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Migrant rights, voting, and resocialization: suffrage in Chile and Ecuador, 1925-2020

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Chapter 1

Migrant Voting: Types, Turnout, and Multi-Sited Political Learning

Migrant political participation is a growing phenomenon in the twenty-first century thanks to high human mobility, the spread of democracy, and the expansion of granting political rights to both emigrants and immigrants. Migrant voters exercise political voice and suffrage rights—traditionally reserved only for resident citizens—which expands democratic representation throughout the demos (political community). As migrant voters grow in number, they also potentially affect electoral outcomes. Migrant voters are distinct from other voters, yet studies still fail to understand why individual migrants choose to participate in politics in more than one country. Throughout the dissertation, I aim to make conceptual, theoretical, and empirical contributions to this knowledge gap.

The most straightforward way to understand differences in electoral decision-making between migrant voters and other voters is asking why they vote. Emigrant voters abroad show concern for the wellbeing of their family and friends and want to see improvements in the origin country, whereas immigrant voters show concern for the wellbeing of themselves and their family and friends in the residence country. They build relations with community members in the residence country such as colleagues, neighbors, and their children's teachers. Migrants may own a house or property in one or both countries so are interested in protecting their assets. Migrant voter behavior seems to be greatly defined by temporal and spatial aspects that arise from having such multiterritorial ties.

Migrants' voting behavior changes over time as they reinforce or change their connections to places and people by living in and between two countries. Over time (the temporal aspect) migrants form distinct relations with two countries (the spatial aspect). Initially, an individual undergoes political socialization and grows 'roots' in the origin country they are born and raised in (see Figure 4.1). Later, if individuals migrate internationally as adults, the shock ends political socialization and starts political resocialization. Whereas political socialization affects voting behavior in one country, political resocialization affects migrants' voting behavior in two countries. Political resocialization is a cognitive learning process during which individuals maintain or adjust political attitudes, values, and behavior based on individual and institutional agents encountered in a new context (Finn 2020a). The dynamic learning process persists throughout each migrant's voting life. During political resocialization, migrants have two sets of roots, or ties, with two countries: one set comprises connections based on the emigrant-origin country relation and another set of roots based on the immigrant-residence

country relation. While migrants can bring prior political learning and experience with them across borders, they maintain or adjust political attitudes, values, and behavior over time towards both the origin and residence countries.

Socialization and resocialization processes comprise complex, temporal, and accumulated learning experiences. Migrants' interactions with individuals and institutional agents in and between the origin and destination countries often create and change the ties one has with a country and the people living there. However, I show that at any given moment, individuals are on only one of nine possible trajectories towards being classified into only one of the four migrant voting types. The trajectories are what I refer to as the Roots Routes, which I detail in Chapter 4 (see Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1). The collectively exhaustive migrant voting categories (Figure 1 in the Introduction) are: 1) immigrant voting, or foreign residents or naturalized persons participating only in the residence country; 2) emigrant voting, or nonresident citizens participating only in the origin country from abroad; 3) dual transnational voting, or migrant voters participating in both countries; and 4) abstention, or migrants choosing not to vote in either country despite having suffrage rights. The Roots Routes and typology fit together because establishing, maintaining, or cutting ties in a country explains why certain factors—such as prior voting, tenure abroad, and civic duty—affect migrants' individual-level electoral behavior. Therefore, better unraveling the (re)socialization processes sheds light on understanding which migrants vote as well as where and why migrants vote.

This chapter contains the theoretical and conceptual framework I use to analyze migrant voting. Section 1 details the migrant voting typology, which allows scholars to more adequately categorize the four existent migrant voting types. In Section 2, which covers migrant individual-level turnout, I outline the relevant factors that drive turnout among all voters and then propose the necessary and sufficient conditions for migrant voting. In Section 3, I frame political socialization as 'growing roots' within a country and with the people there, then offer a new definition of political resocialization that begins at international migration. Finally, in Section 4, I explain how political learning—especially aspects such as when, with whom, and where—affects migrant voting.

1.1 The Typology: Four Migrant Voting Types

Before exploring why migrants vote or abstain, I first suggest a migrant voting typology, presented in Figure 1 in the Introduction. The typology shows individuals' options in a world of expanding migrant enfranchisement. Previously, the options were to vote or abstain only as a resident citizen; now the options for many international migrants are to vote or abstain in the origin country as an emigrant

abroad, and to vote or abstain in the residence country, either as a dual national or a foreign resident. Not two, but *four* distinct types of migrant electoral behavior exist. The typology reflects the four migrant voting types from Finn (2020a): 1) immigrant voting, or foreign residents or naturalized persons participate only in the residence country; 2) emigrant voting, or nonresident nationals participate from abroad only in the origin country; 3) dual transnational voting, or migrant voters participating in both countries; and 4) abstention, or migrants choosing not to vote in either country despite having suffrage rights.

The typology shows the possibility of simultaneous political practices between two political communities. It gives equal weight to both origin and destination countries granting suffrage rights. Building from existent research that already explains who has voting rights or why states grant or withhold rights (e.g., Earnest 2015a, Escobar 2015, Arrighi and Bauböck 2017, Goenaga 2019, Palop-García and Pedroza 2019, Pedroza 2019; Wellman 2021), I contribute to understanding the individual-level decision to vote or abstain in the country or countries of choice. The typology's categories are collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive (Collier *et al.* 2012) since migrants fit into one, and only one, quadrant at a given time. No quadrant is normatively superior. The purpose is not to gauge political integration but to classify migrant voting.

Migrants move between categories and return to the same quadrant many times; this reveals migrant voting trajectories, with some being more typical than others. While there is no convergent endpoint over time, it is possible that once a migrant enters a quadrant, he or she is more likely to remain there, regardless of where he or she lives. For example, when an individual who has never voted relocates to another country, past abstention may affect the migrant in the new political community, resulting in an inactive voter for both the origin and residence countries. Here, abstention exemplifies Tsuda's (2012, p. 635) mutually *negative reinforcement* of transnational engagement because abstention in one country influences the voter to also abstain in another country. Conversely, a similar reciprocal mechanism may work to keep a migrant in the dual transnational voting space: simultaneous participation in two countries can be *positively reinforcing* (Tsuda 2012, p. 644). In the simpler non-transnational (domestic) space, once individuals vote, they are more likely to vote again because of this 'habit' (e.g., Franklin 2004). While migrant voters' political participation in the origin country may reinforce continued participation in the residence country, and vice versa, politically active migrants do not always stay in the dual transnational voting quadrant. These migrants may change into an immigrant or emigrant voter or later abstain, depending on how they change their ties to people and places over time.

Furthermore, long-term migrant voting patterns are not exclusively reinforced from a habit of participation. Migrants can maintain roots and relations over many decades in both the origin and residence countries—what I refer to as *multiterritorial ties*.¹¹ Since migrants often care about the future of both countries and the people living there, I propose that dual transnational voters continue voting because of multiterritorial ties. For emigrants abroad, the principal motives to participate in origin-country politics are civic duty and connections with family and friends still residing there (the left-behind). Meanwhile, immigrants establish ties with and become invested in the newer country and the people there, forming fresh roots and increasing the probability of voting in the residence country.

1.1.1 Not just ‘here’ and ‘there’: To vote or abstain in two countries makes four options

Many scholars have studied migrants’ political engagement at “home and abroad” or “here and there,” alluding to studying individuals as both immigrants and emigrants (e.g., Waldinger 2008, Faist *et al.* 2013, Escobar *et al.* 2015, Chaudhary 2018, Peltoniemi 2018a, McCann *et al.* 2019). Yet a categorical binary is not enough to classify migrant voters. During the last decade, scholars have more often focused on how emigrant voter participation changes and how it affects the origin country (Bureau 2011, Lafleur and Calderón Chelius 2011, Tintori 2011, Collyer 2014a, Gamlen 2015, Waldinger 2015, Domenech and Pereira 2017, Guarnizo *et al.* 2019, Ramírez and Umpierrez de Reguero 2019, Giornei and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020). Overall, as Finn (2020a) points out, there are three outcomes of changed voter participation: post-migration, an emigrant’s political participation toward the origin country may increase, decrease, or remain the same.

