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# Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh: a political biography

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## *Chapter Seven*

## The Great War and the Publication of *Kaveh*

The previous chapter examined the period leading up to the Great War and how events in Iran were shaped by the relationships between the global powers. In particular, the emergence of Germany as an international power, ambitious to expand its influence around the world, was highlighted. In expanding its realm of influence, Germany focused on the East and in particular the Middle East and Iran. Iran's strategic geopolitical position and the fact that it could allow geographical access to Britain's most important colony, India, thus brought it to Germany's attention. Similarly, some Iranians were interested in establishing a relationship with Germany; they considered Germany a benign nation which had the potential to save them from the clutches of the two other great powers, Russia and Britain, both of which were using Iran as a pawn in the battle to maintain dominance in that region and in doing so were tearing apart the country.[895] With the burgeoning Russian military intervention in Iran following Russia's ultimatum in November 1911, Germany was increasingly regarded as Iran's saviour among many Iranian intellectuals and politicians.[896] The pro-German sentiment was also reflected in the newspapers and the literature of the time and poets, in particular, played a role in spreading this sentiment among the ordinary people. Adib-e Pishavari composed *Qaysar Nameh* [Story of the Kaiser], a lengthy versified epic poem of 14,000 lines in praise of the Kaiser and Vahid Dastgerdi wrote his famous ode called *Narenjak* [grenade]. Later Malak al-Shoa'ray Bahar, Mirzadeh Eshqi, 'Aref Qazvini and Abolqasem Lahoti also praised Germany in their works.[897]

The Great War was just the opportunity that some had been hoping for. A group of Iranian politicians and intelligentsia, Taqizadeh among them, saw the outbreak of the Great

[895] For more about the policy of European countries in Iran during the period, see: Mahmoud Afshar Yazdi, *Siyasat-e Oropa dar Iran* [The Policy of Europe in Iran] (Tehran: Bonyad-e Moqofat-e Dr. Afshar Yazdi, 1979).

[896] Taqizadeh himself comments on this, stating that every German victory over the allies was celebrated by his Iranian acquaintances residing in France. See: Taqizadeh, "Mirza Mohammad Khan Qazvini" in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 2: 117.

[897] Behnam, *Berlaniha.*

War as a chance to realise their hopes of preventing British and Russian intervention in Iran. With the formation of a strategical alliance with Germany, here at last was the opportunity to actually put into practice what they had been forcefully advocating for. The group's focus, first and foremost, was to regain the independence and sovereignty of Iran and then to modernise the country. In the context of these developments the previous chapter reflected on Taqizadeh's eagerness to pursue his aim for the formation of an alliance with Germany which ultimately led to some groups of Iranians co-operating with the Germans.

The present chapter provides background information about Iran during the Great War and in that context examines Taqizadeh's activities both during and after the War. Taqizadeh's activities during this period were not only political but also literary and cultural. As can be seen at different points throughout Taqizadeh's life, whenever he saw necessary, he would shift from political activism to focussing more on literary and journalistic activities through which he hoped to be able to exert influence over the masses. One of his greatest successes was in the field of journalism with the publication in Berlin of a journal in Persian called *Kaveh*. *Kaveh* once again gave Taqizadeh, who was living in exile at that time, a voice inside Iran which allowed him to propagate his modern ideas and exert influence not only in the realm of politics but also in literary and cultural matters.

*Kaveh* is a rich source of Taqizadeh's theoretical ideas. It would create a roadmap for the changes he believed were necessary to implement in order for Iran to be able to become a modern nation. At the same time, *Kaveh* reflects the shift in Taqizadeh's strategies as a result of external forces and also provides a record of his intellectual development and understandings of various subjects both during and after the Great War. Some of Taqizadeh's most controversial ideas were first publicised in *Kaveh*. One of his biggest achievements during this time was to gather together like-minded Iranian politicians and intellectuals in Berlin. The formation of this group, as well as providing an opportunity for intellectuals to meet and exchange, also gave *Kaveh* and Taqizadeh more legitimacy and political clout in both political and cultural circles. From its small editorial office located in a council chamber, *Kaveh* was able to disseminate its ideas to a wide audience both in

Iran and beyond its borders. Activities he was involved in whilst in Berlin were considered by Taqizadeh himself as some of the most notable and influential of his lifetime.[898]

After the end of the war, Taqizadeh continued his stay in Germany, deciding to focus more on his cultural activities and the publication of the second series of *Kaveh*, this time independent from German help. With a fresh approach, his focus was now more on literature and culture. Taqizadeh's ideas after the War, which were to become his theoretical framework once he became a statesman, were reflected mostly in the second series of *Kaveh.* In this chapter, we will witness Taqizadeh's significant shift in focus from politics to culture and vice versa, which was reflected in *Kaveh*. This publication is, thus, a valuable source of information, allowing an insight into how Taqizadeh put his theories into practice. Despite the success of *Kaveh,* Taqizadeh was forced to cease publication due to financial difficulties.

**7:1 Iran and the Great War**

First, one should look closely at the situation in Iran and beyond its borders at the outbreak of the Great War, against which Taqizadeh's focus and his political and personal activities during the war and post-war periods can be evaluated.

Following the closure of the Second Parliament, the political situation in Iran had gone from bad to worse. The central government was weakened and had lost its control over many parts of the country. In the absence of a sitting parliament and a powerful central government, the intervention of the foreign powers, Russia and Britain, had increased. Two important provinces of Azerbaijan and Gilan, major centres of constitutionalism in Iran, were occupied and ruled over by the Russians. The modernisation of the financial system which the Democrats had hoped for by hiring the American experts had failed. The Democrats and in particular Taqizadeh had considered the reforms of the American financial experts as the last hope for Iran, highlighting the importance Taqizadeh assigned to American involvement.[899] After the expulsion of the American financial expert Shuster,

[898] Iraj Afshar, "Margh-e Taqizadeh na Karist Khord [Taqizadeh's Death was no Trivial Matter]," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 146.

[899] Taqizadeh, "Anva'-e Jahad-e Melli [National Calls to Action]," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 9: 237.

the Belgian Mornard was appointed as Head of the Treasury. Mornard, desperately seeking an immediate solution to the adverse financial situation, began once again to utilise traditional methods.[900] As a result, neither the old traditional system nor a modern financial system modelled upon that of European countries was fully in place.[901] Rather, a dysfunctional financial system now increased the country's dependence on borrowing money from foreign countries and therefore led to increasing intervention by Russia and Britain.[902] Taqizadeh considered the appointment of Mornard as a fierce blow to the independence of Iran. He believed the engagement of the Belgians in the affairs of Iran would contribute to "Russofication" of the country.[903]

For some of the period in which there was no sitting parliament, Samsam al-Saltaneh, a chieftain from the Bakhtiyari tribe, was Prime Minister which increased this tribe's influence on the running of the country. Many governors of the provinces were chosen from this Bakhtiyari tribe. These tribal rulers often acted in ways which were not in keeping with a constitutional government. In fact, Samsam al-Saltaneh's assignment as Prime Minister could be considered a step backwards in the process of the implementation and consolidation of a democratic and modern government in Iran. His tribal affiliation and loyalty to his tribal roots led him to consider any act carried out by the Bakhtiyaris legitimate. He was of the belief that it was thanks to his efforts and those of his tribe that the constitutional movement had progressed and he therefore demanded a major role for himself and the Bakhtiyaris in the government of the country. He took it for granted that power should be in his hands and thus when he had views opposed to those of the Democrats of the Second Parliament who were generally more educated, rather than peacefully negotiating, he dramatically threatened that he would order the Bakhtiyaris to

[900] Annette Destrée, *Mostakhdemin-e Belzhiki dar Khedmat-e Dolat-e Iran* [Les Fonctionnaires Belges Au Service de La Perse, 1898-1915], trans. Mansoureh Ettehadieh (Tehran: Nashr-e Tarikh-e Mo'aser, 1984), 217.

[901] There was even confusion about which language, English, French, Persian or Russian, to use for recording the financial documents. See: "Hesab-e Mornard," in *Nasim-e Shomal*, February 10, 1915. Baqer Kazemi also complains about the mismanagement of the Belgians which led to trouble in the treasury. See: Baqer Kazemi, *Yaddasht-hay-e az Zendeghi-e Baqer Kazemi* [Notes of Baqer Kazemi], eds. Davoud Kazemi and Mansoureh Ettehadieh (Tehran: Nasr-e Tarik-e Iran, 2012), 1:358.

[902] Ulrich Gehrke, *Pish be Soy-e Sharq: Iran dar Siyasat-e Sharqi-e Alman dar Jang Janhani Dovoum* [Persien in der Deutschen Orientpolitik Während des Ersten Weltkrieges], trans. Parviz Safdari (Tehran: Siamak, 1998), 50.

[903] Taqizadeh to Browne, 13 March 1912, in *Browne Papers*, 9-9-6.

kill the Democrats.[904] The Democrats, though educated and familiar with the concept of the constitution and despite their plans for a modern government, did not have sufficient dedicated followers to seize power to allow them to actualise their ideas. Now, the fact that a tribal leader was to lead the country was a harsh blow to those who had been initially so hopeful that with a new system based on the constitution would come a more democratic system of government, very different from that which had been based on tribal values founded on traditional loyalties and nepotism. The fact that, in his autobiography, Taqizadeh anecdotally highlights the level of obedience and loyalty which members of a tribe would show towards their chieftains might indicate that he too hoped for a similar level of support within a political party.[905] The same level of loyalty and support would have allowed him more opportunity to achieve his political aims within the framework of a political party. However, those outside a traditionally tribal mentality would need a great deal of education and persuasion before they would be willing to follow a political party with the same depth of passion and commitment as those who unquestioningly supported tribal leaders.

Despite his tribal approach to politics, which may be open to criticism, Samsam al-Saltaneh was successful in counteracting the attempts of the deposed Shah and his brother to regain power once again. It was also in Samsam al-Saltaneh's government that the Swedish officers were hired to organise the gendarmerie force in Iran and, in fact, it was this gendarmerie force that eventually succeeded in disarming the Bakhtiyaris.[906]

As well as politically, the country was weak financially and militarily during this period. A lack of income had reduced the power and influence of the central government and crippled efforts to establish order throughout the country. Without the support of an organised army, the central government was unable to collect sufficient taxes from the provinces. The armed forces of Iran were limited at this time, with only 8000 soldiers from the Cossack Brigade and 6000 from the gendarmerie. This small armed force was unable

[904] Baqer 'Aqeli, ed., *Nakhost Vaziran-e Iran: Az Moshir al-Dowleh ta Bakhtiyar* [Prime Ministers of Iran; from Moshir al-Dowleh to Bakhtiyar] (Tehran: 'Elmi, 1991), 130.
[905] Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 121.
[906] 'Aqeli, ed., *Nakhost Vaziran-e Iran*, 142.

to establish security in the country. The irregular armed forces or Mojaheds who had fought for the constitution during the Lesser Despotism period were disarmed. Morale was low among the few that remained; their hopes had been dashed by the situation they now found themselves in and the closure of parliament was a huge blow. The constitutionalists had hoped to reopen the Parliament but the Russians, who were opposed to the idea, prevented this from happening. Some influential Iranians, such as Sardar As'ad, were also against the reopening of the Parliament, believing it would decrease the role of the Bakhtiyari leadership who held the cabinet.[907] Aware of this, Taqizadeh who was eager for the reopening of the Parliament, wrote to Professor Browne requesting him to ask his friend Lynch, who had influence among the Bakhtiyaris, to convince Sardar As'ad to take steps to enable the Parliament to be reopened.[908] Furthermore, Yapram Khan, the Armenian commander of the Mojaheds, who had played a crucial role in uniting the different groups of Mojaheds, was killed in fighting with the insurgents. The absence of a commander like Yapram further weakened the position of the constitutionalists. Many political activists of different political persuasions were sent into exile or had swiftly fled Tehran due to the unfavourable political situation. The regent, Naser al-Molk was now the key player in the political arena of Iran. The Democrat Party of which Naser al-Molk was suspicious had been marginalised; their leadership was weakened and their newspaper *Iran-e Now* was forced to shut down. The press was another area greatly affected by the unstable conditions of the time. Other newspapers, too, such as *Shoura* [Council] and *Esteqlal-e Iran* [The Independence of Iran], publications of the Moderates and The Union and Progress parties, were closed too. The independent *Sharq* [East] had also stopped publication. In the provinces, *Shafaq* in Tabriz and *Now Bahar* [New Spring] in Mashad were forced to close under the pressure of the Russians.[909] Against all this chaos and instability, eyes turned to the regent, Naser al-Molk, who was the most powerful player in the country at that time.

Naser al-Molk's policy was to keep the people of Tehran unaware of the adverse situation in other parts of the country and to at least maintain the nominal independence of Iran by encouraging good relations with Russia and Britain. These two powers used this

[907] Dolatabadi, 3: 216.
[908] Taqizadeh to Browne, 13 March 1912, in *Browne Papers*, 9-9-6.
[909] Bahar, 1: 14.

opportunity to increase their influence in Iran. At this point, it was these powers which were jointly making decisions over major internal affairs in Iran such as elections, the reopening of the parliament, appointments of the provincial governors, the numbers of the gendarmerie and Cossack brigade personnel, the Treasury and railway concessions.[910] More importantly, it was the Russian and British governments which influenced the choice of members who made up the Iranian cabinets. The foreign powers were able to take advantage of the adverse situation in Iran and increased their influence in the country.

Concessions favourable to the Russian and British governments were evident. On 24 January 1914 Russia signed an agreement with the Iranian government to build the Jolfa-Tabriz railroad. The project began in June 1914 and was completed on 21 February 1915.[911] This 147-kilometre railway connected Tabriz directly to Jolfa on the Russian border and facilitated Russian transportation into Azerbaijan province. At the same time, the British were increasing their influence in southern Iran and particularly in the Persian Gulf area, eager to expand the newly established Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and paid little attention to Russian activities in other parts of Iran.[912] The British were also able to obtain the concession for building the railway from Mohamareh (later known as Khoramshahr) to Khoramabad.[913] Britain's main objective was to maintain its alliance with Russia and France against Germany, Austria and Italy. These examples show that the independence of Iran was only nominal and, in reality, the central Iranian government held little power. As Taqizadeh has put it, the British and Russians robbed the Iranian State of her sovereign rights, "reducing her to a helpless dependent obeying their orders".[914]

[910] Mansoureh Ettehadieh, *Ahzab-e Siyasi dar Majles-e Sevvom* [The Political Parties of the Second Parliament] (Tehran: Nashr-e Tarikh-e Iran, 1992), 20.

[911] For more about the conditions of the concession see: Townley to Grey, telegram, 11 February 1913, in *Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Persia: in Continuation of Persia, No. 5 (1912), Cd. 6264* (London: H.M.S.O., 1913), 308.

[912] At the beginning of the Great War, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was of great importance with assets of 4 million Pounds Sterling, more than half of which belonged to the British. The management of the company was with two Britons who had total control over all matters. Aryanpour, 2: 199.

[913] 'Aqeli, ed., *Nakhost Vaziran-e Iran*, 148-9.

[914] Taqizadeh, "The History of Modern Iran: Lectures Given in Colombia University," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh* [The Essays of Taqizadeh] (Tehran: Shokofan, 1979), 8: 223.

Subjected to these concessions and the political, financial and military instability of the country, the general atmosphere in Iran was one of dismay and a strong feeling of hopelessness. On 14 July 1914, three weeks before the outbreak of the Great War, Naser al-Molk prepared in haste for the coronation of the young Shah who had just turned 18.[915] The fact that the Parliament was closed was an added obstacle since according to article 39 of the supplement to the 1906 Constitution, no-one could be crowned monarch without previously having attended parliament and sworn an oath there. This pressed further the necessity of the reopening the Parliament.

**7:2 The Third Parliament**

On 4 December 1914, the Third Parliament was convened.[916] Mostufi al-Mamalek, renowned for his neutral stance, was introduced to the Parliament. Mostufi, in the absence of a parliament, had been carrying out the role of Prime Minister since 18 August 1914. Preparations for the election had been made by the previous Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali ‘Ala al-Saltaneh, whose moves towards the reopening of the Parliament were supported by the British. The British were in favour of the Parliament’s reopening since in the absence of a parliament the Russian influence in Iran had increased.[917] In Azerbaijan no elections were held as its Russian assigned governor, Samad Khan, did not permit elections. Consequently, there were no members representing Azerbaijan in the Third Parliament.[918] During the elections, the two major political parties of the previous parliament began their campaign. The government was concerned about the Democrats and clandestinely assisted the Moderates. The Russians were also against the Democrats and favoured the Moderates. Despite this, the Democrats managed to win a large number of seats.[919] According to Mohammad Taqi Bahar, the Democrats won 31 seats, the Moderates 29, a group called Heyat-e ‘Elmieh 14 seats and 20 seats went to independent members who sided with the Democrats. [920] The Jews, Armenians and Zoroastrians were allowed to have their

[915] This was according to the lunar calendar and he was, in fact, younger than 18.
[916] Hassan Taqizadeh, *Mokhtasar Tarikh-e Majles-e Iran* [A Concise History of the Iranian Parliament] (Berlin: Kaviani, 1918), 24.
[917] Ettehadieh, *Majles va Entekhabat*, 158-9.
[918] Ettehadieh, *Ahzab-e Siyasi dar Majles-e Sevoum*, 9.
[919] Malekzadeh, 6-7: 1619.
[920] Bahar, 14.

representatives as well.[921] Taqizadeh and Navab were elected as representatives of Tehran but their whereabouts was not known.[922] In the end, they did not actually attend parliament. It may have been their preference not to attend, according to some documents.[923] Since Taqizadeh had already begun working with the Germans and as the internal situation of Iran was not favourable, he had decided to stay abroad.[924] At the request of Taqizadeh, Navab was also sent to head the Iranian Embassy in Berlin and officially received by the Kaiser on 12 January 1916.[925] At this point Taqizadeh and his Democrat friends were convinced that the destiny of Iran was bound to the war and what was happening internationally. Furthermore, now with the increased intervention and military presence of the Russians in the internal affairs of Iran, Taqizadeh, with his strong anti-Russian sentiment, would not have been able to fight against Russian domination from within Iran.

