimes an event) whose qualities or actions constitute a source of imitation for others.⁴³ Weaker meanings

⁴⁰ WALTER 2004: 5; cf. ROLLER 2004: 16 on the discourse of exemplarity as “cognitive framework”, and LANGLANDS 2018: 100–111 on two functions of *exempla* (of six in total) she calls ‘cognition’ and ‘discernment’.

⁴¹ WALTER 2004, ch. 2, esp. 51–62 on the *exemplum* as “Modell des Vergangenheitsbezugs”.

⁴² Cf. LANGLANDS 2018: 29–36 on the “core elements” of the *exemplum*, being the ‘hero’, the ‘story’, and the ‘moral’.

⁴³ VAN DER BLOM 2010: 68 defines the *exemplum* as “a specific reference to an individual, a group of individuals, or an event in the past...”, but uses the term almost exclusively to refer to historical individuals.

are also possible, i.e. the *exemplum* merely as an exemplary figure, a person worthy of admiration.⁴⁴ This interpretation of the *exemplum* is related to and perhaps has its origins in the rhetorical argument of authority, the *auctoritas exempli*. The use of *exemplum* for ‘authority’ or ‘role model’ seems to be a derivation of the notion of the *exemplum virtutis*. The *exempla virtutis* provided the canonical list of exemplary deeds performed by Rome’s most famous generals and politicians.⁴⁵ In Roman oratory, the virtuous deeds are frequently equated to the individuals who performed them; the characteristic virtue and the famous name could be employed interchangeably to illustrate morally correct conduct.

However, there is a difference between a role model and an *exemplum*, as Sinclair Bell has convincingly argued. The concept of the role model is reserved for individuals from recent history displaying very specific positive qualities, whereas an *exemplum* can denote a spectrum of entities or behavioural aspects; it can be derived from either past or present; and it is put in a certain narrative format.⁴⁶ Employing the term *exemplum* for an individual in their entirety is a simplification that is not justified by the ancient descriptions of the term, and reduces modern scholars to a rigidity of interpretation that creates more complexities than it solves.

Secondly, scholars like to distinguish between a rhetorical or ‘logical’ and a historical *exemplum*. In practice this distinction is not very useful. The first definitions we have from antiquity indeed concern the use of the *exemplum* in formal oratorical contexts, but these always include a historical component. For Aristotle, the *paradeigma* is a form of proof that resembles induction and therefore works by way of anal-

⁴⁴ Influential studies which adhere to this translation are GOWING 2005, 2013; LOWRIE 2007 who discusses Cicero and Augustus’ interest in ‘making an *exemplum* of themselves’; STEMMLER 2000.

⁴⁵ Cf. LITCHFIELD 1914, still a seminal article on *exempla virtutis* in the Roman culture. In her influential analysis of the semantics of the term *exemplum*, KORNHARDT 1936 in fact allows for such a shift of meaning, in which an *exemplum* can develop from a mere sample or individual token of someone’s behaviour into a complete, exemplary personality (“Gesamtpersönlichkeit”), see 50–52, 55–59.

⁴⁶ BELL 2008: 3 suggests the term “template” for a role model rather than *exemplum*. DRESSLER 2015: 149 employs *exemplum*, ‘paradigm’, ‘template’ interchangeably for Cicero’s historical figure. Cf. LANGLANDS 2018: 31, “The core element of narrative is something that sets the Roman *exemplum* apart from the modern role model or the moral exemplar.”

ogy.⁴⁷ He does make a distinction between different types of *exempla*, but the categories he mentions are the historical and the fictional *exemplum*.⁴⁸ The definitions offered by the Latin rhetoricians are equally historically oriented. The *Rhetor ad Herennium* defines an *exemplum* as a “representation of something someone has done or said in the past, with specific mention of the person’s name” (*exemplum est alicuius facti aut dicti praeteriti cum certi auctoris nomine propositio*, 4.62). Cicero, in his *On Invention*, calls the *exemplum* “that what confirms or weakens the case by the authority or misfortune of a particular individual or event” (*exemplum est, quod rem auctoritate aut casu alicuius hominis aut negotii confirmat aut infirmat*, 1.49). According to Quintilian, an *exemplum* is the mention (or: reminder) of something that has been done or that could hypothetically have been done, and which is useful for making a persuasive point: *rei gestae aut ut gestae utilis ad persuadendum id quod intenderis commemoratio*.⁴⁹ Interestingly, in contrast to the definitions of the Rhetor and Cicero, Quintilian’s emphasis lies on the deeds themselves, the *res gestae*, not on the individual performing these deeds.⁵⁰

In these definitions, all examples are based on a certain analogy, and they are all constructed in relation to the past.⁵¹ The distinction between ‘logical’ and historico-symbolical *exempla* is a matter of scholarship rather than a question inherent to the material, as Fuhrmann has shown.⁵² In any case, the formal, rhetorical aspects of the *exemplum* have led modern scholars to define it as an “anecdote”, a fable, or a story, with the aim of manipulating the audience rather than expressing historical truth. In Martin Bloomer’s monograph on Valerius Maximus, for example, the attention is drawn away from Valerius’ historiographical aims by calling it a “collection of anecdotes”.⁵³ However, the

⁴⁷ On the basis of the definitions in Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, Michael STEMLER, in an extensive article from 2000, distinguishes between a logical and symbolical *exemplum*, between which the juridical precedent stands as a “Mischtypus”. The symbolical example, then, works because of the charismatic and meritocratic force of a historical personality.

⁴⁸ Arist. *Rhet.* 1393a28–1394a18. Cf. ALEWELL 1913.

⁴⁹ Basic definition, at *Inst.* 5.11.6.

⁵⁰ *Contra* ALEWELL 1913: 26: “das historische Beispiel handelt im Gegensatz zu *eikon* und *parabole* stets von Personen, und zwar von historischen und bestimmten; von Sachen kann kein *paradeigma* genommen werden.”

⁵¹ Cf. also Arist. *Rhet.* 1368a29–31.

⁵² FUHRMANN 1973 on the development of the historical *exemplum*.

rhetoricizing, ahistorical nature of *exempla* is disputable.⁵⁴ Despite the *exemplum*'s atemporal character, the historical deed or event it thematizes is still recognizable, otherwise the *exemplum* would lose its relevance. *Exempla* work because, by creating an analogy with real or semi-historical individuals and collective deeds in the past, persons and actions in the present are given a meaningful foundation.

The third and final interpretation is also the broadest: the *exemplum* as a *factum aut dictum memorabile*:⁵⁵ an *exemplum* is a deed or expression, usually by an influential historical figure, that is worthy of record because it teaches us something.⁵⁶ Within the context of historiography this is surely the best road to approaching *exempla*, and resembles the historiographers' own views on the use of *exempla*. The phrase *factum aut dictum memorabile* might sound rather Valerian, but it has a broader basis in Roman thinking.⁵⁷ The famous *dictum* of Livy, which in itself has become an *exemplum* for ancient and modern scholars alike, clearly explains the function of *exempla* within historiographical narrative.⁵⁸ In his monument of Roman history, Livy says, he has provided *documenta*, proofs, of each *exemplum*, which the reader should follow either for his own sake or for the sake of the state in order to avoid a wrong course of action. Although Livy does not specify the meaning of *exemplum* it is clear he envisages active behaviour (*quod imitere capias* ... *quod vites*, 'choose something to imitate and to avoid')⁵⁹ and deeds

⁵³ BLOOMER 1992 is concerned with illustrating the rhetorical background to Valerius' work, and argues Valerius' method was unhistorical. His final judgment of Valerius is worth quoting: "He rambles on like a sententious conversationalist who cannot stop stringing anecdotes together and yet never tells all the details, or never builds his stories to full yarns, but darts along to another instance while the listener entertained, if a little put upon, tries to catch the thread." (10) Cf. ALEWELL 1913: 40. WIEGAND 2013: 150–155 discusses BLOOMER's approach in relation to other scholarship.

⁵⁴ BÜCHER 2006: 152–161; STEMMLER 2000: 165–179; cf. WALTER 2004: 53–55; WIEGAND 2013: 167–168 on the "Zeitdynamik" in Valerius Maximus. See also WIEGAND 2013: 153–154 for the argument that the "Rhetorisierung der *exempla*" mainly aims to improve their readability. During antiquity and in the Middle Ages the *exemplum* became almost a synonym for the fable or anecdote: cf. BREMOND, LE GOFF & SCHMITT 1982.

⁵⁵ See LUCARELLI 2007: 31; WALTER 2004; ROLLER 2004, 2009.

⁵⁶ Cf. CHAPLIN 2000: 3, the *exemplum* as a "guide to conduct".

⁵⁷ Val. Max. *praef.* 1; Quintilian uses the phrase *facta et dicta praeclare*, at *Inst.* 12.2.29.

⁵⁸ Liv. *praef.* 10. *Hoc illud est praecipue in cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te exempli documenta in inlustri posita monumento intueri; inde tibi tuaeque rei publicae quod imitere capias, inde foedum inceptu foedum exitu quod vites.* For further analysis of the use of *exempla* in Livy see CHAPLIN 2000.

⁵⁹ Cf. CHAPLIN 2000: 1.

rather than qualities (*inceptu* and *exitu* together referring to a completed action with a beginning and result). Ultimately, the fact or deed in question is *memorable* for the purpose of instruction and imitation.

Through the process of evaluation and commemoration described by Roller's 'loop', all events from Roman history can be turned into *exempla*.⁶⁰ This means that the *exemplum* in itself is quite a flexible means of communication. I have spoken about the rigidity that can result from regarding the *exemplum* as a specific person instead of something said or done. Indeed, one individual can offer multiple *exempla*, which need not be consistent with each other. For example, the figure of Cato in Valerius Maximus is used to demonstrate several different Roman values, and not specifically the values for which he was, to our modern ideas, best known. His name or actions do not occur under the rubric of *severitas*, while his actions provide an *exemplum severitatis* in 2.9.⁶¹ Similarly, he does not serve to exemplify the ethical quality of *constantia*, but he can be adduced as a figure of *continentia* and *moderatio*.⁶² As we will see, one of his most brilliant performances is in Valerius' chapter on *maiestas* (2.10), a quality that is otherwise not popularly employed in describing Cato, but within the chapter's assemblage of historical events makes for a perfectly fitting illustration of Cato's historical comportment.⁶³

Yet, with an eye to the literary texts discussed in §§ 2 and 3, it is good to note here that despite the flexibility of exemplary discourse the *exemplum* as a 'story' or narrative unit does run according to a certain pattern. Firstly, we have seen that Rhetor ad Herennium notes that a particular name should be connected to the *exemplum* in order to ensure its effect (something, in fact, which Livy above does not explicitly mention). Secondly, Quintilian's definition does state three basic elements of the historical exemplum, as Heinrich Lausberg also points out: the *exemplum* contains some historical (or pseudo-historical) content, it has a certain *utilitas*, and it is given some kind of literary

⁶⁰ Cf. LANGLANDS 2018: 62–65; ROLLER 2004: 7; BELL 2008: 11; LUCARELLI 2007: 29–33; BÜCHER 2006: 154–155; HÖLKESKAMP 2004a: 180; STEMMLER 2000; CHAPLIN 2000 (*passim*).

⁶¹ Cf. Cicero, who emphasizes Cato's quality of severity in *Mur.* 60–61, 74; *Sall. Cat.* 54.5 (*At Catoni studium modestiae, decoris, sed maxime severitatis erat*).

⁶² Cf. *Sall. Cat.* 54.3; *Sen. Constant.* 2.2., *Dial.* 5.38; *Val. Max.* 4.1.14 (*moderatio*), 4.3.12 (*continentia*). The chapter on *constantia* is 3.8.

⁶³ On the variability in the presentation of virtues, see ROLLER 2009: 225–228.

form.⁶⁴ How much detail is conferred on the exemplary event or figure is entirely up to the writer: they can narrate the situation or event completely, or merely allude to it—this allusion can consist of only a name, with which the audience might associate certain deeds or virtues.⁶⁵ It is useful to make a distinction between these two forms of references; Francesca Mencacci has done this for the Roman *viri illustres* by suggesting a category of *narratives* or stories (*racconti*), and of reuses in various manifestations (*riusi*). According to Mencacci, narratives (*racconti*) make an attempt at characterizing the hero and establishing ('fixing') their cultural value or significance.⁶⁶ Short allusions to famous men or their deeds (*riusi*), however, do not invite such moral reflection, and are mainly used as arguments *ex auctoritate*. Consequently, the former category is seen mainly within historiographical or historical texts, and the latter in oratory or *testi di tipo retorico*.⁶⁷ One could debate the generic distinction Mencacci makes, but as a whole her theory works quite well to explain the different formats in which Romans could encounter and employ ancient *exempla*. Egon Flaig, in one of the best analyses of processes of commemoration and forgetting in the Roman tradition, has demonstrated that as a result of such fixed patterns in exemplary stories historical individuals eventually lose their multidimensionality, and only their best-known achievements are preserved in the collective memory.⁶⁸ As we will see, this has great influence on the reputation of Roman politicians, whose careers and characters are reduced to only the most salient aspects.

1.2.3 Conclusion: defining the exemplum

The ephemeral nature of the *exemplum* makes it a difficult and, obviously, popular subject of study. It has no clear format other than the three elements of historical content, narrative structure, and moral-didactic

⁶⁴ LAUSBERG 2008: 228, "Das *exemplum* hat also eine inhaltliche Quelle, eine *utilitas*-Funktion und eine literarische Form."

⁶⁵ So also Quint. *Inst.* 5.11.15–16.

⁶⁶ Cf. ALEWELL 1913: 95–96.

⁶⁷ MENCACCI 2001, quotations at 421–422.

⁶⁸ FLAIG 1990: 61–65.

value. There are no rules for the minimum that is needed to call something an *exemplum*. According to Quintilian a name is enough,⁶⁹ but does that really count as an *exemplum* in itself? The implicit assumption is that the name of one of the *maiores* would evoke the recollection of a historical deed or episode in the minds of the audience, who had heard the whole story as a child, in school, or wandering about one of the many heroic monuments in the city. This elusiveness is part of modern theories of exemplarity: the final responsibility for the interpretation of the *exemplum* is placed with the people, the beholders, who decide upon its value in continuous debate.

Yet, before we enter upon the works of Valerius, Velleius, and Lucan, we should fix some criteria for analyzing *exempla* in order to understand the hallmarks of Cato's and Cicero's political image. Therefore, to recapitulate the above, let us pose the following. For the Romans, an *exemplum* is an action performed by an admirable individual in the (semi-) historical⁷⁰ past that is preserved in some kind of narrative form, with the aim of confirming norms and values for the present. It functions as a concrete cultural symbol carrying specific Roman values, and therefore as a point of orientation in the wide range of conventions and traditions of the Roman people (*mos maiorum*).⁷¹ All *exempla* serve to illustrate and establish the concept of 'Romanness',⁷² either *ex positivo* or *ex negativo*. An *exemplum* offers a model for virtuous behaviour. Basically, *exempla* are military or political in nature, but always approached from an ethical perspective (an action is either 'good' or 'bad', 'right' or 'wrong'). Since *exempla* function on the level of society, they address the question of citizenship and offer a particular vision on the role of the Roman citizen within his community. All exemplary discourse is directed at instruction and imitation: in order to function normatively, the deeds and words of the ancestors are presented as possessing a didactic value. *Exempla* have rhetorical features in order to make them more convincing (with regard to right and wrong behaviour), but that does not undermine their historical value as interpretations of the Ro-

⁶⁹ Quint. *Inst.* 5.11.16.

⁷⁰ Cf. ROLLER 2004: 8, 'mythistorical'; STEMMLER 2000: 168–179 on the tension between fiction and truth.

⁷¹ Cf. HÖLKESKAMP 2004a: 178.

⁷² This concept is not the same as our notion of 'identity', cf. HÖLSCHER 2008.

man past. The meaning of an *exemplum* is created by a form of consensus between sender/originator and receiver(s); an *exemplum* does not exist outside a communicative setting. There is, however, a certain canon of *potential exempla*, based on the recorded deeds of famous politicians of the past and established as such by generations of Romans who have repeatedly employed the same *exempla*. This canon is nowhere written down nor is it fixed, but it exists by grace of literary texts and the monumental landscape ('memory-scape') of the Roman world. Finally, *exempla* are flexible in nature and possess meanings that remain open for discussion and reinterpretation; their ethical value is not regarded as limited to a particular period in time.⁷³

1.3 CICERO AND CATO AS EXEMPLARY FIGURES IN VELLEIUS, VALERIUS, AND LUCAN

In the historiography of the (early) empire, writers continually engaged with the republican past. The discourse of exemplarity facilitates and funnels the commemoration of past events and people, as has been noted above. Valerius Maximus' collection of *exempla*, discussed below, is the culmination of the Roman obsession⁷⁴ with compartmentalizing and categorizing Rome's history according to particular moral values. Alain Gowing, in his comprehensive study *Empire and Memory*, has described the works of the early imperial writers as influenced by two main themes: the memorialization of the republican past and the continuation of republican traditions. With regard to Valerius Maximus and Velleius Paterculus, Gowing states that they "view the Tiberian regime as an extension of the now-restored Republic."⁷⁵ However, in order to make the republican past suitable for the present it needed to be recorded in such a way that it could offer "new paradigms" to the imperial community, and, ultimately, to the emperor, to whom their works are addressed.⁷⁶ The project of (re)writing history thus serves

⁷³ Cf. ROLLER 2004, 'ethical analogy'; HÖLKEKAMP 2004a: 180 speaks of a "static *Raster*" that transcends temporality.

⁷⁴ FLAIG 1999: 62 calls it a "Manie, in alle politischen Fragen mit exempla zu argumentieren".

⁷⁵ GOWING 2005: 34.

⁷⁶ Velleius' work has a teleological outset, with all *exempla* leading to the greatest *exemplum* of Ti-

the construction of unity and continuity between the period before and after Actium. Within this continuous history, as Isabella Wiegand has shown, there is in fact room for the awareness of a 'break' in Rome's history, which is symbolized by Cicero and Cato as the two final conservative politicians.⁷⁷ However, at the same time, through the process of exemplarity by which historical figures were recontextualized and revalued on the basis of imperial interests and concerns, Cicero and Cato were turned into all-time models which transcend the particularities of their lifetime.⁷⁸ With regard to this concept of ahistorical models, the scholarship shows two routes in approaching these. Above I have already mentioned Martin Bloomer's thesis that Valerius Maximus' *exempla* demonstrate a rhetoricization of Roman history: the focus on the rhetorical aspects of Valerius' "anecdotes" leaves them devoid of (most of their) historical and political import.⁷⁹ In reaction to this argument about rhetoricization recent studies have emphasized instead the ethical value of exempla as instruments to teach and disseminate Roman morality.⁸⁰ However, this approach still tends to move away from the idea that exempla would have any political value. In the particular case of the commemoration of Cicero and Cato's career, a certain amount of "depoliticization" is thought to have been necessary in

berius' reign (cf. SCHMITZER 2000 and 2011; GOWING 2007); of book 2, chs. 103–131 are filled with an account of Tiberius' career, culminating in a *laudatio* of the emperor in 126–131. GOWING 2007: 417 even goes so far as to say that *exempla* are not meant as "paradigms" for imitation by citizens anymore, but to "substantiate the unparalleled greatness of the emperor, the *princeps*". Valerius addresses the emperor in the preface of his work as the ultimate judge of the virtues and vice discussed in his work (*certissima salus patriae, Caesar, invoco*; cf. WEILEDER 1998: 45–50). It is also thought that he offers a kind of "mirror" of the imperial propaganda: WEILEDER 1998. LEVICK 1976: 82–91 discusses the key values (virtues) or 'slogans' of Tiberius' reign, and addresses the expression of these values in Valerius Maximus' work.

⁷⁷ WIEGAND 2013: 168.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* 169–173 frames this process of recontextualization and reevaluation as a form of "Überblendung", when historical figures are isolated from their historical contexts or stripped of any problematic features, and thus "made harmless" (169) in the eyes of the imperial readership.

⁷⁹ BLOOMER 1992; cf. CARTER 1975: 36, "In other words he has compiled the ancient equivalent of a Dictionary of Quotations." Cf. WEILEDER 1998: 16–20 on the prejudice that Valerius' work is mainly a rhetorical handbook. Indeed, Valerius as well as Velleius are often seen as representatives of early imperial declamatory education, which is one of the reasons why their work is often analysed for its rhetorical features, and historiographical themes are thought to be derived from declamatory subjects. See most recently KEELINE 2018 and SILLETT 2015, who discuss Velleius and Valerius in the same breath as the Roman declaimers.

⁸⁰ This approach is illustrated by the work of Teresa MORGAN (2007) and Rebecca LANGLANDS (2011–2020). Cf. SKIDMORE 1996.

order to avoid a conflict between the description of their republican convictions and imperial ideology.⁸¹

I believe we should adopt a more comprehensive approach to *exempla*, which is neither completely political, purely ethical, nor exclusively rhetorical. In this chapter, I will approach the exemplary portraits of Cicero and Cato from the perspective of political ethics. ‘Political’ in the studies mentioned is often interpreted as political-ideological, i.e. the advertisement of political beliefs as part of a political agenda. Yet in its less pregnant meaning, political also simply refers to all that is related to government organization and engagement in public affairs.⁸² It is this last meaning of political (‘related to or concerned with public affairs’) which I would like to explore in this chapter. While I will certainly highlight below the imperial historiographers’ moralization of these optimate leaders, I argue that this moral reevaluation rather serves the propagation of public or civic norms and values. Moreover, in illustrating virtues and values that match the long-time morals and traditions of Rome’s community, the Catonian and Ciceronian *exempla* do not interfere with the imperial politics of the time. Valerius and Velleius offer attractive moral vignettes of republican heroes whose actions have been transformed into more general forms of patriotism, and therefore fit seamlessly in their imperial ethics. Lucan, whose *Civil War* as a whole aims at the memorialization of a specially violent episode in the history of Rome and her citizens, records a more pessimistic view on the Republic,⁸³ but nonetheless adopts a similarly ethical lens as Velleius and Valerius.

In §§ 2 and 3, I will examine how the political careers of Cicero and Cato were interpreted in the context of the Republic’s fall. I will do so by addressing the moralization of their words or achievements in exemplary narratives, but also by looking at the simplification of these achievements into singular ethical principles. As we will see, these principles sometimes belong to the realm of philosophy, especially

⁸¹ GOWING 2005 develops this argument in multiple chapters, but see, e.g., 79 on the “depoliticized” nature of the imperial Cato and Cicero. On the silence about Cicero’s republican beliefs in the early Empire, see KASTER 1998 (“an icon that is politically impotent”); GOWING 2013; DRESSLER 2015.

⁸² The *OED* s.v. ‘political’ A.3 lists 6 meanings, among which only one is concerned with partisanship or ideology.

⁸³ See now GALTIER 2018, who follows in the footsteps of GOWING 2005.

in Cato's case, but more often they relate to civic morality in general. One of the central questions is to what extent and on what level Cicero and Cato's republicanism is thematized, symbolized, and turned into a general frame of civic morals, which was applicable to imperial situations. Furthermore, this chapter will flesh out the relation between the icon-like figures in the works of Valerius and Velleius and the narrative reinterpretation of these icons offered by Lucan: while the Tiberian authors focus on singular virtues and heroic actions, Lucan's portrayal highlights political relations and addresses the nature of republican leadership.

It should be noted here that in line with this argument, I will argue against the idea, popular among modern scholars, that within the works discussed in this chapter, the figure of Cato is a symbol of the Stoic sage. The *Civil War*, in particular, is thought to be a response to this philosophical interpretation of Cato's historical figure.⁸⁴ I believe that, while the early imperial portrayal of Cato certainly includes or refers to key values within Stoic philosophy, these philosophical aspects ultimately contribute to the interpretation of his deeds as a statesman. In understanding Cato's political ideology as Stoic we are perhaps misled by the portraits of Cicero and Seneca the Younger, who especially contributed to the image of Cato as a practitioner of Stoic philosophy and the embodiment of Stoic ideals.⁸⁵ In *In defence of Murena*, Cicero presents Cato as a man whose every action is informed by strong moral principles, in particular the philosophy of the Stoa.⁸⁶ While nature has endowed Cato with the virtues of honesty (*honestas*), authority (*gravitas*), temperance (*temperantia*), greatness of mind (*magnitudo animi*), and justice (*iustitia*), Cicero says, Cato applies to these a "doctrine which is not moderate or mild, but, as it seems to me, somewhat too

⁸⁴ For the image of Cato as a "Stoic hero" in Lucan's poem (see BARTSCH 2009: 493), MARTI 1945 is seminal. See also JOHNSON 1987: 35–66; GEORGE 1991; SKLENÁŘ 2003: 59–100; HILL 2004: 213–236. RUSSO 1968: 93–106 opts for the more nuanced definition of "practicing Stoic"; cf. BARTSCH 1997: esp. 118–120. For a recent discussion problematizing Cato's status as a symbol for Stoicism, DROGULA 2019: 296–314 (but consider also MORRELL 2021 on the limits of DROGULA'S approach); cf. PECCHIURA 1965: 79.

⁸⁵ Actually, Cicero alone sets forth the idea of Cato *Stoicus*; the thought that Cato himself was a Stoic does not even feature in Seneca: cf. Cic. *Parad. Stoic.* pr. 2.5, *Brutus* 118.5–6, *Mur.* 74.1; cf. Quint. *Inst.* 11.1.70 on the passage in *In defence of Murena*. Cf. *Fin.* 3.7.5–6 on Cato studying surrounded by books written by the Stoic philosophers. Cf. RUSSO 1974: 95–96.

⁸⁶ Cf. Cic. *Mur.* 61–64.

harsh and rigid for either truth or nature to bear” (*accessit istuc doctrina non moderata nec mitis sed, ut mihi videtur, paulo asperior et durior quam aut veritas aut natura patitur*).⁸⁷ In the ethical treatises of Seneca, Cato’s behaviour provides the moral standard for the Stoic *sapiens*. To cite the words of Robert Goar, “Seneca, aware that Stoics must be able to point to a historical person who actually realized their austere ideal of the *sapiens*, in order to be able to offer some hope to their adherents; and sincerely believing that Cato was such a man, here defines him as the perfect Roman example of the *sapiens* and consistently uses him as such in his writings.”⁸⁸ Seneca’s description of Cato in the opening of *On the Constancy of the Wise Man* is often quoted as typical for the treatment of Cato throughout his treatises:

*Pro ipso quidem Catone securum te esse iussi; nullam enim sapientem nec iniuriam accipere nec contumeliam posse, Catonem autem certius exemplar sapientis viri nobis deos immortalis dedisse quam Ulixen et Herculem prioribus saeculis. Hos enim Stoici nostri sapientes pronuntiaverunt, invictos laboribus et contemptores voluptatis et victores omnium terrorum.*⁸⁹

For Cato’s own sake I commanded you to keep calm, for no *sapiens* can suffer injustice or insulting words; and that the immortal gods have given us a truer exemplar of the wise man in Cato than in Ulysses or Hercules in the previous age. For our Stoics declare these men wise who are invincible in labour, who look down on feelings of desire and who conquer all terrors.

Inspired by Cato’s suicide, Seneca presents Cato as not only a figure-head of republican *libertas*, but as a man who embodied freedom to the extent that he is free mentally and emotionally.⁹⁰ However, although Cato is an inspirational model for Stoic *sapientia* in Seneca’s treatises, he is also often portrayed in relation to the fall of the Republic.⁹¹ Especially in the letters, Cato emerges as a political exemplar, a republican hero whose death constituted a statement about the importance of liberty and illustrated his refusal to choose the side of a(ny) dictator.⁹² He

⁸⁷ Cic. *Mur.* 60.

⁸⁸ GOAR 1987: 36; cf. PECCHIURA 1965: 59–71.

⁸⁹ *Constant.* 2.1.

⁹⁰ For the narrative of Cato’s death, see e.g. *Ep.* 13.14; 24.6–8; 71.15–17. On the popularity of Cato’s suicide as a theme in rhetorical education as well as the historical tradition, RAUH 2018; GOAR 1987: esp. 51–102; TANDOI 1965–1966; KER 2009: 54–56; cf. FEHRLE 1983: 279–302.

⁹¹ E.g. *Prov.* 2.9–12; *Tranq.* 16.1–4. Cf. KER 2009: 247–279, esp. 255–256.

⁹² On Cato’s politics in the letters, see GRIFFIN 1968.

is depicted as a man fully devoted to the Republic.⁹³ The identification of Cato with the Republican or with republican ideology, as we will see, is a constitutive part of his image in the texts discussed below.

The early imperial concentration on singular deeds or sayings as illustrations of virtue or vice greatly affected the imperial legacy of Cicero and Cato's career. The most notable result is that the traditions around the careers of Cicero and Cato start to diverge considerably when it comes to their connection with the Republic and the methods by which they reach their political goals. Whereas the early imperial figure of Cicero is only occasionally identified with the Republic and with political virtue in general, the image of Cato functions as the personification of republican *virtus*. An extreme example of this distinction can be found in Tacitus' *Annals* book 4, his record of the trial of Cremutius Cordus in 25 AD.⁹⁴ Cremutius would have excessively praised Brutus and Cassius, and is accused of *maiestas*, an offence against the authorities. In a speech which according to the commentators reflects Tacitus' own concerns and interests,⁹⁵ the historiographer defends the separation of literature and politics, and places himself in a tradition of historical writing practiced by Livy, Asinius Pollio, and Messala Corvinus who all discussed Brutus, Cassius, Pompey, and other anti-Caesarians in a positive light.⁹⁶ And take Cicero, Cremutius says, "what has the dictator Caesar done in response to that book of him, in which he praises Cato to the heavens, other than write a speech in return, as if they were in court?" (*Marci Ciceronis libro, quo Catonem caelo aequavit, quid aliud dictator Caesar quam rescripta oratione, velut apud iudices, respondit?*) Cremutius' point is that a writer's political views can and should not be judged on the basis of one's choice of topic, which is why in this case Cicero is necessarily divorced from the republicanism Cato here stands for. Cicero offers the form, Cato the content. Cicero is only a vessel for the republican ideas that Cato, essentially, represents.⁹⁷

⁹³ *Ep.* 14.13; 95.69–71, esp. 70 (*ostendit aliquas esse et rei publicae partes*); 104.30 (*cum alii ad Caesarem inclinarent, alii ad Pompeium, solus Cato fecit aliquas et rei publicae partes*).

⁹⁴ On Aulus Cremutius Cordus, see LEVICK 2013.

⁹⁵ MARTIN & WOODMAN 1989: 177; KOESTERMANN 1965: 118–119. WISSE 2013 is now the best study of the relationship between Tacitus' own historiographical reflections and the speech of Cremutius; the starting point, however, should be SUERBAUM 1971.

⁹⁶ *Tac. Ann.* 4.34.2–35.3.

⁹⁷ Cf. SUERBAUM 1971: 77 and n. 42 on the literary nature of the competition between Cicero,

While this example is a rather radical reduction of Cicero's career,⁹⁸ which disregards his defence of the Republic in 63 and against Antony in 44–43 BC, a similar disinterest in Cicero's political ideology can be recognized in the works of Valerius, Velleius, and Lucan, to the benefit of Cato's reputation as spearhead of the Republic. Yet, this thesis turns against the idea that Cicero was remembered in the early imperial period only for his oratory of eloquence and not for his historical value or republican ideals, an idea which is quite widespread and countered only on occasion.⁹⁹ Cicero is an exemplary Roman citizen, but his life offers a varied range of *exempla*. These are not always categorized under core Roman virtues, but they always do represent the central values of Roman society life.

2. Republican heroes in Valerius Maximus and Velleius Paterculus

2.1 CICERO'S (A)POLITICAL QUALITIES

2.1.1 Velleius' celebration of a statesman

Velleius' *Roman History* offers a portrait of Cicero who is at once an intellectual and political hero; it strongly emphasizes his contribution to the state.¹⁰⁰ The first time Cicero is mentioned is in book 1, in

who wrote the Cato, and dictator Caesar, who wrote an Anticato. However, he does point to the political implications of the Cato.

⁹⁸ It is also differently oriented than the fragments we have in Sen. *Suas.* 6.19 and 6.23, where Cremutius describes Cicero as the *princeps senatus Romanique nominis titulus* (19) and as an eminent *civis*, who experienced many private and public feuds (*simultates*) (23).

⁹⁹ Most explicitly voiced by GOWING 2013: 236, "as a historical figure [Cicero] possessed little clout. This is not to deny him his importance in the course of events in the waning years of the Republic, but he had not earned through his actions a place in the Roman moral and ethical universe that manifested itself in the ever-evolving *exemplum* tradition." Counter voices are, on Velleius Paterculus, SCHMITZER 2000: 184–189; on Valerius Maximus, WIEGAND 2013: 130 on the "beinahe symbolische Identifizierung Ciceros mit der res publica".

¹⁰⁰ The best study of Cicero's exemplary nature in Velleius is still GOWING 2005, who devotes only five pages to the subject (44–48); WIEGAND 2013: 130–131 continues along the same lines, but offers too little to be truly convincing.

a description of Rome's literary tradition. Cicero is presented as the summit of Latin eloquence, the master (*princeps*) of all oratory and prose.¹⁰¹ In book 2 of his work, however, Velleius rather focuses on political *exempla*. One of the most important achievements in this regard is the disclosure of the Catilinarian conspiracy, which also gives us some insight into the main Ciceronian qualities the historiographer connects with this episode.

*Per haec tempora M. Cicero, qui omnia incrementa sua sibi debuit, vir novitatis nobilissimae et ut vita clarus, ita ingenio maximus, quique effecit, ne quorum arma viceramus, eorum ingenio vinceremur, consul Sergii Catilinae Lentulique et Cethegi et aliorum utriusque ordinis virorum coniurationem singulari virtute, constantia, vigilia curaque aperuit. Catilina metu consularis imperi urbe pulsus est; Lentulus consularis et praetor iterum Cethegusque et alii clari nominis viri auctore senatu, iussu consulis in carcere necati sunt.*¹⁰²

During this period M. Cicero, who owed his career entirely to himself, a most noble newcomer, whose life was as brilliant as his genius was great, and who prevented that we would be surpassed in intellectual activities by those whom we had conquered in arms—when he was consul he disclosed with extraordinary courage, steadfastness, alertness and care the conspiracy of Sergius Catiline, Lentulus and Cethegus as well as other men of both ranks. Catiline was driven from the city by his fear of the consular power; the ex-consul Lentulus and Cethegus, praetor for the second time, and other famous men were killed in prison at the authority of the senate and the command of the consul.

Velleius explicitly praises the intellectual abilities (*ingenio maximus*) with which Cicero conquered the conspirators, in line with the Ciceronian image of the togate consul (see chapter 1, §1.2). He revealed the conspiracy, and he did this with extraordinary courage (*virtus*),¹⁰³ constancy (*constantia*), alertness (*vigilia*), and care (*cura*). His role as consul is emphasized no less than three times; first juxtaposed with the names of the revolutionary senators Catiline, Lentulus, and Cethegus, secondly in reference to his consular power in expelling Catiline from the city; thirdly with regard to his responsibility for the execu-

¹⁰¹ Vell. Pat. 1.17.3.

¹⁰² *Ibid.* 2.34.3–4.

¹⁰³ Compare Velleius' praise of Cato's role in the debate on 5 December, where again the term *virtus* is used to define Cicero's ('the consul's') behaviour, in 2.35.4 (see below).

tion of Lentulus and Cethegus, in Velleius' account the leaders of the conspiracy in the city.¹⁰⁴ Velleius' concern with Cicero's consular status can be explained by his admiration for Cicero's success in Roman politics despite his *novitas*; the belief that this climb to the top was well deserved is illustrated in the phrase *vir novitatis nobilissimae* and the remark that "he owed all of this to his own efforts".¹⁰⁵ Velleius' *exemplum* distinguishes itself from Sallust's account by praising in explicit terms Cicero's *virtus* and *constantia*. It is rather in accordance with Cicero's own laudatory image of his consular achievements, which were reached solely through the powers of his intellect.

We also catch a glimpse of Ciceronian propaganda in Velleius' account of the Clodius affair and Cicero's exile.¹⁰⁶ As a result of Clodius' machinations, the historiographer notes, "a man who had served the state so well by saving the fatherland, got as a prize the misfortune of exile" (*ita vir optime meritis de re publica conservatae patriae pretium calamitatem exilii tulit*). Cicero is further portrayed as a victim of Caesar and Pompey's enmity against him, due to the fact that he did not want to assist in the execution of Caesar's Campanian law of 60.¹⁰⁷ Cicero's precarious position, taking the middle stance in political disputes, recurs at multiple moments in Velleius' *History*.¹⁰⁸ At the point when the civil war between Pompey and Caesar is about to erupt, Velleius reflects and confirms the Ciceronian ideal of protecting the Republic by mediation (see above, § 1.1). Velleius' account of 49 highlights Cicero's fight for concord; in nicely alliterating terms, the historiographer notes how Cicero was trying to maintain civic harmony in an unparalleled fashion (*unice cavente Cicerone concordiae publicae*).¹⁰⁹

While it is Cicero's mediating skills which are praised in the years between the consulate and the death of Caesar, it is his protection of the Republic that marks Velleius' portrayal of Cicero in his final years.

¹⁰⁴ In Sallust's *Conspiracy of Catiline*, Cicero is connected only with Lentulus' punishment (*Cat.* 46.5, 55.2).

¹⁰⁵ Cf. 2.128 on the 'nobility' of *homines novi*, where Velleius also mentions Cicero.

¹⁰⁶ See now SILLETT 2015: 196–197. Cf. WOODMAN 1983: 65; ELEFANTE 1996: 321, ad 45.2 notes "il linguaggio è naturalmente ciceroniana". On Ciceronian stylistic features in Velleius, cf. MASLAKOV 1984: 458–459; WOODMAN 1975; DIHLE 1955.

¹⁰⁷ Vell. Pat. 2.45.2.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. *Ibid.* 2.58.4 and 2.62.1 on Cicero's mediating role in the aftermath of Caesar's murder.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.* 2.48.5. On the importance of *concordia* and *consensus* as a theme within imperial ideology, see LOBUR 2008, who separately studies Velleius and Valerius.

Moreover, while this fight is praiseworthy in itself, it also offers models of good and bad. The *Philippics* are discussed as a famous *exemplum* of both Cicero's fight to preserve republican liberty and to suppress Antony's vice:

*Haec sunt tempora, quibus M. Tullius continuis actionibus aeternas Antonii memoriae inussit notas, sed hic fulgentissimo et caelesti ore, at tribunus Cannutius canina rabie lacerabat Antonium. Utrique vindicta libertatis morte stetit; sed tribuni sanguine commissa proscriptio, Ciceronis velut satiatio Antonio paene finita.*¹¹⁰

This was the time when M. Tullius in a series of speeches stigmatized Antony's memory forever, but he did so with a brilliant and divine voice, while the tribune Cannutius tore Antony apart with the rage of a dog. Their defence of liberty cost each of them their lives; but the proscription began with shedding the blood of the tribune, and it more or less ended with that of Cicero, as though Antony was satisfied.

In the final passage, 2.66, about Cicero's death, which "functions as an epitaph without actually being one",¹¹¹ Velleius rehearses and summarizes all the virtuous qualities he sees embodied by Cicero's career. This is the moment where the historiographer launches into his long complaint against Mark Antony.

*Abscisa scelere Antonii vox publica est, cum eius salutem nemo defendisset, qui per tot annos et publicam civitatis et privatam civium defenderat. Nihil tamen egisti, M. Antoni ... nihil, inquam, egisti mercedem caelestissimi oris et clarissimi capitis abscisi numerando auctoramentoque funebri ad conservatoris quondam rei publicae tantique consulis irritando necem.*¹¹²

By Antony's crime the voice of the public was beheaded, while nobody stood up for him, he who had stood up all those years for the concerns of the state as well as of private citizens. You have achieved nothing, M. Antony ... nothing, I say, have you achieved by paying a prize for that divine mouth and the severing of that most distinguished head; and by pronouncing a death contract for the murder of the one-time saviour of the Republic and such a great consul.

I will discuss only the elements most relevant to my argument, since this passage has been discussed elaborately in previous scholarship. Its

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.* 2.64.3–4.

¹¹¹ WOODMAN 1983: 145. Cf. PIERINI 2003: 33.

¹¹² Vell. Pat. 2.66.2–3.

content is usually considered to reflect the famous exercises in *Antonium* of the declamation schools.¹¹³ However, regardless of the rhetorical features, Isabella Wiegand has also rightly pointed to Velleius' identification of Cicero with the Republic.¹¹⁴ The historiographer calls Cicero *vox publica*, the voice of all citizens, which was perhaps somewhat of a topos in the early empire.¹¹⁵ Moreover, he twice emphasizes Cicero's rescue of the Republic.¹¹⁶ Again, here as in earlier passages, the terminology in the 'epitaph' recalls the slogans coined by Cicero himself. The idea that Cicero protected the fortune of both private citizens (*salutem privatam civium*) and of the Republic as a whole (*salutem publicam civitatis*) originates in the consular corpus. Furthermore, his main reputation is captured in the double epithet *conservator rei publicae* and *tantus consul*, in reference to both Cicero's self-fashioning slogans as well as Velleius' previous account of Cicero's consulship in 2.34.¹¹⁷

The term *virtus*, while present in the Catilinarian *exemplum*, does not occur in the final eulogy. It is rather immortality-through-eloquence that Velleius focuses upon:

*Famam vero gloriamque factorum atque dictorum adeo non abstulisti, ut auxeris. Vivit vivetque per omnem saeculorum memoriam, dumque ... rerum naturae corpus, quod ille paene solus Romanorum animo vidit, ingenio complexus est, eloquentia inluminavit, manebit incolume, comitem aevi sui laudem Ciceronis trahet omnisque posteritas illius in te scripta mirabitur, tuum in eum factum execrabitur citiusque [in] mundo genus hominum quam <M. Cicero> cedit.*¹¹⁸

¹¹³ Cf. WOODMAN 1975: 11–13 on the similarities of the passage with the genre of the *suasoria*; WOODMAN 1983: 144–145. However, SCHMITZER 2000: 185 believes that it is a “Zeugnis seines persönlichen Engagements”, here directly in reaction to GAMBET 1963: 135 who thinks that Velleius' sincerity is “suspect”. The most elaborate, recent discussion of the (declamatory) topic of Cicero's death is KEELINE 2018: 102–146; on Velleius specifically, see 118–125.

¹¹⁴ As part of the technique to present a *res publica continua*, see WIEGAND 2013: 122–132; 130–131 about Cicero as “Symbolfigur”. Cf. also BALMACEDA 2017 for Velleius' attempts to create a bridge between the Republic and Empire through the concept of virtuousness.

¹¹⁵ See the *laus Ciceronis* by Cornelius Severus in Sen. *Suas.* 6.26, which according to PIERINI 2003: 38 is perhaps the “archetipo” for all later ‘stereotypical’ descriptions of Cicero. See also Livy in *Suas.* 6.17 and Bruttidius Niger in *Suas.* 6.21. Cf. KEELINE 2018, ch. 3 on Cicero's death and 138–140 on Cornelius Severus' poem; 84–90 for an excellent analysis of the theme of Cicero as *vox publica*, where KEELINE also discusses Mart. 5.69.

¹¹⁶ Vell. Pat. 2.66.2, *qui per tot annos et publicam civitatis et privatam civium defenderat*; and 2.66.3, *ad conservatoris quondam rei publicae tantique consulis irritando necem*.

¹¹⁷ So also SCHMITZER 2000: 186 and KEELINE 2018: 123.

¹¹⁸ Vell. Pat. 2.66.4–5. I follow the reading of WOODMAN 1983.

But the fame and the glory of his deeds and words you have not taken away as much as intensified. He lives and will live in the memory of all ages, and as long as the universe ... remains intact, which he, nearly alone of the Roman people, saw in his mind, comprehended with his intellect, and illuminated with his eloquence, the universe will take as its companion through the ages the praise of Cicero. And every later generation will admire his speeches against you, and they will despise your action against him; the human race will sooner disappear from the world than Cicero's fame.

The qualities Cicero displays, as we will see in §2.2, are not equal to Cato's superior virtue. However, it is significant that Velleius explicitly acknowledges that Cicero provides *exempla* just as any other great Roman politician: it is his words (*dicta*) and deeds (*facta*) the glory of which will be remembered, and not (only) his eloquence. Eloquence is the medium, in Velleius' presentation of Cicero's political career, by which the statesman defended the Republic (cf. *fulgentissimo et caelestis ore* in 2.64.3, and *caelestissimi et clarissimi capitis* in 2.66.3). It is also the medium by which he has left to posterity the memory of Antony's deeds, which according to the historiographer made the memory of his own deeds even greater. This passage shows well that, even though for Velleius Cicero was the *princeps eloquentiae*, in the interpretation of the political history of Rome, the eloquence stood in the service of Cicero's civic aims.

From Velleius' compendium of Roman history emerges the picture of Cicero as a virtuous statesman. As a politician, he rescues the state, he mediates between political factions, and he tries to protect the *salus civitatis*. His intellectual abilities (*ingenium*) and his eloquence, praised in book 1, return in book 2 as instruments to represent the citizens and safeguard the constitution.¹¹⁹ What is important is that Cicero's exemplarity is founded on relatively few episodes from his career: the consulship, his relationship with Pompey and Caesar, the Clodius affair, and his great contribution to Roman politics after Caesar's assassination. Moreover, his virtuousness is reduced to a couple of qualities (*ingenium, eloquentia, concordia, conservator reipublicae*) which are often

¹¹⁹ CHRIST 2003: 66–67 has noted Velleius' special interest in the 'intellectual hero', himself examining Velleius' portrayal of Scipio Aemilianus.

based on Ciceronian slogans. Crucial Roman ethical concepts such as *constantia* and *virtus* occur only once and without much elaboration. Finally, the *Philippics* play a special role for Cicero's exemplary assets: not only because they attest of Cicero's divine eloquence and his defence of freedom, but also because they illustrate Antony's immoral conduct. With the *Philippics*, Cicero offered an important model of resistance against the anti-republican movement, and, in other words, a testimonium of republican virtue in opposition to Antony's vice.

2.1.2 Cicero's *humanitas* in Valerius' *Memorable Doings and Sayings*

About Valerius Maximus' portrayal of Cicero, Martin Bloomer has remarked: "The Cicero of Valerius' pages is ... an ornamental figure, marched out to illustrate apolitical themes."¹²⁰ Although 'apolitical' is too strong an interpretation of Valerius' shift of perspective, the republican virtue of his Cicero is rather hard to catch, especially in comparison with the Velleian portrait. Cicero figures in 8 chapters of the *Memorable Doings and Sayings*; Cato the Younger, in comparison, features in 12.¹²¹ The anecdotes about Cicero are of a dispersed nature. It is useful to give a quick overview of the stories where Cicero himself offers models of conduct:¹²²

- *De somniis*, 1.7.5: Cicero, when in exile, has a dream about Marius, which is interpreted as an omen that he will be recalled from exile (and he is, shortly thereafter).
- The *arcana consilia* of the senators (*patres conscripti*), 2.2.3: Apollonius Molon, the first foreign visitor of a senate meeting, is introduced here as the one who "honed the studies of Cicero"¹²³ (*qui studia M. Cice-*

¹²⁰ BLOOMER 1992: 191. Similarly, MASLAKOV 1984: 484, "What we see from the above sequence of exempla in Valerius (and Cicero) is that in the context of public political debate and in the courtroom these controversial characters became mere shadows of their disputed selves ... they were transformed into mere allusions, verbal symbols conveying a single message."

¹²¹ On Cato, see § 2.2.1 below.

¹²² Compare the discussion by SILLETT 2015: 219–223, which is very brief and is followed by an analysis of Valerius' use of Ciceronian sources; Cicero's political exemplarity is not SILLETT's main concern.

¹²³ Translation by Shackleton BAILEY 2000.

ronis acuit), who is called the “supreme power of Roman eloquence” (*summam vim Romanae eloquentiae*).

- *Qui ex inimicitiiis iuncti sunt amicitia aut necessitudine*, 4.2.4: Cicero's extraordinary humanity (*humanitas praecipua*). He defended A. Gabinius on a charge of *repetundae*; P. Vatinius he defended twice.
- *Idem*, 4.2.5: Cicero inspired P. Clodius with his deeds of kindness, who himself defended one Lentulus after having been himself accused by this man.
- *De ingratis*, 5.3.4: Popillius Laenas murders Cicero even though the latter had defended him in the past, and without any personal cause. Valerius describes Cicero's death as a criminal offence.
- *De testibus*, 8.5.5: Cicero testified in the case of Clodius, but his testimony is rejected.
- *Quantum momentum sit in pronuntiatione et apto motu corporis*, 8.10.3: Cicero's *In defence of Gallio* illustrates how an orator can expose at the same time a fault in the oratory of the opposing advocate and make an argument (*pariter et oratoris vitium detexit et causae periclitantis argumentum adiecit*); Valerius quotes from the speech.¹²⁴
- *De mortibus non vulgaribus*, 9.12.7: as praetor, Cicero oversaw the trial of C. Licinius Macer, who committed suicide in order to escape dishonourable punishment. Cicero refrains from pronouncing a verdict, thus saving the man's legacy and fortune.

Apart from these references to Cicero's public career, Valerius also used Cicero's writings as sources for anecdotes about other famous men.¹²⁵ In a chapter on old age, Valerius recounts that Masinissa king of Numidia was known for his power of endurance, the source of his information being, as he tells us, Cicero's *On Old Age*.¹²⁶ In contrast to Velleius, who frequently echoes Ciceronian phrases, Valerius is less keen on employing Ciceronian catchphrases.¹²⁷

As the above overview indicates, Valerius pays little attention to

¹²⁴ Cf. Val. Max. 8.10.3, with Cic. *Brut.* 278. Valerius quotes only the first line of a long fragment in the *Brutus*: *tu istud, M. Calidi, nisi fingeres, sic ageres?* (Cicero has *istuc* for *istud*). Cf. BRISCOE 2019: 172–174.

¹²⁵ It is generally known that Cicero's oeuvre was an important source for Valerius' compendium; an accurate overview of the bibliography on this subject is provided in BRISCOE 2019: 6. BRISCOE also gives us some idea of how pervasive Cicero's influence on Valerius' choice of *exempla* was at 7–8; cf. WARDLE 1998: 16–18 and SILLETT 2015: 223–236.

¹²⁶ Val. Max. 8.13 ext. 1.

¹²⁷ There is one notable instance in 8.5.5, see below. According to KEELINE 2018: 129 this is what connects the works of early imperial writers with the rhetorical schools, where one recognizes the “declamatory pattern of talking about Cicero in Cicero's own words”.

Cicero's *cursus honorum*. Cicero's political failures and successes chiefly provide the historical setting for more personal human experiences that Valerius wants to illustrate. The *exemplum* in chapter 1.7, on dreams (or on apparitions in dreams; *quam certis imaginibus multorum quies adumbrata sit*),¹²⁸ illustrates this tendency. The source for the dream about Marius is Cicero's *On Divination*, which Valerius does not mention, but he does contextualize the dream right away as happening "when Cicero was driven from the city by a band of his enemies" (*inimicorum conspiratione urbe pulsus M. Cicero*).¹²⁹ In *Div.* 1.59, the story about Marius' appearance in Cicero's dream forms the climax of a series of exempla by which Quintus, the interlocutor in book 1, discusses the value of dreams as evidence for divination.¹³⁰ Valerius imitates the structure of the passage in *On Divination*,¹³¹ which dramatizes the dream as a divine comment on Cicero's political exile and as an encouragement not to lose hope. Similarly, he interprets the dream as a turning point for Cicero, whose recall was proposed soon afterwards; Valerius closes the *exemplum* by noting that a proposal for Cicero's return was passed in "Marius' temple of Jupiter".¹³² However, while the story clearly touches upon one of the crucial episodes of Cicero's career, the exile caused by his combat against the Catilinarian conspirators, this *exemplum* does not attribute to him any specific virtue.

The decision not to attribute particular republican virtues to Cicero's deeds forms a consistent pattern in the *Memorable Doings and Sayings*. Surprisingly, while Catiline and his conspiracy are mentioned multiple times as models of vice, they are not once brought into connection

¹²⁸ Val. Max. 1.7 *praef.*

¹²⁹ Cf. WARDLE 1998: 225–227; BOZZI 1999 (*non vidi*). Val. Max. 4.2.4 provides another example of such 'nonchalant' political contextualization of exempla from Cicero's career (the trials of A. Gabinius and P. Vatinius).

¹³⁰ SCHULTZ 2014: 110–111, 133–135; WARDLE 2006: 206–208, 252–256.

¹³¹ Several of the examples in Val. Max. 1.7 are also taken over from *On Divination*. For an overview, see WARDLE 1998: 216–217.

¹³² *Nam in aede Iovis Mariana senatus consultum de reditu est eius factum*. As WARDLE 2006: 255–256 and SCHULTZ 2014: 134 explain (but both too succinctly to be fully understandable), Valerius confuses two separate meetings where Cicero's recall was effected: a first in May 57 which exhorted a citizen's assembly at the temple of *Honos et Virtus*, erected by Marius, to support Cicero's restoration (*Sest.* 116–117), and a second in July 57, where the senate officially voted for his recall.

¹³³ Val. Max. 2.8.7, 4.8.3 (*Catilinae furor*), 9.1.9 (Catiline as a model for *luxuria* and *libido*), 9.11.3 (Catiline's phrase *ruina extinguiam*); cf. 5.8.5 on the severity of A. Fulvius, whose son was one of the conspirators.

with Cicero.¹³³ Instead, in a chapter (2.8) on “military discipline”, C. Antonius, Cicero’s co-consul, is presented as the “conqueror of Catiline” (*Catilinae victor*), who brought back “swords wiped clean” to the camp.¹³⁴ Cicero’s consulate, the most celebrated moment of his career, therefore remains in the periphery of Valerius’ exemplary discourse. The same goes for Cicero’s ‘Philippic period’, which is briefly touched upon in the story of his death. Contrary to expectation, perhaps, this story as a whole serves to exemplify the vice of ingratitude, which is impersonated by Popillius Laena, Cicero’s murderer, whom the orator had once defended in trial “with as much scrupulousness as eloquence” (*non minore cura quam eloquentia*).¹³⁵ Popillius, shamelessly rejoicing in the task bestowed on him by Antony, is also the protagonist of the *exemplum*. Yet despite Cicero’s secondary role in this *exemplum*, Popillius’ vice is still amplified by the contrast with his extremely dignified victim:

*Et virum mitto quod amplissimae dignitatis, certe salutari studio praesentis officii privatim sibi venerandum, iugulum praeberere iussit, ac protinus caput Romanae eloquentiae et pacis clarissimam dexteram per summum et securum otium amputavit.*¹³⁶

And he ordered the man who should have been honoured by him, I won’t say because of his complete authority, but at least because of the ready service and his care to save him privately, to offer his throat, and without further ado cut off the head of Roman eloquence and the very famous hand of peace, at the height of his secure leisure.

Valerius rounds off his *exemplum* with the familiar trope that “there are no adequate words to revile this despicable monster, since there is no second Cicero who can lament worthily enough such misfortune as Cicero experienced” (*invalidae ad hoc monstrum suggillandum litterae, quoniam qui talem Ciceronis casum satis digne deplorare possit alius Cicero non exstat*).¹³⁷ The virtue ascribed here to Cicero is his public eloquence. While in Velleius’ compendium we saw that Velleius sub-

¹³⁴ *Ibid.* 2.8.7: *C. etiam Antonius, Catilinae victor, abstersos gladios in castra rettulit.*

¹³⁵ Note that the virtue of *cura* is also attributed to Cicero by Velleius, in his description of Cicero’s consular achievements (2.34.3). On the (apparently declamatory) topic of Popillius killing Cicero, cf. Sen. *Contr.* 7.2; KEELINE 2018: 102–105, 111–114 and 125–127 (on Valerius).

¹³⁶ Val. Max. 5.3.4.

¹³⁷ This turn of phrase is perhaps modelled on Livy: see his epitaph of Cicero in Sen. *Suas.* 6.22. KEELINE 2018: 127 argues the trope is common in the declamatory schools.

ordinates Cicero's oratory to his goal of defending the state, Valerius' portrayal is more stereotypical in deploying the image of Cicero as the fountainhead of Roman eloquence. The addition that Popillius killed Cicero while he was enjoying *otium* (which seems to neglect Cicero's public action in 43 BC), strengthens the image of Cicero the intellectual at the cost of Cicero the politician.

If we look at other *exempla* where Cicero's public position is taken into account, one cannot escape the idea that Valerius was most interested in the orator Cicero. At one point he even imitates the Ciceronian imagery of militant oratory or eloquence as arms. In a chapter on authoritative men standing witness (*De testibus*), the compiler notes that Cicero was rejected as a witness "in the camp of his own eloquence" (*in ipsis eloquentiae suae castris*), even though he had acquired the highest honours in his campaign on the forum (*forensi militia*) and the highest status in society (*amplissimumque dignitatis locum*).¹³⁸ This interest in Cicero's advocacy is confirmed by the fact that, excepting Valerius' definition of Cicero as *caput Romanae eloquentiae*, the only virtue explicitly attributed to Cicero is *humanitas*. In an *exemplum* in book 4 about friend- and fiendship, which abounds in references to the inflammable political atmosphere of the first-century Republic, including Cicero's own contribution to it, the only conclusion Valerius draws on Cicero's conduct is that it attests of kindness and good manners. As he says, this manifested itself in extraordinary measure in his defence of Aulus Gabinius, who had expelled Cicero from Rome, and in his double defence of P. Vatinius, who always showed ill-will towards his reputation (*dignitati suae semper infestum*). Cicero's kindness did not result in a reputation for inconsistency (*sine ullo crimine levitatis*), Valerius says, but in certain praise (*cum aliqua laude*).¹³⁹ It even inspired his "archenemy" Clodius (*inimicissimus illi P. Pulcher*) to display similar kindness.¹⁴⁰

In conclusion, Valerius is interested in different aspects of Cicero's career than Velleius, and has selected material from his life that emphasizes his general contribution to society instead of his political ambi-

¹³⁸ Val. Max. 8.5.5: *M. Cicero forensi militia summos honores amplissimumque dignitatis locum adeptus, nonne in ipsis eloquentiae suae castris testis abiectus est...*

¹³⁹ *Ibid.* 4.2.4.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 4.2.5. Note that Clodius is also mentioned 8.5.5, where Cicero is said to testify in his trial.

tions. There is no mention of specific republican ideals, and Cicero is not made to represent any particular virtues except *humanitas* and *eloquentia*. In fact, Valerius' remark that Cicero was killed *in otio* strongly favours an image of Cicero whose main value lies in his writing career. Valerius' *Memorable Doings and Sayings* thus paints a fairly limited picture of a very versatile man. He only mentions political events, like the exile or the fight against Antony, in passing, and presents a Cicero who can represent all kinds of values and activities connected with the life of a Roman aristocrat.

However, despite this eclectic portrait, one cannot deny the exemplary status Cicero has for Valerius' compendium.¹⁴¹ There is no place in the works of Valerius (or Velleius, for that matter) where Cicero is *not* a public figure. Cicero's main value for Valerius' work does not lie in any particular virtues, but in the fact that his deeds, as a whole and on a more abstract level, illustrates Valerius' ideal of exemplarity: Cicero's life, in an implicit manner, exemplifies the experiences of a Roman elite civilian and intellectual, with which the imperial reader could identify, and which offered him a framework to think about his own public life. As I have discussed above, this is one of the main functions of the Roman discourse of exemplarity: to establish ethical norms and serve as a catalyst for reflection on morality. Finally, we should not overlook the fact that Cicero's leading role is also thematized in the final *exemplum* discussed above, where he inspires Clodius to adopt honest behaviour towards his rivals. He also explicitly guides and inspires others to adopt proper behaviour—a key feature of any model of exemplarity.

2.2 CATO AS THE DEFINITION OF ROMAN VIRTUS

2.2.1 Valerius Maximus on Cato's complete civic virtue

The *exempla* about Cato's life differ from those taken from Cicero's career in that Cato is presented, by both Velleius and Valerius, as the summit or the incarnation of Roman *virtus* itself. The early imperial writers, including Lucan who will be discussed in § 3, are remarkably

¹⁴¹ Cf. SILLETT 2015: 223.

unanimous when it comes to the analysis of Cato's republicanism and his contribution to society: key concepts are *virtus* and moral leadership (also as a form of exemplary modelling).¹⁴²

As mentioned above, the *Memorable Doings and Sayings* has 12 *exempla* concerning Cato which commemorate him for several core Roman virtues, such as *maiestas*, *fortitudo*, or *dignitas*. I will list them here:

- *De maiestate*, 2.10.7: Cato filibusters in the senate against Caesar's agrarian law and is thrown into prison by Caesar. The entire senate sides with Cato, causing Caesar to change his mind.
- *Idem*, 2.10.8: Cato's behaviour at the *Ludi Florales* causes the Roman citizens to change custom with regard to the performance of the actresses; Valerius subsequently praises Cato as the ideal Roman citizen (see below).
- *De gravitate*, 3.1.2a: a story from Cato's childhood in which he refuses to recommend Poppaedi, the leader of the Latin people, to his uncle M. Drusus, which Valerius interprets as a token of his early-developed authority and perseverance (*perseverantia*).
- *Idem*, 3.1.2b: another story about Cato as a young boy. When frequenting Sulla's house, he is appalled by the dictator's deeds and expresses the desire to kill him, thus demonstrating his fearlessness.
- *De fortitudine*, 3.2.14: Valerius discusses Cato's suicide as a glorious deed, adding the maxim that noble men should prefer *dignitas* without life over life without *dignitas* (*quanto potior esse debeat probis dignitas sine vita quam vita sine dignitate*).
- on dressing contrary to ancient custom, 3.6.7: in presiding over a court case as praetor, Cato appears dressed only in the *toga praetexta*, without a tunic underneath.
- *De moderatione*, 4.1.14: Valerius tells the story of how the senate, after Cato's successful mission to Cyprus, offered him the chance to participate in the praetorian elections *extra ordinem*, with special privileges. He refuses out of modesty and reverence for the law.
- *De abstinentia et continentia*, 4.3.2: when in Asia, Cato, who was commissioned to retrieve money for the treasury at Cyprus, showed an extraordinary abstinence from luxuriousness and from profit. Valerius concludes by saying that Cato and continence were born from the same womb of Nature (*ex eodem Naturae utero et continentia nata est et Cato*).

¹⁴² GOAR 1987: 31–49 and PECCHIURA 1965: 53–86 review Cato's presence in Tiberian and Neronian literature, but, especially in their analysis of the Tiberian texts, focus too much on the rhetorical aspects.

- *Idem*, 4.3.12: obeying ancient rules of modesty (*prisca continentia*), Cato the Younger possessed only twelve slaves.
- *Libere dicta aut facta*, 6.2.5: Cato is identified with the concept of *libertas*, in the sense of speaking one's mind freely.¹⁴³ Valerius relates an episode from Cato's career when he was on a jury and voided a testimonial by Pompey; what appears to be audacity in another is recognized as self-confidence in Cato (*quae in alio audacia videretur, in Catone fiducia cognoscitur*).
- *De repulsis*, 7.5.6: Valerius tells of Cato's failure to obtain the praetorship in 55, and comments that this was a grave error of the Roman people.
- *De industria*, 8.7.2: on Cato's arduous desire for learning (*doctrina*). He is said to have taken Greek books into the curia to read while the senate was assembling.

While these *exempla* as a whole could certainly profit from closer study, I will concentrate in this section on the two *exempla* in book 2. Here, Valerius thematizes his model function for other citizens, having included scenes from Cato's life where his moral excellence inspires and instructs others.

Throughout the *Memorable Doings and Sayings*, Valerius frames Cato as a statesman who stands in a long tradition of famous Roman military and political leaders. Cato's political authority becomes especially clear in chapters 2.9 and 2.10, two chapters which discuss the *nota censoria*, 'the moral control of the censor', and *maiestas*, the type of political authority which Valerius compares to a form of *privata censura*, 'private censorship'. In 2.9.3, Valerius reports an event that happened during the censorship of Cato the Elder, who took away the senatorship of L. Flaminius, an ex-consul, because of immoral behaviour. This action demonstrated how Cato the Elder was a "double model of severity, being Censor as well as Cato" (*et censor et Cato, duplex severitatis exemplum*). In the next chapter, then, which concerns similar but this time unofficial instances of severity, the reader encounters not one but two *exempla* regarding Censorius' great-grandson Cato. The reader is clearly invited to see a connection between the behaviour of the two Porcii; at the same time, Valerius thematizes familial ancestry as the basis for Cato the Younger's public career.

¹⁴³ Cf. e.g. Sen. *Constant.* 2.2; *Ep.* 13.14, 14.13, where Cato is connected with *libertas* as the republican institution instead of freedom of mind. See also §1.3. Cato's exemplary freedom of speech will be developed further in chapter 3, §2.3.

In 2.10, Cato the Younger is compared to Roman military heroes, whose achievements in war were crucial to the history of the Republic; the chapter has *exempla* from the lives of Quintus Metellus Numidicus,¹⁴⁴ Scipio Africanus the Elder, Aemilius Paullus, Scipio Aemilianus, Publius Rutilius, and Gaius Marius. Cato's military pursuits do not seem to measure up to those of the leaders mentioned here, but for Valerius the comparison lies in their immense public authority. Valerius explains the theme of chapter 2.10, *maiestas*, as a moral authority which is awarded to (states)men whose conduct is immaculous. Admiration is an important part of it: as Valerius says, "it flows into the hearts of men with a grateful and pleasing way of entering, clothed in the adornment of admiration".¹⁴⁵ The stories told in 2.10 deal with the honours paid to great Roman generals not by Roman citizens alone but also by foreign peoples. The story about the pirates that visited the house of Scipio Africanus not as *hostes* but as *virtutis admiratores* is as bizarre as it is illustrative for the effect of a great general's magnificence.¹⁴⁶

In his introduction of Cato in 2.10.7, Valerius echoes his initial definition of *maiestas* in the preface: it was *admiration* for Cato's brave and honest lifestyle (*admiratio fortis et sinceræ vitæ*) that made him venerable (*venerabilis*) to the senate. A first *exemplum* of Cato's *maiestas*, then, concerns his role in the senate in 59 BC, during Caesar's consulship, where his filibustering prevented Caesar's new agrarian law from being accepted. Caesar became so annoyed by Cato's behaviour that he threw him into prison. The *maiestas* of Cato is proven not by his recalcitrant behaviour, but by the fact that the whole senate (*universus senatus*) followed Cato to the prison. This event, Valerius notes, even made Caesar's 'divine' mind waver; something, we can add, which did not happen often, and perhaps constitutes the reason why Valerius, who generally expresses an admiration for Caesar, included this story.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁴ Cf. *Att.* 1.16.4.

¹⁴⁵ Val. Max. 2.10 *præf.*: *grato enim et iucundo introit animis hominum allabitur, admirationis prætextu velata.*

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.* 2.10.2b.

¹⁴⁷ A remark in Val. Max. 2.1.10 gives a good idea of Valerius' opinion towards Caesar and his successors. After recalling the Camilli, Scipiones, Fabricii, and Marcelli, he checks himself, saying: "but before I take too long in running through every single luminary individual of our empire, from there, I say, the most splendid part of heaven, the divine Caesars shone" (*ac ne singula imperii nostri lumina simul percurrendo sim longior, inde, inquam, caeli clarissima pars, divi fulserunt Caesares*). Cf. 1.6.12–13 on Caesar's divinely sanctioned defeat of Pompey in 48.

The second *exemplum* of Cato's *maiestas*, in 2.10.8, illustrates Cato's function as a public, ethical model. The story tells how during the *Ludi Florales* Cato and his friend Favonius attended a theatre show.¹⁴⁸ The people wanted the actresses to take off their clothes, but were afraid to ask for this in the presence of Cato. As soon as Cato heard about this from Favonius he left the theatre, for he was afraid to interfere with the people's custom. The people, however, just like the senate in the previous *exemplum*, followed Cato outside with enormous applause. They moreover demanded that old theatrical customs were reintroduced (involving no nakedness) since they "admitted that they attributed more majesty to Cato alone than they would claim for their entire crowd (*sibi universo*)".¹⁴⁹ The key word *universus*, which in 2.10.7 was also used for the senate following Cato, returns here. It emphasizes the contrast between Cato as a unique individual and a very large group of 'normal' citizens (who remain unidentified). Secondly, *universus* signifies Cato's ability to unite whole groups of people by his singular virtuousness.

The plot of the Valerian *exemplum* illustrates rather well the exemplary loop described by Matthew Roller.¹⁵⁰ It describes an act by Cato, which is done in front of a public audience; it is openly admired and acknowledged,¹⁵¹ and finally it leads to a reflection on the existing norms, which are adjusted in imitation of Cato's behaviour. Considered in this way, the *exemplum* about Cato's *maiestas* elucidates the process of exemplarity itself. It also leads Valerius to draw explicit conclusions on the importance of Cato as a political and ethical model. The description of the scene in the theatre culminates in an enthusiastic *laudatio* of Cato's *virtus* by the author:

Quibus opibus, quibus imperiis, quibus triumphis hoc datum est? Exiguum viri patrimonium, astricti continentia mores, modicae clientelae, domus ambitioni clausa, paterni generis una ill<ustris> imago, minime blanda

¹⁴⁸ Cf. Sen. Ep. 97.8.

¹⁴⁹ Val. Max. 2.10.8: *Quem abeuntem ingenti plausu populus prosecutus priscum morem iocorum in scaenam revocarunt, confessus plus se maiestatis uni illi tribuere quam sibi universo vindicare.*

¹⁵⁰ ROLLER 2004: 4–6; see above, §1.2.1.

¹⁵¹ ROLLER's model demands an official act of commemoration; we might say that this act is implicitly confirmed by its inclusion in Valerius' compendium. Cato's action became monumentalized in the literary exempla tradition. We do not have Valerius' source for this exemplum; THEMANN-STEINKE 2008: 564 gives only later parallels.

*frons, sed omnibus numeris perfecta virtus, quae quidem effecit ut quisquis sanctum et egregium civem significare velit, sub nomine Catonis definiat.*¹⁵²

To what resources, what military command, what triumphs was such credit given? The man's patrimony was small, his lifestyle sober due to his self-restraint, his number of clients modest, his house closed to canvassing, of his paternal family there was only one famous ancestor, his appearance was all but charming, but his virtue was perfect on all scores, a virtue which made everyone who wants to indicate a venerable and excellent citizen, to use the name of Cato as a definition.

In his usual rhetorical fashion, Valerius suggests there were no military resources or honours greater than the authority bestowed on Cato at the *Ludi Florales*. This remark seems to distinguish Cato explicitly from the previous examples Valerius had discussed, who were all important generals. Considering his place at the end of a line of *exempla* presented under *maiestas*, Cato seems to be the culmination of the category.¹⁵³ Valerius gives a striking account of the different constituent parts of this great personality. Everything that makes Cato into what he is, is actually rather simple and small, which is indicated by a group of words related to small size: he has an *exiguum* inheritance, his *mores* or way of life are *stricti*, confined, he has a *modica* clientele, and his house is closed to *ambitio*, the means by which Cato could win more political followers. He further has but one, *una*, illustrious ancestor, Cato Censorius, and his appearance is *minime* appealing. Rhetorically, Valerius could not have made the contrast any greater between these characteristics and what is now to come.¹⁵⁴ *Sed* marks the antithesis: for on all counts, *omnibus numeris*, Cato's *virtus* is *perfecta*, complete. In contrast to the lack and the modest size of many things, Cato shows a *complete* fulfilment of character. And Valerius continues to expand on this statement: all those who want to circumscribe an outstanding citizen (*quisquis sanctum et egregium civem significare velit*) could refer to the name of Cato by way of a descriptive category or definition (*sub nomine Catonis definiat*). From the historical individual Cato, in the story about

¹⁵² Val. Max. 2.10.8.

¹⁵³ BLOOMER 1992: 28 acknowledges this as a particular tendency of Valerius: "Within a chapter *exempla* are joined in a sort of hierarchy as if the individual anecdotes were steps leading to the perfect manifestation of the quality in question." Cf. MASLAKOV 1984: 472–475.

¹⁵⁴ On the rhetorical structure of this passage, THEMANN-STEINKE 2008: 562–563.

the festival, Valerius extrapolates a general category of complete civic virtue. This line of thinking is familiar from Cicero's letters, who attests this phenomenon already for the republican period (see § 1): the name is used as a symbol for the ideals of the man. However, while Cicero's 'Cato' stood for ultimate republicanism, Valerius' 'Cato' represents the perfectly virtuous *citizen*. Political ideals have been exchanged for more general civic virtue(s).

Apart from being a good example of Roller's 'loop', the *exemplum* of Cato's *maiestas* illustrates the relevance of the model function of a Roman magistrate with regard to the people. While exempla, as § 2 has demonstrated, are often presented as showcases of ethical models of conduct,¹⁵⁵ Cato here displays a public type of action which goes beyond the (philosophically) ethical, and is inspiring on two levels. On a basic moral level, he inspires abstinence from the lower, carnal pleasures: the nakedness of the actresses would appeal to the desires of the flesh instead of the intellect. On the public level, Cato inspires the people to return to an ancient civic institution or custom (*priscum morem* in 2.10.8). Apart from being a stimulus for personal, moral behaviour, Cato can instigate his fellow citizens to rethink and alter collective regulations. By this line of reasoning the term *universus*, which is used both in 2.10.7 and 2.10.8, acquires a deeper meaning. It is the collective level that leads to Valerius' *laudatio Catonis* as a 'premium' citizen: the value of Cato is recognized and expressed from the perspective of the public sphere. The Cato of Valerius' chapter on *maiestas* is noteworthy because he is a *civis Romanus* and is capable of being a leader to other *cives*.

2.2.2 *Superior Cato in Velleius Paterculus' Roman History*

In Velleius' History, just like in Valerius' memorabilia, Cato also appears prominently as someone who embodies Roman virtue. He first appears in the account of the Catilinarian conspiracy, and is included in

¹⁵⁵ With regard to Valerius, SKIDMORE 1996 is probably the best example of such an approach: he reads the *Memorable Doings and Sayings* as a handbook of ethics for Roman gentleman. For the more democratic view that Valerius' work is a much broader reflection of popular ethics and the idea that all Valerian *exempla* are imbued with a particular social and civic meaning, see MORGAN 2007: 122–159, by whose work I have been much inspired myself.

four other episodes of Velleius' *Roman History*.¹⁵⁶ In discussing Cato's performance in the senate on 5 December, Velleius presents, like Salust had in Cat. 52,¹⁵⁷ his speech as an infectious display of patriotism:

*Ille senatus dies quo haec acta sunt virtutem M. Catonis, iam multis in rebus conspicuam atque praenitentem, in altissimo culmine illuminavit. ... Hic genitus proavo M. Catone, principe illo familiae Porciae, homo virtuti simillimus et per omnia ingenio diis quam hominibus propior, qui numquam recte fecit, ut facere videretur, sed quia aliter facere non potuerat, cuique id solum visum est rationem habere, quod haberet iustitiam, omnibus humanis vitiis immunis semper fortunam in sua potestate habuit ... tanta vi animi atque ingenii invectus est in coniurationem, eo ardore orationem omnium lenitatem suadentium societate consilii suspectam fecit, sic impendentia ex ruinis incendiisque urbis et commutatione status publici pericula exposuit, ita consulis virtutem amplificavit ut universus senatus in eius sententiam transiret ...*¹⁵⁸

That day in the senate, when these matters were discussed, the light of Cato's excellence, which had been illustrious and outstanding in many cases already, reached the sky. ... He, a descendant of his great-grandfather M. Cato, that chief ancestor of the Porcia family, was a man with the greatest resemblance to Virtus, and through his genius nearer in everything to the gods than to men, someone who didn't act correctly in order to make an impression, but because he couldn't act otherwise. To him the only thing that held sense was that which contained justice, and immune to every human fault he always kept fortune within his own control. ... With such strength of mind and genius he inveighed against the conspirators, with that fire of speaking he made the words of all that advertised mildness suspect by suggesting involvement in the conspiracy, he expounded in such a way on the impending danger of destruction and fire in the city and a change in the current political situation, he contributed so much to the virtue of the consul, that it resulted in the entire senate taking over his motion ...

¹⁵⁶ Vell. Pat. 2.45.4–5, Clodius more or less expels Cato to Cyprus, after getting rid of Cicero, but Cato fulfils this mission formidably, with *integritas* and a tinge of *insolentia* (refusing to disembark and greet his fellow senators when arriving in Rome with the treasury); 2.47.4–5 on the Milo trial (see below); 2.49.3, at the beginning of the civil war, Cato says he would rather die than accept that one citizen receives sole rule over the Republic; 2.54.3 on his Libyan march and his refusal to lead Pompey's troops.

¹⁵⁷ See chapter 1, § 3.3.

¹⁵⁸ Vell. Pat. 2.35.

This passage has been read variously as proof of the influence of the rhetorical schools on Velleius' structure and themes, or as a confirmation of the Stoic elements of Cato's imperial reputation.¹⁵⁹ Indeed, Velleius' remark that Cato "always seemed to keep *fortuna* within his own control" as well as his reference to Cato's *iustitia* (a cardinal virtue) could represent Stoic philosophical thought. However, the Stoic concepts are subservient here to the portrayal of Cato as a balanced and equitable statesman. *Fortuna* is a more generally used historical concept in Velleius' historiography;¹⁶⁰ and the *iustitia* that Cato is said to hold as his ultimate guiding principle is also very much a political idea. *Iustitia* was one of the central concepts for the *exempla virtutis* of the Roman historical tradition. Moreover, in Velleius' text it carries a particular political (imperial) connotation, since it was one of the values celebrated in Tiberian propaganda.¹⁶¹ As a whole, this description of Cato's attitude towards the conspirators confirms the idea of Cato's excellent citizenship as it figures in Valerius' work. Note that again, as we have seen in Valerius 2.10.8, the *universus senatus* is said to place itself on Cato's side. One single man was able to convince the entire citizen body to follow his opinions.

It has been noted more often that the texts of the *Roman History* and the *Memorable Doings and Sayings* show signs of a common ideological framework, both moral and political,¹⁶² and that Valerius' and Velleius'

¹⁵⁹ See ELEFANTE 1997 *ad loc.* for an emphasis on the rhetorical structure. GOAR 1987: 31–32 selects this passage for discussion because of the reminiscences of Sallust's portrait of Cato and of Cicero's *Cato* which he recognizes in the "Stoic ideas" of "Cato's equation of *ratio* with *iustitia*" and the ability to keep fortune in hand.

¹⁶⁰ *Fortuna* also figures dominantly in Velleius' description of Caesar's deeds, e.g. Vell. Pat. 2.51, 55. Cf. BALMACEDA 2017: 140; for *fortuna* in Velleius, SCHMITZER 2000: 190–225, with bibliography.

¹⁶¹ On *iustitia* in Velleius, see SCHMITZER 2011; for *iustitia* as a general Roman virtue in *exempla*, see LITCHFIELD 1914. LEVICK 1976: 89 discusses *iustitia* as a central value within Tiberius' reign (and points to the fact that it was also one of the virtues commemorated on the *Clipeus Virtutis* set up in the curia for Augustus in 27 BC). Cf. WEILEDER 1998: 55–56 on Val. Max. 6.5, a chapter devoted to *iustitia*, "of which among all nations our state is the most eminent and surest example" (*eius autem praecipuum et certissimum inter omnes gentes nostra civitas exemplum est*). For *virtus* in Velleius, see BALMACEDA 2017: 129–156, who does not suggest any philosophical reading of the characterization of Cato, at 135. In general, BALMACEDA distinguishes two kinds of *virtus* in Velleius: the military interpretation, *virilis virtus*, and the moral interpretation, *humana virtus*. Cicero and Cato then possess both kinds of *virtus*. *Iustitia* as a central virtue is mentioned only four times in book 2: once regarding Q. Catulus in 2.32, once with respect to Cato's *virtus*, and twice in association with Tiberius' reign, 2.118 and 126.

¹⁶² See JACQUEMIN 1998: 150; WIEGAND 2013.

treatment of Cato is also remarkably similar in their emphasis on Cato's virtue.¹⁶³ I would add that the Tiberian image of Cato (as we have it) is also remarkably uniform in its emphasis on Cato's exemplary role as a model of conduct within Roman politics. Let us look at Velleius' report of the death of Clodius and the trial of Milo in 47.4–5, where he adds the following about Cato:

*Quem quidem M. Cato palam lata absolvit sententia. Qui si maturius tulisset, non defuissent qui sequerentur exemplum probarentque eum civem occisum, quo nemo perniciosior rei publicae neque bonis inimicius vixerat.*¹⁶⁴

On his behalf then M. Cato publicly brought forward a motion of acquittal. If he had done so earlier, there would have been men who followed his example and approved of the murder of this citizen who knew no equal in being destructive for the Republic and hostile to the good men.

The language is Ciceronian: the *perniciosus rei publicae civis* and *inimicus bonis*, with the comparative forms lending extra force to the adjectives, reminds us of Cicero's words about Clodius (among others).¹⁶⁵ Indeed, for the portrayal of Clodius and of his trial, Cicero's speeches offered ample documentation, and the reader might have expected a comment about Cicero's involvement in it. Yet Cicero's figure is absent from this account. Instead, in Velleius' representation of events it is Cato who is said to denounce Clodius, and to vote for Milo's acquittal. As in Velleius' report of the Catilinarian debate, Cato is here described as the one who is able to persuade other senators into voting for his motion. Unfortunately, in this case his motion comes too late—but, Velleius says, if it had been brought forward earlier, some senators would definitely have followed his vote. Cato's conduct is presented as a model for others, an *exemplum*. Like Valerius, Velleius reflects in this passage upon the leading role Cato assumes, or rather, *receives* by his fellow citizens. Similar to the Valerian Cato, Velleius' Cato is able to unify groups of men into making a decision that serves the well-being

¹⁶³ Cf. PECCHIURA 1965: 53–58; GOAR 1987: 31–35.

¹⁶⁴ Val. Max. 2.47.5.

¹⁶⁵ Cicero on Clodius as *perniciosus civis*: Mil. 82, Phil. 8.16 (cf. WOODMAN 1983: 76); the phrase *inimicus bonis* is implicitly brought into relation to Clodius in *Red. sen.* 26–27 (there: *vocem inimicam bonis*). This also seems to be the only instance where Cicero uses the adjective *inimicus* with the dative plural *bonis*.

of the Republic. The entire senate's adherence to Cato's opinion in the Milo case refers back to the consensus he created in the senate during the debate on the Catilinarian conspirators in chapter 2.35. Velleius' use of the term *exemplum* here is an allusion to Cato's unique status as an exemplary protector of Rome.

