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Migrant rights, voting, and resocialization: suffrage in Chile and Ecuador, 1925-2020

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Chapter 2

Granting then Exercising Migrant Voting Rights: Insights from Chile

Since migrants must have suffrage rights before they can vote, the first half of this chapter focuses on enfranchisement whereas the second narrows in on migrant voting. While dozens of countries grant select immigrant groups the right to vote, Chile remains one of only five countries in the world—along with Ecuador, Malawi, New Zealand, and Uruguay—to grant all adult immigrants the right to vote in multilevel elections after a residence period (Pedroza 2013, Arrighi and Bauböck 2017).²² Chile automatically registers foreign residents into the electorate for multilevel elections after five years of permanent residence. Most of these foreigners also have external voting rights, making it is possible to find people who can vote in national-level elections in two countries: the new country of residence (Chile, without needing to naturalize) and the origin country through external voting from abroad.

As a global pioneer in migrant suffrage rights, Chile enfranchised some foreign residents first in local elections in democracy in the 1925 Constitution under President Arturo Alessandri Palma, then expanded the rights to include national-level elections in the 1980 Constitution under the military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet. In this chapter, I suggest that both enfranchisement processes were political elite-led projects during crisis periods, with the main actors being members of the constitutional review committees. After being a pioneer of immigrant suffrage, Chile was a latecomer in granting emigrant suffrage, who only received the right to vote in 2014, and voted from abroad for the first time in 2017. Analyzing Chile's long road to enfranchising both immigrants and emigrants challenges misleading beliefs about the primary role of democratic ideals and international norms in extending migrant voting rights, which, as Escobar (2015) notes, only started being used as reasons to grant suffrage in Latin America in the 1990s onwards. For the historical analyses, I use evidence from newspaper archives from the 1920s, scholarly literature, constitutional laws and reforms, and transcribed debates from constitutional commission sessions (reforming the 1833 Constitution then the 1925 Constitution). I further support my analysis with data from Chile's national

²² Allowing “all adults” to vote means the constitutional right to vote is universal (i.e., non-discriminatory), open to all nationalities, backgrounds, both men and women, etc. However, just as other voters, migrant voters must meet requirements, such as age. While these five countries are the most legally inclusive, thus are extreme cases, dozens of countries allow some foreign residents voting rights at some level, including across the European Union (see Introduction).

censuses dating back to 1875, the National Institute for Statistics (INE), and the Electoral Service (Servel).

Post-enfranchisement, I shift my analysis from the state granting rights to individuals exercising them. Emigrants voting from abroad in national-level elections for the first time generated attention to migrant voting, including for foreign residents, making the run-up to the 2017 presidential election an ideal time to collect data on potential migrant voters through an online survey. In this Chapter, I use the survey results and my typology to provide an empirical illustration exploring the four types of migrant voting. I evaluate some factors that influence individual-level migrant voting in national elections, as outlined in Chapter 1, to further investigate migrant electoral behavior in two countries.

In the following Section 1, I broadly outline the steps to, and motives for, enfranchising migrants. Section 2 details Chile's long 92-year road to enfranchising both immigrants and emigrants, focusing on foreign residents because Chile was a global pioneer in immigrant voting rights and because of the unusual circumstances of extending these rights during dictatorship. I explain the methodology used for surveying potential migrant voters in Chile in 2017 in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 contains the survey's main findings, as related to select hypotheses from the dissertation's Introduction.

2.1 Migrant Enfranchisement: How and Why States Set the Boundaries of the Demos

Migrant enfranchisement means adding migrants to the political community through granting voting rights. Full migrant enfranchisement occurs when a country has granted suffrage rights to both nationals abroad and foreign-born residents, including non-naturalized immigrants (Umpierrez de Reguero *et al.* under review; see Appendix 1.1)²³. Palop-García and Pedroza (2019) outline three steps to enfranchise emigrants: passing, regulating, then applying legislation. To achieve emigrant enfranchisement, a country must enshrine suffrage rights in (electoral or constitutional) law, create regulatory steps for migrants to access the right to vote (e.g., electoral laws), then implement said laws. Enfranchisement is achieved when a new group of migrant voters cast a ballot in an election for the first time; for all migrants, these steps must be completed for both emigrant and immigrant voters.

²³ Nonresident nationals comprise a larger group than emigrants, since some people hold the nationality of a country in which they have never lived and can still exercise voting rights (e.g., descendants of emigrants obtain nationality through *ius sanguinis*). In this dissertation, I focus only on migrants, thus limit my analysis to enfranchisement processes for emigrants abroad and in-country immigrants, including those who have and have not naturalized in the residence country.

A plethora of studies have pinpointed many reasons why countries enfranchise migrants, under which types of government, and how quickly or slowly they have adopted then implemented such rights. Normative reasons outlining who countries ‘should’ enfranchise include those who are subject to a government and its laws, affected by a government’s decisions, or who are stakeholders (e.g., Whelan 1983, Shapiro 2003, Bauböck 2005, 2007, 2015, López-Guerra 2005, Owen 2010, 2012, Bender 2021). Additionally, Beckman (2007, p. 31) identifies groups that are typically excluded from ‘universal’ suffrage such as minors, felons, the intellectually disabled, and migrants.

Contrary to the idea that democracy is the primary driving force for migrant enfranchisement, other regimes, such as hybrid and authoritarian types, have also granted migrant voting rights (Jacobs 1999, Collyer 2014b, Caramani and Grotz 2015). Both emigrant and immigrant enfranchisement have been achieved by established democracies (e.g., Austria, Italy, Japan), when countries were relatively newer democracies (Mexico, Poland, Thailand), and electoral autocracies (Belarus, Gabon, Kazakhstan). In South America from the 1920s through the 1980s, countries generally granted migrant voting rights under what Escobar (2015) calls nondemocratic regimes led by “strongmen” and in democracy in the 1990s onward; the exceptions are Chile in 1925 in the first wave (since it was democracy) and Peru in 1997 in the second wave (since it occurred under ‘strongman’ Fujimori). Before the 1990s, regimes that enfranchised migrants tended to be rightwing and offered rights only for symbolic support, to gain legitimacy, or to increase turnout, meaning most explanations for why enfranchisement occurred were domestic and not international (Escobar 2015). Such ‘strongmen’ are not unusual in the region, even in democracies such as Chile (Alemán and Navia 2009). Chile’s hyperpresidentialist constitution favors a stronger executive power over the legislative branch, including for legal decisions on migrants and migration (Siavelis 2002, Stefoni 2011, Gargarella 2013, Acosta 2018, Thayer 2019, Finn and Umpierrez de Reguero 2020, Freier and Jara Castillo 2020).

From the 1990s onwards, Escobar (2015) finds that typically left-leaning governments in South America have granted migrant voting rights and that domestic factors are more important than international factors for achieving migrant enfranchisement. International factors include but are not limited to: globalization, international agreements on human rights, the notion of “universal citizenship,” regional market integration, and hope for reciprocity. Reciprocity of migrant enfranchisement has arisen particularly among countries with a mutual language or ‘culture’ and those sharing an imperial past, the same political authority, or colonial ties (Bauböck 2005, Hartmann 2015, Turcu and Urbatsch 2015, Arrighi and Bauböck 2017, Chaudhary 2018, Pedroza 2019).

Scholarly studies offer three relevant insights for this chapter: first, the incumbent government's political ideology fails to fully explain migrant enfranchisement. Earnest (2008) analyzes four decades (1975–2005) in 25 mostly European countries and finds left-leaning governments were less likely to grant immigrant suffrage rights. However, when he extends the study five years up until 2010, he finds the opposite: that left-leaning governments were more likely to give foreign residents the right to vote (Earnest 2015a). Thus, the reasons for granting migrant enfranchisement are more complex and go beyond ideology. Second, Wellman (2015, 2021) finds that emigrant enfranchisement, reversal, and reimplementation in South Africa reflected shifting political party power. The present analysis nuances incumbent party decision-making because while the main political leaders played a role in immigrant enfranchisement in the 1920s and 1970s, the core influential decision-making power laid in the hands of constitutional review committee members.

Third, democracy played a larger role in the region in granting migrant suffrage starting in the 1990s because of the worldwide diffusion and adoption of liberal norms, reinforced by a spread of institutions and non-governmental organizations (Turcu and Urbatsch 2015). At the individual level, migrants have more opportunities to claim voting rights both in-country and abroad, access to consular services (i.e., legal protection) have increased, and courts more often consider human rights international agreements (Earnest 2015b, Acosta 2018). Such reasons for migrant enfranchisement were largely absent in the first period of immigrant enfranchisement in Chile in 1925 when the country had few immigrants within its total population. Analyzing the immigrant enfranchisement process during this period sheds light on pre-globalization reasons for enfranchisement unrelated to international factors, colonial ties, or immigrants' claims making.

South American countries used democratization or a return to democracy to reconnect with emigrants who left during nondemocratic periods and allowed residents who already possessed voting rights to finally use them in democratic elections. It is not uncommon for migrant enfranchisement to occur during democratization (Lafleur 2015, Erlingsson and Tuman 2017, Palop-García and Pedroza 2019), especially within the 'window of opportunity' following a democratic transition (Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010, Earnest 2015a), not just in South America but also elsewhere, such as in some Baltic countries (Cianetti 2014). Ramírez and colleagues (1997) identify such a window opens an opportunity also for granting women's suffrage rights.


Besides the immigrant-emigrant specification within enfranchisement laws, countries may further distinguish between suffrage at different levels (e.g., local versus national) or reserve voting rights only for some migrants (e.g., based on emigrants' military or diplomatic status or on immigrants' residency

or origin country) (Arrighi and Bauböck 2017). Between the steps of adopting, regulating, and applying rights, lags or stagnation can occur, or a country can recede to a previous step by repealing legislation (Palop-García and Pedroza 2019), meaning not all democracies offer or have offered immigrant voting rights, emigrant voting rights, or both. Countries such as Nicaragua have adopted rights but never implemented them (Umpierrez de Reguero under review). Other countries have reversed rights (implementing then later eliminating them) for nationals abroad, such as Morocco (Brand 2006, 2010) as well as Armenia, Cook Islands, Guyana, and Liberia (Wellman 2015). South Africa experienced a double reversal since political parties expanded, repealed, and then reinstated diaspora voting after transitioning to democracy (Wellman 2015, 2021). Reversal has also occurred for immigrant voting, which was widespread a century ago in the United States, but for the most part have been repealed (Hayduk 2006, 2015).

2.2 A Long Road to Enfranchising Immigrants and Emigrants in Chile

Despite these studies of migrant enfranchisement and rights reversals, other reasons exist, which come to light by detailing country cases. I do so for Chile and Ecuador to give deeper meaning to the context in which enfranchisement processes unfold and rights' survival over the long term. In Chile, the six steps to enfranchising both immigrants and emigrants took 92 years. The milestones were adoption of restrictive immigrant voting in local elections (1925), expansion of immigrant voting (1980), first application of universal immigrant voting in national elections (1988), adoption of emigrant voting (2014), and emigrants voting from abroad for the first time in national elections (2017) (also see Appendix 2.5). Focusing on immigrants, over this span of almost a century, Chile has experienced changes in the stock (number) of foreign residents and their percentage within total population (see Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1 Chile's Immigrant Stock and Percentage within Total Population, Select Years 1875–2019



Source: Based on data from INE-DEM (2019), UN DESA (2019), and Population and Housing Censuses (*Censos de población y vivienda*), select years between 1875 and 2017, from Chile's National Institute of Statistics (INE).

The immigration trends show that during both migrant enactment steps, the percentage of immigrants in total population was low: Chile extended voting rights to select foreign residents in 1925, all immigrants represented between 2.5% and 3.2% of total population; then Chile expanded enfranchisement to foreign residents in multilevel (local and national) elections in 1980, when immigration was at its lowest percentage recorded, at 0.7%. As Pedroza (2013, p. 31) reports, this puts Chile among at least two dozen other countries that also enfranchised denizens while having “either very low or even negative migration rates.”

It is tempting to limit the analysis of Chile’s immigrant stock and percentage to 1990 since it has steadily grown since then, about a seven-fold increase in three decades. However, extending the temporal analysis to before 1990 reveals additional relevant information. Going as far back as possible with available census data on foreign-born residents, the largest increase in stock occurred between 1875 and 1885; the percentage of foreign residents in Chile peaked at 4.2% in 1885, which remained lower for over 130 years, until the same percentage emerged again in 2017 (see Figure 2.1).

The initial peaks in 1885 and 1907 occurred after many South American countries had implemented policies aimed to attract skilled white European men (Acosta 2018). Shortly after the peak, over the course of World War I and II and into the Cold War era, immigration slowly declined. This trend likely reflects the very few new arrivals in Chile and a normal death rate for the original immigrants during this period. By 1970 when Salvador Allende was president, foreign-born residents comprised 1% of the total population, then dropped to its lowest at 0.7% in 1982 during Pinochet’s regime. This is unsurprising, given the dictatorship perceived foreigners as threats to national security (Stefoni 2011, Lara Escalona 2014, p. 81). Chile’s return to democracy (1989–1990) brought many positive changes, such as economic growth and stability, significant progress on poverty reduction, and improving its ranking on the human development index (Castiglioni and Rovira Kaltwasser 2016). Combined with the broader effects of globalization, Chile became an attractive country of residence, drawing migrants in from new origin countries (see Table 2.3).