Existing literature on political participation outcomes over time focuses primarily on explaining the first two outcomes. For example, Chaudhary’s (2018) study of 12 immigrant groups in seven European cities finds that their emigrant voting for the origin country either increases or decreases over time. Chaudhary (2018) explains his empirical results using two contrasting perspectives derived from other scholars. The first perspective—stemming from Waldinger—maintains that as migrants establish new connections in the destination country during the political resocialization process, ties

¹¹ Waldinger (2008) repeatedly refers to “homeland” versus “homestate” ties to respectively refer to the origin and destination countries, while examines the possibility of transmigrants maintaining “here-there” ties, activities, and connections (although he finds very few transmigrants). To capture the dual nature of connections, I employ the term ‘multiterritorial ties’ that I argue influence activities, specifically, migrant voting.

and political engagement will *decrease* in the origin country.¹² Waldinger (2008, p. 11) supports this idea by measuring three types of cross-border exchanges: first, regularly conducted activities of sending remittances to, travel to, and voting in the origin country (inversely related to geographical distance between countries). Second, attachments and loyalties, measured as plans to settle in the destination country, self-identifying one's 'real homeland', and self-described identity as an origin-country national (biased toward single country political identity and civic duty). Third, Waldinger also measures naturalized citizens' participation and past voting behavior in residence-country politics for registered migrant voters (which excludes foreign resident voting).

The first perspective adopts an assimilationist view that individuals forfeit origin-country ties to "make room for" new connections in the destination country (Guarnizo *et al.* 2019). Others argue that political ties with the 'home state' organically fizzle out as migrants' attention and interest shift from the origin to residence country (Waldinger and Soehl 2013). Assimilation means identity and loyalty link solely to one country, making for a "zero-sum relationship" between political engagement in the two countries (Tsuda 2012, p. 635). Tit-for-tat of forfeiting or replacing ties is an assumption, one that falls short when using empirical evidence to explain long-term voting behavior. The assumption fails to consider a) emigrants' sense of civic duty toward the origin country, b) migrants' multiple options for political participation, even without naturalizing, and c) migrants' relations expand beyond geographical borders and a single 'homeland' because of multiterritorial ties.

In contrast, the second perspective posits that ties and political engagement simultaneously increase in the origin and residence countries and are thus complementary to each other (found in, for example, Guarnizo *et al.* 2003). Guarnizo and colleagues (2003, p. 1223) measure transnational electoral participation in the origin country as having political party membership, giving monetary contributions to a party, and active involvement in political campaigns. Transnational nonelectoral participation in the origin country is measured by hometown civic association membership, monetary contributions to civic projects, and regular membership in charity organizations sponsoring projects.

¹² Although Chaudhary (2018) classifies the first outcome as the 'resocialization' perspective, I ignore his label since it is not synonymous to how it appears in the political socialization literature. There is still much debate over questions such as: to what extent migrant transfer attitudes and behaviors from the origin country to the residence country? How long do these attitudes and behaviors endure over time in both territories and to what extent does exposure to the residence country's political system influence immigrants' adaptation? (see White *et al.* 2008). However, these questions do not inherently imply an assimilationist view that migrants always *replace* ties formed in the origin country with ties from the residence country. Replacement is only one of many possible outcomes of resocialization.

To test this perspective, Chaudhary (2018) uses a sample of immigrants in Europe, but still uses citizenship (as nationality) acquisition and associational membership to measure political and civic engagement. However, such aspects are often absent or irrelevant outside the United States or Europe, limiting the reach of explaining migrant voting outcomes elsewhere.

The individual continues emigrant political engagement from abroad while participating in the residence country, which is explained by either “positive reinforcement” or “co-existence” (Tsuda 2012, pp. 635, 638). Positive reinforcement indicates a causal relationship between the voter’s decisions in two territories. Co-existence indicates a relationship between the voter’s decisions in two territories where neither territory affects a voter’s decision to politically engage in the other.

Both perspectives agree that *immigrants’* political participation in the residence country will increase over time—unsurprising, given engagement there was zero before migration. Guarnizo and colleagues (2003, pp. 1212–1213, 1238–1239) insist that migrants who *regularly* conduct cross-border political activities that affect the origin country comprise only a small minority, which includes better educated individuals with longer tenure in the residence country. Waldinger (2008, p. 14, 2015, p. 8) reiterates that migrants regularly conducting such activities comprise a small elite group. Individuals who have had more time to establish resources in the destination country are more likely to engage in frequent cross-border activities. However, if you extend the definition of participation from exclusively “regular” to include “occasional,” a third of the same sample is politically engaged in both countries, which is more significant than a small minority (Guarnizo *et al.* 2003, pp. 1227, 1238). In a more recent large-N study, McCann, Escobar, and Arana (2019) survey migrants from Mexico and Colombia who live in the US and find that tenure abroad does *not* reduce attention to politics during presidential elections in their origin country. While their study measures the level and frequency of emigrants’ political engagement in two countries, the focus remains on the emigrant-origin country relation, implicitly forfeiting the immigrant-residence country relation.

Using the terminology of the migrant electoral behavior typology (as outlined in the Introduction), both perspectives expect an increase in tenure in the residence country to increase immigrant voting over time but have varying effects on emigrant voting. Waldinger’s logic predicts that as in-country tenure increases, immigrant voting would increase, and emigrant (as well as dual transnational) voting would decrease. As immigrants become more rooted and involved in the destination country, he posits, they reduce their ties and involvement in the origin country, assimilating to ‘natives’ in the destination country and forgoing previous links and behavior from the origin country. Contrarily, Guarnizo and colleagues’ research foresees more migrants entering the dual

transnational voting quadrant over time as they participate in both countries. This scenario implies that migrants maintain ties and involvement in both countries simultaneously.

Moving on from Waldinger and Guarnizo and colleagues' research and following Chaudhary, who led on combining these two contrasting research outcomes, I evaluate both immigrant and emigrant electoral decisions and discuss the relation between migrant voting outcomes between countries. So far, a rough idea exists of who participates and when, with some answers on where. Both Waldinger and Guarnizo and colleagues examine the extent to which a change in migrants' tenure in the residence country (the independent variable X) affects the level of political engagement in the origin country (the dependent variable Y_o) since a change in X causes a change in Y_o . When attempting to determine if tenure abroad affects Y_o , the studies emphasize 'there' (in the origin country) and overall overlook engagement 'here' (in the residence country).¹³

Analyzing political engagement in this way poses two problems: first, it prioritizes either political engagement in the origin country or in the residence country, while in fact both are relevant dependent variables. Moreover, engagement in the residence country may affect that in the origin country, or vice versa, so both must be included. The critical difference between the aforementioned studies and the present analysis is that I am interested if national-level voting is complementary between two countries, not if other types of integration, citizenship, nationality, or memberships in one country affect voting in the other. Second, tenure in the residence country fails to explain migrant abstention in the residence country. Tenure also falls short to explain continued participation in the origin country, unless one follows the complementary perspective, which means also accepting the assumption that the migrant is 'integrating' in the destination country. For this reason, I suggest that it is not tenure per se that is critical in the outcome, but rather the processes that occur over time—such as forming, maintaining, or cutting ties—that explain voting.

¹³ Waldinger and Guarnizo avoid residence-country immigrant participation in the main analysis because they use data from the United States, where foreign residents cannot vote in national elections until they naturalize. Some states allow immigrants to vote in local elections, while most states previously granted suffrage rights, then experienced rights reversal (see Hayduk 2006). Furthermore, although Chaudhary (2018, p. 437) will "examine voting patterns in origin and receiving country national elections among immigrants in Europe," he nonetheless focuses on the origin country, as voting in the most recent national-level election in the origin country is his main dependent variable. Chaudhary (2018, p. 437) uses voting in the last destination country election as an independent variable and moreover does not overcome the naturalization issue since he uses citizenship acquisition and associational membership as proxies for immigrant political and civic engagement.

