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Chouraqui, F.

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Nietzsche and the Stoic Concept of *Recentes Opiniones*

Frank Chouraqui

Leiden University, Institute for Philosophy, Leiden, 2300 RA, The Netherlands

ABSTRACT

In the context of the well-established importance of Nietzsche's engagement with Stoic thought for his work as a whole, this article seeks to make two claims. First, that the Mausoleum reference in Lecture 4 of "On the Future of Our Educational Institutions" constitutes a substantial engagement with the Stoic doctrine of *recentes opiniones* as presented in Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*; and second, that this reference taken in its textual and intertextual context, constitutes a critique of the Stoic views of time and of the relationship of nature and culture. In so doing, the article seeks to contribute to the wider issues of Nietzsche's views on naturalism, fatalism, desirability, and culture.

KEYWORDS

Nietzsche; Stoicism; Time; Culture; Agency

1. Introduction

Nietzsche's relationship with Stoicism has been the subject of lively debate since the early days of Nietzsche scholarship. This is a relationship so important that in a recent chapter devoted to Nietzsche's stoicism, Nuno Nabais, in reviewing both Nietzsche's comments on Stoicism and the host of Nietzsche scholars who have discussed it,¹ declares that Nietzsche's attacks on the Stoics is also an attack on himself. He attributes this to the narcissism of small differences, and concludes that those texts in which Nietzsche rejects stoicism express a "desperate search for differences." Arguing that "on the line now is the very foundation of his [Nietzsche's] whole affinity with the Stoics—with the sage's notion as to the necessity of nature," and asserts that when all is said and done, Nietzsche falls into line with the Stoics in his account of natural necessity.² This should suffice to motivate further investigation and to arouse our interest in Nietzschean passages hitherto left out of the debate.³

This article has the following two very modest aims: the first is to introduce and investigate one such hitherto ignored reference to Stoicism in one of Nietzsche's early (and understudied) texts, his 1872 "Über die Zukunft unserer Bildungsanstalten" ("On the Future of Our Educational Institutions"). I argue that this text is Nietzsche's only *technical* engagement with the Stoics, which should direct our attention to the Stoic doctrine of "fresh opinions" or *recentes opiniones*. The second aim is to probe the philosophical implications of this textual piece of evidence for understanding Nietzsche's relationship to Stoicism. Although this can only be sketched out here, it constitutes the philosophical horizon of the textual discussion that follows. Nabais's remarks suggest that the evidence surrounding Nietzsche's relationship with Stoicism is contradictory, and allows for

three kinds of interpretation: Nietzsche is either a “closet Stoic” (Nabais’s view), an anti-Stoic through and through (the view held for example by Hedwig Gaasterland), or his attitude to Stoicism was ambivalent or ambiguous. My general reading privileges the latter thesis, and frames the broader context of the present article. Nietzsche’s ambivalence is not a sign of confusion, however. Rather, it tracks the fact that Nietzsche fully agrees with one of the key Stoic tenets whilst fully disagreeing with another (in so doing, he also rejects the implicit Stoic thesis that the two are interdependent): the Stoics hold *both* that all meanings and valuations (representations) are *added* on to events, facts or objects (which is why they are subject to temperance, and of the order of “that which depends on us”), and are therefore not metaphysically grounded, and that therefore we must refrain from attributing meanings to them or living according to the said meanings. Nietzsche agrees with the first—indeed, one could argue that the *Genealogy of Morality* is an attack on asceticism defined precisely as the thesis that meaning and value are *discovered* and therefore metaphysically grounded (whereas the aristocratic world-view regards meanings as *created*). However, Nietzsche disagrees with the second point, because he holds that refraining from meaning-making contradicts the nature of life: it does not follow that because specific meanings are not to be found in nature, it is not natural to make meanings. In the later writings, this is expressed in the thesis that all is will to power and that will to power is essentially an interpreting force. Thus trying to repress meaning-making is to go against life as it is. This is why in the famous paragraph 9 of *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche rejects the Stoic ideal of living according to nature: this would involve living according to an *indifferent* nature, that is to say, one would be living without carrying out any acts of valuing and interpreting, which would amount to going against life now defined as interest, value-attribution and meaning-making.⁴ Living according to nature, the aphorism tells us, is therefore a contradiction.⁵

What the “Bildungsanstalten” text shows is that the early Nietzsche already rejected the second thesis, or at least one of its direct implications: the view that we should refrain from meaning-creating and value-attribution. In this early text, Nietzsche objects to the Stoics’ rejection of the figure of Artemisia who famously resisted the healing power of time and refused to let go of her grief at the death of her husband Mausolus. On the contrary, she saw the loss of Mausolus as a great misfortune. Nietzsche’s point is that the Stoics’ rejection of Artemisia’s response to her loss is based on their view that she ignores the fact that the meaning she attributes to Mausolus’s death is a mere representation, and, had she been aware of this, she would have no longer mourned his death. But, Nietzsche objects, Artemisia’s wisdom is superior, for she doesn’t allow her interpretation of Mausolus’s death to be undermined by the fact that this meaning is not intrinsic to the event. She thus applies what Nietzsche will later regard as the aristocratic form of meaning-making whereby one’s interpretations need not be grounded in their objects, but rather are free creations.

It is in this context that I argue that a proper understanding of this passage from the “Bildungsanstalten” sheds light on Nietzsche’s distinctively non-Stoic understanding of nature. Although, as suggested, such an investigation is not without consequences for understanding Nietzsche’s work as a whole, it requires a separate study and cannot be further pursued here.

2. The Lectures

In his 1872 lectures “On the Future of Our Educational Institutions” Nietzsche criticizes the misunderstanding of the concept of education that is at the root of an impoverished educational system in Western Europe and in Germany in particular. Namely, education has come to be understood either as a preparation for coping with life or as a purely gratuitous enterprise, not as an edifying enterprise for both the “genius” and the nation. David Cooper gives an admirably crisp, if simplified, interpretation of Nietzsche’s position. The *Bildung* ideal of Humboldt and Schleiermacher, Cooper’s story goes, was degraded along two lines in the wake of the Prussian victory over France in 1871: along the first line, education began to be regarded as a purely utilitarian enterprise. This is the “realist” view which Nietzsche attacks directly in Lecture 3. Along the other line, scholars distanced themselves from the realists and their narrow pragmatism and promoted the view of scholarship as its own end. Caught between “breadwinners” and “old maids,” Nietzsche’s endeavour was to restore the *Bildung* ideal (despite his disagreements with Humboldt, Schleiermacher etc.).⁶ One of the merits of Cooper’s account is that it shows the untenability of the usual, often dismissive, readings of the lectures as defending a Schopenhauerian ideal of the genius as unconcerned with worldly matters (which would cast Nietzsche as an “old maid”). One might even radicalize Cooper’s view by adding that Nietzsche did not only complain that educational institutions did not fulfil their purported cultural role, but also complained that they had come to be an obstacle to this fulfilment. The reason for this was that they made cultural agency impossible, so that even when it came to geniuses (the result not of culture but of pure chance), their cultural development was stifled: they were not allowed to fulfil their destiny, or as Nietzsche put it, to “redeem [erlösen] the people [Volk]” (Lecture 3). The main function of the lectures, I claim, is to establish a hierarchy between three views of education. The lowest, which he associates with the Stoics, is informed by the principle of necessity: education teaches us to live according to necessity and to satisfy the necessities of life. The second, which Nietzsche associates with Artemisia, is informed by the principle of individual self-aggrandizement: education is a way of making oneself more important and more dominant. Its advantage over the first is that it recognizes that life naturally seeks increase and development. The third, which alone constitutes true culture (“der wahren *Bildung*”), is informed by the principle of collective aggrandizement. This, as we shall see, suggests that Nietzsche’s overarching project was not only to provide a negative critique, but also to positively ascertain the conditions under which cultural agency could be reclaimed.

