

Fifty years of Maghreb emigration: how states shaped Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian emigration

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Fifty years of Maghreb emigration

How states shaped Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian emigration

Katharina Natter

DEMIG project paper 21



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- analyse migration as part of broader global change
- contribute to new theoretical approaches
- advance understanding of the multi-level forces driving migration

Abstract

This paper analyses emigration from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to main European and North American destinations since the 1960s. It explores the role of states, post-colonial ties and migration policies in emigration dynamics. By adopting a historical-comparative approach and an origin country perspective, this paper shows that Maghreb emigration was continuously shaped not only by government strategies in Europe but also by those of Maghreb states. Drawing on new bilateral migration flow data compiled in the DEMIG C2C database, the paper reveals three distinct phases in which Maghreb emigration patterns converge and diverge: the post-independence period in which Maghreb emigration boomed; the period from the mid-1970s until the early 1990s when Algerian emigration levelled off while emigration from neighbouring countries' remained high; and the period from the early 1990s when Moroccan emigration increased exponentially while Tunisian and Algerian only grew moderately. Similarities in Maghreb emigration patterns can be explained by the countries' comparable geopolitical and socio-economic features and that European states apply the same immigration policies to all Maghreb countries. To understand the divergences however, a closer look at origin country factors is required. The paper finds that Algeria's departure from regional emigration patterns in the 1970s can be traced back to the emigration stop implemented by the Algerian government in 1973. Conversely, the active promotion of emigration by the Moroccan state facilitated emigration by making access to passport easier and fostering a culture of emigration that together with high unemployment partly explains Morocco's emigration boom after the 1990s. Finally, recent diversification of Maghreb emigration to divergent South European countries, can be attributed to specific historical linkages, with Moroccans and Algerians mainly migrating to Spain and Tunisians to Italy.

Keywords: Maghreb, emigration, migration policies, state

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1 Introduction

This paper investigates Maghreb emigration dynamics over the past fifty years and analyses the role of states, post-colonial ties and migration policies in shaping these trends. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia are all situated on the southern border of Europe and share a colonial past under French rule (except northern Morocco which was a Spanish protectorate). Morocco and Tunisia gained independence in 1956 and Algeria in 1962. Over the past fifty years, these countries have been subject to similar government policies from main European destination countries: recruitment practices in the 1960s and 1970s, travel visa introductions at the end of the 1980s, and increased border monitoring after the turn of the twenty-first century (Annex 2). They also portray similar trends of urbanisation, demographic and economic development, as well as levels of education and human development, and are all characterised by high youth unemployment (Annex 1).

These socio-economic and geopolitical characteristics, which have been established as main migration determinants in the literature,² can account for the often remarkable similarity in Maghreb emigration patterns. New migration flow data used in this paper reveals however, that there is no homogeneous Maghreb emigration narrative, but three distinct phases in which emigration patterns converged and diverged. While emigration in the post-independence period was similarly dominated by a region-wide boom, Algerian emigration decreased in the 1970s unlike Moroccan and Tunisian emigration which continued at stable and rather high levels. Since the early 1990s, Moroccan emigration has shown exponential increases, while Tunisian and Algerian emigration rose at more moderate levels.

Academia, especially within the francophone world, has studied Maghreb migration since its emergence in the first half of the twentieth century. Case studies focus on the post-colonial relationship between Algeria and France (Termine 1987; Samers 1997; Spire 2005), on the links between socio-economic development and emigration from Morocco and Tunisia (Simon 1973; Findlay 1980; Mzali 1997; López García and Berriane 2004; de Haas 2005), as well as on the increasing engagement of Maghreb states with their emigrant communities (Brand 2002; Fargues 2004; de Haas 2006; Gubert and Nordman 2009). A large literature also deals with the integration processes of Maghreb migrants and their descendants in France and elsewhere in Europe (Sayad 1977; Oueslati 2009; Arango and Quinones 2009), and more recently with the growing number of skilled Maghreb migrants, especially to North America (Bouklia-Hassane and Talahite 2009; Jaidi 2009; Mahjoub 2009). These studies contribute to a better understanding of the micro and macro

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¹ The focus on the core Maghreb countries Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia draws on their classification within the transition theory (Skeldon 1997; de Haas 2005) as 'frontier states', lower middle income countries which function as a labour reservoir for and exhibit important emigration towards the neighbouring high income countries. Libya and Mauretania, which are often seen as part of the Maghreb, do not have the same migratory profile and are hence not included here – Libya is primarily a destination country for North African and Sub-Saharan migrants and Mauretania's main migratory connections are with West African countries.

² Based on the literature (Todaro 1969; Borjas 1989; Massey et al. 1993; Arango 2000) the most important migration determinants are: (1) geographical and cultural-historic proximity between countries – often measured through variables such as distance, the existence of shared borders, common language or a past colonial relationship; (2) economic differences, measured by variables such as GDP per capita, unemployment rates, welfare spending or education levels; and (3) the socio-political situation in origin countries, measured by variables such as civil liberties and political rights, the rule of law and democratisation, or the occurrence of war and violent conflict. The literature also highlights the role of networks in consolidating and sustaining migration over formally closed borders (Böcker 1994; Massey et al. 1998; Castles 2004), as well as the role of aspirations and capabilities in shaping migration behaviour (De Haas 2011).

processes driving the emigration, immigration, return, and integration of Maghreb migrants. This rich literature has, however, failed to explain the observed divergences in regional migration patterns because of its focus on destination country factors and dearth of historical-comparative studies.

This paper thus seeks to contribute to the migration literature in two ways. First, by using new migration flow data from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia towards major European and North American destinations since the 1960s (Vezzoli et al 2014). To date, most analyses rely on migrant stock data, which obscure the underlying dynamics of migration flows and how they react to changes in the domestic and international social, economic or political environment. By analysing flow data, this paper provides a better understanding of regional emigration patterns and complements existing analyses with a dynamic perspective. Secondly, by analysing the role of states, post-colonial ties and migration policies in Maghreb emigration. To date, the literature has mainly emphasised the importance of European states in the emergence of Maghreb emigration, for instance through recruitment practices during the 1960s and 1970s (Massey et al. 1998; Hooghe et al. 2008). The literature also highlights that state influence has decreased since the mid-1970s as migration has become partly self-perpetuating due to network effects that counteract the increasingly restrictive European immigration policies (Fargues 2004; de Haas 2006). In these studies, the attitudes and policies of Maghreb states are often disregarded, creating a 'destination-country bias' in research (Czaika and de Haas 2013; Kritz and Zlotnik 1992). Given that international migration is a phenomenon involving at least two states, any comprehensive study of migration systems should consider the policies of both origin and destination states (Massey 1999). In vein with Brand (2002: 4), this paper therefore argues that 'rather than viewing the sending states as largely passive exit points, they, too, may be understood as a set of institutions whose policies and practices play a 'constitutive role' in international migration'.

