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Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh: a political biography

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Chapter Five

Constitutionalists in Power

The previous chapter highlighted Taqizadeh's main objective during the period of the Lesser Despotism; his efforts to restore the Constitution in Iran. Pursuing this goal was clearly Taqizadeh's chief task during this time. It influenced and indeed overshadowed all other aspects of his life. Chapters Three and Four highlighted Taqizadeh's efforts towards achieving this goal as well as the series of local and international events that occurred, over which he had little control. It was the combination of both these factors that drove his actions and greatly influenced what he learned and achieved during this period. Moving into exile with little hope of reviving the Constitution, it was the fledgling resistance of Tabriz that gave Taqizadeh new direction and re-energised him and other constitutionalists.⁵⁵⁹ While Chapter Three's main focus was Taqizadeh's activities whilst in Europe and in exile. Chapter Four followed Taqizadeh's life after his return to Iran and focused more on the events in Iran and his role in political developments. The previous chapter demonstrated Taqizadeh's role as a political activist holding no official position in the government. In contrast, with the dethroning of Mohammad Ali Shah and the restoration of the Constitution, the Lesser Despotism period came to an end and Taqizadeh's role quickly shifted from that of an advocate for political enlightenment and activist to one of a powerful statesman with great responsibilities, laying the foundations of a new regime. This was the opportunity Taqizadeh had been waiting for. He was now finally able to put into practice the ideas he had been developing until this point.

The present chapter covers Taqizadeh's activities after the constitutionalists regained power in Iran. With the establishment of the First Parliament, the constitutionalists had managed to take control of the legislative power. They now also held the executive power. By overthrowing the old regime, they could now begin to expand the process of secularising in other spheres and especially the judicial system which the clergy had

⁵⁵⁹ According to Rasoulzadeh who had interviewed him, Taqizadeh had not had much hope for the resistance of Tabriz in its early stage. See: Mohammad Amin Raoulzadeh, "Esteqbal-e Melli," *Taraqqi*, August, 25, 1909, no. 180, in *Gozarshaei az Enqelab-e Mashrutiyyat* [Some Reports from the Constitutional Revolution] ed., Rahim Raisnia (Tehran: Pardis Danesh, 2008), 294-9.

traditionally controlled. As this chapter illustrates, the new political leaders, including Taqizadeh, had to tackle this task from two angles: firstly, ridding the country of many of the old regime's establishments and statesmen and secondly by introducing new institutions. The constitutionalists were eager for these new institutions to be more modern in nature and to be modelled on European systems.

This period was also characterised by strong efforts to secularise the government. The desire for this was more dominant among those constitutionalists who had had to leave the country during the Lesser Despotism period. After a year spent abroad, having witnessed the influence of modernisation in other countries, upon returning home they were eager to suggest ways in which the situation in their own country might be improved. Each identified a different source for the backwardness of "the Eastern" countries such as Iran; some considered the reason for the lack of modernisation to be the religion of Islam and the conquering of Iran by the Arabs. This overt confrontation with Islam greatly displeased the religious authorities and heightened their suspicions about the institutions that the constitutionalists were clearly trying to create.⁵⁶⁰ One example is the uproar caused by the detention of the editor of *Habl al-Matin* who had insulted the Arabs by suggesting that it had been their invasion of Iran that had halted the modernisation of the country. The clergy had taken this to imply that it was in fact Islam that was responsible for the downturn of Iran.⁵⁶¹

Another instance is the strong reaction of the conservative clergy and ordinary people to what Mirza Hossein Khan 'Edalat, the famous constitutionalist and a progressive intellectual in Tabriz, had written against the veiling of women. 'Edalat had also advocated for women's rights, including their right to education. The article, under the title of "Ayri Qaberqa" [The Crooked Rib] appeared in *Sohbat*, No. 4, a newspaper which Mirza Hossein Khan published in Azerbaijani Turkish in Tabriz. Its aim was to awaken the political minds of those lower classes who did not understand Persian.⁵⁶² The newspaper was suspended

⁵⁶⁰ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 69.

⁵⁶¹ For more about the trial of *Habl al-Matin*, see: *Neday-e Vatan*, August 11, 1909. Also, *Habl al-Matin* (Calcutta), October 4, 1909.

⁵⁶² *Iran-e Now*, November 29, 1909.

and 'Edalat' was put on trial and imprisoned by the anti-constitutionalist clergy of Tabriz who considered the article to be contradictory to Islamic teachings; the same conservative clergy who had supported the ex-Shah during the siege of Tabriz but still had influence over the masses despite the rule of the new regime. Although Taqizadeh was still resolute that religious reform and improvements in the position of women were necessary, at this point he considered these kinds of remarks harmful for the cause.⁵⁶³ Taqizadeh's priority at this point was to modernise the political system and secure the independence of the country. Diversity of opinions among the constitutionalists and their haste to put into practice their ideas prevented them from forming a strong unified front and thus weakened their position.

A close examination of Taqizadeh's activities during this period reveals that he enjoyed much greater success in his political role in the First Parliament than in the administration of the Directive Committee (*Directoire*), a temporary council set up to take over the executive powers of the government. Later, his party building project in the Second Parliament was equally not as successful as he had originally hoped. Taqizadeh, by forming the Democrat Party during this period, had hoped for systematic modernisation from below through the mobilisation of the masses and their involvement in the political process. This resulted in confrontation between him and the traditional clergy which led to his exile from the country; a huge obstacle to his political ambitions. At the same time this was a blow to the idea of modernisation from below and convinced Taqizadeh and many other intellectuals to favour authoritarian modernity as a more direct route to achieving modernisation in as short a time period as possible.

Although Taqizadeh's activities during this period introduced new ideas into Iranian political discourse and allowed some opportunity for these ideas to be put into practice, we see Taqizadeh's swift personal fall from grace; transforming him from the golden boy of politics into an unwanted political figure. He would arrive to Tehran as a hero and leave as a pariah.

⁵⁶³ Anonymous to Taqizadeh, 2 November 1909, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 170-75.

5:1 Arrival as a Hero

Our prophet migrated from Hejaz with afflicted heart
He had endured so much suffering from the infidels of Quraysh
On the day of conquering Mecca, the prophet returned.⁵⁶⁴

As can be determined from the previous chapters, there were important differences between Taqizadeh's arrival in Tehran after his exile and his first visit there. Upon his first arrival in Tehran in October 1906, he had been a stranger in the city and could not even find his way to the Parliament; the place that represented the zenith of his ambitions. Now, in contrast, from a great distance outside the city walls, a large, enthusiastic crowd who felt they were accompanying a hero to his rightful place would lead him to the Parliament. He was considered a man of great importance. *Neday-e Vatan*'s reflections on the occasion of his arrival represents well Taqizadeh's superior standing among the constitutionalists at this time:

The honourable distinguished philosopher, the Iranian Voltaire, the Mirabeau of the time, the senior and most learned offspring of Azerbaijan and the pride of Iranians, Mr. Taqizadeh finally arrived on Saturday, 7 August 1909. It is a name of glorious merit which has reached all corners of the world. Someone whose exhilarating freedom-loving proclamations have been heard by all humankind. Friends and strangers have researched the personal history of this magnificent human being. He has endured fourteen months of homelessness and managed to survive deadly encounters. He has surmounted major obstacles, laid out the invaluable roadmap of the historical revolution and paved the way for amazing goals to be achieved. He supported the movement itself by using his mental capabilities and by seeking help from all freedom loving people of the world. He lodged in the centre of happiness [Tehran]; the capital of eternal government and was received with much glory, honour,

⁵⁶⁴ "Dar Tahnyat-e Voroud-e Jenab-e Aqay-e Taqizadeh," [In Welcoming his Excellency Taqizadeh] in *Majles*, August 10, 1909.

endearment and many official ceremonies. He was welcomed by a huge number of people from different classes and groups of Mojaheds.⁵⁶⁵

As the passage illustrates, Taqizadeh was hugely popular upon his return to Tehran and this would serve to help his ascent of the ladder of power in the newly formed political structure of the country. Commenting on Taqizadeh's glorious arrival, Sharif Kashani wrote that as Taqizadeh was relatively young and inexperienced, too much respect shown for him on his arrival might have made him too courageous and headstrong. He predicted that this would cause corruption because Taqizadeh was too eager for all the constitutionalists to obey him and act according to his will. Kashani continued that it was difficult to imagine that everybody would follow Taqizadeh, which would thus lead to differences of opinion resulting in confrontation and division within the country.⁵⁶⁶

Nevertheless, part of Taqizadeh's popularity was due to the expectations of the general public. They had faith in the fact that he would bring about swift reforms that would have a positive effect on their daily lives. Mohammad Amin Rasoulzadeh, the political activist and journalist from the Caucasus, was in Tehran at the time of Taqizadeh's arrival and writing for *Taraqqi* [Progress], a newspaper published in the Caucasus. He too wrote about the glory of Taqizadeh's arrival in the city. His report highlights some of the expectations of people; "I talk with an acquaintance. He congratulates me and then adds, 'Thank God, our Taqizadeh has also arrived. God willing, he will make up for our shortcomings...'.⁵⁶⁷" Rasoulzadeh then continued that he hoped Taqizadeh would be able to meet the high expectations that the public had of him.⁵⁶⁸ Such high expectations, however, threatened to be a double-edged sword for Taqizadeh since his focus was aimed on structural reforms rather than directed at changes that might have immediate effects on the daily life of people. Unsurprisingly, this put him at odds with those who were impatient for tangible and swift change in everyday matters. Any inability to bring about the desired change could damage

⁵⁶⁵ *Neday-e Vatan*, August 8, 1909.

⁵⁶⁶ Sharif Kashani, 547.

⁵⁶⁷ Mohammad Amin Rasoulzadeh, "Esteqbal-e Melli [National Welcome]," in *Taraqqi*, August 25, 1909, in *Gozarashaei az Enqelab-e Mashrutiyyat* ed., Raisnia, 294-9.

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid.

his popularity if the general public's hopes were dashed. Everything hinged on what Taqizadeh's planned reforms were and how he would put them into practice. As will become evident later in this chapter, Taqizadeh was more focused on political modernisation during this period than on other issues.

During his initial visit to Tehran in 1906, first attending the parliament as a mere spectator, Taqizadeh had had only a general idea of what he hoped to achieve. In contrast, he was now returning to the capital with a carefully planned and more nuanced political agenda. He had visited Europe and had seen first-hand the workings of a European parliament and was much more au fait with how political parties functioned in Europe. Upon his victorious return to Tehran, he was now more convinced that his first priority must be political party building. This time, unlike his first arrival in Tehran when he had only just embarked on a professional political career, he was now a well-known political figure with strong support. This would enable him to immediately begin work on his plans towards actualising his goals. 'Ain al-Saltaneh's reflections on Taqizadeh's arrival in Tehran include mention of the large number of people welcoming him and hint at the role he would go on to play; "Taqizadeh is the most important and popular of the constitutionalists in Tehran. People are very fond of him. He is young and if all goes to plan, he will become the country's leader".⁵⁶⁹ Events following Taqizadeh's arrival allowed him to play a key role in Iranian politics, thereby confirming the predictions of his rise to power. Taqizadeh soon joined a Directive Committee which would turn out to have similar powers to those of the parliament.

5:2 The Directive Committee (Heyat-e Modirieh)

After the liberation of Tehran, the government's power lay mainly in the hands of a Directive Committee, formed on 12 August 1909 and made up of 20 members who had been chosen from among prominent constitutionalists. Besides Taqizadeh, the membership included Sardar As'ad, Sepahdar, S'ani' al-Dowleh, Hossein Qoli Khan Navab, Hakim al-Molk, Mostashar al-Dowleh, Vahid al-Molk, Sardar Mansour, Nezam al-Soltan, Mo'tamed Khaqan, Ali Mohammad Tarbiat, Haji Seyyed Nasrollah, Sadiq Hazrat, Amid al-Hokama,

⁵⁶⁹ 'Ain al-Saltaneh, 4: 2724-5.