Synopsis of the Lectures

The Lectures were delivered between January 16 and March 23, 1872, before an audience of about 300 people in the Aula of the City Museum of Basel. Nietzsche had arrived there in April 1869 as Professor of Classical Philology at the University of Basel and at the local *Pädagogium*.⁷ One might note that the date of the first lecture coincided almost exactly with the publication of Nietzsche’s first book, *The Birth of Tragedy* (January 2). Stylistically, the text of the Lectures is unusual, as it takes the form of a Platonic dialogue wrapped in an autobiographical narrative.⁸

The story recounts how as students, Nietzsche and his friend (probably Heinrich Romundt) go on a pilgrimage to the place where they first took the solemn oath of starting a community of independent scholars. The place is high in the forested mountains overlooking the Rhine, and to celebrate their oath, the two friends practise shooting, when a philosopher (identified as Richard Wagner by some scholars, including Cooper) and his young friend interrupt them. They have come there themselves for a rendezvous with an unnamed friend. Nietzsche and his friend then agree to keep quiet and share the space with the philosophers, and they overhear their discussion about the sorry state of education and culture. Their unnamed friend, who is announced through several markers, never makes an appearance, although by the end of the fifth lecture his appearance seems imminent, and the projected but never delivered (or written) sixth lecture was supposed to introduce him.

The first half of the first Lecture has a dramatic purpose, setting up the context for the two friends' pilgrimage, their arrival and the encounter with the two philosophers. The second half states the thesis of the work, namely, that current educational institutions are not institutions of culture [Bildung], developing the elitist thesis of the piece, including the view that the current education combines education for the greatest number with the democratization of culture, which culminates in journalism and thus in the fetishization of the present at the expense of the past or the future.

Nietzsche argues that the project of Bildung is the exact opposite of this trend: it is to provide the greatest number with the opportunity of cultivation so that a very small number can become fully developed men of culture. Between the greatest number of students and the minimal number of accomplished men, there is a process of selection based on the ethos of subjection: once educated, even the mediocre will naturally recognize greatness and place themselves at its service.

Lecture 2 further develops the project of this aristocratic education. It begins with a discussion of the German public schools, the main purpose of which should be to develop respect for and sensitivity to the German language just like the Greeks and Romans had for their own languages. This leads the old philosopher to draw a distinction between culture and scholarship, and to discuss the relation between "knowing" and "doing" (Lecture 2). Nietzsche suggests that those who think that scholarship equals culture tend to ignore the necessary connection between knowing and doing, whilst true culture is always precisely an attempt at cultivating this bond. The philosopher's first concrete proposal is therefore to revise or scrap the practice of "German composition" for young students, for by encouraging their attachment to their youthful ideas before they are ripe, it prevents the development of their thought: the students who take themselves too seriously are unable to allow their views to evolve. To counteract this tendency, the philosopher argues, one must follow a strict course of training and discipline, of "obedience and habituation," under the guidance of "the appropriate mystagogues of classical culture" (he cites Goethe, Schiller, Lessing, and Winckelmann), the function of which is to stand as a bridge between modern Germans and the ancient Greeks.

Lecture 3 then develops the thought announced in Lecture 1 concerning the question of selection and obedience. The purpose of culture, it declares, is to be informed by "the sacred hierarchy of nature," which is understood as a force that resists the "education of the masses." Here, Nietzsche inaugurates his monumental notion of culture: the

alternative of the “education of the masses” is the “education of a few men picked for great and lasting works” through which the great individuals “redeem” their entire “Völker” in the eyes of history and make it “eternal.” This emphasis reiterates the contrast of culture and scholarship. For at present, Nietzsche declares, scholarship lives in culture like a parasitic bird lives in a temple: “how much more coolly and fearlessly than ourselves, did that young brood build its measly nests in the magnificent temple!”

The second half of Lecture 3 presents a more subtle discussion about the place of these redemptive works and figures in history, and of the proper relationship men of culture should have with their own ego. Nietzsche recognizes such men as the culmination of a culture. However, their greatness and value is not restricted to their individual existence, but derives from their ability to redeem their own nations. They should therefore never take themselves to be the goals of history (which is where Artemisia fell short). This is because there are no such goals (Nietzsche dispatches Hegel in a few brutal formulas), and because such goals presuppose the end of history and trivialize time (seeing it as an accident to be overcome), the time that will ultimately lead to the promotion of a “German culture of the present.” In short, the great men will be driven by their nature to the “noblest ends,” though they shall not identify such ends with their own individual selves. This leads Nietzsche to conceptualize the difference between the democratic ego, which leads to a cheap form of individualism (in considering itself as an end), and the noble ego, which finds its fulfilment beyond itself. In Lecture 4, Nietzsche describes the former as a kind of “egoism” based on the “subject,” and the latter as a “personality” based on “subjektfreiheit.”

Lecture 4 begins with the discussion of the Stoics and develops the critique of egoism by distinguishing two forms. The first, the Stoic form of egoism, is reductive and isolationist, and the second, personified by Artemisia, is self-aggrandizing. Each of them has a particular relation to time: the former aims at instantaneousness and the latter at eternity. Both are illusions, however, and as such they both fail to achieve culture. So long as their aim is to live in the instant or to live in eternity, Nietzsche declares, their project will fail to attain culture, which involves transformation and thus a combination of the instantaneous and the eternal. This vision of culture, although it demands that we shed our egoistic self-concerns, corresponds to a “restitution of our personality.”