Through an in-depth historical analysis of the socio-political environment in which Maghreb migrations occur, this paper seeks to explore the role of origin states and policies, as well as why Algerian emigration patterns in the 1970s and Moroccan patterns since the mid-1990s have diverged. It argues that when including origin countries in the analysis, the role of states continues to shape Maghreb emigration until today. Recently, Vezzoli (2014) adopted a historical origin-country approach in her case studies on emigration from French Guiana, Guyana and Suriname. The theoretical framework conceptualises the role of colonial heritage and post-colonial ties, and the sequencing of border regimes being introduced and independence in shaping divergent emigration patterns. Following Vezzoli's approach and building upon seminal case studies on Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian migration (Sayad 1977; Findlay 1980; López García 1996; Abs 2001; Collyer 2003; Fargues 2004; López García and Berriane 2004; de Haas 2006), this paper focuses on the role of states, (post)colonial ties, and migration policies in both origin and destination countries to explain the divergence of migration trends among Maghreb countries.

2 The establishment and evolution of Maghreb emigrant communities

Figure 1 shows the geographical distribution of Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian emigrant populations from 1960 to 2010. It shows concentrations in eight traditional European destinations (Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands), more recent destinations in Southern Europe (Spain and Italy), and emerging destinations in North America (Canada and USA). While over eighty percent of Algerian and Tunisian emigrant populations are concentrated in Europe, Moroccan emigration has

been more spread across Europe and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, especially before 1960.

The importance of non-European destinations for Moroccans is linked to two phenomena. Firstly, the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 led to the emigration of around 200,000 Moroccan Jews to Israel. Secondly, Algeria was an important destination for Moroccan labour migrants in the first half of the twentieth century, hosting more than 218,000 Moroccans in 1960. Algerian independence and the closure of the Moroccan-Algerian border in 1962, along with the deterioration of Algeria's economy halted circular migration, which led to the rapid decrease of Morocco's emigrant community to 85,000 in 1970 (de Haas 2005; World Bank 2013). At the same time, Moroccan labour emigration shifted towards European countries.

The remainder of this paper will focus on Maghreb emigration to Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and USA. These destinations capture the majority of Maghreb emigration and because migration flow data from the Maghreb to the UK and MENA destinations are absent. Intra-Maghreb migration however was only important until the 1970s, while the UK has only become a favoured destination for more recently.³




Figure 1: Geographical distribution of Maghreb emigration populations 1960–2010

Figures 2 and 3 show the evolution of Maghreb migrant population and emigration rates (the percentage of the population living abroad) in the eight main destination countries since the 1960s. The World Bank data primarily defines migrants as foreign born, therefore it includes only Maghrebborn migrants, not second or third generation migrants born in European countries. The data offer three main insights: (1) Algeria's emigrant community was established earlier than other Maghreb communities. More than ten percent of Algerians lived abroad in the 1970s, partly due to the

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^{*} OECD countries included are: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and USA

^{** 2010} data corresponds to the UNDP (2012) estimates of bilateral migrant populations Source: World Bank 2013

³ World Bank data (2013) shows the UK has become an increasingly popular destination for Maghreb migrants since the turn of the twenty-first century; hosting around 40,000 Algerians (5,000 in 1990), 21,000 Moroccans (10,000 in 1990), and 10,000 Tunisians (3,000 in 1990) in 2000. Intra-Maghreb migration, in contrast, was particularly important until the 1970s, but since decreased with 30,000 Algerians in Morocco (94,000 in 1960), 18,000 Algerians in Tunisia (33,000 in 1960), and 10,000 Tunisians living in Algeria (29,000 in 1960) since the 1970s. Only Tunisian migration to Libya has increased since the 1970s: from 39,000 in 1980 to 68,000 in 2000.

departure of Algerian-born Europeans post-independence in 1962. Algeria's emigrant community has since decreased to less than three percent of the total Algerian population today, signalling the phasing-out of intense emigration. (2) Tunisia's emigrant population has consistently grown over the past fifty years. In relative terms it is also more migratory than suggested by absolute numbers, with emigrants representing around five percent of the country's population. (3) Morocco's emigration population has grown relatively late. Morocco has given rise to the most important emigrant community since the start of the twenty-first century, with an estimated eight to ten percent of its population (depending on the source) living abroad today. Despite these valuable insights into the growth of migrant communities over time, migration stock data lack information about the more fine-grained dynamics of migration movements.





Figure 2: Maghreb migrant populations in eight OECD* countries 1960-2010

^{** 2010} data corresponds to the UNDP (2012) estimates of bilateral migrant populations Source: World Bank 2013



∠ Algeria
■ Morocco
■ Tunisia


Figure 3: Maghreb migrant populations in eight countries* (% of origin population) 1960–2010

^{*} OECD countries included are: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and USA

Source: World Bank 2013

The new DEMIG C2C database (2014 version) provides this crucial information by tracking yearly bilateral migration flow data from 1946 to 2011 for 29 OECD and 5 non-OECD countries. As annual emigration flow data from Maghreb countries is not available, data on Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian immigration to the eight destination countries was used to 'reconstruct' emigration flows. More generally, emigration data often suffers from significant under-recording, therefore using bilateral immigration data to assess emigration flows leads to more robust results. Figures 4 and 5 depict annual emigration flows and emigration flow rates (the percentage of the national population leaving the country within a year) from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to the eight countries. Given that over eighty percent of Maghreb migrants live in these countries throughout most of the period considered, one can reasonably assume that the flows portrayed below cover most Maghreb emigration in that period. The limitations of the DEMIG C2C database regarding the inclusion of irregular migrants and refugees, as well as the data quality throughout time, are discussed in Annex 3.

The flow data provide three main insights that complement the conclusions drawn from stock data. First, there are striking similarities in Maghreb emigration until the mid-1970s, as well as between Morocco and Tunisia until the 1990s, and between Tunisia and Algeria since the 1990s. These two fundamental shifts in the mid-1970s and mid-1990s are investigated further in this article. Second, while Tunisia was (in relative terms) more migratory than Morocco and Algeria before the 1980s, both Algeria and Tunisia's emigration rates declined up until the turn of the twenty-first century. Figure 4 does not, however, capture the important post-independence emigration from Algeria, which is discussed later on. Finally, Moroccan emigration has increased exponentially since the end of the twentieth century – from around 30,000 emigrants annually in the mid-1990s to around 150,000 in the mid-2000s. At the same time, Algerian and Tunisian emigration grew only moderately, stagnating at around 40,000 and 20,000 emigrants per year respectively, and are thus far from reaching pre-1973 levels.



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* OECD countries included are: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and USA

** 2010 data corresponds to the UNDP (2012) estimates of bilateral migrant populations

Source: DEMIG C2C




Figure 5: Evolution of annual Maghreb emigration rates (% of origin population) 1960–2010

Based on this new flow data the 1960–2010 period can be divided into three analytical periods:

Independence to 1973

The first period stretches from the independence of Maghreb countries in the late 1950s and early 1960s until the Oil Crisis in 1973. It is characterised by the establishment and consolidation of Maghreb emigration mainly to France and other Western European countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany. This development was strongly encouraged by both Maghreb and European states through recruitment agreements and the creation of governmental institutions and structures. Although not visible in the flow data, emigration to Europe also grew because of dwindling labour migration within the Maghreb region.