Although living in Berlin, Taqizadeh had kept himself fully informed about the situation back in Iran.[926] From Berlin Taqizadeh sent some representatives to establish connections with the Democrats and managed to exert influence on both the Democrats in parliament and on officers of the gendarmerie. Solayman Mirza was the leader of the Democrat Party at this time. With the opening of the Third Parliament the foreign powers, Russia, Britain and Germany, began to lobby parliament by contacting parliament members. The Germans, in particular, had approached leaders of the Democrat Party, hoping to lay the groundwork for convincing parliament to vote against Iran's neutral stance in the Great War.[927] Meanwhile Ahmad Mirza was crowned Shah on 21 July 1914, not yet prepared to play his role as a confident ruler who might unite the country. Shortly after Ahmad Mirza's coronation the regent, Naser al-Molk, immediately left for Europe. People had hoped he would solve all the problems. However, unsuccessful in doing so, he fled the country,

[921] For detailed information about the number of members of parliament see: *Mokhtasar Tarikh-e Majles-e Iran* (Berlin: Kaviani, 1918).
[922] Baqer Kazemi, 1: 483.
[923] Hossein Qoli Navab to Taqizadeh, 25 September 1915 in *Nameh-hay-e Tehran* [Tehran Letters], ed., Iraj Afshar, (Tehran: Farzan, 2006), 122-3.
[924] Mojtehedi, 194.
[925] *Kaveh*, January 24, 1916.
[926] Taqizadeh, "The History of Modern Iran: Lectures given in Colombia University" in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 8: 222.
[927] Sepher, 47.

leaving it in a critical situation. The burden of responsibility now rested on the shoulders of the young, inexperienced Ahmad Shah.

### 7:3 The Escalation of the War

Like Iran, pro-German sentiment in Ottoman Turkey was also rife. Following a coup d'état in Ottoman Turkey in January 1913 this greater pro-German sentiment in Istanbul was led by the German-trained Minister of War and son-in-law of the last Sultan, Anvar Pasha. Three months later, Ottoman Turkey joined the war on the German side and Anvar planned for the Sultan to declare a jihad, or holy war, against Britain. Anvar Pasha believed that by uniting with the Germans, the Ottomans still had some hope to stop the disintegration of their empire.[928] The copies of the proclamation of the jihad were forwarded to Berlin for translation and use in propaganda flyers to be distributed among Muslim troops in the forces fighting against Germany and its allies. The jihad called upon Muslims everywhere to rise up and slay their Christian oppressors, and was transmitted through a network of Muslim clerics, assisted by Turkish, German, and Indian agents. The German Foreign Office was hopeful that the Sultan's actions would awaken the power of Islam and encourage a sweeping revolution in India.[929] This propaganda was also widely spread throughout Iran, though it had little effect.[930] Later, seeking advice on religious matters from Shia clergy, the pro-German Iranians requested clarification concerning the position of Muslims who helped allied countries. The response from two leading Shia clergymen was that aiding infidels such as the British, Russians or French was a step towards the elimination of the religion of God and a sin.[931] In short, as Taqizadeh noted: "The ground was very favourable for Germany at that time as far as public opinion was concerned." [932]

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[928] Touraj Atabaki, "Going East: The Ottomans' Secret Service Activities in Iran," in *Iran and the First World War*, ed., Atabaki, 29.

[929] Thomas L. Hughes, "The German Mission to Afghanistan 1915-1916" in *German Studies Review* 25, no. 3 (Oct., 2002), 450. Accessed 15 May, 2008. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1432596.

[930] Mahmoud Ashrafzadeh to Taqizadeh, 10 June 1915, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 402.

[931] *Kaveh*, February 29, 1916.

[932] "The History of Modern Iran: Lectures given in Colombia University," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 8: 221.

With the Ottoman Empire's involvement in the war against the Allies, fighting spread further towards the east and the battle which had begun in Europe now escalated into a war on a global scale. Geographically sandwiched between Russia and the Ottomans, Iran was in danger of becoming a battlefield. On November 1, 1914, Ahmad Shah proclaimed Iran's neutrality whilst in the new parliament the Democrats and the Moderates held strongly opposing views about the war. The Democrats believed that, like Ottoman Turkey, Iran should enter the war in support of Germany with the hope that this support would ensure the independence of Iran. In contrast, the Moderates argued that since the Russians and the British were already present in Iran, it was better to continue with a policy of neutrality. Mostufi al-Mamalek was also endeavouring to maintain neutrality. Eventually the Third Parliament confirmed the neutrality of Iran in the war, supporting the Shah's decision. But, as will become evident, this neutrality was not respected, and Iran became a battlefield for the countries involved. According to international law, if a country at war had troops present in another country, that country's neutrality could not be maintained legally. In the case of Iran, Russia had had a military presence there for some time and thus Iran could not remain neutral and was destined to become a battleground and face the adverse consequences of war.

### 7:4 The Committee of Iranian Nationalists in Berlin

As noted in the previous chapter, following the outbreak of the Great War, the German policy was to stir up trouble for the British in the East, particularly in India. Their aim was to use the Iranian politicians and activists who had fled Iran following the Russian Ultimatum and the Closure of the Second Parliament, many of whom were living in Switzerland, France, Britain, Germany and the United States. Taqizadeh, who was living in the United States at the time, was considered the most suitable to bring together these forces. He was asked to come to Berlin and, with the agreement of the German Foreign Ministry, was put in charge of inviting the Iranians living in Europe to Berlin. Immediately upon his arrival in Berlin Taqizadeh embarked on his plan to help the Germans increase their influence in the East and stir up trouble for the allies. He invited his friends and other like-minded people from various countries to Berlin with the plan of forming a committee. Taqizadeh noted that he hoped to gather together the very best of the noble and patriotic

Iranian diaspora from every corner of Europe.[933] Existing members of the committee would be responsible for contacting nominees outside Germany to assess whether they were indeed willing to sacrifice themselves for the greater good of the country and follow the committee's orders without question. [934]

Since the invited people were from a broad political spectrum and individual negotiations were challenging, the Germans decided to form a committee to try to come to a consensus on how to move forward. Taqizadeh agreed to this. A similar Indian committee had previously been formed. This new group in Berlin was named "The Committee of Iranian Nationalists in Berlin". Although Taqizadeh was the most suitable person, Mirza Mostafa Khan Safa al-Mamalek, the Iranian minister in Austria, was put in charge of the committee. On 7 March 1915, Taqizadeh put forward the program of the newly established committee to the German Foreign Ministry. The Committee was set to unite the Iranian nationalists and, with the support of Germany and German allies, hoped to free the country from the grip of its enemies. In order to implement this goal, before anything else, groups needed to be sent to Istanbul, Baghdad, Tehran and Shiraz to propagate the ideas and prepare the ground for the formation of a pro-German government, to attract the support of the gendarmerie and to establish links with the German Legation in Tehran. In return, the Iranian Committee demanded that the independence and sovereignty of Iran be recognised by the German, Austrian and Ottoman governments. They also requested financial and armed support to help them achieve their goals.[935] After making clear the duties expected of them, some were dispatched by Taqizadeh to Iran and the neighbouring Ottoman Empire to help the Germans there. The Germans' goal was to facilitate the military progress of German troops in Asia with the help of Indian, Iranian and Afghan nationalists. They were of the belief that a strong German presence in Asia would keep Russian and British troops in Asia occupied. Initially the German plan was to send a group through Iran. However, they later changed the plan, sending an independent group to sabotage the British oil infrastructure in the south of Iran, spreading propaganda throughout the Shia holy cities and instigating religious decrees against the Russians and British. The Germans were also

[933] Taqizadeh, "Seyyed Mohammad Ali Jamalzadeh," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 2: 134.
[934] Jamalzadeh, "Taqizadeh," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 213.
[935] Gehrke, 1: 156-7.

stirring up unrest among the tribes in cities such as Bushehr, Isfahan and Kermanshah.[936] One of the key goals of the Committee of Iranian Nationalists in Berlin was to assist the Germans in inciting the tribes of Iran to fight against Russia and Britain.[937] In order to encourage the Iranians to sympathise with the German side rather than with Britain and Russia, the German agents active in Iran went as far as claiming that they had converted to Islam and that all Germans would soon become Muslim. This was a similar strategy to that employed by Napoleon Bonaparte in Egypt a hundred years earlier.[938] A telegraph sent by the *Kaveh* administration to the Kaiser, congratulating him on his birthday, demonstrates that Taqizadeh and his colleagues perceived the Kaiser as "the supporter of the Islamic world" and considered him as the lucky star who would help Iranians save the ancient country of Cyrus the Great.[939]

According to Jamalzadeh, the Berlin Committee were independent and received little financial aid from the Germans.[940] But despite this, Taqizadeh was at this point totally dependent on the Germans and unable to leave Germany easily now that the Germans had shared information with him. Anything that Taqizadeh and his friends planned to publish had to pass the censorship of the Germans.[941]



Figure 12: Taqizadeh (first from right, standing) in Berlin (open source)

[936] For more about this see: W. Griesinger, *German intrigues in Persia, the diary of a German agent, the Niedermayer expedition through Persia to Afghanistan and India* (London: Hodder, 1918).
[937] Jamalzadeh, "Taqizadeh," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 224.
[938] Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 629.
[939] *Kaveh*, February15, 1917.
[940] Jamalzadeh, "Man: Jamalzadeh Darbareh-e Taqizadeh Shahadat Midaham," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 46.
[941] Ilse Itscherenska, "Taqizadeh dar Alman-e Qeysari [Taqizadeh in Imperial Germany]," in *Iran Nameh* 21, nos. 1–2 (2003).

### 7:5 The Migration and Provisional Government

As already discussed, the Democrats were sympathetic towards the Germans. Taqizadeh did not only sympathise ideologically; once again we see here that he instigated practical ways in which his hopes for the future of Iran could be realised. This time, whilst in Berlin, his decision to send envoys to negotiate with the Democrat Committee in Tehran was the first concrete move towards an Iranian alliance with Germany.

The pro-German activities led by the Democrats were not hidden from the British and Russians. In October 1915, the Russians and British were informed that the Iranian government formed by Mostufi al-Mamalek was pro-German and had signed a clandestine agreement with them. Towards the end of October, a large number of Russian troops marched from Qazvin towards the capital. They officially declared that in order to prevent interventions by the Germans and their allies they would take over the capital. On 11 November 1915, a group of Democrat parliament members, journalists and influential politicians departed from Tehran and established the National Defence Committee in Qom.[942] As Russian troops were approaching Tehran, Ahmad Shah decided on 15 November to leave Tehran and relocate the capital. The Members of Parliament were also officially informed that they were to accompany the Shah. On the morning of the same day, many politicians and high-ranking government officials were busy preparing to leave Tehran for Qom. Just at the moment that Ahmad Shah was to leave Tehran, a representative of Russia and Britain informed him that the troops would not in fact enter the capital but would stay in Karaj, 50 km away. The Shah was finally convinced to stay in Tehran. But a large number of parliament members and other influential people had already left and stayed in Qom, 120 km away, joining the National Defence Committee. As this was happening a large section of the gendarmerie forces were positioned between Tehran and Qom in a place called Hassan Abad. On 19 December, with the Russian troops approaching, the National Committee moved to Kashan and then four days later to Isfahan

[942] For a more comprehensive list of names of people who joined the movement see: Abd al-Hossein Sheybani, "Asami-e Mellion Mohajer," in *Khaterat–e Mohajerat: Az Dolat-e Movaqqat-e Kermanshah ta Komiteh-e Mellion-e Mohajer* [Migration Memoirs: From the Provisional Government of Kermanshah to the National Committee of Migrants], eds. Iraj Afshar and Kaveh Bayat (Tehran: Shirazeh, 1999), 708-9.

and finally to Kermanshah.[943] In Isfahan, the National Defence Committee's name was changed to the Iranian Provincial Government.[944] Meanwhile Nezam al-Saltaneh Mafi, the governor of Lorestan and Arabestan (later known as Khozestan), joined the movement with his forces and, on 6 January 1916, became the commander of the Iranian national forces. The Russian forces, who had by now captured Qom, marched towards Isfahan and Kermanshah and succeeded in taking Kermanshah on 24 February, 1916 and Isfahan on 19 March, 1916.[945] The national forces and their leaders were now forced to move to Qasr-e Shirin.[946] At the same time, in 1916 the British established a local force, the South Persia Rifles, under the command of Sir Percy Sykes. By late 1917 the British controlled the south of the country.[947]

Figure13: The Provincial Government Cabinet from right to left: Ardalan, Minister of Agriculture; Farzin; Minister of Finance; Sam'ai, Minister of the Interior; Nezam al-Saltaneh, the interim head of the cabinet and the Minister of War; Modarres, Minister of Justice; Mafi, Deputy Foreign Minister; Qasem Sur-e Esrafil, Minister of Post and Telegraphs.

With the departure of many parliament members, the Parliament was closed the same day and the constitutionalists scattered outside of Tehran; the Shah and the government in Tehran were now surrounded by Russian forces. On 24 December 1915, Mostufi's cabinet

[943] *Kaveh*, February 15, 1917.
[944] Touraj Atabaki, "The First World War, Great Power Rivalries and the Emergence of a Political Community in Iran," in *Iran and the First World War*, ed., Atabaki, 3.
[945] Mohammad Qazvini, *Yaddasht-hay-e Qazvini* [Qazvini's Notes], ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: 'Elmi, 1984), 9-10: 180.
[946] *Kaveh*, February 15, 1917.
[947] Keddie, *Modern Iran,* 74.

was dissolved and Farmanfarma, who was renowned for acting leniently towards Russia and Britain, took power. The Russians, however, did not find him very favourable and he resigned on March 1916 and the government was handed to Mohammad Vali Tonkaboni (Sepahdar). This was nominal and the Russians and British, in fact, had complete control. The financial situation of Iran during this period was worse than ever and the treasury was empty. The salary of the employees and military personnel had not been paid for a year. Sepahdar asked the British for assistance in order to secure on account money on a monthly basis. The British government agreed to pay 200,000 Toman every month and in return demanded that the financial and military affairs of the country be under British and Russian supervision. Sepahdar signed the agreement under "force majeure". The British and Russians also asked for the formation of an Iranian armed force of eleven thousand under the supervision of the British officers in the south of Iran with an increase to the same number of Cossack soldiers in the Northern provinces.[948] This acceptance of British supervision would pave the way for the 1919 Anglo-Iranian agreement.

With the taking of Hamadan by the Ottomans, Sepahdar privately accepted the advice of the Russians and British and resigned on 12 July, 1916.[949] Hassan Vosouq al-Dowleh then formed his cabinet before autumn. The Iranian government at this time had no power to make decisions independently and, in the absence of any parliament, no laws could be legally approved.[950] Following Sepahdar, Vosouq al-Dowleh took office as Prime Minister. The challenging issue for Vosouq was the presence of the German forces on Iranian territory. He ordered the initiation of the Fourth Parliament's elections and provided finance for it which was distributed to the governors. During this period Mohammad Khiyabani in Azerbaijan was preparing the ground for his revolt in Azerbaijan. He had reinforced the Democrat Party there and was publishing the *Tajaddod* [Modernity] newspaper in Tabriz. During Vosouq's tenure, sweeping changes were taking place in Russia which eventually culminated in the Russian Revolution of 1917. The situation in Russia led Vosouq to send a committee to monitor the situation there and assess the possibility of a new agreement with Russia. Seyyed Zi'a the editor of the *Ra'd* [Thunder]

[948] *Kaveh*, April 15, 1917.
[949] *Kaveh*, February 15, 1917.
[950] 'Aqeli, ed., *Nakhost Vaziran-e Iran*, 200-2.

newspaper was assigned as head of this group. His reports from Russia to the Foreign Ministry put Iran in a favourable position following the Russian Revolution.[951]

The Ottoman troops had entered Iranian territory from the western borders with the justification that Russians troops already had a presence in Iran. The Ottoman involvement caused a series of bloody clashes between the ethnic groups living in the southwest of Iran and Azerbaijan province.[952] The reports sent to Taqizadeh from the field detailed the treatment by the Ottomans of the people of Iran, especially those in Azerbaijan. Looting and the extracting of money by force had turned people against the Ottoman forces and there had also been disagreements with the Germans over some issues.[953] The Ottomans opposed any direct connection between Iranians and Germans; this was one of the biggest sticking points. The Ottomans were adamant that the Caliph in Istanbul should be the sole spokesman of the Islamic world.[954] The Ottoman's pan-Islamism was now shifting to more of a focus on pan-Turkism, aiming to make Iranian Turkish-speaking Azerbaijan province part of their empire, ensuring that any connection with the Germans would be broken. Iranian nationalists had hoped that an alliance with foreign forces might lead to a more independent Iran; they soon realised, however, that this was not in fact the case.[955] The pan-Islamic policy was not successful either and there was fear that it could ignite a religious conflict between the mostly Shia Iranians and the Sunni Ottomans.[956] After the end of the Great War, as Hossein Kazemzadeh one of Taqizadeh's colleagues in Berlin wrote, the Ottoman leadership's main goals were politically rather than religiously motivated; they aimed to expand further the Ottoman Empire rather than focus on the unification of the Muslim world through policies of pan-Islamism and the unity of Islam.[957]

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[951] Ibid., 212-3.

[952] For more about the ethnic and religious conflicts in Azerbaijan during this period see: Atabaki, *Azerbaijan*.

