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Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh: a political biography

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Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh

A Political Biography

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Transliteration

Throughout this research, transliteration of Persian based on the system of the *International Society of Iranian Studies* has been used with some minor adjustments. For the names of people and places I have used the most common spelling in English and the names of some well-known historical figures have been spelled as they are commonly used and accepted. Inconsistencies in spellings may occur within quotations as I have maintained the spellings of the original authors. In older texts, Iran is generally referred to as Persia but I have used Iran whenever I have referred to the country; Persia, though, has been used when citing original works. All the translations into English from the original Persian are my own.

Introduction

Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh; his Impact and his Legacy

Taqizadeh lived a long life; 91 years. He began his political and cultural activities in his home town, Tabriz before he was officially elected in December 1906 to represent the people of that city in the First Parliament of Iran. From the age of 29 when he became a member of the First Parliament until he retired from the Iranian Senate shortly before his death in January 1970, he witnessed and played an integral part in the political history of Iran. He was also engaged in numerous cultural activities which were closely interwoven with politics. During Taqizadeh's life important changes took place in Iran and throughout the wider world, including two world wars. Iran's governmental system, affected by the sweeping changes taking place across the globe, moved from a despotic system of governance to one based on a constitution.

Taqizadeh played many different roles throughout the country's political transition. From simply running a small bookshop in his home town and publishing a local newspaper his position shifted to that of a key negotiator and policy maker, dealing face to face with some of the most powerful world leaders. He witnessed the reign of six Shahs; four of whom he had close dealings with. One of these four was Mohammad Ali Shah (reign: 1907 -1909) whom he strongly opposed and, in whose deposition, he was to play a key role. He made it his personal mission to work towards what he saw as the betterment of Iran; the creation of a nation based on a constitution and one which would prosper and become a key player on the world stage. He was to develop and indeed transform his outlook both politically and intellectually. This development happened as he broadened his knowledge and understanding by reading widely, travelling and through intellectual interaction with other thinkers and politicians. From a provincial, turban-wearing young man whose destiny seemed set to become a devout clergyman, he transformed into an experienced, influential political player, dressed in European-style attire; who was determined to modernise Iran and who looked to Europe as his role model. In order to actualise his vision for his country, he would employ various strategies.

Politically, there were two very distinct sides to Taqizadeh's character; one side the theorist, the other the pragmatist. Not only was he a man of ideas but one whose aim was to put those ideas into practice. Beginning from his early writings he expressed his strong belief in the necessity for changes in the cultural, religious and political realms of Iran. But it was not until later that he outlined the nuances of how those changes were to be actualised. He turned the discourse that had been introduced by the previous generation into one which was relevant to the current context in which he lived. Always a pragmatist, he would not act out his plans to achieve his aims until all the details of that plan were established and clearly laid out in his head. Whilst he would have preferred to establish a completely new system of rule based on a pre-set plan, circumstances made it necessary for him to compromise and reform the existing system. Taqizadeh's mind was set on following a European model, though he believed that model should take advantage of local expertise and resources to best fit the local context. He was a well-read man and widely travelled and one who did not miss any opportunity to learn and expand his knowledge. Beside Persian and his mother tongue Turkish he was also familiar with Arabic and spoke German fluently with a more rudimentary knowledge of English and French. Familiar with Iranian culture and religions, Taqizadeh was able to take parts of Iran's vast historical and literary past and adapt them to suit the needs of his contemporary milieu.

Taqizadeh's main aim was to bring about change in a practical way; not simply theorise about it. He believed strongly that the power of human agency was capable of bringing about sweeping changes; that human destiny was not, in fact, tied to divine will, as the religious teaching he had received might suggest. He was convinced that change was inevitable, whether it be sooner or later, driven by the force of history. Nevertheless, he hoped that with active policies a more rapid change could come about. Taqizadeh focused all his political efforts on effecting this rapid change and paving the way for modernity. The ideal road towards modernity, in his view, was one similar to that taken by the Europeans; one that would be the safest and the fastest since there already existed a clearly signposted route. In reality, however, when faced by the obstacles present in the Iranian context, Taqizadeh found that the path he was forced to take was in fact very different from that of the Europeans. This led to the creation of a modernity very particular to Iran. How

this pressing urge for change developed and spread throughout the world has been the subject of much intellectual debate. A full review of the plethora of research and books which discuss this is beyond the scope of what this work here has set out to cover. The aim of this work has been to provide a deep and nuanced assessment of the life of Taqizadeh, and this of course, does necessitate some commentary on the movement towards change as it relates to the biography of Taqizadeh, one of the key intellectuals who played a significant role in developing and shaping the discourse of change in the context of Iran. Taqizadeh was not the only intellectual who was engaged in the discourse of modernity or as it has been referred to in the Iranian context, “Tajaddod”. What gives Taqizadeh particular prominence, however, is the fact that, unlike others, he remained constantly on the scene, rarely veering from the path towards modernity. And, thus, the main questions this research set out to answer were how Taqizadeh’s perception of modernity developed and how he put his ideas into practice. In order to be able to answer those key questions, other points need to be explored. Taqizadeh found himself in many different geographical, political and financial situations throughout his life and career. Whilst following the story of his life, this research has sought to provide answers to the following which guide the main research questions: what were the forces that shaped Taqizadeh’s ideas? What were the changing contexts in which he found himself? Who were the people who influenced his decisions and theories? How did his ideas about the creation of a modernised and modern nation develop and change? How did public opinion towards him change and what were the reactions to his ideas and his deeds? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to set the events around Taqizadeh’s life in a broader context.

Having begun with colonialist developments in the seventeenth century, the eighteenth century witnessed a gradual deepening of the threat to the Islamic states by European powers. As contact with the world outside the Islamic states’ territory began to be considered increasingly necessary, Islamic countries were forced to seek a solution to prevent the dominating power of Europe. New technologies gave nations the upper hand and those who lagged behind in terms of scientific and technological development were at a distinct disadvantage. These less developed countries had first to try to understand the developments before they could tackle how to stop the spread of this new threat; the threat

from this new kind of power was not based on religious ideology but rather its strength originated from science. It took some time for countries which possessed less of this kind of power to be able to distinguish this power from the religion of those who had developed it and realise that it did not receive its source from supernatural sources or any particular religion but was in fact something which could be accessed, learnt and possessed by all humans regardless of their religion, nationality or race. Development towards modernity was equated with European/Western science which was considered at odds with Islamic or non-European identity.

In the heavily politicised historiography of Iran after the Constitutional Revolution, Taqizadeh has often been looked upon as a political character and his behaviour, influence and political leverage have been mostly analysed from a political standpoint. Those who have steered clear of the political realm have generally focused on Taqizadeh as a scholar and assessed his legacy solely in terms of his cultural and literary achievements. In contrast to that, this research now aims to merge both these aspects and importantly adds details and analysis of the often-overlooked influence of his personal life and external forces on his political and scholarly achievements and intellectual development, thereby providing a more comprehensive and nuanced overview of his life story.

A Living Legacy

Taqizadeh was a politician and intellectual who has left behind many works relating to history, culture and literature. Enough of his writings and records of his thoughts remain to allow his ideas and deeds to have become a living legacy for Iranian intelligentsia. Within the realm of historiography, his writings, public speeches and recorded memoirs are often cited. In a country still largely divided over how best it should be run, Taqizadeh's ideas have become part of the discourse of a desire to modernise the country. Whether or not one supports his outlook, there can be little doubt that he was one of the founding leaders of the movement that believed that western democracy could provide a safe and previously tested foundation for the practising of modernity in Iran. For those who support this approach, Taqizadeh's ideas and thoughts paved the way for this progressive approach; for those who attack western democracy, his ideas are used, in contrast, to exemplify an

approach which ultimately failed. For those who favour political Islam, Taqizadeh is still considered an evil representative of the corrupt West and for the more radical even an agent of the West, whose aim was to ensure the surrender of Iran to the hostile non-Islamic West.

Methodology

Taqizadeh's favourable attitude towards the West has placed him in a controversial position within Iranian historiography and even within everyday public discourse. The dichotomy of how he is viewed began with Taqizadeh's first appearance in the political arena during the First Parliament when it became clear to the conservative clergy that he was advocating for a secular state and for a constitution based on secular rather than Islamic law. As Taqizadeh rose through the hierarchy of politics, opposition against him grew and became more vociferous. Taqizadeh was seen as a threat by the opposition; not only was he a politician, but importantly also a theorist who lay the roadmap for how modernity should be practised according to a western and secular style. Through cultural and journalistic activities, he was successful in promulgating his ideas to an audience much wider than had previously been reached by politicians. With the 1917 Russian Revolution and the subsequent spread of the ideas of socialism in Iran, the modernity Taqizadeh was advocating for was considered by many to be capitalistic and imperialistic. Taqizadeh was attacked and criticised not only by those who wished for a state run according to Islamic laws but now also by those who were sympathetic to communism and who saw the Soviet Union as their role model. Those who supported political Islam likened him to someone who had brought the Trojan horse into Islamic lands. Those who advocated a leftist ideology considered him an agent of the West, sent to stop the inevitable spread of leftist ideologies. Set against this background of controversy, it has been from these two opposing and seemingly black and white perspectives that this research has sought to analyse Taqizadeh's life and acts.

Biographical writing has often been linked to the dominant ideologies or indigenous cultures of the subject's country. In traditional Iranian literature biographical writing has commonly represented itself in the form of hagiography. This has continued and even in more recent times in the Iranian context has been used to slur the name and character of

those individuals whom the ruling power or opposition has not favoured. Although more recently independent scholarly biographical writing has tried to distance itself from such strong and biased ideological stances against its subjects, basing itself on and benefitting more from the use of remaining historical documents, Taqizadeh is a good example of one such subject who has not always been objectively written about. Despite the existence of numerous articles and monographs based on Taqizadeh's life, there remains a paucity of published research that focuses on and highlights the importance of his life and work in the formation of a national Iranian identity and his crucial role in the narration of modernity in the Iranian context. This research, rather than provide overly generalised and stylised descriptions of the subject independent of key facts and the historical context, endeavours to focus on details of and influences on Taqizadeh's life that may have been previously overlooked and provide an objective and nuanced record of the legacy he has left on Iran and the journey towards modernity in that nation. Whilst acknowledging that 'influence' is a problematic term, difficult to define, the aim of this thesis has been to build a bridge between micro and macro levels of analyses of those details and influences and offer a presentation and interpretation of how these affect each other.

Available sources have been compared and analysed for their consistency and when necessary have been cited to provide varied perspectives and dimensions. When sufficient material and convincing sources have been available, they have been used to support the analysis and to justify an interpretation. At points, however, sources have been cited merely to present facts, events and ideas, allowing the reader to make his or her own interpretation and to draw his or her own conclusions.

Whilst predominantly a biographical work, this study could also fall within the scope of intellectual history since it deals with the presentation of influential ideas and thoughts, their formation and relationship to each other and to history. As John Burrow has described, intellectual history is the process of recovering "what people in the past meant by the things they said and what these things meant".¹ Burrow's 'said' could also encompass 'wrote'; Taqizadeh's words, both spoken and written have been used to exemplify his thoughts and

¹ Richard Whatmore, quoted in *What is Intellectual History?* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 13.

ideas and how in turn he was influenced by the thinking of his predecessors and contemporaries.

Despite the fact that deconstructionists have emphasised that texts should not be regarded as ‘transparent reflections’ of the writer’s intentions and thoughts, at points throughout this thesis, efforts have been made to intuit the intentions of the authors, in particular Taqizadeh, when writing their texts. This helps to set this work within the field of intellectual history. What also sets this research under the umbrella of intellectual history, is its heavy focus on the ideas as well as actions of Taqizadeh within the context of his life. The presentation of ideas and facts or events in this thesis should, though, be acknowledged as potentially problematic, a challenge discussed by Suzanne Marchand in relation to intellectual history.² Connections between a person’s ideas and thoughts, the ‘texts’ through which those ideas are presented and the context of those texts need to be made with care and caution. Similarly, connections between ideas and events are not straight forward. Whilst ideas can become forces, conversely too, events can transform thought; it is questionable whether ideas and events can ever be disentangled.³

There is a need to acknowledge another potential problem when using autobiographical writing, such as Taqizadeh’s, as a source from which to draw assumptions about the writer’s intellectual stance and indeed of making a link between those perceived ideas of a writer and the world of events within which he is writing. Texts are ambiguous and we should be aware of the myriad way that texts, spoken and written, can create meaning. A full exploration of this philosophical issue is beyond the scope of this thesis.

If we accept the premise that events do not happen nor do ideas form in isolation, then they should be set in context. Intellectual history deals with how ideas originated in their historical contexts. Contexts are important for interpretation and reading but, again, it should be noted that contexts are often multiple and at times may be conflicting or problematically related to each another. This thesis explores how Taqizadeh’s ideas formed

² Marchand, Suzanne. “Problems and Prospects for Intellectual History,” in *New German Critique* 65, 1995, 87–96. Accessed 18 October, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/488535.

³ Ibid.

and developed and the contexts and societies within which these ideas grew and transformed are also described. Whatmore explored how ideas shape or are shaped by societies.⁴ Suggestions are made at points throughout the thesis that at times the ideas helped shape the society and at other times society shaped the ideas. The reader is free to decide which, if any, shaped the other. This seeming ambiguity is part of intellectual history.

Previous biographical works based on Taqizadeh have generally failed to apply a perspective of intellectual history and, any that have, have used it to analyse only short periods of his life. This research, on the other hand, has endeavoured to apply the lens of intellectual history more consistently. This approach helps to evaluate better Taqizadeh's thoughts in relation to other Iranian intellectuals and his interactions with contemporary thinkers and politicians. It also helps to highlight how Taqizadeh's ideas were perceived by others during his lifetime and posthumously.

A biographical approach to this research has allowed some focus on the acts of the man which were carried out due to situational circumstances beyond his control, not just actions taken out of an ideological preference. Ignoring these forced acts and structural factors would have led to misleading conclusions. This is particularly important in the specific context of Iranian intellectual history. As described by Afshin Matin-Ashgari, within historiographical research, Iranian intellectual history is still in its infancy.⁵ This relatively new area of study has emerged out of the aftermath of the 1979 Revolution and research has tended to concentrate on that period rather than previous historical events and focus on Islamic and, in particular, Shiite ideology. Matin-Ashgari has described Middle-Eastern historiography as 'marginalised'.⁶ There is a paucity of research available which deals with Iran and with thinkers influenced more by politics and culture than by religion. With its focus on the intellectual and political life of a particular individual prior to the 1979

⁴ Whatmore.

⁵ Afshin Matin-Ashgari, *Both Eastern and Western: An Intellectual History of Iranian Modernity*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 2.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1.

Revolution, this thesis will help to broaden the scope of this newly developing field of research. It can be helpful for those who want to see Iranian intellectual historiography in a wider context and to compare figures.

Writing a biographical study of a figure from the history of Iran has therefore been challenging. There does not exist a long-standing tradition in historio-biographical writing based on Iran; governments have had and continue to have control over the presentation of political and or religious orientation of any individual and thus what has been allowed to be published. A lack of continuity in biographical research is evident; with changes in government regimes, national figures who may once have been respected have often fallen out of favour and been replaced by others.

I suggest that this study of Taqizadeh's life and thoughts may go some way towards facilitating a better understanding of contemporary Iran. After experiencing two revolutions in one century, the Iran of today is overshadowed by an overriding feeling of disquiet and uncertainty about the future. Scholars and indeed some of the general public are searching for reasons that might account for and explain the current situation that the country finds itself in, particularly following the 1979 Revolution. Much discourse revolves around how the country should be ruled and the best routes for its development. This discourse needs to be analysed in order to provide a clearer understanding of Iran's position and to help provide answers. Whilst Marchand posited that we should not "use the past to work out contemporary anxieties". She goes on to make a point germane to this thesis.⁷ "By understanding the process by which ideas become effectual and identifiable elements of national consciousness and institutionalized authority, we can perhaps come to a clearer understanding of the consequences, both intellectual and social, of the specialization and fragmentation of knowledge in the modern world".⁸

Thus, one way to provide answers and a nuanced understanding of the current state of Iran is to study history and in particular, intellectual history. Intellectual history often

⁷ Marchand.

⁸ Ibid.

flourishes in times of uncertainty.⁹ Whilst the context of contemporary Iran is in many ways very different to that of Taqizadeh's Iran of a century ago, it could be argued that in both periods a proliferation of ideas, skepticism and questioning can be witnessed and that both ages exemplify periods of conflict between the ideas of tradition and modernity. History and ideas are inextricably entwined. And thus, any study of a historical period should consider the intellectual ideas of that time and the leading figures who advocated those ideas.

Review of Early Historiography

Any contemporary history of Iran would, therefore, be incomplete without the inclusion of Taqizadeh's life and activities. There are several accounts written about Taqizadeh's life and his activities; some of these accounts were written during his life time, most after his death. Taqizadeh himself also contributed in the process of his own writings about his life and career. There are several short accounts about his life written or presented by him in the form of diary entries, letters, testimonies, personal essays, lectures and a long autobiography which was published after his death.

Since Taqizadeh was such an influential figure in the contemporary history of Iran and particularly during the Constitutional era, writing about him is an inevitable part of the historiography of this period. The atmosphere of contemporary Iranian society charged with suspicion dominated by conspiracy theories has usually been present in the historiography of this time and the image of Taqizadeh in this context in particular has often been tarred with the same brush.¹⁰ The major historians of this period such as Ahmad Kasravi, Mehdi Malekzadeh and Fereydoon Adamiyat, when dealing with Taqizadeh's activities in the context of the Constitutional era (1905-1911), have taken their own stance on him and the activities he was involved in. Kasravi and Adamiyat have been more critical about the motives and intentions of Taqizadeh as a politician and portrayed him as an unreliable politician with a hidden agenda connected to the hostile foreign powers, while

⁹ Whatmore, 25.

¹⁰ To read more about the conspiracy theories in Iran see: Ahmad Ashraf, "Conspiracy Theories," available at *Encyclopaedia Iranica* online edition, 2011, <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/conspiracy-theories> (accessed 28 February, 2020).

Malekzadeh considered him a true patriot working for the good of his country. The dominance and popularity of the leftist ideology among many Iranian intellectuals also led to being considered by some, in their writings about the contemporary history of Iran, as an agent of British imperialistic power. Taqizadeh's secular outlook and his desire to exclude religion and the clergy from the politics and other establishments traditionally controlled by the clergy also led this group to join the leftists in considering him to be a tool of the British, some suggesting that he was connected to 'satanic' organisations such as the Freemasons. In contrast to this group who were critical of Taqizadeh, a smaller number of people wrote in support of Taqizadeh and against his critics.

The first monograph in the form of a biography was written by Mehdi Mojtehed, who took a positive stance towards Taqizadeh. This book was written two years after the occupation of Iran by the Allies in 1941 and therefore does not cover the whole of Taqizadeh's life.¹¹ Mojtehed, a young lawyer from Tabriz when he wrote the book, later outlined his motivation for writing that book: "When the north and south of our dear country was under the occupation of the British and Russian forces and Taqizadeh was the Ambassador in London and under all sort of accusations and slanders, the feeling of a fair judgment and seeking justice or maybe love for a fellow-citizen made me write the book *Tarikh-e Zendegani-e Taqizadeh* [The life History of Taqizadeh]." ¹² The writer, himself from Tabriz, had access to some people who knew Taqizadeh well. The book, published after the resignation of Reza Shah and the removal of strict censorship, openly criticises Reza Shah and highlights Taqizadeh's disagreements with him. Despite being only seventy-one pages long, and as the writer himself admits, prepared without access to sufficient sources, this book attempted a biographical approach and was based on chronological events. The book could be categorised as a commemorative biography of Taqizadeh. Few copies of this book remain.

¹¹ Mehdi Mojtehed, *Tarikh-e Zendegani-e Taqizadeh* [The Life History of Taqizadeh] (Tehran: Ketabkhaneh-e Tehran, 1943).

¹² Mehdi Mojtehed, Taqizadeh: *Roshangariha dar Mashrutiyyat-e Iran* [Taqizadeh: Clarifications of Iran's Constitution] (Tehran: Daneshgah-e Tehran, 1978), 5.

Mojtehedī, who became close to Taqizadeh after his arrival in Iran from London, spent twenty-five years expanding his book and published a more comprehensive biography of Taqizadeh, this time covering his entire life. In this book, Mojtehedī has tried to answer the criticism that Taqizadeh's enemies had directed at him including criticism by Kasravi and Adamiyat. To maintain the balance of the book, he has also included a chapter about what he considered were shortcomings of Taqizadeh. Since Mojtehedī was part of Taqizadeh's inner circle of friends, the book includes some new information. This book also includes many anecdotes about Taqizadeh which helps to familiarise the reader with a more personal side of Taqizadeh. This book is the most complete published biography of Taqizadeh, as far as the researcher is informed, and is often cited by those who have written about Taqizadeh. The publication of this book was concurrent with the 1979 Revolution in Iran and, due to the strong aversion of the new revolutionary government to Taqizadeh, was not officially circulated although it is still available in some libraries.

Following the 1979 Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran, Taqizadeh was regarded not only as a statesman who co-operated with the corrupt former regime but was also criticised for being anti-religion and anti-Islam and for being a promoter of the decadent Western culture. The official narrative, therefore, was generally negative. Against this background and in line with this view, many articles and short passages in the newspapers or magazines or academic works were written. The most important monograph of this genre is *Zendegi va Zamaneh Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh* [The Life and Times of Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh] by Seyyed Ali 'Alavi.¹³ This book ostensibly aims to trace the hostile and anti-Islamic outlook of Taqizadeh and portrays him as a mysterious character, influenced and even controlled by foreign powers, in particular Britain. It uses a number of secondary sources, none written in any other language than Persian.

Nehzat-e Mashrutiyyat va Naqshah Taqizadeh: Social Demokrasi va Jodaei-e Din az Dowlat [The Constitutional Movement and the Role of Taqizadeh: Social Democracy and

¹³ Seyyed Ali 'Alavi, *Zendegi va Zamaneh Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh* [The Life and Times of Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh] (Tehran: Mo'seseh-e Motale'at va Pazhoeshay-e Siyasi, 2006).

Separation of Religion from Government] by Manoocher Bakhtiyari is the most recently published monograph about Taqizadeh.¹⁴ This book is set out over eight chapters in two volumes, only one volume of which has been released. The book focuses on Taqizadeh during the Constitutional period and his role in introducing secular law to the movement. The writer does not define the book as a personal, political biography of Taqizadeh but only focuses on his life during the Constitutional Period. The first volume of the book which is available explains in detail the early life of Taqizadeh in the context of his birthplace and outlines Taqizadeh's activities until the end of the First Parliament. The writer has benefitted from a wide range of primary and secondary sources in Persian though far fewer in other languages. A large part of the book deals with the ideas of Kasravi and Adamiyat. The writer, believing that the role assigned to Taqizadeh has been underestimated or portrayed in a negative light, has sought to highlight Taqizadeh's role in the process of modernisation of Iran. This publication is well researched but suffers from not setting events in a broader international context. Its biggest shortcoming is the fact that recourse has not been made to works written in English.

There are a number of collections about Taqizadeh, his life and his ideas, probably the most important among them being *Yadnameh-e Taqizadeh* [Reminiscence of Taqizadeh] which is a collection of essays and talks by his friends, colleagues, admirers and followers, compiled in memory of Taqizadeh by Habib Yaghmaei.¹⁵ It provides broad information about different aspects of Taqizadeh's character and personal life.

In addition, there are several scholarly works in the form of Masters or PhD dissertations; those accessible and related to this topic have been cited. Among other scholarly works, a collection of articles dedicated to Taqizadeh in *Iran Nameh*, a Journal of Iranian Studies also contains quality research articles about different periods and aspects of Taqizadeh's life which have been referred to in this research.

¹⁴ Manoocher Bakhtiyari, *Nehzat-e Mashrutiyat va Naqshah Taqizadeh: Social Demokrasi va Jodaei-e Din az Dowlat* [The Constitutional Movement and the Role of Taqizadeh: Social Democracy and Separation of Religion from Government] (Toronto: Pegah, 2015).

¹⁵ Habib Yaghmaei, ed., *Yadnameh-e Taqizadeh* [Reminiscence of Taqizadeh] (Tehran: Anjoman-e Asar-e Melli, 1970).

Taqizadeh's role in the intellectual history of Iran has also been examined by several scholars in different contexts; Ali Ansari's works on *The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran* and *Taqizadeh and European Civilisation* are of the best quality.¹⁶ Matin-Asgari, in *Both Eastern and Western: An Intellectual History of Iranian Modernity* as well as analysing the intellectual history of Iran within a global historical context gives an important account of the Berlin Circle and Taqizadeh's role in it.

Sources

In contrast to much traditional historiographical research that was limited by the 'threshold effect' of sticking within the strict boundaries of single disciplines, this thesis, in line with intellectual history, has sought to make full use of the diversity and vastness of interdisciplinary sources available today. This has, I believe, strengthened this research and allowed Taqizadeh's life to be viewed against a broader context, whilst also leading to the difficulty of knowing when and where to draw the line in the search for and incorporation of those sources, or as Marchand described it, writing about the problems of intellectual history, 'the guilty feeling that we have not read enough'.¹⁷

A broad collection of newspapers, diaries, letters, memoirs, autobiographies and other personal and archival documents have been consulted as part of this research. As noted above, Taqizadeh's own autobiography has been used as the guiding text against which to lay out the chronology of this research text.

In relation to this research, small-scale publications published local to events have been consulted as well as more well-known international ones. Based on information in published articles, secondary sources have also been consulted. Consulting publications from outside Iran has allowed an insight into how events in Iran were perceived by other

¹⁶ Ali M. Ansari, *The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

Ali M. Ansari, "Taqizadeh and European Civilisation," in *Iran: Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies* 54, No.1 (2016), 47-58. DOI: [10.1080/05786967.2016.11882300](https://doi.org/10.1080/05786967.2016.11882300).

¹⁷ Marchand, 87-96.

countries and cultures and in particular foreigners' perceptions of Taqizadeh and his activities.

Newspapers mainly from the Constitutional Revolution period until Taqizadeh's death have been cited widely and incorporated into this research and have been used in conjunction with other sources. These newspapers were mainly published in Persian or English and in a few cases in other languages. The Persian newspapers were accessed from the Iranian Parliament Library in Tehran and the archive of the Tabriz Central Library. Several digitalised versions of historical newspapers both inside and outside Iran have also been consulted online. One of the most important journalistic sources is *Kaveh*, the newspaper of which Taqizadeh was editor and to which he contributed; this publication has been cited extensively and has offered much evidence to elaborate on Taqizadeh's own ideas and thoughts. Written analysis of *Kaveh* as a pioneer in the Iranian press has been produced both in Persian and English and these sources in both languages have been consulted.

Numerous secondary sources detailing Taqizadeh's role during the lead up to the Great War and his connection to repercussions in Iran of the Great War which, when necessary, have also been consulted. A collection of Taqizadeh's writings was published in 10 volumes after his death. More recently, a new collection has been elaborated and extended to 18 volumes. These collections consist of his own writings as well as some further texts and documents related to him. Both collections have been used in this thesis.

Additionally, personal letters written by Taqizadeh himself or letters addressed directly to him or in which he was mentioned have also been heavily cited. Many of these letters are published in collections in different volumes. Some correspondence found in other publications such as varied periodicals, magazines and archives has also been used, notably unpublished correspondence exchanged between Taqizadeh and Edward Browne, accessed in the Cambridge University Library. Documents and correspondence held in the Iranian National Archives and documents in the British National Archives have been used extensively. Published diplomatic correspondence of the British, the Russians and Iranians

has also been consulted as well as the personal file of Taqizadeh from the Oriental School of London. This file contains important information about Taqizadeh's employment in the Oriental School of London and his activities during this period and, as far as I am aware, has previously not been consulted by any other researcher. Books and articles written about Taqizadeh and the period and Taqizadeh's own published works in several volumes have been used throughout. Finally, interviews were also conducted with remaining members of Taqizadeh's family and several others who had known him well.

Taqizadeh was a highly influential and controversial figure in the historiography of Iran; much has been written about him in book passages and memoirs. These sources have often been used by researchers to support their arguments. The same sources have been used and cited by both the leftist sympathisers of the Tudeh Party and the Islamists to bolster their criticism of Taqizadeh and by those who, in contrast, were supportive of Taqizadeh. Since Taqizadeh held important positions throughout his career, he has often been mentioned in the published diaries of statesmen and those who worked with him or had met him. When relevant, these sources have also been referenced in this thesis. Taqizadeh expressed his opinion about many different issues; culture, politics, gender, minorities, language policy, oil and economic issues. Published work dealing individually with these subjects, such as papers, articles or monographs, in which Taqizadeh has been mentioned and his ideas analysed have also been referred to in order to provide evidence of Taqizadeh's views on these particular issues or subjects. Locating these diverse sources has been time consuming but has helped to provide a more multidimensional view of Taqizadeh. Some sources contain information about Taqizadeh written from a neutral stance and focus on a particular memory, his habits or his private life. These, at times seemingly fragmented sources have been incorporated in this thesis with the aim of creating a more vivid image of Taqizadeh, his life and his works.

Structure

Besides this introductory chapter, this book consists of three parts. Part one covers Taqizadeh's life from his early years and includes an analysis of the circumstances which shaped his character. It covers his life and political activities in the context of the

Constitutional Movement. Since Taqizadeh was such an influential figure, both as a politician and an intellectual, this part is more detailed in comparison with Part Two which follows Taqizadeh's life as a statesman. Part Two continues Taqizadeh's life until his death. Since he was less influential in the development of the discourse of modernity during this period this part is not as detailed. The division that has been made between these two sections arises from the distinction that the researcher has made between the earlier and later periods of his life and career. During the earlier part of Taqizadeh's life, he was fighting to bring about change, predominantly outside the governing system, considered by many in power as a dangerous trouble-maker and revolutionary, but voicing the aspirations of the common people. In the later period, by contrast, Taqizadeh was working hand in hand with authoritarian modernity and seemingly appeared to lose much of his grass-roots popularity. Although a respected statesman, albeit with a more limited role, his power came not from people's support as it had done before, but from the system within which he held positions. As will be discussed in more detail in the main chapters, during his later life, Taqizadeh, at times, did not take positions for solely political reasons; at times circumstances dictated his choices. The shorter Part Three, or what might be termed an appendix, contains brief information about his death and some personal photographs acquired from his family.

The chapters that follow take a roughly chronological order. The narrative of this research has been led largely by the narrative of Taqizadeh's own autobiography. Other sources have been integrated into the narrative and deeper background has been provided by exploring key political national and global events to more fully contextualise the biographical information. Chapter Two, for example, digresses slightly from Taqizadeh's own life story in order to give a broader overview of and explain in detail the background of the Constitutional Revolution. To correct, expand on or provide further often differing perspectives to the existing narrative of Taqizadeh's life, other sources have been incorporated and these are outlined in this introduction. In brief, the chapters are as follows:

Chapter One aims to represent the context Taqizadeh was born into and demonstrates how this context influenced and shaped Taqizadeh's character and in particular how it

pushed him in the direction of political and cultural activities, forcing him to distance himself from his traditional “self”. Through a micro historical approach, the chapter focuses on Tabriz, his place of birth and the place which most profoundly shaped his ideas.

Chapter Two provides a background to the Constitutional Revolution and its outcomes. In this chapter the development of the idea of modernity (*tajaddod*) and Taqizadeh’s political and intellectual thoughts are explored as Taqizadeh’s life is narrated against a historical background which helped to shape his character as a young, ambitious politician. This chapter covers Taqizadeh’s participation in the First Parliament until its closure and his subsequent stay in the British Legation where he sought refuge. Following the bombardment of the First Parliament, as well as presenting the socio-political situation of Iran, Chapter Three covers Taqizadeh’s activities to restore the Constitution, his exile to Europe and his dealings with the leading academic and political activist Edward Browne. The uprising in Tabriz and Taqizadeh’s return to his home city to carry on his fight against Mohammed Ali Shah is also discussed and analysed. Chapter Four continues a chronological account of events during the Constitutional Revolution up to the overthrow of Mohammed Ali Shah by the constitutionalists. Taqizadeh’s return to Iran from exile and his continuing efforts to restore the Constitution are also narrated. Chapter Five covers Taqizadeh’s activities after the constitutionalists once again took power. It also details the establishment of the Democrat Party by Taqizadeh. Chapter Six examines the period leading up to the Great War of 1914-1918 and how events in Iran were shaped by events between the global powers. Chapter Seven provides information about Iran during the Great War and examines Taqizadeh’s activities both during and after the war, including the publication of *Kaveh*. Chapter Eight covers Taqizadeh’s life as a statesman including his trip to Russia as the representative of the Iranian government, his return to Iran and the events leading to the end of the Qajar dynasty and the coming to power of Reza Shah. Chapter Nine deals with the latter part of Taqizadeh’s life, including his role in the first and second Pahlavi period. This chapter continues to follow Taqizadeh’s life and career from his trip to Philadelphia until his death. It also details Taqizadeh’s life as a scholar in London and his role as Ambassador of Iran in London. It briefly covers his later years in the Senate.

PART ONE
A CONSTITUTIONALIST

Chapter One

The Young Taqizadeh

Towards the turn of the nineteenth century, Tabriz, the capital of Azerbaijan province in north-western Iran, was in some aspects the country's most important city. This ancient city's unique location, its importance as a centre of commerce and its political standing greatly influenced the lives of its residents. In 1892, George Curzon considered Tabriz to be "the largest commercial emporium in Persia".¹⁸ The people of Tabriz experienced changes happening beyond their borders at that time earlier than the rest of the country. Many were travelling regularly to the Caucasus, to Istanbul and even Europe for business or work. Due to the city's geographical proximity to Russia and Ottoman Turkey, Tabrizis could readily perceive the sweeping changes of modernisation taking place in those neighbouring countries, even without travelling further west into Europe where the influence of modernisation and change was more ostensible. The similarities between Azeri Turkish spoken in Tabriz and the languages of the Ottoman Empire and the Caucasus facilitated familiarity with new ideas spreading from abroad. Tabrizis were beginning to eagerly embrace the notion of modernity which had nurtured the movement of change. It was into this world replete with the idea of change that Taqizadeh was born on 27 September 1878, in an alley in the Nobar district of Tabriz called Hakim Khoie; home to affluent merchants who worked in the grand Bazar of Tabriz.¹⁹

1:1 Tabriz, Centre of Change

The Grand Bazar of Tabriz was one of the largest in the region which attracted people from all over Iran and other countries who came there to do business. Furthermore, Tabriz had been on the route of the main business trade caravans at least since the establishment of the Silk Road. The importance of Tabriz as the centre of merchandise transit had increased with the revival of the Tabriz-Trabzon trade route in the 1830s. According to Charles Issawi, "At its height, in the 1850s and 1860s, the Trabzon-Tabriz route probably

¹⁸ George N. Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 1: 518.

¹⁹ Mojtehed, 18.

accounted for some two-fifths of Iran's total trade".²⁰ Iranian raw silk produced in the Gilan region was primarily exported to Europe over the Tabriz-Trabzon route. Sakamoto Tsutomo wrote:

Both Iranian and foreign merchants played roles in the silk trade. While there are no detailed records that show what percentage of the trade was handled by which merchants, an 1865 report by the British consul in Tabriz estimated that 60 percent of the trade was in the hands of Iranian merchants and 40 percent in the hands of foreign merchants. The most prominent group among the Iranian merchants were Turkish speaking Azerbaijan merchants who had their bases of operation in the most important trading centre, Tabriz. They bought up raw silk in Gilan region, transported it to Istanbul via the Tabriz-Trabzon route and then sent it into the European market. The commercial networks of these Azerbaijani traders had bases in Tabriz as well as Istanbul. In 1880 the Azerbaijani community in Istanbul numbered nearly 10,000.²¹

Alongside these commercial activities, new cultural ideas also permeated Tabriz and inspired intellectual discourse about change and modernisation. In the words of Taqizadeh himself, "The light came from Istanbul to Iran and in particular to Tabriz and gradually began to awaken minds".²² Ahmad Kasravi wrote that in business and foreign trade, Azerbaijanis were more advanced than the other people of Iran and throughout the Caucasus the majority of business was in their hands. He added that in Istanbul and other Ottoman cities as well as some European cities they had a strong presence. These groups of businessmen endured the hardships of travelling. They gained wealth and led respectable lives, whilst increasing their understanding and knowledge about the world. At the same

²⁰ Charles Issawi, "The Tabriz-Trabzon Trade, 1830-1900: Rise and Decline of a Route," in *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 1, no. 1 (1970), 22.

²¹ Sakamoto Tsutomo, "Trading Networks in Western Asia and the Iranian Silk Trade," in *Commercial Networks in Modern Asia*, ed. Linda Grove and Shinya Sugiyama (New York: Curzon Press, 2001), 241.

²² Hassan Taqizadeh, "Tahiyeh-e Moqaddamat-e Mashrutiyyat dar Azerbaijan," [The Background of the Constitutional Movement in Azerbaijan] in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh* [The Essays of Taqizadeh], ed. Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Ofset, 1971), 1: 380.

time, they became more concerned about the state of their own country and its progress. This group of merchants played a crucial role in development of the movement of change in Iran. They were among the first who supported the Constitutional Revolution Movement, financially as well as ideologically.²³

Besides trade, the spreading of modern ideas was additionally facilitated by the innovation of the telegraph. The telegraph connected Tabriz to other regions in Iran and to the outside world and, as a result, was one of the most influential means by which new ideas filtered into Iran during the nineteenth century. As Denis Wright stated, the telegraph “brought Persia into contact with the outside world as never before and was probably more responsible than any other single factor in stimulating those reformist and nationalist movements which began to stir in the last quarter of the nineteenth century”.²⁴ The main telegraph line from Europe which entered Iran at Jolfa crucially passed through Tabriz on its way to Tehran. A local network was also developed. According to Curzon, there were local wires “running from Tabriz to Namin, above Astara, on the Caspian, 136 miles; to Suj Bulak [Savojbulagh], in the Kurdish country, 125 miles; through Khoi to Bayazid, on the Turkish frontier; and through Khoi to Urumiah [Urmia], on the other side of the Shahi Lake”.²⁵

During the Constitutional Revolution, the telegraph played a crucial role in Iranian political and social arenas. It put the people of Tabriz in regular contact with prominent religious leaders both inside and outside Iran, especially those in important Shiite centres like Najaf. In this way, the clergy could, at specific key moments, quickly and effectively transmit some of their Fatwas in support of the Constitution. On many occasions, constitutionalists in Tabriz were immediately informed by means of the telegraph about events happening throughout Iran and further afield such as pro-revolution protests and the closure of bazars. Thus, Tabriz was able to organise simultaneous demonstrations of protest

²³ Ahmad Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e Iran* [History of the Iranian Constitution] (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1984), 1: 128.

²⁴ Denis Wright, *The English Amongst the Persians: During the Qajar Period 1787-1921* (London: Heinemann, 1977), 133.

²⁵ Curzon, 1: 531.

with other regions. News of political unrest and resentment from around the country, including communications about reaction to parliamentary decisions in Tehran reached Tabriz. As each new step was taken towards the establishment of the new constitution, the news would be a cause for celebration for the constitutionalists in Tabriz. All of this would not have happened so easily if it had not been for this modern means of communication. Telegraphs sent to and from Tabriz are some of the most important sources of information pertaining to the early years of the establishment in Iran of the Constitutional Revolution.²⁶

A further factor, adding to the importance of Tabriz, had allowed the conception of an atmosphere of openness to and desire for change in that city and this would consequently play a part in shaping Taqizadeh's intellectual development. Since the time of Abbas Mirza (1789-1833), Tabriz had been the residence of the Qajar crown princes. Traditionally, the Crown Prince was appointed as the governor of Azerbaijan and lived there with his own court. As the Crown Prince and the commander of the Iranian army, Abbas Mirza led the war against Russia from Tabriz. Unsurprisingly, the Iranian-Russian wars (1804-13 and 1826-8) brought much change in Iran. The eventual defeat of the Iranians by Russia revealed how weak the Iranian military had become; it was poorly organised, tactically unsophisticated with outdated weaponry.

These wars allowed the people of Azerbaijan in particular to become familiar with European thought and culture. Seeking remedies to strengthen the military, Abbas Mirza initiated the enforcement of a new set of reforms with the intention that European knowledge and technology be consciously acquired in order to empower Iran. Although these reforms mostly concerned military and administrative sectors, other aspects of life were also affected. European ideas about technology and change needed to be translated and published so that they could reach a much wider audience. The first publishing house in Iran was founded in Tabriz, students were sent to Europe to study in various fields and newspapers began to be published and new factories built. Tabriz was the centre of Iranian foreign policy until the Constitutional Revolution and most foreign ambassadors came

²⁶ Mansoureh Rafi'i, *Anjoman: Organ-e Anjoman-e Eyalati-e Azerbaijan* [The Assembly: Publication of the Provincial Assembly of Azerbaijan] (Tehran: Nashr-e Tarikh-e Iran, 1983), 156.

there for negotiations rather than to Tehran. According to Taqizadeh, until the middle of the reign of Mozaffar al-Din Shah, nearly all Iranian diplomats sent abroad were from Azerbaijan.²⁷

All these developments gradually altered the atmosphere of Tabriz turning it into a city which now perceived the necessity for change and where people were increasingly eager to learn and acquire new knowledge. An eagerness to modernise the country as swiftly as possible led to the emergence of an intellectual discourse revolving around the various ways by which this could be achieved. This discourse first focused on ways to develop military and technological means to block the rising threat of a dominating Europe and later broadened to include wider social, cultural, educational and economic changes. The dominating discourse which emerged in particular after the Irano-Russian Wars, and which was proliferated by many intellectuals of the time, such as Akhondzadeh, Malkam Khan and Mirza Yousef Khan-e Mostashar al-Dowleh-e Tabrizi, concerned the necessity of importing, adapting and gaining knowledge practised in Europe and incorporating new technologies already being utilised there. Opposing this discourse about change was the powerful clergy who had little tolerance for the imitation or acquisition of any ideas or practices imported from Europe. In their view, modern technology and ideology from the non-Muslim lands could endanger their traditionally dominant power base.

The call for Jihad by the clergy, who had tried to galvanise people against the Russians during the Irano-Russian Wars, had failed and this was a further threat to the clergy's position. The disturbing image of a life under non-Muslim governance troubled the clergy and they began to be more tolerant towards the copying of European models of development which could prevent the dominance of Europe in Islamic lands, on the condition that they were not against Sharia law. Tabriz's geographical proximity to the lost territories and its close ties with the people of those regions meant that the discourse about adapting European technology and thought and the possibility of it becoming synchronised with Islamic teachings emerged earlier in Tabriz than in other places in Iran and had begun to develop there.

²⁷ Taqizadeh, "Tahiyeh-e Moqaddamat-e Mashrutiyat dar Azerbaijan," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 1: 378.

Tabriz was becoming a hothouse for radical thoughts and radical actions. By the time Taqizadeh was a young man this discourse of progress and a desire for change had reached its zenith in Tabriz. His early years were marked by experience of living in the dynamic milieu of this city; one in which religion, ideas of modernisation and progress, and the adoption and adaptation of new technologies were actively blending together. But influence too came from Taqizadeh's family.

1:2 Taqizadeh's Family

Much of what is known about Taqizadeh's family, ancestors and formative years comes from what Taqizadeh himself wrote in his autobiography. According to Taqizadeh's writing, his ancestors had been landowners for generations. Being Seyyed or the descendants of the prophet of Islam had also accorded them a special status. Taqizadeh's grandfather, Mir Ebrahim, the son of Haj Nasir, had four sons and two daughters.²⁸ Taqizadeh's father, Aqa Seyyed Taqi Ordoubadi, the third son, was born about 1835 across the Aras River in a village called Vanand, which at that time was part of the territory Iran had lost to Russia. Taqizadeh's oldest uncle, Seyyed Ali, had helped and encouraged his brother, Taqizadeh's father, to go and study in Tabriz and later in Najaf. Having met this older uncle, Taqizadeh described him as a "very respectful and wise man".²⁹ The youngest of Taqizadeh's uncles was Mir Karim, who, according to Taqizadeh, was an erudite man, well read in poetry.³⁰ Taqizadeh did not meet his other uncle, Mir Mohammad, but it is known that one of Mir Mohammad's sons, Taqizadeh's cousin, did become the headman of Vanand. Taqizadeh's father, Seyyed Taqi, unlike his father and brothers, who were all land owners, had had a passion for studying since his early youth and had gone to Tabriz to pursue his religious studies.³¹ Taqizadeh made little reference to the female members of his family so it is difficult to evaluate any possible influences they may have had on him as a young man.

²⁸ *Mir* is an interchangeable synonym for Seyyed, a descendant of the prophet of Islam.

²⁹ Hassan Taqizadeh, *Zendegi-e Tufani* [A Turbulent Life], ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Tus, 2011), 22.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 22.

³¹ *Ibid.*

While in Tabriz, Seyyed Taqi studied in Haj Safar Ali School, a School of Advanced Islamic Studies, and later completed his studies in the holy city of Najaf. Residing there for seventeen years, he took lessons from Sheikh Morteza Ansari, one of the most erudite and distinguished Shiite scholars. He was said to have led a very ascetic and frugal life, likely because of his discipleship to Sheikh Ansari.

Whilst in Najaf, Seyyed Taqi had married and had had two children but his wife and children had died prior to his return to Tabriz. Upon his return to Tabriz, Seyyed Taqi became the imam of a small mosque close to where he lived and later took over responsibility of a larger mosque. Initially he resided in the house of a landowning member of the clergy and soon married Masoumeh, the daughter of his next-door neighbour. Both her parents' families were major landowners in Shabestar, a small town near Tabriz. Masoumeh would provide Seyyed Taqi with eight children, some of whom died during early childhood. Taqizadeh was born when his father was already in his forties. Following in his father's footsteps, Taqizadeh's oldest brother, Aqa Seyyed Morteza, went to Najaf to continue his studies after having first studied theology in Tabriz. Like most knowledgeable students of Najaf at that time, Seyyed Morteza was eager to learn about modern science and used to encourage his brother Taqizadeh to also study these subjects.³² Another of Taqizadeh's brothers, Baqer, became a respectable clergyman and upon the death of his father took over his position in the mosque and led a simple life. According to Mojtehed, Haj Seyyed Baqer was the opposite of Taqizadeh in many aspects. Taqizadeh was a reformist, while Baqer was a conservative who in all likelihood did not like the ideas that his younger brother was advocating and so distanced himself from him. As a result, when choosing a family name Baqer decided to choose the family name Ordoubadi, a name which his father was known by, rather than the name "Taqizadeh", a name which had become famous due to his brother's activities.³³

Taqizadeh had two sisters; the older one was called Robabeh and after her first marriage ended in divorce, she married Taqizadeh's close friend, Mirza Mohammad Ali Khan

³² Mojtehed, 19.

³³ Ibid.

Tarbiat. Sometime after Seyyed Taqi's marriage to Masoumeh, he also temporarily married a widow whom he kept in a separate house. Two children were born from this marriage; a daughter called Soghra and a son called Javad (1883-1948).³⁴ Later Javad established a close relationship with Taqizadeh. Seyyed Taqi married again four or five years before his death. This, Taqizadeh says, was because his mother, Masoumeh, was ill and the new wife would be of assistance in running the household.³⁵

Seyyed Taqi died of Salmonella on 14 March 1897 when Taqizadeh was nineteen years old and was buried in Wadi al-Salam cemetery.³⁶ Soon after, Taqizadeh's mother also passed away.³⁷

1:3 The Influence of his Father

The influence Seyyed Taqi had on Taqizadeh should not be underestimated. His father is the only family member whose character Taqizadeh comments on at length in his autobiography. Clearly his father's family commitment, deep seated religious conviction and respectable position all played an important part in forming Taqizadeh's character.

Taqizadeh writes that his father rarely accepted any invitation to attend social gatherings like feasts or parties, especially avoiding mingling with people connected with the government. Despite Seyyed Taqi's reluctance to meet with politicians and dignitaries, the attempts that these people made to meet with Taqizadeh's father were crucial in shaping an important element of Taqizadeh's future political identity; a confidence in dealing with men of power. Due to his religious status and simple lifestyle, his father had managed to court even the interest of the Crown Prince Mozaffar al-Din Mirza. The prince had tried in vain for many years to meet Seyyed Taqi, attending the mosque at which he preached and even visiting him at his home in order to converse with him. After Mozaffar al-Din Mirza became the Shah, his son Mohammad Ali Mirza took his place as the governor of

³⁴ Soghra was born in 1877, she married a clergyman from Tabriz and had three daughters. Mojtahedi, 21.

³⁵ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 26.

³⁶ Wadi al-Salam is a historical Islamic cemetery located in Najaf, Iraq.

³⁷ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 26.

Azerbaijan and showed great respect for Taqizadeh's father. It is even said that he was one of Seyyed Taqi's disciples.³⁸ Taqizadeh had seen how these men of power operated, and despite a culture in which excessive flattery to the ruling class was part of common practice, he had seen from his father's approach that he could follow a more independent route towards success without having to resort to obsequious behaviour when dealing with men in high positions. As we will see later, Taqizadeh's success and reputation, especially as a member of the First Parliament, was largely due to his independent position and his disinterest in any material benefits. This enabled him to remain untempted by gifts or bribes, distinguishing him from many others.

If one takes into account Lotfollah Ajoudani's categorisation of the clergy of the Qajar period (1796–1925) in their dealings with the government and the Shah, dividing them into three main groups: the silent ones, those who co-operated with the government and those who were openly anti-government, Taqizadeh's father could be considered to fall within the "silent" group who were religiously conservative and had shown caution in their judgment of the government.³⁹

In his autobiography, Taqizadeh describes his father as a man who would avoid religious bigotry. According to Taqizadeh, although his father rejected what the professional narrators of the tragedies of Karbala often preached, he refrained from challenging them.⁴⁰ Taqizadeh goes on to explain that his father did not save any money and had no property other than his house. As Mojtehedī stated, the Crown Prince Mozaffar al-Din Mirza respected him and had assigned a small pension to him, which would be cancelled by Taqizadeh while a member of the financial commission of the First Parliament.⁴¹

³⁸ Nasrollah Fathi, ed., *Sokhangoyan-e Seganeh-e Azerbaijan* [Three Speakers from Azerbaijan] (Tehran: Khorrami, 1977), 124.

³⁹ Lotfollah Ajoudani, *Ulama va Enqelab-e Mashrutiyyat-e Iran* [Ulama and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution] (Tehran: Ketab-e Ameh, 2011), 18. For an overview of the Qajar Period see: Nikki R. Keddie and Farrokh Ghaffary, *Qajar Iran and the rise of Reza Khan, 1796-1925* (Costa Mesa: Mazda, 1999).

⁴⁰ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 25.

⁴¹ Mojtehedī, 18.



Figure 1: Mozaffar al-Din Mirza, Crown Prince and Governor of Azerbaijan

Taqizadeh portrays his father as a very pious man who had never failed to uphold all his religious duties.⁴² Being a pious Muslim, Seyyed Taqi treated his wife (Taqizadeh's mother) well and never broke the Shariah law. He was very strict in raising his children and banned them from the usual youth entertainment of the time.⁴³

The fact that he chose to be known by his father's name "Taqizadeh" demonstrates Taqizadeh's positive feelings towards his father. Taqizadeh's admiration for his father's simple and disciplined lifestyle is apparent in his writing and could explain Taqizadeh's own inclination throughout his career towards a humble lifestyle, despite later having opportunities to lead a much more luxurious life. The position and status of his father afforded Taqizadeh some protection and to some extent laid the foundation for his future success. As we see in the letter which he sent to the Azerbaijani millionaire and philanthropist Taqiev, asking for a scholarship to study, he mentions that he was the son of the famous Imam in Tabriz, obviously knowing that this family connection could help in persuading Taqiev to accept his request.

⁴² Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 25.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 26.




Figure 2: Taqizadeh's brother, Seyyed Baqer Ordoubadi (died 8 November 1940)⁴⁴

1:4 Taqizadeh's Early Education

Taqizadeh began his education early at the age of five. He went on to study theology and Arabic, the doctrine and law of Islam and other subjects which were necessary in order to acquire the rank of clergyman. Traditionally Taqizadeh's family's expectations were that he would follow the same education as his father and brothers. Taqizadeh's path was marked out for him and until his early twenties he had few opportunities to openly divert from the course that had been set for him. That is not to say that he did not gain some non-religious insights along the way. At the age of fourteen, possibly influenced by his older brother, he became interested in the ideas of rational science: astronomy, geometry and mathematics. At the same time his traditional education which was preparing him to become a Mulla focused upon traditional medicine, philosophy and religious laws. When Taqizadeh graduated as a Mulla his father had hoped to send him to Najaf to pursue further religious studies. Taqizadeh, however, was reluctant to go. Taqizadeh writes that he began to question his attitude towards religion at the age of sixteen and expressed his boredom with the curriculum of the school. Gradually he was moving away from his previous unquestioning faith and had come to have a more humanist stance on life; one which gave more value and agency to human beings. He had become more convinced of the importance

⁴⁴ Courtesy of Taqizadeh's brother's family album in Tabriz.

of human agency and individual freedom.⁴⁵ This revelation would change his life significantly. In one of his letters, he describes the passion that this new outlook had created in him:

I was entering a realm that could be described by one person as civilization and by another as education but for me it was as if the scales had dropped from my eyes; I was no longer blind to the light and I could see my surroundings more clearly. I took a step out of the previous dark place around which I had been circling, like a blinkered horse carrying an unbalanced load, weighed down by the destiny forced upon me by the oppression of the men of power. I began to see that there was a whole new world outside Tabriz or Bushehr and beyond the small world that I used to know; I could see the outside world in flux; every nation was anxiously running towards progress.... I saw myself and my countrymen coming down the ladder of progress while the rest of the world were climbing up....⁴⁶

It seems apparent that at this point, under the influence of new ideas, the young Taqizadeh no longer saw the human subject as the product of external forces or fate, as his traditional education would have had him believe. He attempted to free himself of the ideas and prejudices prevalent in his family and was, at this point, so eager to liberate himself from those old traditions and beliefs that he sought to found a new settlement near Tabriz where a more modern lifestyle might be practised.⁴⁷ In search of a new identity, a new foundation for thought, it is to the practice of modernity in Europe that he now turned for inspiration. He could be seen now to be searching for a new grand narrative; one which revolved around human agency and the rational mind rather than some external agency like the will of God. The extract from his letter above reveals that he was breaking with his past

⁴⁵ Hassan Taqizadeh, "Azadi va Heysiyat-e Ensani [Freedom and Human Dignity]," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Ofset, 1972), 2:158.

⁴⁶ Taqizadeh to Taqiev, without date, in Hassan Taqizadeh, *Zendegi-e Tufani*, ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Elmi, 1993), 421-26.

⁴⁷ Fathi, ed., *Sokhangoyan-e Seganeh-e Azerbaijan*, 127.

and traditional world-view and was establishing a new way of thinking. In this period of his life we witness that he perceived his previous world to be on the verge of collapse; it is during this time that he begins to systematically reject and question his former thoughts, beliefs, and experiences. Taqizadeh's religious duties were gradually being transformed into a more universal morality and ethical responsibility. His activities after this point reveal much about this transformation. The ways in which he attempted to influence his society through different means demonstrate that he was far more convinced of the importance of human agency and had begun to look to the West as a role model.

Taqizadeh's father would die a mere eight months after finding out about his son's attempts to educate himself secretly in the practices of sciences. For this his father had reprimanded him severely but he could not prevent Taqizadeh's on-going thirst for knowledge. Taqizadeh had begun to familiarise himself with sciences such as anatomy, chemistry, physics, mathematics, geometry, geography and astronomy. Together with his close friend Mirza Mohammad Ali Khan Tarbiat, who would later become his brother-in-law, he had also begun to learn the French language.⁴⁸

Mirza Javad Nateq, the distinguished speaker of the Constitutional period in Tabriz, mentions another reason for the anger of Taqizadeh's father when he writes "At that time Taqizadeh had courageously written in his treaty that the people of Iran were waiting for the arrival of someone on a grey horse to save Iran...".⁴⁹ This was a clear reference to the return of the twelfth Imam of Shiites and thus would have been an insult to the religious beliefs of many, in particular a clergyman like his father. Taqizadeh's father's death gave him more freedom to pursue his European education as he was no longer restricted by the pressure of his father's strong conservative views and expectations.⁵⁰ He continued to live for two or three years with his other brothers in his father's house but later he and his younger brother Seyyed Javad moved to the house next door which had also belonged to his father. After his brother married, Taqizadeh moved to another house and lived there

⁴⁸ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 30.

⁴⁹ Fathi, ed., *Sokhangoyan-e Seganeh-e Azerbaijan*, 124.

⁵⁰ In his autobiography the date he gave for the death of his father is 14 March 1897 but later in the letter to Taqiev he writes that he was seventeen when his father died.

alone with an aged servant. It was during this period that he was sent by his family to his father's birthplace on the far side of the Aras River to sell their inherited properties and bring back the proceeds.⁵¹

Taqizadeh did not want to take up his father's profession and given that his father had left little inheritance, Taqizadeh, in fact, faced financial difficulties. His older brother who had been supporting him had gone to Najaf to study and so Taqizadeh decided to generate some income himself in order to meet his living expenses and possibly to save some to invest in his education abroad. This was not easy because on the one hand he did not have enough money to start a business but on the other hand he wanted to do cultural work. However, some people were critical of him as that kind of work brought his family name into disrepute. It is worth quoting from one of his letters at length to emphasise his thoughts about his priorities:

I became convinced of my desire to complete my education in order to progress and be involved in the sphere of humanity. Since I had understood that I had the potential to flourish, I regretted seeing the fire extinguished under the ashes of despair and spoiling this talent which was granted by God. The only thing which perplexed me and hindered my passion was the absolute poverty, for my father had died when I was seventeen and he had left very little for us which could be capital to start a business.⁵² That same year my mother and some other relatives also passed away. My brother went to Najaf to study and I resigned from my father's job, for I had to endeavour to live independently. I was so determined about it that it even overcame my passion for science. I said I must earn my living by my own labour and beside that save some money to study abroad, hoping to do something before I became too old to study. I was so busy working that during these seven years I endured the miseries of seventy years. But what can one do without money, being of a young age and without any help, suffering sneers

⁵¹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 27.

⁵² Although Taqizadeh states that he was 17, he was in fact 19 years old at this time. This could have been to help persuade Taqiev to grant his request.

and accusation of heresy from ignorant people in a dreadful place like Tabriz?⁵³ Hence, in the beginning, despite the reproach of people about transgressing decency, I began to do some business in the field of education. I managed to establish a lithography printing-house in the hope that, in that way, I could succeed in actualising some of my wishes and do some good for people. Unfortunately, I was not successful....⁵⁴

In his autobiography Taqizadeh writes that at the age of twenty he became more engrossed in European science and began to increasingly read books in French, Ottoman Turkish and Arabic from Egypt together with the works of modern-minded Iranian writers who advocated change. Among them Talebov-e Tabrizi and Mirza Malkam Khan had the biggest influence on him. It was during this period that he gradually became more interested in political ideas and the concept of liberty. He regularly read newspapers which were published in Istanbul, India and Egypt, such as *Akhtar* [Star], *Soraya* [Pleiades Star], *Parvaresh* [Training], *Hekmat* [Wisdom] and *Habl al-Matin* [Strong Cord]. He also read the famous book of *Siyahat Nameh-e Ebrahim Beyg* [Travel Accounts of Ibrahim Beyg] by Zeyn al-Abedin Maraghei which was among the forbidden books at that time. He would also read the Young Turks magazines, like *Shoraya-e Mellat* [People's Council] which were then being published in Paris. Reading these, his ideas flourished to such an extent that at the age of twenty-one, he and some of his friends established a coterie of forward-thinking people of Tabriz which would later grow. Mirza Seyyed Hossein Khan 'Edalat, Seyyed Mohammad Shabestari (Abol Zi'a), Mirza Mohammad Khan Tarbiat and Mashhadi Ali Asghar Ordoubadi were among the first members; they each brought different experiences and talents to the group. Mirza Seyyed Hossein Khan 'Edalat had gone to Russia when he was young and had stayed there for a while with his cousin who was the Iranian consulate in Haji Tarkhan before travelling to St. Petersburg where he had learnt Russian and become familiarised with various aspects of European civilisation. In St. Petersburg, he became the companion and associate of Seyyed Jamaledin Asadabadi (Afghani). Seyyed Jamal had influenced him greatly. Mirza Hossein Khan later became

⁵³ At that time Mohammad Ali Shah was the Crown Prince and Governor of Azerbaijan. He did not tolerate modern-minded people. He had created secret police in Tabriz.

⁵⁴ Taqizadeh to Taqiev, without date, in *Tufani* ('Elmi), 421-26.

one of the members of the Provincial Assembly of Tabriz. He, together with Seyyed Mohammad Shabestari who also had progressive ideas and Mirza Mohammad Ali Khan Tarbiat and Taqizadeh, created the core of new ideas in Tabriz. They worked together for about ten years until the beginning of the Constitutional Revolution.⁵⁵ Mirza Hossein Khan had also established the *Al-Hadid* [Iron] newspaper in Tabriz. In 1909 when head of education in Tabriz, he published another newspaper, *Sohbat* [Conversation], in Turkish which caused public outrage because of its criticism of religion.⁵⁶

At the age of twenty-one Taqizadeh began to further study anatomy, physiology, pathology and physics with Mirza Mohammad Kermanshahi known as Kofri (The Blasphemous One). Taqizadeh insisted that the only reason that Mirza Mohammad had been accused of blasphemy was because his scientific ideas had challenged superstition. Taqizadeh revered him and called him his very learned master. According to Taqizadeh, after receiving a traditional education, Mirza Mohammad had gone to Europe and studied medicine in Paris for nine years before returning to Iran to begin work as a physician and a lecturer. Taqizadeh believed he had been one of the greatest scientists of Iran and was masterful in Arabic science and Eastern literature as well as the new Western science.

According to Taqizadeh, he had an impressive library filled with Western scientific books and, furthermore, had a very good command of French.⁵⁷ In a letter to Jamalzadeh, Taqizadeh claimed that up until that date, 1955, no Iranian had reached the same scientific rank.⁵⁸ Taqizadeh was later accepted as a teacher of physics in the Dar al-Fonun of Tabriz, where he had previously studied in the past.

Taqizadeh clearly had a positivist interpretation of subjectivity and wanted to actualise his idea of “progress” by promoting science and technology in his society. He began to take practical steps in order to ensure that this became a reality. During this period, he

⁵⁵ Taqizadeh, “Tahiyeh-e Moqaddamat-e Mashrutiyyat dar Azerbaijan,” in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 1:384-5.

⁵⁶ Iraj Afshar, ed., *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyyat va Mohajerat* [The Constitution and Migration Letters], ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Qatreh, 2006), 172.

⁵⁷ Hassan Taqizadeh, “Mirza Mohammad Kofri,” in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 2: 89-92.

⁵⁸ Taqizadeh to Mohammad Ali Jamalzadeh, in *TINA*: 280000033.

founded a school based on modern European methods in order to teach science and foreign languages. This he did together with his three friends; Mirza Seyyed Hossein Khan 'Edalat, Seyyed Mohammad Shabestari and Mirza Mohammad Khan Tarbiat. They called their school Tarbiat which means education. This school was one of only a few at that time which offered modern science and foreign languages. Taqizadeh's attempts to open this school caused uproar. The announcement of the school's opening was published by a publishing house, newly opened in Tabriz. The school advertised that it would offer to teach the subjects of French, English, Russian and the sciences such as geography and physics. The list of curriculum subjects and the advertisement itself were considered heresy among the more conservative clergy. Some fanatic members of the clergy started angrily preaching against the opening of the school and galvanized public opinion. This ended in the closure of the school before its official opening. The pressure of this public opinion caused the governor to send Seyyed Mohammad Shabestari, the manager of the school who had signed the announcement, into exile. Taqizadeh who had put all his energy into setting up the school was very disappointed and he writes in despair:

I took great efforts to establish the ill-fortuned [Tarbiat] school which was the first private school in Tabriz and it inspired the opening of other schools. In order to establish it I suffered a lot but one month after its opening when it had become well known, it was wiped out by the ill-intentions of some men of power and savage acts of ignorant people....⁵⁹

Taqizadeh, who was more protected than his colleagues because of his family's standing and position in society, was able to avoid exile but retreated into some isolation whilst continuing to read, write and secretly organise political activities.⁶⁰ It was during this period, in 1902, that he translated *Les Merveilles Celestes* [Wonders of the Heaven] by the French astronomer Camille Flammarion. It was translated by Taqizadeh under the title of

⁵⁹ Taqizadeh to Taqiev, without date, in Taqizadeh, *Tufani* ('Elmi), 421-26.

⁶⁰ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 33.

Tamaddonat-e Qadimeh [Ancient Civilisations] and was taught later in Loqmanieh School although it was never published.⁶¹

After the unsuccessful attempt to establish the school, Taqizadeh opened a bookshop together with his four close friends; Mirza Seyyed Hossein Khan 'Edalat, Seyyed Mohammad Shabestari (Abol Zi'a), Mirza Yousef Khan Ashtiyani and Mirza Mohammad Khan Tarbiat. The bookshop gradually flourished and became the largest modern bookshop in Tabriz. They imported books on different topics from Egypt, Turkish books from Istanbul and French books from Paris. These books were distributed widely among modern-minded people of Tabriz and provided valuable resources for the Constitutional Movement. Taqizadeh would sit in the bookshop for hours and read voraciously.⁶² This was a new practice because prior to that if people wanted to study, that could only be done at home, in religious school or mosques. Studying in a bookshop could be seen as a public and more secular approach to gaining knowledge.

The bookshop became a centre for the distribution of several progressive newspapers, including *Tarbiat* [Education] newspaper and they gave the bookshop the same name. The bookshop also distributed *Al-Hilal* newspaper of Jurji Zaydan (also spelled Zaidan).⁶³ The bookshop, however, did not bring much financial benefit for Taqizadeh. He writes: "unfortunately because of the weakness of the publishing market in Iran I earned little more than enough to cover expenses. That is to say because of the lack of interest in books, to encourage people to read which was my primary aim, I sold books at very little profit..."⁶⁴ A branch of the bookshop was also opened in Tehran but, according to an announcement published 20 November 1907 in *Sur-e Esrafil* [Seraphim's Trumpet Call], later became independent from the one in Tabriz.⁶⁵ In the end, the bookshop in Tabriz was burnt down

⁶¹ In a different source, Taqizadeh writes that the book was published in Tabriz; Taqizadeh to Jamalzadeh in *The Iranian National Archive*: 280000033.

⁶² Mojtehed, 28.

⁶³ Ibid. For more about Jurji Zaydan see: Thomas Philipp, *Jurji Zaidan and the Foundations of Arab Nationalism* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2014).

⁶⁴ Taqizadeh to Taqiev, without date, in Taqizadeh, *Tufani* ('Elmi), 421-26.

⁶⁵ Rahim Raisnia, ed., *Iran va Osmani dar Astaneh-e Qarn-e Bistom* [Iran and the Ottomans at the Turn of the Twentieth Century] (Tabriz: Sotudeh, 2006) 1: 217.

and plundered by insurgents (supporters of Mohammad Ali Shah) after the bombardment of the First Parliament, during the civil wars in Tabriz.⁶⁶

From 1897 until 1904 Taqizadeh was a member of an association called Alayhuma where together with his other friends he took part in literary debates and criticised the conservative clergy. Mirza Javad Nateq, gives more details about this association and how he was influenced by Taqizadeh and his friends' activities; "These people who were the intellectuals of the time in Tabriz had organised a society for themselves and called it Alayhuma which became their secret code word. Every intelligent young man who did not believe in superstition who joined this group would come to be known as an "Alayhuma".⁶⁷ Selecting this secret word was the invention of Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh...".⁶⁸ Mirza Javad gives more interesting information about this group that apparently he had also joined; "this group of about 20 members had decided to sell whatever property they possessed and with that capital to buy a village and move there. They planned to become self-sufficient and set up a new life based on modern agricultural methods...".⁶⁹ He calls this group the spear head of "tajaddod" or modernity and continues; "among its other activities the Alayhuma group paid a Dervish and taught him to recite in public the patriotic poems of Talebov".⁷⁰

It was during this group's gatherings that Taqizadeh would regularly take the floor and inform his audience about what he had learnt from the foreign press published in the Caucasus, Istanbul, Egypt and Beirut; a practice which helped to develop his later skill and confidence in public speaking and which impressed many especially during his time as a member of the First Parliament.⁷¹

⁶⁶ TNA: FO 371/507, No. 42817-8.

⁶⁷ Taqizadeh chose to use this Arabic word following a mistake made by a conservative clergyman while giving a speech. He used this name ironically to highlight the ignorance of some conservative clergy. For the full story see: Fathi, ed., *Sokhangoyan-e Seganeh-e Azerbaijan*, 131.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 132.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Mojtehed, 28-9

Around 1899 when Taqizadeh was twenty-two the Loqmaneih School was opened in Tabriz and he was invited to teach physics there. Meanwhile he continued his studies in medicine. This was his first unsalaried teaching position.⁷² By 1900 after having learned some French, Taqizadeh became interested in learning English as well. To do this he went to the American school of Tabriz and while learning English also attended some courses in science which were held in English. With a female teacher of the school he studied a philosophical scientific book which contained practical illustrations of chemistry and physics experiments.⁷³

As Taqizadeh's medical knowledge increased he began to provide some simple medical treatments. During this time in partnership with his close friend Mirza Mohammad Ali Khan he established a pharmacy and imported medicine from Germany. This brought some profit for Taqizadeh. A review of the newspapers of that period shows that importing modern medicines to sell in Tabriz was becoming a common practice. This was one of the most tangible and impressive manifestations of the scientific achievements of European modernisation for Iranian people. Since some of these new medicines could quickly and easily cure diseases that traditional practice had been unable to, this of course convinced Taqizadeh further about the power of science to create a change. He was able to witness that some maladies which had been previously accepted as God's Will or destiny could now be cured by mankind's scientific knowledge.

Between 1896 and 1902 Taqizadeh spent most of his time studying science, technology, languages, reading, writing and other literary activities whilst also continuing his clandestine political activities. During this period, he worked on a book called *Zad va Bum* [Homeland]. The major portion of this book published in Tabriz dealt with the natural, political and historical geography of Iran. Taqizadeh who had worked on this book together with his friend Mirza Mohammad Ali Khan did not want his name to be displayed on the book so it was published only under the name of his friend. At the same time, he also worked on a book of Arabic grammar. He was pleased with the outcome, suggesting that

⁷² Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 33-4.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 34-5.

the book was very thorough and easy to use.⁷⁴ Together with Vladimir Minorsky he also translated and published a story called *Esarhaddon, King of Assyria* by Tolstoy.⁷⁵ At that time Minorsky was working as a young secretary in the Russian consulate in Tabriz.⁷⁶ It was the beginning of his friendship with this Russian Orientalist whom Taqizadeh would consider to be his best foreign friend. Taqizadeh maintained contact with him almost up until the death of Minorsky in 1966.

As 1903 approached, Taqizadeh decided to try his hand at journalism. On 30 January 1903, with the co-operation of three of his friends, Mohammad Ali Tarbiat, Hossein 'Edalat and Yousef Ashtiyani, he released the first issue of a scientific magazine called *Ganjineh-e Fonun* [Treasury of Skills]. It was a fortnightly magazine and lithographically published. Rahim Raisnia, a local Azerbaijani historian, suggests that *Ganjineh-e Fonun* was possibly influenced by the style of *Servat-e Fonun*, a magazine published in Turkey from 1891 until 1944.⁷⁷ Every issue consisted of four separate sections, each section having four pages. One was a book about industries written by Mohammad Ali Tarbiat, another the translation of *Les Premieres Civilisations* by Gustave Le Bon that Taqizadeh had translated and another was Jules Verne's *Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea*, translated by Mirza Yousef Khan. The fourth section consisted of different pieces of scientific news, sometimes prepared by Taqizadeh and at other times by his friends. The magazine continued to be published for one year and twenty-four issues of it were published. Taqizadeh writes, "...despite the unbelievable difficulties of publishing in Tabriz, with extraordinary consistent effort, supernatural patience, great suffering and by working day and night in the publishing house, I finished and published it for one year until the last issue...".⁷⁸ The publication of the last issue of the magazine on 4 January 1904 coincided with the conflict between Japan and Russia in the Far East ending in the defeat of Russia by Japan which had a great impact on Iranian revolutionaries.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 35-6.

⁷⁵ An exemplary fable written during the late period of Tolstoy's life.

⁷⁶ Hassan Taqizadeh, "Vladimir Minorsky," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 2: 89-92.

⁷⁷ Raisnia, *Iran va Osmani*, 2: 248.

⁷⁸ Taqizadeh to Taqiev, without date, in Taqizadeh, *Tufani* ('Elmi), 421-26.

Due to the pandemic of cholera spreading through Iran around the same time, Taqizadeh and his friend Mirza Mohammad Ali Khan decided to leave Tabriz and travel abroad. Cholera was spreading in the south and was moving to other areas and in Tabriz people were waiting for the illness's expected arrival in fear. Before leaving Tabriz, Taqizadeh had been busy using his medical knowledge to ensure cholera did not reach his family's house. He had put fresh water in the reservoirs, blocked off the water passage and prepared the necessary drugs to fight the bacteria although he himself left before the illness arrived in Tabriz.⁷⁹

1:5 Travels Abroad

The first place that Taqizadeh and Mirza Mohammad Ali Khan went to on their travels was Nakhchivan. Taqizadeh had an educated friend there who worked as a contractor in road construction, since they were building roadways all over the Caucasus and Turkistan. His friend was a modern-minded man who had all the works of Mirza Malkam Khan and Taqizadeh managed to take a copy of them for himself. They stayed one night there before moving on to Yerevan. Later they took the train to Tbilisi. It was the first time in his life that Taqizadeh had seen trains. He writes:

In Tbilisi which was the gateway to Europe for us, we imagined ourselves in Europe; everything was European and Russian. We stayed there for a while, for about a month and learned a lot, because we socialised with people who were educated in the Caucasus and were modern-minded. There were many Iranians there because it was on the transit route.⁸⁰

For Taqizadeh, his most useful meeting was with Mohammad Aqa Shah Takhtinski, a famous character who published the Turkish newspaper *Sharq-e Rus* [East Russia] which Taqizadeh believed, other than *Tarjoman-e Haqiqat* [Revealer of the Truth] which had been published in the past, was probably the first daily newspaper in the East (Iran and The Caucasus), outside Istanbul which was similar to European newspapers. Taqizadeh writes

⁷⁹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 41.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 42.

about Takhtinski, "He had first studied in Russia, then in France and Germany and had ideas about the new age. He was exactly like a European. I hadn't seen anyone like him in the East...".⁸¹ Taqizadeh was apparently fascinated by what he was seeing in Tbilisi. "Tbilisi was fascinating for us. At night it was laden with light and was like Europe for us. We went to the theater there. We visited museums...".⁸²

Another important meeting for Taqizadeh in Tbilisi was with Jalil Mammadguluzadeh who also worked for *Sharq-e Rus*. He was the founder of the famous *Mulla Nasraddin* satirical magazine. Taqizadeh explains about him, writing that Mirza Jalil had a great sense of humour and was extremely patriotic. "In literary talent nobody in the East could reach his standard and he could possibly be compared to Molière. As he requested, I sent him many humorous books such as *Kolsum Naneh* and others. We became good friends with Mirza Jalil and they were very kind to us...".⁸³

Taqizadeh and his friend continued their journey, travelling from Tbilisi to Batumi. From there they took the ship to Istanbul where they resided in the famous Valid-e Khani Caravanserai where most Iranian people in Istanbul used to live and do business. Taqizadeh who had great interest in books began borrowing some from the bookshops to read. Taqizadeh wrote:

There was a bookshop which kept forbidden books; I borrowed at least one hundred books from there such as the works of Namiq Kamal, novels and plays. We stayed there for about six months and met educated people. We saw an Iranian elementary school whose manager was Haji Reza Qoli Khorasani who always used to send articles to *Habl al-Matin*. Another person was Zeyn al-Abedin Maraghei, the writer of *Siyahat Nameh-e Ebrahim Beyg* which was a forbidden book in Iran. We went to his house and became familiar with the writers of *Akhtar*.⁸⁴

⁸¹ Ibid., 42-43.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid., 43-4.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 45-6.

From Istanbul they travelled to Egypt on an Austrian ship. In Egypt Taqizadeh met Jurji Zaydan on a few occasions. It was during this trip that he wrote the treaty; *A Study of Current Affairs in Iran on Trial by History* and which he later published. It was this treaty that made him far more well-known. In the treaty he argued that the Iranian race had only contributed to the world civilisation during the three dynasties of the Achaemenians, the Sassanids and Safavids. It had been solely during these periods that Iranian participation had been considerable and in other periods, he suggested, Iran had been weak and under the influence of foreigners. He went on to outline and discuss the characteristics of the three periods and concluded that Iran was sick and the remedy for its sickness was to accept Western civilisation, otherwise Iran would be overthrown. This treaty reveals his opinions and political outlook in terms of Iran.⁸⁵ The young Taqizadeh's opinions expressed in this book highlight the linearity of the concept of history in his mind and the importance he placed on human agency in making history; as conscious beings they were capable of making changes and chasing a unified goal, aiding the progress of world civilisation. His tracing of the history of ancient Iran and his emphasis on its value by creating a continuous historical narrative for the country by interlinking different dynasties reveals his attempts to utilise history to serve the needs of nationalism. This treaty can be considered as one of the young Taqizadeh's very first attempts to build a social reality. In order to do this, he used the past as an open field for study and interpretation but then tried to fix and establish it as the single narrative of national history. It seems that he believed in the possibility of deriving objective knowledge from science. This knowledge and scientific objectivity could then be used to study history which in turn could be passed on through education as cultural heritage. This way of thinking could also have helped to give him a new outlook as a replacement for his previous beliefs which had been based on religious ideology.

Mehdi Mojtehed, one of Taqizadeh's biographers compares this book to *Du Contrat Social* and Taqizadeh to its author Jean Jacques Rousseau. He argues; "Not only can we consider this book as his manifesto as a Member of Parliament but also as a roadmap for

⁸⁵ Mojtehed, 30.

his life. For in this book, he expresses in detail his most fundamental opinions. He argues that one should either accept Western civilisation or accept extinction...”.⁸⁶

Taqizadeh had wanted to stay in Egypt and establish a newspaper there, but after six months he could no longer tolerate the hot climate and became sick and so had to leave. From there, he went to Beirut and visited several publishers and bookshops selling Arabic books. After staying forty-nine days in Beirut, he travelled to Damascus by train and stayed there for one week.

On his way back to Tabriz he stayed in Tbilisi again, visiting his friends. It was during this stay that he decided to write a letter to the beneficent merchant Taqiev, asking for a scholarship in order to be able to pursue his studies at the American university in Beirut. In the letter it is clear that he has researched about studying in Beirut while he had been there. In this letter after introducing himself, he gives a summary of his life, education and passion for learning, his cultural efforts and his desire to study abroad. He includes details about his attempts to save money and his lack of success in this, despite great efforts. He goes on to outline the expenses he requires to study in Beirut and asks Taqiev to support him by sponsoring him:

The fear of getting too old to study overcame me and the centre of my heart began to burn, for I could not achieve my goals in Iran. I have known nothing other than working and saving and since the beginning of my life asked anything from anyone, not even a glass of water. My miseries became compounded when I suddenly lost the entire small amount of money that I had saved for my travel expenses. Because of my passion (to study), in distress I left Tabriz, perplexed and helpless. It is this shame passion which is the cause of my feelings of embarrassment and humiliation. When I left Tabriz, after days and nights of thinking, you came into my mind. I thought I have been hearing about your Excellency's love for education and beneficence for ten years. I hear constantly about your good deeds

⁸⁶ Ibid.

supporting education in the Islamic world which are mentioned in the newspapers. I appeal to your sense of honour and generosity. I submit this petition to your blessed presence and have the request hereunder. The plan that I have in mind for my studies is as follows; given that I know only the English and French languages I should study in London or America in English or I should continue my education in Paris in French. All three options are difficult for me since in these countries, one forgets about the East and especially one's home country and it is too costly for people like me to study there. After some years of enquiry, I learned that the Americans have a large, reputable school in Beirut, a type of American school where the languages of instruction are English and Arabic and one which is so well-recognised and of such high quality that, according to the newspapers and the school's prospectus, except for the Japanese schools, is the number one throughout all the East...".⁸⁷

He ended the letter by stating the exact amount of money that he needed every year to study and awaited a reply in Tbilisi. Although on the one hand this letter's tone is obsequious and somewhat humiliating for Taqizadeh, on the other hand, it demonstrates his great passion for learning and his strong desire to pursue his studies and benefit from a western style education which he believed would help him to propagate the movement of change in Iran.

Taqiev possibly did not feel moved by Taqizadeh's emotional appeal as, rather than going to study abroad, in the October of 1905 Taqizadeh returned to Tabriz, a city that was becoming increasingly politically active.

In summary, it can be said that over these early years of learning, writing and travelling, a big shift in Taqizadeh's character takes place; his sense of self-identity has been transformed. When he returns to Tabriz, he uses all these experiences and relationships to construct a new self and put this self forward to the world. His previous self-identity, which

⁸⁷ Taqizadeh to Taqiev, without date, in *Tufani* ('Elmi), 421-26.

had been strongly influenced by his father who as a clergyman had had particular ideas about how his son should follow in his footsteps, is shattered by these experiences and a new self emerges from a developing self; one with a different consciousness. He begins to think of himself as somebody who is developing, someone with a mission. He compares the changes and progress taking place in Iran to global examples. At the end of his journey and his return to Tabriz Taqizadeh no longer has only a local outlook on life, he now thinks in a global context. He is familiar with the languages which can connect him to the developing world outside Iran that he considers to be the source of progress and prosperity. He wants to change; he believes not only in his own agency but also in agency of the people, in the position of his country within the international discourse. He is interested in questions of truth and knowledge, epistemology; he is searching for reasons and remedies.

Chapter Two

Taqizadeh and Constitutionalism

The discussion of the previous chapter took a micro historical approach; Taqizadeh's life was assessed from different perspectives within the social and economic context of the place in which he was born and grew up, Tabriz. This chapter deals with Taqizadeh's move from Tabriz to Tehran and considers his life as a member of the First Parliament leading up to its bombardment by Mohammad Ali Shah and the forced departure of Taqizadeh to Europe. However, before turning to focus specifically upon Taqizadeh's life, we should first take a step back to view the general situation in Iran at the time and examine the global forces that were shaping the country and its people and politics. One of the main focal areas should be the Iranian Constitutional Revolution and its consequences. Within the Constitutional Revolution movement in which Taqizadeh played a crucial role, the development of the idea of modernity (*tajaddod*) was a key factor and as such attention needs to be paid to this concept. It is against this background that this chapter will narrate Taqizadeh's life story, focusing on the salient historical conditions which helped to form Taqizadeh's character as a young, ambitious politician. These focal points, and in particular the Constitutional Revolution have been chosen to highlight Taqizadeh's political and intellectual philosophy and to contextualise the independent forces which influenced and shaped Taqizadeh's character.

Importantly, the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906 leading to the establishment of a parliament and the restriction of the power of the absolute monarch was a turning point in Iranian contemporary history. An attempt to convert an autocratic monarchy to a more democratic system, although not fully successful, left a lasting effect on Iran and the region and on Iran's relationship with the European powers who had interests in the region. Much has been written about the different aspects of the Constitutional Revolution, the intellectual and ideological background and the events. Works by early historians such as Ahmad Kasravi, Edward Browne and later Fereydoon Adamiyat are among the most widely known and respected. More recently, the study of the Constitutional Revolution has developed using new sources, methodologies and different approaches. A full analysis of

such a broad and multi-dimensional field is well beyond the scope of this research. However, what this research does set out to do is use this critical period in Iranian history as a springboard to explore more deeply than previously the life and thought of Taqizadeh, one of the intellectual and political driving forces of the Constitutional Revolution and a key member the First Parliament and beyond. The background to this movement, an investigation of its roots and a consideration of the outcomes will be included in this chapter but importantly this will be through the lens of Taqizadeh. It is his perspective that will shape the unfolding of this and the chapters to follow, rather than that of other commentators or even this writer. Firstly, already existing works by historians of this period that include narratives of Taqizadeh as an eyewitness, activist and intellectual who expressed his thoughts and ideas regarding the Constitutional Revolution movement are worthy of attention and will be cited. Additionally, and what sets this research apart, is a narration and analysis of the movement as seen through Taqizadeh's eyes. Though his thought and approach were broadly consistent, a detailed investigation through the lens of Taqizadeh himself will allow the subtle and nuanced changes in his perspective to become evident and thus in turn provide a more nuanced overview of this critical event in contemporary Iranian history.

2:1 Taqizadeh and the Background of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran

When examining the rise of the various manifestations of modernity in Europe and considering the unfolding of historical events within a framework of conventional periodisation, many historians and intellectuals, among them Taqizadeh, took the French Revolution as a turning point in the spread of “modernity” into “Eastern countries”. In this view “the West”, or what we might take to be Western Europe, is considered as a place in which modernity originated and developed. By focusing on Taqizadeh's perspective, a more nuanced understanding of the concept of modernity and its practice in Iran is possible. Furthermore, I will argue that the narrative of modernity developed by Taqizadeh has emerged as the dominant, recurrent narrative of Iranian historiography throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries.⁸⁸ Indeed, Taqizadeh, though not a historian by profession,

⁸⁸ For an excellent account of the narrative of the enlightenment in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution see: Ali M. Ansari, ed., *Iran's Constitutional Revolution of 1906 and Narratives of the Enlightenment* (London: Gingko Library, 2016).

was an eyewitness to most of the key events of the Revolution and thus in a prime position to provide a coherent, succinct overview of the events as well as his ideas about those events.

Despite some criticism, Taqizadeh's narrative is important since it not only represents his own personal understanding of the emergence, development and practice of the idea of modernity in Iran, but also exemplifies the ideas of many contemporary intellectuals of that time. Since few politicians or even historians have tried to express in a systematic way their understanding of the concept of modernity and its history in Iran, Taqizadeh's writings provide an even more valuable source of reference. As Abbas Milani aptly writes: "The serious truth is that, more or less, not all aspects of Iranian culture, literature and history have yet been researched. The modern-minded intellectuals, obsessed with politics, evaded responsibility to carry out serious research. Rather than encouraging social reform in society they have been occupied with inciting the masses".⁸⁹ Judging by his remaining written works which span the different fields of journalism, history and literary criticism, Taqizadeh stands alone among other political figures as someone who attempted to analyse the situation as he saw it unfolding within his own lifetime. From these writings it is clear that Taqizadeh's approach to explaining the emergence of modernity in Iran typified a Eurocentric perspective. From such a perspective, modernisation and political development are seen as processes initiated from within Europe which are then "exported" to societies beyond Europe and thus to become modern, from this perspective, may be understood to mean to imitate the West.