The Oil Crisis

The 1973 Oil Crisis and subsequent economic recession in Europe changed political and economic priorities that led to the suspension of recruitment. Maghreb migrants continued to emigrate, however, capitalising on opportunities presented by increasingly liberal family reunification laws in Europe (Annex 2). Morocco and Tunisia, compelled by economic stagnation and rising unemployment, also openly encouraged their citizens to migrate as part of labour market strategies. Algeria diverged from this regional trend: the state officially halted emigration in 1973 and the emigration rate was very low compared to the sustained high emigration of Tunisians and Moroccans.


1990-2010

Since the mid-1990s, Maghreb emigration has increased more generally, but this trend has been particularly salient in the Moroccan case. A combination of three factors explains this increase. Firstly, economic discrepancies between Maghreb and major European destinations grew,

^{*} Included are emigration flows to: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and USA Source: DEMIG C2C and World Bank


characterised by a widening gap of GDP per capita from around 5.5:1 in 1985 to 8.5:1 in 1995 (PWT 7.1. 2012). Secondly, new generations entered the labour market in a period of rising unemployment, partly caused by the decline in public sector jobs and agricultural employment (World Bank 2004). At the same time, growing labour demand in southern Europe provided these youth with avenues to migrate and work, especially before Italy and Spain introduced travel visa requirements for Maghreb nationals in 1990 and 1991 (DEMIG VISA 2014 version). Finally, generally higher levels of political freedom, education and mobility throughout the Maghreb contributed to increased migration opportunities (Annex 1). A geographical diversification in destinations also occurred towards Southern Europe and more recently towards North America.

Figures 6 and 7 show changing emigration patterns of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco over the three periods. The subsequent section provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of Maghreb emigration to Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and USA from the 1960 to 2010, and the role of origin and destination states and policies in shaping those migratory trends.



* Included are emigration flows to: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and USA Source: DEMIG C2C

Figure 7: Average annual emigration rates per period (%of origin population)



* Included are emigration flows to: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and USA Source: DEMIG C2C and World Bank

3 The evolution and determinants of Maghreb emigration flows

3.1 Algeria

Algeria was colonised by France in 1830 and integrated into the French state as an administrative department in 1848, leaving a heavy imprint on the country's economic and political structure. As the prototype of a settlement colony, around one million European settlers, mostly French, but also Spanish and Italian, lived in Algeria in 1960 (Temine 1987; López García 1996: 242). Recruitment of Algerian workers for French factories began in 1905 and during World War I, more than 170,000 Algerians fought in the French army (Samers 1997: 45). This period was characterised by intense population movements in both directions, but the 1954–1962 war and Algeria's subsequent independence dramatically restructured migration between the two countries. In the year 1962 alone, over one million 'pieds noirs' (Europeans living in Algeria) and 'harkis' (Algerians who served in the French army during the war of independence and regarded as traitors) left Algeria (de Haas 2006), cutting off many social and economic ties. This contrasts with the situation in Tunisia and Morocco, where the relatively peaceful transition to independence did not cause the entire European population to leave.

After independence, migration between the former colony and the 'métropole' also accelerated due to economic reasons. During the war, much of Algeria's industry and agricultural land was destroyed by the French military during the infamous 'terre brulée campaigns' and unemployment shot up to over 45 percent (Samers 1997: 54). In this context, the free mobility regime between France and Algeria, established in 1947 and consolidated in the 1962 Evian agreement,


the 1960s (Spire and Thave 1999: 42).

⁴ The French Ordinance of 21 July 1962 specified that people of French descent, Europeans having acquired French nationality in Algeria, Jews originating from Algeria and certain Muslim Algerians having acquired a civil status of common law (compared to a civil status of local law) could retain their French nationality after Algerian independence in 1962. Thus, 'pieds noirs' and certain 'harkis' migrating to France were not tracked in French immigration statistics as they were French citizens. The high naturalisation numbers after decolonisation – from 20,000 to 30,000 annually – might exacerbate underestimation of emigration from Algeria to France in

facilitated mobility across the Mediterranean. As the number of Algerians travelling to France skyrocketed from 180,167 'civil Muslim passengers arriving from Algeria' in 1962 to 262,075 in 1963 (I.N.S.E.E. 1964), France began renegotiating the rules for Algerians' entry into France (Slama 2009; Schmitter Heisler 1985).

A first amendment to the Evian agreement in 1964 introduced medical controls, and an annual maximum quota of 12,000 Algerian workers. These new rules showed little effect however, especially as the Algerian government was actively supporting emigration as an unemployment-reducing strategy. On 27 December 1968, a new agreement on the circulation, employment and stay of Algerians and their families was enacted. It ended the free mobility regime and required Algerians to hold a card delivered by the Algerian National Office for Labour (ONAMO) according to a quota determined by France. Between 1968 and 1971, the quota was set at 35,000 workers per year and reduced to 25,000 for 1972–1973 (SOPEMI 1973: 5). The DEMIG C2C data (2014 version) shows that the quota was relatively effective, with 22,055 ONAMO card holders in 1968; 27,326 in 1969; 38,541 in 1970; 41,373 in 1971; 21,599 in 1972; and 21,392 in 1973.

Despite – or because of – France's monopoly as a destination for Algerian migrants, and maybe as a reaction to increasingly restrictive French migration policies, Algeria attempted to diversify its emigration. In 1970, Algeria signed a recruitment agreement with Belgium and in 1974 with the German Democratic Republic (DDR). While migration to DDR grew quickly, peaking at 4,200 workers in 1978 (Lubanda 2012),⁵ emigration to Belgium remained relatively limited. Figure 8 shows the evolution of annual Algerian emigration to major destinations. Note that migration to France outnumbers all other migration corridors and should be read according to the right-hand axis.



⁵ The flows from Algeria to DDR are not recorded in Figure 8, which is based on data provided by the Federal German Republic. After German reunification, migration statistics were merged, but flows towards the DDR were often not attributed to a certain origin and instead merged in a residual category. Figure 8 thus understates Algerian emigration to Germany when taking into account East German data as well.

- * French flows should be referred to using the axis on the right side
- ** Flows to the Netherlands, Belgium and USA are not depicted here due to their small scale (consistently below 1,000) Source: DEMIG C2C

In September 1973, Algeria's President Houari Boumediene unexpectedly suspended emigration to France, signalling its non-alignment in the Cold War and economic independence from the former colonial power (SOPEMI 1974: 5; Lacroix et al 2002). This political move was possible due to the nationalisation of Algeria's oil resources in 1971, and the launch of a new labour market policy that excluded emigration as a safety valve, instead offering public employment opportunities (Fargues 2004: 1360; Bouklia-Hassane et al 2013). Shortly afterwards, France and other European countries stopped recruiting migrant workers in the wake of the Oil Crisis and the subsequent economic recession. Although Algerians continued to enjoy preferential access to France for short term stays until 1994 (Slama 2009: 11), entry became progressively more difficult. The relatively limited emigration that did occur was usually through family-reunification schemes and student migration (Collyer 2003: 3).