Mirza Yans, Mo'ez al-Soltan, Hossein Kasmaei, Seyyed Mohammad Emamjomeh and Vosouq al-Dowleh.⁵⁷⁰

The main task of this Directive Committee was to establish order in the country and prepare the groundwork for elections and the reopening of parliament. It was Taqizadeh who had instigated the formation of a Directive Committee. He had argued that the Extraordinary Grand Council, formed immediately after the liberation of Tehran, had too many members. Since every individual in the council had to vote, this made the process of decision making both time consuming and complicated. Taqizadeh believed that the Directive Committee could be a better alternative.⁵⁷¹ The idea of forming a Directive Committee was evidently connected to the fascination that many of the Iranian constitutionalists, among them Taqizadeh, had for the French Revolution. The fact that Taqizadeh suggests that the Directive Committee was similar to the *Directoire* of the French Revolution indicates how much he had been inspired by European political models and by the French Revolution in particular.⁵⁷² 'Azd al-Molk, the regent, emphasising this influence bitterly writes:

What did we do that the French did not? We had a revolution, confronted the government, created a constitution and established a parliament. Then there was a coup d'état and the parliament was bombarded. We re-established the parliament, deposed the Shah, chose a new Shah, became Mojaheds and ultimately, we created a Directive Committee, just as there once was a *Directoire* in France. We are, thus, not even one step behind the other nations.⁵⁷³

⁵⁷⁰ Mohammad Mehdi Sharif Kashani, *Tarikh-e Mashrutiyyat* [The History of the Constitution], ed., Sirus S' dvandian (Tehran: Negarestan Ketab, 2010), 595.

In a letter to Seqat al-Eslam Tabrizi, 'Azd al-Molk has also mentioned the name of 17 people of this Directive Committee. See: 'Azd al-Molk to Seqat al-Eslam, 11 September 1909, in *Zendegi Nameh-e Shahid-e Niknam*, ed., Fathi, 482-1.

⁵⁷¹ Sharif Kashani, 596.

⁵⁷² Hassan Taqizadeh, "Khaterat-e Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh," in *Mashrutiyyat-e Iran*, ed., Mahmoud Setaysh, (Tehran: Sales, 2006), 62.

⁵⁷³ 'Azd al-Molk to Seqat al-Eslam, 11 September 1909, in *Zendegi Nameh-e Shahid-e Niknam*, ed., Fathi, 485.

He goes on to describe how the members of the Directive Committee imitated down to the finest details what they had read in French, German, English or Egyptian books. He afterwards complains that for those who understood the situation this was particularly painful.⁵⁷⁴

The fascination with and influence of the French Revolution was such that it blinded its Iranian supporters to the fact that circumstances in Iran differed greatly from those of France at the time of the French Revolution. Consequently, the socio-political reality of the Iranian context was overlooked by key members of the Directive Committee; so much so that they were unable to respond effectively to the turbulent situation of that time. One example is the severe punishment meted out to some leading clergy, in spite of their spiritual authority over the masses.

Similar to the laws passed by the National Parliament, those of the Directive Committee were also binding and ministers were obliged to adhere to them.⁵⁷⁵ During the time that the Directive Committee was active, Taqizadeh was the most influential member and consequently head of the decision-making men in Iran.⁵⁷⁶ Ali Mohammad Tarbiat as well as Navab, Mostashar al-Dowleh and Hakim al-Molk were in the close circle of Taqizadeh's friends who supported him and confirmed his decisions in the Directive Committee. Sharif Kashani writes:

The selection of the members of the Directive Committee is decided by his Excellency Taqizadeh. The members are mostly his acquaintances and friends. By nature, his Excellency Taqizadeh has laudable intentions and fierce ambitions, but it had not been possible for him to achieve his goals through the Extraordinary Grand Council. Of the 20 selected members who make up the Directive Committee, the majority agree with his plans and share similar ideas to Taqizadeh. So, whatever suggestions Taqizadeh puts

⁵⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁵ Malekzadeh, 6-7: 1256.

⁵⁷⁶ Taqizadeh himself writes that he was probably the most influential member of the Directive Committee. See: Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 133.

forward, the Directive Committee now agrees to and are thus implemented.⁵⁷⁷

At this point, Taqizadeh's influence was so strong that the rumour circulated that after the dethroning of the Shah, Taqizadeh might possibly become president of Iran.⁵⁷⁸ However, the idea of putting an end to the existing monarchy or appointing a new shah from outside the Qajar dynasty was not feasible since, according to the Treaty of Torkamanchay (1828), the Russians had promised that they would unconditionally support the heirs of the crown prince at that time, Abbas Mirza, in taking the throne.⁵⁷⁹ Regardless of whatever his position might have been, Taqizadeh's impact on the decision making of the Directive Committee was clearly evident in the appointment of Ali Mohammad Tarbiat to the position of head of the Mojaheds in Tehran. Taqizadeh distrusted some of the commanders of the Mojaheds, such as Sepahdar whom he considered was not following constitutional principles.⁵⁸⁰ Thus, with the appointment of Ali Mohammad Khan, Taqizadeh no doubt hoped to have military power on his side and benefit from the potential support from a trusted armed force for the party which he was planning to establish. Moreover, the creation of a modern national army was one of Taqizadeh's ambitions. This was also supported by the First Parliament which considered an organised army as vital for the modernisation of Iran. *Iran-e Now* [The New Iran] emphasising the importance of forming an organised army after the liberation of Tehran wrote, "All politicians, sages and those who want progress share the same opinion that the Iranian government needs an army. Every sensible person knows that if this country does not have an army, its independence will not be secured".⁵⁸¹ As clearly reflected in a telegraph that Taqizadeh sent to the provincial assembly of Gilan during this period, he had been deeply concerned about local unrest. As one of the leading advocates of a powerful central government in Iran, Taqizadeh was worried that the lack of control over the provinces would weaken the central government's authority. He believed strongly that in order to guarantee a sovereign

⁵⁷⁷ Sharif Kashani, 595-6.

⁵⁷⁸ Sadiq al-Saltaneh to Taqizadeh in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Iraj Afshar, 139-41.

⁵⁷⁹ Mohammad Taqi Bahar, *Tarikh-e Mokhtasar-e Ahzab-e Siyasi-e Iran* [A Concise History of Iranian Political Parties] (Tehran: Ketabhay-e Jibi, 1978), 1: 6.

⁵⁸⁰ *The Times*, September 2, 1909.

⁵⁸¹ *Iran-e Now*, September 20, 1909.

state and nationhood, the existence of an organised military force was crucial.⁵⁸² Taqizadeh trusted that the young Ali Mohammad Khan could actualise this vision and unite all the Mojaheds into forming a single, unified army.

Another reason that Taqizadeh considered a national organised army important was that he was deeply concerned about the influence of the Cossack Brigade, the only organised army in Iran at that time. Taqizadeh's concern is noted in the proceedings of the Second Parliament. Taqizadeh was of the opinion that expansion of the Cossack Brigade with its Russian commanders would increase Russian interference in Iran and could be a threat to the independence of the country.⁵⁸³ This concern apparently led the constitutionalists to attempt to change the uniform of the Cossack Brigade, a style clearly modelled on Russian outfits and which had obvious connections with Russia. They also wanted to replace the Brigade's Russian officers with those of other nationalities.⁵⁸⁴ During this time, large numbers of Russian troops were billeted in Tabriz, Qazvin, Rasht, and at various other locations throughout Northern Iran. According to Edward Grey, on July 13 1909, there were 4000 troops in Tabriz, 1700 between Rasht and Qazvin and 600 elsewhere.⁵⁸⁵ Their presence was the source of increasing distrust on the part of the constitutionalists, who suspected Russia of having a hidden agenda.

The idea of having an independent national army was partly actualised by the formation of the Government Gendarmerie in 1910. The Democrats in the Second Parliament played an active role in the setting up of this gendarmerie.⁵⁸⁶ There was hostility between the gendarmerie, which was considered to be under the influence of the British, and the Cossacks who were under the influence of the Russians.

⁵⁸² Taqizadeh to The Provincial Assembly of Gilan, telegram, in *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyyat*, ed., Afshar, 175-80.

⁵⁸³ Proceedings of the Second Parliament, Session 42, 18 January 1910.

⁵⁸⁴ Fraser, 147-8.

⁵⁸⁵ Edward, G. Browne, *The Persian Crisis of December 1911: How it Arose Whither it May Lead Us* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1912), 4.

⁵⁸⁶ For further information about the Government Gendarmerie see: Stephanie Cronin, "Iranian Nationalism and the Government Gendarmerie," in *Iran and the First World War: Battleground of the Great Powers*, ed., Touraj Atabaki (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 43-67.

Despite Taqizadeh supporting the appointment of Ali Mohammad Khan as commander of the Mojaheds, support was not unanimous. Mehdi Malekzadeh believed his appointment was a huge error on the part of the Directive Committee since the Mojaheds consisted of different groups with differing opinions. The majority of Mojaheds who had come from Rasht, for instance, saw Mo‘ez al-Soltan as their chief whereas Armenians considered Yapram Khan as their spiritual father figure and refused to follow the orders of any other commanders. Other groups of Mojaheds also had their own allegiances. As a result, Ali Mohammad Khan was nothing more than a nominal commander; the true commanders were those to whom the Mojaheds were loyal.⁵⁸⁷ Yahya Dolatabadi also considered the appointment of Ali Mohammad Khan to be a contentious issue. He suggested that this led to Sepahdar ordering the creation of an opposition group under the commandship of Mo‘ez al-Soltan.⁵⁸⁸ The disagreement between the various groups of Mojaheds later escalated and had huge ramifications.

But disagreements over the choice of military leaders was not the only pressing issue that the Directive Committee and Taqizadeh as its leading member had to deal with. Since Taqizadeh played an important role in the decisions of the Directive Committee, it is necessary here to elaborate further on the main responsibilities of the Directive Committee and some of the tasks this body had to carry out.

5:3 The Tasks of the Directive Committee

Under the responsibility of the Directive Committee, various issues had to be dealt with which required holding daily sessions. The treasury coffers were empty and the government was in immediate need of cash. The primary task of the Directive Committee was therefore to address this problem and provide a sufficient budget to be able to run the basic administration of the country. Some members of the Directive Committee were specially chosen to form a commission, referred to as the Charity Commission, to gather funds. It was decided that the Directive Committee would fine the affluent royalists in order to raise money and thus the commission was successful in making available funds for

⁵⁸⁷ Malekzadeh, 6-7: 1282.

⁵⁸⁸ Yahya Dolatabadi, 3: 120-1.

urgent needs. According to Taqizadeh, the collected amount was around 1,000,000 Tomans (equivalent to £166,660 at that time).⁵⁸⁹ Commenting on the revenue collected by the commission, Taqizadeh wrote, “There is no doubt that we acted excessively. In the beginning it was said that those [the royalists] who had extorted money from people must be jailed and their money would be confiscated. Some were jailed accordingly...”.⁵⁹⁰ Although many have criticised this radical act of the Directive Committee, historians such as Kasravi approved the appropriation of the money by force from the rich who had opposed the Constitution. But, at the same time, Kasravi admitted that not everyone had been treated equally during the process.⁵⁹¹ What was contentious about this process was the fact that “many men who deserved squeezing” were under foreign protection and this reduced the amount which could be extorted.⁵⁹²

Zel al-Soltan, the deposed Shah’s wealthy uncle, was one of those who was forced to pay a huge sum of money. It was reported that he had to pay 300,000 Tomans in cash and credit. Zel al-Soltan paid 100,000 Tomans (£16,666) in cash and promised to pay another 200,000 (£33,333) within four months.⁵⁹³ As the remaining documents reveal, Taqizadeh had been the key figure in the case of Zel al-Soltan. Zel al-Soltan and his family wrote letters to Taqizadeh, requesting that he help to secure Zel al-Soltan’s release; an example showing Taqizadeh’s influence in this matter.⁵⁹⁴

Besides the Charity Commission, another commission was created to organise taxing provisions and prepare a budget plan for the government. It was necessary to establish a treasury and a system to regulate the collection of these taxes and ensure a centralised collection point.

⁵⁸⁹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 122.

⁵⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁹¹ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 63.

⁵⁹² Barclay to Grey, telegram, 10 August, 1909, in *Further Correspondence No.1 (1910)*, 111-2.

⁵⁹³ *The Times*, September 28, 1909. See also: Zel al-Soltan to the Directive Committee, telegram, 20 October, 1909, in *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyat*, ed., Afshar, 184-6.

⁵⁹⁴ Ibid. 169-204.