The most recent increase from 4.2% in 2017 to 7.8% in 2019 is somewhat misleading since it mainly reflects a change in methodology of how Chile tracks its in-country immigrant stock. Chile was previously an emigrant-sending country; many sought better economic opportunities or absconded from the 1970 and 1980s political crises under Allende then Pinochet (Cano and Soffia 2009). However, increasing immigration in 2017—even if the peak was only around 4%, much lower than ‘immigration nations’—Chile decided not to only rely on the national census to track foreign residents. Instead, Chile’s National Institute of Statistics (INE) began crossing census data with administrative

records (e.g., visa holders and border entries and exits) from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Migration (DEM) to obtain a more precise measure of the immigrant stock. The data for 2019 in Figure 2.1 are estimates; thus, while immigration is climbing, the ‘spike’ between 2017 and 2019 reflects more the changed methodology.

Table 2.1 Milestones in Chile’s 92-year Road to Enfranchising Immigrants and Emigrants²⁴

Year	Action	Enfranchisement Step Description
1925	Review	Subcommission reviews 1833 Constitution
1925	Enact	Article 104 of the 1925 Constitution enacts immigrant suffrage (restrictive, municipal elections) with 5-year residence
1931	Regulate	Electoral law regulates foreign resident voting
1934	Regulate	Electoral law reformed
1935	Apply	First time select foreign residents vote in municipal elections
1974	Review	Commission reviews 1925 Constitution; drafts Article 12 and Article 14
1980	Enact	Article 14 of the 1980 Constitution enacts immigrant suffrage (universal, multilevel elections) with 5-year residence
1988	Apply	First time foreign residents vote in national elections, in plebiscite
2014	Enact	Law 20.748 enacts external voting
2016	Regulate	Law 20.960 regulates external voting
2017	Apply	First application, Chilean nationals vote from abroad in national elections, in presidential primaries (July), first round of the presidential election (November), and second round (December)

²⁴ The steps of enact, regulate, and apply are from Palop-García and Pedroza (2019). Five-year residence is the only constitutional requirement specific to foreign residents, but they must also meet the standard voting requirements (e.g., age of 18 years old and a clean criminal record; previously restricted to literate men 21 years and older). The 1935 municipal elections also marked the first time women voted in Chile.

As a world pioneer of immigrant enfranchisement, but a latecomer for granting nationals the right to vote from abroad, Table 2.1 summarizes critical dates to chronologically visualize how the process unfolded. Allen, Nyblade, and Wellman (2020) highlight that the *mode* of enfranchisement (i.e., change in legislation, by referendum, etc.) and the institutional actors involved not only shed light on why migrants have rights but also their durability over time. As a country study, Chile's road to enfranchising both immigrants and emigrants is worthwhile to analyze how and why rights emerged and may shed light on why they have not been reversed. Considering these trends, and prior to focusing on migrant voting, I ask why the incumbents in both periods decided to grant and enhance immigrant voting rights, first during relative democracy in 1925 and then during dictatorship in 1980.

2.2.1 The 1925 Constitution: Immigrant voting rights in relative democracy

Granting foreign residents' voting rights in Chile was a lengthy multistep process (see Table 2.1). Relating Palop-García and Pedroza's (2019) three enfranchisement steps to immigrants in Chile, the right was approved for municipal elections in 1925 in constitutional law, regularized in 1931 then reformed in 1934, and applied in 1935 when select foreign residents voted for the first time. The 1935 local elections also marked the first time women could vote. As discussed in the next section, the right to vote was expanded to national-level elections in the 1980 Constitution during dictatorship (i.e., with no elections to vote in), then applied in 1988 in a plebiscite. In the 1925 Constitution (Article 104), the vote was restricted to literate men over 21 years old who had lived in Chile at least five years. The electoral law regularizing it occurred in 1931 but specified land ownership as a requirement;²⁵ the 1934 law regularized suffrage for all women, including female foreign residents, without the land ownership requisite (Valenzuela E. M. 1995, p. 174).

Focusing on immigrant suffrage, the important changes in 1925 and 1934 occurred while Arturo Alessandri Palma was President, making him a key political figure in Chile's immigrant enfranchisement history who lies at the center of the present analysis. Primary evidence for this section comes from analyzing the constitutional commission formed to reform the 1833 Constitution, articles

²⁵ In between Alessandri's two presidential terms, a chain of events led to his successor President Emiliano Figueroa Larraín's (from December 1925 to April 1927) resignation, then Carlos Ibáñez del Campo becoming Vice President for three months before being 'elected' president in a one-candidate election, leading Chile from July 1927 to July 1931 under an authoritarian regime (BCN 2020a). While the 1931 law regularized suffrage (with a land ownership requirement), no municipal elections occurred under Ibáñez (Valenzuela E. M. 1995). Alessandri's second presidential administration began in December 1932 (BCN 2020b).

in the 1925 Constitution, data from Chile's Electoral Service (Servel), and data from Chile's national censuses. Secondary evidence comes from the existent literature, which is scarce, as suffrage rights are largely ignored even in historical legal accounts, such as in Durán Migliardi and Thayer's (2017) study of Chile's migratory legislation between 1824 and 1975. An exception includes Courtis's (2016, 2017) analyses recounting the legal evolution of defining certain foreigners as Chileans as early as the 1822 Constitution. A plethora of works focus on Alessandri, ranging from his campaign and the 1920 election (Serrano 1979, Millar 1981) through his second administration starting in 1932 (Correa Sutil 1979), including analyzing his political discourses and personal character (Orrego Vicuña 1979, Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017), to the political and social environment during the period (e.g., Alwyn Oyarzún and Alamos Varas 1979, Krzeminski 1979, Vial Correa 1981). Moreover, Alessandri wrote memoirs of his presidential terms, broken into three volumes: his first presidential administration, self-exile, and second presidential administration (Alessandri Palma 1967a, 1967b, 1967c).

Many scholars continue to consider Alessandri a key political actor in Chile's twentieth century history, which is exemplified by the extensive literature focused on him (e.g., Millar 1981, Vial Correa 1981, San Francisco 2020). Despite being well-known by monikers such as the 'Lion of Tarapacá' (his hometown), Alessandri is not well-known for immigrant enfranchisement; the topic was also largely invisible from the press and political discourses at the time and has been largely absent from academic legal and historical accounts. Put simply by an established historian on the era, Dr. René Millar Carvacho (2020), "suffrage was not a priority" in Alessandri's campaigns or administrations; instead, his main aim during his first presidential administration was to replace the parliamentary system in Chile with a full presidential system, which was achieved in the 1925 Constitution.²⁶ The 'so-called' parliamentary system at the time was not fully parliamentary, nor a working presidential system, and was debated before the 1920 election (Millar 1981, Vial Correa 1981).

I use 'democracy' in quotation marks since Alessandri's presidential administration, especially the first one, differed from modern liberal democracy. According to various democracy indexes, there was a drop—but not a collapse—of democracy between 1925 and 1932, followed by steady growth that

²⁶ Citations marked 'Millar 2020' stem from an informal conversation on August 26, 2020, with Dr. Prof. René Millar Carvacho, a well-known historian and Professor at the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile (*Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile*) and a scholar of Alessandri's political career. Millar is particularly known for his 1981 book, *La elección presidencial de 1920* (The 1920 Presidential Election). After obtaining verbal permission, the conversation was recorded and transcribed (in Spanish). All translations are my own.

collapsed from 1970 to 1990 (see Appendix 2.1). Scully (1992) describes a critical juncture in Chile's party system, starting with Alessandri's victory in 1920 and through a transition period 1924 until 1932. As a charismatic populist candidate and leader unlike any proceeding him, in his first presidency Alessandri took advantage of the class cleavage and (anti)clerical divide in Chile, managing to bring the working class (especially "unorganized urban workers") into party politics, as well as other "previously passive political actors" such as students and artisans (Scully 1992, pp. 77–80). Before analyzing the enfranchisement process, I elaborate on the following incongruencies: on one hand, the 1920 election set the stage for continued middle-class involvement in politics, a milestone in the 20th century; on the other hand, the 1920 election encompassed widespread fraud, irregularities, and low participation—thus lacking important dimensions of democracy.

While several historians of this Chilean period have agreed that the 1920 election was a milestone in Chile's 20th century political history and was competitive (Lennon Zaninovic 2020, Millar 2020), the close presidential election was also marked by irregularities such as vote buying, bribery, and altering of ballots and election records (Millar 1981). Both candidates, Alessandri and Luis Barros Borgoño, took measures to tilt victory in their favor, making the 1920 election fall short of the contemporary requirement of democracy to have free and fair elections.²⁷ However, vote buying was not treated as bribery or an illegal act at the time but rather seen as *gratificaciones* ('gratuities,' as in a reward or bonus) for fulfilling political favors like turning out to vote (Millar 1981, p. 169). Fraudulent practices went beyond election day, as the tight race between the two candidates ended in an official tribunal being formed to verify the actual number of votes for each candidate (i.e., by discounting fraudulent votes) to determine who won.

As Retamal and Retamal (2020) explain, even a century later, the 1920 election was the closest presidential election in Chile's history; Alessandri's victory was "razor thin" (Scully 1992, p. 81), winning by having just one constituent group's support more than Barros Borgoño (177 versus 176 *electores*) (Millar 1981, p. 161). Referring to Alessandri, some tribunal "members did not dare give an unfavorable result to the candidate who a considerable and boisterous part of the [public] opinion had already been chosen as the winner" whereas other members already considered "that Alessandri had won" so even in the face of alleged fraud, they still determined his victory legitimate enough to adapt

²⁷ The 1920 presidential election involved a third candidate, Luís Emilio Recabarren, nominated by Socialist Workers party leaders (Millar 1981). However, Recabarren was barely involved in the competition; Scully (1992, p. 82) reports that, "none of the competing political parties even made public allusion to his candidacy."

the ruling and declare he won by one additional constituent group (Millar 1981, p. 162, own translation). The group had been called for by none other than Alessandri himself and was named—as it turned out, ironically—the Tribunal of Honor.

Despite such irregularities, the novelties that arose at the time set the stage for democratic growth. According to Millar (1981, p. 213, own translation), “the 1920 election clearly reflects a moment of transition in the country’s historical evolution. Values, ideas, economic and social structures are in a full transformation process.” A hundred years after the 1920 election, historians recognize that it “marked the eruption of mass-politics, and with it, modern democracy” (Lennon Zaninovic 2020, quoting Gabriel Cid, historian at the Universidad San Sebastián, own translation). The ‘masses’ included the new urban population of working and middle classes; with rural to urban migration on the rise, literacy rates climbed, which in turn increased the number of eligible voters since literacy was a voting requirement (Millar 1981; see Appendix 2.5). Despite extensive undemocratic practices, Alessandri gained support from “social sectors that had, until then, been on the margins of political decisions” (Lennon Zaninovic 2020, own translation).

Alessandri oversaw significant parts of Chile’s journey to enfranchising immigrants: during his first administration (1920–1925), the new constitution granted some migrants suffrage rights in local-level elections and during his second term, 1932–1938, an electoral law recognized women as voters for the first time while also regularized and implemented (local-level) foreign residents’ suffrage rights. Escobar (2015, pp. 930, 933) describes Alessandri as “an authoritarian leader who resorted to immigrant enfranchisement in search of new support” and positions him as a “strong supporter of universal suffrage.”²⁸ But granting suffrage to two new voter groups does not necessarily signify that Alessandri was a supporter or progressive leader of voting rights. It was possible that he was trying to secure future electoral support, or suffrage emerged for other reasons. To investigate questions surrounding whether Alessandri was a pro-universal suffrage leader, or not, I further examine Chile’s process of immigrant enfranchisement.

