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Phenomenology of death: subjectivity and nature in Husserl's genetic phenomenology

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Conclusions to part 1

In this first part, I have presented some key concepts and ideas of Husserl's phenomenology, and explained why, in the phenomenological context, death poses a problem. Death is a personal experience that is indubitable in one sense, but impossible on the other. This ambivalence is related to the division of the subject into an empirical and a transcendental form of being or awareness. These two aspects form a concrete unity throughout the extent of a personal life, but, according to Husserl, they come apart in death. The reason behind this is, ultimately, the way in which Husserl seems to always place constituting subjectivity outside or beyond spatio-temporality. Whether he refers to it as absolute consciousness or transcendental life, as his thinking evolves he appears to always hold on to this characterization to describe the most fundamental part of consciousness. We can now go deeper into a reflection on subjectivity, in order to understand why this constituting subject is, for Husserl, immortal; as well as explore other notions and their potential relevance for a reconsideration of the paradox of subjectivity and death.