[953] Mahmoud Ashrafzadeh to Taqizadeh, 10 June 1915 in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 402. Also see: Dolatabadi, 4:80.

[954] Yekani, "Zendegani-e Taqizadeh," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 265.

[955] For more about Pan-Turkism see: Touraj Atabaki, "Pan-Turkism and Iranian Nationalism," in *Iran and the First World War*, ed., Atabaki, 121-36. Also: Kaveh Bayat, *Pan-Turkism va Iran* [Pan-Turkism and Iran] (Tehran: Shirazeh, 2008).

[956] Dolatabadi, 4: 35.

[957] *Iranshahr*, 16 January 1924.

Meanwhile, in co-operation with the Ottomans and Iranian nationalists, the Germans were stirring up trouble in other parts of Iran. In order to successfully carry out their operations in the region and particularly in Iran, the Germans were heavily dependent on information from the Committee of Iranian Nationalists directed by Taqizadeh in Berlin. The envoys Taqizadeh had sent from Berlin to the region were travelling with the nationalist forces and were responsible for mediating between the German, Ottoman and Iranian forces. They informed Taqizadeh of developments by letter and received instructions from Berlin. As Mansoureh Ettehadieh has noted, the Berlin Committee was "often out of touch with reality in Iran and was influenced by the policies of individual members who did not always see eye to eye with the leaders of the movement."[958] According to remaining correspondence, the men that Taqizadeh had chosen for the mission were not always in full agreement and often openly criticised each other. [959] Reports from the region sent to Taqizadeh, as well as outlining the situation, also detail the reasons why the mission of the Berlin Committee was unsuccessful. For example, Jamalzadeh in his report to Taqizadeh emphasises the flaws of Nezam al-Saltaneh as commander of the Iranian forces, his mistakes and his insatiable greed and also comments on Nezam al-Saltaneh's inability to meet the expectations of the Berlin Committee. He further comments on the disagreement between Nezam al-Saltaneh and Heydar Khan Amoghlou and other members of the Democrat and Moderate Party. Jamalzadeh's report from Baghdad also reveals more about the reasons for the failures of the Berlin Committee's mission. He describes the reasons for the military defeats of the Iranian united forces as a lack of united commandership and mentions that Nezam al-Saltaneh had insufficient military authority to effectively organise matters. In addition, according to Jamalzadeh, the Swedish officers of the gendarmerie had orders from their governments to avoid becoming embroiled in combat with the Russians.[960]

[958] Mansoureh Ettehadieh, "The Iranian Provincial Government," in *Iran and the First World War*, ed., Atabaki, 10.

[959] In a letter to Taqizadeh Ashrafzadeh writes: "My friends are good and obedient but they are very young and inexperienced. In general, they act like children and lack any gravity. Thus, working with them will be very challenging. Mr. Ravandi is the manifestation of idleness and acts like a gentleman at large. S'ad al-Allah Khan is more efficient but unfortunately Eastern people still think he is rather effeminate…. If two serious and hardworking people are not sent to Shiraz, we will achieve very little. Mahmoud Ashrafzadeh to Taqizadeh, 10 June 1915, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 401.

[960] Jamalzadeh to the German Foreign Ministry, Baghdad, 3 June, 1916 in Gehrke, 2: 957.

The political turmoil of that period has been evidenced above. Taqizadeh, though fully aware of the political issues, turned his focus during this period to the publication of the journal *Kaveh.* This publication, which he edited, would become the lynchpin of his attempts to encourage resistance to the British and Russians. Now, rather than using direct political channels, Taqizadeh would utilise a more subtle approach, employing propaganda journalism and focussing on cultural activities.

***Kaveh***

One of the major activities of Taqizadeh during his residence in Berlin was the publication in Persian of the political and cultural journal *Kaveh*, which would later serve as a model of an avantgarde publication for future Persian writers and journalists.[961] From an early age Taqizadeh had been interested in the press as a vehicle for the promulgating of modern ideas among ordinary people. He had previously tried his hand at journalism by publishing *Ganjineh-e Fonon* in Tabriz. Later he supported *Iran-e Now* as the official publication of the Democrat Party. As reflected in his personal correspondence and writings, throughout his life he was an avid reader of the foreign press as well as that published in Iran. From a young age he had been especially interested in the ideas of Malkam Khan and, in particular *Qanun,* the paper he had begun publishing in London in 1890 and had collected all Malkam Khan's writings. As Ali Ansari has stated, *Qanun*, which had greatly influenced Taqizadeh, could be considered as the forerunner of *Kaveh*.[962] Taqizadeh had also written articles for various other newspapers. All of these formative experiences had prepared Taqizadeh well for his decision to publish another newspaper. Germany, a country where there was freedom from censorship or criticism by conservative religious groups, provided a milieu suitable for the publication of Taqizadeh's new journal. After his arrival in Germany, proposals were outlined for a forthcoming Persian journal. Oscar Mann presented a letter written in German explaining the format to the German authorities, the contents of the articles and the publication's objectives.[963] It is not clear

[961] Sepher, 47.

[962] A. M. Ansari, "Taqizadeh and European Civilisation", 52.

[963] Oscar Mann (18/09/1867- 05/12/1917) was a specialist in Iranian languages and in particular Kurdish. According to Taqizadeh, he greatly helped the Iranian nationalists in Berlin and supported the publication of *Kaveh*. See: *Kaveh*, January 1, 1917.

how much of the detail was suggested by Taqizadeh and his Iranian friends and how much by the German officials with whom Taqizadeh wanted to work. But the journal initially was subject to the stipulations of the Germans and was to act as a vehicle for German propaganda.[964]

As the publishing costs were initially covered by the Germans, Taqizadeh avoided the financial worries which had previously hindered his attempts to launch and publish an earlier paper. The situation in Iran and the fact that many highly regarded Iranian writers and intellectuals were living in exile in Europe provided him the opportunity to invite these individuals to participate in the establishment of his new journal, *Kaveh*.

The first issue of *Kaveh* was published on 24 January 1916, almost exactly one year after Taqizadeh's arrival in Berlin in January 1915. Unlike other newspapers, which usually only used the lunar date together with the Christian date, *Kaveh* also added the Solar Iranian calendar date on its front page.[965] Ansari has highlighted the importance of this, arguing that Taqizadeh as a scholar of calendars was conscious of the importance of distinctive calendars for distinguishing civilisations.[966] The title of the journal, *Kaveh,* which was named after the ancient Iranian mythological figure of the same name, was published with an editorial which emphasised Iranian identity and an explanation for the choice of the name Kaveh; Kaveh was a mythological blacksmith who revolted against the bloodthirsty, tyrant king Zahak, who was of Arab origin, and overthrew him with public help. As Afshin Marashi has argued: "The combination of a popularizing tone and a new nationalist sentiment is best represented in the selection of Kaveh as the name of the newspaper."[967]

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[964] Keivandokht Ghahari, *Nationalismus und Modernismus in Iran in der Periode zwischen dem Zerfall der Qagaren-Dynastie und der Machtergreifung Reza Schah: Eine Untersuchung über die intellektuellen Kreise um die Zeitschriften Kaweh, Iransahr und Ayandeh* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2001), 48-9.

[965] Later in 1924 Taqizadeh played an important role in changing the official calendar of Iran from the Islamic lunar calendar to the solar Iranian one. See: Baqer Kazemi, 2: 316. Taqizadeh was also one of the first who proposed using the solar Islamic calendar in order to prevent the domination of The Gregorian calendar in Iran. He also suggested using the Persian word "gahnameh" instead of the Arabic word "taqvim" for calendar. See: *Kaveh*, April 10, 1921.

For more about Taqizadeh's research on calendars see: S. H. Taqizadeh, "The Old Iranian Calendars Again," *in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 14, no. 3, Studies Presented to Vladimir Minorsky by His Colleagues and Friends (1952), 603-611.

[966] Ansari, *The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran*, 58.

[967] Marashi, 78.

Ansari, discussing Taqizadeh and his decision to allude to the myth of Kaveh, notes that: "Myth had its uses, not only in terms of political mobilization but crucially in educating the public in the virtues of patriotism and civil duty". [968]

*Kaveh's* activities can be divided into two separate periods; the first period ending after 52 issues on 15 August, 1919. The main goal of the first period of the publication was to spread news of the war and the victories of the Germans and make public Russian and British "crimes". It also included news of the activities of the Committee of Iranian Nationalists in Berlin and the Iranian Provisional Government which was formed during the war. At the same time the newspaper praised Germany as the saviour of the Iranian people and Islamic world.[969] Taqizadeh describes *Kaveh* as a "pro-German political journal which, with German support, worked for the independence of Iran."[970] During the war young people in Tehran paid special attention to this newspaper.[971]

In the editorial of the first issue, Taqizadeh explained about the opportunity that the Great War could provide for Iranians to rid themselves of their old enemies, Russia and Britain; two countries which for a long time had been hindering the development of Iran and had stymied Iran's independence. This editorial is also significant since it reflects Taqizadeh's opinions on the war and his political stance regarding Iran and its position in an international setting. Taqizadeh emphasised that Russia and Britain had little respect for Iran and indeed even pitied the country. He suggests that as Russia and Britain were now at war with Germany, Iranians should side with the Germans. This, he believed, was the only way to maintain the independence of Iran and whoever thought Iran should remain neutral or sided with the allies was in fact betraying the country. He then posited that the Great War was the last chance for Iranians to take revenge on their enemies and save their country. The aim he specified for *Kaveh* was to inform Iranians of the situation and to voice the opinion of Iranian expats who lived in Berlin. The tone of the editorial is nationalistic

[968] Ansari, *The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran*, 55.
[969] Jamshid Behnam, Berlaniha: Andishmandan-e Irani dar Berlan [Berliners: Iranian Intellectuals in Berlin] (Tehran: Farzan, 2000), 39.
[970] Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 163.
[971] Saeid Nafisi, *Khaterat-e Siyasi, Adabi, Javani be Ravayat-e Saeid Nafisi* [Literary and Political Memoirs], ed., Alireza E'tesam (Tehran: Nashr-e Markaz, 2002), 149.

and begins with a line from Ferdowsi's *Shahnameh* [The Book of Kings]. In building up his argument, Taqizadeh frequently makes reference to the past in order to emphasise a historical unity for Iran by including references to certain places which had glorious connotations such as Ecbatana, capital of the ancient Persian kings, and Isfahan, the capital of the Safavid kings.[972] By writing that the "savage Russians" were "scattered throughout the country of Cyrus and Darius (pre-Islamic kings) and S'adi and Nezami (poets of the Islamic period)", Taqizadeh strives to galvanise and unite Iranians by addressing their nationalistic pride. He continues by detailing how the Russians were violating and trampling upon all which was sacred for the Iranian nation, their national principals, religious rules, customs and honour and all this while the worried eyes of ten million noble Iranians, descendants of Nadir Shah, seemingly witnessed the situation with indifference.

Taqizadeh who was in contact with European orientalists and had read their works knew the importance of the pre-Islamic Iran in the eyes of Western scholars.[973] Hoping to ignite a sense of pride in the ordinary people, Taqizadeh emphasised this period of Iranian history. Here it should be mentioned that until the end of the nineteenth century Iranians knew little about the pre-Islamic history of Iran. Among the sources in Persian which introduced this period and which was widely read or narrated was the *Shahnameh,* a mixture of myth and historical stories. As Mohammad Taqi Bahar has noted, their literature, referring to Persian literature, was the only thing that Iranians could be proud of.[974] As Marashi has rightly commented about Taqizadeh's introduction in the inaugural issue of *Kaveh*:

> His language also highlights a new set of global assumptions being brought graphically into focus by the war. The new world that Taqizadeh saw around him was a world of nation-states engaged in a global competition of

[972] For more about Taqizadeh's writings on *Shahnameh*, see: Afshin Marashi, "The Nation's Poet: Ferdowsi and the Iranian National Imagination*,"* in *Iran in the 20th Century*, ed., Atabaki, 93-111.

[973] According to Iraj Afshar, at that time *Kaveh* was the first Persian publication of its kind which published reviews and critiques of European books and introduced to Iranians some reputable books on Iran written by orientalists. These reviews were mostly written by Jamalzadeh. *Kaveh* also published the translations of some articles and book chapters by orientalists with the aim of familiarising Iranians with the empirical research method practised in Europe. Iraj Afshar, "Moqaddameh bar Chap-e Dovvom-e *Kaveh* [Introduction to the Second Edition of *Kaveh*]," in Taqizadeh, *Tufani* ('Elmi), 485.

[974] *Nobahar*, 30 May 1923.

> national-assertion and political independence. He believed that people must claim identification with a particular nation-state on this global stage and show concern "for their own nation". It was the tangible reality of the war that brought this set of assumptions into focus for Taqizadeh.[975]

All these concepts used by Taqizadeh in the editorial of *Kaveh* belong to a discourse that had been discussed by others in the past. But most importantly, Taqizadeh, at the opportune moment, managed to bring together, in a systematic way, several scattered nationalistic threads in this regularly published journal which targeted a wide audience. Putting to good use his broad knowledge of literature and culture garnered from his traditional education together with his understanding and experience of western political ideologies, Taqizadeh was well positioned to bring to the fore ideas that would be attractive to different groups of the Iranian populace; those who were proud of the country's heritage as well as those who were more open to the progressive modernity which was being practised in Europe. The Persian language became a unifying force, uniting disparate members of Iranian society under a common love for their national language. The notion of the *Shahnameh* as the national book of Iranians, which emphasised the importance of the Persian language, laid the foundations of the ideology of the modernisation of Iran and what came to be considered Iranian identity, especially during the first and second Pahlavi eras. As will be evident throughout Taqizadeh's later life, he continued to take opportunities to use elements of and allusions to Persian history and literature together with an emphasis on the Persian language, in the belief that these were the base materials necessary for the building of a national identity.

A substantial part of *Kaveh* was generally written by Taqizadeh himself under the pen name of Mohassel. Taqizadeh had his own particular style of prose and was not influenced by the old or contemporary styles. He was not afraid of elaborating extensively about the subjects he wrote. His prose stemmed from a combination of his religious upbringing, politics and scientific integrity. In writing he utilised many examples and his words were

[975] Marashi, 77.

chosen with care and precision according to the context.[976] Mohammad Qazvini (died 27 May 1949) also occasionally wrote articles for the publication usually under the title of *Akazib-e Mazhakeh* [Funny Lies]. From the 10th issue, 15 July 1916, Mohammad Ali Jamalzadeh also joined the group, contributing articles under the name of Shahrokh. Taqizadeh had a close bond with Qazvini and Jamalzadeh, both of whom he regarded highly. Taqizadeh believed Qazvini had no peer in Iran in literary and historical research. Qazvini is commonly referred to as the pioneer of the new empirical research methods used to analyse literary and historical texts in Iran. Jamalzadeh was the son of the famous Seyyed Jamal Va'ez, one of the prominent preachers of the Constitutional Revolution who was imprisoned and then poisoned in the aftermath of the bombardment of the Parliament. He worked closely with Taqizadeh during the period of the First Parliament. Jamalzadeh published his first book during his time working for *Kaveh* under the title of *Ganj-e Shayeghan ya Oza'-e Eqtesadi-e Iran* [The Worthy Treasure or the Economic Situation of Iran] with an introduction written by Taqizadeh. Other writers of *Kaveh* were Hossein Kazemzadeh Iranshahr, Reza Tarbiat, Esma'il Amirkhizi, Abol Hassan Hakimi and Ebrahim Pourdavoud.[977] The journal was to be published every two weeks but was, in fact, often only published once every two months and, towards the end, published only sporadically. At the end of the Great War with the defeat of Germany, financial aid from Germany ceased and publication of *Kaveh* was suspended.

[976] Afshar, "Marg-e Taqizadeh na Karist Khord," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 150.

[977] Kazemzadeh was born in Tabriz. His father was a physician. Following his early education and having learned French he went to Istanbul where he stayed for six years. He then travelled to Belgium, France and Britain. In Belgium he supported the socialists. He also worked with Mohammad Qazvini. Kazemzadeh was in Cambridge working with Browne when he received the invitation from Taqizadeh to go to Berlin to work with him. He lived in Germany between 1915 and 1936, where he published six German books and founded *Iranshahr*, a magazine in Persian which was published between 1922 and 1926. See: Jamshid Behnam*, Berlaniha.*

Pourdavoud was born in Rasht and died in Tehran on 17 November 1968 at the age of 83. Being acquainted with Taqizadeh influenced him greatly and during his residence in Berlin made contact through Taqizadeh with many prominent German scholars who worked on the history of ancient Iran. He was particularly interested in the works of Josef Markwart, a German historian and orientalist, whom he met when he was working with Taqizadeh. Like Taqizadeh, he too married a German woman. His old friend Taqizadeh attended his funeral in a wheel chair some months before his own death. For more information see: Mahmoud Nikuyeh, ed., *Pourdavoud Pazhohandeh Rozegar-e Nakhost* [Pourdavoud: The Pioneering Researcher] (Rasht: Gilan, 1999).

*Kaveh* was a highly influential publication. Qazvini went so far as to write that a single issue of *Kaveh* benefitted Iran much more than all the years of work that Taqizadeh had put into advocating for the constitution.[978] Qazvini believed *Kaveh* was the highest quality and most comprehensive publication that had ever been produced by an Iranian.[979] Browne commented that no Persian newspaper was as good either in appearance or content.[980] People such as Naseh Nateq were of the opinion that the writings of Taqizadeh in *Kaveh* were of such great importance that he should avoid taking up any positions in the government which might later leave him open to criticism and he should instead continue publishing the journal. Ministerial or ambassadorial positions were easy to fill, whilst it was almost impossible to find people like Taqizadeh who could write such convincing articles as those he published in *Kaveh*. [981]

**7:6 Advisory Council for the Education of Iranian Students**

From the time he began his cultural and political activities in Tabriz, Taqizadeh believed strongly in the importance of education as a tool for the enlightenment of the people, allowing them access to modern ideas. As well as publishing his own newspaper he thus decided to open a school in Tabriz. Unfortunately for Taqizadeh, it was soon closed due to opposition from more conservative thinkers. Throughout various periods of his life, believing that education was a catalyst for change and progress and would eventually lead to the modernisation of Iran, whenever the opportunity arose Taqizadeh would propagate the importance of education, an importance that had also been highlighted by previous Iranian reformists. The Great War and Taqizadeh's collaboration with the Germans was one such opportunity.