This chapter seeks primarily to represent Taqizadeh's understanding of the background of the Constitutional Revolution and modernity in Iran rather than solely tracing historical events of this period. In a series of talks and written work, Taqizadeh explained the "background" of the Iranian constitution and tried to place it within the context of global forces acting on the country and events taking place there.⁹⁰ Salient points from one of his

⁸⁹ Abbas Milani, *Tajaddod va Tajaddod Setizi dar Iran* [Modernity and Anti-modernity in Iran], (Essen: Nima, 1998).

⁹⁰ Hassan Taqizadeh, "Tarikh-e Avayel-e Enqelab va Mashrutiyat-e Iran [The History of the Beginning of the Revolution and Iranian Constitution]," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 1: 254-68.

fa speeches will be used to present his ideas in this regard. These will be interwoven with frequent references to his other writings, memoirs and talks mostly from the later period of his life in order to fill and expand upon the gaps in the narrative. It is the consistency of Taqizadeh's intellectual narrative that this chapter hopes to probe and consider.

Taqizadeh strongly supported the notion that the political revolutions of 1642 and 1688 in England, soon followed by the American independence movement, were the key events which led to the establishment of the idea that a national government ought to be based on sovereignty and liberty. The French Revolution of 1789 and the revolutions of 1830 and 1848 in Europe laid the foundations for national governments in Europe. To highlight the importance of the French Revolution Taqizadeh emphasised in his speech that before this event there had been no sign of political freedom in France nor of social equality, although he noted that a great intellectual and philosophical movement was being conceived and developed at this time.⁹¹ He considered that the works of great French writers such as Rousseau, Voltaire and Montesquieu had exerted a strong influence over the ordinary people, a view he inherited from a European intellectual tradition. Taqizadeh agreed with this received wisdom that the growing awareness of the physical and spiritual autarchy of royal rulers and catholic clergies was a pre-requisite for revolution. He had come to the conclusion that the major political aim of the Revolution, the granting of rights to the lower classes, was eventually achieved in the European context.⁹² Importantly, Taqizadeh took his analysis a step further, applying it to his own context. He commented on the way that the French Revolution had influenced social and political change not only in Europe but also how it had slowly permeated "the Eastern countries".

2:2 Modernity in the Islamic World

According to Taqizadeh, the intellectual heritage of Western civilisation alongside technical advancement came gradually to the Islamic East; some of the first manifestations of these influences had taken place in the Ottoman Empire during the early nineteenth century under the reign of Sultan Mahmud II. Throughout the Ottoman Empire, the

⁹¹ Ibid., 255.

⁹² Ibid., 258.

residence place of the Islamic caliphate, anti-modern (Zedd-e Tajaddod) elements, such as religious leaders and the force known as Yeni Cheri or Janissaries (new troops), were strongly opposed to any movement towards reform. On 26 June 1826 this Janissary force which had for centuries been the dominating power in the Ottoman Empire and had defeated the Sultans was finally overturned and Sultan Mahmud established the “Nezam-e Jadid” [New Order or New Army], setting up an army based on a European style. Taqizadeh compares these reforms with the “Nezam-e Jadid” initiated later in Iran by the Crown Prince Abbas Mirza. Nikki Keddie expresses a similar opinion, writing that:

The only Qajar to appreciate the need for a modernized military was Crown Prince Abbas Mirza, Governor General of Azerbaijan in the early nineteenth century. Abbas Mirza made use of the French and British instructors, who had been provided for by treaties, to introduce a Western-style armed force in Azerbaijan. Following the terminology of Muhammad Ali and Selim, he called this army Nezam-e Jadid.⁹³

Explaining the events in Turkey and their influences in Iran, Taqizadeh continues in his first speech under the title of “The History of the Beginning of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution” that the strike of theology students of religious schools, the Noble Edict of Gulhane and Tanzimat in the time of Sultan Majid and the establishment of Askariyeh, Roshdiyeh and Malekiyeh schools all culminated in the reforms of Medhat Pasha. Taqizadeh mentioned that these reforms were similar to those of Amir Kabir in Iran which finally evolved into the Constitutional Revolution in Iran.⁹⁴

Taqizadeh’s elaborations on his belief that the Iranian reforms and the constitutional structure of the Iranian government were influenced by the Ottoman reforms should be considered in more detail. Although the Turkish constitutional revolution of 1876 was short-lived, it was, writes Taqizadeh, the first national government in “the East” and was considered as an extremely significant historical process by those who were striving for “freedom and justice” in this part of the world. In Taqizadeh’s opinion, the Ottomans had,

⁹³ Nikki R. Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 27.

⁹⁴ Taqizadeh, “Tarikh-e Avayel-e Enqelab va Mashrutiyat-e Iran,” in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 1: 258-9.

to a large degree, provided the role model for the gradual transformation of the government and establishment of justice and national government in Iran from the late nineteenth century onwards. The new “Western” social establishments and political, civil and military reforms were filtering into Eastern Islamic countries from Europe at this time and it was in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt that they were initially received; as such, it was from these places that the ideas and practices eventually found their way into other Islamic countries, including Iran.⁹⁵

According to Taqizadeh, at that time more research was required on the intellectual influence of Turkey on Iran both before and during the Constitutional Revolution in order that its place in Iranian historiography be fully acknowledged. Taqizadeh’s perspective on what he sees as a paucity of investigation and reflection on this factor is interesting and highlights his point of view. His knowledge about Turkey was the result of many years of residing there and his regular contact with Turkish people and that nation’s intellectuals in particular. During his time as the Ambassador of Iran in London, in a confidential letter dated 16 February 1944, he wrote to the Foreign Ministry in Iran, expressing his views on Iranians’ weak knowledge about Turkey:

Because Persian speaking Iranians – whether they be high ranking and knowledgeable, ordinary people or educated, men of letters and sages, doctors in different sciences, the authorities of the State, Members of Parliament, the leaders of the country or those who claim they possess the full knowledge of the universe - do not read any publications, the press, magazines or books in Turkish, and do not know Turkish (and if some know they are not consistent in reading Turkish) they have little information about the Turkish nation and the opinions of its people and the literary, political and national movements there....⁹⁶

⁹⁵ Taqizadeh, “Tarikh-e Avayel-e Enqelab va Mashrutiyyat-e Iran,” in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 1: 259.

⁹⁶ Hassan Taqizadeh, *Nameh-hay-e Landan* [London Letters], ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Farzan, 1996), 100.

On another occasion Taqizadeh concludes that the extreme nationalism of the twentieth century and the ensuing attempts to purify language on both sides, led to the two nations being culturally alienated.⁹⁷ However, in contrast to his other writing, in this letter he writes that sending students to Turkey must be strictly banned as it could threaten the unity of Iran.⁹⁸

2:3 European Influence

According to Taqizadeh, prior to the Fath Ali Shah period (1769-1834) no European country had any civil or intellectual influence in Iran. The Portuguese conquering of the Persian Gulf shores at the beginning of sixteenth century until 1623 and later the Dutch had not, according to him, been the source of much cultural or political influence as far as their encounters with Iranians were concerned. The first European impact on the consciousness of the governing bodies of Iran, in Taqizadeh's opinion, was the colonial rule of Britain in India in the mid-eighteenth century and the expansion of Russians into the areas to the north of the Caucasian mountains and the Black Sea shores and forests. The impact of the British Empire and the Russian wars with the Ottomans were, according to Taqizadeh, like waves being watched from a distance.⁹⁹

In later writings Taqizadeh elucidated his ideas, explaining that the arrival to the Safavid court of political commissions from European countries, for example the Shirley brothers in the late sixteenth century and the religious missionaries from Europe, were not a great source of influence in forging a civil connection between Iran and Europe. However, he did admit that these were the first small steps for the movement of change in Iran. According to Taqizadeh, after the Safavid period the small and isolated encounters which took place now and again between Iranian and European courts or Christian religious centres were still relatively insignificant in terms of impact. In his opinion, "a long deep sleep of total ignorance and lethargy dominated this land and a curtain of darkness

⁹⁷ Hassan Taqizadeh, "Ravabet-e Iran va Turkieh [The Relationship between Iran and Turkey]," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 1: 239-46.

⁹⁸ Taqizadeh, *Nameh-hay-e Landan*, ed., Afshar, 106.

⁹⁹ Taqizadeh, "Tarikh-e Avayel-e Enqelab va Mashrutiyat-e Iran," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 1: 260.

separated Iran from the West.”¹⁰⁰ Other than the hostile relationship between Iran and the Ottoman Empire there was no connection between Iran and the West. Taqizadeh continued by suggesting that the fundamental civil changes, reforms and progress of the European countries and the discovery of the American continent had had no impact on how the ruling class treated their subjects in the “East”.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, little difference was made in the way the ruling classes behaved towards their subjects by major political and philosophical works such as *Adab al-Moluk* and *Siyasat al-Modon* written by scientists and intellectual thinkers like Farabi, Maskoyeh, Nezam al-Molk and Nasir al-Din-e Tusi. Equally, little effect was caused by the works of any other Islamic scientists and scholars who were influenced by the theories of Aristotle or the scientific regulations of Anushirvan.¹⁰²

Wanting to emphasise the dysfunctionality of Iranian society in order to prompt a change within itself, Taqizadeh wrote that the advice of the sages, poets and prophets had not been able to diminish the selfishness and tyranny of those in power, except on a few occasions. The positive influence of Islam on the piety of Ghazan Khan in the thirteenth century was an example of one such occasion. Another is the taking of the caliphate of Rashedin [The Rightly Guided Successors] as role models by such rulers as Omar ibn-e Abd al-Aziz.¹⁰³ In Taqizadeh’s words, “the very winsome, pleasant, courageous and even impetuous exhortations of the writers or poets were read but no real or inward effects were perceived from them. The exceptions were the occasional optional self-control, favour or pity towards the inferiors by the rulers.”¹⁰⁴

The essence of Taqizadeh’s argument is found in his quotation of Mirza Malkam Khan who suggested that sages, poets and prophets had been offering advice on many issues to rulers over the last centuries but with little favourable result. The change only took place, he agrees, in the eighteenth century when the French nation chose to stand against the tyranny and overthrew the monarchy.¹⁰⁵ Taqizadeh believed that the French Revolution

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 261.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid., 260.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 261.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 262.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

indeed shook the world; it was a light, he said, which rose from the French horizon and gradually illuminated other parts of the world. We see the same line of thought in Mehdi Malekzadeh's narration of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran using a similar metaphor;

The shining star of liberty appeared in the horizon of France and the revolution exploded like a volcano. It gave light and warmth to all countries of the world. Every country based on its natural predisposition and intellectual education, in a distance or close by was benefited from this immense gift.¹⁰⁶

However, evidently to Taqizadeh's mind, the light and energy of the French Revolution did not have an immediate impact on Iran. Rather, for him, it was the defeat of Iran by Russia, leading to a significant loss of land and the signing of the two humiliating treaties of Golestan (1813) and Torkamanchai (1828) which had caused shockwaves in Iran and was the catalyst for the Constitutional Revolution Movement. The Iranian government became aware of its weakness in comparison to the European countries and considered itself bereft of any resort to power and progress. Taqizadeh mentioned that later this feeling of weakness increased as a result of the war with the British Empire in 1856. The on-going pressure of invading Russia and an increasing number of one-sided concessions took Iran to the verge of annihilation. Iran's other neighbouring country in the East, the British Empire, acted similarly. All these aspects, claims Taqizadeh, had an immense psychological effect on the Iranian people who were watching the decline of their country in front of their eyes.¹⁰⁷

2:3 Economic Influences

Taqizadeh focused on economic influences when he highlighted the link between the Constitutional Revolution and the increasing adverse economic situation of Iran after the Iran-Russian wars. He explained that from the Torkamanchai Treaty until about the middle of the nineteenth century, despite the increasing pressure and domination of Russia, the Iranian government had managed to maintain a balance in its relationship with Russia and

¹⁰⁶ Mehdi Malekzadeh, *Tarikh-e Enqelab-e Mashrutiyyat Iran* [The History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution], (Tehran: 'Elmi, 1994), 1: 111.

¹⁰⁷ Taqizadeh, "Tarikh-e Avayel-e Enqelab va Mashrutiyyat-e Iran", 265.

Britain. Gradually the power and political domination of Russia increased and as a result the economic and commercial influence of Russia began to impact further into the south of Iran. According to Taqizadeh, following the establishment of the Russian Loan Bank in Iran in 1899 and the issuing of two hefty loans in 1900 and 1903 with crippling interest rates, Russian political and economic domination increased dramatically. As Taqizadeh himself witnessed, at the beginning of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution 60 to 64 percent of Iranian commerce was conducted with Russia.¹⁰⁸ Taqizadeh believed incompetency in foreign affairs together with the injustice, tyranny and disorder in the administrative and internal affairs which were regulated, according to him, in the same way they had been in the Middle Ages, were what had triggered the Constitutional Revolution in Iran.¹⁰⁹ Edward Browne, a friend of Taqizadeh who made a study of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, added nationalism to this list when he stated that:

My own conviction is that the mere tyranny of an autocrat would have hardly driven the patient and tractable people of Persia into revolt had tyranny at home been combined with any maintenance of prestige abroad or only moderately effective guardianship of Persian independence. It was the combination of inefficiency, extravagance and lack of patriotic feeling with tyranny which proved insupportable, and a constitutional form of government was sought not so much for its own sake as for the urgent necessity of creating a more honest, effective, and patriotic government than the existing one.¹¹⁰

As mentioned before, in Taqizadeh's opinion, the awakening happened gradually with the rudimentary steps taken by Abbas Mirza, the Crown Prince. Under him, some European knowledge and technology was acquired; he established factories, a printing-house,

¹⁰⁸ Ervand Abrahamian in explaining the causes of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution writes: "The revolution's long-term causes were rooted in 1904-05 by an economic crisis brought about by government bankruptcy and spiralling inflation. Unable to meet government expenditures, Mozaffar al-Din Shah threatened to raise land taxes and default on loans from local creditors. He also turned to British and Russian banks for new loans on top of the 4 million he had already borrowed from them." See: Ervand Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 41.

¹⁰⁹ Taqizadeh, "Tarikh-e Avayel-e Enqelab va Mashrutiyyat-e Iran", 266-7.

¹¹⁰ Edward G. Browne, "The Persian Constitutional Movement," *Proceedings of the British Academy* (London, 1917-18), 8: 323-324.

vaccination programmes and even sent students to Britain to study. One of the most significant developments was the establishment of the first technical school (Dar al-Fonoun) in Tehran in 1852.¹¹¹ This was accompanied by an invitation to Austrian and French teachers to help provide technical knowledge to the students. The establishment of telegraph lines in Iran, beginning from 1864, was a major factor leading to the centralisation of power in Iran.¹¹²

Taqizadeh goes on to elaborate on the intellectual awaking of Iran and people who were influential in this regard. Again, he considers the writings of Mirza Malkam Khan as the most significant. Malkam Khan who was in exile in England published his newspaper *Qanun* [Law] in London. His numerous and insightful treatises caused a revolution in the minds of Iranians who were seeking reform. In Taqizadeh's opinion, after Mirza Malkam Khan the works of Talebov among them *Ketab-e Ahmad* [The Book of Ahmad], *Masalek al-Mohsenin* and *Masael al-Hayat* [The Book of the Pious and Challenges of Life] were highly influential and were circulated widely throughout Iran. *Siyahat Nameh-e Ebrahim Beyg* and Persian newspapers published in Egypt and India, especially *Soraya*, *Parvareh*, *Hekmat* and *Habl al-Matin* also influenced public opinion. Taqizadeh comments that the coming of the famous Seyyed Jamal al-Din Asadabadi (Afghani) in 1887 and 1890 and his oral propaganda against the dictatorship and the necessity for reform was influential. This was especially evident at the protest against the exclusive tobacco concession granted by the Shah to a British company on 8 March 1890.¹¹³

Alongside these external influences which played a part in Iran's Constitutional Revolution, such as the expansion of European scientific knowledge and the spread of these ideas through neighbouring Russia and the Ottoman Empire to Iran, Taqizadeh also elaborated on the reaction that some Iranians had to monumental events that were taking place in these countries, the Russo-Japanese War and the Russian Revolution. As

¹¹¹ Javad Tabatabaei writes: "The opening of Dar al-Funun and the efforts made to transfer new knowledge to Iran was the first step to fill the gap which had existed for a hundred years." Seyyed Javad Tabatabaei, *T'amoli Darbareh-e Iran: Nazariyeh-e Hokumat-e Qanun dar Iran* [Reflections on Iran: Theory of the Rule of Law in Iran], (Tabriz: Sotudeh, 2007), 139.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 270.

¹¹³ Taqizadeh, "Tarikh-e Avayel-e Enqelab va Mashrutiyat-e Iran", 272.

Malekzadeh wrote; “The Russo-Japanese war was one of the most important factors which led to the independence of Iran and the emergence of the Constitutional Revolution.”¹¹⁴

Hekmat, a Persian newspaper then published in Egypt, highlighted the significant effect the Russo-Japanese War had upon the awakening of the Iranian mind and also on the clergy’s opinions regarding the acquisition of modern science and style from Europe. It is worth quoting an extract from it at length:

Until recently, high ranking clergies in Iran were against any new style reforms. Their ridiculous behaviours in Tehran are still not forgotten. They would beat helpless Iranian youths and slapped them on the face with their own hands. They prevented the youth from wearing new style clothes such as redingotes, trousers, starched collared shirts and neckties in which the latter had been used by their own ancestors several thousand years ago. Today Iranian youth are free to wear what they wish. Even the clergies, themselves not only have abandoned the old way, but also act according to the new style. The Russo-Japanese war had also been a useful lesson for them. In one instance a famous preacher in a Tehran mosque on the Manbar (tribune) declared ‘Oh people of Iran; may our eyes and insights be blinded if we do not understand and see that Japan defeated Russia with the power of European science. The day will come when with the use of this science we will also become powerful and mighty and able to protect our own existence. So, we must try hard and learn and act in order to survive.’¹¹⁵

2:4 Internal Causes

In addition to external forces, Taqizadeh did not ignore the impact of internal events on the Constitutional Revolution. According to him, one of the major internal shifts contributing to the Revolution was the influence of religious innovations and reforms, in particular from Sufism. He considered the emergence of the Babi movement as the most

¹¹⁴ Malekzadeh, 1: 170.

¹¹⁵ “Jonbesh-e Iranian va Khaheshhai-e Anan [The Movement of Iranians and Their Wishes],” *Hekmat*, September 4, 1906.

important among all religious movements in Iran at this time. Whilst A.K.S. Lambton identifies that “the intellectual bases” of the Babi movement “go back to the medieval Islamic movements of revolt and heresy, rather than to western liberal movements of reform”,¹¹⁶ Taqizadeh refers to it as a “modern religious revolution”.¹¹⁷

Taqizadeh analyses the influences of this movement from different perspectives showing how it played a role in enhancing the practice of modernity in Iran. The Babi Riot which took place at the beginning of the reign of Naser al-Din Shah in 1850 and the large-scale battles of Mazandaran, Zanzan and Darab which concluded with the defeat of the Babis were, according to Taqizadeh, of utmost importance. Following the defeat, all Babis became hostile to the rule of the Qajars. On one hand, those who had accepted the new religion were, as Taqizadeh commented, released from Islamic fanaticism and were increasingly against the dictatorship of the Mullahs and corruption of the religion in Iran. Taqizadeh considered the Babi Movement as one of the most influential factors behind the Constitutional Revolution and believed that not enough research had been done about it; he went so far as to call the influence of the Babi Movement on the process of change in Iran one of the “hidden causes”. More recently, Abbas Amanat has written that there is a “visible absence in the narratives of the period of any non-Islamic or anti-Islamic dissident elements, and least of all the Babi influence”. Amanat refers to this absence as “a conspiracy of silence”.¹¹⁸ Malekzadeh has also commented on this factor of minorities:

The pressure of the clergy and ordinary people on the minorities naturally made them favour a liberal and constitutional government. They wished to be safe from the tyranny under the umbrella of a codified law so that one day they could be free to practice their beliefs and voice their opinions. They wanted to rid themselves of the limitations that the hypocritical clergy had placed on them. That was why the intellectuals of these minorities, although powerless

¹¹⁶ Ann Lambton, *Qajar Persia*, (London: I.B Tauris & Co Ltd, 1987), 284.

¹¹⁷ Hassan Taqizadeh, “Yek Moqaddameh-e Mokhtasar-e Tarikhi [A Brief Historical Introduction],” in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 2: 232.

¹¹⁸ Abbas Amanat, “Historiography of the Constitutional Revolution,” in *Iran in the 20th Century: Historiography and Political Culture*, ed., Touraj Atabaki (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2009), 36.

and in need of protection by the others, were opposed to the dictatorship of the government and worked as hard as they could to help establish the Constitution. They considered the leaders of the Constitution as their saviors and respected and followed them.¹¹⁹

2:5 Taqizadeh's Theoretical Outlook

Taqizadeh's opinions about the background of the Constitutional Revolution and his stance towards the advent of modernity in Iran are based on the premise that gradual, step by step change towards an "ideal" situation was necessary; this was what Taqizadeh believed in and advocated for. He links these social changes to developments in science and technology; in his theory of history "progress" is closely identified with technology. He fiercely believed almost everything in the world began with "insignificant" steps, and then followed a linear progression. The examples he used when describing the social changes in Iran often contained references to science and progress:

The airplane which has developed as far as it has and is about to conquer the space beyond Earth may have begun with the balloon of the Montgolfier brothers in 1783 and the same goes for all other large- and small-scale changes in the world. If one asks about the beginning of progress, modernity, revolution, change and Westernization in Iran and where they started and on what date, the answer is that small and scattered clouds accumulated in the air gradually 100 years before the Revolution until eventually there was an explosion of Revolutionary light.¹²⁰

What Ervand Abrahamian wrote about the intelligentsia of the late Qajar period in general could also be used to illustrate Taqizadeh's view; "Exposure to the ideas of the West, especially the ideas of the French Enlightenment, persuaded them that history was the March of Human Progress, not the revelation of God's Will as the Muslim '*ulama*'

¹¹⁹ Malekzadeh, 1: 120.

¹²⁰ Hassan Taqizadeh, "Serayat-e Afkar-e Gharbi dar Iran [The Spread of Western Ideas in Iran]," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh* [The Essays of Taqizadeh], ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Shokofan, 1978), 9: 309.

believed, nor the cyclic rise and fall of royal dynasties such as court chronicles narrated.”¹²¹

Taqizadeh's narrative about the background to the Constitutional Revolution is characterised by his imagining a continuous history for Iran by linking the pre-Islamic and Islamic periods and differentiating Iranian people from the neighbouring Arabs or Turks. Notably, in his narrative Taqizadeh did not at times make any specific distinctions when referring to the countries, and simply described the different nations as “the East”. Taqizadeh's narrative is inclined to give great importance to the role of the rulers and governments. What he seems to be missing in this narrative is any consideration of the role of different cultures and subcultures and the forces which were not necessarily controlled by the state in Iran. Taqizadeh often ignores the agency of subaltern groups which had little contact with or influence from the ruling class and the role those groups played in either welcoming a new outlook towards the rest of the world or resisting influence from that world. However, many would eventually agree with Taqizadeh that “undoubtedly the Iranian Constitution changed the political and social situation fundamentally, changing it to the better. It blew the spirit of “tajaddod” (modernity), civilization, patriotism and following of the world of progress into Iran”.¹²²

2:6 A Rising Man

When Taqizadeh returned to Tabriz from his trip to the Caucasus, Egypt and Turkey in October of 1905, the movement pressing for the Constitutional Revolution movement had begun in Tehran; a movement that would eventually succeed in establishing the Majles (National Assembly/Parliament). After fourteen months travelling, Taqizadeh had returned to Tabriz full of knowledge and brimming with information; he was now a well-travelled and educated man who had met many prominent men of the East and was well-versed in their ideas.¹²³ After his return he spent most of his time studying and became increasingly

¹²¹ Ervand Abrahamian, “The Causes of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, August 1979, 10, no. 3, 381-414.

¹²² Hassan Taqizadeh, “Mokhtasar Tarikh-e Majles-e Melli-e Iran [A Brief History of the Iranian National Parliament],” in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Shokofan, 1976), 5:7.

¹²³ Yahya Aryanpur, *Az Saba ta Nima* [From Saba to Nima], (Tehran: Zavvar, 1995), 113.

immersed in politics and gave talks at public gatherings.¹²⁴ As he himself writes, after returning to Tabriz, he began to engage in politics more and to propagate ideas relating to freedom and anti-despotism.¹²⁵ During this time some clandestine groups were active in Tabriz which published announcements calling for revolution and inviting people to revolt; Taqizadeh was involved with several of these groups. All of these activities were precursors to the revolution which took place in Tabriz on 18 September 1906. On that day the activists succeeded in inciting a large number of the people of Tabriz. They closed the Bazar and gathered together in the British consulate until the Crown Prince, Mohammad Ali Mirza, agreed to their demands: the most important of which were the acceptance of the rule of the Constitution in the provinces and the formation of a local assembly to begin the process leading to parliamentary elections in Tabriz.¹²⁶

The harsh treatment of the local populace and despotism of Mohammad Ali Mirza, the crown prince and governor of Azerbaijan, had meant that political gatherings and the establishment of organisations in Tabriz had been close to impossible prior to the revolution in Tabriz. Things were a little different in Tehran in the aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution, where elections had already been held for the forming of the Parliament. However, in Tabriz a severe dictatorship continued to hinder any election process. The majority of people in Tabriz were not even aware of the fact that elections were taking place in the capital. The only way that information could be passed on to the activists in Tabriz was by means of letters and even these were secretly scrutinised.¹²⁷

The well-documented harshness of Mohammad Ali Mirza's leadership as Governor of Azerbaijan became an additional point of grievance for the people of Tabriz who reacted against him by demanding the rule of law more fervently.¹²⁸

¹²⁴ Ebrahim Safa'i, *Tarikh-e Mashrutiyyat be Ravayat-e Asnad* [The History of the Constitution According to Documents], (Tehran: Iranian, 2002), 684.

¹²⁵ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 49.

¹²⁶ For more information see: Nazem al-Eslam Kermani, *Tarikh-e Bidari-e Iraniyan* [The History of the Awakening of Iranians], (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1984), 530-9.

¹²⁷ Ahmad Kasravi, *History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution*, trans. Evan Siegel (Costa Mesa: Mazda, 2006), 182.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

Taqizadeh writes in his autobiography that when he came back to Tabriz, he found no constitution and no sign of freedom; disappointed by the situation he decided to go to Tehran through Russia. Although he clarifies that the reason that he decided to go to Tehran was because he was feeling disappointed in Tabriz, Mojtehedī puts forward that friends had in fact encouraged him to go in order to establish a better connection between Tabriz and Tehran; they wanted Taqizadeh to represent the area in Tehran. Since he was young, seeking fame and had no family, he was considered a suitable candidate. “They told him, “Dear friend, go to Tehran. Be our speaker there. We are here supporting you and we will select you as our deputy in the parliament and will send your credentials”.¹²⁹ Ahmad Kasravi, argues that Taqizadeh was on his way to Egypt when he found out about his selection for parliament, “[he] had left for Egypt several days before the Tabriz movement. When he found out that he had been elected, he headed straight for Tehran and was already in the Majles.”¹³⁰ According to Taqizadeh, however, he received the news about being elected when he was already in Tehran.

Taqizadeh’s return to Tabriz in October 1905 could be considered as marking the beginning of a period in his life in which we see him as having grown in confidence, sufficiently knowledgeable to become involved in politics in a more practical way. Up until this point he had been positioning himself, exploring ideas and striving to understand the political situation. But from the time he returned to Tabriz he began to actively challenge the ruling power. Later in his life it will become evident that he transformed his approach again; moving from being a critical opponent to one who decides to co-operate with the government to further pursue the actualization of his ideas. Taqizadeh’s fluctuating desire to be practical and then enter a period of learning and study is a feature throughout his life. As an intellectual who sought a change in the political and social structure of Iran, he felt obliged to keep abreast of events and developments in the “modern” world in order to fully comprehend the nature of “modernity” (*tajaddod*). Since he believed in the linearity of history and human development, his later decision to leave Tabriz was also due to his eagerness to do something practical in order to push Iranians in

¹²⁹ Mojtehedī, 51.

¹³⁰ Kasravi, Siegel, 219.

the direction of “progress”. He saw the Iranian social and political system as a passive one. He regularly referred to European societies as being advanced in comparison to Iranian society. He referred to himself as the well-wisher of the Iranian nation and like many other intellectuals of the time he believed that it was his duty and moral obligation to inform people and improve their situation.¹³¹ It was due to the adverse political climate in Tabriz, where such goals were less likely to be achieved, that he turned his attention towards more viable contexts outside of his home city.

2:7 Towards Tehran

Taqizadeh left Tabriz on 3 September 1906. During the journey, Mirza Ali Mohammad Khan Tarbiat was under Taqizadeh’s guardianship and education. When they passed Jolfa, Taqizadeh wanted to visit his father’s village, Vanand. This was during the war between Muslims and Armenians and the ensuing security issues on the roads meant that Taqizadeh’s planned short visit to Vanand took longer than expected and he had to remain there for sixteen days, witnessing the war first hand.¹³² Here it might be interesting to note what Taqizadeh thought about the fighting between the Armenians and Muslims and its influence on the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. This may also help us to understand better Taqizadeh’s later interest in investing in organised political work.

Alongside the revolution in Russia, the propagation of independent newspapers, and the emergence of revolutionary groups and committees, Taqizadeh believed that the wars between the Armenians and Muslims played a fundamental role in the changing political atmosphere. He writes:

¹³¹ On the first page of Taqizadeh’s treaty called *Tahqiq-e Ahval-e Kononi-e Iran ba Mohakemat-e Tarikhi* [Study on Current Affairs in Iran with Historical Trials] the writer is introduced as “The well-wisher of the Iranian nation; Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh-e Tabrizi.”

¹³² Kasravi argues that the wars between Armenians and Muslims in the Caucasus had a bitter though enlightening effect on the people in Tabriz. As he describes, many innocent Iranians, among them businessmen and workers, were killed indiscriminately. The Iranian government paid no attention to this and made no attempts to question it. This aroused anger in the people and revealed to them the uselessness and indifference of the Iranian governments towards its own subjects. Regarding Taqizadeh, witnessing these events could have added to his great dislike towards Russians. It was believed that the Russian government was galvanizing both sides to fight because there was a fear that the people of Caucasia would rebel against the Russians since the central government had become weakened due to their defeat in the war with Japan. The war between Armenian and Muslims would keep them busy and would divert their attention. Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e Iran*, 1: 145-7.

During the war with Armenians, with great sorrow the Muslims realized that although both the Armenians and Muslims were peasants and powerless, Armenians everywhere, even in the small villages, had the means to defend themselves with good arms, grenades and dynamite. This was due to their revolutionary and secret organizations which had been active for twenty years. The young people were very belligerent and devoted to their organization and because of that even in the villages where Muslims outnumbered them, Armenians were able to defeat them. Caucasian Muslims became extremely zealous because of this domestic war and they organized devotee groups. They collected arms and warfare and brought many devotees to defend themselves against the Armenians. These, spread to Iran because of the connection of these parts to the borders of Gilan, Khorasan and Azerbaijan and caused uproar in the Northern provinces before permeating to Tehran as well.¹³³

2:8 Uprising in Tabriz

Based on Taqizadeh's own account, when he reached Russian controlled Jolfa, he was informed that the previous day an uprising had taken place in Tabriz prompting many people to go to the British consulate to seek sanctuary. On hearing this news Taqizadeh was so joyful that he considered instead crossing the Aras River and returning to Tabriz in order to participate in the revolution. But because of the difficulties of renewing his passport and other preparations he decided to continue his trip as previously planned.¹³⁴ He first went to Nakhjavan and then took the train to Tbilisi.¹³⁵

After visiting his friends in Tbilisi, Taqizadeh continued on to Baku where some Iranians had been busy setting up a revolutionary committee called "Ejtema'iyun,

¹³³ Taqizadeh, "Tarikh-e Enqelab-e Iran [The History of the Iranian Revolution]," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 1: 321-388.

¹³⁴ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 55-6.

¹³⁵ Taqizadeh had a number of revolutionary and modern-minded friends in Tbilisi. The most prominent one was Mirza Jalil Mohammad Qoli Zadeh, the founder and chief editor of the famous Azeri-language *Molla Nasreddin* newspaper. Molla Nasreddin is also written Mullah Nasreddin or Nasraddin. According to popular belief, he was a satirical character who lived in the Ottoman Empire in the 13th century and about whom many stories have been written.

‘Amiyun” (Social Democrats), closely connected with the Muslim Caucasian revolutionaries. The Russian Revolution prompted them to take action themselves. Social Democrats who Taqizadeh had close connections with later helped to establish the first political party in Iran.¹³⁶ Taqizadeh writes:

After the Russian Revolution, Baku and Tbilisi emerged as passionate revolutionary centres. Especially in Baku where there was a huge (Iranian) population, in winter there numbered around 80000 and in summer some 50000 people were living in the city or in the suburbs. They were mainly occupied working in the oil industry and business. Under the influence of Turkish speaking revolutionary groups from the Caucasus who were working closely with the Russian revolutionaries these people, alongside other committees, established a committee called “Ejtema‘iyun, ‘Amiyun” and they were in constant touch with Iran, especially with Azerbaijan and Gilan.¹³⁷

This trip to the Caucasus was an important event in Taqizadeh’s political career as it enabled him to renew connections with friends and revolutionaries from these areas; a connection which would later become crucially important for him during the time he was a Member of Parliament in Tehran. Remaining correspondence between Taqizadeh and his friends in Tbilisi shows his influence in the revolutionary centres in the Caucasus. While Taqizadeh was a member of Parliament, Mir Baqer Mir Heydar Zadeh from Tbilisi wrote to him; “The major expectation from your Excellency is that you maintain contact with the centre here and inform us about events in Tehran and developments in the Parliament...”

¹³⁶ The Social Democrats played a significant role in fighting despotism in Iran. They helped in the development of the workers’ and peasant movements in Iran. They were active in organising the people of Tabriz when the city was sieged. They joined supporters of the Constitution in the north of Iran and played a crucial role in the removal from power of Mohammad Ali Shah. See: Sohrab Yazdani, *Ejtema‘iyun, ‘Amiyun* [The Social Democrats], (Tehran: Ney, 2012), 13.

¹³⁷ Taqizadeh, “‘Avamel-e Asasi-e Mashrutiyat-e Iran [The Main Factors of the Constitution],” in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 9: 249.

¹³⁸ He even offered to send some fighters (mojaheds) to Tehran should Taqizadeh be in need of them.¹³⁹

Whilst in Baku, Taqizadeh received a letter from Talebov inviting him to his house in Tamir-Khan-Shura, an invitation which Taqizadeh accepted. During his four night stay they discussed various things, the details of which are unclear from the documents we have; all that Taqizadeh writes in his autobiography about his conversation with Talebov is: "We stayed there for four nights and days, me and Mirza Ali Mohammad Khan who was accompanying me. We talked to that wise and experienced man for days and nights."¹⁴⁰ Talebov and Taqizadeh were later both elected as the deputies of Azerbaijan to the first Iranian Parliament. It is unclear why, Talebov decided not to attend the Parliament.¹⁴¹ However, he did invite Taqizadeh to meet him at his house, perhaps suggesting that he knew that Taqizadeh would eventually become a Member of Parliament and was eager to share his ideas with him before he took up this position. Talebov also did the same when the other seven deputies of Azerbaijan travelled via Baku from Tabriz to Tehran to attend the Parliament.

Taqizadeh suggests that Talebov did not take his seat in the Parliament because he was becoming blind and in poor health, but Fereydoon Adamiyat argues that his change of mind was more likely due to his concern for his safety in Tehran; at this stage the ulama of Tehran had condemned Talebov's activities and writings in which he directly attacked the Shia clergy.¹⁴² During his tenure in the First Parliament, Taqizadeh also had to deal with similar accusations of heresy due to his promotion of secular ideas on various occasions. Mohammad Ali Jamalzadeh witnessed that, at least once in that period, Taqizadeh had to perform his prayers in public to quash the rumours that he was not a firm believer.¹⁴³

¹³⁸ Mir Baqer Mir Heydar Zadeh to Taqizadeh, Tbilisi, 4 May 1907, in *Nomeh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 22-3.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 56.

¹⁴¹ Despite the condemnation of his books by prominent members of the Shia ulama, Talebov was elected by fifty-four votes as one of the twelve deputies from Azerbaijan to the first Iranian Parliament, which convened on 7 October 1906.

¹⁴² Fereydoon Adamiyat, *Andishhay-e Talebov-e Tabrizi [The ideas of Talebov -e Tabrizi]* (Tehran: Damavand), 9-11.

¹⁴³ Mohammad Ali Jamalzadeh, "Taqizadeh," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 204-236.

2:9 The Correct Way of Things

After visiting Talebov, Taqizadeh's autobiography reveals that he continued his trip, stopping in Rasht for a few days after arriving there on 21 October 1906. In Rasht he details that he participated in a meeting, by chance taking place during his visit, which had been convened in order to select the deputies of the city to send to the fledgling parliament in Tehran, a process which they were finding hard to organise effectively. This was the time that the process of elections for the first Parliament in the provinces had started. Taqizadeh writes that this was a significant opportunity to explain to them how the selection process was conducted in other foreign countries; they took his advice on board and after hearing him speak decided to apply "the correct way of election".¹⁴⁴ This could mark the beginning of Taqizadeh's popularity among the revolutionary circles of Gilan. Taqizadeh's various correspondences with the constitutionalists of Rasht during the time he was a member of the First Parliament represent the beginning of his growing relationship with famous characters such as Mirza Karim Khan Rashti¹⁴⁵ and his influence on other revolutionaries of Rasht and Gilan in that period.¹⁴⁶ From letters written during this period, Iraj Afshar has come to the conclusion that at this time Taqizadeh was certainly "one of the most popular Iranian constitutionalists in Gilan".¹⁴⁷

As will be evident when looking at Taqizadeh's later life story, "the correct way" of doing things for him often involved some imitation of European ways and Western political traditions. This influence is particularly evident in his parliamentary speeches, even within his very early addresses there. Arguing about creating a platform for the speaker just as the European countries had, he said:

...unless people grasp that inventing everything (by ourselves) hinders the process of progress, nothing will improve. Nowadays we must completely

¹⁴⁴ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 57.

¹⁴⁵ Died 19 April 1947.

¹⁴⁶ See: Iraj Afshar, ed. "Asnadi Darbareh Enqelab-e Gilan va Hamleh-e Mojahedin be Tehran," [Some Documents about the Revolution of Gilan and the Attack of Tehran by the Mojahedin] in *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyyat va Naqsh-e Taqizadeh* [The Newly Found Notes of the Constitution and the Role of Taqizadeh], ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Javidan, 1980), 1-57.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

surrender and imitate others in these worldly matters. This is because these issues (the order of things in the Parliament) have been corrected after many years of experience and our experiences are useless and absurd. The order of the seats and allocation of a place for the speaker is not just because they have done it and we should imitate them. It is because there is no other way for reform. They were thoughtful people who did these things.¹⁴⁸

The imitation of these European institutions and thought does not, however, represent Taqizadeh's only approach to political progress. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that when necessary he was willing to compromise on these attitudes. One such incident during the period of the First Parliament when the necessity for regulations within the assemblies was being discussed, demonstrates this pragmatism. Knowing that the Azerbaijan assembly was a crucial centre of power for him outside the parliament, Taqizadeh argued for more freedom for these assemblies by encouraging parliament to think flexibly about institutional change. Though he usually advocated secular ideas for institutions based on a European model, here because of his own political interests he posited:

In all countries, within national assemblies and parliaments, laws are not written spontaneously; the time and spirit of the nation are considered. This Parliament must also be like that. Sometimes you may see that one incident requires a certain law. As far as the structure of our assemblies are concerned, the principles are written in constitutional law and in this we cannot simply...follow the foreign countries because they have their own background. Here (in the Parliament) we have had regulations (for things) as much as it was needed. Likewise, these regulations could be applied to other issues considering the situation. But I can claim even during the era of despotism the assemblies in the Islamic societies have been more in number comparing to the countries with constitutions or even in the republic countries. They have been also more free and they always came together to talk about the religious and worldly matters. Nowadays we also see that the

¹⁴⁸ Proceedings of the First Parliament, 19 January 1907, 55.

beginning title of our politicians and speakers is this so there is no need for a regulation anymore....¹⁴⁹

This was not the only occasion when Taqizadeh compromised on his European democratic ideals. Adamiyat, a well-known critic of Taqizadeh, wrote that he sometimes spoke against the fundamental nature of democracy, as well as the Constitution, and he quotes one of Taqizadeh's speeches in the First Parliament as evidence for this:

We should not compare this parliament to the other parliamentary constitutional countries who have a history of two or three hundred years old where the governments just ask for supervision and votes from the Parliaments...this Parliament cannot deal with issues through the usual ways. But the Parliament must reform the country by an extraordinary force and an iron hand...like Mohammad Ali Pasha did in Egypt and Napoleon in France.¹⁵⁰

Adamiyat saw this as an example of how Taqizadeh defended a government based on an individual's superiority, and observed that this was not the only time that he did so. Based on a speech Taqizadeh made later in his life in London on 30 May 1934 where he is clearly referring to Reza Shah, Adamiyat highlights this passage to prove his point: "God helped Iran... a great leader emerged and took the destiny of the nation in his hand...his leadership and guidance actualised plenty of the ideals of the First Parliament".¹⁵¹

2:10 The Election Process for the First Parliament

Before focusing on Taqizadeh's eventual arrival in Tehran, it is important to have an overview of his activities as deputy of the newly established parliament. It is also useful to briefly explain the procedure of election for the First Parliament. This is helpful as we build a picture of how Taqizadeh came to sit in the Parliament, and allows us to identify which

¹⁴⁹ *Majles*, 1: 883.

¹⁵⁰ Fereydoon Adamiyat, *Ideolozhi-e Nehzat-e Mashrutiyyat-e Iran [The Ideology of the Iranian Constitutional Movement]* (Tehran: Payam, 1976), 367.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 367.

groups of society he was representing. This relationship between the electorate and those they elected is important as we continue to build a picture of Taqizadeh's political milieu as he entered the Parliament as deputy representing Tabriz.

Following the Constitutional Revolution in Iran, an official copy of the new Constitution was signed by Mozaffar al-Din Shah on 5 August 1906. An electoral law was drafted soon afterwards by a provisional assembly in Tehran and was eventually signed by the Shah on 23 August before being publicly announced on 9 September 1906. The new law laid out the voting franchise which included six social classes: high ranking clergies and religious scholars, noblemen and aristocrats, merchants, guildsmen; voters had to be over twenty-five years old and neither women nor those serving in the military had any voting rights.¹⁵² The eligible classes had to choose their own representatives, 62 selected from Tehran and the rest from the other provinces. In Azerbaijan 12 seats were allocated. It was decided that there should be no more than 200 parliamentary seats in total;¹⁵³ one of those seats would be taken by Taqizadeh.

Included in the requirements for elected members was that candidates had to be aged between 30 and 70 years old and literate in the Persian language.¹⁵⁴ According to Article Nine of the regulation, in every place where an election was to take place a committee had to be formed of members from all six eligible groups under the supervision of the governor to monitor the process of the election. Article Nineteen stated that the deputies of the provinces must come to Tehran as soon as possible and, since it would take a while before they arrived, the elected deputies from Tehran would hold the parliament.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² *Majles*, 1: 883.

¹⁵³ "Fasl-e Aval-e Qava'ed-e Entekhabat [The First Chapter of the Election Regulations]," in *Shahanshahi* [Royal], September 25, 1906.

¹⁵⁴ Among these conditions the one concerning familiarity with the Persian language could prevent many erudite Azerbaijanis who were not fluent in Persian from taking part although they might have been of great assistance to people of the province if they had taken up positions in parliament. Being more fluent in Persian could be one of the reasons that Taqizadeh was considered a more suitable candidate for the position.

¹⁵⁵ "Fasl-e Aval-e Qava'ed-e Entekhabat," in *Shahanshahi*, September 25, 1906.

Election proceedings had not been finalised but there was also fear that a delay in the parliament commencing its duties might encourage the Shah to change his mind and rescind the order. It was important for the national legitimacy of the parliament that the deputies of the provinces join it as quickly as possible. As was mentioned, although the Constitution law was signed by the Shah in Tehran, it was kept secret in Tabriz by the Crown Prince. It was only after the day of the Revolution in Tabriz that the Shah sent a telegram on 27 September 1906 to Tabriz and obliged the Crown Prince to begin the process of elections. Consequently, a provisional assembly was formed by the revolutionary people in Tabriz. Twenty people from the leaders of revolutionaries were chosen to start the process of elections together with the high-ranking clergy. Meanwhile some revolutionary leaders including Ali Monsieure (given this epithet due to his interest in the French Revolution), Rasoul Sadaqiani, Ali Davaforoush, Seyyed Hassan Sharifzadeh and Mirza Mohammad Tarbiat established a clandestine group called “Markaz-e Gheybi” [Communion Centre] and organised a group of Mojaheds (fighters).¹⁵⁶ At least two of the founders of this centre were very close to Taqizadeh. Sharifzadeh was a student of Taqizadeh and Tarbiat his best friend, companion and brother-in-law. Taqizadeh’s friends had great influence in Tabriz and they were in touch with him constantly during the time he was in Tehran.¹⁵⁷

After the regulations for these elections were sent to Tabriz, six people were chosen to supervise the election process. Mohammad Ali Mirza, the Crown Prince, also sent his representative to the assembly. The assembly began publishing its own newspaper titled “Anjoman” on 19 October 1906. The election went well and each class chose its own deputies.¹⁵⁸

The Tabriz Provisional Assembly (Anjoman) was the first in its kind in Iran and its importance grew so significantly that before long it had become the unofficial electoral power institute in Tabriz; it was so powerful that Mohammad Ali Mirza had no choice but to accept and respect its activities as well as its supervision of the government in

¹⁵⁶ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e Iran*, 1: 167.

¹⁵⁷ Mojtehed, 118.

¹⁵⁸ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e Iran*, 1: 174.

Azerbaijan.¹⁵⁹ Two competing groups were now governing in Tabriz; the official government and the Assembly. The Tabriz Assembly was significant because it allowed Taqizadeh and various other deputies of Tabriz to influence the decision making in the central parliament.

On 24 August 1908, the Russian Ambassador in Iran wrote about the situation he had encountered in Tabriz at the end of July 1907: "In practice, for a long period of time all power has been in the hands of the provincial assembly. This assembly is more influential than the other assemblies in Iran and all the Members of the Parliament are ready to obey its orders."¹⁶⁰

The Tabriz Assembly supervised the establishment of assemblies in the different towns of Azerbaijan, sending some propagandists to other towns of the province to help resolve any issues and familiarise people with the Constitution.

Later, this assembly established a branch and became the most important provincial assembly in Tehran. Taqizadeh would later become its leader. His importance steadily grew after strategically strengthening relationships with the Azerbaijani business community; as representative of the Tabriz Bazaar, the most powerful business centre in Iran which consequently influenced the Bazaar in Tehran as well, he was in a key position. Many Azerbaijani businessmen who resided in Tehran supported the Assembly and aided it financially,¹⁶¹ and it allowed Taqizadeh the opportunity to disseminate his ideas both within the Parliament and outside it during his time as a member of the first Parliament. In February 1908 the Azerbaijan Assembly had 2962 members.¹⁶² In the words of Mehdi Qoli

¹⁵⁹ M. S. Ivanov, *Enqelab-e Mashrutiyyat-e Iran* [Iranian Constitutional Revolution], trans. Azar Tabrizi (Tehran: Shabgir, 1978), 52-3.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Mojtehed, 119.

¹⁶² Ahmad Bashiri, trans., *Ketab-e Abi: Gozareshhay-e Mahramaneh-e Vezarat-e Omur-e Kharej-e Englis darbare-e Enqelab-e Mashruteh* [The Blue Book: Secret Reports of the English Foreign Ministry about the Constitutional Revolution], (Tehran: Nashr-e Now, 1984), 1: 165.

Khan Hedayat, at that time the centre of the nation was the Azerbaijan Assembly and Taqizadeh was its head.¹⁶³

2:11 Taqizadeh in Tehran

After spending a few days in Rasht Taqizadeh, whose only thought was visiting the newly established parliament as soon as possible, departed towards Tehran on the first possible means of transport, a post wagon, reaching Tehran on the evening of 28 October 1906.¹⁶⁴ This was a memorable moment in Taqizadeh's life:

The sight of Tehran on that day is still before my eyes. When the wagon reached the Tupkhaneh square, the cart-driver dropped me off and I was left alone there. I sat on the steps of the Shahi Bank for a while, like a lonely stranger, watching the people coming and going and the traffic of horse wagons. I was thinking for a place to spend the night.¹⁶⁵

On that day, by chance, Taqizadeh met his brother who had come from Tabriz earlier. He took Taqizadeh and Mirza Ali Mohammad Khan, who was travelling with him, to his house where they would later reside. The Parliament had opened just a few weeks earlier on 7 October. Taqizadeh's political life in Tehran began immediately; waking up the day after his arrival this young man of 29, dressed in a black turban and long cloak, immediately went out to locate his new political home. He writes: "I was so enthusiastic to find the Parliament. I had come from Tabriz for that very reason."¹⁶⁶

The Parliament, however, was far from the ideal image he had of a European like parliament. Seeing the piles of shoes at the door to the parliament he reflects that he had thought it was a mosque at first, but after taking his shoes off and entering the building he realised once he heard the heated discussions that he was in fact in the parliament. He watched and listened and enjoyed the bitter criticisms of the deputies. When the session

¹⁶³ Mehdi Qoli Mokhber al-Saltaneh Hedayat, *Gozarash-e Iran [Iran Report]*, ed., Mohammad Ali Soti (Tehran: Noqreh, 1984).

¹⁶⁴ Taqizadeh, "Khaterat-e Gozashteh [Memoirs of the Past]," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 9: 282.

¹⁶⁵ Taqizadeh, "Khaterat-e Yek Hafteh-e Man [A Week of my Memoirs]," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 5: 118.

¹⁶⁶ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 58.

was over at noon, he had to leave without his shoes which he could not find at the door where he had left them: "Although that day I remained barefoot, I was in fact so joyful that I could hardly stand on my feet. The sorrow of losing my shoes was nothing compared to the excitement and pleasure of visiting the Parliament."¹⁶⁷

During the first few visits to the Parliament Taqizadeh was only a spectator. Though he was not yet a Member of Parliament, he enjoyed witnessing and hearing the discussions. Impressing him in these sessions was Mirza Javad Khan S'ad al-Dowleh, a key character in the Parliament and a man who would become one of Taqizadeh's rivals.¹⁶⁸

Taqizadeh found out that he had been chosen as a deputy by telegram at the beginning of December. He had been elected by the merchants with 51 votes; an aspect that should be given further attention.¹⁶⁹ Since merchants travelled widely for trade, they tended to be more aware of what was happening outside Iran. They were more likely to have been impressed with the advancement and scientific achievements of Europeans and perhaps even the liberating movements in the Eastern countries. So, in comparison with the other five voting classes it was the merchants who were most supportive of a character like Taqizadeh whose education and travel experiences had given him a broader perspective, looking beyond the local setting, considering Europe as a role model of change and modernisation.

Ebrahim Safa'i, one of the critics of Taqizadeh, believes that at a time when elite education in Iran was for the most part limited to grammar, poetry and literature, Taqizadeh's brief studies in the socio-political situation of European countries showed itself to be noteworthy. His oratory skills were such that the businessmen of Tabriz felt

¹⁶⁷ Taqizadeh, "Khaterat-e Yek Hafteh-e Man", in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 5: 118.

¹⁶⁸ Mirza Javad Khan S'ad al-Dowleh was a Minister at Brussels, 1892-1902. Minister of Commerce, 1905. Exiled 1906 to Yazd, where he took refuge at the British Consulate. Returned to Tehran in November and took his seat as a Member of Parliament. See: R. M. Burrell, ed. *Iran Political Diaries, 1881 - 1965: 1906 - 1907*, (Cambridge: Archive Editions, 1997), 3: 119.

¹⁶⁹ Taqizadeh was elected both as the representative of the guilds and businessmen but he accepted the position of deputy of the business class. Mashallah Ajoudani, *Mashruteh-e Irani* [Constitution; Iranian Style], (Tehran: Akhtaran, 2003), 345.

confident he could be their spokesman in Tehran.¹⁷⁰ Taqizadeh's own conclusion as to why he had been elected suggests that he caught the attention of voters in Tabriz through his treaty *Tahqiq-e Ahval-e Kononi-e Iran ba Mohakemat-e Tarikhi* [Research on Current Affairs in Iran with Historical Trials]; this was published around the time of the election and had caught the attention of Constitutionalists in Tabriz.¹⁷¹ As mentioned in Chapter One, Mojtehedī compares this treatise to the Social Contract, Taqizadeh to Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution to the French Revolution.¹⁷²

The other deputies of Tabriz were elected at this time but since they had not yet departed for Tehran Taqizadeh was the first representative from Azerbaijan to attend the Parliament, and only the second one from the provinces outside of Tehran. Still only 29 at this time, it was only on account of the fact that his age was calculated with the lunar calendar that he had qualified to join. Furthermore, he looked young for his age; according to his own account, he describes himself as looking like an eighteen-year-old.¹⁷³ During his first days in the Parliament one of the influential Members of Parliament remarked caustically to an Azerbaijani Member of Parliament: "What kind of a province do you have? Didn't you find anyone better to send to the Parliament than this kid?"¹⁷⁴

Taqizadeh attended the Parliament as a deputy of Azerbaijan on 8 December and the other members congratulated him.¹⁷⁵ Carefully listening and choosing not to speak for the first seven sessions, he was the subject of rumours. At that time the deputies of Tehran were more respected than those from the provinces;¹⁷⁶ one such member, proud of coming from Tehran and with a feeling of superiority said to an Azerbaijani acquaintance; "Your deputy is a child and does not have a tongue".¹⁷⁷ Taqizadeh finally broke his silence on 22 December, orating his first speech which showcased his talent.

¹⁷⁰ Safa'i, 684.

¹⁷¹ Taqizadeh, "Kholasei az Sharh-e Hal-e Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh az mian-e Owraq-e Chap Nashodeh [A Brief Biography of Hassan Taqizadeh from the Unpublished Papers]," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 2: 262.

¹⁷² Mojtehedī, 31.

¹⁷³ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 62.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Proceedings of the Parliament, Session 10, 8 December 1906.

¹⁷⁶ Taqizadeh, "Khaterat-e Gozashteh," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 9: 283.

¹⁷⁷ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 63.

2:12 Cultural Activities

Taqizadeh's career as a politician did not prevent him from pursuing his cultural interests. He established a branch of Tarbiat bookshop in Tehran and also wrote articles for newspapers such as *Neday-e Vatan* [Call of the Motherland]. An essay published in *Neday-e Vatan* titled "Melal-e Hayeyh va Melal-e Meyeteh" [Living and Dead Nations] reveals Taqizadeh's ideas from this time. In this essay Taqizadeh divided the nations of the world into two clear categories "living nations" and "dead nations", arguing that the distinction between the two was not in political independence or in military power but had its roots in the individual's national feeling which was moulded in the nature of individuals. He believed the existence of a nation was rooted in the independent individuality of each member of that nation and this feeling must be inherent and independent.¹⁷⁸ Ali Ansari has highlighted Taqizadeh's ideas, which he developed further later in his life, stressing that "imposed patriotism [nationalism] cannot take root".¹⁷⁹ So it can be seen that even at the early stages of his political career Taqizadeh had understood that to become modern does not solely mean modernisation and the establishment of modern institutions but rather that every individual must become conscious and eager for the essence of modernity.

¹⁷⁸ Hassan Taqizadeh, "Melal-e Hayeyh va Melal-e Meyeteh [Living and Dead Nations]," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh* [The Essays of Taqizadeh], ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Shokofan, 1974), 4: 337-44.

¹⁷⁹ Ansari, *The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran*, 49.




Figure 3: A drawing of Taqizadeh as a deputy of the First Parliament in a newly discovered manuscript. It reads: “The deputy of the nation of Azerbaijan, the light of the great national parliament.”¹⁸⁰

2:13 Taqizadeh’s First Parliamentary Speech

Taqizadeh’s first speech illuminates the intellectual foundations on which he was trying to build his political career at this time. In it he chose to highlight the importance of certain parliamentary regulations which were needed, and to emphasise how parliamentarians should now be acting according to the codified law. As he had mentioned in his letter to Taqiev as well as in his treaty, *Research on Current Affairs in Iran with Historical Trials*, the influence that the theories of Social Darwinism were having on him are clear; human history was driven, so he extols, by the forces of progress. As many in Europe believed, Taqizadeh saw this progressive element as a competitive drive not only emanating from individual struggles but also from collective national struggles. Deemed a seminal speech, Taqizadeh’s first address to Parliament was later published in pamphlet form with his photo gracing the front cover. The speech starts:

¹⁸⁰ Reza Kheyri Motlaq, ed., *Tarikh-e Yek Saleh Vaqaya’ Mashruteh-e Tabriz* [The History of One Year of the Constitution in Tabriz] (Tehran: Omid Saba, 2018), 307.

Our Parliament is very rudimentary and worse of all it does not strive toward progress. If we consider the progress and degradation of different governments and nations of the world and make some distinctions between those in the highest and lowest positions we can see that at the bottom end are nations such as Russia and the Ottoman Empire who don't have any organized constitution, moving up we come to governments with constitutions like Austria, Germany and England, above these we reach the French, Swiss and United States governments. As nations progress, the shortcomings become fewer and are often corrected. Imagine a government beyond these nations, where even these shortcomings are removed; this is the pinnacle of mankind's. However, when that pinnacle is turned on its head, that is where one would find our government....¹⁸¹

As Mojtehedī put it, this young speaker lived up to his writings (for example in *Research on Current Affairs*) in which he emphasised that the solution to all problems was to accept “Western civilisation”; in other words, that Iranians should strive to accept a constitution similar to that in Europe. The focus that Taqizadeh would have as future chief editor of *Kaveh* was also in evidence in this speech; this was a man fascinated by Europe, who held the performative elements of their parliamentary etiquette as important, suggesting that the members of Parliament must sit on chairs and deliver their speeches from behind a tribune. In other words, Iranian parliamentarians ought to alter the essence of themselves to become more fully “Western”. Nevertheless, it ought not be overlooked that Taqizadeh also attacked the aristocracy and nobility in this speech; this is a new aspect of a man who has been clearly influenced by the Russian social democrats and was advocating for the rights of the working and marginalised classes.¹⁸²

Taqizadeh believed, and orated in this first speech, that Western democratic practice needed to be accepted fully, in all its details and components; Iranians should not be selective when it came to this new form of government:

¹⁸¹ Proceedings of the First Parliament, Session 18, 22 December 1906.

¹⁸² Mojtehedī, 57.

I want to say, in the other parts of the world hundreds of years of effort have been put into enabling the invention of constitutional democracy. If we want to take any invented thing from its origin, we must take it with all its components and details. If we accept the clock as our way of determining the time but leave out one of its cogs it will not function and the purpose for which it is invented - which is determining the time - will not be fulfilled. In these cases, having nothing is better than having an incomplete thing.¹⁸³

Although it is Taqizadeh's name which is most often associated with these Western ideas, it is important to note that he was not the only one advocating such imitation. Adamiyat insists that Talebov also criticised Members of Parliament who did not want to accept these methods and quotes him directly:

Some deputies do not want to accept what is appropriate for the current situation and what guarantees the interests of the country. They ask for constitutional law but they do not accept that this also requires imitation of the Westerners. There is no one to ask them: but isn't this parliament itself a product from the West? From which language is the constitutional law translated? Are not all these things coming from the West? We were astray for a thousand years on account of ignorance, and if now we imitate the science what wrong doing does it bring to our ignorance?¹⁸⁴

However, while Talebov and others such as Malkam Khan had encouraged this imitation and advocated the acquisition of the codified law and political infrastructure of Western Europe, Taqizadeh was certainly the most strident in his insistence that Iranians should follow their lead in every aspect of governance, except perhaps for language.

This speech undoubtedly made Taqizadeh famous and he gradually became one of the most influential characters in the parliament; he was even recognised as the best speaker

¹⁸³ Proceedings of the Parliament, Session 18, 22 December 1906.

¹⁸⁴ Fereydoon Adamiyat, *Andishehay-e Talebov-e Tabrizi* [The Ideas of Talebov-e Tabrizi], (Tehran: Damavand, 1984), 58.

of the House.¹⁸⁵ In the notes which George P. Churchill made in a report detailing biographical notes concerning Persian Statesmen and notables, he writes about Taqizadeh:

During the First Parliament his speeches, and his alone among the babel of voices at Baharistan, were always sensible, judicious, and directed to the point at issue. He often called his fellow deputies to order for digressions or for pointless discussions on matters properly outside the scope of the duties of a Parliament. When early in 1907 the Cabinet Ministers were reluctantly forced to attend the House, he lectured them on their responsibility to Parliament and gradually brought the succeeding Cabinets to recognize this responsibility. His great ability and fearlessness is undoubted.¹⁸⁶

An eyewitness writes about Taqizadeh, giving some useful details about his appearance and outfit at that time:

I was greatly struck by the famous Tabriz member Taqizdda [Taqizadeh], who was sitting quite close to me on the tribune. He has won deserved fame by his fearless independence and his wonderful grasp of political affairs. There is something so sympathetic in his face, so attractive, that it escapes all definition. Imagine a man of barely twenty-five years of age, slightly built, just over the middle height, with a handsome, boyish face and eyes sparkling with cheerful animation, but dimmed at times, especially as he leaned forward to look at the crowd, by that expression which belongs to the dreamer beneath the man of action. He was dressed, as a Persian should be, in a light, bluish-grey 'aba (cloak), with a white and blue turban, the emblem of his birth (for he is a Sayyid [Seyyed]). His clothes were spotlessly clean, but there was nothing of the ' Firangi-mddb'[sic] (Europeanized Persian) about him. He has a cheerful face, a face which inspires confidence. If I am not mistaken, he is of those whose genius is

¹⁸⁵ Abdollah Mostofi, *Sharh-e Zendegi-e Man* [The Story of My Life], (Tehran: Zavvar, 1998), 250.

¹⁸⁶ George Percy Churchill, *Biographical notices of Persian statesmen and notables: September 1909*, (Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, 1910), 567.

capable of inspiring great enthusiasms, great sacrifices, and whose influence leaves a lasting impression on the history of nations. What was he doing, this boy of twenty-five, during the long, bitter years of humiliating despotism? ¹⁸⁷

This was a turning point in Taqizadeh's political life; something that he himself admits: "I became gradually famous after I gave my first talk. My influence increased outside the Parliament. Although people did not know me by sight, they read in the newspapers that Taqizadeh had said this and that."¹⁸⁸ Hassan E'zam al-Saltaneh's notes about the first days of Taqizadeh in the Parliament testify to the fact that his young age and the fact that he was from the provinces was not looked upon favorably and he was even initially mocked. However, he goes on to describe how Taqizadeh's presence was a catalyst for change:

A young man from Tabriz entered the National Assembly. The speaker asked: "Boy, what is your name?" At this point the Members of Parliament began laughing. The young man who was addressed by the Speaker of the Parliament while his face coloured, stuttering in a mix of Persian and Turkish replied: "My name...My name is Seyyed Hassan!" The members laughed again at the young man with his boyish demeanor who introduced himself as the representative of the people of Tabriz. That day and the next coming days the presence of the young representative of Tabriz was an object of laughing and ridicule for the elder Members of the Parliament. Furthermore, there was a protest regarding his age which came to the point that young Hassan's letter of credit was about to be rejected. But the Azerbaijanis made serious efforts which managed on the whole to fix the problem and Seyyed Hassan was settled in the special place (platform) of the Parliamentary Members. One day shortly after this he asked for permission from the Speaker of the Parliament to give a speech and mounted

¹⁸⁷ Edward G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910). It should be noted that Taqizadeh was about thirty at that time but most probably because of his youthful appearance the narrator thought he was twenty-five.

¹⁸⁸ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 64.

the rostrum. He talked with such a passion and enthusiasm that all the other members were surprised and shouted bravo which reverberated around the house. That day was one of the most enthusiastic and exciting days of the Parliament since all the freedom fighters who were referred to as revolutionaries meaning they were hardliners or what might be called these days "leftists" had gathered in the Parliament and were chanting in support of the representative of Tabriz. The same day the Parliament was overwhelmed and Seyyed Hassan's letter of credit was accepted. I worked actively to ensure his letter of credit was accepted. Before him S'ad al-Dowleh had been the pivotal one who had been able to achieve exactly what he wanted in the Parliament. But it soon became that people forgot S'ad al-Dowleh and instead it was the speeches of the young Azerbaijani man that became the topic of conversation in gatherings. Before the Constitutional Revolution nobody had heard of him. His father was also not well known in the field of politics.¹⁸⁹

2:14 The First Parliament (Majles)

The establishment of a national parliament created the foundations of a modern government in Iran which was based on a state-nation structure. The concept of Iran as having a strong geographical position, a national language, concentrated economical and judicial systems with a Constitution transformed to socio-political concepts was completely different to what it had been in the past.¹⁹⁰ The First Parliament (7 October 1906 to 23 June 1908) as Taqizadeh puts it, was not only the national parliament but the mother of the Iranian Constitution. Taqizadeh described the First Parliament as one of the greatest, largest and most enthusiastic national parliaments in Iran. This parliament, besides passing laws, had numerous other tasks and had to institutionalise the Constitution in Iran. It had to get rid of all the old political administration and many other social orders and substitute something new in its place. From the beginning, The First Parliament was

¹⁸⁹ Hassan E'zam Qodsi, *Khaterat-e Man ya Roshan Shodan-e Tarikh-e Sad Saleh* [My Memoirs of and Elucidations on the Hundred Years' History], (Tehran: Aboureyhan, 1970), 2: 1182-3.

¹⁹⁰ Ali Asghar Haqdar, *Majles-e Aval va Nahadhay-e Mashrutiyyat* [The First Parliament and the Constitutional Establishments], (Tehran: Mehr Namag, 2004), 27-8.

determined to prove itself to the government and acquire its necessary rights and put much energy into trying to achieve this. The government, however, with the utmost indifference wanted only to assign this Parliament the same privileges as a courthouse. Nevertheless, the strong voice of the deputies forced the government to accept the Parliament and the first part of the Constitution consisting of 51 articles was signed by the dying Shah and the Crown Prince on 30 December 1906. The Crown Prince had come to Tehran when the Shah died on 9 January 1907. There was strong suspicion about the new Shah and an atmosphere of anxiety and trepidation in the air. The deputies of Tehran attended the parliament followed gradually by the deputies of the provinces and thus the parliament began to grow in power. Taqizadeh believed strongly that the ministers should be accountable to the parliament and that the formation of a Western-like cabinet was one of Parliament's most pressing tasks. Mohammad Ali Shah who had shown his contempt towards the Parliament by not inviting its members to his coronation and was avoiding assigning more power to the Parliament, did not want the ministers to be beholden to the Parliament. He went to great lengths to make sure that this did not happen and initially was successful. Kasravi writes: "Mohammad Ali Mirza had put his plan into practice masterfully and the courtiers considered themselves victorious. But it was the sudden movement of Tabriz which changed things and neutralised the plot."¹⁹¹ This was achieved after much struggle following an ultimatum given by the Parliament to the government in January 1906 in which Taqizadeh played a leading role. For someone like Taqizadeh who strongly advocated for a Western-like parliament it was unacceptable that the ministers would only be responsible to the Shah. Taqizadeh, with this in mind, wrote a letter to his intimate friend Mirza Mohammad Ali Khan Tarbiat in Tabriz explaining that the ministers did not respect the parliament and did not come to the parliament to be questioned. On 5 February 1907 this letter was read in the provisional assembly and caused uproar in Tabriz, especially among people who were hostile towards Mohammad Ali Mirza. The result was that the Shah accepted the Constitution and its stipulations such as establishing a committee to pass the Constitution law. Later this culminated in a dispute between people who were advocating for *Mashrue'h* or a political system based on Islamic law and those who were in favour of a Western-like constitution. According to Taqizadeh the Parliament was

¹⁹¹ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e Iran*, 1: 209.

insistent on establishing all the articles of the Constitution exactly as it was in the West.¹⁹² Eventually, although the Shah was advocating Mashru‘eh, under pressure he had to agree with Mashruteh or a more Western-style constitutional system. But, as will be evident later, whilst preparing the supplements to the Constitutional law, it became clear that there were potential conflicts when Parliament sought to pass laws that were not seen as conforming to the stipulations of Islamic laws.

In addition, the First Parliament specified a fixed budget for the government for the first time and made a distinction between the expenses of the Shah and those of the government.¹⁹³ Taqizadeh was a member of the Budget Committee of the Parliament.¹⁹⁴ Dismissing and sending the local rulers and tribal leaders into exile in different provinces was another achievement of the First Parliament.¹⁹⁵

The speakers of the First Parliament were: Moretza Qoli Khan Sani‘ al-Dowleh from 8 October 1906 until 6 September 1907; Mahmoud Khan Ehtesham al-Saltaneh from 9 September to 29 March 1908 and Mirza Esma‘il Khan Momtaz al Dowleh from 4 April 1908 until the end of the First Parliament on 23 June 1908.¹⁹⁶

Apart from the supplementary law of the Constitution which will be discussed separately the most important laws passed in the First Parliament were as follows:

1. The regulations of guild elections.
2. The regulation of elections.
3. The internal regulation of the Parliament.
4. The law for the provincial assemblies.
5. The municipality laws.
6. The convention for establishing provinces.

¹⁹² Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 64.

¹⁹³ Mojtehed, 48.

¹⁹⁴ Mirza Ebrahim Khan Kalantari Baghmisheh, *Ruznameh-e Khaterat-e Sharf al-Dowleh* [Diary of Sharf al-Dowleh], ed., Yahya Zaka (Tehran: Fekr-e Ruz, 1998), 104.

¹⁹⁵ *Kaveh*, February 15, 1918.

¹⁹⁶ Adamiyat, *Ideolozhi*, 370.

7. The press laws.
8. The regulations for duties.

In January 1908, according to Charles Marling, the British Minister in Tehran, the First Parliament in fact was divided into three groups. One was the group of the chairman (Ehtesham al-Dowleh) with 62 members which held the majority, the second was Seyyed Abdollah's with fewer members than the first and the third was Taqizadeh's group with 25 members.¹⁹⁷

Adamiyat provided a more nuanced division. He divided the members into four groups based on their political policies: traditionalists, moderates, progressives, and the more radical elements; extremists or revolutionaries. He believed the traditionalists considered that the Constitution invaded their traditional heritage. This group consisted mainly of clergymen and was in the majority. The moderates generally consisted of high-ranking clergy (mojtahed), businessmen and members of the guilds. This group supported the progressives on most occasions. According to Adamiyat, the progressives and radical elements were generally educated and intellectual.¹⁹⁸

In the First Parliament the minorities, Armenians, Jews and Zoroastrians, had the right to send their deputies to the Parliament. But only Zoroastrians used this right, sending one deputy, Arbab Jamshid, to the Parliament. The Armenians and Jews did not send any direct members and made the high-ranking Muslim clergies of the Parliament, Behbahani and Tabatabaei as their deputy. In the later Parliaments all three main minorities had members in the Parliament and Armenians were allowed two members.¹⁹⁹

This First Parliament was nothing like a European one in terms of the way parliamentary business was carried out. In the beginning the Parliament was chaotic and with no set

¹⁹⁷ Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran 30 January 1908, in *Persia No. 1 (1909) Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Persia: December 1906 to November 1908* (London: Harrison and Sons, 1909), 100.

¹⁹⁸ Adamiyat, *Ideolozhi*, 362.

¹⁹⁹ Mahmoud Setayesh, ed., "Khaterat-e Hassan Taqizadeh" in *Mashrutiyyat-e Iran* [The Iranian Constitution], (Tehran: Sales, 2006), 71.

procedures and most of its member had no knowledge of parliamentary regulations.²⁰⁰ At that time the deputies used to sit on the ground, the first row of the spectators used to squat and this had even been reflected in European newspapers and ridiculed by some. In a letter to Taqizadeh, Aboul Ghafar Tabrizi, the First Secretary of the Iranian legation in London, writes that this situation in the Parliament decreased the rank and value of the Iranian parliament as he believed that respect from foreigners was one of the fundamentals necessary for progress in national and state affairs.²⁰¹

²⁰⁰ Adamiyat, *Ideolozhi*, 369.

²⁰¹ *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 30.




Figure 4: Taqizadeh depicted on the first page of the *Ayeneh-e Gheyb Nama* [Mirror to the Unseen] newspaper (September 14, 1907).

2:15 Taqizadeh and Amin al-Soltan (Atabak-e Azam)

Amin al-Soltan's return to the political arena of Iran marks a turning point in the constitutional history of Iran. He was an elderly and conservative politician but became Prime Minister in a period of revolutionary fervour within the new parliament; members such as Taqizadeh were eager to do things in a new way, the appointment of Amin al-Soltan contrasted significantly with the direction in which certain members of parliament wanted the government to go, and this possibly led to a strengthening of their resolve to create change. As the spearhead of this movement Taqizadeh found himself in face-to-face opposition with Amin al-Soltan. This position and the consequences it had on Taqizadeh's political life are important and should be analysed in depth.

Amin al-Soltan was one of the most outstanding statesmen of the Qajar period.²⁰² He had become Prime Minister under both Naser al-Din Shah and Mozaffar al-Din Shah in the past and by early 1907, as the opposition groups to the national government were trying to oust Moshir al-Dowleh, the incumbent Prime Minister, the supporters of Amin al-Soltan, among them certain influential Members of Parliament like Seyyed Abdollah Behbahani, were manoeuvring him into position to once again take over.

Under the Naser al-Din Shah reign (1848–1896), Amin al-Soltan had been Prime Minister during the height of Russo-British rivalry in Iran (1885-1896). It was during his tenure that several important concessions were granted to Britain: the opening of the Karun river to navigation, the launching in September 1889 of the British-owned Imperial Bank of Persia. The most important among these was the granting of a fifty-year monopoly on the production, sale and export of Iran's entire tobacco crop to a British citizen in March 1890. This led to the first successful uprising of the people against Qajar rule.²⁰³

During his second tenure (1898-1903), under Mozaffar al-Din Shah, Amin al-Soltan had turned to Russia to obtain a loan (25.5 million Rubles) which was used mainly to finance the Shah's trip to Europe. The repayment of the loan was guaranteed by the income of all

²⁰² "Atabak-e A'zam, Amin-al-Soltan," in *Encyclopedia Iranica*, online edition, 2013, available online: <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/atabak-e-azam> (accessed 29 November, 2013).

²⁰³ Ibid.

Iranian customs except those in the south of the country. “The British strongly protested against the Russian loan and there was a considerable religious and popular discontent”.²⁰⁴ In May 1901, with the help of Amin al-Soltan (who now had the title of Atabak-e Azam), a British citizen named William Knox D’Arcy acquired a sixty-year oil concession. In November, despite the increasing pressure of the opponents, Atabak signed a Russo-Persian convention for customs and commerce which favoured Russian trade in Iran. He signed for another big Russian loan (10 million Rubles) in April the following year and then accompanied the Shah during his second European tour. “Despite British protests, a tariff agreement with Russia signed in December 1902 added to the popular and other opponents’ excitement.”²⁰⁵ Atabak had eventually been forced to resign in September 1903 due to the increasing riots and unrest mainly in Tehran and Tabriz and because of the opposition of the high-ranking clergies in Najaf.²⁰⁶ Following his resignation Atabak had decided to go to Mecca. He first travelled to Russia and from there to China, Japan and after that to Mecca. He eventually ended up residing in Europe. It was this trip that some believed had changed Atabak’s political outlook.²⁰⁷

Mohammad Ali Shah was convinced that an experienced man like Atabak could assist him in getting rid of the Parliament, which is why he invited him back to Iran to become Prime Minister. As Kasravi writes, Atabak’s return to Iran opened a new chapter in the history of the Constitution in Iran:

Despite his seemingly positive attitude, Atabak was malevolent and hostile. Despite all his promises and oaths, he wanted nothing more than to get rid of the Constitution. Mohammad Ali Mirza and his teachers had noticed his cleverness and experience and they had called him to come to Iran to try to extinguish the institution of the movement leading to revolt.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ For more about this trip see: Hedayat, *Gozaresh-e Iran*, 159-63.

²⁰⁸ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e Iran*, 1: 281.

However, not everyone thought like Kasravi and there is diversity in opinion about the intention of Atabak after his return to Iran. Some people like Mehdi Qoli Hedayat believed the attitude of Atabak had changed after his last trip and he was not given sufficient opportunity to prove himself.²⁰⁹ Talebov went further, calling Atabak “a hand blessed by God”. He believed Atabak was on the side of the people rather than the Shah.²¹⁰ Malkam was also among those who believed that Atabak had changed; “Amin al-Soltan is not the person he used to be. With the experience that he now brings, Iran’s future happiness is ensured and should be celebrated.”²¹¹ Fereydoon Adamiyat also posits extensive arguments about Atabak’s change of policy and his intentions to co-operate with the Parliament and respect the Constitution.²¹² Despite this, the recalling of Atabak to Iran upset the Constitutionalists.²¹³ Taqizadeh was among the most furious opponents of his calling him “Kha‘en al-Soltan” (the Kings’s traitor). To fully appreciate the strength of Taqizadeh’s disapproval of this man it is worth quoting him at length:

How can the offspring of the mother country witness someone who has sold the rights of their country return to the bosom of that kind mother? Someone who has increased the burden of the government and brought forward its extinction by 50 years through massive loans. Someone who has given away the chastity of the motherland to unprincipled opponents, someone who has deprived the children who were raised in that mother’s bosom of their beloved one and thrown them to the nearby wolves, someone who has made the country unofficially the protectorate of foreign countries by the means of secret documents and destructive concessions which are still covered under the foreign ministry’s curtain of corruption. Someone who is the origin of all the miseries of this unlucky land. Yes! I claim that the treachery of Mirza Ali Asghar [Atabak]

²⁰⁹ Hedayat, 209.

²¹⁰ Talebov to Mirza Fazl Ali Aqa, 4 May 1907, in *Bohran-e Demokrasi dar Majles-e Aval* [The Crisis of Democracy in the First Parliament], ed. Gholam Hossein Mirza Saleh (Tehran: Negah-e Mo‘aser, 2005), 72-7.

²¹¹ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e Iran*, 1: 252.

²¹² Adamiyat, *Ideolozhi*, 149-201.

²¹³ Mostofi, 172.

carried out against this unfortunate beloved helpless country exceeds a one hundred volume encyclopaedia....²¹⁴

Despite all the opposition, Atabak accepted the Shah's proposal and set off for Iran travelling through Baku where he was saved from assassination by the revolutionaries there only on account of misidentification. Boarding a Russian warship, he reached Anzali on 19 April 1907 and had to face more opposition, organised this time by the Mojaheds who were waiting for him in order to block his arrival and succeeded in forcing him back onto the ship. It was an incident that had to be discussed urgently in the Parliament. Taqizadeh, whilst not as angry as he had been about Atabak, vehemently opposed his return to Iran whilst others in Parliament believed he should be welcomed back. Sharf al-Dowleh, a deputy of Azerbaijan in the Parliament, writes in his diaries that only Taqizadeh and one other member voted against the arrival of Atabak.²¹⁵ He even mentions that the rest of the Parliament strongly criticised Taqizadeh.²¹⁶ Finally, the Parliament decided to reply to the Rasht assembly which had requested Tehran's approval for Atabak to disembark.²¹⁷ When Atabak finally arrived in Tehran and introduced his cabinet to the Parliament on 8 May 1907, he made a speech promising to be loyal to the Constitution and co-operative with the Parliament. The Constitutionalists in other towns, especially in Tabriz, remained suspicious of him and his motives.²¹⁸

Kasravi considered Atabak's return a turning point in the history of the Constitution in Iran. The energy and enthusiasm of the Constitutional Movement had decreased over time and a diversity of opinions was emerging within it. Furthermore, the clergy and the rich who had been in favour of change had become less sympathetic. It could be argued that it is from this point that Taqizadeh's popularity began to wane, a decline which turned into a dramatic fall after he was accused of Atabak's death.

²¹⁴ Hassan Taqizadeh, "Yaddasht-hay-e Chap Nashodeh [The Unpublished Notes]," in *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyat*, ed., Afshar, 69.

²¹⁵ The other deputy was Haji Mirza Hassan.

²¹⁶ Kalantari Baghmisheh, *Ruznameh-e Khaterat-e Sharf al-Dowleh*, 87.

²¹⁷ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e Iran*, 1: 255.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 258.

There is little doubt that Taqizadeh retained much power and influence among the revolutionaries in Tabriz and he is the only one to whom the Mojaheds in Tabriz listened.²¹⁹ However, from this point he began to face heavy criticism. Two days after Atabak's arrival to Iran, Nezam al-Eslam writes to his father Mirza Fazl Ali, a deputy based in Tehran, about the happenings in Tabriz: "the ulama and members of the elite are not very pleased with Taqizadeh and his followers. They have lost their confidence in him. They say that these people have no religion and they are always riotous."²²⁰

It was only nine months since the Constitution had been signed. It is clear that any consensus which had been achieved was falling apart; the relationship between parliament, Atabak and Taqizadeh was becoming increasingly difficult and gaps were widening between the various groups in the Parliament. As Dolatabadi wrote:

Some groups in the Parliament and among them the group of Aqa Seyyed Abdollah Behbahani which is the most powerful one, support Amin al-Soltan because of money, personal bonds or just for the sake of following the others. After only some days the majority of the Parliament is with Amin al-Soltan who has a close acquaintance with Aqa Seyyed Abdolla, Hajis and clergies and has control of the Parliament in the palm of his hand. There were only a few people in the Parliament who were against Amin al-Soltan's return and they are still against him. Amin al-Soltan is unable to get their approval by any means. These people have formed a small group called the minority in opposition and they are standing against the large majority of the Parliament. Among them is Aqa Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh, the deputy of Azerbaijan, a young man of around thirty years old. He is knowledgeable about current affairs and relatively aware of the situation in the world. Since this group are known as patriots and do not have any private motive, the Constitutionals are supporting them. But as the influence of Amin al-

²¹⁹ Naqi Azar Moqaddam, ed. *Vaqay'-e Mashrutiyyat: Be Ravayat-e Nameh-hay-e Seyyed Reza be Haj Mirza Aqa Farshi* [Events around the Constitution: According to Correspondence of Seyyed Reza to Haj Mirza Aqa Farshi], (Tabriz: Yaran, 2007), 348.

²²⁰ Nezam al-Eslam to Mirza Fazl Ali Aqa, 21 April 1907, in Mirza Saleh, 84-5.

Soltan increases, the voice of this group goes increasingly unheard. It has reached the point where they do not let Taqizadeh nor his friends speak in the Parliament.²²¹

Atabak who believed that the so called “minority group” had organised the attack against him while he was returning to Iran tried to oust Taqizadeh from the Parliament but he was unable to succeed.²²² In reports sent from Tehran to Tabriz the Parliament was described as chaotic with most deputies accepting bribes; Taqizadeh was the only one among all Tabriz deputies who resisted whilst the rest co-operated with the government.²²³ According to Cecil Spring Rice, the majority of the Parliament stood with Atabak; public opinion, however, considered that Parliament’s support of Atabak was part of a conspiracy.²²⁴

It is unlikely that Taqizadeh was seeking personal enrichment; Ehtesham al-Saltaneh one of the chairmen of the First Parliament writes that Taqizadeh was patriotic, young and full of fire. He sought fame without any limits but not on account of the money.²²⁵ The group of Azerbaijani deputies, to which Taqizadeh belonged, are described by Ehtesham al-Saltaneh as opposing everything with fiery speeches, wanting to eradicate the routine regulations and principles without thought as to what might replace them.

Whilst Atabak was alive the revolutionaries who were in the minority were unable to make any changes; forced instead to be active outside the Parliament. They put the government under pressure by means of the assemblies, riots and newspapers which all gradually came to focus on Atabak. This would lead first to demands for his resignation and eventually his assassination.²²⁶

²²¹ Yahya Dolatabadi, *Hayat-e Yahya* [The Life of Yahya] (Tehran: Attar, 1982), 2: 125-6.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Hedayat, 209.

²²⁴ Sir Cecil Spring Rice to Sir Edward Grey, Qolhak, 13 September 1907, in *Ketab-e Abi*, 78.

²²⁵ Mohammad Mehdi Mousavi, ed., *Khaterat-e Ehtesham al-Saltaneh*, (Tehran: Zavvar, 1986), 595.

²²⁶ Mansoureh Ettehadiieh, *Peydayesh va Tahavol-e Ahzab-e Siyasi-e Mashrutiyyat: Doreh-e Aval va Dovvom-e Majles-e Shoraey-e Melli* [The Birth and Development of the Constitutional Political Parties: First and Second Parliaments], (Tehran: Gostareh, 1982), 130.

Before going into the issue of Atabak's death, another happening in the Parliament needs to be considered. At this time one of the most important issues facing Parliament was the preparation of the Supplementary Law of the Constitution with which Taqizadeh's name is linked.

Although the Constitution law signed by Mozaffar al-Din Shah had resulted in the opening of the Parliament, it had not made clear many issues like the jurisdictions and duties of the Parliament, the Shah or the ministers. The assembly in Tabriz was also critical of the Constitution law and sought for additional laws to be added. A committee was formed in the Parliament to prepare the Supplementary Law which Taqizadeh was chosen to be a member. Taqizadeh soon became a distinguished member of the committee, defending its content in front of the majority of the Iranian clergies.²²⁷ The Parliament spent six months preparing the Supplementary Law of the Constitution.²²⁸ Article eight of the Supplementary Law which specified the rights of different minorities was controversial. According to this article all the people of Iran were equal in the eyes of the law regardless of their religion. This article provided the pretext for attacking the Parliament. The clergy in the name of Sharia law began to attack the Parliament with Sheikh Fazl al-Allah Nuri the prominent clergyman in Tehran as the leader of this opposition force outside the Parliament. The passing of this law was a strong warning sign to the clergy that the new political system would restrict their power.

