Migrant rights, voting, and resocialization: suffrage in Chile and Ecuador, 1925-2020

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Chapter 4

Migrant (Non-)Voting, Resocialization, and the Roots Routes

In the previous two empirical chapters, I explained the enfranchisement process in two countries and used the migrant voting typology to categorize migrants who vote and abstain, and where. I also detailed the reasons migrants give to explain their turnout decisions in national-level elections, in either or both the origin and residence countries. Now I will explore answers as to why migrants vote, or do not vote, in two countries.

To cast a ballot, voters need suffrage rights, to be registered (i.e., enroll or be automatically enrolled), and be able to reach a polling station—but migrant voters face additional procedures and required documents. Even after enfranchisement, migrant-state relations comprise more layers compared to national citizen-state relations. Immigrant voters must be 'documented' by having established a formal migrant status, whereas emigrant voters must get informed about where and how to register, then cast their ballots from abroad. Maintaining a legal status and registering as a migrant voter requires extra documents—meaning more time and know-how. Falling short can result in non-voting. I discuss which opportunities and barriers to participate make migrants political insiders and outsiders. Moving beyond the boundaries of the demos and crossing international borders, I analyze how migration steps can foster or deter migrants' turnout in two countries.

The typology's four migrant voting categories have transformed the research question from why migrants vote to: why do some migrants vote only in the origin or destination country? Why do other migrant voters participate in both countries, or in neither? There remains a longing for explanation of migrant voting—one that I have hinted at throughout this dissertation. The aim of this Chapter is to use existent studies and the present empirical work to take a step toward theory building to form answers to why migrants vote and change voting behavior. Conceptualizing four types of voting, especially dual transnational voters and their multiterritorial ties, comprise the most novel part of this framework. But where do multiterritorial ties come from? Some migrants keep ties forever, others cut them off. Some migrants can easily form new ones and many migrants maintain ties in two places at once. Digging into how such roots form and change sheds light on why migrants not only vote or abstain but also why they change voting behavior over time.

I argue that international migration causes an individual-level shock that ends migrants' initial political socialization and starts their political resocialization process, which continues throughout their voting lives. As I will expand upon in this Chapter, both are cognitive learning processes that

involve interacting with other people and institutions. Such experiences shape how individuals interpret the political world and their role within it. In turn, the processes affect behavioral outcomes. Whereas political socialization affects individuals' electoral decisions in only one country, migrants' resocialization can remarkably affect electoral decisions in *two* countries: in the origin country as an emigrant and in the residence country as an immigrant. While, again, the present analysis is a step toward theory building, the resocialization process is not the *only* explanation of why migrants vote. Nonetheless, the socialization and resocialization processes leading up to migrant (non)voting—which form and sustain migrant-state relations at the core of claims-making and exercising formal voice in democracies—represent critical pieces in answering why migrants vote.

Since political learning during (re)socialization affects voting behavior, unpacking individuals' personalized trajectories reveals insights into migrant voting. 'Trajectory' in this case refers to an individual's electoral path over time, observed by following their movement among the migrant voting typology's four quadrants: immigrant voting, emigrant voting, dual transnational voting, and abstention. The typology's first use is for distinguishing between these types, which reveals where a given migrant votes; the second use is for tracking a migrant voter's movement to see how behavior changes. Finding changes requires measuring at least two points in time, for which I use prior voting and intention to vote. While intention to vote is a future projection and may entail some misreporting (see Section 2.3.2), since it is hypothetical, it allows for all migrants to express their intention to vote, not just those who currently hold suffrage rights in two countries. I draw on the non-representative group from Chapter 3 of interviews with 71 migrants in Ecuador in 2019. I find that migrants change ties over time, adjusting political attitudes and values to adapt to the current context in each country.

I suggest that multiterritorial ties between emigrants and their origin countries and between immigrants and residence countries can grow, stagnate, or weaken. All possible combinations of adjusting ties form nine paths, what I label the *Roots Routes*, that emerge and change throughout the ongoing resocialization process; changing routes affects migrant voting behavior. As a final contribution of this dissertation, migrant resocialization and the Roots Routes can be used as a framework to analyze migrant participation at local or national levels over time in other contexts.

The following Section 1 covers migrants' political (re)socialization processes; I describe socialization as growing roots and resocialization as growing new roots. I then position individual-state relations as the core component of how to analyze political resocialization as related to migrant voting. In Section 2, I introduce the nine possible paths of Roots Routes that emerge during political resocialization and explain why these paths are more useful and efficient than existent resocialization

theories. Changing routes changes electoral behavior, seen as movement among the four migrant voting types. Then in Section 3, I differentiate between migrants as political insiders or outsiders, an influence gained not only via voting rights. I address assumptions about voting and focus on how opportunities to vote affect the notion of citizenship as nationality. I also present barriers immigrants face that are set by states and reinforced by broader structures. Finally, I explain non-voting, both abstention and prevention, in Section 4. Throughout the Chapter, I draw on qualitative data obtained from interviews conducted in Ecuador from which a surprising convergence toward dual transnational voting appears, suggesting that some migrants can form and maintain multiple country-specific political identities.

4.1 (Re)Socialization Processes and Multiterritorial Ties

To argue that the post-migration political resocialization process shapes migrants' attitudes, values, and behavior, I have examined migrants' ties—i.e., their connections or attachment—to a country or to the people who live there (see Section 1.2.1). But where do multiterritorial ties come from? Enter the political learning process. An individual's socialization is "his learning of social patterns corresponding to his societal positions as mediated through various agencies of society" (Hyman 1959, p. 25). The most relevant takeaway is that socialization is a type of learning. Individuals learn and internalize social and civic rules, norms, values, behavioral patterns, and habits from people—such as family, friends, neighbors, and acquaintances—around them in sociopolitical contexts (see e.g., Berger and Luckmann 1966, Putnam 1993, Morawska 2013, Paul 2013, Rolfe and Chan 2017, Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017). Unlike other voters, international migration causes an individual-level shock that ends migrants' political socialization and starts their political resocialization process, which continues throughout life. Whereas political socialization affects individuals' electoral decisions only in the origin country, resocialization has the potential to affect electoral decisions in both the origin country as an emigrant and in the residence country as an immigrant. Continued learning comes from interacting with individual and institutional agents during the political (re)socialization process.

4.1.1 Political socialization: Growing roots

Everyone interacts with politics and undergoes socialization: "there is no exit from the political world, no possibility of disengagement; human, political decisions permeate human life" (Eliasoph 1998, p.

6).[70] Involvement starts in childhood, as Hyman's (1959) seminal contribution on political socialization positions family, particularly parents, as influential actors who affect a child's political orientation in terms of attitude and behavior, party affiliation, and political participation. In the early years, the family's authority structure plays a major role in the individual's future political behavior and represents a "projective view" of the political system (Bender 1967: 403). People internalize aspects from those around them that become their own (e.g., attitudes, beliefs, cognitions, and values), further embedding these characteristics and roles in society (Berger and Luckmann 1966).[71] By early adolescence, individuals establish their compliance to social rules and authority, understanding of democracy's rules of the game, and "fundamental loyalties to nation" (Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017, p. 4).[72]

While children's early comprehension and political learning shape adult political orientations, it does not determine fixed views and political behavior. Early political socialization scholars had wrongly assumed two things: a) that what was learned in pre-adulthood would remain unchanged throughout life (the primary principle, or the persistence perspective); and b) early knowledge would have a *significant* influence on behavior later in life (Niemi and Hepburn 1995). The primary principle lost footing in academic studies (see e.g., Searing *et al.* 1976, Niemi and Sobieszek 1977, Sears 1983, Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017); it was replaced by the lifelong openness perspective, which explains that individuals can continue political learning over time and have new experiences with different agents (see Sigel 1989, Sears and Funk 1999, Sears and Brown 2013, Wasburn and Adkins

[70] Extensive literature outlines electoral participation and turnout, both individual and aggregate, that is unnecessary to include here; for a review, see Rolfe (2012). Instead, I use earlier works, especially from Political Sociology, and those focused on migrants to outline how migrants undergo political socialization like others but have unique resocialization experiences, differentiating them as voters in two countries.

[71] To define each term, I use the Oxford Online Dictionary: an *attitude* is a way of thinking or feeling about something; a *belief* is something one accepts as true; a firmly held opinion; *cognition* is the mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through thought, experience, and the senses; and *values* are principles or standards of behavior.

[72] While authority and loyalty relate to moral values (Haidt, Graham, and Joseph 2009), other social values such as achievement, conformity, power, and tradition (see Schwartz 1994) correlate with political attitudes (Feldman 2013). Some individual characteristics persist over one's voting life, as political interest stays highly stable (Prior 2010). People tend to only have a small handful of values that are relatively stable but can still change over time. Leading scholars on values, such as Schwartz (1992), position beliefs as part of values; values can affect policy preferences and underpin attitudes toward social groups, politicians, and parties (Feldman 2013, pp. 602–604).

Covert 2017). The new consensus positioned political learning as "visible over almost the whole course of adult participation in the electorate" (Converse 1969, p. 142), although Hyman (1959) highlighted much earlier that while pre-adult political experiences matter, experiences later in life also matter.

Such early processes occur also for migrants, but who will later have additional interactions with agents in another political system and can gain simultaneous voting rights in two countries. Examining migrants, Paul (2013, p. 190) outlines that, "socialising experiences from different contexts can interact with one another to create new meanings as learning is synthesised across time and space." This suggests that electoral behavior organically emerges from the processes of fusing early and later learning in at least two places. Comparing Bolivian emigrants to their peers in the origin country (with the same characteristics and home region), Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez (2015, pp. 14, 21) suggest that their similar voting behavior is due to their similar early political socialization experiences.[73]

For adult migrants, an international move represents a discontinuity in their surroundings, requiring them to assume a new role that changes sociopolitical attitudes and behaviors (Sigel 1989). Migrants' life changes build what Paul (2013, p. 195) calls "layered learning experiences." Layered experiences in turn affect behavior, including the electoral decision to vote or abstain. I am interested in how political learning in a new political system, and its specific context, affect migrants' political behavior not only in one, but two, countries.

