Recasting the history and politics of European integration 'beyond Brussels'

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CHAPTER 1

Recasting the History and Politics of European Integration 'Beyond Brussels'

Matthew Broad and Suvi Kansikas

Europe is a continent whose history has, in one form or another, long been dominated by integration. In the era of the nation state this was arguably first detectable in the early 1800s with the French-led Continental System which, somewhat prophetically in the context of Brexit, brought together much of mainland Europe in a trade war against the United Kingdom.[1] In time this episode would itself spawn the creation of the Concert of Europe, an ambitious mid-nineteenth-century dispute resolution system founded by the region's then-dominant powers Austria,

[1] For the latest research on the Continental System, Katherine B. Aaslestad and Johan Joor (eds.), *Revisiting Napoleon's Continental System: Local, Regional and European Experiences* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

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Russia, France, Prussia and Britain.[2] Naturally, though, one need not travel as far back as Napoleon I to find examples of European states uniting or collaborating more closely with one another. From at least the mid-nineteenth century there emerged numerous initiatives to help solve the problems of, and set standards for, the technological revolution of the Victorian era.[3] This same period also witnessed a proliferation of literary works promoting the broader ideals of European unity.[4] Victor Hugo for one was consistent in his support of economic and political unification, building on the letters of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and the essays of William Penn.[5] Later on, Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi's analogous quest for a unified European state became the basis of the Paneuropean Movement formed in 1923.[6] Having witnessed the horrors of the First World War, Arthur Salter's *The United States of Europe* appealed for European countries to merge under the watch of a centralised technocratic government.[7] And many of these same sentiments resurfaced in the speeches and writings, if not always the deeds, of twentieth-century

[2] See Paul W. Schroeder, 'The 19th Century International System: Changes in the Structure', *World Politics* 39, no. 1 (1986): 1–26.

[3] For a broad overview, Thomas J. Misa and Johan Schot, 'Inventing Europe: Technology and the Hidden Integration of Europe', *History and Technology* 21, no. 1 (2005): 1–19; Jytte Klausen and Louise Tilly (eds.), *European Integration in Social and Historical Perspective: 1850 to the Present* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997); Sidney Pollard, *The Integration of the European Economy Since 1815* (London: Routledge, 2013). For specific examples, Carl Strikwerda, 'The Troubled Origins of European Economic Integration: International Iron and Steel and Labor Migration in the Era of World War I', *American Historical Review* 98, no. 4 (1993): 1106–29; Wolfram Kaiser and Johan Schot (eds.), *Writing the Rules for Europe: Experts, Cartels and International Organizations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

[4] Derek B. Heater, *The Idea of European Unity* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1992); Roy H. Ginsberg, *Demystifying the European Union: The Enduring Logic of Regional Integration* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010); Anthony Pagden (ed.), *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[5] Angelo Metzidakis, 'Victor Hugo and the Idea of the United States of Europe', *Nineteenth-Century French Studies* 23, nos. 1/2 (1994–95): 72–84.

[6] See Patricia Wiedemer, 'The Idea Behind Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-European Union', *History of European Ideas* 16, nos. 4–6 (1993): 827–33. On other intellectuals in this period see Mark Hewitson and Matthew D'Auria (eds.), *Europe in Crisis: Intellectuals and the European Idea 1917–1957* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2012).

[7] Arthur Salter, *The United States of Europe and Other Papers* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1933).

political heavyweights like Aristide Briand, John Maynard Keynes, Jean Monnet and Winston Churchill.

It took the full horrors of the Second World War, however, and thereafter the challenges generated by the nascent Cold War divide, to bring about sufficient pressure to formalise these integrationist trends on a widespread scale.[8] A host of institutions and schemes soon sprung up designed to bring together European states in a bid to serve a multitude of economic, political, cultural and technical needs. For sure, many of these were Western in outlook. Amid mounting fears of communist expansion, for instance, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) sought to encourage intra-Western European trade. The Brussels Treaty Organisation (BTO) and subsequently the Western European Union (WEU), as with the wider North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), added a military edge to this economic cooperation. The Council of Europe was formed in 1949 to promote human rights and democracy, while the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) emerged in 1950 as a cultural basis for collaboration. Other regions of Europe were not immune, however. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) was to the Eastern bloc what the OEEC was to Western Europe. The Warsaw Pact offered a neat counterbalance to the WEU/NATO. By contrast, both the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and Conference on (later Organization for) Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE) drew members from both sides of the Iron Curtain. The fall of the Berlin Wall then ushered in a number of new alliances created by former Soviet satellites. The Central European Visegrad Group (V4) of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, like the Baltic Assembly members Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, certainly showed themselves keen to foster subregional unity, evoking similarities with associations like the Benelux Union established in 1944 and the Nordic Council founded in 1952. Even today the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) stands as an example of supranational European cooperation concentrated closer to the Pacific rather than Atlantic Ocean.