2:16 The Assassination of Atabak

On 31 August 1907 Atabak attended Parliament and read out a letter from the Shah in which he had promised that he would sign the Supplementary Law of the Constitution,²²⁹ and that he would assist the Government and the Parliament in their activities.²³⁰ Kasravi, however, finds this hard to believe, and is more inclined to think that this was a ruse by Atabak to enable him to achieve his own ambitions. In any event there was no opportunity for these ambitions to be realised for as Atabak left the Parliament after reading out this

²²⁷ Sir Cecil Spring Rice to Sir Edward Grey, Qolhak, 18 June 1907, in *Ketab-e Abi*, 49.

²²⁸ Hedayat, 200.

²²⁹ *Majles*, August 26, 1907, no. 167.

²³⁰ *Iran Political Diaries*, 3: 119.

letter he was shot by a member of a radical group by the name of Abbas Aqa Saraf of Tabriz who then turned the gun on himself.

The death of Atabak is still an issue of dispute among historians. Some believe that it was Mohammad Ali Shah who had ordered his death, fearing that Atabak had become too close to the Parliament. Mehdi Qoli Hedayat, a close friend of Atabak, believed that this was the case, and that the Shah had hired a gunman to kill him. More recent historians like Keddie, however, think there is persuasive evidence to show that the Shah was also planning Atabak's assassination and possibly even penetrated the assassin's group.²³¹ Another view is presented by Kasravi and many others who considered Heydar Khan Amoqli to be responsible for planning the assassination; crucially, according to Kasravi's account, Taqizadeh was also informed.²³² In addition to this he goes as far as accusing the British of having a part in this assassination since Atabak was considered to have been a puppet of the Russian authorities. Kasravi even states that Taqizadeh had most likely informed them about the plan.²³³

These activities were always denied by Taqizadeh, but he does write that he thought the Shah was also incapable of ordering such an act; according to Taqizadeh it was most likely to have been carried out by Heydar Khan.²³⁴

Suspicion arose around Taqizadeh's involvement in the assassination after a note was discovered in the pocket of Abbas Aqa. In this letter the murderer identified himself as a Fada'i [devotee] member of the Anjoman [assembly]. Connections were made with the Azerbaijani assembly and assumptions drawn that Taqizadeh, being a member of this assembly, belonged to a secret branch of it. It was he who had ordered the death of Atabak, they claimed.

²³¹ Keddie, 69.

²³² Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e Iran*, 1: 448.

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Taqizadeh, "Darbareh-e Qatl-e Atabak [About Atabak's Death]" in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 2: 209-214.

This theory has remained strong; 58 years after the death of Atabak, Javad Sheikh al-Eslami wrote an article based on the reports of the British embassy in Tehran and other documents in an effort to solve the enigma. He implied in his article that he too believed that it was highly likely that Taqizadeh knew about the plan.²³⁵ Taqizadeh's response to this article is worth considering since it was the last time that he really talked about the incident, having completely omitted it from his own autobiography. In answer to these conclusions, he wrote that he had no idea about this plan and furthermore that the Assembly which Sheikh al-Eslami was referring to had no terrorist agenda and had not planned the assassination.²³⁶ It is a very consciously written response, and it is clear that Taqizadeh was extremely reluctant to discuss the incident. According to Mashallah Ajoudani, this view of the assembly is simply untrue. Contrary to Taqizadeh's word some members had revolutionary and terrorist ideas. His attempt to exempt this assembly from such intentions was, he argued, a desperate way for Taqizadeh to demonstrate his innocence.²³⁷

Mansoureh Ettehadieh has written that, "The death of Atabak was an influential phase for the freedom-seekers. When Atabak was in power these revolutionaries were generally weak but after his death the situation changed. Taqizadeh and his group became powerful and even some of the supporters of Atabak joined them, among them Seyyed Abdollah Behbahani."²³⁸

The death of Atabak could have had serious consequences for Taqizadeh's future political career yet he also represented a threat to the progress that Taqizadeh was in pursuit of.²³⁹ Whether Taqizadeh was involved in the murder or not, it is unlikely that he was terribly upset by the death of this politician. The Shah, on the other hand, hoped perhaps to use the assassination as a pretext to suppress the revolutionaries. In fact, it can be seen that this incident only served to increase these revolutionaries' strength and boldness.²⁴⁰

²³⁵ Javad Sheikh al-Eslami, "Majeray-e Qatl-e Atabak [The Story of Atabak's Death]" in *Qatl-e Atabak va Shanzdah Maqaleh-e Tahqiqi-e Digar* [The Death of Atabak and Sixteen other Investigative Articles] (Tehran: Keyhan, 1987), 3-18.

²³⁶ Taqizadeh, "Darbareh-e Qatl-e Atabak," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 2: 209-214.

²³⁷ Ajoudani, *Mashruteh-e Irani*, 345.

²³⁸ Ettehadieh, *Paydayesh va Tahavol-e Ahzab-e Siyasi-e Mashrutiyat*, 131.

²³⁹ Ajoudani, *Mashruteh-e Irani*, 345.

²⁴⁰ Keddie, 69.

2:17 The Event of Tupkhaneh Square

One of the most significant events which happened during the time of the First Parliament was the incident of Tupkhaneh square. Taqizadeh had a crucial role in resolving this incident. Mohammad Ali Shah who wanted to get rid of the Parliament and regain the kind of power he had inherited from his father, organised groups of people to attack the Parliament. Historians such as Kasravi, Malekzadeh and Browne described these groups as; “hired hooligans”, “gamblers”, “paid ruffians”²⁴¹ although Abrahamian reframes them as people who had more likely come from “the lower classes” and who had not achieved any rights in the elections, the conservative clergies, or certain rich people who were afraid they would lose their positions in the reforms. He writes: “Three elements can be identified in the royalist demonstrations: aristocrats, merchants, craftsmen and unskilled labourers tied to the bazaar economy; the conservative ‘ulama’ and their theology students; and, at times, the “lower classes.”²⁴²

In a moment of unity these groups made an attempt to attack the Parliament; an attack that Taqizadeh said was unsuccessful because it had not been well enough thought through.²⁴³ In response to the threats the supporters of Parliament, rallied by Taqizadeh’s rousing speeches, had gathered in front of the building in order to physically defend it. Taqizadeh writes in his autobiography:

All of a sudden, we noticed a big confused noise like thousands of people were coming. We became very, very scared. This crowd came closer and reached the Parliament. They came and said “no they are people who want to support the Parliament”. It was an extraordinary thing. Those inside the Parliament became very happy.²⁴⁴

²⁴¹ Ervand Abrahamian, “The Crowd in the Persian Revolution.” *Iranian Studies* 2, no. 4, 128-150.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 67.

²⁴⁴ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 68.

To make peace between the Parliament and the Shah, Medi Qoli Hedayat who was acting as a mediator suggested the Shah write two letters to reassure both parties gathered in the Parliament and people in the Square that the Shah would maintain order and to demand that the crowds disperse. He received the letter and went to the Parliament. Taqizadeh took the issue to the War Commission of the Parliament and they agreed to end the dispute. Taqizadeh, Seyyed Abdollah and Ehtesham al-Saltaneh went to the mosque where Taqizadeh talked to people. Hedayat writes, "With all honesty Taqizadeh made an eloquent speech and better than I had expected. The people dispersed and the deputies also went home". This unsuccessful attack had unnerved the Constitutionalists and in compensation they launched a bomb at the Shah's carriage.²⁴⁵

After the escalation of the dispute between the Shah and the Parliament, the Shah asked for four people to leave Tehran; one of them was Taqizadeh. It is alleged that he sent a message to Taqizadeh, advising him to go to Khorasan, but Taqizadeh refused.²⁴⁶ It was probably at this time that Mohammad Ali Shah suggested that Taqizadeh marry a high-ranking princess, accept some villages from the private property of the Shah as a wedding present and go to Mashad to take up the directorship of the holy shrine there. Mojtchedi writes that Taqizadeh rejected this offer although he did not have that much money and was living on only limited income from his brother's small bookshop in Tehran.²⁴⁷

2:18 Mohammad Ali Shah's Coup d'état and the End of the First Parliament

When the news of what had happened in Tupkhaneh Square reached the other provinces and cities, the Constitutionalists started to react by sending supportive telegrams to Tehran. The Tabriz Assembly showed a strong disapproval and announced that Mohammad Ali Shah should no longer be King as he had broken his oath of loyalty to the Parliament. Kasravi concludes that this had been a wise move as soon after other city assemblies followed suit, sending telegrams to the Shah himself calling for his dismissal.²⁴⁸ In Tabriz, meanwhile, they upped the stakes by threatening to secede Azerbaijan province if the

²⁴⁵ Mostufi, 248.

²⁴⁶ Hedayat, *Khaterat*, 213.

²⁴⁷ Mojtchedi, *Taqizadeh*, 114-5.

²⁴⁸ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e Iran*, 2: 518

Constitution was harmed in any way.²⁴⁹ As has been detailed, Taqizadeh played an important role in this process; he was constantly in touch with Tabriz, sending and receiving telegrams. Under these growing pressures the Shah finally agreed to make peace with the Parliament, sending a Koran sealed with an oath that he would respect the Constitution and co-operate with the Parliament.

However, criticism of the Shah continued. The newspapers openly and sometimes rudely undermined the Shah. Whilst he tried to force the Parliament to punish those responsible, including a number of famous preachers and journalists, his demands went unheeded. It was during this time that his dislike of Taqizadeh grew; he had wanted the Parliament to oust him because although Taqizadeh had never openly criticised the Shah, his activities with the radical Tabriz Assembly troubled the Shah.²⁵⁰ Nevertheless, getting rid of a Member of Parliament was something he was unable to do.

The Shah may have signed an oath guaranteeing his support for the Parliament, but it was not genuine. The Shah had been against the Constitution since the beginning, and maintained his plans to get rid of the Parliament; a feeling that was heightened after an attempt was made on his life. He began devising a new way of attacking the Parliament with the help of the Russian embassy and the commander of the Cossack brigade, Colonel Liakhov. The Cossack brigade, established in 1879, was a unit of the Iranian army which had been formed based on the model of Cossack units in the Russian army. The Russians had trained the soldiers in such a way that they would blindly follow the orders of the Russians.²⁵¹ According to Kasravi, Mohammad Ali Shah had already begun talks with the Russian embassy at the beginning of June 1908.

On 4 June 1908, the Shah decided to put his new plan into action; he left Tehran and travelled to Baq-e Shah whilst sending Moshir al-Dowleh to Tehran with the intention of forming a new Cabinet. Having become anxious about what the Shah might attempt to do,

²⁴⁹ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e Iran*, 2: 519.

²⁵⁰ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 71.

²⁵¹ "Cossack Brigade," *Encyclopædia Iranica*, online edition, 2013, available at <https://iranicaonline.org/articles/cossack-brigade> (accessed, 29 January 2014).

some constitutionalists and journalists who had developed bad relations with the Shah moved in to the Parliament building on 22 June. Taqizadeh was not among them as he had been running a fever and was unable to stay the night there.²⁵² He writes in his autobiography that he was awoken the next morning, the 23 June, by the sound of guns. The attack on Parliament had begun. On his way to the Parliament Taqizadeh's path was blocked by the Cossacks who would not permit anyone to pass. The fighting intensified over the day, with the Cossack troops bombing the Parliament²⁵³, whilst fighters from the Azerbaijan Assembly tried, in vain, to defend it. It was eventually completely destroyed.

This destruction left Taqizadeh terrified; the Shah had ordered his capture and it was said that he had even wanted to kill him with his own hands.²⁵⁴ Along with some friends, Taqizadeh hid in a house where they plotted their next move; they talked about taking refuge in an embassy.²⁵⁵ Taqizadeh writes that at that time he did not know any foreigners; he had been avoiding them during the time he was serving in the Parliament. Eventually, however, he was able to take refuge at the British Legation, and was followed by 70 other people who feared for their lives. There could well have been more but for the fact that the Iranian government asked the Legation to stop offering sanctuary to these dissidents.

The Shah "demanded (Taqizadeh's) delivery into the hands of the authorities, which was naturally 'refused'. An amnesty was obtained for him on the condition that he should leave the country for a year and half."²⁵⁶ On receiving this information, Taqizadeh stayed just another 25 days in the British Legation before starting out on a journey to Europe through Rasht and Baku; it was a journey which would have huge consequences for his personal and political life.

Taqizadeh's taking refuge in the British Legation has been criticised by many, among them Kasravi who thought he should have stayed and encouraged the others to defend the

²⁵² Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 73.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ George Percy Churchill, 567.

Parliament. This would, no doubt, have radically changed the story with his probable capture and death. His decision to flee to British protection had a lasting influence on public opinion about Taqizadeh.

This chapter has presented what was a turbulent period in Taqizadeh's life; it was a time in which he was involved in practical ways in political life. It has been evidenced that throughout this time he tried hard to bring his theoretical ideas into reality, but that ultimately it was a task that he found hard to achieve. As he strove to translate his abstract ideas into the reality of the political arena, he soon learned to reconsider and sometimes compromise on his ideals. Nevertheless, the influence which the historical experiences of Europe had upon him, and especially the methods used during the French Revolution, remained important to his approach. It is notable that these methods were not always necessarily democratic or peacefully achieved.

Taqizadeh quickly became famous during this period; his education, close interaction with intellectuals and his experiences outside of Iran impressed his peers and, to some extent, the general population who were galvanized by his extraordinary oratory skills. He capitalized upon a feeling that was growing within the country and tried to use his popularity to push the country towards "progress". It was progress and development that he had often articulated as being necessarily gradual, a "step by step" approach.

In both his own autobiography and in others' descriptions of him, Taqizadeh is depicted as a fiery and hot-tempered politician. He associates this temper with his young age, but it ought not to be forgotten that the socio-political climate of Iran at that time rather pressured him to act in these ways. The Provisional Assembly of Tabriz, which had elected Taqizadeh to the Parliament, itself was a radical body and demanded that its ideas be represented by Taqizadeh in the national Parliament. In this context it could be argued that his open hostility towards Mohammad Ali Shah or Atabak represented rather more the hostility of the revolutionaries in Tabriz; Taqizadeh was, perhaps, merely a representative of them.

This chapter has shown how Taqizadeh's character was shaped and developed through a series of political struggles and personal experiences. His influence during this period was so powerful that his footsteps can be seen clearly in the political scene of contemporary Iran; the foundations of the modern state were undeniably formed in part through his ideas and struggles. Furthermore, the ways in which Taqizadeh has narrated the movement of change and advent of modernity in Iran remains a dominant discourse among historians and people who carry out research in this field, both inside Iran and beyond its borders. Taqizadeh did not write a specific monograph on the background of the Constitutional Revolution, but as discussed at the beginning of the chapter, as his fragmented but consistent ideas are woven together a good sense of how he thought about these things is discernible.

Chapter Three

Activities to Restore the Constitution and First Exile in Europe

The previous chapters focused on the emergence of the movement of change and how the first efforts to put these ideas into practice culminated in the establishment of the First Parliament and its later challenging efforts to practise modernity. Chapter two concluded with the closure of the First Parliament (1906-1908); the Constitution seemingly abrogated in Iran, with the arrest and execution of some key figures of the movement pressing for change. This was a massive blow to the discourse of change and a huge obstacle for the plans that the constitutionalists had for the modernisation of the country.

After the closure of the First Parliament on 23 June 1908, the major goal of the constitutionalists was to re-establish the Constitution and reopen the parliament. Despite the setbacks, some devoted constitutionalists, among them Taqizadeh, were undeterred and would determinedly continue their struggle towards achieving their goal of restoring the Constitution, whether from within the country or from outside its borders.

In response to the constitutionalists' activities, the traditional conservative opponents of the Constitution had developed and employed their own strategies. It is necessary therefore to simultaneously outline the anti-Constitution movement's tactics and activities. This chapter will include details of how both parties, the constitutionalists and their opponents, mobilised their opposition as well as the constitutionalists' transnational activism and diplomacy, both inside and outside Iran.

With the uprising against the Shah of the constitutionalists in Tabriz, the city became the centre of the military and ideological conflict between the constitutionalists and their opponents. Focusing more on the events in Tabriz, this chapter will provide a clearer picture of this intellectual and military confrontation. The constitutionalists and their opponents were greatly influenced by events in neighbouring countries and further afield. It is necessary to elaborate on these influential transnational events taking place outside

Iran in order to fully understand Taqizadeh's political and diplomatic movements while residing in Europe and after his return to Iran.

The importance of this period of his life in determining Taqizadeh's future political outlook and his understanding of the international arena in particular requires special attention. It was during this time that he witnessed first-hand the practice of democracy and modernity in Europe. This helped Taqizadeh to develop his intellectual and political capabilities and rise to prominence. The situations that Taqizadeh found himself in during this period exemplify the importance of circumstances in shaping an individual's life rather than simply one's abilities or competencies. Thus, a detailed understanding is necessary of the social, intellectual and political circumstances of this period.

This chapter begins by discussing Taqizadeh's journey into exile in Europe and his immediate activities there to restore the Constitution in Iran. Whereas his previous position as a member of parliament had placed him at the centre of the political process, at this point, his predominant role now shifts to be that of an exiled political activist.

Though geographically distant from his home country, Taqizadeh's activities continued to be aimed at helping the constitutionalists back in Iran to fight the tyranny of the Shah in order to restore the Constitution. It was during this first exile period that Taqizadeh was to meet a man who would strongly influence the path he was subsequently to take. He established a strong friendship with Professor Edward Granville Browne, a lecturer of Oriental Languages at Cambridge University and a political activist in England, who was a supporter of the Constitution in Iran. This friendship, based on mutual political and cultural interests, was influential in Taqizadeh's intellectual and political development. In addition, the intellectual exchanges between these two ardent activists is discussed. An analysis of their relationship is set against a backdrop of the political landscape of Europe at that time and British policy in Asia as well as the rivalry between Russia and Britain over Iran.

3:1 An Overview of Taqizadeh's Activities after the Closure of the First Parliament

Subsequent to the bombardment of the First Parliament and its closure by Mohammad Ali Shah a new period began to unfold in the history of the Constitutional Movement in Iran. The first period of the movement which resulted in the opening of the First Parliament and the issuing of the declaration of a constitution passed rather peacefully. The events which occurred during the beginning phase of the revolution were primarily based on negotiations between the constitutionalists and the government. During this first period, the constitutionalists achieved most of their major requests by non-violent means. However, in sharp contrast, starting with the bombardment of the Parliament a forceful confrontation took place between the royalists and the constitutionalists which eventually culminated in a bloody battle. Different forces were involved in the opposition groups, which were formed in the aftermath of the bombardment of the Parliament to oppose the Shah. Each of these forces introduced different methods of resistance and used diverse strategies, whether inside the country or abroad, with the aim of restoring the Constitution.

One group, among others, which played an important role in forming a new opposition was a group of people who had to leave Iran for political reasons following the closure of the Parliament. Some of these individuals were forced into exile as a result of their lives being in danger. Others exiled themselves abroad because of dissatisfaction with the government or because they thought their political activities might be more effective outside Iran.²⁵⁷ Taqizadeh was among those who were expelled from the country for political reasons. The Shah believed that sending Taqizadeh into exile would suppress the opposition, isolate him and restrict his political moves in Iran. But, as future events demonstrate, despite his exile, Taqizadeh proved that he was a die-hard politician. He

²⁵⁷ According to Taqizadeh two hundred of the constitutionalists were scattered abroad in various European countries after the coup d'état of June 23, 1908. Hassan Taqizadeh, "The Persian Nationalists," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh* [The Essays of Taqizadeh], ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Shokofan, 1977), 7: 445. As Hossein Pirnia has put it during this period the exiled Iranians could be divided into three groups: the largest group, known as the statesmen who were mostly nobles, princes and some who had previously been ministers, gathered in Paris; a second group residing in London, to which Taqizadeh belonged; and a third group that had gone to Switzerland from where they carried out their activities, consisting of people like Dehkhoda. See: *Mobarezeh ba Mohammad Ali Shah: Asnadi az Fa'liyathay-e Azadikhahan-e Iran dar Oropa va Istanbul* [Fighting against Mohammad Ali Shah: Documents about the Iranian Freedom Fighters in Europe and Istanbul], ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Sazman-e Ketab, 1980), 17-8.

managed effectively to remain active and demonstrated his ingenuity in the methods he employed in order to try to achieve his political goals.

If one divides the Constitutional Movement activities into two categories of political and military resistance, Taqizadeh's major endeavours during this period fall into the former category: politics and diplomacy. Due to his sustained efforts, Taqizadeh managed to effectively launch a movement outside Iran and through his already well-established links connect this movement to opposition groups inside the country. He was one of the leading characters who introduced freelance diplomacy into the contemporary Iranian political scene, thus influencing the sequence of events. It was Taqizadeh's understanding of international politics and the domestic affairs of Iran that allowed him to successfully lead a strong opposition against the Shah, finally isolating him politically. Consequently, in his political manoeuvres he utilised existing propaganda lines and established new diplomatic channels with the opposition groups and political parties who were more sympathetic towards the Iranian Constitutionalist Movement. Taqizadeh's belief in human agency and his strong feelings of moral obligation to improve the situation of his country were the driving force behind his determined resistance to the Shah and his policies. These beliefs and understandings fuelled his drive to fight for the restoration of the Constitution as he entered the British Legation and then moved into exile and would continue to sustain his determination until the Constitution was finally restored.

3:2 From the British Legation towards Europe

After the bombardment of the Parliament Taqizadeh took refuge in the British Legation, remaining there for twenty-five days. The Shah had initially expressed his desire to send six of the refugees, among them Taqizadeh, for a period of exile varying from five to ten years.²⁵⁸ Taqizadeh was sentenced to the longest period of exile, showing the great dislike the Shah had of him. However, following negotiations between the Shah and British chargé d'affaire, it was determined that he should be exiled for eighteen months.²⁵⁹ Unlike others who had accepted travel expenses from the Shah, Taqizadeh, despite being already

²⁵⁸ Charles Marling to Sir Edward Grey, telegram, 11 July 1908, in *Persia No. 1* (1909), 148.

²⁵⁹ Marling to Grey, telegram, 13 July 1908, in *Ibid.*, 149.

in debt, declined the Shah's offer and set out on his journey to Europe with little funds to support himself.²⁶⁰ The main reason for Taqizadeh's refusal to take this money was that he was "an object of mortal hatred of the Shah" and a mutual grudge had long existed between him and the Shah.²⁶¹ There is no doubt that if arrested by the Shah, Taqizadeh would be executed.²⁶² Additionally, Taqizadeh did not have fond memories of Mohammad Ali Shah during the time he had been Crown Prince and Governor of Tabriz when he had treated people cruelly and had created an atmosphere of terror in the town.²⁶³ Starting from this point Taqizadeh's activities were not only following his ideological goals but also directed towards a more intense personal fight with Mohammad Ali Shah.²⁶⁴

One of Taqizadeh's acts which positively affected the campaign led from abroad against the Shah was persuading his fellow refugees still in the Legation to leave there despite their desire to stay.²⁶⁵ This was significant as it then allowed the refugees to carry out political activities outside the Legation. If they had insisted on staying in the Legation, their political potential would have been wasted since the British considered any political act by the refugees "highly undesirable".²⁶⁶ This would not have permitted the refugees to achieve anything whilst trapped in the Legation.²⁶⁷ The move to Europe of Taqizadeh and those who had been staying in the Legation was viewed from several different perspectives. Some saw it as the end of any possibility of success for the Constitution. With the departure

²⁶⁰ David Fraser commented that Taqizadeh's unwillingness to accept the Shah's money made him an exception; "An honourable exception was Taki Zadeh, who declined to take a penny of the Shah's money and who loyally supported the Legation staff in the efforts to induce the refugees to depart". See: David Fraser, *Persia and Turkey in Revolt* (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1910), 46.

²⁶¹ Marling to Grey, 15 July 1908 in *Persia No. 1* (1909), 160.

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ Mohammad Ali Mirza's tyranny in Tabriz is well documented and even his father Mozaffar al-Din Shah displeased with his son's harsh treatment in Tabriz, on several occasions, had advised him to treat people justly in Azerbaijan. See: Iraj Afshar, ed., *Mohammad Ali Mirza Vali'ahd va Mohammad Ali Shah Makhlo'*: 55 *Sanad-e Tazeh Yab* [Mohammad Ali Mirza the Crown Prince and the Deposed Mohammad Ali Shah: 55 Newly Discovered Documents] (Tehran: Nashr-e Abi, 2008).

²⁶⁴ 'Ain al-Saltaneh writes that a long-standing grudge had existed between Mohammad Ali Shah and Taqizadeh since their path had first crossed in Tabriz. 'Ain al-Saltaneh says he preferred not to elaborate on the reason. Qahreman Mirza, 'Ain al-Saltaneh, *Ruznameh-e Khaterat-e 'Ain al-Saltaneh* [Diary of 'Ain al-Saltaneh] eds., Masoud Salvor, Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Asatir, 1998), 4: 2725.

²⁶⁵ Fraser, 46.

²⁶⁶ Grey to Marling, telegram, 15 July 1908, in *Persia No. 1* (1909), 151.

²⁶⁷ Charles Marling the British minister in Tehran who was in charge of negotiations with the Shah about the refugees wrote that they showed "great unwillingness to leave the Legation...". See: Marling to Grey, 5 July 1908, in Ibid., 145.

of Taqizadeh, leaving no leader, some constitutionalists' hopes were completely dashed. But, if Taqizadeh had stayed, it was feared that he could be arrested and possibly even killed. Others believed that, compared to the prospect of his death, Taqizadeh's year's sojourn in Europe seemed a small price to pay.²⁶⁸

Taqizadeh, on his journey into exile, was accompanied by other constitutionalists. The route into exile which he was now taking, with no clear path for his future ahead of him, was the same route along which he had travelled so enthusiastically twenty months earlier when he had come to Tehran. When he had arrived in Tehran, he had been a young highly ambitious man full of ideas to create a change in his country. Friends and foes alike attested to the fact that he had tried hard in that respect and many were impressed with his deeds and his determination. This said, in the course of his attempts to actualise his ideas, he had also realised that achieving his goals was not to prove so easy in practice. He had come to Tehran at a time of great optimism when there was hope in the air that the Parliament would be able to bring about sweeping changes in a short time. These expectations were not only rife among the intellectuals and members of the Parliament, but also among the general public. A brief look at the petitions sent by ordinary people to the Parliament during this period, asking for their problems to be solved by this newly established institution, is representative of the degree and scale of these expectations. By now Taqizadeh understood that these expectations needed to be prioritised and that they should focus on the most fundamental issues such as political modernisation. Witnessing the destruction of the Parliament by the Shah may have made him realise that, rather than moving too hastily towards the attainment of his goals, safeguarding what had already been achieved was crucial.

The young Taqizadeh in Tabriz had spent the majority of his time studying and carrying out cultural activities mostly on a local level in order to inform people about the movement of change. In Tabriz he had only been able to meet with local governors and his knowledge about the structure of power in the capital city was limited. But, after twenty months of

²⁶⁸ Ali Mohammed Dolatabadi, *Khaterat va Molahezat-e Seyyed Mohammad Dolatabadi*, [Memoirs of Seyyed Mohammad Dolatabadi] ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Sokhan, 2009), 518.

intensive work and experience in the Parliament he was now fully aware of all the nuances of government in Iran.

Judging by his extensive correspondence during the First Parliament period, Taqizadeh had managed to establish a wide network of connections both inside and outside Iran. This network spread across different geographical locations and consisted of diverse groups of people with different political and ideological beliefs. While in exile this network helped him in pursuing his political goals and also provided him with more accurate news about the happenings in Iran, especially during periods of strict censorship when reliable sources of information were scarce.²⁶⁹

Despite these strong political and social connections, after the tragic end of the First Parliament Taqizadeh was still penniless and seemed so powerless and vulnerable that the British, who had guaranteed his life, had to send servants from their Legation in Tehran to accompany him and the other constitutionalists travelling with him, to reduce any possible threats to their safety.²⁷⁰ Nevertheless, the future activities of Taqizadeh would prove to his supporters that he was still potentially powerful and an able activist capable of achieving much. His inherent passion drove him to strive to create key changes in his country so that the ideals of democracy and the re-establishment of the Constitution in Iran might be realised.

3:3 Taqizadeh's First Attempts to Restore the Constitution in Iran

Taqizadeh's political moves against the closure of the Parliament began a few days after the bombardment of the Parliament while he was still taking refuge in the British Legation. In one of his first efforts, he wrote a letter addressing the British authorities. In this lengthy

²⁶⁹ The memoirs written about the period of *Estebdad-e Saghir* (Lesser Despotism) often have references to rumours or news that apparently had no basis: See: Seyyed Ahmad Tafreshi Hosseini, *Ruznameh-e Akhbar-e Mashrutiyat va Enqelab-e Iran* [Diary of the Constitutional News and the Revolution of Iran], ed. Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 2007).

A secret British report also reflects on the difficulty of getting accurate information in Tabriz at that time because of the widespread conflicting rumours. See: Marling to Grey, telegram, 4 August 1908, in *Persia No. 1* (1909), 153.

²⁷⁰ In the past the British had also sent servants from their legation to protect the lives of other Iranian politicians such as Atabak when he was exiled to Qom in 1897 and Naser al-Molk in 1907. See: Marling to Grey, telegram, 16 December 1907, in *Ibid.*, 75.

letter, after referring to the distressed and pitiful situation of Iran before the Constitutional Revolution, he mentions the positive British ideological support for the Revolution but at the same time criticises Britain's change of policy after their agreement of 1907 with Russia. The letter emphasises that, after this agreement, the British ignored Russian interference in the internal affairs of Iran. Taqizadeh also makes it clear that the coup d'état against the Parliament was carried out under the orders of and with the financial support of Russia. Then he adroitly argues against the validity of the 1907 agreement by mentioning that the interference of Russia in Iranian affairs was against the articles of this agreement. As a member of the Iranian Parliament, Taqizadeh ends the letter by requesting that the British not let their good name be slurred and that they help Iranian people reinstate their Constitution.²⁷¹ This letter not only represents Taqizadeh's political virtuosity and his awareness about international politics but also his devotion to the Constitution and his desire for the re-opening of the Parliament. It also shows that despite taking refuge in the British Legation, he did not shy away from pointedly criticising Britain's unhelpful policy towards Iran. However, it should be noted that it is possible that some people (such as W. A. Smart and Major Stokes) working in the British Legation in Tehran, who were opposed to the policies of Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary (1905-16), had encouraged Taqizadeh to write such a letter.²⁷² This is despite the fact that Grey in a telegraph sent to Charles Marling, the British Minister in Tehran, had clarified that the British Legation had given refuge to people solely for their safety and protection; not to support or help them in any political activities.²⁷³

²⁷¹ See: *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyyat*, ed., Afshar, 105-9.

²⁷² See: Mansour Bonakdarian, "Iranian Constitutional Exiles and British Foreign-Policy Dissenters, 1908-9" in *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 27 (1995), 175-191.

²⁷³ Grey to Marling, telegram, 13 July 1908, in *Persia No. 1* (1909), 149.



Figure 5: Map showing the three “spheres” of Iran (Russian, British and Neutral) defined in the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1917

At this point it was Taqizadeh’s political pragmatism which led him to decide to take the first steps towards co-operation with the group of politicians in Britain who were against the liberal imperialist Grey, and to later go to London to work with Browne. The reason for his decision was that he considered this opposition to be in line with Iranian national interests. Besides that, Taqizadeh considered the only way to stop the increasing Russian dominance was with the help of Britain.²⁷⁴ As Mohammad Amin Rasoulzadeh, the famous social-democrat of the Caucasus and later a friend of Taqizadeh, stated, Taqizadeh, taking into account the policies of London at that time, took the decision to go to England as fighting from there for freedom, especially freedom of Islamic countries, would be more beneficial.²⁷⁵

Those who criticise Taqizadeh for co-operating with the British and portray him as a British agent often do not consider the division in and complexity of British politics. They are reticent to accept that Taqizadeh’s primary aim was to take advantage of the position in London for the benefit of Iran, just as he would later do when he similarly saw the benefit

²⁷⁴ Taqizadeh to Browne, 19 October 1908 in *Browne Papers*, 1-1-8, in the Cambridge University Library.

²⁷⁵ Mohammad Amin Rasoulzadeh, *Taraqqi*, October 22, 1908.

to Iran of support from Germany during the Great War and thus co-operated with the Germans. This was probably the first time in the modern history of Iranian diplomacy that one witnesses a part of the civil society involving itself in organising collective actions beyond the state boundaries. It is also the first time we witness active diplomacy from an Iranian political opposition group to try and influence an opposition group or party in a European country.

In evaluating Taqizadeh's activities in the aftermath of the bombardment of the Parliament one should also consider the challenging atmosphere and situation of that time. The atmosphere after the closure of the Parliament was one of terror and disappointment. The nationalist forces who had fought so hard for a constitution and a parliament saw what they had achieved now gone. The Parliament was physically destroyed and iconic characters of the Constitutional Movement like Malek al-Motakallemin and Mirza Jahangir Khan among others were brutally killed. Some other important leaders such as Seyyed Mohammad Tabatabaei and Seyyed Abdollah Behbahani, despite their religious high status, were punished and exiled. Other influential characters like Taqizadeh were driven into exile and any prospect of revival of the Constitution seemed distant. The press which was a staunch supporter of the Constitution was shut down while the Russian commander of the Cossack Brigade who had directed the coup d'état was appointed as Governor of Tehran.²⁷⁶ Tehran and other towns of the country were under martial law and all gatherings even in private houses were banned. The majority of the population were indifferent to what had happened but were eager for a government that would establish safety and security in the country.²⁷⁷ However, despite the difficult circumstances Taqizadeh found himself in the sanctuary of the Legation and the gloomy atmosphere and despair of the situation among the Constitutionalists, he was able to handle and analyse the situation well and took astute initial steps towards forming an opposition against the Shah.

²⁷⁶ "Martial Law Proclamation of June 22, 1908", in *Persia No. 1* (1909), 158.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 142.

3:4 The Resistance of Tabriz

On the same day that Mohammad Ali Shah had started the destruction of the Parliament in Tehran, the Royalist forces also began the battle with the constitutionalists in Tabriz.²⁷⁸ This divided the city into two groups; the constitutionalists and the people supporting the Shah. The Shah, who underestimated the resistance of the revolutionaries in Tabriz, hoped to easily take control of the city, not knowing that this was the start of a long bloody civil war. As Browne has put it, the province of Azerbaijan “owing to its comparative wealth and commercial activity, and the hardy and courageous character of its inhabitants became the centre and chief support of the Nationalist movement of revolt” against the tyranny of the Shah.²⁷⁹ Tabriz was the sole remaining area of resistance, in stark contrast to the rest of Iran, where the Constitution had been removed and despotism had been accepted by Iranians.²⁸⁰ Nevertheless, even in Tabriz there was still a strong royalist force controlling huge swathes of the city, opposing the supporters of the Constitution.²⁸¹ However, a small core of resistance remained which managed to gain strength and defend the city and the Constitution. Since Taqizadeh had a crucial role to play in this battle and its outcome, it is necessary to elaborate on the events in Tabriz during this period.

3:5 Battles in Tabriz

On the evening of the first day of the fighting in Tabriz, news of the bombardment of the Parliament and termination of the Constitution reached Tabriz. Many of the senior constitutionalists and leaders of the revolutionaries and members of the Provincial Assembly were frightened and discouraged by the news. Some, who thought it was the end of the Constitution and considered their lives to be in danger, took refuge in the French and Russian Consulates. However, Mojaheds, with the support of people like Ali Monsieur, Haj Ali Davaforoush and Haj Mehdi Kuzehkonani²⁸², did not give up and continued their

²⁷⁸ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashrutiyyat-e Iran*, 2: 676.

²⁷⁹ Edward Granville Browne, *The Reign of Terror at Tabriz* (London: Luzac & Co., 1912), 3.

²⁸⁰ Marling to Grey, telegram, 25 June 1908, in *Persia No. 1* (1909), 128.

Dolatabadi, 2: 346.

²⁸¹ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e Iran*, 2: 685.

²⁸² One of the elders of the merchants in Tabriz. He was influential among most classes in Tabriz, especially among guilds and merchants. He participated actively in the Constitutional Revolution since its beginning. He had an opinion in the Provincial Assembly of Tabriz. See: Mehdi Mojtehed, *Rejal-e Azerbaijan dar Asr-e Mashrutiyyat* [Distinguished Men of Azerbaijan during the Constitutional Period], ed., Gholamreza Tabatabaei Majd (Tehran: Zarrin, 2000), 229.

resistance against the governmental forces. Sattar Khan and Baqer Khan, two prominent chiefs of the Mojaheds, remained fierce in their determination not to surrender.²⁸³

On 27 June 1908, The Washington Post wrote, "The latest news from Tabriz indicates that a renewal of the fighting there is imminent. The revolutionaries are short of ammunition and the supporters of the shah are pressing their advantage".²⁸⁴ On 28 June 1908, the Governor of Tabriz, Mokhber al-Saltaneh, abandoned his position, leaving the city without any governor assigned by the Parliament.²⁸⁵ However, before leaving his position, Mokhber al-Saltaneh, whom Taqizadeh had initially helped to become the governor, handed all governmental forces under his control to the Provincial Assembly.²⁸⁶ This crucially facilitated the defenders of the town in accessing arms and ammunition.²⁸⁷ The Shah, who was trying to restore order in Azerbaijan, appointed 'Ain al-Dowleh as the governor. On 30 June the Shah also reinforced his troops by sending tribal Qaradje Daghi horsemen to Tabriz.

At the same time the return to the city of conservative clergy, who had been previously dismissed by the constitutionalists in Tabriz, strengthened the position of Royalist forces. The anti-constitutionalist clergy and forces gathered together in an assembly called Eslamieh in one of the districts of Tabriz and began to organise the fight against the constitutionalist forces from there. An added pressure for the constitutionalists came from the activities in Tabriz of the Russian Consul-General, Ivan Fedrovich Pokhitanoff, who was encouraging the constitutionalist fighters to end the resistance and ask for forgiveness from the Shah. He succeeded in making many freedom fighters give up their fight though a small group of Mojaheds remained determined to continue to resist the Shah's forces.

²⁸³ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e Iran*, 2: 678.

²⁸⁴ "Will Dissolve Parliament: Shah Contemplates Issuing Decree for New Elections," The Washington Post, Jun 27, 1908, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/144860481/9F68AAA9BBEE444CPQ/1?accountid=12045>.

²⁸⁵ Hedayat, *Gozarash-e Iran*, 210-11.

²⁸⁶ Ibid., 215.

²⁸⁷ Dolatabadi, 2: 350.

The skirmishes continued during the day but ceased at night. The houses between the war lines were evacuated and sometimes plundered.²⁸⁸ The plundering became widespread after the clergy of the Eslamieh assembly declared the constitutionalist fighters to be heretics, calling them Babis, which, according to Islamic law, thus allowed them to be lawfully killed and their belongings captured.²⁸⁹

It was during this period that Taqizadeh's bookshop in Tabriz was plundered. Since the British Legation had given a guarantee to him, Taqizadeh wrote a letter requesting that the British Legation make a claim on his behalf against the Iranian government for damage done to his property in Tabriz. However, the British did not consider his claim valid, since his was only one of so many other properties which had suffered a similar fate.²⁹⁰



Figure 6: The Mojaheds of Laylabad district in Tabriz²⁹¹

3:6 Accusing Constitutionalists of Being Babis

The announcement of the Eslamieh Assembly reveals how the royalist clergy used religious beliefs to galvanize people against the constitutionalists in Tabriz. According to

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Ibid, 681.

²⁹⁰ TNA: FO 371/507, 42817-8.

²⁹¹ Browne Papers, 1-1-8.

an eyewitness, one of the announcements declared, “O Muslims you must put all your endeavours into this task. Where is your honour? These Babis have gathered together and in the name of the Constitution want to propagate their religion. Islam will soon be wiped out. Jihad is obligatory to all of you until you rid the Earth of all these infidels.”²⁹²

Persecution of Babis had started after the abortive attempt to assassinate Naser al-Din Shah in the summer of 1852. Naser al-Din Shah had issued a “Farman” or decree, ordering the identification and killing of all Babis and they?? had increasingly become more powerful.²⁹³ This gave them a free hand to stigmatise whoever they disliked by calling them Babis.²⁹⁴ Furthermore, as Abbas Amanat has stated, “Participation in the anti-Babi campaigns of hatred and cruelty often had the miraculous effect of reversing the mujtahids’ social and even economic fortunes and restoring their fading popularity”.²⁹⁵ Aqa Najafi, a high-ranking clergyman in Isfahan, for instance, had proclaimed a property owner to be a Babi in order to claim the property from him, inciting the students of the religious school to cut the owner into pieces. Although people knew that Aqa Najafi’s initial intention was to own the property, neither the other clergy nor anyone else protested out of fear. Haji Seyyed Abolqasem Zanjani, one of the prominent clergymen of the time in Zanjan, accused two merchants of being Babis and ordered them to be savagely killed simply because they had demanded the repayment of the debts owed to them by Haji Seyyed Abolqasem. Additionally, persecution of Babis was a means by which the governors and local rulers could increase their powers. Jala al-Dowleh, the governor of Yazd, for example, committed many crimes against his enemies by using the pretext that they were Babis.²⁹⁶

²⁹² Mohammad Baqer Vijeivihei, *Tarikh-e Enqelab-e Azerbaijan va Balvay-e Tabriz* [The History of the Revolution of Azerbaijan and Riot of Tabriz] (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 2007), 38.

²⁹³ For more about the birth and evolution of the Babi movement in Iran see: Abbas Amanat, *Resurrection and Renewal: The Making of the Babi Movement in Iran, 1844-1850* (London: Cornell University Press, 1989). For the documents see: Abbas Amanat and Fereydoon Vahman, *Az Tehran ta 'Aka: Babian va Baheian dar Asnad-e Doran-e Qajar* [Babis and Bahais in the Qajar Period Documents] (North Haven: Ashkaar, 2016).

²⁹⁴ Homa Nategh, “Pasraft,” Homa-Nategh (blog).

<http://www.homa-nategh.net/1585160815811575160616101578.html>.

²⁹⁵ Amanat, *Resurrection and Renewal*, 415.

²⁹⁶ Esma‘il Ra‘in, *Anjomanhay-e Seri dar Enqelab-e Mashrutiyyat*, (Tehran: Javidan, 1978), 37-8.

3:7 Tabriz Clergy and Iranian Constitutionalism

The religious leadership of the Eslamieh Assembly in Tabriz had reasons for supporting Mohammad Ali Shah and dismissing the constitutionalists. One reason was that the important clergy in Tabriz were landowners and managed the agricultural properties, pursuing their own financial gains. They set the price of wheat and bread in Tabriz.²⁹⁷ They stored the wheat in time of drought and poor harvest and sold it at higher prices. Religious professionals did not want another new institution like the Tabriz Assembly, a modern institution modelled on European lines and the product of the Constitution, to play that role.²⁹⁸ In addition to that, the clergy were traditionally the major reference point of the masses and they conveyed the requests of people to the government and vice versa. The state also needed the clergy to communicate instructions, to educate, to encourage the people to obey the law, shape their thoughts and more importantly for its legitimacy. The Provincial Assembly was taking over many of those responsibilities. Further, the clergy ruled the judicial system based on Islamic law and this, besides giving them authority, was also a source of income for them.²⁹⁹ The Tabriz Assembly was threatening the traditional authority of the clergy in that respect as well, because the Assembly was acting as a court to which people took their problems and complaints. This could seriously endanger the clergy's position in the hierarchy of the society in which they lived. A further danger of the Constitution for the religious establishment came from its other modern institutions like the new style schools and educational system which traditionally had been controlled by the clergy. Schools were a vehicle for the clergy to exert constant ideological influence on the masses. The number of new schools increased after the Constitutional Revolution in Tabriz. With the new educational system encouraged by the constitutionalists, the clergy found rivals in school teachers. Unlike the constitutionalists, the clergy were also opposed to women's education, their participation in the public arena, equal rights and their employment.

²⁹⁷ See: Nategh, "Dar Ghasb," (blog).

²⁹⁸ As Vanessa Martin writes: "The Anjoman's ideal was to play its part in enabling the country to reach the standard of Europe in terms of the development of the law, education and progress." See: Vanessa Martin, "The Tabriz Anjoman January to June 1907," in *Iran between Islamic Nationalism and Secularism: The Constitutional Revolution of 1906* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013), 125-6.

²⁹⁹ See: Willem Floor, "The Economic role of the Ulama in Qajar Persia" in *Guilds, Merchants & Ulama in Nineteenth-Century Iran*, (Washington, DC: Mage, 2009), 69-98.

Ideologically, the direction of the Constitutional Movement towards secularism displeased many clergy who in the beginning had even supported the Constitution. The most disturbing issues for the clergy were the anti-religious ideas influenced by Socialism which mainly spread through the Caucasus to Tabriz. This concern is expressed in one of the letters Seqat al-Eslam Tabrizi wrote from Tabriz to Mostashar al-Dowleh, one of the Deputies of Azerbaijan in the Parliament. In the letter Seqat al-Eslam speaks about a manifesto written by Taqizadeh which had been published in Baku. The announcement defended “the liberty of conscience and religion”. According to Seqat al-Eslam, this had disturbed people in Tabriz. Seqat al-Eslam believed that expressing these ideas was wrong and that not only did these ideas not suit the needs of the people but they also scared them.³⁰⁰ Apparently, this way of thinking worried the clergy; they were clearly concerned about the future that the constitutionalists foresaw for Iran. Particularly in the summer of 1908, these ideas were more overtly expressed when, with the increasing Stolypin³⁰¹ repressions in Russia, a flow of refugees from the Caucasus began to arrive in Tabriz.³⁰² These ideas were expressed more overtly among the exiled opposition groups in Istanbul which were closely connected to the constitutionalists inside Iran. For instance, in a meeting in Istanbul it was said that “we want a constitution for peasants and farmers, not the kind of constitution that the landlords and other rulers or chiefs want. We are the socialist party....”³⁰³ It seems that the clergy had recognised that, rather than calling these people “Socialists” or “Agnostics” which were rather unknown concepts for the ordinary people at the time, calling them Babis was the easiest way to galvanise the masses against them. Although many ordinary people knew little about the beliefs and laws of the Babi religion, since it was a local movement and cast doubt on some fundamental laws of Islam, it was enough for them to detest the religion and its followers. On the other hand, it seems

³⁰⁰ Seqat al-Eslam to Mostashar al-Dowleh, Tabriz, 25 May 1907, in *Nameh-hay-e Tabriz* [Tabriz Letters], ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Farzan, 1999), 118-129.

³⁰¹ Pyotr Stolypin (1862-1911) Russian Prime Minister (1906-1911). For more information see: Abraham Ascher, *P. A. Stolypin: The Search for Stability in Late Imperial Russia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).

³⁰² Tadeusz Swietochowski, “The Himmat Party; Socialism and the National Question in Russian Azerbaijan, 1904-1920,” in *Cahiers de Monde Russe et Soviétique* 19, no. 1-2 (1978): 119-142. Accessed 25 January 2018. http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/cmr_0008-0160_1978_num_19_1_1309.

³⁰³ Javad Taqizadeh to Hassan Taqizadeh, 17 November 1908, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 110.

that any new concept which was unfamiliar was associated by some people with the Babi religion. For instance, one of the pro-constitutionalist newspapers of the time *Mosavat* commenting on the notion of “Vatan” (homeland) wrote that when talking about the word “Vatan”, Iranian people thought it was the name of the leader of the Babis.³⁰⁴

After the bombardment of the Parliament, stigmatising the constitutionalists as infidels became more common and landowners in particular referred to the concepts of national government and law as heresy and the supporters of the Constitution as infidels who had to be killed.³⁰⁵ This was worse in the small towns and many Constitutionalists were killed or their belongings looted.³⁰⁶ One of the rare female narratives written by Malakeh Iran, Zahir al-Dowleh’s wife, about the events surrounding the bombardment of the Parliament is significant. This further highlights not only how the constitutionalists were labelled as Babis and subsequently killed but also the cruelty shown by the governmental forces to the female members of the constitutionalists’ households.³⁰⁷

Kasravi writes that during the wars in Tabriz the sound of Azan (call to prayer) reverberated so loudly throughout the town one evening that there was barely any house in which it could not be heard. The Royalists stigmatised the constitutionalists as being Babis and, in this way, encouraged their fighters to attack and loot the properties of people in the town. That is why the inhabitants of the town thought that by reciting the call to prayer they would prove that they were in fact Muslims and not Babis.³⁰⁸ By accusing the constitutionalists of being Babis, the Royalists mobilised different groups to fight against the Tabriz resistance movement. “Thousands of Sunni Kurds from Maku, legions of untamed Shahsoran [Shahsavan] and Bakhtiari tribesmen were concentrating to obliterate

³⁰⁴ “Kashf-e Khalaf,” *Mosavat*, November 4, 1907.

³⁰⁵ In a letter to his brother explaining the situation following the bombardment of the Parliament, Javad Taqizadeh writes that the guilds, in particular those made up of constitutionalists, were the most affected and suffered greatly. Their belongings were looted and anyone caught was immediately killed. See: Javad Taqizadeh to Hassan Taqizadeh, 1908, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 126.

³⁰⁶ Dolatabadi, 2: 347. Also see: Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e Iran*, 2:672.

³⁰⁷ Malakeh Iran, letter to Rasht, June 1908, in *Asnad-e Tarikhi-e Vagya Mashruteh-e Iran* [Historical Documents of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution], ed., Jahangir Qa’emmaqami (Tehran: Tahuri, 1969), 57.

³⁰⁸ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e Iran*, 2:718. Also: Esma’il Amirkhizi, *Qiyam Azerbaijan va Sattar Khan* [The Uprising of Azerbaijan and Sattar Khan] (Tehran: Tehran Bookshop, 1977), 160.

Tabriz on the charge of being the home of secret Babism”.³⁰⁹ The propaganda against the constitutionalists was so forceful that in one instance when the Mojaheds arrested some Royalist soldiers during the wars in Tabriz, they begged for mercy, stating that they would convert to become Babis.

The accusation that the constitutionalists were Babis was a threat even for those who had fled Iran and were resident among Iranian communities abroad. Taqizadeh's younger brother, Javad, for example, who was staying in Istanbul during the period after the closure of the Parliament, expressed his fears that being called a Babi would stigmatise him even in Istanbul.³¹⁰

Additionally, in the night letters (nocturnal letters) of the supporters of the Shah, besides calling the constitutionalists in Tabriz infidels, they also used other social stigmatisation such as referring to the constitutionalists as pimps, gays, cuckolds, bastards or wine drinkers.³¹¹ One of the people particularly targeted in these night letters was the close friend and relative of Taqizadeh, Mohammad Ali Tarbiat. Of course, Taqizadeh, as one of the prominent leaders of the constitutionalists, was similarly criticised by the conservative clergy but as he was regarded as a Seyyed, a descendent of the prophet, he was more protected from being thus labelled, though he could still be referred to as a Babi.

In a like manner, in the past, supporters of the Shah had used similar methods to discredit popular opinion; they had paid prostitutes in Tehran to appear unveiled in public during the holy month of Ramadan, thus encouraging the idea that the emancipation of women was one of the anti-Islamic consequences of the Constitution. In another document in regards to women, Mohammad Ali Shah talking against the constitutionalists and their acts

³⁰⁹ “The Civil War in Tabriz,” *London Times*, October 19, 1908.

³¹⁰ Javad Taqizadeh to Hassan Taqizadeh, 1908, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 126.

³¹¹ “Etela” in *Tarikhcheh-e Ruznameh-hay-e Tabriz dar Sadr Mashrutiyyat* [A Concise History of the Newspapers of Tabriz at the Beginning of the Constitution], ed. Abdol Hossein Nahidi Azar (Tabriz: Talash), 70.

in opposition to Islamic law mentions that they wanted to encourage women to open assemblies and talk about freedom.³¹²

Reflecting on the accusations that the constitutionalists were Babis, it is interesting here to note the fact that even Mohammad Ali Shah made the same accusation. In a telegraph addressing the Ulama in Najaf in which he tried to justify his hostility towards the Parliament and Constitution, right before attacking the Parliament the Shah himself accused the constitutionalists of being Babis. He stated that in the Supplementary Law the constitutionalists had particularly put emphasis on the freedom of practising one's own religion in order that they might be able to openly do so. This of course would have been an accusation indirectly aimed at Taqizadeh in particular, who was one of the deputies who had prepared the Supplementary Law and had strongly defended it against the conservative clergy.³¹³ In another instance, about one month before the coup d'état, the police in Tehran arrested some people who were posting an announcement on walls. The announcement, written as if it were by Babis read, "We created this Constitution and just as we created this, we will also create a Republic and now you must give us freedom...". This was clearly yet another attempt by the Royalists to promote the idea that the constitutionalists were all Babis since upon further investigation it became evident that the Shah was behind this and had paid for such a plan.³¹⁴

Besides written materials like newspapers and night letters, public speeches in the mosques or other gatherings were a common way to convey these ideas and galvanise the masses. The orators especially took advantage of the religious occasions to target and influence a large audience.

Likewise, propaganda was equally important for the constitutionalists in order to attract the support of the people and justify the Constitution. The constitutionalists used written

³¹² Mohammad Ali Shah, telegram to Rasht, 18 June 1908, in *Asnad-e Tarikhi-e Vaqya Mashruteh-e Iran*, ed., Qa'emmaqami, 37-9.

³¹³ *Ibid.*, 616.

³¹⁴ Taqizadeh, "Nameh be Ruznameh-e Times" [Letter to *The Times* Newspaper] in *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyat*, ed., Afshar, 119.

media such as newspapers and also benefited from the support of well-known preachers and orators. After the bombardment of the Parliament the publication of the free press stopped in Tabriz. However, soon after, with the increase of resistance against the Shah in the city, the constitutionalists began to publish their own newspapers. *Naleh-e Mellat* [Cry of the Nation] was one of the newspapers which was founded by the Provincial Assembly of Tabriz to reflect the news of the battle with the Shah and the constitutionalists' points of view. *Ettihad* [Unity] published by Mohammad Ali Tarbiat was another newspaper which supported the constitutionalists during the fighting in Tabriz. The Tabriz Assembly also began publishing its own newspaper, *Anjoman*. Interestingly, although the conservative clergy were against any modern means of communication, they realised that utilising this aspect of modernisation was to their benefit in fighting back against the constitutionalists. Hence, the Eslamieh Assembly also started to publish its own newspaper, *Molla 'Amu*, which was published in Azerbaijani Turkish and galvanised public opinion against the constitutionalists.

There were other dimensions of the Tabriz resistance which also gave the conservatives in Azerbaijan cause for concern. For instance, the Russian revolutionaries had grown sympathetic to the Tabriz movement. The importance of the Tabriz resistance for the Communist leaders such as Lenin was expressed in their writings. The main clandestine publications of the Russian Socialists like "Iskara" were sent through Tabriz to Russia with the help of Iranian Social Democrats. The Social Democrat Party in the Caucasus strongly supported the Tabriz fighters and sent to Tabriz a group of fighters who formed the "Mojahedin-e Qafqazi" group there. The Social Democrat Party also greatly assisted the Tabriz resistance by sending guns and ammunition. Similarly, the Russian Social Democrat Party, a powerful political party which was fighting against the Tsar in Russia, showed its support for Tabriz; in an announcement the party's Committee requested any workers who could fight to go to Tabriz. As a result, more than a hundred fighters were sent from Tbilisi alone. The Baku Committee also sent twenty-two fighters to Gilan. It is clear that, alongside teaching combat skills and ammunition techniques and strengthening the military power of the constitutionalists in Tabriz, these people also propagated their parties' ideologies. These activities were, of course, observed by the

clergy and conservative people who viewed the new ideologies as a threat to their positions. Significantly, they associated all these changes with the Constitution.

All this put the conservative clergy into conflict with the constitutionalists and Tabriz became the bloody battlefield of these two groups with their opposing ideologies.



Figure 7: A page of the *Ayeneh-e Gheyb Nama* newspaper, No. 33, 4 May 1908, depicting the interrogation of Seyyed Ali and Mohammad Yazdi who were behind the posting of announcements which introduced Constitutionalists as Babis.

3:8 The Discourse of Modernity and the Importance of the Tabriz Resistance

Like the conservatives and royalists, the constitutional camp also used propaganda lines to propagate their ideas. The ideological conflict reflected in the press or in the speeches of both sides and a new more tangible discourse had increasingly been at the forefront of the minds of ordinary people due to the continuing fighting on the streets of the city. With the escalation of war in Tabriz and intense polarisation of the town into two main opposing groups, the ordinary people also became involved in an unprecedented propaganda war.

The intellectual movement, advocating modernity with strong demands for the necessity of change, had come into existence long before this period and by the mid nineteenth century onward had increasingly come to the surface. The idea of change and modernity

was opposed by some groups and they had also developed their arguments to defend their case and reject the ideological force of the new movement. As documented in the social historical sources of the Constitutional Revolution period, in the beginning of the movement, the people, although participating in the movement, were not always fully aware of the idea of having a Constitution. What they were more concerned with was the necessity of change in their situation. The strong wave of new discourse advocating modernity had remained predominantly among the elite. By the mid nineteenth century, with the development of mass media, this discourse gradually found a wider audience. The foundation of the Constitutional Revolution was based on this discourse and was predominantly the outcome of the feeling of an urgent need for change which the majority of society agreed upon at that period. It was after the opening of the Parliament and beginning of the process of the legislation that a split between the cleric community and secular intellectuals emerged and influenced larger groups of society. With the coming of Mohammad Ali Shah to power and his hostility towards the Constitution, the gap between the two forces widened. The conservative clergy and royalists put the constitutionalists under attack by arguing that the direction of the movement was against religious law. The constitutionalists represented their own arguments and this discourse, reflected in the newspapers and public speeches attracted a wider audience.

One of the articles Taqizadeh wrote in the liberal newspaper; *Sur-e Esrafil* is a good example of this discourse.³¹⁵ Besides representing Taqizadeh's ideas, the article can be seen as an example of an intellectual trying to convince a wider audience of the legitimacy of a new way of looking at the world and religion and its authority in that period. The article was written after the vehement attack and criticism of the newspaper by the clergy which had resulted in its closure and the accusation that the newspaper's editorial staff were heretics.

Taqizadeh, a clergyman himself, had realised that the clergy's authority on different aspects of traditional Iranian society was the main obstacle to any new interpretation of religion which might lead to reforms. In his article entitled "Defa'" (Defence), addressing

³¹⁵ "Defa'," *Sur-e Esrafil*, August 1, 1907.

the clergy, he introduces the idea of them being responsible for the decline of Islam after its glorious past. To support his argument, he suggests various reasons for the negative influence of the contemporary clergy on Islamic societies. Being clearly an advocate for a new scientific interpretation of religion, Taqizadeh mentions that in the early days of Islam the rational sciences had found their way into Islamic countries through the translated sources of Greek and had been adapted to fit in with Islamic rules. This influence had been gradually weakened until even those old books had come to be considered as obscene by later clergy. With such a suggestion, Taqizadeh wanted to emphasise the fact that Islam in its early time had been tolerant and open to adopting ideas from science. This is while the conservative clergy were advocating a return to “real” Islam and considered anything modern to be associated with the West rather than with Islam. By questioning the legitimacy of the contemporary clergy’s interpretation of religion, Taqizadeh wanted to cast doubt on this way of thinking and clear a path for the discourse of modernity and secularisation.

In advocating a world view, Taqizadeh blamed the clergy for isolating Islamic countries from the rest of the world. In fact, besides questioning the authority of the clergy in this article, Taqizadeh was expressing his ideology; a redefinition of Islam and Iranian society in relation to the world and history. He also criticised the clergy for using Arabic which many did not know and language far too complicated for the ordinary people to understand. By bringing this to light, Taqizadeh wanted to defend the right of people to read and interpret the religious texts. This was one of the fundamental bases of modernity; giving an individual freedom and allowing that individual the right to make independent decisions.

By mentioning in the article the backwardness of Iranian society in some social, economic and military aspects, Taqizadeh argued that uneven modernisation was not possible. If other aspects of life were now a victim of those domains he wrote about, then religion too would not be impermeable to those same degrading forces and would inevitably be prevented from developing and indeed would begin to regress.³¹⁶

³¹⁶ Later in his life, defending the necessity of changing the alphabet, Taqizadeh also mentioned that it was not possible just to modernize one aspect of society but rather it had to happen across all aspects of

This article is a clear representation of the ideological gap between the conservative clergy and the secular intellectuals. After the establishment of the Parliament and its passing of laws giving equal rights to people regardless of their religion, for example, it became clearer that the clergy wanted the law of Islam to be practised in contrast to the secular constitutionalists who defended applying civil laws inspired by European models. Taqizadeh advocated the application of reason and science not only in religion but also in every domain of life. The gist of Taqizadeh's positivist approach might be summed up in August Comte's sentence that "the intellect shall be free to exercise its full share of influence in every department of human life".³¹⁷ Taqizadeh managed to voice his opinion more openly during the Second Parliament in one of the articles of the Democrat Party's manifestos which clarified the complete separation of religion and politics.³¹⁸

This difference of opinion between the traditional clergy and the secularists culminated in the constitutionalists in Tabriz being called infidels and an attempt to eradicate them. At this point the rhetoric of both sides took on a more aggressive tone. The wars in Tabriz and extreme polarisation of the town into two camps allowed ordinary people to become more familiar with both sides of the polemic. As Touraj Atabaki has written, "The civil war served to accelerate the rise of political awareness and the consciousness of class identity".³¹⁹ After the constitutionalists conquered Tehran the voice of the clergy was gradually silenced.

When the secularists gained more power in the Iranian political scene during the Reza Shah period, the clergy was forced into almost complete silence and this challenging discourse was marginalised. The new politicians saw no need to reinterpret religion or even challenge the clergy's point of view. This polemic discourse between the modern ideas and

life. See: Hassan Taqizadeh, *Moqaddameh-e Talim-e Omomi ya yeki az Sar Faslhayeh-e Tamaddon* [Introduction to Public Education or one of the Topics of Civilisation] (Tehran: Ketabkhaneh-e Tehran, 1928), 29.

³¹⁷ Auguste Comte, *A General View of Positivism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 20. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511692888>.

³¹⁸ "Qavaed va Nezamnameh-e Ferqey-e Siyasi-e Democrat-e Iran [Rules and Regulations of the Democrat Political Group]," in *Tarikhcheh-e Ahzab va Hezb-e Democrat-e Iran* [A Brief History of the Political Parties in Iran], ed., Safar Zamani (Tehran: Vajehara, 2000), 179-210.

³¹⁹ Touraj Atabaki, *Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and the Struggle for Power in Iran*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 35.

the more traditional ones remained in its rudimentary state until it emerged during the 1979 Revolution. Although the modernity that early constitutionalist intellectuals were advocating was later challenged by communist ideas, it could be considered as a conflict inside the discourse of modernity itself rather than challenging the past and traditional local ideas of religion. However, the resistance of Tabriz at least provided a period in which this discourse could develop slightly and both sides could attempt to challenge each other both militarily and intellectually.

3:9 Fully-fledged War in Tabriz and Taqizadeh's Activities in the Caucasus

If, like Browne, one considers there to be three periods of fighting in Tabriz, the first period was a short period of street fighting when the constitutionalists under Sattar Khan and Baqir Khan controlled only one or two of the thirty quarters into which Tabriz was divided.³²⁰ People were heartened by the rejection of the Russian Counsel's peace proposal by Sattar Khan, as commander of the freedom fighters, and so joined him in defending the city. Thus, began a new chapter in the struggle for Tabriz.

When it became clear that the efforts to establish order in the city of the Russian Consul-General were fruitless and looting of shops and houses became widespread, the Shah sent more troops to restore order and to persuade people to open the bazaars. On 13 July, the Shah ordered Sardar Rahim Khan to enter the town with his 1000 horsemen. Despite only numbering as little as 100 men, the revolutionaries fought back strongly.

Meanwhile, however, Taqizadeh had set out from Tehran, starting his journey into exile in Europe by crossing the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus, still unaware of the increasingly strong ongoing resistance movement of Tabriz. When passing Qazvin, he and his fellow travellers received public support from the people. Taqizadeh's arrival into Rasht was big news and a large number of people came out to see him. The fact that the Governor of Rasht had to report to Tehran that Taqizadeh was stirring up unrest in the town represents Taqizadeh's potential power in galvanising the masses. Hardly surprising then that the Shah wanted to distance him from Iran as long as possible, hoping that this would lead to

³²⁰ Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909*, 249.

Taqizadeh's political retirement. During his time in Rasht, he was hosted in the British Consulate and managed to meet up secretly with constitutionalists such as Yapram Khan. Yapram Khan was one of the Armenian constitutionalists who later played an important role in conquering Tehran. This was the first time that Taqizadeh had met Yapram. He explained to Taqizadeh that he had a plan for an uprising in Gilan which would restore the Constitution.³²¹ From Rasht, Taqizadeh went to Anzali and took the boat for Baku.³²² His autobiography gives a good account of his situation there:

When we reached Baku, we went to a Hotel called 'Europe'. We stayed in that Hotel. We had no money. I mean, "I" did not have any money. We were always concerned and we did not know what would happen next. We added to the cost whenever we ate anything. In Baku, Iranians had an assembly. It was a charity assembly.... Many [Iranian] people were living there, among them businessmen and others who were very rich and in financially secure positions. They came to see me and talked about members of the charity assembly. They told me there was an idea among the members to send some people to Europe to try and publicise their cause in the European press in order to restore the Constitution in Iran. They had together gathered some money with which to send people they found to Europe.³²³

Taqizadeh continued in his autobiography that after they had spoken with him, realizing that he was in dire financial straits, the decision was made to use the funds of 1000 Roubles to facilitate Taqizadeh's journey to Europe and to enable him to achieve the aim of promoting their cause in Europe. Taqizadeh's writing suggests that the Baku merchants, who had been searching for someone to send to Europe in order that they could publicise their cause and promote in Europe the restoration of the Constitution, saw Taqizadeh as the perfect candidate and thus willingly financed his trip. However, it is possible that

³²¹ Hassan Taqizadeh, "Yapram Khan," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 2: 97-9.

³²² The boats were sent by Taqiev who had sympathy with the constitutionalists in Iran. They were treated respectfully in the boats. Esma'il Ra'in, *Heydar Khan Amoghlu* (Tehran: Tahqiq-e Ra'in, 1973), 104.

³²³ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 87.

Taqizadeh himself made the initial suggestion, outlining his plans to go to Europe, after advice from Browne's associates in the British Legation in Tehran. Later in his life as he wrote his autobiography, Taqizadeh could have cleverly pointed towards the fact that it was the Baku merchants who initiated his trip to Europe, rather than himself as this would have been a way to dispel some of the suggestions made by certain political rivals that he had, in fact, been a British agent. Circulation of the conspiracy theory that he was a puppet of the British government was rampant and Taqizadeh was at pains to refute that idea.

Although Taqizadeh had begun a campaign for the re-establishment of the Constitution, initially he probably did not have a clear idea of his future activities when he later found himself in London, for example. His activities in London were more ad hoc and depended a lot on his co-operation with Browne and the Persia Committee rather than a decision previously made by the merchants in Baku.

While in Baku, Taqizadeh carried out activities supporting the freedom fighters in Tabriz. He commented on this, "After the destruction of the Parliament and after the arrival in Baku of people who had been exiled, including me, I made great efforts to collect arms and money for Tabriz from the rich people in Baku but had only limited success".³²⁴ The reason that Taqizadeh and others had limited success in persuading the affluent people in Baku to help the fighters in Tabriz was due to the strict policy of the Russian government which did not want businessmen to become involved in politics, especially against the Shah in Iran, since it supported the Shah. Only Mokhtarof, one of the wealthy people living in Baku, promised to send arms to Tabriz.³²⁵ Taqizadeh and his friends were closely shadowed by the Russian police in Baku and this also limited their activities.³²⁶

Continuing his trip, Taqizadeh went to Tbilisi where the Russian police force also followed his activities. There he met Dehkhoda and M'ozad al-Saltaneh who left for Paris

³²⁴ Ibid., 92.

³²⁵ Ra'in, *Heydar Khan*, 111.

³²⁶ Ibid., 104.

before Taqizadeh.³²⁷ In order to help Sattar Khan and his fighters in Tabriz, Taqizadeh continued his activities in Tbilisi. Mohammad Taqi Sadeqof's diaries outline some of these activities. Mohammad Taqi Sadeqof writes that the Social Democrats of Tbilisi had promised to send help to Tabriz but because of the lack of funds they had realised that in order to gather sufficient support they needed to secure help from the Georgians and Armenians. Sadeqof continues that in order to convince Armenians to help, Taqizadeh gave a lengthy talk in the Armenian Dashnaksion Committee about being Iranian and the role of ethnicities saying, "We are all one nation, sharing the same land which is now in trouble. The independence of Iran is in danger. You should help in every other way."³²⁸ According to Sadeqof, Armenians stated that they already had a committee active in Tabriz and so did not help. But eventually with the help of Heydar Khan they managed to get some support from the Georgians who offered whatever help they could provide. Besides sending money and ammunition to Tabriz, 38 Georgians and 42 Muslim fighters were sent to Tabriz.³²⁹ In a further attempt to help the fighters in Tabriz, Taqizadeh sent a letter to Istanbul and encouraged the Iranians living there to collect money and send it to Sadeqof in Tbilisi.³³⁰

Another remaining letter from Taqizadeh to Sattar Khan in Tabriz, which reveals Taqizadeh's plans for the opposition at this point and the importance of Tabriz resistance for him, sheds more light on his decision to go to Europe. The letter was written August 20, 1908 while Taqizadeh was in Tbilisi. According to this letter, Taqizadeh's initial plan had been to go back to Tabriz but having changed his mind he decided to travel to Europe. The reason for this could be that initially he did not have enough money to travel to Europe but after receiving some money for the trip, he changed his mind. Nevertheless, as he wrote in the letter, the main reason he postponed his trip to Tabriz and instead went to Europe, was to prevent the Shah from receiving a fresh loan from European countries; "If the Shah and Iranian government receive a cash loan, our case is finished and we will be completely

³²⁷ For more information about Dehkhoda and his political activities see: Nahid Nosrat Mozaffari, "Crafting Constitutionalism: Ali Akbar Dehkhoda and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2001), <https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl/dissertations-theses/crafting-constitutionalism-ali-akbar-dehkhoda/docview/275854702/se-2?accountid=12045>.

³²⁸ Ra'in, *Heydar Khan*, 113-4.

³²⁹ Ibid.,

³³⁰ It seems that at this point Taqizadeh and his friends had decided to make the Tbilisi a centre from which to send help to Tabriz.

defeated. If they cannot get the loan they will be defeated for certain. This is so clear that it needs no further explanation.... There were not enough people within my group of friends and associates who were up to this task so the decision was taken that I postpone my trip to Tabriz. It was necessary for me to go immediately to Europe in order to prevent the loan. I will return to Tabriz in a month".³³¹ He also asked Sattar Khan to prepare a letter to be sent to the French Parliament on behalf of "Sattar Khan and all the Azerbaijani Nation" to protest against any foreign loans.³³² In the letter, Taqizadeh also encouraged Sattar Khan and his fighters to resist any governmental forces, to announce an official government in Tabriz and to establish a temporary national parliament in Tabriz. Since the Turkish army had entered into Iranian territory, Taqizadeh also wanted to solve the territorial border disputes between the Ottomans and Iran by attracting the sympathy of the "Young Turks" who were the constitutionalists in Turkey and had come to power after the July 1908 revolution. He advised Sattar Khan to write to the "Young Turks" in Istanbul and request that, as both countries now wanted freedom and to fight against dictatorship, they put aside the old disputes and unite.

The tone of the letter reveals that Taqizadeh considered himself one of the political leaders of the Tabriz movement which he clearly believed thus entitled him to set a road map for the future and outline what the opposition should demand. Taqizadeh had noticed the importance of the legitimacy of a government and wanted to show the international community that Mohammad Ali Shah no longer had legitimacy as the Shah of Iran. At this point, as expressed in the letter, his goal was to depose Mohammad Ali Shah and give the throne to the Shah's son, Crown Prince Ahmad Mirza.

3:10 Leaving the Caucasus

While in Tbilisi, Taqizadeh's brother-in-law and close friend, Mirza Mohammad Ali Tarbiat, who had fled from Tabriz, joined him. Together with Tarbiat and Hossein

³³¹ Taqizadeh, "Nameh be Ruznameh-e Times," in *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyyat*, ed., Afshar 132-6.

³³² Consequently, a telegram was sent about the loan by the Azerbaijan Assembly to the French Senate and National Parliament. See: Amirkhizi, 191.

Parviz³³³, Taqizadeh set off on the journey to Europe, taking with him the money which the businessmen of Baku had provided and some that Tarbiat had brought from Tabriz. Taqizadeh and Tarbiat together bought a bill of exchange from a bank which could be cashed anywhere in the world and took the five or six-day train journey from Tbilisi to Vienna. Owing to bad fortune, on the second day of the journey, the suitcase in which Taqizadeh kept his important documents as well as the bill of exchange was stolen. Abandoning the train near Vladikavkaz to search for the suitcase, they stayed with a friend Taqizadeh knew from Tabriz. Their search for the lost suitcase was unfortunately in vain. Having no money to continue their trip, they had decided to go back to Tbilisi. But, Taqizadeh's friend lent them 300 Rubles, which enabled them to continue their journey to Vienna and on to Paris, where many Iranians, including Dehkhoda and Mo'azed al-Saltaneh, had fled and had gathered, in the hope of forming an opposition group against the Shah. From Paris, Taqizadeh travelled on to London, from where he would continue his political activities, aiming to re-establish the Constitution in Iran.

The following episode is one that sheds light on the relationship between Taqizadeh and one of his closest friends, Mohammad Ali Tarbiat and the story of the stolen bag. Although questions may be raised as to the reliability and objectivity of the following account by Kasmaei, his account of the missing bag allows us to view the event through the eyes of someone other than Taqizadeh. Kasmaei narrates that one night, travelling to Istanbul with Mohammad Ali Tarbiat, Tarbiat had told Kasmaei that Taqizadeh had little kindness, manliness, humanity, feelings or spirituality; that he was fake and dishonest. He thinks only about his own benefit even though he deprives everyone else of any. According to Kasmaei, referring to their trip from Iran, Tarbiat recounted:

³³³ Aqa Hossein Tehrani (Parviz) was the son of Aqa Mirza Mohammad Ali. He went to exile after the closure of the first Parliament to fight with other constitutionalists against Mohammad Ali Shah. He helped Dehkhoda and Mo'azed al-Saltaneh in Switzerland (Yverdon) to publish *Sur-e Esrafil*. After the constitutionalists won Tehran, he returned to Iran and became an influential member of the Democrat Party. He was particularly active in publishing the party's newspaper *Iran-e Now*. Later he withdrew from politics and together with Taqizadeh established the "Tehran" publishing company. He ran the company until his death. See: *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyat*, ed., Afshar, 323.

When we departed from Iran together, Taqizadeh had a large amount of money and bills of exchange in his bag which I knew about and which Taqizadeh was aware I knew of. He was wondering how to avoid having to share any of it with me, despite our friendship and close relationship. But my own self-respect and honour would never have allowed me to have had any expectations of him nor think about taking advantage of him. I was a true constitutionalist and I was committed to working towards Iran's progress through education. That was the reason I had accepted that dangerous mission. You know, as do my other friends, that I have no other intention than this. Unlike Taqizadeh, I want nothing for myself and I do not deceive others. In short, we departed from Baku and took the train. We had to be on board for two days and nights until we reached Batumi. As soon as we arrived in Batumi, Taqizadeh, in a panic and agitated, came and told me, "Do you know that they have stolen my bag. Whatever I had; they have taken. I do not know what to do. All we can afford with the last money I have in my pocket is a ship ticket to Istanbul." I reassured him that it was not a disaster as, once in Istanbul, the Iranians would compensate us. He hoped for this. In Istanbul I realised that he himself had taken the money and the credit notes out of the bag, put them in his pocket and thrown the empty bag out of the train. He wanted to make it clear to me that I should expect nothing from him.³³⁴

To fully appreciate the importance of all of Taqizadeh's activities beginning with the letter he wrote to the British whilst still sheltering in the British Legation and continuing with his efforts in Europe, it is necessary to understand the political landscape of Europe during that period.

³³⁴ Abolqasem Kasmaei, *Khaterat Abolqasem Kasmaei* [The Diaries of Abolqasem Kasmaei], ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Qatreh, 2007), 320-1.

3:11 Europe at the turn of the Nineteenth Century

The nineteenth century was an age of dramatic changes in Europe. Industrialisation, modernisation, revolutions in communications, technology, and science, the rise of the strong state, mass politicization, and the growth of liberalism, nationalism, socialism, and democracy were among the fundamental changes that occurred in Europe during this century.³³⁵

Demographically the population doubled during the nineteenth century in Europe from 205 million in 1800s to 414 million in 1900.³³⁶ In 1900, 24.9 percent of the world population was living in Europe,³³⁷ not taking into account the 38 million who migrated outside Europe in the course of the century.³³⁸ This demographic change had a positive impact on economic growth, ensuring that there were no labour shortages in the increasingly industrial Europe.³³⁹ Industrialisation and the development of factories using modern machinery created many job opportunities across the continent. A shift to powered, special-purpose machinery sped up the production of goods.

Industrialisation led to urbanisation and cities began to expand and become more populated and this facilitated the formation of new social classes. People could now travel more easily and visit more distant lands by using trains and better roads. Communication had also improved during the nineteenth century with the invention of the electric telegraph in 1837. The invention of new means of transportation, such as steamboats and railroads, facilitated the fast and easy transport of goods produced in the factories to near and more distant locations outside Europe. These developments expanded European influence across the globe.

The nineteenth century was known as the age of European colonisation. European countries began to trade on a large scale with countries outside the continent and directed their expansion towards Africa and Asian countries. Following on from other European

³³⁵ Paul W. Schroeder, "International Politics, Peace, and War, 1815-1914" in *A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Europe: 1789-1914* ed., Stefan Berger, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 159.

³³⁶ T.C.W. Blanning, *The Nineteenth Century: 1789-1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 1.

³³⁷ Robert Lee, "Demography, Urbanization, and Migration," in Berger, 56.

³³⁸ Blanning, 1.

³³⁹ Lee, 68.

nations, Germany, too, expanded its influence abroad in the 1880s. After its unification under Prussia's rule, it also emerged as an industrial power. This extended international trade and rivalry between European nations as they targeted new countries and regions. But since that new trade was largely pointed to Europe, it strengthened European domination. In the early nineteenth century Europe was not so dependent on raw materials coming from outside Europe. European industrialisation led to an increase in demand for agricultural and industrial raw materials as well as for other goods. Parts of Asia were gradually drawn into this process of European industrialisation. India, for instance, as part of the British Empire, became a chief source of raw materials. This period of industrialisation and the rise of the middle class in Europe would not have been possible without these supplies and the intensification of exchange with Asia.³⁴⁰

Between the congress of Vienna and the start of the First World War there were five great powers in Europe; Austria (Austria-Hungary, after 1867), Great Britain, France, Prussia (Germany, after 1871) and Russia. Besides these great powers there were other countries in Europe which were considered "secondary states" such as Italy or Ottoman Turkey. The dominance of the five or six powers over such a long period had created instability in international relationships during this time.³⁴¹ This period saw the weakening of the authority of the Ottoman Empire especially in its Central Asian and North African provinces. Afghanistan and Persia, too, were witnessing political instability. These were the only non-European issues which concerned the European powers and greatly affected their relations with one another.³⁴²

By the mid nineteenth century Russia which was expanding its empire and had already advanced into Central Asia was gradually threatening the interests of Britain in the Indian subcontinent. As Edward Grey stated, "Russian advances towards the Indian frontier were

³⁴⁰ Rolf Walter, "Economic Relations between Europe and the World: Dependence and Interdependence" in <http://ieg-ego.eu/>.

³⁴¹ Roy Bridge, Roger Bulle, *The Great Powers and the European States System 1814-1914*, (New York: Routledge, 2013), 1.

³⁴² Ibid, 6.

the most dangerous, the longest standing, or the most likely to recur”.³⁴³ This was after the short-lived threat at the end of eighteenth century of the French led by Napoleon who had plotted to conquer India by passing through Iran. The Russians had already expanded their territory in the Caucasus at the beginning of the century. They had conquered Georgia in 1801 and through a series of wars had annexed a large portion of north-western Iran, including Baku and other important towns such as Darband and Ganjeh, leading to two humiliating treaties for the Iranian side. By the Treaty of Golestan, Iran also gave up her right to maintain a navy in the Caspian Sea. Until the 1830s the British government had not considered Russia as a serious threat to India.³⁴⁴ According to Denis Wright, “...by the early 1830s London and Calcutta had become increasingly concerned with the threat to India from Russia’s expansionist policies: henceforth this danger became almost an obsession in British imperial thinking.”³⁴⁵ The Russian threat and its growing power were reflected in the European press and were a great concern for Europeans. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century the assumption in Europe was that a war between Britain and Russia was inevitable. Russia’s plan to rule in Central Asia and expand its power and Britain’s policy of blocking this is famously referred to as “The Great Game”. In the midst of the Anglo-Russia struggle, “The Persian Government, conscious of its own weakness, considered that its best hope lay in playing off one Government as far as it could against the other, and maintaining as far as it could equipoise of bad relations between Britain and Russia.”³⁴⁶ After the 1907 agreement the policy of keeping two imperialist powers against each other would become ineffective. As will be discussed in the following parts of this chapter, Taqizadeh, as someone who had fully grasped the implication of all of these global events, had realised that he must endeavour to maintain the rivalry between Britain and Russia and take advantage of it for the sake of the independence of Iran.

³⁴³ Viscount Grey of Fallodon, *Twenty-five years, 1892-1916* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1925), 1: 152.

³⁴⁴ Paul W. Schroeder, “The 19th Century International System: Changes in the Structure”, *World Politics*, 39, no. 1 (1986), 15.

³⁴⁵ Wright, *The English Amongst the Persians*, 3.

³⁴⁶ Grey of Fallodon, 1: 154.

3:12 British Foreign Policy during the Nineteenth Century

The question of how to handle foreign affairs was a subject of dispute in Britain in the nineteenth century. Radicals and Liberal governments had differing opinions about how Britain should act with regards to foreign policy. Radicals believed that the British government's policy in keeping the balance of power in Europe created much tension and increased the threat of war. To decrease the inevitability of war, Radicals advocated a policy of supporting the weak and oppressed nations in the world. They believed that independence of the weak nations was important in order to prevent any dangerous confrontation between the dominant powers over these countries. These ideas were expressed throughout the nineteenth century but it was just after 1905 that the radicals began to protest against the policy of the balance of power in Europe which the foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey was implementing.³⁴⁷ Grey's policy sacrificed the independence of the weaker countries. The Radicals were against the 1907 agreement with Russia over Iran, Afghanistan and Tibet. They criticised Grey "for committing Britain to the support of the most reactionary regime in Europe".³⁴⁸ Following the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 in Iran and Mohammad Ali Shah's hostility towards the Constitutionalists, the Shah ordered the destruction of the Parliament with the help of the Russians. Consequently, the British Radicals showed more sympathy towards the Constitutionalists. Since Russia was increasingly helping the Shah to suppress the Constitutionalists especially during the Tabriz resistance, the Radicals insisted that it was Britain's duty to support a constitutional government in Iran and not the tyrant Shah. Grey was under attack from his political opponents who were now preparing themselves for more organised activities against his policy towards Iran and Russia. One such opponent was Henry Finnis Blosse Lynch, who despite being a Liberal-imperialist, criticised the 1907 agreement and joined the leftist opposition to Grey. The left also approached Browne, in the hope that he would form a campaign against Grey, since he had in-depth knowledge about Iran and had many associates among the Iranian community and was concerned about the fate of weaker

³⁴⁷ D. McLean, "English Radicals, Russia, and the Fate of Persia 1907-1913" in *The English Historical Review* 93, no. 367 (1978): 338. Accessed May 3, 2018. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/567065>.

³⁴⁸ Ibid., 339.

nations.³⁴⁹ Taqizadeh's presence in Europe as one of the most distinguished Iranian exiles would be beneficial for Browne and his friends in forming a strong opposition.

3:13 Edward Browne and Taqizadeh's Journey to London

*I heard about your attributes and fell in love with you,
Having not seen your auspicious face,
Thinking of you I became impatient,
What will happen if I see your face!*

These were the opening lines, written in Persian poetry, of the very first letter Browne wrote to Taqizadeh, 5 August 1908, showing interest in hosting him in England. Besides expressing his eagerness to meet Taqizadeh, Browne also offered his help to Taqizadeh and his friends whilst resident in England. Taqizadeh in his autobiography, referring to this letter, writes that Browne had written, "If you come here, we could work together". Taqizadeh specifies that Browne meant "working for the sake of the Constitution" but in the original copy of the letter Browne just mentions, "according to what they have written" to him from Tehran. Taqizadeh and his friends may have planned to visit England and he expresses his eagerness to meet and help them.³⁵⁰ One can infer from this that some friends of Browne, probably in the British Legation in Tehran, had advised Taqizadeh to travel to Britain and they had also informed Browne about the plan. Clearly, Taqizadeh in his autobiography wants to emphasise that it was Browne who had invited him to Britain and he had not intended to go there initially. Considering the time period in which he was writing his autobiography, this could be due to Taqizadeh's fear that if he had mentioned this in his narrative it would intensify the conspiracy theory prevalent in Iranian circles that he was a British agent. Since on the date that Taqizadeh was to arrive Browne would not

³⁴⁹ Mansour Bonakdarian, "The Persia Committee and the Constitutional Revolution in Iran," in *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 18, no.2 (1991), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/196039> (accessed December 20, 2018), 189.

³⁵⁰ Browne had friends with diplomatic positions working in Iran who had once been his students at Cambridge.

be in Britain, Browne ordered his Iranian assistant, Sheikh Hassan Tabrizi,³⁵¹ to host them.³⁵² However, Taqizadeh purchased a cheap return ticket to London and travelled there together with Haji Mirza Aqa Farshi, another Azerbaijani member of the First Parliament, leaving Mohammad Ali Tarbiat in Paris. In London they stayed in a boarding-house that Sheikh Hassan had provided for Taqizadeh and Mo'azed al-Saltaneh. The expenses were covered by Browne.