From these problems, three questions arise: 1) why have scholars found contrary results on migrant political participation in two countries as time passes? 2) In what ways do the same factors (e.g., interest in politics or civic duty) affect migrants' decisions to vote in one or both countries? 3) How does voting in one country affect voting in the other? Answering the first question, I suggest that previous works have over-emphasized naturalization in the destination country and focused primarily on changes in emigrant voting, resulting in perceived trade-offs between voting in the two countries. Instead, I put the origin and residence countries on par and categorize migrant voting into a typology that shows migrants' four unique voting options. It moves beyond 'here' and 'there,' adding complexity to multiterritorial suffrage. I evaluate electoral factors for all four migrant voting types (see Chapter 2) and migrants' reasons for changing voting behavior (in Chapter 3), which supports a more well-rounded attempt at unpacking why migrants vote.

Examining migrant voting in both the origin and residence countries, I suggest that the dynamic political resocialization process serves as a mechanism. It sheds light on why migrants decide to vote—precisely the dissertation's main research question—by exploring how factors, such as years spent abroad, change one's voting behavior in two countries. Migrants pivot between being more politically involved in one country or the other (Tsuda 2012) or participate in both countries (Smith and Bakker 2008, Chaudhary 2018, McCann *et al.* 2019, Erdal 2020). Fluctuations reflect migrant voters adjusting political attitudes, values, and behavior (i.e., through political resocialization) in both countries over time, visualized as changing quadrants within the four migrant voting types.

The last question goes a step further to understand if electoral decisions in one country affect decisions in another country. In other words: does immigrant and emigrant voting show a causal relationship? Migrant voters balance two political communities, from which they select how, and in which ways, to be politically engaged in each (Erdal and Oeppen 2013). The relationship between voting in one country versus the other may be non-causal (non-exclusive or co-existent) when electoral decision-making in the origin or destination country does not affect the electoral choices in the other country (see Chapter 4).

In attempting to answer these questions, I take the viewpoint that political resocialization is not a type of assimilation (see Kivisto 2001) and that transmigrants, as will be further discussed in the next section, can have several identities linking them to more than one country (Glick Schiller *et al.* 1992). Before diving into how multiterritorial ties form during resocialization, I explain what connects migrants between the origin and residence countries in the first place: transnationalism.

1.1.2 Fitting dual transnational voting into transnationalism and citizenship


“Transnationalism,” alongside “globalization,” is a common term used across disciplines and it continues to hold a plethora of meanings (see Vertovec 2009). Kivisto (2001, pp. 551–570) outlines how transnationalism relates to migration, delineating three versions in three disciplines. First, Glick Schiller, Basch, and Szanton Blanc (e.g., 1992, 1995) presented transmigration as a new concept in Cultural Anthropology, emerging from the possibility of making social fields linking origin and residence countries. Second, Portes (e.g., Portes and Zhou 1993, Portes 1995, 1996, 2005, Portes *et al.* 1999) refined transnationalism in Sociology by analyzing ethnic enclaves and segmented assimilation among first- and second-generation immigrants and how the modern world makes it easier for migrants to forge and maintain cross-border connections.¹⁴ Third, Faist (e.g., 1998, 2000) contributed a theoretical articulation to Political Science through the transnational social space paradigm, which emerges more easily through modern telecommunication and travel. Following Faist, I also view transnationalism as one possible post-migration outcome, alongside assimilation and ethnic pluralism.

I apply Glick Schiller, Basch, and Szanton Blanc’s (1995), Faist’s (1998, 2000) and Bauböck’s many studies of transnationalism to my own definition of migrants’ roles in politics. First, migrants can develop multidimensional political identities based on learning in both the origin and residence countries. Political learning also occurs between the two countries in social spaces (also see Faist *et al.* 2013). Second, some, but not all migrants are transmigrants and have multiple identities, which sometimes leads to dual transnational voting as one possible electoral behavior outcome.

Dual transnational voting—first coined by Finn (2020a)—accounts for political behavior practices in origin and residence countries as well as in the social spaces between both countries. Dual transnational voters participate in elections in the origin *and* residence countries, whereas both emigrant and immigrant voting occur in the origin *or* residence country, respectively (see Figure 1.1). Dual transnational voters are distinct from other migrant voters because they hold suffrage rights and multiterritorial ties (e.g., transnational political belonging, civic duty, political interest, and attachment to family and friends) in two countries. As Tsuda (2012, p. 633) highlights, the *simultaneity* of dual engagement in at least two countries is what distinguishes transnationalism from nationalism.

¹⁴ Portes’ studies also identify three distinct types of transnationalism: economic, political, and sociocultural. I do not engage with the second perspective because, as Kivisto (2001) points out, Portes considers transnationalism as a type of assimilation.

Figure 1.1 Relations Between the Four Types of Migrant Voting



Source: Finn (2020a).

Note: Having suffrage rights is a scope condition for migrant voting.

I use Bauböck's (2003) definition of transnational political practices as a framework for my definition of dual transnational voting. According to Bauböck (2003), for any political practice to be considered transnational, it must fulfill two necessary conditions: a) transcend the borders of independent states, and b) involve simultaneous overlapping affiliations of persons to geographically separate polities. Given the emphasis on *practices*, I focus on migrant voting. The term 'transnational voting' comes up in existing literature; however, most of these studies focus solely on what Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) calls homeland politics, explicitly examining political engagement in only the *origin* country over time.¹⁵ As a result, homeland politics and external voting do not meet Bauböck's second condition to be

¹⁵ Regarding active migrant transnationalism, Østergaard-Nielsen (2003, pp. 762–763) distinguishes *immigrant politics* (foreign residents participate in migration politics in the residence country, e.g., to gain rights, during which the origin country becomes involved) from *homeland politics* (emigrants participate in political activities from abroad that affect the origin country). Homeland politics includes three subtypes: emigrant politics (residents abroad working toward institutionalizing a transnational status); diaspora politics (emerging from origin countries prohibiting groups from participating from abroad); and translocal politics (migrant communities' activities with other migrants within the destination country). The various types and subtypes overlap, so are not mutually exclusive (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, p. 763).

considered as transnational political practices. In contrast to existing literature, I acknowledge the possibility of migrants' simultaneous, and possibly overlapping, electoral behavior in two independent states by adding "dual" to the term "transnational voting." Therefore, dual transnational voting can be considered a transnational political practice, according to Bauböck's (2003) definition.

Dual transnational migrant voting is an increasingly relevant phenomenon to study. As voting rights and human mobility increase, migrant voters will eventually comprise a percentage in the electorate large enough to play a role in election outcomes in more than one country (White *et al.* 2008, Tsuda 2012, Paul 2013, Gamlen 2015, McMillan 2015, Chaudhary 2018). Furthermore, migrant voting extends beyond *indirect* participation in the residence country, which is how Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) more narrowly characterizes migrants' transnational involvement; migrants increasingly participate in politics through *direct* and formal means. While migrants' direct political participation has varying degrees of effects, it does not take away from state power; rather it changes the migrant-state relation, as Escobar (2007, p. 48) explains:

The transnational approach to citizenship does not see the end of the national state, which continues to be the main grantor of membership status and rights, but it does not ignore either the imminent transformation of the state/citizen relations as simple aberrations of the traditional conception of the national state. It acknowledges the implications migration has for the status of membership and which do not fit within the legal and conceptual models of the traditional national state.

