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Patchwork compliance: political dialogues about contested human rights

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The relation between mismatching norms and patchwork compliance

3.1 Introduction

This chapter is a first empirical plausibility probe of the political dialogue model. It explores the relation between the theorized cause, outcome and scope conditions of the model. It focuses on the presence of communities adhering to norms that mismatch with human rights, compliance with strongly monitored human rights, and states' international vulnerability. It uses a quantitative analysis to test the first two propositions of this project.

The analysis in this chapter finds support for Proposition 1: that the greater the presence of communities with norms that mismatch human rights, the lower the levels of compliance with the CEDAW and the ICCPR. For Proposition 2, it suggests different outcomes for each treaty. In the case of the CEDAW, the evidence suggests that dependency on international aid from the EU or the US mediates the relation between normative mismatches and compliance. States with communities that adhere to norms that mismatch with human rights, and which are dependent on aid, are expected to have higher levels of compliance as compared to states with similar communities, but which do not receive aid. For the ICCPR, the analysis suggests a different role for the scope condition of vulnerability. Not only does it not find such a mediating role for aid dependency, it indicates that this dependency is in fact related to lower levels of compliance. The chapter concludes with the selection of Jordan as the case study based on the quantitative findings.

3.2 Operationalization of main concepts

This paragraph discusses the quantitative operationalizations of the main concepts; the presence of normative mismatches (cause), levels of compliance with closely-monitored human rights (outcome), and international vulnerability (scope condition).

This chapter uses questions from the World Values Survey (WVS) as proxy variables to measure the presence of communities that adhere to norms that are a mismatch with human rights. This is a survey with a very wide global reach, and is also used by other scholars, such as sociologists, to approximate norms.¹³⁷ Mismatches with CEDAW's Article 7 on political participation are approximated by the question "On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do". A high score on this variable means that a high percentage of the population believes men are better political leaders, and is therefore a proxy for the presence of communities that adhere to norms that are a mismatch with Article 7. For example, in Egypt, 90% of the population believes men make better political leaders than women do.

Normative mismatches with ICCPR's Article 18 on the freedom of religion are measured by the proxy question "How much do you trust people with another religion?". All the

137 See, for example, Stavrova et al. 2013; Williamson & Kerekes, 2011. Other individual-level surveys are also used to measure norms - see, for example, Oyamoto et al., 2016; Bratton, 2007

individual answers that indicated “Do not trust” and “Do not trust at all” were taken together, and then aggregated into percentages on the national level. Higher scores on this variable therefore indicate how widely shared the individual attitudes are, and are thus a proxy for the presence of communities with norms that are a mismatch with ICCPR Article 18. For example, Yemen has a score of 88, which means that 88% of the Yemeni population does not trust people with another religion. This question is used as a proxy, as trust in other groups in society is often interconnected with the norms related to those groups. For instance, Will M. Gervais et al. demonstrate how individuals’ distrust of atheists is closely related to negative attitudes towards atheists.¹³⁸ The countries and presence of communities that adhere to norms that mismatch with ICCPR Article 18 and CEDAW Article 7 are displayed in Table 3 below.¹³⁹

Table 3: Countries in the WVS sample.

Country	Percentage of the population that:				
	Does not trust people with a different religion.	Believes men are better political leaders than women.			
Algeria	85	75	Libya	79	77
Argentina	40	30	Malaysia	N.R.*	69
Armenia	84	66	Mali	32	79
Australia	30	23	Mexico	70	25
Azerbaijan	66	70	Moldova	74	52
Bahrain	51	72	Morocco	77	64
Belarus	59	66	Netherlands	54	14
Brazil	45	31	New Zealand	16	17
Bulgaria	55	48	Nigeria	54	77
Burkina Faso	45	63	Norway	20	15
Canada	20	18	Pakistan	72	74
Chile	58	39	Peru	79	19
China	N.R.*	52	Philippines	66	56
Colombia	66	29	Poland	46	40
Cyprus	72	35	Qatar	N.R.*	86
Ecuador	65	27	Romania	73	51
Egypt	61	90	Russia	60	61
Estonia	55	51	Rwanda	47	49
Ethiopia	60	23	Singapore	N.R.*	46
Finland	23	19	Slovenia	73	27
France	22	21	South Africa	40	52
Georgia	60	64	South Korea	59	52
Germany	51	20	Spain	51	18
Ghana	51	80	Sweden	15	10
Guatemala	N.D.**	32	Switzerland	29	16
Hungary	30	40	Thailand	75	53
India	47	63	Trinidad and Tobago	37	26
Indonesia	60	61	Tunisia	89	76
Iran	N.D.**	N.R.*	Turkey	67	66
Iraq	66	87	Ukraine	57	53
Italy	59	19	United States	27	N.R.*
Japan	84	43	Uruguay	48	15
Jordan	64	81	Uzbekistan	80	77
Kazakhstan	54	64	Vietnam	72	57
Kuwait	59	79	Yemen	88	86
Kyrgyzstan	76	64	Zambia	61	50
Lebanon	50	59	Zimbabwe	63	58

