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Chapter 48

The "Young Turk Zeitgeist" in the Middle Eastern Uprisings in the Aftermath of World War I

Alp Yenen

At the end of World War I Winston Churchill said: "The war of the giants has ended; the quarrels of the pygmies have begun."[1] Retrospectively the historical impact of the political struggles that occurred from the beginning of the Russian Revolution of 1917 until the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924 (the aftermath period as I refer to it in this chapter) was far greater than that of the battles won and lost during the war years. The aftermath of World War I is a complex historical period in its own right, which earns it special attention from historians.[2] The history of the aftermath period in the Middle East by itself proves to be a multifaceted subject with severe consequences, which, according to David Fromkin, brought up a new world order after a "formative" period "in which everything seemed (and may indeed have been) possible."[3]

Is there a Unionist Factor among the Middle Eastern Uprisings in the Aftermath of World War I?

At the end of the war the Ottoman Empire had been defeated and occupied by the Western powers. The Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti: the CUP), which ruled the empire since 1913, was now publicly discredited and formally dissolved. The Young Turk leaders—Enver Paşa, Talat Paşa, and Cemal Paşa—fled secretly into exile, thus escaping prosecution for their war crimes. Meanwhile CUP's underground and paramilitary branches started to organize resistance networks in Istanbul and Anatolia: the so-called Unionist Factor.[4] Soon after the Greek occupation the CUP-led resistance culminated in a nationwide resistance movement under the iconic leadership of Mustafa Kemal Paşa. In general terms similar resistance to colonial or foreign forces as in Anatolia can be found also in Greater Syria (Bilad al-Sham), and Mesopotamia. In Iraq large-scale uprisings against the British administration occurred as early as May 1919 among the Kurdish tribes. Syria was the first to rebel,

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[1] Quoted in Norman Davies, *White Eagle, Red Star*, 21.

[2] For a general survey of the armed conflicts in the aftermath of World War I, see Peter Gatrell, "War after War."

[3] David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, 9.

[4] For the role of the CUP during the Turkish national struggle, see Erik J. Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor*, 68–105; Nur B. Criss, *Istanbul under Allied Occupation, 1918–1923*, 94–114.

under the rule of the leaders of the Arab Revolt of 1916, nominally Prince Faysal and de facto the Young Arab Society (al-Fatat).[5] The British forces left Syria for the French (to whom the territories had been secretly promised) in the autumn of 1919, which gave rise to broad-scale uprisings in urban and rural areas in Syria. These Middle Eastern uprisings against foreign-infidel rule reached a new height in the year 1920, as Syrian resistance against the French occupation forces came to a disastrous climax at the Battle of Maysalun on July 24, 1920. Meanwhile in neighboring Iraq British occupation forces were busy struggling from summer to autumn of 1920 against the Great Iraqi Revolt, which could only be stopped by major air strikes. In Anatolia the primary conflict was between the British-supported Greek forces on the western front but also against the Armenian Republic on the Caucasian front and against the French in the south, in addition to the Anatolian civil war between the Istanbul and Ankara partisans.

For many scholars the most important impact of the aftermath of World War I in the Middle East was the formation of modern nation-states out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire.[6] This assertion implies a teleological or at least a nation-centric approach to the study of the aftermath period, which does not necessarily illuminate the fog of war of the Middle Eastern uprisings. The Middle Eastern uprisings in Anatolia, the Levant, and Mesopotamia in the immediate postwar years are studied mostly in narratives of distinct national movements as well as in diplomatic histories of the peace settlement.[7] In a recent article, however, Michael Provence called attention to the weakness of these nationalist histories, arguing that "the revolts do not fit neatly into the narratives of 'national awakenings' posited by the intellectual histories of the region."[8] Provence's argument that the Middle Eastern uprisings need to be seen in a wider context needs greater scholarly attention.

The Middle Eastern uprisings in the aftermath period were indeed carried out by local elites and popular masses and mostly within their future national framework. Nevertheless, according to Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, in analyzing contentious politics it is still necessary "to look beyond the nation-state at processes such as . . . the framing of local issues as the results of global problems, and the formation of transnational networks, and movement coalitions."[9] Therefore we must ask: is there a connection among the Middle Eastern uprisings in the aftermath period?

If we look for transnational networks and movement coalitions connecting these local uprisings, the historical sources deliver amazing stories on the verge of conspiracy theories, which need further scrutiny. As early as November 1918, shortly after the Unionist leaders disappeared into exile, Sir Eyre Crowe from the Foreign Office suspected that a "powerful international organization" existed. According to his fears, "the heart and soul of all revolutionary and terroristic movements have invariably been the Jews, the Bolsheviks and the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress."[10]

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[5] Eliezer Tauber, *The Formation of Modern Syria and Iraq*, 11–48.

[6] Karen Barkey, "Thinking about Consequences of Empire," 104.

[7] The late historian Sydney N. Fisher is said to have concluded that "from the European point of view, the question of what was to be done with the 'sick man of Europe,' had been fully answered by Anderson and others. This portion of European diplomatic history could be laid to rest." Quoted in William W. Haddad, "Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire," 3. For a detailed assessment of the historiography of the emergence of modern states in the Arab East, see Charles D. Smith, "The Historiography of World War I and the Emergence of the Contemporary Middle East." For the formation of new Muslim republics in the aftermath of World War I see: Stefan Reichmuth, "Der Erste Weltkrieg und die muslimischen Republiken der Nachkriegszeit."

[8] Michael Provence, "Ottoman Modernity, Colonialism, and Insurgency in the Interwar Arab East," 206. I am grateful to Professor Provence (University of California, San Diego) for his generous and kind comments.

[9] Charles Tilly and Sidney G. Tarrow, *Contentious Politics*, 4, 22.

[10] Eyre Crowe, Minute to Foreign Office, November 18, 1918, Great Britain, National Archives (formerly Public Record Office), Foreign Office Papers (hereafter FO) 371.4369.513, quoted in John Fisher, "British

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Especially after the events of the Iraqi revolt in 1920 British Intelligence saw the various Middle Eastern uprisings as the result of an international conspiracy in which the CUP played a crucial role as the “hidden hand.” According to this British conspiracy theory, the exiled CUP leaders, German militarists, and Russian Bolsheviks were jointly planning and executing a political conspiracy in cooperation with local Arab and Turkish insurgents in order to throw off the yoke of British control over Muslim Asia. The bizarreness of these British archival sources as well as the diplomatic imposition of new nation-states made historians dismiss the possible ties between these Middle Eastern uprisings and cleared the way for sectarian nationalist narratives.

This notion of the hidden hand of the CUP in the postwar uprisings extends the arguments made by Erik J. Zürcher in his seminal book *The Unionist Factor* to the larger Middle Eastern setting. Zürcher convincingly demonstrated the role of the CUP within the organizational structures, personnel, and leadership of the Anatolian resistance movement as well as the existence of a Young Turk legacy in the Turkish political culture in the first half of the twentieth century.[11] This chapter examines whether a Unionist Factor existed in the Middle Eastern uprisings discussed earlier. The very strong discourse about the machinations of Young Turks behind the uprisings needs critical attention. In fact the exiled CUP leaders themselves ambitiously created plots very similar to the conspiracy theories circling about them. Unlike in Anatolia, however, the uprisings in the Levant and Mesopotamia were not organized or executed by the CUP, even though they strongly resembled the patterns and spirit of the Young Turks.

By evaluating the British conspiracy theory about the causes of unrest in the Middle East, I show that these sources nevertheless reveal an awakening of Muslim-nationalist struggle against the West. Instead of the Young Turk “hidden hand,” there was a Young Turk zeitgeist that the Middle Eastern insurgents generally shared.[12] The dynamics and character of the local insurgencies were reminiscent of a Young Turk culture. This Young Turk “ghost” is visible in cultivation of Ottoman-Muslim nationalism, the komitadji-style organization of political activism, and the call to jihad in the anti-imperial mass struggle. Provence’s argument of a “common Ottoman genealogy of armed struggle, nationalism, and patriotism” of the anticolonial insurgencies in the Arab East after World War I needs to be put into the intellectual and political context of the Young Turk era.[13] This Young Turk zeitgeist provides a broader framework for the analysis of late and post-Ottoman Middle Eastern politics.[14]

Responses to Mahdist and Other Unrest in North and West Africa, 1919–1930,” 348; and also in John Ferris, “The British Empire vs. the Hidden Hand,” 337.

[11] In *The Unionist Factor* Zürcher first showed the place of Mustafa Kemal within the CUP and the continued role of the CUP in Turkish politics after 1918 until the political purges of 1926. Zürcher introduced his new periodization in “The Ottoman Legacy of the Turkish Republic.” This new periodization (the extension of the so-called Young Turk era from 1908 to 1950) was the most significant argument of his college textbook *Turkey: A Modern History*. For a collected edition of his articles on the Young Turk legacy in Turkey, see *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building*.

[12] In my understanding, Young Turks (Jön Türkler, from French Jeunes-Turcs) is a synonym for Unionists (İttihatcılar, the members of the CUP). The second meaning of the term “Young Turks” implies the whole nationalist-progressive generation of military and civil elites of the late Ottoman and early Republican eras. See Erik J. Zürcher, “Who Were the Young Turks?” 95. According to *Webster’s* dictionary, a third and broader meaning refers to “an insurgent in a political party, especially one belonging to a group or faction that supports liberal or progressive policies.” This usage of the term “Young Turk” as a political activism model in the Mazzinian tradition inspired similar nationalist-progressive movements in the Islamic world, such as Young Arabs, Young Tunisians, Young Bukharans, and Young Afghans.

[13] Provence, “Ottoman Modernity, Colonialism, and Insurgency in the Interwar Arab East,” 207.

[14] This corresponds to what James L. Gelvin calls “culture of of nationalism”: “There is a difference between a ‘culture of nationalism’ and the nationalist movements that spawn in that culture. ‘Culture of nationalism’ refers to a social imaginary inhabited by populations who view the assumptions associated with nationalism

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Instead of offering a historical reconstruction of the Young Turk zeitgeist among the Middle Eastern uprisings, I assess the currents and fallacies of the prevalent historiography. At the heart of the problem lies what Maurus Reinkowski calls “ideological opacity” and its erroneous interpretations.[15] The ideological world of the Young Turk era was an eclectic amalgamation of fragments of different ideologies.[16] The problem with some of these interpretations comes from the notion that these were allegedly conflicting or rival ideologies, such as nationalism, Islam, Ottomanism, and also socialism to a certain extent after the Russian Revolution. Hence transideological interchange has long been regarded as unnatural. The aftermath period was therefore regarded as the heyday of such “unholy alliances.”[17] Contemporary British officials wrongly suspected the machinations of cabals and secret societies as the responsible force behind the transnational and transideological aspects of the Middle Eastern uprisings. Modern Middle Eastern history writing, however, went the opposite direction by erroneously downplaying the transnational ties among the local movements as well as by separating the ideological fragments from each other in favor of genuine nationalist movements, marking ethnonationalism as the dominant corporate identity. Revisionist studies pointed out particular fallacies of this interpretation, but a common ground still has not been established. I argue for the necessity of an alternate reading of this period, with a particular focus on transnational relations, fluid political identities, and cultural resemblance of revolutionary movements of the Middle East. The emergence of nation-states in 1922 long blurred these political currents of Middle Eastern history.