The "transnational approach to citizenship" intertwines with various other approaches to citizenship and nationality studies. Jakobson (2014, p. 17) details four approaches—citizenship as a regulatory regime, citizenship as practice, issue-specific arenas of citizenship, and normative theories of citizenship—then groups them together under a broader umbrella of "citizenship as a multidimensional analytical concept." Jakobson's (2014) broad concept of citizenship includes the variables of legal institutional aspects, value-based ideological aspects, and human agency. Migrants, who can adjust ideology throughout life and in different countries, are similarly influenced by these aspects in a transnational setting.¹⁶ A broadened political and social environment can significantly

¹⁶ Based on an extensive review of works defining and conceptualizing ideology, Gerring (1997, pp. 966, 980) lists "all definitional attributes" and offers a minimal definition: "Ideology, at the very least, refers to a set of idea-elements that are bound together, that belong to one another in a non-random fashion." For Gerring (1997, p. 981), non-random means having some "internal coherence." I select the applicable attributes from

change people's political ideology, especially among migrants (Feldman 2013, p. 602). Within this environment, the regulatory regimes of both the origin and residence countries define political rights and can foster or constrain participation (formal political practice for nationals and foreign residents). Agency flourishes when migrants participate in more than one political community; again, one of the key transnational aspects comes from simultaneity (Bauböck 2003, Tsuda 2012, Jakobson 2014, p. 23, Erdal 2020), in this case, simultaneous political participation in two countries.

Dual transnational voting reflects a “vertical” practice of transnational citizenship: the political practice of voting parallels an individual's (vertical) relation to multiple states (Fox 2005, p. 175, see Jakobson 2014, pp. 26, 30, 58). According to traditional notions of national citizenship, the vertical relation was between a state and a citizen with full political rights. However, my typology of four types of migrant voting challenges the traditional concept of citizenship as nationality since, while emigrant voting requires nationality, immigrant and dual transnational voting do not.

In the past, having political rights was the key defining characteristic of full citizenship (Marshall 1964), hence naturalization was the traditional way to become enfranchised. While many residence countries have “liberalized” access to nationality (Joppke 2007), other paths also exist to gain suffrage rights, as I will detail for Chile and Ecuador (in Chapter 2 and 3). One non-traditional way is through foreign resident suffrage rights, either as an alternative or complementary to naturalization and integration policies (Pedroza 2013, 2019, Huddleston and Vink 2015). In between the two opposing conceptual poles of the national citizen and the foreigner, there are many other legal categories of persons in South America with varying political rights attached to a country, some based on colonial or cultural ties or *ius sanguinis* (Acosta 2018, Finn 2018). Foreign residents with political rights such as voting in local or multilevel elections comprise a category referred to as “denizens” (Hammar 1990, Brubaker 1992, Joppke 2010). International migrants today enjoy more voting options as a national abroad and increased inclusion in the demos as a foreign resident, regardless of naturalization decisions. Coupling these rights with emigrant voting, dual transnational voting is an example of exercising rights-based political membership.

Gerring's definition of “ideology” to define migrant voters' ideology as individual-level thoughts based on their own knowledge of political subject matters, which can help to explain their political behavior. The scholar warns that “it is not reasonable to try to construct a single, all-purpose definition of ideology, usable for all times, places, and purposes... It may be that ideology is *more* context-dependent than most other social science terms” (Gerring 1997, p. 983, emphasis in original). As will become apparent throughout this analysis, the stability of migrants' ideology is challenged when they relocate to a new context, since new political learning can influence their ‘set of idea-elements’ and partly explain changes in political behavior.

National citizens who meet basic requirements continue to be members of the demos and still possess the greatest number of political rights, following “the idea that political power is for members only, and the most fundamental indication of membership is citizenship” (Beckman 2006, p. 155). Yet, citizenship and nationality are not interchangeable terms; for instance, nationality is not always required for formal membership into the demos (Beckman 2006, Hayduk 2006, Joppke 2007, p. 37, Pedroza 2019). In Latin America, they constitutionally differ: nationality is a legal membership whereas citizenship relates to the rights one holds in a given country (Escobar 2015, p. 928, Pedroza and Palop-García 2017b, Acosta 2018). They also differ elsewhere, such as in China, where Liu (2020) shows that the state uses the *hukou* system to ‘unmake’ and ‘remake’ citizenship for emigrants while abroad and upon return. Changing the rights individuals hold affects their citizenship, without changing their nationality. In terms of rights and membership, Pedroza (2019) uses immigrant enfranchisement processes in Portugal and Germany to make a thorough case of how citizenship goes far beyond nationality.

Migrant voting studies have evolved beyond ‘here’ and ‘there’ and the existence of immigrant and dual transnational voting reveals an opportunity for migrants to challenge the intersection of traditional citizenship and nationality notions. How immigrants “define and negotiate their own citizenship” as well as how they respond to citizenship laws affect “the meanings and practices of citizenship” in destination countries (Bloemraad *et al.* 2008, p. 170). After states have unbundled some rights such as voting from nationality, some scholars conceptualize noncitizenship independently from citizenship as nationality (e.g., Tonkiss and Bloom 2015, Bloom 2018). Mixing the “domains” of rights-based with membership-based transnationalism (Fox 2005, p. 192), foreign residents voting without nationality demonstrates another way to be an active member of a political community.

In sum, emigrant, immigrant, and dual transnational voters fulfill Bauböck’s (2003) first condition of political practices transcending the borders of independent states and his second condition of simultaneous overlapping affiliations of persons to geographically separate polities. Migrant voters conduct post-migration cross-border political practices and active voters show overlaps toward the origin country in which their political socialization occurred, in the residence country in which they undergo political resocialization, or in both via dual transnational voting. To unpack multiterritorial suffrage decisions, in the next section I compare relevant factors for all voters versus migrant-specific variables, focusing especially on migrants’ multiterritorial ties.

1.2 Migrant Voter Turnout: Language, Interest, Time, and Ties

Individual voters politically participate because they can, want to, and have been invited to (Verba *et al.* 1995). They can vote because of the resources and knowledge they have; they want to participate because perhaps they are interested in politics; and they have been “invited” or encouraged to vote through various agents. As Spies and colleagues (2020) highlight, while electoral turnout theories based on ‘native’ nationals also apply to immigrants, ‘additional explanatory power’ can be gained by using immigrant-specific approaches. Traditional explanatory variables for voting affect both immigrants and emigrants, but in different ways as compared to other voters (Ruedin 2018)—especially over time and given the multiterritorial aspects inherent in international migrants’ political engagement in two territories (Erdal 2020, Umpierrez de Reguero *et al.* 2020). In turn, they also face additional factors that affect their turnout decisions. I elaborate on such variables in the five hypotheses (presented in the dissertation’s Introduction), which narrow in on migrants and their unique possibility for participating in dual transnational voting.

Extensive literature highlights typical factors that influence individual-level voter turnout, such as age, education, resources, interest in politics, previous voting, and a sense of civic duty (see e.g., Campbell *et al.* 1960, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974, Niemi 1976, Verba *et al.* 1995). Additionally, as reviewed and elaborated on in Rolfe (2012), external and group-level factors such as networks and mobilization affect voter turnout, as do institutional contexts such as registration processes and voting systems (e.g., Powell Jr. 1986, Jackman 1987, Rosenstone and Hansen 2002, Franklin 2004, Avery and Peffley 2005, Blais 2006, 2008, 2008, Rolfe and Chan 2017). Within transnational studies in migration, evidence exists that men are more likely to partake in political activism (Portes 2005, Guarnizo *et al.* 2019) whereas women by voting (e.g., Boccagni and Ramírez 2013).

Resources, such as money spent on transportation to a voting location and time spent becoming and staying politically informed, are necessary for voting (see Figure 1.2). Education and income can measure socioeconomic status and can affect electoral behavior (Verba and Nie 1972, Avery and Peffley 2005). In Latin America, age and education are the best predictors of voting behavior (Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita 2014).¹⁷ When individuals have more resources, they can allocate some for voting, which increases their likelihood to vote (Powell Jr. 1986, Verba *et al.* 1995).

