



Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh: a political biography

Pourbagheri, H.

Citation

Pourbagheri, H. (2021, June 24). *Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh: a political biography*. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3192234>

Version: Publisher's Version

License: [Licence agreement concerning inclusion of doctoral thesis in the Institutional Repository of the University of Leiden](#)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3192234>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Cover Page



Universiteit Leiden



The handle <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3192234> holds various files of this Leiden University dissertation.

Author: Pourbagheri, H.

Title: Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh: a political biography

Issue Date: 2021-06-24

Chapter Six

Uncertainty in Exile and Events Leading up to The Great War

Before continuing to follow subsequent events in Taqizadeh's life in relation to what was happening in Iran, we should take a step back and briefly review Iran's situation within a broader international setting. International affairs and the power struggle taking place in Europe during this period greatly influenced events and politics in Iran. To fully appreciate the situation and political atmosphere within Iran, one needs to consider the geopolitical situation of the world, beyond Iranian borders. The actions and attitudes of Iranian politicians such as Taqizadeh should be assessed against this broader international background. It is this broader overview that will allow a deeper understanding of Taqizadeh's ideas, decisions and actions.

As explained in the previous chapter, Taqizadeh's aim was to swiftly expand the political system of Iran by developing the constitution to better mirror those western constitutions in which party building played an essential part. He successfully introduced and established a well-organised political party. However, the haste with which he achieved this in such a short period and the fact that some of the party's goals were not so easily accepted by Iranian traditional society led to him and the Democrat Party being vilified by their opponents. Taqizadeh was thus pushed into exile for a second time. This chapter covers Taqizadeh's activities during his second exile in Istanbul, Europe and the United States. Set against the background of events happening in Iran, the chapter follows Taqizadeh's life during his time abroad, his strategies and his relationships with senior party members. During this second exile Taqizadeh's saw the achievement of his goals as being dependent on the way the Democrat Party was organised. But, the instability of the country and the weakness of the central government led to the Russian ultimatum and the expulsion of many leading Democrat Party members which was a severe blow to the Party's activities and its goals. Although struggling financially, Taqizadeh nevertheless continued to endeavour to expand his knowledge as both a scholar and a politician.

6:1 The Developing Conflict of Interests over the Middle East between Germany, Russia and Great Britain

As previously mentioned, the political environment of Iran was strongly influenced by the interferences of the two international powers, Russia and Britain, during the tenure of the Second Parliament. The policies of these two countries in relationship to Iran were shaped, to a large degree, in accordance with events taking place in other parts of the world. The rise of industrialised Germany as a powerful economic and military power in Europe was one of the main concerns for Russia, Britain and France. In the period leading to the First World War, Germany was looking beyond its borders in order to expand its influence in other parts of the world including the Middle East. German Emperor Wilhelm II was an ambitious ruler, eager to lead the world and was searching for a place “in the sun”.⁷⁴⁹ The other nations also had similar ambitions; the British talked of “the white man’s burden” and the French claimed they had a “mission civilisatrice” or civilising mission.

Germans were latecomers to the colonising scene and in order to increase their influence, they had begun expansion of their navy. Germany’s ambitions greatly worried Britain which controlled the largest navy in the world. The thought that another country other than Britain might lead the world was unbearable for the British and thus they also began to strengthen their navy. The rivalry between powerful European nations escalated.

A huge number of Muslims were resident in countries ruled by non-Muslims, including in the French colonies, the British colonies where there were over 100 million and 19 million in Russia. The Germans had soon realised that this huge population might be usefully galvanised into an opposition against the colonisers. The Muslims under colonial rule were resentful of being ruled by the infidels and this was the Achilles’ heel of the European colonial powers.⁷⁵⁰ Germany knew it could use these potential allies if necessary. The first step was to establish close relationship with the Ottoman Empire, one of the biggest remaining independent Islamic countries whose ruler Sultan Abd al-Hamid II was

⁷⁴⁹ John C. G. Röhl, *Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900–1941* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 235.

⁷⁵⁰ Sean McMeekin, *The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany's Bid for World Power* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 3.

seen as the Caliph and thus claimed leadership of Sunni Islam. The Ottomans who were agitated by the Russians in the Balkans, the French in North Africa and the British in Egypt and Arabia were desperate to become allies with a powerful European country.⁷⁵¹ Germany with the smallest number of Muslims in its colonies appeared innocent in the eyes of the Islamic world. In 1888 Abd al-Hamid approached German financial circles to seek finance for the building of a railway which would connect Europe to the Persian Gulf. The Deutsche Bank agreed to finance the project and construction immediately began. By the end of 1892 the railroad had reached as far as Ankara. The Baghdad Railway project caused strong opposition from the Russian, French and British governments. Russia who had by then major influence in Central Asia as well as half of Iran, believed that increasing German influence in the region would harm its economic interests and thus strongly opposed the railway project. The completion of the project was not in the interests of the British in the Persian Gulf and particularly in India. In July 1910, *The World Today* wrote:

A German company which has a franchise for the railroad through Asiatic Turkey desires to obtain an outlet on the Persian Gulf. The completion of the road will provide for the first time a land route to India, which is decidedly inimical to the interests of Great Britain, as it would deprive British steamship lines of a large amount of trade, and would destroy the monopoly of the Mediterranean route, obtained by England at great cost.⁷⁵²

Strategically, the Baghdad Railway's goal was to tie Ottomans and the Germans together, while interrupting Britain's nexuses with India by threatening Suez, and providing Germany with its own route to the east through Basra.

Although Russia had been opposed to some features of the Baghdad Railway project, at the famous Potsdam interview between the German Emperor and the Russian Tsar in November 1910, Russia acknowledged the project on condition that no subdivision lines

⁷⁵¹ McMeekin, 3.

⁷⁵² "Events of the Months: Foreign Affairs," *The World Today* 19, no.1 (1910): 692.
<https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015011385773?urlappend=%3Bseq=22>.

were built into Armenia and Kurdistan. In return, Germany withdrew her opposition to Russian railway plans in northern Iran.

The Ottomans were not the only ones who were eager to co-operate with Germany. Iranian officials, who hoped to reduce the pressure of Russia and Britain, had begun approaching the newly united Reich. The initial steps were taken by the Iranian government during the reign of Naser al-Din Shah (1848–96). In the beginning, the Germans were not so interested but as time passed they became increasingly aware of the geopolitical position of Iran and began to show interest.⁷⁵³ In June 1873, Iran and Germany signed a comprehensive, twenty-one article treaty.⁷⁵⁴ This resulted in the opening of the German legation in Tehran in the Spring of 1885.⁷⁵⁵ Following the liberation of Tehran, restoration of the constitution and the arrival of Russian troops in the northern part of Iran, the pro-German policy was more strongly propagated. It was particularly publicised by Iranian press both at home and abroad. *Habl al-Matin* of Calcutta wrote that Iran should seek an alliance with countries such as Ottoman Turkey, Germany, The United States or France. According to the paper, this was because the northern and southern neighbours of Iran (Russia and Britain) had caused widespread damage to the country and creating rivalry would be the means to oppose them. Although the writer of *Habl al-Matin* believed that Asian countries' expectation of support from Europe was not positive, at the same time the article stated that, as Germany would only be able to harm Iran in 30 years' time, Iran, before that happened, would most likely already have become "the Germany of the East" and therefore able to defend itself. The article in *Habl al-Matin* concluded by suggesting that Iran should establish an assembly in Berlin to co-operate with Germany.⁷⁵⁶ *Sharq* also suggested that a relationship with Germany could be beneficial for Iran. The newspaper believed that the Iranian Foreign Minister must choose a powerful country with which to form an alliance. That country should be on good terms with Iran and only seek trade benefits. According to *Sharq*, Germany was a suitable candidate since it was powerful

⁷⁵³ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 284-5.

⁷⁵⁴ Full details of this treaty were published in *Habl al-Matin*, January 2, 1911.

⁷⁵⁵ Oliver Bast, "German-Persian Diplomatic Relations," *Encyclopædia Iranica*, available online: <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/germany-i> (accessed 2 March, 2012).

⁷⁵⁶ *Habl al-Matin*, September 27, 1909.

enough to protect Iran in case of invasion by another country. Germany was also far away from Iran and would only expect economic benefits, in contrast to Russia and Britain who sought territorial gains too. A relationship with Germany would introduce a third power into the region and Iran would benefit from the rivalry between the European nations. *Sharq* emphasised that an alliance with Germany was recommended only in order to maintain the independence of Iran.⁷⁵⁷ Hossein Danesh, writing in *Shams*, similarly advocated an amicable policy towards Germany and was in favour of secretly giving some concessions to the Germans. He posited that this would not damage the sovereignty of the country; in fact, the increased income could be used to strengthen the military.⁷⁵⁸

The Iranians' inclination towards forming an alliance with Germany was not hidden from Russia and Britain. A Russian secret report, for instance, quoted the Iranian newspapers and the desires to establish a relationship with Germany with the aim of then overriding the Russian and British agreements.⁷⁵⁹ At the same time, Iranians closely followed movements of other nations against the colonial powers in different parts of the world. The Ottoman policy of seeking alliance with Germany was noted and was approved of by many intellectuals. In general, at the beginning of the twentieth century, many Muslim countries shared an awareness of the fact that they were suppressed and exploited by European powers. This discourse, which had been initially formed among elite circles, was spread by the press into the public domain. News of the restoration of the Iranian Constitution, for example, was well received in Afghanistan. According to *Habl al-Matin*, after hearing of the victory of the constitutionalists in Iran, the people of Kabul partied for three days.⁷⁶⁰ As we shall see later, the pro-German policy developed simultaneously in Iran and Afghanistan. In analysing the behaviour of politicians like Taqizadeh, one must consider also the intellectual mood of the wider international scene and the mutual influence of the thinkers and politicians of other countries which were also being threatened by colonial powers.

⁷⁵⁷ *Sharq*, June 8, 1910.

⁷⁵⁸ *Shams*, June 14, 1910.

⁷⁵⁹ Report by Poklovski, 19 March 1910, in *Ketab-e Narenji*, ed., Monzavi, 4: 134-5.

⁷⁶⁰ *Habl al-Matin*, September 27, 1909.

6:2 Taqizadeh and his Views on Foreign Affairs

In an essay published in *Habl al-Matin*, Taqizadeh stated his views on Iranian foreign affairs.⁷⁶¹ This essay is significant; it demonstrates that, as the leader of the Democrat Party, Taqizadeh's reflections would also inform the Democrat Party's foreign policy. In this short essay Taqizadeh highlights various countries and their most pressing issues. He states that though foreign policies might be a small fraction of the concerns of other nations around the world, it was the highest priority for Iran. Taqizadeh believed this was due to the invasive interventions of the foreign powers involved in the affairs of Iran which threatened the independence of the country.

According to Taqizadeh, Iranian politics had been divided into Anglophile and Russophile and many Iranian politicians were influenced either by the British or the Russians. This situation changed after Germany gained more power. The political and economic conflicts with Germany and the fear that Iran might fall into the hands of the Russians led Britain to seek allegiance with Russia. Eventually, Russian and British policies towards Iran were aligned. According to Taqizadeh, this was a result of changes in the old global order which had led to the world being now divided between the Allies and the Central Powers. Following his discussion, Taqizadeh states that many Iranian authorities, old statesmen and aristocracy took the side of the Allies. Meanwhile, another power rose to prominence in Iran. Taqizadeh considered this group to be representative of public opinion and, in particular, the young generation of Iran. This new group was opposed to foreign intervention and was non-partisan. However, since this group appeared to follow the tenet that the enemy of my enemy is my friend, it was criticised by some for its pro-German stance.