I exclude migrants who are children or young adolescents from my analysis because dependent minors who move with their family differ from independent migrants who move as adults; in turn, their migrant voting behavior will differ. The younger cohort, or the 1.5 generation (Rumbaut and Rumbaut 1976), is called so because they are in between the first generation of immigrants who are the voluntary adult movers and the second generation who are children born and raised in (their parents' destination) country, which is the children's native country. While we can expect first-generation immigrants to maintain more ties in, and perhaps characteristics of, the origin country, the second-generation will be comparatively more similar to their peers born and raised in the country of residence and less so than children in their parents' origin country, yet the 1.5 generation could be anywhere in between (see, e.g., Zhou 1997, 2004). The adult emigrant politically socialized in the origin country and the second generation in the destination country, who amongst themselves greatly differ

[73] The scholars highlight, however, that indigenous movements had influenced Bolivian voters' early political socialization, perhaps irrelevant in other settings.

in transnational practices and how they exercise citizenship (Luthra *et al.* 2018). In between lies the 1.5 generation, who could fluctuate between the two poles depending on their age, language skills, parents' characteristics, and political learning before and after migration. The peculiarities of the group merit a unique, separate analysis, so I focus solely on adult migrants.

Analyzing migrants' political (re)socialization processes comprise the four aspects present in lifetime learning studies: time span, agencies, change, and process (originally noted in Bender 1967). The time span for migrants' political learning continues into post-migration resocialization, relating to the lifetime openness perspective. Migrants are influenced by at least two sets of agencies, one in the origin country and one in the residence country. Regarding change for migrants, systemic political change occurs during their post-migration interactions with two states, rather than one, whereas intra-systemic change occurs when migrant-state roles evolve when immigrants modify their participation in the residence country, and when emigrants change their participation in the origin country from abroad over time.[74] Finally, unintentional latent political socialization naturally occurs through those around migrants; and manifest political socialization happens through intentional attempts to convey political attitudes, beliefs, and values, for example by state- or party-led mobilization or engagement efforts (see e.g., Bloemraad 2006, Burgess 2018, Burgess and Tyburski 2020, Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020). Unique to migrants also entails having lived in at least two political systems in two different countries. International migration marks a new event in life and living in another country changes one's connections to more than one country, making ties multiterritorial. Leaving the origin country marks the end of political socialization (Paul 2013) and the start of the political resocialization process, which continues throughout migrants' lives.

4.1.2 Political resocialization: Growing new roots

Moving from political socialization to post-migration resocialization is an integral piece of migrant voting: during this process, migrants grow new roots—both as an immigrant in the residence country and also as an emigrant for the origin country—which affect their electoral decisions to vote or abstain in two countries. As I have defined in other works, "political resocialization is a cognitive learning process during which individuals maintain or adjust political attitudes, values, and behavior based on

[74] Systemic political change occurs when there is a change in the distribution and exercise of authority; non- or intra-systemic change occurs when there are fluctuations in, for example, political participation patterns or party affiliation within an existent political system.

individual and institutional agents within a new context" (Finn 2020a, p. 733).[75] The definition builds on previous works on socialization, starting with early contributions breaking down the learning process throughout life (Hyman 1959, Almond 1960, Froman 1961, Bender 1967, Niemi 1973), later research on the learning process, membership, and agents (Rolfe and Chan 2017, Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017, García-Castañon 2018), and analyses on resocialization stages specific to international migrants (White *et al.* 2008, Paul 2013). Ongoing political resocialization processes make migrants distinct as voters, which I further unpacked through targeted questions on early learning versus post-migration experiences in the interviews in Ecuador (see Chapter 3). I draw on migrants' responses during these interviews to form a systematic way to analyze how ties to a country, and the people within it, influence migrant voting outcomes.

As political socialization is a learning process that forms political attitudes, values, and behavior, so is resocialization, which can *change* political attitudes, values, and behavior. Paul (2013, pp. 188, 189) captures the change by suggesting that individuals "unlearn" attitudes and behaviors they had learned in socialization and then partially replacing them through post-migration interactions with new agents. The process goes: learn, unlearn, then learn in a new context. I suggest that migrants do not, however, "unlearn" post-migration, which stirs thoughts of 'forgive and forget'—instead, they change. Past experiences (e.g., from authoritarian or hybrid regimes, or in dysfunctional democracies) leave an "authoritarian imprint" that eventually wears off (Bilodeau 2014). Individuals still remember but move on from previous experiences: the context changes and people change.

At the time of migration, nationals become emigrants and carry previous learning, partisanship, and political practices with them across borders—again, which will influence their electoral turnout. The more similar the two political systems, the easier for migrants to transfer previous experiences and adapt political behavior (Black 1987, Bilodeau 2004, Bilodeau, McAllister, *et al.* 2010). A low learning curve allows for the individual to grow roots more quickly as an immigrant in the residence

[75] Three comments on the definition: first, I reposition 'cognitive' to include it as part of the social process rather the political outcome. People learn from those around them, so learning is more about acquiring knowledge through experiences than a result of the process. Second, political attitudes (a way of thinking or feeling about something) reflect how individuals understand the political world and their role within it—the way one thinks about political regimes, democracy, institutions, and how decision-making occurs, in addition to people's perceived roles in politics. Third, values are more general than attitudes and people tend to order values by relative importance (Schwartz 1992, Feldman 2013, p. 603). Values (principles or standards of behavior) influence voting behavior and vote choice: an individual chooses to vote for a candidate who aligns with their own priorities and outlook.

country. If the transferability theory is applied here, it would suggest that migrant voters who participated in the past will continue to vote in the origin country from abroad in the future and—after gaining suffrage rights and having enough resources (see Figure 1.2)—are more likely to vote in the residence country.

Three existent political resocialization theories—resistance, transferability, and exposure—from White and colleagues (2008) fall short in explaining migrants' political behavior. The resistance theory proposes that some impressions formed from the initial political socialization process endure, meaning impressions formed as per the primacy or persistence principle will affect future behavior (Searing *et al.* 1973, White *et al.* 2008, Sears and Brown 2013, Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017). The transferability theory posits that immigrants can draw on past experiences and transfer lessons learned from their old environment in the origin country and apply them in the new environment in the residence country. Finally, according to the exposure theory, the longer immigrants are exposed to the residence country's political system, the more they adapt to it. Yet, scholars have long realized that early political learning during socialization sets persistent predispositions (Sears and Valentino 1997, Sears and Funk 1999) but does not totally determine future behavior (Niemi and Hepburn 1995)—largely debunking the resistance theory. I argue that prior origin-country political learning influences, but does not determine, future political behavior in either the origin or residence country.

The transferability theory fails to consider residence country influences, making it seem as if the migrant indefinitely draws on knowledge formed through the national citizen-state relation from political socialization. In t_1 of Figure 4.1 the migrant has two sets of roots, one as an emigrant with the origin country and one as an immigrant with the residence country. Transferability can explain why individuals who are already interested in politics are more likely to become interested in politics in the residence country. It could also help explain why prior voting in the origin country increases the probability of emigrant voting from abroad, or prior abstention lowering the probability of emigrant voting. Yet it does not say much about immigrant or dual transnational voting. In contrast, White and colleagues' (2008) exposure theory incorporates destination country effects, explaining that migrants acclimate to the newness of surroundings and develop "attitudinal and behavioural adaptation mechanisms" (Paul 2013, p. 183). However, while it correctly indicates the possibility of changing political beliefs, values, and practices over time, it does not say much about emigrant or dual transnational voting.

The three theories overlap, so must be used together, and they require nuancing to relate to migrant's future political behavior. The theories fail to recognize that learning occurs in contexts

beyond two countries and that, through time, individuals wear three 'hats' in their state relations: the national citizen-state, the emigrant-origin state, and the immigrant-residence state. Each relation creates a set of ties to a country and the people within it. Political attitudes and values from each period are finite, contrary to the indefiniteness posed by the resistance theory. Post-migration learning draws on lessons learned pre-migration in the national citizen-state relation, as the transferability theory explains, but it is not the only source of learning. Exposure to the residence country foresees immigrants adapting to its setting and in the future vote similar to natives (Bilodeau 2014) yet has nothing to say about exposure's influence on emigrant engagement in origin-country elections. Migrants can transfer attitudes but also adapt to the new context through exposure (Blomkvist 2020), meaning the two theories must be used together.[76] Just as before, the same problem Chaudhary (2018) tried to solve emerges: will emigrants' engagement increase or decrease over time? The answer remains 'it depends.' It depends on past experiences, on learning in more than one place and space, on distance between countries, and on the ease of registration and voting. To make sense of a migrant's multiterritorial electoral decisions over time, I instead offer the Roots Routes.

4.2 The Roots Routes: Nine Paths to Explain Migrant Voting

I suggest a three-fold role of individual-state relations (national citizen-state, emigrant-origin country, and immigrant-residence country) and define four categories of migrant voting. The three distinct relations each play a role in understanding how migrants establish and then change political attitudes and values over time during political socialization and resocialization. Post-migration, national citizen-state relations convert to emigrant-origin country relations and individuals also gain a new immigrant-residence country relation. Each relation has its own set of roots, or connections, as depicted in Figure 4.1. Emigrants can deepen ties with the origin country, keep the ties they already have there, or lose ties with the origin country and the people there. Simultaneously, immigrants can create new ties with and in the residence country, keep the ties they have at the time of arrival, or cut ties with the residence country or the people there. The specific combinations affect migrant voting, encouraging migrants to land in one quadrant, rather than another, of the migrant voting typology.

[76] While Blomkvist's (2020) research is within a Bachelor thesis, it uses evidence from interviews that Tomas Hammar conducted in Sweden in 1975–1976 with 664 immigrants from former Yugoslavia, comparing their political attitudes, knowledge, and behavior with 558 Swedes.

