Human nature and governance: soulcraft and statecraft in eleventh century China

Qiao, J.

Human Nature and Governance

-- Soulcraft and Statecraft in Eleventh Century China

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van
de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,
op gezag van rector magnificus prof. dr. ir. H. Bijl,
volgens besluit van het college voor promoties
te verdedigen op donderdag 2 september 2021
klokke 13.45 uur

door

Jiyan Qiao

geboren te Yicheng, China
in 1979

Promotores:	Prof. dr. H. G. D. G. De Weerdt
	Prof. dr. W. L. Idema
Promotiecommissie:	Prof. dr. P. Bol (Harvard University)
	Prof. dr. P. Smith (Haverford College)
	Prof. dr. D. Berger
	Dr. F. Lin

Human Nature and Governance

-- Soulcraft and Statecraft in Eleventh Century China

PhD Dissertation, Leiden University

Contents

Acknowledgments

To finish this decade-long journey was not easy, not to say during a global pandemic originating from my former home city. I thank my teachers, friends, and family in three continents for making it possible.

My thanks first go to Hilde De Weerdt, under whose guidance I chose to specialize in political thought. Most of what is in this dissertation would not have been born were it not for the beautifully pleasant environment she built at Leiden and her amazingly productive style of supervision. Wilt Idema, under whose urging the key chapter first took shape, helped me become a better sinologist and offered support whenever and even when not asked for.

I am also grateful to Peter Bol, for leading me into the field of middle period China from scratch and remaining supportive ever since; to Michael Fuller, for always poignantly helpful conversations over the years; to Michael Puett, my first teacher in early Chinese intellectual history; to Elizabeth Perry, for her valuable counsel that guided me to choose a PhD program fitting myself the most; and to Ruth Mostern, for the well-written note that keeps reminding me what it means to be a good scholar.

While this project was approaching the end, exchanges with Michael Nylan and Yuri Pines moved me substantially forward on early Chinese intellectual history in general and political thought in particular. For appearing in Leiden just when I was hoping for a conversation, I thank Youngmin Kim. When reviewing Youngmin's book, I unexpectedly entered into contact with Philip J. Ivanhoe, only later to find that notwithstanding my graduation schedule, the works produced by him and those in his milieu have to be incorporated.

For inviting me to my very first conference on political theory, I thank the organizers of the 2019 LSE Political Theory Graduate Conference. For a productive time at Oxford not long before the world began shutting down, I thank the organizers of The Britain and Ireland Association for Political Thought 2020 annual conference, as well as those attending my panel, to whom I presented the full argument of this dissertation for the first time. For helpful exchanges at these and other conferences, I thank Ya Zuo, Shuk-ying Chan, Jeffrey Rice, and Leigh Jenco.

Librarians at Harvard, Columbia, New York Public Library, and Leiden facilitated my access to whatever material I encountered in the process of research. Luo Zhongnan and his assistants shipped dozens of boxes across the seas, not only offering me the luxury of using my

own books, but also made a major shift in dissertation direction between 2017 and 2018 possible. Tung Yung-chang and Chen Andi both provided bibliographical help that saved my time.

And time matters for someone who did not begin pursuing her interest until 30. For their company in an otherwise solitary life over the past ten years, I thank my classmates and friends in Cambridge, Manhattan, and Leiden. Special thanks go to Edith Chen, Tingting Hui, and Joost Maltha, for the inspiringly good times they had with me. Finally, for living well in my absence, I thank my family.

Conventions

Dates are by lunar calendar, year/month/day. They/their/them are used as gender-neutral singular. When this does not work, he/him/his is the choice, as the thinkers studied here were male. Unless otherwise noted, translations are mine. Wade-Giles spellings are converted to pinyin in quotations, but kept in titles.

For early Chinese texts, while recent excavations are touched upon, in general I do not engage in debates on textual authenticity or authorship, but simply take them as conveying the views of their namesake "authors."

Works are cited in the main body in short form. For complete authors' names, titles, and publication data, see the Bibliography.

Introduction

> Zigong said, "The Master's cultural accomplishments one can get to hear about; the master's talks of nature and the way of Heaven one cannot get to hear about."
> 子貢曰："夫子之文章，可得而聞也；夫子之言性與天道，不可得而聞也。"
>
> — *The Analects*, 5.13

Systematic study of individuals' political thought remains fundamental in reconstructing Song politics.[1] This dissertation contributes to the reinvention of Chinese political history[2] with a comprehensive account of Wang Anshi's 王安石 (1021-1086) political theory, touching also upon its practice, arguing that it was centered on transforming human nature with statist values against the mid-eleventh century humanist mainstream.[3]

Intellectual historical studies of Wang Anshi over the past three decades have been focused on how he envisioned the relationship between government and society: from the early 1990s, in a number of book chapters and articles, Peter Bol has been showing how Wang's method of learning where everything fit together in an integrated whole as they did in Wang's antiquity justified an activist government.[4] Building on this, Jaeyoon Song meticulously demonstrates how this vision was legitimized in Wang's commentary on the *Rituals of Zhou* (*Zhouli* 周禮).[5] In two dissertation chapters, Douglas Skonicki argues that this vision was grounded in Wang's

[1] De Weerdt, "Recent Trends in American Research in Song Dynasty History," 27.
[2] De Weerdt, "Reinventing Chinese Political History."
[3] Zhang Chengzhong has located the premise of Wang Anshi's political thought at his view of human nature ("'Yi Zhongren Wei Zhi'"). This current study spells out the content of the values as well as the transformation procedure and does not see Wang's main theoretical source as "Legalism." As Zhang's dissertation is unavailable to me, I am using his published work to infer his main arguments on Wang's political thought. About the term "Legalism": notwithstanding its many issues, as Paul Goldin ("Persistent Misconceptions about Chinese 'Legalism'") and many others have been reminding us, I use it as a convenient designation to refer to the group of political thinkers focusing on using laws and methods of administrative control to strengthen the state, aware they probably neither identified themselves as forming a "school" nor had made self-conscious efforts at forming one. For similar uses, see Makeham, "The Legalist Concept of *Hsing-ming*," 87n1; Pines, "Legalism in Chinese Philosophy"; and Harris, "Legalism."
[4] Bol, *"This Culture of Ours*," chapter 7; "Government, Society, and State"; "Whither the Emperor?"; "Emperors Can Claim Antiquity Too"; "Wang Anshi and the *Zhouli*"; and "Reconceptualizing the Order of Things in Northern and Southern Sung." In "Wang Anshi and the *Zhouli*," Bol points out that the *Zhouli* is perhaps better taken "not as a source of policies but as a model for programmatic policy making, in contrast to those who saw governance as responding to circumstances" (251). Using the essays where Wang's approach to governance was first systematically formulated, I shall demonstrate that Wang's statecraft was indeed not for meeting human needs after they arise but programming which needs ought to arise beforehand.
[5] Song, *Traces of Grand Peace*.

cosmological views,[6] while Yinan Luo contends that the reform Wang architected[7] failed not because the activist vision was wrong, but because Wang did not supplement it with practical knowledge on state economy.[8] Compared with the immediate postwar generation of Wang scholars, whose main drive was to settle the verdict on Wang – "what manner of man was Wang Anshi"? Was he a misguided Confucianist, a foresighted statesman, a dictatorial politician or an unusual reformer?[9] If the last, was he practical? –,[10] their work has greatly advanced historical understanding of the unprecedented government interventionist reform officially launched in 1069/2.

How Wang's political vision provided a legitimate rationale for government activism, however, does not exhaust all we can know about Wang's thought that guided the reform. In his engagement with Jürgen Habermas, John Rawls pointed out that the idea of legitimacy "imposes weaker constraints on what can be done," because "it allows a certain leeway in how well sovereigns may rule and how far they may be tolerated."[11] In the case of this study, examining Wang's efforts at legitimization from multiple perspectives is yet to fully answer a number of questions on the specifics in Wang's political theory. For instance, we all know a central agenda of the reform was to unify morality (*yi daode*[12] 一道德), but what were the values this morality was made up of? And through what procedure to get it uniformly upheld? Based on his study of Wang's method of learning, Bol has given a preliminary answer to the first question: "Part of the

[6] Skonicki, "Cosmos, State and Society," chapter 5.
[7] Instead of calling the reform "Wang Anshi's," I see it as being owned by emperor Shenzong, who employed Wang to design it and spearhead its initial execution. For the literature on Shenzong's agency, see the first note in the last paragraph of chapter 1 section II.
[8] Luo, "Ideas in Practice," chapter 1.
[9] James Liu, *Reform in Sung China*, blurb.
[10] Meskill ed., *Wang An-Shih: Practical Reformer?* A generation later, Winston Lo still sought to address "a facet of Wang Anshi's personality" ("Wang An-Shih and the Confucian Ideal of 'Inner Sageliness,'" 41). The pre-war work of H. R. Williamson was driven by a similar motive (*Wang An Shih, Vol. I*, viii). R. Bin Wong notes that earlier generations of Japanese and Western scholars, like the majority of post-1949 mainland Chinese scholars, "have often offered sympathetic accounts" of Wang Anshi, explaining his failures in terms of unhelpful extraneous factors ("Dimensions of State Expansion and Contraction in Imperial China," 54-55). This can also be seen from the need Robert Hartwell felt to defend his negative comment on Wang in an article published in 1971 ("Historical Analogism, Public Policy, and Social Science in Eleventh- and Twelfth-Century China," 727). For a sketch of some western studies on Wang Anshi over the past three centuries, see Zhang Chengzhong, "Jin sanbai nian lai xifang xuezhe yanzhong de Wang Anshi." For a survey of Chinese research on the reform since the Southern Song, see Li Huarui, *Wang Anshi Bianfa yanjiu shi*.
[11] Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 427-28. Rawlsian political philosophy has come under profound critique recently. See, for example, Forrester, *In the Shadow of Justice* and Nelson, *The Theology of Liberalism*. This, however, does not mean some of his insights could not remain valid. For a recent account of Rawls' intellectual development that led to his *A Theory of Justice*, see Gališanka, *John Rawls*.
[12] On the issues involved in translating this term, see chapter 1.

orthodoxy was that there should be an orthodoxy, that what was right was to think that everyone could have the same values and opinions and would be the better for it."[13] He also notes that educational institutions "could serve as a means of leveraging social change."[14] The goal of this study is to turn from "how" to "what," hoping to thereby know more about Wang's learning.

Going beyond discussing the reform as one of government activism can also help us see how it was different from the Qingli reform of the 1040s,[15] which held a similar position on the relationship between government and society and yet was never remotely as controversial.[16] Indeed, focusing on their shared method of learning and the rhetoric of antiquity, scholars mainly see a continuity between the two reforms.[17] If we look at the core values they respectively advocated, however, there shows a rupture.[18] It seems in order to understand why it was Wang's statecraft rather than that of those former Qingli reformers' that attracted emperor Shenzong 神宗 (r. 1067-1085) in the first place and why scholarly views remain divided on it to this day, we need to go beyond Wang's political vision, which we can now take as a given, and dig deeper.

This study focuses on the *content* of Wang Anshi's learning, i.e., his writings on *daode* (道德, literally, the way and its power) and *xingming* (性命, nature[19] and destiny).[20] Regarding what

[13] Bol, "Whither the Emperor?" 117-18. Jaeyoon Song (*Traces of Grand Peace*, 224-28) and Douglas Skonicki ("Cosmos, State and Society," 508-09) noted the value of austerity; Luo Chuanqi and Wu Yunsheng itemized some moral categories and norms that Wang Anshi had discussed (*Wang Anshi jiaoyu sixiang yanjiu*, 122-34).
[14] Bol, "Whither the Emperor?" 118-19.
[15] For a comprehensive comparison of the two reforms from the perspective of bureaucratic politics, see Smith, "Anatomies of Reform."
[16] Charles Hartman notes the contrasting receptions of these two reforms in the Southern Song (*The Making of Song Dynasty History*, 29, 45, 82, 170, 236). Wang Ruilai points out the different reputations Wang Anshi and Fan Zhongyan, leader of the Qingli reform, had among later people (*Tiandi jian qi*, 4). It should be noted that Fan's not being able to fully realize his ambition could have played a role in this.
[17] See, for example, Lu Guolong, *Song ru weiyan*, 2-3, 26-27, 39-40; Yu Yingshi, *Zhu Xi de lishi shijie* (SDX Sanlian shudian edition), chapter 3, esp. 195.
[18] Zhu Gang has noted that Wang Anshi's success marked the end of the ancient prose movement (*Tang Song "Guwen Yundong" yu shidafu wenxue*, 335). Zhang Chengzhong points out the need to go beyond the rhetoric of returning to antiquity that Wang Anshi shared with the mainstream literati and look at what he actually referred to ("'Yi zhongren wei zhi,'" esp. 25-26, 31, 35).
[19] Because Wang is mainly concerned with human nature and in English "nature" alone does not always convey this sense, *"xing*" is frequently translated as "human nature" in this study. Some philosophers question if *xing* means human nature (see, for example, Ames, "The Mencian Conception of *Ren xing* 人性"). For a defense, see Bloom, "Biology and Culture in the Mencian View of Human Nature."
[20] On the central place these occupy in Wang's learning, see Hou Wailu ed., *Zhongguo sixiang tongshi, IV-1*, 423; Ma Zhenduo, *Zhengzhi gaigejia Wang Anshi de zhexue sixiang*, 144; Chen Zhi'e, *Bei Song wenhua shi shulun* (Zhongguo shehui kexue edition), 235; Zhang Yuhan, "Bei Song Xinxue yanjiu," 14; Hu Jinwang, *Wang Anshi de zhexue sixiang yu* Sanjingxinyi, 10. Wang Anshi's only mentally healthy son Wang Pang, who had been working closely together with his father in governance, was also known to be an expert on *daode* and *xingming* (Liang Jiong, Daodezhenjing *jizhu*, 13.105).

Wang wrote on these topics, most of which found in volumes 63-70 of *Collected Writings of Mr. Linchuan*,[21] Yu Yingshi takes them as being about "inner sageliness,"[22] that is, moral self-cultivation in the Confucian tradition. This was one main aspect of what Yu thinks Wang shared with the Neo-Confucians. Other scholars who have studied this body of work in Wang's oeuvre, like Douglas Skonicki and Yinan Luo, also see Wang in a similar light.[23] Through close analysis of key concepts in context and differentiating rhetorical strategies from what was meant, I shall show in chapter 2 that Wang's discussions of human nature were integral to his political thought on governance[24] and that what he advanced as the gist of his learning was an anti-humanist soulcraft centering on using statist values to transform self-regarding humans into subjects who would unreflectively think in the interest of the state. It was cultivationist rather than self-cultivationist,[25] as Wang designed a full procedure to firmly establish these values – otherwise foreign to humans in his view – into people's hearts through externally imposed behavioral regulations.

By conceptual analysis, I mean that practiced by Hannah Arendt and carried forward by Reinhardt Koselleck.[26] Concluding that cooperation with the National Socialists was the rule

---

[21] Wang Anshi, *Linchuan xiansheng wenji* (Zhonghua shuju edition, hereafter *LCJ*. "Linchuan" is the choronym of Wang's ancestral home). My grounds for identifying these as where they are are presented towards the end of this Introduction. Their date of composition is discussed in the Appendix. In *"This Culture of Ours*," Bol briefly discussed some essays in these volumes. In line with his focus on Wang's method of learning, he finds in them "a justification for activism" (224-28, quote at 226).

[22] Yu Yingshi, *Zhu Xi de lishi shijie*, 39-40, 51, 57, 100, 102. For critiques of Yu's terminology, see Mei Kuang, "'Neisheng Waiwang' kaolüe" and Chu Ping-tzu, "Ping Yu Yingshi xiansheng de *Zhu Xi de lishi shijie*," 264–65.

[23] Skonicki takes Wang's ruler as one in the Confucian tradition who cultivates his personal ethics and by this sets an example for the people to emulate ("Cosmos, State, and Society," chapter 5); Luo thinks Wang was, like the Neo-Confucians, concerned with the literati's self-cultivation ("Ideas in Practice," 80).

[24] Studies of Wang Anshi's writings on human nature are many. See, for example, Hu Jinwang, *Wang Anshi de zhexue sixiang yu* Sanjingxinyi, chapter 2 and Appendix 2; Xu Hu, "Wang Anshi zhi renxing lun jiqi kaizhan." Some scholars have attempted to link Wang's view of human nature to his political thought on governance, like Liang Tao, "Wang Anshi de xin waiwang zhengzhi zhexue" and Bi Mingliang, "Wang Anshi zhengzhi zhexue yanjiu." It seems we can go further in integrating the two.

[25] On this distinction, see Ivanhoe, "Hanfeizi and Moral Self-Cultivation."

[26] On the shared intellectual lineage and political sentiments between Arendt and Koselleck, see Hoffman, "Koselleck, Arendt, and the Anthropology of Historical Experience." Niklas Olsen points out that understanding the historical conditions that led to the rise of German National Socialism and modern totalitarianism and what could be done to prevent these from happening again drove the work of them both (*History in the Plural*, 43). Compared with Arendt, whose attitude was perfectly captured in the title of Elisabeth Young-Bruehl's excellent biography (*Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World*), Koselleck, a forty-fiver (Moses, *German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past*), held a pessimistic view of human nature (*Critique and Crisis*), seeing humans, by nature conflictual beings to him, as destined for oppositions (*Sediments of Time*, 252). This view of human nature had led him, like Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno did earlier (*Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 1-34), to put the blame on the Enlightenment, implying that the use of intellect led to human self-destruction. For defenses of Enlightenment values, see Pagden, *The Enlightenment* and Pinker, *Enlightenment Now*.

among intellectuals, Arendt left Germany swearing never to "have anything to do with 'the history of ideas' again."[27] Rather, through conceptual analysis, she "traced political concepts back to the concrete historical and generally political experiences which gave rise to those concepts. She was then able to gauge how far a concept had moved from its origins and to chart the intermingling of concepts over the course of time, marking points of linguistic and conceptual confusion."[28] Taking conceptualization as social action, Koselleck notes conceptual change can take place through having an existing term mean substantially differently.[29] Unpacking the specific conceptual content a term was used to refer to without assuming there was a dictionary meaning is crucial for getting right about Wang Anshi, who carried out his conceptual revolution mainly through couching new concepts in old terms and playing with different meanings of the same word,[30] not infrequently in one sentence. This requires us to carefully investigate the novel meanings he had conventional terms to take on. For this reason, while trying to provide contextual rendering as much as possible, I have in some cases left the key terms un-translated before revealing what they meant through my analysis.

Contextualization is a common methodology among intellectual historians of middle period China.[31] The difference here lies in the new context I identify for Wang's political thought in chapter 1: the humanist statecraft newly emerging in the aftermath of An Lushan rebellion (755-763) – literati self-governance[32] that was first theorized by Han Yu 韓愈 (768-824) in "Tracing the Way" (*yuan dao* 原道),[33] and became the mainstream during the Jiayou and Zhiping periods (1056-1067), thanks mainly to Ouyang Xiu's 歐陽修 (1007-1072) leadership in the ancient prose movement. It was against this that Wang Anshi worked out his statecraft, so as to restore the lost

[27] Young-Bruehl, *Hannah Arendt*, 108. It is interesting to note that at a time when Arendt is enjoying a renewed rising appeal, so is the history of ideas she strongly criticized. On the latter, see, for example, McMahon, "The Return of the History of Ideas?"
[28] Young-Bruehl, *Hannah Arendt*, 318.
[29] Koselleck, *Futures Past*, chapter 5, at 82. On the need to differentiate words from ideas, see Bol, "Words and Ideas."
[30] Ma Zhenduo has noted this (*Zhengzhi gaigejia Wang Anshi de zhexue sixiang*, 77). Douglas Skonicki explains this as Wang's not attempting "to establish a rigid philosophical vocabulary" ("Cosmos, State and Society," 458). I see it as intentional.
[31] Although recently, students of Euro-American intellectual history have been trying to break free from its constraint. See, for example, Gordon, "Contextualism and Criticism in the History of Ideas."
[32] What I mean by this term is explained in chapter 1.
[33] Shao-yun Yang translates it as "Tracing the Way to Its Source" (*The Way of the Barbarians*, 6). I find the abbreviated form "Tracing the Way" adequate, as "trace" has in itself the meaning of "find the source, origins, or roots of," which matches the openness of the Chinese character "*yuan*" very well. For such a rendering, see Bol, "Review of *The Way of the Barbarians*." On Han Yu being a humanist, see Bol, "Words and Ideas."

moral unity in the world given the moral individualism and value pluralism inherent in the practice of writing ancient prose.

Rhetorical strategies are frequently used by writers to reinforce the point they make, as we shall see in the cases of Han Yu and Ouyang Xiu.[34] The situation was, however, different with Wang Anshi, whose aim was not always to get his point across, but rather to make it not immediately apparent to everyone, given his awareness of the controversial nature of his statecraft.[35] Moreover, to reduce the force of expected opposition to his ideas and later to facilitate the smooth implementation of the reform designed with them, he attached great importance to language, including bending grammar in his writings,[36] wielding Laozian dialectics to reverse definitions of what is good and what bad, and devising a new "dictionary" to create a systematic mismatch between name and reality.[37] Not only does this lead present-day Wang scholars who read the same texts of his to arrive at different conclusions, but even some of Wang's contemporaries thought he discarded his learning after having come to power.[38] This requires us to pay particular attention to his linguistic maneuver and not take his words at face value.

After a contextualized reconstruction of Wang's political theory in the first two chapters, I turn to discussing its implementation in chapter 3. Taking the reform as mainly about the economic policies carried out during Shenzong's reign, most scholars think it had failed, hence their being occupied with explaining why.[39] The central topic of Wang's famous myriad-word letter to Renzong that later became his reform blueprint[40] was, however, using government school education to make the kind of humans useful to the state. Given the severely declined imperial authority[41] Shenzong inherited from the previous two reigns, to put this grand design into practice, it had to proceed step by step, including most importantly neutralizing anti-reformers, whose effective opposition lasted through the early twelfth century, even taking back control of the

[34] Part of my inspiration on this came from Yang, *The Way of the Barbarians*.
[35] See, for example, Wang Anshi, "Shang Renzong Huangdi yan shi shu," in *LCJ*, 410-11. Wang turned the small number of students who had gotten the gist of his learning into in-laws, marrying his daughter to Cai Bian, niece to Gong Yuan (Liu Chengguo, *Jinggong Xinxue yanjiu*, 79, 66), and sister to Shen Jichang (Li Tao, *Xu Zizhitongjian changbian* (*XCB* hereafter), 229.5570).
[36] See, for example, Wang Anshi, "Yuan jiao," in *LCJ*, 69.731: "化[於]上."
[37] On the latter two, see chapter 2.
[38] For instance, Sima Guang ("Yu Wang Jiefu shu," in *Sima Wenzhenggong chuanjia ji* (*CJJ* hereafter), 60.723), Fu Bi, and Fan Chunren (Luo Jiaxiang, *Bei Song dangzheng yanjiu*, 51).
[39] Li Huarui, *Wang Anshi bianfa yanjiu shi*, 479.
[40] Tuo Tuo et al., *Song shi*, 327.10542.
[41] The actual power the emperor was able to exercise also declined as a consequence. For a discussion of the difference between power and authority, see Wood, *Limits to Autocracy*, x, 2-8. I discuss what I mean by authority in chapter 1.

government between 1085 and 1093. It was only after 1104, when, through blacklisting, they had been made unable to obstruct the central government's agenda that this education as governance was able to be carried out across the state, as can be seen from the exponential growth in student number and the widespread building of schools.[42]

In chapter 4, I seek to enrich our understanding of the discussions in the preceding chapters by presenting the discovery of Su Shi 蘇軾 (1037-1101),[43] Wang's foremost critic, on the nature of Wang Anshi's statecraft that was made around the turn of the twelfth century. Using material from Su that has not been discussed in English, this is also to address anew the relationship between Wang Anshi and his main theoretical source Mencius. This relationship has been studied by many scholars, including Li Huarui, who in a recent book chapter argues that Mencius' political thought on humane governance guided the reform Wang architected.[44] In chapter 2, I have begun proposing an alternative explanation based on Wang's own writings on human nature. Here, closely studying Su Shi's engagements with Mencius in a project designed to oppose Wang Anshi's statecraft, I hope to show how Mencius, with his insight into human nature, provided the most important theoretical foundations for Wang's soulcraft.

In the Conclusion, I summarize main findings in the four chapters while situating Wang Anshi in the history of Chinese political thought, arguing that his soulcraft as statecraft went one step further than that of the so-called Legalists, who although similarly pursuing greater state power did not work on changing human nature.

While this dissertation is meant as a contribution to the reinvention of Chinese political history, its approach is not that of political history, but intellectual history, more specifically the historical study of political theory. At a metalevel, it sets up a contrast between two theories of governance – humanist and statist – in Tang-Song China. The former, advocated by ancient prose proponents like Han Yu, Ouyang Xiu, and Su Shi, sees the government's job as meeting human needs and guiding the people towards greater humanity, whereas the latter, upheld by Wang Anshi and his followers who sought to end the ancient prose movement which to them had led to the loss of moral unity in their world, pursues greater state power in governance and for this reason finds humanist values counterproductive. Neither theory was able to achieve a full success – at the height

[42] Chaffee, *The Thorny Gates of Learning in Sung China*, 78, 84; Hu, "Cultivating Merit," 132-40.
[43] On their being perceived as archrivals in popular culture, see Idema, "Poet versus Minister and Monk."
[44] Li Huarui, "Northern Song Reformist Thought and Its Sources."

of practicing the humanist approach to governance when Ouyang Xiu and his like-minded fellows dominated the central government between 1056 and 1067, Wang Anshi finished building his statist political theory and gained rising influence through circulating his writings and teaching; when Wang Anshi and his followers were setting the direction toward which the state was heading under the commission of emperor Shenzong and his two sons from 1069 to 1125, adherents to the humanist political theory resisted effectively, even taking back control of the government from 1085 and 1093 and tilting the direction toward their vision from 1100 to 1101. However, a political theory, once adopted as the government's guideline, sets the agenda for political life across the state, having the vast majority of the population head toward it and forcing its opponents, no matter how successful they were, to invest their energy in opposing it rather than focusing on implementing their own agenda. As such, a comprehensive study of Wang Anshi's statist political theory that was devised as an antidote to the humanist one can refresh our understanding of Northern Song political history from the source.

It is necessary to add a note on my translating *ru* 儒 as "Confucian." While I understand the underlying concerns of scholars who are uncomfortable with this rendering, I think we need a convenient, albeit imperfect, designation. As for which word to use, it seems "classicist," the preferred choice of scholars like Michael Nylan,[45] unnecessarily narrows down a rather broad concept to but one aspect of it – the study of a shifting group of texts considered to be classics belonging to the *ru* tradition –, and more importantly assumes the non-*ru* traditions do not have their own classics[46] or study the *ru* classics.[47] On this issue, I share Paul Goldin's critical choice of "Confucian," in the literal sense of "of Confucius," i.e., followers of the tradition in which Confucius was taken to have played a shaping role.[48] Unlike Goldin, however, I do not take Confucianism as just a philosophy featuring "think[ing] for oneself."[49] Rather, the identifier of the Confucian tradition of statecraft that shall emerge from this study is governing according to the

[45] Nylan, *The Five "Confucian" Classics*, 364-65; Yang, *The Way of the Barbarians*, 16; DeBlasi, *Reform in the Balance*, 16. Bol renders *ruxue* as *shi* 士 (literati) learning (*"This Culture of Ours,"* 15-18), as does Elman ("Rethinking 'Confucianism' and 'Neo-Confucianism' in Modern Chinese History," 531). Note Nylan does not object to using the word "Confucian," but only tries to reserve it for the "self-identified ethical followers of Confucius" (*The Five "Confucian" Classics*, 365).
[46] Which they have, like the *Classic of Daode* in the Daoist tradition.
[47] Mozi, for instance, did, as Paul Goldin points out (*Confucianism*, 5).
[48] For a similar position, see Harris, "Han Feizi's Criticism of Confucianism," 426-27.
[49] Goldin, *Confucianism*, 1-2.

principle of *renyi*, that is, broadly loving humans and doing so appropriately.[50] It is for this reason that I apply the technical term "humanist" onto this tradition, given its advocacy of the core value *ren* – humanity, while calling those seeking to remove this value in governance "anti-humanist."

With regard to the sources, scholars have been cautioning us against seeing Wang Anshi through the biased eyes of his critics.[51] In this study, I primarily base my argument on two major pieces of work Wang produced by the late 1050s:[52] *Miscellaneous Theories from Huainan*[53] (*Huainan zashuo* 淮南雜說) and *Commentary on the "Great Plan"* (*"Hongfan" zhuan* "洪範" 傳).[54] The latter was included in *Collected Writings of Mr. Linchuan* in full,[55] whereas the former did not survive as a standalone book. However, given that it was still extant when Wang's writings were being put together under an imperial decree during Huizong's reign and put to print in early Southern Song,[56] unless there is a convincing reason for why the work Wang Anshi was best known for would have been left out,[57] I share the view with scholars like Hou Wailu and Liu Chengguo that key pieces from this book were included in *Collected Writings of Mr. Linchuan* as well,[58] making it unnecessary to continue transmitting on its own.

As for where they are, Hou Wailu suspects volumes 65-70,[59] a view Liu Chengguo[60] and Wang Shuhua[61] agree with. Ma Zhenduo objects to this, mainly on the grounds that the gist of several essays in volumes 66-68 are obviously at odds with relevant content in the *Mencius*,[62] a

[50] Note what is reconstructed as the "Confucian" approach to governance from early to middle period China in this study is dramatically different from the version advocated by self-identified contemporary "Confucian" thinkers. On their agenda, see Jiang and O'Dwyer, "The Universal Ambitions of China's Illiberal Confucian Scholars." For the larger context, see Veg, "The Rise of China's Statist Intellectuals."
[51] See, for example, Li Huarui, *Wang Anshi bianfa yanjiu shi*, 135-49; Levine, "A Performance of Transparency."
[52] For this dating, see the Appendix.
[53] Or "South of the Huai [River]."
[54] On these being Wang's representative works, see the quote from Lu Dian in chapter 1 section III.
[55] Again, see Appendix for issues involved in its dating.
[56] For a detailed discussion of the textual history, see Zhu Shangshu, *Song ren bieji xulu*, 316-35. Wang's collected writings were put to print in 1140 and 1151, the two origins of the modern editions we use. In the entry on *Miscellaneous Theories* in his book completed between 1151 and 1187, Chao Gongwu did not report its being lost (*Junzhai dushuzhi jiaozheng*, 525-26). See also what Liu Chengguo wrote in Wang Anshi, *Wang Anshi ji (jiexuan)*, 20.
[57] Completeness was aimed for when Wang Anshi's great-grandson was compiling his writings under the imperial decree (Zhu Shangshu, *Song ren bieji xulu*, 318).
[58] Hou Wailu, *Zhongguo sixiang tongshi,* IV-1, 446; Liu Chengguo, *Wang Anshi nianpu changbian*, 663-64. Ma Zhenduo thinks it was lost (*Zhengzhi gaigejia Wang Anshi*, 40).
[59] Hou Wailu, *Zhongguo sixiang tongshi,* IV-1, 446.
[60] Liu Chengguo, *Wang Anshi nianpu changbian*, 663-64, 2301.
[61] Wang Shuhua, "Jinggong Xinxue zhushu kaobian," 524.
[62] Ma Zhenduo, *Zhengzhi gaigejia Wang Anshi*, 39-40.

view Gao Keqin adopts.[63] This objection does not stand up to close scrutiny – that *Miscellaneous Theories* rang a bell with *Mencius* among its readers does not mean their contents were in agreement with each other. It could have been caused by the mere fact that both feature extensive talks of human nature,[64] as well as their shared normative outlook.[65] As we shall see, no matter how much Wang Anshi drew upon *Mencius*, he was no copier of Mencius' ideas, nor anybody else's for that matter.

Nevertheless, we can perhaps add more precision to Hou's view.[66] Judging by generic similarity, it seems the starting point should be volume 63, while the latter part of volume 70, consisting of documents for official communication from "On Tea Law" 議茶法 onward, do not belong.[67] In what follows, I take the expositional essays from volume 63 through the first half of volume 70 as from *Miscellaneous Theories*. The ultimate proof for this attribution shall become clear by the end of chapter 2, as main pieces in these volumes, together with *Commentary on the "Great Plan,"* do formulate a systematic theory of *daode* and *xingming* that according to Wang's biography cited in chapter 1 began gaining influence after his *Miscellaneous Theories* went into circulation. Moreover, as we shall see in that chapter, some of the ideas found in these two works had been integrated in the long letter Wang wrote Renzong – the so-called "Myriad-Word Letter" – between late 1058 and early 1059[68] into a sweeping reform blueprint.

Another major source I use is Wang's *Diary*, where he recorded his daily communications with Shenzong for when he was spearheading the reform during the Xining period (1068-1077). In it Wang explicated some of the ideas he formulated in *Miscellaneous Theories* and *Commentary on the "Great Plan"* to the emperor, explaining what they meant in actual governance. About this diary, Kong Xue recently produced a detailed discussion of its origin, process of circulation, and

[63] Gao Keqin, "Wang Anshi zhushu kao," 86-87. The "Kongzi" in Gao's text seems a typo for Mencius. Cf. Ma Zhenduo, *Zhengzhi gaigejia Wang Anshi*, 40.
[64] Wang Shuhua, "Jinggong Xinxue zhushu kaobian," 524.
[65] On Mencius' view being "normatively infused" in general, see Ivanhoe, *Three Streams*, 2. On his take on human nature being normative, see Virág, *The Emotions in Early Chinese Philosophy*, 111.
[66] Gao Keqin, "Wang Anshi zhushu kao," 87.
[67] Volume 62 also has expositional pieces, but they differ by being official communication documents, like those in the latter part of volume 70.
[68] Liu Chengguo dates the submission of Wang's myriad-word letter to early 1059 (*Wang Anshi nianpu changbian*, 473), the reason being that only then did Wang arrive at the capital to take up the position of Administrative Assistant in the Bureau of General Accounts (*duzhi panguan* 度支判官) to which he was appointed in 1058/10.

value as a primary source.[69] An exchange between Cai Jing 蔡京 (1047-1126) and emperor Zhezong 哲宗 (r. 1085-1100) in 1097 tells its importance:

> Cai Jing said: "I have seen that Wang Anshi had a *Diary*. What's in it were all repeated discussions between the late emperor and Anshi on affairs under Heaven, as well as the intention to change the methods and measures during the Xining period, from beginning to end, all complete. I wanted to ask for having it slightly compiled for presenting [to Your Majesty] to read."
> The emperor said: "There was originally a copy in the palace and I have read it in detail for multiple times."
> 京言："竊見王安石有《日錄》一集，其間皆先帝與安石反復論天下事，及熙寧改更法度之意，本末備具。欲乞略行修纂進讀。"
> 上曰："宮中自有本，朕已詳閱數次矣。"[70]

In 1122, on the grounds that "in it military strategies and statecraft often survived in detail" 其中兵謀、政術往往具存, Zhao Zishu 趙子書 (?-?) submitted a memorial asking for banning its commercial sale. Taking Zhao's point made out of concerns for national security, the court granted this, ordering a state-wide destruction of the prints and a ban.[71] While the book did not survive intact, a number of entries in it were quoted in multiple sources, including Li Tao's 李燾 (1115-1184) *Long Draft Continuing* Comprehensive Mirror to Aide Governance, Chen Guan's *Collected Writings in Reverence of Yao*,[72] and Yang Shi's collected writings,[73] allowing cross-examination in many cases. Recently, two editions of partial restoration were published. The one I use is *Xining zoudui rilu* (*Diary on Imperial Audiences during the Xining Period*. *Diary* hereafter).[74]

---

[69] Kong Xue, Wang Anshi Rilu *ji jiao*, preface.
[70] Li Tao, *XCB*, 492.11678. Yang Zhongliang seemed to mistakenly call it "*Shilu*" (Xuzizhitongjianchangbian *jishi benmo*, 92.1595. *JSBM* hereafter. I am using the Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe punctuated edition out of convenience, while checking it against the Beijing tushuguan chubanshe edition). For the various names by which it was called, see Kong Xue, Wang Anshi Rilu *ji jiao*, preface, 7.
[71] Liu Lin et al. eds., *SHY*, *xingfa*, 2.86.8329. De Weerdt discussed this in "What Did Su Che See in the North?" 479.
[72] Chen Guan, *Song Zhongsu Chen Liaozhai Siming zun Yao ji*.
[73] Yang Shi, *Yang Shi ji*.
[74] This is only because I had this edition when conducting this research. Future scholars might want to use Kong Xue's Wang Anshi Rilu *ji jiao* as the basis, as it was published earlier and is equipped with more scholarly apparatuses.

Aside from these main sources, I also use other relevant writings by Wang Anshi himself,[75] his son, and his students, as well as some historiographical works, like Li Tao's *Long Draft* and Yang Zhongliang's 楊仲良 (fl. early 13th century)[76] *Chronicling Events in* Long Draft Continuing *Comprehensive Mirror to Aide Governance*.[77] The biases in the latter type of sources have been systematically critiqued by Charles Hartman.[78] In the sense that history was written by humans with agency, no work was free of their author's agenda, whether they upheld *Daoxue* ideology or not. Being aware of this, however, does not mean they cannot be used as historical sources critically, nor should historians therefore be deterred from going beyond textual and linguistic analysis to know what actually happened in the world under study.[79] As is the case throughout this study, I build my argument on careful examination of primary sources and submit the rest to the reader.

[75] Like his commentary on *Laozi*. Some scholars think this commentary was written after he had permanently retired. Given that that of his son Wang Pang's was produced in 1070, plus the crucial importance of Laozi's idea of *daode* in his political theory as we shall see in chapters 1 and 2, even if Wang Anshi commented on *Laozi* much later than his son did, we should assume it was integral to his work on statecraft. Indeed, from the early 1040s, Wang Anshi had expressed his consistent view that writing should be about governance ("Yu Zu Zezhi shu," in *LCJ*, 77.812). I did not tap into Wang Anshi's intellectual relationship to Buddhism.
[76] For this dating, see Hartman, "Bibliographic Notes on Sung Historical Works."
[77] Yang Zhongliang, *JSBM*.
[78] Hartman, *The Making of Song Dynasty History*.
[79] Hartman himself does not deny this (*The Making of Song Dynasty History*, 47, 333), and his projected second volume promises to tell "the political and social realities behind that discourse" (ibid., xiii). Even in this first volume, when he is accounting for historical events, he still uses the historiographical works whose political agenda he unravels as primary sources (e.g., 250n7, 252n12).

Chapter 1
From Ancient Prose[1] to Wang Anshi

In the fourth month of 1068, after most of the state councilors who had been continuously serving his great-uncle Renzong (r. 1022-1063) and father Yingzong (r. 1063-1067) had left the central government,[2] the twenty-year-old emperor Zhao Xu 趙頊 (1048-1085, r. 1067-1085, temple name Shenzong 神宗),[3] intent on carrying forward his ancestors' great enterprise in its second century and having been looking for someone to assist him,[4] interviewed Wang Anshi 王安石 (1021-1086), asking him what should be done first in governance.[5] To this Wang replied: "Beginning with choosing the craft" 以擇術為始.[6] This implies that Wang saw there were at least two different kinds of statecraft before Shenzong: the existing one that was carried forward from the previous reigns[7] and the alternative Wang was presenting to him.

To see what exactly it was that was passed on to the new emperor and why he would choose to replace it with the one proposed by Wang Anshi, this chapter first traces back to its source – Han Yu's "Tracing the Way," where a path-breaking[8] humanist political theory of self-governance was formulated for the post-An Lushan Rebellion (755-763) new world. Decentralizing moral authority to individual literati (士 *shi*), Han asked them to take social-political actions according to their own moral sense under the general principle of broadly loving humans and doing so

---

[1] This new concept was central to the social-political movement Han Yu and others were campaigning in the eighth century. *Wen* could refer to non-rhythmic prose writing, but *gu* did not just refer to the style, laying its focus rather on the idea. To call a prose piece "*gu*" was to convey the sense that one was expressing one's own view on a matter of public interest by organizing words in a way that gave focal place to one's independent thinking. Combined, it was a new concept emerging in the Tang-Song transition in the Koselleckian sense of concept creation (*Futures Past*, chapter 5).

[2] On Shenzong's actions before interviewing Wang Anshi, see Zhu Yiqun, "Song Shenzong qiyong Wang Anshi zhi Jiangningfu"; Zhou Jia, *Bei Song zhongyang richang zhengwu*, 156-57; Ye Tan, *Da bianfa*, 48-50; and Zhao Dongmei, *Da Song zhi bian*, chapters 8-10. On Shenzong's attack on Han Qi, see Smith, "Shen-Tsung's Reign," 357.

[3] Calling Zhao Xu "Shenzong" is anachronistic for the period when he was alive. This nonetheless could serve as a convenient designation.

[4] See the statement made in Shenzong's voice in the 1082 palace exam question (Liu Lin et al. eds., *Song Huiyao jigao*, 7.24, 5400-01). For bibliographical notes on this primary source, see Hartman, *The Making of Song Dynasty History*, chapter 1.

[5] Zhao Dongmei notes this meeting has received scant attention (*Da Song Zhi Bian*, chapter 12).

[6] Huang Yizhou, Xuzizhitongjianchangbian *shibu* (*XCBSB* hereafter), 3a.92; Yang Zhongliang, *JSBM*, 59.1042. *"Shu"* 術 could be a special term (Makeham, "The Legalist Concept of *Hsing-ming*," 88).

[7] Hartman takes 1045-68 as one period ("Sung Government and Politics," 31). Smith similarly considered the period between 1046 and 1067 as one of relative quietness ("Shen-Tsung's Reign," 323).

[8] Han was part of his generation as David McMullen demonstrated ("Han Yü." See also Bol, *"This Culture of Ours*," 398n83). But in producing this political theory, he went the farthest.

appropriately, the two cardinal *political* values from the Confucian tradition. By the mid-eleventh century, this approach to governance finally ascended to become the mainstream, thanks especially to the ancient prose (*guwen* 古文) movement leader Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修 (1007-1072).[9] In the latter two parts of his "On the Roots" 本論, Ouyang supplemented Han's theory with a more feasible method of realization. Furthermore, during the Jiayou and Zhiping periods (1056-1067), he practiced it in the government with like-minded court officials, till the capable Shenzong saw what it did to imperial authority and began to reassert it with the political theory Wang Anshi had developed by the late 1050s.

I

Han Yu and the Advent of a Humanist Theory of Self-Governance

Like most studies of eleventh century intellectual history, the story has to begin with Han Yu and the piece he spent many years in the making thereof, knew would be dangerous to make public, and expected to only become current in a future time[10] -- "Tracing the Way." "One of the most influential texts in later Chinese thought,"[11] it has been interpreted by many scholars from multiple perspectives.[12] The reading below is from that of political theory. Reading its beginning part against two contexts – an early Chinese political philosophical discourse in discontent with which Han composed this piece and the Tang's prevailing way of governance Han was challenging – and paying attention to Han's rhetorical strategy, we shall come to see that Han wrote it to present a decentralized way of governance against the Tang status quo.[13] It begins with these declarations that seem to have come out of nowhere:

[9] Hartman notes "*guwen* played only a minor role in Song political culture before Ouyang Xiu" ("Zhu Xi and His World," 113).
[10] Han Yu, "Chong da Zhang Ji shu," in *Han Changli wenji zhushi* (*HCLJ* hereafter), vol. 1, 201-05.
[11] Bol, *"This Culture of Ours,"* 128; de Bary and Irene Bloom eds., *Sources of Chinese Tradition, Volume One*, 569.
[12] See, for example, Chen Yinke, "Lun Han Yu"; Hartman, *Han Yü and the T'ang Search for Unity*, 145-62; Bol, *"This Culture of Ours,"* 128-31; Yang, *The Way of the Barbarians*, 29. Youngmin Kim's discussion of Han Yu (*A History of Chinese Political Thought*, chapter 5) focuses on political identity and the relationship between self and things.
[13] On Han was calling for dismantling the Tang status quo in "Tracing the Way," see Bol, *"This Culture of Ours,"* 130.

> To love broadly is what is meant by *ren* (humanity).[14] To practice this appropriately is what is meant by *yi* (appropriateness). Proceeding from this [*renyi*] to go there is what is meant by *dao* (way). Being sufficient of oneself without depending on externals is what is meant by *de* ([moral] power or virtue). "*Ren*" and "*yi*" are defined terms. "*Dao*" and "*de*" are empty positions.[15]
> 博愛之謂仁，行而宜之之謂義。由是而之焉之謂道，足乎己無待於外之謂德。仁與義為定名，道與德為虛位。[16]

As if for fear his reader would have no clue what these sentences were about, after taking issue with Laozi's speaking of *daode* in an anti-humanist way,[17] Han gave a detailed explanation for why it was necessary for him to make the above proclamation:

> The way of the Zhou dynasty declined, Confucius passed away, [books] were burned in the Qin, [the school] of Huang[di]-Lao[zi] [prevailed] in the Han, as did Buddhism in the Jin, Wei, Liang, and Sui dynasties. During these times, those who spoke of *daode* and *renyi*, if not joining Yang Zhu, then joined Mozi; if not joining Laozi, then joined Buddha. Joining them, one necessarily left this [Confucius]. The one they joined was [treated as] the master; the one they left as the servant. The one they joined they followed; the one they left they defamed. Alas, later people, should they desire to hear the theory of *renyi* and *daode*, who should they follow and hear it from? Laozians said: "Confucius is my teacher's disciple." Buddhists said: "Confucius is my teacher's disciple." Those who conducted [the business of] Confucius, accustomed to hearing their theories, took delight in their absurdity and belittled themselves, also saying things like "My teacher also had taken him as his teacher." Not only did they uphold such in their mouths, but they also wrote such in their books. Alas, later people, even if they want to hear the theory of *renyi* and *daode*, whom should they follow and seek it from?
> 周道衰，孔子沒，火於秦，黃老於漢，佛於晉、魏、梁、隋之間。其言道德仁義者，[18]不入於楊，則入於墨。不入於老，則入於佛。入於彼，必出於此。入者主之，出者奴之。入

[14] Short of an exact English equivalent, I prefer this rendering as the two dimensions of its meaning – the human race and humaneness or benevolence – match how Han Yu used it more closely. When rendering it as an adjective, "humane" is the choice.
[15] Translation modified from Bol's (*"This Culture of Ours,"* 128-29).
[16] Han Yu, "Yuan dao," in *HCLJ*, vol. 1, 15.
[17] On anti-humanism in the *Classic of Daode*, see Moeller, *The Philosophy of the* Daodejing, 136-37.
[18] In Hartman's translation (de Bary and Bloom eds., *Sources of Chinese Tradition*, *Volume One*, 570), *renyi* is put before *daode*. It seems to me that in this only place where Han put *daode* before *renyi*, he was referring to the mistaken way in which the relationship between the two had been treated by those speaking of it during the period between Confucius and himself.

> 者附之，出者汙之。噫，後之人其欲聞仁義道德之說，孰從而聽之？老者曰：“孔子，吾師之弟子。”佛者曰：“孔子，吾師之弟子也。”為孔子者，習聞其說，樂其誕而自小也，亦曰“吾師亦嘗師之”云爾。不惟舉之於其口，而又筆之於其書。噫，後之人，雖欲聞仁義道德之說，其孰從而求之？[19]

Han told us he formulated his theory on the relationship between *renyi* and *daode* with which "Tracing the Way" opened because he thought after Confucius passed away, how the two related to each other had been muddled. This all-too-important context the author went to great lengths to point out to us, to the extent of being overly repetitive, however, is yet to be discussed fully. This probably has something to do with the term *daode*.

Today, *daode* is often equated with "morality."[20] Seeing it as a synonym of *renyi*, many also take it as an essential feature of the Confucian tradition. For instance, accusing it of restraining human development and twisting human nature, Liu Zehua charges Confucianism of putting *daode* above all.[21] Setting aside the difference between morality and virtue – anyone with a sense of right and wrong has a morality[22] but not everyone thus has good ethical qualities –,[23] this was not how Han Yu was using this term here. If we leave behind our preexisting notion of what *daode* means in later times, we can see Han was *contrasting* it with *renyi*, taking issue with those who in his view had mistaken its relationship with the latter.

Han's narration of the thousand plus years between Confucius and himself is highly stylized and he did not detail exactly who mistook this relationship and how.[24] Still, by way of some helpful clues, we can get a sense of what Han was referring to.

The first clue comes from Sima Tan 司馬談 (c. 165-110 BCE), who wrote:[25] "*Yin-yang*, *Ru* (Confucius' profession), *Mo* (face tattooing punishment that became the name of a school),

[19] Han Yu, "Yuan dao," in *HCLJ*, vol. 1, 17.
[20] See, for example, Yuli Liu, "The Unity of Rule and Virtue in Confucianism," 218. This works better for later imperial times, including the period under study, hence my rendering it so for the eleventh century but not necessarily for earlier times.
[21] Liu Zehua, *Bashi zi shu*, 329-34.
[22] Cua, *Moral Vision and Tradition*, 278.
[23] The two, however, tend to be conflated (again, see Yuli Liu, "The Unity of Rule and Virtue in Confucianism," 234-35).
[24] For some possibilities, see Gao Buying, *Tang Song wen ju yao*, 147-48.
[25] Like all historians, Sima Tan had his own agenda, as did his son. This, however, does not mean that we cannot take their views as potentially helpful clues. For such an example, see Sato Masayuki, *Xunzi lizhi sixiang*, chapters 1 and 2. For critical discussions of the two Simas, see Petersen, "Which Books Did the First Emperor of Ch'in Burn?";

name, law, and *daode* – these are used for governing" 夫陰陽、儒、墨、名、法、道德，此務為治者.[26] To the older Sima, *daode* is one of the techniques used in governance that is distinct from the one used by those in the same profession as Confucius. Furthermore, according to his son Sima Qian 司馬遷 (145? – c. 87 BCE), using *daode* as a core technique to govern was not restricted to Laozi, but was shared by a variety of political philosophers. For instance, at the end of a combined biography of Laozi, Zhuangzi, Shen Buhai and Han Fei, the younger Sima commented:

> The *dao* Laozi valued contained nothing and responded to change with inaction, thus when he wrote his work, his rhetoric and terminology were abstruse and difficult to understand. Zhuangzi dissipated *daode* and let loose his opinions, but his essence, too, lay mainly in spontaneity. Shenzi treated the lowly as befit the lowly, applying this [principle] to relating [official] titles to actual [duties]. Hanzi snapped his plumb line, cut through to the truth of things, and made clear true from false, but carried cruelty and harshness to extremes, and was lacking in kindness. All of these sprang from the idea of *daode*, but Laozi was the most profound of them all.[27]
>
> 老子所貴道，虛無，因應變化於無為，故著書辭稱微妙難識。莊子散道德，放論，要亦歸之自然。申子卑卑，施之於名實。韓子引繩墨，切事情，明是非，其極慘礉少恩。皆原於道德之意，而老子深遠矣。[28]

These four political philosophers,[29] despite their differences, share in using an approach to governance that originated from the idea of *daode* (*daode zhi yi* 道德之意) articulated in the

Kidder Smith, "Sima Tan and the Invention of Daoism, 'Legalism,' *et cetera*"; Nylan, "Sima Qian"; and Kern, "The 'Masters' in the Shiji."

[26] Sima Qian, *Shiji*, 130.3993. For a similar view, see https://ctext.org/he-guan-zi/xue-wen. Smith rightly notes that Sima Tan was organizing knowledge by intellectual content rather than by personal names or texts ("Sima Tan," 129). It seems to me this applies to what Smith takes as an exception – *mo* – as well, as Sima could be referring to the technique of punishing men by inking characters on their faces.

[27] Translation modified from Nienhauser ed., *The Grand Scribe's Records*, *Volume VII*, 29.

[28] Sima Qian, *Shiji*, 63.2622. The twentieth century scholar Zhang Shunhui thinks "周秦學者言主術同宗'道德'" (*Zhou Qin dao lun fawei*, 36). Zhang Liwen went even further, saying "先秦…時代精神的核心話題是'道德之意'" (*He he xue*, preface to the second edition, 5). This is how Zhang organized the pre-Qin part of his *Zhongguo zhexue sichao fazhan shi*. Like most scholars, Zhang treats *renyi* and *daode* as similar to rather than contrasting with each other (*He he xue*, 7).

[29] One could contend Zhuangzi was not concerned with governance, but the quote below from *Zhuangzi* suggests otherwise.

Classic of Daode attributed to Laozi,[30] among them Laozi went the deepest and the farthest. The Simas' views reflected their perspectives, but it seems they were not too far off the mark, as in one instance, Han Yu also grouped Laozi together with Shen Buhai and Han Fei.[31] Moreover, that the "Legalist" approach to governance originated from Laozi seemed common knowledge in the Song. For instance, Su Shi expressed this view in his essay "On Han Fei,"[32] and Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033-1107) similarly said:

> After Laozi, there were Shen Buhai and Han Fei. On the surface, the way of Shen and Han seem far away from that of Laozi, but their origin came from Laozi.
> 老子之後有申、韓，看申、韓與老子道甚懸絕，然其原乃自老子來.[33]

The Qing scholar Zhu Yixin 朱一新 (1846-1894) also pointed out:

> What was covered in Mr. Lao's book was broad. The schools of name, laws, Yang, Mo, Zhuang, Lie, and military strategists, none was not rooted in it. Therefore, Laozi was the ancestor of heterodoxy.
> 老氏書所賅者廣，名、法、楊、墨、莊、列、兵家莫不本之，故老子為異端之宗。[34]

Among the four listed by Sima Qian, except for Shen Buhai,[35] each has stated a view on the relationship between *daode* and *renyi*. Laozi took a combative stance, seeing its *dao* as incompatible with *renyi* and calling for doing away with such humanist virtues in governance:

---

[30] Sima Qian, *Shiji*, 63.2605-06: "老子修道德，其學以自隱無名為務。…著書上下篇，言道德之意五千餘言而去。" I translate the *Daodejing* of Laozi, taken as exchangeable with *Laozi*, in this way so as to highlight the special term *daode*, a center of this study.
[31] Han Yu, "Song Meng Dongye xu," in *HCLJ*, vol. 1, 349-50.
[32] Su Shi, "Han Fei lun," in *Su Shi wenji*, 4.102.
[33] Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, *Er Cheng ji*, 235. Cf. Lu Guolong's discussion in *Song ru weiyan*, 90-91. On the relationship between Han Fei's teachings and the *Classic of Daode*, see Ivanhoe, "Hanfeizi and Moral Self-Cultivation," 35-38. For studies of Han Fei's interpretations of Laozi from a mainly literary perspective, see Denecke, *The Dynamics of Masters Literature*, 288-300, and Queen, "Han Feizi and the Old Master."
[34] Zhu Yixin, *Wuxietang da wen*, 1.40. Wu Genyou notes that in direct opposition to Confucius, who inherited the virtue-centered Zhou culture, Laozi revolutionized it with *dao*, resulting in the sharp opposition between Confucian and Daoist political philosophies, one focusing on *de*, one focusing on *dao* (Wu Genyou and Fang Xudong, "He Wei Zhengzhi Zhexue?" 175; see also Wu Genyou, *Daojia sixiang jiqi xiandai quanshi*, 3-4, 27).
[35] Surviving fragment of Shen's writings do not contain terms like *daode* or *renyi*. In a revision of his own view, Herrlee G. Creel thought Shen not was a Daoist, nor had he been influenced by Daoism (*Shen Pu-hai*, chapter 11), on the grounds that Shen lived before Laozi's book came into being. It could be, though, that the idea of *daode* had been current before the book titled *Classic of Daode* took a textual form.

> When the great *dao* is abandoned, there is *renyi*. … Cut off *ren*, abandon *yi*, and the people will return to being filial and kind. … When *dao* is lost there is *de*; when *de* is lost there is *ren*; when *ren* is lost there is *yi*.[36]
> 大道廢，有仁義。… 絕仁棄義，民復孝慈。…失道而後德，失德而後仁，失仁而後義。[37]

Zhuangzi stressed the crucial importance of putting *daode* before *renyi*:

> The *de* [power] of emperors and kings takes Heaven and Earth as its ancestor, *daode* its master, and nonaction its norm. … If you speak of *dao* and not of its sequence, then it is not the *dao*; and if you speak of *dao* that is not the *dao*, then what is there to adopt from *dao*? Therefore, the men of ancient times who clearly understood the great *dao* first expounded Heaven and then *daode* followed. Having expounded *daode* and then *renyi* followed.[38]
> 夫帝王之德，以天地為宗，以道德為主，以無為為常。…語道而非其序者，非其道也；語道而非其道者，安取道？是故古之明大道者，先明天而道德次之，道德已明而仁義次之。[39]

And Han Fei produced a detailed account of what governing with *renyi* meant in his time and the destructive results it would bring about to the ruler, despite the good reputation this way of governance enjoyed:

> When the sage implements laws in the state, he must necessarily go against the world and go along with *daode*. … Those who study statecraft in the world, in counselling the rulers, do not say, "Make use of the august and commanding position and thereby harass the wicked and villainous ministers," but all say, "[Practice] *renyi*, grace, and love and that is all." The rulers of our time delight in the reputation of *renyi* but do not scrutinize the actual results. Therefore, the graver consequences were that their states demise and they die while the lighter were that their territories shrink and the rulers despised. How to make this clear? Providing for those in poverty and difficulty is what the world

[36] Translation modified from Ivanhoe, *The* Daodejing 道德經 *of Laozi* 老子, 18-19 and 41.
[37] Chapters 18, 19, and 38 of the *Classic of Daode*.
[38] Translation modified from Watson, *The Complete Works of Zhuangzi*, 100, 102.
[39] Guo Xiang et al., Zhuangzi *zhushu*, 13.251, 256. Differing from the two Simas, Sato does not see a conflicting relationship between *renyi* and *daode* in the *Zhuangzi*, nor does he take *daode* there as referring to a way to govern the world (*Xunzi lizhi sixiang*, 91-92).

calls *renyi* while feeling compassion for the populace and being unable to bear punishing them is what the world calls grace and love. However, if one provides for those in poverty and difficulty, then those without merit get rewarded; and if one cannot bear to kill and punish, then violence and chaos will not cease. If the state had men who had no merit but got rewarded, then externally, the people would not work hard to confront the enemies and cut heads off; internally, they would not prioritize laboring in the fields and manufacturing quickly. Rather, all would want to use goods and money [to bribe], serve the rich and the noble, work on private virtues, and make personal names, in order that they may thereby get distinguished offices and fat salaries. As a result, wicked and self-seeking ministers become many and violent and outrageous fellows increasingly gain the upper hand. What but ruin can befall the state?[40]

聖人為法國者，必逆於世，而順於道德。…世之學術者說人主，不曰"乘威嚴之勢以困姦邪之臣"，而皆曰"仁義惠愛而已矣"。世主美仁義之名而不察其實，是以大者國亡身死，小者地削主卑。何以明之？夫施與貧困者，此世之所謂仁義；哀憐百姓不忍誅罰者，此世之所謂惠愛也。夫有施與貧困，則無功者得賞；不忍誅罰，則暴亂者不止。國有無功得賞者，則民不外務當敵斬首，內不急力田疾作，皆欲行貨財、事富貴、為私善、立名譽以取尊官厚俸。故姦私之臣愈眾，而暴亂之徒愈勝，不亡何待？[41]

In the "Illustrious Schools" (*xianxue* 顯學) chapter, Han Fei made it clear those advocating *renyi* to rulers in his time were the Confucians.[42] To be sure, *ren* was an overarching virtue frequently spoken of by Confucius in the *Analects*.[43] There he also spoke of *yi*, but far less frequently and never together with *ren*. Coupling the two together began with Mencius.[44] Scholars of early Chinese philosophy have been treating *ren* and related values as personal virtues in the

[40] Translation modified from Harris, "Han Fei on the Problem of Morality," 124-25 and Liao, *The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu*, 124-25, 127-28.
[41] Chen Qiyou, Han Feizi *xin jiao zhu*, 4.14.287-88, 4.14.293.
[42] Ibid., 19.50.1124, 19.50.1143.
[43] Tu, "*Jen* as a Living Metaphor in the Confucian *Analects*," 48. The concept of *ren* there centers on but is broader than Han Yu's *ren* as "broad love." About Confucius in the *Analects*, Michael Hunter has convincingly argued that the *Analects* as a *book* did not come into being before the Western Han (*Confucius beyond the* Analects. See also Hunter and Kern eds., *Confucius and the* Analects *Revisited*). This, however, does not negate the conventional wisdom that the parts of which the *Analects* was made up came from the Eastern Zhou period (see, for example, Goldin, "Confucius and His Disciples in the *Lunyu*" and Slingerland "Review of Michael Hunter, *Confucius Beyond the* Analects"). One piece of evidence supporting this latter view this study can supply is that the entries in the *Analects* do not show any awareness of Laozi's concept of *daode*, which had figured prominently in Confucian texts since the *Xunzi*, as we shall soon see.
[44] As Zhu Xi noted (*Sishu zhangju jizhu*, 199). Note, however, Chen Daqi thinks *yi* had already figured centrally in the *Analects* (*Kongzi xueshuo*, preface, 4-5, 125), as does more recently Hagop Sarkissian ("Ritual and Rightness in the *Analects*," 95).

realm of self-cultivation for long. To the political philosophers quoted above, however, *renyi* does not just refer to an individual person's cultivation of his own ethical character, but rather the core *political* values defining an approach to governance associated with Confucius and his followers. From Han Fei's characterization, this approach features meeting the people's needs and treating them with compassion and kindness.[45] To Han Fei, this harms the ruler's interests because being kind to the people would lead them to pursue their own projects in life and away from serving the state.[46]

And, despite Wang Chong 王充 (27-c. 97)'s controversial claim that "Confucius is the ancestor of *daode*" 孔子，道德之祖, [47] neither the term *daode* nor such a Laozian concept can be found in the *Analects*. The same with *Mencius*.[48] Among self-claimed defenders of the way of Confucius, Xunzi was perhaps the first to use the term frequently.[49] Again, we can take a cue from Sima Qian:

> Excellency Xun detested the governance of his chaotic times, with demised states and tyrannical rulers one following the other, refusing to follow the great Way and instead laboring at sorcery and spells and believing in omens. Vulgar Confucians argued over minutiae; those like Zhuang Zhou further disturbed customs with farce. Thus he inquired into the successes and failures of handling things by way of *Ru*, *Mo*, and *daode*, expounding them in sequence in several tens of thousands of characters, and expired.[50]
>
> 荀卿嫉濁世之政，亡國亂君相屬，不遂大道而營於巫祝，信禨祥。鄙儒小拘，如莊周等又猾稽亂俗，於是推儒、墨、道德之行事興壞，序列著數萬言而卒。[51]

[45] On the difference between Confucian and Legalist ways of governance with regard to their approach to political communication, see De Weerdt, "What Did Su Che See in the North?" 466.
[46] For relevant discussions, see Harris, "Critiquing Heavily Normative Conceptions of Harmony," 173-77.
[47] Wang Chong, *Lun heng*, 29.
[48] Though we shall see in chapter 4 that Mencius broached the crucial link between morality and human nature.
[49] Sato, *Xunzi lizhi sixiang*, 287. This is perhaps why Han Yu thought the transmission of the way of *renyi* stopped at Mencius ("Yuan dao," in *HCLJ*, vol. 1, 22).
[50] Translation modified from Nienhauser ed., *The Grand Scribe's Records. Volume VII*, 184.
[51] Sima Qian, *Shiji*, 74.2852-53.

From such words like "learning comes to ritual and then stops – this is called the ultimate of *daode*" 學至乎禮而止矣，夫是之謂道德之極,[52] it seems Xunzi sought to incorporate *daode*,[53] a concept that probably had become quite influential by his time, into ritual, the means by which to realize *renyi*.[54] Xunzi, however, did not explicitly state how he saw the relationship between *renyi* and *daode*.[55] Moreover, according to Masayuki Sato, the Daoist concept of *daode* had penetrated into Xunzi's writings to such an extent that it perhaps helped prevent *Xunzi* from being replaced by the Huang[di]-Lao[zi] 黃老 thought popular in the Han dynasty.[56]

Another major follower of Confucius who handled the relationship between *daode* and *renyi* was Yang Xiong 揚雄 (53BCE – 18AD). In his *Exemplary Figures* 法言, Yang made it explicit what he took away from Laozi and what he disapproved of therein:[57] "There is something I adopt from Laozi's talks of *daode*. When it comes to his chiseling away at *renyi* and extinguishing ritual learning, I do not adopt" 老子之言道德，吾有取焉耳。及捶提仁義，絕滅禮學，吾無取焉耳.[58] Yang also presented a view on how to handle the relationship between *daode* and *renyi*:

> The [relationship between] *dao*, *de*, *ren*, *yi*, and *li* is perhaps like the human body. … Conjoined, they constitute something akin to the primal unity; separated, [their force] dissipates. If a single person is in command of all his four limbs, his body is complete.[59]
> 道德仁義禮，譬諸身乎。… 合則渾，離則散。一人而兼統四體者，其身全。[60]

[52] Wang Xianqian, Xunzi *jijie*, 1.12. Translation modified from Hutton, *Xunzi*, 5.
[53] As Cai Renhou notes (*Kong Meng Xun zhexue*, 475). Cai, however, seems to equate *daode* with its later imperial meaning "morality." His statement that Xunzi rarely directly used *daode* is also inaccurate, as Sato points out (*Xunzi lizhi sixiang*, 65-66).
[54] Hutton, "Ethics in the *Xunzi*," 74-79. See also Ivanhoe, "A Happy Symmetry" and Goldin, *Rituals of the Way*.
[55] As can be seen from Xunzi's uses of *daode* (Sato, *Xunzi lizhi sixiang*, 287).
[56] Sato, *Xunzi lizhi sixiang*, chapter 2, quote at 109-10. By "Daoist," Sato mainly refers to Zhuangzi, given his methodology of looking for the exact word *daode*, which did not appear in Laozi's *Classic of Daode*, though the whole book, from its title onward, was about the idea of *daode*, as Sima Qian noted.
[57] Peter Bol has noted this (*"This Culture of Ours,"* 129).
[58] Yang Xiong, *Yangzi fayan*, 4.10. Translation modified from Nylan, *Exemplary Figures*, 57. For a critique of Yang Xiong's take on Laozi's *daode*, see Su Shi, "Han Yu you yu Yang Xiong," in *Su Shi wenji*, 65.2035.
[59] Translation modified from Nylan, *Exemplary Figures*, 55.
[60] Yang Xiong, *Yangzi fayan*, 4.9-10. For a similar view in early China, see https://ctext.org/su-shu/1/zh. Some modern scholars follow this. See, for example, Chen Daqi, *Kongzi xueshuo*, 153; Cua, *Moral Vision and Tradition*, 283; Shu Dagang and Shen Shengchao, "Dao de ren yi li." It seems to me the internal structure of these five goes like this: *dao* is constituted by *renyi*, which is realized by *li*. Those who act according to this *dao* is considered having *de*. For a similar view, see Hutton, "Ethics in the *Xunzi*," 76-78.

Like Han Yu, Yang sought to make *daode* always coupled with *renyi* (as well as *li*, that by which to realize *renyi*). But not only did Yang put *daode* before *renyi*, he also did not seem to have provided an explanation for why they must be combined.