The Young Turk Conspiracy (in) Theory and Reality

The puzzling question in the aftermath of World War I was why allegedly distinct and hostile groups in the Middle East were revolting simultaneously, similarly, and collectively against the Allied occupation. The most prominent answer to this question by contemporary British officials was that the uprisings were a conspiracy organized and executed by the CUP and other cabals. This Young Turk conspiracy theory was formulated in its most famous form in three reports prepared right after the alarming events in the summer and fall of 1920 by Major Norbert N. E. Bray, a Special Intelligence Officer working for the India Office in Iraq.[18] It is necessary to evaluate whether a conspiratorial

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as self-evident and part of the natural order. . . . A culture of nationalism spread among the populations of the Middle East, as it spread among populations elsewhere, through their engagement in common practices associated with modern states and through their internalization of the organizational rationale underlying those practices. . . . Nationalist movements are distinct political movements that draw from the assumptions of nationalism and thrive in an environment in which a culture of nationalism has taken root. Although the diffusion of a culture of nationalism is an epochal event in the history of a region, nationalist movements are ephemeral phenomena”: James L. Gelvin, “‘Arab Nationalism’: Has a New Framework Emerged?” 11–12.

[15] I am grateful to Professor Reinkowski for calling my attention to this problem.

[16] Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 2.

[17] I borrowed this term from Ben Fowkes and Bülent Gökay, “Unholy Alliance.”

[18] N. N. E. Bray, “Preliminary Report on Causes of Unrest in Mesopotamia, September 1920,” FO.371.5230.E12339. Also available at Great Britain, National Archives (formerly Public Record Office), Cabinet Papers, London (hereafter CAB), under the catalog reference CAB/24/112. See also N. N. E. Bray, “Causes of the Unrest in Mesopotamia—Report No. II, September 1920,” FO.371.5231.7765; and “An Examination of the Cause of the Outbreak in Mesopotamia, with an Indication of Some of the Main Factors Underlying the Disturbed State of the Whole -Middle East, October 1920,” War Office (WO) 33.969. For a brief summary of these reports, see “Notes Presented to Earl Curzon on Relations between Bolsheviks and Turkish Nationalists, November 20, 1920,” FO.371.51.78.E.14638, in Bilâl N. Şimşir, ed., *British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938), Vol. 2: April 1919–December 1920*, 410–13. For a detailed analysis and evaluation of these reports, see Alec L. Macfie, “British Intelligence and the Causes of Unrest in Mesopotamia, 1919–21,” 165. On the role and impact of Major Bray’s reports, see John Fisher, “Major Norman Bray and Eastern Unrest in the British Empire in the Aftermath of World War I.” For a harsh dismissal of Bray’s reports as “nonsense,” see Eliezer Tauber, “Syrian and Iraqi Nationalist Attitudes to the Kemalist and Bolshevik

Unionist Factor was behind the Middle Eastern uprisings. As I show, Bray's report was not all fiction but rather was based on an assortment of intelligence reports collected mostly in Europe and Turkey by radio and human sources delivering generally accurate intelligence. Indeed very similar plans were made by exiled Unionists in multiple regions to revolutionize the Muslim masses against colonial occupations. Allegations that Enver was toying with "Pan-Islamic, Bolshevist, Pan-Turkish and all disgruntled forces" to find further help was not wrong after all.[19] Major Bray was also right when he claimed that Talat had been trying to establish cooperation with the Syrian and Iraqi insurgents, Egyptian nationalists, and Indian Muslims as well as with Russian Bolsheviks. In explaining these transnational and transideological connections, however, patterns of conspiratorial and paranoid thinking led to incredible theories that not only found currency within British officialdom but were also covered in the international press. [20]

The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 was seen by British officials as a Jewish-Freemason conspiracy against British ambitions in the Middle East.[21] The Young Turk conspiracy theory of 1908 was based on Orientalist assumptions that the Young Turks were incapable of organizing a constitutional revolution: the question of agency was explained by ideas of anti-Semitism that presumed the "hidden hand" of the Jew, in form of crypto-Jews and Freemasons, behind the Young Turks. This was of course totally preposterous.[22] The reception of the CUP as an agent of chaos by foreign observers also needs to be put in the Orientalist tradition of interpreting every Muslim resistance to the Islamic-Sunni order as "super conspiracies dedicated to atheism, republicanism, free love and general mayhem."[23] As British policy makers were shocked by the occurrence of anti-British movements in their Islamic dominions after the end of the war, they started reading the events according to the familiar template of the Young Turk conspiracy theory of 1908, which again attributed agency to secret cabals and outside forces, namely the "Enver & Talaat & the CUP-Jew-German-Bolshevik combination."[24] In Fromkin's words, "[t]he C.U.P., the continued influence of Germany even in defeat, pan-Islam, Bolshevism, Russia—all had come together and were poised to swoop down upon the British Empire at its greatest points of vulnerability."[25]

According to Major Bray's reports, the Middle Eastern unrest was a "concerted action" directed by secret societies originating in Berlin and Moscow. Many detached local groups like the "Pan-Arabs, the Nationalists, the disgruntled Effendi, the tribesman . . . , and the fanatical priest" were now rebelling collectively against the British rule in Iraq but also elsewhere, so Bray claimed an "outside influence

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Movements," 909–12. For a more nuanced critique of these intelligence reports as "fairly accurate, reasonable even when wrong," see John Ferris, "'The Internationalism of Islam'," 66; and idem, "The British Empire vs. the Hidden Hand," 326. For a cultural analysis of conspiratorial thinking in the reports of Bray and others, see Priya Satia, *Spies in Arabia*, 201–37.

[19] Commander Heathcote-Smith, "Report (Constantinople) on the Activities of the National Defence Organization, July 24, 1919," FO.371.4158.118411, in Bilâl N. Şimşir, ed., *British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938), Vol. 1: April 1919–March 1920*, 61.

[20] N. N. E. Bray, "Turco-Bolshevik Activities: Note by Political Intelligence Officer Attached to India Office, December 10, 1920," IO.L.P&S.18.B360, British Library, cited in Fisher, "Major Norman Bray," 51, 47.

[21] Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, 41–43; Satia, *Spies in Arabia*, 204. Gerald Fitzmaurice, the chief dragoman of the British Embassy at the Ottoman capital, was the most influential promoter of the Young Turk conspiracy theory of 1908: see Geoff Berridge, *Gerald Fitzmaurice (1865–1939)*.

[22] This British conspiracy theory of interpreting the Young Turk Revolution as a Jewish-Freemason plot was later reanimated by Islamicizing-revisionist historians from Middle Eastern countries working with British archival material. See Maurus Reinkowski, "Late Ottoman Rule over Palestine," 69–72, 74–75.

[23] Robert Irwin, "An Orientalist Mythology of Secret Societies," 80.

[24] D. G. Osbourne, Minute, September 23, 1920, FO.371.4946.E11702, quoted in Ferris, "The British Empire vs. the Hidden Hand," 342.

[25] Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, 461.

. . . making concerted action possible."[26] According to Bray, "a very important meeting" between Talat Paşa representing the CUP and Turkish nationalists and an emissary of Faysal on behalf of the Arab nationalists was held around November 15, 1919, in Montreux then a second one in December in St. Moritz.[27] Other sources corroborate the existence of these meetings. Talat Paşa was indeed in Switzerland from October 23 until November 19, 1919.[28] He was back in Switzerland as late as December 24, staying there until mid-January 1920.[29] In addition German archival sources document a meeting of Young Turk leaders in St. Moritz in January 1920.[30]

Bray claims that during these meetings a preliminary alliance was formed by the exiled CUP leaders, Mustafa Kemal Paşa, and Arab nationalists. In a larger historical context this was in fact a time in which Iraqi and Syrian nationalists were considering joining the Turkish national movement in order to defeat the common Western enemy.[31] During the Arab raid on British troops in Dayr al-Zor in December 11, 1919, and the Turkish campaign against French troops in Cilicia in January 20, 1920, there were many contacts between Turkish and Arab insurgents.[32] It is known that Mustafa Kemal and Faysal were trying to establish an official and lasting cooperation between the Arab and Turkish nationalists.[33] Faysal made no secret of "his sympathy and admiration for the Kemalist movement in Turkey."[34] In January 1920 a secret Arab delegation was sent to Mustafa Kemal Paşa. The negotiations were aborted by Faysal, however, who would later regret his hasty withdrawal from the negotiations before the final battle against the French in July 1920.[35] Even after Faysal's defeat, there were contacts

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[26] Bray, "Preliminary Report on Causes of Unrest in Mesopotamia," 3. For more examples of such observations of "unity of purpose and lack of dissensions" and the existence of "some controlling personality behind the movement" by British Intelligence officials on spot, see Satia, *Spies in Arabia*, 205–6.

[27] Bray, "Preliminary Report on Causes of Unrest in Mesopotamia," 4.

[28] Compare Cavid Bey's diary entry from October 23, 1919: Cavid Bey, *Felaket Günleri*, 1:253; Talat Paşa, letter (Berlin), November 21, 1919, to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), in Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın and Osman S. Kocahanoğlu, eds., *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları*, 144–45. Peculiarly, there is no entry in Cavid's diary between November 12 and 22. It seems to have been the talk of the town by then that Talat was in Switzerland. According to Cavid's diary (November 10, 1919), *Tribune de Genève* reported that Talat arrived in Switzerland with a fake passport and was trying to establish the new Young Turk headquarters in Zurich. Cavid Bey, *Felaket Günleri*, 1:258.

[29] Cavid Bey mentions in a diary entry on December 24, 1919, that he received a telegram from Talat Paşa, who was by then in St. Moritz. Ibid., 276. Cemal Paşa was also in Switzerland by then, which indicates an important meeting.

[30] Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts/Archive of the German Foreign Ministry, Berlin (hereafter PAAA), Deutsche Gesandtschaft Bern, Zusammenkunft jungtürkischer Führer in der Schweiz, January 14, 1920, AA R 14162.

[31] For a declaration of solidarity and alliance with the Turkish national movement by Syrian nationalists, see M. Metin Hülagü, *İslam Birliği ve Mustafa Kemal*, 81. The earliest approach by Arab nationalists was in November 1918, during the armistice negotiations of Mudros between Ali Fuad (Cebesoy) and Nuri al-Sa/'id. Fuad Paşa, however, dismissed it as a British intrigue. Ali Fuat Cebesoy, *Milli Mücadele Hatıraları*, 84–85. See also Sina Akşin, "Turkish-Syrian Relations in the Time of Faysal (1918–20)," 3.