Figure 4.1 The Roots Routes: Nine Paths of Migrant Political (Re)Socialization

<table>
<tr><th colspan="2">Political socialization</th><th>Growing roots</th></tr>
<tr><td>t_0
pre-migration</td><td>Establishing political attitudes, values, and behavior, occurring:
✓ for all individuals
✓ with one country</td><td>National citizen-state roots
  </td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Migrant political resocialization</td><td colspan="2">Either set of new roots can grow (1), stagnate (2), or shrink (3)</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">t_1
post-migration</td><td rowspan="2">Maintaining or adjusting political attitudes, values, and behavior, occurring:
✓ for migrants
✓ with two countries</td><td>Emigrant-origin country roots
  </td><td>Immigrant-residence country roots
  </td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Three possibilities for two sets of roots ($3^2 = 9$) make nine distinct Roots Routes</td></tr>
</table>

Three options (grow, stagnate, shrink) for each of the two sets starting at t_1 mean each set can increase, maintain, or reduce, creating nine distinct Roots Routes (3^2=9). The aim of the routes is to conceptualize migrants' political trajectories over time, which came about based on existent studies and migrant responses while analyzing in-depth interviews. Here political resocialization occurs for *adult* international migrants, excluding children and the so-called 1.5 generation. At migration, the national citizen-state relation converts to a new emigrant-origin state relation.

Table 4.1 Summary of the Nine Possible Roots Routes

1	grow E-O, grow I-R	4	maintain E-O, grow I-R	7	reduce E-O, grow I-R
2	grow E-O, maintain I-R	5	maintain E-O, maintain I-R	8	reduce E-O, maintain I-R
3	grow E-O, reduce I-R	6	maintain E-O, reduce I-R	9	reduce E-O, reduce I-R

Note: E-O reflects roots stemming from the emigrant-origin country relation whereas I-R abbreviates the immigrant-residence country roots.

With the shorthand terms E-O referring to emigrant-origin country roots and I-R to immigrant-residence country roots, Table 4.1 summarizes the nine possibilities. Migrants can change Root Routes over time, various times. Each route encourages migrants to land in one of the four quadrants in the migrant voting behavior. Changing routes can affect voting behavior, relocating the migrant into another quadrant. Growing roots encourages voting, maintaining roots parallels maintaining the status quo (i.e., a migrant keeps the same voting behavior), and shrinking roots discourages voter turnout. When emigrant-origin country roots deepen, emigrant voting rises, and by default, also dual transnational voting; similarly, when immigrant-residence country roots deepen, immigrant voting increases, and by default, dual transnational voting. The opposite holds true: weakening roots in a country, or with the people living there, decreases migrant voting in that country.

New ties (growing roots) are one of the possibilities of post-migration roots: they symbolize connections or attachments formed through new interactions. In the residence country, people become involved in their new communities by building a family, meeting neighbors, and working with new colleagues. Similar to how everyone experiences political socialization, Waldinger (2008, p. 24) recognizes that "roots get established in the country of arrival, whether wanted or not," meaning new immigrants in a destination country inevitably form at least some ties. Immigrants take interest in salient issues affecting the community and the country's future. Gaining voting rights after a residence period—for example after five years in both Chile and Ecuador—provides a formal channel to exercise political voice on issues that shape the country's future. Similarly, after migrating, emigrants interact with the origin country in new ways. They may join associations or networks in their new residence country that relate to the origin country (e.g., diaspora communities, sport teams, cultural clubs, food festivals). As citizens abroad, they face different rules and procedures for registration and voting. Suffrage rights connect emigrants to their origin countries; for example, many Chileans abroad

reconnected with Chile when they exercised the external vote for the first time in 2017 in a national election. Connections nurture migrants' post-migration roots with either or both the origin and residence countries.

Cut ties (shrinking roots) is the opposite of attachment and can be either abrupt or drawn out. The first type of detachment conveys the idea of emigrants 'cutting ties,' 'moving on,' and migration as a step of 'leaving it all behind.' The reason for emigration may relate to cutting ties, for example when individuals leave after a regime collapse, during or after an economic crisis, or to move away from a malfunctioning democracy. Cutting ties may mean the emigrant had to renounce citizenship: losing both residence and citizenship may be enough to cut ties and involvement with the origin country. For immigrants, cutting ties with the residence country may involve international relocation elsewhere. The second type envisions migrants reducing ties slowly: for emigrants, they may slowly lose touch with friends, family, and news in a country in which they no longer live or are unable to travel there. Waldinger (2008, p. 25) refers to this as a "gradual withering away of home country ties"; Waldinger and Soehl (2013, p. 1268) recognize that emigrants may continue social and familial ties but nonetheless become, "detached from the polity they left behind." For immigrants, they may be overwhelmed and excited in the destination country immediately after arrival but once the "honeymoon" period ends, they better evaluate political institutions' performance, even in highly democratic countries (Bilodeau and Nevitte 2003).

Whereas the transferability and exposure theories can explain growing ties (in the residence country), they fall short explaining the contrary situation of reducing ties in either or both countries. Therefore, I suggest *detachment theory* which proposes that some individuals decrease or sever ties to the origin or residence country, or both, during resocialization. Based on my fieldwork (see Chapter 2 and 3), some migrants indeed become detached, which can occur purposefully or unintentionally. McCann, Escobar, and Arana acknowledge, "It is entirely possible that expatriates grow *detached* from public affairs after settling abroad" (2019, p. 18, emphasis added); however, they relate detachment to assimilation theories of a zero-sum game of replacing political attitudes, beliefs, or values with new ones. This tit-for-tat replacement of political attitudes and values does not fit the social world because migrants do not scrap their knowledge, attitudes, and views—they adjust them over time.

Instead of replacing or "unlearning," detachment takes two forms: a) cutting ties, like renouncing nationality and b) reducing connections, or simply 'losing touch.' Detachment from a country lowers political engagement over time, including voting, in that country. For emigrants, detachment may involve negative reasons for leaving the origin country or an uninterest or loss of interest in politics

there, just as other voters become uninterested, avoid politics, or develop apathy toward political engagement (Eliasoph 1998). Emigrants can disconnect from social networks, 'leave it all behind', or relocate with the entire family unit (i.e., there are no left-behind family members in the origin country). Detachment from the origin country while abroad lowers the probability of emigrant voting, whereas detachment from the residence country lowers the probability of immigrant voting. By default, detachment from both countries would decrease the probability of dual transnational voting and increase the probability of abstention.

Keep ties (maintaining roots) means individuals maintain established connections or attachments. Despite living abroad, emigrants continue ties with the origin country, including a sense of duty or loyalty with civic or patriotic motives. These ties were evident in the survey data from Chile and in the interview data from Ecuador. The deeper the initial socialization roots had grown in terms of political identity and belonging, the longer I expect someone to consider the origin, rather than the destination, country as 'their' country. Another way emigrants keep ties with the origin country is through maintaining communication and connections with people there, such as family, friends, colleagues, and schoolmates with whom they used to interact with regularly. Having these conversations, which often include following the news, politics, and events happening in the community, suggest the migrant is still interested in and informed about current events. Maintaining close connections with the origin country make it more likely for emigrants to be politically active, even while abroad. Besides ties to the territory and people there, many emigrants also have financial connections that encourage them to maintain ties with the origin country such as owning goods or property. Interest in their assets would increase a migrants' probability to vote in national-level elections that would affect taxes. At first glance, maintaining ties may appear to reflect resistance theory. While some political orientations (e.g., being more left or rightwing) may endure—'resisting' the test of time—they are still flexible (see Chapter 3) thus differ from resistance theory.

Even at the time of migration, immigrants have at least superficial roots in the residence country due to previous interactions between the individual and state. For example, potential immigrants submit pre-migration bureaucratic documents when applying for a visa such as medical, financial standing, and proof of nationality records (Finn 2019). Thus, even when resocialization first begins, individuals already have some roots as an immigrant in the residence country (the far-right side of t_1 in Figure 4.1). Within the initial post-migration period, immigrants may maintain superficial roots; for example, a migrant who plans to live in the residence country only temporarily for work may not wish to strengthen other social or political ties—as Waldinger (2008, p. 5) puts it, "some are simply

sojourners, for whom the displacement is experienced as temporary and hence never put down roots," whereas others intend to settle. Having superficial roots affects the future propensity to vote, not because migrants necessarily feel 'attached' to the country but because they have verified an ability to gather bureaucratic information, interact with the government, and understand how laws and structural procedures function in the residence country (while also demonstrating skills in the country's language). Interacting with institutional actors builds skills facilitating posterior interactions with state procedures. Initial superficial roots do not determine migrants' political engagement per se but establishing roots create useable skills for future migrant voting.

Just as White et al.'s (2008) other theories, resistance theory fails to recognize that post-migration (t_1), there are two new sets of roots. The theory overly concerns itself with pre-migration learning, ignoring migrants' diverse roles over the migrant trajectory. At migration, the national citizen-state relation ends, and the emigrant-origin country relation begins, alongside the new immigrant-residence country relation. Previous learning affects both new sets. The two-dimensional resistance theory lacks complexity and does not consider that learning is multidimensional in its temporal and spatial aspects. To better incorporate this complexity, I sketch three sets of roots from pre- and post-migration to match the three unique individual-state roles. Previous learning does not evaporate; rather, individuals change political attitudes and values, depending on interactions with agents in and between the two countries, which can change political behavior in the origin and residence countries.

Similar to how Chaudhary (2018) finds evidence for both an increase and decrease in emigrant voting over time abroad, White et al. (2008, pp. 275–277) find evidence that validates both the transferability and exposure theories, but for different political outcomes: migrants transfer interest in politics between countries and exposure impacts (only) immigrant voter turnout.[77] As I highlighted before, the two theories are not mutually exclusive and are also difficult to combine to understand the outcome of migrant political participation. Chaudhary (2018, p. 20) concludes by stating that "pre-migration political socialization, coupled with a political resocialization in the receiving country, may generate a degree of complementarity in the political engagement of immigrants who have both the

[77] White et al. (2008, p. 276) position an interest in politics as the least demanding form of political engagement (since the only requirement is following politics in the media) so such an interest would be easier to transfer from one context to another. They find exposure has a "substantial impact on *immigrant* voter turnout" regardless of origin country and exposure to the destination country's politics seems to be a prerequisite for immigrant voting (White *et al.* 2008, pp. 275, 277, emphasis added); since earlier learning in a different context does not necessarily deter voter turnout, their findings contrast the resistance theory premise.

resources and motivations to vote 'here' and 'there'." While he was referring to certain post-colonial immigrants, he mentions that "a simultaneous political socialization in which their positions in multiple political fields expose them to different ideas about governance, citizenship, rights and responsibilities" (Chaudhary 2018, p. 20).