Lecture 5 returns to the shortcomings of the current school system and addresses the Platonic worry that its members and students do not know *that they do not know* what culture is. In short, they engage in “pseudo-culture,” which is explicitly signposted by the anti-Greek relations between teachers and students in the current system that separates the active elements from the contemplative elements: the teacher speaks and the student listens. Doing and knowing are divorced and as long as they remain so, our education will fall short of culture, which is concerned with their unity. Here the emphasis returns to the initial (Stoic) strategy of forgetting of the self, which comes from the confinement of the student in passivity, and is an attempt that fails: we cannot forget ourselves. Nietzsche now introduces one of the fruitful paradoxes that pervade his work: left to our own devices, we are hell-bent on alienation, and so our freedom leads to passivity. What we need are cultural figures that dominate and force us to become ourselves again. So domination is no longer equated with passivity but rather with the unity of contemplation and action: “great leaders are necessary” (as leaders they are active, and are necessitated by forces that transcend them); “all culture begins

with the very opposite of that which is now praised as academic freedom: with obedience, with subordination, with breeding, with subservience.”

Themes and Arguments

Having briefly outlined the Lectures, I propose a framework for interpreting them as a guide for a detailed reading of Nietzsche’s view of the Stoics. In his letter of December 20 to Malwida von Meysenbug, Nietzsche harshly criticized his own text for “ending up losing itself in pure negativity.”⁹ Jacques Derrida perhaps made too much of this in declaring that “in the lectures *On the Future of Our Educational Institutions*, it is disgust that controls everything.”¹⁰ For this is to ignore the fact that the negativity is for the sake of promoting aristocratic taste.¹¹ However, the text is shot through with tensions and apparent contradictions, so that even a generous reader will have to contend with Nietzsche’s inconsistent, and at sometimes contradictory, word use.

Without forcing the text into positive statements which it doesn’t warrant, we can outline the aristocratic project that motivates the negative tone. Broadly speaking, the aim is to establish the conditions that would make cultural agency possible again. It is uncontroversial, for example, that the paramount opposition the text is built upon is the opposition between training, which aims at utility and survival, and culture, which aims at greatness. But these opposing aims play out through a number of other fruitful oppositions that deserve closer attention.

For our purposes, we should focus on three such oppositions: knowing vs doing, the temporal vs the atemporal, and the personal vs the impersonal. Nietzsche’s attitude, in each case, is not to pick a side but to reject the oppositions themselves as fallacious. The result of this, as intimated above, is a “monumental” vision of culture. My argument is simple: Nietzsche sets up an opposition between two general attitudes: the democratic attitude that takes for granted (or results in maintaining) that the (binary) pairs are mutually exclusive. In contrast, the aristocratic attitude does not hold them as mutually exclusive but sees true culture as grounded and developing out of what unifies the two attitudes (although this grounding remains undeveloped, Nietzsche provides some hints about it). Only this kind of (aristocratic) attitude can restore cultural agency, which involves two dimensions. First it must lead to greatness; and second, this greatness must be redemptive collectively and historically. The democratic opposition between “knowing and doing” renders the cultural agency of “greatness-building” impossible; the opposition of the temporal and the atemporal renders cultural agency impossible *tout court*; and that of the personal and the impersonal renders collective redemption impossible. But why does Nietzsche reject these oppositions?

Nietzsche rejects the opposition between knowing and doing because it prevents what he terms “fighting.” It leaves us, as he writes in Lecture 4, with “doers” (the “breadwinners”) and with scholars (the “old maids”). Breadwinners act in the world blindly and are uninformed by culture, which is why they can only perform everyday actions but no truly cultural actions. On the other hand, the old maids of gratuitous scholarship will retreat from the world and their knowledge, disconnected from practice, will be stumped knowledge, too. Nietzsche’s presupposition is that knowledge is incomplete if it has no effect. What concerns him is the assumption that knowledge

and action are neatly distinct and independent of each other. This sharp separation is at the core of the democratic view. Thus Nietzsche considers the relation between “knowing” (“learning,” “thinking,” “understanding,” or “listening”) (first page of Lecture 1), and “doing” (“inventing,” “creating,” or “living”) (Lectures 1 and 4) as the centre of the tension between the modern democratic and utilitarian education he abhors and the noble culture he seeks to promote.

In her account of “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” (*Über Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne*) (a text written in the following months), Barbara Neymeyr briefly alludes to Stoicism to suggest that this is exactly the distinction between “intuitive man” (on the side of “life”) and the Stoic man (on the side of “reason”). Apart from confirming that Stoicism was at the background of Nietzsche’s work in 1872, it confirms that he regarded Stoicism as opposed to life seen as “doing,” and Neymeyr adds that the Stoic attitude threatens “art” and creation.¹²

Not only is modern education deluded in upholding the distinction between knowing and doing but it also enforces the opposition between the active and the contemplative throughout its institutions, exercises, customs and pedagogical techniques. This is apparent in seeing the teacher as embodying the active principle and the student as embodying the passive/contemplative principle (Lecture 5). This is particularly disastrous because it contributes to the institutional removal of “geniuses,” who embody the union of thought and action, from the world, by preventing their development. Nietzsche attributes this genius-stifling view to Stoicism, and already in his preface to the Lectures, declares that some might wish “in despair” “not to fight any longer: all one requires is to give himself up to solitude in order to be alone as soon as possible.” This looks like a caricature of Stoicism. Against this desperate move into passivity, Nietzsche argues that the very ground for culture is fighting: “between those who take everything for granted and those anchorites, there stand the *fighters*—that is to say, those who still have hope” (Preface). For Nietzsche, the notion of hope, as connected to fighting, stands in direct opposition to the resignation of isolation and fatalistic view of life as something to be dealt with, rather than as something to be transformed. In Lecture 2, he opposes his own vision with the view of education as “struggle for life” (which becomes a major theme in the fourth lecture where it is rejected five times).

The theorist whom Nietzsche has in mind here is Adolph Diesterweg whose *Pädagogisches Wollen und Sollen* (1857; [Educational intentions and obligations]) presented the theory of education as struggle for life. In Nietzsche’s preparatory notes to the Lectures, (8[107]), he envisaged four lectures, the second of which would focus on Diesterweg, and the fourth to be entitled “hopes” [Hoffnungen].¹³ This might suggest that the attack on fatalism is directed at Diesterweg, which is confirmed in the note on the entire lecture project as dramatizing the opposition between Diesterweg’s “adoration of the real” and “classical cultivation” (8[113]).¹⁴ Thus in relating “hope” to “fighting” Nietzsche implies that culture is active, that men of culture and geniuses are transformers of their nations and therefore that culture is not the same as “scholarship.”