[32] Naramoto goes even further and argues that these uprisings in Dayr az-Zor and Cilicia were communicated and even coordinated between Mustafa Kemal Paşa and Arab nationalists: Eisuke Naramoto, "An Introductory Note on Military Alliance between the Arab and Turkish Nationalists, 1919–1920." See also Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, 170–72; Zeine Zeine, *The Struggle for Arab Independence*, 133–36. Even though Tauber rejects the notion of cooperation, he documents vast contacts between Turkish and Arab nationalists: Tauber, "Syrian and Iraqi Nationalist Attitudes to the Kemalist and Bolshevik Movements," 898–907. But all these scholars also rely very much on British archival documents.

[33] Naramoto, "An Introductory Note on Military Alliance between the Arab and Turkish Nationalists," 219; Hülagü, *İslam Birliği ve Mustafa Kemal*, 73–81.

[34] Zeine, *The Struggle for Arab Independence*, 134. For British suspicions that "Feisal's natural instinct is pro-Turk" see Isaiah Friedman, *British Miscalculations*, 57.

[35] Zeine, *The Struggle for Arab Independence*, 135–36.

between the Arab insurgents of Antakya under Ibrahim Hananu and the Kemalist representatives in Maraş.[36]

According to Bray's report, an "Asiatic-Islamic Federation" was founded to unite and coordinate these diverse movements.[37] Founded by the exiled CUP leaders, the preamble of the charter of the Union of the Islamic Revolutionary Societies (İslam İhtilal Cemiyetleri İttihadı) was astonishingly similar to Bray's claims:

> The aim of the Society is to make the Muslims—who are used like slaves, enslaved and dominated by the imperialists and capitalists—masters of their own fate under the leadership of Turkey; to ensure their free and independent organization within their national culture [*kendi milli medeniyetleri dahilinde*]; and to liberate them from captivity. The aim of the Society is to create the organization necessary to realize the aforementioned goal, by uplifting and uniting the Muslims spiritually [and materially] [*manen ve maddeten*].[38]

According to Bray, it was decided to search for assistance in Bolshevik Russia. A program of cooperation between the exiled Unionists and the Bolsheviks did indeed exist, which according to Enver Paşa included the "liberation of the Muslim nations" and the "adoption of socialist principles in liberated lands on the condition of respecting the traditions and nature of internal affairs [*idare-i dahiliyesinde esasat ve bünyeye tevafuk ettirmek şartı ile*]."[39] In Bray's report, Emir Shakib Arslan, trusted by both the Unionists and Faysal, was chosen to go to Moscow to negotiate with the Soviets.[40] Talat Paşa wrote to Mustafa Kemal Paşa that a representative of Faysal had approached a colleague of his (probably Shakib Arslan). According to Talat, the Arab nationalists were so disappointed with the Allies that now they were considering joining a Turkish-Arab dual monarchy modeled after Austria-Hungary.[41] The British archival sources document that Arslan declared to Maksim Litvinov, the leading Soviet diplomat in Europe, that "all [Arab] hatred against the Turk had been dispelled and all that was now wanted was mutual trust and combination in support of the common cause."[42]

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[36] Dalal Arsuzi-Elamir, "The Uprisings in Antakya 1918–1926," 590. According to Khoury: "In fact, the northern Syrian resistance was far more influenced by the Turkish nationalist movement than it was by the Arab nationalist movement. . . . Within the semicircle of the northern Syrian revolt originated and an alliance developed with the Kemalist movement": Philip S. Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, 105. Similarly, Mosul for similar reasons was also more closely associated with the Anatolian movement than with Baghdad. Friedman, *British Miscalculations*, 163.

[37] Fisher, "Major Norman Bray," 49.

[38] Quoted from the English translation by Ared Misirliyan in Martin S. Kramer, *Islam Assembled*, 175–77. For the Turkish version, see Kazım Karabekir, *İstiklâl Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkânı*, 103–4; Zafer Toprak, "İslam İhtilal Cemiyetleri İttihadı (İttihad-ı Selamet-i İslam) ve Panislamizm," 179–81.

[39] Enver Paşa, letter (Berlin) [December 1919] to Cemal Paşa (Munich) in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, eds., *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları*, 34. This is the outline of the first arrangement between Enver and Talat and their Bolshevik partner in Berlin, Karl Radek. See also Edward H. Carr, "Radek's 'Poltical Salon' in Berlin 1919," 419–20.

[40] Yamauchi relies on the same British Intelligence reports as Major Bray and documents these meetings in Switzerland in which Emir Shakib Arslan "played the important role of transmitting messages from Faysal to Talat": Masayuki Yamauchi, ed., *The Green Crescent under the Red Star*, 20.

[41] Talat Paşa, letter (Berlin), December 22, 1919, to Mustafa Kemal Paşa (Ankara), in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları*, 205–6.

[42] Bray, "Preliminary Report on Causes of Unrest in Mesopotamia," 4–5. For Shakib Arslan's letter, see India Office, "Intelligence Report (Switzerland) to Foreign Office concerning the Alleged Intrigues of Faisul with the Bolsheviks," February 10, 1920, FO.371.5032.E-21.2.44, quoted in Zeine, *The Struggle for Arab*

Thus a very real and present conspiracy was lurking beneath Bray's reports. A. L. Macfie came to the conclusion that "while the information collected was for the most part accurate enough, the conclusions drawn were dangerously misleading."[43] As John Ferris concluded, the British fears of a conspiracy "were not unreasonable."[44] Ferris sees the problem in interpretation of a "complex foe": "The problem was interpretation. Britain suffered from too much and too little intelligence, and a complex foe. Its enemies were in a real conspiracy, but a dysfunctional one, resting on opportunism and ignorance. They lied to each other, and enable one another's fantasies. There was not one fantasy, or conspiracy, but many of both."[45]

This "complexity" of Britain's foes—the CUP, local Turkish and Arab insurgents, and Bolsheviks—assumes that they were "unnatural" allies: Arabs and Turks, Nationalists and pan-Islamists, Muslims and Bolsheviks, and so forth. Obviously the British misinterpreted—or mystified—the nature of the relations among the different political actors in the East. The reaction to Indian activist Sheikh Mushir Hosain Kidwai's book *The Sword against Islam* summarizes the official British perception of these connections:[46]

> it is the gospel of the latest form of C.U.P. Bolshevism directed against the British Empire more especially in India and Egypt. It shows more clearly than everything I have seen yet how this movement is connected up with every form of revolutionary activism throughout the world: C.U.P., Bolshevism, Indian and Egyptian nationalism, anti-Zionism, Sinn Fein, the extreme Labour Party, Japanese Asiaticism, [and] Persian "democracy."[47]

The exiled Young Turk leaders had indeed political ties to Germans,[48] Bolshevists,[49] Kemalists,[50] Arab nationalists around Faysal, Indian revolutionaries,[51] Irish Sinn Feiners,[52] and Egyptian nationalists.[53] The British were essentially not wrong in suspecting the Young Turks, but

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Independence, 134–35.

[43] Macfie, "British Intelligence and the Causes of Unrest in Mesopotamia," 172.

[44] Ferris, "'The Internationalism of Islam,'" 67. For a report that demonstrates how well informed British Intelligence was on Enver Paşa's activities in June 1922, see "A Report by the British Secret Intelligence Service, Constantinople Branch," June 22, 1922, FO.371.7947.E.6421, in Bilâl N. Şimşir, ed., *British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938), Vol. 4: October 1921–October 1922*, 281–87.

[45] Ferris, "The British Empire vs. the Hidden Hand," 329.

[46] Mushir H. Kidwai, *The Sword against Islam*. See also Syed Tanvir Wasti, "Mushir Hosain Kidwai and the Ottoman Cause," 257–59.

[47] George Kidston, minute, October 24, 1919, FO.371.4233.141286, quoted in Fisher, "Major Norman Bray," 45.

[48] Alp Yenen, "The Exile Activities of the Unionists in Berlin (1918–1922)."

[49] On Enver's activities in Moscow, see Louise Bryant, *Mirrors of Moscow*, 149–63.

[50] For the relationship of the exiled Unionists with Mustafa Kemal Paşa, see Selim İlkin and İlhan Tekeli, "Kurtuluş Savaşında Talat Paşa ile Mustafa Kemal'in Mektuplaşması"; Salahi R. Sonyel, "Mustafa Kemal and Enver in Conflict, 1919–22"; Saime Yüceer, "Enver Paşa'nın Anadolu'da İktidarı Ele Geçirme Çabaları."

[51] Apparently Talat Paşa was in touch with Mohammed Ali from the Indian Khilafat Movement. Talat Paşa, letter (Berlin) [August 1920] to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları*, 161–62; Enver Paşa, letter (Moscow), August 26, 1920, to Mustafa Kemal Paşa (Ankara), in ibid., 43–47. See also M. Naeem Qureshi, *Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics*, 221–23.

[52] Aubrey Herbert, *Ben Kendim*, 326.

[53] Kramer, *Islam Assembled*, 71. The most prominents were Dr. Ahmad Fu'ad Bey and Sheikh 'Abd al-'Aziz Shavish (in Turkish: Çaviş) Efendi from Egypt. They both were agents of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa during World War I.

"these parties were aligned with but not allied to each other."[54] A Unionist Factor in terms of the CUP taking "the first steps to organize a national resistance movement . . . by establishing an underground network" as in the Turkish War of Independence cannot be extended to the uprisings in Greater Syria and Mesopotamia.[55] As Fromkin and Satia argue, the British wrongly interpreted these separate but connatural local events as the single well-organized plot of a world conspiracy.[56]

The CUP was filling an important gap in explaining the uprisings. The CUP was everything and nothing at the same time. Its pragmatic and eclectic use of allegedly conflicting policies and ideologies of (pan-)Turkism, pan-Islamism, and Ottomanism as well as liberalism, socialism, and nationalism hindered the explicit and definite political categorization of Young Turks and other similar Middle Eastern movements. On the practical side, however, thanks to this political ambiguity of the CUP, anything could be attributed to them. Therefore the CUP after the end of the war was able to "embrace pan-Islamic, Egyptian Nationalist, possibly Bolshevic [*sic*], and even Indian Nationalist activity."[57] But the CUP was not regarded as a political organization with pragmatic policies in cooperation with foreign counterparts and strategic partners, as was in fact the case, but rather as a mysterious political phantom capable of changing disguises and infiltrating and manipulating diverse political spheres regardless of "natural" boundaries. Therefore it was very common to conclude that "[t]he ostensible bolshevik, pan-islamic and nationalist propaganda are [*sic*] all apparently organized and controlled in the near East by [Young] Turks."[58] In the perception of the British officials, the CUP and Bolsheviks merged to a single political body in the aftermath of World War I, because it was wrong to think that "there is or ever has been any dividing line between the CUP and bolshevism. The force behind all these movements is the same."[59]

