



Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

Slow reading on the wing: Entangling enactive literary criticism, the energia of early modern imagining, and artistic research

Romburgh, S.G. van; Haar, A.D.M. van de; Schulte Nordholt, A.E.

Citation

Romburgh, S. G. van. (2021). Slow reading on the wing: Entangling enactive literary criticism, the energia of early modern imagining, and artistic research. In A. D. M. van de Haar & A. E. Schulte Nordholt (Eds.), *Figurations animalières à travers les textes et l'image en Europe. Du Moyen Âge à nos jours. Essais en hommage à Paul J. Smith. Faux Titre* (pp. 422-434). Leiden, Boston: Brill. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3249689>

Version: Submitted Manuscript (under Review)

License: [Leiden University Non-exclusive license](#)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3249689>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).



Slow Reading on the Wing: Entangling enactive literary criticism, early modern *energia*, and artistic research

Sophie van Romburgh

{first draft, submitted 10 Jul 2020; pre-print}

This essay entangles enactive approaches of current cognitive literary criticism, the early modern concept of *energia*, and artistic research practice, to reflect on imaginative modes of thinking in kinesis, somatosensory gestures and animating actions, with a preference for those bird-related.

Magpies I see on my dune hikes usually remain blended in with the landscape. They are images, which I look at in pictorialist manner, not fully attentive to their presence. Yet I have the capacity to make them salient. The magpie may quicken to life for me when it mutters as I pass. Suddenly aware of being perceived, I am stirred, in turn, to heightened alertness. I better sense the magpie as a presence, and am more aware of mine. Its animation, however, does not jolt the magpie out of the imagination into something like ‘reality’. Rather, the magpie’s animation happens in imaginative mode. This is not just because the dune hike is an ongoing art project, so that anything relating to it might be part of its artistic imaginary,¹ nor because I have, as a city-dweller, no need to hunt for magpie pie. The magpie comes to life as an image because I have, as a human animal, the cognitive fluidity to do so.

Excitingly, recent enactive accounts of cognition forego any fundamental distinction between imagination and everyday perception. Enactivists emphasize, in philosopher Shaun Gallagher’s words, ‘the continuity that exists between different cognitive activities – perception, action, memory, imagination’.² Perception is not a snapshot-like representation in the mind (a ‘picture’) for the purpose of our taking actions; instead, philosopher Alva Noë maintains, action is constitutive of perception.³ Similarly, Gallagher adds, ‘remembering and imagining ... are just that – activities, or *doings*’.⁴ Cognition is embodied: enactive, affective, extended, and ecological. As philosopher Evan Thompson explains:

¹ Romburgh Sophie van, “I walk the trail till the trail walks me/ And I bring you the sand in my shoes” (2012–). Ongoing walking project, dimensions variable. Collection of the artist.

² Gallagher S., *Enactivist Interventions. Rethinking the Mind* (Oxford: 2017) 191.

³ Noë A., *Action in Perception*, Perception and Mind (Cambridge, Mass. – London: 2004) 1–34.

⁴ Gallagher, *Enactivist Interventions* 191.

[To] think the mind is something in the head or the brain ... It's like saying that flight is inside the wings of a bird. The mind is relational. It's a way of being in relation to the world. You need a brain, just as the bird needs wings, but the mind exists at a different level — the level of embodied being in the world.⁵

Our embodied being in the world – our bird flight, the mind, cognition – is also represented in enactivist accounts by a more abstract, yet nonetheless animal-inspired image: as ongoingly enacted by a high-order complex organism dynamically coupled to its emergent environment.⁶ While it may seem grotesque to consider humanities scholars pursuing their studies of animal imagery in terms of organisms dynamically coupled to their emergent environments, it is crucial to realize that what pertains between them (scholars and organisms) is not a vital difference, but a matter of gradation, and imaginative representation. '[P]erception's function is never purely recognitional', Gallagher observes, 'There are always ulterior motives', be they food for survival, or 'aesthetic enjoyment'.⁷ Essentially, '[t]here is an aspect of imagination in perception itself'.⁸

Likewise, the psychologist Eleanor Rosch seeks not to dualize our experience of everyday reality and what she calls the imaginative arts, such as literature and the visual arts. In an 'evocative' paper titled "If You Depict a Bird, Give It Space to Fly",⁹ Rosch adduces the Buddhist insight that a deeper, more inclusive understanding is always available to each of us, which we sometimes glimpse, yet commonly have blocked by self-interests. The imaginative arts, Rosch proposes, may offer an environment (a space) that affords us to let go of self-centred hopes and fears, thus to sense a mind-expanding understanding that is not other, but has been there all along. Moreover, the arts facilitate our losing ourselves into them by their 'being presented in the same imaginative modality', such as brushstrokes, or words;¹⁰ – or, for instance, by artistic context or practice, which is what makes my art project's dune hikes different from other hikes.

