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## **Migrant rights, voting, and resocialization: suffrage in Chile and Ecuador, 1925-2020**

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## Conclusion

Voting from abroad for nonresident nationals occurs for more than 120 territories and immigrant voting in almost 50 (Arrighi and Bauböck 2017, GLOBALCIT 2019). The expanding phenomenon of migrant enfranchisement unbundles rights from territory for emigrants, allowing them to take suffrage with them abroad; for immigrants, states grant rights based on residency, largely unbundling suffrage from nationality (Beckman 2006, Maas 2013, Caramani and Grotz 2015, Vink 2017). Migrant political participation affects democratic decision-making and electoral outcomes in two polities, reasons for which both migrant enfranchisement and migrant voting merit scholarly research.

Migrant voters are unique from other voters since they face additional factors that influence their electoral decisions and because they hold suffrage rights in two countries. Most studies on this topic have focused on either emigrants or immigrants, mostly in advanced democracies and primarily at the local level. I considered individuals as both emigrants for the origin country and immigrants in the residence country. My goal has been to unpack why migrants decide to vote or abstain in either the origin or residence country, in both, or in neither.

To collect data on migrant voters, I examined Chile and Ecuador because both countries grant immigrants multilevel voting rights after a five-year residence. Most are South Americans who also hold emigrant voting rights, making these two countries likely cases in which to find individuals who have dual transnational voting rights in national-level elections. The case studies shed light on the legal and normative origins of migrant enfranchisement, differences among the migrant voting variants, and how political (re)socialization processes help explain why migrants vote and change voting behavior over time.

Given I have focused on migrant rights, voting, and political resocialization, I review these in the next three sections. I highlight the similarities and differences from the case studies of Chile and Ecuador. Thereafter, I summarize my argument about the migrant resocialization process and how it applies to other contexts. I conclude by outlining how this dissertation opens future lines of research.

### **Migrant Suffrage Rights:**

#### **Comparing Enfranchisement in Chile and Ecuador**

Since migrants must have suffrage rights before they can vote, I conducted historical analyses of migrant enfranchisement in both case studies of Chile (1925–2017) and Ecuador (1998–2008). Palop-García and Pedroza (2019) outline three steps to enfranchise emigrants: legislation must be 1) passed,

2) regulated, and 3) applied. I used the same steps not only for emigrant but also for immigrant enfranchisement. Countries can get caught in debate before enacting enfranchisement (Pedroza 2019), stagnate between steps (Finn 2020b, Umpierrez de Reguero unpublished), experience rights reversal (Brand 2006, 2010, Hayduk 2006, 2015), or fluctuate between granting, repealing, then again granting migrant suffrage (Wellman 2015, 2021).<sup>84</sup> Beginning the process does not guarantee that immigrants or emigrants will eventually exercise suffrage rights in local, national, or multilevel elections—or that they will continue to vote in the given country. Both Chile and Ecuador have completed all three migrant enfranchisement steps.

Both Chile and Ecuador grant foreign residents multilevel suffrage after a five-year residence, regardless of naturalization decisions or origin-country nationality (after meeting basic requirements such as age). Along with Malawi, New Zealand, and Uruguay, this ranks Chile and Ecuador among the most inclusive polities, at least on paper, for immigrant suffrage worldwide (Arrighi and Bauböck 2017). Dozens of other countries offer select immigrant groups the right to vote but typically restrict it based on nationality, especially throughout the Commonwealth and in the European Union; the latter also typically restricts denizen voting to local-level elections.

Immigrants in both Chile and Ecuador comprise primarily South Americans with a low or no language barrier for becoming or staying informed about politics. Moreover, most immigrants had been impacted by the effects of nondemocracy, either through first-hand experiences or indirectly from parents and relatives living under such regimes. Such political learning enriched the migrants' in-depth responses regarding their (re)socialization processes, incorporating comparative views of political leaders, institutions, and the role of government.

Aside from such commonalities, Chile and Ecuador differ in important ways, making them two separate case studies. They granted suffrage rights at different times and for different reasons (see Table 2.1 and 3.1 for legal milestones in each country). Chile first granted rights to immigrants; the steps occurred in 1925 (enacted), 1934 (regulated), and 1935 (applied) for local-level elections and respectively in 1980, 1988, and 1988 at the national level (Courtis 2017, Finn 2020b). These earlier

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<sup>84</sup> To understand why states grant migrant suffrage rights, see the theoretical and normative studies of, e.g., López-Guerra (2005), Bauböck (2007, 2015), Beckman (2007), and Owen (2012), as well as Bender (2021) arguing for refugee suffrage. There are also many analyses on migrant enfranchisement drivers, patterns, and timing (e.g., Calderón Chelius 2003, 2019, Earnest 2008, 2015a, Rodríguez 2010, Stuhldreher 2012, Escobar 2015, Lafleur 2015, McMillan 2015, Turcu and Urbatsch 2015, Koopmans and Michalowski 2016, Mosler and Pedroza 2016, Erlingsson and Tuman 2017, Belton 2019).

dates make the country a world pioneer of immigrant suffrage rights, alongside other countries such as New Zealand (in 1853). After various failed attempts, Chile completed the three steps for emigrant enfranchisement in 2014, 2016, and 2017 (Toro and Walker 2007, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] 2015, 2016). Ecuador first enfranchised emigrants by completing the three steps in 1998, 2000/2002, and 2006, then immigrants in 2008, 2009, and 2009 (Palop-García and Pedroza 2019, Ramírez and Umpierrez de Reguero 2019, Umpierrez de Reguero and Dandoy 2020). Since 2008, Ecuador also reserves legislative seats in the National Assembly to represent emigrants in their own overseas district, as the country's Fifth Region (Boccagni and Ramírez 2013, Collyer 2014a, Palop-García 2017, 2018, Umpierrez de Reguero *et al.* 2017). Chile thus experienced a long 92-year road whereas Ecuador had a relatively short 11-year road to migrant enfranchisement.

