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Phenomenology of death: subjectivity and nature in Husserl's genetic phenomenology

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Phenomenology of death. Subjectivity and Nature in Husserl's genetic phenomenology.

Propositions

1. The theme of death illustrates the paradoxical character of Husserl's understanding of subjectivity because it demonstrates the effective distinction between transcendental subject and empirical human being.
2. Limit-cases such as death are "natural phenomena" insofar as they concern the primal facticity of existence and involve the subject as a whole.
3. Limit-cases in general, and death in particular, challenge the purity of the first-person standpoint and the integrity of the transcendental principle.
4. Husserl's claim that transcendental subjectivity is immortal is misguided, and should be retained only as a methodological warning against an excessive dismissal of transcendentalism.
5. Regarding a possible philosophy of limits, Merleau-Ponty's specific interpretation of phenomenology is advantageous in as much as it stresses the ambiguous character of the subject, but runs the risk of overstepping the boundaries of the phenomenological method.

6. The genetic analysis of constitution leads to an absolute fact (the existence of the Ego in the horizon of the world) that cannot be founded on anything else. This entails subjectivity is not self-founding, as is often suggested in Husserl's more idealistic reading.
7. Husserl's inclination towards an idealistic view of the subject is partly motivated by a misconception of Nature that considers it the realm of mere physicality.
8. Nature, considered as primal facticity and not mere materiality, can be integrated in a description of transcendental subjectivity. Only in this sense can the subject be considered natural.
9. The primal-I (*Ur-Ich*) is a presupposed dimension of subjectivity that cannot stand alone or serve as a foundation for constitution.
10. An integral understanding of constituting subjectivity should consider her as transcendental person, i.e. an embodied process of becoming that encompasses diverse aspects of subjectivity where none holds a privilege over the others.
11. The tension between phenomenology and the natural sciences stems from an unnecessarily skewed view of Nature, Subjectivity, and their relationship.
12. Reconsidering the notions of Nature and Subjectivity is the first step towards bridging the gap between subjective states of consciousness and objective features of the brain that lead to the "hard problem" of consciousness.