Nietzsche, as noted, also rejects the opposition between the instantaneous and the timeless. In spite of the Schopenhauerian undertones of the Lectures, as many have emphasized,¹⁵ Nietzsche’s turning away from Schopenhauer is prefigured in his

rejection of this opposition. For unlike Schopenhauer who sees the genius as evolving in the realm of the timeless, Nietzsche seeks a form of cultural agency that reconciles the eternal and the immediate. For him the mutual exclusion of the temporal and the timeless trivializes any notion of history. This opposition is expressed variously as “the instant” and the “future,” “present” and “future,” “today” and “always” (Lecture 4). It is not, however, the opposition between “modern” or “fashionable” and “unmodern” and “unfashionable” (Lecture 2; see also Lecture 5). For this is an opposition Nietzsche endorses: for “modern” is precisely the commitment to the discontinuity of time, to the instant as opposed to the movement from past to present to future that is necessary for cultural agency. Since the “modern” denies change out of concern for the present, Nietzsche’s response is an appeal to be “unmodern.” His subtle thinking here needs to be carefully worked through: first, the rejection of the continuity of time can be equally achieved with reference to the present instant, or to timelessness. Notice how in both cases, the temporal *flow*, the process of becoming, is denied. Further, Nietzsche points out that the appeal to the instant and the appeal to the eternal equally imply a self-fulfilment that requires no change and no agency. It follows that it is only by embracing becoming that cultural agency can take place.¹⁶

The alternative between the instantaneous and the timeless presupposes the impossibility of “history” proper. The need for history points to a temporality that combines change and continuity. Nietzsche insists on continuity in his example of the “haruspex” and of the “hyphen” (Lecture 4); and he insists on transformation in his concept of agency. We can therefore see how both timelessness and the instant fail to meet his requirements: timelessness precludes transformation, and the instant precludes continuity.

Furthermore, both timelessness and the instant lead to one of two forms of passivism (one might speculate: passivism of the nihilistic kind for the “sons of the present” (Lecture 5), and of the quietist kind for Diesterweg’s “worshippers of eternity”). As such, they also lead to what Nietzsche calls “egoism,” the absence of concern for culture in general. This can manifest itself as an absence of concern for one’s contemporaries, but most often such egoism is expressed as a neglect of the future (including the “redemption” of future generations), and of one’s own postmortem status in the eyes of future generations (Lecture 3). The continuity of time, in contrast, allows for the present to be productive of the future, and therefore allows for cultural projects to be carried out in historical time, across individuals and generations (Preface).

Finally, Nietzsche rejects the opposition of the personal and the impersonal. For Nietzsche, of course, the solution is not to oppose egoism with selflessness. Here his argument is analogous to the argument against timelessness: there is a way of using one’s unique personality to transcend one’s ego. Nietzsche appears to be using two senses of “the self,” which leads to several ambiguous passages. First, the self is understood in a narrow sense as isolated from the rest of the world and temporally located in one’s own life span. One might call this the “ego.” In the second sense, the self is regarded as a means to access the collective and transgenerational reality. Here, cultivating one’s self means recognizing the stakes we hold in collective, cultural and historical developments. This is why Nietzsche insists that the education system of his time teaches bad egoism and, at the same time, that “false culture robs us of our own

individuality.” Similarly, false culture asks us to “forget ourselves” (Lecture 5), while high culture demands that we “purify ourselves from subjectiveness” (Lecture 4). This seems paradoxical: it seems that “forgetting ourselves” is opposed to “purifying ourselves from subjectiveness.” “Subjectiveness,” it seems, attaches us to our natural passivity and struggle for existence. It seeks survival. Our “individuality,” by contrast, experiences the “personal necessity of culture” (Lecture 1). But, as noted, the prospect of the replacement of democratic education with aristocratic culture is a “restitution of our personality” (Lecture 4). When caught in the struggle between the subjective and the individual, we cannot achieve the restitution of our personality on our own, because this self-reliance will pass the initiative over to the current dominant part of our self, and in modern times, this is the (bad) “subjective.” Thus this restitution can only take place via an external authority (in his discussion of Schopenhauer in the *Untimely Meditations* Nietzsche famously calls this an “educator”: “all culture begins with obedience”) (Lecture 5). In contrast to the Schopenhauerian reading of this text, Nietzsche does not seek to overcome the personal through the impersonal, but aims at overcoming this mutual opposition itself: one must find the connection between the personal and the cultural, for both culture and personal flourishing depend on it.

Four points have now come to light: Firstly, Nietzsche rejects the oppositional pairings above; secondly, these oppositions, taken together, constitute the democratic world-view that he opposes; thirdly, Nietzsche’s rejection of these false oppositions leads him into their counter-measures (“Fighting” is a counter-measure to “doing” and “knowing”; “History” is a counter-measure to timelessness and instantaneity; “Personality” is a counter-measure to egoism and selflessness); and fourthly, Nietzsche sees the convergence of these three concepts as the backbone of the aristocratic world-view he proposes. Culture is a process enabled by the unity between theoretical knowledge and the ability for transformation, through which cultural agents follow their own personal needs for transcending their subjectivity and thus exercise their natural connection with the past and the future of their “nation.”

3. The Mausoleum Text

It is Lecture 4 that contains an allusion to the Stoics, but indeed the Stoic theme has been running throughout. As we shall see, this is so not only in the broad terms of the relations of the ego and the world and of nature and agency, but also more technically in the framing of the entire problem of culture in terms of contraction and expansion. The lecture begins with the announcement that we are now “proceeding on the second-half of our journey” (Nietzsche had planned two more lectures in addition to the five delivered¹⁷). This makes these passages literally central. The lecture opens with a quick recap of the previous lecture, and then Nietzsche announces that “the philosopher once more began to speak.”

Nietzsche’s Mausoleum Text and Cicero’s Text

The philosopher declares: “I for my own part, know only two exact contraries: institutions for teaching culture and institutions for teaching how to succeed in life.” He continues:

A man must learn a great deal in order to live and in order to fight the fight towards existence; but everything that he as an individual learns and does as part of this endeavor still has nothing to do with culture [Bildung]. This takes its initial start in an atmosphere that lies far above the world of necessity, struggle for existence and need. The question now is to what extent a man values his ego in comparison with other egos, and how much of his strength he invests in the struggle to make a living. Many a one, by *stoically* shrinking the scope of their needs, will swiftly and easily reach the sphere in which they may forget their ego, and, as it were, shed it, in order to enjoy perpetual youth in a solar system home to the timeless and impersonal. Another *increases the breadth of the effects and the needs of his ego* as much as possible, and *builds the mausoleum* of this ego so greatly that he seems to prepare for entering the arena in which he shall conquer *that monstrous adversary, Time*. Even in this impulse we detect a longing for immortality: *wealth and power, wisdom, presence of mind, eloquence, a flourishing outward aspect, a renowned name*—all these are merely turned into the means by which an insatiable, personal will to live longs for new life, a longing for a final, illusory, eternity. “But even in this highest form of the subject, in the enhanced needs of such a distended and as it were collective individual, true culture is never truly reached.” (my emphasis)

This is a complex text, but we can already note that Nietzsche’s point became famous later on (largely because of other early texts, especially UM II and III of 1874). It relies on four arguments. Firstly, survival is not the same as life. On the side of survival there is a certain notion of nature, and on the side of life, culture. Secondly, culture only arises when the necessities of survival are met, but it also constitutes the only justification for it: survival is not an end in itself. Thirdly, life includes increase and a will to exceed the strictly necessary. As such, increase and culture both stand as factors that distinguish life from survival (we can already see that Nietzsche’s attack on the Stoics relies on their ignoring this distinction, and therefore ignoring the importance of increase and of culture). And fourthly, both life and survival have an ambiguous relationship to the ego.