The reasons behind Ecuador's migrant enfranchisement corresponded with democracy, migrants' human rights, and inclusion. In contrast, immigrant enfranchisement in Chile had little to do with civic engagement in democratic processes in the 1920s and was extended in the 1980s regardless of the minute immigrant population size. It instead reflected a longer path dependence, dating back at least a century of normative views shaping migrant-related legislation. Early accounts outline that nineteenth-century migration legislation aimed at attracting white skilled Europeans as part of Chile's legal nation-building project (Lara Escalona 2014, Durán Migliardi and Thayer 2017, Acosta 2018), then including some foreigners into legal definitions of who is considered 'Chilean' as early as the 1822 Constitution (Courtis 2017).

I present the path dependence finding while considering, and agreeing with, Vink (2017, p. 229) that "understanding citizenship regimes requires a context-sensitive approach." This insight does not make path dependency arguments irrelevant but rather highlights that previous citizenship rights, including political inclusion, can change in the future since the target group of these rights change over time, given the "contested and changing reality" (Vink 2017, p. 230). When the Commission was reviewing the 1833 Constitution to draft the 1925 Constitution, political elites' normative viewpoints about nationals versus foreigners' rights and obligations to the state set enduring norms (Finn 2020b), including understandings of which migrants belong to the demos. Yet notions slowly change over time, for instance when Chile included emigrants in 2014–2017 and contrarily, could eliminate long-standing immigrant suffrage in the future.

## The Four Types of Migrant Voting

Facing the choice to vote or abstain in origin-country elections as an emigrant (nonresident national), and the same choice in residence-country elections as an immigrant (foreign resident), creates four options. I capture these in a collectively exhaustive migrant voting typology (Finn 2020a): 1) immigrant voting, or foreign residents or naturalized persons participating only in the residence country; 2) emigrant voting, or nonresident nationals participating only in the origin country from abroad; 3) dual transnational voting, or migrant voters participating in both countries; and 4) abstention, or migrants choosing not to vote in either country despite having suffrage rights (see Figure 1 in the Introduction).

The typology has advanced conceptualizing noncitizenship and citizenship. As Tonkiss and Bloom (2015) argue, noncitizenship represents its own independent analytical category that does not require citizenship as a starting point. As a bundle of rights, citizenship can correspond to both nationals (those with a certain nationality, evidenced, for example, by holding a passport) as well as non-nationals. Foreign residents exercising voting rights in a growing number of countries creates (or expands) the notion of non-national citizens. While emigrant voting requires the nationality of the origin country, denizen voting does not when non-naturalized foreign residents can vote in residence-country elections. Changing the rights individuals hold affects their citizenship, without changing their nationality. Since nationality alone does not define membership in the demos (Beckman 2006), citizenship as nationality cannot comprise the core of analyses of membership or rights, or of exercising those rights.

Building from Pedroza's (2019) analysis of 'citizenship beyond nationality' that examines debates on denizen enfranchisement, and recognizes that citizenship also includes membership and identity, I highlight that not just gaining rights but *exercising* suffrage rights matters for conceptualizing citizenship. I emphasize citizenship as a bundle of rights because voters may be a (non-)national of a certain country; having and using political rights means migrant voters are citizens. In contemporary times, foreigners can more often gain membership either through naturalizing or residence (Pedroza 2013, Huddleston and Vink 2015) (see Table 2.2). Migrant voting has further deconstructed part of the concept of citizenship as nationality since casting a vote from abroad and active denizen voting are valid alternative ways to be active members of the demos.

The typology also has two empirical uses, both of which I exploit in this analysis. With two different goals, I chose two methods, both using migrant voting as the dependent variable. First, I applied the migrant voting typology to examine differences among migrant voters. Using original

survey data from Chile, I evaluated the independent variables of knowledge of voting rights in the residence country, linguistic communication, interest in politics, intention to stay, and in-country tenure (see Appendix 2.10 and 2.11). The online survey—designed in Qualtrics and advertised through Facebook—was available for five days in both November and December 2017, aligning with Chile’s two rounds of the presidential election (see Appendix 2.6–2.8). Chileans living abroad voted for the first time in national-level elections in 2017, which drew attention to the phenomenon of migrant voting, even though immigrants had been voting in Chile for over eighty years. Survey Respondents qualified by meeting the voting age and being foreign-born but currently residing in Chile, resulting in 1,482 completed surveys. Of those, 680 migrants had voting rights in national-level elections in two countries (see Appendix 2.10). To analyze the group in Chapter 2, I drew on the typology’s first use of showing a snapshot in time. Classifying migrants in only one quadrant for any election demonstrates *which* migrants vote or abstain and where.

The cognitive learning process and linguistic communication related to immigrants’ understanding and involvement in the political world shed more light on migrant voting than language fluency. As native speakers in a region of linguistic variation within Spanish, the survey responses revealed informal linguistic barriers to interacting with formal political channels. The survey asked about migrants’ self-reported ability “to communicate clearly and coherently” in Spanish in Chile. While low communication created informal barriers to politics with Chileans and in Chilean spaces of political debate, it did not blockade electoral participation for the group. The larger takeaway would be that while fluency creates a formal barrier to immigrants’ electoral participation, I find that linguistic communication presents an informal barrier to becoming embedded into residence-country politics. As language and linguistic particularities are woven into a country’s cultural ‘code,’ fluency represents a poor measure of (political) belonging or integration. Instead, the resocialization learning process better explains how immigrants embed themselves in the residence country, interact with ‘locals’, and participate in formal channels.