5:4 Purging the Court

A further issue that the Directive Committee needed to address was the fact that supporters of the ex-Shah remained in the court. The Directive Committee was determined to purge the court of these counsellors they considered undesirable. Hakim al-Molk was a close friend of Taqizadeh and a man whom he could rely on to get the job done. In fact, Taqizadeh resided in his house after his arrival in Tehran.⁵⁹⁵ It was he who was appointed in the court, with the responsibility of monitoring the new Shah. Hakim al-Molk initiated reform in the court by expelling reactionary advisers and court members of the ex-Shah. One of the key figures to be dismissed was Seraya Shapshal, the infamous Russian tutor and adviser of Mohammad Ali Shah. He acquired the epithet of “Bloody Shapshal”, having encouraged the Shah to use violent means to crush the constitutional movement. Indeed, Taqizadeh himself, using unusually strong language, called him a “bastard”, thus displaying his great dislike of the Shah’s Russian adviser.⁵⁹⁶

Another controversial act carried out by the Directive Committee was the ousting of Ahmad Shah’s Russian tutor, Smirnov.⁵⁹⁷ Taqizadeh referred to Smirnov’s adverse influence on the young Ahmad Shah similar to that of Shapshal on Mohammad Ali Mirza.⁵⁹⁸ According to Taqizadeh, dismissing this tutor angered the Russians and led them to begin negotiations to restore Smirnov’s position in the court. Taqizadeh explained how the Russians put some key members of the new regime under pressure by demanding they immediately pay their debts to the Russian bank. Among others, the regent, ‘Azd al-Molk, Sepahdar and Sardar Mansour had substantial debts to the bank. They were greatly concerned by the recalling of the debts. The Russian bank which was a branch of the Russian finance department had 30 million Roubles credit and had authorised large loans to leading figures in Iran as a means of restraining and controlling them. As a result, these influential figures were beholden to the Russians and whenever they acted against the

⁵⁹⁵ Taqizadeh, *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 2: 103.

⁵⁹⁶ Tufani, 126.

⁵⁹⁷ For more about Smirnov, see: Evan Siegel, “A Review of the Memoirs of Konstantin Nikolaevich Smirnov, Crown Prince Ahmad’s Tutor,” available online:

<http://iran.qlineorientalist.com/Articles/Smirnov/Smirnov.html> (accessed November 25, 2016).

⁵⁹⁸ For more about Ahmad Shah’s education and his character, see: Ahmad Ali Sepher, “Shakhsyat va Akhalaq-e Soltan Ahmad Shah” in *Iran dar Jang-e Bozorg* [Iran in the Great War] (Tehran: Adib, 1983), 32-7.

Russian interests, the bank would ask for the debt to be repaid. However, despite all this, the tutor was dismissed and the court was subject to a sweeping purge.⁵⁹⁹ Commenting on the purge of the court, Taqizadeh writes, “After the liberation of Tehran, we eradicated everything remaining from Mohammad Ali Shah.”⁶⁰⁰

5:5 Appointing Governors

The Directive Committee was also assigned the role of appointing suitably qualified governors for the provinces. Mokhber al-Saltaneh, who was still in Europe, was asked to go directly to Tabriz to become the governor of Azerbaijan, a position he had held before the coup d'état in June 1908.⁶⁰¹ Taqizadeh facilitated this appointment which was generally well-received since he had “the reputation of being a strong enlightened man”.⁶⁰² He arrived in Tabriz on 18 August, 1909.⁶⁰³ Samsam al-Saltaneh from the Bakhtiyari tribe was chosen as the governor of Isfahan.⁶⁰⁴ The Directive Committee endeavoured to avoid appointing public officials from the old regime whose reputations were marred. Accordingly, Taqizadeh immediately used his influence to oppose the selection of ‘Ala’ al-Dowleh as the governor of Fars since he considered the old prince as “the embodiment of the old system”.⁶⁰⁵ This was despite British complaints about the disturbances in Bushehr. They wanted the Directive Committee to send someone powerful to control those regions and protect British interests and so exerted constant pressure on the Directive Committee to send ‘Ala’ al-Dowleh as the governor of Fars.⁶⁰⁶ The situation in Shiraz, the capital of Fars, was also aggravated by the disturbances there with the news of an approaching force of 10,000 from the Qashqai tribe. David Fraser believed this could have been because of local feuds but suggested that a tribe more numerous and wealthier than the Bakhtiyaris might have been jealous of the deeds of this other tribe active in the capital and wanted to show what they were capable of.⁶⁰⁷ This was a further issue which the new

⁵⁹⁹ Setayesh, 64.

⁶⁰⁰ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 125.

⁶⁰¹ Barclay to Grey, Monthly Summary, 13 August 1909, in *Further Correspondence No.1 (1910)*, 116-9.

⁶⁰² Smart to Barclay, 25 July, 1909, in *Further Correspondence No.1 (1910)*, 113.

⁶⁰³ Amirkhizi, 477.

⁶⁰⁴ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 62.

⁶⁰⁵ Barclay to Grey, telegram, 10 August 1909, in *Further Correspondence No.1 (1910)*, 91.

⁶⁰⁶ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 145.

⁶⁰⁷ Fraser, 150.

government had also to contend with; it needed to appoint governors who would not be associated with the old regime and would be able to handle local unrest and secure the sovereignty of the central government.

Taqizadeh's first speech given in the Directive Committee has references to these problems and emphasises his dissatisfaction with the involvement of the officials who had been key players during the old regime.⁶⁰⁸ It appears that Kasravi overlooked Taqizadeh's references in his speech to these officials when he expressed criticism of the lack of mention of former politicians' involvement in the new government.⁶⁰⁹ The first issue of *Iran-e Now* carried an article emphasising the need for the old regime's officials to be replaced by a new generation of men. The article quotes Taqizadeh expressing his dissatisfaction with those from both the old and the new regimes who remained in power.⁶¹⁰

5:6 Choosing the Crown Prince and a New Cabinet

On 1 September Mohammad Hassan Mirza, the new Shah's younger brother, was officially proclaimed as the crown prince by the Directive Committee. The Directive Committee also appointed a cabinet, with Sepahdar as Minister of War and Sardar As'ad as Minister of the Interior. Since the Directive Committee fulfilled the role of prime minister, there was no need for any other person to be appointed to that position. The police force was placed under the control of Yaprak Khan.⁶¹¹

5:7 Punishment of those who had Supported the ex-Shah

The Directive Committee had also to decide about the punishment of those who had supported the ex-Shah. Two famous figures who were executed by the constitutionalists before the formation of the Directive Committee were Sheikh Fazl al-Allah Nouri, the prominent anti-constitutionalist clergy and Mir Hashem from Tabriz who were both hanged in public. Sheikh Fazl al-Allah's hanging was unexpected and raised criticism against the

⁶⁰⁸ *Iran-e Now*, August 24, 1909.

⁶⁰⁹ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 74.

⁶¹⁰ *Iran-e Now*, August 24, 1909.

⁶¹¹ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 62.

constitutionalists from among the religious supporters.⁶¹² Nobody could have imagined that such an important clergyman would be executed.⁶¹³

The trial of Sheikh Fazl al-Allah was brief and the execution was quickly carried out. Yaprak Khan, who had been newly appointed as the head of police believed if he was to be executed, it should be done immediately whilst public support for it remained high. At the same time, some of Sheikh Fazl al-Allah's opponents believed that if he stayed alive he might incite tribes to rise up against the constitution.⁶¹⁴

Sheikh Fazl al-Allah's refusal to take refuge in any foreign embassy after the arrival of the constitutionalists in Tehran in order to save his life and furthermore his calmness during the trial and his execution affected the masses. He maintained his position right up until his last breath on the gallows, calling the constitutionalists anti-religious and Babis.⁶¹⁵ The memory of Sheikh Fazl al-Allah's execution, when the anti-constitutionalists forces had taken over in Tabriz in 1912 was still fresh and was a reason for the opposition forces to want to avenge the constitutionalists. In a letter to Browne outlining the events of that period, Taqizadeh explains how people in Tabriz were forced to hold mourning services for Sheikh Fazl al-Allah and Mir Hashem in houses and mosques. After the execution of Sheikh Fazl al-Allah, many religious people considered voting in the elections of the Second Parliament as Haram (religiously forbidden) and did not participate.⁶¹⁶

In fact, this execution remained as a clear representation of the clash between those who advocated a secular state inspired in the context of modernity and those who believed the government must remain tied to religious law. Indeed, Sheikh Fazl al-Allah's execution was viewed in the discourse of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 as an example of the disgraceful domination of Western ideology over the indigenous Islamic ideology. Jalal al-Ahmad, the writer and social critic whose works influenced the anti-western ideology of

⁶¹² Abdallah Ha'eri, *Tashayo ' va Mashrutīyat dar Iran va Naqsh-e Iranian-e Moqim-e Iraq* [Shi'ism and the Constitution in Iran and the Role of the Iranians living in Iraq], (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1981), 158.

⁶¹³ *Tufani*, 124.

⁶¹⁴ Daneshvar 'Alavi, 68-9.

⁶¹⁵ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 125.

⁶¹⁶ Mojtehedī, 153.

the Revolution famously commented that he considered the corpse of Sheikh Fazl al-Allah as a symbol of the domination of the West over Iran.⁶¹⁷

While Taqizadeh was not involved directly in Sheikh Fazl al-Allah's case, as a leading member of the movement of change and secularism, he would always be held responsible for the execution by those who supported the idea of political Islam. Ali Mohammad Tarbiat who had very close ties with Taqizadeh was present at Sheikh Fazl al-Allah's trial and was believed to be among those who had insisted on the execution.⁶¹⁸ Similarly, Yaprak Khan the Armenian police chief in Tehran was blamed by Sheikh Fazl al-Allah's supporters for his execution. Taqizadeh held Yaprak Khan in the highest regard and considered him peerless, on par even with Napoleon.⁶¹⁹

Furthermore, there were other issues concerning Taqizadeh which also displeased the opposition groups. Although some famous anti-constitutionalists were executed, severe punishments were also meted out to minor accomplices of the ex-Shah. Others, on the other hand, who had committed graver wrongdoings escaped punishment and were even appointed to key positions in the new regime. Among those who were left unpunished was 'Ain al-Dowleh who played a key role in the battles with the constitutionalists in Tabriz and who the constitutionalists believed had been responsible for many crimes. It would not be difficult to assume that this seemingly double standard approach to punishments would lead many people to feel deep displeasure and disappointment in the new regime.⁶²⁰

5:8 Establishing Order and Expelling the ex-Shah

The large number of Mojaheds who had stayed in Tehran after the city's liberation caused problems in the city; some of the Mojaheds and Bakhtiyaris had begun mistreating the local inhabitants of Tehran. To control this, the Directive Committee published a

⁶¹⁷ Jalal al-Ahmad, *Gharbzadegi* [Westoxification], (Qom: Khorram, 2006), 62.

⁶¹⁸ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 133.

⁶¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 279.

⁶²⁰ Mohammad Amin Rasoulzadeh, "Pass az Fateh-e Tehran: Mojazathay-e E'dam," *Taraqqi*, August 8, 1909 no. 166, in *Gozarashaei az Enqelab-e Mashrutiyyat*, ed., Raisnia, 252-5.

decree, stating that if Mojaheds or Bakhtiyaris troubled other citizens, they would be arrested and punished.⁶²¹

Since it was not possible to imprison him, a further goal of the Directive Committee was to force the ex-Shah out of Iran. If he stayed in the country, he would likely stir up trouble.⁶²² For this purpose, a committee of four or five people was chosen. The committee was made up of the following members: Mostashar al-Dowleh, Vosouq al-Dowleh, Navab and Taqizadeh. Sadiq Hazrat also joined the group on some occasions.⁶²³ Before expelling the ex-Shah, the committee had to take charge of the royal jewellery and decide about the deposed Shah's financial matters concerning his debts to foreign banks and his properties.⁶²⁴ This would once again bring Taqizadeh face-to-face with his old rival, Mohammad Ali Shah.⁶²⁵ The committee had to go the Russian Legation several times to negotiate about the financial matters of the ex-Shah in the presence of Russian and British representatives. The ex-Shah insisted on staying in Iran and was unwilling to hand over the royal jewellery.⁶²⁶ He even personally telegraphed the Russian Tsar to beg protection of his rights.⁶²⁷ Undoubtedly Taqizadeh's role in the ex-Shah's ousting from the country was crucial; he was the one who had insisted that this happen. It is considering this role that Seqat al-Eslam Tabrizi criticised Taqizadeh over sending the ex-Shah to Russia rather than imprisoning him or sending him elsewhere.⁶²⁸ And, later, when in Russia, the ex-Shah himself referred to Taqizadeh as "the infidel Seyyed" responsible for his ousting.⁶²⁹

⁶²¹ Sharif Kashani, 606-7.