After analyzing two non-representative groups of potential migrant voters, through a survey and interviews, I find three major parallels with Chaudhary's (2018) important contribution to the study of migrant voting. First, migrants (not only those from post-colonial settings) are positioned in multiple political fields, which allow them to establish multiple political identities. Second, resources and motivation combined indeed make a sufficient condition for migrant voting (see Figure 1.2 and Section 3.3). Third, resocialization itself is not what generates complementarity between migrant voting in two countries, but rather the result of the resocialization process, during which migrants continually make, maintain, or weaken ties in both countries. Although political resocialization occurs while the migrant is physically in the residence country, the process unfolds in two places since the migrant has a simultaneous immigrant-residence country relation as well as an emigrant-origin country relation.

The findings address Hypothesis 5 from the dissertation's Introduction that potential migrant voters with greater connections with a country are more likely to vote in that country. While experiences during political resocialization in the residence country have the possibility to affect both emigrant and immigrant roots, based on the interviews, the direction of change seems primarily unilateral. Experiences in the residence country tend to change the migrant-origin country roots (except for civic duty) whereas emigrant roots cause little change in residence-country ties. Such distinctions convey that the Roots Routes overcome the issues that I identified with the political resocialization theories of resistance, transferability, and exposure from White et al. (2008). The nine Roots Routes have added a manageable amount of complexity to the process, are mutually exclusive paths (i.e., a migrant can only be on one at a time), and they help predict migrant voting patterns, as I discussed in this section. The routes capture the various individual-state relations necessary to understand how migrants grow, maintain, or reduce ties related to two countries. They offer terminology and a framework to use in future empirical analyses on how political resocialization can affect migrant political participation. Specific to migrant voting, scholars can couple the routes with the migrant voting typology, as I do in the following subsection.

4.2.1 Dual transnational voters: Trajectories through the migrant voting typology

As the phenomenon of voting in national-level elections in two countries has rarely been studied, I focus on dual transnational voters using empirical data reported by migrants in Ecuador. The first use of the migrant voting typology is to analyze the differences between migrant voters, separated into the four types in any given moment. The second use is to make the static typology become dynamic by following individual movements among the four quadrants. One way to visualize such movements is comparing two moments in time; to achieve this, I asked migrants about their past voting behavior and future intention to vote. I explain migrants changing ties with people and places over time is reflected in their movement between quadrants.

While exposure to various political systems pre- and post-migration affects migrants' electoral turnout outcomes, how the exposure affects electoral decisions depends on political learning. Migrant voters' movements among the quadrants parallel their experiences throughout their voting life, meaning it is possible to track their movements by following their political resocialization processes. Condensing the possibilities, three principal movements exist: (1) migrants abstain then vote (in one country to both), (2) they vote (in one country to both) then abstain, or (3) they move among the three active types of migrant voting: emigrant, immigrant, and dual transnational.

Based on the Interviewees who have migrant voting rights in two countries, Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of their electoral behavior in 2019, whereas Figure 4.3 captures the group of migrants' future intention to vote. Comparing the two figures shows (intended) movement, revealing a tendency of moving away from abstention and toward dual transnational voting. Given the three basic movements among migrant voting types, the Interviewees moved especially toward dual transnational voting and away from abstention. The classification again shows that the typology is exhaustive in its four categories and that tracking movement shows transitions as changes in migrant voting over time in both the origin and residence countries.

To explain such movement over time, I suggest migrants change relations with people and places and evaluate current affairs in both countries, which sets them on one of the nine Roots Routes. Migrant voters distinguish between country contexts (see Section 1.3; Figure 1.3) and relevant issues. In the interviews, Chileans commented, "You have to check out the context of what's happening in Chile and what's happening here" (CL10);[78] "you've got to study each case, each candidate, each

[78] As in Chapter 3, I reference the interviews using the ISO Alpha-2 country codes and number each interview (i.e., CL1 is Chilean Interviewee 1, CO for Colombia, CU Cuba, PE Peru, and VE Venezuela).

[political] regime… So, *one vote doesn't influence the other one*" (CL11, emphasis added). When asked directly if voting in Ecuador would affect future voting in Peru, an Interviewee replied, "I believe that it doesn't affect [it] because politics are really different here in Ecuador and in Peru" (PE11).

Figure 4.2 Prior Migrant Voting: 58 Interviewees in Ecuador[79]

		Votes in Origin Country: Yes	Votes in Origin Country: No
Votes in Residence Country	Yes	Dual transnational voting 26 Respondents	Immigrant voting 16 Respondents
	No	Emigrant voting 10 Respondents	Abstention 6 Respondents

Source: Application of Finn's (2020a) typology.

Figure 4.3 Intention for Future Migrant Voting: 56 Interviewees in Ecuador[80]

		Votes in Origin Country: Yes	Votes in Origin Country: No
Votes in Residence Country	Yes	Dual transnational voting 41 Respondents	Immigrant voting 10 Respondents
	No	Emigrant voting 5 Respondents	Abstention 0 Respondents

Source: Application of Finn's (2020a) typology.

[79] From the 71 Interviewees, I exclude those who unable to enter all four quadrants: 4 Venezuelans (who did not yet hold immigrant suffrage rights in Ecuador) and 9 Cubans (who did not have external voting rights).

[80] Of 71 interviews, 15 people preferred not to answer this question, leaving a sample of 56. The intention to vote is a hypothetical future scenario that shows interest in participating in elections, thus I include all Respondents, not only those who already had voting rights in both countries.

While migrant voting in one country may, or may not, affect voting in the other country, migrant voters seem to evaluate a given country's particular political arena, making electoral decisions geographically bounded and independent. No one responded, directly or indirectly, that voting in the residence country was because of a habit or previous voting in the origin country; vice versa, no one reported voting in the origin country simply because they vote in the residence country. This suggests that migrant electoral turnout depends on context-specific socialization and resocialization, which aligns with existent findings (e.g., Bilodeau, White, *et al.* 2010, Paul 2013, Bilodeau 2014, Escobar *et al.* 2014, Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez 2015, McCann *et al.* 2019, Umpierrez de Reguero *et al.* 2020).

4.2.2 Multiple political identities based on country-specific contexts

Part of what makes political resocialization unique for international migrants is that they can develop multiple identities that connect to each place, despite inherent characteristics and previous identity linked to the origin country. Such multiple political identities can be country-specific, which was common among Interviewees. Some had enduring left or rightwing political orientations, but others were somewhat flexible. Although this group is non-representative of a larger population—and further samples should be tested in other contexts—on the surface, it suggests that migrants can change political attitudes throughout the political resocialization process.

While psychological factors influence ideology and environmental and elite factors affect political attitudes and beliefs, "political ideology can change significantly in response to the broader political and social environment" (Feldman 2013, p. 602). As such, individual and institutional agents within a given context shape people's political attitudes and beliefs—an important part of socialization. Based on the interviews, the multiterritorial aspect of migrants' lives can result in adapting ideology in response to two simultaneous environments. In-depth, open-ended responses on ideology showed very few migrant voters always identify as right, left, or center. Many highlighted that they gauge the current environment and candidates, then adjust electoral decisions accordingly. The dual response to two political environments is what I refer to as developing more than one political identity, since forming and adjusting political identities to an environment affects migrant voting.

The finding suggests that political identity may be fluid, not fixed, across borders. Some migrants report evaluating candidates rather than parties or ideology, whereas others will support only candidates or parties from the right or left. Following Feldman (2013, p. 591), I understand ideology as "used to describe the ways in which people organize their political attitudes and beliefs." Some migrant voters identity with the right, center, left, or a spot in between in both countries, while others

separate their identity—for example, outright distinguishing between the two political communities by voting for the right in the destination country and in the center for the origin country (PE4). Throughout the survey and interview data, I find fluidity and changes in political identity or partisanship, even among older individuals.

About half of the Interviewees reported choosing the 'candidate' or 'person' rather than a political party, adjusting their political position in the process. While other voters may also do this, migrant voters differ in the sense that they follow and evaluate politics and candidates in two countries; this means their positions in one country may "follow" them abroad affecting immigrant voting or their new adaptations could affect future emigrant voting. As a Chilean said, "I relate to people, not to political parties" (CL11), and a Colombian reported, "I believe, independent of left or right, [I vote] for what they're offering" (CO2). "There are rightwing people who are really bad and there are leftwing people who are really bad," so this Interviewee identifies with the center and votes for "the best person at the present moment" (VE4). "The topic of ideology doesn't really weigh in when going to vote. People follow people: they vote for the person" (CL5). Five Peruvian Interviewees (1, 8, 11, 13, 14) also report such flexibility since their vote choice depends on the candidate, the proposals, and the country. "I don't have a political party, I'm not a party supporter, I try to vote for who more or less has the tools [to get the job done] and I don't vote by party; I try to vote with my head, not with my heart" (VE5). Given these four origin countries differ in their political systems and party structures, these interviews show initial evidence that migrants do not necessarily use shortcuts such as past partisanship when it comes to migrant voting.

While the final decision involves vote choice, migrants spend more time, compared to other voters, getting informed (e.g., following issues, considering candidates' campaigns, etc.) in two countries before deciding to vote or abstain in an election. "I try to choose someone who, based on my own criteria, is good… I think that, independently from political affiliation, it depends a lot on who they are as a human being, because they are the ones who are going to apply [the policies]" (CU2). Such choices are more complex for migrants since they evaluate candidates in two countries, in two systems, and rank issues differently in the two environments. Other migrant voters may identify with right or left based on experience but would nonetheless consider a candidate from the other side; while other voters may do this, they change their vote choice *over time* whereas migrants can vote for, e.g., center-left in one country while at the *same time* vote for center-right in the other country.