¹⁷ The required minimum age for voting is typically 18 throughout the region, with some exceptions: the minimum age is 16 years old in Brazil and Ecuador (Umpierrez de Reguero *et al.* 2017).

While time and money boost the ability to vote, having resources entails a necessary, but insufficient, condition for migrant voting. One also needs some knowledge to be able to vote; for instance, knowing they have suffrage rights, the procedures of how to register, where and when to vote, and for whom to vote. Voting entails trade-offs, forgoing resources to register, stay informed, and vote that could have been used on other activities. Because political engagement can be costly, migrants who are more established in the residence country have more time and resources “to remain connected” and participate from abroad in origin-country politics (Escobar *et al.* 2015, McCann *et al.* 2019). Consequently, those with greater resources more often participate in emigrant voting from abroad (e.g., Lafleur 2015, Chaudhary 2018). Using the same logic, those with greater resources would more often participate as an immigrant in the residence country. Voters, particularly immigrants, must also know enough of the language to be able to follow politics, gain voting information, and read the ballot; Hypothesis 1 captures self-reported ability to communicate in the residence country language.

Voters also participate in national elections because they want to, for example, spurred by civic duty or interest in politics (e.g., Campbell *et al.* 1960, Rolfe 2012, Smets and Van Ham 2013) (also see Section 1.2.1). Interest in politics positively relates with electoral behavior because people interested in politics stay informed about politics and then are more likely to vote (Powell Jr. 1986, Verba *et al.* 1995, Rosenstone and Hansen 2002, Prior 2010). Yet most people are only moderately interested in politics, as a higher interest requires more resources to develop and maintain (Dalton 2008, Almond and Verba 2015 [1963], McCann *et al.* 2019). For emigrants, along with civic duty and the ease of voting, an interest in politics also influences voting from abroad (Peltoniemi 2018b). For immigrants, Black (1987) discovers that their interest in, and accumulative experience with, politics play a large role in political participation, regardless of where it occurs. White *et al.* (2008) similarly find that in Canada, immigrants from a variety of political system types who have an interest in elections and voting show very similar post-migration adaptation to Canadian politics.

What remains unclear is if a migrant’s general interest in politics (e.g., ‘following the news’) would be enough to become a dual transnational voter, or if the interest must be country-specific to turn out to vote in that country. I explore this idea by focusing on interest in politics in Hypothesis 2. While the presence or absence of interest in politics affects migrant voting, a lack of variation over time fails to explain a *different* outcome (i.e., voting in one election then abstaining in the next). As Prior (2010, p. 763) highlights, “political interest behaves like a central element of political identity, not like a frequently updated attitude.” Since I aim to focus precisely on migrants’ adjusted attitudes and

behavior, I suggest that migrants' interest in politics often relates to a country or the people there, meriting more focus on ties rather than interest in politics per se.

Time plays a large role in many voting-related decisions since the longer migrants live in a country, the more likely they are to gain resources, knowledge, and networks in the residence country and the more incentives they have to improve language skills, stay informed about residence-country politics, and spend resources to register and vote. In other words, tenure (the amount of time one has resided in the destination country) and intention to stay both correlate with migrants' resources and choices on investing time and money. Hypothesis 3 focuses on longer tenure, not only its influence on immigrant or emigrant voting, but on dual transnational turnout in both countries. For immigrants, tenure increases exposure to the newer political system and allows time for obtaining local knowledge on issues and candidates, whereas emigrants may engage in new or different ways with origin-country politics (White *et al.* 2008, Bilodeau 2014, Peltoniemi 2018a, Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019). Similarly, Hypothesis 4 involves intention to stay in the residence country (versus returning to the origin country or relocating elsewhere) since I expect longer plans to stay give migrants greater incentives to make connections and establish themselves in the residence country, benefits that pay off in the long term.

Verba and colleagues (1995) also explain individuals vote because they are “invited to” participate by a variety of agents and groups, suggesting that mobilization can increase turnout among voters (Smets and Van Ham 2013), including for immigrant voters (e.g., Bloemraad 2006, Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019) and emigrant voters (Burgess 2014, Gamlen 2015, Paarlberg 2020). At the institutional level, a country's government or party system affects political participation, e.g., a country's legal framework can encourage or discourage participation, while mandatory (as compared to facultative) voting systems can boost turnout (Powell Jr. 1986, Jackman 1987, Franklin 1999, Fornos *et al.* 2004, Blais 2006). Some scholars argue that electoral institutions will not function in the same way for emigrants abroad: “International migration systematically weakens connections between emigrants and sending states: sending states lack organizational capacity in the place where migrants reside; migration limits the political communications required for mobilizing and informing an electorate” (Waldinger and Soehl 2013, p. 1247). However, evidence consistently shows that origin countries, political parties, and migrant organizations engage with emigrants abroad (e.g., Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, Smith and Bakker 2008, Délano and Gamlen 2014, Burgess 2018, Délano 2018, Koinova and Tsourapas 2018, Paarlberg 2019, Tsourapas 2020, Yener-Roderburg 2020, Fliess 2021), expanding the political arena beyond national territories (Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020).

State-led processes affect migrant voting since automatic or easy registration processes increase enrollment whereas expansive voting rights increase turnout (Lafleur 2013, Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020). Conversely, cumbersome or multi-step registration processes decrease turnout, at least for emigrants (e.g., Lafleur and Calderón Chelius 2011, Hutcheson and Arrighi 2015, Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020). Over a dozen countries grant emigrants special representation in the origin country (Collyer 2014a, Hartmann 2015, Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019). For instance, Ecuador reserves legislative seats in the National Assembly to represent emigrants in their own overseas district (Palop-García 2017, 2018, Umpierrez de Reguero *et al.* 2017, Fliess 2021); campaigns directly target emigrants who elect candidates to these designated seats (Umpierrez de Reguero and Dandoy 2020).


Party-led outreach via mobilization instigates higher emigrant turnout (Burgess 2018, Burgess and Tyburski 2020). Worldwide, political parties have started to conduct electoral campaigns abroad for external voters (Burgess 2018, Paarlberg 2019, Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020) sometimes mixing with active migrant organizations and hometown associations (see Fauser 2013). “A vibrant party is an active organization that operates beyond electoral cycles, has clear symbols, and maintains a significant presence in the territory” (Rosenblatt 2018). As the diaspora politics literature explores parties expanding their activities beyond the territory—a natural development of a new *modus operandi* (Rashkova 2020)—some are targeting certain emigrants in particular areas, perhaps striving to be vibrant parties abroad.

Countries such as Italy have many emigrants abroad concentrated in certain locations (e.g., Italian descendants in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay) and strategically target their connections with the group, as do leaders of “local ethnic associations” in residence countries (Tintori 2011, p. 178). Some Turkish political parties similarly try to mobilize its high emigrant population in Germany (Yener-Roderburg 2020; also see Mügge *et al.* 2019 for Turks in the Netherlands). Such efforts are less fruitful in areas with large emigrant populations scattered across a country since it is difficult to target them with finite campaign resources (van Haute and Kernalegenn 2020, p. 244). Similarly, political party campaigning abroad is also not worth it for countries such as Mauritius and Namibia with small emigrant populations, thus they refrain from engaging in overseas mobilization (Hartmann 2015).

Additional groups, organizations, candidates, states, and interest groups are also able to mobilize voters (Schildkraut 2005), including migrant voters. A wide range of organizations and outlets such as ethnic media, for-profit businesses (e.g., travel agencies, insurance brokers, notaries, and immigrant consultants), NGOs and community groups, and government-backed initiatives target immigrants by providing information and building political know-how skills in an attempt to increase immigrants’

political participation (Bloemraad 2006, pp. 83–98). People tend to surround themselves with like-minded people. Spouses, family, friends, colleagues, neighbors, and acquaintances form networks and play a role in individual-level choices to participate (Rolfe and Chan 2017, Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017, García-Castañón 2018; Ryan 2018). Rooij (2012, p.470) finds that informal social networks in Western Europe had more influence on individuals' electoral choices and played a larger role in getting migrants to participate in politics than formal institutions. As Putnam (1993, 2000) highlights, social capital such as networks, norms, and trust enable individuals to cooperate and foster civic engagement.