⁶²² Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 71.

According to *Iran-e Now* delay in the departure of the ex-Shah had created some hopes among the anti-constitutionalists and the rumour was that he had managed to come out of the legation to end the constitution. See: *Iran-e Now*, September 10, 1909.

⁶²³ Mahmoud Setaysh, ed., "Khaterat-e Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh, [The Memories of Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh]" in *Mashrutiyyat-e Iran* [The Iranian Constitution] (Tehran: Sales, 2006), 63.

⁶²⁴ The Qajar kings had a keen interest in jewellery. The collection begun by the founder of the dynasty, Aqa Mohammad Khan, was added to by later kings.

⁶²⁵ Taqizadeh had to meet the ex-Shah in person for negotiations. See: *Iran-e Now*, September 6, 1909.

⁶²⁶ Amirkhizi, 465-6.

⁶²⁷ *The Times*, September 2, 1909.

⁶²⁸ *Zendegei Nameh-e Shahid-e Niknam*, ed., Fathi, 500.

⁶²⁹ Kasmaei, 151.

After long negotiations on the matter of the ex-Shah's expulsion, a protocol of eleven articles was signed on September 7, 1909.⁶³⁰ The government took the ex-Shah's property and agreed to pay his debts in instalments. It was arranged that, provided he leave Iran, the Iranian government would pay 100,000 Tomans annually to Mohammad Ali Shah through the Russian Legation.⁶³¹ As it was agreed that after leaving Iran he would reside in Russia, the Russians insisted on the financial settlement of the ex-Shah as they wished to avoid the burden for the Russian treasury of being responsible for any of his expenses during his stay in Russia.⁶³² Taqizadeh and Hossein Qoli Khan who believed that the nation did not have the means to pay such a substantial sum to the deposed Shah reluctantly accepted the deal.⁶³³ He was to go to Russia and not return to Iran or the agreement about the payment would be null and void. Additionally, it was agreed that he would personally hand over to the legation all the jewellery he had taken.⁶³⁴ The Shah set off on his journey, leaving Tehran for Anzali on 9 September, accompanied as far as Qazvin by 120 Cossacks led by a Russian officer.⁶³⁵ As Mohammad Ali Shah and his wife prepared to leave the country, Taqizadeh found himself in an awkward situation. Indeed, Taqizadeh himself commented on seeing the Shah shed tears of regret.




Figure 10: The stamp used by the Directive Committee (left) and Extraordinary Grand Council

⁶³⁰ To read the full text of the protocol, see: *Iran-e Now*, September 9, 1909.

⁶³¹ Barclay to Grey, 12 August, 1909 in *Persia No.1* (1910), 130-1.

According to Browne this amount was 100,000 Tomans equal to £16666 at that time, See: Browne, *Persian Revolution*, 325.

⁶³² Kazemzadeh, 547.

⁶³³ Daneshvar 'Alavi, 74.

⁶³⁴ Amirkhizi, 462-3.

⁶³⁵ Barclay to Grey, telegram, 9 September 1909, in *Persia No.1* (1910), 125.

5:9 Dissolution of the Directive Committee

After the deposing of the Shah and his exit from the country, the Directive Committee was dissolved on 12 September, 1909 and the ministers regained the power to act independently.⁶³⁶ An advisory committee of forty members replaced the Directive Committee in which the members of the Directive Committee were included.⁶³⁷ The Directive Committee resigned en masse due to a serious disagreement with the cabinet ministers. According to *Iran-e Now*, after the Directive Committee took control, the country had found itself more in a state of flux; the political situation was far less stable than it had previously been as the influence of the central government became less effective in the provinces. The Directive Committee had been primarily established to temporarily take over the executive power. As soon as the ministers felt confident in their positions and felt that the Directive Committee was interfering in their affairs, the Directive Committee was dissolved. This would prevent the ministers from having to share their power with members of the Directive Committee.⁶³⁸ It was at this point that someone had to take the role of Prime Minister. Sepahdar was asked to take that position. Sepahdar's diaries indicate that he played an active role in the dissolution of the Directive Committee; he wrote that he had insisted on the immediate opening of the Parliament. Despite the fact that the Directive Committee and Taqizadeh had opposed that, Sepahdar eventually succeeded in dissolving the Directive Committee.⁶³⁹ On November 19, 1909 the Prime Minister and his cabinet were introduced to the parliament. In this cabinet Sardar As'ad took the role of Interior Minister, Moshir al-Dowleh Justice Minister, Sani' al-Dowleh Education Minister and Vosouq al-Dowleh the finance minister.⁶⁴⁰ As Naser al-Molk, who had been previously declared Foreign Minister was still reluctant to return from Europe, 'Ala al-Saltaneh took that post. Kasravi describes 'Ala al-Saltaneh as one of the people who had belonged to the circle of the ex-Shah but had later joined the constitutionalist camp.⁶⁴¹

⁶³⁶ *Iran-e Now*, September 13, 1909.

⁶³⁷ Barclay to Grey, telegram, 13 September 1909, in *Persia No.2 (1910)*, 126.

⁶³⁸ *Iran-e Now*, September 14, 1909.

⁶³⁹ Quoted in Sharif Kashani, 580.

⁶⁴⁰ Proceedings of the Second Parliament: Session 9, 10 November 1909.

⁶⁴¹ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 72-3.

According to a British report, after the dissolution of the Directive Committee its prominent members such as Taqizadeh and Navab kept their distance from the government, thus allowing the ministers to act independently. Their distancing themselves was apparently not helpful for as the report stated, "The Ministers, deprived of the support of the men who will doubtless form the most influential section of the Medjliss [Majles], found their responsibilities too great, and they soon set to work to urge these men to abandon this attitude of aloofness."⁶⁴² One reason for Taqizadeh's distancing himself from executive issues was the increasing criticism he faced during the period of the Directive Committee.

5:10 Opposition to Taqizadeh

It seems that Taqizadeh's haste to achieve his goals had led him to use his influence and place his friends and supporters in key positions. This was not without consequences and was strongly resented by some of the prominent constitutionalists who felt they had been pushed out of the circle of power. One of the main difficulties that the new regime faced was the disagreement between those who had played leading roles since the beginning of the constitutional movement and those who had joined later and had participated in the restoration of the constitution following the closure of the First Parliament. The leading characters of the first constitution era saw the constitution as their legacy. They believed that as founders of the constitutional movement they were the only ones who had the legitimate right to have control over affairs in the new government. In contrast, those who had joined the movement after the bombardment of the First Parliament, deposing the Shah and re-establishing the constitution, had a different stand. They regarded the first constitution era as a closed chapter. They had worked hard to create the constitution once more and thus believed they had the right to power in the government. This disagreement between these two factions put Taqizadeh, as the leading member of the first constitution period, in dispute with others such as Sepahdar whom he considered to be simply the nominal leader of the constitutionalist forces who had liberated Tehran.⁶⁴³

⁶⁴² Barclay to Grey, 7 October 1909, in *Persia No.2 (1910)*, 141.

⁶⁴³ Malekzadeh, 6-7: 1324.

As mentioned previously, Taqizadeh used his influence to choose Ali Mohammad Khan as the commander of the Mojaheds in Tehran. This had put some other leaders of the Mojaheds, such as Mo‘ez al-Soltan, who had expected to be chosen as the head of the Mojaheds, in direct opposition to Taqizadeh. As reflected in ‘Ain al-Saltaneh’s diaries, because of the choice of Ali Mohammad Khan as head of the Mojaheds, a dispute had arisen among the Mojaheds. The Mojaheds of Tehran were the main protesters, putting forward the argument that Taqizadeh’s popularity and success should not lead to the Mojaheds automatically supporting whomever he had chosen.⁶⁴⁴ Taqizadeh himself writes that this point of contention turned Sepahdar and Mo‘ez al-Soltan against him.⁶⁴⁵ Sepahdar, as the Minister of War, was not sympathetic towards the Directive Committee.⁶⁴⁶ There was also a personal animosity, over the execution of Sheikh Fazl al-Allah, between Sepahdar and Ali Mohammad Khan, whom he believed to be too radical.⁶⁴⁷

As reported in *Iran-e Now*, the closed circle of the Directive Committee and its privately held sessions was criticised by the opposition groups.⁶⁴⁸ ‘Azd al-Molk refers to this secrecy in a letter to Seqat al-Eslam; “Nobody is allowed to enter the meeting room. They have a bell and, on the tables, there are jars of water and containers full of ice. Before giving a speech, some members take a drink to wet their mouths. It is said that during these meetings that take place behind closed doors the independence of the country is discussed...”.⁶⁴⁹

As the most influential member of the Directive Committee criticisms were aimed predominantly at Taqizadeh. The nocturnal letters distributed in Tehran by some opposition groups increasingly condemned Taqizadeh. One of these nocturnal letters in particular interestingly focuses on the criticism Taqizadeh faced and warns him about not acting beyond the limits of his responsibilities:

⁶⁴⁴ ‘Ain al-Saltaneh, 4: 2766.

⁶⁴⁵ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 128.

⁶⁴⁶ Barclay to Grey, 10 September 1909, in *Persia No.2 (1910)*, 132.

⁶⁴⁷ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 124.

⁶⁴⁸ *Iran-e Now*, September 1, 1909.

⁶⁴⁹ ‘Azd al-Molk to Seqat al-Eslam, 11 September 1909, in *Zendegi Nameh-e Shahid-e Niknam*, ed., Fathi, 485.

For example, his Excellency Taqizadeh was previously the editor of a newspaper and ran a bookshop. He made himself popular through some of his enthusiastic, public-spirited talks. As public opinion towards him grew, people elevated him from the rank of bookseller to the high position he came to hold and considered him their representative. On the day of his arrival in Tehran everybody expressed happiness and joy. As soon as Taqizadeh requested that the Extraordinary Grand Council become the Directive Committee, the authorities of the state kept quiet and showed no objection. For about a month the Directive Committee had power; they did whatever they wanted to control people's words and actions. Not only did the order of affairs not improve but in fact worsened by the hour and the country fell into further chaos. Instead of eliminating corruption, they created it....⁶⁵⁰

Letters sent from Tabriz to Taqizadeh after the opening of the Parliament also reveal that he was being slandered in his hometown.⁶⁵¹ But, criticism against Taqizadeh was not limited to inside Iran. Iranians in Istanbul and Europe increasingly became dissatisfied with Taqizadeh and what they considered his radical acts.⁶⁵² Hossein Danesh, the Iranian political activist and journalist based in Istanbul, in a letter to Browne commented that Taqizadeh's behaviour had polarised public opinion and had led to political instability in Iran.⁶⁵³ *Shams* [Sun] newspaper published in Istanbul by Seyyed Hassan Tabrizi was one of the harshest critics of Taqizadeh. It not only did not cover the news of Taqizadeh's arrival in Tehran but also criticised other newspapers for their exaggerated coverage of the event which *Shams* called disgusting.⁶⁵⁴ In its editorials and published letters, it criticised the offensive and harsh language which was often used by Taqizadeh and *Iran-e Now* against foreign powers especially Russia, which they claimed was provocative and against the national interests of Iran. At the same time, *Shams* did not approve of a swift approach towards practising modernity in Iran and believed that Iranian society was not

⁶⁵⁰ Sharif Kashani, 686-9.

⁶⁵¹ Vram Pilosian to Taqizadeh, Tabriz, 3 February 1910, in *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyat*, ed., Afshar, 251-62.

⁶⁵² Dolatabadi, 3: 114.

⁶⁵³ Hossein Danesh to Browne, 19 December 1909, in *Browne Papers*, 1-2-5.