Second, I attempt to explain how and why factors affect individual migrant decisions to vote in one, both, or neither country. I analyzed in-depth interviews, occurring between June and October 2019 with 71 foreign residents in Ecuador, to unpack the reasons migrants give for voting and their political (re)socialization processes. Interviewees qualified if they were of voting age and currently living in Ecuador but grew up in Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Peru, or Venezuela. Variation in democracy, hybrid regimes, and authoritarianism attempted to capture migrants’ political learning experiences from, and effects of, (non)democracy over time and across borders. To analyze the group, I classified

migrants into the four migrant voting types and outlined their *motives* to vote in one, both, or neither country in Chapter 3. Thereafter, in Chapter 4, I drew on the typology's second use of tracking movements between quadrants throughout a migrant's voting life over political resocialization. I separately discussed migrants' authoritarian imprints which seemed to endure but not determine migrant voter turnout decisions.

Combined with the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 1, these analyses shed light on migrant rights, voting, and political resocialization. The migrant voting typology itself entails the primary contribution, due to its conceptual implications and usefulness for empirical applications.<sup>85</sup> I then started to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for migrant voting. Resources and ties—i.e., connections to a territory or nation-state as well as to people within it—form a necessary condition for migrant voting and moreover, determine which of the four migrant voting types a migrant belongs, at any given moment (see Figure 1.2). Holding enough ties in the origin country results in emigrant voting, whereas ties in the destination country can lead to immigrant voting. Ties in both relates to dual transnational voting. I further elaborate on this argument in Chapter 3 by outlining the reasons that migrants provide when asked why they vote or abstain (see Table 3.3; Section 3.3). I claim that resources and a motive form a sufficient condition for migrant voting. I draw these conclusions based on my findings of the overlaps and differences between the case studies.

### **Migrant Voting:**

#### **Comparing Individual-Level Turnout and Ties in the Case Studies**

Acknowledging that more international migrants face a choice of voting or abstaining in two countries—and that voting in *both* places matter for democracy—means recognizing the four distinct types of migrant voting behavior. The most novel quadrant is dual transnational voting. In both Chile and Ecuador, dual transnational voting occurred more frequently than expected, although the data were non-representative. Examining the survey data from Chile and interview data from Ecuador using the migrant typology yielded the following results:

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<sup>85</sup> Migrant political engagement literature has grown over the last two decades (as noted throughout this dissertation, e.g., Guarnizo *et al.* 2003, 2019, Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, Hayduk 2006, Tsuda 2012, Bilgili 2014, Escobar *et al.* 2015, Gamlen 2015, McIlwaine and Bermudez 2015, McMillan 2015, Waldinger 2015, Paarlberg 2017, Chaudhary 2018, Peltoniemi 2018b, McCann *et al.* 2019, Mügge *et al.* 2019, Ramírez and Umpierrez de Reguero 2019, Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020, Finn 2020a, McCann and Jones-Correa 2020; Besserer 2021; Fliess 2021; Jakobson *et al.* 2021; Szulecki *et al.* 2021). It seems that the trend will continue, presenting ample opportunities to apply the migrant voting typology.



- **Chile survey data:** Out of 658 potential migrant voter Respondents, most were classified as emigrant voters, with 332 reporting having voted only in origin-country elections. 201 were dual transnational voters who had participated in both countries, followed by 93 who abstained and 32 immigrant voters who reported having voted only in Chile (the residence country) (see Figure 2.2).
- **Ecuador interview data:** Out of 58 Interviewees with voting rights in two countries, the largest group were dual transnational voters (26 Respondents), followed by 16 immigrant voters, 10 emigrant voters, and 6 in abstention. Projecting into the future, all planned to be active voters, especially dual transnational voters, corresponding to 41 Respondents (see Figure 4.2 and 4.3).

The inherent duality of international migration signals that political engagement is more costly for migrant voters than for other (non-migrant) voters. One factor of voting behavior is having resources, and allocating some toward voting, such as money spent for transportation to a voting location and time spent on becoming and staying politically informed. For migrants, such resources again must exist in not only one but two countries. This information can be difficult to obtain and understand for origin-country voting procedures when living abroad (since emigrant voting differs from their previous in-country voting as resident nationals) as well as in the residence country for immigrant voting since the entire system and institutions are new. Trade-offs for voting are the forgone resources used to register, stay informed, and vote that would have been spent on other activities. Gaining knowledge of new systems and in two places simultaneously means migrant voting requires even more resources. Over time, more established immigrants have more time and resources to get involved and participate in origin-country politics (Escobar *et al.* 2014, McCann *et al.* 2019).

Following politics in two countries is time-consuming in practice and, moreover, interest may not lead to participation in both countries (Jakobson and Kalev 2013, Waldinger and Soehl 2013, McIlwaine and Bermudez 2015). While dual transnational voting implies that migrants stay involved in both countries simultaneously, forming and maintaining dual identities, duties, and ties to people and places requires effort. To ease the burden, states, organizations, and political parties attempt to connect with migrants, especially emigrants, being strategic in targeting larger populations in popular destination countries (e.g., Tintori 2011, van Haute and Kernalegenn 2020, Yener-Roderburg 2020). State-led diaspora politics and institutions abroad can convey information and strengthen transnational connections (Fauser 2013, Délano and Gamlen 2014, Adamson 2016, Burgess 2018) or attempt to control them (see, e.g., Brand 2006, Liu 2020, Tsourapas 2020). Institutional changes such as granting voting rights, special emigrant representation, and easing registration increases migrant

voting (Lafleur 2013, Collyer 2014a, Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019, Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020). Party-led outreach such as electoral campaigning abroad can stir higher emigrant turnout (Burgess 2018, Paarlberg 2019, Burgess and Tyburski 2020); such evidence points to new dynamics of party politics abroad (Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020), expanding well beyond national bounded territories. Using Rosenblatt's (2018) notion of 'vibrant parties', political parties are targeting emigrant voters, many striving to become vibrant parties abroad. In response, migrants act within these political opportunity structures and exercise agency within legal and institutional bounds, deciding to vote or abstain in each election.