Given all this, it is perhaps a little surprising that the majority of writing on European integration history since the start of this century has focused almost exclusively on the evolution of one particular, and until recently geographically quite narrow organisation: the European Union (EU). Key

[8] For debates on exactly how this happened, Wolfram Kaiser and Antonio Varsori (eds.), *European Union History: Themes and Debates* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

debates in the literature have hence tended to centre on the diverse national interests which in 1950 drove just six Western European countries to negotiate what became the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and, some seven years later, create the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)—consolidated in 1967 in the European Communities (EC)—and thereafter the various internal and external battles fought to reform and expand that same organisation into one which until 2004 was still only a club of 15 mostly small West European states.[9] This picture may well have broadened in more recent years. We now have for instance a much better idea of the ways non-state actors like political parties and interest groups—often acting transnationally across national boundaries—were instrumental to and ultimately helped shape today's EU political system.[10] We also have a much greater sense of the institutional dimension of the EU, thanks in part to official histories sanctioned by the European Commission and the European Parliament (EP).[11] And there has likewise been a welcome recent shift in favour of studying the emergence of some of the most important early common policies pursued by EU states,

[9] On the issue of small states see Baldur Thorhallsson and Anders Wivel, 'Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and What Would We Like to Know?', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 19, no. 4 (2006): 651–68. The original six were France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

[10] See for example Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht and Morten Rasmussen (eds.), *The History of the European Union: Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950–72* (London: Routledge, 2009); Wolfram Kaiser and Jan-Henrik Meyer (eds.), *Societal Actors in European Integration: Polity-Building and Policy-Making 1958–1992* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

[11] Michel Dumoulin, Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, and European Commission, *The European Commission, 1958–72: History and Memories* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007); Éric Bussière, et al., *The European Commission 1973–86: History and Memory* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2014); European University Institute, *Building Parliament: 50 Years of European Parliament History, 1958–2008* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009). As far as supranational accounts of the early EU go, the best remain N. Piers Ludlow, *Dealing with Britain: The Six and the First UK Application to the EEC* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); N. Piers Ludlow, *The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist Challenge* (London: Routledge, 2006).

including in the realm of agriculture, social welfare and competition.[12] But the starting point nevertheless remains stubbornly EU-centric.

Against this backdrop, this edited collection, and the conference at the University of Helsinki upon which it is based, is designed as an exercise in looking beyond the EU and investigating in depth some of the various European structures which developed before and in parallel to it. Our participants, as with the chapters included in this volume, were driven by four overriding principles.

First was the desire to expose those other forms of European unity which clearly existed, and continue to do so, but have been generally sidelined by scholars. These include not only the various international organisations (IOs) mentioned above but various types of formal and informal cooperation like transnational party networks, cultural federations and trade and economic agreements.[13] Each in their own way has done much to enhance the unity and cohesion of particular concoctions of European states around a specific goal. Seldom have these different forms of collaboration been given the detailed academic treatment within the literature on European integration that they deserve. Important exceptions do of course exist. Most notable are those works produced in the 1990s as part of the Europe-wide *Identités européennes* or 'European identity' research project—led by Robert Frank and, before him, René Girault—which dwelt at length with several competitors of the early EU.[14] That this trend has since stalled, though, perhaps means that it is time to shift our attention from the EU and assess—even if momentarily—once more both the origins and internal workings of other European actors and agents and,

[12] Kiran Klaus Patel (ed.), *Fertile Ground for Europe? The History of European Integration and the Common Agricultural Policy since 1945* (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2009); N. Piers Ludlow, 'The Making of the CAP: Towards a Historical Analysis of the EU's First Major Common Policy', *Contemporary European History* 14, no. 3 (2005): 347–71; Kiran Klaus Patel and Heike Schweitzer (eds.), *The Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[13] On the different 'types' of IOs see Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations* (London: Penguin, 1998).

[14] Examples include René Girault (ed.), *Identité et conscience européennes au XXe siècle* (Paris: Hachette, 1994); Robert Frank (ed.), *Les identités européennes au XXe siècle* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2004); Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, Wilfried Loth and Raymond Poidevin (eds.), *Institutions européennes et identités europeennes* (Brussels: Emile Bruylant, 1998); Anne Deighton, *Building Postwar Europe: National Decision-Makers and European Institutions 1948–63* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995).

more broadly, how they might have influenced the political and institutional landscape of modern Europe.

A second characteristic binding the contributors to this volume was the sense that by concentrating so singly on the EC/EU framework we risk portraying it as the sole embodiment or inevitable outcome of European integration. It is not entirely uncommon to see the EU styled in the literature as the solitary success story of European cooperation.[15] Nor is it altogether surprising to see the so-called 'founding fathers' like Jean Monnet and former French Prime Minister Robert Schuman described as architects not just of the European Union per se but 'of the European integration project' in its entirety.[16] To be clear, the point we are making here should not be misinterpreted as EU-scepticism. Nor would we be so brash as to deny the sheer political, economic and cultural significance of the EU and its predecessors. On the contrary, by expanding the remit of European integration we can in fact help comprehend the environment in which the EU itself has emerged and better grasp the facets which make it so unique an organisation. At the same time, we want to emphasise that European integration, and indeed the very notion of Europe itself, is a contested one and that the values and goals of ever-closer union which have led to the creation of the European Union have not always been—and are unlikely in the future to be—universally embraced.[17] Studying the diverse models of

[15] For instance, a recent article by Manners and Murray details how the 'European integration narrative' is crucial for Europe and Europeans, but it continues to amplify the unproblematised link between Europe and the EU. See Ian Manners and Philomena Murray, 'The End of a Noble Narrative? European Integration Narratives after the Nobel Peace Prize', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 54, no. 1 (2015): 185–202.

[16] See for instance European Commission, 'Robert Schuman: The Architect of the European Integration Project', available at https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/robert_schuman_en.pdf (accessed 20 June 2018).