During the years of the Great War, Taqizadeh and those who worked with him in Berlin paid special attention to the education of Iranian youth in Germany. This resulted in the

[978] Mohammad Qazvini to Taqizadeh, in *Nameh-hay-e Paris*: *Az Mohammad Qazvini be Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh* [Paris Letters: From *Mohammad Qazvini to Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh*] ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Qatreh, 2005, 42.

[979] Qazvini to Taqizadeh, in Ibid., 74.

[980] Browne to Taqizadeh, 6 June 1920, in *Nameh-hay-e Edward Browne be Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh*, eds., Zaryab and Afshar, 107.

[981] Naseh Nateq, "Darbareh-e Taqizadeh," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 194.

establishment of an advisory council to encourage and enable Iranian students to study in Germany.[982] According to Taqizadeh, before the outbreak of the war approximately 500 Iranian students had been studying abroad. More than 200 students chose France or the French part of Switzerland to continue their studies while the number of students in Britain was between 30 to 40, due to Britain's presence in countries bordering Iran.[983] Other students were scattered across various other countries. At this point the number of Iranian students in Germany was only about eight. Iranians had predominantly chosen to study in France because of the widespread use of the French language in Iran.[984] French had become particularly widespread in Iran following the trip of Naser al-Din Shah to France during which he committed to sending 50 Iranian students to various schools in France.

Taqizadeh, who himself had previously studied French language and culture, was aware of the differences between the German and French education.[985] He seemingly favoured the German system, encouraging more students to study in Germany. Aware of the rapid industrial achievements of Germany, Taqizadeh regarded the country as a beneficial place for Iranians to study. German education, with its focus on industrial and agricultural education, was advantageous, he believed, as expertise in these areas of study was needed to facilitate the modernisation of Iran. In contrast, Taqizadeh saw little benefit to Iran of Iranians studying Political Science or Law, which were the subjects mainly studied by the Iranian students in France.[986] Another reason for the Iranian nationalists to encourage German language and education was the importance that the German language had gained during the Great War. Abdol Hossein Sheybani (Vahid al-Molk), one of the prominent Iranian Democrats wrote, for instance, that learning German should be a priority and sought to abandon the English and French languages, the languages of Germany's foes.[987] Taqizadeh himself also began learning German intensively by hiring a private tutor.[988] Immersed in a German speaking environment and having a German fiancée must also have

[982] Beirat zur Ausbildung Persischer in Deutschland.
[983] *Kaveh*, March 15, 1918.
[984] *Kaveh*, March 15, 1918.
[985] As Taqizadeh mentioned in his autobiography, he studied French for 5 years in Tabriz. *Tufani*, 30.
[986] *Kaveh*, March 15, 1918.
[987] Abdol Hossein Sheybani, 147.
[988] Jamalzadeh, "Taqizadeh," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 226.

facilitated his mastery of the language. Taqizadeh envisaged a future positive relationship between Germany and Iran and hoped that Iranian graduates from Germany might facilitate a strong bond between the two nations.

During the war period the German government paid for a group of Iranian students to study in Germany. "The Advisory Council for the Education of Iranian Students" whose members were Germans and Iranians sent the Iranian students to different cities according to the subject they would study, each of them staying with a German family. In the spring of 1918, 11 students were settled in Germany with the help of this council. Taqizadeh's efforts were not fruitless. 'Ezz al-Mamalek Ardalan, for example, writes that he sent his two sons to study in Germany after seeing Taqizadeh's announcements in the newspapers stating that they would accept students to study in Germany for as little as 30 Toman a month.[989] Fattallah Akbar Sepahdar A'zam a former Prime Minister, encouraged by Taqizadeh's activities, also decided to send his son to study in Germany.[990] One of the tribal chieftains of Azerbaijan, Sardar 'Ashayer, had also decided to send his son to study in Germany through the council established by Taqizadeh.[991] These examples show the effectiveness of Taqizadeh and *Kaveh* in encouraging young Iranians to study in Germany. The fact that members of the elite were willing to send the expenses of their children directly to Taqizadeh also shows the degree of trust that they had in him.

Bozorg 'Alavi, the prominent contemporary Iranian writer, was one of the young students studying in Germany under the supervision of this council. One of his memoirs from his time there sheds more light on Taqizadeh's attitude towards European culture and highlights the fact that his insistence on following the European path towards modernisation was not readily accepted even by the students who were already studying in Germany. 'Alavi, whose father was a good friend of Taqizadeh, mentions that during conversations between Taqizadeh and some students, one student had voiced the opinion

[989] 'Ezz al-Mamalek Ardalan, *Khaterat-e 'Ezz al-Mamalek Ardalan*: *Zendegi dar Doran-e Shesh Padeshah* [Memoirs of *'Ezz al-Mamalek Ardalan*: Life in the Reign of Six Kings], ed., Baqer 'Aqeli (Tehran: Namak, 2004), 180-1.

[990] Fattallah Akbar Sepahdar to Taqizadeh, 27 October 1922, in *Nameh-hay-e Tehran*, ed., Afshar, 77-8.

[991] Mehdi Qoli Mokhber al-Saltaneh to Taqizadeh, 22 November 1921, in Ibid., 108-9.

that although Europe had benefitted from many advances, Europe was morally decadent; men and women kissed in public. Taqizadeh's reply, which shocked the students and had a profound influence on 'Alavi, was, "What is wrong if a girl and a boy love each other and have intimate relations with each other? That is not decadence." [992] This anecdotal narrative demonstrates Taqizadeh's social outlook influenced by liberalism and his respect for individualism.

From what we gather from 'Alavi's memoirs, many of the Iranian students who had gone to study in Germany, including 'Alavi himself, found themselves quite overwhelmed by the strict German discipline and lifestyle, in contrast to the Iranian way of life. Hence, organisations such as the council set up by Taqizadeh would have been a great benefit to the newly arrived youngsters, helping them to adapt and settle more easily in the European country. Unlike Taqizadeh, some members of the Berlin circle such as Mohammed Qazvini were against the idea of sending Iranian students to Europe. They believed that the European environment spoiled Iranians and considered it more beneficial to send European teachers to Iran.[993]

Following the defeat of Germany in the Great War, financial help from the German government stopped and, as a result, Taqizadeh requested that affluent Iranians help the Iranian students abroad and in particular those who wished to study in Germany. The defeat of the Germans did not alter Taqizadeh's opinion that Germany was an advantageous country in which to study for the Iranian students. In Taqizadeh's words, although Germany was disabled militarily, it was still the leading country for the study of scientific subjects. Taqizadeh argued that many students from Eastern countries also chose Germany to study for other reasons: one was the political neutrality of Germany in the affairs of Eastern countries; another was the fact that studying in Germany was cheaper than in the USA or other European countries.[994] By 1922, the number of Iranian students studying in

[992] Hamid Ahmadi, ed., *Khaterat-e Bozorg 'Alavi* [Memoirs of Bozorg 'Alavi] (Spånga: Baran, 1997), 72-3.

[993] Abdol Hossein Sheybani, 399.

[994] Taqizadeh, "Mohaselin-e Irani dar Alman [Iranian Students in Germany]", in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh: T'alim va Tarbiat*, ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Tus, 2013), 17: 27-34.

Germany had reached 70 of which about 45 were supervised by the Council for the Education of Iranian Students.[995] By the end of the same year this number had risen sharply to 120 students.[996] Taqizadeh felt so strongly about the importance of this opportunity for young Iranians to receive a European education that he sent his younger brother, Javad, from Berlin to Iran in order to promote the advantages of young students studying in Germany.[997]

Taqizadeh maintained this approach in later years and continued to actively encourage Iranians to benefit from a German education. A British diplomatic report notes that in 1924 Taqizadeh was "an active organiser" of the reopening of the German School in Tehran, facilitated by the Society of German Persian Schools in Tehran.[998] Having been exposed to the culture, customs and language of Russia or Britain through their educational experiences, Iranian politicians and statesmen were often categorised as either Russophile or Anglophile and thus favoured the country within whose educational system they had studied. Some, too, had studied in France. France had also increased its influence in Iran by sending missionaries and establishing schools which besides teaching the French language also propagated Christianity. All these countries had vested interests in Iran following their colonial histories. The extent of the influence of these nations in Iran is illustrated by Taqizadeh in his writings. For instance, he explains that before the Constitutional Revolution, Mozaffar al-Din Shah felt it necessary to employ not one but three physicians to oversee his health; an English one, a Russian and a French doctor. This, he comments, was to placate all three nations and avoid any one of them feeling that their influence in the Iranian court was less than that of the other countries.[999] Taqizadeh, aware of the politicians' bias towards these countries' involvement in Iranian affairs, hoped to present an alternative option. He aimed to reduce the influence of the colonial powers in Iran by pressing for students to study in Germany or within a German educational setting, rather than British, Russian or French. By promoting this more neutral alternative for study,

[995] *Iranshahr*, 24 August 1922.
[996] Ibid., 20 December 1922.
[997] Abol Hassan Hakimi to Taqizadeh, 10 July 1922, in *Nameh-hay-e Tehran*, ed., Afshar, 32.
[998] Lord D'Abernon, 28 May 1924, *TNA:* FO 371/10154.
[999] Taqizadeh, "Tarikh-e Avayel-e Enqelab va Mashrutiyat Iran," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 1: 310.

Taqizadeh hoped to limit the possible negative consequences that studying in a country with vested interests in Iran might bring to the modernisation of the country. Furthermore, sending students to be educated in Germany and then to return to Iran, bringing with them the modern ideas, was considered a strategy which would enhance the process of modernisation by putting into practice Taqizadeh's ideas of creating Iranians who were "inwardly and outwardly" European.[1000] Hossein Parviz, for example, was one of the people in Taqizadeh's circle of friends who believed that this approach to educating students abroad was a stepping stone towards the implementation of Taqizadeh's ideas.

After the consolidation of Reza Shah's power and establishment of a stronger central government, the government organised the sending of students abroad with a bursary. Whilst for Taqizadeh this was a positive step forward, he was of the opinion that there should also be some conditions placed on the students in order to qualify for the bursary. In his opinion, not only should the students be in general good health but he also outlines other conditions which he considered equally important and which highlight the fact that Taqizadeh was conscious of what he considered the uneven modernisation taking place across the country, in particular what he saw as the concerning trend of centre-periphery educational developments in Iran. Taqizadeh was one of the first to bring this issue to the fore. He reflected that it was crucial that an equal number of students were sent abroad to study from every province and mentioned that the provincial cities and Tabriz in particular were not treated equally compared to the capital, stating that the lack of schools in provinces must not be used as a pretext for granting fewer students from the provinces the opportunity to be sent to study abroad. He commented that no Iranian subject should be treated like a stepchild and demanded equal rights for everyone, even requesting that students from the provinces be given preferential treatment during the selection process since in some provinces Persian was not the dominant spoken language. This made it more difficult for those students to express themselves well in Persian and thus compete with Persian speaking students. Taqizadeh posited that these students should receive one year's

[1000]. See: Taqizadeh, "Tasavorati dar Bab-e Ferstadan-e Mohaselin be Oropa [Some Ideas about Sending Students to Europe]," in *Shafaq-e Sorkh*, February 30, 1928.

education in Tehran paid for by the government and suggested that at least 80 percent of the students granted the bursary should be chosen from the provinces.[1001]

### 7:7 Activities Outside Germany

During the Great War period, Taqizadeh made various trips in Europe including to Switzerland, Austria, Denmark and Sweden. These trips were often to promote the Iranian case in a wider international setting, publicising Russian and British interventions in Iranian affairs. British confidential reports, for example, shed light on the reason he had travelled to Switzerland and the outcome of the trip: "About May 1916, Taqi Zada [Taqizadeh] is believed to have visited Switzerland where he hoped with the aid of Indian revolutionaries, to stir up trouble in India, his efforts as regards Persia having more or less failed".[1002] A remaining letter from Taqizadeh to Mahmoud Afshar further evidences that Taqizadeh's trip to Switzerland had another purpose; to establish a newspaper in order to publish articles on the subject of Iran.[1003] In another note, Taqizadeh comments that the aim of his trip to Switzerland was to find enthusiastic Iranians to join the committee in Berlin. Indeed, Taqizadeh was traveling with the head of the Indian Committee who Taqizadeh describes as a highly intelligent and efficient character. This proves that, as stated in British reports, Taqizadeh still maintained close ties with the Indian Committee at this point.[1004]

As well as the British, the Germans were also closely monitoring Taqizadeh's movements. Taqizadeh's trips outside Germany had to be approved by the Germans and his movements were limited.[1005] Nevertheless, criticising the policy of Britain and Russia in international settings was in line with the policies of the Germans with whom Taqizadeh was co-operating and thus Taqizadeh's actions would have been welcomed.

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[1001] Hossein Parviz to Taqizadeh, 1 February 1923, in *Nameh-hay-e Tehran*, ed., Afshar, 81-5.
[1002] 7 June 1917 *TNA:* FO 371/3067.
[1003] Taqizadeh to Mahmoud Afshar, 14 December 1917, in *Nameh-hay-e Dustan* [Letters from Friends], ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Bonyad-e Moqofat-e Dr. Mahmoud Afshar, 1996), 71-4.
[1004] Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 320.
[1005] Ilse Itscherenska, "Taqizadeh dar Alman-e Qeysari [Taqizadeh in Imperial Germany]," in *Iran Nameh* 21, nos. 1–2 (spring–summer 2003).

It was an article published in the Danish newspaper, *Politiken*, defending the rights of Iran against Russian and British interference in Iran, which caught Taqizadeh's attention and was the reason for his trip to Denmark. The writer of the article was the famous Georg Brandes.[1006] Taqizadeh, realising how instrumental the well-known Brandes' work could be in influencing international public opinion, took the decision to go from Berlin to meet Brandes. Jamalzadeh recalls that Taqizadeh journeyed to Denmark in spite of the difficulties of wartime to further inform Brandes about Russian and British involvement in Iran. As well as expressing his gratitude to Brandes for what he had already written, Taqizadeh also encouraged him to publish more about the pernicious interference of Russia and Britain in Iran. Following Brandes' request for further information, Taqizadeh wrote an extensive account in English about the misdoings of Britain and Russia in Iran which Brandes used in his later articles. According to Jamalzadeh, Brandes' articles were translated into various languages.[1007] After the Russian Revolution, Brandes wrote an article addressing the Russian Revolution leaders, Lenin and Trotsky, inviting them to expiate the acts carried out in Iran by the former Russian regime. According to Taqizadeh, this article was very effective.[1008] Mojtehedi emphasises that convincing Brandes to write in support of Iran and against the policies of Russia and Britain in Iran was one of Taqizadeh's biggest achievements.[1009] The fact that Taqizadeh was aware of such individuals and went to great lengths to contact them demonstrates both his extensive international network and the fact that he took advantage of all available opportunities in Europe to further his cause. As he so often did, as well as carrying out political activities, Taqizadeh took every opportunity to enrich himself culturally. Taqizadeh had developed a keen interest in pre-Islamic Iran and during his 19 day stay in Denmark, using a guide book, he was able to find his way to the location where the oldest copy of Avesta was held in Copenhagen.[1010] Taqizadeh would return to Scandinavia for a key political event.

[1006] *Politiken*, 6 July 1916.
[1007] Jamalzadeh, "Man Jamalzadeh Darbareh-e Taqizadeh Shahadat Midaham" in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 60.
[1008] Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 164-5.
[1009] Mojtehedi, 191.
[1010] Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 164-5.

### 7:8 The 1917 Stockholm Peace Conference

The planned Socialist Congress of 1917 in Stockholm was to be the pinnacle of Taqizadeh's activities aimed at bringing the Iranian case to the fore internationally. It was of particular interest to Taqizadeh because of its anti-imperialist rhetoric. The run up to this conference gave Taqizadeh the opportunity to reflect and publicise the intervention of British and Russians in the affairs of Iran. The congress had been organised with the Dutch-Scandinavian socialists in Stockholm; its goal was to end hostility between different nations after the Great War and help to consolidate peace. However, as the governments of France, Britain and the United States did not permit their delegations to participate, the planned international conference became a forum for discussion rather than a platform for action. Taqizadeh attended together with Vahid al-Molk Sheybani representing the Iranian nationalists.[1011] In Stockholm he met and talked with representatives from the socialist movements of the different countries.[1012] While there, he also crossed paths with Yahya Dolatabadi for the first time in several years. Dolatabadi mentions that Taqizadeh had greatly changed as a consequence of his long sojourn in Europe and interaction with Europeans although he still maintained his core attributes.[1013] Documents show the British continued to monitor Taqizadeh's activities, including during his trip to Stockholm. [1014]

Together with the announcement to the conference which was published in the Swedish newspapers signed by Taqizadeh and Vahid al-Molk after the first Russian Revolution and overthrow of the Tsarist regime in March 1917, Taqizadeh also wrote an open letter to the members of the Russian Cabinet who had attended the conference in Stockholm.[1015] In this letter he referred to the history of the intervention of the former Russian regime in the affairs of Iran and outlined in detail how it had crippled the country's sovereignty and economy and helped to restrict any progress or developments. Together with the British, the Russian Imperialist regime, he wrote, had ensured that Iran could do little or nothing

[1011] Ibid., 165.
[1012] According to Qazvini Taqizadeh left for Stockholm on 2 June and returned on 26 September 1917. See: Qazvini, *Yaddasht-hay-e Qazvini*, 9-10: 185-6.
[1013] Dolatabadi, 4: 57.
[1014] "Note on the Persian Taqi Zada," 7 June 1917 *TNA*: FO371/3067.
[1015] Taqizadeh to members of the Russian cabinet, Stockholm, June 1917 in Taqizadeh, *Tufani* ('Elmi), 870-78.

without consultation with the two powers and indeed Russia had gone to great lengths to ensure that Iran was so financially and politically weakened that it had had little chance of moving towards modernisation. Taqizadeh expressed his strong desire that the new 'democratic' regime in Russia move away from their 'despotic' policies of 'strangling of this ancient country' and would soon officially openly declare more favourable policy in Iran.