To see the implications of this text, let us look at the attitude to Stoicism expressed here. Of course, Nietzsche says explicitly that the view that stakes everything on survival at the expense of culture is “Stoic.” This is, indeed, the only *explicit* piece of textual evidence suggesting he had the Stoics in mind, but there is plenty that is implicit, as for example, his reference to the Mausoleum.

The Mausoleum reference invites us take the Stoic theme seriously, without which it is hard to understand Nietzsche’s point. It points to Cicero’s *Tusculan Disputations*, a text devoted to the Stoic theory of the emotions. Nietzsche’s text echoes Cicero’s text, and displays a deep understanding of it. Here is Cicero’s text:

[G]rief arises from an opinion of some present evil, which includes this belief that it is incumbent on us to grieve. To this definition Zeno has added, very justly, that the opinion of this present evil should be recent. Now this word recent they explain thus: those are not the only recent things which happened a little while ago; but as long as there shall be any force, or vigor, or freshness in that imagined evil, so long it is entitled to the name of recent. Take the case of Artemisia, the wife of Mausolus, King of Caria, who made that noble sepulcher at Halicarnassus; while she lived, she lived in grief, and died of it, being worn out by it, for that opinion was always recent with her: but you cannot call that recent which has already begun to decay through time. Now the duty of a comforter is to remove grief entirely.¹⁸

Before I compare this to Nietzsche’s text and to the general theory of recent or fresh opinions as Nietzsche may have found it in other sources, I wish to substantiate my claim that this

Ciceronian text is indeed Nietzsche's source in the above quoted passage, by the following four remarks.

First, it has been shown that at the time he delivered his lectures, Nietzsche had just finished teaching a year-long course on Cicero's *Academica* (1871) (see his letter to Ritschl, December 30, 1870), (BVN-1870, 117), and his list of readings included Cicero's complete works. We also know that in 1865 he read Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* and, as Thomas Brobjer has documented, "in the period before 1865, the philosophical author whom Nietzsche read most was Cicero" and that he "continued to read him well into the 1870s and gave university courses on him."¹⁹ In addition, we have one published allusion to section 80 of the fourth *Tusculan Disputations* (about one page after the passage at hand) in the *Twilight of the Idols* (1888).²⁰ Finally, Barbara Neymeyr takes for granted that the *Tusculan Disputations* are a major source of Nietzsche's engagement with Stoicism.²¹ Nietzsche, in short, could not have ignored this passage.²²

Secondly, in this passage, Cicero returns to the legendary case of Artemisia who was held up as a model of a loyal wife for her refusal to overcome her grief at the death of Mausolus, her husband and brother. The Stoics, as the context makes clear, consider the practices of those who regard grieving to be a duty as resistance to the natural action of time, and therefore reject them as impious. For all that such mourners do is refresh the opinion that grieving is appropriate and that their loss was undesirable. From a Stoic perspective, this means that they lack the knowledge that nothing is intrinsically "evil." Interestingly, Nietzsche interprets mourners such as Artemisia differently: they know (like Nietzsche himself but unlike the Stoics) that there are good reasons to interpret some events in this or that way even *regardless* of their intrinsic nature. This brings up a second clue: the reference to the Mausoleum—the name of the sepulcher to Mausolus built by Artemisia—points to this text, especially if it is placed alongside the remarks that those who build mausoleums are trying to "fight and conquer this terrible adversary, Time" (Lecture 4) (which is what Cicero's passage is about).

Thirdly, Nietzsche's reference to the mausoleum-builders as valuing and achieving "wealth and power, wisdom, presence of mind, eloquence, a flourishing outward aspect, a renowned name" suggests that the intensity of her grief for her husband is merged with her sense of self-aggrandizement. It fits quite precisely with the portrayals of Artemisia Nietzsche could have found in Vitruvius, Demosthenes, and Polyaeus, who all describe her as a queen who built a monument for her dead husband, as well as for commemorating her own military victories (e.g., Vitruvius, *De Architectura*). The point here is that the fact that Artemisia built the Mausoleum at Halicarnassus in memory of Mausolus should not contradict the view that Nietzsche had her in mind when talking of self-aggrandizing endeavours.

Finally and more importantly, Nietzsche's use of the odd metaphor of the cultural agent's "widening the scope and needs of their ego" seems to allude to the Stoic doctrine of the emotions (discussed in such terms in the *Tusculan Disputations* and elsewhere), according to which they coincide with a dilatation or a contraction of one's mind (*pneuma*). Keeping the emotions of appetite and pleasure fresh amounts to keeping one's mind dilated (while distress and fear involve contraction).²³ Note that Nietzsche doesn't interpret Artemisia as building her husband's mausoleum out of distress (for then, he would have talked of a "contraction" of the ego), but out of pride. Indeed, the mausoleum, in Nietzsche's version, is not for Mausolus, it is for the

Ego of the builder herself. Note also that this interpretation seems corroborated by *Human, All Too Human* I, 22, entitled “Disbelief in the *monumentum aere perennius*,” where Nietzsche explicitly connects mausoleum-building to the ideas discussed above, by arguing that egoism is a characteristically “modern” neglect of historical time which is opposed to a non-egotistical, ancient and “historical” concern for oneself that demands that we undertake action for the ages. This is why in *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche regards mausoleum-building as a mark of high culture, and as something to restore *as long as* we build “mausoleums” not for our own sake but for the sake of culture, which takes it one step beyond Artemisia and explains why Nietzsche argues that even she hadn’t reached “der wahren Bildung.” This is confirmed by Neymeyr’s reading of the Stoic as the enemy of artistic creation in *On Truth and lies in a Nonmoral Sense*.²⁴

The doctrine of fresh opinions

Although it is not our purpose to enter into the *details* of the Stoic doctrine of fresh (recent) opinions, I want to point to a few basic and well-known facts which Nietzsche himself would have been familiar with.²⁵ This doctrine of fresh opinions, which Cicero attributes to Zeno—but which more recent scholars claim to have been written by Chrysippus²⁶—was the subject of a debate involving three generations of Stoics, chiefly Zeno, Chrysippus, and Posidonius. All agree that Zeno established the principle that emotions are judgments and therefore fall under what “depends on us.” In doing so, Zeno may or may not have engaged directly with the objection according to which emotions fade independently of judgments: when I lose a friend, my grief might fade over time even if I maintain my judgment that this loss is bad for me. The response to this objection, apparently formulated by Chrysippus, was to appeal to a new criterion: recentness. Vivid emotions should be seen as “*recent* opinions.” Although the sources differ, the later Stoics took this to mean one of two things depending on whether one thinks of recentness as extrinsic or intrinsic to a judgment: Either recentness is seen as an *added* judgment (Zeno and Posidonius): when I grieve, I judge, *first*, that the loss of my friend is bad for me; *second*, that it is recent; and *third*, that a recent undesirable event is worse than an old one. Alternately, it could mean that recentness affects the psycho-physical nature of the judgment itself (Chrysippus): recentness is not a separate judgment. My judgment that the loss of my friend is bad *is* a fresh judgment. If it changes through time, it becomes another judgment.²⁷

Both views have problems, all of which are related to the idea of “fading”: in the first, it is hard to see why a recent undesirable event is deemed worse than an old one, unless it is *assumed* that that is how we generally feel. But of course, this would give the initiative to the emotional aspect of our experience and therefore defeat the whole Stoic effort of reducing emotions to judgments and committing them to a circular argument of the kind that Posidonius reproaches Chrysippus for.²⁸ In the second case, one must explain how this unified judgment belongs to two temporalities so that recentness is affected through time but the judgment of undesirability is not.