Algeria's low emigration rate between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s is therefore not only the result of stricter French immigration policies, as highlighted in the literature, but also Algerian state discourse that discouraged emigration and policies that offered socio-economic securities as part of a nascent welfare state (López García 1996: 242). This active state support is still visible in today's labour market structure, in which public employment accounts for a third of the national workforce (Annex 1). The official discourse that discouraged emigration throughout the 1970s and 1980s was accompanied by governmental efforts to incite the return of its emigrants - although with limited effects (Bouklia-Hassane 2010: 45). In 1976, the return of Algerian emigrants was even identified in the Algerian National Charter as one of the 'major objectives of the Socialist revolution' (Giubilario 1997: 4). While economic development flourished until the mid-1980s, with unemployment below nine percent and growth rates over five percent, the oil shock of 1986 triggered a crisis in Algeria's oil-dependent economy. Unemployment skyrocketed to over twenty percent, remaining at such high levels for nearly two decades (Bouklia-Hassane and Talahite 2009: 22). This led to increased emigration to France and Germany shown in Figure 8. Despite this slight upward trend, this episode shows the power of state involvement in interrupting traditional migration patterns. It also provides an interesting case study of the rapid weakening of migrant networks and erosion of post-colonial ties in a specific economic and political context.

Radical change in Algeria's political situation in the 1990s did not leave emigration patterns untouched. A short democratic period in Algeria at the start of the 1990s saw 'Front Islamique du Salut' (FIS) elected in 1991. In January 1992 however, the military took over government control, banned the FIS and arrested its members. What ensued was a ten-year long civil war between governmental forces and Islamist groups, creating more than 100,000 victims (Gasiorowski 1992; López García and Berriane 2004: 454). The long-lasting political crisis restructured the profile of emigrants. While the period until 1973 was dominated by low-skilled workers and family migration was prominent in the 1970s and 1980s, the civil war created more refugee and skilled emigrants (Collyer 2003: 6; Bouklia-Hassane 2012: 2). Even with a slight increase in emigration visible during the 1990s, especially towards France, the civil war and accompanying explosion of unemployment rates to over 25 percent (Annex 1) did not lead to large-scale emigration. The disruption of the migratory chain by the state twenty years earlier may explain this. Contrary to the Moroccan and Tunisian experience in which a 'migration culture' spread over large sections of the population in the 1980s and 1990s; the lack of a 'migration culture' in Algeria meant that emigration was not

commonly seen by the Algerian population as an obvious alternative to crisis at home (Fargues 2004: 1360).

Since the end of the civil war in 2002, Algerian emigration increased, albeit to a limited extent compared to its neighbours, and diversified geographically. Germany experienced a peak in Algerian immigration in the early 1990s, which can be attributed to the number of Algerian asylum seekers registered in Germany increasing from 1,035 in 1990 to 11,262 in 1993 (Initiative gegen Abschiebehaft Berlin 1996), and to the change in the statistical system after the German reunification in 1991. Italy held limited appeal for Algerian migrants, but Canada became an attractive destination for highly skilled migrants because of its points-based immigrant selection system and today, 62 percent of Algerian migrants in Canada are tertiary educated (Bouklia-Hassane and Talahite 2009: 44). In this context of growing emigration and in line with the global trend of state engagement towards their emigrant communities, Algeria recently began showing interest in engaging with its diaspora to benefit from their financial and human capital by establishing a State Secretary in charge of the Algerian community abroad (Bouklia-Hassane 2012: 7).

Most importantly however, Algerians have increasingly chosen to migrate to Spain – in reaction to growing labour market opportunities in the low-skilled segment, but also because historical connections have facilitated emigration to Spain. Spanish-Moroccan relations indeed reach back centuries: Spain's presence in Algeria during the nineteenth century was considerable, with up to 120,000 Spaniards living in Algeria in the 1880s. The cultural influence was particularly strong in the Oran region, where numerous Spanish newspapers were printed and sold until the 1930s, reaching not only the European community, but also the broader Muslim population (López García 1996: 27). This contributed to the survival of Spanish influence even after decolonisation, shown by the importance of Spanish radio and television throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Epalaza 1981: 143).

Official links between Spain and Algeria remained dormant until the 1980s, because of the Algerian war and political differences, but formal and informal links have since multiplied. The regular ferry line from Alicante to Oran was revived and, in June 1985, a partnership was signed by the two cities to boost trade and human mobility. More recently, formal co-operation in the energy sector has fostered economic links between Spain and Algeria. Finally, two new passenger liners were opened in 2002 and 2003 between Almeria and Algeria and Oran and Ghazaouet. This shows that in a context of economic opportunities, states and societies can re-activate largely dormant historical ties to spur human mobility and economic co-operation (López García and Berriane 2004: 458-459).

3.2 Tunisia

French colonisation of Tunisia from 1881 to 1956 was accompanied by settlement of French citizens –10,000 in 1891 to 144,000 in 1945 (Perkins 2004: 39-42). Unlike Algeria and Morocco, colonisation did not create large-scale emigration from Tunisia to France in the first half of the twentieth century. Even without an established emigration tradition before independence, around 250,000 Tunisians

⁶ After German reunification, migration statistics were merged. Emigration to DDR was often not attributed to an origin but merged in a residual category, hence, Figure 8 understates Algerian emigration to Germany when also considering East German data. This would also explain the 'artificial' peak in 1992–1993 to a certain extent: when re-unified Germany began collecting migration data in 1992 or 1993, the bilateral dimension was comprehensively applied for eastern and western regions and all Algerian immigration captured as such.

⁷ In 1994 Algeria provided 63 percent of Spain's natural gas (Gillespie 1996: 210).

emigrated in the following two decades (Findlay 1980: 187). This emigration surge was importantly spurred by structural unemployment in Tunisia's labour market at the end of the 1950s. Tunisians may also have chosen to emigrate pre-emptively, in anticipation of independence and the introduction of a border regime. The importance of 'now or never migration' before and around the year of independence has for instance been highlighted in the case studies of Vezzoli (2014).


Shortly after independence, the Tunisian state aimed to bring this emigration under control through the signature of recruitment agreements with France in 1963 and Germany in 1965. Tunisian labour market policies also openly encouraged emigration through the creation of the Office for Professional Development and Employment in 1967, as well as the establishment of the Tunisian Agency for Technical Cooperation in 1972 to manage the emigration of high-skilled Tunisians (Simon 1973: 4; López García 1996: 248; Mzali 1997; Jerad 2011). This state activism contributed to transforming Tunisia into the most migratory Maghreb country (in relative terms) in the 1960s and peaking in the 1970s with the emigration of 115,000 Tunisians (DEMIG C2C, 2014 version). State control did not, however, affect migration corridors equally. Figure 9 shows that while France and Germany were successful in recruiting Tunisian workers, recruitment agreements signed with Belgium in 1969 and the Netherlands in 1971 did not lead to extensive migration movements.