On this view, when we experience an image – and why not make it a magpie, the image may actually quicken us, in the sense of quickening aspects of us usually blocked by self-interests, thus making us (feel) more alive, present in a mode (or space) we commonly think of

⁵ Heuman L., "The Embodied Mind. An interview with philosopher Evan Thompson", *TRICYCLE. The Buddhist Review* (Fall 2014), <https://tricycle.org/magazine/embodied-mind/>; cf. Gallagher, *Enactivist Interventions* 12.

⁶ E.g., *ibid.* 6, 54–55.

⁷ *Ibid.* 116.

⁸ *Ibid.* 196.

⁹ Rosch E., "If Your Depict a Bird, Give It Space to Fly": Eastern Psychologies, the Arts, and Self-Knowledge", *SubStance* 30, 1/2, 94/95 (2001) 236–253, at 238.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 240–241.

as imaginative. There is, therefore, no need for an inherent dichotomy between the animal as image and a gull whose poop lands on one's head. Enactivism now thinks without counterfactuals, without decoupling, and without the 'epistemic vigilance' that the literary scholar Terence Cave suggests we need when engaging with literature in order 'to keep our bearings' and, even, as 'the precondition for the very possibility of imaginative thought'.¹¹ Enactivist implications for humanities scholarship are rousing.

The gull's poop hits you on the head in words, birdwatching reader, yet you can feel somatosensory responses: a 'ghost echo' of ducking away for its splashing,¹² and a tingling of the skin on the scalp, almost like goose bumps. Put yourself face to face with Jan Asselijn's *The Threatened Swan*,¹³ and you may proprioceive, to use the philosopher and dancer Barbara Montero's phrase, the swan's wings rising and its head lunging in the muscles of your neck and armpits.¹⁴ Such sensorimotor responses usually remain below the level of reflective awareness. They are the imaginative affordances made salient in cognitive literary criticism, notably in literary scholar Guillemette Bolens's work on the calibration of kinesic, sensorimotor perceptual simulations in the dynamics of reading,¹⁵ and Cave's energizing, thought-provoking *Thinking with Literature* (2016), some of whose animal-related imagery I will shortly explore. '[K]inesic reading brings to the surface something you always already felt when you read the text properly', Cave observes, 'but somehow ignored for the sake of supposedly "higher", more intellectual or aesthetic pleasures'.¹⁶ Why include such responses in our critical reflection, one wonders. Because 'strictly nothing forbids them', Bolens reasons, and 'for the simple and straightforward reason that critics trigger them when reading'.¹⁷

'A cognitive reading of literary texts ... would seek to uncover the hidden work of ... on-the-wing construction of meaning', Cave advances.¹⁸ This is not nearly the only animal-related image that propels his argument; his criticism is fairly alive with them. The literary excerpts selected for cognitive discussion throughout *Thinking with Literature* include a variety of

¹¹ Gallagher, *Enactivist Interventions* 83–125; Cave T., *Thinking with Literature. Towards a Cognitive Criticism* (Oxford: 2016) 72, 73.

¹² Ibid. 37.

¹³ Jan Asselijn, "The Threatened Swan" (ca. 1650). Oil on canvas, 144 x 171 cm. Amsterdam, Rijksmuseum.

¹⁴ Montero B.G., "Proprioceiving Someone Else's Movement", *Philosophical Explorations* 9, 2 (2006) 149–161.

¹⁵ Bolens G., *The Style of Gestures. Embodiment and Cognition in Literary Narrative*, foreword Berthoz A., Rethinking Theory (Baltimore: 2012); idem, "Kinesis in Literature and the Cognitive Dynamic of Gestures in Chaucer, Shakespeare, and Cervantes" *Costellazioni* 5 (2018) 81–103.

¹⁶ Cave, *Thinking with Literature* 29.