Based on the literature and my fieldwork, I posit resources combined with ties to people or places in one or both countries might constitute a necessary condition (see Figure 1.2) and having resources and a motive to vote might be conceived as a sufficient condition for migrant voting (as outlined in Chapter 3). When asked why they vote or abstain, migrants give reasons to explain their electoral behavior. Drawing on the open-ended interview questions, three reasons stand out as the strongest for accounting for migrants' decision to vote (see Table 3.3): 1) migrants have ties to people, mostly family, living in the country; 2) migrants have deeply rooted ties to a territory through ideas of citizenship, nationality, and the nation, as well as civic duty; and 3) migrants are invested in creating a flourishing future for the country—both a stronger democracy and stable economy. A secondary reason is a reaction to formal recognition, meaning migrants feel inclusion or belonging shortly after enfranchisement, motivating them to participate. Bureaucratic reasons include concerns about avoiding fines (whether or not the fine would logistically reach them) and voting only to obtain a voting certificate. The voting certificate in Ecuador is commonly requested when completing other bureaucratic tasks, like opening a bank account. Although foreign residents have optional voting, migrants reported that other people are unaware of this fact, believing it mandatory for everyone. While these were mostly specific to country contexts and electoral rules—or misunderstandings of those rules—the reasons could also be prevalent elsewhere with similar settings.

Within territorial ties, there are variation and overlaps between immigrant and emigrant voting. Immigrants' ties correspond with residence and belonging as a foreign resident whereas emigrants' ties relate more to nationality and belonging, despite living abroad. Immigrants spoke more frequently about trust in the voting process and compared the origin and residence countries' institutional and legal frameworks and transparency. Emigrants focused more on obligations or responsibilities to the origin country, often framing it still as "their" country. Responses were divided yet often came from the same individuals, highlighting the duality of migrants' lives and the separation of voting in two

countries. It also signals scholars to keep studying the four types of migrant voting and understand the possibility of dual transnational voting, rather than only analyzing immigrant or emigrant voting. A significant overlap in motivating factors among emigrant and immigrant voters was a sense of civic duty to continue voting over time, not only in the origin but also in the residence country. The rights-responsibilities balance between the migrant and a state can emanate from both the emigrant-origin country and the immigrant-residence country relation.

The Interviewees' multiterritorial ties to the territory and to people within it seem to be 'mutually reinforcing' within a country (using terminology from Tsuda 2012)—migrant voters who establish social belonging (e.g., through forming a family) in the destination country may then develop a sense of belonging to the nation-state. However, ties alone do not necessarily instigate voter turnout. McIlwaine and Bermudez (2015), after interviewing Colombians living in London and Madrid, propose that emigrant voting is just one way of “expressing citizenship” since migrants convey belonging to the origin country through nationality (“feeling Colombian”) but still abstain. In my group of Interviewees, I find that when territorial connections increase because of a real or imagined return to the origin country, it increases emigrant voting and abstention in the residence country, indicating that belonging is not a sufficient condition for emigrant voting.

Ties and notions of nationality, as linked with citizenship practices, become more complex under shifting (non)democratic political regimes. Regardless of their sense of civic duty or attachment to a country (which does not necessarily entail the state or government), individuals can lose their willingness to politically participate under nondemocratic regimes. Moving to democracy brings *tangible* benefits, as Bilodeau (2014, p. 361) outlines, such as guaranteeing rights and freedoms, and *symbolic* benefits like “the hope for a better life.” Most of the 71 Interviewees moved from a less or nondemocratic country to a more democratic country (see Table 3.4) and their responses support Bilodeau's results. Despite a possible social desirability bias, many Interviewees seemed to appreciate the freedom to voluntarily participate in free and fair elections and the ability to choose who they consider the best candidate. They maintain connections and duty to the origin country and some vote from abroad, even in electoral autocracies (e.g., some Venezuelan Interviewees). Within my data, the symbolic benefits of a better life in the residence country live on; migrants reported strong commitments to a flourishing future (in terms of a stronger democracy and economy) that solidified as a main reason for migrant voting.

Multiterritorial voting was previously downplayed in migration and electoral studies, but the category of dual transnational voting is essential in demonstrating that migrant voting in one country

can be independent from electoral decisions in another country, even though it is the same individual voting in both places. While a trade-off between voting in two places may occur—especially since getting and staying involved in politics in two places requires more resources and time for migrants—I suggest that for individual-level migrant turnout, a trade-off between voting in the origin and residence countries does *not* organically emerge over time. In my interview data, migrants separated their motives for voting; for example, they distinguished between ties based on civic duty and belonging to a place based on their role as an emigrant or immigrant (see Table 3.3). I find that one membership, belonging, or sense of duty does not replace previous ones, but rather they can co-exist (also see Tsuda 2012, Bilgili 2014, Umpierrez de Reguero *et al.* 2020).