Although emigration to Germany and France⁸ declined slightly after the 1973 Oil Crisis, the recruitment stop enacted by several European countries did not lead to the expected results. This is partly due to the deteriorating labour market in Tunisia, which recorded an additional 100,000 unemployed workers in the 1972–1982 period (Mzali 1997: 152-153). Together with population growth, this consolidated international migration as a structural component in Tunisia's labour market. Emigration did partly adjust to the recruitment stop by reorienting towards family reunification as the primary entry channel into Europe and by partially switching to irregular entry and stay. The 1981 regularisation in France provides evidence for the continued irregular migration of Tunisians throughout the 1970s: 22,000 Tunisians were regularised, more than any other nationality (Jerad 2011).

Figure 9: Annual Tunisian emigration to France, Germany, Italy and Canada, 1965–2010*

⁻

⁸ The peak in emigration recorded in 1982 is artificial due to the French regularisation programme that year and suggests that entries in the previous years have been higher than portrayed below, at an estimated average level of 7,000 per year in the 1974–1982 period.



* Flows to the Netherlands, Belgium and USA are not depicted here due to their small scale (consistently below 500) Source: DEMIG C2C

Throughout this period, the Tunisian government sustained its effort to encourage and institutionalise emigration. The 1972–1975 development plan set an annual target of 60,000 emigrants to relieve the labour market and boost the economy through remittances. Tunisia also sent state representatives abroad to directly contact employers and solicit labour for Tunisian workers, and developed intensive consular activities to assist emigrants (Oueslati 2009: 6; Mzali 1997: 171; Brand 2002: 7). Finally, the Office for Tunisian Workers Abroad, Employment and Professional Training was established in 1973 and transformed into the Office for Tunisians Abroad in 1988. This last change signals a widening of the state interest in its citizens abroad – beyond the workforce and including second generation migrants (Jerad 2011). In this context, Tunisian labour emigration also diversified towards Libya following the signature of a recruitment agreement in 1971. Although the DEMIG C2C database (2014 version) does not include data on migration between Tunisia and Libya, Findlay (1980: 202) provides evidence for this growing migration. Libya replaced France as the top destination for Tunisian emigrants at the end of the 1970s with 27,500 Tunisians migrating to Libya in 1977alone.

As in Algeria, the end of the 1980s in Tunisia was characterised by a temporary liberalisation of the political regime when the new President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali implemented reforms to restore the rule of law and respect of human rights. Democratisation developments were reversed by 1992, however, after clashes between the government and leaders of the islamist Al-Nahda party (Gasiorowski 1992, Monjib 2011). The year 1992 also saw a break in Tunisian economic growth levels, falling from five percent in the 1987–1992 period to two percent in 1993–1994 (Giubilario 1997: 30). Since then, however, the Tunisian economy has experienced continued growth and Tunisia was internationally praised as a model for economic stability under the regime of Ben Ali until 2011 (López García and Berriane 2004: 456). Despite this economic growth, changes to Tunisia's educational and demographic structure spurred unemployment, especially among the young and educated. Unemployment rates of highly-skilled rose from 9 percent in 1999 to 23 percent in 2010, and youth unemployment reached 30 percent (Mzali 1997: 156; López García and Berriane 2004: 456; Bel Hadj Zekri et al. 2013; Annex 1). The situation was exacerbated by the decline of migration

to Libya after the 1992 UN embargo on Libya, which contributed to the increased emigration over the past two decades shown in Figure 9.

From the mid-1980s, Tunisians increasingly migrated to nearby Italy where rapid economic development compared to Tunisia's dwindling growth rates created attractive prospects for new migrants. Italy's 'laissez-faire' immigration policy and the introduction of repeated regularisation programmes – Figure 9 shows the peak of the 1989 amnesty – created a favourable context for labour migrants wishing to seize opportunities in the formal and informal Italian labour market. Yet, Tunisian emigration did not diversified to the extent of its Maghreb neighbours and remained essentially limited to Italy. In contrast to Morocco and Algeria, North America for instance, has not become a new destination for Tunisian (skilled) migrants.

Italy's predominance as a new destination for Tunisians can be traced back to its sociopolitical involvement in the country over the past centuries. In fact, Italy showed interest in colonising Tunisia in the second half of the nineteenth century because of the important Italian community living there (Choate 2010: 2). The economic difficulties faced by the young Italian state (only created in 1861) however, did not offer a favourable context for this geopolitical enterprise (Procacci 1970). At the same time, European geopolitics, and especially German and British interests in the Mediterranean Sea, favoured France over Italy as colonial ruler of Tunisia (Choate 2010: 4). Despite France's colonisation of Tunisia in 1881, by 1900 Italians represented nearly ninety percent of Tunisia's European population of 80,000 people. This led Choate (2010: 6) to coining Tunisia as an 'Italian colony under French rule'. Later in the twentieth century, the dominance of Italy's national public broadcasting company RAI in Tunisian television contributed to stimulating emigration to Italy over other, less familiar and more distant, destinations such as Spain (López García and Berriane 2004: 468). 10 Italy's geographic proximity has also continuously fostered strong relations between the two states and at the turn of the twenty-first century, governmental co-operation on migration accelerated. In 1998, a re-admission agreement was signed, and in 2000 a bilateral agreement on seasonal labour (DEMIG POLICY 2014 version). Similar to the reasons underlying Algeria's focus on Spain, Italy's historical connections to Tunisia partly explain its importance as a growing destination for Tunisian migrants.

3.3 Morocco


Significant Moroccan emigration started at the beginning of the twentieth century as a consequence of French and Spanish colonisation in 1912. While the North of Morocco became a Spanish protectorate, the heartland of Morocco was under French rule. Like in Algeria and Tunisia, colonisation prompted the settlement of Europeans and in 1950 nearly 300,000 French and 150,000 Spanish citizens were living in Morocco (Service central des statistiques 1954; López García 2008: 18). First large-scale migration movements from Morocco towards Europe occurred in the context of war: 35,000 and 125,000 Moroccans joined the French army in World War I and II respectively, and around 40,000

⁹ Italy only introduced its first immigration law in 1986, before which it was not regulated. The 1986 Law (Act 943 and Act 948) created a very favourable environment for migrants, declaring total parity of treatment between Italian and foreign workers, allowing family reunification and launching the first regularisation programme, adjusting the status of 118,000 foreign workers within three months (DEMIG POLICY 2014 version). In 1998, the *Decreto Flussi* gave a further annual quota of 3,000 permits to Tunisian workers (later increased to 4,000), which have been mainly used to regularise Tunisians with irregular status working in Italy (Mahjoub 2009: 41).

¹⁰ The crucial role of Italian television in providing information about potential destinations and in channelling emigration has already been highlighted by Mai (2004) in the case of Albanian migration to Italy.