Still others took a more ambivalent stance. For instance, at the same time when affirming "The foundation of *dao* is *renyi* and that is all" 夫道之本，仁義而已矣,[61] Xun Yue 荀悅 (148-209) also acknowledged the efficacy of governing with *daode*:

> For those who cross big rivers, the best way is to take a boat and the second swim. Those who swim toil and are in danger, whereas those who take a boat are at leisure and secure. If they go into the water when weak, they will surely get drowned. Those who govern the people with intelligence and capability are like swimming; those who govern the people with *daode* are like taking a boat.
> 濟大川者，太上乘舟，其次泅。泅者勞而危，乘舟者逸而安，虛入水則必溺矣。[62]以知能治民者，泅也；以道德治民者，舟也。[63]

These were not necessarily what Han Yu had in mind exactly, but they were all within the full range of discourse on the relationship between *daode* and *renyi* that was available to him, some of which he did engage explicitly in "Tracing the Way." For instance, other than pointing out Laozi's slighting *renyi*, he also quibbled with Yang Xiong and Xunzi for "picking out something from [Laozi's talks of *daode*] but not carefully; speaking of [the relationship between the *renyi* and *daode*] but not in detail" 擇焉而不精，語焉而不詳. With this partial reconstruction giving us a glimpse of what Han Yu was referring to,[64] we can now see, in this earlier discourse Han was engaging with, *renyi* and *daode* were two technical terms used to refer to two distinct ways of governance, the former originating from Confucius, the latter Laozi. The distinction between the two used to be quite clear-cut, as Laozi's *daode* was designed to oppose the Confucian *renyi* head-on, but beginning with the *Xunzi*, the term *daode* gained a more and more permeating presence in

[61] Xun Yue, *Shenjian*, 1.1.
[62] I am not sure what purpose *shi* 矣 serves here, as the usual meanings of this character do not seem to make sense in this context.
[63] Xun Yue, *Shenjian*, 1.6. Put forward in the form of a question, this seems to reflect what was current in Xun's time.
[64] For a fuller picture, see https://ctext.org/pre-qin-and-han?searchu=%E9%81%93%E5%BE%B7, especially those search results that have *daode* and *renyi* in close proximity.

texts attributed to the Confucian tradition, creating ever more linguistic and conceptual confusions as time went on.[65]

It is against this background that it becomes clear what Han was trying to achieve with the theory on the relationship between *renyi* and *daode* (*renyi daode zhi shuo* 仁義道德之說) he laid out at the very beginning of "Tracing the Way." By putting *renyi* before *daode* and depriving the Daoist terms *dao* and *de* of their independence, making them empty positions that have no meanings of their own but have to be filled with those of *ren* and *yi*,[66] he was attempting to drive out the Laozian concept of *daode* from this discourse and give pride of place to the way of governance Han Fei deemed detrimental to the monarch. With this powerful conceptual action, it seems Han Yu wanted to make sure that even though the term *daode* may still be in currency, it shall not be used to refer to a Laozian concept any more.

Why did Han take such a serious issue with Laozi's *daode*? Here another context figures in – Tang politics. In an influential article titled "On Han Yu," Chen Yinke notes Han's target was the emperors and prime ministers around Han's time who advocated Daoism.[67] Seeing the Tang imperial house's reverence of Laozi that reached an apex during Xuanzong's 玄宗 reign (712-755) as ridiculous, however, Chen thought the issue Han Yu had with them was that their indulgence in a superstitious religion made the people suffer by harming the social customs.[68] In Han Yu's rhetoric, there were indeed such words that seem to support understanding his point at this level.[69] However, if we are willing to let go of the assumption that a ruler could afford indulging in something unrelated to his full-time job – governing a vast population across an expansive territory through a large bureaucracy in the face of other power holders who would seize whatever opportunities there are to contend with him,[70] we can see what Han was attacking was not just the influence of Daoist religion in social customs but actually the way the Tang was governed.

---

[65] As can be seen in the multiple meanings the term *daode* was used to refer to in the eleventh century that we shall see toward the end of this chapter.
[66] On filling empty categories with concrete meanings, see Koselleck, *Futures Past*, 187.
[67] To the evidence Chen presented, see also Han Yu's own statement in Han, "Chong da Zhang Ji shu," 201: "今夫二氏之所宗而事之者，下乃公卿輔相，吾豈敢昌言而排之哉？" Han only stopped short of pointing his fingers at the monarch.
[68] Chen Yinke, "Lun Han Yu," 326-28.
[69] See, for example, Han Yu, "Lun Fo gu biao" (*HCLJ*, vol. 2, 399).
[70] Smith and Ebrey, "Introduction," 7. On reciprocity being the "cardinal principle of Tang patronage for Buddhism and Daoism," see Benn, "Taoism as Ideology in the Reign of Emperor Hsüan-Tsung (712-755)," 7.

In an insightful study of the Tang's Daoist ideology focusing on Xuanzong's reign,[71] Charles David Benn argues that

> The emperor favored Daoist theories of self-cultivation[72] and statecraft because they offered theoretical support for the contentions that the monarch holds all authority and that officeholders must devote themselves to public service. He integrated classical and religious Daoism in his efforts to capitalize on their doctrines. To disseminate the ideology among his people and to train Daoist officeholders, he introduced institutional innovations which became unique features of Tang culture.[73]

Regarding Daoist statecraft, Alex Feldt recently pointed out:

> [T]he political structure presented in the *Laozi* would necessarily be autocratic, with a centralized government ruled by the Daoist sage and administered by numerous ministers. The ruler or autocrat would operate through *wuwei*, allowing the ministers and others to have direct control of government functions, while always maintaining ultimate control and authority. Thus, the ruler would enjoy supreme political authority.[74]

Benn notes Xuanzong's use of Daoist ideology in governance reached a high point during the Tianbao period (742-755),[75] to the extent that "most of his acts enhancing the prestige of Daoism and integrating it with the state ritually, politically and academically during that period gave it a

[71] On the similarities (and differences) between Xuanzong and Huizong, see Bol, "Emperors Can Claim Antiquity Too," 202.
[72] The Daoist theories of "self-cultivation" are not about trying to acquire virtues, but using physical and mental therapeutics to attain longevity. On the different kinds of cultivation in the context of governance, see the Conclusion.
[73] Benn, "Taoism as Ideology," 3. Drawing on Benn, Paul van Els notes that this period also saw a highpoint in the reverence of the *Wenzi*, a text "traditionally ascribed to a disciple of Laozi" (*The Wenzi*, 2).
[74] Feldt, "Governing through the Dao," 335. On Chinese emperors' using Daoism as a means of political legitimization, see Lagerway, *Taoist Ritual in Chinese Society and History*, chapter 15. On the political uses of religion in Chinese history, see Yang, *Religion in Chinese Society*. I see Daoism as more than an instrument for legitimacy.
[75] Benn, "Taoism as Ideology," 11. Benn thinks Xuanzong was in line with earlier Tang emperors in using Daoism "as a dynastic, monarchical and bureaucratic ideology" (ibid., 1). From his study and that of Barrett's discussed below, it seems this became more conspicuous from the third emperor Gaozong (r. 649-683) and then most obvious under Xuanzong. That in relation to his project on *The Essentials of Governance*, where chapter 13 was titled *renyi*, Wu Jing 吴兢 (670-749) got demoted suggests it was perhaps not to Xuanzong's taste. On Wu Jing's agenda, see De Weerdt and McMullen, "Introduction," xv-xvi, xix-xx.

privileged status in the belief that it was indispensable to the state."[76] T. H. Barrett further observes that

> Xuanzong's efforts to create an alternative to the traditional Confucian conception of monarchy were finally rejected only under later dynasties, and his many ideological innovations did not simply evaporate in 755 in the face of the rebellion of An Lushan. Rather the Tang dynasty continued to draw on the reserve of ideological capital he had amassed until its final demise, and the fact that this process took a century and a half to complete bears witness to the efficacy of Xuanzong's strengthening through Daoism of the prestige of his family line.[77]

Moreover, under Xianzong 憲宗 (r. 805-820), the emperor during whose reign Han Yu probably wrote "Tracing the Way,"[78] there came another sustained effort at recentralization that resulted in "a remarkable resurgence of Chang-an's authority within a mere fifteen years."[79] And Barrett points out this coincided with the emperor's continued support for Daoism.[80]

Regardless of whether Han Yu was responding to the recentralization during Xianzong's reign or faulting Xuanzong for his full-scale adoption of Daoist ideology in the decade leading to the rebellion, or both, that he was working against centralized rule is certain: by defining *dao* in an open-ended way – "proceeding from this to go there" – and *de* as moral autonomy – "being sufficient of oneself without relying on externals [for moral guidance]" –, Han made the central authority irrelevant in an individual's moral decision-making. Against the mid-Tang mainstream that still saw the monarch as "the ultimate source of social values,"[81] Han Yu produced a new approach to governance that grants moral authority – the right to decide what is the right thing to do – to each individual literatus,[82] telling them there isn't a predefined way one must follow and that it is not necessary to rely on any authority other than oneself.

---

[76] Benn, "Taoism as Ideology," 8.
[77] Barrett, *Taoism under the T'ang*, 72-73.
[78] Shao-yun Yang seeks to date "Yuan dao" to 812 ("*The Way of the Barbarians*," 28, 52-53).
[79] Dalby, "Court Politics in Late T'ang Times," 611-12. See also Peterson, "The Restoration Completed," 153-54.
[80] Barrett, *Taoism under the T'ang*, 78. DeBlasi thinks the ninety years between 760 and 850 featured decentralization on the whole, despite Xianzong's "ephemeral" attempts at recentralization (*Reform in the Balance*, 8-9).
[81] DeBlasi, *Reform in the Balance*, 67. By "social values," I take DeBlasi as meaning values current in the society.
[82] As it is, Han meant this for the *shi* (literati or men of letters) only. Those who professions were agriculture, manufacture, or commerce as well as those in the non-secular sectors were not included (Han Yu, "Yuan dao," in *HCLJ*, vol. 1, 17).

It is worth paying close attention to Han's rhetorical strategy:[83] a good writer, Han knew the attack would be the more effective if his ammunition was focused on one target that went the farthest rather than being diffused among many. This is why while on the surface, he mainly called out Laozi,[84] in presenting *renyi* as the only right way to govern, he actually implicitly denied legitimacy to all the other approaches to governance from China's past – like that of the Legalists, who, after all, contributed to the making of the first empire in China.[85] Combined with the fact that he used his detailed and unmuddled theory contrasting *renyi* with *daode* to structure the whole piece, we can see Han was using Laozi's *daode* as a rhetorical device to refer to all kinds of approaches to governance, originating from the Central Country (*zhong guo* 中國)[86] or not, that did not fall in line with the one he was advocating. With this, Han Yu was trying to make the way to govern he referred to with the term *renyi* the only one for the Chinese people to have, because, he claimed, loving humans appropriately is something that can be agreed upon by all human beings under Heaven (*tianxia zhi gongyan* 天下之公言), whereas Laozi's *daode*, due to the fact that it is spoken of after having abandoned *renyi*, is but the private opinion of one person [the ruler, for the interest of his own state] (*yiren zhi siyan* 一人之私言).[87]

In the middle of "Tracing the Way," Han gave an illustration of how this way of governance works: in creating the civilization, how did the sages decide what is the right thing to do? "They looked to the needs and desires of men and created institutions that satisfied their desires in a way that led them to care for each other."[88] That is, to Han, governing with *renyi* means seeing the government's job as meeting human needs by means of various cultural forms for finer humanity among humans. Han's sages – whom he differentiated from mundane monarchs[89] – were the

[83] This is inspired by discussions in Yang, "*The Way of the Barbarians*," 16, 22.
[84] For Han's awareness of the other ways of governance in general, see his "Song Meng Dongye xu," in *HCLJ*, vol. 1, 349-50; for his attitude toward the Legalist way in particular, see "Lun bu zei xing shang biao," in ibid., vol. 2, 395. For his view on the Qin state whose power the Legalists' theories helped increase, see his "Yu Meng Shangshu shu," in ibid., vol. 1, 317-8.
[85] For recent studies of just two among them, see, for instance, Pines trans., *The Book of Lord Shang* and Goldin ed., *Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Han Fei*. Given the size of this group and the fact that it was their approach to governance that initiated China's imperial era to which the Tang belonged, Han's silence on them constituted an implicit strong statement.
[86] Bol, "Geography and Culture."
[87] Han Yu, "Yuan dao," in *HCLJ*, vol. 1, 15. Goldin notes Han Fei's *gong* 公 was just the ruler's self-interest (*After Confucius*, 59).
[88] Bol, *"This Culture of Ours,"* 129.
[89] Han Yu, "Yuan dao," in *HCLJ*, vol. 1, 18-19. Conflating the two has led Hsiao Kung-chuan to claim this piece was about revering the monarch (*Zhongguo zhengzhi sixiang shi*, 252). For a critique of Hsiao's approach, see Kim, *A History of Chinese Political Thought*, introduction.

exemplars for his intended readers to emulate, each on their own. Because this political theory put love of humanity at its center, this was a humanist way to govern. Because political philosophers from Laozi to Han Yu all took governing with *renyi* as the identifying feature of the approach of Confucius and his followers, I think we can justifiably call this humanist political theory "Confucian."[90]

In summary: read against the earlier discourse on the relationship between *renyi* and *daode* Han was reacting against and the Tang's centralized way of governance Han was challenging, as well as paying attention to his rhetorical strategy, we can see Han Yu's overarching purpose in writing "Tracing the Way" was to replace the approach to governance referred to with Laozi's *daode* that centralizes authority to the monarch in an anti-humanist way with the Confucian one referred to with *renyi* that decentralizes moral authority to the literati in a humanist way.[91]

Inherent in Han's political theory is moral individualism and value pluralism: except for establishing two inter-related values – broad love of humans and doing so appropriately – as a general principle, Han gives no definition for what is moral.[92] Rather, in authorizing each individual to simply proceed from *renyi* and make moral decisions entirely on their own, Han reveals his normative view that one should establish "a personal moral foundation independent of society" within oneself and use this "personal version of the dao of the sage" to make one's moral judgment.[93] In other words, what Han presents is a theory of self-governance under the guideline of loving humans appropriately.[94] "Tracing the Way" is thus the founding text in this new way of governance that Song political philosophers kept engaging with, either as Han's followers trying to improve it or as his opponents seeking to cancel it. The choice Wang Anshi asked Shenzong to make was regarding this.

My uses of "decentralization" and "self-governance" in the case of Han Yu need some explication. By the former, I mainly refer to Han's theory of dispersing the locale of moral authority among individual literati rather than having it concentrated in the court or the emperor.

---

[90] As noted in the Introduction, this historical version of Confucian political theory was very different from that advocated by contemporary "Confucian" political thinkers. For a recent example of the latter, see Bai, *Against Political Equality*.

[91] For what I mean by "decentralization," see below.

[92] This is consistent with DeBlasi's observation that Han Yu thinks humans are not moral by nature (*Reform in the Balance*, 132).

[93] Bol, *"This Culture of Ours,"* 133-34.

[94] While seeking to establish a similar case for the mid-Tang ancient prose proponents in general, DeBlasi does not think "Tracing the Way" supports this reading, given the role of sage-rulers in there (*Reform in the Balance*, 138). The key lies in recognizing the clear distinction Han Yu made between sage-rulers and monarchs.

Moreover, Han did not have the power to grant political authority, nor did he theorize such. But decentralizing moral authority opened the path for decentralizing political authority, which eventually happened by the mid-eleventh century, as we shall soon read below. The same with "self-governance": by this I mean Han's theory was one of having individual literati making moral decisions on their own. This again did not involve political decision-making until the mid-eleventh century.[95]

Intellectual life tends to be ahead of social-political developments, sometimes by centuries. After the An Lushan rebellion, in David McMullen's words, "[t]he court no longer provided the framework in which the scholarly community rehearsed and defined their political values. At the same time, there was political and social continuity."[96] Like all ground-breaking ideas, Han Yu's political theory had to await a fitting social soil. Through the last decades of the ninth century, the medieval aristocrats constituting the body politic with the Tang ruling house continued to exist.[97] Their being tightly bound up with the imperial family through marriage and other social networks made the outdated centralist ideology linger on. Although this elite demised around the turn of the tenth century, the subsequent Five Dynasties proved no better times for self-governance. This only became possible in the more long-lasting Song state founded in 960.

Beginning with the second emperor (r. 976-997), in part to replace the powerful founding elite with men from outside the circle of established families,[98] the Song had been increasingly recruiting civil servants mainly through the examination system.[99] By the mid-eleventh century, when the Song was at the turn of its second century, the founding families who helped the Zhao 趙 house build the state had been considerably replaced by a new type of elite consisting mainly of degree holders, who had by now become semi-hereditary.[100] While the original intention of the exam system was to recruit literati "dependent on government service and unstintingly loyal to the

[95] For a helpful discussion of the difference between moral and political authority, see Koselleck, *Critique and Crisis*, 58-60.
[96] McMullen, "Views of the State in Du You and Liu Zongyuan," 61. On the development toward individual autonomy in the late eighth and early ninth centuries, see id., *State and Scholars in T'ang China*, 261-62 and "Han Yü."
[97] Tackett, *The Destruction of the Medieval Chinese Oligarchy*.
[98] Hartwell, "Demographic, Political, and Social Transformations of China," 409: from 976 to 1063, the percentage of policy-making offices held by professional elite had been steadily increasing at the same time when that held by the founding elite was steadily declining. On the origins of Song elite, see Hymes, "Sung Society and Social Change," 621ff.
[99] Smith and Ebrey, "Introduction," 6-7.
[100] Hartwell, "Demographic, Political, and Social Transformations of China," 408-09.

throne,"[101] over time they grew more independent,[102] relying not so much on the imperial house as on the polity – the political entity constituted by current and prospective participants in the political system consisting of examinees, examiners, teachers, officials, and the emperor, among others, each possessing negotiating power to some extent.[103] It was among these men of letters, led by Ouyang Xiu through the ancient prose movement – a literary intellectual movement carried forward from its mid-Tang proponents like Han Yu –, that a self-governing republic[104] first materialized.

II
Ouyang Xiu and Self-Governance

> More than two hundred years after Han Yu, the world got Master Ouyang. His learning promotes that of Han Yu and Mencius, so as to reach Confucius. Manifesting the substance of humanity and appropriateness in ritual and music, it seeks to be in line with the great Way. … The literati, no matter worthy or unworthy, agree without prior consultation that "Master Ouyang is today's Han Yu."

[101] Smith and Ebrey, "Introduction," 7.

[102] Although it is still customary for many scholars to start by saying the Song was a period of centralized rule, the century-old view of Naito Konan that it was marked by autocracy because such literati were more dependent on the emperor given their lack of an independent power basis has been critiqued by historians of middle period China. See, for example, Bol, *Neo-Confucianism in History*, 117-19; Hymes and Schirokauer, "Introduction," 43, 46; Wang Ruilai, "Lun Songdai xiangquan" and "Lun Songdai huangquan," 144–5. See also the surveys of the debate on the power relationship between the emperor and the prime minister in Northern Song in Skonicki, "Employing the Right Kind of Men," 45-51 and Song, *Traces of Grand Peace*, 153-56. To these, we can add one solid piece of evidence: in 1057, most examinees felt Ouyang Xiu, one literatus who was selected through the examination system in the 1020s and who was entrusted by his office with the power to change the exam standards, was their patron, rather than Renzong. As Hilde De Weerdt notes, this was the year when imperial prerogative to fail candidates was rescinded (*Competition over Content*, 9n13).

[103] De Weerdt, *Competition over Content*. Although De Weerdt thinks the state is still important, her work does highlight the agency of non-state players consisting mainly of the literati. Paul Smith and Patricia Ebrey call these "cohabitants of the Song state" ("Introduction," 5-7).

[104] For uses of this term, see Min, "The Republic of the Mind"; Song, "Tension and Balance," 275; Kim, *A History of Chinese Political Thought*, chapter 6 and "A Decentralized Republic of Virtue." What I hope this study adds is that Han Yu's "Tracing the Way" laid the theoretical foundation for this republic and that it debuted in the mid-eleventh century and survived three reigns that sought to end it by practicing Wang Anshi's theory (Shenzong, Zhezong and Huizong, the latter two only when they were ruling in person), before flourishing in the Southern Song. On a republic not needing to be non-monarchical, see Hankins, "Exclusivist Republicanism and the Non-Monarchical Republic" and *Virtue Politics*, chapter 3. On the Jiayou administration being a monarchical republic, see Lu Guolong, *Song ru weiyan*, 25.

> 愈之後二百有餘年而後得歐陽子，其學推韓愈、孟子以達於孔氏，著禮樂仁義之實，以合於大道。…士無賢不肖，不謀而同曰："歐陽子，今之韓愈也。"[105]

Ouyang's successor Su Shi, one of Wang Anshi's foremost critics, thought his teacher carried forward Han Yu's governing with *renyi* by giving it concrete forms in ritual and music.[106] This theoretical supplement was made in "On the Roots" 本論, regarding which a twentieth century scholar noted:

> "On the Roots" originated from Changli's[107] "Tracing the Way," and had particularly numerous theories inquiring into the source. Previous people said: were Mr. Ouyang's "On the Roots" not practiced, Changli's "Tracing the Way" would ultimately be empty assumptions only.
> "本論"淵源於昌黎"原道"，而特多探原之說。前人謂歐公"本論"不行，則昌黎"原道"終為虛設。[108]

Han Yu never got to make state policy.[109] Nor did he produce a theory on how to get from the current non-Confucian way of governance to governing with *renyi*. Rather, at the end of "Tracing the Way," raising the question of how to get from the status quo to the ideal he outlined, Han answered: "burning their books and turning their temples into abodes."[110] As Li Gou 李覯 (1009-1059) pointed out, this is both violent and impractical.[111] Moreover, such forceful measures can hardly be undertaken by any agent other than those who are in control of the government.[112] And yet the reality is that Han Yu was seldom on good terms with them. The fundamental problem

---

[105] Su Shi, "*Jushi ji* xu," in Ouyang Xiu, *Ouyang Xiu quanji*, preface. Dated to 1091. See also Chen Shidao, *Houshan tancong*, 109 and Yuan Xingzong, "Ba Liu Yuanfu wen," in Zeng Zaozhuang and Liu Lin eds., *Quan Song wen*, 218.200.
[106] For Ouyang's own view on Han Yu's legacy, see the comment he wrote by the end of Han Yu's biography in Ouyang Xiu and Song Qi, *Xin Tang shu*, 176.5269.
[107] Choronym of Han Yu's self-claimed ancestral home.
[108] Huang Gongzhu ed., *Ouyang Yongshu wen*, preface, 11. That "On the Roots" was continuing "Tracing the Way" seems the shared view among commentators, even though they differ on what exactly Ouyang was continuing and how well he did it (Hong Benjian, *Ouyang Xiu shi wen ji jiao jian*, 515-16). James Liu's analysis of this essay focuses on Ouyang's gradualism, an abiding theme Liu finds in him (*Ou-Yang Hsiu*, 114-15, 163–65). This view is carried forward by Ronald Egan (*The Literary Works of Ou-Yang Hsiu*, 70).
[109] Chen Shidao, *Houshan tancong*, 109.
[110] Han Yu, "Yuan dao," in *HCLJ*, vol. 1, 23.
[111] Li Gou, *Li Gou ji*, 16.146.
[112] This is perhaps why scholars assume the subject here is the government. For instance, Egan thinks Han was urging the government to do this (*The Literary Works of Ou-Yang Hsiu*, 70). So does Yang (*The Way of the Barbarians*, 93). Strictly speaking, the text of "Tracing the Way" did not designate the subject.

with his dramatic approach to implementing his political theory is that it essentially pinned the hope for realizing literati self-governance on there appearing a powerful man in the government willing to take that kind of action, which was beyond Han's control. By contrast, in "On the Roots," Ouyang proposed a more viable way to practice Han's ideas and it was thanks to this that Han's new approach to governance finally went beyond being a mere theory.

At the beginning of the final version of "On the Roots," Ouyang set up Buddhism as the rhetorical device with which to refer to all the various ways of governance not in line with the one he was advocating.[113] Looking back to the more than a millennium of history when the Central Country suffered the harm from the Buddhist way, Ouyang found expelling it had not worked. Rather, it kept coming back after being removed for a while, each time with greater force. The reason, Ouyang pointed out using a medical metaphor, was because China's vital energy became deficient from within, making itself susceptible to external causes of illness. Thus, to save China from being invaded by the barbarian way of governance, the more fundamental thing to do was to fill the Chinese world with *liyi* – the basis with which to victory over Buddhism –, not giving it any chance to exert its way onto the Chinese people.

The term *liyi* came from the *Xunzi*,[114] where it as David Nivison notes was sometimes used interchangeably with *li*.[115] In line with Xunzi,[116] Ouyang also used it to refer to the ritual system consisting of various specific forms of ritual and music. And, just like Xunzi's *li* was for better meeting human needs by aligning their potentially insatiable desires with limited material resources,[117] Ouyang's ritual and music, practiced in state and society and taught at schools, were for guiding the people toward *renyi*,[118] like how they were in antiquity:

[113] For more on Ouyang's rhetorical strategy, see below.
[114] Eric Hutton argues that *yi* 義 as used by Xunzi does not have a ready equivalent in English ("Ethics in the *Xunzi*," 72–73).
[115] Nivison, "Response to James Behuniak," 113.
[116] Precisely because he very much adopted Xunzi's method, Ouyang began the third part with what he thought was not helpful in the *Xunzi*. Ouyang's 1042 view on ritual did not change when he wrote the introduction to the treatise on ritual and music in the *New Tang History* in the 1050s. As his son wrote, "其於《唐書.禮樂志》，發明禮樂之本" (*Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 1371). For a discussion of Ouyang's work on this, including its dating, see Sung, "An Ambivalent Historian." For an analysis of the introduction, see Bol, "*This Culture of Ours,"* 195-97.
[117] Wang Xianqian, *Xunzi jijie*, 13.337: "故制禮義以分之，以養人之欲，給人之求，使欲必不窮乎物，物必不屈乎欲." For a discussion, see Ivanhoe, "A Happy Symmetry," 315.
[118] On Ouyang's project being one of humanist, see Fuller, "Moral Intuitions and Aesthetic Judgments," 1324.

> In the people's lives, if they were not laboring in the fields, they were occupied in ritual and music; if they were not in their homes, they were in the schools. What they heard with their ears and saw with their eyes were nothing but *renyi*, towards which they were gladly drawn tirelessly. Throughout their lives, they did not see other things. How could they have the spare time to aspire for what was outside these? It is therefore I say that even if there were Buddhism at that time, it would have had no way to get into the people, because there were such instruments then.
> 民之生也，不用力乎南畝，[119]則從事於禮樂之際；不在其家，則在乎庠序之間。耳聞目見，無非仁義，樂而趣之，不知其倦。終身不見異物，又奚暇夫外慕哉？故曰雖有佛無由而入者，謂有此具也。[120]

The reason why people are drawn to Buddhism, Ouyang pointed out in the next part, was because they had long been accustomed to it. Under this situation, calling for them to ban Buddhism as Han Yu said and asking them to turn to *liyi* – something they had never seen or heard of – would only scare them away. Rather, the way to victory over Buddhism was simply to diligently perform all kinds of rites at all level of society – from imperial sacrifice to Heaven to a commoner's wedding and immerse people in them. In this way, humanity would gradually get realized in a generation (*shi er hou ren* 世而後仁).[121]

Like Han Yu's focusing his ammunition on Laozi's *daode* in his attack on all the ways of governance not in line with governing with *renyi*, Ouyang, an equally good writer, was using Buddhism for the same purpose. This can be clearly seen from the following sentences in the last part of "On the Roots":

> In the past, the barbarians lived mixed up admist the Nine Provinces – the so-called Rong of Xu, the White Di, the Man of Jing (i.e., the Chu), the Yi of the Huai [River], and the like. The Three Dynasties [of Xia, Shang, and Zhou] having declined, [barbarians] like these all invaded the Central Country. Thus the Qin, as western Rong, took possession of the Eastern Zhou capital, and [the rulers of] both the Wu and the Chu states arrogated to themselves the title of king. … At that time, even though Buddhism had not arrived yet, how could the Central Country not become barbarian?

[119] Che Hsing-chien notes Ouyang Xiu had a sober view on the non-applicability of the well-field system in his time ("Shi lun Ouyang Xiu de Ruxue fan ben lun," 168n100). This suggests that Ouyang was perhaps again applying the rhetorical strategy of simplifying the message for ideological advocacy.
[120] Ouyang Xiu, "Ben lun zhong," in *Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 122.
[121] Ouyang Xiu, "Ben lun xia," in *Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 124.

> Therefore, when the kingly way isn't made clear and *renyi* abandoned, the harms of the barbarians would come.[122]
>
> 昔者戎狄蠻夷雜居九州之間，所謂徐戎、白狄、荊蠻、淮夷之類是也。三代既衰，若此之類並侵於中國，故秦以西戎據宗周，吳、楚之國皆僭稱王。…當是之時，佛雖不來，中國幾何其不夷狄也。以是而言，王道不明而仁義廢，則夷狄之患至矣。[123]

Following Han Yu, Ouyang's purpose was to establish the way of governance Han formulated in "Tracing the Way" as the only legitimate way to govern. For this, he called all the other ways "barbarian," to indicate their inferiority. Buddhism, with its foreign origin, makes a convenient target.[124] But the "barbarians" he list were not necessarily those living outside the Central Country – except for Buddhists, all lived within the bounds of "China." Nor was Ouyang's focus on their ethnicities. Rather, he was using Buddhism as the representative of all the "barbarian" ways of governance that did not feature *renyi*, including the one that helped strengthen the Qin state and turn it into an empire. To Ouyang, like to Han Yu, the only way for the Chinese people to have was to govern with *renyi* – the Confucian way.

That Ouyang was a successor to Han Yu on a decentralized approach to governance may be counterintuitive. Indeed, he has frequently been taken as a centralist. For instance, in *Ordering the World*, Robert Hymes and Conrad Schirokauer think Ouyang was someone who, like almost all in the Northern Song, asks "the center to act systematically and positively on the world around it."[125] Their textual basis is the original first part of "On the Roots" that Ouyang deleted when editing his own anthology not long before his death in 1072.[126] In that part, Ouyang premised using adorning ritual and music to revitalize *renyi* on having strengthened the state first:

> Revenue was sufficient for use and able to provide for natural disasters. Soldiers were sufficient to ward off calamity but did not go so far as to cause calamity. Only with all this supplied did they embellish ritual and music and promote *renyi* to educate and guide them.[127]

---

[122] Translation modified from Yang, *The Way of the Barbarians*, 93.
[123] Ouyang Xiu, "Ben lun xia," in *Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 123-24.
[124] Yang thinks Ouyang's argument here was that "Buddhism's influence was far less dangerous to the Chinese civilization than the barbarian incursions of Confucius' day" (*The Way of the Barbarians*, 92). James Liu notes Ouyang's attack on Buddhism "was confined to theory" (*Ou-Yang Hsiu*, 165).
[125] Hymes and Schirokauer, "Introduction," 14-16.
[126] On this revision, see Higashi Hidetoshi, *Fugu yu chuangxin*, 230, 232.
[127] Translation modified from Hymes and Schirokauer, "Introduction," 14-15.

> 財足於用而可以備天災也，兵足以禦患而不至於為患也。凡此具矣，然後飾禮樂、興仁義以教道之。[128]

As Hymes and Schirokauer noted, this represented Ouyang's thinking in the 1040s,[129] more precisely in 1042, when he was amidst the developments that led to the short-lived Qingli reform of 1044 in which he played the role of an ideologist.[130] With the Tangut war in the background,[131] those calling for a reform were expected to deliver a stronger state. What Ouyang wrote in this part constituted some ideas on how to attain it. However, between it and the latter two parts, there was an inherent contradiction: governing with *renyi*, as Han Fei rightly pointed out, entails allowing the people to go about their own business, and yet for strengthening the state, Ouyang needed the subjects to "devote themselves to the state selflessly" 忘身許國.[132] Perhaps aware of this, Ouyang began the original trilogy by making a distinction between roots and branches 本末 and the precedent and the subsequent 先後, suggesting what he dealt with in the first part was temporally prior. This may have avoided making himself self-contradictory in logic, but the overall title of the three parts as a whole was after all "On the Roots," a topic the original first part did not go into. Whichever reason it was that eventually led Ouyang to make the well-considered decision to delete it,[133] that part was not where contemporaries saw Ouyang's legacy lied.[134] Rather, cutting out the part on strengthening the state and keeping guiding the people toward *renyi* with ritual and music suggests that Ouyang later made a choice between the two conflicting goals.

The deletion was made in the early 1070s, but Ouyang's choice was made much earlier, during the decade of "self-cultivation and political quiescence" following the failure of the 1044 reform. As James Liu points out, after returning to the central government in 1054, Ouyang "no longer desired to promote another reform," only wanting to make some improvements.[135] In doing

---

[128] Ouyang Xiu, "Ben lun shang," in *Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 412.
[129] Hymes and Schirokauer, "Introduction," 14.
[130] Bol, *"This Culture of Ours,"* 172.
[131] McGrath, "The Reigns of Jen-Tsung and Ying-Tsung," 300-16.
[132] Ouyang Xiu, "Ben lun shang," in *Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 123. The view that the state has to be strengthened first before the people can be cultivated is in line with the logic stated at the opening of *Guanzi*: "倉廩實則知禮節" (Dai Wang, *Guanzi jiaozheng*, 1.1).
[133] Higashi thinks Ouyang deleted the first part, where anti-Buddhism did not figure, to reflect his strong attitude to exclude Buddhism late in his life (*Fugu yu chuangxin*, 239).
[134] See, for example, the offering pieces written on Ouyang's death (*Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 1331-52).
[135] Liu, *Ou-yang Hsiu*, 69. On the same page, Liu also points out Ouyang realized he was wrong to provoke factional dispute in the past, even though his strong personality did not stop him from "making criticisms or raising objections."

so, he finally fell in line with the administration whose approach to governance Wang Anshi disapprovingly characterized as "in everything following the natural pattern and tendency" 一切因任自然之理勢.[136] Peter Bol also notes the mature Ouyang focused on *wen*,[137] the various cultural forms with which to guide the people toward *renyi*. It was this commitment to cultural things (*wenwu* 文物), not the ideas he flirted with on strengthening the state in 1042,[138] that "had come to define the mainstream of the new intellectual culture" by the 1050s.[139]

Other than using an all-embracing ritual system to gradually realize *renyi*, Ouyang also fixed another issue in Han Yu's theory. The stress Han put on building a personal foundation of morality and being fully self-sufficient within oneself could be taken as encouraging individuals to be different from others, with the logical result being that some would make this an end in itself, by writing in an idiosyncratic and strange way. In Ouyang's words, "were one to be different from the majority, then one must necessarily do what is odd and strange" 苟欲異眾，则必为迂僻奇怪."[140] This was precisely a direction the ancient prose movement took, resulting in the so-called Imperial University Style (*Taixue ti* 太學體) that celebrates eccentricity.[141] In 1057, being in charge of the examination and under the support of his central government colleagues,[142] Ouyang

See also Qi Xia, *Wang Anshi bianfa*, 97. Frederick Mote also notes the change Ouyang Xiu and his fellow Qingli reformers underwent in the 1050s and 1060s (*Imperial China*, 138).

[136] Wang Anshi, "Ben chao bainian wushi zhazi," in *LCJ*, 41.446.

[137] Bol, "*This Culture of Ours,*" 201. Uffe Bergeton has been problematizing translating *wen* as culture ("From 'Awe-Inspiringly Beautiful' to 'Pattern in Conventional Behavior'"; *The Emergence of Civilizational Consciousness in Early China*; and "Found (and Lost?) in Translation"). For a critique of his methodology, see Pines, "Review of *The Emergence of Civilizational Consciousness in Early China*."

[138] Bol, "*This Culture of Ours*," 196.

[139] Bol, "The Sung Context," 33. Ouyang's dropping government activism during this decade can also be known from those unhappy about his actions thereafter. For instance, in 1059, Wang Anshi's confidant Wang Ling 王令 (1032-1059) wrote Ouyang Xiu a poem, urging him not to forget his erstwhile ambition (*Wang Ling ji*, 447). This suggests that in reality, Ouyang was no longer pursuing it. See also Wang Anshi's complaint in 1061 (Li Tao, *XCB*, 193.4678).

[140] Ouyang Xiu, "Yi xue zhuang," in *Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 889. See also the record of conduct Wu Chong wrote for Ouyang in ibid., 1339.

[141] For a helpful discussion, see Zeng Zaozhuang, "Bei Song Guwen Yundong de quzhe guocheng." Cf. Ge Xiaoyin, "Ouyang Xiu paiyi 'Taixueti' xin tan." Ge's including Hu Yuan as being among Ouyang's targets jars with the congeniality of the Jiayou central government officials as perceived by Ouyang Xiu's sons (Ouyang Fa et al., "Shiji," in *Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 1377), as well as Ouyang's own officially expressed view of Hu in 1056 ("Ju liu Hu Yuan guan gou Taixue zhuagn," in *Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 868-69). The same applies to Ming-kin Chu's seeing Ouyang's 1057 action as ending the pluralistic culture that had come into being under Hu Yuan in the Imperial University (*The Politics of Higher Education*, 64).

[142] Bol, *"This Culture of Ours,"* 192. This indicates that Ouyang was acting on behalf of the court for public interest, rather than pushing his personal agenda high-handedly. On Ouyang seeing the government's job as meeting human desires, see Bol, "The Sung Context," 35.

changed the grading criteria to discourage this, thereby redirecting the movement back to focusing on using writing ancient prose to develop one's own "ideas about what ought to be done."[143]

In a recently published book, Ming-kin Chu takes this as Ouyang Xiu advancing his own intellectual agenda high-handedly,[144] and as such "very likely inspired Wang Anshi to adopt similarly high-handed tactics two decades later."[145] Chu's observation precisely tells the necessity to study the content of Wang's learning, which we shall see was diametrically different from Ouyang's. Here let us note that Ouyang was not using this high-handed measure to centralize authority. Rather, the point of this apparently authoritarian action was to select into officialdom men with their own moral sense who would act independently according to the personal moral foundation established within themselves. As Peter Bol notes, in practice, Ouyang "left it to learned individuals to determine correct policy according to the occasion."[146] In other words, this is a centralist action the purpose of which was to populate the government with self-governing officials to whom authority[147] shall be decentralized.[148] This was a major step in getting Han Yu's theory of self-governance as improved by Ouyang Xiu implemented at the national level – however small the odds were, Ouyang after the mid-1050s *was* the supportive powerful man Han Yu had pinned his hopes on over two centuries ago.[149]

That this small probability event could have occurred was thanks to the convergence of multiple factors, including imperial personality and health. Renzong 仁宗 (r. 1023-1063), the second palace-born Song emperor, was a soft, or kind, person, neither entertaining imperial ambitions nor wishing to exact the people, even before his health made these impossible.[150] In

[143] Bol, "The Sung Context," 28.
[144] Chu, *The Politics of Higher Education*, 61-65.
[145] Ibid., 13.
[146] Bol, "The Sung Context," 44. This is consistent with Skonicki's observation that the Qingli reformers "advocated a more decentralized conception of government in which local officials were charged with the task of transforming the populace and initiating political order" ("Cosmos, State and Society," 513).
[147] More than moral authority here, but actually including political authority.
[148] Delegation also featured in the original first part of "On the Roots," as Hymes and Schirokauer noted ("Introduction," 15). This fits the inside outsider Chia-fu Sung finds in Ouyang ("An Ambivalent Historian"), i.e., someone who wishes to remain independent of the bureaucracy of which he is a part.
[149] On Ouyang's political and intellectual authority in the 1050s, see Bol, "The Sung Context," 28-29.
[150] McGrath, "The Reigns of Jen-tsung and Ying-tsung"; Zhou Jia, *Bei Song zhongyang richang zhengwu*, 114, 223-24. Hartman argues that the allegory of a humane Renzong reign was mainly a Southern Song construction (*The Making of Song Dynasty History*, chapter 8), but the temple title *ren* conferred on him after he passed away in 1063 suggests this was how ranking officials in the early 1060s saw the core feature of his governance. Moreover, this was also how Wang Anshi repeatedly characterized it from the late 1050s to the late 1060s, in communications with both Renzong himself ("Shang Renzong Huangdi yan shi shu," in *LCJ*, 39.410) and his grandnephew Shenzong ("Ben chao bainian wu shi zhazi," in *LCJ*, 41.445).

1056/1, he further fell dysfunctionally ill[151] and never fully recovered since.[152] This presented Ouyang Xiu and his like-minded fellows in the central government a rare chance to practice self-governance at the highest level, by making decisions on state affairs through collective deliberation.[153]

Such affairs included imperial succession – Renzong happened to be also heirless, and the decision on whom to inherit him was in effect made by Ouyang Xiu and his colleagues collectively.[154] From the detailed account on how Renzong's adopted heir got established as emperor Yingzong 英宗 (r. 1063-1067),[155] it seems Renzong was forced to take the advice repeatedly offered him by his court officials.[156] The authority enjoyed by Yingzong was even less: not only did this adoptee have less political capital to begin with, but he was also indebted to and overpowered by those ranking officials who mostly continued to hold power through the end of his reign. Even though he may have wanted to more actively exercise imperial power,[157] his health and swift death made that at best an unfulfilled wish. Coupled with corresponding institutional developments – by the last decade of Renzong's reign, with independent institutions like the Remonstrance Bureau and the Censorate constituting independent restraints on imperial power,[158]

---

[151] Li Tao, *XCB*, 182.4394.

[152] Although there were instances when Renzong sought to re-assert imperial authority, like in 1061 (Hartman, "Sung Government and Politics," 85).

[153] On decision-making from 1056 to early 1067, see Han Qi's biography in *Song shi*, 312.10224-26. On Ouyang Xiu's tenure during this period, see his "Bozhou qi zhi shi di yi biao," submitted in the spring of 1068, in *Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 719: "更二府之繁，蓋亦八年之久." See also Ouyang's biography in *Song shi*, 319.10378-9 and that in *Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 1364. On collective deliberations during Renzong's reign, see Zhou Jia, *Bei Song zhongyang richang zhengwu*, 238-51. On Han and Ouyang being like-minded, see Han's own account in the offering piece he wrote for Ouyang (Han Qi, "Ji wen," in *Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 1331): "餘早接公，道同氣類." See also the account given by Ouyang Xiu's son in ibid., 1378.

[154] On Ouyang's leading role in this, see his record of conduct written by Wu Chong in *Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 1339: "凡再上疏，請立皇子以固天下根本。及在政府，遂與諸公協定大議."

[155] Yang Zhongliang, *JSBM*, volume 51.

[156] This was made explicit in the brief account in Xu Ziming, *Song zai fu biannian lu*, 5.318. From the latter, we also learn that the choice of Yingzong as Renzong's adopted heir was proposed by Mei Yaochen, who conceived of the idea, together with Wen Yanbo and Fu Bi, not as Han Qi's biography says originated from Renzong himself (*Song shi*, 312.10225). Such historiographical inconsistencies indicate the sensitive nature of this matter, in the handling of which the court officials probably crossed a line that they knew would come with consequences. On this awareness in Fan Zhen, see Yang Zhongliang, *JSBM*, 51.903; in Sima Guang, ibid., 51.913; in Han Qi, *Song shi*, 312.10225. By all means, Renzong's agency was not clearly seen in this process.

[157] Zhou Jia, *Bei Song zhongyang richang zhengwu*, 156-57; Xiao-bin Ji, *Politics and Conservatism in Northern Song China*, 108.

[158] Note, however, like Luo Jiaxiang (*Bei Song dangzheng yanjiu*, 31), Ari Levine thinks they were for restraining ministerial power (*Divided by a Common Language*, 80).

a system of checks and balances had been established –,[159] imperial authority kept declining during the Jiayou (1056-1063) and Zhiping (1063-1067) periods.

As a result, when Yingzong's heir Zhao Xu took the throne on the twenty-fifth day of the first month of 1067,[160] the way of governance theorized by Han Yu and carried forward by Ouyang Xiu – that is, decentralizing authority to individual literati and leaving affairs in the state to be managed by them on their own, each according to their independent judgment of what is the right thing to do on each occasion under the general principle of loving humans appropriately – had become established at all levels of government, resulting in a world where, as Wang Anshi complained, "one person has one sense of what is right and ten persons ten" 一人一義，十人十義.[161]

A capable young man showing an interest in *Hanfeizi* when still a prince,[162] Shenzong was intent on stepping up his personal grasp on power.[163] He also had greater ambitions:[164] to carry forward and enlarge the Zhao house's accumulated assets in its second century and into the indefinite future[165] by strengthening the state in the competitive East Asian world order,[166] in which the Song had been paying for peace since the beginning of the eleventh century.[167] For realizing them, the existing ranking officials were probably deemed in the way, for in about a year, with Ouyang Xiu taking the lead, they had left the central government one after another.[168]

---

[159] As Hartman has demonstrated ("Historical Narrative and the Two Faces of Song Dynasty Governance," 43, 47, 54). See also id., "Sung Government and Politics," 103-12. This can be also seen from Wang Anshi's disapproving summary of the key features of Renzong's reign ("Ben chao bainian wu shi zhazi," in *LCJ*, 41.444-46).

[160] Li Tao, *XCB*, 209.5073.

[161] Ma Duanlin, *Wenxian tongkao*, 31.293. Ming-kin Chu translates more of this quote in *The Politics of Higher Education*, 92.

[162] Li Tao, *XCB*, 205.5005.

[163] Zhu Yiqun notes Shenzong wanted to take back the scepter of power that had been decentralized for long as soon as possible ("Song Shenzong qiyong Wang Anshi," 360).

[164] Zhao Dongmei thinks Shenzong's ambition derived from a need to prove the merit of the branch to which he and his father, who became the emperor by adoption, belonged (*Da Song zhi bian*, 225-26). Zhou Jia notes the continuity between Yingzong's attempt to become more active in the daily management of government affairs months before his death and the corresponding measure Shenzong understook five months after ascending the throne (*Bei Song zhongyang richang zhengwu*, 156-57).

[165] Liu Lin et al. eds., *SHY*, *xuanju* 7, 5401.24.

[166] Ibid., 5399.20. On this world order, see Tackett, *The Origins of the Chinese Nation*.

[167] On Shenzong's seeing militant neighboring states and powerful men as the two paramount issues to address, see his words in Li Tao, *XCB*, 250.6093.

[168] In Ouyang's biography in *Song History*, it is said that "神宗初即位，欲深譴修" (*Song shi*, 319.10380; *Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 1368). Li Tao even registered "上初欲誅修" (*XCB*, 209.5079). Whatever it was, their departure shortly after Shenzong took the throne perhaps told the new emperor's attitude towards them.

Meanwhile, Shenzong began approaching Wang Anshi, whose work had long impressed him.[169] Three months after becoming the emperor, Shenzong appointed Wang to govern Jiangning 江寧, Wang's home prefect where he had been living free of official duty for some four years, and Wang, who kept declining central government appointments until then, took it;[170] half a year later, the emperor further summoned Wang to be his Hanlin academician, and Wang took it, again.[171] When during their first meeting in 1068/4 Wang advised the emperor to begin with choosing the craft, what he meant was replacing the humanist literati self-governance with his that was developed to counteract it.

III
Wang Anshi and the Self-Governing Mainstream

A broadly learned literatus with literary and administrative capabilities, Wang Anshi followed the ancient prose movement early in his career.[172] Desiring a perfect order,[173] however, Wang came to be concerned about the loss of a uniform way due to the moral individualism and value pluralism inherent in the very practice of writing ancient prose. By the mid-1050s at the latest, Wang had made his discontent with Han Yu and Han's successor Ouyang Xiu known.

---

[169] On Shenzong being Wang's reader when still a prince, see "Wang Jinggong Anshi zhuan," in Hong Ye et al. eds., *Wanyanji shan cun*, 370: "神宗在藩邸，見其文, 異之." See also Wang Anshi's biography in *Song shi*, 327.10543 and Shenzong's words in Huang Yizhou, *XCBSB*, 92: "朕久聞卿道術德義" and Yang Zhongliang, *JSBM*, 59.1045: "朕知卿久，非適今日也." While Wang Anshi was the architect of the reform, Shenzong was its owner: not only did he originate it, but he also kept directing it and pushing it forward, with or without Wang Anshi personally spearheading it – after Wang's permanent retirement, Shenzong kept hiring men who he thought had grasped Wang's approach to governance, be they Wang Anshi's relatives or students. And Shenzong could fire them as he wished, especially with his increased grasp on power thanks to the efforts of Wang Anshi and his associates, like in the Yu Fan case (Chu, "Official Recruitment, Imperial Authority, and Bureaucratic Power"). For works highlighting Shenzong's agency, see Ye Tan, *Da bianfa* and Li Yumin, "Song Shenzong zhizao de yi zhuang da yuan'an" and "Wutai Shi'an xin tan." On Shenzong's role in the reform, see Cui Yingchao and Zhang Qifan, "Xi Feng bianfa zhong Song Shenzong zuoyong" and Li Guoqiang, "Lun Bei Song Xining bianfa de shizhi."

[170] Before accepting this position, Wang had declined Shenzong's summon to the court once. For a close examination of this process, see Zhu Yiqun, "Song Shenzong qiyong Wang Anshi."

[171] Zhao Dongmei, *Da Song zhi bian*, 144-45.

[172] See, for instance, the cover letters he wrote around 1045 to literati officials who he thought were in a position to help advance his career on finishing the three-year tenure of his first job (first of the two "Shang Zhang Taibo shu" and "Shang Zu Wuze shu," in *LCJ*, 77.810-12). According to Wang's own account, at this time, he had not completed his learning (second of the three "Da Wang Shenfu shu," in *LCJ*, 72.768: "某學未成而仕"). Another indicator of this was that he kept diligently studying while working at his first job (Luo Chuanqi and Wu Yunsheng, *Wang Anshi jiaoyu sixiang yanjiu*, 9-10).

[173] Bol, "*This Culture of Ours*," chapter 7.

Across Wang Anshi's oeuvre, criticisms of Han Yu were numerous,[174] some of which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. He was less explicit about Ouyang, a widely respected social superior who expressed an interest in meeting him since the 1040s[175] and recommended him to central government positions twice, once in 1054, once 1056.[176] Still, going beyond rhetoric and reading the texts against their contexts, we can see how he saw Ouyang and the mainstream defined by this Song Han Yu.

In 1056,[177] around the time of their first meeting, Ouyang wrote Wang a poem, the first half of which reads:

翰林風月三千首　Mr. Hanlin's Wind and Moon [Poems], three thousand pieces;
吏部文章二百年　Director of Personnel Department's refined writings, two hundred years.
老去自憐心尚在　Aging, I take pity on myself, having but the wish [to lead];
後來誰與子爭先　Of those coming forward, who can contest the first place with you?[178]

To this Wang responded:

欲傳道義心猶在　Desiring to transmit the meaning of the Way, that wish is still in me;
強學文章力已窮　Exerting myself to learn refined writings, I have been exhausted.
他日若能窺孟子　Were I able to gain a glimpse of Mencius someday;
終身何敢望韓公　How dare I look up to Mr. Han all my life.[179]

When interpreting this poetic exchange, Gu Yongxin chose to agree with the Qing defender of Wang Anshi Cai Shangxiang 蔡上翔 (1717-1810), who thought this was evidence that the two extremely admired each other and that Wang actually wanted to regard himself as the Han Yu of

[174] In *LCJ*, see, for example, "Qiu huai" 秋懷 (12.181), "Du Mo" 讀墨 (4.112), "Han zi" 韓子 (34.371-72), "Bo Yi" 伯夷 (63.674-75), "Yuan xing" 原性 and "Xing shuo" 性說 (68.626-27) and "Shang ren shu" 上人書 (77.811).
[175] Zeng Gong, "Yu Wang Jiefu di yi shu," in *Zeng Gong ji*, 16.255.
[176] Ouyang Xiu, "Zai lun shuizai zhuang," and "Jian Wang Anshi Lü Gongzhu zhazi," in *Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 865, 871.
[177] On this dating, see Li Deshen, *Wang Anshi shi wen xinian*, 91. See also Gu Yongxin, *Ouyang Xiu xueshu yanjiu*, 194n1.
[178] Ouyang Xiu, "Zeng Wang Jiefu," in *Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 395.
[179] Wang Anshi, "Fengchou Yongshu jianzeng," in *LCJ*, 22.264. The same view was expressed in "Qiu huai," in *LCJ*, 12.181. Wang's intellectual relationship to Mencius is discussed in chapters 2 and 4.

his time.[180] The several Song interpretations we have, however, all suggest otherwise. For instance, Ye Mengde 葉孟得 (1077-1148) commented:

> Mr. Wang, Duke of Jing,[181] initially did not know Mr. Ouyang Wenzhong.[182] Zeng Zigu made efforts to recommend him [to Ouyang], who was then willing to socialize with him, but Duke of Jing would not get himself connected in the end. At the beginning of the Zhihe period (1054-55), he was Administrative Assistant in the Herds Office, while Wenzhong returned to the court. It was only then he was known and why Ouyang wrote the verse "Mr. Hanlin's Wind and Moon [Poems], three thousand pieces; Director of Personnel Department's refined writings, two hundred years." However, Duke of Jing still did not think him someone who knew himself, therefore he responded with: "Were I able to gain a glimpse of Mencius someday, how dare I look up to Mr. Han all my life." He expected himself to be Mencius and took Wenzhong as Han Yu.
> 王荊公初未識歐文忠公，曾子固力薦之，公願得游其門，而荊公終不肯自通。至和初，為羣牧判官，文忠還朝，始見知，遂有"翰林風月三千首，吏部文章二百年"之句。然荊公猶以為非知己也，故酬之曰："他日儻能窺孟子，此身安敢望韓公。"自期以孟子，處公以為韓愈。[183]

The Song commentator of Wang Anshi's poems Li Bi 李壁 (1158-1222) told us that a friend of his read "how dare I look up to Mr. Han" as Wang meaning he still did not wish to be Han Yu and ridiculing Ouyang for being fond of emulating Han.[184] Zhu Yi 朱翌 (1097-1167) similarly informed us of a contemporary reading: "Those discussing this say Wang Anshi was angry that Ouyang Xiu compared him to Han Yu" 議者謂介甫怒永叔以退之相比.[185] Slight differences aside,[186] they all took Wang Anshi as not happy about being compared to Han Yu. This is consistent with the biography of Wang Anshi written by his Song followers, where it was written:

---

[180] Gu Yongxin, *Ouyang Xiu xueshu yanjiu*, 194-5. For a similar view, see Xie Yingxin, "Jiayou shiqi Ouyang Xiu yu Wang Anshi jiaoyi yanjiu."
[181] Wang Anshi was conferred upon the title of Duke of Jing Fiefdom 荊國公 late in his life.
[182] Ouyang Xiu's posthumous title.
[183] Quoted from Gu Yongxin, *Ouyang Xiu xueshu yanjiu*, 194n1.
[184] Wang Anshi, *Wang Jingwengong shi jianzhu*, 33.827: "是猶不願為退之，且譏文忠之喜學韓也."
[185] Zhu Yi, *Yijueliao za ji*, 36.
[186] There were also different understandings of whom Ouyang was referring to with Director of Personnel Department (Wang Anshi, *Wang Jingwengong shi jianzhu*, 33.827). As we shall see below, those did not seem to be how Wang Anshi took it.

"In learning, he expected himself to be like Mencius, not speaking of Xun Kuang or Han Yu" 其學以孟軻自許，荀況、韓愈不道也.[187]

Wang Anshi's own take tells us more. In a letter to Ouyang Xiu that Gu Yongxin thinks was referring to this exchange,[188] Wang wrote:

> I was excessively praised. This is not what a senior great man should appropriately bestow a junior unworthy person on. Is this perhaps what is called enticing him and wanting him to get to this point? Nevertheless, I am afraid I still cannot live up to your expectation. I thus force myself to reciprocate the gift you sent me out of deep kindness, not daring to talk about poetry. If you would forgive me for my transgression, I would be most fortunate.
> 惟褒被過分，非先進大人所宜施於後進之不肖，豈所謂誘之欲其至於是乎。雖然，懼終不能以上副也。輒勉強所之，以酬盛德之貺，非敢言詩也。惟赦其僭越，幸甚。[189]

Thinking Ouyang showered undue praise upon himself, Wang surmised this was perhaps because the senior official wanted to entice himself toward a goal he set for him. Regardless, Wang feared he could not live up to Ouyang's expectations in the end. Noting his responding poem was only in return for Ouyang's present, he asked Ouyang to forgive him for his disobeyance. It seems that Wang read Ouyang's poem as his using future leadership in the ancient prose movement to encourage him to emulate Han Yu.[190] Politeness aside, Wang Anshi was not moved.

Wang's view on the mainstream revealed itself even more in the exchanges between him and his close friend Wang Ling 王令 (1032-1059). In 1054, Anshi entered into an unusually intimate relationship with Ling,[191] a young man in whom Wang Anshi seemed to have found a

---

[187] "Wang Jinggong Anshi zhuan," in Hong Ye et al. eds., *Wanyanji shan cun*, 375.
[188] I share Gu's view on this: the first and third sentences in the quote below look like a prose version of "嘉篇為貺豈宜蒙," the last line in Wang's "Fengchou Yongshu jianzeng" (*LCJ*, 22.264).
[189] Wang Anshi, second of "Shang Ouyang Yongshu shu," in *LCJ*, 74.784. The beginning of this quote was repeated in the fourth letter to Ouyang (*LCJ*, 74.785).
[190] In the 1040s, Ouyang Xiu criticized Wang Anshi for imitating Han Yu's style in writing (Zeng Gong, "Yu Wuang Jiefu di yi shu," in *Zeng Gong ji*, 16.255). This suggests that to Ouyang, the point of learning from Han Yu lied elsewhere.
[191] Through repeated efforts, Wang Anshi married his wife's sister to Wang Ling (Wang Anshi, "Yu jiu shi Wu silu yi Wang Fengyuan yin shi shu," in Wang Ling, *Wang Ling ji*, 399; and the chronicle of Wang Ling's life in ibid., 442, 444-45). After Ling's premature death, Anshi not only wrote an epitaph for him (ibid., 383-84), but also numerous pieces reminiscing him (ibid., 397-402, especially "Si Fengyuan"). He also took responsibility for Ling's posthumous daughter, marrying her well (ibid., 422). The intensity of emotions Wang Anshi invested in Wang Ling seemed verging on a kind of transference, perhaps in proportion to his perceived loneliness in the world at that time.

sounding board, if not a soulmate. Frequently painting the Renzong reign in a dark tone,[192] Ling wrote this verse to Anshi: "It is hard to fight for the Way with the likes of stealers; good at thinking, my fellows together say 'return'" 難與躔徒爭有道，好思吾黨共言歸.[193] Seeing the court as being filled with fellow stealers [of imperial authority] who had lost the [proper] way,[194] Ling thinks the wise thing to do for men like himself and Wang Anshi – the minority party – was to stay away from it.[195] Wang Anshi greatly appreciated his friend's advice, thinking that compared with those who wanted himself to go along with the world, only what Ling said fully accorded with what he wanted to say from his heart.[196] In a poem inviting Ling for a face-to-face discussion on how to save the fallen world, Anshi revealed his intent to expel the heterodoxy (*yiduan* 異端), counting on Ling's help in this enterprise.[197] As for what exactly went wrong in their times, in a letter to Lü Huiqing 呂惠卿 (1032-1111), Wang Ling made it clear: "the literati abandoned *daode* and compete with each other to learn refined writings" 士之舍道德而爭以文字為學也.[198] This seems a commentary on the first two lines in Wang Anshi's responding poem to Ouyang Xiu.

Wang Anshi's explicit statement of his view on the mainstream was made in his several memorials submitted to Emperor Renzong. From 1058 to 1061, Wang repeatedly complained to Renzong on the lack of talents in both government and society. For instance, at the beginning of his myriad-word letter,[199] he declared: "I have tried to observe those in office in the world, [finding] no more lack [of talents] than in the present. … I also sought out [talents] on the streets and in the

---

[192] See, for example, Wang Ling, "Meng huang," in *Wang Ling ji*, 41-42.
[193] Wang Ling, "Ji Jiefu," in *Wang Ling ji*, 189.
[194] In 1062/6, Sima Guang voiced a similar concern ("Jin xi shu," in *CJJ*, 24.349: "威福之柄一失於人而習以為常，則不可復收矣"). A firm believer in maintaining the balance of power (Sariti, "Monarchy, Bureaucracy, and Absolutism," 74-75; Bol, "*This Culture of Ours*," chapter 7; and Zhao Dongmei, *Da Song zhi bian*, 392-94, 421-23), Sima was concerned about the imbalance in power distribution due to declined imperial authority. In *Politics and Conservatism in Northern Song China*, Xiao-bin Ji argues that Sima consistently aimed for increasing imperial authority. The evidence Ji produces is mainly for the reigns of Renzong, Yingzong and early Shenzong. These happen to coincide with the period of imperial authority decline. For the period after Shenzong's authority had been significantly boosted in comparison with that of the grand councilors, Ji is yet to produce convincing evidence.
[195] For more of such advice to Wang Anshi, see Wang Ling, "Da Wang Jiefu shu" and "Yu Wang Jiefu shu," in *Wang Ling ji*, 326-28. Both dated to 1058 (ibid., 444). He Wenhuan perceptively noted that "按當日朝政國勢，未為甚失，措辭乃爾，大是背逆" (ibid., 413).
[196] See especially Wang Anshi's twelfth letter to Wang Ling: "逢原所以教我，得鄙心所欲出者。…大抵見教者，欲使安石同乎俗、合乎世耳。非足下教我，尚何望於他人" (*Wang Ling ji*, 395-96).
[197] Wang Anshi, "Ji Wang Fengyuan," in ibid., 396. Note here Wang painted himself as the true Confucian and the mainstream as the likes of Shen Buhai and Han Fei. This suggests such were common rhetorical strategies shared by literati of different ideologies in their seeking to establish their own vision as the orthodox.
[198] Wang Ling, "Yu Lü Jifu shu," in *Wang Ling ji*, 330.
[199] For slightly different counts of the characters in this letter, see Drechsler, "Wang Anshi and the Origins of Modern Public Management," 354.

fields, but not seeing many either" 臣嘗試竊觀天下在位之人，未有乏于此时者也….臣又求之於閭巷草野之間，而亦未見其多焉.[200] If we link such complaints to the context – this was, as a matter of fact, the Jiayou (1056-1063) period, an era many thought full of talents[201] thanks to the long-term intellectual leadership of Ouyang Xiu in literati society and now also in the central government,[202] the illocutionary force of Wang's words becomes clear.[203]

In this long letter to Renzong, Wang sharply contrast the ability to be useful to the state, what he called "talent" 才 (*cai*), with literary skills, what he called "the learning for carving insects and cutting seals" 雕蟲篆刻之學 (*diaochong zhuanke zhi xue*), which to him not only did not help make talents useful to the state, but actually harmed the making of such. Labeling those gifted with the latter "the unworthy," Wang made a daring statement: "Now the unworthy luckily rose to high-ranking officials. They therefore got to extend [such luck] to their likes, gathering them in the court. This is why those in the court are mostly unworthy. Even though there might be some who are worthy and wise, facing the difficult situation of lacking assistance, they often cannot get their way among them" 今使不肖之人，幸而至乎公卿，因得推其類聚之朝廷，此朝廷所以多不肖之人，而雖有賢智，往往困於無助，不得行其間也.[204] Hong Mai 洪邁 (1123-1202) told us "at the time Fu Bi and Han Qi were grand councilors. Unhappy on reading it, they knew he would necessarily make trouble were his wish fulfilled." 當時富、韓二公在相位，讀之不樂，知其得志必生事.[205] Ouyang's name was not mentioned, but Fu and Han were his allies sharing his

[200] Wang Anshi, "Shang Renzong Huangdi yan shi shu," in *LCJ*, 39.411. This was reiterated in "Shang shizheng shu" (ibid., 424) and "Ni shangdian zhazi" (ibid., 438).
[201] Su Shi, "*Jushi ji* xu": "自歐陽子出，天下爭自濯磨，… 長育成就，至嘉祐末，號稱多士," in *Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 1. Cao Jiaqi notes this in "'Jiayou zhi zhi' wenti tan lun," 63.
[202] On Ouyang's leadership among the Confucians, see *Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 1331-34, 1336, 1339, 1341, 1343, 1346, 1355. On his decisive role in the shaping of Northern Song political culture and literati character, see Hartman, "Zhu Xi and His World," 113. These made Wang Anshi's not mentioning his role as an intellectual leader in the offering piece he wrote on Ouyang's death but rather focusing on his personal success all the more striking (*Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 1332).
[203] For Wang's negative comments on Ouyang after Shenzong took the throne, see Wang Anshi, *Xining zoudui rilu*, 135; and Li Tao, *XCB*, 211.5134-35.
[204] Wang Anshi, "Shang Renzong Huangdi yan shi shu," in *LCJ*, 39.418. In the late 1060s, Wang again complained to Shenzong about the status quo that was carried forward from the previous decade (Yang Zhongliang, *JSBM*, 69.1045).
[205] Hong Mai, *Rongzhai suibi*, IV.4.673. Zhu Yiqun notes Wang Anshi's antagonistic relationship with Han Qi during the Jiayou period, which went back probably to their first working together in the 1040s ("Song Shenzong qiyong Wang Anshi," esp. 352-54).

approach to governance.[206] Perhaps not coincidentally, after 1059, there was no longer any reports on personal interactions between Wang Anshi and Ouyang Xiu, at least as far as Gu Yongxin's thorough search for evidence showing their having a "friendship" goes.[207]

On what grounds, then, did Ouyang Xiu recommend Wang Anshi for central government positions in the mid-1050s, leading Wang to think he wanted to pass leadership in the ancient prose movement to himself? Before the early 1060s, Wang Anshi was known for classical scholarship, literary skills, and adminstirative capabilities, in addition to having inadventently built a reputation for not seeking to get ahead on the official ladder.[208] In both times when Ouyang recommended Wang, Ouyang was, in line with his commitment to literati self-governance, seeking to restrict imperial power by having the emperor hear independent opinions from principled speaking officials. As early as 1034, he had pointed out the remarkable power of the speaking officials, as they "could address the monarch on any policy issue."[209] In 1054,[210] Ouyang wanted to fill the two vacant remonstration positions with men who would not take advantage of the reputation of the speaking officials to seek their own career advancement. This makes Wang Anshi, a man with a track record of being able to hold onto his own principle, an ideal candidate.[211] The 1056 recommendation likewise stressed Wang's adherence to principles,[212] a quality Wang had exhibited in the poem exchange above as well. While Ouyang also mentioned the fame Wang had made in the world for his erudition and writing, he did not recommend Wang for his ideas on governance.[213] Quite on the contrary, after 1059, the year Wang's such ideas revealed themselves

[206] See Ouyang Fa et al., "Shiji," in *Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 1377 for his relationship with Fu and Han Qi, "Ji wen," in ibid., 1331 that with Han Qi.
[207] Gu Yongxin, *Ouyang Xiu xueshu yanjiu*, 192-98. Wang Shuizho also notes their personal interactions got increasingly sparser after the late 1050s (*Wang Shuizhao zixuanji*, 209).
[208] Chen Zhi'e, *Bei Song wenhua shi shulun*, 21-22.
[209] Hartman, "Sung Government and Politics," 105. In this he apparently shared the position of Fan Zhongyan 範仲淹 (989-1052), who sought to restrain imperial power by having it rely on "the power of remonstrance and the power of opinion" (Liu, "An Early Sung Reformer," 124). This could have contributed to creating the impression that he wanted to "seize the ruler's authority" (*duo renzhu quan* 奪人主權) for the benefit of the literati, a charge filed against him in 1054 (Li Tao, *XCB*, 176.4269).
[210] Ouyang Xiu, "Jian Wang Anshi Lü Gongzhu zhazi," in *Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 870-71. On the dating, see Gu Yongxin, *Ouyang Xiu xueshu yanjiu*, 193n4.
[211] Comparing Ouyang's recommendations for Wang Anshi with those for Su Xun and his sons, there seems to be a difference between his liking the Sus' ideas in an affectionally personal way and his recommending Wang more on professional grounds.
[212] Ouyang Xiu, "Zai lun shuizai zhuang," in *Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 865.
[213] Before Shenzong, Wang was appointed to central government positions either for his literary skills, like drafting edicts, or administrative capabilities, like managing state herds and finance. Only Shenzong gave him "virtual free rein to implement [his ideas]" (Mote, *Imperial China*, 139).

in the myriad-word letter to Renzong, neither did Ouyang recommend Wang any more nor was there any known socialization between them.[214]

Under this situation, aware of his singularity[215] and knowing when to advance and when withdraw,[216] Wang Anshi's overall strategy was to stay away from the court as much as possible, to maintain his integrity. In his own words: "In the past, because what I learned was impractical, making it hard to get along with the times, I therefore wanted to seclude myself in leisurely and idle positions, by which perhaps to fulfill my wish" 舊惟所學之迂闊，難以趨時，因欲自屏於寬閑，庶幾求志.[217] Compared with working in the central government or as central government emissaries, Wang preferred being a prefect, where as the local head he could apply his ideas on governance in the area under his administration freely – precisely the gist of self-governance.[218] Wang did occasionally accept central government jobs, but often when he had no choice but to.[219] He showed some passion when appointed as Drafter, a position granting him direct access to emperor Renzong, but eventually he realized that when the court was filled with men whose ideology he did not share, chances of influencing the emperor with his ideas were minimal, not to mention Renzong's own inclination to let things be how they naturally are. As he spoke of his experience between 1061 and 1063: "When I was Drafter during Renzong's reign, I only went up to the palace once, nor did I have friends among senior officials" 在仁宗朝知制誥，只一次上殿，與大臣又無黨.[220]

Wang, however, did not passively wait for his time to come. Rather, he kept advancing his own agenda in ways he could, a main part of which being to build up his influence through writing and teaching. Around the same time when self-governance was being established as the mainstream, Wang's major work got into circulation, as his student Lu Dian told us:

---

[214] The only known interaction thereafter was Ouyang's writing a letter of congratulations on Wang Anshi's becoming the prime minister in 1071 (Gu Yongxin, *Ouyang Xiu xueshu yanjjiu*, 196-97).
[215] Wang Anshi, "Shang Renzong Huangdi yan shi shu," in *LCJ*, 39.410-11.
[216] For Wang's own statement of his principles on when to advance in the officialdom and when to withdraw, see his poem "Chou Wang Bohu": "逢時豈遽廢，避俗聊須噤" (*LCJ*, 5.116). For a discussion, see Yang Qianmiao, *Wang Anshi "Yi" xue yanjiu*, 200-05.
[217] Wang Anshi, "Shouzhao ling shishi xie biao," in *LCJ*, 60.647. Written to Shenzong in 1070.
[218] Deng Guangming, *Bei Song zhengzhi gaigejia Wang Anshi*, 16; Zhao Dongmei, *Da Song zhi bian*, 144.
[219] For instance, the 1054 appointment to the Herds Office 群牧司 was eventually taken up under Ouyang Xiu's instruction (Yang Zhongliang, *JSBM*, 59.1037). For a sense of how his confidant Wang Ling advised him on how to reject central government appointments without offending those in power, see id., "Da Wang Jiefu shu," in *Wang Ling ji*, 326.
[220] Li Tao, *XCB*, 234.5684.