Auto-identifying as rightwing, a migrant voter said, "in all seriousness, when someone tells me he's a Socialist or [in] a Socialist party, I keep him at an arm's distance" (VE10); he nonetheless has

voted for left-leaning parties in Venezuela who are part of the opposition and, depending on the candidates, would be open to *either side* in Ecuador as an immigrant voter. Another Interviewee similarly remarked,

> In Colombia, I've always gone for the right because the left has done many things to them [the people]… if I first see a candidate who's doing well and I see that this person is honest and can do something—take the reins of the country or a certain place—and if he's from the right, I support him, and if he's from the left, I would think about it. (CO12)

Ideological fluidity has limits: Interviewees more commonly fluctuate between the left and left-center, or the right and right-center whereas very few reported being open to voting for the right and the left in the *same* country; however, whether this holds *between* countries is an avenue for future research. Based on the interviews, some migrants commented that they are not completely convinced by either side, so vote for the lesser evil. "We had to pick him because the other ones were worse" (CO16). The lesser evil can result in a fixed ideological position,

> [T]he leftwing candidates have shown us that they just talk and talk and talk, right? They talk in a different way, but they go and do the same [thing] that the right does, and worse. We've already lived through that in Venezuela, in Colombia, in Ecuador, everywhere where the left has governed, yea, so *I don't want to say that the right is doing it well, but the left is doing it worse*…. Now with the new generation… they've forgotten what the left has done to us in Colombia, that *they've murdered, robbed, violated all human rights*… these young people think that those of us who vote for the right are stupid… but we know that they're murderers. (CO4, emphasis added)

Just as for other voters, ideology can be fixed also for migrant voters who already established their values and reported that they will not evolve anymore, as one Interviewee commented, "if you have an ideological, political, solid standpoint, wherever it is that you are, *it'll be the same forever*" (CL4, emphasis added). Even being just 30 years old, "At this later stage I already have, really have, my viewpoints, my ideologies, already have [certain] criteria" (CO6); she was convinced that her criteria will not change again, nor her voting habits. "I lean more toward the right than toward the left; clearly I'm never going to vote for somebody from the left" (VE1). Such a fixed position based on previous political learning underlines prior trauma, as a Venezuelan commented, "when you learn and…

understand what happened in Venezuela, you're never ever going to want to support a socialist or communist [electoral] platform" (VE2). Peruvians had similar reactions when discussing Fujimori, whose nickname "Chinochet" was based on his similarities to Pinochet's rule (Meléndez 2018). One Interviewee reported that "he, yes, is [from] a leftwing party; in his government's time there were also quite a few disappearances of people, massive killings in neighborhoods" (PE1). Other fellow Peruvian Interviewees who reported living through times of corruption, narcotrafficking, disappearances, and curfews under leftwing governments said they will remain rightwing.

While each country context clearly shapes the details of the Respondents' standpoints, similar responses came from all five origin countries. This underlines two important differences between migrants and other voters: a) migrants may, or may not, take such political learning with them across borders and apply them in the residence country (e.g., they vote rightwing in the origin, so also vote right in the residence country); and b) migrants may display fixed or fluid viewpoints over time. A fixed position may remain only for the origin country, while they adopt a new one for the residence country; they could transfer the prior fixed position to both countries, or adapt stances towards both countries over time. Highlighting again the inherent duality in migration that make migrants different from other voters, separating their positions towards two countries indicates that international migrants can develop multiple political identities.

On fixed positions, the bluntest findings from the 71 interviews corresponded to rightwing ideology from the early wave of Chilean migrants. A 49-year-old man who moved to Ecuador in the early 2000s said, "Pinochet and the right brought order to the country, and he made it possible for working people *to be able to have a normal life*; they could save up for their family, and work, and everything" (CL12, emphasis added). The "order" came after economic and social collapse that had occurred before the coup under Allende and the left. This Interviewee grew up during the Pinochet era, so these understandings of the times had been interpreted through childhood and adolescence. He remembered himself and his family working hard during Allende times yet, "I couldn't get food, I couldn't get a lot of things, because you had to be with the leftwing party to be able to get them." He added, "I don't deny that there were human rights violations" under Pinochet, but in 2019, he conveyed that "there's a lot of really poor information around what happened during Pinochet's government; there's a lot of bad information and a lot of victimization from leftwing people" since he believed that those who disappeared during the regime were guilty. For him, the negative authoritarian mark proves worse, because he still recalled scarcity under a leftwing government, contrasted by

prosperity and a "normal life" during a military dictatorship, which solidified into a fixed ideological position.

Regarding fluid positions, a common reason for moving along the right-left ideological line for each election was a real or hypothetical situation in which the migrant voter felt that the country needs a "big change," captured in the motive of being invested in a flourishing future (see Section 3.3.2). Such migrants reported evaluating the country's current situation and candidates' proposals as more important than ideology, so reported being willing to vote for the other ideological pole. Instead of indecisiveness, such fluctuation reveals savvy political actors who gauge the current political, social, and economic environment to consider which candidate or party promises could be attainable and would improve the country, origin or residence. Rather than exaggerating the idea of migrants having multiple political identities, my aim is to highlight that while some migrant voters take fixed ideology across borders and apply it in elections, it is an oversimplified notion since other migrant voters show more fluidity in their positions over time towards both countries' politics.

Getting and staying informed about politics in two places also brought obstacles. Some Interviewees complained about a lack of information about candidates and parties, even when they searched for it. Others noted an unnecessary use of formal "elegant" language on ballots, instead of simple accessible phrasing (PE1). Other migrant voters showed interest in politics, attempted to follow and learn about candidates, but despite such efforts, they reported still feeling uninformed when going to vote. Getting and staying informed about country-specific politics is time-consuming and difficult when access to unbiased media may be restricted. The distance and time away that lowered the emigrant's ties to the country can also result in resorting to a single stream of political information, such as strictly from family members, rather than a variety of sources across the country to paint the larger political scene.

4.3 Migrant Political Insiders and Outsiders: Rights and (Non-)National Citizens

Considering such obstacles, not all migrants are able to get or stay involved in politics, even if they have voting rights in a country. Contrarily, many migrants never gain voting rights but are still able to participate in politics in other ways. Political participation is thus not bound by migrant status or voting rights. Given the important effects of shaping the political arena, in this subsection I discuss migrants as both political insiders and outsiders and how this affects the notion of citizenship. A political insider is an actor with the power to influence decisions within the political arena, whereas an outsider lacks such influence.

The porousness of borders (evidenced by clandestine migration) and the demos (evidenced by its morphing and re-morphing) highlight that neither international borders nor the boundary of the demos adequately indicates which migrants are political insiders or outsiders. Migrants who have voting rights may seem like political insiders, but if they feel like outsiders, they disengage and abstain in elections. Rolfe and Chan (2017, p. 372) posit "it may be that individuals who don't 'fit' with others within their immediate social context are less likely to engage in prosocial activities such as political participation." Moreover, migrant non-voters may be insiders or outsiders, migrant voting represents only one way of becoming a political insider.[81]

Nationality still plays a principal role in establishing voting requirements, varying between regions and countries (e.g., Groenendijk 2008, Arrighi and Bauböck 2017). Decades ago, Carens (1989) offered the parsimonious dimensions of birthplace and residence to determine who has which political rights. Paraphrasing Carens' argument, Beckman (2006, p. 157) states, "At the end of the day, the extent to which people have social ties or are affected by the social context is consequently less important for the extent of their political rights. All that matters is whether they are born in the country and, if not, for how long they have been living there." Sidestepping the importance of social ties and context for granting rights makes sense from the viewpoint of state-led decision-making over the boundaries of the demos. Yet, moving to post-enfranchisement, social ties and context are critical pieces in understanding why migrants participate (Ryan 2018). As I have reiterated, it is not enough to understand why states grant voting rights but also to know when, where, and why migrants exercise suffrage rights.

For migrant voting, neither nationality nor naturalization comprises the whole story of gaining or exercising voting rights. As Luthra, Waldinger, and Soehl (2018, p. 177) point out, "while the electorate is clearly bounded, the boundary between society and the polity is fuzzier, with many aspects of political life accessible to all." Some people without voting rights, such as undocumented immigrants, may seem like political outsiders on the surface, yet in the US they participate in the political realm and in certain cities have gained voting rights (Hayduk and Coll 2018, Besserer 2021). Using a

[81] My definition refers to both emigrants' and immigrants' political influence, gained through nationality or suffrage rights. Some countries, such as Mexico, restrict even naturalized individuals' political activity (Fitzgerald and Cook-Martín 2014). Other states reduce emigrants' direct influence by withholding suffrage rights when residing abroad. Regarding foreign residents, Kukathas (2021) positions all immigrants and potential immigrants as outsiders, whereas I consider that different people and groups at different times can be political outsiders or insiders.

representative sample of both documented (including naturalized) and undocumented Latino immigrants across the US, McCann and Jones-Correa (2020) measure individuals' fear in two ways: deportation and finances. The findings show that fear of the risk to the personal safety of loved ones motivates immigrants to increase their civic engagement. This underlines my finding in Chapter 3 that familial ties can be a main factor motivating migrant voting (see Table 3.2).

Participation in various aspects of society parallels sociological discussions involving acculturation, integration, and segmented assimilation for both the first and second generation of migrants (Portes and Zhou 1993, Portes 1995, e.g., Berry 1997, Zhou 1997, Waters *et al.* 2010, Hainmueller *et al.* 2017). Those who legally cross an international border, maintain their documents and legal status, speak the language (Chiswick and Miller 1996), and have formal job contracts seem more likely to 'integrate' and politically participate. Naturally, this means anyone who has left one or more of these pre- or post-migration steps incomplete faces lower chances to fully participate in a society (Finn 2019; see Figure 4.4). As Brettell (2015: 174) states, "the interaction between structure and agency accepts the fact that migrants shape and are shaped by the context (political, economic, social, and cultural) within which they operate, whether in the sending or in the receiving country".

Figure 4.4 Temporal Nonlinear Hurdles to Immigrants' Access to Formal Rights



Note: The terms pre- and post-migration bureaucracy come from Finn (2019).

In this sense, *agency* is a necessary component of being a political insider—and migrant voters must overcome more barriers than other voters to be able to participate. Such barriers mostly comprise non-organic steps, as depicted in Figure 4.4, which occur over time but are not necessarily linear, as migrants can skip steps and regress in, or lose, legal status various times along the way. Each column reflects a reduced potential immigrant population. Those with 'capabilities' and 'aspirations' will move but each step is embedded within human and economic development in both countries and relates to broader social and structural changes within the globalized world (Carling 2002, de Haas 2014, 2021), as are state decisions over migrant membership (Smith 2003), including voting rights.