Alessandri appears to be front and center of the Commission and Subcommission. The constitutional discussion sessions leading up to the resulting Article 104 in the 1925 Constitution were recorded, transcribed, and are made digitally available in Chile’s Library of the National Congress (Ministerio del Interior [Ministry of the Interior] 1925). The document is called “The Official Acts of

²⁸ The original quote from Escobar (2015, p. 930) refers to authoritarian leaders, in plural, referring to both 1925 enfranchisement in Chile as well as in 1983 in Venezuela.

the Commission and Subcommissions' Sessions in Charge of Analyzing the Project of the New Political Constitution of the Republic.' The original Consultative Commission—which Alessandri called for through Decree 1.422—comprised 122 people, then resulted in two subcommissions (*forma* and *reforma*): the first met only three times to oversee relevant tasks and logistics, such as obtaining voters' approval for the process; the second (*reforma*) was the Subcommission of Constitutional Reforms. It comprised 15 men chosen by Alessandri and met 30 times to discuss amendments and draft 110 Articles (Bernaschina 1956, BCN 2020c).²⁹

Tsebelis (2018, pp. 15–17) reports that the Subcommission was made up of “politicians and other political operatives” but since the group lacked popular legitimacy, “Alessandri resorted to an extra-constitutional means of ‘legitimizing’ his Subcommission’s constitutional proposal” by holding a plebiscite. Since Alessandri hand-picked the members, and actively participated while presiding over the sessions, I posit that the results aligned with Alessandri’s political objectives. Alessandri’s insistence to obtain his goals and resistance to negotiation (Millar 2020) reflects Tsebelis’s (2018, p. 15) account that “Alessandri reportedly stormed out of a Subcommission meeting and was ready to halt reform talks altogether” after remarks from a conservative party representative.

My analysis of discussions about foreign residents’ voting rights and their right to be elected starts with reviewing the official record in a 757-page document, in which the term “foreigners” (*extranjeros*) appears 39 times.³⁰ J. Guillermo Guerra proposes making, “a clear distinction between what political citizenship and municipal citizenship is,” in other words, distinguishing those voting in national and local elections. Guerra also suggests that women and foreign residents who are “contributors” (assumedly meaning those who paid taxes) should be granted voting rights at the municipal level (Ministerio del Interior [Ministry of the Interior] 1925, p. 328). Other conversations about foreigners involve *ius soli* and naturalization; the Subcommission upholds the 1833 Constitution determining that

²⁹ Fifteen men participated in the Subcommission: Domingo Amunátegui Solar, Luis Barros Borgoño, Ramón Briones Luco, Nolasco Cárdenas, Guillermo Edwards Matte, J. Guillermo Guerra, Manuel Hidalgo, Roberto Meza Fuentes, Pedro N. Montenegro, Enrique Oyarzún, Romualdo Silva Cortés, Francisco Vidal Garcés, Carlos Vicuña Fuentes, Eliodoro Yáñez, and Héctor Zañartu. Additionally, the Minister of Justice at the time, José Maza, was also active in the sessions and the Subsecretary of the Interior, Edecio Torreblanca, served as the Subcommission’s Secretary.

³⁰ For scholars interested in further details, discussion regarding foreign residents revolves around voting rights (pp.152, 158, 270, 389–390, 599), their right to be elected (pp.282, 283, 287, 295, 523), and *ius soli*, naturalization, and nationality (p.332, 472, 534, 570) (Ministerio del Interior [Ministry of the Interior] 1925, Stuhldreher 2012, 2016, also see Margheritis 2015, p. 327). All translations are my own.

those born in the Chilean territory are Chilean and that foreigners may adopt the Chilean nationality and naturalize after one year of residence (Ministerio del Interior [Ministry of the Interior] 1925, p. 327). Considering that citizenship regimes involve both access to acquiring nationality and the rights related to it (Vink 2017), such high access made Chile more inclusive to immigrants, but not to emigrants in this instance (Vink and Bauböck 2013). However, the Subcommittee did not offer blanket rights to all foreigners, as they explicitly excluded children born in Chile to transient foreigners (in contemporary lingo, referring to temporary immigrants) and to foreign diplomats working in Chile from the privilege of naturalizing after a year. The Subcommittee also determined that foreigners must renounce their original nationality when they adopt Chilean nationality (Ministerio del Interior [Ministry of the Interior] 1925, pp. 534, 570).³¹

José Maza, the Minister of Justice at the time, states that, “having the right to vote in municipal elections is something unrelated to nationality” (Ministerio del Interior [Ministry of the Interior] 1925, p. 328). Maza’s comment sets the tone for further mentions of immigrant suffrage rights, which resulted in the drafting of Article 104, which establishes a five-year residence as a pre-condition to be an immigrant voter in Chile (still in effect as of 2020). While there were other general voting requirements at the time such as being 21 years or older, male, and literate, the residence condition applied specifically to foreigners.

While Alessandri had played a major role in suggesting and organizing the Subcommittee, such anticlimactic discussions behind the resultant constitutional article did not shed light on his role in immigrant enfranchisement in Chile. Alessandri knew how to use “all the available tools” to gain popular support from the “masses” and incite them when he thought it would help his political ends (Millar 2020). Rather than being a suffrage advocate, Alessandri seeking votes, electoral support, legitimacy, or symbolic popularity as a leader could better explain the emergence of new voting rights.

2.2.1.1 Explaining early enfranchisement

I challenge three seemingly plausible explanations for enfranchising foreign residents in Chile in 1925: policy diffusion (of neighboring countries’ enfranchisement policies), the leader being a suffrage advocate, and a small foreign population (making it relatively easier to pass enfranchisement legislation).

³¹ Similarly, the 1833 Constitution (Article 6) also required Chileans to renounce their Chilean nationality, if they nationalized in another country.

Historically, in 1925 Chile was a pioneer in immigrant enfranchisement, regionally and globally, which credits Alessandri with not following a trend but rather starting one. Nonetheless, neighboring countries had already taken preliminary steps to enfranchising immigrants. Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil were main immigrant-receiving nations at the time (Acosta 2018). Despite having higher populations of foreigners, the city of Buenos Aires passed Law 1.240 on foreign resident voting in 1917 (Escobar 2017, p. 10). Uruguay had also made progress redefining eligibility of the electorate: Article 1 of its 1830 Constitution granted political association to “all citizens” in all sections of the territory, Article 1 of its 1918 Constitution Article 1 changed it to “all inhabitants” in the territory, then Article 78 of its 1934 Constitution granted foreign resident voting rights in both local and national elections (Stuhldreher 2016, pp. 248–249).³² While Chile remains an innovator in granting immigrant voting rights, it was not a radical move at the time, even compared to nearby countries with higher immigrant populations.

Second, I find little evidence that Alessandri was “a fervent supporter of universal suffrage,” as Echeverría (2015, p. 3) claims. Escobar (2015) mentions that Alessandri was a strong supporter of voting rights but does not explore this stance further. As president, Alessandri was a political elite and through his administration, tried to increase his role as the Executive. Despite his own obtained power, Alessandri was also known for standing against hierarchies, including being anti-party (Silva 2006) and using his speeches to appeal to the “masses” of the day (Millar 1981). Since most of the “masses” had just started to be politically included at this time, I did not expect a public discussion around immigrant enfranchisement. This was confirmed when a keyword search through newspaper articles from 1924 and 1925 in Chile’s National Digital Library proved fruitless (see Appendix 2.2), showing no public discussion or contestation.

The only concrete evidence that I find supporting Alessandri’s position as an advocate of voting rights is that universal suffrage was one of three main topics in his project to reform the 1833 Constitution (BCN 2020b). However, as quoted above, Millar disagrees with this, which also became evident to me given the sparse attention Alessandri and the Subcommission members dedicated to discussing suffrage rights (Ministerio del Interior [Ministry of the Interior] 1925). Alessandri prioritized automatic registration in the electorate to reduce manipulation and protect his own political

³² While Uruguay remains one of the most liberal countries worldwide for immigrant voting rights, eligibility rules to access suffrage rights were, and continue to be, rigid. To vote, immigrants must have a clean criminal record, maintain residence in Uruguay for 15 years, have a job, and have formed a family in the country (Stuhldreher 2012, 2016, Margheritis 2015).

aims (Millar 2020), which underlaid his reputation for his connection with the “masses” through his political discourse rhetoric (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017). For example, he closed the National Congress in 1924 during his first administration, took power into his own hands instead of calling for a constituent assembly, and manipulated the press during his second administration (Millar 2020, San Francisco 2020). Alessandri did not hesitate to limit rights when ‘necessary’ instead of negotiating or allowing other voices to be heard.

Third, as compared to total population, there were very few immigrants during this period (see Figure 2.1); moreover, few people had voting rights since the country still excluded women, illiterate men, and those under 21 years old. Upon return from his self-exile during his first presidency, Alessandri’s return stirred optimistic public opinion about positive change to overcome political and social crisis (Donoso 1934, Alwyn Oyarzún and Alamos Varas 1979). In the 1920s, “general dissatisfaction with the existing order” had dissipated throughout society, including discontentment with the parliamentary system (Silva 1994). The scenario illuminates why Alessandri gained popular support and why the population was unconcerned with selective immigrant enfranchisement.

However, none of these three reasons shed light on *why* Alessandri extended voting rights to some foreign residents in local elections. It seems possible that Alessandri could have been trying to gain votes or continue his popularity.³³ At first glance, these motivations seem implausible because a) immigrants were enfranchised at the local (not national) level, so they would not have been able to directly reelect Alessandri; and b) with only a small population of foreigners in the total population, further reduced through rigid eligibility requirements for voting, the number of migrant voters would have been too low to significantly affect electoral outcomes. However, taking a closer look into the context and enfranchisement process, I cannot discard either of these scenarios. While they cannot fully answer the question of why the administration granted immigrant voting rights, both carry validity and reveal a glimpse into the whole picture.

On the surface, both the number and percentage of immigrants in the population seem too insignificant to play a role; in 1925, immigrants made up between 2.5% and 3% of total population (see Figure 2.1). However, the voting requirements (only literate men 21 years old and older) meant the entire electorate in 1925 was much smaller than modern electorates. In the 1920 presidential election, 383,331 men were on the electoral registry and 166,115 voted—representing just 9% of the

³³ While Alessandri’s grandfather had emigrated from Italy to Chile and Alessandri had a familial link to Italian communities, this fact alone is insufficient to assume that he supported foreign residents’ political rights.

entire male population at the time (Millar 1981). Thus, immigrants who gained voting rights in 1925 became part of a small special electorate.

Of the approximate 105,500 immigrant residents in 1930, around 65% were European and many of the 68,163 men would have had voting rights (Dirección General de Estadística de Chile [General Directorate of Statistics of Chile] 1931, Gutiérrez Roldán 1975; see Appendix 2.3, 2.4, 2.5). As Fernández Domingo (2006) reports, before 1860, Europeans arriving to Chile mostly worked in trade and self-employed professions with technical skills; French, Germans, and Italians formed part of the middle and upper classes. Escobar (2015, p. 933) adds that some “immigrants achieved significance as skilled labourers, merchants and entrepreneurs.” Based on this citation, Echeverría (2015, p. 3) then posits that the administration recognized immigrants’ importance “by the granting of limited voting rights to those foreigners who met certain requirements.” However, based on public records, the press, and academic sources, I find no evidence of Alessandri or the Subcommission deciding to grant voting rights as a ‘reward’ or in recognition of such occupations or contributions. Under greater scrutiny, it seems that these skilled European men would have met voting requirements and as such, carried much more political weight than as first appeared. Even with conservative estimates of the adult foreign-born male population, the number is significant since the electorate numbered only 383,331 in 1920.

Given that the immigrant electorate only gained local-level voting rights, perhaps Alessandri sought to gain indirect electoral support or increase his chances of future election or appointment to other public local-level positions. Alessandri had been a “political insider” before running for president, given his career as Senator and Deputy (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017, p. 523, BCN 2020b). His desire to continue his political trajectory and gain and maintain political power through holding public office is thus a reasonable ambition. More specifically, Samuels (2003, p. 2) narrows the theory of political ambition to a particular form of “progressive” ambition (in his case study of Brazil) with politicians seeking first a short-term post as Deputy followed by serving in state or local politics over the long term. After being president twice, Alessandri continued as a Senator until his death in 1950 (BCN 2020b). Alessandri’s political trajectory aligns well with Samuels’ definition of progressive political ambition; it seems feasible that Alessandri could have sought to gain electoral support in any additional way he could. Despite a small population of foreign residents, granting them local-level suffrage meant that they could then electorally support Alessandri in municipal elections after his presidency.

The 1925 Constitution gave the President of Chile the right to name mayors of the main cities in Chile, but Decree 1.642 of 1934, approved in 1935, changed it so mayors were elected (Senado de Chile [Senate of Chile] 2016). Fewer municipalities meant fewer representatives to be elected. The literate foreign resident professionals resided primarily in six areas (Atacama, Santiago, Valparaíso, Valdivia, Concepción, and Magallanes), and these men were the ones who gained voting rights. Therefore, it is possible that foreign residents could have aided in electing mayors in municipal elections who supported Alessandri since this link would indirectly boost his chances of presidential reelection.

In addition to electoral support at the ballot, Alessandri may have been trying to use foreign residents to increase (real or imagined) legitimacy as the incumbent. Was it possible that Alessandri was looking to win favor from wealthy migrant families, for example, to boost popularity in elite circles? Based on the evidence I have gathered, it does not appear to be the case, mostly because the Executive had the power to grant key players nationality, which would have been a more direct way to grant immigrants multilevel voting rights, allowing them to elect Alessandri. Instead, it seems that political elites other than Alessandri lie at the core of why the 1925 Constitution granted local-level migrant voting rights: a project by elites, for elites, to gain indirect electoral support to maintain political power, as well as win votes in the future.