Figure 1.2 Select Necessary Conditions for Migrant Voting



Source: The description “can/able to” is based on Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995).

Migrants' networks, connections, and activities in two countries foster multiterritorial ties, thus represent critical pieces in unpacking migrant voting. Existing networks and connections can maintain political engagement in the origin country (Lafleur and Calderón Chelius 2011, Collyer 2014a, Escobar *et al.* 2014, Waldinger 2015, Chaudhary 2018, McCann *et al.* 2019); similarly, gaining new social networks and local information can lead to immigrant participation in the destination country (Hochschild *et al.* 2013, Morawska 2013, Chaudhary 2018, McCann and Jones-Correa 2020, Pujols 2020). I explore ties in both countries, and their relation to the four types of migrant voting, in Hypothesis 5. In Chapter 3, I find more migrants report being interested in politics because of personal or civic ties or because they are invested creating a better democratic and economic future for a country. As I will show in Chapter 4, establishing a connection with a country and caring about people within it can motivate migrants to stoke their interest in politics and encourage them to stay informed in either the origin or residence country, or both. Outlined in Figure 1.2, I propose that migrant voters who have the resources to exercise suffrage rights will decide to vote or abstain based on their ties or duties (the attachment and loyalties) with individuals and nations. International migrants' ties and concern for the future are *multiterritorial*, making them different from other voters. Multiterritorial ties add complexity to voting decisions since they signify electoral choices in one country may influence electoral choices in the other country.

The dotted lines at the top of Figure 1.2 indicate suffrage rights comprise a scope condition, because without them, one has no voting rights to exercise.¹⁸ Once suffrage rights are obtained, migrant voting is then determined by both resources and ties. The variable of ties is inapplicable in compulsory voting systems. Reaching a bottom tier of “origin country” results in emigrant voting whereas “destination country” results in immigrant voting; combining emigrant and immigrant voting indicates dual transnational voting; absence of adequate resources or failure to reach a bottom-tier results in abstention. Political learning, positioned vertically along Figure 1.2, occurs throughout life—first as socialization and then for migrants as resocialization, which shapes voting behavior. When migrants have resources and ties, the combination creates a necessary condition for individual-level voter turnout.

¹⁸ “Scope conditions are closely tied to necessary conditions. *By definition* all cases included have a value of 1 on the scope condition” (Goertz 2017, p. 110, emphasis in original). Migrants having suffrage rights is thus a requisite for migrant voting.

1.2.1 Inherent duality: Multiterritorial ties and civic duty in two countries

“Ties” refer to information flows and connectedness to family or assets, or to the nation-state or nationality (Boccagni and Ramírez 2013). It is a shorthand term for an individual’s connections, or attachment, to a territory/nation-state or the people who live there. Like other voters, migrants’ connections potentially affect how they think and feel about a given setting. Individuals care about the education system in which their children are enrolled; people care about the quality of healthcare they and their loved ones receive; voters care if their politicians are caught in corruption scandals versus spending time bettering communities; investors care about tax policy in a country in which they invested. What differs for migrants is that ties are multiterritorial.

Ties include a sense of belonging, which breeds a sense of duty or obligation, implying that an individual has a rights-responsibility relationship with a state. A sense of duty and how a voter defines the act of voting affects migrant voters’ decisions to vote or abstain (Wass and Blais 2017, Peltoniemi 2018a, pp. 61–62). When the sufficient condition of having resources and strong ties is met, it seems more likely that individuals vote (see Figure 1.2). Ties to the origin country result in emigrant voting whereas ties to the residence country result in immigrant voting. Hypothesis 5 proposes that the existence of multiterritorial ties (to both countries or people within the countries) increases dual transnational voting.

Emigrants maintain relations with the origin country and with people there. As Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez (2015, p. 8) point out, states and political parties know emigrants continue to care about the origin country but may lack information. As a result, institutional agents strive to fill the information gap for migrants and entice them to participate; for example, the Mexican electoral authority has used a campaign *hazlo por los tuyos* (‘do it for yours,’ meaning your loved ones) urging emigrants to register and vote, attempting to take advantage of emigrants’ connections with family and friends in Mexico (Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez 2015).

Political parties worldwide conduct electoral campaigns abroad, even from countries that legally prohibit campaigning abroad, such as Mexico (Smith and Bakker 2008), since politicians can rally and make speeches abroad before announcing official candidacy in elections (Paarlberg 2017, McCann *et al.* 2019). Politicians also attempt to strategically affect voting in the origin country by nurturing emigrant-origin country relations in the hopes that emigrants will influence their family and friends ‘back home,’ as Paarlberg (2017) found in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Mexico. Part of this strategy lies in politicians believing in an influential connection between emigrants and their

friends and family left behind, evidenced by remittances (Burgess 2012, Adamson 2016, Paarlberg 2017, 2019).

Sending money demonstrates emigrants are still committed to, and care about, their family and friends' wellbeing in the origin country. While countries 'tap into' emigrant resources and may 'embrace' the emigrant-origin state national identity, they form diaspora institutions to *govern* the emigrant population (Gamlen 2014, pp. 183, 192). But diasporas are not only governed by state policies; for centuries there have been actors who affect politics in both the origin and residence countries and in the larger geopolitical context (see Adamson 2016, 2019, 2020; Koinova and Tsourapas 2018). In the current globalized world, one way of active political participation is voting (e.g., through postal or electronic methods) on different sides of international borders. Larger studies of aggregated emigrant voter turnout (e.g., Burgess and Tyburski 2020, Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020) show that sending remittances correlates with increased emigrant participation in origin-country politics. Similarly, Erlingsson and Tuman (2017) find that in Latin America and the Caribbean, sending remittances can increase the chances of governments granting emigrant suffrage rights. Countries formally recognize continued ties between emigrants and origin countries—these connections can endure even decades after emigration and shape the emigrants' ties with the country and the people there (see Chapter 3).

Post-migration, immigrants interact with individuals and institutional agents in a new context. Political resocialization unites previous learning with new experiences, which can change attitudes, opinions, and political party preferences that migrants apply to both the origin and residence countries (White *et al.* 2008, Paul 2013, p. 202, Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez 2015, Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017, Chaudhary 2018) (see Chapter 3 and 4). A modified attitude can affect immigrant and emigrant voting, as individuals compare political systems and adapt their role as political actors in one or both territories.

Multiterritorial ties reflect the duality in migrants' lives that affect political decisions in both countries. Migrants build political attitudes and beliefs from early learning (Niemi and Hepburn 1995), creating "layered learning experiences that accumulate over space and time" (Paul 2013, p. 195). Mixing "pre-departure" attitudes and stances (such as ideology) with new ones in the residence country result in changes in attitudes, attachments, and behavior that are more dynamic than for other voters (Paul 2013, p. 195, Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez 2015).

One prominent aspect of duality in migrant voters' lives involves civic duty within the rights-responsibility nexus. Migrants may feel a (civic, national, patriotic) responsibility, or obligation, to a

certain community, country, nation, or nation-state. The various levels of connection and duty exemplify what Maas (2013) explains as multilevel citizenship—i.e., citizenship is not only a legal status given by a state but can be established and practiced at other substate and suprastate levels. A sense of civic duty can emerge from political learning via family, school, religious groups, media, and peer associations (Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017, pp. 4, 17). Individuals can also base their sense of duty on the rights-responsibilities toward a country; as I explore in Chapter 3 and 4, migrant voters can display distinct rights-responsibility relations with the origin and residence countries. Migrants can translate their sense of civic duty connected to a country into the act of voting.

