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## **Migrant rights, voting, and resocialization: suffrage in Chile and Ecuador, 1925-2020**

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# Introduction

Why do migrants vote? In what ways do migrants' ties to the origin country keep them voting? When becoming more rooted in the residence country, what happens to their voting behavior over time? Combining these multifaceted research questions exposes critical interlinkages that shed light on the phenomenon of migrant voting. Human behavior lies at the center of this discussion: individuals are active agents in societies and politics participating in more than one place. Migrants' dual lives unfold in and between origin and residence countries, given their experiences in social surroundings and interactions with state and non-state institutions under different political regimes. A growing number of migrant voters across world regions merit research into when, where, and why migrants vote or abstain. The aim of this kind of research is to give meaning to, and make sense of, migrants' unique positioning as both emigrants and immigrants and how that affects their participation in two countries' national-level elections.

'Migrants' in this dissertation refer to adults who relocated across international borders, comprising foreign residents (immigrants and denizens) in their new residence, or destination, country and nonresident nationals for the origin country (emigrants abroad or overseas and the diaspora), including dual nationals. While more inclusive democracies incorporate migrants into the demos, or political community, *participation* serves as a main pillar of democracy. Once states enfranchise migrants, mainstream studies have largely overlooked how and to what extent suffrage rights affect migrant voting decisions (Arrighi and Bauböck 2017). To fill this gap, I chose individual-level migrant voting as the dependent variable; using original survey and interview data, I explore what voting means to migrants and unpack how multiterritorial ties can influence migrant voting behavior.

Migrant voters exercise suffrage in four ways: immigrant voting (foreign residents vote only in the residence country), emigrant voting (nonresident nationals vote only for the origin country from abroad), dual transnational voting (in both countries), and abstention (not voting in either, despite holding suffrage rights) (Finn 2020a). I capture and summarize these four migrant voting options in a typology (see Figure 1) that provides a framework for 1) classifying migrant voting and questioning the reasons migrant voters lie in one quadrant and not another.; and 2) analyzing voters' electoral behavior by following their political resocialization paths, showing changes in migrant electoral behavior over time. The typology serves as the dissertation's key framework for exploring migrant voting and individual migrants' decisions to participate or abstain in two countries' elections throughout their voting lives.

When deciding whether to vote, all voters are influenced by factors such as education and life-cycle stages. However, international migrants who have the right to vote in two countries are influenced by additional factors unique to their life circumstances (see Section 1.2 in Chapter 1). Moreover, while all voters experience varying degrees of political socialization from interacting with agents in and beyond institutions like the media, education, family members, and acquaintances (e.g., Froman 1961, Rolfe and Chan 2017), migrants politically socialized in one country, then moved and live outside their origin country, further distinguishing them as voters (see e.g., Paul 2013, Waldinger 2015, Chaudhary 2018). International relocation, which involves an uprooting of connections to the origin country, then re-rooting to the residence country, is a shock that affects any migrant's life. Yet new connections or ties do not simply replace the old ties. Individuals change their original, national citizen-state relation to an emigrant-origin state relation and gain a new, immigrant-residence state relation. I hypothesize that, over time, migrants maintain, adjust, or shrink their connections or “roots” to both the origin and residence countries and the people living in these countries. I further suggest that the three possible outcomes in two countries result in nine possible resocialization pathways, which I call the Roots Routes, based on the idea that changing ties to people and places changes individual-level migrant voter turnout.

I select Chile and Ecuador as case studies, in which I consider each individual as simultaneously an immigrant and emigrant. Both countries offer immigrants the right to vote in national-level elections after a five-year residence (without naturalizing, i.e., adopting the country's nationality), which is rarer than offering emigrant suffrage rights to nationals abroad. Ecuador allows foreign residents to register after five years whereas Chile automatically registers foreign residents as voters. Most of their foreign-born populations also hold emigrant voting rights, which facilitates finding individuals who can potentially vote in national-level elections in two countries—that of residence and origin. For each country case study, I analyze the history of full migrant enfranchisement to set the context for migrant voting, contributing my own original research. The legal process can contain lags or rights reversal, highlighting enfranchising migrants is not necessarily linear or permanent. In Chile, I demonstrate the typology's first use to more quantitatively outline which migrants vote and the second more qualitative use in Ecuador to start to unpack the reasons migrants give to explain why they vote.

My historic analysis of Chile's long road to migrant enfranchisement in 1925, 1980, and 2014 is sourced from national censuses, newspaper archives, transcriptions from commissions reviewing the constitution, and constitutional articles. For migrant voting in Chile, I combine official statistics,

electoral registries, and an original online survey of 1,482 migrants during Chile's 2017 presidential election, to highlight differences between the typology's four migrant voting types. For Ecuador's comparatively short road to enfranchisement, I examine electoral laws, academic studies, and the 1998 and 2008 Constitution. My analysis of migrant voting is based on 71 interviews conducted in Ecuador in 2019 with migrants from Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Peru, and Venezuela who had lived under various (non)democratic political regimes. My study of migrant voting in Ecuador is a vehicle to explore the reasons migrants vote, abstain, or are prevented from voting.

Through this dissertation, I raise questions and discussions on larger concepts regarding contemporary citizenship practices and migrant political participation in more than one country. I attempt to reconceptualize migrant voting by categorizing it into four distinct types. Migrant voters not only differ from other voters but also among themselves. The most unique group comprise those who vote in both origin- and residence-country elections, which I call 'dual transnational voting.' Dual transnational voters remain underrepresented in existing literature, despite their potential impact on electoral outcomes in two countries and despite the importance of their democratic participation as a novel suffrage practice in the globalized world. Finally, I offer a framework for evaluating migrants' political resocialization processes, which I do by showing various trajectories of migrants becoming embedded within a place through their ties to people and the country. While this dissertation focuses on migrant voting behavior, scholars can apply the same framework to other social phenomena, particularly migrant participation in societies of residence and origin.

After elaborating on the dissertation's main concepts and the migrant voting typology in Chapter 1, I analyze evidence from Chile in Chapter 2 and from Ecuador in Chapter 3. After gaining suffrage rights and enough resources to vote, migrants also need *reasons* to turn out. For some, reasons are straightforward but for others, they involve a complex time-sensitive mix of ties, duties, trust, loyalty, and perceptions toward a certain country (or nation-state), political parties, and people. I find that, alongside being invested in a country's future, multiterritorial ties to people and places tend to ebb and flow, in turn affecting migrants' choices to vote or abstain in two countries. The findings establish the foundation for my claim in Chapter 4 that international migration is a shock that starts the political resocialization process, during which an individual maintains or adjusts political attitudes, values, and behavior over time. Interactions with agents in both countries, and in the social spaces between them (see Figure 1.3), migrants can grow, maintain, or shrink their roots in both countries, as I capture in the Roots Routes (see Figure 4.1). Each route influences migrants' decisions to vote in one or neither

country or in both countries—meaning each migrant’s route is linked to their current quadrant in the migrant voting typology.

In the rest of the Introduction, I expand on the main concepts of migrant political rights, voting, and resocialization and how this study will contribute to the gaps in relevant literature. Then I present my migrant voting typology, used as a framework throughout the analysis, followed by my hypotheses built from theories from pertinent literature. I justify the two country case selections and explain the methods used for my analysis, before elaborating on the aims and contributions to be drawn from my findings. I conclude by outlining the four chapters, showing how the dissertation fits together to shed light on the phenomenon of migrant voting.