¹⁷ Bolens, "Kinesis in Literature" 92, 95.

¹⁸ Cave, *Thinking with Literature* 23.

animal images – crow, tiger, owls, bull, as if to bear out literally that literature be treated ‘as an animated affordance’,¹⁹ a vital concept for enactivists developed by the psychologist James J. Gibson to express ‘what the environment offers the animal’.²⁰ Moreover, Cave’s discursive writing buzzes with animals, from jellyfish and crustaceans to the flocking of starlings and birds’ nests.

These animal images suggest that it may be relatively easy for readers, cognitive literary scholar novices, to imagine—and—animate images of animals – to enact them, really – in accordance with the embodied, cognitive approach discussed. My simply enumerating crow, tiger, owls, and bull, by contrast, confirms a point of warning Bolens makes: when critics take images out of their narrative context and put them in a list for analysis, they lose their sensorimotor dynamics and ‘freeze’.²¹ This means, of course, that we, readers, ‘freeze’: evidently, we do not respond to itemised animal words as energetically (we do not read them with ears perked, nostrils flared, eyes wide open, so to say) as we do to an animal image in its natural habitat.

For such is the attitude advocated for the cognitive literary critic in the first paragraph of *Thinking with Literature*’s opening section ‘Changing the cognitive environment’:

Cognition – whether animal or human – is alert, attentive, responsive. ... [T]he merest hint of an unexpected smell or sound, a flicker on the edge of vision, a shift in the perceived direction of the breeze, will trigger an immediate response. ... [L]iterary criticism needs to be as alert and attentive as any other cognitive activity we perform – arguably more so than most.²²

What interests me here is that quick succession of briefest scenes – animating images – that smell, sound, sight, and touch: ‘the merest hint of an unexpected smell or sound, a flicker on the edge of vision, a shift in the perceived direction of the breeze’. They address us in our capacity as human animals: as organisms in an environment, sooner than scholars at our desk. They alert us to aspects, attitudes, motives perhaps, that we share with many nonhuman organisms. The little scenes do not urge us to act like animals, or as if we were animals – as we imagine animals to act, but rather to be aware of how we act as the animals we are. Such awareness is foregrounded from the beginning, when cognition is qualified as ‘animal or human’, and the scope is set for an ecological continuity within which to enact slow reading on the wing, whether

¹⁹ Ibid. 9.

²⁰ Gibson J.J., “The Theory of Affordances”, quoted in Cave, *Thinking with Literature* 47; cf. Gallagher, *Enactivist Interventions* 115–121, 192–197.

²¹ Bolens, “Kinesis in Literature” 93.

²² Cave, *Thinking with Literature* 1.

in encounters with animal images, or abstract conceptual work (and sometimes the two may blend).

The little scenes are underspecified,²³ so that they make salient not settings, nor possible agents causing a hint, flicker, and shift, but the processes of alertness, attentiveness, and responsiveness themselves, which the criticism theorizes the cognitive literary scholar needs. The scenes do so by not only illustrating these processes, but also by making us sit up and notice, alert, attentive, and responsive, right as we read. Before having even reached the words that ‘will trigger an immediate response’, we have had such response already. Their immediacy makes it seem that bringing the scenes to life – making these images vivid – is effortless. Vivid imagining that is effortless, ‘as if the text is doing the work for you’, is pleasurable and rewarding, as the literary scholar G. Gabrielle Starr observes in connection with cognitive research on “‘enacted’ imagery,” that is, imagery ‘belonging to the reader’.²⁴ (Vivid imagining that requires much effort from the reader, incidentally, Starr finds to be pleasurable and rewarding for us too.) ‘A vivid image may seem more fully the product of one’s own imagination – an achievement peculiarly one’s own’.²⁵

What makes images come to life for us, then, resonates for us, stirs our sensorimotor responses, stirring us. When animal images are vivid, it is because they animate us. Their vivacity touches our experiencing of life – our life force, if one will. Animal images may afford us effortlessly, pleasurable, and usually subconsciously, to feel (more) alive, and thus to be more alive in the manner and for the reason, I propose, that Rosch suggests: because we may experience a glimpse of more capacious knowing. Cleverly, and enactively, the little scenes in Cave’s opening paragraph demonstrate that ‘[m]iniature kinesic details embedded in a context that is non-descriptive ... can energize that context as a whole’.²⁶ The sensation of life (life force, energy) is unobstructed in the imaginative mode. We enact the theory of *Thinking with Literature* quickened in the way we may feel quickened by a magpie muttering as we pass by the dune trail.

