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A European Ministry of Finance? Charting and testing the national constitutional limits to EU fiscal integration

Behre, F.

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A European Ministry of Finance?

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Charting and Testing the National Constitutional
Limits to EU Fiscal Integration

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Frederik Behre

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Promotor: prof. dr. S.C.G. Van den Bogaert

Co-promotor: prof. dr. A. Cuyvers

Promotiecommissie: prof. dr. R.C. Tobler
prof. dr. M. Nettesheim (Tübingen University, Germany)
prof. dr. T. Ojanen (Helsinki University, Finland)
prof. B. Smulders (Vrije Universiteit Brussels, Belgium)

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