> Between the Jiayou (1056-1063) and Zhiping (1064-1067) periods, … to the south of the Huai [River], literati and senior officials venerated Mr. Anding's[221] learning. I alone doubted it. Only when I got Duke of Jing's *Miscellaneous Theories from Huainan* and his *Commentary on the "Great Plan"* did I say yes in my heart. It was thereupon that I was willing to become Mr. Linchuan's disciple.
>
> 嘉祐、治平間，…淮之南，學士大夫宗安定先生之學，予獨疑焉。及得荊公《淮南雜說》與其《"洪範"傳》，心獨謂然，于是願掃臨川先生之門。[222]

To Lu, Wang's learning as formulated in these two pieces of work was distinct from those taught by Hu Yuan 胡瑗 (993-1059), a man in Ouyang's camp who in early Jiayou was Lecturer in the Imperial University.[223] With regard to the main feature of Hu's learning as compared to that of Wang Anshi, his student Liu Yi 劉彝 (1017-1086) summarized to Shenzong as follows:[224]

> Your servant heard that the sage's way has its substance, function, and cultural form. Things like the ruler and the officials, father and son, *renyi* and ritual and music that cannot be changed across time constitute its substance.[225]
>
> 臣聞聖人之道，有體、有用、有文。君臣父子，仁義禮樂，曆世不可變者，其體也。[226]

To Hu, like to Ouyang Xiu, the values guiding human relationship that remain constant all the time are *renyi*.[227] By contrast, this was how Wang Anshi's follower[228] characterized his learning:

---

[221] Hu Yuan 胡瑗 (993-1059).

[222] Lu Dian, "Fu Fujun muzhi," in Zeng Zaozhuang and Liu Lin eds., *Quan Song wen*, 101.244. In 1063, taking leave of the court on his mother's death, Wang never responded to the court's summon again. Rather, after finishing his mourning period, he chose to teach in his home prefect, training his first batch of students. For the students he taught during this period, see Liu Chengguo, *Jinggong Xinxue yanjiu*, 63ff.

[223] Ouyang Fa et al., "Shiji," in *Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 1377.

[224] This conversation took place in 1069.

[225] For alternative translations, see Chu, *The Politics of Higher Education*, 57; Wood, *Limits to Autocracy*, 73-74; and de Bary, "A Reappraisal of Neo-Confucianism," 89.

[226] Zhu Xi, *Wu chao mingchen yanxing lu*, 316.

[227] On the difference between Hu and Wang, see Lu Guolong, *Song ru weiyan*, 125.

[228] On this author being Cai Jing and not his brother Cai Bian, see Zhang Chengzhong, "Cai Jing wei 'Wang Anshi zhuan' kao." Whichever Cai it was, it is certain that this was written by an admirer who sought to tell the larger issue Wang was concerned with. Compared with those penned by Wang's opponents that read more about polemics than substance, like the one in *Song shi* (327.10541-53) that drew heavily on Sima Guang's *Sushui jiwen*, this sympathetic perspective tallies more with the image of Wang emerging from his own writings that we shall see in the next chapter.

> Since the Former King's blessings were depleted, states differed and families were different. From Han till Tang, such development [of diversity] from the original [unity] gradually deepened. When the Song arose, cultural things flourished, but it had not been known that *daode* [lies in] the workings of nature and destiny.[229] Anshi strived after a hundred generations, seeking to match [the achievements of] Yao, Shun, and the Three Dynasties. He penetrated what could not be predicted from [the natural workings of] day and night or yin and yang, and entered [the domain of] the magical. Initially, he wrote *Miscellaneous Theories* in tens of thousands of words. The world said his words were on a par with those of Mencius'. It was thereupon that literati under Heaven began to trace the idea of *daode* and look into the root cause of nature and destiny.
> 自先王澤竭，國異家殊。由漢迄唐，源流浸深。宋興，文物盛矣，然不知道德、性命之理。安石奮乎百世之下，追堯、舜、三代，通乎晝夜陰陽所不能測而入於神。初著《雜說》數萬言，世謂其言與孟軻相上下。於是天下之士始原道德之意，窺性命之端云。[230]

Renyi was gone, and the cultural forms featuring the mature Ouyang's legacy that Hu Yuan shared were considered unhelpful for solving the issue of value diversity Wang was mainly concerned with.[231] In their place, Wang put the idea of *daode* that was first formulated by Laozi in the *Classic of Daode*, further coupling it with a topic Confucius was rather reluctant to touch upon[232] but was introduced into the Confucian tradition by Mencius – human nature.[233] These were also what emperor Shenzong thought were most impressive in Wang's learning, telling him: "Since you were in the Hanlin Academy, I first got to hear the theory of *daode*, thereupon my mind was slightly opened up and awoken" 自卿在翰林，始得聞道德之說，心稍開悟[234] and "You know the workings of nature and destiny" 卿知性命之理.[235]

On the biases in Wang's other biographies, see Pei Rucheng and Sun Jianmin, "Lun Song Yuan shiqi de sange Wang Anshi zhuan."

[229] The grounds for my inserting "lies in" in the rendering are presented in chapter 3.

[230] Chao Gongwu, *Junzhai dushuzhi jiaozheng*, 525–26.

[231] For a contemporary response against this, see Shu Dagang, "'Fu shi san shu, ji jue cisheng bu xu guo,'" 530.

[232] The *Analects*, 5.13. For a discussion of how commentators from He Yan through the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi to Dai Zhen and Zhang Xuecheng had interpreted this passage, see Ivanhoe, "Whose Confucius? Which Analects?"

[233] For more on this, see chapters 2 and 4.

[234] Wang Anshi, *Xining zoudui rilu*, 63; Li Tao, *XCB*, 233.5661. Wang was appointed to the Academy in 1067 and had his first audience with the emperor in 1068/4. Geng Nanzhong 耿南仲 (?-1128), one of Wang Anshi's followers, characterized Wang's learning as the learning of *daode* (*daode zhi xue* 道德之學), which to Geng had brought about great increase in state power (Li Jingde ed., *Zhuzi yulei*, 101.2572-73).

[235] Li Tao, *XCB*, 234.5684.

In the first section, we have seen that in "Tracing the Way," Han Yu made a powerful action to drive out *daode*, so as to make *renyi* the only legitimate way to govern. In section II, we also saw that in the latter two parts of "On the Roots" that reflected the mature Ouyang Xiu's approach to governance, he carried forward this dropping of *daode*, only putting forward a better way to realize *renyi* – using ritual and music, the cultural things. Wang's learning was centered on counteracting this. As the Jurchen literatus Zhao Bingwen's 趙秉文 (1159-1232) noted: "Since Master Han, [people] talked about *renyi* but did not touch upon *daode*. This was why Mr. Wang had a theory of *daode* and nature and destiny" 自韓子，言仁義而不及道德。此王氏所以有道德性命之說也。[236]

It should be noted that Han Yu did not succeed in driving out the term *daode*. Rather, it seems by the eleventh century, it had been co-opted by the Confucians, as can be seen in this 1070/8 court discussion:

> Zeng Gongliang (999-1078) said, "*Daode* should be used as well." Shenzong said, "What the current generation referred to as *daode* is not *daode*." Anshi said, "The village hypocrite looks like [having] *daode* but actually [has] no *daode*."
> 曾公亮言："當兼用道德。"上曰："今一輩人所謂道德者，非道德也。"安石曰："鄉原似道德而非道德也。"[237]

Of the two concepts of *daode* in this conversation, the one referred to by Zeng Gongliang was, Shenzong told us, used by the Confucian mainstream,[238] which Shenzong and Wang Anshi did not approve of. Rather, the *daode* they deemed desirable was a different one, the one Wang Anshi taught Shenzong on meeting him. Some scholars take Wang's lecturing the young emperor on *daode* as evidence of his practicing Confucian principles,[239] but in his diary, Wang recorded

---

[236] Zhao Bingwen, "Yuan jiao," in *Xianxian Laoren Fushui wenji*, 1.1. For an intellectual biography of Zhao, see Bol, "Seeking Common Ground," 502-12. For a late eleventh-century attempt to make *daode* and *xingming* compatible, see Zhang Lei, "Shang Huang Jianpan shu," in *Zhang Lei ji*, 847 (Zhang was born in 1054. Even if the letter was written when he was 20, it would still be dated to after the reform had been launched). Bol points out Zhang's philosophical position cannot stand up to scrutiny ("A Literati Miscellany and Sung Intellectual History," 129-30).
[237] Li Tao, *XCB*, 214.5217-18.
[238] Like the one referred to by Liu Yi in the above response to Shenzong ("臣師胡瑗以道德仁義教東南諸生") or Ouyang Xiu's use of *daode* in the original first part of "On the Roots" ("Ben lun shang," in *Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 413: "論道德，可興堯舜之治"). For more examples of this use, see *Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 1336 ("以文章道德為一世學者宗師") and 1341 ("明於道德，見於文章").
[239] See, for example, Yu Yingshi, *Zhu Xi de lishi shijie*, 38-40.

himself telling Shenzong where his concept came from and what it was meant for: "The way Laozi talked about *daode* is precisely that by which the ruler operates the world" 如老子言道德者，正人主所以運天下.[240]

In summary, this chapter has shown that in "Tracing the Way," Han Yu formulated a humanist theory of self-governance for the post-An Lushan Rebellion new world that decentralizes moral authority to each literatus, asking them to decide what is the right thing to do on their own according to the general principle of loving humanity broadly and doing so appropriately. By the mid-eleventh century, Ouyang Xiu, leader of the ancient prose movement, supplemented Han's political theory with a more viable method of implementation – gradually realizing *renyi* through ritual and music –, and, together with like-minded ranking officials in the central government, took advantage of the quiet decade from Renzong fell dysfunctionally sick in 1056 to the swift demise of his adopted successor Yingzong in 1067 to practice literati self-governance at all levels of government. As a result, what Han Yu theorized over two centuries ago finally became the mainstream, resulting in a world where, as Wang Anshi complained, each person had a sense of what is right and ten persons ten. It was against this context that Wang Anshi worked out his political theory, the purpose of which was to reverse this long-term development toward decentralization that originated in the mid-Tang.[241] Now let us see how this reversal was theorized.

[240] Wang Anshi, *Xining Zoudui rilu*, 134; Yang Shi, *Yang Shi ji*, 125. Undated. From what they were discussing, it is likely this took place earlier in the reform. Wang followed by saying that "it is only because those below average do not know the gist that the people lead each other to confuse the custom and fall into indolence" 但中人以下不明其旨，则相率乱俗，陷為偷惰. It was perhaps for this reason that he, his son, and his students produced over a dozen of commentaries on *Laozi* and *Zhuangzi* (Zhang Yuhan, "Bei Song Xinxue yanjiu," 37–38. See also Chao Gongwu, *Junzhai dushuzhi jiaozheng*, 11.471). Scholars studying this body of work find they were trying to convince the literati to let go of their own moral standards (see, for example, Yin Zhihua, "Wang Anshi de Laozi *zhu* tanwei," 48; Lin Chun Hung, "Lü Huiqing Daode Zhenjing *zhuan* yu Zhuangzi *yi* zhong de sixiang san lun," 81; Lin Ming-chao, "Wu wo er wu wu fei wo"; and Yamada Takashi, "Lü Huiqing guanyu *Laozi Zhuangzi* sixiang qianxi," 54).
[241] Skinner, "Introduction," 25; Hartwell, "Demographic, Political, and Social Transformations," 395.

Chapter 2
Governing by Transforming Human Nature
-- The Political Theory of Wang Anshi

This chapter reconstructs the statecraft Wang Anshi presented emperor Shenzong during their 1068/4 meeting. To undo the existing humanist way of decentralized governance, Wang Anshi's countermeasure drew mainly from two theoretical sources: *Laozi* and *Mencius*.[1] In line with Laozi's idea of *daode*, he first recentralized the dispersed moral authority to the monarch and replaced the humanist value system with one that served the interest of the ruler's state; then, building mainly on Mencius' insight into human nature, he worked out a full procedure, using externally imposed behavorial regulations to firmly establish these statist values into the people's hearts, to the extent that they would guide their social-political actions unreflectively.

Each of these two sides has been explored by previous scholars: two decades ago, Lu Guolong has highlighted the role Daoism played in Wang's political philosophy;[2] and Wang's relationship to Mencius has been studied from many angles,[3] including Li Huarui's recent argument that Mencius' political thought on humane governance had guided the reform Wang architected.[4] Benefiting partly from the former[5] while making a start in presenting an alternative to the latter, I integrate Wang's key takeaways from his two favorite books to reveal more of the content of the morality Wang wished to have all uphold, the procedure through which to get it firmly established in the people's hearts, and his efforts at justifying this crafted nature.

I. Reversing Literati Self-Governance

In the previous chapter, we have seen that the theory of literati self-governance was first formulated by Han Yu in "Tracing the Way" and he did so by defining four terms – *ren*, *yi*, *dao*, *de* – at its very beginning. When working out its countermeasure, Wang Anshi did it in a similar

[1] Sima Guang noted these were Wang Anshi's two favorite books ("Yu Wang Jiefu shu," in *CJJ*, 60.723).
[2] Lu Guolong, *Song ru weiyan*, chapter 2.
[3] See, for example, Yang Zhijiu, "Wang Anshi yu Mengzi," 143; Hsia Chang-pwu, *Li Gou yu Wang Anshi yanjiu*, 175–212; Jin Shengyang, "Wang Anshi *Yijie* yu Mengzi de guanxi chuyi."
[4] Li Huarui, "Northern Song Reformist Thought and Its Sources." See also his "Lun Bei Song houqi liushi nian de gaige" and "Songdai jianxing Mengzi de renzheng sixiang."
[5] My main disagreement with Lu, noted below, is where he thinks Wang was seeking to restrict imperial power.

way, by defining five terms, four of which taken from Han Yu, at the opening of an essay called "After Nine Changes Can Reward and Punishment Be Spoken of" 九變而賞罰可言.[6]

Although not as famous as Han Yu's "Tracing the Way," the central importance of "Nine Changes" in Wang Anshi's school of learning can be seen from the frequency with which it appeared across their extant works:[7] among those we know, in a letter written to Han Qiuren 韓求仁 (?-?) around 1064, Wang Anshi explicated parts of it[8] – this suggests it was composed before this time but not too far ahead to make it lose freshness, fitting the late 1050s dating, as I argue in the Appendix, of the *Miscellaneous Theories* volumes to which it belongs; in his commentary on the "Great Plan," another part was found;[9] in 1070, Wang's student Lu Dian 陸佃 (1042-1102) used the gist of this piece to his advantage in the first palace exam held after the reform was officially launched;[10] and Wang Pang 王雱 (1044-1076), Wang Anshi's son, incorporated it in his commentary on the *Zhuangzi*.[11]

It began thus:

> That on which the myriad things rely for their existence is *tian*; that from which none does not proceed to go there is *dao*; what of the *dao* that is in me is *de*; to love according to *de* is *ren*; to love [in this way] appropriately is *yi*.
> 萬物待是而後存者，天也；莫不由是而之焉者，道也；道之在我者，德也；以德愛者，仁也；愛而宜者，義也。[12]

Except for *tian* (Heaven), all were what Han Yu had defined. Moreover, starting from *dao*, each subsequent term was defined in terms of the preceding one, a chain that bound the latter four

---

[6] Wang Anshi, "Jiu bian er shangfa ke yan," in *LCJ*, 67.710. Perhaps reflecting its central position in volumes 63-70, this piece also threads together many pieces therein.
[7] Taking the "Nine Changes" as a constitutional document in Wang's political philosophy building, Lu Guolong uses his reading of this essay to organize his discussion of the philosophies of Wang Anshi, Wang Pang and Lu Dian (*Song ru weiyan*, 22-23, 108).
[8] Wang Anshi, "Da Han Qiuren shu," in *LCJ*, 72.763. Discussed below. Liu Chengguo (*Wang Anshi nianpu changbian*, 680) and Li Desheng (*Wang Anshi shiwen xinian*, 164) both date the letter to 1064. Wang's mourning period fell between 1063 to 1065.
[9] Wang Anshi, "'Hongfan' zhuan," in *LCJ*, 65.686: "道者，萬物莫不由之者也."
[10] Discussed below. On the institution of the palace examination, see Bol, "Emperors Can Claim Antiquity Too," 180-83.
[11] Wang Pang, Nanhuazhenjing *xinzhuan*, 16.196. See also the 1097 palace exam question (Liu Lin et al. eds., *SHY*, *xuanju* 7, 5404.30). On the continuity between Huizong era governance and Wang Anshi's theory, see chapter 3.
[12] Wang Anshi, "Jiu bian er shangfa ke yan," in *LCJ*, 67.710.

together while leaving out *tian* alone. This structural feature, plus the seemingly similar definitions of *dao*, suggests Wang Anshi was engaging with Han Yu head-on. As for what kind of engagement this was, Yu Yingshi thinks Wang was trying to attain a higher degree of accuracy on the basis of Han's definitions.[13] Reading it closely against the context established in chapter 1, we shall come to see Wang was, in line with the idea of *daode* originating from Laozi, advancing an anti-humanist centralized approach to governance in direct opposition to Han Yu.

Looking at the overall structure of "Nine Changes," whereas at the beginning of "Tracing the Way" Han Yu first established two broadly sharable humanist virtues and then left what is moral for each individual to decide on their own, telling them there isn't a predefined way one must follow and that it is not necessary to rely on any authority other than oneself, Wang began with two centralist concepts that precluded individual independence and moral autonomy – all must rely on a single source for existence and all must follow a single path. With this reiteration, echoed by repeated invocation of Laozi's *daode* toward the end of this essay, Wang brought to the fore the overarching importance of a unitary authority.

Wang's main concern in what came in between was advancing his anti-humanist concepts using Han's terms. This was no ordinary task given the mainstream at the time, nor was it easy to achieve. Wang took great care both to manage this feat and to avoid making it too explicit. Other than creating a façade of similarity with Han Yu's definitions by borrowing some of his words, he mainly proceeded from two directions: sequence and content.

First, Wang reversed the sequence of Han Yu's pairs of terms. This reversal changed everything.[14] As we have seen, in formulating his humanist approach to governance, the crucial thing Han Yu did was putting *renyi* before *daode* and making the latter empty positions whose meanings had to be filled with humanist love. Now, by putting Laozi's *daode* before *renyi* and having the latter's meanings depend on the former, Wang quietly declared his war against Han's humanism.

Second, in line with this reversal, not only was the core concept changed from *ren* to *dao*, but what they meant also became fundamentally different. As Lu Guolong noted, although the

[13] While noting similarities in Wang's definition of *dao* and that of Han Yu's, Yu's focus is on Wang's concept of *de* (*Zhu Xi de lishi shiji*, 61-62).

[14] On the great importance Wang attaches to sequence in general, see Bol, *"This Culture of Ours,"* 212–13. See also his stress of this point later in the essay with Zhuangzi's words: "What is there to gain from the Way were it not spoken of according to the sequence?" 語道而非其序，安取道 (Wang Anshi, "Jiu bian er shangfa ke yan," in *LCJ*, 67.711).

words Wang used to define *dao* looked similar to those employed by Han Yu – he only added two characters "*mobu*" 莫不 (none not) in the front –,[15] because Han defined his *dao* after *ren* and *yi*, "proceeding from this to go there" means acting according to the principle of broadly loving humans and doing so appropriately.[16] That is, constituted by the virtues *ren* and *yi*, Han's *dao* is the humanist way in the Confucian tradition. This is not the case with Wang's *dao*. Put at the beginning of a chain of four interconnected terms, it does not have any concrete content, but stands on its own as an abstract concept – that which all must follow. If we go with Sima Qian's characterization cited in the previous chapter – "the *dao* Laozi valued contained nothing" –, Wang's *dao* is Laozi's way that is incompatible with *renyi*,[17] i.e., anti-humanist.

Because all the subsequent three concepts are defined in terms of this *dao*, Wang's *de* did not mean "virtue" in the Confucian sense, nor was his *ren* humanist love. Different from Han Yu, who gave his core concept *ren* a substantive content – to love broadly, Wang Anshi's *ren* did not have an independent meaning of its own but had to be filled with that of his *de*, whose meaning was further dependent on that of his *dao*, the only way that all must follow. Defined in this manner, *ren* now meant to love in accordance with one's grasp of the one and only right way. The focus here was not love, but a directive on the need to follow this way, as immediately after defining his *yi* on the basis of this *ren*, Wang wrote: "[In conducting] *ren*, there is what comes before and what comes after; [in conducting] *yi*, there is what is above and what is below. This is called distinction. What comes before does not make free with [what belongs to] what comes after; what is below does not infringe upon what is above.[18] This is called maintaining [the distinction]." 仁有先後, 義有上下，谓之分。先不擅後, 下不侵上，谓之守。[19] Furthermore, several lines thereafter, quoting a phrase from the *Book of Documents*, he glossed *renyi* as "reverence and deference" 允恭克讓.[20] All these were to make *ren* not mean broad love of humanity.[21]

---

[15] By adding these two characters, however, Wang made Han's open-ended approach to morality closed. On Huizong's adoption of this definition of *dao* in his commentary on *Daode jing*, see Yin Zhihua, *Bei Song* Laozi *zhu yanjiu*, 48–49.
[16] Lu Guolong, *Song ru weiyan*, 109.
[17] Recall Laozi's "大道廢，有仁義" in chapter 1.
[18] Of the two directives here, Wang's focus was on the latter.
[19] Wang Anshi, "Jiu bian er shangfa ke yan," in *LCJ*, 67.710.
[20] Ibid. This is closer to Wang's *li*. For more on this, see below.
[21] In his commentary on the "Great Plan," at the only place where *renyi* was mentioned, Wang Anshi interpreted *ren* as "不虐煢獨" and *yi* "不畏高明" (*LCJ*, 65.690). This again was not Han Yu's *renyi* as broad love and doing so appropriately, but a directive against conducting specific actions. For more on Wang's new concept of *ren* advanced in the *Miscellaneous Theories* volumes, see below.

Wang's anti-humanism is most carefully packed in the conceptual content of his *tian*. When discussing this text, Douglas Skonicki thinks Wang's *tian* refers to the cosmos and was where Wang grounded his political order.[22] This is the rhetorical effect Wang wanted to achieve, like with these sentences in the middle of the essay:

> Among those who spoke of where *daode* originated in antiquity, none did not attribute it to *tian*. Yao was a great one among the sages. Confucius commended him thus: "*Tian* is great and Yao modeled upon it." This is called knowing *tian*.
> 古之言道德所自出而不屬之天者，未之有也。堯者，聖人之盛也，孔子稱之曰："惟天惟大，惟堯則之。"此之謂明天。[23]

The way Wang worded it made it look like being in line with the earlier imperial worldview,[24] such as that expressed in Dong Zhongshu's 董仲舒 (192-104 BCE) statement that "the great source of *dao* came from *tian*" 道之大原出於天.[25] However, Wang's use of two *"shi"* (this) in the opening definitions of *tian* and *dao*, each with a different referent, tells us he saw this *tian*, alone left out of the interconnected chain of four terms, as *parallel to* rather than integrally connected with his *dao*.[26] As for what this *tian* actually referred to, a conversation between Wang and Shenzong recorded in his diary made it clear.

In 1072, when discussing issues related to carrying out the village militia (*baojia* 保甲) policy, Wang Anshi wanted to replace the convention of having the government pay monetary reward to local security helpers with unpaid militia, who furthermore were to pay for weapons and relevant expenses on their own. Shenzong was concerned with the resentment this major change would cause among the people, saying: "When the people are used to it, they are at ease with it, like it is natural. [If imposing upon them something] they are not used to, they would necessarily resent. If the riverbanks broke, destroying the people's properties, the people would not resent the broken riverbanks. But if the destruction was caused by someone, then they would resent him." 民

[22] Skonicki, "Cosmos, State and Society," 520.
[23] Wang Anshi, "Jiu bian er shangfa ke yan," in *LCJ*, 67.711.
[24] On this worldview, see Bol, *Neo-Confucianism in History*, 58-60.
[25] Ban Gu, *Han shu*, 56.2518-19.
[26] Wang Anshi, "'Hongfan' zhuan," in *LCJ*, 65.695.

習慣則安之如自然，不習慣則不能無怨。如河決壞民產，民不怨決河，若人壞之則怨矣。[27]

Earlier in this conversation Wang had pointed out that Shenzong was so concerned about the populace that in making laws, he followed the principle of making it convenient to the people in everything.[28] Now, he picked up this example to teach the emperor how to govern:

> Your Majestry precisely should do what Heaven[29] does. … What is called "what Heaven does" is like riverbank bursts. "The great power of Heaven and Earth is called 'rearing.'"[30] However, the reason why Heaven is not concerned when riverbanks burst and destruct the people's properties is because it simply follows the principle ruthlessly. Therefore, bitter coldness and summer rains are what people resent, but Heaven does not make alterations because of this, thinking the year's harvest cannot be accomplished without bitter coldness and summer rains. Confucius said, "Heaven is great and Yao modeled upon it." Yao had Gun repair watercourses and Gun put the five elements in disorder for nine years. With Your Majesty's heart that is concerned about the populace, it may well be that [Yao] should have been unable to eat or sleep well. And yet Yao was able to wait for so long. This was because he could do what Heaven does: following the principle ruthlessly.
> 陛下正當為天之所為。…所謂天之所為者，如河決是也。"天地之大德曰生，"然河決以壞民產而天不恤者，任理而無情故也。故祈寒暑雨，人以為怨，而天不為之變，以為非祈寒暑雨不能成歲功故也。孔子曰："惟天為大，惟堯則之。"[31]堯使鯀治水，鯀汩陳其五行[32]九載。以陛下憂卹百姓之心，宜其寢食不甘，而堯能待如此之久，此乃能為天之所為，任理而無情故也。[33]

This was Wang Anshi explicating to the emperor the theory he formulated in "Nine Changes" in a face-to-face meeting, during which he revealed the referent of *tian* that he took care not to make apparent in his public writings.

---

[27] Li Tao, *XCB*, 236.5742.
[28] Li Tao, *XCB*, 236.5741.
[29] I chose this more literal rendering when translating it.
[30] From the "Appended Words" chapter of the *Classic of Change*. Translation modified from Lynn trans., *The Classic of Changes*, 77.
[31] *Mencius*, 3A.4.
[32] From the "Great Plan" chapter of the *Book of Documents*.
[33] Li Tao, *XCB*, 236.5742. Li's source here was Wang's diary.

Even if we can still translate this *tian* as the cosmos, Wang was not using it to refer to the unknown Nature that humans in earlier imperial times were awed by and looked up to as the model in building their order,[34] but how it behaves towards the populace *as interpreted by himself*:[35] its great power being bringing up the people, even though some local disasters cause damage to the affected residents, *tian* would not be concerned but simply does what it should do unrelentingly. In order to achieve larger overall accomplishments, it does not change its course of action simply because what it has to do inflicts inconveniences upon the people. This was how Yao governed, Wang claimed by bending the words Mencius put into Confucius' mouth[36] towards his purpose: Yao had Gun repair watercourses, which Gun did by throwing into disorder the arrangement of the five elements. This must have caused great trouble to the populace, and yet Yao was resolute enough to have let Gun do it for as long as nine years. Yao was an example, Wang told Shenzong, of a ruler who was capable of behaving like *tian*: just follow the principle of doing what is necessary for attaining the overall goal, not being concerned about how the people might feel.

Because this is what Wang thought rulers should learn from *tian*, when later in "Nine Changes" he criticized those who did not learn from *tian* but simply did what they did according to their own sense of right and wrong,[37] we should take him as faulting them for caring about the people's feelings in policy-making,[38] like his criticism of Shenzong above, or his discontent with Renzong 仁宗 (r. 1022-1063) below. As suggested by the temple title conferred upon him posthumously based on the perceived feature of his reign, Renzong – the humane ancestor – governed with humanity. In the late 1050s and early 1060s, however, Wang Anshi repeatedly pointed out to the emperor himself that with his intention to be humane to the people and to love things (*ren min ai wu* 仁民愛物),[39] "households ought to have adequate supplies, people live in contentment, and great order be brought about in the world. However, the result did not reach this"

---

[34] As Deng Guangming noted (*Bei Song zhengzhi gaigejia*, 92-97).

[35] Just like how he interpreted the sage's intention in his commentary on the *Zhouli* as studied by Bol (*"*Wang Anshi and the *Zhouli"*) and Song (*Traces of Grand Peace)*. The cosmos or Nature can of course be interpreted as ruthless, but can be interpreted as agreeable as well.

[36] For other such instances where words not spoken of by Confucius in the *Analects* were cited in *Mencius*, see *Mencius*, 2B.4 and 6A.6. For a discussion, see Fu Sinian, *Xing ming gu xun bianzheng*, 632.

[37] Wang Anshi, "Jiu bian er shangfa ke yan," in *LCJ*, 67.711.

[38] Here lies my major difference from Lu Guolong, who thinks Wang meant this to refer to the ruler's arbitrary will (*Song ru weiyan*, 108-10), hence his argument that Wang was concerned with restraining imperial power. Both Liang Tao ("Wang Anshi de xin waiwang zhengzhi zhexue," 261-64) and Lu Hao ("Zhi xin yu zhi dao," 38) adopted Lu's view.

[39] In Wang's terminology, *wu* 物 also referred to people or things in the spiritual sphere. On the latter use, see his commentary on the "Great Plan" (*LCJ*, 65.686).

宜其家給人足，天下大治，而效不至於此。[40] Being humane to the people and caring about them in governance did not help Renzong accomplish big.[41]

Wang's attitude towards the humanist way of governance was fully revealed in an essay titled "King and Hegemon" in the *Miscellaneous Theories* volumes:

> The greatness of the king is like Heaven-and-Earth. Heaven-and-Earth does not trouble the myriad things and the myriad things all get their natures. Even though the myriad things get their natures, they do not know it was the accomplishment of Heaven-and-Earth. The king does not trouble the world, and all under Heaven get ordered. Although they get ordered, none knows this was thanks to the power of the king. The way of the hegemon is not so. Like those kindhearted persons in the world, when [the people] are cold, he gives them clothes; when [the people] are hungry, he gives them food. Although the people know my kindheartedness,[42] my kindness nonetheless cannot extend far.
>
> 王者之大，若天地然，天地無所勞於萬物，而萬物各得其性，萬物雖得其性，而莫知其為天地之功也。王者無所勞於天下，而天下各得其治，雖得其治，然而莫知其為王者之德也。霸者之道則不然，若世之惠人耳，寒而與之衣，飢而與之食，民雖知吾之惠，而吾之惠亦不能及夫廣也。[43]

Giving people clothes when they are cold and food when they are hungry was what Han Yu meant by governing with *ren* in "Tracing the Way" – Wang almost quoted Han verbatim.[44] By calling those governing according to this principle "hegemon," Wang was, like Laozi, slighting this humanist approach, as well as implying its illegitimacy. What Wang thinks is true *ren* is governing in an impersonal way,[45] to have all the myriad things get their proper natures and to put

---

[40] Wang Anshi, "Shang Renzong Huangdi yan shi shu," in *LCJ*, 39.410. The same idea was also expressed by him in "Ni shangdian zhazi," in *LCJ*, 41.438.

[41] For Wang's pursuit of the perfect order, see Bol, *"This Culture of Ours,"* chapter 7; and "Government, Society, and State."

[42] It was not uncommon for Wang Anshi to write in the first person. For another example, see id., "'Hongfan' zhuan," in *LCJ*, 65.693: "吾所建者道." We shall encounter more below.

[43] Wang Anshi, "Wang ba," in *LCJ*, 69.732.

[44] Han Yu, "Yuan dao," in *HCLJ*, vol. 1, 19.

[45] Wolfgang Drechsler thinks "impersonal" should be the norm in modern public management and that Wang's myriad-word letter to Renzong was where this ideal originated. See his string of publications from 2013, which has given rise to a debate in that field ("Wang Anshi and the Origins of Modern Public Management in Song Dynasty China"; "Debate: Towards Understanding Wang Anshi and Confucian Public Management"; "Debate: Once Again Wang Anshi and Confucian Public Management"; and Xuan Zhao and id., "Wang Anshi's Economic Reforms: Proto-Keynesian Economic Policy in Song Dynasty China"). Adopting a Gadamerian "fusion of horizon" approach and

everything in order.[46] Compared with those who govern with Han's *ren*, the kindness of Wang's kings is not immediately apparent, but the benefit it brings about extends to everything in the world. By calling such rulers "king," Wang was justifying their pursuing a grand goal at the cost of meeting human needs in the here and now.[47] That is, he thinks attaining such lofty goals necessitates inhumane means,[48] as he wrote in his commentary on *Laozi*: "Not being *ren* (humanist *ren*) is the utmost *ren* (Wang's *ren*)" 不仁乃仁之至.[49]

It was this new concept of *ren* that Wang was talking about in "Nine Changes,"[50] as did he across the *Miscellaneous Theories* volumes, like "my *ren* is sufficient to reach Heaven above, saturate grasses and trees below, and overflow to the barbarians to the side" 吾之仁，足以上格乎天、下浹乎草木、旁溢乎四夷,[51] "*ren* helps the myriad things without being exhausted" 仁濟萬物而不窮,[52] "King Wu advocated the great *yi* (rightness) in the world, … this is *ren*" 武王倡大義[53]於天下, … 仁也[54] and "*ren* [the term] is the same as that [used by] the ancients but the love is different" 仁與古人同而愛不同.[55] Even Wang's *ai* was also a new concept, as he wrote, again in his commentary on *Laozi*: "Those who love (Wang's *ai*) the people love them (Wang's *ai*) by not loving (humanist *ai*) them. Only in this way can they grow." 愛民者，以不愛愛之，乃長.[56] This is a new type of "love" that does not refer to interpersonal care among humans.[57] Wang did

taking Wang Anshi as representing the Confucian tradition, Drechsler gives Wang a central place in his proposal for public administration to go beyond Eurocentrism ("Paradigms of Non-Western Public Administration and Governance"; "Beyond the Western Paradigm: Confucian Public Administration"; and "Max Weber and the Mandate of Heaven").

[46] Wang's *ren* was similar to Li Gou's (*Li Gou ji*, 12), which Zheng Jianzhong thinks was completely "utilitarian" ("Bei Song ren xue sixiang yanjiu," 87). For a similar view, see Song, *Traces of Grand Peace*, 166.

[47] In other words, Wang's governance was "programmatic policy making" rather than responding to circumstances, as Bol noted in "Wang Anshi and the *Zhouli*" (251).

[48] As shown in Wang Zengyu, "Wang Anshi Bianfa jianlun"; Meng Wentong, "Bei Song bianfa lun gao"; and Smith, "Shen-Tsung's Reign."

[49] Rong Zhaozu, *Wang Anshi Laozi* zhu *ji ben*, 9-10. For relevant discussions, see Luo Chuanqi and Wu Yunsheng, *Wang Anshi jiaoyu sixiang yanjiu*, 125 and Liang Tao, "Wang Anshi de xin waiwang zhengzhi zhexue," 275.

[50] This is the kind of *ren* governance (*renzheng*) spelled out in Li Huarui, "Northern Song Reformist Thought and Its Sources."

[51] Wang Anshi, "Ren zhi," in *LCJ*, 67.717.

[52] Wang Anshi, "Daren lun," in *LCJ*, 66.707.

[53] This rightness seems closer to "萬世永賴時乃功" in "Jiu bian er shangfa ke yan" (*LCJ*, 68.710).

[54] Wang Anshi, "Boyi," in *LCJ*, 63.675.

[55] Wang Anshi, "Liyue lun," in *LCJ*, 66.705.

[56] Rong Zhaozu, *Wang Anshi Laozi* zhu *ji ben*, 18.

[57] Like the *ai* in "Fengsu" (*LCJ*, 69.737): "天之所愛育者民也，民之所系仰者君也。聖人上承天之意，下為民之主，其要在安利之，而安利之要不在於它，在乎正風俗." That is, to love and nurture the people means to correct their behavioral pattern rather than meeting their needs.

keep using *ren* and *ai* in the conventional sense, like in "*ren min ai wu*" above,[58] but what makes the difference is the new sense he invented and made them take on.

Read in this light, given that it was Han Yu who most forcefully drove out Laozi's *daode* in his advocation of the humanist way of governance that became the mainstream around the time Wang was completing *Miscellaneous Theories*, when toward the end of "Nine Changes" Wang lamented the disuse of *daode* in governance, we should take him as putting the blame on Han Yu, in direct opposition to whose "Tracing the Way" this essay was written. Behind the carefully crafted linguistic shield, Wang was saying: governing in the humanist way theorized by Han Yu was how the world got into great chaos and made those intent on accomplishing big unable to attain their goal.[59]

If in "Nine Changes" Wang only stressed the importance of having a uniform source of authority, in the two pieces where parts of his definitions of the five terms appear, he pointed out this source should be the monarch. In the letter replying to Han Qiuren, who probably had difficulty understanding Wang's new concepts, Wang explicated his definitions of *dao* and *de* as follows:

> Speaking of the totality of the *dao*, then there is no place where it does not exist and nothing that it does not do. Scholars cannot possess it, but must necessarily have it in their hearts. What of the *dao* that is in me is *de*. *De* can be possessed.
> 語道之全，則無不在也，無不為也，學者所不能據也，而不可以不心存焉。道之在我者為德，德可據也。[60]

The *dao* that all must follow is not for scholars to hold in hand, but only for them to keep in mind. This is because, he wrote in the other piece – his commentary on the "Great Plan" –,[61] "what I build is the *dao*; what the populace know is just the *de*" 吾所建者道，而民所知者德而已矣.[62]

---

[58] Although this is outside the *Miscellaneous Theories* volumes, as is the *ren* in the "Yao Wangzhiguo wo lu" poem: "知子有仁心，不忍鉤我魚" (*LCJ*, 1.87). A thorough research is yet to be done on all uses of *ren* in Wang's oeuvre.
[59] Recall what he said on his being a minority in the Jiayou court in chapter 1.
[60] Wang Anshi, "Da Han Qiuren shu," in *LCJ*, 72.763. Wang's gloss of *ren* in this letter by referring to Confucius' leaving Lu again has nothing to do with broad love of humanity. Moreover, he also openly, albeit subtly, affirms that Laozi's attack on *renyi* was appropriate.
[61] Wang's definition of *dao* in "Jiu bian er shangfa ke yan" appears, in a paraphrased form, early in this commentary (*LCJ*, 65.686).
[62] Wang Anshi, "'Hongfan' zhuan," in *LCJ*, 65.693. That at a critical moment early in the reform, when Shenzong seemed to be wavering in the face of strong objections, Wang presented this to the emperor (Li Tao, *XCB*, 216.5257) suggests this is in the interest of the ruler.

The *dao* that is omnipresent and does everything is to be built by the monarch from the perspective of the totality. This should be kept from the populace – scholars included – who shall only know the *de*.[63] The respective roles of the monarch and the populace were most clearly designated in his comments on the *huangji* section of the "Great Plan":

> *Huang*, the monarch; *ji*, the center. [This] says that when the monarch establishes the center, then the myriad things all fall into their place. … The son of Heaven makes the people's parents, so as to reign over all under Heaven. [The people] should obey and go along with him, so as to imitate what he does and not go against him.
> 皇，君也；極，中也。言君建其有中，則萬物得其所。…天子作民父母以為天下王，當順而比之，以效其所為，而不可逆。[64]

And, this monarch is not to be restrained by Nature or the cosmos:

> The ruler of course should assist Heaven-and-Earth to manage the myriad things. When Heaven-and-Earth and the myriad things did not get their normalcy, then it surely is appropriate for him to be fearful and cultivate and reflect on himself. Now, some think that Heaven had this change must have been brought about by my having this fault, or think disasters and unusual phenomena were originally Heaven's affairs, having nothing to do with me, and that I know working on human affairs and that is all. Should one act according to the former theory, one is unperceptive and fearful; should one act according to the latter theory, one is single-minded and negligent. Those who are not unperceptive, fearful, single-minded or negligent would take changes in Heaven as [a reason to] fear for oneself, without saying that Heaven had this change must be due to my having done this thing. They only use the right principle under Heaven to check if they have made any mistake and that is all.
> 人君固輔相天地以理萬物者也。天地萬物不得其常，則恐懼修省，固亦宜也。今或以為天有是變，必由我有是罪以致之；或以災異自天事耳，何豫於我，我知修人事而已。蓋由前之說，則蔽而蔑；由後之說，則固而怠。不蔽不蔑，不固不怠者，亦以天變為己懼，不曰天之有某變必以我為某事而至也，亦以天下之正理考吾之失而已矣。[65]

[63] Which is embodied in the various rites ("德以禮為體") (Wang Anshi, "*Yi* xiang lun jie," in *LCJ*, 65.698).
[64] Wang Anshi, "'Hongfan' zhuan," in *LCJ*, 65.689, 65.691.
[65] Wang Anshi, "'Hongfan' zhuan," in *LCJ*, 65.695.

Wang was not maintaining a connection between the cosmos and human affairs or using natural abnormalties to restrain imperial power. Rather, while paying a lip service to the earlier imperial model, he was mainly making the point that the monarch should stick to his course of action without being afraid of Heaven.[66]

In her study of five Northern Song thinkers' commentaries on the "Great Plan," Michael Nylan finds Wang Anshi "alone sought to preserve the central notion, inherent in both the original and Han 'Plans,' that power and authority must be unified in the person of the ruler if the empire is to enjoy peace and prosperity."[67] This is consistent with Wang's relationship with the mid-eleventh century mainstream discussed in the previous chapter. Whereas Han Yu in "Tracing the Way" sought to make the central authority irrelevant, Wang made the monarch – the one who wields Laozi's *daode* to operate all under Heaven – the source of social values once again; whereas Han Yu made moral autonomy an imperative to the literati, Wang asks all to obediently follow the ruler and not go against his will. In his counteraction to the new way of governance that emerged in the aftermath of the An Lushan rebellion, not only did Wang bring back the old way of centralized imperial rule, but he also freed the monarch from being constrained by the natural order, encouraging him to do whatever it takes to accomplish big.[68]

After he began spearheading the reform, this was what Wang did in practice. On the one hand, he kept teaching the monarch to centralize moral authority to himself.[69] Here are two of the fourteen instances recorded in *Long Draft* alone:

> Your Majesty must necessarily want likes and dislikes and right and wrong derive from yourself.
> 陛下必欲好惡是非出己。[70]

---

[66] See, for example, how Su Shi took Wang to mean here: "君於天下無所畏，惟天以儆之，今乃曰天災不可以象類求，我自視無過則已矣。為國之害，莫大於此。" (*Dongpo* Shu *zhuan*, 8.278-79). In his paraphrase, Su simply disregarded the camouflage Wang created with his rhetoric.
[67] Nylan, *The Shifting Center*, 97.
[68] Ling Zhang notes Wang's government activism extended to controlling and regulating the physical environment (*The River, the Plain, and the State*, 150). For Wang's imposing the human order he created upon the natural order, see the last section of this chapter.
[69] Li Tao, *XCB*, 223.5419, 223.5427, 225.5474, 230.5590, 232.5632, 233.5658, 234.5675, 236.5739, 239.5809, 239.5813, 240.5837, 242.5894, 246.5996, and 250.6089.
[70] Li Tao, *XCB*, 239.5813.

> If Your Majesty makes likes and dislikes on your own, even if they are excessive, you can still have others fear you; if Your Majesty let others make likes and dislikes, then I fear your [authority to] punish or reward will be stolen by others.
> 陛下若自作好惡，雖有過當，尚令人畏；陛下若令他人作好惡，即恐威福為人所竊。[71]

The fact that Wang Anshi needed to reiterate this to Shenzong over and over again tells us the young emperor was new to the idea that the monarch should monopolize moral authority – despite his early interest in Han Fei, Shenzong after all grew up during the Jiayou and Zhiping periods, when "one person has one sense of what is right and ten persons ten."

On the other hand, the anti-humanist centralized approach to governance Wang formulated in "Nine Changes" also became the new guideline for literati learning, as can be seen from the 1070 palace examnation. Held just a year after the reform was launched, the policy question asked prospective officials how the sage kings in antiquity were able to put everything in order.[72] A goal inherent in Wang Anshi's concept of *ren* but not always pursued in the Song,[73] it is said most examinees were shocked on reading it.[74] But Lu Dian, who had been learning with Wang since at least 1066,[75] answered nice and ease with a successful essay, in which he wrote, squarely against Han Yu but fully in line with Wang Anshi:

> After *daode* has been made clear, follow it then with *renyi*. … This is that by which the myriad things get their order.
> 道德已明，然後次之以仁義。…此萬事之所以得其序也。[76]

II. Replacing the Humanist Value System

[71] Li Tao, *XCB*, 233.5658.
[72] Liu Lin et al. eds., *SHY*, *xuanju* 7, 5398.19.
[73] See, for example, Su Shi's questioning of the premise of this question ("Ni jishi dui yushi ce," in *Su Shi wenji*, 9.302).
[74] Lu Dian, "Yushi ce," in Zeng Zaozhuang and Liu Lin eds., *Quan Song wen*, 101.111; Tuo Tuo et al., *Song shi*, 343.10918.
[75] Lu Dian, "Shen jun mubiao", in ibid., 101.267. Written in 1075/8.
[76] Lu Dian, "Yushi ce," in ibid., 101.109. Lu Guolong points out that "Jiu bian er shangfa ke yan" was one of Lu's intellectual sources in this essay (*Song ru weiyan*, 147).

Not only did Wang Anshi reverse Han Yu's humanist theory of decentralized governance, but he also worked out an alternative value system to replace Han's that was centered on love of humanity. In an essay titled "Tracing [Humane] Nature" 原性, Han Yu wrote:

> Human nature is what arises when one is born. … That by which human nature is constituted are five [virtues]: *ren* (humanity), *li* (propriety), *xin* (trustworthiness), *yi* (appropriateness), and *zhi* (wisdom).
> 性也者，與生俱生也。…其所以為性者五：曰仁、曰禮、曰信、曰義、曰智。[77]

Han claims that human nature is comprised of the five constant virtues and they are generated in humans on birth. Whether this was his belief or not,[78] it is clear he wanted people to believe that such humanist virtues are undetachable from their being. Eye to eye, Wang wrote an essay titled the same, where he made his target explicit:

> The Great Ultimate is that from which the Five Elements were born, but the Five Elements are not the Great Ultimate. Human nature is the Great Ultimate of the five constant [virtues], but the five constant [virtues] cannot be called human nature. This is why I differ from Master Han.
> 夫太極者，五行之所由生，而五行非太極也。性者，五常之太極也，而五常不可以謂之性。此吾所以異於韓子。[79]

By comparing the relationship between human nature and the five constant virtues to that between the Supreme Extreme and the five specific elements deriving from it, Wang Anshi downgraded the five constant virtues from being identical to human nature to merely its derivatives. The

---

[77] Han Yu, "Yuan xing," in *HCLJ,* vol. 1, 26.
[78] DeBlasi, for instance, reads this essay as Han Yu's attempt to explain "why men are not moral" (*Reform in the Balance*, 132).
[79] Wang Anshi, "Yuan xing," in *LCJ*, 68.726. It is true that in an essay titled "Xing lun" (*LCJ*, 1064-65), Wang expressed a different view, saying "性者，五常之謂也." Regarding the date of composition of the latter essay, Hsia Chang-pwu thinks it was written later than "Yuan xing" (*Li Gou yu Wang Anshi yanjiu*, 209n82). I share the view of scholars like Chen Zhi'e (*Bei Song wenhua shi shulun*, 240), Liu Chengguo (*Jinggong Xinxue yanjiu*, 136), and Xu Hu ("Wang Anshi Zhi renxing lun jiqi kaizhan," 104) that this was written earlier. My grounds are simple: in "Xing lun," Wang Anshi was still following Han Yu by saying human nature is constituted by the five humanist virtues and following Mencius by saying human nature is good, whereas the statecraft he built by the late 1050s and began putting into practice from the late 1060s was centered on anti-humanism. This shows this essay was written before Wang's learning was completed and was considered not representing the mature Wang's thought, hence its not being included in the *Miscellaneous Theories* volumes, nor even in the main body of *LCJ*.

implication is they can then be detached from the source that gave rise to them. With this, Wang had opened up the path for removing the value system centering on humanity.[80]

In its place, Wang prepared a dual-track new value system. The replacement had quietly taken place in the myriad-word letter to Renzong, where after lamenting the lack of talents in the Jiayou world, he pointed out the way to form them:

> The situation among humans is that what they wish to obtain are good conduct, beautiful reputation, honorable ranks, and fat profit. These the Former Kings were able to wield to reign over the literati under Heaven. To those literati under Heaven who were able to abide by them to put the world in order, they gave all they wished to obtain.
> 人之情所願得者，善行美名尊爵厚利也，而先王能操之以臨天下之士。天下之士有能遵之以治者，則悉以其所願得者以與之。[81]

By good conduct, Wang did not mean *renyi*, which was not mentioned even once in this long letter,[82] but *liyi* 禮義[83] and *lianchi* 廉恥 (non-corruption and shame), the latter was invoked seven times.[84]

Some scholars think *lianchi* is no different from *renyi*.[85] Han Yu's fellow ancient prose proponent Liu Zongyuan 柳宗元 (773-819), however, made a clear distinction:

> Non-corruption and shame are the minutiae of rightness (*yi*) that ought not to be on a par with rightness as the strings [that uphold a state]. What the sages used to establish the world is called

[80] For an alternative reading, see Zheng Jianzhong, "Bei Song ren xue sixiang yanjiu," 92–93. Zheng sees Wang as having made important contributions to the Confucian tradition.
[81] Wang Anshi, "Shang Renzong Huangdi yan shi shu," in *LCJ*, 39.421. The formulation is refined, partly by fixing a grammatical issue in the long letter, in "Ni shangdian zhazi" (*LCJ* 41.439): "夫成人之才甚不難。人所願得者尊爵厚祿，而所榮者善行，所恥者惡名也。今操利勢以臨天下之士，勸之以其所荣，而予之以其所願，則孰肯背而不為者？" This is strikingly similar to the method for getting the populace to go all out to work for the ruler that Shang Yang put forward (Pines trans., *Book of Lord Shang*, 148-49).
[82] The five times when "*ren*" alone was mentioned were for questioning its efficacy.
[83] Given Wang's unique use of especially *li*, I shall present my translation after the extensive discussions below.
[84] Wang Anshi, "Shang Renzong Huangdi yan shi shu," in *LCJ*, 39.410-23. It seems Wang was building a new ranking system, where one's qualification for promotion is based on *lianchi* and the reward is *liyi*. Phrases like "獎之以禮義" (ibid., 419) would not make grammatical sense unless we assume Wang was using his special term to refer to ranks in a new hierarchical honor system. For more on their meanings, see below.
[85] See, for example, Chen Zhi'e, *Bei Song wenhua shi shulun*, 34. As such, Chen takes Wang's advocating *li-yi-lian-chi* as part of "the revival of traditional Confucian culture" (ibid., 19). The very fact that Wang proposed them as that towards which the current social custom should be changed suggests he was using them to break up with the tradition.

> *renyi*. *Ren* focuses on kindness whereas *yi* judgment. With kindness making [the ruler] close [to the people] and judgment [his treatment of them] appropriate, the way to govern is complete. Carrying it out is *dao*, obtaining it is *de*, fulfilling it is *li* and being sincere about it is *xin*. All are named differently according to where it goes. Now, what Mr. Guan took as strings [i.e., *li-yi-lian-chi*][86] are perhaps not what the sages established?
>
> 廉與恥，義之小節也，不得與義抗而為維。聖人之所以立天下，曰仁義。仁主恩，義主斷。恩者親之，斷者宜之，而理道畢矣。蹈之斯為道，得之斯為德，履之斯為禮，誠之斯為信，皆由其所之而異名。今管氏所以為維者，殆非聖人之所立乎？[87]

After meeting Shenzong, Wang Anshi presented this replacement value system to the emperor, giving it fuller explication in their face-to-face conversations, some of which were recorded in his diary. On the one hand, Wang advised Shenzong to generously reward those obeying his orders with official ranks and high salaries: "Your Majesty should not be tired of rewarding meritorious services. It is rather difficult for the subjects to obey orders, while it is rather easy for the ruler to distribute ranks and salaries. If even Your Majesty is tired of distributing ranks and salaries, how can the subjects not be tired of obeying orders?" 陛下賞功不當倦。人臣用命甚難，人君出爵祿甚易。陛下出爵祿尚倦，則人臣用命豈能無倦？[88] On the other hand, this cannot work alone, as Wang told Shenzong on another occasion: "The ruler should prioritize forming a custom of non-corruption and shame with *li* and *yi*. Profit is negative and the negative should be hidden; *yi* is positive and the positive should be manifested." 人主當以禮義成廉恥之俗為急。凡利者，陰也，陰當隱伏；義者陽也，陽當宣著。[89] Motivating the subjects to follow the ruler with high ranks and salaries could not be made apparent.[90] This must work together with forming a new social custom of *lianchi* with *liyi*. That is, in the new value system Wang designed, there are two tracks: the openly advocated and the secretively operative. There were well-thought reasons for this, Wang explained to Shenzong:

---

[86] On this, see below.
[87] Liu Zongyuan, *Liu Zongyuan ji jiaozhu*, 3.229.
[88] Wang Anshi, *Xining zoudui rilu*, 90. Dated to 1073/3/20. On how this advice was followed by the emperor, see a complaint Peng Ruli 彭汝礪 (1042-1095) voiced in 1076/11 (Li Tao, *XCB*, 279.6818).
[89] Yang Shi, *Yang Shi ji*, 107. Wang Anshi, *Xining zoudui rilu*, 129. Undated. Later Wang would come to agree with Shenzong that before gaining the ability to carry out this agenda, they needed to first generate enough revenue (Li Guoqiang, "Lun Bei Song Xining bianfa de shizhi," 68). For more on this, see chapter 3.
[90] Wang Anshi, *Xining zoudui rilu*, 90, 129. Yang Shi, *Yang Shi ji*, 107.

> Managing revenues indeed cannot be delayed. But if to prioritize managing revenues, and regard it as urgent to use those capable [of making money], then people will devise clever means to pursue profit. Were this custom formed, it won't be to the ruler's benefit, nor the world's blessing. [Managing] affairs in the world is like harmonizing [the different flavors] in a soup – one should make the sour and the salty balanced and then it would be harmonious. … Manifest *li*, *yi* [duty], non-corruption, and shame, to show the people the loyal and the good are valued and promoted – this I am afraid cannot be postponed.
> 理財誠不可緩，然以理財為先，以使能為急，則人將機巧趨利。此俗成，則非人主之利，非天下之福。天下事譬如和羹，當令酸鹹適節，然後為和。…明禮義廉恥，以示人崇進忠良，恐不可緩。[91]

It is precisely because in the hidden, the ruler spurs his subjects with profit that it is important to build a new social custom, to neutralize the profit-seeking desire the secret incentive shall encourage among the people. To its designer, these two tracks work together to bring about a harmonious moral order in the world.

While as we have seen above, to Wang, there was an inner structure between *liyi* and *lianchi* – the former was the means by which to form a social custom consisting of the latter –, he often spoke of *li-yi-lian-chi* together. Other than in the above passage, below is another example. During a meeting before 1069/2, Shenzong asked Wang how to implement his statecraft. To this Wang responded:

> Changing the social customs and establishing methods and measures are what is urgent today. For anyone wanting to beautify social customs, the key lies in increasing the superior men and decreasing the petty men. This is because *li-yi-lian-chi* comes out of the superior men. … When the way of the petty men wanes, then the custom of *li-yi-lian-chi* is formed and those who have turned into superior men from below average would be many. When the custom of *li-yi-lian-chi* is broken down, then those who have turned into petty men from below average would also be many.

[91] Wang Anshi, *Xining zoudui rilu*, 129. Undated.

> 變風俗、立法度，方今所急也。凡欲美風俗，在長君子、消小人，以禮義廉恥由君子出故也。…小人道消，則禮義廉恥之俗成，而中人以下變為君子者多矣。禮義廉恥之俗壞，則中人以下變為小人者亦多矣。[92]

Why *li-yi-lian-chi* instead of the five constant virtues? The earliest advocation of this set of values appeared in the *Guanzi*:

> When the four strings are put up, then the monarch's orders are carried out. … When the four strings are not put up, the state then demises. … What are called the four strings? The first is *li*, the second *yi*, the third *lian*, and the fourth *chi*. *Li* makes [the people] not transgress, *yi* makes them not advance on their own, *lian* makes them not hide their evils, and *chi* makes them not follow the wicked. Therefore, if they do not transgress, then the ruler's position is secure; if they do not advance on their own, then the people will be free of cunningness and deceit; if the people do not hide their evils, then their conducts would naturally be integral; if the people do not follow the wicked, then perverse things will not arise.
>
> 四維張，則君令行。…四維不張，國乃滅亡。… 何謂四維？一曰禮、二曰義、三曰廉、四曰恥。禮不踰節，義不自進，廉不蔽惡，恥不從枉。故不踰節，則上位安；不自進，則民無巧軸；不蔽惡，則行自全；不從枉，則邪事不生。[93]

Li-yi-lian-chi are the four strings supporting *the monarch's* state. Establishing these four strings, all for restraining the populace, is so that his orders will be carried out, whereas not setting them up would lead to the demise of his state.

In the 1930s, the New Life Movement of the Nationalist Party also promoted *li-yi-lian-chi* as core values.[94] Like the late eleventh century reform, which had to handle the consequences of the ancient prose movement, it was confronted with the task to counteract the New Culture Movement (*Xinwenhua Yundong* 新文化運動), which similarly led to increased moral individualism and value pluralism. In an insightful study, Arif Dirlik points out:

---

[92] Yang Zhongliang, *JSBM*, 59.1045-6. See also Li Tao, *XCB*, 239.5808 (not *renyi*).
[93] Translated adapted from Rickett, *Guanzi*, 53.
[94] Chiang Kai-shek, *Xinshenghuo Yundong gangyao*.

> [M]orality in New Life ideology is instrumental, existing only to serve the ends of the state. In the Kuomingtang version, national interest was the only criterion to distinguish the moral from the immoral: that which contributed to state power was moral, that which did not, immoral.

Moreover, Dirlik follows by saying, because the New Life ideology expected the people to prove their worthiness to their ruler, obedience rather than inner conscience was the highest possible virtue.[95]

Li-yi-lian-chi are statist values.[96] Just like the secretive track in Wang's value system that encourages subjects to obey orders by rewarding them with high salaries and official ranks, these values in the open track serve the same purpose: making it habitual for them to obediently follow the ruler's orders. This is in stark contrast to the humanist value system advocated by men like Han Yu and Ouyang Xiu, which asks the literati to build a personal foundation of morality within themselves under the general principle of *renyi*, including when necessary offending the ruler and remonstrating him straightforwardly. As Su Shi wrote when prefacing Ouyang's anthology: "Since the emergence of Master Ouyang, all under Heaven strive to polish themselves, … taking saving the times to practice the Way as worthy and offending imperial authority to remonstrate him as loyal" 自歐陽子出，天下爭自濯磨，…以救時行道為賢，以犯顏納諫為忠.[97]

It is true that at the same time when advocating *renyi*, Ouyang Xiu also wrote these words in the introduction to the biography of Feng Dao 馮道 (882-954) in the *New History of the Five Dynasties*:[98]

> It is said: "*Li-yi-lian-chi* are the four strings of the state. If these four strings were not put up, the state will then perish." Excellent indeed is Mr. Guan's way with words! *Li-yi* is the premier method for governing the people; *lian-chi* is the premier integrity with which to establish the people. Had they no *lian*, then there would be nothing they would not take; had they no *chi*, then there would be nothing they would not do. When the people are like this, then there would be no catastrophic

[95] Dirlik, "The Ideological Foundations of the New Life Movement," 971.
[96] A search in Ctext shows that in early Chinese texts, the four characters "*li-yi-lian-chi*" appeared together only in Daoist and Legalist sources (the one in *Hanshu* was citing *Guanzi*).
[97] Following Wang Gung-wu ("Feng Tao"), scholars generally take Ouyang's concept of loyalty as meaning serving only one ruler. See, for example, Jay, *A Change in Dynasties*, 94; Standen, *Unbounded Loyalty*, 32; Levine, *Divided by a Common Language*, 13; and de Pee, "Notebooks (*Biji*) and Shifting Boundaries of Knowledge," 147-48. It seems to me Ouyang thinks a literatus' loyalty is owed to *res publica* rather than to any monarch or his state.
[98] In the aforementioned article, Wang Gung-wu defends Feng as a Confucian and accuses Ouyang of being moralistic, typical of the Song neo-Confucians.

> turmoil and devastating defeat that would not arrive. How much more so when it comes to those who are high officials. When there is nothing they would not take and nothing they would not do, how can all-under-Heaven not be chaotic and the state not perish? I have read Feng Dao's "Jottings of the Old Man of Eternal Joy" and saw the account he gave of himself as glories. He can be called someone devoid of *lianchi*. From this, one can then know about all-under-Heaven and the state.
> 傳曰："禮義廉恥，國之四維；四維不張，國乃滅亡。"善乎，管生之能言也！禮義，治人之大法；廉恥，立人之大節。蓋不廉，則無所不取；不恥，則無所不為。人而如此，則禍亂敗亡，亦無所不至，況為大臣而無所不取不為，則天下其有不亂，國家其有不亡者乎！予讀馮道"長樂老敍，"見其自述以為榮，其可謂無廉恥者矣，則天下國家可從而知也。[99]

In the main body of the biography, however, Ouyang noted Feng was not greedy about money.[100] As Sheng Xianfeng points out, Ouyang's focus was on *chi*,[101] specifically on Feng's not being shamed of serving some ten monarchs in a disorderly world. This to Ouyang was against Confucius' concept of *chi*: "in a state that is without the way, to be wealthy and high-ranking is a shame" 邦無道，富且貴焉，恥也.[102] As such, the point Ouyang was making in the above passage was that individual literati's adherence to their own ethical principle in matters of serving or withdrawal had bearing on the well-being of all-under-heaven and the state. Note Ouyang was not concerned with any particular ruler's state, but the generic state and more importantly human society on the whole. In this, he was reiterating the progression from individual self-cultivation to pacifying all-under-heaven in "Great Learning": "After having cultivated oneself, the family is then managed; after one's family is managed, the state is then orderd; after the state is ordered, all-under-Heaven is then pacified" 身修而後家齊，家齊而後國治，國治而後天下平,[103] just like what Han Yu did in "Tracing the Way."[104]

In other words, while on the surface Ouyang seemed to be commending *Guanzi*'s statist values, in this private historiographical project of his,[105] he actually bent them toward the literati,

---

[99] Ouyang Xiu, *Xin Wudai shi*, 54.611. Translation modified from id., *Historical Records of the Five Dynasties*, trans. Richard L. Davis, 438.
[100] Ouyang Xiu, *Xin Wudai shi*, 54.612.
[101] Sheng Xianfeng, "Lun *Xin Wudai shi* de 'lianchi' guan." Rickett notes *lian* "is not an important virtue in either the *Lun yu* or the *Mengzi*" (*Guanzi*, 51).
[102] The *Analects*, 8.13.
[103] Zheng Xuan and Kong Yingda, *Liji zhengyi*, 60.1859.
[104] DeBlasi, *Reform in the Balance*, 138.
[105] Sung, "An Ambivalent Historian."

like how he bent the institution of remonstrance in the letters of recommendation for Wang Anshi: whereas to *Guanzi*, setting up these four strings was so that the ruler's orders would be carried out, Ouyang was criticizing Feng Dao, a man of letters, for going along with different rulers so as to remain in high office under them all.[106] As made clear with his criticism of those literati who did not cherish themselves but bore humiliation in order to survive toward the end of the introduction to Feng's biography,[107] Ouyang was admonishing his intended audience to hold dear their personal integrity and not to compromise before power.[108] By no means was he calling for the literati to subject themselves to monarchs, nor did we ever find him trying to use *lianchi* to replace *renyi*, the core values he carried forward from Han Yu, made the mainstream by the mid-eleventh century, and kept upholding by the early 1070s when editing "On the Roots" not long before his death.

By contrast, Confucius' concept of *chi* did not figure in the value system Wang Anshi designed.[109] Rather, at the same time when using *lian* to stress non-corruption,[110] he used *chi* to refer to being ashamed of extravagance in personal expenditure.[111] This is because to him, a social custom in which people are proud of extravagance is the source of corruption, as he wrote: "Heavy-handedly banning corrupt officials while taking the law against extravagance lightly, this is the so-called banning the incidental while implementing the fundamental" 重禁貪吏而輕奢靡之法，此所謂禁其末而施其本.[112] It also encourages those with greater private wealth to trespass their defined place in society, making it harder to maintain social order, as he wrote in an essay belonging to the *Miscellaneous Theories* volumes titled "Social Customs" 風俗:

> The superior man makes custom with frugality. The harm [of social customs] lies in extravagance. Were the people extravagant and not checked, how to handle the harm? Were it like this, then there would be people who exhaust their wealth and go beyond their designated social ranks to go after what is trendy at the time.

[106] Ouyang Xiu, *Xin Wudai shi*, 54.614-15.
[107] Ibid., 54.612.
[108] Bol notes Ouyang thinks that "intellectual values should be independent of power at court" ("The Sung Context," 33).
[109] Even though he himself adhered to it throughout his life. On Wang's treating himself differently from all the other literati, see Conclusion.
[110] Wang Anshi, "Shang Renzong Huangdi yan shi shu," in *LCJ*, 39.412: "養廉恥而離於貪鄙之行."
[111] Ibid., 39.416: "婚喪、奉養、服食、器用之物，皆無制度以為之節，而天下以奢為榮，以儉為恥."
[112] Ibid., 39.417.

君子制俗以儉，其弊為奢。奢而不制，弊將若之何？夫如是，則有殫極財力僭瀆擬倫以追時好者矣。[113]

It was for this reason he advocated frugality (*jian* 儉).[114] Despite the view that has been made popular by today's "Confucian" thinkers and politicians,[115] frugality was *not* a core value upheld by Confucius. Although in the *Analects*, Confucius said he preferred spending less to extravagance,[116] he did not regard it as a principle in governance,[117] nor did Mencius for that matter.[118] It was the statist political thinker Mozi who strongly advocated this value.[119] And the Confucians were actually his target of criticism in this regard,[120] because he thought they ornately decorate ritual and music (*fan shi liyue* 繁飾禮樂) rather than adhering to the principle of spending less for the sake of the state.[121] Wang's advocation of frugality is in line with this statist tradition rather than the Confucian one, just like his uses of *lianchi* are truly in line with *Guanzi*.[122] Unlike Ouyang Xiu's stress of individual literati's ethics for the well-being of *res publica*, Wang's focus is on regulating the subjects' monetary relationship to a specific ruler's state.