Political elite-led projects are nothing new in South America. Elite projects to populate, whiten, and build a nation are core themes throughout Acosta's (2018) detailed account of two centuries of migration and citizenship law in South American countries. Attracting fair-skinned skilled Europeans had previously been part of Chile's legal nation-building project to increase and whiten the population, strongly influencing its nineteenth-century migration legislation (Lara Escalona 2014, Durán Migliardi and Thayer 2017, p. 442, Acosta 2018). Spilling over into the twentieth century, the notion of 'ideal' or 'desirable' migrants were still white European literate men. Other immigrants in Chile, such as Arabs and Asians, faced discrimination as 'non-ideal' immigrants (which continues today; see Chan and Montt Strabucchi 2020); those with undocumented status made them ineligible to vote—which frames why Escobar (2015, p. 943) explains that immigrant enfranchisement under Alessandri occurred against a backdrop of imagining the desirable European immigrant uninterested in naturalizing and few in number. Through the normative perspective of the day, the decisionmakers saw this select group of foreigners as those that 'should' have voting rights. Rather than seeing foreigners as outsiders, literate men were valued for their skill and sex, regardless of their birthplace. Such a perspective is reinforced by the Subcommittee's outcome separating naturalization decisions

from voting rights (Ministerio del Interior [Ministry of the Interior] 1925, pp. 328, 599). The normative lens suggests that few within the elite group of voters would have opposed welcoming working-aged, skilled, white, literate men as new members in the exclusive electorate ‘club.’

The possibility remains that Alessandri believed in greater suffrage rights and wanted to include new voters, but I would not portray him as a strong or fervent supporter of voting rights for foreign residents. Granting a group of migrant voters the right to participate in local-level elections could have boosted his popularity—and indirectly his chances of reelection—in a more significant way than has been recognized in the literature. Another simpler explanation is that new migrant voters mirrored the current voter profile so much so, that extending suffrage rights to them was a ‘natural’ step, unworthy of press or debate. While this may appear to be an anticlimactic ending to the question of why some migrants gained voting rights in the 1925 Constitution, it is crucial to explaining the extension of suffrage rights universally to adult migrant residents in multilevel elections in the 1980 Constitution. The major difference is that while the first step occurred during ‘democracy,’ the second occurred during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet.

2.2.2 The 1980 Constitution: Expanding immigrant voting rights under authoritarian rule

The coup d’état that overthrew Allende’s administration resulted in a declared state of emergency and Pinochet’s 17-year military dictatorship (1973–1990). Political parties had polarized to two extremes,³⁴ dissolving the ideological center, which eliminated the possibility of forming coalitions necessary for reaching agreement (Bermeo 2003, Valenzuela 2003). Pinochet knew that maintaining polarization would allow him to take advantage of the dire situation. According to Huneeus (2000), implementing economic and constitutional changes was part of a multidimensional plan to legitimize the regime (gaining admiration from some in the process), extend his rule, delay transition (i.e., continue the declared state of emergency), and centralize political power. Martínez and Díaz (1996) point out that changing the foundations of the political and socioeconomic systems may have been a standalone objective (also see Barros 2002). Being unable to single-handedly control all political players, Pinochet founded the secret police DINA (*Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional*, or the National Intelligence

³⁴ In Chile, political parties began to form 1828–1891, with the emergent Conservative, Radical, and Liberal parties (Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1976, Valenzuela J. S. 1995). A tripolar division of left, center, and right had dominated the Chilean partisan system since the late 1820s and this deep-rooted system reemerged post-Pinochet (Valenzuela J. S. 1995, Scully 1996).

Directorate) to control the opposition, as well as spy on government employees in their private and professional lives (Huneus 2000, pp. 104, 160).³⁵

Part of the political overhaul to create change required wiping the slate clean: Pinochet eliminated other political parties and began a constitutional revision. The objective of reviewing the 1925 Constitution and implementing ('Chicago boys' technocrat style) free market economic change was to reestablish normalcy in politics and the economy, after it had been in dire straits prior to the coup (Huneus 2000, pp. 215–217). According to Bermeo (2003), society comprised "ordinary people" who believed the coup saved Chile from communism, that the country was in a war against Marxism, and as such, underestimated or ignored abundant violence and human rights abuses. Pinochet aimed to settle the chaos but used the 'war' against Marxism and a state of emergency to maintain fear so he could make significant institutional changes during this critical juncture in Chile.

Almost immediately following the 1973 coup, the Ortúzar Commission began its lengthy process of reviewing the 1925 Constitution, which contributed to the final product of Chile's 1980 Constitution. The process unfolded within the context of crisis. The final wording agreed upon in 1974 for Article 12 (defining suffrage and who national citizens are) and Article 14 (foreign resident voting) were both approved in 1978 during the writing of what would become the 1980 Constitution.

2.2.2.1 A foreign resident's right versus a national's duty

I examine transcribed dialog from the Ortúzar Commission in 1974 (Historia de la Ley, Art.14 2005).³⁶ The Commission was a selected group assigned to review the nationality and citizenship articles within the 1925 Constitution, in preparation for the eventual 1980 Constitution. These discussions are included in the History of the Law of Article 14 of the Republic of Chile's Political Constitution of 1980. The National Congressional Library, the Supreme Court, and the General Accounting Office collaborated to prepare this document. It contains sections of the conversations that occurred during the political sessions while the Commission members reviewed the previous constitution. I also use

³⁵ The DINA was the secret police in Pinochet's first years, which was then changed to the CNI (*Central Nacional de Informaciones*, or the National Information Center) in 1977. These organizations, and Pinochet, were later tried in court for violating human rights, such as inflicting torture (Huneus 2000, pp. 113, 163).

³⁶ The official name was the Commission of Studies for the New Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile (*La Comisión de Estudios de la Nueva Constitución Política de la República de Chile*), but is more commonly known as the Ortúzar Commission, given the last name of the group's leader.

Articles 12 and 14 from Chile's 1980 Constitution, as well as academic references regarding context, enfranchisement, and migration law.

At the time, the Migration Law of 1975 (still active as of December 2020) regulated immigrant flows, which had been implemented earlier in Pinochet's regime from a national security perspective (Stefoni 2011). Nonetheless, immigrant suffrage rights had not changed since the 1925 Constitution. The expansion of immigrant voting rights from local to national elections in the 1980 Constitution was not a drastic change; rather I view the change as an "institutional innovation" since it expanded the status quo (Thelen 2003, p. 209). Since 1925, select foreign-resident voters could choose if they wanted to participate or abstain in municipality elections; I found the Commission expanded this understanding to mean immigrant voters should be able to choose whether they want to participate, or not, in *all* elections, both municipal and national.

A critical political actor in forming this perspective regarding the right, not duty, to vote was Jaime Guzmán. Guzmán had led the Gremial movement and was close with Pinochet, writing numerous speeches for him and stating that this government could restore social peace (Huneus 2000, p. 146).³⁷ Guzmán was a vocal member of the Ortúzar Commission, taking suffrage stances opposing other Commission members—particularly contrasting Jorge Ovalle Quiroz and the Commission's President, Enrique Ortúzar Escobar. The Commission members discuss foreign resident voting as a right, not an obligation, and their dialogues express strong views regarding the appropriateness of mandatory voting.

Guzmán was the only one on the Commission who supported an optional voting system for all voters, whereas the other members argued it should be optional only for immigrant voters. Reviewing the Commission's debate in *Historia de la Ley*, Article 14 (2005, pp. 35–38, 43–44, own translation), Ortúzar in particular expresses that facultative (voluntary) voting would have grave consequences for social order, and it would be a mistake to interpret "the contemporary conception of what a free, open, and democratic society is" while being lax about the "weak sustaining bases" of such a society if the government allowed voters to choose to be interested, or not, in the electoral process (Finn

³⁷ The Gremial movement was a Chilean political group located within higher education, based out of the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile (*Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile*), led by Jaime Guzmán, who maintained a "close relationship" with Pinochet, a relationship that served as political backing for the movement (Huneus 2000, p. 146). As a young political elite, Guzmán started a conservative political party, the Independent Democratic Union (*Unión Demócrata Independiente*, UDI) (Luna *et al.* 2013), which remains active, as of 2020.

2020b). Ortúzar argues that the government must force people to vote, because if they have a choice, many will abstain—preferring instead a day of rest rather than making the “minimal sacrifice” of expressing their opinion at the ballot. He believed that activists and those with strong interests would always vote, which would worsen the political divide since moderate voters would abstain. He continued to argue that, as national citizens lose interest in public matters, it would allow those “desiring the destruction of the institutional system” to succeed. However, Ortúzar’s belief that ‘all’ members must participate is *not* synonymous with universal suffrage goals, but it did encompass a large electorate group. The Commission considered eligible national voters to be Chileans free of convicted sentences and crimes who were at least 18 years old; meeting these requirements, Chilean nationals gained suffrage rights.³⁸

In contrast to Ortúzar and other supporters’ position on mandatory voting for Chileans, most of the Commission views foreign resident voting as a right, not an obligation. They aimed to constitutionally ensure that immigrants who meet requirements would then have the possibility to vote in the future, but only if legislators decided to grant this right via electoral law—as Silva Bascuñán summarizes (*Historia de la Ley*, Art.14 2005, p. 30)—highlighting the critical difference between the legal enfranchisement steps of enactment versus regulation. However, the Commission determined that foreign residents would not be able to run for elected office. Despite the Commission’s stance that optional voting would make sense in a “purely aristocratic or elite society, but in no way in a democracy in which all its members are called to participate,” they nonetheless decided that foreign residents should be allowed to opt in or out of being members of the electorate and choose to vote or abstain in each election.

The Commission’s stance endured and was converted into Article 14 of the 1980 Constitution: “Foreigners residing in Chile... may exercise suffrage rights in the cases and manner determined by law.” Although the Commission wanted to avoid the possibility of legislators or political parties using immigrant enfranchisement as partisan leverage, their focus remained on ensuring immigrant voting, if enacted, could never be constitutionally considered mandatory. The debate focused on future constitutional interpretation of who could meet requirements to be an immigrant voter. The Commission states that voting is not an inherent right, although they also express that individuals will

³⁸ After debate if national voters should be 18 or 21 years old, the final decision (in Session 57 on December 5, 1987) favored 18 as the minimum voting age.

have the option (after 10 years, later reduced to 5) to choose, as the immigrants see fit, to participate or not in the political community.

The voting as a right-versus-duty discussion had two repercussions on the voting system and personal freedoms today (Finn 2020b). First, in 2010, Chile was already experiencing declining turnout in the mandatory voting system with optional electoral registration and switched to an optional voting system with automatic registration, but lower turnout continued (Navia 2004, Herrera and Navia unpublished)—which did not destroy the institutional system. As compared to when voting was compulsory, turnout rates have indeed been lower (Carlin 2006); in Chile’s 2017 presidential election, participation was 46.8% of the electorate (Joignant 2018), which Ortúzar’s thinking had predicted: fewer people vote when it is voluntary. However, based on the Commission sessions, the debate was never about voting being optional or mandatory, but rather about how to control Chilean nationals to ensure they fulfil this obligation (their “moral duty”), i.e., how to establish the grounds for effective punishment for Chileans who do not vote (Historia de la Ley, Art.14 2005, pp. 35, 39–40, 42).

Second, the resulting 1980 Constitution (counterintuitively) increased foreign residents’ personal freedoms while restricting that of nationals. Commission member Enrique Evans de la Cuadra saw no reason why the Constitution would not also grant suffrage rights to foreigners under certain conditions, given Chile offers immigrants the chance to naturalize after a residence period (Historia de la Ley, Art.14 2005, p. 10). As Pedroza (2015) outlines, a country can include migrants in the demos either through a traditional route of naturalization (see, e.g., Brubaker 1992) or through enfranchising them. The Commission seems to echo this view, as members expressed that optional voting after a residence period is *just as logical* as offering optional naturalization after a residence period (Finn 2020b). This created two ways of joining the political community in Chile: naturalization would mean gaining the Chilean nationality and thereafter voting would be mandatory;³⁹ alternatively, the Commission allowed non-naturalized immigrants to join the political community and participate in elections only when they wanted to, as shown in Table 2.2.

³⁹ Various reasons exist as to why people would prefer not to naturalize in a country, e.g., it may change legal (economic, social, or political) rights in the origin country; they may feel the costs outweigh the additional benefits; they may already have more than one nationality or are not allowed to have another; others may lack the resources to apply or not meet requirements.

Table 2.2 Two Paths for Immigrants to Vote, Chile

Immigration	→	Naturalization	Mandatory voting for nationals (until 2009/2012)
			Facultative voting for nationals (enacted in 2009, applied in 2012)
	→	Enfranchisement	Facultative voting for foreign residents (since 1980, applied in 1988)

Source: Extended from Finn (2020b).