### **Introducing Migrant Rights, Voting, and Political Resocialization**

Over 120 autonomous territories grant some migrants a form of suffrage rights in local or national elections, or both (Earnest 2008, 2015a, Arrighi and Bauböck 2017, GLOBALCIT 2019, IDEA 2019). Suffrage rights define political membership in the demos, so when states include foreign residents, they eliminate the nationality requirement for voting and when they include nationals abroad, they eliminate the residence requirement (Caramani and Grotz 2015). In this sense, ‘morphing the demos’ (Bauböck 2015) has reshaped traditional nationality and territorial requirements for membership in the political community, extending the concept and practices of citizenship ‘beyond nationality’ (Pedroza 2019). While legal distinctions between nationals and non-nationals remain, more countries offer more individuals formal voice in the decision-making process than any time in the past.

My study builds and expands on relevant literature on granting migrant rights, which has been emerging since the 2000s. Numerous studies examine the theoretical and normative reasons why states grant suffrage rights to migrants (e.g., López-Guerra 2005, Bauböck 2007, 2015, Beckman 2007, Owen 2012), why states should enfranchise refugees (Bender 2021), and why states should re-enfranchise migrants after reversing such rights (on the United States [US], see Hayduk 2006). Various macro enfranchisement analyses focus on the drivers, patterns, and timing (e.g., Earnest 2008, 2015a, Lafleur 2015, Turcu and Urbatsch 2015, Koopmans and Michalowski 2016). Other studies have assessed immigrant enfranchisement discussions and reforms at subnational levels, especially in the EU, with their successes and failures (Pedroza 2013, 2019, Piccoli 2021); and Michel and Blatter (2021) examine to what extent public opinion supports enfranchising emigrants and immigrants in Europe.

While research on migrant enfranchisement has progressed over the last decades, many aspects have yet to be analyzed at different levels within and across the globe. Past studies tend to limit their scope to advanced democracies, leaving out hybrid and competitive authoritarian regimes that also hold elections. However, exceptions exist since some studies have indeed addressed different regimes and emigrant enfranchisement in various African states (e.g., Brand 2010, Wellman 2015, 2021, Wellman and Whitaker 2021). Studies on Latin America and the Caribbean also include different regimes and colonial legacies, such as Erlingsson and Tuman (2017) analyzing 24 countries and Belton (2019) comparing Caribbean countries.

Additionally, country case studies tend to focus on either emigrant or immigrant enfranchisement, such as on Mexico (Calderón Chelius 2003), New Zealand (Barker and McMillan 2014, McMillan 2015), Portugal (Pedroza 2019), South Korea (Mosler and Pedroza 2016, Chang and Pedroza 2020), and Uruguay (Stuhldreher 2012). Prominent research on external voting in Latin America also comes from Jean-Michel Lafleur (Lafleur and Calderón Chelius 2011, Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez 2015, Bermudez *et al.* 2017). Taking a historic view, Allen, Nyblade, and Wellman (2020) are compiling a dataset on worldwide emigrant enfranchisement rights' modes and durability; however, they still exclude immigrant rights in the dataset.

To fill in some of these gaps in migrant enfranchisement studies, I focus on both immigrant and emigrant enfranchisement processes in two countries. I build especially from analyses conducted by Escobar (2007, 2015, 2017) since they focus on Latin America and include processes of both immigrant and emigrant voting rights. For both Chile and Ecuador, I examine their enfranchisement processes, drawing on Palop-García and Pedroza's (2019) three steps that states enact, regulate, then apply migrant voting rights. I choose Chile as a pioneer of granting immigrant suffrage and Ecuador as a later example of enacting both immigrant and emigrant rights simultaneously (Escobar 2015). Chile was a top-down early adopter of immigrant suffrage in 1925 in local-level elections, extending these to the national level in the 1980 Constitution, curiously enacted under a military dictatorship (Finn 2020b). In contrast, Ecuador was a relative latecomer in 2008, seemingly adhering to the global-norms hypothesis (i.e., the expansion of human rights encourages enfranchisement) and bottom-up demand from civil society. However, regarding emigrant suffrage, Ecuador began emigrant enactment in the 1990s and implemented it in 2006 onwards whereas Chile was a regional latecomer, enacting it much later in 2014 and implementing it in 2017. Besides the legal steps, I also explore the reasons why and how Chile and Ecuador granted migrant suffrage. For example, Chile challenges existent reasons to expand the demos and highlights the importance of migrants knowing about their voting rights.

Data collected in Ecuador reveal how immigrants and emigrants can have rights on paper yet face challenges exercising them in practice. As such, it contributes to larger debates in migration studies about the boundaries of the demos, as well as recent work by Allen and colleagues (2020) on the modes of migrant suffrage enactment and the durability of application over time.

After states grant voting rights, my focus shifts to migrants exercising these rights, another aspect not fully explained by relevant literature. Migrants mirror other voters in some ways yet hold additional characteristics that influence their electoral decisions for turnout and vote choice. Drawing on Verba, Scholzman, and Brady (1995), individuals overall politically participate because they can, they want to, and because they are invited to. Individuals can participate because they have enough resources; they want to because they are interested in participating; and finally, they are invited to participate by various nodes and agents encouraging them to vote. To examine individuals' electoral decisions, I look at learning processes that occur during political socialization and resocialization that ultimately influence individuals' voting behavior.

Early Political Psychology, Sociology, and Political Science studies on children's political socialization shows that they acquire civic norms and values from surrounding influences and actors (e.g., Hyman 1959, Bender 1967, Niemi 1973, Eliasoph 1998, Morawska 2013). Interactions within a network early on establishes social psychological micro-foundations (Rolfe 2012). Political experiences in pre-adulthood also directly shape political decisions, including future electoral behavior (Hyman 1959). However, although influential, political socialization experiences in the formative years growing up do not fully determine electoral behavior in adult life (Searing *et al.* 1973, Niemi and Sobieszek 1977, Jennings and Niemi 1981, Niemi and Hepburn 1995). Instead, political learning continues over time: the lifelong openness perspective explains that people keep learning through new experiences with individual and institutional agents (see Sigel 1989, Sears and Funk 1999, Sears and Brown 2013, Wasburn and Adkins Covert 2017). Additionally, adults who migrate also undergo political *resocialization*, post-migration (Sigel 1989, Paul 2013).

As I have defined in other works, “political resocialization is a cognitive learning process during which individuals maintain or adjust political attitudes, values, and behavior based on individual and institutional agents within a new context” (Finn 2020a, p. 733). For adult migrants, I suggest that their initial political socialization—which began while growing up in the origin country—ends when they move to a different country, which instigates their political resocialization process. Simplifying some of the drivers of migration and the ‘capability’ to move (see Carling 2002, de Haas 2021), the more forced the migration was, and the larger the difference between the two countries' political systems,



the larger the shock. I attempt to explain why and how migrants decide to participate, or not, in national elections in origin and residence countries by asking them about their political learning before, during, and after migration.

Migrants, unlike other voters, undergo what Paul (2013, p. 195) calls “layered learning experiences,” which accumulate over time and across spaces. Layered experiences in turn affect migrant political behavior, including the electoral decision to vote or abstain. One remanent, or layered prior experience, is what Bilodeau (2014, p. 362) calls authoritarian imprints, defining them as migrants having “an imprint of their political socialization under an authoritarian regime [that] marks their general outlook on politics.” Authoritarian imprints from the origin country can affect political behavior in the residence country, as evidenced in Australia and Canada (Bilodeau and Nevitte 2003, Bilodeau 2004, 2014, Bilodeau, McAllister, *et al.* 2010). I add to the discussion of authoritarian imprints by analyzing migrant voting in Chile and Ecuador, countries that host migrants with low or no language barriers and who experienced political socialization under nondemocracy. The case studies offer an opportunity to unpack migrants’ hybrid and authoritarian imprints in a South American context (also see Finn and Umpierrez de Reguero 2021).