In conclusion, Taqizadeh saw the source of disagreement over foreign policy between the Democrats, who he thought were unfairly referred to as "revolutionaries", and the Moderates.⁷⁶² Taqizadeh believed that Russia and Britain encouraged the Moderates to oppose the Democrats resulting in the schism which occurred during the Second

⁷⁶¹ *Ibid.*, February 6 and 13, 1911.

⁷⁶² *Shafaq* published an article about this topic: "Moderation and Revolution," March 11, 1911.

Parliament. This was, he suggested, because the nationalistic policy of the Democrats was in sharp contrast to the interests of Russia and Britain. It was this policy that Taqizadeh followed whilst abroad, after his ousting from Parliament. Taqizadeh's views on foreign affairs will be discussed further later in this chapter.

6:3 The Situation in Iran after Taqizadeh's Departure

After Taqizadeh's departure from Tehran, the tension between the Democrats and the Moderates continued. Subsequently, the disarmament of the Mojaheds in Tehran by the government led to a serious conflict and the wounding of Sattar Khan.⁷⁶³ Another incident was the death of the regent, 'Azd al-Molk, on 22 September, 1910.⁷⁶⁴ The choice of a new regent was a point of conflict in the Parliament; the Moderates wanted Naser al-Molk as regent whilst the Democrats, supported by the Bakhtiyaris, favoured Mirza Hossein Khan Mostufi al-Mamalek. The Parliament voted for Naser al-Molk with 40 votes while Mostufi only won 20. *Shams* commented that the vote for Naser al-Molk in the Parliament was an ideological defeat for the Democrats.⁷⁶⁵ Taqizadeh writes that he was in Istanbul when Naser al-Molk became the regent. According to Taqizadeh the new regent was a highly suspicious man and believed the Bakhtiyaris and the Democrats were responsible for all the wrongdoings.⁷⁶⁶ Naser al-Molk gained the majority of the votes as he was considered knowledgeable, trusted by the ulama, was well known in diplomatic circles outside Iran and was respected by the tribal chiefs.⁷⁶⁷ Naser al-Molk had studied in Oxford and had been a classmate of Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister. As he had headed the

⁷⁶³ This incident which is known as the "Park-e Atabak" incident was caused by the disarmament of the Mojaheds in Tehran. After the liberation of Tehran by the various groups of Mojaheds, the fact that they were armed was the source of many troubles for the inhabitants and worrisome for the government, causing the government to demand their disarmament. Some groups of Mojaheds were reluctant to hand over their arms and gathered in protest in the Atabak Park, the residence of Sattar Khan. The government decided to use force and thus laid siege to the park. During the clashes, Sattar Khan was wounded in the leg; an injury that would plague him for the rest of his life. Classic historical accounts of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution tended to focus on the most obvious consequences of the Mojaheds' presence in Tehran and commented on the fact that they were armed which disturbed public order and security in Tehran. But, there were other problems besides this issue which seemingly were paid less attention and deserve further research. *Iran-e Now*, for instance, reported that it was believed the presence of the Mojaheds had caused house rental prices in central Tehran to skyrocket. *Iran-e Now* claimed that increasingly prostitutes had rented these houses, thus causing an increase in rent prices. See: *Iran-e Now*, October 28, 1910.

⁷⁶⁴ Sharif Kashani, 778.

⁷⁶⁵ *Shams*, October 8, 1910.

⁷⁶⁶ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 169-70.

⁷⁶⁷ Sharif Kashani, 779.

Iranian legation in London in the past, he was personally acquainted with many British politicians.⁷⁶⁸ He had become Prime Minister during the reign of Mohammad Ali Shah. He was later imprisoned by the Shah but after the intervention of a British minister in Tehran was released and went to Europe where he supported the exiled constitutionalists during the Lesser Despotism Period. Naser al-Molk had been previously nominated as regent but had refused the post in favour of ‘Azd al-Molk.⁷⁶⁹

Upon the Parliament’s approval, Naser al-Molk, who was by then living in Britain, was officially recalled to Tehran. He chose to travel to Iran through Russia. While travelling across Russia he was not initially as warmly received by the Russian government as would have been expected by someone with the rank of regent. It was apparent that the Russians considered him an anglophile. Thus, cognisant of that, he tried to convince the Russian officials that they were mistaken since the Moderates, who were on good terms with Russia, had chosen him as regent. However, the Russians were unconvinced and wanted him to prove his sincerity by using his influence upon his arrival in Tehran to appoint Sepahdar, their candidate, as Prime Minister.⁷⁷⁰ The Russians treated Naser al-Molk with respect as he crossed Russian territory and even withdrew their forces from Qazvin when he entered Iran. Kasravi believed that this was because the new regent had promised to help to reduce the animosity of the Iranian people towards Russia and Britain.⁷⁷¹ According to *Shams*, there was much hope that Naser al-Molk would, in particular, solve most of the existing problems between Iran and Britain.⁷⁷² *The London Times* wrote, “The new Regent, who is not without experience of public affairs, enjoys an exceptional reputation for integrity and character; and his Western education - he is a Balliol man - would seem to have specially fitted him to guide Persia through a critical period of transition”.⁷⁷³

⁷⁶⁸ *Shams*, November 23, 1910.

⁷⁶⁹ Malekzadeh, 7-6: 1299.

⁷⁷⁰ Ahmad Ali Sepher, *Khaterat-e Siyasi-e Movarrehk al-Dowleh Sepher* [Political Memoirs of *Movarrehk al-Dowleh Sepher*], ed., Ahmad Sami’i (Tehran: Namak, 1995), 31-2.

⁷⁷¹ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 153.

⁷⁷² *Shams*, October 30, 1910.

⁷⁷³ *The London Times*, “Great Britain and the New Regent of Persia”, February 1, 1911.

Before Naser al-Molk's arrival, the parties had put aside their differences and both agreed to allow him the opportunity to serve the country. Taqizadeh was not in Tehran at that time. Despite this, remaining correspondence proves that he was constantly in touch with the senior members of the Democrat Party and, although not present, was in fact leading the party in Iran. Seemingly contradicting this, Taqizadeh himself stated that since he was in Istanbul during that period he was not so involved in the conflicts between the Moderates and the Democrats.⁷⁷⁴ In correspondence with Ali Badamchi, one of the senior members of the party, Taqizadeh emphasised that the Democrats should not interfere with minor governmental issues and remain impartial.⁷⁷⁵ The same approach was reflected in *Iran-e Now*, the Democrat Party's official publication. Details of this approach were published in eleven articles and emphasised the need for co-operation with the other parties to oppose those conservatives who were against the constitution. It recommended a less aggressive stance and highlighted the importance of publicising the ideology of the Party to gradually attract more members.⁷⁷⁶ And thus the Democrat Party, wanting to demonstrate their willingness to co-operate with the new regent, upon his arrival, sent members to welcome him. In contrast to this show of support, when the representatives of the Democrat party arrived to greet him, it was seen that Naser al-Molk, suspicious of their intentions, was in possession of a gun. This dramatic gesture was considered a demonstration of his lack of trust of the Democrats, conveying a clear message to the Russians that he would not side with the Democrats.⁷⁷⁷

Upon his arrival, Naser al-Molk pressured the Parliament into strengthening its majority in order to prevent the Democrats who were in the minority but more organised from frequently dominating the Parliament. Naser al-Molk played a large role in unifying smaller parties such as Ettefaq va Tarraqi [Unison and Progress] and the Moderates in the Parliament. He believed a constitutional government could not function effectively with a parliament whose members were split up into disparate groups and driven by their own

⁷⁷⁴ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 169.

⁷⁷⁵ Mohammad Ali Badamchi to Taqizadeh, 8 March 1911, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 240-52.

⁷⁷⁶ *Iran-e Now*, October 24, 1910.

⁷⁷⁷ Sepher, *Khaterat-e Siyasi-e Movarrehk al-Dowleh Sepher*, 31-2.

personal interests.⁷⁷⁸ According to a British Foreign Ministry source, the regent was adamant that he would not take up his post unless a majority were united in support of the government ministers.⁷⁷⁹

By the time that Naser al-Molk arrived in Tehran, Mostufi al-Mamalek, backed by the Democrats, had formed the government. However, with the arrival of the regent that government resigned.⁷⁸⁰ Naser al-Molk nominated Sepahdar for the post of Prime Minister. Although this was against the Democrats' wishes, they did not protest as the regent was not acting illegally. Consequently, the Parliament declared a majority with 48 votes in favour of Sepahdar as Prime Minister.⁷⁸¹ The joining of the majority of Moderates to Sepahdar's cabinet highlighted Naser al-Molk's aim to avoid having a cabinet dominated by the Democrats. With the formation of this new cabinet, the anti-constitutionalist clergy and old aristocracy were hopeful that the constitutionalists' hold over the country was weakening.

After Taqizadeh's departure, the intense political situation of Iran created by the assassination of Behbahani was exacerbated by further killings. Sani' al-Dowleh, the Finance Minister and the Speaker of the First Parliament was assassinated by two Russian nationals on 13 February, 1911. This deepened the division and hostility between the political groups in Iran.⁷⁸² Sani' al-Dowleh had been educated in Europe and was keen to see the modernisation of Iran. His death was a blow to those who advocated reform and modernisation. It was said that Sani' al-Dowleh's anti-Russian attitude was the reason for his assassination.⁷⁸³ Taqizadeh believed that the Russians had been involved in plotting the killing of Sani' al-Dowleh or had encouraged other Iranian Russophiles to commit the

⁷⁷⁸ *Iran-e Now*, February 22, 1911.

⁷⁷⁹ Barclay to Grey, telegram, 13 February 1911, in *Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Persia: In Continuation of Persia No. 1* (1911), (London: Harrison and Sons, 1912), 21.

⁷⁸⁰ Mamalek became Prime Minister, he was only 37 years old and despite being young was very much respected in society. His sojourns to Europe had influenced him and he was greatly interested in reforms and serving the public. Most of his ministers were under forty years of age and each could converse in one or more foreign languages. See: Baqer 'Aqeli, *Ruz Shomar-e Tarikh-e Iran* [A Journal of Iranian History] (Tehran: Goftar, 1995), 1:74.

⁷⁸¹ Barclay to Grey, telegram, 24 February 1911, in *Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Persia: In Continuation of Persia No. 1* (1911), 23.

⁷⁸² Dolatabadi, 3:158.

⁷⁸³ "British Blue Book on Persia Vindicates Shuster," in *The New York Times*, June 30, 1911.

crime. He suspected there to be a connection between this assassination and the railway project in Iran in which Sani' al-Dowleh had been heavily involved, eager for the project to be actualised.⁷⁸⁴ According to *Iran-e Now*, after Sani' al-Dowleh's death, among his papers were documents stating that he had plans to ask for loans from the United States to promote the railway project in Iran.⁷⁸⁵

By the time Naser al-Molk became the regent, the general situation of the country was chaotic and the central government was losing control over the provinces. The hopes and expectations of the general public for the new constitutional government were not met and were, in fact, replaced by deep disappointment and bitterness. The masses believed that all the hardships they were facing: the food and water shortages; the financial recession; the lack of security and poverty, would be fixed by a new governing system. But after a year and a half, they realised that their hopes were not going to be realised. Not only did they not see any signs of improvements, but the adverse situation was in fact deteriorating. The public was disappointed and disillusioned with the government. This further strengthened those who questioned the legitimacy of the constitutional law in contrast with Islamic law which cast doubts over the authority of the central government.⁷⁸⁶ The central government was weakened and the intervention by foreign countries had increased. The plan for transition of power from an individual to parties was unsuccessful and once again it was Naser al-Molk upon whom everyone pinned their hopes, eager for the situation to change. In response to the overriding feeling of despair, Naser al-Molk was seen as a possible saviour by both politicians and the general public. He was positively compared to previously successful rulers in Iranian history such as Karim Khan, Shah Abbas, and Anoushirvan. Unlike Taqizadeh, Naser al-Molk was more of a career politician and less ideologically driven in his profession. In Taqizadeh's opinion, it was Naser al-Molk who facilitated the ruling of the Moderates and in order to achieve this he had tried to destroy the opposition party. In fact, his victims had been political freedom and the constitution. Taqizadeh then writes about Naser-al Molk's character:

⁷⁸⁴ Taqizadeh to Browne, 1 June 1911, Istanbul, in *Browne Papers*, 9- 4- 1.