Chileans and immigrants both have automatic registration and optional voting, enacted in 2009 (Law 20.337), regulated in 2012 (Law 20.568), and applied in 2012 (in local elections). Both categories must be free of felony convictions and at least 18 years old, whereas foreigners must have also reached a five-year residence in Chile. In other words, after five years in Chile, the state has the electoral service automatically add foreign residents to the electorate (for both municipal and national elections) whereas individual immigrants choose to participate in elections, or not. Foreign residents also choose whether or not to naturalize.

Therefore, contrary to outliers in Europe that stress either national citizenship or political rights for denizens (without easy access to naturalization) (see the discussion in Huddleston and Vink 2015), Chile has long offered both. Comparing countries within and beyond the EU that have extended versus withheld local-level suffrage rights, some countries have easy whereas others have difficult naturalization rules—meaning that while naturalization rules may be part of the story, the naturalization regime alone does not spur or block discussion (or approval) of denizen enfranchisement (Pedroza 2013).

Granting voting rights to foreign residents makes their enfranchisement “an option vis-à-vis naturalization, either an *alternative* or a *pathway*” (Pedroza 2013, p. 27, emphasis in original). In the case of Chile in 1980, the two both led to holding multilevel voting rights (although these were not implemented until 1988). The two routes of including migrants in the demos apply only to first-generation immigrants since Chile has *ius soli* laws: children are born into the nationality, making it a non-voluntary (but renounceable) membership. Enfranchisement through residence increases immigrants’ agency and offers extensive liberty to choose the extent to which they participate

politically in the destination country—initially giving immigrants more freedom than Chilean voters, who previously had mandatory voting.

However, the constitutional change offering more rights to foreigners than nationals strangely occurred during a restrictive period in Chile’s migratory legislative history. The regime deported many foreigners and discouraged others from entering the country, framing them as threats to society, the regime, and state security (Lara Escalona 2014, pp. 62, 81, 90).⁴⁰ In this sense, the complementary view did not emerge because of territorial inclusiveness arguments (see Bauböck 2005) but nonetheless the outcome in Chile was inclusiveness.

2.2.3 Granting emigrant voting rights, 2014–2017

The last stage to reach migrant enfranchisement in Chile was granting suffrage rights to nationals abroad, which took three years to complete the three steps for emigrant enfranchisement. Chile was an extreme latecomer in granting Chileans the right to vote from abroad, in stark contrast to having been a pioneer in foreign resident voting rights (Escobar 2015, 2017). External voting was enacted into law in 2014 (Law 20.748), which outlined voting from abroad in presidential primaries, presidential elections, and national-level plebiscites. External voting was then regulated in 2016 (Law 20.960), requiring Chileans to change their address to abroad and to prove a past residence of at least one year in Chile, presumably any time within the individual’s life. Finally, enfranchisement for emigrants was applied in 2017—first in July for the primaries, followed by the first round of the presidential election in November, then the second round in December 2017. In total, Chile’s long road to migrant enfranchisement thus ran a whopping 92 years, from 1925 to 2017.

Chile’s emigrant enfranchisement process had various failed attempts before approval (Toro and Walker 2007). According to the official record of constitutional reform detailing the chronology of external voting, the first mention of Chileans being allowed to vote from abroad dates to 1971 during Allende’s administration (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] 2015). Interestingly, this occurred before Pinochet’s regime—the regime that exiled many Chileans, as well as pushed others to emigrate. The topic of external voting quickly resurfaced post-Pinochet: in 1991,

⁴⁰ The military dictatorship had strict control over mobility (the right of entry and exit) of all persons, Chileans and foreigners alike (DL 2460 of 1979) and could expel individuals after a 24-hour notification (Lara Escalona 2014, pp. 87–88). ‘Restrictive’ here in dictatorship differs from studies on Chile’s contemporary restrictive migration governance (Finn and Umpierrez de Reguero 2020, Vásquez *et al.* 2021), which occurred in democracy.

a proposal tried to modify it (Law 18.700) to include Chileans abroad in presidential elections. Two years later, the proposal, along with details on electoral registration, was presented, but nothing came of it. The discussion lay dormant until 2005, when another proposed modification to Law 18.700 was rejected. Despite the setback, it marked a turning point in external voting as a regular issue, appearing every one to three years. In 2009, Bachelet proposed automatic registration and facultative voting for Chileans abroad, but again, nothing came of it. In 2010, Piñera proposed a similar motion to modify Law 18.700 but his proposal required voters to have some form of link (*vínculo*) to Chile in order to vote from abroad—the Senate considered such a link as restrictive and rejected the proposal (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] 2015).

A group of Senators followed up in 2013 by re-opening discussion on external voting for presidential elections and plebiscites and suggested that external voter registration be required before every Chilean election. It was approved with 29 votes from the Senate (with 6 votes against and 1 abstention), thus moved to the Chamber of Deputies (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] 2015). In 2014, Bachelet prioritized the discussion and added the right to also vote in presidential primary elections and eliminated the voter registration requirement before every election. The National Congress approved the constitutional reform project in April 2014, with Bachelet's last amendments, which proved successful through the following legal steps in the Chamber of Deputies, finishing in 2016 (as Law 20.960). Bachelet commented,

We believe that with this law, we are honoring democracy, by allowing each of our compatriots to effectively have the possibility of marking his or her preference in our national elections. And that is what we are doing—we are cutting a tie that was limiting [the breadth of] our democracy and also [we are] strengthening the bond between the sons and daughters of this land, by enacting the law that will regulate the right to vote of Chilean men and women abroad. (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] 2016, own translation)

Thus, the presidential primaries and election of 2017 marked the first applications of Chileans voting from abroad. The highest number of voters registered and who voted in 2017 came from Chileans living in Argentina and the United States (Joignant 2018)—which are among top destination countries for Chileans (Luna *et al.* 2016, p. 53).⁴¹ The requirement in Law 20.960 of living at least one

⁴¹ Reported in 2016, the largest stock of Chileans residing abroad was in Argentina (429,708 people), the US (113,394), Sweden (42,396), Canada (37,577), and Australia (33,626) (Luna *et al.* 2016). The highest numbers

year in Chile is important because it excludes some from the larger group of Chileans abroad (anyone holding the nationality) to include voters only from the smaller group of emigrants—meaning the Chilean nationality is not a sufficient condition to vote for the second or later generations who have never lived in Chile. A Chilean abroad must register their address with Chile, fill out a form to register to vote, show Chilean identification, and prove that they have lived in Chile at least a year (*el certificado de vecindamiento de Extranjería*) (Serval 2020). Voter registration becomes automatic when Chile’s Electoral Service has access to the residence certificate (Law 18.566).

To achieve enfranchisement, again, a country must enshrine migrant voting rights (making it law), regulate them via the legal framework (making it possible to exercise the right), as well as implement them (the first time migrants vote in elections) (Palop-García and Pedroza 2019). For foreign resident (immigrant) voting in Chile, this occurred between 1925 and 1934 for local elections and then between 1980 and 1988 for national elections. For nonresident nationals (emigrant) voting from abroad, the enfranchisement process took place between 2014 and 2017. In total, Chile took 92 years to enfranchise both immigrants and emigrants, spanning 1925 to 2017 (also see Courtis 2016, 2017, Finn 2020b).

Despite the long history of immigrant voting in Chile, emigrants voting from abroad for the first time in 2017 drew overall attention to migrant voting. The 2017 presidential election presented an ideal moment to collect data that would allow me to further explore the phenomenon of migrant voting and which migrants vote. The rest of this chapter expands upon the four migrant voting categories (emigrant, immigrant, and dual transnational voting, as well as abstention). I conducted a survey in Chile in 2017 focused on electoral participation in the origin and residence countries. Using the results, I investigate four hypotheses focused on how linguistic communication, interest in politics, intention to stay, and in-country tenure might affect individual-level migrant voter turnout.

2.3 Surveying the Four Migrant Voting Types in Chile

The survey was available for five days in both November and December 2017, aligned with Chile’s two rounds of the presidential election. I selected the year 2017 because immigrants comprised about 5% of the total population (see Table 2.3 and 2.4) and foreign residents automatically obtain voting

of registered Chilean voters abroad in 2017 were in Argentina (7,507), the US (5,308), Spain (3,099), and Canada (2,581), whereas accordingly the most votes came from Argentina (3,876) and the US (3,391) (Joignant 2018).

rights after a five-year residence (Echeverría 2015; Law 20.568 Art. 6, 2012). Consequently, almost 2% of the electorate for the 2017 election comprised registered immigrant voters (i.e., 267,116 foreign residents in the electorate of 14,308,151 people) (Servel 2017, Joignant 2018). These percentages suggest that the special electorate group of registered immigrant voters have the potential to significantly impact a close election in Chile. In the 2017 election, 39,137 Chileans abroad were also registered to vote (Joignant 2018).

To contextualize the election, on November 19, 2017, eight candidates appeared on the ballot in the first round.⁴² Piñera from the right-center party coalition Let's Go Chile (*Chile Vamos*) won about 37% of the votes and Guillier from The Strength of the Majority (*La Fuerza de la Mayoría*), part of the center-left coalition of the New Majority (*Nueva Mayoría*) won about 23% (Servel 2017). In the run-off on December 17, 2017, Piñera won about 55% and Guillier 45% of the votes (Servel 2017). Sebastián Piñera had served his first term as President of Chile in 2010–2014 and began his second term in March 2018.

In the first round, about 19% of eligible immigrants in the electorate (51,213 individuals) voted, versus about 21% (56,163) in the second round in December (Servel 2017). A majority (over 33,000) of these immigrant voters participated from the Metropolitan Region, in which Santiago is located (Servel 2017).⁴³ Comparatively, overall turnout in the general election was about 47% in the first round and 49% in the second round; of the emigrant electorate (Chileans residing abroad), 60% of those registered turned out to vote in the first round and 54% in the second (Joignant 2018). Based on Servel data, Bravo and Bravo (2018) show that compared to Chileans, foreign resident voters were 3 percentage points less likely to turn out to vote, *ceteris paribus*. Therefore, immigrant voters were less likely to vote than Chileans living both inside and outside the territory.

⁴² The eight candidates were Eduardo Artés Brichetti, Marco Enríquez-Ominami Gumucio, Carolina Goic Borojevic, Alejandro Guillier Álvarez, José Antonio Kast Rist, Alejandro Navarro Brain, Sebastián Piñera Echenique, and Beatriz Sánchez Muñoz.

⁴³ Chile comprises 16 regions. In the first round of the 2017 presidential election, 33,479 of the 51,213 immigrant voters who participated live in the Santiago Metropolitan Region; 3,520 voted in Tarapacá, 3,156 in Antofagasta; 2,870 in Valparaíso; 2,060 in Arica and Parinacota; and about 1,000 or fewer in the remaining regions (Servel 2017).

2.3.1 An original electoral online survey

After designing the survey between March and July 2017, I ran a small pilot in October 2017.⁴⁴ I designed the survey in Qualtrics and promoted it through FacebookAds (an advertisement component of the social media website, Facebook). It was available and open to responses between November 14–19 and December 12–17, 2017, five days until the polls opened on election day for each round.

Respondents qualified by being of voting age, being foreign-born, and residing in Chile. To find survey respondents, I applied a Facebook filter for foreign-born persons who entered the site while in Chile (based on logging in through a Chilean IP address). People from this group saw an advertisement on their newsfeed; the photo displayed international flags and stated, in Spanish, “Immigrant in Chile? Your voice counts! A brief survey” (photo in Appendix 2.6). Clicking on this Facebook advertisement redirected the individual to the Qualtrics survey.

The survey was advertised and conducted only in Spanish since most immigrants are intraregional and must live five years in Chile before gaining voting rights.⁴⁵ After reading information about the survey and participant anonymity, each Respondent answered the question, “Do you accept participating in this study under the previously listed conditions?” (see Appendix 2.7). Only those clicking “yes” indicating their informed consent could proceed to the survey. The survey closed for those failing to meet the age or location requirements asked in the first questions.

Of the survey Respondents during the total 10 days over which the survey was available online, I eliminated: a) those who had answered less than 70% of the survey (excluding 932 responses from November and 707 from December); b) those who completed the survey in less than three minutes (90 the first round and 46 the second) since this is an inadequate amount of time to have properly comprehended the questions; and c) the very few ‘repeat’ surveys that shared an IP and had copy and pasted responses to the open-ended questions. That left 1,482 remaining usable responses.

The 1,482 Respondents include both potential voters and migrant voters. Chile only grants foreign residents suffrage rights after a five-year residence, so many Respondents (N=805) had not

⁴⁴ The Research Ethics Committee within the Faculty of Social Sciences and History at the Universidad Diego Portales in Chile approved the survey.

