Fascisms seen and unseen: the Netherlands, Japan, Indonesia, and the relationalities of imperial crisis
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Visualizing FASCISM
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Interwar Fascism Viewed from Empire

On July 16, 1943, Edward John Voûte, the Nazi-appointed mayor of Amsterdam, received a letter of complaint from Johan Bastiaan Van Heutsz Jr. Mayor Voûte surely knew who its author was. Van Heutsz’s father, former governor-general of the Netherlands Indies Joannes Benedictus Van Heutsz (1851–1924), was the most famous and decorated Dutch military man of modern times, known above all for his successful “pacification” of the ever restive region of Aceh at the turn of the twentieth century. Eight years earlier, a grand monument to mark his memory had been unveiled, with great fanfare, in the southwest of the city and was christened by Queen Wilhelmina herself. Yet Van Heutsz Jr., who made little secret of his Nazi sympathies, was not impressed. With a smug conviction that reflected not only his prestigious familial pedigree but also the confidence of a man convinced that history was finally on his side, he condemned the monument as “weak” and “decadent,” unbefitting the image of his conquering imperial warrior father. As such, he wrote, it was in fact the very embodiment of the “weakness” of the prewar Dutch political status quo that had produced it—an indecisive, corrupt system of parliamentary democratic rule that had proven itself incapable of defending the national interest, sold out the empire, and, in effect, brought Nazi
occupation upon itself. The monument should be replaced, he insisted, with something more appropriately masculine and martial.¹

Van Heutsz Jr. left behind his own visual record that makes it easy to imagine what sort of alternative he had in mind. A year before writing to the mayor, he had returned to the Netherlands from an extended tour of Nazi-occupied Russia and published a travelogue entitled A Viking in Russia (Wiking door Rusland), its cover emblazoned with a Viking warrior with medieval armor, sword, a winged helmet, and a Nazi swastika on his shield, standing against a backdrop of a large “ss” logo. Several months later, Van Heutsz Jr., a medical doctor, volunteered for the Waffen ss (the ss military arm) and headed back to the Eastern Front to treat wounded German soldiers, by now in great supply. Subsequently decorated for bravery after his “Viking Panzer Division” escaped Soviet encirclement at Cherkasy in the Ukraine, he died in battle near Munich shortly before war’s end. In the meantime, Mayor Voûte, a faithful servant of the Nazis, had taken no action on Van Heutsz Jr.’s request to change the monument. Indeed, he had little incentive to do so: despite their open and avowed loyalty to the Nazi cause, Van Heutsz Jr. and other open supporters of Nazi German rule, such as the Dutch fascist Nationaal Socialistische Beweging (NSB), wielded little influence with Voûte’s Nazi bosses. Nor were they popular with most of the Dutch population, many of whom viewed them as traitors to the nation.

Although not widely known among the Dutch general public, the story of Van Heutsz Jr. and his letter to the mayor is hardly a secret among scholars of modern Dutch history. On the one hand clearly substantiating the existence of home-grown Dutch fascists, it also serves to illustrate why scholars of fascism and its visual expressions would rarely envision the interwar Netherlands as the most fruitful place to start: whatever his family relation to the Netherlands’ most famous colonial military man, in his open devotion to Nazi Germany and to Nazism, Van Heutsz Jr. was an exception to the Dutch rule. Moreover, his problem with the monument was, after all, its lack of any fascist aesthetic, which he saw as symbolic of a prewar Dutch political regime also lacking in everything he admired so much in the German one. The period leading up to Nazi occupation had indeed witnessed a continued Dutch commitment to parliamentary democracy and to institutions such as the League of Nations as a civilized and progressive means of settling international disputes, along with an ongoing faith in the possibility of respect for the Netherlands’ peaceful neutrality (which had kept it out of the
previous world war). Even at the height of its popularity during the depths of the Great Depression in the mid-1930s, the NSB had never managed to attain more than 8 percent of the national vote, and it subsequently lost support as its leader, Anton Mussert, moved to embrace Hitler and his policies of anti-Semitism and racial purity. The stability of Dutch liberal democracy through the thick and thin of this period of crisis—a time when not only Germany and Italy but many other societies in central, eastern, and southern Europe turned decisively toward reactionary authoritarianism—has conventionally resulted in a positioning of the interwar Netherlands at a far remove from fascism. In seeking out fascism in the Pacific theater during this period, historiographical and popular conventions would much sooner point us toward the aggressive imperial Japanese than to the peaceful Dutch. Amid a long list of other wartime atrocities they committed against the inhabitants of East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific, it was, after all, the Japanese who unilaterally invaded the Netherlands East Indies and subjected its Dutch population to a merciless and brutal incarceration many experienced as quintessentially fascist.

Yet looking beyond the conventional equation of interwar Dutch fascism with that of Nazi Germany—an equation that makes fascism in the interwar Netherlands seem reassuringly limited to a fringe group of puppets, opportunists, and ideologues such as Van Heutsz Jr. and NSB leader Anton Mussert—another perspective exists from which emerges an entirely indigenous Dutch lineage of interwar fascism far more pervasive and troubling in its influence. It is a lineage whose monuments are still everywhere visible if we only take the trouble to look. That we are not in the habit of doing so is attributable to two ideological force fields whose global grip on the study of the interwar period, and thus also on that of fascism, remains nearly hegemonic: Eurocentrism and nation-centrism. The identity of Van Heutsz Jr. as the son of the Netherlands’ most famous colonial general, born and raised in the Netherlands Indies and obsessed with their fate, serves as an essential clue here, though his exceptional Nazi sympathies could also be said to have long served as a distraction convenient to the Eurocentric conventions of the discipline, distracting us from, in a word, empire. For while Van Heutsz Jr. must be thankfully acknowledged as atypical of the interwar Dutch social and political elite in his open Nazi sympathies, his anxiety over the fate of a Dutch empire under siege from within and without, his nostalgia for the memory of his imperial strongman father, and his embrace of a fascist worldview as a
means of “returning” the Netherlands to the imagined prosperous, orderly, and world-renowned empire over which his father had once presided were all in fact sentiments with a much wider currency.

Rendered invisible in the conventional Euro- and nation-centric story of the Netherlands’ World War II is the essential identity of this period as one in which Dutch colonial subjects still vastly outnumbered its citizens. In an increasingly hostile interwar environment that embraced metropole and colony alike, many Dutch citizens were drawn not to Nazism as such but to an essentially native, imperial form of fascism as a vehicle for securing their continued imperial privileges or gaining new ones. Viewed not with the internecine rivalries of Europe but rather the global order of empires in mind, the peace-loving, democratic, progressive, liberal Netherlands motherland of the interwar period is thus revealed as rather like the top of an iceberg, whose emergence above the visible surface as such was made possible only by its placement atop a much larger social body groaning underneath the waves: a colonial body riven with social hierarchy, racism, autocracy, militarism, and exploitation—and a place where the Dutchman’s position of authority, superiority, and prosperity was forever secure.