⁷⁸⁵ *Iran-e Now*, February 22, 1911.

⁷⁸⁶ *Shams*, August 8, 1910.

There are seemingly contradictory sides to this statesman's character. His political intelligence is clearly evident and he is an admirable speaker. His knowledge is vast, he can converse in French, English and Russian. His morals and integrity are beyond question. However, he is more of a theorist than a practical man; he only uses his intelligence to criticise and by nature is a pessimist. He seems to lack any courage of his convictions and does not fervently defend his opinions. His main concern is his popularity among the masses and he is willing to go to any lengths to ensure this popularity. In reality, he is a weak man and therefore, like any weak man, he bears a grudge and the slightest opposition to him triggers vengeful feelings.⁷⁸⁷

Despite all this, Naser al-Molk played a significant role in the consolidation of the political parties in Iran. Taqizadeh was also one of the pioneers in Iranian political history who promoted the idea of giving importance to a party as a whole rather than to an individual. Amirkhizi quotes Mohammad Ali Tarbiat who narrated that, when the Democrats met to discuss the possibility that Taqizadeh might leave the country and voted against it, Taqizadeh gathered the senior members of the Party and convinced them that the Party should not be dependent on him or any other individual.⁷⁸⁸ Nevertheless, as Touraj Atabaki has argued, it has been a common pattern in Iranian history that when the country is on the verge of disintegration and anarchy it is expected that an extraordinary character will bring integrity and prosperity back to the country.⁷⁸⁹ Accordingly, at the time of the discussed events, it was now expected that Naser al-Molk would play such a role and bring back security and integrity to Iran.

6:4 The British Note of Interference

As a result of the lack of security in the south of Iran, the British were threatening to send forces to Iran in order to establish order and protect their interests.⁷⁹⁰ Because of the

⁷⁸⁷ X, "La Situation Politique de la Perse," in *Revue de Monde Musulman*, (June 1914), 27 : 275.

⁷⁸⁸ Amirkhizi, 576.

⁷⁸⁹ Touraj Atabaki, "Agency and Subjectivity in Iranian National Historiography," in *Iran in the 20th Century*, ed., Atabaki, 71.

⁷⁹⁰ Barclay to Persian Government, Tehran, 14 October 1910, in *Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Persia: In Continuation of Persia No. 1*, 105.

geographical position of the main British trade routes across southern Iran, these forces' jurisdiction would extend as far as the neutral zone which had been agreed under the agreement of 1907. At the same time, in the view of the British, this area was where Germany hoped to expand its influence to with the construction of the Baghdad-Khaneqain railway. The Russians viewed the idea of British expansion very positively and were eager for the establishment of a more permanent British force in southern Iran. A British Army presence in the south of the country would, they believed, make it easier for their Russian troops to occupy northern regions of the country and facilitate reinforcement of Russian troops.⁷⁹¹

According to *Shams*, the British note of intervention was discussed extensively in the Ottoman and German newspapers. In an article published in *Shams*, Hossein Danesh described how this note had galvanised some circles in Istanbul and he suggested that this act against Iran was considered as a threat to the whole Islamic world. Some members of the Etihad va Taraqqi [Union and Progress] Party, a leading party advocating reforms in Ottoman Turkey, gave public talks, asking that the Ottomans unite with Iran, Germany and other Islamic countries to defend the common enemy, Britain and Russia.⁷⁹² Similarly, *Iran-e Now* wrote that the British note was discussed in German and Islamic world newspapers and in particular quoted the *Gunash* [Sunshine] newspaper published in Baku. *Gunash* wrote that the whole Islamic world should pay great attention to this act and even suggested that the ultimatum was given to test the reaction of the Islamic world and gauge the importance of Iran for Muslims. *Gunash* advised all Muslims to unite and protest the British threat.⁷⁹³ *Chereh Nama* [True Face] wrote that looking at a world map, one could clearly see that faithlessness faced Islam, darkness faced the light, Westerners faced those in the East; the Europeans like angry, hungry, aggressive lions were facing a group of Muslims. *Kheyr al-Kalam* [The Best Words] of Gilan noted that the British ultimatum would be a big test not only for Iran but also for the rest of the Islamic world.⁷⁹⁴ In another

⁷⁹¹ Mansour Bonakdarian, *Britain And the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911: Foreign Policy, Imperialism and Dissent* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 224.

⁷⁹² *Shams*, November 21, 1910.

⁷⁹³ *Iran-e Now*, November 1, 1910.

⁷⁹⁴ *Khair al-Kalam*, December 24, 1910.

article, *Iran-e Now* posited that, although Muslims had not progressed far enough along the path of civilisation, unity of the Islamic world could nevertheless be mobilised by the religious orders of high ranking clergy.⁷⁹⁵ In a letter to Taqizadeh, Browne noted that the British establishment was affected by the protests of the Muslim world, in particular the large demonstration in Istanbul. They had not anticipated such a strength of feeling of solidarity in the Islamic world, and were sceptical of Muslims uniting, especially Shiites and Sunnis.⁷⁹⁶

The idea of Islamic unity in its modern sense, which would later become further widespread at the outbreak of the First World War, might well be traced back to this point in history.⁷⁹⁷ Because of new and efficient means of transportation and communications from the end of the 19th century onwards, Islamic countries were better connected and informed about each other's affairs. Whilst leaders of Islam had previously sought to spread the religion, now the focus had turned to uniting the followers of Islam in order to protect Islamic lands from the threat of the invading forces who had been empowered by scientific thought and new technologies. The idea of Islamic unity was an ongoing discourse a year after the British threatened intervention in Iran. *Neday-e Jonoub* [Call of the South] warned, "O Muslims, try to unite and chase away the germs of contention. If your life continues like this, leaving you miserable and pitiful, it will not be long before our Islamic countries are held ransom to the grudges and ambitions of the Christian countries."⁷⁹⁸ *Shafaq*

⁷⁹⁵ According to *Iran-e Now*, following the British threat, the Iranians of Istanbul gathered together in one of the theatres in the central district of Beyoglu to protest against Britain and Russia. Many Turks especially high-ranking officials were present. The speakers and in particular one from Tunisia talked about the unity of the Muslim nations and expressed concern about the negative consequences of distancing Iran from the Ottoman Empire. They demanded that the Ottoman government oppose this, unite with and seek help from the Triple Alliance. One of the members of parliament praised Germany, mentioning that Germany had taken the place of Britain and enumerated the services that Germany had performed for the Muslims, especially in Morocco. The speaker's final proposal was to send a telegram to the German Emperor asking that he prevent Iran from breaking away from the Ottoman Empire. This suggestion was praised by all present. Chants of 'Long Live Germany' were heard from all sides.

⁷⁹⁶ Browne to Taqizadeh, Cambridge, 8 May 1911, in *Nameh-hay-e Edward Browne be Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh*, eds., Zaryab and Afshar, 34-6.

⁷⁹⁷ While Pan-Islamic ideology and organisation in the Ottoman Empire dated from Sultan Abd al-Hamid II's reign (1876-1909), certain signs point to some earlier developments and preparatory conditions. See: Jacob M. Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 9.

⁷⁹⁸ *Neday-e Jonoub*, November 21, 1911.

[Dawn] also published an editorial under the title “The Unity of Islam” and highlighted the importance of bilateral co-operation between Iran and Ottoman Turkey.⁷⁹⁹

Frustratingly for Taqizadeh, who had himself previously been victim of a religious decree by high-ranking clergy, the idea of Islamic unity which once again depended on that same clergy’s predominant leadership, was again threatening to rear its ugly head.⁸⁰⁰ This must have been a bitter pill to swallow for Taqizadeh. In a letter to Browne, who was obviously in favour of respecting the leading Shia clergy of Najaf, Taqizadeh strongly expressed his opinion.

He wrote that, whilst he accepted that the clergy of Najaf had played a significant role in establishing the constitution and acknowledged that this should be recognised, he was opposed to these clergymen or indeed the clergy in general benefitting from having extra rights.⁸⁰¹ Using an example from the past, he emphasised that, while drafting the electoral law of the Parliament, Iranian Armenians had also demanded an extension of their powers after having been instrumental in helping the constitutional movement. They had demanded that there be three deputies in the Parliament instead of the one that they were legally entitled to. Taqizadeh, however, had disagreed strongly with this, arguing that this went against the fundamental principle of equality and non-discrimination of all persons before the law. Similarly, now, the clergy were expecting exceptional rights. And again, Taqizadeh expressed his dissent. As Ali Ansari has argued, as a result of his religious education, Taqizadeh was all too well aware of the flaws of the Shia establishment from inside out.⁸⁰² He thus suggested that the clergy’s powers were already too wide reaching and that granting them any further powers might have long lasting negative consequences.⁸⁰³

⁷⁹⁹ *Shafaq*, March 6, 1911.

⁸⁰⁰ *Iran-e Now* had previously criticised the unlimited power of the clergy after they had announced their disapproval of Taqizadeh. *Iran-e Now*, like Taqizadeh, advocated the equality of all people under the constitutional government. See: “Mashrutiyat va Nofouz-e Ashkhas,” [The Constitution and the Influence of Individuals] in *Iran-e Now*, July 6, 1910.

⁸⁰¹ There is an elaborate article published in *Habl al-Matin* regarding the power of the clergy and the authority of the prominent cleric of Najaf. According to *Habl al-Matin*, the decree against Taqizadeh had greatly weakened the authority of the clergy.

⁸⁰² Ansari, *The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran*, 51.

⁸⁰³ Taqizadeh to Browne, Istanbul, 30 March 1911, in *Browne Papers*, 1-1-30, 1-1-40.

Despite Taqizadeh's great respect for Browne, we see here that Taqizadeh was not willing to compromise when it came to what he believed in; he was indeed an independent thinker and ready to boldly defend his stance when necessary. Fully aware of the key role of the clergy in the formation of the concept of the unity of Islam, Taqizadeh struggled to identify with it. The clergy was pushing for the superior rights of Muslims over anyone who might not be of the same faith. Taqizadeh, however, had been greatly influenced by the French Revolution. His ideology revolved around the concept of building a nation whose subjects would have equal rights, despite their beliefs. The Democrat Party, which Taqizadeh represented, had many influential non-Muslim members such as Armenians. Another reason that Taqizadeh questioned the clergy's stance on the unity of Islam was that he saw that this would lead to the Ottomans having the upper hand. He was well aware of the fact that some factions of Ottoman political parties or pan-Turkists were eager to expand the territory of the Ottoman Empire and they considered the Turkish speaking regions of Iran as being under the natural jurisdiction of that empire. Theoretically speaking, Taqizadeh did not view the confrontation between the West and Iran from a religious perspective. He considered the source of the backwardness of the Islamic world to be its lack of rationality and absence of scientific methods. For Taqizadeh, science was a universal knowledge which could be learnt and utilised universally and was not exclusively possessed in particular by any nation, religion or race. As was mentioned in previous chapters, Taqizadeh was determined to find ways for Iranians to learn and develop this ideology as swiftly as possible.