Not only is *li-yi-lian-chi* a statist value system under Wang Anshi, but it is also anti-humanist. This is seen most clearly in his unique concept of *li*, yet another new concept advanced

[113] Wang Anshi, "Fengsu," in *LCJ*, 69.737.
[114] On Wang's deploring the culture of luxury and his advocacy of austerity, see Song, *Traces of Grand Peace*, 224, 226.
[115] Who identify the so-called "Confucian values" with "the belief in thrift, hard work, filial piety, and loyalty" (Zakaria, "Culture Is Destiny," 114). To the early to middle period Chinese political thinkers covered in this study, none of these was considered the core values in the Confucian tradition of statecraft, which they – Confucians or not – took to be *renyi*. For a useful differentiation between cardinal virtues and dependent virtues, see Cua, "Virtues of Junzi." See also id., *Moral Vision and Tradition*, chapter 13.
[116] The *Analects*, 3.4, 7.36, and 9.3. See also ibid., 1.5.
[117] See, for example, the *Analects*, 10.6.
[118] See, for example, *Mencius*, 2B.16.
[119] See, for instance, the "Jie yong" 節用 and "Jie zang" 節葬 chapters in *Mozi*. This is also how Han Fei saw it, to whom Mozi was a model for being spendthrift whereas Confucius to the contrary (Chen Qiyou, Han Feizi *xin jiao zhu*, 50.1129).
[120] Sun Yirang, Mozi *xian gu*, 39.180.
[121] On Mozi being a state consequentialist, see Ivanhoe, "Mohist Philosophy." See also id., *Confucian Moral Self Cultivation*, 17.
[122] Adopting a social evolutionist perspective, Sun Shaohua sees a change from stressing *chi* during the Spring and Autumn period to emphasizing *lianchi* during the Warring States period instead of seeing them along the lines of different schools ("Xian Qin lianchi sixiang ji shehui fengsu de bianqian").

under the cloak of an existing term. Its content is spelled out in two adjacent essays in the *Miscellaneous Theories* volumes: "On *Li*" 禮論 and "On *Li* and Music" 禮樂論.[123]

Before looking into them, it is necessary to address the dating of the second piece, as some scholars think it was written late in Wang's life, given its speculative outlook.[124] This outlook is probably due to the prevalence of discussions of the internal, like heart and human nature, in it. This, however, does not mean they are not about statecraft. Quite on the contrary, they turned out to be central to it, as we shall soon see. Taking it as no different from the other pieces in the *Miscellaneous Theories* volumes, I date it to the late 1050s together with the "On *Li*" that precedes it. For those still doubting this, we can in any case date the ideas in it to before 1064-65, for in Wang's famous "Inscription on the Qian Prefectural School" 虔州學記, discussed in the next chapter, they were already present. For now, let us see what Wang meanst by *li*.

In "On *Li*," he wrote:

> In general, what is used as *li* must necessarily humiliate their free and proud heart and thwart their desire-indulging nature. None does not desire leisure and [*li*] makes them work for the superior. None does not desire gains, and [*li*] makes them give precedence to the senior.
> 凡為禮者，必詘其放傲之心，逆其嗜欲之性。莫不欲逸而為尊者勞，莫不欲得而為長者讓。[125]

Wang Anshi saw humans as by nature self-regarding, tending to get their desires met. This is how he saw beings in general, as he wrote in a poem:

---

[123] *LCJ*, 66.701-06. As we shall see, they are actually both about *li*. Wang probably added "music" in the title of the second essay to avoid repetition.

[124] For instance, Skonicki asserts that "[i]t is certainly true that the essays Wang composed during his retirement at Jinling 金陵 were more speculative than his earlier writings," and he includes this essay as one among those ("Cosmos, State and Society," 455). See the similar view of Li Zhiliang (*Wang Jinggong wenjji jianzhu*, 939 and 1033). Bol suspects it belonged to Wang's late writings because it and "On Attaining and Using Unity" "are concerned with the internal and the cosmological" ("Government, State, and Society," 165n81). Bol's surmise seems partly based on Hsia Chang-pwu's view that "Xing lun," where Wang expressed the view that human nature is all good, was written after Wang had retired ("Wang Anshi sixiang yu Mengzi de guanxi," 315; *Li Gou yu Wang Anshi yanjiu*, 209n82). In a footnote at the beginning of this section, I have presented my grounds for why this essay was written early in Wang's career, specifically before he completed his learning. Here I would add that Wang's writings on the internal that seem "speculative" are actually integral to his statecraft, which is, as indicated in the title of this dissertation, a soulcraft. I thank the anonymous reviewer for *Journal of Song-Yuan Studies* for helping me realize the necessity of discussing this matter in detail.

[125] Wang Anshi, "Li lun," in *LCJ*, 66.702.

牛若不穿鼻　Were an ox not roped in the nose,
豈肯推人磨　How can it pull the millstone for the human?
馬若不絡頭　Were a horse not bridled on the head,
隨宜而起臥　It will get up and lie down as it pleases.[126]

It is for this reason that *li* was devised, to work against their natural inclinations and make them work for those above them in the social hierarchy. He followed by making a couple of analogies:[127]

> Cutting wood to make a utensil and harnessing a horse to make it drive a carriage – these are not what the wood or horse is born capable of. Therefore, one must chop the wood with an axe, straighten it with the carpenter's line marker, round it with the compass, square it with the L-square and bind and glue the pieces together. It is thereafter the utensil becomes fit for use. [With the horse], in the front, restrain it with a bridle; in the back, force it with flogging. [Whether it] gallops or trots, runs slowly or quickly, do not let it run freely on its own but make it obey the driver in every movement. It is thereafter the horse becomes fit for driving.
> 夫斫木而為之器，服馬而為之駕，此非生而能者也。故必削之以斧斤，直之以繩墨，圓之以規而方之以矩，束聯膠漆之，而後器適於用焉。前之以銜勒之制，後之以鞭策之威，馳驟舒疾，無得自放，而一聽於人，而後馬適於駕焉。[128]

Wang's *li* is regulative: like the axe with which the carpenter chops off the unwanted part from the piece of wood to be made into a utensil, or the bridle put on the horse's head for the driver to control each and every of its movements.

It is not hard to see whom Wang was referring to with the unbridled horse. In the long letter to Renzong written in the late 1050s, when complaining the lack of talents, he was referring to the absence of a specific quality:

---

[126] First of Wang's "Ni Hanshan shide ershi shou," in *LCJ*, 3.99. For a discussion, see Qi Xia, *Qiu shi ji*, 492.
[127] Like Mencius, Wang Anshi likes to use analogy in argument. On Mencius' use of analogy in argument, see Lau, *Mencius*, Appendix 5. David Nivison suggests Mencius uses "recognizable Mohist techniques of argument and refutation" and is familiar "with the use of Mohist dialectical concepts" (*The Ways of Confucianism*, 104). See also Ivanhoe, "Mohist Philosophy."
[128] Wang Anshi, "Li lun," in *LCJ*, 66.702.

> Your subject thinks we can know that the talents currently in office are insufficient from where I had been to as part of my job assignment. Now, within thousands of *li*[129] in a circuit, those who can carry out the court's laws and ordinances, know the priorities among them, and in everything drive the people so as to fulfill their duties are very few.
> 臣以謂方今在位之人才不足者，以臣使事之所及則可知矣。今以一路數千里之間，能推行朝廷之法令，知其所緩急，而一切能使民以修其職事者甚少。[130]

An official's "talent" is measured by whether he would faithfully carry out the court's orders or not. In a conversation with Shenzong on 1070/9/2 that was recorded in his diary, Wang Anshi made a similar point:

> Recent state councilors were engaged in advancing their friends and faction, blocking the ruler's [channels of information], excluding and crushing literati of talent, and cannot be driven, therefore among your present aides extremely few have real capabilities and are usable."
> 近世執政務進朋黨，蔽塞人主，排抑才士，不可駕御者，故今侍從有實材可用者極少。[131]

The usability of a state councilor lies in his controllability by the ruler. As such, Wang's regulative *li* is designed for taming the self-governing literati mainstream, to turn them from free and proud individuals into subjects fully under the ruler's control.[132]

This *li* is diametrically different from that of Ouyang Xiu's.[133] Whereas Ouyang uses *li-yue* to guide people toward *renyi*, Wang's *li* works against the natural inclinations of humans, saying "being close to how humans feel is not the utmost of *li*" 禮之近人情，非其至.[134] That is, Ouyang's *li* is humanist whereas Wang's anti-humanist. As such, Wang's new concept of *li* is not one of the five constant virtues in the Confucian tradition. Rather, it refers to the behavioral regulations meant to turn humans against how they are by nature so that they can be made useful

[129] Chinese mile, one equaling 0.31 mile.
[130] Wang Anshi, "Shang Renzong Huangdi yan shi shu," 39.411.
[131] Wang Anshi, *Xining zoudui rilu*, 28.
[132] Wang's strong disapproval of such literati can be seen from an incident taking place in 1061, when he refused to draft the edict to appoint Su Zhe as an official, because he suspected Su "assists the prime minister and concentrates on attacking the ruler" 右宰相，專攻人主 (Li Tao, *XCB*, 194.4711).
[133] Skonicki notes Ouyang Xiu thinks ritual activities should be distinguished from government administration ("Cosmos, State and Society," 495n105, 290-91).
[134] Wang Anshi, "Li yue lun," in *LCJ*, 66.704. On Ouyang's valuing "emotional responses to the actualities of human life" (*renqing* 人情), see Bol, "*This Culture of Ours*," 201.

to the ruler's state. Considered together with Wang's actions against the humanist *ren*,[135] it seems Wang was trying to use this anti-humanist *li* to replace *ren* as the new core value:[136] recall in "Nine Changes," he glosses *renyi* as "reverence and deference", which is actually the conceptual content of his *li*; in "On *Li* and Music," he similarly wrote: "Do not watch unless it accords with *li*; do not listen unless it accords with *li*; do not speak unless it accords with *li*; do not move unless it accords with *li*. Then the way of *ren* is not far away." 非禮勿視，非禮勿聽，非禮勿言，非禮勿動，則仁之道亦不遠也。[137] Adhere to the regulative *li* and one would come close to what Wang conceived of as *ren*.

At the institutional level, Wang's *li* is laid out in his commentary on *Zhouli*:[138] each person has a designated role in the hierarchical social-political system and every level has its stipulated behavioral codes.[139] The ruler orders from above and each level downward carries them out. Each inferior obeys his superior and all the way up to the ruler. As Wang wrote therein:

> The implementation of *li* is to have the worthy govern the unworthy and the noble govern the lowly. … When everyone agrees with their superior and goes all out [to carry out his orders], then *li* comes from one source and above and below are ordered.
> 禮之行，有以賢治不肖，有以貴治賤…人各上同而自致，則禮出於一，而上下治。[140]

As a value for the people to uphold, it means to observe such regulations and not to violate them.

Wang did not seem to have spelled out the content of his concept of *yi* 義,[141] but Lin Zhiqi 林之奇 (1112-1176) told us:

---

[135] This makes Wang's closer to the type of *li* that Lu Xun called "eating man" (Tu, *Humanity and Self-Cultivation*, 13).
[136] In this, Wang's approach shows similarities to Li Gou's. In his seven essays on *li* written in 1032 and a postscript written 15 years thereafter, Li proposed an overarching concept of *li* that incorporates (and fundamentally changes the meanings of) the other four constant virtues (*Li Gou ji*, 5-27). Bol notes *li* for Li Gou was "the sum of all values" (Hymes and Schirokauer, "Introduction," 10n1).
[137] Wang Anshi, "Li yue lun," in *LCJ*, 66.703.
[138] For a study of this commentary, see Song, *Traces of Grand Peace*. For discussions of Wang's *li*, see Fang Xiaoyi, *Bei Song Xinxue yu wenxue*, 49–50, 112-18; and Hu Jinwang, *Wang Anshi de zhexue sixiang yu* Sanjingxinyi, 108-11. Both (mis)take Wang's governing with *li* as in line with governing with *de* in the Confucian tradition.
[139] This is more like a military order. For a comparable modern case, see James Scott's discussion of Le Corbusier's city (*Seeing like a State*, 114-15).
[140] Cheng Yuan-min, Sanjingxinyi *jikao huiping (1)* -- Shangshu, 290.
[141] Although it could be like in the case of *renyi*, the meaning of *yi* depends on that of the cardinal value preceding it.

> When interpreting the classics, Mr. Wang often takes "cruelty" as "*yi*" and also often contrasts "*ren*" with "*yi*".
> 王氏之解經，多以"忍"為"義"，亦多以"仁"、"義"對說。[142]

Wang interprets *yi* as cruelty and makes it the opposite of the humanist *ren*. Similarly, Su Shi complained:

> There is the *rěn* meaning cruelty; there is the *rěn* meaning tolerance. … However, some recent scholar said "when one has to be decisive, one cannot be compassionate. Cruelty is what is meant by *yi*." This is King Cheng teaching Junchen to be resolute at punishing and executing people and take cruelty as *yi*. … The disaster of inhumanity stoped at the six classics. And yet now he falsely interprets the classics like this to support and encourage inhumanity.
> 有殘忍之忍，有容忍之忍。…而近世學者乃謂"當斷不可以不忍，忍所以爲義，"是成王教君陳果於刑殺，以殘忍爲義也。…不仁之禍，至六經而止，今乃析言誣經以助發之。[143]

These suggest Wang's *yi* is also an anti-humanist concept.

To sum up, this replacement value system is anti-humanist and serves the interest of the ruler's state. These constitute the two mutually reinforcing points Wang Anshi took away from Laozi's idea of *daode*. On the one hand, he asks morality to be defined by a unitary source – the ruler, to whom all individuals should defer their moral autonomy. On the other, because this is a ruler-centered approach to morality, the old values revolving around individuals have to be replaced with new ones centering on the ruler – the head of state – as well.[144] We all know the reform Wang designed was aimed at unifying morality. It was with this new value system that morality was to be unified.[145]

---

[142] Cheng Yuan-min, Sanjingxinyi *jikao huiping (1)* -- Shangshu, 213.
[143] Ibid., 212-13. On the referent of "recent scholar" being Wang Anshi, see Li Yun-long, "Su Shi *Dongpo Shuzhuan* yanjiu," 151-54. See also Bol, *"This Culture of Ours*," 438n79.
[144] Other than *li-yi-lian-chi*, there appeared more derivative values along this line, like the Eight Conducts discussed in chapter 3.
[145] Given the difference between nation and state (De Weerdt, "Review of Nicolas Tackett"), it is probably a bit of a stretch to call *li-yi-lian-chi* a nationalistic value system. But if "nationalism" indeed appeared in the eleventh century as Nicolas Tackett argued (*The Origins of the Chinese Nation*), Wang Anshi's efforts could have played a not insignificant part in it. For an illuminating comparative case, see Nguyen, "The Noble Person and the Revolutionary," esp. 138-50.

It should be noted that these are just for the governed, not applicable to the governing. As Wang wrote in his commentary on the "Great Plan:"

> Adhering to the constant to serve the ruler is the way of the officials; holding discretion to drive the officials is the way of the ruler.
> 執常以事君者，臣道也；執權以禦臣者，君道也。[146]

Discretion is the ruler's exclusive[147] right not to be bound by the constant norms he made for those working for him.[148]

Here comes an issue: humans are not born to care about the ruler's state. How then to get these externally introduced values that do not serve the individual self's interest established in them? This is where the original part in Wang's statecraft lied. If so far the discussion is primarily on how he brought back Laozi's idea of *daode*, in what follows we shall see the new path he broke, building mainly on Mencius' insight into human nature.

III. Making the Statist Values "Natural"

Tu Wei-ming notes that "*li* without *ren* easily degenerates into social coercion."[149] Wang Anshi, however, did not wish his *li* to be simply coercive.[150] Nor is this *li* the *fa* 法 in the Legalist tradition.[151] In his long letter to Renzong, Wang had made a clear distinction between the two.[152] Over a decade later, in a face-to-face conversation with Shenzong, he explicated it as follows:

> Penal laws and the legal system are not the basis for governing. These are the business of clerks, not the ruler's way. … Manipulating [the people's] spirit and transforming them with soulcraft, so

[146] Wang Anshi, "'Hongfan' zhuan," in *LCJ*, 65.692.
[147] Ibid., 65.693.
[148] For a discussion of this concept, see Yang Qianmaio, *Wang Anshi "Yi" xue yanjiu*, 190–99. For an example of how Wang used *quan*, see Smith, "Shen-Tsung's Reign," 365. For another example, see Wang Anshi, *Xining zoudui rilu*, 12. The latter case is discussed in chapter 4.
[149] Tu, *Humanity and Self-Cultivation*, 13.
[150] As Yinan Luo contends ("Ideas in Practice," 84).
[151] Many scholars take Wang as mainly a Legalist. See, for example, Deng Guangming, *Bei Song zhengzhi gaigejia*, 73; Zhang Chengzhong, "'Yi zhongren wei zhi'"; Zhao Dongmei, *Da Song zhi bian*, 9. For a disagreement with Deng, see Li Huarui, "Northern Song Reformist Thought and Its Sources," 237-38. For Deng's revision of his own view, see *Deng Guangming zhishi conggao*, 129-52.
[152] Wang Anshi, "Shang Renzong Huangdi yan shi shu", in *LCJ*, 39.412. For more on this, see chapter 3.

> as to make them naturally change toward the good and stay away from punishment is the ruler's way. … If to harmonize all under Heaven as one, and check the barbarians simultaneously, in the humble opinion of your servant, … there is no other way except for fundamentally changing the custom, to make everyone want to go all out [to serve the ruler]. Mere legal system cannot be relied upon to succeed in attaining the goal.
>
> 刑名法制非治之本，是為吏事，非主道也。…蓋精神之運、心術之化，使人自然遷善遠罪者，主道也。…若欲調一天下，兼制夷狄，臣愚以為非…風俗丕變，人有自竭之志，則區區法制未足恃以收功。[153]

Wang is not satisfied with what laws have to offer.[154] Part of the reason was because, as he wrote in his commentary on *Laozi*, "Laws and ordinances are for prohibiting wrongdoing under Heaven. Because they prohibit wrongdoing, inauthenticity thus arises. When laws are issued, offenders are given rise to; when ordinances are promulgated, treacheries are generated." 法令者，禁天下之非。因其禁非，所以起偽。蓋法出奸生，令下詐生.[155] What Wang wanted was to have the people "naturally" think in accord with the new morality he designed. For this, Wang had his *li* take on a transformative role in addition to the regulative one discussed above. This is again formulated in "On *Li*" and "On *Li* and Music."

In "On *Li*," after using cutting wood and taming the horse to make clear the regulative function of his *li*, Wang pointed out: "That the sage does not make a utensil unless with wood and does not drive a carriage unless with the horse is also based on their Heaven-endowed raw material." 聖人舍木而不為器，舍馬而不為駕者，固亦因其天資之材也.[156] By way of analogy, he was saying that the reason why the self-regarding humans can be turned into being useful to the ruler's state, like the raw piece of wood getting turned into a utensil or the wild horse into a carriage-driving equipment, is because there is some raw material in them to work on. What is this material? Immediately thereafter, he wrote:

---

[153] Li Tao, *XCB*, 230.5590-91. Dated to 1072/2.
[154] This is consistent with Wang Zhaoyu's view that "legal constraint is at best of secondary importance (Song, *Traces of Grand Peace*, 211).
[155] Quoted from Lu Guolong, *Song ru weiyan*, 131.
[156] Wang Anshi, "Li lun," in *LCJ*, 66.702.

Now at birth, a person has the feeling of fearing his father and loving his mother. The sage follows what he desires by nature and makes regulations for him. Therefore, although the regulations are coercive, they work by following what he desires by nature. … The body of a monkey or an ape is not unlike that of a human. [But should the sage] want to restrain it with [the ranking system defining] the noble and the lowly, and control it with [behavioral norms like] bowing and deferring, then it will hurry off to deep mountains and big forests and flee. Even if frightening it with force and taming it with transformative [techniques], can it obey? … Therefore, I say, *li* begins with Heaven[’s endowment] and completes through human [efforts]. Were there no such [endowment] from Heaven and yet humans wanted to do it, of all the things in the world, I have never seen such.
今人生而有嚴父愛母之心，聖人因其性之欲而為之制焉，故其制雖有以強人，而乃順其性之欲也。…夫狙猿之形，非不若人也，欲繩之以尊卑而節之以揖讓，則彼有趨於深山大麓而走耳，雖畏之以威而馴之以化，其可服邪？…故曰：禮始於天而成於人，天則無是，而人欲為之，舉天下之物，吾蓋未之見也。[157]

The theory Wang is formulating here is built on two passages from *Menicus*:

Humans all have the feeling of compassion and pity. Humans all have the feeling of shame and detest. Humans all have the feeling of reverence and respect. Humans all have the feeling of right and wrong.
惻隱之心，人皆有之；羞惡之心，人皆有之；恭敬之心，人皆有之；是非之心，人皆有之。[158]

The feeling of compassion and pity is the beginning of *ren*. The feeling of shame and detest is the beginning of *yi*. The feeling of reverence and respect is the beginning of *li*. The feeling of right and wrong is the beginning of *zhi*. … In general, having these four beginnings within oneself, if one knows filling them all out, it will be like a fire starting up, a spring breaking through. If one can fill them out, they will be sufficient to care for all within the Four Seas. If one does not fill them out, they will not be sufficient to serve one’s parents.

[157] Wang Anshi, “Li lun,” in *LCJ*, 66.702.
[158] *Mencius*, 6A.6. Translation modified from Van Norden trans., *Mengzi*, 149.

惻隱之心，仁之端也；羞惡之心，義之端也；辭讓之心，禮之端也；是非之心，智之端也。…凡有四端於我者，知皆擴而充之矣，若火之始然，泉之始達。苟能充之，足以保四海；苟不充之，不足以事父母。[159]

All human beings are born with a variety of feelings. These are the starting points from which they can come to acquire various moral values. Knowing this and working on enlarging these feelings, powerful morality can be established in them.[160]

We know Wang Anshi fully mastered this Mencian theory, because in an essay titled "Yang [Xiong] and Mencius" 揚孟, again belonging to the *Miscellaneous Theories* volumes, he selectively applied it for his purpose:

> At birth, no human being does not have the nature (i.e., natural feeling) of shame and detest. Let us for now illuminate this with the beginning [originating from the feeling of] shame and detest. Suppose there is someone who, being ashamed of the good conduct's not being cultivated and detesting the good reputation's not getting established, exerts himself at the good to fill out his nature of shame and detest, then who can resist his becoming a worthy? This is a person who gets the proper nature and what Mencius called by "nature."
> 夫人之生，莫不有羞惡之性，且以羞惡之一端以明之。有人於此，羞善行之不修，惡善名之不立，盡力乎善以充其羞惡之性，則其為賢也孰禦哉？此得乎性之正者，而孟子所謂性也。[161]

Of the four feelings Mencius mentioned, Wang Anshi chose the one that leads to *yi* 義, which Lin Zhiqi and Su Shi told us Wang had to mean cruelty and used as the opposite of *ren*. This is not coincidence, for in "Tracing [Human] Nature," he explicitly took issue with Mencius' taking *ren* as innate in human nature:

> Mencius thought the feeling of compassion and pity everyone has, hence his saying that by nature, no human is not *ren* (humae). Were the so-called nature like what he said, it must be that the feeling

[159] *Mencius*, 2A.6. Translation modified from Van Norden trans., *Mengzi*, 46.
[160] For an insightful analysis of how moral training actually took place with Mencius, see Ivanhoe, "Confucian Self Cultivation and Mengzi's Notion of Extension."
[161] Wang Anshi, "Yang Meng," in *LCJ*, 64.680.

> of bitter resentment and anger all humans do not have. It is only thereafter that it can be said that by nature no human is not good. But do all humans indeed have no such?
> 孟子以惻隱之心人皆有之，因以謂人之性無不仁。就所謂性者如其說，必也怨毒忿戾之心人皆無之，然後可以言人之性無不善，而人果皆無之乎。[162]

Read in this light, what Wang meant by "good conduct" in "Yang [Xiong] and Mencius," as we have pointed out when discussing his dual-track value system, does not refer to *renyi* in the Confucian tradition, but the statist values *li-yi-lian-chi*.

Now we can see, in the "On *Li*" passage, he was saying: All human beings are born with the natural feeling to fear their father, so the sage made the ranking system according to this fundamental truth in their nature, to have the inferior revere the superior with fear; all human beings are born with the feeling to love their mother, so the sage made behavioral regulations according to this fundamental truth in their nature, to have those below give precedence to those above.

These are not what they would do naturally, Wang admits of their coerciveness, but in design they followed what they desire in their nature. Other species, even though they might look like humans on the outside, like apes and monkeys, because in their nature there are no such feelings, such efforts won't work. Humans alone are suitable to be tamed and transformed with Wang's *li*. The feeling of fearing their father and loving their mother they are born with provides the biological foundation on which to cultivate in them fear for and love of the ruler[163] with the ranking system and its accompanying behavioral regulations that are designed based on this fundamental truth about human nature. Making them intimidated and taming them with efforts at transforming them, eventually they will become obedient. Wang's *li* begins by working on such inborn feelings and completes its mission with human efforts at transformation.

A passage Wang Anshi's son Wang Pang 王雱 (1044-1076) wrote in his commentary on *Zhuangzi* made a similar point:

---

[162] Wang Anshi, "Yuan xing," in *LCJ*, 68.726. This is consistent with Wang's mature, anti-humanist view of human nature, rather than the one he expressed in "Xing lun," when he was still following Mencius by saying human nature is all good.

[163] This was eventually written into the goal of education under Huizong, as we shall see in chapter 3.

> What is naturally so is [endowed by] Heaven; what is made so is [the result of] human [efforts]. That which is within what is naturally so is what one has; that which is outside what is made so is what one does not have. How can human [efforts] snatch away what one has or increase what one does not have? Therefore, what one has is one's [inborn] nature; what one does not have is what Zhuangzi called "enlarging." *De* (the capacity to be moral) is what one has in oneself. Human [efforts] at increasing what one has in oneself is enlarging.
> 自然者，天也；使然者，人也。在自然之中者，有也；在使然之外者，無也。人安能奪其所有、益其所無哉？故所有者，性也；所無者，莊子所謂侈[164]也。德者，己之所有也。於己之所有，人益之，是侈也。[165]

Human beings are born with some natural material for others to work on from outside, so that they would come to acquire the morality they did not have originally.

There still remains a problem: How do we know the externally imposed *li* would necessarily reach inside, making it possible to amplify these feelings from outside, till getting the desired morality established? This is addressed in "On *Li* and Music." In the beginning part of this long essay,[166] Wang wrote:

> Nurturing the inborn [nature] lies in maintaining the corporeal form; filling out the corporeal form lies in nurturing *qi* (vital energy), nurturing *qi* lies in pacifying the heart, pacifying the heart lies in being sincere to the utmost, and being sincere to the utmost lies in exhausting [the proper] nature (i.e., going all out to establish the proper nature). Not exhausting [the proper] nature is not adequate for nurturing the inborn [nature]. Those who can exhaust [the proper] nature are sincere to the utmost; those who can be sincere to the utmost have a pacified heart; those who can pacify their heart nurture their *qi*; those who can nurture their *qi* maintain their corporeal form; those who are capable of maintaining their corporeal form nurture their inborn [nature]. Not nurturing the inborn [nature] is not adequate for exhausting [the proper] nature.

---

[164] This is the key word here. In this context, Pang uses it to mean "enlarge", like Mencius' *chong* 充, as can be seen from his explication in the last sentence.
[165] Wang Pang, Nanhua zhenjing *xin zhuan*, 16.271.
[166] On this being a difficult text, see Bol, "Government, Society, and State," 165. It is also considerably longer than the other essays in the *Miscellaneous Theories* volumes. However, Liang Tao notes it is crucial for unpacking Wang's political philosophy ("Wang Anshi de xin waiwang zhengzhi zhexue," 266–68). Liang has rightly connected this text to *Mencius* 2A2. It seems exploring this connection further can yield more fruits. Yinan Luo thinks in this text, Wang "spelled out an entire process of self-cultivation" like that that of the Neo-Confucians, albeit "relatively ambiguous and impractical" ("Ideas in Practice," 80). My reading below suggests otherwise.

> 養生在於保形，充形在於育氣，養氣在於寧心，寧心在於致誠，致誠在於盡性，不盡性不足以養生。能盡性者，至誠者也；能至誠者，寧心者也；能寧心者，養氣者也；能養氣者，保形者也；能保形者，養生者也，不養生不足以盡性也。[167]

The number of concepts Wang introduced makes it look dazzling,[168] but basically, he was just delineating a bi-directional chain:

inborn [nature] 生 ⇌ body 形 ⇌ *qi* 氣 ⇌ heart 心 ⇌ sincerity 誠 ⇌ [the proper] nature 性

At the center of this long chain lies the assumption that *qi* and heart interact with each other,[169] an assumption that was first theorized by Mencius.[170] This is why after finishing delineating the bi-directional chain, Wang immediately brought out Mencius:

> The inborn [nature] and [the proper] nature follow one another; will and *qi* complement one another, one outer, one inner. The inborn [nature] being murky, [the proper] nature will then be concealed; [the proper] nature being murky, the inborn [nature] will then be concealed. This is like "when the will is unified, it moves *qi* and when the *qi* is unified, it moves the will."
> 生與性之相因循，志之與氣相為表裏也。生渾則蔽性，性渾則蔽生，猶"志一則動氣，氣一則動志也。"[171]

[167] Wang Anshi, "Li yue lun," in *LCJ*, 66.703.
[168] Michael Nylan points out that "it is more often that Legalists and Taoists who seek to impress their readers with the marvelous quality of their teachings by dazzling displays of verbal pyrotechnics" (*The Shifting Center*, 33). Wang Anshi applied it not infrequently. For a couple of other examples, see "Yang Meng" and "Dui nan" (*LCJ*, 64.679-70 and 68.728-29).
[169] A number of scholars have noted that Wang was trying to make a connection between the inborn [nature] or body-*qi* and [the proper] nature. See, for example, Ma Zhenduo, *Zhengzhi gaigejia Wang Anshi*, 111; Li Xiangjun, *Wang Anshi xueshu sixiang yanjiu*, 221–22; Hu Jinwang, *Wang Anshi de zhexue sixiang yu* Sanjingxinyi, 52; Liang Tao, "Wang Anshi de xin waiwang zhengzhi zhexue," 267. Yinan Luo approaches this passage from a political-economical perspective ("Ideas in Practice," 83).
[170] See, for example, Yang Rubin, *Rujia shenti guan*, 45, 52.
[171] Wang Anshi, "Li yue lun," in *LCJ*, 66.703.

The quotation comes from *Mencius* 2A2, arguably one of the most important entries in the entire *Mencius*.[172] When discussing with his student Gongsun Chou 公孫醜 on how to attain an immovable heart as one's moral guide, Mencius says:

> Your will is the commander of *qi*. *Qi* fills the body. When your will is there, *qi* follows. It is therefore said: "Keep your will. Do not injure *qi*."
> [Gongsun Chou continues:] "You have already said 'When your will is there, *qi* follows.' Why do you then add 'Keep your will. Do not injure *qi*?'"
> [Mencius] replies: "When your will is unified, it moves *qi*. When *qi* is unified, it moves your will. Now, [what moves] when running and stumbling is *qi*, but it moves one's heart instead."[173]
> 夫志，氣之帥也；氣，體之充也。夫志至焉，氣次焉。故曰："持其志，無暴其氣。"
> "既曰'志至焉，氣次焉'，又曰'持其志無暴其氣'者，何也？"
> 曰："志壹則動氣，氣壹則動志也。今夫蹶者趨者，是氣也，而反動其心。"[174]

Mencius thinks that the will – what one sets one's heart on – should be the commander of the *qi*. On the other hand, he also recognizes that the *qi* caused by one's bodily movements can stir one's heart as well. That is, *qi* and heart interact with each other.[175] As Peter Bol points out, this in effect shows that a moral question is a physical one.[176] With this, the key theoretical issue in establishing the desired values in the subjects with externally imposed behavioral regulations has been solved. As Wang followed by saying: "the Former Kings, knowing this is so, therefore made *li* according to their understanding of the nature of all under Heaven" 先王知其然，是故體天下之性而為禮.[177] It is because the Former Kings knew that *qi* and heart interact with each other that they devised *li*, so as to "restore the proper nature through rectifying a person's *qi*" 正人氣而歸正性.[178]

---

[172] Numerous scholars have studied it. My understanding is based on Bol, "There Has Never Been One Greater Than Confucius." For other helpful discussions, see Li Cunshan, *Zhongguo qi lun tanyuan yu fawei*, 108; and Yang Rubin, *Rujia shenti guan*, chapter 3, esp. 154-66.
[173] Translation modified from Van Norden trans., *Mengzi*, 38.
[174] *Mencius*, 2A.2.
[175] Not everyone shares this assumption. For instance, Mencius' interlocutor Gaozi "refuses to make the connections between external and internal" (Bol, "There Has Never Been One Greater Than Confucius," 50).
[176] Bol, "There Has Never Been One Greater Than Confucius," 50.
[177] Recall what Wang wrote in "On *Li*": "因性之欲而為制" (*LCJ*, 66.702).
[178] Note that Wang is using two meanings of "*xing*": one is one's inborn nature – how humans are naturally –, the other is the nature one ought to have, what I translate as "the proper nature."

Combining this with what Wang wrote in "On *Li*", we can see the full procedure Wang had in mind:

Former Kings→*li*→inborn nature→body→*qi*→heart→sincerity→the proper nature

The Former Kings[179] made behavioral regulations to work on people' inborn nature through their bodily movements. Such movements generate *qi* and because *qi* interacts with the heart, over time the attitude they set their heart on will be changed and the proper nature established in them. Wang's *li*[180] follows how human nature works to establish the morality he designed in the people's hearts as the proper nature they should have. This is "the ruler's way" Wang referred to in the conversation with Shenzong: manipulating people's spirit and transforming them with soulcraft, till they naturally think in accord with what is defined as good, i.e., in the interest of the ruler's state. The talks of the internal figure prominently in this essay, because Wang's statecraft is essentially a soulcraft – governing by transforming human nature.

Compared with forcing people to conform, Wang Anshi prefers having people's hearts unreflectively think in this way:

> Watching it and being necessarily able to see it, listening to it and being necessarily able to hear it, moving toward it and being necessarily able to arrive at it, thinking about it and being necessarily able to grasp it – this is what sincerity attains. Hearing it without listening to it, seeing it without watching it, grasping it without thinking about it, arriving at it without moving toward it – this is what [the proper] nature has inherently and that from which the magical arises, what those who go all out with their heart and sincerity attain. Therefore, what makes it unfathomable from sincerity is [the proper] nature. The worthy are those who nourish and establish [the proper] nature; the sages are those who exhaust [the proper] nature to attain utmost sincerity.

[179] Zhang Chengzhong thinks Wang's "former kings" were closer to those referred to in *Guanzi* and *Han Feizi* ("Cong *Guanzi* 'Qingzhong' dao *Zhouguan* 'Quanfu'," 21). It seems to me Wang was referring to those in the broader statist tradition, including the Daoists, Legalists, and Mohists.

[180] Music works together with *li* as its supplement. Wang's focus was only on *li*, as can be seen from his four prohibitions against behaviors not in line with *li*.

> 視之能必見，聽之能必聞，行之能必至，思之能必得，是誠之所至也。不聽而聰，不視而明，不思而得，不行而至，是性之所固有，而神之所自生也，盡心盡誠者之所至也。故誠之所以能不測者，性也。賢者，鞠以立性者也；聖人，盡性以至誠者也。[181]

Sincerity – one's conscious efforts – can bring about some results. But it is not as good as when people act out of what is ingrained in their nature. It is therefore the superior man aims at establishing the proper nature in himself and the sage attains sincerity with this proper nature that has been fully established in his heart, without needing to make a conscious effort at being sincere.

What matters in this type of learning is heart instead of eyes and ears, because "to hear and see is what the ears and eyes can do, but that by which one is smart and bright does not lie in the ears and eyes" 聰明者，耳目之所能為；而所以聰明者，非耳目之能為也.[182] What the heart learns is not phenomenal knowledge, but morality. It is therefore at the beginning stage, the superior man would reduce interaction with the outside world and strictly observe the *li*,[183] until he has come to a point where he would not be led astray by the other schools of teaching:

> The *Book of Change* says, "in Reduction/Loss,[184] there is difficulty in the beginning and gain in the end." … Reduce sounds in the ears, reduce colors in the eyes, reduce words in the mouth, reduce movements in the body – aren't these difficult in the beginning? When arriving at the destination, there is nothing the ears do not hear, nothing the eyes do not see, nothing the mouth speaks that isn't trusted, and nothing the body moves that does not conquer – aren't these gaining in the end? Therefore, in the beginning of the superior man's learning, he is like a stupid person or an ignorant child. On arriving at the destination, Heaven and Earth are not big enough for him, people and things are not numerous enough for him, ghosts and spirits cannot hide from him, and the fragmented [teachings] of the various masters cannot confuse him.
>
> 《易》曰"損，先難而後獲"。[185]…耳損於聲，目損於色，口損於言，身損於動，非先難歟？及其至也，耳無不聞，目無不見，言無不信，動無不服，非後得歟？是故君子之學，始如

[181] Wang Anshi, "Li yue lun," in *LCJ*, 66.702.
[182] Ibid., 66.704.
[183] Ibid., 66.703.
[184] The name of the forty-first of the sixty-four hexagrams.
[185] The *Book of Change* actually says "先難而後易". It seems Wang intentionally switched "易" with "獲," in keeping with his general approach to allure people into his program with profit.

> 愚人焉，如童蒙焉。及其至也，天地不足大，人物不足多，鬼神不足為隱，諸子之支離不足惑也。[186]

Like Wang's engagement with Han Yu on sequence, the point is to first establish in the student's heart the right morality, so that in his moral decision-making, environmental input through eyes and ears cannot sway him. The theoretical source again comes from *Mencius*:

> The faculties of eyes and ears do not reflect, but are deceived by things. Things interact with things and simply lead them along. The faculty of heart, however, thinks. If it thinks, it will then get it. If it does not think, it will not then get it. This is what Heaven has given me. Establish it in the greater faculty first and then the lesser [faculties] will not be able to gain the upper hand.
> 耳目之官不思，而蔽於物。物交物，則引之而已矣。心之官則思，思則得之，不思則不得也。此天之所與我者，先立乎其大者，則其小者弗能奪也。[187]

If in the reform Wang architected, some officials are granted "entrepreneurial autonomy"[188] or allowed to respond to things spontaneously,[189] it should be *after* they have acquired this proper nature.[190]

This soulcraft is premised on a theoretical precondition: that human nature can be changed. This was not how people at the time generally thought,[191] partly given Confucius' view to the contrary in the *Analects* 17.3:[192] "the wisest and the stupidest do not change" 上智與下愚不移. His other statement – "You can discusss the loftiest matters with those who are above average, but not with those who are below average" 中人以上可以語上，中人以下不可以語上[193] – also suggests a similar view: some people are not malleable, but simply remain how they were born to

[186] Wang Anshi, "Li yue lun," in *LCJ*, 66.705-6.
[187] *Mencius*, 6A.15. Translation modified from Van Norden trans., *Mengzi*, 156.
[188] Smith, *Taxing Heaven's Storehouse*, 117.
[189] Luo, "Ideas in Practice," 80.
[190] Paul Smith has shown that most of those granted such entrepreneurial autonomy "had already displayed their aggressiveness, ingenuity, and loyalty to the reform cause in previous New Policies posts or tasks" and that they were probably typically ruthless (*Taxing Heaven's Storehouse*, 123, 125).
[191] See, for example, the views of Liu Chang and Sima Guang cited below.
[192] Mid-eleventh intellectuals did not blindly follow Confucius (Bol, *Neo-Confucianism in History*, 61), but the majority still followed him on this specific point.
[193] The *Analects*, 6.21. Translation Slingerland's (*Confucius* Analects, 59).

be. In two adjacent essays in the *Miscellaneous Theories* volumes, Wang Anshi produced a theory of the malleability of human moral nature, claiming it to be consistent with Confucius.

In "Tracing Human Nature," referring to the *Analects* 17.3, Wang wrote:

> This is about intelligence and stupidity, whereas what I said is about human nature and good and bad. With regard to the good, so long as the bad people do it, it is so; with regard to intelligence, the stupid people perhaps cannot be forced to have it.
> 此之謂智愚，吾所云者，性與善惡也。[194]惡者之於善也，為之則是；愚者之於智也，或不可強而有也。[195]

Making a distinction between the intellectual and the moral spheres, Wang says Confucius' words were about the former only.[196] In the intellectual sphere, Wang grants that the stupid cannot be changed to become intelligent, as Confucius said. The case is, however, different in the moral sphere, Wang points out: here, a bad person can still do good things. That is, one's moral nature can be changed by making efforts.

By "intelligence," Wang specifically refers to literary gift, as he follows by writing:

> Fu Xi composed the *Change*, whereas the words of later sages', unless by the brightest and the divinest of all under Heaven, whose can participate in it? Confucius composed the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, and Ziyou and Zixia could not place a single word in it. It is perhaps that Fu Xi's intelligence, none other than the brightest and the divinest under Heaven can participate in; and that Confucius' intelligence, even Ziyou and Zixia cannot be forced to be capable of, let alone the stupidest. Its unchangability is clear.

[194] Fu Sinian points out that it was Mencius who initiated the discourse on human nature being good (*Xing ming gu xun bianzheng*, 628). For more on what this meant for Wang Anshi's soulcraft as statecraft, see chapter 4.
[195] Wang Anshi, "Yuan xing," in *LCJ*, 68.726-27.
[196] This distinction was also made in the earlier "Xing lun" (*LCJ*, 1064). While as noted above, there were indeed changes between "Xing lun" and the later essays in the *Miscellaneous Theories* volumes, if we look at the underlying questions Wang was addressing with such statements, we can find some consistency. For instance, in his three essays on human nature – "Yuan xing," "Xing shuo," and "Xing lun" –, Wang Anshi was consistently grappling with one issue: to resolve the challenge posed by what Confucius said in the *Analects* 17.3 to his project of changing human nature.

> 伏羲作《易》，而後世聖人之言也，非天下之至精至神，其孰能與於此？孔子作《春秋》，則游、夏不能措一辭。蓋伏羲之智，非至精至神不能與；惟孔子之智，雖游、夏不可強而能也，況所謂下愚者哉？其不移明矣。[197]

The *Analects* 11.3 tells us Ziyou and Zixia were the two students of Confucius' who are good at literary learning (*wenxue* 文學). If even they cannot add a word to Confucius' *Spring and Autumn Annals*, then such literary gift is undoubtedly exclusive to the few sages like Fu Xi and Confucius and cannot be acquired through learning at all. This is not necessarily what Confucius meant by intelligence, but Wang Anshi's interpretation of it supports his agenda against literary learning, by telling people this depends on rare inborn talent and excludes most people.

If here Wang still begrudgingly grants the validity of Confucius' words in the intellectual sphere, in "Explicating Human Nature" 性說, Wang absorbs intelligence into morality by supplying a solution for changing one's "intellectual" quality:[198]

> Practicing the good and doing just that, this is the so-called the wisest; practicing the bad and doing just that, this is the so-called the stupidest. Sometimes practicing the good, sometimes practicing the bad, this is the so-called average men. … It is only because they do not change that thereafter they are called the wisest; it is only because they do not change that thereafter they are called the stupidest. All are named on their deaths. It is not that what is born cannot be changed.
>
> 習於善而已矣，所謂上智者；習於惡而已矣，所謂下愚者；一習於善，一習於惡，所謂中人者。…惟其不移，然後謂之上智；惟其不移，然後謂之下愚。皆於其卒也命之，夫非生而不可移也。[199]

Under the façade of linguistic resemblance to Confucius' "by nature, people are close; by practice, they are removed from each other" 性相近，習相遠,[200] Wang Anshi carried out a few bold conceptual actions: first, what he now means by *zhi* does not refer to one's inborn intellectual capacity, but the ability to accord with what is defined as good. Second, whereas in Confucius,

---

[197] Wang Anshi, "Yuan xing," in *LCJ*, 68.727.
[198] Liu Chengguo notes Wang's willingness to contradict himself in order to stress the importance of practice (*Jinggong Xinxue yanjiu*, 139).
[199] Wang Anshi, "Xing shuo," in *LCJ*, 68.727.
[200] The *Analects*, 17.2.

buyi 不移 means one's intellectual aptitude remains the same throughout one's life, Wang has them mean one consistently does something without change. Finally, one's aptitude is not determined at birth, but on death, and the criterion for evaluating it is not how one is born to be, but the actions one chooses to perform throughout one's life. In this way, Wang made even "intellectual" nature malleable, so long as one is willing to put efforts into it.[201]

Paul Smith notes that to carry out Wang's plan, suitable men "had to be mustered from all levels of society."[202] And yet, as we saw in chapter 1, Wang Anshi did not think men with literary talent – the vast majority of the existing elite who were selected into officialdom through the *jinshi* examination featuring the testing of literary skills – useful. This made it necessary for him to mobilize a new type of men to aspire to climb up on the social ladder, who constituted the vast majority of the adult male population in the state. Wang Anshi had worked out a full procedure for attracting them and turning them into the kind of agents that would be useful to the ruler's state, the question is whether such men, born lacking the talent the literati mainstream at the time considered essential for getting ahead in officialdom, would believe they can do it.[203] In the long letter to Renzong, after pointing out the way to draw people in with the dual-track value system, Wang had noted this problem:

> Were the literati unable [to do it], that is it. If they are able [to do it], who would let go of what they wish to have and not encourage themselves to become talents? Thus I say: not to be concerned about the people's not doing it. Be concerned about their inability. … Except for the stupidest whose material cannot be changed, there is none who is unable to join this.
>
> 士不能則已矣，苟能，則孰肯舍其所願得，而不自勉以為才？故曰：不患人之不為，患人之不能。…自非下愚不可移之才，未有不能赴者也。[204]

The only bottle neck on the stimulation mechanism Wang designed is not everyone thinks they have this ability. This is what he sought to convince his intended audience in these two essays:

---

[201] For an insightful analysis of this essay in comparison with Han Yu's "Tracing Human Nature," see Zhang Chengzhong, "'Yi zhongren wei zhi,'" 22-24.
[202] Smith, "State Power and Economic Activism," 87.
[203] For instance, around this time, Liu Chang 劉敞 (1019-1068) put forward an argument that managing the state is the job of a select few ("Lun xing," in Zeng Zaozhuang and Liu Lin eds., *Quan Song wen*, 59.259). Likewise, Sima Guang was against the creation of a new elite (Bol, "Government, Society, and State," 180). In this regard, Wang's program was a "progressive" one by today's standard.
[204] Wang Anshi, "Shang Renzong Huangdi yan shi shu," in *LCJ*, 39.421-22.

nothing cannot be changed. So long as one keeps doing what is defined as good till death, even if he was born stupid by intellectual aptitude, he would be called the wisest, not to say changing one's moral nature.

IV. Justifying the Crafted Nature

After the 1068/4 meeting with Shenzong, Wang Anshi wrote the emperor a short note,[205] in which he criticized the governance during Renzong's reign and pointed out the two spheres where it failed:

> In everything, he followed the natural pattern and tendency, while not working on manipulating spirit or scrutinizing [the relationship] between name and substance.
> 一切因任自然之理勢，而精神之運有所不加，名實之間有所不察。[206]

These are the two spheres Wang were addressing with a statecraft devoted to changing the natural state of things.

Wang Anshi's objection to following how things are naturally is because he thinks in this way they are not useful to the ruler's state. Despite his major takeway from Laozi's idea of *daode*, he faults him for following the natural way.[207] Rather, what is natural needs to be completed by the sage through governance: "the sage is only engaged in cultivating what he uses to complete the myriad things, and does not speak of that by which to give birth to the myriad things. It is perhaps because that which gives birth lies in nature, not what human forces can get to participate in." 聖人唯務修其成萬物者，不言其生萬物者，蓋生者尸之於自然，非人力之所得與矣。[208]

This includes human nature, as he wrote in his commentary on the "Great Plan":

[205] This letter is said to have been read by the emperor attentively for several times (Huang Yizhou, *XCBSB*, 95).
[206] Wang Anshi, "Ben chao bainian wushi zhazi," in *LCJ*, 41.446.
[207] Wang Anshi, "Laozi," in *LCJ*, 68.723. Cf. Lu Guolong's reading to the contrary (*Song ru weiyan*, 106).
[208] Wang Anshi, "Laozi," in *LCJ*, 68.723. See also id., "Li lun," in *LCJ*, 66.701-02.

> Likes and dislikes are human nature. What Heaven[209] ordains is called human nature. What is made [by the people] is human action. Human action is then contrary to [the proper] nature. … What is called "showing them likes and dislikes" is nothing but [showing them] the nature [they should have].
>
> 好惡者，性也，天命之謂性。作者，人為也，人為則與性反矣。…所謂"示之以好惡者，"[210]性而已矣。[211]

Wang kept switching the referents of his terms,[212] but his point is clear: a person's nature is not to be left for them to decide on their own, but should be ordained by a higher authority, who shows them the nature they should have.

In the above, we have seen how Wang worked on manipulating spirit to craft the nature they should have. Let us now see how he scrutinized the relationship between name and substance.[213] As we know, rectifying names is the top priority in governance according to Confucius. Wang Anshi took this very seriously, claiming "the sage's teaching lies in rectifying names and that is all" 聖人之教，正名而已.[214] In a conversation with Shenzong, after citing Confucius' words in the *Analects* 13.3 about the consequences of not rectifying names, like preventing things from getting accomplished and making the people not knowing where to put their hands and feet, Wang pointed out:

> Thus, the root cause for the people's not knowing where to put their hands and feet lies in the names having not been rectified. … Now, different opinions exist in the court and most people have

[209] Wang used *tian* to refer to the ruler here. The rationale he told us is as follows: "人君以中道布言，是以為彝是以為訓者，於天其訓而已"; "二帝三王之誥命，未嘗不稱天者，所謂於帝於訓也，此人之所以化其上也" ("'Hong fan' zhuan," in *LCJ*, 65.691).
[210] Li Longji and Xing Bing, Xiaojing *zhushu*, 24.
[211] Wang Anshi, "'Hong fan' zhuan," in *LCJ*, 65.691.
[212] For instance, this *ren* 人, used in contrast to Heaven (i.e., the ruler), refers to the populace, different from the *ren* in the "Laozi" quote above.
[213] While this was a technique commonly found in Mohist, Daoist and Legalist writings (see, for example, Makeham, *Name and Actuality in Early Chinese Thought*; Defoort, "The Rhetorical Power of Naming"), Xunzi also worked in great depth on this. However, as Michael Fuller's work on moral epistemology has shown, Xunzi's approach is phenomenological – to him, humans gain moral knowledge through their sense perception of phenomena in the world via their corporeal faculties (*Drifting among Rivers and Lakes*, 37-39). That is, to Xunzi, the name refers to the substance in the phenomenal world about which humans are to know through their eyes and ears. One's thinking – the function of the heart – is based on this. This is not the line Wang Anshi was following.
[214] Wang Anshi, "Yuan xing," in *LCJ*, 68.727. Rectifying names was the main task of a number of Wang's essays, including "Yang Meng" (*LCJ*, 64.679-70) and "Dui nan" (*LCJ*, 68.728-29). One signal for when he was doing this is the appearance of such terms as "*zhengxing*" 正性 and "*zhengming*" 正命.

> treacherous thoughts. … The devious is taken as upright and the upright devious. [The issue of] names having not been rectified is severe. Then when it causes such harms as to make the people not know where to put their hands and feet and eat each other, it shall not come as a surprise.
> 然則民無所措手足，其本在於名不正。…今朝廷異論，類皆懷奸，…以邪為正，以正為邪，其為名不正甚矣，則其患至於人無所措手足、人相食無足怪也。[215]

Rectifying names is fundamental for making the people know how to behave, especially at a time when Wang's counter-mainstream value system was still in the minority. It is for this reason that Wang did lots of work in this regard. Below I sketch three lines along which it unfolded.

1. Claiming the shaped nature is not inauthentic

In "On *Li*," at the same time when saying the role of his *li* is to restrain people's natural tendencies with coercive behavioral regulations that over time will transform their nature into the proper one, Wang also justified it:[216]

> Alas, Excellency Xun, in his not knowing *li*, said, "The sage transformed human nature and inauthenticity[217] arose." Thus I know he did not know *li*. The important thing in knowing *li* lies in knowing the point of *li*. However, while Excellency Xun highly praised the beauty of its methods, measures, and rhythms, when it comes to speak of transformation, he then thought it [made people] inauthentic. How could he have known the point of *li*? Now *li* begins with Heaven['s endowment] and completes through human [efforts]. Knowing Heaven['s endowment] and yet not knowing human [efforts], it is then crude; knowing human [efforts] yet not knowing Heaven['s endowment], it is then inauthentic. The sage disliked their being crude and hated their being inauthentic. It was for this *li* arose. Now Excellency Xun took the sage's transforming human nature as giving rise to inauthenticity. His mistake lied in not knowing Heaven['s endowment].
> 嗚呼，荀卿之不知禮也，其言曰"聖人化性而起偽"[218]，吾是以知其不知禮也。知禮者，貴乎知禮之意。而荀卿盛稱其法度節奏之美，至於言化，則以為偽也。亦烏知禮之意哉？夫

[215] Li Tao, *XCB*, 225.5474-5. Dated to 1071/7.
[216] Wang tends to do these two things simultaneously in one text.
[217] John Knoblock (*Xunzi*, 150) translates "*wei*" as "conscious exertion" while Hutton (*Xunzi*, 248) and Virág (*The Emotions in Early Chinese Philosophy*, 164) "deliberate effort." My literal translation is based on the fact that Wang pairs it with "*zhen*" (authenticity).
[218] Wang Xianqian, Xunzi *jijie*, 23.424.

> 禮始於天而成於人，知天而不知人則野，知人而不知天則偽。聖人惡其野而疾其偽，以是禮興焉。今荀卿以謂聖人之化性為起偽，則是不知天之過也。[219]

Wang Anshi was referring to what Xunzi said in the "Human Nature is Evil" chapter of *Xunzi*. According to Xunzi's words there, each person is naturally inclined to get his own needs met and it is only thanks to the norms for ritual propriety and duty (*li* and *yi*) made by the sages that human relationships are ordered. However, because the son's giving precedence to the father and the younger brother's working more to relieve the burden of the older brother are not how they would behave naturally, Xunzi said that at the same time when transforming human nature, *li* gave rise to inauthenticity.[220] Wang Anshi agrees with Xunzi on *li*'s going against people's natural inclinations,[221] but he would not allow it be said that the nature people come to acquire through the transformation is inauthentic, because, he contends, such a transformation begins with people's natural endowment – it is biologically rooted in humans.

Other than grounding this proper nature in human biology to counter charges of inauthenticity, Wang also denigrates the inborn nature. In the above, we have seen him call it "crude." It is also potentially harmful:

> Had the sage not made *li* for them, then under Heaven there would be those who slight their father and hate their mother. [People behaving like] this can also be said to have lost their [proper] nature. If those who have gotten their [proper] nature were regarded as inauthentic, then can those who have lost their [proper] nature be regarded as authentic? This is why Excellency Xun was someone who did not think it through.
>
> 聖人苟不為之禮，則天下蓋將有慢其父而疾其母者矣。此亦可謂失其性也。得性者以為偽，則失其性者乃可以為真乎？此荀卿之所以為不思也。[222]

Transforming human nature with *li* is fully justified because otherwise humans would do harm to each other. In helping them get the proper nature, the sage did the people a favor. Through a series of tricky reasoning in the first three sentences, perhaps intentionally so to lead the reader into

[219] Wang Anshi, "Li lun," in *LCJ*, 66.701-02.
[220] Wang Xianqian, Xunzi *jijie*, 23.422-24.
[221] Wang Anshi, "Li lun," in *LCJ*, 66.702.
[222] Wang Anshi, "Li lun," in *LCJ*, 66.702.

accepting his argument, Wang turned to take the offensive, by questioning the sense of those who say the shaped nature is inauthentic.[223]

Similar legitimizing efforts were also made elsewhere. For instance, in "Forgiving Mistake," again an essay in the *Miscellaenous Theories* volumes, Wang wrote:

> Existing between Heaven and Earth, it is of course impossible for a human being to be without mistakes. But eventually it does not harm his becoming a worthy and even a sage. Why? It is only because he is good at returning to the norm. … Heaven endows the five elements to the myriad intelligent beings. Humans originally had them all. Having them but not thinking about them, they get lost; thinking about them but not practicing them, they get laid to waste. One day, one regrets his previous mistakes and resolutely thinks about and practices them. This is getting back what has been lost and picking up what has been laid to waste. If, however, [someone] says this is not his nature, this is leading all under Heaven to harm human nature. … One's having money with oneself is certainly not as [firm] as one's having the nature in oneself. When one gets back one's lost money, the money cannot be said to be not his; then, can it be said that the nature one lost but gets back is not his nature?
>
> 人介乎天地之間，則固不能無過，卒不害聖且賢者何？亦善複常也。…天播五行於萬靈，人固備而有之。有而不思則失，思而不行則廢。一日咎前之非，沛然思而行之，是失而複得、廢而復舉也。顧曰非其性，是率天下而戕性也。…財之在己，固不若性之為己有也。財失複得，曰非其財，且不可；性失複得，曰非其性，可乎？[224]

Living according to one's natural inclinations cannot free one from making mistakes. But if one is good at following the behavioral regulations, one can still gain the proper nature. The biological roots being in every human being, one only needs to know the method and follow it in action. When one acquires it, this new nature cannot be said to be something alien to oneself, but should be taken as the nature one originally had but got lost due to carelessness – even getting back one's lost money cannot be said to be getting something not belonging to him, how can getting back one's lost nature, which has deep roots in one's biological being, be said to not belong to him?[225]

---

[223] Note Wang did not say the shaped nature is "authentic". This gives us a sense of the care he took with his wording.
[224] Wang Anshi, "Yuan guo," in *LCJ*, 69.732.
[225] Scholars note that "retrieving lost nature" was one of the main points made in Wang Pang's commentaries on *Laozi* and *Zhuangzi*. See, for example, Lu Guolong, *Song ru weiyan*, 172; Chiang Shu-chun, " Wang Pang Laozi *zhu* 'Xing lun' fawei"; and Shen Ming-quian, "Wang Pang Nanhua Zhenjing *xin zhuan* sixiang tixi quan gou," 138-41.

Conversely, those who turn away from the morality Wang designed can be said to have lost their nature, as Wang wrote in a letter to a student:

> The ancients took having no superior men as having no Way and having no auspicious virtue (*de*) as having no virtue – then it is not impermissible to call those who depart from the good and approach the bad as having lost their nature.
> 古人以無君子為無道，以無吉德為無德，則出善就惡謂之性亡，無不可也。[226]

Whether the reader finds Wang's such arguments convincing or confusing, that he felt it necessary to make efforts at legitimization tells his uneasiness with the potential illegitimacy of his political theory. This partly derived from the counter-mainstream nature of the values he proposed and partly from the widely perceived goodness of the humanist virtues – to convince people that broad love of humans is actually bad was perhaps no easy task, so was making people believe that it is good to place the state's interest above that of the individual self. But most importantly, Wang needed to get his revolutionary definition of what is good accepted.

2. Reversing good and bad with rhetorical devices

That rhetorical devices are useful in reversing moral order can be seen from a global comparative case. In his study of rhetoric in Renaissance Europe, Quentin Skinner has shown how virtue and vice are neighbors. Through wielding certain rhetorical techniques, a virtue can be turned into a vice, no matter how implausible it may seem at first sight. One such technique is called "paradiastole," which some Tudor rhetoricians thought "can actually be *defined* as a method of excusing the vices by redescribing them as virtues." Skinner's example is Machiavelli: in taking issue with the virtues of clemency and liberality, Machiavelli's tricks lied in using paradiastolic re-descriptions to disparage "the most excellent vertues among men," and calling things with contrary names "by implying that the great and indispensable virtue of clemency is really a vice," so as "'to praise that which is to be despised and detested, to follow that which is to be fled, to love that which is to be hated,' and above all 'to bring into a confusion the distinction of good and evil.'"[227]

---

[226] Wang Anshi, "Zai da Gong Shenfu *Lunyu Mengzi* shu," in *LCJ*, 72.765. See also "Yang Meng," in *LCJ*, 66.680.
[227] Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes*, 153, 163, 172. The last citation is Skinner quoting Innocent Gentillet. Note, however, James Hankins' revisionist argument that what Machiavelli did was to make virtue irrelevant in politics, rather than turning it into vice (*Virtue Politics*, chapter 19).

If rhetorical devices can help Machiavelli in his attempt to turn clemency into a vice and confuse the distinction between good and evil, they can help Wang Anshi in his attempt to convince people humanity is bad and turn the existing moral order upside down as well.

In his commentary on the "Great Plan", Wang wrote:

> Once soft, once hard; once dark, once bright. Therefore, when there is the upright, there is the devious; when there is the fine, there is the foul; when there is the ugly, there is the beautiful; when there is the ominous, there is the auspicious. The workings of nature and destiny and the idea of *daode* are both in this.
>
> 一柔一剛，一晦一明，故有正有邪，有美有惡，有醜有好，有凶有吉。性命之理，道德之意，皆在是矣。[228]

What did he mean by saying the workings of nature and destiny and the idea of *daode* – the gist of his learning according to his admiring biographer – both lie in pairs of opposites? Wang Anshi was referring to dialectics – the crucial weapon for carrying out a social revolution –,[229] which was supplied by *Laozi*, the "earliest major representative of Chinese dialectics."[230] For instance, to this line in *Laozi* – "When all under Heaven know that by which the fine is fine, then the foul [shall become apparent]; when all know that by which the good is good, then the bad [shall become apparent]" 天下皆知美之為美，斯惡已；皆知善之為善，斯不善已, Wang's commentary reads: "The fine is the opposite of the foul. The good is the reverse of the bad. This is the constant way things work." 夫美者，惡之對；善者，不善之反。此物理之常.[231] Things in the moral sphere always exist in relation to their opposites. A thing is fine not because it has intrinsic qualities that make it fine, but because it is the opposite of the foul. A thing is good not because it has intrinsic qualities that make it good, but because it is the reverse of the bad. To Wang, this is how

[228] Wang Anshi, "'Hongfan' zhuan," in *LCJ*, 65.686.
[229] Qi Xia, *Songxue de fazhan he yanbian*, 19; Wang Shuhua, "Jinggong Xinxue zhushu kaobian," 534–35.
[230] Zhang Dainian, *Zhang Dainian quanji*, I.21. There was a well-known anecdote about Wang Pang: when asked to identify roe and deer before he was ten, Pang responded by saying that the one next to the roe is deer, and the one next to the deer is roe (Peng Cheng, *Moke hui xi*, 40). Although any smart boy can come up with such an answer, it is possible that Wang Anshi taught dialectical way of thinking to Pang.
[231] Rong Zhaozu, *Wang Anshi Laozi* zhu *ji ben*, 4.

things are in general.[232] Knowing a moral judgment always exists in relation to its opposite and they can always be transformed into each other, society's moral order can always be reversed.[233]

Carrying out this social revolution at a time when the humanist value system was prevailing among the Confucians, to whose ranks Wang belonged given that "Confucianism" was the default learning for those pursuing a government career at the time, Wang Anshi did not think it wise to openly attack *renyi* or call for removing them.[234] This is where dialectics figured. To effect a fundamental change in social values, all he needed was to define which values were considered good and have the ruler reward those exhibiting them. Once the people see obediently following the ruler for the interest of the state is encouraged, what is discouraged – using one's own moral judgment in social-political actions according to the general principle of loving humans broadly and appropriately – shall go without saying. The key lies in what is good and what bad are up to definition and the right to define them belongs to the ruler exclusively, as we have seen in the first section of this chapter.

Perhaps because argumentation often took place in oral exchanges, there are not many sources showing how Wang actually wielded rhetorical devices to reverse good and bad. But the following case can give us a glimpse. In 1070/2, wanting to persuade Wang Anshi to drop the reform, Sima Guang 司馬光 (1019-1086) wrote his old colleague a myriad-word letter, in which he pointed out:

> Now, in governance, Jiefu[235] changed all the old methods of the ancestors, making front rear, above below, right left, and what's established destroyed. … None is able to follow the conventional and maintain the constant.

[232] Note by "things" (*wu*), Wang meant things in the spiritual realm as well, like how he did at the beginning of his commentary on the "Great Plan": 五事之本在人心; …天一生水，其於物為精；…地二生火，其於物為神；…" (*LCJ*, 65.685-86).
[233] For a helpful analysis, see Hou Wailu ed., *Zhongguo sixiang tongshi, IV-1*, 452–54.
[234] Nor would he openly oppose Confucius, as we have seen in his attempt to draw on Confucius' authority when advancing his view on human nature in "Yuan xing" and "Xing shuo" above. Similar efforts were all also made in "Fuzi xian yu Yao Shun" (*LCJ*, 67.711-12). Despite the care Wang Anshi took, however, some of his contemporaries had nonetheless figured this out. Other than Lin Zhiqi and Su Shi above and Chen Cisheng below, his cousin Zeng Gong also noted Wang's turning against Confucius by emptying out *ren* (humanity) in the epitaph he wrote for Wang Ling ("Yu Wang Shenfu shu," in *Zeng Gong ji*, 16.264).
[235] Wang Anshi's courtesy name.

> 今介甫為政，盡變更祖宗舊法，先者後之，上者下之，右者左之，成者毀之...無一人得襲故守常。[236]

The reform had turned the whole world upside down. In this letter, Sima Guang accused Wang Anshi of setting up a reform headquarters to bypass established government agencies, causing troubles to the people by making none able to continue living in the previous way of life, having the government pursue profit-making, and refusing to accept criticism.[237] To these accusations, Wang responded:

> What the Confucians fight about especially lies in name and substance. When names and substances have been made clear, then the reason under Heaven has been gotten. Now what Junshi[238] lectured me on is that I have incurred the resentment and slander of all under Heaven because I encroached upon the bureaucracy, caused troubles, pursued profit-making, and refused to accept criticism. To me, I think receiving the ruler's order to discuss methods and measures and establish them in the court, thereby delegating them to relevant officials [for implementation], is not encroaching upon the bureaucracy. Upholding the Former Kings' governance to generate benefits and remove harms is not causing troubles. Managing revenues for all under Heaven is not pursuing profit-making. Keeping away evil theories and making things difficult for the crafty is not refusing to accept criticism.
>
> 夫儒者所爭，尤在於名實。名實已明，而天下之理得矣。今君實所以見教者以為侵官、生事、徵利、拒諫，以致天下怨謗也。某則以謂受命於人主，議法度而修之於朝廷，以授之於有司，不為侵官。舉先王之政，以興利除弊，不為生事。為天下理財，不為徵利。闢邪說，難任人，不為拒諫。[239]

With a re-description, Wang made what Sima accused as bad stand on a high moral ground.

3. Claiming a grounding in the Confucian tradition and the cosmos

---

[236] Sima Guang, "Yu Wang Jiefu shu," in *CJJ*, 60.723. For a similar complaint, see Liu Zhi, "Lun zhuyifa fenxi di er shu," in *Zhongsu ji*, 3.56–57.
[237] Sima Guang, "Yu Wang Jiefu shu," in *CJJ*, 60.719-25.
[238] Sima Guang's courtesy name.
[239] Wang Anshi, "Da Sima jianyi shu," in *LCJ*, 73.773. Li Deshen dates this to shortly after Sima Guang's 1070/2/27 letter to Wang (*Wang Anshi shi wen xinian*, 211).

Wang Anshi recognizes the importance of maintaining continuity with tradition in building legitimacy, as he stressed it by citing a line from the *Book of Documents*: "That the affairs of one, not making the ancients his masters, can be perpetuated for generations, is what I have not heard" 事不師古，以克永世，匪說攸聞.[240] This is why despite his love of *Mencius* and *Laozi*,[241] when designing the core curriculum for teaching this new morality, as we shall see in the next chapter, Wang chose three classics from the Confucian tradition. In this way, he added legitimacy to his revolution by grounding it in the tradition he fundamentally broke up with in terms of the content of core values.