N=74, *N.R. = not ratified corresponding treaty, **N.D.= no data available on norms. Non-ratifying states and those with missing values are deleted from subsequent analysis.

138 Gervais et al. 2011

139 Both questions are measured in WVS wave 5 and 6

Measuring norms is difficult because of their shared nature, and the WVS proxies do not solve this issue.¹⁴⁰ The WVS collects individual-level data only, and it does not explicitly test the validity of that individual belief with all other members of the community to see whether it is indeed a shared norm.¹⁴¹ Individual beliefs as measured in the survey might not be similar to a community's shared rules. An individual can live according to the shared norms of her society without accepting or internalizing them at the individual level.¹⁴² This would mean, for instance, that a respondent to a survey is part of a community in which the shared norm is that children should contribute to the household income. At the same time, she can express in the survey that she individually believes that only parents should be responsible for the family's income.

This being said, there are several important arguments in favor of choosing the individual-level survey. First, even though norms transcend the single individual, any shared rule cannot be understood without its individual basis. If we are looking for norms, we must eventually find evidence of their existence in the beliefs or attitudes of individuals. If they are not found at the individual level, they cannot exist at the level of the community.¹⁴³ It is possible but highly unlikely that there is a shared norm prescribing that children should contribute to the household income, when there is no-one in that community who individually believes that this is how it should be. Moreover, community norms are often internalized in the long run, and should therefore be reflected in individual-level beliefs as well.¹⁴⁴ Thereby, in this chapter, the individual-level data is aggregated to the country-level, resulting in a percentage score for each country that indicates how widely shared individual-level beliefs are. Finally, these proxies are still better indicators as compared to the ones that are currently used in human rights literature to measure normative mismatches or 'cultures'.¹⁴⁵ In particular, the top-down classifications sometimes used by one scholar at one point in time do not account for the changing nature of norms, ignore communities' own opinions and description of their norms, and disregard both differences within 'civilizations' and similarities between 'civilizations'.¹⁴⁶

Compared to such variables, the data used in this project to approximate communities' norms provides a more fine-grained analysis.¹⁴⁷ The aggregated percentages on individual

140 Bratton, 2007:99

141 Cancian, 1975

142 Lauth, 2000, 2004: 6

143 Lauth, 2004:7

144 Coleman, 1990

145 For instance, in one test, Wade M. Cole (2013) uses Samuel Huntington's classification of countries in one of nine 'civilizational indicators' and one 'other' category to analyse the relation between culture and human rights compliance. This variable obscures what, exactly, the shared rules in those 'civilizations' are, and consequently relies on untested assumptions that certain civilizations have a better match with human rights norms than others.

146 In another test, Cole (2013) measures the presence of different religious groups per country to see whether that influences levels of compliance. This variable again relies on untested assumptions on what kind of norms such religions prescribe, it neglects the idea that norms can change within religions, that there can be vast differences between communities and their norms within one religion, and finally neglects similarities between different communities from different religions.

147 Cole, 2013

beliefs are not only a more detailed description of which beliefs individuals actually adhere to, but also make clear how many people do not adhere to them. Moreover, these beliefs are directly reported by the individuals themselves, are not classified from the top down by one scholar, and are much more sensitive to differences within countries, and similarities across countries. Finally, the additional qualitative fieldwork allows for cross-checking and in-depth analysis of communities' norms, by drawing on current scholarship and letting experts and political actors discuss what they see as the dominant norms with regard to women's political participation and religious freedom in their country.