Moreover, the animating scenes of Cave’s opening ecology come to us in the same imaginative modality, in the way Rosch indicates:²⁷ enactive events that address different senses (vision, hearing, smell, touch) reach us in the single medium of words. Mediated, animal images have been made by other human animals (artists, writers, scholars). Animal images, including

²³ Ibid. 27.

²⁴ Starr G.G., “Theorizing Imagery, Aesthetics, and Doubly Directed States”, in Zunshine L. (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Literary Studies* (Oxford: 2015) 1–27, at 5, 4. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199978069.013.0013.

²⁵ Ibid. 6.

²⁶ Cave, *Thinking with Literature* 81.

²⁷ Rosch, “If You Depict a Bird” 240–241.

these brief animating scenes, may, therefore, have been – ever so slightly – anthropomorphized, so that they speak to us in a manner we relate to, and that we have, perhaps culturally, come to desire of animals. Animal images seem to better fit our expectation of how animals are than do animals in the wild, whose interests and perceptions may be very different from how human animals experience them. The philosopher of science Vinciane Despret highlights how (cognitive) ethologists must first ‘become with’ the animals they want to study, in order to figure out what moves them: ‘[L]et the birds do the talking’.²⁸ This is another reason why the magpie on the dune hike is an image. That magpie’s perception remains alien, not understood by me, because I have not ‘become with’ the magpie’s interests, let alone the possibility of its imagination. A nonhuman animal’s images may seldom seem imaginative to us.

For our current interests, though, there are several assumptions to make about the imaginative in human cultures. If imagination, perception, memory and action exist in fluid continuity, and if, as Gallagher maintains, ‘there is an aspect of imagination in perception itself’,²⁹ moreover, if the imaginative arts give access, as Rosch proposes, to a broader understanding that is usually blocked by self-interest, yet always available to all, then one may suspect that the imagination, and the imaginative, may constitute, and have constituted, a more comprehensive aspect of everyday experience for cultures other than our own (however we identify ours), geographically as well as historically. This should be consequential for the humanist scholar engaging with earlier time periods and their (animal) images.

Other scholarly cultures may, therefore, similarly be, or have been, more effortlessly expert in enacting the imaginative, and including sensorimotor affordances in their scholarship than we are, twenty-first-century humanities scholars still fairly at the cusp of an embodied, experiential, enactive turn. For instance, the literary scholar Alan Richardson observes that, at least in the English-speaking world, the imagination was deliberately discounted in ‘modern’ twentieth-century literary criticism.³⁰ As expert understanding of what the imagination may avail has, therefore, dwindled, the Romantics have something to offer, Richardson advises, to current neuro-cognitive studies.³¹ And consider the classicist Luuk Huitink’s comparison of today’s enactivism and classical rhetoric’s expositions on the concept of *enargeia*, especially for its aiming

²⁸ Despret V., “The Enigma of the Raven”, *Angelaki* 20, 2 (2015) 57–72, at 67, 62.

²⁹ Gallagher, *Enactivist Interventions* 196.

³⁰ Richardson A., “Imagination: Literary and Cognitive Intersections”, in Zunshine, *Oxford Handbook* 1–27, at 3–4. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199978069.013.0012.

³¹ *Ibid.* 5, 17.

to reach lifelikeness by ‘the careful selection of “telling details”’ to work the audience’s imagination in a manner we may now call enactive.³² (*Enargeia* concerns the force of ‘depictive’ imagery, in Starr’s words: imagery ‘belonging to a text’).³³