During the interwar period and above all amid the crisis generated by the Great Depression, uncontrollable revolutionary forces both within the Kingdom of the Netherlands and around the world began to raise the temperature of the seas in which this imperial iceberg floated: forces from the Left, including rising labor movements critical of the social status quo and anti-colonial nationalists who sought an end to empire; and forces from the Right, including the Netherlands’ prime imperial competitors, the Japanese, who sought a radical global imperial redistribution. In response, Dutch political, economic, and social elites both in the metropole and in the colony increasingly sought solace in a nostalgic return to the imperial glory days that was in fact something new. The period also witnessed the parallel rise of a Dutch middle-class fascist movement, the NSB, that shared and amplified these domestic and imperial anxieties and antipathies. Domestically, the NSB had an agenda and social composition similar to those of contemporaneous fascist movements in neighboring countries, and as elsewhere in Europe, it stood in ambivalent relation to domestic elites as having shared social and political enemies but also as being a potential political competitor. Its failure to make serious inroads among metropolitan socioeconomic elites ensured that the dominant story of the Netherlands’ World War II would be one of fascist failure. Meanwhile, “offstage” in the colonial arena of the Netherlands East
Indies, however, the two streams of Dutch fascism flowed synergistically and powerfully together, revealing a shared imperial progeny and logic. Although it was increasingly politically contested and pushed to the fringes of the public eye in the metropole as the more immediate threat of war within Europe expanded, Dutch interwar fascism thus remained strongest and most visible on the “front lines” of the Netherlands’ increasingly besieged Pacific empire.

Thus viewed in a relational and transnational frame that takes in the interwar Netherlands, its Indonesian colony, and its main imperial competitor Japan as an interconnected whole, it is in fact the Dutch interwar empire more than the Japanese one that confronts the viewer with the most obvious and monumental material expressions of fascism. It is these that are therefore the focus of this essay. Carved in stone or cast in metal and emphasizing the masculine military charisma of the individualized imperial ruler, they reflected Dutch fascism’s mainly elite and colonial pedigree as quintessentially imperialist, exclusive, and hierarchical. Specifically, the discussion revolves around three distinctive interwar monuments built to honor Governor-General Van Heutsz in colony and metropole in the 1920s and 30s and their subsequent divergent histories: a massive militaristic mausoleum built in 1927 that still stands in Amsterdam’s New Eastern Cemetery; a domineering memorial in the center of the colonial capital Batavia, completed in 1932, that surprisingly survived the Japanese occupation but not the transition to an independent Indonesia; and last, a monument erected in the southwest quarter of Amsterdam in 1935, which Van Heutsz’s son singled out during the war for its atypical lack of a fascist aesthetic. All three were unveiled with equally immense fanfare during the interwar period, but only the last survived into postwar memory.

Such Dutch designs of the interwar years reflected a yearning to freeze imperial hierarchy in place, thereby forever fixing Indonesians as colonial subjects rather than citizens of the Dutch nation. In contrast, visual and other propaganda produced by the Japanese promised the revolutionary destruction of the old Dutch order and its replacement with an Asia revitalized and unified by a common cause and a common culture. Insofar as it emphasized horizontal social unity and inclusion rather than the social hierarchy and distancing of the Dutch model, Japan’s call for an “Asia for the Asians” bore immeasurably greater potential appeal and transferability to Japan’s colonial populations. But in practice, such promises were contradicted by a Japanese determination to preserve their empire that was no less fierce than that of their Dutch competitors. In Indonesian eyes, the resultant
contradiction—the gap between the nation-building that was promised and the empire-building that was delivered—ultimately revealed a Japanese fascist logic no less cruel than that of the Dutch.

Bringing the two together, the following discussion presents a brief history of interwar fascism and its visual expressions in what might be called an Indonesia-centric frame: a look at Dutch and Japanese interwar fascisms and their social logics as revealed in mutual competition over an increasingly resistant colonial location whose resources and population each sought to secure. The attempt has yielded a narrative centered on Dutch fascism and its interwar evolution, with Japan and its wartime alternative arriving and receiving brief attention as a counterreferent relatively late in the story. Such an emphasis reflects not only limitations of space and an Indonesian chronology in which Japan made a relatively late appearance, but also the oft-hidden relational nature of “Japanese fascism” as expressed in how Japan’s message necessarily manifested itself in a specifically Southeast Asian wartime context, that is, as a revolutionary alternative to the European imperial order—and European fascism—that had come before. An exploration of these two distinct and competing fascist lineages highlights two inflections of a global phenomenon studies of fascism and fascist aesthetics underemphasize: the complex global relationality between the interwar rise of fascism and the crisis of empire.

Monuments to Imperial Glory and the Fascist Face of the Interwar Netherlands

Fascist monumentality in the interwar Netherlands? As the avowed Nazi Van Heutsz Jr. fulminated, little of this was on offer in the 1935 monument in the southwest of Amsterdam (figure 8.1). Its centerpiece was a female figure clad in toga, mounted upon a large stone base positioned in the middle of a reflecting pool. The figure bore in her hands not a sword but a legal parchment roll: she was a version of the Greek Lady Justice. Behind her stood two small lions, and behind those towered two brick pillars connected high above by an inverted U-shaped metal form with rays projecting outward and upward, suggesting the sun. The pillars and the lions were meant to symbolize metropole and colony, separated by the water below and united by the sun above. Between arched galleries emerging to the left and right appeared a succession of stone-carved pictorials representing the main islands comprising the colonial archipelago, peacefully populated by male and female Indonesia-
sian figures and figurines of social status from high to low and in primitively stylized native dress—kings, peasants, and godlike figures—surrounded by products and dwellings associated with each. The image of the conqueror of Aceh himself, however, appeared almost as an afterthought, in virtually two dimensions, on a round metal plaque mounted on the front of the central base. Rather than that of the conquering Viking warrior that Van Heutsz Jr. had in mind, the colonial relationship depicted here was one of a gentle and maternalistic purveyance of civilization.

Since the end of World War II, the Van Heutsz monument in Amsterdam's southwest has remained standing in a relative obscurity reflective of a more general Dutch ignorance of, and discomfort with, the imperial past. For the minority taking an interest in the matter, it has nevertheless remained the nation’s best known monument to that past, and as such has been the greatest focal point of public struggles over the meaning of that heritage. For the postwar Dutch Left in particular, the ruthless brutality associated with Van Heutsz’s “successes” in bringing to heel the rebellious “outer” provinces of Aceh as well as Bali, Celebes, Sumbawa, Lombok, and
elsewhere during his tenure as general and subsequently governor-general (1904–9) made the monument a logical and perennial target of attacks as a symbol of the evils of Dutch imperialism.