[17] On Europe as a contested concept, Michael J. Heffernan, *The Meaning of Europe: Geography and Geopolitics* (London and New York: Arnold, 1998); Evlyn Gould and George J. Sheridan (eds.), *Engaging Europe: Rethinking a Changing Continent* (New York: Lexington, 2007); Zeynep Arkan, 'Defining 'Europe' and 'Europeans': Constructing Identity in the Education Policy of the European Union,' *Federal Governance* 10, no. 2 (2013): 35–46. On the universality (or otherwise) of ever closer union, Desmond Dinan, Neill Nugent and William E. Paterson (eds.), *The European Union in Crisis* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); Ann Katherine Isaacs, Ewald Hiebl and Luisa Trindade, *Perspectives on European integration and European Union History* (Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2010); H.M. Government, 'Alternatives to Membership: Possible Models for the United Kingdom Outside the European Union' (2016), available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/504604/

European cooperation can consequently reveal much about the plural nature of European integration and the diverse ways of organising cooperation throughout the continent.

A third, related strand that united us was the feeling that European integration was, and still is, an all-European affair but has rarely been treated as such. The countries of the Eastern bloc eagerly took part in the CSCE for instance.[18] Some even chose to integrate into global trade regimes during the Cold War itself.[19] Long before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet system, in other words, Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries experimented with integration.[20] There was therefore logic to their decision to increase the pace and scope of such links in a post-Cold War setting. It is true of course that hopes of consolidating such historical ties were partly realised by the 2004 and 2007 waves of EU enlargement of which CEE states formed the bulk of the new intake. But as the above attests, these same countries have an 'integrative experience' well beyond their association with Brussels.[21] To relate European integration equitably with the integration schemes first devised by the EU's six founder members therefore risks overshadowing these experiences. Studying the formation and operation of the different examples of cooperation that emerged from behind the Iron Curtain

Alternatives_to_membership_-_possible_models_for_the_UK_outside_the_EU.pdf (accessed 20 June 2018).

[18] Csaba Békés, 'The Warsaw Pact and the CSCE Process from 1965 to 1979', in Wilfred Wilfried and Georges-Henri Soutou (eds.), *The Making of Détente: Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War*, 1965–75 (London: Routledge, 2008), 201–19.

[19] Leah A. Haus, *Globalizing the GATT: The Soviet Union's Successor States, Eastern Europe, and the International Trading System* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1992).

[20] There is currently a study on this subject underway at the European University Institute, Florence, led by Federico Romero and entitled 'Looking West: The European socialist regimes facing pan-European cooperation and the European Community'. For more see Angela Romano, *The European Community and Eastern Europe in the Cold War. Overcoming the East-West divide* (London and New York: Routledge, forthcoming 2020).

[21] Suvi Kansikas, 'The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance: A Restricted Cold War Actor', *Comparativ* 27, nos. 5–6 (2017): 84–100. We use 'Brussels' as a metonym to mean the current EU—parlance especially common in public, journalistic and political circles—given that it is considered the de facto capital of the Union. EU institutions are, however, seated in Frankfurt, Strasbourg and Luxembourg City, and EU agencies are spread across various member states.

or that worked across it should consequently go some way to illuminating an otherwise hidden aspect of European integration.[22]

The final point that ought to be added to this list relates to the chronological dangers of likening EU integration to European integration more generally. More than a handful of authors have located the dawning of integration to 1949–50 when, confronted variously by the nascent Cold War, burgeoning coal shortages, and the perceived ineptitude of the intergovernmental Council of Europe, Monnet sketched the first blueprints for the ECSC with its centralised high authority and embryonic incarnations of the EP, European Council and European Court of Justice.[23] Others did not hesitate to mark the golden jubilee of the signing of the Treaty of Rome by talking of '50 years of European integration', thereby homing in on 1957 as the genesis of the integration process.[24] Meanwhile, it has become all too common an occurrence to tell of how European integration was frustrated in the 1960s—thanks not least to the Machiavellian mischief of French President Charles de Gaulle—and thereafter almost terminated in the 1970s and 1980s, only to be revived in the mid- to late 1980s with the transformation of the EEC into the EU—all but ignoring many contemporaneous efforts to unite various European states and peoples.[25] And even in more recent times, Brexit has inevitably led to doom-mongers pronouncing the 'end of European integration' as we know it.[26]

The problem, as is well known, is that this narrative, even if a somewhat extreme characterisation, remains at best simple and at worse misleading.[27] For plenty of forms of European integration thrived both before and during these periods of history. That the creation of the Council of Europe—an organisation which gave the EU its flag and anthem—predates the EEC by nearly a decade alone suggests that European integration ought

[22] We appreciate the work done by historians of technology on shining a light on other forms of hidden integration such as unification through infrastructure, for instance Misa and Schot, 'Inventing Europe'.

[23] Mark Gilbert, 'Narrating the Process: Questioning the Progressive Story of European Integration', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 46, no. 3 (2008): 641–62.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Desmond Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2004).

[26] Frank Schimmelfennig, 'Brexit: Differentiated Disintegration in the European Union', *Journal of European Public Policy* 25, no. 8 (2018), 1154–73.

[27] Gilbert, 'Narrating the Process'.

not to be confined to the birth of the present-day EU.[28] Likewise, the formation of the European Space Agency (ESA) in 1975 offers an example of 'successful' integration that defies the oft-described picture of 'crisis' or 'stagnation' that we have become used to. European integration, in short, did not start in 1950; nor did it languish at key moments over the following decades. To that end, changes to the institutional makeup of the EU are unlikely to spell its end.