In this discourse of conspiracy Enver Paşa had a key role. He was in fact a fugitive revolutionary leader condemned for war crimes, thus connecting the German militarists with Russian Bolshevists. Enver indeed had a great impact on Muslims all over the world as the revolutionary hero from a modest family who became the warrior son-in-law of the Ottoman sultan-caliph. "Enver was linked to everyone,"[60] so he was prominent not only in British Intelligence reports but also in the British and international press. According to the *New York Times*: "It is to Enver Pasha's talent for intrigue that the union between Moslems and Hindus, the most striking and dangerous feature of the movement, is chiefly due."[61]

Islam and its relationship to nationalism and Bolshevism were also a problem in interpretation. Islam itself was seen as a secret society characterized by anti-Western tendencies.[62] In a political report the British Intelligence chief in Constantinople insisted on the existence of ongoing conspiracies "which, with the concomitant evil of Pan-Islamism, seem to fill the near horizon day by day with greater power of disturbing the British world."[63] The potential alliance between Bolshevists and Muslim

[54] Ferris, "The British Empire vs. the Hidden Hand," 334.
[55] Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor*, 168.
[56] Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, 461; Satia, *Spies in Arabia*, 203.
[57] Quoted in Satia, *Spies in Arabia*, 206.
[58] Ibid.
[59] George Kidston from Foreign Office, quoted in ibid., 224.
[60] Ferris, "The British Empire vs. the Hidden Hand," 329.
[61] "Germans Inspire New Plot in East," *New York Times,* July 3, 1919.
[62] Satia, *Spies in Arabia*, 211.
[63] Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) chief in Constantinople, "Political Report," May 5, 1920, FO.371.5178.E.4689, quoted in Ferris, "'The Internationalism of Islam,'" 65.

revolutionaries highly alarmed the British officials.[64] T. E. Lawrence (of Arabia) was even talking about a "wahabi-like Moslem edition of Bolshevism."[65]

Not all fiction about the Young Turk conspiracy was fabricated by the British. Local dissidents, functioning as informants for the British Intelligence, also were relying on and enhancing the Unionist Factor discourse for their own political agenda. For instance, forgery reports by Armenian nationalists claimed an identical conspiracy between Mustafa Kemal Paşa, Enver Paşa, Faysal, and the Bolsheviks in order to mobilize more support for the Armenian cause.[66] Some other alarming but unreliable reports by local contenders like Ibn Su'ud claimed that the Sharifian forces in the Hijaz, Syria, and Iraq, Turkish nationalists in Anatolia, and the Wafd Party in Egypt were waging a jihad against the British forces.[67] Meanwhile the Ottoman government officials in Constantinople were continuously associating Mustafa Kemal with Enver.[68] Even though the Unionist Factor in the Anatolian resistance movement was mostly real, part of it was purely discursive.[69] Its purpose was to criminalize and demonize the Anatolian resistance movement in the public discourse by associating it with the CUP. This discursive aspect of the Unionist Factor derived from the paranoid and conspiratorial thinking in the British officialdom and among the anti-Unionist Ottoman elites. Soon Mustafa Kemal needed to distance himself publicly from Enver. In an interview he said: "It is untrue that we are working with Enver Pasha."[70] Dissident local voices all over the Middle East were relying on the negative discourse of the Unionist Factor, which shows again how reasonable and widespread this Young Turk discourse was by then.

The Young Turks were held responsible for the otherwise unexplainable puzzle that various Muslim groups were engaged in uniform struggles against the British Empire and its local collaborators at the end of the war. The Young Turk conspiracy theory of the aftermath period gave an esoteric meaning to the correlation of incidents that were otherwise "naturally" unconnected or hostile to each other. These transnational and transideological connections somehow resembled a Young Turk "ghost", which does not necessarily postulate a Young Turk intrigue but rather a Young Turk zeitgeist on the part of Middle Eastern insurgents.

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[64] Malcolm Yapp, *The Making of the Modern Near East*, 316.
[65] T. E. Lawrence, "Note," September 20, 1919, FO.371.4236.129405, quoted in Satia, *Spies in Arabia*, 212.
[66] British General Headquarters (Constantinople), "Telegram to War Office," September 23, 1919, FO.371.4233.136149, in Şimsir, *British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938), Vol. 1*, 121.
[67] Ferris, "'The Internationalism of Islam,'" 66.
[68] See, for instance, Military Intelligence, Constantinople branch, "Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports for Week Ending 21st November 1919," November 21, 1919, FO.371.4161.161851, in Şimsir, *British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938), Vol. 1*, 248.
[69] The question of whether Mustafa Kemal and Enver were working together has long stuck in the heads of British Intelligence officers. For example, Captain J. S. Perring stationed in Samsun reported: "I beg to express the opinion that the whole movement originates with Enver Pasha, whose presence in the Caucasus there can be very little doubt of, and his appearance at the head of the present organization is openly talked of": J. S. Perring, "Report (Samsun) to Vice-Admiral Sir D. de Robeck (Constantinople)," October 1, 1919, FO.406.41, 292, No. 139-1, in ibid., 159. Meanwhile his superior officer, Admiral Richard Webb, had his doubts: "I do not agree with his opinion, as expressed in paragraph 2, as to the movement originating with Enver; other reports rather go to show that Mustafa Kemal has no dealings with him whatever": Richard Webb, "Report (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon," October 18, 1919, FO.406.41.p. 291-292, No. 139, in ibid., 158.
[70] United States Radio Press, "Nationalist Party in Turkey," October 15, 1919, FO.406.41, 299, No. 140-5, in ibid., 170–71.

Yenen, Alp. “The ‘Young Turk Zeitgeist’ in the Middle Eastern Uprisings in the Aftermath of World War I.” In *War and Collapse: World War I and the Ottoman State*. Edited by M. Hakan Yavuz and Feroz Ahmad, 1181–1216. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2016.

The Young Turk Zeitgeist of the Middle Eastern Uprisings

In his dissertation Nabeel Audeh argues that “the ideological legacy of Foreign Office views on the Young Turks [has been] inherited by, and incorporated into, Anglo-American historiography since the First World War.”[71] Immediately after the war the newly emerging Arab nationalist and Kemalist historiography traditions followed this trend in order to discredit the late Ottoman state generally and the Young Turk rule in particular.[72] Therefore the Ottoman legacy in the post-Ottoman world was long ignored. Nevertheless some revisionist studies have produced inspiring results on the impact of the Ottoman legacy in the modern Middle East and the Balkans.[73] Most of these studies deal not directly with the aftermath period but with long-term aftereffects. Beyond the general Ottoman legacy that is even evident in early independent successor states like Serbia and Greece, a further Young Turk legacy can be seen in later successor states with predominantly Muslim populations. According to Provence, the common Ottoman background based on the identity constructive experience in imperial and military education institutions as well as the military struggles of the last Ottoman decade connect the postwar uprisings in Anatolia and the Arab East.[74] I argue that the Middle Eastern insurgents shared the same political culture: a Young Turk zeitgeist characterized by cultivation of Ottoman-Muslim nationalism, komitadji-style organization of political activism, and framing the anti-imperialist mass struggle as a jihad. Among British officials Admiral Richard Webb, the British high commissioner in Constantinople, was one of the few who correctly sensed this cultural dimension of the Unionist Factor:

> Whether the organizers . . . can properly be called Committee [of Union and Progress] men or not is a question of labels. They may differ from the Committee to some extent in personality. . . . They may differ in minor points of sentiment. They may differ even more in method. Their fundamental character is, however, the same. . . . They want no foreign interference or foreign protection. . . . They want to fight Europe, and, above all, England, with the weapons of pan-Islamism and pan-Turanianism. They aspire to sign, not the death warrant of the Empire, but a lease of new life.[75]

Cultivation of Ottoman-Muslim Nationalism

One significant feature of the Young Turk zeitgeist is the cultivation of Ottoman-Muslim nationalism, from which the distinct ethnonationalist ideologies emerged later during the interwar years. Here I follow the concept of Ottoman-Muslim nationalism developed by Zürcher and extend it to other non-Turkish Muslims of the Ottoman Empire.[76] The forerunners of Turkish and Arab nationalist movements emerged in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. But scholarly debates in Middle Eastern Studies have reached an impasse instead of common ground in regard to the questions of evolution and political

[71] Nabeel Audeh, “The Ideological Uses of History and the Young Turks as a Problem for Historical Interpretation,” 2–3.
[72] Ibid., 3–4.
[73] The best collection of articles by leading scholars on the Ottoman legacy in the Middle East and the Balkans is Carl L. Brown, ed., *Imperial Legacy*. For the Ottoman impact in the Middle East from a more historical perspective, see Albert Hourani, “The Ottoman Background of the Modern Middle East.”
[74] Provence, “Ottoman Modernity, Colonialism, and Insurgency in the Interwar Arab East.”
[75] Of course Webb refers here to the Unionist Factor in the Anatolian resistance movement. For the sake of generalization I have left out his references to Turkish nationalists: Richard Webb, “Report (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon,” October 10, 1919, FO.406.41,251–56, No. 126, in Şimsir, *British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938), Vol. 1*, 141.
[76] Erik J. Zürcher, “Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists: Identity Politics, 1908–1938.”

impact of nationalism.[77] I regard the main cause of the disagreement to be the interpretation of ideological opacity: the relationship of (Arab and Turkish) nationalism to other corporate identities like Ottomanism and Islam. Yusuf Akçura's *Three Policies* (1904) established the discoursive tradition of seeing Ottomanism, pan-Islam, and Turkism as contradictory and rival ideologies.[78] It is undeniable that Young Turks relied on all these ideologies interchangeably, so their ideological opacity is generally explained by reducing it to mere political opportunism.[79]

Three discursive dichotomies in the history writing of Middle Eastern nationalist movements have long hindered the explanation of the ideological opacity of Ottoman-Muslim nationalism. These three dichotomies are mostly based on "methodological nationalism," which makes nation-states, nations, and nationalism into a major analytical category.[80] The first dichotomy is between Turkish and Arab nationalisms in the late Ottoman Empire: the claim that Arab and Turkish nationalism emerged as rival and hostile mass-movements. The second dichotomy is between nationalism and Ottomanism. The literature of this dichotomy generally underestimates the late Ottoman Empire as a functioning multinational state and the Ottoman society as an established social system against the rising nationalist movements. The third dichotomy is between nationalism and Islam, based on the idea of an alleged incompatibility and rivalry between these corporate identities.[81] These three narrative tropes have prevented the establishment of a common framework for studying Ottoman-Muslim nationalism in the Young Turk era.