Patchwork compliance

This study distinguishes between the degree and range of compliance in order to be able to capture the wide variation in compliance. For the quantitative part, it is not always possible to do both. For example, in the case of the CEDAW, we can judge the degree to which Article 7 is implemented by investigating the number of women in national parliaments. To judge the range, we need to look at how many of the CEDAW articles were implemented in domestic legislation. Unfortunately, the range of compliance is difficult to measure quantitatively, as there is not sufficient data available per country. Therefore, the quantitative analysis focuses only on the degree of compliance. The qualitative chapters study both degree and range.

The data used to measure the degree of compliance with CEDAW's Article 7 (Right to political participation) is collected by the World Bank.¹⁴⁸ It shows the percentage of seats held by women in national parliaments. The variable used to measure the degree of compliance with the ICCPR's Article 18 (Freedom of religion) is collected by Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI). It indicates whether citizens can exercise, practise and proselytize others to their religion, or whether the state restricts them in doing so. A score of 0 indicates severe repression, such as governments that force conversions to a dominant or state-sponsored religion or try to restrict conversions to minority religions through intimidation. A score of 1 indicates moderate restrictions and a score of 2 compliance with religious freedom.¹⁴⁹ For the regression analysis, this variable was recoded into a dummy variable, in which 0 indicates compliance, and 1 moderate to severe repression. Importantly, the outcome variables were both lagged between 1 to 4 years, dependent on data availability, so as to make sure the hypothesized cause had time to affect the outcome.

The data source for this variable has not been without controversy, as it is based on the reporting of human rights violations by the US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Critics were afraid the Reports would favor countries in which the

148 The World Bank Development Indicators are available at <https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators>. Last accessed 13 May 2021

149 See the CIRI Data & Documentation for a complete description of the coding process; <http://www.humanrightsdata.com/p/data-documentation.html>. Last accessed 13 May 2021

US had an interest, and paint much too grim a picture of ideologically opposed regimes.¹⁵⁰ One study systematically comparing the findings of the Country Reports with Amnesty's Annual Reports has gone a long way in settling this concern. It concludes that there is no reason to believe that biases systematically affect the Country Reports in the vast majority of cases. Even more so, the assessments have clearly converged in their evaluations of states' violations over time.¹⁵¹

International vulnerability

Vulnerability to the international human rights community is operationalized as having strong economic ties with the US and/or the EU through aid and trade. This is not based on an assumption that these states are human rights protectors. Rather, the US and EU states are considered as having dominated the human rights agenda in the past decades, even as they have violated human rights extensively during that same period.¹⁵² US and EU dominance in international relations over the past decades has resulted in a very strong Western influence in shaping the interpretation and application of international human rights.¹⁵³ Moreover, scholars argue that the Charter and Declaration of Human Rights strongly overlap with typically Western norms and political philosophy, and that this is why, in other parts of the world, human rights are perceived as a product of the West.¹⁵⁴

Two variables are used to measure international vulnerability. The first is the extent of trade with EU member states and/or the US; the second is whether or not aid was received from EU institutions and/or the US - both as percentage of a country's GDP. These scope conditions are coded as dummies in which the condition (vulnerability) is present or absent. For aid, the condition in the reference category is not present, meaning no aid received, or present, meaning the country received aid from the US and/or EU institutions.

This coding had to be adjusted for trade, as all states in the dataset traded with either the US or EU member states. The reference category therefore includes all states that trade less than average with the US and/or EU member states as a percentage of their GDP. The second category includes all states that trade more than average with the US and/or EU member states. As this continuous variable was recoded into the presence or absence of the scope condition, the average was chosen as the cut-off point.¹⁵⁵ Appendix A lists

150 Poe et al., 2001:651

151 Poe et al., 2001: 677

152 Risse et al. 2013

153 Brems, 2004

154 Pollis & Schwab, in: Koggel, 2006

155 Selecting a cut-off point, instead of using international vulnerability as a continuous variable, is necessary as it is a mixed-methods study. Scope conditions are either present or absent. However, as this is the first mixed-methods design to work with cut-off points for international vulnerability, current literature working on international vulnerability does not give guidance on the selection of such a cut-off point. Future research is pivotal to confirm the validity of using the average as cut-off point. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) in particular will be a useful methodology, as it allows for investigation of the presence or absence of specific conditions. Including such a study was beyond the scope of the current project.

the countries in each of the two categories. All data on aid and trade comes from the US Census Bureau and the European Office for Statistics, Eurostat.¹⁵⁶