According to Richard Sorabji, this debate was settled by Posidonius, yet according to Martha Nussbaum it was she herself who solved it. Both agree on the solution however, which lies in denying the objection itself: it is not true, they claim, that our judgment maintains itself through time. On the contrary, we find the loss of a friend less

undesirable for us as time passes, because our being is less involved with their existence as the years of their absence accumulate. The judgment “this is bad for me” has changed because the person referred to as “me” has changed over time.

This brings us back to Cicero’s point: there are two notions of recentness at work. The first is objective: things are recent if “they happened a little while ago.” However, there is a second sense because they can also be recent “as long as there shall be any force, or vigor, or freshness in that imagined evil.” In that case too, “they are entitled to the name of recent.” Between the two, stands agency: the ability to refresh our emotions and therefore to separate the two temporal lines, the chronological age of the event and its emotional age. This separation, which splits the natural from the psychological, was rejected by the Stoics as an act of hubris. And this is precisely what Nietzsche calls the mausoleum-builder’s attempt “to fight and conquer that terrible adversary, Time.”

4. Nietzsche’s Stand on the Doctrine of Fresh Opinions

The consequences of Nietzsche’s stand on the doctrine of fresh opinions centre on the notion of cultural agency. All the oppositions he rejects are rejected because they relegate cultural agency to the status of an anomaly. In another text from 1872, Nietzsche criticizes Stoic philosophy for making agency impossible and praises the Stoic philosophers for violating their own dictates for the sake of “Willensfreiheit” (19 [108]). This is relevant to the doctrine of fresh opinions, for if refreshing our opinions is a sin, it is because it opposes the natural order of nature. This means that the agency involved in doing so is not recognized as part of nature, although it is recognized as *real*. Therefore, the Stoic notion of nature is insufficient to account for all there is: it presupposes but does not justify relegating this kind of refreshing agency to a nature that is seen as deterministic. In order to justify it, a Stoic would have to show that one’s deterministic nature is more natural than natural agency, but this is impossible given the Stoic identification of nature and reality: nothing is real unless it is natural. As a result, Nietzsche shows that the narrow sense of nature which he attributes to the Stoics involves a rejection of cultural agency and a commitment to the metaphysical prejudice that culture is neither natural nor continuous with nature. The idea of recent opinions was first introduced to settle the question of the demarcation between nature and non-nature in the context of emotional life. The stigma attached to the deliberate *refreshing* of opinions (objectionable as hubristic and counter-natural) leads to a stigma on culture whereby it is regarded as unnatural as well. As mentioned earlier, Diesterweg (whom Nietzsche throws in the same basket as the Stoics) regards this hubris as a breach of the adoration of the real.

According to Nussbaum, the doctrine of recent opinions is meant to separate truth-judgments from value-judgments and therefore to ensure that acts of valuation cannot be attributed to nature, so that happiness can be said to depend entirely on us.²⁹ Without it, emotions would not be entirely reducible to judgment, and the Stoic identification of the alternative of nature and judgment with the alternative of “what doesn’t depend on us” (i.e., nature) and “what depends on us” (i.e., judgment) would be endangered. In such a situation, our normative emotions would be irreducible to judgments and would therefore have to be attributed to nature: happiness would

then no longer depend on us. There is reason to believe that Nietzsche worried about the Stoics' effort to avoid this insofar as it meant maintaining a reductionist notion of nature that excludes cultural agency.

The doctrine of recent opinions also implies that culture (the realm of collective aggrandizement) should be placed on the side of judgment and of "what depends on us," and that it would therefore either need to be reduced to nature or count as impious, counter-natural and hurtful: culture would be stigmatized as perversion. The strict alternative of nature and culture leads to a Stoic rejection of culture, and thus to cultural impoverishment.³⁰

These interpretations can now be applied to Nietzsche's Mausoleum text, in which he contrasts two forms of egoism. The first form is Stoic, and the second is anti-Stoic (Artemisian). This becomes clearer with reference to the Ciceronian text in which Artemisia's mausoleum-building is used as a contrastive scenario to the Stoic doctrine. What the two forms of egoism have in common is that they identify the world with the ego and, in this sense, qualify as forms of egoism that Nietzsche rejects. One might note that even that contrast between them is laid out in Stoic terms, since Nietzsche suggests that Stoic egoism reduces the world to the ego (hinting at the famous Stoic metaphor of the "citadel of the self"), whilst Artemisia's anti-Stoic egoism is an expansion that inflates the ego to the dimensions of the whole world (the Mausoleum).

The theme of the reduction of the world to the ego is pervasive in Stoicism, although whether Nietzsche interprets it correctly is another question. In the sources Nietzsche verifiably knew, Marcus Aurelius used the citadel analogy to insist on the isolation of the individual from the world, and Epictetus, in a no less famous passage, expanded the notion of the self to include everything, as he reduced what "doesn't depend on us" (i.e., as per his own definition, what is not ourselves—the "world") to "nothing" (in the opening of the *Handbook*). Nietzsche rejects both this reduction and this expansion. The reason he rejects the reductive view is that it commits one's life to a narrow sense of the ego as mere survival and self-protection. It thus relates it to money-making, a connection made by the Stoics themselves,³¹ and to a neglect of transgenerational, cultural ambitions. In addition, Nietzsche was well aware of the Stoic notion of agency with its two basic principles: (1) agency does not lie in creating real events or circumstances but simply in choosing how we live with such realities; and (2) that such agency is identical with correct judgment, and reduces even this reduced sense of agency to a form of knowledge *as opposed to* a form of action.³² This visibly goes against the sense of cultural agency outlined above, which involves the *coordination* of knowing and doing. Behind this lies the problem of time. There is the worry that the Stoic approach to the ego involves, like Diesterweg's view, a notion of time as non-transformative, non-historical, and non-cultural. Indeed, it is a matter of subjecting oneself to nature, instead of standing up to nature, for the sake of culture. After all, all the sources, including Cicero, converge on regarding the doctrine of recent opinions as stating that our duty is to refrain from refreshing these opinions in order to let them fade away as nature intends. As such, the Stoic view falls on the side of the democratic ideal, which refuses the unity of knowledge and action and the transformative character of time, and subscribes to a narrow understanding of the ego's aspirations as self-centered and incompatible with greater, historical and collective aims.