Browne had some interests in hosting Taqizadeh and other exiled constitutionalists. He had realised the benefit of working with Iranian political refugees, in particular the Members of Parliament residing in Europe. Co-operation with them would help him to form a more effective opposition against Grey's foreign policy in the Middle East, especially in Iran. Grey's foreign policy was more favourable towards Russian interests and thus not favoured by Taqizadeh and other constitutionalists. In the face of criticism, Grey ignored Russian responsibility in aiding the Royalist attack on the Parliament. For those who were against the British foreign policy, the presence of Iranian exiles in the country could be used to help to discredit official news of Russian intervention in events in Iran. "The exiles' presence also demonstrated the abominable nature and outcome of Grey's accord with St. Petersburg."³⁵³ At the same time Grey was pleased with the 1907 Anglo-Russian agreement because this agreement allayed his fears about "further Russian advances in the direction of the Indian frontier"³⁵⁴. In fact, Grey was in favour of the opening of a new Parliament by the Shah. Some other Liberal Members of the British Parliament, however, like Lynch, who had investments in Iran, were more worried about

³⁵¹ Sheikh Hassan Tabrizi known also as Sheikh Hassan of Cambridge had been exiled from Istanbul. Sheikh Hassan taught Persian in Cambridge between 1906-7 and prior to that published a newspaper called *Khelafat* in London together with a refugee from Egypt called Najib Hendieh. Sheikh Hassan returned to Iran in early 1910 and for about a year published a newspaper in Tehran called *Asr*. He also wrote some letters about the situation of Iran to Browne. Hassan Javadi, introduction to *Nameh-ha 'i az Tabriz* [Letters from Tabriz] by Edward G. Browne (Tehran: Kharazmi, 2008), 19.

³⁵² Browne to Taqizadeh, Cambridge, 5 August 1908, in *Nameh-hay-e Edward Browne be Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh* [Letters of Edward Browne to Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh], eds., Abbas Zaryab Khoei and Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Ketabkhay-e Jibi, 1992), 1-2.

³⁵³ Bonakdarian, "Iranian Constitutional Exiles and British Foreign-Policy Dissenters, 1908-9," in *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 27, no. 2 (1995), 180.

³⁵⁴ Grey of Fallodon, 1: 159.

the negative effects that this agreement could cause for the business interests of Britain in Iran and Ottoman Iraq and were supporting Browne.³⁵⁵

Likewise, Taqizadeh was also pursuing his own interests; publicising the tyranny of the Shah, stopping the increasing influence of Russia over Iran and restoring the Constitution. Browne's invitation was a good opportunity to pursue his aim. Besides these reasons, one should not forget Taqizadeh's adverse financial and psychological state at this point of his life and the effects this may have had on his decisions. Denis Wright describes Taqizadeh's situation during that period as "impecunious".³⁵⁶ Hesam al-Dowleh Mo'ezzi who had seen Taqizadeh in London and had been asked by Mo'azed al-Saltaneh to show him around in London, described Taqizadeh at that time. His comments imply Taqizadeh's difficult financial state. This is one of the first times that Taqizadeh is described as not wearing his usual clergy attire:

...a young thin man with dark complexion and sunken cheeks came to visit me. Mr. Taqizadeh was wearing a very short coat, tight trousers, baggy at the knees and a red flowery handkerchief round his neck. He talked with a Turkish accent. He showed me Mo'azed al-Saltaneh's visiting card. We chatted a bit; I liked that he was knowledgeable about current affairs and politics. For a few days I spent some Shillings on him. We visited museums and historical gardens. He was very happy and satisfied, whereas I was not, since first of all his clothes caused some people to laugh at him and secondly, he had the idea of an independent Azerbaijan.³⁵⁷

This is one of the rare occasions that we witness Taqizadeh talking about an independent Azerbaijan. He was always an advocate for an independent Iran by focusing on Persian language and culture as a crucial unifying element. The reason he talked about an

³⁵⁵ Bonakdarian, "Iranian Constitutional Exiles and British Foreign-Policy Dissenters, 1908-9", 180.

³⁵⁶ Denis Wright, *The Persians amongst the English: episodes in Anglo-Persian history* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1985), 203.

³⁵⁷ Hesam al-Dowleh Mo'ezzi, *Khaterat-e Hesam al-Dowleh Mo'ezzi* [Memoirs of Hesam al-Dowleh Mo'ezzi], ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Soraya, 2000), 53.

independent Azerbaijan could be because of the unfortunate and hapless situation of Iran at that time. Azerbaijan was the only strong centre of resistance for the constitutionalists. Most probably Taqizadeh felt hopeless about re-establishing the Constitution throughout the whole of Iran and saw the independence of Azerbaijan as a practical inevitable solution to prevent the movement from dying out. He also wanted to introduce the Tabriz Assembly as the legitimate government in Iran.³⁵⁸

Browne who had the intention of recording the history of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran encouraged Taqizadeh to stay in Britain and offered him a small job in Cambridge, listing Persian and Arabic books in the library. Browne wrote, "I was fortunate enough to be able to obtain for him some little employment in the Cambridge University Library during the autumn of that year, and thus for several weeks enjoyed daily conversations with him and his friend and partner Mirza Muhammad Ali Khan. All that I saw of him only served to confirm and deepen the favourable impression already produced by the reports of common friends. He struck me as a man equally".³⁵⁹ With Browne's help, Taqizadeh initiated his activities in London by preparing a manifesto together with Mo'azed al-Saltaneh and sending it to *The Times* newspaper. Part of this statement was published on 15 October 1908. *The Times* wrote, "The manifesto which we have received for publication, is signed by Taghi-zada [Taqizadeh] and the Moazid-es Saltana [Mo'azed al-Saltaneh] and represents their views and those of their fellow-exiles on the Persian crisis".³⁶⁰ The gist of the statement was that foreign countries, in particular Russia, should not interfere in the internal affairs of Iran; "We are confident that if Persia is left alone, and

³⁵⁸ On 13 August 1908 *Hekmat* newspaper quoting a Russian paper writes that; "a strong party in Tabriz, Azerbaijan province, has been formed by wealthy powerful people who are actively trying to separate the province and establish an independent country. The streets and alleys of the city are full of their announcements; attempting to galvanize people against Russia, others trying to encourage an army of young people of the province to achieve their goal of independence ...". *Hekmat*, Year 16, No 916, page 9, 13 August 1908. The Manchester Guardian (December 14, 1908) also cites comments made during interviews with two Russian newspapers by the Russian Minister at Tehran, M. Hardwig; "He says that there is in the northern province of Azerbaijan, of which Tabriz is the centre, a popular movement for 'the separation and organisation of an autonomous province. Only, that separation will not be allowed by the interested powers-Russia and Great Britain'. Another document stating that Russia was against an independent establishment in Azerbaijan: Nicolson to Grey, telegram, 9 January 1909, in *Persia No. 2 Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Persia: In Continuation of Persia No. 1* (1909), (London: Harrison and Sons, 1909), 20.

³⁵⁹ Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909*, 332.

³⁶⁰ "The Persian Nationalists," *London Times*, October 15, 1908.

if the Great Powers of Europe will refrain from giving the shah moral or material support, our case is certain to triumph”.³⁶¹ Furthermore, the manifesto emphasised that the Parliament had avoided any strong resistance since the constitutionalists were threatened with Russian intervention in the event of them acting against the Shah. The statement also highlighted the horrifying situation in Tabriz. The manifesto asked that foreign countries to no longer give loans to the Iranian government in the absence of a legitimate Parliament. In describing the achievements of the First Parliament, the manifesto explained how people were given equal rights irrespective of race or religion. Part of this statement which was bitter about the Shah and his personality was not published. This was due to the fact that the policy of the Liberal politicians was to avoid any extremist actions and dispel extremist ideas. It was also the case when some of the ulama in Najaf who supported the Constitutionalists sent a declaration to all European governments. They condemned Mohammad Ali Shah as a tyrant and declared his government’s decisions and any loan agreements with foreign banks invalid. Lynch strongly refused to publish such extreme words against the Shah in a British paper. He was concerned about the consequences of such an act which could cause more unrest and encourage foreign intervention in Iran.³⁶² Browne also expressed his concern about such extreme behaviour, when the first issue of *Sur-e Esrafil* was published in Yverdon after an article in which Dehkhoda had bitterly attacked the Shah. Browne wrote to Mo‘azed al-Saltaneh, “In my opinion, writing bitterly like that about the shah has no benefit in this situation. Whatever is said [about the Shah] is true but it is not always necessary to state the obvious”.³⁶³ It is clear that at this point Browne was hoping that the constitutionalists would make peace with the Shah. That could be one reason that Taqizadeh’s condemnation of the Shah also gradually lessened before he returned to Tabriz to try to negotiate with the Shah, despite the fact that the revolutionaries and Sattar Khan opposed his plan. It seems that in the beginning Taqizadeh had had a hard time compromising his ideals.

³⁶¹ Ibid.

³⁶² Mangol Bayat, *Iran’s First Revolution: Shiism and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1909*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 245.

³⁶³ Browne to Mo‘azd al-Saltaneh, 10 February 1909, in *Mobarezeh ba Mohammad Ali Shah*, ed., Iraj Afshar, 201.

One of the letters that Taqizadeh wrote to Browne when he was in London, dated 19 October 1908, is clearly representative of the confused and difficult situation in which he found himself in Europe and at the same time reflects on his relationship with Browne:

... I am now an unfortunate Iranian in Europe. I do not know what I should do. I do not speak the language well enough to be able to carry out any useful activities here. I do not have enough financial credit to prevent me from sitting and worrying. I can do nothing for my country other than sit here and, like a person disappointed with the world, cry over the miserable state of my country which is imprisoned by the European countries who do not give us a moment's peace.

Now I make a plea to you, honourable friend, that as a friend of Iran, a humanist and a defender of the oppressed, you give me some advice about where I should go and what I should do. What should I do to save my country? My hope and that of all Iranian patriots was Tabriz and our sole happiness in the world was linked to that. Now that the Shah has managed to achieve nothing, the Russians are coming to help him.³⁶⁴ I came to Europe in order to be able to do something to help my nation and to prevent any Russian interference. I had hoped that as soon as I had reached London, I would have been able to meet some of the Members of Parliament and visit the Foreign Minister. I thought that I could give conferences and express my views in detail and that the newspapers would run copious stories covering that news. I thought that in one week I could carry out this important service for my country. But now I see that I have been sitting in a room with my friends (who had come here precisely for the same purpose) for nearly forty days and achieved very little apart from two short articles that the owner of the newspaper edited according to his own whims, which did little to express our aims. Now I do not know what I can do and where I should go to achieve something. Does your Excellency give permission for us to stay here

³⁶⁴ It is a reference to the news that "two companies of Russian infantry and 100 Russian Cossacks" were on their way to Tabriz from Jolfa. Nicholson to Sir Edward Grey, telegram, 17 October 1908, in *Persia No. 1* (1909), 192.

for a short while and busy ourselves with trying to achieve what we set out to do?³⁶⁵

Although the tone of Taqizadeh in this letter is humble, it seems that he indirectly complains to Browne and his associates who had advised them to go to Britain that what they had promised him and his friends had not come true and that they had not been able to achieve as much as they had hoped.

Browne's reply was short but sympathetic and suggests that he was willing to do whatever he could to assist Taqizadeh and clearly wanted to placate Taqizadeh:

God knows that I want to do whatever I can to help. I have already tried but unfortunately so far in vain. However, I will continue to do my best in whatever way I can. But what can a person without any influence do when faced with Sultans, ministers and dictators. These ministers are thinking only of their own interests and do not care about others. I managed to reach Sir Edward Grey with great difficulty and I talked at length. Later I wrote a long petition. I subsequently tried to take your Excellency to him but was unable. For the time being there is no other choice. Here it is not like Iran where one can force oneself upon the King or one of the ministers.³⁶⁶

But soon, with the help of Grey's leftist critics, Browne was able to satisfy Taqizadeh by launching a more organised campaign against the Liberal government's foreign policy towards Iran by forming the Persia Committee. A meeting was arranged for Taqizadeh and Mo'azed al-Saltaneh to meet Lynch who introduced them to other opposition members.³⁶⁷ They agreed that Taqizadeh would prepare an article to read for a group of 25 Members of Parliament.³⁶⁸ Taqizadeh asked Browne to translate the article into English. On 29 October

³⁶⁵ Taqizadeh to Browne, 19 October 1908, in *Browne Papers*, 1-1-8.

³⁶⁶ Browne to Taqizadeh, 20 October 1908, in *Nameh-hay-e Edward Browne be Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh*, eds., Zaryab and Afshar, 9-10.

³⁶⁷ Taqizadeh to Browne, 20 October 1908, in *Browne Papers*, 1-1-8.

³⁶⁸ Taqizadeh to Browne, 28 October 1908, in *Ibid.*, 1-1-7

1908, Taqizadeh together with Mo‘azed al-Saltaneh delivered the speech under the title of “A Summary of Recent Developments in Iran”.

As Bayat has referred to, it seems that “the committee’s task was to induce the constitutionalists to follow a course of moderate, loyalist opposition, selecting from among them those figures most likely to succeed as leaders of a restored constitutional monarch regime”.³⁶⁹ Educating young Iranian politicians is clearly what Lynch wanted when he wrote to Browne about Taqizadeh, “I hope that your Taghi Zada [Taqizadeh] is attending courses or learning English as quickly as possible to enable him to do so. Our committee shall have as one of its objects the looking after young Persians coming over here to study and the equipping them for functions of Government.”³⁷⁰

When there was some discussion of Taqizadeh’s return to Iran, Lynch wrote to Browne, “Taghi Zada [Taqizadeh] ought surely to remain here and study. Who knows how long it may be before things are ready for him out there?”³⁷¹

3:14 The Persia Committee

The creation of the Persia Committee was mainly due to the organised efforts of Browne and his old friend from his schooldays, Lynch. Lynch knew the region very well and had travelled there extensively since he owned shipping services and roads in and around the Persian Gulf.³⁷² The primary aim of the Persia Committee was to set out a campaign in order to create a change in British foreign policy such as would force the Russians to respect the independence and integrity of Iran. The members of the committee were prominent members of both houses of parliament and some journalists and writers. Lynch

³⁶⁹ Bayat, 245.

³⁷⁰ Quoted in Shiva Balaghi, “Nationalism and Cultural Production in Iran, 1848-1906,” (PhD diss., The University of Michigan, 2008), 71. Accessed December 16, 2016. <https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl/dissertations-theses/nationalism-cultural-production-iran-1848-1906/docview/304573861/se-2?accountid=12045>.

³⁷¹ Ibid.

³⁷² Christopher N. B. Ross, “Persia Committee (act. 1908–1914),” in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (2010). Accessed 17 December, 2016. <https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-100991>.

became the Chairman and Browne the Vice Chairman of the committee with R.H. Gretton of the Manchester Guardian as the Secretary.³⁷³

The objectives of the Persia Committee which were drafted in December 1908 were first “to stimulate public interest in the Persian people and in their efforts to regenerate Persia; and to enlist it on the side of the declared policy of Great Britain and Russia –namely, non-intervention in Persia”.³⁷⁴ The second objective was to influence British public opinion in order to support restoring of the Constitution in Iran.³⁷⁵ These political aims supported those of Taqizadeh, who was determined to reveal the situation of Iran to an international audience and make the world aware of the tyranny of Russia in Iran. Thus, the Committee’s aims greatly pleased Taqizadeh and his fellow constitutionalists.

As the news about Tabriz and its revolution against the Shah came predominantly through Russian sources, the Persia Committee in London decided to send an English correspondent to Tabriz in order to provide an alternative source of reporting the situation.

3:15 Browne and Iran

The importance of Edward Browne’s friendship with Taqizadeh and the influence they had on each other’s political and scholarly activities necessitates a brief summary of Browne’s life, his ideas and intellectual heritage.

Edward Granville Browne, son of a wealthy shipbuilder, was born on 7 February, 1862 in Uley, Gloucestershire.³⁷⁶ His father, Sir Benjamin Granville, sent him to preparatory school at Glenalmond, to Eton College and Cambridge University.³⁷⁷ His political and professional work merged soon after he finished his elementary education. His uncle had voluntarily participated in the Russo-Turkish War (1877–78) fighting for the Ottomans.

³⁷³ Bonakdarian, *Iranian Constitutional Exiles*, 175-191.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

³⁷⁶ Hassan Taqizadeh, “Khatabeh dar Majles-e Sugvari-e Browne [Eulogy at Browne’s Memorial Service],” in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 1: 254-268.

³⁷⁷ G. Michael Wickens, Juan Cole, Kamran Ekbal, “Browne, Edward Granville,” *Encyclopædia Iranica*, IV/5, pp. 483-488, available online: <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/browne-edward-granville> (accessed 30 December, 2012).

Browne developed the same anti-Russian feelings and sympathy for Ottoman Turkey as his uncle. As he wrote himself, he “watched the progress of this struggle with eager attention.”³⁷⁸ Browne’s original intention was to attend a military school and then join the Turkish army as an officer. However, his father was against this decision and persuaded Browne to study medicine. Browne went to medical school with the hope that he could still join the Ottoman army as a military doctor.

His enthusiasm for Ottoman Turkey led him to start learning the Turkish language. Since he found out that in order to successfully master Ottoman Turkish, he must know Persian and Arabic, he began to learn Persian in the summer of 1880.³⁷⁹ He consequently mastered all three languages. This subsequently allowed him a deeper insight into and engagement with the politics of the East. This engagement would intensify after his first visit to Istanbul in June 1882.³⁸⁰ Reading the works of Gobineau, who had served as the chargé d’affaires in Iran, in particular his famous book about the philosophy and religions in Asia, he became interested in knowing more about the different religions and especially the Babi movement in Iran.³⁸¹

Abandoning the idea of joining the Turkish army, Browne had hoped that his proficiency in Oriental languages would facilitate his employment in the British Consular Service in the Middle East. He was, however, disappointed to find out that they preferred the knowledge of European languages. Just as he was giving up hope he achieved a fellowship of his Cambridge College, allowing him the opportunity to spend a year in Iran. He travelled through Iran, visiting different towns and met and talked with the followers of various religions and beliefs. Later, in order to investigate more about Babism, he travelled to Cyphers and Akko and talked to the two rival brothers of the Babi movement,

³⁷⁸ Edward Granville Browne, *A Year Amongst the Persians* (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1893), 6.

³⁷⁹ Ibid, 11.

³⁸⁰ Ibid, 12.

³⁸¹ Edward Granville Browne, *Nuqtat al-Kaf* (Leiden: Brill, 1910).

Gobineau was in possession of the only original manuscript of *Nuqtat al-Kaf*, the early history of the Babi movement in Iran, written by Haji Mirza Jan Kashani, who was executed by the Iranian authorities in 1852. Browne who was searching for the manuscript managed to locate it in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris and published it.

Mirza Yahya Noori, known as Sobh-e Azal and Mirza Hossein Ali Noori, known as Bah al-Allah and collected much information about Babism.³⁸² When he returned to England he published his book about traveling in Iran, *A Year Amongst the Persians*, which brought him fame.³⁸³ Besides working as a lecturer and then professor of Oriental languages at Pembroke College, Cambridge, Browne published extensively about the history of Iran and Persian literature. He published a series of old Persian manuscripts. Being one of the people in charge of the Gibb family foundation, he dedicated money to publish Arabic, Turkish and Persian books and since he was more interested in Persian he published and edited mostly Persian books.³⁸⁴ One of Browne's most notable works was an extensive book in four volumes; *Literary History of Persia*.

When Mozaffar al-Din Shah travelled to Europe he agreed to meet Browne and was complimentary about his interest in Iran.³⁸⁵ Browne had many Iranians friends in Iran and other places. He had constant correspondence with them and updated his knowledge about the politics and literary affairs of Iran. He even had correspondence with the important Ulama of Najaf. He provided personal help and financial assistance for many Iranians who were in exile.³⁸⁶ Benefiting from such an extensive network of friends who were constantly in touch with him Browne wrote his other important book, *The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909* which described the happening of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran. The book was mostly based on Taqizadeh's narratives and the reports Browne's student Smart sent to him from Tehran. In writing the book, Browne had benefited from the help of Mohammad Qazvini and Sheikh Hassan Tabriz.

According to Taqizadeh, Browne was so saturated in Islamic culture and sciences that he himself considered his religious belief a mixture of Islam and Christianity.³⁸⁷ Taqizadeh believed that Browne, represented the positive side of the Iranians to Europe and helped

³⁸² Browne, *Nuqtat al-Kaf*.

³⁸³ Taqizadeh, "Khatabeh dar Majles-e Sugvari-e Browne," 44.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ G. Michael Wickens, Juan Cole, Kamran Ekbal, "Browne, Edward Granville," *Encyclopædia Iranica*, IV/5, pp. 483-488, available online: <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/browne-edward-granville> (accessed 30 December, 2012).

³⁸⁷ Taqizadeh, "Khatabeh dar Majles-e Sugvari-e Browne," 42.

the formation of a good image of Iran in general. As Taqizadeh has put it, the essence of Browne's opinion was that a group of politicians in Europe stirred unrest and constant miseries for the other nations and was responsible for the unhappiness of mankind.³⁸⁸

3:16 Taqizadeh and Browne

Working with Browne familiarised Taqizadeh more with European political ideas and furnished him with more ideas which helped him to develop his own view of practising modernity in Iran as well as using history and Iran's past to help build up a nation-state. Later in his life, Taqizadeh developed these ideas during the interwar period through his periodical *Kaveh*. His aim was to construct an "authentic" national identity for Iranians. It was through Orientalism that Taqizadeh would gain a new understanding of Iranian history.³⁸⁹ Taqizadeh, previously writing *Zad va Bum* in Tabriz, had expressed such tendencies by dividing inhabitants of Iran into four categories: 1. Iranians 2. Turks 3. Kurds and Bakhtiyaris. 4. Semites. He referred to Persian speaking people as "the Iranian element" and "one of the most well-favoured and shapely and intelligent in the world".³⁹⁰ Throughout his life Taqizadeh tried to build an Iranian identity based on the Persian language. At the same time Orientalism added a scientific aspect to the process of connecting Iran's past to its present.

Browne played a key role in connecting Iran and Britain since Browne's works and activities could be considered the starting point of the modern history of Iran in Britain. Iran was an exotic place for Browne and many of his contemporaries.³⁹¹ He saw the essence of Iran in Persian culture, language and literature. For instance, he considered the Persian speaking people as "much brighter, more intelligent, and more amiable than the natives of Azerbaijan". He described the Turkish speaking people as having "scowling faces and furtive grey eyes".³⁹² He immediately found a connection between the language and appearance of the people while leaving Azerbaijan and entering the Persian speaking part

³⁸⁸ Ibid, 51

³⁸⁹ Afshin Marashi, *Nationalizing Iran: Culture, Power, and the State, 1870-1940* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008), 81.

³⁹⁰ Hassan Taqizadeh and Mohammad Ali Tarbiat, *Zad va Bum* [Homeland], (Tabriz: Tarbiat, 1901), 48.

³⁹¹ C. A. Bayly, "The Orient: British Historical Writing about Asia since 1890" in *History and Historians in the Twentieth Century*, ed., Peter Burke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 93.

³⁹² Browne, *A Year Amongst the Persians*, 77.

of Iran; “The change in the appearance of the people is accompanied by a change in language, for this was the first place we came to at which the Persian tongue appeared to preponderate over the Turkish”. Browne highlighted the influence of the pre-Islamic history of Iran. He assumed the most important characteristic of Persians as a nation was their passion for mystical speculations. He believed that “Aryan freedom” had been overcome by “Arab steel” in the early years of the Islamic expansion.

Unlike many other Orientalists who believed the Persians had lost any creative element in thought and culture, Browne believed the creativity of Iranians was ongoing and had not decreased but was indeed developing. If ancient Persia’s religious creativity was expressed in Zoroastrianism and Mithraism, the Babi movement showed the capacity of contemporary Iranians to produce new interpretations based on Islam. Browne assumed that there was a continuity of Iranian identity throughout history.³⁹³ He regarded the Persian language and its literature as the core of this identity. In the political realm, Browne saw the Constitutional Revolution as the revival of Iran as an independent nation. One can trace this line of thought, too, in Taqizadeh’s ideas. Meeting Browne seems to have influenced Taqizadeh to consider Persian literature as an integral part of Iranian identity.

3:17 Persia’s Appeal to England

Taqizadeh was clearly dissatisfied and frustrated with the fact that all his views and concerns about the interference of Russia in the affairs of Iran were not being fully publicised and only partly published in the British press. Together with Mo‘azed al-Saltaneh he prepared another privately published text, titled “Persia’s Appeal to England”, addressed to members of the British Parliament and other politicians. His hope was that they were cognisant of the gravity of the Russian interference and aware of Russia’s “steady growth in Iran”³⁹⁴ The text signed by Taqizadeh and Mo‘azed al-Saltaneh on 27 October 1908 details the increase in Russia’s influence in different aspects of politics, trade and in the Iranian court. Frustrated by the growing interference of Russia in the affairs of Iran, they wanted to show that the Iranian constitutionalists and public opinion in general

³⁹³ C. A. Bayly, 93.

³⁹⁴ Taqizadeh and Mo‘azed al-Saltaneh, “Persia’s Appeal to England,” in *Maqallat-e Taqizadeh*, 7: 452.

viewed Britain favourably and considered the British as supporters of the establishment of an Iranian constitution and parliament. Support for the Iranian nationalists had weakened following the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, which, according to the text, not only endangered the independence of Iran but was also unfavourable for the interests of Britain in Iran. In the rest of the text the authors outline the increasing interference of Russia in the affairs of Iran in support of the Shah and against the interests of the Iranian people and Russia's role in the destruction of the Iranian parliament. Taqizadeh's fear that the Russians would send troops to break the resistance of constitutionalists in Tabriz is also expressed in this letter. Taqizadeh was at pains to reassure the British politicians that "the interests of Persian People and England are identical." Taqizadeh and other constitutionalists in exile hoped these facts would raise sympathy and convince the Liberal Party in Britain to act against the Russians who, according to the writers, were determined to eradicate the constitution in Iran. Taqizadeh had penned this text from abroad but he soon came to feel that more active opposition within Iran was preferable to propaganda from abroad. He decided to return to Iran and join the resisting revolutionary forces there.

3:18 Travelling to Tabriz

The struggle between the constitutionalists and the governmental forces in Tabriz was still on going after four months of intense fighting. The constitutionalists had managed to gain control over most parts of the town. They had succeeded in defeating the Royalists in the Davahchi district and had managed to dissolve the Eslamieh Assembly and push back the governmental forces to Basmenj on the outskirts of Tabriz. The Tabriz Assembly, which was controlling the town in the absence of a parliament, had officially declared itself the National Assembly. However, the Shah, angry about the situation in Tabriz, was plotting a complete siege of Tabriz and blocking the trade routes. This was the situation of the town until, in December 1909, Taqizadeh received a telegram from Jolfa, stating that the situation in Tabriz was not good and that he should go to Tabriz immediately. After discussing the case with Browne, Taqizadeh decided to travel to Tabriz. In a letter to Browne, Taqizadeh stated that Sattar Khan had asked him to go to Tabriz while he was doing what Taqizadeh had advised him to do.³⁹⁵ Browne was not happy about Taqizadeh's

³⁹⁵ Taqizadeh to Browne in *Browne Papers*, 1-1-45.

return because Taqizadeh played a key role in the campaign that they had organised against Grey's policies. Browne wrote, "It is a pity that you cannot stay longer".³⁹⁶ But, Taqizadeh was determined about his decision to go and had already begun to plan his journey with great secrecy since there was a high risk of him being arrested while passing through the Russian territory or in Iran before reaching Tabriz. Although some historians like Kasravi consider Taqizadeh's motives in going to Tabriz opportunistic and with the aim of holding power, this trip was not without risk for Taqizadeh.³⁹⁷ By returning to Tabriz from Europe, the British guarantee with regard to Taqizadeh's life and property would be officially cancelled.³⁹⁸ That is why Browne had advised him not to go to Iran through Russia. If his true identity was discovered by the Russians, he could be arrested and, in all likelihood, handed over to the Shah in Iran. Nevertheless, as the evidence implies, Taqizadeh had been under pressure from his friends and family to return to Tabriz. Mohammad Ali Tarbiat writes to Taqizadeh, emphasising that in Tabriz they needed him and his presence there would be highly beneficial.³⁹⁹ Additionally, Javad the younger brother of Taqizadeh, criticised Taqizadeh's continuing residence in Europe, arguing that it could not be helpful since foreigners had their own interests at heart; "If England were sincere in their efforts about this matter, the Iranian Parliament would have reopened by now. Thus, I do not understand why you do not depart for Tabriz. If we gain nothing else, at least our blood will be mixed with that of other martyrs of freedom in Azerbaijan".⁴⁰⁰ Further evidence is Browne's letter to Dehkhoda in which he writes about Taqizadeh's return to Tabriz; "as there was so much insistence from the other side, he [Taqizadeh] felt obliged to go...".⁴⁰¹

Taqizadeh first went to Paris and from there travelled to Istanbul on December 19, 1908.⁴⁰² Despite the danger, Taqizadeh travelled with a counterfeit passport to Odessa, trying to hide his identity, by wearing a beard. The 60-hour train journey took him from

³⁹⁶ Browne to Taqizadeh, 4 December 1909, in Javadi, 20.

³⁹⁷ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e Iran*, 2: 808.

³⁹⁸ Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, 9 January 1909, in *TNA*: FO 371/803.

³⁹⁹ Mohammad Ali Tarbiat to Taqizadeh, October 31, 1908, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 96-7.

⁴⁰⁰ Javad Taqizadeh to Hassan Taqizadeh, November 1908, in *Ibid.*, 100-7.

⁴⁰¹ Browne to Dehkhoda, January 23, 1909, in *Mobarezeh ba Mohammad Ali Shah*, ed., Afshar, 199.

⁴⁰² Taqizadeh to Browne, Istanbul, December 20, 1909, in *Browne Papers*, 1-1-61.

Odessa to Vladikavkaz.⁴⁰³ He continued to Baku and from there to Tbilisi, where he contacted Heydar Khan's father who helped him stay in Tbilisi for some days before he managed to reach Tabriz, his identity still hidden.⁴⁰⁴ Back on home soil he first went to his friend, Mirza Hossein Khan 'Edalat's house, had his hair cut there, put on his clerical robes and went to the Tabriz Assembly to begin a new phase in his life. After his arrival in Tabriz the last road connecting Tabriz to the outside world was blocked and the siege of Tabriz was complete. Thus, began another chapter in the Tabriz battles and the history of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution.

⁴⁰³ Taqizadeh to Browne, Vladikavkaz, 29 December 1909, in *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁴ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 101-2.

Chapter Four

Restoration of the Constitution and Return from Exile

As well as presenting the socio-political situation of Iran during the aftermath of the destruction of the First Parliament, the previous chapter scrutinised Taqizadeh's political and intellectual life, reflecting on the influence of external forces in developing his character. At the chapter's core was the idea that both events and Taqizadeh's reactions to those events simultaneously shaped his character. Although Taqizadeh's time in exile was aggravated by financial hardship, his trip to Europe broadened his political horizons and acquainted him greatly with the European political system and parliamentarism. His time in Europe also allowed him to witness democracy in practice. Moreover, the activities of Taqizadeh during this exile familiarised him with the importance of newspapers and journalism in politics.⁴⁰⁵ The main intellectual influence of this exile on Taqizadeh was in terms of his political outlook. It convinced him of the necessity of immediately pursuing party-building in Iran; an idea that he put into practice as soon as he gained enough leverage following the restoration of the Constitution and reopening of the Parliament.⁴⁰⁶ It was during his first exile that Taqizadeh put aside his traditional clerical attire and began to wear European civil clothes for the first time. Whilst this change could be considered rather trivial, it was in fact a decisive psychological step towards him becoming "inwardly and outwardly European" and symbolic of his new way of thinking.

A further outcome of this exile for Taqizadeh was the formation of strong ties with some European politicians. This deepened his sense of belonging to an international community and encouraged his views that history was moving in the direction of progress, and that people of all nations should work in unity in order to further this progress. That may explain

⁴⁰⁵ In the first Issue of *Iran-e Now*, the publication of the Democrat party, published by Taqizadeh and his friends on 24 August 1909 a whole article deals with the importance of the press in the modern world, arguing that newspapers were highly influential and were "the big government" in the West. "The strength of Newspapers is stronger than the heavy artillery. The press is the voice of a nation. A nation which does not have a newspaper does not have a voice...".

⁴⁰⁶ Vram Pilosian to Taqizadeh, 19 August 1909, in *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyat*, ed., Afshar, 238-42.

the fact that during his exiled period in Europe, Taqizadeh joined a masonic lodge⁴⁰⁷. The main goal of masonic lodges was to “bring men together by a common impulse and inspiration in mutual respect and brotherly regard”.⁴⁰⁸ Taqizadeh was not alone in this way of thinking. There were others who had previously worked for similar goals; Malkam Khan, for instance, who had established a lodge and by whom Taqizadeh had been greatly influenced. Seyyed Jamal al-Din Asadabadi (Afghani) also known as Asadabadi (1838-1896) had similarly propagated the concept of Islamic unity; an example of how European and Islamic ideas could merge and influence each other.⁴⁰⁹ Seyyed Jamal preferred to seek modern values “within the Islamic tradition instead of openly borrowing them from the hostile West”.⁴¹⁰ This is especially important since many have considered freemasonry as a solely European notion. However, one observes the development and promotion of similar ideas by certain brotherhoods in the Islamic world, such as the Ikhwan al-Safa

⁴⁰⁷ In a letter to Taqizadeh, Esma‘il Momtaz al-Dowleh refers to “the Lodge” which according to Iraj Afshar implies that Taqizadeh had joined a Lodge at that time. See: Esma‘il Momtaz al-Dowleh to Taqizadeh, 25 November 1908, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 118-9.

According to Esma‘il Ra‘in Taqizadeh first joined a freemason lodge, Iran Awakening Lodge, in 1907. See: Esma‘il Ra‘in, *Faramushkhaneh va Framasonry dar Iran* [Masonic Lodges and Freemasonry in Iran] (Great Britain: Tahqiq-e Ra‘in, 1978), 531.

⁴⁰⁸ John Fort Newton, *The Builder: A Journal for the Masonic Student* 4, no.7 (1918). Accessed 15 May, 2018.
<http://www.lakeharrietlodge.org/lhl277/MainMenu/Home/MasonicLibrary/TheBuilderMagazine/TheBuilderMagazineVolume4Number7/tabid/210/Default.aspx>.

⁴⁰⁹ Taqizadeh, “Seyyed Jamal al-Din Maruf be Afghani,” in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 2: 75-84. For more about Seyyed Jamal see:

Nikki R. Keddie, *Seyyed Jamaal al-Din al-Afghani: a Political Biography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

For more about Malkam Khan see: Hamid Algar, *Mirza Malkam Khan: A Study in the History of Iranian Modernism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

Fereshteh Mangench-Nourai, “The Life and Thought of Mirza Malkam Khan, 1833/4-1908: A Contribution to the History of Iranian Liberal Ideas” (PhD diss., University of Colorado, 1970) ProQuest (302398151).

Esma‘il Ra‘in, *Mirza Malkam Khan: Zendeghi va Kosheshhay-e Siyasi Ou* [Mirza Malkam Khan: His Life and Political Activities] (Tehran: Safi Ali Shah, 1974).

⁴¹⁰ Keddie, 1.

Seyyed Jamal enjoyed some success in decreasing hostilities between different branches of Islam. As Browne has noted: “thanks to the teachings of Sayyid Jamalud-Din and his successors (amongst whom the Prince Hajji Sheikhur-Ra’is, author of the Ittihadu l-Islam, or “Union of Islam,” and other similar works, deserves special mention), the two principle independent States of Islam [Iran and Ottoman Turkey] were beginning to realize how much they had in common, both of fears and hopes”. Browne, *Persian Revolution*, 250.

group (Brethren of Purity) much earlier than Europe.⁴¹¹ As Hamid Algar has put it, “Such similarities may have played some role in the preparation of prominent Iranians for entry to masonic or pseudo-masonic groupings”.⁴¹²

One could deduct that the reason that intellectuals in Islamic countries now revisited Islamic tradition and teachings, searching for concepts similar to those from freemasonry, was the sweeping influence of the French Revolution. This history-changing revolution, characterised by its slogans promoting the notion of humanity being a unified entity and extolling the sense of brotherhood, had been a major ideological catalyst. Leading on from this, *anjomans* [assemblies], which played a crucial role in supporting and spreading the idea of the Constitution often particularly chose names which implied the concept of unified brotherhood, such as *Okhovat* [brotherhood], *Ettehad* [unity] or *Baradaran* [brethren]. Some of these assemblies established secret organisations similar to the freemasons, highlighting the popularity of the idea at that time. One example of this developing way of thinking is a letter written by the Tabriz Assembly to the British and Russian legations. Its opening line “according to nature’s law all human beings have relationships with and should be loved by each other...” similarly represents this idea.⁴¹³ Another example is the manifesto that constitutionalists of Azerbaijan addressed to “les Parisians de la liberté et de la justice” under the title of “Appeal by the People of Azerbaijan, Persia, to the Civilized World”. The first sentences of the manifesto emphasise the notion of the unity of human beings, “To all lovers of humanity. To all who seek justice in five continents. Though we Persians, in religion and nationality, differ from you, the manner of government in every country works for the common good of its people. But in humanity and justice and the seeking of righteousness we are all alike. We are drinking of

⁴¹¹ A group of Muslim scholars who founded a secret society in the second half of the 10th century in Basra and Baghdad. The goal of the society was to promote the study of philosophy among the Muslim world in order to fight against superstitions. The majority of members of this group were Iranian. According to them “individual human souls emanate from the universal soul and rejoin it after death; the universal soul in its turn will be united with God on the day of the Last Judgment...”. See: *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s.v. “Ikhwan-as-Safa,” available online: <http://www.britannica.com/topic/Ikhwan-as-Safa> (accessed 19 July, 2015).

⁴¹² Hamid Algar, “An Introduction to the History of Freemasonry in Iran,” in *Middle Eastern Studies* 6, no.3 (1970): 276-96. Accessed May 15, 2015. doi: 10.1080/00263207008700153.

⁴¹³ Barclay to Grey, 30 December 1908, in *Persia No. 2*, 33.

the same spring...”.⁴¹⁴ The idea of brotherhood and unity was highlighted in freemasonry and was particularly attractive to the Iranian intellectuals who had been able to find similar concepts in Islam. Interestingly, one piece from the *Hekmat* newspaper on 21 February 1909 elaborates on the concept of freemasonry, attempting to emphasise the Eastern origins of it. *Hekmat* writes that freemason[ry] or Faramosh Khaneh (house of oblivion) is an institution which was established in Hamedan before King Solayman’s time and it was only during the Crusades that it took on some Christian and Jewish reformist ideas.

Within this context, in analysing the reasons for Taqizadeh joining a freemasonry lodge, one could surmise that Taqizadeh wanted to build a bridge between the home-grown ideas and the so-called European ones and considered the concept of unity and brotherhood in line with his ideological goals. It is likely that he was also hoping to reap the benefits of belonging to a masonic lodge as it would allow him the opportunity to raise the profile of his goals internationally and thus further his own political ambitions concerning Iran. It is against this background that Taqizadeh's thoughts and acts must be analysed.

The present chapter continues to chronologically cover events during the Constitutional Revolution up to the overthrow in Tehran of Mohammad Ali Shah by the constitutionalists. Taqizadeh was clearly a key player in these events. A rather detailed narration of this period is necessary in order to also fully appreciate Taqizadeh’s, at times, more subtle role in these happenings. It additionally allows one to observe the influence of situational factors on Taqizadeh’s intellectual development in particular and on Iranian intellectual history in general.

4:1 Events in Tehran and the Council of Notables

November 1908 was an eventful month for both the Royalist and Constitutionalist camps. During this month, in response to the organised demonstration of the conservative clergy against the Constitution in Tehran, Mohammad Ali Shah, addressing the reactionary clergy, officially abolished the Constitution; “Considering that you denounced the

⁴¹⁴ “The Civil War in Tabriz,” in *The Times*, October 19, 1908. Judging by the style, this manifesto was most likely written by Taqizadeh.

Constitution as against the Islamic laws, we, always desirous of the welfare of our subjects, entirely abolish the Constitution, and will henceforward rule in strict accordance with Koranic principles and dispense universal justice".⁴¹⁵ The initiation of this act was organised by Sheikh Faz al-Allah Nouri, a leading anti-constitutionalist clergyman in Tehran and some courtiers who had represented the Shah in a petition which supported the idea that the Constitution was contrary to Islam.⁴¹⁶ The decision of the Shah to abolish the Constitution was despite all his previous oaths and promises to restore the Constitution and displeased the Russian and British representatives who were expecting the Shah to restore it. The British and Russians made their resentments clear by sending a joint memorandum "reminding His Majesty of his promises." They were "convinced that the only hope of terminating the present deplorable situation lies in the convocation of an elective Assembly and an amnesty for Tabreez [Tabriz]".⁴¹⁷ The British and Russians forced the Shah to open the Parliament, concerned that the riots would become widespread and that the country would fall into a state of anarchy. This would result in the disintegration of Iran and was against the interests of Britain and Russia.⁴¹⁸ But the Shah was still hostile to Tabriz and believed that, "It was a mistake to suppose that the people of that city wanted a Constitution or would be pacified if it were granted."⁴¹⁹ He was adamant that, "the people of Tabriz were revolutionaries, and included a number of Caucasians".⁴²⁰ However, under increasing pressure, on 28 November 1908 the Shah revealed to the British and Russian legations that, "It was his unalterable intention to grant a Constitution to the country, but stated that the opposition of the clergy put obstacles in his way. He declared that he would the next day summon a special permanent consultative body, which he would invest with powers".⁴²¹ The Shah also wanted a new carefully drafted electoral law allowing only deputies who "would not fall under the influence of evil-disposed agitators nor repeat the former mistakes."⁴²² The regulations for this Council were printed and published on 11

⁴¹⁵ "The Constitution Abolished," *The Times*, November 23, 1908.

To know more about the demonstration of 7 November, 1908, see: Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, telegram, November 8, 1908, in *Persia No. 1* (1909), 204.

⁴¹⁶ Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, 25 November 1908, in *Persia No. 2* (1909), 7.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁴¹⁸ Barclay to Grey, telegram, 8 January 1909, in *Ibid.*, 20.

⁴¹⁹ "The Situation in Persia: Views of the Shah," *The Times*, December 4, 1908.

⁴²⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴²¹ "The Situation in Persia: Fresh Promises by the Shah," *The Times*, November 30, 1908.

⁴²² *Ibid.*, 1908.

December.⁴²³ It was declared that the Council would consist of fifty members who would include clergy, merchants, “men skilled in state affairs, and others who will be elected by the people”.⁴²⁴ But, as later was revealed, the Shah’s intention was to appoint the members himself and the nature of the assembly was non-elective.⁴²⁵ A British diplomatic record states that the members of the Council were ignorant and reactionary apart from one or two who were unwilling to attend.⁴²⁶ The Council which was held in the Shir va Khorshid [Lion and Sun] building was attended by some members only two days a week and often just 35 out of 50 members showed up.⁴²⁷

One of the reasons the Shah ordered the formation of such a council was to hoodwink the British and Russian legations who were pushing him to reopen the Parliament. However, it seems this act was not convincing. They believed that “unless the Shah can be induced to summon to it men of more liberal views, it will be vain to look to it for any assistance towards revival of the Constitutional regime.”⁴²⁸ Hence, their representatives showed their dissatisfaction on 28 November in private meetings with the Shah. At the same time the constitutionalists and in particular Taqizadeh disagreed with the formation of such an assembly. They saw the establishment of such a council as ineffective in improving the situation of the country, since the Shah would “take good care that it shall possess only nominal powers, and be entirely subservient to his will”.⁴²⁹ It could be considered that there were other motives for organising such an assembly. As stated in *Habl al-Matin* at the time, by establishing this Council of Notables, the Shah could manipulate the people, arguing that the Council was the same as the National Parliament and secondly, whenever anything went wrong, he would be able to use the Council as a scapegoat, thus avoiding any personal responsibility. Most importantly, the Shah could utilise certification by the Council to secure the foreign loan he hoped to receive.

⁴²³ Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, 31 December 1908, in *Persia No. 2* (1909), 28.

⁴²⁴ Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, telegram, 10 December 1908, in *Ibid.*, 5.

⁴²⁵ There are several references to this Council in the diaries of ‘Ain al-Saltaneh. ‘Ain al-Saltaneh, 3: 5.

⁴²⁶ Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, telegram, 1 December 1908, in *Persia No. 2*, 2.

⁴²⁷ Mansoureh Ettehadieh, *Majles va Entekhabat: Az Mashruteh ta Payan-e Qajar* [Majles and the Elections: Since the Constitution until the End of Qajar] (Tehran: Nashr-e Tarikh-e Iran, 1996), 118. Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e Iran*, 2: 828.

⁴²⁸ Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, 4 December 1908), in *Persia No. 2* (1909), 12.

⁴²⁹ “The Persian Nationalists,” *The Times*, October 15, 1908.

Despite all these events in Tehran, the constitutionalists took control of more towns in Azerbaijan. On 16 November Maragheh was occupied by the constitutionalists, although some days later on the 30 November they were forced out and returned to Tabriz. On the 13 November they occupied Salmas and on 23 November Bonab.⁴³⁰ They were also marching towards Marand and Khoi.⁴³¹

Meanwhile, supporters of the Constitution in Tehran were carrying out clandestine activities. Despite the severe restrictions in Tehran, secret assemblies were active and people such as Hossein Qoli Khan Navab and S‘ani‘ al-Dowleh together with some clergy were actively supporting the Constitution and organising plots such as the unsuccessful assassination attempt of Sheikh Faz al-Allah.⁴³²

All these, in particular the victory of the constitutionalists of Tabriz over the royalists forcing them to abandon the town, was great encouragement to the supporters of the Constitution in other parts of Iran and set the wheels in motion for future uprisings.

4:2 Taqizadeh’s Activities in Tabriz

Taqizadeh’s return to Tabriz at the beginning of January 1909 coincided with an intense phase of the battles in the town between the constitutionalists and the Shah’s Forces. The Shah, who was now desperate to conquer the town, had appointed to Basmenj on the outskirts of Tabriz, his aunt’s husband Arshad al-Dowleh as the new commander of infantry. Samad Khan Shoja‘ al-Dowleh was at the same time approaching Tabriz from the west. Rahim Khan, another warlord of the Shah, blocked the Jolfa road to Tabriz. According to Kasravi, the number of the royal forces on the outskirts of Tabriz had reached up to forty thousand.⁴³³ It seemed that the intention of the Shah was to starve the inhabitants of Tabriz by forming a blockade.⁴³⁴ On 14 January 1909, just one week after Taqizadeh’s

⁴³⁰ Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, “Monthly Summary of Events”, 3 December 1908, in *Persia No. 2* (1909), 11.

⁴³¹ “The Constitution Abolished,” *The Times*, November 23, 1908.

⁴³² Taqizadeh, “Tarikh-e Avayel-e Enqelab va Mashrutiyat-e Iran” in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh* 1: 297. Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e Iran*, 2: 828-30.

⁴³³ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e Iran*, 2: 824. Also; Malekzadeh, 4-5: 944.

⁴³⁴ Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, telegram, 13 January 1909, in *Persia No. 2* (1909), 22.

arrival, *The Times* correspondence reported that, "The serious news comes from Tabriz and Maku that the Kurds have blocked the Jolfa Road and thus interrupted the trade. Prices are therefore running high."⁴³⁵ Although for a short period prices returned to normal and life was easier, soon after the blockade events turned for the worse in Tabriz.⁴³⁶ Added to the blockade and armed conflicts, diseases were also killing people in Tabriz. One source reveals that in the middle of this seemingly impossible position in which the revolutionaries in Tabriz now found themselves, Taqizadeh's return to the town spurred them on. They considered him well-versed in the politics of the region and someone who had a strong connection with the foreign powers involved in the Iranian political scene. Taqizadeh's arrival was reflected in the newspapers in Tabriz; *Anjoman* newspaper wrote, "Now with ultimate joy, Azerbaijan embraces its distinguished offspring."⁴³⁷ *Naleh-e Mellat* considered Taqizadeh's arrival in Tabriz as "joyous news".⁴³⁸ Taqizadeh could be key to strengthening the resistance movement and it was likely that he could resolve the situation through diplomacy, especially at a time when 'Ain al-Dowleh had been restored to Commander of the Forces, "with instruction to avoid a conflict and to enter into negotiations".⁴³⁹

4:3 Taqizadeh and his Negotiations with 'Ain al-Dowleh

'Ain al-Dowleh, unlike the other senior commanders of the Shah who still believed they could defeat the constitutionalists in Tabriz by military force, knew that an easy victory would not be achievable soon. As Esma'il Amirkhizi has put it, "The difference between 'Ain al-Dowleh and other commanders such as Rahim Khan and Shoj'a Nezam was that 'Ain al-Dowleh's intention was for the constitutionalists to surrender and stop demanding a constitution. Others, however, wanted to kill them and plunder all their belongings".⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁵ "Persia: Disturbances by Kurds," *The Times*, January 15, 1909.

According to Browne the complete blockade of the Jolfa road occurred around February 3rd of that year. Browne, *Persian Revolution*, 249. Keeping the Jolfa road open was crucial for the constitutionalist fighters; trade between Russia and Tabriz had to pass through Jolfa. Most importantly, the closure of the Jolfa road would prevent the arrival of arms and ammunitions to Tabriz.

⁴³⁶ Mosavat Newspaper gives an account of the relatively good situation of Tabriz after the royalists were forced outside the town and provides a list for the prices of different goods in Tabriz.

⁴³⁷ *Anjoman*, January 11, 1909.

⁴³⁸ *Naleh-e Mellat*, January 18, 1909.

⁴³⁹ "The Situation at Tabriz," *The Times*, October 24, 1908. Also see; Barclay to Grey, telegram, 11 February, 1909, in *Persia No. 2 (1909)*, 44.

⁴⁴⁰ Amirkhizi, 218-9.

‘Ain al-Dowleh had previously taken part in unfruitful negotiations with the town leaders but there is little doubt that the arrival in Tabriz of Taqizadeh, one of the most prominent leaders of the resistance movement, would have serious repercussions for the royalist camp. In view of Taqizadeh’s political position it was deemed necessary to instigate a line of communication with him.⁴⁴¹ As reflected in letters that remain, exchanged between Taqizadeh and ‘Ain al-Dowleh, ‘Ain al-Dowleh had initiated approaching Taqizadeh through his deputy, Hossein Qoli Khan. The correspondence which had begun shortly after Taqizadeh’s arrival in Tabriz sheds more light on the nature of his role in negotiations with ‘Ain al-Dowleh and reflects Taqizadeh’s way of thinking during this period. It seems that Taqizadeh had been unwilling to reply to Hossein Qoli Khan’s first letters, of which no copies can be located, or possibly these letters did not reach him.

However, there is a letter (24 January 1909), from Hossein Qoli to Taqizadeh, the tone of which shows great respect towards Taqizadeh. In the letter Hossein Qoli Khan emphasises that meeting Taqizadeh was crucial. He explains about the good intentions of ‘Ain al-Dowleh and expresses his delight at the news of Taqizadeh’s arrival in Tabriz.⁴⁴² He goes on to state that since Taqizadeh’s arrival, ‘Ain al-Dowleh had been eager to meet him. Taqizadeh’s reply to this letter is brief. He writes that he was similarly keen to meet and so facilitated Hossein Qoli’s entrance into the town for negotiations at the headquarters of the *Mosavat* newspaper. In a further letter, clearly written after his talks with Hossein Qoli, Taqizadeh mentions that he had consulted with members of the Local Assembly and senior clergy of the town such as Seqat al-Eslam. He adds that it had been agreed that ‘Ain al-Dowleh would send some of his trusted confidants for further talks to Tabriz in order to make clear ‘Ain al-Dowleh’s intentions. Taqizadeh also proposes that a representative of neutral countries, France or the United States, for example, should be present at the meeting. He goes on to suggest that in order to avoid unproductive meetings similar to

⁴⁴¹ It seems that besides Taqizadeh, ‘Ain al-Dowleh had contacted other people in Tabriz as well. A British diplomatic document reported from Tabriz that; “several persons there have received letters from Ain-ed-Dowleh [‘Ain al-Dowleh], in which he expresses a wish to see them and negotiate for peace.” Barclay to Grey, telegram, 6 February, 1909, in *Persia No. 2 (1909)*, 44.

⁴⁴² Hossein Qoli Khan to Taqizadeh, 5 February 1909, in *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyat*, ed., Afshar, 144-6.

previous ones, negotiations should be minuted in “a protocol”.⁴⁴³ From these comments, Taqizadeh’s strong suspicion and mistrust towards ‘Ain al-Dowleh which would clearly increase following further negotiations, is already evident. Noticeably, according to one Russian diplomatic record, Sattar Khan was opposed to negotiations with ‘Ain al-Dowleh.⁴⁴⁴ It is highly probable that this is the reason that Taqizadeh avoids mentioning Sattar Khan in the letter.

In a third lengthy letter to Hossein Qoli dated 9 February 1909, Taqizadeh is more cynical of the honesty of the royalist camp and states that he hoped that they would act with more integrity. He bitterly complains about the rhetoric which was prevalent among politicians in Iran at that time. He continues that a gang of “elderly infants” are playing with the destiny of Iran; “I am very ashamed that ignorance and arrogance is so widespread among the distinguished senior statesmen and the grey bearded sages...that a young man like me without much experience, simply because he has broadened his horizons beyond this ruined [country].... should advise the authorities; wise men, statesmen and senior ministers...”.⁴⁴⁵ He then writes that the Shah’s intention has been to spill his blood and that of others like him, adding that he believed that if the Shah succeeded, he would lay on a feast in his residence and put on a firework display.⁴⁴⁶ From the letter, it is clear that Taqizadeh’s proposal to ‘Ain al-Dowleh, asking him to send a delegation to the town had not been accepted and that had caused disappointment and distrust among the local inhabitants.

Besides showing Taqizadeh’s mistrust towards ‘Ain al-Dowleh, the letter hints at more subtle features of Taqizadeh’s character and reveals his mind-set at that time. The eagerness of Taqizadeh to utilise new methods even in negotiations is quite evident; he criticises the

⁴⁴³ Taqizadeh to Hossein Qoli Khan, in *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyat*, ed., Afshar, 146-8.

⁴⁴⁴ Sabline, telegram, 6 February 1909, in *Ketab-e Narenji: Ghozareshay-e Siyasi-e Vezarat-e Kharejeh-e Rousieh Darbareh Enqelab-e Mashrutayieh-e Iran* [The Orange Book: Diplomatic Reports of the Russian Foreign Ministry about the Iranian Constitutional Revolution], ed., Ahmad Bashiri (Tehran: Nour, 1984), 2: 101.

⁴⁴⁵ Taqizadeh to Hossein Qoli Khan, in *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyat*, ed., Afshar, 148-51.

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

old methods of negotiations and is clearly inspired by western methods. He talks about “protocols” and adding transparency and openness to the old traditions.

‘Ain al-Dowleh later began corresponding directly with Taqizadeh. In his first letter he states that Taqizadeh’s arrival in Tabriz had pleased him and hopes that Taqizadeh can find a solution to end the conflict. He wants to meet with Taqizadeh in order to talk about a possible peace agreement.⁴⁴⁷ Clearly Taqizadeh’s mistrust of ‘Ain al-Dowleh made him reluctant to leave the safety of Tabriz which was under the jurisdiction of the constitutionalists. He instead encourages ‘Ain al-Dowleh to send one of his confidants to the town for negotiations. In reply, ‘Ain-al Dowleh accepts the offer and agrees to send someone.⁴⁴⁸ In another letter Taqizadeh, presumably after meeting ‘Ain-al Dowleh’s messenger, comments that if they were to agree upon a peaceful solution, it would be no less an achievement than the victories of such famous conquerors as Alexander and Napoleon. Taqizadeh repeatedly emphasises the importance of frankness in the negotiations and avoidance of obsequiousness.⁴⁴⁹ Disappointingly, as reported in a British diplomatic document, these negotiations were seemingly unsuccessful and most probably Taqizadeh had then given up hope of resolving the conflict with ‘Ain-al Dowleh. In a letter to Browne, Taqizadeh clearly emphasises that he was reluctant to carry on the negotiations because of lack of honesty from ‘Ain-al Dowleh’s side.⁴⁵⁰

The letters exchanged between these two characters demonstrate the personal confrontation between Taqizadeh and ‘Ain al-Dowleh and not solely the negotiations between the two political figures. The correspondence is representative, at the same time, of a confrontation between a traditional system and a newer outlook on the world which questions and raises doubts about the functionality of the old system. If Taqizadeh had previously wanted to somehow come to terms with the old system, he was now more determined to substitute it with a new one. Equally it is clear that Taqizadeh, as the spearhead of the movement of change, sees the elderly ‘Ain al-Dowleh as the embodiment

⁴⁴⁷ ‘Ain al-Dowleh to Taqizadeh, in *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyat*, ed., Afshar, 152-2.

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid., 154.

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid., 155- 7.

⁴⁵⁰ Taqizadeh to Edward Browne, 21 March 1909 in *Browne Papers*, 9-4-4.

of a corrupted, traditional government and society, and one which is dysfunctional. In Taqizadeh's opinion, 'Ain al-Dowleh lacked one essential feature of being modern; having a broader international view. Unlike Taqizadeh, 'Ain al-Dowleh had not "broadened his horizons". This was something which Taqizadeh considered gave him the upper hand over 'Ain al-Dowleh. But 'Ain al-Dowleh was not the only person with whom Taqizadeh had differing opinions. There was even clear conflict between Taqizadeh and such key characters of the constitutionalist camp in Tabriz as Sattar Khan.



Figure 8: A page from *Zanbur* newspaper, depicting Taqizadeh and Mohammed Ali Shah. The caption in Azerbaijani Turkish reads: "My hand is bloody; is that why you do not shake hands with me? Look, now I have washed my hands. I can even wear gloves, if necessary".

4:4 Taqizadeh and Sattar Khan

As the situation in Tabriz became increasingly difficult for both the locals and the foreigners there, the Russians, who had been looking for an opportunity to increase their dominance in the region, expressed their dissatisfaction with the situation in Azerbaijan, claiming that it was prejudicial for their interests in that region. They argued that Russian subjects were under threat. The Russian authorities believed that “Sattar Khan was in a sense the master of the situation, but he was really governed by the Caucasian revolutionaries, who were ready for any mischief”.⁴⁵¹

The situation in Azerbaijan was clearly causing great consternation in the Russian government, particularly due to the independent acts of Sattar Khan and the sympathy being shown towards him and his cause by the revolutionaries throughout the Caucasus. The Russians, by exaggerating about the influence and number of the Caucasian fighters (up to 5000 men) among Sattar Khan’s troops, justified that their subjects were under threat in the town.⁴⁵² An added thorn in the side of the Russians was the group of trans-Caucasian Tartars.⁴⁵³ This insurgent group already regarded Sattar Khan as a hero and they were now carefully monitoring events in Tabriz.⁴⁵⁴

Taqizadeh, who whilst in England had previously heard of the oppressive behaviour of some of the Mojaheds, believed that Sattar Khan was too lax in his control of his constitutionalist fighters, the Mojaheds, and suggested that they should be more carefully monitored and kept under stricter control. On his return to Tabriz, Taqizadeh delivered a fiery speech at the Provincial Assembly and in the presence of Sattar Khan and Baqer Khan

⁴⁵¹ Nicolson to Grey, 18 November 1908, in *Persia. No 1 (1909)*, 213.

⁴⁵² Malekzadeh, 4-5: 1003.

⁴⁵³ Taqizadeh emphasised what he considered to be an exaggeration of the influence and number of Armenian and Georgian fighters on the Iranian revolution. He commented that most fighters were originally Iranians and all foreign fighters together hardly even made up 3% of the total fighting force. He further states that the Iranian revolutionary workers from the Caucasus did not change their Caucasian clothes when they returned to Iran to participate in the movement and were thus known as “Mojahedin-e Qafqazi”. According to him, in the siege of Tabriz 50 foreigners participated and 40 of them lost their lives. Ref: Hassan Taqizadeh, “Oza‘-e Siyasi-e Iran”, in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 4: 152-199.

⁴⁵⁴ Nicolson to Grey, 18 November 1908, in *Persia. No 1 (1909)*, 213.

reprimanded the Mojaheds who had acted beyond their remit.⁴⁵⁵ Taqizadeh stated that in the eyes of civilised people in the world, the most abhorrent events were the killing of women and children and the plundering of others' belongings.⁴⁵⁶ Taqizadeh's concern for the security of women and children, for the plundering of innocent people's property and the fact that he views this from the perspective of a "civilised person" demonstrates his strong belief in human rights inspired by European ideas; the same beliefs which had been at the core of the French Revolution. Taqizadeh also pushed for religious equality, a further example of the ideology he wished to promote.

The disagreements had intensified to such a degree that Mo'azed al-Saltaneh refers to a grudge between Taqizadeh and both Sattar Khan and his ally Baqer Khan. According to him, because of this growing dispute, Taqizadeh had been ready to leave Tabriz and return to Europe.⁴⁵⁷ It appears that the absence of Taqizadeh from London had substantially decreased the influence of the political activities of the exiles. Dehkhoda in a letter to Mo'azed al-Saltaneh, complains, "Why at this time should London be empty...all of us for thousands of reasons talked against this Seyyed [Taqizadeh]. I swear to God if these pretenders had one tenth of his enthusiasm and perseverance now everything would be in order. What is so bad about being ambitious and hard-working." ⁴⁵⁸ In another letter Dehkhoda writes, "...when his Excellency Mr Taqizadeh, may my soul be sacrificed for him, was in Europe due to the gravity of the situation he spent more than two months of his time with his Excellency Mo'azed al-Saltaneh in London. There he tried to persuade British opinion to the [Iranian] nation's goals by revealing the political ruses of Russia in Iran and to push the necessity of not interfering in Iranian affairs. In a short time, he managed to divert all the British political and press strength, which had until that point been completely ineffectual, towards Iran and on such a scale that the Russian role in Iran

⁴⁵⁵ Rezazadeh Shafaq, "Be Monasebat-e Vafat-e Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh [On the Occasion of Taqizadeh's Death]," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 14.

Hassan Taqizadeh, "Tarikh-e Avayel-e Enqelab va Mashrutiyyat-e Iran [The History of the Beginning of the Revolution and Iranian Constitution]," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 1: 320.

⁴⁵⁶ Amirkhizi, 297.

⁴⁵⁷ Mo'azed al-Saltaneh to the members 11 March 1909, in *Mobarezeh ba Mohammad Ali Shah*, ed., Afshar, 32-6.

Dehkhoda to The Sa'adat Assembly, 18 March 1909, in *Ibid.*, 50.

⁴⁵⁸ Dehkhoda to Mo'azed al-Saltaneh, Yverdon, 29 January 1909, in *Nameh-hay-e Siyasi-e Dehkhoda* [The Political Letters of Dehkhoda], ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Ruzbehan, 1980), 38.

was being discussed on every page of the newspapers and in every corner of society. But when the same sacred being [Taqizadeh] left London, out of a necessity to be in Azerbaijan due to the civil war in Tabriz, everybody lamented. The most pressing issue was to keep the British informed and maintain positive British public opinion towards Iran. To achieve this goal, it was necessary to have in London four or five men of influence whom the British considered important. Unfortunately, the elders of the movement did not realise the importance of this at the time and not one single individual went there. In the end, the Russian agents were able to propagate their own ideas over those of the Iranians who sought freedom, and with mendacious and fake publications, the Russians ruined the efforts of that sacred being [Taqizadeh] and Mo'ez al Saltaneh. Additionally, a letter from Seqat al-Eslam explains that, after his arrival in Tabriz, Taqizadeh had sided with Baqer Khan. The editor of Seqat al Eslam's biography, Nasrollah Fathi, believes Taqizadeh wanted to create a schism between Sattar Khan and Baqer Khan since they were each aligned with opposing religious groups within the city; Baqer Khan was Motashr' while Sattar Khan was Sheikhi.⁴⁵⁹

Taqizadeh strongly opposed any radical acts being carried out by the Mojaheds fighting for the Constitution. He had learned from his time in Europe that there was a tendency in some political circles in Europe to call the constitutionalists in Tabriz anarchists and extremists. He was determined that nothing should add fuel to this negative image of the pro-constitutionalists. A further reason for Taqizadeh's reluctance to support any kind of extreme act was his fear that any such act could trigger the intervention of a foreign power such as Russia, in particular. His concern was not without grounds. *The Times* correspondent, Captain Lionel James, for instance, who wanted to leave Tabriz on October 1908, writes that "Sata [Sattar] Khan had given it out that he would not permit the Europeans to leave the town" and thought they planned to take the Europeans as hostages if things went too far.⁴⁶⁰ Mokhber al-Saltaneh similarly mentions the resentment of some inhabitants of Azerbaijan towards Sattar Khan. According to him, Sattar Khan and Baqer Khan organised for their own people to collect taxes by force from the rich and this had

⁴⁵⁹ *Zendegi Nameh-e Shahid-e Niknam Seqat al-Eslam-e Tabriz* [The Life Story of Well-respected Martyr Seqat al-Eslam-e Tabrizi], ed., Nasrollah Fathi (Tehran: Noriyani, 1973), 410.

⁴⁶⁰ "The Civil War in Persia," *The Times*, November 2, 1908.

displeased the affluent members of society.⁴⁶¹ The majority of those who were forced by Sattar Khan to pay these taxes were businessmen. It is thus not surprising that Taqizadeh, as a representative of businessmen in the First Parliament, would be expected to afford these businessmen some protection. The businessmen in Baku who had close ties with Tabriz had previously helped Taqizadeh financially and now assumed that he would use his influence to prevent their exploitation. According to Mojtehedī, the businessmen of Tabriz celebrated Taqizadeh's arrival in Tabriz and complained to him about the disorder.⁴⁶² A British diplomatic record also adds evidence to this enforced contribution by the rich; money had "to be found somehow for the payment of the troops, who in the case of natives, receive from 2 to 6 krans a day each, while volunteers from the Caucasus get as much as 10 krans".⁴⁶³ It is clear from this that Sattar Khan was responsible for the payment of his troops but there is no explicit evidence here of Taqizadeh's criticism of this nor of his suggesting an alternative solution for paying the troops. No documentation has been found stating what Taqizadeh's own source of income was during those days.

Another document which reflects on the disagreement in the constitutional camp is a Russian diplomatic record. The document reports Taqizadeh's conciliatory role. According to the report, a rumour was circulating in Tehran about a dispute between two groups of constitutionalists in Azerbaijan. These two groups had agreed to end the conflict because of the adverse effects it had on peoples' daily life. Taqizadeh had been "at the head of this peaceable attempt".⁴⁶⁴

Kasravi, as well as criticising Taqizadeh for seeking refuge in the British legation, comments about his disagreement with Sattar Khan, "At that time, in Tabriz, people were still unaware of his dishonourable act during the bombardment. They considered him one of the bravest leaders of the Constitution, respected him and expected him to achieve much. But he had distanced himself, staying at home, clandestinely causing problems. One of his

⁴⁶¹ Mehdi Qoli Hedayat, *Khaterat va Khatarat*, (Tehran: Zavvar, 2009), 191.

⁴⁶² Mojtehedī, 133.

⁴⁶³ Wratislaw to Grey, 18 November 1908, in *Persia No. 2 (1909)*, 32.

⁴⁶⁴ Sabline's Report, 6 January 1909, in *Ketab-e Narenji*, ed., Bashiri, 99-100.

justifications was that Mojaheds were looting houses".⁴⁶⁵ Kasravi continues that Taqizadeh, together with Heydar Khan and Mohammad Ali Tarbiat, was against Sattar Khan, primarily out of selfishness but that they were also acting in accordance with the orders of British politicians.⁴⁶⁶ Kasravi's claim that Taqizadeh was not very politically active during this time could be true since, as mentioned in Taqizadeh's own writing, he had spent some time during this period teaching modern science to students at his rented house in the Armenian quarter of the town. This house was behind the American school and in case of any threat to Taqizadeh, he would have been able to seek shelter and protection there. Seyyed Mohammad Reza Shirazi (Mosavat) who was now residing in Tabriz was among the students of Taqizadeh.⁴⁶⁷ Mosavat, who was close to Taqizadeh, had begun to publish his newspaper in Tabriz. The similarity in their political views on the ideas of practising modernity meant that the editorial stance reflected in the newspaper mirrored Taqizadeh's own ideas during this period. The first issue of the newspaper in Tabriz was published on 23 January 1909. In this issue a section was dedicated to the current situation of Tabriz and to the fact that the constitutionalists were busy organising modern institutions. The key idea, as published by Mosavat, was to ensure the immediate practice of the separations of powers. Mosavat interestingly later comments that those in power including Sattar Khan and Baqer Khan understood that they could not manage without the separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers. He commented that the province of Azerbaijan should be managed according to the law of civilised nations and that institutions should be established with specific duties, separate from others. Mosavat refers to the Tabriz Assembly as a 'small parliament' which sat six days a week and to the fact that six trusted people chosen by the Assembly were appointed to carry out judicial duties. He commented on the well-regimented police force and the well-organised municipality, among others. These articles, as well as being a way of helping to create order in the town, represent the eagerness of a group of constitutionalists, which included

⁴⁶⁵ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e Iran*, 2: 808.

⁴⁶⁶ Kasravi accuses Tarbiat of writing a letter to Browne to vilify Sattar Khan, calling him a looter. Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e Iran*, 2: 809. Taqizadeh, later in his life, praised Sattar Khan as a national hero and on several occasions had denied that Tarbiat had written such a letter.

⁴⁶⁷ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 110.

Mosavat and Taqizadeh, to put their ideological beliefs into practice at the earliest opportunity, in order to modernise the country.

Despite these strong ideological ambitions, the reality of the situation was quite different and in fact highly contentious. Taqizadeh found himself at loggerheads with other key players in the Tabriz resistance; he was in direct conflict with others who were less ideologically focused and in particular with Sattar Khan over practical issues. One of the disagreements between Sattar Khan and Taqizadeh, for example, was over Sardar Faraj Aqa Zonuzi, whom Sattar Khan had sent to Marand after the town had fallen into the hands of the constitutionalists. According to Kasravi, Taqizadeh had criticised Faraj Aqa to Sattar Khan, complaining that he was a wine drinker. Sattar Khan had replied that he had not sent Faraj Aqa there as an imam.⁴⁶⁸ Taqizadeh, who had met Faraj Aqa on his way to Tabriz, describes him as a vulgar show-off who acted as if he were a king.⁴⁶⁹ Before the arrival of Taqizadeh to Tabriz the misbehaviour of some of the Mojaheds had been criticised by people such as Hassan Sharifzadeh who had even been killed because of his remarks.

Similarly, in a letter to Taqizadeh, Mohammad Ali Tarbiat complained about the behaviour of some of the Mojaheds, commenting on the fact that they could do whatever they wanted to without any interference from Sattar Khan. This was one of the reasons that Tarbiat wanted Taqizadeh to return to Tabriz from Europe.⁴⁷⁰ It seems that the increasing authority of Sattar Khan had forced the Assembly and other constitutionalists into a corner. As a British diplomatic document reports in November 1908, "Since the retirement of the Shah's forces the town has been entirely in the hands of Sattar Khan and Bagher [Baquer] Khan, and military party. A rump Anjuman [Assembly] still exists, but it has little or no say in affairs, though meetings are constantly held which anyone who pleases to attend."⁴⁷¹ It was hoped that with Taqizadeh's return to Tabriz would come an increase in the power of the Assembly. However, it seems that Taqizadeh achieved less than had been expected

⁴⁶⁸ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e Iran*, 2: 808.

⁴⁶⁹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 106.

⁴⁷⁰ Mohammad Ali Tarbiat to Taqizadeh, 31 October, 1908, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 96-7.

⁴⁷¹ Wratislaw to Grey, 18 November 1908, in *Persia No. 2 (1909)*, 32.

of him in terms of limiting the power of Sattar Khan. 'Ain al-Saltaneh writes that little attention was paid to Taqizadeh in Tabriz at that time.⁴⁷² But despite this, Taqizadeh's influence should not be underestimated. As an example, Heydar Khan Amoghlu, who played an important role in the armed resistance against the Shah, informed Taqizadeh directly about the significant activities he had taken part in such as sending a parcel bomb to kill Shoja Nezam.⁴⁷³ Additionally, Ali Mohammad Tarbiat, who commanded a group of Azerbaijani Mojaheds in Rasht, was under Taqizadeh's direct orders.

A further example of the existing conflict between Taqizadeh and Sattar Khan is a letter that Browne included in his book about the history of the Constitution. It was said that this letter was sent to Browne by Mohammad Ali Tarbiat and Taqizadeh had ordered Tarbiat to write such a letter.⁴⁷⁴

From information supplied to me from several trustworthy sources since my account of the siege of Tabriz was in print, I fear there is no doubt that Sattar Khan deteriorated sadly during the latter part of the siege and afterwards. The following is from a correspondent in whose judgement I have great confidence, and who was well placed for forming an opinion. I quote it with great regret, but since the aim of the historian should be the truth only, I feel that I have no right to suppress it.⁴⁷⁵

In this lengthy letter the writer first gives an account of Sattar Khan's background as a working class man who had greatly helped the constitutionalists during the Tabriz resistance but who had been subsequently spoiled by success; "He began to rob inoffensive citizens; his house was full of spoils; eleven stolen pianos decorated his drawing-room; he took to heavy drinking; he took unto himself many wives; he was no longer seen in the firing rank, but rested on his laurels in slothful ease". The writer then goes on, "I think that

⁴⁷² 'Ain al-Saltaneh, 3: 2374.

⁴⁷³ Taqizadeh writes that Heydar Khan sent the receipt of the post office directly to him when he was in London

⁴⁷⁴ Taqizadeh, "Tarikh-e Avayel-e Enqelab va Mashrutiyat-e Iran," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 1: 319-20.

⁴⁷⁵ Edward G. Browne, *Persian Revolution of 1905-1909* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910), 441.

the above is a fair description of Sattar, and I know that Taqi-zada [Taqizadeh], for instance, agrees with it...”.⁴⁷⁶

In this case, however, one should not forget the fact that although Sattar Khan was an illiterate man who came from a working-class background, his role was crucial in the resistance against the Shah and one could not expect him to be faultless. Later in his life Taqizadeh refers to the fact that he always had a positive opinion about Sattar Khan and after he returned to Tabriz had met him several times and had always found Sattar Khan to be polite and gallant. Taqizadeh disagreed about the content of the letter and stated that it was not fair to make such accusations about Sattar Khan. He declared that without doubt the writer of the letter was an Englishman and it was regrettable that Kasravi accused Mohammad Ali Tarbiat of writing the letter.⁴⁷⁷

4:5 Revolts against the Shah in other parts of Iran

The resistance of the constitutionalists in Tabriz and their relative victory over the royal forces raised the hope of the restoration of the Constitution in other provinces of the country. The deployment of the resistance movement to other parts of Iran was crucial for the constitutionalists in order to prevent the Shah from concentrating all his forces against Tabriz. One significant event happened in the north, with Mohammad Vali Khan-e Tonekaboni (also known as Sepahdar, meaning “greatest of the marshals”) as the key player. Sepahdar was initially appointed by Mohammad Ali Shah to command the royal forces which were fighting under the supervision of ‘Ain-al Dowleh against the constitutionalists in Tabriz.⁴⁷⁸ Later, due to an argument with ‘Ain-al Dowleh, he had walked out in protest, returning to his property in Tonekabon, and had turned his back on the Shah.⁴⁷⁹ Sepahdar, meanwhile, showed sympathy for the constitutionalists and made

⁴⁷⁶ Browne, *Persian Revolution*, 442.

⁴⁷⁷ Taqizadeh, “Tarikh-e Avayel-e Enqelab va Mashrutiyat-e Iran,” in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 1: 319-20.

⁴⁷⁸ Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, 28 January, 1909 in *Persia No. 2 (1909)*, 49-50.

⁴⁷⁹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 112. Amirkhizi writes that: “During the first days of Sepahdar’s arrival in Tabriz, unlike ‘Ain al-Dowleh who wanted to solve the conflict peacefully, Sepahdar was very harsh to the extent that when the representative of people went to visit ‘Ain al-Dowleh and began talking about the Constitution he became very angry, stood up and put his hands in his pockets and went out of the room, saying that he wouldn’t sit in a place where there was talk about the Constitution”. Amirkhizi, 214.

some agreements with Sattar Khan.⁴⁸⁰ He finally completely revolted from his own region against the Shah on 8 December 1908, writing a letter to Sattar Khan stating that he had Tonekabon and Mazandaran under his control.

After the revolt of Sepahdar, events took place in Isfahan and Bakhtiyari that benefitted the constitutionalists. People of Isfahan were dissatisfied with the governor, Eqbal al-Dowleh, who had been sent there by the Shah after the bombardment of the Parliament and who had been given full powers to severely punish the opposition.⁴⁸¹ At the same time, two prominent clergymen in Isfahan, Aqa Najafi (Haj Sheikh Mohammad Taqi) and his brother Haj Nour al-Allah, who were not on good terms with the governor, sided with the constitutionalists and ordered people not to pay taxes.⁴⁸² This provided the grounds for a future riot in Isfahan in which Bakhtiyaris also played a role. Later, in other parts of Iran, such as Hamedan, Shiraz, Mashad and Bushehr, riots also took place. These movements had differing levels of success. As will be mentioned, some, such as the riots in Rasht and Isfahan, were more purposeful and planned while others, in Shiraz and Bushehr, were more of a mixture of smaller disturbances and political dissatisfactions.⁴⁸³

4:6 Isfahan and the Bakhtiyaris

Bakhtiyaris, as a large tribe, had several chiefs and were divided in particular over their position regarding the Shah. A large number of them had joined the royalist camp near Tabriz and were fighting against the constitutionalists whilst other groups were in Tehran supporting the Shah.⁴⁸⁴ While Samsam al-Saltaneh, who had the post of Ilkhani (the head chieftain), was staying in Chahar Mahal among the Bakhtiyaris, his relationship with Mohammad Ali Shah was strained and he was concerned about his position. Samsam al-Saltaneh's younger brother, Sardar As'ad who was in Paris at that time had also come to sympathise with the constitutionalists. The constitutionalists had realised that to actualise

⁴⁸⁰ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e Iran*, 2: 778.

⁴⁸¹ "The Persian Disorders, Fighting in Isfahan," *The Times*, January 5, 1909

⁴⁸² Ahmad Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh-e Azerbaijan* [The 18 Years History of Azerbaijan] (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 2008), 2.

⁴⁸³ Browne, *Persian Revolution*, 250.

⁴⁸⁴ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 3.

their plans in Iran they needed the help of the head of a tribe as large as the Bakhtiari.⁴⁸⁵ Taqizadeh, who had met and talked to Sardar As'ad in Paris before his return to Tabriz, mentions that after some negotiations Sardar As'ad had eventually agreed to help the constitutionalists. This is while Mokhber al-Saltaneh Hedayat writes that when Taqizadeh went to Paris, a special room was rented for him in Café de Lappe. Sardar As'ad covered the expenses. They attended two or three sessions of negotiations but had little to discuss. They had also invited Naser al-Molk to join them but he had not come.⁴⁸⁶ It is obvious that Mokhber al-Saltaneh, Taqizadeh and other constitutionalists in exile had encouraged Sardar As'ad to support a fight against the Shah in Iran. Other constitutionalists, such as Dehkhoda, were clearly dubious about the intentions of Sardar As'ad and thought he was not ideologically driven and more interested in his own personal ambitions.⁴⁸⁷ Similarly, Shokrollah Mo'tamed Khaqan (Qavam al-Dowleh) warned Taqizadeh about the possible ill intentions of Sardar As'ad and the Bakhtiari.⁴⁸⁸ The correspondence of Taqizadeh from that period indicates that Taqizadeh and his friends had been talking about encouraging Bakhtiari to support their case at least since November, in contrast to

⁴⁸⁵ Ivan Alekseevich Zinoviev, *Enqelab-e Mashrutiyyat-e Iran* [The Iranian Constitutional Revolution], trans. Abolqasem E'tesami (Tehran: Eghbal, 1983), 127.

⁴⁸⁶ Hedayat, *Khaterat va Khatarat*, 181.

Mirza Abolqasem Khan Naser al-Molk Qaragozlou born on 17 July 1856 was the son of Ahmad Khan Sartip and the grandchild of Mirza Mahmoud Khan Naser al-Molk Hamedani. He completed his preliminary education in Tehran and in 1878 went abroad to continue studying. He finished his studies in political science at Oxford University before returning to Iran. In 1884 he was appointed to a position in the foreign ministry and given the title of Moshir. His grandfather was Foreign Minister at that time. He later became head of the Khorasan forces and in 1887 became the adjutant of Naser al-Din Shah and was given the title of Naser al-Molk (helper of the country). During the third trip of Naser al-Din Shah to Europe (April – September 1889) he was among the entourage of the Shah and translated the European press for him. Upon Mozaffar al-Din Shah's ascendancy to the throne, as special envoy, Naser al-Din visited Britain and Ottoman Turkey to announce the Shah's reign. During the Shah's first and third visits to Europe he accompanied the Shah. Naser al-Molk became the Minister of Finance in November 1896 and held this position in two further cabinets. He was also the governor of Kurdistan for a short period. At the beginning of Mohammad Ali Shah's reign, he briefly became the Prime Minister (October 1907). After the liberation of Tehran and deposition of Mohammad Ali Shah, Naser al-Molk held the position of Foreign Minister in the first and second cabinets of Sepahdar-e Tonkaboni. On 23 September 1910 he was chosen as the regent by the parliament. Besides politics he was also involved in literary activities; he had translated Shakespeare's *Othello* and *The Merchant of Venice* into Persian. He died on 26 December 1927 in Tehran. Ref: Saif al-Allah Vahidnia, "Naser al-molk va Yaddasht-hayash" in *Khaterat va Asnad* (Tehran: Vahid, 1990), 3: 59-62.

⁴⁸⁷ Dehkhoda to Mo'azed al-Saltaneh, 7 January 1909 [?], in *Mobarezeh ba Mohammad Ali Shah* ed., Afshar, 74-5. To know more about the role of Bakhtiari in the Constitutional Revolution, see: Arash Khazeni, "The Bakhtiari Tribes in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution" in *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 25, no.2 (2005), 337-398.

⁴⁸⁸ Mo'tamed Khaqan to Taqizadeh, 1908, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 133-5.

Mokhber al-Saltaneh who had wanted to imply that this had been his plan alone.⁴⁸⁹ It is important to note that after the return of Taqizadeh to Tabriz, Bakhtiyaris maintained their connections with Paris. Mo‘azed al-Saltaneh communicated news of the events in Isfahan from Paris to Tabriz by telegraph.⁴⁹⁰ Sardar As‘ad had sent his nephew, Samsam al-Saltaneh’s son, Morteza Qoli Khan, to Isfahan, taking with him special instructions for Isfahan and the Bakhtiyaris.⁴⁹¹ The instructions included encouraging Samsam al-Saltaneh and the clergy in Isfahan to support the Constitution and fight the Shah. Meanwhile the Shah had discharged Samsam al-Saltaneh from his position, replacing him with his brother Sardar Zafar, who was instrumental in arranging detachments of Bakhtiyaris to go to Tabriz to fight against the constitutionalists.⁴⁹² Samsam al-Saltaneh, however, did not accept the Shah’s order and was ready to revolt. It was at this time that the riot had taken place in Isfahan. Aqa Najafi and Haj Aqa Nour al-Allah, two influential clergymen of the town, displeased with the Governor, organised people to be sent from the villages to join the riots and simultaneously sent a message to Samsam al-Saltaneh inviting him to Isfahan.⁴⁹³ Following three days of rioting in the town, Zargham al-Saltaneh with two hundred horsemen arrived near the town and a battle took place. After two days of skirmishes and the Bakhtiyaris gained control, entering the town and establishing an assembly.⁴⁹⁴ When Samsam al-Saltaneh was informed about the victory, he departed for Isfahan, arriving there 6 January. Before long everything returned to normal in the town and people once again went about their business.⁴⁹⁵ Samsam al-Saltaneh consequently wrote a letter to Sattar Khan, reporting his victory.⁴⁹⁶ Two months later Sardar As‘ad travelled to Bakhtiyari through southern Iran and with some others Khans arrived in Isfahan.⁴⁹⁷

⁴⁸⁹ Esma‘il Momtaz al-Dowleh to Taqizadeh, 25 November 1908, in *Ibid.*, 118.

⁴⁹⁰ From Paris to Iyvordn, 7 January 1909 in *Mobarezeh ba Mohammad Ali Shah*, ed., Iraj Afshar, 16.

⁴⁹¹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 112.

⁴⁹² Barclay to Grey, 31 December 1908) in *Persia No. 2 (1909)*, 30.

⁴⁹³ Heydar Khan Amoghlu also traveled to Isfahan to attend a meeting to organise the riot. See: Nour al-Allah Daneshvar ‘Alavi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh Iran va Jonbesh Vatan Parastan-e Esfahan va Bakhtiyari* [The History of the Iranian Constitution and the Movement of the Patriots of Isfahan and Bakhtiyari] (Tehran: Danesh, 1976), 37.

⁴⁹⁴ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 5.

⁴⁹⁵ Daneshvar ‘Alavi, 47.

⁴⁹⁶ To see a summary of this letter, see: Amirkhizi, 324-5.

⁴⁹⁷ Daneshvar ‘Alavi, 47.

The events of Isfahan greatly affected the people of Tehran. The general situation of Tehran was getting worse; at nights gun shots were heard and passers-by were attacked and robbed. Tehran was less peaceful and secure than previously.⁴⁹⁸ The Shah's treasury was empty, although the military and administrative staff did receive their regular salary. In other parts of the country the situation was deteriorating for the Shah. In Mashad people refused to pay taxes.⁴⁹⁹ At the same time another major change was unfolding; constitutionalists were busy in Gilan trying to organise an army against the Shah.

4:7 Gilan

Rasht, the capital of Gilan province, was the second town after Tabriz which strongly supported the Constitution. However, unlike Tabriz, after the bombardment of the Parliament, following some days of resistance, succumbed to the Shah's forces. The Shah had sent one of his loyal supporters Aqa Bala Khan-e Sardar Afkham to govern Gilan. He had begun to treat people harshly and under his strict governorship, persecution of the constitutionalists was rife there. Nevertheless, despite this pressure, some constitutionalists, encouraged by the resistance of Tabriz, remained active and established a connection with the Local Assembly in Tabriz. A number of Mojaheds had moved to Rasht from Tabriz and the Caucasus and were clandestinely planning a revolt there.⁵⁰⁰

In the events in Gilan Taqizadeh played a more decisive role than in Isfahan. He corresponded with and was well acquainted with Gilan's influential constitutionalist characters, such as Mo'ez al-Soltan and his younger brother Mirza Karim Khan. Mirza Karim Khan was influential in establishing a connection with the Social Democrat Party in Tbilisi and persuading them to support the constitutionalists of Gilan. It is said that Stalin personally supervised the sending of fighters and arms to Gilan. The fighters came from Tbilisi to Baku and from there went to Anzali by commercial ship owned by Taqiev, the famous pro-constitutionalist businessman of the Caucasus.⁵⁰¹ Ali Mohammad Khan

⁴⁹⁸ Sablin's Report, 9 January 1909 in *Ketab-e Narenji*, ed., Bashiri, 84-5.