Norm monitoring

The second scope condition is the monitoring of a norm. It is operationalized as how often and how extensively a state is evaluated by other members in the community on its compliance record. Both norms studied here are relatively closely monitored for each ratifying state, and therefore no variable is taken up in the models. In addition, there are no other indicators available that measure the extra monitoring by key states or other actors in the human rights community. Some studies have solved this by including naming-and-shaming as a proxy. However, this is not a suitable proxy for monitoring in this study, as the wish to avoid sanctioning leads state decision-makers to start a political dialogue. That is to say, it is the anticipation of being sanctioned – because a norm is closely monitored – that triggers the pathway of political dialogue as proposed in this project. Consequently, once a state is named-and-shamed, it is already beyond that stage. However, as this project analyses two closely-monitored human rights norms, the scope condition is already present. Still, the nuanced variation in monitoring over time, such as individual member states that start to monitor other states' norm compliance outside of UN structures, is taken up by the qualitative studies, as is further discussed in Chapter 4.

3.3 Mismatching norms and compliance with CEDAW Article 7

Figure 2 below probes the relation between mismatching norms and compliance with Article 7, women's right to political participation. It shows a downward slope that could indicate a correlation between the two; the higher the percentual presence of communities with norms that are a mismatch with CEDAW Article 7, the lower the degree of compliance with that Article.

Yet, the figure also clearly shows considerable variation in the degree of compliance between those countries that all have such a strong presence. The countries in the lower right corner of the figure - Jordan, Yemen, Qatar, Egypt, Iraq and Egypt - score the highest on the presence of communities adhering to norms that are a mismatch with CEDAW Article 7, all with percentages over of 80%. Yet there is still a lot of variation in their degrees of compliance. Qatar and Yemen have no women in their national parliament. Egypt has only 2% women in its parliament. It is followed by Jordan, which has 12% women in its national parliament. Iraq's parliament has over twice that percentage; 25%. This is as

¹⁵⁶ Eurostat Database <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/home>; US Census Bureau; <https://www.census.gov/en.html> Last accessed 13 May 2021

much as Canada, where only a minority of 18% of the population believes men are better political leaders. Also Rwanda and South Africa stand out, as they are among the countries with very high degrees of compliance, while the presence of communities with norms that are a mismatch with CEDAW Article 7 is around 50% of their respective populations.




Figure 2 CEDAW: Presence of communities with norms that mismatch with CEDAW Art. 7 and percentage of women in national parliament as compliance with CEDAW Art. 7

The relation that was visible in Figure 2 is further investigated in Model 1 in Table 4. This model supports Proposition 1; that the presence of communities that adhere to norms that are a mismatch with CEDAW Art. 7 is significantly related to compliance. The higher that presence, the lower the degree of compliance with CEDAW Article 7. Each 1% increase in the presence of these communities is expected to result in 0.28% fewer women in parliament.

Table 4 CEDAW: Mismatching norms, international vulnerability, and percentage of women in national parliament as compliance with CEDAW Article 7

	Model 1 B (SE)	Model 2 B (SE)	Model 3 B (SE)	Model 4 B (SE)	Model 5 B (SE)
Presence of communities with norms which are a mismatch with CEDAW Art. 7 (0-100%)	-0.28 (0.05)***	-0.30 (0.05)***	-0.27 (0.14)*	-0.64 (0.16)***	-0.64 (0.22)**
Higher than average rate of trade with US/EU		5.41 (2.10)*	5.40 (2.10)*	4.77 (2.04)*	4.77 (2.06)*
Received aid from US/EU		3.95 (2.36)	4.02 (2.40)	4.32 (2.31)	4.30 (2.34)
Mismatching norms * Trade			-0.02 (0.09)		0.01 (0.09)
Mismatching norms * Aid				0.22 (0.10)*	0.22 (0.10)*
Constant	33.71 (2.44)***	21.11 (4.94)**	19.67 (8.37*)	36.40 (8.55)***	37.03 (11.51)**

*N=72 Notes: All tests are two-tailed. * P < .05, ** P < .01, *** P < .001*

Model 2 adds the scope condition of international vulnerability. It indicates that a higher-than-average rate of trade with the US/EU is significantly related with an increase in women in parliament. On the whole, states that trade more than average with the EU are expected to have about 5.4% more women in parliament, compared to states that do not trade as much with the US or the EU. Receiving aid was expected to increase levels of compliance as well. Yet, the relation is not significant when this variable is added to the current model which includes the presence of communities with norms that are a mismatch with human rights and trade with the US or EU member states.