This letter is a key document as it lay the groundwork for the 1921 agreement between Russia and Iran which would finally release Iran from the crushing ties to the previous Tsarist Russia that had seriously hindered Iran's progress towards greater autonomy. Taqizadeh's activities were highly effective in publicising Iran's situation and promoting the country's needs and demands.

Together with Jamalzadeh, Yahya Dolatabadi and Vahid-al-Molk Sheybani as representatives of the Committee of Iranian Nationalists were in Stockholm. The diaries of Abd al-Hossein Sheybani reveal that many other prominent constitutionalists such as Heydar Khan were also in Stockholm and they had daily meetings.[1016] In his autobiography Taqizadeh mentions that he had established a centre in Stockholm to actively campaign against Russia and Britain[1017].

[1016] Abd al-Hossein Sheybani.
[1017] Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 321.

Stockholms Dagblad.

Fredagen den 29 Juni 1917

Seyed Hassan Taqisadeh.

En persisk patriot, som riktar en vädjan till ryska regeringen.

S. Hassan Taqisadeh.

Ryska konstituerande nationalförsamlingen inkallas till den 13 oktober.

Valdag blir den 30 september. — Ministären Venizelos färdigbildad. — Upplysande debatt i schweiziska nationalrådet om affären Grimm—Hoffmann. — Ententemakterna börja uppsäga sina handelstraktater.

Situationen.

Läget i Ryssland.

Konstituerande församlingens sammankallande.

Valen ekola äga rum den 30 september.

Församlingen sammanträder den 13 oktober.

PETROGRAD den 27 juni. (Br. T.) Den provisoriska regeringen har offentliggjort en dekret, som bestämmer att valen till konstituerande församlingen skola äga rum den 30 september samt att församlingen skall sammankallas den 13 oktober i år.

Ett rysk ekonomiskt råd.

För det ekonomiska livets och arbetarnas tryggande utvandas.

PETROGRAD den 26 juni. (Br. T.) I och för det nationella ekonomiska livets allmänna organisation och arbetarnas ordnade hav regeringen för avsikt att upprätta ett ekonomiskt råd hos regeringen under ledning av industriexperter och arbetare. På detta råd skola representanter för arbetare och soldaterråden, bönderna, industricharna, köpmännen, bönderna, arbetsgivarorganisationerna och arbetarna.

Kozackkongressen manar till krigets fullföljande.

Avvisar energiskt tanka på separatfred.

PETROGRAD den 27 juni. (Br. T.) Kozackkongressen antog i natten den energiska resolution, i vilken den erinrar om sin pliktkänsla och sin beredvillighet att i nära samförstånd med de allierade fullföra kriget bade till fullständig seger vunnits. I resolutionen klandras djupt skarpt Smolnijens och Rysslands vara förrädare. Sedvilningen uppmanas att vederbörlig åtgärder.

En dryg rysk extra inkomstskatt.

Utvidgat förslag att en skattskatt införes.

PETROGRAD den 26 juni. (Br. T.) Finansministern har för regeringen framlagt förslag att en skattskatt skall införas på inkomsterna. Denna skatt skulle betalas av gäldare om över 10 000 rubel och skulle utgöra 10 procent av den del av inkomsten, som överstiger 10 000 rubel. Skatten skulle betalas utöver den gamla inkomstskatten.

Affären Grimm—Hoffmann.

En debatt i schweiziska nationalrådet.

Affären ordnad utan ultimatum eller hotelser.

BERN den 26 juni. (Br. T.) Schweiziska telegrambyrån meddelar:

Nationalrådet började onsdags förmiddag förhandlingarna om förklarade 6. och 7. neutralitetsbrotten, huvudsakligen Grimm-Hoffmann-affären kom på tal.

Nationalrådets president Hübscher inledde förhandlingarna med att tala över den konstaterade, att det ej var bra, att Schweiz' enighet till trots rådde affären ur världen och att den fria och allsidiga debatten togs bort. Det vore ett lyckligt förhållande, om det kunde gälla alla brutal neutralitetsöverträdelserna hälde det Schweiz. Man uppmanade till lugn och besinning.

Presidenten för neutralitetsutskottet, Pioda från Schaffhausen, sägel om redogörelse rörande de politiska anklagelsemålen och som därvid in på affären Grimm-Affären. Utskottet hade ingående undersökt och gående konstaterat, att det ej var fråga om någon inblandning från schweizisk sida. Det officiella utlandet ansåg saken vara saken för utgjord genom Hoffmanns egenhändiga skrivelse till förbundsrådets förklaring. Även den utländska pressen ansåg nu saken utgjord. Det var dan på sina ställen icke gjorde det, huvudsakligen för att Hoffmann själv hade en del av sin schweizisk pressen. Det oaktadt var saken utgjord för utlandet. En inblandning utifrån hade Schweiz hittat, men bestämt tillbakavisat sig. (Stab.)

Hoffmann hade tänkt på glimlin fred, ej på separatfred.

Talaren diskuterade därefter innehållet av Hoffmanns telegram, som efter brad som sades, skulle vara en ovanlig handling för diplomater. En sådan ovanlig handling för utlandet ansåg det utgjort försök göra att förhandla med Frankrike bakom Tysklands och Rysslands rygg och att det icke var denna framgång att det icke var. Det var av Grimms telegram, liksom Hoffmanns skrivelse, klart. Av detta telegram framgick det att Hoffmann ej ens uppfattningen av Grimms telegram. Det framgick av Hoffmanns telegram, att han ej ens visste, vad han talade om, när han talade om en separatfred mellan Ryssland och Tyskland. Af Hoffmanns svar framgick också tydligt, att han ville icke förhandla med Frankrike på egen hand, brutalt han handlat. Det framgick av Grimms telegram också det politiska läget. Hoffmann hade ej ens visste, att det icke var Frankrike, som hade att förhandla om fred, utan att det var Tyskland, som ville ha fred. Det var Tyskland, som ville ha fred, och det var Hoffmann fel, att han ej visste det. Det var Hoffmann, som ej visste, att det icke var Frankrike, som hade att förhandla om fred, utan att det var Tyskland, som ville ha fred.

Russia was still embroiled in a war with Germany. The war had caused great hardships on the nation and Lenin had promised peace. By 1918, Russia had suffered heavy territorial losses and was left with few resources and the Russian army was depleted. When Russia's participation in the war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Russia and the Central Powers on March 3, 1918, Russia lost one-third of its population, one-third of its agricultural land, and about two-thirds of its heavy industry. Although the treaty was far from ideal for Russia, it turned out to be highly advantageous for Iran when Russia's involvement in Iran began to wane. The Russian revolutionaries had sympathised with the Iranian constitutionalists and, as a result, a large number of the Russian forces left Iran following the Russian Revolution and the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. This provided a good opportunity for Iran to regain its sovereignty, having been, until now, stifled by the increasing involvement of the former Russian regime in the affairs of the country. Prior to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk an armistice between Russia and the Central Powers was agreed on 15 December 1917. Article ten of the agreement referred to Iran. Taqizadeh believed this article was a practical step towards real independence for Iran. The article stated, "The Ottoman and Russian commanders-in-chief consider the independence and integrity of Iranian territory as fundamental and are willing to withdraw their troops from Iran. The commanders will engage in negotiations with the Iranian government as soon as possible to finalise the details of the withdrawal and other acts which are necessary." [1019] Taqizadeh wrote about this agreement in an article titled "The Withdrawal from Iran: A Step towards True Independence" which was published in the German newspaper *Norddeutsche Allgemeine* and which praised Germany for its positive stance towards Iran.[1020]

According to a British diplomatic document, Taqizadeh sent a telegram to the German Chancellor in the name of "The Committee of Persian Nationalists at Berlin and the whole of the Iranian nation" to officially express their gratitude for Germany's support of Iran. The telegram is as follows:

[1019] *Kaveh*, January 15, 1918.
[1020] *Norddeutsche Allgemeine*, December 23, 1917.

> Our gratitude is the greater because the whole paragraph 10 of Armistice Treaty was added for no other reason than for securing the freedom independence and territorial integrity of the Persian Empire. We hope that this benevolent act which provides brilliant evidence that German Empire is a true champion of the freedom of nations will be followed by further steps which are indispensable for Persia's complete independence and her liberation from the bonds which are incompatible with principles of freedom.[1021]

With the Russians now potentially off the political scene, the time was ripe for the revival of the Democrat Party and the Democrats who were still present in Iran once again began to organise political activities. With the help of some senior members of the Party who were still in Tehran they reorganised the Party, establishing the committee of the Party according to their previous manifesto. These Democrats were eager to take advantage of the situation provided by the Russian Revolution and preserve the independence of their country by being impartial to the powers involved in the war. Their goal was to establish a strong independent government by supporting the Shah. This group were referred to as the "Tashkili" [pro-formation] Democrats since some members of the previous Democrat Party now distanced themselves from the Party and had established a new Democrat Party which was referred to as "Zedd-e Tashkili" [non-pro-formation].[1022] The Zedd-e Tashkilis believed that they should wait for the return of their leaders such as Solayman Mirza, Mosavat, Taqizadeh and Navab and reorganise the Party under their supervision. The Zedd-e Tashkilis only considered those who had joined the party before the "migration" to be true Democrats whilst the Tashkilis had been more flexible and had accepted new members.[1023] The Tashkilis were headed by A'dl al-Molk and the Zedd-e Tashkilis by

[1021] Sir W. Townley, telegram, 5 January 1918 *TNA*: FO 371/3258.
[1022] Bahar, 1: 27.
[1023] British diplomatic correspondence suggests that the British were concerned about the return of the former Democrat leaders to Iran and in particular Solayman Mirza who was sent first to Mesopotamia and later to Bombay as a prisoner of war. See: Secretary of State to Civil Commissioner Baghdad, telegram, 31 July 1920, and 3 August 1921, *TNA*: FO 371/4921. However, the British Legation in Tehran believed that his return was not so concerning. They argued that if the enemies of Britain realised at the time of the opening of the Parliament that Solayman Mirza's non-return to Iran was due to the British action, they would view it as British intervention in Iranian affairs. Mr. Norman, telegram, Tehran, 23 August 1920, *TNA*: FO 371/4921.

Mohammad Kamarehei.[1024] Among the most famous people from the Tashkilis were Mokhber al-Saltaneh, Hakim al-Molk, E'tel' al-Molk, Mo'aven al-Saltaneh, Seyyed Hashem Vakil, Seyyed Mohammad Tadayyon, Malak al-Shoa'ray-e Bahar and Mirza Ali Akbar Sa'tsaz. Among the Zedd-e Tashkilis were Taqi Binesh, Hossein Parviz and Mahmoud Pahlavi (later known as Mahmoud Mahmoud).[1025]

The Zedd-e Tashkilis published their own newspaper called *Setareh-e Iran* [Star of Iran] while the Tashkilis published *Iran, Now Bahar* [New Spring] *and Zaban-e Azad* [Free Language]. In a letter to Taqizadeh, Sheikh Ebrahim Zanjani complains about the destructive behaviour of both groups.[1026] After unsuccessful negotiations and discussions, Taqizadeh and Navab were unable to come to any agreements with either of the groups.[1027] This was, in fact, the catalyst for Taqizadeh's withdrawal from the Democrat Party.

The conflict between these two groups resulted in the postponement of the elections of the Fourth Parliament. The elections first took place in Tehran on 3 July 1917 and later in the provinces. Elections continued until the opening of the Fourth Parliament on 22 June 1921. In the end, together both branches of the Democrats won the majority of seats in the parliament although disagreements between the two branches weakened their position. As a result, successive governments came to power none of which had much faith in the role of parties in the political process. This period of less than one year between the springs of 1917 and 1918 saw 5 different governments formed. The Zedd-e Tashkilis gradually faded and with that the unity of the Democrat Party was damaged for good.[1028] The holding of elections was difficult during this period due to the foreign military occupation and unrest throughout the country.[1029] The British took Baghdad on 11 March, 1917 and reinforced what was called "The South Persian Rifles" to protect their interests and the oil fields in

[1024] Gehrke, 1:457.

[1025] To read more about Tashkili and Zedd-e Tashkili see the diaries of: Seyyed Mohammad Kamarehei, *Ruznameh-e Khaterat* [Diary of Seyyed Mohammad Kamarehei] , Mohammad Javad Moradinia (Tehran: Shirazeh, 2003).

[1026] Ebrahim Zanjani to Taqizadeh, without date, in *Nameh-hay-e Tehran*, ed., Afshar, 65-7.

[1027] Baqer 'Aqeli, ed., *Khaterat-e yek Nakhostvazir* [A Prime Minister's Memoir] (Tehran: 'Elmi, 1992), 45.

[1028] Bahar, 1: 27-8.

[1029] Ettehadieh, *Majles va Entekhabat: Az Mashruteh ta Payan-e Qajarieh*, 188.

the south of the country. This group's role was to maintain security in the south and also to fight against the activities of German agents who were active there during that period.

Besides the Russian Revolution, other significant happenings occurred in Iran at this time which affected the formation of the Parliament and the general situation in the country. The holding of the Paris Peace Conference and the Anglo-Iranian Convention of 1919 were among the most important events during this period. Furthermore, the riots of Sheikh Mohammad Khiyabani in Azerbaijan and Mirza Kochak Khan in Gilan province further weakened the central government. The unstable situation led to people's primary demand being territorial integrity for the country. It was against this background that the coup d'état of 26 February, 1921 took place. The importance of these events, the role Taqizadeh played in them, both directly and indirectly, and his opinion about them necessitate that these events be looked at in more detail.

**7:10 The Paris Peace Conference**

One of the issues which negatively impacted the situation of Iran was its reluctant involvement in the Great War which, despite the fact that Iran had claimed neutrality in the war and had no alliance with either side, had spread onto Iranian soil. When the victorious allies of the Great War held the Paris Peace Conference commencing on 18 January, 1919, their aim was to settle the issues raised by the war and its aftermath. Iran had hoped that this would be an opportunity for Iran to ask for reimbursement for the devastating damage it had suffered as a result of the war. Iran as a non-belligerent country had probably been affected more than any other neutral country by the consequences of the war. [1030] From the beginning of the Paris Peace Conference, the Iranian government had been determined to send a complete delegation to defend Iran's case and secure the sovereignty and independence of the country. Consequently, a group was formed under the leadership of the Foreign Minister, Ali Qoli Khan Moshaver al-Molk Ansari.[1031] The delegation went to

[1030] Cyrus Ghani, *Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah: From Qajar Collapse to Pahlavi Rule* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 23.

[1031] For more about the Iranian delegation see: Mohammad Ali Foroughi, *Yaddasht-hay-e Ruzaneh-e Mohammad Ali Foroughi az Safar-e Konfrance-e Paris December 1919-August 1920* [The Diaries of Mohammad Ali Foroughi of Paris Conference December 1919-August 1920], eds., Mohammad Afshin Vafaei and Pejman Firuzfar (Tehran: Sokhan, 2015).

Paris and worked to achieve their assigned mission. Iran had various demands: 1. Representation at the Peace Conference. 2. Abrogation of the Anglo-Russian Convention (of 1907) and all other treaties prejudicial to Iran's independence, and guarantees of Iran's territorial integrity in the future. 3. Compensation for damage caused by actions of the fighting forces in her territory. 4. Economic Liberty. 5. Revision of treaties and annulment of those assigning foreigners extra-territorial privileges. 6. Revision of the concessions now in operation in accordance with the preceding articles. 7. Readjustment of frontiers and compensation for previous encroachments.[1032]

These demands had been agreed upon at a meeting attended by the Cabinet as well as all former Cabinet members headed by the Prime Minister Vosouq al-Dowleh.[1033] The Iranian delegation formed to represent Iran in the Paris Peace Conference departed from Tehran for France on 17 December, 1918, with high hopes that attending the conference would raise the profile of Iran.[1034] However, despite their greatest efforts, the Iranian delegation could not obtain a hearing at the conference and the countries opposed to the Iranian delegation joining the conference overpowered those who were eager to hear what the Iranian delegation had to say. Thus, the Iranian delegation did not have an opportunity to put forward the case that Iran had not, in fact, been a belligerent in the war. With the unexpected news of the Anglo-Iranian agreement of 1919 the Iranian delegation was disbanded.

Fully aware of the importance of the Paris Peace Conference, Taqizadeh wrote a "Memorandum on Persia's Wishes and Her Aspirations Addressed to The Peace Conference". The memorandum was prepared in two parts. The first part outlined the reasons why Iran was an important player in the quest for world peace. The six main sections with the following headings, elaborated in details his points: 1. Iran is an extensive country; 2. Iran is a nation of one homogenous people; 3. Iran has a strong past record; 4. Iran is capable of progress; 5. Iran has suffered greatly; 6. Iran is faithful to its agreements.

[1032] Philip Graves, *The Life of Sir Percy Cox* (London: Hutchinson, 1941), 251.
[1033] Keddie, *Modern Iran*, 77.
[1034] Leon Novar, "The Great Powers and Iran, 1914-1921," (PhD. diss., The University of Chicago, 1958), 155. Accessed July 4, 2019. https://search.proquest.com/docview/301923544?accountid=12045.