All told, then, this volume has four main goals. First and foremost it is a study of some of the numerous but sometimes still overlooked structures that have contributed to the unity of modern Europe. Second, the book is an attempt to understand and analyse the formation and evolution of these structures as important—though not always successful—forums in their own right, often with distinct, though no less valid, visions of how cooperation between European states ought to proceed. Third, the volume hopes to capture quite how much European integration has always been, and continues to be, a pan-European rather than exclusively West European affair. And last, it aims to complement those scholars who have already set about lengthening the trajectory and chronology of the integration process beyond the six decades that the EU has existed.

Widening the Scope of EC/EU Integration History

As we have already intimated, research within the field of European integration history, which has primarily been focused on EU history, has in the last decade or so advanced in terms of the scope, methodologies, frameworks as well as research objects.[29] The list of actors and institutions put under the scholarly microscope hence now include both supranational and non-state actors; the methodological scope goes beyond the earlier focus on diplomatic and economic history to include organisational and institutional history; and researchers have gradually included in their enquiries various policy fields and the role of EU law. In line with the cultural and transnational turns, the field is increasingly interested in perceptions,

[28] Kiran Klaus Patel, 'Provincialising European union: Co-operation and Integration in Europe in a Historical Perspective', *Contemporary European History* 22, no. 4 (2013): 649–73.

[29] Kaiser and Varsori (eds.), *European Union History*; Laurent Warlouzet, 'European Integration History: Beyond the Crisis', *Politique européenne*, 44 no. 2, (2014): I–XXV; Wilfried Loth, *Building Europe: A History of European Unification* (Berlin: De Gruyter 2015); Kiran Klaus Patel, 'Widening and Deepening? Recent Advances in European Integration History', *Neue Polit. Lit.* 64, (2019): 327–57.

identity, narratives and images of Europe. Thus, the field has developed to a stage where it can be considered mature and flourishing. Laurent Warlouzet even suggests that the widening of the field has reached a stage where it could be labelled more generically as European cooperation within which the study of the EC/EU would be just one subfield.[30]

Among the demands to enhance the scope of integration studies is the need to study the EU's relations with and contacts to the outside world. During its first decades, the history of the EU was studied as if it were isolated from other events that dominated the international history of the twentieth century and processes such as the Cold War.[31] This led to a situation in which the EC/EU was examined without paying due attention to the bidirectional flows of influence between it and other actors that exist on its periphery. Fortunately, this approach has now started to be challenged. Recently, we have witnessed a call put forward by leading scholars of contemporary Europe to 'provincialise' or somehow 'de-centre' the EU from the broader tale of European integration.[32] Kiran Klaus Patel, in his path-breaking 2013 article 'Provincialising European union', began to formulate a new research agenda to study the EU in its full international context—one, in other words, that proposed evaluating the links, networks, contacts, influence and dynamics that both historically and in more recent times have connected the EU to the outside world and which have 'energised, complemented or rivalled the efforts of the European Community'.[33] The aim, according to Patel, should be to show that while the EC/EU model is a unique form of international cooperation, it nonetheless does not exist in a vacuum: some of its policy innovations and responses have been formulated in contact with or as a reaction to external influences.[34] Similarly, the lack of research on the EU's relations with other IOs has been noted within the field of EU studies. A book edited by Amandine Orsini focuses on the EU's relations with United Nations organisations and asks how to study the causes, forms and effects of the

[30] Warlouzet, XIX.

[31] N. Piers Ludlow, 'Introduction', in N. Piers Ludlow (ed.), *European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik–Westpolitik, 1965–1973* (London: Routledge, 2007).

[32] Patel, 'Provincialising European union'. A similar but somewhat earlier criticism was contained in Wolfram Kaiser, 'From State to Society? The Historiography of European Integration', in Michelle Cini and Angela K. Bourne (eds.), *Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 190–208.

[33] Patel, 'Provincialising European union', 651.

[34] Ibid., 652.

EU's long-term participation with(in) IOs. According to Orsini, the research agenda of studying the EU as an international actor has been scattered and it has neglected the study of two parameters: 'the complexity of the international environment, and the historical dimension of the EU's participation in it'.[35] And the research agenda in the field of European integration history was pushed still further by Patel and Wolfram Kaiser in 2017, with a collection of articles that analysed the links between the EC and other regional organisations such as the Council of Europe, the OEEC and its successor, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and NATO. The aim was to point out how learning, diffusion of knowledge and ideas and other transnational influences travelled between IOs in Western Europe during the Cold War period.[36]

All of this means we have a pretty good sense of how the field of EU integration history has, since its inceptions in the 1970s, narrated the European integration process, and how it has recently responded to the critique about its narrow scope. And yet, vital work remains to be done. For while Patel and Kaiser's approach seeks in many ways to invigorate the study of the EC/EU itself, our aim has been to show that provincialising the European Union also requires us to deal with integration 'beyond Brussels'. The widening scope of research within the field has still not overcome the problem of EU-centricity. The central paradigm of the field is that European integration axiomatically only happens within or through the European Community/Union. As editors, we worked to position this book to scrutinise and dissect this paradigm and offer a more nuanced understanding of European integration. As a result, the approach taken in this collection is to focus on European actors and institutions and their efforts to foster unity, which do not necessarily have anything or very little

[35] Amandine Orsini, 'Introduction. Studying the EU with(in) International Organisations: Research Agenda', in Amandine Orsini (ed.), *The European Union with(in) International Organisations. Commitment, Consistency and Effects across Time* (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 1. For more on the EU's contribution to multilateralism see Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (eds.), *The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

[36] Wolfram Kaiser and Kiran Klaus Patel, 'Multiple Connections in European Cooperation: International Organizations, Policy Ideas, Practices and Transfers 1967–1992', *European Review of History* 24, no. 3 (2017): 337–57; Thomas Risse, 'De-centring the European Union: Policy Diffusion among European Regional Organizations – A Comment', *European Review of History* 24, no. 3 (2017): 472–83.

to do with EC/EU integration as such but which, we claim, should be labelled as European integration.