When one begins to read scholars from earlier time periods enactively, with an embodied, embedded, extended, affective, experiential mind, one may discover sensorimotor affordances energizing their writing (to speak with Cave) to an extent one never noticed before, and in a sustained manner that suggests the scholar’s interests had been in these energizing capacities of imaginative thinking all along. I am referring to the work of the seventeenth-century art theoretician and philologist Francis Junius. Elsewhere, I have argued that today’s kinesic-enactive criticism resonates with the philological approach that Junius and fellow Septentrional philologists used in their scholarship, for instance for etymological interpretation.³⁴ I had argued before, prior to my learning about a cognitive, enactive turn, that the philologists read for *energia*, a concept adumbrated in Junius’s art theory *De pictura veterum* (1637).³⁵ *Energia* expresses, in my abbreviated paraphrase, the actualization of a work’s or image’s force (or a word’s, I add), when artist and critic (reader, scholar, viewer) have each so involved themselves in the image, with their thoughtfulness, caring, learning, skills, moral and ethical judgement, and all their senses – ‘attentive, alert, responsive’, Cave might say – that they are genuinely, albeit virtually, present in its imaginative space, and meet.³⁶ While artists engage in the force of *enargeia*, critics engage in the force of *energeia*, the ‘enacted imagery’ of Starr’s research. The critic must, then, feel present in the image for the image to come to life. Energizing the image, the critic is energized; energized, the critic energizes the image.

Evidently, we do not all have sensorimotor responses in the same way, nor to the same degree. Montero observes that ‘[p]eople, it seems, differ as to how proprioceptively aware they are’.³⁷ Starr notes that ‘the fundamental ability to have vividly imagined enactments of literary works is ... not uniform’.³⁸ In Cave’s animating opening scenes, for me the ‘shift in the perceived

³² Huitink L., “Enargeia, Enactivism and the Ancient Readerly Imagination”, in Anderson M. – Cairns D. – Sprevak M. (eds.), *Distributed Cognition in Classical Antiquity*, The Edinburgh History of Distributed Cognition (Edinburgh: 2019) 169–189, at 172.

³³ Starr, “Theorizing Imagery” 4.

³⁴ Romburgh S.G. van, “Some Kinesic-Enactive Implications of Reading ‘Energia’ in Early Modern Septentrional Philology”, paper presented at *Making of the Humanities VII*, Amsterdam, 15–17 November 2018.

³⁵ Idem, “*Hyperboreo sono*: An Exploration of Erudition in Early Modern Germanic Philology”, *Erudition and the Republic of Letters* 3 (2018) 274–313; Francis Junius F.F., *De pictura veterum libris tres* (Amsterdam: J. Blaeu, 1637); Weststeijn Th., *Art and Antiquity in the Netherlands and Britain: The Vernacular Arcadia of Franciscus Junius (1591–1677)*, *Studies in Netherlandish Art and Cultural History* 12 (Leiden – Boston: 2015).

³⁶ Ibid. 245–287; Aldrich K. – Fehl Ph. – Fehl R. (eds.), *Franciscus Junius. The Literature of Classical Art. 1: The Painting of the Ancients. De Pictura veterum according to the English translation (1638)* (Berkeley – Los Angeles – Oxford: 1991) 375–380, 388–391; Nativel C. (ed. – trans.), *Franciscus Junius. De pictura veterum. Edition du livre i* (Geneva: 1996).

³⁷ Montero, “Proprioceiving” 156.

³⁸ Starr, “Theorizing Imagery” 2.

direction of the breeze' touches my skin. But you, reader, may primarily have *seen* the breeze change direction in trees and weathercocks. Your imagining may be more pictorialist.

In her study of vivacity in literary imagining, the literary scholar Elaine Scarry observes how hard it is to try imagine an imagined perched bird to fly ('a young female cardinal'): 'I cannot move her up as she flies, but I can move the world behind her down, as though the world were only watercolors on a kite'.³⁹ In strategies like this, Scarry has developed an inventive practice to envision movement in literary images, which enables her readers to picture, in the conclusion, how '[t]hat black eagle is back again, flashing its bank-vault wings. Waterfowl circle up and down in bright lifts and falls. ... I can keep my eyes fixed steadily upward on the light blue of the sky and yet see birds landing in the garden below'.⁴⁰

Pictorialist-style imagining, like Scarry's, accords with the pre-enactive representationalist understanding of perception. Representationalism may actually have strengthened imagining pictorialistically, I aver, because imagining in pictures aligned so well with how the mind was thought to operate, just as sensorimotor sensibilities evoke today's enactivism. Scarry's inventive exercises bolster one's 'nimbleness',⁴¹ in picturing movement as moving images on a picture plane. From an enactivist perspective, however, they ignore my body, my kinesic, sensorimotor involvement, my dynamic coupling to the emergent environment.