Model 3 explores the relation between domestic norms and compliance further, by probing whether it is mediated by a state's international vulnerability operationalized as trade. The coefficient is small, at -0.02, and not significant. In short, when we understand vulnerability as trade dependency, Proposition 2 for the CEDAW is not supported.

Model 4 explores Proposition 2 again, but focuses on aid dependency. Even though aid does not have a significant independent relation with compliance, this model suggests it does mediate the relation between norms and compliance. That is to say, the relation between domestic norms and compliance is weaker in states that receive aid from the US or the EU. On the other hand, these norms have a stronger relation with compliance in countries that do not receive aid. This supports Proposition 2; that countries with a large presence of communities with norms that are a mismatch with human rights, and that are aid-dependent, are likely to have higher levels of compliance as compared to countries with similar sizes of such communities, but that are not receiving aid from the US or EU member states. The following model, Model 5, which includes interaction effects for aid and trade, shows similar results in terms of the direction and significance of the relation found.

The mediating role of international vulnerability in the relation between domestic norms and compliance is visualized in Figure 3 below. It demonstrates the extent to which international vulnerability weakens the effect of normative mismatches. For example, countries with a large majority presence of such communities (80-100%) and that did not receive aid, are expected to have between 0-5% women in their national parliaments. Countries with a similar majority presence between 80-100%, but that did receive aid, are expected to have many more women in parliament; between 10 and 15%.¹⁵⁷




Figure 3: CEDAW: Interaction effect between mismatching norms and US/EU aid received

3.4 Mismatching norms and compliance with ICCPR Article 18

In Figure 4, we can see a pattern for ICCPR Article 18 which is similar to the one we saw for the CEDAW. It suggests a relation between normative mismatches and compliance; the larger the presence of communities with norms that are a mismatch with ICCPR Article 18, the less governments protect religious freedom. Also for the ICCPR, there is still a considerable difference in the degree of compliance between countries with similar percentages of normative mismatches. For instance, in the top five countries in terms of normative mismatches, four exercise severe and widespread repression of religion. The

¹⁵⁷ The visualization of the non-significant interaction effect between mismatching norms and trade can be found in Appendix C.

fifth country, Japan, shares that high percentage of communities adhering to norms that are a mismatch with ICCPR Article 18, but exercises moderate repression only. When we investigate the figure further, we even see that countries with similar percentages of such communities can vary between severe and widespread repression to no repression at all. For example, countries such as Egypt, Jordan and Iraq have a majority presence of communities with norms that are a mismatch with Article 18 with percentages over 60%. These governments exercise severe and widespread repression of religion. Yet countries such as Colombia, that have a similarly large presence of such communities, do not restrict freedom of religion at all. Table 5 below further probes this relation.




Figure 4: ICCPR: Presence of communities with norms mismatching ICCPR Art. 18 and government protection and repression of religion as compliance with ICCPR Art. 18

Table 5: ICCPR: Mismatching norms, international vulnerability and government protection or violation of freedom of religion as compliance with ICCPR Art. 18

	Model 1 Odds (SE)	Model 2 Odds (SE)	Model 3 Odds (SE)	Model 4 Odds (SE)	Model 5 Odds (SE)
Presence of communities with norms which are a mismatch with ICCPR Art. 18 (0-100%)	0.95 (0.02)***	0.96 (0.02)*	0.97 (0.02)	0.97 (0.02)	0.98 (0.03)
Higher than average rate of trade with US/EU		0.56 (0.67)	0.51 (0.67)	0.58 (0.65)	0.52 (0.68)
Received aid from US/EU		0.20 (0.64)*	0.24 (0.65)*	0.23 (0.65)*	0.24 (0.65)*
Mismatching norms * Trade			0.97 (0.04)		0.97 (0.04)
Mismatching norms * Aid				0.98 (0.04)	0.97 (0.04)
Constant	11.10 (0.89)**	14.71 (1.01)*	8.96 (1.33)	11.20 (1.30)	4.38 (1.52)

N = 71 Notes: All tests are two-tailed. * $P < .05$, ** $P < .01$, *** $P < .001$

For this logistic regression, the outcome variable was recoded to two categories; the first being moderate to widespread repression and the second, compliance. Therefore, the results need to be interpreted differently from the CEDAW linear regression model. The relation is described in an odds ratio; values less than 1 indicate that as the presence of communities whose norms are a mismatch with ICCPR Art. 18 increases, the odds that compliance occurs decrease.