His previous trips to Egypt and Lebanon and living in Istanbul during this period had allowed Taqizadeh to monitor the situation and keep abreast of the developments and ideas which were circulating at the time. Two articles by Taqizadeh published in 1912 and 1913 entitled "Les Courants Politiques dans la Turquie Contemporaine" [Political Trends in Contemporary Turkey] and "Doctrines et Programme des Partis Politiques Ottomans" [Doctrines and Programmes of the Ottoman Political Parties], prove the depths of knowledge he had acquired about contemporary political developments during his time in

Istanbul.⁸⁰⁴ Taqizadeh was well versed in Seyyed Jamal al Din Asadabadi's (Afghani) ideas about Islamic unity, having earlier stayed in Egypt and attended classes given by Seyyed Jamal al Din's disciple, Sheikh Mohammad Abdoh. His residency in Istanbul, the melting pot of the Islamic world's political ideas, had exposed him to the developing discourse of the concept of Islamic unity and informed his beliefs and ideology which would lead to the eventual implementation of political policies. Taqizadeh's ideas developed over time. To fully appreciate the gradual development of his ideas concerning Iran's position within an international context, Taqizadeh's time in Istanbul should be examined further.

Meanwhile, Browne also tried to make peace between Taqizadeh and the leading clergy in Najaf. With the aim of mediating, he wrote a letter to Akhund Khorasani who had declared Taqizadeh unfit for political roles.⁸⁰⁵ But, Ayatollah Khorasani replied that although the clergy were aware of the benefits of Taqizadeh's services, during the revolutionary period his dismissal had been necessary.⁸⁰⁶

6:5 Taqizadeh in Istanbul

Despite the writing of Mojtehedī which states that Taqizadeh was well received in Istanbul and that he was aided by the community of Tabrizi businessmen, other sources suggest that he was rather isolated in Istanbul. Although he was a high-profile politician, it seems that the Turkish authorities also ignored Taqizadeh's presence in that city.⁸⁰⁷ Hossein Danesh, in a letter to Browne, wrote that although Taqizadeh's period of leave from the Parliament had ended, he was still to be summoned back. He then continued that Taqizadeh was not at all respected in Istanbul and little attention was paid to him. Danesh regarded Taqizadeh's fall from grace as deplorable. He was saddened by the fact that a single clergyman's religious order could have such devastating consequences for a

⁸⁰⁴ X, "Les Courants Politiques Dans la Turquie Contemporaine," in *Revue du Monde Musulman*, (1912), 21: 158- 221. And: X "Doctrines et Programme des Partis Politiques Ottomans," in *Revue du Monde Musulman*, (December 1913), 23: 151-164.

⁸⁰⁵ Browne to Ayatollah Khorasani, 446-7

⁸⁰⁶ Akhund Khorasani to Browne, 30 June 1911, in *Hoqoq Begiran-e Englis dar Iran* (Tehran: Javidan, 1994), 447-8.

⁸⁰⁷ Hedayat, 219.

politician.⁸⁰⁸ Browne too, informed by various contacts in Iran, was concerned about the role Taqizadeh had played in causing tension between the political parties in Iran. In the same letter, Danesh mentions that Taqizadeh greatly resented that some had complained about him to Browne. Drawing from other letters sent from Tehran to Taqizadeh, it is evident that some from inside Iran were attempting to put pressure on Taqizadeh by inciting the Iranian community in Istanbul to discredit him.⁸⁰⁹ Taqizadeh complained that even before his arrival in Istanbul some had provoked Iranians in Istanbul against him.⁸¹⁰ During his stay in Istanbul, in a letter to Browne, Taqizadeh laments that after the liberation of Tehran some had turned against him and had attempted to tarnish his reputation.⁸¹¹

During the first few months of Taqizadeh's stay in Istanbul he was still hopeful that he might return to Iran and at least reside in Tabriz. He was repeatedly warned by friends inside Iran, however, that now was not the right time for him to go back; the atmosphere was volatile and it would be preferable if he waited for the situation to calm down before attempting to return.⁸¹² A letter from Tarbiat to Taqizadeh states that the Tabriz provincial Assembly had sent a telegraph to the Parliament and the regent requesting that Taqizadeh be recalled to Iran. But, not in favour of that idea, he adds that Taqizadeh should put aside any thoughts of returning to Iran because of the chaotic and unstable situation of the country. Tarbiat then writes bluntly, "I see no positive feelings or enthusiasm towards you here and even your friends seem to have almost forgotten about you. I appear to be the only person who is constantly thinking of you and admires you...".⁸¹³ He then advises Taqizadeh that he should reside somewhere outside Iran, continue writing and find some other occupation as his return might not be possible for years. But, though far from Iran, the remaining correspondence shows that Taqizadeh was kept constantly updated about the political affairs of Iran and was influential in leading policies of the Democrat Party in Iran. For instance, Mahmoud Oskuyi, one of the Democrat Party members in Tabriz, wrote to

⁸⁰⁸ Hossein Danesh to Edward Browne, 27 February 1911, in *Browne Papers*, 1-2-24.

⁸⁰⁹ Mohammad Ali Badamchi to Taqizadeh, 8 March 1911, and Manoucher Irani to Taqizadeh, 15 March 1911 in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 240-52 and 252-4.

⁸¹⁰ Mohammad Ali Badamchi to Taqizadeh, 2 April 1911, in *Ibid.*, 256-7.

⁸¹¹ Taqizadeh to Browne, 30 March 1911, in *Browne Papers*, 1-1-39.

⁸¹² Mohammad Ali Badamchi to Taqizadeh, 2 April 1911, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 256-7.

⁸¹³ Mohammad Ali Tarbiat to Taqizadeh, 9 September 1911, in *Ibid.*, 296-9.

Taqizadeh, asking him to continue sending instructions to the Party branch in Tabriz since his words were the most influential.⁸¹⁴ Taqizadeh's residency in Istanbul had also put him in direct contact with Turkish politicians. He writes that he was in constant touch with the Young Turks or Etihad va Taraqqi Party, the ruling government party at that time.⁸¹⁵ It was recorded that Taqizadeh had organised an assembly of migrants and businessmen from Tabriz called "Jam'at-e Nashr-e Ma'raf [The Assembly for the Promotion of Education]."⁸¹⁶ According to Mojtehedī, Taqizadeh had established this assembly to familiarise the migrants with the New World and science. They were to do research about Iranian literature and politics. Every week each member would carry out research in the libraries of Istanbul connected to a certain subject, before giving a talk for the others. The aim of this was to broaden their knowledge and improve their oratory skills.⁸¹⁷ Esma'īl Yekani talks about a small organisation called "The Iranian Democrat Committee", founded while Taqizadeh had resided in Istanbul. It is possible that he is talking about the same group or alternatively the group he mentions could have been made up of only the more senior members of the party. According to Yekani, after the events in Tabriz in the winter of 1911 and persecution of the constitutionalists, many leading constitutionalists had come to Istanbul and were active in the committee. These included Mohammad Ali and Reza Tarbiat, Esma'īl Nobari, Esma'īl Amirkhizi, Mirza Aqa Naleh-e Mellat, Ghafar Zonouzi, As'ad al-Allah Ahmadzadeh, Mahmoud Ghanizadeh, Ali Mohammad Salmasi and Yekani. Taqizadeh himself also attended the meetings of this committee.⁸¹⁸

Commenting on Taqizadeh's attempts to educate as many Iranians as he could, one should note that during this period that he was staying in Istanbul, London and Paris the concept of eugenics first became a respectable concept, supported by prominent politicians and learned men. The first international eugenics conference was held in London in 1912.

⁸¹⁴ Mahmoud Oskuyi to Taqizadeh, 1911, in *Ibid.*, 368.

⁸¹⁵ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 169.

⁸¹⁶ 'Isa Sadiq, "Taqizadeh," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 4.

⁸¹⁷ Mojtehedī, *Tarikh-e Zendeghani-e Taqizadeh*, 33.

⁸¹⁸ Esma'īl Yekani, "Zendeghani-e Taqizadeh [The Life of Taqizadeh]," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 264.

Later, while Taqizadeh was writing for *Kaveh*, elements of the eugenics movement's theories about the improvement of the human race are traceable in his writings.

6:6 American Financial Experts

After the disarmament of the Mojaheds in Tehran and the establishment of some security in the capital, one of the plans of the fledgling government was to modernise the financial system of the country. The Iranian government, after consultation with the leaders of the Parliament, therefore decided to hire financial advisers from countries neutral and uninvolved in Iran's affairs, which might help to modernise the traditional Iranian financial system. At the same time, Russia and Britain were opposed to the idea of hiring advisers from other non-aggressive, impartial European countries since they believed it would promote international rivalry over Iran.⁸¹⁹ This matter was discussed in parliament in November and December of 1910 and it was decided to hire financial advisers from the United States of America. The fact that these advisers were from outside Europe, they believed, would mean that they would not be influenced by those European powers with interests in Iran. Owing to the adverse financial state of the country and its empty coffers, during the summer and autumn of 1909 the Iranian government had approached Britain and Russia for a loan. The loan from the Russian and British governments was for the amount of \$2,500,000. The Parliament considered the conditions of this loan to be dangerous for the sovereignty and independence of Iran and thus the proposal was rejected. Employing the foreign advisers and establishing a centralised tax system would help to ameliorate the struggling financial situation that the country found itself in without having to rely on foreign loans. With the support of the Democrat Party, American financial officials W. Morgan Shuster, the Treasurer-General, Charles I. McCaskey, the Inspector of Provincial Revenues and Bruce G. Dickey, the Inspector of Taxation arrived in Tehran on the 12 May, 1911.⁸²⁰ On his way to Iran, Shuster met Taqizadeh in Istanbul. Interestingly, Shuster and Taqizadeh each mention that it was the other gentleman who came to meet him. Though Taqizadeh does not share any details of the meeting, Shuster writes that they

⁸¹⁹ Bonakdarian, *Britain And the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911*, 225.

⁸²⁰ Barclay to Grey, 18 May 1911, in Further Correspondence No. 3(1912) in Continuation of No.1(1911), 63.

met for an hour and discussed the troubles in Iran.⁸²¹ Taqizadeh was a member of the financial committee of the First Parliament and was knowledgeable about the financial affairs of the country.⁸²² Shuster later wrote about the insight he received from the Iranian exiled in Istanbul regarding the situation in Iran: "...I confess that the prospects were not particularly encouraging".⁸²³ One can assume that Taqizadeh gave some advice to Shuster and reassured him that the Democrats in Tehran would wholeheartedly support him.⁸²⁴ Later, while working in Iran, Shuster was grateful for the backing he received from *Iran-e Now*, the official publication of the Democrat Party.⁸²⁵

Shuster's arrival gave the Democrats one last chance to retake power in the Parliament.⁸²⁶ Despite much opposition, Shuster, with support from the Democrats, managed to quickly win over the Parliament and gained its support and trust. Shuster assigned, as his adviser, Hossein Qoli Khan Navab, one of the high-ranking Democrat Party leaders and the previous cabinet's Foreign Minister. Hossein Qoli Khan, while Foreign Minister, had played an important role in hiring Shuster. According to Malekzadeh, Shuster had taken side with the Democrat Party because of his close relationship with senior members of the Democrat Party and in particular with Navab. Navab was fluent in English and familiar with western culture and thus able to influence Shuster and gain his trust.⁸²⁷ Shortly after arriving in Tehran, Shuster introduced a campaign of fiscal reforms, which positively impacted on the public and further garnered him popular support including from both women in Tehran and those in the scores of secret Women's Societies there.⁸²⁸

Shuster was criticised by those who did not find his reforms in line with their own interests. Sepahdar, the Prime Minister, and many of the cabinet ministers were heavily critical of Shuster.⁸²⁹ The "Mostufis", the traditional accountants of the treasury, were also

⁸²¹ W. Morgan Shuster, *The Strangling of Persia* (New York: The Century Co., 1912), 36.