⁴⁹⁹ "An Unforgettable Note to Great Britain's Ambassador," 16 January 1909, in *Ibid.*, 78.

⁵⁰⁰ According to Amirkhizi these fighters, numbering between 20 and 30, who had come from the Caucasus to Rasht were connected to the Social Democrat Committee party of Baku. Amirkhizi, 325.

⁵⁰¹ Malekzadeh, 4-5: 1042-4

Tarbiat, whom Taqizadeh considered as his spiritual protégé, was also among the constitutionalists in Gilan and commanded his own group there. Ali Mohammad Khan received orders directly from Taqizadeh. The letters remaining from him to Taqizadeh exemplify the degree of his dutifulness towards Taqizadeh.⁵⁰² Considering his importance in the events of Gilan and later in the conquering of Tehran, it will be useful to give a brief account of Ali Mohammad Khan's life and his association with Taqizadeh.

Ali Mohammad was born in 1883 in Tabriz and was the younger brother of Mohammad Ali Tarbiat. Since his father had died when he was very young, he had been raised by his older brother Mohammad Ali. Ali Mohammed was fond of Taqizadeh and Taqizadeh loved him like his own child. He was greatly influenced by both his older brother and Taqizadeh and thus had developed nationalistic ideas and had become an ardent defender of constitutionalism. Educated in the American school of Tabriz, when Taqizadeh left Tabriz for Tehran, Ali Mohammed accompanied him.⁵⁰³ After the destruction of the First Parliament when Taqizadeh's life was in imminent danger Ali Mohammad Khan was instrumental in helping him to seek shelter in the British Legation.⁵⁰⁴ He also accompanied Taqizadeh to the Caucasus during Taqizadeh's first exile.⁵⁰⁵

In Rasht, a group of Mojaheds, having secretly gathered weapons in their houses, finally came out of hiding and began their fight against government forces on 7 February, 1909. Ali Mohammad Khan was the leader of 300 Tabrizi Mojaheds who participated in the raid.⁵⁰⁶ They killed the governor, Aqa Bala Khan, and took control of the town, immediately forming an assembly which they named the Sattar Assembly after Sattar Khan. On the same day Mo'ez al-Soltan and Ali Mohamad Tarbiat in a joint telegraph informed Tabriz of their victory; "Tabriz, with the grace of God, on 7 February thanks to the brave efforts of the Mojaheds, the repression came to an end in Gilan. The Governor together with thirty-five supporters of the government was killed, the government building

⁵⁰² Ali Mohammad Tarbiat to Taqizadeh, Tbilisi, 7 September 1908, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 96-7.

⁵⁰³ *Iran-e Now*, October 24, 1910.

⁵⁰⁴ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 75-6.

⁵⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 89.

⁵⁰⁶ *Naleh-e Mellat*, February 16, 1909.

was burnt and two Mojaheds died for the cause. The goals of the nationalists achieved and the provincial assembly established, the national forces are now ready for your orders.”⁵⁰⁷

A few days later an envoy was sent to invite Sephadar to Gilan. Sephadar accepted the invitation and arrived in Rasht to great fanfare. “The news from Resht [Rasht] created a great stir in Teheran [Tehran] and there were apprehensions of disturbance, but the Shah gave a taste of his quality by flooding the town with troops.”⁵⁰⁸ What happened in Rasht encouraged people of Tehran to fight with the Shah.⁵⁰⁹ After this victory some of the constitutionalists who were scattered throughout the Caucasus or in Istanbul began to move to Gilan.⁵¹⁰ On 20 February, Sepahdar informed Tabriz that he had Rasht under his control. Meanwhile the Sa‘dat Assembly in Istanbul and the Bakhtiyaris in Isfahan were asking Sepahdar about his plan to move towards Tehran.⁵¹¹ Unfortunately, the situation in Tabriz was not as positive.

⁵⁰⁷ *Naleh-e Mellat*, February 24, 1909.

⁵⁰⁸ “The Persian Disorders,” *The Times*, February 15, 1909.

⁵⁰⁹ “Description of the Events,” 5-12 February 1909 in *Ketab-e Narenji*, ed., Bashiri, 2: 105.

⁵¹⁰ Dolatabadi, 3:68-9.

⁵¹¹ Amirkhizi, 328.



Figure 9: Ali Mohammad Khan Tarbiat (From the family album of Manoocher Mohandess)

4:8 The Siege of Tabriz

On 11 February, 1909 *The Times* wrote that “trustworthy information from Tabriz states that the town is completely surrounded by royalist troops. All the roads are closed, and neither posts nor caravans can proceed”. Tabriz was completely cut off from supplies and nearly on its knees.⁵¹² The efforts of Sattar Khan and his Mojaheds to end the siege proved unsuccessful. Most people in Tabriz were in a desperate situation due to the lack of provisions. “There was very great suffering among the poorer classes of the town”.⁵¹³ Some were starving to death.⁵¹⁴ Women were among the groups who were most agitated. They were demanding that the conflict stop or at least continue out of town. They had demonstrated a few times but with little result.⁵¹⁵ A passage by Arthur Moore, the British correspondent who was in Tabriz at that time, sheds more light on the reaction of ordinary people and especially women to the pressures of the blockade in Tabriz; “The women who had nothing to fear, and in Musulman [Muslim] countries have more than once shown themselves in such crises a terrible and irresistible power, which should be remembered when we talk of the complete subjugation of women in the East, were openly rioting in the streets, and spat when they uttered the names of Satar [Sattar] Khan, Bakir [Baquer] Khan, the Anjuman [Anjoman] and the *Meshruteh* [Constitution]”.⁵¹⁶ Edouard Valmont, a French diplomat, portrayed a tragic scene in Tabriz, due to the lack of food and the violent reaction of a group of women against the situation. It is a striking example of the desperate situation of the town and is worth quoting at length:

In the streets the scenes are heartrending; thousands of women and children are crying for bread, with threats or entreaties. These women of Tabriz have already, on more than one occasion, been driven to deeds of violence in their despair. Hajji Kasam Agha [Haji Qasem Aqa], the former deputy of Ardebil, was their first victim. He was president of a committee for ensuring bread to the people, and one morning, on his way to the Anjuman, he was

⁵¹² Barclay to Grey, telegram, 11 February 1909, in *Persia No. 2* (1909), 44-5.

⁵¹³ Barclay to Grey, telegram, 25 March, 1909, in *Ibid.*, 68.

⁵¹⁴ Barclay to Grey, telegram, 30 March, 1909, in *Ibid.*, 71.

⁵¹⁵ ‘Ain-al Saltaneh, 2299.

⁵¹⁶ “The Siege of Tabriz,” *The Times*, July 3, 1909.

challenged by a body of women and accused of being a corn-forestaller. He replied with an oath, and they fell upon him furiously, when his servant coming up with a revolver, enabled him to get away and take refuge in the telegraph office, where he concealed himself in a cupboard. The women pursued him thither, and having at last found him, they attacked him savagely with the iron heels of their shoes, tearing out his beard and gouging out his eyes. Some men having come to their assistance in this tragic work, he was finished off with their daggers, after which, having denuded him of his clothing, they hung him up by his feet from a building in the Artillery Square.⁵¹⁷

As well as losing the breadwinners of the families in the battles, women were also the victims of plundering and abuse. A passage of *Naleh-e Mellat* reflects on how the royalist forces in one of the penultimate battles in Tabriz (5 March 1909) indiscriminately stripped women of their belongings and jewellery. This happened in one the poorest districts in Tabriz whose inhabitants were not even pro-constitutionalist.⁵¹⁸ According to Malekzadeh, women were so desperate for food that they rushed over fields of alfalfa near the royal forces heedless of the danger of being shot.⁵¹⁹ As mentioned before, Taqizadeh's first public speech after his return to Tabriz implies that some of the constitutionalist forces at times also mistreated women.

The atmosphere in Tabriz was clearly tense. This tense situation in Tabriz worried both Britain and Russia. The Local Assembly also wanted their help in solving the problem. In order to try to ameliorate the situation, representatives from the British and Russian Legations visited the Shah. They expressed their concern for the current situation in Tabriz, suggesting that an armistice would solve the conflict there. After first resisting this idea, claiming it would negate the gains of the previous nine months, the Shah agreed to a six-

⁵¹⁷ *The Moon of The Fourteenth Night: Being The Private Life of an Unmarried Diplomat in Persia During the Revolution*, ed., Eustache de Lorey and Douglas Sladen (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1910), 317.

⁵¹⁸ *Nalleh-Mellat*, March 10, 1909.

⁵¹⁹ Malekzadeh, 1126.

day armistice during which time bread would be delivered to help feed the inhabitants for that period.⁵²⁰ On 19 April 1909, in the middle of a fierce battle with the governmental forces, Sattar Khan was informed that the Shah had agreed to open the roads on condition that the constitutionalists stop attacking the governmental forces. Hearing that, Sattar Khan immediately ordered the cessation of firing.⁵²¹ Nonetheless, despite the Shah's promises, the blockade was not removed.⁵²² There was hope that during this period a peaceful solution could be achieved by negotiations. Although food did not reach the town, the Russian and British Consuls continued their efforts, but without results.

The Russians had previously wanted to bring troops to Tabriz in order to end the siege and had tried to open routes linking the provinces to the town. They had halted, awaiting the result of the negotiations with the Shah, with their troops ready on the other side of the border.⁵²³ On 23 April the Russian and British Consul Generals sent a letter to the provisional Assembly stating that "since the Iranian government has not opened the roads to the provinces, the Russian and British governments have agreed to open the roads themselves."⁵²⁴

4:9 Taqizadeh and his Telegraph to the Shah

Hearing the news of the coming of Russian troops to Tabriz, the Local Assembly members were overwhelmed by a sense of grief and shock. They invited Taqizadeh for consultation. Taqizadeh suggested that the only solution was to immediately send a telegraph to the Shah, begging him to order 'Ain al-Dowleh to open the roads for supplies. In return for the opening of the roads, the constitutionalists would end the fighting and be obedient to the Shah. Taqizadeh argued that the priority must be to maintain the independence of the country and prevent foreign troops from setting foot on Iranian soil. For, once they had entered the country, expelling them would be extremely difficult; a fact that future events would prove to be true. Taqizadeh's advice was taken and it was agreed

⁵²⁰ *The Times*, April 21, 1909

⁵²¹ Barclay to Grey, telegram, April 21, 1909, in *Persia No. 2 (1909)*, 103.

⁵²² Barclay to Grey, Tehran, April 25, 1909, telegram [15488], in *Ibid.*, 109.

⁵²³ Barclay to Grey, telegram, April 21, 1909, in *Ibid.*, 102.

⁵²⁴ Amirkhizi, 407.

to send the telegraph that he had drafted without delay. Meanwhile Taqizadeh was asked to go to the Ottoman Consulate. When he returned, however, he noticed that in his absence they had decided not to send the telegraph. Some members of the Assembly and particularly Baqer Khan had opposed sending it. Baqer Khan believed that the news of the coming of Russian troops was a political ruse and not true. The result that day was that the telegraph was not sent.⁵²⁵ Taqizadeh has narrated in his autobiography what happened soon after:

The telegraph was not sent. I became rather annoyed and apprehensive. I returned home and did not go to the Assembly the next day. The following afternoon they came for me several times. I refused to go. They insisted and so I eventually went. I saw they were so upset. Some, who were businessmen, had encountered a number of Europeans (Austrian and German) while on their way to work. They had commented, "Thanks to God the siege has been lifted. The Russian troops will arrive tomorrow". They became very agitated and I realised they had become very uncomfortable. I was saddened. I said there is no other way. So, they did not listen to Salar [Baqer Khan] and the telegraph was sent. To prevent the coming of the Russian troops, they sent a few people to the British Consulate to say that we were ourselves busy negotiating. The British, who were completely opposed to the arrival of the Russian troops, told us to send the telegraph right away. The correspondent of *The Times* newspaper sent it.⁵²⁶

As a British diplomatic report states, the majority of the Local Assembly members approved the idea of the coming of Russian troops but Taqizadeh and Baqer Khan were among those who were against it.⁵²⁷ It seems that the blockade had made ordinary people more desperate. Their priority was for life to return to normal. But Taqizadeh could foresee the adverse consequences of Russian interference.

⁵²⁵Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 115.

⁵²⁶ *Ibid.*, 115-6.

⁵²⁷*TNA*: FO 371/807.

The telegraph was, however, read by the Shah on 25 April 1909. It is said that when the Shah read it, he was so moved that his eyes filled with tears. He asked the Local Assembly members to come to the telegraph office to negotiate face to face. The Shah then agreed to lift the siege and on 26 April an amnesty was granted in Tabriz.⁵²⁸ When Taqizadeh and others attempted to continue the negotiations the next morning, in the middle of the talks they were informed by phone that the Russian troops had already passed the borders. This greatly upset Taqizadeh and the others and Taqizadeh nervously drafted a telegraph stating that what they were trying to prevent had now happened and they were no longer disposed to negotiate.⁵²⁹ On 1 May Russian troops arrived in Tabriz.⁵³⁰ The Shah had ordered the opening of the roads and provisions began gradually to reach the town. The royalist troops, who were surrounding Tabriz, had begun to disperse and Liakhoff with his Cossack brigade was recalled to Tehran. This was because the Shah needed his forces to prevent the imminent attack of the Bakhtiyaris on Tehran.⁵³¹ The Shah wanted 'Ain al-Dowleh to stay in Azerbaijan as the governor but this would not have been a popular appointment at that time.⁵³² He left Tabriz for Tehran on 12 May. The nationalist Deputy Governor in Tabriz at that time was Ijlal al-Molk.⁵³³

4:10 The Joint Statement of Russia and Britain

On 22 April the Russian and British representatives in Tehran visited the Shah, making him a joint proposal. They believed that if the Shah did not follow their recommended reforms which were offered in six articles, the restoration of order in the country would be difficult and a state of anarchy would prevail. In brief, the statement contained: 1. The removal from any position of power of certain reactionary characters such as the Minister of War; 2. The re-establishment of the Constitution; 3. The appointment of a council to elaborate and promulgate a new electoral law; 4. The proclamation of a general amnesty; 5. The fixing of a date for the elections of a new parliament. The sixth article of the

⁵²⁸ Nicolson to Grey, telegram, May 23, 1909, in *Persia No. 1 (1910) Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Persia: In continuation of Persia No 2 (1909)*, (London: Harrison and Sons, 1910), 6-7.

⁵²⁹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 114. Amirkhizi, 413-4.

⁵³⁰ Miller, telegram, May 1, 1909 in *Ketab-e Narenji*, ed., Bashiri, 161.

⁵³¹ Sablin, telegram, May 6, 1909 in *Ibid.*, 164.

⁵³² Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Mashruteh-e Iran*, 906.

⁵³³ Barclay to Grey, May 20, 1909 in *Persia No. 1 (1910)*, 15-7.

statement was a promise from the Russian and British governments to the Shah of a fresh loan on condition that the other five articles were put into practice.⁵³⁴

The content of the statements was published in foreign newspapers. The constitutionalists protested against the statement, especially the last article concerning the foreign loan. They believed it marred the independence of the country. The Local Assembly in Tabriz sent a telegram to the Council of Ministers in protest, demanding information about the exact content of the statement. According to Amirkhizi, the telegram was drafted by Taqizadeh. The Foreign Minister replied to this telegram stating that none of the articles were against national interests.⁵³⁵ The fact that the Local Assembly wrote directly to the Foreign Minister and that he felt obliged to reply shows the power and importance of the Local Assembly in Tabriz. Clearly, once the military conflict had come to an end, the Assembly and its non-militant members together with Taqizadeh had increased their political force in decision-making. The importance of Taqizadeh as a key political player grew after Sattar Khan and Baqer Khan had to seek refuge in the Ottoman consulate for fear of being arrested by the Russians.⁵³⁶ Taqizadeh, because of the recommendations of the Russian and British governments, wanted to come to an agreement with the Shah, but Sattar Khan and the others were against this.⁵³⁷ According to a British report, the Russians were apparently planning to send Sattar Khan and Baqer Khan abroad since they believed they were stirring up trouble.⁵³⁸ Meanwhile, the Shah was quick to actualise what the British and Russians had requested. On 5 May, the Shah ordered the re-establishment of the Constitution and the date for the election was set for 19 July 1909.⁵³⁹

⁵³⁴ Barclay to Grey, April 22, 1909, in *Persia No. 2 (1909)*, 128-9.

⁵³⁵ Amirkhizi, 441-4.

⁵³⁶ *Ibid.*, 436-8.

⁵³⁷ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 20. Taqizadeh writes in his autobiography that the British and Russians advised them to make peace with the Shah. Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 118.

⁵³⁸ Barclay to Grey, July 5, 1909, in *Persia No. 1 (1910)*, 52.

⁵³⁹ Sabline, telegram, May 5, 1909, in *Ketab-e Narenji*, ed., Bashiri, 164.

4:12 The Electoral Law

Negotiations for peace continued between Tabriz and Tehran. In Tehran a council of twenty-one people was formed to draft the new law. The members of the council were mostly constitutionalists. They called the commission “The Assembly of Peace”. As a first priority, the commission sought the opinion of the deputies in important provinces. The representatives of the provinces suggested changing the electoral law. The Tabriz Assembly, as the representative of the other provinces, was in charge of conducting the negotiations concerning the new electoral law. The Local Assembly in Tabriz demanded that the Shah restore the old constitution, “informing him that the proposed arrangement on the lines of religious law was not acceptable.”⁵⁴⁰ The electoral law was completed on 10 June and was presented to the Shah three days later. Taqizadeh writes, “For about two months from early morning to midnight we were busy sending telegraphs. We may have exchanged hundreds of thousands or even a million words before we eventually agreed upon the articles of the new electoral law.”⁵⁴¹

The number of members of parliament under the new law was 120 in contrast to the previous 156. Unlike the elections of 1906, the elections now were to be in two degrees; that is, firstly candidates from town districts were elected by the general public. In a second round of voting only those ‘elected’ in the first round then chose from amongst themselves the desired number of ‘representatives’.⁵⁴² These new elections were no longer based on class. The deputies need not be natives of the region but had to have lived there for at least six months and be currently resident there.⁵⁴³ Due to a lack of facilities, it was decided that elections would be held only in the big cities. Women did not have the right to be elected or vote. Under the new law the five major tribes in Iran: Bakhtiyaris, Shahsavans, Qashqais, Khamseh and Turkomans were allowed to have one deputy each in the parliament. The non-Muslim communities such as Chaldeans, Armenians, Jews and Zoroastrians could also each have one deputy. An attempt was made for the opening of the Senate in line with the Constitution of 1906. An effort was made to reduce the number of foreign words used in

⁵⁴⁰ Barclay to Grey, telegram, April 30, 1909, in *Persia No. 2 (1909)*, 115.

⁵⁴¹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 117-8.

⁵⁴² *Persia No. 2 (1909)*, 94-5.

⁵⁴³ Barclay to Grey, telegram, June 17, 1909 in *Persia No. 1 (1910)*, 42-3.

the documents outlining the new electoral law, using Persian equivalents instead. The word “Vakil” (deputy), due to its religious connotations, was changed to “Namayandeh” (representative).⁵⁴⁴

Meanwhile, as promised to the Russians and British, the Shah had formed a new cabinet which satisfied the constitutionalists, with Naser al-Molk as Prime Minister. Since Naser al-Molk was still in Europe, Saad al-Dowleh acted as his vice. Naser al-Molk was a veteran politician who had served for the previous Shahs and had been Finance Minister during the First Parliament period.

4:13 The Plan to Attack Tehran

While some of the constitutionalists were negotiating with the Shah, searching for a peaceful solution, those in Isfahan and Gilan had other intentions. On 3 May Sardar As‘ad and Samsam al-Dowleh in a joint telegraph to all the foreign legations expressed their intention to march on the capital.⁵⁴⁵ On 5 May 1909 Qazvin was taken from Rasht by 200 constitutionalists.⁵⁴⁶ Now Sepahdar, Yapram Khan and Ali Mohammad Tarbiat and Mo‘ez al-Soltan had settled in Qazvin with their fighters and had made their centre there. The Sattar Assembly was held there.⁵⁴⁷ They began sending telegrams to Tabriz and direct communication was established between the Mojaheds and Tabriz.⁵⁴⁸ They argued that the Shah had re-established the constitution but they did not trust him and would go to Tehran. Kasravi describes this group as well-organised and equipped with good commanders; “Despite being young, due to his valour and perseverance, Mirza Ali Mohammad Khan was popular with everyone. If among the revolutionaries a few others had been as qualified as Yapram and as zealous as this young man, greater tasks could have been performed.”⁵⁴⁹

At the same time the Bakhtiari and constitutionalists in Isfahan were preparing themselves to march towards Tehran. Sardar As‘ad was reassured by the constitutionalists

⁵⁴⁴ ‘Ain al-Saltaneh, 2453.

⁵⁴⁵ Barclay to Grey, telegram, May 3, 1909, in *Ibid.*, 117.

⁵⁴⁶ Barclay to Grey, telegram, May 5, 1909, in *Ibid.*, 118.

⁵⁴⁷ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 27.

⁵⁴⁸ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 118.

⁵⁴⁹ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 27.

in Tehran that the people of the capital would support the constitutionalists there and would help them. After gathering 700 fighters from Bakhtiari, Sardar As'ad was now in readiness to leave Isfahan and begin his raid on Tehran.

4:15 Differences of Opinion Concerning an Attack on Tehran

After the opening of Qazvin, the constitutionalists had differing opinions about attacking Tehran. Taqizadeh, who was negotiating with the Shah for a peaceful solution to end the conflict and was discussing arrangements for the reopening of the Parliament, was among those who did not support the idea of attacking Tehran. Before the Russian troops had arrived in Tabriz, in a joint telegram, Taqizadeh together with Sattar Khan, had encouraged the constitutionalists of Rasht to quickly conquer Qazvin.⁵⁵⁰ Later, however, he had changed his opinion. Clearly the presence of Russian troops in Tabriz and the fear that if the constitutionalists attacked Tehran, the Russians would intensify their presence was a grave concern. Remaining diplomatic documents from both the British and the Russians confirm that both governments were much concerned by the approaching of the constitutionalist forces from Gilan and Isfahan to Tehran. In another longer telegraph to Ali Mohammad Tarbiat and Mo'ez al-Soltan, Taqizadeh talked about the idea of attacking Qazvin once more. Besides this point, the telegraph also illustrates the close relationship between Taqizadeh and the leaders of the constitutionalists in Gilan. In the telegraph Taqizadeh put emphasis on the importance of treating the general public well and on not interfering with people with money or businessmen.⁵⁵¹ Amirkhizi has written about this disagreement; "With regards to the departure of the Rasht army towards Tehran, in the assembly there was a disagreement between the late Mosavat and two or three other members of the Assembly and me. This was resolved soon and the Assembly agreed upon the departure of the army towards Tehran."⁵⁵² Amirkhizi does not mention the name of Taqizadeh but there is a remaining telegram from Taqizadeh about this issue. In the telegram, Taqizadeh explains about his reasons for disagreeing with the plan. He states that many were critical of his negative attitude towards an attack on Tehran, but after reading

⁵⁵⁰ Taqizadeh and Sattar Khan to Mo'ez al-Soltan, telegram, in *Nasim-e Shomal*, March 5, 1909.

⁵⁵¹ Taqizadeh to Mo'ez al-Soltan and Ali Mohammad Tarbiat, telegram, in *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyat*, ed., Afshar, 28-29.

⁵⁵² Amirkhizi, 448.

twenty issues of *The Times* he was convinced the constitutionalists should not go to Tehran. He believed:

The presence of the foreign Mojaheds in that region is like poison. In the British Parliament one of the members inquired from the Foreign Minister if the Russian government was going to send troops to secure the Anzali-Tehran road. The minister replied boldly that the Russian government did have the right to send troops, since that road was the communication route between Europe and Tehran and the main Russian route to the centre and was heavily used. The Russian citizen insurgents have occupied there....⁵⁵³

Taqizadeh mentioned in the telegram that he did not want to impose his opinion over them and they were free to act as they wanted. At the same time, Yaprām from Qazvin had asked Sattar Khan's opinion about attacking Tehran. Sattar Khan had advised him to act according to their military preparations and suggested that if they could, they should conquer Tehran.⁵⁵⁴ This could be yet another example of disagreement between Taqizadeh and Sattar Khan.

4:16 The Liberation of Tehran

Despite Taqizadeh's opinion, the plan to attack Tehran was carried out. In Tehran Bakhtiyaris who supported the Shah, upon realising the determination of the constitutionalists to conquer Tehran, were anxious about their future. Sardar As'ad's brother, Sardar Zafar, and the other chiefs who supported the Shah agreed to welcome Sardar As'ad. After the departure of Sardar As'ad on 21 May, news spread that the constitutionalists of Gilan had also departed for Tehran under the command of Sepahdar. While the governmental forces were in Kashan and were planning to attack Isfahan, Sardar As'ad managed to avoid confronting them there by taking another route to reach Tehran. In Qom other constitutionalist forces joined Sardar As'ad's troops. Although in Qom the Russian and British consulate generals went to convince Sardar As'ad not to attack Tehran,

⁵⁵³ Taqizadeh to Ali Mohammad Tarbiat, telegram, June 11, 1909, in *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyyat*, ed., Afshar, 36-40.

⁵⁵⁴ Amirkhizi, 447.

they were not successful in changing his mind. While residing in Qom, Sardar As'ad had negotiations with Saad al-Dowleh who was now in the office of Deputy Prime Minister. These talks were also unable to dissuade him from attacking Tehran.⁵⁵⁵

In Tehran the situation was confused. The Shah was on the outskirts of Tehran in Saltanat Abad. Liakhoff was in charge of defending Tehran. The constitutionalists reached Tehran at 6 a.m. on 13 July and the fight began. After three days the constitutionalists had captured key positions in Tehran including the parliament. On 16 July, realising there was no hope left, Mohammad Ali Shah decided to seek refuge in the Russian legation. An extraordinary grand council was formed, made up of Ulama, previous members of parliament, businessmen, ministers and other notables.⁵⁵⁶ The council issued a proclamation, announcing that Mohammad Ali Shah had voluntarily abdicated. Sepahdar Tonekaboni was appointed Minister of War and Ahmad Mirza, the thirteen-year-old son of Mohammad Ali Shah, was appointed the new Shah. Until the convening of the parliament, 'Azd al-Molk, the head of the Qajar tribe, would act as Regent.⁵⁵⁷ The extraordinary grand council chose about 20 people to act as the directors to control events. Taqizadeh, as a member of the previous parliament, was invited to join this Directory. He left Tabriz with an escort of Mojaheds of Tabriz and reached Tehran on 6 August. The constitutionalists of Tehran went to Karaj to welcome him and accompanied him to Tehran with a musical troop.⁵⁵⁸ Taqizadeh had now become one of the most influential men of this period of Iranian history. This liberation of Tehran brought to a close the period known as the Lesser Despotism. The Lesser Despotism, the period between the closure of the First Parliament and the dethroning of Mohammad Ali Shah, despite the adverse socio-economic effects of the civil war, is an important phase in the intellectual and political history of Iran. Although Mohammad Ali Shah destroyed the First Parliament, he was unable to become the absolute ruler of Iran as he had wished. The rule of constitution for two years had spread its roots deeply. Due to the influence of freedom of speech, people had become more informed and politically aware. It was no longer possible to eradicate the constitution simply by a coup

⁵⁵⁵ Malekzadeh, 1096-8.

⁵⁵⁶ "The Events in Tehran," 16 July, 1909, in *Ketab-e Nareni*, ed., Bashiri, 243-6.

⁵⁵⁷ Amirkhizi, 451.

⁵⁵⁸ Mojtehed, 148.

d'état. During the aftermath of the closure of the parliament, Tabriz became the main centre of the ideological and military opposition against the Shah. After the uprising in Tabriz, the two main international powers involved in the affairs of Iran had realised that the Shah would not easily be able to suppress the movement. The Russians, despite supporting the Shah, were concerned about the growing sympathy of the Russian revolutionary Social Democrat Party for the Iranian case and wanted to end the conflict. Similarly, the British, due to their interests in the region, also preferred a powerful centralised power to a state of anarchy which had prevailed after the overthrowing of the constitution by the Shah. However, the insistence of the Shah on his policy and the misdeeds of some of his advisors and supporters had resulted in the spreading of the resistance movement from Tabriz to other parts of Iran and culminated in the deposing of the Shah. This was the first time in Iranian history that a Shah had been disposed by an organised movement of the masses.

The destruction of the parliament by the Shah turned the attention of the international media towards Iran and gave an opportunity to the Iranian constitutionalists to present their demands to a global audience. This allowed the intellectuals of the movement greater familiarisation with the concept of democracy and other associated ideas such as human rights. Within this context, Iranian intellectuals began to come into contact with political groups in other countries who had similar demands and who were in the same position as that in Iran; fighting for freedom and constitutionalism. A growing universal outlook enabled the Iranian intellectuals to focus on Iran becoming a unified nation and view the country in relation to other nations. Consequently, a historical consciousness developed in them as they began to make use of history in its modern sense as a vehicle to give meaning to the constitutional revolution and its goals; a history which highlighted the golden periods of the Iranian nation. The dominant theme was to see the position of Iran declining throughout the course of history. This outlook was widely used in the pre-constitutional discourse of the intellectuals in Iran. The period of the Lesser Despotism provided intellectuals with an opportunity to use history as a strong tool to incite the masses and compare the adverse situation of Iran with its glorious past. The culprits of the dramatic decline of Iran were its corrupted rulers and Mohammad Ali Shah was the embodiment of such a ruler. The intellectuals introduced the Constitutional Revolution as a movement

which would elevate Iran to its previous prestigious position among other nations. Taqizadeh, among others, was one who used this discourse on several occasions to justify the fight against Mohammad Ali Shah by mentioning distinguished rulers of Iran from different periods. Although utilising these glorious historical periods was helpful in inciting the masses, it introduced a vague and confusing concept in the political and intellectual discourse in Iran. What was considered outstanding in this selective glorious past of Iranian history was often associated with the military power of a specific ruler or conqueror such as Nader Shah and there was less emphasis on the cultural or democratic aspects of the different periods of Iranian history. In short, this emphasis on the military achievement of the nation resulted in a disregard for a deep social cultural analysis of these periods. It created a superficial glorification of the past and a nostalgia to regain that prestigious past. Taqizadeh was one of the few Iranian intellectuals who utilised these ideas when addressing the public. He was more knowledgeable than many other Iranian politicians at that time about the concept of democracy.

The Lesser Despotism period allows a useful study of key Iranian political players. The difference between the prominent constitutionalist players is crucial here. Characters such as Sepahdar-e Tonekaboni or the Bakhtiyari chiefs like Sardar As'ad, Samsam al-Saltaneh or Zargham-al Saltaneh, for example, clearly lacked the ideological foundation that Taqizadeh possessed and the consistency that he showed. Sepahdar was first sent to Tabriz to fight with the constitutionalists there but due to an argument with 'Ain al-Dowleh had left and returned to Tonekabon before revolting against the Shah and joining the constitutionalists. Zargham al-Saltaneh and Samsam al-Saltaneh showed similar characteristics. They had first been in Tehran with Mohammad Ali Shah supporting him but later had joined the constitutionalist camp. The constitutionalists in Paris had to convince Sardar As'ad to join their camp and organise a plan against the Shah. The documents at hand prove that the constitutionalists were highly suspicious about his intentions before the conquering of Tehran. What these people do not share with Taqizadeh is a solid persistent ideological goal that was used as a road map. Taqizadeh had a clearer idea than other constitutionalists about political, cultural, economic modernisation. He might momentarily veer off his path due to forces beyond his control but the horizon of his

goal would remain constant and he would find his way back to his original route. It is this consistency and unwavering focus towards and awareness of his goals that was lacking in the majority of others who participated in the constitutional movement.

The Lesser Despotism period and the attempts of the constitutionalists to form a strong opposition against the Shah helped to unite throughout the Iranian territory groups of people who might otherwise have been geographically or ethnically on the periphery. The end result of this period was the passing of the first electoral law, allowing more Iranians to be involved in political decision making by giving them the chance to vote and be represented in parliament. The participation of many of the tribes, making up a large part of Iran's population is a good example. The constitutional movement helped to converge Iranian thought into one single specific goal. This laid the foundations for the feeling of a shared destiny among the many different groups and classes of Iranian society.

Chapter Five

Constitutionalists in Power

The previous chapter highlighted Taqizadeh's main objective during the period of the Lesser Despotism; his efforts to restore the Constitution in Iran. Pursuing this goal was clearly Taqizadeh's chief task during this time. It influenced and indeed overshadowed all other aspects of his life. Chapters Three and Four highlighted Taqizadeh's efforts towards achieving this goal as well as the series of local and international events that occurred, over which he had little control. It was the combination of both these factors that drove his actions and greatly influenced what he learned and achieved during this period. Moving into exile with little hope of reviving the Constitution, it was the fledgling resistance of Tabriz that gave Taqizadeh new direction and re-energised him and other constitutionalists.⁵⁵⁹ While Chapter Three's main focus was Taqizadeh's activities whilst in Europe and in exile. Chapter Four followed Taqizadeh's life after his return to Iran and focused more on the events in Iran and his role in political developments. The previous chapter demonstrated Taqizadeh's role as a political activist holding no official position in the government. In contrast, with the dethroning of Mohammad Ali Shah and the restoration of the Constitution, the Lesser Despotism period came to an end and Taqizadeh's role quickly shifted from that of an advocate for political enlightenment and activist to one of a powerful statesman with great responsibilities, laying the foundations of a new regime. This was the opportunity Taqizadeh had been waiting for. He was now finally able to put into practice the ideas he had been developing until this point.

The present chapter covers Taqizadeh's activities after the constitutionalists regained power in Iran. With the establishment of the First Parliament, the constitutionalists had managed to take control of the legislative power. They now also held the executive power. By overthrowing the old regime, they could now begin to expand the process of secularising in other spheres and especially the judicial system which the clergy had

⁵⁵⁹ According to Rasoulzadeh who had interviewed him, Taqizadeh had not had much hope for the resistance of Tabriz in its early stage. See: Mohammad Amin Raoulzadeh, "Esteqbal-e Melli," *Taraqqi*, August, 25, 1909, no. 180, in *Gozareshaei az Enqelab-e Mashrutiyyat* [Some Reports from the Constitutional Revolution] ed., Rahim Raisnia (Tehran: Pardis Danesh, 2008), 294-9.

traditionally controlled. As this chapter illustrates, the new political leaders, including Taqizadeh, had to tackle this task from two angles: firstly, ridding the country of many of the old regime's establishments and statesmen and secondly by introducing new institutions. The constitutionalists were eager for these new institutions to be more modern in nature and to be modelled on European systems.

This period was also characterised by strong efforts to secularise the government. The desire for this was more dominant among those constitutionalists who had had to leave the country during the Lesser Despotism period. After a year spent abroad, having witnessed the influence of modernisation in other countries, upon returning home they were eager to suggest ways in which the situation in their own country might be improved. Each identified a different source for the backwardness of "the Eastern" countries such as Iran; some considered the reason for the lack of modernisation to be the religion of Islam and the conquering of Iran by the Arabs. This overt confrontation with Islam greatly displeased the religious authorities and heightened their suspicions about the institutions that the constitutionalists were clearly trying to create.⁵⁶⁰ One example is the uproar caused by the detention of the editor of *Habl al-Matin* who had insulted the Arabs by suggesting that it had been their invasion of Iran that had halted the modernisation of the country. The clergy had taken this to imply that it was in fact Islam that was responsible for the downturn of Iran.⁵⁶¹

Another instance is the strong reaction of the conservative clergy and ordinary people to what Mirza Hossein Khan 'Edalat, the famous constitutionalist and a progressive intellectual in Tabriz, had written against the veiling of women. 'Edalat had also advocated for women's rights, including their right to education. The article, under the title of "Ayri Qaberqa" [The Crooked Rib] appeared in *Sohbat*, No. 4, a newspaper which Mirza Hossein Khan published in Azerbaijani Turkish in Tabriz. Its aim was to awaken the political minds of those lower classes who did not understand Persian.⁵⁶² The newspaper was suspended

⁵⁶⁰ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 69.

⁵⁶¹ For more about the trial of *Habl al-Matin*, see: *Neday-e Vatan*, August 11, 1909. Also, *Habl al-Matin* (Calcutta), October 4, 1909.

⁵⁶² *Iran-e Now*, November 29, 1909.

and 'Edalat' was put on trial and imprisoned by the anti-constitutionalist clergy of Tabriz who considered the article to be contradictory to Islamic teachings; the same conservative clergy who had supported the ex-Shah during the siege of Tabriz but still had influence over the masses despite the rule of the new regime. Although Taqizadeh was still resolute that religious reform and improvements in the position of women were necessary, at this point he considered these kinds of remarks harmful for the cause.⁵⁶³ Taqizadeh's priority at this point was to modernise the political system and secure the independence of the country. Diversity of opinions among the constitutionalists and their haste to put into practice their ideas prevented them from forming a strong unified front and thus weakened their position.

A close examination of Taqizadeh's activities during this period reveals that he enjoyed much greater success in his political role in the First Parliament than in the administration of the Directive Committee (*Directoire*), a temporary council set up to take over the executive powers of the government. Later, his party building project in the Second Parliament was equally not as successful as he had originally hoped. Taqizadeh, by forming the Democrat Party during this period, had hoped for systematic modernisation from below through the mobilisation of the masses and their involvement in the political process. This resulted in confrontation between him and the traditional clergy which led to his exile from the country; a huge obstacle to his political ambitions. At the same time this was a blow to the idea of modernisation from below and convinced Taqizadeh and many other intellectuals to favour authoritarian modernity as a more direct route to achieving modernisation in as short a time period as possible.

Although Taqizadeh's activities during this period introduced new ideas into Iranian political discourse and allowed some opportunity for these ideas to be put into practice, we see Taqizadeh's swift personal fall from grace; transforming him from the golden boy of politics into an unwanted political figure. He would arrive to Tehran as a hero and leave as a pariah.

⁵⁶³ Anonymous to Taqizadeh, 2 November 1909, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 170-75.

5:1 Arrival as a Hero

Our prophet migrated from Hejaz with afflicted heart
He had endured so much suffering from the infidels of Quraysh
On the day of conquering Mecca, the prophet returned.⁵⁶⁴

As can be determined from the previous chapters, there were important differences between Taqizadeh's arrival in Tehran after his exile and his first visit there. Upon his first arrival in Tehran in October 1906, he had been a stranger in the city and could not even find his way to the Parliament; the place that represented the zenith of his ambitions. Now, in contrast, from a great distance outside the city walls, a large, enthusiastic crowd who felt they were accompanying a hero to his rightful place would lead him to the Parliament. He was considered a man of great importance. *Neday-e Vatan's* reflections on the occasion of his arrival represents well Taqizadeh's superior standing among the constitutionalists at this time:

The honourable distinguished philosopher, the Iranian Voltaire, the Mirabeau of the time, the senior and most learned offspring of Azerbaijan and the pride of Iranians, Mr. Taqizadeh finally arrived on Saturday, 7 August 1909. It is a name of glorious merit which has reached all corners of the world. Someone whose exhilarating freedom-loving proclamations have been heard by all humankind. Friends and strangers have researched the personal history of this magnificent human being. He has endured fourteen months of homelessness and managed to survive deadly encounters. He has surmounted major obstacles, laid out the invaluable roadmap of the historical revolution and paved the way for amazing goals to be achieved. He supported the movement itself by using his mental capabilities and by seeking help from all freedom loving people of the world. He lodged in the centre of happiness [Tehran]; the capital of eternal government and was received with much glory, honour,

⁵⁶⁴ "Dar Tahnyat-e Voroud-e Jenab-e Aqay-e Taqizadeh," [In Welcoming his Excellency Taqizadeh] in *Majles*, August 10, 1909.

endearment and many official ceremonies. He was welcomed by a huge number of people from different classes and groups of Mojaheds.⁵⁶⁵

As the passage illustrates, Taqizadeh was hugely popular upon his return to Tehran and this would serve to help his ascent of the ladder of power in the newly formed political structure of the country. Commenting on Taqizadeh's glorious arrival, Sharif Kashani wrote that as Taqizadeh was relatively young and inexperienced, too much respect shown for him on his arrival might have made him too courageous and headstrong. He predicted that this would cause corruption because Taqizadeh was too eager for all the constitutionalists to obey him and act according to his will. Kashani continued that it was difficult to imagine that everybody would follow Taqizadeh, which would thus lead to differences of opinion resulting in confrontation and division within the country.⁵⁶⁶

Nevertheless, part of Taqizadeh's popularity was due to the expectations of the general public. They had faith in the fact that he would bring about swift reforms that would have a positive effect on their daily lives. Mohammad Amin Rasoulzadeh, the political activist and journalist from the Caucasus, was in Tehran at the time of Taqizadeh's arrival and writing for *Taraqqi* [Progress], a newspaper published in the Caucasus. He too wrote about the glory of Taqizadeh's arrival in the city. His report highlights some of the expectations of people; "I talk with an acquaintance. He congratulates me and then adds, 'Thank God, our Taqizadeh has also arrived. God willing, he will make up for our shortcomings...'.⁵⁶⁷" Rasoulzadeh then continued that he hoped Taqizadeh would be able to meet the high expectations that the public had of him.⁵⁶⁸ Such high expectations, however, threatened to be a double-edged sword for Taqizadeh since his focus was aimed on structural reforms rather than directed at changes that might have immediate effects on the daily life of people. Unsurprisingly, this put him at odds with those who were impatient for tangible and swift change in everyday matters. Any inability to bring about the desired change could damage

⁵⁶⁵ *Neday-e Vatan*, August 8, 1909.

⁵⁶⁶ Sharif Kashani, 547.

⁵⁶⁷ Mohammad Amin Rasoulzadeh, "Esteqbal-e Melli [National Welcome]," in *Taraqqi*, August 25, 1909, in *Gozarashaei az Enqelab-e Mashrutiyyat* ed., Raisnia, 294-9.

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid.

his popularity if the general public's hopes were dashed. Everything hinged on what Taqizadeh's planned reforms were and how he would put them into practice. As will become evident later in this chapter, Taqizadeh was more focused on political modernisation during this period than on other issues.

During his initial visit to Tehran in 1906, first attending the parliament as a mere spectator, Taqizadeh had had only a general idea of what he hoped to achieve. In contrast, he was now returning to the capital with a carefully planned and more nuanced political agenda. He had visited Europe and had seen first-hand the workings of a European parliament and was much more au fait with how political parties functioned in Europe. Upon his victorious return to Tehran, he was now more convinced that his first priority must be political party building. This time, unlike his first arrival in Tehran when he had only just embarked on a professional political career, he was now a well-known political figure with strong support. This would enable him to immediately begin work on his plans towards actualising his goals. 'Ain al-Saltaneh's reflections on Taqizadeh's arrival in Tehran include mention of the large number of people welcoming him and hint at the role he would go on to play; "Taqizadeh is the most important and popular of the constitutionalists in Tehran. People are very fond of him. He is young and if all goes to plan, he will become the country's leader".⁵⁶⁹ Events following Taqizadeh's arrival allowed him to play a key role in Iranian politics, thereby confirming the predictions of his rise to power. Taqizadeh soon joined a Directive Committee which would turn out to have similar powers to those of the parliament.

5:2 The Directive Committee (Heyat-e Modirieh)

After the liberation of Tehran, the government's power lay mainly in the hands of a Directive Committee, formed on 12 August 1909 and made up of 20 members who had been chosen from among prominent constitutionalists. Besides Taqizadeh, the membership included Sardar As'ad, Sepahdar, S'ani' al-Dowleh, Hossein Qoli Khan Navab, Hakim al-Molk, Mostashar al-Dowleh, Vahid al-Molk, Sardar Mansour, Nezam al-Soltan, Mo'tamed Khaqan, Ali Mohammad Tarbiat, Haji Seyyed Nasrollah, Sadiq Hazrat, Amid al-Hokama,

⁵⁶⁹ 'Ain al-Saltaneh, 4: 2724-5.

Mirza Yans, Mo'ez al-Soltan, Hossein Kasmaei, Seyyed Mohammad Emamjomeh and Vosouq al-Dowleh.⁵⁷⁰

The main task of this Directive Committee was to establish order in the country and prepare the groundwork for elections and the reopening of parliament. It was Taqizadeh who had instigated the formation of a Directive Committee. He had argued that the Extraordinary Grand Council, formed immediately after the liberation of Tehran, had too many members. Since every individual in the council had to vote, this made the process of decision making both time consuming and complicated. Taqizadeh believed that the Directive Committee could be a better alternative.⁵⁷¹ The idea of forming a Directive Committee was evidently connected to the fascination that many of the Iranian constitutionalists, among them Taqizadeh, had for the French Revolution. The fact that Taqizadeh suggests that the Directive Committee was similar to the *Directoire* of the French Revolution indicates how much he had been inspired by European political models and by the French Revolution in particular.⁵⁷² 'Azd al-Molk, the regent, emphasising this influence bitterly writes:

What did we do that the French did not? We had a revolution, confronted the government, created a constitution and established a parliament. Then there was a coup d'état and the parliament was bombarded. We re-established the parliament, deposed the Shah, chose a new Shah, became Mojaheds and ultimately, we created a Directive Committee, just as there once was a *Directoire* in France. We are, thus, not even one step behind the other nations.⁵⁷³

⁵⁷⁰ Mohammad Mehdi Sharif Kashani, *Tarikh-e Mashrutiyyat* [The History of the Constitution], ed., Sirus S' dvandian (Tehran: Negarestan Ketab, 2010), 595.

In a letter to Seqat al-Eslam Tabrizi, 'Azd al-Molk has also mentioned the name of 17 people of this Directive Committee. See: 'Azd al-Molk to Seqat al-Eslam, 11 September 1909, in *Zendegi Nameh-e Shahid-e Niknam*, ed., Fathi, 482-1.

⁵⁷¹ Sharif Kashani, 596.

⁵⁷² Hassan Taqizadeh, "Khaterat-e Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh," in *Mashrutiyyat-e Iran*, ed., Mahmoud Setaysh, (Tehran: Sales, 2006), 62.

⁵⁷³ 'Azd al-Molk to Seqat al-Eslam, 11 September 1909, in *Zendegi Nameh-e Shahid-e Niknam*, ed., Fathi, 485.

He goes on to describe how the members of the Directive Committee imitated down to the finest details what they had read in French, German, English or Egyptian books. He afterwards complains that for those who understood the situation this was particularly painful.⁵⁷⁴

The fascination with and influence of the French Revolution was such that it blinded its Iranian supporters to the fact that circumstances in Iran differed greatly from those of France at the time of the French Revolution. Consequently, the socio-political reality of the Iranian context was overlooked by key members of the Directive Committee; so much so that they were unable to respond effectively to the turbulent situation of that time. One example is the severe punishment meted out to some leading clergy, in spite of their spiritual authority over the masses.

Similar to the laws passed by the National Parliament, those of the Directive Committee were also binding and ministers were obliged to adhere to them.⁵⁷⁵ During the time that the Directive Committee was active, Taqizadeh was the most influential member and consequently head of the decision-making men in Iran.⁵⁷⁶ Ali Mohammad Tarbiat as well as Navab, Mostashar al-Dowleh and Hakim al-Molk were in the close circle of Taqizadeh's friends who supported him and confirmed his decisions in the Directive Committee. Sharif Kashani writes:

The selection of the members of the Directive Committee is decided by his Excellency Taqizadeh. The members are mostly his acquaintances and friends. By nature, his Excellency Taqizadeh has laudable intentions and fierce ambitions, but it had not been possible for him to achieve his goals through the Extraordinary Grand Council. Of the 20 selected members who make up the Directive Committee, the majority agree with his plans and share similar ideas to Taqizadeh. So, whatever suggestions Taqizadeh puts

⁵⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁵ Malekzadeh, 6-7: 1256.

⁵⁷⁶ Taqizadeh himself writes that he was probably the most influential member of the Directive Committee. See: Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 133.

forward, the Directive Committee now agrees to and are thus implemented.⁵⁷⁷

At this point, Taqizadeh's influence was so strong that the rumour circulated that after the dethroning of the Shah, Taqizadeh might possibly become president of Iran.⁵⁷⁸ However, the idea of putting an end to the existing monarchy or appointing a new shah from outside the Qajar dynasty was not feasible since, according to the Treaty of Torkamanchay (1828), the Russians had promised that they would unconditionally support the heirs of the crown prince at that time, Abbas Mirza, in taking the throne.⁵⁷⁹ Regardless of whatever his position might have been, Taqizadeh's impact on the decision making of the Directive Committee was clearly evident in the appointment of Ali Mohammad Tarbiat to the position of head of the Mojaheds in Tehran. Taqizadeh distrusted some of the commanders of the Mojaheds, such as Sepahdar whom he considered was not following constitutional principles.⁵⁸⁰ Thus, with the appointment of Ali Mohammad Khan, Taqizadeh no doubt hoped to have military power on his side and benefit from the potential support from a trusted armed force for the party which he was planning to establish. Moreover, the creation of a modern national army was one of Taqizadeh's ambitions. This was also supported by the First Parliament which considered an organised army as vital for the modernisation of Iran. *Iran-e Now* [The New Iran] emphasising the importance of forming an organised army after the liberation of Tehran wrote, "All politicians, sages and those who want progress share the same opinion that the Iranian government needs an army. Every sensible person knows that if this country does not have an army, its independence will not be secured".⁵⁸¹ As clearly reflected in a telegraph that Taqizadeh sent to the provincial assembly of Gilan during this period, he had been deeply concerned about local unrest. As one of the leading advocates of a powerful central government in Iran, Taqizadeh was worried that the lack of control over the provinces would weaken the central government's authority. He believed strongly that in order to guarantee a sovereign

⁵⁷⁷ Sharif Kashani, 595-6.

⁵⁷⁸ Sadiq al-Saltaneh to Taqizadeh in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Iraj Afshar, 139-41.

⁵⁷⁹ Mohammad Taqi Bahar, *Tarikh-e Mokhtasar-e Ahzab-e Siyasi-e Iran* [A Concise History of Iranian Political Parties] (Tehran: Ketabhay-e Jibi, 1978), 1: 6.

⁵⁸⁰ *The Times*, September 2, 1909.

⁵⁸¹ *Iran-e Now*, September 20, 1909.

state and nationhood, the existence of an organised military force was crucial.⁵⁸² Taqizadeh trusted that the young Ali Mohammad Khan could actualise this vision and unite all the Mojaheds into forming a single, unified army.

Another reason that Taqizadeh considered a national organised army important was that he was deeply concerned about the influence of the Cossack Brigade, the only organised army in Iran at that time. Taqizadeh's concern is noted in the proceedings of the Second Parliament. Taqizadeh was of the opinion that expansion of the Cossack Brigade with its Russian commanders would increase Russian interference in Iran and could be a threat to the independence of the country.⁵⁸³ This concern apparently led the constitutionalists to attempt to change the uniform of the Cossack Brigade, a style clearly modelled on Russian outfits and which had obvious connections with Russia. They also wanted to replace the Brigade's Russian officers with those of other nationalities.⁵⁸⁴ During this time, large numbers of Russian troops were billeted in Tabriz, Qazvin, Rasht, and at various other locations throughout Northern Iran. According to Edward Grey, on July 13 1909, there were 4000 troops in Tabriz, 1700 between Rasht and Qazvin and 600 elsewhere.⁵⁸⁵ Their presence was the source of increasing distrust on the part of the constitutionalists, who suspected Russia of having a hidden agenda.

The idea of having an independent national army was partly actualised by the formation of the Government Gendarmerie in 1910. The Democrats in the Second Parliament played an active role in the setting up of this gendarmerie.⁵⁸⁶ There was hostility between the gendarmerie, which was considered to be under the influence of the British, and the Cossacks who were under the influence of the Russians.

⁵⁸² Taqizadeh to The Provincial Assembly of Gilan, telegram, in *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyyat*, ed., Afshar, 175-80.

⁵⁸³ Proceedings of the Second Parliament, Session 42, 18 January 1910.

⁵⁸⁴ Fraser, 147-8.

⁵⁸⁵ Edward, G. Browne, *The Persian Crisis of December 1911: How it Arose Whither it May Lead Us* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1912), 4.

⁵⁸⁶ For further information about the Government Gendarmerie see: Stephanie Cronin, "Iranian Nationalism and the Government Gendarmerie," in *Iran and the First World War: Battleground of the Great Powers*, ed., Touraj Atabaki (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 43-67.

Despite Taqizadeh supporting the appointment of Ali Mohammad Khan as commander of the Mojaheds, support was not unanimous. Mehdi Malekzadeh believed his appointment was a huge error on the part of the Directive Committee since the Mojaheds consisted of different groups with differing opinions. The majority of Mojaheds who had come from Rasht, for instance, saw Mo‘ez al-Soltan as their chief whereas Armenians considered Yapram Khan as their spiritual father figure and refused to follow the orders of any other commanders. Other groups of Mojaheds also had their own allegiances. As a result, Ali Mohammad Khan was nothing more than a nominal commander; the true commanders were those to whom the Mojaheds were loyal.⁵⁸⁷ Yahya Dolatabadi also considered the appointment of Ali Mohammad Khan to be a contentious issue. He suggested that this led to Sepahdar ordering the creation of an opposition group under the commandship of Mo‘ez al-Soltan.⁵⁸⁸ The disagreement between the various groups of Mojaheds later escalated and had huge ramifications.

But disagreements over the choice of military leaders was not the only pressing issue that the Directive Committee and Taqizadeh as its leading member had to deal with. Since Taqizadeh played an important role in the decisions of the Directive Committee, it is necessary here to elaborate further on the main responsibilities of the Directive Committee and some of the tasks this body had to carry out.

5:3 The Tasks of the Directive Committee

Under the responsibility of the Directive Committee, various issues had to be dealt with which required holding daily sessions. The treasury coffers were empty and the government was in immediate need of cash. The primary task of the Directive Committee was therefore to address this problem and provide a sufficient budget to be able to run the basic administration of the country. Some members of the Directive Committee were specially chosen to form a commission, referred to as the Charity Commission, to gather funds. It was decided that the Directive Committee would fine the affluent royalists in order to raise money and thus the commission was successful in making available funds for

⁵⁸⁷ Malekzadeh, 6-7: 1282.

⁵⁸⁸ Yahya Dolatabadi, 3: 120-1.

urgent needs. According to Taqizadeh, the collected amount was around 1,000,000 Tomans (equivalent to £166,660 at that time).⁵⁸⁹ Commenting on the revenue collected by the commission, Taqizadeh wrote, “There is no doubt that we acted excessively. In the beginning it was said that those [the royalists] who had extorted money from people must be jailed and their money would be confiscated. Some were jailed accordingly...”.⁵⁹⁰ Although many have criticised this radical act of the Directive Committee, historians such as Kasravi approved the appropriation of the money by force from the rich who had opposed the Constitution. But, at the same time, Kasravi admitted that not everyone had been treated equally during the process.⁵⁹¹ What was contentious about this process was the fact that “many men who deserved squeezing” were under foreign protection and this reduced the amount which could be extorted.⁵⁹²

Zel al-Soltan, the deposed Shah’s wealthy uncle, was one of those who was forced to pay a huge sum of money. It was reported that he had to pay 300,000 Tomans in cash and credit. Zel al-Soltan paid 100,000 Tomans (£16,666) in cash and promised to pay another 200,000 (£33,333) within four months.⁵⁹³ As the remaining documents reveal, Taqizadeh had been the key figure in the case of Zel al-Soltan. Zel al-Soltan and his family wrote letters to Taqizadeh, requesting that he help to secure Zel al-Soltan’s release; an example showing Taqizadeh’s influence in this matter.⁵⁹⁴

Besides the Charity Commission, another commission was created to organise taxing provisions and prepare a budget plan for the government. It was necessary to establish a treasury and a system to regulate the collection of these taxes and ensure a centralised collection point.

⁵⁸⁹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 122.

⁵⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁹¹ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 63.

⁵⁹² Barclay to Grey, telegram, 10 August, 1909, in *Further Correspondence No.1 (1910)*, 111-2.

⁵⁹³ *The Times*, September 28, 1909. See also: Zel al-Soltan to the Directive Committee, telegram, 20 October, 1909, in *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyat*, ed., Afshar, 184-6.

⁵⁹⁴ Ibid. 169-204.

5:4 Purging the Court

A further issue that the Directive Committee needed to address was the fact that supporters of the ex-Shah remained in the court. The Directive Committee was determined to purge the court of these counsellors they considered undesirable. Hakim al-Molk was a close friend of Taqizadeh and a man whom he could rely on to get the job done. In fact, Taqizadeh resided in his house after his arrival in Tehran.⁵⁹⁵ It was he who was appointed in the court, with the responsibility of monitoring the new Shah. Hakim al-Molk initiated reform in the court by expelling reactionary advisers and court members of the ex-Shah. One of the key figures to be dismissed was Seraya Shapshal, the infamous Russian tutor and adviser of Mohammad Ali Shah. He acquired the epithet of “Bloody Shapshal”, having encouraged the Shah to use violent means to crush the constitutional movement. Indeed, Taqizadeh himself, using unusually strong language, called him a “bastard”, thus displaying his great dislike of the Shah’s Russian adviser.⁵⁹⁶

Another controversial act carried out by the Directive Committee was the ousting of Ahmad Shah’s Russian tutor, Smirnov.⁵⁹⁷ Taqizadeh referred to Smirnov’s adverse influence on the young Ahmad Shah similar to that of Shapshal on Mohammad Ali Mirza.⁵⁹⁸ According to Taqizadeh, dismissing this tutor angered the Russians and led them to begin negotiations to restore Smirnov’s position in the court. Taqizadeh explained how the Russians put some key members of the new regime under pressure by demanding they immediately pay their debts to the Russian bank. Among others, the regent, ‘Azd al-Molk, Sepahdar and Sardar Mansour had substantial debts to the bank. They were greatly concerned by the recalling of the debts. The Russian bank which was a branch of the Russian finance department had 30 million Roubles credit and had authorised large loans to leading figures in Iran as a means of restraining and controlling them. As a result, these influential figures were beholden to the Russians and whenever they acted against the

⁵⁹⁵ Taqizadeh, *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 2: 103.

⁵⁹⁶ Tufani, 126.

⁵⁹⁷ For more about Smirnov, see: Evan Siegel, “A Review of the Memoirs of Konstantin Nikolaevich Smirnov, Crown Prince Ahmad’s Tutor,” available online:

<http://iran.qlineorientalist.com/Articles/Smirnov/Smirnov.html> (accessed November 25, 2016).

⁵⁹⁸ For more about Ahmad Shah’s education and his character, see: Ahmad Ali Sepher, “Shakhsyat va Akhalaq-e Soltan Ahmad Shah” in *Iran dar Jang-e Bozorg* [Iran in the Great War] (Tehran: Adib, 1983), 32-7.

Russian interests, the bank would ask for the debt to be repaid. However, despite all this, the tutor was dismissed and the court was subject to a sweeping purge.⁵⁹⁹ Commenting on the purge of the court, Taqizadeh writes, “After the liberation of Tehran, we eradicated everything remaining from Mohammad Ali Shah.”⁶⁰⁰

5:5 Appointing Governors

The Directive Committee was also assigned the role of appointing suitably qualified governors for the provinces. Mokhber al-Saltaneh, who was still in Europe, was asked to go directly to Tabriz to become the governor of Azerbaijan, a position he had held before the coup d'état in June 1908.⁶⁰¹ Taqizadeh facilitated this appointment which was generally well-received since he had “the reputation of being a strong enlightened man”.⁶⁰² He arrived in Tabriz on 18 August, 1909.⁶⁰³ Samsam al-Saltaneh from the Bakhtiyari tribe was chosen as the governor of Isfahan.⁶⁰⁴ The Directive Committee endeavoured to avoid appointing public officials from the old regime whose reputations were marred. Accordingly, Taqizadeh immediately used his influence to oppose the selection of ‘Ala’ al-Dowleh as the governor of Fars since he considered the old prince as “the embodiment of the old system”.⁶⁰⁵ This was despite British complaints about the disturbances in Bushehr. They wanted the Directive Committee to send someone powerful to control those regions and protect British interests and so exerted constant pressure on the Directive Committee to send ‘Ala’ al-Dowleh as the governor of Fars.⁶⁰⁶ The situation in Shiraz, the capital of Fars, was also aggravated by the disturbances there with the news of an approaching force of 10,000 from the Qashqai tribe. David Fraser believed this could have been because of local feuds but suggested that a tribe more numerous and wealthier than the Bakhtiyaris might have been jealous of the deeds of this other tribe active in the capital and wanted to show what they were capable of.⁶⁰⁷ This was a further issue which the new

⁵⁹⁹ Setayesh, 64.

⁶⁰⁰ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 125.

⁶⁰¹ Barclay to Grey, Monthly Summary, 13 August 1909, in *Further Correspondence No.1 (1910)*, 116-9.

⁶⁰² Smart to Barclay, 25 July, 1909, in *Further Correspondence No.1 (1910)*, 113.

⁶⁰³ Amirkhizi, 477.

⁶⁰⁴ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 62.

⁶⁰⁵ Barclay to Grey, telegram, 10 August 1909, in *Further Correspondence No.1 (1910)*, 91.

⁶⁰⁶ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 145.

⁶⁰⁷ Fraser, 150.

government had also to contend with; it needed to appoint governors who would not be associated with the old regime and would be able to handle local unrest and secure the sovereignty of the central government.

Taqizadeh's first speech given in the Directive Committee has references to these problems and emphasises his dissatisfaction with the involvement of the officials who had been key players during the old regime.⁶⁰⁸ It appears that Kasravi overlooked Taqizadeh's references in his speech to these officials when he expressed criticism of the lack of mention of former politicians' involvement in the new government.⁶⁰⁹ The first issue of *Iran-e Now* carried an article emphasising the need for the old regime's officials to be replaced by a new generation of men. The article quotes Taqizadeh expressing his dissatisfaction with those from both the old and the new regimes who remained in power.⁶¹⁰

5:6 Choosing the Crown Prince and a New Cabinet

On 1 September Mohammad Hassan Mirza, the new Shah's younger brother, was officially proclaimed as the crown prince by the Directive Committee. The Directive Committee also appointed a cabinet, with Sepahdar as Minister of War and Sardar As'ad as Minister of the Interior. Since the Directive Committee fulfilled the role of prime minister, there was no need for any other person to be appointed to that position. The police force was placed under the control of Yaprak Khan.⁶¹¹

5:7 Punishment of those who had Supported the ex-Shah

The Directive Committee had also to decide about the punishment of those who had supported the ex-Shah. Two famous figures who were executed by the constitutionalists before the formation of the Directive Committee were Sheikh Fazl al-Allah Nouri, the prominent anti-constitutionalist clergy and Mir Hashem from Tabriz who were both hanged in public. Sheikh Fazl al-Allah's hanging was unexpected and raised criticism against the

⁶⁰⁸ *Iran-e Now*, August 24, 1909.

⁶⁰⁹ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 74.

⁶¹⁰ *Iran-e Now*, August 24, 1909.

⁶¹¹ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 62.

constitutionalists from among the religious supporters.⁶¹² Nobody could have imagined that such an important clergyman would be executed.⁶¹³

The trial of Sheikh Fazl al-Allah was brief and the execution was quickly carried out. Yaprarn Khan, who had been newly appointed as the head of police believed if he was to be executed, it should be done immediately whilst public support for it remained high. At the same time, some of Sheikh Fazl al-Allah's opponents believed that if he stayed alive he might incite tribes to rise up against the constitution.⁶¹⁴

Sheikh Fazl al-Allah's refusal to take refuge in any foreign embassy after the arrival of the constitutionalists in Tehran in order to save his life and furthermore his calmness during the trial and his execution affected the masses. He maintained his position right up until his last breath on the gallows, calling the constitutionalists anti-religious and Babis.⁶¹⁵ The memory of Sheikh Fazl al-Allah's execution, when the anti-constitutionalists forces had taken over in Tabriz in 1912 was still fresh and was a reason for the opposition forces to want to avenge the constitutionalists. In a letter to Browne outlining the events of that period, Taqizadeh explains how people in Tabriz were forced to hold mourning services for Sheikh Fazl al-Allah and Mir Hashem in houses and mosques. After the execution of Sheikh Fazl al-Allah, many religious people considered voting in the elections of the Second Parliament as Haram (religiously forbidden) and did not participate.⁶¹⁶

In fact, this execution remained as a clear representation of the clash between those who advocated a secular state inspired in the context of modernity and those who believed the government must remain tied to religious law. Indeed, Sheikh Fazl al-Allah's execution was viewed in the discourse of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 as an example of the disgraceful domination of Western ideology over the indigenous Islamic ideology. Jalal al-Ahmad, the writer and social critic whose works influenced the anti-western ideology of

⁶¹² Abdallah Ha'eri, *Tashayo' va Mashrutīyat dar Iran va Naqsh-e Iranian-e Moqim-e Iraq* [Shi'ism and the Constitution in Iran and the Role of the Iranians living in Iraq], (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1981), 158.

⁶¹³ *Tufani*, 124.

⁶¹⁴ Daneshvar 'Alavi, 68-9.

⁶¹⁵ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 125.

⁶¹⁶ Mojtehedī, 153.

the Revolution famously commented that he considered the corpse of Sheikh Fazl al-Allah as a symbol of the domination of the West over Iran.⁶¹⁷

While Taqizadeh was not involved directly in Sheikh Fazl al-Allah's case, as a leading member of the movement of change and secularism, he would always be held responsible for the execution by those who supported the idea of political Islam. Ali Mohammad Tarbiat who had very close ties with Taqizadeh was present at Sheikh Fazl al-Allah's trial and was believed to be among those who had insisted on the execution.⁶¹⁸ Similarly, Yaprak Khan the Armenian police chief in Tehran was blamed by Sheikh Fazl al-Allah's supporters for his execution. Taqizadeh held Yaprak Khan in the highest regard and considered him peerless, on par even with Napoleon.⁶¹⁹

Furthermore, there were other issues concerning Taqizadeh which also displeased the opposition groups. Although some famous anti-constitutionalists were executed, severe punishments were also meted out to minor accomplices of the ex-Shah. Others, on the other hand, who had committed graver wrongdoings escaped punishment and were even appointed to key positions in the new regime. Among those who were left unpunished was 'Ain al-Dowleh who played a key role in the battles with the constitutionalists in Tabriz and who the constitutionalists believed had been responsible for many crimes. It would not be difficult to assume that this seemingly double standard approach to punishments would lead many people to feel deep displeasure and disappointment in the new regime.⁶²⁰

5:8 Establishing Order and Expelling the ex-Shah

The large number of Mojaheds who had stayed in Tehran after the city's liberation caused problems in the city; some of the Mojaheds and Bakhtiyaris had begun mistreating the local inhabitants of Tehran. To control this, the Directive Committee published a

⁶¹⁷ Jalal al-Ahmad, *Gharbzadegi* [Westoxification], (Qom: Khorram, 2006), 62.

⁶¹⁸ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 133.

⁶¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 279.

⁶²⁰ Mohammad Amin Rasoulzadeh, "Pass az Fateh-e Tehran: Mojazathay-e E'dam," *Taraqqi*, August 8, 1909 no. 166, in *Gozarashaei az Enqelab-e Mashrutiyyat*, ed., Raisnia, 252-5.

decree, stating that if Mojaheds or Bakhtiyaris troubled other citizens, they would be arrested and punished.⁶²¹

Since it was not possible to imprison him, a further goal of the Directive Committee was to force the ex-Shah out of Iran. If he stayed in the country, he would likely stir up trouble.⁶²² For this purpose, a committee of four or five people was chosen. The committee was made up of the following members: Mostashar al-Dowleh, Vosouq al-Dowleh, Navab and Taqizadeh. Sadiq Hazrat also joined the group on some occasions.⁶²³ Before expelling the ex-Shah, the committee had to take charge of the royal jewellery and decide about the deposed Shah's financial matters concerning his debts to foreign banks and his properties.⁶²⁴ This would once again bring Taqizadeh face-to-face with his old rival, Mohammad Ali Shah.⁶²⁵ The committee had to go the Russian Legation several times to negotiate about the financial matters of the ex-Shah in the presence of Russian and British representatives. The ex-Shah insisted on staying in Iran and was unwilling to hand over the royal jewellery.⁶²⁶ He even personally telegraphed the Russian Tsar to beg protection of his rights.⁶²⁷ Undoubtedly Taqizadeh's role in the ex-Shah's ousting from the country was crucial; he was the one who had insisted that this happen. It is considering this role that Seqat al-Eslam Tabrizi criticised Taqizadeh over sending the ex-Shah to Russia rather than imprisoning him or sending him elsewhere.⁶²⁸ And, later, when in Russia, the ex-Shah himself referred to Taqizadeh as "the infidel Seyyed" responsible for his ousting.⁶²⁹

⁶²¹ Sharif Kashani, 606-7.

⁶²² Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 71.

According to *Iran-e Now* delay in the departure of the ex-Shah had created some hopes among the anti-constitutionalists and the rumour was that he had managed to come out of the legation to end the constitution. See: *Iran-e Now*, September 10, 1909.

⁶²³ Mahmoud Setaysh, ed., "Khaterat-e Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh, [The Memories of Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh]" in *Mashrutiyyat-e Iran* [The Iranian Constitution] (Tehran: Sales, 2006), 63.

⁶²⁴ The Qajar kings had a keen interest in jewellery. The collection begun by the founder of the dynasty, Aqa Mohammad Khan, was added to by later kings.

⁶²⁵ Taqizadeh had to meet the ex-Shah in person for negotiations. See: *Iran-e Now*, September 6, 1909.

⁶²⁶ Amirkhizi, 465-6.

⁶²⁷ *The Times*, September 2, 1909.

⁶²⁸ *Zendegei Nameh-e Shahid-e Niknam*, ed., Fathi, 500.

⁶²⁹ Kasmaei, 151.

After long negotiations on the matter of the ex-Shah's expulsion, a protocol of eleven articles was signed on September 7, 1909.⁶³⁰ The government took the ex-Shah's property and agreed to pay his debts in instalments. It was arranged that, provided he leave Iran, the Iranian government would pay 100,000 Tomans annually to Mohammad Ali Shah through the Russian Legation.⁶³¹ As it was agreed that after leaving Iran he would reside in Russia, the Russians insisted on the financial settlement of the ex-Shah as they wished to avoid the burden for the Russian treasury of being responsible for any of his expenses during his stay in Russia.⁶³² Taqizadeh and Hossein Qoli Khan who believed that the nation did not have the means to pay such a substantial sum to the deposed Shah reluctantly accepted the deal.⁶³³ He was to go to Russia and not return to Iran or the agreement about the payment would be null and void. Additionally, it was agreed that he would personally hand over to the legation all the jewellery he had taken.⁶³⁴ The Shah set off on his journey, leaving Tehran for Anzali on 9 September, accompanied as far as Qazvin by 120 Cossacks led by a Russian officer.⁶³⁵ As Mohammad Ali Shah and his wife prepared to leave the country, Taqizadeh found himself in an awkward situation. Indeed, Taqizadeh himself commented on seeing the Shah shed tears of regret.




Figure 10: The stamp used by the Directive Committee (left) and Extraordinary Grand Council

⁶³⁰ To read the full text of the protocol, see: *Iran-e Now*, September 9, 1909.

⁶³¹ Barclay to Grey, 12 August, 1909 in *Persia No.1* (1910), 130-1.

According to Browne this amount was 100,000 Tomans equal to £16666 at that time, See: Browne, *Persian Revolution*, 325.

⁶³² Kazemzadeh, 547.

⁶³³ Daneshvar 'Alavi, 74.

⁶³⁴ Amirkhizi, 462-3.

⁶³⁵ Barclay to Grey, telegram, 9 September 1909, in *Persia No.1* (1910), 125.

5:9 Dissolution of the Directive Committee

After the deposing of the Shah and his exit from the country, the Directive Committee was dissolved on 12 September, 1909 and the ministers regained the power to act independently.⁶³⁶ An advisory committee of forty members replaced the Directive Committee in which the members of the Directive Committee were included.⁶³⁷ The Directive Committee resigned en masse due to a serious disagreement with the cabinet ministers. According to *Iran-e Now*, after the Directive Committee took control, the country had found itself more in a state of flux; the political situation was far less stable than it had previously been as the influence of the central government became less effective in the provinces. The Directive Committee had been primarily established to temporarily take over the executive power. As soon as the ministers felt confident in their positions and felt that the Directive Committee was interfering in their affairs, the Directive Committee was dissolved. This would prevent the ministers from having to share their power with members of the Directive Committee.⁶³⁸ It was at this point that someone had to take the role of Prime Minister. Sepahdar was asked to take that position. Sepahdar's diaries indicate that he played an active role in the dissolution of the Directive Committee; he wrote that he had insisted on the immediate opening of the Parliament. Despite the fact that the Directive Committee and Taqizadeh had opposed that, Sepahdar eventually succeeded in dissolving the Directive Committee.⁶³⁹ On November 19, 1909 the Prime Minister and his cabinet were introduced to the parliament. In this cabinet Sardar As'ad took the role of Interior Minister, Moshir al-Dowleh Justice Minister, Sani' al-Dowleh Education Minister and Vosouq al-Dowleh the finance minister.⁶⁴⁰ As Naser al-Molk, who had been previously declared Foreign Minister was still reluctant to return from Europe, 'Ala al-Saltaneh took that post. Kasravi describes 'Ala al-Saltaneh as one of the people who had belonged to the circle of the ex-Shah but had later joined the constitutionalist camp.⁶⁴¹

⁶³⁶ *Iran-e Now*, September 13, 1909.

⁶³⁷ Barclay to Grey, telegram, 13 September 1909, in *Persia No.2 (1910)*, 126.

⁶³⁸ *Iran-e Now*, September 14, 1909.

⁶³⁹ Quoted in Sharif Kashani, 580.

⁶⁴⁰ Proceedings of the Second Parliament: Session 9, 10 November 1909.

⁶⁴¹ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 72-3.

According to a British report, after the dissolution of the Directive Committee its prominent members such as Taqizadeh and Navab kept their distance from the government, thus allowing the ministers to act independently. Their distancing themselves was apparently not helpful for as the report stated, “The Ministers, deprived of the support of the men who will doubtless form the most influential section of the Medjliss [Majles], found their responsibilities too great, and they soon set to work to urge these men to abandon this attitude of aloofness.”⁶⁴² One reason for Taqizadeh's distancing himself from executive issues was the increasing criticism he faced during the period of the Directive Committee.

5:10 Opposition to Taqizadeh

It seems that Taqizadeh's haste to achieve his goals had led him to use his influence and place his friends and supporters in key positions. This was not without consequences and was strongly resented by some of the prominent constitutionalists who felt they had been pushed out of the circle of power. One of the main difficulties that the new regime faced was the disagreement between those who had played leading roles since the beginning of the constitutional movement and those who had joined later and had participated in the restoration of the constitution following the closure of the First Parliament. The leading characters of the first constitution era saw the constitution as their legacy. They believed that as founders of the constitutional movement they were the only ones who had the legitimate right to have control over affairs in the new government. In contrast, those who had joined the movement after the bombardment of the First Parliament, deposing the Shah and re-establishing the constitution, had a different stand. They regarded the first constitution era as a closed chapter. They had worked hard to create the constitution once more and thus believed they had the right to power in the government. This disagreement between these two factions put Taqizadeh, as the leading member of the first constitution period, in dispute with others such as Sepahdar whom he considered to be simply the nominal leader of the constitutionalist forces who had liberated Tehran.⁶⁴³

⁶⁴² Barclay to Grey, 7 October 1909, in *Persia No.2 (1910)*, 141.

⁶⁴³ Malekzadeh, 6-7: 1324.

As mentioned previously, Taqizadeh used his influence to choose Ali Mohammad Khan as the commander of the Mojaheds in Tehran. This had put some other leaders of the Mojaheds, such as Mo‘ez al-Soltan, who had expected to be chosen as the head of the Mojaheds, in direct opposition to Taqizadeh. As reflected in ‘Ain al-Saltaneh’s diaries, because of the choice of Ali Mohammad Khan as head of the Mojaheds, a dispute had arisen among the Mojaheds. The Mojaheds of Tehran were the main protesters, putting forward the argument that Taqizadeh’s popularity and success should not lead to the Mojaheds automatically supporting whomever he had chosen.⁶⁴⁴ Taqizadeh himself writes that this point of contention turned Sepahdar and Mo‘ez al-Soltan against him.⁶⁴⁵ Sepahdar, as the Minister of War, was not sympathetic towards the Directive Committee.⁶⁴⁶ There was also a personal animosity, over the execution of Sheikh Fazl al-Allah, between Sepahdar and Ali Mohammad Khan, whom he believed to be too radical.⁶⁴⁷

As reported in *Iran-e Now*, the closed circle of the Directive Committee and its privately held sessions was criticised by the opposition groups.⁶⁴⁸ ‘Azd al-Molk refers to this secrecy in a letter to Seqat al-Eslam; “Nobody is allowed to enter the meeting room. They have a bell and, on the tables, there are jars of water and containers full of ice. Before giving a speech, some members take a drink to wet their mouths. It is said that during these meetings that take place behind closed doors the independence of the country is discussed...”.⁶⁴⁹

As the most influential member of the Directive Committee criticisms were aimed predominantly at Taqizadeh. The nocturnal letters distributed in Tehran by some opposition groups increasingly condemned Taqizadeh. One of these nocturnal letters in particular interestingly focuses on the criticism Taqizadeh faced and warns him about not acting beyond the limits of his responsibilities:

⁶⁴⁴ ‘Ain al-Saltaneh, 4: 2766.

⁶⁴⁵ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 128.

⁶⁴⁶ Barclay to Grey, 10 September 1909, in *Persia No.2 (1910)*, 132.

⁶⁴⁷ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 124.

⁶⁴⁸ *Iran-e Now*, September 1, 1909.

⁶⁴⁹ ‘Azd al-Molk to Seqat al-Eslam, 11 September 1909, in *Zendegi Nameh-e Shahid-e Niknam*, ed., Fathi, 485.

For example, his Excellency Taqizadeh was previously the editor of a newspaper and ran a bookshop. He made himself popular through some of his enthusiastic, public-spirited talks. As public opinion towards him grew, people elevated him from the rank of bookseller to the high position he came to hold and considered him their representative. On the day of his arrival in Tehran everybody expressed happiness and joy. As soon as Taqizadeh requested that the Extraordinary Grand Council become the Directive Committee, the authorities of the state kept quiet and showed no objection. For about a month the Directive Committee had power; they did whatever they wanted to control people's words and actions. Not only did the order of affairs not improve but in fact worsened by the hour and the country fell into further chaos. Instead of eliminating corruption, they created it....⁶⁵⁰

Letters sent from Tabriz to Taqizadeh after the opening of the Parliament also reveal that he was being slandered in his hometown.⁶⁵¹ But, criticism against Taqizadeh was not limited to inside Iran. Iranians in Istanbul and Europe increasingly became dissatisfied with Taqizadeh and what they considered his radical acts.⁶⁵² Hossein Danesh, the Iranian political activist and journalist based in Istanbul, in a letter to Browne commented that Taqizadeh's behaviour had polarised public opinion and had led to political instability in Iran.⁶⁵³ *Shams* [Sun] newspaper published in Istanbul by Seyyed Hassan Tabrizi was one of the harshest critics of Taqizadeh. It not only did not cover the news of Taqizadeh's arrival in Tehran but also criticised other newspapers for their exaggerated coverage of the event which *Shams* called disgusting.⁶⁵⁴ In its editorials and published letters, it criticised the offensive and harsh language which was often used by Taqizadeh and *Iran-e Now* against foreign powers especially Russia, which they claimed was provocative and against the national interests of Iran. At the same time, *Shams* did not approve of a swift approach towards practising modernity in Iran and believed that Iranian society was not

⁶⁵⁰ Sharif Kashani, 686-9.

⁶⁵¹ Vram Pilosian to Taqizadeh, Tabriz, 3 February 1910, in *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyat*, ed., Afshar, 251-62.

⁶⁵² Dolatabadi, 3: 114.

⁶⁵³ Hossein Danesh to Browne, 19 December 1909, in *Browne Papers*, 1-2-5.

⁶⁵⁴ *Shams*, November 12, 1909.

ready for such abrupt changes. It was also not in favour of following the European style of modernisation to the letter which Taqizadeh and his followers were.⁶⁵⁵

An anonymous letter published in *Shams* targeted Taqizadeh directly. It suggested Taqizadeh and three of his friends controlled everything and were in fact responsible for the chaotic situation in the country. The writer of the letter accused Taqizadeh of receiving secret money and suggested that if the people of Tabriz did not demand Taqizadeh's removal from power, it would be impossible to establish order in the country.⁶⁵⁶

Yahya Dolatabadi considered Taqizadeh's involvement in the Directive Committee to be the starting point of the opposition against him. This in turn led to a group which Taqizadeh had excluded from power to speak out against him. He wrote that the opposition likened Taqizadeh's activities in the Directive Committee to those of Napoleon Bonaparte's in France. According to Dolatabadi, this explained how a group of constitutionalists rose up against Taqizadeh and how in turn Taqizadeh responded by garnering the support of people, some of whom were not always the most suitably qualified. Dolatabadi comments that Taqizadeh, with the so-called backing of the Social Democrat Party of the Caucasus, had managed to further increase his authority. He continues that some people sent from Baku by the party had come to Tehran in order to express their dissatisfaction with Taqizadeh. This resulted in the power of the opposition being strengthened and Taqizadeh's power being weakened.⁶⁵⁷ Popular opinion, particularly in Tehran, also became more negative towards Taqizadeh and the Directive Committee since they had taken steps to curb the use of opium and alcohol, a habit popular among many inhabitants of the capital.

This negative attitude towards Taqizadeh may have influenced the number of votes that he received when nominated as the representative of Tehran. The results of the elections could show that Taqizadeh's popularity was diminishing in Tehran. Despite Taqizadeh's popularity upon his arrival in Tehran, by the time the elections were held, the number of

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid., October 28, 1909.

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid., November 12, 1909.

⁶⁵⁷ Dolatabadi, 3: 120.

votes he received was limited. Of the 55 candidates qualified for the second round of the elections he ranked only 25th with 250 votes. In comparison, Navab for instance, received the third highest number of votes with 2102.⁶⁵⁸ Seqat al-Eslam mentioned in a letter that Taqizadeh, to whom people had been so devoted in the beginning, was now becoming increasing unpopular in Tabriz and Tehran because people believed he was an anglophile.⁶⁵⁹ ‘Ain al-Saltaneh wrote that businessmen in Tehran were complaining about Taqizadeh.⁶⁶⁰ In another case, immediately after the opening of the Parliament a nocturnal letter blames Taqizadeh for supporting the appointment of the governor of Fars, Saham al-Dowleh who, according to the letter, had been ineffectual.⁶⁶¹ This is while, according to a British report, Saham al-Dowleh had displayed extraordinary skill in his administration of that province. He was successful in establishing his authority as the governor and had “already made some progress in the settlement of the British claims”.⁶⁶² But the same report mentions that the governor had made many enemies especially among the clergy. Apparently Saham al-Dowleh’s family background was also a point to be criticised by those who believed he was not the right kind of man for the role of governorship. Sharif Kashani commented that Saham al-Dowleh was not a suitable candidate as he came from a working-class family, his father being a servant. He commented that the governors of Fars were traditionally chosen from the ranks of wealthy noblemen and princes who carried great authority. He considered that Saham al-Dowleh lacked these attributes and thus would not be successful in Fars since he would lack any sense of authority in the eyes of the general public.⁶⁶³ Following the establishment of the Constitution, mobility across social ranks became more accepted. However, at this point, there was still great exception to Saham al-Dowleh’s candidature which highlights the resistance this progressive idea faced. Saham-al Dowleh’s case also demonstrates how much pressure there was on those such as Taqizadeh, whose aim was for fundamental reform in the governmental system, and how few options were in fact open to them.

⁶⁵⁸ ‘Ain al Saltaneh, 4: 2753.

⁶⁵⁹ *Zendegei Nameh Shahid-e Niknam*, ed., Fathi, 507.

⁶⁶⁰ ‘Ain al-Saltaneh, 4: 2783.

⁶⁶¹ Sharif Kashani, 654-6.

⁶⁶² Barclay to Grey, 4 November 1909, in *Further Correspondence No.2 (1910)*, 156-7.

⁶⁶³ Sharif Kashani, 600.

In fact, the period between the creation of the Directive Committee and the opening of the Second Parliament was characterised by increased hostility between Sepahdar and his supporters and Taqizadeh.⁶⁶⁴

⁶⁶⁴ Dolatabadi, 3: 123.

(اسامی منتخبین درجه)

(اول طهران)

— عدد منتخبین درجه اول دارالخلافه بنا بر قانون ۵۰ نفر مد ولی ملاحظه آنکه —

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۳	حسینقل خان نواب	۲۱۰۲	۲۲	مشیرالدوله	۴۵۷	۴۱	ناصرالملک	۲۰۰
۴	ممتازالدوله	۲۰۹۲	۲۳	حسنعلیخان	۳۹۵	۴۲	دکتر حیدر میرزا	۱۹۵
۵	ذکاءالملک	۲۰۸۹	۲۴	مؤمنالملک	۳۷۲	۴۳	سلیمان میرزا	۱۸۷
۶	مختبرالملک	۲۰۴۵	۲۵	نقیزاده	۳۵۰	۴۴	حاجی سید محمد امامزاده	۱۸۷
۷	افانسیخ محمد حسین یزدی	۱۶۷۳	۲۶	مأسدالله	۳۲۶	۴۵	یحیی میرزا	۱۷۵
۸	حکیمالملک	۱۶۳۵	۲۷	دکتر امیرخان	۲۹۳	۴۶	ممتاز السلطنه	۱۷۴
۹	مستشارالدوله	۱۵۷۵	۲۸	مستوفی المالک	۲۸۹	۴۷	میرزا دودخان علی آبادی	۱۷۰
۱۰	دکتر ولی الله خان	۱۵۵۵	۲۹	لسان الحکما	۲۷۹	۴۸	افانسیخ محمد تقی کرکافی	۱۶۶
۱۱	صنیع الدوله	۱۵۱۳	۳۰	وحیدالملک	۲۷۴	۴۹	حاج محمد تقی شاهرودی	۱۶۳
۱۲	حاج امیر القصر	۱۳۴۳	۳۱	حاج علی حاج حبیب	۲۶۵	۵۰	ملا اسدالله فقیه التجار	۱۵۷
۱۳	وثوق الدوله	۱۰۴۵	۳۲	ظهرالدوله	۲۵۷	۵۱	صدرالامام	۱۵۶
۱۴	حاج امام جمعه خوئی	۱۰۲۲	۳۳	افانسیخ مهدی نجم آبادی	۲۵۳	۵۲	مستشار السلطان	۱۵۳
۱۵	صدیق حضرت	۹۸۶	۳۴	رضاقلینان رئیس	۲۴۸	۵۳	قاسم محمد رضای سادات	۱۵۳
۱۶	شیخ رئیس	۸۳۴	۳۵	افانسیخ علی نجم آبادی	۲۴۰	۵۴	مقام میرزا سید محمد طباطبائی	۱۵۰
۱۷	اسدالله میرزا	۷۶۴	۳۶	افانسیخ علی نوری	۲۳۶	۵۵	حاج سید علی نقی یزدی	۱۱۸
۱۸	میر السلطان	۶۶۹	۳۷	فاحسین نجم آبادی	۲۲۶			
۱۹	میرزا حسین خان کسائی	۵۰۲	۳۸	فخر الاسلام	۲۲۵			

Figure 11: The list of the elected people for the second round of the elections. Taqizadeh is ranked number 25.⁶⁶⁵

⁶⁶⁵ 'Ain al-Saltaneh, 4: 2753.