⁴⁵ Although there are immigrants from outside South America residing in Chile (for example, one of the recent emergent immigrant groups originates from Haiti, with Creole as their native language), I nonetheless conducted the survey only in Spanish. The intention was not to cater to native speakers (the majority language of foreign residents in Chile; see Table 2.3) but rather, based on the requirement to be eligible to vote, I assumed Respondents would have enough language acquisition over the five years of residence to answer the survey.

yet met the threshold, meaning the survey attracted many newly arrived immigrants. Given such a high number of individuals without suffrage rights responded to a call geared toward the upcoming election (“Immigrant in Chile? Your voice counts!”) hints that Respondents are interested in both politics and political participation in the residence country. Nonetheless, I focus only on migrants who, at the time of the survey, had voting rights in national-level elections in two countries (N=680). After eliminating missing data, I was left with a final count of 658 Respondents for the present analysis.

The large number of responses reflect an advantage of online surveys: they offer quick data collection, are inexpensive, and eliminate interviewer bias (Berrens *et al.* 2003). However, as a Facebook opt-in survey, the self-selected respondents do not comprise a random or representative sample, thus the results hold internal validity only for this group. I do not extrapolate to all migrant voters nor try to attempt to predict future patterns of electoral behavior in Chile.

The survey had several limitations: one potential bias is that Respondents needed a Facebook account and had to be logged in during the open period to complete the survey. Although a non-political photo advertised the survey, selection bias may exist since I conducted the survey before a presidential election. Stating “your voice counts” implied political voice, appealing to respondents interested in politics, which could have affected the decision to vote as well as the decision to answer the survey. Furthermore, while the survey captured migrants’ electoral behavior in the past and present in two countries, a design flaw creates a limitation to the study: the question about past voting in the origin country failed to specify whether this was before or after migration. Although this disrupts proper categorization for emigrant and dual transnational voting, it is not detrimental to achieving my research objectives, as I elaborate on in the next two subsections.

2.3.2 Measuring demographics, socioeconomic standing, and political engagement

The dependent variable is previous migrant voting, based on the migrant voting typology categorizing four types: immigrant, emigrant, and dual transnational voting, and abstention (see Figure 1 in the Introduction). I defined “previous voting” as having voted in the past whereas abstention means never having voted before. I conducted a multinomial logistic regression on this multicategorical dependent variable. As Starkweather and Moske (2011, p. 1) describe it, “Multinomial logistic regression is a simple extension of binary logistic regression that allows for more than two categories of the dependent or outcome variable. Like binary logistic regression, multinomial logistic regression uses maximum likelihood estimation to evaluate the probability of categorical membership.” This type of regression is fitting because my dependent variable comprises four categories, which are nominal since

they are not in any order or scale. Being non-linear, interpreting multinomial logistic regression follows a different logic, so I present the odds ratio to report the results. My objective was to explore the phenomenon of migrant voting; specifically, I am interested in showing that migrants voters' electoral behavior and turnout are influenced by additional independent variables at the individual level. To estimate the level of influence each independent variable has on the dependent variable, I examine their effect on this group of survey respondents.

The survey contained three sections: demographics, socioeconomic standing, and political engagement (see Appendix 2.8 to see all questions).⁴⁶ Regarding political engagement, I expected some misreporting because memory is imperfect and because of the social desirability response bias (voter turnout is often overreported because people who abstain, or will abstain, feel reluctant or embarrassed to say this, so they lie). Those who misreport voting because of imperfect memory “unintentionally misremember” voting while those who misreport voting because of the social desirability response bias “intentionally misreport” voting (Holbrook and Krosnick 2010, p. 41). While the online survey opted for brief questions and answers to avoid tiring out respondents and to encourage them to complete the questionnaire, the fact that it was anonymous and online may have helped overcome the bias. Holbrook and Krosnick (2010, p. 44) find that the social desirability bias may decrease in online surveys since they are self-administered, the logic being that “if the respondent could report an embarrassing fact anonymously and confidentially, then he or she would have no motivation to lie and would tell the truth” hence, it eliminates the “social pressure” for a certain response. In short, an impersonal and anonymous online survey takes out the ‘social’ aspect, so respondents feel less pressure to lie.

From the survey, I take *knowledge of voting rights in the residence country* as an independent variable because foreign resident voter registration occurs automatically in Chile after a five-year residence. Hence, many immigrants are unaware of suffrage rights. While having suffrage rights is a scope condition (because without them, one has no voting rights to exercise; see Figure 1.2 in the previous Chapter), migrants need to *know* they have voting rights as an immigrant in the residence country in order to vote. Thus, knowledge of voting rights is an independent variable that can affect turnout. Knowledge of voting rights was captured in the survey question: “Do you have the right to vote in the upcoming presidential elections in Chile?” The available answers were “yes,” “no,” or “I don’t

⁴⁶ As covered in the dissertation’s Introduction where I analyze migrants’ political engagement, I am interested in the conventional form of formal political participation: voting in national-level elections, both as a foreign resident in the residence country and as a national abroad for the origin country.

know.” The second two answers gauged how many migrant Respondents—who have immigrant voting rights due to a five-year residence—were unaware of this right. I asked this because while most nonresident nationals in South America can vote from abroad in national-level origin country elections, foreign resident voting at the national level in the residence country is a rarer phenomenon (GLOBALCIT 2019), so some immigrants may be unaware of such suffrage rights or if they have them. Since most South American countries have used compulsory voting systems (for resident nationals), I assume that individuals have knowledge of emigrant but not necessarily immigrant voting.

The survey addresses four main hypotheses from the dissertation’s Introduction, that correspond with the following four independent variables: interest in politics, in-country tenure, intention to stay, and linguistic communication.⁴⁷ Hypothesis 1 states: Potential migrant voters who self-report being able to communicate well in the language of the residence country are more likely to participate in immigrant or dual transnational voting. Language is important since it is necessary to obtain political information on candidates and logistically for casting a ballot. While most South American states’ dominant language is Spanish, and intraregional migration is prevalent (see Table 2.3), there are large variations in countries’ vocabulary, phrasing, and accents. To capture this for my analysis, the survey contains a variable of self-reported ability to communicate in Spanish in Chile, what I label as *linguistic communication*. The survey item asked, “When you speak Spanish in Chile, how often are you able to communicate clearly and coherently?” Respondents could select “always,” “frequently,” “sometimes,” “rarely,” “never,” or “I don’t know.” No one answered the last two (unsurprising, given the survey was in Spanish). Thereafter, I combined “always” and “frequently” to mark linguistic communication as “high” versus combining “sometimes” and “rarely” as “low” linguistic communication.

Hypothesis 2 posits: Potential migrant voters who have a higher interest in politics are more likely to participate in dual transnational voting. The variable *interest in politics* is derived from the item, “How interested are you in politics?” Respondents could choose the options of “very interested,” “somewhat interested,” “uninterested,” or “very uninterested.” I included four possible responses to avoid people defaulting to the middle option, similar to cross-national surveys, such as the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and the World Values Survey, which both also offer four response options. I then grouped “uninterested” and “very uninterested” into one indicator.

⁴⁷ See Chapter 3 and 4 for the remaining Hypothesis 5 on ties to a country, and on how political socialization in a nondemocratic origin country affects migrant voting in two countries.

Hypothesis 3 suggests: Potential migrant voters who have a longer intention to stay in the residence country are more likely to participate in immigrant or dual transnational voting. *Intention to stay* conveys immigrants' future plans of how long they think they will continue living in the country of residence. The survey asked, "For how many more years do you plan on living in Chile?" The six possible answers were: less than a year, 1–4 years, 5–10 years, forever, I don't know, or I don't live in Chile. I used the last answer as another check to be sure I captured only the target group (foreign-born residents); if "I don't live in Chile" was selected, the survey automatically closed. No one answered "less than a year" so this category does not appear in the analysis. Thus, the remaining four categories are listed in the descriptive table (Appendix 2.8). *Intention to stay* disregards how long migrants have already lived in Chile, focusing only on future plans of how much *longer* they plan to stay. Those planning to stay long term will have larger accumulated benefits from voting since the elected government's adopted policies would affect migrants who still live in the residence country.

Hypothesis 4 proposes: Potential migrant voters who have a longer tenure in the residence country are more likely to participate in immigrant or dual transnational voting. *In-country tenure* comprises the number of years lived in the country of residence. I calculated in-country tenure by subtracting the open-ended response arrival year from 2017 (when the survey was conducted) and then grouped them into 6–10, 11–20, or more than 20 years. Tenure of five years and below is inapplicable because in the present analysis, I only included eligible migrant voters; the requirement to obtain voting rights is a five-year residence. After excluding those who did not yet have suffrage rights as a foreign resident in Chile, the sample size was 680—then eliminating missing data, 658.

For control variables, I used age, education, sex, election round, and top nationalities. Age is grouped into categories of 16–24, 25–33, 34–42, 43–50, or over 50 years of age. While 18 is a typical minimum age for voting, some countries such as Brazil and Ecuador offer the right to those 16 years old and older (Umpierrez de Reguero *et al.* 2018). Education is the highest level of schooling completed, from elementary school to holding a postgraduate degree—reflecting the six major categories in a national survey in Chile.⁴⁸ I condensed the completed education categories and labeled them as high school or lower, professional training, and university (both under- and post-graduate). The categories for sex are woman or man. Election rounds in November then December 2017 comprise the subsamples. Again, the analysis focuses on voter turnout rather than vote choice,

⁴⁸ The national survey (*la Encuesta Nacional UDP*) was conducted yearly from 2005 through 2015, designed by a multidisciplinary team based at the Universidad Diego Portales in Santiago, Chile (more information available, in Spanish, at <http://encuesta.udp.cl/>).

meaning I examine if migrants vote or abstain, not for whom they vote in each election round. Lastly, I used the question on origin country to separate the top nationalities of Respondents from Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela.⁴⁹

2.3.3 A brief validation of Chile's migrant population and turnout

While the survey produced a convenient sample, and while I do not post-stratify the responses, in this subsection I provide an overview of the documented immigrant population in Chile in 2017 near the presidential election. I first outline the how the general immigrant population has grown, then focus on the migrant voter population and turnout in 2017. As of the end of 2019, immigration is at the highest it has ever been in Chile yet, at around 8% of total population, it pales in comparison to other immigrant residence countries or superdiverse cities. There has been a steady uptick in numbers since 2000, especially since 2015 (see Figure 2.1), and Chile has received more residents from different origin countries. From 1970 to 2002, immigrants originated mainly from Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Spain—the first three of which are Chile's border countries. But over the last decade, and according to the 2017 national census as depicted in Table 2.3, Colombia and Venezuela displaced Ecuador and Spain in terms of top origin countries.

Haitians are an emerging immigrant group in Chile: through 2014, Chile did not provide this individual nationality its own category, placing it in 'other countries', presumably due to such a low stock (Acosta *et al.* 2018, Finn and Umpierrez de Reguero 2020). Yet in 2017, Haitians represented 8.5% then 14.3% in 2018 of all foreign-born persons living in Chile, surpassing more traditional nationalities of Argentines, Bolivians, and Colombians in 2018 and 2019 (as seen in Table 2.3). Colombians and Venezuelans have replaced Argentines and Peruvians as top origin countries of immigrants living in Chile. Based on the 2019 estimate, Venezuelans represent almost 1 in 3 immigrants in Chile, while combining Colombians, Haitians, and Peruvians account for another 39%, meaning almost three quarters originate from four countries, only one of which (Peru) is a border country.

⁴⁹ In previous models, I included border countries (Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru) as well as other Latin American and Caribbean countries but found that including the top nationalities of the Respondents (from Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela) showed a more fruitful relation with migrant voting.

Table 2.3 Chile's Foreign-Born Population, Select Years 2005–2019

Total Number of Foreign-Born in Chile by Year					
2005	2010	2014	2017	2018	2019
212,935	305,212	410,988	779,863	1,251,225	1,492,522

Origin-Country Composition of Foreign-Born Population by Year						
	2005	2010	2014	2017	2018	2019*
Argentina	25.2%	19.9%	16.3%	9.0%	6.0%	5.3%
Bolivia	5.9%	6.4%	8.8%	10.0%	8.6%	8.0%
Brazil	3.8%	3.2%	3.0%	1.8%	1.5%	1.3%
China	1.1%	1.6%	1.9%	1.2%	1.1%	1.1%
Colombia	2.4%	3.6%	6.1%	14.3%	11.7%	10.8%
Cuba	--	--	--	0.9%	1.3%	1.1%
Dominican Republic	--	--	--	1.5%	1.4%	1.3%
Ecuador	5.1%	5.0%	4.7%	3.7%	3.0%	2.8%
Haiti	--	--	--	8.5%	14.3%	12.5%
Peru	20.6%	30.4%	31.7%	25.5%	17.9%	15.8%
Spain	4.7%	3.7%	3.5%	2.1%	1.7%	1.5%
United States	4.5%	3.6%	3.1%	1.6%	1.3%	1.2%
Venezuela	2.2%	1.9%	1.9%	11.3%	23.0%	30.5%
No declared country	--	--	--	0.4%	0.3%	0.2%
Other countries	24.5%	20.7%	19.1%	8.3%	7.0%	6.4%

Sources: Finn and Umpierrez de Reguero (2020), INE-DEM (2019), INE (2017a, 2020).