Over time, rather than a trade-off or replacement, migrants changed their positioning and motives to vote in one country or both countries. I show this (in Figure 4.2 and 4.3) by using the migrant voting typology as a framework to track changes in migrant voting over time in two countries and compare prior migrant voting to future intention to vote. I attempt to understand individual-level decisions to vote or abstain in the country or countries of choice by asking why a migrant would land in one quadrant and not another in the typology. Three principal movements through the migrant voting typology exist: 1) migrants abstain then vote (in one country to both), 2) they vote (in one country to both) then abstain, or 3) they move among the three active types of migrant voting: emigrant, immigrant, and dual transnational.

For emigrants, some studies show that transmigrant activities and engagement across borders are practiced only by a small exclusive group (as mentioned, Guarnizo *et al.* 2003, Waldinger 2008). Chaudhary (2018) combines the contrasting research outcomes stemming from assimilationist versus complementary views but reports evidence for both, leaving the debate unresolved. Moreover, Chaudhary (2018) uses citizenship (as nationality) acquisition and associational membership to measure political and civic engagement in Europe, which limits explaining migrant voting outcomes elsewhere. This line of research also continues an unbalanced focus on ‘integration’ in the residence country, as Erdal (2020) highlights. Instead, following Finn (2020a) and Umpierrez de Reguero and colleagues (2020), equalizing the origin and residence countries allows for analysis of individuals’ turnout as an immigrant and emigrant voter. Combining both immigrant and emigrant voting for Interviewees (a group interested in politics and with high prior voting), asking about their future intention to vote revealed a strong convergence toward dual transnational voting.

Overall, it seems that migrants evaluate current country-specific politics when deciding to vote, making their electoral decisions geographically bounded and independent. No Interviewees reported

voting in the origin country simply because they vote in the residence country, or vice versa. Very few Interviewees reported abstention in both countries because of an uninterest in politics (granted, the social desirability bias could have affected their reported positions); those self-identified as apolitical showed a general uninterest, not an aversion or dislike of politics that arose in one country and then filtered to the other. Similarly, the underlying reasons for voting among those reporting a high interest in politics were familial ties, territorial ties, and strong beliefs in using formal voice to participate in democracy. However, this finding should be further tested elsewhere and with other data, as both groups reported high education, an interest in politics, and almost all of them faced a low or no language barrier to gain political knowledge. In other words, these migrants could have been more pre-disposed to vote in both places.

My analyses strongly align with work emphasizing the *simultaneity* of dual engagement in the origin and residence countries (e.g., Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004, Tsuda 2012, Bilgili 2014, Erdal 2020). Simultaneity is a key component differentiating migrants from other voters, in turn nuancing studies on migrant voting processes and outcomes. Political involvement also stretches into and across spaces that international migration and migrants create and sustain *between* countries, as depicted in Figure 1.3 (Faist 1998, 2000, Smith 2003, Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004, Waldinger 2008, 2015, Erdal and Oeppen 2013, Fauser 2013, Jakobson and Kalev 2013, Paul 2013). Migrants' unique positions within these spaces have "familial, socio-cultural, economic and political" aspects (Faist *et al.* 2013, p. 54)—including following politics and voting on both sides of the border.

The liminality of the two places (the origin and residence countries) forms the concepts of transmigrants and transnationalism; immigrants, emigrants, and transmigrants live in and between places. Building from this literature, I suggest four learning places and spaces for international migrants (Figure 1.3) that include the two countries, the transnational space between them, and the intersecting and independent migratory system (the last stemming from Paul 2013). The duality of being involved in more than one place and space complicates the phenomenon of migrant voting, which is reflected in the migrant voting typology.

Another contribution of this dissertation is detailing not only the reasons for migrant voting but also reasons for migrant non-voting (see Section 4.4). Non-voting cannot be ignored in a study about voting since it may be voluntary abstention or a result of legal or bureaucratic obstacles preventing a group of voters from participating. While abstention is part of the dependent variable (since it is part of the four migrant voting types), involuntary non-voting is not. I nonetheless argue in Section 4.4.1

that migrants who abstain can still be political insiders and affect the political sphere, as McCann and Jones-Correa (2020) show.

Abstention occurred mainly due to a lack of ties in both countries, distrust in one or both countries' voting processes (e.g., through a lack of transparency or information), or lack of interest (see Table 4.2). For example, Chile automatically registers foreign residents into the electorate, while in Ecuador they must register to join the electorate. Automatic registration has led to some individuals being uninformed or misinformed about having voting rights as an immigrant in Chile (also see Doña-Reveco and Sotomayor 2017, Pujols 2020).

Within the group of migrant Interviewees, those who answered they have either not voted or do not plan to vote, were then asked an open-ended question of 'why'. For them, non-voting occurred for three main reasons: the origin country did not grant emigrant voting rights (e.g., Cuba), the individual had not yet reached the residence requirement to gain immigrant voting rights (i.e., had lived less than five years in Chile or Ecuador), or because migrants were prevented from voting. Despite some migrants falling into the first category of non-voting, I nonetheless included many of these migrants in my analyses because they can shed light on how a lack of rights in one country may affect their voting behavior in the other country. Moreover, Cubans also expressed hope for voting from abroad within their lifetimes in Cuba—surprisingly, many reported an intention to vote as emigrants in the future, if Cuba holds democratic elections and allows emigrants to vote.

I took the second scenario of not yet reaching the residence requirement into consideration by asking these migrants about their prior voting pre-migration, their emigrant voting post-migration, and intended future voting. Of 1,482 Respondents, most intended to stay long term in Chile since more than half reported plans to stay six years or more—of these, 322 reported intending to stay more than 10 years or “forever.” 658 Respondents had already met the five-year requirement and gained voting rights; of these, 301 had already resided in Chile between 6 and 10 years, whereas 357 reported their arrival year was 11 to more than 20 years ago. Based on these results, all survey Respondents and Interviewees could answer *as if* they had voting rights, since intention is hypothetical.