⁸²² Mojtehed, 178.

⁸²³ Shuster, 36.

⁸²⁴ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 169.

⁸²⁵ Shuster, 20.

⁸²⁶ Afary, 314.

⁸²⁷ Malekzadeh, 6-7: 1374.

⁸²⁸ Shuster, 194-8.

⁸²⁹ Afary, 320.

unhappy with Shuster's reforms and were siding with the Russians in opposition to the Americans.⁸³⁰ The increasing authority of Shuster, together with the growing power of the Democrats who had a strong anti-Russian policy, could not be ignored by the Russians. Abd al-Rahim Khalkhali explaining the situation to Taqizadeh writes, "These days all the fights and disputes are over Mr. Shuster. The Prime Minister and all the ministers and Moustofis, those who received payments, spongers, loafers, taxpayers, nobles, dignitaries are all, each and every one, against Shuster..."⁸³¹ In another correspondence, Khalkhali even mentions that Shuster was accused of being a Babi or Bahai by his opponents.⁸³²

While Shuster was struggling to organise the financial affairs of the country, with some success, insurgencies in support of the return of the ex-Shah were taking place in different corners of the country. One of the biggest threats was to Mohammad Ali Shah's brother, Salar al-Dowleh and the ex-Shah himself. Salar al-Dowleh had arrived in Iranian territory from the western frontiers and, with the backing of some Kurds, was preparing to attack the capital and re-establish his brother as Shah. A further threat was the news of the ex-Shah, Mohammad Ali Shah's return to Iran with the consent of the Russians. On 17 July, 1911, Mohammad Ali Shah, assisted by a few fellow followers, confident of help from the Turkman and Shahsavan tribes following a prior agreement, set foot on Iranian soil at Astarabad on the shore of the Caspian Sea in the north of Iran. He was ready to begin his campaign to regain power. Amongst his followers were the ex-Shah's brother, Shoa' al-Saltaneh, Amir Bahador and S'ad al-Dowleh.⁸³³ The news of the ex-Shah's attempt to regain the throne united the Democrats and the Moderates.⁸³⁴ This resulted in the removal of Sepahdar who was allegedly a secret accomplice of the ex-Shah. On 24 July, he tendered his resignation which the regent accepted. On 26 July, Samsam al-Dowleh from the Bakhtiyari tribe became Prime Minister.⁸³⁵ On 13 September, 1911, the government forces

⁸³⁰ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 159.

⁸³¹ Abd al-Rahim Khalkhali to Taqizadeh, 4 November 1911, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 338-43.

⁸³² *Ibid.*

⁸³³ Barclay to Grey, Tehran, 28 July 1911, in *Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Persia: No. 1* (1911) (London: Harrison and Sons, 1912), 144.

⁸³⁴ Malakzadeh, 6,7: 1390.

⁸³⁵ Barclay to Grey, Tehran, 9 August 1911, in *Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Persia: No. 1* (1911) (London: Harrison and Sons, 1912), 148.

dispersed the ex-Shah's forces in Savadkouh. Now the only chance the ex-Shah had to avoid being captured by governmental forces was to seek refuge on Russian soil. This would violate article 10 of the protocol which Iran had signed with Russia and Britain in September 1909 before the Shah had been sent into exile. Basing their argument on this agreement, the Iranian government appealed against the ex-Shah being allowed to enter Russian territory and requested that if he were to set foot on Russian land, Russian authorities would arrest and hand him over to Iran.⁸³⁶ According to the agreement, if it were proved that the ex-Shah caused political disturbances, his pension would be suspended.

6:7 The Russian Ultimatum and Closure of the Second Parliament

Shuster, as the Treasurer-General, put all his efforts into collecting the taxes that, according to the law, wealthy people were obliged to pay. Unlike the pre-constitutional era, when the rich would often evade paying taxes and in contrast the poor were heavily taxed, Shuster's policy was to treat everybody equally. This attitude, at times, brought him face to face with people wielding great power. His approach was, in fact, in line with the policies of the Democrat Party, which advocated protecting the less fortunate citizens.

To be able to maintain his authority to collect taxes, Shuster was determined to organise a special treasury gendarmerie. He asked Major C. B. Stoke, who was about to leave his position as British military attaché, to command this newly founded gendarmerie. The Russian legation strongly objected to the appointment since Stoke, as a British subject, would clearly not be too well-disposed towards the Russians and resented their authority. As a result, Stoke was forced to once again take up his previous posting in India. This was a clear blow to Shuster, whether that was the Russian's intention or not.

The Russians were determined to sabotage Shuster's plans. They finally had the pretext to demand Shuster's removal from office and his expulsion from Iran. In November 1911, the Iranian treasury gendarmes attempted to confiscate the property of Shoa' al-Saltaneh, the ex-Shah's brother, as he had assisted the ex-Shah's attempts to regain his throne. The

⁸³⁶ Barclay to Grey, telegram, 13 September 1911, in *Ibid.*, 144.

Russian Cossacks intervened and arrested five of the gendarmes. The Russians claimed they had the right to carry out these actions as Shoa' al-Saltaneh was a Russian subject and thus protected by the Russian government, and was in debt to the Russian Imperial Bank. This was, however, not the case; he was, according to Percy Sykes, a Turkish subject.⁸³⁷

Eventually, on 29 November 1911, Russia announced an ultimatum to the Iranian government asking for the dismissal of Shuster and one of his nominees, Mr. Lecoffre, recently appointed as his agent in Tabriz. Secondly, the Russians requested an agreement not to engage any foreigners in the service of the Iranian government without the previous consent of the British and Russian legations. Additionally, they demanded an indemnity for the expenses of the Russian troops in Iran. If the Iranian government did not comply with the terms of the ultimatum within 48 hours, the Russian troops would advance into the country.⁸³⁸ The British government made no objection to the Russian ultimatum. Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister, stated that, "Whilst one of the chief objects of the Anglo-Russian Agreement with regard to Persia was to safeguard and preserve the independence of that country, it was nevertheless absolutely essential that the Government of an independent Persia should take account of the respective interests of Russia and Great Britain in the parts adjoining their frontiers."⁸³⁹

On 1 December 1911, Parliament sat to decide the matter while a large crowd was waiting outside to hear the final decision. The decision of the majority was to reject the Russian ultimatum. In the afternoon, the resolution was submitted to the Russian Minister and shortly after the Foreign Minister resigned. The British government was meanwhile urging the Iranians to accept the ultimatum.⁸⁴⁰

The Iranian people, especially in Tehran, reacted against the Russian ultimatum. In Tehran people closed the Bazar and demonstrated against the ultimatum and women and

⁸³⁷ Percy Sykes, *A History of Persia*, (London: Macmillan and Co., 1951), 425.

⁸³⁸ *The London Times*, November 30, 1911.

⁸³⁹ *The London Times*, December 1, 1911.

⁸⁴⁰ *The London Times*, December 2, 1911.

children also took part.⁸⁴¹ People of many other provinces showed their support for the ultimatum by sending telegraphs to the Parliament in Tehran.⁸⁴² In Tabriz, a large number of students took part in a demonstration in front of the French and Ottoman consulates.⁸⁴³ 500 women from Tehran sent a telegraph to the provinces seeking support to fight for the independence of the country.⁸⁴⁴

Being outside Iran and aware of the international affairs and the perils of Russia's objectives, Taqizadeh was busy. He sent telegraphs to the leadership of the country and senior members of the Democrat Party, warning them about the seriousness of the situation. Since the Russian government had promised that if the Iranian government officially apologised, the Russians would withdraw their troops, Taqizadeh, in a telegram to Vosouq al-Dowleh, the Foreign Minister of the time, requested that an apology be sent immediately.⁸⁴⁵

Meanwhile, although it should have been dissolved after the ultimatum was rejected by the Parliament, the government was still in place and was in regular contact with the regent, trying to find a solution. Since the deadline for the ultimatum was rapidly approaching, the government had only two solutions; to reject the ultimatum which was what the Parliament and the people wanted or to accept it and dissolve the Parliament by military force. It was clear that if the ultimatum was not respected, the Russians would send more troops to Iran and the British would not object. The British government had advised the Iranians to accept the ultimatum and thus prevent the expansion of Russian troops in Iran. Although nations such as India, the Ottoman Empire and Egypt sent telegrams in support of the Iranian Parliament and encouraged the Iranians to resist the Russians, they were not fully aware of the gravity of the situation and the danger which was threatening Iran.

⁸⁴¹ *Shafaq*, December 10 and 18, 1911.

⁸⁴² *Ibid.*, no.42, December, 1911.

⁸⁴³ *Ibid.*, December 18, 1911.

⁸⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, December 7, 1911.

⁸⁴⁵ Taqizadeh to Vosouq al-Dowleh, telegram, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 377-8.

The regent and the government were convinced that not accepting the ultimatum would undermine the integrity and sovereignty of the country. The existence of the Parliament meant that it was impossible to accept the ultimatum and thus it was decided that the Parliament be dissolved. The Parliament was closed and members were prevented from entering the building. At the same time that the government officially announced the news of the acceptance of the ultimatum to the Russian legation, some Democrats, opposing the decision, took arms against the government. They were, however, disarmed by government forces. In a telegram, Sardar As'ad informed Taqizadeh about the Democrats' belligerent behaviour and requested that Taqizadeh use his influence:

The Democrats are inciting people against the Russian, British and Iranian governments. They are encouraging people to fight against the Russian troops. They have also publicised your telegram in opposition. It is necessary that you warn them immediately against this kind of instigation and prevent this incitement of the Democrats. A minute's delay is perilous and will endanger the country.⁸⁴⁶

This kind of behaviour from some of the supporters of the Democrat Party demonstrates that the leadership of the Party or at least Taqizadeh had lost authority and control of some of the Party members. The telegram Taqizadeh sent to Mohammad Reza Mosavat, one of the senior members of the Party, clearly indicates that Taqizadeh had been opposed to any radical act during this period. In the telegram, Taqizadeh instructs Mosavat, "Do not let affairs get out of hand so that control slips from the leadership into the hands of the masses. Please make all our friends fully aware of the matter."⁸⁴⁷ Previously, before the ultimatum, Taqizadeh had been similarly approached and asked to moderate the behaviour of the Democrat Party.

⁸⁴⁶ Sardar As'ad to Taqizadeh, telegram, *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat* ed., Afshar 379.

⁸⁴⁷ Taqizadeh to Mohammad Reza Shirazi (Mosavat), telegram, in *Ibid.*, 380-1.