Wang's most striking legitimizing effort came from the preface he wrote to his *Explication of Characters*:

> Strokes, … and characters, … are both rooted in Nature and cannot be made by the private intelligence of human beings. [They] and Fu Xi's eight hexagrams and King Wen's sixty-four hexagrams, though different in use, were made in the same way. They supplement each other to complete the *Change*. The Former Kings thought this cannot be taken lightly and were concerned that future generations in the world might lose the method. Therefore, they unified [how they were written] once every three years. The reason for unifying it was so as to make *daode* the same.
> 文者，…字者，…皆本於自然，非人私智所能為也。與夫伏羲八卦，文王六十四，異用而同制，相待而成《易》。先王以為不可忽，而患天下後世失其法，故三歲一同。同之者，一道德也。[242]

Again, Wang turned the tradition upside down: according to the earlier imperial view, the writing system resulted from the cumulative efforts of a few humans who modeled upon the patterns in the natural world, evolving step by step from the simpler pictographic symbols – hexagrams included – to an increasingly complex language.[243] In Wang's account, however, humans were not allowed a role in its creation. With "*yu fu*" 與夫 (and), Wang separated the hexagrams from the

[240] Wang Anshi, "Shang wu shi zhazi," in *LCJ*, 41.440. Translation adopted from James Legge trans., *The Shoo King*, 260.
[241] Sima Guang, "Yu Wang Jiefu shu," in *CJJ*, 60.723. Wang did, however, play an important role in elevating the official status of Mencius, as noted in chapter 3.
[242] Wang Anshi, "*Xining Zishuo* xu," in *LCJ*, 84.879.
[243] See for example Xu Shen's preface to *Shuowen jiezi* (Yan Kejun ed., *Quan Shanggu, Sandai, Qin, Han, Sanguo, Liuchao wen*, vol. II, 43) and the introduction to the bibliography treatise of *Sui History* (Wei Zheng et al., *Sui shu*, 32.903-04).

writing system, making them parallel to each other instead of one following another in a linear timeline:



The Former Kings could help maintain the connection between the writing system and the cosmos by unifying how characters were written every three years,[245] but they did not have a hand in their creation. In this way, the characters with which the students were to begin learning the morality Wang Anshi designed had been grounded in the natural order.[246] The extraordinariness of this legitimizing effort lied in that whereas in the earlier imperial worldview, humans designed their order by modeling upon that of the cosmos,[247] Wang made the speechless cosmos conform to the human order he designed.[248]

To sum up, deriving from his key takeaways from Laozi and Mencius, Wang Anshi's political theory mainly consisted of four parts: first, in line with Laozi's idea of *daode*, reversing literati self-governance by recentralizing moral authority to the monarch and turning against humanism; second, introducing a dual-track statist value system to replace the humanist one prevailing at the time; third, building on Mencius' insight into human nature, using a full procedure to firmly establish these values in the subjects' hearts, as if there were "natural" to them; finally, justifying this crafted nature by saying it is not inauthentic, wielding rhetorical devices to make the statist values with which it was composed of accepted as good, and claiming a grounding for

[244] The sixty-four hexagrams of King Wen did not appear in the *Book of Change*, nor in Xu Shen's preface to *Shuowen jiezi* (Zhonghua shuju 1963 edition, 15a.314), but only in *Shiji* (4.154). I am not sure why Wang said so, but his account from Fu Xi to King Wen could be similar to Zhu Xi's expanding the four characters to sixteen in the introduction to his commentary on the *Doctrine of the Mean* ("*Zhongyong* zhangju xu," in *Sishu zhangju jizhu*, 14). For a close reading of Zhu's introduction, see Bol, "Words and Ideas."

[245] A practice I am yet to find historical records on.

[246] As Qiu Hansheng rightly observes ("Wang Anshi de Xinxue he bianfa sixiang de yuanze," 31).

[247] Bol, *Neo-Confucianism in History*, 58-60.

[248] See also Cai Bian's comment on this work (Chao Gongwu, *Junzhai dushuzhi jiaozheng*, 1000: "晚以所學考字畫奇耦橫直，深造天地陰陽造化之理，著《字說》，包括萬象，與《易》相表裏"). Winston Lo takes Wang's *Zishuo* "as a compendium of knowledge, his statement of the ultimate reality" ("Wang An-shih and the Confucian Ideal of 'Inner Sageliness,'" 48). This stands to the extent that this "reality" refers to the one made by Wang Anshi.

the new morality in the Confucian tradition and the cosmos. Now, let us turn to its implementation.[249]

[249] On the difference between political theory and the theory guiding specific political practice, see Liu Zehua, *Zhongguo chuantong zhengzhi sixiang fansi*, 5.

Chapter 3
Education as Governance
-- Practicing Wang Anshi's Ideas under Shenzong and His Two Sons

Taking the reform Wang Anshi designed as mainly about the economic policies carried out during Shenzong's reign, most scholars think it had failed. Among the various reasons they then proceeded to offer for why, a main line of explanation is that Wang was so idealistic that his good ideas fell to the hard ground of complicated reality in the process of implementation.[1] Wang's myriad-word letter to Renzong, where he laid out the blueprint for the later reform was, however, mainly about the formation of talents through education.[2] In a perceptive note, the Southern Song scholar Lü Zhong 呂中 (*js.* 1247) pointed out, "at the time, those discussing it all said the Finance Planning Commission should not be set up, whereas few criticized the establishment of the Secretariat Planning Commission. … However, the Finance Planning Commission was for increasing revenues and profits, while the Secretariat Planning Commission was for establishing methods and measures." 時議者皆言三司條例司不當置，而中書條例一司罕有論其非者。…然三司條例司，興財利者也；中書條例司，立法度者也。[3]

Moreover, in Wang Anshi's conceptualization, institutions mainly referred to educational institutions, as he wrote in "Duke of Zhou" 周公, an essay in the *Miscelleneous Theories* volumes:

> With regard to a superior man's conducting governance, if he establishes the good method in the world, then the world gets ordered; if he establishes the good method in a state, then the state gets ordered; if he cannot establish methods but wants to please everyone, then his days are not enough. Had the Duke of Zhou known how to govern, then he should establish the method for [running] schools in the world.

[1] See, for example, James Liu, *Reform in Sung China*, 116; Yang Qianmiao, *Wang Anshi "Yi" xue yanjiu*, 185–86; Yinan Luo, "Ideas in Practice," 112; Li Huarui, "Lun Bei Song houqi liushi nian de gaige," 198–200.
[2] For a similar observation, see Li Guoqiang, "Lun Bei Song Xining bianfa de shizhi," 68. Deng Guangming also noticed this, but thinks it shows a mismatch between Wang's theory (on educating officials) and his reform practice (economic policies) (*Bei Song zhengzhi gaigejia*, 29, 36).
[3] Lü Zhong, *Leibian huangchao dashiji jiangyi*, 16.299. For discussions of this work, see Li Guoqiang, "Lun Bei Song Xining bianfa de shizhi," 70–71; Song, "Shifting Paradigms in Theories of Government," chapter 2; and Hartman, *The Making of Song Dynasty History*, chapter 4.

> 蓋君子之為政，立善法於天下則天下治，立善法於一國則一國治，如其不能立法，而欲人人悅之，則日亦不足矣。使周公知為政，則宜立學校之法於天下矣。[4]

The good method to establish for governing the world well was, to Wang, a wide-ranging school system.

In other words, the reform Wang designed was mainly about using government school education to impelement his soulcraft. Based on this understanding, this chapter first reconstructs Wang Anshi's educational thought and then discusses how efforts were made step by step under Shenzong and his two sons since 1069, till Wang's design was eventually carried out in full force after 1104.

I. Wang Anshi's Ideas on Education

Since his twenties, Wang Anshi had been attaching great importance to the role of school education in governance. In 1048, as a county magistrate, Wang wanted to build a school to educate the local youth. In the letter inviting the teacher he chose, Wang wrote:

> It has been long since humans came into being.[5] Father and son, husband and wife, older brother and younger brother, guests and friends – these are the relationships amongst them. Who holds [the norm for] such relationships? Ritual,[6] music, penal laws, administrative orders, cultural things and the numbering system are the apparatuses for [regulating] each and every one of these relationships. Who holds the apparatuses? Establish for the people a ruler and officials, who are to hold them. Without getting a teacher, the ruler does not know how to be a ruler; without getting a teacher, the officials do not know how to be officials. Establish for them a teacher, who is to hold both. If the ruler does not know how to be a ruler, and the officials do not know how to be officials, then wouldn't it be fortunate that the human species did not harm and kill each other to extinction? The weightiness of being a teacher is without a doubt.

---

[4] Wang Anshi, "Zhou gong," in *LCJ*, 64.677. See also the 1094 palace exam question, in Liu Lin et al. eds., *SHY*, *xuanju* 7, 5403.29; and Si Yizu ed., *Song da zhaoling ji*, 157.593, "Xuexiao shi neng botong shishuliyue zhi zhi shangdeng yubi shouzha." On the continuity between Wang's political theory and Huizong era governance, see section III below.

[5] I thank Peter Bol for help with this translation.

[6] In this context Wang was using it in the conventional sense of *li*.

> 人之生久矣，父子、夫婦、兄弟、賓客、朋友其倫也。孰持其倫？禮樂、刑政、文物、數制，事為其具也。其具孰持之？為之君臣，所以持之也。君不得師，則不知所以為君；臣不得師，則不知所以為臣。為之師，所以並持之也。君不知所以為君，臣不知所以為臣，人之類，其不相賊殺以至於盡者，非幸歟？信乎其為師之重也。[7]

The people do not know the proper relationships amongst themselves. They need to be taught by the ruler and his ministers with all kinds of tools used in governance. But the ruler and his ministers do not know how to govern, either. They need to be taught by the teacher. To Wang, humans do not know how to be human unless taught by the teacher, without whom humankind would destruct itself.[8]

Ten years later, Wang articulated the method of teaching in his long letter to Renzong:[9]

> In antiquity, [no matter] the son of Heaven or the feudal lords, from the walled cities to the villages, all had schools, and they placed numerous instructive officials and were strict in their selection. And the court's ritual, music, penal laws and administrative orders were all [taught] in schools. What the *shi*[10] observed and practiced were all the model words and virtuous conducts of the Former Kings and the idea with which they ordered all under Heaven.
> 古者天子諸侯，自國至於鄉黨皆有學，博置教道之官而嚴其選。朝廷禮樂、刑政之事皆在於學。士之所觀而習者，皆先王之法言德行、治天下之意。[11]

In the era of the Former Kings – Wang's rhetorical device for saying how things should be –, a state-wide school system down to villages was established, and everything about governance was taught there by carefully selected teachers. Different from Liu Chang, who as we saw in chapter 2 thought only a handful of elites can undertake the work of governance, Wang Anshi thought schools should teach all students how to govern. Wang's silence is equally eloquent: no mention

---

[7] Wang Anshi, "Qing Du Chun xiangsheng ru xianxue shu," in *LCJ*, 77.814-15.
[8] Wang was, in Douglas R. Weiner's words, "arguing from privileged knowledge" ("Demythologizing Environmentalism," 405-06). This was again fundamentally different from the individualistic and open-ended approach to teaching Han Yu advocated in "Shi shuo" (*HCLJ*, vol. 1, 62-65). I thank Wilt Idema for this point.
[9] This letter has been read by many scholars. See, for instance, Bol, "Government, Society, and State," 161–62; Smith, *Taxing Heaven's Storehouse*, 117–18; and Luo, "Ideas in Practice," 112–28. My reading follows along the line I have been delineating.
[10] It is more problematic to translate "*shi*" as "literati" for the period Wang was referring to, even though his interest still lied in literati of his own time.
[11] Wang Anshi, "Shang Renzong Huangdi yan shi shu," in *LCJ*, 39.412.

was made of cultural learning for the students' self cultivation. Moreover, the students were exposed to one way only, as Wang stressed:

> The talent of a person is formed in concentration and destroyed in impurity. Therefore, in their handling of the people's talents, the Former Kings placed craftmen in the local authorities, peasants in the fields, merchants in shops, and literati in schools, so that they were each concentrated in their own business without seeing other things, for fear other things would be [distractive] enough to harm their business. With regard to the so-called literati, they not only made them unable to see other things, but showed them the way of the Former Kings only, whereas the heterodox teachings of the hundred schools and the various masters were kept off, making no one dare to practice them.
> 夫人之才，成於專而毀於雜。故先王之處民才，處工於官府，處農於畎畝，處商賈於肆，而處士於庠序，使各專其業，而不見異物，懼異物之足以害其業也。所謂士者，又非特使之不得見異物而已，一示之以先王之道，而百家諸子之異說，皆屏之而莫敢習者。[12]

All those who learn are to be put in schools and learn from one school of teaching only, lest they be led astray by the other schools and the goal of learning not attained. This is an immersive program meant to establish the morality Wang Anshi designed into the students's hearts through an insulated process that minimizes distractions that could reach the students through their eyes and ears, like the one laid out in "On *Li* and Music."

On the right way to cultivate (*yang* 養) the students, Wang wrote: "Enrich them with money, restrain them with *li*, and punish them with *fa* (penal law)"饒之以財，約之以禮，裁之以法.[13] He explained:

> What does "enrich them with money" mean? The [general] situation among humans is that when their money is not enough, they then [tend to be] greedy, mean, and corrupt, doing whatever they can [to get money]. The Former Kings knew this, therefore in designing the salary system, [they made sure that] from [as low as] commoners serving in the government, their salaries were already enough to substitute for farming. For those higher in the hierarchy than this, the salaries would increase rank by rank, so that they would be sufficient to cultivate their non-corruption and shame and make them stay away from greedy and mean conducts.

[12] Ibid., 39.414-15.
[13] Ibid., 39.412-13.

> 何謂饒之以財？人之情，不足於財，則貪鄙苟得，無所不至。先王知其如此，故其制祿，自庶人之在官者，其祿已足以代其耕矣。由此等而上之，每有加焉，使其足以養廉恥而離於貪鄙之行。[14]

High salaries were for forming in those working for the government the statist values. Elsewhere Wang made the same point with a succinct formulation: "In the ruler's [dealings with] the literati and senior officials, if he can enrich them with money, he can thereafter demand them with non-corruption and shame" 蓋人主於士大夫，能饒之以財，然後可責之以廉恥.[15] Assuming such values had no appeal to humans on their own, Wang thought the ruler needed to attract followers with money.

Moreover, Wang went on to write, the salaries should be high enough to make those fully devoted to the ruler feel not only their life cycle were taken care of, but also that of their offspring. This, however, was less about the ruler's generosity than subjecting the officials to the ruler's full control,[16] as Wang's gloss of *li* made clear:

> What does "restrain them with *li*" mean? The [general] situation among humans is that when they have sufficient money but no *li* to restrain them, they then would be licentious, devious, evil and dissipated, doing whatever they can [to spend the money]. The Former Kings knew this, and therefore set limits [on how much they can spend]. For events like marriage, funeral, sacrifice, providing for [parents and children], and feasting, as well as things like clothes, food, utensils and appliances, they all put restraints with stipulated amounts and unify them with the method for regulating weights and measures. For those one can spend money on according to the stipulation but cannot afford, one does not have them; for those one can afford but cannot spend money on according to the stipulation, one cannot have even a gram or an inch more.
>
> 何謂約之以禮？人情足於財而無禮以節之，則又放僻邪侈，無所不至。先王知其如此，故為之制度。婚喪、祭養、燕享之事，服食、器用之物，皆以命數為之節，而齊之以律度量衡之法。其命可以為之而財不足以具，則弗具也；其財可以具而命不得為之者，不使有銖兩分寸之加焉。[17]

[14] Ibid., 39.412.
[15] Wang Anshi, "Kan xiang za yi," in *LCJ*, 62.663.
[16] Zhang Chengzhong, "'Yi zhongren wei zhi,'" 29.
[17] Wang Anshi, "Shang Renzong Huangdi yan shi shu," in *LCJ*, 39.412-13.

Such high salaries were not to be spent freely. There were detailed regulations on how much of one's salaries one can spend according to their rank, from major life events down to little things used in one's daily life.[18] What Wang referred to with "*li*" here was *not* rituals or ceremonies, but the *li* in "On *Li*," the behavioral regulations used by the ruler to gain full control over those who work for him. Were there no such regulations, Wang pointed out, then "all under Heaven would pride on extravagance and feel ashamed of being thrifty" 天下以奢為榮，以儉為恥, resulting in "the destroy of the heart for non-corruption and shame" 廉恥之心毀也. [19] The purpose was still to form the statist values in the hearts of those drawn in with high salaries.

As for *fa*, Wang glossed as follows:

> What does "punish them with *fa*" mean? The Former Kings had taught all the literati under Heaven the crafts of the Way. For those who did not follow the teaching, they then treated them with the *fa* to discard them to remote places and hold them in contempt for the rest of their lives. The Former Kings had restrained them with *li*. For those who did not observe the *li*, they then treated them with the *fa* to exile and execute them. … The reason why the Former Kings were willing to impose major punishments on minor offenses without hesitation was because they thought were it not so, it would not be enough to unify the custom under Heaven so as to accomplish my governance.
> 何謂裁之以法？先王於天下之士，教之以道藝矣，不帥教則待之以屏棄遠方、終身不齒之法。約之以禮矣，不循禮則待之以流、殺之法。…加小罪以大刑，先王所以忍而不疑者，以為不如是不足以一天下之俗而成吾治。[20]

Compared with his *li* – the regulations imposed on people's behaviors to eventually transform their natures, Wang did not expect his *fa* to take on this transformative role. It was simply used to deter people from violating such regulations and make them fear the consequences for non-compliance. Of the two, Wang's preference was for the former, the latter being but a last resort, albeit indispensable.

---

[18] Such regulations functioned like sumptuary laws, which according to *Black's Law Dictionary* (fourth edition, 1605) are "laws made for the purpose of restraining luxury or extravagance, particularly against inordinate expenditures in the matter of apparel, food, furniture, etc." Various societies from antiquity to recent times had used such laws to regulate and reinforce social hierarchy and morality. I thank Hilde De Weerdt for this point.
[19] Wang Anshi, "Shang Renzong Huangdi yan shi shu," in *LCJ*, 39.416-17.
[20] Ibid., 39.413.

In that Wang's *li* means behavioral regulations and his *fa* severe punishment for non-compliance, his way of "cultivating" the students has but two legs: attracting people to join the program with monetary allurement and then transforming them with *li*. This tallies perfectly with the dual-track value system he designed, in which the ruler mobilizes prospective state agents with profit and then turns them into obedient subjects with the statist values.[21]

And, just like in designing the value system, Wang does not wish to make the profit part explicit, in theorizing on education, he also stresses the importance of not making the people know the purpose of this "education."[22] This he pointed out in an essay titled "Tracing Education": "Those who are good at education hide its purpose, to have the people transformed by the ruler up above while not knowing the source of that which is used to educate them" 善教者藏其用，民化上而不知所以教之之源.[23]

In 1064, in his well-known "Inscription for Qian Prefectural School," Wang brought the two aspects of his learning – Laozi's idea of *daode* and Mencius' insight into human nature – together and integrated them into an educational program. He began by pointing out the unruly local custom and the key role he expected school education to play in changing it. Then he proclaimed:

> What the Former Kings called *daode* lies in the workings of nature and destiny and that is all.
> 先王所謂道德者，性命之理而已。[24]

In saying this, Wang Anshi was not, as some scholars think,[25] disclosing the content of the Former Kings' *daode*, which we have seen in the previous chapter was a statist value system, but pointing out the way to establish it in the students' hearts. He was saying that the Former Kings established the kind of morality they deemed desirable in their people based on how things work with human nature. In the previous chapter, we have also seen it refers to the fundamental fact that all human

[21] On such "carrot-and-stick" measures as applied during the Huizong era, see Chu, *The Politics of Higher Education*, 164. The link between Wang's theory and Huizong era governance is discussed in section III below.
[22] For a brief discussion of Wang's rather broad concept of education, see Song, *Traces of Grand Peace*, 201-02. On Wang's education means reforming humans, see Li Xiangjun, *Wang Anshi xueshu sixiang yanjiu*, 23.
[23] Wang Anshi, "Yuan jiao," in *LCJ*, 69.731-32. Note Wang's bending of grammar in "化[於]上."
[24] Wang Anshi, "Qinzhou xueji," in *LCJ*, 82.858. On why this essay lies outside the *Miscellaneous Theories* volumes, see the Appendix.
[25] For instance, Deng Guangming, *Bei Song zhengzhi gaigejia*, 61.

beings are born with the natural feeling to fear their father and love their mother, which provides the raw material to work on, and that the *qi* generated from their bodily movements interacts with their heart, which makes sure that the behavioral regulations imposed on them can eventually impact the innermost of their being. Other than the two, there were also some other fundamental facts about human nature that Wang had implied, including humans are social beings, in that unlike monkeys or apes, they do not flee to mountains but necessarily live in the human society when asked to observe such behavioral regulations, and that they desire money, which guarantees that they will respond to monetary allurement and join the program.

Immediately following this, Wang explained:

> Its degrees lie among [ritual] dishes, platters, bells, drums, pipes and strings. Constantly concerned about the difficulty to make it known, they therefore established government teachers and built schools to gather together the *shi* under Heaven. [Through] "procuring agreement, naming, demonstration, and persuasion,"[26] singing songs and dancing to musical strings, they made the people know the idea [of *daode*] deeply.
> 其度數在乎俎豆、鐘鼓、管絃之間。而常患乎難知，故為之官師，為之學，以聚天下之士，期命辯說，誦歌絃舞，使之深知其意。[27]

The ritual utensils and musical instruments make a visual representation of this morality with their different gradations for different ranks – Wang's *li* at the institutional level –,[28] but to make sure the people know it, the Former Kings gathered them together in government schools and had them taught by officially appointed teachers through various teaching methods, rhetorical techniques included.

Moreover, Wang went on to write, the Former Kings did not just count on the students' own willingness, but took measures to drive them with reward and punishment. And everything taught there was uniformly ordered by the son of Heaven across the realm. Those not ordered by him were not spoken of among the students. As a result,

[26] Various argumentative techniques from the "Rectifying Names" chapter of *Xunzi* (Wang Xianqian, Xunzi *jijie*, 22.409). Translation Hutton's (*Xunzi*, 241).
[27] Wang Anshi, "Qinzhou xueji," in *LCJ*, 82.858.
[28] For an alternative interpretation, see Qi Xia, *Songxue de fazhan he yanbian*, 322.

> The literati's running, walking, bowing, exchanging toasts, smiling, speaking, ascending, descending, exiting and entering here – none was not taught.
> 士之奔走、揖讓、酬酢、笑語、升降、出入乎此，則無非教者。[29]

Each and every behavior of the student ought to come out of the education carried out under the ruler's order, just like taming the horse in "On *Li*". This, Wang claimed, was why the Former Kings could effortlessly unify morality in the entire realm from their little court. The social custom thus formed lasted a long time, even capable of surviving the Qin's 秦 burning books, killing scholars and shutting down schools. This is because, Wang explained,

> The Former Kings' *daode* originated from the workings of nature and destiny, and the workings of nature and destiny originated from the human heart. The *Classic of Poetry* and the *Book of Documents* can follow it to attain the goal [of establishing this morality], but cannot snatch away what they have or give them what they do not have. Although the classics were lost, what originated from the human heart is still there. Then how could they make them discard what is crystal clear [in their own hearts] and follow the deaf and the dim-sighted?
> 先王之道德出於性命之理，而性命之理出於人心。《詩》、《書》能循而達之，非能奪其所有而予之以其所無也。經雖亡，出於人心者猶在，則亦安能使人舍己之昭昭而從我於聾昏哉？[30]

The morality the Former Kings designed was made by following how human nature works and the workings of human nature are rooted in the human heart. The textbooks used to carry out this moral education can help establish it there. Once established, however, neither can it be taken away nor can it be said that it was planted from outside, because, as Wang had argued in "On *Li*", it has biological roots in the human heart. The textbooks may be destroyed, but the biological roots guarantee that this morality shall continue guiding their social-political actions, because, as Wang had argued in "On *Li* and Music," the people in whom this morality has been established use their hearts instead of eyes or ears as the basis to make moral judgments.

[29] Wang Anshi, "Qinzhou xueji," in *LCJ*, 82.859.
[30] Ibid.

The Qin wanted to put down dissidents, Wang went on to note, yet in destructing the entire institution of education, it did the opposite of helping itself, resulting in gaining more and more criticizers and dooming its eventual collapse. Mozi (ca. 468-ca. 376 BCE) was also concerned with each person's having a different opinion, yet his stupidity was no different from the Qin, in that his theory of having the inferior identify with the superior included but penal laws and administrative orders,[31] which Wang had pointed out were not the ruler's way. The best way to restore the lost moral unity in the world was through government school education. With the right method, even the most unruly outlaws can be transformed, not to say those who learn, Wang concluded.[32]

As a political thinker, Wang Anshi wanted a lasting solution to moral unification.[33] For this, merely coercing the people would not do. Transformative education was his answer. So long as the people can be made to "naturally" think in the interest of the state, there is nothing that cannot be accomplished.[34] This is why what he meant by institutions was mainly the institution of government school education, because "education" was what his governance was mainly about. As Cheng Yi succinctly summarized:

> In the beginning, they followed him for profit. Over time, their hearts got transformed. Now they have become accustomed to it.
> 始也以利從，久則心化之，今而既安之。[35]

II. Preparing for Practicing Wang Anshi's Ideas

After being selected by Shenzong to spearhead the reform in the late 1060s, Wang Anshi immediately set about turning these ideas into practice. In 1069/4, two months after the reform

[31] Wang was referring to the "Identifying with the Superior" chapters of *Mozi* (Sun Yirang, Mozi *xian gu*, 3.44–61).
[32] The "*renyi*" in the last part of this essay was Wang's new concept, not Han Yu's.
[33] He faulted others for being shallow in their scholarship (Wang Anshi, "Li yue lun," in *LCJ*, 66.705).
[34] On taming the people being Wang's panacea for governing all state affairs, civil and military alike, see Wang Anshi, *Xining zoudui rilu*, 42-44.
[35] Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, *Er Cheng ji*, 1217. This I think is why the New Policies reform lasted much longer than the Qingli one. Chen Zhi'e reads Cheng Yi's comment that Wang's learning "transformed" (*huage* 化革) human heart as having "conquered" (*zhengfu* 徵服) the people's hearts through persuasion (*Bei Song wenhua shi shulun*, 233-34). There is, however, a difference between persuasion and convincing.

was launched, Wang Anshi proposed to reform the examination system.[36] This was but the preparatory step for eventually establishing a state-wide school system through which to select government agents. As he wrote in the proposal:

> I humbly think that in ancient times, the selection of literati was all rooted in schools. Therefore, *daode* was unified above and [the right] custom was formed below. The human talents were all capable of accomplishing something in the world. Since the grace of the Former Kings was exhausted, the method of teaching and nurturing had nowhere to be rooted. The literati, although having beautiful material, had no schools, teachers, or friends to be completed by. This is what those discussing the matter were concerned about. Now, in wishing to restore the ancient system and remove the harms, the concern is about lacking a gradual process. It is fitting to first remove the parallel writings that exact on rhymes, so that those who learn can focus on studying the meanings of the classics. Wait till the court has built schools and then look into the method the Three Dynasties used to educate and select [the literati]. Implementing it in all under Heaven, the ancient way can perhaps thus be restored.
>
> 伏以古之取士，皆本於學校，故道德一於上，而習俗成於下，其人材皆足以有為於世。自先王之澤竭，教養之法無所本，士雖有美材而無學校師友以成就之，議者之所患也。今欲追複古制，以革其弊，則患於無漸。宜先除去聲病對偶之文，使學者得以專意經義，以俟朝廷興建學校，然後講求三代所以教育選舉之法，施於天下，庶幾可複古矣。[37]

The reason why government schools were considered preferable to the one-off selection through the examination system was because, for Wang's education to work, the students had to be put in an insulated environment, for them to go through the full immersion program delineated in "On *Li*

[36] Some scholars think reforming the examination to have it focus on the meanings of the classics was the majority view. See, for example, Kondō Kazunari, "Wang Anshi de keju gaige," 138; Lin Yan, *Bei Song keju kaoshi yu wenxue*, 98; Li Junxiu, "Tang zhi Bei Song keju zhidu biange yu *Mengzi* jingxue diwei de queli," 169–70. The key again lies in the content, i.e., what the classics were supposed to mean. For more on this, see below.
[37] Wang Anshi, "Qi gai ketiao zhazi," in *LCJ*, 42.450.

and Music" over an extended period of time.[38] Left to learn on their own won't do.[39] And, the reason why interpretation of classical texts was considered preferable to poetry was because, like the difference between Wang Anshi's statecraft and that of the mid-eleventh mainstream, in evaluating the examinees' answers, the former has a right answer whereas the latter has the metrical rules as a general guideline only. Beyond that, the examinee is given plenty of room to come up with a composition featuring his personal understanding of how things are in the world based on his accumulated learning and his evaluation of the specific occasion covered in the poem. In other words, other than a general guideline applicable to all examinees, there is no right answer in evaluating poems. The situation with classical interpretation is quite the opposite. There is a predetermined standard answer – how Wang Anshi and his associates interpreted them – and the evaluation is based on the extent to which one's answer matches it, as Lu Dian's successful answer for the 1070 palace examination question has shown.

More importantly, changing the nature of everything became the focus of learning, as can be seen from the palace examinations held after the reform was officially launched. The question for the 1070 one read:

> When a sage was ruling all under heaven, all officials got their [designated] duties and the myriad affairs got their [proper] order. There were [things they] did not do, but whatever they did was accomplished; there were [people they] did not reform, but whomever they reformed submitted. Fields were opened and water courses dredged. Plants and trees prospered and birds, aninals, fish, and turtle all got their [proper] nature.[40]
>
> 蓋聖人之王天下也，百官得其職，萬事得其序。有所不為，為之而無不成；有所不革，革之而無不服。田疇闢，溝洫治，草木鬯茂，鳥獸魚鼈無所不得其性者.[41]

[38] From an account Su Shi gave of Wang's proposed reform of the exam and school systems, Wang's timeline for completing this transformation process seemed to be nine years ("Yi xuexiao gongju zhuang," in *Su Shi wenji*, 25.723). This timeline matters. Recall in chapter 1, we have seen Ouyang Xiu expected his program of guiding the people toward *renyi* by immersing them in ritual and music to take effect in a generation. This tells that Ouyang, adopting an approach to governance that uses moral influence without directly intervening into the people's lives, expected the newly born to pick this up from their environment gradually in their formation, whereas Wang's was an interventionist program to change the already formed people within a set timeline.

[39] On the examination field being a space for competition over content between the central government and private teachers of various persuasions, see De Weerdt, *Competition over Content*. Chu Ming-kin notes Ouyang Xiu had proposed to select literati through schools during the Jiayou period ("Bei Song Taixue Su Jia an," 149). The difference, once again, lies in the content of school education – what the schools were supposed to teach. On Ouyang's opposition to exploring human nature, see below.

[40] Cf. Bol's translation in "Emperors Can Claim Antiquity Too," 183-84.

[41] Liu Lin et al. eds., *SHY*, *xuanju* 7, 5398.19.

The myriad things, instead of living according to how they are naturally, *get* the nature they should have as a result of the sage's governance. That is, the goal of governance is taken as replacing the inborn nature of every living organism – humans included – with a nature they should have for the state to accomplish big: establishing a perfect order where everything falls in its due place and each of the myriad things gets their [proper] nature.

Three years later, in 1073, these goals were once again stressed in the palace exam question: "With [this], governing those above, then the Sun, the Moon, and the Stars get their order; governing those below, then birds, beasts, grasses and trees all get their natures" 以上治則日月星辰得其序，[42]以下治則鳥獸草木得其性.[43] Just like Wang Ling, who painted the Renzong era governance in a dark light in the 1050s, the assumption here is that everything Shenzong inherited from the previous reigns is out of order and every living being on Earth is not how they should be like. It is therefore necessary to use an activist government to make them conform to the order Wang Anshi designed.

Given the visibility and influence of such exams at the national level, those pursuing a government career were thus guided to pursue the kind of learning that would get the entire cosmos in proper order and make everything have a proper nature. This made Wang Anshi's learning – which uniquely centers on this – the national guideline, even without being enforced so: with a considerable number of Wang Anshi's followers from the 1060s being selected into officialdom with high distinction,[44] that one should learn what helps in this regard was made apparent to all those who were aspiring to join the officialdom.[45]

The same year, Shenzong asked Wang Anshi to create a new curriculum.[46] Not trusting others having the ability to do it well, he had Wang, the head of government, personally create it, by penning one of three classical commentaries himself[47] and closely overseeing the preparation

[42] This again tells that to Wang, "the cosmos" is not the one that operates on its own independently of human will.
[43] Liu Lin et al. eds., *SHY*, *xuanju* 7, 5399.21.
[44] Liu Chengguo, *Jinggong Xinxue yanjiu*, 63-66.
[45] As Bol has noted for the Huizong era ("Emperors Can Claim Antiquity Too," 200), that the government's policy concern was with unifying morality and changing human nature was seen in the palace exam questions for whenever Shenzong and his sons were ruling in person (Liu Lin et al. eds., *SHY*, *xuanju* 7, 5398-5401, 5403-08). Conversely, whenever the government was not in their control, the questions were about responding to actual problems in the state (ibid., 5401-03).
[46] Li Tao, *XCB*, 243.5917.
[47] Wang Anshi, "*Zhouliyi* xu," in *LCJ*, 84.878.

of the other two.[48] Even during the interval when Wang was forced out of the central government from 1074/4 to 1075/3, he remained in charge of this project.[49]

In 1075/6, on completing the new meanings of the *Zhouli*, the *Classic of Poetry* and the *Book of Documents*, the entire project team was greatly rewarded by the emperor. When asking Wang Anshi to take it, Shenzong said: "Your compiling the meanings of the classics is not like compiling the other books. … It is for wanting to guide the literati and senior officials under Heaven with the morality you [designed]" 卿修經義與修他書不類，… 乃欲以卿道德倡導天下士大夫.[50] These three commentaries were meant to have the statist morality upheld by all government agents, current and prospective.

This purpose was also revealed in their prefaces Wang wrote. For instance, the preface to his commentary on the *Zhouli* said:

> When manifested in governance, *dao* [stipulates] the position for the noble and the lowly, the order for the rear and the front, the number for the more and the less, and the timing for the slow and the rapid.
> 惟道之在政事，其貴賤有位，其後先有序，其多寡有數，其遲[速][51]有時。[52]

Wang's commentary on the *Zhouli* laid out the way all the myriad things must follow. In chapter 2, we have seen that early in the reform, Wang kept asking the emperor to show his likes and dislikes to the people. That wasn't ideal. The morality Wang designed needs to be spelled out. This is perhaps why Wang attached particular importance to this commentary, by writing it himself. The same with his commentary on the *Classic of Poetry*, in the preface of which Wang likewise wrote: "Poems [in the *Classic of Poetry*] lead to *daode* above and reach *liyi* below. Imitating the

[48] Li Tao, *XCB*, 229.5570.
[49] Li Tao, *XCB*, 252.6173. That state rightness (*guoshi* 國是, a concept analyzed below) remained Wang Anshi's statecraft during this period can be seen from the fact that Wang's students still occupied the lecturer's position at the Classics Mat (Jiang Peng, *Bei Song jingyan yu Songxue de xingqi*, 98-99). On the institution of the Classics Mat in the long eleventh century, see also Guarino, "Learning and Imperial Authority in Northern Sung China." On its importance for political theoretical discussions between the emperor and his attendants, see De Weerdt, "Empire and the Institutions and Practices of Classicizing Learning." On the great care Wang took with the wording in these three commentaries, see Li Tao, *XCB*, 258.6563-67.
[50] Li Tao, *XCB*, 265.6495. See also the 1076 palace exam question: "朕欲士之知德也，故造之以經術" (Liu Lin et al. eds., *SHY*, *xuanju* 7, 5400.21).
[51] The original text reads "數" (Wang Anshi, "*Zhouliyi* xu," in *LCJ*, 84.878).
[52] Ibid.

words in their speech, superior men shall arise; following the sequence of their way, sages shall be formed." 詩上通乎道德，下達乎禮義。放其言之文，君子以興焉；循其道之序，聖人以成焉.[53] Wang also wrote a "dictionary" to accompany these textbooks – the so-called *Explication of Characters* (*Zishuo* 字說). Its purpose was still the same: "Teaching must necessarily begin with this. Those who can know this have known nine-tenths of the idea of *daode*" 教學必自此始。能知此者，則於道德之意已十九矣.[54]

An anecdote recorded in the biography of Chen Cisheng 陳次升 (1044-1119) in *Song History* gives us a glimpse of the content of this dictionary:

> [When Chen Cisheng] entered the Imperial University, the lecturer, having just received Wang Anshi's *Explicating Characters*, called up the students to teach them with it. Cisheng rose up and said: "Is the Prime Minister's learning that of the Qin's? Glorifying Shang Yang for being able to carry out *ren* governance and excusing Li Si for things he did.[55] If not the Qin's learning then what?" 入太學，時學官始得王安石《字說》，招諸生訓之，次升作而曰："丞相豈秦學邪？美商鞅之能行仁政，而為李斯解事，非秦學而何？"[56]

This *ren* is Wang's new concept of *ren*, the impersonal and anti-humanist one that encourages the ruler to do whatever it takes to realize grand overall goals. In the previous two chapters, we have seen a few other examples where Wang couched his new concepts in old terms, including *daode*, by which he meant that of Laozi's rather than what was used by the mainstream at the time; *li*, the regulative yet transformative behavioral regulations rather than the cultural form Ouyang Xiu used for guiding the people toward humanist virtues; *xing*, the crafted nature people ought to have rather than the one they were born with; *tian*, that on which all things rely for existence and which behaves ruthlessly toward the populace rather than the unknown Nature or cosmos upon which earlier imperial humans modeled their order; and *yi*, cruelty and the opposite of humanity rather than appropriateness or rightness. Based on these and from the above glimpse, it is possible that

[53] Wang Anshi, "*Shiyi* xu," in *LCJ*, 84.878-9. For the role poetry plays in moral epistemology, see Fuller, *Drifting among Rivers and Lakes*, 14. I thank Wilt Idema for a helpful discussion on this.
[54] Wang Anshi, "Xining *Zishuo* xu," in *LCJ*, 84.879-80.
[55] On the life and thought of Shang Yang, see Pines trans., *The Book of Lord Shang*; on the life of Li Si, see Bodde, *China's First Unifier*.
[56] Tuo Tuo et al., *Song shi*, 346.10969.

Wang meant this dictionary to make his *re*definitions of the old terms the new and default way to conceptualize the world.

In 1080, four years after Wang's permanent retirement, his revisions of the three commentaries were still being adopted by the emperor and promulgated state-wide.[57] Wang's work on the *Explication of Characters* continued into the 1080s, not long before he died.[58]

Despite these preparations, however, Wang's idea of building a state-wide school system down to villages through which to select state agents was not able to be turned into practice until 1104.[59] A stele dated to that year told us:

> During Xining (1068-77) and Yuanfeng (1078-85), emperor Shenzong was determined to accomplish something. He established the Three Hall method; from the capital to the major cities, he ordered the Confucian teacher [Wang Anshi] to build schools and select literati [by examining their understanding of] the meanings of the classics, so that those who learn would have something to follow. … However, the civil examinations selected literati once every three years, while the method for recommending them to the emperor from local schools was only discussed but not implemented. From the day he inherited the throne, emperor Zhezong was intent on continuing his father's plan, but did not practice it comprehensively. The present emperor, with his bright and wise quality, aided by his utmost sincere and tireless heart, inherited their will and continued their affairs. Thus he ordered the prefects and counties under Heaven to build schools for nurturing human talents and discuss the method for recommending local literati and evaluating the excellent as practiced in Chengzhou.[60] Not just prefects and counties have schools. From big counties through medium ones to small ones, all have their quotas. Officials were chosen to nurture the students with delight and Circuit Supervisors were further ordered to supervise them. It can be said to have been carried out comprehensively. I once heard that in antiquity, a literatus served and thereafter had salaries. Now the lowly literati [i.e., students] were supported with food and drinks, provided for with salaries and taught carefreely. When their studies are completed, they are then recommended up to the state for selection [into officialdom] according to [their competence]. It is unprecedented.

[57] Wang Anshi, "Qi gai *Sanjingyi* wu zi zhazi er dao," in *LCJ*, 43.456-460.
[58] Gao Keqin, "Wang Anshi zhushu kao," 85. This suggests that even late in life, Wang was still occupied with statecraft.
[59] This is what Wang Anshi meant by saying that only after nine changes can reward and punishment be spoken of. Before his statecraft could work, the entire order of things had to be turned upside down first.
[60] Capital of the Western Zhou Dynasty.

> 熙寧、元豐間，[神]宗皇帝銳於有為，立三舍法，自京師達之都邑，命師儒興學校，以經義取士，學者有所宗。…然科舉三年一取士，而賓興獻貢之法議而未行。哲宗皇帝嗣位之日，有意續紹，然行之而未詳焉。今主上以聰明睿智之資，加以至誠不倦之心，繼厥志、述厥事。於是詔天下郡縣興庠序以養人材，講成周賓興論秀之法。豈惟州郡有學，然自大縣、中縣、小縣皆有其額，擇官以樂育之，又命監司提督之，可謂行之而詳也。嘗聞古之士也，仕而後有祿。今在下之士，未仕而以飲食贍之，以俸祿給之，優游以教之，待其成而上副國家之選，以前古未之有也。[61]

During the entirety of Shenzong's reign, while some preparatory steps were taken, selecting literati through government schools instead of the examination system as laid out in Wang Anshi's 1069/4 reform proposal stopped at the level of discussion. Zhezong 哲宗 (personal r. 1093-1100) did get to implement it, but only to a limited extent. It was only comprehensively practiced under Huizong 徽宗 (personal r. 1101-1126).[62]

This is because, to implement Wang's soulcraft full-scale, which is nothing short of a human nature re-engineering project that necessitates a fundamental change in the way people live, two preconditions had to be met: there were sufficient start-up funds and there was not much obstruction. The former isn't a small sum: paying students salaries to attact them to schools and keep them there before they begin generating revenues for the state years later and building such schools across the country and keeping them running cost.[63] It was perhaps for this reason that despite his earlier insistence on prioritizing changing social customs, Wang Anshi later came to agree with Shenzong to first focus on enriching the government's coffer through the wide-ranging economic policies.[64] The latter was tougher to handle. Indeed, it is said that this was the main reason why Shenzong did not get to implement Wang's plan: "Emperor Shenzong was just about to build schools, when it was met with the different opinion of [those serving in the later] Yuanyou

[61] Huang Pengnian, *Jifu tongzhi*, 117.72b. For a partial translation, see Chaffee, *The Thorny Gates of Learning in Sung China*, 83.
[62] Yuan Zheng notes that under Huizong and Cai Jing, the civil examination system was completely replaced by the gradated school system (*Songdai jiaoyu*, 147). Thomas Lee, however, claims that Cai Jing "never actually succeeded in suspending one single examination" (*Government Education and Examinations in Sung China*, 247).
[63] Su Shi's 1101 account of Nan'an Military Prefectural School gives us a sense of how much it costs to build just one such school: begun in 1095 winter and completed in 1097 spring, this boarding school can accommodate hundreds of students. While the central government provided a sum, "countless" local aids chipped in ("Nan'an jun xue ji," in *Su Shi wenji*, 11.374).
[64] Li Guoqiang, "Lun Bei Song Xining bianfa de shizhi," 68.

[administration]. So it was not yet implemented." 神宗皇帝將建學焉，屬元祐異議，遂不及行。[65] That Zhezong's implementation was limited was due to the same reason: during the first eight years of his reign, when he, underaged, was not yet ruling on his own, it was the anti-reformers who took control of the government under the support of a sympathetic regent. The force of opposition remained strong at the beginning of Huizong's reign.[66]

This was to a great extent thanks to the public political culture Shenzong inherited from the previous two reigns. Under that culture, on the one hand, literati were encouraged to address the monarch directly on state affairs. For example, during the reign of Renzong, writing to the emperor on state affairs regardless of one's position did not constitute transgression: Cheng Yi did this in 1050[67] as a teenager without official status, Wang Anshi did this in 1058 as an incoming administrative assistant in the Bureau of General Accounts, and Su Zhe did this in 1061 as an examinee, lecturing the emperor on how to behave.[68] None of them got into trouble for such behaviors. Rather, in the last case, we were told Renzong not only did not get offended, but was actually pleased by his court officials' praise of his tolerance of this. On the other hand, as noted in chapter 1, the monarch's authority was checked by remonstrators. Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032-1085), for example, told us that "during Renzong's reign, remonstrating officials were generously tolerated" 仁宗朝優容諫臣.[69] These prevented the monarch from being able to have the whole state head toward one direction.

As a result, at the beginning of the reform, Shenzong's authority was, albeit recovering from the nadir,[70] still rather limited. Throughout the 1070s, dissidents were openly obstructing or opposing the reform, as can be seen from the activities of Su Shi[71] and those living in Luoyang.[72] Change, however, gradually took place.

---

[65] Yang Zhongliang, *JSBM*, 135.2286.
[66] For the political history of the reigns of Zhezong and Huizong, see Levine, "Che-Tsung's Reign (1085-1100) and the Age of Faction," and "The Reigns of Hui-Tsung (1100-1126) and Ch'in-Tsung (1126-1127) and the Fall of the Northern Sung." For the politics of reform under Huizong, see Chaffee, "Huizong, Cai Jing, and the Politics of Reform."
[67] Cheng Yi, "Shang Renzong Huangdi yan shi shu," in *Er Cheng ji*, 510.
[68] Su Zhe, "Yushi zhice," in *Luancheng ji*, 1714-17. On Renzong's response, see Li Tao, *XCB*, 194.4711.
[69] Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, *Er Cheng ji*, 29.
[70] For a sense of the gradual recovery, see, for example, Wang Anshi, *Xining zoudui rilu*, 28 and 39.
[71] Egan, *Word, Image, and Deed in the Life of Su Shi*, 33-46.
[72] Freeman, "Lo-Yang and Opposition to Wang An-Shih."

Since Shenzong's ascension to the throne, imperially decreed cases began to rise.[73] As Dai Jianguo argues, at the same time when Shenzong's imperial authority kept rising, the officials' dignity was declining,[74] just like how Wang Anshi theorized with the horse metaphor in "On *Li*." In 1071, major shakeup occurred at the Imperial University, with both the teachers and the students thereafter becoming more in line with Wang Anshi's thought.[75] Then there was what Charles Hartman called "a turning point" in Northern Song intellectual life – the arrest and trial of Su Shi in 1079, who by then had become a public opinion leader, for slandering and being direspectful toward Shenzong.[76] While the previous actions were still local, influencing only the bounded places, this incident sent a strong signal, at the national level, to everyone. Now not following the monarch could incur apprehension, conviction, and, as Su Shi believed while in prison, death sentence. Thereafter, literati became much less vocal and changed their ways of political expression. Even Su Shi, who by natural inclination could not hold his tongue,[77] came to increasingly censor himself, including by covering his public writings with thick layers of allusion[78] and encoding them.[79]

Slightly different from Hartman, who ends his brilliant discussion of the significance of this case in public political culture by saying that "the rise of literary persecution in the Northern Sung seems more a result of bureaucratic factionalism than of any attempt by the Sung monarchs to exert their theoretical powers of absolute control,"[80] I would note that while I share his view that the Song was not featured by autocracy, it seems here the root reason goes beyond bureaucratic factionalism,[81] deriving from Wang Anshi's political theory.

---

[73] Dai Jianguo, "Xi Feng zhaoyu yu Bei Song zhengzhi," and Li Yumin, "Song Shenzong zhizao de yizhuang da yuan'an."
[74] Dai Jianguo, "Xi Feng zhaoyu yu Bei Song zhengzhi," 120, 124. This can be also seen from changes in the way officials attended court meetings and had audiences with the emperor under Shenzong (Zhou Jia, *Bei Song zhongyang richang zhengwu*, 157-205).
[75] Chu Ming-kin, "Bei Song Taixue Su Jia an kao shi," 143-67. It is said that at night, Wang Anshi would lecture the Imperial University lecturers, some being his students from the 1060s, who would then lecture their students during the day, none using their own ideas (Li Tao, *XCB*, 228.5545-46).
[76] Hartman, "Poetry and Politics in 1079," 44. For full accounts of this case, see Egan, *Word, Image, and Deed*, 46-53; and Uchiyama Seiya, *Chuanmei yu zhenxiang*, 173-271.
[77] See, for example, Su Shi, "Lu Tao Yuanming shi," in *Su Shi wenji*, 67.2111.
[78] Fuller, *The Road to East Slope*, 306.
[79] Murck, *Poetry and Painting in Song China*. Stressing secret-keeping was frequently seen in Su Shi's post-arrest writings (see, for example, "Yu Fan Chufu," 11 of 11, in *Su Shi wenji*, 50.145).
[80] Hartman, "Poetry and Politics in 1079," 44.
[81] Li Yumin notes that maintaining his absolute authority was what drove Shenzong behind the making of this case ("Wutai Shi'an xin tan," 25).

As we have seen in the previous chapter, according to Wang, there should be only one authority for all in the state, and those not having the proper nature are regarded as having no nature, thereby not humans and hence no right to be in the political system. This implies that the political system shall allow only those who are willing to go along with it. In the words of Peter Bol, Wang's "idea of a perfect order … made no allowances for any legitimate opposition or disagreement."[82] For those who do not conform, there is only one theoretical outcome: be ostracized from the society, which is made the same with the state. This is why political exiling became more and more commonplace, in ever larger batches in the late Northern Song.[83] Wang's, in other words, is a theory for single-party rule.

The concept of *guoshi* 國是 also derives from this. Through his extended discussion, Yu Yingshi has helped us pay more attention to this important concept that according to him first appeared early in Shenzong's reign.[84] Building on this, Xiao-bin Ji translates it as "policy consensus of the state."[85] "Consensus," however, is premised on each being allowed an opinion of their own. According to Wang's political theory, however, individuals should not have their own opinions but should simply follow the central authority.[86] Understood in this light, it seems the concept means "state rightness" – what the ruler's state decides is right, as Chu Ping-tzu points out.[87] The very fact that it became an important concept during Shenzong's reign tells that independent opinion no longer had legitimacy. Rather, the whole state should hold on to that which the state defines as right. This is different from the concept of public rightness (*gongshi* 公是)[88] that existed prior to Shenzong's reign.[89] Whereas *guoshi* is what the ruler's state defines as right,

[82] Bol, "Emperors Can Claim Antiquity Too," 203.
[83] Su Shi himself had come to this conclusion ("Lun Zhou Tong shan yi peixiang zihe zhazi," 2 of 2, in *Su Shi wenji*, 29.833).
[84] Yu Yingshi, *Zhu Xi de lishi shijie*, chapter 5.
[85] Ji, *Politics and Conservatism in Northern Song China*, 17. Levine adopts this (*Divided by a Common Language*, 181n3; "Court and Country," 358). Hartman translates it as "state policy" (*The Making of Song Dynasty History*, 258), which seems to work better as a non-literal rendering.
[86] For a sense of Wang's attitude towards those having independent point of view instead of obediently following the ruler's order, see the demotion decree he drafted for Zhang Shizheng ("Yiluanshi Yingzhou cishi Zhang Shizheng luo cishi yijiu Yiluanshi zhi," in *LCJ*, 55.597). The right way to be a military officer is to be obedient, Wang wrote, and those who follow this would be rewarded. The emperor granted Zhang rank and office. Zhang should repay this by going all out to serve the emperor. However, Zhang turned out to slight the emperor by interfering with the state's policy using his own judgment. Hence the demotion.
[87] Chu Ping-tzu, "Ping Yu Yingshi xiansheng de *Zhu Xi de lishi shijie*," 288.
[88] As in Liu Chang's *Gongshi ji*, whose brother Liu Ban 劉攽 (1023-89) took *gongfei* 公非 as his style name. Similarly with *gongyi* 公議, as in Tian Kuang's 田況 (1005-1063) *Rulin gongyi*.
[89] This seems to be the origin of the Southern Song concept of *gong* that Hymes and Schirokauer discussed in length ("Introduction," 51-55).

gongshi is what is right as decided by the majority of the literati for the interest of *res publica*. The difference between the two is that between "the private opinion of one person [the ruler, for the interest of his own state]" and "the public opinion of all under Heaven" that Han Yu pointed out at the beginning of "Tracing the Way."[90]

Another major obstruction came from the independent authority of the speaking officials. In chapter 1, we have seen that since the 1030s, men of letters like Fan Zhongyan and Ouyang Xiu had been bending the speaking offices toward literati. By late Renzong's reign, remonstrators and censors had come to work with a few ranking officials to check imperial authority, as Wang Anshi observed in 1061:

> Your subject has humbly observed that since the recent years, Your Majesty delegated everything under Heaven to seven to eight ministers. All under Heaven at first praised this unanimously, hoping that should they be fortunate enough to accomplish something, all the harms can then be repaired. However, among present ministers, the weak ones do not dare to guard the laws for Your Majesty by offending the remonstrators and censors, but only think of how to maintain their salaries and keep their positions; as for the strong ones, they rely on imperial edicts to make up laws and ordinances, freely doing what they wanted without choosing between right and wrong according to the moral principle. And none of the remonstrators and censors dare to go against their will. Further, Your Majesty stayed at home idle and silent, both ears listening to what they did without raising a question.[91] How can the court be like this for long without falling into chaos?
> 臣等竊觀陛下自近歲以來，舉天下之事屬之七八大臣，天下初以翕然幸其有為，能救一切之弊。然而方今大臣之弱者，則不敢為陛下守法以忤諫官、御史，而專為持祿保位之謀；大臣之強者，則挾聖旨造法令，恣行所欲，不擇義之是非，[92]而諫官、御史亦無敢忤其意者。陛下方且深拱淵默，兩聽其所為而無所問。安有朝廷如此而能曠日持久而無亂者乎？[93]

[90] Han Yu, "Yuan dao," in *HCLJ*, vol. 1, 15.
[91] This again shows, from Wang Anshi's critical point of view, that the late Renzong reign indeed featured the emperor's non-action, with state affairs being decided by the several ranking court officials.
[92] Read "不擇義理之是非" (Li Tao, *XCB*, 193.4686).
[93] Li Tao, *XCB*, 193.4678. Luo Jiaxiang points out that this made clear Wang's negative view on the political activities of the remonstrators and censors late in Renzong's reign (*Bei Song dangzheng yanjiu*, 47).

In "On Remonstrators" 諫官論, an essay belonging to the *Miscellaneous Theories* volumes, Wang Anshi sought to turn the remonstrators back to working for the monarch:[94]

> Having the worthy govern the unworthy and the noble govern the lowly was the way in antiquity. Who are the so-called noble? Ranking and senior officials. Who are the so-called lowly? The literati and the commoners. … Now the remonstrators are what the son of Heaven calls "literati," and yet they are noble like the three highest officials of the son of Heaven. … Being in the position of literati and yet entrusted with the responsibility of the three highest officials, this was not the way in antiquity. In ancient times, … each remonstrated according to their position.
> 以賢治不肖，以貴治賤，古之道也。所謂貴者，何也？公卿、大夫是也。所謂賤者，何也？士、庶人是也。…今之諫官者，天子之所謂士也，其貴，則天子之三公也。…士之位而受三公之責，非古之道也。古者…各以其職諫。[95]

Theorized as such, the remonstrators were deprived of the authority to speak up on matters beyond their designated rank in the political system. Because the emperor stands at the top of this system, this in theory made it illegitimate for anyone to criticize the emperor, their ultimate superior. Thus the role of the remonstrators and censors is reduced to obediently obeying their ruler's orders.

After the reform began, this theory was practiced under Shenzong and Wang Asnhi, who, according to Paul Smith, "viewed the Censorate as an administrative arm of the court rather than as an independent political entity." The consequence of this was that "censorial opposition to any regime decisions constituted grounds for dismissal."[96] It is perhaps partly for this reason that as Zhu Xi noted, by the Yuanfeng period (1078-1085), Shenzong was able to take control of specific government matters.[97]

Since assuming personal rule in 1093, Zhezong had been carrying forward his father's work in changing the public political culture, sending those who had served in the Yuanyou 元祐 (1085-1093) administration into exile in batches.[98] Between 1102 and 1104, Huizong further advanced

[94] For an alternative reading, see Song, *Traces of Grand Peace*, 222.
[95] Wang Anshi, "Jianguan lun," in *LCJ*, 63.673-74.
[96] Smith, "Shen-tsung's Reign," 375.
[97] Li Jingde ed., *Zhuzi yulei*, 130.3095. See also Zhou Jia, *Bei Song zhongyang richang zhengwu*, 157. This is reflected in changes in the spatial configuration of government offices through the Yuanfeng reform (Foong, *The Efficacious Landscape*, 42, 60-63; Hartman, "Sung Government and Politics," 100).
[98] For Zhezong's view on the Yuanyou government as well as his intent to continue his father's enterprise, see the 1094 palace exam question (Liu Lin et al. eds., *SHY*, *xuanju* 7, 5403.28). The very fact that after Su Shi was banished

this, by forbidding dissidents from being physically present in the capital and blocking the path into officialdom of their offspring.[99] Although the blacklisting did not last too long before being lifted, the effect had been achieved: thereafter, dissidents were no longer able to hinder the advancement of the government's agenda, nor did they have the power to seize back control of the government again. Rather, Huizong maintained Wang Anshi's statecraft as state rightness until 1125.[100]

III. Huizong and the Realization of Wang Anshi's Design

After 1104, Wang Anshi's idea of using government school education to make the kind of state agents who would go all out to follow the ruler's orders was finally practiced in full scale across the realm. According to the stele cited above, the students were paid good salaries and taught how to govern the state – all according to Wang's design. As for the values advocated in the schools, a contemporary complaint told us:

> When the Three Hall method was implemented, the students, evaluated by grades, were pretty occupied with reporting on others' wrongdoings. Shi Gongbi (1061-1115) said, "Establishing schools was to gradually refine the people with *renyi*, wanting them to have the conduct of literati and noble men. Merely having them report on each other's wrongdoings was not the original point of building schools."
> 三舍法行，士子計等第，頗事告訐。石公弼言："設學校者，將以仁義漸摩，欲人有士君子之行。顧使之相告訐，非所以建學本意也。"[101]

In line with Han Yu and Ouyang Xiu, Shi Gongbi thinks schools should guide students toward *renyi*, and yet the purpose of the Three Hall system was precisely to the opposite. In other words,

---

to Huizhou that year, Li Gonglin found it necessary to avoid greeting Su Shi's followers in public (Harris Jr., *Painting and Private Life in Eleventh-Century China*, 13) tells the time's political atmosphere.

[99] For the various editions of the Yuanyou faction list and the process of the blacklisting, see Luo Changfan, "Yuanyou dangji bei de li hui yu banben yuanliu." Zhu Yiqun's dissertation ("Bei Song wanqi dangjin de xingcheng yu zhankai (1085-1125)"), which could have also dealt with this issue, is currently unavailable to me.

[100] On the need to treat Shenzong and his sons as one entity, see Li Huarui, "Northern Song Reformist Thought and Its Sources," 224-25. Zhao Dongmei notes Shenzong and Wang Anshi were the starting point that led up to Huizong and Cai Jing (*Da Song zhi bian*, 10).

[101] Tuo Tuo et al., *Song shi*, 348.11031.

the kind of state-wide education carried out from 1104 was in line with Wang Anshi's anti-humanism.

If material from *Song History* could be biased given the influence of Daoxue ideology running through it,[102] the 1104 decree issued in the name of Huizong to the Imperial University preparatory school (Biyong 辟雍) has survived to us, which began as follows:

> I commend that in the past, in making the social customs good, encouraging the [people] to make contributions and enjoy working, and having them revere the monarch and love their superior, none was not accomplished in schools.
> 朕嘉在昔，善天下之俗，勸功樂事，尊君親上，莫不受成於學。[103]

The ideal school education teaches students to revere the monarch and love their superior – the ultimate one of all being the monarch. These were precisely the values to be made out of the inborn feeling of fearing one's father and loving one's mother that Wang theorized in "On *Li*" about half a century ago.

From 1107, the Huizong administration further pushed Wang Anshi's morality-above-all approach to learning to its logical conclusion, by opening the Eight Conduct (*baxing* 八行) track in the school selection system.[104] With this, one could be selected into officialdom simply on the basis of the extent to which their conduct matches what the government defines as good. At the beginning of the decree, it was said:

> Schools are for making social customs good and human relations clear. It is where human talents came from. Now there is the method for educating and nurturing [the students] but no system for making customs good and human relations clear. This is perhaps not enough for making it clear to all under Heaven.

[102] Hartman, *The Making of Song Dynasty History*, chapter 5.
[103] "Huangdi ci Biyong zhao," in Bi Yuan, *Shanzuo jinshizhi*, 17.29b. For discussions, see Chu, *The Politics of Higher Education*, 160, and Ebrey, "Huizong's Stone Inscriptions," 246-47.
[104] For discussions of these eight conducts, see Bol, "Whither the Emperor?" 118–19; Hu, "The Eight Virtue System in Late Northern Sung China"; and Chu, "Pursuing Moral Governance."

> 學以善風俗、明人倫，而人材所自出也。今有教養之法而未有善俗明倫之制，殆未足以兼明天下。[105]

Like how Wang Anshi defined it in the long letter to Renzong, talent does not refer to one's literary ability, but the good conduct in line with the statist morality. Similarly, a 1115 decree began by claiming that "schools nurture humans with the good" 學校以善養人.[106] In contrast to the kind of education advocated by the ancient prose proponents that uses various cultural forms to guide the students toward developing their own moral sense, Huizong's schools nurture the students with what the central authority defines as good.

With regard to these eight conducts – being filial, respectful of elders, amicable [to affinal relatives], friendly [to neighbors], responsible, considerate, loyal, and polite (*xiao ti yin mu ren xu zhong he* 孝悌姻睦任恤忠和), many scholars take them as "Confucian" ethics.[107] They indeed look like the so-called "Confucian values" advocated by contemporary politicians and thinkers like Lee Kuan Yew, in that these eight conducts are all centered around a subject's obedience and loyalty to the ruler-state,[108] as the decree followed by saying:

> Confucius said, "One who is filial to and respectful of his elders rarely becomes the kind of person who is inclined to defy his superiors, and there has never been a case of one who is disinclined to defy his superiors stirring up rebellion."[109]
>
> 孔子曰："其為人也孝悌，而好犯上者，鮮矣；不好犯上，而好作亂者，未之有也。"[110]

In the *Analects* 1.2, these words were attributed to Youzi. But the point of citing this from a classical work with high cultural authority was to add support to the point that these eight conducts

---

[105] "Daguan sheng zuo zhi bei," in Bi Yuan, *Shanzuo jinshizhi*, 17.35a. For discussions, see Chu, *The Politics of Higher Education*, 161, and Ebrey, "Huizong's Stone Inscriptions," 247-28.
[106] Si Yizu ed., *Song da zhaoling ji*, 157.592, "Xuexiao zengyuan yubi."
[107] See, for example, Yuan Zheng, *Songdai jiaoyu*, 139–44; Chen Zhi'e, *Bei Song wenhua shi shulun*, 19; and Ebrey, "Huizong's Stone Inscriptions," 239, 247.
[108] A feature Samuel Huntington identifies with Asian societies (*The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 225). For a convincing argument against the myth of a "Confucian" East Asia, however, see O'Dwyer, *Confucianism's Prospects*.
[109] The *Analects*, 1.2. Translation modified from Slingerland's (*Confucius* Analects, 1).
[110] "Daguan sheng zuo zhi bei," in Bi Yuan, *Shanzuo jinshizhi*, 17.35a.

beginning with *xiao* and *ti* were meant to help choose obedient subjects who would not disobey their superiors, rather than for their love of their family members per se.

Moreover, the first punishment was for disloyalty due to conducts that violate the interest of the ruler-state:

> Those who commit conducts like rebellion, betrayal, great offense (sons and grandsons exempt) and great disrespect, slandering the ancestors and criticizing the emperor are subject to punishment for disloyalty.
> 諸謀反、謀叛、謀大逆（子孫免）及大不恭，詆訕宗廟，指斥乘輿，為不忠之刑.[111]

The absence is perhaps more telling – nowhere did we see *renyi* included as a conduct to be rewarded. Despite the difference from *li-yi-lian-chi* in name, the gist of these eight conducts was still taking the state's interest as the benchmark to decide who is moral and who not. As Dirlik points out with regard to the New Life Movement: "Morality, therefore, had a shifting content, adapting to ever-changing circumstances with that one end in view."[112]

All these demonstrate that educational developments during Huizong's reign were guided by Wang Anshi's political theory. The prefectural and county schools data analayzed by Yongguang Hu[113] and the exponential growth in student number, surpassing 200,000 by 1116,[114] indicate that after the early 1100s blacklisting, Wang's idea of using a state-wide school system to make the kind of humans who would go all out to serve the ruler obediently, the essential gist of his method of governance that Shenzong chose out of the belief that it would help perpetuate the Zhao dynasty, was being practiced in all sincerity across the country. As Robert Hartwell sharply pointed out, while on the surface Cai Jing's educationl innovations "seem to have been prompted by a desire to increase educational opportunity,"[115] the primary goal of his program was actually

[111] Ibid., 17.36b.
[112] Dirlik, "The Ideological Foundations of the New Life Movement," 491.
[113] Hu, "Cultivating Merit," 132-40. More research is to be conducted on the actual implementation of Wang's ideas in Huizong era government schools, by looking into sources like state documents and personal memoirs. I thank Wilt Idema for pointing out the need to strengthen this weak spot later on.
[114] Si Yizu ed., *Song da zhaoling ji*, 157.593. See also Chaffee, *The Thorny Gates of Learning in Sung China*, 78, 84.
[115] For this view, see Kracke, "The Expansion of Educational Opportunity in the Reign of Hui-Tsung of the Sung and Its Implications."

to "impose ideological conformity that had few parallels before the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century."[116]

This sense of accomplishment was also conveyed through the names Huizong chose for his reign periods from 1107: Daguan 大觀 – a great spectacle for all to see; and Zhenghe 政和 (Harmonious Governance), Chonghe 重和 (Double Harmony) and Xuanhe 宣和 (Proclaiming Harmony) – the perfect order his father pursued with Wang Anshi was considered to have been realized, at least he proclaimed so.[117] The 1109 palace exam question tells the current policy concern was with celebrating success in governance: "in the past, the Former Kings made rites on having settled governance and made music on having completed accomplishments" 昔者先王治定而制禮，功成而作樂.[118]

[116] Hartwell, "Historical Analogism," 715.

[117] This, however, does not mean the success was total. For instance, in 1115, dissidents were still troublesome enough to make the concern with them into the palace exam question that year (Liu Lin et al. eds., *SHY*, *xuanju* 7, 5406.34).

[118] Liu Lin et al. eds., *SHY*, *xuanju* 7, 5405.32. For a discussion, see Lam, "Huizong's Dashengyue, a Musical Performance of Emperorship and Officialdom," 416-17. Huizong's practice of Wang Anshi's ideas was all-round, extending even to the sphere of medicine, as can be seen from the preface he wrote to the *Classic of Sagely Benefaction* 聖濟經: "一陰一陽之謂道，偏陰偏陽之謂疾。不明乎道，未有能已人之疾者。" The curing of physical illness depends on one's knowledge of the *dao*, which the emperor alone commands according to Wang Anshi. And what Huizong wrote was based on an inquiry into the workings of nature and destiny 性命之理 (quoted from Goldschmidt, "Huizong's Impact on Medicine and on Public Health," 317-18). As such, this is not a book about medicine, but about the implementation of Wang's statecraft through treating the ill. Chaffee thinks that over the course of his reign, Huizong "underwent a personal transformation, increasingly departing from the models of his father and brother" ("Huizong, Cai Jing, and the Politics of Reform," 54). It seems to me Huizong was only keeping up with the times, doing what his father and brother had wanted to do but not yet able to, including bringing Wang Anshi's adoption of Laozi's idea of *daode* to its logical conclusion – himself becoming "Emperor Lord of Way" (Chao, "Huizong and the Divine Empyrean Palace 神霄宮 Temple Network," 338).

Chapter 4
Human Nature and the Limits of Government
-- Su Shi's Critique of Wang Anshi's Intellectual Source Mencius

In this chapter, I hope to enrich our understanding of the discussions in the preceding three chapters by presenting the discovery of Su Shi 蘇軾 (1037-1101) on the nature of Wang Anshi's statecraft. At the end of chapter 3 section I, we have seen that Cheng Yi had grasped Wang's statecraft as a kind of soulcraft. Here we shall see that Su, usually taken as a literary genius, also figured this out in his political theory project, undertaken in the form of classical commentary, that was designed to oppose Wang Anshi's statecraft and completed around the turn of the twelfth century.

Using a set of eight entries from one of this project's output – *Explicating the* Analects (Lunyu *shuo* 論語說) – where Su took issue with Mencius, this chapter also seeks to address anew the relationship between Wang Anshi and Mencius, who was singled out as Wang's most important intellectual source in his biography that we read in chapter 1. This relationship had been widely noticed since the 1060s, resulting in numerous discussions from many perspectives among present-day scholars.[1] Recently, Li Huarui argued that "the nucleus of Mencius' political theory" was realized by Wang Anshi through the reform.[2] In chapter 2, I have begun presenting an alternative explanation, revealing how Mencius' insight into human nature provided the key theoretical premise for Wang's soulcraft. Here I would like to supplement that with the deep connections between the two that Su Shi identified. In what follows, I first give a brief account of the background of this project of Su Shi's and then discuss these eight connections he identified therein one by one.