As we have seen, the most important elements we distinguished for *exempla* and exemplary discourse in general, return in the characterization of Cato. His model behaviour ultimately pertains to (Roman) citizenship and civic ideals; and a peculiar mark of his leadership is that he knows how to create consensus among large groups of people. Moreover, the *virtus* he possesses is not an aim in itself but rather an inclination to act rightly and justly and to benefit the community. Several political episodes from Cato's career are especially suitable to illustrate his ethical superiority. The decisions Cato makes, or refuses to make, are commonly employed by Valerius and Velleius to demonstrate his integrity and other excellent qualities that flow from this. At the point in the narrative where Cato returns from Cyprus, his boat full of riches and received by a cheering crowd on the banks of the Tiber, which he duly ignores by sailing on to the allocated place of embarkment, Velleius notes that this is the kind of *integritas* it would be wrong to praise:¹⁶⁶ it is so dominating and splendid that it rejects all possible judgment. This kind of superlative description of Cato is also part of Valerius' discussion of Cato's *maiestas*. Furthermore, though Valerius does not award Cato such elaborate praise after book 2, the reader is also reminded of it in stories about his childhood, the story of his death (which would have been a *clarissimus excessus*, done *constantissime* and with *gravitas*), his unusual dress, or finally his conduct as governor of Cyprus that showed him to be born from the same womb as *Continentia* herself.¹⁶⁷ These kinds of *exempla* turn Cato into an important figure in popular morality as well as in historical writing; the intertwining of ethical and political themes defines Cato's reputation as civic authority.

¹⁶⁶ Vell. Pat. 2.45.5: *cuius integritatem laudari nefas est*.

¹⁶⁷ Val. Max. 3.1.1–2, 3.2.14, 3.6.7, 4.3.12, respectively. See the list above in § 2.2.1.

2.3 CONCLUSIONS

In the Tiberian accounts of republican history, the exemplary nature of both Cicero's and Cato's deeds is often confirmed by reference to specific political behaviour or social status. It is noteworthy that the vignettes frequently thematize a kind of moral sensibility which is perfect on the level of individual action, but in such a way that it also offers models for other citizens. The *virtus* Velleius and Valerius describe is a synonym for patriotism and the concern for fellow citizens. While Cicero and Cato are equal representants of the aristocratic political culture of the Republic, there is a difference in the types of values with which they are identified. Cicero is in fact situated by Velleius and Valerius alike at the heart of Roman politics, but he is a versatile figure. Eloquence and advocacy are popular concepts by which his contribution to Roman society is framed, but even these do not cover all aspects of Cicero's performance in the Tiberian sources. This difficulty is made greater by the differences between the Velleian and the Valerian portraits of Cicero; Velleius still emphasizes Cicero's role as political mediator and *conservator rei publicae*, but Valerius seems more interested in Cicero's personal (and intellectual) life. A theme that is picked up by both authors is the Ciceronian trope about oratory as a weapon in civil strife, which preserves the political foundation of Cicero's rhetorical talents.

Cato's exemplarity, on the other hand, is situated much more explicitly in his illustration of the morality of political action. His decisive actions, as they are described, teaches fellow citizens how moral perfection leads to political authority. His position within exemplary discourse is further strengthened by his ancestry, which forms a narrative thread in the Catonian *exempla*. As we have seen, the *mores* of Cato the Elder function as an introduction to the character portrayal of his great-grandson.¹⁶⁸ The *severitas* and *continentia* which was already part of the reputation of the *gens Porcia* served as an anchor for *exempla* about Cato the Younger.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁸ Much more implicitly, of course, in the case of Valerius, who handles Cato the Elder and the Younger in consecutive chapters (2.9 and 2.10).

¹⁶⁹ This works both ways: see BÜCHER 2006: 258–263 for Cicero's reviving of the *exemplum* of the elder Cato through the *exemplum* of Cato the Younger.

The consensus Cicero is at times said to have created, whether by his mediating skills, by his talent as an advocate, or by his overall intellectual superiority (*humanitas*), is not carried to the point that he really unites the Republic.¹⁷⁰ Instead, Cato receives this characteristic of being able to unite the senate and the people into a harmonious, republican citizen body. The *exempla* from Cicero's life do not discuss any interaction with large(r) groups; in contrast, the tales about Cato's political conduct often address his comportment towards his senatorial colleagues and give him a very marked position among the citizens of Rome. His exemplary quality is embedded in these tales themselves, as we have seen; the process of exemplarity is thematized, and the role of Cato as leading magistrate thus confirmed by the spectators within the account itself.¹⁷¹ As we will see next, in Lucan's *Civil War* Cicero's exemplary status is further disconnected from republican ideology, whereas Cato's deeds as well as his oratory demonstrate how his whole being is devoted to the leadership of the Roman citizens.

3. Exemplarity as civic leadership in the *Civil War*

3.1 READING LUCAN

In the present analysis of Cato and Cicero, I propose to read the *Civil War*, like the works of Valerius Maximus and Velleius Paterculus, in a historiographical vein. While it is certainly not a work of historiography it does have certain historiographical aims. These aims are, concretely: 1) construing a moral-didactic framework for reflecting on the civil war(s) that caused a transition from republican to autocratic government; 2) inviting readers to use this framework for reflection upon their 'own' Roman history; 3) contributing to the historical commemoration of Rome's great men, by giving context and content to traditional exempla that were part of the Roman collective memory

¹⁷⁰ Cicero had presented himself as doing so. See chapter 1, esp. § 1.2.

¹⁷¹ See § 1.2.1.

and cultural identity.¹⁷² During the last twenty years or so, scholars have increasingly approached the *Civil War* from the perspective of cultural memory studies.¹⁷³ We can push this approach a bit further in comparing Lucan's representation of republican figures to the historical *exempla* in Roman historiography. The *Civil War* restages the Tiberian *exempla* discussed above. My focus will be somewhat different from that adopted by previous scholarship. The idea that the *Civil War* reflects exemplary discourse is not novel, but current attempts to analyse Lucan's treatment of *exempla* have been restricted to a type of reading which searches for a direct comparison between the *exempla* literature and the Lucanian epic. A popular method here is to highlight the rhetorical roots (in declamatory education) of Lucan's character portraits.¹⁷⁴ For the study of Lucan's epic as a more elaborate reworking of *exempla* the work of Joanne Mira Seo is of great relevance, which argues that in fact, through the figure of Cato, the *Civil War* shows the invalidity of the process of exemplarity and in particular of (ethical) imitation, especially in the context of civil war. However, her interpretation is heavily based on the paradigm of Cato *Stoicus*, and it bypasses the fact that Cato, as we will see, is capable of acting as a more general role model for republican patriotism and leadership.¹⁷⁵

This chapter contends that the *Civil War* provides no passive reflections of the *exempla* tradition, but that the poet actively seeks to modify traditional images of the Roman past, and that he is interacting with

¹⁷² Lucan's interest in the civil war of 49–48 is mostly described in terms of his obsession with *libertas*. SEEWALD 2008: 45 states: “der Verlust der republikanischen Freiheit und die Entstehung der Tyrannei durch den Bürgerkrieg ist das zentrale Thema des *Bellum civile*.” Cf. e.g. GAGLIARDI 1976; THORNE 2011; STOVER 2008; NARDUCCI 2002: 116–137, 167–183. See also the political reading of the *Civil War* of Shadi BARTSCH 1997, who argues that Lucan is trying to illustrate the importance and effect of political ideologies, in order to, at the same time, reject and refute them, vacillating between the two roles of “rebel and nihilist” (9). On the relationship between poetry and history in the *Civil War*, see GRIMAL 1970, an essential article which makes an argument for “la précision avec laquelle Lucain utilise ses sources historiques” (95); cf. LINTOTT 1971; ESPOSITO 2018: esp. 39–40 for an ‘essential’ bibliography. BARTSCH 2009: 494 provides a short overview of the question.

¹⁷³ GOWING 2005: 82–96 on Lucan's ‘memorializing history’ is followed by THORNE 2011 and the comprehensive study by GALTIER 2018.

¹⁷⁴ See BONNER 1966; LINTOTT 1971: 498–500. On Cato specifically, MARTI 1945: 360–361.

¹⁷⁵ MIRA SEO 2013: 92–93, “In his studiously conventionalized Cato and his numerous emulators, Lucan seems to interrogate the effectiveness of exemplarity, revealing instead the superficiality of imitation, and ultimately the bankruptcy of ideals in a civil war whose ethical boundaries were as uncertain as the boundless deserts of Libya.” Cf. also BROUWERS 1989 on Cato's status as *exemplar virtutis* in Lucan; he does emphasize the patriotic nature of his virtue.

the original historiographical sources that yielded them. The Lucanian image of Cato incorporates all the elements we have seen in Velleius and Valerius: the strong connection between Cato and *libertas*, his integrity and perfect *virtus*, his ideal republicanism, and his role as an exemplar for his fellow citizens. Yet whereas in the Tiberian compendia of republican figures and events there is often little elaboration and contextualization, to Lucan a wide range of narrative techniques was available by which he could imbue the traditional *exempla* with new meanings. In my analyses below, I will show how Lucan plays with the narrative potential of the exemplary stories. As noted in §1.2, *exempla* are by definition a flexible and open genre; Lucan is seen to shift, subvert, and modify the main themes of the *exempla* in Velleius and Valerius. Moreover, each time the *Civil War* represents a major historical figure, it thematizes their public function and the (often disastrous) effect of their decisions on the Roman citizens. In general, this recontextualization—or renarrativization—of *exempla* has the opposite aim of a project like Valerius', who attempted to categorize *exempla* from the past according to specific values and therefore simplified the historical narrative. Placing the deeds of these republican heroes again into a historical context, as in the *Civil War*, breathes new life into the debate about the (political) meaning and complexity of past events.

In this second part of the chapter, I will continue my analysis of the virtues of Cato and Cicero in relation to each other, focusing on books 2, 7, and 9 of the *Civil War*. Cato is an important protagonist in book 2 and in book 9, which features the famous march through the desert of Libya. Cicero figures in book 7, but only for some thirty lines, where he is unhistorically placed in Pompey's army camp in Pharsalus (he had in fact stayed behind, with Cato, at Dyracchium).¹⁷⁶ Both Cicero and Cato are depicted as conservative politicians, members of the optimate party who stand opposed to Caesar's ideology and support Pompey's cause (though not always willingly). In the *Civil War*, there appears a novel point of comparison between the two men: their rhetorical abilities. Contrary to what would be expected, in this game Cicero is the person who draws the last straw. Within the *Civil War* Cato is shown to be the perfect orator, who is able, without exception, to convince his

¹⁷⁶ LANZARONE 2016: 148. Cf. Liv. *Per.* 111; Plut. *Cic.* 39, *Cato Min.* 55.

fellow citizens of the proper course of action. The speech Cicero addresses to Pompey in book 7, on the other hand, is flawed from start to finish, and offers a negative *exemplum* of public leadership. Just like in the material offered by Velleius and Valerius, Cato is used to illustrate exemplary virtue and leadership, and is presented as a model for imitation and instruction. Book 9 will function as a good example for the discourse of exemplarity which I have examined in the first part of this chapter; in addition to demonstrating the criteria for Roman exemplarity, however, it also shows, in a very Lucanian fashion, its limits.¹⁷⁷

3.2 CATO AS A PARADIGM OF CIVIC VIRTUE AND REPUBLICANISM

Cato is a protagonist in books 2 and 9 of the *Civil War*. The other books feature brief references to his life and career, or his role in the war. Since the scholarly discussion usually focuses on book 2 and/or book 9, it is useful to give an overview of the passages in which Cato plays a role.

- Book 1.120–128. The narrator addresses Pompey and Caesar in a short introduction of these two protagonists of the epic poem. In asking the question of which side is right, the narrator mentions Cato as the ‘arbitrator’ or ‘judge’ of the party who is conquered (*victrix causa deis placuit, sed victa Catoni* [128]). However, the third major protagonist of the epic, Cato, is placed above the contending parties, and connected with the cause of the Republic—the losing side in this war.
- Book 1.310. Caesar addresses a fiery speech to his army. In a description of the opposing side he mentions Cato explicitly as a member of the *partes in bella togatae*, civilian leaders. He refers to him as *nomina vana*, “empty names”, referring to Cato’s emblematic stature as protector of the Republic.
- Book 2.234–325. Brutus visits Cato and expresses his anxiety about the civil war, which he believes Cato should stay out of. Cato admits civil war is a crime, but posits that it is his duty and desire to protect Rome and *Libertas*.
- Book 2.326–371. Cato’s sober marriage with Marcia, his former wife. Hortensius, the husband to which Cato himself had given her, has died,

¹⁷⁷ Cf. JOHNSON 1987, esp. 55–63, and MIRA SEO 2013: 66–93.

and Marcia persuades her normally so inflexible husband to marry her again. The narrator describes the ascetic nuptials.

- this description leads to a characterization of Cato by the narrator, equally focusing on his ascetic lifestyle and appearance: 2.372–391. The depiction of Cato's *mores* passes into praise of his (fatherly) concern for the common welfare.
- Book 3.164: Caesar plunders the treasury in the temple of Saturn. The narrator recalls all the venerable treasures assembled here, mentioning also the money Cato brought back from Cyprus for the Roman treasury—a familiar *exemplum* (see § 2.2).
- Book 6 has two short references to Cato's life. In line 311, the narrator refers to 'sacred' Cato's death at Utica as part of all the slaughter that could have been prevented (*nec sancto caruisset vita Catone*). In line 790, as part of Erichtho's necromancy, the shadow of Cato the Elder is mentioned, mourning the fate of his progeny, who did not want to end up in slavery (*non servituri maeret Cato fata nepotis*). This is again a reference to Cato's suicide at Utica.
- Book 9, throughout, special episodes being:
 - 9.19–30. Cato wants to continue Pompey's cause now that the Republic is leaderless; he is presented to lead the *partes Libertatis*, a party for Libertas.
 - 9.188–214: Cato gives a funeral speech for Pompey; he concludes by announcing that he will sooner die than live to serve Caesar.
 - 9.215–283: altercation between an anonymous soldier who tries to desert (together with many other Pompeian soldiers) and Cato. Cato convinces the soldiers to maintain the fight for liberty, and mocks their slavish attitude in being willing to fight only for Pompey.
 - 9.255–283: adhortative speech to Pompeian troops.
 - 9.303–949: the march through the desert in Libya, with at 379–406 a battle speech by which Cato prepares his men for the hardships that await them in the desert, and at 564–584 a speech at the oracle of Ammon.
- Book 10.397. The character Pothinus, responsible for Pompey's death, now exhorts his accomplice in that murder to assassinate Caesar; in his speech he refers to the *vota Catonum Brutorumque*, the prayers of Cato and Brutus, which will make them prosper.

In some passages, Cato's name pops up in exemplary fashion: the narrator makes short allusions to specific episodes or deeds, such as the

suicide (which is not represented in Lucan's epic), or the successful mission to Cyprus. In other passages, the *exempla* from Cato's life are represented much more elaborately, such as the relationship with Marcia, whom Cato himself had married off to Hortensius.¹⁷⁸ In books 2 and 9, however, Lucan went far beyond the image from the *exempla* tradition, creating a narrative out of these standard story patterns and integrating the popular subject of Cato's exemplary virtue in the narrative structure of the *Civil War*, where it is used to illustrate his extraordinary patriotism and leadership qualities.

3.2.1 *The (re)public(an) man*

Cato's performance in the *Civil War* has often been interpreted, in line with the frequent interpretation of his figure as a symbol of Stoicism,¹⁷⁹ as the behaviour of the ideal Stoic sage, who even seeks to transform those around him into fellow Stoics. In response to Cato's frequent experience of emotions, modern scholars have argued that there is something wrong with his Stoicism, whether or not with the purpose of drawing conclusions on Lucan's personal vision on (Stoic) philosophy and politics.¹⁸⁰ We can solve these inconsistencies by taking a different view on Lucan's Cato: I believe that rather than a Stoic sage, Cato is presented as a republican hero and a public man, whose life and identity are strongly connected with the Republic. Although there are clear indications that Lucan was inspired by certain Stoic concepts when he composed his characterization of Cato, the poet nowhere gives evidence that he views Cato's conduct from a perspective other than his political ideology. Within the *Civil War*, philosophy is subservient to the portrayal of political heroes.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ On this story, RUSSO 1974: 100–103; DROGULA 2019: 173–175. Cf. Quint. *Inst.* 3.5.11 and 10.5.13 on the marriage as a declamatory subject; Plut. *Cat. Min.* 52.3–5 (featuring a quotation from Caesar's *Anticato* in 52.4); Strabo 11.9.1.

¹⁷⁹ See above, §1.3.

¹⁸⁰ MIRA SEO 2013: 66–67, n. 1 briefly sums up the argument. Cf. SKLENÁŘ 2003: 63–72, 78–79, 99–100; BARTSCH 1997: 118–121 for the argument that Lucan-Cato's Stoicism is flawed (cf. BARTSCH 2009: 500–501). Cf. JOHNSON 1987: 44–66 who asks “Can Lucan really have intended to give us a cruel cartoon of the Stoic saint” (45), and gives a positive answer by pointing to Lucan's apparent disappointment in the Roman political and moral system.

¹⁸¹ Cf. also SKLENÁŘ 2003: 62–63; although he emphasizes the presence of the ideal (or even

Book 2: Cato professes his public engagement

Book 2 of the *Civil War* introduces Cato as an insomniac who cannot think of anything other than the *publica fata virum casusque urbis*.¹⁸² In book 2 of the *Civil War*, when Cato is introduced in the narrative, one of the first qualities ascribed to him is that he is *securus sui*.¹⁸³ In his speech, Brutus, who has come to his uncle to try and stop him from joining the war, further characterizes his uncle as unperturbed and morally upright: Cato is said to possess a *certum robur*, his steps remain *inconcussa*, and he is *immunis* for the corruption of others.¹⁸⁴ In contrast, Pompey and Caesar mix everything up, and create a world of confusion.¹⁸⁵ Brutus attempts to dissuade his uncle from joining the war both because civil war is criminal (*scelus*, 2.266) and because Cato's participation will give Caesar all the more cause to continue it. In the final lines of his speech, Brutus prepares the transition between his and Cato's reply by anticipating that his uncle might choose the country over his own unshakable virtuousness:

*quod si pro legibus arma
ferre iuvat patriis libertatemque tueri,
nunc neque Pompei Brutum neque Caesaris hostem
post bellum victoris habes.*¹⁸⁶

but if it pleases you to carry arms
on behalf of the ancestral laws, and to protect freedom,
you will not have Brutus now as an enemy of Pompey
or Caesar, but of the victor after the war.

Earlier, Brutus had emphasized the immorality of the war as incompatible with Cato's strong moral nature, but he now acknowledges that

'stereotype', 72) of the Roman statesman, he still interprets Cato's portrayal almost exclusively from the perspective of Stoic philosophy (and its subversion).

¹⁸² Luc. 2.239–240.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.* 2.241. Lines 2.256 *durare* and 2.380 *duri Catonis* [*secta*] introduce the idea of a 'hard', consistent Cato for the first time.

¹⁸⁴ *Certo robore*, line 245; *inconcussa tenens vestigia*, 248; *immunem corrupti moribus aevi*, 256. For the idea that Cato is immune for the immorality of others, see also Vell. Pat. 2.35.

¹⁸⁵ Luc. 2.250 *cladibus immixtum*; 2.251 *rapiunt*; 2.252 *polluta domus*; 2.253–54 *ruinae* / *permiscenda fides*.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.* 2.281–284.

going to war might be part of the wish to protect the two pillars of state: the ancestral laws (the *mos maiorum*) and republican freedom. What is more, Brutus promises that he, too, will continue the defence of the Republic after this war, fighting the sole rule of either Pompey or Caesar. Indeed, Brutus cannot persuade Cato of his viewpoint, but Cato does persuade Brutus of his, since, as the narrator notes, with his reply Cato “applied the spurs of anger and in the young man stirs up a great hot passion for civil war”.¹⁸⁷ With this remark, Lucan constructs a line of republican resistance running from Cato to his nephew Brutus, who, as the reader knows, would later erect an anti-Caesarian movement and kill the dictator. By making Cato responsible here for Brutus’ “passion for civil war” Lucan suggests that Cato is the primary model of the republican resistance in the final phase of the Republic.¹⁸⁸

Right from his introduction in book 2, Cato’s thoughts are said to depend on the political situation in Rome; the first words he speaks in reply to his nephew concern the civil war, *civilia bella*. His moral trust in *fata* and in his *virtus secura* only come second, thus illustrating how his ethical philosophy, as it were, was subordinate to the true concern of his mind, the state.¹⁸⁹ “I agree, Brutus, that civil war is the highest crime / but wherever fate pulls, sound virtue will follow” (*sumмум, Brute, nefas civilia bella fatemur / sed quo fata trahunt, virtus secura sequetur*).¹⁹⁰ His speech will indeed invert Brutus’ depiction of him as the traditional philosophical sage, as Fabrice Galtier has recently argued convincingly.¹⁹¹ Moreover, in contrast to the exemplary stories

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.* 2.323–325: ... *acris / irarum movit stimulos iuvenisque calorem / excitat in nimios belli civilis amores*.

¹⁸⁸ The commentators *ad loc.* also note this future reference: see FANTHAM 1992 and DREYLING 1999. Such *prolepseis* to Brutus’ involvement in the plot against Caesar occur on multiple moments in the Civil War: cf., e.g., 9.17–19, 10.397–398.

¹⁸⁹ Luc. 2.286–287. An example where the order is reversed (this time the thought runs from ethical to political behaviour) but the moral and political philosophy appear to be similarly intertwined is 2.380–383: *Hi mores, haec duri inmotata Catonis / secta fuit, servare modum finemque tenere / naturamque sequi patriaeque impendere vitam / nec sibi sed toti gentium se credere mundo*.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.* 2.286–287. The idea is both Roman (political) and Stoic (philosophical), as DREYLING 1999: 128 explains. However, according to BARTSCH 1997: 120 with n. 55, this opening sentence clearly shows that, as a whole, it does not denote a Stoic attitude at all, since according to Stoic philosophy the willing are not dragged at all, but only follow.

¹⁹¹ GALTIER 2018: 247–266; cf. NARDUCCI 2002: 395–401. GALTIER argues that Brutus echoes the Senecan interpretation of Cato: “Inspirée en grande partie par la formulation sénéquienne, cette vision de Caton est soumise à une dramatisation qui en actualise les enjeux” (256). His argument fascinates all the more since if he is right, the speech given by Lucan’s Cato could be regarded more

we have seen above, where Cato does not speak, in Lucan's epic he himself gets to place this *virtus* into the context of his political ambitions and patriotism. In the speech to Brutus, Cato paints a picture of the world falling apart, and Rome with it, while he alone stays uninvolved in the events (*otio solus agam?*).¹⁹² Apostrophizing Rome and Libertas, he swears he will not abandon them unless they have utterly perished.¹⁹³ Cato's philosophy of life is strongly marked by a desire to participate in the battle over the Republic;¹⁹⁴ his personage, how Lucan has created it, cannot be disconnected from the Republic. The dialogue between Brutus and Cato creates the roots for an image of Cato as a public leader who openly shows awareness of his own exemplary role and of his responsibilities to the state—an awareness which especially marks his actions in book 9.

The narrator's 'eulogy'¹⁹⁵ of Cato in book 2 confirms this image of a patriot above all else. This character portrait evokes the image of Cato as Stoic *sapiens*, especially as it is worked out in Cicero's *In defence of Murena* (see above, § 1.3). However, the narrator refuses to depict Cato as a purely philosophical model, and shifts the discussion toward his civic and patriotic ideals:

*hi mores, haec duri immota Catonis
secta fuit, servare modum finemque tenere
naturamque sequi patriaeque impendere vitam
nec sibi sed toti genitum se credere mundo.*

...

*urbi pater est urbique maritus,
iustitiae cultor, rigidi servator honesti,
in commune bonus; nullosque Catonis in actus
subrepsit partemque tulit sibi nata voluptas.*¹⁹⁶

generally as a refutation of the 'Senecan' Cato. MIRA SEO 2013: 71–72 draws a similar conclusion on the dialogue, but appears to regard this observation as a distraction from her argument about Cato's exemplary status.

¹⁹² Luc. 2.295.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.* 2.302–303: ... *non ante revellar / exanimem quam te complectar, Roma, tuumque / nomen, Libertas, et inanem persequar umbram.*

¹⁹⁴ In any case, as Greta REYDAM-SCHILS 2005: 83–113 explains clearly, Stoicism was not in favour of abstaining from political life at all. According to REYDAM-SCHILS, practicing Stoics lived according to "two parallel sets of norms: philosophical and sociopolitical". Cf. BARTSCH 1997: 117–119 on the Lucanian Cato's participation in public affairs.

¹⁹⁵ As FANTHAM 1992 *ad loc.* terms it.

This is his character, this the unshakable doctrine
 of unbending Cato, to keep measure and stick to his goal,
 to follow nature and devote his life to the fatherland
 and to believe that he was not born for himself but for the whole
 ... L world.
 father and husband for the city he is,
 an admirer of justice, a keeper of strict honesty,
 good for the commonwealth; in none of Cato's actions
 does passion born in him overcome him or take part of him.

The idea of *durus* Cato, whose behaviour is in accordance with a strict set of principles (*secta*), is reminiscent of Cicero's words in *In defence of Murena*,¹⁹⁷ who, as quoted above, questioned Cato's *doctrina* because it would in fact be harmful, not only in the case of an individual like Murena but with regard to the republican institutions.¹⁹⁸ But while Cicero was sceptical about Cato's uncompromising devotion to the institutions, Lucan offers a different image in which Cato's public position is depicted as one of fatherhood and protectiveness. By placing Cato's strictness and stability explicitly in the context of the city (*urbi*), the community (*in commune bonus*) and justice (*iustitiae, honesti*), Lucan gives meaning to these stereotypical assets.¹⁹⁹ Cato's strictness and inflexibility are contextualized as qualities that help him serve the public cause.

At this point in the narrative, Cato still has a passive role. However, he will soon involve himself in the war, and the conversation with Brutus is an anticipation of his future task as Roman general. In sum, before Cato has yet done anything, he is characterized as a father of the city, an epitome of justice, a protector of rightfulness, and a man who serves the commonwealth. All these elements return in book 9—in a superlative fashion.

¹⁹⁶ Luc. 2.380–383; 388–391.

¹⁹⁷ DREYLING 1999: 164–165 further embeds this passage in the literary tradition.

¹⁹⁸ For the idea that Cato was not born only for himself, see also *Mur.* 83: *M. Cato, qui mihi non tibi, sed patriae natus esse <videris>*. Cf. Sen. *Dial.* 6.20.6. According to DREYLING 1999: 164 this was a topos in Latin literature.

¹⁹⁹ Cf. FANTHAM 1992: 152, "L. has transformed Cato from a narrow reactionary ... into a citizen of the world." GOAR 1987: 44–45, in his discussion of lines 380–391 believes that especially lines 384–386 evoke the image of Cato Censorius more than of his progeny.

Book 9: Cato's Party for Liberty

In his study of the concept of *libertas* in the Civil War, Donato Gagliardi describes how Cato reappears in book 9 as the “political and military antagonist of Caesar”.²⁰⁰ Book 9 is devoted to an elaborate portrayal of the republican leader and his ideals. Right at the beginning of book 9, the theme of Cato as protector of the state is picked up again. He is said to take on the guardianship of the state:

*Ille, ubi pendebant casus dubiumque manebat
quem dominum mundi facerent civilia bella,
oderat et Magnum, quamvis comes isset in arma
auspiciis raptus patriae ductuque senatus;
at post Thessalicas clades iam pectore toto
Pompeianus erat. Patriam tutore carentem
excepit, populi trepidantia membra refovit,
ignavis manibus proiectos reddidit enses,
nec regnum cupiens gessit civilia bella
nec servire timens. Nil causa fecit in armis
ille sua: totae post Magni funera partes
Libertatis erant.*²⁰¹

He, while the outcome hung in the balance, and it remained unclear who the civil war would make master of the world, also hated Magnus, although he had gone to war as part of his retinue, carried off by the authority of the senate and the orders of the senate. Yet after the bloodbath in Thessaly in his whole heart he was a Pompeian. He took pity on the fatherland which lacked a guardian, and he warmed the trembling limbs of the people, to insipid hands he gave back the swords they had laid down, and he did not lead the civil war in desire of kingship, nor in fear of becoming a slave. He did nothing in arms

²⁰⁰ GAGLIARDI 1976: 152. He argues that Stoic terminology (theory) is transformed in the *Civil War* to suit the discussion of essentially civilian, political themes: “La frattura con gli intellettuali stoici e con Seneca, su questo punto, è enorme: la libertà dall’azione si è tramutata infatti in libertà di azione.”

²⁰¹ Luc. 9.23–30.

because of personal gain: after Pompey's death
his was completely the party of Liberty.

The identification of Cato with *libertas* is a familiar theme from the *exempla* tradition. We are reminded of the famous dictum “no liberty without Cato, nor Cato without liberty”.²⁰² Whereas this type of rhetorical maxim obscures the historical roots of this identification,²⁰³ Lucan creates a narrative around this type of aphoristic thought. First, the passage above describes a certain psychological transformation in Cato's attitude.²⁰⁴ While he first hated Pompey and wanted to belong to neither side in the civil war, after the battle of Pharsalus he recognizes how much the fatherland needs him. Just as Marcia in book 2 was in want of a husband and guardian, the collective body of Rome needs someone to guide them after Pompey's death,²⁰⁵ and Cato cannot refuse. In describing how Cato warms the arms and legs of the soldiers and hands them back their swords, the narrator emphasizes the personal connection Cato creates with the soldiers. Lucan's second move in renarrativizing the *exempla* about Cato's *libertas* relates to the manner in which he frames Cato's taking over Pompey's army: this is presented as a conscientious decision. Due to his distrust of (the power of) single leaders and faction strife Cato will not merely follow Pompey's cause or even the cause of the senate (which, as we will see in § 3.3, is represented by Cicero), but he will take on leadership of the army on his own terms and in accordance with his republican ideals. There will be no Catonian army, but an army for the Republic: *partes Libertatis*. Finally, Lucan embeds the transformation of Cato as leader of the Republic into the historical background of Pompey's death: as his widow Cornelia relates, Pompey's last words concerned his successor. At the beginning of book 9, Cornelia returns from Egypt to the Pompeian army. Moved as always by a faithful wife's sadness, Cato—who has not

²⁰² Val. Max. 6.2.5; Sen. *Constant.* 2.2.

²⁰³ BLOOMER 1992: 190 argues that an “extraordinary rhetoricization—where the individual loses individual features and has as substitute a verbal classification—characterizes Valerius' treatment of Cato”. Cf. FEHRLE 1983: 24, 26; GOAR 1987: 34, and GOWING 2005: 49–62 on the loss of Cato's symbolic political status in early imperial rhetorical schools.

²⁰⁴ For the idea of a transformation at this point see GEORGE 1991.

²⁰⁵ For *patria* in line 24 surely also stands for its citizens and, very concretely, for the leaderless troops of soldiers encamped at Pharsalus.

just become the guardian of the army but also of Pompey's widow and sons—allows her a long speech to expound on her grief.²⁰⁶ Cornelia relates that Pompey had already sanctioned the establishment of an army for liberty by Cato. He had spoken to his son Sextus about the continuation of the war, concluding with the words “one man it will be proper to obey, if he will create a party for liberty: Cato” (*uni parere decebit / si faciet partes pro libertate, Catoni*).²⁰⁷ Rather than commemorating Cato as a unique protector of Roman liberty, Lucan embeds his consistent defence of Roman institutions in the narrative about the anti-Caesarian party, adding the fictive element of Pompey appointing Cato as his legitimate successor. It is well noted that the concept of the *partes Libertatis* is also a fiction, since no such movement existed in the late Republic or the early imperial period. There must be cynicism in Lucan's choice to make Cato the representative of some kind of abstract ideal.²⁰⁸ Yet the phrase actually makes clear how Cato could personify or express the concept of Roman liberty: his ideas about the Republic are collected in and symbolized by a specific citizen body, i.e. Pompey's army. In the course of book 9 the term *libertas* will return a couple of times; after the emphatic constitution of Cato's alleged ‘liberal party’ it becomes a catchword of his oratory.²⁰⁹ We will see in § 3.2.4 how Cato makes *libertas* into a persuasive element of his leadership programme.

Halfway through the account of Cato's generalship in book 9, the narrator elevates Cato as the true leader of not just the Pompeian army but the entire Roman people. This passage repeats some of the motifs in the character description in book 2, but puts his actions in historical perspective, offering them as a model of perfect patriotism:

*Si veris magna paratur
fama bonis et si successu nuda remoto
inspicitur virtus, quidquid laudamus in ullo
maiorum, Fortuna fuit. Quis Marte secundo,*

²⁰⁶ Compare Luc. 9.165–166, where Cato silences and reconciles Pompey's two sons who had been fighting over the right course of action now that their father has died.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.* 9.96–97.

²⁰⁸ Perhaps an allusion to previous discussions of Cato's idealistic policy by republican and imperial writers. On Cato's ‘Platonic’ naivety with regard to state matters, see Cic. *Att.* 2.1.8.

²⁰⁹ Luc. 9.193 and 205 (in the funeral speech for Pompey); 9.265.

*quis tantum meruit populorum sanguine nomen?
Hunc ego per Syrtes Libyaeque extrema triumphum
ducere maluerim, quam ter Capitolia curru
scandere Pompei, quam frangere colla Iugurthae.
Ecce parens verus patriae, dignissimus aris,
Roma, tuis, per quam numquam iurare pudebit,
et quem, si steteris umquam cervice soluta,
nunc, olim, factura deum es.*²¹⁰

If great fame is won through true goodness
and if pure virtue can be seen after removing the success,
whatever we praise in any of the ancestors, it was Fortune.
Who has deserved such a great name through a favourable Mars,
who through the blood of peoples?
Him I would rather see lead a triumph across the Syrtes
and the outskirts of Libya, than thrice ascend the Capitol
in the cart of Pompey, or than break the neck of Jugurtha.
Behold, the true father of the fatherland, really worthy of your altars,
Roma, by whose name it will never cause shame to swear,
and who, if you will ever stand with your neck freed,
you will now, some time, make into a god.²¹¹

The narrator asks the important question: who really has a claim to fame on the basis of pure virtuousness? Who of the ancestors deserves the acclaim of the people for fighting in Roman wars? Cato he would prefer, he says, in a nice juxtaposition of *hunc* and *ego*, rather than Pompey or Marius. Behold the true father of the fatherland (*ecce parens verus patriae*), who is worthy to be honoured in Rome's sacred temples, who will be made a god as soon as Rome is free again.²¹² The idea that Cato is a *pater* or *parens patriae* links the two passages in book 2 and 9.

²¹⁰ Luc. 9.593–604.

²¹¹ Cf. TAYLOR 1949: 181–182 on the final four lines.

²¹² PARATORE 1976 discusses the political implications of the conceptualization of Cato as *pater patriae*. This admiration for Cato's republicanism is often presented as an element of (secret) resistance against imperial rule. WILKINSON 2011 gives an overview of this resistance (which is often seen as the 'Stoic' or philosophical opposition) in the early empire, and also discusses the ways in which Cato was used as a model (esp. 61–77); cf. TAYLOR 1949, ch. 8 on 'Catonism' vs. 'Caesarism'; WIRSZUBSKI 1950: 126–129 on the memory of Cato under the Principate; cf. SYME 1958: 554–562. We have no proof that Cato was included among the *summi viri* at the Forum Augustum, or that it was officially allowed to set up statues or display images of him: SEHLMAYER 1999.

Yet while in book 2, the narrator introduced Cato's paternal care for Rome as well as for its citizens as an individual character trait, in book 9 he has fully illustrated his patriotism and sense of public leadership in the march through Libya. His public value has been proven so clearly that he can be compared to the valorous *triumphatores* of Rome, and is also imagined to receive the honours of the title *pater patriae*. The following sections will examine the constitutive elements of Cato's civic heroism in the *Civil War*: his authoritative sanctity, his guiding virtue, and his exemplary leadership.

3.2.2 Narrating Cato's sacredness

An important element of Cato's portrait as hero of the Republic is his sacred or divine core. The idea of godliness supports the presentation of him as *pater patriae*, whose perfect morality makes him into a perfect leader of state. Interestingly, Cato's sacred morality manifests itself especially through his speech. The words he speaks emanate from his *sanctum* or *arcanum pectus*; he speaks *sacrae voces* that flow from his *os sanctum*; his mind is full of god, and the words he speaks are not inferior to oracles.²¹³ The sanctity of Lucan's Cato seems to have been based on an image that is supported on a broader cultural plain.²¹⁴ As we have seen, Valerius says Cato's name can define a *sanctus et egregius civis*; and Velleius remarks that in everything Cato is closer to the gods than to other human beings (see § 2.2).²¹⁵ Yet Lucan is the one who makes this standard epithet part of the narrative of Cato's participation in the civil war, by connecting on several different occasions Ca-

²¹³ Luc. 2.825 *arcano pectore*; *sacras voces*; 2.372 *sancto ore*; 9.564–65 *deo plenus*; *dignas adytis e pectore voces*.

²¹⁴ However, according to GOAR 1987: 41–49 it finds its full expression with Lucan. He argues that it is in the *Civil War* that Cato became truly “canonized, even apotheosized” (41).

²¹⁵ Velleius uses the term *sanctus* of several republican heroes in book 2 of his history, such as Ti. Gracchus (2.2), C. Marius (2.11), Livius Drusus (2.13), Pompeius (twice, in 2.29 and 53), and also of the father of Octavian (2.59). He does not apply the epithet to Cato. Valerius is less prone to use *sanctus* for individuals; except for Cato, other republican exemplary figures it is applied to are C. Valerius Flaccus, P. Scipio Nasica, and M. Scaevola. It is also used for Octavia, the sister of Augustus. Interestingly, Valerius likes to employ it for more abstract notions, like *pudicitia* (6.1) or the *res publica* herself (6.6.1). The translators render it as ‘upright’ (SHIPLEY 1924) and ‘blameless’ (SHACKLETON BAILEY 2000). The term *sacer* is generally not used by Velleius to indicate people.

to's divine quality with actual behaviour. Moreover, he adds the question of truth, and thereby of *fides*. In introducing the funeral speech that Cato gives in commemoration of Pompey, the narrator observes that it comes from "a chest that is full of truth".²¹⁶ As opposed to other prophets and oracles in the *Civil War*, Cato is the one who genuinely embodies the truth.²¹⁷ The terminology of *sacer/sanctus* evokes the association with a hero cult.²¹⁸ The suggestion might not be so far from reality. Pliny the Younger mentions in one of his letters a certain Titiinius Capito who in his house has *imagines* on display of Cato, Brutus, and Cassius, about whom he even writes beautiful poems.²¹⁹ There is (late antique) literary evidence that already in the Augustan age, and by Augustus himself, Cato was upheld as an heroic ancestor, as Robert Goar has shown.²²⁰

The terminology of *sacer/sanctus* adds an imperial flavour to the presentation of Cato in the *Civil War*. During the Augustan period *sanctus* developed from a more general indication of divine qualities into a specific epithet for the emperor as well, stimulated by the habit of deification. At the same time, the term *sacer*, too, came to indicate a celestial, divine nature, and eventually became an epithet of the emperor.²²¹ Applying the terminology of *sanctus* and *sacer* to Cato, then, is a reference to the kind of worship the emperors would enjoy after his time and already enjoyed in Lucan's time of writing. In fact, in 2.604 this idea is confirmed by the hypothesis that Cato might once become *deus*. The divine aspects of Cato's personality, that make him such an

²¹⁶ Luc. 9.189: *verba sed a pleno venientia pectore veri*.

²¹⁷ SEEWALD 2008: 118–119, 284.

²¹⁸ TAYLOR 1949: 162–182 explains (at 182): "Instead of a party there was a cult of Cato, *sanctus Cato*, maintained, without opposition, in the houses of senators and nobles." TAYLOR discusses the ideals of Catonism and Caesarianism from the late Republic until the early Empire, and the question of whether we can regard these movements as official political "parties".

²¹⁹ Plin. *Ep.* 1.17.3.

²²⁰ GOAR 1987: 29–30; the source is Macrobius, *Sat.* 2.4.18.

²²¹ See Brill's New Pauly s.v. *sanctus* (WARDLE), *sacer* (RIVES). The words *sacer* and *sanctus* derive from the same stem, but do not have identical meanings. The term *sanctus* is probably older (possibly from an Indo-European root) than that of *sacer*, and it refers in the first place to something safeguarded in its existence by a law or rule; while *sacer* denotes all that naturally belongs to the divine realm (ERNOUT & MEILLET 1985: 586). Persons (and things) can be *sanctus* when they deserve a certain measure of respect, especially the dead and (historical) heroes. In a third step the word *sanctus* gained a similar meaning as the Greek ἅγιος, holy, when the person in question is thought to have qualities of divine origin; cf. ERNOUT & MEILLET 1985: 587. For the meaning of *sacer* as especially applied to imperial rulers and their families, see OLD s.v. 7.

ideal leader (see below), turn him into a kind of proto-emperor, as it were.²²²

3.2.3 Narrating Virtus

I have shown above that in the Tiberian period, Cato as a person is equated to *virtus*, and that his name alone is said to denote perfect citizenship. Within the *Civil War* this metonymical relation is worked out further on the level of the narrative. Cato's *virtus* is portrayed as acting over him, defining his behaviour and his choices. This idea is first expressed in the maxim Cato himself presents in his very first speech: *quo fata trahunt, virtus secunda sequetur* ("virtue will follow unwaveringly wherever fate leads it"; see also above, § 3.2.1).²²³ The reader understands that Cato means to say that, in order to remain true to his morality, he should follow fate. But instead of declaring that *he* will follow fate wherever it leads him—which, in this context, would have been a more straightforward way of saying it—he offers the abstract, philosophical maxim that virtuousness adjusts itself to the will of fate. Cato, as he presents it here, is subordinate to his excellence, following the final guidance of ultimate virtue. The metonymy returns in book 9, each time illustrating Cato's impulse to cross the desert and reunite the troops in the province of Africa. At the beginning of the march, the narrator describes that "Cato's virtue, which could not bear staying, dared to send his troops to unknown tribes and to go around the Syrtes by land, having trust in his army" (*at impatiens virtus haerere Catonis / audet in ignotas agmen committere gentes / armorum fidens et terra cingere Syrtim*).²²⁴ After a speech to his soldiers and a digression about the land the army is about to traverse, the narrative is resumed by another reference to Cato's *virtus* as the driving force: ... *hac ire Catonem / dura iubet virtus*.²²⁵ Similarly, right after Lucan's digression

²²² HARDIE 2010 shows that the shared theme in epic and historiography of the single leader who is able to regulate a crowd must have had particular relevance in the imperial age. At 15–17 he discusses Scipio's performance in Livy book 28, which he likewise calls a "proto-imperial moment".

²²³ Luc. 2.287.

²²⁴ *Ibid.* 9.371–973. Cf. 9.301–302, where the same idea is voiced: ... *sed iter mediis natura vetabat / Syrtibus: hanc audax sperat sibi cedere virtus*.

²²⁵ *Ibid.* 9.444–445.

on the horrors caused by the Libyan snakes (9.700–838) and a plaintive speech by the soldiers (839–880),²²⁶ Cato's virtue is presented as driving them forwards almost like an independent force:

*Cogit tantos tolerare labores
summa ducis virtus, qui nuda fusus harena
excubat atque omni Fortunam provocat hora.*²²⁷

The superb virtue of the leader forced them
to endure such great pains, who slept naked lying in the sand,
and who challenged Fortuna continuously.

The leading force of Cato's virtue has become a conjunctive element that forms the red thread in the story of the march, and drives the army on each time it encounters obstacles (either physical or emotional).

In these examples, we recognize the concept of Cato's *dura virtus*, a virtue so stable and inflexible it can endure any task and ordeal lying before him. Another conspicuous element is the narrator's subjectification of Virtus as being the agent instead of Cato himself; we are reminded of the exemplary Cato in Velleius' historiography, where he was *Virtuti simillimus* and therefore 'closer to the gods than to human beings' (§ 2.2.2). Lucan, however, nuances this static image of Cato as Virtue herself, whose behaviour is moral in a superhuman, godly way. In contrast to the characterizations by Velleius and Valerius, Lucan's Cato shows signs of human emotion and psychological development. At the moment when his relatives or fellow citizens are in want of something his passions overrule his reason, and he is seen to divert from his usual strictness. For example, at 2.350, where Marcia has returned to Cato begging him to take her back, her voice is said literally to "bend", or "move" her ex-husband: *hae flexere virum voces*. The verb *flecto* corresponds antithetically with the language of stability Lucan uses to describe Cato.²²⁸ In book 9, then, Lucan develops the image of the human, emotional Cato. This time he is moved by his fellow soldiers. In an exchange with an anonymous deserter in 9.220–283 the words

²²⁶ On Cato's notorious fight against the Libyan snakes, see JOHNSON 1987; BARTSCH 1997: 29–35; NARDUCCI 2002: 415–422; MALAMUD 2003; TIPPING 2011: 232–236.

²²⁷ Luc. 9.881–883.

²²⁸ Compare Cato's sudden tears at Cornelia's arrival from Egypt in book 9.49–50.

are said to 'burst', *eruperunt*, from Cato's chest for indignation about the slavish attitude of Pompey's army. Furthermore, in the examples just discussed, his *virtus* is described as depending on human feelings. At 9.371–372, it is called *impatiens*, 'intolerant' and daring (*audet*), in its desire to cross the Libyan desert. The use of *impatiens* is a pun on the Stoic concept of *patientia*: patience and tolerance originally connote dispassionateness and a lack of disturbance,²²⁹ yet Cato's virtue is so tough, so strong that his tolerance, *patientia*, of snakes, thirst, heat, and sand²³⁰ becomes passionate and restless. *Impatiens* here highlights Cato's stormy and boundless desire for morality. Similarly, whereas *ira* is something a Stoic sage should avoid as much as possible, Cato is famously seen to burst out in anger (*concitus ira*) against one of his soldiers when the poor man tries to offer his general a bit of water in his helmet. Cato's anger is expressed physically by his beating the helmet out of the soldier's hand and spilling the water on the ground.²³¹

In the attribution of *virtus* to particular actions of Cato we recognize the moral philosophy of the Roman exemplary tradition, where individuals or specific events always offered practical, concrete examples of particular values or virtues.²³² But whereas in collections of *exempla* the equation of Cato and *virtus* is the final goal, Lucan went a step further: Cato's *virtus* is made into a narrative device, a motif which helps structure the story. Cato's moral virtue, imagined as being a causal force, is made an integral part of the course of events.

3.2.4 Narrating Cato's exemplarity: the mutiny (Luc. 9.215–293)

In the passages taken from Valerius and Velleius presented above, Cato's actions were imitated by his fellow citizens out of respect and admiration for his high sense of morality; his exemplarity therefore lies for a great part in his ethical leadership.²³³ In treating his soldiers Cato

²²⁹ SKLENÁŘ 2003: 88 discusses the Stoic language in this passage.

²³⁰ All joys for true manly virtue, see Luc. 9.402–403.

²³¹ Luc. 9.500–510. Alternatively, *excudere* in line 510 may mean something like 'shaking the helmet empty', but Cato is not said to accept the helmet that is being extended to him.

²³² MORGAN 2007 has called this 'executive ethics', where behaviour instead of abstract values shapes and illustrates social rules. Cf. LANGLANDS 2011 on 'situational ethics'; also LANGLANDS 2018: 124–127.

knows how to direct their behaviour in the preferred moral direction: he is able to transfer his own ethical qualities onto his soldiers—not only by being such a virtuous general, but also by reflecting on his own position. In the adhortative speech given to the army before they will enter the desert, Cato presents himself as a *comes*, a *miles* rather than a *dominus* or *dux*. His call to the soldiers to “gather their courage for the great enterprise of virtue and the toughest labours”²³⁴ is effective because he imagines himself thirsting, burning in the sun, and walking by foot rather than riding his horse just like the other soldiers.²³⁵ That will make the difference, he says, between an authoritative leader, a *dux*, and a fellow soldier, *miles*.²³⁶ Cato is the *primus inter pares*²³⁷ of the Pompeian army.

Lucan gives an extra impulse to the image of Cato as an ethical leader by exploiting the special, didactic relationship between Cato and his fellow Romans; the *Civil War* breathes new life into the image of the ‘censor’ of Valerius’ *exempla*. It focuses on his engagement with others, whom he corrects and upbraids in long passages of direct speech.²³⁸ In other words, his superior sense of morality is illustrated in the narrative through his verbal interaction with secondary figures who serve as foils.²³⁹ In book 2, it is Brutus and Marcia whom Cato guides and comforts in a fatherly manner. In book 9, it is the Pompeian army, which he has turned into a republican army, an army for Libertas.²⁴⁰ At several moments in the narrative, Lucan introduces minor characters, either a named individual or anonymous soldiers, who can act as a foil for

²³³ On Cato as a republican leader, see GEORGE 1991: 254–258.

²³⁴ Luc. 9.380–381: ... *componite mentes / ad magnum virtutis opus summosque labores*.

²³⁵ *Ibid.* 9.394–398.

²³⁶ *Ibid.* 9.401–402: *si quo fuerit discrimine notum / dux an miles eam*.

²³⁷ SEEWALD 2008: 227.

²³⁸ See Luc. 9.221 *hunc ... fugientem ... / litus in extremum tali Cato voce notavit*, with SEEWALD 2008 *ad loc.* Note that *notavit* calls to mind the theme of the ‘censorship’ of the two Catones (worked out by Valerius Maximus in 2.9–10, see above, § 2.2.1).

²³⁹ Twice Cato seems to act in reaction to no specific word or deed: the first time is when he decides to march straight through the desert (9.444–445), and the second time occurs during the army’s first encounter with the Libyan snakes (9.611–618). The fact that Cato has no foil in these instances might also indicate that these choices were not exactly shared by the others.

²⁴⁰ Luc. 9.29–30: *totae post Magni funera partes / Libertatis erant*, “after the death of Pompey he was completely on the side of Libertas”; *partes* has a political meaning, the plural often referring to the ancient equivalent of a modern political party. TAYLOR 1949: 1–24, on the exact terminology of *partes*, see 8–12.

Cato's grandness: a mutinous soldier (9.217–293), the lieutenant Titus Labienus (9.549–586), and the water carrier (9.500–510).²⁴¹

In this section I would like to examine not merely Cato's moral-didactic relationship with his soldiers, but the way in which he builds this relationship through the use of oratory; it is particularly in his speech(es) that he shows himself to be the ethical leader of the army. His oratory marks the contrast between his own and Cicero's role in the *Civil War*: the speeches in book 9 offer a programmatic vision of patriotism and concern for the state that Cicero's speech lacks (see below, § 3.3). Ironically, it is Cato who openly emphasizes the importance of protecting the Republic against Caesar's monarchic plans, while historically speaking, Cicero had been the one who had documented the fall of the Republic and had produced a philosophy of republicanism.²⁴² In order to illustrate Cato's exemplary function I will examine the exchange between him and the mutinous soldiers.²⁴³

After Pompey has died, Lucan voices the soldiers' unwillingness to continue to fight; he does so by making one of these soldiers give a speech that represents the collective feeling. This anonymous deserter indicates that he has followed Pompey alone as his leader (*dux*) in the war: "I shall have a master, as defeat compels,²⁴⁴ but no leader, Magnus: having followed only you in the war, I will follow fate now that you are gone" (*dominum, quem clades cogit, habebo / nullum, Magne, ducem: te solum in bella secutus / post te fata sequar*).²⁴⁵ In the eyes of the soldiers, Caesar has already won, and the only thing left to do is submit to fate. Since the moment Pompey has died, civil war has become a crime (*Pompeio scelus est bellum civile perempto*, 9.248). The troops should rather try to side with a legitimate leader, with Caesar who was consul at the time:

²⁴¹ At Luc. 9.846–889, Cato is placed vis-à-vis the entire army; their long lament is followed by a description of Cato's fearless, tireless personal care for every individual soldier.

²⁴² Cf. LINTOTT 1971: 500, who argues that Cicero's thought provided the content for Cato's speeches.

²⁴³ AHL 1976: 254–262 is instructive for its comparison of Cato's leadership style in this passage with that of Caesar in book 5. At 257 he summarizes: "Cato draws men up to his own level; he invites them to emulate him; he ennobles them. Caesar reduces them to the level of minions."

²⁴⁴ Following the translation of BRAUND 1992.

²⁴⁵ Luc. 9.241–243.

*Si publica iura,
si semper sequeris patriam, Cato, signa petamus
Romanus quae consul habet.*²⁴⁶

If you always obey the public laws and the fatherland, Cato,
Let us seek the standards which the Roman consul has.

The reference to Cato's absolute faith in the Roman law alludes to the image of Cato as it appears from the *exempla* tradition. His inability to violate the laws is attested in, for instance, the *exempla* handling his mission to Cyprus or his refusal to endorse Caesar's laws.²⁴⁷ The soldier appeals to this aspect of Cato which is known from popular tradition. If you are the constitutionalist we know you to be from the stories we have heard, the soldier seems to be saying, you would not condemn us for protecting ourselves by choosing a path that will at least be authorized by one official leader, Caesar. The view of the narrative shifts from one end of the spectrum to the other: from the history of great men—such as Pompey, Cato, and Caesar—to the perception and commemoration of their deeds by the common people.

In fact, the opinion of the anonymous soldier echoes in part the opinion Cato had voiced in book 2. The civil war is a *scelus*, and it is contrary to the *publica iura*.²⁴⁸ The soldier's phrase *post te fata sequar* in 9.243, quoted above, further reminds of Cato's remark *quo fata trahunt, virtus secuta sequetur*. However, the soldier misunderstands what it means for the Lucanian Cato to follow the fatherland. For, in order to do that, as he has also established in book 2, he must fight. It is not according to the laws or to *libertas* that the Republic would fall into the hands of one ruler. He has taken up the task of *tutor* and *pater patriae*.²⁴⁹ The soldier's confusion over Cato's priorities thematizes the gap between the Cato of the *exempla* tradition and the epic Cato of Lucan's poem, whose patriotism defeats legal principle and consistency.

Now, the floor for debate has been opened: *actum Romanis fuerat de rebus*.²⁵⁰ This is a difficult sentence, usually translated as "the Ro-

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.* 9.249–251.

²⁴⁷ Val. Max. 4.3.2 with Vell. Pat. 2.45; or Val. Max. 2.10.7.

²⁴⁸ Luc. 2.286–288, 315–316.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 9.601: *ecce parens verus patriae*, and 9.24–25 *patriam tutore carentem / excepit*.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.* 9.253.

man state was/would have been finished".²⁵¹ However, within the context of the oratorical exchange between Cato and the soldier, *agere* (*de Romanis rebus*) could also refer to public speaking.²⁵² The narrator had framed the mutiny as a situation of discord (*discordia volgi*, 9.217), which Cato, as their new general, needed to resolve. The word *actum*, then, so emphatically placed at the beginning of line 9.253, also recalls the atmosphere of discord and debate within Republican politics. The phrase *actum Romanis fuerat de rebus* has a forensic ring to it, alluding to the idea that there had been put forward a motion on Rome's situation from the side of the soldiers. Subsequently, Cato, cast in the role of public orator at a Republican *contio* who needs to persuade the people of his course of action, brings forward a contrary motion.²⁵³ He begins by mocking their slavish attitude: "So you have fought the war by equal vow, young men; you have been, too, on the side of the masters, and you were a Pompeian not a Roman army?" (*Ergo pari voto gessisti bella, iuventus, / tu quoque pro dominis, et Pompeiana fuisti, / non Romana manus?*). Cato's speech has a double strategy: it is both exhortation and accusation, its tone being ironical and biting. It presents a clear idea of right and wrong, and centres around the question of what is *honestum* for Roman citizens. Its thesis is clear: it is wrong, or *inhonestum*, to give up the defence of the Republic and give in to the prospect of a dictatorial reign. Cato reproaches the behaviour of the soldiers, and even goes so far as to call them "disgraceful servants" (*famuli turpes*).²⁵⁴ The language of honour and reward, most densely used towards the end of the speech, exhorts the soldiers to weigh their own gain against that of the entire Republic.²⁵⁵ Cato's exhortative rhetoric highlights the value of *kairos* in the struggle of the Roman people for *libertas*:

²⁵¹ DUFF 1928; BRAUND 1992; SCHRIJVERS 2013. For the expression *actum est* see OLD s.v. *ago* 21C.

²⁵² Compare the expression *cum populo agere*, OLD s.v. *ago* 39c; for forensic meanings of *ago*, see OLD s.v. 39–44. See also lines 215–217, where the narrator compares Cato's funeral speech for Pompey with the official *laus funebris* held from the rostra on the Roman forum (... *quam si Romana sonarent / rostra ducis laudes*).

²⁵³ SEEWALD 2008 *ad loc.* is accordingly led to recognize Lucan the declaimer in this passage.

²⁵⁴ Luc. 9.274.

²⁵⁵ Ibid. 9.262–63 *causa digna*; 266 *pudeat*; 272–73 *meruistis iudice vitam / Caesare*; 275 *maiora mereri*; 280 *mercede*; 281 *pretio*; 282 *meritum*. For a rhetorical analysis of the speech see SEEWALD 2008: 255–283; cf. AHL 1976: 254–257; GALL 2005.

*Potuit vestro Pompeius abuti
 sanguine: nunc patriae iugulos ensesque negatis
 cum prope libertas? Unum Fortuna reliquit
 iam tribus e dominis.*²⁵⁶

Pompey could misuse your blood:
 now you deny your fatherland your necks and swords
 when liberty is near? Fortune has left but one
 out of three masters.

Since only one Triumvir has remained, the opportunity has come to free the Roman state from its tyrants. Cato corrects the faulty view of the troops that they fought only for Pompey, and offers them a different perspective, in which they fight as free citizens, for the fatherland.

The political ethics Cato presents in his fiery speech has an impressive effect on the soldiers. In a poetic bee simile,²⁵⁷ the narrator describes how the soldiers flock back to the shore where Cato stands, in the same manner in which bees performing their search for honey re-assemble and return at the sound of the beekeeper's flute. The *securus pastor*, whose livelihood is secure because his bees work for him, resembles the general who is certain that his cause is just and his soldiers will help him achieve it:

*gaudet in Hyblaeo securus gramine pastor
 divitias servasse casae. Sic voce Catonis
 inculcata viris iusti patientia Martis.*²⁵⁸

Happy is the herdsman, secure in his Sicilian meadow, that he has maintained the riches of his cottage. Thus by the voice of Cato the tolerance of a just war was inculcated in the men.

Pastor and *Catonis* are both positioned at the end of the verse, thereby enhancing the comparison. The beekeeper resembles the state leader because, apart from keeping his men in check, he also takes care of them. Whereas the beekeeper uses a musical instrument, Cato uses his

²⁵⁶ Luc. 9.263–266.

²⁵⁷ Such bee similes are rather topical in epic poetry: cf., e.g., Hom. *Il.* 2.86–94 and Vergil *Aen.* 1.430–436 about Carthage.

²⁵⁸ Luc. 9.291–293.

voice to regroup and unite the troops of Pompey. It is this voice, which comes from Cato's sacred heart,²⁵⁹ by which he can pass on his feeling for justice and his personal integrity to the men around him. His voice can inculcate into the Roman citizens an acceptance of the war and the belief that it is *honestum*, right. As in the *exempla* discussed in § 2, the civic ideals and the patriotism of the Lucanian Cato are contagious: they encourage his fellow citizens to imitate his conduct and adjust their moral values.

The rhetorical ability that is attributed to Cato in the *Civil War* is an enhancement of the image of Cato as it arises from Valerius and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Velleius. Whereas the Tiberian writers leave in the middle by what means Cato was able to convince others to imitate his exemplary virtuousness, Lucan has found a way to explain what made Cato's stature so impressive. From earlier sources it is clear that Cato had a talent for speaking; the stories about his filibustering prove this.²⁶⁰ Lucan restores the orator Cato by planting multiple speeches in his mouth and illustrating the power of his oratory. In contrast, the speeches Caesar gives in the poem are effective because of the fear his soldiers feel of him; Pompey is obeyed by reason of the respect all the Roman citizens pay to him.²⁶¹ Of the three leaders in the *Civil War* it is Cato whose words actually present the *content* as vital. It is this content that goes beyond the interests of single players in the war. Cato's *virtus* may be reckless (*audax*),²⁶² but it is in fact the only *virtus* that is seen to have some positive (instructive) effect on normal citizens.

3.3 CICERO'S CALL FOR BATTLE

I have spent quite some time on Cato at the expense of Cicero's figure in the *Civil War*. In a way this accords with the poem itself: Cicero ap-

²⁵⁹ Lucan introduces Cato's speech by saying that "the voice of the leader burst out of his sacred chest" (*erupere ducis sacro de pectore voces*), 9.255. See also § 3.2.2 above.

²⁶⁰ Cf. Caes. *BAfr.* 22, *BCiv.* 1.32; Cass. Dio 39.34–35; Plut. *Cat. Min.* 5.2.

²⁶¹ Cf. Luc. 5.319–364, where Caesar also performs an angry speech to prevent his soldiers from mutiny. His solution is to execute the men who had started it; Caesar's reign of terror is diametrically opposed to Cato's moral leadership. In 2.531–595, Pompey gives a battle speech. Although the words are spoken *veneranda voce*, it is received *nullo clamore* and with no direct action from the soldiers.

²⁶² When the narrative is resumed after these speeches, Cato's *audax virtus* is called the central

pears only very briefly in book 7, where he is given a speech of 17 lines addressed to ‘his’ general Pompey.²⁶³ Again, as in the Valerian *exempla*, Cicero’s political value and contribution to Roman politics are being undermined. The speech of Cicero illustrates the difference between his and Cato’s exemplary image. Velleius Paterculus and Valerius Maximus had still awarded Cicero the status of the most successful Roman orator.²⁶⁴ Lucan, however, also negates Cicero’s achievements in the field of oratory. The Cicero of the *Civil War* is a member of the aristocracy who is not able to represent the Roman people. His performance stands in stark contrast with that of Cato: while Cato shows what republicanism, i.e. support of the Republic, entails, Cicero highlights the self-interested, antagonistic attitude of the Roman elite.

Cicero appears unexpectedly at the beginning of book 7 in the army camp at Pharsalus.²⁶⁵ The Battle of Pharsalus is looming, but Pompey does not want to fight for fear of his defeat; the narrator bemoans his tragic fate.²⁶⁶ The army, however, is impatient to go to battle—for fate has ordained that they must,²⁶⁷ and appeals to Pompey to pick up the standards. The narrator creates suspense by switching in line 58 to the first person plural in directing, on behalf of the Roman people, a desperate question to the gods, asking why it is possible that the army is destined for such a nefarious battle. At this point then, Cicero is introduced, the “greatest master²⁶⁸ of Roman eloquence”, who cannot bear the voices of the soldiers anymore and who is angry about the war:

*Cunctorum voces Romani maximus auctor
Tullius eloquii, cuius sub iure togaque
pacificas saevus tremuit Catilina securis,
pertulit iratus bellis, cum rostra forumque*

force in the decision to cross the Syrtes: 9.302.

²⁶³ On the speech, see LA BUA 2020; ROCHE 2019: 83–84; ESPOSITO 2018; NARDUCCI 2003; AHL 1976: 160–164; GAMBET 1963: 141–146; MALCOVATI 1953.

²⁶⁴ Vell. Pat. 1.17; Val. Max. 2.2.3, 4.2.4, 8.10.3.

²⁶⁵ See ESPOSITO 2018 (with plenty of bibliography) for the common interpretation of Cicero’s speech as a fictional *suasoria*, which would mirror the early imperial interest in the rhetorical Cicero taught in the schools.

²⁶⁶ Luc. 9.29–42; Pompey’s special bond with Rome is strongly emphasized here.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.* 9.45–55.

²⁶⁸ Cf. OLD s.v. *auctor* 8.

optaret passus tam longa silentia miles.
*Addidit invalidae robur facundia causae.*²⁶⁹

The voices of all men the greatest master of Roman eloquence Tullius, under whose law and toga cruel Catilina shivered before peaceful axes, expressed, angry with the war, since he desired the rostra and forum, having endured such a long silence as a soldier. His fluent speech added strength to an invalid case.

With *cunctorum voces* placed proleptically at the beginning of this introduction Lucan alludes to Cicero's exemplary role as *vox publica*; modern scholars have pointed out that Lucan stages Cicero here as the 'portavoce' not only of the Roman soldiers but of Lucan himself.²⁷⁰ We will return to this argument presently. The term *facundia* in line 67, which occurs only here, is clear evidence for the rhetorical context of Lucan's introduction. The image of Cicero as model orator is further developed by reference to the episode of the Catilinarian conspiracy and to Cicero's defence of the Republic. Lines 63–64 (*cuius sub iure togaque / pacificas saevus tremuit Catilina securis*) evoke the Ciceronian symbol of the *dux togatus*, which was also picked up in the Tiberian narrative about Cicero.²⁷¹

However, this traditional model function of Cicero's political actions is immediately subverted, for the poem interprets Cicero's contribution to society as one of no effect. First, Cicero is said to long for the rostra and the forum, because in his duty as a soldier he has endured a silence for far too long (*longa silentia*). There is a double entendre in this line. The silence Cicero experienced refers *in concreto* to the situation of 49–48, when Cicero's duties as a politician-orator were suspended by the war. It also refers to his lack of military endeavours during his career; Cicero was not particularly famous for military exploits (his triumph in Cilicia being a singular instance of success). On a metapoetic level, moreover, the silence refers to the fact that Cicero

²⁶⁹ Luc. 7.62–67.

²⁷⁰ LANZARONE 2016: 148–149 and NARDUCCI 2003.

²⁷¹ In his 2003 article, Emanuele NARDUCCI demonstrated the intertextual parallels for the passage. He argues that Lucan here conflates the eulogies of Cornelius Severus (*Suas.* 6.26, *ictaque luctu / conticuit Latiae tristis facundia linguae*) and Sextilius Ena (*Suas.* 6.27, *deplendus Cicero est Latiaeque silentia linguae*); cf. already MALCOVATI 1953: 289 n. 1. LANZARONE 2016: 152 follows this argument.

only receives an opportunity to speak in book 7 of the *Civil War*; he has not been allowed to fulfil a role in the narrative—and he will not have one hereafter. Despite his aversion to the civil war Cicero now decides to appeal publicly to Pompey to take up arms. But when the silence is finally broken, and Cicero's oratory regains a podium, he will only defend or stimulate a cause that is principally wrong, remarks the narrator: *addidit invalidae robur facundia causae*. *Invalidus* should be read in its forensic meaning: the argument is invalid and the orator will only wrap words around an idea that is weak and unconvincing from the start.²⁷² The term also refers to the bad counsel Cicero is about to offer Pompey, which will be confirmed by the general's response.²⁷³ This is what the orator says:

*Hoc pro tot meritis solum te, Magne, precatur,
uti se Fortuna velis, proceresque tuorum
castrorum regesque tui cum supplice mundo
adfusi vinci socerum patiari rogamus.
Humani generis tam longo tempore bellum
Caesar erit? Merito Pompeium vincere lente
gentibus indignum est a transcurrente subactis.
Quo tibi fervor abit aut quo fiducia fati?
De superis, ingrate, times causamque senatus
credere dis dubitas? Ipsae tua signa revellent
prosilientque acies: pudeat vicisse coactum.
Si duce te iusso, si nobis bella geruntur,
sit iuris, quocumque velint, concurrere campo.
Quid mundi gladios a sanguine Caesaris arces?
Vibrant tela manus, vix signa morantia quisquam
expectat: propera, ne te tua classica linquant.
Scire senatus avet, miles te, Magne, sequatur
an comes.*²⁷⁴

Fortuna requests from you only this, Magnus, in return for so many rewards, that you will make use of her, and we, the elders of your

²⁷² The expression *invalida causa* might derive from Lucan's own rhetorical education; ROCHE 2019 *ad loc.* notes that this line contains only rhetorical terms. For the rhetorical meaning of *invalidus* see OLD s.v. 4.

²⁷³ ESPOSITO 2018: 45 calls him "un consigliere fraudolento".

²⁷⁴ Luc. 7.68–85.

camp, and your kings, together with the world as supplicant, prostrated at your feet, ask that you let your father-in-law be conquered. Will Caesar be the cause of war for humankind for such a long time? It is fair that the peoples subdued by Pompey racing by are indignant that he is taking a long time to gain victory. Where has your passion gone? where your trust in fate? Do you doubt the gods, ungrateful man, or do you hesitate to entrust the cause of the senate to the gods? Of their own will the troops will wrench up the standards and march forward: you will be ashamed to have victory forced upon you. If you are commanded to be our leader, if this war is waged for our benefit, then let it be their right to engage on whichever battlefield they please. Why do you keep away the swords of the people from Caesar's body? Their hands brandish the weapons, everyone can barely wait for the lagging signal: hurry, lest your trumpets leave you behind. The senate desires to know, Magnus, whether it should follow you as a soldier or as retinue.²⁷⁵

It is clear that this speech is quite unciceronian, in thought and style. It is short (not yet 18 lines), especially compared to that of Pompey which is twice as long (36 lines). Moreover, it does not concur with Lucan's introduction of Cicero as *iratus bellis* and a civilian leader without arms.²⁷⁶ In the previous and the present chapter, we have often encountered the motif of Cicero's humane leadership and his tendency to compromise; Velleius identified Cicero's policy as one aiming at *concordia*, and Valerius praises Cicero as an inspiring model of *humanitas*. And yet, although Cicero was known for his peace-loving and diplomatic attitude, Lucan creates an orator who begs for war.

Furthermore, the speech seems to question Cicero's status as *vox publica*. Lines 69–71, 74, and 84–85 indicate that Cicero mainly represents the higher echelons of the army and particularly the Roman senate, the governmental body that had assigned this war to Pompey.²⁷⁷ *Rogamus* in line 71 confirms that Cicero is acting as a political representative and including himself among the *proceres tuorum castrorum*

²⁷⁵ For this difficult passage I made use of the translations by DUFF 1928 and BRAUND 1992.

²⁷⁶ LANZARONE 2016: 152 notes on the phrase *iratus bellis*: "Notevole, nel testo lucaneo, la paradosalità di un Cicerone che, 'adirato per la guerra', spinge Pompeo alla guerra".

²⁷⁷ See ROCHE 2019: 84, "As a symbol of the constitutional authority of the senate, Lucan's Cicero dramatizes Pompey's obligations to a political community...". Cf. Vell. Pat. 2.49, *Pompeium senatus auctoritas, Caesarem militum armavit fiducia*.

regesque. The reference to the *causam senatus* (76), together with the remark “the senate wishes to know” (*scire senatus avert*, 84) signal his status as *consularis*, who would have been allowed to speak on behalf of other senators. Therefore, the remark that Cicero represents the “voice of all men” (*cunctorum voces*, 7.62) in the army acquires an ironical flavour; as an optimate politician, Cicero would sooner focus on the welfare of the aristocracy.²⁷⁸ The final sentence of his speech also appears to ignore the fact that the largest part of the army consisted of farmers and veterans.

Pompey’s reaction to Cicero’s cry for battle is certainly not the desired one:

*Ingemuit rector sensitque deorum
esse dolos et fata suae contraria menti.*²⁷⁹

The leader groaned and felt that it was the tricks
of the gods, and a fate contrary to his own mind.

Pompey feels that this appeal to his sense of valour and steadfastness is a trick of the gods to engage him in the war, although he would rather keep out of it. It is striking to see that what the narrator calls the *dolos deorum* are voiced through the mouth of Cicero—him of all people, the *maximus auctor eloquii*.²⁸⁰ The untrustworthy character of Cicero’s rhetoric, which was already anticipated by the phrase *invalida causa* in 7.67, is confirmed by Pompey’s reluctant response.²⁸¹ The general’s awareness of the tricks which Cicero is playing (by, for example, asking him whether he is afraid, or has lost his trust in the senate or even the gods—things he could not possibly say yes to) only further weakens his argument. Pompey gives in to the orator’s appeal without any sign that he is convinced by the cause of the senate: “The war will not be the crime nor the glory of Pompey; you win your case with the gods, Cae-

²⁷⁸ KEELINE 2018: 85 similarly notes this, and eloquently remarks: “He was a conservative politician with a convert’s zeal, having raised himself up to the consulship from a family that could boast no senators among its ancestors, and at least from his consulship on he could not easily have been described as the voice of the people.”

²⁷⁹ Luc. 7.85–86. NARDUCCI 2003: 85 sees an allusion 7.85 to the concept of the *rector* or *guberna-*tor in Cicero’s political philosophy; cf. AHL 1976: 162.

²⁸⁰ We are reminded of Sallust’s *Cat.* 26, where the historiographer mentions *dolos* and *astutia* as Cicero’s prime qualities. See chapter 1, § 2.3.1.

²⁸¹ NARDUCCI 2003: 82.

sar, with unjust prayers: the fight is on"²⁸² (*Pompei nec crimen erit nec gloria bellum. / Vincis apud superos votis me, Caesar, iniquis: / pugnatur ...*). Moreover, in the speech he gives in response, Pompey immediately and subtly adjusts the perspective on his own leadership as it was established by Cicero. By asking whether the senate should follow as a *miles* or *comes* Cicero had put Pompey's leadership to the test; while a *miles* would follow a military general, a *comes* denotes a civilian escort.²⁸³ The idea that Pompey, at the head of an entire army, would not pursue his military duties, is of course ridiculous. However, Pompey subtly responds to Cicero's ridicule, and even corrects him in the process: he will not fight as a *dux*, or a military leader, he says, but as a fellow soldier, a *miles*.²⁸⁴ Cicero has framed his position in the army wrongly: Pompey will engage in the battle himself, as a *miles*. What is more, he will even engage in it despite the foreknowledge that he—or the Republic herself—will not see the end of it.²⁸⁵ The ultimate self-sacrifice is a true sign of *virtus*; Pompey acts according to the responsibilities of a general, but one who sees himself as equal to his fellow citizens.

It is not just Pompey who is unconvinced by the *causa senatus*: the soldiers as well react anxiously to the discussion between the leaders of their camp.²⁸⁶ The result is complete chaos. The narrator compares Pompey, in giving free rein to the people's anger, to a sailor overpowered by a storm who needs to give his ship over to the winds. Neither Cicero nor Pompey have succeeded in reassuring them of the justness of the war, and the "paleness of many faces as a foreboding of death"²⁸⁷ indicates that all hope is lost.

²⁸² As BRAUND 1992 translates.

²⁸³ See ROCHE 2019: 89, who explains *comites* refers to members of staff who travel with a provincial governor, or simply denote the escort on a journey. ROCHE believes Cicero's final remark is meant as a direct insult.

²⁸⁴ Luc. 7.87–88: *si placet hoc, inquit, cunctis, si milite Magno, / non duce tempus eget, nil ultra fata morabor*. See above, § 3.2.4; part of Cato's leadership ethics is to present himself as a (fellow) *miles* among the soldiers.

²⁸⁵ E.g. Luc. 7.91–92: *testor, Roma, tamen Magnum quo cuncta perirent / accepisse diem*; and 95: *quis furor, o caeci, scelerum?*

²⁸⁶ FANTHAM 1992: 178–179 points out Pompey's earlier failure to persuade and exhort his army in book 2.

²⁸⁷ Luc. 7.129–130: *multorum pallor in ore / mortis venturae faciesque simillima fato*.

Is Lucan's Cicero a mouthpiece of the Roman people and the poet, as some commentators have claimed? This is rather hard to believe considering the ambiguous portrait he renders of him. It is true that Cicero's speech voices part of the feelings in Pompey's camp, but the orator seems to have no idea of the real issues at stake here. Cicero's distant relation to the soldiers in Pompey's army suggests that he does not make an adequate (military) leader. Multiple times in his speech, he identifies himself with the senators. Historically speaking, there is no oddity in this: Pompey was acting on behalf of the senate, who according to the Roman constitution were still the two generals' equal colleagues. Yet considering the enormity of the battle itself, Cicero could have expressed some concern about the horrifying nature of the war as a *crimen* against fellow citizens, or about the soldiers' position. His view is the view of the elite at Rome, for whose power Caesar was a great threat. At the beginning of book 7 the narrator takes care to emphasize the tragedy of the battle at Pharsalus and the misery of the collective people; Cicero's exhortation of Pompey, on behalf of the leading citizens of Rome, increases the feeling of unease about this war against one of the state's ex-consuls and her own citizens. What is more, it is not only warring against but warring *with* its own citizens. Dorothee Gall has pointed out that the relationship between general and troops is a crucial motif in the *Civil War*, in support of the overall theme of civil war as *nefas*.²⁸⁸ By adducing Cicero as a representative of the elite republican party, and making Pompey comply to the senate's wish to fight, the narrator highlights the miserable position of the Roman soldiers, who were bound by oath to obey their generals.

The question remains why Lucan introduced Cicero at this point in the narrative. Why include him at all, especially if it is so 'uncharacteristically' unhistorical?²⁸⁹ One reason may have been that Cicero, whom the poem's readers knew was intimately acquainted with Pompey and Caesar both politically and privately, adds dramatic weight to the final moment before the battle.²⁹⁰ However, Lucan may also have been interested in Cicero's status as a figurehead of the Republic. In his study on the development of Cicero's figure in the early empire, Gowing ar-

²⁸⁸ GALL 2005.

²⁸⁹ NARDUCCI 2003: 79.

²⁹⁰ Cf. AHL 1976: 162.

gues that Lucan “writes Cicero back into history”.²⁹¹ Whereas Cicero's political standpoints had been precarious under Augustus and Tiberius, within Lucan's rather subversive tale of the civil war Cicero may reenter as an optimate republican opposing Caesar. Lucan's portrait of Cicero, although stereotypical in its focus on Cicero's iconic eloquence, does offer something of a historical interpretation of Cicero's role in the events around Pharsalus. Firstly, Lucan's Cicero is in fact a leader of the elite party that he has represented so staunchly throughout his career. Secondly, as we know from Cicero's personal letters to Atticus, he had a great distrust of Pompey and objected for a long time against sailing to Dyracchium; this disgruntled and antagonistic attitude is clearly represented in his speech in book 7.²⁹²

To turn to the exemplary aspects of Cicero's performance, at first glance Lucan's portrait is relatively familiar: Cicero is introduced as the togate general who defeated Catiline, whose eloquence is unparalleled, and who was a great representative of fellow citizens as a result of his oratorical services. However, almost as soon as Lucan has established the traditional image of Cicero as the salvation of the Roman community, he breaks it again. Cicero's famous negotiations for peace are distorted into a public demand for battle,²⁹³ which disregards the needs of the Roman soldiers he is initially thought to represent. We might think the figure of Cicero is only as bellicose as he is bored, having no platform to exercise his skills. There is certainly some humour in this portrayal. Yet Pompey's response again thematizes the tragedy of the battle at Pharsalus; his awareness of the bloody prospects of this battle stands in uncomfortable contrast with the eagerness to fight represented by Cicero, who stayed safely away from Pharsalus, and whose own lack of military exploits was manifest.

²⁹¹ GOWING 2013: 244.

²⁹² From books 7–11 which deal with this period, good examples are *Att.* 7.14.2, 8.3.2–5, 8.11.2, 8.11D.5–8 (Cicero to Pompey), 9.7.3; cf. ESPOSITO 2018: 40–42. HOLLIDAY 1969: 65–69 sees a direct correspondence between the attitude expressed in Cicero's letters and his speech in the *Civil War*. For the letters to Atticus as a possible source for Lucan, see MALCOVATI 1953: 293–297; HOLLIDAY 1969: 84–92 (including a direct response to MALCOVATI's article).

²⁹³ On Cicero's role within book 7 as Pompeian partisan and a proponent of ‘bellicism’, see FUCECCHI 2011 (esp. 246–247). The demand for battle might also be, in some way, a reflection of the tone of Cicero's *Philippics*, which as we have seen was of equal importance to the historical tradition and Cicero's exemplary function. However, I currently see no allusions to this period of Cicero's career. MALCOVATI 1953: 296–297 does recognize allusions to *Phil.* 2, but in Cato's eulogy of Pompey (9.188–214), and unfortunately she does not elaborate on this observation.

3.4 CONCLUSIONS

Looking at the portraits of Cicero and Cato in the *Civil War*, there could not be a greater difference between these two defenders of the Republic. In a nutshell, Cicero represents the interests of the Roman elite, Cato the interests of the state herself. Cicero is aligned with the *proceres* and the *reges* of Pompey's army camp as well as with the senate in Rome, who are anxious to be robbed of their power by Caesar. Cicero's plea for battle confirms and perpetuates the strife between the political factions in Rome.²⁹⁴ Quite in contrast to Cicero's policy, Cato, in his exchanges with fellow citizens, propagates a type of devotion to the Republic that surpasses all individual concern.²⁹⁵ Lucan presents us the ultimate citizen of the *exempla* tradition, whose love for the state is so incorruptible that it has become superhuman.

We have seen in § 2 of this chapter that Cicero's exemplary value is especially difficult to pin down. He is variously portrayed as a superb orator, a kind advocate, and a protector of the Republic. Within Velleius' historiography, his political virtue is explicitly stated, but in Valerius' collection of *exempla*, Cicero's republican ideals have made way for general scenes from the life of a famous Roman citizen, to which few specific values are attached. Though his ethical character is spotless, it is not comparable to the moralistic lifestyle of his fellow senator Cato. Cicero's life may offer models for conduct, but Cato's deeds and words are simply irresistible in their expression of undiluted patriotism: the stories about Cato's life differ most from those about Cicero's in their emphasis on the public admiration and imitation of his deeds. Consequently, the figure of Cicero becomes more one-dimensional in its general display of 'humanity', and the figure of Cato, whose actions are always described in relation to republican (or Roman) values, becomes more ideological in its expression.

In many ways, this picture is continued in Lucan's *Civil War*, as we have seen in § 3. To start with Cicero, he does not play a major role. The

²⁹⁴ Alternatively, LA BUA 2020: 83 goes so far as to argue that "... the man who prided himself for saving the city and preserving Roman aristocratic constitution [*sic*] is blamed for the death of Pompey and the beginning of Caesar's dictatorial regime". I think that is perhaps an overinterpretation of the effect of Cicero's speech.

²⁹⁵ However, Cato, does create a strict opposition between his army and that of Caesar. This becomes clear from 9.274 onward.

poet presents him in the first place as an aristocrat and an orator, who is most at home on the Forum but seriously out of place—quite literally so—in the camp at Pharsalus. He does not possess any clout with Pompey, apart from being able to represent the feelings of the Roman senate. Moreover, in his only rhetorical performance in the *Civil War*, he fails to present a valid argument. Nothing remains of the ‘summit of eloquence’ apart from the slogan itself.²⁹⁶ I do not believe that the *Civil War* is meant to paint a typically negative picture of Cicero. That is beside the author’s point. The need of a senatorial personage led the poet to introduce one of the most famous figures from the Republic who was known to have co-negotiated the terms and outcome of the civil war. The Lucanian Cicero, who focuses only on the immediate power conflict instead of expressing any ideological wish to rescue the Republic, serves to demonstrate the tragic result of this civil war: a citizen body which was divided into factions, and forced to fight against itself. Quite some time ago, Frederick Ahl concluded that “Cicero, then, who makes here his one and only appearance in the *Pharsalia*, becomes symbolic of the senate, the whole theory of the republic, and its helplessness in the moment of crisis.”²⁹⁷ I would say that Lucan does more than just signal the senate’s ‘helplessness’; he also signals how in the late Republic, discord was cultivated rather than dissolved. In this respect, Cicero’s angry rhetoric recalls the contentious atmosphere of first-century Roman public life.