6:8 Taqizadeh's Trip to Paris and London

Following the dispute over Shuster, who was supported by the Democrats and fearful of the imminent deployment of Russians troops in Iran, Sardar As'ad and other like-minded people now decided to bring these matters to Taqizadeh's attention. They were hopeful that Taqizadeh might persuade the Democrats in Tehran to keep silent about the Shuster case and thus Taqizadeh was invited to Paris for talks, where he stayed for about a month (November 1911). Although there is no documentation concerning the content of the discussion in Paris between these two men, a letter from Rasoulzadeh to Taqizadeh sheds more light on Taqizadeh's meeting with Sardar As'ad and the relationship between the Democrats and Bakhtiariis. He writes:

In terms of a relationship with Sardar As'ad, I was not particularly hopeful about this meeting. It became clear that, as I had quite rightly expected, your meeting with him has not changed anything with regards to the main issues. What you deem as Sardar As'ad's crudeness and ignorance, I consider to be the inherent mentality, capacity and disposition of a tribal chief. Regarding his pledges about a relationship with the Democrats, considering his criticisms of Democratism, I am not sure how sincere he is and how far he can be trusted. But I do not want you to conclude from what I said that I am in favour of a confrontation with the Bakhtiariis.⁸⁴⁸

In a letter to Moshir al-Molk, the Iranian Minister in London, Taqizadeh provides more information about his meetings in Paris. He writes that during the three days he was in Paris, he had daily meetings with Sardar As'ad and Lynch who had come from Britain. In one of the meetings Momtaz al-Saltaneh, Iranian representative in Paris, was also present.⁸⁴⁹ Taqizadeh later went to London, where Moshir al-Molk, was of the same opinion that he should act to silence the Democrats in Tehran. It was during Taqizadeh's time in London that the Russian ultimatum over Shuster's dismissal was announced. Whilst

⁸⁴⁸ Rasoulzadeh to Taqizadeh, Istanbul, 18 November 1911, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 324-6.

⁸⁴⁹ Taqizadeh to Moshir al-Molk, Istanbul, 27 March 1913, in *Asnad-e Siyasi-e Dooran-e Qajarieh* (Tehran), 390-4

in England, Taqizadeh travelled to Cambridge and stayed in Browne's house for three days (9 to 12 December 1911).⁸⁵⁰

Yahya Dolatabadi, one of the prominent constitutionalists who had left Iran and was in Europe at that time, writes about contacting Taqizadeh during his visits to Europe. He writes:

...my goal is to know with what plans he has come to Europe and what his strategy is. I want to see whether he has been changed by what he has experienced, his exile and the goals that he and his friends have been unable to achieve. I want to see whether he would now accept that these happenings have proved that what I said in Tehran was correct and wonder if he will make the right choices from now on, having learnt his lesson. I hope that together we can now find the right path for the Democrat Party.⁸⁵¹

Sometime later, Dolatabadi met Taqizadeh in Paris and claims that he noticed a big change in him. His impression was that Taqizadeh regretted some of his previous policies. According to Dolatabadi, he had several meetings with Taqizadeh and concluded that what had happened was because of past decisions. They could not do much to change the situation now that they were in Europe. Instead, they could prepare the groundwork for a better future for Iran. Dolatabadi gives a list of what they could do: encourage Iranian students studying abroad to return to Iran with plans and, through the press, steer European opinion towards Iran. He later notes that after concurring with each other, Taqizadeh agrees to co-operate with him and returns to Istanbul. He continues that after a month Taqizadeh sends a letter inviting him to Istanbul to participate in actualising a plan he had come up with in Istanbul. Dolatabadi speculates that this plan was to ignite a revolution in Iran.⁸⁵²

In addition to the turmoil of the political situations with which Taqizadeh was dealing, he was also plagued during this period by great financial difficulties. In his autobiography

⁸⁵⁰ Taqizadeh to Browne, 1-1-21. Also: Browne to Taqizadeh, 7 December 1911, in *Nameh-hay-e Edward Browne be Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh*, eds., Zaryab and Afshar, 37.

⁸⁵¹ Dolatabadi, 205.

⁸⁵² *Ibid.*, 205-6.

Taqizadeh highlights his difficult financial situation, commenting that he had only bread and cheese to eat, was struggling to make ends meet and had no money for travel. Realising Taqizadeh's dire situation, Mohammad Qazvini, Iranian scholar and political activist who was residing in Paris, offered his assistance by purchasing for him a third-class train ticket to Istanbul. During the trip Taqizadeh spent the last of his money and arrived in Istanbul penniless.⁸⁵³

Rasoulzadeh, a leading Democrat and the editor of *Iran-e Now*, was forced to leave Iran. He was expelled from Iran under the increasing pressure of the Russians, leading the Prime Minister of the time, Sepahdar, to order his dismissal. Rasoulzadeh had spearheaded the anti-Russian sentiment in the Iranian press which caused the Russians to demand his dismissal. Prior to his dismissal, Hossein Parviz had informed Taqizadeh that the Moderate cabinet wanted to close down *Iran-e Now* and in particular to get rid of Rasoulzadeh.⁸⁵⁴ Rasoulzadeh first spent some time in the Caucasus and again, under Russian pressure, left there too and travelled to Istanbul where he shared a house with Taqizadeh. According to Taqizadeh, upon arrival in Istanbul Rasoulzadeh was financially impoverished. Taqizadeh describes how Rasoulzadeh arrived with no shoes so he had given him his own shoes. Taqizadeh writes about this period:

I had a hard time making a living. In fact, I did not have any source of income. After my arrival in Istanbul, Mohammad Amin Rasoulzadeh, the editor of *Iran-e Now* in Tehran, upon the insistence of the Russians was dismissed from Tehran and had gone to his hometown Baku and from there came to Istanbul. As we were very good friends, he came to my house and stayed with me; in fact, we shared one house. For a while we struggled to make ends meet. We tried to teach Persian to anyone who wanted to learn which afforded us a small income which we lived on.⁸⁵⁵

⁸⁵³ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 350.

⁸⁵⁴ Hossein Parviz to Taqizadeh, 1911, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 363.

⁸⁵⁵ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 169.

Clearly Rasoulzadeh found himself in a difficult situation, personally. But it also negatively impinged on the situation back in Iran. The absence of Rasoulzadeh from Tehran was a big blow for the Democrats and *Iran-e Now*, of which he was chief editor.⁸⁵⁶

6:9 The Russian Intervention and “The Reign of Terror in Tabriz”

After the acceptance of the Russian ultimatum by the Iranian government and the closure of the Parliament and the bringing under control of the situation, influential members of the parties were sent into exile. The Russians, being aware of the weakness of the central government, tried to take full control of affairs in the province of Azerbaijan and its capital Tabriz. The Russian troops had camped outside Tabriz since April 1909 to protect the consulates and lives of the Europeans living in Tabriz. In the final phase of the resistance of the city, assurances were given that the military presence would be temporary. But, despite this promise, the troops did not withdraw after the battles ended and remained outside the city. After their ultimatum, the Russian decided to enter the city to disarm the city’s armed constitutionalist groups which had defended the city against the ex-Shah’s forces. Consequently, after a brief resistance, the defenders of the city surrendered and the Russians finally entered the city. They persecuted not only the Mojaheds but also the senior constitutionalists residing there. The events in Tabriz of 21 December, 1911 and consequently the armed resistance of some Mojaheds opened a fresh bloody chapter in the history of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran. The Mojaheds of Tabriz attacked the Russian forces, attempting to force their retreat from the city, but they were defeated. Some senior constitutionalists managed to escape from the city but many had no choice but to surrender their arms and stay while the Russians took full control of the city. On 31 December, 1911 the Russians executed Seqat al-Eslam, the respected clergyman of Tabriz, together with seven others who were thought to have played a role in inciting the people to revolt against the Russians. The persecution and killing of the constitutionalists of Tabriz continued more ferociously after Samad Khan entered Tabriz.

⁸⁵⁶ Ahmad Ostovar to Taqizadeh, Tehran, 7 June 1911, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 272.

As soon as Mohammad Ali Shah stepped onto Iranian soil, he assigned Samad Khan Shoja' al-Dowleh, one of the ex-Shah's commander and chiefs of the Shahsavan tribe, as the governor of Azerbaijan. Consequently, Samad Khan telegraphed 'Ain al-Dowleh, who had been newly appointed governor by the central government, declaring that he had been appointed as the governor of Azerbaijan by his Majesty Mohammad Ali Shah and suggesting that 'Ain al-Dowleh therefore need no longer return to Azerbaijan to take up that post. Three times, on 13, 17 and 25 September 1911, he attempted to break into the city to attack the defenders, Mojaheds of Tabriz. But he was unsuccessful at every attempt. Later he began to blockade the city to prevent food from entering the city. In the meantime, Samad Khan ruled over Maragheh and its vicinity.⁸⁵⁷

After taking the city under their control, the Russians admitted Samad Khan as the governor. Samad Khan entered the city on 2 January, 1912. He began massacring the constitutionalists and members of the general public in the most barbaric ways. Samad Khan, aided by the Russians, looted houses and captured and hanged the constitutionalists of Tabriz.

In the surprising silence of the British witnessing the tragedy of Tabriz, Taqizadeh began to publicise the events of Tabriz to make the world aware of what was happening in his home town. Taqizadeh managed to record the events of Tabriz in detail and included them in letters to Browne. Taqizadeh's letters were collected by Browne who later used them to inform the British public about the terrible Russian acts. Browne later translated the letters and published them in a collection with an introduction but without mention of Taqizadeh's name to maintain his anonymity. The story of the killings in Tabriz are recorded in other historical accounts but most important is the fact that Taqizadeh's aim was to immediately try to make the outside world aware of what was happening. In this way, Taqizadeh ensured that these tragic events were recorded for posterity. These events were deeply traumatising for Taqizadeh. Hearing the news of the execution of his friends whom he had fought with to achieve his goals further strengthened his resolve to fight Russian dominance in Iran. The destruction of what had been achieved in Tabriz in cultural and educational realms was

⁸⁵⁷ Solayman Mohssen Eskandari to Taqizadeh, 21 September 1911, in *Ibid.*, 309-15.

particularly painful for Taqizadeh; his hopes for the development of modern education and a brighter future for Iran were dashed.

Taqizadeh writes to Browne about the fact that, following the occupation of the Russians and coming to power of Samad Khan Shoja' al-Dowleh, the cultural and educational progress of Tabriz had seemingly taken a step backward. As he quite rightly highlights, after many years of hard work, education in Tabriz had been modernised and many modern-style schools had opened in Iran, including in Tabriz. Taqizadeh mentions that these schools had had a positive effect in Tabriz and remarks that in that city alone 25 elementary and high schools which utilised progressive European-style methods of education had been opened. According to Taqizadeh, 3000 students were studying in these schools where science, in particular, was being taught very successfully. Following the occupation of the Russians in Tabriz, these schools were now forced to close and, in their place, traditional schools were re-opened in the mosques. Taqizadeh was deeply distressed by the situation and commented that he regretted that the light of knowledge had been extinguished in Tabriz.⁸⁵⁸

Besides Tabriz, the Russians had carried out the same campaign in the occupied northern provinces of Iran. After the acceptance of the Russian ultimatum, the general situation in Iran was not so positive. The Parliament was closed and it was unclear when it would reopen. The central government was becoming increasingly weakened and the tribal and local rulers were taking control in different parts of the country. The most influential politicians had been exiled or killed or were in hiding and little political activity which might change the situation was possible. Taqizadeh, in the light of these events and the current situation, felt disheartened and helpless. Any hope of him returning to Iran soon was gone. He therefore looked for an alternative.

6:10 Moving to London and then the United States

Judging by the remaining documents, after his disappointment at being unable to return to Iran, Taqizadeh's intention was to leave Istanbul and spend time in Europe. However,

⁸⁵⁸ Taqizadeh to Browne, 22 April, 1912, in *Browne Papers*, 9-9-27.

his adverse financial situation prevented him from actualising his plan. As previously noted, Taqizadeh was struggling financially and needed to find a means of earning money. Thus, with diminished hopes of return to Iran, on 22 April 1912, he wrote to Browne that a School of Oriental Languages was about to open in London and asked Browne about the possibility of working there so that he might secure some income.⁸⁵⁹ Unfortunately for Taqizadeh, Browne's reply informed him that the school's opening was not imminent and any such opportunity would not be soon. Added to this, was his realisation that staying in Istanbul would be equally difficult.