Notes: *2019 is an estimate from INE (2020). Nationalities comprising less than 1% of total foreigners are included in the 'Other countries' category. In bold are the top five nationalities present in 2017, relevant to frame migrant voter turnout.

In 2017, immigrants in Chile overwhelmingly were adults: 85% between 15 and 64 years old, versus 10.6% under 15 and 3.6% 65 and older (INE, 2018; see Appendix 2.9). The gender balance between men and women immigrants was steady throughout all 16 regions, between 44–55%; in the Santiago Metropolitan, where the greatest number of immigrants in Chile reside, the balance was 50-50 in 2017 (Appendix 2.9). Survey Respondents showed a female-favorable gender balance since 59% of Respondents were women and 41% were men; in the smaller sample of 650, women comprise about 63% versus 37% men (see Appendix 2.10).

Since the group of Respondents is highly educated, it is important to highlight that immigrants have consistently had at least two years or more of education, on average, as compared to ‘native’ Chileans. According to data from CASEN (*Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional*, or National Socioeconomic Characterization), Chileans over 24 years old averaged 9.74 years of education in 2006, which slowly increased over time to 10.85 years of education in 2017; comparatively, immigrants over 24 years old averaged 12.93 years of education in 2006, which stayed steady until increasing to 13.30 years of education in 2017 (Fuentes and Hernando 2019, p. 394).

During the 2017 presidential election, there were two rounds of voting, resulting in the election of President Sebastián Piñera. Bear in mind that in 2017, the foreign-born population was about half of what it was in 2019; with 779,863 foreigners, in the election year immigrants represented 4.2% of the total population (see Figure 2.1). Of those immigrants, more than a third were eligible to vote, or 267,116 foreign residents, comprising 145,052 women and 122,064 men (Servel 2017). By nationality of origin country, in both rounds of the 2017 presidential election, more than a third of immigrant voters who participated were Peruvian, following by 10.9% Argentine, then 8.9% Bolivian, and 8.6% Colombian (Servel 2017, Joignant 2018; see Table 2.3).

The four nationalities in Table 2.4 comprise four of the five top origin countries represented in Chile in 2017 (for all nationalities, see Appendix 2.9).⁵⁰ While the four groups comprised almost 60% of all foreign-born residents in Chile in 2017, foreigners numbered only 4.2% of total population, which helps to understand why immigrant voters only comprised 0.75% of all voters in 2017.

⁵⁰ Regarding the rest of the top ten nationalities of immigrant voter turnout versus stock in the total population, five other groups are overrepresented. Ecuadorians comprised 3.7% of foreigners in 2017 yet represented 6% of immigrant voters in the first round; Spaniards comprised 2.1% in the foreign population but represented 3.8% of immigrant turnout; and similarly, Germans, Uruguayans, and Brazilians each represented about 2% of immigrant voters (Servel 2017; see Table 2.2).

Table 2.4 Foreign-Born Population and Voters, 2017, Chile⁵¹

Top Origin Countries	Percentage of Foreign-Born in Chile		
	Within foreign-born population	Voter turnout 2017	Voter turnout in survey
Argentina	9.0%	10.9%	9.8%
Bolivia	10.0%	8.9%	6.6%
Colombia	14.3%	8.6%	22.0%
Peru	25.5%	36.0%	28.4%
Total of all foreigners	58.8%	64.4%	N/A
Total within all voters	N/A	0.75%	N/A

Sources: The foreign-born population comes from official data (INE 2017b, INE-DEM 2019); voter turnout calculated for the first election round based on Joignant (2018) reporting Servel data; survey turnout based on the 658 responses.

Venezuela, the fifth origin country in 2017 (before becoming the largest immigrant group in 2019), comprised a newer migrant inflow, so naturally many had not yet met the five-year residence mark before the 2017 election. Venezuelan residents in Chile, however, already hold political views toward other immigrants and toward immigration-related policy (Doña-Reveco and Gouveia 2021). Haitians, despite being an emergent group in Chile—who represented 8.5% of foreigners in 2017—barely voted and were absent from the top 20 nationalities who participated in the 2017 election (Joignant 2018). Like Venezuelans, Haitians comprised an even more recent immigrant flow in Chile, so very few would have already gained voting rights. Nonetheless, both Haitians and Venezuelans will represent important foreign resident voters in future Chilean elections.

2.4 Findings from Surveying Migrants in 2017

The descriptive statistics show that the 658 responses split almost evenly between the two presidential election rounds in November and December 2017 (see Appendix 2.10 for descriptive characteristics)—similar to the almost even turnout rates in both rounds. This group of survey

⁵¹ The top four origin countries reflect turnout in Chile’s 2017 presidential election. The turnout percentage of each nationality is the number of foreign residents from the origin country who voted, over the total number of foreign residents who voted (i.e., I do not consider how many are registered to vote per nationality).

Respondents reported being interested in politics, educated, and slightly more female (63% women). The most common age range was between 34 and 42 years old, comprising a third of Respondents, whereas about 20% were between 43 and 50 and 24% over 50.

Almost all had moved from a Latin American or Caribbean country, with the most Respondents being Colombian (22%) or Peruvian (28%), representing the top two origin countries in the sample. These nationalities align with the two primary foreign-born population by origin country in Chile in 2017 (see Table 2.3). Approximately a third had finished high school, a third professional training, and a third completed university. Regarding knowledge of voting rights in Chile, 57% reported that they know they have the right to vote, whereas 43% reported either that they do not have voting rights or that they were unsure if they have voting rights or not—these numbers are worrisome and reflect high misinformation about suffrage rights as foreigners in Chile, as discussed in the next subsection.

Regarding the four main independent variables of interest (communication, interest in politics, intention to stay, and tenure), linguistic communication clashes with the fact that almost all Respondents were native speakers of Spanish; while coming from a regional origin country increased fluency, it did not translate to high linguistic communication. While 409 self-reported being able to communicate clearly and coherently in Spanish in Chile, 249 people responded that they did not, underlining why I measured communication rather than fluency. However, speaking Spanish as a mother tongue allowed Respondents to stay informed about politics and elections, whether they engage in political discussions or not. In fact, the next variable, interest in politics, revealed that only 70 of the 658 Respondents said they were uninterested in politics, whereas 254 were somewhat interested and 334 were highly interested. Such high interest in politics goes hand-in-hand with the high number of active voters, as discussed in the next subsection.

Respondents intended to stay long term in Chile since more than half reported plans to continue living in Chile six years or more—of these, 322 reported intending to stay more than 10 years or “forever.” Respondents also had lengthy tenures in Chile; while all Respondents in the group of 658 had lived in Chile at least five years at the time of the survey, and thus had gained voting rights, 301 had already resided in Chile between 6 and 10 years, whereas 357 reported their arrival year was 11 to more than 20 years ago. Long tenure and intention to stay reflect the shorter geographic distance to border or regional countries. Perhaps intention to stay is supported by being able to visit the origin country more easily and frequently, as well as hear more news on the residence country’s national media coverage.

2.4.1 Answering four hypotheses on migrant voting

Using the migrant voting typology, Respondents fit into each of the four quadrants: about half are classified as emigrant voters and almost a third are dual transnational voters (see Figure 2.2). Since only 93 of the 658 Respondents abstained in national-level elections in both countries, I consider the Respondents very politically active. Figure 2.2 is not intended to summarize or forecast migrant voting in Chile; rather, it shows a snapshot in time for this group of Respondents, demonstrating the typology's utility.

Figure 2.2 Prior Migrant Voting: 658 Survey Respondents in Chile

		Votes in Origin Country	
		Yes	No
Votes in Residence Country	Yes	Dual transnational voting 201 Respondents	Immigrant voting 32 Respondents
	No	Emigrant voting 332 Respondents	Abstention 93 Respondents

Source: Application of Finn's (2020a) typology.

Dual transnational migrant voters comprising 201, almost a third of Respondents, was higher than expected; however, the survey limitation of a lack of distinction between voting in the origin country pre- versus post-migration could overestimate voters in this category. Another possibility is that these individuals' origin countries had had compulsory voting systems and they continued voting because they had internalized the habit.⁵² Ignoring the nonvoters, the Respondent group comprises 565 active voters. The immigrant voting quadrant is the least filled, meaning that most individuals who voted in the residence country have also voted in their origin country. Even if the survey question

⁵² Within the survey group, emigrant voting was compulsory only for Peruvian nationals abroad. Nonetheless, some Peruvians reported voting while others abstained (in my interviews, some believed they will not receive a fine abroad if they do not vote; see Chapter 3). Given the variation in voting behavior, I include Peruvians in the analysis.

miscategorized some of these voters as dual transnational, having voted in the origin country before migration and in the residence country after migration would have placed these individuals in the immigrant voting category. These two categories would still comprise the same number of active migrant voters in the group.



The immigrant voting quadrant houses only 32 migrants, showing that within 658, very few people opted to vote *only* in the destination country. Based on this group's voting behavior, as well as interviews (see Chapter 3), most migrants do not simply 'replace' previous political attitudes, values, and behavior from the origin country with those from the residence country, even after a long tenure.⁵³ For someone to politically assimilate, it would mean that post-migration, an individual would forfeit origin-country ties or characteristics in order to replace them with those from the residence country (Guarnizo *et al.* 2019). Full political assimilation implies that identity and loyalty link to solely one country, making a 'zero-sum' relationship between political engagement in two countries (Tsuda 2012, p. 635). Such a zero-sum outcome could manifest itself as migrants vote only in the origin country from abroad, but this is not the case for the third of the group who are dual transnational voters.


The multinomial logistic regression shows abstention, immigrant voting, and dual transnational voting from the multicategorical dependent variable (for results, see Appendix 2.11). Since emigrant voting is the most common type of migrant voting among this group of Respondents, it serves as the reference category. The goodness-of-fit indicators suggest that the model is adequate for explaining the dependent variable on which migrant Respondents vote and in which location.

Since the interpretation of multinomial logistic regression is complex—given the migrant voting types comprise a multicategorical dependent variable—the following odds ratio graphs in Figure 2.3 accompany the multinomial logistic regression results in Appendix 2.11. Since emigrant voting serves as the reference category, the independent and control variables are shown for abstention, immigrant voting, and dual transnational voting in three separate graphs, with each showing the variables of interest. If the variable's margin range intercepts with 0 (marked with a vertical line through the graph), it is not statistically significant. If the margin range is on the positive side, the variable has a positive relation with the type of migrant voting, as compared to emigrant voting. Similarly, ranges located below 0 indicate an inverse relation with the migrant voting type.

⁵³ Such replacement would parallel the concept of social assimilation, understood as “the decline, and at its endpoint the disappearance, of an ethnic/racial distinction and the cultural and social differences that express it” (Alba and Nee 1997, p. 863), also reflecting Gordon's (1964) definition of structural assimilation.

Figure 2.3 Odds Ratio Graphs from the Multinomial Logistic Regression, N=658





I review the results in order of the variables listed in the odds ratios. The first variable listed in the three graphs, knowledge of voting rights as a foreign resident in the residence country, is highly significant and positively related to both immigrant and dual transnational voting. Previous exploratory work in Santiago, Chile, showed that many immigrants lack information or have misinformation regarding their right to vote (Doña-Reveco and Sotomayor 2017, Pujols 2020). In contrast to the 377 migrants who knew they had suffrage rights in Chile, 281 Respondents were misinformed about such rights. Within this group, all 658 Respondents had voting rights, yet 176 reported not having them at the time of the survey and 105 were unsure if they had the right or not in the upcoming presidential election.⁵⁴ It seems that automatic voter registration leaves many individuals ill-informed or uninformed.

The other four variables in the above graphs each relates to a hypothesis. Hypothesis 1 (Migrant voters who self-report being able to communicate well in the language of the residence country are more likely to participate in immigrant or dual transnational voting) is partially supported by the

⁵⁴ An exception would be if migrants had spent more than one year outside of Chile and had lost continuous residence—but they would have also had to misreport their original arrival year as when they moved to Chile. Another exception is if they were undocumented migrants, which is possible, but unlikely given the high tenure and socioeconomic standing reported by most survey Respondents.

results. The results show that low communication (distinct from language fluency) is significant for increasing the chances of abstention (i.e., non-voting in both the origin and residence countries). This means that, within this group of Respondents, lower communication in the residence country relates to abstaining altogether.

Hypothesis 2 (Migrants who have a higher interest in politics are more likely to participate in dual transnational voting) is strongly supported by the results. While interest in politics affects all voters, the duality of migrant voters means they carry political attitudes, beliefs, and values with them across borders. Their past learning, prior voting, and interest in politics ‘travel’ with migrants across borders. Although uninterest in politics is highly significant and has an inverse relation with dual transnational voting, being somewhat interested in politics is significant and has an inverse relation with dual transnational voting. Hence, only Respondents who are *very* interested in politics have a high and significant probability of being a dual transnational voter. This makes sense, as a very high interest in politics may be enough to motivate migrants to spend time staying informed in two countries. The abstention category was also significant and positively related to those who are somewhat interested in politics—meaning that Respondents who are only partially interested are more likely to sit out of elections in both countries.