The significance of Taqizadeh's statements, whether one agrees with them or not, is that it is these statements that the future Iranian government followed after the coup d'état of 1921. These statements came to represent the main principles by which Iran wanted to present itself as a modern nation on the international stage.

The second part of the memorandum dealt with the demands of Iran from the conference: 1. The discussion and settlement of the Iranian case at the international conference 2. Evacuation of foreign troops from Iranian territory 3. The annulment of illegal and generally retrogressive treaties, obligations, undertakings and political and economic restraints 4. The annulment of the capitulation system 5. Positive and generous financial and moral support from the League of Nations.[1035]

In comparison to the results the delegation had hoped for from the conference, Taqizadeh's memorandum appears to set out more realistic expectations, better attuned to the international situation at that time and thus was a more viable alternative to the delegations' initial sweeping demands. Despite this and the fact that Taqizadeh did not have any official governmental position, his activities were nevertheless followed by the Iranian intelligentsia and at times his actions were questioned. For instance, in the case of the above-mentioned letter to the Russian officials about the expectations of the Iranians after the Russian Revolution, Ali Akbar Davar, who later became the Justice Minister during the First Pahlavi Period and was studying in Europe at that time, criticised Taqizadeh's views on the rights of Iran over the Caspian Sea. Davar believed Taqizadeh had remained silent about the Caspian Sea issue which would thus make it difficult to raise it again in future. However, he admitted that the Caspian Sea issue was a complicated one.[1036]

What is clear from Qazvini's letter to Taqizadeh is that Taqizadeh was opposed to the overly ambitious demands of the Iranian delegation participating in the Peace Conference in Paris after the collapse of the Russian Empire. One of their claims was for territory in

[1035] Taqizadeh, *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 7: 722-8.
[1036] Ali Akbar Davar, 1 June 1919, *TINA*: 296003465.

the Caucasus which had previously been under the rule of Iran but had later been lost to Russia according to the post Irano-Russian Wars agreements of 1813 and 1828. Most of this region was Turkish speaking and culturally and linguistically had close affiliations to Iranian Azerbaijan. At this time, there was a fear that with the collapse of Tsarist Russia and the announcement of the independence of the Caucasus Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, these newly independent states would look to Iranian Azerbaijan to join them and threaten Iran's integrity. This explains why Taqizadeh believed that the claim to take back the Turkish speaking part of the Caucasus could lead to future troubles for the unity of Iran. The British also advised Iran against claiming back this region.[1037]

### 7:11 The Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919

By the end of the Great War, Britain, as one of the victorious countries, became the only major foreign power remaining in Iran. During the war the British troops had had a presence in Iran to protect the oilfields at Abadan in the south of the country; now the war had ended their influence grew as Ottoman forces and their German supporters were defeated and pushed out of the Middle East. The chaotic situation in Russia after the revolution of 1917 and the withdrawal of Russian forces from Iran further encouraged the British to advance their forces into northern Iran to help the troops who were fighting against the new pro-Communist Regime of Russia. However, towards the end of 1919 the British government came to the conclusion that the expulsion of the Bolshevik regime in Russia was unrealistic as the anti-Bolshevik forces were defeated on all fronts.[1038] Many of the Iranian politicians and aristocracy who had previously been Russophile, now with the collapse of Tsarist Russia, had joined the British camp. However, due to the new Russian regime's more amicable policy towards Iran, the British became increasingly conscious of permanently blocking the spread of Russian power and influence in Iran, the rest of the Middle East and India. In order to pursue this policy, the British decided to deepen their roots by making Iran a virtual British protectorate.[1039] Curzon, Britain's new

[1037] Qazvini To Taqizadeh, Paris, 21 February 1920, in *Nameh-hay-e Paris*, ed., Afshar, 27-8
[1038] Houshang Sabahi, *British Policy in Persia 1918–1925* (London: Frank Cass, 1990), 61.
[1039] Dolatabadi, 4: 97.

Foreign Minister, saw the defeat of Germany and Russia as providing Britain with the perfect opportunity to take over the whole of Iran.[1040]

During the Great War, Iran faced many struggles and, despite claiming neutrality, the country was occupied by the Russians, the British and the Ottomans. Many people had perished due to the invasions of these nations and the consequences of this. The Great War years and the years that followed became known as the period of failure of the constitution, chaos and political disintegration.[1041] This also further convinced the British to believe that their plan to fully control Iran could succeed. Lord Curzon was of the opinion that any agreement made with Iran, while guaranteeing its nominal independence, must at the same time confirm Britain's dominance in Iran.

The Anglo-Iranian agreement, consisting of six articles, was signed on 9 August 1919 in Tehran.[1042] The treaty was secretly prepared and suddenly announced.[1043] According to the agreement, Britain was granted sole rights over the supply of weapons and loaned finances and even administrative experts and advisory staff. Britain was to loan the sum of £2 million to Iran with an annual interest rate of 7 percent which was to be repaid in 20 years in exchange for the rights to aid Iran in the construction of railways and to help the country eradicate famine. They would help Iran to build up uniformed forces which could establish order throughout the country. The British would also assist Iran so that it might avoid having to pay vast sums in damages as a result of its involvement in the Great War. Mirza Hassan Khan Vosouq al-Dowleh, the Prime Minister at the time who facilitated the

[1040] For more about British policy towards Iran after the Great War see: Oliver Bast, "British Imperialism and Persian Diplomacy in the Shadow of World War I (1914–1921)," in *Didgah: New Perspectives on UK-Iran Cultural Relations* (London: British Council, 2015), 83-125.

[1041] Touraj Atabaki, "The First World War, Great Power Rivalries and the Emergence of a Political Community in Iran," in *Iran and the First World War*, ed., Atabaki, 1-7.

[1042] To read the full text of the agreement in English see: "Announce Britain's Treaty with Persia," *The New York Times*, September 20, 1919. Also see: *Great Britain. Agreement Between Great Britain And Persia: Agreement Between His Majesty's Government and the Persian Government. Signed at Tehran, August 9, 1919*. Washington: Govt. print. off., 1919. Accessed July 4, 2019. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044103159505.

For the Persian text see: *Kaveh,* January 22, 1920.

[1043] The Minister in Persia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State, telegram, August 13, 1919 in *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* 2, (1919). Accessed July 4, 2019. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1919v02/d673.

drafting of the agreement, received an advance of £160,000, presumably to help steer the agreement through the Majles since all foreign treaties required parliamentary approval.[1044]

Lord Curzon's comments about how the agreement had been conceived, which he made on 18 September, 1919 at a dinner party where he hosted his Iranian counterpart Firuz Farmanfarma, allows a further insight:

> …. It was a year and a quarter ago Earl Curzon proceeded that the present Persian Prime Minister came into power. He was a large-minded and patriotic man who enjoyed the confidence of his Sovereign and who associated himself with capable and influential colleagues. A little while later, Sir Percy Cox was sent to Persia as our representative. When he went to Teheran and established friendly relations with the Persian Cabinet, he found a willingness to proceed towards some new agreement between the two Powers. At this stage, negotiations with Persia were entered into. The Russian Empire had temporarily disappeared. The Turkish Empire was in dissolution. Great Britain remained the only powerful neighbour of Persia to who she could turn. It was an obvious necessity to Great Britain to have a peaceful and prosperous Persia, and as regards Persia herself, if it was true that external assistance of some sort was necessary for her, it was only natural that she should turn to this country. Persia wanted guarantees for internal securities and freedom from external aggression, good internal administration and good finance.[1045]

Despite Curzon's positive view, the agreement was criticised both inside Iran and abroad. Russia and France protested strongly against this agreement. The United States similarly did not approve of the agreement. The reply of the US State Department to the British Government's request that the United States approve the agreement was to be one of the sharpest and most caustic notes sent to London in those years.[1046]

[1044] Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran*, 61.
[1045] "The Anglo-Persian Agreement," *The Manchester Guardian*, September 19, 1919.
[1046] "Persians Told We Object," *The New York Times*, September 25, 1919.

Within the country there were also strong reactions. The province of Azerbaijan revolted as a result of the Anglo-Persian agreement. In Gilan, the Communist Party formed what they called a Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran and in 1920 prepared to march into Tehran with a guerrilla force of some 1,500. Mutinies in the gendarmerie and the Cossack Division paralysed the government, which was unable to end incessant tribal warfare, control British forces in the south or block the Red Army in the north. In brief, as Taqizadeh has noted, the agreement had dissatisfied the educated Iranians.[1047] In reaction to the chaotic situation of the country and the inability of the central government to maintain security a revolt took place in the province of Azerbaijan. Mohammad Khiyabani proposed reconvening parliament and establishing a republic, renamed the province Azadiastan [Country of Freedom]. Some believe that Khiyabani's revolt was not linked to the 1919 agreement.[1048] However, in some of the foreign press of the time it was stated that the revolt was indeed a reaction to that agreement.[1049]

As Oliver Bast has commented, "In the course of the ensuing Anglo-Iranian conflict, the Iranian foreign policy-makers came to realise that their own interpretation of this Agreement did not match that of the British".[1050] The Iranian Parliament never ratified this agreement and in 1921 it was announced null and void. The failure of the 1919 agreement led to the 1921 coup and the coming to power of Reza Khan and his Pahlavi dynasty; and so began a new era in Anglo-Iranian relationships.[1051] But, before proceeding further it is necessary to discuss briefly the two major provincial revolts of Azerbaijan and Gilan in response to the weakness of the central government and the 1919 agreement.

[1047] *Kaveh*, July17, 1920.

[1048] For instance, see: Homa Katouzian, "Ahmad Kasravi on the Revolt of Sheikh Mohammad Khiyabani" in *Iran and the First World War*, ed., Atabaki, 95-119.

[1049] *The New York Times*, October 18, 1919.

[1050] For more about British policy towards Iran after the Great War see: Oliver Bast, "British Imperialism and Persian Diplomacy in the Shadow of World War I (1914–1921)," in *Didgah: New Perspectives on UK-Iran Cultural Relation* (London: British Council, 2015), 113.

[1051] Homa Katouzian, "The Campaign Against the Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919" in *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 25, no. 1 (1998), 45-6.

### 7:12 Taqizadeh's view on the Riots in the Provinces

After the collapse of the Tsarist regime, the Russians withdrew their army from the Iranian Azerbaijan province. The British could not send their forces there to fill the gap left by the Russian's withdrawal. Bolshevik propaganda had influenced some in Iranian Azerbaijan and the central government in Tehran was fearful that communists would finally seize power in Tabriz. This caused the anglophile Prime Minister Vosouq al-Dowleh to send officials from Tehran to overhaul the police department and financial administration which was causing dissatisfaction among the officials who already held posts. This added to the dissatisfaction of people in Tabriz who were already disappointed by the dysfunctional central government and it paved the way for Khiyabani, a Democrat and member of the Second Parliament, to galvanize the local people against the central government and seize power. In a declaration released on 8 April 1920, Khiyabani and his supporters stated that the local government was acting against the constitution and specified that their goal was to restore order and actualise the constitution.[1052] Khiyabani's uprising ended with the taking over of the central government on 13 September, 1920 and his death. Opinions differ about Khiyabani's political objectives. Taqizadeh had his own opinions about this local uprising. It is important to review his comments on this in order to fully comprehend the policy of the central government regarding Azerbaijan and other provinces under Pahlavi rule over the coming decades.

Taqizadeh's opinion about Khiyabani is expressed later in the second series of *Kaveh*. Though implicit, any idea of the independence of Azerbaijan is bluntly rejected in the article. Taqizadeh considered Khiyabani's act childish and a mere show to fool the masses. He again emphasises the integrity of Iran as a unified country since Achaemenian times and describes Azerbaijan as an integral part of Iran which cannot be separated. Satirically, Taqizadeh describes the leaders of the movement as "the Great Politicians". He is particularly critical about the attempt of this movement to change the name of the province from Azerbaijan to Azadiastan. This suggestion came from the fact that the northern part of the Aras River which was currently located in land belonging to the Russian empire, although it had previously been part of Iran, had declared independence, calling their newly

[1052] Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 858-68.

established republic 'Azerbaijan'.[1053] In summary, Taqizadeh believed that if the Iranian government did not hand over the management of the country's affairs to the experts, even with the existing national unity in Iran there would still be separatist movements in Iran since people living near the frontiers would be able to witness the reforms and progress of the neighbouring countries and would thus, in contrast, recognise the backwardness of their own nation. [1054]

At the same time, Taqizadeh is critical of the disapproving nature of the people of Iranian Azerbaijan towards Iran's central government. Despite the significant role that Azerbaijan had played in the Constitutional Movement, according to Taqizadeh, its people must view matters from a broader national perspective and should not consider themselves as solely responsible for the shortcomings of the government and should not threaten to sever their ties with the central government. He warns the Azerbaijanis not to allow themselves to be influenced by the independence seeking movements of the Caucasus as that could lead to ethnic clashes and bloodshed. Influenced by the European racial theories concerned with maintaining a country's unity, Taqizadeh promises to publish a follow-up article in which he would outline the story of the Azerbaijani people's ability to avoid being influenced by the Mogul rulers. This would emphasise the idea that, despite their linguistic and cultural difference, Azerbaijanis were indeed pure Iranians.[1055] The suggestion of Taqizadeh that Azerbaijanis not interfere with affairs of the capital is in sharp contrast to the fact that they forcefully resisted the closure of the Parliament by Mohammad Ali Shah and the abolition of the Constitution. This had been in contrast to almost all other provinces which had been in favour of the abolition of the Constitution and the re-establishment of authoritarian rule. But, at this point, Taqizadeh's main goal was to maintain the fragile unification of Iran. A part of Taqizadeh's Memorandum addressed to the Peace Conference of Paris reveals how Taqizadeh views Iran as a unified country: "Unified together by all sorts of bonds, belonging nearly all to the same race and having the same culture, habits and faith and almost the same language throughout, the Persian people form a unit of nationality. The country inside its present boundaries has always been, from the time of

[1053] *Kaveh*, August 16, 1920.
[1054] Ibid., August 6, 1921.
[1055] Ibid., August 16, 1920.

Ionian wars down to the present day, a contiguous body and the hereditary home of the same people who had and still has an original culture of her own and who has left behind a glorious history." [1056] Despite these seemingly unrealistic and what might be termed romanticised theories, Taqizadeh was more pragmatic in his analysis of the harm that the government's centralisation policy had caused.

In Taqizadeh's view, the riots in the provinces had been caused by extreme corruption in the central administration of the country and the uneven allocation of resources throughout the provinces, compared to the capital. Taqizadeh complained that the corruption in the capital was stifling development of the provinces especially in the already more developed northern provinces of Iran, such as Azerbaijan, Gilan and Khorasan and suggested that this had led to provincial uprisings in those regions. He regretted that the opinion of the provinces had not been taken into account in the drafting of national policies; what was termed the consensus of mass opinion was, in fact, merely the view of the people of Tehran. He continued that the political viewpoints of Isfahan or Tabriz, for instance, did not carry as much weight as those of central Tehran and added that the people of the provinces were under the control of a governor from the capital rather than a local representative, even when it came to the process of electing members of parliament. According to Taqizadeh, despite the full support of the people, the provincial members of parliament did not have the same leverage as those from Tehran. However, in spite of all this, Taqizadeh did not consider that riots against the central government were the solution. He again emphasised the importance of education, keeping fit through physical exercise and the fight against disease. He believed that if leaders of the provincial uprising, such as Khiyabani, Colonel Pesyan and Mirza Kochak Khan, focus their efforts instead on education, they would be able to aid the implementation of reforms in Tehran. Taqizadeh accepted that, as had been posited, the reason for these uprisings was more than simply the personal ambitions of the leaders of these provincial uprising. According to Taqizadeh,

[1056] Taqizadeh, "Memorandum on Persia's Wishes and her Aspirations Addressed to the Peace Conference of Paris" in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 7: 722- 8. For the French copy see: Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 853-9.

people of the provinces were frustrated by the corruption of politicians in the capital and this convinced them to join the provincial uprisings.[1057]

While the events discussed above were taking place, *Kaveh* had only sporadically been published and, in fact, had eventually ceased publication all together. It was not until the beginning of 1920, when Taqizadeh began independently publishing the second series of *Kaveh* without financial support from the Germans that he was able to share his views in writing on those events. Writing after the events would have allowed Taqizadeh the time and space to reflect on what had happened and reactions to the events. It is, thus, important to examine in detail the views he expressed in the second series of *Kaveh.*

**7:13 The Second Series of *Kaveh***

The second series of *Kaveh* began publication on 22 January 1920. In the editorial of the first issue Taqizadeh made it clear that the first series of *Kaveh* had been tailored for the war when co-operation with Germany had been necessary for the good of Iran. Now that the war had ended, *Kaveh's* wartime editorial stance would adapt to the new peace time period. There would be a completely different editorial focus with no ties to the previous series. The journal would publish more scientific, literary and historical articles with the aim of promulgating European culture and lifestyle in Iran, promoting a united nation and the maintenance of Persian language and literature. It also planned to campaign against fundamentalism and bigotry. Taqizadeh emphasised that following the revolution and change of government in Russia the situation was no longer so critical; there were now opportunities to devise long term plans for fundamental changes and to more effectively promote modernity in Iran. Now that the immediate Russian threat was removed leaving only Britain as the dominant power, British influence could be moderated by diplomacy and, thus, was not seen as an imminent danger. Furthermore, the heroic and emotional tone of the first issue of the first series of *Kaveh,* which had envisioned humanity's fate as being tied to warfare and indeed had praised war, had now changed. In the post-war series of *Kaveh,* following the peace agreement of 8 February 1920, Taqizadeh now propagated the idea of peace as the natural order of society and was hopeful that people

[1057] *Kaveh*, March 30, 1922.

would distance themselves from bloodshed as a way to resolve their disagreements.[1058] This now contrasting stance highlights how Taqizadeh, who had previously hoped to change Iran through the use of military force, had now moved his focus towards literature and culture, as often happens during peace time. This was of course influenced by the post-war atmosphere in Europe which was experiencing the devastating consequences of the Great War.