Moreover, with regard to Ahl’s mention of the “theory of the Republic”, it is rather Cato who, more than anyone in the *Civil War*, represents what republican ideology constitutes. We recognize the morally superior Cato of the *exempla* recorded by Valerius and Velleius, who personifies *libertas* and civic *virtus*, and who teaches proper ethics to his fellow citizens. On the one hand, in the text of the *Civil War* we still very much encounter the traditional image of a Cato whose rigid morality defines his actions. It is even echoed intradiegetically, when one of the soldiers appeals to Cato in reference to his well-known respect for the laws. On the other hand, Lucan improves upon this image by making Cato’s exemplary assets into *Leitmotifs* within the nar-

²⁹⁶ Luc. 7.62–63.

²⁹⁷ AHL 1976: 162.

orative. The narrative explores the social and historical impact of Cato's archetypal *virtus* and *libertas*, and Cato himself is seen to undergo a psychological development: from *sapiens* to public man. Moreover, his political ideology gains further shape by his interaction with secondary figures such as Brutus and Cornelia or the Pompeian soldiers. In these interactions, the figure of Cato appears as the ethical leader par excellence, whose words cause some kind of ethical conversion on the part of his followers. One of the biggest novelties of Lucan's Cato, in comparison with the Tiberian image, is his talent for public speaking. Not only are his republican values illustrated by the narrative, they are expressed and even transmitted by the man himself. This oratorical strength is, of course, a continuation of the picture in Sallust's *Conspiracy of Catiline* (and possibly other late republican sources.). Velleius' presentation of Cato as a shining beacon of virtue under Tiberius is the first evidence of a tradition initiated by Sallust's antilogy in the *Conspiracy of Catiline*. Lucan's goal, however, went beyond characterizing Cato's oratory as an influential force. The *Civil War* thematizes Cato's sacred voice as the instrument by which he could be an inspirational model for his fellow citizens.

With regard to the effect of Cato's republican leadership in the *Civil War*, Shadi Bartsch observed: "Although he could not have known or expected it to be possible, Lucan's Cato did make a difference in the end; he taught Pompey's army to fight for *libertas* rather than for a master; and this transformation turned the struggle, however briefly, into one between republicanism and Caesarism."²⁹⁸ Though it was successful, the impact of Cato's civic ideology is marginal. The text of the *Civil War* makes it clear that Cato's republicanism is a utopian ideal. The narrator leaves no doubt from the beginning (and every reader knew) that Caesar was going to win and Cato would die.²⁹⁹ Therefore, with the demonstration of the tremendous influence Cato exercised on his fellow citizens the limits of his exemplary role become apparent, too. The *Civil War* is retracing, almost dissecting, Cato's moral exemplarity

²⁹⁸ BARTSCH 1997: 129. Cf. GEORGE 1991: 254–258.

²⁹⁹ Had Lucan written the suicide of Cato we would have known the full contours of Cato's personage in the *Civil War*. I do not wish to enter into the discussion about the supposed ending of the poem; seminal is AHL 1976: 307–326. For an overview of the scholarship on this complex question see BARTSCH 2009. For the present argument, it does not really matter whether Lucan wrote the suicide or not.

by looking at the means and consequences of civic virtue in a Republic marked by conflicting ideologies and political self-fashioning. In presenting a complete identification of Cato with *virtus*, the *Civil War* appears to be dealing not only with the tragic fate of this republican hero—who would die during this war—but with the loss of political virtue itself.

In sum, Cato has definitely won something in Lucan's poem: a systematic rhetorical power to defend the Republic's values. Crowned with the title of *pater patriae* and *tutor* of the Roman citizens, Cato gets to be the spokesman of the Republic. Cicero, who had actually been crowned *pater patriae* for his achievements in 63, is 'only' the *maximus auctor eloquii*, and an unpersuasive one at that.³⁰⁰ Cato fulfils the role of political representative, caring for and giving direction to the Roman citizens, a role which Cicero had so carefully laid out for himself in his public oratory. Why could Cicero, or at least his imperial figure, not represent or defend his own political ideals? Perhaps it was because Roman readers could peruse Cicero's oratory and philosophy for themselves that later writers did not venture to put his thoughts into words again. Perhaps the Latin historiographers did not want to measure themselves against his ultimate eloquence, and waited for their Greek colleagues to do this in a different language. Perhaps, at least as far Lucan was concerned, Cicero simply missed a connection to the common people, and lacked the instructive potential of a true political leader.

³⁰⁰ Luc. 9.62.

CHAPTER THREE

Plutarch, Seneca, and Cassius Dio on Cicero's ethical competence

1. Introduction: From exemplarity to ethical competence

1.1 EXEMPLARS AS ETHICAL LEADERS

In the previous chapter, we saw that the discourse of exemplarity is all about ethical conduct: *exempla* are vehicles for expressing ethical norms and values for the present. The figure of Cicero could be a suitable model of civic virtue for early imperial writers—though perhaps in less distinct ways than his contemporary Cato. In the *exempla* discussed in chapter 2, leadership constituted a large part of exemplary action. The early imperial writers not only present models of behaviour, they also reflect on the manner in which the deeds and words of these models are publicly admired and followed (imitated). The *exempla* about Cato especially show what a moral paragon can do in a leading position; he could encourage other Roman citizens to consider the meaning of ‘true’ republican values and lead them to adjust their moral standards. In this chapter, I will further explore the relationship between moral excellence and (exemplary) leadership, focusing particularly on the presence of these qualities in the imperial portrayal of Cicero. What kind of moral criteria does a Roman statesman have to meet in order to become a guide of conduct for his fellow citizens?

To be able to answer this question, we will have to shift the focus of our discussion from the perception or commemoration of exemplary deeds to the responsibilities and ethical awareness of the exemplary agent. We will concentrate on ‘operation one’ of Matthew Roller’s model: the action itself, or rather the individual’s decision to undertake the action.¹

The type of moral leadership that Roman exemplars represent, which teaches others about virtue and vice, is a popular subject in the social sciences. It is from this field that we will borrow some terminological tools for this chapter. Leadership, as it was thematized in chapter 2, possesses a double meaning: on the one hand, it encompasses the public function of figures like Cicero and Cato, who were senators and magistrates of the Republic; on the other hand, leadership also connotes the moral-didactic relationship between an exemplar and his followers, who are induced to imitate the exemplar’s behaviour. Modern leadership studies provide a concept that combines the institutional with the moral aspect: ethical leadership, which is thought to be one of the most successful leadership styles. The following overview shows how well the modern concept of the ethical leader maps onto the construct of the Roman exemplar:²

- Ethical leaders are *principled* persons who have a clear sense of right and wrong;
- they have a reputation for being *ethically competent*;
- their character is associated among other things with *integrity*, honesty, and conscientiousness;
- they are known to *care* for their community;
- they have the moral *courage* to “uphold their moral values even in the face of significant external pressures, adversity, or risks”.³

Ethical leadership rests on the principle of role modeling: a good ethical leader ‘infects’, as it were, his followers with the norms and values

¹ See chapter 2, §1.2.1.

² BROWN & TREVIÑO 2006: 602: “ethical leaders are exemplary models”. Compare the remark by HERES & LASTHUIZEN 2013: 52, “ethical leadership is, to an important extent, in the eye of the beholder” with LANGLANDS 2018: 37, “the issue of evaluation, and of how one judges what is worthwhile and what is appropriate, is fundamental to Roman exemplary ethics”.

³ HERES & LASTHUIZEN 2013: 53.

that are appropriate in a specific moral context.⁴ The agreeable and conscientious nature of ethical leaders together with their extraordinary care for others in the community makes them highly successful.⁵ One of the most important criteria for ethical leadership is to “walk the talk and talk the walk”, that is, to remain consistent in the decisions one makes and the actions one undertakes; this also includes (publicly) reflecting on the ethical implications of one’s behaviour.⁶

I choose to use the concept of ethical leadership as complementary to the framework of exemplarity, just as I have already applied it in chapter 2. The criterium of ethical reflection especially connects the discourses of exemplarity and ethical leadership. Rebecca Langlands has argued convincingly that exemplary stories are tools for teaching the essentials of Roman ethics; not only do *exempla* provide moral lessons, they also appeal to one’s cognitive and critical skills to the extent that they stimulate reflection about the meaning of virtue and vice, and cultivate the ability to discern which moral action is required under which circumstances.⁷ While Langlands’ research concentrates primarily on the ethical dynamics evoked by exemplary stories, I would like to highlight the act of moral discernment on the part of the individual setting the *exemplum*. In Langlands’ theory it is implied that Roman citizens who have successfully completed the trajectory of learning from *exempla* will be individuals who are competent enough to become ethical models themselves, but the thesis of her book mainly explores ethical competencies as the end result of the process of exemplarity, not as the basis for exemplary conduct. Let us, then, have a closer look at the relevance of such ethical competencies for becoming a Roman exemplar and ethical leader.

⁴ BROWN & TREVIÑO 2006: 600–602; HERES & LASTHUIZEN 2013: 59–60. I will stay away from the term ‘role model’ in the analyses below and prefer to use the term ‘leader’ or ‘model’; this is partly due to the confusion within classical scholarly discussions of exemplarity over the difference between ‘exempla’ and ‘role models’: see chapter 2, § 1.2.2.

⁵ This is shown by modern empirical research, see HERES & LASTHUIZEN 2013: 64.

⁶ *Ibid.* 55–57. Cf. MENZEL & COOPER 2013: 20 and BROWN & TREVIÑO 2006: 595–597.

⁷ With regard to the functions of exemplary stories, LANGLANDS 2018: 128 lists not only traditional ones like “creating aspiration” and “modeling excellent behaviour”, but also “promoting self-reflection, enabling epistemological progress, testing precepts and assumptions, honing moral judgment and exploring complex ethical ideas”.

1.2 ETHICAL COMPETENCE

As mentioned above, one of the criteria for being an ethical leader is having the stamp of ethical competence. Not easily captured in a few words, within leadership theory ethical competence entails “the quest for knowledge and action that defines right and wrong behaviour”.⁸ Ethical competence relies on the individual’s mediating between their cognitive skill to absorb moral rules and standards (of a certain ethical context or, we might say, of a community) and their capacity to implement actively this ethical knowledge in private as well as professional behaviour. Donald Menzel’s influential definition of ethical competence (fig. 1) is based on six sub-competencies, which reinforce and interact with each other—hence the cyclical structure. Commitment




Fig. 1 – The dynamics of ethical competence
(From: Menzel 2013)

to high standards, knowledge of ethics codes and the ability to engage in ethical reasoning are all internal assets; the final two competencies concern external or public actions. Menzel’s definition demands an

⁸ MENZEL 2018: 1752.

individual who is committed to high moral standards, who has knowledge of the appropriate ethical code(s) within a community, and who is able to reflect on this code. Most importantly, the ethical code is applied in the management of public situations, with the complementary aim of promoting correct ethical practices among others. The ethically competent person gains a leading role by having the ability to reflect openly on the moral complexity of these situations; they thereby stimulate similar behaviour in others, and increase the interest in addressing moral issues.⁹

1.3 A ROMAN MODEL OF ETHICAL COMPETENCE

When Menzel designed his inclusive model of ethical competence, he was mainly thinking about how leadership functions in modern organizations. It can, however, be applied to any community or organizational system where social cohesion is strong and where there is a clear relation between a leading individual and a collective. Applied to the political community of Rome (fig. 2),¹⁰ the ethical competencies of a Roman statesman could be defined along the following lines. Starting from the top right of the model, the first competency, a commitment to high moral standards, resembles the Roman emphasis on *virtus* as crucial to the understanding of goodness and social status. The second competency, knowledge of the ethics codes or laws, consists of Roman ethical education, which included the study of philosophy but which also, for example, entailed a thorough knowledge of the *mos maiorum*.¹¹

⁹ It is true that the terms 'ethical' and 'moral' are usually employed interchangeably. James McGregor BURNS 2014 draws a distinction between ethical virtues, ethical values, and moral values. The first he defines as "Ten Commandments" rules, "old-fashioned" ideas about personal conduct; the second as values relating to honesty, integrity and accountability; the third as values pertaining to liberty, equality, justice, and community. Without subscribing fully to such a complex categorization, I think that, in general, ethical relates rather to an abstract, philosophical way of thought that strives to define good and bad within a given cultural context, while moral often refers to the social effects and the public evaluation of specific conduct; ethical is therefore associated with cognitive abilities, and moral less so. In what follows, I will make use of these terms in accordance with this tentative distinction.

¹⁰ Since the scope of this chapter is defined by the actions of magistrates or state leaders, we are necessarily looking at elite layers of society and male members of the aristocracy.

¹¹ On the traditional Roman focus on morality and national history, with the *mos maiorum* as 'code de vie noble' and pedagogical framework at the same time, MARROU 1965: 342–351. At 346, he




Fig. 2 – Menzel 2013 adapted: A possible model for Roman ethical competence

Next, the Roman statesman would be expected to be able to use this knowledge for reflecting on ethical problems in his daily life, i.e. he should bring Roman ethics into practice. The fourth competency for a Roman statesman would be to act according to the correct ethical norms and values in his *public* activities. As a magistrate, he was expected to illustrate what is and is not appropriate Roman behaviour. His final competency would be to promote Roman values actively in his public speeches and administrative tasks, setting models of conduct for his peers and the people and activating their sensibility for debating questions of morality. It should be noted that in applying this model to the literary texts below, I will not address all these ethical competencies separately. In practice, as we will see, the texts do not allow us to make a sharp distinction between the personal ability to bring ethical knowledge into practice and the action of publicly reflecting on moral values.

Despite its schematic nature, which obviously simplifies the reality of (Roman) moral thinking, Menzel's model does help us in two ways. It attempts to explain the mechanism by which appropriate norms and

values are transmitted from exemplars to followers; and it focuses on the manner in which ethically competent individuals *themselves* translate their virtue and their knowledge of the ethical code into morally approved behaviour. That is to say, the ethical competence model integrates an aspect of cognitive and moral competence on the part of the leader that theoretical models of exemplarity usually lack.

Now, as for Cicero, whose philosophical writings made a great contribution to Roman political ethics and who personified the ideal of the intellectually trained politician, one would imagine that he scored highly on all ethical competencies, and for this reason could also be considered a veritable ethical leader. But, as we have seen in chapter 2, his leadership skills are not all that visible in the early imperial tradition. In the texts under examination in the present chapter, we will see that the perception of Cicero's leadership does not change much throughout the imperial period. Moreover, and this is what the current chapter will explore in detail, his ethical-philosophical qualities are not such a straightforward part of his reputation either. Cicero's status as philosopher is a dubious feature of his reception in the historiographical texts of the empire. For one thing, his political-philosophical writings are almost entirely neglected. Plutarch, for example, makes note of Cicero's writing activities in the period that Caesar was dictator, but draws no connections between Cicero's philosophical theory and his public career.¹² However, in their narratives of Cicero's life both Plutarch and Cassius Dio suggest that he would have fared better had he stuck to his philosophical studies.¹³ Cicero's philosophy is always looming in the background of the imperial narratives, right because it is the *absence of philosophy* that led to the critique on Cicero's conduct.¹⁴

Cicero fulfilled his own share in this process. He actively developed the image of defender of his country by means of a rhetoric that spoke greatly to the people of the city of Rome. He also carefully developed an image of himself as *vox publica*, the voice of the people, in

observes: "l'essentiel est de former la conscience de l'enfant ou du jeune homme, de lui inculquer un système rigide de valeurs morales, des réflexes sûrs, un style de vie."

¹² Cf. *Cic.* 40–41, on Cicero's literary pursuits during Caesar's dictatorship.

¹³ *Plut. Cic.* 5.1–2, where the oracle of Delphi is said to have discouraged Cicero from embarking upon a political career; *Cass. Dio* 38.18–29, the dialogue between Cicero and the mysterious philosopher Philiscus, who admonishes Cicero to quit politics, and predicts his death.

¹⁴ A similar observation is made in SWAIN 1990.

the speeches that he published during his life.¹⁵ Students of Cicero's oeuvre know that he used the same powerful voice to philosophize about statesmanship and the status of Roman politics. Yet, in the public speeches there was little space for theoretical musings. The historiographers seem to have been aware that, to use John Dugan's words, "his training and deeply ingrained habits as an orator appear to have rendered him a person constantly negotiating rhetorical problems and acutely self-conscious of the sort of *ethos* he was presenting to his varied audiences."¹⁶ Imperial readers of Cicero's oratory might have gotten the impression that his intellectual talents were employed mainly on behalf of party politics and his own contentious honour; Cicero's eloquence would have been the kind that was pandering exclusively to the public gaze.

In the sections below, we will examine Cicero's ethical competencies according to the model discussed above. We will look at the perception of Cicero's *virtus*, his respect for the Roman ethics code, his practical implementation of ethical-philosophical precepts, and his capacity for promoting moral behaviour in others. The final aim is to gain more insight into the reasons why Cicero lacked the image of the ethical leader, someone whose ethical excellence can be considered as inspiring and edifying.

1.4 TEXTS

The authors and texts in this chapter have been selected on the basis of their explicit analysis of Cicero's moral or immoral behaviour, in the hope that my discussion will offer a solid basis for evaluating more implicit judgments about Cicero's political reputation. Like the next chapter, the present chapter has a strong focus on Greek literature. This means that many valuable testimonia regarding Cicero's ethical leadership will not be considered here, such as Quintilian's nuanced judgment of Cicero as *vir bonus*, a good man who, however, was not without fault; the recurring praise for Cicero as *orator oratorum* in Tacit-

¹⁵ See PIEPER, VAN DER VELDEN & JANSEN 2022.

¹⁶ DUGAN 2005: 334.

tus' *Dialogus*; or the portrait by Pliny the Elder in which Cicero is elevated as a good republican citizen.¹⁷

I will devote special attention to Cassius Dio's portrait of Cicero. This portrait is usually regarded as being highly negative and influenced by anti-Ciceronian invective.¹⁸ I aim to nuance this view by addressing the intellectual discussion that is at the bottom of Dio's approach to Cicero's character and his actions. In order to properly value Dio's account we require a certain sensibility for the cultural discourse in which his work is embedded and especially for imperial concepts of political leadership. Therefore, I will approach Dio's work from a broader perspective, by comparing and contrasting it with the theories of statesmanship in the works of Plutarch and Seneca, two of the most important philosophical writers of the imperial era. While Dio was born almost a century after Seneca's death and at least thirty years after Plutarch's, he knew Seneca's writings,¹⁹ and he used Plutarch's work for his own history.²⁰ Regardless of any direct connections between the works of these writers, all of them were participants in the cultural debates pertinent to intellectual life under the empire; they touch upon the same themes and repeatedly reflect on the republican past as well as on political life under imperial rule. The figure of Cicero is an important part of this reflection on Rome's past: Cicero's life offers insight into the ambitions, experiences, and disappointments of the senatorial elite in Rome, to which Seneca and Dio belonged and to which Plutarch was closely connected.

With regard to the necessity of virtue for a political leader, the need for philosophical education, and the practical application of philosophical tenets, Plutarch and Seneca show great similarities in thought. Both argue from a common framework of exemplarity, in which great men from the past function as models for behaviour.²¹ The analyses

¹⁷ Compare Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.112 with 11.1.22–24; Tac. *Dial.* 22; Plin. *HN* 7.116–117.

¹⁸ MILLAR 1964: 46–55 is the most often quoted example of this attitude. See also MILLAR 1961; VAN STEKELBURG 1971: 25; GOWING 1992 and 1998 (“[Dio] views him chiefly as a meddling, irritating man who thoughtlessly impeded Rome's conversion to monarchy”, 1998: 383); LINTOTT 1997: 2514–2515; WELCH 2019 (“[Dio's] judgment that Cicero was a weak politician and a failed philosopher”, 105). More nuanced views in KEMEZIS 2014: 111n.46 and MONTECALVO 2014: 7–14.

¹⁹ Cass. Dio 61.10.2; see below.

²⁰ MARTINELLI 2000 reviews 19 different instances of Dio using Plutarch as a source; cf. HOSE 1994: 420. Christopher PELLING is especially good at noting the similarities between Plutarch and Dio; for an example regarding the account of the Catilinarian conspiracy, see PELLING 2002: 46.

below, which present their Roman and Greek perspective in parallel, will show that there are many similarities between their theories about political participation in society. Such a juxtaposition will allow us to think beyond a 'Greek' and 'Latin' tradition, and to consider the narrative of Cicero's political conduct as one that is shared across traditions, and which is part of Roman standards of morality maintained by the intellectual elite across the empire. Moreover, Plutarch's work complements Seneca's civic philosophy in interesting ways. As Rebecca Langlands has recently noted, the Greek philosopher gives expression to the Roman practice of exemplarity in a way that none of the Latin writers do.²² Despite or perhaps rightly because of the Greek prism through which he regards Roman politics, Plutarch is an extremely useful source for analyzing the perception of political behaviour in the Roman world.

By comparing the ideas of Plutarch, Seneca and Cassius Dio, I hope to show not only that their perceptions of Cicero's political reputation are quite well in accord with each other, but I also aim to illuminate the similarities in outlook between these two Greek intellectuals and Rome-raised Seneca with regard to what it means to be a good citizen and a successful political leader.²³ All maintain a strong focus on exemplary behaviour, the importance of which is not necessarily located in the deeds themselves but in the manner in which the (historical) individuals cope with their failures and successes.

The plan of this chapter is twofold. § 2 will be a case study of Cicero's inability to discern the moral boundaries of public conduct. This

²¹ Within Plutarchan scholarship, the question that has occupied scholars most is the matter of what I call below 'the ethics of imitation' (cf. n. 91), i.e. the process of imitation and emulation evoked by the description of the lives of great men from history: see in particular the work by Tim DUFF e.g. 1999, 2008; WHITMARSH 2001, see esp. 55–56; PELLING 2002: 237–251; STADTER 2014: 231–245. Cf. LANGLANDS 2020 for a recent discussion of these earlier views. Plutarch's fascination with 'great men in history' inspired a vast corpus of literature about the Plutarchan ideal of statesmanship; good studies with further bibliography are SQUILLONI 1989; VAN RAALTE 2004; DE BLOIS 2008; DESIDERI 2011; FULKERSON 2012; STADTER 2014: 215–245. BENEKER 2016 discusses the biographies of Cicero and Demosthenes with regard to political virtue.

²² LANGLANDS 2020: 93. Also essential in this respect are PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ 2002, who connects the 'topos of imitation' within Plutarch's work with the discourse of exemplarity; and JACOBS 2020 discusses how the 'heroes' of Plutarch's *Lives* are seen to respond to and imitate the ethical and political conduct, i.e. *exempla*, of heroes from the other *Lives*. BRENK 2008 is slightly reproductive but still relevant. MAYER 2008 is the classic study of *exempla* in Seneca's work.

²³ For Cassius Dio and Plutarch's connection to Rome, I refer to the Introduction.

theme becomes most prominent in the imperial discussion of his licentious style of speaking, or *παρρησία*. *Parrhēsia* is known as the motor of Athenian democracy, a critical faculty which all Athenian citizens could publicly employ to protect their community against mismanagement and harmful leadership. However, when Plutarch and Cassius Dio describe Cicero's *parrhēsia*, it has no beneficial effect at all. As I will argue below, not he but Cato will become the counterpart to typical Demosthenic *parrhēsia*, "truth-to-power" frankness.²⁴

Cicero's lack of ethical competence and the larger question of his failure to integrate philosophy into his political career will be addressed in §3. The Greek historiographers' projection of sophistic and philosophical ideas on Cicero's career turn him into an ambiguous, almost disappointing public figure who did not live up to his potential. One of the passages in imperial literature that is most illustrative of this attitude but often misunderstood, is Cassius Dio's representation of Cicero's exile in book 38 of the *Roman History*. In order to grasp the intellectual stakes in the imperial debate about Cicero's failure to 'philosophize', we will examine which ethical competencies are required of imperial statesmen on the basis of Senecan and Plutarchan political philosophy. In the works of both writers, Cicero's political conduct is used as an example of the improper translation of ethical awareness into public action.

2. Cicero's failure to speak frankly

One of the most explicit—and harshest—analyses of Cicero's political conduct is found in book 38 of Cassius Dio's history. Book 38 is dedicated to the years 59–58 BC. The beginning of book 38 centres on Caesar's rising power and the tumultuous situation in the senate, which was the result of his unprecedented legal measures. The second major plot of book 38 concerns Cicero's personal vendetta with Caesar and Clodius, which resulted in his exile.²⁵ Cicero would have plotted

²⁴ For the notion of truth-to-power *παρρησία*, see SACKS 2018: 51–53, 56–57.

²⁵ For a recent and extremely thorough analysis of this story plot, see BURDEN-STREVS 2020: 53–60.

against the lives of Caesar and Pompey, together with Lucullus.²⁶ He also openly abuses Caesar in a speech given on behalf of his former co-consul Antonius Hybrida, accusing him of complicity in the Catilinarian affair; the abuse (λοιδορεῖν) is mentioned separately by the historiographer as an outrageous ‘feature’ of the speech.²⁷ Caesar (‘normally so sanguine’)²⁸ forms a pact with Clodius to remove Cicero from the political scene. The historiographer explains that it was a challenge to destroy a man with so much power in the state due to the force of his rhetoric (ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ διὰ τὴν τῶν λόγων δεινότητα δυνάμενον).²⁹ Clodius decided to appeal not only to the people but also to the equestrians and the senate, around whom, so Dio claims, Cicero pulled the strings not because of their appreciation of him but rather because of their fear of him (ἄτε καὶ διὰ φόβον μᾶλλον ἢ δι’ εὐνοίαν ισχύοντα).³⁰

Cicero was feared because of his frank speech, for which Dio uses the classical Athenian term *parrhēsia*. We would expect that the ability to speak freely is a positive quality in the context of republican politics, but in Dio’s eyes it is not:

Παμπληθεῖς γὰρ ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐλύπει, καὶ οὐκ ἐς τοσοῦτον οἷ τι ὠφελοῦμενοι ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ὥκειοῦντο ἐς ὅσον οἱ βλαπτόμενοι ἡλλοτριοῦντο. πρὸς γάρ τοι τῷ τοῦς πλείους τῶν ἀνθρώπων προχειρότερον ἐπὶ τοῖς δυσχερεστέροις ἀγανακτεῖν ἢ τῶν ἀμεινόνων χάριν τισὶν ἔχειν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν συναγορεύσασί σφισιν ἀποδεδωκέναι τὸν μισθὸν νομίζειν, τοὺς δ’ ἀντιδικήσαντας ἀμύνεσθαι τρόπον τινὰ προαιρεῖσθαι, πικροτάτους ἐχθροὺς ἐαυτῶ ἐποίει περιεῖναι τε καὶ τῶν κρατίστων αἰεὶ ποτε ἐπιχειρῶν καὶ τῇ παρρησίᾳ πρὸς πάντας ὁμοίως ἀκράτῳ καὶ κατακορεῖ χρώμενος, ἄτε καὶ τὴν δόξαν τοῦ δύνασθαι συνεῖναι τε καὶ εἰπεῖν ἅ μηδεὶς ἄλλος, καὶ πρὸ τοῦ χρηστὸς εἶναι δοκεῖν, θηρώμενος. ἔκ τε οὖν τούτου, καὶ διότι μέγιστόν τε ἀνθρώπων ἡὔχει καὶ οὐδένα ἐξ ἴσου ἐαυτῷ ἤγεν, ἀλλὰ ἐν τε τοῖς λόγοις ὁμοίως καὶ ἐν τῷ βίῳ πάντας τε ὑπερεφρόνει καὶ ἰσοδίατος οὐδενὶ ἡξίου

²⁶ Cass. Dio 38.9.2; cf. App. B. Civ. 2.12.43, who claims the plotters were Cato, Bibulus and Cicero. On Dio’s version of this ‘Conspiracy of Vettius’, see MONTECALVO 2014: 174–181. The conspiracy is evidenced by Att. 2.24 and several speeches, where Cicero exculpates himself. It is not clear why Dio would choose to implicate Cicero in the plot other than for the narratological reason of strengthening the image of Cicero as warmonger.

²⁷ Cass. Dio 38.10.4–11.2.

²⁸ Ibid. 38.11.3.

²⁹ Ibid. 38.12.4.

³⁰ Ibid. The use of fear as a political weapon is a common Dionean topos, see KUHN-CHEN 2002: 174–176.

³¹ Cass. Dio 38.12.6–7.

εἶναι, φορτικός τε καὶ ἐπαχθὴς ἦν, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐκείνων οἷς ἤρεσκε, καὶ ἐφθονεῖτο καὶ ἐμισεῖτο.³¹

For he had hurt a great many people by his speeches, and those who were helped by him were not drawn to his side in the same degree as those he offended were alienated from him. For, besides the fact that the majority of men are more inclined to be annoyed about nastiness than to be thankful to someone for favours done, and that they believe that they have paid their advocates the due amount, whereas their goal is to avenge themselves in some way on their opponents, Cicero made himself bitter enemies by always attacking the most powerful men and by applying to all alike a frankness of speech that was intemperate and excessive, since he was in pursuit of a reputation for being knowledgeable and for saying what nobody else could, more than for appearing to be a good citizen. For this reason, and because he was the greatest boaster alive³² and considered nobody to be on a par with himself, but in his speeches just as in life looked down on everybody and did not deem anybody to live on equal footing with him—for this reason he was burdensome and annoying, and as a result he was even begrudged and hated by the very people he favoured.

In Dio's eyes, Cicero's frankness is destructive. It is intemperate (ἄκρατος) and excessive (κατακορής), and due to his extravagant openness Cicero consciously evoked ill-will (φθόνος) among his fellow citizens. Cicero's litigious speech forms a theme in the invective tradition and in Plutarch's writings as well, but Dio is the only one to apply the Greek notion of *parrhēsia* to his behaviour.³³ While every student of Cicero could think of a couple of reasons why the orator may be blamed for excessive rhetoric, it is more difficult to understand why a Greek intellectual such as Dio, having been educated to appreciate the bold speaking of his Athenian ancestors, would find fault with political frankness at all.

In fact, as I will demonstrate below, the fault lies not in the use of *parrhēsia* as such, but in Cicero's failure to implement certain ethical values in his application of frankness—or, as Dio phrases it, in his disinterest in being a 'good' citizen (χρηστός).³⁴ In this chapter we

³² I follow the unrivalled translation by WHITE 1914.

³³ See [Sall.] *Inv. in Cic.* 2.1 (*immoderata eloquentia*), 6.1; Plut. *Cic.* 25–27 (examples of Cicero's licentious speech), cf. 38.2–6. Cf. VAN DER BLOM 2019: 44, 47–48.

³⁴ WELCH 2019 gives a good overview of Dio's concept of (civic) virtue.

will examine the virtue of speaking frankly as a specific quality of the good statesman. Originally the watchword of fifth-century Athenian politics, in the philosophical schools of the Hellenistic period it became an essential instrument for moral improvement in the counsel of rulers as well as the private context of friendship.³⁵ This ‘therapeutic’ use of *parrhēsia* continues to characterize the imperial discourse on statesmanship. I will argue that Plutarch and Dio envisage frank speech as inherent to the conduct of the good leader who has a guiding role towards his superiors and the people. Even though, in Dio’s case, *parrhēsia* is seen as the main drive behind Roman republican oratory, the interpretation of its role in political debate is based on the premise that *parrhēsia* should be deployed with the purpose of moral advancement. Cicero’s ‘frank’ criticism does not conform to this ideal. His use of *parrhēsia* reflects, in fact, the counterside of the classical Athenian concept, and opposes the image of the ethically competent statesman who is supposed to offer constructive criticism based on truth.

2.1 PARRHĒSIA IN GREEK LITERATURE

Classical Athenian parrhēsia

Etymologically, the Greek term *parrhēsia* is a combination of πᾶς (all) and ῥῆσις (speech). Its literal meaning is therefore “speaking everything”.³⁶ Someone who speaks freely can be called a παρρησιαστής, a term traceable to Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* (1124b) but otherwise not frequently used in texts from the classical period.³⁷ *Parrhēsia* as a concept is often translated as “freedom of speech”,³⁸ but is also com-

³⁵ SCARPAT 1964: 58–61; KONSTAN 1996; KONSTAN 1998: 3–5; SACKS 2018: esp. 51–53, 56–57.

³⁶ SCARPAT 1964: 35; MOMIGLIANO 1973: 260; FIELDS 2020: 10.

³⁷ *Parrhēsiastēs* is freely used in modern literature to refer to a person who has *parrhēsia*, but this does not reflect ancient practice. See FOUCAULT 2019, MONOSON 2000. Cf. SAXONHOUSE 2005: 92, ‘parrhesiast’. There are 40 instances of the term according to the *TLG*, the earliest of which date to the Hellenistic period: Aristotle *Eth. Nic.* 1124b, and a fragment from Callisthenes, T2b Jacoby. Further occurrences in Diog. Laertius *Anarcharsis* 1.101; *Menedemus* 2.127; *Archesilaus* 4.33 (all same wording). [Plut.] *X orat.* on Lycurgus, 842d; Diod. Sic. 14.5.7; Luc. *Dial. D.* 3.12; Joseph. *AJ* 2.299; Philo, *In Flacc.* 178. Cf. Phot. *Bibl.* Bekker 497b on Lycurgus; *Suda* τ 588 s.v. Τιμαγένης (on Timagenes of Alexandria; cf. τ 836 s.v. Τουσκλάνω), and λ 77 s.v. λαλιά (as ἡ δημηγορία; summary of Diog. Laert. 4.33).

³⁸ MOMIGLIANO 1973; RAAFLAUB 2012.

monly referred to as “frankness”, “frank criticism”, or even “openness” or “revealing speech”.³⁹ As these interpretations demonstrate, *parrhēsia* as a term refers to speech content as well as technique: on the one hand it denotes a rhetorical strategy (saying everything), and on the other it refers to a sincere (unembellished, straightforward) attitude towards the topic at hand.⁴⁰

The development of *parrhesia* is strongly connected with the history of the Athenian democracy. In the Athenian assembly, ἰσηγορία was used to indicate the formal citizen’s right to speak their mind in the assembly, while παρρησία carried a heavy moral association, being related to truth-telling.⁴¹ The term *parrhēsia* first occurs in Euripides’ tragedies, and is frequently seen throughout the works of the Attic orators and Plato. Demosthenes regularly takes recourse to the concept of frankness at the beginning and end of his speeches, partly as a form of *captatio benevolentiae*, and partly to send a critical message to the assembly.⁴² The closing words of the fourth oration against Philip of Macedon offer a helpful contextualization of frankness of speech:⁴³

Ταῦτ’ ἐστὶ τάληθῃ, μετὰ πάσης παρρησίας, ἀπλῶς εὐνοίᾳ τὰ βέλτιστ’ εἰρημένα, οὐ κολακείᾳ βλάβης καὶ ἀπάτης λόγος μεστός, ἀργύριον τῷ λέγοντι ποιήσων, τὰ δὲ πράγματα τῆς πόλεως τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἐγχειριῶν. Ἡ οὖν παυστέον τούτων τῶν ἐθῶν, ἢ μηδέν’ ἄλλον αἰτιατέον τοῦ πάντα φαύλως ἔχειν ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς.⁴⁴

This is the truth, spoken with complete frankness and purely from goodwill in the best words; not a speech full of harm and conceit due

³⁹ FIELDS 2020, FOUCAULT 2019, and KONSTAN 1996 show that the definition of *parrhēsia* is not just literal but ideological, in that it stands in direct contrast to flattery and deceit. ‘Revealing speech’: SAXONHOUSE 2005: 87.

⁴⁰ Cf. HÜLSEWIESCHE 2002: 106, “Parrhesie [ist] die inhaltlich freimütige Rede, die bis zur freien Rede geht”.

⁴¹ SCARPAT 1964: 44–45, cf. 52; MONOSON 2000: 53. Moral also in the meaning of ideological, definitive of Athenian citizenship. In Eur. *Phoen.* 387–391, freedom of speech is said to distinguish the citizen from the exile or non-citizen.

⁴² For παρρησία connected with ἀλήθεια, see Dem. 6.31, 9.3, 10.76, 23.204, 37.55, 60.26. Cf. Dem. 3.3, 8.21 and 24, and Isocr. 20.72, 24.12, for *parrhēsia* as a more general guarantee of the sincerity of the orator’s words. Cf. also Eur. fr. 737; Plut. *Mor.* 59d, 715f. On the invocation of *parrhēsia* at the beginning of speeches, MONOSON 2000: 60–61.

⁴³ Although the matter should not concern us here, this speech is often regarded as spurious by modern scholars. The current passage might offer an excellent argument for negating the originality of this speech; nowhere else in Demosthenes’ speeches is *parrhēsia* framed in such clear terms. For an overview of the discussion, see MACDOWELL 2003; cf. HAJDÚ 2002: 44–47, 447–448.

⁴⁴ Dem. 10.76.

to flattery, which will make the speaker rich and which puts state affairs into the hands of the enemies. Either these habits must be halted, or nobody else should be blamed for the bad situation than you yourselves.

Like all *Philippics*, the oration carries an exhortatory, critical tone. It aims at activating the Assembly to raise resources for the defence against Philip as well as convincing them that it is not in their best interest to listen to other politicians who trivialize Philip's policy. Throughout the speech, the speaker shows himself as being aware of the danger incurred through expressing such criticism.⁴⁵ This final paragraph illustrates how his frankness is part of a matrix of ethical concepts related to social and public relationships: cognate qualities are truth (ἀλήθεια) and goodwill (εὖνοια), opposites are flattery (κολακεία) and deceit (ἀπάτη) together with doing willful harm to others (βλάβη).⁴⁶ Also on the opposite spectrum of frankness is the interest in self-gain—the antithesis of the frank speaker is the speaker who is only interested in making money and who betrays his city. In the context of assembly rhetoric, *parrhēsia* is a term that signals the speaker's integrity and his sincere adherence to the truth, particularly a truth which will benefit his community.⁴⁷ Moreover, the above passage clarifies that in the context of public oratory generally, frank speech is a valued quality in a people's representative, the orator who (in contrast to the flatterer) sacrifices his own interests for the sake of the city and whose main goal is to protect the state.

In her study of the 'practice of *parrhēsia*' in the Athenian sources, Arlene Saxonhouse very briefly mentions the above passage from the *Fourth Philippic* to support her conclusion that "the truly parrhesiastic speaker eschews the art of rhetoric".⁴⁸ Deceit, ἀπάτη, was a danger

⁴⁵ On the inherent risk in *parrhēsia*, see esp. FOUCAULT 2019: 42–43.

⁴⁶ A helpful contextualization of the nexus of acts and "modes of communication" associated with *parrhēsia* is found in FIELDS 2020: 2.

⁴⁷ MONOSON 2000: 60 usefully distinguishes four aims embedded in the claim of *parrhēsia*: 1) to "identify the speaker's motivation as a commitment to truth and to the exposure of truth"; 2) to "suggest that the speaker willingly incurred a risk by speaking"; 3) to "emphasize moral virtue of speaker and audience"; 4) to "affirm the usefulness of rigorous, critical appraisal of proposals before the Assembly".

⁴⁸ SAXONHOUSE 2005: 92. This conclusion is based on ancient conceptualizations of frankness and not on postmodern interpretations of speech (acts). In this regard, see FIELDS 2020 who con-

looming large over political debates, where clever orators could easily persuade the people by catering to their desires. Though this appears to be a very Platonic type of argument, it is a more broadly shared notion in Greek classical and post-classical literature that represents the “ethics of *parrhēsia*”:⁴⁹ the speaker should at all times keep in mind for whose benefit they will employ frankness, and what should be the boundaries of free speech.⁵⁰ Several modern scholars have made a distinction between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ *parrhēsia*,⁵¹ but the sources themselves seem rather to imply a quality whose good or bad use was the responsibility of the speaker. When used badly, *parrhēsia* is usually accompanied by an adjective with pejorative meaning,⁵² and turns into an instrument of unrest that does not benefit but harms the state. In these cases the use of *parrhēsia* reflects the ethical incompetency on the part of the speaker who has lost sight of what is in the public interest.⁵³

In the waning democracy of the fourth century, classical writers further developed the ethical interpretation of *parrhēsia*. While Demosthenes came to function as the model for oratorical *parrhēsia*, the Pla-

tends that any declaration of frankness is a rhetorical act with a particular (political) goal. Cf. SLUITER & ROSEN 2004: 7.

⁴⁹ See the excellent discussion in MONOSON 2000, chs. 2 and 6, to which my own discussion is heavily indebted.

⁵⁰ The inability to see what these boundaries are and the dangers associated with excessive speech made *parrhēsia* “the favourite target of democracy’s critics”, thus RAAFLAUB 2004: 224.

⁵¹ E.g. SCARPAT 1964: 37, on Eur. *Or.* 905; FOUCAULT 2019: 41. A good discussion of the “semantics of *parrhēsia*”, which includes many of the classical loci cited here, is SLUITER & ROSEN 2004: 4–8.

⁵² ἀμαθής: Eur. *Or.* 905; κατακορής: Pl. *Phaedr.* 240e; cf. Isoc. *Bus.* 11.40 who associates it with κακηγορία. Isocr. 7.20 (*Areopagiticus*) is an interesting case, since παρρησία carries no adjective, but is clearly pejorative, standing in opposition to ἰσονομία as a positive ideal. Here again, I would argue, it is not ‘freedom of speech’ itself which is inherently bad, but its equation with equal rights in government; in Isocrates’ sceptical view of democracy, in the wrong hands frankness becomes a licence for anarchy; cf. CHRISTODOULOU 2012. It is the misuse of frankness, such as Isocrates apparently observed in political life, that offers problems, and turns frankness, which would be the mark of a well-functioning democracy, into licence or impudence, which is actually what he argues in Isoc. 8.14 (*On the Peace*): “I know that it is contentious to oppose your opinions, and that *although we have a democracy*, there is no *parrhēsia* except that expressed here by the most senseless persons who care nothing about you, and by the comic poets in the theatre” (ἐγὼ δ’ οἶδα μὲν ὅτι πρόσαντές ἐστιν ἐναντιοῦσθαι ταῖς ὑμετέραις διανοίαις, καὶ ὅτι δημοκρατίας οὔσης οὐκ ἔστι παρρησία, πλὴν ἐνθάδε μὲν τοῖς ἀφρονεστάτοις καὶ μὴδὲν ὑμῶν φροντίζουσιν, ἐν δὲ τῷ θεάτρῳ τοῖς κωμωδοδιδασκάλοις; italics mine). Similarly, Pl. *Rep.* 557b. Cf. Aeschin. 1.31, where it is said that a man of bad morals will never be thought (by the audience) to say anything beneficial to the city. He can rightfully use *parrhēsia* just like anyone else, but it will be regarded as having no merit.

⁵³ Cf. SAXONHOUSE 2005: 96, “Freedom of speech is enshrined not for the benefit or freedom of the individual; it exists in the vision of these orators for the sake of the city.”

tonic dialogues articulated the template for a form of *parrhēsia* related to intellectual leadership. In book 8 of the *Laws*, Plato asserts that the ideal state requires a leader who “honours frank speech above everything else”, and who “will say whatever he deems best for the city and for the citizens”.⁵⁴ Aristotle confirms in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that a man of excellence (the *μεγαλόψυχος*) possesses *parrhēsia*. In his words, it is necessary that this man values truth above a good reputation and—we may add, accordingly—speaks and acts openly (καὶ ἀμελεῖν τῆς ἀληθείας μάλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης, καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν φανερώς); because he spurns common opinion the great-souled man is a *parrhēsiastēs* and a truthful person (παρρησιαστῆς γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονητικὸς εἶναι καὶ ἀληθευτικός).⁵⁵ Aristotle adds that this man organizes his life around no one unless he is a friend; those who are dependent on others are flatterers (κόλακες).⁵⁶ Indeed, *parrhēsia* is one of the qualities of a good man, in both the private and the public sphere.⁵⁷

Parrhēsia in Greek literature of the Roman world

The Roman constitution, even during republican times, did not recognize a universal citizen right to express one’s opinion (what would have been Greek *isēgoria*) and contribute to state policy (by means of critical speech, *parrhēsia*).⁵⁸ Only recently has Scarpāt’s influen-

⁵⁴ Pl. *Leg.* 835c.

⁵⁵ Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 4.1124b26–30.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 1124b31–1125a2.

⁵⁷ In a private setting, frank criticism was regarded as a necessary feature in advising one’s friends on their moral conduct. Cf. *Gorg.* 487a–488b, where Socrates contends that a good friend needs to possess three qualities: knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), goodwill (εὖνοια), and frankness of speech (παρρησία). Additionally, if he is to be an adequate judge of his friend’s moral behaviour, he should be wise and free of shame. For such behaviour in the face of kings, see Isoc. 2.14.2–3 (*To Nicocles*).

⁵⁸ The Latin writers lacked an exact parallel for the Greek concept, the political reality of Roman *libertas* being difficult to reconcile with that of Greek παρρησία: see HELLEGOUARC’H 1963: 542–559, who compares the “conception égalitariste et démocratique” of the Greeks with the “conception aristocratique et hiérarchisée” of the Romans; MOMIGLIANO 1973: 260–262; HÜLSCHIEWIESCHE 2002: 115; RAAFLAUB 2012; FIELDS 2020: 14, with n. 80. In his letters, Cicero uses the word παρρησία untranslated, see *Att.* 1.16.8 and 9.2a.2, with SCARPAT 1964: 57, 113. In its meaning of ‘unveiled speech’ the term lived on in the rhetorical handbooks as *licentia, libera oratio*, or simply παρρησία: *Rhet. Her.* 4.48–49; Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.27–29; Cic. *Or.* 3.205, and *Or.* 138; see LAUSBERG 2008, §761. The notion of *libertas*, originally more or less the equivalent of republicanism (WIRSZUBSKI 1950: 4–5), acquired new meaning in the works of Tacitus, who associates the loss of it since the Republic with moral de-

tial study of the semantic development of *parrhēsia* in classical and in Christian times been supplemented by an examination of the concept in Greek imperial prose.⁵⁹ In her monograph *Frankness, Greek Culture and the Roman Empire*, Dana Fields argues convincingly that frankness of speech “still had political relevance” in dealing with Roman rulers,⁶⁰ in philosophical (ethical) discussions on freedom and self-mastery and in the context of public rhetoric. Both on the local and the imperial level, *parrhēsia* was a highly evaluated aspect of political conduct. Fields demonstrates that, contrary to the traditional idea first set out by Scarpāt and also by Foucault, the history of *parrhēsia* is not exemplary for the so-called “turn to the self” in the post-classical period.⁶¹ Political participation in the imperial age is often explained in reference to the classic dichotomy of democracy versus monarchy, a reference that is in many ways provoked by the discourse in the historiographical sources and which therefore is, to a certain extent, a reflection of ancient political thought. Fields argues that through the discourse of frankness—in which *parrhēsia* is only one term within a large conceptual framework—Greeks in their roles of imperial adviser, philosopher, or *rhētor* did attempt (and succeed) to play their part in political decision-making on the level of “individual judgment and personal interaction”.⁶² Generally, it can be said that the imperial discourse on *parrhēsia* boils down to two interrelated issues. One is the antithesis between flattery and frankness vis-à-vis the (Roman) ruler; the other is the matter of truth-telling that leads to moral improvement in contradistinction to rhetorical deceit and self-promotion that is harmful for the city or community.

generation and the dearth of intellectualism, cf. *Hist.* 1.1. In political terms, when the authority of the subject of free speech is not acknowledged sufficiently, *libertas* turns into *licentia* (HELLEGOUARC'H 1963: 558); the term *licentia* thus resembles the type of *parrhēsia* coming from depraved men that critical Athenian intellectuals, like Isocrates and Plato above, lament.

⁵⁹ SCARPAT 1964: 62–69 does briefly discuss snippets from Plutarch and Lucian. See also HÜLSEWIESCHE 2002: 103–117, who offers a (very) rough overview of the continuation of the concepts *isēgoria* and *parrhēsia* from classical into imperial times.

⁶⁰ FIELDS 2020: 4.

⁶¹ As FIELDS shows, this idea is reinforced by the traditional view that imperial Greeks (in Rome and in the provinces) were devoid of political influence. This is surely inherent to the image of the Second Sophistic as a particularly cultural and literary movement in influential studies such as ANDERSON 1993, SWAIN 1996, WHITMARSH 2001. Yet see also SWAIN 1996: 70–77 on the political identity of the imperial Greeks and the notion of “civic classicism”, and the contributions in SWAIN 2000, esp. by DESIDERI, SALMERI, and MA.

⁶² FIELDS 2020: 8.

For the texts under discussion in this chapter it is important to realize that views of frank speech in the empire perpetuate the conceptual frames as well as the terminology introduced in the classical Athenian sources. Take, for example, the opening of Dio of Prusa's *On Kingship* 3, where Dio emphasizes his knowledge of Trajan's virtuous character: "But I, noble emperor, I have enjoyed your presence, and I am perhaps as well acquainted with your character as anybody to know that you find delight in truth and frankness (ἀληθεία καὶ παρρησία) rather than in flattery and deceit (θωπεία καὶ ἀπάτη)." ⁶³ We immediately recognize the classical, 'Demosthenic' dichotomy of truth and *parrhēsia* versus flattery and deceit. While the actual theme of the introduction of *On Kingship* 3 is an anecdote about Socrates, the articulation of the values of frankness and truth is firmly rooted in Demosthenic vocabulary; indeed, Socrates and Demosthenes were both famous paradigms of *parrhēsia* in post-classical times. ⁶⁴ On the oratorical level, this 'frank' introduction proclaimed before the emperor is a self-promotional act on Dio's part: here I am, he says, a Greek who discourses in the Attic tongue of my ancestors. In addition, Tim Whitmarsh has shown that the classical, rhetorical theme of flattery vs. frankness plays a crucial role in the formation of Dio's moral identity as professional orator. ⁶⁵ On the level of power relations, the introduction constitutes a bow to Trajan's benign and tolerant leadership, which allowed his inferiors to speak their minds openly, ⁶⁶ as well as a wink to the emperor's intellectual capacities, since it presumes he would appreciate this classicistic

⁶³ Dio Chrys. Or. 3.2–3: ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ γενναῖε αὐτοκράτορ, παραγέγονά σοι, καὶ τυχὸν οὐδενὸς ἦττον ἔμπειρός εἰμι τῆς σῆς φύσεως, ὅτι τυγχάνεις χαίρων ἀληθεία καὶ παρρησία μᾶλλον ἢ θωπεία καὶ ἀπάτη. On a historical note, Plutarch, in *Advice* 815d, calls *parrhēsia* the "sacred (i.e. biggest, emergency) anchor" of state that allows statesmen to protect their city; he gives as examples the Pergamenes under Nero, the Rhodians ("lately") under Domitian, and the Thessalians under Augustus. SWAIN (2000: 13–50; cf. SWAIN 1996: 187–241) offers a lucid and comprehensive overview of early modern and modern scholarship on Dio of Prusa, excepting the seminal study of Dio in WHITMARSH 2001.

⁶⁴ See FIELDS 2020: 12–17; cf. SCARPAT 1964: 68. On Demosthenes as a model specifically for Dio of Prusa, FIELDS 2020: 106–114. Apart from Plutarch's explicit presentation of Demosthenes as a symbol of *parrhēsia* in *Dem.* 12.3–4, 14.3, where the phrase (λέγειν) μετὰ παρρησίας echoes Demosthenes' own formulation, see e.g. the echo of Demosthenes in the speeches of Cassius Dio: 41.28.1 (λέξω μετὰ παρρησίας; Caesar to his soldiers) or 52.3.3 (λέξω μετὰ παρρησίας, Agrippa to Octavian).

⁶⁵ WHITMARSH 2001: 194–197. Cf. KONSTAN 1997 on the theme of frankness vs. flattery in *On Kingship* 3.

⁶⁶ Cf. JONES 1978: 115–123; KONSTAN 1997: 133–135 on the philosophical message of the introduction. For a slightly different view, see SWAIN 1996: 200. HARRIS 1980: 889–893 discusses the political implications of Dio's celebration of the Hellenic heritage under Roman rule; cf. HAHN 1906.

opening.⁶⁷ In our discussion of Plutarch, Cassius Dio and other imperial authors, we should take into account that Athenian conceptual language strongly affects the Greek authors' representation of Roman republican frankness. This means that certain ethical strands of the discussion on frankness, especially in the context of rhetorical performance, are continued in imperial times: the idea that *parrhēsia* is an outward mark of moral virtue greatly affected Greek imperial conceptions of free speech. Imperial conceptions of frankness are strongly influenced by the Platonic-Aristotelian mix of ideas, whether or not in combination with the 'Demosthenic' strategies exemplified by Dio of Prusa's *On Kingship*.

Reinhold Hülsewiesche, in his overview of 'Redefreiheit' in the ancient world, argues that in the Roman world *parrhēsia* remained a meaningful concept only in the rhetorical tradition as (figurative) political freedom of speech.⁶⁸ However, we should be careful to rule out *in primis* the political associations of *parrhēsia* in the literature of the empire.⁶⁹ Dana Fields' monograph revives the historical, civic function of *parrhēsia*, but also consistently argues that any claim of *parrhēsia* indicates a rhetorical strategy on the part of the speaker.⁷⁰ Due to this focus on political participation rather than political virtue, she is less interested in frankness as an *ethical quality*.⁷¹ In the present chapter, I would like to accentuate the ideological instead of the rhetorical dimension of

⁶⁷ Cf. WHITMARSH 2001, who focuses on the establishment of a pedagogical relationship between emperor and philosopher in Dio's speeches, "Trajan's ethical superiority, rather, lies in his exposure to philosophical *paideia*" (208), that is, Greek culture and education. On the exemplarity of ancient Greek models in Dio's speeches, cf. SALMERI 2000: 84–85; on this (ideological) feature of imperial Greek oratory in general, BOWIE 1974; SWAIN 1996: 91–96; WEBB 2006.

⁶⁸ As representative of this rhetorical tradition, he remarkably refers to Cassius Dio: HÜLSEWIESCHE 2002: 114, 116.

⁶⁹ WHITMARSH 2001: 141–147, who rules out that in Musonius Rufus' (first century AD) treatise on exile the term can still represent the "democratic conception", too. In fact, WHITMARSH is the one to show that ethics is politics in the rhetorical strategies of the sophists; by acting as 'educators' of the Roman rulers and transmitting Greek *paideia* onto their Roman peers, the Greeks are actually able to establish a powerful political identity.

⁷⁰ Cf. FIELDS 2020: 191, "this rhetorical game".

⁷¹ However, FIELDS does not ignore the ethical aspects; e.g. p. 5 ("the implications of the term are both ethical and political"), 14 (Marcus Aurelius uses *parrhēsia* as "a short-hand for philosophic virtue, like so many authors in this study"); 31 (*parrhēsia* playing a role in the creation of ethical identities); 111 (Dio of Prusa as a philosophical frank speaker); 122–125 (the moral character of the *dēmos*). In general, she approaches frankness as a (civic) "value shared between speaker and audience" (194), thus embedding the ethical aspects of *parrhēsia* in her definition of it. However, while she explains brilliantly how frankness relates to discussions of identity and power, and emphasizes

frank speech. As arises from the texts of Plato and Aristotle, *parrhēsia* was one of the markers of ethical goodness in a statesman. It is related to political virtue, to political truth if you will, in the sense that a man's moral quality was measured based on the extent to which truthfulness inspired his frankness. In other words, frankness is perceived as much a feature of behaviour as it is of speech; a good statesman is capable of self-control and moderation, and his frankness of speech is one of the outward signals of these ethical abilities. In Plutarch's writings, frankness becomes a prerequisite for the good statesman, one constituent part of his political reputation. He thus normalizes Plato's ideal of the philosopher-king as the model of *parrhēsia*, and expands on Aristotle's vision of the excellent man by arguing how *parrhēsia* can be used beneficially with regard to his fellow citizens. Cassius Dio, then, adopted a similar attitude in making *parrhēsia* one of the criteria for good statesmanship in his Roman History. Before we focus on the quality of *parrhēsia* as part of the Plutarchan and Dionean image of Cicero, we should consider the ethical discussion about frankness in Plutarch's *Moralia*. These texts give us some direction as to understanding the meaning of *parrhēsia* for the intellectual elite, and specifically the Greek-educated elite, in the imperial period.

2.2 PLUTARCH'S THERAPEUTIC PARRHĒSIA

While Plato and Aristotle had primed the concept of frankness to connote personal and civic excellence, Plutarch further contextualises frankness in the civic setting of the Roman world, particularly Greek provincial government. In the treatises *How to Distinguish a Flatterer from a Friend* and *Advice on Civic Life* he emphasizes the peculiar strength of 'therapeutic *parrhēsia*', a type of frankness which is morally beneficial. Whereas Socrates handles frankness as an important criterion for true friendship, Plutarch introduces *parrhēsia* as a healing quality not just in private relationships but also in social networks.⁷²

its importance for imperial Greek self-positioning, she does not define in what ways *parrhēsia* was constitutive of imperial conceptions of the good (states)man.

⁷² Cf. HÜLSEWIESCHE 2002: 112, restricting this use of 'philosophical' *parrhēsia* to private criticism. Contra SHEPPARD 1984–1986, who argues that Plutarch's ideal of frankness is "not to be used

In Plutarch's writings, *parrhēsia* is an element of social interaction on the collective level. In the following sections we will explore in particular the meaning of frankness for the civic leader. Such a reading should also provide more depth to the common views of Plutarchean *parrhēsia* as a strictly moral or philosophical value.⁷³

The treatise *How to Distinguish a Flatterer from a Friend* contains a section on *parrhēsia* which can almost be read as a separate treatise.⁷⁴ Although its framework is not necessarily political, Plutarch's idea of the contexts in which frankness is to be used and avoided are all socially oriented; he deals with situations pertaining to the private sphere as well as to public performance—even the subject of approaching Roman rulers is addressed. The treatise dates to the period between 90 and 116 AD (perhaps specifically to 96/97), and is addressed to the Athenian king Antiochus Philopappus.⁷⁵ In it, Plutarch provides us with an elaborate overview of the benefits and pitfalls of *parrhēsia*. We have already seen that in the classical discussion the notions of flattery and freedom of speech often occur in tandem. Plutarch's work is inspired, in particular, by Plato's ideas about true friendship (love). In *Gorgias*, the need for true *parrhēsia* from our friends in order to put limits on φιλαυτία, (blind) love for oneself, is thematized in contrast to deceptive (untruthful) adulation.⁷⁶

in a public situation" as following from *Flatterer* 70e-f. The argument there, however, is that one should never correct a friend *en public* (as part of a wider argument about *kairos*, finding the right moment)—not that frankness belongs strictly to the private sphere.

⁷³ GALLO & PETTINE 1988: 21–22; cf. SCARPAT 1964: 68, who, although he categorizes Plutarchean *parrhēsia* under "valore morale", notes "con la trasposizione del concetto di parrhesia nella sfera morale, non andò perduto il carattere di pubblicità implicito in qualunque discorso politico. Col concetto di parrhesia è unita sempre per i Greci la rappresentazione di una pubblica condotta di vita."

⁷⁴ For previous literary analyses of this work, see ZIEGLER 1964: 164–166; VALGIGLIO 1992: 3971; WHITMARSH 2006; GALLO & PETTINE 1988: 7–26; SIRINELLI 1989: 65–79. WHITMARSH 2006 and FIELDS 2008 provide good cultural-historical contextualization.

⁷⁵For the question of the dating, see JONES 1966, who opts for the wider time frame, and WHITMARSH 2006, who suggests the specific date of 96/97 AD, which he relates to a physical encounter between Plutarch and Philopappus. This means that the treatise was either written slightly before or simultaneously with the *Parallel Lives*, which would have been started after 96 AD (the year of Domitian's death) and finished before Plutarch's death in 120, and *Advice on Civic Life*, which JONES estimates was written perhaps between 96–98 AD but in any case finished before 114 AD (JONES 1971: 35, 135–137). On *Advice on Civic Life*, see also CARRIÈRE 1984: 10–13, who opts for three possible dates between 100–101, 103–104 or 107–109 AD. On Antiochus Philopappus, JONES 1971: 59; WHITMARSH 2006: 93–94.

⁷⁶ Compare *Gorg.* 286d with *Flatterer* 50a-b. There are also interesting similarities with Plato's

Parrhēsia, according to Plutarch, needs to be developed like an art (φιλοτεχνεῖν) in so far as it is the greatest and the most powerful medicine within the bond of friendship —that is, on the condition that one practice the type that is true and based on friendship.⁷⁷

Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὴς καὶ φιλικὴ παρρησία τοῖς ἀμαρτανομένοις ἐπιφύεται, σωτήριον ἔχουσα καὶ κηδεμονικὸν τὸ λυποῦν, ὥσπερ τὸ μέλι τὰ ἥλκωμένα δάκνουσα καὶ καθαίρουσα, τᾶλλα δ' ὠφέλιμος οὖσα καὶ γλυκεῖα.⁷⁸

For true and loving frankness attends to mistakes, providing rescue and care to what hurts, like honey stinging and purifying open wounds, but being otherwise helpful and sweet.

In an extensive medical analogy, Plutarch explains that friends are the protectors of each other's soul, and that frankness is one of the remedies for curing the faults of the other. However, although *parrhēsia* sometimes needs to “bite” to remove the evil, it should always be used moderately and without excess. Moreover, it should be well-timed and appropriate.⁷⁹ One solution Plutarch offers is mixing frankness with praise rather than vituperation, something a noble friend, a father, or a teacher would do to set the character of their relatives or pupils straight (πρὸς ἐπανάρθωσιν ἡθους).⁸⁰ There are thus a couple of errors easily made with regard to *parrhēsia*, which Plutarch discusses in quite some detail and with vivid examples taken from both the Greek and Roman historical tradition. The first mistake we should avoid making is to offer our criticism without taking away what is crude, τὸ ἄκρατον,⁸¹ and failing to remain moderate (ἀμετρία). Frank speech is not the same as blame or vituperation, μέμψις or ψόγος. For those who use *parrhēsia* are respected and admired, and those who distribute blame attract ac-

Phaedrus, though thematically the relation with this Platonic treatise is much looser: compare *Flatterer* 51d on outward appearances, where Plutarch quotes from Pl. *Phdr.* 239d, and *Phdr.* 240e with 68d, on *parrhēsia* resulting from ebriety; at *Phdr.* 240b there is mention of the flatterer (as a stereotype). Cf. FOUCAULT 2019: 185–191. Plato's life offers an exemplum twice, in *Flatterer* 67c-e, and 70e. On the Platonic theme of Plutarch's treatise, RUSSELL 1973: 94–96.

⁷⁷ *Flatterer* 74d.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* 59d.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.* 74d: δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὴν παρρησίαν φιλοτεχνεῖν, ὅσῳ μέγιστόν ἐστι καὶ κράτιστον ἐν φιλῷ φάρμακον, εὐστοχίας τε καιροῦ μάλιστα καὶ κράσεως μέτρον ἐχούσης αἰεὶ δεομένην. Cf. 73d.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.* 73d, where again the analogy of the doctor is used. See also §3.1.5 below.

⁸¹ *Ibid.* 66b. For the argument as I paraphrase it, see 66a-e. The term ἄκρατος (οἶνος) in its technical sense refers to undiluted wine, which of course also had a negative effect in that it was too strong to enjoy.

cusation themselves, and they are despised instead of listened to.⁸² As a related mistake,⁸³ a catalyst for this negative reaction is the apparent influence of self-love or self-promotion in freely giving one's opinion. The charge of φιλαυτία should in any way be avoided.

A second mistake to be avoided is to become arrogant or scurrilous:

Δεύτερον τοίνυν ὥσπερ ἐκκαθαίροντες ὕβριν ἅπασαν καὶ γέλωτα καὶ σκῶμμα καὶ βωμολοχίαν ἡδύσματα πονηρὰ τῆς παρρησίας ἀφαιρῶμεν.⁸⁴

Now, a second point, let's remove from our frank speech vulgar sauciness, cleansing it, as it were, from every form of arrogance and ridicule and scurrility and buffoonery.

People who apply ridicule and clownish language (τὸ παιδιῶδες) will in the end only destroy themselves; they are dancing on the brink of a volcano, as Plutarch explains it.⁸⁵ This behaviour is merely a display of ill-temperedness (ἀκρασία) and hatred (ἔχθρα) mixed with bad manners (κακοήθεια) and arrogance (ὕβρις). Frank speaking should represent sincerity (σπουδή) and good character (ἥθος), and it should observe the right timing (καιρός).⁸⁶

A third situation one should watch out for is employing frankness in public and trying to glorify oneself simultaneously:

Οὐ γὰρ φιλικὸν ἀλλὰ σοφιστικὸν ἄλλοτρίοις ἐνευδοκιμεῖν σφάλμασι, καλλωπιζόμενον πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας, ὥσπερ οἱ χειρουργοῦντες ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις ἰατροὶ πρὸς ἐργολαβίαν. ἄνευ δὲ τῆς ὕβρεως, ἣν οὐδεμιᾷ θεραπείᾳ προσεῖναι δίκαιόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ τῆς κακίας σκεπτέον φιλόνηκον καὶ αὐθαδές.⁸⁷

⁸² *Ibid.* 66e: ὅθεν αἰδοῦνται τοὺς παρρησιαζομένους καὶ θαυμάζουσι, τοῖς δὲ μεμφομένοις ἀντεγκαλοῦσι καὶ καταφρονοῦσιν. The undefined and unexpressed "they" in this reasoning is, I think, telling of Plutarch's informal style. Cf. 70d, where Plutarch writes: "for hurt is caused by him who abuses, while a service is done by him who admonishes (γίνεται γὰρ οὕτω τὸ μὲν λυπηρὸν τοῦ λοιδοροῦντος, τὸ δὲ ὠφέλιμον τοῦ νουθετοῦντος)".

⁸³ This is how Plutarch presents it in 66e: the action of μέμφεσθαι (or ἐξονειδίζειν), reproaching someone, appears to be the result from being personally offended, which is where φιλαυτία comes into the picture.

⁸⁴ *Flatterer* 67e.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* 68a.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* 68c. These things become impossible once one is drunk, in relation to which Plutarch warns about the effects of alcohol, an allusion to Plato's description of drunken frankness in *Phdr.* 240e. Cf. *Plut. Apoph.* 207f, and *Quaest. conv.* 712a on the reading of (Old) comedy (whose *parabasis* would be characterized by σπουδή and παρρησία) at symposia.

⁸⁷ *Flatterer* 71a.

For it is not a mark of friendship but of sophistry to gain glory in another's faults, showing off in front of the audience, like doctors who operate in a theatre with the aim of attracting new patients. Apart from arrogance, which ought never to influence any therapy, one needs to realize this is contentious and high-minded, parts of vice.

In other words, frank speaking should never have rhetorical success as its final goal, but should aim at private and salutary support:

Διὸ δεῖ σφόδρα φυλάττεσθαι καὶ τοῦτο μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς μὴ παρεπι-
δείκνυσθαι μηδὲ δημαγωγεῖν ἀλλ' ὀνησιφόρως καὶ θεραπευτικῶς χρῆ-
σθαι τῇ παρρησίᾳ βουλομένους.⁸⁸

That is why this should be taken seriously, in addition to the previous things, by those who want to employ freedom of speech not to make a display or to win popularity but in a beneficial and serviceable way.

There is one group that is allowed to make somewhat of a display: old men, who can truly pride themselves on a good reputation (δόξη) and on their status (ἀξίωμα), might offer criticism while referring to their own successes.⁸⁹ Those who do not have this status, on the other hand, end up making themselves annoying (ἐπαχθής) and burdensome (βάρυς). As Plutarch had emphasized at the start of his reflections on frankness in friendship, honest criticism needs to come from feelings of goodwill (εὖνοια),⁹⁰ and should not intend to take someone down or gain profit out of it.

The reference to older men who have proved themselves and the emphasis on *parrhēsia* as a means of moral instruction are part of a bigger argument relating to the ethics of imitation.⁹¹ In the context of mixing praise with criticism, Plutarch notes particularly that the element of praise might incite the addressee to choose the higher path of virtue:

⁸⁸ *Ibid.* 71d.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* 71a. Cf. *On Self-praise* 546f and 547a, where it is confirmed that old men tend to exalt themselves; however, they should be indulged whenever they have obtained true virtue and glory. On this treatise, see INGENKAMP 1971: 62–69.

⁹⁰ *Flatterer* 74c.

⁹¹ On the nature of Plutarch's writings as providing ethical instruction for his readers seminal studies are DUFF 1999: esp. 52–71; PELLING 2002: 237–251; STADTER 2014: 231–245. LANGLANDS 2020 is the first explicitly to connect Plutarch's moral programme, in which the description of virtue incites the reader to imitate and emulate this virtue (*Plut. Per.* 2.2–3, *Dem.* 1.6 with DUFF 1999: 34–49), with the Roman discourse of exemplarity.

Οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀνίησι τοῦ ψόγου τὸ τραχὺ καὶ κελευστικόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ζῆλον ἐμποιεῖ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν αἰδουμένῳ τὰ αἰσχροῖα τῇ τῶν καλῶν ὑπομνήσει καὶ παράδειγμα ποιουμένων τῶν βελτιόνων ἑαυτόν.⁹²

For not only does he soften the harsh and the hortatory element of the criticism, but he evokes the desire in a man for emulating himself, since he is made to feel ashamed of bad deeds when remembered of his good conduct, and makes himself into an example of even better deeds.⁹³

In another passage Plutarch describes the effect of men employing good *parrhēsia* as driving their friends towards virtue, and leading them away from vice (παρορμῶσι πρὸς τὰ καλὰ καὶ τῶν αἰσchrῶν ἀπελάυνουσι).⁹⁴

Plutarch's discussion of frankness is framed as a discussion on ethical virtue. His emphasis lies on the role of frankness in (interpersonal as well as public) relationships and on the remedying effects of criticism. Moderation, sincerity, and an abstention from self-promotion are required qualities for justly and correctly applying frankness. Plutarch's argument around these behavioural aspects turn *parrhēsia* into a matter not (simply) of natural ability but of training and competence; in fact, the hortative tone of this treatise suggests that it aims at the

⁹² *Flatterer* 72d.

⁹³ For this difficult passage I used the translation of BABBITT 1927. Cf. *On Self-praise* 539e-f and 544d-e, where the exact same thought is voiced, and self-praise is defended on the grounds that it can sometimes be used to incite others to virtuous deeds.

⁹⁴ *Flatterer* 74b. The language of movement towards the good and away from evil is reminiscent of Diodorus Siculus' reflections on freedom of speech for the historiographer in the prooemium to book 15. Here, Diodorus stresses that historiographers, who he refers to as "we", through their habitual frank criticism (τῇ συνήθει τῆς ἱστορίας παρρησίᾳ), award the proper praise (τὸν δίκαιον ἐπιλέγειν ἔπαινον) to men for good deeds, and judge bad men (τοὺς φαύλους), when they make mistakes, as worthy of just punishment (ἄξιον δικαίας ἐπιτιμῆσεως). For, he says, "we believe that through this kind of approach those who are naturally inclined to virtue are urged towards attaining immortality in reputation as a result of excellent deeds, but those who have the opposite disposition are turned away from their impulse for wickedness through fitting words of reproach" (διὰ τοῦ τοιούτου τρόπου νομίζομεν τοὺς μὲν εὖ πεφυκότας πρὸς ἀρετὴν τῷ διὰ τῆς δόξης ἀθανατισμῷ προτρέψεσθαι ταῖς καλλίσταις ἐγχειρεῖν πράξεσι, τοὺς δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν ἔχοντας διάθεσιν ταῖς ἀρμοστούσαις βλασφημίαις ἀποτρέψειν τῆς ἐπὶ τὴν κακίαν ὁρμῆς.) Plutarch as well as Diodorus—writing from different perspectives but with a shared interest in educating citizens about the nature of virtue—give us quite a clear idea of how praise and frank (or constructive) criticism operate on the exemplary level; by both, *parrhēsia* is regarded as being an indispensable element of the discourse of moral imitation. Diodorus' words evoke the theme of Livy's prooemium 11, although the theme of frank criticism is absent there; see chapter 2, §1.2.2. On *parrhēsia* as "an intricate aspect of moral assessment" in Diodorus' *Library*, see SACKS 1990: 33–35; cf. SACKS 2018: 51–62 for a wider contextualization of *parrhēsia* in Hellenistic literature.

moral improvement of the reader. Moreover, frank speech becomes part of exemplary conduct, both as a means of instructing others and as one of the criteria according to which an individual can be judged in terms of public and private virtue. The frankness of an individual is thus subordinated to his social role as a friend and citizen.

2.3 CATO AGAIN (WHY CICERO COULD NOT MEASURE UP AGAINST DEMOSTHENES)

We will now turn to the treatise *Advice on Civic Life*, where Plutarch revisits the concept of therapeutic *parrhēsia*, this time as the quality of a good politician, and actually comments on the behaviour of historical figures, including Cicero. To be fair, this discussion will rather highlight the *absence* of *parrhēsia* in the account of Cicero's political action. While Plutarch explicitly names frankness as one of the qualities of a good statesman, it is omitted from the characterization of Cicero. However, as we will see, the terminology used in analyses of Cicero's style of speaking overlaps with that figuring in *How to Distinguish a Flatterer from a Friend*; both treatises deal extensively with the topic of political speech. The context of Plutarch's analyses of Cicero's speech, moreover, and the foils he employs to throw Cicero's speech into relief, are explicitly associated with the notion of *parrhēsia*.

Advice on Civic Life is addressed to Menemachus of Sardis, about whom we do not have much information other than that he was a fellow Greek aristocrat interested in how to maintain an influential position under imperial rule.⁹⁵ The treatise contains all kinds of practical comments on the duty of politicians in Greek or otherwise provincial communities.⁹⁶ Every aspect of a political career is handled, including the style of speaking (λόγος) which a politician should adopt.⁹⁷ In gen-

⁹⁵ CARRIÈRE 1984: 29–33.

⁹⁶ Due to its practical nature as a collection of practical tips and tricks, I prefer the translation advice over precepts for παραγγέλματα; 'political', in my opinion, does not do justice to the focus on local city government and social relationships in Plutarch's treatise, which is why I have opted for 'civic'. Compare the translations in PELLING 2002, whose 'Advice on public life' comes closest to and has inspired my interpretation; STADTER 2014: 5, RENOIRTE 1951 ("conseils"). On the meaning of "precepts" and Plutarch's position in the philosophical tradition, see CARRIÈRE 1984: 4–5.

⁹⁷ *Advice* 802e–805e.

eral, the discourse of the politician, councillor, and ruler alike should be “full of genuine character, true spirit, the ancestral freedom of speech, foresight, and loving involvement” (ἥθους ἀπλάστου καὶ φρονήματος ἀληθινοῦ καὶ παρρησίας πατρικῆς καὶ προνοίας καὶ συνέσεως κηδομένης ὁ λόγος ἔστω μεστός).⁹⁸ Plutarch adds that this discourse should show pleasure in virtue and also exhort (be ἀγωγός) to virtue through an edifying use of words and ideas: again, frankness of speech is an element of imitable behaviour that is morally constructive.⁹⁹ Moreover, it should be seen as a hereditary feature of the Greeks; whether we interpret πατρικός as meaning ‘ancestral’ or ‘fatherly’, either way it represents an emphasis on community rather than individualism.

Right after defining the proper style of civic speaking, Plutarch gives us examples of bad style.¹⁰⁰ This pertains to the use of jokes and ridicule as part of one’s public speech, which is pardonable only under certain circumstances. It is here that Plutarch combines political history with philosophical thought, which the ideas in the treatise *How to Distinguish a Flatterer from a Friend* touch upon and are illustrated by Roman history. The exemplar adduced for a bad style of speaking, and misuse of freedom of speech is none other than Cicero:

Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ σκῶμμα καὶ γελοῖον ἔστιν ὅτε γίγνεται πολιτικοῦ λόγου μέρος, εἰ μὴ πρὸς ὕβριν ἢ βωμολοχίαν ἀλλὰ χρησίμως ἐπιπλήττοντος ἢ διασύροντος λέγοιτο. Μάλιστα δ’ εὐδοκιμεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τὰς ἀμείψεις καὶ τὰς ἀπαντήσεις· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ παρασκευῆς καὶ κατάρχοντα γελωτοποιοῦντος ἔστι καὶ δόξα κακοηθείας πρόσεστιν, ὡς προσῆν τοῖς Κικέρωνος σκῶμμασι καὶ τοῖς Κάτωνος τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου καὶ Εὐξιθέου τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους συνήθους· οὗτοι γὰρ ἔσκωπτον ἀρχόμενοι πολλάκις.¹⁰¹

It is in fact true that jesting and ridicule are part of a statesman’s speech sometimes, if they are not spoken with the aim to insult someone or play the buffoon, but as a useful form of rebuke or reproach. Such things are most reputable in the case of responses and retorts; for when it’s premeditated and unprovoked, that is the behaviour of a

⁹⁸ *Advice* 802f. NORTH FOWLER 1936 translates παρρησίας πατρικῆς as ‘a father’s frankness’, but if we interpret πατρικός as related to history rather than family, it might well be a reference to the Athenian democratic roots of the term. On the passage, see, very briefly, FIELDS 2020: 107, who goes on to test (with success) its precepts on the speeches of Dio of Prusa.

⁹⁹ *Advice* 803a.

¹⁰⁰ COSENZA 2000 contextualizes this and similar passages within Plutarch’s theory of political virtue.

¹⁰¹ *Advice* 803c.

clown, and it attracts a reputation for bad manners, as this attached itself to the jokes of Cicero and Cato the Elder and Euxitheus the friend of Aristotle; for they often began making jokes.

While the point of departure is different (here, the topic at hand is ridicule in political speech), the conceptual framework of this passage resembles Plutarch's approach to *parrhēsia* in *How to Distinguish a Flatterer from a Friend*. The idea of useful criticism stands opposed to feelings of self-importance or a lack of restraint. The terminology used to define good and bad speech in the two treatises is similar; just as Plutarch had advised the removal of all scurrility and buffoonery from frank speech (67e), he advises the (aspiring) politician here to refrain from ridicule and silliness, even though jokes are a part of oratorical discourse. Again, the principle of moderation should guide the speaker. Plutarch refers to Cicero's jokes as an illustration of the kind of βωμολοχία and unprovoked γελωτοποιία one would want to avoid in political speech. The counterexample in this part of *Advice on Civic Life* is Demosthenes, particularly his *Philippics*, which illustrate a solemn and high-minded style of speaking. Following the passage quoted above, Plutarch includes several retorts from Demosthenes to political opponents in order to illustrate how ridicule should be employed correctly.¹⁰²

The mention of Demosthenes' *Philippics* invites the question: what of Cicero's Roman imitation of these speeches, in which he openly and without scruples inveighed against Antony?¹⁰³ Plutarch's moral treatises do not mention the *Philippics*. The biographies do, although even there, they receive little attention.¹⁰⁴ In the *Cicero*, the only reference to the speeches is implicit, informing us that Cicero "drove Antony out, raised a faction against him, and sent the two consuls Hirtius and Pansa to war against him, and then he convinced the senate to vote (ἔπεισε ψηφίσασθαι τὸν σύγκλητον) lictors and a praetor's insignia for Caesar on the ground that he was defending the country".¹⁰⁵ In the life

¹⁰² The good example of the *Philippics*, together with the speeches in Thucydides (Sthenelaus in book 1; Pericles and Archidamus in book 2), was already introduced right before this passage on jesting (803b), creating a sustained antithesis between Demosthenes and Cicero.

¹⁰³ The (Greek) imperial reception of the *Philippics* is discussed further in chapter 4.

¹⁰⁴ Note *Cic.* 41.4, where Plutarch mentions in passing that he derived information from "Antony's replies to the *Philippics*" (ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς Φιλίππικους ἀντιγραφαῖς).

¹⁰⁵ *Cic.* 45.3: τὸν μὲν Ἀντώνιον ἐξέκρουσε καὶ κατεστasiaσε καὶ πολεμήσοντας αὐτῷ τοὺς δύο ὑπάτους, Ἴρτιον καὶ Πάνσαν, ἐξέπειψε, Καίσαρι δὲ ραβδούχους καὶ στρατηγικὸν κόσμον, ὡς δὴ προπολεμοῦντι τῆς πατρίδος, ἔπεισε ψηφίσασθαι τὴν σύγκλητον.

of Antony Plutarch uses similar, implicit, language to describe Cicero's performance in the senate, this time specifying that he persuaded the senate to declare Antony a public enemy (ἔπεισε τὴν βουλὴν ἐκείνον ... πολέμιον ψηφίσασθαι)—a reminder of the central theme of the *Philippics*. The reader is left to himself to fill in the precise way by which Cicero fuelled the opposition against Antony, namely by his oratory. Not only does this diminish the literary legacy of Cicero's actions in the years 44–43 BC, it also negates the status of model speeches for Cicero's *Philippics*. In *Advice on Civic Life*, then, the orator who does stand model for Plutarch's ethically stimulating speech is Demosthenes.¹⁰⁶

The image of Cicero as a joker and a clownish figure is not limited to the *Moralia*, but is a systematic element of Plutarch's portrayal of the orator, as is again demonstrated by the biography.¹⁰⁷ Apparently fascinated by Cicero's cleverness of speech, his δεινότης, Plutarch devotes a long stretch of text to examples from the collection of Cicero's jokes (*Cic.* 25–27). He introduces the passage with the remark that Cicero made many men famous by speaking or writing about them; sometimes, however, whenever Cicero expressed criticism towards someone else, he could be mean and petty, as in the case of Pelops of Byzantium, whom he refused to help in gaining honours (τιμαί) from his people.¹⁰⁸ “This now”, Plutarch says, “was a mark of his desire to emulate others, just as he often neglected propriety due to being carried away by the cleverness of his speech” (ταῦτά τε δὴ φιλότιμα, καὶ τὸ πολλάκις ἐπαιρόμενον τοῦ λόγου τῇ δεινότητι τὸ πρέπον προῖεσθαι, *Cic.* 25.1). The failure to keep measure is a running theme in the biography. At its beginning, Plutarch stresses the bad reputation Cicero received as a result of his excessive rhetorical tricks:

Ἦ δὲ περὶ τὰ σκώμματα καὶ τὴν παιδιὰν ταύτην εὐτραπελία δικανικὸν μὲν ἐδόκει καὶ γλαφυρόν, χρώμενος δ' αὐτῇ κατακόρως πολλοὺς ἐλύπει καὶ κακοηθείας ἐλάμβανε δόξαν.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ Instead of focusing on Cicero's eloquence in the episode after Caesar's death, Plutarch draws his readers' attention to Cicero's political power (δύναμις) in the state, and his motivations for using this power: his hatred (μῖσος) for Antony and his lust for honour (ἡ φύσις ἡττων οὖσα τιμῆς); see *Cic.* 15.1.

¹⁰⁷ Reading the *Moralia* and *Lives* in tandem is especially fruitful, since they form a “unity” in which the theory of the former is tested and proven in the latter, as is noted by DUFF 1999: 5. For similar approaches, see most essentially VALGIGLIO 1992: esp. 3979–3992; the plethora of studies collected in NIKOLAIDIS 2008; XENOPHONTOS 2016.