Figure 4.4 captures wider influences as multilevel contextual factors surrounding (potential) immigrant populations' decision-making steps, what de Haas (2021) calls "sets of perceived geographical opportunity structures." The figure highlights that only a small elite population become eligible to gain additional rights as documented foreign residents (also see Spiro 2008). At the organizational level, a migration regime has spread, affecting migration governance at the global, regional, and national scales (Betts 2010, Geddes *et al.* 2019), including in South America (Domenech 2013, Acosta and Freier 2015, 2018, Finn and Doña-Reveco 2021). Migration governance has become more restrictive in South America (Brumat *et al.* 2018, Finn *et al.* 2019), including in Chile (Acosta *et al.* 2018, Finn and Umpierrez de Reguero 2020, Vásquez *et al.* 2021). Domenech (2018) reviews how the regime has emerged through forums and agreements, for instance, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and through international organizations' power and influence over creating 'best practices' for 'good governance' and 'migration management'. Such management can largely be grouped into national, international, and transnational modes of governing migration (Gamlen and Marsh 2011). These larger processes affect decision-making for states and migrants as active agents, in this case, voters. I am thus suggesting that all levels are relevant pieces in understanding who gains voting rights and which migrants vote. Migrants who *gain* certain legal statuses before or at the border crossing and those who *maintain* a legal status via ongoing post-migration bureaucracy, will be closer to gaining formal rights (Finn 2019), such as participating in migrant voting.

First come rights, then voting. Possessing political rights was traditionally the key defining factor of full citizenship (Marshall 1964) (see Section 1.1.2). GLOBALCIT (2020, p. 8) defines citizenship as "a legal status and relation between an individual and a state or other territorial polity that entails specific legal rights and duties," using it as a synonym for nationality (i.e., 'citizenship as nationality'). People face an uneven playing field for accessing such rights as well as to nationality in the first place,

for example, due to investor programs benefitting the wealthier (see Džankić 2019) and selection mechanisms targeting the 'highly skilled', a definition that varies across time and countries (see, e.g., Shachar and Hirschl 2014). Given my focus on national-level voting rights, citizenship indicates a person's bundle of rights defined through the individual-state relation. In most contemporary democracies, being an adult national citizen is usually sufficient to gain voting rights (Caramani and Grotz 2015), but citizenship as nationality does not define membership in the demos (Beckman 2006) since citizens include both nationals (those with a certain nationality, evidenced for example by holding a passport) as well as non-nationals in local, regional, and national elections (Pedroza 2013, 2019, Arrighi and Bauböck 2017, Piccoli 2021).

Citizenship practices can be multilevel (Maas 2013) and are located within transnational constellations of citizenship regimes (Bauböck 2010, Vink 2017). As Arrighi and Bauböck (2017, p. 16) conclude, "standard assumptions in theories and comparative studies of democratic citizenship need to be revised by paying symmetrical attention to emigration and immigration contexts and differentiating between national and local levels of citizenship." When states extend migrant voting rights (see Appendix 1.1), they eliminate the inequality of considering some individuals' preferences over others based on nationality or residence. Migrant voting disrupts prior nationality and residence links—at the local or national level, or both—since denizen and diaspora voters are also members whose preferences, as expressed through voting, have equal weight.

Sometimes states withhold emigrant suffrage rights (even though they are nationals), creating a kind of membership 'penalty' for those living abroad, compared to resident nationals. Granting external voting rights eliminates the penalty. Furthermore, while emigrant voting requires nationality, denizen voting often does not. Many countries allow foreign residents to vote in local elections without naturalizing (e.g., EU nationals residing in another EU country) and even in national elections (e.g., in Chile and Ecuador; see Chapter 2 and 3; Appendix 1.1). Immigrant voters indicate the discrepancy between full political rights is eliminated and an equal opportunity of political participation for all those living in the territory and who meet voting requirements is opened.

Since casting a vote from abroad and active denizen voting are other ways to be members, migrant voting has changed the concept of citizenship as nationality, given its three dimensions defined by Bauböck (2006): legal status, rights, and political participation. When immigrants, emigrants, or both groups have political rights and participate, these two dimensions are no longer exclusively reserved for national citizens, weakening the concept of citizenship as nationality. This leaves legal status as the remaining dimension, defined as the legal relation between the individual and the state and is embodied

in the most basic sense, as holding a visa versus nationality (e.g., through *ius soli*, *ius sanguinis*, *ius domicile*, naturalization, etc.).[82] While holding one or the other largely differs in practice, it conceptually means that the legal status of citizenship is the only dimension differentiating (non)migrant groups. The measurement would be if an individual holds citizenship as nationality as a binary measure (yes or no), obtained either by birth or naturalization. A stand-alone dimension is fragile, diminishing its conceptualization.

Although individuals may feel a sense of citizenship as nationality through active participation, citizenship is no longer the foundational aspect of nationality. A "sense of citizenship based on active participation" is high-intensity citizenship, while low-intensity citizenship is "a minimum set of rights linked to membership, without necessarily requiring agency" (Fox 2005, p. 193). Here, membership is not nationality. The citizenship-nationality distinction underlies why many South American states could enfranchise immigrants in the early to mid-1900s "without having to address issues of national identity and solidarity or the value of citizenship, as has been the case, for example, in the United States" (Escobar 2015, p. 929). As Bauböck (2002, p. 4) outlines, citizenship broadly means a "status of full and equal membership in a self-governing political community" but "citizenship boils down to 'nationality', i.e., a formal affiliation of persons to states." Moreover, "how migration changes citizenship depends to a large extent on how states and their citizens *perceive* migrants and on how they *construct* the meaning of citizenship" (Bauböck 2002, p. 2, emphasis in original). However, although the 'citizens' Bauböck refers to are nationals and the meaning of 'citizenship' here refers to nationality at its core, ultimately states and people (socially and legally) determine who can gain membership to become a political insider.

Migrant voting changes citizenship as a concept, exemplifying "citizenship beyond nationality" (Pedroza 2019). The same holds for Faist's (2001, p. 8) discussion of the broad dimensions of citizenship as a) "legal status of equal individual liberty" and b) "some affinity to a political community". Compared to nationals, a denizen voter has equal political rights, and an active migrant voter can also demonstrate affinity to the same political community. Therefore, when discussing voting rights and electoral participation, the terms 'citizen' and 'noncitizen' (including 'nonresident citizen' and 'noncitizen resident') should be replaced with 'nationals' and 'non-nationals.' Tension

[82] A person's bundle of rights does not only depend on holding a visa versus nationality, as rights can vary even within these categories. For example, nationals who were born with the nationality can have more secure long-term rights, as compared to people who naturalized, when residing abroad (for Latin America, see Pedroza *et al.* 2016).

exists between nationals and non-nationals in a democracy. Democracies give equal weight to individuals' preferences (Dahl 1971)[83] and nationality allocates people to states, dividing nationals from foreigners (Brubaker 1992, Acosta 2018) and signaling that its members have equal rights. But for immigrants, such a delineation denotes that not all individuals in the territory are equally represented since the democratic state would prioritize national citizens' preferences over that of foreign residents. A similar situation occurs for emigrants; when states withhold voting rights from those residing abroad, not all nationals are equally represented in the democratic origin state.

4.4 Reasons for Migrant Non-Voting: Abstention versus Prevention

Migrants who successfully pass through the numerous stages (of Figure 4.4) and then gain voting rights may then participate in immigrant, emigrant, or dual transnational voting, or abstain. Beyond these four migrant voting categories, another group exists since there is a difference between non-voting by choice (i.e., abstention) and involuntary non-voting (prevention). Based on the exploratory non-representative set of 71 interviews conducted in Ecuador, in this section, I group the reasons for migrant non-voting, which complements the motives for migrant voting (as listed in Table 3.3).

At the time of interviews (between August and October 2019), the 71 migrants were foreign residents in Ecuador (for details on the Interviewees and questionnaire, see Chapter 3 and Appendix 3.4–3.6). Before moving to Ecuador, they were born and raised in five Latin American origin countries: Chile (14 Interviewees), Colombia (20), Cuba (9), Peru (14), and Venezuela (14). Overall, the group of 71 migrant Interviewees are highly educated (with 48 reporting having a university degree), range in age from 21 to 76 years old, 55 of them reported having stable employment, and one in every five reported that they or someone in their household had experienced some form of discrimination within the last year in Ecuador (for more descriptive characteristics, see Table 3.1).

Interviewees who reported that they had not voted or did not plan to vote were asked a follow-up question asking *why* they did not vote or did not plan to vote. On one hand, abstention among these Interviewees is mostly because of a lack of ties or a distrust in politics, politicians, or voting

[83] While Mill (2006 [1861]) argues that everyone, regardless of sex and race, ought to have a political voice, he also argues against everyone having an *equal* voice since he favors weighted voting. During his era, living in England, there were drastic gaps between what Mill refers to as illiterate 'manual laborers' and those working in skilled professions. Conversely, mainstream ideals of democracies consider all votes evenly (e.g., Dahl 1971), whereas some contemporary non-mainstream proposals (e.g., Brennan 2017) still advance Mill's weighted political voice in voting systems.

procedures. While trust was mentioned as a necessary condition to vote, those who abstain report distrust as a sufficient condition to not participate. On the other hand, some migrants cannot vote due to reported obstacles deterring or blocking them, either on paper or in practice (also see Umpierrez de Reguero *et al.* 2020). I thus separate migrant non-voting into two categories, abstention versus prevention, as detailed in the next two subsections.

4.4.1 Abstention: Migrants who abstain can still be political insiders

Migrants who voluntarily choose to not vote fall into the abstention category of the migrant voting typology. Table 4.2 lists Interviewees' responses explaining why they preferred, or still prefer, to abstain. 'Main reasons' in the table are the motives Interviewees most cited as principal reasons for abstaining, whereas the 'secondary reason' was less commonly cited.

Table 4.2 Reasons for Migrant Abstention

Main reasons	**Lack of ties** Emigrants: non-residents, lack of belonging to the nation Immigrants: non-nationals, lack of belonging to the nation, future plans to leave
	Distrust Emigrants: democratic voting process, transparency Immigrants: voting process, transparency, politics, politicians
Secondary reason	**Lack of interest**
(Case-specific) bureaucratic reason	Compulsory voting, once registered (only emigrants)
Past reasons	Lack of information (only immigrants)
	Presidential turnover (only immigrants)

Source: Based on interviews with migrants in Ecuador in 2019.