⁶⁵⁴ *Shams*, November 12, 1909.

ready for such abrupt changes. It was also not in favour of following the European style of modernisation to the letter which Taqizadeh and his followers were.⁶⁵⁵

An anonymous letter published in *Shams* targeted Taqizadeh directly. It suggested Taqizadeh and three of his friends controlled everything and were in fact responsible for the chaotic situation in the country. The writer of the letter accused Taqizadeh of receiving secret money and suggested that if the people of Tabriz did not demand Taqizadeh's removal from power, it would be impossible to establish order in the country.⁶⁵⁶

Yahya Dolatabadi considered Taqizadeh's involvement in the Directive Committee to be the starting point of the opposition against him. This in turn led to a group which Taqizadeh had excluded from power to speak out against him. He wrote that the opposition likened Taqizadeh's activities in the Directive Committee to those of Napoleon Bonaparte's in France. According to Dolatabadi, this explained how a group of constitutionalists rose up against Taqizadeh and how in turn Taqizadeh responded by garnering the support of people, some of whom were not always the most suitably qualified. Dolatabadi comments that Taqizadeh, with the so-called backing of the Social Democrat Party of the Caucasus, had managed to further increase his authority. He continues that some people sent from Baku by the party had come to Tehran in order to express their dissatisfaction with Taqizadeh. This resulted in the power of the opposition being strengthened and Taqizadeh's power being weakened.⁶⁵⁷ Popular opinion, particularly in Tehran, also became more negative towards Taqizadeh and the Directive Committee since they had taken steps to curb the use of opium and alcohol, a habit popular among many inhabitants of the capital.

This negative attitude towards Taqizadeh may have influenced the number of votes that he received when nominated as the representative of Tehran. The results of the elections could show that Taqizadeh's popularity was diminishing in Tehran. Despite Taqizadeh's popularity upon his arrival in Tehran, by the time the elections were held, the number of

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid., October 28, 1909.

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid., November 12, 1909.

⁶⁵⁷ Dolatabadi, 3: 120.

votes he received was limited. Of the 55 candidates qualified for the second round of the elections he ranked only 25th with 250 votes. In comparison, Navab for instance, received the third highest number of votes with 2102.⁶⁵⁸ Seqat al-Eslam mentioned in a letter that Taqizadeh, to whom people had been so devoted in the beginning, was now becoming increasing unpopular in Tabriz and Tehran because people believed he was an anglophile.⁶⁵⁹ ‘Ain al-Saltaneh wrote that businessmen in Tehran were complaining about Taqizadeh.⁶⁶⁰ In another case, immediately after the opening of the Parliament a nocturnal letter blames Taqizadeh for supporting the appointment of the governor of Fars, Saham al-Dowleh who, according to the letter, had been ineffectual.⁶⁶¹ This is while, according to a British report, Saham al-Dowleh had displayed extraordinary skill in his administration of that province. He was successful in establishing his authority as the governor and had “already made some progress in the settlement of the British claims”.⁶⁶² But the same report mentions that the governor had made many enemies especially among the clergy. Apparently Saham al-Dowleh’s family background was also a point to be criticised by those who believed he was not the right kind of man for the role of governorship. Sharif Kashani commented that Saham al-Dowleh was not a suitable candidate as he came from a working-class family, his father being a servant. He commented that the governors of Fars were traditionally chosen from the ranks of wealthy noblemen and princes who carried great authority. He considered that Saham al-Dowleh lacked these attributes and thus would not be successful in Fars since he would lack any sense of authority in the eyes of the general public.⁶⁶³ Following the establishment of the Constitution, mobility across social ranks became more accepted. However, at this point, there was still great exception to Saham al-Dowleh’s candidature which highlights the resistance this progressive idea faced. Saham-al Dowleh’s case also demonstrates how much pressure there was on those such as Taqizadeh, whose aim was for fundamental reform in the governmental system, and how few options were in fact open to them.

⁶⁵⁸ ‘Ain al Saltaneh, 4: 2753.

⁶⁵⁹ *Zendegei Nameh Shahid-e Niknam*, ed., Fathi, 507.

⁶⁶⁰ ‘Ain al-Saltaneh, 4: 2783.

⁶⁶¹ Sharif Kashani, 654-6.

⁶⁶² Barclay to Grey, 4 November 1909, in *Further Correspondence No.2 (1910)*, 156-7.

⁶⁶³ Sharif Kashani, 600.

In fact, the period between the creation of the Directive Committee and the opening of the Second Parliament was characterised by increased hostility between Sepahdar and his supporters and Taqizadeh.⁶⁶⁴

⁶⁶⁴ Dolatabadi, 3: 123.

(اسامی منتخبین درجه)

(اول طهران)

— عدد منتخبین درجه اول دارالخلافه بنا بر قانون ۵۰ نفر مد ولی ملاحظه آنکه —

— شاید بعضی از آقایان استعفا بدهند یا عذوری داشته باشند ۵۵ —

— نفر ذیل با کثرت آسب انتخاب و معین شده اند —

۱ حاج سید نصرالله	۳۶۱۵	۲۰ میرزا سید محمد محمدی	۱۹۲	۳۹ میرزا علی محمد خان جماد	۲۱۳
۲ احتشام السلطنه	۲۹۳۳	۲۱ محشم السلطنه	۴۶۱	۴۰ حاج شیخ مرتضی اشقیانی	۲۰۸
۳ حسینقل خان نواب	۲۱۰۲	۲۲ مشیرالدوله	۴۵۷	۴۱ ناصرالملک	۲۰۰
۴ ممتازالدوله	۲۰۹۲	۲۳ حسنعلیخان	۳۹۵	۴۲ دکتر حیدر میرزا	۱۹۵
۵ ذکاءالملک	۲۰۸۹	۲۴ مؤمنالملک	۳۷۲	۴۳ سلیمان میرزا	۱۸۷
۶ مختبرالملک	۲۰۴۵	۲۵ تقی زاده	۳۵۰	۴۴ حاجی سید محمد امامزاده	۱۸۷
۷ افشین محمد حسین یزدی	۱۶۷۳	۲۶ ماضدالملک	۳۲۶	۴۵ یحیی میرزا	۱۷۵
۸ حکیمالملک	۱۶۳۵	۲۷ دکتر امیرخان	۲۹۳	۴۶ ممتاز السلطنه	۱۷۴
۹ مستشارالدوله	۱۵۷۵	۲۸ مسعودیالملک	۲۸۹	۴۷ میرزا دودخان علی آبادی	۱۷۰
۱۰ دکتر ولی الله خان	۱۵۵۵	۲۹ لسانالملک	۲۷۹	۴۸ افشین محمد تقی کرکانی	۱۶۶
۱۱ صنیع الدوله	۱۵۱۳	۳۰ وحیدالملک	۲۷۴	۴۹ حاج محمد تقی شاهرودی	۱۶۳
۱۲ حاج امیر القصر	۱۳۴۳	۳۱ حاج علی حاج حبیب	۲۶۵	۵۰ ملا اسدالله فقیه التجار	۱۵۷
۱۳ وثوق الدوله	۱۰۴۵	۳۲ ظهیرالدوله	۲۵۷	۵۱ صدرالملک	۱۵۶
۱۴ حاج امام جمعه خوئی	۱۰۲۲	۳۳ افشین محمد مهدی نجم آبادی	۲۵۳	۵۲ مستشار السلطان	۱۵۳
۱۵ صدیق حضرت	۹۸۶	۳۴ رضاقلینان رئیس	۲۴۸	۵۳ قاسم محمد رضای سادات	۱۵۳
۱۶ شیخ رئیس	۸۳۴	۳۵ افشین علی نجم آبادی	۲۴۰	۵۴ آقا میرزا سید محمد طباطبائی	۱۵۰
۱۷ اسدالله میرزا	۷۶۴	۳۶ آقا شیخ علی نوری	۲۳۶	۵۵ حاج سید علی تقی یزدی	۱۱۸
۱۸ ممر السلطان	۶۶۹	۳۷ قاسم بن نجم آبادی	۲۲۶		
۱۹ میرزا حسین خان کسائی	۵۰۲	۳۸ فخر الاسلام	۲۲۵		

Figure 11: The list of the elected people for the second round of the elections. Taqizadeh is ranked number 25.⁶⁶⁵

⁶⁶⁵ 'Ain al-Saltaneh, 4: 2753.

5:11 Elections for the Second Parliament

The elections of the Second Parliament were organised by the Directive Committee. In general, there were many complaints about questionable practices during the proceedings of those elections.⁶⁶⁶ It was said that some of the parliament members of the provinces were nominated from Tehran. In Kurdistan, for instance, as they could not reach agreement over who should be their parliamentary representatives, they requested Tehran to choose.⁶⁶⁷

The election in Azerbaijan was also controversial. Reports circulated that some candidates bought votes in Tabriz.⁶⁶⁸ There was even controversy surrounding the election of Taqizadeh. In one letter remaining, Seqat al-Eslam complains about some of the indications that the election of Taqizadeh and others was not completely honest:

The case of Azerbaijani deputies is questionable. Firstly, the elected members are elected by dishonest means and secondly the members are totally unqualified and insufficiently knowledgeable. That so-called friend [Taqizadeh] who was elected had no suitable qualifications to be a member of the Assembly. He was not even eligible as he had no property, nor was he a tax-payer. However, they managed to ensure his entrance into the Assembly with a particular goal in mind. They proclaimed that they had given him property as a gift, which was, in fact, not true. Then the members appointed an assistant for the committee. They forced voters to write certain members' names on the ballot papers, including the names of the editors of "Mosavat" and "Nejat" and Sheikh Reza Dehkhareqani. The first two were not known locally, nor were they aware of affairs in Azerbaijan. In short, they tried to strengthen their own party. They rigged the second round of the elections so that their friends and acquaintances would be elected.⁶⁶⁹

⁶⁶⁶ Ettehadieh, *Majles va Entekhabat*, 120.

⁶⁶⁷ *Iran-e Now*, October 14, 1909.

⁶⁶⁸ Ettehadieh, 133.

⁶⁶⁹ *Zendegi Nameh-e Shahid-e Niknam*, ed., Fathi, 499.

The letters of Vram Pilosian from Tabriz who actively worked with Taqizadeh to set up the Democrat Party also evidence the fact that the supporters of Taqizadeh had conflicts with Seqat al-Eslam; "The electoral campaign has already started in Tabriz. Our party, or to put it better, our friends are in dispute with Seqat al-Eslam, Ijlal al-Molk and their colleagues. I hope that our men will emerge from the struggle victorious, since their adversaries are not active men and are unable to work seriously".⁶⁷⁰ The result of the election shows that Taqizadeh and his friends were in fact victorious in Tabriz. In the first round of the elections in Tabriz, from 2878 collected votes, Taqizadeh won the majority with 2302 votes, followed by Mostashar al-Dowleh with 1949.⁶⁷¹ The disagreement between Taqizadeh and his friends and Seqat al-Eslam concerned the election law. Taqizadeh advocated for an election in which everybody could vote. However, according to Nasrollah Fathi, Seqat al-Eslam believed that only educated people should have the right to vote.⁶⁷² Mehdi Mojtahedi rejects this stand and comments that since Seqat al-Eslam was a landowner, he was concerned that if the peasants received a right to vote, they would not pay the land interests.⁶⁷³

The election of Taqizadeh in Tabriz was not without further opposition; documents reveal that some prominent constitutionalists in Tabriz were unhappy with the result. A letter written to Taqizadeh from Tabriz informed him that some leading constitutionalists there including Ali Davaforoush were critical of him.⁶⁷⁴ They were of the opinion that Taqizadeh and his party's passive attitude in Tehran had given the upper hand to the supporters of Sardar As'ad and Sepahdar; "The supporters of Sardar and Sepahdar talk with forceful military language whereas Taqizadeh's party uses only innuendo in the

⁶⁷⁰ Vram Pilosian to Taqizadeh, Tabriz, 15 August 1909, in *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyat*, ed., Afshar, 238-42.

⁶⁷¹ Mohammad Ali Badamchi to Hassan Taqizadeh, 13 September 1909, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 158-60.

⁶⁷² *Zendegei Nameh-e Shahid-e Niknam*, ed., Fathi, 577.

⁶⁷³ Mojtahedi, 145-6.

⁶⁷⁴ According to Taqizadeh, Ali Davaforoush was one of the pioneering political figures of the constitutional revolution. He was among the first group of people who sought refuge in the British consulate in Tabriz in 1906, demanding the establishment of the constitution. During the resistance of Tabriz, he personally participated in the battles; his arm was injured and he was hospitalised for three months. He campaigned strongly for education and cultural development. The S'adat school in Tabriz which had 500 pupils was supported by him. He was later executed by Russians. Ref: Hassan Taqizadeh to Edward Browne, 16 January 1912, in *Browne Papers*, 9-9-41.

press”.⁶⁷⁵ It appears that a group was organised in Tabriz to discredit Taqizadeh. While Sardar As‘ad and Sepahdar were military men, Taqizadeh was much more the politician and strategist. It was not surprising then that he preferred the media to the use of armed means. The disagreement between Taqizadeh and Sattar Khan did little to strengthen any effect that the military force of Tabriz might have had. This meant that the influence that the Azerbaijani constitutionalists were able to have in Tehran was far less than they would have expected. Future events would prove that the concerns of people like Ali Davaforoush were well founded.⁶⁷⁶ Despite the strong resistance and sacrifices of the Azerbaijanis in Tabriz during the Lesser Despotism, they were less influential in the government than the Bakhtiyaris who joined the fight only in the final phases of the resistance during the liberation of Tehran.