The reason Nietzsche prefers Artemisia's approach is that it fulfils the first two requirements: to unify knowledge and action and to think of time as transformative (it's the time of building, and of the future generations of admirers). High culture requires the cultivating figures not to identify with their particular "subjectiveness" but rather with their "individuality": that part of them that aspires to culture. The Artemisian model fulfils the requirements of culture only partially, however, for the subject—not culture—remains the final end of the cultural action. In the case of Artemisia, the cultivating activity remains *for the sake of* the builders themselves, to satisfy their "longing for survival" and for a "new life" and not for culture itself. After emphasizing that the Stoic self-restriction corresponds to a minor form of life, and Artemisian self-expansion is an improvement over it because it answers to the desiring dimension of life, Nietzsche adds that even this is insufficient: it needs to be completed by a drive not just for conquest, but for culture. He closes the Mausoleum passage thus:

But even in this highest form of the subject, in the enhanced needs of such a distended and as it were collective individual, true culture is never truly reached. . . . For in all his sound and fury, however great and special they may seem to the onlooker, he remains bound to his own restless, desiring ego: that enlightened, ethereal sphere of selfless contemplation continually eludes him—and thus, let him learn, travel, and collect as he may, he is to always be exiled and eternally remote from true culture. For true culture would scornfully refuse to soil itself with the needy and desiring individual; it knows very well how they only want to use it for their own selfish purposes; and if anyone believes that they have succeeded in enclosing it for the sake of their own practical needs, and that they can live off it by exploiting it, this is when [Bildung] slips away noiselessly and with an air of mockery.

5. Conclusion

I have argued that Nietzsche makes a conscious and deliberate reference to the Stoics in his Mausoleum text. Based on an account of the text in the context of his lectures on education, and of Cicero's text as part of the overall Stoic doctrine of fresh opinions (which we can reasonably assume Nietzsche was acquainted with), I argued that Nietzsche rejected the Stoics on three grounds: first, their account of agency is faulty; second, their account of time is faulty; third, their account of the self is faulty.

Nietzsche, moreover, believed such theoretical mistakes had dire practical consequences for culture. Stoicism, he held, prevents cultural agency for two reasons: it ignores the fact that what distinguishes "life" from "nature" is its involvement with expansion and culture (and thus ignores the need for culture); and its concept of nature excludes valuations (and it shouldn't do so, because it is valuation that motivates cultural agency).

Nietzsche's view of the Stoics may have been wrong, but his point goes much further than a mere quarrel about the history of philosophy. For him, the importance of these purported flaws of the Stoic doctrine lies in their alleged kinship with the modernism of his time (exemplified by Diesterweg, among others). As a result—and this is the sticking point for Nietzsche—any account of culture based on the misconceptions listed above will be faulty. For Nietzsche, only the aristocratic viewpoint can produce culture, and although she is not a perfect exponent of it, Artemisia offers a glimpse of aristocratic pathos. As such, she is rehabilitated by Nietzsche. The aristocratic viewpoint he glimpses in Artemisia is based on

an exact reversal of the three Stoic and modern misconceptions: it affirms the unity of contemplation and action within historical temporality, and thus makes room for historical agency on the part of the genius, and it allows for a convergence of the personal purposes of the genius with supra-individual, transgenerational, and transcendent purposes.

Notes

1. See, for example, Andler, *Nietzsche*; Deleuze, *Nietzsche et la Philosophie*; Granier, *Le problème de la vérité*; Morel, *Nietzsche*; Magnus, "Connection between Nietzsche's Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence"; Nussbaum, "Pity and Mercy"; Schatzki, "Ancient and Naturalistic Themes"; Brodsky, "Nietzsche's Notion of Amor Fati"; Elveton, "Nietzsche's Stoicism"; Groff, "Al-Kindi and Nietzsche"; Lane, "Honesty as the Best Policy"; Bertino, "Nietzsche und die Hellenistische Philosophie"; Neymeyr, "'Selbst-tyrannei' und 'Bildsäulenkalte'"; Crick, "Nietzsche's Sophist."
2. Nabais, *Nietzsche and the Metaphysics of the Tragic*, 85, 94.
3. Nietzsche's published comments on the Stoics appear in: *Human, All Too Human*, II, 386; *The Wanderer and his Shadow*, 107, 110; *Daybreak*, 131, 139 (on agency and desirability), 251, 425, 450 (on Seneca), 546; *The Gay Science* 12 (where scientific naturalism is associated with Stoicism for having the same notion of nature), 34, 123 (on Marcus Aurelius) and 306, 326; *Beyond Good and Evil*, 9 and 247; *Ecce Homo*, 'Books', 3 (On Eternal Recurrence).
4. Note that saying that life is interest is different from saying that life is interested. This means that even if the definition of life as indifference, which Nietzsche puts forward in *Beyond Good and Evil*, 9, is attributable to Nietzsche and not simply a formulation of the Stoics' own view on nature, and even if one wishes to identify "life" with "nature" there would be no contradiction between the Nietzschean thesis that life is interest and the view that nature is indifferent.
5. Whether this means that Nietzsche disagrees with the idea of *living according to nature* as indifference or that he disagrees with *the idea that nature is indifferent* is left open.
6. Cooper, *Authenticity and Learning*, 28ff.
7. Gossman, *Basel*, 425.
8. The Lectures can be found in Nietzsche, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe (KGW)* III, Vol. 5/1, 725ff. All translations from the Lectures are my own.
9. Nietzsche to Malwida von Meysenbug, December 20, 1872. In *KGW*, *BVN*, Letter 282.
10. Derrida, *Otobiographies*, 23.
11. On the anti-modern animus and elitist ethos of Nietzsche's lectures, see Gossman, *Basel*, 423–24, 427–30. See also Burckhardt, cited by Jensen in "Geschichte or Historie?", 255: "The latest thing in our world: the demand for culture [*Kultur*] as a human right, which is a veiled desire for a life of luxury [*Wohlleben*]." On Burckhardt's anti-democratic conception of Bildung, see Schmidt, "Der Liberalismus," 18–22, cited by Ruehl in *Italian Renaissance*, 87.
12. Neymeyr, "'Selbst-tyrannei' und 'Bildsäulenkalte'," 67.
13. On this notebook being a preparation for the Lectures, see Ruehl, "An Uncanny Reawakening," 255.
14. On Nietzsche's contempt for Diesterweg's theory of education, see also *KSA* 14[21] 1871 and 8[107].
15. For example: Baker, "Existential Philosophers on Education"; Siemens, "Nietzsche and the 'Classical'." For some elements of distance between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer in these early texts, see Jensen, "Geschichte or Historie?", 211–26.
16. On "modern" see Introduction: "[pupils] should be old and new" as opposed to "modern or up-to-date"; "glances of the future in the entrails of existing conditions." This is repeated in Lecture 1 and Lecture 2. On "Current" in the sense of coins, opposition of "journalist," master of the present and Genius, master of "all time," see Lecture 1 and Lecture 4: "Freeing modern man from the curse of modernity" and "the echo of the present was heard in them." For the "sons of the present," see Lecture 5. There, students are described as