¹⁰⁸ *Cic.* 24.7.

And his ready wit in using jokes and such playfulness seems to be pleasant and part of the courtroom, but by using it in excess he hurt many and acquired the reputation of malignity.

While making jokes is part of the rhetorical deal, as Plutarch admits here and in *Advice on Civic Life*,¹⁰⁹ Cicero's lack of moderation, together with an apparent lack of understanding of the moral implications of his behaviour, turns his eloquence into an antagonizing force. Instead of framing Cicero's frank and critical ways of speaking about the conduct of others as *parrhēsia*, Plutarch emphasizes Cicero's tendency to transgress the boundaries of morality; the term *κακοήθεια* quite literally signals a bad moral disposition. In this particular passage, we might have expected *παρρησία* to fill the place of *εὐτραπεία*, since the term *κατακόρως* and its cognates are regularly combined with the former term to indicate the bad effects of frankness.¹¹⁰ In fact, *εὐτραπεία*, when employed pejoratively, is a direct synonym for *βωμολοχία*,¹¹² which, as we have seen in *Advice on Civic Life* 803c, was the antithesis of frankness according to Plutarch's theory. Tellingly, the term *παρρησία* is never used by Plutarch to define Cicero's style of speaking, neither in *Advice on Civic Life* nor in the Cicero. The omission in the Cicero is significant since the term does occur, quite in harmony with the picture presented in *Advice on Civic Life*, in the parallel biography of Demosthenes. Indeed, Plutarch presents Demosthenes as a model of *parrhēsia* among the Greeks, building his good reputation precisely upon this specific quality: "but having taken as the noble subject of his career (*πολιτεία*) the defence (*δικαιολογία*) of the Greeks against Philip and having fought worthily on her behalf, he soon gained a reputation (*δόξα*) and was elevated above the rest (*περίβληπτος ἦρθη*) because of his speeches and his frankness of speech (*παρρησία*), so that he was admired in Greece and was revered by the great king [i.e. Philip]."¹¹³ As

¹⁰⁹ *Cic.* 5.4.

¹¹⁰ Cf. *Cic.* 27.1.

¹¹¹ Cf. Plut. *Apoph.* 207f, *Quaest. conv.* 712a, cf. *On Self-praise* 541e (τὸν κόρον τῶν ἐπαίνων); Cass. Dio 38.12.6 and 46.29.1 (about Cicero), 54.3-5. See also n. 86.

¹¹² *LSJ* s.v. *εὐτραπεία* 2.

¹¹³ *Dem.* 12.3: Λαβὼν δὲ τῆς πολιτείας καλὴν ὑπόθεσιν τὴν πρὸς Φίλιππον ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἑλλήνων δικαιο-
λογίαν, καὶ πρὸς ταύτην ἀγωνιζόμενος ἀξίως, ταχὺ δόξαν ἔσχε καὶ περίβληπτος ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων ἦρθη καὶ
τῆς παρρησίας, ὥστε θαυμάζεσθαι μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι, θεραπεύεσθαι δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως. Cf.
14.3 on his *parrhēsia* with the *dēmos*. LINTOTT 2013 *ad loc.* also sees a connection with Plutarch's

Andrew Lintott notes, for Plutarch, Demosthenes' *parrhēsia* is a token of his genuine, "morally correct" attitude.¹¹⁴

A short comparison of the picture of Cicero in the biography and *Advice on Civic Life* with the tenets of *How to Distinguish a Flatterer from a Friend* teaches us that he behaves oppositely to Plutarch's ideal statesman. In the latter treatise, Plutarch had described the situation in which the person relishing his freedom of speech at the cost of another (out of love for himself) became *ἐπαχθής* and *βαρύς* (71a). The term *ἐπαχθής* also figures in the biography in the description of the aftermath of the Catilinarian conspiracy, where Cicero is shown to exalt and glorify himself to the frustration of his fellow citizens.¹¹⁵ Held up against the 'rules' of frank speech outlined in *How to Distinguish a Flatterer from a Friend*, Cicero's self-promoting speech is an aberration, and does not merit the label *parrhēsia*. Nor, finally, does his provocative jocularity match the Plutarchan image of the exemplary citizen who remedies private or public problems with his frankness, the 'therapist' leader who conciliates and offers moral guidance rather than divides. Cicero's unrestrained speech is presented as an ethical flaw, the incompetence to recognize the (moral) conditions under which (frank) speech may be used appropriately.

The analysis might end here were it not for the fact that Cicero has an important foil who further elucidates the ethical preliminaries for frankness.¹¹⁶ We have seen in previous chapters that a particular fellow senator of Cicero's always seems to surpass him in speech at crucial moments: Cato the Younger.¹¹⁷ In *Advice on Civic Life* Cato is a fitting model for frank speech. According to Plutarch, there are few things more important for a politician than to strive for friendly relations with other statesmen and to create harmony in the state. Cato's behaviour serves as a good example of what this would look like in practice.

discussion of *parrhēsia* in *Advice* 802f "as one of the requirements for a political orator in his [i.e. Plutarch's] time".

¹¹⁴ LINTOTT 2013: 7.

¹¹⁵ Cic. 14: καὶ τὸν λόγον ἡδιστον ὄντα καὶ χάριν ἔχοντα πλείστην ἐπαχθῇ καὶ φορτικὸν ἐποίησε τοῖς ἀκρωμένοις, ὥσπερ τινὸς ἀει κηρὸς αὐτῷ τῆς ἀηδίας ταύτης προσούσης. Note that φορτικός here is a synonym of βαρύς. See also Cic. 28.1.

¹¹⁶ Cf. MALLAN 2016: 261.

¹¹⁷ Plutarch (818d) also attributes a glorious role to Cato during (?) the Catilinarian conspiracy, where he convinced the senate to distribute grain among the people, and thereby "ended the uprising", κατέπαυσε τὴν ἐπανάστασιν; see CARRIÈRE 1984: 198.

Καὶ Κάτων διενεχθεὶς πρὸς τὸν Πομπήιον ἐν οἷς ἐβιάζετο τὴν πόλιν μετὰ Καίσαρος, ἐπεὶ κατέστησαν εἰς πόλεμον, ἐκέλευσε Πομπηίῳ παραδοῦναι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, ἐπειπὼν ὅτι τῶν αὐτῶν ἐστὶ καὶ ποιεῖν τὰ μεγάλα κακὰ καὶ παύειν. Ὁ γὰρ μεμιγμένος ἐπαίνῳ ψόγος οὐκ ἔχων ὕβριν ἀλλὰ παρρησίαν, οὐδὲ θυμὸν ἀλλὰ δηγμὸν ἐμποίων καὶ μετάνοιαν, εὐμενὴς φαίνεται καὶ θεραπευτικός· αἱ δὲ λοιδορίαι τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἥκιστα πρέπουσιν.¹¹⁸

For example, Cato, who differed in opinion with Pompey on the means by which he was claiming rule over the city together with Caesar, ordered the transfer of the command to Pompey when they were at war, saying that it was of the same men to commit terrible things and stop them. Mixing blame with praise, not possessing arrogance but frankness, and not applying anger but a sharp wit and intelligence, he comes across as well-disposed and willing to serve. Words of abuse do not fit politicians at all.

The Catonian *exemplum* is mentioned in one breath with examples (not quoted here) from the Attic orators, Aeschines, Demosthenes and Hypereides, and men like Solon and Pericles. Plutarch finishes with the *exemplum* of Demosthenes' *Philippics*, which are 'purified' from all kinds of abuse, including ridicule.¹¹⁹ This remark clearly refers back to his earlier denunciation of ridicule in speeches, where Cicero was aduced as a negative model in contrast to Demosthenes. Cato and Demosthenes, then, are a like-minded duo in their use of appropriate civic discourse.¹²⁰

In the *Lives*, Cato's *parrhēsia* is mainly a mark of resistance against Caesar and Pompey, true to the original 'Demosthenic' meaning of the term. However, there are also tales of Cato's ability to benefit others by means of his frank criticism in interpersonal relationships. In the biography of Pompey, Plutarch remarks that Pompey admired Cato for his frank speech and for the strength with which he alone publicly fought for justice.¹²¹ Moreover, this quality makes him want to be his friend; this wish recalls the ideal of Platonic frankness within friendship. A dif-

¹¹⁸ *Advice* 810c.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.* 810d: οἱ δὲ Φιλιππικοὶ καθαρεύουσι καὶ σκώμματος καὶ βωμολοχίας ἀπάσης.

¹²⁰ SCARPAT 1964: 68 dubs Cato the 'modello romano di *parrhēsia*'.

¹²¹ *Pomp.* 44.2: θαυμάσας δὲ τὴν παρρησίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν τόνον ὃ μόνος ἐχρήτο φανερώς ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων, ἐπεθύμησεν ἀμῶς γέ πως κτήσασθαι τὸν ἄνδρα. In *Cato Min.* 33, Cato is admired for speaking freely even when Caesar throws him into prison in 59 BC. Cato's refusal to give in to Pompey or Caesar is similarly celebrated in *Val. Max.* 6.2.5, where his righteous conduct as praetor, which antagonizes Pompey, is characterized as *libertas* and *fiducia*.

ferent example of Cato's frank way of speaking is his conversation with the Egyptian king Ptolemy in the *Cato the Younger*.¹²² Just as Croesus spoke in honesty with Cyrus in Herodotus' *Histories*, so Cato speaks with Ptolemy, lecturing him about happiness, εὐδαιμονία, and advising him against complying with the wishes of corrupt Roman governors in Egypt. Ptolemy is struck by the truthfulness (ἀλήθεια) and the intelligence (σύνεσις) of the man, regaining his senses again as someone does after a fit of madness or delirium (οἶον ἐκ μανίας τινὸς ἢ παρακοπῆς ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων ἔμφρων καθιστάμενος). The interaction between Ptolemy and Cato resembles the traditional pattern of the philosopher-adviser conversing frankly with his ruler, which became a prominent aspect of the discourse of *parrhēsia* in the imperial period (see above, § 2.1).¹²³ Most importantly for our argument, however, is that Cato's frankness stimulates Ptolemy to reflect on virtue and vice, and on what is best for his state; accordingly, the king changes his behaviour. Therefore, Cato not only lives up to the Demosthenic model by brilliantly and sincerely correcting Pompey's conduct, but he also fulfils Plutarch's (Platonic) ideal of the friendly parrhesiast who gives direction to others for improving their character and their lives.

2.4 CICERO AS A NEGATIVE EXEMPLAR OF PARRHĒSIA IN CASSIUS DIO

In this final section, we will return to Cassius Dio's account of republican *parrhēsia* and its role in the portrayal of Cicero. Our reading of the *Moralia* has provided us with a toolkit with which to explain the function of frankness within a sociopolitical setting. As we will see, Dio adopted the familiar conceptual interpretation of *parrhēsia* as a feature of political deliberation that should improve, not sabotage political relationships, and which more broadly speaking is the expression of ethical concerns about the civic status quo. Furthermore, within the narrative of the *Roman History*, as Mallan observes, more than an interpersonal speech act, *parrhēsia* is contextualized historically as a feature

¹²² *Cato Min.* 35.2–5.

¹²³ Cf. GEIGER 1971 *ad* 35.5.

¹²⁴ MALLAN 2016: 260–261; KUHN-CHEN 2002: 197–198.

of the old republican political system which loses its foundation in the first century BC.¹²⁴

Before we are able to understand what is wrong with Cicero's 'excessive' frankness, however, it is worthwhile looking at Dio's portrait of Cato: the image of Cato as the Roman exemplar of frankness of speech, as we have encountered in Plutarch's writings, is continued by Dio. Cato is a representative of the conservative Republic in which outspokenness was still a highly appreciated civic value. He is the filibustering maverick who blocks and refuses to endorse Caesar's laws,¹²⁵ but Dio interprets this behaviour as a positive mark of his conservatism, i.e. his aversion to any kind of innovation.¹²⁶ If there is any way to access Dio's notion of *parrhēsia* in its original form as political defence or protective mechanism, it is through Cato. An iconic passage in this regard is the private conversation between Cato and his son at Utica, which celebrates the value of free speech for the Republic. Realizing that it is impossible to defeat Caesar, Cato orders his crew at Utica to leave and his son to join Caesar's side. When his son asks him why he would not do the same, Cato famously responds: "I, having been raised in freedom (ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ) and with freedom of speech (ἐν παρρησίᾳ), cannot in old age change and learn how to live in slavery instead". His son, on the other hand, being born and raised in a dynastic political system, should respect (θεραπεύειν) the fate (τὸν δαίμονα) that was given to him, which is to say he should endure Caesar's rule.¹²⁷ This ideological expression of the importance of free or frank speech for the republican institution that is attributed to Cato here, also features a few books earlier by an actual example from Cato's political practice, which is especially relevant in comparison with Dio's portrayal of Cicero, as we will see shortly. In book 39, Dio relates that under the First Trium-

¹²⁵ See Cass. Dio 38.3 (famous episode of Cato thrown into prison) and 38.7 (refusal to take public oath) on Cato's opposition to Caesar's agrarian laws; 38.17 on Cato's role in Cicero's feud with Clodius.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.* 38.3.1 (ἦν δὲ ἄλλως μὲν ἐπιεικής καὶ οὐδενὶ νεοχμῶ ἀρεσκόμενος). In book 37, Cato is introduced as a man of true inborn virtue, praise that Cicero never receives from the Greek historiographer: 37.57.3, ἔμφυτος ἀρετή.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.* 43.10.5: ἐγὼ μὲν ἔν τε ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ ἐν παρρησίᾳ τραφεὶς οὐ δύναμαι τὴν δουλείαν ἐκ μεταβολῆς ἐπὶ γήρως μεταμαθεῖν· σοὶ δ' ἐν τοιαύτῃ καταστάσει καὶ γεννηθέντι καὶ τραφέντι τὸν δαίμονα τὸν λαχόντα σε θεραπεύειν προσήκει. Cato's words here evoke the traditional connection between Cato and *libertas* in Latin texts: see chapter 2. On the passage, MALLAN 2016: 262–26; cf. GOAR 1987: 73–76.

virate in 55 BC, Cato violently opposed the plan to prolong Caesar's command in Gaul for another three (*sic*) years in the senate by speaking (δημηγορήσαι) randomly (κατανάλωσε τὸν καιρόν, which we might also translate as 'he filibustered') about the condition of the state and by refusing to stick to the allotted two hours—an act landed him in prison.¹²⁸ In Dio's words, the day was wasted (κατετριβή) since none of the tribunes got to speak. Dio next explains Roman procedure by adding that in *contiones* (σύνοδοι τοῦ δήμου) private citizens were allowed to speak before the magistrates, because it was important that citizens could share their thoughts without being influenced by the opinion of a superior; speaking first, they could speak out with complete frankness (ἐπὶ πάσης παρρησίας τὰ δοκοῦντα αὐτῷ λέγειν).¹²⁹ The freedom of mind and body Cato which says he has grown up in, is illustrated in this passage by his resistance to Caesar. It is this civic *parrhēsia* benefitting the state that Dio describes five books later as being lost under Caesar's dictatorship.¹³⁰ *Parrhēsia*, then, is a practice that sharply brings into focus the change from republic to monarchy.¹³¹ If *parrhēsia* has a positive effect on political decision-making in the Republic, then Cato represents its true value.¹³² Though his oratorical strategies are not always fruitful, at least not in Dio's account, it is clear from the personal words before his death that he applies them because of a genuine concern for the constitution.

After our reading of Plutarch it should come as no surprise that the symbolic figure for misuse of *parrhēsia* in Dio's *History* is Cicero; in fact, he is the symbolic figure for 'frankness' overall. There are no less than 8 passages in which Cicero either identifies himself or is identified (by internal characters, or by the narrator) with freedom of speech.¹³³

¹²⁸ *Ibid.* 39.34.3–4.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.* 39.35.2: ἐν γάρ τοι ταῖς συνόδοις ταῖς τοῦ δήμου, ἐν αἷς γε καὶ ἐβουλευόντο, πάσαις τοῖς ιδιώταις πρὸ τῶν τὰς ἀρχῶν ἐχόντων ὁ λόγος ἐδίδοτο, τοῦ μηδένα αὐτῶν, ὡς ἔοικε, τῇ τοῦ κρείττονος γνώμῃ προκαταλαμβάνομενον ὑποστέλλεσθαι τι ὦν φρονοίη, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πάσης παρρησίας τὰ δοκοῦντα αὐτῷ λέγειν. On the passage, which is the only one referring to this specific rule, MORSTEIN-MARX 2004: 163.

¹³⁰ At Cass. Dio 44.10.2. When two tribunes, Gaius Marullus and Lucius Flavius issue a pamphlet that they were prevented from speaking their mind freely and safely on behalf of the state (οὔτε ἐλευθέραν οὔτ' ἀσφαλῆ τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ παρρησίαν ἐχόντων), Caesar becomes very angry (περιοργῆς) and accuses them in front of the senate.

¹³¹ Cf. KUHN-CHEN 2002: 197.

¹³² MALLAN 2016 skips over the positive connotations, focusing on the "futility" (263) of Cato's *parrhēsia*.

This stands in stark contrast with other characters in the *Roman History*. Cato is characterized twice as being a frank speaker, and on one of these instances only implicitly. Other individuals, either in republican or imperial times, are connected with the practice of *parrhēsia* just once.¹³⁴

We have already seen at the beginning of this chapter that Dio associates Cicero's particular freedom of speech with several ethical flaws, among which the most important is a lack of self-control.¹³⁵ A comparison of Dio's presentation of frankness with Plutarch's 'therapeutic' *parrhēsia* confirms that it is primarily Cicero's lack of ethical competence that bothers the imperial historiographers, i.e. his failure to recognize the social conventions underlying the use of frankness. Let us have another look at Cassius Dio's analysis of Cicero's conduct, which was quoted in Greek at the beginning of this chapter:

Cicero made himself the most bitter enemies by always attacking the most powerful men and by applying to all alike a freedom of speech that was intemperate and excessive. For he was in pursuit of a reputa-

¹³³ These passages are: Cass. Dio 38.12.6 (the narrator refers to Cicero's excessive frankness in the aftermath of the Catilinarian conspiracy); 38.15.3 (Pompey asks Cicero to stay in Rome during the Clodian affair, and defend himself and the senate with his *parrhēsia*); 38.29.1 (Philiscus sees Cicero's frankness as a political risk); 39.10.2 (Cicero checks himself after his return from exile, especially with regard to Caesar, knowing that his frankness had caused his expulsion); 45.22.5 (in the speech against Calenus, Cicero reflects on the existence of *parrhēsia* under Caesar), and 45.46.3 (same speech, Cicero identifies himself as a frank speaker, even at the risk of death); 46.26.1 (Calenus' speech, he mocks Cicero's unrestrained speech); 46.29.1 (the narrator refers to Cicero's excessive frankness in the debate with Calenus).

¹³⁴ The historiographer's attribution of *parrhēsia* to different political leaders throughout the Republic and empire is a topic that would benefit from closer study. See Cass. Dio 5 fr. 18.3 (Cicero's *parrhēsia* towards the people); 12 fr. 46.1 (Hanno was δεινὸς τῇ παρρησίᾳ, and spoke ἀπαρκαλύπτως); 30–35.100 Gaius Titus, pejoratively (τῇ τε παρρησίᾳ μετὰ ἀναισχυντίας κατακορεῖ χρώμενος); 54.3.5 L. Licinius Varro Murena (the son of L. Licinius Murena, cos. 62 BC, and conspirator against Augustus), pejoratively (ἀκράτῳ καὶ κατακορεῖ τῇ παρρησίᾳ πρὸς πάντας ὁμοίως ἐχρήτο); 57.2.5 Asinius Gallus, the son of Asinius Pollio, in a positive vein (παρρησίᾳ αἰεὶ ποτε πατρὶα καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ σύμφερον αὐτῷ χρώμενος); 66.12.1 Helvidius Priscus, son-in-law and follower of the Stoic Thræsea Paetus under Nero, pejoratively (τὴν τε τοῦ Θρασέου παρρησίαν οὐ σὺν καιρῷ μιμούμενος); 68.20.2 Parthamasiris, Armenian king under Trajan; 69.4.3 Apollodorus the Architect (under Hadrian); 74[75].9.1, 4 the senator Cassius Clemens, whose *parrhēsia* is admired by Septimius Severus. See also the famous debate between Agrippa and Maecenas in book 52, where both men's *parrhēsia* is emphasized and admired by Augustus: 52.41.1 (cf. 52.3.3). Augustus' special appreciation of frank speech is further noted at 53.21.4, 55.4.3, 55.7.4, 56.40.3, 56.40.1. MALLAN 2016: 269–272 discusses several of these passages.

¹³⁵ Cf. MALLAN 2016: 260, "[Dio] seems aware of an ethical boundary between frankness and unrestrained offensiveness."

tion for being knowledgeable and for saying what nobody else could, more than for appearing to be a good citizen.¹³⁶

According to this passage, there are three social values Cicero fails to observe. Firstly, if we think back to the definitions of frankness presented by Plato, Demosthenes and Plutarch, we recall that morally just frankness depends on integrity or virtue, on the genuine concern for the addressee, and on modesty or altruistic motives as opposed to self-promotional strategies. Cicero acts exactly oppositely to all these criteria. His frankness does not come in a modest format (ἄκρατος καὶ κατακορής), nor does he differentiate between his addressees (πρὸς πάντας ὁμοίως [...] χρώμενος), something which Plutarch advises in his *Moralia*. Secondly, instead of acting out of sincere concern for the state or his fellow citizens, as Demosthenes had done and Cato the Younger does in his own time, Cicero is preoccupied with his own reputation—not the reputation of being a morally good citizen, an ἀνὴρ χρηστός, but the reputation of being a wise and brazen man. Thus, personal ambition surpasses civic effort, a serious deviation from the ethical ideal that statesmen should above all contribute to the welfare of their community. The final social rule Cicero ignores is related to the fact that he merely ‘attacks the most powerful men’ (τῶν κρατίστων ἐπιχειρῶν). Now, at first sight, based on Plutarch’s discussion of *parrhēsia*, the problem appears to lie in ἐπιχειρεῖν, Cicero’s aggressive attitude, with which he creates hatred instead of harmony. This is by all means as far from Plutarch’s therapeutic *parrhēsia* as can be. However, if the problem lies in τῶν κρατίστων, an aspect of the situation which significantly affects the consequences of Cicero’s attacks, Dio’s message might have a slightly different meaning, which is tailored to the imperial reader. In truth-to-power relations *parrhēsia* is a tricky business, but, as we have seen in Plutarch’s example of Cato frankly addressing Pompey, it is very possible for the lower-placed official to express criticism about his superiors. In the imperial period, frankness could be employed by ambassadors or magistrates towards Roman rulers (even the emperor), as we have seen in § 2.1 of this chapter. Yet Cato knew, just as any imperial reader did, that frankness was a strategy that should be applied moderately or else at least according to certain (hierarchical) rules of

¹³⁶ Cass. Dio 38.12.7, above, p. 176–177.

conduct; the exemplum of his interaction with Pompey in Plutarch's *Advice on Civic Life* 810c, as well as the admiration of Pompey for Cato in the *Pompey*, illustrate that kind of sensitivity. Cicero, in contrast, transgresses these rules by not acknowledging the status of the men he spoke to, by not applying measure, and by failing to differentiate between his addressees (τῇ παρρησίᾳ πρὸς πάντας ὁμοίως ἀκράτῳ καὶ κατακορεῖ χρώμενος). He is the imperial reader's worst nightmare.¹³⁷

This brings us to the question of how we should interpret the negative portrayal of Cicero's excessive frankness in Dio's *History*. In my opinion, Dio's pointed remarks about Cicero's conduct are not so much the product of an attempt at blackening the orator's reputation as they are the expression of his views on Roman civic morality. In explaining the utility of *parrhēsia* in book 39, as we have seen above, Dio supposes that free speech in the Republic was a protective mechanism on the part of the citizens against the personal will and power of influential magistrates. While Cato, then, illustrates a classicistic type of 'true' *parrhēsia* associated with the traditional republican constitution (and resonating with the ancient Athenian interpretation of free speech), Cicero represents a type of 'topsy-turvy' *parrhēsia*, a freedom of speech that works in reverse, or counterproductively. In line with the argument of Plutarch's moral treatises, Dio insinuates in his books on the late Republic that Cicero and other republican politicians disregarded what mattered most in the context of city politics, that is, to strive for the common good over personal status.¹³⁸ In particular, the books handling the final years of Cicero and the Republic express a strong ideological vision on (good) government, while at the same time illustrating how the political elite fails to meet these moral standards. One peculiar passage in book 46, describing the fight against Antony, offers a specially strong condemnation of the behaviour of the senators. "The senators (οἱ βουλευταὶ) themselves", Dio says, "were responsible for these disasters [i.e. the battles, the proscriptions]. For they should have

¹³⁷ FIELDS 2020: 191 sums up nicely the relevance of this careful use of *parrhēsia* for imperial citizens: "As the social and political environment of the post-classical Greek world becomes more hierarchical and stratified, the term *parrhēsia* develops from its egalitarian origins amid the radical democracy of classical Athens to become increasingly identified with criticism directed from below at those more powerful."

¹³⁸ Such communal spirit is "für Dio ... eine zentrale Tugend", according to KUHN-CHEN 2002: 163–165.

appointed one man as their leader who served the state's best interest (ἕνα τινὰ τὸν τὰ ἀμείνῃα φρονοῦντα προστήσασθαι), and attached themselves to him through everything. But they did not do so, supporting some men and magnifying them at the cost of others, but subsequently trying to take them back down, and as a result they had no friend, but made all of them enemies."¹³⁹ By this kind of factional strife, in which alliances change abruptly and without consideration for the communal welfare, both the senators and the people, who become involved in this power struggle, destroy the state, in Dio's opinion.¹⁴⁰ In his account of the battle of Philippi, the historiographer explicitly connects the loss of freedom (ἐλευθερία) and freedom of speech (παρρησία)—the hallmarks of the Republic—with the rise of political factions; one faction leading the Roman people to single rule, the other safeguarding their autonomy (οἱ μὲν ἐς δυναστείαν αὐτοὺς ἤγον, οἱ δὲ ἐς αὐτονομίαν ἐξηροῦντο). As a result of this war, the people would never again reach a situation in which they had proper or full freedom of speech (ὅθεν οὐδ' ἀνέκυψεν ἔτι πρὸς ἀκριβῆ παρρησίαν ὁ δῆμος).¹⁴¹ As Dio makes very clear, in the party politics of the late Republic, there is no place for true *parrhēsia*, ἀκριβῆς παρρησία; that belonged to the Republic as it once was, the Republic of Cato's ideals.

Staged against the background of this historical argument about the internal destruction of the republican constitution, Cicero is Dio's go-to politician for exemplifying the problems which the Republic was facing, especially the problem of free speech. Throughout the books on the late Republic, Cicero is associated with antagonism. The passage discussed above (38.12.6–7) is not the only moment when Cicero's rhetorical excesses are judged negatively. Cicero's contemporaries and the historiographer himself all denounce his frank manner of speaking, apart from one instance which might just as well be ironical: in 58 BC,

¹³⁹ Cass. Dio 46.34.1: Αἴτιοι δὲ τῶν κακῶν τούτων αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς οἱ βουλευταὶ ἐγένοντο. δέον γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἕνα τινὰ τὸν τὰ ἀμείνῃα φρονοῦντα προστήσασθαι καὶ ἐκείνῳ διὰ παντὸς συνάρασθαι, τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐποίησαν, ὑπολαβόντες δὲ δὴ τινὰς καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἑτέρους ἐπαυξήσαντες ἔπειτα καὶ ἐκείνους ἀντικαθελεῖν ἐπεχείρησαν, καὶ τούτου φίλον μὲν οὐδένα, ἐχθροὺς δὲ πάντας ἔσχον.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 46.34.4. HOSE 1994: 422–424 reads 46.34–35 not only as crucial for the argument of the books on the history of the late Republic but for the general message of the *Roman History*; according to HOSE, this authorial evaluation addresses Dio's "senatorial readership", and is an expression of the "politisch-didaktische Funktion" of his work (424).

¹⁴¹ Cass. Dio 47.39.2.

Pompey encourages Cicero to stay in Rome and protect himself as well as the senate against Clodius by means of his *parrhēsia*, disguising to Cicero—who believed himself to be one of Pompey’s *amici*—the fact that he was at the same time encouraging Clodius to get Cicero out of the way.¹⁴² There is a significant build-up in the picture of Cicero as a frank speaker which makes the reader aware of the moral conditions under which freedom of speech can be exercised in a political setting, and the genuine repercussions for the speaker who ignores these.

The reverse political effect of Ciceronian frankness is thematized in the account of Cicero’s exile—which, in fact, according to Dio’s account was the direct result of his antagonistic attitude towards Caesar and Clodius.¹⁴³ Cicero is advised by the fictional philosopher Philiscus not to return to Rome, considering his boldness and the many enemies he has made:

Φοβοῦμαι δέ, ἔς τε τὰ πράγματα ἀποβλέπων καὶ τὴν σὴν παρρησίαν ἐννοῶν, τὴν τε δύναμιν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀντιστασιωτῶν σου θεωρῶν, μήποτε τι καὶ αὐθις σφαλῆς. ... Καίτοι πῶς μὲν οὐ δεινόν, πῶς δ’ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ἀποτμηθῆναι τέ τινος τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ἐς τὴν ἀγορὰν τεθῆναι, κἂν οὕτω τύχη, καὶ ἄνδρα τινὰ αὐτῇ καὶ γυναῖκα ἐνυβρίσαι; καὶ με μὴ ὡς φαῦλά σοι οἰωνιζόμενον μισήσης, ἀλλ’ ὡς διοσημίαν τινὰ προδεικνύοντα φύλαξαι. μηδὲ σε ἐξαπατάτω τοῦθ’, ὅτι καὶ φίλους τινὰς τῶν δυνατῶν ἔχεις...¹⁴⁴

But I fear, looking at the state of affairs in Rome and knowing of your outspokenness, and considering the power and the multitude of your opponents, that you might come to fall again. ... Seriously, wouldn’t it be horrible, wouldn’t it be full of shame to have one’s head cut off and be put on display in the forum, when this should so happen, and for a man or a woman to be disgraced there? And please don’t hate me for portending awful things to you, but heed me like some god-given sign predicting your future. Don’t let yourself be fooled by the belief that you have friends among powerful men ...

¹⁴² Cass. Dio 38.15.3: [Pompey] γνώμην δὲ ἐδίδου καταμεῖναι καὶ ἐαυτῷ τε ἅμα καὶ τῇ βουλῇ μετὰ παρρησίας βοηθῆσαι. For Dio’s account of this ‘master plan’ devised by Caesar and Pompey to destroy Cicero’s career, see 38.14.7–16.1. Pompey’s contrived rhetoric here, his pretension of honesty in praising Cicero’s *parrhēsia* while secretly supporting Clodius, would in its own way be an illustration of the self-serving speech of late republican politicians.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.* 39.10.2. See § 3.3 for more details about Dio’s account of Cicero’s exile.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 38.29.1–3.

Philiscus proceeds by describing how men who want power will sacrifice even their dearest friends, commenting perhaps on Pompey's machinations in the affair with Clodius right before the exile, and quite certainly referring to Octavian's later betrayal of Cicero. Cicero's frankness of speech is here directly connected with the destruction of his political career. According to Philiscus, Cicero's frankness does not combine well with the megalomania of the most influential Roman leaders. Asserting that for this reason Cicero will fail politically, he asks Cicero to imagine his own death and the subsequent desecration of his body.¹⁴⁵ It is important to note that Philiscus does not judge Cicero's *parrhēsia* anywhere as being bad; his argument is that it is problematic in the light of dynastic rule. It is the same argument Cassius Dio the historiographer makes earlier in book 38, in the passage we have already discussed.

With this knowledge, then, we arrive in books 45–46 at Cicero's second ἀριστεία (after his fight against Catiline in 63 BC) in the period after Caesar's death: his struggle against Antony, and the delivery of the *Philippics*. Fufius Calenus, one of Antony's historical supporters, acts in the narrative as a stand-in for Antony during the period of the Philippic debates (43 BC).¹⁴⁶ Calenus makes Cicero's frankness part of a sustained argument about the unreliability of the orator and his rhetorical trickery. Such an equation of frankness with deception stands in stark contrast to the classical Athenian opposition between *parrhēsia* as truth-telling, on the one hand, and deceitful words spoken in pursuit of personal gain, on the other.¹⁴⁷ However, Calenus applies the term not seriously but ironically, in response to an argument Cicero made at the end of his speech, where the orator had stated that he enjoyed such a splendid career precisely because of his *parrhēsia*: "in no way have I ever feared death as the result of my boldness—this is why I have been so very successful."¹⁴⁸ At other moments in the speech, too,

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.* 38.29.1–3. Narratologically, Philiscus' words anticipate the account of Cicero's murder and the mutilation of his body in book 47.8.

¹⁴⁶ Antony was not in Rome when Cicero performed *Philippics* 3–14: MANUWALD 2009: 20–31. See chapter 4, § 3 for more details about the figure of Calenus and Dio's Philippic debate.

¹⁴⁷ Conspicuous passages in this respect are Cass. Dio 46.4.1 (Cicero is a trickster), 46.6.4 (Cicero fawns upon, σαίνων καὶ γελῶν, everyone), 46.22.2 (Cicero flatters, θεραπεύει, his enemies while simultaneously plotting against them).

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 45.46.3: οὐτε γὰρ ἄλλως τὸν θάνατόν ποτε τὸν ἐκ τῆς παρρησίας ἐφοβήθην. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ κατάρθωσα πλείστον... Cf. 45.22.5. See BERTRAND 2008: 81 on 45.31.3, where Dio's Cicero refers to

Dio's Cicero identified himself with the practice of *parrhēsia*; what is more, he twice referred to it as a basic principle of political deliberation that is lost under 'tyrannical rule', and as part of the Republican constitution he is defending.¹⁴⁹

Calenus does not support Cicero's interpretation of his frankness as saving the state. He ridicules his opponent's frankness by reducing it to a dog's noise: "for you were surely not lacking in frankness; indeed, plenty and to no purpose you barked (ὕλάκτεις)".¹⁵⁰ The association with garrulity and disruption is topical and familiar from the Athenian sources.¹⁵¹ By means of this imagery, Calenus breaks down Cicero's careful construction of himself as a parrhesiast, painting a picture of a man who speaks freely and frankly but to no beneficial purpose. To some extent, this portrayal of Cicero's licentious speech reminds us of Plutarch's analysis in the *Moralia* and the Cicero (see above, § 2.3), where Cicero is similarly denied the practice of *parrhēsia* as a genuine service to the state. Moreover, we are reminded of Philiscus' words

the rostra as τὸ βῆμα τὸ ἐλευθερίον, the podium of liberty; in Bertrand's opinion, this is a reference to *parrhēsia* as the prime feature of the republican constitution. If so, this must be a projection of Dio's Greek concept of free speech onto the Roman forum. Whereas the podium in the Assembly was theoretically open to any member of the ecclesia, speaking from the Roman rostra was an act reserved for those holding a magistracy. Although BERTRAND is right to notice the rostra was marked by symbols of the people's *libertas* (esp. the Marsyas statue), this *libertas* connoted something very different from classical Greek *parrhēsia*: WIRSZUBSKI 1950: 13. Cf. PINA POLO 2012: 53, who states: "The Rostra gained a special place in the collective memory of the Romans as a symbol of the continuity and efficiency of a political system which backed the power of the elite. From this Rostra this elite monopolized the capacity to speak before the people". On the status and (aristocratic) appearance of the rostra in the republican period, FREYBERGER 2009: 29–30, 32–36, 50–55; COARELLI 2014: 51–54.

¹⁴⁹ Cass. Dio 45.18.2, 45.22.1; in both cases the envisaged 'tyrant' forbidding freedom of speech is Antony. Since the idea that free speech is inherent to a free state is a familiar topic from Cicero's own writings, it is remarkable that only this invective speech against Antony conceptualizes the importance of frankness, and not the speech on amnesty in book 44.23–33, which is a rather extensive celebration of Roman civic ideals. For the ideal in Cicero's works, see *Orat.* 1.30; *Brut.* 6. For the speech on amnesty in Dio book 44, see most recently LA BUA 2020: 92–95 and MONTECALVO 2014: 305–337.

¹⁵⁰ Cass. Dio 46.26.1: οὐ γάρ που καὶ παρρησίας ἐνδεὴς ἦσθα· πολλὰ γοῦν καὶ μάτην ὑλάκτεις. At 46.16.4 Calenus taunts Cicero by mimicking his words "I alone fight for liberty" (ἐγὼ μόνος ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἀγωνίζομαι) and "I alone speak frankly on behalf of the Republic" (ἐγὼ μόνος ὑπὲρ τῆς δημοκρατίας παρρησιάζομαι). See chapter 4, § 3.2.4. On the use of δημοκρατία for the Roman Republic, FECHNER 1986: 38–39; FREYBURGER-GALLAND 1997: 118–120; BELLISSIME 2016.

¹⁵¹ Above, § 2.1. See Cass. Dio 46.1.3, 7.3, 28.1 and 28.4, where Calenus emphasizes Cicero's θρασυτης; and 46.16.1, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἂν εἰπεῖν ἔχοι· εἰ γὰρ εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἂν τοῦτου πρότερον ἐξελάλησεν ("but he would have nothing to say; for if he had, he would've blurted it out immediately"). With regard to the latter example, cf. *Suda* λ 77 s.v. λαλιά, which is associated with *parrhēsia*.

in book 38, where the philosopher warned Cicero that his frankness would eventually cause his death. Calenus' speech is obviously vilifying in tone and purpose, but just like Philiscus, he argues that Cicero's frankness does more harm than good in the current political situation. Both Calenus and Philiscus are made to demonstrate that, contrary to Cicero's beliefs, his frank criticism only stands *in the way* of true success, since it turns his fellow senators against him.

I used the phrase 'made to demonstrate' because the words of these internal figures largely confirm the historiographer's own comments about Cicero's *parrhēsia*. Throughout, the *Roman History* sustains the image of Cicero's polemicizing *parrhēsia*. Apart from the passage in book 38 quoted above, the historiographer raises the theme on two other occasions. The first concerns Cicero's *De consiliis suis*, a booklet containing critical information on Caesar and Crassus' complicity in the Catilinarian affair.¹⁵² The writing of this book could have been labelled an instance of justified *parrhēsia*, a truth-to-power act against the dynastic leaders of the Republic. Yet, Dio chose to present it differently. The reader is told that the book was kept hidden in light of the recent banishment, which was the fruit of Cicero's "intemperate frankness" (ἡ ἄκρατος παρρησία).¹⁵³ This is a very deliberate attempt to stage Cicero's freedom of speech as something ruinous instead of an act that is courageous and sincere.¹⁵⁴ Whereas Dio could have acknowledged

¹⁵² Cass. Dio 39.10.2–3. On *De consiliis suis*, RAWSON 1982.

¹⁵³ Cass. Dio 39.10.2: ἄτε καὶ τῶν τῆς ἀκράτου παρρησίας ἐπικαρπιῶν νεωστὶ πεπειραμένος, βιβλίον μέντοι τι ἀπόρητον συνέθηκε.

¹⁵⁴ Interestingly, Dio does not recognize Cicero's act of writing *De consiliis suis* to be the kind of alternative historical account that is truthful and nuances the versions of potential despotic leaders for which he praises the republican political system (as opposed to the imperial regime) in book 53.19.2–3: "for in the past every event was reported in the senate and in the assembly, even if something would happen on a distance from Rome, hence everyone learnt of it and many wrote about it. For this reason, too, the truth of the events, even if some writers told them while influenced to a large extent by fear and favour, or friendship or enmity, was found in one way or the other in different writers who wrote about the same things, or from the public records. Since that time events started to be more secret and hidden from the public eye..." (πρότερον μὲν γὰρ ἔς τε τὴν βουλὴν καὶ ἔς τὸν δῆμον πάντα, καὶ εἰ πόρρω πού συμβαίη, ἐσέφερέτο· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες τε αὐτὰ ἐμάνθανον καὶ πολλοὶ συνέγραφον, καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια αὐτῶν, εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα καὶ φόβῳ τινὰ καὶ χάριτι φιλία τε καὶ ἔχθρα τισὶν ἐρρήθη, παρὰ γούν τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς τὰ αὐτὰ γράψασιν τοῖς τε ὑπομνήμασι τοῖς δημοσίοις τρόπον τινὰ εὐρίσκετο. ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ χρόνου ἐκείνου τὰ μὲν πλείω κρύφα καὶ δι' ἀπορρήτων γίγνεσθαι ἤρξατο...). Dio uses the same word, ἀπόρητος, to describe the literature produced since Augustus' rule and Cicero's *De consiliis suis* (βιβλίον ... τι ἀπόρητον), thus already signalling the change in freedom and introduction of censure under dynastic rule in the late Republic. Cf. MILLAR 1964: 37–38. On the historical meaning of the passage, MANUWALD 1979: 93–94, KUHN-CHEN 2002: 198.

Cicero's historiographical frankness, he denounces him for his oratorical *parrhēsia*, perhaps because it was again directed against men who were more powerful than him. The second occasion concerns Dio's evaluation of the debate between Cicero and Calenus in book 46.29.1. In this instance, the historiographer presents himself as the arbiter by proclaiming no victory for either Calenus or Cicero; he notes that Cicero, "who in fact himself applied to all alike a freedom of speech that was intemperate and excessive, did not expect to receive similar frankness from others in return" (αὐτὸς μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀκράτῳ καὶ κατακορεῖ τῇ παρρησίᾳ αἰεὶ πρὸς πάντας ὁμοίως ἐχρήτο, παρὰ δὲ δὴ τῶν ἄλλων οὐκ ἥξιον τὴν ὁμοίαν ἀντιλαμβάνειν).¹⁵⁵ The debate about Antony ends up being a wasted day (ὥστε τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκείνην καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐχ ἥκιστα μάτην κατατριβῆναι). Dio uses the same terminology (κατατριβεῖν) in his account (39.34.3–4) of Cato's filibustering episode in 55 BC, when the time for counsel was wasted as a result of his obstinacy. In contrast to Cato, however, who tried to protect the institution by his action, Cicero has lost sight of the public welfare: "and then, having ceased to consider the affairs of the state, he turned to slandering Calenus" (καὶ τότε οὖν ἀφείς τὸ τὰ δημόσια διασκοπεῖν ἐς λοιδορίας αὐτῷ κατέστη).¹⁵⁶ Completely controlled by his emotions, Cicero used his bold speaking not to the benefit but to the detriment of the state.¹⁵⁷

Moreover, note that the first part of the sentence quoted from 46.29.1 is almost identical to Dio's earlier remark in 38.12.6 (καὶ τῇ παρρησίᾳ πρὸς πάντας ὁμοίως ἀκράτῳ καὶ κατακορεῖ χρώμενος), where for the first time the historiographer defined the aims and consequences of Cicero's frank criticism. The repetition of this phrase in the account of his final years, with the intervention of Philiscus' prophecy of death as long as Cicero continued his practice of *parrhēsia*, signals Cicero's upcoming death in the next months, which every reader knew had been a

¹⁵⁵ Cass. Dio 46.29.1.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 46.29.1. Cf. KUHN-CHEN 2002: 164 n. 130 on the topos of disregarding the common good in Dio's republican narrative. We can add Cicero to the examples KUHN-CHEN gives of republican figures singled out for their disregard of the common good (*inter alios* Tiberius Gracchus, Pompey, Caesar).

¹⁵⁷ As MALLAN 2016: 268–269 explains, this is more than a "superfluous dig at Cicero"; the comparison with the Cato episode actually strengthens MALLAN's argument that Dio saw the behaviour of Cicero (and Calenus) as symptomatic for the degeneration of the Republic.

¹⁵⁸ As tradition has it; cf. Vell. Pat. 2.66; Plut. *Cic.* 46.2, 49.1 (the people did not see Cicero's face on the rostra but rather the image of the soul of Antony, τῆς Ἀντωνίου ψυχῆς εἰκόνα). Sen. *Suas.* 6

direct result of his controversy with Antony.¹⁵⁸ Within Dio's work, this death happens quite soon after this episode in book 47.¹⁵⁹

It is Cicero who teaches the reader that rhetoric has its boundaries; that a statesman should be very careful in observing the rules of conduct in his contact with more powerful individuals; and that morality surpasses frankness of expression in value, especially in political debate, since otherwise frankness will lose its original function and become a personal weapon. It is also Cicero who teaches the reader the particularly gloomy lesson that fearless speech expressed in the presence of those who are more powerful could be lethal. In Dio's narrative, Cicero has exchanged ethical equilibrium for political ambitions. His figure thus poses questions about the proper conduct in the exercise of power, and illustrates that self-promotional strategies of the kind he employs transgress the moral expectations the Roman community holds of a statesman, since they lead to strife instead of concord.

2.5 BROADENING THE SCOPE: WHERE IS THE PHILOSOPHER?

There is a tragic aspect to the use of frank speech by Dio's Cicero, which he, as Cato did, considered an inherent right in the republican political system. Like Cato, he expresses frank criticism in opposition to dynastic rulers, in his case Antony, but he is not able to do this in such a manner that he gains admiration or creates followers. On the contrary, he creates enemies, as not only the historiographer but also internal characters (Philiscus, Calenus) emphasize. Even though Cato's frankness tends to obstruct political deliberation, Dio leaves no doubt that Cato associates freedom of speech with the protection of the traditional republican constitution. Cicero, on the other hand, is more concerned with his own reputation than with upholding the Republic. This image confirms the portrayal of Cicero in Plutarch's writings,

and 7 are based on the premise that Antony was responsible for Cicero's death; for our purposes, see esp. the historiographical testimonials about Cicero's death 6.17 (Livy), 6.19 (Cremutius Cordus), 6.20–21 (Bruttidius Niger; Cicero killed at Antony's orders), 6.23 (Aufidius Bassus); 6.26 (Cornelius Severus; Cicero's death is Antony's crime).

¹⁵⁹ Cass. Dio 47.8.

where Cicero is said to act mainly out of ambition when employing criticism in his speeches or writings. While Cato, embodying Demosthenic free speech to defend the state and Platonic frankness in his civic relationships, fits the classical image of the citizen *parrhēsiastēs*, Cicero, on the contrary, uses frankness as a weapon to achieve what he wants personally, and not only undoes the healing effect of *parrhēsia* but also symbolizes its opposite, namely harmful speech. At the cost of the Republic, his imperial self cannot demonstrate any sign of constructive criticism.

As this summary comparison of Cicero and Cato demonstrates once more, the recurring motive of frankness is embedded in a wider discourse on good statesmanship: literally so in Plutarch, who handles *parrhēsia* as one of the qualities of the good civic leader; more implicitly in Dio, who has especially turned Cicero's *parrhēsia* into a destructive force and part of the rivalry in republican politics, which severely undercuts the foundation of the state. In Dio's *Roman History*, then, freedom or frankness of speech has become a peg on which to hook the history of Cicero's fall—and, within the historiographer's personal perception of the actual decision-making process in republican politics, the doomed fate of the Republic.¹⁶⁰

The reading of Plutarch has shown that the impossibility of capturing Cicero's frank speech with the term *parrhēsia* is explained by imperial standards concerning political morality. Dio has opted for a more explicit treatment; the notion of *parrhēsia* symbolizes Cicero's rhetorical manoeuvres throughout the *Roman History* but always with an emphasis on its negative effects. Dio applies the classical concept only to show it has lost its true or original meaning in the context of Cicero's public performance. Indeed, these imperial ideas on frankness, as we have seen, are rooted in Platonic and Aristotelian theory on civic leadership and civic excellence; *parrhēsia* is a virtue traditionally associated with well-developed intellect, being the expression of a critical mind. Held up against this philosophical light, Cicero's behaviour is seriously flawed. While Plutarch sees it as the duty of a speaker who knows how to negotiate frankness dependent on the circumstances to instruct his

¹⁶⁰ This is implied at MALLAN 2016: 269. Both MALLAN and KUHN-CHEN 2002: 197–198 note the importance of *parrhēsia* as a motif of discontinuity in Dio's account of the transition of Republic to monarchy, but they do not present it (like I do) as one of the causes of Cicero's fall.

fellows on moral matters, Cicero makes people angry and sets them up against himself. What is even more serious is that he does not seem to be aware of it. As the imperial historiographers portray him in the passages discussed above, he shows no sign of any higher ethical values informing his behaviour (like justice or moderation), nor does he appear to reflect on the role (its legal limitations, its effects) of frank criticism within the context of republican decision-making (which is why the debate with Calenus turns into a brawl).

But what, then, about Cicero's extensive philosophical education? What about the dozens of philosophical (rhetorical as well as political) writings he produced, in which he systematically discusses the civic virtues, the ideal constitution, and the qualities of the perfect statesman-orator? Stephanie Kurczyk, in a monograph dealing with Cicero's representation of his own past, shows quite clearly that especially in his philosophical writings, Cicero was acutely aware of the ethical conduct expected of a Roman statesman. In these works, Cicero also "instrumentalizes philosophical thought for the interpretation of his own past" by way of justifying his political choices, as Kurczyk argues.¹⁶¹ Moreover, in her words, "Die eigenen Taten und die unabhängige Haltung gegenüber ihrer Resonanz werden als Äußerung eines standfesten und an höheren Werten orientierten Charakters gewertet."¹⁶² Cicero paid great attention to constructing the persona of a philosophical writer who consistently practiced what he preached in real life. Moreover, he put forward the image of the philosophically educated orator, the public speaker whose superb moral knowledge made him a leading figure of the community and an educator of the people.¹⁶³

Although Cicero's *parrhēsia*, especially in comparison with the picture presented of the ideal politician-*parrhēsiastēs* in the *Moralia*, lacks

¹⁶¹ KURCZYCK 2006: 333.

¹⁶² *Ibid.* 328.

¹⁶³ GILDENHARD 2007 gives an illuminating overview of this element of Cicero's philosophical programme. Essential passages thematizing the complementary relationship of politics and philosophy are *Orat.* 12–13; *Off.* 1.3 (to his son Marcus); *Tusc.* 1.7–8 (with GILDENHARD 2007: 148–156), "I have always judged this to be the perfect form of philosophy, which can speak copiously and elegantly about the most important questions; to this practice I have devoted my time with such intensity, that I even dared to hold disputations in the manner of the Greeks" (*Hanc enim perfectam philosophiam semper iudicavi, quae de maximis quaestionibus copiose posset ornatque dicere; in quam exercitationem ita nos studiose operam dedimus, ut iam etiam scholas Graecorum more habere audemus*, 1.7); *Acad.* 1.11.

any sign of reflection on proper morals, Plutarch does echo the image constructed by Cicero himself at other moments in his biography of the orator. He attributes to him a spectacular sense of justice in combination with rhetorical excellence:

Μάλιστα γὰρ οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐπέδειξε Ῥωμαίοις ὅσον ἡδονῆς λόγος τῷ καλῷ προστίθῃσι, καὶ ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον ἀήττητόν ἐστιν ἂν ὀρθῶς λέγῃται, καὶ δεῖ τὸν ἐμμελῶς πολιτευόμενον αἰεὶ τῷ μὲν ἔργῳ τὸ καλὸν ἀντὶ τοῦ κολακεύοντος αἰρεῖσθαι, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ τὸ λυποῦν ἀφαιρεῖν τοῦ συμφέροντος.¹⁶⁴

For this man showed the Romans in exceptional fashion how much pleasure speech can add to what is right, and that justice is invincible if it is clothed in the right words; and that it is essential that the harmonious politician in his acts always prefers what is good over what is flattering, and in his speech removes all harm from what is useful.

Here, Cicero is associated with several aspects of political virtue: τὸ καλόν, τὸ δίκαιον (δικαιοσύνη), the observance of public benefit (τὸ σύμμερον). Moreover, he is said to be someone whose statesmanship is ἐμμελής, harmonious (literally, ‘in tune’). This man demonstrates the type of civic excellence and leadership Plutarch and his philosophic predecessors Plato and Aristotle propagate;¹⁶⁵ and with respect to Cicero’s self-image, the picture Plutarch paints in this passage is much more in tune with the Ciceronian ideal of the statesman-orator, or, for that matter, with Cicero’s autorepresentation in the philosophical writings.¹⁶⁶ How do we reconcile this ‘model’ Cicero with the unabashed Cicero who forgets to serve the common good?

The puzzle of Cicero’s imperial *ethos* is not solved by examining the role of frankness alone in the accounts of his career. While his excessive *parrhēsia* explains specific (negative) evaluations of Cicero’s behaviour, it does not explain the deeper moral assumptions underlying the account of his deeds, and it causes apparent contradictions in the representation of his status as preeminent Roman citizen. In the second half of this chapter we will examine more comprehensively to what extent Cicero matches imperial ideals about political leadership. More specifically, how do imperial conceptions of statesmanship affect the por-

¹⁶⁴ Cic. 13.1.

¹⁶⁵ That Plutarch has the Platonic ideal in mind when describing Cicero as the good statesman, appears later in the work, in *Comp. Dem. et Cic.* 3.4; see below, §3.2.1.

¹⁶⁶ This is an observation more broadly shared, as PIEPER [forthc.] shows.

trayal of Cicero's political conduct? The answer to this would enable us to embed and position further the discussions of Cicero's virtuousness in an intellectual discourse extending beyond individual testimonials. It will moreover clarify the complex relationship between the image of Cicero as a beacon of intellectualism and, at the same time, a negative model of disproportionate civic conduct.

3. The Roman statesman as ethical leader

3.1 PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE: TWO RESPONSES

3.1.1 *Writing politics*

In this third part of the chapter, we will use the model of ethical competence as a tool to guide us through the different aspects of political morality and ethical leadership as they are described by Seneca and Plutarch. I will compare their views on the different ethical competencies described in § 3.1: high moral standards, ethical education, the practical application of ethical awareness in private or professional life, and the ability to teach others about ethical questions. In § 3.2, the conceptualization of these competencies will be tested on their presentation of Cicero's statesmanship. In § 3.3, we will once more return to Cassius Dio's ambiguous portrayal of Cicero in book 38, using the findings of the previous sections in order to demonstrate the extent to which Dio's account of Cicero's exile, too, is informed by the imperial ideal of ethically competent statesmanship.

There are good grounds for reading Plutarch and Seneca side by side, as I do here. As Roman citizens with ties to the highest echelons of imperial society, writing philosophy was not an enterprise separate from their public life. Both of them explored the parameters of Roman morality and the concept of the 'good Roman (wo)man'; in their daily activities they served Roman rule. Naturally, my comparison takes into account the differences, too. While Plutarch emphasizes the especial necessity for men who are advanced in their political career to instruct

and inspire aspiring politicians, Seneca shows himself to be more concerned with the pedagogical relationship between the emperor and his adviser(s). As the personal tutor and counsellor of Nero he lived the ideal expressed in *On Clemency*, “that the most important things in securing good government are not the form of constitution and the provision of legal restraints, but the right education to ensure good character in the ruler and the right advice to encourage him in the best use of his power”.¹⁶⁷ Moreover, the two writers differed greatly in their method of embedding philosophy in Roman public and private life, as Lieve Van Hoof explains in what is to date the most extensive comparison (to my knowledge) between the philosophical writing of Plutarch and Seneca:¹⁶⁸

Indeed, while both Plutarch and Seneca regularly evoke loaded polarities such as politics and philosophy, activity and leisure, city and countryside, care of the body and care of the soul, concern with others and concern with the self, or external and internal orientation, Plutarch's preference, in contrast to Seneca's, does not lie a priori with the traditional ‘philosophical pole’. Plutarch's advice in fact varies depending on the context, perspective, or discourse.¹⁶⁹

As Van Hoof explains, while Seneca's treatises and letters provide an overview of Stoic philosophical theory, Plutarch's *Moralia* offer a mix of ideas and lessons which Van Hoof calls ‘practical ethics’;¹⁷⁰ Plutarch's ethical writings teach the Roman elite to manage their ambitions and expectations in society with the help of practical, ethical-philosophical instructions.¹⁷¹ He would not have been interested in presenting a consistent ethical theory, like Seneca offered in his letters to Lucilius and his treatises. Nor would he draw a strict distinction between a philosophical and a political life, which is common in Roman Epicureism and, to a lesser extent, Stoicism.¹⁷² The consistent emphasis on civic

¹⁶⁷ GRIFFIN 2000: 539. On the public aspects of Seneca's writing, see also SCHOFIELD 2015.

¹⁶⁸ VAN HOOFF 2007; VAN HOOFF 2010: 19–65 on the methodological differences.

¹⁶⁹ VAN HOOFF 2010: 30.

¹⁷⁰ VAN HOOFF argues against the slightly derogatory term ‘popular philosophy’; on the popular nature of Plutarch's work, cf. e.g. AALDERS & DE BLOIS 1992, *passim*, but see esp. 3396–3404; DE LACY & EINARSON 1959, North Fowler 1936: 156–157. The controversy around Plutarch's ‘popular’ philosophy is explained well by VAN HOOFF 2010: 1–7, VAN DER STOCKT 2011, and PELLING 2011.

¹⁷¹ VAN HOOFF 2010: 27, 56.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 34, 37–39.

life within Plutarch's philosophy is a well-known feature of his work.¹⁷³

Although I subscribe to Van Hoof's interpretation of Plutarch's treatises as a type of practical ethics and I acknowledge the differences between the Senecan and Plutarchan project, my discussion of these writers will focus rather on the points of contact, which are also mentioned by Van Hoof in the observations quoted above. Regardless of their particular (philosophical) scope, Seneca as well as Plutarch wrote in order to instruct and support their fellow citizens and friends.¹⁷⁴ They address the question of the (mental as well as physical) freedom of Roman imperial citizens, and offer precepts to live a good and useful life. Most importantly, they agree on what it takes to be an ethically competent individual who is of good service to his family, his friends, his community: namely, to acquire moral knowledge, i.e. the knowledge to distinguish good from wrong, in order to instruct your daily and your professional actions; and to inspire others to do the same.

I will first examine the ideal of the philosophically educated statesman in the works of Seneca and Plutarch. As we will see, for the first three ethical competencies discussed below (ethical education, virtue, and the practical application of philosophy), the ideas of Seneca and Plutarch are quite comparable and complement each other in several ways. With regard to the competency of ethical instruction, I have found Plutarch's socially oriented concept of the statesman as an ethical guide of conduct more helpful than the concept of private advisorship as it is set out in Seneca's *Letters to Lucilius* and the moral treatises; it is especially in this area that Plutarch offers useful descriptions of the process of (civic) exemplarity which are lacking in Seneca's writings.

The works of Seneca and Plutarch are a treasure house of ideas about ethical leadership, but I have especially looked for explicitly theoretical passages that help us to understand their portrayal of Cicero, which I discuss in § 3.2. There, I shall illustrate which intellectual and ethical competencies Cicero is shown to possess or lack, and explain why

¹⁷³ See also AALDERS & DE BLOIS 1992: 3384–3385, paraphrasing *Old Man* 791c: "Politische Aktivität ist in Plutarchs Augen eine wesentliche und sogar die höchste Form menschlicher Betätigung, sie ist ein göttlicher Auftrag, und Plutarch betrachtet die politische Aretè als die vollkommenste Form der Aretè." Cf. *Advice* 821f.

¹⁷⁴ Cf. BRAUND 2009: 51–57 for some educational aspects of Seneca's treatises. SETAIOLI 2013 explains in more detail how Seneca's writings were a form of 'therapy', educating the addressees on how to improve their soul and character.

there is attached such a strong value judgment to his 'lesser' behaviour in the political arena. Contrary to Cicero's own *perfectus orator*, the imperial Cicero is a leader who loses his ethical competence (the ability for ethical reflection in social contexts) after the peak of his career, as a result of which he falls from grace.

3.1.2 *Ethical education as a criterion for statesmanship*

Ethical education—knowledge of the Roman ethics code—is the ethical competency which we will examine first. It is a most essential part of the imperial ideal of statesmanship, as Seneca and Plutarch demonstrate.¹⁷⁵

Seneca often expresses criticism on the active life in politics, since it brings with it vices which disturb one's mental balance.¹⁷⁶ One can be virtuous in the private sphere as much as in public life; the Stoic intellectual should not necessarily direct himself to the public need but rather to the pursuit of individual virtue.¹⁷⁷ However, Griffin notes that the topic of the private versus the public life is examined in extraordinary detail by Seneca, in different treatises and letters, where he moreover does not always openly prefer *otium* over the *vita activa*.¹⁷⁸ The letters speak of the special position of the *sapiens* in civic life, an ideal which is brought into effect in Seneca's own assumption of the persona of the good adviser in the political treatise addressed to Nero, *On Clemency*.

More to the point, in letters 94 and 95 to Lucilius, Seneca discusses the relation between general philosophical tenets and practical rules of conduct in a public career. He argues that 1) *praecepta* can be useful since virtue divides itself into a rational (*contemplatio, disciplina*) and practical (*exercitatio, actio*) element;¹⁷⁹ and 2) *praecepta* need to be the

¹⁷⁵ For the different ethical competencies, see above, §§ 1.2 and 1.3.

¹⁷⁶ E.g. *Ep.* 94.69–73; *Tranq.* 7.4–6. See GRIFFIN 1976: 315–366 for Seneca's fluctuating views on the philosopher's participation in politics, ranging from total abstention to the obligation of fulfilling honourable offices.

¹⁷⁷ BRAUND 2009: 8.

¹⁷⁸ GRIFFIN 1976: 315 and GRIFFIN 2000: 545. Entirely devoted to this question are *On Tranquility of Mind* and *On Otium*, addressed to the influential citizen Annaeus Serenus. On Annaeus, VON RHODEN 1893.

result of ethical principles or norms, *decreta*.¹⁸⁰ Practical rules, ‘consolations’ and ‘exhortations’ need to be supplemented by and grounded in philosophical knowledge.¹⁸¹ Seneca’s frame of thought here is the increasing degeneration of Roman moral values and lifestyle, which he believes can be cured by a combination of *praecepta* and *decreta*. There is a remarkable place for *exemplaria virtutis* such as Cato, Scipio, or Laelius, who, if we describe them in detail for our fellow men, teach the differences between vice and virtue:

*Proderit non tantum quales esse soleant boni viri dicere formamque eorum et lineamenta deducere, sed quales fuerint narrare et exponere, Catonis illud ultimum ac fortissimum vulnus, Laeli sapientiam et cum suo Scipione concordiam, alterius Catonis domi forisq̄ue egregia facta...*¹⁸²

It will be useful not only to say what kind the good men commonly are, or describe their form and their outline, but to narrate and expound how they behaved; of Cato that final and most honourable wound, the wisdom of Laelius and the friendship with his Scipio, of the other Cato his distinguished action at home and abroad...

While the study of philosophical principles is an important means of becoming a better man, Seneca’s pedagogical method also includes the narration of the lives of great Roman statesmen, such as the Catos and Laelius. All these examples demonstrate the integration of ethical qualities in political action. More than being practical examples of specific virtues or vices, these exempla, when told with enough attention to the character of these men (*quales fuerint narrare et exponere*), can teach about a certain philosophical attitude in life and in death.

Much more strongly than Seneca, Plutarch believes that for the Roman intellectual, philosophy and politics are (should be) two sides of the same coin. Intellectual training and moral awareness could be a direct reason for the appeal of great leaders like Dion and Brutus, as Plutarch states in his introduction to their lives:

Ὡν ὁ μὲν αὐτῷ Πλάτωνι πλησιάσας, ὁ δὲ τοῖς λόγοις ἐντραφεὶς τοῖς Πλάτωνος, ὥσπερ ἐκ μιᾶς ὥρμησαν ἀμφοτέρω παλαιστράς ἐπὶ τοὺς μεγίστους

¹⁷⁹ *Ep.* 94.45–47, featuring Marcus Agrippa as a positive example.

¹⁸⁰ On the theory of precepts and rules in these two letters and Seneca’s place within Stoic ethics, see IOPPOLO 2000.

¹⁸¹ *Ep.* 95.34.

¹⁸² *Ep.* 95.72. According to the principle, laid out by Posidonius, of *ethologia*: *Ep.* 95.65–66.

ἀγῶνας. καὶ τὸ μὲν ὅμοια πολλὰ καὶ ἀδελφὰ πράξαντας μαρτυρῆσαι τῷ καθηγεμόνι τῆς ἀρετῆς ὅτι δεῖ φρονήσει καὶ δικαιοσύνη δύναμιν ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τύχην συνελθεῖν, ἵνα κάλλος ἅμα καὶ μέγεθος αἱ πολιτικαὶ πράξεις λάβωσιν, οὐ θαυμαστόν ἐστιν.¹⁸³

These two [Dion and Brutus], the one having enjoyed the company of Plato, the other having been raised on the texts of Plato, they were both driven toward the greatest battles as if coming from the same wrestling school. And it is not so remarkable that they, having engaged upon many similar and related matters, bore witness to their leader in virtue, showing that political power and fate need to be united in sagacity and justice for political deeds to gain beauty and greatness.¹⁸⁴

Practical wisdom (φρόνησις) and a proper sense of justice (δικαιοσύνη), two of Plato's four cardinal virtues, result in political success. To put it differently, political influence (or: power) consists in ethical proficiency.¹⁸⁵ For the discourse of philosophy, as Plutarch remarks in the treatise *Why Philosophers Should Converse Especially with Men in Power*, “wishes to make everything that she touches upon effective, and efficient and alive, and she imbues men with the motivation to act, and with judgments aimed at the public benefit, and with honourable purposes, with sagacity and greatness of mind combined with mildness and caution”.¹⁸⁶ In passages like these, the term φιλοσοφία is tantamount to civic values. It is this that motivates and validates any politician's conduct.

Sophia Xenophontos has argued convincingly that Plutarch, in fact, envisages politics as a “site of moral education” having three successive stages which together form a cycle: apprenticeship, leadership of the people, and teaching aspiring politicians.¹⁸⁷ Plutarch's ethical and political treatises present a unified image of the statesman as ethical instructor.¹⁸⁸ Towards the end of the treatise *Whether an Old Man*

¹⁸³ Plut. *Dion* 1.2.

¹⁸⁴ On the topic of Dion and Brutus' ‘philosophical’ rulership, see the essay by DILLON 2008.

¹⁸⁵ VAN RAALTE 2004 deals in more detail with the philosophical profile of Plutarchan politicians. She argues that in Plutarch's work, philosophy alone is not enough to make a successful statesman; he also requires exceptional rhetorical skills.

¹⁸⁶ 776c-d: ἀλλ' ἐνεργὰ βούλεται ποιεῖν ὧν ἂν ᾗσῃται καὶ πρακτικὰ καὶ ἔμψυχα καὶ κινητικὰς ὁρμὰς ἐντίθησι [REISKE: ἐπιτίθησι] καὶ κρίσεις ἀγωγοὺς ἐπὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα καὶ προαιρέσεις φιλοκάλους καὶ φρόνημα καὶ μέγεθος μετὰ πραότητος καὶ ἀσφαλείας. On this and similar ideas, ROSKAM 2002.

¹⁸⁷ XENOPHONTOS 2016: 126–150.

¹⁸⁸ See DUFF 1999, esp. 49–51; PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ 2002; XENOPHONTOS 2016.

Should Engage in Politics, Plutarch remarks that engaging in politics resembles practicing philosophy—it is seniors who are especially aware of the capacity for ethical reflection a politician should have. The ultimate model is Socrates, who “was the first to show that life at every moment and in every aspect, in all experiences and activities alike, accepts philosophy”.¹⁸⁹ Indeed, Plutarch’s ideal of the philosophically educated statesman, being the “incarnation of an exemplary ethos”,¹⁹⁰ who has a strong duty towards his people, has its roots in the Platonic philosopher-king. Yet while the idea of ethical imitation and perfection is Platonic at the core, Plutarch focuses on the reality of Roman life, striving for moral education on the basis of practical advice and concrete examples from Greek and Roman history. As Russell has noted, Plutarch and Seneca are not so different in their belief that practical precepts, grounded in *exempla virtutis*, enable moral improvement, of themselves,¹⁹¹ and—I would add—also of others.¹⁹²

3.1.3 *The necessity of virtue/aretē for a political leader*

Another essential ethical competency for the state leader is his commitment to high moral standards; this is at first sight an individual quality, but in the Roman mind the individual always carries a responsibility toward the collective. While Seneca and Plutarch have different ideas about ethical leadership—the former more familiar with the role of private adviser, while the latter thinks service to the community is the highest form—they agree that personal virtue is the key to any successful civic involvement.

Letter 120 to Lucilius is devoted to the question of how the notion of the good and honourable (*boni honestique notitia*) comes to men.¹⁹³ Seneca poses that we can only learn about the good by observing and

¹⁸⁹ *Old Man* 796e.

¹⁹⁰ SQUILLONI 1989: 227, on Plutarch’s ideal leader.

¹⁹¹ RUSSELL 1973: 88. Cf. BRAUND 2009: 7–8.

¹⁹² Cf. GRIFFIN 2000: 555–558 on *On Otium*.

¹⁹³ According to LANGLANDS 2018: 102–104, in *Ep.* 120 Seneca rather shows the limits of the process of learning through *exempla*; my analysis of this letter takes a more positive approach, since I think it tells us much about the influence of the exemplar as a leader of others.

comparing deeds done by others;¹⁹⁴ these deeds provide an ‘image of virtue’, *imago virtutis*.¹⁹⁵ With these words Seneca nicely captures the essence of the Roman *exempla* tradition. The argument quickly leads into a discussion of *perfecta virtus*.¹⁹⁶ According to Seneca, perfect virtue entails being consistent with oneself (*par sibi*) always and in every action; the virtuous individual is not “good as the result of fitting counsel (*consilio*), but led by habit (*more*) in such measure that he cannot only do the right thing (*recte facere*), but cannot do anything if not right”.¹⁹⁷ True virtue, Seneca continues, can be summarized as follows:

*Hanc in partes divisimus: oportebat cupiditates refrenari, metus comprimi, facienda provideri, reddenda distribui: comprehendimus temperantiam, fortitudinem, prudentiam, iustitiam et suum cuique dedimus officium. Ex quo ergo virtutem intelleximus?*¹⁹⁸

This we have divided into parts: desires needed to be restrained, fears suppressed, necessities to be foreseen, and what is due needs to be done. We included in it moderation, bravery, wisdom, justice and we gave to each of these its own function. In whom do we then recognize virtue?

The wise man shows the qualities of a fixed and steady mind. He is larger than life; in fact, he is a master of life by being perfectly balanced:

*Ostendit illam nobis ordo eius et decor et constantia et omnium inter se actionum concordia et magnitudo super omnia efferens esse. Hinc intellecta est illa beata vita secundo defluens cursu, arbitrii sui tota.*¹⁹⁹

His regularity proves his virtue to us, and his sense of propriety, his constancy, and the fact that all his deeds are in accordance with each other, as well as his greatness that places him above everything. From there this happy life is fathomed, flowing in its natural course, which is completely in his own power.

¹⁹⁴ *Ep.* 120.4.

¹⁹⁵ *Ep.* 120.8.

¹⁹⁶ See WILDBERGER 2014 for Seneca’s concept of wisdom and (political) virtue, with discussion of *Ep.* 120 at 317 and 321; she also notes how the Roman discourse of exemplarity influences Seneca’s concept of virtue.

¹⁹⁷ *Ep.* 120.10: *praeterea idem erat semper et in omni actu par sibi, iam non consilio bonus, sed more eo perductus ut non tantum recte facere posset, sed nisi recte facere non posset.*

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.* 120.11. I am aware that I have personalized Seneca’s passive construction, which is part of his formal survey of the elements of virtue.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

Accordingly, a *vir perfectae virtutis* is someone who accepts that he “is a citizen and soldier of the world who believes he endures labours as if he were commanded”.²⁰⁰ This remark is typical of Seneca’s Stoic perspective on politics: while his view of personal excellence is still rooted in civic action, true virtue for him exists in adopting a philosophically detached attitude to one’s public tasks and one’s place on earth.

There are two facets to Seneca’s image of Roman virtue that deserve extra attention. The first is that it unites the mastery of emotions, the cognitive ability for reflection or anticipation on what is needed (*provideri*), and a decisiveness to act upon those needs (*distribui*). As discussed in the introduction, ethical competence relies on the cognitive skill for recognizing and identifying ethical problems, and translating this knowledge into particular, relevant actions. The term *intellegere* is used twice in the above passage (*virtutem intelleximus; intellecta est beata vita*), and again in 120.13 (below, *intellectum*).²⁰¹ Seneca places emphasis on the rational insight that is created by the behaviour of a moral exemplar. This cognitive transfer between model and followers must be part of the reason why Seneca attaches so much value to consistency of action on the part of the exemplar.

How does this rational insight come about? This is the second noteworthy aspect of this passage, Seneca’s description of the public’s eager response to the exemplar of virtue:

*Fecit multis intellectum sui et non aliter quam in tenebris lumen effulsit advertitque in se omnium animos, cum esset placidus et lenis, humanis divinisque rebus pariter aequus.*²⁰²

He enabled many to understand him, and he shone no differently than a light in the dark, and he directed the minds of everyone to himself through being placid and mild, equal of character in human and divine matters alike.

Brad Inwood paraphrases: “the source of our insight [in what is good] is a moral paragon”.²⁰³ I would add that the paragon does more than

²⁰⁰ *Ep.* 120.12, *civem esse se universi et militem credens labores velut imperatos subiit*.

²⁰¹ Cf. *Ep.* 120.4.

²⁰² *Ep.* 120.13. The same metaphor occurs in Plut. *Mor.* 806a, who adds that the great men illuminate their pupils like the sun shines on the planets around her, making them grow and making them shine too (συνεκφωτίζειν).

²⁰³ INWOOD 2007: 328.

provide moral knowledge to the people; he makes them part of his 'club', as it were. The wise man turns the onlookers to him (*advertit in se*) like a light in the dark, language which suggests a leader-follower relationship. Virtue attracts, is Seneca's philosophy; it is infectious.²⁰⁴ The passage in *Ep.* 120 is a remarkable addition to his image of virtue as a light elsewhere in his work. In *Ben.* 4.22, Seneca describes how virtue draws men to her by enveloping their minds in her beauty, and capturing them through their admiration of her light and splendour.²⁰⁵ In *Ep.* 120, then, Seneca takes the extra step of attributing extraordinary virtue to an individual who acts as moral exemplar. In this case, not virtue itself, but an individual *with* virtue can draw all minds to him; importantly, the light has now become a metaphor (*non aliter quam lumen*) for the intellectual influence this man exercises on his fellows.

Plutarch describes this process of attraction-by-virtue in more detail. At the beginning of his *Advice on Civic Life*, he affirms that public leaders should be free from fault in their behaviour (ῥῆθι), counsel (βουλευματα), actions (πράξεις), and lives (βίοι);²⁰⁶ they should furthermore act in an unchangeable (ἄτρεπτος) and steadfast (δυσμετάθετος) fashion.²⁰⁷ Why? Because they have the responsibility to transmit this virtue to the community.²⁰⁸ In the treatise *How to Praise Oneself Inoffensively*, Plutarch offers a very concrete method of doing so. He insists that through the medium of praise speeches the politician can provide stimuli for greater and more splendid actions (πλειόνων καὶ καλλιόνων πράξεων ἀφορμὰς) than he had himself described. The politician will not praise himself in order to showcase his own virtue but instrumentalizes his virtue, as it were, to make his fellow citizens zealous to achieve even more virtuous deeds themselves.²⁰⁹ Furthermore, in this type of praise grounded in virtue, the civic leader can show the differ-

²⁰⁴ An analogous passage is Plut. *Numa* 20.8, where Numa is defined as Plato's philosopher king, who inspires his people to live their lives in happiness and concord, with justice and temperance, by his distinctive exemplarity and shining life (ἐν εὐδελῶ παραδείγματι καὶ λαμπρῷ τῷ βίῳ).

²⁰⁵ The language of admiration is a sign that also here, we are in the realm of exemplary discourse: LANGLANDS 2018: 88–92.

²⁰⁶ *Advice* 801a.

²⁰⁷ *Advice* 799b.

²⁰⁸ Cf. AALDERS & DE BLOIS 1992: 3392; cf. *To an Uneducated Ruler* 780b.

²⁰⁹ *On Self-praise* 539e–f. See also 821d, where the power of the people's goodwill combined with the absolute virtue of the leader are said to be a steady wind pushing a man into politics: καὶ ὅλως, ὅταν ἀλήθεια καὶ ἀρετὴ προσγένηται [τῇ εὐνοίᾳ], φορόν ἐστι πνεῦμα καὶ βέβαιον ἐπὶ τὴν πολιτείαν.

ence between good and bad counsel, and divert his fellows from taking the wrong course (μᾶλλον δὲ ἀποστρέψαι τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἐπὶ τὰ κρείττω τὴν διαφορὰν ἐνδεικνύμενον).²¹⁰ Again, the presence of absolute virtue in combination with the ability to address directly what is right and wrong defines leaderlike behaviour. We will return to this matter in the next two sections.

3.1.4 *Philosophy in practice: dealing with fame*

How does the statesman implement the ethical code in his daily behaviour, and how does he show that he is capable of ethical reflection? For Plutarch and Seneca, a strong sign of moral incompetency in the political citizen is inconsistency of action and an excess of ambition.²¹¹ There is a fine line between vice and virtue, as Seneca often remarks in his letters, and vice is always lurking just around the corner. Both Seneca and Plutarch devote considerable space to the question of which vices to avoid in personal and public life.

According to Seneca, as we have seen, the life of a person who has perfect *virtus* is completely *arbitrii sui*, lived according to his own judgment. Although the wise man is aware of his social function, he remains constant in mind and action, and he stands above everything and everyone else (quite literally so, since Stoic theory poses that the *sapiens* has part of the divine). He is completely free.²¹² What is more, a person without a character firmly rooted in virtue is prey to a vacillation of the mind (*fluctuatio*), and a continuous (mental) movement between his simulation of virtues and his love for vices (*inter simulationem virtutum amoremque vitiorum adsidua iactatio*).²¹³ In *Ep.* 94, Seneca gives examples of men who were defeated by the desires, *cupiditates*, which unhinged their minds. In political men, these desires express themselves as crazy and vain ambition. Thus, Alexander was led by *furor*; Pompey

²¹⁰ *On Self-praise* 545d-e.

²¹¹ On the value of constancy (consistent behaviour) in Plutarch, see FULKERSON 2012; for Seneca, see STAR 2012: 23–61.

²¹² Cf. e.g. *Ep.* 104.33–34, 94.56 (nature produces us free men), 95.71 (with the example of Cato the Younger); *Constant.* 5.4 (true virtue is free and immovable), 19.2 (liberty of mind is standing above injustice done to you).

²¹³ *Tranq.* 2.8, *Dial.* 10.5.1 (Cicero).

possessed by an *insanus amor* of false greatness; Caesar led on by *gloria* and *ambitio*; and Marius' *ambitio* destroyed him.²¹⁴

Plutarch similarly battles ambition and lust for wealth in his description of good leaders.²¹⁵ He explains to Menemachus right away in *Advice on Civic Life* that there are people who enter politics from a desire for 'empty' glory (ὑπὸ δόξης κενῆς) or love of competition (φιλονεικίας τινός), or who use it as some sort of pastime (τῇ πολιτείᾳ διαγωγῇ χρώμενοι).²¹⁶ The man who goes into politics for these reasons will be overpowered (ἐκπλήττηται) and led astray (ἀναστρέφεται). A strong political vision is crucial to combat such empty desires.²¹⁷ In a way reminiscent of Seneca's ideas in *Ep.* 94, Plutarch also asserts that the policy or purpose (προαίρησις) of a man of state should be secure (τῆς ἀσφαλείας ἐχομένη), and steer clear of the turbulent and mad effects of 'empty fame'.²¹⁸

Plutarch offers a very practical reason for avoiding excessive love of competition and fame: a civic leader in the provinces must always keep in mind that he is being ruled, too. According to Plutarch, just as Pericles repeated to himself when he assumed the general's cloak that he ruled free men, Greeks, and Athenian citizens, so an official in the province should repeat to himself that "being under rule yourself, you rule a city assigned to proconsuls, to governors of the Emperor".²¹⁹ It is in the interest of one's community to be humble and encourage concord and cooperation. Therefore, it is emphasized repeatedly that a leader should prevent feelings of φθόνος;²²⁰ he should also discourage

²¹⁴ *Ep.* 94.62. In Seneca's words, they appeared to lead others (*agere alios visi sunt*), but in fact they were being led (*agebantur*) [by their ambition] (94.61). NEWMAN 2008 studies Seneca's perception of honour and fame (*gloria*) especially in the letters to Lucilius.

²¹⁵ Cf. esp. *Advice* 819f; 813c.

²¹⁶ *Advice* 798c-d.

²¹⁷ *Advice* 798e. For Plutarch, γνώμη, a strong opinion, and λογισμός, a reasoning behind one's actions, are crucial qualities for a good politician.

²¹⁸ *Advice* 815c.

²¹⁹ *Advice* 813e. If Plutarch is serious with this Pericles example, and I think he is, this is a very remarkable way of reusing classical models; it shows us the flexibility of Greek intellectuals in reinterpreting the concept of Athenian freedom, their desire to establish continuity with the past regardless of political circumstances, and above all a strong wish for peace over the freedom of individual *poleis*. Cf. 816f–817c where the theme is explored further; Plutarch suggests that teaching politics (πολιτική παιδεία) in his time included lessons about being ruled.

²²⁰ Avoidance of φθόνος in: *Advice* 804d, 807a, 811e, 816e, 820a (on pure virtue), 824b. Compare the treatise *On Self-praise*, which contains many similar ideas and is in itself a manifesto for goodwill

the formation of factions within a community. Slander, διαβολή, and other forms of calumny are things to avoid at any cost.²²¹

3.1.5 *Teaching others about complex ethical situations*

The final ethical competency is being able to teach others about the ethics code by openly identifying and discussing issues of morality; by doing this, an ethical leader will act as a model of virtue that inspires others to adopt the proper moral behaviour in similar situations. We have seen that Seneca envisages the perfectly virtuous man as a shining light and model of instruction for his fellow citizens. Yet Seneca leaves open the question precisely why these citizens would be the wise leader's responsibility.

Plutarch, in his *Advice on Civic Life*, leaves no doubt about the necessity of instructing one's fellow citizens. To start with, his description of the good statesman (ὁ χρηστός) around the end of the treatise stresses his nature as a man of the people (κοινὸς ὢν). He cares for the people around him; he laughs (συνχαίρειν) and he cries (συναλγεῖν) with them. He is equal (ἴσος) to the people, and looks the same (ὁμαλός), as if he lives on the same footing (ὁμοδημεῖν καὶ συνανθρωπεῖν). Finally, he is their counsellor (σύμβουλος), their advocate (συνήγορος) and a benign mediator (διαλλακτήης) in the event of a conflict. The frequency of words with the prefixes ὁμο- and συν- in this passage is notable, and signals the collective aims of the good statesman.²²² To quote the words of Alan Wardman: "Thus the function of the 'politicus' is seen to depend on his own gentleness of character. His aim is to create a unified state, in which the citizens feel that the state as a whole is more important to them than their individual friends or enemies."²²³ A special role is reserved for older men. In the treatise *Whether an Old Man*

in the community. See FIELDS 2008 for the social implications of envy in the "agonistic elite culture" of Plutarch's time.