شمارهٔ مسلسل ۳۶ — سال پنجم — شماره ۱

این روزنامه هر ماه یک بار در ۱۶ صفحه نشر میشود

عنوان مراسلات
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# کاوه

۱۳۲٤

قیمت اشتراک
موقتاً (تا عودت میزان پول بحالت طبیعی)

| | سالیانه | هر شماره |
|---|---|---|
| در ایران ... | ۲ تومان | ۲ قران |
| در آلمان ... | ٤۰ مارک | ٤ مارک |
| در سایر ممالک | ۷۰ فرانک | ۱ فرانک |

Jahrg. 5 • Nr. 1 • Neue Folge • ۱٤ شهریور ماه قدیم ۱۲۸۹ یزدگردی = غرّهٔ جمادی الآخره ۱۳۳۸ = ۲۲ ژانویهٔ ۱۹۲۰

## دورهٔ جدید

مقصود از دورهٔ جدید تغیر اساسی است که در تاریخ روزنامهٔ کاوه حادث میشود. روزنامهٔ کاوه در زمان جنگ پیدا شد و بشکل یک روزنامهٔ سیاسی تأسیس شد که غرض عمده از نشر آن در ابتدا تقویت معنوی بود بآن دسته از وطن پرستان ایرانی که عقیدهٔ آنها در جنگ بین المللی گذشته حسیّات ومنافع ایران در آن طرفی بود که با روس دشمن ذاتی ایران میجنگید و هر نوع مماشات وکنار آمدن را با دولت امپراطوری روس محال میدانست. در اثنای جنگ تاریخ عالم بسرعت سیر میکرد ووقایع عظیمه ای پی در پی در دنیا رخ نمود که هر کدام بقرن محتاج بود: شکست بزرگ روس، انقلاب در آن مملکت و منجر شدنش به «بالشویزم»، که قطعهٔ مقابل شکل حکومت تسارهای قدیم روس بود، انقراض سلطنت هاسبورگ و پاشیده شدن دولت متحد اتریش و مجارستان، سرنگون شدن عثمانی وزوال حکومت ترک از ممالک غیر ترکی، پیدا شدن دول تازه‌ای از ملل غیر حکومت، مداخلهٔ دولت الایالات متحدهٔ آمریکای شمالی در امور دنیای قدیم وسیاست آن.

معلوم است که همهٔ این وقایع بعلاوهٔ شکست آلمان وزوال نفوذ سیاست او موقتاً از فعلیات دیگر دنیا عوامل مهمّی هستند برای تبدیل اساسی در سیاست مشرق زمین و مخصوصاً ایران. این مملکت که قبل از جنگ سر و کارش بیشتر با روس وانگلیس بود وتا اندازه‌ای با عثمانی وآلمان و از همه بیشتر سرنوشت آن مملکت در دست روس بود حالا از همه بیشتر در تحت نفوذ انگلیس آمده وجزیرهٔ برتانی است که در امور وسیاست آسیای وسطی اولین مقام را دارد ویس از آن فرانسه و آمریکا هم کم وبیش گاهی حرفی میزنند.

روزنامهٔ کاوه زائیدهٔ جنگ بود ولهذا روش این روزنامه نیز با موقع جنگ مناسب بود وحالا که جنگ ختم شده وصلح بین المللی در رسید کاوه نیز دورهٔ جنگی خودرا ختم شده میداند ویک دورهٔ صلحی شروع میکند. ولهذا اساس وخط روش تازه‌ای که از اول سال ۱۹۲۰ میلادی مطابق با ۹ ربیع الثانی ۱۳۳۸ کاوه جدید پیش میگیرد نسبتی با کاوهٔ سابق ندارد و در واقع روزنامهٔ تازه‌ای میشود که مندرجات آن بیشتر مقالات علمی وادبی وتاریخی خواهد بود ومسلک و مقصدش بیشتر از هرچیز ترویج تمدّن اروپائی است در ایران، جهاد برضدّ تعصّب، خدمت

Figure 15: The front page of the first issue of the second series of *Kaveh*

[1058] *Kaveh*, 21 February 1920.

It was in the inaugural editorial of this second series of *Kaveh* that Taqizadeh first laid out his controversial roadmap for the modernisation of Iran. It was based on three main principles; firstly, unconditional acceptance of and promotion of all aspects of European culture; its behaviours and traditions, its scientific methods, its industrial achievements and its lifestyle. The only exception was to be language, since the Persian language, as a strong unifying element, was to be protected at all costs. Secondly, there should be ample efforts to preserve and promote the Persian language and thirdly, a focus on the spreading of science by the establishment of schools and the spread and development of public education.

Taqizadeh's opponents were suspicious about the shifting editorial approach of *Kaveh* and Taqizadeh; from an initial pro-German stance, following the defeat of Germany the publication became politically neutral, focused more on history and literature. Aware of Taqizadeh's sympathy towards the British, Taqizadeh's critics saw this shift as a ruse and accused him of being a British agent.[1059] But after the disappointment following the Great War of not seeing the gains for Iran that he had hoped for, and his futile efforts to incite the Iranian people, Taqizadeh had concluded that it was not possible to mobilise illiterate people. The aim of *Kaveh* during its second period was thus to promote the importance of education in Iran and familiarise people with new ideas of modernity and nationhood. Taqizadeh was convinced that an unstable political situation was detrimental to the future of Iran and that education would increase stability and security in the country. Taqizadeh had realised that after the end of the Great War the perception of Europe that many educated Iranians especially the inhabitants of Tehran had was now changed. As Yahya Dolatabadi noted, before the war it was as if European civilisation was the sun high in the sky towards which the people of Iran stretched out their arms in worship.[1060] They assumed Europe was replete with positive sentiments and empathy, kindness and emotion. They considered Europe as the cradle of humanity. However, the Great War had disillusioned them and they realised that the technological advancements of Europe had distanced Europeans from emotions.[1061] Those who had previously been advocating for European influence now

[1059] Naseh Nateq, "Darbareh-e Taqizadeh," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 191.
[1060] Dolatabadi, 90-1
[1061] Ibid.

believed they were treading the wrong path. Following the war, helped by *Kaveh's* editorials Taqizadeh hoped to re-energise the pro-European movement once again. But there were still some who were critical of this attitude expressed in *Kaveh*.

Abbas Eqbal Ashtiyani was a young man who later became a famous scholar. Taqizadeh and he shared correspondence in which Eqbal also criticised the new stance of *Kaveh* and its focus on literature and education. He wrote to Taqizadeh that from the tone of the articles published in *Kaveh* it was clear that continuously chasing politics had left its writers drained and weary. With some sense of disappointment, they had concluded that the solution to Iran's problems lay in the revival of literature, in science and in education. In short, his opinion was that the main cause of the decline of Iran was politics.[1062] From what Taqizadeh had written in reply to Eqbal it is clear that he strongly believed in the superiority of Western civilisation and was surprised that some intellectuals in Iran should doubt this "obvious fact". Comparing Iran to Western civilisation he commented, "We see quite clearly that Western civilisation has better adapted to the vicissitudes of material life. They have fought against diseases and have faced nature's adversities and succeeded in overcoming them. From a moral viewpoint, westerners do not lie as much as we do. They do not steal, plot against or hurt each other as much as we do. Most Western habits and customs are based on cleanliness and they know the value of time and directness".[1063]

Another critic of Taqizadeh during the second period of *Kaveh* and its move away from politics to a focus on culture and literature was his close friend, Mohammad Reza Mosavat. In a letter to Taqizadeh Mosavat bitterly criticises him:

> You have given yourself over to literature with the hope that the perfection of literature will mirror itself in the perfection of the nation and strengthen the government so that Iran may be released from forceful British command. You believe literature will help Iran gain the strength to build a factory to produce cannons capable of firing cannon balls a

[1062] Abbas Eqbal Ashtiyani to Taqizadeh, 1920-21, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 464-9.

[1063] Taqizadeh to Eqbal in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Tus, 2011), 14: 345-63.

> distance of 200 kilometres. Sir, only when the nation is strong again will its literature be enriched; not vice versa.

Mosavat clearly had an interpretation of the concept of modernity different to that of Taqizadeh. Taqizadeh who had once been an advocate of hard science had realised that modernisation by itself was not the only solution for Iran and that a deeper understanding of it in a theoretical sense was necessary. Taqizadeh viewed literature as a vehicle to convey the essence of modernity to the ordinary people. In contrast, Mosavat believed:

> The initial achievements of Germany were a result of the power of machinery, the 42 cm canons, submarines and extraordinary aeroplanes. Their final defeat was due to the powerful tanks and armoured vehicles of the British and the outstanding shipbuilding factories of the USA and its allies. Both sides seemingly had it all: flourishing literature, emancipation of women and freedom of religion, the right to protest and fine arts such as painting. But in the end, it was the machine that won the Great War. [1064]

Despite these words of Mosavat, it is evident that Taqizadeh was firmly convinced that without general public education, any political activities or reforms were useless and would not be long-lasting. Taqizadeh believed that if Iran wanted to catch up with the Europeans who he believed were at the vanguard of the caravan making its way towards civilisation, there was no alternative but to educate the illiterate masses. He used the example of Japan which by developing education and sending students to Europe and the United States had been able to quickly catch up with those societies at more advanced stages of modernisation. Although in Taqizadeh's mind there was not a conscious understanding or distinction between modernisation and modernity, through experience he had come to realise that without enlightening individuals, modernity could not be practiced in its totality throughout the country. [1065] He thus criticised those who were pushing for the swiftest route towards change without raising awareness and educating the general public. According to

[1064] Mosavat to Taqizadeh, Vienna, April 1920, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 459-62.

[1065] *Kaveh*, April 10 1921.

Taqizadeh, those advocating for swift reforms believed that improved levels of education would naturally follow once a "righteous cabinet" came to power, when a "righteous party" held the majority in the parliament and after all the conventions, treaties, agreements and foreign loans were nullified and national security reinstated. Only when a strong army had been developed, railways and banks built and scientific study and practice accepted would schooling proliferate, they believed. In response to this argument Taqizadeh continued:

> This is a flawed dream which comes out of a misguided desire for hasty reform in Iran. This is because it is feared that salvation will come too late; they (advocates of swift reforms) do not want to wait twenty years, desperate to see the fruits of their labours in three or four years. This haste, though, has in fact led to the opposite result; there have been and will continue to be constant delays and setbacks on the path towards true freedom. I and my fellow thinkers have been saying for fifteen years now that reform through education will take time. Instead, they want to improve conditions in the country by passing laws and forming political parties but actually very little progress has been made, if at all. In fact, we have only moved as everything moves forward naturally in the world. Still in Yazd, like in the Middle Ages, we distance ourselves from our Zoroastrian countrymen and don't conduct business with them simply because they don't dress like us. In Khorasan we still make fun of those who don't use opium and in Tabriz we are still proud of those who hit their head with swords during mourning ceremonies.[1066]

Although Taqizadeh had not formulated a detailed plan for the spread of ideas of modernity in Iran, in the first issue of the second year of the new series of *Kaveh* he laid out 17 points that he believed were crucial for Iran's move towards modernisation. His focus was on what could be done outside the realm of politics to fight corruption and what he considered weak morals of Iranian people. Taqizadeh believed that these strategies were more important than political modernisation and would lead the country in the right direction. His main points were as follows: 1. A focus on public education and its

[1066] *Kaveh*, April 10, 1921.

widespread proliferation.[1067] (The spreading of education throughout the country was, for him, a crucial point and one that he recommended be carried out at all costs) 2. Publication of useful books and translation and publication of Western books. 3. The unconditional acceptance of Western manners and customs. 4. Strong encouragement of regular European-style physical exercise. 5. Safeguarding of the national unity of Iran. 6. Preservation and protection of the national language, Persian. 7. A campaign against the use of opium, opium smoker's pipe and alcohol. 8. A battle against ignorant intolerance, and the full granting of equal rights to followers of different religions. 9. A proclamation of a campaign to eradicate diseases, in particular malaria, venereal disease, tuberculosis, typhoid fever and childhood illnesses. 10. Maintenance of the independence and sovereignty of Iran. 11. Modernisation of the country following a European style with particular focus on the introduction of machinery. 12. Freedom of women, including their right to education and a demand for the granting of their rights and wishes. 13. A battle against mendacity. 14. A forceful attempt to abolish the evil habit of plotting and intrigue which has unfortunately become rampant throughout Iran under the name of "diplomacy". 15. The wiping out of the shameful practice of unnatural love which since the beginning of time has been one of the worst evils of our people and one of the greatest obstacles to civilisation.[1068] 16. A battle against buffoonery, facetious talk, hyperbole, idle banter and garrulity and an attempt to engender an attitude of seriousness among people. 17. Revival of positive traditional Iranian national customs and habits.

The points above were written with a secular mind set and there is no evidence of advocating for the practice of a set religion. Some of the points focusing on equality for followers of all religions and women's rights are some of the universally accepted core values of modernity. Other points are based on Taqizadeh's personal observations which

[1067] Some of these points were underlined in the original text and have been similarly underlined in this translation.

[1068] It should be noted that "the unnatural love" that Taqizadeh refers to here is the practice of homosexuality in the context of Iran in that period and it should not be confused with homosexuality in its modern sense. There should be a distinction made between the homosexuality as a lifestyle choice and what is termed 'situational' homosexuality. This 'situational' or 'behavioural' homosexuality often occurs in a closed society with extreme segregation of sexes leading to restricted contact with the opposite sex resulting in relations with same-sex partners. For more on this topic see for example: Stephen O. Murray and Will Roscoe, eds., *Islamic Homosexualities: Culture, History, and Literature*. Edited New York: New York University Press, 1997.

together form guidelines for the practice of modernity and the modernisation of Iran. It could be suggested that it is those points outlined by Taqizadeh which apply specifically to the Iranian context that turned out to be the ones which, in his view, hindered the acceptance or practice of modernity in Iran.

During this period Taqizadeh extensively studied the benefits of sport and exercise. He was convinced that the key solution to Iran's troubles lay not in politics but in education, the promotion of sport and a battle against alcohol, opium and various diseases. Thus, in almost every issue of the new series of *Kaveh* he dedicated an article to the promotion of sport and a healthy lifestyle and extolling the importance of education. One should also bear in mind that Taqizadeh was living in post-war Germany where the importance of sport was increasingly emphasised. After the defeat of Germany in 1918 the physical fitness of its citizens became a national priority.[1069] As a result, Germany in the early 1920s became the birth place of sports psychology focusing on the study of the effects of physical exercise on the human mind, emotions and behaviour.[1070] Consequently, in the 1920s physical education was given more attention and was considered essential for the development of healthy, well-educated individuals.[1071] These practices were based on a modern view, influenced by the eugenics movement, of the ideal body being strong, streamlined, and engineered for maximum performance.[1072]

The emphasis on physical exercise expressed by Taqizadeh was later continued by others, in particular Hossein Kazemzadeh who in his journal *Iranshahr* [Land of Iran] dedicated several articles to the importance of physical education in Iranian schools. In his private correspondence Taqizadeh is particularly direct about his new attitude to physical

[1069] Erik N. Jensen, *Body by Weimar: Athletes, Gender, and German Modernity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 4.

[1070] The German Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (1778-1852), following the Napoleonic invasion, encouraged the idea of restoring the spirit of his countrymen through the practice of physical exercise. Hossein Kazemzadeh published an article declaring Jahn the father of German sporting activity and highlighted Jahn's emphasis on the importance of physical exercise in his Journal *Iranshahr*. See: *Iranshahr*, 16 January 1924.

[1071] Roland Naul, "Physical Education Teacher Training," in *Sport and Physical Education in Germany*, eds. Roland Naul and Ken Hardman (London: Routledge, 2002).

[1072] Erik N. Jensen, *Body by Weimar: Athletes, Gender, and German Modernity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 4.

exercise. In a letter to Mahmoud Afshar, for instance, he openly expresses his views on the necessity of changing the current situation in Iran through education and promotion of a healthy lifestyle:

> In addition to thousands of examples abroad, I have had personal first-hand experience in Iran as well and am thus convinced of the necessity of following this course of action. Most, if not all, Iranians are unprincipled, indecisive and obsequious. They talk with insincere complements and are sycophants. They are liars and cheats, opportunists who are quick to follow what they consider to be the most advantageous route as and when they see fit or as they call it "politics". Every day, according to the present circumstances, they voice what they consider to be the most suitable opinion on that day. In short, they lack character. They are constantly busy plotting sabotage and involved in intrigue. I can honestly say that the only exemption I have seen is the military personnel from Iran who trained in military academies in France or in Iran under the supervision of military commanders from a European system, (even those trained by the savage Russian Cossacks).[1073]

These comments by Taqizadeh about military personnel exemplify the importance that was assigned by some members of the intelligentsia to the army and propagate the idea that a military man was the ideal leader to save Iran. This further lay the foundations for Reza Khan (subsequently Reza Shah Pahlavi), a military Cossack officer, to be viewed as just such a leader and was one of the reasons he was able to topple the Qajar dynasty and swiftly climb the ladder of power to eventually become the Shah.

Through the second series of *Kaveh,* Taqizadeh's additional aim was to educate its readership about what could be considered the core values of modernity such as valuing scientific study, respect for religious minorities and in particular equal rights of non-Muslims living in Iran. According to Taqizadeh himself, one of the reasons he had had to

[1073] Taqizadeh to Mahmoud Afshar, 10 January 1922, in *Nameh-hay-e Dustan*, ed., Afshar, 99-103

leave the Second Parliament was the fact that he had insisted on advocating for the rights of an Ismaili who was the victim of religious fanaticism. Now he again found himself criticised when he advocated in *Kaveh* for the rights of Babis, Christians, Zoroastrians and Jews in Iran. And once again Taqizadeh was accused of being Babi and had to vehemently deny it. At this point he realised that it was not enough to simply want the external trappings of modernity; people must also respect the core values of modernity such as non-discrimination against religious minorities and freedom of belief. Living abroad now he could not be targeted by the extremist clergy and was free to push more explicitly for reforms in Islam with the aim of purifying it from what he considered to be superstitions.