Migrants, as both emigrants and immigrants, have ties, or roots, to both countries and the people who live there and are politically influenced by both throughout their lives. Over time, migrants grow, maintain, or shrink their roots; three possible scenarios in two countries result in nine possible resocialization pathways ( $3^2=9$ ), what I call the Roots Routes. The paths map migrants’ trajectories of forming and adjusting ties to a country (duty, patriotism, wanting to contribute) and people within the country (family and close friends), both as an immigrant voter in a residence country and as an emigrant voter for the origin country. On explaining political participation, I follow Rolfe’s position that studies should consider not only individuals but also take their social interactions seriously since they affect social outcomes; people are “embedded in particular social contexts” and expectations shape their role within the political world (Rolfe 2012, pp. 2, 16; also see Ryan and Mulholland 2015; Ryan 2018).

The Roots Routes are a step towards improving existent resocialization theories of resistance, exposure, and transferability (White *et al.* 2008) to reveal meaning and motivations behind migrant voting and voting behavior changes over time, which I expand on later in this Introduction. The Roots Routes show the process of migrants becoming embedded within the ‘soil’ of society and through different social interactions and relations, with and within a country, nurturing the roots so they grow deeper (see Chapter 4). However, they can be uprooted or wither away when the soil lacks water and

nutrients—relations may be insufficient to solidify migrants’ roots in a hostile society toward emigrants (e.g., perceiving them as “traitors”) or immigrants (e.g., as “outsiders”). While I examine migrant voting in specific contexts and the experiences that continue to shape voting behavior, the framework can be applied beyond this dissertation’s focus, for instance, to studies of belonging, participation, and integration at the individual or group level.

## **Framework: A Migrant Voting Typology of Voting Here, There, in Both Countries, or Nowhere**

To analyze why migrants vote or abstain, I propose a typology that categorizes four types of migrant voting (see Figure 1) based on how an individual votes from abroad as an emigrant for origin-country elections and as an immigrant voting in the residence country. The typology can explain the voting behavior of migrants who have, or potentially will have, voting rights in both the origin and residence countries. It is not meant to gauge political integration but rather to capture if a migrant either votes or abstains, in the origin and residence countries. This creates four types of migrant voting: 1) immigrant voting, meaning foreign residents participate only in the residence country; 2) emigrant voting, indicating nonresident nationals participate from abroad only in the origin country; 3) dual transnational voting, or participating in both countries; and 4) abstention, or choosing not to vote despite having suffrage rights in both countries (Finn 2020a). Migrants are not only different from other voters but, as the typology implies, vary among each other. The typology displays individuals’ voting options in a world of expanding enfranchisement by literally drawing lines between the various electoral behavior choices available to migrant voters.

The typology nuances the binary of migrant voting that literature characterizes as ‘here’ and ‘there’ (e.g., in Chaudhary 2018)—implying the residence and origin country, respectively. Migration scholars have long recognized that transnational spaces emerge between the two places (Glick Schiller *et al.* 1992, 1995, Faist 1998), that the migratory system cuts through them (Paul 2013), and that activities occur and communities form ‘between’ the ‘here’ and ‘there’ (Portes 1996, Portes *et al.* 2002, Waldinger 2008, e.g., Erdal and Oeppen 2013). Some studies examine how places besides the two localities can influence migrants’ integration, identity, and everyday lives—what Shams (2020) conceptualizes as ‘elsewhere’ places with spillover effects from global politics or events.<sup>1</sup> States are also involved; policies

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<sup>1</sup> Shams (2020) gives examples of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) recruitment and terrorist attacks impacting ethnic or religious identity of migrants living in a variety of other countries; the events occur far

from the origin country can foster emigrants' integration as immigrants in residence countries, as evidenced with Mexican policies aimed at Mexicans living in the United States (Smith and Bakker 2008, Délano 2018), suggesting policies have the power to link both places. The distinction between 'here' and 'there' further blurs as borders 'shift' far into other territories (Shachar 2020, Finn and Jakobson 2021), for example through implementing 'border' control procedures and requiring pre-migration bureaucratic documents while potential immigrants still live in the origin country (Finn 2019, Brumat and Finn 2021). Post-migration, casting votes can occur for two geographic places. Following Tsuda (2012), participation in the two places happens simultaneously, within the same time span (also see Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). However, some factors that influence migrant voters' behavior stem from within, between, and beyond the 'here' and 'there.'

The typology frames my analysis of migrant electoral behavior (i.e., individual-level turnout) and its four categories make my dependent variable of migrant voting multicategorical. While top-down enfranchisement is established at the national or supranational level, voters ultimately decide whether to cast a ballot;<sup>2</sup> thus the typology shifts the focus from states to individuals. It highlights that immigrants are simultaneously emigrants (Pedroza and Palop-García 2017a, Sayad 2018 [1999]), aligning with scholars who have recently nuanced migrant voting (e.g., Caramani and Grotz 2015, Waldinger 2015, Chaudhary 2018, Finn 2020a). I add to the discussion by focusing on one type of political participation (national-level voting) in states offering extensive migrant suffrage rights, putting origin and residence countries on par with each other. The typology can be used to systematically categorize migrant voting for local or multilevel elections and its purpose is multifold: to differentiate between migrant voters, to describe migrant voters and what it means when they engage in origin- and residence-country politics, and to track changes in individuals' electoral behavior over time in the two countries.

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from migrants' physical location but are nonetheless powerful enough to redefine migrants' identities and how the residence-country society views them. Similar scenarios can unfold related to voting and partisanship.

<sup>2</sup> I assume that each individual has free choice to vote or abstain, whereas in reality migrant voters may face high barriers to participation (Finn 2019), such as rigid eligibility requirements or cumbersome registration processes. Such rules and barriers disincentivize voters from casting ballots (see, e.g., Franklin 1996, Norris 2004). Contrarily, easier registration encourages turnout (Jackman 1987, Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019). While scholars must include regulations and ease of registration in their analyses (as I do), it is unfitting to include it in the typology because of variation among countries.

After international migration, individuals with multiterritorial political rights face two choices, to vote or abstain, in two countries—creating *four* distinct types of migrant electoral behavior (see Figure 1 below). The typology demonstrates that political participation can be (a)symmetrical between the origin and residence countries, since a voter can participate in some elections, but not others, or in one country but not the other. While it does not capture the in-betweenness of places (as it only considers voting in either the origin country or residence country), recognizing that such places exist facilitates discovering the factors stemming from living in and between the countries that influence voting behavior (see Figure 1.1 and Section 1.3 in Chapter 1). This helps to understand why migrants lie in one quadrant and not another, and potentially why they change behavior.

**Figure 1 A Migrant Voting Typology<sup>3</sup>**

		Votes in Origin Country	
		Yes	No
Votes in Residence Country	Yes	Dual transnational voting	Immigrant (foreign resident) voting
	No	Emigrant (nonresident national) voting	Abstention

*Source:* Modified from Finn (2020a).

All migrant voters fit into one, and only one, quadrant at any given time, making the typology’s categories collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive (Collier *et al.* 2012). There is no ‘ideal’ quadrant since the typology has no normatively superior quadrant. The immigrant voting quadrant comprises foreign residents (non-naturalized individuals living in the residence country) and here I also include naturalized individuals, meaning those who adopted the residence country’s nationality (who may be dual nationals or hold multiple nationalities). Emigrants who renounce nationality would lose origin-country voting rights so lie beyond this classification. Migrants can make various

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<sup>3</sup> Note that nonresident nationals comprise a larger group than ‘emigrants’ since it comprises both emigrants and their descendants (and others who gain the nationality from abroad); however, I focus only on emigrants (first-generation adults who move abroad).

movements between categories and are free to return to the same quadrant numerous times. Movements are not necessarily linear towards one voting type, indicating that there is no straight-line pattern of voting behavior over time nor an end point to migrants' voting trajectories. Nonetheless, in some contexts, I expect certain patterns are more likely to emerge (see Chapter 3 and 4).