Six of the elected members for the Parliament from Azerbaijan, including Mohammad Ali Tarbiat, arrived in Tehran on 18 October, 1909 and resided in Taqizadeh’s house.⁶⁷⁷ This suggests a close relationship between them and Taqizadeh. According to *Sharq*, following the arrival of Azerbaijani parliamentary members, there was heightened concern that Taqizadeh’s party would gain too much power. Vehement speeches in the mosques were heard, claiming that if Taqizadeh’s party gained further powers, this would most likely lead to him becoming Speaker of the Parliament.⁶⁷⁸ Five out of the nineteen members elected from Azerbaijan were previously members of the First Parliament. A British report, evaluating the elections in Azerbaijan, concluded that since “only four lesser mullahs” were elected, it was indicative of the eclipse of clericalism and “perhaps the most significant feature of the election.”⁶⁷⁹ The clergy, who in the early days of the revolution had benefitted from co-operation with the constitutionalists, were strongly represented in the First Parliament. But, after the liberation of Tehran there were clear tensions between some religious leaders who had had authority in the past and the new leaders who were

⁶⁷⁵ Anonymous to Hassan Taqizadeh, 3 November 1909, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 170-81.

⁶⁷⁶ A letter from Ali Davaforoush to Taqizadeh sheds more light on the disagreements between him and Taqizadeh. See: Ali Davachi (Davaforoush) to Taqizadeh in *Ibid.*, 183-6.

⁶⁷⁷ *Iran-e Now*, October 19, 1909.

⁶⁷⁸ *Sharq*, October 25, 1909.

⁶⁷⁹ Barclay to Grey, November 4, 1909, in *Persia. No. 1 (1910)*, 154.

now advocating a secular judicial system which would limit the powers that the clergy had traditionally held over the courts.⁶⁸⁰

5:12 The Return of Behbahani

One of the most prominent clergy members of the First Parliament, who had been forced into exile first in Buzehrud near Kermanshah and later in Najaf following the coup d'état, was Seyyed Abdollah Behbahani.⁶⁸¹ He arrived in Tehran a day before the opening of the Second Parliament, with great hope of regaining his previous influential position after his success in the First Parliament. The situation had greatly changed, however, and he now found himself faced with a strong opposition challenging his power. Yahya Dolatabadi writes that he had been given a message for Behbahani from the Social Democrats of Baku, warning him that he should not exceed the limits of his powers and should not focus on integrating religious and civil law.⁶⁸² In a letter Sharif Kashani, considering the unfavourable situation in Tehran, had advised Behbahani not to return to Tehran and had even suggested his life could be in danger.⁶⁸³ The return of Behbahani and his presence in the Second Parliament established a strong opposition against Taqizadeh and those who were advocating a secular governmental system.

Most constitutionalists wanted a secular parliament with a new generation of members. A letter from Dehkhoda exemplifies well the kind of representatives who were considered by the leading constitutionalists as ideal for election to the Parliament and fitted well with the political atmosphere of the period. In the letter, composed before the elections of the Second Parliament, Dehkhoda emphasises that the elected members should be from a new generation of politicians, well-versed in contemporary affairs and conversant in foreign languages. He then states; "I do not say that we should hand over affairs of state to a bunch of youths who have seen Europe or studied there but my point is that we should increase

⁶⁸⁰ *The Times*, December 28, 1909.

⁶⁸¹ For more about Behbahani's exile, see: Esma'il Mortazavi Borazjani, *Zendani-e Buzehrud* [The Prisoner of Buzehrud] (Tehran: Anjoman-e Doustan, 1958). Taqizadeh has written a review about this book and considers it a reliable source about Behbahani's life, see: Taqizadeh, *Tufani: Attachments*, 639-47.

⁶⁸² Dolatabadi, 3: 126-8.

⁶⁸³ Sharif Kashani, 593-5.

the number of these people in the Parliament by any means....”⁶⁸⁴ Besides the clergy, some tribes and their protests were also a source of conflict for the constitutionalists. Dehkhoda’s comments on the destructive role the various tribes played in the downfall of the constitution are also interesting. He believed that if the tribes were more involved in the Second Parliament, they would then be able to play a more constructive role in the political process.⁶⁸⁵ One example of the destructive role of the tribes was the case of Rahim Khan, a tribal chief who caused huge problems for the government.

5:13 The Threat of Rahim Khan

Local insurgences were one of the obstacles to the new constitutional regime establishing a powerful central government. After Mohammad Ali Shah left the country, his supporters began causing trouble for the new regime in various locations. The opposition of Rahim Khan Chalabianlou, one of the tribal chiefs of Azerbaijan, was the main threat to the sovereignty of the central government in Tehran. Rahim Khan had fought for the ex-Shah during the siege of Tabriz. Just as he was about to break the resistance of Tabriz, involvement of the Russians in ending the siege had thwarted his attempt. After the liberation of Tehran and establishment of the constitutional regime, finding himself in danger of arrest and punishment, he aimed to attack Ardabil with the pretext of supporting the ex-Shah. On October 29 he was arrested by the Russians but, after paying 20,000 Turkish Lira and 180 camels, he was released.⁶⁸⁶

Realising the precarious situation in Ardabil, the Governor of Azerbaijan, Mokhber al-Saltaneh, ordered Sattar Khan, whose presence in Tabriz both he and the Russians were unhappy about, to go to Ardabil with his fighters to take control of the town. On September 9, Sattar Khan departed for Ardabil with a group of about one hundred men.⁶⁸⁷ In Sarab more forces joined Sattar Khan, increasing the number of fighters to about three hundred. A month later a huge army was attacked by Rahim Khan and many members of the

⁶⁸⁴ Dehkhoda to a political character in Tehran, in *Nameh-hay-e Siyasi-e Dehkhoda*, ed., Afshar, 65-74.

⁶⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁶ Edward, G. Browne, *The Persian Crisis of December 1911*, 4-5.

⁶⁸⁷ Amirkhizi, 489-516.

Shahsavani tribe who had joined him.⁶⁸⁸ Sattar Khan had to retreat and surrender the town due to lack of support from central and local government.

Together with nine other tribal chiefs, Rahim Khan sent a telegraph to Mohammad Ali Shah, revealing their intention to overthrow the Constitution.⁶⁸⁹ He was also supported by factions of the clergy who were displeased by limitations being placed on their traditional power due to the establishment of the constitutional regime.⁶⁹⁰ On November 9, Rahim Khan threatened to march to the capital and overthrow the Constitution in favour of the ex-Shah.⁶⁹¹ Rahim Khan's attempt was used as a pretext for the Russians to send more troops to Iran, putting increased pressure on the newly-formed government in Iran just before the opening of the Second Parliament in Tehran.

5:14 The Second Parliament

Our Iran will become like Europe because of the Parliament

No! Even better than anywhere in the world.⁶⁹²

On 15 November 1909 the Second Parliament was opened, resembling a European parliament in appearance. The hall in which the sessions were held was as big as an amphitheatre, 28 meters in length and 11 and a half meters wide. Its members did not sit on the floor as they had done during the First Parliament. Instead, now, five semi-circular rows of seats were designed for the members of parliament to sit in. Special places were allocated for the speaker, committee members, ministers, ulama, foreign envoys and spectators.⁶⁹³ Each political party sat in its own allotted place on the right, left or in the

⁶⁸⁸ For more about the role of Shahsavani tribe during this period see: Richard Tapper, "Raiding, Reaction and Rivalry: The Shahsevan Tribes in the Constitutional Period," in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 49, no. 3 (1986): 508-53. Accessed 18 May, 2018. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/617828>.

⁶⁸⁹ Abdol Hossein Navaei, *Dolathay-e Iran: Az Aqaz-e Mashrutiyat ta Oltimatom* [Iranian Governments from the launch of the Constitution to the Ultimatum], (Tehran: Babak, 1976), 146.

⁶⁹⁰ Report by Poklovski, 19 March 1910, in *Ketab-e Narenji: Ghozareshay-e Siyasi-e Vezarat-e Kharejeh-e Rousieh Darbareh Enqelab-e Mashrutayieh-e Iran* [The Orange Book: Diplomatic Reports of the Russian Foreign Ministry about the Iranian Constitutional Revolution], trans., Parvin Monzavi (Tehran: Parvaz, 1989), 4: 68.

⁶⁹¹ Browne, *The Persian Crisis of December 1911*, 5.

⁶⁹² *Iran-e Now*, November 15, 1909.

⁶⁹³ *Ibid.*, October 19, 1909.

centre of the parliament. The rules and regulations of the Second Parliament were copied exactly from that of the French.⁶⁹⁴ The calibre of the members of parliament had increased and many had been educated in Europe and were knowledgeable about political structures in the west. Some of them were even able to converse in one or more European languages.

The expectations people had of this parliament were great. *Iran-e Now* considered the reopening of the parliament as the real modernisation of Iran.⁶⁹⁵ Since the government was eager for the parliament to be opened quickly, once the candidates of Tehran and Azerbaijan and some other cities were elected, the parliament opened before others joined.⁶⁹⁶ With the presence of only sixty-four members in Tehran rather than the full one hundred and twenty, the parliament sat with only a few more than the required minimum number. In fact, this majority was only on paper since during the fifth session of the parliament, when they wished to confirm ‘Azd al-Molk as the regent, only 56 members were present to cast votes. Before the voting procedure began, Adib al-Tojar, one of the members, reminded them that there were insufficient members present to start proceedings. In response, Taqizadeh stated it was acceptable that some members from the provinces were only introduced by telegraphs and their actual presence was not necessary.⁶⁹⁷ During sittings of the parliament, Mostashar al-Dowleh was chosen as the president and Haji Seyyed Nasr al-Allah as the first vice-president of the Parliament.⁶⁹⁸ By the time the Second Parliament had come to an end, not all members had yet been elected. The number of the members fluctuated as some accepted governmental jobs and quit the parliament, some passed away and some never actually joined the parliament. There is, thus, no complete list of the members of this parliament.

In the fourth session of the parliament, following the required speech of the speaker, Taqizadeh took the stage. He showed his appreciation to those who had been killed in the name of the constitution and thanked those who had come to Iran to fight for the

⁶⁹⁴ Taqizadeh, “Tarikh-e Mokhtasar-e Majles,” in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 5: 237.

⁶⁹⁵ *Iran-e Now*, November 15, 1909.

⁶⁹⁶ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 75.

⁶⁹⁷ Proceeding of the Second Parliament, 22 November, 1909, Session 5.

⁶⁹⁸ Barclay to Grey, November 21, 1909, in *Further Correspondence No.1* (1911), 3-4.

constitution; Caucasian Mojaheds, Armenians, Georgians and those who had assisted the constitutional movement from beyond the borders of Iran, such as Browne and Lynch.⁶⁹⁹

The Second Parliament, formed after much fighting and bloodshed, was strongly nationalistic. Its members considered the independence of the country to be in danger.⁷⁰⁰ In the Second Parliament the influence of landowners and governmental staff increased. This created a far more conservative parliament, which was not in line with the goals of such members as Taqizadeh.

Two distinct political groups dominated this parliament, each with its own distinct stance. One group favoured moderate progressive ideas. Its supporters were referred to as “Et‘dalioun”; Moderates. The Moderates advocated compromise with the more conservative forces and favoured gradual reform and were concerned about the intervention of foreign powers in the country’s affairs. The second political group’s strategy was quite the opposite; they were more interested in immediate sweeping reforms and were unwilling to compromise. The second group were known as Democrats. *Iran-e Now* suggested that the difference between the two groups lay mainly in the fact that whilst one party advocated a more wide-sweeping constitution, necessitating reform in every aspect of governance including the economic and judiciary system, the other group, the Moderates, wanted only to obliterate the rule of dictatorship.⁷⁰¹

5:15 The Democrat Party

Whilst up to the end of the period of Lesser Despotism there were two major political inclinations: “Royalist” and “Constitutionalist”, now with the formation of the Second Parliament, political pluralism surfaced in Iran; politics became more nuanced. The Democrat Party was one which pioneered a more well-defined political goal by becoming the first political party in Iran.