A letter from Taqizadeh to Moshir al-Molk, the Iranian Minister in London, is informative. It discusses his leaving Istanbul and his six-month sojourn in London. Taqizadeh explains that when he was in Paris and met Sardar As'ad and Lynch, Lynch had advised him not to stay in Istanbul but rather to go to Britain and reside in London or Cambridge. Lynch's argument was that in Istanbul Taqizadeh would be unable to flourish and develop intellectually, whereas in Europe the environment was more conducive to learning. Taqizadeh remarks that Lynch had indirectly stated that if he went to Europe, the Persian Society would finance him. Taqizadeh adds that as another option, Samad Khan Momtaz al-Saltaneh, the Iranian Minister in Paris, had also informed him that if he were to reside in Paris the Union Franco-Persane would cover his expenses.⁸⁶⁰ Initially, Taqizadeh, after consultation with Sardar As'ad, had rejected the offers, arguing that, as a well-known Iranian politician, accepting money from foreigners for him was inappropriate and would compromise his impartiality. Sardar As'ad had stated the importance of having someone in Europe to represent the Iranian government's view to the European press and had therefore promised Taqizadeh that upon his return to Iran he would request that the government provide a salary for him. However, this promise was never fulfilled.⁸⁶¹ A letter from Mohammad Ali Tarbiat shows that Taqizadeh had also discussed his decision to stay in Europe with him. He writes to Taqizadeh:

⁸⁵⁹ Taqizadeh to Browne, 22 April 1912, in *Ibid.*

⁸⁶⁰ Union Franco-Persane, presided over by the famed explorer and archaeologist Marcel Dieulafoy, had been formed in Paris on July 3 1909, to promote the cause of the Iranian revolution. See: Bonakdarian, *Britain And the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911*, 207.

⁸⁶¹ Taqizadeh to Moshir al-Molk, Istanbul, 27 March 1913, in *Asnad-e Siyasi-e Dowran-e Qajariyeh* [Political Documents of the Qajar Era] ed., Ebrahim Safa'i (Tehran: Roshdiyeh, 1973), 390-94.

I am once again telling you my opinion, which, as before, you can reject. If you can manage to make a living there, by all means you should stay a little longer there; that's preferable to returning to Iran or Istanbul since in Iran you would have no security and in Istanbul no benefit nor job. On the other hand, Europe is not only an important place but you can also gain importance there. Unlike in Iran, you can greatly benefit from being able to do any number of jobs there and better yourself. I hold little hope of Sardar As'ad affording you any assistance. I have nothing further to say about the other options. I know nothing.⁸⁶²

Taqizadeh writes that, unsure of the intention of Nabil al-Dowleh, he was hesitant to go and ask the opinion of an acquaintance he had there. This acquaintance was Mahmoud Pahlavi (later known as Mahmoud Mahmoud) who advised Taqizadeh to come to the United States, adding that Taqizadeh could always leave whenever he wanted if he found being there unfavourable.⁸⁶³

Although in his autobiography Taqizadeh tries to imply that it was Nabil al-Dowleh who persuaded him to go to the States and his trip was spontaneous, the correspondence between the two men suggests that Taqizadeh had previously had plans to do so. Taqizadeh had enquired about Nabil al-Dowleh's activities in the States and Nabil al-Dowleh's reply sheds more light on Taqizadeh's decision to travel to the States and his intentions once he arrived there. Nabil al-Dowleh writes that he was constantly active in the States and had succeeded in hiring Shuster and sending him to Iran.⁸⁶⁴ He comments that he had talked to American businessmen and had encouraged them to invest in Iran. Clearly Taqizadeh's intention was that Nabil al-Dowleh hire more advisers from the States

⁸⁶² Mohammad Ali Tarbiat to Taqizadeh, Istanbul, 29 November 1911, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 356-61.

⁸⁶³ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 173.

⁸⁶⁴ Shuster highlights the role of Nabil al-Dowleh in his book: "I had never even dreamed of going to Persia before my appointment, but the eloquence of the Persian chargé d'affaires at Washington, Mirza Ali Kuli [Qoli] Khan, removed my early doubts and I finally decided to do what I could to help a people who had certainly given evidence of an abiding faith in our institutions and business methods". Ref: Shuster, 4.

to send to Iran to develop the Iranian railways and industry. Taqizadeh, he writes, would be able to witness his efforts once he came to the States. He encourages Taqizadeh to use his influence to persuade the Iranian press to advocate hiring advisers from the United States. In closing, he reiterates his eagerness that Taqizadeh leaves immediately for the United States and warns him against Russian spies finding out about his plans.⁸⁶⁵ From Nabil-al Dowleh's correspondence with Taqizadeh, it seems that at this point Taqizadeh was mainly focused on securing assistance from the United States rather than other countries. What we can conclude about Taqizadeh's decision to go to the United States is that he did not consider staying in Europe to be beneficial for creating a change in Iran since Britain had apparently decided to ignore Russian intervention in Iran. In a letter to Browne, Taqizadeh writes, "Although I am not so well informed about current political affairs, it has become apparent to me that British policies rarely oppose or resist the Russians (although in some aspects, they do)."⁸⁶⁶ Taqizadeh even mentions that after the Russian ultimatum Browne himself had lost hope that Britain would stop Russia and that he believed it would be better if Iran sought help from Germany.⁸⁶⁷ However, the enforced ending of Shuster's mission by the Russians led Taqizadeh to reconsider his strategy and later accept Germany's offer to work in alliance with them. This could explain why Taqizadeh did not inform Browne about his trip and why Browne expressed his surprise about Taqizadeh's unexpected decision to travel to the United States.⁸⁶⁸ Correspondence exchanged between Browne and Taqizadeh proves that it was, in fact, Taqizadeh's independent decision to go to the United States, rather than, as some suggested, he went there following Browne's advice. This is contrary to Jamalzadeh's narrative concerning Taqizadeh's reasons for going there. Jamalzadeh mentions that Taqizadeh had told him that a wealthy US banker with a large library stocked with Persian, Arabic and Turkish books had asked Browne to introduce someone to him who could index his books. According to Jamalzadeh, Browne had proposed that Taqizadeh accept that position and had thus gone

⁸⁶⁵ Nabil al-Dowleh to Taqizadeh, without date, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat* ed., Afshar, 369-73.

⁸⁶⁶ Taqizadeh to Browne, Istanbul, 22 April 1912, in *Browne Papers*, 9-9-27.

⁸⁶⁷ Taqizadeh, "Khatabeh dar Majles-e Sugvari-e Browne," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 1: 50.

⁸⁶⁸ Taqizadeh to Browne, 26 May 1913, in *Browne Papers*, 1-1-50.

to the States.⁸⁶⁹ In contrast, Taqizadeh's autobiography gives no mention of Browne's involvement in his decision to go there. Esma'il Yekani's notes indicate that, even before going to Europe for six months, Taqizadeh had decided to go to the United States. He recalls:

Taqizadeh, after staying for about a year and nine months in Istanbul, departed for Europe and after staying six months in London, left for the United States. At the time of his departure from Istanbul, the late Haji Esma'il Amirkhizi and I went to see him off at the Sirkeci Jetty. When the time of his departure arrived and we began to say our goodbyes, he turned to us and said, "This journey that I am about to take is a kind of suicide. In fact, I am like a dead person who breaks off all ties with his friends, relatives and acquaintances and travels to some place beyond this world. I am going to the other side of the world from where we are now standing".⁸⁷⁰

According to Taqizadeh himself, until his journey to the United States, he spent most of his time in the British Museum, studying and carrying out research.⁸⁷¹ As well as outlining Taqizadeh's premeditated plans to travel to the United States, this extract also hints at Taqizadeh's feelings of insecurity and desperation about both his private and political life. Taqizadeh began his journey to the United States on 31 May, 1913.⁸⁷² After a five-and-a-half-day sea journey he reached New York on 6 June.⁸⁷³ As discussed above, Browne, who was surprised by the seemingly sudden decision of Taqizadeh to go to the United States, wrote to Taqizadeh, suggesting that he should remain in Europe to be closer to the Islamic countries and his friends. He considered Taqizadeh's presence in the United States useless for Iran. But Taqizadeh clearly had an agenda very different to what Browne assumed. Taqizadeh's reasons for moving to the United States were in part financial and indeed he

⁸⁶⁹ Jamalzadeh, "Man, *Jamalzadeh Darbareh-e Taqizadeh Shahadat Midaham* [I, Jamalzadeh, Testify about Taqizadeh]," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 44.

⁸⁷⁰ Esma'il Yekani, "Zendegehani-e Taqizadeh [The Life of Taqizadeh]," in *Ibid.*, 263.

⁸⁷¹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 150.

⁸⁷² Taqizadeh to Browne, 24 May 1913, in *Browne Papers*, 1-1-52.

⁸⁷³ Taqizadeh to Browne, 15 June 1913, in *Ibid.*, 1-1-51.

had been unable to gain employment during his six months' residence in England.⁸⁷⁴ However, it seems, different to Browne's hopes for Islamic unity, Taqizadeh actually had other plans. These plans included working in co-operation with the Americans who he believed might assist in the modernisation of Iran and no doubt encouraging the Americans to play a more active role in the region to reduce the pressure of Russia and Britain on Iran.

It should be noted that during this period the outbreak of the First World War was imminent. The dispute between Germany and France over Morocco had reached a critical point and conflict was expected. Britain, who needed an alliance with Russia in case of war with Germany, deliberately overlooked Russia's interference in Iran, with the aim of securing Russian consent for its policy towards Iran.⁸⁷⁵

6:11 Life in the United States

Taqizadeh was welcomed in New York by Nabil al-Dowleh and some Iranians whom he had gathered together to welcome Taqizadeh. According to Taqizadeh, after spending a couple of days in a hotel in New York, Nabil al-Dowleh invited him to his house in the Catskills, a mountainous area in upstate New York, as Nabil al-Dowleh was eager to work with Taqizadeh. Taqizadeh does not expand on the nature of any work he was supposed to have done with Nabil al-Dowleh. Taqizadeh describes Nabil al-Dowleh as a rich, generous man and a strong believer in the Bahai faith. Taqizadeh narrates that he stayed for two or three months in the house with Nabil-al Dowleh and his American wife and children. Taqizadeh mentions two other men who were living in his host's house. One was a young Indian man who he describes as a revolutionary, working against the British, and a member of the Gadar Party which had been set up by Indians in California to carry out activities against the British rule in India.⁸⁷⁶ The second was a man from Urmia whom Taqizadeh had previously known as Mirza Reza Khan Dara (Afshar) but who now called himself Shafizadeh. Mirza Reza Khan had studied at the American school of Urmia and had come

⁸⁷⁴ Taqizadeh to Browne, 26 May 1913, in *Ibid.*, 1-1-50.

⁸⁷⁵ Malekzadeh, 6-7: 1461.

⁸⁷⁶ For more about the Hindustan Gadar Party (alternatively spelled "Ghadar," or "Ghadr," meaning rebellion) see: South Asian American Digital Archives: <http://www.saadigitalarchive.org/collection/gadar-party>.

to the United States to continue his studies. Taqizadeh had previously met Afshar in Urmia.⁸⁷⁷ Afshar had little money and Nabil al-Dowleh had brought him to his house as a Persian tutor to his children. Sepher describes him as a “passionate and fiery man”.⁸⁷⁸ In his autobiography, Taqizadeh also talks about other Iranian students who lived in that house.⁸⁷⁹ He again does not expand on what he and Nabil al-Dowleh worked on together but implies that after some time they lost touch.