Accepting that European integration is more than EU-based cooperation has both practical as well as theoretical implications. To start, if we agree that there is more to European integration than just the EU, it is easier to admit that the EU cannot and will not accommodate every European country's preferences. Some aspiring members such as Turkey have been in the waiting room for decades, while countries in the post-Soviet space like Ukraine and Georgia are just entering the queue. Britain joined the now EU in 1973 but has since opted to leave. Russia has during most of the EC/EU's existence rejected it. Elaborating, as this book does, some of the multitude of ways that countries may cooperate with one another despite all this can give policymakers vital points of departure. What is more, studying European integration 'beyond Brussels' opens a new view into the study of the present. It is important to tease out forms of cooperation that have so far been hidden or neglected in the grand narrative of European integration, because we do not know which building-blocks of contemporary Europe will be important for European unity as well as Europeans in the future.

European Integration Beyond the EU

In designing a novel approach to European integration 'beyond Brussels', what we argue ultimately is that the term 'European integration' needs to regain its broader meaning. *Europe* is and should be more than the EU, and *integration* is more than Brussels-centred integration towards supranationalism. Here we acknowledge that we are aiming to reinvigorate a field that has systematically been building this exact paradigm of EU-centricity, which sees European integration as synonymous with the progress of the EC/EU integration. As Patel argues, the EEC and those representing it played a considerable role in making it the gold standard, turning itself 'into the symbolic core of all attempts of European co-operation'.[37]

The aim to broaden the scope of activities studied under the label of European integration resonates with a critique posed towards EU studies: the incongruity of the EU's and Europe's borders, geographically,

[37] Patel, 'Provincialising European union', 665–7.

politically as well as culturally.[38] The critique towards the frequent and ingrained use of the EU as a synonym for Europe, and the subsequent 'othering' of the non-EU parts of Europe, has been raised within the field of East European area studies.[39] While the Cold War seemed to divide the continent with a Berlin Wall, the East-West division dates back much longer—even to the era of the Enlightenment according to Larry Wolff's influential book *Inventing Eastern Europe*.[40] The collapse of communism seemed to dilute the need for this type of peripheralisation of Eastern Europe as the former communist countries adopted a 'return to Europe' onto the political agenda for their transition. However, the eastern enlargement of the EU has nevertheless 'intensified questions about the boundaries of Europe and Europeaness'.[41]

In our aim to broaden the scope of what counts as *European*, our contribution joins this critique of the narrow focus on the EU integration that takes a teleological view of the EU uniting Europe.[42] The individual chapters of the book depict a Europe from the 'Atlantic to the Urals', and even beyond, with Anna Lowry's contribution on the EAEU extending the geographic scope to Central Asia. In particular, the chapters bring new light on integration processes in the eastward part of the continent, which has so far been in the focus of integration studies only to the extent that the countries in the region have aligned themselves to Brussels-based organisations.[43]

[38] Noel Parker (ed.), *The Geopolitics of Europe's Identity: Centers, Boundaries, and Margins* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Mikael af Malmborg and Bo Stråth (eds.), *The Meaning of Europe: Variety and Contention Within and Among Nations* (Oxford: Berg, 2002).

[39] Pamela Ballinger, 'Recursive Easts, Shifting Peripheries: Whither Europe's 'Easts' and 'Peripheries'?' *East European Politics and Societies* 31, no. 1 (2017): 3–10. For more on 'othering' see Beyza Ç. Tekin, *Representations and Othering in Discourse: The Construction of Turkey in the EU Context* (Amsterdam: John Benjamin, 2010).

[40] Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994).

[41] Merje Kuus, 'Geopolitics Roundtable. Multiple Europes: Boundaries and Margins in European Union Enlargement', *Geopolitics* 10, no. 3 (2005): 567–70, here 567.

[42] Gilbert, 'Narrating the Process'. For an understanding of the long historical roots of the East-West divide, see Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe*.