The first dichotomy between Turkish and Arab nationalism derives from the argument that Arab and Turkish nationalism emerged in an atmosphere of political rivalry during the turn of the century and that this animosity played a principal role during the last decade of Ottoman politics, especially during the Arab Revolt. The most prominent and influential narrative of an early emergence of Turkism as a political ideology was put forward by M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, following in the footsteps of David Kushner. Hanioğlu relies on an unbeatable corpus of intellectual, political, and private writings of leading Young Turk figures from the prerevolutionary era and claims that the Young Turks were adherents of Turkish ethnonationalism prior to the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, even as early as 1902.[82] As impressive as his scholarship is, his argument is disputed. For instance, after praising Hanioğlu's work on the early Young Turk movement as "the definitive study, unlikely to be surpassed," another expert on the Young Turk era, Feroz Ahmad, criticizes Hanioğlu's interpretation of Turkish nationalism, because it disregards the later Young Turk period (1908–18) and is based mostly on the personal thoughts of individual figures.[83] Although both Hanioğlu and Kushner are more or less

[77] James L. Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties*, 220; Fred Halliday, "The Formation of Yemeni Nationalism," 26; Zürcher, "Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists," 214–17.
[78] Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*. For a critical rereading of Akçura, see M. Hakan Yavuz, "Nationalism and Islam." See also Zürcher, "Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists," 215.
[79] M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Preparation for a Revolution*, 296, 298. See also Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, 155; Hans-Lukas Kieser, *Vorkämpfer der "Neuen Türkei,"* 73.
[80] Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider, "Unpacking Cosmopolitanism for the Social Sciences," 3–4. An alternate definition is delivered by Chernilo, who differentiates between a theoretical and historical version of methodological nationalism: Daniel Chernilo, "The Critique of Methodological Nationalism," 104–5.
[81] A fourth dichotomy in the literature is the incompatibility of Islam and socialism. The attraction of Muslim insurgents to socialism was based mostly on populist, revolutionary, and anti-imperial sentiments and socialism was not necessarily a strong corporate identity among the Middle Eastern elites and masses, so this question needs to be dealt elsewhere.
[82] M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, "Turkish Nationalism and the Young Turks, 1889–1908"; idem, "Turkism and the Young Turks, 1889–1908"; David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876–1908*.
[83] Feroz Ahmad, "Review of *The Young Turks in Opposition* by M. Sükrü Hanioğlu," 1589. See also the discussion between Hanioğlu and Ahmad in *American Historical Review* 102, no. 4 (1997): 1301–3. But the discussion is less productive because both experts prefer to discuss terminological interpretations of nation

cautious in implying political consequences of the prerevolutionary intellectual and cultural development of Turkism in the following years of Young Turk rule,[84] they made way for other scholars who are more ambitious in seeing Turkish nationalism as the monocausal force behind the Ottoman cataclysm. Following Hanioğlu's arguments, reductionist interpretations that claim that CUP policies (1913–18) were guided primarily by Turkish ethnonationalism gained currency.[85] Although Turkism was an emerging cultural and political current, it is nevertheless disputed how far the CUP policies were actually driven by ideas of Turkish ethnonationalism alone. The problem is that many scholars reduce the Young Turk era to a period of Turkification in internal affairs and pan-Turkism in foreign affairs. The pan-Turkism thesis is an especially rough simplification that needs to be taken with a grain of salt regardless of its numerous scholarly references.[86] The argument of Turkification—in many aspects undeniable but also overstated in the literature—needs to be contextualized when it comes to the Arab provinces.[87]

The emergence of Arab nationalism was long based on George Antonius's epic narrative of the "awakening" of Arab national opposition to the "Turkish yoke," coming to its natural climax during the Arab Revolt of 1916.[88] This narrative was repeatedly revised and corrected by several generations of renowned scholars of Arab history. It is now broadly established that the Arab Revolt was not a popular nationalist movement but rather a separatist minority insurrection sponsored and magnified by the British war propaganda and later by postwar Arab nationalists.[89] Most scholars now agree that most of the Arabs remained loyal to the Ottoman Empire until its disappearance. To quote Khoury, Arab nationalists were still "a humble minority" in Syria even in 1920. Arab nationalism emerged as a political ideology in the 1920s or even as late as the 1930s, as some other scholars argue.[90]

Even so, many scholars of Arab history still explain the early emergence of Arabism as a defensive reaction to Turkification policies of the CUP government.[91] Attempts have been made to

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and nationalism in Ottoman Turkish instead of historiographical interpretations of Turkish nationalism.

[84] Kushner's conclusion is cautious but not without consequences: "The nationalism of the early Turkists was largely cultural. Nowhere in their writings was there a challenge to Ottomanism and Islamism, the official doctrines of the [Hamidian] state. On the contrary, they were all too often eager to note their adherence to these doctrines. . . . The decade of the Young Turk rule only intensified the processes which were leading the Turks toward political nationalism. . . . These pressures both at the periphery and at the center itself could not but increase the sense of isolation and unity of the Turks and accelerated their conversion to Turkish nationalism": *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism*, 98. Similarly, Hanioğlu relativizes the early rise of Turkism in connection to the continuing adherence of the Young Turks to Ottomanism: "Turkism rose to prominence much earlier than is usually assumed, while Ottomanism persisted much later than is commonly held": Hanioğlu, "Turkism and the Young Turks," 19.

[85] See: Hans-Lukas Kieser's "Introduction" in his edited volume *Turkey beyond Nationalism*, vii–xvii.

[86] For an exemplary survey of pan-Turkism in the Young Turk era, see Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism in Turkey*, 28–71. Reynolds argues that pan-Turkism is overestimated in scholarly works, only because it serves teleological and political functions: Michael A. Reynolds, "Buffers, Not Brethren." Elsewhere Reynolds showed that pan-Turkism did not affect the Young Turk policies toward the Turkic populated regions of Caucasia, Crimea, and Central Asia: Michael A. Reynolds, *Shattering Empires*.

[87] Erol Ülker, "Contextualising 'Turkification,'" 613–36.

[88] George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*. See also Albert Hourani, "The Arab Awakening Forty Years After"; Martin S. Kramer, "Ambition's Discontent"; William L. Cleveland, "The Arab Nationalism of George Antonius Reconsidered."

[89] The revolt was supported only by a minority of the Arabs, such as local chieftains with their own kingdom ambitions, well-paid Bedouin tribes without any national sentiments, and a few idealist and nationalist officers from the Ottoman army. Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, "Myth in the Desert, or Not the Great Arab Revolt."

[90] Philip S. Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism*, 74; C. Ernest Dawn, "The Origins of Arab Nationalism," 10; Sylvia Kedourie, ed., *Arab Nationalism*, 35.

[91] Zeine Zeine, *The Emergence of Arab Nationalism*, 83; Hisham Sharabi, *Arab Intellectuals and the West*,

rehabilitate Antonius's Turkish-Arab dichotomy thesis in order to predate the emergence of Arab nationalism.[92] Hanioğlu again provided some critical but not unproblematic evidence from the pre-1908 private correspondence of Young Turk figures. He showed the presence of chauvinistic and colonialist sentiments among some Turkish nationalists from the CUP toward the Arabs: "The fact that they were of the same religion as the Arabs was not significant to the Young Turks. They saw themselves as bringing civilization to the tribal society of the Arabs and protecting it against Western Imperialism."[93] It is questionable, however, how far these individual sentiments can be generalized. Other scholars of Ottoman history provided evidence from the era of Young Turk rule that Islamist and Ottomanist policies were primarily directed toward the Arabs instead of policies of Turkification.[94] After an analysis of Arab and Young Turk political relations, Hasan Kayalı delivers a more balanced interpretation than the prevailing intellectual histories of Turkish and Arab nationalisms:

> However, they [Young Turks] upheld the imperial polity and multiethnic agendas rather than implement a Turkish nationalist program in the conduct of state affairs. In fact, Turkish nationalist activity continued to be restricted to the cultural-literary domain. The CUP as a political party subscribed to Ottomanist and Islamist political ideals. Like Arabs, Turks (including Unionist Turks) carried multiple layers of identities. Some Unionists were attracted to Turkism, but cultural identities and allegiances did not correspond to political agendas.[95]

This of course does not mean that there were no tensions between Arabs and Turks or that ethnonationalism played no role. Rather, the mutual exclusivity of Turkish and Arab ethnonationalisms were more often secondary to the inclusive ideas of Ottoman-Islamic solidarity.[96] The discursive dichotomy between Turks and Arabs was one of the main pillars of the perspective of contemporary British observers.[97] On March 22, 1920, Winston Churchill said at the House of Commons: "There are the Arabs who have been disturbed by the [French] occupation of Syria, and who are inclined now, for the first time, in many ways to make common cause with the Turkish Nationalists, thus uniting two forces by whose division our policy has hitherto prospered."[98]

107; Rashid Khalidi, "Ottomanism and Arabism in Syria before 1914," 53–54; Mahmoud Haddad, "The Rise of Arab Nationalism Reconsidered," 213; Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism*, 58.

[92] Rashid Khalidi in particular champions this "revision of the revisionist thesis" in order to build leverage against the Zionist narratives claiming that the Arabs lacked any sentiment for statehood and nationalism. Khalidi claims that the majority of Ottoman Arabs already were adherents of Arabism in 1914, while at the same time admitting that they might not have had separatist tendencies in regard to the Ottoman Empire: Rashid Khalidi, "Ottomanism and Arabism in Syria before 1914," 62.

[93] M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, "The Young Turks and the Arabs before the Revolution of 1908," 31.

[94] For Ottoman historians rejecting the argument of Turkification of the Arab provinces, see Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 20—11; Zafer Toprak, "Bir Hayal Ürünü," 14–22; Ülker, "Contextualising 'Turkification,'" 623. The distinguished Arab historian C. Ernest Dawn also dismisses the Turkification argument because it is based on strongly biased sources like the British diplomatic documents or the few dissident Arab newspapers. Instead he interprets the emergence of Arabism as a result of intra-Arab conflict over governmental positions after the war: C. Ernest Dawn, "The Origins of Arab Nationalism," 11–12.

[95] Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 210.

[96] For the Turkish-Arab animosity in history and historiography, see Ulrich W. Haarmann, "Ideology and History, Identity and Alterity."

[97] Audeh, "The Ideological Uses of History and the Young Turks," 622–24.

[98] Quoted in Zeine, *The Struggle for Arab Independence*, 136.