²²¹ *Advice* 803a-c, 810a, 825e-f. Cf. Seneca's conclusion in *Constant.* 19 on the *sapiens'* refusal to be involved in conflict (*rixa, conluctatio*) and his immunity against calumny (*iniuria, contumelia*). In 817c, Plutarch gives this Stoic thought a very practical turn, explaining how a civic leader should disregard the calumny of his Roman superiors.

²²² I paraphrase *Advice* 823a-c. Cf. 824b, where similar language is used.

²²³ WARDMAN 1974: 62–63.

Should Engage in Politics, Plutarch argues that senior citizens should engage in politics for no other reason than the education (παιδεία) and the instruction (διδασκαλία) of the young (οἱ νέοι); the elder gives guidance to the young man, whose soul is moulded and modelled by his words and deeds.²²⁴ The idea of ‘modelling’ the soul of others lies at the core of Plutarch’s understanding of exemplary education, and it is an interesting addition to the process of learning-by-exempla as it is usually described in Latin literature.²²⁵

The leader’s role as mediator (διαλλακτής/-ήρ) is worked out quite elaborately in *Advice on Civic Life*. For Plutarch, a good statesman is a type of doctor-cum-mediator, solving conflicts between other citizens wherever they arise.²²⁶ It is imperative that the statesman himself does not choose sides and has no enemies (except when these are the type of Aristion, Nabis or Catiline, who were a sickness to the city):

Τοὺς δ’ ἄλλως ἀπάδοντας ὥσπερ ἀρμονικὸν ἐπιτείνοντα καὶ χαλῶντα πρῶς εἰς τὸ ἐμμελὲς ἄγειν, μὴ τοῖς ἀμαρτάνουσι σὺν ὀργῇ καὶ πρὸς ὕβριν ἐπιφυόμενον, ἀλλ’ ὥς Ὅμηρος ἠθικώτερον· «ὦ πέπον, ἦ τ’ ἐφάμην σε περὶ φρένας ἔμμεναι / ἄλλων» καὶ «οἶσθα καὶ ἄλλον μῦθον ἀμείνονα τοῦδε νοῆσαι».²²⁷

But those who show dissent in another manner one ought to call to order like a musician tightens and gently loosens the strings, and one should not come at these trespassers in anger or with arrogance, but, like Homer does, in a morally instructive way: “Truly, my friend, I did think you surpassed other men in your wisdom”, and “You know how to devise a better speech than this”.

The term ἠθικώτερος summarizes the task of the statesman in difficult situations: to give moral guidance, not reproof.

Plutarch has a special interest in this problem-solving ability of the civic leader. The greatest and ultimate goal of the ‘art of statecraft’, as Plutarch terms it, is preventing *stasis*, civil strife.²²⁸ The politician has

²²⁴ *Old Man* 790e-f: ἀλλ’ εἰ διὰ μηδὲν ἄλλο τῷ γέροντι παιδείας ἔνεκα τῶν νέων καὶ διδασκαλίας πολιτευτέον ἐστὶν ... ἐπευθύνει τὸν νέον, ἔργοις ἅμα καὶ λόγοις πλαττόμενον ἐμψύχως καὶ κατασχηματίζόμενον.

²²⁵ Current theories of exemplarity do not recognize such active interaction between model and imitator; see chapter 2, §1.2.1.

²²⁶ On the image of the doctor-politician, also e.g. *Advice* 825d; *Agis Cleom.-Gracchi Comp.* 4.2 is a very good example from the *Lives*. Cf. SWAIN 1996: 177 with note 129; WARDMAN 1974: 57–63.

²²⁷ *Advice* 809e.

²²⁸ A civic leader should instead focus on five core qualities in a city, rhetorically formulated in al-

the noble task of creating concord and harmonious relations among the people.²²⁹ In a rather long passage, which is worth quoting to understand the mechanism of ethical instruction he describes, Plutarch explains exactly how the statesman can successfully play the mediator between two opposing parties:

Τὸ μᾶλλον οἰόμενον ἀδικεῖσθαι μέρος ἐξομιλοῦντα πρότερον καὶ συναδικεῖσθαι δοκοῦντα καὶ συναγανακτεῖν, εἴθ' οὕτως ἐπιχειροῦντα παύειν καὶ διδάσκειν ὅτι τῶν βιάζεσθαι καὶ νικᾶν ἐριζόντων οἱ παρέντες οὐκ ἐπιεικέα καὶ ἦθει μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήματι καὶ μεγέθει ψυχῆς διαφέρουσι, καὶ μικρὸν ὑφιέμενοι νικῶσιν ἐν τοῖς καλλίστοις καὶ μεγίστοις· ἔπειτα καὶ καθ' ἓνα καὶ κοινῇ διδάσκοντα καὶ φράζοντα τὴν τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν πραγμάτων ἀσθένειαν, ἥς ἐν ἀπολαῦσαι ἁμεινόν ἐστι τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσι, μεθ' ἡσυχίας καὶ ὁμονοίας καταβιώναι, μηδὲν ἐν μέσῳ τῆς τύχης ἄθλον ὑπολελοιπυίας.²³⁰

[He should] first conciliate the party who believes to have been offended most, and appear to share their feeling of injustice and their anger, then try in this way to soothe them and teach them that those who can let go are better than those who fight because they want to have the power and win, not only in fairness and character but also in mind and greatness of soul, and that they who can yield in something small will be victorious in the best and greatest matters. Next, he should instruct them individually and collectively, and tell them about the weak condition of the Greek state, in which it is better for well-thinking men to benefit from this one thing, leading our lives in peace and in concord, since fate has left no prize open for competition.

The Greek civic leader, in Plutarch's eyes, is able to do more than provide an example of virtuousness to his community. Not only is he expected to act according to high moral standards, he also needs to engage publicly as well as privately in discussions about ethical norms and values. Apart from knowing what is right and acting justly, he should give instructions on how to handle morally problematic situations.²³¹ This

literative asyndeton: εἰρήνης ἐλευθερίας εὐετηρίας εὐανδρίας ὁμονοίας (824c), "peace, freedom, prosperity, good men, concord". On the role of concord in Plutarch's writings, see PAVIS-D'ESCURAC 1981, SQUILLONI 1989: 235 n.36, SWAIN 1996: 177–182. For the historical reality of ὁμόνοια as political virtue in the Greek cities of the Roman Empire: SHEPPARD 1984–1986.

²²⁹ Cf. *Advice* 800a, where the word ῥυθμίζειν, again a musical metaphor, is used to describe the politician's task of uniting the people.

²³⁰ *Advice* 824d–e.

²³¹ Cf. Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 44 on the duty of the politician to soothe (πραύνειν) not inflame (ἐρεθίζειν) an angry crowd.

man seems to approach the (unattainable) Platonic ideal of the philosopher-king,²³² but if we look at the practical examples Plutarch offers, including from his own career,²³³ his attitude is rather down-to-earth and applicable to everyday city life.²³⁴ Always remember, Plutarch says, “I’m not in office for me, I’m in it for my country”.²³⁵ Moreover, at the end of the passage quoted above, the Greek city leader is encouraged to preach concord and harmony because of the inferior position of the Greek state. That remark greatly clarifies (though it also poses new questions) why Plutarch saw such a great responsibility for civic leaders like Menemachus and himself: provincial government under the Empire could be a tricky business, and the Greek statesman needed specific ethical competencies to deal with conflicting interests on the local as well as imperial level.

3.2 CICERO, ETHICAL LEADER IN SENECA AND PLUTARCH

It is time to apply Plutarch’s as well as Seneca’s ideal of ethical competence onto their portrayal of Cicero, and examine where and how he fails to be an ethical leader. One incentive for discussing the portrayal of Cicero in the context of ethical competence is that complex characterizations of Cicero, including both praise and blame, frequently lead modern classicists to engage in elaborate debates about the imperial authors’ final judgment, which can be positive or negative as long as it is not inconsistent or unsystematic.²³⁶ This is not helpful. In this section I will zoom in on Cicero’s image in Seneca and Plutarch, discuss-

²³² On the influence of Plato’s Republic on Plutarch’s political treatises mixed with practical views from the Peripatetic school see AALDERS & DE BLOIS 1992.

²³³ *Advice* 811c, 816d.

²³⁴ Cf. PALM 1959: 30–44 and VAN HOOFF 2010 on Plutarch’s practical, realistic approach.

²³⁵ *Advice* 811c: οὐκ ἑμαυτῷ γέ φημι ταῦτ’ οἰκονομεῖν ἀλλὰ τῇ πατρίδι.

²³⁶ See also the Introduction. For Seneca as a case in point of this tendency, compare Gambet 1970: 172, “Seneca’s evidence for Cicero is characterized at almost every turn by the same consistency which marked its author’s life” with KEELINE 2018: 196, “In Seneca the Younger Cicero is conspicuous by his absence”. Both scholars signal that Cicero only occasionally features in Seneca’s work, and feel the need to conclude that this indicates a dismissive attitude towards Cicero. My analysis is built rather on the conviction that Seneca could appreciate the complexities of Cicero’s character; what is more, I will show that his diverse treatment of Cicero’s life and career is correlated with his views about statesmanship and citizenship.

ing well-known and less-known passages, with the aim of presenting a more comprehensive judgment of his moral qualities, which can be both disappointing and positive models at the same time. I will explain that Cicero's philosophical virtue is not negated, which is why he may still function as a model of excellence, but that there is a problem with the translation of cognitive qualities into actual behaviour. The philosophical theory discussed in §2 will enable us to trace the different steps in Cicero's ethical development, and to recognize where and how his ethical exemplarity is frustrated. My analysis will also deepen our insight into the question of why Cicero was such an easy target of moral criticism and accusations of hypocrisy.

3.2.1 *Cicero's high moral standards and ethical training*

Plutarch's Cicero is born with the qualities to become a wise leader, and his education brought him all the moral knowledge the good citizen has need of. Little Cicero presents the essence of the Platonic intellectual: "as Plato thought fitting for nature prone to learning and philosophy, he became such that he loved every form of knowledge and spurned no type of literature or education".²³⁷ It is indeed a highly philosophical and *Greek* training that Cicero would enjoy as an adolescent. When still in Rome, Cicero already associated himself with Greek scholars (φιλόλογοι), this in addition to the traditional Roman practice of the *tirocinium fori* (which he took under Mucius Scaevola).²³⁸ Plutarch dwells on Cicero's experiences in Greece, and the varied group of philosophers and orators he met. According to the biographer, his contact with the Academics and Stoics in Athens even made Cicero consider spending the rest of his life in philosophical contemplation there.²³⁹ This would not happen, for though his nature was prone to learning, it was also ambitious (φιλότιμος).²⁴⁰ Here, still at the very be-

²³⁷ *Cic.* 2.3: γενόμενος δ', ὥσπερ ὁ Πλάτων ἀξιοῖ τὴν φιλομαθὴ καὶ φιλόσοφον φύσιν, οἷος ἀσπάζεσθαι πᾶν μάθημα καὶ μηδὲν λόγον μηδὲ παιδείας ἀτιμάζειν εἶδος.

²³⁸ On the *tirocinium fori*, MARROU 1965: 345–346; GOLDBECK 2012.

²³⁹ *Cic.* 4.2.

²⁴⁰ *Cic.* 5.2. In *Cic.* 40, Plutarch devotes some space to Cicero's actual philosophical pursuits at the time of Caesar's dictatorship, but his prime interest lies with Cicero's coinage of Latin terminology for the subject of natural philosophy.

ginning of the biography, in the formative stadium of his life, Cicero is already presented as struggling with two contrasting lives, the philosophical and the political.

Throughout the biography, Plutarch plays with the Platonic disposition or potential that Cicero represents and the clash between his knowledge-loving nature and the political reality. The biographer attributes the highest sense of justice (τὸ δίκαιον) to the orator as well as extraordinary sagacity (σύνεσις περιττή) in handling political conflict.²⁴¹ Plutarch's statement (*Cic.* 13.1; see above, § 2.5) that Cicero personifies the marriage of justice and eloquence illuminates his major contribution to Rome's history and captures the reason for including Cicero among the *viri illustres* of the *Lives*. In addition, Cicero was a good patriot with a big heart for the Republic, a theme that recurs outside the *Cicero* as well.²⁴² At one point in his life, Cicero even represents the Platonic ideal of the philosopher-leader (Plutarch pragmatically bends the concept of king into that of the political leader). In the comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero, the biographer notes, quoting Plato, *Rep.* 473d:²⁴³

Ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ Ῥώμῃ λόγῳ μὲν ἀποδειχθεὶς ὕπατος, ἐξουσίαν δὲ λαβὼν αὐτοκράτορος καὶ δικτάτορος ἐπὶ τοὺς περὶ Κατιλίαν, ἐμαρτύρησεν ἅμα τῷ Πλάτῳ μαντευομένην παῦλαν ἔξιν κακῶν τὰς πόλεις, ὅταν εἰς ταῦτὸ δύναμις τε μεγάλη καὶ φρόνησις ἐκ τίνος τύχης χρηστῆς ἀπαντήσῃ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης.²⁴⁴

²⁴¹ *Cic.* 13.1 and 18.4 (on the Catilinarian conspiracy), respectively.

²⁴² *Cic.* 22.3 (voice of the people), 49.3 (Augustus to his grandson); *Cato Min.* 32.4 (although, here, as often, Cicero is also seen being led by egocentric reasons); *Ant.* 19.1; *Pomp.* 49 (Cicero loved by the senate); *On Exile* 605f.

²⁴³ Socrates' words run thus (the parts quoted by Plutarch are printed in bold): "Unless, I said, either the philosophers will govern in the cities or these said kings and rulers will pursue philosophy lawfully and appropriately, and **this, political power and philosophy, will agree in one person**, and when the many souls who go after one without the other are excluded from necessity, **there is no end to evil**, my dear Glaukon, **in the cities**, nor, I think, for the human race; and until this moment that state we outlined presently will not grow to her potential or see the light of the sun." ('Εὰν μὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ οἱ βασιλεῖς τε νῦν λεγόμενοι καὶ δυνάσται φιλοσοφήσωσι γνησίως τε καὶ ἱκανῶς, **καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ταῦτὸν συμπίεση, δύναμις τε πολιτικὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία**, τῶν δὲ νῦν πορευομένων χωρὶς ἐφ' ἑκάτερον αἱ πολλαὶ φύσεις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποκλεισθῶσιν, **οὐκ ἔστι κακῶν παῦλα**, ὧ φίλε Γλαῦκον, **ταῖς πόλεσι**, δοκῶ δ' οὐδὲ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ γένει, οὐδὲ αὐτῇ ἢ πολιτείᾳ μὴ ποτε πρότερον φυῇ τε εἰς τὸ δυνατόν καὶ φῶς ἡλίου ἴδῃ, ἦν νῦν λόγῳ διεληλύθαμεν.) Plutarch refers to the same passage at *Numa* 20.6–7. The idea of political leaders testifying to Plato's philosophical tenets also occurs in *Dion* 1.3; see above, § 3.1.2.

²⁴⁴ *Comp. Dem. et Cic.* 3.4.

In Rome itself, having been appointed consul in name, but with the power of a sole ruler and dictator in the period of the Catilinarian conspiracy, he proved true, along the lines of Plato's prophecy, that there would be an end to the evil in the city states when in the same person a great power and wisdom should unite with justice, as the result of some happy fortune.

The preposition ἅμα does more than suggest that Cicero simply confirmed Plato's words in book 5 of the *Republic*.²⁴⁵ Instead of having its usual temporal value, ἅμα here expresses the value of linking two things or people together within the same space; in other words, it places Cicero and Plato on the same team. The remark connects Cicero and Plato on the level of philosophical leadership, and is possibly a reference to the indebtedness of Cicero *philosophus* to Plato's work. The image is not without irony: the Roman orator carried out in practice what the Greek philosopher only prophesied in his literary dialogues. Again, as often in Plutarch's biography, the difference between the active life, which Cicero eventually chose, and the contemplative pursuit of literature is thematized. While the above passage is an enthusiastic celebration of Cicero's ethical leadership as consul, there are no similar praises in the account of events after 63, even though Cicero enjoyed a similar authority in the years 44–43 BC. Plutarch's positive evaluation of Cicero's political conduct is situated exclusively in the period before and during the Catilinarian conspiracy.

In Seneca's treatises, it is also the consul Cicero who receives praise for his patriotism.²⁴⁶ In the *Consolation to Marcia*, Seneca adduces Cicero as the example of someone who would have benefited from an early death, specifically during his consulship, which constituted the height of his career:

M. Cicero si illo tempore quo Catilinae sicas devitavit, quibus pariter cum patria petitus est, concidisset, liberata re publica servator eius, si denique filiae suae funus secutus esset, etiam tunc felix mori potuit. Non vidisset strictos in civilia capita mucrones nec divisa percussoribus occisorum bona,

²⁴⁵ As is implied by PERRIN's Loeb translation (1919: 217): "[C]icero bore witness to the truth of Plato's prophecy".

²⁴⁶ On Seneca's reception of Cicero, see the essential studies by KEELINE 2018: 196–222; GOWING 2013; FEDELI 2006; SETAIOLI 2003; GAMBET 1970 (cf. GAMBET 1963: 157–183); GRIMAL 1984.

*ut etiam de suo perirent, non hastam consularia spolia vendentem nec caedes locatas publice nec latrocinia, bella, rapinas, tantum Catilinarum.*²⁴⁷

M. Cicero, if he would have fallen in the period in which he shunned Catiline's dagger strikes, with which he was attacked in the same manner as the country, the Republic liberated and he its saviour—if indeed he would have followed his daughter in death, he could still have died a happy man. He wouldn't have seen the swords swung at the heads of citizens nor the goods of the murdered being divided among the slayers, in order that they would have died at their own cost; he would not have seen the consular spoils put up for auction, or the murders that were officially contracted, nor the thievery, wars, plundering, so many Catilines!

This passage is usually discussed as evidence that in his portrayal of Cicero, Seneca was strongly influenced by (his own education in) the rhetorical schools of Rome. It is true that this passage rehearses standard Ciceronian *topoi* (the 'saviour of the country', the good consul Cicero against the villainous Catiline). However, whereas modern scholars focus on the one-dimensionality of this 'exemplary' Cicero, I rather want to focus on the contextualization of his figure.²⁴⁸ The *exemplum* of Cicero's consular *aristeia* is part of a series of three: it is sandwiched between *exempla* from the lives of Pompey and Cato. In this passage, Cicero is characterized by Seneca as the saviour of the Republic. Though the quality of Cicero's own ethical standards are not the subject of this *exemplum*, it is implied by the context. Elsewhere Seneca more explicitly defines Pompey, Cicero and Cato as *boni*, good men.²⁴⁹ In the *Consolation to Marcia*, the philosopher refers to the lives of these *boni cives* in order to claim that there is no such thing as a premature death, for when a man has reached a high-point in life he also often experiences bad things after that; dying at the climax of one's life is best.

²⁴⁷ *Dial.* 6.20.5.

²⁴⁸ The declamatory or 'exemplary' influences in Seneca's portrait of Cicero are addressed by KEELINE 2018: 197–203, who closely follows GAMBET 1970 in his interpretation. GRIMAL 1984 allows for more depth, in arguing that Seneca, due to his identification with Cicero as a man of letters and political exile (cf. FEDELI 2006: 220), was genuinely interested in Cicero's personality and life; cf. SETAIOLI 2003: 56–61.

²⁴⁹ *Tranq.* 16.1. There, Seneca discusses horrible deaths of good men (*bonorum exitus mali*). The examples given are Socrates, Pompey, and Cicero, who were ungraciously killed by their former clients, and Cato who fell on his own sword to save the Republic.

All three republican politicians are commemorated in connection to their service to the state. Cicero saved the republic (*liberata re publica servator eius*); Pompey was the pride and pillar of the Roman empire (*decus istud firmamentumque imperii*); Cato lived not just for personal freedom but for the freedom of the Roman people (*vir libertati non suae tantum sed publicae natus*).²⁵⁰ Within this cluster of *exempla* about republican heroism, Cicero's deeds are amplified as a symbol of virtue and Roman excellence.

3.2.2 Cicero's ability to apply philosophical (& rhetorical) knowledge to problematic situations

Another essential ethical competency, as we have seen above, is being able to apply one's philosophical knowledge and moral training to ethically complex or conflicting situations. Cicero does this formidably, according to the sources, during the Catilinarian conspiracy. Plutarch, Seneca, and others emphasize his industriousness, his wisdom and his patriotism in handling the political conflict.²⁵¹ Elaborate accounts of the conspiracy, already beginning with Sallust's *Conspiracy of Catiline* (and possibly based on Cicero's own records of the events), disclose his intricate plan to uncover the conspirators' schemes.²⁵² Up until the point of the final debate on the fate of the conspirators, Cicero's decisiveness and his leadership in protecting the Republic are praised.

As soon as the executions have been carried out, however, Cicero's conduct falls short of what is expected from an ethical leader, i.e. proper reflection on the potentially difficult aspects of the events. Instead of, for example, addressing the extraordinary nature of the punishment of the conspirators (immediate execution instead of exile) or the problem of executing Roman senators, Cicero devotes himself to self-justification and self-praise in order to counter the (admittedly, mostly *ad hominem*) criticism from society. The articulation of Cicero's behav-

²⁵⁰ *Dial.* 6.20.4 (Pompey); 6.20.6 (Cato).

²⁵¹ *Sen. Suas.* 6.23 (Aufidius Bassus), 6.24 (Asinius Pollio), 6.26 (Cremutius Cordus); *Sen. Dial.* 6.20.5 (see above), *Ben.* 5.17.2; *Plut.* 12.5, 18.4, 22.3; *Vell. Pat.* 2.34; *Flor.* 2.12; *App. B. Civ.* 2.1.7; *Cass. Dio* 37.33.1.

²⁵² For Sallust's discussion of Cicero's consular actions, see chapter 1, §2.

iour by Plutarch and Cassius Dio reflects this criticism quite strongly (and sometimes misleadingly). Plutarch states that after the conspiracy, “Cicero enjoyed the highest power in the city, but made himself odious to many, not by any bad action, but by praising himself all the time and puffing himself up he was disliked by many”.²⁵³ Not only did Cicero fail to analyze the ethical implications of his decisions, he also made himself guilty of one of the great mistakes a political leader could make: to praise himself too excessively. By making himself ἐπίφθορος, i.e. creating φθόνος, he risked destroying the community; a risk Plutarch explains well in his ethical and political treatises (see above, § 3.1.4). Cicero’s boundless personal ambition, φιλοτιμία ἄκρατος, stood in the way of his service to the (re)public.²⁵⁴

In the period before the exile, Cicero’s fear of being destroyed by Clodius makes him prone to taking up arms. Plutarch describes in the *Cato the Younger* that right after Cato himself is sent on a mission to Cyprus by one of Clodius’ laws, Cato “advises Cicero not to cause civil strife and plunge the city into war and murder, but to yield to necessity and become the saviour of the fatherland again”.²⁵⁵ The seriousness of this image of Cicero as warmonger can be articulated against the background of Plutarch’s theoretical writings: there, Plutarch thematizes the importance of concord and harmony, and part of *Advice on Civic Life*, as I have discussed above, is devoted to the necessity, especially from the Greek perspective, for a the statesman to prevent the rise of *stasis*.

Exiled Cicero illustrates a similar inability in practicing his moral skills in public and in private. In Plutarch’s words, Cicero behaves desperately and is deeply grieved, mourning for Italy like a rejected lover, even though he receives much honour from the local elite. This is especially remarkable, the biographer notes, considering his excellent *paideia*:

Πολλῶν δὲ φοιτῶντων ἀνδρῶν ὑπ’ εὐνοίας καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων διαμιλλωμένων πρὸς αὐτὰς ταῖς πρεσβείαις, ὁμως ἄθυμῶν καὶ περίλυπος

²⁵³ Cic. 24.1; cf. *On Self-praise* 54of. For a similar view, see Cass. Dio 37.38.2, 38.12.6–7. Note how Plutarch makes sure to emphasize that Cicero is not a bad man (πονηρός).

²⁵⁴ Cic. 24.2.

²⁵⁵ *Cato Min.* 35.1: Τοιαύτη δὲ καταληφθεὶς ἀνάγκη Κικέρωνι μὲν ἐλαυνομένῳ παρήνεσε μὴ στασιάσαι μηδὲ εἰς ὄπλα καὶ φόνους τὴν πόλιν ἐμβαλεῖν, ἀλλ’ ὑπεκστάντα τῷ καιρῷ πάλιν γενέσθαι σωτήρα τῆς πατρίδος.

διῆγε τὰ πολλά, πρὸς τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ὥσπερ οἱ δυσέρωτες, ἀφορῶν, καὶ τῷ φρονήματι μικρὸς ἄγαν καὶ ταπεινὸς ὑπὸ τῆς συμφορᾶς γεγωνὺς καὶ συνεσταλμένος, ὡς οὐκ ἂν τις ἄνδρα παιδείᾳ συμβεβιωκότα τοσαύτη προσεδόκησε. καίτοι πολλάκις αὐτὸς ἤξιον τοῦ φίλου μὴ ῥήτορα καλεῖν αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφον· φιλοσοφίαν γὰρ ὡς ἔργον ἡρῆσθαι, ῥητορικὴ δ' ὀργάνῳ χρῆσθαι πολιτευόμενος ἐπὶ τὰς χρείας.²⁵⁶

Many men visited him out of goodwill, and the Greek cities were hotly contending against one another by sending embassies. Still, despondent and in deep grief he spent most of his time, with his head turned to Italy, in the manner of lovesick people, and he became petty and weak as a result of his misfortune, and downcast, in a way you would not expect from a man with such an extensive ethical education. And yet he often asked from his friends not to call him an orator, but a philosopher; for he had chosen philosophy as his proper work, and he used oratory as an instrument in reaching his political goals.

Just as Philiscus would later do in Dio's *Roman History*, Plutarch expresses wonder about the difference between Cicero's ethical training and his personal comportment in exile. While Cicero's professional study of philosophy is mentioned here as his primary goal in life, Plutarch attributes this idea to Cicero himself and voices it as part of Cicero's strategy of self-presentation. In fact, the image of Cicero *philosophus* is broken down by the biographer's sceptical judgement of Cicero's personal conduct. While the terminology used to describe this conduct (μικρὸς and ταπεινός; love-sick people, δυσέρωτες) is already quite negative, the remark that one would not expect (ὡς οὐκ ἂν τις προσεδόκησε) this kind of behaviour from a man like Cicero drives home the message that he does not live up to the standards of the intellectual leadership he represents. The particle καίτοι ('and yet') enhances Plutarch's refusal to endorse Cicero's image of himself as a philosopher. His scepticism matches the overall portrayal of Cicero in the period after the consulship.

While Plutarch probably based part of his judgment on the desperate tone and the lamentations marking the private letters to Atticus

²⁵⁶ Cic. 32.4. XENOPHONTOS 2016 is an excellent analysis of how Plutarch envisages *paideia* as mainly ethical education. I opt for a different interpretation than PERRIN 1915: 'lofty discipline'; WARNER 1958: 'training and education'; or LINTOTT 2013: 'education'. Cf. SWAIN 1990 on *paideia* as an ethical measuring stick in the *Cicero*.

during the period of the exile,²⁵⁷ the narrative itself puts emphasis on Cicero's public visibility in Macedonia, which he cannot enjoy. Indeed, it is public opinion which, in Plutarch's analysis, has taken away all reasonableness from Cicero's soul:

Ἄλλ' ἡ δόξα δεινὴ τὸν λόγον, ὥσπερ βαφὴν, ἀποκλύσαι τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ τὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἐνομόρξασθαι πάθη δι' ὁμιλίαν καὶ συνήθειαν τοῖς πολιτευομένοις, ἂν μὴ τις εὖ μάλα φυλαττόμενος οὕτω συμφέρεται τοῖς ἐκτὸς ὥς τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν, οὐ τῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασι παθῶν συμμεθέξων.²⁵⁸

But public opinion is able to wash away all reason from the soul, like a dye, and impress the emotions of the people on politicians through their interaction with and closeness to them, unless one is extremely on his guard and decides only to engage in external matters in so far as they pertain to political action itself, not to the emotions that come with the action.

Cicero has lost the λόγος to analyze and examine the situation; his failure to recognize his own fallibility as a politician rules out any conduct that would be proper to an intellectual like him. As Plutarch also described in the *Advice on Civic Life*, a citizen trained in philosophy should be able to foresee the dire consequences of potential fame, and avoid excessive ambition altogether.

The negation of Cicero's capacity for personal reflection is sustained in the account of the events after his return from exile. Even in Plutarch's account of the civil war, in which Cicero initially has a favourable role, he is eventually shown to make the wrong political choices. As the biographer describes it, Cicero tried to mediate between Caesar and Pompey in the period right before the war broke out. The manner in which Cicero's attempts at mediation are described are reminiscent of the good leader-cum-mediator from *Advice on Civic Life*, whose main task is to prevent *stasis*.²⁵⁹ Just like the good Plutarchan statesman who tries to calm both parties while listening to them separately, Cicero tries to placate Caesar and Pompey individually: "privately, Cicero gave much advice to Caesar by sending letters, and he made entreaties to

²⁵⁷ Cf. Cic. *Att.* 3.3–27, the bulk of which was written in Thessaloniki, the final place of his exile. LINTOTT 2013: 16, however, is sceptical that Plutarch had read Cicero's letters. But cf. n. 260 below.

²⁵⁸ Cic. 32.5.

²⁵⁹ See above, §3.1.5. Plutarch even uses similar terminology: the term *πραύνειν*, to soothe or placate, is of central value for the statesman-mediator.

Pompey in person, addressing both of them in soothing and assuaging words" (ιδία δὲ συνεβούλευε πολλὰ μὲν Καίσαρι γράφων πολλὰ δ' αὐτοῦ Πομπηίου δεόμενος, πρᾶυνων ἐκάτερον καὶ παραμυθούμενος). However, despite Cicero's efforts to mediate, the situation is soon beyond saving, and he is shown to experience a serious dilemma about which side he should choose, since neither is preferable.²⁶⁰ When Caesar marches to Spain, Cicero makes up his mind and sails to Pompey at Dyrrachium. Yet instead of receiving praise for his decision to fight with Pompey, he is corrected in his choice by Cato, who believes that Cicero's place is in Rome:

Καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἀσμένους ὥφθη, Κάτων δ' αὐτὸν ἰδὼν ἰδία πολλὰ κατεμέμετο Πομπηίῳ προσθέμενον· αὐτῷ μὲν γὰρ οὐχὶ καλῶς ἔχειν ἐγκαταλιπεῖν ἢ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς εἴλετο τῆς πολιτείας τάξιν, ἐκεῖνον δὲ χρησιμώτερον ὄντα τῇ πατρίδι καὶ τοῖς φίλοις εἰ μένων ἴσος ἐκεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἀποβαῖνον ἡρμόζετο, κατ' οὐδένα λογισμὸν οὐδ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης πολέμιον γεγενῆσθαι Καίσαρι καὶ τοσούτου μεθέξοντα κινδύνου δεῦρ' ἦκειν.²⁶¹

And he was welcomed heartily by the others, but Cato, when he spoke with him in private, blamed him greatly for attaching himself to Pompey: as for himself, it wasn't alright to abandon the political policy he had taken from the beginning, but Cicero, although he was more useful for his fatherland and his friends if he remained neutral in Rome and adapted himself to the outcome of the events, had become an enemy of Caesar without any reason or cause, and came here to partake in such great danger.

Like Plutarch in his portrayal of Cicero in exile, Cato comments on Cicero's lack of reason, i.e. his inability to behave rationally. As Cato puts it, there was no reason or necessary cause (κατ' οὐδένα λογισμὸν οὐδ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης) for Cicero to join Pompey and antagonize Caesar. He could have continued to serve Rome and his fellow citizens by remaining there, but instead he chose to plunge into battle. Especially notable is the comparison Cato makes between himself and Cicero. Cato argues it was impossible for him to remain in Rome without undermining his political stance (τῆς πολιτείας τάξιν), referring to his continuous

²⁶⁰ Cic. 37.2. Plutarch echoes Cicero's own words (*Att.* 8.7.2) in saying "as a result, he knew from whom to escape, but he did not know to whom he should escape" (ὥστ' ἔχειν μὲν ὅν φύγη, μὴ ἔχειν δὲ πρὸς ὃν φύγη; compare the Latin, *ego vero quem fugiam habeo, quem sequar non habeo*).

²⁶¹ Cic. 38.1.

opposition to Caesar and his relentless defence of republican institutions. In Cato's eyes, Cicero does not have such a political programme, which means he could have taken a neutral position in the war; the remark that Cicero had come κατ' οὐδένα λογισμὸν, without any rationale informing his plan, brings home the image of a Cicero who behaves irrationally because he has no clearly formulated political viewpoint.²⁶²

This altercation between Cato and Cicero is one of several in Plutarch's biographies of both men.²⁶³ For reasons of space I cannot discuss all of these separately, but the above passage exemplifies quite well how differently Cicero and Cato were thought to perceive their political role in Roman society. Cicero's choice to join Pompey is just as informed by social considerations as by a concern for the state; Cato's actions, on the other hand, are consistently the result of his conservative political policy. Moreover, while the above passage focalizes Cato's attitude towards Cicero, the biographer does not disagree with Cato's words. He describes that the exchange with his friend made Cicero change his mind about coming to the Pompeian camp (Κικέρωνος ἀνέστρεφον οἱ λόγοι τὴν γνώμην), and that his obvious chagrin about this decision made him generally odious to Pompey and the army.²⁶⁴ Plutarch's description of Cicero's stay at Dyracchium again supports the image of a man who is inconsistent in his actions, and who could not employ his intellectual and political training as part of his leadership or guidance of his fellow citizens.

²⁶² Cf. LINTOTT 2013: 8 with regard to Plutarch's portrait: "Cicero's career, however, seems to develop without any apparent devotion to a political principle."

²⁶³ The most important exchanges between Cicero and Cato are listed here. *Cic.* 23.3 (Cato was "a great help" to Cicero and the state in the aftermath of the conspiracy; also, by praising Cicero's consulate in a public speech (δημηγόρησας) he made Cicero 'father of the fatherland', *pater patriae*); 34 (Cicero wants to annul all Clodius' laws, but Cato opposes him in the senate; after this altercation, their mutual respect for each other was less visible); 39.1–2 (Cato wants Cicero, who is his senior, to take command over Pompey's troops, but Cicero refuses. Sextus Pompey and his friends call him a traitor and attack him, which Cato prevents by stepping in and sending Cicero away). *Cato Min.* 19.3 (Cicero thanks Cato for driving Clodius away from the city, but Cato corrects him, saying that he should thank the city, since he was acting on her behalf); 21.5 (Murena trial, Cato laughing about Cicero's wittiness); 32.4–6 (Cicero (ὁ ῥήτωρ) persuades Cato to take an oath concerning Caesar's agrarian law, by arguing εἰ μὴ Κάτων τῆς Πώμης, ἀλλ' ἡ Πώμη δέσται Κάτωνος, δέονται δὲ καὶ οἱ φίλοι πάντες); 35 (passage in the main text); 40 (altercation about Clodian laws, cf. *Cic.* 34); 55.3 (debate about leadership Pompeian troops; Cato "calmed Cicero down in private" (ἐνουθέτησεν ἰδίᾳ), and "clearly saved Cicero from death", cf. *Cic.* 39.1–2).

²⁶⁴ *Cic.* 38.2.

Seneca is similarly critical of Cicero's composure.²⁶⁵ The following passage from *On Shortness of Life* is worth quoting in its entirety, for it offers an interestingly complex characterization of Cicero's political reputation.

*M. Cicero inter Catilinas, Clodios iactatus Pompeiosque et Crassos, partim manifestos inimicos, partim dubios amicos, dum fluctuatur cum re publica et illam pessum euntem tenet, novissime abductus, nec secundis rebus quietus nec adversarum patiens, quotiens illum ipsum consulatum suum non sine causa sed sine fine laudatum detestatur! Quam flebiles voces exprimit in quadam ad Atticum epistula iam victo patre Pompeio, adhuc filio in Hispania fracta arma refovente! "Quid agam", inquit, "hic, quaeris? Moror in Tusculano meo semiliber". Alia deinceps adicit, quibus et priorem aetatem complorat et de praesenti queritur et de futura desperat. Semiliberum se dixit Cicero: at me hercules numquam sapiens in tam humile nomen procedet, numquam semiliber erit, integrae semper libertatis et solidae, solutus et sui iuris et altior ceteris. Quid enim supra eum potest esse qui supra fortunam est?*²⁶⁶

M. Cicero, thrown about between the Catilines, Clodii, Pompeii and Crassi, who were on some occasions open enemies, on others dubious friends, while he was driven hither and thither with the Republic he held on to her while she was sinking, eventually swept away, neither calm in prosperity nor tolerant of adversity—how many times was that consulship of his, praised not without reason but without end, cursed by him? How lamentably did he speak in one of the letters to Atticus, in that period when Pompey the father was already vanquished, but the son [Sextus] was still reviving the fractured army in Spain? 'What do I do,' he said, 'here, you ask? I linger in my Tusculan villa, half-free.' Then he added some other things, bemoaning the past and complaining about the present, and despairing about the future. Cicero said he was half-free. But, by Hercules, no *sapiens* will ever resort to such a low term, he shall never be half-free, being always of complete and sound freedom, independent and his own master, and above everybody else. For what can stand above him who stands above fortune?

²⁶⁵ This is not surprising considering Seneca's moral programme. STAR 2012: 23–61 explains that within Seneca's view of exemplarity, the ultimate quality of examples of virtue should be their 'command of the self' and his self-control: "the new key for ascribing glory and virtue lies in the agent's psychological state at the time of action, not simply in the result" (27). Also interesting, with regard to my comparison of Cicero and Cato, are STAR's observations about Cato as an exemplar within Seneca's writings. According to him, Cato and the example of his steadfastness in taking his life, "is the paradigmatic image of the rhetoric of self-command" (50).

²⁶⁶ *Dial.* 10.5.1–3.

The context of the passage is the desire, held by men in high office, for *otium*. Seneca illustrates this with three (originally) republican *exempla*: Augustus, Cicero, and Livius Drusus. Importantly, while we have seen that in the *exempla* tradition recorded by Valerius Maximus Ciceronian *exempla* are mainly categorized in the field of social relationships and oratory, this passage is good evidence that Cicero was definitely classified as a man of high—the highest—office.

The example of Cicero's lack of *otium* is introduced in a highly rhetorical fashion which smacks of the declamation school.²⁶⁷ The names of Catiline, Clodius, Pompey, and Crassus, together with the reference to the Republic situate Cicero in a civic context, emphasizing his public (not literary or philosophical) persona. The opening sentence itself is "a complex, not un-Ciceronian sentence", as one of the commentators remarks,²⁶⁸ featuring a staccato syntax, multiple qualifying clauses which break the flow of the sentence, and stylistic figures such as chiasmus and hyperbaton (*consulatum ... laudatum*), all nicely exemplifying the chaotic state of Cicero's mind. The succeeding exclamations made by Seneca (*quam ... exprimit; at me Hercules... ; quotiens... ?*) give the passage a dramatic flavour, which is still intensified by the insertion of Cicero's own plaintive words from the period between 48–45 BC.²⁶⁹ The climax comes in Seneca's indignant remark about Cicero's lack of a Stoic attitude: a *sapiens* is never half-free, but always enjoys complete freedom and independence. Seneca here has twisted Cicero's conception of *liber*. Based on the historical context given by Seneca himself (*iam victo ... arma refovente*), Cicero's words appear to mean that he regrets not being free as a citizen, awaiting the result of the civil war between Caesar and the Pompeians. The contents of *Att.* 13.31, the supposed source for the 'quotation', confirm that Cicero feels hemmed in by Caesar's machinations, and tries to keep at least some of his independence (*semiliberi saltem simus*).²⁷⁰ In the letter, Cicero's attempt to

²⁶⁷ For further discussion of this passage, see especially GRIMAL 1984: 660–662; SETAIOLI 2003: 58–60.

²⁶⁸ WILLIAMS 2003 *ad loc.*

²⁶⁹ I subscribe to the argument, set forth in WILLIAMS 2003: 146, that Seneca quoted, whether freely or (erroneously) from memory (see GRIMAL 1959 *ad loc.*), from *Att.* 13.31, dating to May 45, the only place in the letters where Cicero employs the word *semiliber*, and in the context of the civil war. Cf. SETAIOLI 2003: 59.

²⁷⁰ *Att.* 13.31.3.

remain semiliber highlights the essence of late republican strife and the difficulty of keeping one's head above the water in a storm of political factions. Seneca, however, uses it in order to introduce a philosophical discussion, namely on the freedom of the Stoic wise man (*sapiens*).

The public persona of Cicero who fights against rebels like Catiline and Clodius, the persona of the rescuer of the Republic, who appears at the start of this *exemplum*, is carefully deconstructed by Seneca. This Cicero is not a political agent, but a prey to the actions of others: *iac-tatus, fluctuatur, abductus* all indicate a lack of self-regulation. He does not possess *constantia* (*nec ... quietus nec ... patiens*), and even his consulate, the crown of his political career, is not approached with any steadfastness. Rather, he praises it endlessly (*sine fine*), which again suggests lack of self-control, while at the same time cursing it, showing no mental stability at all. By resorting to the private letters Seneca gives evidence of this emotional instability. The final remark, then, that a *sapiens* will never use the word *semiliber* can be read in two ways—either as an expression of disappointment in Cicero's philosophical abilities, which he is then confirmed to have but insufficiently; or, more commonly, one can read them as a negation of Cicero's philosophical knowledge. If he would have been a Stoic *sapiens*, *libertas* would have meant something wholly different to him, but he could not reach this comprehension due to his personal lack of *constantia* and his continuous engagement in civic life.²⁷¹

I think we should opt for the first explanation. Seneca's disappointment in Cicero gains more clarity from a comparison with Plutarch's image of Cicero as (non-)ethical leader. Rather than using Cicero as a foil for the perfect Stoic *sapiens*, Seneca comments upon his conduct as a public persona; the main thrust of all three exempla in *On Shortness of Life* consists in the high extent of their public engagement, not their philosophical qualities. Again, as in Plutarch's biography, there appears to be something wrong with Cicero's personal reflection on his political career. It is emotional instead of rational and destructive instead of productive. We have seen in § 3.1.3 that for Seneca, the mastery of emotions and unity of action are crucial for a moral exemplar (*Ep.* 120.11).

²⁷¹ WILLIAMS 2003: 145; GRIMAL 1959: 27–28; GAMBET 1970: 181–182; SETAIOLI 2003: 59–60; FEDELI 2006: 218.

More importantly, the terminology employed in the passage from *On Shortness of Life* in fact recalls the language of the letters. In *Ep.* 120, Seneca describes the life of the moral exemplar as being completely his own, *vita sui arbitrii tota*, which is similar in meaning as *sui iuris* in the passage above. In *Ep.* 120 Seneca further specifies that the opposite type, the uneducated mind (*mala mens*), is following all kinds of external impulses in a constant vacillation (*fluctuatio*) and a moving to and fro (*iactatio*) between vice and virtue. Political commanders in particular, like Alexander or Caesar, can become unhinged by all kinds of desires which control *them* instead of the other way round, Seneca explains in *Ep.* 94.61–67. The passage in *On Shortness of Life* features a Cicero who acts similarly to these men. Yet at the same time, Seneca was well aware of Cicero's important contribution to the Latin philosophical tradition;²⁷² moreover, his inclusion of Cicero on other occasions in the group of Roman *boni* makes it clear that Cicero's excellence in general was undisputed. I believe that the reason why Seneca suddenly goes 'off-topic'²⁷³ with his remark about the freedom of the Stoic sapiens, is that there is an expectation of high-level moral thinking on Cicero's part which does not manifest itself in his public conduct. In other words, Seneca's transition from Cicero's public career to the topic of the freedom of the wise man is evoked by Cicero's failure to become the kind of ethical leader he *could have been* on the basis of education and standing. As in Plutarch and Dio, as we have seen at the beginning of this chapter, Cicero is not able to put his ethical training to good use. This might not affect his excellence as a man, but it does harm his political reputation, given that he is not capable of setting the exemplary standards expected of Roman leaders.

3.2.3 Cicero walking the talk of moral virtue

The crux to becoming an ethical leader, someone who fulfils all ethical competencies, is to successfully embody the principles of their moral

²⁷² E.g. *Ep.* 17.2, 100.9, 108.30 (where he refers to Cicero's Republic). On Seneca's awareness of Cicero's philosophical achievements, see KEELINE 2018: 203–207, who concludes however that "Cicero is damned by sustained silence" (at 204). For Cicero as a philosophical model within Seneca's work, see e.g. *Ep.* 58.12, with LAVERY 1965: 104, 112.

training for the benefit of the public. Ironically, in one aspect of his career, Cicero is actually able to exercise his sensibility for moral virtue publicly—in his oratory. The image of Cicero as benefactor of the people through his eloquence is actually less common in the historical tradition than we might expect. Seneca the Elder records at least one instance in the declaimers.²⁷⁴ In his excerpts from the Augustan and Tiberian historiographers, who all discuss Cicero's important position in the state, only the poet Cornelius Severus is seen to connect Cicero's eloquence with the exercise of law and justice.²⁷⁵ The idea that Cicero's public performance was ethically instructive is never articulated in the writings of Seneca the Younger, but Plutarch is rather elaborate in explaining both Cicero's potential for being a moral paragon and the reasons why he eventually failed to become one.

Plutarch asserts in his biography that it is through his oratory that Cicero is able to teach others a sense of justice. As we have seen above, this form of ethical leadership is located in the period of the consulship.

Μάλιστα γὰρ οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐπέδειξε Ῥωμαίοις ὅσον ἡδονῆς λόγος τῷ καλῷ προστίθῃσι, καὶ ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον ἀήττητόν ἐστιν ἂν ὀρθῶς λέγῃται, καὶ δεῖ τὸν ἐμμελῶς πολιτευόμενον αἰετὶ τῷ μὲν ἔργῳ τὸ καλὸν ἀντὶ τοῦ κολακεύοντος αἰρεῖσθαι, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ τὸ λυποῦν ἀφαιρεῖν τοῦ συμφέροντος.²⁷⁶

For this man showed the Romans in exceptional fashion how much pleasure speech can add to what is right, and that justice is invincible if it is clothed in the right words; and that it is essential that the harmonious politician in his acts always prefers what is good over what is flattering, and in his speech removes all harm from what is useful.

This passage proves that Cicero, for Plutarch, did personify the virtue of justice, and was very well able to transfer his ethical qualities in his interaction with other Roman citizens. This is a quality of Cicero's conduct not often recognized in modern studies of the imperial accounts; Cicero's philosophical proficiency is generally regarded as being more

²⁷³ See WILLIAMS 2003 *ad loc.*

²⁷⁴ Sen. *Suas.* 6.7 (Cornelius Hispanus).

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.* 6.26: *egregium semper patriae caput ille senatus / vindex, ille fori, legum iurisque togaeque / publica vox ...* Cf. SILLETT 2015: 179–180. *Suas.* 6.23 has some examples where Cicero's oratory is hinted to be his instrument for protecting the state: Cremutius Cordus speaks of *simultates publicae* fought by Cicero, but without mentioning the means, and Aufidius Bassus, who refers to the orator as having been “born for the Republic”, which he “defended and governed” in old age.

²⁷⁶ *Cic.* 13.1.

or less absent.²⁷⁷ Giving perhaps the wrong impression are the long lists of witticisms recorded by Plutarch in *Cicero* and *Sayings of the Romans*, all praised for their mental acuity but not for their appropriateness.²⁷⁸ Such *exempla* inscribe Cicero in the historical records as a rhetor more than anything else.²⁷⁹

Nevertheless, the orator is also consistently evaluated for his *potential* of being an ethical model or leader. In the passage just quoted, Cicero is emphatically presented as a morally good man—not just a man with rhetorical skills—who could offer ethical instruction to others (ἐπέδειξε Ῥωμαίους).²⁸⁰ The image concurs with Cicero's own ideal of the *doctus orator* who combines philosophical wisdom with the study of rhetoric to the mutual success of both disciplines.²⁸¹ The passage above reminds us of the opening of *On Invention*, where Cicero sets out that according to him “wisdom without eloquence does little good to cities, but eloquence without wisdom is for the most part very harmful, and is never useful” (*sapientiam sine eloquentia parum prodesse civitatibus, eloquentiam vero sine sapientia nimium obesse plerumque, prodesse numquam*). At least, in the particular chapter of Plutarch's Cicero quoted above, Cicero is seen to embody his own intellectual ideal.

Moreover, in terms of ethical instruction, Plutarch emphasizes Cicero's position as adviser of Octavian. In *On the Fortune of the Romans*, which discusses the reasons for Rome's greatness, in a passage which is usually overlooked, Cicero receives part of the credit for Augustus' rise to government, and not only as an adviser. Plutarch recalls an anecdote in which Augustus, sending his grandson off to war, prayed that his

²⁷⁷ The traditional argument is that Cicero must yield this position to Cato the Younger. E.g. SWAIN 1990: 197 on Plutarch; GAMBET 1970: 175–181, GRIFFIN 1976: 184–185, and KEELINE 2018: 199–200 on Seneca.

²⁷⁸ *Sayings of the Romans* 204e–205f includes 21 quotations (with a bit of historical context) from Cicero translated to the Greek; *exempla* 14 to 20 all date to the civil war between Caesar and Pompey; there is no *exemplum* related to the ‘Philippic’ period. At *Cic.* 7.4, Plutarch calls such sayings χαρίεντα, to be translated as either ‘witty’ or ‘elegantly spoken’; cf. *Cic.* 25, where it is said that Cicero often lost sense of appropriateness, τὸ πρέπον, as a result of the force of his eloquence, and the lists of witticisms in *Cic.* 25–27 (causing hatred), 38.2–6 (raising positive laughter).

²⁷⁹ SWAIN 1990: 195.

²⁸⁰ Though we should also note that Plutarch does not use teaching terminology here as he does elsewhere. This passage expresses the same idea as *Comp. Dem. et Cic.* 3.4 and *Dion* 1.3, which we have discussed above.

²⁸¹ Cf. *Rep.* 1.12, *Orat.* 3.142–143, *Or.* 12–13, *Tusc.* 1.7–8, with GILDENHARD 2007 on Cicero's ideal of *paideia romana*, according to which education is the key to a successful political system.

offspring would have the courage of Scipio, the popularity of Pompey and the fortune that accompanied himself,

Καθάπερ ἔργῳ μεγάλῳ δημιουργὸν ἐπιγράψας ἑαυτῷ τὴν Τύχην, ἥτις αὐτὸν ἐπιθείσα Κικέρωνι καὶ Λεπίδῳ καὶ Πάνσᾳ καὶ Ἰρτίῳ καὶ Μάρκῳ Ἀντωνίῳ, ταῖς ἐκείνων ἀριστεταῖς καὶ χερσὶ καὶ νίκαις καὶ στόλοις καὶ πολέμοις καὶ στρατοπέδοις γενόμενον πρῶτον εἰς ὕψος ἄρασα καὶ καταβαλοῦσα τούτους, δι' ὧν ἀνέβη, μόνον κατέλειπεν. ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ἐπολιτεύετο Κικέρων καὶ Λέπιδος ἐστρατήγει καὶ Πάνσας ἐνίκᾳ καὶ Ἰρτιος ἐπίπτε καὶ Ἀντώνιος ὕβριζεν.²⁸²

And as one would carve out the maker's name on a great monument, he recorded Fortune as his own maker, who has thrust him upon the lives of Cicero, Lepidus, Pansa, Hirtius, and Mark Antony, and raised him up high, having become first citizen by way of their deeds of valour, their deeds, their victories, their expeditions and wars and legions; and Fortune threw these men down, through whom he climbed up, and left him standing alone. For him now Cicero governed the state, Lepidus led an army, Pansa conquered in war and Hirtius fell, and Antony caused outrage.

In this passage it is presented as if Cicero governed the state (ἐπολιτεύετο) as part of Augustus' destiny; (the end of) Cicero's political career is thus connected with the rise of Octavian-Augustus. This remark is a reference to the cooperation between Cicero and Augustus in 44–43 BC, a 'pact' which is described in full at *Cic.* 44–45.²⁸³ There, Cicero is presented as the tutor of the νεανίσκος Octavian on the basis of his power (δύναμις) with the people and senate; he is even said to have been called father by Octavian.²⁸⁴

The treatise *Whether an Old Man Should Engage in Politics*, which I have discussed briefly above (§ 3.1.2), is crucial for understanding Plutarch's portrayal of the relationship between Cicero and Octavian and its negative outcome for Cicero personally. In the first place, Cicero's fatherly connection with Octavian is in correspondence with Plutarch's ideal of the citizen leader who can supervise and educate younger as-

²⁸² *On the Fortune of the Romans* 319e.

²⁸³ On the pact, SWAIN 1996: 159–160; MOLES 1988: 197.

²⁸⁴ *Cic.* 45.1. Plutarch initially emphasizes the difference in age and status between Cicero and Octavian by calling the latter a 'boy' in varying terms (νεανίσκος, 44.1; παῖς, 44.5; μαιράκιον, 45.1). Octavian's boyhood is made undone by his first military successes, after which he suddenly is called a "young man" (νέος ἀνὴρ, 45.4); it is the young man who betrays Cicero in 46.1.

piring politicians. A political veteran himself in 43 BC, Cicero was well suited for this role of experienced adviser of the young. Yet Cicero fails to become an ethical leader of others on multiple counts. The passage quoted above illuminates one of these: Octavian merely *used* the deeds of Cicero and others in order to climb up to the position of *primus inter pares*. Although the biography acknowledges that initially there was a kind of didactic relationship, this relationship did not survive the push of Octavian's desire for power; Cicero was merely a servant to his needs.

The primary reason, however, why Cicero could not live up to the standard of the exemplary leader seems to have been Plutarch's belief that in his dealings with Octavian he was blinded by ambition. Cicero's behaviour is well comparable with the list of pitfalls for elder politicians that Plutarch provides in *Whether an Old Man Should Engage in Politics*. One of these pitfalls is feelings of envy as a result of the political game, which in younger men can be positively termed as competition, zeal, or ambition, but in senior statesmen is definitely very inappropriate.²⁸⁵ The old man should be "beyond envy",²⁸⁶ advising and supporting the younger man unstintingly. Another pitfall for elder men is excessive mingling in city affairs, attending to every little point of contention, and overestimating their importance in the city. The senior citizen should take action only when it concerns a matter of national safety or when honour and propriety are at stake.²⁸⁷ Moreover, at 795a Plutarch adds that the senior should be present in silence at assembly meetings, acting as an arbiter in the political conflict (βραβεύων φιλοτιμίας πολιτικῆς ἀμιλλαν), correcting and instructing his younger colleagues where needed without censuring them (ἄνευ ψόγου) and without envy (ἀφθόνως),²⁸⁸ removing strife (φιλονεικία), slander (βλασφημία), and anger (ὀργαί) from the debate.

This analysis provides the theoretical background to the account of Cicero's 'Philippic' period in the biography, explaining on the ethical level why, according to Plutarch, Cicero's relationship with Octavian

²⁸⁵ *Old Man* 796a.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*: δεῖ πορρωτάτω τοῦ φθονεῖν ὄντα τὸν πολιτικὸν γέροντα.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.* 794d.

²⁸⁸ I follow the conjecture made by REISKE; the manuscripts have ἀφόβως. Within the language of competition and contention used in this passage, however, ἀφθόνως is the better option.

did not turn out in his favour. As the biographer notes, it was hatred for Antony (μῖσος), and his natural weakness for honour (ἡ φύσις ἡττων οὔσα τιμῆς) that made Cicero attach himself to the young Augustus; moreover, he believed that it would gain him more power in the state (νομίζοντα προσλαμβάνειν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τὴν ἐκείνου δύναμιν).²⁸⁹ This stands in contrast to the teachings of *Whether an Old Man Should Engage in Politics* which prescribes that elderly politicians should be free from zealousness and envy. Plutarch's evaluation of Cicero's attitude towards Octavian is of great significance within the narrative tradition: it portrays a man who has lost sight of ethical concerns and acts from egocentric reasons. Cicero would not have assisted Octavian out of concern for the public welfare;²⁹⁰ he would have acted on a desire for power, which the pact with Octavian in fact delivered to him, as Plutarch emphasizes. Cicero's power in the city reached its greatest height in that period (τοῦ δὲ Κικέρωνος ἀκμὴν ἔσχεν ἡ δύναμις ἐν τῇ πόλει τότε μεγίστην) and ruling like this, he could do whatever he wanted (καὶ κρατῶν ὅσον ἐβούλετο...)—to fight Antony, send the consuls out to war, and make the senate vote for a proposal that Octavian receive the status of praetor.²⁹¹

It is difficult to see whether, in his depiction of Cicero's lust for power, Plutarch is responding to a common theme cultivated by the declamation schools (Cicero *transfuga*) and, for example, by the historiographer Asinius Pollio who wrote an account of the fall of the Republic unfavourable to Cicero.²⁹² It might also be a personal judgment based on the post-consulate speeches, which Plutarch disliked for their boastful nature and continuous repetition of the *acta consulis*.²⁹³ At any rate, part of this evaluation of Cicero appears to have been inspired

²⁸⁹ *Cic.* 45.1.

²⁹⁰ But see *Ant.* 19.1, where Plutarch notes that Octavian broke the friendship with Cicero because he realized the latter was striving to restore the old republican constitution! Though conspicuous, it is the only place I have found where this sentiment is attested; here, for once, Cicero's political conduct aligns with that of Cato the Younger.

²⁹¹ *Cic.* 45.3; cf. *Ant.* 17.1. On the promise of political power, see also Cass. Dio 46.42.2–3. On the general disastrous effects of this relationship for Cicero, App. *B. Civ.* 3.12.82, 3.14.92–92; Cass. Dio 46.43.4–5.

²⁹² On the influence of Asinius Pollio on the Greek imperial historiographers, see DRUMMOND 2015: 439–440, 444 (with bibliography) and HOSE 1994: 259–264; cf. GABBA 1956 on Appian; PELLING 1988: 27 and PELLING 2002: 12–13 on Plutarch. For the theme of Cicero *transfuga*, see [Sall.] *Inv. in Cic.* 7.

²⁹³ *Cic.* 24.1–2.

by Augustus' autobiography: Plutarch remarks (without mentioning a source) that Augustus admitted that he used Cicero's love of power to his own advantage (χρήσταιτο τῇ Κικέρωνος ἐν δέοντι φιλαρχίᾳ).²⁹⁴

Although the historical Cicero contended in his philosophical works that philosophy and eloquence could not (should not) exist without each other, the historiographical Cicero of the empire is not able to walk his own talk. Highly trained in philosophy, he lacks the philosophical strength needed to restrain his ambitions and stay away from party politics. Moreover, he is no suitable ethical teacher of others, as his failed relationship with Octavian illustrates. Finally, Cicero's love of power makes his behaviour not only morally questionable, it makes him extremely vulnerable as well.

3.3 PHILISCUS AND CICERO: THE WOULD-BE PHILOSOPHER

We started this chapter with Dio's scathing judgment about Cicero's political performance and the exile in 58 BC, and it is to Dio's account that I would finally like to return. In §2 of this chapter we already looked at Cicero's incompetency in using frank speech for the benefit of the state. At this point, it is worthwhile to have a last look at the portrayal of Cicero's political choices and his particular lack of philosophical skills in exile. We can understand Dio's account more clearly when we consider it from the perspective of the imperial ideals about leadership, as they have been described above. Within the narrative of book 38, Dio emphasizes two elements of Cicero's political action: his involvement in faction strife and his irrational behaviour.

As related in the beginning of §2 above, Cicero's deeds in the year 58 definitely fall into the category of political scheming (the plot against Caesar and Pompey, his public abuse of Caesar). Unfortunately, as a result of Cicero's exaggerated belief in his own cunning (φρόνησις)²⁹⁵ he is greatly deceived by his fellow senators, especially by Pompey whom he considers to be his friend.²⁹⁶ The historiographer frames Cicero as

²⁹⁴ *Cic.* 45.5. Cf. MOLES 1988: 197; LINTOTT 2013: 204.

²⁹⁵ *Cass. Dio* 38.14.3; cf. 16.1.

a man who acts solely out of concern for himself. He narrates how Cicero chooses to stay quiet in the senate about the laws favouring Caesar's position which Clodius wants to propose, in exchange for personal safety; and how he places trust in men like Pompey and Piso in the belief that such pacts will make him victorious in the matter of the Clodian laws.²⁹⁷ Furthermore, Cicero risks causing serious civil conflict. When he realizes that neither Crassus nor Pompey will defend him from Clodius' attacks he becomes frightened and tries to take up arms—again, the historiographer notes (φοβηθεὶς αὐθις ἐπεχείρησε μὲν ὅπλα ἄρασθαι), αὐθις creating the suggestion that Cicero's desire for arms was symptomatic.²⁹⁸ Among other things, he was openly abusing (προεπηλάκιζε) Pompey. Cato and Hortensius restrain him, lest his conduct would unleash a civil war (μὴ καὶ ἐμφύλιος ἐκ τούτου πόλεμος γένηται).²⁹⁹ In shame and with a bad name (μετὰ κακοδοξίας), Cicero feigns a voluntary departure from Rome.³⁰⁰

These events, then, precede the digression about Cicero's sojourn in Macedonia, which appears to be inspired by Plutarch on more than one level. As we have seen in § 3.2.2, Plutarch relates in the biography that Cicero could not enjoy his visits from many gentlemen ambassadors who came from all over Greece, "and became petty and weak as a result of his misfortune, and downcast, in a way you would not expect from a man who has such an extensive ethical knowledge" (καὶ τῷ φρονήματι μικρὸς ἄγαν καὶ ταπεινὸς ὑπὸ τῆς συμφορᾶς γεγονῶς καὶ συνεσταλμένος, ὥς οὐκ ἂν τις ἄνδρα παιδείᾳ συμβεβιωκότα τοσαύτη προσεδόκησε). Although Cicero often asked his friends to call him a philosopher instead of an orator, he does not act like one; public opinion (δόξα) made him incapable of emotionally detaching himself from the situation.³⁰¹ As I believe, it is this analysis by Plutarch—which might have been more topical in the imperial period than we can gather from the extant sources—which Dio works out into the long diatribe between Cicero and

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.* 38.14.3 (ἡπατήθη), 15.1 (ἐπὶ τὸν Κικέρωνα ἀπάτην), 16.2 (ἀπατηθείς); cf. 29.3 where Cicero is warned μὴ σε ἐξαπατάτω τούθ' ὅτι καὶ φίλους τινὰς τῶν δυνατῶν ἔχεις.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.* 38.13–14 and 16.1–2, respectively.

²⁹⁸ In the context of book 38 it logically refers back to Cicero's plans to assassinate Pompey and Caesar (38.9.2).

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.* 38.17.4. Cf. Plut. *Cato min.* 35.1.

³⁰⁰ Cass. Dio 38.17.4.

³⁰¹ Plut. *Cic.* 32.4–5.

a certain Greek philosopher called Philiscus.³⁰² Certainly not without an important dose of humour, Dio presents Cicero as a helpless man who is weeping and behaving like a woman (θρηνῶν καὶ γυναικείως διακείμενος).³⁰³ Just as Plutarch does in the biography, Dio's Philiscus expresses wonder over his lack of emotional control, despite his "extensive and multifaceted education" and his experience as an advocate (πολλῆς μὲν παιδείας καὶ παντοδαπῆς μετεσχηκότα, πολλοῖς δὲ καὶ συνηγορηκότα).³⁰⁴ Moreover, he is not self-sufficient (αὐτάρκης) in his present situation—a thought that derives from Platonic philosophy but is also part of Plutarch's ideal of the statesman.³⁰⁵ Cicero himself admits that he is in need of proper philosophical advice from Philiscus:

³⁰² The format of the diatribe corresponds with the literary tradition of consolation. On the diatribe, see CLAASSEN 1999: 86 who defines it as the genre in which a speaker carries the intellectual burden of the argument, but involves a second person as the motor behind his speech. Others, such as Gowing 1998 or Montecalvo 2010, refer to it as (a Platonic type of) dialogue in accordance with Philiscus' own words (38.18.4, καὶ γὰρ ἄν τι ὠφελήσασθαι σε διαλεξάμενος); it is also often simply categorized as 'speech', e.g. WHITMARSH 2001: 137 n. 13, MILLAR 1961. KEELINE 2018: 171–176 proposes we should see the interaction between Cicero and Philiscus as representing two *suasoriae* or a *controversia*; cf. BURDEN-STREVEVS 2018: 113 on other Ciceronian speeches in Dio's work. See also KEMEZIS 2014: 289–290 who argues that the 'dialogue' was a later addition to the book since it contradicts the narrative on some points (for example, Philiscus confirms Cicero's wisdom and courage (38.18.3, 22.1–4) in contradiction of the narrator's judgment in 38.14.3, 16.1, 17.4). In my view, these contradictions may just as well be intentional, for they support the dramatic irony surrounding the Dionean figure of Cicero, who fails as a statesman despite all his intellectual talents. More pointedly, Cicero ignores Philiscus' advice to withdraw to a life of leisure and philosophy and his subsequent prediction of his downfall (38.29) only to end up dead and on display on the rostra (in 47.8), Philiscus' prophecy having been fulfilled. For the figure of Philiscus, see now the overview in MONTECALVO 2014: 278–282.

³⁰³ Cass. Dio 38.18.1.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁵ Cass. Dio 38.18.5, 19.3. The allusion is probably to Pl. *Rep.* 3.387d, in which context the matter of crying is also addressed; see GOWING 1998: 386 (also next note). In *Rep.* 3.387c–388a it is argued that leaders of state should not cry (as part of a bigger argument that all passages from Homer in which men or gods are crying should be abolished); in 387d, Socrates asserts that the Guardians should be αὐτάρκεις πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἥκιστα ἐτέρου προσδεῖται, "self-sufficient for living a good life, and surpassing others in having least need of others". Cf. *Menex.* 248a for the same ideal of self-sufficiency in the good man who is σώφρων, ἀνδρείος, and φρόνιμος. For αὐτάρκεια as a quality of the perfect Plutarchan statesman, see e.g. *Alex.* 53.1 (Callisthenes), *Numa* 1.2 (αὐτάρκη γενέσθαι πρὸς ἀρετήν), *Dem.* 1.2. See RAAFLAUB 2004: 184–187 on *autarkeia* as essential part of the Athenian concept of freedom, with further references; COOLSAET 1993: 209–310 on *autarkeia* as moral (aristocratic) ideal in classical and imperial philosophy. While Philiscus' framework for evaluating Cicero's political behaviour is clearly Platonic, he mixes in many *topoi* from Stoic treatises on exile as well, most conspicuously Musonius Rufus; compare e.g. Mus. *De ex.* 10–11 p. 50 Hense on the possibility for a man in exile to possess ἀνδρεία, δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη and φρόνησις, the same values that Philiscus says still reside in Cicero. To use GOWING's words (1998: 378), the dialogue is "a hodgepodge of philosophical commonplaces". CLAASSEN 1999 compares the narrative of Cicero's exile in Plutarch and Dio.

Ὡσπερ γὰρ τῶν φαρμάκων, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τῶν λόγων καὶ διαφοραὶ πολλαὶ καὶ δυνάμεις ποικίλαι εἰσὶν, ὥστ' οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν εἰ καὶ ἐμὲ τὸν λαμπρὸν ἔν τε τῇ γερουσίᾳ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τοῖς τε δικαστηρίοις σοφία τινὶ καταιονήσειας.³⁰⁶

For as with drugs, so there are many different kinds of words, with various powers; it will not be surprising, then, if you can steep me, brilliant though I am in the senate and the assemblies and the courthouse, in some wisdom.

Right before speaking these words, Cicero asked Philiscus to take away the mist (of sadness) from his soul, and to bring him back to the “light of old” (τὸ ἀρχαῖον φῶς). Contrary to what the educated reader might expect, Cicero is not referring here to some sort of Platonic light of true wisdom, the light of philosophy, but to his political reputation.³⁰⁷ Despite Philiscus’ admonitions to resort to a leisurely life and follow the example of Xenophon and Thucydides, who both took up a life of writing in the country,³⁰⁸ Cicero will in the end ignore every bit of advice Philiscus offers to him. He rushes back to the Forum as soon as his honour is restored, which in the narrative happens immediately after their conversation.³⁰⁹ In the passage cited above, it is already implied that Cicero is not interested in sharing Philiscus’ kind of wisdom: the term λαμπρός, with which Cicero describes his political reputation, picks up his earlier metaphor of the light of old, and suggests that the only light Cicero is concerned about is the public spotlight.³¹⁰ His ambitions, as they frequently do in Plutarch’s biography, again get the better of him.

Within the dialogue, there is a marked contrast between Cicero’s irrational behaviour on the one hand, and his ethical excellence on the other. Philiscus admires him as a man who has reached the highest lev-

³⁰⁶ Cass. Dio 38.19.1.

³⁰⁷ GOWING 1998: 386 notes that this passage is modelled on *Alc.* II, 150d-e. There, Alcibiades expresses his readiness to learn how to behave towards gods and men on the basis of true knowledge of right and wrong. However, the metaphor of removing a “mist” from someone’s eyes goes as far back as Homer *Il.* 5.127–128, later becoming especially popular in magical texts. I thank Bert van den Berg for this observation.

³⁰⁸ Cass. Dio 38.28.1–2.

³⁰⁹ Cass. Dio 38.30.1.

³¹⁰ BURDEN-STREVS 2020: 53–60 posits that the focus in the entire conversation actually lies on oratory. In this way, the exchange between Philiscus and Cicero moralizes and explains the orator’s downfall as a result of his eloquence in the narrative.

els of wisdom (see φρονιμώτατος in 22.1) and justice (δικαιοσύνη in 22.2).³¹¹ In fact, he possesses all four of the cardinal virtues laid out by Plato in the *State*: courage (ἀνδρεία), temperance (σωφροσύνη), a sense of justice (δικαιοσύνη), and wisdom (φρόνησις).³¹² The contrast is intensified by Philiscus' use of the tropes of consolation which Cicero himself applies to exile in the *Tusculan Disputations*—while not every reader might notice the specific allusions, certainly most educated Romans (Greeks included) knew that Cicero produced his fair share of consolatory literature, and also wrote on the topic of banishment.³¹³

One explanation for this inherent tension centres on Dio's main source for Cicero's attitude in exile: the letters to Atticus.³¹⁴ Jo-Marie Claassen is convinced that the exchange between Philiscus and Cicero is a "point-by-point refutation" of *Att.* 3.15, written at the place of exile; this letter is remarkable for the desperation and mad grief Cicero expresses about his banishment. Within the Ciceronian tradition of the Empire, the letters are frequently employed as evidence for Cicero's personal comportment in situations of political conflict.³¹⁵ Another explanation for Dio's ambiguous portrayal of Cicero revolves around the narrative structure of the *Roman History*: most commentators agree that the behaviour in exile is meant to accentuate the (negative) characterization in the narrative.³¹⁶ Dio, then, would have actively tried to show up Cicero's faults in this dialogue. However, this latter interpretation wholly ignores Philiscus' positive evaluation of Cicero's ethical qualities.

Philiscus' mixed appraisal of Cicero as a statesman serves, above all, to show the limits of his ethical competence. The surrounding narrative

³¹¹ Cass. Dio 38.22.1.

³¹² MONTECALVO 2010: 64, on 38.22.1–4. For the cardinal civic virtues being wisdom (here presented as σοφία), courage, temperance, and justice, see Pl. *Rep.* 4.427e and further. On the "four virtues template", which underlies many of Dio's portraits of Roman politicians, WELCH 2019.

³¹³ Compare Cass. Dio 38.23 (disfranchisement and banishment are only evil by convention (νόμος) and popular opinion (δοκήσις), and harm neither body nor soul) with Cic. *Tusc.* 3.80; 5.106; and 24 (displacement is not an evil) with *Tusc.* 5.108–109. More in MILLAR 1961: 16 n.60 (with other parallels in exile literature generally); GOWING 1998: 383–384.

³¹⁴ Pace GOWING 1998: 384 n.32, who "remains skeptical" that Dio had read the letters.

³¹⁵ Sen. *Dial.* 10.5.2 and Plut. *Cic.* 37.2 were discussed above. The practice extended well beyond antiquity: e.g. Petrarca *Ep.* 24.3, and Bruni *Cicero novus* p. 462 ed. VITI 1996.

³¹⁶ BURDEN-STREVEVS 2020: 58–60; MONTECALVO 2010: 70 ("Cassius Dio's final judgment of Cicero"); GOWING 1998: 383. Negative views in LINTOTT 1997: 2514–2515, VAN STEKELENBURG 1971: 25 and MILLAR 1961; in the same vein, WELCH 2019: 105–106. See n. 18 above.

and the dialogue work together to demonstrate Cicero's philosophical and ethical potential and his inability to meet that potential. The narrative invites the reader to see Cicero as a factionalist, and therefore a bad statesman, who creates discord rather than harmony in the state, and who cannot separate his personal ambitions from his public function. On the other hand, the dialogue, especially Philiscus' discourse parts, invites the reader to see what Cicero could *also* have been, had he been able to make the connection between his cognitive abilities, which provided him with all the cardinal virtues, and his practical conduct in public life. The fact that Philiscus converses with Cicero at length in the language of philosophy is already a remarkable acknowledgement of his abilities in this discipline. The Cicero of Cassius Dio's *Roman History* is ethically competent to the extent that he has virtue, and due to his extensive education knows how to be wise; but he fails in the competencies of practicing ethical rules himself and instructing others about the correct moral behaviour. What is worse, he is not just unable to bring his ethical excellence into practice, but he cannot even instruct *himself* to behave rationally and according to the standards expected of a Roman intellectual.

3.4 CONCLUSIONS

Without trying to forge any interdependence between Plutarch and Dio, it is clear that Dio's Cicero is evaluated along the same moral standards as political leaders in Plutarch's work. Self-control and reason, justice, and education are important qualifications for a political leader in Philiscus' dialogue with Cicero and also elsewhere in the narrative.³¹⁷ The Platonic scheme, moreover, of the philosopher-leader is key to understanding Philiscus' analysis of Cicero's behaviour; similarly to Plutarch's view that Cicero actualized Plato's prophecy about ideal leadership, Philiscus states that Cicero has all the prerequisites for being a Platonic leader, but he fails to be that type of leader in the public space. Just as Cicero in Plutarch's account loses the capacity to

³¹⁷ As WELCH 2019 has argued for multiple historical figures, including Cicero, in the Roman history.

reflect on the ethical implications of his actions after the Catilinarian conspiracy, the Dionean Cicero is indeed too concerned with his own reputation to protect the common good adequately—or himself for that matter. One of the worst results of his ethical incompetence is that he risks stirring up civil war, as Dio relates at the beginning of book 38.³¹⁸

In Dio's history as a whole, the dominant influence of φιλοτιμία is indicated as being one of the main deficits of the republican political system.³¹⁹ The charge of ambition against Cicero is therefore symptomatic, a part of Dio's historiographical programme. However, that does not prevent it from being a conspicuous element in the narrative of Cicero's life, and a particular moral criticism he has in common with Plutarch. Furthermore, far from being an exclusive aspect of the 'Greek' tradition, the judgment is shared by Latin writers. Seneca complains, too, about Cicero's lack of composure and his excessive ambition in *On Shortness of Life*, especially in the light of his general moral excellence as a Roman citizen.

In one of the few articles addressing Cicero's lack of philosophy in Plutarch's biography, Simon Swain argues that because, in Plutarch's eyes, Cicero lacked *paideia* he was unable to make it as a statesman. Swain also notes that the key concept for defining the strengths and weaknesses of Cicero, Cato, and Brutus in their eponymous *Lives* is, indeed, philosophy. I agree with the latter remark but not with the former. I hope to have shown that according to Seneca, Plutarch, and Dio there was in principle nothing wrong with Cicero's ethical training; more than that, his intellectualism, and—for the Greek writers—especially his Greek studies, promised great success in his political career. Plutarch and Dio-Philiscus even believe that around the time of the consulship, Cicero fulfilled the Platonic ideal of the philosopher-leader they so cherished.

The imperial historiographers envisage a Cicero who meets several ethical competencies: he is a well-educated man, who read Greek philosophy and had many contacts among Greek intellectuals in Rome and the province; he also excelled as a state leader during his consul-

³¹⁸ Cass. Dio 38.17.4.

³¹⁹ KUHN-CHEN 2002: 168–169; BURDEN-STREVENS 2020: 215–227. See also the introduction to chapter 4, §§1.1–2.

ship, when he demonstrated great cognitive abilities in solving the conspiracy of Catiline and became a model of patriotism by protecting Rome from war. From that point on, however, Cicero symbolizes the leader who loses his sensitivity for the Roman ethics code, and fails to meet the criteria required to become an ethical model for others.

As we have seen, successful statesmanship for Plutarch and Seneca consists in a virtuous disposition, a thorough education, the ability to act in response to one's cognitive reflection on ethical problems, and the instructive effect of this ability on other people. Especially for Plutarch, teaching ethical norms and values to others is a vital quality of the (morally) accomplished citizen. The continuation of certain moral standards through the leadership of individual citizens is part and parcel of the Roman culture of exemplarity. This culture puts high demands on its members, demands of moral excellence and consistency which were difficult to meet, and apparently only available to a select group of men, among whom Cato the Younger is one of the most conspicuous figures. He fulfills the cycle of ethical competencies with few missteps—and the missteps he did make, like drinking too much or dressing inappropriately, as tradition tells,³²⁰ were easily forgiven since these did not affect his public leadership. One of the clearest, tangible results of his ethical proficiency is his collection of followers who continued to promote his moral programme, from Favonius to Thrasea Paetus and Seneca himself.³²¹

I have made an attempt to uncover the deeper reasons behind the criticism of Cicero's political comportment, which depend upon imperial ideals about ethical competence. As I have shown in the pages above the problem of Cicero's behaviour, as it is identified in the imperial sources, should be localized in his inability to apply his high command of philosophical tenets and his moral excellence to his political action. This is, in a sense, a charge of hypocrisy, and that is indeed an important theme in the declamatory and historical tradition. But the ancient debate revolves around more than signalling a lack of constancy or inconsistent behaviour on Cicero's part. The imperial narrative of Cicero's life is informed by a specific view of exemplary leadership. The

³²⁰ Mart. *Ep.* 2.89; Val. Max. 3.6.7.

³²¹ For Cato's moral exemplarity in Seneca's writings, see, briefly, chapter 2, § 1.3.

qualities assessed in a moral exemplar are socially oriented: ambition, feelings of competition (envy), conflict-solving, and patriotism were the criteria according to which citizen- and statesmanship were judged. This particular framework of social values is important to keep in mind when analyzing the portrayal of Roman leaders; ultimately, their image was not defined by personal character traits, but by the way in which they managed to translate their personal skills into acts of public benefit. In the literary texts we have discussed, political figures are selected to demonstrate the proper application of the Roman ethics code to public action. This is where Cicero fails, at least in the second half of his public life. Moreover, within the narrative of the fall of the Republic, imperial authors include Cicero's actions as part of the explanation for the dysfunctionality of the republican institution. Instead of morally improving the state by demonstrating essential Roman virtues, Cicero acts upon the kind of desires that were already the death of a city state, like ambition and contentiousness. Indeed, the main point made by the authors discussed in this chapter concerns the necessity of ethical leadership in times of civic crisis (*stasis*).

In sum, what is at stake in the portrayal of Cicero's exemplary leadership is the imperial belief in a type of intellectual government that is able to place the public good above personal benefits, which is the only way a state may prosper. Ethical education and personal virtue are envisaged to be the ultimate foundation for all political action and the fountainhead of harmony and concord among the Roman people. Within this cultural ideal, Cicero has an important role to play, being the archetype of the intellectual statesman. However, his career path eventually demonstrates the fallibility of the civic leader: having once attained the highest form of leadership possible, Cicero's desire for recognition eventually exceeds his ability for ethical reflection.

CHAPTER FOUR

Ciceronian speeches in Appian and Dio

1. Introduction

1.1 THE VOX CICERONIANA IN GREEK HISTORIOGRAPHY

In the previous chapters, we have studied the reception of Cicero's life and career from the angle of imperial 'portraits of a statesman', and we have examined in particular the relationship between Cicero's intellectual qualities and his political action. In the present chapter, I would like to look more closely at the representation of Cicero's speech, his oratorical style, and the formulation of his political ideals. Perhaps surprisingly, the most elaborate 'reperformances' of Cicero's oratory are found not in Latin writers, but in the Greek historiographies of Appian and Cassius Dio. In the works of the Greek historiographers Cicero regains his voice, though it is significantly different from the voice familiar to the reader of his own work. As we will see in this chapter, Cicero's own speeches usually provided a solid basis on which to build a new version.¹ Yet this does not mean that the imperial writers cannot present rather idiosyncratic interpretations of Cicero's political rhetoric.

¹ However, it was not strictly necessary for the historiographers to possess a physical speech, as Cassius Dio's 'complete' version of Cicero's amnesty speech attests: Cass. Dio 44.23–33. On Dio's use of an existing speech, VAN STEKELENBURG 1971: 63; FECHNER 1986: 59; MILLAR 1961: 17–18 assumes there is no parallel for this speech in Livy. The amnesty speech, as we know from several sources, was delivered by Cicero on the second day after Caesar's murder. Information is restricted to Cicero himself (*Phil.* 1.1) and to a select group of later writers: as far as tradition allows us to see, only the epitomes of Florus and Velleius, and Plutarch, Appian, and Dio mention it: Flor. 2.17; Vell.

My analysis will concentrate in particular on the Greek recreation and imitation of Cicero's *Philippics*, which are presented as ultimate examples of Ciceronian rhetoric.² The performance of the *Philippics* constituted a significant moment in the final years of the Republic, and this is clearly reflected in the Roman histories of Appian and Cassius Dio. There, the *Philippics* provided the material for two large, conspicuous antilogies which appear at breaking points in the narrative. Appian (*B. Civ.* 3.52–60) composed an altercation between Cicero and one of Antony's main supporters, C. Calpurnius Piso, during a three-day senate assembly discussing the war at Mutina (between Decimus Brutus and Antony).³ Dio, in turn, created a semi-historical dispute in the senate between Cicero and Q. Fufius Calenus which bridges two books (45.18–46.28).⁴ Both antilogies address the same question: should Antony be proclaimed a public enemy? Consequently, the Cicero–Calenus debate is an interesting mirror piece to the Cicero–Piso debate in Appian, though the points of contact between both sets of speeches have received less interest than one would expect.⁵ In my discussion

Pat. 2.58; Plut. *Cic.* 42; App. *B. Civ.* 2.142.593; Dio Cass. 44.23–33. Moreover, Florus, Velleius, and Appian refer to the speech only in passing. It is my belief that Dio took Plutarch's succinct remarks concerning the contents of the speech in *Cic.* 42 as an incentive to write a complete deliberative speech.