[43] Eastern Europe thus entered the focus of EU studies at the turn of the 1990s when the collapse of communism for the first time opened the possibility of these countries joining the European Union. John Pinder, *The European Community and Eastern Europe* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs 1991); Heinz Kramer, 'The European Community's Response to the New Eastern Europe', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31, no. 2 (1993): 213–44; Peter van Ham, *The EC, Eastern Europe and European Unity. Discord, Collaboration*

The chapters in this book likewise focus on regional and subregional integration in Eastern and Western Europe as well as visions on and efforts and mechanisms towards all-European cooperation. They draw a vital picture of Europe, which consists of various subregions. Some are well-established with their own regional organisations, such as the Visegrad Group; others are more imagined such as 'Central Europe'.[44] It is here that our book contributes to another field within area studies that problematises the concept of *Europe* in a multidisciplinary framework, namely 'new regionalism'.[45] An article by Philippe De Lombaerde and others addresses the 'Eurocentric bias' within comparative regionalism by noting that much of the literature uses the EU experience as a basis of generalisations. The EU has become the gold standard for what integration is and what it aims at. Thus, as the authors point out, other modes of regionalism are compared to the EU standard, reflecting 'a teleological prejudice' which understands 'progress' in terms of EU-style institutionalisation.[46]

In our quest to broaden the definition of regional integration, we take as a starting point Leon Lindberg's definition of European integration to mean 'the development of devices and processes for arriving at collective decisions by means other than autonomous action by national governments'.[47] A large share of the literature on regional integration has originated in the study of economic integration and focused on the organisations' ability to influence market integration and create trade. Already early theorists of integration noted that the EEC had 'clearly emerged as the nucleus

and Integration Since 1947 (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993); Karen E. Smith, *The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1998); Jose I. Torreblanca, *The Reuniting of Europe. Promises, Negotiations and Compromises* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001).

[44] See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London and New York: Verso, 2006).

[45] Fredrik Söderbaum, *Rethinking Regionalism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

[46] Philippe De Lombaerde, Fredrik Söderbaum, Luk van Langenhove and Francis Baert, 'Problems and Divides in Comparative Regionalism', in Finn Laursen (ed.), *Comparative Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond* (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2010), 21–39. For a refreshing examination of the deployment (or not) of regionalism by scholars see Louise Fawcett, 'The History and Concept of Regionalism', *European Society of International Law Conference Paper Series*, no. 4 (2012), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2193746 (accessed 10 January 2020).

[47] Leon N. Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Integration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 5.

of integration efforts in Europe'.[48] Nevertheless, while some regional organisations do not even aim at economic integration—as Vinokurov and Libman argue in their study on regional economic organisations[49]—for many of them non-economic outcomes can be far more important. These organisations may be valuable for their members even though they do not produce any tangible outcomes in terms of their declared goals. The CMEA—an organisation dubbed a failure in terms of integration[50]—is a good example of this. For on the one hand recent scholarship shows that it did engage in admittedly fruitless discussions as to whether to develop supranational forms of economic integration.[51] Even so, following Vinokurov and Libman's classification,[52] the CMEA 'assume(d) political or even security functions'[53] and it could be seen a platform for 'facilitating communication among leaders during moments of crisis'.[54] Thus, the aim of this book is to underline the importance of the aims and processes towards integration and not just the outcome of the actions.

In practice, this sees the book mix chapters that do not refer or even relate to the common narrative of EU integration with those that deal with their respective IO's direct interaction with the EC/EU. Several chapters concentrating on subregional cooperation do not build on the general trends and progress of Brussels-based cooperation; others by contrast take the approach of distinguishing their respective form of integration in relation to the EC/EU. The chapters similarly provide a variety of ways and processes through which Europe has been unified, several of which do not entail the pooling of sovereignty or striving towards supranational decision-making according to the EC/EU model. As we shall see, unity has been produced by active mediation and bridge-building policies, by policymakers acting outside as well as within the formal

[48] Bela Balassa, 'European Integration: Problems and Issues', *The American Economic Review* 53, no. 2 (1963): 175–84, here 175.

[49] Evgeny Vinokurov and Alexander Libman, *Re-evaluating Regional Organizations: Behind the Smokescreens of Official Mandates* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

[50] Andre Steiner, 'The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance – An Example of Failed Economic Integration?', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 39, no. 2 (2013): 240–58.

[51] See special issue, edited by Uwe Müller and Dagmara Jajesniak-Quast, called 'The Comecon Revisited: Integration in the East Bloc and Entangled Global Economies', *Comparativ* 27, nos. 5–6 (2017).

[52] Vinokurov, Libman, *Re-evaluating Regional Organizations,* 2–3.

[53] Kansikas, 'The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance'.

[54] Elena Dragomir, 'Romania's Participation in the Agricultural Conference in Moscow, 2–3 February 1960', *Cold War History* 13, no. 3 (2013), 331–51.

framework of the EU, and even within the forum of East-West trade discussions. Unity has likewise been achieved by cooperation between parliamentary parties and other non-governmental organizations, through the exchange of ideas and practices, and through envisioning cooperative forms and models. Economic integration was also a political goal of the regimes on the other side of the Iron Curtain: for the centrally planned economies, integration could be pursued through planning and coordination on the intergovernmental level.[55] And while some of the individual chapters of the book focus on integration policies at the national level, there are many more that are interested in individuals traversing layers of power. Contributions towards unearthing the 'hidden integration' produced by technology, joining the call to 'transnationalise' European integration, also form part of the book.[56]

All the examples discussed in our book attest to European integration taking place and being actively produced at many levels above and beyond the nation state. Here we engage with the latest developments in the study of transnational history. De-centring the state is the main approach of transnational history. Influenced by the constructivist turn, scholars in the field since the end of the Cold War have been primarily interested in phenomena related to the non-material world: information flows and ideological change.[57] We join this field by analysing individuals, groups and trans- and sub-national actors that interacted across institutions, and by offering a novel periodisation without the state-centric, realist inclination towards wars and conflicts.[58] In this vein, the chapters of the book transcend boundaries within the Cold War and EU literature by focusing on continuities beyond the crucial turning points of 1945, 1950/57 and 1989.