Even in his turn-of-the-century heyday, Van Heutsz’s capacity for “excesses,” yielding “native” casualties in the tens of thousands, were already well known. When news and grisly photographs of the 1904 slaughter of the entire Acehnese village of Kuta Reh trickled into the mother country, pressure mounted for his resignation. He was saved from this fate only by the unyielding support of the young Queen Wilhelmina, who was to remain a die-hard fan of Van Heutsz during his life and after his death. In 1967, amid expanding anti–Vietnam War protests, the Van Heutsz monument was defaced with white paint and even subjected to a failed bomb attack. By 1984, when it was targeted in a second failed bomb attack, the lettering and the plaque of the general had disappeared altogether, never to be recovered.

Over the same decades, however, mainstream historians, military men, and others among the Dutch elite—including a large community of former colonial residents—have more quietly continued to characterize Van Heutsz as a tough but admirable figure who succeeded in unifying the archipelago when all others had failed, also emphasizing that he was not only a conqueror but also a bearer of civilization. It was, after all, under his watch that the colonial regime had responded to long-standing progressive calls for an “ethical policy” toward the “natives” by instituting a system of village schools (albeit also catering to conservatives of the day by insisting that the “natives” foot the bill for the schools themselves). A 2006 essay in the mainstream Historisch Nieuwsblad described Van Heutsz as progressive for his day, a man “too practical to be racist.” Even today, a prominent infantry regiment of the Dutch Mobile Air Brigade still proudly bears Van Heutsz’s name; this brigade was originally formed directly out of units of the defunct Netherlands Indies Colonial Army (KNIL) when the Dutch lost their military bid to hold onto the colony in 1950. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that a committee appointed to restore and rechristen the monument in the early 2000s referred to it as representing the “two faces of Dutch colonialism.”

For all the controversy and attention to Dutch colonial history that the Van Heutsz monument has brought to the surface since its unveiling some eighty years ago, the focusing of Dutch attention upon this particular monument, and upon the particular colonial history of the man with whom it is associated, is even more remarkable for what it obscures. For all their heatedness and social significance, such debates, and the ideological frame
they reinforce, have functioned as a remarkably effective means of detaching and distancing postwar understandings of Dutch colonialism from the immediate late imperial context in which the monument itself was actually produced—that is, from the interwar period. Significantly, this was a period in which Van Heutsz achieved a far greater stature in death than he had ever achieved in life. Among Dutch elites both metropolitan and colonial, it was in fact a period that witnessed a virtual Van Heutsz mania. Properly restored to this context, the monument in Amsterdam’s southwest emerges in quite a different light: as only the last in a whole series of Van Heutsz statues, busts, and monuments—a veritable avalanche, in fact—erected not only across Amsterdam and the Dutch motherland, but across the length and breadth of the Netherlands Indies as well, during the decade after his death in 1924. Among these, the 1935 monument in Amsterdam’s southwest in fact stands out as a striking exception to the interwar rule, particular in its pronounced rejection of the fascistic martial, masculine aesthetics upon which Van Heutsz’s Nazi son insisted.

From the façade of the Dutch Commercial Company (Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij) in Amsterdam’s city center to the central square of Banda Aceh, capital of the province where Van Heutsz’s worst atrocities were committed, busts, figures, and references to Van Heutsz (and other beloved Dutch colonial figures such as East India Company (voc) founder Jan Pieterszoon Coen), cast in bronze or cut in stone, came to adorn dozens of public spaces across both metropole and colony between roughly 1925 and 1935. Along with the 1935 monument in Amsterdam’s southwest, the two largest and most monumental of these arose, respectively, in the east of Amsterdam in 1927 and in the center of the colonial capital of Batavia in 1932. Reflecting the depth of Van Heutsz nostalgia that gripped Dutch economic and political elites during this period, each was funded through massive private donations and christened with overwhelming official fanfare.

When Van Heutsz Jr. wrote to Amsterdam’s mayor in 1943 to complain about the “weakness” of the newest monument to his father, he might have indeed pointed to more than just the cover of his own recent pamphlet as an example of an appropriately “strong” alternative. For sixteen years, the model alternative had in fact already existed for all to see: the Van Heutsz mausoleum, constructed as the centerpiece of Amsterdam’s New Eastern Cemetery and christened—like the 1935 monument—by Queen Wilhelmina herself (figure 8.2). Van Heutsz’s reburial there in July 1927 was conducted with the full honors of a state funeral, and he remains today the only non-
royal recipient of such an honor. Those standing in attendance included an honor guard of the colonial militia (KNIL), which included a sizeable Indonesian representation.

Led by an honorary monument committee whose membership represented the cream of the Dutch political and economic elite, the mausoleum had been financed through donations from a host of national, provincial, and local committees founded across the nation and in the Netherlands Indies upon the retired general’s death in Switzerland in 1924. Exhumed and transported to Amsterdam for reburial three years later, the general’s coffin and remains were first displayed at a great public ceremony at the royal palace on the Dam Square, from whence they were solemnly paraded some six kilometers to the cemetery. Designed by the modernist “Amsterdam school” architect Jordanus Roodenburgh and carved of great reddish granite blocks by the sculptor Bon Ingen-Housz (1881–1953) of the Hague—both winners of a design competition—the colossal mausoleum suggested the form of a military fortress or an immense battle tank. Its bunker-like entrance was flanked by two supremely muscular, larger-than-life Viking warriors modeled after

8.2 Reburial ceremony at the Van Heutsz Mausoleum, Nieuwe Oosterbegraafplaats, Amsterdam, 1927. From the photo collection Hat Leven (1906–1941), SFA02001387, Hat Leven, Spaarnestad Photo.
figures on the Monument to the Battle of Nations christened by Kaiser Wil- helm in Leipzig in 1913. At the mausoleum’s rear, flanking a listing of Van Heutsz’s military and political titles, stood two more muscular male figures. The soldier to the left of the title list wore a helmet and sported the bundle of wooden rods that symbolized strength and authority in Etruscan and Ro- man yore, now also the symbol of Mussolini’s new regime to the south—the fasces. To its right stood Mercury, the Roman god of trade and profit as well as guide to the underworld.

