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## Immigration

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## 7 Immigration

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Immigration changes the racial and ethnic composition of national populations; it reshapes urban environments, labor market structures and cultural diversity; and it raises a broad set of issues related to human rights, foreign policy and national identity. How do governments around the world regulate the arrival and settlement of foreigners? And how should modern societies deal with the social change that immigration brings with it? These questions go to the core of current political debates – not only in Europe, North America or Australia, but also in countries such as Japan, Malaysia, South Africa, Turkey, or Saudi Arabia. This chapter seeks to contextualize these debates by introducing the key processes through which immigration affects race relations and ethnic dynamics around the globe.

### **Defining international migration**

International migration refers to the movement of people across national borders. Most statistical offices classify individuals as migrants only if they stay in the destination country for at least one year, and they often erase them from their databases once they naturalize and take on the nationality of the host country. In popular discourses, however, the word migrant is generally used to designate all people with a different nationality, and sometimes even their naturalized descendants. Refugees are one specific category of migrants who receive international protection from persecution in their home country according to the 1951 Geneva Convention. As this chapter looks at the interplay between immigration, race and ethnicity, it adopts a broad definition of international migration that covers recently arrived and long-term settled individuals, high and low-skilled workers, refugees and asylum seekers, students, family members and co-ethnics. It however excludes international tourists from the discussion, as these engage with the host society in a radically different, more superficial way.

In contrast to this broad definition of international migration, a quick look at political debates or news reports reveals that the discussion around immigration, race and ethnicity in fact only revolves around certain categories of migrants – what Bonjour and Duyvendak (2018) have coined the “migrant with poor prospects”. Indeed, the heated debates on immigration in Europe and North America do not turn around Indian students or South African diplomats, but around foreigners

that are perceived as both culturally different and economically deprived. Similarly, discussions around foreigners in Morocco rarely touch upon the French retirees living along the coast, but focus mostly on Christian sub-Saharan African migrants. Thus, not every foreigner is seen in the eyes of the public as an *immigrant*. This makes it all the more important to carefully look at the intersection of class, culture and race that underpins any discussion about immigration.

### **Global shifts in immigration patterns and policies**

Against dominant discourses that highlight the unprecedented scale of global migration, in fact the percentage of migrants in the world population has remained rather stable over the last century, at around 3 percent. What has changed is the directionality of migration: Until the first half of the 20th century, international migrants came mostly from Europe. In the context of colonialization and imperialism, or fleeing war and economic misery (such as the Irish famine of 1845), they settled in Africa, Asia and the Americas. A striking 48 million Europeans emigrated between 1846 and 1924, which represents about 12 percent of Europe's population in 1900. Since the end of World War II, the geography of global migration has changed: Migrants from Africa, Asia or Latin America have increasingly moved to Europe and North America in the context of decolonization, postwar economic reconstruction, labor recruitment and family reunification. In parallel to intercontinental migration, international migration mostly concentrates within specific regions like South-East Asia, West Africa, the Middle East or the European Union.

States have actively tried to shape the ethnic and racial composition of immigration: On the one hand, states have enacted policies to deter specific migrant groups. In the past, countries explicitly excluded certain ethnic or racial groups from immigrating, such as the 'Whites only' immigration policies in South Africa or Australia, or 'Asian immigration bans' and informal exclusions of Jewish immigrants in North and South America. These explicit exclusions were largely abolished in the 1960s and 1970s, but selection on ethnic or racial grounds has continued implicitly, through targeted skill or income requirements or through country-specific travel visa requirements. A recent example is Trump's 2017 'Muslim ban' that temporarily blocked the entry of citizens from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Despite such immigration restrictions, lower-skilled workers or migrants from countries whose access to legal entry opportunities is limited continue to arrive irregularly, through 'the back door', or – which is more often the case – overstay their temporary visas.