Moroccans from the Rif area were recruited by Franco's army during the Spanish civil war (1936–1939) (Haas 2005, 2014). Although most of these soldiers returned to Morocco after their service, this period sowed the seeds for future migration. The colonial period also initiated important migration from Morocco to Algeria, which was often a first step in subsequent migration to France (De Haas 2005). After Morocco gained independence in 1956 emigration increased, partly due returned Europeans mobilising their private and professional networks in Morocco to recruit cheap and dependable labour (Brand 2002: 7). Moroccan workers were increasingly recruited during the Algerian war (1954–1962) when the French sought to replace Algerian workers (López García 1996: 55, Samers 1987: 50).

In the following years Europe's economic boom led to soaring Moroccan emigration, which was further stimulated by recruitment agreements with France and Germany in 1963, Belgium in 1964 and the Netherlands in 1969. The colonial division of Morocco between Spain and France impacted the geography of emigration patterns; while Moroccans from the former French zone continued migrating mainly to France after independence, migrants from the formerly Spanish zone were the primary target for recruitment by other European states. Emigration to northern European states was particularly attractive because of dwindling labour opportunities in post-independence Algeria. Indeed, growing tensions between the Morocco and Algeria led to the closure of the common border in 1962 and traditional temporary migrations from the Moroccan Rif to the Algerian Oran region faded out (López García 1996: 55, de Haas 2005: 19). This is reflected in the shrinking size of the Moroccan migrant community in Algeria. While an estimated 215,000 Moroccan migrants lived in Algeria in 1960, only 85,000 were left in 1970, and even less in recent decades (World Bank 2013). Migration to Europe and active recruitment thus provided a welcomed alternative and restructured the geographic pattern of Moroccan emigration. Figures 10 and 11 show that in contrast to Algeria and Tunisia, Moroccan emigration was already geographically diversified in the 1960s. Note the scales of Figure 10 and 11 differ, with migration to France, Italy and Spain outnumbering all other migration corridors.






Figure 11: Annual Moroccan emigration to Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada and USA 1965–2010

Source: DEMIG C2C

Despite several European countries ceasing formal recruitment, Moroccan emigration to France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany continued at average levels of 18,000, 6,500 and 4,000 emigrants per year respectively over the 1973-1995 period. Emigration was also actively encouraged by the Moroccan state. Starting in 1968, Morocco's five-year economic development plans included the goal of maximising labour emigration to relieve high domestic unemployment levels (Fargues 2004: 1359-1360; Gubert and Nordmann 2009: 77). These ongoing efforts by the Moroccan state contributed to creating a strong 'culture of emigration' in which large portions of the population began to see emigration as a desirable life choice (López García 1996: 55; Jaidi 2009: 66). Confronted with increasing labour immigration restrictions, however, Moroccan migrants turned towards settlement and family migration and increasingly started to use irregular entry channels. Between 1981 and 2012, about 445,000 Moroccans were regularised in France, Belgium, Italy and Spain, a number which highlights the importance of irregular migration (Belguendouz et al. 2013). In parallel, migration to Arab oil-producing countries emerged in reaction to European border closure and the oil boom. Such migration remained limited relative to Tunisia, with only 3,400 Moroccans emigrating to Libya and Saudi Arabia (the main destinations for Moroccans) each year on average in 1975-1985 (López García 1996: 54).

Since the mid-1990s, estimated Moroccan emigration portrays a remarkable increase from around 30,000 emigrants annually in the mid-1990s to 150,000 in the mid-2000s. This surge reflects a further diversification of Moroccan emigration destinations, primarily to Spain and Italy – which account for 45 and 18 percent respectively of total Moroccan emigration in the 2000s – and to a smaller extent to Canada and USA. There are four interlinked explanations for this evolution that reflect how domestic and regional political and economic developments changed Moroccans' aspirations and capabilities to emigrate throughout the 1990s.

Political liberalisation

While entry into Europe may have become more difficult, leaving Morocco has become easier with the liberalisation of passport regimes. At the beginning of the 1990s, access to Moroccan passports

changed from a selectively granted right and an instrument to control emigration to an administrative formality, which increased Moroccan's capabilities to emigrate (de Haas 2007). This should be seen as part of a more general liberalisation process that affected Morocco in this period. After a thirty-year period of repressive rule under King Hassan II, characterised by arbitrary arrests of political opponents and the near-complete absence of political freedoms, Morocco experienced a relative political opening in 1991. While the power of the King remained untouched, press freedom, freedom of speech and women's rights improved. Since King Mohammed VI rose to power in 1999 after the death of Hassan II, this trend towards liberalisation has been consolidated, leading to a reduction in the number of political prisoners and the creation of pro-democratic civil society groups (Monjib 2011).

Lack of socio-economic development

This political shift, however, was not accompanied by improved economic opportunities or living standards for the Moroccan population. On the contrary, Morocco's labour market performance was particularly poor in the same period and resulted in an aggravation of inequality and poverty especially in urban areas (Arango and Gonzalez 2009: 7). Together with a low job creation rate in the private sector, the cutting back of public employment pushed unemployment to over 20 percent in the 1990s (Annex 1; World Bank 2004: 71). Morocco's domestic absorption rate (the number of entries into national employment relative to the total national labour supply) over the 1990–1995 period was also only 46 percent, compared to 78 percent in Tunisia (Giubilaro 1997: 58; World Bank 2004: 99). Both skilled and unskilled workers suffered consequently. This was exacerbated by a series of droughts in the early 1990s and growing competition with Spain for agricultural exports affecting the agricultural sector that accounted for nearly half of Morocco's workforce (World Bank 2004: 105). In the cities, the educated youth was particularly affected, resulting highly skilled making up 67 percent of Morocco's unemployed in 2007 (Giubilaro 1997: 36; Jaidi 2009: 12, 30). Taken together, these factors created a climate in which poor socio-economic developments increased emigration aspirations.

Relatively slow growth

Societal discontent was further aggravated by the economic prosperity of its neighbours – the Algerian rentier state and the 'Tunisian miracle' praised as a model for economic growth and stability. Although macro-level socio-economic indicators do not vary greatly between Maghreb countries, a closer look at regional trends reveals that Morocco's socio-economic development is indeed lagging behind. While GDP per capita were comparable across the Maghreb until the mid-1970s, Algeria's and Tunisia's GDP per capita have been consistently 30 to 50 percent higher than that of Morocco over the past two decades. Human development indicators, although growing, also lag behind regional levels, mainly due to Morocco's dismal education record (see Annex 1). Moroccans also closely observed the Spanish economic take-off after its accession to the European Union in 1986. While Spain's GDP per capita was on average seven times higher than Morocco's in the 1960–1990 period, it was on average nine times higher in the last two decades (PWT 7.1. 2012). This comparison between domestic and regional economic developments strengthened feelings of international relative deprivation and affected migration incentives and behaviour (Czaika and de Haas 2012).