Despite the immensity and extravagance of Van Heutsz’s Amsterdam tomb, so much donor money was left over that the committee decided to invest this in two more monuments, one in the colonial capital of Batavia and the other in a second location in Amsterdam. As we have seen, the latter was to become a source of distress for Van Heutsz Jr. The stories of these two monuments reveal the way fascism’s course diverged between metropole and colony before and after World War II.

A suitably central location in Batavia had been chosen and work by 1930 was underway. Reflecting the general’s sudden public ubiquity as symbolic crystallization of a colonial nostalgia that had only deepened since the Great Depression had set in, one observer noted, with little apparent sense of irony, that “the Van Heutsz Monument Committee chose this location because there is not enough room for such a large monument on the Van Heutsz Boulevard.”

The Batavia Van Heutsz Monument was finally unveiled in August 1932 (figure 8.3). The winning design, stunningly executed by Indonesian craftsmen, had been conceived in the Netherlands by the architect Willem Marinus Dudok, famous for his “romantic cubism,” in collaboration with sculptor Hendrik van den Eynde. As Van Heutsz’s successor Governor-General J. C. De Jonge revealed the monument to the public for the first time, a great crowd of dignitaries and onlookers marveled at its immense and imposing stonework and the unmistakable message of imperial power it projected. The figure of Van Heutsz, his eyes and rigid body both facing firmly forward toward the horizon, stood high on a central pedestal from which emerged, far below and before him, a well-ordered mass of “natives” driven forward by Dutch colonial troops. A great elephant stood in their midst, a “native” guide perched atop him, suggesting the opening of a way through hitherto impenetrable jungle. Other half-naked Indonesians emerged in a relief to Van Heutsz’s side, somewhat higher up but still well beneath him, bearing the fruits of their manual labors on their shoulders. Below them appeared Van Heutsz’s name
and dates in office (1904–9) and text that read, “He Created Order, Peace, and Prosperity, and Unified the Peoples of the Netherlands Indies into One.”

In a commemoration speech amplified through great loudspeakers that could be “seen from afar” and relayed live to both of the new public radio channels in the European mother country more than ten thousand kilometers distant, De Jonge said of his forerunner Van Heutsz: “He laid a milestone.” Echoing the grand words carved into the monument, he continued: “More than ever before, he executed policies that aimed for prosperity, happiness, and development of the land and its people. It is right,” he proclaimed, “that he is called an ‘Empire builder.’ But nevertheless, we must also acknowledge that he was a ‘home builder’—builder of the home of the Indies’ society that we now inhabit.”

The monument’s reactionary colonial symbolism was not equally welcomed by all. Days before its unveiling ceremony, the Indonesian Student’s Association (pppi) had convened at their Batavia headquarters—a boarding house that had been rechristened the “Indonesia Building” since the association’s founding in 1928—to issue the following statement: “The history of
General Van Heutsz is a history of suffering for the Indonesian people, the people of a subject nation, and Van Heutsz’ name is synonymous with the loss of freedom in various territories, causing Indonesia to be the victim of imperialism . . . the construction of a monument to Van Heutsz in these times . . . means the deliberate deepening of a wound in the hearts of the Indonesian people.” In the metropole too, plans for a second Amsterdam monument had met with unprecedented resistance from the city council, whose membership now included socialists and even communists determined to prevent another expensive tribute to “a man with blood on his hands.” After a long standoff, an uncomfortable, controversial compromise was reached: the conservatives would get “their” monument, and the Left theirs. The latter, a statue of Domela Nieuwenhuis (1846–1919), the founder of the Netherlands’ first social democratic party, was unveiled to huge, enthusiastic crowds in the west of the city center in 1931, his provocatively raised arm ending in a clenched fist.

When the monument in Amsterdam’s southwest was finally unveiled in 1935, it was greeted with a hyperbolic speech from then prime minister Hendrikus Colijn entirely in keeping with earlier precedent. The hard-liner Colijn, founder of the “Anti-Revolutionary Party” and with a long record of ministerial appointments, had served under Van Heutsz in Aceh in his younger days, also committing atrocities in the name of “pacification.” His speech compared the general to no less than “Hannibal, Caesar, and Alexander the Great.” Yet as Van Heutsz’s son later noted, this time the look of the monument decisively failed to match the martial rhetoric. In subsequent years, a remarkable story emerged as an explanation: Frits van Hall, coauthor of the winning entry in the competition for the monument’s design, was in fact a committed communist. A colleague even contended later that the superficial, two-dimensional quality of the Van Heutsz plaque and lettering on the monument had been entirely intentional, attributing to Van Hall the subversive declaration, “replace it with the words ‘freedom,’ ‘merdeka’ [the Indonesian word for independence],’ or ‘Indonesia,’ and you’ve got a Statue of Liberty!” Yet the selection committee’s choice for such a peaceful, maternal motif seems above all a reflection of the monument’s broader formative context: an interwar Dutch political environment in which the critical views of the now-established Left could no longer be simply ignored or suppressed. In its very serenity, the 1935 monument thus revealed the scars of the pitched political battles of the late 1920s that lay behind its construction.

It was no doubt to such unwelcome, “subversive” interwar developments in
both metropole and colony that Governor-General J. C. De Jonge alluded in his speech as he unveiled the Batavia monument in 1932—developments that only seemed to be gaining momentum since the recent onset of the Great Depression: “How far away from us Van Heutsz now seems to stand. One might wonder if people would put up with a figure like Van Heutsz nowadays. He was a man of action. Imagine a man of action in these times of so much talk! A man like Van Heutsz in these times where everything is criticized! In these times, when everyone wants to have a say in everything!”¹⁵ For De Jonge and others of his ilk, the colonies at least remained a place where it was still possible to rule with an iron fist, particularly where the “natives” were concerned. Elsewhere in Asia, where anticolonial movements were gathering momentum—places such as British India, the Philippines, China, and Burma—the Anglo-American powers were beginning to opt for a more “constructive” response that combined the suppression of “radicals” with piecemeal, gradualist delaying tactics of compromises and negotiations with “moderate elements.” By the late 1930s, within this context, the U.S. and Great Britain had made pledges of greater autonomy and future independence to Burma and the Philippines. But for the Dutch in the East Indies—as with the Japanese in Korea and China during the same period, for example—immense economic and psychological investments in their imperial “jewels in the crown” combined with heightened fears of international instability and economic peril to yield instead a more aggressive and uncompromising stance than ever. The appointment of the hard-liner De Jonge, and his enthusiasm for Van Heutsz, reflected the determination of Dutch elites to make time stand still—or better yet, to make it retreat.