### **Linking Migrant Voting to Transnationalism and (Non)Citizenship**

The migrant voting typology incorporates aspects of transnationalism in migration studies and raises conceptual questions about (non)citizenship. It is recognized that migrants do not wholly live in one country or in two countries (Waldinger 2008)—instead, migrant voters ‘balance’ two political communities, from which they select how, and in which ways, to be politically engaged in each location (Erdal and Oeppen 2013). Given the aforementioned spread of migrant voting rights around the globe, migrant voters can establish multifaceted and context-specific political identities, for instance feeling belonging and loyalty to more than one country (see Glick Schiller *et al.* 1992, Yuval-Davis 2006, Faist and Gerdes 2008, Bilodeau, McAllister, *et al.* 2010). Political practices “that transcend the borders of independent states are *transnational* if they involve simultaneous overlapping affiliations of persons to geographically separate polities” (Bauböck 2003, p. 705, emphasis in original). Given this definition, migrant voting as I study it entails a transnational political practice since the migrant has crossed borders and holds suffrage rights in two polities.

Transnational citizenship can be parsimoniously conceptualized as status, identity, and participation, which Jakobson and Kalev (2013) offer by condensing literature on these dimensions (e.g., Soysal 1994, Sassen 2002, Guarnizo *et al.* 2003, Bloemraad 2004). They add Fox's (2005) idea of vertical versus horizontal transnational citizenship, to offer a six-fold model of individuals practicing citizenship as status, identity, and participation both vertically and horizontally (Jakobson and Kalev 2013).<sup>4</sup> The vertical relation is between the individual and state whereas the horizontal one entails “power relations within society” (Fox 2005, p. 175). Together they form a transnational perspective, as migrants' bureaucratic relations with two states and with people in both societies. I capture this in migrants' motives for voting and in the Roots Routes as migrants' ties to both a country and the people, mostly family, living in that country.

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<sup>4</sup> An example of vertical citizenship as identity would be loyalty to the state whereas a horizontal example could be solidarity with social peers; citizenship as participation vertically would be voting out of duty whereas horizontally would be through civic activism (Jakobson and Kalev 2013, p. 203).

Migrants' liminal relation with the two places (the origin and residence countries) is what forms the concepts of transmigrants and transnationalism; immigrants, emigrants, and transmigrants can live in and between places. Building from literature spanning Political Science, Political Theory, and Sociology (e.g., Glick Schiller *et al.* 1992, 1995, Portes 1996, Faist 1998, Kivisto 2001, Bauböck 2003, Guarnizo *et al.* 2003, Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003, Fox 2005, Escobar 2007, Faist and Fauser 2011, Erdal and Oeppen 2013, Faist *et al.* 2013, Jakobson and Kalev 2013, Paul 2013; Erdal 2020), I suggest four learning places and spaces in which international migrants participate and (re)socialize (see Section 1.3 and Figure 1.3 in Chapter 1). These comprise the two countries, the transnational space between them, and the intersecting and independent migratory system (the last from Paul 2013).

As a transnational practice, migrant voting raises conceptual issues with formal membership (political rights in a demos) and the practices of citizenship (exercising rights connected to membership). Citizenship in sovereign territories is “a legal status and relation between an individual and a state or other territorial polity that entails specific legal rights and duties”, as defined by the Global Citizenship Observatory (GLOBALCIT 2020, p. 8). While in some places (e.g., the EU and US) citizenship is synonymous with nationality, these two terms legally differ in some Latin American constitutional law (Pedroza and Palop-García 2017b). In other words, states can legally define a foreign resident as a ‘citizen’, without naturalizing to become a national citizen. When literature refers to citizenship as synonymous to nationality, I specify ‘citizenship as nationality’; otherwise, I refer to citizenship as a person’s bundle of rights, including voting rights.

Conceptualizing citizenship (as nationality), Bauböck (2006) establishes legal status, rights, and political participation as its three dimensions. Both access to, and loss of, this legal status and its related rights differ greatly between countries (Vink and Bauböck 2013), in turn creating variations among citizenship regimes, which are “institutionalized systems of formal and informal norms that define access to membership, as well as rights and duties associated with membership, within a polity” (Vink 2017, p. 222). I recognize that citizenship can be a political construction to mean *membership* at levels besides the territorial nation state (Maas 2013)—which I see as contributing to migrants’ ties to people and places that in turn affect their citizenship practices, including voting behavior. I attempt to nuance (non)national migrant voters with respect to gaining and exercising political rights through membership in two political communities.

As casting a vote from abroad and active immigrant voting have emerged as alternative ways to be members, migrant voting has changed the concept of citizenship as nationality. Offering political rights to non-nationals demonstrates a “decoupling of rights and benefits from the status of

citizenship [as nationality]” (Vink 2017, p. 223)—in turn, nationality is no longer a necessary condition to gain membership in the demos (Beckman 2006, Maas 2013, Pedroza 2013, Caramani and Grotz 2015). Nationality nonetheless remains a sufficient condition when individuals also reach voting requirements such as sanity, non-criminality, and a certain age (Beckman 2006). Holding rights in two countries has been facilitated by the spread of states accepting dual nationality and less worry over divided loyalties (Spiro 1997, 2016, Faist 2001, Faist and Gerdes 2008). Tolerance for dual nationality stretched from one-third in 1960 to three-quarters of countries worldwide in 2018, diffusing between neighbor states and reinforced by diaspora politics (Vink *et al.* 2019). Diaspora engagement has transformed migrant-country relations since, as Délano and Gamlen (2014) highlight, “such origin-state efforts to engage diasporas redefine the parameters of citizenship.” Diaspora governance and the expansion of migrant organizations and political parties abroad (see Gamlen 2014, Adamson 2016, Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020) also affect citizenship practices, as both emigrants and immigrants engage in politics in two countries.

When immigrants, emigrants, or both groups have rights and participate, these two dimensions are no longer exclusively only for national citizens, weakening the concept of citizenship as nationality (Finn 2020a). Foreign residents electorally participating in a growing number of countries creates (or expands) the notion of non-national citizens. I pay special conceptual attention to the voter subgroup allowed to cast ballots in national-level elections as immigrants in one country and simultaneously as emigrants of another. As shown in Figure 1, people exercising voting rights in two countries participate in what I refer to as *dual transnational voting*. While emigrant voting requires nationality, immigrant voting does not. Since nationality alone does not define membership in the demos (Beckman 2006), citizenship as nationality cannot comprise the core of analyses of membership or rights, or of exercising those rights. Digging further into membership and transnationalism, I look to political (re)socialization theories to make sense of migrant voting in two countries.

## **Existing Theories and Hypotheses:**

### **Making Sense of Political Learning and Migrant Voting in Two Countries**

Existent theories of political resocialization fall short to illustrate electoral outcomes of migrant voting. White and colleagues (2008) suggest three theories: resistance, exposure, and transferability theory. *Resistance theory* reflects the primacy or structuring principle, meaning impressions from the initial political socialization process endure; in short, occurrences and influences during one’s earlier years

resist change later in life. *Exposure theory* indicates that although one may already hold political beliefs, norms, and practices, it is possible that these change over time, especially when living in a new political system in a different territory. *Transferability theory* suggests that immigrants draw on past experiences (e.g., with political regimes, prior interest in politics, and past voting) and apply lessons from their old environment in the origin country to life in the residence country.

The theories are not mutually exclusive and fail to recognize that migrants' individual-state relations change over time. Specifically, while relocation ends the initial political socialization process, the migrant converts their national citizen-country relation to an emigrant-origin country relation, and also gain an immigrant-residence country relation. These are the three individual-state relations captured by the Roots Routes. The political resocialization process continues throughout migrants' voting lives, as their experiences affect how much their connections to people and places are strengthened, diminished, or stabilized over time. Digging into the roots with a framework of migrant political resocialization helps make sense of political learning and migrant voting outcomes.