Hypothesis 3 (Migrant voters who have a longer intention to stay in the residence country are more likely to participate in immigrant or dual transnational voting) is neither supported nor contradicted by the results. Intriguingly, intention to stay is not statistically significant for any of the migrant voting categories for this group. The immigrant voting category reports all negative coefficients for short- and long-term intentions to stay as well as for those who are unsure of their future residence plans. This means that the Respondents are less likely to be an immigrant voter, as compared to being an emigrant voter—however, these relations are not statistically significant. Instead, the results suggest that future plans to stay longer in Chile does not affect people in this group when deciding to turn out to vote or not.

Hypothesis 4 (Migrant voters who have a longer tenure in the residence country are more likely to participate in immigrant or dual transnational voting) is strongly supported by the results. In-country tenure (medium is 6–10 years and long is 11 to more than 20 years of having already lived in Chile) has a significant relation with migrant voting: the longer migrants live abroad, the more likely they are to vote as emigrants. The results contradict Waldinger’s (2008) findings that an emigrant’s political engagement with the origin country decreases post-migration, and aligns more with Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller (2003) that emigrant engagement with the origin country increases over time living

abroad. However, an increase in engagement with the origin country does not necessarily parallel an increase in engagement with the residence country, at least for conventional participation such as voting. If they were complementary, more migrants would land in the dual transnational voting quadrant, rather than the emigrant quadrant.

The significant control variables in the model for some migrant voting types include age, top origin countries, and election round. The other control variables (education, sex, and having emigrant rights) are not statistically significant. The multinomial logistic regression table (in Appendix 2.11) shows that the youngest cohort of migrant voters under 25 years old is highly significant and positively related to abstention (as compared to emigrant voting)—this corresponds with the trend of younger people in general being less involved in voting, rather than a migrant phenomenon. From 16 to 33, age is negatively correlated with dual transnational voting, but insignificantly so. Regarding the top origin countries, being from Peru is negatively related to and statistically significant for abstention and immigrant voting. The correlation reveals a slight bias since, as mentioned, Peru has compulsory voting for nationals abroad. While Peruvians abroad are more likely to vote from this institutional rule that compels them to, not all of them vote (Umpierrez de Reguero *et al.* 2020). Lastly, the first round of the election is highly significant, with an inverse relation (as compared to emigrant voting) with dual transnational voting. The result means more Respondents reported higher prior voting in both countries in December 2017, which makes sense, since they had recently had the chance to cast a vote in November 2017.

Despite not representing all immigrants in Chile, the exploratory exercise of evaluating select variables' influence on migrant voting offers insights behind migrants' electoral behavior in two countries. The fact that 249 of 658 Respondents reported low linguistic communication is worrisome, given their at least five years of residence in the destination country. But surprisingly this variable was not statistically significant for the group. Although lower linguistic communication in Chile created a barrier from socially discussing or engaging in political discussion, it did not blockade electoral participation. In other words, immigrants are interested in politics and informed about politics in both countries but may avoid talking politics with Chileans in Chile.

Lastly, an overall takeaway is that dual transnational voting (migrants voting in both the origin and residence countries) may represent a more common phenomenon than previously thought. While it is well-established that more years of education and an interest in politics increases individual-level turnout, I have found that these characteristics also naturally increase turnout among this group of 658. The new insight is which type of migrant voting they choose: Figure 2.2 shows that 332 were

emigrant voters, 201 dual transnational voters, 32 immigrant voters, and 93 fell in the abstention quadrant. As reviewed in Chapter 1, Chaudhary's (2018) "complementarity perspective" (based on, e.g., Guarnizo *et al.* 2003) and Tsuda (2012, p. 644) posit that simultaneous political participation in two countries can be positively reinforcing. But migrant voting in one or both countries does not necessarily influence voting in the other; instead, some migrants vote for other reasons, including voting to battle corrupt leaders, improve the road to democracy, and lean toward open-market economic policy, as I explore in Chapter 3. The turnout decisions in two places do not necessarily have to 'reinforce' each other or have a causal relation to each other. However, as I will explore in Chapter 4, they are indeed related, at the very least because migrants move internationally with inherent political attitudes, values, and previous behavior learned throughout life.

2.5 Conclusion

Historic immigrant flows to Chile peaked in 1885 at 4.2% foreign-born residents within the total population, which was not reached again until 2017 (see Figure 2.1). Given the low numbers of foreigners, the fact that Chile enfranchised migrants at all provokes questions about the reasoning behind enfranchisement. To achieve migrant enfranchisement, a country must enact, regulate, then implement emigrant suffrage rights (Palop-García and Pedroza 2019) as well as immigrant suffrage rights. Chile's legal process lasted 92 years, from 1925 until 2017. The milestones were adopting restrictive immigrant voting in local elections (in 1925), expanding immigrant voting (1980), first application of universal immigrant voting in national elections (the 1988 plebiscite), adopting emigrant voting (2014), and emigrants voting from abroad for the first time in national elections (2017) (see Table 2.1). Despite lags between each step, the migrant enfranchisement path in Chile has had no rights reversals. Immigrant voting rights as established in the 1980 Constitution, however, will likely be discussed the next time a constitutional committee meets; as of December 2020, this may occur in 2021 or 2022.

I find that both the 1925 and 1980 immigrant enfranchisement processes seem to have been political elite-led projects, the elites mostly being the commission members. While the sessions occurred first under President Arturo Alessandri Palma then General Augusto Pinochet, their roles differed, as Alessandri was very present throughout the process versus Pinochet being absent. The first process, despite low numbers of foreign residents at the time, foreign voters could have created strategic legitimacy for the incumbent government, given the tight restrictions to vote (i.e., literate males over 21 years old). Importantly, they also offered Alessandri future electoral support in

municipal elections. Using primary and secondary sources, I debunked the conjecture that Alessandri was a strong supporter of universal suffrage; expanding the electorate was not a priority in his first administration, which was based on other reforms. More plausibly, foreign residents who ‘naturally’ (normatively) fit with the current voter profile were included in the electorate by convenience. The profile changed with the times, since just a decade later Chile regulated voting rights in local-level elections for women in 1934 (Law 5.357), who did not receive full political rights until 1949 (Law 9.292) (Valenzuela E. M. 1995; see Appendix 2.5). Thus, I view the constitutional changes as more organic and normative—reflecting the elite views of the period—that created indirect support for Alessandri’s reelection and possibly boosted his plans for municipal-level public office.

The second process where foreign residents gained more extensive suffrage rights under a nondemocratic government provides new evidence strengthening Brubaker’s (1992) insight that historical conceptions of the demos will have long-lasting effects. Analyzing the Ortúzar Commission members’ sessions on nationality, citizenship, and suffrage, their extensive debates revolved around *which* foreigners will have the right to vote under which rules, rather than *if* foreigners will vote. After a designated residence period, they positioned naturalization and foreign resident enfranchisement as equally logical routes to joining the demos, leaving the choice up to immigrants. Immigrant suffrage was explicitly determined to be a right, never an obligation, as it was for Chilean nationals. However, an important feature for continued durability of this constitutional right is that this path dependence grew from *elites’* normative perspective; in contemporary democracies, including Chile, what matters most are perspective of most voters. When a new commission is formed to review the 1980 Constitution, immigrant voting rights may again be on the negotiation table—but its outcome will reflect the normative views of voters, rather than only elites.

Expanding immigrant voting in 1980 in Chile during dictatorship reinforces the idea that migrant enfranchisement is not a democratic phenomenon. The process counterintuitively resulted in expanding rights and freedom for foreign residents to take an interest in politics or become integrated as they wish within the political community, except running for public office. According to Committee members (except Guzmán), the Constitution should not allow Chileans the choice to vote or abstain since Chileans could be “indifferent” to the country’s society and future; Ortúzar called voting a “moral duty” and it was required to take interest in public matters, in order to support order, security, and institutions (Historia de la Ley, Art.14 2005, pp. 40–41). As such, Chilean voters faced compulsory voting and punishment if they failed in their “moral duty” to vote. Contrarily, foreign voters faced facultative voting as well as optional naturalization after a five-year residence. The choice meant that

nationals and foreigners had fundamentally different relationships with Chile since the state had different expectations for the two groups.

Offering foreign residents two paths to multilevel suffrage rights (see Table 2.2), one with full membership via naturalization and one with residence-based extensive rights, could relate to a ‘complementary’ view between naturalization and integration policies toward immigrants (Huddleston and Vink 2015). Chile not only decoupled suffrage rights with nationality, but these policies convey that rights are not an ‘alternative’ to naturalization. As Pedroza (2013, pp. 40–41) frames the topic, “denizen franchise gives immigrants the decision of how to integrate and when to participate.” As such, in this case, it is unnecessary to evaluate naturalization’s relation to integration, i.e., if it is a “catalyst or crown” (Hainmueller *et al.* 2017). Rather, Chile takes the focus off the integration discussion—and away from positioning nationality acquisition as an end goal—by showing another approach for immigrants’ membership and participation, an early decision taken that had nothing to do with concerns about integration.

After a state decides the extent to which to enfranchise which migrants, its effect on migrant voting remains a gap in mainstream literature on electoral behavior (Arrighi and Bauböck 2017). Once migrants obtain voting rights, participation in democratic elections represents the substantive last step of a democracy approaching a modern version of universal adult suffrage. Voting allows individuals to express formal political voice and affect election outcomes, which may also increase migrant political integration. Thus, I conducted a survey in 2017 on migrant electoral behavior, then analyzed 658 responses to explore which migrants vote and where.

Taking the four migrant voting categories as a multinomial dependent variable, I explored four hypotheses on how the independent variables of linguistic communication, interest in politics, intention to stay, and in-country tenure might affect migrant voting behavior and turnout—while controlling for age, education, sex, election round, and top nationalities. While all 658 Respondents had voting rights in Chile in 2017, within the group, 176 reported not having suffrage rights and 105 were unsure if they could vote in the upcoming presidential election, which was only days away. Knowledge of voting rights in the destination country proved highly significant and positively related to both immigrant and dual transnational voting. These findings indicate that in countries using automatic voter registration to add foreign residents to the electorate, as Chile does, greater efforts should be made to inform individuals that they have the right to vote.

Among the 658 Respondents, 249 reported low linguistic communication, despite having lived in the residence country at least the past five years. But lower communication was not statistically

significant and did not form a barrier to migrant voting for this group; they can stay informed about politics in both countries but perhaps avoid talking politics with Chileans in the residence country. Regarding interest in politics, only Respondents who reported being “very interested” in politics had a high and significant probability of being a dual transnational voter. Being highly interested can motivate migrants to spend time staying politically informed in two countries. For those reporting being “somewhat interested” in politics also showed a significant and positive relation to abstention, indicating that Respondents who are only partially interested are more likely to sit out of elections in both countries.

Whereas intention to stay proved insignificant in affecting migrant voting decisions, the findings on tenure partially aligned with Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller (2003; see Chapter 1) since emigrant engagement increased over time abroad. However, an increase in engagement with the origin country does not necessarily come along with an increase in engagement with the residence country, at least for conventional participation such as voting. If they were complementary, more migrants would land in the dual transnational voting quadrant, rather than the emigrant quadrant. What is new here is that I have four types of migrant voting (rather than just two, voting in the origin country versus the residence country), nuancing the previous findings. While emigrant voting goes up over time, faster than dual transnational voting, it means that emigrant engagement is not increasing *because of* engagement in the residence country. In other words, it seems as though voting ‘here’ is not as related to voting ‘there’ as has the literature previously suggested.

Such results should pique the interest of scholars interested in integration and diaspora politics, since over a third of the group had voted in the country of residence as immigrants and half had participated in external voting as emigrants. As I propose throughout this dissertation, the four types of migrant voting must be analyzed together to form a more complete picture of migrants’ electoral options and individual-level turnout decisions. Based on my theoretical argument and this survey of 658 migrants, I suggest that very few individuals opt to vote *only* in the residence country (i.e., fall into the immigrant voting quadrant) because people do not simply ‘replace’ previous political attitudes, values, and behavior from the origin country to ‘match’ those with from the residence country—in other words, full political assimilation in that sense is an antiquated notion.

Future studies should not assume ‘integration’ or political participation will organically arise over time simply by living in a country. Likewise, scholars cannot assume the converse scenario of disengagement from origin-country participation. In an extreme scenario, if all immigrants completely assimilated, they would fall in only the immigrant voting and abstention categories; if all emigrants

kept ties only to the origin country, they would fall only in the emigrant voting and abstention categories. In Figure 2.2, a mix exists throughout the four quadrants, which I would also expect in other contexts.