Nowhere was this clearer than in De Jonge’s response to Indonesia’s fledgling nationalist movement and its charismatic young leader Sukarno. Upon his appointment in 1931, one of De Jonge’s first moves was to send Sukarno to prison for a four-year term for “subversive activities.” At first, protests from Dutch progressives in both colony and metropole pressured him into releasing Sukarno three years early, but a year later, after publishing the essay “Attaining Indonesian Independence,” Sukarno was again arrested. This time De Jonge invoked emergency powers to ship the troublemaker and his right-hand man Mohammad Hatta safely off to unlimited exile on the distant island of Flores. The two would only be released at Japanese hands some eight years later.
Interimperial Competition and the Rise of Japanese Fascism

If the insecurity of the early 1930s found many Dutch looking back nostalgically, many Japanese were looking rather aggressively ahead. Just as the Dutch were unveiling the Van Heutsz monument in Batavia, their Japanese imperial competitors were busy putting the finishing touches on a radical challenge not only to rising Chinese anticolonial nationalism but also to long-standing Euro-American imperial hegemony in Asia: 1932 witnessed the crowning of Pu Yi on the throne of the puppet state of “Manchukuo.” Prompted by visions of a “Manchurian lifeline” that would provide land, resources, and military security in a hostile and dangerous post-1929 world—a buffer against the rising threats of Chinese nationalism and Soviet communism, as well as insurance against Western protective trade barriers and anti-immigration policies—the Manchurian invasion was initiated by rebellious factions within Japan’s military, but it quickly proved wildly popular among the general public. In Japan, as in places like Germany, where Hitler came to power in 1933, and in Italy, where Mussolini’s regime peaked in popularity with its brutal victory over Ethiopia in 1935, interwar yearnings for such a decisive “breakthrough” were feeding dangerous support for a combination of authoritarian politics at home and aggressive imperial expansion abroad.

The social mapping of Dutch and Japanese interwar fascisms alike was complex and varied, but they had important and telling differences. In comparison to Dutch imperial fascism, whose center of gravity lay among its political and economic elites, particularly those with a direct investment in the empire, Japan’s interwar fascism was fundamentally more a phenomenon of a frustrated middle class. As such, as much as it shared with Dutch interwar fascism an embrace of a reactionary nostalgia against the revolutionary social challenges and imperial threats of the era, it also had a stronger social revolutionary component. Reflective of their class position, its supporters (heavily represented by younger, low-ranking army officers) often expressed a particular sense of frustration at the persistence of Japan’s “old order,” a domestic power structure perceived to be dominated at the top by a “semifeudal” political and economic oligarchy from which they felt excluded. They also felt threatened “from below” by the rise of an increasingly restless, politicized, and chaotic “mass society” symbolized by activist workers and audacious modern women. A renovated, unified, virile nation-state—one cleansed of the “Western” scourges of individual and class interests, efficiently implementing and distributing the benefits of technological progress, and regi-
mented and mobilized for battle in the ruthless international struggles of the day—was the only way forward. In combining a call for a “return” to an ancient indigenous morality and spirituality with a leap into a socially and technologically engineered future, along with a critique of the materialism, individualism, and class conflict of capitalism and communism alike as unwelcome “Western” imports, such discourses can be usefully compared with those of fascist Chinese counterparts that Maggie Clinton considers in chapter 1 of this volume.

As in Italy and Germany too, Japan’s interwar spokesmen for national renovation saw an expanded and rejuvenated empire as key to the success of their domestic program (an aggressive luxury the Guomindang, relatively politically weak and at the mercy of the much more powerful Western and Japanese imperialists, could hardly afford). But unlike the Germans and Italians, Japan’s position as a non-Western empire in a Western-dominated world made both its imperialism and its stance toward anticolonial nationalism more complex. As the crisis of Western modernity deepened and tensions with the Western powers mounted, Japan’s “outsider” status as a nonwestern society was increasingly seen as strength rather than weakness: Japan’s solution to the interwar crisis would consist of a rejection of “Western” individualism and liberalism and a “return” to its original Asian values. By the same token, interwar Japanese were inclined to sympathize with the anticolonial nationalism of fellow Asians so long as it was directed against Western colonizers. As imperial Japan moved deeper into China, it increasingly proclaimed its struggle as a mission of Asian liberation from Western domination. Where the Dutch sought to increasingly suppress anticolonial nationalism, Japan’s spokesmen sought in effect to transcend the inherently conflicting agendas of Japanese imperialism and Asian nationalism by co-opting Asian anticolonial nationalism and its appeals within a Japanese imperial framework.

Dutch Fascism from Below: The Crisis of Empire and the Rise of the NSB

As the Depression continued and the international climate darkened further, mass middle-class-oriented fascist movements gained traction not only in Japan, Germany, and Italy but across the length and breadth of Europe. Mainstream observers in the Netherlands and elsewhere marveled at the “achievements” of Mussolini and Hitler, who seemed to be uniquely successful in
quieting unrest, unifying their populations, and strengthening their economies while the rest of the world was losing its way. Less commonly noted is that fascist ideas and movements also enjoyed a particular popularity among colonial middle classes as well as elites in Western Europe’s colonies in Asia and Africa. This was fortified not only by particularly strong colonial identification with fascism’s racist, social Darwinist worldviews but also by unease at the newfound aggressiveness of anticolonial movements and the fascists’ particularly muscular promises to defend against them.

In the Netherlands Indies such sentiments were strengthened further in response to increasing tensions with imperial Japan. Before Japan’s expanding war with China raised the military temperature in the region from the late 1930s onward, these tensions were fostered primarily by economic competition, as Japanese businesses and entrepreneurs aggressively sought, in Asian markets, a means of exporting Japan’s way out of the Depression. In the early 1930s, cheap Japanese products flooded the Netherlands Indies, and hundreds of small-scale Japanese entrepreneurs set up shops across the archipelago to sell them. Friendly and selling their wares at competitively low prices, these shopkeepers had become popular among the local population. Indonesians often favored them over the ethnic Chinese, who were traditionally seen as economic and social rivals, dominated the lower reaches of the retail economy, and received relatively preferential treatment from the Dutch colonizers. With their own colonial market share severely threatened, the Dutch responded with protectionism. An increasingly militant Japan, which left the League of Nations in 1933 over Manchuria, responded with increasingly militant rhetoric.

Against this ominous backdrop, the Netherlands’ own aspiring fascist leader Anton Mussert found no warmer reception than in the Netherlands Indies. When he arrived in Batavia in 1935, his NSB party, founded four years earlier, was the fifth largest in the mother country, having won 8 percent of the votes in the most recent election. But among the Dutch community of the Netherlands Indies, the NSB was the largest political party. In both colony and metropole, the NSB enjoyed considerable support among the unemployed, small-business owners, and low-ranking officials such as the police forces. “At home,” at least so long as Mussert’s support at the polls remained manageably low, the ruling elite preferred to keep him at arm’s length; state employees were prohibited from joining his party. In the Indies, however, Mussert was treated as a guest of state and was twice received with great ceremony by Governor-General De Jonge himself. The highlight of Mussert’s
colonial visit, avidly filmed and screened in the local cinemas, was his ceremonial wreath-laying at the new Van Heutsz monument.