I. Su Shi's Classical Commentary Project

While Su Shi had been criticizing the reform Wang Anshi designed since the late 1060s,[3] it was only in this classical commentary project that he engaged it systematically at a high level of

[1] See, for example, Yang Zhijiu, "Wang Anshi yu Mengzi"; Wang Zengyu, "Mengzi zai Songdai yasheng diwei zhi queding jiqi yingxiang."
[2] Li Huarui, "Northern Song Reformist Thought and Its Sources," 225, 229.
[3] Egan, *Word, Image, and Deed*, chapter 2.

abstraction. The project began in 1080,[4] shortly after Su arrived at his first exile place Huangzhou 黃州 (in today's Hubei Province) following his release from prison. By 1081/4, Su Shi had finished a first edition of two of his three planned books – *Explicating the* Analects, *Commentary on the* Classic of Change, and *Commentary on the* Book of Documents.[5] He did start working on the last one,[6] but did not finish it.[7] It was in late 1097, during his third exile to Danzhou (on today's Hainan Island),[8] that he picked this project up again.[9]

In a poem written in the process of turning to it, Su stated his authorial intention as follows:

申韓本自聖	Shen Buhai's and Han Fei's [learnings] originated from the sage[10];
陋古不復稽	Slighting antiquity, they did not study it any more.
巨君縱獨欲	Jujun[11] indulged in his autocratic desires,
借經作巖崖	Borrowing the classics as precipitous cliffs.
遂令青衿子	Thus those young students were made
珠璧人人懷	To each and every yearn for pearls and jades.[12]
鑿齒井蛙耳	Xi Zaochi,[13] a frog at the bottom of a well only,

[4] Bol, *"This Culture of Ours,"* 282.
[5] Su Shi, "Yu Teng Dadao," no. 21, in *Su Shi wenji*, 51.1482, and "Huangzhou shang Wen Lu Gong shu," in ibid., 48.1380. Wu Xuetao (*Su wen xinian kaolüe*, 135) and Kong Fanli (*Su Shi nianpu*, 504–06) both date Su's cover letter to Wen to 1081/4 based on convincing arguments. Shu Dagang dates it to 1082 without explaining his grounds ("Su Shi Lunyu *shuo* liuchuan cunyi kao," 123).
[6] Su Shi, "Yu Wang Dingguo shu," no. 11, in *Su Shi wenji*, 52.1519. Dated to the autumn of 1081.
[7] For reasons unclear. His brother told us this book Su Shi finally wrote when living south of the sea (Su Zhe, *Luancheng ji*, houji, 22.1422).
[8] There are no textual grounds supporting Shu Dagang's statement that Su Shi worked on this project when in Huizhou ("'Fu shi san shu, ji jue cisheng bu xu guo,'" 500). Rather, Su's writings during that period tell that he still placed his hopes on the political tide turning favorably towards him, even though he seemed to have settled down there with the building of a new residence. See, for example, Su Shi, "You ciyun er shou tong fang xinju," in *Su Shi shiji*, 40.2221: "也知卜筑非真宅."
[9] Su arrived at his exile place in Danzhou on 1097/7/2 (Kong Fanli, *Su Shi nianpu*, 1273). In 1097/12, he was still putting together he-Tao poems (*Su Shi shiji*, 35.1882). Given these, the starting time of Su's focused work on the project was likely 1098. It is not impossible though, that he began turning his attention to it and did some preparatory work (like borrowing books, discussed below) in late 1097.
[10] Confucius.
[11] Wang Mang 王莽 (45 BCE – 23AD).
[12] The source seems Cao Zhi's "Yu Yang Zude shu": "當此之時，人人自謂握靈蛇之珠，家家自謂抱荊山之玉" (Yan Kejun ed., *Quan Shanggu Sandai Qin Han Sanguo Liuchao wen*, 428). Su was using pearls and jades to refer to aiming for the abstract *dao* in learning, as he wrote in "Ri yu" 日喻 (The Sun as Analogy [for Learning]): "今者以經術取士，士求道而不務學" (*Su Shi wenji*, 64.1981). Su thought learning can lead one to *dao*, but *dao* itself cannot be sought as a goal ("道可致而不可求", in ibid.).
[13] Xi was a man active in the latter half of the fourth century. See his biography in Fang Xuanling, *Jin shu*, 82.2152-58, where it was actually the monk Dao'an 釋道安 who made such a boast.

信謂天可彌	Casually said Heaven could be patched up.
大道久分裂	The great *dao* has long been divided;
破碎日愈離	Broken into pieces, it drifts away more and more daily.
我如終不言	Were I in the end not to speak,
誰悟角與羈	Who will make the young understand?
吾琴豈得已	My zither – how can it be put to rest?
昭氏有成虧	To Mr. Zhao, there exist completeness and incompleteness.[14]

Shen Buhai[15] and Han Fei, two statist political theorists whose statecrafts Sima Qian thought originated from Laozi's idea of *daode*, disrespected tradition in a break from Confucius – apparently innuendos for Wang Anshi. The autocratic Wang Mang was probably alluding to Shenzong, who commissioned Wang Anshi to create a new curriculum with three Confucian classics, to have students learn to acquire the statist morality Wang designed.[16] After some three decades since the official launch of the reform, it was no easy job to restore the *dao* that had been broken into pieces to its original completeness and get it back in line with Confucius' teaching. It needed someone who is broadly learned to make a serious effort at it. This left Su Shi no choice but to take it on himself, so that the new generations would have a chance to understand the situation.

The last two lines revealed Su's deep commitment in this project. In "On Equalizing Things" 齊物論, Zhuangzi ranked three levels of knowing: the utmost being before anything exists; next being before things get separated from each other; further next being before the separated things get differentiated into right and wrong. As for the rationale for this ranking, Zhuangzi explained:

> The manifesting of right and wrong is that by which the *dao* becomes incomplete. That by which the *dao* becomes incomplete is that by which love[17] gets complete. Do there indeed exist completeness and incompleteness? Do there indeed not exist completeness and incompleteness?

[14] Su Shi, *Ying Song* Dongpo Xiansheng he Tao Yuanming shi, 3.14a-14b.
[15] The minister hired by the ambitious Duke Zhao of Han 韓昭侯 (?-333 BCE) to carry out a systematic reform to strengthen the state. On him, see Creel, *Shen Pu-hai*.
[16] There was even a shared classic – the *Zhouli*. On Wang Mang's use of it for programmatic policy-making, see Puett, "Centering the Realm."
[17] By which Zhuangzi seems to mean preference.

> There existing completeness and incompleteness, thus Mr. Zhao plays the zither; there not existing completeness and incompleteness, thus Mr. Zhao does not play the zither.
> 是非之彰也，道之所以虧也。道之所以虧，愛之所以成。果且有成與虧乎？果且無成與虧乎？有成與虧，故昭氏之鼓琴也；無成與虧，故昭氏之不鼓琴也。[18]

Zhao Wen 昭文 (Manifesting Culture) is good at playing zither. Although he plays beautifully, he cannot command all the notes. Therefore, so long as he plays, the incompleteness of his skill becomes manifest. If he puts it aside and does not play it, however, the five notes are complete on their own. To Zhuangzi, humans' making explicit value judgments on things in the world impairs the original intactness of the *dao*: things being equal in the eyes of this self-claimed moral relativist,[19] one's preference for this thing over that makes the *dao* lose its completeness. Following this line of reasoning, the only logical conclusion is non-action – not to intervene in the otherwise perfectly operating world. The translation of this in the zither case is that Mr. Zhao should not play the zither. Therefore, in declaring that he would not stop playing his zither, Su was directly contradicting Zhuangzi,[20] one of the thinkers whose talks of *daode* originated from Laozi, asserting that there are objective criteria against which to judge what is right and what wrong and that they need to be made manifest.

When preparing for working on this project, Su borrowed over a thousand volumes of books[21] from Zheng Jiahui 鄭嘉會 (?-?), a scholar-official then stationed in Guangdong. In a poem written out of gratitude to Zheng in the late 1090s,[22] Su disclosed his target:

猶當距楊墨	Still I should resist Yang Zhu and Mo Di,
稍欲懲荊舒	And slightly I want to punish Jing-Shu.[23]

[18] Guo Xiang et al., Zhuangzi *zhushu*, 2.40-41. For alternative translations (and interpretations), see Hinton trans., *Chuang Tzu*, 25; Watson trans., *The Complete Works of Zhuangzi*, 11-12; Ziporyn trans., *Zhuangzi*, 14-15; and Graham trans., *Chuang-Tzu*, 54-55.
[19] Philip J. Ivanhoe notes a deep self-contradiction in Zhuangzi: in insisting on the relativism of everything, Zhuangzi actually reveals his deeply held belief that is not relativist ("Was Zhuangzi a Relativist?").
[20] Many scholars take Su as a devoted student of Zhuangzi. For a recent example, see Yang, *Dialectics of Spontaneity*.
[21] Kong Fanli, *Su Shi nianpu*,1281; Su Shi, "Yu Zheng Jinglao," 1 of 4, in *Su Shi wenji*, 56.1674.
[22] Su Shi, "He Tao zeng Yang Zhangshi," in *Ying Song* Dongpo Xiansheng he Tao Yuanming shi, 4.15b-16a. For different views on the dating of this poem, see Lin Guanqun, *Xinbian Dongpo* Haiwai ji, 135.
[23] Other than the title of Duke of Jing mentioned above, Wang Anshi was posthumously conferred upon the title of King of Shu 舒王 during Zhezong's reign. For a textual variant of the last two lines, see Yang Tianbao, *Jinling Wangxue yanjiu*, 55: "未暇…，且復…."

He wanted to, like Mencius did in the Warrring States period,[24] defend Confucius' teaching against mistaken approaches, by which he meant Wang Anshi's learning that guided the reform regime.[25]

Before leaving Danzhou freed from exile in 1100/5, Su Shi had finished the project.[26] On the last day of the next month, heading back north, he met with a big flood in today's Guangxi Province, feeling his life endangered. In the middle of the moonless night, he got up in the boat anchored in the sea, deeply sighing: "Why is it that I keep riding such dangers? … What I wrote on the *Change*,[27] the *Documents* and the *Analects* are all carried with me and there is no other copy in the world" 吾何數乘此險也！… 所撰《易》、《書》、《論語》皆以自隨，世未有別本.[28] Given that in 1081, Su had sent a neat copy of *Explicating the* Analects to Wen Yanbo 文彥博 (1006-97), in part out of a wish for its preservation,[29] this suggests he had updated his earlier work to an extent that made the 1080s edition outdated. In any case, the critical edge toward Mencius that we shall read in the next section was not found in his pre-1097[30] writings.

While popularly known for his literary pieces,[31] Su kept stressing these three commentaries were the consummation of his lifetime's learning, what he hoped to be remembered by.[32] In recent years, studies of them have been growing,[33] but *Explicating the* Analects is yet to be discussed in English.[34]

---

[24] *Mencius*, 3B.9: "楊墨之道不息，孔子之道不著。"

[25] For an account of this from the perspective of Su Guo, the son accompanying Su Shi in exile, see the trilogy of poems Guo wrote on his father's birthday that year (Shu Dagang et al., Xiechuan ji *jiaozhu*, 84-88). On the dating of this trilogy, see Kong Fanli, *Su Shi nianpu*, 1281-82.

[26] Su Shi, "Ti suo zuo Shu Yi *zhuan* Lunyu *shuo*," in *Su Shi wenji*, 66.2073.

[27] Shu Dagang thinks this was the joint work of the three Sus ("'Fu shi san shu, ji jue cisheng bu xu guo,'" 503-05). As I discuss below, even though his father and brother may have contributed something at the early stage, the edition completed around 1100 reflects Su Shi's view around that time, which even replaced his own in the early 1080s.

[28] Su Shi, "Shu Hepu zhou xing," in *Su Shi wenji*, 71.2277.

[29] Su Shi, "Huangzhou shang Wen Lugong shu," in *Su Shi wenji*, 48.1379-80.

[30] Including in the "Chaozhou Han Wengong miao bei" written in 1092 (*Su Shi wenji*, 70.508). On Su's such views showing his reverence of Mencius, see Jin Shengyang, "Lun Su Shi de Meng xue sixiang," section 1. This reverence probably ran through his whole life until this critical turn.

[31] Egan, *Word, Image, and Deed*, 68.

[32] Shu Dagang, "'Fu shi san shu, ji jue cisheng bu xu guo,'" 501-2.

[33] Peter Bol ("This Culture of Ours," 282-93) has studied Su's commentaries on the *Classic of Change* and the *Book of Documents*. Michael Fuller ("Aesthetics and Meaning in Experience," 323-25) and Curie K. Virág ("'That Which Encompasses the Myriad Cares,'" chapter 7) have discussed passages in the former. Substantial studies of them in Chinese mainly include: Jin Shengyang, *Su shi* Yizhuan *yanjiu*; Leng Chengjin, *Su Shi de zhexue guan yu wenyi guan*, chapter 1; Xu Jianfang, *Su Shi yu* Zhouyi; Deng Tanzhou, "Lun Su Shi *Shuzhuan* de zhengzhi sixiang"; Li Yun-long, "Su Shi *Dongpo Shuzhuan* yanjiu"; and Tsai Ken-hsiang, *Songdai* Shangshu *xue'an*, 179-212.

[34] For Chinese language studies of it, see below.

Among the three commentaries, this is the one that did not survive intact.[35] But it had been influential. In 1172, when prefacing his *Arguments in Reverence of Mencius, Cont'd* (*Zun Meng xubian* 尊孟續辨), Yu Yunwen 余允文 (fl. 1160s) wrote:

> In recent times, [people] like He Shenzhi (He She 何涉, alive ca. 1041) deleted *Mencius*, Chao Yuezhi (1059-1129) slandered Mencius, and the ranks of Liu Chang 劉敞 (1019-1068), Liu Daoyuan (Liu Shu 劉恕, 1032-1078) and Zhang Yu (fl. ca. 1040s) all spoke of Mencius negatively. However, none of these gained the trust of later scholars. Therefore, it is certainly not worth arguing with them. [But] for instance, Wang Chong (27-ca. 97) of Later Han wrote *On Balance*, where there was a "Chapter on Ridiculing Mencius"; of late, Mr. Su Shi wrote *Explicating the* Analects, arguing with Mencius at [eight] places. Among scholars, those who read and study their books to get ahead are numerous. Can there be no arguments?
>
> 近世如何深之刪孟，晁說之詆孟，劉原父、道原、張俞輩，皆非議孟子。然皆不取信後學，茲固不足辨。如後漢王充著《論衡》，而有刺孟篇；近世蘇公軾作《論語說》，而與孟子辨者[八]。[36]學者誦習其書以[謀][37]進取者總總也，可無辨乎。[38]

Su Shi's *Explicating the* Analects, where he engaged with Mencius in eight entries, was not only widely and attentively read, but also deemed persuasive. Being versed in it was even considered an advantage in career advancement.

While bibliographical scholars have been retrieving entries in this lost book,[39] what is relevant to this study are those eight entries, which Wang Shuizhao and Zhu Gang think were the most valuable part in *Explicating the* Analects.[40] The text for them survived in two editions.[41]

---

[35] For discussions of its textual history, see Shu Dagang, "Lunyu *shuo* xulu"; Wang Shuizhao and Zhu Gang, *Su Shi pingzhuan*, 169–71.

[36] As the editor of Yu's book noted, this most likely misses a "八", the number of engagements Su Shi himself counted (see below).

[37] The text reads 媒, probably a misprint.

[38] Yu Yunwen, "Zun Meng xu bian yuan xu," in *Zun Meng bian (Fu xubian bielu)*, 37. For Song literati's debates on Mencius, see Chun-chieh Huang, "Chinese Hermeneutics as Politics."

[39] After Shu Dagang put most of them together in 2001, more were published (for instance, Gu Jian, "Su Shi Lunyu *shuo* jiyi buzheng"; and Xu Jiaxing, "Su Shi Lunyu *shuo* shiyi"). However, not all of them can be trusted as coming from the original book without careful examination. For instance, for the *Analects* 1.6, Qing Sanxiang takes Su Shi's 1060 "Han Yu lun" as a comment on this entry ("Su Shi Lunyu *shuo* gouchen," 112). While Su could have taken what he wrote some forty years ago as a basis, there is no way to know if those words got incorporated in the commentary verbatim, nor if Su's view on the *Analects* entry remained the same.

[40] Wang Shuizhao and Zhu Gang, *Su Shi pingzhuan*, 171.

[41] Yu Yunwen, *Zun Meng xubian*, 49-55; and Shao Bo, *Shaoshi wenjian houlu*, 86-92.

Comparing them shows there is a reliable textual basis for discussing Su's ideas.[42] In the past decade, there have appeared a number of studies of these eight entries. While some are devoted to defending Mencius,[43] Su's engagements with Mencius have begun to be linked to his opposition to Wang Anshi.[44] Based on what has been reconstructed in chapter 2, I shall for each issue Su Shi took with Mencius identify what he was actually going after in this project designed for opposing Wang Anshi's statecraft.

Among the eight, which I translate in full following the sequence in *Arguments in Reverence of Mencius, Cont'd*, the first and the last are both on human nature, whereas the middle six are all on governance, especially the political values used to guide it. We know Su Shi used to disapprove of talks of human nature, saying "the concern among Confucians lies in that they discuss [human] nature" 儒者之患，患在於論性.[45] Before looking into the content, this structural feature, plus Su's taking up the topic of human nature, which had by then been central in intellectual inquiry for nearly four decades,[46] suggests Su, like Cheng Yi, identified Wang's statecraft as a soulcraft.

II. Eight Engagements with Mencius

[42] I have found six differences between the two: 1) Shao's edition includes one more entry, which appears behind the first one. Commentators generally disregard it as there Su Shi did not seem to be arguing with Mencius. Although why Shao put it there remains a question, Shao himself quoted Su saying "與孟子辨者八" (92). 2) the second entry in Yu's edition was the fourth in Shao's edition. 3) "環" in the sixth entry reads "完" in Shao's edition, which also adds a "而" in front of "以時修其橋梁." 4) in the seventh entry, Yu's edition says "鄭衛之聲" whereas Shao's "鄭衛之害." 5) in the last entry, Yu's edition says "難於善," whereas Shao's "離於善." The sixth difference lies in the statement that functions like a preface, which we shall read by the end of this chapter. Yu's edition includes the full text of what is quoted there, whereas Shao's has only the first sentence. In sum, ruling out differences in fullness of quotation and sequence, the two texts of the eight entries vary at but four characters, which though posing slightly different readings do not affect the argument.

[43] Chen Yingrui, "Fa Kongshi zhi mi"; and An Wenyan, "Su Shi bian Meng kao."

[44] Jin Shengyang, "Lun Su Shi de Meng xue sixiang"; Hu Jinwang, "Lun Su Shi de 'bian Meng' sixiang."

[45] Su Shi, "Han Yu lun," in *Su Shi wenji*, 4.114. So did Sima Guang and Su Zhe. For their criticisms of talks of nature and destiny, see Jin Shengyang, "Bei Song fei xingmingxue de xingqi yu zhuanbian," 64–65; and Ye Ping, "Su Shi, Su Zhe de 'xing ming zhi xue.'"

[46] Chen Zhi'e thinks that under Wang Anshi's influence, talking about human nature became a shared interest among all major intellectual figures, including Su Shi (*Bei Song wenhua shi shulun*, 234-35). Chen is right to point out that Wang was the one who made this topic central in Song intellectual culture, but Su was not turning to be interested in human nature under Wang's influence. Rather, he took this topic up to seriously engage with him, *despite* his consistent lack of interest in exploring it.

1. The master said: "Hui – his heart did not go against *ren* (humanity) for three months. As for the rest, but days or a month and no more." Confucius said: "To people, I censure some and praise some. For those I have something to praise, I would necessarily examine them."
子曰："回也，其心三月不違仁，其餘則日月至焉而已矣。"[47] 孔[48]子曰："吾之於人也，誰毀誰譽，如有所譽者，其有所試。"[49]

That Confucius had examined Yan Hui and observed him for long is no doubt. Probably he had quietly scrutinized him, for as long as three months, and none of his [behaviors] in hardship or hurriedness did not come out of *ren*. Therefore, Confucius knew he would not turn against it all his life. For a superior man to observe a person, he must necessarily observe him on where he does not ponder. Where he ponders there can be faking and even if [one observes him] for a lifetime one would not get his authentic [nature]. Therefore, during as long as three months, there must be where his preparation and pondering will not reach. What is faked is not different from what is authentic [on the surface], and [yet] the superior man slights it. Why? [Because] when faced with big gains and losses, it will fail. Mencius said: "Yao and Shun had it by nature; Tang and Wu took it on in person; and the five warlords borrowed it. Borrowing it for long and not returning it, how do you know they did not have it?" What is borrowed and what is in one's nature have different roots, not to say returning it or not. Were Confucius to look at it, he would have figured it out in no more than one day, not needing to wait for three months. How come "not knowing [if they had it]"?
其於顏子，試之也，熟而觀之也，審矣。蓋嘗默而察之，閱三月之久，而其顛沛造次，無不一出於仁者，是以知其終身之弗叛也。君子之觀人也，必於其所不慮焉觀之。其所慮者，容有偽也，雖終身不得其真。故三月之久，則必有備慮之所不及者矣。偽之與真無以異，君子賤之，何也？有大利害臨之，則敗也。孟子曰："堯舜性之也，湯武身之也，五霸假之也。久假不歸，安知其非有也。"[50]假之與性，其本亦異矣，豈論其歸與不歸哉。使孔子視之，不終日而决，不待三月也，何不知之有。

Confucius' explicit talks of human nature are at but two places in the *Analects*, and the above quotes are none of those. By adding 15.25 behind 6.7, which on the face of it seems to be

[47] The *Analects*, 6.7.
[48] Su Shi adds "孔" to the received text. As slight paraphrasing is common in Su's commentaries, I shall not note them unless they affect the meanings significantly.
[49] The *Analects*, 15.25.
[50] *Mencius*, 7A.30.

about the difficulty of attaining full humanity, Su Shi got a theory of how to tell a person's true nature from Confucius. With "examining" having appeared in 15.25, Su thus bent 6.7 toward this direction: because, as Confucius said in 15.25, he would examine the person before making a statement about his quality, so what he said with regard to Yan Hui in 6.7 must be about examining him through long-term observation. He quietly scrutinized him for as long as three months, and found that he consistently acted out of humanity, whether in great predicament or in a hurry – situations that restrict his ability to pretend. It is then he knew *ren* is something Yan Hui would never turn against. With this, Su claimed: what one does that is not out of one's nature, i.e., the artificial, is less valuable, even though the behaviour may look the same, because such cannot last. This is where Su took issue with *Mencius* 7A.30.

In his resolute defense of Mencius against Su Shi, the Southern Song scholar Yu Yuwen argued that Mencius of course knew the five warlords were not by nature humane. The reason he said so was only because Mencius wished to encourage them to do some good after all.[51] To Yu, Su Shi was making a fuss over something not worth arguing about at all. Indeed, this may sound plausible to most, including even Su Shi himself before the late 1090s. But what Su identified here is a deep connection between *Mencius* 7A.30 and the core of Wang Anshi's statecraft, which is using behavioural regulations to change human nature. Underlying this is the assumption that by having people behave in a different pattern over an extended period of time, their natures can be re-shaped. For this, Su found *Mencius* 7A.30 provide the theoretical foundation, which says that so long as one keeps behaving in a certain way for long, even if such behavior did not derive from one's inborn nature, the others would not tell much of a difference, but would be perhaps led to think he has it in himself as part of his nature.

This goes directly to the heart of Wang Anshi's entire design, because Wang was aware that the re-shaped nature is different from the inborn one – while in his efforts at rectifying names, he claims it is not artificial, he never said the reshaped nature is authentic. Now, Su took it up head on, saying that what came out of the authentic – one's inborn nature – would last, whereas that from the reshaped nature could not stand the test of big gains or losses. And Su had an estimation of how long the regime would last: in 1101, shortly before his death, Su planned to entrust his three commentaries to Qian Jiming 錢濟明 (?-?), telling him not to make them public until after

[51] Yu Yunwen, *Zun Meng xubian*, 49.

three decades.[52] It seems Su was not far from the mark: the Song state fell in 1126, with two emperors being captured, along with them the entire imperial entourage.[53] And, in the face of this kind of big loss, the reshaped nature did not sustain: after the Zhao house restored itself in the south, Wang Anshi's statecraft was never adopted as state rightness any more.[54]

> 2. Confucius said: "Were wealth pursuable, even just a whip-holding soldier, I will do it. If not pursuable, I follow what I like."
> 子曰："富而可求也，雖執鞭之士，吾亦為之。如不可求，從吾所好。"[55]
>
> For all things pursuable, one gets it by pursuing it. Without pursuing it, one does not get it. *Ren* and *yi* are never obtained without being pursued. [He] thus knew they are pursuable. Thus [he] said, "Is *ren* far? I desire of *ren* and *ren* comes." With regard to wealth and nobility, some pursue but don't get them, some don't pursue but get them. [He] thus knew they cannot be pursued. Therefore, he said, "Were wealth pursuable, even just a whip-holding soldier, I will do it. If not pursuable, I follow what I like." With regard to profit, the sage had never intended to pursue. How would he ask if it was pursuable or not? However, if he directly tells people not to pursue it, people will still entertain the hope that it can be obtained and only stop pursuing it under the sage's urging. If people stop pursuing it under the sage's urging, what is put on hold will arise at times. It is for this reason that he told them it is not pursuable, saying, were it pursuable, even I would be pursuing it. The thinking being that raising the height of the lane gate and reinforcing the case lock are not as good as opening the gate and unlocking the case, to show them there is nothing there. However, Mencius said, "[That one desires] food and sex is human nature, yet therein also lies destiny. That is why the superior man does not ascribe it to human nature. [That one can attain] *renyi* is destiny, yet therein also lies human nature. That is why the superior man does not ascribe it to destiny." The superior man, when it comes to teaching others, will use the substance. Why is there [something like] "do not ascribe it to"? Taking [the desire for] food and sex as human nature, then they can be obtained by pursuing, whereas the superior man forbids the pursuit of such. Taking *renyi* as destiny, then they cannot be obtained by pursuing, whereas the superior man urges the people to have them.

---

[52] Shu Dagang, "'Fu shi san shu, ji jue cisheng bu xu guo,'" 502.
[53] Ebrey, *Emperor Huizong*, chapter 16.
[54] Although the term *guoshi* continued to be used, as Yu Yingshi demonstrates (*Zhu Xi de lishi shijie*, 267-88), the concept was no longer the same in the Southern Song. Whereas in the Northern Song, it referred to adopting Wang Anshi's statecraft in governance as that which is right for the whole state, after the dynasty was reconstituted in the south, it referred to but one specific policy sphere – peace or war in foreign relations.
[55] The *Analects*, 7.12.

> Forbidding the people to have what they can pursue and urging them to have what cannot be pursued, who under heaven can follow it? Therefore, that *ren* and *yi* are pursuable while wealth and nobility not pursuable are truly so by the way things are. Were one to take what is pursuable as not pursuable and what is not pursuable as pursuable, even a sage cannot [manage].
> 凡物之可求者，求而得，不求則不得也。仁義未有不求而得者，是以知其可求也，故曰："仁遠乎哉？我欲仁，斯仁至矣。"[56]富貴有求而不得者，有不求而得者，是以知其不可求也，故曰："富而可求也，雖執鞭之士，吾亦為之。如不可求，從吾所好。"聖人之於利，未嘗有意於求也，豈問其可不可哉？然將直告之以不求，則人猶有可得之心，特迫於聖人而止耳。夫迫於聖人而止，則其止也，將有時而作矣，故告之以不可求者，曰：使其可求，雖吾亦將求之。以為高其閈閎，固其扃鐍，不如開門發篋，而示之無有也。而孟子曰"食、色性也，有命焉，君子不謂性也；仁、義命也，有性焉，君子不謂命也。"[57]君子之教人，將以其實，何謂"不謂"之有。夫以食色為性，則是可以求得也，而君子禁之；以仁義為命，則是不可以求得也，而君子强之。禁其可求者，强其不可求者，天下其孰能從之？故仁義之可求，富貴之不可求，理之誠然者也。如以可為不可，以不可為可，雖聖人不能。[58]

In this entry, Su Shi was engaging with Wang Anshi on the proper goal of learning, for which he found *Mencius* 7B.24 provide support for Wang. In chapter 2, we have seen that in the dual-track value system Wang designed, official ranks and high salaries were the secretively operative mechanism to draw people in. Even though the openly advocated were the statist values, the profit part was what actually got people motivated in the first place. To facilitate this, in his writings, Wang had been encouraging literati to pursue social-political success. For instance, in "Yang [Xiong] and Mencius" 揚孟, Wang admonishes all literati to make an effort to do better than what they are destined for on birth:

> If by talent one can be lowly, one is lowly, or by the crime [one committed] one can die, one dies, then how would Mencius call this this person's destiny without censuring him? He would necessarily hate his losing his proper destiny. Mencius said: "the way the mouth is disposed towards tastes, the eyes towards colours, the ears towards sounds, the nose towards smells, and the four

[56] The *Analects*, 7.30.
[57] *Mencius*, 7B.24 as paraphrased by Su Shi.
[58] In another output of his commentary project, Su wrote: "士之所求者爵禄，而爵禄我有也。挾是心以輕士，此最人主之大患。故告之曰：臣之所以為民上者，非為爵禄也，為德也" (*Dongpo* Shu *zhuan*, 7.227).

> limbs towards ease is human nature, yet therein also lies destiny. That is why the superior man does not ascribe it to human nature. The way *ren* (humanity) pertains to the relation between father and son, *yi* (duty) pertains to the relation between the monarch and his officials, *li* (the rites) to the relation between guest and host, *zhi* (wisdom) to the worthy, and the sage to the way of Heaven, is destiny, yet therein also lies human nature. That is why the superior man does not ascribe it to destiny."[59]
>
> 才可以賤而賤，罪可以死而死，則孟子豈以謂人之命而不以罪其人哉？亦必惡其失命之正也。孟子曰："口之於味也，目之於色也，耳之於聲也，鼻之於臭也，四支之於安逸也，性也，有命焉，君子不謂性也。仁之於父子也，義之於君臣也，禮之於賓主也，知之於賢者也，聖人之於天道也，命也，有性焉，君子不謂命也。"[60]

Those who accept their fate as is are not getting their "proper destiny" and as such would be censured by Mencius. The point Wang was making by drawing on *Mencius* 7B.24 is that a literatus should not accept his lot, nor follow his natural inclination based on what his senses delight in, but must make efforts to change it,[61] thereby to climb up on the social ladder. This is using Mencius to urge literati to break free from what they are destined to be and achieve beyond the limits of their inborn qualities,[62] so as to maximize what everyone can contribute to the state, the key to swiftly increasing state power – what Wang Anshi's biographer meant by saying his learning had "penetrated what could not be predicted from [the natural workings of] day and night or yin and yang, and entered [the domain of] the magical." Now, in taking issue with Mencius on this, Su Shi was trying to reset the legitimate goal of learning back to *renyi*, contending, like Han Yu, that these humanist virtues were part of human nature, hence cannot be detached from being human.

> 3. Zigong asked about governance. The Master said: "Sufficient food, sufficient armaments, and the people's trust. That is all." Zigong said: "Were there no choice but to get rid of [one], which of the three first?" [The Master] said: "Get rid of armaments." Zigong said: "Were there no choice but

[59] Translation modified from Lau's (*Mencius*, 162).
[60] Wang Anshi, "Yang Meng," in *LCJ*, 64.680.
[61] On this being Mencius' point, see Fu Sinian, *Xing ming gu xun bianzheng*, 631-33.
[62] Scholars agree that to Wang, what matters is not the inborn, but the efforts made from outside. See, for example, Luo Chuanqi and Wu Yunsheng, *Wang Anshi jiaoyu sixiang yanjiu*, 59–61; Xiao Yongming, "Yi Wang Anshi wei daibiao de Xinxue Xuepai," 169; Chen Zhi'e, *Bei Song wenhua shi shulun*, 277–80.

to get rid of [one], which of the two first?" [The Master] said: "Get rid of food. Since of old everyone has to die, [but] without the people's trust [the state] cannot stand."
子貢問政，子曰："足食、足兵，民信之矣。"子貢曰："必不得已而去，於斯三者何先？"曰："去兵。"子貢曰："必不得已而去，於斯二者何先？"曰："去食。自古皆有死，民無信不立。[63]"[64]

Mencius compared the lightness and weightiness of *li* and food. If *li* is weighty and food light, he then gets rid of food. If food is weighty and *li* light, he then gets rid of *li*. The same with sex. However, Confucius got rid of food and kept trust, saying "Since of old everyone has to die, [but] without the people's trust [the state] cannot stand." He did not further compare their lightness and weightiness. Why? [I] say: *Li* and trust, in comparison with food and sex, are like the five grains' not killing people. Now someone asks: "I, for fear of the five grains' killing people, want to forbid them. How about that?" The answer must be: "I would rather eat the five grains and die than forbidding them." This is in line with Confucius' theory of getting rid of food and keeping trust. Now one responds by saying: "Pick out those killing ones to forbid and those non-killing ones not to forbid." Among the five grains, how come there were killing ones? This is in line with Mencius' theory of comparing the lightness and weightiness of *li* and food. *Li* is what makes one get a wife. Those who abandon *li* and lose their wives are all over the place, [but] there has never been one who does not get a wife because he follows *li*. Trustworthiness is what makes one get food. Those who abandon trust and lose food are all over the place, [but] there has never been one who does not get food because he is trustworthy. Now in legislation they do not follow what is commonplace under Heaven, but rather follow what has never happened, to open the gate for removing or keeping [*li*]. When the people are made to think *li* is removable at certain times, then they will each weigh it according to their own idea. How can there be any constant standard for [evaluating] its lightness and weightiness then? Following Mencius' theory, it won't be long before *li* gets abandoned. Somebody says: "Shun got married without telling his parents. Then if he followed *li*, he would not have gotten a wife." [I] say: "This is what Mencius transmitted. In ancient times, there were no such sayings. On the whole, what [Mencius said about] Shun's painting the grain storage, repairing the well, and getting married without telling his parents were all vulgar persons' talks in the states

[63] Scholarly views differ on the subject of "不立". Some take it to be the state (Legge trans., *The Four Books*, 162; Yang Bojun, Lunyu *yizhu*, 124; Chin trans., *Confucius* The Analects *(*Lunyu*)*, 183; Slingerland, *Confucius* Analects, 128), some the common people (Lau trans., *Confucius:* The Analects, 113; Ni, *Understanding the* Analects *of Confucius*, 286). For the earlier imperial majority view on its being the state, see Cheng Shude, Lunyu *jishi*, 838-40.
[64] The *Analects*, 12.7.

of Qi and Lu. Upon checking in the *Book of Documents*: Shun's serving his parents was perhaps to 'advance them to become good' and not to become wicked. There were no such sayings there. Even if, unfortunately, such existed, then they were nonetheless not what is expected by the way things work among humans. Since Shun, those like the old deaf man perhaps also existed, but there has never been any who, as a father, does not want his son to get married. Therefore [I] say: 'There has never been one who does not get a wife because he follows *li*.'" Somebody says: "It is *li* for a sister-in-law and a younger brother not to touch hands when giving things. [But] seeing the sister-in-law drowning yet not pulling her by hand, saying according to *li* they should not touch hands – can one do this? This is [what made] *li* removable at certain times." [I] say: "That sister-in-law and younger brother do not touch hands is *li*. On the sister-in-law's drowning, pulling her by hand is also *li*. Why is there [a choice to be made between] removing or adopting [*li*]?"

孟子較禮食之輕重，禮重而食輕，則去食；食重而禮輕，則去禮。惟色亦然。[65]而孔子去食存信，曰"自古皆有死，民無信不立"，不復較其輕重，何也？曰：禮、信之於食、色，如五穀之不殺人。今有問者曰："吾恐五穀殺人，欲禁之，如何？必答曰："吾寧食五穀而死，不禁也。"此孔子去食存信之論也。今答曰："擇其殺人者禁之，其不殺人者勿禁也。"五穀安有殺人者哉？此孟子禮食輕重之論也。禮，所以使人得妻也。廢禮而失妻者皆是，緣禮而不得妻者，天下未嘗有也。信，所以使人得食也。棄信而失食者皆是，緣信而不得食者，天下未嘗有也。今立法不從天下之所同，而從其所未嘗有，以開去取之門，使人以為禮有時而可去[66]也，則將各以其私意權之，其輕重豈復有定物？從孟子之說，則禮廢無日矣。或曰：舜不告而娶，則以禮，則不得妻也。曰：此孟子之所傳，古無是說也。凡舜之塗廩浚井、不告而娶，皆齊魯間野人之語，考之於《書》，舜之事父母，蓋"烝烝乂"，不至於姦。無是說也。使不幸而有之，則亦非人理之所期矣。自舜以來，如瞽瞍者，蓋亦有之；為人父而不欲其子娶妻者，未之有也。故曰：緣禮而不得妻者，天下無有也。或曰：嫂叔不親授，禮也。嫂溺而不援，曰禮不親授，可乎？是禮有時而去取也。曰：嫂叔不親授，禮也。嫂溺，援之以手，亦禮也，何去取之有？

In this long entry, Su Shi was mainly engaging with Mencius on two issues: first, Mencius unwittingly made Confucius' *li* 禮 removable, thereby opening the path for Wang Anshi's eventually removing it together with the other humanist virtues from being human; second, by

[65] Referring to *Mencius*, 6B.1, discussed below.
[66] *Zun Meng xubian* (51) reads 去 as 去取.

coupling it with *quan* 權, Mencius not only turned Confucius' concept of *li* into one that is more dogmatic, but also licensed people to freely depart from established norms, providing a ready justification for Wang Anshi's free application of *quan* in governance. Let us look at them one by one.

1) Mencius made *li* removable

In the beginning part of his commentary, Su Shi was referring to *Mencius* 6B.1:

> A man from Ren asked Wulu Zi: "Which is weightier, *li* or food?" [Wulu Zi] said: "*Li* is weightier." "Which is weightier, *li* or sex?" [Wulu Zi] said: "*Li* is weightier."
> [The man] said: "Eating according to *li*, you would starve to death; eating not according to *li*, you would get something to eat. Would you necessarily eat according to *li*? Welcoming the bride in person, you would not get a wife; not welcoming the bride in person, you would get a wife. Would you necessarily welcome the bride in person?" Wulu Zi was unable to answer. The following day he went to Zou and told this to Mencius.
> Mencius said: "In answering this, what difficulty is there? If you bring the tips to the same level without measuring the difference in the bases, you can make a piece of wood an inch long heigher than a tall building. In saying that gold is heavier than feathers, how can one be referring to the amount of gold in a clasp and a whole cartload of feathers? If you compare a case where food is weighty with one where *li* is light, how can the weightiness of food be the only [absurd conclusion you can draw]? If you compare a case where sex is weighty with one where *li* is light, how can the weightiness of sex be the only [absurb conclusion you can draw]? Go and reply to the questioner as follows: 'Twisting your elder brother's arm and taking the food from him, then you get something to eat; not twisting it, then you don't get anything to eat. Will you then twist it? Climbing over the wall of your neighbour on the east side and dragging their virgin daughter into your arms, then you get a wife; not dragging her, then you don't get a wife. Will you then drag her?'"[67]
> 任人有問屋廬子曰："禮與食孰重？"曰："禮重。"
> "色與禮孰重？"曰："禮重。"
> 曰："以禮食，則飢而死；不以禮食，則得食，必以禮乎？親迎，則不得妻；不親迎，則得妻，必親迎乎？"屋廬子不能對，明日之鄒以告孟子。
> 孟子曰："於答是也，何有？不揣其本而齊其末，方寸之木可使高於岑樓。金重於羽者，豈謂一鉤金與一輿羽之謂哉？取食之重者，與禮之輕者而比之，奚翅食重？取色之重者，

[67] Translation modified from Lau's (*Mencius*, 134).

與禮之輕者而比之，奚翅色重？往應之曰：‘紾兄之臂而奪之食，則得食；不紾，則不得食，則將紾之乎？踰東家牆而摟其處子，則得妻；不摟，則不得妻，則將摟之乎？’”

The one from Ren, apparently not buying Mencius' preaching on the importance of *li*, challenged Mencius' student with a tricky situation, where if one adheres to *li*, one will starve to death, whereas if one abandons it, one will get the food to survive. The same with sex.

In the face of such a grave consequence for adhering to *li*, Mencius' student found it hard to maintain his original position. He had no choice but to seek his teacher out and see how he would respond. Mencius thought this a piece of cake and saw the trick of the questioner lied in that he compared food at the weightiest (when a mouthful could save a life) with *li* at its lightest (when abandoning it costs little), making it obvious that the former is the more important. Tit for tat, Mencius responded with a reverse situation, where *li* is obviously a weighty matter (twisting older brother's arm) whereas food is light (just some food in a daily scenario, not the food the getting of which makes a difference between life and death).

To Su Shi, Mencius may have won the argument but had lost his ground. The real issue, as Su pointed out by comparing *li* and trust to the five grains, is that the questioner, in asking the question the way he did, assumes *li* to be on the same footing with food, whereas in *Analects* 12.7, Confucius treats trust – which Su took to be at the same level as *li* – as the foundational value on which the state stands that cannot be weighed against values like food or sex in any case. Indeed, in Su's explication, they were regarded by Confucius as the very foundation on which the basic human needs for food and sex could possibly be met. To Su, Mencius' mistake is that, by following the questioner's logic in his attempt to defend Confucius' teaching that *li* is more important than food and sex, Mencius fell into the trap the questioner set up by unwittingly accepting his assumption that as a value, *li* is removable, just like food or sex. By doing so, Mencius opened the path for Wang Anshi's eventual removal of the five constant virtues from being human. The right response, Su pointed out, is to reject the questioner's assumption upfront. This is because, just like the five grains do not harm humans, these humanist values can never be bad. As he wrote in the poem discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the point Su was trying to make here is that these virtues are inherently good and cannot be overturned no matter what. This is against Wang Anshi's contention, building on Laozi's dialectics and Zhuangzi's relativism, that the goodness of all

values is relative, depending on how they are defined by humans through their linguistic manoeveur.

2) Mencius changed Confucius' concept of *li*

Su Shi thinks Mencius, by coupling *li* with *quan* 權, fundamentally changed Confucius' concept of *li*. This change he notes took place in *Mencius* 4A.18:

> Chunyu Kun said: "Is it *li* that, in giving and receiving, a man and a woman should not touch hands?"
> Mencius said: "It is."
> [Chunyu Kun] said: "When one's sister-in-law is drowning, does one then pull her by hand?"
> [Mencius] said: "Not helping a sister-in-law who is drowning is to be a brute. It is *li* that, in giving and receiving, a man and a woman should not touch hands, but pulling the drowning sister-in-law by hand is discretion."[68]
> 淳於髡曰："男女授受不親，禮與？"
> 孟子曰："禮也。"
> 曰："嫂溺則援之以手乎？"
> 曰："嫂溺不援，是豺狼也。男女授受不親，禮也；嫂溺援之以手者，權也。"

As is frequently the case across the *Mencius*,[69] in this passage, Mencius had *li* mean a rule: a man and a woman should not touch hands. Therefore, when challenged by an imagined scenario where adhering to it could cost a human life, Mencius had to introduce another concept – "discretion":[70] It is *a rule* that a man and a woman do not touch hands in giving and receiving things; it is [up to one's own] discretion that the younger brother, on seeing his sister-in-law drowning, saves her with his hands out of expediency.

Despite his self-conscious devotion to defending Confucius' *li*, that Mencius felt it necessary to add discretion to make it work implies he did not think Confucius' *li* allows individuals to decide what is the right thing to do on their own. And yet as Karyn Lai convincingly

[68] Translation modified from Lau's (*Mencius*, 84).
[69] See, for instance, *Mencius* 3B.3, 4B.27, 5B.6 and 5B.7. See also 2B.2 and 4B.3, where the speakers were not Mencius.
[70] For the importance of this concept to Wang Anshi, see Yang Qianmiao, *Wang Anshi "Yi" xue yanjiu*, 190–99; Jin Shengyang, "Wang Anshi *Yijie* yu Mengzi de guanxu chuyi," 86; and Geng Liangzhi, "Wang Anshi Yixue yuqi Xinxue ji Luoxue," 42.

argues, the *li* in the *Analects* is open-ended and exploratory, offering such flexibility in itself.[71] Probably pressured by the need to propagate Confucius' teaching more than a hundred years after he passed away,[72] Mencius inadvertently turned Confucius' *li* toward more like a dogma. While in his use, this *li* was not yet as sophisticated as Wang's that took on both a regulative and a transformative role, in making Confucius' *li* more dogmatic, it points toward the direction of stipulated regulations.[73]

Moveover, Su Shi further pointed out: by licencing people to disregard *li* and make expediencies on their own, not only did it make people think that Confucius' *li* does not have to be always followed, but there would be no constancy in governance any more.[74] Mencius may not have intended it, but it was the change he introduced to Confucius' concept of *li* that opened the path for Wang Anshi's justifying the ruler's doing whatever that is necessary in the name of *quan*, like in the following case recorded in his diary.

In a 1069/9 meeting, Shenzong asked Wang how to respond to Cheng Hao's objection to their selling ordination certificates [for Buddhist monks][75] in the Bureau of Sacrifices to increase the capital for running the Ever Normal Granary program. Wang replied:

> What Hao said is what is thought of as the regular in the king's way. Your servant thinks what Hao said did not reach the discretionary in the king's way. "It is *li* that, in giving and receiving, a man and a woman should not touch hands, but pulling the drowning sister-in-law by hand is discretion. Not helping a sister-in-law who is drowning is to be a brute."[76] Now [by selling those ordination certificates], the Bureau of Sacrifices can obtain 450,000 *dan*[77] of millet. Supposing each person loans three *dan* in a famine year, this can save the lives of 150,000 persons. Now, to plan for famine years, one should do it in years of harvest, and yet there is no money to spare in the state's treasury. This is why [the ordination certificates in] the Bureau of Sacrifices are being sold. The 3,000 heads

[71] Lai, "*Li* in the *Analects*."
[72] Ivanhoe, "Heaven as a Source for Ethical Warrant in Early Confucianism," 216.
[73] This can be seen from Lau's translating Mencius' *li* as "prescribed by the rites" (*Mencius*, 84).
[74] Ivanhoe thinks that by doing this, Mencius grants the individual too much "autonomy" than Confucius ever allowed ("Thinking and Learning in Early Confucianism," 486). It seems to me what Mencius grants is the *liberty* for the individual to be freed from tradition, while at the same time removing the autonomy inherent in Confucius' concept of *li*.
[75] I thank Wilt Idema for help on this.
[76] Wang's paraphrase of *Mencius* 4A.18.
[77] One *dan* is about 5 bushels.

> shaven can save the lives of 150,000 persons. If one doesn't approve of this, one does not know discretion.
>
> 顥所言，以為王道之正。臣以為顥所言，未達王道之權。"男女授受不親，禮也。嫂溺，援之以手，權也。嫂溺不援，是豺狼也。"今祠部所可致粟凡四十五萬。若凶年，人貸三石，可全十五萬性命。今欲為凶年計，當以豐歲為之，而國用有所不暇，故賣祠部。所剃三千人頭，而所可救活者十五萬人性命，若以為不可，是不知權也。[78]

Seeing Mencius' concept of *quan* as essentially constituting a license to disregard constant norms when human lives were at stake, Wang made an application of it to defend the unconventional practice of selling ordination certificates to fund the Ever Normal Granary, part of the economic policies to raise start-up funds for his educational program: the money the government shall make through this sale can buy millets that can be loaned to sustain 150,000 persons in a famine year. Even though the current year is one of bumper harvest, it is fully justified to sell ordination certificates in the Bureau of Sacrifices, rather than using funds from the state's treasury, to make preparation for bad years. This is what knowing *quan* means, Wang contends.

Whether the others find this persuasive or not, Shenzong himself knew *quan* as so interpreted by Wang Anshi is not far from deception. During a conversation, he raised his concern with Wang: "Did Shang Yang ever deceive?" 商鞅何嘗變詐？ Wang Anshi assured him: "In governing the state, Yang's fault did not lie in deceiving, but in being unable to form subjects with *li-yi-lian-chi*" 鞅為國不失於變詐，失於不能以禮義廉恥成民而已.[79] Wang acknowledges that the way of governance he taught Shenzong has in it deceiving the people, but there is no need to worry about the people finding this out: by forming them with the statist values Wang designed, they shall become more and more obedient[80] and their critical faculty degenerate over time, hence less likely to object to or even detect inconsistencies in the ruler's previous and current orders.

In an inspired article, Philip J. Ivanhoes notes: "Mencius did not abandon the Confucian tradition or ignore its precedents. However, his view did diminish the stature of both the sages and

---

[78] Yang Shi, *Yang Shi ji*, 111-12. For a relevant discussion, see Hu Jinwang, "Lun Su Shi de 'Bian Meng' sixiang," 32. Yang Shi and the author of *Songshi quanwen* (Wang Shengduo punctuated, 653) gave two accounts of this same discussion, suggesting that this conversation between Shenzong and Wang Anshi as recorded in Wang's diary that was in circulation in Yang's time perhaps indeed took place. Except for some minor variations in wording, the main difference was only that the latter did not make explicit the quote from *Mencius* 4A.18.

[79] Wang Anshi, *Xining zoudui rilu*, 135. Undated.

[80] See, for example, ibid., 28, 39.

the rites. If everyone is capable of deciphering the eternal patterns, it is easy to see how one might begin to question the importance of the sages and the rites themselves."[81] This is the deep connection Su Shi identified between Mencius and Wang Anshi here. The solution, Su Shi pointed out at the end of this long entry, is not to take *li* as a fixed rule, but what one evaluates as the right thing to do on each specific occasion, that is, Confucius' *li*.[82]

How can *li* and trust be more important than food and sex – the basic needs for continued human existence – in managing the state? John Dunn's work on Locke's concept of trust can help illuminate this point on which Su Shi did not elaborate. As Dunn puts it, to Locke, "The duty to be trustworthy simply *is* more fundamental than the moral conventions or positive laws of any society, because none of the latter is necessarily morally valid and because, without the former, human society would not be possible at all." Dunn follows by stressing: "without its display human society simply cannot exist."[83] In other words, trust is the bond that holds individuals together and "what makes human society possible."[84] In line with Locke, John Rawls also ranks values hierarchically in his engagement with utilitarianism, a tradition whose line Wang Anshi's statecraft fell in, though his is perhaps more accurately called state consequentialist.[85] To Rawls, for a society to be well-ordered, certain values should be taken as "settled" and "uncompromising," "not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests," that is, "even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override." Rawls' primary concern is with freedom and equality, but he also talked about trust: "Distrust and resentment corrode the ties of civility, and suspicion and hostility tempt men to act in ways they could otherwise avoid."[86] We can supplement these with a brief note on *li*: in that trust bonds individuals whereas *li* reinforces this bond with appropriate

[81] Ivanhoe, "Thinking and Learning in Early Confucianism," 479. Different from Karyn Lai, however, Ivanhoe understood Confucius' *li* as "rules."
[82] This may sound similar to Mencius' "*quan*," as at first sight it too seems to have left the decision on what is the right thing to do on each occasion to the whimsical will of each individual. The difference lies in Su's concept of *wuli* 物理, discussed in length by Michael Fuller in *The Road to East Slope*, chapter 3 (see also id., *Drifting among Rivers and Lakes*, 46-47). Different from Wang Anshi's relativist view of *wuli*, which takes right or wrong as just a matter of linguistic maneuver, Su's concept refers to the inherent pattern of things out there that exists independent of human will. As such, it can be learned and one's judgment of what is right on a specific occasion can be agreed upon by other reasonable humans. Keeping practicing making moral decisions according to the way things are, one can develop the ability to respond to things in a way that is both "true to himself and to the thing he is responding to and brings into being things that have real value for that moment" (Bol, *"This Culture of Ours,"* 284).
[83] Dunn, "The Concept of 'Trust' in the Politics of John Locke," 286–87.
[84] Ibid., 287.
[85] Because it does not pursue the maximization of pleasure. This is the term scholars like Ivanhoe use. I have been calling it "statist."
[86] Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 3-4, 6.

treatment of each other (Confucius' and Su Shi's *li*) to avoid resentment and hostility, these two values complement each other and work together to keep society cohesive and agreeable to live in.

The reason why these two values[87] are essential to Su Shi is because different from Wang Anshi, who sought to use a social reorganization to incorporate all individuals into the political system,[88] Su, like Han Yu in "Tracing the Way" and Ouyang Xiu in "On the Roots," assumes society is the voluntary association of self-governing individuals. The sociable values must be there because they are what makes society in this situation possible. The case is entirely different in the social structure Wang Anshi designed, where the most important value is accepting what the central authority orders the people to do.

> 4. Ji Kangzi asked Confucius about governance, saying: "Were I to kill those lacking the Way to [get the people to] move toward those possessing the Way, how about that?" Confucius responded: "In your governance, why use killing? Should you desire of good, the populace will be good. The virtue (*de*) of the superior men is like wind, and that of the petty men grass. Let the wind blow over the grass and it will necessarily bend."
> 季康子問政於孔子曰："如殺無道以就有道，何如？"孔子對曰："子為政，焉用殺？子欲善，而民善矣。君子之德風，小人之德草，草上之風必偃。"[89]
>
> Even when Yao and Shun were up high, they still could not avoid killing those lacking the Way. Yet the superior men eventually do not take killing people as a rule. Among the populace, there are those who unfortunately tread on [a path] leading to death on their own. I did not kill them. Mencius' saying "were one to kill the populace with the way to make them live, even though they are put to death, they would not resent those who kill them" made later tyrants and corrupt officials all say "I am killing them with the way to make them live." It is therefore Confucius could not bear saying it.
> 雖堯舜在上，不免於殺無道，然君子終不以殺人為訓。民之不幸而自蹈於死則有之，吾未嘗殺。孟子言"以生道殺民，雖死，不怨殺者"，[90] 使後世暴君汙吏皆曰"吾以生道殺之"，故孔子不忍言之。

[87] The value of wisdom (*zhi* 智) is assumed in Su's commentary on the *Book of Documents* (see, for example, *Dongpo* Shu *zhuan*, 10.322-23 and 7.226).
[88] Wang Anshi, *Xining zoudui rilu*, 38.
[89] The *Analects*, 12.19.
[90] *Mencius*, 7A.12: "以佚道使民，雖勞不怨；以生道殺民，雖死不怨殺者."

Su Shi grants that it is unavoidable for no matter how humane a ruler to suppress the unruly by putting them to death, as the *Book of Documents* says of sage rulers in antiquity. But there is a difference between resorting to it when having no choice but to and taking it as a guideline in governance. Whereas Mencius consistently advocated governing with *renyi*, what he said in *Mencius* 7A.12 amounts to legitimizing governing by cruelty: so long as the killing is for the populace to live, it is fully justified. Wang Anshi's justification of the reform government's treating the people inhumanely was precisely along this line: because its purpose is for putting everything in order and getting every human being their proper nature, it has the right to take control of the people's lives, including when necessary taking their lives. This was already made clear in the reform blueprint submitted to Renzong in the late 1050s:

> The creation of methods and establishment of systems are difficult and those who take chances are unwilling to go along with and please [the ruler] to work toward [realizing the goal he set]. Therefore, those in antiquity, should they want to accomplish something, must necessarily precede it with punishment and execution. It is thereafter their will got fulfilled.
> 惟其創法立制之艱難，而僥幸之人不肯順悅而趨之，故古之人欲有所為，未嘗不先之以征誅而後得其意。[91]

Wang did not go this far in practice, nor did the reform regime – Su Shi, with all the charges of slandering and being disrespectful of the emperor, was spared his life. But Wang's logic was that of Ji Kangzi's. For this, the words in *Mencius* 7A.12 provided a ready justification.

> 5. Zigong asked by saying: "How can one be called a *shi* (literatus, man of noble character, or superior man)?" The Master said: "Conducting oneself with [a sense of] shame and, when dispatched to the four corners of the world, not disgracing the monarch's orders, such can be called a *shi*." [Zigong] said: "Dare I ask what's the next [best]?" [The master] said: "In what he says, he must necessarily keep his promise; in what he does, he must necessarily achieve the result. Shallow and obstinate, such is the look of a petty man, but perhaps he can still be the next [best]."

[91] Wang Anshi, "Shang Renzong Huangdi yan shi shu," in *LCJ*, 39.422.

子貢問曰：“何如斯可謂之士矣？”子曰：“行己有耻，使於四方不辱君命，可謂士矣。”曰：“敢問其次。”曰：“言必信，行必果，硜硜然小人哉，抑亦可以為次矣。”[92]

Making a sure promise and taking it as trustworthiness, braving the daunting and the tough and taking it as resoluteness – these certainly were what Confucius slighted. Following him, Mencius thus said: “The superior man, in what he says, does not necessarily keep his promise; in what he does, does not necessarily achieve the result.” This then is not what Confucius called the superior man. The superior man does not make a sure promise, but in what he says he never fails to keep his promise; he does not brave the daunting and the tough, but in what he does he never fails to achieve the result. Now, to take not necessarily keeping one’s promise as superior is to open the way leading gradually to abandon trustworthiness. This is not what Confucius meant by getting rid of food and armaments.

立然諾以為信，犯患難以為果，此固孔子之所小也。孟子因之，故曰“大人者，言不必信，行不必果”。[93]此則非孔子所謂大人也。大人者，不立然諾，而言未嘗不信也；不犯患難，而行未嘗不果也。今以不必信為大，是開廢信之漸，非孔子去食去兵之意也。

In the *Analects* 13.20, Confucius said that those who necessarily keep their promises are petty; by contrast, in *Mencius* 4B.11, Mencius said the superior men does not necessarily keep their promise. Mencius’ words may look similar to those of Confucius’, but the two were qualitatively different: the former is an after-the-fact judgment Confucius made regarding those who do so, thinking such although less than ideal is not entirely without merit, whereas Mencius’ words essentially constitute a normative definition for what makes one a superior man that points toward the eventual removal of trustworthiness.[94]

Like the connection Su Shi identified in the previous entry, this is again a theoretical starting point that Wang Anshi picked up from Mencius and developed to its logical conclusion. As he wrote in “King and Hegemon”:

Duke Huan of Qi, under the threat of Cao Mo’s sword, promised to return his land. The wish to return his land did not come from my heart. It was promised only to avoid death. According to the

[92] The *Analects*, 13.20.
[93] *Mencius*, 4B.11.
[94] Cf. An Wenyan’s discussion (“Su Shi bian Meng kao,” 42).

way of the king, it is fine not to return it, and yet Duke Huan insisted on returning it. Duke Wen of Jin, when attacking Yuan, promised to withdraw in three days. After three days, [the people of] Yuan did not surrender. According to the way of the king, it is fine even if he waited until they surrendered, and yet Duke Wen insisted on withdrawing his troops. It is perhaps because he wanted to show his trustworthiness to the people.

齊桓公劫於曹沫之刃，而許歸其地。[95]夫欲歸其地者，非吾之心也，許之者，免死而已。由王者之道，則勿歸焉可也，而桓公必歸之地。晉文公伐原，[96]約三日而退，三日而原不降。由王者之道，則雖待其降焉可也，而文公必退其師，蓋欲其信示於民者也。[97]

In line with Mencius, Wang claims that true kings would not care to keep their promise. Going one step further than Mencius, Wang turned to slight those who did keep their promise, thinking that in doing so, they were only making a show of their trustworthiness for others to see.

6. Somebody asked about Zichan. The Master said: "A kindhearted person."

或問子産。子曰："惠人也。"[98]

Zichan made enclosed ditches, established a reviled administration, and cast the penal code for Zheng.[99] Upon dying, he taught his son Taishu with fierceness. His use of law was profound, and his governance strict. There was some immediate benefit extended to the populace, [but] no far-reaching plan for managing the state. Therefore, both Hunhan and Shuxiang ridiculed him, and Confucius thought him a kindhearted person but not *ren* (humane), perhaps slighting him. Mencius said, Zichan carried people across at Zhen and Wei rivers with his own horse carriage – "kindhearted but not knowing how to govern." This was perhaps following Confucius' words but lost the point. Zizhan, with regard to governing, put in order its military levies, repaired the full circle of city walls and roads and built bridges at the right time – these being more than enough, how come he would carry people across with his own horse carriage? The *Record of Rites* says:

[95] Sima Qian, *Shiji*, 86.3053-54.
[96] Lü Buwei, *Lüshi chunqiu*, 19.249-50.
[97] Wang Anshi, "Wang ba," in *LCJ*, 67.714.
[98] The *Analects*, 14.9.
[99] For an alternative translation, see Durrant, Li, and Schaberg, trans., *Zuo Tradition / Zuozhuan: Commentary on the "Spring and Autumn Annals"*, 1405. I read "封" as an adjective for "洫" rather than a noun in a parallelly structured compound.

"Zizhan, being the mother of the multitude, was able to feed them but unable to teach them." This further missed the point by following what Mencius said.

子產為鄭作封洫，立謗政，鑄刑書。[100]其死也，教子大叔以猛。其用法深，其為政嚴，有及民之近利，無經國之遠猷，故渾罕、叔向皆譏之，而孔子以為惠人，不以為仁，蓋小之也。孟子曰：子產以乘車濟人於溱、洧，"惠而不知為政"[101]。蓋因孔子之言，而失之也。子產之於政，整齊其兵賦，環治其城郭、道路，以時修其橋梁，則有餘矣，豈以乘車濟人哉？《禮》曰："子產，衆人之母也，能食之，而不能教。"此又因孟子之言而失之也。

The issue Su took with Mencius here was on the referent of Confucius' concept of *hui*, the content of which the *Analects* 14.9 did not spell out.[102] In his effort to elaborate on Confucius, Mencius thought it referred to the personal favour Zichan did for the people. Su Shi, however, wanted to draw on Confucius' authority to ridicule Wang Anshi's activist approach to governance, hence his filling the conceptual content of *hui* with building infrastructure, implementing mutual-surveillance among the people by encouraging them to report on each other, and casting penal code – measures that cannot fail to ring a bell to those undertaken by the reform regime. With this, Su wanted to point out that while these can bring some immediate benefit to the people, they are no long-term plan for managing the state.[103] To make his case convincing, Su found it necessary to discount Mencius' interpretation of the *Analects* 14.9 among Confucians – for instance, when commenting on the *Record of Rites* sentence Su cited, Zheng Xuan 鄭玄 (127-200) built on Mencius' speculation,[104] saying: "Zichan once carried those who wished to cross the river in the winter with his own horse carriage and yet the carriage-bridge was not built. This is tender-heartedness" 子產嘗以其乘車濟冬涉者，而車梁不成，是慈仁。[105]

[100] Yang Bojun, Chunqiu Zuozhuan *zhu*, Zhaogong 6, 1276.
[101] *Mencius*, 4B.2.
[102] Note, however, in *Zuozhuan*, it is said that on hearing Zichan's words on keeping the schools open for the people in his state to discuss government, Confucius highly commended him, using even the word "*ren*" 仁 (Yang Bojun, Chunqiu Zuozhuan *zhu*, Xiang 31, 1192; Nylan, *The Five "Confucian" Classics*, 293). This is also what Su Shi found praiseworthy in Zichan's legacy ("Nan'an jun xue ji," in *Su Shi wenji*, 11.373).
[103] This was a view Su had expressed decades earlier (see, for example, "Shang Shenzong Huangdi shu," in *Su Shi wenji*, 25.730, 25.737), only now arguing for it more systematically at a higher level of abstraction in this commentary project.
[104] In his sub-commentary, Kong Yingda 孔穎達 (574-648) revealed Zheng Xuan's source was *Mencius* 4B.2 (Zheng Xuan and Kong Yingda, Liji *zhengyi*, 50.1614).
[105] This is the only entry where I have not established a theoretical link between Mencius and Wang Anshi.

7. As for music, listen only to the Shao and Wu. Prohibit the tunes of Zheng, and keep glib people at a distance – the tunes of Zheng are licentious, and glib people are dangerous.[106]
樂則韶、舞。放鄭聲，遠佞人。鄭聲淫，佞人殆。

The harm of the music of Zheng and Wei is on a par with that of glib people. Mencius said, "Today's music is like ancient music." Why? Were Mencius to govern, how could he keep the tunes of Zheng and not get rid of them? His saying "Today's music is like ancient music" was only for getting his words accepted by [saying] what the king liked to hear. And this was not the only case. Loving beauty, money and bravery – these were the three illnesses of the various lords, and yet in each case, Mencius said: No harm. So long as you follow what I say, the hundred surnames will only fear the king's not loving it. Take doctors for example. Thinking the medicine unable to be taken [by the patient], the doctor uses what they love as medicine. Will it work? Were [the love of] [licentious] tunes, beauty, and money able to make one a [true] king, then profit can also be used to advance *renyi* – why did he so deeply reject King Hui of Liang? Isn't this losing his original intention?
鄭衛之害，與佞人等。孟子曰："今樂猶古樂。"何也？使孟子為政，豈能存鄭聲而不去也哉？其曰"今樂猶古樂，"特因王之所悦而入其言耳。且不獨此也。好色、好貨、好勇，是諸侯之三疾，而孟子皆曰無害，從吾之説，百姓惟恐王之不好也。[107]譬之於醫，以藥之不可行也，而以其所嗜為藥，可乎？使聲、色與貨而可以王，則利亦可以進仁義，何拒梁惠之深乎？此豈非失其本心也哉？

Su was pointing out a deep self-contradiction in Mencius: in rhetoric, he resolutely objected to putting profit before *renyi*, the message of *Mencius* 1A.1. In substance, however, he sought to get the kings to adopt his proposed way of governance with means essentially against his core values. In doing so, Mencius was, as Curie Virág points out, using efficacy to encourage rulers to do what Mencius thinks is good.[108] While the values Mencius aimed to sell were the humanist virtues *renyi*, in selling them with what they have to deliver instead of their inherent value per se, Mencius was not essentially different from Wang Anshi, who advised Shenzong to use official

[106] The *Analects*, 15.11. Translation slightly modified from Slingerland's (*Confucius* Analects, 179).
[107] *Mencius*, 1B.3, 1B.5.
[108] Virág, *The Emotions in Early Chinese Philosophy*, 123.

ranks and high salaries to attract literati to do what the central authority defines as "good conduct." In this regard, the two of them are both consequentialists.

8. The Master said, "By nature, people are close; by practice, they are removed from each other." The Master said, "Only the wisest and the stupidest do not change."
子曰："性相近也，習相遠也。"子曰："惟上智與下愚不移。"

Nature can be confused but not wiped out. What can be wiped out is not nature. Humans' betraying their natures were at the extreme in the cases of Jie, Zhou and Robber Zhi. But their evilness must necessarily derive from what they delight in or are angry at. Where they do not delight in or are not angry at there was no evildoing ever. Therefore, [despite] the tree's nature being upward and the water's nature downward, if pressed down, a tree can be bent and wound downward. When what presses it down is exhausted, it has never been that it does not go upward again. In the case of water, splashing it, it can be made to shoot up and reach a higher place. When what splashes it is exhausted, it has never been that it does not fall down. This is what Mencius had seen. Mencius saw something regarding nature, but departed from it [by saying it is] good. The *Change* says: "Once *yin*, once *yang* is called the Way. What follows it is good. What completes it is nature." What completes the Way is nature, whereas good is but what follows it, not nature. Nature is like *yin-yang* whereas good is like the myriad things. Of things, there is none that does not [have the successive movements of] *yin* and *yang*, but the myriad things cannot be taken as *yin-yang*. Therefore, *yin-yang* we watch but do not see and listen to but do not hear, and yet it is not non-existent. Now, one names them by [the criterion that] what is not non-existent is existent, then all that exist are things, not *yin-yang*. Therefore, Heaven the First makes water, but water isn't Heaven the First; Earth the Second makes fire, but fire isn't Earth the Second; human nature makes good, but good isn't nature. Were nature able to be called good, Confucius would then have said it. If one can call it good, one can also call it bad. Thus what Excellency Xun said about nature's being bad perhaps originated from Mencius and what Yang Xiong said about [nature's being] a mixture of good and bad perhaps originated from the two masters. [Precisely] because nature cannot be named good or bad, Confucius' words were thus but "By nature, people are close; by practice, they are removed from each other." If they are close, then why cannot the wisest and the stupidest be changed? [I] say: there is a way by which they can be changed, but there are not [sufficient] resources with which to change them. It is like the theory of my younger brother Ziyou, who said: "What rains from Heaven is water. What runs in big rivers and is stored in pits and wells is also water. What accumulates [on

the ground] to make a muddy road is still water. Pointing at the muddy road and telling people "this has the nature of water" is acceptable. Saying "I shall wait till it becomes limpid and drink it" is, however, unacceptable. This is what is called "the wisest and the stupidest do not change."