Making sense of migrant voting at the individual level requires exploring not just personal characteristics but also the institutional and social context in which they live, in both physical places and transnational spaces. It involves asking migrants about their experiences navigating the migratory system and interacting with state institutions; where their families live and if they used to or currently discuss politics together; and their interest in, and knowledge of, politics, candidates' campaigns, and voting registration. Additionally, migrants who have lived in nondemocracy might be influenced by their trust (or lack thereof) in democracy, governments, and voting procedures. Taking an agency-based focus on individual migrants, and considering their past and present contexts, I propose five hypotheses to investigate these topics and answer questions about the motives and influences behind why migrants vote.

*Hypothesis 1:* Potential migrant voters who self-report being able to communicate well in the language of the residence country are more likely to participate in immigrant or dual transnational voting. While non-fluency in a language is an obvious barrier to voting, migrant voters can face more nuanced language difficulties.<sup>5</sup> I stress linguistic communication, which focuses more on

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<sup>5</sup> Linguistic distance (i.e., the closeness between the immigrants' and the new country's language) influences initial residence country choice and then language acquisition and proficiency increase earnings in the residence country (Chiswick and Miller 2015) and political participation (Luthra *et al.* 2018). Beyond economic integration, "earnings payoff tends to be high, yet this underestimates the *total returns* as it does not include the social, cultural, and political benefits of destination proficiency" (Chiswick and Miller 2015,



understanding and being involved in the political world through active participation. Given South America has high intraregional migration, and the primary language is Spanish in most countries, I take advantage of the survey data of native speakers who change countries to show that language proficiency falls short when analyzing political participation in the residence country. Linguistic communication differentiates migrants (even if native speakers of the same language) from the native-born population.<sup>6</sup> As (re)socialization is a learning process through experience, the *cognitive* aspect helps unveil some informal linguistic barriers to interacting with formal political channels, such as migrant voting. I expect that immigrants with greater ability to communicate will become more involved in the residence country's elections, whether they continue voting in origin-country elections or not.

*Hypothesis 2:* Potential migrant voters who have a higher interest in politics are more likely to participate in dual transnational voting. Interest in politics is a well-established independent variable that influences individual-level voter turnout among native-born voters in a country. I add duality by exploiting the multiterritorial aspect of migrant voting as a chance to uncover new knowledge about electoral behavior. Does an overall interest in politics motivate migrant voting in both countries, or is the interest country-specific? Does being interested in politics in the residence country motivate migrants to also vote in the origin country, and vice versa? Migrants more often being able to vote or abstain in one or both countries adds complexity to interest in politics as a 'traditional' factor, particularly for dual transnational voters who participate in two countries.

*Hypothesis 3:* Potential migrant voters who have a longer tenure in the residence country are more likely to participate in immigrant or dual transnational voting. Previous studies on migrant political engagement outcomes over time have produced inconclusive findings (e.g., Portes 1996, Guarnizo *et al.* 2003, Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, Waldinger 2008, 2015, Chaudhary 2018, McCann *et al.* 2019). While Waldinger (2015) finds that new political loyalties negatively affect political engagement in the origin country, immigrants do not necessarily choose between competing loyalties: Chaudhary (2018) reveals that migrants can be actively engaged in two locations, although in practice this is time-consuming and may not translate to participation (Jakobson and Kalev 2013). I expect in-country tenure and

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p. 211 emphasis added). Putting these economics studies into broader terms, the linguistic distance between variations of Spanish is small, i.e., presents a low barrier to effectively communicate shortly after arrival. Besides facilitating everyday life, part of the 'payoff' is political integration via electoral engagement.

<sup>6</sup> Ramakrishnan (2013) highlights that immigrants are distinct from native-born minority groups in terms of legal status since the former hold visas instead of nationality. For this reason, language skills and communication of migrant voters versus native-born non-native speakers of the dominant language are not comparable and should be evaluated separately.

intention to stay to increase *immigrant* voting (since it was presumably zero prior to migration<sup>7</sup>) but could either increase or decrease *emigrant* voting. Dual transnational voting, by virtue of being a combination of the other two migrant voting types, is affected by default. For instance, emigrants who did not vote in the origin country will continue to abstain there but may vote in the residence country (thereby entering the immigrant voting quadrant); emigrants who voted in the origin country could start or continue to vote from abroad and start to vote in the residence country (thereby entering the dual transnational voting quadrant).

*Hypothesis 4:* Potential migrant voters who have a longer intention to stay in the residence country are more likely to participate in immigrant or dual transnational voting. Both the intention to stay and the previous factor of in-country tenure are unique to migrants and irrelevant for other voters. Relevant literature proposes that the stakeholder principle, having a common interest in a country's future with the native-born population, or a 'stake' in a country, as an argument that states use to offer or withhold migrant suffrage rights (Bauböck 2007). One signal that migrants envision having a stake in the residence country is when they report that they plan to live there 'forever'. This again does not necessarily reduce the (horizontal and vertical) identities and participation migrants have with origin countries. The migrant may be part of the 'imagined community' (Anderson 2016 [1983]), is still attached to, or is involved with, life in the origin country. Examples of this include investing in business and property or staying in contact with family and friends who remain there, even if they do not plan to return. Considering the possibility of entrenched and iterated roots, I expect political membership in the demos and intention to stay to increase voting in the residence country, or in both countries.

*Hypothesis 5:* Potential migrant voters with greater connections with a country are more likely to vote in that country. This directly addresses migrants' ties, or connections, to a country, visualized as different sets of roots (in Figure 4.1). Living everyday life, working, paying taxes, and other activities create roots, identities, and ties in a destination country (e.g., Glick Schiller *et al.* 1992, Boccagni and Ramírez 2013, Erdal and Oeppen 2013) (see Chapter 3 and 4). One kind of tie is developing political belonging to that country, in the sense of having a shared interdependent future with other members (Yuval-Davis 2006). I expect that migrants with more ties are more likely to turn out to vote.

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<sup>7</sup> In unique instances, migrants could have already voted in the residence country before moving there: for example, a Chilean could have inherited an Italian nationality by *ius sanguinis* and have participated in external voting for Italy without ever having lived there (i.e., as a nonresident national but not as an emigrant). They could then move to Italy and continue voting as a resident dual national in Italian elections while also voting from abroad as an emigrant for Chilean elections.

All my hypotheses advance the broader argument that when immigrant voting increases and external voting stays constant, dual transnational voting increases by default. The hypotheses do not consider children migrants and those without rights to vote in both countries. Turnout decisions for migrants in my case studies, as discussed in the next section, reveal greater complexity when their origin country has or had hybrid or nondemocratic regimes—given the ‘authoritarian imprint’ migrants carry with them (Bilodeau 2014). For emigrant voting, I expect individuals from nondemocracies (that are still undemocratic, as of 2020) to abstain in origin-country elections, at minimum because such elections fail to meet democratic standards of being free and fair. Contrarily, these migrants may be more inclined to participate in immigrant voting, despite the authoritarian imprint. One reason is because of what Bilodeau and Nevitte (2003) explain as the migrant honeymoon phase of boosted trust in the residence country’s democratic system and political institutions—meaning at first, immigrants judge the country not for what it does, but for what it *represents*, such as the hope for a better life. This optimistic period in the new environment entails a positive experience for migrants during political resocialization. While migrants adjust their voting behavior in the two countries, it may occur slowly when political learning under nondemocracy is deep-rooted. Overall, I expect potential migrant voters with weaker perceptions of a country’s democracy vote less in that country, as compared to those with stronger perceptions.