In an accompanying speech, Mussert hammered upon his qualifications as defender of the empire from unprecedented threats within and without: “Countrymen, any year now could be the last of our existence as a self-sufficient nation. And I say to you, the Indies is practically undefended, and if we lose the Indies—I cannot say it enough—at that moment there will be no possibility for a self-sufficient existence for our people. At that moment, we’ll have to become a part of Germany. And no matter how much we might respect our neighbors, that’s surely the last thing a real Dutchman would want!” Until 1940, donations from the Dutch colonial community would remain an essential source of revenue for the NSB—a little-known colonial lifeline for Holland’s metropolitan fascists.17

In both colony and metropole, however, 1935 proved to be the high point of Mussert’s popularity. In the mother country, the elite establishment shunned the NSB as radical upstarts, and strong conservative allegiance to the political parties associated with the Netherlands’ two main, largely separate religious communities (zuilen) of Catholics and Protestants further condemned supporters of the NSB to “outsider” status and even social ostracism. Largely as a result, its support at the polls in 1937 dropped to little more than half that of two years earlier; it would not recover before the Nazi invasion in 1940. While the NSB in the colony clearly enjoyed more open support from members of the social elite, there, as in the Netherlands, a substantial proportion of the NSB’s support came from disaffected members of the middle class. In other ways, however, the social composition of the NSB’s supporters, the reasons for their support, and the eventual reasons for its decline were all distinctive—and distinctively colonial. For here the majority of NSB party members—some 70 percent—were members of its large mestizo Indo-European (“Indo”) community, who comprised some four-fifths of those with official status as Dutch citizens.18

The Indo community had come about through centuries of Dutch rule in Batavia and the surrounding areas, and it comprised the core of the traditional colonial ruling elite. In practice, as in other places around the world, closer ties with the Dutch motherland and the increasing influence of social Darwinist, racist thinking in the late nineteenth century meant increasing discrimination against these “mixed bloods” at the hands of the “pure” (totok) Dutch. But when the colonial state formalized a system of separate, discriminatory legal codes for themselves, “natives,” and “foreign Orientals” at the
end of the nineteenth century, most Indos were awarded official Dutch status. However severe the racist attitudes that Dutch colonial elites entertained toward them, in the overriding interest of maintaining the “tranquility” of the colonial status quo, the move was a practical necessity. In a classic act of colonial “divide and conquer,” the Indos were thus strategically aligned with the totok Dutch and positioned above and separately from the natives, thereby heightening tensions between them and the latter.

As Indonesian anticolonial nationalism gained strength, for the many Indos for whom the Netherlands Indies was the only imaginable homeland (rather than the Netherlands, let alone “Indonesia”), the NSB’s stress on protecting Dutch civilization and the Dutch empire against all such “radical” threats inside and out held a distinctive appeal. NSB membership was also a way of emphasizing one’s Dutch cultural identity and loyalty in a colonial environment in which the questioning of both was frequently deployed as a basis for anti-Indo discrimination.19

Making such Indo support for the NSB at all possible was the NSB’s emphasis on cultural purity and national loyalty, rather than racial purity, as the prime criteria for membership in the Dutch nation. In this the Dutch fascists of the early to mid-1930s more closely resembled and emulated those in Italy than those in Germany.20 This situation was to change, however, as Mussert and other NSB leaders increasingly came to identify the party with the Nazis and correspondingly increase emphasis on “Aryan” racial purity and anti-Semitism. Such moves inevitably alienated many Indos from the NSB, and the NSB overall experienced a dramatic decline in its colonial membership during the last years before the war.

After Nazi Germany invaded the Netherlands in May 1940 and the NSB there chose collaboration, the Dutch colonial authorities in the Netherlands Indies cracked down on the local NSB as an enemy of the free Dutch state. Yet where Indonesian nationalists were concerned, the continued hard-line stance of the Dutch colonial regime was not easily distinguishable from that advocated by the NSB. It was only in mid-1941, when the great showdown between imperial powers, long predicted by both fascists and the communists, threatened to spread to the Pacific, that the Dutch colonial state actively began to court the support of “moderate” Indonesian nationalist elements. In the meantime the Netherlands had been occupied by Japan’s ally Nazi Germany, and Japanese relations with the Dutch and their American allies had steeply declined as a result of ongoing tension over Japan’s war in China and related Japanese moves into a French Indochina now controlled by Vichy.
fascists. In their hour of need, the Dutch belatedly called upon their Indonesian “brethren” to help them defend “their” homeland against the invading Japanese “fascists.”

**Ambivalent Alternative: Japanese Fascism and Occupied Indonesia**

For Indonesians, to say such Dutch wartime appeals were too little too late would be an understatement. Indeed, it was easy to view such belated Dutch calls for (little) “brotherhood” as nothing really new but merely the other side of the Dutch imperial Janus face that had existed in the form of the “ethical policy” at least since the days of Van Heutsz. While the Dutch sought to identify a common enemy by branding the Japanese as fascists, until now Indonesians’ most intimate encounter with fascism had been with that of the Dutch rather than the Japanese variety; democracy, meanwhile, had remained an exclusively Dutch possession. In practice, most Indonesians could therefore be forgiven for harboring a more positive inclination toward the arriving Japanese than the Dutch expected—all the more so given the jaw-dropping power with which the Japanese made their irresistible entry.

On March 9, 1942, Japanese forces conquered Java after a whirlwind campaign lasting just nine days, wresting it, along with the rest of the Indonesian archipelago, from centuries of Dutch colonial domination. Singapore, the “impregnable fortress” of Britain’s Asian empire, had fallen ignominiously just weeks before. Japanese, Americans, Europeans, and Southeast Asians were stunned and radicalized by the suddenness of this development and the vastness of its implications. Japan, perennially viewed not only by Westerners but by most Indonesians as little more than a distant, second-class Western copycat, now seemed to have beaten the West at its own game. Indonesians lined the roads to welcome Asia’s new leaders, who also proclaimed themselves Asia’s liberators; they emphasized the point by hoisting Indonesian flags alongside their own. Not just for Japanese but for Indonesians as well, both past and future seemed suddenly bathed in a new “Asian” light.