Regarding the third non-voting scenario, voting prevention refers to legal or bureaucratic obstacles that deter or block migrants from voting (see Section 4.4.2). Some migrants with suffrage rights 'on paper' reported not fully having them in practice in the origin or residence country, or both. Examples of such barriers included non-cooperative consulate staff, fear of a lack of anonymity with voting (e.g., cited by Venezuelans), and long distances between migrants' homes and polling stations

(either because, for instance, they failed to change their residential address, or a lack of polling stations well distributed across the residence country for emigrants).

Latin American countries' experiences with democratic breakdown, transition, and nondemocracy added complexity to migrant (non-)voting. Most migrant Interviewees had lived in nondemocracy and reported political and social experiences with corruption, government turnover, torture, and narco-trafficking, to name a few. These aspects affected their economic wellbeing through unemployment, scarcity, inflation, waiting in line for basic needs like food and medicine, and in several cases triggered their initial decision to emigrate. Despite even traumatic or brutal political experiences, identity (especially through nationality) and civic duty for the origin country remain strong for some and keeps emigrants voting even decades later. This was particularly true for Chilean Interviewees who were able to vote as emigrants for the first time in 2017, almost thirty years after the country returned to democracy.

### **Migrant Political Resocialization:**

#### **Theory Building to Why Migrants Vote Where and When**

After exploring self-reported reasons for (not) voting and rationales for why migrants vote—two pending questions remain: how do these reasons form and why do these motives affect migrant voting? To start answering this, in Chapter 4, I suggest that international migration is a shock that starts the political resocialization process, during which a person (as an immigrant and emigrant) maintains or adjusts political attitudes, values, and behavior over time. Cumulative political experiences with two distinct political systems and various regimes affect how ties are formed, in turn also influencing self-reported motives about where and when migrants vote or abstain. Alongside being invested in a country's future, multiterritorial ties to places and people ebb and flow, affecting migrants' choices to vote or abstain in two countries.

My claim is that political resocialization helps to explain individual-level migrant voter turnout. Both socialization and resocialization processes comprise complex, temporal, and accumulated learning experiences. During political resocialization in a new context, international adult migrants maintain or adjust political attitudes and values that in turn affect voting behavior in two countries. As I argue, especially in Chapter 4, all individuals interact with the state pre-migration, a process I refer to as “growing roots” through their national citizen-state relation (see Figure 4.1). Post-migration, individuals replace national citizen-state relations with emigrant-origin country relations and gain immigrant-residence country relations. Each person manages two country relations after

migrating, each with its own set of roots representing the ties a migrant has with that country. I further suggest that migrants grow, keep, or cut their ties to each country and the people who live within these territories (summarized in Table 4.1). This conceptualization results in three possibilities for two sets of roots, making nine different Roots Routes.

Growing roots, or making ties, mean that immigrants immerse themselves in their new surroundings in the residence country by building a family, meeting neighbors, working with new colleagues, or getting involved in salient community issues. Similar to how political socialization occurs for everyone, “roots get established in the country of arrival” for migrants “whether wanted or not” (Waldinger 2008, p. 24), meaning immigrants unavoidably form at least some ties. While emigrants have past experiences with the origin country, they interact with the country and people there in new ways after emigrating. They may join associations or networks in the new country that relate to the origin country (e.g., hometown associations). As nationals abroad, emigrants face different rules and procedures for registration and voting compared to their peers in the origin country.

Keeping ties, or maintaining their roots, means individuals maintain established connections or attachments. Emigrants can continue ties with the origin country, including a sense of loyalty, duty, or civicness. The deeper the initial socialization roots in terms of political identity and belonging, the longer one will consider the origin country as ‘their’ country. Emigrants also maintain communication and connections with family, friends, colleagues, and schoolmates with whom they used to interact with regularly. Moreover, emigrants may continue to own goods or property in the origin country that encourage them to maintain ties through financial connections. Immigrants have at least superficial roots in the residence country even at the time of migration due to previous individual-state interactions. For example, potential immigrants submit pre-migration bureaucratic documents when applying for a visa such as medical, financial standing, and identification records (Finn 2019). Since individuals already have some roots as an immigrant in the residence country when political resocialization begins (see Figure 4.1), they either maintain superficial roots (e.g., perhaps those who have moved temporarily for work may be uninterested in strengthening other social or political ties) or adjust roots by growing them further or cutting them post-migration.

Cutting ties, or shrinking their roots, can occur abruptly or slowly. On one hand, some emigrants cut ties when ‘moving on’ or emigrating as a way of ‘leaving it all behind.’ Abruptness may relate to the reason for emigration, for instance, when individuals leave after a regime collapse or a malfunctioning democracy, or because of economic crisis, they may more quickly cut ties. Moreover, forced migration or renouncing nationality can eliminate formal legal connections with the origin



country. While I did not directly inquire about the reason for initial emigration, migrant Interviewees revealed their relations with the origin country at the time of migration via explaining their political socialization and their relations thereafter during the political resocialization process. It seems that the graver the situation for leaving the origin country, the greater the shock at the time of migration and more likely that the migrant will cut their ties to the origin country, although not to the people there. On the other hand, emigrants could also slowly experience a “gradual withering away of home country ties” (Waldinger 2008, p. 25). This includes not only lowering emigrant-origin country ties (e.g., facing travel restrictions or commitments that prevent them from visiting to keep their ties strong) but also losing touch with family. This scenario seems likely for migrants who relocate with their immediate family thus everyone lives in the residence country. Immigrants may shrink their roots if they do not intend to stay in the residence country, possibly after having negative experiences after migrating, or may break them off when relocating to a third country.