The second dichotomy of nationalism and Ottomanism is closely associated with the first one and derives from the idea that the Ottoman state, society, and civic identity had no virtue so that alternative nationalist identities emerged to replace the Ottoman rule. Michael Reynolds argues that most of the studies have illustrated late Ottoman history "not so much as the final era of an empire but as the prelude to (or resumption of) several distinct national histories" and the Ottoman Empire itself "as a realm of competing nationalisms."[99] William L. Cleveland once warned that late Ottoman history "cannot be viewed merely as a prelude to Arab nationalism," because "the late Ottoman state had internal viability" of its own.[100] Hanioğlu also correctly criticizes the fallacy in seeing "Ottomanism and Turkism in a distinctly essentialist manner. As a consequence, it imagines a false completion between two discrete, monolithic, and unchanging ideologies; Ottomanism on the one hand and Turkism (or Turkish nationalism) on the other. In reality, however, these concepts possessed fluid, blurred boundaries even after the Balkan Wars."[101]

Modernist and nationalist history-writing traditions dismiss the Ottoman Empire as a failed multinational state ruled by "Oriental despotism." Peculiarly, when it comes to the narrative of the "Turkish yoke," the Ottoman Empire is illustrated as a brutal authoritarian state. But when it comes to the narrative of the cultural development and national emancipation of Ottoman minorities, the Ottoman society is depicted as a fertile ground for sectarianism, tribalism, and nationalism. The binary opposition between the Gladstonian image of the "unspeakable Turk" and the romanticized image of "Ottoman cosmopolitanism" is one of the further fallacies of the historiography, resulting in a causality dilemma. On the one hand, nationalization is regarded as a reaction to "Oriental despotism" which is, on the other hand, depicted as a reaction to the sectarianism, tribalism, and nationalism that emerged in the "Mosaic model" of the Ottoman society.[102]

Ottomanism is probably the most misunderstood corporate ideology in the intellectual histories of the Middle East. Most of the major studies in late Ottoman history "are devoted to the delineation of the failure of the Ottoman system as a prelude to the triumph of the modern state."[103] Obviously Ottomanism failed to incorporate the non-Muslims (especially Christians, more than Jews) and Muslims within a common civic identity. This, however, was not the same as the incorporation of Turkish and non-Turkish Muslims into a common Ottoman-Islamic identity. A strange but widely repeated idea holds that the shift from Ottoman-Islamic identity to national and secular Arab or Turkish identity happened overnight right after the Ottoman Empire found itself on the losing end of World War I. Awad Halabi recently showed that "Ottoman and Islamic loyalties persisted among both Turks and Arabs, making a sharp periodization [between the Ottoman and post-Ottoman eras] unsustainable." Basing his analysis on the Palestinian press during "the liminal years 1917–22," Halabi interprets the decline of Ottoman rule in the Arab provinces rather as "gradual processes, not [as] an abrupt break between Ottoman rule and colonial or nationalist regimes."[104] Even in the National Pact of 1920 Turkish nationalists were still eagerly talking about the "Ottoman nation."[105] Nuri al-Sa\'id, who left the Ottoman army to join the Arab Revolt, writes: "None of us thought of separation from the Ottoman Empire. Our thinking was directed toward obtaining a local Arab administration, the recognition of

[99] Reynolds, *Shattering Empires*, 3.
[100] William L. Cleveland, *Islam against the West*, 24.
[101] Hanioğlu, "Turkism and the Young Turks," 4.
[102] Audeh, "The Ideological Uses of History and the Young Turks," 550–51.
[103] Rifaat A. Abou-el-Haj, "The Social Uses of the Past," 189. Here Abou-el-Haj refers to seminal works like Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*; and Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*.
[104] Awad Halabi, "Liminal Loyalties," 19–20.
[105] Roderic H. Davison, "Nationalism as an Ottoman Problem and the Ottoman Response," 52.

Arabic as an official language, and Turkish-Arab association in the administration of the general policy of the state."[106]

The third dichotomy between nationalism and Islam suggests that these are incompatible and conflicting ideologies. On the one hand, this Orientalist argument derives from limiting Islam to its theoretical and normative teachings.[107] On the other hand, this view comes from the modernist perspective that regards nationalism as a natural product of secularism and liberalism against religious conservatism and atavism. The post-Ottoman nationalists inherited this Orientalist understanding of Islam and nationalism and were eager to construct their own secularist histories.[108] Thus the Turkish and Arab national movements during the Young Turk era are generally interpreted in the literature as strongly secular, so that their attitude toward Islam is mostly dismissed as opportunistic and superficial or even hostile. This is again a misleading generalization.[109] Zürcher, for instance, argues that within the political rhetoric of Young Turks (including the Kemalist movement in Anatolia) the major corporate identity motive was not Turkish ethnonationalism but rather Ottoman-Muslim nationalism.[110] Kayalı also argues that under Young Turk rule "religion continued to be the primary focus of allegiance for the Muslim masses" and that therefore the existing Ottomanism as a state ideology was first Islamized by the Young Turks after the Balkan Wars.[111] After an analysis of major Young Turk periodicals, Masami Arai comes to a similar conclusion: "Contrary to the received wisdom, Turkish nationalists did not necessarily pursue secularization or Westernization; they were rather in favour of Islamization and Modernization. They searched for a means of regaining the original truth of Islam, and a way of modernization other than Westernization."[112]

Both the Arab and Turkish national movements were intellectual inheritors of the nineteenth-century Islamic reform movements led by the Young Ottoman intellectuals and other political activists like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and his students.[113] Sir Gilbert Clayton of the Colonial Administration of Mesopotamia correctly concluded that for "the vast majority of [Arab] Moslems, Arab nationalism and Islamism are synonymous terms."[114]

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[106] Quoted in William W. Haddad, "Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire," 19.

[107] For example, P. J. Vatikiotis writes: "Islam and nationalism are mutually exclusive terms. As a constructive loyalty to territorially defined national group, nationalism has been incompatible with Islam in which the state is not ethnically or territorially defined, but is itself ideological and religious": Panayiotis J. Vatikiotis, *Islam and the State*, 42–43.

[108] Edmund Burke III, "Orientalism and World History," 495.

[109] Of course we cannot ignore the impact of positivism and scientism on the Young Turk intellectual world, which become most evident in the early Republican era: M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Atatürk*, 48–67.

[110] Erik J. Zürcher, "The Vocabulary of Muslim Nationalism"; idem, "Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists." Gotthard Jaeschke was the first scholar to appreciate the role of religion during the Turkish national movement: Gotthard Jaeschke, "Nationalismus und Religion im Türkischen Befreiungskriege." For other authors giving religion a major role within the rise of Turkish nationalism, see Yavuz, "Nationalism and Islam"; and Elisabeth Özdalga, "Islamism and Nationalism as Sister Ideologies."

[111] Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 211.

[112] Masami Arai, *Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era*, 97.

[113] The intellectual impact of the Young Ottoman movement on Young Turk political culture is unquestioned, whereas the impact of the Islamic reform movement on the emergence of Arab nationalism was disputed among scholars of Arab intellectual history. While some scholars rejected this Islamic input by underlining the role played by Arab Christians and Western-educated secular Arabs, other scholars dismiss these as politically marginal and detached from the masses. These scholars address the decisive role of Islamic Arab reformers and activists, such as Muhammad \'Abduh, Muhammad Rashid Rida', \'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, and others in the development of Arabism as a political movement.

[114] Quoted in Friedman, *British Miscalculations*, 49.

The political references to Islam were not necessarily meant as religious devoutness but rather as an essential part of political identity.[115] The idea of pan-Islam was an integral element within the Middle Eastern culture of nationalism, serving as a "proto-nationalism," as Nikki Keddie argues.[116] According to Zürcher, "their ideology was a cocktail of political, territorial, and religious elements, but one in which the Ottoman Muslim identity element predominated to such an extent that we can indeed speak of 'Muslim nationalism.'"[117] Cleveland argues from the Arab perspective that "appeals to Islamic solidarity and to the defence of the Islamic order against the West dominated the political discourse in the Eastern Arab World during the First World War" and "[t]hroughout the 1920s."[118] Finally, in Gelvin's words: "The bonds of Islam thus came to exemplify, not contravene or replace, the bonds of nation."[119] The discursive dichotomy between nationalism and Islam was also another pillar of the British officials' perception of the Middle Eastern uprisings: "Panislamism is . . . a potential danger. . . . The antidote is nationalism."[120] Meanwhile the Middle Eastern insurgents apparently had another formula: "Be nationalist because it is the only way to save Islam. . . . Be loyal to Islam because it is the only way to save our national inheritance."[121]

It is necessary to overcome these discursive dichotomies in order to understand the cultivation of Ottoman-Muslim nationalism in the Young Turk era. Historians need to acknowledge that not only Turkish and Arab nationalism but also Ottoman identity and Islam could and did coexist, overlap, and challenge as well as inspire each other at the same time. During the final weeks of the defense of Medina in December 1918, the commander of the Ottoman forces, Fahri Paşa responded to British officials requesting his surrender, revealing his multilayered identity: "I am a Mohammedan. I am an Osmanli. I am the son of Bayer Bay. I am a soldier."[122]

The Komitadji-style Organization of Political Activism

The other feature of the Young Turk zeitgeist during the immediate postwar years was the increasingly komitadji nature of political activism among rising elites. The nonpolitical tradition of rural banditry (*eşkiyacılık* or *çetecilik*) by nomadic tribes, army deserters, and criminal gangs in the Ottoman periphery was adopted by the nationalist factions of Ottoman Christians in the second half of the nineteenth century and turned into a distinctive form of political contention, called *komitacılık*, which included secret societies of political conspiracy, guerrilla and terrorist tactics, and radical partisanship. The Young Turk army officers learned these underground and guerrilla tactics in the Balkans during their fight against the Bulgarian and Macedonian komitadjis and consequently organized their opposition movement against Sultan Abdülhamid in the same fashion, resulting in the revolution of 1908.[123]

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[115] Zürcher, "Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists," 230–31.
[116] Nikki R. Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism," 26–27.
[117] Of course Zürcher speaks here only about Turkish nationalists during the Young Turk era, including the postwar Anatolian resistance: Zürcher, "The Vocabulary of Muslim Nationalism," 90. For an official statement of Mustafa Kemal referring to the Muslim nation regardless of ethnicity, see Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, "Türk Milletini Teşkil Eden Müslüman Öğeler Hakkında," May 1, 1920, in Nimet Arsan, ed., *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, 73–74.
[118] William L. Cleveland, "The Role of Islam as Political Ideology in the First World War," 85.
[119] James L. Gelvin, "Modernity and Its Discontents," 83.
[120] A minute by Arthur Hirtzel, August 8, 1919, quoted in Ferris, "The British Empire vs. the Hidden Hand," 340.
[121] Memorandum by Mr. Ryan, December 25, 1919, quoted in Friedman, *British Miscalculations*, 88–89.
[122] Reginald Wingate, letter to Lynden-Bell, February 20, 1919, F.O. 371/4166, 81504/740, quoted in Elie Kedourie, "The Surrender of Medina, January 1919," 132.
[123] Here I refer to the second generation of Young Turks, mostly low-rank officers and clerks from Thrace,

The use of komitadji repertoire of political contention opened up the way to politics for lower and middle classes and built up a new political class that endured even after the end of the empire and played a crucial role in the successor states.[124] These Young Turk–like new political elites had some common features across the Middle East:

> First, they owe their status to their training and modern skills, not to their wealth. Second, they are mostly, especially until quite recently, in government careers. Third, they are most likely the offspring of urban petite bourgeoisie or the rural middle class. The military in particular and to a lesser extent civilian bureaucracy provided a channel of upward mobility to the sons of such modest families.[125]

Beyond its original Mazzinian roots, the CUP became itself a party model in the Middle East. Secret societies were founded by Arab students, officers, and intellectuals. These Arab committees were directly inspired by or even sometimes initiated by the CUP.[126] Therefore the Turkish and Arab organizations behind the Middle Eastern uprisings were similar or even connatural. The Young Arab Society (al-Fatat) was an organization very similar to CUP and fashioned after the Young Turk model. Arab and Turkish nationalists had an identical background. Both the CUP and famous Arab secret societies like al-Fatat and al-‘Ahd emerged as secret societies among the students and officers educated at the Ottoman academies.[127] In his general survey on the origins of “Young” movements in Asia Mansura Haidar concludes: “The Young Turk movement proved to be a political catalyst which enthused and goaded the Asians to fight against colonialists.”[128]

The komitadji spirit of political activism was also apparent in the sacralization of the party and state. Along with the revolution of 1908, the Young Turks introduced Jacobinism to Ottoman politics.[129] Not without a cause the CUP was called by its members “the sacred society” (*cemiyet-i mukaddese*). After the takeover of governmental power the esoteric-militant loyalty to the committee was translated into a strong statist mentality (*devletçilik*).[130] After the demise of Ottoman rule the ulema and local elites in the Arab provinces continued to promote these “state-centric nationalist ideologies” of the Young Turk era to the masses.[131]

The resistance and protest patterns used by Turkish and Arab insurgents during the aftermath period reveal also a similarity. The Middle Eastern uprisings were all carried out with the typical

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Albania, and Macedonia. Suavi Aydın, “İki İttihat-Terakki,” 124.