### **Chile and Ecuador: Case Selection and Justification**

This dissertation’s population of interest are individuals who have undergone political socialization processes in at least two countries and have the potential to gain national-level voting rights in two countries. To find migrants who have all four voting options available to them, I looked to countries that offer universal suffrage rights to foreign residents at the national level, which is rarer than offering emigrant suffrage rights. As of 2020, there are five countries in the world which fulfill this criterion: Chile, Ecuador, Malawi, New Zealand, and Uruguay. I discarded New Zealand because it has been thoroughly analyzed by other scholars (e.g., Barker and McMillan 2014, 2017, McMillan 2015) and Malawi because it has a very low, decreasing in-country immigrant stock, totaling just 1.3 percent of total population (UN DESA 2017, p. 25). The three remaining country candidates are in South

America, a region that grants migrants extensive voting rights (Escobar 2015, 2017).<sup>8</sup> I eliminated Uruguay from the analysis because its rigid eligibility requirements makes it difficult to access denizen voting rights; according to Article 78 of the National Constitution, immigrants must provide proof of good behavior (no criminal record), property or capital in Uruguay, an occupation or profession, have formed a family in Uruguay, and maintained residence in the country for the last 15 years (Margheritis 2015, Stuhldreher 2016).

This leaves Chile and Ecuador as the remaining two countries to serve as country cases. Both offer universal foreign resident suffrage rights in national-level elections, meaning that they offer immigrants without the residence country's nationality the right to vote after a five-year period. Ecuador allows foreign residents to register after these five years whereas Chile automatically registers foreign residents as voters (Law 20.568, Article 6, 2012). The foreign-born immigrant stock in both Chile and Ecuador primarily comprises those born in another South American country (INE 2019, INE-DEM 2019, INEC 2020), almost all of which extend emigrant voting rights (GLOBALCIT 2019). Chile and Ecuador are thus likely cases in which to find individuals who potentially have dual transnational voting rights in national-level elections. Despite drawing parallels between Chile and Ecuador in the Conclusion, due to differences detailed in Chapter 2 and 3, I examine the countries as separate (i.e., not comparative) case studies. While the dependent variable in each analysis is individual-level migrant voting, the two case studies shed light on migrant enfranchisement legal processes, Chile as a pioneer and Ecuador with a human-rights based approach. I detail the various steps of granting migrant suffrage rights to set each country context, before analyzing migrant voting.

In terms of the two waves of Latin American migrant enfranchisement defined by Escobar (2015), Chile counts as an early adopter and Ecuador as a latecomer to granting migrant voting rights. However, Chile was an early adopter only of restricted *immigrant* suffrage in local-level elections in the 1925 Constitution (Article 104), then the 1980 Constitution (Article 14) expanded foreign resident suffrage to the national level, under General Augusto Pinochet's military dictatorship (Finn 2020b). This scenario is an extreme case demonstrating that democracy is not a necessary condition for expanding migrant enfranchisement. Foreign residents voted at the local level for the first time in 1935—along with women voting for the first time (Valenzuela E. M. 1995)—and at the national level in the 1988 plebiscite (Finn 2020b). Yet regarding *emigrant* rights, Chile was a latecomer compared to

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<sup>8</sup> Suriname represents the exception since it has never had migration laws and is usually excluded in South American migration analyses (see Finn *et al.* 2019). Additionally, Guyana and Uruguay do not grant external voting rights to nationals abroad (Stuhldreher 2012, IDEA 2019).

the rest of Latin America, only granting them in 2014 and nationals abroad voting for the first time in the 2017 presidential election (see Chapter 2 and Table 2.1).

Ecuador enfranchised migrants relatively recently, first to nationals abroad in the 1998 Constitution (*Ley Orgánica para el Ejercicio del Derecho al Voto de los Ecuatorianos/as Domiciliados en el Exterior*), regulating them in the 2000 Electoral Law (Article 4 and 99) and in a 2002 electoral reform, then applying them for the first time in 2006 (Ramírez 2018, Palop-García and Pedroza 2019, Umpierrez de Reguero and Dandoy 2020). Ecuador then enshrined multilevel voting rights for foreign residents in the 2008 Constitution and applied them in 2009 (see Chapter 3 and Table 3.1). The two country case studies reveal nuances in the role of democracy and democratic principles in migrant enfranchisement processes and the importance of how political elites frame migrants before and after extending voting rights.

### **Methods: A Survey in Chile and Interviews in Ecuador**

As established throughout the Introduction, I am interested in evaluating factors that affect migrant voting, as proposed by the hypotheses in the previous section, and in unpacking the political resocialization process to explore why such factors, contexts, and individuals' motives affect migrant voting. To achieve these two different aims, I used two different methods to conduct fieldwork. In Chile, I administered a survey in 2017 to gauge the factors that affect migrant voting and highlight the four migrant voting types. In Ecuador, I drew from in-depth interviews from 2019 to unpack the reasons migrants give for voting and their political (re)socialization processes in both the origin and residence countries. Chapter 4 establishes the political resocialization process as a framework to link how certain factors and political experiences affect individuals' electoral turnout in national-level elections as present (voting) or absent (abstention).

Focused on Chile, Chapter 2 identifies real-world examples of enfranchisement in dictatorship and democracy and exemplifies the four migrant voting types through quantitative analysis. I obtained a non-representative sample by conducting an online survey, designed in Qualtrics and promoted via Facebook, during the weeks leading up to the 2017 Chilean presidential election. The online survey offered quick data collection and obtained responses from 1,482 migrants. 2017 was an ideal year for such a survey since it was the first time that Chilean emigrants voted from abroad in the presidential primaries, drawing overall attention to migrant voting, even though non-naturalized immigrants had had national-level suffrage rights since 1980 and had exercised them since 1988 (Finn 2020b). The

Research Ethics Committee within the Faculty of Social Sciences and History at the Universidad Diego Portales in Santiago, Chile, approved the survey before it was launched. It was available for five days before the election on November 19, 2017, and for another five days before the second round on December 17, 2017. It closed before the election polls opened to avoid mixing the intention to vote with prior voting. Respondents qualified if they lived in Chile but were born in another country and were of voting age. The final database contains 1,482 migrant respondents.

The survey comprised three sections: demographics, socioeconomic status, and political engagement (see Appendix 2.8). After accepting the informed consent agreement to participate in the online survey, the first section captured age, year of migration, sex, origin country, and intention to stay in the residence country (the possible answers were: less than a year, 1–4 years, 5–10 years, forever, “I don’t know”). The second asked about discrimination and its frequency over the past 12 months, subjective household socioeconomic status (from 1, “we do not meet our needs,” to 4, “it allows us to live comfortably”), ability of linguistic communication in the residence country (from 1, “always,” to 5, “never”), inter- and intra-group contact in various social and work groups (majority Chileans, majority from the origin country, majority from other countries for colleagues, neighbors, friends, and other groups), education (from 1, “no schooling,” to 9, “doctoral degree”), and employment (temporary job, stable job, no job but searching, no job but not searching, study and work, study, not studying or working, retired).

The third section asked about political engagement with questions regarding political news consumption (newspapers, television, radio, and social media) in both countries, interest in politics (from 1, “very interested,” to 4, “completely uninterested”), and knowledge of voting rights in the residence country (“yes”, “no”, or “I don’t know”). Since voter registration for foreign residents is automatic in Chile after a five-year residence, immigrants may be unaware of suffrage rights. This is important because while non-voting appears as abstention, not knowing one has suffrage rights translates to involuntary non-voting, which is different from voluntary abstention. This section also included a short series of questions on past experiences and future intention to vote in both countries. Those answering “no” to voting were asked, “why?” as an open-ended field prompting a reply. Those answering “yes” to voting in the upcoming 2017 election were asked who they would vote for from the provided list of candidates. Qualtrics randomized the order of the candidates in the online surveys to avoid respondents selecting only the first choices. The first round contained eight candidates whereas the second round had two.