Throughout their voting lives, migrants change Roots Routes as their ties to places and people change. The Roots Routes and the migrant voting typology fit together because each of the nine routes carry different chances of pertaining to only one (at a time) of the four types of migrant voting: immigrant, emigrant, dual transnational, and abstention. Understanding how such roots form and change—in other words, understanding the (re)socialization processes—sheds light not only on why migrants vote or abstain but also why they change voting behavior over time. My contributions build from and add to the theories and literature related to political (re)socialization. I particularly focus on the resistance, transferability, and exposure theories from White and colleagues (2008). Although they separately hold validity, the theories lack complexity and must be used together to explain individuals’ political attitudes, beliefs, and values over time (see Section 4.1.2). To overcome the shortcomings of previous resocialization theories, I offer three solutions.

First, I propose detachment theory, which explains that some individuals decrease or sever ties to the origin or residence country, or both, during resocialization. As McCann, Escobar, and Arana note, “it is entirely possible that expatriates grow *detached* from public affairs after settling abroad” (2019, p. 18, emphasis added). Detachment does not follow classic assimilation theories that convey a zero-sum game of replacing political attitudes, beliefs, or values with new ones. Migrants do not scrap their knowledge, attitudes, and views but rather adjust them over time. Detachment from the origin country while abroad would lower emigrant voting, whereas detachment from the residence country would lower immigrant voting. By default, detachment from both countries would decrease dual transnational voting and increase abstention.

Second, to better incorporate complexity, I sketch three sets of roots from pre- and post-migration to match the three unique individual-state roles: national citizen-country, the emigrant-origin country, and the immigrant-residence country relations (see Table 1.1; Figure 4.1). Similar to how early political learning during socialization sets persistent predispositions but does not determine future behavior (Niemi and Hepburn 1995), I suggest that earlier political learning during migrants' origin-country socialization partly influences current political behavior in the origin and residence countries, as both Bilodeau (2014) and Chaudhary (2018) also suggest in their migrant voting studies.

Third, I try to add multidimensional aspects of where migrants' political learning occurs through incorporating temporality, agents, and context into conceptualizing migrant voting and political resocialization (see Section 1.3). The transnational space in between the origin and destination countries—which have been called “social fields” (Glick Schiller *et al.* 1992, p. 1) or comprise a “social space” (Faist 1998, 2000)—and the migratory system as a learning space (Paul 2013; see Figure 1.3) are particularly relevant. Like Erdal's (2020) ‘multiscalar approach’ to migrant transnationalism and integration, continued political learning is multidimensional in its temporal and spatial aspects. Since migrants' political resocialization affects both sets of roots, it can affect multiterritorial voter turnout.

While migrants are influenced by individual and institutional agencies throughout political resocialization, they themselves are active agents. Migrants are the final decision makers on when and where to vote or abstain and must contend with the barriers to participation on paper and in practice (see Section 4.4.2). Migrants draw on information from various countries—not only past personal experiences but also general knowledge of democracy and politics—to evaluate current issues and the feasibility of political parties or candidates' campaign promises. Unpacking migrants' political (re)socialization processes from my data, part of this evaluative filter (and critical eye) among South American migrants comes from experiences with repression and crises under both left and rightwing governments and in nondemocracy. Negative prior experiences made some immigrants attentive and cautious when evaluating political discourse and candidates' promises in the residence country, whereas others became disillusioned and disengaged with politics. But overall, negative past experiences prompted emigrants and immigrants to evaluate and compare politics in both countries, adapt political attitudes to fit the current political context, and update their positions in both the origin and residence countries over time.

Experiences with shifting regimes and nondemocracy in the origin country leave a mark—what Bilodeau (2014) calls an “authoritarian imprint”—but I find they are not determinative of migrant voter turnout or vote choice in the residence country (see Section 3.4). Chilean emigrants who lived

in dictatorship under an extreme right Pinochet may still vote for a right or center-right candidate in the origin or residence country. Venezuelans who experienced food shortages and hyperinflation under a left government may still vote for a left or center-left candidate in the residence country when they believe the candidate would bring progress. I also found traces of *indirect* imprints in younger migrants who had ‘inherited’ them from parents or family who live or had lived in nondemocracy. The ‘heirs’ to memory about government and ideology were prevalent with young Chilean and Colombian Interviewees whereas indirect experience was currently unfolding with Venezuelans with friends and family under the nondemocratic regime at the time of interviews. In short, despite direct or second-hand negative prior political experiences, adult migrants still vote and update their stances, not just based on long-term prior experiences but also in reaction to more recent ones.

### **Moving Migrant Voting Research Forward: Future Agenda for Comparison and Causality**

The typology and its applications have paved the way forward for future studies on migrant voting and political engagement in origin and residence countries. Migrant political participation can incredibly affect democratic decision-making and electoral outcomes in two countries—an unfathomable phenomenon in previous decades that is now growing worldwide. It is beyond the time that all studies should recognize how the past and present roles of both countries, and the people who live in both, affect migrants’ political behavior.

While migrant political participation analyses may focus more on one side as part of their research objectives (e.g., immigrants’ integration in the residence country or emigrants’ involvement in homeland politics), the temporal influences from the other country are relevant and cannot be ignored. Moreover, the present and future outcomes of political behavior—migrant voting or other types of (non)conventional political participation—can affect politics in both countries. The four exhaustive migrant voting types deliver the conceptual terminology and framework to recognize the potential political involvement that occurs in what I have called the four spaces and places of political learning. Scholars can apply this framework to extend comparability and establish causality.