The relation indicated in Figure 4 is confirmed in the findings of Model 1 and supports Proposition 1; that the larger the presence of communities whose norms are a mismatch with ICCPR Art. 18, the less likely states are to comply with ICCPR Article 18 on religious freedom. Each 1% increase in the presence of such communities multiplies the odds of compliance occurring by 0.95. As this number is below 1, it means the probability that a state complies actually decreases as the presence of normatively mismatching communities increases.

Model 2 adds states' international vulnerability in aid and trade. It indicates a very different dynamic in international vulnerability as compared to the CEDAW findings. Remarkably, having received aid from the US/EU makes states less likely to comply, when controlling for trade and the presence of communities with norms which are a mismatch with ICCPR Art. 18. Such states have an odds ratio on compliance of 0.20. Trading more than average with the US/EU is not significantly correlated with compliance when controlling for aid and mismatching norms.

Models 3, 4 and 5 investigate whether the relation between the presence of communities whose norms are a mismatch with ICCPR Art. 18 is mediated by states' international vulnerabilities as outlined in Proposition 2. The results do not support the proposition. In contrast with the CEDAW, international vulnerability does not weaken the effect of domestic norms on levels of compliance.

The visualization of the relation can be found below. It shows that countries with a smaller presence of communities whose norms mismatch with ICCPR Art. 18 are more likely to comply, as compared to states that have a larger presence. For example, states that only have a small minority presence (0-20%) of such communities, have a mean predicted probability of over 0.8 of complying. States that have a large majority presence (80-100%) have a mean predicted probability of well under 0.2 of complying.¹⁵⁸

158 The visualization of the non-significant interaction effects between mismatching norms and aid and trade can be found in Appendix D.




Figure 5: Relation between the presence of communities with norms which are a mismatch with ICCPR Art. 18 and the mean predicted probability of states' compliance with ICCPR Art. 18.

3.5 Case study selection

Using the findings of this chapter as an introduction to the following extensive qualitative case studies has several advantages. First of all, the findings in this chapter are instrumental in investigating correlations between the normative mismatch and compliance outcomes, and in highlighting the differences in these correlations between the two treaties. Nonetheless, the correlations found here do not imply causation. Case studies on the two treaties offer a solution here, as the operation of the proposed pathway of the political dialogue can be studied in detail. They enable an investigation of the pathway in general, but also shed further light on the differences that were identified in this chapter. Crucially, they make it possible to investigate whether or not the pathway of political dialogue is actually present in both instances; and if it is, to what extent it is used differently by leaders, and why. Finally, they allow for the observing of any expected, and unexpected, aspects of the pathway of the political dialogue.

In addition, qualitative methods allow for conceptual refinements with higher levels of validity. As is clear from the quantitative operationalizations, highly complex theoretical concepts such as international vulnerability needed to be simplified in order for them to be measurable in the same way across the world. Although that simplification is both

necessary and useful in order to compare the levels of vulnerability across different states, it does mean a loss of depth and runs the risk of conceptual stretching.¹⁵⁹ This depth is brought back in by investigating these same concepts as so-called 'sensitizing concepts' in the case studies.

Moreover, the quantitative analysis of this chapter does not allow for the identification of variables which may have been left out, or unexpected developments that influence the central relationship. By using qualitative data collection methods, in particular open-ended interviewing techniques, the fieldwork for the case study makes it possible to identify new developments or unexpected outcomes that determine the workings of the central pathway.¹⁶⁰

As one of the aims of this study is to investigate a pathway, a typical case is most suitable.¹⁶¹ Such an 'on-lier' has typical values on the theorized cause, scope conditions, and outcome of the political dialogue model, and the smallest possible residual to the predicted level of compliance.¹⁶² The case should thus have at least a majority presence of communities whose norms are a mismatch with human rights, a higher than average rate of trade with US/EU and receive EU or US aid, and have observed levels of compliance that are very close to its predicted level of compliance. Jordan is exactly such a case, as is visible in the table below. The following chapter, Chapter 4, further describes the presence of the cause and scope conditions in the Jordanian context. Then, Chapter 5 and 6 describe how the pathway mediated the relation between mismatching norms and patchworks of compliance in Jordan for the CEDAW and ICCPR.