To imagine an imagined perched bird to move (a magpie, perhaps), enact it to life: throbbing, blinking, as alert as oneself to Cave's hint of a smell, that sound, that flickering, the breeze – and hold on to this bird in an ongoingly emergent dynamic. This, I say, is how *energia* may happen. Its quickening is felt more centrally inside the body. If one tried constraining one's imagination to privileging recognitional aspects of perception, one might entirely miss acknowledging, and valuing, that broader understanding that the imaginative arts, and the imagination, may afford glimpses of, and miss experiencing life – being present – in this expanded, imaginative mode. Why include sensorimotor responses in our critical reflection? Because perception, and imagination, are enactive.

My artistic practice seeks to access and show up for viewing (for experiencing) that imaginative space of perception that might otherwise remain unobserved. It enacts gestures as gestures, not for us (me as maker, you as viewer, both as doer) to resolve them into outcomes or objects, but rather for us to linger in the space of sensorimotor sensibilities, animated action, kinesic, proprioceptive processes that act through us, for us, with us, and, moved with anticipation and tenderness, to be responsive to their energizing. I like to see my work as realistic.

³⁹ Scarry E., *Dreaming by the Book* (New York: 1999), 'Conclusion'. Adobe Digital Editions.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

It is not inconceivable that some nonhuman animals imagine similarly. Some nonhuman animals may offer us their presence in the landscape-ecology, but we fail to notice and do not return it with ours as we pass. ‘Uncivil’, the crow may snicker to its crow companion, ‘though unsurprising’. After all, while we may anthropomorphize nonhuman animals and their imaginations, perhaps we over-anthropomorphize human animals and theirs.



Selective Bibliography

- Aldrich K. – Fehl Ph. – Fehl R. (eds.), *Franciscus Junius. The Literature of Classical Art. 1: The Painting of the Ancients. De Pictura veterum according to the English translation (1638)* (Berkeley – Los Angeles – Oxford: 1991).
- Belfi A.M. – Vessel E.A. – Starr G.G., “Individual Ratings of Vividness Predict Aesthetic Appeal in Poetry”, *Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts* 12, 3 (2018) 341–350.
- Berger J., “Why Look at Animals,” in idem, *About Looking* (London: 1980) 1–26.
- Bolens G., *The Style of Gestures. Embodiment and Cognition in Literary Narrative*, foreword by A. Berthoz, Rethinking Theory (Baltimore: 2012).
- , “Kinesis in Literature and the Cognitive Dynamic of Gestures in Chaucer, Shakespeare, and Cervantes,” *Costellazioni* 5 (2018) 81–103.
- Borgdorff H.A., “Reasoning through Art. Inaugural lecture, delivered upon acceptance of the Chair in Theory of Research in the Arts, at the Faculty of Humanities, Leiden University, on 10 February 2017”.
- Cave T., *Thinking with Literature. Towards a Cognitive Criticism* (Oxford: 2016).
- , “Towards a Passing Theory of Literary Understanding” in Cave T. – Wilson D. (eds.), *Reading beyond the Code. Literature and Relevance Theory* (Oxford: 2018) 167–183.
- Crist E., *Images of Animals. Anthropomorphism and Animal Mind* (Philadelphia: 1999).
- Despret V., “The Enigma of the Raven”, *Angelaki* 20, 2 (2015) 57–72.
- , “Thinking Like a Rat”, *Angelaki* 20, 2 (2015) 121–134.
- , “We are not So Stupid ... Animals Neither”, *Angelaki* 20, 2 (2015) 153–161.
- Gallagher S., *Enactivist Interventions. Rethinking the Mind* (Oxford: 2017).
- Haraway D.J., “Encounters with Companion Species: Entangling Dogs, Baboons, Philosophers, and Biologists”, *Configurations* 14, 1–2 (2006) 97–114.
- , *Staying with the Trouble. Making Kin in the Chthulucene*, Experimental Futures (Durham – London: 2016).
- Heuman L., “The Embodied Mind. An interview with philosopher Evan Thompson”, *TRICYCLE. The Buddhist Review* (2014). <https://tricycle.org/magazine/embodied-mind/>
- Huitink L., “Enargeia, Enactivism and the Ancient Readerly Imagination”, in Anderson M. – Cairns D. – Sprevak M. (eds.), *Distributed Cognition in Classical Antiquity*, The Edinburgh History of Distributed Cognition (Edinburgh: 2019) 173–193.
- Johnson M., *The Meaning of the Body. Aesthetics of Human Understanding* (Chicago – London: 2007).
- Junius Francis F.F., *De pictura veterum libris tres* (Amsterdam: J. Blaeu, 1637).
- Kiverstein J.D. – Rietveld E., “Reconceiving Representation-Hungry Cognition: An Ecological-Enactive Proposal”, *Adaptive Behavior* 26, 4 (2018) 147–163.
- Kohn E., *How Forests Think. Toward an Anthropology Beyond the Human* (Berkeley – Los Angeles – London: 2013).
- Montero B.G., “Proprioceiving Someone Else’s Movement”, *Philosophical Explorations* 9, 2 (2006) 149–161.
- , “Embodied Aesthetics”, in Newen A. – De Bruin L. – Gallagher S. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition* (Oxford: 2018-09-13) 1–21. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.48.
- Nativel C. (ed. – trans.), *Franciscus Junius. De pictura veterum. Edition du livre i* (Geneva: 1996).
- Noë A., *Action in Perception, Perception and Mind* (Cambridge, Mass. – London: 2004).
- Rheinberger H.-J., “Forming and Being Informed: Hans-Jörg Rheinberger in Conversation with Michael Schwab”, in Schwab M. (ed.), *Experimental Systems: Future Knowledge in Artistic Research* (Leuven: 2013).
- Richardson, Alan, “Imagination: Literary and Cognitive Intersections,” in Zunshine L. (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Literary Studies* (Oxford: 2015) 1–27. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199978069.013.0012.
- Romburgh Sophie van, “I walk the trail till the trail walks me/ And I bring you the sand in my shoes” (2012–ongoing). Ongoing walking project, dimensions variable. Collection of the artist.
- , “In the morning, when my brain is worlding” (2017). Installation of ink on paper drawings, dimensions variable. Drawing installation during the conference “Worlding the brain: Affect, Care, Engagement”, 2–4 November 2017, University of Amsterdam. Collection of the artist.
- Romburgh S.G. van, “*Hyperboreo sono*: An Exploration of Erudition in Early Modern Germanic Philology”, *Erudition and the Republic of Letters* 3 (2018) 274–313.
- , “Some Kinesic-Enactive Implicatures of Reading ‘Energia’ in Early Modern Septentrional Philology”, paper presented at *Making of the Humanities VII*, Amsterdam, 15–17 November 2018.
- Rosch E., “If Your Depict a Bird, Give It Space to Fly: Eastern Psychologies, the Arts, and Self-Knowledge”, *SubStance* 30, 1/2, 94/95 (2001) 236–253.
- Scarry E., *Dreaming by the Book* (New York: 1999). Adobe Digital Editions.