Lack of ties, specifically non-residency for emigrants, was a main factor for abstention: "I don't live there… it's that I'm not interested in what is happening, not even with my country" (PE6). Interestingly, the Respondent still referred to Peru as "my country" (showing territorial connections) yet wanted no part of it—thus, in practice, cut territorial ties. While growing roots and strengthening

ties with people and a place can increase turnout, lowering ties to the origin country or the people there has the opposite effect: it leads to a lack of ties, and a higher probability of abstention.

However, it was surprising to discover non-residency as a reason for abstention even when emigrants still had family in the origin country. Some gave straightforward answers as to why: "I don't live there, so it wouldn't affect me like it does for the people who live there… that's why I don't participate in elections there" (CO11). But for others, the answer was more complex: "it's my country, but there's a difference; since I'm not living in Peru, I don't exactly know what, [or] who, is better for Peru as [the elected] leader" (PE2). While this Respondent gave non-residence as a reason to abstain, he still had ties there ("my country") but felt disconnected from politics to a point that he believed he lacked substantial details of the political environment to make an informed choice. In these cases, personal feelings toward the origin country do not seem to affect turnout decisions in the country of residence.

In other cases, ties to the origin country may affect electoral behavior in both countries. Some emigrants who expressed belonging to the origin country did not necessarily convert, or translate, this to turnout in the origin country from abroad. When interviewing Colombians in London and Madrid, McIlwaine and Bermudez (2015, p. 398) describe emigrant voting as just one way of "expressing citizenship" since many emigrants define belonging through nationality ("feeling Colombian") but belonging does not go hand-in-hand with emigrant voting from abroad. Similarly, within the present group of Respondents, when territorial connections increase because of a (concrete or imagined) return to the origin country, it increases emigrant voting and abstention in the residence country.

Independent of ties to the origin country, immigrants do not necessarily or 'naturally' grow roots in their country of residence. Some may have strong ties in the destination country and suffrage rights as a foreign resident but continue to view national-level voting as a right traditionally reserved for nationals. One Respondent believed that "I'm not Ecuadorian. I reckon that since I'm not Ecuadorian, representatives should be elected by actual Ecuadorians… Ecuador for Ecuadorians" (CL1).

Another main factor for abstention among both emigrants and immigrants is distrust in politics, politicians, or voting procedures. Those interviewed by McIlwaine and Bermudez (2015, p. 397) cite distrust of the Colombian party system and politicians as a reason for abstention in origin-country elections. When emigrants distrust the democratic voting process and transparency, it may be because of an undemocratic political regime controlling the origin country. One Venezuelan Respondent detailed, "In Venezuela, there's no democracy, there's no way to vote… Venezuela no longer exists, Venezuelan politics don't exist" (VE7). Immigrants who distrust the residence country's democratic

institutions tend to be suspicious of the voting process and transparency in the residence country's system and of politicians and politics overall.

Distrust in Ecuador's voting process and transparency mostly came from immigrants who comparatively considered their origin-country's procedures as smoother or more transparent. For example, one Respondent unfavorably compared Ecuador's processes to contemporary Chile: "I've had the experience of being an electoral overseer [in Ecuador]. Unfortunately, elections—especially presidential elections, [but] also the local ones—there's this problem with transparency in counting the votes, and it's a recurring problem" (CL5).

Respondents also described distrust in more general terms, such as becoming disillusioned after years of empty political promises and especially after corruption and scandals. For one Respondent, "Peru already takes the cake on that one because not a single president up until now has come out clean" (PE5), referring to executive leaders failing to leave office without a scandal. Past studies have found that migrants in Eastern European countries were similarly disaffected, for example by corruption ruining trust in politics and institutions (Kostadinova 2003, Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020). Many Peruvian Interviewees reported viewing all politics and politicians as the same; they abstained when they felt their vote would not make a difference one way or another because it results in "the same economic situation, the same problems; with politicians it's always the same situation, day after day" (PE9). Despite feeling disillusioned, this Respondent was undocumented in Ecuador and travels back to Peru for every election to avoid the fine—but said he has always casted blank ballots. For others, overall disillusionment—"the truth is, politics are horrendous" (PE6)—can affect voting behavior in both the origin and residence countries.

A secondary factor for migrant abstention was a reported lack of interest. Various Colombians (CO5, 8, 15) explained that "it has never been my priority, not in my country, nor in another, to vote"; that "I don't really like politics, I'm a bit uninterested… I'm not really interested in seeing who's going to be my next president;" or "the truth is that I'm anti-political… I'm uninterested, so I don't worry about voting." Others were interested in electoral participation but reported a *momentary* disinterest because they found politicians and parties' offers unappealing. One Respondent preferred not to participate in immigrant voting, "because I'm not convinced by anybody [running]" (CL3); another admitted "the truth is that I don't identify with anyone [running]" (PE1). Similarly, many Cuban Interviewees emphasized that political parties in Ecuador have failed to propose an appealing political line or agenda, so individuals wanting to vote are left to choose the candidate who most closely—but yet, not quite—reflected their preferences. Even those who reported being uninterested or neutral

about politics were informed about current events, the economy, scandals, as well as past candidates' and current incumbents' names, political parties, and policies. Such extensive knowledge parallels McCann and colleagues' (2019) findings that Mexican and Colombian emigrants in the United States, even those who spent a long time living abroad, maintain similar political attentiveness as compared to those who never left the origin country.

One bureaucratic factor some Interviewees cited as a reason for abstention was avoiding certain types of compulsory voting. Some Respondents abstain because once they register as an emigrant voter, future voting is compulsory. These Respondents wanted to vote in some, but not all, origin-country elections—so in an all-or-nothing game, they chose abstention.

Lastly, a few Respondents mentioned past factors for abstention that have since become obsolete: lack of information and presidential turnover. Lack of information was mainly prevalent before widespread Internet access and migrants could not gain information on candidates and upcoming elections, even when they searched for it. Nonetheless, a couple Respondents still found it difficult to find specific or straightforward information regarding candidates in Ecuador. Presidential turnover was common in Ecuador over the decade between 1996 and 2006 during which the country had seven presidents (see Appendix 3.7). One Respondent recalled, "I heard a lot of news, and mostly around the topic of presidential instability because there were always a lot of them" (CO14). Many had little information about Ecuador's politics or daily life, but nonetheless emigrated then stayed. While presidential turnover represents a reason for abstention only in past decades, I include it because it shows migrants' ability to evaluate changing political environments.

4.4.2 Prevention: Rights on paper but not in practice

While the previous factors apply to migrants who chose to abstain, other migrants reported that their lack of participation was non-voluntary, blocked by legal or bureaucratic obstacles deterring them, what I refer to as 'prevention'. Despite enfranchisement and seemingly low legal barriers for registering and voting for most migrants interviewed, such obstacles remain for migrant voting. In short, some migrants with suffrage rights 'on paper' reported not fully having them in practice.

A widespread issue for many foreign residents across Ecuador, including some Interviewees, was that they believed they had been registered to vote in the 2019 multilevel elections in Ecuador but were not. They wanted and intended to vote but found their name missing on the electoral registry and thus could not cast a ballot. The National Electoral Council authorities argued that in prior elections, there had been an omission or misinterpretation of a clause in the Electoral Law (Código

de la Democracia [Code of Democracy] 2009), which requires foreign residents to enroll before each local, regional, and national election. The rationale behind this part of the legislation was that migrants were (believed to be) more likely change residences, as compared to other voters in Ecuador. Since many migrants had previously been able to vote by registering a new address (*cambio de domicilio*) with the National Electoral Council, the legal loop allowed them to continue voting up until the 2019 election, when the Council raised the issue. In other words, the step of voting registration had not been enforced since 2009 when denizens began voting in Ecuador (Umpierrez de Reguero *et al.* 2020). Therefore, when the National Electoral Council eliminated the migrants' names to account for the legal discrepancy, they ended up preventing many foreign residents from voting in 2019.

Other Respondents lamented the distance between their homes and polling stations as a barrier to participation, although many nonetheless made the journey to vote. While distances generally increase when living outside urban areas, several Respondents reported lengthy travel because they had moved since the last election but failed to update their residential address. The extra task of changing their address prevented several Respondents from being able to vote at a nearby location. One emigrant Respondent thought that the very task of registering to vote was superfluous because "if somebody goes to the Embassy, they should already have at least a registry of people who have emigrated, and maybe we could even simply go [to the Embassy directly] to vote" (CO8).

Certain barriers to participation applied specifically to Venezuelan Interviewees. While many Respondents had originally emigrated for political reasons, the Venezuelan group differs because the political situation is contemporary and ongoing. Moreover, international accords recognizing refugee status are more prevalent and recognized in South American countries, as compared to prior migration waves. As Freier and Parent (2019) argue, using the definition of refugees in the Cartagena Declaration of 1984, the last wave of Venezuelan emigrants has faced generalized violence, immense violations of human rights, and other factors that have disturbed the public order, which are sufficient conditions to consider them refugees. Regardless, countries throughout the region have responded with a variety of policies and established visas for Venezuelan emigrants (Brumat 2021); the most inclusive policies in the region include Argentina and Uruguay's extension of the Mercosur Residence Agreement to Venezuelans and Brazil's implementation of a legal route in late 2019 for Venezuelans to claim refugee status (Acosta *et al.* 2019, Brumat 2019, Ramírez *et al.* 2019, Acosta and Madrid 2020). As of 2020, Nicolás Maduro still holds political power after his 'reelection' in 2018. Recent emigrants still have fresh ties to family and friends in Venezuela who continue living under Maduro's authoritarian regime, which resulted in very different open-ended responses from Venezuelan Respondents, as compared

to, for example, Chilean immigrants who lived under Allende's then Pinochet's regimes in the 1970s and 1980s. There were stark differences between Venezuelan migrants and migrants from other countries in their views of freedom and liberty in democracy and of using democratic voice as a tool to express opinions and instigate political change.

While Venezuelans abroad can vote in any Consulate, they continue to face two major problems. First is that Venezuelan law requires "legal residence" in the residence country to be able to register and vote at the Consulate. Many Venezuelans fled the country and remain unable to obtain all the documents necessary to establish a legal status in the residence country, particularly birth certificates and criminal background checks, which must be issued by the Venezuelan government (Freier and Parent 2018, Acosta *et al.* 2019, Finn and Umpierrez de Reguero 2020). Lacking such documents prevent some Venezuelan emigrants from participating in Venezuelan elections. Others with documents reported wanting to avoid all interactions with diplomatic personnel, given their connection to the incumbent government. As Buxton (2018) points out, Maduro relies heavily on the armed forces, with state administration comprising active and retired military. It is understandable that Venezuelans recognize or assume the military-Maduro connection in offices abroad and are consequently deterred from engaging with diplomatic personnel.