On the other hand, states have developed policies to attract specific migrant groups: In the wake of state formation or after international wars, states have tried to 'homogenize' the ethnic composition of their national populations through large-scale, often forced, population displacements. Prominent examples are the population exchange of Orthodox Christians and Muslims between Greece and Turkey in 1923, or the population transfers following the 1947 partition of India and Pakistan, the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, or during the Yugoslav

wars in the 1990s. Also, countries have signed labor recruitment agreements or subsidized the journeys and settlement of prospective migrants – such as Argentina, Australia or Brazil in the 19th century, Western European countries after World War II, or Gulf countries since the 1970s. Over the past decades, states around the world have developed sophisticated immigration regulations to attract immigrants with specific skill-sets or from a particular ethnic background. For instance, European and Asian countries – such as Germany, Greece, Hungary, Poland, India, Korea or Japan – have devised so-called ‘co-ethnics migration policies’ to attract descendants of emigrants or people from neighboring countries considered part of the same ethnic group.

These global migration trends have reshaped the racial and ethnic composition of national populations: In the U.S., where race was historically discussed in terms of a binary Black–White ‘color line’, large-scale immigration from Latin America and Asia after 1965 has introduced new actors and dynamics into debates on race. In Europe, postcolonial immigration from Africa, Asia and the Middle East has increased ethnic and religious diversity in societies that have largely considered themselves ethnically homogeneous. In the Gulf States, immigrants make up between 70 to over 90 percent of the domestic workforce, and between 30 and 50 percent of residents are Asian. The growth of a largely rights-deprived and economically marginalized class of Asian migrant workers alongside highly-skilled Asian immigration and the local Arab elite has created new social hierarchies in which race, class and education interact in complex ways.

### **National identity and ‘the other’**

Immigration questions understandings of ‘who we are’ and ‘how we live’. It challenges dominant narratives around national identity and the myths that underlie what Benedict Anderson (1983) has famously coined ‘imagined communities’. In the Netherlands, the integration of Italian (Catholic) immigrants into Dutch (Protestant) culture and society was seen as highly problematic. In the U.S., Italian immigrants were originally not perceived as ‘White’. Several decades later, no one in Western Europe is talking about the need to integrate Italian immigrants anymore, and in the U.S., Italians have been recategorized as ‘White’ in public and political discourse. This shows the fluid, constructed nature of who is considered ‘the other’ and the need to conceptualize race boundaries not as stable, but as a result of racialization processes.

In Europe, discourses around immigration have shifted since the 1990s toward other markers of ‘otherness’ – in particular Muslim religion and Arab ethnicity. In France, Germany, Austria or the Netherlands, immigration from North Africa and Turkey has set religion on the political agenda again. The societal debates about building mosques or wearing the Islamic headscarf are fueled by nationalist politicians who frame the debate around the purported opposition between Europe’s tradition of liberalism, democracy and Christian values on the one hand, and Islam on the other.

But also in other world regions, contemporary identity debates crystallize around immigration. In Japan, immigration from Asia and Latin America upsets the official state discourse of ‘ethnic homogeneity’. In Morocco, immigration from Europe, Asia and sub-Saharan Africa questions the religious and ethnic pillars of national identity. In particular, the integration of Christian immigrants into a predominantly Muslim population raises issues of religious diversity that partly mirror those in Europe regarding Muslim immigrants. Similarly, the marginalization of and racism toward the country’s Black minorities, as well as debates around Morocco’s history of trans-Saharan slave trade have resurfaced in the context of growing sub-Saharan immigration.

### **Dominant trends in integration policies**

Debates about the ‘integration’ of foreigners thus always accompany immigration and generally focus on two main issues: socioeconomic and cultural integration. Socioeconomic integration concerns the incorporation of immigrants in the labor market, education, housing and social welfare system of the host country. Research has shown that immigrants are on average net contributors to national economies and that diversity is key in generating scientific, societal and technological innovation. Nonetheless, many migrants face systematic discriminations and marginalization in many countries, end up taking on jobs at the bottom of the labor market and live in ethnically segregated parts of cities. Thus, ethnic and class background often continue to be tightly linked even for second- or third-generation migrants.

Cultural integration, which is a contentious societal topic in many countries, revolves around the ways in which immigrants adopt, transform or reject the norms, values or identity frameworks of the host society. Indeed, immigrants always bring their habits, food, religion and way of life with them. The influence of Jazz in world music or the fact that – in the words of former British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook in 2001 – “Chicken Tikka Massala is now a true British national dish” are powerful examples of everyday cultural cross-fertilization as a result of immigration. As the Swiss author Max Frisch famously wrote regarding Italian guest workers in Switzerland back in 1965: “We asked for workers, but human beings came”.