5:11 Elections for the Second Parliament

The elections of the Second Parliament were organised by the Directive Committee. In general, there were many complaints about questionable practices during the proceedings of those elections.⁶⁶⁶ It was said that some of the parliament members of the provinces were nominated from Tehran. In Kurdistan, for instance, as they could not reach agreement over who should be their parliamentary representatives, they requested Tehran to choose.⁶⁶⁷

The election in Azerbaijan was also controversial. Reports circulated that some candidates bought votes in Tabriz.⁶⁶⁸ There was even controversy surrounding the election of Taqizadeh. In one letter remaining, Seqat al-Eslam complains about some of the indications that the election of Taqizadeh and others was not completely honest:

The case of Azerbaijani deputies is questionable. Firstly, the elected members are elected by dishonest means and secondly the members are totally unqualified and insufficiently knowledgeable. That so-called friend [Taqizadeh] who was elected had no suitable qualifications to be a member of the Assembly. He was not even eligible as he had no property, nor was he a tax-payer. However, they managed to ensure his entrance into the Assembly with a particular goal in mind. They proclaimed that they had given him property as a gift, which was, in fact, not true. Then the members appointed an assistant for the committee. They forced voters to write certain members' names on the ballot papers, including the names of the editors of "Mosavat" and "Nejat" and Sheikh Reza Dehkhareqani. The first two were not known locally, nor were they aware of affairs in Azerbaijan. In short, they tried to strengthen their own party. They rigged the second round of the elections so that their friends and acquaintances would be elected.⁶⁶⁹

⁶⁶⁶ Ettehadieh, *Majles va Entekhabat*, 120.

⁶⁶⁷ *Iran-e Now*, October 14, 1909.

⁶⁶⁸ Ettehadieh, 133.

⁶⁶⁹ *Zendegi Nameh-e Shahid-e Niknam*, ed., Fathi, 499.

The letters of Vram Pilosian from Tabriz who actively worked with Taqizadeh to set up the Democrat Party also evidence the fact that the supporters of Taqizadeh had conflicts with Seqat al-Eslam; "The electoral campaign has already started in Tabriz. Our party, or to put it better, our friends are in dispute with Seqat al-Eslam, Ijlal al-Molk and their colleagues. I hope that our men will emerge from the struggle victorious, since their adversaries are not active men and are unable to work seriously".⁶⁷⁰ The result of the election shows that Taqizadeh and his friends were in fact victorious in Tabriz. In the first round of the elections in Tabriz, from 2878 collected votes, Taqizadeh won the majority with 2302 votes, followed by Mostashar al-Dowleh with 1949.⁶⁷¹ The disagreement between Taqizadeh and his friends and Seqat al-Eslam concerned the election law. Taqizadeh advocated for an election in which everybody could vote. However, according to Nasrollah Fathi, Seqat al-Eslam believed that only educated people should have the right to vote.⁶⁷² Mehdi Mojtahedi rejects this stand and comments that since Seqat al-Eslam was a landowner, he was concerned that if the peasants received a right to vote, they would not pay the land interests.⁶⁷³

The election of Taqizadeh in Tabriz was not without further opposition; documents reveal that some prominent constitutionalists in Tabriz were unhappy with the result. A letter written to Taqizadeh from Tabriz informed him that some leading constitutionalists there including Ali Davaforoush were critical of him.⁶⁷⁴ They were of the opinion that Taqizadeh and his party's passive attitude in Tehran had given the upper hand to the supporters of Sardar As'ad and Sepahdar; "The supporters of Sardar and Sepahdar talk with forceful military language whereas Taqizadeh's party uses only innuendo in the

⁶⁷⁰ Vram Pilosian to Taqizadeh, Tabriz, 15 August 1909, in *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyat*, ed., Afshar, 238-42.

⁶⁷¹ Mohammad Ali Badamchi to Hassan Taqizadeh, 13 September 1909, in *Nomeh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 158-60.

⁶⁷² *Zendegei Nameh-e Shahid-e Niknam*, ed., Fathi, 577.

⁶⁷³ Mojtahedi, 145-6.

⁶⁷⁴ According to Taqizadeh, Ali Davaforoush was one of the pioneering political figures of the constitutional revolution. He was among the first group of people who sought refuge in the British consulate in Tabriz in 1906, demanding the establishment of the constitution. During the resistance of Tabriz, he personally participated in the battles; his arm was injured and he was hospitalised for three months. He campaigned strongly for education and cultural development. The S'adat school in Tabriz which had 500 pupils was supported by him. He was later executed by Russians. Ref: Hassan Taqizadeh to Edward Browne, 16 January 1912, in *Browne Papers*, 9-9-41.

press”.⁶⁷⁵ It appears that a group was organised in Tabriz to discredit Taqizadeh. While Sardar As‘ad and Sepahdar were military men, Taqizadeh was much more the politician and strategist. It was not surprising then that he preferred the media to the use of armed means. The disagreement between Taqizadeh and Sattar Khan did little to strengthen any effect that the military force of Tabriz might have had. This meant that the influence that the Azerbaijani constitutionalists were able to have in Tehran was far less than they would have expected. Future events would prove that the concerns of people like Ali Davaforoush were well founded.⁶⁷⁶ Despite the strong resistance and sacrifices of the Azerbaijanis in Tabriz during the Lesser Despotism, they were less influential in the government than the Bakhtiyaris who joined the fight only in the final phases of the resistance during the liberation of Tehran.

Six of the elected members for the Parliament from Azerbaijan, including Mohammad Ali Tarbiat, arrived in Tehran on 18 October, 1909 and resided in Taqizadeh’s house.⁶⁷⁷ This suggests a close relationship between them and Taqizadeh. According to *Sharq*, following the arrival of Azerbaijani parliamentary members, there was heightened concern that Taqizadeh’s party would gain too much power. Vehement speeches in the mosques were heard, claiming that if Taqizadeh’s party gained further powers, this would most likely lead to him becoming Speaker of the Parliament.⁶⁷⁸ Five out of the nineteen members elected from Azerbaijan were previously members of the First Parliament. A British report, evaluating the elections in Azerbaijan, concluded that since “only four lesser mullahs” were elected, it was indicative of the eclipse of clericalism and “perhaps the most significant feature of the election.”⁶⁷⁹ The clergy, who in the early days of the revolution had benefitted from co-operation with the constitutionalists, were strongly represented in the First Parliament. But, after the liberation of Tehran there were clear tensions between some religious leaders who had had authority in the past and the new leaders who were

⁶⁷⁵ Anonymous to Hassan Taqizadeh, 3 November 1909, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 170-81.

⁶⁷⁶ A letter from Ali Davaforoush to Taqizadeh sheds more light on the disagreements between him and Taqizadeh. See: Ali Davachi (Davaforoush) to Taqizadeh in *Ibid.*, 183-6.

⁶⁷⁷ *Iran-e Now*, October 19, 1909.

⁶⁷⁸ *Sharq*, October 25, 1909.

⁶⁷⁹ Barclay to Grey, November 4, 1909, in *Persia. No. 1 (1910)*, 154.

now advocating a secular judicial system which would limit the powers that the clergy had traditionally held over the courts.⁶⁸⁰

5:12 The Return of Behbahani

One of the most prominent clergy members of the First Parliament, who had been forced into exile first in Buzehrud near Kermanshah and later in Najaf following the coup d'état, was Seyyed Abdollah Behbahani.⁶⁸¹ He arrived in Tehran a day before the opening of the Second Parliament, with great hope of regaining his previous influential position after his success in the First Parliament. The situation had greatly changed, however, and he now found himself faced with a strong opposition challenging his power. Yahya Dolatabadi writes that he had been given a message for Behbahani from the Social Democrats of Baku, warning him that he should not exceed the limits of his powers and should not focus on integrating religious and civil law.⁶⁸² In a letter Sharif Kashani, considering the unfavourable situation in Tehran, had advised Behbahani not to return to Tehran and had even suggested his life could be in danger.⁶⁸³ The return of Behbahani and his presence in the Second Parliament established a strong opposition against Taqizadeh and those who were advocating a secular governmental system.

Most constitutionalists wanted a secular parliament with a new generation of members. A letter from Dehkhoda exemplifies well the kind of representatives who were considered by the leading constitutionalists as ideal for election to the Parliament and fitted well with the political atmosphere of the period. In the letter, composed before the elections of the Second Parliament, Dehkhoda emphasises that the elected members should be from a new generation of politicians, well-versed in contemporary affairs and conversant in foreign languages. He then states; "I do not say that we should hand over affairs of state to a bunch of youths who have seen Europe or studied there but my point is that we should increase

⁶⁸⁰ *The Times*, December 28, 1909.

⁶⁸¹ For more about Behbahani's exile, see: Esma'il Mortazavi Borazjani, *Zendani-e Buzehrud* [The Prisoner of Buzehrud] (Tehran: Anjoman-e Doustan, 1958). Taqizadeh has written a review about this book and considers it a reliable source about Behbahani's life, see: Taqizadeh, *Tufani: Attachments*, 639-47.

⁶⁸² Dolatabadi, 3: 126-8.

⁶⁸³ Sharif Kashani, 593-5.

the number of these people in the Parliament by any means....”⁶⁸⁴ Besides the clergy, some tribes and their protests were also a source of conflict for the constitutionalists. Dehkhoda’s comments on the destructive role the various tribes played in the downfall of the constitution are also interesting. He believed that if the tribes were more involved in the Second Parliament, they would then be able to play a more constructive role in the political process.⁶⁸⁵ One example of the destructive role of the tribes was the case of Rahim Khan, a tribal chief who caused huge problems for the government.

5:13 The Threat of Rahim Khan

Local insurgences were one of the obstacles to the new constitutional regime establishing a powerful central government. After Mohammad Ali Shah left the country, his supporters began causing trouble for the new regime in various locations. The opposition of Rahim Khan Chalabianlou, one of the tribal chiefs of Azerbaijan, was the main threat to the sovereignty of the central government in Tehran. Rahim Khan had fought for the ex-Shah during the siege of Tabriz. Just as he was about to break the resistance of Tabriz, involvement of the Russians in ending the siege had thwarted his attempt. After the liberation of Tehran and establishment of the constitutional regime, finding himself in danger of arrest and punishment, he aimed to attack Ardabil with the pretext of supporting the ex-Shah. On October 29 he was arrested by the Russians but, after paying 20,000 Turkish Lira and 180 camels, he was released.⁶⁸⁶

Realising the precarious situation in Ardabil, the Governor of Azerbaijan, Mokhber al-Saltaneh, ordered Sattar Khan, whose presence in Tabriz both he and the Russians were unhappy about, to go to Ardabil with his fighters to take control of the town. On September 9, Sattar Khan departed for Ardabil with a group of about one hundred men.⁶⁸⁷ In Sarab more forces joined Sattar Khan, increasing the number of fighters to about three hundred. A month later a huge army was attacked by Rahim Khan and many members of the

⁶⁸⁴ Dehkhoda to a political character in Tehran, in *Nameh-hay-e Siyasi-e Dehkhoda*, ed., Afshar, 65-74.

⁶⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁶ Edward, G. Browne, *The Persian Crisis of December 1911*, 4-5.

⁶⁸⁷ Amirkhizi, 489-516.

Shahsavani tribe who had joined him.⁶⁸⁸ Sattar Khan had to retreat and surrender the town due to lack of support from central and local government.

Together with nine other tribal chiefs, Rahim Khan sent a telegraph to Mohammad Ali Shah, revealing their intention to overthrow the Constitution.⁶⁸⁹ He was also supported by factions of the clergy who were displeased by limitations being placed on their traditional power due to the establishment of the constitutional regime.⁶⁹⁰ On November 9, Rahim Khan threatened to march to the capital and overthrow the Constitution in favour of the ex-Shah.⁶⁹¹ Rahim Khan's attempt was used as a pretext for the Russians to send more troops to Iran, putting increased pressure on the newly-formed government in Iran just before the opening of the Second Parliament in Tehran.

5:14 The Second Parliament

Our Iran will become like Europe because of the Parliament

No! Even better than anywhere in the world.⁶⁹²

On 15 November 1909 the Second Parliament was opened, resembling a European parliament in appearance. The hall in which the sessions were held was as big as an amphitheatre, 28 meters in length and 11 and a half meters wide. Its members did not sit on the floor as they had done during the First Parliament. Instead, now, five semi-circular rows of seats were designed for the members of parliament to sit in. Special places were allocated for the speaker, committee members, ministers, ulama, foreign envoys and spectators.⁶⁹³ Each political party sat in its own allotted place on the right, left or in the

⁶⁸⁸ For more about the role of Shahsavani tribe during this period see: Richard Tapper, "Raiding, Reaction and Rivalry: The Shahsevan Tribes in the Constitutional Period," in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 49, no. 3 (1986): 508-53. Accessed 18 May, 2018. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/617828>.

⁶⁸⁹ Abdol Hossein Navaei, *Dolathay-e Iran: Az Aqaz-e Mashrutiyat ta Oltimatom* [Iranian Governments from the launch of the Constitution to the Ultimatum], (Tehran: Babak, 1976), 146.

⁶⁹⁰ Report by Poklovski, 19 March 1910, in *Ketab-e Narenji: Ghozareshay-e Siyasi-e Vezarat-e Kharejeh-e Rousieh Darbareh Enqelab-e Mashrutayieh-e Iran* [The Orange Book: Diplomatic Reports of the Russian Foreign Ministry about the Iranian Constitutional Revolution], trans., Parvin Monzavi (Tehran: Parvaz, 1989), 4: 68.

⁶⁹¹ Browne, *The Persian Crisis of December 1911*, 5.

⁶⁹² *Iran-e Now*, November 15, 1909.

⁶⁹³ *Ibid.*, October 19, 1909.

centre of the parliament. The rules and regulations of the Second Parliament were copied exactly from that of the French.⁶⁹⁴ The calibre of the members of parliament had increased and many had been educated in Europe and were knowledgeable about political structures in the west. Some of them were even able to converse in one or more European languages.

The expectations people had of this parliament were great. *Iran-e Now* considered the reopening of the parliament as the real modernisation of Iran.⁶⁹⁵ Since the government was eager for the parliament to be opened quickly, once the candidates of Tehran and Azerbaijan and some other cities were elected, the parliament opened before others joined.⁶⁹⁶ With the presence of only sixty-four members in Tehran rather than the full one hundred and twenty, the parliament sat with only a few more than the required minimum number. In fact, this majority was only on paper since during the fifth session of the parliament, when they wished to confirm ‘Azd al-Molk as the regent, only 56 members were present to cast votes. Before the voting procedure began, Adib al-Tojar, one of the members, reminded them that there were insufficient members present to start proceedings. In response, Taqizadeh stated it was acceptable that some members from the provinces were only introduced by telegraphs and their actual presence was not necessary.⁶⁹⁷ During sittings of the parliament, Mostashar al-Dowleh was chosen as the president and Haji Seyyed Nasr al-Allah as the first vice-president of the Parliament.⁶⁹⁸ By the time the Second Parliament had come to an end, not all members had yet been elected. The number of the members fluctuated as some accepted governmental jobs and quit the parliament, some passed away and some never actually joined the parliament. There is, thus, no complete list of the members of this parliament.

In the fourth session of the parliament, following the required speech of the speaker, Taqizadeh took the stage. He showed his appreciation to those who had been killed in the name of the constitution and thanked those who had come to Iran to fight for the

⁶⁹⁴ Taqizadeh, “Tarikh-e Mokhtasar-e Majles,” in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 5: 237.

⁶⁹⁵ *Iran-e Now*, November 15, 1909.

⁶⁹⁶ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 75.

⁶⁹⁷ Proceeding of the Second Parliament, 22 November, 1909, Session 5.

⁶⁹⁸ Barclay to Grey, November 21, 1909, in *Further Correspondence No.1* (1911), 3-4.

constitution; Caucasian Mojaheds, Armenians, Georgians and those who had assisted the constitutional movement from beyond the borders of Iran, such as Browne and Lynch.⁶⁹⁹

The Second Parliament, formed after much fighting and bloodshed, was strongly nationalistic. Its members considered the independence of the country to be in danger.⁷⁰⁰ In the Second Parliament the influence of landowners and governmental staff increased. This created a far more conservative parliament, which was not in line with the goals of such members as Taqizadeh.

Two distinct political groups dominated this parliament, each with its own distinct stance. One group favoured moderate progressive ideas. Its supporters were referred to as “Et‘dalioun”; Moderates. The Moderates advocated compromise with the more conservative forces and favoured gradual reform and were concerned about the intervention of foreign powers in the country’s affairs. The second political group’s strategy was quite the opposite; they were more interested in immediate sweeping reforms and were unwilling to compromise. The second group were known as Democrats. *Iran-e Now* suggested that the difference between the two groups lay mainly in the fact that whilst one party advocated a more wide-sweeping constitution, necessitating reform in every aspect of governance including the economic and judiciary system, the other group, the Moderates, wanted only to obliterate the rule of dictatorship.⁷⁰¹

5:15 The Democrat Party

Whilst up to the end of the period of Lesser Despotism there were two major political inclinations: “Royalist” and “Constitutionalist”, now with the formation of the Second Parliament, political pluralism surfaced in Iran; politics became more nuanced. The Democrat Party was one which pioneered a more well-defined political goal by becoming the first political party in Iran.

⁶⁹⁹ *Iran-e Now*, November 28, 1909.

⁷⁰⁰ Ettehadieh, *Majles va Entekhabat*, 123.

⁷⁰¹ *Iran-e Now*, March 20, 1910.

As was previously mentioned, Taqizadeh had had the idea of forming a political party after his return from Europe and before his arrival in Tehran. The liberation of Tehran and dethroning of the Shah together with Taqizadeh's role in establishing the foundations of a new political order enabled the ideas of forming a party to become a reality. Immediately upon his arrival in Tehran Taqizadeh, finding the situation favourable, began laying the groundwork for the formation of the Democrat Party. The creation of a party would provide a platform for the organised mobilisation of the masses in a secular context which could accommodate all other non-Muslim communities. This was in line with Taqizadeh's roadmap which followed the democratic models of Europe.

A detailed picture of the activities of the Social Democrats of the Caucasus will allow a fuller understanding of the development of social democracy in Iran prior to the Constitutional Revolution in 1906. The intellectuals, inspired by the Russian Revolution of 1905, had begun forming circles to spread the ideas of social democracy particularly in Tabriz. These activists were either Iranians who had close contact with the Caucasus, those who had gone there to work or people from that region who had ties with Iranians. Heydar Khan Amoghlu, for instance, who was originally from the Caucasus, had attempted to organise a social democrat party during his stay in Mashhad as early as 1903-4.⁷⁰²

Iranian Armenians in particular were among those who had organised activities to promote social democracy in Iran and had connections with socialists in Europe. In 1890 some Armenians had established a group in Tbilisi called "Dashnaktsutun". This group later established its headquarters in Azerbaijan and Tabriz. Since the detailed background of the Social Democrats is discussed in other sources, the focus here will be on the formation of the Iranian Democrat Party in relationship to Taqizadeh.⁷⁰³

⁷⁰² Atabaki, *Azerbaijan*, 35.

⁷⁰³ See: Khosro Shakeri, Arshavir Chalangarian, and Tigran Darvish, etc., ed., Mohammad Hossein Khosropanah, *Naqsh-e Aramaneh dar Sosal Demokrasi-e Iran* [The Role of Armenians in Iranian Social Democracy] (Tehran: Shirazeh, 2003). Also see: Janet Afary, "International and Multi-ethnic Solidarity: Revolutionary Forces Reconquer Tehran," in *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution 1906-1911* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 228-54.

Sources referencing the Dashnaktsutun Archives indicate that Vahan Zakarian, a member of the Azerbaijan Central Committee of the Dashnaktsutun, had meetings with Taqizadeh to discuss forming a new party in the winter of 1909.⁷⁰⁴ They had discussed creating a party with a platform similar to that of Dashnaktsutun. According to these sources, Taqizadeh had, as early as November 1908, clandestinely planned forming a party with two Armenian Social Democrats; Vram Pilosian and Tigran Ter Hakobian. This is clearly evident in the letters of Vram Pilosian to Taqizadeh immediately after Taqizadeh's arrival in Tehran. As a letter clearly indicates, Pilosian and Taqizadeh had discussed "the project" in Tabriz.⁷⁰⁵

Pilosian writes, "The era of forming political parties in Iran has started". He goes on to explain how, after Taqizadeh's departure from Tabriz, he and his friends had endeavoured to quickly form the party and emphasises the haste in which it was done: "We need to hurry, so that all our plans are not taken over by the others. We should try to create an organised democratic party majority in the Second Parliament." He also adds that he and his friends were eager that people sympathetic to their cause be elected from Tabriz in the parliamentary elections. According to the letter, the party's rules had also to be translated. In a second letter, after receiving replies from Taqizadeh and his friends in Tehran, Pilosian expresses his joy at their efforts to organise the party in Tehran. He writes; "The Democrat Party is no longer a fantasy, because it really exists."⁷⁰⁶ He also recommends that the party be organised according to a European model" and adds, "We need, in the Second Parliament, energetic and strongly patriotic men, for if the Second Parliament does not satisfy the people and put an end to anarchy in the provinces, our independence will be in danger."⁷⁰⁷

Taqizadeh and Pilosian wanted a party independent from the Dashnaktsutun and were reluctant to let members of Dashnaktsutun join their party. This had disappointed

⁷⁰⁴ Houri Berberian, *Armenians and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911* (Oxford: Westview, 2001), 134-5.

⁷⁰⁵ Vram Pilosian to Taqizadeh, Tabriz, 15 August 1909, in *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyyat*, ed., Afshar, 238-42.

⁷⁰⁶ Vram Pilosian to Taqizadeh, Tabriz, 26 January 1910, in *Ibid.*, 247-51.

⁷⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

Dashnakists such as Zakarian.⁷⁰⁸ Interestingly, Taqizadeh has not written about his dealings with Armenians in Tabriz and their role in the development of the Democrat Party in Iran.

Although Pilosian did not speak Persian and wrote his letters to Taqizadeh in French, his correspondence to Taqizadeh gives evidence that he was advocating an independent secular Iran with Persian as its national language and with rights for minorities; goals to which the Democrat Party and Taqizadeh were also devoted.⁷⁰⁹ This was despite the fact that beside nationalistic ideologies, democrats also endeavoured to incorporate Islamic principles into their manifesto.⁷¹⁰ However, clearly these amendments were not convincing enough for the religious masses. Later, when the Democrats were under attack, some of Taqizadeh's friends suggested that the manifesto needed some revisions. The public were worried about some of the manifesto's articles and believed the constitutionalists were attempting to reduce the influence of the clergy. Mohammad Ali Badamchi commented that some articles in the manifesto put democracy at risk; "I wish that when the manifesto was being written the article about the separation from politics of the ulama and about the education of women had not been included. Now that this has been written, the ulama will have to be won over. Otherwise, the ulama from one side and nobles, land owners and other corrupt people from the other side will succeed in wiping out democracy".⁷¹¹ He goes on to demand a solution and encourages Taqizadeh to write an explanation using arguments from the Koran. According to Badamchi, if these two articles had not been made part of the manifesto, 2000 people would have joined the party. In another letter Ahmad Ostovar complained that if the Democrats had taken into consideration public opinion from the beginning and thus adapted the party's manifesto accordingly, the result would have been

⁷⁰⁸ Houri Berberian, *Armenians and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911* (Oxford: Westview, 2001), 134-5.

⁷⁰⁹ To read about Iranian nationalism and the role of non-Persian intellectuals in developing language policies see: Touraj Atabaki, "Pan-Turkism and Iranian Nationalism" in *Iran and the First World War*, ed., Atabaki, 121-36.

⁷¹⁰ Fereydoon Adamiyat has analysed this aspect of the Democrat Party in one of his books and comments on the sometimes contradictory nature of these adaptations. See: *Fekr-e Demokrasi-e Ejtemaei dar Nehzat-e Mashrutiyyat-e Iran* [The Idea of Social Democracy in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution] (Tehran: Payam, 1984), 118.

⁷¹¹ Mohammad Ali Badamchi to Taqizadeh, 8 March 1911, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 240-52.

more favourable.⁷¹² It seems that even the word “democrat” discouraged some people from joining the party. In a letter to Taqizadeh, Pilosian asks him if he perhaps knows a Persian or Arabic word which could be equivalent to “democrat”. He was afraid that Iranians would find this European term distasteful as they always had a repugnance for foreign words.⁷¹³

The Democrat Party established branches in provincial centres and sent party members to the provinces to propagate its programme. Soon the influence of the Democrat Party spread and many young and educated people in particular began to join. The senior members of the Democrat Party were: Taqizadeh, Seyyed Mohammad Mosavat, Hossein Qoli Khan Navab, Soleyman Mirza, Hakim al-Molk, Sheikh Mohammad Khiabani, Heydar Khan Amoghlu, Rasoulzadeh, Mirza Mohammad Khan Nejat, Esma‘il Nobari, Mohammad Ali Tarbiat, Ali Mohammad Tarbiat and Seyyed Jalil Ardabili. Taqizadeh was the leader of the party.⁷¹⁴

5:16 The Democrats in the Parliament

The activities of the Democrat Party in the Second Parliament caused conflicts in the Parliament; the disagreements between “the Moderates” and the Democrats were one of the biggest problems. The Democrats were well organised with a clearly defined program and despite being in the minority with no more than twenty members, this gave them the upper hand in Parliament.⁷¹⁵ The program of the Democrat Party which was considered revolutionary at that time was based on two fundamental premises: fighting against landowners and the separation of the political system from religion. By pursuing these two policies the Democrats would find themselves facing two traditionally powerful groups; the clergy and the tribal chiefs.

Although the party tried to adapt its ideology to Islamic rules, one of the articles of the party’s manifesto banned any professional clergy from becoming a member. Members who

⁷¹² Ahmad Ostovar to Taqizadeh, 6 June 1911, in *Ibid.*, 269-75.

⁷¹³ Vram Pilosian to Taqizadeh, Tabriz, 3 February 1910, in *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyat*, ed., Afshar, 251-62.

⁷¹⁴ Mojtehed, 155-6.

⁷¹⁵ Ettehadieh, *Peydayesh va Tahavol Ahzab-e Siyasi*, 190.

were aristocrats or those in positions of authority who were considered too submissive were also not accepted.⁷¹⁶ Taqizadeh's belief that Iran's only path to rapid and successful modernisation was the same route that had already been carved out by the Europeans, once again became evident. The Democrats continued to advocate the idea that small reforms were useless; only starting anew with sweeping changes could lead to success.⁷¹⁷ The Democrats believed that as Iran was a predominantly agricultural country, importance must be given to agriculture and the welfare of farmers secured. In order to protect the farmers and develop agriculture, it was vital that the Democrat Party represented and defended the farmers in Parliament.⁷¹⁸

The Democrats had borrowed heavily from the earlier manifestos of the Social Democrats.⁷¹⁹ The manifesto of the Democrat Party was issued consisting of 32 articles in seven sections as follows: all persons should be treated equally before the law regardless of their race, religion and ethnicity; the complete separation of religion and politics; the casting of a direct secret ballot system for the public; contemporary public education for everyone; the establishment of a national military service system; access to courts, free of charge; the change of tax collection from indirect taxes to direct taxes; the nationalisation of forestry, rivers, pastures and mines; the use of religious endowments (waqfs) under the supervision of the government for charity and cultural purposes.

The Democrats were more focused on the modern intelligentsia, while the Moderates represented the land aristocracy and the traditional middle class.⁷²⁰ In terms of foreign policy, the Democrats enjoyed good relations with the British whilst the Moderates were on better terms with the Russians.⁷²¹

⁷¹⁶ "Asnadi Chand az Hezb-e Democrat," in *Oraq-e Tazehyab-e Mashrutuyat*, ed., Afshar, 352.

⁷¹⁷ *Iran-e Now*, November 22, 1909.

⁷¹⁸ *Ibid.*, November 13, 1909.

⁷¹⁹ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 104.

⁷²⁰ *Ibid.*, 105.

⁷²¹ *Bahar*, 1: 12.

5:17 *Iran-e Now*, a Modern Newspaper

The conquest of Tehran and the deposing of Mohammad Ali Shah heralded a new period in the development of the press in Iran. As discussed in the opening of Chapter Four, Taqizadeh, who was well aware of the importance of the press and had previously tried his hand at journalism, played an active role in introducing new methods of journalism which helped modernise the press in Iran. After the coup d'état of Mohammad Ali Shah most newspapers were forced to close. Following the liberation of Tehran (July, 1909) there came a period of freedom of the press and several newspapers were launched with more defined political editorial stances. One newspaper in particular which helped to radically transform journalism in Iran was *Iran-e Now*, which would later become the organ of the Democrat Party. About ten newspapers were published in Tehran, *Iran-e Now* being one.⁷²² *Iran-e Now* soon became the paper with the largest circulation in Tehran.⁷²³ Financed by an Armenian called Basel and first published on 24 August 1909, this newspaper represented Taqizadeh's and his party's political opinions.⁷²⁴ From late November 1909, *Iran-e Now* began to suggest that political parties should work transparently and introduce their plan to the parliament and the public.⁷²⁵ The owner and nominal editor of *Iran-e Now* was Seyyed Mohammad Shabestari also known as Abu'zi, who had previously been the editor of *Al-Hadid* and *Mojahed*. However, the real editor and most influential contributor to the newspaper was Mohammad Amin Rasoulzadeh who had come from Baku and after travelling to Rasht and Tabriz had settled in Tehran after the liberation of the city. *Iran-e Now* was the first newspaper in Iran to be published in the format used in Europe and became a role model for other newspapers.⁷²⁶ It paved the way for later publications with its wider content and journalistic techniques based on European models.⁷²⁷

Iran-e Now covered varied topics and carried articles discussing the political situation of Iran and foreign countries and the minutes of the parliamentary proceedings. It also

⁷²² Barclay to Grey, September 10, 1909, in *Persia. No. 1* (1910), 132.

⁷²³ Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 104.

⁷²⁴ 'Ain al-Saltaneh: 4: 2789.

⁷²⁵ *Iran-e Now*, November 28, 1909.

⁷²⁶ Edward Granville Browne, *The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1914), 52-3.

⁷²⁷ Adamiyat, *Fekr-e Demokrasi*, 97.

received telegraphs about events happening in Iran and elsewhere, ran business advertisements, published poetry and translated excerpts from European history. *Iran-e Now* demonstrated how the press could be used to influence public opinion and even government policy. In the intellectual history of Iran this publication could be considered as the predecessor of *Kaveh*, later published by Taqizadeh in Berlin; an example of a newspaper which promoted the ideas of modernisation.⁷²⁸

5:18 The Religious Decree against Taqizadeh

One incident which, according to Taqizadeh himself, exacerbated the enmity between him and the traditional clergy and led to the declaration of a Fatwa (religious decree) condemning him, was his upholding of one of the laws he himself had helped to pass, supporting the equal rights of religious minorities.⁷²⁹ This took place during the period of the Second Parliament in one of the villages of Neyshabour in the Khorasan province. Taqizadeh, in the presence of some clergy, among them Behbahani, demanded the punishment of a local Mullah, Sheikh Mohammad Baqer, who had killed two Ismailis, followers of a minority branch of Shia Islam, returning from a pilgrimage to Mecca. Added to the unpopularity of Taqizadeh's demand was the fact that Mohammad Baqer was brought to Tehran under arrest by order of the Armenian chief of police, Yaprak Khan. This caused further indignation at the arrest of a Muslim Mullah by a non-Muslim Armenian. Taqizadeh, who had worked hard to include the equal treatment of all male citizens regardless of religion or ethnicity in the Supplementary Constitutional Laws now had to defend it in practice.⁷³⁰ Now, although he was simply upholding that law by demanding the punishment of the Mullah Baqer, Taqizadeh found himself in an even more difficult position. His defence of the implementation of the law he had fought so hard to pass caused strong resentment among the clergy.⁷³¹ This gave the opportunity that those

⁷²⁸ Similar discourse was first presented with almost the same tone in *Iran-e Now*, though it had not been as widely accepted at that time. *Kaveh*'s publication coincided with a period when the public were more eager to embrace the ideas put forward by the newspaper and there was more opportunity for the ideas presented to be translated into policy than when *Iran-e Now* was being written. In addition, *Kaveh* was more widely circulated and read in Iranian intellectual circles both at home and abroad.

⁷²⁹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 137.

⁷³⁰ Afary, 291.

⁷³¹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 135-7.

who opposed Taqizadeh had been waiting for. They thus requested the issue of a Fatwa against him.

Taqizadeh's establishment of the Democrat Party in the Second Parliament and its controversial political activities further galvanized opposition against him. Sattar Khan who had now come to Tehran opposed the Democrats and Taqizadeh. Sattar Khan was suspicious of the Democrats, considering them over ambitious and destructive. He believed that Democrats should be ousted from the political scene. Some of the strongest opposition is evident in the telegraph sent by Ayatollah Abdollah Mazandarani and Mohammad Kazem Khorasani, two prominent Shia clergymen in Najaf. This correspondence demanded Taqizadeh's immediate exile and a ban on any involvement in the political affairs of Iran. The telegraph stated that since it had become evident that Taqizadeh's school of thought opposed the country's Islamic values and Sharia law, it was therefore not appropriate for him to be a member of the parliament.⁷³² It further stated that they would not allow him into the parliament and threatened that anybody who assisted him would be tarred with the same brush. Since being branded an infidel and excommunicated could have serious consequences for Taqizadeh, his colleagues, in particular his close friend Mohammad Ali Badamchi, questioned the two prominent clergy as to whether Taqizadeh was indeed excommunicated or not. The response was published in *Habl al-Matin* newspaper which revealed that the clergy of Najaf did not consider him an infidel. Taqizadeh wrote that for a while, following advice from the regent 'Azd al-Molk, they hid the telegram from the public until the situation became too intense.⁷³³ Taqizadeh realised that he could no longer stay in Tehran and decided to temporarily return to Tabriz. He requested a period of three months leave from the Parliament.⁷³⁴ Following the issue of this religious order, the parliament arranged for him to leave Tehran and he resided for some time in Tabriz.

⁷³² Ibid., 400.

⁷³³ Ibid.

⁷³⁴ Ibid., 137.

5:19 The Assassination of Seyyed Abdollah Behbahani

Seyyed Abdollah Behbahani was a powerful blocking force of goals of the Democrat Party. After his return to Tehran upon the opening of Parliament, he had been welcomed enthusiastically by a religious crowd. Although he was warned many times by some radical constitutionalists not to interfere in politics, he continued to act as he had during the First Parliament and had established an unofficial government. He was well respected by a large group of people and had great influence over the various military and political figures throughout the country. Many of Behbahani's followers were supporters of the Moderates and they considered the idea of the separation of religion and politics to be totally against the core nature of religion. Dolatabadi writes that the religious order against Taqizadeh had been made possible only with the assistance of Behbahani.⁷³⁵ In response, Taqizadeh had become angry and told Behbahani that his comments suggested that he was in fact anti-Islam.⁷³⁶ According to Dolatabadi, at one point Behbahani asked Taqizadeh to go to the holy shrines outside Iran to talk with the ulama there. Dolatabadi also comments that Sardar As'ad had tried to make peace between Taqizadeh and Behbahani but Behbahani had been reluctant. However, the issuing of the religious order against Taqizadeh and the suspected role of Behbahani in supporting this fatwa increased the hostilities between the Democrats and the Moderates.

On the evening of 17 July, 1910, a carriage stopped in front of Behbahani's house, the passengers entered the house and shot him.⁷³⁷ The next day, upon hearing the news, people closed the Bazar and their shops and demanded the punishment of the assassins.

5:20 Beginning of the Second Exile

After the issue of the religious order against Taqizadeh and the death of Behbahani, pressure increased against the presence of Taqizadeh in the Parliament and even in Tehran. Following the assassination of Behbahani and introduction of the Democrats responsible for the act, the position of Taqizadeh weakened in Tehran and he was forced to leave the city. This enforced departure was in sharp contrast to his exalted arrival. It was said that

⁷³⁵ Dolatabadi, 136.

⁷³⁶ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 300.

⁷³⁷ For the full story see: *Majles*, July 18, 1910.

the atmosphere was so much against him that he had to seek shelter in Sardar As‘ad’s house.⁷³⁸ Taqizadeh eventually left Tehran and travelled through Rasht, Baku and Tbilisi to Tabriz. Mokhber al-Saltaneh, the Governor of Azerbaijan, writes that Taqizadeh arrived in Tabriz on 9 September 1910. Taqizadeh mentions that the Governor supported him as much as he could.⁷³⁹ Mokhber al-Saltaneh comments that the Provincial Assembly in Tabriz was suspicious of Taqizadeh and the majority of businessmen in Tabriz disliked him.⁷⁴⁰ This is while Taqizadeh himself states that he had many friends in Tabriz and businessmen, in particular, supported him.⁷⁴¹ But the very fact that the Governor had asked the police to protect him shows that there was potential danger for him.

It was in Tabriz that Taqizadeh received the sad news of the death of Ali Mohammad Tarbiat, who was killed in Tehran in revenge for the death of Behbahani. As was mentioned previously, Taqizadeh was very fond of Ali Mohammad Khan and considered him as his spiritual follower. The death of Ali Mohammad Khan deeply saddened Taqizadeh.⁷⁴² The following excerpt from a letter that Taqizadeh wrote to a friend and which was published in *Iran-e Now* demonstrates the grief that Taqizadeh felt for the loss of Ali Mohammad Khan:

Could anyone have envisaged the strength of my love, devotion, affection and attachment to that dear young martyr. He was a paragon of virtue, perseverance, excellence, morality and honesty in this world. Imagine an angel of blessings, modesty and purity, an embodiment of ethics and rationality. From his infancy till his death, he was guiltless. He did not allow himself to be distracted by fleeting pleasures in the pursuit of happiness. He did not seek worldly pleasures but rather remained in abject poverty and deprivation out of a great love for his country. Demonstrating tenacity and altruism, he spent many a sleepless

⁷³⁸ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 131.

⁷³⁹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 139.

⁷⁴⁰ Hedayat, 211.

⁷⁴¹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 139.

⁷⁴² Ibid.

night on his journey from Rasht to Tehran; a light burning for freedom and democracy. Alas... what a divine light that after burning brightly was cruelly extinguished. What an example of true humanity risen out of such an abyss. He left me; me the one who had educated him like a father and loved him like my own child...no, child is too weak a word to fully express my feelings for him. I was left like a moth fluttering in eternal unhappiness and the darkness of life, without his light to guide me.... he abandoned me. Where are you, sun rising in the East, morning light, divine bird, solitary soul....⁷⁴³

The remaining correspondence indicates that while in Tabriz Taqizadeh was in communication with the Democrat Party members in Tehran. He tried his best to promote the Party. Taqizadeh believed that rescuing the country was dependent on promoting the Party and increasing the number of Party members.⁷⁴⁴ Esma'il Amirkhizi writes that when Taqizadeh was staying in Tabriz some of his followers had asked him to promote the Democrat Party in Tabriz. Taqizadeh had accepted the request and as a result the number of members had risen.⁷⁴⁵

The absence of Taqizadeh from the Parliament was a loss for the Democrats. Ebrahim Zanjani writes that without Taqizadeh the Parliament was without any soul.⁷⁴⁶ It seems that Taqizadeh was expecting to stay in Tabriz only for a short while and then return to Tehran once the situation calmed down. But letters sent to him by friends advised him not to return to Tehran because of the intense situation in the capital. Zanjani's letter depicts the difficult situation in the country at that time, the riots in the provinces and the widespread robbery and insecurity. He mentions Tehran as being the source of all the problems and widespread comments that people in the city were making against the Constitution and the Parliament. He then continues that, without a denial of Taqizadeh's excommunication order from

⁷⁴³ *Iran-e Now*, 17 October, 1910.

⁷⁴⁴ Khamaneh to Taqizadeh, Tehran, 10 December 1910, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 212-7.

⁷⁴⁵ Amirkhizi, 660.

⁷⁴⁶ Sheikh Ebrahim Zanjani to Taqizadeh, without date, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 217-26.

Najaf, he did not advise Taqizadeh to return to Tehran. Sheikh Mohammad Khiabani also wrote to Taqizadeh mentioning that even the uttering of his name in the Parliament was contentious and advised him not to return.⁷⁴⁷ Taqizadeh writes that after some months staying in Tabriz, he received copies of Russian newspapers in which they had published telegraphs from Tabriz stating that he was stirring up troubles in Tabriz. He eventually concluded that his enemies were preparing the groundwork to move against him and since Russian troops were in Tabriz it was likely that he was at risk there.⁷⁴⁸

Taqizadeh finally decided to leave Tabriz for Istanbul on 4 December, 1910. Taqizadeh's friends advocated strongly for his departure and in an official letter announced their decision that he should leave. They hoped that in Istanbul Taqizadeh could still be useful for the party and even en route to Istanbul could open up branches of the party and promote its ideology. Taqizadeh planned his trip through Khoi and Maku. He was received as an official guest by the Ottomans and treated with respect. He reached Erzurum on 1 January, 1911 and took the boat from Trabzon to Istanbul.

⁷⁴⁷ Sheikh Mohammad Khiabani to Taqizadeh, Tehran, 30 October 1910, in *Oraq-e Tazeh Yab-e Mashrutiyat*, ed., Afshar, 347-8.

⁷⁴⁸ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 157-8.

Chapter Six

Uncertainty in Exile and Events Leading up to The Great War

Before continuing to follow subsequent events in Taqizadeh's life in relation to what was happening in Iran, we should take a step back and briefly review Iran's situation within a broader international setting. International affairs and the power struggle taking place in Europe during this period greatly influenced events and politics in Iran. To fully appreciate the situation and political atmosphere within Iran, one needs to consider the geopolitical situation of the world, beyond Iranian borders. The actions and attitudes of Iranian politicians such as Taqizadeh should be assessed against this broader international background. It is this broader overview that will allow a deeper understanding of Taqizadeh's ideas, decisions and actions.

As explained in the previous chapter, Taqizadeh's aim was to swiftly expand the political system of Iran by developing the constitution to better mirror those western constitutions in which party building played an essential part. He successfully introduced and established a well-organised political party. However, the haste with which he achieved this in such a short period and the fact that some of the party's goals were not so easily accepted by Iranian traditional society led to him and the Democrat Party being vilified by their opponents. Taqizadeh was thus pushed into exile for a second time. This chapter covers Taqizadeh's activities during his second exile in Istanbul, Europe and the United States. Set against the background of events happening in Iran, the chapter follows Taqizadeh's life during his time abroad, his strategies and his relationships with senior party members. During this second exile Taqizadeh's saw the achievement of his goals as being dependent on the way the Democrat Party was organised. But, the instability of the country and the weakness of the central government led to the Russian ultimatum and the expulsion of many leading Democrat Party members which was a severe blow to the Party's activities and its goals. Although struggling financially, Taqizadeh nevertheless continued to endeavour to expand his knowledge as both a scholar and a politician.

6:1 The Developing Conflict of Interests over the Middle East between Germany, Russia and Great Britain

As previously mentioned, the political environment of Iran was strongly influenced by the interferences of the two international powers, Russia and Britain, during the tenure of the Second Parliament. The policies of these two countries in relationship to Iran were shaped, to a large degree, in accordance with events taking place in other parts of the world. The rise of industrialised Germany as a powerful economic and military power in Europe was one of the main concerns for Russia, Britain and France. In the period leading to the First World War, Germany was looking beyond its borders in order to expand its influence in other parts of the world including the Middle East. German Emperor Wilhelm II was an ambitious ruler, eager to lead the world and was searching for a place “in the sun”.⁷⁴⁹ The other nations also had similar ambitions; the British talked of “the white man’s burden” and the French claimed they had a “mission civilisatrice” or civilising mission.

Germans were latecomers to the colonising scene and in order to increase their influence, they had begun expansion of their navy. Germany’s ambitions greatly worried Britain which controlled the largest navy in the world. The thought that another country other than Britain might lead the world was unbearable for the British and thus they also began to strengthen their navy. The rivalry between powerful European nations escalated.

A huge number of Muslims were resident in countries ruled by non-Muslims, including in the French colonies, the British colonies where there were over 100 million and 19 million in Russia. The Germans had soon realised that this huge population might be usefully galvanised into an opposition against the colonisers. The Muslims under colonial rule were resentful of being ruled by the infidels and this was the Achilles’ heel of the European colonial powers.⁷⁵⁰ Germany knew it could use these potential allies if necessary. The first step was to establish close relationship with the Ottoman Empire, one of the biggest remaining independent Islamic countries whose ruler Sultan Abd al-Hamid II was

⁷⁴⁹ John C. G. Röhl, *Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900–1941* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 235.

⁷⁵⁰ Sean McMeekin, *The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany's Bid for World Power* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 3.

seen as the Caliph and thus claimed leadership of Sunni Islam. The Ottomans who were agitated by the Russians in the Balkans, the French in North Africa and the British in Egypt and Arabia were desperate to become allies with a powerful European country.⁷⁵¹ Germany with the smallest number of Muslims in its colonies appeared innocent in the eyes of the Islamic world. In 1888 Abd al-Hamid approached German financial circles to seek finance for the building of a railway which would connect Europe to the Persian Gulf. The Deutsche Bank agreed to finance the project and construction immediately began. By the end of 1892 the railroad had reached as far as Ankara. The Baghdad Railway project caused strong opposition from the Russian, French and British governments. Russia who had by then major influence in Central Asia as well as half of Iran, believed that increasing German influence in the region would harm its economic interests and thus strongly opposed the railway project. The completion of the project was not in the interests of the British in the Persian Gulf and particularly in India. In July 1910, *The World Today* wrote:

A German company which has a franchise for the railroad through Asiatic Turkey desires to obtain an outlet on the Persian Gulf. The completion of the road will provide for the first time a land route to India, which is decidedly inimical to the interests of Great Britain, as it would deprive British steamship lines of a large amount of trade, and would destroy the monopoly of the Mediterranean route, obtained by England at great cost.⁷⁵²

Strategically, the Baghdad Railway's goal was to tie Ottomans and the Germans together, while interrupting Britain's nexuses with India by threatening Suez, and providing Germany with its own route to the east through Basra.

Although Russia had been opposed to some features of the Bagdad Railway project, at the famous Potsdam interview between the German Emperor and the Russian Tsar in November 1910, Russia acknowledged the project on condition that no subdivision lines

⁷⁵¹ McMeekin, 3.

⁷⁵² "Events of the Months: Foreign Affairs," *The World Today* 19, no.1 (1910): 692.
<https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015011385773?urlappend=%3Bseq=22>.

were built into Armenia and Kurdistan. In return, Germany withdrew her opposition to Russian railway plans in northern Iran.

The Ottomans were not the only ones who were eager to co-operate with Germany. Iranian officials, who hoped to reduce the pressure of Russia and Britain, had begun approaching the newly united Reich. The initial steps were taken by the Iranian government during the reign of Naser al-Din Shah (1848–96). In the beginning, the Germans were not so interested but as time passed they became increasingly aware of the geopolitical position of Iran and began to show interest.⁷⁵³ In June 1873, Iran and Germany signed a comprehensive, twenty-one article treaty.⁷⁵⁴ This resulted in the opening of the German legation in Tehran in the Spring of 1885.⁷⁵⁵ Following the liberation of Tehran, restoration of the constitution and the arrival of Russian troops in the northern part of Iran, the pro-German policy was more strongly propagated. It was particularly publicised by Iranian press both at home and abroad. *Habl al-Matin* of Calcutta wrote that Iran should seek an alliance with countries such as Ottoman Turkey, Germany, The United States or France. According to the paper, this was because the northern and southern neighbours of Iran (Russia and Britain) had caused widespread damage to the country and creating rivalry would be the means to oppose them. Although the writer of *Habl al-Matin* believed that Asian countries' expectation of support from Europe was not positive, at the same time the article stated that, as Germany would only be able to harm Iran in 30 years' time, Iran, before that happened, would most likely already have become "the Germany of the East" and therefore able to defend itself. The article in *Habl al-Matin* concluded by suggesting that Iran should establish an assembly in Berlin to co-operate with Germany.⁷⁵⁶ *Sharq* also suggested that a relationship with Germany could be beneficial for Iran. The newspaper believed that the Iranian Foreign Minister must choose a powerful country with which to form an alliance. That country should be on good terms with Iran and only seek trade benefits. According to *Sharq*, Germany was a suitable candidate since it was powerful

⁷⁵³ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 284–5.

⁷⁵⁴ Full details of this treaty were published in *Habl al-Matin*, January 2, 1911.

⁷⁵⁵ Oliver Bast, "German-Persian Diplomatic Relations," *Encyclopædia Iranica*, available online: <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/germany-i> (accessed 2 March, 2012).

⁷⁵⁶ *Habl al-Matin*, September 27, 1909.

enough to protect Iran in case of invasion by another country. Germany was also far away from Iran and would only expect economic benefits, in contrast to Russia and Britain who sought territorial gains too. A relationship with Germany would introduce a third power into the region and Iran would benefit from the rivalry between the European nations. *Sharq* emphasised that an alliance with Germany was recommended only in order to maintain the independence of Iran.⁷⁵⁷ Hossein Danesh, writing in *Shams*, similarly advocated an amicable policy towards Germany and was in favour of secretly giving some concessions to the Germans. He posited that this would not damage the sovereignty of the country; in fact, the increased income could be used to strengthen the military.⁷⁵⁸

The Iranians' inclination towards forming an alliance with Germany was not hidden from Russia and Britain. A Russian secret report, for instance, quoted the Iranian newspapers and the desires to establish a relationship with Germany with the aim of then overriding the Russian and British agreements.⁷⁵⁹ At the same time, Iranians closely followed movements of other nations against the colonial powers in different parts of the world. The Ottoman policy of seeking alliance with Germany was noted and was approved of by many intellectuals. In general, at the beginning of the twentieth century, many Muslim countries shared an awareness of the fact that they were suppressed and exploited by European powers. This discourse, which had been initially formed among elite circles, was spread by the press into the public domain. News of the restoration of the Iranian Constitution, for example, was well received in Afghanistan. According to *Habl al-Matin*, after hearing of the victory of the constitutionalists in Iran, the people of Kabul partied for three days.⁷⁶⁰ As we shall see later, the pro-German policy developed simultaneously in Iran and Afghanistan. In analysing the behaviour of politicians like Taqizadeh, one must consider also the intellectual mood of the wider international scene and the mutual influence of the thinkers and politicians of other countries which were also being threatened by colonial powers.

⁷⁵⁷ *Sharq*, June 8, 1910.

⁷⁵⁸ *Shams*, June 14, 1910.

⁷⁵⁹ Report by Poklovski, 19 March 1910, in *Ketab-e Narenji*, ed., Monzavi, 4: 134-5.

⁷⁶⁰ *Habl al-Matin*, September 27, 1909.

6:2 Taqizadeh and his Views on Foreign Affairs

In an essay published in *Habl al-Matin*, Taqizadeh stated his views on Iranian foreign affairs.⁷⁶¹ This essay is significant; it demonstrates that, as the leader of the Democrat Party, Taqizadeh's reflections would also inform the Democrat Party's foreign policy. In this short essay Taqizadeh highlights various countries and their most pressing issues. He states that though foreign policies might be a small fraction of the concerns of other nations around the world, it was the highest priority for Iran. Taqizadeh believed this was due to the invasive interventions of the foreign powers involved in the affairs of Iran which threatened the independence of the country.

According to Taqizadeh, Iranian politics had been divided into Anglophile and Russophile and many Iranian politicians were influenced either by the British or the Russians. This situation changed after Germany gained more power. The political and economic conflicts with Germany and the fear that Iran might fall into the hands of the Russians led Britain to seek allegiance with Russia. Eventually, Russian and British policies towards Iran were aligned. According to Taqizadeh, this was a result of changes in the old global order which had led to the world being now divided between the Allies and the Central Powers. Following his discussion, Taqizadeh states that many Iranian authorities, old statesmen and aristocracy took the side of the Allies. Meanwhile, another power rose to prominence in Iran. Taqizadeh considered this group to be representative of public opinion and, in particular, the young generation of Iran. This new group was opposed to foreign intervention and was non-partisan. However, since this group appeared to follow the tenet that the enemy of my enemy is my friend, it was criticised by some for its pro-German stance.

In conclusion, Taqizadeh saw the source of disagreement over foreign policy between the Democrats, who he thought were unfairly referred to as "revolutionaries", and the Moderates.⁷⁶² Taqizadeh believed that Russia and Britain encouraged the Moderates to oppose the Democrats resulting in the schism which occurred during the Second

⁷⁶¹ Ibid., February 6 and 13, 1911.

⁷⁶² *Shafaq* published an article about this topic: "Moderation and Revolution," March 11, 1911.

Parliament. This was, he suggested, because the nationalistic policy of the Democrats was in sharp contrast to the interests of Russia and Britain. It was this policy that Taqizadeh followed whilst abroad, after his ousting from Parliament. Taqizadeh's views on foreign affairs will be discussed further later in this chapter.

6:3 The Situation in Iran after Taqizadeh's Departure

After Taqizadeh's departure from Tehran, the tension between the Democrats and the Moderates continued. Subsequently, the disarmament of the Mojaheds in Tehran by the government led to a serious conflict and the wounding of Sattar Khan.⁷⁶³ Another incident was the death of the regent, 'Azd al-Molk, on 22 September, 1910.⁷⁶⁴ The choice of a new regent was a point of conflict in the Parliament; the Moderates wanted Naser al-Molk as regent whilst the Democrats, supported by the Bakhtiyaris, favoured Mirza Hossein Khan Mostufi al-Mamalek. The Parliament voted for Naser al-Molk with 40 votes while Mostufi only won 20. *Shams* commented that the vote for Naser al-Molk in the Parliament was an ideological defeat for the Democrats.⁷⁶⁵ Taqizadeh writes that he was in Istanbul when Naser al-Molk became the regent. According to Taqizadeh the new regent was a highly suspicious man and believed the Bakhtiyaris and the Democrats were responsible for all the wrongdoings.⁷⁶⁶ Naser al-Molk gained the majority of the votes as he was considered knowledgeable, trusted by the ulama, was well known in diplomatic circles outside Iran and was respected by the tribal chiefs.⁷⁶⁷ Naser al-Molk had studied in Oxford and had been a classmate of Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister. As he had headed the

⁷⁶³ This incident which is known as the "Park-e Atabak" incident was caused by the disarmament of the Mojaheds in Tehran. After the liberation of Tehran by the various groups of Mojaheds, the fact that they were armed was the source of many troubles for the inhabitants and worrisome for the government, causing the government to demand their disarmament. Some groups of Mojaheds were reluctant to hand over their arms and gathered in protest in the Atabak Park, the residence of Sattar Khan. The government decided to use force and thus laid siege to the park. During the clashes, Sattar Khan was wounded in the leg; an injury that would plague him for the rest of his life. Classic historical accounts of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution tended to focus on the most obvious consequences of the Mojaheds' presence in Tehran and commented on the fact that they were armed which disturbed public order and security in Tehran. But, there were other problems besides this issue which seemingly were paid less attention and deserve further research. *Iran-e Now*, for instance, reported that it was believed the presence of the Mojaheds had caused house rental prices in central Tehran to skyrocket. *Iran-e Now* claimed that increasingly prostitutes had rented these houses, thus causing an increase in rent prices. See: *Iran-e Now*, October 28, 1910.

⁷⁶⁴ Sharif Kashani, 778.

⁷⁶⁵ *Shams*, October 8, 1910.

⁷⁶⁶ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 169-70.

⁷⁶⁷ Sharif Kashani, 779.

Iranian legation in London in the past, he was personally acquainted with many British politicians.⁷⁶⁸ He had become Prime Minister during the reign of Mohammad Ali Shah. He was later imprisoned by the Shah but after the intervention of a British minister in Tehran was released and went to Europe where he supported the exiled constitutionalists during the Lesser Despotism Period. Naser al-Molk had been previously nominated as regent but had refused the post in favour of 'Azd al-Molk.⁷⁶⁹

Upon the Parliament's approval, Naser al-Molk, who was by then living in Britain, was officially recalled to Tehran. He chose to travel to Iran through Russia. While travelling across Russia he was not initially as warmly received by the Russian government as would have been expected by someone with the rank of regent. It was apparent that the Russians considered him an anglophile. Thus, cognisant of that, he tried to convince the Russian officials that they were mistaken since the Moderates, who were on good terms with Russia, had chosen him as regent. However, the Russians were unconvinced and wanted him to prove his sincerity by using his influence upon his arrival in Tehran to appoint Sepahdar, their candidate, as Prime Minister.⁷⁷⁰ The Russians treated Naser al-Molk with respect as he crossed Russian territory and even withdrew their forces from Qazvin when he entered Iran. Kasravi believed that this was because the new regent had promised to help to reduce the animosity of the Iranian people towards Russia and Britain.⁷⁷¹ According to *Shams*, there was much hope that Naser al-Molk would, in particular, solve most of the existing problems between Iran and Britain.⁷⁷² *The London Times* wrote, "The new Regent, who is not without experience of public affairs, enjoys an exceptional reputation for integrity and character; and his Western education - he is a Balliol man - would seem to have specially fitted him to guide Persia through a critical period of transition".⁷⁷³

⁷⁶⁸ *Shams*, November 23, 1910.

⁷⁶⁹ Malekzadeh, 7-6: 1299.

⁷⁷⁰ Ahmad Ali Sepher, *Khaterat-e Siyasi-e Movarrehk al-Dowleh Sepher* [Political Memoirs of *Movarrehk al-Dowleh Sepher*], ed., Ahmad Sami'i (Tehran: Namak, 1995), 31-2.

⁷⁷¹ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 153.

⁷⁷² *Shams*, October 30, 1910.

⁷⁷³ *The London Times*, "Great Britain and the New Regent of Persia", February 1, 1911.

Before Naser al-Molk's arrival, the parties had put aside their differences and both agreed to allow him the opportunity to serve the country. Taqizadeh was not in Tehran at that time. Despite this, remaining correspondence proves that he was constantly in touch with the senior members of the Democrat Party and, although not present, was in fact leading the party in Iran. Seemingly contradicting this, Taqizadeh himself stated that since he was in Istanbul during that period he was not so involved in the conflicts between the Moderates and the Democrats.⁷⁷⁴ In correspondence with Ali Badamchi, one of the senior members of the party, Taqizadeh emphasised that the Democrats should not interfere with minor governmental issues and remain impartial.⁷⁷⁵ The same approach was reflected in *Iran-e Now*, the Democrat Party's official publication. Details of this approach were published in eleven articles and emphasised the need for co-operation with the other parties to oppose those conservatives who were against the constitution. It recommended a less aggressive stance and highlighted the importance of publicising the ideology of the Party to gradually attract more members.⁷⁷⁶ And thus the Democrat Party, wanting to demonstrate their willingness to co-operate with the new regent, upon his arrival, sent members to welcome him. In contrast to this show of support, when the representatives of the Democrat party arrived to greet him, it was seen that Naser al-Molk, suspicious of their intentions, was in possession of a gun. This dramatic gesture was considered a demonstration of his lack of trust of the Democrats, conveying a clear message to the Russians that he would not side with the Democrats.⁷⁷⁷

Upon his arrival, Naser al-Molk pressured the Parliament into strengthening its majority in order to prevent the Democrats who were in the minority but more organised from frequently dominating the Parliament. Naser al-Molk played a large role in unifying smaller parties such as Ettefaq va Tarraqi [Unison and Progress] and the Moderates in the Parliament. He believed a constitutional government could not function effectively with a parliament whose members were split up into disparate groups and driven by their own

⁷⁷⁴ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 169.

⁷⁷⁵ Mohammad Ali Badamchi to Taqizadeh, 8 March 1911, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 240-52.

⁷⁷⁶ *Iran-e Now*, October 24, 1910.

⁷⁷⁷ Sepher, *Khaterat-e Siyasi-e Movarrehk al-Dowleh Sepher*, 31-2.

personal interests.⁷⁷⁸ According to a British Foreign Ministry source, the regent was adamant that he would not take up his post unless a majority were united in support of the government ministers.⁷⁷⁹

By the time that Naser al-Molk arrived in Tehran, Mostofi al-Mamalek, backed by the Democrats, had formed the government. However, with the arrival of the regent that government resigned.⁷⁸⁰ Naser al-Molk nominated Sepahdar for the post of Prime Minister. Although this was against the Democrats' wishes, they did not protest as the regent was not acting illegally. Consequently, the Parliament declared a majority with 48 votes in favour of Sepahdar as Prime Minister.⁷⁸¹ The joining of the majority of Moderates to Sepahdar's cabinet highlighted Naser al-Molk's aim to avoid having a cabinet dominated by the Democrats. With the formation of this new cabinet, the anti-constitutionalist clergy and old aristocracy were hopeful that the constitutionalists' hold over the country was weakening.

After Taqizadeh's departure, the intense political situation of Iran created by the assassination of Behbahani was exacerbated by further killings. Sani' al-Dowleh, the Finance Minister and the Speaker of the First Parliament was assassinated by two Russian nationals on 13 February, 1911. This deepened the division and hostility between the political groups in Iran.⁷⁸² Sani' al-Dowleh had been educated in Europe and was keen to see the modernisation of Iran. His death was a blow to those who advocated reform and modernisation. It was said that Sani' al-Dowleh's anti-Russian attitude was the reason for his assassination.⁷⁸³ Taqizadeh believed that the Russians had been involved in plotting the killing of Sani' al-Dowleh or had encouraged other Iranian Russophiles to commit the

⁷⁷⁸ *Iran-e Now*, February 22, 1911.

⁷⁷⁹ Barclay to Grey, telegram, 13 February 1911, in *Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Persia: In Continuation of Persia No. 1* (1911), (London: Harrison and Sons, 1912), 21.

⁷⁸⁰ Mamalek became Prime Minister, he was only 37 years old and despite being young was very much respected in society. His sojourns to Europe had influenced him and he was greatly interested in reforms and serving the public. Most of his ministers were under forty years of age and each could converse in one or more foreign languages. See: Baqer 'Aqeli, *Ruz Shomar-e Tarikh-e Iran* [A Journal of Iranian History] (Tehran: Gofar, 1995), 1:74.

⁷⁸¹ Barclay to Grey, telegram, 24 February 1911, in *Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Persia: In Continuation of Persia No. 1* (1911), 23.

⁷⁸² Dolatabadi, 3:158.

⁷⁸³ "British Blue Book on Persia Vindicates Shuster," in *The New York Times*, June 30, 1911.

crime. He suspected there to be a connection between this assassination and the railway project in Iran in which Sani‘ al-Dowleh had been heavily involved, eager for the project to be actualised.⁷⁸⁴ According to *Iran-e Now*, after Sani‘ al-Dowleh’s death, among his papers were documents stating that he had plans to ask for loans from the United States to promote the railway project in Iran.⁷⁸⁵

By the time Naser al-Molk became the regent, the general situation of the country was chaotic and the central government was losing control over the provinces. The hopes and expectations of the general public for the new constitutional government were not met and were, in fact, replaced by deep disappointment and bitterness. The masses believed that all the hardships they were facing: the food and water shortages; the financial recession; the lack of security and poverty, would be fixed by a new governing system. But after a year and a half, they realised that their hopes were not going to be realised. Not only did they not see any signs of improvements, but the adverse situation was in fact deteriorating. The public was disappointed and disillusioned with the government. This further strengthened those who questioned the legitimacy of the constitutional law in contrast with Islamic law which cast doubts over the authority of the central government.⁷⁸⁶ The central government was weakened and the intervention by foreign countries had increased. The plan for transition of power from an individual to parties was unsuccessful and once again it was Naser al-Molk upon whom everyone pinned their hopes, eager for the situation to change. In response to the overriding feeling of despair, Naser al-Molk was seen as a possible saviour by both politicians and the general public. He was positively compared to previously successful rulers in Iranian history such as Karim Khan, Shah Abbas, and Anoushirvan. Unlike Taqizadeh, Naser al-Molk was more of a career politician and less ideologically driven in his profession. In Taqizadeh's opinion, it was Naser al-Molk who facilitated the ruling of the Moderates and in order to achieve this he had tried to destroy the opposition party. In fact, his victims had been political freedom and the constitution. Taqizadeh then writes about Naser-al Molk’s character:

⁷⁸⁴ Taqizadeh to Browne, 1 June 1911, Istanbul, in *Browne Papers*, 9- 4- 1.

⁷⁸⁵ *Iran-e Now*, February 22, 1911.

⁷⁸⁶ *Shams*, August 8, 1910.

There are seemingly contradictory sides to this statesman's character. His political intelligence is clearly evident and he is an admirable speaker. His knowledge is vast, he can converse in French, English and Russian. His morals and integrity are beyond question. However, he is more of a theorist than a practical man; he only uses his intelligence to criticise and by nature is a pessimist. He seems to lack any courage of his convictions and does not fervently defend his opinions. His main concern is his popularity among the masses and he is willing to go to any lengths to ensure this popularity. In reality, he is a weak man and therefore, like any weak man, he bears a grudge and the slightest opposition to him triggers vengeful feelings.⁷⁸⁷

Despite all this, Naser al-Molk played a significant role in the consolidation of the political parties in Iran. Taqizadeh was also one of the pioneers in Iranian political history who promoted the idea of giving importance to a party as a whole rather than to an individual. Amirkhizi quotes Mohammad Ali Tarbiat who narrated that, when the Democrats met to discuss the possibility that Taqizadeh might leave the country and voted against it, Taqizadeh gathered the senior members of the Party and convinced them that the Party should not be dependent on him or any other individual.⁷⁸⁸ Nevertheless, as Touraj Atabaki has argued, it has been a common pattern in Iranian history that when the country is on the verge of disintegration and anarchy it is expected that an extraordinary character will bring integrity and prosperity back to the country.⁷⁸⁹ Accordingly, at the time of the discussed events, it was now expected that Naser al-Molk would play such a role and bring back security and integrity to Iran.

6:4 The British Note of Interference

As a result of the lack of security in the south of Iran, the British were threatening to send forces to Iran in order to establish order and protect their interests.⁷⁹⁰ Because of the

⁷⁸⁷ X, "La Situation Politique de la Perse," in *Revue de Monde Musulman*, (June 1914), 27 : 275.

⁷⁸⁸ Amirkhizi, 576.

⁷⁸⁹ Touraj Atabaki, "Agency and Subjectivity in Iranian National Historiography," in *Iran in the 20th Century*, ed., Atabaki, 71.

⁷⁹⁰ Barclay to Persian Government, Tehran, 14 October 1910, in *Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Persia: In Continuation of Persia No. 1*, 105.

geographical position of the main British trade routes across southern Iran, these forces' jurisdiction would extend as far as the neutral zone which had been agreed under the agreement of 1907. At the same time, in the view of the British, this area was where Germany hoped to expand its influence to with the construction of the Baghdad-Khaneqain railway. The Russians viewed the idea of British expansion very positively and were eager for the establishment of a more permanent British force in southern Iran. A British Army presence in the south of the country would, they believed, make it easier for their Russian troops to occupy northern regions of the country and facilitate reinforcement of Russian troops.⁷⁹¹

According to *Shams*, the British note of intervention was discussed extensively in the Ottoman and German newspapers. In an article published in *Shams*, Hossein Danesh described how this note had galvanised some circles in Istanbul and he suggested that this act against Iran was considered as a threat to the whole Islamic world. Some members of the Etihad va Taraqqi [Union and Progress] Party, a leading party advocating reforms in Ottoman Turkey, gave public talks, asking that the Ottomans unite with Iran, Germany and other Islamic countries to defend the common enemy, Britain and Russia.⁷⁹² Similarly, *Iran-e Now* wrote that the British note was discussed in German and Islamic world newspapers and in particular quoted the *Gunash* [Sunshine] newspaper published in Baku. *Gunash* wrote that the whole Islamic world should pay great attention to this act and even suggested that the ultimatum was given to test the reaction of the Islamic world and gauge the importance of Iran for Muslims. *Gunash* advised all Muslims to unite and protest the British threat.⁷⁹³ *Chereh Nama* [True Face] wrote that looking at a world map, one could clearly see that faithlessness faced Islam, darkness faced the light, Westerners faced those in the East; the Europeans like angry, hungry, aggressive lions were facing a group of Muslims. *Kheyr al-Kalam* [The Best Words] of Gilan noted that the British ultimatum would be a big test not only for Iran but also for the rest of the Islamic world.⁷⁹⁴ In another

⁷⁹¹ Mansour Bonakdarian, *Britain And the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911: Foreign Policy, Imperialism and Dissent* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 224.

⁷⁹² *Shams*, November 21, 1910.

⁷⁹³ *Iran-e Now*, November 1, 1910.

⁷⁹⁴ *Khair al-Kalam*, December 24, 1910.

article, *Iran-e Now* posited that, although Muslims had not progressed far enough along the path of civilisation, unity of the Islamic world could nevertheless be mobilised by the religious orders of high ranking clergy.⁷⁹⁵ In a letter to Taqizadeh, Browne noted that the British establishment was affected by the protests of the Muslim world, in particular the large demonstration in Istanbul. They had not anticipated such a strength of feeling of solidarity in the Islamic world, and were sceptical of Muslims uniting, especially Shiites and Sunnis.⁷⁹⁶

The idea of Islamic unity in its modern sense, which would later become further widespread at the outbreak of the First World War, might well be traced back to this point in history.⁷⁹⁷ Because of new and efficient means of transportation and communications from the end of the 19th century onwards, Islamic countries were better connected and informed about each other's affairs. Whilst leaders of Islam had previously sought to spread the religion, now the focus had turned to uniting the followers of Islam in order to protect Islamic lands from the threat of the invading forces who had been empowered by scientific thought and new technologies. The idea of Islamic unity was an ongoing discourse a year after the British threatened intervention in Iran. *Neday-e Jonoub* [Call of the South] warned, "O Muslims, try to unite and chase away the germs of contention. If your life continues like this, leaving you miserable and pitiful, it will not be long before our Islamic countries are held ransom to the grudges and ambitions of the Christian countries."⁷⁹⁸ *Shafaq*

⁷⁹⁵ According to *Iran-e Now*, following the British threat, the Iranians of Istanbul gathered together in one of the theatres in the central district of Beyoglu to protest against Britain and Russia. Many Turks especially high-ranking officials were present. The speakers and in particular one from Tunisia talked about the unity of the Muslim nations and expressed concern about the negative consequences of distancing Iran from the Ottoman Empire. They demanded that the Ottoman government oppose this, unite with and seek help from the Triple Alliance. One of the members of parliament praised Germany, mentioning that Germany had taken the place of Britain and enumerated the services that Germany had performed for the Muslims, especially in Morocco. The speaker's final proposal was to send a telegram to the German Emperor asking that he prevent Iran from breaking away from the Ottoman Empire. This suggestion was praised by all present. Chants of 'Long Live Germany' were heard from all sides.

⁷⁹⁶ Browne to Taqizadeh, Cambridge, 8 May 1911, in *Nameh-hay-e Edward Browne be Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh*, eds., Zaryab and Afshar, 34-6.

⁷⁹⁷ While Pan-Islamic ideology and organisation in the Ottoman Empire dated from Sultan Abd al-Hamid II's reign (1876-1909), certain signs point to some earlier developments and preparatory conditions. See: Jacob M. Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 9.

⁷⁹⁸ *Neday-e Jonoub*, November 21, 1911.

[Dawn] also published an editorial under the title “The Unity of Islam” and highlighted the importance of bilateral co-operation between Iran and Ottoman Turkey.⁷⁹⁹

Frustratingly for Taqizadeh, who had himself previously been victim of a religious decree by high-ranking clergy, the idea of Islamic unity which once again depended on that same clergy’s predominant leadership, was again threatening to rear its ugly head.⁸⁰⁰ This must have been a bitter pill to swallow for Taqizadeh. In a letter to Browne, who was obviously in favour of respecting the leading Shia clergy of Najaf, Taqizadeh strongly expressed his opinion.

He wrote that, whilst he accepted that the clergy of Najaf had played a significant role in establishing the constitution and acknowledged that this should be recognised, he was opposed to these clergymen or indeed the clergy in general benefitting from having extra rights.⁸⁰¹ Using an example from the past, he emphasised that, while drafting the electoral law of the Parliament, Iranian Armenians had also demanded an extension of their powers after having been instrumental in helping the constitutional movement. They had demanded that there be three deputies in the Parliament instead of the one that they were legally entitled to. Taqizadeh, however, had disagreed strongly with this, arguing that this went against the fundamental principle of equality and non-discrimination of all persons before the law. Similarly, now, the clergy were expecting exceptional rights. And again, Taqizadeh expressed his dissent. As Ali Ansari has argued, as a result of his religious education, Taqizadeh was all too well aware of the flaws of the Shia establishment from inside out.⁸⁰² He thus suggested that the clergy’s powers were already too wide reaching and that granting them any further powers might have long lasting negative consequences.⁸⁰³

⁷⁹⁹ *Shafaq*, March 6, 1911.

⁸⁰⁰ *Iran-e Now* had previously criticised the unlimited power of the clergy after they had announced their disapproval of Taqizadeh. *Iran-e Now*, like Taqizadeh, advocated the equality of all people under the constitutional government. See: “Mashrutiyyat va Nofouz-e Ashkhas,” [The Constitution and the Influence of Individuals] in *Iran-e Now*, July 6, 1910.

⁸⁰¹ There is an elaborate article published in *Habl al-Matin* regarding the power of the clergy and the authority of the prominent cleric of Najaf. According to *Habl al-Matin*, the decree against Taqizadeh had greatly weakened the authority of the clergy.

⁸⁰² Ansari, *The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran*, 51.

⁸⁰³ Taqizadeh to Browne, Istanbul, 30 March 1911, in *Browne Papers*, 1-1-30, 1-1-40.

Despite Taqizadeh's great respect for Browne, we see here that Taqizadeh was not willing to compromise when it came to what he believed in; he was indeed an independent thinker and ready to boldly defend his stance when necessary. Fully aware of the key role of the clergy in the formation of the concept of the unity of Islam, Taqizadeh struggled to identify with it. The clergy was pushing for the superior rights of Muslims over anyone who might not be of the same faith. Taqizadeh, however, had been greatly influenced by the French Revolution. His ideology revolved around the concept of building a nation whose subjects would have equal rights, despite their beliefs. The Democrat Party, which Taqizadeh represented, had many influential non-Muslim members such as Armenians. Another reason that Taqizadeh questioned the clergy's stance on the unity of Islam was that he saw that this would lead to the Ottomans having the upper hand. He was well aware of the fact that some factions of Ottoman political parties or pan-Turkists were eager to expand the territory of the Ottoman Empire and they considered the Turkish speaking regions of Iran as being under the natural jurisdiction of that empire. Theoretically speaking, Taqizadeh did not view the confrontation between the West and Iran from a religious perspective. He considered the source of the backwardness of the Islamic world to be its lack of rationality and absence of scientific methods. For Taqizadeh, science was a universal knowledge which could be learnt and utilised universally and was not exclusively possessed in particular by any nation, religion or race. As was mentioned in previous chapters, Taqizadeh was determined to find ways for Iranians to learn and develop this ideology as swiftly as possible.

His previous trips to Egypt and Lebanon and living in Istanbul during this period had allowed Taqizadeh to monitor the situation and keep abreast of the developments and ideas which were circulating at the time. Two articles by Taqizadeh published in 1912 and 1913 entitled "*Les Courants Politiques dans la Turquie Contemporaine*" [Political Trends in Contemporary Turkey] and "*Doctrines et Programme des Partis Politiques Ottomans*" [Doctrines and Programmes of the Ottoman Political Parties], prove the depths of knowledge he had acquired about contemporary political developments during his time in

Istanbul.⁸⁰⁴ Taqizadeh was well versed in Seyyed Jamal al Din Asadabadi's (Afghani) ideas about Islamic unity, having earlier stayed in Egypt and attended classes given by Seyyed Jamal al Din's disciple, Sheikh Mohammad Abdoh. His residency in Istanbul, the melting pot of the Islamic world's political ideas, had exposed him to the developing discourse of the concept of Islamic unity and informed his beliefs and ideology which would lead to the eventual implementation of political policies. Taqizadeh's ideas developed over time. To fully appreciate the gradual development of his ideas concerning Iran's position within an international context, Taqizadeh's time in Istanbul should be examined further.

Meanwhile, Browne also tried to make peace between Taqizadeh and the leading clergy in Najaf. With the aim of mediating, he wrote a letter to Akhund Khorasani who had declared Taqizadeh unfit for political roles.⁸⁰⁵ But, Ayatollah Khorasani replied that although the clergy were aware of the benefits of Taqizadeh's services, during the revolutionary period his dismissal had been necessary.⁸⁰⁶

6:5 Taqizadeh in Istanbul

Despite the writing of Mojtehedī which states that Taqizadeh was well received in Istanbul and that he was aided by the community of Tabrizi businessmen, other sources suggest that he was rather isolated in Istanbul. Although he was a high-profile politician, it seems that the Turkish authorities also ignored Taqizadeh's presence in that city.⁸⁰⁷ Hossein Danesh, in a letter to Browne, wrote that although Taqizadeh's period of leave from the Parliament had ended, he was still to be summoned back. He then continued that Taqizadeh was not at all respected in Istanbul and little attention was paid to him. Danesh regarded Taqizadeh's fall from grace as deplorable. He was saddened by the fact that a single clergyman's religious order could have such devastating consequences for a

⁸⁰⁴ X, "Les Courants Politiques Dans la Turquie Contemporaine," in *Revue du Monde Musulman*, (1912), 21: 158- 221. And: X "Doctrines et Programme des Partis Politiques Ottomans," in *Revue du Monde Musulman*, (December 1913), 23: 151-164.

⁸⁰⁵ Browne to Ayatollah Khorasani, 446-7

⁸⁰⁶ Akhund Khorasani to Browne, 30 June 1911, in *Hoghoq Begiran-e Englis dar Iran* (Tehran: Javidan, 1994), 447-8.

⁸⁰⁷ Hedayat, 219.

politician.⁸⁰⁸ Browne too, informed by various contacts in Iran, was concerned about the role Taqizadeh had played in causing tension between the political parties in Iran. In the same letter, Danesh mentions that Taqizadeh greatly resented that some had complained about him to Browne. Drawing from other letters sent from Tehran to Taqizadeh, it is evident that some from inside Iran were attempting to put pressure on Taqizadeh by inciting the Iranian community in Istanbul to discredit him.⁸⁰⁹ Taqizadeh complained that even before his arrival in Istanbul some had provoked Iranians in Istanbul against him.⁸¹⁰ During his stay in Istanbul, in a letter to Browne, Taqizadeh laments that after the liberation of Tehran some had turned against him and had attempted to tarnish his reputation.⁸¹¹

During the first few months of Taqizadeh's stay in Istanbul he was still hopeful that he might return to Iran and at least reside in Tabriz. He was repeatedly warned by friends inside Iran, however, that now was not the right time for him to go back; the atmosphere was volatile and it would be preferable if he waited for the situation to calm down before attempting to return.⁸¹² A letter from Tarbiat to Taqizadeh states that the Tabriz provincial Assembly had sent a telegraph to the Parliament and the regent requesting that Taqizadeh be recalled to Iran. But, not in favour of that idea, he adds that Taqizadeh should put aside any thoughts of returning to Iran because of the chaotic and unstable situation of the country. Tarbiat then writes bluntly, "I see no positive feelings or enthusiasm towards you here and even your friends seem to have almost forgotten about you. I appear to be the only person who is constantly thinking of you and admires you...".⁸¹³ He then advises Taqizadeh that he should reside somewhere outside Iran, continue writing and find some other occupation as his return might not be possible for years. But, though far from Iran, the remaining correspondence shows that Taqizadeh was kept constantly updated about the political affairs of Iran and was influential in leading policies of the Democrat Party in Iran. For instance, Mahmoud Oskuyi, one of the Democrat Party members in Tabriz, wrote to

⁸⁰⁸ Hossein Danesh to Edward Browne, 27 February 1911, in *Browne Papers*, 1-2-24.

⁸⁰⁹ Mohammad Ali Badamchi to Taqizadeh, 8 March 1911, and Manoucher Irani to Taqizadeh, 15 March 1911 in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 240-52 and 252-4.

⁸¹⁰ Mohammad Ali Badamchi to Taqizadeh, 2 April 1911, in *Ibid.*, 256-7.

⁸¹¹ Taqizadeh to Browne, 30 March 1911, in *Browne Papers*, 1-1-39.

⁸¹² Mohammad Ali Badamchi to Taqizadeh, 2 April 1911, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 256-7.

⁸¹³ Mohammad Ali Tarbiat to Taqizadeh, 9 September 1911, in *Ibid.*, 296-9.

Taqizadeh, asking him to continue sending instructions to the Party branch in Tabriz since his words were the most influential.⁸¹⁴ Taqizadeh's residency in Istanbul had also put him in direct contact with Turkish politicians. He writes that he was in constant touch with the Young Turks or Etihad va Taraqqi Party, the ruling government party at that time.⁸¹⁵ It was recorded that Taqizadeh had organised an assembly of migrants and businessmen from Tabriz called "Jam'yat-e Nashr-e Ma'ref [The Assembly for the Promotion of Education]."⁸¹⁶ According to Mojtehedī, Taqizadeh had established this assembly to familiarise the migrants with the New World and science. They were to do research about Iranian literature and politics. Every week each member would carry out research in the libraries of Istanbul connected to a certain subject, before giving a talk for the others. The aim of this was to broaden their knowledge and improve their oratory skills.⁸¹⁷ Esma'il Yekani talks about a small organisation called "The Iranian Democrat Committee", founded while Taqizadeh had resided in Istanbul. It is possible that he is talking about the same group or alternatively the group he mentions could have been made up of only the more senior members of the party. According to Yekani, after the events in Tabriz in the winter of 1911 and persecution of the constitutionalists, many leading constitutionalists had come to Istanbul and were active in the committee. These included Mohammad Ali and Reza Tarbiat, Esma'il Nobari, Esma'il Amirkhizi, Mirza Aqa Naleh-e Mellat, Ghafar Zonouzi, As'ad al-Allah Ahmadzadeh, Mahmoud Ghanizadeh, Ali Mohammad Salmasi and Yekani. Taqizadeh himself also attended the meetings of this committee.⁸¹⁸

Commenting on Taqizadeh's attempts to educate as many Iranians as he could, one should note that during this period that he was staying in Istanbul, London and Paris the concept of eugenics first became a respectable concept, supported by prominent politicians and learned men. The first international eugenics conference was held in London in 1912.

⁸¹⁴ Mahmoud Oskuyi to Taqizadeh, 1911, in *Ibid.*, 368.

⁸¹⁵ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 169.

⁸¹⁶ 'Isa Sadiq, "Taqizadeh," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 4.

⁸¹⁷ Mojtehedī, *Tarikh-e Zendegeh-e Taqizadeh*, 33.

⁸¹⁸ Esma'il Yekani, "Zendegeh-e Taqizadeh [The Life of Taqizadeh]," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 264.

Later, while Taqizadeh was writing for *Kaveh*, elements of the eugenics movement's theories about the improvement of the human race are traceable in his writings.

6:6 American Financial Experts

After the disarmament of the Mojaheds in Tehran and the establishment of some security in the capital, one of the plans of the fledgling government was to modernise the financial system of the country. The Iranian government, after consultation with the leaders of the Parliament, therefore decided to hire financial advisers from countries neutral and uninvolved in Iran's affairs, which might help to modernise the traditional Iranian financial system. At the same time, Russia and Britain were opposed to the idea of hiring advisers from other non-aggressive, impartial European countries since they believed it would promote international rivalry over Iran.⁸¹⁹ This matter was discussed in parliament in November and December of 1910 and it was decided to hire financial advisers from the United States of America. The fact that these advisers were from outside Europe, they believed, would mean that they would not be influenced by those European powers with interests in Iran. Owing to the adverse financial state of the country and its empty coffers, during the summer and autumn of 1909 the Iranian government had approached Britain and Russia for a loan. The loan from the Russian and British governments was for the amount of \$2,500,000. The Parliament considered the conditions of this loan to be dangerous for the sovereignty and independence of Iran and thus the proposal was rejected. Employing the foreign advisers and establishing a centralised tax system would help to ameliorate the struggling financial situation that the country found itself in without having to rely on foreign loans. With the support of the Democrat Party, American financial officials W. Morgan Shuster, the Treasurer-General, Charles I. McCaskey, the Inspector of Provincial Revenues and Bruce G. Dickey, the Inspector of Taxation arrived in Tehran on the 12 May, 1911.⁸²⁰ On his way to Iran, Shuster met Taqizadeh in Istanbul. Interestingly, Shuster and Taqizadeh each mention that it was the other gentleman who came to meet him. Though Taqizadeh does not share any details of the meeting, Shuster writes that they

⁸¹⁹ Bonakdarian, *Britain And the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911*, 225.