⁶⁹⁹ *Iran-e Now*, November 28, 1909.

⁷⁰⁰ Ettehadieh, *Majles va Entekhabat*, 123.

⁷⁰¹ *Iran-e Now*, March 20, 1910.

As was previously mentioned, Taqizadeh had had the idea of forming a political party after his return from Europe and before his arrival in Tehran. The liberation of Tehran and dethroning of the Shah together with Taqizadeh's role in establishing the foundations of a new political order enabled the ideas of forming a party to become a reality. Immediately upon his arrival in Tehran Taqizadeh, finding the situation favourable, began laying the groundwork for the formation of the Democrat Party. The creation of a party would provide a platform for the organised mobilisation of the masses in a secular context which could accommodate all other non-Muslim communities. This was in line with Taqizadeh's roadmap which followed the democratic models of Europe.

A detailed picture of the activities of the Social Democrats of the Caucasus will allow a fuller understanding of the development of social democracy in Iran prior to the Constitutional Revolution in 1906. The intellectuals, inspired by the Russian Revolution of 1905, had begun forming circles to spread the ideas of social democracy particularly in Tabriz. These activists were either Iranians who had close contact with the Caucasus, those who had gone there to work or people from that region who had ties with Iranians. Heydar Khan Amoghlu, for instance, who was originally from the Caucasus, had attempted to organise a social democrat party during his stay in Mashhad as early as 1903-4.⁷⁰²

Iranian Armenians in particular were among those who had organised activities to promote social democracy in Iran and had connections with socialists in Europe. In 1890 some Armenians had established a group in Tbilisi called "Dashnaktsutun". This group later established its headquarters in Azerbaijan and Tabriz. Since the detailed background of the Social Democrats is discussed in other sources, the focus here will be on the formation of the Iranian Democrat Party in relationship to Taqizadeh.⁷⁰³

⁷⁰² Atabaki, *Azerbaijan*, 35.

⁷⁰³ See: Khosro Shakeri, Arshavir Chalangarian, and Tigran Darvish, etc., ed., Mohammad Hossein Khosropanah, *Naqsh-e Aramaneh dar Sosal Demokrasi-e Iran* [The Role of Armenians in Iranian Social Democracy] (Tehran: Shirazeh, 2003). Also see: Janet Afary, "International and Multi-ethnic Solidarity: Revolutionary Forces Reconquer Tehran," in *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution 1906-1911* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 228-54.

Sources referencing the Dashnaktsutun Archives indicate that Vahan Zakarian, a member of the Azerbaijan Central Committee of the Dashnaktsutun, had meetings with Taqizadeh to discuss forming a new party in the winter of 1909.⁷⁰⁴ They had discussed creating a party with a platform similar to that of Dashnaktsutun. According to these sources, Taqizadeh had, as early as November 1908, clandestinely planned forming a party with two Armenian Social Democrats; Vram Pilosian and Tigran Ter Hakobian. This is clearly evident in the letters of Vram Pilosian to Taqizadeh immediately after Taqizadeh's arrival in Tehran. As a letter clearly indicates, Pilosian and Taqizadeh had discussed "the project" in Tabriz.⁷⁰⁵

Pilosian writes, "The era of forming political parties in Iran has started". He goes on to explain how, after Taqizadeh's departure from Tabriz, he and his friends had endeavoured to quickly form the party and emphasises the haste in which it was done: "We need to hurry, so that all our plans are not taken over by the others. We should try to create an organised democratic party majority in the Second Parliament." He also adds that he and his friends were eager that people sympathetic to their cause be elected from Tabriz in the parliamentary elections. According to the letter, the party's rules had also to be translated. In a second letter, after receiving replies from Taqizadeh and his friends in Tehran, Pilosian expresses his joy at their efforts to organise the party in Tehran. He writes; "The Democrat Party is no longer a fantasy, because it really exists."⁷⁰⁶ He also recommends that the party be organised according to a European model" and adds, "We need, in the Second Parliament, energetic and strongly patriotic men, for if the Second Parliament does not satisfy the people and put an end to anarchy in the provinces, our independence will be in danger."⁷⁰⁷

Taqizadeh and Pilosian wanted a party independent from the Dashnaktsutun and were reluctant to let members of Dashnaktsutun join their party. This had disappointed

⁷⁰⁴ Houri Berberian, *Armenians and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911* (Oxford: Westview, 2001), 134-5.

⁷⁰⁵ Vram Pilosian to Taqizadeh, Tabriz, 15 August 1909, in *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyyat*, ed., Afshar, 238-42.

⁷⁰⁶ Vram Pilosian to Taqizadeh, Tabriz, 26 January 1910, in *Ibid.*, 247-51.

⁷⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

Dashnakists such as Zakarian.⁷⁰⁸ Interestingly, Taqizadeh has not written about his dealings with Armenians in Tabriz and their role in the development of the Democrat Party in Iran.

Although Pilosian did not speak Persian and wrote his letters to Taqizadeh in French, his correspondence to Taqizadeh gives evidence that he was advocating an independent secular Iran with Persian as its national language and with rights for minorities; goals to which the Democrat Party and Taqizadeh were also devoted.⁷⁰⁹ This was despite the fact that beside nationalistic ideologies, democrats also endeavoured to incorporate Islamic principles into their manifesto.⁷¹⁰ However, clearly these amendments were not convincing enough for the religious masses. Later, when the Democrats were under attack, some of Taqizadeh's friends suggested that the manifesto needed some revisions. The public were worried about some of the manifesto's articles and believed the constitutionalists were attempting to reduce the influence of the clergy. Mohammad Ali Badamchi commented that some articles in the manifesto put democracy at risk; "I wish that when the manifesto was being written the article about the separation from politics of the ulama and about the education of women had not been included. Now that this has been written, the ulama will have to be won over. Otherwise, the ulama from one side and nobles, land owners and other corrupt people from the other side will succeed in wiping out democracy".⁷¹¹ He goes on to demand a solution and encourages Taqizadeh to write an explanation using arguments from the Koran. According to Badamchi, if these two articles had not been made part of the manifesto, 2000 people would have joined the party. In another letter Ahmad Ostovar complained that if the Democrats had taken into consideration public opinion from the beginning and thus adapted the party's manifesto accordingly, the result would have been

⁷⁰⁸ Houri Berberian, *Armenians and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911* (Oxford: Westview, 2001), 134-5.

⁷⁰⁹ To read about Iranian nationalism and the role of non-Persian intellectuals in developing language policies see: Touraj Atabaki, "Pan-Turkism and Iranian Nationalism" in *Iran and the First World War*, ed., Atabaki, 121-36.

⁷¹⁰ Fereydoon Adamiyat has analysed this aspect of the Democrat Party in one of his books and comments on the sometimes contradictory nature of these adaptations. See: *Fekr-e Demokrasi-e Ejtemaei dar Nehzat-e Mashrutiyat-e Iran* [The Idea of Social Democracy in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution] (Tehran: Payam, 1984), 118.

⁷¹¹ Mohammad Ali Badamchi to Taqizadeh, 8 March 1911, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 240-52.

more favourable.⁷¹² It seems that even the word “democrat” discouraged some people from joining the party. In a letter to Taqizadeh, Pilosian asks him if he perhaps knows a Persian or Arabic word which could be equivalent to “democrat”. He was afraid that Iranians would find this European term distasteful as they always had a repugnance for foreign words.⁷¹³

The Democrat Party established branches in provincial centres and sent party members to the provinces to propagate its programme. Soon the influence of the Democrat Party spread and many young and educated people in particular began to join. The senior members of the Democrat Party were: Taqizadeh, Seyyed Mohammad Mosavat, Hossein Qoli Khan Navab, Soleyman Mirza, Hakim al-Molk, Sheikh Mohammad Khiabani, Heydar Khan Amoghlu, Rasoulzadeh, Mirza Mohammad Khan Nejat, Esma‘il Nobari, Mohammad Ali Tarbiat, Ali Mohammad Tarbiat and Seyyed Jalil Ardabili. Taqizadeh was the leader of the party.⁷¹⁴

5:16 The Democrats in the Parliament

The activities of the Democrat Party in the Second Parliament caused conflicts in the Parliament; the disagreements between “the Moderates” and the Democrats were one of the biggest problems. The Democrats were well organised with a clearly defined program and despite being in the minority with no more than twenty members, this gave them the upper hand in Parliament.⁷¹⁵ The program of the Democrat Party which was considered revolutionary at that time was based on two fundamental premises: fighting against landowners and the separation of the political system from religion. By pursuing these two policies the Democrats would find themselves facing two traditionally powerful groups; the clergy and the tribal chiefs.

Although the party tried to adapt its ideology to Islamic rules, one of the articles of the party’s manifesto banned any professional clergy from becoming a member. Members who

⁷¹² Ahmad Ostovar to Taqizadeh, 6 June 1911, in *Ibid.*, 269-75.

⁷¹³ Vram Pilosian to Taqizadeh, Tabriz, 3 February 1910, in *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyat*, ed., Afshar, 251-62.

⁷¹⁴ Mojtehed, 155-6.

⁷¹⁵ Ettehadieh, *Peydayesh va Tahavol Ahzab-e Siyasi*, 190.

were aristocrats or those in positions of authority who were considered too submissive were also not accepted.⁷¹⁶ Taqizadeh's belief that Iran's only path to rapid and successful modernisation was the same route that had already been carved out by the Europeans, once again became evident. The Democrats continued to advocate the idea that small reforms were useless; only starting anew with sweeping changes could lead to success.⁷¹⁷ The Democrats believed that as Iran was a predominantly agricultural country, importance must be given to agriculture and the welfare of farmers secured. In order to protect the farmers and develop agriculture, it was vital that the Democrat Party represented and defended the farmers in Parliament.⁷¹⁸

The Democrats had borrowed heavily from the earlier manifestos of the Social Democrats.⁷¹⁹ The manifesto of the Democrat Party was issued consisting of 32 articles in seven sections as follows: all persons should be treated equally before the law regardless of their race, religion and ethnicity; the complete separation of religion and politics; the casting of a direct secret ballot system for the public; contemporary public education for everyone; the establishment of a national military service system; access to courts, free of charge; the change of tax collection from indirect taxes to direct taxes; the nationalisation of forestry, rivers, pastures and mines; the use of religious endowments (waqfs) under the supervision of the government for charity and cultural purposes.

The Democrats were more focused on the modern intelligentsia, while the Moderates represented the land aristocracy and the traditional middle class.⁷²⁰ In terms of foreign policy, the Democrats enjoyed good relations with the British whilst the Moderates were on better terms with the Russians.⁷²¹

⁷¹⁶ "Asnadi Chand az Hezb-e Democrat," in *Oraq-e Tazehyab-e Mashrutuyat*, ed., Afshar, 352.

⁷¹⁷ *Iran-e Now*, November 22, 1909.

⁷¹⁸ *Ibid.*, November 13, 1909.

⁷¹⁹ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 104.

⁷²⁰ *Ibid.*, 105.

⁷²¹ *Bahar*, 1: 12.

5:17 *Iran-e Now*, a Modern Newspaper

The conquest of Tehran and the deposing of Mohammad Ali Shah heralded a new period in the development of the press in Iran. As discussed in the opening of Chapter Four, Taqizadeh, who was well aware of the importance of the press and had previously tried his hand at journalism, played an active role in introducing new methods of journalism which helped modernise the press in Iran. After the coup d'état of Mohammad Ali Shah most newspapers were forced to close. Following the liberation of Tehran (July, 1909) there came a period of freedom of the press and several newspapers were launched with more defined political editorial stances. One newspaper in particular which helped to radically transform journalism in Iran was *Iran-e Now*, which would later become the organ of the Democrat Party. About ten newspapers were published in Tehran, *Iran-e Now* being one.⁷²² *Iran-e Now* soon became the paper with the largest circulation in Tehran.⁷²³ Financed by an Armenian called Basel and first published on 24 August 1909, this newspaper represented Taqizadeh's and his party's political opinions.⁷²⁴ From late November 1909, *Iran-e Now* began to suggest that political parties should work transparently and introduce their plan to the parliament and the public.⁷²⁵ The owner and nominal editor of *Iran-e Now* was Seyyed Mohammad Shabestari also known as Abuzi', who had previously been the editor of *Al-Hadid* and *Mojahed*. However, the real editor and most influential contributor to the newspaper was Mohammad Amin Rasoulzadeh who had come from Baku and after travelling to Rasht and Tabriz had settled in Tehran after the liberation of the city. *Iran-e Now* was the first newspaper in Iran to be published in the format used in Europe and became a role model for other newspapers.⁷²⁶ It paved the way for later publications with its wider content and journalistic techniques based on European models.⁷²⁷

Iran-e Now covered varied topics and carried articles discussing the political situation of Iran and foreign countries and the minutes of the parliamentary proceedings. It also

⁷²² Barclay to Grey, September 10, 1909, in *Persia. No. 1* (1910), 132.