States have reacted to the settlement of migrants in different ways. Castles (1995) distinguishes three integration models: differential exclusion, assimilation and active integration policies such as pluralism or multiculturalism. Countries such as Germany until the 1970s, or Japan and the Gulf countries more recently, have opted for a policy of differential exclusion, whereby immigrants are included in the labor market but excluded (to varying degrees) from welfare systems or political participation. Countries such as France, as well as the U.K. until the 1960s, have pursued assimilation policies. These require migrants to leave their distinctive cultural values and habits behind and to adopt those of the host country. Realizing that assimilation policies often reinforce economic and cultural

segregation rather than foster integration, most countries have gradually moved toward more pluralist integration policies.

Pluralist approaches grant immigrants equal economic, social and political rights as citizens. They expect migrants to conform to the host society's rules and fundamental rights, but do not require migrants to give up their distinctive cultural, ethnic or religious values. Pluralism can take two forms: It can be a position of *laissez-faire*, as is the case in the U.S., where difference is tolerated but not institutionalized by the state. Or it can come in the form of multicultural policies, such as in the Netherlands, Canada or Sweden, where the state actively intervened in the organization of social life to maintain tolerance and diversity through antidiscrimination measures in education, housing or the labor market, as well as through funding immigrant or ethnic associations. However, national integration policies never fully fit one or the other of these ideal typical integration models. Countries often adopt a mixture of policy approaches, depending on the migrant group targeted and the policy area in question, and a country's approach is not set in stone but can shift over time to accommodate new social realities.

### **The social dynamics of immigration**

Within discussions on integration, researchers have claimed that democracies have an in-built tendency to expand immigrants' rights, because democracy is underpinned by a liberal ideology that upholds the protection of individual human rights. However, democracy and liberal stances toward immigration and ethnic diversity do not necessarily go hand in hand. As FitzGerald and Cook-Martín (2014) have shown in their historical research on ethnic immigration policies in the Americas, democracies were the first to establish ethnic immigration selection criteria and the last to abolish them, long after most Latin American autocracies did so.

In fact, the presence of immigrants triggers two conflicting social dynamics in democracies: On the one hand, immigrants will use their social and political rights – such as freedom of expression, freedom of association or political representation – to make their voice heard, to denounce socially unjust practices such as migrants' urban marginalization or social discrimination, and to claim the protection of their rights. In this endeavor, they are often supported by local civil society associations, human rights organizations or legal actors. On the other hand, parts of the host population might experience feelings of uncertainty and fear in the face of immigration and demand the protection of national workers and national identity.

In Europe, immigration since the 1960s has changed many aspects of social life, with ethnic diversity triggering not only cultural, culinary and technological innovations, but also shifts in the labor market, religious and cultural norms, as well as urban neighborhoods. Across many countries, these fears are regularly fueled into anti-immigration claims by populist politicians during election campaigns. At the same time, surveys on attitudes toward immigration across Europe show that over the past decades, racial prejudice has been declining and that particularly

younger generations of better educated Europeans who have grown up with seeing immigration as a normal feature of society tend to be more welcoming toward immigrant groups. This suggests that a more diverse society may lead to more tolerant citizen attitudes.

The U.S., where nearly one in seven is foreign-born and one in four is non-white, is another prime example showcasing how immigration can lead to opposing political dynamics: While the growth of the immigrant electorate has increased the representation of minorities in Congress over the past decades, at the same time anti-immigrant discourse and white supremacist fringe organizations have gained ground, in particular since the election of Donald Trump in 2016. However, opposition to ethnic diversity is anything but new and it has often been more overt and violent in the past. One just has to think about the lynching of Black people as well as the racial segregation in the U.S. Southern States under the 'Jim Crow laws' until 1965, or about the violent 'race riots' in the U.K. in the early 1980s that targeted Black immigrants and their British-born descendants.