To analyze the survey sample, I use the typology's first intended purpose of classifying migrant voting, showing a snapshot in time of when individuals lie in one quadrant. Classifying migrants in only one quadrant for any election demonstrates *which* migrants vote or abstain and where they vote (in one country, in both, or in neither). This use allowed me to ask descriptive questions such as: which types of migrants are in which quadrant and what are the differences between migrant voters in the various quadrants? Using multinomial regressions, I used the survey response data to compare individuals in the various quadrants to better understand the differences among migrant voting types.

Focused on Ecuador, Chapter 3 uses qualitative analysis to understand why a given individual votes in one, both, or neither country. The evidence came from transcribed semi-structured interviews conducted between June and October 2019 with 71 foreign-born residents in Ecuador. I designed the interview questions between April and June 2019 within a project investigating democracy and migrant voting through a transnational perspective.<sup>9</sup> The Research Ethics Committee at the Universidad Casa Grande in Ecuador approved these interviews as part of the research project. Interviewees qualified if they were currently living in Ecuador, were of voting age, and their origin country was either Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Peru, or Venezuela. Each nationality group was part of a traditional immigration wave to Ecuador between 1979 and 2007 or a recent wave between 2008 and 2018. Time of migration is important, as I am interested in experiences when the migrants grew up under certain political regimes (democracy, hybrid regime, or authoritarianism) in the origin country.

The interviews comprised four sections with closed- and open-ended questions (see Appendix 3.6). They started with basic questions in Section A and Section B asking about electoral participation. Section A captured age, sex, origin country, education, year of migration, previous migration, and intention to stay (less than a year, 1–4 years, 5–10 years, forever, “I don’t know”). Section B captured interest in politics in both the origin and residence countries (from 1, “very interested,” to 4, “completely uninterested”), then simple “yes” or “no” responses to questions about voting registration in the destination country and prior and future intention to vote in both countries. For those answering “yes” to having voted in Ecuador in the past, Interviewees identified which elections they voted in from a list of the seven opportunities to vote since 2009. Many of the demographics,

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<sup>9</sup> Funded by the Universidad Casa Grande, Ecuador, the project was entitled, *Democracia, ideología y partidismo en perspectiva transnacional: Evidencia del voto migrante en y desde Ecuador, 1979–2018* (Democracy, Ideology, and Partisanship from a Transnational Perspective: Evidence of Migrant Voting in and from Ecuador, 1979–2018). Gabriela Baquerizo, Sebastián Umpierrez de Reguero, and I were the Principal Researchers, with research assistance from Vivian Cartagena, Paula Lanata, María José Medina, and Claudia Navarrete.

socioeconomic status, and political engagement variables and questions in the interviews purposefully reflected those from the Chilean survey. In addition, questions asked Interviewees to self-report their political orientation (0 being most left-leaning and 10 being most right-leaning) and to what extent they agreed with the statement, “Democracy is the best type of government” (ranking 1 as “totally agree,” to 5, “totally disagree”).

Section C, the main descriptive part of the interviews, comprised open-ended questions on: a) electoral participation, b) political culture and political socialization, c) democracy and political resocialization, and d) political identity.<sup>10</sup> Each of these four subsections included two to four questions about past electoral experiences and the main obstacles to, and impact of, migrant voting in both the origin and residence countries that Interviewees were encouraged to elaborate on. More in-depth questions were asked about discussing politics with family while growing up, their first voting experiences, and if and how prior voting influences their projected future electoral decisions. The interviews also inquired into changed perceptions of democracy in both countries, pre- and post-migration, to capture expectations and effects from exposure to the residence country’s political system, as well as if Interviewees have followed politics in the origin country since emigration. Lastly, Interviewees were asked about similarities and differences in their self-reported political orientations in the two countries, including how they relate to political parties and movements.

The interviews closed with Section D, which contained quick-to-answer, but slightly more sensitive questions, to obtain a more complete migrant profile. The section captured legal status in the residence country (no visa, in process, temporary, permanent, dual national, asylum seeker, or refugee), future intention to naturalize, any discrimination experienced within the past 12 months, perceived motives behind the discrimination, employment (temporary job, stable job, unemployed but searching, no job but not searching, study and work, study, not studying or working, retired), subjective household socioeconomic status (from 1, “we do not cover our needs,” to 4, “it allows us to live comfortably”), frequency of travel to the origin country, frequency and amount of remittances sent to the origin country, active membership (in political parties, migrant associations, non-governmental organizations [NGOs], none) in both countries, and trust in political institutions (political parties, police, courts, electoral system, the executive branch, armed forces, legislative branch, and the embassy and consulates) in both countries (see Appendix 3.6 for all interview questions, in original language and translated to English).

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<sup>10</sup> The open-ended questions were transcribed and are available (in Spanish) upon request.



To analyze the interview data, I used the typology's second intended purpose of tracking movements between quadrants throughout a migrant's voting life to analyze changed electoral behavior through their political resocialization paths. My analysis attempts to address explanatory research questions in Chapter 3 such as: what are the reasons why migrants change their electoral behavior in more than one political community over time? How does an individual migrant voter decide when to vote in the origin country and the residence country? In addition, I recorded nuances the Interviewees described about their political socialization and resocialization processes. I noted common occurrences during the migrants' personalized trajectories related to connections, trust, and political participation the origin and residence countries, to name a few. I use the interview data to offer a first attempt in Chapter 4 of theory building and explaining why migrants vote and why they change behavior over time in two countries.

The research faces limitations since the data collection techniques in both case studies resulted in non-representative groups that prevent me from generalizing about all migrant voters within or beyond Chile and Ecuador. Given the country contexts, obtaining representative samples of migrant voters would have been difficult and costly; representativeness remains a challenge in many countries. Leading scholars have questioned even influential studies with generalized findings. For example, Guarnizo et al. (2003, p. 1223) state their survey "can be considered representative of each immigrant nationality in its principal areas of concentration", but Waldinger (2008, pp. 6–7) doubts this, mainly due to its "significant referral element" (meaning that one interviewee had referred another, who referred another, and so on). Waldinger questions representativeness for any generalization, including to the three nationalities under study. Despite non-representativeness in the present analyses, the evidence presented in each case study in this dissertation seeks to preserve internal validity and offers valuable insights into migrant enfranchisement and types of migrant voting.

I apply the typology to analyze survey and interview data, adding to my earlier work (Finn 2020a) that initially presented the typology. Migrants adapt some political attitudes, beliefs, and values over time; how they adapt depends on agencies in both the origin and residence countries and experiences in between and beyond the two places (see Section 1.3). Political socialization in the origin country previously instilled in the individual affects voting; however, migrants change through political resocialization, which can unilaterally affect voting behavior in one country, or reciprocally affect it in two countries.

## Aims and Contributions of Analyzing Migrant Voting

In the rest of this dissertation, I aim to, 1) reconceptualize migrant voting by classifying the various types of migrant voting, 2) explore the differences among the four types of migrant voters and their motives to vote or abstain, drawing special attention to dual transnational voters participating in national elections in two countries, and 3) offer a framework for evaluating migrants' political resocialization processes and linking them to migrant voting outcomes. Using the interview data, I suggest that the Roots Routes show migrants' trajectories of becoming embedded within a place through their ties to people and the country. The framework does not assume inevitable or organic bottom-up or top-down political incorporation, but it does assume individuals' capability for agency and getting involved politically. Given this, I discuss barriers to participation, as well as legal and institutional blockades to migrant voting, as apparent abstention may in fact be prevention from voting (see Section 4.4).

By focusing on migrant voting, I make the following contributions: a) introduce a comprehensive migrant electoral behavior typology (Figure 1); b) identify factors and reasons that foster and deter migrant voting; c) highlight the importance of including migrant voters in mainstream electoral literature on turnout and vote choice; d) deconstruct the concept of citizenship as nationality (by focusing on citizenship practices and migrants exercising electoral rights as nationals and non-nationals); e) use the migrant voting typology as a framework to track changes in migrant voting over time in two countries; and f) attempt to reconstruct political resocialization theories.