While bringing a diverse group of chapters—and scholars and disciplines—together, we are fully aware that this volume is by no means

[55] For latest analyses of CMEA integration, see the special issue *Comparativ* 27, nos. 5–6 (2017).

[56] See the endeavours towards this end in the six-volume book series 'Making Europe' by Palgrave Macmillan, details of which are available at https://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14816 (accessed 20 June 2018).

[57] Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War', *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (1994): 185–214.

[58] Akira Iriye, 'Historicizing the Cold War', in Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

comprehensive in its coverage of European IOs. Several European organisations and subregions are not represented in the book. Nordic or Mediterranean cooperation, to name a few, are not covered. The book is also noticeably lacking chapters on the Council of Europe and the OEEC/OECD. The security aspect of European cooperation within the context of NATO, WEU or the Warsaw Pact is likewise missing. The scope is nevertheless broad enough to underline the fact that EU does not constitute Europe, and integration in its various forms happens 'beyond Brussels'. Moreover, many of the chapters do not fit into the chronology we are used to reading within European or Cold War history. This is because they, in line with transnational history, are more interested in progress and activities that are not generated by nation states: energy prices and technological progress for instance are global phenomena over which nation states seek to control but which are often driven by broader, global trends.

Structure of the Book

The book consists of three parts, which expose three distinct, though often interdependent, levels of European regionality: the pan-European, regional and subregional levels. Writing in 2009, Andrew Cottey stated that 'over the last twenty years or so regions, regionalism and regional integration have emerged as growing factors in global politics'.[59] Part of the explanation for this is doubtless the establishment of the European Union and the collapse of communism, which together opened the former eastern bloc to accession to the EU and NATO; research on regionalism and, by extension, subregionalism, flourished in tandem. The literature on regionalism has thus been much influenced by the existence of the EU as an integrative and co-optative institution. However, since a good portion of scholarship does tend to treat the EU as the major point of departure for European regionalism, we engage with this literature critically.[60] We of course accept the difficulty and contentious nature of defining what is a region and what is a subregion. But in line with the argument of this book—which is to look for unity processes beyond the EU—we adopt a

[59] Andrew Cottey, 'Sub-regional Cooperation in Europe: An Assessment', *Bruges Regional Integration and Global Governance Papers* no. 3 (2009), 6. The authors would like to thank Martin Dangerfield for bringing the literature on subregionalism to their attention.

[60] De Lombaerde, Söderbaum, van Langenhove and Baert, 'Problems and Divides in Comparative Regionalism'.

different view on the EU's role and place on the map of European regionalism. For instance we disagree with the literature that the EU alone constitutes integration on the European, macro-level—after all, at the time of writing it counts 27 out of 44 European countries among its membership.[61] This fact and more so its origins as a Western European club of six founding members designate it as a regional rather than a pan-European process. Because of all this, we use our three-level categorisation of European integration processes and regional organisations in order to represent the macro-, the meso- and the micro-levels. This division is based on the approach of multi-levelled interaction, which distinguishes between the focus area and ambitions of the IOs and other actors on the European continent.[62]

Part I, called 'Pan-European Ideas, Structures and Interactions', has four chapters which work on the all-European level, with a focus on either continent-wide projects or cooperation which breaks free of the East-West divide. The chapters form a picture of pan-European IOs as agents in East-West bridge-building. They begin with Daniel Stinsky's contribution (Chap. 2) on the UNECE, which in many ways was (and is) a remarkable body. After all, it was the first post-1945 IO dedicated to economic cooperation on the European continent whose evolution saw policymakers struggle head-on with what was meant by 'Europe'. While its value may have seemingly declined in the face of institutional competition from the subsequent creation of the OEEC and later the ECSC, so Stinsky argues, the UNECE nevertheless carved out a niche for itself in fostering international technical cooperation. Its first Executive Secretary, Gunnar Myrdal, indeed consciously saw its role less as a grand vision of 'unity' than as a practical, technical way for European states from both sides of the Iron Curtain to work together despite the broader antagonisms and misunderstandings of the developing Cold War.

Chapter 3 by Philippe Vonnard picks up on this pan-European dynamic but concentrates on cultural cooperation. More specifically, he examines

[61] Cottey, 'Sub-regional Cooperation in Europe', 9.

[62] Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy, 'Introduction: The Cold War from a New Perspective', in Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy (eds.) *Reassessing Cold War Europe* (London: Routledge, 2011), 1–15. The meso-level is a relevant category also for instance in the history of technology. For example Thomas Misa, 'Retrieving Sociotechnical Change from Technological Determinism', in Leo Marx and Merritt Roe Smith (eds.), *Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism* (Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1998), 115–41.

the early years of the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), formed in 1954, and its European Champions Clubs' Cup—a competition which included football teams from both Eastern and Western Europe—televised on another European platform: the *Eurovision* network of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU). Vonnard traces the negotiations between UEFA and the EBU—a less appreciated example of IO-IO interaction—which led to the televising of football matches, favoured by the latter for their ostensibly apolitical content and acknowledged by both as having the capacity to improve understanding and appreciation of other 'European' nations.