[124] Keith David Watenpaugh, *Being Modern in the Middle East*, 160–184.

[125] Ergun Özbudun, “The Continuing Ottoman Legacy and the State Tradition in the Middle East,” 146.

[126] On the efforts of the Young Turks to establish Young Turk clubs for the Arabs in Libya, see Rachel Simon, “Mustafa Kemal in Libya,” 20–21.

[127] Haddad, “The Rise of Arab Nationalism Reconsidered,” 205.

[128] Mansura Haidar, “The Origin, Genesis and Regional Chain Reaction of the ‘Young’ Movement,” 52. Most of the Arab nationalist associations during the aftermath period were called “Young”: Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties*, 200.

[129] Feroz Ahmad, “War and Society under the Young Turks, 1908–1918” (2003), 129.

[130] As Paul Dumont noted, statism “has two separate but related meanings. In a general way, it refers to strategy of state intervention in all social, economic, cultural and educational activities. . . . In a more limited sense, the term indicates a specific economic policy.” In this chapter I refer to its first and general meaning, which “implies a paternalistic approach in which the state has responsibility for organizing the life of the nation and finding solutions to all its problems”: Paul Dumont, “The Origins of Kemalist Ideology,” 39. See also Özbudun, “The Continuing Ottoman Legacy and the State Tradition in the Middle East,” 137.

[131] Gelvin, “Modernity and Its Discontents,” 79–80.

contentious repertoire of the Young Turk era.[132] According to Khalidi, Arab nationalists adopted the public mobilization policies of the CUP in the postwar period: "Street demonstrations, use of media, and military coups became instruments of drastic political change."[133] The mobilization of popular masses was also a feature of the komitadji tradition of the Young Turk era.[134] Gelvin argues that the demonstration culture in the late Ottoman Empire was adopted and transformed by the elites and popular masses in Syria in the aftermath of World War I.[135]

Furthermore the relationship to the Bolsheviks and socialism in general needs to be seen within the revolutionary concept of komitadji. During the Baku Congress Şevket Süreyya (Aydemir), a promising young nationalist, was introduced to Enver Paşa, whose biography he would later write. According to Aydemir's impressions, Enver Paşa saw the Bolsheviks merely as a komitadji organization. "He believed," as Aydemir recalls "that the Bolshevik Party came to power by a komitadji coup d'état like the secret Committee of Union and Progress did." Therefore the nature of the cooperation between Young Turks and Bolsheviks was based on the notion that "a komitadji knows a komitadji."[136]

Last but not least, the most important komitadji legacy is paramilitary warfare. According to a British official, the movement "would foment insurrections resorting to the avowed tactics of guerilla and *cemitadji* [*sic*] warfare."[137] Between 1914 and 1922 warfare was the "daily environment of the ordinary people" in Syria and elsewhere in the Arab East and in "their vision of the world."[138] Provence has persuasively shown the impact of the modern Ottoman education institutions and the military experience in the Ottoman army on the identity construction of the postwar Arab leaders and insurgents. Accordingly, "[t]ens of thousands of colonial citizens" who "challenged the postwar settlement" were former Ottoman citizens or even Ottoman soldiers who were actually politically cultivated in the Hamidian and Young Turk eras.[139]

Anti-Imperial Mass Struggle as Jihad

As Hanioğlu writes, "anti-imperialism constituted one of the main pillars of the CUP ideology." European imperialism was perceived as a "modern crusade," so the anti-imperialist discourse of the Young Turk era had a correspondingly Islamic tone.[140] The use of jihad in the anti-imperial struggle was one of the most important features of the Young Turk zeitgeist among the popular masses. According to Provence, the emerging resistance to European occupiers was actually based on "familiar

[132] "*Contentious repertoires* are arrays of contentious performances that are currently known and available within some set of political actors": Tilly and Tarrow, *Contentious Politics*, 11.
[133] Khalidi, "Ottomanism and Arabism in Syria before 1914," 65.
[134] For the Young Turks' public mobilization politics, see Ahmad, "War and Society under the Young Turks, 1908–1918" (2003), 127–31.
[135] Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties*, 260–63. See also idem, "The Social Origins of Popular Nationalism in Syria." Gelvin acknowledges that already "during the mid-to-late 19th century a populist political sociability emerged in Syria," but he he underlines the social dynamics of the postwar popular demonstrations.
[136] Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, 195.
[137] Quoted in Friedman, *British Miscalculations*, 56. See also: Watenpaugh, *Being Modern in the Middle East*, 177.
[138] Nadine Méouchy, "From the Great War to the Syrian Armed Resistance Movement (1919–1921)," 516.
[139] Provence, "Ottoman Modernity, Colonialism, and Insurgency in the Interwar Arab East," 206. Provence corrects Tauber's argument that the Ottoman military background of the Arab insurgents did not play a role in Turkish-Arab relations: Tauber, "Syrian and Iraqi Nationalist Attitudes to the Kemalist and Bolshevik Movements," 904.
[140] Hanioğlu, *Preparation for a Revolution*, 302, 303, 306.

Ottoman ideas of religion, nation, and homeland. As practical ideologies of anti-imperialism, these identities had been nurtured in Ottoman military and civil schools and the military service between around 1880 and 1913."[141]

Contrary to nationalist interpretations, the Middle Eastern insurgents of the aftermath period used a very strong Islamic rhetoric. The Islamization of political rhetoric was not an atavistic resistance to modern developments at the end of the Ottoman Empire or mere pragmatism to manipulate the masses but rather a discourse that complemented the general nationalist and anti-imperial struggle.[142] As Gelvin shows, the calls for jihad were very common in postwar Syria. People who had recently escaped the conscription of the Ottoman and Faysal governments were now freely participating in the jihad against the French occupation.[143] During the Iraqi revolt there were also calls for jihad by Shi'ite *mujtahidin*.[144] Gertrude Bell wrote from Iraq to her father: "We are now in the middle of a full-blown Jihad."[145] Mustafa Kemal himself often used the term "jihad" in his political statements.[146] Mustafa Kemal's newspaper, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, had the same anti-imperialist and pan-Islamic tone as Enver's *Liwa-el-Islam*.[147] The Kemalist newspaper argued that the Anatolian movement was part of the general struggle in Asia for freedom.[148] The chief of political affairs of the Foreign Ministry of the Ankara government, Yusuf Hikmet (Bayur) was not just bluffing but also considering a very possible political option, as he warned the Allies: "should western European governments refuse to abandon their imperialistic ambitions in our country, we should be obliged to fight imperialism with its own weapons. We would join hands with all the oppressed nationalities of Asia. At the head of millions of Asiatic warriors trained by us, we would lead the fight for the emancipation of all colonies."[149]

The Bolshevists called upon the Muslim delegates of the Baku Congress to wage "a true people's holy war," targeted "above all against British Imperialism!" This demonstrates how appealing the jihad became in anti-imperialist struggle even for antireligious Communists.[150] Anti-imperialism was therefore one of the ideological bridges between Islam and communism in the aftermath period.[151]

I consider this call to jihad in the anti-imperialist mass struggle in the aftermath period to be a typical feature of the Young Turk zeitgeist connecting the different national, local, or tribal insurgencies

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[141] Provence, "Ottoman Modernity, Colonialism, and Insurgency in the Interwar Arab East," 207.
[142] Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties*, 187.
[143] Ibid., 3, 111, 113, 116, 133–34.
[144] Amal Vinogradov, "The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered," 136.
[145] Quoted in Friedman, *British Miscalculations*, 191.
[146] Report by Commander Heathcote-Smith, Constantinople, July, 24, 1919, FO.371.4158.118411, in Şimşir, *British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938), Vol. 1*, 58; "Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued by M.I.1c., Constantinople Branch for the Week Ending 13th May, 1920," May 24, 1920, FO.371.5168.E.6151, in idem, *British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938), Vol. 2*, 111.
[147] For *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*'s coverage of uprisings in Africa and Asia, see Hadiye Yılmaz, *Kurtuluş Savaşımız ve Asya-Afrika'nın Uyanışı Hâkimiyeti Milliye Yazılarıyla*. *Liwa-el-Islam* was a biweekly political journal published in Berlin from March 1921 until December 1922. The journal was published in Ottoman-Turkish, German, Farsi, and Arabic. For detailed information, see Gerhard Höpp, *Arabische und islamische Periodika in Berlin und Brandenburg, 1915–1945*, 25–32, 80–83; A. Alp Yenen, "Berlin unter dem Banner des Islams," 89–134; Selçuk Gürsoy, ed., *Enver Paşa'nın Sürgünü*.
[148] *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, February 2, 1920, quoted in Yılmaz, *Kurtuluş Savaşımız ve Asya-Afrika'nın Uyanışı Hâkimiyeti Milliye Yazılarıyla*, 41. A similar subordination of the Anatolian movement to the uprising of the oppressed peoples of the world can be found also in the Unionist publications: Mim-Re, "İngiltere İmparatorluk Meclisi," *Liwa-el-Islam* 1, no. 9 (1921): 92.
[149] Quoted in Roderic H. Davison, "Middle East Nationalism," 343.
[150] Grigory Zinoviev (chair of the Executive Committee of the Comintern) in his opening speech at the First Congress of the Peoples of the East on September 1, 1920, in Baku: John Riddell, ed., *To See the Dawn*, 88.
[151] Fred H. Lawson, "The Northern Syrian Revolts of 1919-1921 and the Sharifian Regime: Congruence or Conflict of Interests?," 265.