Future studies should incorporate new cases and perspectives. Cross-country or cross-region studies would shed light on more institutional, historical, or contextual differences that affect migrants’ voting behaviors and patterns. Moreover, given circular and stepwise migration, engagement can also be surveyed in more than two countries. In the four places and spaces of political learning (Figure 1.3), the origin and residence countries constitute the two places, yet many migrants have lived, or will

live, in additional countries (see e.g., Constant 2020); their political experiences from additional countries may affect their political views, activism, and participation in different ways, opening further avenues of research to incorporate these additional countries.

Instead of covering national-level elections, researchers could alternatively focus on local or multilevel voting when migrants hold suffrage rights in two countries. They could also nuance the application to those holding local-level immigrant voting and national-level emigrant voting, as is common throughout the European Union for EU migrants. Quantitative tools such as econometric models would be inappropriate since the independent variables that influence individual-level voter turnout can differ for local versus national elections. More fitting and fruitful, from my perspective, would be qualitative research that could distinguish between variables and further delve into the motives migrants give for voting, and how these reasons differ between levels and elections. Even more possibilities for further comparison include extending analyses over time with the same migrants by using panel data, for example. Scholars could also apply the typology to other migrants such as dependent movers (e.g., children and the 1.5 generation) or migrants' descendants who hold political rights in a country in which they have never lived.

Based on the data analyzed in this dissertation, migrant belonging and ties are difficult to untangle. While I nestle belonging territorial ties as a reason for migrant voting, some migrants reported belonging yet still abstain in elections. Similarly, McIlwaine and Bermudez (2015) find that some Colombian emigrants report identity or belonging with a place or community but abstain in origin-country elections. Waldinger and Soehl (2013) also show Mexicans abroad keep close social ties but show minimal political participation in Mexican elections (also see Smith and Bakker 2008, Finn and Besserer 2021). One explanation for belonging not translating into emigrant voting is migrants' different understandings of citizenship and its practices that shape migrants' identities (Pedroza and Palop-García 2017b, Pedroza 2019). While 'feeling Colombian' uses nationality to spur an identity and instigate ties to the origin country, attachment is not necessarily expressed through electoral participation. Perhaps territorial ties based on belonging increases voting ("I vote because it's still my country") more so than belonging from ties (e.g., being or feeling a certain nationality translates to an identity). Future studies can further unpack migrant belonging and ties, as related to participation.

One topic that may be of particular interest would be the convergence of movement in the typology toward dual transnational voting (see Section 4.2.1). What causes a migrant to move from abstention to voting, or from immigrant or emigrant voting to dual transnational voting? Institutions, political parties, media (traditional and digital), issue salience, or the electoral legal system in one or

both countries may influence migrant voting more than individual-level characteristics or life events. How do residence-country actors and institutions instigate immigrant voting? When could immigrant voting in the residence country instigate emigrant or dual transnational voting in the origin country? Once in the dual transnational voting quadrant, what keeps migrants motivated to continue voting in two countries? What obstacles do they face and overcome over time?

I suggest that having resources and ties increases the probability of being a migrant voter, that combining resources and a motive creates a sufficient condition for migrant voting, and that establishing multiterritorial roots increases the probability of being a dual transnational voter. However, none of these hypotheses directly explain a change in voting behavior. The political resocialization process can help to explain how migrants' relations with people and places change over time, which in turn, changes migrants' political behavior in two countries. During (re)socialization, both social and political agencies, as institutions and actors, play roles and affect migrants' attitudes, values, and behavior. Breaking down the political resocialization process, how and when do migrants start developing their new identity, belonging, and a sense of civic duty? When and how do state or political party-led campaigns connecting with migrants instigate, advance, or deter the process? How do interactions at religious gatherings, community groups, diaspora activities, and with migrant organizations affect connections?

The present findings also reveal the possibility that migrants develop and maintain multiple country-specific political identities. Migrants show extensive ability to separately analyze each country's political scene, candidates, and context; in parallel, such separation positioned their turnout in the origin and residence countries as independent non-causal decisions. Yet, I initially found that multiterritorial roots with people and places in two countries seem to relate to dual transnational voting. Developing multiple political identities, including self-identification of political ideology in both countries, and how they relate to migrant voting should be extended to other settings and examined with migrants from a variety of backgrounds.

The process of instigating migrant voting does not have to occur through active mobilization or targeted campaigns, but rather can emerge from the overall political ambience and from individual-level factors. Since political resocialization links conditions with outcomes, scholars can dissect the process to find causal mechanisms not only for migrant voting but for other types of migrant political engagement. Original panel data in the United States in McCann and Jones-Correa (2020) show that between 2016 and 2020 (during Trump's administration), both fear and anger toward the political arena positively relates to *higher* migrant civic engagement in protest and traditional routes of political

participation—these results hold across states, nationalities, and legal status, including undocumented immigrants. Given this high civic engagement by migrants without suffrage rights in national elections, combined with the significant number of naturalized individuals who can vote, indicates that many migrants and their children are active political insiders. The political scene affects their behavior, and their behavior affects politics and electoral outcomes. Moving forward—as exemplified by McCann and Jones-Correa’s (2020) work—it is critical to understand motives not only for voting but also for nonconventional engagement and under what conditions migrants participate. It is also imperative to investigate the same immigrants’ participation in the origin country, as emigrants.

It cannot be stated enough that migrant voters are unique from other voters due to the inherent duality of international migration and the spread of individuals being able to exercise political rights in more than one country. Rather than favoring origin or residence country engagement, moving forward, scholars must include both countries on par. The overarching goal of this work has been to guide intellectual discussion toward this nuanced and novel conceptualization, so that future scholars exploring migrant enfranchisement, voting, and political resocialization may continue the research advanced throughout these pages.