- Smith, P.J. “Terug naar La Fontaine. Rede uitgesproken bij de aanvaarding van het ambt van hoogleraar in de Franse letterkunde aan de Universiteit Leiden op vrijdag 25 juni 1999”.
- Spolsky E., “Elaborated Knowledge: Reading Kinesis in Pictures”, *Poetics Today* 17, 2 (1996) 157–180.
- Smuts, Barbara, “Embodied Communication in Non-Human Animals”, in Fogel A. – King B.J. – Shanker S.G. (eds.), *Human Development in the Twenty-First Century: Visionary Policy Ideas from Systems Scientists* (Cambridge: 2008) 136–146.
- Starr G.G., “Theorizing Imagery, Aesthetics, and Doubly Directed States,” in Zunshine L. (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Literary Studies* (Oxford: 2015) 1–27. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199978069.013.0013.
- Varela F.J. – Thompson E. – Rosch E., *The Embodied Mind. Cognitive Science and Human Experience*, revised edn, new foreword Kabat-Zinn J., new introductions Thompson E. – Rosch E. (Cambridge, Mass. – London: 2016).
- Wesseling J., *Of Sponge, Stone, and the Intertwinement with the Here and Now. A Methodology of Artistic Research*, inaugural lecture to the Chair of Practice and Theory of Research in the Visual Arts, Leiden University, Faculty of Humanities, Academy of Creative and Performing Arts, 19 September 2016 (Amsterdam: 2016).
- Weststeijn Th., *Art and Antiquity in the Netherlands and Britain: The Vernacular Arcadia of Franciscus Junius (1591–1677)*, *Studies in Netherlandish Art and Cultural History* 12 (Leiden – Boston: 2015).