Autocratic regimes do not grant their citizens – and even less so the foreigners in their territory – political rights and room for claims-making. In the long-term, however, immigration inevitably leads to societal dynamics among and between immigrants and natives that can range from innovation and cultural cross-fertilization in areas such as food or music to ethnic and socioeconomic segregation or feelings of alienation. Even in the autocratic Gulf States, where immigrants are deprived of rights and citizens have little political freedoms, immigration has become a societal issue that governments have to engage, which is linked to labor market and social welfare policies, but also to questions of human rights and religious diversity. Thus, no state can, in the long run, escape from the social dynamics emerging out of immigration.

### **Immigration politicization**

Whether immigration is conceived as a public problem or as an opportunity is not so much related to the numbers or origin of immigrants but depends on how immigration and its racial and ethnic components are politicized in the national sphere. This can go in two ways: On the one hand, immigration, its magnitude and effects, can be inflated for political gains. Brexit (the process through which the U.K. is leaving the European Union) is a case in point: Despite evidence that immigration to the U.K. did not negatively impact British economy and social services, the pro-Brexit campaign focused on the allegedly adverse effects of immigration – with success. Similarly, although U.S. President Donald Trump's rhetoric of a 'migrant invasion' in autumn 2018 was disconnected from the actual size of the 'migrant caravan' crossing Mexico, made up of less than 10,000 migrants, it was effective in creating a climate of fear just before the midterm elections. However, this instrumentalization of immigration or ethnic minorities by far-right, populist parties is nothing exceptional: Nationalist discourses have often flared up at moments of economic crisis, such as in the wake of the 1929 economic crisis in Europe or after 2008. It is also not limited to the Global North: In multiethnic Malaysia or



South Africa for instance, immigrants are regularly blamed for crime or unemployment by political leaders who seek to polarize the country's population.

On the other hand, not all types of immigration are framed as problematic. Political leaders can also choose to depoliticize large-scale immigration or frame it in positive terms. This has for instance been the case in Tunisia, where the settlement of several hundred thousand Libyan citizens since 2011 has not become a politically salient issue. Political parties do not polarize around Libyan immigration and policymakers generally refer to them as 'brothers' or 'guests'. This narrative also characterizes political discourses on Syrian refugees in Turkey or Palestinian immigrants in Lebanon and Jordan. Another example of non-politicization is labor migration from Ukraine to Poland: Over the past years, around half a million Ukrainians have migrated to Poland every year – but nationalist anti-immigration discourses in Poland focus on the few refugees that have arrived from the Middle East. These examples suggest that immigration might be less salient when migrants are perceived as culturally close to the host population. However, research on West Africa shows that cultural or ethnic proximity is no guarantor for immigrant inclusion, as leaders of both immigrant groups and the host population might emphasize cultural boundaries to strengthen a distinctive group identity and to demarcate political territory, herewith exacerbating tensions.

Thus, immigration can be both an opportunity to bring into the light and break up existing racial and ethnic inequalities in society, as well as an occasion for nationalist or other political entrepreneurs to shift boundaries and create new racial or ethnic hierarchies. Given that long-term trends in public attitudes show stable or declining racial prejudice and xenophobia, processes of immigration politicization are key to explain why certain immigrant groups are framed as a threat or as an opportunity.

### **Migration as part and parcel of social change**

Ultimately, however, the debate should not be about which framing of immigration is right or wrong, but should start with understanding that immigration is an intrinsic part of societal change: On the one hand, migration is a response to national economic, social and political developments in origin and destination countries. Particularly advanced, industrialized economies have an in-built, structural demand for migrant labor that will not decline in the decades to come. At the same time, migration is a driver for change in itself, as immigrants alter the country's demographic profile in terms of age, ethnicity, religion and race, introduce new cultural values and lifestyles into the host society, boost technological innovation and raise distinct sociopolitical claims in origin and destination countries. It would be exceptional if societies would not react to and debate these changes. However, a fruitful debate about immigration, race and ethnicity would abandon the polarization between the 'pro' and 'anti' immigration stances. It would start by acknowledging that immigration and immigration-driven change is inevitable in modern industrialized societies and focus on how to best accommodate and respond to these changes.



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