Taking a slightly different route, Chap. 4 by Alexandra Athanasopoulou Köpping tells a new story of the Socialist Group of the European Parliament, and in particular the efforts of its members to engage in parliamentary diplomacy via East-West party networks such as the Socialist International—all of which the Socialist Group used to build bridges towards the Soviet Union. The chapter challenges the teleological view that the EP gained international, diplomatic agency only after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992/93 and shows the informal, extra-EU role played by Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Meanwhile, Chap. 5 on the OSCE, written by Emma Hakala, argues that the organisation had an integrative and Europeanising role in the reconstruction of post-war Balkans. Due to the organisation's wide mandate and membership, it has used its position as a bridge-builder to promote European norms and values in the region and to assist the countries' EU accession goals.

Part II, entitled 'Imagining, Negotiating and Building Regional Integration', consists of those chapters which focus on what might be called meso-level integration projects, pertaining more closely to the East-West political blocs in Europe. Chapters 6 and 7 deal with Western European-centric cooperation, beginning with the piece by Ettore Costa on the British Labour Party and the formative years of the Socialist International (SI). Costa asserts that the social democratic network became a space for discussion about European cooperation, and that exposure to this network itself also helped define Labour's views on the matter. In so doing, he adds crucial nuances to our understanding of Labour's oft-perceived 'rejection' of unity in the 1950s; rather, together with several of its counterparts within the SI, Labour developed a vision of integration that was both rational and robust in supporting cooperation of sorts even though this did not necessarily coincide with the vision then

driving the six members of the ECSC. This latter conclusion overlaps considerably with the argument made by Juhana Aunesluoma in his examination of the European Economic Area (EEA) treaty, a project designed by the European Commission in late-1980s to build a bridge between the European Community and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). At its heart, Aunesluoma claims, was an understanding that some countries in Western Europe were then unlikely to be able to join the Community in the medium term. While its longevity—surviving as it does to the modern day—may well have surprised its creators, it nonetheless became a less political and less supranational framework for countries aiming to achieve similar economic goals. This is, in other words, a prime example of integration 'by other means'.

Chapters 8 and 9 then examine the Eastern portion of the continent. In his chapter, Falk Flade analyses in particular the CMEA's transnational energy infrastructures: the electricity grid 'Mir' (Peace), crude oil pipeline 'Druzhba' (Friendship) and the gas pipeline 'Soyuz' (Union). These were the most successful results of Eastern bloc economic integration, which worked to counter Western arguments that CMEA integration was a failure. Crucially, though, this was not based on free-market integration—which is the basic premise of many economic integration theories—but, in the case of cross-border infrastructure projects, was built through mutual collaboration and investments of CMEA members, the result of which was 'hidden integration'. The following contribution by Anna Lowry picks up this discussion by analysing the common industrial and innovation policies of the members of the present-day Eurasian Economic Union, elaborated through their adoption and participation in so-called Technology Platforms. The chapter argues for a non-EU centric approach to integration, which acknowledges the members' stage of development as transitioning countries, their position as commodity exporters and the power and resource asymmetry between Union members, while making the argument that smaller EAEU members see benefits in joining the Russian-led bloc as a way to improve their positions in global value chains.

'European Integration At and Around the Subregional Level', the name of Part III, in turn analyses European integration on the micro-level of the regional hierarchy. In doing so, it distinguishes cooperation between entities whose membership is typically based on contiguity and a shared sense of belonging. Subregions are 'sub-sets of a larger regional space' that usually have broad agendas but are less institutionalised and deal with

low-level politics.[63] Of the four chapters in this section, Chaps. 10 and 11 grapple with subregional cooperation during the Cold War. Pauli Heikkilä's chapter centres on proposals outlined by *émigrés* for a Central European federation in the 1950s, studying these via the four main party coalitions through which political emigrants tended to congregate. Heikkilä traces the origins of the proposals, teases out the shared aims of the four coalitions—which included social democrats, liberals, peasants and Christian democrats—but also ponders the reasons why these ideas never really gained traction. Despite 'failing', the chapter nevertheless highlights that emigrants had a very clear sense of how their own subregion and the European continent more generally ought to integrate—visions that were not always shared or welcomed by their Western European counterparts. John Krige's chapter also concentrates on an ultimately rather disappointing venture: the European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO). This was launched to make use of what was left from Britain's cancelled *Blue Streak* missile programme, and promised to allow its members to develop a satellite launch vehicle as a way of competing with American, Soviet and Japanese space technology. In tracing the early history of the ELDO, Krige shows the inconsistencies of Britain's approach to the project. The chapter's value is in showing the lessons of this story in terms of understanding Britain's wider approach to European integration and, more generally, the struggles between countries as they cooperated on scientific projects as a distinct example of cooperation beyond the strict confines of the EEC/EU.

The remaining two chapters then deal with Central East European subregional cooperation, of which currently the best-known example is the Visegrad Group. In Chap. 12, Katalin Miklóssy gives a long-term view into the external and internal impulses that have led to the countries' interest in subregional cooperation and the various cooperation forms and initiatives that these countries have been involved in during their history. Chapter 13 by Martin Dangerfield on the other hand dives deep into the substance and activities of the Visegrad. With a focus on intra-group societal and cultural cooperation including Grant and Partnership schemes, cooperation with non-participants (so-called Visegrad+) and defence cooperation, the chapter shows how the organisation contributes to the

[63] Cottey, 'Sub-regional Cooperation in Europe', 6.

EU-level integration process while also complementing it by filling some gaps that the EU does not provide.

In our concluding chapter (Chap. 14), Anne Deighton then reflects on some of the key findings that these authors present and some of the implications of the book for our understanding of the past, current and future European integration process.