Some of the articles written by Taqizadeh in the new series of *Kaveh* can shed more light on Taqizadeh's core ideas aimed at moving Iran in the direction of modernity. In the first place, Taqizadeh wanted Iranians to be aware of their lack of knowledge and backwardness in different fields. For him this was the starting point of his strategy to move the people from ignorance towards knowledge. He believed that the greatest social malady was the ignorance of the masses which he referred to as a mob.[1074] He was opposed to extreme nationalism and the mixing of sentimentality with science and saw humanity as a universal value which he believed should not be tainted by nationalism. Further, he elaborated on what he considered as the mixing of politics with science which he referred to as "the false patriotism" and which he thought had become an epidemic in Iran. Admitting to a lack of knowledge and accepting the superiority of the scientific progress of Europe and its civilisation was still considered a national crime by most Iranians. In Taqizadeh's opinion it was better that Iranians admit their ignorance and start anew to acquire scientific knowledge as the Europeans had done.[1075]

In an attempt to counteract superstitious beliefs and the questioning of a non-scientific outlook on life, Taqizadeh began publishing a serious of provocative articles in *Kaveh* titled "Debate between Day and Night". The style of these articles was based on a traditional genre of Persian poetry, *Monazereh*. *Monazereh*, meaning debate or dialogue, is one of the

[1074] *Kaveh*, August 16, 1920.
[1075] *Kaveh,* July 17, 1920.

less prevalent types of Persian poetry, employing rhetorical figures of speech through which the poet discusses both sides of a topic, as if a debate were taking place, the characters of the poems taking turns to set questions and offer answers. In this genre of poetry, the parties carrying out this dialogue or debate were people or sometimes other animate or even inanimate objects. Often the poetic debates were written as taking place between two lovers. Although what Taqizadeh published in *Kaveh* was not in verse, he deliberately chose to use the style of this genre of poetry, using a debate between day and night or light and darkness to symbolise a distinction and a tension between tradition and modernity. In one of the articles, for instance, Taqizadeh used this style to highlight the contrast between how westerners described monkeys and how they were perceived in the Islamic world.[1076] In order to highlight the contrasting views, Taqizadeh juxtaposed two columns, each written from the point of view of one side of the debate. Qazvini's comments about Taqizadeh's attempts is illuminating since Qazvini was sharing his opinions contemporaneously and would have been fully aware of the perils of someone like Taqizadeh writing in such a style and about such topics at that time as well as recognising the temerity of Taqizadeh in discussing such controversial subjects which might easily enrage religious conservatives. Suggesting Taqizadeh might become the Voltaire of Islam, Qazvini writes:

> …I greatly enjoyed the topic you have raised in *Kaveh* and in my opinion it is one of *Kaveh*'s most useful topics and it is definitely an original subject. Because to this day nobody has had either the courage or the temerity to even broach this subject. I think (if you are not thinking of going back to Iran) this subject must be elaborated further, and dealt with more courageously and you should repeat the work of Voltaire in … (Islam). [1077] This means the same service that Voltaire did for Christianity you would do for ... (Islam). For how long should these monstrosities of Islam be covered up? For the past…. (1400) years, whenever someone has uttered anything

[1076] *Kaveh*, May 20, 1920.

[1077] Here there are three dots in the text. It is not known whether this is how it was written by Qazvini in the original text or whether it was added later by Iraj Afshar, the editor of the published letters, in order to avoid controversy. In any case, it would seem highly likely that the omitted word was actually "Islam".

> against these heaped up fantasies, superstitions and darkness of … (Islam), that person has been considered depraved, accused of heresy, been excommunicated and murdered. Now the power of the authorities of…. Is totally shattered but this darkness still hangs over the hearts of Muslims and has pitched a tent there. Eventually someone must be found who has the courage to say…[1078]

In a letter, Taqizadeh also discusses this topic and makes his intentions clearer. He elaborates that he wants to criticise those contemporary Iranians who are following the knowledge of the Middle-Ages and who have not only failed to move forwards but, in fact, have moved backwards. He is critical of the fact that few traces remain of the works of the scholars of the early centuries of Islam and science and literature seem to have been forgotten. He states that the mistakes made by the learned men of the olden times have been repeated and even exacerbated by contemporary Islamic scholars. Interestingly Taqizadeh comments that some of the famous poets, historians and men of letters of the Qajar time, such as Reza Qoli Hedayat, E'temad al-Saltaneh and Mirza Taqi Sepher were not knowledgeable and even suggested they were charlatans. Among the ones Taqizadeh criticises is the famous Talebov who is widely believed to have had an impact, through his activities, on the awakening of people prior to the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. Contrary to mainstream opinions about Talebov, Taqizadeh believed his works were populist. He similarly criticises Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani and calls him the propagator of ignorance and impudence.[1079] He states that if Iranian scholars have written at all, it has been very little in the twentieth century, criticises their style as old fashioned and posits that there seemed to be few critical thinkers who could be considered to be on the same

[1078] It seems that this part is also omitted and has been replaced by three dots.

[1079] This is in contrast with what Fereydoon Adamiyat, the distinguished contemporary Iranian historian, has written about Kermani. He greatly praises Kermani and describes him as "The greatest thinker of nationalism, the harbinger of European civic knowledge and foundations, the critique of colonialism, the hatred of humanitarian religion. Pre-Constitutional Revolutionary thinker. Founder of Philosophy of Iranian History. One of the pioneers of modern wisdom in Iran ... a renowned national poet, critic of literary traditions, representative of literary criticism." Based on Adamiyat's positive depiction, Kermani became known as one of the most influential and revered figures who intellectually inspired the Constitution. However, Taqizadeh's comments about Kermani should be taken into consideration and offer an important contrast to the widely held positive opinions about this man in Iranian historiography. Adamiyat, *Andisheh-hay-e Mirza Aqa Khan-e Kermani*.

level as the Western scholars. Taqizadeh's criticism could have stemmed from the fact that Talebov was attempting to move towards modernity within a framework of Islam. Taqizadeh, on the other hand, was a staunch secularist who saw a need for a complete separation of politics and religion. Kermani was a committed Babi influenced by that religion's ideology and Taqizadeh would have equally been opposed to any suggestion that religion might be in the same arena as politics; there was no place for any religious influence in modernity's ideology, for Taqizadeh.

While in Germany during and after the war, Taqizadeh could not have failed to become aware of the increased presence of women in many facets of life due to the war situation. As was also witnessed in other European countries, with many men fighting and involved in the war efforts, women in Germany had begun to play a more active role in society. This must have influenced Taqizadeh and could account for the fact that his focus turned to women's rights and the role women might play in the modernisation of Iran. This is in contrast to many of his contemporary politicians and intellectuals who had not themselves witnessed women's increased prominence. The importance of this period in the emancipation of women in Europe has been addressed extensively, but less attention has been paid to the perception of this by Iranians. One example of an Iranian who had witnessed this in Germany at that time was Vahid al-Molk Sheybani, a friend of Taqizadeh. He recounts his impressions of being in Berlin during the war, noting the lack of men and increased presence of women: "The first thing which catches one's attention upon arriving in Berlin is the lack of people especially males. The young men are all serving in the army or at the front lines. Most jobs which were previously done by men are now being carried out by women. The post wagons and urban carriages are driven by women".[1080] This was in contrast to prior to the war when having a profession, especially for women from middle class and noble backgrounds, had been considered a slur on the good name of their families. These upper classes had suffered the most.[1081] Here it should be mentioned that the lack of available marriageable men further facilitated the marriages between European women and Iranians. One obvious example is the marriage of Abol Hassan Hakimi to a German woman

[1080] Abd al-Hossein Sheybani, 137.

[1081] Qobad Taqizadeh, *Alman dar Nim Qarn-e Akhir* [Germany; The Last Fifty Years] (Tehran, Ofset, 1965), 42.

whose husband was missing in the war. After a five-year wait they were eventually able to find out through the German Red Cross in Russia that he had died in war and thus Hakimi was finally able to marry the now widowed woman.[1082] The marriages of Iranian men to European women could be an interesting area of further academic research.

In the new issues of *Kaveh* Taqizadeh dedicated more pages to reflecting on the situation of women in Iran and the necessity for them to be educated in order to help change the situation in Iran. The first article dedicated to the education of women was written by Jamalzadeh's Swiss wife, published under her Persian name "Zari Khanoum" which, unlike most articles about women in Iranian newspapers at that time which highlighted the role of women vis-à-vis the progress of society, emphasised the rights of women as human beings not as chattels or housekeepers. It also highlighted their right to be happy, liberated and financially independent and emphasises women's agency and their right to take ownership of their own destiny and their own happiness.[1083] These efforts were closely aligned to Taqizadeh's ideas of developing a modern state based on equal rights for all members of that state.

Another point which is worthy of mention and which Taqizadeh has referred to in *Kaveh* is the uneven process of modernisation in Iran and the disparity between the situation in the capital and that of the provinces. This disparity had had a long-standing influence on the modernisation of Iran. Taqizadeh is concerned about ensuring that what the inhabitants of Tehran applied to the capital, they also applied to the rest of Iran. Regarding the situation of women, he is also critical of the lack of consistency in the levels of education of women across the country. However, in *Kaveh* Taqizadeh celebrates the fact that more female Iranians are being educated in new style schools but also expresses his regret that the education of women, like many other things, has been limited to Tehran, whilst the provinces have been deprived of the same opportunities. Opportunities for female education throughout the whole country, not just in the capital, Taqizadeh feels, is

[1082] Abol Hassan Hakimi to Taqizadeh in 10 July 1922, in *Nameh-hay-e Tehran*, ed., Afshar, 35.
[1083] "Asas-e Enqelab-e Ejtema'ei: Tarbiat-e Zanan," [The Origins of Social Revolution: Women's Education] in *Kaveh*, June 18, 1920.

a necessity if the modernisation of Iran is to be achieved.[1084] He comments that between Tehran and the provinces there is a vast difference in terms of culture, the extent of modernisation and security and many political leaders and intellectuals often ignore this fact. He notes that the Iranian government should not only be responsible for security and developments in Tehran but also in other parts of Iran. In short, he advocates for a powerful, stable central government whose members hold sufficient powers to plan and implement changes.[1085]

On 30 March 1922, a special issue of *Kaveh* was published. In the editorial Taqizadeh explained about the financial problems of the newspaper but was hopeful that the newspaper should continue. Since he had been dispatched to Moscow as part of a government mission, he was unable to continue the work. He assured his supporters that the newspaper would begin publication again upon his return. However, this was a promise that he could not keep; *Kaveh* was never published again. Despite this, *Kaveh's* legacy remained. It would be remembered for ever as a pioneering paper that represents part of Iran's journey towards modernity.

Taqizadeh's editorial focus in *Kaveh* provides a perspective on his views on developments in Iran and his concerns about the country's slow progress towards modernity. The most pressing concerns for Taqizadeh were now the country's internal situation and the lack of a powerful central government which could maintain Iran's unity. This was different to previously, when he had considered foreign forces as the biggest threat to the sovereignty of Iran. In fact, it could be said that, while at the beginning of the Constitutional Revolution he had hoped that reform in the political system and the restriction of the intervention of any foreign powers in Iran might lead to Iran's development, after the end of the Great War his perspective changed and became more introspective. He had come to the belief that the problem mainly lay not with external factors but rather with issues within its own borders; Iran must first resolve its internal issues before it had any hope of successfully moving towards modernisation. In his own

[1084] *Kaveh,* May 21, 1920.
[1085] *Kaveh*, September 1, 1921.

words, “The British, the Russians nor the Ottomans were capable of completely destroying Iran. The biggest political, national and racial threats were, in fact, opium, alcohol, venereal disease and lack of physical exercise which were going to endanger the existence of Iran. All these threats could be easily addressed by widespread education.”[1086] Clearly, at this point, Taqizadeh is influenced by the theory of survival of the fittest; rather than political development his suggested approach is to focus on social maladies which according to him had paralysed the Iranian people. After having been previously determined to create change through political activities, he now believes political development could not take place without these social and cultural problems first being solved.[1087]

Although *Kaveh* was attempting to target a wider audience, women among them, and both within and outside Iran, its financial situation was dire. Living in post-war Germany was becoming increasingly challenging. The post-war financial crisis made life difficult for people and Taqizadeh and his colleagues working in *Kaveh* had to face the vicissitudes of daily life. The post-war years for Germany were the gloomiest. Many families had lost their breadwinners. Food shortage, cold and hunger had made the situation even worse. Oil and bread had become so scarce that even the upper-class families struggled to afford these necessities. According to Jamalzadeh, both he and Taqizadeh, both of whom worked for *Kaveh,* did not have sufficient food and Taqizadeh was unable to sleep due to being so weak. Mahmoud Afshar describes Taqizadeh’s life in Berlin as being so difficult that he had to wear repaired shoes. During the same period, Iran was also witnessing fundamental changes.

**7:14 The 1921 Coup**

The Iranian government had lost most of its power outside the capital by 1920 and British and Soviet forces had control over most of Iran’s territory. A letter written to Taqizadeh by Mohammad Ali Badamchi may partly explain the unfavourable situation in Iran in 1921. Describing the situation of the country he writes: “The situation in Azerbaijan is becoming worse on a daily basis. Local insurgents are taking over the country. There is

[1086] *Kaveh*, September 1, 1921.
[1087] *Kaveh*, March 30, 1922.

no trace of central government. All over Iran, in particular in Azerbaijan, tyranny is rife and abusive chieftains reign. Marauding pillagers and Kurds are ransacking the villages. All the governmental forces which have consumed the country's finances and eaten up all the loans are now completely paralysed and have lost all control."[1088]

On the Sunday night of 20 February 1921, 2500 Cossack soldiers departed from Gazvin, about 200 kilometres from Tehran. Under the command of Reza Khan (later known as Reza Shah Pahlavi) Tehran was occupied with little resistance. The recently appointed Prime Minister, Fatollah Akbar Sepahdar-e A'zam was deposed.[1089] Consequently negotiations began between Reza Khan and the Shah about the formation of a new government.[1090] It was said that Reza Khan wanted a strong administration, loyal to the Shah.[1091] By taking control of the capital Reza Khan was able to imprison several former officials, among them Firuz Mirza Farmanfarma, the former Foreign Minister. The deposed Prime Minister, Sepahdar-e A'zam took refuge in the British Legation and was assured by Reza Khan of a pardon.[1092] In the aftermath of the coup, Seyyed Zi'a al-Din Tabatabaei, a journalist, was appointed the new Prime Minister.

On 9 April, Seyyed Zi'a, at a dinner party held for foreign officials, laid out the foreign policy of his government. He declared that relations with Great Britain were now cordial, owing to the voiding of the Anglo-Persian agreement which had caused misunderstandings. Iran, he continued, depended on good relations with Russia and England. In addition, Iran had turned to America which had always previously opposed the Anglo-Persian pact for agriculture and to France for legal advisers. Iran had also contemplated employing Belgians and Swedes. On May 1, the British troops left Tehran just as a Russian mission entered.[1093] Seyyed Zi'a's cabinet lasted 100 days. During this period, it became evident that he was unable to implement plans ensuring British interests. As a result, the British minister in

[1088] Mohammad Ali Badamchi to Taqizadeh, 10 August 1921, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, 473.
[1089] The occupation of Tehran was affected with only about a dozen persons slightly wounded. "Keeps Order in Teheran," *The New York Times,* February 25, 1921.
[1090] "Persian General Occupies Teheran," *The New York Times,* February 23, 1921.
[1091] "Persians to Defy Red," *The New York Times*, February 24, 1921.
[1092] "Prince Jailed in Tehran," *The Washington Post*, February 27, 1921.
[1093] "Persia's New Alignment," *Current History (New York), 14*(3), 526-7.

Tehran informed Ahmad Shah that they would no longer support Seyyed Zi'a and that he should be removed by the Shah.

During this period, Taqizadeh was witnessing these events from Germany whilst struggling to survive in the difficult situation of post-war Germany. According to Jamalzadeh the members of the committee had received a small amount of money from the Germans after the war to facilitate their return to their home countries. Some of the committee members invested this money to open a shop called "Persepolis". This grocer's shop was to sell pyjamas and open up business links with Iran and would once again provide a small income for Taqizadeh and his colleagues who had stayed to publish *Kaveh*. Unfortunately, this was not profitable and after a short time, the shop had to close.[1094] Taqizadeh was now seeking advice from his friends in Iran and considering returning to Iran. Yahya Dolatabadi in a letter to Taqizadeh writes that although he was looking forward to seeing Taqizadeh, he recommended he postponed his return. He adds that being assigned to a mission abroad would be Taqizadeh's best option. He complains about the political situation of Iran, suggesting that the time is not right for Taqizadeh's return.[1095] Mohammad Ali Foroughi similarly advised Taqizadeh to remain in Europe if he could. Like Dolatabadi he also believed that it would be better for Taqizadeh to be assigned a position outside Iran. Foroughi promised that he would do his best to aid him in this regard.[1096] It is in this context that the groundwork was laid for Taqizadeh to be assigned a task in Russia.

[1094] Jamalzadeh, "Man Jamalzadeh Darbareh-e Taqizadeh Shahadat Midaham" in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 46-7.
[1095] Yahya Dolatabadi to Taqizadeh, 11 February 1922 in *Nameh-hay-e Tehran*, ed., Afshar, 38-9.
[1096] Foroughi to Taqizadeh, 6 November 1921 in Ibid., 49-50.