The second problem is that elections in Venezuela fail to meet free and fair democratic procedures. Since 2003 under Hugo Chávez then Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela has been an electoral autocracy (see Table 3.4). Electoral autocracies hold elections but without electoral accountability since the institutions responsible are de-facto undermined (Lührmann *et al.* 2018). Thus, very few Venezuelans turn out to vote among the already reduced number of Venezuelans abroad who are willing and able to register, given Venezuela's undemocratic elections. This issue prompted further exploration of migrants' past experiences in nondemocracy, their current views on democracy, and how these affect their current electoral behavior in two countries.

Some are understandably hesitant, afraid, or irritated by the notion of interacting with personnel in Venezuelan diplomatic offices. One Respondent remarked that going to the Consulate "frightens you" (VE1) and another Respondent admitted "one is even scared to go to the Embassy and give their name and sign up and the whole thing because they feel like all of that is controlled by the government" (VE3). Moreover, Venezuelan Respondents maintained that Embassy personnel assume emigrants are part of the opposition: "They know that we're here, [that] we reject the government there, and they're not interested in having a vote against [them]. They're uninterested in having a vote that wouldn't be in their favor" (VE6). The Respondent went on to say, "I believe that the Venezuelan

government is uninterested in any vote from abroad and it shouldn't be like that, because we're Venezuelans", suggesting that nationality should be sufficient to exercise suffrage rights.

Many feared a lack of anonymity with voting and distrusted the electoral system because, "in Venezuela, in 1998, there was an election and a famous list came out from Tascón, who was a congressman [and] in theory, this congressman had written and released a list [of names] who had voted against the [incumbent] government" (VE3). Others reported having tried to participate in emigrant voting, but diplomatic personnel blocked voter registration by using bureaucratic barriers to prevent emigrants from participating in origin-country elections; they were inflexible with appointments and voting dates or incorrectly recorded identification numbers or birthdates on official documents.

Bureaucracy, logistics, and infrastructure can all stifle voter registration. Hartmann (2015, p. 915) finds that such practices, common in the Sub-Saharan African countries that his research focuses on, depress turnout not only physically but also psychologically, as it introduces "doubts about the rationale behind participating in elections which may not be entirely free and fair", which discourages turnout. In the same vein, one Respondent explained the difficulty of obtaining documents from the Venezuelan government led to exclusion as an emigrant voter:

> The problem is that people who are now arriving to Ecuador, or those who arrived here between 2015 and 2018, are people who don't have resources and they came here without documents, without birth certificates, without passports, so they can't legalize their migratory status, and as a result, they don't have their chance to exercise voting rights. (VE11)

Post-migration, living abroad further exacerbates logistics and being able to overcome bureaucracy. A Respondent described it as: "In Venezuela, since everything is destroyed and the institutions don't really work to [be able to] get a birth certificate, it's hard. So you have to hire someone to do the paperwork for you and he charges you to get it, they send it to you here, and then you can get in [to register]…" (VE13). The Respondent dispelled the notion that the requirements for obtaining paperwork was easy because "in Venezuela, it's hard to get all that government paperwork." Only those who have or can get their documents can formalize their status, then register and exercise voice through formal political participation.

These obstacles that blockade voting have not always existed. Most of the 14 Venezuelan Interviewees were well-established in Ecuador and had voted from abroad, eight as dual transnational voters and two as emigrant voters. However, this participation largely occurred before

authoritarianism took hold in the origin country. Like other Interviewees, the reasons Venezuelan Interviewees gave for voting revolved around being invested in a flourishing future and territorial and familial ties (see Chapter 3). As I have argued before, the critical aspect of ties that differentiates migrants from other voters is the duality. Developing and maintaining multiterritorial ties with both the origin and residence states lies at the core of unpacking the four types of migrant voting.

4.5 Conclusion

Becoming a full member of a demos brings voting rights, no longer necessarily restricted by nationality and residence since voters can be foreign residents and nationals abroad. Migrant voting has changed the concept of citizenship as nationality since active denizen voting and casting a vote from abroad are alternative ways to be members. Citizenship is a person's bundle of rights defined through the individual-state relation. Considering migrant voting has led me to suggest that, when discussing voting rights and electoral participation, the terms 'citizen' and 'noncitizen' (and 'nonresident citizen' and 'noncitizen resident') should be replaced with nationals and non-nationals. Non-nationals can alternatively be called 'denizens' or 'foreign residents.'

I also argue that neither international borders nor the boundary of the demos distinguishes migrants as political insiders or outsiders. When enfranchisement boundaries are clearly defined, migrants outside the demos are electoral outsiders whereas active migrant voters are political insiders. Yet other migrants may have suffrage rights on paper but not in practice, making it possible for migrant non-voters to be insiders or outsiders. Before migrants can even attempt to vote, they encounter a series of barriers perpetuated by states, depicted in Figure 4.4, that serves to reduce the number of migrants eligible to vote. Combining a legal border crossing with completed pre- and post-migration bureaucracy creates a necessary and sufficient condition to maximize the ability to access full rights (Finn 2019). In short, many steps exist along the migratory trajectory, long before the 'normal' steps of registration and voting.

To address migrant non-voting, I separate abstention from prevention. Based on 71 interviews (with immigrants in Ecuador who were born and raised in Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Peru, and Venezuela), the main reasons for choosing not to vote, despite having suffrage rights, were lack of ties to a country and distrust. Emigrants voting for origin-country elections reported distrust due to a lack of transparency and the voting process. Immigrants voting in the residence country also conveyed additional distrust of politics and politicians. The second most cited reason for abstention was a lack of interest, which for some meant overall apathy toward politics and the political process. Others

expressed interest in voting but explained a momentary disinterest because they found politicians and parties misaligned with their priorities or felt unrepresented by the current political movements, parties, and candidates.

Other migrants cannot vote due to reported obstacles deterring or blocking them, either on paper or in practice. Prevention means non-voting is involuntary on the individual's part and thus makes this group political outsiders in the political arena, even for those who have rights 'on paper'. For example, Venezuelans who moved before being able to gather all pre-migration documents lack a legal status in the residence country and thus cannot register to vote in either country. Some Venezuelan migrants who could register as an emigrant voter feared interacting with diplomatic officials, given their link to the incumbent government in Venezuela. Others who went to register reported diplomatic personnel issuing documents with incorrect information and waiting up to a year for documents. In this case, being undocumented brings a double punishment since they cannot register as an immigrant or emigrant voter. Others still reported being able to register then vote but did so despite knowing that recent elections were not free and fair—this group of migrant voters would seem to be political insiders, but their vote is not equally considered fairly, thus they have limited influence over future political decisions, despite voting.

What rights migrants have on paper and in practice, reflecting the migrant-state relation and perceptions, are critical pieces of information to better understanding migrant voting. I argue that by focusing on the emigrant-origin country relation and the immigrant-residence country relation (see Figure 4.1), the political resocialization process helps explain the outcome of individual-level migrant voter turnout. Analyzing 71 Interviewees provided an empirical sample to "see" the unobservable mechanism of resocialization in action, for both migrant voters and non-voters. Moreover, the process explains why a migrant is located within a specific migrant voting quadrant in the typology—as an immigrant voter, emigrant voter, dual transnational voter, or in abstention. Political (re)socialization processes are not the only individual-level explanations for migrant voting; contextual and institutional factors within each country, such as incentives, information, and issue salience in elections, also affect proclivities to vote or abstain. Nonetheless, the political resocialization process sheds light on why migrants vote or abstain as well as why migrants participate in only one country, both, or neither.

Throughout political resocialization—which continues over the voting life—migrants grow, maintain, or reduce ties with people and places over time, resulting in distinct Roots Routes. As compared to individual-level variables—such as tenure abroad and intention to stay (which are factors that affect voting but not reasons or mechanisms) or an interest in a politics (largely invariable)—

changing Roots Routes through adjusting ties to people and places better explains the outcome of migrant voting in two countries. Each route carries different probabilities of pertaining to only one (at a time) of the four types of migrant voting.

Analyzing political resocialization through the nine Roots Routes provides a systematic approach to nuance migrant voting farther from the simplistic dichotomy of voting 'here' or 'there', as I first discussed in Chapter 1. Moreover, my intention was to highlight that White and colleagues' (2008) resistance, transferability, and exposure theories fall short in explaining the outcomes stemming from migrants' political resocialization processes. They ignore that learning occurs in contexts beyond two countries and that, over time, individuals wear three 'hats' in their state relations: the national citizen-state, the emigrant-origin state, and the immigrant-residence state. Since a scholar must combine them to make sense of a migrant's multiterritorial electoral decisions over time, they fall short of explaining political behavior. Instead, changing Roots Routes can change electoral behavior—seen as movement among the four types of migrant voting. I have proposed detachment theory to entail when migrants: a) cut ties, for example, renounce nationality, or b) reduce connections, simply 'lose touch.' Detachment from a country lowers political engagement over time, including voting, in that country.

I also suggest that growing and maintaining multiterritorial roots in both the origin and residence countries increase the probability of being a dual transnational voter. But will they stay in this quadrant over the long term? This question requires diving deeper into how the independent variable of in-country tenure affects migrant voting in two countries. On one hand, dual transnational voters will not necessarily remain in the quadrant for the rest of their voting lives because movement between the typology's quadrants seems to be normal. Just because someone has participated in national-level immigrant and emigrant voting does not necessarily mean they are interested in voting in every election. On the other hand, voting in two countries may be mutually reinforcing (Tsuda 2012) to keep a migrant in the dual transnational voting quadrant. When asking migrants if they wanted to and planned to vote in the future, more reported wanting to vote in both countries, suggesting a convergence toward dual transnational voting. I did not find evidence of a trade-off between voting in the origin and residence country; changing ties in, or perceptions of, one country seemed to affect voting only in that country, not the other. This indicates independent (non-causal) voting decisions in the two countries.