A variety of factors and life events can influence one's sense of civic responsibility, starting with birthright nationality (see Shachar 2009) and political socialization in a country. What happens afterwards is subject to debate: following the persistence perspective, preadult learning persists throughout life; following the impressionable years perspective, certain age ranges (over late adolescence and early adulthood) are most susceptible to change then stabilize, or “crystallize”. Early learning is particularly important for partisanship, prejudice, and racial and ethnic identity (Sears 1975, Sears and Brown 2013, pp. 71, 75, 85). By early adolescence, some individuals will have already established certain political orientations, political interest, and national loyalty or duty (Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017, p. 4).

International migrants are again unique from other voters because of dual transnational voting: does an established sense of civic responsibility stir migrant voting in both countries? Or is duty expressed by voting in only one country? For emigrant voters, scholars have already identified civic duty as an independent variable that drives external voting, which Peltoniemi (2018b) finds among Finnish emigrants. Migrants who take suffrage rights abroad for the origin country understandably can maintain voting habits and civic duty, which keeps them voting while living abroad. As immigrant voters, moving internationally is a shock that begins the political resocialization process in a new country context with a different political system, institutions, and agents around them (see Chapter 4). The environment brings opportunity for fresh learning that can influence adults as voters.

Strong civic ties or duty can waver or further consolidate when a large exogenous shock occurs during political socialization, such as economic crisis, political crisis, war (at home or abroad), or outbreaks of violence; individuals reevaluate their political orientations during such shocks, which will

be hard to change again (White *et al.* 2008, p. 269).¹⁹ Sears and Brown (2013, pp. 59, 77) refer to such catalysts as what occurs in “the times” or *zeitgeist* that form people’s “life histories.” Countries can opportunely draw on people’s “deep-rooted attachment to the political system established in childhood” to connect with individuals for political purposes (Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017, p. 5). Citizen-state connections shed light on why individuals comply with laws and play by the rules, like paying taxes and completing military duty (Easton and Dennis 1969, Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017). Military service in times of war exemplifies this relationship since countries call on people (as part of their duty) and people obey (willing to die for the country as part of their duty). Ties and civic duty endure but also change shape over one’s experiences in “the times.”

Upon relocating to another country, individual migrants—but again, not necessarily refugees—bring their sense of civic duty with them: the citizen-state reciprocal relation changes into the emigrant-origin country relation. Emigrants can “maintain close ties with families and friends” in the origin country (Paul 2013, p. 198). As I explain in Chapter 3, feelings of obligation can form long stable roots within an individual’s political trajectory; if formed, a sense of duty to a certain place or community is highly unlikely to become uprooted, even after emigrating.

Since the emigrant is now also an immigrant, what about civic duty in the residence country? One needs time to settle in and create ties before deciding on values within the new context, which may or may not include a sense of duty toward the country or the idea of the nation-state. More commonly, ties in the residence country are to family and friends. When an immigrant says, however, that civic duty motivates them to vote (see Chapter 3), the rights-responsibilities balance also applies between countries and foreign residents. Immigrants building ties in the destination country and emigrants continuing ties with the origin country demonstrates the possibility of maintaining multiterritorial ties.

Recapitulating Figure 1.2, the combination of resources and ties can shed light on which of the four migrant voting types a migrant belongs, at any given moment. Holding enough ties in the origin country results in emigrant voting, whereas enough ties in the residence country results in immigrant

¹⁹ Emigrants and refugees have different motives for relocating to another country, yet the overlapping general objective is to seek a more prosperous life. War within the origin country affects refugees personally, putting their own safety at risk. Contrarily, when the origin country engages in war abroad, it affects citizens in the country and abroad differently. For instance, adults in the US changed political stances and behavior during the time of the Vietnam War, prompting scholars to question the continued relevance of the persistence perspective (Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017, pp. 6, 33–36).

voting. Absence of either resources or ties results in abstention. Combining emigrant and immigrant voting signals dual transnational voting.

1.3 Migrants' Political Learning: Temporality, Agents, Places, and Spaces

During (re)socialization, three critical aspects are temporality, agents, and context—meaning political learning depends on when, with whom, and where it occurs. First, temporality of political learning is more than just the pre- and post-migration divide since the duration and sequence of learning matters. Specific to migrants, Paul (2013, p. 190) highlights that “migration results in superimposed sets of learning experiences that occurred in particular spaces (contexts) and sequences (chronological orders).” The political socialization process affects political engagement only in the origin country; the outcome of voting is binomial (vote: yes or no). Duration matters because migrants must have grown up in the environment before relocating—i.e., children or young adolescents who are too young to have voted in the origin country may not have had time to completely form their political attitudes and values, which will affect the political resocialization process.

Post-migration, the political resocialization process can affect engagement in two countries; the outcome of migrant voting is multinomial (vote in the origin country: yes or no; vote in the residence country: yes or no). As Paul (2013) points out, new learning does not lead to an exclusive outcome (e.g., all migrants will vote after a certain length of time or after exposure to a certain type of political system). In short, temporality is important because voting outcomes depend on the attitudes, values, and behaviors individuals had learned during socialization, and then also the ways individuals maintain or change them post-migration during resocialization.

The second critical aspect of political learning is agents in and beyond institutions. Agents influence migrants in the socialization process either indirectly (e.g., exposure to media) or directly through interpersonal interactions. According to Froman (1961), an individual's learning environment is influenced by the media, education, peers, and family. Close contacts such as family and friends are not the only influential figures; daily interactions with neighbors and acquaintances also play a role (Rolfe and Chan 2017).

Differential treatment towards immigrants can affect whether the individual views the political scene in the residence country as a friendly place or a hostile environment for foreigners. Impressions and lived experiences influence decisions to politically participate. When faced with conflicting views, people tend to “accept the political norms of the preferred socializing agent” (Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017, p. 13). Post-migration, various agents reinforce or countervail migrants' political

orientations; during resocialization, migrants maintain or adjust political attitudes, values, and behavior in the new context.

Which agents are the most influential? It partly depends on age. Wasburn and Adkins Covert (2017, p. 17) organize a life-course model of political socialization recognizing social identities, historical contexts, and maturation of individuals who are aging in a changing society.²⁰ The major transitions of leaving school, starting work, starting a family, retiring, and maintaining health all relate to which agents are active at which stage, and their relative importance. Family members always play important roles, even despite changing family structures (Jennings *et al.* 2009). Who is considered ‘family’ depends on the life stage: it first comprises the family one is born into, in young adulthood it becomes the family one establishes, which later in life serves as the dominant family socializing agent. Parents represent top-down direct socializing agents whereas spouses are lateral socializing agents used to discuss politics and electoral decisions (García-Castañón 2018). Families can affect partisanship, stances on political issues, trust of the federal government, as well as interest and knowledge of politics (Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017, p. 62). For adults, partisanship fluctuates dependent on “the times,” meaning specific experiences through life (Sears and Brown 2013, p. 81). Later in life, agents in the workplace replace agents in school.

Agents from religious affiliations, voluntary associations, and the media endure through all life stages. The media as a source of political information traditionally came from television, newspapers, and radio but now also includes social media and websites.²¹ Voluntary associations include formal organizations such as trade unions as well as informal and nonpolitical organizations (e.g., social clubs, sport teams, student councils, community service) (Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017, pp. 77–78). By participating in associations, people develop skills such as leadership and voice that they then use to engage with politics. Similarly, as mentioned, completing bureaucratic government paperwork allows


²⁰ Wasburn and Adkins Covert (2017, pp. 14–15, 17, 27, 47) refer to social identities as gender, race/ethnicity, and social class; historical contexts include period or cohort effects and varying reactions to political events; and maturation refers to cognitive development and increasing political sophistication. The last helps shed light on how individuals’ sociopsychological characteristics “have influenced their learning political beliefs, values, attitudes, and patterns of participation” (Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017, p. 47).