To fully appreciate Taqizadeh’s future actions and the situation in which he would find himself, it is necessary here to explore deeper his life in the United States. As in Istanbul and Europe, Taqizadeh continued to suffer financial problems in the United States and was desperately seeking employment. He writes, “If we had not cut ourselves off from Ali Qoli Khan, he could have done something for us”. Talking about “us” implies that he is including Mirza Reza Khan. Taqizadeh left Nabil al-Dowleh and went to New York in August 1913, Mirza Reza joining him later in September. In Taqizadeh’s words he was in constant contact with Mirza Reza from September 1913 until the end of December 1914.⁸⁸⁰ Afshar writes that they shared a room.⁸⁸¹

For a while Taqizadeh found a job with a wealthy Armenian man who had old manuscripts which Taqizadeh indexed for him. Taqizadeh writes that this man “assisted me financially”.⁸⁸² Jamalzadeh mentions that Taqizadeh was financially struggling so much that he had told Jamalzadeh that he was so desperate that he had gone to the train station to work as a porter but was unable to as he did not have the correct permission to do so.⁸⁸³ It seems that his financial problems and the need for him to work in varied jobs had distanced Taqizadeh from politics. In the letters sent to Browne, he notes that there

⁸⁷⁷ Taqizadeh, “Taqizadeh va Mirza Reza Khan Afshar,” in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 2: 270.

⁸⁷⁸ Sepher, 55.

⁸⁷⁹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 155.

⁸⁸⁰ Taqizadeh, “Taqizadeh va Mirza Reza Khan Afshar [Taqizadeh and Mirza Reza Khan Afshar],” in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 2: 270.

⁸⁸¹ Reza Afshar, “Goushe-ha-i az Tarikh-e Mo’aser [Glimpses of Contemporary History],” in *Nashrieh-e Daneshkadeh-e Adabiyat-e Tabriz* 6 (1954), 4.

⁸⁸² Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 156.

⁸⁸³ Jamalzadeh, “Man: Jamalzadeh, Darbareh-e Taqizadeh Shahadat Midaham,” in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 46.

was little coverage of Iranian news in the United States press and he struggled to access the news about his home country and requests Browne to keep him informed.⁸⁸⁴

It was also during this time that Taqizadeh wrote articles for the French magazine *Revue du Monde Musulman*. Taqizadeh states that Hossein Kazemzadeh Iranshahr, a friend of his in Paris, was aware of Taqizadeh's financial difficulties and had informed him if he wrote articles for this magazine, he would get paid. Taqizadeh wrote four articles for *Revue du Monde Musulman* which were published anonymously with the writer's name marked as X. According to Taqizadeh, he received 400 Francs for these articles which enabled him to get by. For a short period, he also worked in a publishing house which published bibles. Taqizadeh mentions that wherever he was he wrote with the interests of Iran at heart. Taqizadeh also describes translation work he did for a company. The company sold their product internationally and wanted to explore the Middle Eastern market. Taqizadeh was introduced to the company by Professor Jackson whom Taqizadeh knew from Iran. Jackson had travelled to Iran to copy the Bistoon carvings. The company wanted Taqizadeh to translate their brochure into Persian. Taqizadeh describes his happiness at being paid, after being without an income. Later Taqizadeh translated the brochure into Arabic and Turkish and was later asked to sign a contract to market their product throughout the Ottoman Empire. Taqizadeh was preparing for the trip when the First World War broke out.⁸⁸⁵

6:12 Co-operation with the Germans

When Russia and Britain, who were considered the two major threats to the independence of Iran, became embroiled in the Great War in the summer of 1914, the importance of the opportunity that the war would afford the Iranians was clear for the political forces in Iran. With the spread of war, various political factions in Iran began to openly confront Russia and Britain, confident in the knowledge that they could rely on aid from Germany and Ottoman Turkey.⁸⁸⁶

⁸⁸⁴ Taqizadeh to Browne, 15 June 1913, in *Browne Papers*, 1-1-51.

⁸⁸⁵ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 157-8.

⁸⁸⁶ Abd al-Hossein Sheybani, *Khaterat-e Mohajerat: Az Dolat-e Movaqat Kermanshah ta Komiteh Mellion Berlin*, ed., Iraj Afshar and Kaveh Bayat (Tehran: Shirazeh, 1999), 11.

After the outbreak of the First War, around the end of 1914, German politicians thought of using the Indian revolutionary Gadar Party to stir up trouble for the British in India. To do this, they organised a committee in Berlin with the help of Chatou Badaia, a famous Indian revolutionary. They also managed to attract an important Indian revolutionary by the name of Har Dyal from Switzerland to Germany.⁸⁸⁷ According to a letter of the British Foreign Office, “At the end of 1915, Har Dyal was either living with Taqi Zada [Taqizadeh] or using him as a post box, as letters to him under the assumed name of Mirza Osman, were sent c/o Herr Taqi Zada, Pension Weyergang, 29 Schluterstrasse, Berlin.”⁸⁸⁸

Molavi Barakt al-Allah was another member of the same committee. The first task of this committee was to spread propaganda to the Allied prisoners of war from Muslim countries. Its second goal was to facilitate the passage to India through Iran of propagandists. Chatou Badaia believed the only truly organised political force was the Democrat Party in which Taqizadeh was influential. The committee therefore demanded that Taqizadeh, who was in the United States at that time, be invited to Germany.⁸⁸⁹ According to a confidential document, “In 1911 he [Taqizadeh] was mentioned in a letter written by Ajit Singh in Switzerland to Chattopadhyaya [Chatou Badaia] in Paris; described as a great admirer of the scheme of Asiatic unity. In another letter to Chattopadhyaya, Ajit Singh enclosed a letter of introduction to Taqi Zada [Taqizadeh] for Trimul Acharya who was then about to visit Constantinople”.⁸⁹⁰

Taqizadeh described the initial stages of his relationship with the Germans on three separate occasions: in his autobiography; in a reply that he had written to Reza Afshar and in a short note that Iraj Afshar published in Taqizadeh’s collections of documents. Taqizadeh’s descriptions of his meetings with the Germans are garbled and differ from each other. According to Taqizadeh’s autobiography, he one day received a letter from the German Consul in New York. The Consul enquired if he wanted to go to Germany.

⁸⁸⁷ For more about the Gadar Party and Lala Har Dayal see: *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. “Lala Har Dayal,” available online: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/254783/Lala-Har-Dayal> (accessed 31 July, 2012).

⁸⁸⁸ *TNA*: FO 371/3067.

⁸⁸⁹ Sepher, 55.

⁸⁹⁰ *TNA*: FO 371/3067.

Taqizadeh writes that the Iranians in the United States were very positive about the Germans and considered them similar to “the prophet David who had come to save them”. Because of this, Taqizadeh replied that he accepted the offer whole heartedly.⁸⁹¹ In the other remaining note he mentions that in October or early November 1914 Afshar wrote a letter to the German Ambassador in Washington, stating that he wished to serve the Germans in the Great War. The Germans had contacted the Ottoman Consul, Jalal Beyek, in New York and had investigated about Afshar. In November 1914, the German Consul in New York met with him but they did not have serious talks. He then writes that on 25 November Afshar had more important and elaborate talks with the Germans in a hotel. On 29 November, Taqizadeh received a letter which had asked for a meeting with him on the 31st but the letter reached him late and the meeting did not take place.⁸⁹² The Consul encouraged Taqizadeh to go to Germany to work with the Germans and lead the Muslim prisoners of war in Germany. Taqizadeh mentions that later he came to realise that the real reason the Germans approached him in New York was to request that he lead the Indian committee in Berlin. While Mirza Reza Afshar also had some meetings with the Germans, British secret documents prove Taqizadeh’s words about his connection with the Indian committee. Reza Afshar later claimed in an article that he played the central role and the Germans initially had contacted him and he was the one who had introduced Taqizadeh to the Germans. Taqizadeh diplomatically and in a very carefully worded manner refutes Afshar’s claims.⁸⁹³ In contrast to Afshar’s comments, Taqizadeh claimed that it was, in fact, he who had requested the Germans to allow Afshar to accompany him. According to Taqizadeh, the Germans provided them with the expenses of the trip but Taqizadeh was eager to know how much his salary would be. He requested 200 dollars, which the Germans agreed to. However, Taqizadeh comments that even if he had asked for 10,000 dollars, they would have agreed, as he later discovered once he had reached Germany. After some preparations, Taqizadeh, together with Mirza Reza Khan Afshar, departed the United States for Germany. The Germans provided Taqizadeh with a fake passport under the name of “Hassan”. According to Sepher, first travelling to Rotterdam, on board the ship Taqizadeh

⁸⁹¹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 159-60.

⁸⁹² Taqizadeh, “Majeray-e Harekat az New York be Berlin [The Adventure of Moving from New York to Berlin],” in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 5: 177-9.

⁸⁹³ Taqizadeh, “Taqizadeh va Mirza Reza Khan Afshar,” in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 2: 269-74.

met a famous Indian called Lata, who had previously lived in Iran under the name of Zi‘a al-Din although Taqizadeh himself never mentioned meeting any Indians on board the ship. Taqizadeh was met in the Netherlands by the German Consul. According to Taqizadeh, they reached Berlin around 15 January, 1915. However, the date that Sepher records is 10 January. This date is the one which also appears in Taqizadeh’s response to Afshar’s article. According to Ilse Itscherenska, who investigated the political archives of the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin, Taqizadeh actually arrived in Berlin on 13 January, 1915.⁸⁹⁴

Once in Germany, it became clear that the Germans did not, in fact, want Taqizadeh and Afshar to work with the Allied prisoners of war. Rather, they wanted them to work with the Indian committee and help the revolutionary Indians to facilitate their travelling through Iran to India. In Berlin, the Indian committee asked for Taqizadeh’s advice. Taqizadeh agreed to work with them, on the proviso that he could also work independently. He decided to form his own team and invited various people from varied locations across Europe to work with him. He invited the following to come to Germany: Kazemzadeh Iranshar from Cambridge, Pourdavoud, Ashrafzadeh and Mirza Mohammad Khan Qazvini from Paris, Jamalzadeh, Nasr al-Allah Khan Jahanghir and Sa’d al-Allah Khan Darvish Ravandi from Switzerland, Mirza Esma‘il Nobari, Esma‘il Amirkhizi and Mirza Aqa Naleh-e Mellat and Mirza Esma‘il Yekani from Istanbul. After consulting together, they decided to form an Iranian committee and to co-operate with the Germans. They were to travel to Eastern countries in different groups, with each group focused on one of the provinces. With this plan in mind, they began their mission. Kazemzadeh and Mirza Reza Khan Afshar went to Tehran, Ashrafzadeh and one or two others to Shiraz, Jamalzadeh, Amirkhizi, Pourdavoud and Nobari went to Baghdad and afterwards to Kermanshah. It was there that they published the newspaper called *Rastakhiz* [Resurrection]. In addition, Taqizadeh also wanted the Iranian diplomatic team in Germany to be in the hands of a reliable person. Taqizadeh believed that by any means possible it should be Hossein Qoli Khan Navab who would lead the Iranian legation in Berlin. He set an appointment with Hossein Qoli Khan Navab in Montero, Switzerland and personally went there to meet him.

⁸⁹⁴ Ilse Itscherenska, Taqizadeh dar Alman-e Qaysari [Taqizadeh in imperial Germany], in *Iran Nameh*, 21:1 and 2, 49-76.

Hossein Qoli Khan accepted the offer and the German foreign ministry asked the German embassy in Tehran to facilitate this. Navab was now the Iranian Consul in Berlin.

Taqizadeh's co-operation with the Germans allowed him to come out of the political isolation in which he had found himself in the United States. Through working with the Germans, Taqizadeh was once more able to bring together the Democrat Party members who had been scattered across the globe and once again take an active role in the Iranian political scene.