性可亂而不可滅。可滅非性也。人之叛其性，至於桀、紂、盜跖，極矣。然其惡，必自其所喜怒。其所不喜怒，未嘗為惡也。故木之性上，水之性下，木抑之，可使輪囷下屬。抑之者窮，未嘗不上也。水激之，可使瀼湧上達。激之者窮，未嘗不下也。此孟子之所見也。[109]孟子有見於性，而離[110]於善。易曰："一陰一陽之謂道，繼之者善也，成之者性也。"成道者性，而善繼之耳，非性也。[111] 性如陰陽，善如萬物；物無非陰陽者，而以萬物為陰陽則不可，故陰陽者，視之不見，聽之不聞，而非無也。今以其非無即有而命之，則凡有者皆物矣，非陰陽也。故天一為水，而水非天一也；地二為火，而火非地二也；人性為善，而善非性也。使性而可以謂之善，則孔子言之矣。苟可以謂之善，亦可以謂之惡，故荀卿之所謂性惡者，蓋生於孟子；而揚雄之所謂善惡混者，蓋生於二子也。性其不可以善惡命之，故孔子之言曰"性相近也，習相遠也"而已。夫苟相近，則上知下愚曷為不可移也？曰有可移之理，無可移之資也。若夫吾弟子由之論也，曰：雨於天者，水也；流於江河、蓄於坎井，亦水也；積而為泥塗者，亦水也。指泥塗而告人曰：是有水之性，可也。曰：吾將俟其清而飲之，則不可。是之謂上知與下愚不移。

In chapter 2, we have seen Wang Anshi, truly bothered by what Confucius said in the *Analects* 17.2 and 17.3, tried to explain away their negative effect on his project in two of the essays in the *Miscellaneous Theories* volumes. The reason is simple: the whole of his design of governance is premised on the assumption that human moral nature is malleable. Given this, it is perhaps no coincidence that Su Shi's engagements with Mencius end with an argument for the unchangeability of human nature.

Recall that in "Tracing the Way," Han Yu claims that the way constituted by *renyi* was lost after Mencius. Part of the reason he said so was because whereas Confucians from Xunzi onward did not get right the relationship between *renyi* and *daode* fully, Mencius only advocated *renyi*, never speaking of *daode*. Before the late 1090s, Su Shi did not question this. Rather, as late as 1091, in the preface to Ouyang Xiu's anthology, he was still following Han's judgment on this

[109] *Mencius*, 6A.1-2.
[110] It seems the textual variant in *Shaoshi wenjian houlu* reads better here (91). *Zun Meng xubian* says 難 (54).
[111] For a reiteration of this view, see Su Shi, *Su shi* Yi *zhuan*, 7.160.

matter. But now he had a different understanding: it was Mencius who initiated the *daode* discourse in the Confucian tradition, by linking talks of human nature to morality, even though in his writings the term *daode* did not appear.[112] With Mencius saying human nature is good, Xunzi followed by saying it is bad, so did Yang Xiong, who said it is a mixture of good and bad. The problem is not whether human nature is good or bad or a mixture of the two, but that it originally did not refer to this moral sphere – in the *Analects*, the sphere Confucius referred to was intellectual. Mencius led all subsequent Confucians into this sphere that Confucius did not mean it to refer to.

As Curie Virág perceptively notes, Su Shi's point here is that "[t]o discourse on the normative condition of the nature itself, then, was a problematic endeavor. The proper object of inquiry was at the level of what the nature brought into being, not what it *was*."[113] She further observes that for Mencius, "insight into the workings of reality, and of human nature as part of that reality, is necessary for mastering the science of politics."[114]

Broaching the link between human nature and morality is the greatest theoretical contribution Mencius made to Wang Anshi's soulcraft. Indeed, it was precisely because Mencius had made this link that Wang could claim that when Confucius said the stupidest and the wisest are unable to be changed, Confucius was not referring to human nature – which he was –, but was referring to talent.[115] Building on Mencius, Wang made talks of human nature all about morality, which were further used to manipulate the people's spirit and eventually transform their moral nature.[116]

---

[112] The tendency to read Mencius back into Confucius has prevented scholars from discovering this. For instance, while aware of this tendency among later Confucians, Yü-sheng Lin nonetheless thinks Confucius implicitly holds the view that human nature is moral ("The Evolution of the Pre-Confucian Meaning of *Jen* 仁 and the Confucian Concept of Moral Autonomy," 186n23, 186-87n24). Similarly, while noting Mencius thinks "man is *by nature* oriented toward morality," Sungmoon Kim still assumes Mencius was "articulating" what Confucius meant to say but did not make explicit (*Theorizing Confucian Virtue Politics*, 96, 7, 10-11). On the fundamental difference between Mencius and Confucius on human nature, see Lin Guizhen, *Tiandao tianxing yu renxing renqing*, 211.

[113] Virág, "'That Which Encompasses the Myriad Cares,'" 265.

[114] Virág, *The Emotions in Early Chinese Philosophy*, 121.

[115] Wang Anshi, "Yuan xing," in *LCJ*, 68.727.

[116] Apparently not everyone in Su's time had figured this out, one example being Liu Chang, another Wang Anshi critic. When responding to Ouyang Xiu's question – whether Mencius' claim that "the nature of humans must necessarily be good" 人之性必善 was consistent with Confucius' words "the wisest and the stupidest do not change" 上智與下愚不移 –, Liu produced an answer that was essentially in line with what Wang Anshi did in "Yuan xing": granting that Mencius did not fundamentally contradict Confucius, Liu said the two were referring to two different spheres (*Gongshi xiansheng dizi ji*, 4.62).

Indeed, this theoretical breakthrough Menicus made was so important that Wang even once tried to build a tradition of it, so that Mencius would not look so singular in the Confucian tradition. This was attempted in his "On [Human] Nature" 性論:

> Were one to make clear the grades of one's talent, then Confucius' so-called theory that the wisest and the stupidest do not change is right. Were one to make clear nature, then what Confucius said with "By nature, people are close; by practice, they are removed from each other", what the *Doctrine of Mean* said with "following nature is called the Way," and Mencius' theory that "there is no human being who is not good" are right. Among those who were good at talking about nature in antiquity, none surpassed Zhongni (Confucius). Zhongni was the best among sages. Below Zhongni, none surpassed Zisi. Zisi was one who learned from Zhongni. Below Zisi, none surpassed Meng Ke. Meng Ke was one who learned from Zisi. Zhongni's words were recorded in the *Analects*. The theories of Zisi and Meng Ke were sketched out in the *Doctrine of the Mean*, and expounded in the seven chapters [of *Mencius*].
> 欲明其才品，則孔子所謂上智與下愚不移之說是也。欲明其性，則孔子所謂性相近習相遠，中庸所謂率性之謂道，孟軻所謂人無有不善之說，是也。古之善言性者，莫如仲尼。仲尼，聖之粹者也。仲尼而下，莫如子思。子思，學仲尼者也。其次莫如孟軻，孟軻，學子思者也。仲尼之言，載於論語；子思孟軻之說，蓋於中庸，則明於七篇。[117]

As discussed in chapter 2, this is an essay Wang wrote before his learning was completed. But his solution to discount the negative effect of Confucius' view on the unchangeability of human nature was along the same line that he later settled on: making a distinction between the intellectual and the moral and restricting Confucius' words to the former sphere only. Believing that for anything to last, it had to maintain a continuity with tradition on the surface,[118] Wang did not wish to highlight Mencius' groundbreaking innovation, but tried to make it look like Mencius was following in the footsteps of Confucius via Zisi, even though neither made the link between human nature and morality. It was important for Wang to create this façade of continuity between Mencius and Confucius, because in his project to reshape human moral nature, Mencius was the only

[117] Wang Anshi, "Xing lun," in *LCJ*, 1064.
[118] Wang Anshi, "Shang wu shi zhazi," in *LCJ*, 41.440.

authority to fall back on in the Confucian tradition. This is why Wang venerated Mencius so much, claiming "Meng Ke, a sage" 孟軻，聖人也.[119]

Recent scholarship suggests Su Shi was probably right. According to Chen Lai, at the time of "Human Nature Comes via Mandate" (*Xing zi ming chu* 性自命出), a text dated to the period between Confucius and Mencius,[120] there still did not exist a doctrine of human nature is good.[121] This suggests this doctrine was perhaps indeed invented by Mencius. Once human nature has been linked to moral judgments, using moral education to change it toward what is defined as good is only a matter of time.

As a whole, these eight entries were where Su Shi did his political theoretical work, like Han Yu's "Tracing the Way" and Ouyang Xiu's "On the Roots." At the same time when carrying forward their enterprise by defending the humanist way of governance, Su laid out a systematic critique of Wang Anshi's statecraft by revealing its deep connections with its most important theoretical source *Mencius*. With this, Su sought to make clear how Mencius, in his defense of Confucius at a challenging time, unwittingly opened the path that eventually led to Wang Anshi's anti-Confucian approach to governance that could claim a grounding in the Confucian tradition thanks to its being in line with Mencius at a number of critical places. In this way, he showed that, Mencius, whose status had been steadily rising since mid-Tang, especially among the ancient prose practitioners, was actually the starting point of a type of learning different from that of Confucius', i.e., a *yiduan* 異端 (!).[122]

As Su wrote when stating his purpose of arguing with Mencius:

> I, in composing *Explicating the* Analects, argued with Mencius [at] eight [places]. I am not fond of arguing, [but] I thought Mencius was close to Confucius. The world declining and the Way obscure, the ranks of Laozi, Zhuangzi, Yangzi and Mozi, although all alike derived [their learning] from Confucius, deviated and departed from him so extremely as to [approaching] the [barbarian] Hu

[119] Wang Anshi, "Da Gong Shenfu shu," in *LCJ*, 72.765. It was perhaps for this reason Wang played a major role in elevating the official status of *Mencius*. On this, see Yang Zhijiu, "Wang Anshi yu Mengzi," 142; Chun-chieh Huang, "The Rise of the Mencius," 173-74; Xu Hongxing, "Tang Song jian de Mengzi shengge yundong," 106–7; Wang Zengyu, "Mengzi zai Songdai yasheng diwei zhi queding jiqi yingxiang," 491–92; Zhou Shuping, *Liang Song Mengxue yanjiu*, 55-57.
[120] Cook, *The Bamboo Texts of the Guodian*, 108-9.
[121] Chen Lai, "The Guodian Bamboo Slips and Confucian Theories of Human Nature," 33, 43-44.
[122] Seen from *Mencius* 1A.3 and 1A.7, it seems Mencius' approach to governance was also interventionist.

> and Yue. Now if I argue with Lao, Zhuang, Yang and Mo, even if I won, it would still be far removed from Confucius. Therefore, I must argue with Mencius. Should I argue [with him] and win, then I shall arrive at Confucius.
> 吾為《論語説》，與孟子辯者八。吾非好辯也，以孟子為近於孔子也。世衰道微，老、莊、楊、墨之徒皆同出於孔子，而乖離之極，至於胡、越。今與老、莊、楊、墨辯，雖勝之，其去孔子尚遠也，故必與孟子辯。辯而勝，則達於孔子矣。[123]

In his deep contemplation on how the ancient prose movement resulted in Wang Anshi's statecraft,[124] Su found the origin lied in Mencius, the most vocal defender of Confucius whose adherence to governing by *renyi* was taken for granted by Han Yu, Ouyang Xiu and his earlier self. Around the turn of the twelfth century, Su figured out it was Mencius who opened the path leading to and provided the indispensable theoretical premises for Wang Anshi's anti-humanist soulcraft – governing by transforming human nature.[125]

[123] Yu Yunwen, *Zun Meng xubian*, 54-55. On Su seeing his three commentaries as that by which to safeguard Confucius' learning, see "Shu Hepu zhou xing," in *Su Shi wenji*, 71.2277.
[124] On the reform Wang designed being a descendant of the ancient prose movement, see Bol, *Neo-Confucianism in History*, 72.
[125] Scholars have long noted the influence of Daoism on Mencius. See, for example, Waley, *The Way and Its Power*, 50; and Creel, *Confucius and the Chinese Way*, 194). This is perhaps why Wang Anshi could have favored *Laozi* and *Mencius* simultaneously.

Conclusion

In 1104, when his statecraft was firmly established as the "state rightness," Wang Anshi was invited into Confucius Temple. In the decree issued for this, it was written:

> The craft of the way [to govern] got split among a hundred schools; the vulgar learnings have been doing harm for a thousand years. The practice of commentaries impaired the literati's ability to hear and see clearly. As a result, it has been long since they saw the purity and completeness of Heaven and Earth and the grand totality of the ancients. The late Duke of Jing Fiefdom Wang Anshi, with the wisdom of the first awakened, transmitted the sage's classics, elucidated the secret of nature and destiny, and unified the dispersed *daode*. Explaining the abstruse meanings with commentaries, he opened up and illuminated the literati's minds; holding together the myriad differences, he made them converge on one principle.
> 道術裂於百家，俗學弊於千載。士以傳注之習，汩亂其聰明，不見天地之純全、古人之大體，斯已久矣。故荊國公王安石，由先覺之智，[1]傳聖人之經，闡性命之幽，合道德之散。訓釋奧義，開明士心；總其萬殊，會於一理。[2]

Like Shenzong's comments on what in Wang's learning that impressed him the most and the biography written by one of his followers, it identifies Wang's unique contribution as using his insight into human nature to unify morality. Similarly, Chen Guan 陳瓘 (1057-1124), one of the best students trained by the reform regime's educational system who later turned against it,[3] figured out the crux of Wang's statecraft as follows:

> "What the Former Kings called *daode* lies in the workings of nature and destiny and that is all." This is Wang Anshi's essential gist. There are the three classics, the *Explication of Characters*, and the *Diary*, all being about the workings of nature and destiny. Cai Bian (1048-1117),[4] Jian Xuchen (fl. late eleventh and early twelfth century), Deng Xunwu (1057-1121) and others – their motive is pure and one: to advocate practicing Wang's teaching. What they call "accomplishing big" is but

[1] On his view that the first awakened has an obligation to make the Way he got across shared by all, see Wang Anshi, "Qing Du Chun xiangsheng ru xianxue shu," in *LCJ*, 77.815.
[2] Si Yizu ed., *Song da zhaoling ji*, 156.584. For an alternative interpretation, see Li Huarui, "Northern Song Reformist Thought and Its Sources," 225.
[3] Chen passed the *jinshi* exam as the third best in 1079.
[4] Wang Anshi's student and son-in-law.

> the workings of nature and destiny; what they call "carrying on" is also but the workings of nature and destiny. What they call "unifying *daode*" is also to unify it with the workings of nature and destiny. What they call "to make the custom the same" is also to make it the same with the workings of nature and destiny. Not practicing the workings of nature and destiny they call heterodox learning; not following the workings of nature and destiny they call current fashion. Abolishing the current fashion, they then banish their practitioners; angry at heterodox learnings, they then burn their books. Therefore, since Cai Bian et al. came to power, what they call "state rightness" all originated from the workings of nature and destiny. Nobody can get to shake it.
>
> "先王所謂道德者，性命之理而已"矣，此王安石之精義也。有三經焉，有《字說》焉，有《日録》焉，皆性命之理也。蔡卞、蹇序辰、鄧洵武等用心純一，主行其教。其所謂大有為者，性命之理而已矣。其所謂繼述者，亦性命之理而已矣。其所謂一道德者，亦以性命之理而一之也。其所謂同風俗者，亦以性命之理而同之也。不習性命之理者，謂之曲學；不隨性命之理者，謂之流俗。黜流俗則竄其人，怒曲學則火其書。故自卞等用事以來，其所謂"國是"者皆出性命之理，不可得而動摇也。[5]

Everything in Wang's statecraft is centered on his insight into human nature. This is because, of his two main theoretical sources *Laozi* and *Mencius*, governing in line with Laozi's idea of *daode* – centralizing authority to the monarch and advocating anti-humanism – is not new. The rulers adopting Daoist and Legalist political theories had long been practicing it. In this regard, Wang only brought back an age-old method to govern against the humanist mainstream in the mid-eleventh century. What is new is his using what he knew about the workings of human nature to make the statist values firmly established in the subjects' hearts. This is where his original theoretical contribution to the statist tradition of statecraft lies.

And his contribution was mainly made by building on what Mencius had written on human nature, as we have seen in chapters 2 and 4.[6] With the theoretical premises *Mencius* provided him – that humans have the innate capacity to be moral because they are born with a variety of feelings; that amplifying these innate feelings, one can come to acquire moral values that will automatically

[5] Chen Guan, *Song Zhongsu Chen Liaozhai Siming zun Yao ji*, preface, 448.359. This text is also recorded in Shao Bo's *Shaoshi wenjian houlu* (179–80), with slight textual differences. On Chen and this work that was written between 1106-09, see Zhang Qifan and Jin Qiang, "Chen Guan yu *Siming zun Yao ji*. Despite his sharpness on Wang's essential gist, however, perhaps because his intended reader was Huizong, Chen focused his criticism of Wang on his irreverence of emperorship.

[6] These probably have not exhausted the deep connections between Wang Anshi and Mencius.

guide one's moral decision-making in social-political actions; and that such amplification can be conducted from outside through behavioral regulations, because a moral question is a physical one –, supplemented by his own work on the malleability of human moral nature, Wang had a complete theory of human nature with which to establish the statist values firmly into the subjects' hearts, as if they were their "nature."

By focusing his statecraft on crafting the human soul, Wang Anshi broke a new ground in the history of Chinese political thought. To begin with, while Wang Anshi certainly drew some elements from the Legalistic approach to governance, like through a social reorganization to encompass all individuals in the social-political system and make them all contribute to the state's interest,[7] he clearly differentiates his approach from that of the Legalists', as his premise is quite the opposite of theirs: the Legalist political theorists take human nature as unmalleable,[8] so their approach is simply to make use of the self-interested nature of humans. As Yuri Pines writes of Shang Yang 商鞅 (390-338 BCE), one of the Qin's major statecraft thinkers: "What is needed then is just to direct the people to pursue personal benefits in ways that will serve the common needs."[9] This is precisely where Wang Anshi found fault in them.

In a poem written in 1053,[10] Wang wrote:

三代子百姓	The Three Dynasties took the populace as children,
公私無異財	By having there no difference between public and private wealth.
人主擅操柄	The ruler monopolized the wielding of the scepter,
如天持斗魁	Like Heaven's holding the handle of Kui Star.
賦予皆自我	Granting and giving both originating from me,
兼並乃奸回	Amalgamating and annexing were deemed evil and wicked.
奸回法有誅	The evil and the wicked being by law to be executed,
勢亦無自來	Their power therefore had no source to come from.
後世始倒持	Only in later ages did the holding [of the scepter] become reversed;
黔首遂難裁	The common people thus became hard to control.

[7] Wang Anshi, *Xining zoudui rilu*, 127, referring to "令民為什伍" in Sima Qian, *Shiji*, 68.2710. For Wang's application of it, see *Xining zoudui rilu*, 38.
[8] On this in Han Fei, see Ivanhoe, "Hanfeizi and Moral Self-Cultivation," 36; Harris, "Critiquing Heavily Normative Conceptions of Harmony," 164. On this in Shang Yang, see Pines trans., *The Book of Lord Shang*, 50-51.
[9] Pines trans., *The Book of Lord Shang*, 50.
[10] On this dating, see Gao Keqin, *Wang Anshi shiwen xuan ping*, 59.

秦王不知此　The king of Qin did not know this,
更築懷清台　Further building the Huaiqing Terrace.[11]
禮義日已偷　*Liyi* was stolen daily;
聖經久堙埃　And the sages' classics were long buried in dust.[12]

Wang saw the Qin as not being careful enough to avoid contradicting itself: on the one hand, they wished to enforce centralized rule; on the other, the First Emperor of Qin would set up the widow who was able to maintain her late husband's business and protect herself with private wealth as a model for the people. To Wang, private wealth was a major source of threat to the ruler's ability to monopolize authority over the population.[13] Not only does it give the rich – the so-called "engrossers" – a source of independent power to contend with that of the ruler's, but each person's going about their own business fundamentally contradicts the goal of strengthening the state, making it hard for the ruler to get all to work toward a single goal obediently,[14] as he wrote in 1060:[15]

> Having money but not managing it, then the lowly people in the fields and alleys will all be able to arrogate to themselves the power of giving and taking, and monopolize the profit from the myriad things, thereby to compete with the ruler for [the allegiance of] the populace and let loose their insatiable desires. It is not that one must be of high rank, strong, outstanding, and big and then is able to do so. Were it like this, that the son of Heaven still did not lose his populace would be but a claim.
> 有財而莫理，則阡陌閭巷之賤人，皆能私取予之勢，擅萬物之利，以與人主爭黔首，而放其無窮之欲，非必貴強桀大而後能。如是，而天子猶為不失其民者，蓋特號而已耳。[16]

This is why Wang suggests in the above poem to eradicate private wealth: the way the Three Dynasties treated their people was, like how parents treated their kids, by making no distinction

[11] For a discussion of the widow for whom this terrace was built, see Zhang Chengzhong, "Cong *Guanzi* 'Qingzhong' dao *Zhouguan* 'Quanfu,'" 17.
[12] Wang Anshi, "Jianbing," in *LCJ*, 4.114.
[13] For a brief discussion of the reform regime's attitude toward private interests, see Bol, "Examination and Orthodoxies," 41.
[14] Shang Yang as studied by Pines did not seem to think so (*The Book of Lord Shang*, 50).
[15] Gao Keqin, *Wang Anshi shiwen xuan ping*, 95.
[16] Wang Anshi, "Duzhi fushi ting timing ji," in *LCJ*, 82.861.

between public and private wealth. Everything in the state belonged to the ruler, who controlled the distribution of everything.

During a conversation with Shenzong in 1074, Wang most clearly pointed out where he faulted Qin:

> The Former Kings, after having put in order administrative matters to the extent that it was enough to strengthen the state, further beautified the social custom, so that even in the extreme cases where their offspring did nothing in court or died before their successor was born, there would not be disorder.[17] If not engaging in purifying the social custom with loyalty, trustworthiness,[18] non-corruption, and shame but only working on strengthening the state, then it is Qin.
> 先王既修政事，足以強其國；又美風俗，使後嗣至於朝委裘、植遺腹而不亂。若不務以忠、信、廉、恥厚風俗，專以強國為事，則秦是也 。[19]

In order to make sure the imperial house retain its monopoly on authority even when the throne was passed on to unambitious or incapable successors – as it had happened with Renzong and Yingzong –, the key is to build a fitting social custom to retain the people's loyalty regardless of the arbitrary personal quality of the ruler. As we have read in chapter 4, when speaking of Shang Yang, Wang pointed out to Shenzong, Shang's governance failed because he was "unable to form subjects with *li-yi-lian-chi*." Using the statist values to form such obedient subjects who would not be corrupt or extravagant in personal expenditure is where Wang Anshi went beyond the Legalists. Like them, Wang uses the self-interested bent in human nature to mobilize the people with official ranks and high salaries; unlike them, however, he added one step: using the restrictive statist values to neutralize the profit-seeking desire such a method would stimulate, so as to make sure the people are mobilized to serve the state, rather than pursuing their own private interests.

Wang Anshi was not the first Chinese political thinker who sought to unify morality by transforming human nature.[20] Mozi was a precedent in this regard. The difference is: while like Wang Anshi Mozi also saw human nature as malleable and thus too aimed for transforming

[17] I thank Wilt Idema for help on this translation.
[18] These could be Wang's concepts stressing one's loyalty and trustworthiness to the ruler – as Dirlik points out, the statist morality has a changing content but remains constant in serving the interest of the state.
[19] Li Tao, *XCB*, 250.6093.
[20] If we agree that changing human nature is *the* defining feature of totalitarianism (Cinpoes, *Nationalism and Identity in Romania*, 70), the Qin was not yet, despite Zhengyuan Fu's claim that it was (*China's Legalists*).

people's natures so that they would identify with their superiors, "he saw such changes as quite easy to achieve and described a decidedly outside-in process of redirecting people's desires and orientations."[21] By contrast, Wang Anshi thinks it is very difficult to change how humans are by nature and that a purely external approach cannot guarantee success. His improvements upon Mozi's craft include not only using the regulative and transformative *li* to change people's natures through a well-designed full procedure building on Mencius' insight into human nature, making sure external efforts can effect real changes inside, but also the building of a state-wide government school system, to put the students in there and immerse them in only one kind of learning over an extended period of time, until each and every of their behavior is like how they are taught. That is, compared with Mozi, Wang added more control over the process of transformation.

Moreover, Wang recognizes the central place the Confucian classics occupy in literati learning – the common core so to speak. Thus he had the statist values written into the commentaries on three Confucian classics carefully chosen to be the textbooks used in this education. As he points out in the "Inscription for Qian Prefectural School," the Qin was stupid to burn the classics in its attempt to put down dissidents. Such obviously anti-tradition move would only increase its illegitimacy in the eyes of the Confucians, incurring their ever stronger criticism that would soon topple down the regime. The smart way is to busy them in the classics, but change what they are supposed to take away from them.

Finally, taking government school education as central to governance was not new in the Song, either. As Robert Hartwell noted, plans for developing "state education were common features of Northern Sung reform programs."[22] The difference is that Ouyang Xiu – the political theorist of the 1040s Qingli reform – strongly opposed inquiry into human nature.[23] It seems to me that this is why Wang Anshi, who had reflected on why the earlier reform failed and was disappointed by the Qingli reformers' inability to accomplish something, could have forayed into this virgin zone, because only by changing human nature can dissidence be made to disappear and the self-regarding humans turned into selfless contributors to rapid increase in state power. Most importantly, only in this way can the success last, because then the people would act out of their hearts and remain unswayed by what they see and hear, as Wang stressed in "On *Li* and Music."

[21] Ivanhoe, "Hanfeizi and Moral Self-Cultivation," 35.
[22] Hartwell, "Historical analogism," 714.
[23] Ouyang Xiu, "Da Li Xu di er shu," in *Ouyang Xiu quanji*, 319. For a translation and discussion, see Fuller, "Moral Intuitions and Aesthetic Judgments," 1324-26.

In a letter to Zeng Gong, Wang characterized his learning as follows:

> I read everything, from the books of the hundred schools and the various masters to such minor theories like the *Canon of Difficult Issues*, *Plain Questions* and *Compendium of Materia Medica*, and I inquire of everyone, including farmers and craftswomen.[24] …He [Yang Xiong] first obtained his knowledge and then read, so as to adopt or reject things [from what he read]. Therefore, heterodox learnings cannot confuse him. It is only because he cannot be confused that he was able to adopt or reject things [from what he read], with which to illuminate my way and that is all.
> 某自百家諸子之書，至於《難經》、《素問》、《本草》諸小說，無所不讀。農夫女工，無所不問。…彼致其知而後讀，以有所去取，故異學不能亂也。惟其不能亂，故能有所去取者，所以明吾道而已。[25]

Wang read all the books that there were *after* he had gotten his ideas, so that he could select whatever is useful in them for his purpose and leaving out the rest. For instance, in *Laozi*, he drew upon the idea of *daode* and dialectics, but not non-action; in *Mencius*, he took away the aforementioned theories for transforming human nature, but dropped Mencius' idea that all humans are innately humane.

Using Laozi's idea of *daode* to centralize authority and discard the humanist virtues, building a state-wide government school system to firmly establish the replacement statist value system into the students' hearts on the basis of mainly Mencius' insight into human nature, using textbooks compiled in the form of commentaries on Confucian classics to implement this educational program, as well as drawing upon Confucius' teaching on the importance of rectifying names to justify the crafted nature and wielding Laozi's dialectics to carry out this social revolution, Wang Anshi's statecraft is one of a kind of its own. He integrated a wide range of knowledge available to him at that time into an original statecraft that was in essence an anti-humanist soulcraft: governing by transforming the self-governing literati, through whom to govern the populace, into obedient subjects of the ruler who would go all out to serve his state selflessly.

In the debate following the publication of Yu Yingshi's *The Historical World of Zhu Xi* (*Zhu Xi de lishi shijie* 朱熹的歷史世界), historians of middle period China have been trying to

[24] Translation modified from Bol's ("Government, Society, and State," 165).
[25] Wang Anshi, "Da Zeng Zigu shu," in *LCJ*, 73.779.

show that Zhu Xi was unlike Wang Anshi, in that he did not pin his agenda on getting imperial support.[26] The first half of Yu's equation – that Wang Anshi's writings on *daode* and *xingming* 道德性命 were about moral self-cultivation, like that of the neo-Confucians –, is yet to be scrutinized.[27] In his study of early Chinese political philosophy, Philip J. Ivanhoe makes a distinction among three different approaches to governance: self-cultivationist, cultivationist, and non-cultivationist.[28] To Ivanhoe, the Confucians were self-cultivationists, while the Mohists were cultivationists, in that in their pursuit of state success, they sought to cultivate the people with a uniform morality. Han Fei was an example of the non-cultivationists, because his advice to the ruler on paying attention to his public behavior was to Ivanhoe closer to public relations management or image-making rather than a demand on cultivating his character. It seem to me that, just like his learning was all-inclusive, Wang Anshi was three in one: for himself, he was a self-cultivationist, in that he abides by his principle in choosing whom to serve and whom not throughout his life and there is no report on his being corrupt,[29] although those sharing Chen Lai's view that "the *ru* learning of Confucius was originally the learning of *ren*" 孔子之儒學本來即是仁學[30] would object to calling him a "Confucian"; for members of the literati class other than himself, he was a cultivationist, in that he sought to use government school education to cultivate them with statist values from outside, the purpose of which was to remove their individuality, that by which to identify an individual self;[31] for the monarch he chose to serve, he is a non-cultivationist, in that he never asked Shenzong to cultivate the humanist virtues and he made clear that the statist values are not applicable to the ruler. What he asked Shenzong was only to heed his image when appearing before his subjects.

---

[26] Bol, "On the Problem of Contextualizing Ideas" and "Words and Ideas"; Hartman, "Zhu Xi and His World."
[27] Chu Ping-tzu has raised a question in this direction ("Ping Yu Yingshi xiansheng de *Zhu Xi de lishi shijie*," 258). Bol suggests conducting "a careful analysis of Wang Anshi's letters and essays" ("On the Problem of Contextualizing Ideas," 77). While this study did not confirm his surmise on the dating of Wang's essays, I hope it helps demonstrate Wang's fundamental difference from Zhu Xi.
[28] Ivanhoe, "Hanfeizi and Moral Self-Cultivation," 35-36.
[29] See, for example, Yang Zhongliang, *JSBM*, 59.1053.
[30] Chen Lai, *Renxue benti lun*, 29. When trying to make sense how the seemingly "Confucian" values like "loyalty, filial piety, diligence, self-discipline, and frugality" could be used to bring about "a powerful, interventionist, centralized government that explicitly aimed for a 'Wealthy Nation and Strong Army,'" Chaibong Hahm and Wooyeal Paik coined the term "Legalist Confucianism." It is perhaps no coincidence that Wang Anshi figured prominently in it ("Legalistic Confucianism and Economic Development in East Asia," 486).
[31] Notwithstanding the many issues involved in any attempt to characterize what is "Confucian," perhaps we can agree with Tu Wei-ming on this: "The self as the center of relationship has always been the focus of Confucian learning" (*Confucian Thought*, 55).

This is why Wang Anshi's statecraft was adhered to by Shenzong and his two sons from 1068 to 1125, so long as they were ruling in person: his was an antidote to literati self-governance, a novel way to govern the world that newly emerged in the Tang-Song transition as part of the ancient prose movement. First theorized by Han Yu in "Tracing the Way" and becoming the mainstream by the mid-eleventh century under the leadership of Ouyang Xiu, it resulted in a nadir of imperial authority when Shenzong took the throne.

In contrast to the vast majority of literati who were capitalizing on it to advance literati self-governance, Wang Anshi was dedicated to reversing this trend and he thought deeply on how to accomplish this. Against the ancient prose movement's spirit of moral autonomy, Wang recentralized moral authority to the ruler,[32] asking all the litearti to defer their right to decide what is the right thing to do to him.[33] Thinking humanist values counterproductive to state building, Wang introduced a statist value system to replace them. Because these values center on the ruler's state instead of individual human beings themselves, Wang devised a full procedure to firmly establish them in their hearts and chose government school education as the institution through which to carry out this human nature re-engineering project across the state. Using rhetorical devices, Wang justified this crafted nature as not inauthentic, but even superior to one's inborn nature.

Wang Anshi certainly was an ancient prose practitioner and he remained so his whole life, but the goal of his learning that guided the later reform was to end the movement, for to him, the moral individualism and value pluralism inherent in the writing of ancient prose got the world into great chaos, and its humanist orientation made it impossible for those aiming at accomplishing something to attain their goal. If, to use Jaeyoon Song's word, there was a "constitution"[34] before Wang came to power, the reform he designed was aimed at replacing it with a new one to the exact opposite. Benefiting from the political culture encouraging straightforward policy criticism that his theory sought to make disappear, Wang Anshi could regard himself as governing together with

[32] On Wang's dedication to centralizing authority to the monarch, see Song, *Traces of Grand Peace*, chapter 7; Yinan Luo, "Ideas in Practice," 103, 122; Zhao Dongmei, *Da Song zhi bian*, 226, 348.
[33] Zhao Dongmei, *Da Song zhi bian*, 460.
[34] Song, *Traces of Grand Peace*, 17-19.

the monarch,[35] or even above him, being his teacher on this statecraft,[36] but in seeking to unify morality, the literati were seen as the targets to be tamed, or, failing that, ostracized from the single-party political system.[37] In his pursuit of a perfect order where everyone upheld the same morality, Wang devised a statecraft that empowers the monarch at the cost of everyone else,[38] including himself.[39]

Despite the dedication of the three successive monarchs to hold on to Wang's soulcraft, however, the post-mid-Tang long-term trend toward decentralization as noted by William Skinner and Robert Hartwell did not get reversed but came back after the Zhao house fell captive to the Jurchens in 1126.[40] The path Han Yu opened and Ouyang Xiu carried forward eventually led to the Southern Song decentralized republic of virtue that remained the dominant way of governance for centuries thereafter,[41] only changing its grounding from in the phenomenal world of culture to the metaphysical Way.[42]

---

[35] Yu Yingshi, *Zhu Xi de lishi shijie*, 223-29. For a critical engagement with Yu's argument on these pages, see Chu Ping-tzu, "Ping Yu Yingshi xiansheng de *Zhu Xi de lishi shijie*," 283. For an argument building on Yu's argument, see Kim, "A Decentralized Republic of Virtue," 98-101.

[36] Song, "The *Zhou Li* 《周禮》 and Constitutionalism," 430 and 438n16. See also Jin Shengyang, "Lun Wang Anshi *Huainan zashuo* zhong de 'yi zhi' sixiang."

[37] Jaeyoon Song notes "Wang Anshi sought to enable the emperor to reassert direct control over the population" against "the conservatives' view of the emperor governing in collaboration with the literati" (*Traces of Grand Peace*, 166).

[38] During the Huizong era, only Wang's works were being published alongside the emperor's state documents (Zhu Shangshu, *Song ren bieji xu lu*, 317). This is perhaps because his serves the interest of the monarch.

[39] As can be seen from the case of Yu Fan discussed by Ming-kin Chu ("Official Recruitment, Imperial Authority, and Bureaucratic Power"). This is perhaps why the two female regents since the reform began were both sympathetic to the anti-reformers – they were victims to Wang's statecraft as well. For a sketch of their regency careers, see McMahon, *Celestial Women*, 17-19.

[40] By having the statist value system installed in the subjects' hearts before allowing them to act autonomously, Wang's statecraft can also be seen as a serious effort to address the lack of administrative capacity to manage a vast empire while retaining central control.

[41] Youngmin Kim, "A Decentralized Republic of Virtue," 101-06, 115-16. Taking the Jiayou-Zhiping period as the origin of Southern Song local elite activism can help explain why they kept invoking the Northern Song anti-reformers as their predecessors, as Hartman has noted (*The Making of Song Dynasty History*, especially chapter 8). Wang Ruilai also observes the continuity in theory of the monarch between Fan Zhongyan and the Neo-Confucians (*Tiandi jian qi*, 43). Cao Jiaqi points out "元祐初所行則主要以嘉祐之政為楷模" ("Zhao Song dang chao shengshi shuo zhi zaojiu jiqi yingxiang," 79), suggesting what was being restored during the Yuanyou period was the Jiayou system. While Hartman often uses "Qingli" to call this era, given he actually refers to the "Renzong-era figures such as Ouyang Xiu, Han Qi, Fu Bi, and Sima Guang" (*The Making of Song Dynasty History*, 45), what he has in mind is probably also the Jiayou period: Sima was not yet at a decision-making level during the Qingli period (1041-48) and the rest were only briefly in power in the 1040s.

[42] Zhu Xi was, like Cheng Yi, discontent with Ouyang in terms of the latter's stress on cultural forms. But in terms of the ancient prose movement's social-political advocacy – literati self-governance –, he no doubt carried Ouyang's enterprise forward. On literati voluntarism in the Song and Yuan dynasties, see Bol, *Neo-Confucianism in History*, 246-56. For the political philosophy underlying it, see Kim, "Zhu Xi's Political Philosophy in Context."

Appendix
Dating Wang Anshi's Two Major Works

In this appendix, I discuss the dates of composition of the two major sources used in this study – *Miscellaneous Theories from Huainan* and *Commentary on the "Great Plan,"* and, in relation to them, delineate the timeline of Wang Anshi's work on statecraft and evaluate a commonly used reference on dating Wang's prose pieces since 2005.

1. Dating *Miscellaneous Theories* and the timeline of Wang Anshi's work on statecraft

Regarding the date of composition of this work, on top of the decade-long range Lu Dian gave us, Liu Anshi's 劉安世 (1048-1125) report further narrowed down its public circulation to the early 1060s.[1] This suggests its composition was completed in the late 1050s, around the time when Wang composed the long letter to Renzong.

Some scholars think the *Miscellaneous Theories* was written in the early-to-mid 1040s.[2] This is more likely the starting point of Wang's work on it,[3] for if it had been finished at that time, it would be hard to explain why it could still impress Lu Dian as strikingly fresh nearly two decades later, or why Wang only got to make a name on it in the early 1060s.[4]

Moreover, it seems that in its taking the final shape, Wang Ling could have played a not insignificant role – in 1057, Ling was invited to live in Anshi's home for several months, the purpose of which, according to Anshi, was to "work on learning" (*xiu xue* 修學).[5]

Given the close correspondence between the ideas in the myriad-word letter and those in the *Miscellaneous Theories* volumes that we have seen, it is not impossible that Anshi had been finalizing his *Miscellaneous Theories* through discussions with Ling in the last few years before

---

[1] Ma Yongqing and Wang Chongqing, *Yuancheng yulu jie*, 6: "金陵在侍從時，…《淮南雜說》行乎時." Wang served as Drafter, a position considered "imperial attendant," from 1061/6 to 1063/8. See also Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, *Er Cheng ji*, 434.

[2] Yu Yingshi, *Zhu Xi de lishi shijie*, 125; Deng Guangming, *Bei Song zhengzhi gaigejia*, 7-8.

[3] On this my view is closer to Gao Keqin's ("Wang Anshi zhu shu kao," 87, quoted in Wang Shuhua, "Jinggong xinxue zhushu kaobian," 523). For indications of Wang's starting working on it, see, for example, Wang Anshi, "Yu Zu Zezhi shu," in *LCJ*, 77.812. This was written in 1046, right after Wang completed his three-year tenure in Huainan. See also id., "Shang Zhang taibo shu," in *LCJ*, 77.810 and "Shang ren shu," in *LCJ*, 77.811. Whether or not this was the embryo of the *Miscellaneous Theories*, not all that Wang considered representative of him at this time were necessarily included in the later book, and he certainly wrote more thereafter, for the eventual size to become "tens of thousands of words."

[4] Wang Anshi had had a reputation for being easy to be demoted but hard to be promoted for decades (Zhao Dongmei, *Da Song zhi bian*, 142). It was only after the late 1050s that he began to make a name for his ideas.

[5] Wang Ling, *Wang Ling ji*, 441-42. Ling's writings are worth looking into for possible further insight.

Ling's death in 1059. Some pieces in it, having just been worked out, were integrated into a massive reform blueprint on Wang Anshi's receiving a central government appointment,[6] for presentation to the emperor. Besides, this also fits with the dating of major individual pieces that I have discussed in chapter 2, like "Nine Changes" and "Inscription for Qian Prefectural School."

Based on these, we can reconstruct the timeline of Wang Anshi's work on statecraft:

By the late 1050s, Wang had completed building his political theory, which was systematically formulated in the *Miscellaneous Theories* and the *Commentary on the "Great Plan,"* the latter not unlikely circulated as part of the former.[7] These prepared the handy ideas for him to integrate when writing the myriad-word letter to Renzong between late 1058 and early 1059.

Between 1064 and 1065, during his mourning period for his mother, he further worked out the method for implementing this political theory in the "Inscription for Qian Preferectual School," his last major original theoretical work.

In 1068/4, when meeting Shenzong for the first time, he orally presented the gist of his statecraft, both his political theory and the method for its implementation, to the emperor, who found it convincing and commissioned Wang to act upon this blueprint step by step from 1069/2.[8]

In the early 1070s, Shenzong asked Wang Anshi to create a new curriculum based on the core ideas in his statecraft, resulting in the *New Meanings of the Three Classics* completed in 1075 that became textbooks used in government school education. These Wang kept revising into the 1080s, alongside his work on *Explication of Characters.*

2. Dating Wang Anshi's *Commentary on the "Great Plan"* and evaluating *Wang Jinggong wenji jianzhu*

About this commentary, Lu Dian reported it was available for him to obtain a copy between 1056 and 1067.[9] Li Tao further informed us that it was being cited in the 1070 decree exam[10] and

[6] This could have stimulated Wang with the access it granted him to Renzong, offering him opportunities to convince the emperor to adopt his ideas on governance.
[7] When speaking of Wang's representative work that made his first fame, both Cai Jing and Liu Anshi just mentioned *Miscellaneous Theories*.
[8] During the 1068/4 meeting, Shenzong asked Wang to write down what he orally presented him, but Wang did not eventually spell out his statecraft in one piece, perhaps not feeling comfortable leaving such a written record. On this, see Kong Xue, Wang Anshi Rilu *ji jiao*, preface. Zhao Dongmei offers an explanation from the political perspective (*Da Song zhi bian*, chapter 12).
[9] Lu Dian, "Fu Fujun muzhi," in Zeng Zaozhuang and Liu Lin eds., *Quan Song wen*, 101.244.
[10] Li Tao, *XCB*, 215.5246.

that Wang had presented a slightly revised edition of it to the emperor before 1070/10/17.[11] While we probably have no way to know the exact extent of revision,[12] "deleting, polishing, and calligraphing" (*shanrun shanxie* 刪潤繕寫)[13] isn't overhaul. These should be sufficient to locate the date of composition of the core ideas in the copy of it as found in *Collected Writings of Mr. Linchuan* to roughly the same time as *Miscellaenous Theories*, that is, around the late 1050s.[14]

In a frequently consulted annotated edition of Wang's prose pieces, however, Li Zhiliang claims it was written in early Yuanfeng (1078-1085), after Wang had permanently retired.[15] Because since its publication in 2005, it is common for scholars to rely on Li's view to decide when a prose piece was written by Wang Anshi,[16] it is necessary to take a close look at how Li arrived at his conclusion on this piece, as an illustration of his working method.

After stating his aforementioned view, Li cites a sentence from Cai Shangxiang's *Wang Jinggong nianpu kaolüe*, which speculates that Wang must have presented this to the emperor during the Yuanfeng period,[17] for which I have found no textual support. Then Li follows by saying that Gu Donggao in *Wang Jinggong nianpu* says this piece was written in 1077, also without giving the grounds. Thinking these point to a similar date, Li finishes substantiating his view that the composition of this text dates to early Yuanfeng. Neither of them, however, actually supports Li's view: Cai's was about its date of presentation, while Gu's date was not yet Yuanfeng. But the bigger issue is that Li only considers these two Qing views, for reasons unknown, while entirely ignoring those from the Song listed above, nor does he engage existing present-day scholarly views that date this commentary differently.[18] Unfortunately, for the seven volumes from 26 to 32 (corresponding to volumes 63-69 in *Collected Writings of Mr. Linchuan*), this is one of the only four pieces for which Li offers an explanation for his dating view at all.[19] For the rest, Li simply

[11] Li Tao, *XCB*, 216.5257; Wang Anshi, "Jin 'Hongfan' biao," in *LCJ*, 56.609.
[12] For discussions of the difference between this edition and the one Lu Dian read, see Hu Jinwang, "Wang Anshi '*Hongfan*' *zhuan* zuo nian lunbian," 276; and Zhang Bing, *"Hongfan" quanshi yanjiu*, 138-39.
[13] Wang Anshi, "Jin 'Hongfan' biao," in *LCJ*, 56.609.
[14] For example, Ma Zhenduo dates its completion to not too long before 1066 (*Zhengzhi gaigejia Wang Anshi*, 39). For a strong defense of this view, see Zhang Bing, *"Hongfan" quanshi yanjiu*, 138.
[15] Li Zhiliang, *Wang Jinggong wenji jianzhu*, 992.
[16] See, for example, Skonicki, "Cosmos, State and Society," 454n28; Song, *Traces of Grand Peace*, 362n11; Chen Yingrui, "Fa Kongshi zhi mi," 90n39; Hu Jinwang, *Wang Anshi de zhexue sixiang yu* Sanjingxinyi, 171n4. Yinan Luo quotes from it without discussing the issue of dating ("Ideas in Practice," chapter 1).
[17] Cai Shangxiang, *Wang Jinggong nianpu kaolüe*, 270.
[18] Like those mentioned above.
[19] The other three being "*Yi* fan lun" (Li Zhiliang, *Wang Jinggong wenji jianzhu*, 939), "Dui yi" (ibid., 988-89), and "Laozi" (ibid., 1083). The grounds he offered for the first two are speculative; those for the third are the view of Cai

gives a date without saying anything about his grounds, despite his declared claim to the contrary.[20] In this way, Li attained his goal of providing a date for all of Wang's prose pieces.[21] As such, in my discussions in the main body of this study, I have not referred to the dates Li gives but rather drawn on well-founded views there are and, failing that, provided my own analysis based on available evidence.[22]

Shangxiang, who was not determined on this dating but simply put it there based on apparent topical similarity to a dated letter (*Wang Jinggong nianpu kaolüe*, 308).

[20] Li Zhiliang, *Wang Jinggong wenji Jianzhu*, 11.

[21] Ibid. This was a goal at which other scholars have to admit their failure. See, for instance, Li Deshen, *Wang Anshi shi wen xi nian*, 2, and Liu Chengguo, *Wang Anshi nianpu changbian*, 709. On the quality of Li's other works, see Wang Shengduo punctuated, *Songshi quanwen*, 1-2; and Liu Chengguo, "Du *Wang Jinggong shi zhu bu jian* xian yi."

[22] This is not to say some of Li's dating cannot happen to be right, nor is it my intention to negate the convenience his work has provided Wang scholars, as the first detailed annotation of Wang's prose pieces. What I am stressing here is only the need to check his grounds before following his view. For instance, when Skonicki does this checking on this commentary, he decides to call its date of composition "indeterminate," given the differences between Li's view and the evidence from Lu Dian and Li Tao he noted ("Cosmos, State and Society," 454n28, 456-57).

Bibliography

Abbreviations for frequently cited works:

CJJ Sima Guang, *Sima Wenzhenggong chuanjia ji* 司馬溫正公傳家集

LCJ Wang Anshi, *Linchuan xiansheng wenji* 臨川先生文集

HCLJ Han Yu, *Han Changli wenji zhushi* 韓昌黎文集注釋

SHY Liu Lin et al. eds., *Song huiyao jigao* 宋會要輯稿

XCB Li Tao, *Xu Zizhitongjian changbian* 續資治通鑒長編

JSBM Yang Zhongliang, Huang Song Tongjian Changbian *jishi benmo* 皇宋通鑒長編紀事本末

XCBSB Huang Yizhou, Xuzizhitongjianchangbian *shibu* 續資治通鑒長編拾補

Ames, Roger T. "The Mencian Conception of *Ren xing* 人性: Does It Mean 'Human Nature'?" In *Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts: Essays Dedicated to Angus C. Graham,* ed. Henry Rosemont, Jr. Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1991, 143–75.

An, Wenyan 安文研. "Su Shi bian Meng kao" 蘇軾辨孟考. *Yunnan daxue xuebao (Shehui kexue ban)* 15, no. 3 (2016): 38–44.

Bai, Tongdong. *Against Political Equality: The Confucian Case*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2020.

Ban, Gu 班固. *Hanshu* 漢書. Commented by Yan Shigu 顏師古. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1962.

Barrett, T. H. *Taoism under the T'ang: Religion and Empire during the Golden Age of Chinese History*. London: The Wellsweep Press, 1996.

Benn, Charles David. "Taoism as Ideology in the Reign of Emperor Hsüan-Tsung (712-755)." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1977.

Bergeton, Uffe. "Found (and Lost?) in Translation: Culture in the *Analects*." *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 79, no. 1 & 2 (2019): 49–95.

———. "From 'Awe-Inspiringly Beautiful' to 'Pattern in Conventional Behavior': The Historical Development of the Metacultural Concept of Wen in Pre-Qin China." *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 139, no. 2 (June 2019): 433–54.

———. *The Emergence of Civilizational Consciousness in Early China: History Word by Word*. London and New York: Routledge, 2019.

Bi, Mingliang 畢明良. "Wang Anshi zhengzhi zhexue yanjiu" 王安石政治哲學研究. Ph.D. dissertation, Shanxi shifan daxue, 2012.

Bi, Yuan 畢沅. *Shanzuo jinshizhi* 山左金石志. Xuxiu Sikuquanshu, Shibu, Jinshi lei 909–910. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2002.

Black, Henry Campbell. *Black's Law Dictionary: Definitions of the Terms and Phrases of American and English Jurisprudence, Ancient and Modern*. Fourth Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1968.

Bloom, Irene. "Biology and Culture in the Mencian View of Human Nature." In *Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations,* ed. Alan K. L. Chan. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002, 91–102.

Bodde, Derk. *China's First Unifier: A Study of the Ch'in Dynasty as Seen in the Life of Li Ssu* 李斯. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1938.

Bol, Peter K. "A Literati Miscellany and Sung Intellectual History: The Case of Chang Lei's *Ming-Tao Tsa-Chih*." *Journal of Sung-Yuan Studies* 25 (1995): 121–51.

———. "Emperors Can Claim Antiquity Too: Emperorship and Autocracy Under the New Policies." In *Emperor Huizong and Late Northern Song China: The Politics of Culture and the Culture of Politics,* eds. Patracia Buckley Ebrey and Maggie Bickford. Cambridge (Mass.) and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006, 173–205.

———. "Examination and Orthodoxies: 1070 and 1313 Compared." In *Culture and State in Chinese History: Conventions, Accommodations, and Critiques,* eds. Theodore Huters, R. Bin Wong, and Pauline Yu. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1997, 29–57.

———. "Geography and Culture: Middle-Period Discourse on the *Zhong guo* -- The Central Country." In *Space and Cultural Fields: Spatial Images, Practices and Social Production,* ed. Huang Ying-Kuei 黃應貴. Taipei: Center for Chinese Studies 漢學研究中心, 2009, 61–105.

———. "Government, Society, and State: On the Political Visions of Ssu-Ma Kuang and Wang An-Shih." In *Ordering the World: Approaches to State and Society in Sung Dynasty China,* eds. Robert P. Hymes and Conrad Schirokauer. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford: University of California Press, 1993, 128–92.

———. *Neo-Confucianism in History*. Cambridge (Mass.) and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008.

———. "On the Problem of Contextualizing Ideas: Reflections on Yu Yingshi's Approach to the Study of Song Daoxue." *Journal of Song-Yuan Studies* 34 (2004): 59–79.

———. "Reconceptualizing the Order of Things in Northern and Southern Sung." In *Cambridge History of China*, *Volume 5, Part Two: Sung China, 960-1279,* eds. John W. Chaffee and Denis Twitchett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, 665–726.

———. "Review of *The Way of the Barbarians: Redrawing Ethnic Boundaries in Tang and Song China* by Shao-Yun Yang. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2019." *Journal of Chinese History*, 2020, 1–4. https://doi.org/10.1017/jch.2020.18.

———. "Seeking Common Ground: Han Literati under Jurchen Rule." *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 47, no. 2 (December 1987): 461–528.

———. "The Sung Context." In Kidder Smith Jr. et al., *Sung Dynasty Uses of the I Ching*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990, 26-55.

———. "There Has Never Been One Greater Than Confucius." In *Ways with Words: Writing about Reading Texts from Early China,* eds. Pauline Yu et al. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2000, 49–54.

———. *"This Culture of Ours": Intellectual Transitions in T'ang and Sung China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992.

———. "Wang Anshi and the *Zhouli*." In *Statecraft and Classical Learning: The Rituals of Zhou in East Asian History,* eds. Benjamin A. Elman and Martin Kern. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010*,* 229–51.

———. "Whither the Emperor? Emperor Huizong, the New Policies, and the Tang-Song Transition." *Journal of Sung-Yuan Studies* 31 (2001): 103–34.

———. "Words and Ideas -- Methodological Contexts for China's Intellectual History." In *Jinshi Zhongguo zhi bian yu bubian*. Taibei: Academia Sinica, 2013, 287–336.

Cai, Renhou 蔡仁厚. *Kong Meng Xun zhexue* 孔孟荀哲學. Taibei: Xuesheng shuju, 1984.

Cai, Shangxiang 蔡上翔. *Wang Jinggong nianpu kaolüe* 王荊公年譜考略. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1973.

Cao, Jiaqi 曹家齊. "'Jiayou zhi zhi' wenti tan lun" "嘉祐之治"問題探論. *Xueshu yuekan*, no. 9 (2004): 60–66.

———. “Zhao Song dang chao shengshi shuo zhi zaojiu jiqi yingxiang -- Songchao ‘Zuzong jiafa’ yu ‘Jiayou zhi zhi’ xin lun” 趙宋當朝盛世說之造就及其影響──宋朝“祖宗家法”與“嘉祐之治”新論. *Zhongguoshi yanjiu*, no. 4 (2007): 69–89.

Chaffee, John W. “Huizong, Cai Jing, and the Politics of Reform.” In *Emperor Huizong and Late Northern Song China: The Politics of Culture and the Culture of Politics,* eds. Patracia Buckley Ebrey and Maggie Bickford. Cambridge (Mass.) and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006, 31–77.

———. *The Thorny Gates of Learning in Sung China: A Social History of Examinations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Chao, Gongwu 晁公武. *Junzhai dushuzhi jiaozheng* 郡齋讀書志校證. Edited by Sun Meng 孫猛. Shanghai: Shanghai shiji chuban youxian gongsi, Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2011.

Chao, Shin-yi. “Huizong and the Divine Empyrean Palace 神霄宮 Temple Network.” In *Emperor Huizong and Late Northern Song China: The Politics of Culture and the Culture of Politics,* eds. Patracia Buckley Ebrey and Maggie Bickford. Cambridge (Mass.) and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006, 324–58.

Che, Hsing-chien 車行健. “Shi Lun Ouyang Xiu de Ruxue fan ben lun” 試論歐陽修的儒學返本論. *Dong Hwa Journal of Humanities* 東華人文學報, no. 11 (2007): 143–72.

Chen, Guan 陳瓘. *Song Zhongsu Chen Liaozhai Siming Zun Yao ji* 宋忠肅陳了齋四明尊堯集. Xuxiu Sikuquanshu, shibu, shiping lei 448. Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 2002.

Chen, Lai. “The Guodian Bamboo Slips and Confucian Theories of Human Nature.” *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, Supplement to Volume 37 (2010): 33–50.

——— 陳來. *Renxue benti lun* 仁學本體論. Beijing: SDX Sanlian shudian, 2014.

Chen, Qiyou 陳奇猷. Han Feizi *xin jiao zhu* 韓非子新校注. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2000.

Chen, Shidao 陳師道. *Houshan tancong* 後山談叢. Vol. 6. *Quan Song biji* 全宋筆記, II. Zhengzhou: Daxiang chubanshe, 2006.

Chen, Yingrui 陳盈瑞. “Fa Kongshi zhi mi -- Su Shi Lunyu *shuo* de bian Meng sixiang” 發孔氏之秘──蘇軾《論語說》的辯孟思想. *Journal of Chinese Literature of National Cheng Kung University* 成大中文學報, no. 44 (2014): 81–120.

Chen, Yinke 陳寅恪. “Lun Han Yu” 論韓愈. In *Jinmingguan cong gao chu bian* 金明館叢稿初編, Second edition. Beijing: SDX Sanlian shudian, 2009, 319–32.

Chen, Zhi’e 陳植鍔. *Bei Song wenhua shi shulun* 北宋文化史述論. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1992.

———. *Bei Song wenhua shi shulun* 北宋文化史述論. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2019.

Cheng, Hao 程顥, and Cheng Yi 程頤. *Er Cheng ji* 二程集. Second edition. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2004.

Cheng, Shude 程樹德. *Lunyu jishi* 論語集釋. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1990.

Cheng, Yuan-Min 程元敏. Sanjingxinyi *jikao huiping (1)* -- Shangshu 三經新義輯考彙評（一）——尚書. Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe, 2011.

Chiang, Kai-shek 蔣介石. *Xinshenghuo Yundong gangyao* 新生活運動綱要. Nanchang: Xinshenghuo yundong cujinhui, 1934.

Chiang, Shu-chun 江淑君. “Wang Pang Laozi *zhu* ‘xing lun’ fawei -- Jianlun ‘Yuan Ru ru *Lao*’ zhi quanjie xiangdu” 王雱《老子注》‘性論’發微──兼論“援儒入《老》之詮解向度. *The Journal of Society for Humanities Studies in East Asia* 東亞人文學, no. 2 (2002): 119–46.

Chin, Annping, trans. *Confucius* The Analects *(*Lunyu*)*. New York: Penguin Books, 2014.

Chu, Ming-kin 朱銘堅. “Bei Song Taixue Su Jia an kao shi” 北宋太學蘇嘉案考釋. *Journal of Chinese Studies* 中國文化研究所學報, no. 56 (January 2013): 143–67.

———. “Official Recruitment, Imperial Authority, and Bureaucratic Power: Political Intrigue in the Case of Yu Fan.” *Journal of Song-Yuan Studies* 45 (2015): 207–38.

———. “Pursuing Moral Governance: The Political and Social Implications of the Baxing (Eight Virtues) Scheme in Late Northern Song (960-1127) China.” *Monumenta Serica* 66, no. 1 (2018): 33–70.

———. *The Politics of Higher Education: The Imperial University in Northern Song China*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2020.

Chu, Ping-tzu 祝平次. “Ping Yu Yingshi xiansheng de *Zhu Xi de lishi shijie: Songdai shidafu zhengzhi wenhua de yanjiu*” 評余英時先生的《朱熹的歷史世界：宋代士大夫政治文

化的研究》. *Journal of Chinese Literature of National Cheng Kung University* 成大中文學報, no. 19 (2007): 249–98.

Cinpoes, Radu. *Nationalism and Identity in Romania: A History of Extreme Politics from the Birth of the State to EU Accession*. London and New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2010.

Cook, Scott. *The Bamboo Texts of the Guodian: A Study and Complete Translation*. Ithaca, New York: The East Asia Program, Cornell University, 2012.

Creel, Herrlee G. *Confucius and the Chinese Way*. New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1960.

———. *Shen Pu-hai: A Chinese Political Philosopher of the Fourth Century B.C.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1974.

Cua, A. S. *Moral Vision and Tradition: Essays in Chinese Ethics*. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1998.

———. "Virtues of Junzi." In *Confucian Ethics in Retrospect and Prospect,* eds. Vincent Shen and Kwong-Loi Shun, Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2008, 7–26.

Cui, Yingchao 崔英超, and Zhang Qifan 張其凡. "Xi Feng bianfa zhong Song Shenzong zuoyong zhi kaoxi" 熙豐變法中宋神宗作用之考析. *Jinan xuebao (Renwen kexue yu shehui kexue ban)*, no. 3 (2004): 116–23.

Dai, Jianguo 戴建國. "Xi Feng zhaoyu yu Bei Song zhengzhi" 熙豐詔獄與北宋政治. *Shanghai shifan daxue xuebao (Zhexue shehui kexue ban)* 42, no. 1 (2013): 114–127.

Dai, Wang 戴望. *Guanzi jiaozheng* 管子校正. In *Zhuzi jicheng* 諸子集成. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2006.

Dalby, Michael T. "Court Politics in Late T'ang Times." In *The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 3, Sui and T'ang China, 589-906, Part 1,* ed. Denis Twitchett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, 561–681.

de Bary, Wm. Theodore, and Irene Bloom eds. *Sources of Chinese Tradition, Volume One*. Second edition. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.

———. "A Reappraisal of Neo-Confucianism." In *Studies in Chinese Thought,* ed. Arthur F. Wright. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953, 81–111.

de Pee, Christian. “Notebooks (*Biji*) and Shifting Boundaries of Knowledge in Eleventh Century China.” *The Medieval Globe* 3, no. 1 (2017): 129–68.

De Weerdt, Hilde. *Competition over Content: Negotiating Standards for the Civil Service Examinations in Imperial China (1127-1279)*. Cambridge (Mass.) and London: Harvard University Asia Center, distributed by Harvard University Press, 2007.

———. “Empire and the Institutions and Practices of Classicizing Learning.” Work in progress.

———. “Recent Trends in American Research in Song Dynasty History,” 2016.

———. “Reinventing Chinese Political History.” Leiden University Repository, November 7, 2014. https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/29857.

———. “Review of Nicolas Tackett. *The Origins of the Chinese Nation: Song China and the Forging of an East Asia World Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.” *H-Nationalism, H-Net Review*, August 2018.

———. “What Did Su Che See in the North? Publishing Laws, State Security, and Political Culture in Song China.” *T’oung Pao* 92, no. 4–5 (2006): 466–94.

De Weerdt, Hilde, and David McMullen. “Introduction.” In *The Essentials of Governance*, by Wu Jing. Edited by Hilde De Weerdt, Glen Dudbridge, and Gabe van Beijeren. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020, xv-lxii.

DeBlasi, Anthony. *Reform in the Balance: The Defense of Literary Culture in Mid-Tang China*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002.

Defoort, Carine. “The Rhetorical Power of Naming: The Case of Regicide.” *Asian Philosophy* 8, no. 2 (1998): 111–18.

Denecke, Wiebke. *The Dynamics of Masters Literature: Early Chinese Thought from Confucius to Han Feizi*. Cambridge (Mass.) and London: Harvard University Asia Center, distributed by Harvard University Press, 2010.

Deng, Guangming 鄧廣銘. *Bei Song zhengzhi gaigejia Wang Anshi* 北宋政治改革家王安石. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1997.

———. *Deng Guangming zhishi conggao* 鄧廣銘治史叢稿. Beijing: Beijing Daxue chubanshe, 2010.

Deng, Tanzhou 鄧潭洲. “Lun Su Shi *Shuzhuan* de zhengzhi sixiang” 論蘇軾《書傳》的政治思想. *Qiusuo*, no. 6 (1989): 73–77.

Dirlik, Arif. "The Ideological Foundations of the New Life Movement: A Study in Counterrevolution." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 34, no. 4 (1975): 945–80.

Drechsler, Wolfgang. "Beyond the Western Paradigm: Confucian Public Administration." In *Public Policy in the "Asian Century": Concepts, Cases and Futures,* eds. Sara Bice, Avery Poole, and Helen Sullivan. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018, 19–40.

———. "Debate: Once Again Wang Anshi and Confucian Public Management." *Public Money & Management* 35, no. 4 (2015): 254–55.

———. "Debate: Towards Understanding Wang Anshi and Confucian Public Management." *Public Money & Management* 34, no. 4 (2014): 246–48.

———. "Max Weber and the Mandate of Heaven." *Max Weber Studies* 20, no. 1 (2020): 25–56.

———. "Paradigms of Non-Western Public Administration and Governance." In *The International Handbook of Public Administration and Governance,* eds. Andrew Massey and Karen Johnston. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015, 104–31.

———. "Wang Anshi and the Origins of Modern Public Management in Song Dynasty China." *Public Money & Management* 33, no. 5 (2013): 353–60.

Dunn, John. "The Concept of 'Trust' in the Politics of John Locke." In *Philosophy in History: Essays on the Historiography of Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 279-301.

Durrant, Stephen, Wai-yee Li, and David Shaberg, trans. *Zuo Tradition / Zuozhuan: Commentary on the "Spring and Autumn Annals."* Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2016.

Ebrey, Patricia Buckley. *Emperor Huizong*. Cambridge (Mass.) and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2014.

———. "Huizong's Stone Inscriptions." In *Emperor Huizong and Late Northern Song China: The Politics of Culture and the Culture of Politics*, eds. by Patricia Buckley Ebrey and Maggie Bickford. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2006, 229–74.

Ebrey, Patricia Buckley, and Maggie Bickford, eds. *Emperor Huizong and Late Northern Song China: The Politics of Culture and the Culture of Politics*. Cambridge (Mass.) and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006.

Egan, Ronald. *The Literary Works of Ou-Yang Hsiu (1007-1072)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

———. *Word, Image, and Deed in the Life of Su Shi*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994.

Elman, Benjamin A. "Rethinking 'Confucianism' and 'Neo-Confucianism' in Modern Chinese History." In *Rethinking Confucianism: Past and Present in China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam*, eds. Benjamin A. Elman, John B. Duncan, and Herman Ooms. Los Angeles: University of California, Los Angeles, 2002, 518–54.

Fang, Xiaoyi 方笑一. *Bei Song Xinxue yu wenxue – Yi Wang Anshi wei zhongxin* 北宋新學與文學──以王安石為中心. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2008.

Fang, Xuanling 房玄齡. *Jin shu* 晉書. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974.

Feldt, Alex. "Governing through the Dao: A Non-Anarchistic Interpretation of the Laozi." *Dao* 9, no. 3 (2010): 323–37.

Foong, Ping. *The Efficacious Landscape: On the Authorities of Painting at the Northern Song Court*. Cambridge (Mass.) and London: Harvard University Asia Center, distributed by Harvard University Press, 2015.

Forrester, Katrina. *In the Shadow of Justice: Postwar Liberalism and the Remaking of Political Philosophy*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2019.

Freeman, Michael Dennis. "Lo-Yang and Opposition to Wang An-Shih: The Rise of Confucian Conservatism, 1068-1086." Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1973.

Fu, Sinian 傅斯年. *Xing ming gu xun bianzheng* 性命古訓辨證. *Fu Sinian quanji*. Vol. 2. Changsha: Hunan jiaoyu chubanshe, [1938] 2003.

Fu, Zhengyuan. *China's Legalists: The Earliest Totalitarians and Their Art of Ruling*. Armonk, New York and London, England: M. E. Sharpe, 1996.

Fuller, Michael A. "Aesthetics and Meaning in Experience: A Theoretical Perspective on Zhu Xi's Revision of Song Dynasty Views of Poetry." *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 65, no. 2 (2005): 311–55.

———. *Drifting among Rivers and Lakes: Southern Song Dynasty Poetry and the Problem of Literary History*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center, 2013.

———. “Moral Intuitions and Aesthetic Judgments: The Interplay of Poetry and Daoxue in Southern Song China.” In *Modern Chinese Religion I: Song-Liao-Jin-Yuan (968-1368AD)*. Leiden: Brill, 2014, 1307–77.

———. *The Road to East Slope: The Development of Su Shi’s Poetic Voice*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990.

Gališanka, Andrius. *John Rawls: The Path to a Theory of Justice*. Cambridge (Mass.) and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2019.

Gao, Buying 高步瀛. *Tang Song wen ju yao* 唐宋文舉要. Hong Kong: Zhonghua shuju, 1976.

Gao, Keqin 高克勤. *Wang Anshi shiwen xuan ping* 王安石詩文選評. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2002.

———. “Wang Anshi zhushu kao 王安石著述考.” *Fudan xuebao (Shehui kexue ban)*, no. 1 (1988): 83-89+30.

Ge, Xiaoyin 葛曉音. “Ouyang Xiu paiyi ‘Taixueti’ xin tan” 歐陽修排抑‘太學體’新探. In *Han Tan wenxue de shanbian* 漢唐文學的嬗變. Beijing: Beijing Daxue chubanshe, 1990, 208–14.

Geng, Liangzhi 耿亮之. “Wang Anshi Yixue yuqi Xinxue ji Luoxue” 王安石易學與其新學及洛學. *Zhouyi yanjiu*, no. 4 (1997): 37–45.