² The 'Philippics' are the only sample of Ciceronian rhetoric in Appian's historiography. Dio represents Ciceronian speech on two other occasions apart from the 'Philippic' exchange: the first is the dialogue with Philiscus in book 38.18–29, which I discuss in chapter 3; the second is the amnesty speech at 44.23–33, which is a fascinating interpretation of Cicero's political ideology, and which I hope to study in a future project.

³ VAN STEKELENBURG 1971: 78–79 and GABBA 1956: 167n.1. Cass. Dio 46.29.2 also suggests that the debate took only three days. This is historically incorrect, as MANUWALD 2007: 23 points out. Cf. GOWING 1992: 235n.26. Antony himself left Rome at the end of November 44 BC, see MANUWALD 2007: 21. L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus was a well-known and long-time rival of Cicero (he was also the addressee of the speech *Against Piso*). Cicero openly inveighs against Piso in *Phil.* 12, a speech delivered in March 43 BC. See further MÜNZER 1897; MANUWALD 2007: 35; VAN DER BLOM 2013; MANUWALD 2019, III (no. 127).

⁴ Q. Fufius Calenus was a familiar figure in Roman politics since his praetorship of 59 BC. In the civil war between Pompey and Caesar he stood on Caesar's side, and Cicero's letters to Atticus tell of his bad relationship with Calenus. In *Att.* 11.8.2, dated December 48 BC, Cicero, then at Brundisium, notes: *Fufius est illic, mihi inimicissimus*. In the words of SHACKLETON BAILEY 1986: 395, he was "personally and politically obnoxious to Cicero". After Caesar's assassination, Calenus fulfilled quite a central role in the Roman forum as a supporter of Antony: MÜNZER 1910 and MANUWALD 2007: 38. He also commanded two legions at Philippi in 42 BC. His involvement in the war against Brutus and Cassius is described at length by Appian and Dio: e.g. Cass. Dio 42.13–14, 46.32.2; App. *B. Civ.* 2.58.239, 5.3.14, 5.51.213. There is ample evidence for the antagonism between Cicero and Calenus in the *Philippics*: *Phil.* 3.20, 5.25, 7.5, 8.11–19, 10.3–6, 11.15, 12.3–4.

⁵ GOWING 1992: 235–239 and KEELINE 2018: 177–188 directly compare the two sets of speeches; VAN STEKELENBURG 1971: 78–98 is mainly concerned with *Quellenforschung*.

of these historiographical responses to Ciceronian rhetoric, I will treat the speeches written for Cicero on an equal level as those written for his opponents, since the latter also develop themes derived from the *Philippics*.

Despite Cicero's famous reputation as orator and rhetorician (a subject I will return to shortly), the 'Philippics' by Appian and Dio do not occupy a positive place in the narrative. Cicero's speeches are received ambiguously by his fellow citizens. Nor do the historiographers themselves, as we will see, encourage the reader to regard the speeches as admirable specimens of rhetorical fluency. On the contrary, they are presented as part of a larger senatorial debate in which Cicero does not have the moral high ground. Instead, Piso and Calenus are the ones who deliver stylistically impressive and (semi-)effective speeches.

The imperial recreation of Cicero's style of speaking reacted to a diverse image of Cicero as historical figure, rhetorical model, and historical source. To start with, he was a major political player of the first century BC, and his character and actions receive their due attention, as the previous chapters demonstrate. The historiographers took care to reflect this ethos in the speech parts. For example, Cicero's habitual boasting about himself and his achievements is an important element in Cassius Dio's Ciceronian 'Philippic' in book 45.⁶ A second aspect to consider is the imperial writers' imitation of the rhetorical model of Cicero. Writing a speech for the master of Rhetoric invited the historiographer to pull out their own rhetorical toolbox.⁷ The historiographers could use as many other rhetorical models for their composition as they liked and integrate a mix of Hellenistic and Roman rhetorical theory, but in the case of a famous, well-published orator like Cicero, the main point of reference would remain this particular orator.⁸ Thirdly, the imperial historiographers interact with Cicero as a

⁶ See below, §§ 3.2.3–4.

⁷ LA BUA 2019: 85–93 gives no evidence for the reading of the *Philippics* in the Roman schools. According to LA BUA, the *Verrines* and the *Catilinarians* were the most popular speeches in "Latin-speaking regions and Romanized Egypt" (89).

⁸ The collections of *suasoriae* and *controversiae* made by Seneca the Elder illustrate that the *Philippics* were a popular text in the declamation schools of the Empire; the 'Philippics' written by Appian and Dio are usually regarded as a reflection of and reaction to this popularity. The most 'comprehensive' account of Appian and Dio's 'Philippics' in relation to Roman declamation is now KEELINE 2018: 177–188, which is still very short.

historical source. The historiographers could mine his public speeches for dates on major events, for names and the reputations of prominent politicians, for relationships and feuds within the political parties, for Roman customs—whatever they were looking for. As this chapter demonstrates, the historiographers frequently oscillate between Cicero in his capacity as historical source, rhetorical model, and historical personality.

1.2 SAMPLING CICERO: SPEECHES AS HISTORICAL EXEMPLA

We can use different terms in reference to Ciceronian speeches in imperial historiography: reconstruction, reperformance, or imitation. The advantage of the term *reconstruction* is that it acknowledges a historicizing tendency, an attempt to get closer to the historical Cicero, which explains the historiographers' blatant desire to characterize Cicero's personality and actions with great colour. On the other hand, by interpreting the orations as *reperformances* or creative *imitations* the focus comes to lie on the historiographer's art of composition in rewriting Ciceronian pieces, whether or not with a particular speech of Cicero in mind, or even on the table in front of him. I argue, however, that the imperial revival of Cicero's voice contains both a literary-rhetorical and historical component. We need a comprehensive approach to Ciceronian speeches in Greek historiography, which I will outline here.

Quite recently, Adam Kemezis has proposed the theory that Cassius Dio's reconstructions of republican oratory function primarily as a *negative example* of first-century decision-making and the increasingly dynastic nature of politics. Kemezis has recognized the use of three distinctive narrative modes in the *Roman History*: the "republican" mode, the "*dynasteiai*" mode, and the "monarchical" mode. Set speeches are one element to be considered in determining any of these modes. To the narrative of the late republican period Kemezis attributes the 'dynastic' (*dynasteiai*) mode. This mode illustrates the focus on personal interests instead of public benefit, resulting in policy that is driven chiefly by conflicts between a select group of influential political figures. Φιλονικία and φιλοτιμία create a further downward spiral in

which no room is left for politicians to excel by their virtue alone or to act truly in accordance with what is best for the state. This observation applies not only to Cassius Dio; Appian, too, spotted obvious flaws in the republican system.⁹ In Kemezis' eyes, the speeches included in the narrative of the late Republic, deliberative speeches in particular, serve to elucidate the futility of oratory when one or two powerful magistrates hold the reins. The figure of Cicero would especially exemplify this.¹⁰ Kemezis proposes that we see the speeches as a way "to portray rhetoric itself, and how it functioned, what sorts of propaganda were effective, and how impotent more enlightened forms of discourse could be".¹¹ He does not support the popular view, which I have also outlined in chapter 1 (§ 3.1.2), that speeches are only a means to illustrate the intentions of the actors or the motives behind main events in the narrative.¹²

This last view, i.e. that the speeches are fully subservient to the narrative and do not carry a message in themselves, has strongly influenced the discussion of the meaning and position of the 'Philippics' in the histories of Appian and Cassius Dio. Modern scholars emphasize that Appian's and Dio's speeches are a way to elucidate or comment upon events and the motivation of characters in the narrative.¹³ The content of the Ciceronian speeches would fit the general imperial image of the republican politician who is acting out of personal ambition and eyeing future gains;¹⁴ and the picture of Cicero was thus made to comply with the historiographers' theory of history about the moral degeneration of the Republic.¹⁵ We have already seen, at least with re-

⁹ For φιλονικία as a typical element of republican politics, see App. *B. Civ. praef.* 1.1; 5.18; 2.2.4 (about Catiline); 2.102.425 (about the φιλονικία between Caesar and Pompey); 3.61.252 (about Cicero himself); and Dio Cass. 37.27.1; 38.8.1; 41.53.2 (the φιλονικία and φιλοτιμία between Caesar and Pompey).

¹⁰ KEMEZIS 2014: 92–113.

¹¹ *Ibid.* 111.

¹² To my brief excursus of the function of speeches within historiography in chapter 1 the present section will add another function of speech, namely to serve as a historical *exemplum* of either beneficial or destructive political deliberation.

¹³ So GOWING 1992: 225–245; KUHN-CHEN 2002: 23; LACHENAUD 2006, who speaks of an "opération sémiotique" of the speeches in Dio in relation to the narrative; FOMIN 2016.

¹⁴ For the wider discussion regarding the extent to which the historian could project his own literary ideals onto the historical material, see MARINCOLA 2007: 298–313.

¹⁵ Cf. BURDEN-STREVEVS 2015a: 28 who captures Dio's message nicely by saying: "Cassius Dio made a conscious and deliberate choice to give his audience, through oratory, an insight into the

gard to Cassius Dio,¹⁶ that in ethical terms, Cicero's desire for power is presented as unhealthy and destructive. The orations, then, are considered a contribution to this general characterization of him, and to confirm his reputation for being arrogant and obnoxious.¹⁷ Among students of Dio the direct discourse is especially employed as evidence for the prevalence of negative views about Cicero in imperial literature. In particular the speech put in the mouth of Calenus, which incorporates slander produced by the anti-Ciceronian tradition, is a popular medium for doing so.¹⁸ Ultimately, such analyses have led to a method of investigation that highlights the historiographers' own political bias as well as the historicist tendency to project an imperial world view on the republican period—a view which often leads to misunderstandings or misrepresentations of the political system.¹⁹

Ironically, whenever the speeches in Appian and Dio are studied separately from the narrative, they are largely stripped of their historiographical value; the speeches would be products of the rhetorical declamation practiced in the schools of the Roman empire.²⁰ They would lack any historical aim, being composed as epideictic orations.²¹ The status of Appian and Dio as writers of the Second Sophistic further leads scholars to question the historical value of the speeches. 'Sophistic historiography', as Anderson has called it, is "a problem", since the

constitutional and moral problems of the Roman Republic as he believed contemporary Romans themselves would have perceived and discussed them.

¹⁶ Above, chapter 3.

¹⁷ Cf. ANDERSON 1992: 107, who believes that Dio's dialogue between Philiscus and Cicero in book 38 is meant to purvey an "ethos" rather than "act as a historical chronicle".

¹⁸ The belief that we can distil Dio's own opinion about Cicero from Calenus' words is outdated: cf. MILLAR 1964, VAN STEKELENBURG 1971, LINTOTT 1997, who were the main proponents of this view.

¹⁹ LINTOTT 1997: 2514–2518. Appian and Dio are often portrayed as monarchists. For Dio, see MILLAR 1964 and MANUWALD 1979: 8–26, who wrote a seminal commentary on Dio's narrative of Augustus' career; more critical are the essays in LANGE & MADSEN 2016; cf. MADSEN 2020. For Appian's monarchic stance, see HOSE 1994: 258–30; BUCHER 2000: 429–444 with a near exhaustive bibliography. KUHN-CHEN 2002 maps Appian and Dio's scepticism about republican politics well.

²⁰ See, most recently, KEELINE 2018: 140–146, who admits that declamation explains only part of the reception of Cicero in the Greek sources, but according to him still a significant part (141), and FOMIN 2016; cf. BURDEN-STREVEVS 2020: 12–13 for a refutation of this view, and 112–144 for a novel overview of the influence of rhetorical education on Dio's *Roman History*.

²¹ Dio is the most popular subject of such speculations, cf. MILLAR 1961; VAN STEKELENBURG 1971: 152. As travelling ambassadors of their Greek cities, many Greek intellectuals under the Empire performed show speeches celebrating civic values and Roman rule: BOWERSOCK 1969. For a helpful overview of 'sophistic performance', see WHITMARSH 2005: 19–40.

retorical artistry confounds historiographical truths.²² Acting against such views is Christopher Burden-Strevens, who argues that the rhetorical discourse is an integral part of Dio's historiographical programme, and the conspicuously rhetorical style an attempt at demonstrating the corruptness of republican oratory.²³ I agree that the rhetorical nature of the Ciceronian speeches—the topic of discussion here—is meant to be conspicuous. Appian and especially Dio put much effort into the stylistic composition of the speeches. As we will see below, the interest in rhetorical showstoppers has a peculiar function when it comes to the evaluation of Ciceronian speech in light of Greek and Roman history.

I will discuss the Greek 'Philippics' not (simply) as a form of rhetorical commentary on the events in the narrative or declamatory imitations, but, inspired by Kemezis' work, as negative *exempla* of Ciceronian oratory. In chapter 2, I explained that the typical *exemplum* is something said or done by a famous figure in history, a *memorable dictum aut factum*. Generally, when it comes to speeches in historiography, modern scholars focus on the historical *exempla* used by the speakers rather than examining how the speech in itself might form an example for the readers.²⁴ Examining exactly this function of the Greek 'Philippics' allows us to investigate to what extent the speeches operate as models of Ciceronian and, by extension, republican speech. On the one hand, I will continue the approach that has already been adopted by Kemezis and Burden-Strevens, in which the Greek 'Philippics' are seen as inseparable from the imperial narrative about the fall of the Republic.²⁵ The speeches exemplify the destructive impact of Ciceronian oratory, and they are employed to highlight the general demise of republican deliberative procedure due to competition and factional strife. On the other hand, I will also develop the argument that the 'Philippics' were meant to contain an actual sample of Cicero's oratory,

²² ANDERSON 2003: 105–114. On the negative interpretation of 'sophist', also WHITMARSH 2005: 15–19. I would add that modern scholarship is still influenced by this negative understanding of 'sophist(ic)'.

²³ BURDEN-STREVEN 2020: *passim*, but see esp. 147–191.

²⁴ CHAPLIN 2000 offers the best and most extensive example of this type of approach; in chapter 2 she illustrates "three voices" that can formulate *exempla*: she distinguishes the narrator from the historical character, which she divides into 'speakers' and 'focalizers'. Other important studies are BÜCHER 2006, MARINCOLA 2010 (in PAUSCH 2010), FELDHER 2012.

²⁵ KEMEZIS 2014; BURDEN-STREVEN 2020.

and to render what was considered to be a Ciceronian style of rhetoric which fits the typical image of the leader of the *optimi*. Especially Appian's imitation of Cicero's *Philippics* is still much neglected, which is why a large part of this chapter will be devoted to his exchange between Cicero and Piso in book 3 of the *Civil Wars*.

I will examine the historiographers' reperformances of Cicero's oratory by using the tools of intertextuality and allusivity. The Ciceronian set speeches illustrate the historiographer's quest for models which could elucidate and further develop the image of Cicero in the historical tradition. Cicero's oratory, as we will see, is patterned on rhetorical strategies both deriving from his own corpus and from Greek models. The goal and result of this literary game is that Cicero receives a firm place in both Roman and, in certain measure, Greek history. Finally, apart from using intertexts to position Cicero in history, Appian and Dio also use the speeches to create a interpretive loop in their account; this loop goes, I think, beyond the common practice, mentioned above, of employing speech as historical explanation. The narrative confirms the image portrayed in the speeches, and vice versa. Especially for the oratorical parts the strong links with the narrative help to extrapolate the rhetoric from its own register to the world of historical events, illustrating in fact that the Ciceronian speeches are more than an innocent example of typical republican courthouse rhetoric, but have their actual (negative) effects on the course of events.

In sum, the present chapter aims at exploring the process by which Cicero's Philippic oratory, through Appian and Cassius Dio, became a model for republican rhetoric in Greek imperial historiography. The *Philippics* are meant to present a negative example of contentious, i.e. *philonikistic*, speech. In a world where everybody acts out of personal motives, there is no basis for a commonly shared rhetoric. Cicero's career exemplifies this extremely well, because despite being a publicly proclaimed Defender of the Republic he could not master the political game, and his inability to do so foreshadowed the imminent fall of himself and the Republic's constitution. Before I apply this approach to the Ciceronian speeches in Appian and Cassius Dio, however, the next sections will briefly discuss the relationship between the cultural background of these Greek historiographers and their interaction with Cicero's Latin writing.

1.3 WHEN THE ROMAN WHO IS ΔΕΙΝΟΤΑΤΟΣ ΕΙΠΕΙΝ SPEAKS GREEK

A major issue underlying the argument of this chapter is to what extent Appian and Cassius Dio actually imitate Cicero's *Philippics* as Latin texts. In general terms, what is the textual relationship between the 'Philippics' written by the imperial historians and Cicero's *Philippics*? This is a question that has long since occupied modern scholars. Until very recently, the dominant approach in answering it was to point out parallels between the texts and to review the representation of historical details.²⁶ With the work of Christopher Burden-Strevens, however, the study of the speeches in Cassius Dio has received a rhetorical-literary impulse. In his monograph, he illustrates not only the many parallels between Cicero's *Philippics* and Dio's antilogy between Cicero and Calenus, but he also convincingly argues that Dio takes over argumentative structures and stylistic figures from Cicero's speeches.²⁷ Though Dio's 'Philippic' does not completely map onto the original Latin speeches, Burden-Strevens' analyses show two things very clearly: first, that Dio closely read the text of the *Philippics* in Latin, and second, that he deliberately imitates the original speeches.²⁸ In a similar vein, I will closely study the literary process of reperforming Ciceronian speech. There is much to gain with respect to the representation of republican oratory in Greek historiography. Accordingly, the present chapter has two particular aims. On the one hand, it will add to the remarkably limited research about the relationship between Appian's history and Cicero's (rhetorical) corpus.²⁹ On the other, it intends to demonstrate the influence of Greek Attic oratory on the Ciceronian *Philippics* more fully than Burden-Strevens allows for.³⁰

²⁶ For Appian, see MAGNINO 1984; HAHN 1968: 199–202. For Dio: GOWING 1992: 235–245, particularly illustrative is 238 n.34 in response to VAN STEKELENBURG 1971; MILLAR 1961: 18; cf. FOMIN 2016: 231.

²⁷ BURDEN-STREVENs 2020: 72–93.

²⁸ Cf. RODGERS 2008 and BURDEN-STREVENs 2018 on the presence of Cicero's *On the Manilian Law* as a text within Dio's account of the debates concerning the Gabinian and Manilian laws.

²⁹ PELLING 1985 and GOWING 1992: 235–239 offer a starting point. Cf. BURDEN-STREVENs 2018: 113, who (still) signals that “we need a fuller rhetorical analysis of these discourses in relation to their sources”.

³⁰ I have set out this view elsewhere: PIEPER, VAN DER VELDEN & JANSSEN 2022. BURDEN-STREVENs 2020: 90, 92 discards this topic rather resolutely due to the “tremendous attention” given

Indeed, a primary feature of Second Sophistic literature is the constant reference to the Greek past. Among others, Anderson and Swain have shown how the period in which Appian and Dio wrote was defined by not only an overwhelming interest in classical Athens but also the re-establishment of the classical Greek language.³¹ Barbara Kuhn-Chen has demonstrated that the historiographers of the second and third century worked in a long tradition of moral history extending back to Herodotus, featuring a consistent interest in civic virtues, like courage and moderation, and vices, like ambition (*philotimia*) and greed.³² Greek as well as Latin (Roman) writers took part in this tradition: as the literary models of Roman Greek historiographers, Kuhn-Chen not only names Thucydides and Polybius, but also Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus (although in the end she finds it easiest to assimilate the philosophy of history of the imperial Greek writers with that of their classical Greek predecessors).³³ The rhetorical style of the speeches in Appian and Dio's histories is predominantly Attic in accordance with

to it by previous scholars. I am not sure this is justified, since, similarly to the superficial search for parallels dominating the discussion about the imperial reception of the *Philippics* (cf. BURDEN-STREVENS 2020: 72 n. 113), scholars usually do no more than signal allusions to or intertexts in the Attic orators, without exploring the question as to what extent these intertexts have shaped and constructed the discourse parts on a more substantial, thematic level.

³¹ Cf. BOWERSOCK 1969 and BOWIE 1974 for the imperial Greek scholars' reorientation on their classical past. With regard to education, SWAIN 1996 gives a general overview of the literary and historical background of imperial Greek scholars; SIDEBOTTOM 2007 reviews the training of Severan orators. See MILLAR 1964 on Cassius Dio's background. ANDERSON 1993 *passim* offers a good idea of the all-pervasive influence of the rather "narrow" (70) set of classical Greek authors. Questions of literary influence and intertextuality with regard to these individual classical models are still being explored and expanded. To give but one example, there are unmistakable references to Thucydides and Demosthenes in the discourse parts of the imperial historiographies. For a recent discussion of such references see BURDEN-STREVENS 2018. Dio's reliance on Thucydides was first investigated by Ernesto KYHNITZSCH 1894. Regarding the allusions to Demosthenes in the Cicero–Calenus debate, KOSTER 1980 is most systematic, though he only points out three allusions to Aeschines and Demosthenes—this sufficiently shows the poor state of research. BERTRAND 2008 provides occasional points of contact between Dio and either Aeschines or Demosthenes, but does little to interpret them; perhaps due to the historical nature of her commentary she also omits many allusions.

³² For example, see App. B. *Civ.* 2.98–99 and Cass. Dio 37.57.3 (with KUHN-CHEN 2002: 158) on Cato the Younger. Cato is explicitly presented as a recognized (and recognizable) model for high-mindedness in a corrupted society; Dio states he is of the sort who have "innate virtue", ἀρετὴ ἐμφυτός.

³³ KUHN-CHEN 2002: 25–30 on the literary predecessors of imperial Greek historiographers. HOSE 1994: 165–329 and 364–417 is more comprehensive in including the Latin historiographers as possible sources for Appian and Dio's work. Cf. PITCHER 2018, who makes a good case for Sallust's influence on Appian's Catiline; URSO 2019 on Dio.

the classicistic fashion, the desire for linguistic purity, of the second and third centuries AD.³⁴

In particular, there was one important model in Athenian history whose life and career in many respects happened to mirror the life and career of Cicero: Demosthenes. Cicero's own imitation of Demosthenes was no secret.³⁵ Caroline Bishop has argued that by putting tremendous energy into modeling his career after that of Demosthenes, Cicero established his (future) canonical status already during his lifetime. Demosthenes' speeches, of course, enjoyed canonicity as an important model for orators in the Roman Republican period; Cicero could ride this wave of exemplarity by inventing himself as the Roman Demosthenes.³⁶ The pairing of Demosthenes and Cicero became a popular theme in historiography as well as rhetorical handbooks.³⁷ Both men were models for rhetorical style and exemplary citizenship (for they both employed their rhetoric to the benefit of the state), with Cicero at the same time reviving his Attic example and setting the standards for successful civic rhetoric according to which he himself would be judged—and which he was able to fulfil. The comparison between the Roman and Athenian orator became itself canonical, which is attested by literary critical texts (Caecilius of Caleacte, Ps.-Longinus' *On the Sublime*) as well as by imperial biography (Plutarch's *Parallel Lives* of Demosthenes and Cicero) and historiography (Appian pairs the two men at some length in his discussion of Cicero's exile).³⁸ Whereas the similarities addressed by Plutarch and Appian mainly concern personality traits and life events,³⁹ Dio picked up on Cicero's relation to Demosthenes as an orator too, as I shall argue below. In fact, Andrew Lintott uniquely stated that "one might say that Cicero's

³⁴ SWAIN 1996: 248–253 (Appian), 401–408 (Dio).

³⁵ The most notable example is *Phil.* 2, which is written after the example of Demosthenes' *On the Crown*. Cf. MANUWALD 2007: 135–136. Essential are the multiple studies on this subject by Wilfried STROH, e.g. 1982 and 2000; cf. WOOTEN 1983; WEISCHE 1972, esp. 99–112, 166–194.

³⁶ BISHOP 2019: 173–219.

³⁷ MANUWALD 2007: 136–138; BISHOP 2015.

³⁸ *B. Civ.* 2.15.56, and 60. GABBA 1956: 227 believes Appian took his information directly from Plutarch.

³⁹ On the *synkrisis* of Demosthenes and Cicero in ancient literary criticism, DE JONGE 2019. DE JONGE is right to note that Plutarch also pays attention to the rhetorical style of the orators. Yet, as the biographer remarks himself (*Comp. Dem. et Cic.* 1.3), his main aim is to give the reader insight into the orators' characters.

Philippic in Dio is what Demosthenes would have said, had he been in Cicero's position."⁴⁰

1.4 FROM GREEK TO LATIN (AND BACK): READING CICERO AS A LATIN CLASSIC

It is now commonly thought that Appian and Dio read Latin and used Latin sources in writing their histories: Asinius Pollio, Cremutius Cordus, and Sallust are all mentioned by Dio, though he does not say he consulted their works during his own project.⁴¹ Appian in his *Civil Wars* mentions, among others, Asinius Pollio, Varro, Caesar, and Augustus as literary predecessors.⁴² In terms of education, we know that within the Greek schools of the empire Virgil and Cicero were the most popular authors for learning Latin (though most of the didactic papyri found date to slightly later than Appian and Cassius Dio's lifetime).⁴³ One of the first scholars to research the Greeks' use of Latin, Bruno Rochette, has argued that Cicero predominantly offered them a source of historical information and did not inspire the Greek historians in the form of a literary model.⁴⁴ This view has been sufficiently countered, at least with respect to Cassius Dio, by the work of Burden-Strevens. Moreover, Rochette's view seems to contradict the evidence that Greek imperial writers were very sensitive to the rhetorical features of speech(es) in general. More importantly, if indeed Cicero was taught in the provincial schools of the empire, this would have turned him into one of the classical models for the Greek students to imitate and emulate. Despite the strong focus on Athens and the Athenian legacy which is attested by the Greek writers of the empire,⁴⁵ it is therefore not improbable that the speeches of Cicero provided templates for

⁴⁰ LINTOTT 1997: 1501. This observation has not led to any closer examination of Demosthenic imitation in the (Ciceronian) speeches of Dio's *Roman History*.

⁴¹ BURDEN-STREVENES 2015a: 39–44, esp. 36; on Dio's ability to read Latin, see also BURDEN-STREVENES 2018: 114.

⁴² BRODERSEN 1993: 356–359. On Appian's command of Latin, see also FAMERIE 1998: 27–32; HOSE 1994: 173 n. 19; HAHN & NÉMETH 1993: 397. Cf. GOWING 1992: 274–277.

⁴³ DICKEY 2015.

⁴⁴ ROCHETTE 1997: 279.

⁴⁵ ANDERSON 1992: 119–120 argues that Athens was “the teacher and foster-mother of Rome” (120).

thinking about and performing oratory, especially Roman republican oratory. It is not unthinkable either that Greek students, similarly to native Roman students, practiced giving 'Ciceronian' *suasoriae*. This chance may have increased if they, as Rochette believes for Plutarch, Appian, and Dio, enjoyed their Latin education at least for some time in the city of Rome itself.⁴⁶

A particular factor which may have contributed to Appian and Dio's interest in Ciceronian oratory is their participation in Roman city life. As discussed in the Introduction, both men were based in Rome for the greater part of their adult life, and fulfilled civic duties in which good speaking abilities were vital. Similar to Cicero, Appian was an advocate (*causidicus*), which would have fueled a professional interest in Cicero's oratorical skills.⁴⁷ As a historiographer, he appreciated Cicero's fame no differently from the Latin writers: he paid a visit to the site at Caieta in order to write the account of Cicero's death (*B. Civ.* 4.19.73).⁴⁸ Of Cassius Dio's personal experience with Cicero's life and work we know little, but his public career resembled that of the republican orator. Dio's senatorial rank, his successful public career in Rome and his thorough reading about the history of Rome⁴⁹ bring him intellectually close to Cicero; they especially shared a double life of *otium* and *negotium*.

Alain Gowing has suggested that the Greek historians must have enjoyed—and taken—quite some freedom in composing their orations because the difference in language also meant a completely different end product which readers would not readily compare with the original.⁵⁰ These Greek historiographers must have been excited to

⁴⁶ ROCHETTE 1997: 331. I do not believe, however, as he seems to suggest, that these Greek writers developed all their knowledge of Latin in Rome; they may have practiced speaking or writing Latin in their hometown. What is more, it is very likely that if Greeks came to Rome to obtain or continue a certain political function, as we know Plutarch, Appian, and Dio did, they made the effort of learning at least a certain amount of Latin before they reached the city.

⁴⁷ In court, Appian would probably have been expected to speak Latin: see MILLAR 1964: 188–189; ADAMS 2003: 562.

⁴⁸ In narrating how Cicero's flight from his assassins failed, Appian says that "brought to shore, he retreated to his own estate, near the Italian city of Caieta, which I have seen in my inquiry into this event" (εἰς ἴδιον χωρίον, ὃ καθ' ἰστορίαν τοῦδε τοῦ πάθους εἶδον, ἀμφὶ Καίτην πόλιν τῆς Ἰταλίας, καταχθεις ἡρέμει).

⁴⁹ See Cass. Dio 73[72].23.5 for the remark that Dio took ten years to read (or compile: συνέλεξα) the history of Rome from its foundation until Severus' reign.

⁵⁰ GOWING 1992: 226.

compose a ‘new’ product which would also relate to the cultural framework of readers outside of Italy because it could render Ciceronian and Roman concepts in the language of the (Greek) provincial. Also at play must have been the competitive wish to emulate similar Ciceronian orations in the works of fellow historiographers (Asinius Pollio? Livy?), or perhaps to produce a Greek specimen of Ciceronian rhetoric. Yet on the other hand, Appian and Dio were *intimi* of the Roman court and must have expected their audience to contain at least some native speakers of Latin who knew their Cicero well. It is probably best to see the speeches given by Cicero from a more general perspective as moments of creative imitation which were specifically triggered by the canonical status of Cicero as the ‘best speaker in Roman history’.⁵¹ The question of language in this case relates more to the author’s self-representation than it does to the image of Cicero, although, as we will see, his Greek style does have consequences for the interpretation of his position in history. Since we possess no comment that expresses the Greek historiographers’ knowledge of or familiarity with Cicero’s work, we cannot decide on any of these possibilities—and perhaps all of them are true.

2. The debate between Cicero and Piso (App. B. Civ. 3.52–60)

2.1 READING APPIAN’S ACCOUNT OF 44–43 BC

Appian’s *Roman History* is not often appreciated for its literary qualities, which means that the speeches have been relatively neglected as objects of study.⁵² Their value has been properly acknowledged by István Hahn and Alain Gowing, who have situated them within Appian’s

⁵¹ Cf. Plut. *Cic.* 13.1; App. B. *Civ.* 2.1.2; Cass. Dio 37.33.1, 38.12.4.

⁵² Whereas the scholarly tradition initiated by GABBA 1956 is directed to *Quellenforschung* and attempts to retrace Appian’s account of the *Civil Wars* back to Augustan sources—most notably Asinius Pollio and Livy—the current tendency, first exemplified by HAHN 1968/1993 and GOLDMANN 1988, is to emphasize Appian’s personal creativity and independency as a scholar. See WELCH 2015: 1–13 for an overview of modern approaches to Appian’s work.

historiographical programme, and also examined certain rhetorical features.⁵³ Yet much thought on the matter is still needed. This part of the chapter is an attempt to unravel further the literary intertexts which played a role in the construction of the Philippic debate in book 3 of the *Civil Wars*.

For the sake of clarity I have divided my analysis into three parts. The first part will examine Appian's engagement with the Philippics as a primary intertext and medium for interpreting the debate about the actions of Mark Antony. The second part will address the thematic and ideological features framing the debate, showing how the Philippic exchange between Cicero and Piso serves as a negative *exemplum* of republican oratory. Finally, by analyzing the political argument that underlies the conflict between Piso and Cicero with the help of Demosthenic intertexts, I will explain in the third part how Athenian democratic concepts informed Appian's representation of Roman republican politics.

Appian stages the debate between Cicero and Piso at the moment in the narrative when Antony is besieging Decimus Brutus in Gaul; Hir-tius and Pansa, the consuls of 43 BC, convene the senate "on the matter of Antony" (ἐπὶ Ἀντωνίῳ).⁵⁴ This is the reason for Cicero and his followers—Appian calls them οἱ Κικέρωνος φίλοι or, more frequently, οἱ Κικερωνεῖοι—to create disturbances in the city and to propose voting Antony a public enemy. Antony's lust for power and his wily tricks (indicated by the verb τεχνάζειν) for achieving sole rule (δυναστεία, μοναρχία) are described earlier in books 2 and 3.⁵⁵ In 3.46.188–47.193 the historiographer remarks that it was hard to follow the sudden changes of heart that the senators seemed to have: they now favoured Antony, now Octavian, without there being a clear line of policy among them. In this general confusion, Cicero and his followers are not the first or the only ones to cultivate a hatred publicly against Antony. One impor-

⁵³ HAHN 1968; GOWING 1992.

⁵⁴ B. Civ. 3.50.202.

⁵⁵ Formulations with τεχνάζειν: 2.124.518 (Antony and Lepidus), 2.131.547 (cf. Lepidus at 2.132), 2.143.599 (regarding Caesar's funeral oration); with δυναστεύειν/δυναστεία: 3.7.22, 3.13.43 (Octavian's words), cf. 2.124.518 (ἀρχῆς ὀρεγόμενοι); Antony having monarchical power, μοναρχικὴ ἀρχή: 3.7.22. GABBA 1956: 153–154 signals in book 3 "un completo mutamento di rotta" on the part of the narrator toward Antony and a decisively negative tone in the characterization of Antony's behaviour. His explanation is that Appian used Augustan material in writing his account of the events.

tant instance in book 3 is the speech given by the tribune Cannutius, in which the people “who were afraid that Antony was aiming at tyranny (ἐπὶ τυραννίδι)” are exhorted to support Octavian.⁵⁶ Another such instance is the revolt among Antony’s Macedonian legions assembled in Brundisium, who accuse Antony of not having dealt properly with Caesar’s murderers. When Antony vindicates himself by decimating a larger than normal part of the army, feelings of “anger and hatred” increase considerably.⁵⁷ It is clear, therefore, that within book 3 of the *Civil Wars* Cicero represents but one specific movement in Roman society that is anti-Antonian. The “Ciceroniani”, his followers, might or might not be the men who have rejected Antony’s conduct in the preceding narrative, like Cannutius; they are not mentioned by name. At any rate, from 3.50.202 onwards, Cicero is Antony’s main opponent—similarly to how Cicero represents the situation in the *Philippics*.

The context of the Appianic debate is the beginning of January, when multiple sessions in the senate were devoted to the question of what to do with Antony; Appian’s account thus chronologically coincides with Cicero’s *Philippics* 5–6.⁵⁸ The debate between Cicero and Piso, then, thematizes a question which is also essential within *Phil.* 5, and which concerns all senators: were the laws issued at Antony’s initiative after Caesar’s death legal, or should they be declared void since Antony enacted them *per vim* and *contra auspicia*?⁵⁹ Was Antony not acting like a despot—in sum, like an enemy of the Republic?

The historiographer describes in 3.50.202–205 how the Ciceronians are lobbying for the public denunciation of Antony, and how L. Calpurnius Piso, the curator of Antony’s business while he was abroad,⁶⁰ tries to de-escalate the situation by saying that it is not appropriate to convict a consul who is not even present to defend himself. Emotions run high when the senate is prevented from voting Antony a public enemy by the single veto of the tribune Salvius, who next enters into (verbal) combat with the ‘Ciceronians’ in front of the people.⁶¹ The

⁵⁶ B. Civ. 3.41.167.

⁵⁷ Ibid. 3.43.178.

⁵⁸ Dating of the speeches at RAMSEY 2003: 14–15 and MANUWALD 2007: 19–31, where the historical context of the speeches is also being discussed.

⁵⁹ *Phil.* 5.7–10, 21.

⁶⁰ Cicero himself states that Fufius Calenus fulfilled this function (*Phil.* 12.18).

⁶¹ For Salvius, who is only mentioned by Appian, see BROUGHTON, *MRR* 2.340; MÜNZER 1920.

senate is now definitely angry with Antony,⁶² and since they cannot vote him a public enemy at that point, they decide to bestow honours on Decimus Brutus and Octavian, and to reward those troops who have defected from Antony. The senators know that proclaiming these honours for Antony's enemies is effectively proclaiming him a public enemy to the state, as the historiographer remarks. However, the situation is complicated by the appearance in the curia of Antony's mother, his wife, and his young son together with his entire household, who beg the senators to take mercy on their *paterfamilias*. The event causes the senate to doubt their decision, at which point Cicero addresses them (ἐβουληγόρησεν)⁶³ in fear (δείσας) of seeing the proceedings turn in favour of Antony.

The debate itself has a unique, triadic plan. At 3.52.213–53.220 we have the speech performed by Cicero, followed by the answer of Piso, which is twice as long, at 3.54.221–60.248. After Piso's speech, Appian reflects on the results of the discussion, which turn out negatively for Cicero. He presents a peculiar episode in which Cicero falsifies the decrees of the senate that were brought to Antony by an embassy. Then comes a second response to Cicero's invective rhetoric, this time given by Antony himself in the form of a letter (3.63.257–258). Antony's response is represented partly by paraphrase and partly by direct speech and constitutes a personal attack on Cicero. Cicero's reaction is not reported in the narrative, but after hearing about Antony's angry letter the senate votes him a public enemy forthwith.⁶⁴

In §§ 2.2 and 2.3.1–2, I shall discuss the speeches of Cicero and Piso together as a literary and thematic reworking of the *Philippics*. In § 2.3.3,

⁶² The historiographer quickly recaps the main reasons for this anger, the primary one being Antony's move against them after the amnesty was proclaimed on 17 March: *B. Civ.* 3.51.208.

⁶³ Strikingly enough, a search in the *TLG* shows that the term βουλευγορέω is only used twice in Appian (and outside Appian only once, in Poll. *Onom.* 4.27). The second time the subject is Octavian, speaking to the senate and people after the battle of Actium (*B. Civ.* 5.13.130); here the term is paired with the more common δημηγορεῖν. This latter term occurs 18 times in Appian's *Roman History*, of which 12 times are in the *Civil Wars*. Naturally, Cicero is not speaking to the people at 3.52–53, so to use δημηγορεῖν would have been inappropriate; cf. *B. Civ.* 4.4.20, where in the description of Cicero's death it is said that his head and hand were attached to the rostra, the place where he used to speak to the people (ἡ κεφαλὴ δὲ τοῦ Κικέρωνος καὶ ἡ χεὶρ ἐν ἀγορᾷ τοῦ βήματος ἀπεκρέμαντο ἐπὶ πλεῖστον, ἔνθα πρότερον ὁ Κικέρων ἐδημηγόρει). Thus the only two people in Appian's history who are explicitly said to address (harangue) both the senate and the people are Cicero and the future Augustus.

⁶⁴ *B. Civ.* 3.63.258.

I will look at the ways in which Antony's response is deployed by the historiographer to unmask the corruption of the republican senate, and to enhance the ideological role of the *Philippics* within the narrative.

2.2 CICERO'S *PHILIPPICS* AS AN ESSENTIAL MEDIUM FOR INTERPRETING THE POLITICAL CONFLICT

2.2.1 Appian's '*Philippic*' for Cicero

In the opinion of previous scholars, Appian's '*Philippic*' for Cicero is not a worthy imitation of the *Philippics*. Gowing notes that "we should instead stress the degree to which Cicero's speech in Appian does *not* resemble its ostensible model",⁶⁵ though he does point out some parallels between Appian's speech and the Latin original. In this section, I would like to argue to the contrary that we should see both Cicero and Piso's speech as a creative interpretation which is definitely modelled on the *Philippics*. As mentioned before, I take the more comprehensive perspective that we should view both speeches as a response to the *Philippics* instead of only Cicero's contribution. Modern scholars have let themselves be disappointed by the lack of verbal parallels, but the imitation of specific phrases is not the only method for creating allusivity. Appian's reperformance of the *Philippic* debate is built on an imitation of thematic features and pathos rather than particular rhetorical strategies inspired by the Latin text.⁶⁶ Most importantly, as I will argue in this section and the next, for the argument made in this part of the *Civil Wars* Appian did not need to draw strongly on the precise Latin text: it was enough to capture the tone and the tenor of the *Philippics*, which as a whole serve as an illustration of republican oratory. Having said that, there are in fact two traditionally *Philippic* features that jump out at the reader: the repetitive emphasis on Cicero's argument that Antony was πολέμιος to Rome and the unprofessional hatred that Cicero seems to display toward Antony, which interferes with his role

⁶⁵ GOWING 1992: 235. See now also KEELINE 2018: 177, who believes that Appian's '*Philippic*' is more of an "epitome" than a "rhetorical reworking" of the *Philippics*, and dismisses it as "rather less interesting" than the '*Philippic*' in Dio.

⁶⁶ However, there are some verbal parallels with *Phil.* 5: see next note.

as counsellor. We will examine these after a general overview of the speeches of Cicero and Piso.

Appian's 'Philippic' for Cicero does not have a very clear structure and begins rather *in medias res* with a reference to the proceedings of the day before as well as an attack on the tribune Salvius. It can be (roughly) divided into four parts:

1. Exordium (3.52.213–215). Cicero refers to the senate meeting on the day before and the decrees that have been passed, and he directs himself at Salvius, who should know better than to oppose the entire senate; he is either driven by his friendship with Antony or he is ignorant of what is happening. He should follow the senate's opinion. Cicero presents the argument that the majority always prevails.
2. Argumentation (3.52.216–217): this is a review of Antony's actions. These are: the embezzlement of money from Caesar's heritage; taking the armies from Macedon and marching to Gaul without permission from the senate—besides, Cicero argues, these troops were meant for Thrace, but he led them to Italy and he did it secretly; surrounding himself by a royal cohort in Brundisium; and (?) keeping a guard of armed men in the city; marching from Brundisium to Rome but turning around and proceeding to Gaul as soon as he saw the size of Octavian's army.
3. As an additional charge (3.53.218), Cicero dwells on Antony's cruel decimation of the soldiers at Brundisium (though the location is not clear from the speech).
4. Peroration (3.53.219–220). Cicero again refers to the honours awarded to the soldiers of Antony who deserted or will still desert, which decree is tantamount to declaring Antony a public enemy. He returns to the ignorance of Salvius, and emphasizes the threat that Antony currently poses for Rome.

Most of the arguments in this speech can be found in *Phil.* 5, which was held in the period Appian describes in this part of the narrative, and in Cicero's other *Philippics*.⁶⁷ Piso's speech, on the other hand, is written

⁶⁷ Thematic parallels between *Phil.* 5 and Appian's 'Philippic', with the arguments in order of Appian's speech: *stupidity of the person who considers Antony to be his friend*, *B. Civ.* 52.213 = *Phil.* 5.5–6 (exordium) (cf. *Phil.* 3.34); *we have already voted Antony a public enemy*, 52.213 = *Phil.* 5.29 (cf.

more independently than the 'Philippic' by Cicero.⁶⁸ Piso's emphasis on Cicero's negative portrayal of Antony clearly links the two speeches together:

1. Exordium (3.54.222–223). Piso appeals to the law, which demands that the accused should be present, and challenges Cicero, 'the cleverest speaker' (δεινότατον εἰπεῖν). He will prove Cicero's charges false.
2. Refutation of Cicero's accusations (3.54.224–56.233): a) the embezzlement of money, which Antony investigated by a decree ratified by the senate; b) he was given the governorship of Gaul by law, while Decimus Brutus illegally holds an army. The people are the sole arbiter in deciding who is a friend and who is an enemy; c) Antony's function as general (αὐτοκράτωρ) allowed him to decimate his soldiers; moreover, his army was disobedient. Cicero argues inconsistently because of his hatred for Antony (Κικέρωνα δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἀνωμαλίαν ἐξέστησεν ἡ ἔχθρα, 3.58.233).
3. Proof (3.57.234–238) that Antony has not behaved like a tyrant since Caesar's death, as Cicero claims: review of his actions (*inter alia*, amnesty, recall of Sextus Pompey, Pseudo-Marius) which were all done for the benefit of the state, not otherwise.

Phil. 3.14, 4.5, 7.10–11, 13); Antony has squandered Caesar's heritage, 52.215 = *Phil.* 5.10; Antony's armed troops in the city, 52.215 = *Phil.* 5.18 (cf. *Phil.* 5.17, 3.9, 2.112); Antony fled back to Gaul when he saw Octavian's camp, 52.217 = *Phil.* 5.23–24 (cf. *Phil.* 3.31); Antony cruelly decimated his troops, 52.218 = *Phil.* 5.22 (cf. *Phil.* 3.4, 12.12, 13.18); we need to declare war against Antony, 52.220 ≈ (e.g.) *Phil.* 5.33. As this short overview shows, apart from the argument that Antony had already been voted a public enemy, Appian's speech follows the order of the arguments in *Phil.* 5, which suggests he looked closely to this text as a model, but the parallels are not that conspicuous. Verbal parallels can be found on two occasions: 1) the idea that the decimation was cruel (53.218), τὴν οὕτως ὠμὴν ὥρισε τιμωρίαν, which is much emphasized in Cicero's account of the story, cf. *Phil.* 3.4 (*hac ille crudelitate imbutus*), 5.22 (*crudelis*), 12.12 (*praedicatio crudelitatis*), 13.18 (*crudelis tyrannus; crudelissimae uxoris*); 2) the exordium, which appears to imitate both the theme and the structure of *Phil.* 5.5–6. Compare 52.213 Σάλουιον δὲ τὸν μόνον ἐμποδῶν γινόμενον ἢ πάντων εἶναι χρηρὶ συνετώτερον ἢ φιλίᾳ τὰδε πράσσειν ἢ τῶν ἐνεστώτων ἀμαθίᾳ. ὧν τὸ μὲν αἰσχιστόν ἐστιν ἡμῖν, εἰ δόξομεν ἀσυνετώτεροι πάντες ἐνὸς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ αὐτῷ Σαλουίῳ, εἰ φιλίαν τῶν κοινῶν προτιμῶ, with *Phil.* 5.5–6 *Hoc qui non videt, excors, qui, cum videt, decernit, impius est. ... Nullae istae excusationes sunt: 'Meus amicus est.' Sit patriae prius. 'Meus cognatus.' An potest cognatio propior ulla esse quam patriae, in qua parentes etiam continentur?* In both exordia, the consideration of friendship above the fatherland (τὰ κοινὰ vs. *patria*) and the idea of stupidity (*excors*, συνετώτερον) play a central role; moreover, Appian appears to imitate the succession of alternative elements (cf. ἢ... ἢ... ἢ, εἰ with *qui ... qui, an potest*).

⁶⁸ GOWING 1992: 235–237 argues that Piso's speech resembles the *Philippics* more closely in its rhetorical fervour than Cicero's oration.

⁶⁹ *B. Civ.* 3.53.220.

4. Refutation (3.58.239–242) of the senate's suspicion that Antony would march on Rome, although Octavian's encampment is outside Rome, but he is not considered an enemy. How hypocritical was the praise for Antony, also from Cicero, when he left Rome with the army. Reference to Antony's family in front of the curia.
5. Peroration (3.59.243–60.248). Cicero is inconsistent (cf. Κικέρωνος μεταβολῆς, 59.243). Piso's proposal is to de-escalate, take the armies away from Decimus and Octavian, let the suffering city fortify itself with these armies. He exhorts the senate: the hatred, strife, and contention should cease, and it would be rash to declare Antony a public enemy. The people have voted Antony his governorship; the senate should be their wise councillors.

The one subject that is seriously and strangely lacking from both Cicero and Piso's speech is the debate regarding the embassy. This question features very prominently in the original *Philippics* dating to this period, and one would from a historical point of view expect Appian's Piso, who was part of this first embassy, to refer to it himself. In fact, the embassy is left completely unmentioned by the historiographer until the point that they are actually almost departing, having received the decrees passed in the senatorial debate and penned down by Cicero (Κικέρωνα συγγράψαι τε καὶ δοῦναι τοῖς πρεσβεύουσι προσέταξαν, 3.61.252). Since the surrounding narrative focuses on Cicero's vendetta with Antony, Appian's 'Philippic' is probably not meant as an accurate representation of the *Philippics*, but it offers a sample of the typical invective that characterized Cicero's oratory in 44–43 BC, and which is not necessarily productive, as we will see.

Yet, Appian does imitate certain prominent themes in the *Philippics*. I will give the most notable example from Cicero's speech, in the peroration where he argues that Antony is indeed an enemy already, and Salvius is stupid not to see it:

Πότερον οὖν ἡμεῖς Ἀντώνιον ψηφίζομεθα εἶναι πολέμιον, ἢ Ἀντώνιος ἡμᾶς ἤδη πολεμεῖ, καὶ ὁ δήμαρχος ἡμῶν ἔτι ἀγνοεῖ, μέχρι ἄρα Δέκμου πεσόντος ἢ τε χώρα τοσῆδε οὔσα καὶ ὁμορος ἡμῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ χώρᾳ ὁ Δέκμου στρατὸς ἐς τὰς καθ' ἡμῶν ἐλπίδας Ἀντωνίῳ προσγένηται. Τότε γὰρ αὐτόν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ δήμαρχος ψηφιεῖται πολέμιον, ὅταν ἡμῶν γέννηται δυνατώτερος.⁶⁹

Do we now vote that Antony is an enemy, or is Antony rather already waging war upon us? But our tribune will remain clueless, until Decimus has fallen, and this great land that borders on our land and, apart from the land, Decimus' army has come into Antony's possession to use in his plans against us. For then, it seems, will the tribune vote him an enemy: when he has gained power over us.

As the educated reader knows, the discussion as to whether Antony was a public enemy or not takes up a central place in the *Philippics*. In *Phil.* 5.33 Cicero spoke: "Against him, fathers, a war, a war, I say, must be fought, and right away; any delay by sending ambassadors should be rejected!" (*cum hoc, patres conscripti, bello, bello, inquam, decertandum est, idque confestim; legatorum tarditas repudianda est*).⁷⁰ Later that year, Cicero's use of *bellum* would become the subject of discussion when his fellow senators openly rejected his polemical attitude—this is in fact the opening topic of *Phil.* 8 (see next section). As a result of his attempt to designate Antony as an enemy of the Roman people, Cicero's *Philippics*, more than anything he had produced, were a call for battle. The passage quoted above demonstrates how Appian's speech for Cicero alludes strongly to this particular rhetoric of war: the term πολέμιος functions as a frame for this peroration. The first sentence states that Antony is actually not only an enemy of Rome but already waging war on it, ἤδη πολεμεῖ; the verb πολεμέω echoes the preceding noun πολέμιος. What is more, the idea that Antony is πολέμιος to Rome in fact frames the entire 'Philippic', since Cicero began his speech by reminding the senate that they voted Antony an enemy the day before (ἐψηφίζόμεθα εἶναι πολέμιον), and now comes back to this thought in the peroration.⁷¹

2.2.2 *Piso's anti-'Philippic': more Ciceronian intertexts*

Piso's speech is an ironic response to Cicero's use of πολέμιος. Piso uses the term no less than six times. Four of the six times Cicero's use of the word is contrasted with the letter of the law and shown to be inva-

⁷⁰ Cf. *Phil.* 5.25; the word occurs no less than 36 times in this speech; words of the stem *inimic-* 6 times.

⁷¹ B. *Civ.* 3.52.213.

lid. One example suffices to show the tenor of Piso's argument. With regard to the matter of the decimation of Antony's army, Piso claims that Antony possessed full authority to punish misbehaving soldiers: nobody ever calls a general to account for such actions.

Οὐδὲ τῶν νῦν συγγενῆς οὐδεῖς, ἀλλὰ Κικέρων ἐπιμέμφεται καὶ φόνου κατηγορῶν **πολέμιον κοινόν** ἀντὶ τῶν ὠρισμένων ἐπιτιμίων τοῖς φονεῦσι τίθεται.⁷²

And none of their [sc. the soldiers'] relatives bear a grudge against him now, but Cicero does, and while accusing him of murder he brands him a **public enemy** in contradiction to the legal punishments for murderers.

The claim that Antony was an enemy of the Roman people, which is the hallmark of the *Philippics*, is cleverly dismantled by Appian's Piso. On the one hand, he sets Cicero off from the rest of the Roman people by suggesting that he is the only person to find fault with Antony's behaviour.⁷³ The addition of the word κοινός, which does not occur in Cicero's 'Philippic' or elsewhere in Piso's reply, carries an ironic tone: even though the Roman citizens directly affected by Antony's policy have no complaints, Cicero presents Antony as an enemy to all of them. On the other hand, Piso stresses the illegal character of Cicero's programme: Cicero heaps angry accusations upon Antony instead of applying the codified legal action to his charge. As we shall see below in more detail, this is part of Piso's rhetorical technique to characterize Cicero as a blasphemer who does not have any respect for the Roman law.

A second aspect of Piso's contribution to the debate which alludes to the thematic discourse of the *Philippics* is the complaint that Cicero was acting out of anger instead of arguing reasonably. In *Phil.* 8, Cicero directly responds to the accusation made by Calenus that he is arguing in an irascible manner with him:

*Nam quod me tecum iracunde agere dixisti solere, non est ita. Vehementer me agere fateor, iracunde nego. Omnino irasci non temere soleo, ne si merentur quidem.*⁷⁴

⁷² *Ibid.* 3.56.231.

⁷³ This is completely opposite to Cicero's own self-representation in the speeches. See below on the image of Cicero as *publica vox*, n. 106.

For with respect to what you said, that I'm often angry when I argue with you, that is not true. I confess that I'm a vehement speaker, but I deny that I'm an angry one. Trust me, I do not get angry without reason, not even when people deserve it.

Possibly in response to this image of Cicero as an irascible speaker, Piso explicitly voices the argument that anger is not a fitting emotion in official debate:

Καὶ τάδε μὲν εἴρηται τοῖς ἄνευ φθόνου καὶ φιλονικίας ἀκρωμένοις· τοῖς δὲ ἀπερισκέπτως καὶ ἀπαρασκεύως δι' οἰκείαν ἔχθραν ἢ φιλονικίαν ἐκθορυβοῦσιν ὑμᾶς κριτὰς παραινῶ μὴ ταχεῖς εἶναι μηδὲ προπετεῖς ἐς ἄνδρας μεγίστους τε καὶ στρατιᾶς ἄρχοντας ἱκανῆς μηδὲ ἄκοντας ἐκπολεμοῦν...⁷⁵

And this was said to those who listen without envy or love of competition. To those who are running amok inconsiderately and thoughtlessly because of personal hate or strife—I advise you not to make hasty or premature decisions which concern men who are mighty and lead powerful armies, and not to make them hostile if they don't want to be...

When senators let their personal feelings obscure their counsel the results of their decisions could be detrimental to the state. Feelings of hatred (ἔχθρα) and bad competition (φιλονικία) cause unrest (θόρυβος), and this is exactly what should be avoided if large armies are involved. Piso does not mention Cicero's name explicitly as part of the "people who speak inconsiderately and thoughtlessly" (ἀπερισκέπτως καὶ ἀπαρασκεύως), but the vocabulary used in this passage reminds us of his argument about Cicero's inconsistency. In a reaction to the defection of two of Antony's legions (to the side of Octavian), Piso argued that this kind of desertion opposes military law and should be condemned instead of praised. Moreover, by accusing Antony at the same time of tyrannical ambitions and of punishing his soldiers so harshly—two things which are irreconcilable in Piso's line of argument—"Cicero has been driven to inconsistency by his hatred" (Κικέρωνα δὲ καὶ ἐς ἀνωμαλίαν ἐξέστησεν ἢ ἔχθρα).⁷⁶ Therefore, in Piso's speech we encounter the same idea as the historical Calenus already expressed in 43 BC: Cicero allows his emotions, and especially his anger, to in-

⁷⁴ *Phil.* 8.16.

⁷⁵ *B. Civ.* 3.60.246.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.* 3.58.233.

fluence him in the debate over Antony. As becomes clear from Piso's speech, just as it does from Calenus' oration in Dio book 46 (see below, § 3.2), Cicero's aggressive rhetoric leads to complaints that he is stimulating the outbreak of civil war instead of tempering the conflict. The charge of warmongering seems to be historical, since Cicero in *Phil.* 7.3 also defends himself against certain other senators that he was "playing the war trumpet" (*bellicum me cecinisse dicunt*).

Appian's representation of the polemic between Cicero and his fellow senators, which featured so prominently in the Latin speeches, is a unique recreation of the objections made against Cicero's anti-Antonian rhetoric by his fellow senators. Piso's speech displays a type of indignation which is completely different—as we will see—from the tone of Dio's speech for Calenus, which incorporates a range of popular themes from the invective tradition in *Ciceronem*.⁷⁷ In my opinion, the lack of "bitter personal invective" and "sweeping rhetorical flourishes"⁷⁸ is not evidence that Appian ignored the *Philippics* as a model; rather, the historiographer was interested in the terms of republican debate as well as the harmful element of pathetic rhetoric as a problematic aspect of this debate.

To recapitulate, I have demonstrated that with regard to the themes of the debate between Cicero and Piso, the *Philippics* were an important medium through which Appian envisaged the events of early 43 BC. His imitation of the polemic expressed in (and by) the *Philippics* lends coherence to his antilogy. Furthermore, we might say that Appian's debate offers a very compressed sample of Cicero's oratory in his final years, whose main features consist of the representation of Antony as public enemy as well as a contentious or angry rhetoric.

2.3 THEMATIC AND IDEOLOGICAL FEATURES OF APPIAN'S PHILIPPIC DEBATE

2.3.1 *The position of the debate within the narrative*

Classical Greek historiography is full of democratic assemblies where political matters are explored from multiple sides in symbouleutic

⁷⁷ See below, § 3.2.4.

⁷⁸ GOWING 1992: 235.

speeches. As multiple scholars have demonstrated, the classical historiographers often presented their speeches in clustered groups to mark major, dramatically intense moments in the course of events during the Peloponnesian war.⁷⁹ Appian's speeches, all located in the period after Caesar's death, serve a similar ideological purpose. After the murder of Caesar, in the historiographer's words, it became much more difficult to find men who were φιλελευθέροι than μισθωτοί, 'sycophants' who would support whomever was in power.⁸⁰ Furthermore, in the preface to the *Civil Wars* Appian notes that the assassination of Caesar, who actually brought the *staseis* temporarily to a halt, revived the citizens' ambitions to surpass their peers (ἐς τὰ ἀντίπαλα φιλονικία).⁸¹ The debate in the senate in January 43 BC marks a transitional moment in Appian's text. After months of heightened tension and ambivalence, the senators finally decree that war must be waged against Antony; this is the official beginning of the final civil war of the late Republic.

As if to highlight this pivotal moment, the antilogy between Cicero and Piso is the only senatorial debate in the *Civil Wars*. Before this debate there have indeed been important moments marked by direct speech, but they consist of separate contributions to senatorial meetings or of direct addresses to either the Roman people or military troops.⁸² Antony, for example, has addressed the senate several times to express his preferred course of action, and Brutus has given a long speech to the people which clarifies the goals of the Liberators. The exchange between Cicero and Piso, in contrast, constitutes the first time that multiple sides of the conflict are articulated in the space of one meeting.

Viewing Appian's Philippic debate from a narratological perspective, we can safely say that it is meant as a recapitulation and illustration of the attitudes of the different factions in Roman society as they are described in the main narrative. Narrative and speech work together

⁷⁹ For Herodotus, see LANG 1984; for Thucydides, COGAN 1981: 123–126, who identifies these moments as “changes”; for Xenophon, BARAGWANATH 2017, HUITINK & ROOD 2019: 102.

⁸⁰ *B. Civ.* 2.120.504. On the negative portrayal of the Roman senators and elite in this period, HOSE 1994: 290–294.

⁸¹ *B. Civ. praef.* 5.

⁸² Appian also includes a few dialogues between the Second Triumvirate and their followers, but by then the balance of power has shifted so much to the side of Antony and Octavian that it is difficult to see these dialogues as an equal exchange of thoughts.

in demonstrating the reasons each party had for either attacking or supporting Antony. There are strong verbal parallels between the narrative and discourse; Cicero and Piso frequently echo the words of the historiographer in the main narrative. In this regard, the speeches do not present any new information about the situation of 44–43 BC. Appendix A provides a complete overview of parallel passages. As is confirmed by this overview, Cicero's words are often mainly repeating those of the historiographer. Consequently, they are less a piece of vile invective than Appian makes us believe in his imitation of Cicero's angry Philippic rhetoric, in his account of the social disturbances caused by the Ciceronian faction, or in the condemnation of Cicero's falsification of the senate's decree at 3.61.251–252. For instance, with regard to Antony's management of Caesar's documents, Appian already concedes at the beginning of book 3 that Antony is misusing them in order to hand out favours (3.5.16). Another fine example is the tale of Antony's decimation of the soldiers at Brundisium. In his contribution to the debate, Cicero relates that Antony wished to "crush the soldiers' spirit" (τὴν στρατιὰν καταπλησόμενος, 3.52.218), and he emphasizes that these soldiers were executed without trial only because they mocked Antony's conduct. Piso counters this image by arguing that a general is definitely allowed to punish his soldiers for such disobedience (3.56.230). Yet if we study the episode in the main narrative, the historiographer appears to present the matter in a similar manner as (but independently from) Cicero. The situation is focalized from the soldiers' point of view: Appian describes their anger and their scorn at Antony's empty words (οἱ δὲ ἐγέλασαν τῆς σμικρολογίας). The word σμικρολογία, not present in other accounts of the story, is especially deprecating. The army's explicit mockery of Antony is Appian's own addition to the story, and it makes it all the more significant that this element returns in Cicero's speech. Furthermore, just like Cicero, in order to define Antony's main aim with the decimation the historiographer uses the term καταπλήσσειν. With his speech for Cicero Appian has created a strong reminder of several particularly unpopular episodes that have been related in the preceding narrative of book 3. Thematically, then, through the repetition of value-laden terminology the 'Philippic' affirms the ambiguous portrayal of Antony in the narrative.

In terms of narrative structure, the direct introduction to the debate

neatly summarizes its content and tone. The historiographer clearly explains both sides of the debate. Cicero and his friends believe that Antony should be declared a public enemy (πολέμιον αὐτὸν ἤξιουν ἤδη ψηφίσασθαι), considering his attack on Gaul and his abuse of the army which was designated for Thrace but now employed to march on Italy. Moreover, Antony has antagonized them by strutting about the city surrounded by his guard, an armed band, and using arms and watchwords around his house as if it were a fortress (ἐν τε τῇ πόλει φανερώς δορυφορηθέντος ὑπὸ τοσῶνδε λοχαγῶν καὶ περὶ τὴν οἰκίαν ὥσπερ ἄκραν ὅπλοις καὶ συνθήμασι κεχηρμένον).⁸³ Piso, on the other hand, who Appian says managed Antony's affairs in his absence (ὁ τῷ Ἀντωνίῳ τὴν ἀποδημίαν ἐπιτροπεύων), and many others in his wake believed that Antony should be brought to trial and that it was not appropriate if a consul who was honoured one day was to be convicted the next (καλεῖν αὐτὸν ἐς κρίσιν ἤξιουν, ὡς οὐ πάτριον σφίσιν ἀκρίτου καταδικάζειν οὐδ' εὐπρεπὲς τοῦ χθὲς ὑπάτου τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας).⁸⁴ By outlining the main points of the speakers in advance, the historiographer strongly guides the readers' interpretation of the debate.

2.3.2 *Cicero and Piso unmasked by the historiographer*

Although the speeches carry little informational value, they possess a strong ethical value and function as a tool to interpret morally both the events and the motivation of the political players. Intratextual links within the *Roman History* are used to illustrate the distortion of the facts in the speakers' representations of the events up to January 43 B.C. Although we have just seen that Appian is in some ways as anti-Antonian as Cicero in his 'Philippic', both Cicero and Piso are seen to present a charged version of Antony's actions compared to the words of the historiographer himself.

An example of such tendentiousness on Cicero's part is the account of Antony's interruption of the march on Rome. This would have been the result of the news that two of his legions had defected to Octavian,

⁸³ *B. Civ.* 3.50.204.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.* 3.50.205.

and were now stationed near the city. Cicero relates that out of fear of Octavian and his army, Antony broke off his march and fled to Gaul (Καίσαρος δὲ αὐτὸν τοῦ νέου σὺν ἐτέρῳ στρατῷ φθάσαντος ἔδεισε καὶ ἐς τὴν Κελτικὴν ἐτράπετο, 3.52.217). In the main narrative, this event is related somewhat differently (3.45.186): “thrown off by this (διαταραχθείς), Antony visited the curia; they discussed some minor matters, and then he immediately proceeded to the city gates and from the gates to the city of Alba in the hope of changing the deserters’ convictions.” On the basis of this version, the reader has no reason to believe that Antony took flight because he was afraid of Octavian’s military power.

By depicting Antony as a coward, Cicero betrays his contentious strategy to undermine Antony’s authority. He further blackens his opponent’s reputation by adding that Gaul was a good place from which to attack Rome (ὡς εὐκαιρον ἐφ’ ὀρμητήριον), *since (ὅτι) Caesar had taken power over us marching from there* (ὅτι καὶ ὁ Καίσαρ ἐκεῖθεν ὀρμώμενος ἐδυνάστευσεν ἡμῶν).⁸⁵ This ominous observation illustrates that Cicero is contriving to present Antony as a would-be Caesar, i.e. a tyrant. This type of rhetorical strategy confirms the image of the ‘Ciceroniani’ in the main narrative, who aim at dividing society instead of reconciling the different parties. The comparison of Antony’s consulship with Caesar’s *dynasteia* was exactly the kind of incendiary rhetoric that Piso and his party rejected.

Piso himself, despite his excellent credentials,⁸⁶ is guilty of distorting the truth in an even more consequential manner. With regard to the law that gave Antony the command over Gaul (and made D. Brutus its illegitimate defender), Piso notes:

Τὴν δὲ Κελτικὴν ἡγεμονίαν οὐκ ἐψηφισάμεθα μὲν ἡμεῖς Ἀντωνίῳ, ἔδωκε δὲ ὁ δῆμος νόμῳ, παρόντος αὐτοῦ Κικέρωνος, ᾧ τρόπῳ καὶ ἕτερα πολλάκις ἔδωκε καὶ τήνδε τὴν ἡγεμονίαν αὐτὴν Καίσαρι πάλαι.⁸⁷

We have not voted to give the government of Gaul to Antony, the people, with Cicero himself present, gave it to him by law, just like they often gave other offices and this same governorship to Caesar in the past.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* 3.52.217.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* 3.50.205, ἀνὴρ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα Ῥωμαίων ἐπιφανής.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* 3.54.225.

⁸⁸ For the comparison with Caesar, see also *B. Civ.* 3.27.104.

Piso here counters both Cicero's accusation that Antony illegally acquired the province of Gaul, and his statement that Caesar envisaged Gaul as an operating base from which to attack Rome. Both men had been given the province legally, both men had a right to be stationed there with an army. From a rhetorical perspective, this is a fairly convincing argument. It would have been successful had not the historiographer presented a very different picture earlier in book 3 (27.102–30.119). For what Piso does not mention is that Antony's request for Gaul was first denied by the senate. Having this knowledge, Piso's remark that "*we* have not voted in favour of giving Antony Gaul" acquires a very different flavour. What Piso also does not mention is the *σύνθημα*, the secret plan, Antony is subsequently said to have devised. According to the narrative, on the day of the vote, Antony bribed the tribunes to keep quiet during the election, he surrounded the forum with a guard preventing citizens from leaving, and used an uncommon procedure which made the citizens vote by tribe instead of century. The corrupt nature of the 'law' Piso mentions in the above passage will not have escaped Appian's readers.

I shall give one final example of Piso's double agenda as it is uncovered in the debate; other minor incongruencies will be pointed out in Appendix A. An important moment when the historiographer himself comments on the illegal aspects of the consul's behaviour is during the episode with Pseudo-Marius, also known as Amatius. Piso presents Antony's quick liquidation of Pseudo-Marius as a praiseworthy action done for the benefit of Rome (3.57.235). However, the main narrative reports that Antony exploited the rumour that Amatius was plotting against the state for his own benefit and executed him *χωρίς δίκης, μάλα θρασέως*—without a trial and precipitately (3.3.6). According to the historiographer, Amatius' conspiracy functioned as a pretext for restoring Antony's own unpopularity with the senate, which was due to his (quite literally) incendiary funeral speech for Caesar (3.2.2). The reactions to Antony's decision are described as mixed; certainly not everybody felt blessed by Amatius' removal. Though they also saw how it would be useful, "the senate was struck by the deed, since it was excessive and illegal".⁸⁹

⁸⁹ B. *Civ.* 3.3.6: καὶ ἡ βουλὴ τὸ μὲν ἔργον ἐθαύμαζεν ὡς μέγα καὶ παράνομον...

The discrepancies between the speeches and the main narrative pinpoint the real problem in this situation: the orators' deceptive rhetoric combined with a competitive need to trump their opponent undermine the process of decision-making. Appian proves himself a master in showing the flaws of all the parties involved in this conflict.

2.3.3 *Antony's speech and the exemplary lesson of the debate*

The final part of the debate in the senate shows the subtlety of Appian's moralizing technique. He notes that "either unawares or on purpose (λαθόντες εἴτ' ἐξεπίτηδες), the senate ordered Cicero to write up and give the other orders to Antony to the envoys".⁹⁰ Still led by his personal strife with Antony, Cicero writes down this letter φιλονίκως καὶ ψευδῶς, "contentiously and mendaciously".⁹¹ Cicero's contentious deed unlocks a disastrous chain of events in Appian's narrative. The narrator comments that it seemed like a malevolent *daimon* was leading Cicero to his destruction in its machinations to overthrow the Republic.⁹² "he was not so much influenced by hatred, as, it seems, by a demon who disturbed the state to the point of revolution, and who was evilly disposed toward Cicero himself" (οὐδεμιᾶς ἔχθρας τοσῆσδε ὑπόουσης, ἀλλ', ὡς ἔοικε, τοῦ δαιμονίου τὰ κοινὰ ἐς μεταβολὴν ἐνοχλοῦντος καὶ αὐτῷ Κικέρωνι κακῶς ἐπινοοῦντος).⁹³

When he reads the letter Antony bursts out in anger (σὺν ὀργῇ πολλὰ ἐς τε τὴν βουλὴν καὶ τὸν Κικέρωνα ἀπερρίπτει), and he gives two replies, which are quoted (partly) in direct speech.⁹⁴ First, in a personal outburst against the poor ambassadors, he defends himself to the senate against the attacks made by Cicero, recapitulating the main points of Piso's speech. Most notable about Antony's first reply is the continu-

⁹⁰ *Ibid.* 3.61.250.

⁹¹ *Ibid.* 3.61.252.

⁹² GOLDMANN 1988: 30 explains this comment as indicative of Appian's belief "die Entstehung des römischen Weltreiches sei durch göttlichen Beschluß erfolgt". However, as GOLDMANN argues (30–31), it is typical for Appian that, rather than being a pawn in the hands of the gods, Cicero is also presented as partly responsible for the events himself.

⁹³ *B. Civ.* 3.61.252.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.* 3.62.254. I propose to place the quotations marks after ἀπερρίπτει (sim. WHITE 1913). The phrase ἀπερρίπτει θαυμάζων ὅτι has more or less the same value as ἔφη or ἔλεγεν; the two *verba praesentia* ἡγούνται and νομίζουσιν invite us to note the transition.

ing antithetical structure (built by repeated μέν–δέ constructions) in which Cicero's actions are contrasted with those of his rivals in such a way as to demonstrate his inconsistent behaviour, just like Piso was prone to highlight Cicero's hypocrisy (ἀνωμαλία, 3.56.233). The explosive response is followed by the narratorial remark that Antony nevertheless wrote to the senate to confirm he would hand himself over. In his second reply, which takes the form of a letter, Antony addresses Cicero, showing himself to be unwilling to release Gaul at all. The "contentious and false" orders Cicero wrote thus seduce Antony into admitting his bellicose ambitions, making him immediately dangerous to the state. On hearing Antony's personal response to Cicero, the senate votes him a public enemy (3.63.258). Did the senate give Cicero the task to write the orders to Antony on purpose, as the narrative suggests, knowing that it would create an explosive answer by Antony and draw him out? If so, according to the way it is presented in Appian's account this was at the cost of Cicero himself, since it made him Antony's direct enemy. Every reader is aware of what that would eventually lead to.

Most importantly, in this final part of the deliberations, the whole episode is interpreted as an *exemplum* of republican φιλονικία interfering with political relations and removing all roads to constructive counsel. Cicero, then, is the unlucky lead actor. We have seen that in the preface to the Civil Wars it is stated that, when Caesar and his autocratic regime died, bad competition, φιλονικία, between republican politicians became rife again. Piso's speech picks up on this theme of φιλονικία, as we have seen above:⁹⁵ in the peroration he appeals to the part of the audience which is free from ill-will (φθόνος) and contentiousness (φιλονικία), and he admonishes those who are causing unrest because of their personal hatred (οἰκεία ἔχθρα) and contentiousness (φιλονικία) to act instead as proper councillors. The concept of φιλονικία is explicitly placed in the realm of exemplary discourse by Piso's reference to the *exemplum* of Marcius Coriolanus (ἀναμνησκομένους Μαρκίου τοῦ Κοριολανοῦ).⁹⁶ As Piso implies, most senators are not able to separate their personal emotions and professional responsibilities. Cicero's

⁹⁵ See § 1.2 above.

⁹⁶ B. Civ. 60.246. The thought that personal ambitions should be repressed in political debate is also present in republican texts, as the opening of Caesar's speech in Sallust's Conspiracy of Catiline illustrates. See chapter 1, § 3.2.

personal rivalry with Antony exemplifies that fault, as the historiographer also confirms. Piso's speech frames Cicero's actions as an example of the contentious attitude of the republican senators, which is thematized throughout the *Civil Wars* as part of the explanation for the fall of the Republic. Even though, as we have seen in the previous section, Piso himself is not flawless, he is able to reflect on the (dangers of) moral corruption within republican politics. It is this aspect of the speech that gives him the moral high ground in the discussion. Again, as we have seen in chapter 3, Cicero's lack of reflection on his behaviour and his difficulty in controlling his emotions make him an example of the disintegration of the republican institutions.

2.4 ATTIC ORATORY AS A STYLISTIC AND IDEOLOGICAL TEMPLATE FOR THE DEBATE BETWEEN CICERO AND PISO

2.4.1 *Simplifying Cicero as a representative of the elite 'majority'*

In the previous sections, we have focused on the *Philippics* as the main intertext for the debate between Cicero and Piso; an *exemplum* of contentious oratory, these speeches demonstrate the problem of political competition. In this part, we will look at Appian's interaction with the Greek tradition. I will argue that, in fact, the ideological framework of the debate is not so much Roman as it is Greek. There is a strong thematic antithesis between the arguments of Cicero and Piso, which could be summarized as a clash between the personal interests of the ruling elite and the law. Cicero's aristocratic standpoint that the senate is the ultimate arbiter in the debate is corrected by Piso's argument that democratic law should be the ultimate point of reference. What is at stake in their oratorical exchange is the proper functioning of the republican system in its legislative, elective, and juridical procedures. By simplifying Cicero's argument into a defence of the special rights of the senators, and centering Piso's argument around the law, Appian revives the fourth-century Greek discourse around democratic procedure. In § 3.2.5, it will be seen that Demosthenic oratory, in particular, functions as an important model for Appian's representation of the senatorial debate.

Appian's Cicero is an aristocrat through and through. In his opening words, he argues that Salvius should obey his superiors, who have more political power and more knowledge than he does:

Ἀμαθῶς δ' αὐτὸν ἔχοντα τῶν παρόντων ἔδει πιστεύειν ὑπάτοις ἀνθ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ στρατηγοῖς καὶ δημάρχους τοῖς συνάρχουσιν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις βουλευταῖς, οἱ τοσοῖδε τὴν ἀξίωσίν τε καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντες διὰ τε ἡλικίαν καὶ ἐμπειρίαν ὑπὲρ τὸν Σάλουιον καταγινώσκομεν Ἀντωνίου. ἔστι δ' ἐν τε χειροτονίαις καὶ δίκαις αἰεὶ τὸ πλεόν δικαιοτέρον.⁹⁷

If he is ignorant of what is happening he ought to listen to the consuls instead of himself, and to the praetors and the tribunes who govern together with him, and to all the other councillors—us great men surpassing Salvius by authority and numbers as the result of our age and experience, we condemn Antony. In elections and in trials the majority is always the most rightful.

What does Cicero mean by the platitude that the majority is always the most rightful in elections and court cases (ἔστι δ' ἐν τε χειροτονίαις καὶ δίκαις αἰεὶ τὸ πλεόν δικαιοτέρον)? Indeed, many republican institutions, for example regarding legislation and election procedures, functioned by virtue of the right of the majority.⁹⁸ However, the comments preceding this sententia indicate that it is not necessarily a democratic idea: Cicero argues that Salvius would do better in trusting the consuls, praetors, tribunes, and the other senators, because as a result of their seniority and their experience they have authority and they form a large group. The 'majority', τὸ πλεόν, refers to the men at the top of the political hierarchy—definitely not to the common majority formed by the Roman people. Cicero is shown to vary on the familiar argument that a republic is governed by the multitude of citizens, turning it into

⁹⁷ B. Civ. 3.52.214.

⁹⁸ It is interesting that the two official procedures that Cicero mentions here, the election of magistrates and the criminal trial, are usually believed to be strongly influenced by the Roman elite at the cost of the will of the Roman people. For election procedure as influenced by the elite, especially in the *comitia centuriata* where the consuls and praetors were chosen, see TAYLOR 1949: 50–75; *contra*, LINTOTT 1999: 202–206. Cf. MOURITSEN 2001: 94–96. Fundamental is also HÖLKESKAMP 2004a: 257–280 in reaction to the opposite views of MILLAR 1998; MOURITSEN 2001 is less polemical. HÖLKESKAMP 2004b usefully reviews the international scholarship about Roman political culture. On criminal trials specifically, see the succinct overview in HARRIES 2007, who explains that with the rise of standing courts, the *quaestiones perpetuae*, in the latter part of the Republic, the original *iudicium populi* (HARRIES 2007: 14–16) lost in power; the standing *quaestiones* were officially termed *publica iudicia*, but they were set up rather as a means of self-regulation for the elite (16–18). Cf. BADIAN & LINTOTT 2012.

a particular validation of the power of the senatorial order. The argument made in this peroration will be proven by Piso to be a wrong interpretation of the democratic right of the majority.

To a certain extent, the views of Appian's Cicero resemble those expressed in the historical Cicero's political and philosophical writings. According to Cicero's philosophy, the power of the republican constitution should depend on two important bodies: the state laws and the senate. The laws were seen as the cornerstone of the state's organization, as the famous quotation from *In defence of Cluentius* illustrates.⁹⁹ The senate was the agent determining the manner in which they ought to be exercised. In his treatises, Cicero expresses scepticism about the rule of the people. He believed that "the safety of the citizens is found in the deliberations of the best men", in *optimorum consiliis posita est civium salus* (*Rep.* 1.51).¹⁰⁰ Institutionally, the laws were adopted (or blocked) by the people's assembly, which, in contrast to the senate, had political power, *potestas*. Cicero himself, however, thought that the only road to a "balanced and harmonious" Republic was through giving the senate (the elite, or the *boni cives*) ultimate responsibility (*auctoritas*) over state policy.¹⁰¹ Cicero believed that the system of democratic voting, as it was exercised in the *comitia*, was fragile.¹⁰²

However, the Cicero of the public speeches takes on a very different persona, and hammers on the influence of the Roman people on state policy and the outcome of specific law cases. On multiple occasions, particularly whenever the reputation or safety of one of his clients or of himself was at stake, Cicero is seen to appeal to the ultimate power (*maxima* or *summa potestas*) of the *populus Romanus*.¹⁰³ The *vox populi* that Cicero claimed to represent forms a central argument of his public speeches.¹⁰⁴ For instance, in *Phil.* 7.22 Cicero proudly remarks "What

⁹⁹ *Cluent.* 146, *Legum ministri magistratus, legum interpretes iudices, legum denique idcirco omnes servi sumus ut liberi esse possimus*. Cassius Dio alludes to this passage in his speech of Cicero: 45.43.4. Cf. *Cic. Rep.* 1.49.4 (*quid est enim civitas nisi iuris societas civium?*)

¹⁰⁰ Transl. by J. ZETZEL 1999: 22.

¹⁰¹ E.g. *Leg.* 3.10, 3.28, 3.38; *Sest.* 137 contains another such plea for the *auctoritas senatus*. On this concept, BLEICKEN 1975: 304–324; LINTOTT 1999: 86–88.

¹⁰² Cf. *Rep.* 2.22, 3.23; *Sest.* 96–143. See BLEICKEN 1975: 280–284, 288–294.

¹⁰³ Cf. *Rab.* 5, *Dom.* 80 (see BLEICKEN 1975: 288–294, MEIER 1997: 116–117). MILLAR 1998: 71–72 and 172–174 also discusses *Ver.* 2.5.143–144 and *Planc.* 10–15 as examples of Cicero's reference to the people as a powerful, legislative body.

¹⁰⁴ This theme is ubiquitous in the public speeches. Apart from the *Philippics*, see e.g. *Cat.* 4.19,

shall I say about all of the Roman people? From a forum fully packed they have twice called upon me to speak in an assembly, with one mind and one voice, and they have expressed their great wish to restore freedom.”¹⁰⁵ In accordance with this image, Cicero is often framed in imperial literature as the *publica vox* that represented the feelings of the Roman citizens and defended their interests.¹⁰⁶

Despite this image of Cicero as a guide and leader of the Roman people, Appian's *Roman History* devotes no attention at all to Cicero's relationship with the people. (Not even, as we might expect, in his account of the Catilinarian conspiracy, in which the historiographer focuses rather on the proceedings in the senate.)¹⁰⁷ The only reference to Cicero's popularity is Appian's comment that the people (ὁ δῆμος) voted Cicero *pater patriae* at the instigation of Cato the Younger.¹⁰⁸ The speech for Cicero in book 3 guides the reader further towards a view of Cicero as the optimate who believed in the power of the intellectual elite.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, in his rendition of Cicero's 'Philippic', Appian responds to an existing tradition in which Cicero is primarily the spokesman of the senate.¹¹⁰ In chapter 2, we saw that in Lucan's *Civil War*, Cicero acts as the representative of the senate, who has little feeling for the people's wishes or interests. Appian's speech presents a similar Cicero who adopts an exclusively aristocratic point of view, but he actually gives voice to this aristocratic ideology, using a type of vocabulary that recalls elite republican discourse. The most prominent example of this is the emphasis on hierarchy and the authority of the senate, which makes Salvius' disobedience to more esteemed senior senators highly offensive (τοῖς ἄλλοις βουλευταῖς, οἱ τοσοῖδε τὴν ἀξίωσιν τε καὶ

Pis. 7. Cf. *Red. pop.* 25, *Red. sen.* 28; *Cat.* 1.18, 27–29. A good discussion of the concept and its afterlife is found in KEELINE 2018: 84–89.

¹⁰⁵ *Nam quid ego de universo populo Romano dicam? Qui pleno ac referto foro bis me una mente atque voce in contionem vocavit declaravitque maximam libertatis recuperandae cupiditatem.* Cf. *Phil.* 14.16.