It is one of the great ironies of modern imperial history that the “liberation” of Indonesians from the late imperial Dutch brand of fascism thus came at the hands of imperial Japanese, whose own fascistic conviction of their unique “world-historical” racial destiny as Asia’s natural-born leaders and liberators, hardened through years of brutal, frustrated aggression against a resistant China and ongoing resentment at Western domination
and arrogance, was in turn immeasurably strengthened by their success in this very same act, and by the warm reception they received in response in Southeast Asia. For those who refused to acknowledge their new imperial hegemony—Chinese, Korean resisters, Westerners, communists—the Japanese continued to reveal their most exclusionary and brutal fascist face. But Japanese justification of their Asian mission rested on a critique of a Western hegemony based on imperialism, racism, and capitalism, and they were in desperate need of support from their neighbors. To those who acknowledged their hegemony and shared their enemies, they promised inclusion in an Asian order of blood brotherhood rather than imperialist exploitation, a “return to Asia” comprising both cultural restoration and social renovation.

The result was that the legitimacy and identity of Japan’s mission of “liberation” in Southeast Asia was located in a contradictory space, at once fascist and antifascist, imperialist and anti-imperialist, capitalist and anticapitalist, modern and antimodern. This is perhaps the reason that Japanese propaganda imagery in Southeast Asia, like its domestic expressions considered by Julia Adeney Thomas in chapter 7 of this volume, appeared markedly lacking in what might be called a fascist aesthetic—in stark contrast to the aesthetics of the monuments the Dutch erected in a desperate attempt to turn back the imperial clock. Reflecting a fundamentally ambivalent and contradictory Japanese wartime position vis-à-vis its new colonial subjects—and indeed toward the old-fashioned hierarchies of empire itself—Japanese propaganda combined appeals to the imperial and the national that overlapped with and contradicted one another.

As a first step toward building this new Japanese-Asian order, the Japanese sought to undermine remaining symbols of Dutch imperial legitimacy not only through confining the Dutch to prison camps—first men and later women and children—but also by destroying monuments and other points of reference to Dutch colonial power. On April 29, 1942, the eve of mass celebrations of the emperor’s birthday some two months after the Japanese arrived, a statue commemorating Jan Pieterszoon Coen, the seventeenth-century founder of Batavia, was toppled, along with the “Amsterdam Gate on Prinsen Street.” Yet remarkably, the Japanese chose to leave the Van Heutsz monument standing, electing only to erase the text engraved upon it and to remove the figure of Van Heutsz from view by encasing it in wood (figure 8.4). A Japanese-language newspaper explained that the monument “is considered unique and of artistic merit.”22

Elsewhere, in propaganda films such as The Battle of Hawaii and the Malay...
Straits (1942), ordinary Indonesians were treated to repeated visual displays of Japanese power, most often in the form of ordinary soldiery mobilized for, and winning, battles in air and on land and sea. Such films were shown in theaters as well as in traveling film screenings throughout the countryside using specially outfitted trucks and portable outdoor screens, a technique that drew upon an Italian fascist model. Later, as the war situation grew more desperate, local propaganda such as the short film Indonesia Raya—named after and with a stirring soundtrack comprising the Indonesian national anthem—moved to incorporate Indonesians as active, empowered participants in a similar militarized aesthetic. A series of recognizably typical Indonesian landscapes melted into anonymous, neat ranks of marching, muscle-bound Indonesian paramilitaries. (Although an ongoing Japanese ambivalence toward “arming the natives” could still be read in the soldiers bearing wood-carved rifles rather than real ones!)

Dazzled by Japan’s military successes, seduced by such propaganda, and intrigued by the lessons of Japan’s experience as a uniquely successful and modern non-Western nation-state, many Indonesians were more receptive to Japan’s appeals than was later acknowledged. Sukarno, whom the Japanese freed from years of Dutch-imposed exile, was the most prominent of the
many Indonesian nationalists from across the political spectrum who chose to work with the new overlords. In practice, however, the Japanese delivered much less than they had promised. Early hopes that Japan might soon grant Indonesia independence were quickly dashed when both the Indonesian flag and the national anthem were banned “until further notice” in the name of maintaining public order. It was only in September 1944, when the tide of the war had turned decisively against Japan, that Tokyo finally issued a promise of Indonesian national independence, and only then at some undetermined point in the future—a point that had yet to be reached when Japan surrendered to the Allies in August 1945. Like the Dutch before them, the Japanese were little interested in affording Indonesians greater political autonomy, and Sukarno and other nationalist leaders soon grew tired of the fetters imposed on their expression and activities in the name of wartime unity. The mass of Indonesia’s population, out of direct reach of such media campaigns, experienced the Japanese and their regime in the impersonal form of increasingly crushing administrative exactions, meted out by Indonesian officials who had little time for or interest in intellectual argumentation. Japan’s ever-escalating demands for labor and resources were combined with military-colonial arrogance, ignorance, and oppression that made the former Dutch rulers seem tolerant and brotherly by comparison. By the end of the occupation in 1945, with the colony ravaged and basic necessities in impossibly short supply, even most of the nationalists who had cast their lot with Japan early on had lost faith in them. The negative image of “fascists” in the minds of Indonesians, once dominated by the Dutch, was now more commonly associated with the Japanese.

In the end, the ambivalence of Japanese occupation for Indonesia might well be summed up in the wartime fate of Batavia’s Van Heutsz monument: in erasing Van Heutsz’s name and tribute and covering up his figure, the Japanese occupiers had succeeded in effacing Dutch authority and the symbols upon which its power and legitimacy were based. But they failed to replace it with anything concrete. Not only did they not have the time to craft and recraft the monumentalization of the dead as they did in Taiwan and Korea, as Paul Barclay shows in chapter 2; in ideological terms too the situation in Indonesia was even more unsettled and precarious. Throughout the occupation, the monument’s offer-bearing Indonesians remained, and its soldiers continued to drive them forward to ruin. When the returning Dutch began a new, ultimately futile and devastating war in late 1945 to turn back the colonial clock, the monument remained standing as silent witness.24 During the
revolution, nationalist youth covered the Jakarta monument with anticolonial slogans, and in 1953,—four years after that war’s end, it was completely destroyed by the newly independent Indonesian government (figure 8.5).