Goldin, Paul R. *After Confucius: Studies in Early Chinese Philosophy*. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2005.

———. *Confucianism*. Ancient Philosophies. Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2011.

———. “Confucius and His Disciples in the *Lunyu*: The Basis for the Traditional View.” In *Confucius and the* Analects *Revisited: New Perspectives on Composition, Dating, and Authorship,* eds. Michael Hunter and Martin Kern. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2018, 92–115.

———, ed. *Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Han Fei*. Dordrecht etc.: Springer, 2013.

———. “Persistent Misconceptions about Chinese ‘Legalism.’” *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 38, no. 1 (2011): 88–104.

———. *Rituals of the Way: The Philosophy of Xunzi*. Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1999.

Goldschmidt, Asaf. “Huizong’s Impact on Medicine and on Public Health.” In *Emperor Huizong and Late Northern Song China: The Politics of Culture and the Culture of Politics,* eds. Patracia Buckley Ebrey and Maggie Bickford. Cambridge (Mass.) and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006, 275–323.

Gordon, Peter. “Contextualism and Criticism in the History of Ideas.” In *Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History,* eds. Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 32–55.

Graham, A.C., trans. *Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters*. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2001.

Gu, Jian 谷建. “Su Shi Lunyu *shuo* jiyi buzheng” 蘇軾《論語說》輯佚補正. *Kongzi yanjiu*, no. 3 (2008): 41–48.

Gu, Yongxin 顧永新. *Ouyang Xiu xueshu yanjiu* 歐陽修學術研究. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2003.

Guarino, Marie. “Learning and Imperial Authority in Northern Sung China (960-1126).” Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1994.

Guo, Xiang 郭象 and Cheng Xuanying 成玄英 commented, Cao Chuji 曹礎基 and Huang Lanfa 黃蘭發 eds. Zhuangzi *zhushu* 莊子注疏. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2011.

Hahm, Chaibong, and Wooyeal Paik. “Legalistic Confucianism and Economic Development in East Asia.” *Journal of East Asian Studies* 3, no. 3 (2003): 461–91.

Han, Yu 韓愈. *Han Changli wenji zhushi* 韓昌黎文集注釋*, Volumes 1 and 2*. Edited by Yan Qi 閻琦. Xi’an: Sanqin chubanshe, 2004.

Hankins, James. “Exclusivist Republicanism and the Non-Monarchical Republic.” *Political Theory* 38, no. 4 (2010): 452–82.

———. *Virtue Politics: Soulcraft and Statecraft in Renaissance Italy*. Cambridge (Mass.) and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2019.

Harris, Eirik Lang. “Critiquing Heavily Normative Conceptions of Harmony: Thoughts from the *Han Feizi*.” *Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture* 33 (February 2020): 155–79.

———. “Han Fei on the Problem of Morality.” In *Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Han Fei,* ed. Paul R. Goldin. Dordrecht etc.: Springer, 2013, 107–31.

———. “Han Feizi’s Criticism of Confucianism and Its Implications for Virtue Ethics.” *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 5, no. 3 (2008): 423–53.

———. “Legalism: Introducing a Concept and Analyzing Aspects of Han Fei’s Political Philosophy.” *Philosophy Compass* 9, no. 3 (2014): 155–64.

Harris Jr., Robert E. *Painting and Private Life in Eleventh-Century China: Mountain Villa by Li Gonglin*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998.

Hartman, Charles. “Bibliographic Notes on Sung Historical Works: Topical Narratives from the *Long Draft Continuation of the Comprehensive Mirror that Aids Administration* (*Hsü tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien chi-shih pen-mo* 續資治通鑑長編紀事本末) by Yang Chung-liang 楊仲良 and Related Texts.” *Journal of Sung-Yuan Studies* 28 (1998): 177–200.

———. *Han Yü and the T’ang Search for Unity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

———. “Historical Narrative and the Two Faces of Song Dynasty Governance.” Second Middle Period Chinese Humanities Conference, Leiden, 2017.

———. “Poetry and Politics in 1079: The Crow Terrace Poetry Case of Su Shih.” *Chinese Literature: Essays, Articles, Reviews (CLEAR)* 12 (1990): 15–44.

———. “Sung Government and Politics.” In *Cambridge History of China, Volume 5, Part Two: Sung China, 960-1279,* eds. John W. Chaffee and Denis Twitchett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, 19–138.

———. *The Making of Song Dynasty History: Sources and Narratives, 960-1279 CE*. Cambridge, New York, etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2021.

———. “Zhu Xi and His World.” *Journal of Song-Yuan Studies*, no. 36 (2006): 107–31.

Hartwell, Robert M. “Demographic, Political, and Social Transformations of China, 750-1550.” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 42, no. 2 (1982): 365–442.

———. “Historical Analogism, Public Policy, and Social Science in Eleventh- and Twelfth-Century China.” *The American Historical Review* 76, no. 3 (June 1971): 690–727.

Higashi, Hidetoshi 東英壽. *Fugu yu chuangxin -- Ouyang Xiu sanwen yu guwen fuxing* 復古與創新──歐陽修散文與古文復興. Shanghai: Shiji chuban jituan; Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2005.

Hinton, David, trans. *Chuang Tzu: The Inner Chapters*. Berkeley, CA: Counterpoint, 2014.

Hoffman, Stefan-Ludwig. “Koselleck, Arendt, and the Anthropology of Historical Experience.” *History and Theory* 49, no. 2 (May 2010): 212–36.

Hong, Benjian 洪本健. *Ouyang Xiu shi wen ji jiao jian* 歐陽修詩文集校箋. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2009.

Hong, Mai 洪邁. *Rongzhai suibi* 容齋隨筆. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2005.

Hong, Ye 洪業, Nie Chongqi 聶崇岐, Li Shuchun 李書春, Zhao Fengtian 趙豐田, and Ma Xiyong 馬錫用, eds. *Wanyanji shan cun* 琬琰集刪存. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1990.

Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor W. Adorno. *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*. Edited by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr and Edmund Jephcott. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2002.

Hou, Wailu 侯外廬, ed. *Zhongguo sixiang tongshi, IV-1* 中國思想通史第四卷上冊. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1959.

Hsia, Chang-pwu 夏長樸. *Li Gou yu Wang Anshi yanjiu* 李覯與王安石研究. Taipei: Da’an chubanshe, 1989.

———. “Wang Anshi sixiang yu Mengzi de guanxi” 王安石思想與孟子的關係. In *Jinian Sima Guang Wang Anshi shishi jiubai zhounian xueshuyantaohui lunwenji* 紀念司馬光王安石逝世九百週年學術研討會論文集. Taibei: Wenshizhe chubanshe, 1986, 295–326.

Hsiao, Kung-chuan 蕭公權. *Zhongguo zhengzhi sixiang shi* 中國政治思想史. Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2014.

Hu, Jinwang 胡金旺. “Lun Su Shi de ‘bian Meng’ sixiang” 論蘇軾的“辨孟”思想. *Beijing huagong daxue xuebao (Shehui kexue ban)*, no. 1 (2012): 30–34.

———. “Wang Anshi ‘“Hongfan” zhuan’ zuonian lunbian” 王安石《洪範傳》作年論辨. *Zhongnan daxue xuebao (Shehui kexue ban)* 20, no. 3 (June 2014): 273–77.

———. *Wang Anshi de zhexue sixiang yu* Sanjingxinyi 王安石的哲學思想與《三經新義》. Beijing: Guangming ribao chubanshe, 2014.

Hu, Yongguang. “Cultivating Merit: The Three Hall System in Late Northern Song, 1070-1121.” Ph.D. dissertation, Binghamton University, State University of New York, 2011.

———. “The Eight Virtue System in Late Northern Sung China.” *Virginia Review of Asian Studies* 18 (2016): 160–80.

Huang, Chun-chieh. “Chinese Hermeneutics as Politics: The Sung Debates over Mencius.” In *Classics and Interpretations: The Hermeneutic Traditions in Chinese Culture,* ed. Ching-i Tu. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2000, 195–211.

———. “The Rise of the Mencius: Historical Interpretations of Mencian Morality, ca. A.D. 200-1200.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1980.

Huang, Gongzhu 黃公渚, ed. *Ouyang Yongshu wen* 歐陽永叔文. Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1934.

Huang, Pengnian 黃彭年. *Jifu tongzhi* 畿輔通志. 300 volumes, [1885] 1928.

Huang, Yizhou 黃以周. Xu Zizhitongjianchangbian *shibu* 續資治通鑒長編拾補. Edited by Gu Jichen 顧吉辰. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2004.

Hunter, Michael. *Confucius beyond the* Analects. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2017.

Hunter, Michael, and Martin Kern eds. *Confucius and the* Analects *Revisited: New Perspectives on Composition, Dating, and Authorship*. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2018.

Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: Simon & Schuster, 1996.

Hutton, Eric. *Xunzi: The Complete Text*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014.

Hutton, Eric L., ed. *Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Xunzi*. Dordrecht etc.: Springer, 2016.

———. “Ethics in the Xunzi.” In *Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Xunzi,* ed. Eric L. Hutton. Dordrecht etc.: Springer, 2016, 67–93.

Hymes, Robert. “Sung Society and Social Change.” In *Cambridge History of China, Volume 5, Part Two: Sung China, 960-1279,* eds. John W. Chaffee and Denis Twitchett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, 526–664.

Hymes, Robert P., and Conrad Schirokauer. “Introduction,” in *Ordering the World: Approaches to State and Society in Sung Dynasty China*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford: University of California Press, 1993, 1–58.

Idema, Wilt. “Poet versus Minister and Monk: Su Shi on Stage in the Period 1250-1450.” *T’oung Pao* LXXIII (1987): 190–216.

Ivanhoe, Philip J. “A Happy Symmetry: Xunzi’s Ethical Thought.” *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 59, no. 2 (1991): 309–22.

———. *Confucian Moral Self Cultivation*. Second edition. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2000.

———. “Confucian Self Cultivation and Mengzi’s Notion of Extension.” In *Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi,* eds. Xiusheng Liu and Philip J. Ivanhoe. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2002, 221–41.

———. “Hanfeizi and Moral Self-Cultivation.” *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 38, no. 1 (2011): 31–45.

———. “Heaven as a Source for Ethical Warrant in Early Confucianism.” *Dao* 6, no. 3 (2007): 211–20.

———. “Mohist Philosophy.” In *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* ed. Edward Craig. London and New York: Routledge, 1998.

———, trans. *The* Daodejing 道德經 *of Laozi* 老子. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2003.

———. “Thinking and Learning in Early Confucianism.” *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 17, no. 4 (1990): 473–93.

———. *Three Streams: Confucian Reflections on Learning and the Moral Heart-Mind in China, Korea, and Japan*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.

———. “Was Zhuangzi a Relativist?” In *Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi*, eds. Paul Kjellberg and Philip J. Ivanhoe. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996, 196–214.

———. “Whose Confucius? Which Analects?” In *Confucius and the* Analects*: New Essays,* ed. Bryan W. Van Norden. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, 119–33.

Jay, Jennifer W. *A Change in Dynasties: Loyalism in Thirteenth-Century China*. Bellingham, Washington: Western Washington University, 1991.

Jiang, Peng 姜鵬. *Bei Song jingyan yu Songxue de xingqi* 北宋經筵與宋學的興起. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2013.

Jiang, T. H., and Shaun O’Dwyer. “The Universal Ambitions of China’s Illiberal Confucian Scholars.” *Palladium Magazine*, September 26, 2019. https://palladiummag.com/2019/09/26/the-universal-ambitions-of-chinas-illiberal-confucian-scholars/. Accessed March 25, 2021.

Ji, Xiao-bin. *Politics and Conservatism in Northern Song China: The Career and Thought of Sima Guang (1019-1086)*. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2005.

Jin, Shengyang 金生楊. “Bei Song fei xingmingxue de xingqi yu zhuanbian” 北宋非性命學的興起與轉變. *Xihua shifan daxue xuebao (Zhexue shehui kexue ban)*, no. 5 (2011): 62–68.

———. “Lun Su Shi de Meng xue sixiang” 論蘇軾的孟學思想. In *Xibu quyu wenhua yanjiu* 西部區域文化研究, eds. Wang Shengming and Jin Shengyang. Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 2013.

———. “Lun Wang Anshi *Huainan zashuo* zhong de ‘yi zhi’ sixiang 論王安石《淮南雜說》中的‘異志’思想.” *Sichuan Daxue xuebao (Zhexue shehui kexue ban)*, no. 6 (2002): 89–93.

———. *Su shi* Yizhuan *yanjiu* 蘇氏《易傳》研究. Chengdu: Bashu shushe, 2002.

———. “Wang Anshi *Yijie* yu Mengzi de guanxi chuyi” 王安石《易解》與《孟子》的關係芻議. *Sichuan shifan xueyuan xuebao (Zhexue shehui kexue ban)*, no. 5 (2002): 85–88.

Kern, Martin. “The ‘Masters’ in the *Shiji*.” *T’oung Pao* 101, no. 4–5 (2015): 335–62.

Kim, Sungmoon. *Theorizing Confucian Virtue Politics: The Political Philosophy of Mencius and Xunzi*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020.

Kim, Youngmin. “A Decentralized Republic of Virtue: True Way Learning in the Southern Song Period and Beyond.” In *Deparochializing Political Theory,* ed. Melissa S. Williams. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020, 93–119.

———. *A History of Chinese Political Thought*. Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2018.

———. “Zhu Xi’s Political Philosophy in Context: With Special Focus on His Commentaries of the Four Books.” in *Dao Companion to Zhu Xi’s Philosophy,* eds. Kai-Chiu Ng and Yong Huang (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2020), 499–522.

Knoblock, John. *Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, Volume III, Books 17-32*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1994.

Kondō, Kazunari 近藤一成. “Wang Anshi de keju gaige” 王安石的科舉改革. In *Riben zhongqingnian xuezhe lun Zhongguoshi Song-Yuan-Ming-Qing juan* 日本中青年學者論中國史 宋元明清卷. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1995, 136–66.

Kong, Fanli 孔凡禮. *Su Shi nianpu* 蘇軾年譜. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1998.

Koselleck, Reinhart. *Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathologies of Modern Society*. Cambridge (Mass.): The MIT Press, 1959.

———. *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*. Translated by Keith Tribe. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.

———. *Sediments of Time: On Possible Histories*. Translated by Sean Franzel and Stefan-Ludwig Hoffman. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2018.

Kracke, Edward A. "The Expansion of Educational Opportunity in the Reign of Hui-Tsung of the Sung and Its Implications." *Sung Studies Newsletter* 13 (1977): 6–30.

Lagerwey, Benjamin. *Taoist Ritual in Chinese Society and History*. New York: Macmillan, 1987.

Lai, Karyn. "*Li* in the *Analects*: Training in Moral Competence and the Question of Flexibility." *Philosophy East and West* 56, no. 1 (January 2006): 69–83.

Lam, Joseph S. C. "Huizong's Dashengyue, a Musical Performance of Emperorship and Officialdom." In *Emperor Huizong and Late Northern Song China: The Politics of Culture and the Culture of Politics,* eds. Patracia Buckley Ebrey and Maggie Bickford. Cambridge (Mass.) and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006, 395–452.

Lau, D. C., trans. *Confucius:* The Analects. London: Penguin Books, 1979.

Lau, D. C., trans. *Mencius*. London: Penguin Books, 2003.

Lee, Thomas H. C. *Government Education and Examinations in Sung China*. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1985.

Legge, James, trans. *The Four Books*. Shanghai: The Commercial Press LTD, 1930.

———. *The Shoo King. Second Edition with Minor Text Corrections and a Concordance Table*. Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc., 1991.

Leng, Chengjin 冷成金. *Su Shi de zhexue guan yu wenyi guan* 蘇軾的哲學觀與文藝觀. Beijing: Xueyuan chubanshe, 2004.

Levine, Ari Daniel. "A Performance of Transparency: Discourse of Veracity and Practices of Verification in Li Tao's *Long Draft*." In *Powerful Arguments: Standards of Validity in Late Imperial China,* eds. Martin Hofmann, Joachim Krutz, and Ari Daniel Levine. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2020, 90–134.

———. "Che-Tsung's Reign (1085-1100) and the Age of Faction." In *The Cambridge History of China, Volume 5, Part One: Sung China, 960-1279,* eds. Denis Twitchett and Paul Jakov Smith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 484–555.

———. "Court and Country: Discourses of Social-Political Collaboration in Northern and Southern Song China." *The Medieval History Journal* 19, no. 2 (2016): 351–93.

———. *Divided by a Common Language: Factional Conflict in Late Northern Song China*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008.

———. "The Reigns of Hui-Tsung (1100-1126) and Ch'in-Tsung (1126-1127) and the Fall of the Northern Sung." In *The Cambridge History of China, Volume 5, Part One: Sung China, 960-1279,* eds. Denis Twitchett and Paul Jakov Smith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 556–643.

Li, Cunshan 李存山. *Zhongguo qi lun tanyuan yu fawei* 中國氣論探源與發微. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1990.

Li, Deshen 李德身. *Wang Anshi shi wen xinian* 王安石詩文系年. Xi'an: Shanxi renmin chubanshe, 1987.

Li, Gou 李覯. *Li Gou ji* 李覯集. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2011.

Li, Guoqiang 李國強. "Lun Bei Song Xining bianfa de shizhi" 論北宋熙寧變法的實質. *Shi lin*, no. 2 (2011): 66–71.

Li, Huarui 李華瑞. "Lun Bei Song houqi liushi nian de gaige 論北宋後期六十年的改革." *Huazhong guoxue* 8 (spring 2017): 189–200.

———. "Northern Song Reformist Thought and Its Sources." In *State Power in China, 900-1325,* eds., Patricia Ebrey and Paul Smith. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2016, 219–43.

———. "Songdai jianxing Mengzi de renzheng sixiang" 宋代踐行孟子的仁政思想. *Zhongguo shehui kexue bao*, February 23, 2018.

———. *Wang Anshi Bianfa yanjiu shi* 王安石變法研究史. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2004.

Li, Jingde 黎靖德, ed. *Zhuzi yulei* 朱子語類. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986.

Li, Junxiu 李峻岫. "Tang zhi Bei Song keju zhidu biange yu *Mengzi* jingxue diwei de queli" 唐至北宋科舉制度變革與《孟子》經學地位的確立. In *Rujia dianji yu sixiang yanjiu 4* 儒家典籍與思想研究第四輯*,* ed. Beijing Daxue *Ruzang* bianzhuan yu yanjiu zhongxin. Beijing: Beijing Daxue chubanshe, 2012, 159–75.

Li, Longji 李隆基, and Xing Bing 邢昺. Xiaojing *zhushu* 孝經注疏. In *Shisanjing zhushu* (Zhengli ben) 十三經注疏（整理本）. Beijing: Beijing Daxue chubanshe, 2000.

Li, Tao 李燾. *Xu Zizhitongjian changbian* 續資治通鑒長編. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2004.

Li, Xiangjun 李祥俊. *Wang Anshi xueshu sixiang yanjiu* 王安石學術思想研究. Beijing: Beijing shifan daxue chubanshe, 2000.

Li, Yumin 李裕民. “Song Shenzong zhizao de yizhuang da yuan’an -- Zhao Shiju an pouxi” 宋神宗製造的一樁大冤案──趙世居案剖析. In *Qingzhu Deng Guangming jiaoshou jiushi huadan lunwenji* 慶祝鄧慶銘教授九十華誕論文集, ed. Tian Yuqing. Shijiazhuang: Hebei jiaoyu chubanshe, 1997, 171–81.

———. “Wutai Shi’an xin tan” 烏臺詩案新探. In *Songshi kao lun* 宋史考論. Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 2009, 24–34.

Li, Yun-long 李雲龍. “Su Shi *Dongpo Shuzhuan* yanjiu” 蘇軾《東坡書傳》研究. MA thesis, National Chengchi University, 2000.

Li, Zhiliang 李之亮. *Wang Jinggong wenji jianzhu* 王荊公文集箋注. Chengdu: Bashu shushe, 2005.

Liang, Jiong 梁迥 ed. Daodezhenjing *jizhu* 道德真經集注. In *Daozang* 道藏. Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin: Wenwu chubanshe, Shanghai shudian, and Tianjin guji chubanshe, 1988.

Liang, Tao 梁濤. “Wang Anshi de xin waiwang zhengzhi zhexue” 王安石的新外王政治哲學. In *Zhongguo zhengzhi zhexue shi, Vol. 2* 中國政治哲學史, 第二卷, ed. Peng Yongjie 彭永捷. Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2017, 256–76.

Liao, W. K., trans. *The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu: A Classic of Legalism. Vol. I*. London: Arthur Probsthain, 1939.

Lin, Chun Hung 林俊宏. “Lü Huiqing Daode zhenjing *zhuan* Yu Zhuangzi *yi* zhong de sixiang san lun” 呂惠卿《道德真經傳》與《莊子義》中的思想三論. *Chinese Political Science Review* 政治學報, no. 53 (June 2012): 63–96.

Lin, Guanqun 林冠群. *Xinbian Dongpo* Haiwai ji 新編東坡海外集. Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe, 2015.

Lin, Guizhen 林桂榛. *Tiandao tianxing yu renxing renqing -- Xian Qin rujia “xing yu tiandao” lun kao yuan* 天道天行與人性人情──先秦儒家“性與天道”論考原. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2015.

Lin, Ming-chao 林明照. “Wu wo er wu wu fei wo: Lü Huiqing Zhuangzi *yi* zhong de wu wo lun” 無我而無物非我：呂惠卿《莊子義》中的無我論. *Studies in Sinology* 中國學術年刊, no. 35 (September 2013): 1–32.

Lin, Yan 林巖. *Bei Song keju kaoshi yu wenxue* 北宋科舉考試與文學. Shanghai: Shanghai shiji chuban gongfen youxian gongsi, Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2006.

Lin, Yü-sheng. “The Evolution of the Pre-Confucian Meaning of *Jen* 仁 and the Confucian Concept of Moral Autonomy.” *Monumenta Serica* 31 (1974-1975): 172–204.

Liu, Chang 劉敞. *Gongshi ji* 公是集. Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1937.

———. *Gongshi xiansheng dizi ji* 公是先生弟子記. Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe, 2010.

Liu, Chengguo 劉成國. “Du *Wang Jinggong shi zhu bu jian* xian yi” 讀《王荊公詩注補箋》獻疑. *Zhongguo haiyang daxue xuebao (Shehui kexue ban)*, no. 2 (2006): 66–71.

———. *Jinggong Xinxue yanjiu* 荊公新學研究. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2006.

———. *Wang Anshi nianpu changbian* 王安石年譜長編. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2018.

Liu, James T. C. “An Early Sung Reformer: Fan Chung-Yen.” In *Chinese Thought and Institutions,* ed. John K. Fairbank. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1957, 105–31.

———. *Ou-Yang Hsiu: An Eleventh-Century Neo-Confucianist*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967.

———. *Reform in Sung China -- Wang An-Shih (1021-1086) and His New Policies*. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1959.

Liu, Lin 劉琳, Diao Zhongmin 刁忠民, Shu Dagang 舒大剛, and Yin Bo 尹波, eds. *Song Huiyao jigao* 宋會要輯稿. Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 2014.

Liu, Yuli. “The Unity of Rule and Virtue in Confucianism.” In *Conceptions of Virtue East and West,* eds. Kim-Chong Chong and Yuli Liu. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2006, 215–36.

Liu, Zehua 劉澤華. *Bashi zi shu* 八十自述. Beijing: SDX Sanlian shudian, 2017.

———. *Zhongguo chuantong zhengzhi sixiang fansi* 中國傳統政治思想反思. Beijing: SDX Sanlian shudian, 1987.

Liu, Zhi 劉摯. *Zhongsu ji* 忠肅集. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2002.

Liu, Zongyuan 柳宗元. *Liu Zongyuan ji jiaozhu* 柳宗元集校注. Edited by Yin Zhanhua 尹占華 and Han Wenqi 韓文奇. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2013.

Lo, Winston W. "Wang An-Shih and the Confucian Ideal of 'Inner Sageliness.'" *Philosophy East and West* 26, no. 1 (1976): 41–53.

Lu, Guolong 盧國龍. *Song ru weiyan: Duoyuan zhengzhi zhexue de pipan yu chongjian* 宋儒微言：多元政治哲學的批判與重建. Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe, 2001.

Lu, Hao 盧豪. "Zhi xin yu zhi dao -- Wang Anshi de zhengzhi sixiang jiqi zhexue jichu" 治心與治道──王安石的政治思想及其哲學基礎. MA thesis, Henan daxue, 2009.

Lü, Buwei 呂不韋. *Lüshi chunqiu* 呂氏春秋. In *Zhuzi jicheng* 諸子集成. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2006.

Lü, Zhong 呂中. *Leibian huangchao dashiji jiangyi* 類編皇朝大事記講義. Edited by Zhang Qifan 張其凡 and Bai Xiaoxia 白晓霞. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2014.

Luo, Changfan 羅昌繁. "Yuanyou dangji bei de li hui yu banben yuanliu -- Jian lun Yuanyou dangji minglu de biangeng" 元祐黨籍碑的立毀與版本源流──兼論元祐黨籍名錄的變更. *Beijing shehui kexue*, no. 11 (2018): 58–71.

Luo, Chuanqi 羅傳奇, and Wu, Yunsheng 吳雲生. *Wang Anshi jiaoyu sixiang yanjiu* 王安石教育思想研究. Nanchang: Jiangxi jiaoyu chubanshe, 1991.

Luo, Jiaxiang 羅家祥. *Bei Song dangzheng yanjiu* 北宋黨爭研究. Taibei: Wenjin chubanshe.

Luo, Yinan. "Ideas in Practice: The Political Economy of Chinese State Intervention during the New Policies Period (1068-1085)." Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 2015.

Lynn, Richard John, trans. *The Classic of Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as Interpreted by Wang Bi*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.

Ma, Defu 馬德富. "Su Shi Lunyu *shuo* gouchen" 蘇軾《論語說》鉤沉. *Sichuan daxue xuebao (Zhexue shehui kexue ban)*, no. 4 (1992): 59–68.

Ma, Duanlin 馬端臨. *Wenxian tongkao* 文獻通考. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986.

Ma, Zhenduo 馬振鐸. *Zhengzhi gaigejia Wang Anshi de zhexue sixiang* 政治改革家王安石的哲學思想. Wuhan: Hubei renmin chubanshe, 1984.

Makeham, John. *Name and Actuality in Early Chinese Thought*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994.

———. "The Legalist Concept of *Hsing-ming*: An Example of the Contribution of Archaeological Evidence to the Re-Interpretation of Transmitted Texts." *Monumenta Serica* 39 (1990-1991): 87–114.

McGrath, Michael. "The Reigns of Jen-Tsung (1022-1063) and Ying-Tsung (1063-1067)." In *The Cambridge History of China, Volume 5, Part One: The Sung Dynasty and Its Precursors, 907-1279,* eds. Denis Twitchett and Paul Jakov Smith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 279–346.

McMahon, Darrin M. "The Return of the History of Ideas?" In *Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History,* eds. Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 13–31.

McMahon, Keith. *Celestial Women: Imperial Wives and Concubines in China from Song to Qing*. Lanham, Boulder, New York, London: Rowman and Litterfield Publishers, 2016.

McMullen, David. "Han Yü: An Alternative Picture." *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 49, no. 2 (December 1989): 603–57.

———. *State and Scholars in T'ang China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

———. "Views of the State in Du You and Liu Zongyuan." In *Foundations and Limits of State Power in China,* ed. S. R. Schram. London and Hong Kong: School of Oriental and African Studies and the Chinese University Press, 1987, 59–85.

Mei, Kuang 梅廣. "'Neisheng Waiwang' kaolüe" "內聖外王"考略. *Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies* 清華學報 41, no. 4 (2011): 621–67.

Meng, Wentong 蒙文通. "Bei Song bianfa lun gao" 北宋變法論稿. In *Gushi zhenwei* 古史甄微. *Meng Wentong wenji* 5. Chengdu: Bashu shushe, 1999, 402–73.

Meskill, John, ed. *Wang An-Shih: Practical Reformer?* Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1963.

Min, Byounghee. "The Republic of the Mind: Zhu Xi's 'Learning (Xue)' as a Sociopolitical Agenda and the Construction of Literati Society." Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 2007.

Moeller, Hans-Georg. *The Philosophy of the* Daodejing. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.

Moses, A. Dirk. *German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Mote, Frederick W. *Imperial China 900-1800*. Cambridge (Mass.) and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1999.

Murck, Alfreda. *Poetry and Painting in Song China: The Subtle Art of Dissent*. Cambridge (Mass.) and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000.

Nelson, Eric. *The Theology of Liberalism: Political Philosophy and the Justice of God*. Cambridge, Mass. and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2019.

Nguyen, Nam. "The Noble Person and the Revolutionary: Living with Confucian Values in Contemporary Vietnam." In *Confucianisms for a Changing World Order,* eds. Roger T. Ames and Peter D. Hershock. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2018, 128–61.

Ni, Peimin. *Understanding the* Analects *of Confucius: A New Translation of* Lunyu *with Annotations*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2017.

Nienhauser, William H., Jr., ed. *The Grand Scribe's Records, Volume VII. The Memoirs of Pre-Han China by Ssu-Ma Ch'ien*. Translated by Cheng Tsai-fa, Lu Zongli, William H. Nienhauser Jr., and Robert Reynolds. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994.

Nivison, David S. "Response to James Behuniak." *Philosophy East and West* 50, no. 1 (2000): 110–15.

———. *The Ways of Confucianism: Investigations in Chinese Philosophy*. Edited by Bryan W. Van Norden. Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1996.

Nylan, Michael. "Sima Qian: A True Historian?" *Early China* 23–24 (1998-1999): 203–46.

———. *The Five "Confucian" Classics*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001.

———. *The Shifting Center: The Original "Great Plan" and Later Readings*. Nettetal: Steyler Verlag, 1992.

——— trans., *Exemplary Figures / Fayan*. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2013.

O'Dwyer, Shaun. *Confucianism's Prospects: A Reassessment*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2019.

Olsen, Niklas. *History in the Plural: An Introduction to the Work of Reinhart Koselleck*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2012.

Ouyang, Xiu. *Historical Records of the Five Dynasties*. Translated by Richard L. Davis. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.

——— 歐陽修. *Ouyang Xiu quanji* 歐陽修全集. Beijing: Zhongguo shudian, 1986.

———. *Xin Wudai shi* 新五代史. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974.

Ouyang, Xiu 歐陽修, and Song Qi 宋祁. *Xin Tang shu* 新唐書. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975.

Pagden, Anthony. *The Enlightenment: And Why It Still Matters*. New York: Random House, 2013.

Pei, Rucheng 裴汝誠, and Sun Jianmin 孫建民. "Lun Song Yuan shiqi de sange Wang Anshi zhuan" 論宋、元時期的三個王安石傳. In *Ban su ji* 半粟集, by Pei Rucheng. Baoding: Hebei daxue chubanshe, 2000, 110–35.

Peng, Cheng 彭乘. *Moke hui xi* 墨客揮犀. In *Quan Song biji* 全宋筆記, III–1. Zhengzhou: Daxiang chubanshe, 2008.

Petersen, Jens Østergård. "Which Books Did the First Emperor of Ch'in Burn? On the Meaning of *Pai Chia* in Early Chinese Sources." *Monumenta Serica* 43 (1995): 1–52.

Peterson, Charles A. "The Restoration Completed: Emperor Hsien-Tsung and the Provinces." In *Perspectives on the T'ang,* eds. Arthur F. Wright and Denis Twitchett. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973, 151–91.

Pines, Yuri, trans. *The Book of Lord Shang: Apologetics of State Power in Early China*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2019.

———. "Legalism in Chinese Philosophy." In *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2014. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-legalism/.

———. "Review of *The Emergence of Civilizational Consciousness in Early China: History Word by Word*. By Uffe Bergeton. London: Routledge, 2019, 227pp." *T'oung Pao* 105, no. 3–4 (2019): 498–504.

Pinker, Steven. *Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress*. New York: Penguin Books, 2018.

Puett, Michael. "Centering the Realm: Wang Mang, the *Zhouli*, and Early Chinese Statecraft." In *Statecraft and Classical Learning: The Rituals of Zhou in East Asian History,* eds. Benjamin A. Elman and Martin Kern. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010, 129–54.

Qi, Xia 漆俠. *Qiu shi ji* 求實集. Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1982.

———. *Songxue de fazhan he yanbian* 宋學的發展和演變. Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin chubanshe, 2002.

———. *Wang Anshi bianfa* 王安石變法. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1979.

Qiu, Hansheng 邱漢生. "Wang Anshi de Xinxue he bianfa sixiang de yuanze" 王安石的新學和變法思想的原則. *Lishi jiaoxue*, no. 3 (1959): 26–34.

Queen, Sarah A. "*Han Feizi* and the Old Master: A Comparative Analysis and Translation of *Han Feizi* Chapter 20, 'Jie Lao,' and Chapter 21, 'Yu Lao.'" In *Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Han Fei,* ed. Paul R. Goldin. Dordrecht etc.: Springer, 2013, 197–256.

Rawls, John. *A Theory of Justice*. Revised Edition. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999.

———. *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

Rickett, Allyn W. *Guanzi: Political, Economic, and Philosophical Essays from Early China. A Study and Translation. Volume One*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985.

Rong, Zhaozu 容肇祖. *Wang Anshi Laozi* zhu *ji ben* 王安石老子注輯本. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979.

Sariti, Anthony William. "Monarchy, Bureaucracy, and Absolutism in the Political Thought of Ssu-Ma Kuang." *Journal of Asian Studies* 32, no. 1 (November 1972): 53–76.

Sarkissian, Hagop. "Ritual and Rightness in the *Analects*." In *Dao Companion to the* Analects*,* ed. Amy Olberding. Dordrecht etc.: Springer, 2014, 95–116.

Sato, Masayuki 佐藤將之. *Xunzi lizhi sixiang de yuanyuan yu Zhanguo zhuzi zhi yanjiu* 荀子禮治思想的淵源與戰國諸子之研究. Taibei: Guoli Taiwan daxue chuban zhongxin, 2013.

Scott, James C. *Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998.

Shao, Bo 邵博. *Shaoshi wenjian houlu* 邵氏聞見後錄. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983.

Shen, Ming-quian 沈明謙. "Wang Pang Nanhua Zhenjing *xin zhuan* sixiang tixi quan gou" 王雱《南華真經新傳》思想體系詮構. MA thesis, National Taiwan Normal University, 2008.

Sheng, Xianfeng 盛險峰. "Lun *Xin Wudai shi* de 'lianchi' guan" 論《新五代史》的'廉恥'觀. *Beifang luncong*, no. 4 (2010): 74–78.

Shu, Dagang 舒大刚. "'Fu shi san shu, ji jue cisheng bu xu guo' – Lidai dui Su Shi *Yizhuan*, *Shuzhuan*, Lunyu *shuo* de yanjiu" 撫視三書, 即覺此生不虛過——歷代對蘇軾《易傳》、《書傳》、《論語說》的研究. In *Su Shi yanjiu shi* 蘇軾研究史, by Zeng Zaozhuang et al. Nanjing: Jiangsu jiaoyu, 2001, 500–70.

———, ed. "Lunyu *shuo*" 論語說. In *San Su quanshu* 三蘇全書, eds. Zeng Zaozhuang and Shu Dagang. Beijing: Yuwen chubanshe, 2001, 3.165–273.

———. "Lunyu *shuo* xulu." In *San Su quanshu* 三蘇全書, eds. Zeng Zaozhuang and Shu Dagang. Beijing: Yuwen chubanshe, 2001, 3.159–64.

———. "Su Shi Lunyu *shuo* liuchuan cunyi kao" 蘇軾《論語說》流傳存佚考. *Xinan minzu xueyuan xuebao (Zhexue shehui kexue ban)* 22, no. 6 (2001): 123–25.

Shu, Dagang 舒大刚, Jiang Zongxu 蔣宗許, Li Jiasheng 李家生, and Li Liangsheng 李良生. Xiechuan ji *jiaozhu* 斜川集校注. Chengdu: Bashu shushe, 1996.

Shu, Dagang 舒大剛, and Shen Shengchao 申聖超. "Dao de ren yi li: 'Shuxue' hexin jiazhiguan Lun" 道德仁義禮：'蜀學'核心價值觀論. *Shehui kexue yanjiu*, no. 2 (2017): 120–27.

Si, Yizu 司義祖, ed. *Song Da zhaoling ji* 宋大詔令集. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1962.

Sima, Guang 司馬光. *Sima Wenzhenggong chuanjia ji* 司馬溫正公傳家集. Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1937.

———. *Sushui jiwen* 涑水記聞. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1989.

Sima, Qian 司馬遷. *Shiji* 史記. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2014.

Skinner, Quentin. *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Skinner, G. William. "Introduction: Urban Development in Imperial China." In *The City in Late Imperial China,* ed. G. William Skinner. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1977, 3–31.

Skonicki, Douglas. "Cosmos, State and Society: Song Dynasty Arguments Concerning the Creation of Political Order." Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 2007.

———. "Employing the Right Kind of Men: The Role of Cosmological Argumentation in the Qingli Reforms." *Journal of Song-Yuan Studies* 38 (2012): 39–98.

Slingerland, Edward, trans. *Confucius* Analects*, with Selections from Traditional Commentaries*. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2003.

———. "Review of Michael Hunter, *Confucius Beyond the* Analects. Leiden: Brill, 2017." *Early China* 41 (2018): 465–75.

Smith, Kidder. "Sima Tan and the Invention of Daoism, 'Legalism,' *et cetera*." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 62, no. 1 (2003): 129–56.

Smith, Kidder, Jr., Peter K. Bol, Joseph A. Adler, and Don J. Wyatt. *Sung Dynasty Uses of the I Ching*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.

Smith, Paul Jakov. "State Power and Economic Activism during the New Policies, 1068-1085." In *Ordering the World: Approaches to State and Society in Sung Dynasty China,* eds. Robert P. Hymes and Conrad Schirokauer. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford: University of California Press, 1993, 76-127.

———. "Anatomies of Reform: The Qingli-Era Reforms of Fan Zhongyan and the New Policies of Wang Anshi Compared." In *State Power in China, 900-1325,* eds. Patricia Buckley Ebrey and Paul Jakov Smith. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2016, 153–91.

———. "Shen-Tsung's Reign and the New Policies of Wang An-Shih, 1067-1085." In *The Cambridge History of China, Volume 5, Part One: Sung China, 960-1279,* eds. Denis Twitchett and Paul Jakov Smith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 347–483.

———. *Taxing Heaven's Storehouse: Horses, Bureaucrats, and the Destruction of the Sichuan Tea Industry, 1074-1224*. Cambridge (Mass.) and London: Council on East Asian Studies Harvard University: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 1991.

Smith, Paul Jakov, and Patricia Buckley Ebrey. "Introduction." In *State Power in China, 900-1325,* eds. Patricia Buckley Ebrey and Paul Jakov Smith. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2016, 3–26.

Song, Jaeyoon. "Shifting Paradigms in Theories of Government: Histories, Classics, and Public Philosophy in 11th-14th Century China." Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 2007.

———. "The *Zhou Li* 《周禮》 and Constitutionalism: A Southern Song Political Theory." *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 36, no. 3 (2009): 424–38.

———. "Tension and Balance: Changes of Constitutional Schemes in Southern Song Commentaries on the *Rituals of Zhou*." In *Statecraft and Classical Learning: The Rituals*

of Zhou in East Asian History, eds. Benjamin A. Elman and Martin Kern. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010, 252-276.

———. *Traces of Grand Peace: Classics and State Activism in Imperial China*. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Asia Center, 2015.

Standen, Naomi. *Unbounded Loyalty: Frontier Crossing in Liao China*. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2007.

Su, Shi 蘇軾. *Dongpo* Shu *zhuan* 東坡書傳. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1991.

———. *Su Shi shiji* 蘇軾詩集. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1982.

———. *Su Shi wenji* 蘇軾文集. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986.

———. *Su Shi* Yi *zhuan* 蘇氏易傳. Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1936.

———. *Ying Song* Dongpo Xiansheng he Tao Yuanming shi 景宋東坡先生和陶淵明詩. Tianjin: Tianjin guji chubanshe, 2015.

Su, Zhe 蘇轍. *Luancheng ji* 欒城集. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1987.

Sun, Shaohua 孫少華. “Xian Qin lianchi sixiang ji shehui fengsu de bianqian yu zhuzi baijia zhi xingqi” 先秦廉恥思想及社會風俗的變遷與諸子百家之興起. In *Zhuzi xuekan 4* 諸子學刊 第四輯. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2010, 1–12.

Sun, Yirang 孫詒讓. Mozi *xian gu* 墨子閒詁. In *Zhuzi jicheng* 諸子集成. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2006.

Sung, Chia-fu. “An Ambivalent Historian: Ouyang Xiu and His New Histories.” *T’oung Pao* 102, no. 4–5 (2016): 358–406.

Tackett, Nicolas. *The Destruction of the Medieval Chinese Oligarchy*. Cambridge (Mass.) and London: Harvard University Asia Center: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2014.

———. *The Origins of the Chinese Nation: Song China and the Forging of an East Asian World Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Tian, Kuang 田況. *Rulin gongyi* 儒林公議. Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1937.

Tsai, Ken-hsiang 蔡根祥. *Songdai* Shangshu *xue’an* 宋代尚書學案. Taibei: Huamulan wenhua chubanshe, 2006.

Tu, Wei-ming. *Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1985.

———. *Humanity and Self-Cultivation: Essays in Confucian Thought*. Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1979.

———. "*Jen* as a Living Metaphor in the Confucian *Analects*." *Philosophy East and West* 31, no. 1 (1981): 45–54.

Tuo, Tuo 脫脫 et al. *Song shi* 宋史. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985.

Uchiyama, Seiya 內山精也. *Chuanmei yu zhenxiang -- Su Shi jiqi zhouwei shidafu de wenxue* 傳媒與真相──蘇軾及其周圍士大夫的文學. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2013.

van Els, Paul. *The Wenzi: Creativity and Intertextuality in Early Chinese Philosophy*. Leiden: Brill, 2018.

Van Norden, Bryan W., trans. *Mengzi: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries*. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2008.

Veg, Sebastian. "The Rise of China's Statist Intellectuals: Law, Sovereignty, and 'Repoliticization.'" *The China Journal* 82 (2019): 23–45.

Virág, Curie K. "'That Which Encompasses the Myriad Cares': Subjectivity, Knowledge, and the Ethics of Emotion in Tang and Song China." Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 2004.

———. *The Emotions in Early Chinese Philosophy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Waley, Arthur. *The Way and Its Power: A Study of the* Tao Tê Ching *and Its Place in Chinese Thought*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1934.

Wang, Anshi 王安石. *Linchuan xiansheng wenji* 臨川先生文集. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959.

———. *Wang Anshi ji (jiexuan)* 王安石集 （節選）. Edited by Liu Chengguo 劉成國. Beijing: Guojia tushuguan chubanshe, 2019.

———. *Wang Jingwengong shi jianzhu* 王荊文公詩箋注. Annotated by Li Bi 李壁 and punctuated by Gao Keqin 高克勤. Shanghai: Shanghai shiji chuban gongfen youxian gongsi, Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2010.

———. *Xining zoudui rilu* 熙寧奏對日錄. Edited by Gu Hongyi 顧宏義, Ren Renren 任仁仁, and Li Wen 李文. In *Wang Anshi quanji* 王安石全集. Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 2016.

———. Wang Anshi Rilu *ji jiao* 王安石日錄辑校. Edited by Kong Xue 孔學. Chengdu: Sichuan daxue chubanshe, 2015.

Wang, Chong 王充. *Lun heng* 論衡. In *Zhuzi jicheng* 諸子集成. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2006.

Wang, Gung-wu. “Feng Tao: An Essay on Confuican Loyalty.” In *Confucian Personalities,* eds. Arthur F. Wright and Denis Twitchett. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1962, 123–45.

Wang, Ling 王令. *Wang Ling ji* 王令集. Edited by Shen Wenzhuo 沈文倬. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1980.

Wang, Pang 王雱. Nanhuazhenjing *xinzhuan* 南華真經新傳. Vol. 16 of *Daozang* 道藏. Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin: Wenwu chubanshe, Shanghai shudian, and Tianjin guji chubanshe, 1988.

Wang, Ruilai 王瑞來. “Lun Songdai huangquan” 論宋代皇權. *Lishi yanjiu*, no. 1 (1989): 144–59.

———. “Lun Songdai xiangquan” 論宋代相權. *Lishi yanjiu*, no. 2 (1985): 106–20.

———. *Tiandi jian qi: Fan Zhongyan yanjiu* 天地間氣：範仲淹研究. Taiyuan: Shanxi jiaoyu chubanshe, 2015.

Wang, Shengduo 汪聖鐸, punctuated. *Songshi quanwen* 宋史全文. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2016.

Wang, Shuhua 王書華. “Jinggong Xinxue zhushu kaobian” 荊公新學著述考辨. In *Songshi yanjiu luncong 10* 宋史研究論叢第十輯, eds. Jiang Xidong 姜錫東 and Li Huarui 李華瑞. Baoding: Hebei daxue chubanshe, 2009, 519-538.

Wang, Shuizhao 王水照. *Wang Shuizhao zixuanji* 王水照自選集. Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000.

Wang, Shuizhao 王水照, and Zhu Gang 朱剛. *Su Shi pingzhuan* 蘇軾評傳. Nanjing: Nanjing daxue chubanshe, 2004.

Wang, Xianqian 王先謙. Xunzi *jijie* 荀子集解. Beijing: Zhongxi shuju, 2012.

Wang, Zengyu 王曾瑜. “Mengzi zai Songdai yasheng diwei zhi queding jiqi yingxiang” 孟子在宋代亞聖地位之確定及其影響. In *Qingzhu Deng Guangming jiaoshou jiushi huadan lunwenji* 慶祝鄧廣銘教授九十華誕論文集, ed. Tian Yuqing. Shijiazhuang: Hebei jiaoyu chubanshe, 1997, 491–98.

———. “Wang Anshi Bianfa jianlun” 王安石變法簡論. *Zhongguo shehui kexue*, no. 3 (1980): 131–54.

Watson, Burton, trans. *The Complete Works of Zhuangzi*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013.

Wei, Zheng 魏徵 et al. *Sui shu* 隋書. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1973.

Weiner, Douglas R. "Demythologizing Environmentalism." *Journal of the History of Biology* 25, no. 3 (1992): 385–411.

Williamson, H. R. *Wang An Shih: A Chinese Statesman and Educationalist of the Sung Dynasty, Vol. I*. London: Arthur Probsthain, 1935.

———. *Wang An Shih: A Chinese Statesman and Educationalist of the Sung Dynasty, Vol. II*. London: Arthur Probsthain, 1937.

Wong, R. Bin. "Dimensions of State Expansion and Contraction in Imperial China." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 37, no. 1 (1994): 54–66.

Wood, Alan. *Limits to Autocracy: From Sung Neo-Confucianism to a Doctrine of Political Rights*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995.

Wu, Genyou 吳根友. *Daojia sixiang jiqi xiandai quanshi* 道家思想及其現代詮釋. Shanghai: Shanghai jiaotong daxue chubanshe, 2018.

Wu, Genyou 吳根友, and Fang Xudong 方旭東. "He wei zhengzhi zhexue? -- Wu Genyou, Fang Xudong Jiaoshou duitanlu" 何謂政治哲學？──吳根友、方旭東教授對談錄. *Zhexue fenxi* 10, no. 1 (2019): 166–87.

Wu, Xuetao 吳雪濤. *Su wen xinian kaolüe* 蘇文系年考略. Huhehaote: Neimenggu jiayu chubanshe, 1989.

Xiao, Yongming 肖永明. "Yi Wang Anshi wei daibiao de Xinxue xuepai" 以王安石為代表的新學學派. In *Zhongguo xueshu shi (Song-Yuan juan - shang)* 中國學術史（宋元卷上）, by Zhu Hanmin 朱漢民 et al. Nanchang: Jiangxi jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001, 164–96.

Xie, Yingxin 謝迎欣. "Jiayou shiqi Ouyang Xiu yu Wang Anshi jiaoyi yanjiu" 嘉祐時期歐陽修與王安石交誼研究. BA thesis, Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman 拉曼大学, 2013.

Xu, Hongxing 徐洪興. "Tang Song jian de Mengzi shengge yundong" 唐宋間的孟子升格運動. *Zhongguo shehui kexue*, no. 5 (1993), 101-16.

Xu, Hu 許澍. "Wang Anshi zhi renxing lun jiqi kaizhan" 王安石之人性論及其開展. *Siwuxie*, no. 1 (2012): 98–115.

Xu, Jianfang 徐建芳. *Su Shi yu* Zhouyi 蘇軾與《周易》. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2013.

Xu, Jiaxing 許家星. "Su Shi Lunyu *shuo* shiyi" 蘇軾《論語說》拾遺. *Lantai shijie*, no. 15 (2012): 54–55.

Xu, Shen 許慎. *Shuowen jiezi* 說文解字. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1963.

Xu, Ziming 徐自明. *Song Zaifu biannianlu jiaobu* 宋宰輔編年錄校補. Edited by Wang Ruilai 王瑞來. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986.

Xun, Yue 荀悅. *Shenjian* 申鑒. In *Zhuzi jicheng* 諸子集成. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2006.

Yamada, Takashi 山田俊. "Lü Huiqing guanyu *Laozi Zhuangzi* sixiang qianxi" 呂惠卿關於《老子》《莊子》思想淺析. *Zongjiaoxue yanjiu*, no. 4 (1998): 46–57.

Yan, Kejun 嚴可均, ed. *Quan Shanggu, Sandai, Qin, Han, Sanguo, Liuchao wen* 全上古三代秦漢三國六朝文. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2009.

Yang, Bojun 楊伯峻. Chunqiu Zuozhuan *zhu* 春秋左傳注. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2009.

———. Lunyu *yizhu* 論語譯注. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2011.

Yang, C. K. *Religion in Chinese Society: A Study of Contemporary Social Functions of Religion and Some of Their Historical Factors*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962.

Yang, Qianmiao 楊倩描. *Wang Anshi "Yi" xue yanjiu* 王安石"易"學研究. Baoding: Hebei daxue chubanshe, 2006.

Yang, Rubin 楊儒賓. *Rujia shenti guan* 儒家身體觀. Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Zhongguo wenzhe yanjiusuo, 2004.

Yang, Shao-yun. *The Way of the Barbarians: Redrawing Ethnic Boundaries in Tang and Song China*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2019.

Yang, Shi 楊時. *Yang Shi ji* 楊時集. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2018.

Yang, Tianbao 楊天保. *Jinling Wangxue yanjiu -- Wang Anshi zaoqi xueshu sixiang de lishi kaocha (1021-1067)* 金陵王學研究──王安石早期學術思想的歷史考察（1021－1067）. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2008.

Yang, Xiong 揚雄. *Yangzi fayan* 揚子法言. In *Zhuzi Jicheng* 諸子集成. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2006.

Yang, Zhijiu 楊志玖. “Wang Anshi yu Mengzi” 王安石與孟子. *Shehui kexue zhanxian*, no. 3 (1979): 142–46.

Yang, Zhiyi. *Dialectics of Spontaneity: The Aesthetics and Ethics of Su Shi (1037-1101) in Poetry*. Leiden: Brill, 2015.

Yang, Zhongliang 楊仲良. Huang Song Tongjianchangbian *jishi benmo* 皇宋通鑒長編紀事本末. Punctuated by Li Zhiliang 李之亮. Ha’erbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 2006.

———. Xuzizhitongjianchangbian *jishi benmo* 續資治通鑒長編紀事本末. Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 2003.

Ye, Ping. “Su Shi, Su Zhe de ‘xing ming zhi xue’” 蘇軾、蘇轍的性命之學. *Zhongguo renmin daxue xuebao*, no. 6 (2010): 86–92.

Ye, Tan 葉坦. *Da bianfa -- Song Shenzong yu shiyi shiji de gaige yundong* 大變法──宋神宗與十一世紀的改革運動. Shanghai: SDX Sanlian shudian, 1996.

Yin, Zhihua 尹志華. *Bei Song* Laozi *zhu yanjiu* 北宋《老子》注研究. Chengdu: Bashu shushe, 2004.

———. “Wang Anshi de Laozi *zhu* tanwei” 王安石的《老子注》探微. *Jiangxi shehui kexue*, no. 11 (2002): 43–48.

Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth. *Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2004.

Yu, Yingshi 余英時. *Zhu Xi de lishi shijie: Songdai shidafu zhengzhi wenhua de yanjiu* 朱熹的歷史世界：宋代士大夫政治文化的研究. Taibei: Yunchen, 2003.

———. *Zhu Xi de lishi shijie: Songdai shidafu zhengzhi wenhua de yanjiu* 朱熹的歷史世界：宋代士大夫政治文化的研究. Shanghai: SDX Sanlian shudian, 2011.

Yu, Yunwen 余允文. *Zun Meng bian (Fu xubian bielu)* 尊孟辨（附續辨別錄）. Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1937.

Yuan, Zheng 袁徵. *Songdai jiaoyu -- Zhongguo gudai jiaoyu de lishixing zhuanzhe* 宋代教育──中國古代教育的歷史性轉折. Guangzhou: Guangdong gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 1991.

Zakaria, Fareed. “Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew.” *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 2 (1994): 109–26.

Zeng, Gong 曾鞏. *Zeng Gong ji* 曾鞏集. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984.

Zeng, Zaozhuang 曾棗莊. “Bei Song Guwen Yundong de quzhe guocheng” 北宋古文運動的曲折過程. *Wenxue pinglun*, no. 5 (1982): 83–90.

Zeng, Zaozhuang 曾棗莊, and Liu Lin 劉琳, eds. *Quan Song wen* 全宋文. Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 2006.

Zhang, Bing 張兵. “Hongfan” *quanshi yanjiu* 《洪範》詮釋研究. Ji’nan: Qilu shushe, 2007.

Zhang, Chengzhong 張呈忠. “Cai Jing wei “Wang Anshi zhuan” kao” 蔡京為《王安石傳》考. *Min Tai wenhua yanjiu*, no. 3 (2017): 33–35.

———. “Cong *Guanzi* ‘Qingzhong’ dao *Zhouguan* ‘Quanfu’ -- Lun Wang Anshi licai sixiang de xingcheng” 從《管子·輕重》到《周官·泉府》──論王安石理財思想的形成. *Guanzi xuekan*, no. 3 (2017): 16–21.

———. “Jin sanbai nian lai xifang xuezhe yanzhong de Wang Anshi” 近三百年來西方學者眼中的王安石. *Shixue lilun yanjiu*, no. 4 (2016): 133–41.

———. “Shenzong fadu yu Bei Song wanqi gaigeshi yanjiu” 祖宗法度與北宋晚期改革史研究. Ph.D. dissertation, Tsinghua University, 2017.

———. “‘Yi zhongren wei zhi’ -- Wang Anshi zhengzhi sixiang de renxing jidian yu zhidu linian’” “以中人為制”──王安石政治思想的人性基點與制度理念. *Zhengzhi sixiang shi* 8, no. 4 (2017): 19–35.

Zhang, Dainian 張岱年. *Zhang Dainian quanji* 張岱年全集. I. Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin chubanshe, 1996.

Zhang, Lei 張耒. *Zhang Lei ji* 张耒集. Beijing: Zhonghua, 1990.

Zhang, Ling. *The River, the Plain, and the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Zhang, Liwen 張立文. *He he xue -- 21 shiji wenhua zhanlüe de gouxiang* 和合學──21 世紀文化戰略的構想. Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2016.

———. *Zhongguo zhexue sichao fazhan shi* 中國哲學思潮發展史. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2014.

Zhang, Qifan 張其凡, and Jin Qiang 金強. “Chen Guan yu *Siming zun Yao ji* -- Bei Song Zhe Hui zhiji dangzheng de yige cemian kaochao” 陳瓘與《四明尊堯集》──北宋哲徽之際黨爭的一個側面考察. *Zhejiang daxue xuebao (Renwen shehui kexue ban)* 34, no. 3 (2004): 111–19.

Zhang, Shunhui 張舜徽. *Zhou Qin dao lun fawei* 周秦道論發微. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1982.

Zhang, Yuhan 張鈺翰. "Bei Song Xinxue yanjiu" 北宋新學研究. Ph.D. dissertation, Fudan University, 2013.

Zhao, Bingwen 趙秉文. *Xianxian Laoren Fushui wenji* 閑閑老人滏水文集. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985.

Zhao, Dongmei 趙冬梅. *Da Song zhi bian, 1063-1086* 大宋之變，1063－1086. Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2020.

Zhao, Xuan, and Wolfgang Drechsler. "Wang Anshi's Economic Reforms: Proto-Keynesian Economic Policy in Song Dynasty China." *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 42, no. 5 (2018): 1239–54.

Zheng, Jianzhong 鄭建中. "Bei Song ren xue sixiang yanjiu" 北宋仁學思想研究. Ph.D. dissertation, Xibei daxue, 2010.

Zheng, Xuan 鄭玄 and Kong Yingda 孔穎達. Liji *zhengyi* 禮記正義. In *Shisanjing zhushu* (Zhengli ben) 十三經注疏（整理本）. Beijing: Beijing Daxue chubanshe, 2000.

Zhou, Jia 周佳. *Bei Song zhongyang richang zhengwu yunxing yanjiu* 北宋中央日常政務運行研究. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2015.

Zhou, Shuping 周淑萍. *Liang Song Mengxue yanjiu* 兩宋孟學研究. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2007.

Zhu, Gang 朱剛. *Tang Song "Guwen Yundong" yu shidafu wenxue* 唐宋"古文運動"與士大夫文學. Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 2013.

Zhu, Shangshu 祝尚書. *Song Ren bieji xu lu* 宋人別集敘錄. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1999.

Zhu, Xi 朱熹. *Sishu zhangju jizhu* 四書章句集注. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983.

———. *Wu chao mingchen yanxing lu* 五朝名臣言行錄. In *Zhuzi quanshu* 朱子全書. Shanghai and Hefei: Shanghai guji chubanshe and Anhui jiaoyu chubanshe, 2002.

Zhu, Yi 朱翌. *Yijueliao za ji* 猗覺寮雜記. Vol. 10. *Quan Song biji* 全宋筆記, III. Zhengzhou: Daxiang chubanshe, 2008.

Zhu, Yiqun 朱義群. "Bei Song wanqi dangjin de xingcheng yu zhankai (1085-1125)" 北宋晚期黨禁的形成與展開 (1085-1125). Ph.D. dissertation, Peking University, 2018.

———. “Song Shenzong qiyong Wang Anshi zhi Jiangningfu de beijing jiqi zhengzhi he wenhua yihan” 宋神宗起用王安石知江寧府的背景及其政治和文化意涵. *Zhonghua wen shi luncong*, no. 3 (2017): 351–74.

Zhu, Yixin 朱一新. *Wuxietang da wen* 無邪堂答問. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2000.

Ziporyn, Brook, trans. *Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings*. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2009.

Summary

This dissertation contributes to the reinvention of Chinese political history with a comprehensive account of Wang Anshi's 王安石 (1021-1086) political theory, touching also upon its practice, arguing that it was centered on transforming human nature with statist values against the mid-eleventh century humanist mainstream.

Intellectual historical studies of Wang Anshi over the past three decades have been focused on how he envisioned the relationship between government and society. Aiming to go beyond this, this study focuses on the "what" in Wang's learning, i.e., his writings on *daode* 道德 and *xingming* 性命 (literally, the way and its power, nature and destiny), most concentratedly found in volumes 63-70 of *Collected Writings of Mr. Linchuan* 臨川先生文集. Regarding this body of work in Wang's oeuvre, scholars like Yu Yingshi take them as being about moral self-cultivation in the Confucian tradition. Through close analysis of key concepts in context and differentiating rhetorical strategies from what was meant, I argue in chapter 2 that Wang's discussions of human nature were integral to his political thought on governance and that what he advanced as the gist of his learning was an anti-humanist soulcraft centered on using statist values to transform self-regarding humans into subjects who would unreflectively think in the interest of the state. It was cultivationist rather than self-cultivationist, as Wang designed a full procedure to firmly establish these values – otherwise foreign to humans in his view – into people's hearts through externally imposed behavioral regulations.

To see how this was so, I reconstructed the context against which Wang developed this theory in chapter 1: the humanist statecraft newly emerging in the aftermath of An Lushan rebellion (755-63) – literati self-governance that was first theorized by Han Yu 韓愈 (768-824) in "Tracing the Way" (*yuan dao* 原道), and became the mainstream during the Jiayou and Zhiping periods (1056-1067), thanks mainly to Ouyang Xiu's 歐陽修 (1007-1072) leadership in the ancient prose movement. Troubled by the moral individualism and value pluralism inherent in the practice of writing ancient prose, Wang worked out his statecraft so as to restore the lost moral unity in the world.

After a contextualized reconstruction of Wang's political theory in the first two chapters, I turn to discussing its implementation in chapter 3. Taking the reform as mainly about the economic

policies carried out during Shenzong's reign, most scholars think it had failed. The central topic of Wang's famous myriad-word letter to Renzong that later became his reform blueprint was, however, using government school education to make the kind of humans useful to the state. Given the severely declined imperial authority Shenzong inherited from the previous two reigns, to put this grand design into practice, it had to proceed step by step, including most importantly neutralizing anti-reformers, whose effective opposition lasted through the early twelfth century, even taking back control of the government between 1085 and 1093. It was only after 1104, when they had been made unable to obstruct the central government's agenda through blacklisting that this education as governance was able to be carried out across the state, as can be seen from the exponential growth in student numbers and the widespread building of schools.

In chapter 4, I seek to enrich our understanding of the discussions in the preceding chapters by presenting the discovery of Su Shi 蘇軾 (1037-1101), one of Wang's foremost critics, on the nature of Wang Anshi's statecraft that was made around the turn of the twelfth century. Using material from Su that has not been discussed in English, this is also to address anew the relationship between Wang Anshi and his main theoretical source Mencius. This relationship has been studied by many scholars, including Li Huarui, who in a recent book chapter argues that Mencius' political thought on humane governance guided the reform Wang architected. In chapter 2, I have begun proposing an alternative explanation based on Wang's own writings on human nature. Here, closely studying Su Shi's engagements with Mencius in his classical commentary project that was designed to oppose Wang Anshi's statecraft, I hope to show how Mencius, with his insight into human nature, provided the most important theoretical foundations for Wang's soulcraft.

In the Conclusion, I summarize main findings in the four chapters while situating Wang Anshi in the history of Chinese political thought, arguing that his soulcraft as statecraft went one step further than that of the so-called Legalists, who although similarly pursuing greater state power did not work on changing human nature.

Samenvatting

Deze dissertatie draagt bij tot de heruitvinding van de Chinese politieke geschiedenis met een uitvoerige uiteenzetting over Wang Anshi's politieke theorie (1021-1086), waarbij ook de praktijk aan de orde komt, met als argument dat deze gericht was op de transformatie van de menselijke natuur met staatische waarden, tegen de humanistische hoofdstroming van het midden van de zeventiende eeuw in.

In de afgelopen drie decennia hebben intellectueel-historische studies over Wang Anshi zich geconcentreerd op hoe hij de relatie zag tussen overheid en samenleving. Met als doel verder te gaan dan dit, richt deze studie zich op het "wat" in Wang's leer, d.w.z. zijn geschriften over *daode* 道德 en *xingming* 性命 (letterlijk, de weg en zijn macht, aard en bestemming), het best samengebracht te vinden in volumes 63-70 van "Collected Writings of Mr. Linchuan" 臨川先生文集. Geleerden als Yu Yingshi gaan ervan uit dat dit werk in Wang's oeuvre gaat over morele zelf-cultivering in de Confucianistische traditie. Door middel van een nauwkeurige analyse van de sleutelbegrippen in hun context en het onderscheiden van retorische strategieën van wat er bedoeld werd, betoog ik in hoofdstuk 2 dat Wang's discussies over de menselijke natuur integraal deel uitmaakten van zijn politieke denken over bestuur en dat wat hij naar voren bracht als de kern van zijn leer een anti-humanistische "soulcraft" was, gericht op het gebruik van staatische waarden om individualistische mensen gericht op hun eigenbelang om te vormen tot onderdanen die zonder na te denken in het belang van de staat zouden denken. Het was eerder cultiverend dan zelf-cultiverend, omdat Wang een volledige procedure ontwierp om deze waarden - die volgens hem anders vreemd zijn aan mensen - stevig in de harten van mensen te verankeren door middel van van buitenaf opgelegde gedragsregels.

Om te zien hoe dit in zijn werk ging, heb ik in hoofdstuk 1 de context gereconstrueerd waarin Wang deze theorie ontwikkelde: het humanistische staatsbestel dat opkwam in de nasleep van de opstand van An Lushan (755-63) - literatistisch zelfbestuur dat voor het eerst werd getheoretiseerd door Han Yu 韓愈 (768-824) in "Tracing the Way" (*yuan dao* 原道), en werd de hoofdstroming tijdens de Jiayou en Zhiping periodes (1056-1067), vooral dankzij Ouyang Xiu's 歐陽修 (1007-1072) leiderschap in de oude proza beweging. Verontrust door het morele individualisme en het waardenpluralisme dat inherent was aan de praktijk van het schrijven van

oud proza, werkte Wang zijn staatkunde uit om de verloren morele eenheid in de wereld te herstellen.

Na een gecontextualiseerde reconstructie van Wangs politieke theorie in de eerste twee hoofdstukken, bespreek ik de uitvoering ervan in hoofdstuk 3. De meeste geleerden menen dat de hervorming, die hoofdzakelijk betrekking had op het economisch beleid dat tijdens Shenzong's bewind werd gevoerd, mislukt was. Het centrale onderwerp van Wang's beroemde ontelbare-woorden tellende brief aan Renzong, die later zijn hervormingsblauwdruk werd, was echter het gebruik van het onderwijs op de staatsschool om het soort mensen te maken dat nuttig was voor de staat. Gezien de sterk verminderde keizerlijke autoriteit die Shenzong van de vorige twee regeerperiodes had geërfd, moest hij, om dit grootse plan in praktijk te brengen, stap voor stap te werk gaan, met als belangrijkste het neutraliseren van de anti-hervormers, wier effectieve oppositie tot het begin van de twaalfde eeuw standhield, en die tussen 1085 en 1093 zelfs de controle over de regering terugwonnen. Pas na 1104, toen zij niet langer in staat waren om de agenda van de centrale regering door middel van zwarte lijsten te dwarsbomen, kon dit onderwijs als bestuur in de hele staat worden doorgevoerd, zoals blijkt uit de exponentiële groei van het aantal leerlingen en de wijdverbreide bouw van scholen.

In hoofdstuk 4 probeer ik ons begrip van de discussies in de voorgaande hoofdstukken te verrijken door de ontdekking van Su Shi 蘇軾 (1037-1101), een van Wang's belangrijkste critici, over de aard van Wang Anshi's staatsmanschap die rond de eeuwwisseling van de twaalfde eeuw werd gedaan, te presenteren. Aan de hand van materiaal van Su dat nog niet in het Engels is besproken, wordt ook de relatie tussen Wang Anshi en zijn belangrijkste theoretische bron Mencius opnieuw aan de orde gesteld. Deze relatie is door vele geleerden bestudeerd, waaronder Li Huarui, die in een recent boekhoofdstuk betoogt dat Mencius' politieke denken over humaan bestuur de leidraad vormde voor de hervorming die Wang ontwierp. In hoofdstuk 2 ben ik begonnen met het voorstellen van een alternatieve verklaring, gebaseerd op Wangs eigen geschriften over de menselijke natuur. Door Su Shi's engagement met Mencius nauwkeurig te bestuderen in zijn klassieke werk met commentaren, dat was bedoeld om Wang Anshi's staatsmanschap, hoop ik aan te tonen hoe Mencius, met zijn inzicht in de menselijke natuur, de belangrijkste theoretische grondslagen verschafte voor Wang's "soulcraft."

In de Conclusie vat ik de belangrijkste bevindingen uit de vier hoofdstukken samen en situeer ik Wang Anshi in de geschiedenis van het Chinese politieke denken, waarbij ik betoog dat

zijn “soulcraft” als staatsmanschap een stap verder ging dan dat van de zogenaamde Legalisten, die weliswaar op vergelijkbare wijze grotere staatsmacht nastreefden, maar niet werkten aan het veranderen van de menselijke natuur.

Curriculum Vitae

Jiyan Qiao was born and raised up in a village in northwestern Hubei. After an early life as an economist and a translator in Wuhan, she began pursuing her interest in the humanities in 2010. Following a couple of years' self-learning in Chinese and Western history, philosophy, and classics, she went to Harvard to attend a master's program as a Harvard-Yenching Institute fellow and came to Leiden for doctoral studies in 2015. Her main research interest is history of Chinese political thought, focusing on the middle period and from a global comparative perspective.