⁸²⁰ Barclay to Grey, 18 May 1911, in Further Correspondence No. 3(1912) in Continuation of No.1(1911), 63.

met for an hour and discussed the troubles in Iran.⁸²¹ Taqizadeh was a member of the financial committee of the First Parliament and was knowledgeable about the financial affairs of the country.⁸²² Shuster later wrote about the insight he received from the Iranian exiled in Istanbul regarding the situation in Iran: "...I confess that the prospects were not particularly encouraging".⁸²³ One can assume that Taqizadeh gave some advice to Shuster and reassured him that the Democrats in Tehran would wholeheartedly support him.⁸²⁴ Later, while working in Iran, Shuster was grateful for the backing he received from *Iran-e Now*, the official publication of the Democrat Party.⁸²⁵

Shuster's arrival gave the Democrats one last chance to retake power in the Parliament.⁸²⁶ Despite much opposition, Shuster, with support from the Democrats, managed to quickly win over the Parliament and gained its support and trust. Shuster assigned, as his adviser, Hossein Qoli Khan Navab, one of the high-ranking Democrat Party leaders and the previous cabinet's Foreign Minister. Hossein Qoli Khan, while Foreign Minister, had played an important role in hiring Shuster. According to Malekzadeh, Shuster had taken side with the Democrat Party because of his close relationship with senior members of the Democrat Party and in particular with Navab. Navab was fluent in English and familiar with western culture and thus able to influence Shuster and gain his trust.⁸²⁷ Shortly after arriving in Tehran, Shuster introduced a campaign of fiscal reforms, which positively impacted on the public and further garnered him popular support including from both women in Tehran and those in the scores of secret Women's Societies there.⁸²⁸

Shuster was criticised by those who did not find his reforms in line with their own interests. Sepahdar, the Prime Minister, and many of the cabinet ministers were heavily critical of Shuster.⁸²⁹ The "Mostufis", the traditional accountants of the treasury, were also

⁸²¹ W. Morgan Shuster, *The Strangling of Persia* (New York: The Century Co., 1912), 36.

⁸²² Mojtehed, 178.

⁸²³ Shuster, 36.

⁸²⁴ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 169.

⁸²⁵ Shuster, 20.

⁸²⁶ Afary, 314.

⁸²⁷ Malekzadeh, 6-7: 1374.

⁸²⁸ Shuster, 194-8.

⁸²⁹ Afary, 320.

unhappy with Shuster's reforms and were siding with the Russians in opposition to the Americans.⁸³⁰ The increasing authority of Shuster, together with the growing power of the Democrats who had a strong anti-Russian policy, could not be ignored by the Russians. Abd al-Rahim Khalkhali explaining the situation to Taqizadeh writes, "These days all the fights and disputes are over Mr. Shuster. The Prime Minister and all the ministers and Moustofis, those who received payments, spongers, loafers, taxpayers, nobles, dignitaries are all, each and every one, against Shuster..."⁸³¹ In another correspondence, Khalkhali even mentions that Shuster was accused of being a Babi or Bahai by his opponents.⁸³²

While Shuster was struggling to organise the financial affairs of the country, with some success, insurgencies in support of the return of the ex-Shah were taking place in different corners of the country. One of the biggest threats was to Mohammad Ali Shah's brother, Salar al-Dowleh and the ex-Shah himself. Salar al-Dowleh had arrived in Iranian territory from the western frontiers and, with the backing of some Kurds, was preparing to attack the capital and re-establish his brother as Shah. A further threat was the news of the ex-Shah, Mohammad Ali Shah's return to Iran with the consent of the Russians. On 17 July, 1911, Mohammad Ali Shah, assisted by a few fellow followers, confident of help from the Turkman and Shahsavan tribes following a prior agreement, set foot on Iranian soil at Astarabad on the shore of the Caspian Sea in the north of Iran. He was ready to begin his campaign to regain power. Amongst his followers were the ex-Shah's brother, Shoa' al-Saltaneh, Amir Bahador and S'ad al-Dowleh.⁸³³ The news of the ex-Shah's attempt to regain the throne united the Democrats and the Moderates.⁸³⁴ This resulted in the removal of Sepahdar who was allegedly a secret accomplice of the ex-Shah. On 24 July, he tendered his resignation which the regent accepted. On 26 July, Samsam al-Dowleh from the Bakhtiyari tribe became Prime Minister.⁸³⁵ On 13 September, 1911, the government forces

⁸³⁰ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 159.

⁸³¹ Abd al-Rahim Khalkhali to Taqizadeh, 4 November 1911, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 338-43.

⁸³² Ibid.

⁸³³ Barclay to Grey, Tehran, 28 July 1911, in *Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Persia: No. 1* (1911) (London: Harrison and Sons, 1912), 144.

⁸³⁴ Malakzadeh, 6,7: 1390.

⁸³⁵ Barclay to Grey, Tehran, 9 August 1911, in *Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Persia: No. 1* (1911) (London: Harrison and Sons, 1912), 148.

dispersed the ex-Shah's forces in Savadkouh. Now the only chance the ex-Shah had to avoid being captured by governmental forces was to seek refuge on Russian soil. This would violate article 10 of the protocol which Iran had signed with Russia and Britain in September 1909 before the Shah had been sent into exile. Basing their argument on this agreement, the Iranian government appealed against the ex-Shah being allowed to enter Russian territory and requested that if he were to set foot on Russian land, Russian authorities would arrest and hand him over to Iran.⁸³⁶ According to the agreement, if it were proved that the ex-Shah caused political disturbances, his pension would be suspended.

6:7 The Russian Ultimatum and Closure of the Second Parliament

Shuster, as the Treasurer-General, put all his efforts into collecting the taxes that, according to the law, wealthy people were obliged to pay. Unlike the pre-constitutional era, when the rich would often evade paying taxes and in contrast the poor were heavily taxed, Shuster's policy was to treat everybody equally. This attitude, at times, brought him face to face with people wielding great power. His approach was, in fact, in line with the policies of the Democrat Party, which advocated protecting the less fortunate citizens.

To be able to maintain his authority to collect taxes, Shuster was determined to organise a special treasury gendarmerie. He asked Major C. B. Stoke, who was about to leave his position as British military attaché, to command this newly founded gendarmerie. The Russian legation strongly objected to the appointment since Stoke, as a British subject, would clearly not be too well-disposed towards the Russians and resented their authority. As a result, Stoke was forced to once again take up his previous posting in India. This was a clear blow to Shuster, whether that was the Russian's intention or not.

The Russians were determined to sabotage Shuster's plans. They finally had the pretext to demand Shuster's removal from office and his expulsion from Iran. In November 1911, the Iranian treasury gendarmes attempted to confiscate the property of Shoa' al-Saltaneh, the ex-Shah's brother, as he had assisted the ex-Shah's attempts to regain his throne. The

⁸³⁶ Barclay to Grey, telegram, 13 September 1911, in *Ibid.*, 144.

Russian Cossacks intervened and arrested five of the gendarmes. The Russians claimed they had the right to carry out these actions as Shoa' al-Saltaneh was a Russian subject and thus protected by the Russian government, and was in debt to the Russian Imperial Bank. This was, however, not the case; he was, according to Percy Sykes, a Turkish subject.⁸³⁷

Eventually, on 29 November 1911, Russia announced an ultimatum to the Iranian government asking for the dismissal of Shuster and one of his nominees, Mr. Lecoffre, recently appointed as his agent in Tabriz. Secondly, the Russians requested an agreement not to engage any foreigners in the service of the Iranian government without the previous consent of the British and Russian legations. Additionally, they demanded an indemnity for the expenses of the Russian troops in Iran. If the Iranian government did not comply with the terms of the ultimatum within 48 hours, the Russian troops would advance into the country.⁸³⁸ The British government made no objection to the Russian ultimatum. Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister, stated that, "Whilst one of the chief objects of the Anglo-Russian Agreement with regard to Persia was to safeguard and preserve the independence of that country, it was nevertheless absolutely essential that the Government of an independent Persia should take account of the respective interests of Russia and Great Britain in the parts adjoining their frontiers."⁸³⁹

On 1 December 1911, Parliament sat to decide the matter while a large crowd was waiting outside to hear the final decision. The decision of the majority was to reject the Russian ultimatum. In the afternoon, the resolution was submitted to the Russian Minister and shortly after the Foreign Minister resigned. The British government was meanwhile urging the Iranians to accept the ultimatum.⁸⁴⁰

The Iranian people, especially in Tehran, reacted against the Russian ultimatum. In Tehran people closed the Bazar and demonstrated against the ultimatum and women and

⁸³⁷ Percy Sykes, *A History of Persia*, (London: Macmillan and Co., 1951), 425.

⁸³⁸ *The London Times*, November 30, 1911.

⁸³⁹ *The London Times*, December 1, 1911.

⁸⁴⁰ *The London Times*, December 2, 1911.

children also took part.⁸⁴¹ People of many other provinces showed their support for the ultimatum by sending telegraphs to the Parliament in Tehran.⁸⁴² In Tabriz, a large number of students took part in a demonstration in front of the French and Ottoman consulates.⁸⁴³ 500 women from Tehran sent a telegraph to the provinces seeking support to fight for the independence of the country.⁸⁴⁴

Being outside Iran and aware of the international affairs and the perils of Russia's objectives, Taqizadeh was busy. He sent telegraphs to the leadership of the country and senior members of the Democrat Party, warning them about the seriousness of the situation. Since the Russian government had promised that if the Iranian government officially apologised, the Russians would withdraw their troops, Taqizadeh, in a telegram to Vosouq al-Dowleh, the Foreign Minister of the time, requested that an apology be sent immediately.⁸⁴⁵

Meanwhile, although it should have been dissolved after the ultimatum was rejected by the Parliament, the government was still in place and was in regular contact with the regent, trying to find a solution. Since the deadline for the ultimatum was rapidly approaching, the government had only two solutions; to reject the ultimatum which was what the Parliament and the people wanted or to accept it and dissolve the Parliament by military force. It was clear that if the ultimatum was not respected, the Russians would send more troops to Iran and the British would not object. The British government had advised the Iranians to accept the ultimatum and thus prevent the expansion of Russian troops in Iran. Although nations such as India, the Ottoman Empire and Egypt sent telegrams in support of the Iranian Parliament and encouraged the Iranians to resist the Russians, they were not fully aware of the gravity of the situation and the danger which was threatening Iran.

⁸⁴¹ *Shafaq*, December 10 and 18, 1911.

⁸⁴² *Ibid.*, no.42, December, 1911.

⁸⁴³ *Ibid.*, December 18, 1911.

⁸⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, December 7, 1911.

⁸⁴⁵ Taqizadeh to Vosouq al-Dowleh, telegram, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 377-8.

The regent and the government were convinced that not accepting the ultimatum would undermine the integrity and sovereignty of the country. The existence of the Parliament meant that it was impossible to accept the ultimatum and thus it was decided that the Parliament be dissolved. The Parliament was closed and members were prevented from entering the building. At the same time that the government officially announced the news of the acceptance of the ultimatum to the Russian legation, some Democrats, opposing the decision, took arms against the government. They were, however, disarmed by government forces. In a telegram, Sardar As'ad informed Taqizadeh about the Democrats' belligerent behaviour and requested that Taqizadeh use his influence:

The Democrats are inciting people against the Russian, British and Iranian governments. They are encouraging people to fight against the Russian troops. They have also publicised your telegram in opposition. It is necessary that you warn them immediately against this kind of instigation and prevent this incitement of the Democrats. A minute's delay is perilous and will endanger the country.⁸⁴⁶

This kind of behaviour from some of the supporters of the Democrat Party demonstrates that the leadership of the Party or at least Taqizadeh had lost authority and control of some of the Party members. The telegram Taqizadeh sent to Mohammad Reza Mosavat, one of the senior members of the Party, clearly indicates that Taqizadeh had been opposed to any radical act during this period. In the telegram, Taqizadeh instructs Mosavat, "Do not let affairs get out of hand so that control slips from the leadership into the hands of the masses. Please make all our friends fully aware of the matter."⁸⁴⁷ Previously, before the ultimatum, Taqizadeh had been similarly approached and asked to moderate the behaviour of the Democrat Party.

⁸⁴⁶ Sardar As'ad to Taqizadeh, telegram, *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat* ed., Afshar 379.

⁸⁴⁷ Taqizadeh to Mohammad Reza Shirazi (Mosavat), telegram, in *Ibid.*, 380-1.

6:8 Taqizadeh's Trip to Paris and London

Following the dispute over Shuster, who was supported by the Democrats and fearful of the imminent deployment of Russians troops in Iran, Sardar As'ad and other like-minded people now decided to bring these matters to Taqizadeh's attention. They were hopeful that Taqizadeh might persuade the Democrats in Tehran to keep silent about the Shuster case and thus Taqizadeh was invited to Paris for talks, where he stayed for about a month (November 1911). Although there is no documentation concerning the content of the discussion in Paris between these two men, a letter from Rasoulzadeh to Taqizadeh sheds more light on Taqizadeh's meeting with Sardar As'ad and the relationship between the Democrats and Bakhtiari. He writes:

In terms of a relationship with Sardar As'ad, I was not particularly hopeful about this meeting. It became clear that, as I had quite rightly expected, your meeting with him has not changed anything with regards to the main issues. What you deem as Sardar As'ad's crudeness and ignorance, I consider to be the inherent mentality, capacity and disposition of a tribal chief. Regarding his pledges about a relationship with the Democrats, considering his criticisms of Democratism, I am not sure how sincere he is and how far he can be trusted. But I do not want you to conclude from what I said that I am in favour of a confrontation with the Bakhtiari.⁸⁴⁸

In a letter to Moshir al-Molk, the Iranian Minister in London, Taqizadeh provides more information about his meetings in Paris. He writes that during the three days he was in Paris, he had daily meetings with Sardar As'ad and Lynch who had come from Britain. In one of the meetings Momtaz al-Saltaneh, Iranian representative in Paris, was also present.⁸⁴⁹ Taqizadeh later went to London, where Moshir al-Molk, was of the same opinion that he should act to silence the Democrats in Tehran. It was during Taqizadeh's time in London that the Russian ultimatum over Shuster's dismissal was announced. Whilst

⁸⁴⁸ Rasoulzadeh to Taqizadeh, Istanbul, 18 November 1911, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 324-6.

⁸⁴⁹ Taqizadeh to Moshir al-Molk, Istanbul, 27 March 1913, in *Asnad-e Siyasi-e Dooran-e Qajarieh* (Tehran), 390-4

in England, Taqizadeh travelled to Cambridge and stayed in Browne's house for three days (9 to 12 December 1911).⁸⁵⁰

Yahya Dolatabadi, one of the prominent constitutionalists who had left Iran and was in Europe at that time, writes about contacting Taqizadeh during his visits to Europe. He writes:

...my goal is to know with what plans he has come to Europe and what his strategy is. I want to see whether he has been changed by what he has experienced, his exile and the goals that he and his friends have been unable to achieve. I want to see whether he would now accept that these happenings have proved that what I said in Tehran was correct and wonder if he will make the right choices from now on, having learnt his lesson. I hope that together we can now find the right path for the Democrat Party.⁸⁵¹

Sometime later, Dolatabadi met Taqizadeh in Paris and claims that he noticed a big change in him. His impression was that Taqizadeh regretted some of his previous policies. According to Dolatabadi, he had several meetings with Taqizadeh and concluded that what had happened was because of past decisions. They could not do much to change the situation now that they were in Europe. Instead, they could prepare the groundwork for a better future for Iran. Dolatabadi gives a list of what they could do: encourage Iranian students studying abroad to return to Iran with plans and, through the press, steer European opinion towards Iran. He later notes that after concurring with each other, Taqizadeh agrees to co-operate with him and returns to Istanbul. He continues that after a month Taqizadeh sends a letter inviting him to Istanbul to participate in actualising a plan he had come up with in Istanbul. Dolatabadi speculates that this plan was to ignite a revolution in Iran.⁸⁵²

In addition to the turmoil of the political situations with which Taqizadeh was dealing, he was also plagued during this period by great financial difficulties. In his autobiography

⁸⁵⁰ Taqizadeh to Browne, 1-1-21. Also: Browne to Taqizadeh, 7 December 1911, in *Nameh-hay-e Edward Browne be Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh*, eds., Zaryab and Afshar, 37.

⁸⁵¹ Dolatabadi, 205.

⁸⁵² Ibid., 205-6.

Taqizadeh highlights his difficult financial situation, commenting that he had only bread and cheese to eat, was struggling to make ends meet and had no money for travel. Realising Taqizadeh's dire situation, Mohammad Qazvini, Iranian scholar and political activist who was residing in Paris, offered his assistance by purchasing for him a third-class train ticket to Istanbul. During the trip Taqizadeh spent the last of his money and arrived in Istanbul penniless.⁸⁵³

Rasoulzadeh, a leading Democrat and the editor of *Iran-e Now*, was forced to leave Iran. He was expelled from Iran under the increasing pressure of the Russians, leading the Prime Minister of the time, Sepahdar, to order his dismissal. Rasoulzadeh had spearheaded the anti-Russian sentiment in the Iranian press which caused the Russians to demand his dismissal. Prior to his dismissal, Hossein Parviz had informed Taqizadeh that the Moderate cabinet wanted to close down *Iran-e Now* and in particular to get rid of Rasoulzadeh.⁸⁵⁴ Rasoulzadeh first spent some time in the Caucasus and again, under Russian pressure, left there too and travelled to Istanbul where he shared a house with Taqizadeh. According to Taqizadeh, upon arrival in Istanbul Rasoulzadeh was financially impoverished. Taqizadeh describes how Rasoulzadeh arrived with no shoes so he had given him his own shoes. Taqizadeh writes about this period:

I had a hard time making a living. In fact, I did not have any source of income. After my arrival in Istanbul, Mohammad Amin Rasoulzadeh, the editor of *Iran-e Now* in Tehran, upon the insistence of the Russians was dismissed from Tehran and had gone to his hometown Baku and from there came to Istanbul. As we were very good friends, he came to my house and stayed with me; in fact, we shared one house. For a while we struggled to make ends meet. We tried to teach Persian to anyone who wanted to learn which afforded us a small income which we lived on.⁸⁵⁵

⁸⁵³ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 350.

⁸⁵⁴ Hossein Parviz to Taqizadeh, 1911, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 363.

⁸⁵⁵ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 169.

Clearly Rasoulzadeh found himself in a difficult situation, personally. But it also negatively impinged on the situation back in Iran. The absence of Rasoulzadeh from Tehran was a big blow for the Democrats and *Iran-e Now*, of which he was chief editor.⁸⁵⁶

6:9 The Russian Intervention and “The Reign of Terror in Tabriz”

After the acceptance of the Russian ultimatum by the Iranian government and the closure of the Parliament and the bringing under control of the situation, influential members of the parties were sent into exile. The Russians, being aware of the weakness of the central government, tried to take full control of affairs in the province of Azerbaijan and its capital Tabriz. The Russian troops had camped outside Tabriz since April 1909 to protect the consulates and lives of the Europeans living in Tabriz. In the final phase of the resistance of the city, assurances were given that the military presence would be temporary. But, despite this promise, the troops did not withdraw after the battles ended and remained outside the city. After their ultimatum, the Russian decided to enter the city to disarm the city’s armed constitutionalist groups which had defended the city against the ex-Shah’s forces. Consequently, after a brief resistance, the defenders of the city surrendered and the Russians finally entered the city. They persecuted not only the Mojaheds but also the senior constitutionalists residing there. The events in Tabriz of 21 December, 1911 and consequently the armed resistance of some Mojaheds opened a fresh bloody chapter in the history of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran. The Mojaheds of Tabriz attacked the Russian forces, attempting to force their retreat from the city, but they were defeated. Some senior constitutionalists managed to escape from the city but many had no choice but to surrender their arms and stay while the Russians took full control of the city. On 31 December, 1911 the Russians executed Seqat al-Eslam, the respected clergyman of Tabriz, together with seven others who were thought to have played a role in inciting the people to revolt against the Russians. The persecution and killing of the constitutionalists of Tabriz continued more ferociously after Samad Khan entered Tabriz.

⁸⁵⁶ Ahmad Ostovar to Taqizadeh, Tehran, 7 June 1911, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 272.

As soon as Mohammad Ali Shah stepped onto Iranian soil, he assigned Samad Khan Shoja' al-Dowleh, one of the ex-Shah's commander and chiefs of the Shahsavan tribe, as the governor of Azerbaijan. Consequently, Samad Khan telegraphed 'Ain al-Dowleh, who had been newly appointed governor by the central government, declaring that he had been appointed as the governor of Azerbaijan by his Majesty Mohammad Ali Shah and suggesting that 'Ain al-Dowleh therefore need no longer return to Azerbaijan to take up that post. Three times, on 13, 17 and 25 September 1911, he attempted to break into the city to attack the defenders, Mojaheds of Tabriz. But he was unsuccessful at every attempt. Later he began to blockade the city to prevent food from entering the city. In the meantime, Samad Khan ruled over Maragheh and its vicinity.⁸⁵⁷

After taking the city under their control, the Russians admitted Samad Khan as the governor. Samad Khan entered the city on 2 January, 1912. He began massacring the constitutionalists and members of the general public in the most barbaric ways. Samad Khan, aided by the Russians, looted houses and captured and hanged the constitutionalists of Tabriz.

In the surprising silence of the British witnessing the tragedy of Tabriz, Taqizadeh began to publicise the events of Tabriz to make the world aware of what was happening in his home town. Taqizadeh managed to record the events of Tabriz in detail and included them in letters to Browne. Taqizadeh's letters were collected by Browne who later used them to inform the British public about the terrible Russian acts. Browne later translated the letters and published them in a collection with an introduction but without mention of Taqizadeh's name to maintain his anonymity. The story of the killings in Tabriz are recorded in other historical accounts but most important is the fact that Taqizadeh's aim was to immediately try to make the outside world aware of what was happening. In this way, Taqizadeh ensured that these tragic events were recorded for posterity. These events were deeply traumatising for Taqizadeh. Hearing the news of the execution of his friends whom he had fought with to achieve his goals further strengthened his resolve to fight Russian dominance in Iran. The destruction of what had been achieved in Tabriz in cultural and educational realms was

⁸⁵⁷ Solayman Mohssen Eskandari to Taqizadeh, 21 September 1911, in *Ibid.*, 309-15.

particularly painful for Taqizadeh; his hopes for the development of modern education and a brighter future for Iran were dashed.

Taqizadeh writes to Browne about the fact that, following the occupation of the Russians and coming to power of Samad Khan Shoja' al-Dowleh, the cultural and educational progress of Tabriz had seemingly taken a step backward. As he quite rightly highlights, after many years of hard work, education in Tabriz had been modernised and many modern-style schools had opened in Iran, including in Tabriz. Taqizadeh mentions that these schools had had a positive effect in Tabriz and remarks that in that city alone 25 elementary and high schools which utilised progressive European-style methods of education had been opened. According to Taqizadeh, 3000 students were studying in these schools where science, in particular, was being taught very successfully. Following the occupation of the Russians in Tabriz, these schools were now forced to close and, in their place, traditional schools were re-opened in the mosques. Taqizadeh was deeply distressed by the situation and commented that he regretted that the light of knowledge had been extinguished in Tabriz.⁸⁵⁸

Besides Tabriz, the Russians had carried out the same campaign in the occupied northern provinces of Iran. After the acceptance of the Russian ultimatum, the general situation in Iran was not so positive. The Parliament was closed and it was unclear when it would reopen. The central government was becoming increasingly weakened and the tribal and local rulers were taking control in different parts of the country. The most influential politicians had been exiled or killed or were in hiding and little political activity which might change the situation was possible. Taqizadeh, in the light of these events and the current situation, felt disheartened and helpless. Any hope of him returning to Iran soon was gone. He therefore looked for an alternative.

6:10 Moving to London and then the United States

Judging by the remaining documents, after his disappointment at being unable to return to Iran, Taqizadeh's intention was to leave Istanbul and spend time in Europe. However,

⁸⁵⁸ Taqizadeh to Browne, 22 April, 1912, in *Browne Papers*, 9-9-27.

his adverse financial situation prevented him from actualising his plan. As previously noted, Taqizadeh was struggling financially and needed to find a means of earning money. Thus, with diminished hopes of return to Iran, on 22 April 1912, he wrote to Browne that a School of Oriental Languages was about to open in London and asked Browne about the possibility of working there so that he might secure some income.⁸⁵⁹ Unfortunately for Taqizadeh, Browne's reply informed him that the school's opening was not imminent and any such opportunity would not be soon. Added to this, was his realisation that staying in Istanbul would be equally difficult.

A letter from Taqizadeh to Moshir al-Molk, the Iranian Minister in London, is informative. It discusses his leaving Istanbul and his six-month sojourn in London. Taqizadeh explains that when he was in Paris and met Sardar As'ad and Lynch, Lynch had advised him not to stay in Istanbul but rather to go to Britain and reside in London or Cambridge. Lynch's argument was that in Istanbul Taqizadeh would be unable to flourish and develop intellectually, whereas in Europe the environment was more conducive to learning. Taqizadeh remarks that Lynch had indirectly stated that if he went to Europe, the Persian Society would finance him. Taqizadeh adds that as another option, Samad Khan Momtaz al-Saltaneh, the Iranian Minister in Paris, had also informed him that if he were to reside in Paris the Union Franco-Persane would cover his expenses.⁸⁶⁰ Initially, Taqizadeh, after consultation with Sardar As'ad, had rejected the offers, arguing that, as a well-known Iranian politician, accepting money from foreigners for him was inappropriate and would compromise his impartiality. Sardar As'ad had stated the importance of having someone in Europe to represent the Iranian government's view to the European press and had therefore promised Taqizadeh that upon his return to Iran he would request that the government provide a salary for him. However, this promise was never fulfilled.⁸⁶¹ A letter from Mohammad Ali Tarbiat shows that Taqizadeh had also discussed his decision to stay in Europe with him. He writes to Taqizadeh:

⁸⁵⁹ Taqizadeh to Browne, 22 April 1912, in *Ibid.*

⁸⁶⁰ Union Franco-Persane, presided over by the famed explorer and archaeologist Marcel Dieulafoy, had been formed in Paris on July 3 1909, to promote the cause of the Iranian revolution. See: Bonakdarian, *Britain And the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906-191*, 207.

⁸⁶¹ Taqizadeh to Moshir al-Molk, Istanbul, 27 March 1913, in *Asnad-e Siyasi-e Dowran-e Qajariyeh* [Political Documents of the Qajar Era] ed., Ebrahim Safa'i (Tehran: Roshdiyeh, 1973), 390-94.

I am once again telling you my opinion, which, as before, you can reject. If you can manage to make a living there, by all means you should stay a little longer there; that's preferable to returning to Iran or Istanbul since in Iran you would have no security and in Istanbul no benefit nor job. On the other hand, Europe is not only an important place but you can also gain importance there. Unlike in Iran, you can greatly benefit from being able to do any number of jobs there and better yourself. I hold little hope of Sardar As'ad affording you any assistance. I have nothing further to say about the other options. I know nothing.⁸⁶²

Taqizadeh writes that, unsure of the intention of Nabil al-Dowleh, he was hesitant to go and ask the opinion of an acquaintance he had there. This acquaintance was Mahmoud Pahlavi (later known as Mahmoud Mahmoud) who advised Taqizadeh to come to the United States, adding that Taqizadeh could always leave whenever he wanted if he found being there unfavourable.⁸⁶³

Although in his autobiography Taqizadeh tries to imply that it was Nabil al-Dowleh who persuaded him to go to the States and his trip was spontaneous, the correspondence between the two men suggests that Taqizadeh had previously had plans to do so. Taqizadeh had enquired about Nabil al-Dowleh's activities in the States and Nabil al-Dowleh's reply sheds more light on Taqizadeh's decision to travel to the States and his intentions once he arrived there. Nabil al-Dowleh writes that he was constantly active in the States and had succeeded in hiring Shuster and sending him to Iran.⁸⁶⁴ He comments that he had talked to American businessmen and had encouraged them to invest in Iran. Clearly Taqizadeh's intention was that Nabil al-Dowleh hire more advisers from the States

⁸⁶² Mohammad Ali Tarbiat to Taqizadeh, Istanbul, 29 November 1911, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 356-61.

⁸⁶³ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 173.

⁸⁶⁴ Shuster highlights the role of Nabil al-Dowleh in his book: "I had never even dreamed of going to Persia before my appointment, but the eloquence of the Persian chargé d'affaires at Washington, Mirza Ali Kuli [Qoli] Khan, removed my early doubts and I finally decided to do what I could to help a people who had certainly given evidence of an abiding faith in our institutions and business methods". Ref: Shuster, 4.

to send to Iran to develop the Iranian railways and industry. Taqizadeh, he writes, would be able to witness his efforts once he came to the States. He encourages Taqizadeh to use his influence to persuade the Iranian press to advocate hiring advisers from the United States. In closing, he reiterates his eagerness that Taqizadeh leaves immediately for the United States and warns him against Russian spies finding out about his plans.⁸⁶⁵ From Nabil-al Dowleh's correspondence with Taqizadeh, it seems that at this point Taqizadeh was mainly focused on securing assistance from the United States rather than other countries. What we can conclude about Taqizadeh's decision to go to the United States is that he did not consider staying in Europe to be beneficial for creating a change in Iran since Britain had apparently decided to ignore Russian intervention in Iran. In a letter to Browne, Taqizadeh writes, "Although I am not so well informed about current political affairs, it has become apparent to me that British policies rarely oppose or resist the Russians (although in some aspects, they do)."⁸⁶⁶ Taqizadeh even mentions that after the Russian ultimatum Browne himself had lost hope that Britain would stop Russia and that he believed it would be better if Iran sought help from Germany.⁸⁶⁷ However, the enforced ending of Shuster's mission by the Russians led Taqizadeh to reconsider his strategy and later accept Germany's offer to work in alliance with them. This could explain why Taqizadeh did not inform Browne about his trip and why Browne expressed his surprise about Taqizadeh's unexpected decision to travel to the United States.⁸⁶⁸ Correspondence exchanged between Browne and Taqizadeh proves that it was, in fact, Taqizadeh's independent decision to go to the United States, rather than, as some suggested, he went there following Browne's advice. This is contrary to Jamalzadeh's narrative concerning Taqizadeh's reasons for going there. Jamalzadeh mentions that Taqizadeh had told him that a wealthy US banker with a large library stocked with Persian, Arabic and Turkish books had asked Browne to introduce someone to him who could index his books. According to Jamalzadeh, Browne had proposed that Taqizadeh accept that position and had thus gone

⁸⁶⁵ Nabil al-Dowleh to Taqizadeh, without date, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyyat va Mohajerat* ed., Afshar, 369-73.

⁸⁶⁶ Taqizadeh to Browne, Istanbul, 22 April 1912, in *Browne Papers*, 9-9-27.

⁸⁶⁷ Taqizadeh, "Khatabeh dar Majles-e Sugvari-e Browne," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 1: 50.

⁸⁶⁸ Taqizadeh to Browne, 26 May 1913, in *Browne Papers*, 1-1-50.

to the States.⁸⁶⁹ In contrast, Taqizadeh's autobiography gives no mention of Browne's involvement in his decision to go there. Esma'il Yekani's notes indicate that, even before going to Europe for six months, Taqizadeh had decided to go to the United States. He recalls:

Taqizadeh, after staying for about a year and nine months in Istanbul, departed for Europe and after staying six months in London, left for the United States. At the time of his departure from Istanbul, the late Haji Esma'il Amirkhizi and I went to see him off at the Sirkeci Jetty. When the time of his departure arrived and we began to say our goodbyes, he turned to us and said, "This journey that I am about to take is a kind of suicide. In fact, I am like a dead person who breaks off all ties with his friends, relatives and acquaintances and travels to some place beyond this world. I am going to the other side of the world from where we are now standing".⁸⁷⁰

According to Taqizadeh himself, until his journey to the United States, he spent most of his time in the British Museum, studying and carrying out research.⁸⁷¹ As well as outlining Taqizadeh's premeditated plans to travel to the United States, this extract also hints at Taqizadeh's feelings of insecurity and desperation about both his private and political life. Taqizadeh began his journey to the United States on 31 May, 1913.⁸⁷² After a five-and-a-half-day sea journey he reached New York on 6 June.⁸⁷³ As discussed above, Browne, who was surprised by the seemingly sudden decision of Taqizadeh to go to the United States, wrote to Taqizadeh, suggesting that he should remain in Europe to be closer to the Islamic countries and his friends. He considered Taqizadeh's presence in the United States useless for Iran. But Taqizadeh clearly had an agenda very different to what Browne assumed. Taqizadeh's reasons for moving to the United States were in part financial and indeed he

⁸⁶⁹ Jamalzadeh, "*Man, Jamalzadeh Darbareh-e Taqizadeh Shahadat Midaham* [I, Jamalzadeh, Testify about Taqizadeh]," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 44.

⁸⁷⁰ Esma'il Yekani, "*Zendegehane-e Taqizadeh* [The Life of Taqizadeh]," in *Ibid.*, 263.

⁸⁷¹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 150.

⁸⁷² Taqizadeh to Browne, 24 May 1913, in *Browne Papers*, 1-1-52.

⁸⁷³ Taqizadeh to Browne, 15 June 1913, in *Ibid.*, 1-1-51.

had been unable to gain employment during his six months' residence in England.⁸⁷⁴ However, it seems, different to Browne's hopes for Islamic unity, Taqizadeh actually had other plans. These plans included working in co-operation with the Americans who he believed might assist in the modernisation of Iran and no doubt encouraging the Americans to play a more active role in the region to reduce the pressure of Russia and Britain on Iran.

It should be noted that during this period the outbreak of the First World War was imminent. The dispute between Germany and France over Morocco had reached a critical point and conflict was expected. Britain, who needed an alliance with Russia in case of war with Germany, deliberately overlooked Russia's interference in Iran, with the aim of securing Russian consent for its policy towards Iran.⁸⁷⁵

6:11 Life in the United States

Taqizadeh was welcomed in New York by Nabil al-Dowleh and some Iranians whom he had gathered together to welcome Taqizadeh. According to Taqizadeh, after spending a couple of days in a hotel in New York, Nabil al-Dowleh invited him to his house in the Catskills, a mountainous area in upstate New York, as Nabil al-Dowleh was eager to work with Taqizadeh. Taqizadeh does not expand on the nature of any work he was supposed to have done with Nabil al-Dowleh. Taqizadeh describes Nabil al-Dowleh as a rich, generous man and a strong believer in the Bahai faith. Taqizadeh narrates that he stayed for two or three months in the house with Nabil-al Dowleh and his American wife and children. Taqizadeh mentions two other men who were living in his host's house. One was a young Indian man who he describes as a revolutionary, working against the British, and a member of the Gadar Party which had been set up by Indians in California to carry out activities against the British rule in India.⁸⁷⁶ The second was a man from Urmia whom Taqizadeh had previously known as Mirza Reza Khan Dara (Afshar) but who now called himself Shafizadeh. Mirza Reza Khan had studied at the American school of Urmia and had come

⁸⁷⁴ Taqizadeh to Browne, 26 May 1913, in *Ibid.*, 1-1-50.

⁸⁷⁵ Malekzadeh, 6-7: 1461.

⁸⁷⁶ For more about the Hindustan Gadar Party (alternatively spelled "Ghadar," or "Ghadr," meaning rebellion) see: South Asian American Digital Archives: <http://www.saadigitalarchive.org/collection/gadar-party>.

to the United States to continue his studies. Taqizadeh had previously met Afshar in Urmia.⁸⁷⁷ Afshar had little money and Nabil al-Dowleh had brought him to his house as a Persian tutor to his children. Sepher describes him as a “passionate and fiery man”.⁸⁷⁸ In his autobiography, Taqizadeh also talks about other Iranian students who lived in that house.⁸⁷⁹ He again does not expand on what he and Nabil al-Dowleh worked on together but implies that after some time they lost touch.

To fully appreciate Taqizadeh’s future actions and the situation in which he would find himself, it is necessary here to explore deeper his life in the United States. As in Istanbul and Europe, Taqizadeh continued to suffer financial problems in the United States and was desperately seeking employment. He writes, “If we had not cut ourselves off from Ali Qoli Khan, he could have done something for us”. Talking about “us” implies that he is including Mirza Reza Khan. Taqizadeh left Nabil al-Dowleh and went to New York in August 1913, Mirza Reza joining him later in September. In Taqizadeh’s words he was in constant contact with Mirza Reza from September 1913 until the end of December 1914.⁸⁸⁰ Afshar writes that they shared a room.⁸⁸¹

For a while Taqizadeh found a job with a wealthy Armenian man who had old manuscripts which Taqizadeh indexed for him. Taqizadeh writes that this man “assisted me financially”.⁸⁸² Jamalzadeh mentions that Taqizadeh was financially struggling so much that he had told Jamalzadeh that he was so desperate that he had gone to the train station to work as a porter but was unable to as he did not have the correct permission to do so.⁸⁸³ It seems that his financial problems and the need for him to work in varied jobs had distanced Taqizadeh from politics. In the letters sent to Browne, he notes that there

⁸⁷⁷ Taqizadeh, “Taqizadeh va Mirza Reza Khan Afshar,” in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 2: 270.

⁸⁷⁸ Sepher, 55.

⁸⁷⁹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 155.

⁸⁸⁰ Taqizadeh, “Taqizadeh va Mirza Reza Khan Afshar [Taqizadeh and Mirza Reza Khan Afshar],” in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 2: 270.

⁸⁸¹ Reza Afshar, “Goushe-ha-i az Tarikh-e Mo’aser [Glimpses of Contemporary History],” in *Nashrieh-e Daneshkadeh-e Adabiyat-e Tabriz* 6 (1954), 4.

⁸⁸² Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 156.

⁸⁸³ Jamalzadeh, “Man: Jamalzadeh, Darbareh-e Taqizadeh Shahadat Midaham,” in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 46.

was little coverage of Iranian news in the United States press and he struggled to access the news about his home country and requests Browne to keep him informed.⁸⁸⁴

It was also during this time that Taqizadeh wrote articles for the French magazine *Revue du Monde Musulman*. Taqizadeh states that Hossein Kazemzadeh Iranshahr, a friend of his in Paris, was aware of Taqizadeh's financial difficulties and had informed him if he wrote articles for this magazine, he would get paid. Taqizadeh wrote four articles for *Revue du Monde Musulman* which were published anonymously with the writer's name marked as X. According to Taqizadeh, he received 400 Francs for these articles which enabled him to get by. For a short period, he also worked in a publishing house which published bibles. Taqizadeh mentions that wherever he was he wrote with the interests of Iran at heart. Taqizadeh also describes translation work he did for a company. The company sold their product internationally and wanted to explore the Middle Eastern market. Taqizadeh was introduced to the company by Professor Jackson whom Taqizadeh knew from Iran. Jackson had travelled to Iran to copy the Bistoon carvings. The company wanted Taqizadeh to translate their brochure into Persian. Taqizadeh describes his happiness at being paid, after being without an income. Later Taqizadeh translated the brochure into Arabic and Turkish and was later asked to sign a contract to market their product throughout the Ottoman Empire. Taqizadeh was preparing for the trip when the First World War broke out.⁸⁸⁵

6:12 Co-operation with the Germans

When Russia and Britain, who were considered the two major threats to the independence of Iran, became embroiled in the Great War in the summer of 1914, the importance of the opportunity that the war would afford the Iranians was clear for the political forces in Iran. With the spread of war, various political factions in Iran began to openly confront Russia and Britain, confident in the knowledge that they could rely on aid from Germany and Ottoman Turkey.⁸⁸⁶

⁸⁸⁴ Taqizadeh to Browne, 15 June 1913, in *Browne Papers*, 1-1-51.

⁸⁸⁵ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 157-8.

⁸⁸⁶ Abd al-Hossein Sheybani, *Khaterat-e Mohajerat: Az Dolat-e Movaqat Kermanshah ta Komiteh Mellion Berlin*, ed., Iraj Afshar and Kaveh Bayat (Tehran: Shirazeh, 1999), 11.

After the outbreak of the First War, around the end of 1914, German politicians thought of using the Indian revolutionary Gadar Party to stir up trouble for the British in India. To do this, they organised a committee in Berlin with the help of Chatou Badaia, a famous Indian revolutionary. They also managed to attract an important Indian revolutionary by the name of Har Dyal from Switzerland to Germany.⁸⁸⁷ According to a letter of the British Foreign Office, “At the end of 1915, Har Dyal was either living with Taqi Zada [Taqizadeh] or using him as a post box, as letters to him under the assumed name of Mirza Osman, were sent c/o Herr Taqi Zada, Pension Weyergang, 29 Schluterstrasse, Berlin.”⁸⁸⁸

Molavi Barakt al-Allah was another member of the same committee. The first task of this committee was to spread propaganda to the Allied prisoners of war from Muslim countries. Its second goal was to facilitate the passage to India through Iran of propagandists. Chatou Badaia believed the only truly organised political force was the Democrat Party in which Taqizadeh was influential. The committee therefore demanded that Taqizadeh, who was in the United States at that time, be invited to Germany.⁸⁸⁹ According to a confidential document, “In 1911 he [Taqizadeh] was mentioned in a letter written by Ajit Singh in Switzerland to Chattopadhyaya [Chatou Badaia] in Paris; described as a great admirer of the scheme of Asiatic unity. In another letter to Chattopadhyaya, Ajit Singh enclosed a letter of introduction to Taqi Zada [Taqizadeh] for Trimul Acharya who was then about to visit Constantinople”.⁸⁹⁰

Taqizadeh described the initial stages of his relationship with the Germans on three separate occasions: in his autobiography; in a reply that he had written to Reza Afshar and in a short note that Iraj Afshar published in Taqizadeh’s collections of documents. Taqizadeh’s descriptions of his meetings with the Germans are garbled and differ from each other. According to Taqizadeh’s autobiography, he one day received a letter from the German Consul in New York. The Consul enquired if he wanted to go to Germany.

⁸⁸⁷ For more about the Gadar Party and Lala Har Dayal see: *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. “Lala Har Dayal,” available online: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/254783/Lala-Har-Dayal> (accessed 31 July, 2012).

⁸⁸⁸ TNA: FO 371/3067.

⁸⁸⁹ Sopher, 55.

⁸⁹⁰ TNA: FO 371/3067.

Taqizadeh writes that the Iranians in the United States were very positive about the Germans and considered them similar to “the prophet David who had come to save them”. Because of this, Taqizadeh replied that he accepted the offer whole heartedly.⁸⁹¹ In the other remaining note he mentions that in October or early November 1914 Afshar wrote a letter to the German Ambassador in Washington, stating that he wished to serve the Germans in the Great War. The Germans had contacted the Ottoman Consul, Jalal Beyek, in New York and had investigated about Afshar. In November 1914, the German Consul in New York met with him but they did not have serious talks. He then writes that on 25 November Afshar had more important and elaborate talks with the Germans in a hotel. On 29 November, Taqizadeh received a letter which had asked for a meeting with him on the 31st but the letter reached him late and the meeting did not take place.⁸⁹² The Consul encouraged Taqizadeh to go to Germany to work with the Germans and lead the Muslim prisoners of war in Germany. Taqizadeh mentions that later he came to realise that the real reason the Germans approached him in New York was to request that he lead the Indian committee in Berlin. While Mirza Reza Afshar also had some meetings with the Germans, British secret documents prove Taqizadeh’s words about his connection with the Indian committee. Reza Afshar later claimed in an article that he played the central role and the Germans initially had contacted him and he was the one who had introduced Taqizadeh to the Germans. Taqizadeh diplomatically and in a very carefully worded manner refutes Afshar’s claims.⁸⁹³ In contrast to Afshar’s comments, Taqizadeh claimed that it was, in fact, he who had requested the Germans to allow Afshar to accompany him. According to Taqizadeh, the Germans provided them with the expenses of the trip but Taqizadeh was eager to know how much his salary would be. He requested 200 dollars, which the Germans agreed to. However, Taqizadeh comments that even if he had asked for 10,000 dollars, they would have agreed, as he later discovered once he had reached Germany. After some preparations, Taqizadeh, together with Mirza Reza Khan Afshar, departed the United States for Germany. The Germans provided Taqizadeh with a fake passport under the name of “Hassan”. According to Sepher, first travelling to Rotterdam, on board the ship Taqizadeh

⁸⁹¹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 159-60.

⁸⁹² Taqizadeh, “Majeray-e Harekat az New York be Berlin [The Adventure of Moving from New York to Berlin],” in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 5: 177-9.

⁸⁹³ Taqizadeh, “Taqizadeh va Mirza Reza Khan Afshar,” in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 2: 269-74.

met a famous Indian called Lata, who had previously lived in Iran under the name of Zi'ā al-Din although Taqizadeh himself never mentioned meeting any Indians on board the ship. Taqizadeh was met in the Netherlands by the German Consul. According to Taqizadeh, they reached Berlin around 15 January, 1915. However, the date that Sepher records is 10 January. This date is the one which also appears in Taqizadeh's response to Afshar's article. According to Ilse Itscherenska, who investigated the political archives of the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin, Taqizadeh actually arrived in Berlin on 13 January, 1915.⁸⁹⁴

Once in Germany, it became clear that the Germans did not, in fact, want Taqizadeh and Afshar to work with the Allied prisoners of war. Rather, they wanted them to work with the Indian committee and help the revolutionary Indians to facilitate their travelling through Iran to India. In Berlin, the Indian committee asked for Taqizadeh's advice. Taqizadeh agreed to work with them, on the proviso that he could also work independently. He decided to form his own team and invited various people from varied locations across Europe to work with him. He invited the following to come to Germany: Kazemzadeh Iranshar from Cambridge, Pourdavoud, Ashrafzadeh and Mirza Mohammad Khan Qazvini from Paris, Jamalzadeh, Nasr al-Allah Khan Jahanghir and Sa'd al-Allah Khan Darvish Ravandi from Switzerland, Mirza Esma'il Nobari, Esma'il Amirkhizi and Mirza Aqa Naleh-e Mellat and Mirza Esma'il Yekani from Istanbul. After consulting together, they decided to form an Iranian committee and to co-operate with the Germans. They were to travel to Eastern countries in different groups, with each group focused on one of the provinces. With this plan in mind, they began their mission. Kazemzadeh and Mirza Reza Khan Afshar went to Tehran, Ashrafzadeh and one or two others to Shiraz, Jamalzadeh, Amirkhizi, Pourdavoud and Nobari went to Baghdad and afterwards to Kermanshah. It was there that they published the newspaper called *Rastakhiz* [Resurrection]. In addition, Taqizadeh also wanted the Iranian diplomatic team in Germany to be in the hands of a reliable person. Taqizadeh believed that by any means possible it should be Hossein Qoli Khan Navab who would lead the Iranian legation in Berlin. He set an appointment with Hossein Qoli Khan Navab in Montero, Switzerland and personally went there to meet him.

⁸⁹⁴ Ilse Itscherenska, Taqizadeh dar Alman-e Qaysari [Taqizadeh in imperial Germany], in *Iran Nameh*, 21:1 and 2, 49-76.

Hossein Qoli Khan accepted the offer and the German foreign ministry asked the German embassy in Tehran to facilitate this. Navab was now the Iranian Consul in Berlin.

Taqizadeh's co-operation with the Germans allowed him to come out of the political isolation in which he had found himself in the United States. Through working with the Germans, Taqizadeh was once more able to bring together the Democrat Party members who had been scattered across the globe and once again take an active role in the Iranian political scene.

Chapter Seven

The Great War and the Publication of *Kaveh*

The previous chapter examined the period leading up to the Great War and how events in Iran were shaped by the relationships between the global powers. In particular, the emergence of Germany as an international power, ambitious to expand its influence around the world, was highlighted. In expanding its realm of influence, Germany focused on the East and in particular the Middle East and Iran. Iran's strategic geopolitical position and the fact that it could allow geographical access to Britain's most important colony, India, thus brought it to Germany's attention. Similarly, some Iranians were interested in establishing a relationship with Germany; they considered Germany a benign nation which had the potential to save them from the clutches of the two other great powers, Russia and Britain, both of which were using Iran as a pawn in the battle to maintain dominance in that region and in doing so were tearing apart the country.⁸⁹⁵ With the burgeoning Russian military intervention in Iran following Russia's ultimatum in November 1911, Germany was increasingly regarded as Iran's saviour among many Iranian intellectuals and politicians.⁸⁹⁶ The pro-German sentiment was also reflected in the newspapers and the literature of the time and poets, in particular, played a role in spreading this sentiment among the ordinary people. Adib-e Pishavari composed *Qaysar Nameh* [Story of the Kaiser], a lengthy versified epic poem of 14,000 lines in praise of the Kaiser and Vahid Dastgerdi wrote his famous ode called *Narenjak* [grenade]. Later Malak al-Shoa'ray Bahar, Mirzadeh Eshqi, 'Aref Qazvini and Abolqasem Lahoti also praised Germany in their works.⁸⁹⁷

The Great War was just the opportunity that some had been hoping for. A group of Iranian politicians and intelligentsia, Taqizadeh among them, saw the outbreak of the Great

⁸⁹⁵ For more about the policy of European countries in Iran during the period, see: Mahmoud Afshar Yazdi, *Siyasat-e Oropa dar Iran* [The Policy of Europe in Iran] (Tehran: Bonyad-e Moqofat-e Dr. Afshar Yazdi, 1979).

⁸⁹⁶ Taqizadeh himself comments on this, stating that every German victory over the allies was celebrated by his Iranian acquaintances residing in France. See: Taqizadeh, "Mirza Mohammad Khan Qazvini" in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 2: 117.

⁸⁹⁷ Behnam, *Berlaniha*.

War as a chance to realise their hopes of preventing British and Russian intervention in Iran. With the formation of a strategical alliance with Germany, here at last was the opportunity to actually put into practice what they had been forcefully advocating for. The group's focus, first and foremost, was to regain the independence and sovereignty of Iran and then to modernise the country. In the context of these developments the previous chapter reflected on Taqizadeh's eagerness to pursue his aim for the formation of an alliance with Germany which ultimately led to some groups of Iranians co-operating with the Germans.

The present chapter provides background information about Iran during the Great War and in that context examines Taqizadeh's activities both during and after the War. Taqizadeh's activities during this period were not only political but also literary and cultural. As can be seen at different points throughout Taqizadeh's life, whenever he saw necessary, he would shift from political activism to focussing more on literary and journalistic activities through which he hoped to be able to exert influence over the masses. One of his greatest successes was in the field of journalism with the publication in Berlin of a journal in Persian called *Kaveh*. *Kaveh* once again gave Taqizadeh, who was living in exile at that time, a voice inside Iran which allowed him to propagate his modern ideas and exert influence not only in the realm of politics but also in literary and cultural matters.

Kaveh is a rich source of Taqizadeh's theoretical ideas. It would create a roadmap for the changes he believed were necessary to implement in order for Iran to be able to become a modern nation. At the same time, *Kaveh* reflects the shift in Taqizadeh's strategies as a result of external forces and also provides a record of his intellectual development and understandings of various subjects both during and after the Great War. Some of Taqizadeh's most controversial ideas were first publicised in *Kaveh*. One of his biggest achievements during this time was to gather together like-minded Iranian politicians and intellectuals in Berlin. The formation of this group, as well as providing an opportunity for intellectuals to meet and exchange, also gave *Kaveh* and Taqizadeh more legitimacy and political clout in both political and cultural circles. From its small editorial office located in a council chamber, *Kaveh* was able to disseminate its ideas to a wide audience both in

Iran and beyond its borders. Activities he was involved in whilst in Berlin were considered by Taqizadeh himself as some of the most notable and influential of his lifetime.⁸⁹⁸

After the end of the war, Taqizadeh continued his stay in Germany, deciding to focus more on his cultural activities and the publication of the second series of *Kaveh*, this time independent from German help. With a fresh approach, his focus was now more on literature and culture. Taqizadeh's ideas after the War, which were to become his theoretical framework once he became a statesman, were reflected mostly in the second series of *Kaveh*. In this chapter, we will witness Taqizadeh's significant shift in focus from politics to culture and vice versa, which was reflected in *Kaveh*. This publication is, thus, a valuable source of information, allowing an insight into how Taqizadeh put his theories into practice. Despite the success of *Kaveh*, Taqizadeh was forced to cease publication due to financial difficulties.

7:1 Iran and the Great War

First, one should look closely at the situation in Iran and beyond its borders at the outbreak of the Great War, against which Taqizadeh's focus and his political and personal activities during the war and post-war periods can be evaluated.

Following the closure of the Second Parliament, the political situation in Iran had gone from bad to worse. The central government was weakened and had lost its control over many parts of the country. In the absence of a sitting parliament and a powerful central government, the intervention of the foreign powers, Russia and Britain, had increased. Two important provinces of Azerbaijan and Gilan, major centres of constitutionalism in Iran, were occupied and ruled over by the Russians. The modernisation of the financial system which the Democrats had hoped for by hiring the American experts had failed. The Democrats and in particular Taqizadeh had considered the reforms of the American financial experts as the last hope for Iran, highlighting the importance Taqizadeh assigned to American involvement.⁸⁹⁹ After the expulsion of the American financial expert Shuster,

⁸⁹⁸ Iraj Afshar, "Margh-e Taqizadeh na Karist Khord [Taqizadeh's Death was no Trivial Matter]," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 146.

⁸⁹⁹ Taqizadeh, "Anva'-e Jihad-e Melli [National Calls to Action]," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 9: 237.

the Belgian Mornard was appointed as Head of the Treasury. Mornard, desperately seeking an immediate solution to the adverse financial situation, began once again to utilise traditional methods.⁹⁰⁰ As a result, neither the old traditional system nor a modern financial system modelled upon that of European countries was fully in place.⁹⁰¹ Rather, a dysfunctional financial system now increased the country's dependence on borrowing money from foreign countries and therefore led to increasing intervention by Russia and Britain.⁹⁰² Taqizadeh considered the appointment of Mornard as a fierce blow to the independence of Iran. He believed the engagement of the Belgians in the affairs of Iran would contribute to "Russofication" of the country.⁹⁰³

For some of the period in which there was no sitting parliament, Samsam al-Saltaneh, a chieftain from the Bakhtiyari tribe, was Prime Minister which increased this tribe's influence on the running of the country. Many governors of the provinces were chosen from this Bakhtiyari tribe. These tribal rulers often acted in ways which were not in keeping with a constitutional government. In fact, Samsam al-Saltaneh's assignment as Prime Minister could be considered a step backwards in the process of the implementation and consolidation of a democratic and modern government in Iran. His tribal affiliation and loyalty to his tribal roots led him to consider any act carried out by the Bakhtiyaris legitimate. He was of the belief that it was thanks to his efforts and those of his tribe that the constitutional movement had progressed and he therefore demanded a major role for himself and the Bakhtiyaris in the government of the country. He took it for granted that power should be in his hands and thus when he had views opposed to those of the Democrats of the Second Parliament who were generally more educated, rather than peacefully negotiating, he dramatically threatened that he would order the Bakhtiyaris to

⁹⁰⁰ Annette Destrée, *Mostakhdemin-e Belzhiki dar Khedmat-e Dolat-e Iran* [Les Fonctionnaires Belges Au Service de La Perse, 1898-1915], trans. Mansoureh Ettehadiieh (Tehran: Nashr-e Tarikh-e Mo'aser, 1984), 217.

⁹⁰¹ There was even confusion about which language, English, French, Persian or Russian, to use for recording the financial documents. See: "Hesab-e Mornard," in *Nasim-e Shomal*, February 10, 1915. Baqer Kazemi also complains about the mismanagement of the Belgians which led to trouble in the treasury. See: Baqer Kazemi, *Yaddasht-hay-e az Zendegehi-e Baqer Kazemi* [Notes of Baqer Kazemi], eds. Davoud Kazemi and Mansoureh Ettehadiieh (Tehran: Nasr-e Tarik-e Iran, 2012), 1:358.

⁹⁰² Ulrich Gehrke, *Pish be Soy-e Sharq: Iran dar Siyasat-e Sharqi-e Alman dar Jang Janhani Dovoum* [Persien in der Deutschen Orientpolitik Während des Ersten Weltkrieges], trans. Parviz Safdari (Tehran: Siamak, 1998), 50.

⁹⁰³ Taqizadeh to Browne, 13 March 1912, in *Browne Papers*, 9-9-6.

kill the Democrats.⁹⁰⁴ The Democrats, though educated and familiar with the concept of the constitution and despite their plans for a modern government, did not have sufficient dedicated followers to seize power to allow them to actualise their ideas. Now, the fact that a tribal leader was to lead the country was a harsh blow to those who had been initially so hopeful that with a new system based on the constitution would come a more democratic system of government, very different from that which had been based on tribal values founded on traditional loyalties and nepotism. The fact that, in his autobiography, Taqizadeh anecdotally highlights the level of obedience and loyalty which members of a tribe would show towards their chieftains might indicate that he too hoped for a similar level of support within a political party.⁹⁰⁵ The same level of loyalty and support would have allowed him more opportunity to achieve his political aims within the framework of a political party. However, those outside a traditionally tribal mentality would need a great deal of education and persuasion before they would be willing to follow a political party with the same depth of passion and commitment as those who unquestioningly supported tribal leaders.

Despite his tribal approach to politics, which may be open to criticism, Samsam al-Saltaneh was successful in counteracting the attempts of the deposed Shah and his brother to regain power once again. It was also in Samsam al-Saltaneh's government that the Swedish officers were hired to organise the gendarmerie force in Iran and, in fact, it was this gendarmerie force that eventually succeeded in disarming the Bakhtiariys.⁹⁰⁶

As well as politically, the country was weak financially and militarily during this period. A lack of income had reduced the power and influence of the central government and crippled efforts to establish order throughout the country. Without the support of an organised army, the central government was unable to collect sufficient taxes from the provinces. The armed forces of Iran were limited at this time, with only 8000 soldiers from the Cossack Brigade and 6000 from the gendarmerie. This small armed force was unable

⁹⁰⁴ Baqer 'Aqeli, ed., *Nakhost Vaziran-e Iran: Az Moshir al-Dowleh ta Bakhtiyar* [Prime Ministers of Iran; from Moshir al-Dowleh to Bakhtiyar] (Tehran: 'Elmi, 1991), 130.

⁹⁰⁵ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 121.

⁹⁰⁶ 'Aqeli, ed., *Nakhost Vaziran-e Iran*, 142.

to establish security in the country. The irregular armed forces or Mojaheds who had fought for the constitution during the Lesser Despotism period were disarmed. Morale was low among the few that remained; their hopes had been dashed by the situation they now found themselves in and the closure of parliament was a huge blow. The constitutionalists had hoped to reopen the Parliament but the Russians, who were opposed to the idea, prevented this from happening. Some influential Iranians, such as Sardar As'ad, were also against the reopening of the Parliament, believing it would decrease the role of the Bakhtiari leadership who held the cabinet.⁹⁰⁷ Aware of this, Taqizadeh who was eager for the reopening of the Parliament, wrote to Professor Browne requesting him to ask his friend Lynch, who had influence among the Bakhtiyaris, to convince Sardar As'ad to take steps to enable the Parliament to be reopened.⁹⁰⁸ Furthermore, Yapram Khan, the Armenian commander of the Mojaheds, who had played a crucial role in uniting the different groups of Mojaheds, was killed in fighting with the insurgents. The absence of a commander like Yapram further weakened the position of the constitutionalists. Many political activists of different political persuasions were sent into exile or had swiftly fled Tehran due to the unfavourable political situation. The regent, Naser al-Molk was now the key player in the political arena of Iran. The Democrat Party of which Naser al-Molk was suspicious had been marginalised; their leadership was weakened and their newspaper *Iran-e Now* was forced to shut down. The press was another area greatly affected by the unstable conditions of the time. Other newspapers, too, such as *Shoura* [Council] and *Esteqlal-e Iran* [The Independence of Iran], publications of the Moderates and The Union and Progress parties, were closed too. The independent *Sharq* [East] had also stopped publication. In the provinces, *Shafaq* in Tabriz and *Now Bahar* [New Spring] in Mashad were forced to close under the pressure of the Russians.⁹⁰⁹ Against all this chaos and instability, eyes turned to the regent, Naser al-Molk, who was the most powerful player in the country at that time.

Naser al-Molk's policy was to keep the people of Tehran unaware of the adverse situation in other parts of the country and to at least maintain the nominal independence of Iran by encouraging good relations with Russia and Britain. These two powers used this

⁹⁰⁷ Dolatabadi, 3: 216.

⁹⁰⁸ Taqizadeh to Browne, 13 March 1912, in *Browne Papers*, 9-9-6.

⁹⁰⁹ Bahar, 1: 14.

opportunity to increase their influence in Iran. At this point, it was these powers which were jointly making decisions over major internal affairs in Iran such as elections, the reopening of the parliament, appointments of the provincial governors, the numbers of the gendarmerie and Cossack brigade personnel, the Treasury and railway concessions.⁹¹⁰ More importantly, it was the Russian and British governments which influenced the choice of members who made up the Iranian cabinets. The foreign powers were able to take advantage of the adverse situation in Iran and increased their influence in the country.

Concessions favourable to the Russian and British governments were evident. On 24 January 1914 Russia signed an agreement with the Iranian government to build the Jolfa-Tabriz railroad. The project began in June 1914 and was completed on 21 February 1915.⁹¹¹ This 147-kilometre railway connected Tabriz directly to Jolfa on the Russian border and facilitated Russian transportation into Azerbaijan province. At the same time, the British were increasing their influence in southern Iran and particularly in the Persian Gulf area, eager to expand the newly established Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and paid little attention to Russian activities in other parts of Iran.⁹¹² The British were also able to obtain the concession for building the railway from Mohamareh (later known as Khoramshahr) to Khoramabad.⁹¹³ Britain's main objective was to maintain its alliance with Russia and France against Germany, Austria and Italy. These examples show that the independence of Iran was only nominal and, in reality, the central Iranian government held little power. As Taqizadeh has put it, the British and Russians robbed the Iranian State of her sovereign rights, "reducing her to a helpless dependent obeying their orders".⁹¹⁴

⁹¹⁰ Mansoureh Ettehadieh, *Ahza-e Siyasi dar Majles-e Sevvom* [The Political Parties of the Second Parliament] (Tehran: Nashr-e Tarikh-e Iran, 1992), 20.

⁹¹¹ For more about the conditions of the concession see: Townley to Grey, telegram, 11 February 1913, in *Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Persia: in Continuation of Persia, No. 5 (1912), Cd. 6264* (London: H.M.S.O., 1913), 308.

⁹¹² At the beginning of the Great War, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was of great importance with assets of 4 million Pounds Sterling, more than half of which belonged to the British. The management of the company was with two Britons who had total control over all matters. Aryanpour, 2: 199.

⁹¹³ 'Aqeli, ed., *Nakhost Vaziran-e Iran*, 148-9.

⁹¹⁴ Taqizadeh, "The History of Modern Iran: Lectures Given in Colombia University," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh* [The Essays of Taqizadeh] (Tehran: Shokofan, 1979), 8: 223.

Subjected to these concessions and the political, financial and military instability of the country, the general atmosphere in Iran was one of dismay and a strong feeling of hopelessness. On 14 July 1914, three weeks before the outbreak of the Great War, Naser al-Molk prepared in haste for the coronation of the young Shah who had just turned 18.⁹¹⁵ The fact that the Parliament was closed was an added obstacle since according to article 39 of the supplement to the 1906 Constitution, no-one could be crowned monarch without previously having attended parliament and sworn an oath there. This pressed further the necessity of the reopening the Parliament.

7:2 The Third Parliament

On 4 December 1914, the Third Parliament was convened.⁹¹⁶ Mostufi al-Mamalek, renowned for his neutral stance, was introduced to the Parliament. Mostufi, in the absence of a parliament, had been carrying out the role of Prime Minister since 18 August 1914. Preparations for the election had been made by the previous Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali 'Ala al-Saltaneh, whose moves towards the reopening of the Parliament were supported by the British. The British were in favour of the Parliament's reopening since in the absence of a parliament the Russian influence in Iran had increased.⁹¹⁷ In Azerbaijan no elections were held as its Russian assigned governor, Samad Khan, did not permit elections. Consequently, there were no members representing Azerbaijan in the Third Parliament.⁹¹⁸ During the elections, the two major political parties of the previous parliament began their campaign. The government was concerned about the Democrats and clandestinely assisted the Moderates. The Russians were also against the Democrats and favoured the Moderates. Despite this, the Democrats managed to win a large number of seats.⁹¹⁹ According to Mohammad Taqi Bahar, the Democrats won 31 seats, the Moderates 29, a group called Heyat-e 'Elmieh 14 seats and 20 seats went to independent members who sided with the Democrats.⁹²⁰ The Jews, Armenians and Zoroastrians were allowed to have their

⁹¹⁵ This was according to the lunar calendar and he was, in fact, younger than 18.

⁹¹⁶ Hassan Taqizadeh, *Mokhtasar Tarikh-e Majles-e Iran* [A Concise History of the Iranian Parliament] (Berlin: Kaviani, 1918), 24.

⁹¹⁷ Ettehadieh, *Majles va Entekhabat*, 158-9.

⁹¹⁸ Ettehadieh, *Ahzaab-e Siyasi dar Majles-e Sevum*, 9.

⁹¹⁹ Malekzadeh, 6-7: 1619.

⁹²⁰ Bahar, 14.

representatives as well.⁹²¹ Taqizadeh and Navab were elected as representatives of Tehran but their whereabouts was not known.⁹²² In the end, they did not actually attend parliament. It may have been their preference not to attend, according to some documents.⁹²³ Since Taqizadeh had already begun working with the Germans and as the internal situation of Iran was not favourable, he had decided to stay abroad.⁹²⁴ At the request of Taqizadeh, Navab was also sent to head the Iranian Embassy in Berlin and officially received by the Kaiser on 12 January 1916.⁹²⁵ At this point Taqizadeh and his Democrat friends were convinced that the destiny of Iran was bound to the war and what was happening internationally. Furthermore, now with the increased intervention and military presence of the Russians in the internal affairs of Iran, Taqizadeh, with his strong anti-Russian sentiment, would not have been able to fight against Russian domination from within Iran.

Although living in Berlin, Taqizadeh had kept himself fully informed about the situation back in Iran.⁹²⁶ From Berlin Taqizadeh sent some representatives to establish connections with the Democrats and managed to exert influence on both the Democrats in parliament and on officers of the gendarmerie. Solayman Mirza was the leader of the Democrat Party at this time. With the opening of the Third Parliament the foreign powers, Russia, Britain and Germany, began to lobby parliament by contacting parliament members. The Germans, in particular, had approached leaders of the Democrat Party, hoping to lay the groundwork for convincing parliament to vote against Iran's neutral stance in the Great War.⁹²⁷ Meanwhile Ahmad Mirza was crowned Shah on 21 July 1914, not yet prepared to play his role as a confident ruler who might unite the country. Shortly after Ahmad Mirza's coronation the regent, Naser al-Molk, immediately left for Europe. People had hoped he would solve all the problems. However, unsuccessful in doing so, he fled the country,

⁹²¹ For detailed information about the number of members of parliament see: *Mokhtasar Tarikh-e Majles-e Iran* (Berlin: Kaviani, 1918).

⁹²² Baqer Kazemi, 1: 483.

⁹²³ Hossein Qoli Navab to Taqizadeh, 25 September 1915 in *Nameh-hay-e Tehran* [Tehran Letters], ed., Iraj Afshar, (Tehran: Farzan, 2006), 122-3.

⁹²⁴ Mojtehed, 194.

⁹²⁵ *Kaveh*, January 24, 1916.

⁹²⁶ Taqizadeh, "The History of Modern Iran: Lectures given in Colombia University" in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 8: 222.

⁹²⁷ Sepher, 47.

leaving it in a critical situation. The burden of responsibility now rested on the shoulders of the young, inexperienced Ahmad Shah.

7:3 The Escalation of the War

Like Iran, pro-German sentiment in Ottoman Turkey was also rife. Following a coup d'état in Ottoman Turkey in January 1913 this greater pro-German sentiment in Istanbul was led by the German-trained Minister of War and son-in-law of the last Sultan, Anvar Pasha. Three months later, Ottoman Turkey joined the war on the German side and Anvar planned for the Sultan to declare a jihad, or holy war, against Britain. Anvar Pasha believed that by uniting with the Germans, the Ottomans still had some hope to stop the disintegration of their empire.⁹²⁸ The copies of the proclamation of the jihad were forwarded to Berlin for translation and use in propaganda flyers to be distributed among Muslim troops in the forces fighting against Germany and its allies. The jihad called upon Muslims everywhere to rise up and slay their Christian oppressors, and was transmitted through a network of Muslim clerics, assisted by Turkish, German, and Indian agents. The German Foreign Office was hopeful that the Sultan's actions would awaken the power of Islam and encourage a sweeping revolution in India.⁹²⁹ This propaganda was also widely spread throughout Iran, though it had little effect.⁹³⁰ Later, seeking advice on religious matters from Shia clergy, the pro-German Iranians requested clarification concerning the position of Muslims who helped allied countries. The response from two leading Shia clergymen was that aiding infidels such as the British, Russians or French was a step towards the elimination of the religion of God and a sin.⁹³¹ In short, as Taqizadeh noted: "The ground was very favourable for Germany at that time as far as public opinion was concerned."⁹³²

⁹²⁸ Touraj Atabaki, "Going East: The Ottomans' Secret Service Activities in Iran," in *Iran and the First World War*, ed., Atabaki, 29.

⁹²⁹ Thomas L. Hughes, "The German Mission to Afghanistan 1915-1916" in *German Studies Review* 25, no. 3 (Oct., 2002), 450. Accessed 15 May, 2008. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1432596>.

⁹³⁰ Mahmud Ashrafzadeh to Taqizadeh, 10 June 1915, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashruiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 402.

⁹³¹ *Kaveh*, February 29, 1916.

⁹³² "The History of Modern Iran: Lectures given in Colombia University," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 8: 221.

With the Ottoman Empire's involvement in the war against the Allies, fighting spread further towards the east and the battle which had begun in Europe now escalated into a war on a global scale. Geographically sandwiched between Russia and the Ottomans, Iran was in danger of becoming a battlefield. On November 1, 1914, Ahmad Shah proclaimed Iran's neutrality whilst in the new parliament the Democrats and the Moderates held strongly opposing views about the war. The Democrats believed that, like Ottoman Turkey, Iran should enter the war in support of Germany with the hope that this support would ensure the independence of Iran. In contrast, the Moderates argued that since the Russians and the British were already present in Iran, it was better to continue with a policy of neutrality. Mostofi al-Mamalek was also endeavouring to maintain neutrality. Eventually the Third Parliament confirmed the neutrality of Iran in the war, supporting the Shah's decision. But, as will become evident, this neutrality was not respected, and Iran became a battlefield for the countries involved. According to international law, if a country at war had troops present in another country, that country's neutrality could not be maintained legally. In the case of Iran, Russia had had a military presence there for some time and thus Iran could not remain neutral and was destined to become a battleground and face the adverse consequences of war.

7:4 The Committee of Iranian Nationalists in Berlin

As noted in the previous chapter, following the outbreak of the Great War, the German policy was to stir up trouble for the British in the East, particularly in India. Their aim was to use the Iranian politicians and activists who had fled Iran following the Russian Ultimatum and the Closure of the Second Parliament, many of whom were living in Switzerland, France, Britain, Germany and the United States. Taqizadeh, who was living in the United States at the time, was considered the most suitable to bring together these forces. He was asked to come to Berlin and, with the agreement of the German Foreign Ministry, was put in charge of inviting the Iranians living in Europe to Berlin. Immediately upon his arrival in Berlin Taqizadeh embarked on his plan to help the Germans increase their influence in the East and stir up trouble for the allies. He invited his friends and other like-minded people from various countries to Berlin with the plan of forming a committee. Taqizadeh noted that he hoped to gather together the very best of the noble and patriotic

Iranian diaspora from every corner of Europe.⁹³³ Existing members of the committee would be responsible for contacting nominees outside Germany to assess whether they were indeed willing to sacrifice themselves for the greater good of the country and follow the committee's orders without question.⁹³⁴

Since the invited people were from a broad political spectrum and individual negotiations were challenging, the Germans decided to form a committee to try to come to a consensus on how to move forward. Taqizadeh agreed to this. A similar Indian committee had previously been formed. This new group in Berlin was named "The Committee of Iranian Nationalists in Berlin". Although Taqizadeh was the most suitable person, Mirza Mostafa Khan Safa al-Mamalek, the Iranian minister in Austria, was put in charge of the committee. On 7 March 1915, Taqizadeh put forward the program of the newly established committee to the German Foreign Ministry. The Committee was set to unite the Iranian nationalists and, with the support of Germany and German allies, hoped to free the country from the grip of its enemies. In order to implement this goal, before anything else, groups needed to be sent to Istanbul, Baghdad, Tehran and Shiraz to propagate the ideas and prepare the ground for the formation of a pro-German government, to attract the support of the gendarmerie and to establish links with the German Legation in Tehran. In return, the Iranian Committee demanded that the independence and sovereignty of Iran be recognised by the German, Austrian and Ottoman governments. They also requested financial and armed support to help them achieve their goals.⁹³⁵ After making clear the duties expected of them, some were dispatched by Taqizadeh to Iran and the neighbouring Ottoman Empire to help the Germans there. The Germans' goal was to facilitate the military progress of German troops in Asia with the help of Indian, Iranian and Afghan nationalists. They were of the belief that a strong German presence in Asia would keep Russian and British troops in Asia occupied. Initially the German plan was to send a group through Iran. However, they later changed the plan, sending an independent group to sabotage the British oil infrastructure in the south of Iran, spreading propaganda throughout the Shia holy cities and instigating religious decrees against the Russians and British. The Germans were also

⁹³³ Taqizadeh, "Seyyed Mohammad Ali Jamalzadeh," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 2: 134.

⁹³⁴ Jamalzadeh, "Taqizadeh," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 213.

⁹³⁵ Gehrke, 1: 156-7.

stirring up unrest among the tribes in cities such as Bushehr, Isfahan and Kermanshah.⁹³⁶ One of the key goals of the Committee of Iranian Nationalists in Berlin was to assist the Germans in inciting the tribes of Iran to fight against Russia and Britain.⁹³⁷ In order to encourage the Iranians to sympathise with the German side rather than with Britain and Russia, the German agents active in Iran went as far as claiming that they had converted to Islam and that all Germans would soon become Muslim. This was a similar strategy to that employed by Napoleon Bonaparte in Egypt a hundred years earlier.⁹³⁸ A telegraph sent by the *Kaveh* administration to the Kaiser, congratulating him on his birthday, demonstrates that Taqizadeh and his colleagues perceived the Kaiser as “the supporter of the Islamic world” and considered him as the lucky star who would help Iranians save the ancient country of Cyrus the Great.⁹³⁹

According to Jamalzadeh, the Berlin Committee were independent and received little financial aid from the Germans.⁹⁴⁰ But despite this, Taqizadeh was at this point totally dependent on the Germans and unable to leave Germany easily now that the Germans had shared information with him. Anything that Taqizadeh and his friends planned to publish had to pass the censorship of the Germans.⁹⁴¹




Figure 12: Taqizadeh (first from right, standing) in Berlin (open source)

⁹³⁶ For more about this see: W. Griesinger, *German intrigues in Persia, the diary of a German agent, the Niedermayer expedition through Persia to Afghanistan and India* (London: Hodder, 1918).

⁹³⁷ Jamalzadeh, “Taqizadeh,” in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 224.

⁹³⁸ Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 629.

⁹³⁹ *Kaveh*, February 15, 1917.

⁹⁴⁰ Jamalzadeh, “Man: Jamalzadeh Darbareh-e Taqizadeh Shahadat Midaham,” in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 46.

⁹⁴¹ Ilse Itscherenska, “Taqizadeh dar Alman-e Qeysari [Taqizadeh in Imperial Germany],” in *Iran Nameh* 21, nos. 1–2 (2003).

7:5 The Migration and Provisional Government

As already discussed, the Democrats were sympathetic towards the Germans. Taqizadeh did not only sympathise ideologically; once again we see here that he instigated practical ways in which his hopes for the future of Iran could be realised. This time, whilst in Berlin, his decision to send envoys to negotiate with the Democrat Committee in Tehran was the first concrete move towards an Iranian alliance with Germany.

The pro-German activities led by the Democrats were not hidden from the British and Russians. In October 1915, the Russians and British were informed that the Iranian government formed by Mostufi al-Mamalek was pro-German and had signed a clandestine agreement with them. Towards the end of October, a large number of Russian troops marched from Qazvin towards the capital. They officially declared that in order to prevent interventions by the Germans and their allies they would take over the capital. On 11 November 1915, a group of Democrat parliament members, journalists and influential politicians departed from Tehran and established the National Defence Committee in Qom.⁹⁴² As Russian troops were approaching Tehran, Ahmad Shah decided on 15 November to leave Tehran and relocate the capital. The Members of Parliament were also officially informed that they were to accompany the Shah. On the morning of the same day, many politicians and high-ranking government officials were busy preparing to leave Tehran for Qom. Just at the moment that Ahmad Shah was to leave Tehran, a representative of Russia and Britain informed him that the troops would not in fact enter the capital but would stay in Karaj, 50 km away. The Shah was finally convinced to stay in Tehran. But a large number of parliament members and other influential people had already left and stayed in Qom, 120 km away, joining the National Defence Committee. As this was happening a large section of the gendarmerie forces were positioned between Tehran and Qom in a place called Hassan Abad. On 19 December, with the Russian troops approaching, the National Committee moved to Kashan and then four days later to Isfahan

⁹⁴² For a more comprehensive list of names of people who joined the movement see: Abd al-Hossein Sheybani, "Asami-e Mellion Mohajer," in *Khaterat-e Mohajerat: Az Dolat-e Movaqqat-e Kermanshah ta Komiteh-e Mellion-e Mohajer* [Migration Memoirs: From the Provisional Government of Kermanshah to the National Committee of Migrants], eds. Iraj Afshar and Kaveh Bayat (Tehran: Shirazeh, 1999), 708-9.

and finally to Kermanshah.⁹⁴³ In Isfahan, the National Defence Committee's name was changed to the Iranian Provincial Government.⁹⁴⁴ Meanwhile Nezam al-Saltaneh Mafi, the governor of Lorestan and Arabestan (later known as Khozestan), joined the movement with his forces and, on 6 January 1916, became the commander of the Iranian national forces. The Russian forces, who had by now captured Qom, marched towards Isfahan and Kermanshah and succeeded in taking Kermanshah on 24 February, 1916 and Isfahan on 19 March, 1916.⁹⁴⁵ The national forces and their leaders were now forced to move to Qasr-e Shirin.⁹⁴⁶ At the same time, in 1916 the British established a local force, the South Persia Rifles, under the command of Sir Percy Sykes. By late 1917 the British controlled the south of the country.⁹⁴⁷



Figure13: The Provincial Government Cabinet from right to left: Ardalan, Minister of Agriculture; Farzin; Minister of Finance; Sam'ai, Minister of the Interior; Nezam al-Saltaneh, the interim head of the cabinet and the Minister of War; Modarres, Minister of Justice; Mafi, Deputy Foreign Minister; Qasem Sur-e Esrafil, Minister of Post and Telegraphs.

With the departure of many parliament members, the Parliament was closed the same day and the constitutionalists scattered outside of Tehran; the Shah and the government in Tehran were now surrounded by Russian forces. On 24 December 1915, Mostufi's cabinet

⁹⁴³ *Kaveh*, February 15, 1917.

⁹⁴⁴ Touraj Atabaki, "The First World War, Great Power Rivalries and the Emergence of a Political Community in Iran," in *Iran and the First World War*, ed., Atabaki, 3.

⁹⁴⁵ Mohammad Qazvini, *Yaddasht-hay-e Qazvini* [Qazvini's Notes], ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: 'Elmi, 1984), 9-10: 180.

⁹⁴⁶ *Kaveh*, February 15, 1917.

⁹⁴⁷ Keddie, *Modern Iran*, 74.

was dissolved and Farmanfarma, who was renowned for acting leniently towards Russia and Britain, took power. The Russians, however, did not find him very favourable and he resigned on March 1916 and the government was handed to Mohammad Vali Tonkaboni (Sepahdar). This was nominal and the Russians and British, in fact, had complete control. The financial situation of Iran during this period was worse than ever and the treasury was empty. The salary of the employees and military personnel had not been paid for a year. Sepahdar asked the British for assistance in order to secure on account money on a monthly basis. The British government agreed to pay 200,000 Toman every month and in return demanded that the financial and military affairs of the country be under British and Russian supervision. Sepahdar signed the agreement under “force majeure”. The British and Russians also asked for the formation of an Iranian armed force of eleven thousand under the supervision of the British officers in the south of Iran with an increase to the same number of Cossack soldiers in the Northern provinces.⁹⁴⁸ This acceptance of British supervision would pave the way for the 1919 Anglo-Iranian agreement.

With the taking of Hamadan by the Ottomans, Sepahdar privately accepted the advice of the Russians and British and resigned on 12 July, 1916.⁹⁴⁹ Hassan Vosouq al-Dowleh then formed his cabinet before autumn. The Iranian government at this time had no power to make decisions independently and, in the absence of any parliament, no laws could be legally approved.⁹⁵⁰ Following Sepahdar, Vosouq al-Dowleh took office as Prime Minister. The challenging issue for Vosouq was the presence of the German forces on Iranian territory. He ordered the initiation of the Fourth Parliament’s elections and provided finance for it which was distributed to the governors. During this period Mohammad Khiyabani in Azerbaijan was preparing the ground for his revolt in Azerbaijan. He had reinforced the Democrat Party there and was publishing the *Tajaddod* [Modernity] newspaper in Tabriz. During Vosouq’s tenure, sweeping changes were taking place in Russia which eventually culminated in the Russian Revolution of 1917. The situation in Russia led Vosouq to send a committee to monitor the situation there and assess the possibility of a new agreement with Russia. Seyyed Zi’a the editor of the *Ra’d* [Thunder]

⁹⁴⁸ *Kaveh*, April 15, 1917.

⁹⁴⁹ *Kaveh*, February 15, 1917.

⁹⁵⁰ ‘Aqeli, ed., *Nakhost Vaziran-e Iran*, 200-2.

newspaper was assigned as head of this group. His reports from Russia to the Foreign Ministry put Iran in a favourable position following the Russian Revolution.⁹⁵¹

The Ottoman troops had entered Iranian territory from the western borders with the justification that Russians troops already had a presence in Iran. The Ottoman involvement caused a series of bloody clashes between the ethnic groups living in the southwest of Iran and Azerbaijan province.⁹⁵² The reports sent to Taqizadeh from the field detailed the treatment by the Ottomans of the people of Iran, especially those in Azerbaijan. Looting and the extracting of money by force had turned people against the Ottoman forces and there had also been disagreements with the Germans over some issues.⁹⁵³ The Ottomans opposed any direct connection between Iranians and Germans; this was one of the biggest sticking points. The Ottomans were adamant that the Caliph in Istanbul should be the sole spokesman of the Islamic world.⁹⁵⁴ The Ottoman's pan-Islamism was now shifting to more of a focus on pan-Turkism, aiming to make Iranian Turkish-speaking Azerbaijan province part of their empire, ensuring that any connection with the Germans would be broken. Iranian nationalists had hoped that an alliance with foreign forces might lead to a more independent Iran; they soon realised, however, that this was not in fact the case.⁹⁵⁵ The pan-Islamic policy was not successful either and there was fear that it could ignite a religious conflict between the mostly Shia Iranians and the Sunni Ottomans.⁹⁵⁶ After the end of the Great War, as Hossein Kazemzadeh one of Taqizadeh's colleagues in Berlin wrote, the Ottoman leadership's main goals were politically rather than religiously motivated; they aimed to expand further the Ottoman Empire rather than focus on the unification of the Muslim world through policies of pan-Islamism and the unity of Islam.⁹⁵⁷

⁹⁵¹ Ibid., 212-3.

⁹⁵² For more about the ethnic and religious conflicts in Azerbaijan during this period see: Atabaki, *Azerbaijan*.

⁹⁵³ Mahmoud Ashrafzadeh to Taqizadeh, 10 June 1915 in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 402. Also see: Dolatabadi, 4:80.

⁹⁵⁴ Yekani, "Zendegani-e Taqizadeh," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 265.

⁹⁵⁵ For more about Pan-Turkism see: Touraj Atabaki, "Pan-Turkism and Iranian Nationalism," in *Iran and the First World War*, ed., Atabaki, 121-36. Also: Kaveh Bayat, *Pan-Turkism va Iran* [Pan-Turkism and Iran] (Tehran: Shirazeh, 2008).

⁹⁵⁶ Dolatabadi, 4: 35.

⁹⁵⁷ *Iranshahr*, 16 January 1924.

Meanwhile, in co-operation with the Ottomans and Iranian nationalists, the Germans were stirring up trouble in other parts of Iran. In order to successfully carry out their operations in the region and particularly in Iran, the Germans were heavily dependent on information from the Committee of Iranian Nationalists directed by Taqizadeh in Berlin. The envoys Taqizadeh had sent from Berlin to the region were travelling with the nationalist forces and were responsible for mediating between the German, Ottoman and Iranian forces. They informed Taqizadeh of developments by letter and received instructions from Berlin. As Mansoureh Ettehadieh has noted, the Berlin Committee was “often out of touch with reality in Iran and was influenced by the policies of individual members who did not always see eye to eye with the leaders of the movement.”⁹⁵⁸ According to remaining correspondence, the men that Taqizadeh had chosen for the mission were not always in full agreement and often openly criticised each other.⁹⁵⁹ Reports from the region sent to Taqizadeh, as well as outlining the situation, also detail the reasons why the mission of the Berlin Committee was unsuccessful. For example, Jamalzadeh in his report to Taqizadeh emphasises the flaws of Nezam al-Saltaneh as commander of the Iranian forces, his mistakes and his insatiable greed and also comments on Nezam al-Saltaneh’s inability to meet the expectations of the Berlin Committee. He further comments on the disagreement between Nezam al-Saltaneh and Heydar Khan Amoghlo and other members of the Democrat and Moderate Party. Jamalzadeh’s report from Baghdad also reveals more about the reasons for the failures of the Berlin Committee’s mission. He describes the reasons for the military defeats of the Iranian united forces as a lack of united commandership and mentions that Nezam al-Saltaneh had insufficient military authority to effectively organise matters. In addition, according to Jamalzadeh, the Swedish officers of the gendarmerie had orders from their governments to avoid becoming embroiled in combat with the Russians.⁹⁶⁰

⁹⁵⁸ Mansoureh Ettehadieh, “The Iranian Provincial Government,” in *Iran and the First World War*, ed., Atabaki, 10.

⁹⁵⁹ In a letter to Taqizadeh Ashrafzadeh writes: “My friends are good and obedient but they are very young and inexperienced. In general, they act like children and lack any gravity. Thus, working with them will be very challenging. Mr. Ravandi is the manifestation of idleness and acts like a gentleman at large. S’ad al-Allah Khan is more efficient but unfortunately Eastern people still think he is rather effeminate.... If two serious and hardworking people are not sent to Shiraz, we will achieve very little. Mahmoud Ashrafzadeh to Taqizadeh, 10 June 1915, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 401.

⁹⁶⁰ Jamalzadeh to the German Foreign Ministry, Baghdad, 3 June, 1916 in Gehrke, 2: 957.