⁷²³ Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 104.

⁷²⁴ 'Ain al-Saltaneh: 4: 2789.

⁷²⁵ *Iran-e Now*, November 28, 1909.

⁷²⁶ Edward Granville Browne, *The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1914), 52-3.

⁷²⁷ Adamiyat, *Fekr-e Demokrasi*, 97.

received telegraphs about events happening in Iran and elsewhere, ran business advertisements, published poetry and translated excerpts from European history. *Iran-e Now* demonstrated how the press could be used to influence public opinion and even government policy. In the intellectual history of Iran this publication could be considered as the predecessor of *Kaveh*, later published by Taqizadeh in Berlin; an example of a newspaper which promoted the ideas of modernisation.⁷²⁸

5:18 The Religious Decree against Taqizadeh

One incident which, according to Taqizadeh himself, exacerbated the enmity between him and the traditional clergy and led to the declaration of a Fatwa (religious decree) condemning him, was his upholding of one of the laws he himself had helped to pass, supporting the equal rights of religious minorities.⁷²⁹ This took place during the period of the Second Parliament in one of the villages of Neyshabour in the Khorasan province. Taqizadeh, in the presence of some clergy, among them Behbahani, demanded the punishment of a local Mullah, Sheikh Mohammad Baqer, who had killed two Ismailis, followers of a minority branch of Shia Islam, returning from a pilgrimage to Mecca. Added to the unpopularity of Taqizadeh's demand was the fact that Mohammad Baqer was brought to Tehran under arrest by order of the Armenian chief of police, Yapram Khan. This caused further indignation at the arrest of a Muslim Mullah by a non-Muslim Armenian. Taqizadeh, who had worked hard to include the equal treatment of all male citizens regardless of religion or ethnicity in the Supplementary Constitutional Laws now had to defend it in practice.⁷³⁰ Now, although he was simply upholding that law by demanding the punishment of the Mullah Baqer, Taqizadeh found himself in an even more difficult position. His defence of the implementation of the law he had fought so hard to pass caused strong resentment among the clergy.⁷³¹ This gave the opportunity that those

⁷²⁸ Similar discourse was first presented with almost the same tone in *Iran-e Now*, though it had not been as widely accepted at that time. *Kaveh*'s publication coincided with a period when the public were more eager to embrace the ideas put forward by the newspaper and there was more opportunity for the ideas presented to be translated into policy than when *Iran-e Now* was being written. In addition, *Kaveh* was more widely circulated and read in Iranian intellectual circles both at home and abroad.

⁷²⁹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 137.

⁷³⁰ Afary, 291.

⁷³¹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 135-7.

who opposed Taqizadeh had been waiting for. They thus requested the issue of a Fatwa against him.

Taqizadeh's establishment of the Democrat Party in the Second Parliament and its controversial political activities further galvanized opposition against him. Sattar Khan who had now come to Tehran opposed the Democrats and Taqizadeh. Sattar Khan was suspicious of the Democrats, considering them over ambitious and destructive. He believed that Democrats should be ousted from the political scene. Some of the strongest opposition is evident in the telegraph sent by Ayatollah Abdollah Mazandarani and Mohammad Kazem Khorasani, two prominent Shia clergymen in Najaf. This correspondence demanded Taqizadeh's immediate exile and a ban on any involvement in the political affairs of Iran. The telegraph stated that since it had become evident that Taqizadeh's school of thought opposed the country's Islamic values and Sharia law, it was therefore not appropriate for him to be a member of the parliament.⁷³² It further stated that they would not allow him into the parliament and threatened that anybody who assisted him would be tarred with the same brush. Since being branded an infidel and excommunicated could have serious consequences for Taqizadeh, his colleagues, in particular his close friend Mohammad Ali Badamchi, questioned the two prominent clergy as to whether Taqizadeh was indeed excommunicated or not. The response was published in *Habl al-Matin* newspaper which revealed that the clergy of Najaf did not consider him an infidel. Taqizadeh wrote that for a while, following advice from the regent 'Azd al-Molk, they hid the telegram from the public until the situation became too intense.⁷³³ Taqizadeh realised that he could no longer stay in Tehran and decided to temporarily return to Tabriz. He requested a period of three months leave from the Parliament.⁷³⁴ Following the issue of this religious order, the parliament arranged for him to leave Tehran and he resided for some time in Tabriz.

⁷³² Ibid., 400.

⁷³³ Ibid.

⁷³⁴ Ibid., 137.

5:19 The Assassination of Seyyed Abdollah Behbahani

Seyyed Abdollah Behbahani was a powerful blocking force of goals of the Democrat Party. After his return to Tehran upon the opening of Parliament, he had been welcomed enthusiastically by a religious crowd. Although he was warned many times by some radical constitutionalists not to interfere in politics, he continued to act as he had during the First Parliament and had established an unofficial government. He was well respected by a large group of people and had great influence over the various military and political figures throughout the country. Many of Behbahani's followers were supporters of the Moderates and they considered the idea of the separation of religion and politics to be totally against the core nature of religion. Dolatabadi writes that the religious order against Taqizadeh had been made possible only with the assistance of Behbahani.⁷³⁵ In response, Taqizadeh had become angry and told Behbahani that his comments suggested that he was in fact anti-Islam.⁷³⁶ According to Dolatabadi, at one point Behbahani asked Taqizadeh to go to the holy shrines outside Iran to talk with the ulama there. Dolatabadi also comments that Sardar As'ad had tried to make peace between Taqizadeh and Behbahani but Behbahani had been reluctant. However, the issuing of the religious order against Taqizadeh and the suspected role of Behbahani in supporting this fatwa increased the hostilities between the Democrats and the Moderates.

On the evening of 17 July, 1910, a carriage stopped in front of Behbahani's house, the passengers entered the house and shot him.⁷³⁷ The next day, upon hearing the news, people closed the Bazar and their shops and demanded the punishment of the assassins.

5:20 Beginning of the Second Exile

After the issue of the religious order against Taqizadeh and the death of Behbahani, pressure increased against the presence of Taqizadeh in the Parliament and even in Tehran. Following the assassination of Behbahani and introduction of the Democrats responsible for the act, the position of Taqizadeh weakened in Tehran and he was forced to leave the city. This enforced departure was in sharp contrast to his exalted arrival. It was said that

⁷³⁵ Dolatabadi, 136.

⁷³⁶ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 300.

⁷³⁷ For the full story see: *Majles*, July 18, 1910.

the atmosphere was so much against him that he had to seek shelter in Sardar As‘ad’s house.⁷³⁸ Taqizadeh eventually left Tehran and travelled through Rasht, Baku and Tbilisi to Tabriz. Mokhber al-Saltaneh, the Governor of Azerbaijan, writes that Taqizadeh arrived in Tabriz on 9 September 1910. Taqizadeh mentions that the Governor supported him as much as he could.⁷³⁹ Mokhber al-Saltaneh comments that the Provincial Assembly in Tabriz was suspicious of Taqizadeh and the majority of businessmen in Tabriz disliked him.⁷⁴⁰ This is while Taqizadeh himself states that he had many friends in Tabriz and businessmen, in particular, supported him.⁷⁴¹ But the very fact that the Governor had asked the police to protect him shows that there was potential danger for him.

It was in Tabriz that Taqizadeh received the sad news of the death of Ali Mohammad Tarbiat, who was killed in Tehran in revenge for the death of Behbahani. As was mentioned previously, Taqizadeh was very fond of Ali Mohammad Khan and considered him as his spiritual follower. The death of Ali Mohammad Khan deeply saddened Taqizadeh.⁷⁴² The following excerpt from a letter that Taqizadeh wrote to a friend and which was published in *Iran-e Now* demonstrates the grief that Taqizadeh felt for the loss of Ali Mohammad Khan:

Could anyone have envisaged the strength of my love, devotion, affection and attachment to that dear young martyr. He was a paragon of virtue, perseverance, excellence, morality and honesty in this world. Imagine an angel of blessings, modesty and purity, an embodiment of ethics and rationality. From his infancy till his death, he was guiltless. He did not allow himself to be distracted by fleeting pleasures in the pursuit of happiness. He did not seek worldly pleasures but rather remained in abject poverty and deprivation out of a great love for his country. Demonstrating tenacity and altruism, he spent many a sleepless

⁷³⁸ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 131.

⁷³⁹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 139.

⁷⁴⁰ Hedayat, 211.

⁷⁴¹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 139.

⁷⁴² Ibid.

night on his journey from Rasht to Tehran; a light burning for freedom and democracy. Alas... what a divine light that after burning brightly was cruelly extinguished. What an example of true humanity risen out of such an abyss. He left me; me the one who had educated him like a father and loved him like my own child...no, child is too weak a word to fully express my feelings for him. I was left like a moth fluttering in eternal unhappiness and the darkness of life, without his light to guide me.... he abandoned me. Where are you, sun rising in the East, morning light, divine bird, solitary soul....⁷⁴³

The remaining correspondence indicates that while in Tabriz Taqizadeh was in communication with the Democrat Party members in Tehran. He tried his best to promote the Party. Taqizadeh believed that rescuing the country was dependent on promoting the Party and increasing the number of Party members.⁷⁴⁴ Esma'il Amirkhizi writes that when Taqizadeh was staying in Tabriz some of his followers had asked him to promote the Democrat Party in Tabriz. Taqizadeh had accepted the request and as a result the number of members had risen.⁷⁴⁵

The absence of Taqizadeh from the Parliament was a loss for the Democrats. Ebrahim Zanjani writes that without Taqizadeh the Parliament was without any soul.⁷⁴⁶ It seems that Taqizadeh was expecting to stay in Tabriz only for a short while and then return to Tehran once the situation calmed down. But letters sent to him by friends advised him not to return to Tehran because of the intense situation in the capital. Zanjani's letter depicts the difficult situation in the country at that time, the riots in the provinces and the widespread robbery and insecurity. He mentions Tehran as being the source of all the problems and widespread comments that people in the city were making against the Constitution and the Parliament. He then continues that, without a denial of Taqizadeh's excommunication order from

⁷⁴³ *Iran-e Now*, 17 October, 1910.

⁷⁴⁴ Khamaneh to Taqizadeh, Tehran, 10 December 1910, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 212-7.

⁷⁴⁵ Amirkhizi, 660.

⁷⁴⁶ Sheikh Ebrahim Zanjani to Taqizadeh, without date, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 217-26.

Najaf, he did not advise Taqizadeh to return to Tehran. Sheikh Mohammad Khiabani also wrote to Taqizadeh mentioning that even the uttering of his name in the Parliament was contentious and advised him not to return.⁷⁴⁷ Taqizadeh writes that after some months staying in Tabriz, he received copies of Russian newspapers in which they had published telegraphs from Tabriz stating that he was stirring up troubles in Tabriz. He eventually concluded that his enemies were preparing the groundwork to move against him and since Russian troops were in Tabriz it was likely that he was at risk there.⁷⁴⁸

Taqizadeh finally decided to leave Tabriz for Istanbul on 4 December, 1910. Taqizadeh's friends advocated strongly for his departure and in an official letter announced their decision that he should leave. They hoped that in Istanbul Taqizadeh could still be useful for the party and even en route to Istanbul could open up branches of the party and promote its ideology. Taqizadeh planned his trip through Khoi and Maku. He was received as an official guest by the Ottomans and treated with respect. He reached Erzurum on 1 January, 1911 and took the boat from Trabzon to Istanbul.

⁷⁴⁷ Sheikh Mohammad Khiabani to Taqizadeh, Tehran, 30 October 1910, in *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyat*, ed., Afshar, 347-8.

⁷⁴⁸ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 157-8.