Opportunities across the Mediterranean

The growing economic discrepancies with Spain have, however, also created new opportunities for Moroccan migrants to work in Spain's booming agricultural and construction sectors. The geographical proximity of Spain – via the Strait of Gibraltar and Ceuta and Melilla, the two Spanish enclaves on the Moroccan coast – has always facilitated circulation between the two continents. The social networks between Northern Morocco and Spain that persisted even after independence were

rapidly revived upon Spain's economic take-off (López García 2008). From a mere transit country for Moroccan migrants wishing to reach France and other destinations in Northern Europe, Spain turned into an attractive destination itself. On the political level, Spain also tapped into historical bonds by signing bilateral labour agreements with Morocco in 1996, 1999 and 2001 (López García and Berriane 2004: 84; DEMIG POLICY 2014 version). Hence, increased perceptions of international relative deprivation and the opening of a window of economic opportunities have contributed to reactivating post-colonial ties between Morocco and Spain both at the societal and political level.

Together, these factors contribute to a better understanding of the spectacular increase in Moroccan emigration and the striking divergence from regional patterns observable throughout the 1990s and the 2000s. Further research, however, would benefit from a deeper analysis of how differences in the structure of Maghreb labour markets and bilateral relations with south European countries have led to remarkably divergent emigration patterns.

4 The sustained role of the state in shaping Maghreb emigration patterns

Drawing on new bilateral migration flow data compiled in the DEMIG C2C database, this paper offered new insights into the fluctuations, peaks and divergences of Maghreb emigration over the past fifty years. Three periods of Maghreb emigration were identified: from Maghreb countries' independence until 1973 – characterised by the dominance of Algerian emigration, a boom in Tunisian emigration and the importance of both European and Maghreb state recruitment mechanisms; the 1973 Oil Crisis until the mid-1990s – in which Moroccan and Tunisian emigration continued at relatively high levels despite European immigration restrictions but Algerian flows decreased due to emigration discouraging state policies and an economic boom; and the mid-1990s onwards – when Moroccan emigration has spectacularly increased and more generally, Maghreb emigration has diversified geographically.

The Maghreb region is an insightful case for studying the role of states and policies in migration dynamics. To date, the literature has mainly emphasised two aspects of this relationship: the role played by European states in initiating Maghreb emigration dynamics through colonisation and recruitment; and the decrease in state influence since the mid-1970s as migration has become partly self-perpetuating due to network effects that have counteracted increasing restrictions in Europe. This paper complements existing studies, arguing that in order to comprehensively assess the role of the state in migration processes, research should move beyond a 'destination country' bias and pay sufficient attention to the crucial role of origin states and their policies. The findings show that Maghreb states' policies towards emigration are as important as destination country policies in shaping emigration over time; and that Maghreb migrants continue to react to state-created migration opportunities on both sides of the Mediterranean today.

Three mechanisms were identified through which origin and destination states have affected the overall levels, destinations and composition of migration in the past fifty years:

(1) State-fostered 'national climates' can play a crucial role encouraging or discouraging emigration. For instance, the striking divergence of Algerian emigration in the 1970s and 1980s from Morocco and Tunisia's sustained emigration can be partly explained by Maghreb state policies that fostered or repressed cultures of emigration. As shown in this paper, the newly independent Maghreb countries, facing important economic challenges and high unemployment levels, included emigration as an

integral part of their labour market strategies. Morocco pursued the most consistent and pro-active emigration policy, but Tunisia also played an important role encouraging emigration. Therefore, the consistent migration from Morocco and Tunisia in the 1970s and 1980s cannot exclusively be interpreted as a heritage of the recruitment era. It was also the result of Moroccan and Tunisian governments' continued pro-emigration policy. Although Algeria also encouraged its citizens to emigrate initially, the government halted emigration in 1973 based on the expectation that oil and gas revenues would lead to full employment. Despite the failure of Algeria's economic policies and persisting unemployment levels, the attempted establishment of a rentier economy and socialist welfare system, as well as a national atmosphere side-lining emigrants had a long-lasting effect on emigration patterns. Algerian emigration between the 1970s and the 1990s is strikingly low relative to the region.

- (2) Bilateral socio-political involvement of origin states can also influence the directionality of migration. As shown, colonial heritage, but also foreign media can play a crucial role in establishing a familiarity for a given destination. The diversification of destinations in the 1990s was shaped by historical linkages between Italy and Tunisia, Spain and Algeria, and Morocco and Spain. While colonialism affected the Maghreb quite uniformly at first sight, this paper shows that the colonial imprint on Maghreb countries was in fact quite different. Algeria was colonised for over a century by France (1830–1962), politically integrated into the French state from 1848 and settled by over one million Europeans. Tunisia's colonisation by France (1881–1956) was less profound and its socio-political was also affected by the settlement of Italian citizens. Morocco experienced the shortest but most complex colonial rule, when France and Spain split the Moroccan territory into two colonial protectorates in 1912. The colonisation of the Maghreb triggered the settlement of significant numbers of Europeans in the colonies. This phenomenon is often neglected in the analysis of European-North Africa migration systems, but was crucial in sowing the seeds for future migration in reverse directions. The spectacular increase in emigration from the Maghreb to Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s unfolded against the background of decolonisation and the return of most settlers to Europe. The diversification of migration destinations that occurred after the 1990s also galvanised these historical ties. While Spain became a 'new' prime destination for Moroccans and Algerians, Tunisians were more oriented towards Italy. These resurgent migration channels cannot be considered a direct effect of the colonial era. Nonetheless, post-colonial ties and continued human interactions between both shores of the Mediterranean can play a crucial role in steering migration to one specific destination, especially when (re)activated in a period of economic opportunities at the destination.
- (3) Finally, policies enacted to support or deter the arrival of specific migrant groups influenced the composition of Maghreb emigration. For instance, when Europe formally enacted an emigration stop in 1973 and 1974, emigration from the Maghreb continued regardless, capitalising on existing networks and the liberalised European family reunification policies. This shifting of migrant categories from labour migration to family reunification in reaction to restrictive state policies has been conceptualised as 'categorical substitution' (de Haas 2011). This effect can also be observed in the partial shift of Maghreb emigration towards irregular channels in the 1990s as a reaction to the introduction of travel visa requirements by European states between 1984 and 1992 (Annex 2), as well as increased border controls. More recently, Maghreb migrants have also increasingly migrated to North America not the least because of the American and Canadian skills-oriented immigration programmes that provide attractive prospects to skilled workers from around the world. The increasing number of skilled Moroccans and Algerians migrating to North America supports the hypothesis of a continued responsiveness of migrants to state-created opportunities.

Without questioning the importance of networks and other processes which help sustaining migration corridors despite increased policy restrictions, the evidence presented in this paper confirms the crucial role of both origin and destination states in shaping migration.