¹⁰⁶ *Sen. Suas.* 6.19 (Cremutius Cordus), 6.21 (Bruttedius Niger), 6.26 *publica vox* (Cornelius Nepos); *Luc.* 7.62; *Cass. Dio* 38.18.1.

¹⁰⁷ *B. Civ.* 2.2.4–7.23.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.* 2.7.24.

¹⁰⁹ GABBA 1956: 165–175 already signals that “Dal cap. 50 in poi Senato e Cicerone sono strettamente congiunti nell'azione politica e nel disprezzo del storico” (167).

¹¹⁰ E.g. *Luc.* 7. 62–84; *Juv.* 7.197–199, 8.244 (*pater patriae*); *Plin. HN* 7.116–117 (*primus in toga* ...); *Sen. Suas.* 6.26 (*ingentia consulis acta / iurataeque manus*); *Sen. Dial.* 10.5.1; *Sid. Apol. Carm.* 2.186 (*Arpinas consul*); *Plut. Cic.* 13. Cf. *Catul.* 49 for Cicero as typical aristocrat (*tu optimus omnium patronus*).

τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντες διὰ τε ἡλικίαν καὶ ἐμπειρίαν ὑπὲρ τὸν Σάλουιον).¹¹¹ However, as we will see below, this expression of the Roman *auctoritas senatus* is still a coloured interpretation of Ciceronian thought, for it also prepares the reader for Piso's Greek interpretation of civic justice.

2.4.2 *Piso for the people? Projecting a Greek perspective on the Roman constitution*

Piso's defence of the law functions as a corrective to Cicero's aristocratic beliefs. The image of Piso as a pious citizen has been established in advance of his speech: in book 2.136.567, Piso is already introduced as a man bound to the legal institutions of Rome, when he does not succumb to the other senators' wishes that he divulge Caesar's testament. The first words of his contribution, which are concerned with the legal aspects of the controversy over Antony's policy, confirm this portrayal:

Ὁ μὲν νόμος, ὦ βουλή, δικαιοῖ τὸν εὐθυνόμενον αὐτὸν ἀκοῦσαι τε τῆς κατηγορίας καὶ ἀπολογησάμενον ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ κρίνεσθαι· καὶ τὸν δεινότεον εἰπεῖν Κικέρωνα ἐς ταῦτα προκαλοῦμαι. ἐπεὶ δὲ ὀκνεῖ μὲν παρόντος Ἀντωνίου κατηγορεῖν, ἀπόντος δ' ἐγκλήματά τινα εἶπεν ὡς μέγιστα ἐκ πάντων καὶ ἀναμφίλογα ὄντα, παρῆλθον ἐγὼ δείξων αὐτὰ ψευδῇ βραχυτάταις ἀποκρίσεσι.¹¹²

The law, dear senate, states that he who is under investigation himself hears the accusation and that a verdict is passed after he has defended himself; and I challenge Cicero, he who is most skilled at speaking, to do this. But since he hesitates to accuse Antony with him being present, and now that he is absent brings certain indictments against him as if they are the most important of all and indisputable, I will step forward to show in a few brief words that these are false.

Piso will in fact continue to make more than a few brief comments on the matter. He makes a sustained argument for obeying the law in matters of civil conflict. "It is not," he says, "fitting for those of good counsel (i.e. the senators) to engage in factional strife against the people during times of great danger, and to forget, that in the past this used to be the task of the people, to make a distinction between the actions

¹¹¹ B. Civ. 3.52.214.

¹¹² Ibid. 3.54.222.

of friends and enemies.” He goes on to imbue the senators with some historical awareness:

Μόνος γὰρ ἐκ τῶν πάλαι νόμων ὁ δῆμος αὐτοκράτωρ εἰρήνης πέρι καὶ πολέμου σκοπεῖν. ὦν μὴδὲν ὁ δῆμος ἐπιστήσειε μὴδὲ ἐπιμηνίσκειεν ἡμῖν, προστάτου λαβόμενος.¹¹³

For according to the laws of old the people alone have the authority to decide on matters of peace and war. May the people never be aware of this and project their anger at us, having taken themselves a leader.

Piso’s remark that the people were traditionally the αὐτοκράτωρ is extraordinary. Appian never uses this term, which commonly refers to the official function of (military) ‘imperator’ or general, for the people except in this passage.¹¹⁴ Theoretically, the *populus Romanus* did have a sovereign position in the election of magistrates, Roman legislation, and particular criminal cases.¹¹⁵ These institutional rights have even led Fergus Millar to argue that Rome was a direct democracy.¹¹⁶ However, this idea has been much contested by other historians of Rome, and the *communis opinio* is that effectively, the plebs were in many respects dependent on as well as manipulated by the elite, who monopo-

¹¹³ B. Civ. 3.55.229.

¹¹⁴ The term is frequent in the *Civil Wars*, and can roughly be used for three categories of officials (cf. FAMERIE 1998: 91–102): a) generals, e.g. 1.5.40 and 2.12.87, who can also receive the official Roman title of ‘Imperator’, e.g. 5.13.124 (Octavian); b) dictators, e.g. 1.11.99 (Sulla), 1.2.16; c) the Emperor, e.g. 1.5.38 (Hadrian) or 2.13.90 (Trajan). Cf. VRIND 1923: 31–37 on the term in Cassius Dio, where it would be a synonym of *imperator*.

¹¹⁵ On the sovereignty of the Roman people, BLEICKEN 1975: 28–32 (in response to MOMMSEN’s articulation of this political ideal) and 244–324; MEIER 1997: 117–151 who describes rather how the assemblies were restricted in their rights. LINTOTT 1999: 40–41, 43, 199–208 nuances the effect of these limitations. Cf. SANDBERG 1993. Cic. *Rab.* 5, *Dom.* 80; Sall. *Hist.* 3.48.15 (Licinius Macer); [Sall.] *Ep.* 2.3.2, 2.5.2 and 2.5.5 (about the ancient Roman constitution) are the few ancient sources which voice the concept of the *summa potestas/vis populi*. [Sall.] *Ep.* 2.5.5 most closely resembles Piso’s turn of phrase: *ita paulatim populus, qui dominus erat, cunctis gentibus imperitabat, dilapsus est...*

¹¹⁶ See MILLAR 1998: 197–226 (who also defended this argument in later articles). The power of the people’s assembly is confirmed by MORSTEIN-MARX 2013, who illustrates that the assembly did have an effect on public policy in Rome, by blocking on occasion laws which the elite wanted to push through. However, despite this ‘democratic’ feature of public policy, there seems to have been little ability by the people to change the nature of republican administration also, which enabled the magistrates and senate to control most of what was going on in Rome. Compare also Cic. *Rep.* 2.56 on the traditional Republic, which places the authority to govern with the senate. WIRSZUBSKI 1950: 14 explains: “*Libertas* [sc. of the *populus Romanus*] primarily consists in those rights which (a) affect the status of the individual citizen, and (b) ensure that the State is a real *res publica*; the nominal right to govern is included among them, but its actual exercise is subject to the possession of *auctoritas* and *dignitas*.”

lized all the magistracies.¹¹⁷ In reality, therefore, the sovereignty of the people was structurally undermined.

What inspired Appian to make Piso say this? I would like to propose that the historiographer, rather than voicing a Roman idea, projects his Greek views about the authority of the people on the constitution of the Roman Republic. Jochen Bleicken already signalled a similar tendency in a fragment from Appian's *Punic Wars* (*Lib.* 112.531), where it is described how the Roman people are frustrated over the election of Scipio Aemilianus as consul for 147 B.C. This would have been in contradiction with the decrees issued by the Roman kings Romulus and Tullius, which stated that the people held the authority (τὸν δῆμον εἶναι κύριον) in the assembly and had legislative power.¹¹⁸ Bleicken does not examine how Appian's formulation of this ideal imitates the conceptual language used to discuss the powers of the people in Greek political writings, which, I think, lends more strength to the case for his Greek interpretation of Roman government.

The idea that the *dēmos* is sovereign (κύριος in the *Punic Wars* fragment, or αὐτοκράτωρ in Piso's speech) is found in a few other Greek analyses of the Roman constitution.¹¹⁹ Dionysius of Halicarnassus discusses the same historical period as does the fragment from Appian's *Punic Wars*; it is probably also this period to which Piso refers. Dionysius relates how, during his reign, Romulus granted the *populus* three rights: to choose magistrates, to authorize (new) laws, and to decide on matters of war whenever the king allowed them to do so (*Ant. Rom.* 2.14.3). Three books later in his discussion of Servius Tullius' transformations of the Roman constitution, Dionysius revisits and expands on these rights, saying "that according to the ancient laws the people possessed the authority over three matters, which were extremely important and vital: to appoint the magistracies both civil and military, to

¹¹⁷ See note 98.

¹¹⁸ According to BLEICKEN, this comment about popular sovereignty is "ohne Anspruch auf den Wert eines verfassungstheoretischen Grundsatzes" (292). He states: "Soweit es Aussagen in antiken Quellen gibt, die im Sinne einer omnipotenten, schrankenlosen Beschlussfähigkeit der römischen Volksversammlungen ausgelegt werden könnten, handelt es sich um Übertragung griechischen Denkens auf römische Verhältnisse." (292–293).

¹¹⁹ Polyb. 6.14.4, where Polybius distinguishes between the people who are κύριος with regard to the laws, political offices, matters of honour and punishment, and peace and war; and the consuls who have αὐτοκράτορα δύναμιν and αὐτοκράτορα ἐξουσίαν with regard to military equipment and field operations; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.14.3.

sanction laws and abolish them, and to judge whether a war should be started or ended” (ὅτι τριῶν πραγμάτων ὁ δῆμος ἐκ τῶν παλαιῶν νόμων κύριος ἦν τῶν μεγίστων τε καὶ ἀναγκαιοτάτων, ἀρχὰς ἀποδείξει τὰς τε κατὰ πόλιν καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ στρατοπέδου, καὶ νόμους τοὺς μὲν ἐπικυρῶσαι, τοὺς δ’ ἀνελεῖν, καὶ περὶ πολέμου συνισταμένου τε καὶ καταλυομένου διαγνῶναι, *Ant. Rom.* 4.20.1). Note that just like Dionysius, Piso mentions that the power of the people also pertained to decisions about peace and war (εἰρήνης περὶ καὶ πολέμου σκοπεῖν).¹²⁰

The Greek articulation of Roman popular sovereignty reflects the classical Athenian formulation of the people’s rights. In his *Constitution of Athens* Aristotle describes how Solon famously devised the democratic system in which “having the authority of the vote, the people were sovereign in the state” (κύριος γὰρ ὢν ὁ δῆμος τῆς ψήφου κύριος γίνεται τῆς πολιτείας, 9.1).¹²¹ The idea is also conspicuous in the Demosthenic corpus, especially in the forensic speeches. The authority of the people and their role as “guardians” of the law forms an essential topic within Demosthenes’ rhetorical discourse:¹²² “Here with us [sc. in Athens], the people are sovereign in the state, and the imprecations and laws and guards [are], to prevent anybody else from becoming sovereign”, the orator says in *Against Leptines*.¹²³ In short, looking at the frequency of this type of analysis in the Greek tradition (and its absence in the Latin texts), we may argue that it was indeed his Greek predecessors who provided Appian the terminology to colour Piso’s argument.

It is true that on many counts, Piso’s argument also coheres with Roman elite views about politics, such as Cicero expresses in his speech: while Piso acknowledges the traditional sovereignty of the people, he also implies that the people should not become too aware of this power, since it might induce them to “take a leader” (προστάτου λαβόμενος)

¹²⁰ Cf. Polyb. 6.14.10: ὑπὲρ εἰρήνης οὗτος βουλευέται καὶ πολέμου.

¹²¹ Similar terminology occurs in Plato, *Leg.* 700a: οὐκ ἦν, ὦ φίλοι, ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τῶν παλαιῶν νόμων ὁ δῆμος τινων κύριος, ἀλλὰ τρόπον τινὰ ἐκὼν ἐδούλευε τοῖς νόμοις. The thought here is, however, directly the opposite from that of Aristotle. The idea of the people being ‘slaves to the law’ would recur in Cicero, *Cluent.* 146 (see n. 99). On the voting procedure of the Athenian assembly, OBER 1989: 133–134. The sovereignty of the Athenian people is explored in OSTWALD 1986, see esp. 77–83 and 520–524, where he describes the differences between the fifth- and fourth-century constitution.

¹²² WOHL 2010.

¹²³ Dem. 20.108: παρὰ δ’ ἡμῖν ταύτης μὲν ὁ δῆμος κύριος, καὶ ἀραὶ καὶ νόμοι καὶ φυλακαὶ ὅπως μηδεὶς ἄλλος κύριος γενήσεται.

and try to overrule the senate. In general, though, the emphasis on the *potestas populi* is remarkable, especially in light of the last hundred years of the Republic where party politics was the rule rather than the exception, Caesar and Antony, whom Piso defends, being some of the best-known examples of this.

In the next section, I will further contextualize Piso's argument by demonstrating that it was the oratory of Demosthenes, in particular, which furnished Appian with the terminology as well as the ideological framework for the Cicero–Piso debate.

2.4.3 *Evaluating republican oratory through Athenian discourse*

The vocalization of the different perspectives in the Cicero–Piso debate is not only Greek, it is also peculiarly Demosthenic. The speeches feature an arsenal of words and phrases taken from the Demosthenic corpus. Cicero, for example, uses a phrase which occurs nowhere in Appian except here: ἡ χώρα τοσῆδε οὖσα καὶ ὁμορος (3.53.220).¹²⁴ The combination χώρα ὁμορος, “neighbouring land”, is used in the exordium of Demosthenes’ *Olynthiac* 1.5, where Philip is said to threaten the nearby lands—a reason for the Athenians, so argues Demosthenes, to take quick action.¹²⁵ Just as Philip is on the border of the Athenian state, threatening to make himself her master, so Antony is waiting to march on Italy and take over power. More significant, however, is Piso’s use of Demosthenic phrases. The opening words of Piso’s speech, ὁ μὲν νόμος (... ἐπεὶ δὲ ὀκνεῖ), are based on an antithetical structure which only Demosthenes frequently employed in his forensic orations, and which therefore became a hallmark of his oratory;¹²⁶ the second-century rhetorician Hermogenes acknowledges it as particularly suc-

¹²⁴ There are more phrases in the Cicero–Piso debate which are seldom used by Appian (on the basis of a *TLG* search): διαστασιαζέσθαι 55.229 (only in *Mac. fr.* 11.1); ἀνωμαλία 56.233, cf. *B. Civ.* 2.134, *Mac. fr.* 18.3, *Mithr.* 163; νυκτοφυλακεῖν 52.216 and 57.237 (twice), cf. *B. Civ.* 2.125.522, 3.45, and 5.46 (and *Mithr.* 198); ἀμαφίλογος 54.223 and 57.238, cf. *B. Civ.* 2.128; ἀπερισκτέπτως 60.246, only in *Celt. fr.* 2.4; ἀπαρασκεύως 60.246, only in *B. Civ.* 2.7.23.

¹²⁵ (Sparing) usage of this phrase is restricted to Demosthenes and Isocrates. Cf. *Dem.* 2.1 (again the exordium), 15.22; *Isocr. Archid.* 76, cf. 61. The phrase is otherwise common in Diodorus Siculus and imperial historians.

¹²⁶ In the classical corpus, there are nine instances of this formulation in Demosthenes’ or Demosthenic texts (26.8, cf. 25.15–16; 23.84; 24.47, 55; 27.17; 37.35; 39.39; and the spurious 46.13, 20), one

cessful.¹²⁷ By placing his opponents directly opposite the law, Demosthenes could nullify their trustworthiness and emphasize the illegality of their actions. Take as an example the speech *Against Timocrates*:

Καὶ ὁ μὲν νόμος μὴδ' ἐπιψηφίζειν φησὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων παρὰ ταῦτα μηδένα· ὁ δ' ἔγραψε τοῖς προέδροις ἐπάναγκες, ἔάν τις καθιστῇ, προσάγειν, καὶ προσέγραψεν «ὅπότ' ἂν τις βούληται».¹²⁸

Now, the law says that no one of the magistrates is allowed to put the question in contradiction of these measures; yet he wrote that it is necessary for the commissioners, when somebody nominates sureties, to account for themselves, and he added “whenever a man wishes”.

We recognize the same strategy in the exordium of Piso's oration:¹²⁹ “The law, dear senate, states that he who is under investigation himself hears the accusation and that a verdict is passed after he has defended himself; and I challenge Cicero, he who is most skilled at speaking, to do this. But since he hesitates to accuse Antony with him being present ...”. The law poses a particular procedure for prosecuting the accused, but Cicero follows his own procedure that violates the law.¹³⁰

A rhetorical formula that corresponds with this strategy of ad-ducing the law as technical proof (πίστις ἄτεχνος) is the focus on its antiquity.¹³¹ Demosthenes has a particular way of referring to “the ancient laws” of Athens: οἱ πάλαι (κείμενοι) νόμοι. The more common formulation would be οἱ παλαιοὶ νόμοι, as it also occurs in other Greek authors.¹³² As far as I have been able to trace, Demosthenes is the only classical author who has the adverb πάλαι instead of the adjective παλαιός.¹³³ It is therefore worth observing that Piso uses the

single instance in Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens* (60.9) and one in Dinarchus (*Aristogeit.* 14.5). Dio Chrysostom uses the formulation in 31.132.

¹²⁷ In *Id.* 1.6, Hermogenes quotes the example of Dem. 25.15 (with plural subject).

¹²⁸ Dem. 24.55.

¹²⁹ Full Greek text on p. 295.

¹³⁰ The only other place in his *Roman History* where this device is used is in the speech by Brutus in book 2, who opposes the law with Caesar: καὶ ὁ μὲν νόμος ὁ τῶν προγόνων καὶ ὁ ὄρκος οὐδ' ἐπάγεσθαι δίκην ἔτι οὐσι δημάρχοις ἐπιτρέπουσιν· ὁ δὲ Καῖσαρ αὐτοὺς ἐξήλασεν, οὐδὲ δίκην ἐπαγαγὼν (2.138.575).

¹³¹ WOHL 2010: 28.

¹³² Cf. Pl. *Leg.* 700a and Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 4.20.2.

¹³³ On multiple occasions: Dem. 20.8.1; 21.35.1; 24.137.1 and 5, 139.4, 142.6; (spurious) 58.17.2. It is noteworthy that both this phrase and the ὁ μὲν νόμος ... ὁ δὲ construction figure in pseudo-Demosthenic texts.

Demosthenic phrase in his rather charged analysis of the *dēmos* as the αὐτοκράτωρ in the ancient laws: μόνος γὰρ ἐκ τῶν πάλαι νόμων ὁ δῆμος αὐτοκράτωρ (3.55.229). The classical ‘Athenian’ idea stating the sovereignty of the people is accompanied by a word usage familiar from Athens’ most renowned orator.

One more passage from Demosthenes’ *Against Meidias*, a speech delivered—probably in public—in 346 BC against his personal rival Meidias,¹³⁴ will in my view explain not only these minor Demosthenic features but also the broader framework of the debate. I will show that while imitating Demosthenic vocabulary and style, Appian also took over the conceptual framework present in orations of the Attic orator. Let us have a look at an iconic passage from the final part of *Against Meidias*, which proposes how an incorrupt legal (democratic) system should function:¹³⁵

Μηδαμῶς, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, μὴ προδῶτε μήτ’ ἐμὲ μήθ’ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς μήτε τοὺς νόμους. Καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτ’ εἰ θέλοιτε σκοπεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν, τῷ ποτ’ εἰσὶν ὑμῶν οἱ αἰεὶ δικάζοντες ἰσχυροὶ καὶ κύριοι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει πάντων, ἐάν τε διακοσίους ἐάν τε χιλίους ἐάν θ’ ὁπόσους ἂν ἡ πόλις καθίσῃ, οὔτε τῷ μεθ’ ὀπλῶν εἶναι συντεταγμένοι μόνοι τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν, εὖροιτ’ ἂν, οὔτε τῷ τὰ σώματ’ ἄριστ’ ἔχειν καὶ μάλιστ’ ἰσχύειν, οὔτε τῷ τὴν ἡλικίαν εἶναι νεώτατοι, οὔτε τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενί, ἀλλὰ τῇ τῶν νόμων ἰσχύϊ. Ἡ δὲ τῶν νόμων ἰσχὺς τίς ἐστίν; ἄρ’ ἐάν τις ὑμῶν ἀδικούμενος ἀνακράγῃ, προσδραμοῦνται καὶ παρέσονται βοηθοῦντες; οὐ· γράμματα γὰρ γεγραμμέν’ ἐστί, καὶ οὐχὶ δύναιντ’ ἂν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. τίς οὖν ἡ δύναμις αὐτῶν ἐστίν; ὑμεῖς ἐὰν βεβαιώτ’ αὐτοὺς καὶ παρέχητε κυρίους αἰεὶ τῷ δεομένῳ. Οὐκοῦν οἱ νόμοι θ’ ὑμῖν εἰσὶν ἰσχυροὶ καὶ ὑμεῖς τοῖς νόμοις. δεῖ τοίνυν τούτοις βοηθεῖν ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἂν αὐτῷ τις ἀδικουμένῳ, καὶ τὰ τῶν νόμων ἀδικήματα κοινὰ νομίζειν, ἐφ’ ὅτου περ ἂν λαμβάνηται, καὶ μήτε λητουργίας μήτ’ ἔλεον μήτ’ ἄνδρα μηδένα μήτε τέχνην μηδεμίαν εὐρήσθαι, μήτ’ ἄλλο μηδὲν δι’ ὅτου παραβάς τις τοὺς νόμους οὐ δώσει δίκην.¹³⁶

By all means, men of the jury, do not betray me or yourselves or the laws. For if you are willing to consider and investigate this question

¹³⁴ On the historical context and argument of the speech, HARRIS 2008.

¹³⁵ MACDOWELL 1990: 37 comments: “Elsewhere we can analyse his [sc. Demosthenes’] cleverness and skill at arguing; at the close we can simply admire a masterpiece of eloquence.” Further on this speech, whose authenticity is questioned but generally accepted, in OBER 1994 (the current passage is discussed at 102–104). HARRIS 2008 offers good introductory remarks (10–13, 75–87).

¹³⁶ Dem. 21.223–225.

in particular, why those of you always called upon to judge are influential and responsible for everything in the city, if you're either two hundred or a thousand or as many as the city gives a seat, you will find that it is not through being organized in arms, alone of all the citizens, or through having the best bodies and being the strongest, or by being the youngest in age, or by any of these things — no, it is by the strength of the law. What is the strength of the law? If one of you gets hurt and screams, will they come running and be there to help him? No. For they are written words, and they cannot do this. What then is their power? You are, when you confirm them and validate them when necessary. Surely then, the laws have force because of you, and you because of the laws. Therefore you must help them in the same way as someone would do himself whenever he is harmed, and consider any wrongs done to the laws as being common (wrongs), by whomever they are committed, **and absolutely nothing must be devised, no public services nor pity nor any individual nor any rhetorical trick, by which anyone who has transgressed the laws will not serve a penalty.**

In fourth-century Athenian forensic oratory there were two sources of authority one could appeal to: the laws (οἱ νόμοι) and the jurors as representatives of the people (ὁ δῆμος).¹³⁷ This representative body, however, should never make a decision on its own, for it was their task to guard the sanctity of the laws (παρέχῃτε κυρίου) and confirm their validity (βεβαιῶτε αὐτούς) when necessary. Their authority relies not on their numbers or their military force, their physical strength, or their age, but on their power to enact the laws (ἡ τῶν νόμων ἰσχὺς). Demosthenes emphasizes at the end of the passage that jurors should never be seduced by the bribery (of wealthy men), by their personal pity or by any man's wiles. The law is the only yardstick for making a decision about right and wrong.¹³⁸

If we replace “men of the jury” in the above passage from *Against Meidias* with ‘conscripted fathers’ we are not far away from Piso’s argument in Appian’s history. Despite the major gap between the Athenian and Roman concept of democracy, Appian has injected a Demosthenic

¹³⁷ WOHL 2010: 26; OBER 1989: 299–304. HARRIS 2008: xxi–xxviii is also useful. For a good discussion of this passage in *Against Meidias*, see WOHL 2010: 35–37.

¹³⁸ For the extraordinary emphasis on the rule of the law within this speech, see HARRIS 2008: 12–13; he states that the term νόμος is used approximately 100 times.

view of civic justice into his discussion of late republican debate. Demosthenes argues that councillors should never appeal to their extraordinary power, to strength, or age in order to overrule others—in short, their place at the top of the hierarchy is irrelevant in their task as council. The thought recalls Cicero's opposite, elite viewpoint, according to which Salvius should follow the opinion of his superiors, who are older and wiser and greater in number (τὴν ἀξίωσίν τε καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντες διὰ τε ἡλικίαν καὶ ἐμπειρίαν). Against this conviction, Piso, just as Demosthenes does in *Against Meidias*, places the law as the ultimate compass for counsel. Furthermore, the absence of personal views or interests, which Demosthenes discusses here, is one of Piso's major criticisms of Cicero.

As Appian presents it, the conflict between Piso and Cicero is caused by the latter's rash factionalism and elite vision on the rights that the senate could take in prosecuting a man: Piso's chief problem is the inconsistency in Cicero's political behaviour, which seems to be the result of a personal vendetta, and his neglect of the law (the first word of his oration). Piso points the senate to the particular responsibility of preserving (not undermining) laws enacted by the people, just as Demosthenes refers the jurors to their official function as protectors of the laws. The polar opposition between the law and the private individual with their personal ambitions, which we have also seen manifesting itself on a syntactic level in the opening of Piso's oration, is part and parcel of the forensic argument in the speeches of Demosthenes and to a lesser extent (that we know) of his contemporaries. Appian did not need to quote Demosthenes directly in order to participate in this discourse; the educated reader would probably recognize it quickly enough on the basis of his own reading of the Attic orators.¹³⁹ In this regard, the continuous repetition of the word νόμος not only serves the internal coherence of Piso's oration, but is an allusive tool that signals the foundation of this imperial speech on Athenian models, especially Demosthenes.

¹³⁹ The only exception I have found so far (but there will definitely be more) is in Antony's speech to Octavian (3.20.76), the apophthegm that the common people are as fickle as a stormy sea, which can be traced back to Dem. 19.135. It must have been a more commonly used expression, for Dio Chrysostom is also seen to use it in 3.49: HAHN 1968: 202. HAHN provides an incorrect reference for Dem. 19.

Therefore, whereas in their representation of the senate's role in government, Appian's speeches for Cicero and Piso are also compatible with aristocratic political philosophy during the Republic, the discourse used to articulate the ideological opposition within the debate is Greek. Cicero's undemocratic theory about the prevalence of the senate is exactly the kind of argument that is rejected as harmful (for: a mark of φιλονικία) both by the narrator and by Piso. When Piso subsequently counters Cicero with a speech that concentrates completely on the legal aspects of the conflict, the reader is offered a mix of typical aristocratic denigration of the people and a continual emphasis on the ancestral laws of the Roman people—an emphasis with Athenian overtones, which are reinforced by verbal allusions to Demosthenes' oratorical corpus. Appian is constantly inviting his readers to switch contexts or codes: the speeches move back and forth from the Roman senate house, which is the setting for the actual events in the narrative, to the court of democratic Athens, which has shaped the rhetorical discourse in which the ideas of the opponents are voiced. The fact that the Roman politicians are not capable of meeting the ideological standards they express, creates an uneasy contrast between Greek and Roman republican history. It is indeed possible for a Roman to talk like Demosthenes, but if one cannot embody the words, what meaning do they still have? And if the great imitations of Demosthenes' speeches, Cicero's *Philippics* turn out to be an *exemplum* for faulty oratory, how successful should we say this imitation still is?

It is tempting to consider Cicero's short and rather ineffective speech as a dismissal of his political involvement and of his character, too. Piso, who gives the longer and more Hellenic (Demosthenic) speech would be the better politician, representing the sincerity and the moral reflection that Cicero appears to lack. This must partly be true: Appian explicitly identifies Cicero's conduct as contentious and dishonest, and the whole episode, as we have seen, is designed to make Cicero's 'Philippic' opposition to Antony a negative *exemplum* of the bad competition between republican politicians, which eventually destroyed the constitution. A simpler reason for denying Cicero the longer speech could be that Appian did not want to repeat the *Philippics* or, alternatively, create a conflicting version. Yet, the debate gains most in impact when the reader acknowledges that it is firmly embedded in

the narrative of books 2 and 3, which reveal both of the speakers *and* Antony to have personal motives that are harmful to the state. Even the senate, who are as a majority supposed to make a fair judgment of the speakers' arguments, appear to have ulterior motives, tricking Cicero into fanning the dispute with Antony. Applying the language of *Against Meidias*, we could say that once all the councillors have become corrupt, the system on which the constitution is founded falls apart—which is precisely what Appian wants to show has happened to the Republic.

3. The debate between Cicero and Calenus (Cass. Dio 45.18–46.28)

3.1 FRAMING THE DEBATE

We will now turn to the second monumental manifestation of Ciceronian oratory in Greek imperial historiography: the debate between Cicero and Calenus in Cassius Dio, books 45 and 46, which constitutes one of the longest pieces of direct speech in the entire extant work. The debate has been a popular subject of study, especially in relation to the anti-Ciceronian invective in Calenus' speech.¹⁴⁰ Another traditional point of attention, as I discussed in the introduction above, are the parallels between Dio's speech for Cicero and the Latin *Philippics*. Alain Gowing was the first to go as far as saying that Dio tried to *imitate* Cicero's *Philippics*, but he was less interested in Dio's method of literary imitation than in the use of the speeches to support Dio's characterization of Cicero and Antony.¹⁴¹ Scholars also recognize that Dio's speech

¹⁴⁰ Calenus' oration is an essential part of ZIELIŃSKI's argument about the imperial "Cicerokarikatur", the negative, ahistorical portrait of Cicero's faults that was devised in the declamation schools: cf. ZIELIŃSKI 1912: 280–288. ZIELIŃSKI believed that the speech Calenus gives was modeled on the example of a Greek declamatory speech, a view which has little influence anymore (but see recently KEELINE 2018: 178–188). See MILLAR 1961: 19–20, KOSTER 1970: 200–210, VAN STEKELENBURG 1971: 83–87; BURDEN-STREVEVS 2020: 80, 84.

¹⁴¹ GOWING 1992: 238–239, "Dio's version of the *Philippics* is a faithful if motley imitation of the originals..." (238); cf. GOWING 1992: 238n.34. GOWING responds to VAN STEKELENBURG 1971: 80.

for Cicero contains allusions to all fourteen Philippics.¹⁴² In the words of Estelle Bertrand, “L’abondance des échos des Philippiques ainsi que la présence de quasi-citations attestent également de l’utilisation, très probablement directe, des discours cicéroniens par Dion Cassius”.¹⁴³ In recent years, Christopher Burden-Strevens has done much to determine the literary method behind the Ciceronian speeches, examining in particular Dio’s strategies for imitating the themes as well as the rhetorical structure of *Phil. 2*.¹⁴⁴ My own approach will be somewhat different. We will certainly examine which elements Dio has imitated from Cicero’s *Philippics*, but we will use these results to determine what Dio considered as typical of Ciceronian oratory, and especially the ways in which this oratory confirmed or weakened Cicero’s political reputation. As in the analysis of Appian’s debate above, the central question that concerns us here is how the *Philippics* function as an *exemplum* of Cicero’s public conduct and political programme. As has been discussed in the introduction, for Dio, too, the *Philippics* provide a sample of the type of contentious rhetoric that destroyed the Republic. In illustrating this, I will also pay attention to the Ciceronian ‘soundbites’, the political slogans Cicero devised during his career, which feature in the speeches of both Cicero and Calenus.¹⁴⁵ Within the broader exemplum of the Philippics, these recognizable Ciceronian catchphrases function as (negative) exemplary *dicta* of the orator’s rhetorical self-fashioning. Finally, we will see how Dio Hellenizes the debate by reinventing the Demosthenic template for Cicero’s *Phil. 2*; the still preliminary findings in this section should especially inspire further research. However, in advance of my discussion of the speeches themselves, I should say a few words about the thematic framework of the debate: the narrative already provides clear cues for the prob-

Both follow the practice of the nineteenth-century study *de fontibus*. For a good overview of these early sources, see FECHNER 1986: 63–69.

¹⁴² I see prominent allusions to *Phil. 1, 3, 4, 5, 12, and 14* (see Appendix B). BURDEN-STREVENs believes the closest correspondences are with *Phil. 2, 5, and 8*, whereas GOWING 1992 and VAN STEKELENBURG again give different parallels to consider. These parallels appear to be remarkably open for interpretation. See BERTRAND 2008: xxiii–xxvii for a “tableau de concordance” listing all the parallel passages in Dio’s speech and Cicero’s *Philippics*.

¹⁴³ BERTRAND 2008: xxii.

¹⁴⁴ BURDEN-STREVENs 2020: 79–84, 89–92 is now the fullest account of Dio’s imitation of *Phil. 2*.

¹⁴⁵ For this idea, see also PIEPER, VAN DER VELDEN & JANSSEN 2022.

lems that are at the core of the debate, and which concern not just the welfare of the Republic but of Cicero, too.

Dio situates the Cicero–Calenus antilogy in the same setting as Appian does the Cicero–Piso debate, namely the first days of 43 BC and as part of a senatorial meeting.¹⁴⁶ In contrast to Appian, however, Dio’s speech bears no resemblance to the subject or themes of *Phil.* 5, which was performed at the beginning of January. As we will see in §§ 3.2.1 to 3.2.3, Dio’s recreation of the speeches, based on the imitation of *Phil.* 2 and parts of *Phil.* 1 and 3–14, takes little account of chronology. His time frame is even more confusing since Cicero’s opponent, Calenus, is addressed at length in *Phil.* 8 and *Phil.* 10 (both dating to February).¹⁴⁷

The vehement altercation between Cicero and Calenus takes up approximately half of the narrative of books 45–46, which deal with the events after the assassination of Caesar. In the first half of book 45 Dio describes the rise of the young Caesar as well as the factional strife between the Antonii and the followers of Octavian and Decimus Brutus. In Dio’s words, Rome had *de facto* become a monarchy: Antony and Octavian were only upholding the appearance of liberty (τό τε τῆς ἐλευθερίας σχῆμα ἐφαντάζετο καὶ τὰ τῆς δυναστείας ἔργα ἐγίγνετο).¹⁴⁸ Cicero is presented as one of the key players in this chaotic situation. Dio relates that when at the end of 44 BC it is decided that all senate meetings will be protected by a guard, all the senators are happy with this new measure, but Cicero in particular:¹⁴⁹

Ταῦτα γὰρ ἤρεσκε μὲν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς πλείοσι τῶν ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ τότε ὄντων ... μάλιστα δὲ δὴ τῷ Κικέρωνι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔχθος σφοδρότατον ὑπάρχον τὸν τε Καίσαρα ἐθεράπευε, καὶ πᾶν ὅσον ἐδύνατο καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ τούτῳ τε ἐβοήθει καὶ ἐκεῖνον ἐκάκου. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ... ἐπανήλθεν ἐπειδήπερ ἐκπεπολεμωμένους σφᾶς ᾤσθητο.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁶ Cf. VAN STEKELENBURG 1971: 89–91 who presupposes at least one common source. It is interesting that both Appian and Dio make little mention of Cicero’s speeches before the people, for example *Phil.* 6, which was held shortly after *Phil.* 5.

¹⁴⁷ *Phil.* 8.11–19, *Phil.* 10.3–6. However, Calenus is also addressed, yet without the mention of his name, in *Phil.* 5.25 (cf. 5.1), where Cicero directly responds to his proposal to send an embassy to Antony.

¹⁴⁸ Cass. Dio 45.11.2.

¹⁴⁹ Plut. *Cic.* 43.3–4 tells a different story: Cicero would have come back because Antony had “undergone a miraculous change of behaviour” (μεταβεβλήσθαι Ἀντώνιον θαυμαστὴν μεταβολήν), and collaborated nicely with the senate.

¹⁵⁰ Cass. Dio 45.15.3–4.

This pleased most of those who were in Rome at the time, but Cicero in particular. Because of his intense hatred towards Antony he was courting Caesar, and he supported the latter as much as he could with speech as well as action, and was trying to harm Antony. And therefore ... he returned when he found out that these men were enemies.

Whereas the Roman senators are presented en bloc and without any mention of names (τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς πλείοσι), Dio lifts Cicero out of this group. He focalizes the orator's feelings towards Antony (hatred, ἔχθος), and he comments on Cicero's motivation to support Octavian, namely to harm Antony (ἐκάκου).¹⁵¹ Just as in Appian's narrative preceding the debate, Dio emphasizes Cicero's hateful relationship with Antony as the main drive behind his political conduct.

The destructive effects of Cicero's incapacity to prevent his emotions from influencing his political choices¹⁵² resonate in Dio's catalogue of bad omens and the oracles predicting the fall of the Republic (καὶ λόγια πρὸς κατάλυσιν τῆς δημοκρατίας φέροντα παντοῖα ἦδετο),¹⁵³ which frames the debate between Cicero and Calenus. In the narrative directly preceding the senatorial debate Cicero's downfall is portended together with the fall of the Republic. The historiographer relates the mutilation of the statue of Minerva as Guardian Goddess, which Cicero had set up before leaving Rome in 58 BC. This omen is said to be the prediction of death for Cicero himself: καὶ τοῦτο μὲν καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ Κικέρωνι τὸν ὀλεθρον προεδήλωσε (45.17.4). This fatalist view is reinforced by his reflection on the debate *after* Calenus' speech. Cicero is said to be incapable of himself enduring the *parrhēsia* he employed against others (παρὰ δὲ δὴ τῶν ἄλλων οὐκ ἤξιον τὴν ὁμοίαν ἀντιλαμβάνειν), and as a result he takes to insulting Calenus (ἐς λοιδορίας αὐτῷ κατέστη), losing the public cause out of sight (καὶ τότε οὖν ἀφείς τὸ τὰ δημόσια διασκοπεῖν). Consequently, the day is wasted, as well as the possibility of effective counsel.¹⁵⁴ The whole debate is thus more or less futile to begin with. Moreover, it only fuels Cicero's excessive frankness, which within the *Roman History* as a whole is thematized as forming a significant contribution to his downfall later in 43 BC, as we have seen in

¹⁵¹ Cf. Plut. *Cic.* 45.1.

¹⁵² This incapacity is thematized as a serious problem by Dio, as we have seen in chapter 3.

¹⁵³ Cass. Dio 45.17.6.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.* 46.29.1: ὥστε τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκείνην καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐχ ἥκιστα μάτην κατατριβῆναι.

chapter 3, § 2.4. The historiographer's conclusion and introduction of the debate form a neat ring composition which signals the devastating effects of the senatorial deliberations in 43.

3.2 DIO'S IMITATION OF THE *PHILIPPICS*

3.2.1 *Establishing the Philippics as the main intertext*

Right from the beginning of Cicero's speech, Dio leaves little doubt that he wrote his 'Philippic' in close reference to the Latin *Philippics*. We have seen in the previous section that the historiographer frames the debate as being of great personal relevance for Cicero. The *exordium* of the speech now confirms that Cicero's *Philippics* constituted his main political activity in 44–43 BC. Again, as in Appian's narrative, Cicero's Philippic oratory is the main lens through which to view his conduct in his final years.

The exordium of Cicero's speech immediately embeds the speech in the larger context of his public performances of 44–43 BC:

Ὡν μὲν ἔνεκα τὴν ἀποδημίαν, ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ πλείστον ἐκδημήσων, ἐστειλάμην, καὶ διὰ σπουδῆς τὴν ἐπάνοδον, ὡς καὶ πολλὰ ὑμᾶς ὠφελήσων, ἐποίησάμην, ἠκούσατε πρῶην, ὦ πατέρες, ὅθ' ὑμῖν περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἀπελογησάμην.¹⁵⁵

You have heard the day before yesterday, fathers, for which reasons I prepared my journey abroad, with the aim to stay away for a long time, and why I made a hasty return, with the aim to be of good assistance to you, and I have apologized for the actions themselves.

While Appian's Cicero began by referring to the senate's deliberations of the previous day (ἐχθές, 3.50.213), Dio's Cicero connects his speech to an earlier speech that he delivered himself on "the day before yesterday" (πρῶην). These temporal indications in the discourse are connected with the information in the narrative, which states that the senatorial deliberations lasted multiple days.¹⁵⁶ However, Dio is more specific than Appian in referring to the *First Philippic*, delivered on

¹⁵⁵ Cass. Dio 45.18.1.

¹⁵⁶ See n. 3 above.

2 September 44 BC in response to Antony's speech on 1 September,¹⁵⁷ in which Cicero indeed explained his reasons for leaving Rome, and apologized for his action. The *First Philippic* is not mentioned in the narrative preceding the speech. The reference to a (non-specified) speech outside the narrative invites the reader to activate his knowledge about the series of speeches in this period by which Cicero exerted an extensive political influence.¹⁵⁸ Right at the beginning of Cicero's speech, the historiographer flags up the main intertext(s), encouraging the reader to interpret the speech as a Greek imitation and reperformance of the famous Latin orations.

Apart from establishing the main intertexts of the speech, the exordium also introduces the importance of the *Philippics* for Cicero's reputation as defender of the Republic:

Οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δυναστείᾳ καὶ τυραννίδι ζῆν ὑπομείναιμ' ἂν, ἐν ἣ μῆτε πολιτεύσασθαι ὀρθῶς μῆτε παρρησιάσασθαι ἀσφαλῶς μῆτε τελευτῆσαι χρησίμως ὑμῖν δύναμαι, οὐτ' αὖ παρὸν τῶν δεόντων τι πράξαι, κατοκνήσαιμ' ἂν καὶ μετὰ κινδύνου τοῦτο ποιῆσαι.¹⁵⁹

For I would not be able to survive either under a dynastic rule or a tyranny, in which I could not be of proper service to the public, nor have the freedom to speak my mind safely, nor die in a manner that would be useful to you; but, on the other hand, when there is an emergency, I would not hesitate to act, even when it was dangerous.

In this passage, Cicero associates himself with the essential republican values of *parrhēsia* and *eleutheria* (the opposite of living under a dynastic or tyrannical rule),¹⁶⁰ and expresses the wish to serve the public (πολιτεύσασθαι ὀρθῶς) in order to demonstrate his complete allegiance to the republican constitution.¹⁶¹ The identification with the state is further strengthened by the thought that a good republican citizen cannot and will not live under the rule of an autocrat. It is a thought that marked Cicero's Catilinarian oratory (*Cat.* 4.3), and

¹⁵⁷ The exact dating for this speech is provided by Cicero himself, at *Phil.* 5.19, but see MANUWALD 2007: 19n.53.

¹⁵⁸ Cf. BURDEN-STREVEVS 2020: 80.

¹⁵⁹ Cass. Dio 45.18.2.

¹⁶⁰ At Cass. Dio 45.11.2, the historiographer also reflects on this antithesis between ἐλευθερία and dynastic or monarchical rule, see p. 307 above.

¹⁶¹ MALLAN 2016: 265–266. He also draws a link with the death scene of Cato the Younger in book 43.10.5, where the two terms are explicitly connected.

which returns in Cicero's *Phil.* 2.119, where he explicitly refers to his consulship.¹⁶² There, he rhetorically poses that death cannot come too soon for a consular, who has reached the highest office in which to serve the Republic. In *Phil.* 2.119 he adds that it is the highest good to die in the fight for a free people (*ut moriens populum Romanum liberum relinquam*; compare μήτε τελευτῆσαι χρησίμως ὑμῖν δύναμαι in the passage above). The *Philippics* were more than a means to oppose Antony: they were also an attempt to establish his reputation as a true republican hero. Dio's allusion to the Ciceronian motif also recreates this double layer of meaning in the Greek 'Philippic'.

3.2.2 Imitating Cicero's 'Philippic' style

As mentioned above, the 'Philippic' imitates arguments, themes, and rhetorical strategies used in the Latin *Philippics*, with a special number of references to *Phil.* 2 (see also Appendix B). I summarize the speech in the overview below. In this section and the next, we will then look more closely at some stylistic aspects and political themes that for Dio formed the heart of Ciceronian oratory.

- 45.18–19: Cicero introduces himself and his political position.
- 45.19–20.2: He stresses the importance of making good council, and he inveighs against those who deny that Antony should be regarded as an enemy of state.
- 45.20.3–20.4: *quasi-narratio*. Cicero lists the illegal measures Antony has taken, allegedly on behalf of the state.
- 45.20.5–22.2: it is extremely important that Antony be hated and punished—we could call this the *propositio* of the speech.
- 45.22.3–25.4: Antony has deceived the senate to vote for measures which he only executed in such a way that they were beneficial to himself.
- 45.26–34.1: The review of Antony's measures as a consul is followed by a more personal attack on his life. This attack functions as the *argumentatio* of the speech, demonstrating the reasons why

¹⁶² For the topos, cf. Dem. 18.205 (*On the Crown*).

Antony should in no way be regarded as a trustworthy leader. Antony's chief qualities are his avarice and licentiousness, which define everything he does. Cicero, however, confines himself to examples of Antony's bad behaviour while he was in public office: the climax of this catalogue of crimes is his attempt to crown Caesar—by which action he destroyed the Republic.

- 45.34.2–37.6: Lingering on the consequences of proclaiming Caesar *rex populi*, Cicero warns the senate of Antony's own tyrannical ambitions, and admonishes them once again to stop him and punish him.
- 45.38–42.5: We arrive at the heart of the speech, where Cicero's two aims become clear: on the one hand he tries to convince the senate that Antony is an enemy of the state and a plotter against freedom, and on the other he advises them to support the young Caesar.
- 45.41: Interlude: Cicero defends himself at this point against the charge that he was complicit in the conspiracy against Caesar, and he appeals to his own reputation as a *consularis*.
- 45.42.6–45.3: As the second part of his advice, the idea of an embassy is rejected, since it would only cause a delay favourable to Antony.
- 45.4–46.5: In the penultimate paragraph of the speech a heightened tone is employed to reaffirm his wish to die rather than to live under a tyranny, and to celebrate his political fame and the successes he has won through his *παρρησία*. This should probably be regarded as the *peroratio* of the speech...
- 45.47: ... but as it stands, the dramatic conclusion is followed by yet another topic of invective, namely Antony's failure to imitate his grandfather Marcus Antonius and his habit of gathering all kinds of suspicious characters around him.

The speech as a whole bears little resemblance to Appian's 'Philippic', except perhaps for its general premise that Antony should be declared a public enemy. However, it is useful to compare the Greek 'Philippics' on the matter of a particular anecdote recurring in the *Philippics*, and which features in both Appian and Dio's speech for Cicero: Antony's decimation of the army at Brundisium. Such a comparison shows us

how Dio, much more conspicuously than Appian, tried to imitate Cicero's rhetorical style and the actual language of the *Philippics*, not just the content of the speeches. It is also a useful addition to Burden-Strevens' recent research, who limits himself to Dio's representation of passages from *Phil.* 2.¹⁶³

Cicero's account of Antony's slaughter of his own soldiers is reported most vividly in *Phil.* 3, which also appears to have been the main source for the anecdote in Dio's speech.

*Quippe qui in hospitibus tectis Brundisi fortissimos viros optimosque civis iugulari iusserit; quorum ante pedes eius morientium sanguine os uxoris respersum esse constabat. Hac ille crudelitate imbutus, cum multo bonis omnibus veniret iratior, quam illis fuerat, quos trucidarat, cui tandem nostrum aut cui omnino bono pepercisset?*¹⁶⁴

Cic. *Phil.* 3.4

For he ordered that the bravest men and noble citizens were **slaughtered under the roof of his guest** at Brundisium; it was well known that the **face of his wife was bespattered with the blood** of these men, who were dying **at his feet**. That man, who is tainted with such **cruelty**, who of us or which good citizen at all would he have spared, given that he came here being much more angry with all good men than he was with those whom he butchered.

Juxtaposing the two versions of the anecdote in Appian and Dio's speech for Cicero quickly demonstrates to which extent Dio attempted to cover the peculiarities of Cicero's rhetorical style.

Τὴν στρατιὰν ἐπὶ τοῖσδε καταπλησόμενος, ἵνα πρὸς μὴθὲν αὐτῷ παρανομοῦντι κατοκνή, διεκλήρωσεν ἐς θάνατον, οὐ στασιάσαντας ἢ φυλακὴν ἢ τάξιν ἐν πολέμῳ λιπόντας, ἐφ' ὧν μόνων ὁ στρατιωτικὸς νόμος τὴν οὕτως ὥμῃν ὥρισε τιμωρίαν, καὶ ὅμως αὐτῇ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ὀλίγοι μόλις ἐν τοῖς πάνυ κινδύνοις ἐχρήσαντο ὑπ' ἀνάγκης· ὁ δὲ φωνῆς ἢ γέλω-

Ὁ μὲν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις κρατήσας πολλῶν ἐφείσατο, οὗτος δέ, πρὶν καὶ δυνηθῆναι τι, τριακοσίους στρατιώτας, καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἑκατοντάρχους τινάς, μὴδὲν ἀδικήσαντας, οἱκοὶ παρ' ἑαυτῷ, παρούσης τῆς γυναικὸς καὶ βλεπούσης, ἐφόνευσεν, ὥστε καὶ τοῦ αἵματος αὐτὴν ἀναπλῆσαι. Καίτοι τὸν οὕτως ὥμῳς ἐκεῖνοις, ὅτε καὶ θεραπεύειν αὐτοὺς ὤφειλε, χρησάμενον τί

¹⁶³ BURDEN-STREVENIS 2020: 79–84.

¹⁶⁴ Cf. *Phil.* 5.22: *Cum eius promissis legiones fortissimae reclamassent, domum ad se venire iussit centuriones, quos bene sentire de re publica cognoverat, eosque ante pedes suos uxorisque suae, quam secum gravis imperator ad exercitum duxerat, iugulari coegit.* Cf. *Phil.* 12.12, 13.18.

τος ἦγεν ἐς θάνατον τοὺς πολίτας καὶ θάνατον οὐ τῶν ἐλεγχθέντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν διαλαχόντων.

In addition, to frighten his army, so that they would not shrink back from any crime he committed, he decimated them, even though they had not mutinied nor had they deserted their watchpost or the ranks in war, the only offences for which military law prescribes such a **cruel** sentence, and even in these cases only few have used it, but sparingly and in very dangerous situations when it was absolutely necessary. But he killed citizens because of a word or a laugh, citizens who were not convicted in trial but were chosen by lot.

App. B. Civ. 3.53.218

οὐκ οἶσθε τῶν δεινοτάτων πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἂν καὶ νικήσῃ, ποιήσῃ;

Caesar, after he conquered in war, spared many, but this man, even before he had any power, **killed in his own home** three hundred soldiers, among whom also several **centurions**, who had done nothing wrong, **while his wife was present and watched, so that even she was stained with their blood**. Now, what horrible things do you think he, who has treated these men so **cruelly** when he was supposed to take care of them, will do to all of you, when he wins?

Cass. Dio 45.35.3–4

In Appian's account, there is one traceable allusion to Cicero's report: the motif of Antony's cruelty in exacting this punishment on the soldiers.¹⁶⁵ Appian's Cicero frames the act in the context of military practice, commenting that the *decimatio* (διεκλήρωσεν ἐς θάνατον) was usually exacted only on soldiers who deserted or committed mutiny. Antony, however, applied it only because his soldiers mocked him, and not even because they had been convicted for a misdemeanour (οὐ τῶν ἐλεγχθέντων). In the original anecdote in the *Philippics*, Cicero makes no mention of official, military terminology. Instead, he takes recourse to the language of murder (*iugulari*).

Cassius Dio imitates all the essential elements of the Ciceronian anecdote. Firstly, the refusal to frame the event as a military act: like *Phil.* 3.4, the speech for Cicero speaks of murder (ἐφόνευσεν vs. *iugulari iussit*). Secondly, the event is situated in Antony's (guest) house, which further moves the act from military practice into the personal sphere; *Phil.* 3.4 and *Phil.* 5.22 have *in hospitibus* and *domum*, respectively, which is imitated in Dio's οἶκοι παρ' ἑαυτῷ. Thirdly, an addition

¹⁶⁵ See also above, n. 67. Perhaps Appian's πολίτας also mirrors Cicero's use of *cives*, a term which emphasizes the enormity of Antony's action: the murder of fellow citizens.

which most distinguishes Dio's anecdote from Appian's, Dio includes the presence of Antony's wife, a central element to the story as is told in *Phil.* 3.4, 5.22, and 13.18. Not only was the wife present (παρούσης τῆς γυναικὸς καὶ βλεπούσης vs. *ante pedes eius uxoris*), she was besmeared by the soldiers' blood (ὥστε καὶ τοῦ αἵματος αὐτὴν ἀναπλῆσαι), a gory detail that is only included in Cicero's report of the story in *Phil.* 3.4 (*morientium sanguine os uxoris respersum*). The pathos in the image of Fulvia's face bespattered with the soldiers' blood is mirrored by the exaggeration in the term ἀναπλῆσαι, which has the double meaning of filling up and defiling something.¹⁶⁶ Finally, Dio ends his anecdote with a rhetorical question, the same strategy as employed in *Phil.* 3.4. When Antony, "tainted with cruelty" (*imbutus crudelitate*), is even angrier with the Roman elite (*bonis omnibus*) than with these soldiers he has slaughtered, how will he spare any of the senators, or any good citizen, Cicero asks. Similarly, Dio's Cicero poses the question: when Antony has treated his own army so cruelly (ὥμῳς), what terrible things will he do to us when he wins this war? Cicero's Philippics offered a blueprint for Dio's imitation of Cicero's oratory, which captures the main motifs, rhetorical pathos, and even particular stylistic figures.

3.2.3 *Typifying Cicero through his political slogans*

Apart from imitating rhetorical features of Cicero's Philippic oratory, Dio integrates another, infamous aspect of Ciceronian rhetoric: the promotion of his own achievements, or his self-praise. Cicero's tendency to boast about his career features prominently in Plutarch's work and in Dio's narrative of the Catilinarian conspiracy, as we have seen in chapter 3.¹⁶⁷ Dio's speech for Cicero is unique for its imperial interpretation and reperformance of Cicero's self-fashioning techniques. We have seen that in the introduction of the 'Philippic', Cicero presents himself as a defender of republican freedom. In addition, Cicero relies on his consular authority on multiple occasions, and refers to his successful suppression of Catiline's wicked conspiracy.

¹⁶⁶ LSJ s.v. II.

¹⁶⁷ Plut. *On Self-praise* 540f, *Cic.* 24.1–2, *Comp. Dem. et Cic.* 2; Cass. Dio 38.12.6–7.

Ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ ταῦθ' ὑμῖν παραινῶ, καὶ εἶγε ὑπατεύων ἔτυχον, πάντως ἂν καὶ ἐποίησα, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον, ὅτε καὶ τὸν Κατιλίαν καὶ τὸν Λέντουλον αὐτῷ τούτῳ προσήκοντα ἐπιβουλεύσαντας ὑμῖν ἡμυνάμην.¹⁶⁸

I now am giving you [sc. the senate] this advice, and had I perchance been consul, I would have taken care of all of it, just like in the past, when I defended you from Catilina and Lentulus (a relative of this man here) who were plotting against you.

In the *Philippics*, Cicero frequently refers to his single-handed suppression of Catiline's wicked crimes.¹⁶⁹ Within the Ciceronian tradition as a whole, Cicero's praise of his own consular deeds was a controversial topic, as I have shown in chapter 1, §1.3. The quoted passage is definitely a response to the popular subject of this recurring autoreferentiality, but in this case, Dio also incorporated it as part of his accurate representation of the style of the *Philippics*.¹⁷⁰

The most obvious example of Cicero's strategies for self-fashioning comes at the end of the speech, in the 'semi-peroration'. In a rhetorical *tour de force*, Dio imitates Cicero's concern with his own reputation by including famous Ciceronian slogans.

Ὡς ἔγωγε οὕτω γνώμης, ὦ πατέρες, ἔχω ὥστ' ἂν μὲν πεισθῇτέ μοι, καὶ πάννυ ἂν ἡδέως καὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας καὶ τῆς σωτηρίας μεθ' ὑμῶν ἀπολαῦσαι, ἂν δ' ἄλλο τι ψηφίσσηθε, τεθνάναι μᾶλλον ἢ ζῆν ἐλέσθαι. οὔτε γὰρ ἄλλως τὸν θάνατόν ποτε τὸν ἐκ τῆς παρρησίας ἐφοβήθη (καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ κατάρθωσα πλεῖστον· τεκμήριον δὲ ὅτι καὶ θῆσαι καὶ ἐορτάσαι ἐφ' οἷς ὑπατεύων ἐποίησα ἐψηφίσασθε, ὅπερ οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἄλλῳ μὴ οὐκ ἐν πολέμῳ γέ τι καταπράξαντι ἐγένετο), νῦν δὲ καὶ ἡκιστα. Καὶ γὰρ ὁ μὲν θάνατος οὐκ ἂν ἄωρος ἄλλως τε καὶ πρὸ τοσοῦτων ἐτῶν ὑπατευκότι μοι γένοιτο (καίτοι μνημονεύετε ὅτι τοῦτο καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ὑπατείᾳ ὑμῖν εἶπον, ἵνα μοι πρὸς πάντα ὡς καταφρονοῦντι αὐτοῦ προσέχητε)· τὸ δὲ δὴ φοβηθῆναί τινα καθ' ὑμῶν καὶ τὸ δουλεῦσαι τινὶ μεθ' ὑμῶν καὶ πάννυ ἂν μοι

¹⁶⁸ Cass. Dio 45.42.6.

¹⁶⁹ *Phil.* 2.118 (*contempsit Catilinae gladios*); 4.15 (*ut igitur Catilinam diligentia mea, senatus auctoritate, vestro studio et virtute fregistis* [sc. the people]...); 8.15 (*Ego Catilinam perire volui*); 14.14 (*An vero ego qui Catilinam haec molientem sustulerim, everterim, adflixerim, ipse exstiterim repente Catilina?*). The figure of Catiline is also employed separately throughout the *Philippics*, representing the archetypal villain.

¹⁷⁰ Contrary to the *Philippics*, where only Catiline is mentioned, Dio adds Lentulus to the picture, who was the stepfather of Antony. The addition of Lentulus probably suited the historiographer's own purposes, since it creates another condensed reference to the chief intertext, *Phil.* 2 (18). The mention of Lentulus also anticipates Calenus' slanderous description of Cicero's imprisonment and execution of the senior statesman in 46.20.3–5.

ἄωρότατον συμβαίη. Ὅθενπερ τοῦτο μὲν καὶ συμφορὰν καὶ ὄλεθρον, οὐ τοῦ σώματος μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς τε δόξης, ὅφ' ἣς πού καὶ μόνης αἰδίοι τρόπον τινὰ γιγνόμεθα, εἶναι νομίζω· τὸ δὲ δὴ λέγοντά τε καὶ πράττοντα ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἀποθανεῖν ἰσοστάσιον ἀθανασίᾳ ἄγω.¹⁷¹

For I hold this opinion, Fathers, that, if you follow me, I shall very gladly enjoy freedom and safety together with you, but if you vote for something different, I'd choose to die rather than be alive. For never have I feared death as a result of my outspokenness (and because of this I have had great success; evidence of this is that you have voted to organize sacrifices and a festival in the name of the things I've done during my consulate, something which has never before happened to anybody unless they had done something exceptional in war), and not in any way do I fear it now. Death, you know, would not come unseasonably for me, especially since I have been consul so many years ago (yes, remember that I have said this to you in my very consulship, in order that you would always take me seriously, knowing that I despise death); however, to fear anyone who acts against you, and to serve as a slave together with you would appear truly unbecoming to me. This constitutes, I believe, unhappiness and destruction, not only of the body but of the soul and of one's reputation, by which, and by which alone, I think, we become immortal in a way; I, then, believe dying while speaking and acting on your behalf is paramount to immortality.

This passage revisits the theme of the exordium, namely Cicero's inability to live under a tyranny, but this time in direct allusion to the peroration of *Phil.* 2. In *Phil.* 2.119, Cicero boldly asserts that if he did not believe twenty years ago that death came too soon for a consular, it would surely not come too soon for an old man (*etenim, si abhinc annos prope viginti hoc ipso in templo negavi posse mortem immaturam esse consulari, quanto verius non negabo seni*).¹⁷² In the Greek 'Philippic', Cicero similarly states that death cannot come too soon for a consular like him (ὁ μὲν θάνατος οὐκ ἂν ἄωρος ... γένοιτο); Dio's ἄωρος is a Greek translation of Cicero's *immatura*. Furthermore, he also reminds the audience that he had spoken the same words during his consulship (μνημονεύετε ὅτι τοῦτο καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ὑπατείᾳ ὑμῖν εἶπον).

¹⁷¹ Cass Dio 45.46.2–5.

¹⁷² Cf. *Cat.* 4.3: *Nam neque turpis mors forti viro potest accidere neque immatura consulari nec misera sapienti*, BERTRAND 2008: 91 notes that the remark in *Cat.* 4.3 became one of Cicero's famous sentences, proven by the fact that Quintilian quotes it as one of Cicero's apophthegmata. Cf. Sen. *Controv.* 7.2.10 and *Suas.* 6.12 with KEELINE 2018: 111–112.

Reminding us of his opening words, Cicero emphasizes the importance of personal freedom (ἐλευθερία) and freedom of speech (παρρησία), and signposts his republican ideals. Yet in this final part of his speech, Cicero now takes the opportunity to review how his practice of freedom has always yielded him personal success. His final advice to the senate about the measures against Antony turns into extended reflection on his own political career. He recalls the successes of his consulship (κατώρθωσα πλείστον) and the *supplicatio* that was voted in his honour (ὅτι καὶ θῦσαι καὶ ἐορτάσαι ἐφ' οἷς ὑπατεύων ἐποίησα ἐψηφίσασθε). He ends this section of his speech by musing about the nature of immortality, and claiming that dying while speaking and acting (λέγοντα τε καὶ πράττοντα) on behalf of the senate will be equivalent to immortality (ἰσοστάσιον ἀθανασία).

While this type of discourse already recalls in a general sense statements of self-fashioning in Cicero's public oratory, Dio's Greek also imitates the language of Cicero's self-representation. In several speeches after 63 BC, Cicero would repeat that he was the only one who was awarded a *supplicatio* for civil service, while others received it for military achievements.¹⁷³ In *Phil.* 2, Cicero twice refers to this special honour (at 2.2 and 2.13); in 2.13 he states that "since the foundation of the city this honour has never been received by a civilian leader except me" (*qui honos post conditam hanc urbem habitus est togato ante me nemini*). Dio's Greek closely approaches the Latin construction: "[you voted a *supplicatio*] which never happened to anyone else except when they achieved something great in war" (ὅπερ οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἄλλω μὴ οὐκ ἐν πολέμῳ γέ τι καταπράξαντι ἐγένετο). In both texts, a participle depends on *nemo*/οὐδεὶς. Dio's ἐν πολέμῳ γέ τι καταπράξαντι, which explains that the *supplicatio* used to be granted to military leaders, specifies Cicero's *togato*.

In this interpretation of Ciceronian rhetoric, Dio certainly goes a step further than Appian: whereas Appian only employed key terms and selected typical themes from the Ciceronian corpus, Dio translates characteristic Ciceronian slogans into Greek, and offers what is

¹⁷³ *Cat.* 4.20; *Phil.* 2.13, *Phil.* 14.24 (not 14.20, as BERTRAND's commentary has it). Cf. *Phil.* 2.2, *Pis.* 6. Bertrand 2008: 91 does not seem to acknowledge Dio's reworking of the Latin, and discusses Cicero's references to his *supplicatio* from a general point of perspective, as a recurring feature of the *Philippics*.

probably the best post-Ciceronian example of Cicero's self-fashioning strategies. Appian's Cicero exemplified the general attitude and political thought of the aristocratic elite of the Republic, without any specific reference to his public oratory. Dio's speech for Cicero, on the other hand, is an ingenious interpretation of the Latin *Philippics* that addresses multiple layers of Cicero's public performance. It recreates particular themes and stylistic features of the Latin speeches, but also imitates a significant part of Cicero's political self-promotion.

Again, as we have seen in our analysis of Appian's speech for Cicero, the *Philippics* are firmly established as an essential medium for interpreting Cicero's role in the senate. Again, the Greek imitation of the *Philippics* conveys a moral message. Cicero's reference to himself creates an undeniable link between Dio's account of the Catilinarian conspiracy and of Cicero's prominent role in the strife between the Caesarians and anti-Caesarians. More than providing the rhetorical ammunition for Dio's speech, the *Philippics* also form the narratological climax of Dio's representation of Cicero's political programme. The political slogans amplify the ethos Dio had constructed of Cicero since books 37–38, where Cicero is described as boisterous, self-centered, and contentious. Moreover, within books 45–46, the 'Philippic' is especially framed as a flawed piece of oratory: the narrative and the speech work together to suggest that the *Philippics* had a great deal to do with Cicero's downfall: the preceding narrative contains an announcement of Cicero's death; the imperfect peroration of the speech itself illustrates Cicero's incompetence to restrain himself, and check his *parrhēsia*; and the debate is concluded by a comment on Cicero's inability to stop arguing after Calenus' part. By giving us a sample of Cicero's political rhetoric, Dio also provides an example of oratory as it should not be.

3.2.4 'Retweeting' Cicero's political programme: Calenus' response to the 'Philippic'

Dio's speech for Calenus plays a complex role in the narrative. It is a rhetorical exercise in anti-Ciceronian invective, but it is also a political commentary on Cicero's actions and career. Furthermore, within the

narrative setting, Calenus' speech should be read, in tandem with Cicero's oration, as a historical illustration of the different political factions in the post-Caesarian period. In this section I will focus on the ways in which Calenus' interpretation of Cicero's political image relates to the surrounding narrative. Calenus' retort is designed to re-evaluate and deconstruct his opponent's republican programme.¹⁷⁴ In this 'anti-Philippic', there are many points of contact with Cicero's *Philippics*,¹⁷⁵ yet what is most interesting about it is that the historiographer goes beyond the imitation of these particular speeches and engages with Cicero's strategies for political self-promotion.

The argument of Calenus' speech against Cicero is built upon a double proposition: either Cicero knew from the start that Antony was a criminal and had neglected his political duty to fight against the measures voted in his favour, or he was unable to provide good reason to vote against them and is slandering Antony just for the cause of it.¹⁷⁶ Calenus' defence of Antony is largely based on providing 'proof' for the second hypothesis, as the following overview shows.¹⁷⁷

– 46.1–9: exordium.

- 46.1: Cicero's impudence (θρασύτης) and his personal hatred (ἔχθρα, ὀργή) against Antony need to be countered for the benefit of the public.
- 46.2–9: Overview of Cicero's character. He is untrustworthy and a lover of civic discord, ἄπιστος φύσει καὶ παραχώδης ἔστι, and he is an αὐτόμολος (3.4). His family background is discussed (4–5). Cicero is a typical rhetor always looking for profit, enjoying other people's feuds and always plotting against others. He praises himself for his public deeds yet has never accomplished anything truly important (in arms). His *parrhēsia* is only used for personal gain; he exemplifies the ἔργον ῥήτορος in a mean way (οὐδὲν ἄξιον λόγου).

¹⁷⁴ For a very thorough analysis of this speech, see KOSTER 1980: 200–210.

¹⁷⁵ See BURDEN-STREVS 2020: 89–92.

¹⁷⁶ Cass. Dio 46.10.4.

¹⁷⁷ My analysis differs slightly from the proposed structure by KOSTER 1980: 201, followed by BERTRAND 2008: xxviii: 46.1 = *exordium*; 2–9 = *propositio*; 10 = transition; 11–25 *argumentatio* (with 18 as "Schmähintermezzo"); 26 = another transition; 28–29 = *peroratio*.

- 46.10: *proposition*. If Cicero was truly φιλόπολις, he would have accused and prosecuted Antony long ago. If not, he is only criticizing Antony for the sake of it (μάτην συκοφαντεῖν).
- 46.11: starting to overview Antony's actions (= *argumentatio*). Antony's tribunate and his close relationship to Caesar are discussed. Cicero's flight from Rome in 58 BC is ridiculed.
- 46.12–16: Antony's actions while in office as master of the horse. Calenus repeats that Cicero was silent during the previous year (σὺ σιωπήσας, 13.3; cf. 16.1). Cicero is variously portrayed as a war-monger (12.3), a coward (13.3, 15.3), a man of empty words (15.3, 16.4); his contradictory behaviour is highlighted (14.4, 15.1). Calenus imitates Cicero's rhetorical style in 16.4 (see below).
- 46.17–26: overview of Antony's deeds during the consulship; all his acts were publicly approved, including by Cicero.
 - 46.17.5–8, 46.19: the event with the diadem at the Lupercalia. Antony is presented as a wise counsellor who corrected Caesar's autocratic ambitions. Cicero makes up μύθοι about Antony out of jealousy (φθόνος).
 - 46.18–22: interlude, continuation of negative characterization of Cicero meant to show that he is himself guilty of all the things he charges Antony with (cf. 22.2).
 - 46.18: list of degenerating Greek nicknames for Cicero. His debauched life style (divorce, mistresses, incestuous relationship with Tullia).
 - 46.20–21: Cicero's consulship, the conspiracy of Catiline, flight from Rome in 58 BC. Cicero created discord and civil war in a city that was harmonious and quiet (οὐχ ἡσυχάζουσιν μὲν καὶ ὁμονοοῦσαν τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν καὶ ἐξετάραξας καὶ ἐστασίασας, 20.1). He executed Lentulus and the others without a trial. Calenus ridicules the arms against the toga theme, and later mocks Cicero's project of writing a history of Rome.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁸ BERTRAND 2008: 106 believes the first project must be the epic poem *De consulatu suo*, and the second the *Anekdotia*, which Cicero mentions a couple of times in his letters to Atticus, picked up by Plutarch in his biography (*Cic.* 41.1). With regard to the history of the consulship, I would say the Greek treatise *Περὶ ὑπατείας* is another possible candidate, since Plutarch's *Life* confirms that this is circulating at least in the first century; regardless of whether Dio had access to the treatise,

- ▶ 46.22: Cicero never practices what he preaches, his political policy is egocentric. He shows ἀχαριστία towards Antony and Caesar. He was involved in the assassination of Caesar.
- 46.23–26: All decrees voted in favour of Antony were done so legally and without force. Cicero stayed silent during all the senate meetings (23.5; ἐσιωπήσας, 25.2; 26.1). Antony was the best choice of leader at the time. Cicero is jealous that he was not chosen, but he would have been dangerous. Cicero is only master of his ἀντίθετα, his inconsistent actions (25.5). Antony follows the law, in contrast to Decimus Brutus and Octavian (26.3–7; cf. Piso in App. *B. Civ.* 55.226).
- 46.27–28: peroration.
 - 46.27: Cicero φιλαπεχθήμων (27.1); Calenus will give advice (ὕμῃν παραινῶ), which is to de-escalate, treat men with armies not as enemies, and do not agitate them; treat them as citizens and friends (πολιτικῶς καὶ φιλικῶς) and send an embassy.
 - 46.28: personal admonition to Cicero to refrain from causing *stasis*, and not let his personal hatred for Antony damage the public welfare (28.1).¹⁷⁹ Calenus emphasizes the need for consistency: if Cicero truly wants to save the fatherland, then he should speak and act accordingly.

Calenus' counterattack on Cicero is more or less a point-by-point refutation of Cicero's accusations against Antony, not dissimilar to the disposition of Piso's speech in Appian and with a specific emphasis on the legality of Antony's actions. As part of his proof that Antony is not a public enemy, Calenus systematically takes Cicero's career apart. His

he would have known it existed from his reading of Plutarch. Bertrand is right to point out that *De consulatu suo* was an important theme in Ciceronian invective (see esp. *Inv. in Cic.* 3.5) and in the literary tradition generally, where its famous verses led their own life (see e.g. Juv. 10.122; Quint. *Inst.* 11.1.22–24; *Laus Pis.* 35–36). There is thus a good possibility, especially considering Dio's use of invective material for Calenus' speech, that the historian is referring to the poem here. However, should this be true, I am not so sure why Dio has omitted to quote the typical phrase *cedant arma togae*, which would have made the reference much clearer to the reader, and which is in line with other references to the poem in the extant literature. More doubt is raised by the use of συγγράφαι with regard to this work, a term connoting a historiographical (not poetic) purpose (the classic locus, also for Dio, being Thuc. *Hist.* 1.1).

¹⁷⁹ Cass. Dio 46.28.1: μηδὲ πολεμοποιεῖν, μήτε διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν πρὸς τὸν Ἀντώνιον ἔχθραν δημοσίᾳ πᾶσαν τὴν πόλιν ἐς κίνδυνον αὐθις καθιστάναι.

main arguments are a) that Cicero did not openly speak out against the measures proposed in Antony's favour from being adopted (the motif of Cicero's silence, see the overview above); b) that Cicero is a sycophant, a rhetor full of deceit; and c) that Cicero is an enemy of republican harmony. The first argument has a factual basis in the events of the preceding months, while the latter two target Cicero's personal behaviour.

Aspects b) and c) are exemplified by a passage well into Calenus' speech. While in his 'Philippic', Cicero thematizes the importance of freedom of speech for his career, Calenus argues that Cicero misused his rhetorical abilities to such an extent that it became undemocratic and an instrument of discord:

Οὕτως οὔτε τὰ δίκαια πρὸς τοὺς νόμους οὔτε τὰ συμφέροντα πρὸς τὸ τῷ κοινῷ χρησίμιον ἐξετάζει, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἀπλῶς πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν διάγει, καὶ ἐφ' οἷς ἄλλους ἀποσεμνύνει, ταῦθ' ἑτέροις ἐγκαλεῖ, καὶ καταψευδόμενος ὑμῶν καὶ προσδιαβάλλων ὑμᾶς.¹⁸⁰

Thus, he does not define justice on the basis of the laws or what is advantageous on the basis of the public welfare, but he manages everything simply to suit his own purposes, and the things he glorifies in some he reproaches in others, even telling false lies about you and slandering you besides.

This passage demonstrates well how Calenus portrays Cicero as a self-serving political leader, who places himself outside the rules of society. His self-interest leads to an inconsistent policy, but what is worse is that he also actively disrupts civic harmony (in so far as first-century republican politics was a harmonious affair) by telling lies and making false charges against his fellow senators.

Most striking about Calenus' argument about Cicero's discordant and self-centered attitude is that it is supported by Ciceronian intertexts. Calenus' oration integrates the Ciceronian slogans that also feature in Cicero's speech, but only to turn them against the orator. Calenus manneristically quotes the orator's self-referential comments about his personal relation with the senate and the Republic:¹⁸¹

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.* 46.22.7.

¹⁸¹ Cf. *Ibid.* 46.9.2: "privately you rule through them [sc. prominent citizens] and manage to get all that you want, and publicly you cry out in vain, and you bawl out those vile phrases: "I alone am your friend", or perhaps, "well I so-and-so, but all the others hate you", and "I alone wish you well,

Οὕτω που ὁ μέγας οὗτος καὶ φιλόπολις ῥήτωρ, ὁ πανταχοῦ καὶ ἀεὶ θρυλῶν καὶ λέγων ‘ἐγὼ μόνος ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἀγωνίζομαι, ἐγὼ μόνος ὑπὲρ τῆς δημοκρατίας παρρησιάζομαι· ἐμὲ οὔτε χάρις φίλων οὔτε φόβος ἐχθρῶν ἀπείργει τοῦ μὴ οὐ τὰ συμφέροντα ὑμῖν προσκοπεῖν· ἐγὼ, κἂν ἀποθανεῖν ἐν τοῖς ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν λόγοις δεήσῃ, καὶ μάλ’ ἡδέως τελευτήσω’.¹⁸²

Behold this great and patriotic orator, he who cannot stop saying everywhere and always: “I alone fight for freedom, I alone speak my mind on behalf of the Republic; neither goodwill towards my friends nor fear for my enemies will keep me from considering what is good for you; I, even when I should die speaking on your behalf, will very gladly meet my end”.

We have seen that in the ‘Philippic’ Cicero identifies himself with essential republican values and presents himself as a defender of the Republic, who is not afraid to die. Calenus now turns this strategy against him. He ridicules Cicero’s self-promotion by mimicking his excessive use of *ego*.¹⁸³ In combination with the argument of 22.7, which I have quoted above, Calenus demonstrates that Cicero’s emphasis on himself should not be interpreted as a mark of his singular defense of the Republic, but mainly signals his desire to serve his own needs. Cicero’s identification with republican freedom is not genuine. In fact, the *parrhēsia* which Cicero prides himself on is rather the manifestation of his boastfulness and egocentrism.¹⁸⁴ Calenus supports this argument by repeating throughout his contribution that Cicero kept silent on those crucial moments where the policy of the state was being defined; never did he speak out against Antony or any of his proposed measures.

Calenus ends with an exhortation to consider the public welfare and with the advice to treat the leaders of the different factions as friends

all the others plot against you”, and all this and more...” (ἰδίᾳ μὲν διὰ τούτων πολιτεύῃ καὶ πάνθ’ ὅσα βούλει διοικεῖς, δημοσίᾳ δὲ βοᾷς ἄλλως, κεκραγῶς τοὺς μισοῦντες ἐκείνους λόγους ‘ἐγὼ μόνος ὑμᾶς φιλῶ,’ καὶ εἰ οὕτω τύχῃ, ‘καὶ ὁ δεῖνα, οἱ δ’ ἄλλοι πάντες μισοῦσι,’ καὶ ‘ἐγὼ μόνος ὑμῖν εὖνοῶ, οἱ δ’ ἄλλοι πάντες ἐπιβουλεύουσι,’ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα ...)

¹⁸² Cass. Dio 46.16.3–4.

¹⁸³ Cass. Dio 46.9.2–3. Cf. *Phil.* 2.72, 7.7, 8.15, 12.17; *Cat.* 4.2, *Pis.* 21. Cf. PIEPER, VAN DER VELDEN & JANSSEN 2022. Cicero uses the demonstrative *ego* 124 times in the *Philippics*. MACKENDRICK 1995 discusses the frequent use of *ego* in the speeches between 66–45 BC.

¹⁸⁴ We recognize this aspect from the narrator’s characterization of Cicero in book 38.12.6–7. Cf. MALLAN 2016: 267–268, where he explains how Calenus undermines Cicero’s idealized notion of *parrhēsia*. According to MALLAN, the republican concept of *parrhēsia* and its negative effect on political decision-making is actually the central theme of these two speeches (269). On Cicero’s *parrhēsia*, see chapter 3, § 2.

instead of waging war upon them. Cicero himself is addressed in the final paragraph of the speech. Calenus admonishes him not to let his personal hatred for Antony damage the state. He not only reproaches Cicero for acting contrary to the state's interests, but he also tears down some of the fundamental principles of Cicero's self-fashioning rhetoric:

Μὴ γάρ τοι νομίσης ὅτι τὸ θρασύνεσθαι ἢ εὐκλεές ἐστιν ἢ ἀσφαλές, μηδ' ἂν εἴπῃς ὅτι τοῦ θανάτου καταφρονεῖς, καὶ ἐπαινέισθαι ἐπὶ τούτῳ πιστεύσῃς. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ τοιούτους ὡς καὶ κακὸν ἂν τι ὑπ' ἀπονοίας τολμήσαντας καὶ ὑποπτεύουσι πάντες καὶ μισοῦσιν· οὓς δ' ἂν ἴδωσι περὶ πλείστου τὴν ἑαυτῶν σωτηρίαν ποιουμένους, καὶ ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ ἐγκωμιάζουσιν ὡς μηδὲν ἂν ἐκόντας ἄξιον θανάτου ποιήσαντας. Καὶ σὺ οὖν, εἴπερ ὄντως σώζεσθαι τὴν πατρίδα ἐθέλεις, τοιαῦτα καὶ λέγε καὶ πράττε ἐξ ὧν καὶ αὐτὸς σωθήσῃ, μὴ μὰ Δί' ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἡμᾶς συναπολεῖς.¹⁸⁵

Don't you think that boldness is either glorious or wholesome, and do not trust that you will be praised for saying that you despise death. For everyone distrusts and hates such men, believing that they might venture some evil action due to a loss of sense; those whom they see value their own safety, they praise and laud, believing they wouldn't willingly risk death. But you, now, if you really want to save the country, speak and act in such a way that will also keep you safe, and not, by God, in such a way that you will destroy us as well as yourself.

This passage is a response to Cicero's words in the peroration of *Phil.* 2.119¹⁸⁶ and elsewhere, that he would gladly risk his life for the Republic, and did not fear death. Calenus denies that death on behalf of the Republic will turn Cicero into a republican hero.¹⁸⁷ Instead, it makes him hated and distrusted, since people believe that someone who does not mind his own safety will not care about their safety either (indicated by κακὸν τι ... τολμήσαντας). What Cicero frames as ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἀγωνίζεσθαι or ὑπὲρ τῆς δημοκρατίας παρρησιάζεσθαι (16.3, passage cited above), is framed by Calenus as τὸ θρασύνεσθαι, being over-bold. It will result, according to him, in the destruction of not just

¹⁸⁵ Cass. Dio 46.28.

¹⁸⁶ Above, p. 317.

¹⁸⁷ The topos of dying for Rome is also mocked by Calenus in chapters 26.2, 28.4–5, since, had Cicero truly been free from fear of death, he would have opposed Antony much more openly at an earlier stage.

Cicero himself, but the state in its entirety. Calenus' final words mirror Dio's analysis in the narrative directly preceding the debate, where Cicero's destruction is portended.¹⁸⁸

Cicero's claim to be Rome's true defender is shot down by Calenus, but not simply through a general attack on his (consular) authority. Certainly, the anti-Ciceronian invective targeting Cicero's personality, relationships, and public mistakes does its work. But much more harmful, perhaps, is Calenus' caricatural imitation of Cicero's egotistic political self-presentation, and his serious analysis, at the end of his oration, of the negative effects of this type of oratory on the Republic. Calenus employs Cicero's rhetorical manoeuvres as an *exemplum* for the bigger problem that undercuts the proper functioning of republican debate: the contention and egocentrism that defines the policy of Roman senators. Certainly, Calenus' own rhetorical invective should not be taken at face value or as a direct confirmation of the historiographer's opinion. Yet the aptness of his analysis in the final paragraph of his speech is highlighted through similarities with the historiographer's contextualization of the debate, who likewise focalizes the disastrous consequences of Cicero's personal ambitions.

3.2.5 *Demosthenes' On the Crown as a model for Dio's 'Philippic'*

I would like to conclude my analysis of Dio's Ciceronian debate by addressing one final elephant in the room: how does Dio's Greekness influence his representation of Cicero's oratory? Indeed, on a word level, sentence constructions and rhetorical formulas seem to derive from models of Attic oratory.¹⁸⁹ Dio has also taken over several very specific phrases from *On the Crown*.¹⁹⁰ In this final section, I would like

¹⁸⁸ Cass. Dio 45.17.4.