²¹ Media acts as socialization agents through agenda setting, priming, and framing (Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017, p. 80): *agenda setting* means that the media covers certain issues and their importance; *priming* is an extension of agenda setting since it makes some issues more salient than others, in effect influencing people’s political judgements on the topic; and *framing* means media has the power to impose “cognitive frameworks for understanding political actors, conditions, and events” (also see Valentino and Nardis 2013).

immigrants to develop destination country-specific skills that they can then use for migrant political engagement. The third critical aspect of political learning is the context, integral to migrant voting. Migrants interact with agents beyond the residence country, as Paul (2013, p. 188) details:

...one cannot discuss how migration changes ideas, behaviours, identities, priorities and lifestyles without analysing the learning mechanisms underlying these transformations. Learning occurs through interactions between migrants and receiving societies; between migrants and diasporic organisations; between migrants and their non-migrant friends and family back home; between more or less experienced migrants in the receiving country etc. Politicians and government authorities enter the picture when they adapt to appeal to migrants... Learning does not happen in a vacuum: one needs to analyse what attitudes and behaviours acquired in primary socialisation are unlearned and partially replaced with values and action repertoires from the host country.

Figure 1.3 Four Political Learning Places and Spaces for International Migrants



Sources: Built from ideas in select literature (Glick Schiller *et al.* 1992, Faist 1998, 2000, Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, Faist *et al.* 2013, Jakobson and Kalev 2013, Paul 2013, Finn 2019).

The context of learning is multiterritorial and beyond. Waldinger (2015, p. 20) notes, “As opposed to the globalists who see immigrants living in two worlds and the nationalists insisting that these same home country connections be cut, I will show that the immigrants are instead between here and there.” The betweenness of the two places is what forms the concepts of transmigrants and transnationalism. Living in and between places applies to immigrants, emigrants, and transmigrants. In between the places are two additional spaces (see Figure 1.3) where migrants interact with various agents.

Regarding each part of Figure 1.3, the two physical territories of the origin and destination countries are where people live before and after migration. Migrants can embed themselves in social and political structures in the newer residence country while they simultaneously keep connections to the origin country (Faist *et al.* 2013, Fauser 2013). Each country has a distinct political system, regime, political culture, governmental institutions, and offers a certain bundle of political rights. Here, individuals interact with agents within the family, school system, religious groups, workplace, and voluntary associations, and through media exposure (see Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017). In between the two countries, Glick Schiller and colleagues (1992, p. 1) propose migrants build “social fields” linking the places, which they call “transnationalism.”

Based on Faist (1998, 2000), the “social space” that has organically emerged through migrants’ actions and involvement in political culture and practices between the origin and destination countries is what I label as the transnational space. Through migrants’ involvement in political culture and practices linking the origin and destination countries, a social space organically emerges, called the transnational space. As Jakobson and Kalev (2013, p. 202) point out, the space is not only one of “social interaction, but economic stock-taking, political motivations and governance regimes, that also shape the context for transnational migration.”

Lastly, Paul (2013, pp. 192–193) includes the “transnational migratory system” as one of the “relevant learning spaces” containing migrant-related security, control, politics, policies, cross-border political parties, and institutions. I partially separate the transnational space from the migratory system; although they overlap, the migratory system encompasses the transnational space entirely. The migratory system exists in both the origin and residence countries, as well as independent from them, for example the role of non-governmental organizations and via supranational or international law.

Furthermore, only some of the migratory system is transnational. Countries maintain policies and laws defining migrants’ rights as well as (non-)state organizations and institutions working with migrants and migration. For example, certain departments or ministries (e.g., the Ministry of the Interior or Foreign Affairs) often manage migration topics within a country and human mobility across

borders. Decision-making on migration governance strategies can be at the national level (see Geddes *et al.* 2019). Moreover, border control and security form critical parts of a country's sovereignty because states need them to maintain (at least an appearance of) control over the territory (De Genova 2002, Hollifield and Wong 2015). The migratory system requires individuals to complete pre- and post-migration bureaucracy, which are the steps and documents countries require before allowing individuals to legally reside and formally participate in society and politics (Finn 2019).

Migrants can construct multiple identities by living in and being connected to two territories (Basch *et al.* 1994, Glick Schiller *et al.* 1995). Experiences with new governments and political activities prompt migrants to compare their new environment to the origin country (Paul 2013; see Chapter 2 and 3). While adult attitudes can change substantially, the boundary between analyzing socialization versus behavioral changes is always hazy (Niemi and Sobieszek 1977, p. 211). Nonetheless, I argue migrants can have multiple political identities and simultaneous multiterritorial ties. Political learning forms ties, which affect how, why, and to what extent migrants politically participate. Table 1.1 summarizes the relation of the temporal migration trajectory with political learning and outcomes.

Table 1.1 Longitudinal Migrant Voting Processes

Time	Electoral Options	Main Political Learning Process	Roots and Relation	Learning Places and Spaces	Relevant Independent/ (Control) Variables
t_0 pre-migration	1. Vote	Socialization: establishing political attitudes, values, and behavior	Growing roots: 1. national citizen-state relation	Origin country	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • resources • interest in politics • ideology • civic duty • (age) • (education)
	2. Abstain				
t_1 post-migration short term	1. Vote only in origin country	Resocialization: maintaining or adjusting political attitudes, values, and behavior	Two sets of roots: 1. emigrant-origin country relation 2. immigrant-residence country relation	1. Origin country 2. Destination country 3. Transnational space 4. Migratory system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • resources • communication • interest in politics • intention to stay • in-country tenure • multiterritorial ties to people/country • (nondemocratic origin country)
	2. Vote only in residence country				
	3. Vote in both countries				
	4. Abstain in both countries				
t_2 post-migration long term	Continuation in a migrant voting quadrant	Resocialization: growing, maintaining, or shrinking roots in origin and residence countries	Migrants can change between the nine Roots Routes, which can result in moving between migrant voting quadrants		
	Movement between migrant voting quadrants				

Notes: The term “learning spaces” in the socialization context comes from Paul (2013, p. 192), as does the migratory system as one of the spaces. The four electoral options come from Finn’s (2020a) migrant voting types.

1.4 Conclusion

Increased international migration and the expansion of migrant enfranchisement around the globe have increased the number of migrant voters—many of whom have formal political voice in two countries, the origin and residence countries. What drives migrants to vote or abstain? Why do migrants turn out to vote in one country or in both? I argue that combining resources and ties to a country or the people within it can lead to migrant voting (see Figure 1.2). To examine migrant voting as a dependent variable, I offer a migrant voting typology (Figure 1 in the Introduction) as an analytical framework. As suggested in Finn (2020a), moving past just ‘here’ and ‘there’, the choice to vote or abstain in two countries makes four options: immigrant voting, emigrant voting, dual transnational voting, and abstention. While emigrant voting requires nationality, immigrant and dual transnational voting do not. As such, migrant voting affects the notion of citizenship as nationality, as further detailed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3).

Throughout the dissertation, I put particular emphasis on dual transnational voting, representing the inherent duality in international migrants’ lives, including their interest and political participation in two countries. Migrant voters are unique from other voters because, as nonresident nationals and as foreign residents (or with multiple nationalities), they hold additional suffrage rights and face additional explanatory variables affecting electoral decisions (see Table 1.1). Moreover, other factors (e.g., civic duty and multiterritorial ties to both countries) can develop and change over time.

Migrants also differ because they experienced political socialization in one country then political resocialization in another country. Although the political socialization process is already complex—and adding migrant resocialization in a second country further increases complexity—it is a step worth taking because it guides electoral behavior and socialization literature toward a growing group of political actors: migrant voters. Migrants’ political socialization and resocialization processes not only occur in the origin and residence countries but also in transnational spaces between them and in the migratory system (see Figure 1.3). International migrants interact with different sets of agents, both people and institutions, that influence migrants to establish, maintain, and adapt their political attitudes, values, and behavior. Whereas political socialization affects individuals’ electoral decisions in only one country, migrants’ resocialization can affect electoral decisions as both an emigrant for the origin country and as an immigrant in the residence country.