Essays on welfare benefits, employment, and crime
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Propositions relating to the dissertation

*Essays on Welfare Benefits, Employment, and Crime*

by Marco Stam

1. By providing a minimum income guarantee, welfare provisions substantially reduce crime among welfare recipients.

2. Mandatory activation programs for welfare recipients can increase crime by lowering the accessibility of income protection, while participation in such programs can decrease crime by reducing the time available to commit crime.

3. Welfare recipients commit more financially motivated crime towards the end of the monthly welfare payment cycle, while other offenses spike directly after benefit receipt.

4. State dependence of criminal behavior does not materialize through adverse labor market consequences.

5. In light of its substantial societal costs, crime must be taken into account in order to gain a comprehensive overview of the costs and benefits of welfare – and labor market policies.

6. Cutting costs on welfare schemes creates a waterbed effect, where the costs of crime increase.

7. Criminologists should exploit more exogenous policy variation, whereas economists should pay more attention to spillover effects of economic policy on non-economic outcomes.

8. Data scouting efforts to further the integration of reliable microdata sources are crucial to expand insights into the economics of crime and the effects of economic – and criminal justice policies on other life domains.

9. Finishing your PhD dissertation during a pandemic is probably not much different from finishing your PhD dissertation not during a pandemic.

10. To avoid being called upon to resuscitate a person in need, it is probably wise to use the title of doctor sparingly.