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
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
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
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Annex 1


A. Demographic indicators








B. Economic indicators







C. Labour market indicators

Structure of Maghreb labour markets


	Algeria	Morocco	Tunisia
Share of agriculture in employment, 2007	14%	45%	21%
Share of public sector in employment, 2007	33%	5%	16%


Source: Bouklia-Hassane and Talahite 2009; Mahjoub 2009; Jaidi 2009







D. Educational indicators





E. Political and social indicators





Annex 2

A. Migration policy developments timeline for Maghreb emigration 1960-2010

		11 1300							GL:11 1
Year	Free mobility France- Algeria	Recruitment agreements	Recruitment stops	Re- integration programmes	Family re- unification as legal right	Regularisation	Re- admission agreements	Targeted border control	Skilled worker policies in North America
1960 1961									
1962	Evian Agreement: free mobility consolidated								
1963		France- Morocco; France- Tunisia; Germany- Morocco							
1964	Quota of 12,000 introduced	Belgium- Morocco							
1965		Germany- Tunisia							
1966 1967									Canada: points-based system for workers
1968	End of free mobility, work permit required								WOIKEIS
1969	•	Belgium- Tunisia; Netherlands- Morocco							
1970		Belgium- Algeria			Netherlands				
1971		Netherlands- Tunisia; Libya-Tunisia							
1972 1973			Netherlands; Germany;			France			
		DDR-Algeria	Algeria	France-Algeria	Germany	Belgium			
1974 1975		, and the second	France		France: family	Netherlands			
					members right to work				
1976				Netherlands	France				
1977 1978					Germany: right to work for family members				Canada: labour market test for all economic migrants
1979				Germany		AT d. 1			
1980 1981				France-Algeria		Netherlands France			
1701						Tance			


1982							Canada: exemption from labour market test for high skilled
1983		_					
1984		France		α .			
1985		Belgium	Tr. 1	Spain			
1986	E	NT-4111-	Italy	Italy			
1987	France- Morocco	Netherlands					
1988							
1989				Italy			
1990							
1991				Spain			USA: Creation of H1B visa for high skilled & of lottery programme
1992					Spain- Morocco		
1993					Belgium- Morocco	Spain builds fence around Ceuta	
1994						Count	
1995				Italy			
1996	Spain- Morocco			Spain		Spain builds fence	
						around Melilla	
1997				France			
1998				Italy	Italy- Morocco; Italy-Tunisia; Germany- Morocco		
1999						Spain: System of External Vigilance	
2000	Italy-Tunisia		Spain	Spain; Belgium		-	
2001	Spain- Morocco		-	Spain			
2002				Italy; Canada		Italy increases patrols at sea	Canada: Points based system introduced
2003 2004					Spain-Algeria		
2005	Spain- Morocco			Spain			
2006				Spain	Italy-Algeria; Germany- Algeria		
2007	Italy- Morocco			Netherlands			
2008		Spain			France- Tunisia		
2009				Italy; Belgium			
2010				-			

Source: DEMIG POLICY database, 2014 version

B. Timeline on travel visa introduction for Maghreb countries 1973-2012

Note: Visa free entry is shown in light grey, and visa required for entry in dark grey

Visa requirements from 8 OECD countries examined in this study Canada Morocco Tunisia Germany Morocco Tunisia Belgium Morocco Tunisia Algeria Netherlands Morocco Tunisia Algeria Netherlands Morocco Tunisia Italy Morocco Tunisia Italy Morocco Tunisia Algeria Morocco Tunisia Algeria Morocco Tunisia Algeria Netherlands Morocco Tunisia Algeria Morocco Tunisia A	issuance	of traveller		4 4
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United Kingdom Algeria	Ireland	Morocco		
Morocco	United Kingdom			
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Source: DEMIG VISA database, 2014 version

Annex 3

Limitations of the DEMIG C2C migration flow data

- (1) The data does not include yearly information on irregular migrant entries. There are two exceptions:
 - a. Several of the peaks visible in the graph correspond to regularisation campaigns in France (1973, 1981, 1998) or Italy (1986, 1989, 1995, 2002) and thus the flow data retrospectively includes part of the irregular migrant population (DEMIG POLICY 2014 version). The yearly numbers of immigrants are therefore probably more continuous and the overall trend smoother than suggested by the graphs above.
 - b. Although Spain also conducts regular amnesties (1991, 1996, 2000 and 2005) irregular migrants do not appear in Spanish statistics at the time of their regularisation, but of their registration in the municipality. Since 2000, the Spanish registration system requires all migrants to register in the municipality after arrival regardless of the legal status, and registration is a requirement for any regularisation.
- (2) The data is inconsistent with regards to the inclusion of refugees: While Belgium, France, Italy and Spain take refugees into account in their yearly immigration statistics, German and Dutch data do not include them at all, which might lead to an undervaluation of Algerian emigration in the 1990s. Canada and the United States take refugees into account in their immigration data, but only record them once they are granted permanent residency, at the end of a successful asylum procedure. This introduces a time delay between the arrival of refugees and their appearance in immigration statistics.
- (3) Finally, the data quality decreases when going back in time. While data between 1988 and 2009 comprises all eight countries of interest and is hence very comprehensive, older data was not available for all eight countries (see Annex 4). Nevertheless, emigration data for Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco is representative of overall emigration numbers from the 1970s onwards because the dominant, traditional destinations are included. Three exceptions need to be highlighted:
 - a. Historical migrations from Morocco to Algeria and Israel in the 1950s are not captured.
 - b. Algerian data suffers from inconsistent reporting by France and is undervalued in the 1960s. This limitation is exacerbated by the fact that naturalized Algerians and French colons who returned from Algeria after independence in 1962 were not captured in these numbers.
 - c. Data recorded for the period between the Oil Crisis in 1973 and the Gulf War in 1991 suffers from a slight underestimation, as the closure of European labour markets to Maghreb migrants in the mid-1970s led to a relative and temporary reorientation of emigration towards other Arab countries, especially from Tunisia to Libya (Findlay 1980; Mahjoub 2009; Jaidi 2009).

Annex 4

Data availability per reporting and origin country

Reporting country	Criteria used in analysis	Algeria	Morocco	Tunisia
Belgium**	Country of citizenship	1977-2009	1977-2009	1977-2009
Canada	Country of citizenship	1974-2010	1964-2010	1964-2010
France*,**	Country of citizenship	1965-2008***	1961-2008	1964-2008
Germany**	Country of citizenship	1964-2009	1964-2009	1964-2009
Italy	Country of citizenship	1980-2010	1980-2010	1980-2010
Netherlands	Country of citizenship	1966-2010	1966-2010	1967-2010
Spain	Country of citizenship	1988-2011	1988-2011	1988-2011
United States of America	Country of birth	1953-1963 1973-2010	1953-1963 1973-2010	1953-1963 1973-2010

Source: DEMIG C2C

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^{*} Data for France in 2009 has been estimated according to reported data from the three previous years.

^{**} Data for Belgium, France and Germany in 2010 has been estimated according to reported data from the three previous years.

^{***} Data between 1965 and 1973 has been completed with additional sources on workers holding a card from the Algerian labour office.