The implications from this analysis shed light on larger debates in the literature, as touched on throughout this Introduction, such as the process and effects of changing the boundaries of the demos, individual-level transnational (non)citizenship practices, and political integration in contemporary societies holding elections. Since enfranchisement legally converts migrants from outsiders beyond the political community into potential insiders within the demos, I examine who grants migrant suffrage rights, when, and to whom. Before understanding migrant voting as a phenomenon, it is important to know who can vote and who cannot. Rights can remain symbolic on paper but not in practice (for all or some voters) until migrants *exercise* suffrage rights, freely choosing to vote or abstain.

## Outline of the Chapters

Throughout all four chapters, individuals lie at the core—this is a people-centered study, specifically their political learning in democracy and nondemocracy, electoral motivations, and connections to other people and places that influence migrants’ decision-making to vote, or not, in national elections in two countries. Hereafter, the dissertation contains four chapters and a conclusion, as follows.

Chapter 1, *Migrant Voting: Types, Turnout, and Multi-Sited Political Learning*, contains the migrant voting typology as an analytical framework, the main concepts, and the places and spaces in which political learning occurs that ultimately affect individual-level migrant voter turnout. Given the spread of migrant enfranchisement, more international migrants have become potential voters in two countries—an in-person voter in the residence country and a voter from abroad for origin-country elections. There are a total of four combinations of voting or abstaining in two countries: immigrant voting, emigrant voting, dual transnational voting, and abstention. I put particular emphasis on dual transnational voting, representing the inherent duality in international migrants’ lives, including their interest and participation in more than one polity. In this chapter, I also clarify transnationalism in migration as well as citizenship versus nationality. Before introducing the dependent variable of individual-level migrant voting, prior to being able to vote, migrants must have suffrage rights; I explain that resources and ties to a country or the people within it can lead to migrant voting. Thereafter, I elaborate on each of the independent variables within the five hypotheses offered in this Introduction. Whereas some factors (e.g., age and education) affect all voters, some are specific to migrant voters (e.g., intention to stay and linguistic communication) and others develop or change over time (e.g., civic duty and multiterritorial ties to both countries). Such factors also arise through political learning in transnational spaces between countries and in the migratory system. The chapter overall sets the stage for using the four migrant voting types in the following chapters that explore individual-level migrant turnout.

Chapter 2, *Granting then Exercising Migrant Voting Rights: Insights from Chile*, begins with an explanation of how and why states set the boundaries of the demos, the political community with voting rights, then outlines the long 92-year road to enfranchising immigrants and emigrants in Chile. Through historical content analysis, I explain the major actors involved in the process of enfranchising some foreign residents in local-level elections in 1925 in relative democracy, extending them to national-level elections in the 1980 Constitution during a military dictatorship, then granting emigrant voting rights between 2014 and 2017 in democracy. Data for this analysis comes from national

censuses from 1875 onwards, newspapers, academic literature, constitutional laws, and transcribed debates while reviewing constitutional amendments. In the second empirical part of the chapter, I use the migrant voting typology to show which migrants vote, based on responses to an original survey of 1,482 migrant voters in Chile. Emigrants voting from abroad in national-level elections for the first time in 2017 brought attention also to denizen voting, making the run-up to the 2017 presidential election an ideal time to collect data on migrant voters and potential voters. I review the instrument, measurements, and a brief validation before employing a multinomial regression model. It includes the 680 survey respondents who held national-level suffrage rights in both the origin and residence countries, with the aim of empirically exploring four hypotheses to better understand which explanatory variables affect migrant voting.

Chapter 3, *Unpacking Migrants' Electoral Decisions: Insights from Ecuador*, is three-fold: it outlines migrant enfranchisement in Ecuador, reports reasons for voting based on interviewing migrants, and discusses how migrants have formed and transplanted authoritarian imprints. First, I present Ecuador's short road to enfranchising immigrants and emigrants via its 1998 and 2008 Constitutions. Second, I review the empirical method, interview design, and selection process. The data for this analysis comes from 71 interviews—completed between June and October 2019—with migrants living in Ecuador. Interviewees had undergone political socialization in their origin countries of Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Peru, or Venezuela, prior to residing in Ecuador. Open-ended questions explored how migrants' (non)democratic experiences had resulted in comparative views on democracy, institutional trust, political culture, and electoral participation. The goal was to move past factors that influence voting and instead find reasons migrants vote or do not vote—migrants have *motives* for voting in two countries. The main reported reasons for voting were multiterritorial ties to people and places and being invested in a country's flourishing future, for both a stronger democracy and economy. Both relate to the origin and residence countries, but often in different ways. A secondary reason for voting was formal recognition as a voter—which instigated feelings of belonging and civicness. I also identified bureaucratic reasons, for instance, obtaining documents such as a voting certificate to facilitate non-electoral tasks, making the act of voting a means, rather than an end. Third, I explore how political learning in nondemocracy formed authoritarian imprints, formed by violence, corruption, economic crashes, and elections that were unfree, unfair, or both. Such imprints prove enduring over the course of migrants' lives but are not determinative of voting behavior in the residence country or, surprisingly, of projected voting for the origin country.

Chapter 4, *Migrant (Non-)Voting, Resocialization, and the Roots Routes*, builds from the prior chapters' analyses to take a step toward theory building and to offer a systematic framework for applying it. I underline how the new findings relate to overarching ideas on citizenship practices, (non)nationality, and political participation. State-led control creates barriers for some immigrants to participate in society and politics, yet after gaining suffrage rights, migrants may or may not exercise these rights. While migrant voting indicates political integration, migrants who abstain are not necessarily unintegrated. Using evidence from previous chapters, I compare abstention versus prevention of voting: migrants who abstain can still be political insiders whereas other voters have rights on paper but are prevented from voting in practice, forced to be political outsiders. I then address why migrants vote or abstain in two countries. I consider international migration as an individual-level shock that ends migrants' political socialization and starts the ongoing political resocialization process. The key components are multiterritorial ties with countries (e.g., civic duty) and the people living there (e.g., family and friends), which affect political attitudes and values, in turn affecting political behavior.

Whereas political socialization (or growing roots) affects individuals' electoral decisions in only one country, migrants' resocialization (growing new roots) can remarkably affect electoral decisions as both an emigrant for the origin country and as an immigrant in the residence country. Based on interactions with agents in the two countries and in the social spaces between them, over time migrants can grow, maintain, or shrink their roots with both the origin and residence countries. Three possibilities in two countries result in nine possible resocialization pathways, what I call the *Roots Routes*. The main goal is to take a step toward theory building to replace resocialization theories, in order to better explain why migrants vote and why they may change voting behavior. I use the four migrant voting categories to track migrants' personalized trajectories by examining prior turnout to migrants' future intention to vote in the two countries to show changes in migrant voting over time.

To conclude the dissertation, I highlight the contributions stemming from analyzing migrant rights, voting, and resocialization, drawing on evidence from the two case studies of Chile and Ecuador. Moreover, I elaborate on the conceptual and theoretical implications of the migrant voting typology's uses and the *Roots Routes*. I reiterate political resocialization as an explanation, and the *Roots Routes* as a framework, are not the only ways to understand why migrants vote. Nonetheless, the (re)socialization processes leading up to migrant (non)voting—that forms and sustains migrant-state relations at the core of claims-making and exercising formal voice in contemporary democracies—represent critical pieces in answering why migrants vote. As such, I suggest political resocialization and the *Roots Routes* can help explain individual migrants' electoral turnout in two

countries and claim that these prove more useful than existent resocialization theories. I finalize by drawing on my findings to suggest how other scholars can conceptually build from and empirically apply the migrant voting typology and the Roots Routes in future research on migrant political resocialization and participation.