Table 6: Typical case values in Jordan

Treaty	Cause	Scope condition		Expected	Outcome
	Presence of normatively mismatching communities	Higher than average rate of trade with US/EU	Received aid from US/EU	Predicted compliance	Observed compliance
CEDAW Article 7	87.1%	Yes	Yes	10-15%	10.80%
ICCPR Article 18	67.7%	Yes	Yes	Repression	Repression

By choosing the case study in this way, some typical risks of qualitative research are avoided. For example, the choice of case study can be influenced by a researcher's personal preferences, existing knowledge or cognitive bias in favor of a particular proposition or outcome.¹⁶³ By basing the choice of case on the quantitative study, the risk of such a selection bias is minimized. Still, there are risks attached to selecting a typical case in which

159 George & Bennett, 2005:19-20

160 George & Bennett, 2005:21

161 Seawright & Gerring, 2008:299

162 Seawright & Gerring, 2008:299

163 George & Bennett, 2005:24

the independent and dependent variables vary as the propositions expect. It means that cases that could contradict the expectations are not taken into account, which could result in overstating the generalizability of the pathway to a too large universe of cases. As the selection of more cases, such as deviant cases, was beyond the scope of this research project, two other strategies will be used to mitigate this risk.

The first is making a clear demarcation of the universe to which the political dialogue model could apply.¹⁶⁴ As elaborated on in Chapter 2 and this chapter, these are the cases that share three main characteristics: presence of communities that adhere to norms that are a mismatch with human rights, ratification of a closely monitored human rights treaty, and vulnerability to the international human rights community through aid and trade.

The second is clarifying the limitations that come with selecting only Jordan from this universe. While it is a case that is typically representative of the demarcated universe, this does not mean the findings from this case study as presented in the following chapters can be simply and directly generalized to other countries with the same characteristics. The first quantitative probe suggests that there are generalizable correlations between normative mismatches and lower levels of compliance, but this does not mean that the mechanism that will be investigated in the following case studies on Jordan also mediates that correlation in all these countries. It is possible that there are other types of mechanisms driving this correlation in other countries that are not investigated in this project.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has probed the relationships between the cause, scope conditions and outcome of the political dialogue model; the presence of communities whose norms mismatch with human rights, variations in compliance with closely monitored human rights, and international vulnerability to the EU or the US. The findings support Proposition 1 on this pathway for both treaties: the larger the presence of such communities, the less likely states are to comply. However, the findings on Proposition 2 are different for the two treaties. In the case of the CEDAW, the effect of the presence of these communities is weaker in states that are internationally vulnerable, which supports Proposition 2. This mediating role of international vulnerability was not found for the ICCPR. These differences will be further investigated in the typical case of Jordan in the following chapters.

The findings in this chapter are not fully conclusive, though. An important limitation is the absence of some important control variables which could result in omitted variable bias. This is due, firstly, to the purpose and role of the quantitative analysis within the mixed

¹⁶⁴ George & Bennett, 2005:25

methods design, as it is intended to probe the relation between the cause, scope conditions and outcome of the pathway proposed in chapter 2. Moreover, the dataset includes only a limited number of observations, which makes the adding of many more control variables problematic. Yet, the same models for CEDAW and ICCPR, with 'US or EU member state' included as control variable, can be found in Appendix C and D. These models are not very different from the ones presented in this chapter, as both the direction and the significant relations remain the same.

A more complicated statistical model, in particular a multilevel regression model in which more observations (several years per country) can be included, could have been used for a more rigorous test of the central relation. It allows for the inclusion of more control variables, as well investigating the relation over time. However, such a model was beyond the scope of the current study. Instead, this was taken up in a study by Violet Benneker, Stephanie Steinmetz and Klarita Gërxhani on compliance with CEDAW Article 7.¹⁶⁵ They used a multilevel regression model with the same independent and dependent variables, but included the control variables of GDP, GDP growth, level of democracy, dependence on trade, dependence on aid, population size, population growth, ratification of the Convention on the Political Rights of Women (CPRW), years since ratification of CEDAW, regime stability and levels of education.¹⁶⁶ Their results are similar to the ones presented here, as they suggest a strong relation between mismatching norms and compliance with CEDAW Article 7. Though this adds evidence to the propositions in the case of the CEDAW, it does not for the ICCPR, which still needs to be investigated in future research.

165 Benneker et al. 2020.

166 Davenport, 1995; Henderson, 1999; Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Mitchell & McCormick, 1988; Poe et al., 1999; Thornton et al., 1983; Zanger, 2000.