¹⁸⁹ For example, the construction ἐς τοσοῦτο ... [a form of ἐρχομαι] ... ὥστε ... is used often, or similar comparative constructions with τοσοῦτος/τοιούτος; cf. Dem. 18.212 for a general example, and compare in particular Dio Cass. 45.21.1 with Isocr. *Antid.* 89, Dem. 19.55. Cf. LINTOTT 1997: 1501.

¹⁹⁰ E.g. the collocation βοῶν καὶ κεκραγῶς, employed by Dio at 45.27.1 and later at 76[77].14.1, is used twice by Demosthenes in reference to Aeschines, at 18.132 and 199; apart from a reference in Arist. *Plout.* 722 there exist no other notable parallels for this phrase in classical literature (cf. Worman 2004 on the voice imagery). Dionysius of Halicarnassus in *Dem.* 31.13 and Demetrius in *Eloc.* 49 both discuss the phrase in order to exemplify (Demosthenes') forceful style. That suggests it was a famous phrase, and it might have appealed to Dio in this particular instance for the reminder it

to offer a small glimpse of the Greek template underlying the debate between Cicero and Calenus. It is notable that, much more than Appian's speech, Dio's 'Philippic' is a hybrid product; in order to re-enact Cicero's oratory, Dio turned to the ultimate model of *Philippic* 2, Demosthenes' *On the Crown*.¹⁹¹ I will concentrate on one conspicuous passage in the 'Philippic' (45.27.4), which imitates *Phil.* 2.55, but which is remodeled so as to imitate the Greek source passage in Dem. 18.159 as well. This discussion hopefully serves as an encouragement to examine Dio's literary method in greater detail.

Chapter 27 of the 'Philippic' is dedicated to Antony's behaviour when he served as tribune of the people. According to Cicero, Antony defiled his office by secretly conspiring with Caesar against the senate. In a remarkably pathetic passage, he is described as the planter of the seed of all evils (τὸ σπέρμα τῶν κακῶν) connected with Caesar's domination, and he is called the common bane (ὁ κοινὸς ἀλιτῆριος) of the Republic. The term ἀλ(ε)ιτῆριος, 'accursed', also to be used as a substantive, is almost unique in Dio's work, and features only three times in the extant books (twice in connection with the behaviour of senators right after Caesar's death).¹⁹²

At first sight, this passage appears to be an allusion to *Phil.* 2.55, where Cicero blames Antony for the civil war between Caesar and Pompey. Cicero summarizes: "Therefore, in the way that the origin of trees and plants is located in seeds, so you are the seed of this most horrid war" (*Ut igitur in seminibus est causa arborum et stirpium, sic huius luctuosissimi belli semen tu fuisti*). He goes on to describe how Antony killed three armies of the Roman people, killed many famous citizens, and harmed the *auctoritas* of the senate. Everything that happened after the civil war is Antony's fault.¹⁹³ To illustrate Antony's disastrous effect on the state, Cicero employs the metaphor of a plague (*pestis*): "like

carried of the debate between Demosthenes and Aeschines. Another remarkable example of Demosthenic phrasing occurs at Cass. Dio 45.38.1, where Cicero exhorts the senators μηδ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τῷ παρόντι ῥαστώνης δελεαζώμεθα, "not to be overly attracted by the easiness of the present". The combination of δελεάζω with ἡ ῥαστώνη is only seen in Dem. 18.45, which must therefore be the source of inspiration for this peculiar phrase.

¹⁹¹ I intend to discuss this topic more fully in the future.

¹⁹² Cf. Cass. Dio 46.34.5; 73[74].2.2 (about Commodus).

¹⁹³ *Phil.* 2.55: *omnia denique, quae postea vidimus—quid autem mali non vidimus?—si recte ratiocinabimur, uni accepta referemus Antonio*.

Helen for the Trojans”, he says, “Antony is the cause of plague and ruin for the Roman Republic” (*ut Helena Troianis, sic iste huic rei publicae causa belli, causa pestis atque exitii fuit*). The idea of defilement which is inherent to the term *pestis*¹⁹⁴ derives from the text that offered the model for Cicero’s *Phil. 2*, Demosthenes’ oration *On the Crown*.¹⁹⁵

In *On the Crown*, Demosthenes argues at length that Aeschines collaborated with Philip of Macedon. He blames him for fuelling the Amphissean War, a war which would only have assisted Philip’s grand plan to conquer Greece. Demosthenes calls Aeschines a plague for everyone who has died in the war as well as the evil seed of Athens’ failure to withstand Philip’s force:

Ἵν εἰς οὐτοσί, ὄν, εἰ μηδὲν εὐλαβηθέντα τάληθες εἰπεῖν δέοι, οὐκ ἂν ὀκνήσαιμ’ ἔγωγε κοινὸν ἀλειτήριον τῶν μετὰ ταῦτ’ ἀπολωλότων ἀπάντων εἰπεῖν, ἀνθρώπων, τόπων, πόλεων· ὁ γὰρ τὸ σπέρμα παρασχών, οὗτος τῶν φύντων αἴτιος.¹⁹⁶

Of these [evil men around Philip] it was this man, whom I won’t hesitate to call, if the truth must be spoken without scruples, the common curse of all those who perished thereafter [sc. after the Amphissean war]—men, places, cities: he who sows the seed is responsible for the things produced.

This passage is especially interesting because it is a response to Aeschines’ insult that Demosthenes himself, in fact, was the ἀλιτήριος τῆς Ἑλλάδος.¹⁹⁷ The idea that each constituted the ultimate source of evil in the eyes of the other forms a common and easily recognizable theme within the antilogy. For his characterization of Antony, Cicero took over both the element of the public curse (with *pestis* as the Latin translation of ἀλιτήριος) and the metaphor of the seed.

Dio read *Phil. 2* with Aeschines and Demosthenes in mind—for him basic school authors—and probably immediately recognized Cicero’s allusion to his Athenian predecessors. His reworking of the passage ‘restores’ the Greek hypotext:

¹⁹⁴ OLD s.v. 5.

¹⁹⁵ See above, §1.3. Cicero also employs the imagery in crescendo in *Cat. 1.30*: Catiline is not just a *pestis rei publicae* but also the *stirps et semen malorum omnium*.

¹⁹⁶ Dem. 18.159.

¹⁹⁷ Aeschin. 3.131, 157. YUNIS 2001 *ad loc.* believes Aeschines is more “vigorous” in calling Demosthenes an evil spirit of Greece. I am not so sure that Demosthenes’ climactic, asyndetic trikolon is less forceful.

Νῦν δὲ οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ καὶ ἐκείνῳ τὰς προφάσεις ἐνδοὺς καὶ τὸ τῆς βουλῆς ἀξίωμα καταλύσας, τό τε θράσος τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἐπαυξήσας· οὗτος ὁ τὸ σπέρμα τῶν κακῶν τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα ἐκφύντων ἐμβάλων, οὗτος ὁ κοινὸς ἀλιτῆριος οὐχ ἡμῶν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς οἰκουμένης ὀλίγου πάσης γενόμενος, ὥς που καὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐναργῶς ἐσήμηνεν. ὅτε γοῦν τοὺς θαυμαστοὺς ἐκείνους νόμους ἐσέφερε, βροντῶν πάντα καὶ ἀστραπῶν ἐπλήρωθη. Ἵν' οὐδὲν ὁ μισθὸς οὗτος, καίπερ οἰωνιστὴς εἶναι λέγων, φροντίσας, κακῶν καὶ πολέμων, ὥσπερ εἶπον, οὐ τὴν πόλιν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐπλήρωσε.¹⁹⁸

Now it is this man who has given him [sc. Caesar] the pretexts as well as undermined the authority of the senate, and who has increased the audacity of the soldiers; it is him who has planted the seed of all troubles that occurred after this, he is the common plague not only of us but of nearly the entire known world, as, I think, Heaven clearly showed us. Indeed, when he proposed those remarkable laws, everything was filled with thunder and lightning. These omens this wicked man did not think about, although he claims to be an augur, and he filled up with disaster and war, as I said, not only the city but the whole world.

From his Greek model, Dio took the construction of τὸ σπέρμα + participle, in which Antony provides the seed (compare τὸ σπέρμα ἐμβάλων with τὸ σπέρμα παράσχων in Dem. 18.157), instead of being the seed, as in *Phil.* 2.55 (*semen tu fuisti*). While Cicero restricts Antony's evil effect to the Republic itself, Dio imitates the Demosthenic imagery in extending the influence of Antony to the whole world. More still, he emulates his Attic predecessor by repeating this idea twice (τῆς οἰκουμένης πασης; τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐπλήρωσε). Other features, such as the phrase ὁ κοινὸς ἀλιτῆριος (compare Cicero's *pestis*) and the substantivized participle τῶν (ἐκ)φύντων bring Dio's text close to *On the Crown*. Yet, though with regard to the formulation of the argument Dio largely follows Demosthenes' example, other details derive from his Latin model. Especially the addition that Antony had damaged the authority of the senate (τὸ τῆς βουλῆς ἀξίωμα καταλύσας) seems to derive directly from *Phil.* 2.55 (*auctoritas huius ordinis adflicta est*).

¹⁹⁸ Cass. Dio 45.27.4.

We have seen that Dio was perfectly capable of rendering Cicero's rhetorical style in Greek, without the mediation of a Greek source. The imitation of Demosthenic language was a deliberate choice meant to evoke the classic rhetorical locus of the ἀλιτήριος as it features in perhaps the greatest debate produced in the field of Attic oratory. It shows us how easily Dio's method of literary imitation intertwines Latin and Greek models. The passage is a sophisticated response to the canonical comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero. It illustrates how Greek writers of history like Appian and Dio, but perhaps Plutarch too, compared the two classical orators on the level of not just their life and career but also their rhetorical style. In the historiographical speeches we have seen in this chapter, Ciceronian and Demosthenic stylistic features eventually form one hybrid product.

4. Concluding remarks

At first sight, Appian and Dio's paraphrases and quotations of Ciceronian themes and slogans (in Dio's case) appear primarily to serve their ambiguous, *philonikistic* portrayal of Cicero in the main narrative. However, digging deeper, as we have done in this chapter, uncovers the intellectual quality of the Greek historiographers' engagement with the *Philippics*. On the one hand, there is the, at times extremely, careful imitation of Ciceronian catchphrases or favourite *topoi*, which recreates his oratorical style. On the other hand, as we have seen especially in Dio's writing, there is an attempt to catch a piece of Cicero's political programme, his self-fashioning technique to present himself as Rome's saviour and republican hero. Rather than presenting purely 'fictional' speeches, as is often argued, these Greek scholars demonstrate an approach to Ciceronian oratory which attempts to cover multiple aspects of his 'original' performance. This literary-cum-historicist concern with reenacting Ciceronian speech concentrates around the Philippic oratory of his final year.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁹ Admittedly, there is more differentiation in Cassius Dio than there is in Appian. Within Appian's *Roman History*, it is the *Philippics* alone that constitute and define Ciceronian oratory. Within

On a moral-didactic level, the Ciceronian speeches, including the speeches by Piso and Calenus, provide a moral lesson, an exemplum of destructive oratory. The *Philippics* are a lens through which to evaluate the status of late republican politics. Both Appian and Dio take care to demonstrate that the Philippic encounters are ineffective rhetorical episodes which do not advance the political conflict. Through the use of ideological language which mirrors the discussion in the main narrative, Ciceronian speech becomes a prototype for late republican oratory and, in particular, its flaws. By extension, Cicero as a political actor himself tragically exemplifies the citizen whose lust for competition causes his ultimate downfall. Especially in Appian, the Philippic debate marks a breaking point in the story: Cicero's rhetoric is used to symbolize the start of the final civil war in the Republic. Octavian's growing power is hanging like a sword of Damocles over the senate's head, a theme which will be worked out in the succeeding narrative of Appian's as well as Dio's history. Finally, if the accounts of Appian and Dio confirm one thing it is that Cicero's *Philippics*, although a negative example of political rhetoric, formed a monumental contribution to the political conflict in the last phase of the Roman Republic.

To conceptualize the debate, the historiographers have taken their recourse to samples of Attic (Athenian) oratory which match the Roman context. This is nothing spectacular, since the classicistic culture of imperial Greeks greatly influenced their adoption of a traditional Attic register. Yet, the terminology and techniques used by Appian and Dio's Cicero, Piso, and Calenus do in fact open up general questions about republican ideology. Through the use of typical Demosthenic language the speeches associate Roman politics with fourth-century Athenian democracy. Athens and Rome were both Republics, but in an entirely different way; this becomes clear once more from the comparison of Piso's speech with the Demosthenic model *Against Meidias*. As a consequence of the Athenian framework, questions like 'What is the basis for common decision-making if everybody puts their own interests first?', or 'How far are republican orators allowed to go in their

Dio's narrative, Ciceronian style is doubly defined by his amnesty speech in book 44.23–33, which I have not discussed here, and the speech against Calenus. Still, the latter speech is three times longer, and it carries a strong symbolic function with regard to Dio's interpretation of Cicero's political role in this phase of Roman politics.

invective strategies?’ gain a deeper meaning. As we have seen, the imperial historiographers revive a particular ideological discourse against contentiousness, ambition, and self-interest that is recognizable from Demosthenes’ defense of Athens and other Attic orators. Demosthenes rightly signalled the extent of the corruption in the democratic state and the dangers of succumbing to the Macedonian expansion. In the imperial narratives of Rome’s history, similar problems now lead the Republic to its end.

There is an enormous difference between Demosthenes’ defense of the Republic and Cicero’s Philippic battle with Antony. Cicero is no *alter* Demosthenes. In fact, whereas Cicero’s *Philippics* themselves create the image of a heroic saviour of the fatherland, the Greek historiographers convey the message that these speeches contributed greatly to the escalation of the conflict with Antony and the victory of Octavian. This picture is in line with Plutarch’s representation of the events in the Demosthenes and Cicero and in the *Moralia*, where he praises Demosthenes’ (admired) oratory against Philip and raises the occasional eyebrow at Cicero’s (failed) interaction with his fellow citizens, as we have seen in chapter 3. We would do well to recognize much more often that such story patterns seem to stretch from Plutarch to Cassius Dio, and, at any rate, remain remarkably consistent within the Greek literature of the Empire.

In the end, historiography is about establishing models of exemplary citizenship and offering critical tools to consider the relationship between the past and the present. The search for cultural and literary models, as I have shown in this chapter, was an important aspect of this process. Appian and Dio’s speeches of Cicero mark a crucial phase in the Ciceronian tradition: the appropriation of Ciceronian rhetoric from a Hellenic point of perspective. In a development beginning with Plutarch, Cicero became the shared heritage of the Latin and Greek literary tradition. Writing a speech for the most famous orator of the Roman world was a bold move—the ultimate challenge—but it could be done. It is part of the Greek imperial writers’ laying claim to a Roman history which had become partly their own. The writing of a Ciceronian speech in Greek served as a confirmation that Latin and Greek oratory, as the imperial audience knew it, did not know great differences. For although Cicero’s style is Attic and artificial, he is still utterly recog-

nizable as the Cicero familiar from his own public oratory. Regardless of any cultural competition manifesting itself within the rhetorical discourse, the blending of Roman and Athenian concepts also teach how the conduct of a Cicero, a Piso, or a Calenus chimes in with ideological and historical patterns that were familiar from the Greek tradition.

Conclusion

In his crisp analysis of Cicero's political life, Christian Habicht signals that it was a career with "ups and down, a few sparkling highlights and large periods of impotence". "The usual verdict", he states about Cicero, "is that he was a failure, even if he had his moments, as when he crushed the Catilinarians in 63, when he withstood Caesar's offers, or when he mobilized the country against Antonius."¹ Failure—more than once this term is used to describe Cicero's political achievements.² The idea that Cicero did not reach his potential, mostly due to his "extravagant ambitions",³ is remarkably persistent, marking ancient and modern analyses alike. This thesis has shown how the political choices of Rome's most renowned orator play an ambiguous role in imperial reflections on virtue and statesmanship. Yet there is more to learn about the man and politician Cicero than just his failures. In the cultural debate about what virtuous statesmanship and Roman citizenship entails, Cicero exemplifies as no other historical figure what it means to live during the late Republic. He does not represent the ideology of republicanism, he is no beacon of *libertas*, and he does not symbolize the *perfecta virtus*. Rather, he personifies the difficulties of leadership in civil war, and the helplessness of intellectualism in a society under arms. From Sallust to Cassius Dio, Cicero's public duties are consistently examined against the background of republican faction strife, discord and dynastic rule.

Chapter 1 explored how Sallust's *Conspiracy of Catiline* is a pivotal moment in the narrative tradition concerning Cicero's statesmanship.

¹ HABICHT 1990: 87.

² STOCKTON 1971: 333; SHACKLETON BAILEY 1971: 279; GOWING 2013: 239–240. BISHOP 2020 takes an original approach in arguing that Cicero's canonical status in history is due precisely to his failures.

³ STOCKTON 1971: 334.

Sallust renegotiates Cicero's consular memory by employing a dual strategy of generalization and neutralization. Instead of openly criticizing or countering Cicero's own version of the events, Sallust adopts a more constructive approach which matches his positive, didactic aim of providing images of Roman *virtus*. Criticism is replaced by a strategic silence. On the one hand, the historiographer distinguishes between the consular office and the person holding it, a distinction which results in two strands of discourse: one that deals on an abstract, idealized level with the conduct of the consul as leader of state, and one that comments upon the individual acts done by Cicero as a historical figure. On the other hand, Sallust almost entirely omits the Catilinarian oratory from his account of the conspiracy. Not only does the figure of Cicero have no direct speech, the speeches of Caesar and Cato also actively reject the emotional rhetoric that characterizes the *Catilinarians*, and overwrite it with a type of oratory that has the explicit aim of moral edification. Sallust also offers an alternative political hero of the year 63, namely Cato; in the *Conspiracy of Catiline*, the tradition of Cato as figurehead of the Republic begins to crystallize.

Chapter 2 demonstrated how the two traditions about Cicero and Cato further diverge. Within the early imperial representations of political virtue the *exempla* about Cicero's life do not have a strong ideological value. Instead, in the Tiberian *exempla* as well as in Lucan's *Civil War*, Cato's actions are most strongly connected with republican ideals. His patriotism is exemplified by his ability to unite the senate and the people and to act as their leader, a story pattern which is absent in the *exempla* about Cicero. Furthermore, Cato's most recognizable character trait is his embodiment of Roman virtue. Cicero's exemplary value, in contrast, is much harder to define; he can alternatively be a good and kind advocate, an icon of (intellectual) sensitivity (*humanitas*), the scourge of Mark Antony, or the Keeper of the Republic (*conservator reipublicae*), but he fulfils all of these virtues only incidentally.

An important episode within the Ciceronian tradition that sharpens this distinction between Cicero and Cato is Lucan's dramatization of the battle at Pharsalus. Whereas in the *Civil War*, Cato personifies the altruism needed for saving republican *libertas*, Cicero represents the self-interested, contentious attitude of the Roman optimate party, who simply want to fight and win. Again, as in the *Conspiracy of Cati-*

line, Ciceronian oratory takes a negative place in the narrative and is defeated by the superior, morally informed rhetoric of Cato. Cicero's speech in book 7 is focused on the interests of the elite alone, and is an ineffective, rather inconsequential piece of oratory. Cato's multiple speeches, in contrast, are all persuasive attempts to unite the Roman citizens and protect the Republic.

Chapters 3 and 4 subsequently investigated what it is that makes Cicero such an unsuitable representative of the people, in his speech and in his deeds. Chapter 3 shows that there is a philosophical element to the imperial portraits of Cicero: this responds partly to his status as a philosophically trained aristocrat, and partly to a broader imperial concern with self-control and morally informed action as key parts of virtuous statesmanship. While Cicero's own philosophy plays a minor role in the imperial accounts of his life and career, it always appears to be just under the surface. Plutarch, Seneca and Cassius Dio all imply that Cicero possessed a certain potential for being an ethical model, a potential which he fulfilled for a brief period during the consulship. Soon after, however, his ambitions get the better of him. He demonstrates a fatal lack of ethical competence in not being able to utilize his intellectual qualities for the benefit of himself or the Republic, or to bring his personal ideals regarding good citizenship into practice. Cicero's emotional instability as well as his inability to act consistently and rationally towards his peers, especially those more powerful than him, are recurring themes in the narrative of his life. The dialogue between Philiscus and Cicero in book 38 of Dio's *Roman History* is a pointed demonstration of this clash between Cicero's intellectual capacities—in particular his ethical insight and awareness of what it means to be a good political leader—and the way he practices his professional activities.

The Greek texts discussed in chapters 3 and 4 all present the argument that Cicero's rhetoric is seriously flawed. Not stylistically, in its delivery or in any of the technical aspects, but in the way it is used as a weapon against others, that is, within its civic context. His speech is another indication of Cicero's ethical incompetence, since he is unable to judge to what measure and in which circumstances he can successfully use his *parrhēsia*. Whereas Cato the Younger, just like Demosthenes in the fourth century BC, can instrumentalize his critical voice to the benefit of the Republic, Cicero's excessive frankness only fuels discord.

In the narrative of the Greek historiographers, Cicero's rhetoric, which is self-interested and contentious, exemplifies that the republican system is corrupt; Appian and Dio restage the *vox Ciceroniana* in the senate house in order to analyse the process and (negative) effects of republican deliberation. Their imitation of the Philippic oratory marks another milestone in the Ciceronian tradition, and demonstrates the depth that (Greek) imperial writers could reach in their interpretation and cultural appropriation of Cicero's legacy. Appian's 'Philippic' is the manifesto of a Roman aristocrat, which recalls the typical imperial image of the senator and ex-consul brandishing his toga instead of a sword. Cassius Dio's portrait of the orator Cicero, in turn, seems to have been injected with a dose of anti-Ciceronian venom, illustrating the kind of (arrogant, inconsistent) conduct that was severely criticized in the invective literature. However, instead of simply copying such *topoi* for the purpose of entertaining his audience, Dio applies them to address a problem that is essential in his narrative of the fall of the Republic: the danger of self-centred political policies.

Although the four chapters have been organized thematically and chronologically, this book offers more than case studies. I would like to reflect here—without pretending to be exhaustive—on several synchronic and diachronic aspects of the tradition outlined in the above pages.

I began this book with an overview of thematic aspects of the Ciceronian tradition that have their roots in Cicero's own published speeches: the image of the 'war' against Catiline, the self-fashioned concept of the *dux togatus*, and the *invidia Ciceronis*, which preoccupied him greatly ever since the consulship. Quite remarkably, these three political themes constitute important parts of his image all through the Empire. Another thesis could be written (and I have chosen not to do that here) about the historiographical accounts of the suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy, in which Cicero invariably plays a crucial role. What is most important for the purposes of this book is that also for the imperial authors, the Catilinarian conspiracy is a highpoint in the development of Cicero's political career. This thought is articulated more often than not in reference to the motif of the *consul togatus*. The suppression of Catiline and his rebels represented just how much intellectual capital coupled with political power could do, and writers like

Velleius Paterculus, Plutarch and Seneca explicitly reflect on this extraordinary facet of Cicero's statesmanship. Lastly, the criticism about Cicero's political choices and his self-presentation (or his conduct more generally) forms a conspicuous thread in all the texts we have read. Rather than focusing on outright criticism or anti-Ciceronian texts, I have foregrounded more implicit, silent means of criticism. Sallust's *Conspiracy of Catiline* starts a tradition in which rebuke and slander are exchanged for a moral-didactic commentary on Cicero's deeds. Whereas Sallust simply leaves out the type of behaviour he thought unfitting for a consul, other authors like Lucan, Plutarch or Cassius Dio chose to present Cicero as a complex personality, whose deficits serve as a mirror of the times and illustrate that the republican constitution, as it was organized then, was untenable, while his intellectual excellence and his rhetorical skill remain untouched. Some portraits, like Lucan's or Dio's, are constructed more negatively than others, but I have proposed that it is precisely the ambiguity that conveys the precarious condition of first-century Roman politics.

With regard to negative characterizations of Cicero, this thesis has hopefully complicated the scholarly debate for the better. While his faults are usually summarized as inconsistency (*inconstantia*) and boastfulness or self-praise, these vices, I believe, only cover half of the problem. As we have seen in chapters 3 and 4, the historiographical portraits of Cicero are influenced by certain ethical standards which require politicians to provide models of conduct for others. Cicero often cannot even control himself, his ambitions and emotions, let alone teach others how to be a good citizen and statesman. A great part of the problem, then, lies in his failure to be a good leader of his fellow citizens, not simply in his own unstable character. We would do well to keep into account that most imperial portrayals of Cicero, and certainly those discussed above, participate in this discourse of self-control and self-determination; they interpret Cicero's character and actions not simply for the purpose of giving a judgment but of determining his value within the historical context. A constant feature of these portraits is that Cicero's figure is connected with antagonism and with rupture. For all Cicero's political fantasies about the *concordia omnium*, his deeds are interpreted with notable frequency as catalysts of discord and disharmony. We already see traces of this in the fragments from

Augustan and Tiberian historiographers,⁴ but it becomes especially prominent in the accounts of the Greek historiographers. This surely bears a relation to the imperial preoccupation with concord (ὁμόνοια) and peace under the monarchy, which marks Greek and Latin texts alike, but which we have not been able to explore.⁵

An important part of Cicero's imperial image is that his personal fate is related to the fall of the Republic. As we have seen in chapter 2, in Lucan's *Civil War*, for example, Cicero is made to perform a speech which is impotent (*invalidus*), and which is said to be part of evil tricks played by the gods. Cicero's oratory has become unpersuasive, and on top of that it has become a means to advance the destruction of the Republic. More significant even are the divine prophecies in Plutarch, Appian and Cassius Dio, who all argue that Cicero's death will be simultaneous with and dependent on the fall of the Republic.⁶ Due to this peculiar image, Cicero's life is situated at a breaking point in history. He is not, like Cato, in any special way identified with republican ideology (except perhaps in Velleius Paterculus' history), but the story pattern that Cicero perished together with the Republic still constitutes an important, and enduring, link between his name and the *respublica Romana*.⁷ In other cases, he functions as a 'bridge', a transition figure on the brink of the imperial age, who may represent values that are not so much republican as they are *Roman*, and therefore also appealing to an imperial audience. We have seen that especially Velleius Paterculus and Valerius Maximus envisage such a timeless value for Cicero's words and actions.

Rhetoric and (direct) speech are another constant in the imperial accounts of Cicero's life. The fascination with the rhetorical excellence of Rome's greatest orator is probably what links the historiography of the empire most to other literary genres. Seneca's letters and treatises,

⁴ Cremutius Cordus (Sen. *Suas.* 6.23) and Asinius Pollio (*ibidem*, 6.24) both employ the term *simultates*, enmities or feuds, as one of Cicero's particular challenges in public life.

⁵ Compare also the speech for Cicero in Cass. Dio 44.13–23, where ὁμόνοια is an important motif. For the concern with political consensus (*consensus, concordia*) and peace under the imperial ruler in Latin texts, see e.g. Plin. *Pan.* 4.6–7, 5.1 (cf. 94.2). The emperor—in Pliny's case this was Trajan (see also chapter 3, §2.1 on Dio of Prusa)—, who is presented as an exemplar of peace and harmony, becomes an essential foil for statesmen from the Republic; cf. KRAUS 2005.

⁶ Plut. *Cic.* 5.1–2; App. *B. Civ.* 3.61.252; Cass. Dio 45.17.4.

⁷ The image recurs in Renaissance portrayals of Cicero, for example in the work of Coluccio Salutati and Leonardo Bruni. See JANSEN 2020.

discussed in chapter 3, are a good example of this cross-generic image. We can draw several conclusions regarding the response to Cicero's oratory. Firstly, it is the public speeches with which imperial writers engage most, apart from some isolated references to the letters.⁸ There is no serious interaction with Cicero *philosophus* (even in the dialogue with Philiscus in Cassius Dio book 38, there is little to suggest that Dio used Cicero's philosophical writings). This does not mean that the imperial writers were not aware of the range of literature Cicero produced—they were—but they direct the spotlight towards his forensic and deliberative speeches, with a special attention for the *Philippics*. Secondly, his wittiness, his rhetorical skill and his antagonistic attitude are all fixed parts of the imperial accounts of his career. The extended overview of Ciceronian witticisms in Plutarch's biography is a striking example, which demonstrates that Cicero was regarded as a rhetor above anything else. On a third note, both Latin and Greek imitations of Ciceronian rhetoric directly interact with the published Ciceronian corpus. These imitations are never a straightforward rendition of the original speeches, but they often betray an attempt to catch the *vox Ciceroniana*, either with regard to performance or to style. The Greek historiographers' personal acquaintance with Cicero's work remains a topic for further research, but we can be quite sure that they read the *Philippics* in Latin. A final aspect of the imperial engagement with Ciceronian rhetoric is that it is often interpreted as something dangerous. From Lucan onwards an element of trickery becomes inherent to historical accounts of Cicero's career. Within the context of civil war, his clever rhetoric becomes a destructive weapon which disregards and damages the unity and harmony of the republican state. This image could not be further removed from the message of Cicero's published speeches, which present him as the *vox populi* and on occasion even as the voice of the Republic herself.

The template for the Ciceronian 'Philippics' in Appian and Dio's histories, however much they imitate the rhetorical argument and style of *Philippics*, is decidedly Greek, and seems to have been inspired by Demosthenes' oratory in particular—although much research into the intertexts of the Appianic and Dionean speeches is still needed. At first

⁸ E.g. Plut. *Cic.* 37.2, 45.2; Sen. *Dial.* 10.5.2.

sight, the Attic template chiefly defines the style of the speakers. Yet closer inspection reveals that it also influenced the conceptual representation of the issues discussed. In Appian and Dio's Philippic debate the dangers of rhetorical sophistry are formulated in Demosthenic terms. Furthermore, in especially Appian's speech for Piso the emphasis on the power of the people's assembly and the need to respect the laws transports the reader back to the fourth-century courtroom. Such Hellenization of republican debate inspires broader questions which I have only begun to answer: to what extent do Greek imperial historiographers map the history of the Roman Republic onto the history of Athenian democracy, and how is their reception of Demosthenes and Cicero connected?⁹ With regard to the former question we can say that the deployment of a classical Greek framework for the reconstruction of republican senate meetings reveals a form of historical patterning. In their exploration of the causes of the fall of the Republic, Appian and Dio fell back on a familiar, existing conceptual debate about political corruption in fourth-century Greek orators. Moreover, in light of the monumental influence of oratory within Athens' final democratic phase—recorded for eternity in the speeches of a Demosthenes, Isocrates or Aeschines—it is probably no coincidence that Appian and Dio took the senatorial proceedings of republican Rome, especially after Caesar's death, as a point of departure to explore the operation of Roman politics.

The implicit or explicit comparison with Demosthenes is a standard element of the reception of Cicero in the imperial Greek literature. Plutarch's famous parallel life of the two orators plays an essential role for any imperial references to the similarities between the two orators. Yet on the textual level, at least Cassius Dio seems to have been aware of Cicero's own imitation of Demosthenes, reviving their literary interdependence in his 'Philippic'. A perhaps surprising conclusion is that the comparison between Cicero and Demosthenes does not stretch beyond the technical excellence of their oratory or similar developments in their public career. Plutarch never says it with so many words, but he makes it clear, in the *Moralia* as well as the *Lives*, that Cicero

⁹ Here, Greek historiography might show traces of a development in the rhetorical tradition of the Empire, where Cicero is envisaged as being a Roman Demosthenes: see BISHOP 2015.

is no second Demosthenes. With respect to the ethical quality of his *parrhēsia* and civic impact, the Greek orator is far superior. To what extent Demosthenes' public oratory served as a similar moral foil for Cicero's rhetoric in the historiographies of Appian and Dio could not be ascertained, but future research into the interaction with Demosthenes' rhetorical corpus in these texts will hopefully shed more light on this question.

Another question that remains to be answered is whether the imperial writers associated Cicero's deeds with a particular political programme. Let us review the evidence. Sallust's consul is less the real statesman than an idealized, positive force protecting the state against Catiline's wicked plans. Valerius Maximus envisages Cicero as a *vir bonus*, a good Roman patriot with a range of qualities to inspire others. Velleius praises the freedom-fighter and the protector of the common welfare, but in the end he proclaims that Cicero's immortality is chiefly due to his eloquence. Lucan's Cicero is a rather unsympathetic ex-consul, who is hoping for another chance at glory but has little impact on the events of the civil war; his 'battlefield' are the rostra and the forum, and his battle exhortation directed towards Pompey is inappropriate. The Plutarchan and Senecan image of Cicero is focused on his intellectualism and his vulnerability, which make him subordinate to greater leaders like Pompey, Caesar and Octavian; while it is clear that he defends the traditional constitution, he is not able to profess his allegiance to the Republic in any convincing way. Appian's Cicero does voice his ideology, but it is not so much republican as it is aristocratic; self-preservation seems to be his true concern. Finally, the versatile and self-absorbed figure in Cassius Dio's *Roman History* speaks beautiful words about concord and harmony in his plea for amnesty for the Liberators, but he makes all of these undone in his angry and self-centred oratory against Mark Antony. Although it is implied everywhere that Cicero represents the side of the Republic, it is clear that he is not able to devote himself entirely to the republican cause. With regard to this picture, the imperial writers are remarkably unanimous.

At this point, Cato the Younger should once more be taken into the equation. I believe that the tension between Cicero's behaviour and the militant, non-negotiable patriotism of Cato, which features in nearly all the texts we have read,¹⁰ has not only helped us formulate what

republicanism and republican virtue constitute, but also guided the imperial writers' views on the political value of Cicero's actions. In a certain sense, Cato stole Cicero's thunder. Rome was an action-oriented society, and in the quest for exemplary virtue, deeds performed in the public space weighed most heavily. Where Cicero wrote about the true meaning of *libertas*, Cato enacted it; where Cicero described the importance of genuine leadership and patriotism, Cato's frank opposition against Caesar set the standard for others. The process of exemplarity amplifies deeds and spoken words, not ideals. Therefore, although Cicero's writings expressed a clear republican ideology, it was not these ideals but the writing in itself that became a famous aspect of his political personality. This image stands in ironical contrast to one of Cicero's famous self-fashioning strategies, which consisted in legitimizing and extolling his own behaviour by repeated reference to ancient Roman heroes; Henriette van der Blom has argued that inscribing himself in the ancient tradition must have been part of Cicero's political success.¹¹ She contends that he was not just interested in establishing an image of himself as intellectual and literary statesman, but wanted to be a political hero as well.¹² While I assume she is right, it is ironical that within the imperial historical tradition, Cicero's intellectual qualities are amplified more than his political achievements. Cicero failed indeed—in turning himself into the type of figurehead he wanted to be.

The reception of Cicero in antiquity demonstrates the kinds of constraints that the historical tradition imposes on the legacy of public individuals as well as, to put it bluntly, the limits of becoming famous. Cicero was not able to direct the way in which he was commemorated, however much he tried. In the end, his behaviour did not match the type of discourse imperial intellectuals engaged in when reflecting on political life: it was too feisty, too contentious, and probably too much out of tune with the imperial ideal of consensus and (self-)composure. The selective, *exempla*-trained eye with which later Roman writers looked at Cicero's life could not appreciate the unedifying effects of his public self-presentation, although it considered his general patriotism

¹⁰ Appian is the exception; in book 2 of the *Civil Wars*, Cato the Younger is not associated explicitly with major republican values.

¹¹ VAN DER BLOM 2010.

¹² *Ibid.* 338 in reaction to DUGAN 2005. Cf. MANUWALD 2015: 21.

and his eloquence to be a model for others. I have occasionally paid more attention to the cultural context and the beliefs of the imperial writers than to their depiction of Cicero's career, but this is the only way we can understand how reception works. My aim was to do more than to list or describe, in a Zielińskian fashion, the different textual portraits of Cicero. The thematic studies above have hopefully shown how Cicero's political action gradually develops into a tool for analyzing republican leadership, the ideology of the Roman optimates, and, ultimately, the fall of the Republic. This was probably not only a literary or textual process, although we have restricted ourselves to literary texts—and other evidence is scarce. Since exemplarity is a cultural and social phenomenon, the conclusions drawn here will have some pertinence to the oral and material realm of Roman life, from the stories told at home or in the Forum to the images set up in the public and private space. Furthermore, this thesis has shown that within the pluralistic culture of the Empire, Cicero became very much a *Roman* icon, whose life story resonated with Latin- as much as with Greek-speaking intellectuals. The detail with which Plutarch and Dio represent his talents, his faults and his rhetoric is evidence of their thorough appropriation of the history of Rome, and perhaps of their personal identification with this figure from the past who had similarly spent a large part of his life behind his writing table, but always in service of the public. Moreover, the myriad points of contact between the Latin and Greek texts we have discussed, in particular the continuation of specific, recognizable motifs, make for a fairly unified tradition.

In sum, the imperial Cicero teaches us many things. He shows what oratory represents within a civic setting: how eloquence can be dangerous, but also has the capacity to make the good conquer the evil forces in society. He exemplifies how difficult it is to follow a steady course in politics and stick to one's policy; any political leader nowadays would more readily identify with Cicero's flexibility and insecurity than with Cato's superhuman integrity (as sad as that perhaps is). Most of all, his figure represents that leadership comes in many different forms, but to make it into the historical records, it is deeds not words that count.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Intratextual links between the narrative and the debate between Cicero [C] and Piso [P] in Appian *B. Civ.* 3

Narrative¹

3.51.210 Οἱ μὲν δὴ ταῦτα ψηφισάμενοι διελύθησαν, ὡς τὸν Ἀντώνιον ἔργῳ διὰ τῶνδε εἶδέναι **πολέμιον ἐψηφισμένον**...

3.51.209 **ἐψηφίσαντο** ὁμῶς Δέκμον τε ἐπαινεῖσαι οὐκ ἐκστάντα Ἀντωνίῳ τῆς Κελτικῆς, καὶ τοῖς ὑπάτοις Ἰρτίῳ καὶ Πάνσῃ Καίσαρα συστρατηγεῖν οὗ νῦν ἔχει στρατοῦ, ἐπὶ χρυσὸν τε αὐτοῦ εἰκόνα τεθῆναι καὶ γνώμην αὐτὸν ἐσφέρειν ἐν τοῖς ὑπατικοῖς ἥδη καὶ τὴν ὑπατείαν αὐτὴν μετιέναι τοῦ νόμου θάσσον ἔτεσι δέκα, ἕκ τε τοῦ δημοσίου δοθῆναι τοῖς τέλεσι τοῖς ἐς αὐτὸν ἀπὸ Ἀντωνίου μεταστάσιν, ὅσον αὐτοῖς ὁ Καῖσαρ ἐπὶ τῇ νίκῃ δώσειν ὑπέσχετο.

3.5.16 πολλὰ ἐς πολλῶν χάριν προσετίθει καὶ ἐδωρεῖτο πόλεσι καὶ δυνάσταις καὶ τοῖσδε τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ φρουροῖς· καὶ ἐπεγράφετο μὲν πᾶσι τὰ Καίσαρος ὑπομνήματα, τὴν δὲ χάριν οἱ λαβόντες ἡδεσαν Ἀντωνίῳ.

3.27.102 Ὁ δ' Ἀντώνιος ἐς τὴν Ἰταλίαν τὸν στρατὸν ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας διενεγκεῖν ἐπενόει, καὶ προφάσεως ἄλλης ἐς τοῦτο ἀπορῶν ἡξίου τὴν βουλὴν **ἀντὶ τῆς Μακεδονίας ἐναλλάξαι οἱ τὴν ἐν τῷ Ἄλπεων Κελτικῇ, ἧς ἡγεῖτο Δέκμος Βροῦτος Ἀλβίνος.** Cf. 3.24.92.

3.43.175 Ἀντωνίῳ δ' ἀφίκτο μέσον ἐς τὸ Βρεντέσιον ἐκ πέντε τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ τελῶν τέσσαρα. Cf. 3.50.203

3.45.184 Αὐτὸς δ' ἐπιλεξάμενος ἐκ πάντων στρατηγίδων **σπεῖραν** ἀνδρῶν ἀρίστων τά τε

Speakers

[C] 52.213 οἷς γὰρ αὐτοῦ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἐτιμῶμεν, τούτοις **ἐψηφιζόμεθα** εἶναι **πολέμιον**.

[C] 53.219 δωρεὰς χθὲς **ἐψηφίσασθε**

[C] 52.215 τὰ χρήματα ἡμῶν Καίσαρος ἀποθανόντος ἐσφετερίσατο Ἀντώνιος

ibid. Μακεδονίας ἄρχειν παρ' ἡμῶν ἐπιτυχὼν ἐπὶ τὴν Κελτικὴν ὥρμησε

[C] 52.216 **σπεῖραν** ἐν Βρεντεσίῳ βασιλικὴν συνέταξεν ἀμφ' αὐτὸν εἶναι

¹ Whenever the text is italicized (by me) it concerns an essential personal judgment or comment by the historiographer or speaker. Bold text indicates verbal parallels. Bold italics signal similar phrasing.

σώματα καὶ τὸν τρόπον ὥδευεν ἐς Ῥώμην ὡς ἐκείθεν ἐπὶ τὸ Ἀρίμινον ὁρμήσων.

3.45.184 τοὺς δ' ἄμφ' αὐτὸν ἔχων ὑπεζωσμένους καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν **νυκτοφυλακοῦντας** ἐνόπλους· **συνθήματα** τε αὐτοῖς ἐδίδοδο, καὶ αἱ φυλακαὶ παρὰ μέρος ἦσαν ὡς ἐν στρατοπέδῳ. Cf. 2.125, 522, also 3.5.14, 3.30.117, 3.50.204.

3.45.186 **διαταραχθεὶς** οὖν εἰσῆλθε μὲν ἐς τὸ βουλευτήριον, ὡς δ' ἔφ' ἕτερα αὐτοὺς συναγαγὼν μικρὰ διελέχθη καὶ εὐθύς ἐπὶ τὰς πύλας ἐχώρει καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν πυλῶν ἐπὶ Ἄλβην πόλιν ὡς μεταπίσων τοὺς ἀποστάντας.

3.43.178 αἰτήσας δὲ παρὰ τῶν χιλιάρχων τοὺς στασιώδεις (ἀνάγραπτος γάρ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς Ῥωμαίων στρατοῖς αἰεὶ καθ' ἓνα ἄνδρα ὁ τρόπος) **διεκλήρωσε** τῷ στρατιωτικῷ νόμῳ καὶ οὐ τὸ δέκατον ἅπαν, ἀλλὰ μέρος ἔκτεινε τοῦ δεκάτου, νομίζων σφᾶς ὥδε **καταπλήξειν** δι' ὀλίγου.

3.43.177 οἱ δὲ **ἐγέλασαν** τῆς **σμικρολογίας** καὶ χαλεπήναντος αὐτοῦ μᾶλλον ἐθορύβουν καὶ διεδίδρασκον.

3.20.73 [Ant.] εἰ μὴ πιθανὸν ἦν ἔτι ἀγνοεῖν σε κενὰ πρὸς τοῦ πατρὸς **ἀπολελείφθαι** τὰ κοινὰ **ταμιεῖα**; τῶν προσόδων, ἐξ οὗ παρήλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐς αὐτὸν ἀντὶ τοῦ ταμιείου συμφερομένων καὶ εὑρεθησομένων αὐτίκα ἐν τῇ Καίσαρος περιουσίᾳ, ὅταν αὐτὰ **ζητεῖν** **ψηφισώμεθα**. Cf. 3.21.78.

3.27.103 ἡ δὲ βουλὴ τήνδε τὴν Κελτικὴν ἀκρόπολιν ἐπὶ σφίσιν ἡγουμένη ἐδυσχέραίνε τε καὶ τῆς ἐνέδρας τότε πρῶτον ἦσθοντο καὶ τὴν Μακεδονίαν δόντες αὐτῷ **μετενόουν**... ὁ δὲ ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς βουλῆς ἐπενόει τὸν **δῆμον αἰτῆσαι νόμῳ** τὴν Κελτικὴν, **ᾧ τρόπῳ** καὶ ὁ **Καῖσαρ** αὐτὴν **πρότερον** εἰλήφει καὶ Συρίαν Δολοβέλλας ὑπογύως... Cf. 3.30.115 (law voted under military pressure); 3.51.208.

2.132.554 ὡς δὲ ἄλις ἔσχε τῆς ὄψεως καὶ οὐδ' ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ τι γεγέννητο θερμότερον, τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἄνδρας ἔγνω περισφάζειν **ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης**...

ibid. φανερώς αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ πόλει σιδηροφοροῦντες ἄνδρες ἐδορυφόρουν τε καὶ **ἐνυκτοφυλάκουν** ὑπὸ **συνθήματι**.

[C] 52.217 Καῖσαρος δὲ αὐτὸν τοῦ νέου σὺν ἐτέρῳ στρατῷ φθάσαντος ἔδεισε καὶ ἐς τὴν Κελτικὴν ἐτράπετο... Cf. [P] 3.58.239

[C] 52.218 Τὴν στρατιὰν ἐπὶ τοῖσδε **καταπλησόμενος**, ἵνα πρὸς μὴθὲν αὐτῷ παρανομοῦντι κατοκνηῇ, **διεκλήρωσεν** ἐς θάνατον... Cf. [P] 56.230

ibid. ὁ δὲ φωνῆς ἡ **γέλωτος** ἤγεν ἐς θάνατον τοὺς πολίτας καὶ θάνατον οὐ τῶν ἐλεγχθέντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν διαλαχόντων.

[P] 54.224 ὁ Καῖσαρ τὰ χρήματα διεφόρησε καὶ κενὰ **καταλέλοιπε** τὰ **ταμιεῖα**...

Ἀντωνίου δὲ μετ' οὐ πολὺ **ζητεῖν** αὐτὰ **ψηφισαμένον**

[P] 57.235 **ζήτησιν** εἶναι τῶν κοινῶν χρημάτων

[P] 54.225 τὴν δὲ Κελτικὴν ἡγεμονίαν οὐκ ἐψηφισάμεθα μὲν ἡμεῖς Ἀντωνίῳ, **ἔδωκε δὲ ὁ δῆμος νόμῳ**, παρόντος αὐτοῦ Κικέρωνος, **ᾧ τρόπῳ** καὶ ἕτερα πολλάκις ἔδωκε καὶ τήνδε τὴν ἡγεμονίαν αὐτὴν **Καῖσαρι πάλαι**.

[P] 57.234 Τίνα ἔκτεινεν ὡς τύραννος ἄκριτον ὁ νῦν κινδυνεύων ἀκρίτως;

3.4.11 ὡς δὲ καὶ Σέξστον Πομπήιον ὁ Ἀντώνιος, τὸν Πομπηίου Μάγνου περιποθήτου πᾶσιν ἔτι ὄντος, εἰσηγήσατο καλεῖν ἐξ Ἰβηρίας, πολεμουμένον ἔτι πρὸς τῶν Καίσαρος στρατηγῶν, ἀντί τε τῆς πατρώας οὐσίας δεδημευμένης ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν αὐτῷ δοθῆναι μυριάδας Ἀττικῶν δραχμῶν πεντακισχιλίας, εἶναι δὲ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἤδη τῆς θαλάσσης, καθὼς ἦν καὶ ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ταῖς Ῥωμαίων ναυσὶν αὐτίκα ταῖς πανταχοῦ χρῆσθαι εἰς τὰ ἐπείγοντα...

3.2.2; 3.3.6 ὁ δὲ αὐτὴν χαλεπαίνουσιν ἐνι τοιῷδε πολιτεύματι ἐς εὐνοίαν ἑαυτοῦ μετέβαλεν... τῷδε οὖν τῷ λόγῳ τῆς ἐνέδρας ὁ Ἀντώνιος ἐπιβαίνων οἷα ὕπατος συλλαμβάνει καὶ κτείνει τὸν Ἀμάτιον χωρὶς δίκης, μάλα θρασέως. Cf. 3.16.57, 36.142.

3.7.23 αὐτὸν οὖν τὸν Δολοβέλλαν ὁ Ἀντώνιος, νέον τε καὶ φιλότιμον εἰδώς, ἔπεισεν αἰτεῖν Συρίαν ἀντί Κασίου καὶ τὸν ἐς Παρθυαίους κατελεγεμένον στρατὸν ἐπὶ τοὺς Παρθυαίους, αἰτεῖν δὲ οὐ παρὰ τῆς βουλῆς (οὐ γὰρ ἔξην), ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοῦ δήμου νόμῳ. Cf. 3.16.58, 24.91, 36.143.

2.125.522 ὁ δὲ Ἀντώνιος τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς ἐκέλευσε νυκτοφυλακεῖν τὴν πόλιν, ἐκ διαστήματος ἐν μέσῳ προκαθημένους ὥσπερ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ. Cf. 3.50. 204.

3.46.188 Δεῦρο δὲ ὄντι ἢ τε βουλὴ σχεδὸν ἅπασα καὶ τῶν ἱππέων τὸ πλεῖστον ἀφίκετο ἐπὶ τιμῇ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ δήμου τὸ ἀξιολογώτατον· οἱ καὶ καταλαβόντες αὐτὸν ὀρκούμενοι τοὺς παρόντας οἱ στρατιώτας καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῶν πάλαι στρατευσάμενων συνδραμόντας (πολὺ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο ἦν) συνώμνυον ἐκόντες οὐκ ἐκλείψειν τὴν ἐς Ἀντώνιον εὐνοίαν τε καὶ πίστιν, ὥς ἀπορῆσαι, τίνες ἦσαν, οἱ πρὸ ὀλίγου παρὰ τὴν Καίσαρος ἐκκλησίαν τὸν Ἀντώνιον ἐβλασφῆμουν.

3.4.13 ἃ καὶ Κικέρων συνεχῶς ἐπῆνει τὸν Ἀντώνιον

[P] 57.235 Πομπήιον τὸν Πομπηίου τοῦ ὕμετέρου κατεκάλει καὶ τὴν πατρώαν ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων αὐτῷ διέλυε περιουσίαν.

[P] 57.235 τὸν Ψευδομάριον λαβὼν ἐπιβουλεύοντα ἀπέκτεινε καὶ ἐπηνέσαστε πάντες.

[P] 57.237 μόνος ἦρχεν ἀποδημήσαντος ἐπὶ Συρίας Δολοβέλλα

ibid. στρατὸν εἶχεν ἔτοιμον ἐν τῇ πόλει τὸν ὕφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῷ δεδομένον; οὐκ ἐνυκτοφυλάκει τὴν πόλιν...;

[P] 58.241 αὐτὸν ἐς τὸ Τίβυρον ἐξίοντα πόσοι προεπέμποιεν καὶ πόσοι συνώμνυμεν οὐχ ὀρκούμενοι;

[P] 58.241 πόσους δὲ Κικέρων ἐπαίνους ἐς τὴν πολιτείαν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀρετὴν ἀνάλισκε;

3.51.211 Ἀντωνίου δὲ ἡ μήτηρ καὶ ἡ γυνὴ καὶ παῖς ἔτι μαιράκιον οἷ τε ἄλλοι οἰκεῖοι καὶ φίλοι δι' ὅλης τῆς νυκτὸς ἐς τὰς τῶν δυνατῶν οἰκίας διέθεον ἰκετεύοντες καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν ἐς τὸ βουλευτήριον ἰόντας ἠνώχλουν, ριπτούμενοί τε πρὸ ποδῶν σὺν οἰμωγῇ καὶ ὀλορυγαῖς καὶ μελαίνῃ στολῇ παρὰ θύραις ἐκβοῶντες...

[P] 58.242 τὰ ἐνέχυρα τὰ νῦν ὄντα πρὸ τοῦ βουλευτηρίου κατέλιπεν [Ἀντ.] ἡμῖν, μητέρα καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ μαιράκιον υἱόν; οἱ κλαίουσι καὶ δεδίασι νῦν οὐ τὴν Ἀντωνίου πολιτείαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν ἐχθρῶν δυναστείαν.

Appendix B

Reference to the *Philippics* in Cassius Dio's speech for Cicero (Cassius Dio 45.18–47)

In the table below, I have given an overview of all the parallels between Cassius Dio's speech for Cicero and Cicero's *Philippics* that have been listed by Gowing 1992: 238 n. 34 (who assumes in his list also the references provided by Van Stekelenburg 1971: 80), Bertrand 2008: xxiii–xxvii, and Burden-Strevens 2020: 80–84. The final column offers my own observations.

As one can see, there are few places where scholars agree about the intertexts present in Dio's speech. Therefore, this table is not meant as a comprehensive overview of the intertextual connections with the *Philippics*, but to assemble in one place the data which scholars have collected until now. Others may take this as their point of departure in examining Dio's literary imitation of the *Philippics*.

Cass. Dio 45	Gowing (incl. Van Stekelenburg)	Bertrand	Burden- Strevens	Jansen
18.1	(<i>v.St.</i> 1.1–11) 3.28, 1.38	2.1? (corr. = 2.76)		1.1; 2.76
19.1		3.5		
20.1				cf. 3.20; 5.1, 25; 7.5; 14.15, 18
20.4	3.31		2.2, 5	
22.4		2.19, 112; 3.9; 5.18; 13.18		
22.6	3.29	5.10 (cf. 6.3; 8.15; 13.5)		
23.4		1.1; 2.90–91		
23.5		1.16		

Cass. Dio 45	Gowing (incl. Van Stekelenburg)	Bertrand	Burden- Strevens	Jansen
23.6		2.92; 5.11	2.8	
23.7	1.16	1.3 (cf. 2.91)		
23.8		1.2		
24.1		5.11		2.93
24.2		1.4; 5.10		
26.1	2.6			
26.2	2.44	2.44	2.45, 47	2.44–45
26.4	2.48	2.47, 48		2.47, 48
27.1	2.50–52	2.52		2.52
27.2	27.2–4 = 2.53, 55			2.50
27.3				2.53
27.4		2.53, 55		2.55
27.5	(<i>v.St.</i> 5.7–9) 1.31; 2.6, 79–84	5.8, 9		
28.1	2.62 (should be 2.63?)	2.63	2.63 (incorr.; ref. at 28.2)	2.63
28.2		2.58	2.58	
28.3	(<i>v.St.</i> 2.62, 65, 67–69)	2.64	2.64	28.3–4 = 2.64–65
28.4		2.71	2.66	
28.4 Charybdis	(<i>v.St.</i> 2.66)	2.67	2.66 (corr. = 2.67)	2.67
29.1			2.70	2.70
29.2	5.20			
30.1	(<i>v.St.</i> 30–32 = 2.84– 87) 2.84, 86; 3.12	2.85, 86	2.85 (corr. = 2.86)	2.86
30.2	(<i>v.St.</i> 2.43, 101)	2.43		
30.3		5.20		5.20
31.1	3.10	2.87		

Cass. Dio 45	Gowing (incl. Van Stekelenburg)	Bertrand	Burden- Strevens	Jansen
31.3	2, 85; 3.12; 13.17		2.86 (corr. = 2.85)	2.85; 3.12
32.1-2	32.2 = 3.8-9	2.86	2.87; 3.8-9	
32.4	(v.St. 2.97)			
34.3	2.117			
34.6		3.8		
35.2	2.117; 13.18			
35.3	(v.St. 5.22) 2.116-117; 3.4	3.4		3.4, 10, 31; 4.4; 5.22; 12.12; 13.18
35.4	3.29; 7.21			
36.3		5.24		5.24
37.4	2.108; 8.7			2.108; 8.7
38.2	3.3	3.3		
38.3	4.4; 5.42			
38.5-6	10.18-19; 11.37			
39.1	4.8			4.8
39.4		2.71		2.71
40.2		2.48, 49		
40.3		2.71		
41.1	2.25-36		2.25, 34, 35	
42.6	4.15			
43.2	5.3, 25			
43.3	5.26			
44.1	6.7			
45.1	5.21	3.27; 5.26		
45.2	6.3-6			
45.5	6.18	7.8		
46.1				cf. 8.11-19; 10.2- 6; 11.15; 12.3-4

Cass. Dio 45	Gowing (incl. Van Stekelenburg)	Bertrand	Burden- Strevens	Jansen
46.2	3.29; 7.14; 10.19–20			
46.3				2.119
46.5	14.32–33			14.32–33
47.2	(<i>v.St.</i> 1.34) 1.34–35			47.1–2 = 1.34–35
47.3	1.34–35	2.42	2.42	
47.4	(<i>v.St.</i> 2.56, 98; 3.16)			cf. 2.90; 3.16
47.5			2.41	

Nederlandse samenvatting

Dit proefschrift behandelt de reputatie van de staatsman M. Tullius Cicero in de Romeinse Keizertijd. Cicero neemt een bijzondere plek in binnen de westerse cultuurgeschiedenis vanwege zijn gigantische oeuvre, dat bestaat uit onder andere redevoeringen, retorische handboeken, filosofische verhandelingen en vele brieven aan zijn sociale kring in Rome. Zijn werk, maar ook zijn persoonlijkheid kennen een lange receptiegeschiedenis. Het NWO VIDI-project ‘Mediated Cicero’, waarvan dit promotieonderzoek deel uitmaakt, heeft getracht verschillende episoden van dit receptietraject in kaart te brengen.

Deze dissertatie zet zich af tegen de overwegend retorisch georiënteerde onderzoeksstudies die de laatste jaren zijn voortgebracht. In zulke studies wordt de beeldvorming rondom Cicero’s persona in de oudheid vooral verklaard vanuit de centrale rol die zijn werk innam in het Romeinse onderwijs. Dat Cicero’s naam onlosmakelijk verbonden was met de Latijnse welsprekendheid en met de bestudering van de retorica, staat buiten kijf. Er is echter ook een lange traditie waarin Cicero’s politieke daden de hoofdrol spelen; deze traditie strekt zich zelfs uit tot de moderne tijd. Westerse politici beroepen zich nog steeds op Cicero als de ware republikein of de ideale politicus.

Dit proefschrift bestaat uit een viertal thematische *case studies* die zich alle richten op de politieke aspecten van Cicero’s nagedachtenis. Een logische bron voor de beeldvorming rondom Cicero *politicus* is de antieke historiografie. Dit is een genre dat vaak wordt benaderd als regelrechte informatiebron over Cicero’s leven, maar minder vaak als een medium voor culturele beeldvorming. De geschiedschrijving uit de keizertijd is daarbij extra interessant aangezien zij Cicero’s politieke carrière weergeeft als een onderdeel van het historische proces waardoor de Republiek ten onder ging. Vanuit methodologisch oog-

punt probeert dit proefschrift een diverse benadering van de antieke bronnen te laten zien. Enerzijds is er een sterke focus op de teksten zelf ('close reading'): wat voor terminologie gebruiken de geschiedschrijvers om over Cicero te spreken? Hoe karakteriseren zij hem? Welke vertelmiddelen passen zij toe in hun verslag van Cicero's carrière? Anderzijds worden de teksten geplaatst in een breed cultureel-historisch, zelfs sociaal kader, dat steeds de vraag stelt: hoe verhoudt de beeldvorming over Cicero zich tot Romeinse ideeën over (politiek) leiderschap? Anders geformuleerd: hoe kunnen we specifieke beschrijvingen van Cicero's daden extrapoleren naar een algemeen begrip van de politiek-morele vraagstukken die de Romeinen bezig hielden?

Hoofdstuk 1 neemt een van de eerste historiografische bronnen over Cicero's consulaat, te weten Sallustius' *Bellum Catilinae* (*Samenzwering van Catilina*), onder de loep. Sallustius (86–35 v. Chr.) was een tijdgenoot, zelfs een bekende, van Cicero. De *Bellum Catilinae* is daarvoor een eigentijdse weergave van de gebeurtenissen tijdens Cicero's consulaat. Er is echter iets vreemds aan de manier waarop Sallustius Cicero neerzet in zijn werk: in tegenstelling tot de andere hoofdrolspelers in de Catilinarische samenzwering spreekt Cicero niet in de directe rede. Een aspect dat wel nadrukkelijk wordt gepresenteerd, is de slechte reputatie (*invidia*) die Cicero opliep als gevolg van de samenzwering. Veel onderzoekers hebben Sallustius' weergave van Cicero's daden daarom op een negatieve wijze geïnterpreteerd: Cicero's stem zou bewust onderdrukt worden en zijn consulaat bekritiseerd. In deze *case study* onderzoek ik de *Bellum Catilinae* vanuit het perspectief van *memory studies*. Binnen de 'memory studies' is recentelijk een beweging ontstaan die in plaats van 'herinneren' (het schriftelijk of oraal hervertellen en/of via monumenten vereeuwigen) juist het 'vergeten' (tot taboe maken, archiveren, onderdrukken) van bepaalde gebeurtenissen en figuren naar voren brengt. De *Bellum Catilinae* illustreert hoe zulk vergeten er in de praktijk uitziet: de geschiedschrijver toont zich vaardig in het selecteren, weglaten en herformuleren van historische gebeurtenissen – hier specifiek van Cicero's daden. Mijn analyse laat een genuanceerd beeld zien, waarin Sallustius probeert om Cicero's beschrijvingen van de samenzwering te *herschrijven* vanuit een onpersoonlijk perspectief, terwijl hij daarnaast een sterk morele boodschap

toevoegt aan het verhaal. Sallustius pakt belangrijke thema's uit de Catilinarische redevoeringen op, zoals de oorlogsterminologie en de kritiek (*invidia*) die onvermijdelijk op het hoofd van de consul neer zou komen als hij streng zou optreden tegen de samenzweerders. Een aspect dat centraal staat in Cicero's rede, maar dat Sallustius weglaat uit zijn relaas, is de functie van de consul als een soort generaal in de stad (*dux togatus*). In plaats van zich te richten op de machtige positie van de consul focaliseert Sallustius de ethische dilemma's die een politieke leider in tijden van crisis ervaart. Cicero's individuele rol in de samenzwering wordt hierdoor geabstraheerd naar de gecompliceerde taak van een civiele leider om de vrede in de staat te bewaren en morele normen na te leven. Dit moraliserende beeld spreekt ook uit de redevoeringen die Sallustius zijn hoofdpersonages laat houden. Zoals gezegd heeft het personage Cicero geen directe rede. Cruciaal in de besluitvorming over het lot van de samenzweerders zijn daarentegen de redes van Caesar en Cato (*Cat.* 51–52), twee politici die lijnrecht tegenover elkaar staan. Terwijl Caesar (in overeenstemming met zijn historische imago) een pleidooi houdt voor mildheid in het bestraffen van de samenzweerders, gebruikt Cato krachtige oorlogsretoriek die aanstuurt op de laatste, draconische maatregel: de doodstraf. In de redevoeringen van Caesar en Cato vindt men impliciete verwijzingen naar passages in Cicero's *Catilinarische redevoeringen*. Caesar veroordeelt de opzweepende retorica die zo kenmerkend is voor de *Catilinaria*; Cato gebruikt, op zijn beurt, juist wel het type oorlogsmetafoor dat Cicero al toegepaste, maar steekt deze in een moreel verantwoord jasje. Terwijl de geschiedschrijver de *Catilinaria* haast geheel weglaat uit zijn narratief, suggereert Caesars rede dat dergelijke rede een verkeerd soort besluitvorming in de hand werken, en introduceert Cato een type argumentatie dat ver uitstijgt boven de Ciceroniaanse pathetiek. Met Cato's rede wordt als het ware de retorica waarmee Cicero als consul de staat tegen Catilina had beschermd, *overschreven*.

Hoofdstuk 2 onderzoekt hoe de beeldvorming rond Cicero en Cato de Jongere zich verder ontwikkelt in de vroege Keizertijd. De *Bellum Catilinae* illustreert goed hoe Cato al in zijn eigen tijd tot een symboolfiguur voor de Republiek werd. Daarmee rijst echter de vraag: als Cato de idealen van de Republiek personifieert, met welk soort po-

litiek beleid identificeerden de Romeinen Cicero dan? Deze tweede *case study* richt zich geheel op het proces waardoor de daden van historische helden een symboolfunctie krijgen voor latere generaties. Dit proces noemen moderne geleerden exemplariteit. Exemplariteit kan gezien worden als een cultureel discours waarin de Romeinse geschiedenis wordt gecategoriseerd aan de hand van korte verhalen, *exempla*, die een morele boodschap over deugd en ondeugd uitdragen. In deze *exempla* staat altijd een specifieke historische figuur, een 'held', centraal. Moderne exemplariteitstheorie stelt dat er verschillende stappen bestaan in de commemoratie van zo'n held: 1) de (helden)daad; 2) de positieve of negatieve evaluatie van zijn medeburgers; 3) de monumentalisering van de heldendaad in het stadslandschap en/of in de literatuur; 4) de opname van de daad in het cultureel geheugen, waar deze voortdurend tot een normatieve discussie uitnodigt. Met name stap 4, de morele conceptualisatie van de daden in het cultureel geheugen, is relevant wanneer we kijken naar de receptie van republikeinse politici in de keizertijd. Met behulp van het exemplariteitsmodel demonstreer ik dat Cicero's politieke carrière evenzo werd aangewend als normatief symbool in het Romeinse publieke debat.

Hoewel moderne geleerden vaak betogen dat Cicero's daden geen goed materiaal waren voor positieve *exempla* over leiderschap, laat mijn onderzoek zien dat dit argument geen recht doet aan de historische traditie. Na een algemeen overzicht van de aard en functie van *exempla* introduceert hoofdstuk 2 het werk van de Tiberiaanse auteurs Velleius Paterculus (19 v. Chr. – na 30 n. Chr.) en Valerius Maximus (fl. 14–37 n. Chr.). In deze bronnen uit de vroege keizertijd heeft Cicero een diverse set eigenschappen; ze zetten hem in een positief daglicht, maar hij vormt niet direct een symbool voor zijn tijd of voor de Republiek. In Velleius' *Historiae Romanae* (Romeinse geschiedenis) wordt hij geprezen als beschermer van de Republiek, terwijl de *Facta et dicta memorabilia* (Gedenkwaardige daden en gezegden) van Valerius Maximus een intellectueel en een patriot in de ruimste zin van het woord presenteren. Het beeld van Cato de Jongere als politicus is daarentegen veel uitgesprokener. In alle *exempla* over zijn openbare leven wordt de nadruk gelegd op morele superioriteit en op leiderschap. Sterker nog, Cato heeft het vermogen om het volk en de senaat van Rome te verenigen – Cicero heeft slechts het vermogen om oppervlakkig de vrede

te bewaren. Op basis van Velleius en Valerius kunnen we concluderen dat Cato de Romeinse deugd en mannelijkheid (*virtus*) pur sang is. Dit maakt hem ook de best mogelijke vertegenwoordiger van de traditionele waarden van de Republiek.

In het tweede deel van hoofdstuk 2 plaats ik de beknopte beschrijvingen van Velleius en Valerius in de bredere context van de vroege keizertijd door een vergelijking te maken met de *Bellum Civile* (*Burgeroorlog*) van Lucanus (39–65 n. Chr.). Dit epos, over de oorlog tussen Caesar en Pompeius in de jaren 49–45 v. Chr., illustreert in groter detail het al eerder geschetste contrast tussen Cicero en Cato. Cicero mag dan een handig spreker en betrokken staatsman zijn, Cato is het bolwerk van de Republiek en alle waarden die zij vertegenwoordigt. Cicero's republikeinse idealen behelzen weinig meer dan de zorg om de macht van de elite, die door Caesar verloren zou gaan. Cato echter, nog afgezien van zijn eigen onberispelijke moed en doorzettingsvermogen, weet in zijn eentje de moraal van het gehele Pompeiaanse leger hoog te houden. Samen met de *exempla* in Velleius en Valerius demonstreert de *Bellum Civile* een duidelijke historische trend in de vroege keizertijd: het uitgesproken moraliserende karakter van Cato's daden maakt *hem* de ultieme leider van de Republiek, en niet Cicero. Cicero's figuur wordt verbonden met de senatoriale elite, terwijl Cato (ook) een directe connectie heeft met het Romeinse volk.

In **hoofdstuk 3** wordt de ethische component van politiek leiderschap verder verkend met behulp van zowel het exemplariteitsmodel, dat is geïntroduceerd in hoofdstuk 2, alsook moderne theorieën over leiderschap. Daarbij zet ik een stap vooruit in de (keizer)tijd en breid ik de Latijnse bronnen uit met de Griekse. De wetenschappelijke discussie over exemplariteit in de Romeinse oudheid richt zich met name op de relatie tussen de exemplarische held en zijn navolgers; met andere woorden, de morele reflectie op en eventuele imitatie van de daden van de held. Mijn onderzoek stelt de *eigen* reflectie van de held centraal. In de *exempla* over Cato is goed te zien dat zijn morele houding een belangrijk onderdeel is van zijn status als leider van het Romeinse volk. Binnen moderne leiderschapstheorie bestaat het idee dat dit type leiderschap, te weten 'ethisch leiderschap', zeer succesvol is. Behalve de integriteit van de leider en hun betrokkenheid bij de gemeenschap is

een belangrijke eigenschap van de ethisch leider dat zij 'ethisch competent' zijn. Volgens het invloedrijke model van Donald Menzel (zie proefschrift, p. 168) betekent dit concreet dat de leider beschikt over verscheidene sub-competenties, te weten hoge morele standaarden, een kennis van de normen en waarden van de gemeenschap en een vermogen om deze kennis toe te passen op de praktijk, het kunnen (h)erkennen en uitdragen van die normen en waarden naar anderen toe, en ten slotte het aanmoedigen van dergelijk gedrag bij anderen. Menzels model vormt het hermeneutisch raamwerk voor een nauwkeurige bestudering van Cicero's morele karakter in de historische traditie. Concreet gezegd, in dit hoofdstuk worden Cicero's *virtus*, zijn kennis en praktische invulling van de Romeinse normen en waarden alsmede zijn vermogen om anderen het goede voorbeeld te geven onderzocht. Een eerste, directe uiting van zijn ethische (in)competentie is te vinden in zijn redevoeringen. Retorica en vrije rede (*parrhēsia*, *libertas*), zoals die worden besproken door Plutarchus (ca. 46–120 n. Chr.) en Cassius Dio (163/164 – ca. 235 n. Chr.), is een belangrijke voorwaarde voor een functionerende staat, en in het bijzonder voor een gezonde Republiek. Retorische middelen horen door politici aangewend te worden ten behoeve van de rust en vrede. Het beeld dat deze Griekse auteurs schetsen van Cicero's publieke optreden, weersprekt dit ideaal. In plaats van de kalmte te bewaren, hitst Cicero het volk op; in plaats van zijn retorische kwaliteiten ondergeschikt te maken aan het welzijn van de staat is hij slechts geïnteresseerd in het vergroten van zijn persoonlijke roem. Een vergelijking met Plutarchus' en Cassius Dio's lovende bespreking van Cato de Jongere laat zien waar het Cicero aan ontbreekt: een vermogen tot succesvol reflecteren op de ethische (morele) implicaties van zijn retorica. Het idee dat Cicero's publieke rede 'onethisch' is, valt echter moeilijk te rijmen met de erkenning, in deze zelfde auteurs, dat hij ook een intellectueel en een filosoof was.

Het tweede deel van hoofdstuk 3 wil deze schijnbare inconsistentie wegnemen. Het toetst het model van Menzel aan de theorieën van Plutarchus en Seneca over goed staatsmanschap; beide auteurs documenteren het belang dat in de keizertijd werd gehecht aan de filosofische educatie van de politicus. De ideale politicus, in de werken van Plutarchus en Seneca, is een man met vergaande kennis over ethiek en een innerlijke neiging naar deugdzzaamheid. Het resultaat is dat hij niet

alleen *zelf* evenwichtig weet om te gaan met zijn hoge positie, maar ook *anderen* kan onderwijzen over de juiste normen en waarden. Dit laatste maakt hem vooral tot een voorbeeldfiguur binnen zijn gemeenschap. In hun portret van Cicero beroepen Plutarchus en Seneca zich op dit algemene beeld over staatsmanschap. Cicero's rechtschapen inborst en zijn hang naar excelleren worden geroemd, maar tegelijkertijd worden zijn onevenwichtigheid, zijn eerezuchtigheid en zijn onvermogen om anderen correct moreel gedrag aan te leren betreurd. Het is goed om te benadrukken dat Cicero dus enerzijds een baken van intellectualisme en educatie, anderzijds een voorbeeld van de corrumperende aard van de politiek kan zijn. In het slotgedeelte van dit hoofdstuk betoog ik dat ook het Cicero-beeld in Cassius Dio binnen dit conceptuele kader begrepen moet worden. Met name de dialoog tussen Philiscus en Cicero is bedoeld om te demonstreren dat Cicero's filosofische, ethische voor-treffelijkheid op gespannen voet staat met zijn gedrag in het openbaar. Daarbij is Dio er niet op uit om Cicero's reputatie te schaden, maar eerder om te laten zien dat de sociale en politieke organisatie van de Republiek door en door verrot was.

Hoofdstuk 4 beargumenteert dat de Griekse geschiedschrijvers Cicero tot een cultuuroverstijgend symbool van (corrupte) politieke retorica maken. Opmerkelijk genoeg is er in de Latijnse historiografie geen redevoering van Cicero te vinden; de Griekse historiografie daarentegen levert ons een sterke staaltje Ciceroniaanse welsprekendheid. Dit hoofdstuk behandelt de tweede-eeuwse auteur Appianus van Alexandrië (ca. 95 – 165 n. Chr.) en wederom Cassius Dio, die in hoofdstuk 3 is geïntroduceerd. Beide historiografen hebben hun eigen 'Philippische' debat geënceneerd. Cicero's *Philippicae* (*Philippische redevoeringen*) zijn al sinds de oudheid een belangrijke bron voor de gebeurtenissen na Caesars dood. Het feit dat Appianus en Cassius Dio elementen uit deze redevoeringen overnemen voor hun relaas van die periode is dus niet zo vreemd. Wat frappant is, is de keuze om het politieke conflict te illustreren met behulp van uitvoerige speeches in de directe rede: de figuur Cicero geeft bij beide geschiedschrijvers eerst zelf een redevoering, die vervolgens weersproken wordt door redevoeringen van Antonius' aanhangers in Rome – in Appianus is dit L. Calpurnius Piso, in Dio Q. Fufius Calenus. In beide gevallen is de rede van Cicero's te-

genstander de effectievere. Sterker nog, Cicero's polemische houding en zijn emotionele betrokkenheid bij de situatie werken averechts. Appianus creëert een narratief waarin zowel Piso als Cicero verraderlijke retorische middelen gebruiken om hun partij de overwinning te laten behalen; in het bijzonder Cicero's verdediging van de belangen van de elite gaat ten koste van het belang van de staat. Door verbale parallellen met Demosthenische (Attische) retorica weet Appianus een historisch-ideologische laag toe te voegen aan het Philippische debat, waarin de val van de Republiek, net als de val van de Atheense democratie, onvermijdelijk lijkt. Net als Appianus construeert ook Cassius Dio een verhaallijn waarin Cicero en zijn aanhangers duidelijk afsterven op een politieke mislukking. Dio is echter veel explicieter in de manier waarop hij Cicero's eigen politieke keuzes en zijn gedrag jegens anderen onderdeel maakt van de politieke crisis. Door Ciceroniaanse slogans uit de originele *Philippicae* te imiteren zet de geschiedschrijver een beeld neer van een arrogante, zelfingenomen politicus die zich vooral druk maakt over zijn eigen reputatie en niet zozeer over wat het beste is voor de staat. Terwijl Dio's Cicero spreekt met een Ciceroniaanse stem, spreekt zijn tegenstander Calenus, net zoals Piso, met de stem van het morele overwicht. Calenus bevestigt het beeld van Cicero dat al eerder wordt geschetst in het hoofdnarratief door de historiograaf (Cass. Dio 38.12.6–7, 45.17.4): een geregeld roekeloze, op roem beluste blaaskaak, die het publieke belang uit het oog verliest. Zowel Dio als ook Appianus betogen dat het Cicero's noodlot is, als gevolg van zulke politieke misvattingen, om samen met de Republiek ten onder te gaan.

In hoofdstuk 3 is met name Cicero's persoonlijke houding ten opzichte van zijn openbare functie besproken, die niet overeenkomt met het ideaal van de harmoniestichtende staatsman. Naast het probleem dat Cicero, volgens de schrijvers uit de keizertijd, zijn persoonlijke ambities niet weet te conformeren aan de standaarden waaraan een Romeinse staatsman moest voldoen, sijpelt het onvermogen om emoties te beteugelen en het morele voorbeeld te geven ook door in zijn publieke redevoeringen. Hiervan zijn de *Philippicae*, volgens Appianus en Cassius Dio, een uitstekend voorbeeld. Het is goed om te bedenken dat de *Philippicae* niet slechts dienen tot het negatief karakteriseren van onze specifieke staatsman, maar vooral ook een trend moeten weerge-

ven. In de ogen van de Griekse geschiedschrijvers verstoorde de republikeinse gewoonte om politieke conflicten uit te vechten in publieke redevoeringen het evenwicht in de staat. Zij bieden een interpretatie van de Romeinse geschiedenis waarin competitie en persoonlijke ambitie het telkens winnen van de belangen van de gemeenschap, waardoor de instituties van de Republiek van binnenuit worden uitgehold.

In de **conclusie** duid ik een aantal rode lijnen aan in de lange traditie van Sallustius tot Cassius Dio, die betrekking hebben op Cicero's politieke overtuigingen, zijn retorische vaardigheden en zijn falen als filosoof-politicus. De keizertijdlijke weergave van Cicero's politieke carrière blijkt verrassend consistent. Ten eerste, als het gaat om zijn politieke voorkeuren, wordt Cicero sterk geframed als een conservatieve aristocraat, een lid van de senatoriale elite. Zijn wereldbeeld wordt bepaald door de Romeinse aristocratische ambitie om zo snel mogelijk omhoog te klimmen op de politieke ladder en het hoogst mogelijke succes te behalen – in Cicero's geval was dit niet alleen het consulaat, maar ook de overwinning op de Catilinarische samenzweerders. Daarbij wordt Cicero's republikeinse gedachtegoed, zoals hij dat uiteenzet in zijn filosofische oeuvre, niet verbonden met zijn rol in de politieke praktijk; specifieke republikeinse waarden, zoals *libertas* of burgermoed in het algemeen, worden in de Romeinse historische traditie eerder gesymboliseerd door de daden van Cato de Jongere. Ten tweede speelt de retorica een centrale rol in de beoordeling van Cicero's carrière. In eerste instantie komt dit door zijn reputatie als grootste redenaar die Rome ooit gekend heeft. Er is echter nog een ander aspect aan Cicero's welsprekendheid dat zijn imago definieert: het gebrek aan ethische reflectie in zijn gebruik van retorica als middel om een politiek doel te bereiken. Dit brengt ons bij een derde rode draad in de historische traditie: Cicero's onvermogen om zich 'filosofisch' op te stellen in complexe situaties en daarmee passend leiderschap te tonen. Met wat de geschiedschrijvers beschrijven als irrationeel gedrag werkt Cicero niet alleen zijn eigen politiek falen in de hand, maar draagt hij daarnaast bij aan de corrupte besluitvorming en partijvorming die de Republiek naar de ondergang hebben geholpen. Het feit dat Cicero's leven door Romeinse geschiedschrijvers onderdeel wordt gemaakt van dergelijke politieke analyses over het lot van de Republiek is een con-

clusie die aantoonst in hoe grote mate de Romeinse historiografen de geschiedenis van gebeurtenissen verbonden met de geschiedenis van 'grote mannen'.

Wat tot slot te weinig wordt erkend in moderne studies, maar wordt benadrukt in deze dissertatie, is dat de Griekse geschiedschrijvers, van Plutarchus tot Cassius Dio, een extra laag toevoegen aan hun analyse van de 'Val' van Cicero en van de Republiek. Hun interpretatie van zowel de woorden als daden van Cicero wordt sterk gekleurd door een constante vergelijking met Demosthenes. Een belangrijke overkoepelende observatie die wordt gedaan en die verder uitgewerkt moet worden in vervolgonderzoek, is dat, bij de Griekse schrijvers, het einde van de Republiek tot op zekere hoogte wordt gespiegeld aan de val van de democratie in Athene. Dit heeft natuurlijk grote gevolgen voor hun presentatie van de gebeurtenissen in republikeins Rome – en voor de manier waarop oud-historici en classici deze geschiedwerken zouden moeten lezen.

De keizertijdlike karakterisering van Cicero *politicus* moeten we niet benaderen als geïsoleerde verhalen over één historische figuur, maar als een dwarsdoorsnede van de vragen die de Romeinen verbonden aan staatsmanschap in het algemeen. In het geval van laat-republikeinse politici zoals Cicero en ook Cato de Jongere neemt vooral 'crisis management', het vermogen om succesvol een gemeenschap door een politieke crisis heen te leiden, een grote rol in. Ondanks zijn kennis van politiek-ethische kwesties en zijn welsprekendheid slaagt Cicero er niet in om de Republiek van haar eigen ondergang te redden. De antieke verklaring hiervoor is dat het onvermogen om zijn ambities en emoties te beteugelen hem ethisch incompetent maken; qua leiderschap betekent dit dat hij geen moreel boegbeeld voor zijn medeburgers kan zijn. Cicero verwordt in de Romeinse keizertijd tot een stereotype tragische held, die ondanks – of misschien juist als gevolg van – zijn intellectualisme volledig misleid wordt door politieke machts spelen, en ten onder gaat aan hetzelfde systeem dat hij zolang heeft proberen te beschermen.

Curriculum vitae

Leanne Madelon JANSEN was born in 1990 at Apeldoorn, the Netherlands, where she attended the Gymnasium Apeldoorn between 2003 and 2009. Between 2009 and 2015 she completed a BA and Research MA in Classics (cum laude) at Leiden University. She is co-founder of Sophia Aeterna, the study society for Classics in Leiden, of which she was the secretary for one and a half years. During her studies she worked as a tour guide in the National Museum of Antiquities (RMO), as a teacher-tutor at Studiekring Leiden, and, for a short period, as a part-time teacher of Greek at the Johan de Witt Gymnasium, Dordrecht. From October 2015 to February 2017 she was a research assistant to prof. Ineke Sluiter and the coordinator of the Forum Antiquum lecture series. At the beginning of 2017, then, she received a position as aio (PhD researcher) within the NWO VIDI-project 'Mediated Cicero'. Her doctoral dissertation was supervised by Prof. Antje Wessels and Dr Christoph Pieper. She conducted part of her doctoral research at the Royal Dutch Institute in Rome (KNIR) and the University of Washington, Seattle. She also presented her research at multiple international conferences in Manchester, St Andrews, and Rome. These activities have yielded peer-reviewed articles on Leonardo Bruni's *Cicero novus* and on the reception of Cicero's voice from antiquity to the Renaissance (co-publication with Christoph Pieper and Bram van der Velden). Apart from that, she explored the media of public scholarship. She was a member of the editorial board of the Leiden Arts in Society Blog, and she became part of 'Faces of Science' (KNAW/NEMO Kennislink), a network of PhD students who try to bridge the gap between the scholarly community and the general public. As an aio, she taught courses in Latin grammar and rhetoric to BA students; since she has finished her dissertation, she has worked as a lecturer of Ancient History and Latin at Leiden University and Groningen University. Over the years she has developed two main interests: to study the reception of classical antiquity and to teach classical history and literature to young people.