**Legacies Seen and Unseen**

Long demolished in Indonesia, both the main monuments to Van Heutsz in Amsterdam remain standing today, each highlighting in its own way the ongoing limits and lacunae in the Dutch engagement with the colonial past—above all with regard to the inglorious interwar decades in which the two monuments arose. As noted above, the 1935 monument was a frequent target of postwar protest and vandalism, and by the late 1990s it was commonly recognized that it was in need of a facelift. In 2004, after several years of deliberations involving consultation with historians and interested parties, the city of Amsterdam rechristened it the “Indies-Netherlands Monument,
1596–1949.” The first date refers to the Dutch founding of the colonial capital of Batavia by Jan Pieterszoon Coen (the same man whose monument in Batavia had been knocked down by the Japanese, to Indonesian applause, in 1942). The second year marks that in which the Dutch were finally compelled to surrender their colony to an Indonesia whose leaders had in fact declared its independence four years earlier in 1945. A committee member claimed that they had thereby “finally honored [monument co-designer] Van Hall’s wishes.” Yet contrary to Van Hall’s wishes, it was to the colonial “Indies” rather than to an independent “Indonesia” that the monument was renamed, and nowhere did the anticolonial nationalist slogan “merdeka” (independence) appear. The compromised new/old naming reflected a twenty-first-century Dutch state and civil society in which colonial nostalgia retained great sway among many of those with the greatest investment in the colonial past—foremost among them the large postcolonial community of former Indies residents and their descendants, along with the Dutch military. The Dutch king attended a ceremony to honor the Van Heutsz Brigade’s sixty-fifth anniversary in June 2015, its members proudly clad in colonial-era military attire.

In 2003, with much less fanfare, the Van Heutsz mausoleum was dismantled and removed from its central, commanding position at the entrance to Amsterdam’s New Eastern Graveyard. Five years later it was reassembled in a more quiet and secluded location several minutes’ walk deeper into the graveyard, among trees, bushes, and, ironically enough, several graves of honored Dutch resisters to Nazi rule during the World War II era. Less ironic, but no less remarkable, is the presence of another grave nearby occupied by the notorious Dutch war criminal Captain Raymond Westerling (1919–87), who, in a manner reminiscent of Van Heutsz two generations before him, oversaw the killing of thousands of Indonesians in campaigns to “restore order” during the war of independence. Westerling was never prosecuted.

Interviewed in 2003 regarding the Van Heutsz mausoleum’s planned move to “a less prominent location,” the graveyard director insisted that the action was prompted not by the sight of the monument but only by long-standing frustration at the inconvenience of having to lead funeral processions around it on the way to the main hall. Despite the apparent synchronicity of the move with the refurbishing and rechristening of its sister monument to the west, the director denied any connection to “political correctness or any change in the status of the ‘pacifier of Aceh’ . . . ‘If it had been Johan Cruijff lying there, we still would have moved him.’” A small new signboard planted next to the
mausoleum when it was reassembled in its new location in 2008 nevertheless contends that it “tells the story of our changing view of the Netherlands’s colonial past . . .[,] designed to honor the general and his military successes, it now reminds us mostly of a dark page of Dutch history.” In the single paragraph subsequently dedicated to this history, however, reference is made only to the Aceh War. The history of the interwar period that actually produced the mausoleum—including its multiple fascisms and the imperial relationalities that shaped their distinctive forms—remain hidden in the shadows.

Notes
2 In his 2004 study Fascists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), sociologist Michael Mann divides interwar Europe into three zones: a zone of sturdy parliamentary democracies to the west, a zone of uniform authoritarian regimes to the east, and a “swing zone” in the middle that included Spain, France, and Germany—societies deeply divided between Left and Right, whose ultimate fate was determined, argues Mann, in relation to the depth of their experience with and commitment to parliamentary democracy.
3 During the same period, Van Heutsz’s public reputation was further weakened by rumors of an extramarital affair (Blessing, “Jo van Heutsz [1851–1924]”).
4 Blessing, “Jo van Heutsz (1851–1924).”
8 Het nieuws van den dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië, December 12, 1930. After In-
donesian independence the boulevard was named after the Acehnese resistance leader Teuku Umar.


10 “De Redevoeringen,” De Indische Courant, August 24, 1932.


12 Like Van Heutsz, Nieuwenhuis’s glory days had actually occurred decades earlier, and his son would remark decades later that such a confrontational revolutionary gesture had never been a part of his father’s visual vocabulary. But as with Van Heutsz, the interwar period put its own stamp on his legacy. “Domela in het Westerpark,” Ons Amsterdam 10 (October 2012): 3.


14 The young van Hall accepted the commission as his first major project after several other leading progressive artists refused it, including members of the De Kring Society and the most well-known sculptor of the “Amsterdam school,” Hildo Krop. Ruud van Haastrecht, “Geef Van Heutsz Monument Ander Doel,” Trouw/De Verdieping, October 30, 1998.

15 “De Redevoeringen.”

16 “NSB was in Indië niet zo omstreden als in Nederland,” Trouw, August 21, 1999.


20 “The Dutch nation is found equally in Europe, East Asia, and the West Indies as a race of the spirit, which absorbs the race of the blood,” states an early NSB pamphlet. “We deny anyone the right to bring discord to the nation of the spirit by investigating whether Dutch who are pure in their national feeling have un-Aryan, that is to say Jewish or Indisch blood.” “Page 26 of Mussert Brochure number 4,” quoted in “Een merkwaardig Verbond,” Soerabaiasch Handelsblad, March 30, 1935.

21 The conservative Dutch interpretation of the Atlantic Charter issued by the Allies in August 1941, which promised postwar the right of self-determination to all countries participating in the conflict, only added fuel to the fire. When pressed by Indonesian Volksraad councilman Soetardjo as to whether the Netherlands
intended to honor the charter with relation to Indonesia, the Dutch authorities waffled, asserting their commitment to “democratic principles” while at the same time maintaining that the promise of self-determination did not apply within empires! Bernhard Dahm, History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century (London: Praeger, 1971), 80.

22 Unabara newspaper, April 28, 1942, 2.


24 While playing well to a Dutch audience inclined to blame the Japanese for destroying the “bond of centuries,” Dutch postwar attempts to delegitimize Sukarno as a pro-Japanese “fascist puppet” gained little traction among Indonesians.

25 See “Andere Tijden: Van Heutsz.”

26 See, for example, Lizzie van Leeuwen, Ons Indisch Erfgoed: Zestig jaar strijd om cultuur en identiteit (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2008).

27 Adding insult to injury for a man who to this day personifies Dutch brutality in Indonesia but retains support in Dutch military circles, an Indonesian text inscribed on the gravestone by Westerling’s family reads, “The People Gave You the Title of Just Ruler” (Rakjat memberi beliau gelar ratu adil).

28 Although Westerling was never tried, the author of The Last Typhoon, a 1992 fictional account of Westerling’s atrocities that compared them to those of the ss, was put on trial in Groningen in 1994 for “tarnishing the honour and the good name of Dutch troops.” The two were acquitted, but the Ministry of Justice appealed the case; acquittal followed once again in January 1995. See Leonard Doyle, “Colonial Atrocities Explode Myth of Dutch Tolerance,” The Independent, May 28, 1994.