indifferent to time, and later, it is education that is portrayed as indifferent to time: it forgets future generations, this includes a problem of individuation/collective fate, and raises the question of a collective organism. In Lecture 2 “the present will be a hyphen” and good pupils will be “servants of your own future culture.” See also Jensen’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s Second *Untimely*: “all too few had developed the capacity for sensing the correct attitude towards the past that would cultivate healthy new growth. Nietzsche’s lectures at Basel ‘On the Future of our Educational Institutions’ dealt with this theme thoroughly.” Jensen continues: “for these reasons, then, the ‘objective’ endeavor that seeks the value-free and value-neutral truth about a past to which its students are trained to cultivate indifference ruins the study of history, education generally, and as a result represents a major disadvantage for culture: it crushes the personality of an individual, the soul of a culture.” Jensen, “Geschichte or Historie?”, 106.

17. Nietzsche to Wagner, July 25, 1872. In *KGW*, BVN, 1872, Letter 246.
18. Cicero, *Tuscan Disputations*, III, 31, lines 71–76; hereafter references are cited in the text.
19. Brobjer, *Nietzsche’s Philosophical Context*, 44ff., see also 245; and Nietzsche, *KSA* 32 [2]].
20. Nietzsche, “The Problem of Socrates,” in *Twilight of the Idols*, 3. Andreas Urs-Sommer has recently argued that this reference to Cicero comes from the adaptation of Cicero by Lichtenberg and Zeller (Urs-Sommer, *Kommentar*, 270). Further references to Cicero appear in *KSA* 11:26[452], 7:30[11], 7:32[2], 7:32[14]) 7:754. Cicero also figures in a list of Stoics and Epicureans in *KSA* 1, 811. For further references to Cicero in Nietzsche, see Bett, “Nietzsche and the Romans.”
21. Neymeyr, “‘Selbst-tyrannie’ und ‘Bildsäulenkalte,’” see esp. 69 and with reference to the Fourth Disputation specifically, 71 and 76.
22. Although there are some implicit allusions to it in Kant’s *Anthropology* and *Third Critique*, none of them mentions Cicero, Artemisia, or Mausolus by name (Kant, *Akademieausgabe*, VII, 237 and 262; and *Kritik der Urtheliskraft*, section 54, in *Akademieausgabe*, 331). One might also note that the *Disputations* is the first text to use “culture” in a non-agricultural sense (in 2.13). This fact had not escaped Nietzsche, who wrote to Gersdorff on February 11, 1874 from Basel that he was working on a ‘Cicero und der romanische Begriff der Cultur.’
23. Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, 4.14. See also Long and Sedley, *Hellenistic Philosophers*, vol. 1: Andronicus, *On Passions* I (SVF 3.391, part) [Reporting Stoic definitions]: “(1) Distress is an irrational contraction, or a fresh opinion that something bad is present, at which people think it right to be contracted [i.e., depressed]. (2) Fear is an irrational shrinking [aversion], or avoidance of an expected danger. (3) Appetite is an irrational stretching [desire], or pursuit of an expected good. (4) Pleasure is an irrational swelling, or a fresh opinion that something good is present, at which people think it right to be swollen [i.e., elated].” Stobaeus 2.88,22-89,3 (= A5; SVF 3.378, part): “In the case of all the soul’s passions, when they [the Stoics] call them ‘opinions,’ ‘opinion’ is used instead of ‘weak supposition,’ and ‘fresh’ instead of ‘the stimulus of an irrational contraction or swelling.’ There is a debate about this theory of swellings, as Sorabji reports that according to Chrysippus and against Zeno, emotions were not contractions or swelling, but rather were the same as the judgments, and that it is the judgments that are the swelling and the contracting.” Sorabji, *Emotions and Peace of Mind*, 35.
24. Neymeyr, “‘Selbst-tyrannie’ und ‘Bildsäulenkalte,’” 67.
25. Aside from Cicero, Nietzsche’s sources on the stoics in that period were Plutarch’s *Contradictions of the Stoics* and Diogenes Laertius. Nietzsche’s direct reading of the Stoics is hard to ascertain, although there is no doubt he was acquainted with the major imperial Stoics (Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius). Seneca and Marcus Aurelius both insisted on the stoic habit of money-making through the king, through friends or through teaching. The relations of teaching, money-making and political authority are two of the ways that the current educational system is bankrupt according to Nietzsche. This suggests an influence of these sources (see Erskine, *Hellenistic Stoa*, 64ff.). In addition, Nietzsche must have come across Stoic materials through Alexander of Aphrodisia whom he read in

preparation for his Aristotle course of 1872. There, he will have seen the Stoics portrayed as determinists and therefore as enemies of cultural agency. See Long "Stoic Determinism."

26. De Lacy, "The Four Stoic 'Personae'"; Nussbaum, *Therapy of Desire*; Brennan, "Old Stoic Theory of Emotions"; Sorabji, *Emotions and Peace of Mind*.
27. See Sorabji, *Emotions and Peace of Mind*, 35.
28. Ibid., 37.
29. Nussbaum, *Therapy of Desire*, 381ff.
30. Note that although the Stoic context helps clarify things, none of the remarks depend on any knowledge of it besides Cicero's text. In other words, it is reasonable to assume that Nietzsche might have seen things this way, even if he was unaware of the details of Zeno's, Chrysippus's, and Posidonius's views, as presented by modern scholarship.
31. Erskine, *Hellenistic Stoa*, 153ff.
32. The stoics are therefore seen to reduce action to thought. Yet reduction is not unification, and this is not enough to satisfy Nietzsche's requirement for a continuity between the two, since such a reduction only forecloses the possibility of external action. See Erskine, *The Hellenistic Stoa*, 153ff. See also Nussbaum, *Therapy of Desire*, 381ff.

Notes on contributor

Frank Chouraqui is Assistant Professor of Continental Philosophy at Leiden University, the Netherlands. He works on Nietzsche and the Phenomenological tradition as well as political ontology within a phenomenological paradigm. He is the author of *Ambiguity and the Absolute* (Fordham University Press, 2014) and *A Philosophical Guide to the Body and Embodiment* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2020, forthcoming), and the coeditor (with Emmanuel Alloa and Rajiv Kaushik) of *Merleau-Ponty and Contemporary Thought* (SUNY, 2019, forthcoming).

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