to a single framework of Ottoman-Muslim resistance against the West. As a result of the secular perception of the CUP in the literature, their relation to pan-Islam has been continuously understated. Especially the jihad of 1914 has been repeatedly illustrated as a "Holy War Made in Germany," thus downplaying the role of the Young Turk government.[152] Mustafa Aksakal has demonstrated a continued use of jihad in Ottoman politics long before World War I.[153] In the case of the Young Turks, the CUP and its irregular forces acting as Ottoman intelligence and special operations forces have continuously promoted pan-Islam and jihad since the Turkish-Italian War over Libya in 1911 in order to ensure the loyalty of the Ottoman-Muslim subjects and to mobilize Muslim insurgencies against the Christian enemies of the Ottoman Empire.[154] Even though the jihad of 1914 did not fulfill its promise, only with the aftermath period did a new jihad emerge as a transnational social movement of the anticolonial Muslim struggle.[155] In Halabi's words: "This pan-Islamic aspect combined with persistent Ottomanism and generic anti-imperialism to serve as another point of connection between the Turkish and Palestinian [also Syrian and Iraqi] causes during the early 1920s."[156]

Not without reason the idea of pan-Islam became "the greatest single concern for British intelligence between 1919 and 1923."[157] Consequently the main purpose of the peace settlement became the punishment and prevention of pan-Islamism.[158]

Conclusion: The Young Turk Discourse in History and Historiography

In the aftermath period the Young Turk exiles ambitiously attempted and publicly announced efforts to unite the different Muslim and Middle Eastern uprisings against the British imperialism. A Unionist Factor in an operational sense, however, was not behind the uprisings of the Arab East. The discourse of the Unionist Factor, in the form of conspiracy theories, alarmed British decision makers and encouraged them to act more severely against everything that the Young Turks represented: Ottoman-Muslim nationalism, revolutionary activism, pan-Islamic anti-imperialism, and most of all transnational and transideological coalitions among revolutionaries in the Middle East. Although they failed terribly, the story of the Young Turks' exile activities delivers an alternative narrative of the prevailing zeitgeist of the Muslim and Middle Eastern uprisings in the aftermath of World War I. According to a contemporary British cabinet paper: "The C.U.P., in fact, have [*sic*] not given up the game. The war may lead to the opening of the Straits and the partition of the Ottoman Empire. But it has immensely

[152] The expression "Holy War Made in Germany" was coined in 1915 by the Dutch scholar of Islamic and Oriental Studies Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, in an article critical of his German Orientalist colleagues involved in German war propaganda. For the English translation of his Dutch article, see Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, *The Holy War "Made in Germany."*

[153] Mustafa Aksakal, "'Holy War Made in Germany'?" 187.

[154] This was the main policy of the Ottoman Army's intelligence and special operations branch, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (Special Organization), which was also closely connected to paramilitary and underground branches of the CUP. Due to missing archival sources and the disputed role of the organization during the Armenian massacres, only a few scholarly surveys on the history of Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa are available: see Philip H. Stoddard, "The Ottoman Government and the Arabs, 1911 to 1918."

[155] For the increase of "new" jihad calls between 1914 and 1920, see Méouchy, "From the Great War to the Syrian Armed Resistance Movement (1919–1921)," 512–13. See also: Lawson, "The Northern Syrian Revolts of 1919-1921 and the Sharifian Regime," 262.

[156] Halabi, "Liminal Loyalties," 26.

[157] Ferris, "'The Internationalism of Islam,'" 66.

[158] Yapp, *The Making of the Modern Near East*, 303.

weakened the orderly forces of civilization, and loosened the hold of Europe over large areas of the Moslem world. There may still be room in this World for Enver."[159]

Even though it did not lead to the formation of an effective transnational coalition between the Middle Eastern uprisings, intense negotiations and transactions were conducted between transnational agents of different movements. The transideological connections between allegedly conflicting groups blurred and confused the understanding of contemporary British observers, which made room for conspiracy theories. In order to hinder the growth of a transnational anticolonial movement of Ottoman Muslims, it was necessary to eliminate all the Ottoman-Islamic remnants that united the insurgents. Accordingly the British supported the isolation and nationalization of local movements. The Islamic transnationalism of the aftermath period was thus defeated by supporting local nationalism. For instance, Macfie argues that these intelligence reports on Enver's conspiratorial activities pushed the British policy makers to consider a rapprochement with Mustafa Kemal Paşa.[160] The imposition of the mandates and the enthronement of the Sharifian princes as their new rulers were further measures against pan-Islamism.[161] Peculiarly, those leaders of the postwar Middle East who were most touched by the Young Turk era themselves were also the ones who rejected this legacy with the most vigor.[162] To sum up the cultivation of Arab nationalists after the Young Turk model, Phebe Marr offers a remarkable observation:

> All evidence suggests that … the seeds of [Arab] nationalism had as yet put down no deep roots among a population still wedded to tribe, clan, family, and above all religion. Even among those committed to Arab nationalist goals, Ottoman values and ideals remained strong. Four centuries of Ottoman tradition had left their mark. The new generation of Iraqis, no matter how vociferously they might denounce the Young Turks, resembled nothing so much as an Arab version of the Young Turks themselves.[163]

Edmund Burke suggests that when it comes to historicizing the past "orientalism and nationalism are deeply interconnected."[164] The formation of Middle Eastern nation-states in 1922 set the blueprint for the colonial and nationalist history writing of the twentieth century. The legacy of the Young Turk conspiracy theory, developed by British officials, "continues to resurface in altered form in scholarly and semi-scholarly monographs of uneven quality dealing with the Young Turk period."[165] The prevalent historiography is still having difficulties in interpreting the Turkish-Arab relations, particularly in the immediate postwar years, and the ideological opacity of the Young Turk era in the Middle East in general. The simplification of the ideological opacity of the Young Turk zeitgeist to political opportunism is merely another attempt to defend the devious dominance of ethnonationalism as a social force. The ideological eclecticism among Ottoman Muslims had its own viability and should not be measured or judged by other standards.

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[159] CAB/27/34, quoted in Ferris, "The British Empire vs. the Hidden Hand," 340.
[160] Alec L. Macfie, "British Intelligence and the Turkish National Movement, 1919–22," 14.
[161] Ferris, "The British Empire vs. the Hidden Hand," 339–40.
[162] Karl K. Barbir, "Memory, Heritage, and History," 106.
[163] Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 28.
[164] Burke, "Orientalism and World History," 494.
[165] Audeh, "The Ideological Uses of History and the Young Turks," 572.

The preoccupation with ethnonationalism is the link between the contemporary British Intelligence reports and the prevailing literature on the Young Turk era. According to Audeh, this confusion

> explains the literature’s tendency to assert a strong correlation between ethnicity and Oriental political behavior; that is the racially-specific component of Oriental political movements is commonly regarded as more significant than the ideological messages these movements espouse. Thus for example, the formal, ostensible differences between Arab nationalism, Egyptian nationalism, Persian nationalism, etc. are considered much more meaningful than the underlying [anti-imperialist] similarities they share. . . . This was obviously the case in England’s attitude towards Young Turk nationalism as well. Because of its theoretical and conceptual constitutive elements, there is a structural tendency in the Literature to systematically recreate the Young Turk period as a peculiar and aberrational interim . . . during which a cabal of unreasonable Turkish adventurers, ethnically and sociologically unrepresentative of the Ottoman body politic, managed to subvert the “normal,” if unequal, relationship [with the West generally and the British Empire in particular].[166]

Neither the hidden hand theory nor the grand narratives of distinct nationalist movements explain the Middle Eastern uprisings between 1918 and 1922. The different local insurgents shared cross-border Ottoman-Islamic solidarity, mutual inspiration as revolutionaries, and zeal to fight the colonial occupation. The interpretation of one of the experts of the German Auswärtiges Amt was more down to earth than that of his British colleagues:

> The evidence that the mandatory powers have an interest in spreading the belief that there is a Bolshevik infection of their Oriental people does not entitle one in any way to believe that every connection is invented. It is rather worthwhile to pick out the grains of truth that, as already hinted at, are hidden in the husks of the false evidence. In one point the enacted concerns displayed by the Entente are actually real and correct, despite all the fantasy in the particular details: that there is a logical connection between incidences that are spatial disparate, such as in Egypt and in India. The concept of a Bolshevik origin is merely a very transparent veil, with which the controlling powers of the Entente attempt to enshroud the eyes of the “profanum vulgus” from their own realization that there is an awakening sense of solidarity in the Islamic Orient.[167]

A certain form of transnational social movement was emerging among the Muslim rebels, which was characterized by a common political culture that I call in this chapter the Young Turk zeitgeist. A further and more extensive study of the postwar Muslim uprisings—beyond the Ottoman realms in North Africa, Egypt, Iran, India, and Turkestan—is still necessary to establish an even broader understanding of this very special period without reproducing teleological and partisan interpretations. The postwar Middle Eastern and Muslim uprisings resemble a “global movement” of anticolonial

[166] Ibid., 690–91.
[167] Herbert Diel, “Beziehungen zwischen islamischer Bewegung, Bolschewismus und Sozialismus,” June 6, 1919, AA R 14553, 5.

Muslim nationalism within the "global moment" of the aftermath of World War I.[168] Coming back to Provence's initial argument, we should not see these uprisings "as separate movements of national liberation but rather as locally conditioned elements of a single, undifferentiated struggle."[169] The Italian Orientalist Leone Caetani similarly noted in 1919:

> The convulsion [about the partition of the Ottoman Empire] has shaken the Islamic and Oriental civilization to its foundations. The entire Oriental world, from China to the Mediterranean, is in ferment. Everywhere the hidden fire of anti-European hatred is burning. Riots in Morocco, risings in Algiers, discontent in Tripoli, so-called Nationalist attempts in Egypt, Arabia, and Libya are all different manifestations of the same deep sentiment and have as their object the rebellion of the Oriental world against European civilization.[170]

This chapter demonstrates the necessity of a turn in historiography toward transnational, entangled, and comparative approaches to the aftermath period in the Middle East. Some well-established discursive dichotomies in the historiography as well as methodological nationalism still hinder the explanation of the political contention culture of late and post-Ottoman insurgents. The formation process of new nation-states needs to be seen in connection with the intellectual and political currents of the Young Turk zeitgeist. The dynamics of this period are essential, not only because of the formation of the modern Middle Eastern states but also because of its lost battles and forgotten dreams.

[168] For the concept of "global movements" and "global moments," see Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier, "Introduction."

[169] Provence, "Ottoman Modernity, Colonialism, and Insurgency in the Interwar Arab East," 206–7.

[170] "Sees East in a Ferment: Italian Orientalist Fears the Effect of Partitioning Turkey," *New York Times*, June 1, 1919, quoted (with an erroneous date) in Friedman, *British Miscalculations*, 17.