The political turmoil of that period has been evidenced above. Taqizadeh, though fully aware of the political issues, turned his focus during this period to the publication of the journal *Kaveh*. This publication, which he edited, would become the lynchpin of his attempts to encourage resistance to the British and Russians. Now, rather than using direct political channels, Taqizadeh would utilise a more subtle approach, employing propaganda journalism and focussing on cultural activities.

Kaveh

One of the major activities of Taqizadeh during his residence in Berlin was the publication in Persian of the political and cultural journal *Kaveh*, which would later serve as a model of an avantgarde publication for future Persian writers and journalists.⁹⁶¹ From an early age Taqizadeh had been interested in the press as a vehicle for the promulgating of modern ideas among ordinary people. He had previously tried his hand at journalism by publishing *Ganjineh-e Faron* in Tabriz. Later he supported *Iran-e Now* as the official publication of the Democrat Party. As reflected in his personal correspondence and writings, throughout his life he was an avid reader of the foreign press as well as that published in Iran. From a young age he had been especially interested in the ideas of Malkam Khan and, in particular *Qanun*, the paper he had begun publishing in London in 1890 and had collected all Malkam Khan's writings. As Ali Ansari has stated, *Qanun*, which had greatly influenced Taqizadeh, could be considered as the forerunner of *Kaveh*.⁹⁶² Taqizadeh had also written articles for various other newspapers. All of these formative experiences had prepared Taqizadeh well for his decision to publish another newspaper. Germany, a country where there was freedom from censorship or criticism by conservative religious groups, provided a milieu suitable for the publication of Taqizadeh's new journal. After his arrival in Germany, proposals were outlined for a forthcoming Persian journal. Oscar Mann presented a letter written in German explaining the format to the German authorities, the contents of the articles and the publication's objectives.⁹⁶³ It is not clear

⁹⁶¹ Sepher, 47.

⁹⁶² A. M. Ansari, "Taqizadeh and European Civilisation", 52.

⁹⁶³ Oscar Mann (18/09/1867- 05/12/1917) was a specialist in Iranian languages and in particular Kurdish. According to Taqizadeh, he greatly helped the Iranian nationalists in Berlin and supported the publication of *Kaveh*. See: *Kaveh*, January 1, 1917.

how much of the detail was suggested by Taqizadeh and his Iranian friends and how much by the German officials with whom Taqizadeh wanted to work. But the journal initially was subject to the stipulations of the Germans and was to act as a vehicle for German propaganda.⁹⁶⁴

As the publishing costs were initially covered by the Germans, Taqizadeh avoided the financial worries which had previously hindered his attempts to launch and publish an earlier paper. The situation in Iran and the fact that many highly regarded Iranian writers and intellectuals were living in exile in Europe provided him the opportunity to invite these individuals to participate in the establishment of his new journal, *Kaveh*.

The first issue of *Kaveh* was published on 24 January 1916, almost exactly one year after Taqizadeh's arrival in Berlin in January 1915. Unlike other newspapers, which usually only used the lunar date together with the Christian date, *Kaveh* also added the Solar Iranian calendar date on its front page.⁹⁶⁵ Ansari has highlighted the importance of this, arguing that Taqizadeh as a scholar of calendars was conscious of the importance of distinctive calendars for distinguishing civilisations.⁹⁶⁶ The title of the journal, *Kaveh*, which was named after the ancient Iranian mythological figure of the same name, was published with an editorial which emphasised Iranian identity and an explanation for the choice of the name Kaveh; Kaveh was a mythological blacksmith who revolted against the bloodthirsty, tyrant king Zahak, who was of Arab origin, and overthrew him with public help. As Afshin Marashi has argued: "The combination of a popularizing tone and a new nationalist sentiment is best represented in the selection of Kaveh as the name of the newspaper."⁹⁶⁷

⁹⁶⁴ Keivandokht Ghahari, *Nationalismus und Modernismus in Iran in der Periode zwischen dem Zerfall der Qagaren-Dynastie und der Machtergreifung Reza Schah: Eine Untersuchung über die intellektuellen Kreise um die Zeitschriften Kaweh, Iransahr und Ayandeh* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2001), 48-9.

⁹⁶⁵ Later in 1924 Taqizadeh played an important role in changing the official calendar of Iran from the Islamic lunar calendar to the solar Iranian one. See: Baqer Kazemi, 2: 316. Taqizadeh was also one of the first who proposed using the solar Islamic calendar in order to prevent the domination of The Gregorian calendar in Iran. He also suggested using the Persian word "gahnameh" instead of the Arabic word "taqvim" for calendar. See: *Kaveh*, April 10, 1921.

For more about Taqizadeh's research on calendars see: S. H. Taqizadeh, "The Old Iranian Calendars Again," in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 14, no. 3, Studies Presented to Vladimir Minorsky by His Colleagues and Friends (1952), 603-611.

⁹⁶⁶ Ansari, *The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran*, 58.

⁹⁶⁷ Marashi, 78.

Ansari, discussing Taqizadeh and his decision to allude to the myth of Kaveh, notes that: "Myth had its uses, not only in terms of political mobilization but crucially in educating the public in the virtues of patriotism and civil duty".⁹⁶⁸

Kaveh's activities can be divided into two separate periods; the first period ending after 52 issues on 15 August, 1919. The main goal of the first period of the publication was to spread news of the war and the victories of the Germans and make public Russian and British "crimes". It also included news of the activities of the Committee of Iranian Nationalists in Berlin and the Iranian Provisional Government which was formed during the war. At the same time the newspaper praised Germany as the saviour of the Iranian people and Islamic world.⁹⁶⁹ Taqizadeh describes *Kaveh* as a "pro-German political journal which, with German support, worked for the independence of Iran."⁹⁷⁰ During the war young people in Tehran paid special attention to this newspaper.⁹⁷¹

In the editorial of the first issue, Taqizadeh explained about the opportunity that the Great War could provide for Iranians to rid themselves of their old enemies, Russia and Britain; two countries which for a long time had been hindering the development of Iran and had stymied Iran's independence. This editorial is also significant since it reflects Taqizadeh's opinions on the war and his political stance regarding Iran and its position in an international setting. Taqizadeh emphasised that Russia and Britain had little respect for Iran and indeed even pitied the country. He suggests that as Russia and Britain were now at war with Germany, Iranians should side with the Germans. This, he believed, was the only way to maintain the independence of Iran and whoever thought Iran should remain neutral or sided with the allies was in fact betraying the country. He then posited that the Great War was the last chance for Iranians to take revenge on their enemies and save their country. The aim he specified for *Kaveh* was to inform Iranians of the situation and to voice the opinion of Iranian expats who lived in Berlin. The tone of the editorial is nationalistic

⁹⁶⁸ Ansari, *The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran*, 55.

⁹⁶⁹ Jamshid Behnam, *Berlaniha: Andishmandan-e Irani dar Berlan* [Berliners: Iranian Intellectuals in Berlin] (Tehran: Farzan, 2000), 39.

⁹⁷⁰ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 163.

⁹⁷¹ Saeid Nafisi, *Khaterat-e Siyasi, Adabi, Javani be Ravayat-e Saeid Nafisi* [Literary and Political Memoirs], ed., Alireza E'tesam (Tehran: Nashr-e Markaz, 2002), 149.

and begins with a line from Ferdowsi's *Shahnameh* [The Book of Kings]. In building up his argument, Taqizadeh frequently makes reference to the past in order to emphasise a historical unity for Iran by including references to certain places which had glorious connotations such as Ecbatana, capital of the ancient Persian kings, and Isfahan, the capital of the Safavid kings.⁹⁷² By writing that the "savage Russians" were "scattered throughout the country of Cyrus and Darius (pre-Islamic kings) and S'adi and Nezami (poets of the Islamic period)", Taqizadeh strives to galvanise and unite Iranians by addressing their nationalistic pride. He continues by detailing how the Russians were violating and trampling upon all which was sacred for the Iranian nation, their national principals, religious rules, customs and honour and all this while the worried eyes of ten million noble Iranians, descendants of Nadir Shah, seemingly witnessed the situation with indifference.

Taqizadeh who was in contact with European orientalisks and had read their works knew the importance of the pre-Islamic Iran in the eyes of Western scholars.⁹⁷³ Hoping to ignite a sense of pride in the ordinary people, Taqizadeh emphasised this period of Iranian history. Here it should be mentioned that until the end of the nineteenth century Iranians knew little about the pre-Islamic history of Iran. Among the sources in Persian which introduced this period and which was widely read or narrated was the *Shahnameh*, a mixture of myth and historical stories. As Mohammad Taqi Bahar has noted, their literature, referring to Persian literature, was the only thing that Iranians could be proud of.⁹⁷⁴ As Marashi has rightly commented about Taqizadeh's introduction in the inaugural issue of *Kaveh*:

His language also highlights a new set of global assumptions being brought graphically into focus by the war. The new world that Taqizadeh saw around him was a world of nation-states engaged in a global competition of

⁹⁷² For more about Taqizadeh's writings on *Shahnameh*, see: Afshin Marashi, "The Nation's Poet: Ferdowsi and the Iranian National Imagination," in *Iran in the 20th Century*, ed., Atabaki, 93-111.

⁹⁷³ According to Iraj Afshar, at that time *Kaveh* was the first Persian publication of its kind which published reviews and critiques of European books and introduced to Iranians some reputable books on Iran written by orientalisks. These reviews were mostly written by Jamalzadeh. *Kaveh* also published the translations of some articles and book chapters by orientalisks with the aim of familiarising Iranians with the empirical research method practised in Europe. Iraj Afshar, "Moqaddameh bar Chap-e Dovvom-e *Kaveh* [Introduction to the Second Edition of *Kaveh*]," in Taqizadeh, *Tufani* ('Elmi), 485.

⁹⁷⁴ *Nobahar*, 30 May 1923.

national-assertion and political independence. He believed that people must claim identification with a particular nation-state on this global stage and show concern “for their own nation”. It was the tangible reality of the war that brought this set of assumptions into focus for Taqizadeh.⁹⁷⁵

All these concepts used by Taqizadeh in the editorial of *Kaveh* belong to a discourse that had been discussed by others in the past. But most importantly, Taqizadeh, at the opportune moment, managed to bring together, in a systematic way, several scattered nationalistic threads in this regularly published journal which targeted a wide audience. Putting to good use his broad knowledge of literature and culture garnered from his traditional education together with his understanding and experience of western political ideologies, Taqizadeh was well positioned to bring to the fore ideas that would be attractive to different groups of the Iranian populace; those who were proud of the country’s heritage as well as those who were more open to the progressive modernity which was being practised in Europe. The Persian language became a unifying force, uniting disparate members of Iranian society under a common love for their national language. The notion of the *Shahnameh* as the national book of Iranians, which emphasised the importance of the Persian language, laid the foundations of the ideology of the modernisation of Iran and what came to be considered Iranian identity, especially during the first and second Pahlavi eras. As will be evident throughout Taqizadeh’s later life, he continued to take opportunities to use elements of and allusions to Persian history and literature together with an emphasis on the Persian language, in the belief that these were the base materials necessary for the building of a national identity.

A substantial part of *Kaveh* was generally written by Taqizadeh himself under the pen name of Mohassel. Taqizadeh had his own particular style of prose and was not influenced by the old or contemporary styles. He was not afraid of elaborating extensively about the subjects he wrote. His prose stemmed from a combination of his religious upbringing, politics and scientific integrity. In writing he utilised many examples and his words were

⁹⁷⁵ Marashi, 77.

chosen with care and precision according to the context.⁹⁷⁶ Mohammad Qazvini (died 27 May 1949) also occasionally wrote articles for the publication usually under the title of *Akazib-e Mazhakeh* [Funny Lies]. From the 10th issue, 15 July 1916, Mohammad Ali Jamalzadeh also joined the group, contributing articles under the name of Shahrokh. Taqizadeh had a close bond with Qazvini and Jamalzadeh, both of whom he regarded highly. Taqizadeh believed Qazvini had no peer in Iran in literary and historical research. Qazvini is commonly referred to as the pioneer of the new empirical research methods used to analyse literary and historical texts in Iran. Jamalzadeh was the son of the famous Seyyed Jamal Va'ez, one of the prominent preachers of the Constitutional Revolution who was imprisoned and then poisoned in the aftermath of the bombardment of the Parliament. He worked closely with Taqizadeh during the period of the First Parliament. Jamalzadeh published his first book during his time working for *Kaveh* under the title of *Ganj-e Shayeghan ya Oza'-e Eqtesadi-e Iran* [The Worthy Treasure or the Economic Situation of Iran] with an introduction written by Taqizadeh. Other writers of *Kaveh* were Hossein Kazemzadeh Iranshahr, Reza Tarbiat, Esma'il Amirkhizi, Abol Hassan Hakimi and Ebrahim Pourdavoud.⁹⁷⁷ The journal was to be published every two weeks but was, in fact, often only published once every two months and, towards the end, published only sporadically. At the end of the Great War with the defeat of Germany, financial aid from Germany ceased and publication of *Kaveh* was suspended.

⁹⁷⁶ Afshar, "Marg-e Taqizadeh na Karist Khord," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 150.

⁹⁷⁷ Kazemzadeh was born in Tabriz. His father was a physician. Following his early education and having learned French he went to Istanbul where he stayed for six years. He then travelled to Belgium, France and Britain. In Belgium he supported the socialists. He also worked with Mohammad Qazvini. Kazemzadeh was in Cambridge working with Browne when he received the invitation from Taqizadeh to go to Berlin to work with him. He lived in Germany between 1915 and 1936, where he published six German books and founded *Iranshahr*, a magazine in Persian which was published between 1922 and 1926. See: Jamshid Behnam, *Berlaniha*.

Pourdavoud was born in Rasht and died in Tehran on 17 November 1968 at the age of 83. Being acquainted with Taqizadeh influenced him greatly and during his residence in Berlin made contact through Taqizadeh with many prominent German scholars who worked on the history of ancient Iran. He was particularly interested in the works of Josef Markwart, a German historian and orientalist, whom he met when he was working with Taqizadeh. Like Taqizadeh, he too married a German woman. His old friend Taqizadeh attended his funeral in a wheel chair some months before his own death. For more information see: Mahmoud Nikuyeh, ed., *Pourdavoud Pazhohandeh Rozegar-e Nakhost* [Pourdavoud: The Pioneering Researcher] (Rasht: Gilan, 1999).

Kaveh was a highly influential publication. Qazvini went so far as to write that a single issue of *Kaveh* benefitted Iran much more than all the years of work that Taqizadeh had put into advocating for the constitution.⁹⁷⁸ Qazvini believed *Kaveh* was the highest quality and most comprehensive publication that had ever been produced by an Iranian.⁹⁷⁹ Browne commented that no Persian newspaper was as good either in appearance or content.⁹⁸⁰ People such as Naseh Nateq were of the opinion that the writings of Taqizadeh in *Kaveh* were of such great importance that he should avoid taking up any positions in the government which might later leave him open to criticism and he should instead continue publishing the journal. Ministerial or ambassadorial positions were easy to fill, whilst it was almost impossible to find people like Taqizadeh who could write such convincing articles as those he published in *Kaveh*.⁹⁸¹

7:6 Advisory Council for the Education of Iranian Students

From the time he began his cultural and political activities in Tabriz, Taqizadeh believed strongly in the importance of education as a tool for the enlightenment of the people, allowing them access to modern ideas. As well as publishing his own newspaper he thus decided to open a school in Tabriz. Unfortunately for Taqizadeh, it was soon closed due to opposition from more conservative thinkers. Throughout various periods of his life, believing that education was a catalyst for change and progress and would eventually lead to the modernisation of Iran, whenever the opportunity arose Taqizadeh would propagate the importance of education, an importance that had also been highlighted by previous Iranian reformists. The Great War and Taqizadeh's collaboration with the Germans was one such opportunity.

During the years of the Great War, Taqizadeh and those who worked with him in Berlin paid special attention to the education of Iranian youth in Germany. This resulted in the

⁹⁷⁸ Mohammad Qazvini to Taqizadeh, in *Nameh-hay-e Paris: Az Mohammad Qazvini be Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh* [Paris Letters: From Mohammad Qazvini to Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh] ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Qatreh, 2005), 42.

⁹⁷⁹ Qazvini to Taqizadeh, in *Ibid.*, 74.

⁹⁸⁰ Browne to Taqizadeh, 6 June 1920, in *Nameh-hay-e Edward Browne be Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh*, eds., Zaryab and Afshar, 107.

⁹⁸¹ Naseh Nateq, "Darbareh-e Taqizadeh," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 194.

establishment of an advisory council to encourage and enable Iranian students to study in Germany.⁹⁸² According to Taqizadeh, before the outbreak of the war approximately 500 Iranian students had been studying abroad. More than 200 students chose France or the French part of Switzerland to continue their studies while the number of students in Britain was between 30 to 40, due to Britain's presence in countries bordering Iran.⁹⁸³ Other students were scattered across various other countries. At this point the number of Iranian students in Germany was only about eight. Iranians had predominantly chosen to study in France because of the widespread use of the French language in Iran.⁹⁸⁴ French had become particularly widespread in Iran following the trip of Naser al-Din Shah to France during which he committed to sending 50 Iranian students to various schools in France.

Taqizadeh, who himself had previously studied French language and culture, was aware of the differences between the German and French education.⁹⁸⁵ He seemingly favoured the German system, encouraging more students to study in Germany. Aware of the rapid industrial achievements of Germany, Taqizadeh regarded the country as a beneficial place for Iranians to study. German education, with its focus on industrial and agricultural education, was advantageous, he believed, as expertise in these areas of study was needed to facilitate the modernisation of Iran. In contrast, Taqizadeh saw little benefit to Iran of Iranians studying Political Science or Law, which were the subjects mainly studied by the Iranian students in France.⁹⁸⁶ Another reason for the Iranian nationalists to encourage German language and education was the importance that the German language had gained during the Great War. Abdol Hossein Sheybani (Vahid al-Molk), one of the prominent Iranian Democrats wrote, for instance, that learning German should be a priority and sought to abandon the English and French languages, the languages of Germany's foes.⁹⁸⁷ Taqizadeh himself also began learning German intensively by hiring a private tutor.⁹⁸⁸ Immersed in a German speaking environment and having a German fiancée must also have

⁹⁸² Beirat zur Ausbildung Persischer in Deutschland.

⁹⁸³ *Kaveh*, March 15, 1918.

⁹⁸⁴ *Kaveh*, March 15, 1918.

⁹⁸⁵ As Taqizadeh mentioned in his autobiography, he studied French for 5 years in Tabriz. *Tufani*, 30.

⁹⁸⁶ *Kaveh*, March 15, 1918.

⁹⁸⁷ Abdol Hossein Sheybani, 147.

⁹⁸⁸ Jamalzadeh, "Taqizadeh," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 226.

facilitated his mastery of the language. Taqizadeh envisaged a future positive relationship between Germany and Iran and hoped that Iranian graduates from Germany might facilitate a strong bond between the two nations.

During the war period the German government paid for a group of Iranian students to study in Germany. "The Advisory Council for the Education of Iranian Students" whose members were Germans and Iranians sent the Iranian students to different cities according to the subject they would study, each of them staying with a German family. In the spring of 1918, 11 students were settled in Germany with the help of this council. Taqizadeh's efforts were not fruitless. 'Ezz al-Mamalek Ardalan, for example, writes that he sent his two sons to study in Germany after seeing Taqizadeh's announcements in the newspapers stating that they would accept students to study in Germany for as little as 30 Toman a month.⁹⁸⁹ Fattallah Akbar Sepahdar A'zam a former Prime Minister, encouraged by Taqizadeh's activities, also decided to send his son to study in Germany.⁹⁹⁰ One of the tribal chieftains of Azerbaijan, Sardar 'Ashayer, had also decided to send his son to study in Germany through the council established by Taqizadeh.⁹⁹¹ These examples show the effectiveness of Taqizadeh and *Kaveh* in encouraging young Iranians to study in Germany. The fact that members of the elite were willing to send the expenses of their children directly to Taqizadeh also shows the degree of trust that they had in him.

Bozorg 'Alavi, the prominent contemporary Iranian writer, was one of the young students studying in Germany under the supervision of this council. One of his memoirs from his time there sheds more light on Taqizadeh's attitude towards European culture and highlights the fact that his insistence on following the European path towards modernisation was not readily accepted even by the students who were already studying in Germany. 'Alavi, whose father was a good friend of Taqizadeh, mentions that during conversations between Taqizadeh and some students, one student had voiced the opinion

⁹⁸⁹ 'Ezz al-Mamalek Ardalan, *Khaterat-e 'Ezz al-Mamalek Ardalan: Zendegi dar Doran-e Shesh Padeshah* [Memoirs of 'Ezz al-Mamalek Ardalan: Life in the Reign of Six Kings], ed., Baqer 'Aqeli (Tehran: Namak, 2004), 180-1.

⁹⁹⁰ Fattallah Akbar Sepahdar to Taqizadeh, 27 October 1922, in *Nameh-hay-e Tehran*, ed., Afshar, 77-8.

⁹⁹¹ Mehdi Qoli Mokhber al-Saltaneh to Taqizadeh, 22 November 1921, in *Ibid.*, 108-9.

that although Europe had benefitted from many advances, Europe was morally decadent; men and women kissed in public. Taqizadeh's reply, which shocked the students and had a profound influence on 'Alavi, was, "What is wrong if a girl and a boy love each other and have intimate relations with each other? That is not decadence."⁹⁹² This anecdotal narrative demonstrates Taqizadeh's social outlook influenced by liberalism and his respect for individualism.

From what we gather from 'Alavi's memoirs, many of the Iranian students who had gone to study in Germany, including 'Alavi himself, found themselves quite overwhelmed by the strict German discipline and lifestyle, in contrast to the Iranian way of life. Hence, organisations such as the council set up by Taqizadeh would have been a great benefit to the newly arrived youngsters, helping them to adapt and settle more easily in the European country. Unlike Taqizadeh, some members of the Berlin circle such as Mohammed Qazvini were against the idea of sending Iranian students to Europe. They believed that the European environment spoiled Iranians and considered it more beneficial to send European teachers to Iran.⁹⁹³

Following the defeat of Germany in the Great War, financial help from the German government stopped and, as a result, Taqizadeh requested that affluent Iranians help the Iranian students abroad and in particular those who wished to study in Germany. The defeat of the Germans did not alter Taqizadeh's opinion that Germany was an advantageous country in which to study for the Iranian students. In Taqizadeh's words, although Germany was disabled militarily, it was still the leading country for the study of scientific subjects. Taqizadeh argued that many students from Eastern countries also chose Germany to study for other reasons: one was the political neutrality of Germany in the affairs of Eastern countries; another was the fact that studying in Germany was cheaper than in the USA or other European countries.⁹⁹⁴ By 1922, the number of Iranian students studying in

⁹⁹² Hamid Ahmadi, ed., *Khaterat-e Bozorg 'Alavi* [Memoirs of Bozorg 'Alavi] (Spånga: Baran, 1997), 72-3.

⁹⁹³ Abdol Hossein Sheybani, 399.

⁹⁹⁴ Taqizadeh, "Mohaselin-e Irani dar Alman [Iranian Students in Germany]", in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh: T'alim va Tarbiat*, ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Tus, 2013), 17: 27-34.

Germany had reached 70 of which about 45 were supervised by the Council for the Education of Iranian Students.⁹⁹⁵ By the end of the same year this number had risen sharply to 120 students.⁹⁹⁶ Taqizadeh felt so strongly about the importance of this opportunity for young Iranians to receive a European education that he sent his younger brother, Javad, from Berlin to Iran in order to promote the advantages of young students studying in Germany.⁹⁹⁷

Taqizadeh maintained this approach in later years and continued to actively encourage Iranians to benefit from a German education. A British diplomatic report notes that in 1924 Taqizadeh was “an active organiser” of the reopening of the German School in Tehran, facilitated by the Society of German Persian Schools in Tehran.⁹⁹⁸ Having been exposed to the culture, customs and language of Russia or Britain through their educational experiences, Iranian politicians and statesmen were often categorised as either Russophile or Anglophile and thus favoured the country within whose educational system they had studied. Some, too, had studied in France. France had also increased its influence in Iran by sending missionaries and establishing schools which besides teaching the French language also propagated Christianity. All these countries had vested interests in Iran following their colonial histories. The extent of the influence of these nations in Iran is illustrated by Taqizadeh in his writings. For instance, he explains that before the Constitutional Revolution, Mozaffar al-Din Shah felt it necessary to employ not one but three physicians to oversee his health; an English one, a Russian and a French doctor. This, he comments, was to placate all three nations and avoid any one of them feeling that their influence in the Iranian court was less than that of the other countries.⁹⁹⁹ Taqizadeh, aware of the politicians’ bias towards these countries’ involvement in Iranian affairs, hoped to present an alternative option. He aimed to reduce the influence of the colonial powers in Iran by pressing for students to study in Germany or within a German educational setting, rather than British, Russian or French. By promoting this more neutral alternative for study,

⁹⁹⁵ *Iranshahr*, 24 August 1922.

⁹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 20 December 1922.

⁹⁹⁷ Abol Hassan Hakimi to Taqizadeh, 10 July 1922, in *Nameh-hay-e Tehran*, ed., Afshar, 32.

⁹⁹⁸ Lord D’Abernon, 28 May 1924, *TNA*: FO 371/10154.

⁹⁹⁹ Taqizadeh, “Tarikh-e Avayel-e Enqelab va Mashrutiyat Iran,” in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 1: 310.

Taqizadeh hoped to limit the possible negative consequences that studying in a country with vested interests in Iran might bring to the modernisation of the country. Furthermore, sending students to be educated in Germany and then to return to Iran, bringing with them the modern ideas, was considered a strategy which would enhance the process of modernisation by putting into practice Taqizadeh's ideas of creating Iranians who were "inwardly and outwardly" European.¹⁰⁰⁰ Hossein Parviz, for example, was one of the people in Taqizadeh's circle of friends who believed that this approach to educating students abroad was a stepping stone towards the implementation of Taqizadeh's ideas.

After the consolidation of Reza Shah's power and establishment of a stronger central government, the government organised the sending of students abroad with a bursary. Whilst for Taqizadeh this was a positive step forward, he was of the opinion that there should also be some conditions placed on the students in order to qualify for the bursary. In his opinion, not only should the students be in general good health but he also outlines other conditions which he considered equally important and which highlight the fact that Taqizadeh was conscious of what he considered the uneven modernisation taking place across the country, in particular what he saw as the concerning trend of centre-periphery educational developments in Iran. Taqizadeh was one of the first to bring this issue to the fore. He reflected that it was crucial that an equal number of students were sent abroad to study from every province and mentioned that the provincial cities and Tabriz in particular were not treated equally compared to the capital, stating that the lack of schools in provinces must not be used as a pretext for granting fewer students from the provinces the opportunity to be sent to study abroad. He commented that no Iranian subject should be treated like a stepchild and demanded equal rights for everyone, even requesting that students from the provinces be given preferential treatment during the selection process since in some provinces Persian was not the dominant spoken language. This made it more difficult for those students to express themselves well in Persian and thus compete with Persian speaking students. Taqizadeh posited that these students should receive one year's

¹⁰⁰⁰. See: Taqizadeh, "Tasavorati dar Bab-e Ferstadan-e Mohaselin be Oropa [Some Ideas about Sending Students to Europe]," in *Shafaq-e Sorkh*, February 30, 1928.

education in Tehran paid for by the government and suggested that at least 80 percent of the students granted the bursary should be chosen from the provinces.¹⁰⁰¹

7:7 Activities Outside Germany

During the Great War period, Taqizadeh made various trips in Europe including to Switzerland, Austria, Denmark and Sweden. These trips were often to promote the Iranian case in a wider international setting, publicising Russian and British interventions in Iranian affairs. British confidential reports, for example, shed light on the reason he had travelled to Switzerland and the outcome of the trip: “About May 1916, Taqi Zada [Taqizadeh] is believed to have visited Switzerland where he hoped with the aid of Indian revolutionaries, to stir up trouble in India, his efforts as regards Persia having more or less failed”.¹⁰⁰² A remaining letter from Taqizadeh to Mahmoud Afshar further evidences that Taqizadeh’s trip to Switzerland had another purpose; to establish a newspaper in order to publish articles on the subject of Iran.¹⁰⁰³ In another note, Taqizadeh comments that the aim of his trip to Switzerland was to find enthusiastic Iranians to join the committee in Berlin. Indeed, Taqizadeh was traveling with the head of the Indian Committee who Taqizadeh describes as a highly intelligent and efficient character. This proves that, as stated in British reports, Taqizadeh still maintained close ties with the Indian Committee at this point.¹⁰⁰⁴

As well as the British, the Germans were also closely monitoring Taqizadeh’s movements. Taqizadeh’s trips outside Germany had to be approved by the Germans and his movements were limited.¹⁰⁰⁵ Nevertheless, criticising the policy of Britain and Russia in international settings was in line with the policies of the Germans with whom Taqizadeh was co-operating and thus Taqizadeh’s actions would have been welcomed.

¹⁰⁰¹ Hossein Parviz to Taqizadeh, 1 February 1923, in *Nameh-hay-e Tehran*, ed., Afshar, 81-5.

¹⁰⁰² 7 June 1917 *TNA*: FO 371/3067.

¹⁰⁰³ Taqizadeh to Mahmoud Afshar, 14 December 1917, in *Nameh-hay-e Dustan* [Letters from Friends], ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Bonyad-e Moqofat-e Dr. Mahmoud Afshar, 1996), 71-4.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 320.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Ilse Itscherenska, “Taqizadeh dar Alman-e Qeysari [Taqizadeh in Imperial Germany],” in *Iran Nameh* 21, nos. 1-2 (spring-summer 2003).

It was an article published in the Danish newspaper, *Politiken*, defending the rights of Iran against Russian and British interference in Iran, which caught Taqizadeh's attention and was the reason for his trip to Denmark. The writer of the article was the famous Georg Brandes.¹⁰⁰⁶ Taqizadeh, realising how instrumental the well-known Brandes' work could be in influencing international public opinion, took the decision to go from Berlin to meet Brandes. Jamalzadeh recalls that Taqizadeh journeyed to Denmark in spite of the difficulties of wartime to further inform Brandes about Russian and British involvement in Iran. As well as expressing his gratitude to Brandes for what he had already written, Taqizadeh also encouraged him to publish more about the pernicious interference of Russia and Britain in Iran. Following Brandes' request for further information, Taqizadeh wrote an extensive account in English about the misdoings of Britain and Russia in Iran which Brandes used in his later articles. According to Jamalzadeh, Brandes' articles were translated into various languages.¹⁰⁰⁷ After the Russian Revolution, Brandes wrote an article addressing the Russian Revolution leaders, Lenin and Trotsky, inviting them to expiate the acts carried out in Iran by the former Russian regime. According to Taqizadeh, this article was very effective.¹⁰⁰⁸ Mojtehedī emphasises that convincing Brandes to write in support of Iran and against the policies of Russia and Britain in Iran was one of Taqizadeh's biggest achievements.¹⁰⁰⁹ The fact that Taqizadeh was aware of such individuals and went to great lengths to contact them demonstrates both his extensive international network and the fact that he took advantage of all available opportunities in Europe to further his cause. As he so often did, as well as carrying out political activities, Taqizadeh took every opportunity to enrich himself culturally. Taqizadeh had developed a keen interest in pre-Islamic Iran and during his 19 day stay in Denmark, using a guide book, he was able to find his way to the location where the oldest copy of Avesta was held in Copenhagen.¹⁰¹⁰ Taqizadeh would return to Scandinavia for a key political event.

¹⁰⁰⁶ *Politiken*, 6 July 1916.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Jamalzadeh, "Man Jamalzadeh Darbareh-e Taqizadeh Shahadat Midaham" in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 60.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 164-5.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Mojtehedī, 191.

¹⁰¹⁰ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 164-5.

7:8 The 1917 Stockholm Peace Conference

The planned Socialist Congress of 1917 in Stockholm was to be the pinnacle of Taqizadeh's activities aimed at bringing the Iranian case to the fore internationally. It was of particular interest to Taqizadeh because of its anti-imperialist rhetoric. The run up to this conference gave Taqizadeh the opportunity to reflect and publicise the intervention of British and Russians in the affairs of Iran. The congress had been organised with the Dutch-Scandinavian socialists in Stockholm; its goal was to end hostility between different nations after the Great War and help to consolidate peace. However, as the governments of France, Britain and the United States did not permit their delegations to participate, the planned international conference became a forum for discussion rather than a platform for action. Taqizadeh attended together with Vahid al-Molk Sheybani representing the Iranian nationalists.¹⁰¹¹ In Stockholm he met and talked with representatives from the socialist movements of the different countries.¹⁰¹² While there, he also crossed paths with Yahya Dolatabadi for the first time in several years. Dolatabadi mentions that Taqizadeh had greatly changed as a consequence of his long sojourn in Europe and interaction with Europeans although he still maintained his core attributes.¹⁰¹³ Documents show the British continued to monitor Taqizadeh's activities, including during his trip to Stockholm.¹⁰¹⁴

Together with the announcement to the conference which was published in the Swedish newspapers signed by Taqizadeh and Vahid al-Molk after the first Russian Revolution and overthrow of the Tsarist regime in March 1917, Taqizadeh also wrote an open letter to the members of the Russian Cabinet who had attended the conference in Stockholm.¹⁰¹⁵ In this letter he referred to the history of the intervention of the former Russian regime in the affairs of Iran and outlined in detail how it had crippled the country's sovereignty and economy and helped to restrict any progress or developments. Together with the British, the Russian Imperialist regime, he wrote, had ensured that Iran could do little or nothing

¹⁰¹¹ Ibid., 165.

¹⁰¹² According to Qazvini Taqizadeh left for Stockholm on 2 June and returned on 26 September 1917. See: Qazvini, *Yaddasht-hay-e Qazvini*, 9-10: 185-6.

¹⁰¹³ Dolatabadi, 4: 57.

¹⁰¹⁴ "Note on the Persian Taqi Zada," 7 June 1917 *TNA*: FO371/3067.

¹⁰¹⁵ Taqizadeh to members of the Russian cabinet, Stockholm, June 1917 in Taqizadeh, *Tufani* ('Elmi), 870-78.

without consultation with the two powers and indeed Russia had gone to great lengths to ensure that Iran was so financially and politically weakened that it had had little chance of moving towards modernisation. Taqizadeh expressed his strong desire that the new 'democratic' regime in Russia move away from their 'despotic' policies of 'strangling of this ancient country' and would soon officially openly declare more favourable policy in Iran.

This letter is a key document as it lay the groundwork for the 1921 agreement between Russia and Iran which would finally release Iran from the crushing ties to the previous Tsarist Russia that had seriously hindered Iran's progress towards greater autonomy. Taqizadeh's activities were highly effective in publicising Iran's situation and promoting the country's needs and demands.

Together with Jamalzadeh, Yahya Dolatabadi and Vahid-al-Molk Sheybani as representatives of the Committee of Iranian Nationalists were in Stockholm. The diaries of Abd al-Hossein Sheybani reveal that many other prominent constitutionalists such as Heydar Khan were also in Stockholm and they had daily meetings.¹⁰¹⁶ In his autobiography Taqizadeh mentions that he had established a centre in Stockholm to actively campaign against Russia and Britain¹⁰¹⁷.

¹⁰¹⁶ Abd al-Hossein Sheybani.

¹⁰¹⁷ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 321.



Figure 14: An article about Taqizadeh in the Swedish newspaper, *Stockholms Dagblad*

7:9 The Impact of Russian Revolution in Iran

Following the Migration and the attempts by the Democrats to undermine Russian and British involvement in Iran, the influence of Russia and Britain actually increased in Iran. As Taqizadeh wrote, "In Tehran the British and Russians increasingly robbed the Iranian State of her sovereign rights, reducing her to a helpless dependent obeying their orders. They took control of the financial and military administration of the country. This was the state of affairs and there seemed to be very little hope for Iran as an independent state when suddenly an unexpected and huge historical event changed the whole situation. This was the Russian Revolution of 1917".¹⁰¹⁸

In November 1917, the Russian revolutionary Bolsheviks took control of the whole of Russia, with Vladimir Lenin at the head. At the time that new Soviet regime came to power,

¹⁰¹⁸ Taqizadeh, "The History of Modern Iran: Lectures given in Colombia University" in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 8: 223.

Russia was still embroiled in a war with Germany. The war had caused great hardships on the nation and Lenin had promised peace. By 1918, Russia had suffered heavy territorial losses and was left with few resources and the Russian army was depleted. When Russia's participation in the war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Russia and the Central Powers on March 3, 1918, Russia lost one-third of its population, one-third of its agricultural land, and about two-thirds of its heavy industry. Although the treaty was far from ideal for Russia, it turned out to be highly advantageous for Iran when Russia's involvement in Iran began to wane. The Russian revolutionaries had sympathised with the Iranian constitutionalists and, as a result, a large number of the Russian forces left Iran following the Russian Revolution and the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. This provided a good opportunity for Iran to regain its sovereignty, having been, until now, stifled by the increasing involvement of the former Russian regime in the affairs of the country. Prior to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk an armistice between Russia and the Central Powers was agreed on 15 December 1917. Article ten of the agreement referred to Iran. Taqizadeh believed this article was a practical step towards real independence for Iran. The article stated, "The Ottoman and Russian commanders-in-chief consider the independence and integrity of Iranian territory as fundamental and are willing to withdraw their troops from Iran. The commanders will engage in negotiations with the Iranian government as soon as possible to finalise the details of the withdrawal and other acts which are necessary."¹⁰¹⁹ Taqizadeh wrote about this agreement in an article titled "The Withdrawal from Iran: A Step towards True Independence" which was published in the German newspaper *Norddeutsche Allgemeine* and which praised Germany for its positive stance towards Iran.¹⁰²⁰

According to a British diplomatic document, Taqizadeh sent a telegram to the German Chancellor in the name of "The Committee of Persian Nationalists at Berlin and the whole of the Iranian nation" to officially express their gratitude for Germany's support of Iran. The telegram is as follows:

¹⁰¹⁹ *Kaveh*, January 15, 1918.

¹⁰²⁰ *Norddeutsche Allgemeine*, December 23, 1917.

Our gratitude is the greater because the whole paragraph 10 of Armistice Treaty was added for no other reason than for securing the freedom independence and territorial integrity of the Persian Empire. We hope that this benevolent act which provides brilliant evidence that German Empire is a true champion of the freedom of nations will be followed by further steps which are indispensable for Persia's complete independence and her liberation from the bonds which are incompatible with principles of freedom.¹⁰²¹

With the Russians now potentially off the political scene, the time was ripe for the revival of the Democrat Party and the Democrats who were still present in Iran once again began to organise political activities. With the help of some senior members of the Party who were still in Tehran they reorganised the Party, establishing the committee of the Party according to their previous manifesto. These Democrats were eager to take advantage of the situation provided by the Russian Revolution and preserve the independence of their country by being impartial to the powers involved in the war. Their goal was to establish a strong independent government by supporting the Shah. This group were referred to as the "Tashkili" [pro-formation] Democrats since some members of the previous Democrat Party now distanced themselves from the Party and had established a new Democrat Party which was referred to as "Zedd-e Tashkili" [non-pro-formation].¹⁰²² The Zedd-e Tashkilis believed that they should wait for the return of their leaders such as Solayman Mirza, Mosavat, Taqizadeh and Navab and reorganise the Party under their supervision. The Zedd-e Tashkilis only considered those who had joined the party before the "migration" to be true Democrats whilst the Tashkilis had been more flexible and had accepted new members.¹⁰²³ The Tashkilis were headed by A'dl al-Molk and the Zedd-e Tashkilis by

¹⁰²¹ Sir W. Townley, telegram, 5 January 1918 *TNA*: FO 371/3258.

¹⁰²² Bahar, 1: 27.

¹⁰²³ British diplomatic correspondence suggests that the British were concerned about the return of the former Democrat leaders to Iran and in particular Solayman Mirza who was sent first to Mesopotamia and later to Bombay as a prisoner of war. See: Secretary of State to Civil Commissioner Baghdad, telegram, 31 July 1920, and 3 August 1921, *TNA*: FO 371/4921. However, the British Legation in Tehran believed that his return was not so concerning. They argued that if the enemies of Britain realised at the time of the opening of the Parliament that Solayman Mirza's non-return to Iran was due to the British action, they would view it as British intervention in Iranian affairs. Mr. Norman, telegram, Tehran, 23 August 1920, *TNA*: FO 371/4921.

Mohammad Kamarehei.¹⁰²⁴ Among the most famous people from the Tashkilis were Mokhber al-Saltaneh, Hakim al-Molk, E'tel' al-Molk, Mo'aven al-Saltaneh, Seyyed Hashem Vakil, Seyyed Mohammad Tadayyon, Malak al-Shoa'ray-e Bahar and Mirza Ali Akbar Sa'tsaz. Among the Zedd-e Tashkilis were Taqi Binesh, Hossein Parviz and Mahmoud Pahlavi (later known as Mahmoud Mahmoud).¹⁰²⁵

The Zedd-e Tashkilis published their own newspaper called *Setareh-e Iran* [Star of Iran] while the Tashkilis published *Iran, Now Bahar* [New Spring] and *Zaban-e Azad* [Free Language]. In a letter to Taqizadeh, Sheikh Ebrahim Zanjani complains about the destructive behaviour of both groups.¹⁰²⁶ After unsuccessful negotiations and discussions, Taqizadeh and Navab were unable to come to any agreements with either of the groups.¹⁰²⁷ This was, in fact, the catalyst for Taqizadeh's withdrawal from the Democrat Party.

The conflict between these two groups resulted in the postponement of the elections of the Fourth Parliament. The elections first took place in Tehran on 3 July 1917 and later in the provinces. Elections continued until the opening of the Fourth Parliament on 22 June 1921. In the end, together both branches of the Democrats won the majority of seats in the parliament although disagreements between the two branches weakened their position. As a result, successive governments came to power none of which had much faith in the role of parties in the political process. This period of less than one year between the springs of 1917 and 1918 saw 5 different governments formed. The Zedd-e Tashkilis gradually faded and with that the unity of the Democrat Party was damaged for good.¹⁰²⁸ The holding of elections was difficult during this period due to the foreign military occupation and unrest throughout the country.¹⁰²⁹ The British took Baghdad on 11 March, 1917 and reinforced what was called "The South Persian Rifles" to protect their interests and the oil fields in

¹⁰²⁴ Gehrke, 1:457.

¹⁰²⁵ To read more about Tashkili and Zedd-e Tashkili see the diaries of: Seyyed Mohammad Kamarehei, *Ruznameh-e Khaterat* [Diary of Seyyed Mohammad Kamarehei], Mohammad Javad Moradinia (Tehran: Shirazeh, 2003).

¹⁰²⁶ Ebrahim Zanjani to Taqizadeh, without date, in *Nameh-hay-e Tehran*, ed., Afshar, 65-7.

¹⁰²⁷ Baqer 'Aqeli, ed., *Khaterat-e yek Nakhostvazir* [A Prime Minister's Memoir] (Tehran: 'Elmi, 1992), 45.

¹⁰²⁸ Bahar, 1: 27-8.

¹⁰²⁹ Ettihadieh, *Majles va Entekhabat: Az Mashruteh ta Payan-e Qajarieh*, 188.

the south of the country. This group's role was to maintain security in the south and also to fight against the activities of German agents who were active there during that period.

Besides the Russian Revolution, other significant happenings occurred in Iran at this time which affected the formation of the Parliament and the general situation in the country. The holding of the Paris Peace Conference and the Anglo-Iranian Convention of 1919 were among the most important events during this period. Furthermore, the riots of Sheikh Mohammad Khiyabani in Azerbaijan and Mirza Kochak Khan in Gilan province further weakened the central government. The unstable situation led to people's primary demand being territorial integrity for the country. It was against this background that the coup d'état of 26 February, 1921 took place. The importance of these events, the role Taqizadeh played in them, both directly and indirectly, and his opinion about them necessitate that these events be looked at in more detail.

7:10 The Paris Peace Conference

One of the issues which negatively impacted the situation of Iran was its reluctant involvement in the Great War which, despite the fact that Iran had claimed neutrality in the war and had no alliance with either side, had spread onto Iranian soil. When the victorious allies of the Great War held the Paris Peace Conference commencing on 18 January, 1919, their aim was to settle the issues raised by the war and its aftermath. Iran had hoped that this would be an opportunity for Iran to ask for reimbursement for the devastating damage it had suffered as a result of the war. Iran as a non-belligerent country had probably been affected more than any other neutral country by the consequences of the war.¹⁰³⁰ From the beginning of the Paris Peace Conference, the Iranian government had been determined to send a complete delegation to defend Iran's case and secure the sovereignty and independence of the country. Consequently, a group was formed under the leadership of the Foreign Minister, Ali Qoli Khan Moshaver al-Molk Ansari.¹⁰³¹ The delegation went to

¹⁰³⁰ Cyrus Ghani, *Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah: From Qajar Collapse to Pahlavi Rule* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 23.

¹⁰³¹ For more about the Iranian delegation see: Mohammad Ali Foroughi, *Yaddasht-hay-e Ruzaneh-e Mohammad Ali Foroughi az Safar-e Konfrance-e Paris December 1919-August 1920* [The Diaries of Mohammad Ali Foroughi of Paris Conference December 1919-August 1920], eds., Mohammad Afshin Vafaei and Pejman Firuzfar (Tehran: Sokhan, 2015).

Paris and worked to achieve their assigned mission. Iran had various demands: 1. Representation at the Peace Conference. 2. Abrogation of the Anglo-Russian Convention (of 1907) and all other treaties prejudicial to Iran's independence, and guarantees of Iran's territorial integrity in the future. 3. Compensation for damage caused by actions of the fighting forces in her territory. 4. Economic Liberty. 5. Revision of treaties and annulment of those assigning foreigners extra-territorial privileges. 6. Revision of the concessions now in operation in accordance with the preceding articles. 7. Readjustment of frontiers and compensation for previous encroachments.¹⁰³²

These demands had been agreed upon at a meeting attended by the Cabinet as well as all former Cabinet members headed by the Prime Minister Vosouq al-Dowleh.¹⁰³³ The Iranian delegation formed to represent Iran in the Paris Peace Conference departed from Tehran for France on 17 December, 1918, with high hopes that attending the conference would raise the profile of Iran.¹⁰³⁴ However, despite their greatest efforts, the Iranian delegation could not obtain a hearing at the conference and the countries opposed to the Iranian delegation joining the conference overpowered those who were eager to hear what the Iranian delegation had to say. Thus, the Iranian delegation did not have an opportunity to put forward the case that Iran had not, in fact, been a belligerent in the war. With the unexpected news of the Anglo-Iranian agreement of 1919 the Iranian delegation was disbanded.

Fully aware of the importance of the Paris Peace Conference, Taqizadeh wrote a "Memorandum on Persia's Wishes and Her Aspirations Addressed to The Peace Conference". The memorandum was prepared in two parts. The first part outlined the reasons why Iran was an important player in the quest for world peace. The six main sections with the following headings, elaborated in details his points: 1. Iran is an extensive country; 2. Iran is a nation of one homogenous people; 3. Iran has a strong past record; 4. Iran is capable of progress; 5. Iran has suffered greatly; 6. Iran is faithful to its agreements.

¹⁰³² Philip Graves, *The Life of Sir Percy Cox* (London: Hutchinson, 1941), 251.

¹⁰³³ Keddie, *Modern Iran*, 77.

¹⁰³⁴ Leon Novar, "The Great Powers and Iran, 1914-1921," (PhD. diss., The University of Chicago, 1958), 155. Accessed July 4, 2019. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/301923544?accountid=12045>.

The significance of Taqizadeh's statements, whether one agrees with them or not, is that it is these statements that the future Iranian government followed after the coup d'état of 1921. These statements came to represent the main principles by which Iran wanted to present itself as a modern nation on the international stage.

The second part of the memorandum dealt with the demands of Iran from the conference: 1. The discussion and settlement of the Iranian case at the international conference 2. Evacuation of foreign troops from Iranian territory 3. The annulment of illegal and generally retrogressive treaties, obligations, undertakings and political and economic restraints 4. The annulment of the capitulation system 5. Positive and generous financial and moral support from the League of Nations.¹⁰³⁵

In comparison to the results the delegation had hoped for from the conference, Taqizadeh's memorandum appears to set out more realistic expectations, better attuned to the international situation at that time and thus was a more viable alternative to the delegations' initial sweeping demands. Despite this and the fact that Taqizadeh did not have any official governmental position, his activities were nevertheless followed by the Iranian intelligentsia and at times his actions were questioned. For instance, in the case of the above-mentioned letter to the Russian officials about the expectations of the Iranians after the Russian Revolution, Ali Akbar Davar, who later became the Justice Minister during the First Pahlavi Period and was studying in Europe at that time, criticised Taqizadeh's views on the rights of Iran over the Caspian Sea. Davar believed Taqizadeh had remained silent about the Caspian Sea issue which would thus make it difficult to raise it again in future. However, he admitted that the Caspian Sea issue was a complicated one.¹⁰³⁶

What is clear from Qazvini's letter to Taqizadeh is that Taqizadeh was opposed to the overly ambitious demands of the Iranian delegation participating in the Peace Conference in Paris after the collapse of the Russian Empire. One of their claims was for territory in

¹⁰³⁵ Taqizadeh, *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 7: 722-8.

¹⁰³⁶ Ali Akbar Davar, 1 June 1919, *TINA*: 296003465.

the Caucasus which had previously been under the rule of Iran but had later been lost to Russia according to the post Irano-Russian Wars agreements of 1813 and 1828. Most of this region was Turkish speaking and culturally and linguistically had close affiliations to Iranian Azerbaijan. At this time, there was a fear that with the collapse of Tsarist Russia and the announcement of the independence of the Caucasus Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, these newly independent states would look to Iranian Azerbaijan to join them and threaten Iran's integrity. This explains why Taqizadeh believed that the claim to take back the Turkish speaking part of the Caucasus could lead to future troubles for the unity of Iran. The British also advised Iran against claiming back this region.¹⁰³⁷

7:11 The Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919

By the end of the Great War, Britain, as one of the victorious countries, became the only major foreign power remaining in Iran. During the war the British troops had had a presence in Iran to protect the oilfields at Abadan in the south of the country; now the war had ended their influence grew as Ottoman forces and their German supporters were defeated and pushed out of the Middle East. The chaotic situation in Russia after the revolution of 1917 and the withdrawal of Russian forces from Iran further encouraged the British to advance their forces into northern Iran to help the troops who were fighting against the new pro-Communist Regime of Russia. However, towards the end of 1919 the British government came to the conclusion that the expulsion of the Bolshevik regime in Russia was unrealistic as the anti-Bolshevik forces were defeated on all fronts.¹⁰³⁸ Many of the Iranian politicians and aristocracy who had previously been Russophile, now with the collapse of Tsarist Russia, had joined the British camp. However, due to the new Russian regime's more amicable policy towards Iran, the British became increasingly conscious of permanently blocking the spread of Russian power and influence in Iran, the rest of the Middle East and India. In order to pursue this policy, the British decided to deepen their roots by making Iran a virtual British protectorate.¹⁰³⁹ Curzon, Britain's new

¹⁰³⁷ Qazvini To Taqizadeh, Paris, 21 February 1920, in *Nameh-hay-e Paris*, ed., Afshar, 27-8

¹⁰³⁸ Houshang Sabahi, *British Policy in Persia 1918-1925* (London: Frank Cass, 1990), 61.

¹⁰³⁹ Dolatabadi, 4: 97.

Foreign Minister, saw the defeat of Germany and Russia as providing Britain with the perfect opportunity to take over the whole of Iran.¹⁰⁴⁰

During the Great War, Iran faced many struggles and, despite claiming neutrality, the country was occupied by the Russians, the British and the Ottomans. Many people had perished due to the invasions of these nations and the consequences of this. The Great War years and the years that followed became known as the period of failure of the constitution, chaos and political disintegration.¹⁰⁴¹ This also further convinced the British to believe that their plan to fully control Iran could succeed. Lord Curzon was of the opinion that any agreement made with Iran, while guaranteeing its nominal independence, must at the same time confirm Britain's dominance in Iran.

The Anglo-Iranian agreement, consisting of six articles, was signed on 9 August 1919 in Tehran.¹⁰⁴² The treaty was secretly prepared and suddenly announced.¹⁰⁴³ According to the agreement, Britain was granted sole rights over the supply of weapons and loaned finances and even administrative experts and advisory staff. Britain was to loan the sum of £2 million to Iran with an annual interest rate of 7 percent which was to be repaid in 20 years in exchange for the rights to aid Iran in the construction of railways and to help the country eradicate famine. They would help Iran to build up uniformed forces which could establish order throughout the country. The British would also assist Iran so that it might avoid having to pay vast sums in damages as a result of its involvement in the Great War. Mirza Hassan Khan Vosouq al-Dowleh, the Prime Minister at the time who facilitated the

¹⁰⁴⁰ For more about British policy towards Iran after the Great War see: Oliver Bast, "British Imperialism and Persian Diplomacy in the Shadow of World War I (1914–1921)," in *Didgah: New Perspectives on UK-Iran Cultural Relations* (London: British Council, 2015), 83-125.

¹⁰⁴¹ Touraj Atabaki, "The First World War, Great Power Rivalries and the Emergence of a Political Community in Iran," in *Iran and the First World War*, ed., Atabaki, 1-7.

¹⁰⁴² To read the full text of the agreement in English see: "Announce Britain's Treaty with Persia," *The New York Times*, September 20, 1919. Also see: *Great Britain. Agreement Between Great Britain And Persia: Agreement Between His Majesty's Government and the Persian Government. Signed at Tehran, August 9, 1919*. Washington: Govt. print. off., 1919. Accessed July 4, 2019. <https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044103159505>.

For the Persian text see: *Kaveh*, January 22, 1920.

¹⁰⁴³ The Minister in Persia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State, telegram, August 13, 1919 in *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* 2, (1919). Accessed July 4, 2019. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1919v02/d673>.

drafting of the agreement, received an advance of £160,000, presumably to help steer the agreement through the Majles since all foreign treaties required parliamentary approval.¹⁰⁴⁴

Lord Curzon's comments about how the agreement had been conceived, which he made on 18 September, 1919 at a dinner party where he hosted his Iranian counterpart Firuz Farmanfarma, allows a further insight:

.... It was a year and a quarter ago Earl Curzon proceeded that the present Persian Prime Minister came into power. He was a large-minded and patriotic man who enjoyed the confidence of his Sovereign and who associated himself with capable and influential colleagues. A little while later, Sir Percy Cox was sent to Persia as our representative. When he went to Teheran and established friendly relations with the Persian Cabinet, he found a willingness to proceed towards some new agreement between the two Powers. At this stage, negotiations with Persia were entered into. The Russian Empire had temporarily disappeared. The Turkish Empire was in dissolution. Great Britain remained the only powerful neighbour of Persia to who she could turn. It was an obvious necessity to Great Britain to have a peaceful and prosperous Persia, and as regards Persia herself, if it was true that external assistance of some sort was necessary for her, it was only natural that she should turn to this country. Persia wanted guarantees for internal securities and freedom from external aggression, good internal administration and good finance.¹⁰⁴⁵

Despite Curzon's positive view, the agreement was criticised both inside Iran and abroad. Russia and France protested strongly against this agreement. The United States similarly did not approve of the agreement. The reply of the US State Department to the British Government's request that the United States approve the agreement was to be one of the sharpest and most caustic notes sent to London in those years.¹⁰⁴⁶

¹⁰⁴⁴ Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran*, 61.

¹⁰⁴⁵ "The Anglo-Persian Agreement," *The Manchester Guardian*, September 19, 1919.

¹⁰⁴⁶ "Persians Told We Object," *The New York Times*, September 25, 1919.

Within the country there were also strong reactions. The province of Azerbaijan revolted as a result of the Anglo-Persian agreement. In Gilan, the Communist Party formed what they called a Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran and in 1920 prepared to march into Tehran with a guerrilla force of some 1,500. Mutinies in the gendarmerie and the Cossack Division paralysed the government, which was unable to end incessant tribal warfare, control British forces in the south or block the Red Army in the north. In brief, as Taqizadeh has noted, the agreement had dissatisfied the educated Iranians.¹⁰⁴⁷ In reaction to the chaotic situation of the country and the inability of the central government to maintain security a revolt took place in the province of Azerbaijan. Mohammad Khiyabani proposed reconvening parliament and establishing a republic, renamed the province Azadiastan [Country of Freedom]. Some believe that Khiyabani's revolt was not linked to the 1919 agreement.¹⁰⁴⁸ However, in some of the foreign press of the time it was stated that the revolt was indeed a reaction to that agreement.¹⁰⁴⁹

As Oliver Bast has commented, "In the course of the ensuing Anglo-Iranian conflict, the Iranian foreign policy-makers came to realise that their own interpretation of this Agreement did not match that of the British".¹⁰⁵⁰ The Iranian Parliament never ratified this agreement and in 1921 it was announced null and void. The failure of the 1919 agreement led to the 1921 coup and the coming to power of Reza Khan and his Pahlavi dynasty; and so began a new era in Anglo-Iranian relationships.¹⁰⁵¹ But, before proceeding further it is necessary to discuss briefly the two major provincial revolts of Azerbaijan and Gilan in response to the weakness of the central government and the 1919 agreement.

¹⁰⁴⁷ *Kaveh*, July 17, 1920.

¹⁰⁴⁸ For instance, see: Homa Katouzian, "Ahmad Kasravi on the Revolt of Sheikh Mohammad Khiyabani" in *Iran and the First World War*, ed., Atabaki, 95-119.

¹⁰⁴⁹ *The New York Times*, October 18, 1919.

¹⁰⁵⁰ For more about British policy towards Iran after the Great War see: Oliver Bast, "British Imperialism and Persian Diplomacy in the Shadow of World War I (1914-1921)," in *Didgah: New Perspectives on UK-Iran Cultural Relation* (London: British Council, 2015), 113.

¹⁰⁵¹ Homa Katouzian, "The Campaign Against the Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919" in *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 25, no. 1 (1998), 45-6.

7:12 Taqizadeh's view on the Riots in the Provinces

After the collapse of the Tsarist regime, the Russians withdrew their army from the Iranian Azerbaijan province. The British could not send their forces there to fill the gap left by the Russian's withdrawal. Bolshevik propaganda had influenced some in Iranian Azerbaijan and the central government in Tehran was fearful that communists would finally seize power in Tabriz. This caused the anglophile Prime Minister Vosouq al-Dowleh to send officials from Tehran to overhaul the police department and financial administration which was causing dissatisfaction among the officials who already held posts. This added to the dissatisfaction of people in Tabriz who were already disappointed by the dysfunctional central government and it paved the way for Khiyabani, a Democrat and member of the Second Parliament, to galvanize the local people against the central government and seize power. In a declaration released on 8 April 1920, Khiyabani and his supporters stated that the local government was acting against the constitution and specified that their goal was to restore order and actualise the constitution.¹⁰⁵² Khiyabani's uprising ended with the taking over of the central government on 13 September, 1920 and his death. Opinions differ about Khiyabani's political objectives. Taqizadeh had his own opinions about this local uprising. It is important to review his comments on this in order to fully comprehend the policy of the central government regarding Azerbaijan and other provinces under Pahlavi rule over the coming decades.

Taqizadeh's opinion about Khiyabani is expressed later in the second series of *Kaveh*. Though implicit, any idea of the independence of Azerbaijan is bluntly rejected in the article. Taqizadeh considered Khiyabani's act childish and a mere show to fool the masses. He again emphasises the integrity of Iran as a unified country since Achaemenian times and describes Azerbaijan as an integral part of Iran which cannot be separated. Satirically, Taqizadeh describes the leaders of the movement as "the Great Politicians". He is particularly critical about the attempt of this movement to change the name of the province from Azerbaijan to Azadiastan. This suggestion came from the fact that the northern part of the Aras River which was currently located in land belonging to the Russian empire, although it had previously been part of Iran, had declared independence, calling their newly

¹⁰⁵² Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh*, 858-68.

established republic 'Azerbaijan'.¹⁰⁵³ In summary, Taqizadeh believed that if the Iranian government did not hand over the management of the country's affairs to the experts, even with the existing national unity in Iran there would still be separatist movements in Iran since people living near the frontiers would be able to witness the reforms and progress of the neighbouring countries and would thus, in contrast, recognise the backwardness of their own nation.¹⁰⁵⁴

At the same time, Taqizadeh is critical of the disapproving nature of the people of Iranian Azerbaijan towards Iran's central government. Despite the significant role that Azerbaijan had played in the Constitutional Movement, according to Taqizadeh, its people must view matters from a broader national perspective and should not consider themselves as solely responsible for the shortcomings of the government and should not threaten to sever their ties with the central government. He warns the Azerbaijanis not to allow themselves to be influenced by the independence seeking movements of the Caucasus as that could lead to ethnic clashes and bloodshed. Influenced by the European racial theories concerned with maintaining a country's unity, Taqizadeh promises to publish a follow-up article in which he would outline the story of the Azerbaijani people's ability to avoid being influenced by the Mogul rulers. This would emphasise the idea that, despite their linguistic and cultural difference, Azerbaijanis were indeed pure Iranians.¹⁰⁵⁵ The suggestion of Taqizadeh that Azerbaijanis not interfere with affairs of the capital is in sharp contrast to the fact that they forcefully resisted the closure of the Parliament by Mohammad Ali Shah and the abolition of the Constitution. This had been in contrast to almost all other provinces which had been in favour of the abolition of the Constitution and the re-establishment of authoritarian rule. But, at this point, Taqizadeh's main goal was to maintain the fragile unification of Iran. A part of Taqizadeh's Memorandum addressed to the Peace Conference of Paris reveals how Taqizadeh views Iran as a unified country: "Unified together by all sorts of bonds, belonging nearly all to the same race and having the same culture, habits and faith and almost the same language throughout, the Persian people form a unit of nationality. The country inside its present boundaries has always been, from the time of

¹⁰⁵³ *Kaveh*, August 16, 1920.

¹⁰⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, August 6, 1921.

¹⁰⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, August 16, 1920.

Ionian wars down to the present day, a contiguous body and the hereditary home of the same people who had and still has an original culture of her own and who has left behind a glorious history.”¹⁰⁵⁶ Despite these seemingly unrealistic and what might be termed romanticised theories, Taqizadeh was more pragmatic in his analysis of the harm that the government’s centralisation policy had caused.

In Taqizadeh’s view, the riots in the provinces had been caused by extreme corruption in the central administration of the country and the uneven allocation of resources throughout the provinces, compared to the capital. Taqizadeh complained that the corruption in the capital was stifling development of the provinces especially in the already more developed northern provinces of Iran, such as Azerbaijan, Gilan and Khorasan and suggested that this had led to provincial uprisings in those regions. He regretted that the opinion of the provinces had not been taken into account in the drafting of national policies; what was termed the consensus of mass opinion was, in fact, merely the view of the people of Tehran. He continued that the political viewpoints of Isfahan or Tabriz, for instance, did not carry as much weight as those of central Tehran and added that the people of the provinces were under the control of a governor from the capital rather than a local representative, even when it came to the process of electing members of parliament. According to Taqizadeh, despite the full support of the people, the provincial members of parliament did not have the same leverage as those from Tehran. However, in spite of all this, Taqizadeh did not consider that riots against the central government were the solution. He again emphasised the importance of education, keeping fit through physical exercise and the fight against disease. He believed that if leaders of the provincial uprising, such as Khiyabani, Colonel Pesyan and Mirza Kochak Khan, focus their efforts instead on education, they would be able to aid the implementation of reforms in Tehran. Taqizadeh accepted that, as had been posited, the reason for these uprisings was more than simply the personal ambitions of the leaders of these provincial uprising. According to Taqizadeh,

¹⁰⁵⁶ Taqizadeh, “Memorandum on Persia’s Wishes and her Aspirations Addressed to the Peace Conference of Paris” in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 7: 722- 8. For the French copy see: Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 853-9.

people of the provinces were frustrated by the corruption of politicians in the capital and this convinced them to join the provincial uprisings.¹⁰⁵⁷

While the events discussed above were taking place, *Kaveh* had only sporadically been published and, in fact, had eventually ceased publication all together. It was not until the beginning of 1920, when Taqizadeh began independently publishing the second series of *Kaveh* without financial support from the Germans that he was able to share his views in writing on those events. Writing after the events would have allowed Taqizadeh the time and space to reflect on what had happened and reactions to the events. It is, thus, important to examine in detail the views he expressed in the second series of *Kaveh*.

7:13 The Second Series of *Kaveh*

The second series of *Kaveh* began publication on 22 January 1920. In the editorial of the first issue Taqizadeh made it clear that the first series of *Kaveh* had been tailored for the war when co-operation with Germany had been necessary for the good of Iran. Now that the war had ended, *Kaveh's* wartime editorial stance would adapt to the new peace time period. There would be a completely different editorial focus with no ties to the previous series. The journal would publish more scientific, literary and historical articles with the aim of promulgating European culture and lifestyle in Iran, promoting a united nation and the maintenance of Persian language and literature. It also planned to campaign against fundamentalism and bigotry. Taqizadeh emphasised that following the revolution and change of government in Russia the situation was no longer so critical; there were now opportunities to devise long term plans for fundamental changes and to more effectively promote modernity in Iran. Now that the immediate Russian threat was removed leaving only Britain as the dominant power, British influence could be moderated by diplomacy and, thus, was not seen as an imminent danger. Furthermore, the heroic and emotional tone of the first issue of the first series of *Kaveh*, which had envisioned humanity's fate as being tied to warfare and indeed had praised war, had now changed. In the post-war series of *Kaveh*, following the peace agreement of 8 February 1920, Taqizadeh now propagated the idea of peace as the natural order of society and was hopeful that people

¹⁰⁵⁷ *Kaveh*, March 30, 1922.

would distance themselves from bloodshed as a way to resolve their disagreements.¹⁰⁵⁸ This now contrasting stance highlights how Taqizadeh, who had previously hoped to change Iran through the use of military force, had now moved his focus towards literature and culture, as often happens during peace time. This was of course influenced by the post-war atmosphere in Europe which was experiencing the devastating consequences of the Great War.

شماره ۱
سال پنجم
شماره مسلسل ۳۶



<p>قیمت اشتراک موقتاً (تا عودت میزان پول بهالت طبعی)</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th>سالیه</th> <th>هر ششماه</th> </tr> <tr> <td>در ایران ... ۲ تومان</td> <td>۲ فران</td> </tr> <tr> <td>در آلمان ... ۴۰ مارک</td> <td>۴ مارک</td> </tr> <tr> <td>در سایر ممالک ... ۳۰ فرانک</td> <td>۱ فرانک</td> </tr> </table>	سالیه	هر ششماه	در ایران ... ۲ تومان	۲ فران	در آلمان ... ۴۰ مارک	۴ مارک	در سایر ممالک ... ۳۰ فرانک	۱ فرانک	<h1 style="font-size: 4em;">کافه</h1> <p>۱۳۲۱</p>	<p>این روزنامه هر ماه یک بار در ۱۶ صفحه نشر میشود</p> <p>عنوان مراسلات Redaktion Kaveh: Berlin-Charlottenburg, Leibnizstr. 64</p>
سالیه	هر ششماه									
در ایران ... ۲ تومان	۲ فران									
در آلمان ... ۴۰ مارک	۴ مارک									
در سایر ممالک ... ۳۰ فرانک	۱ فرانک									

۱۴ شهریور ماه قدیم ۱۲۸۹ زردکری = عرّه جدای الاخره ۱۳۳۸ = ۲۲ ژانویه ۱۹۲۰ • Neue Folge • Nr. 1 • Jahrg. 5

دوره جدید

مقصود از دوره جدید تغییر اساسی است که در تاریخ روزنامه کاوه جات میشود. روزنامه کاوه در زمان جنگ پیدا شده و بشکل یک روزنامه سیاسی تأسیس شد که غرض عمده از نشر آن در ابتدا تقویت معنوی بود تا آن دسته از وطن پرستان ایرانی که بقیه آنها در جنگ بین الحاق گشته حیات و منافع ایران در آن طریق بود که با روس دشمنی بی امان ایران میکنند و هر نوع محاشات و کار آمدن را با دولت امپراطوری روس مخالف میدانست. در انتهای جنگ تاریخ عالم بسرعت سیر میکرد و وقایع عظیمه ای بی دریغ در دنیا رخ نمود که هر کدام بفرق محتاج بود: شکست زرنگ روس، انقلاب در آن ملک و منجر شدن به «بلشوزم» و قطع نقایب شکل حکومت تزاریهای قدیم روس بود. انقراض سلطنت عاسیووک و بنشیند شدن دولت مشجده اتریش و مجارستان، سرنگون شدن غلای و زوال حکومت ترک از حاکم غیر ترکی، پیدا شدن دول تازه ای از ملای عظمیه، مدخله دولت ایالات متحده آمریکای شمالی در امور دنیای قدیم و سیاست آن.

معلوم است که همه این وقایع علاوه شکست آلمان و زوال نفوذ سیاست او موقتاً از قطعات دیگر دنیا عوامل مهمی هستند برای تبدیل اسبقی در سیاست مشرق زمین و مخصوصاً ایران. این ملک که قبل از جنگ سر و کارش بیشتر با روس و انگلیس بود و تا اندازه ای با عثمانی و آلمان و از همه بیشتر سرنوشته آن ملک در دست روس بود حالا از همه بیشتر در تحت نفوذ انگلیس آمده و جزیره بریتانی است که در امور و سیاست آسیای وسطی اولین مقام را دارد و پس از آن فرانسه و آمریکا هم کم و بیش گاهی حرفی میزنند.

روزنامه کاوه زائیده جنگ بود و لهذا روش این روزنامه نیز با موقع جنگ متناسب بود و حالا که جنگ ختم شده و صلح بین المللی در رسیدن سکاهوه نیز دوره جنگی خود را ختم شده میداند و بیک دوره صلحی شروع میکند. و لهذا اساس و خط و روش تازه ای که از اول سال ۱۹۲۰ میلادی مطابق با ۹ ربیع الثانی ۱۳۳۸ کاوه جدید پیش میگرد نسبت به سکاهوه سابق ندارد و در واقع روزنامه تازه ای میشود که مندرجات آن بیشتر مقالات علمی و ادبی و تاریخی خواهد بود و مسلک و شمشاد بیشتر از هر چیز ترویج تمدن اروپائی است در ایران، جهاد برضه تحقیر، خدمت

Figure 15: The front page of the first issue of the second series of *Kaveh*

¹⁰⁵⁸ *Kaveh*, 21 February 1920.

It was in the inaugural editorial of this second series of *Kaveh* that Taqizadeh first laid out his controversial roadmap for the modernisation of Iran. It was based on three main principles; firstly, unconditional acceptance of and promotion of all aspects of European culture; its behaviours and traditions, its scientific methods, its industrial achievements and its lifestyle. The only exception was to be language, since the Persian language, as a strong unifying element, was to be protected at all costs. Secondly, there should be ample efforts to preserve and promote the Persian language and thirdly, a focus on the spreading of science by the establishment of schools and the spread and development of public education.

Taqizadeh's opponents were suspicious about the shifting editorial approach of *Kaveh* and Taqizadeh; from an initial pro-German stance, following the defeat of Germany the publication became politically neutral, focused more on history and literature. Aware of Taqizadeh's sympathy towards the British, Taqizadeh's critics saw this shift as a ruse and accused him of being a British agent.¹⁰⁵⁹ But after the disappointment following the Great War of not seeing the gains for Iran that he had hoped for, and his futile efforts to incite the Iranian people, Taqizadeh had concluded that it was not possible to mobilise illiterate people. The aim of *Kaveh* during its second period was thus to promote the importance of education in Iran and familiarise people with new ideas of modernity and nationhood. Taqizadeh was convinced that an unstable political situation was detrimental to the future of Iran and that education would increase stability and security in the country. Taqizadeh had realised that after the end of the Great War the perception of Europe that many educated Iranians especially the inhabitants of Tehran had now changed. As Yahya Dolatabadi noted, before the war it was as if European civilisation was the sun high in the sky towards which the people of Iran stretched out their arms in worship.¹⁰⁶⁰ They assumed Europe was replete with positive sentiments and empathy, kindness and emotion. They considered Europe as the cradle of humanity. However, the Great War had disillusioned them and they realised that the technological advancements of Europe had distanced Europeans from emotions.¹⁰⁶¹ Those who had previously been advocating for European influence now

¹⁰⁵⁹ Naseh Nateq, "Darbareh-e Taqizadeh," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaci, 191.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Dolatabadi, 90-1

¹⁰⁶¹ Ibid.

believed they were treading the wrong path. Following the war, helped by *Kaveh's* editorials Taqizadeh hoped to re-energise the pro-European movement once again. But there were still some who were critical of this attitude expressed in *Kaveh*.

Abbas Eqbal Ashtiyani was a young man who later became a famous scholar. Taqizadeh and he shared correspondence in which Eqbal also criticised the new stance of *Kaveh* and its focus on literature and education. He wrote to Taqizadeh that from the tone of the articles published in *Kaveh* it was clear that continuously chasing politics had left its writers drained and weary. With some sense of disappointment, they had concluded that the solution to Iran's problems lay in the revival of literature, in science and in education. In short, his opinion was that the main cause of the decline of Iran was politics.¹⁰⁶² From what Taqizadeh had written in reply to Eqbal it is clear that he strongly believed in the superiority of Western civilisation and was surprised that some intellectuals in Iran should doubt this "obvious fact". Comparing Iran to Western civilisation he commented, "We see quite clearly that Western civilisation has better adapted to the vicissitudes of material life. They have fought against diseases and have faced nature's adversities and succeeded in overcoming them. From a moral viewpoint, westerners do not lie as much as we do. They do not steal, plot against or hurt each other as much as we do. Most Western habits and customs are based on cleanliness and they know the value of time and directness".¹⁰⁶³

Another critic of Taqizadeh during the second period of *Kaveh* and its move away from politics to a focus on culture and literature was his close friend, Mohammad Reza Mosavat. In a letter to Taqizadeh Mosavat bitterly criticises him:

You have given yourself over to literature with the hope that the perfection of literature will mirror itself in the perfection of the nation and strengthen the government so that Iran may be released from forceful British command. You believe literature will help Iran gain the strength to build a factory to produce cannons capable of firing cannon balls a

¹⁰⁶² Abbas Eqbal Ashtiyani to Taqizadeh, 1920-21, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 464-9.

¹⁰⁶³ Taqizadeh to Eqbal in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Tus, 2011), 14: 345-63.

distance of 200 kilometres. Sir, only when the nation is strong again will its literature be enriched; not vice versa.

Mosavat clearly had an interpretation of the concept of modernity different to that of Taqizadeh. Taqizadeh who had once been an advocate of hard science had realised that modernisation by itself was not the only solution for Iran and that a deeper understanding of it in a theoretical sense was necessary. Taqizadeh viewed literature as a vehicle to convey the essence of modernity to the ordinary people. In contrast, Mosavat believed:

The initial achievements of Germany were a result of the power of machinery, the 42 cm canons, submarines and extraordinary aeroplanes. Their final defeat was due to the powerful tanks and armoured vehicles of the British and the outstanding shipbuilding factories of the USA and its allies. Both sides seemingly had it all: flourishing literature, emancipation of women and freedom of religion, the right to protest and fine arts such as painting. But in the end, it was the machine that won the Great War.¹⁰⁶⁴

Despite these words of Mosavat, it is evident that Taqizadeh was firmly convinced that without general public education, any political activities or reforms were useless and would not be long-lasting. Taqizadeh believed that if Iran wanted to catch up with the Europeans who he believed were at the vanguard of the caravan making its way towards civilisation, there was no alternative but to educate the illiterate masses. He used the example of Japan which by developing education and sending students to Europe and the United States had been able to quickly catch up with those societies at more advanced stages of modernisation. Although in Taqizadeh's mind there was not a conscious understanding or distinction between modernisation and modernity, through experience he had come to realise that without enlightening individuals, modernity could not be practiced in its totality throughout the country.¹⁰⁶⁵ He thus criticised those who were pushing for the swiftest route towards change without raising awareness and educating the general public. According to

¹⁰⁶⁴ Mosavat to Taqizadeh, Vienna, April 1920, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, ed., Afshar, 459-62.

¹⁰⁶⁵ *Kaveh*, April 10 1921.

Taqizadeh, those advocating for swift reforms believed that improved levels of education would naturally follow once a “righteous cabinet” came to power, when a “righteous party” held the majority in the parliament and after all the conventions, treaties, agreements and foreign loans were nullified and national security reinstated. Only when a strong army had been developed, railways and banks built and scientific study and practice accepted would schooling proliferate, they believed. In response to this argument Taqizadeh continued:

This is a flawed dream which comes out of a misguided desire for hasty reform in Iran. This is because it is feared that salvation will come too late; they (advocates of swift reforms) do not want to wait twenty years, desperate to see the fruits of their labours in three or four years. This haste, though, has in fact led to the opposite result; there have been and will continue to be constant delays and setbacks on the path towards true freedom. I and my fellow thinkers have been saying for fifteen years now that reform through education will take time. Instead, they want to improve conditions in the country by passing laws and forming political parties but actually very little progress has been made, if at all. In fact, we have only moved as everything moves forward naturally in the world. Still in Yazd, like in the Middle Ages, we distance ourselves from our Zoroastrian countrymen and don’t conduct business with them simply because they don’t dress like us. In Khorasan we still make fun of those who don’t use opium and in Tabriz we are still proud of those who hit their head with swords during mourning ceremonies.¹⁰⁶⁶

Although Taqizadeh had not formulated a detailed plan for the spread of ideas of modernity in Iran, in the first issue of the second year of the new series of *Kaveh* he laid out 17 points that he believed were crucial for Iran’s move towards modernisation. His focus was on what could be done outside the realm of politics to fight corruption and what he considered weak morals of Iranian people. Taqizadeh believed that these strategies were more important than political modernisation and would lead the country in the right direction. His main points were as follows: 1. A focus on public education and its

¹⁰⁶⁶ *Kaveh*, April 10, 1921.

widespread proliferation.¹⁰⁶⁷ (The spreading of education throughout the country was, for him, a crucial point and one that he recommended be carried out at all costs) 2. Publication of useful books and translation and publication of Western books. 3. The unconditional acceptance of Western manners and customs. 4. Strong encouragement of regular European-style physical exercise. 5. Safeguarding of the national unity of Iran. 6. Preservation and protection of the national language, Persian. 7. A campaign against the use of opium, opium smoker's pipe and alcohol. 8. A battle against ignorant intolerance, and the full granting of equal rights to followers of different religions. 9. A proclamation of a campaign to eradicate diseases, in particular malaria, venereal disease, tuberculosis, typhoid fever and childhood illnesses. 10. Maintenance of the independence and sovereignty of Iran. 11. Modernisation of the country following a European style with particular focus on the introduction of machinery. 12. Freedom of women, including their right to education and a demand for the granting of their rights and wishes. 13. A battle against mendacity. 14. A forceful attempt to abolish the evil habit of plotting and intrigue which has unfortunately become rampant throughout Iran under the name of "diplomacy". 15. The wiping out of the shameful practice of unnatural love which since the beginning of time has been one of the worst evils of our people and one of the greatest obstacles to civilisation.¹⁰⁶⁸ 16. A battle against buffoonery, facetious talk, hyperbole, idle banter and garrulity and an attempt to engender an attitude of seriousness among people. 17. Revival of positive traditional Iranian national customs and habits.

The points above were written with a secular mind set and there is no evidence of advocating for the practice of a set religion. Some of the points focusing on equality for followers of all religions and women's rights are some of the universally accepted core values of modernity. Other points are based on Taqizadeh's personal observations which

¹⁰⁶⁷ Some of these points were underlined in the original text and have been similarly underlined in this translation.

¹⁰⁶⁸ It should be noted that "the unnatural love" that Taqizadeh refers to here is the practice of homosexuality in the context of Iran in that period and it should not be confused with homosexuality in its modern sense. There should be a distinction made between the homosexuality as a lifestyle choice and what is termed 'situational' homosexuality. This 'situational' or 'behavioural' homosexuality often occurs in a closed society with extreme segregation of sexes leading to restricted contact with the opposite sex resulting in relations with same-sex partners. For more on this topic see for example: Stephen O. Murray and Will Roscoe, eds., *Islamic Homosexualities: Culture, History, and Literature*. Edited New York: New York University Press, 1997.

together form guidelines for the practice of modernity and the modernisation of Iran. It could be suggested that it is those points outlined by Taqizadeh which apply specifically to the Iranian context that turned out to be the ones which, in his view, hindered the acceptance or practice of modernity in Iran.

During this period Taqizadeh extensively studied the benefits of sport and exercise. He was convinced that the key solution to Iran's troubles lay not in politics but in education, the promotion of sport and a battle against alcohol, opium and various diseases. Thus, in almost every issue of the new series of *Kaveh* he dedicated an article to the promotion of sport and a healthy lifestyle and extolling the importance of education. One should also bear in mind that Taqizadeh was living in post-war Germany where the importance of sport was increasingly emphasised. After the defeat of Germany in 1918 the physical fitness of its citizens became a national priority.¹⁰⁶⁹ As a result, Germany in the early 1920s became the birth place of sports psychology focusing on the study of the effects of physical exercise on the human mind, emotions and behaviour.¹⁰⁷⁰ Consequently, in the 1920s physical education was given more attention and was considered essential for the development of healthy, well-educated individuals.¹⁰⁷¹ These practices were based on a modern view, influenced by the eugenics movement, of the ideal body being strong, streamlined, and engineered for maximum performance.¹⁰⁷²

The emphasis on physical exercise expressed by Taqizadeh was later continued by others, in particular Hossein Kazemzadeh who in his journal *Iranshahr* [Land of Iran] dedicated several articles to the importance of physical education in Iranian schools. In his private correspondence Taqizadeh is particularly direct about his new attitude to physical

¹⁰⁶⁹ Erik N. Jensen, *Body by Weimar: Athletes, Gender, and German Modernity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 4.

¹⁰⁷⁰ The German Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (1778-1852), following the Napoleonic invasion, encouraged the idea of restoring the spirit of his countrymen through the practice of physical exercise. Hossein Kazemzadeh published an article declaring Jahn the father of German sporting activity and highlighted Jahn's emphasis on the importance of physical exercise in his *Journal Iranshahr*. See: *Iranshahr*, 16 January 1924.

¹⁰⁷¹ Roland Naul, "Physical Education Teacher Training," in *Sport and Physical Education in Germany*, eds. Roland Naul and Ken Hardman (London: Routledge, 2002).

¹⁰⁷² Erik N. Jensen, *Body by Weimar: Athletes, Gender, and German Modernity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 4.

exercise. In a letter to Mahmoud Afshar, for instance, he openly expresses his views on the necessity of changing the current situation in Iran through education and promotion of a healthy lifestyle:

In addition to thousands of examples abroad, I have had personal first-hand experience in Iran as well and am thus convinced of the necessity of following this course of action. Most, if not all, Iranians are unprincipled, indecisive and obsequious. They talk with insincere complements and are sycophants. They are liars and cheats, opportunists who are quick to follow what they consider to be the most advantageous route as and when they see fit or as they call it “politics”. Every day, according to the present circumstances, they voice what they consider to be the most suitable opinion on that day. In short, they lack character. They are constantly busy plotting sabotage and involved in intrigue. I can honestly say that the only exemption I have seen is the military personnel from Iran who trained in military academies in France or in Iran under the supervision of military commanders from a European system, (even those trained by the savage Russian Cossacks).¹⁰⁷³

These comments by Taqizadeh about military personnel exemplify the importance that was assigned by some members of the intelligentsia to the army and propagate the idea that a military man was the ideal leader to save Iran. This further lay the foundations for Reza Khan (subsequently Reza Shah Pahlavi), a military Cossack officer, to be viewed as just such a leader and was one of the reasons he was able to topple the Qajar dynasty and swiftly climb the ladder of power to eventually become the Shah.

Through the second series of *Kaveh*, Taqizadeh’s additional aim was to educate its readership about what could be considered the core values of modernity such as valuing scientific study, respect for religious minorities and in particular equal rights of non-Muslims living in Iran. According to Taqizadeh himself, one of the reasons he had had to

¹⁰⁷³ Taqizadeh to Mahmoud Afshar, 10 January 1922, in *Nameh-hay-e Dustan*, ed., Afshar, 99-103

leave the Second Parliament was the fact that he had insisted on advocating for the rights of an Ismaili who was the victim of religious fanaticism. Now he again found himself criticised when he advocated in *Kaveh* for the rights of Babis, Christians, Zoroastrians and Jews in Iran. And once again Taqizadeh was accused of being Babi and had to vehemently deny it. At this point he realised that it was not enough to simply want the external trappings of modernity; people must also respect the core values of modernity such as non-discrimination against religious minorities and freedom of belief. Living abroad now he could not be targeted by the extremist clergy and was free to push more explicitly for reforms in Islam with the aim of purifying it from what he considered to be superstitions.

Some of the articles written by Taqizadeh in the new series of *Kaveh* can shed more light on Taqizadeh's core ideas aimed at moving Iran in the direction of modernity. In the first place, Taqizadeh wanted Iranians to be aware of their lack of knowledge and backwardness in different fields. For him this was the starting point of his strategy to move the people from ignorance towards knowledge. He believed that the greatest social malady was the ignorance of the masses which he referred to as a mob.¹⁰⁷⁴ He was opposed to extreme nationalism and the mixing of sentimentality with science and saw humanity as a universal value which he believed should not be tainted by nationalism. Further, he elaborated on what he considered as the mixing of politics with science which he referred to as "the false patriotism" and which he thought had become an epidemic in Iran. Admitting to a lack of knowledge and accepting the superiority of the scientific progress of Europe and its civilisation was still considered a national crime by most Iranians. In Taqizadeh's opinion it was better that Iranians admit their ignorance and start anew to acquire scientific knowledge as the Europeans had done.¹⁰⁷⁵

In an attempt to counteract superstitious beliefs and the questioning of a non-scientific outlook on life, Taqizadeh began publishing a series of provocative articles in *Kaveh* titled "Debate between Day and Night". The style of these articles was based on a traditional genre of Persian poetry, *Monazereh*. *Monazereh*, meaning debate or dialogue, is one of the

¹⁰⁷⁴ *Kaveh*, August 16, 1920.

¹⁰⁷⁵ *Kaveh*, July 17, 1920.

less prevalent types of Persian poetry, employing rhetorical figures of speech through which the poet discusses both sides of a topic, as if a debate were taking place, the characters of the poems taking turns to set questions and offer answers. In this genre of poetry, the parties carrying out this dialogue or debate were people or sometimes other animate or even inanimate objects. Often the poetic debates were written as taking place between two lovers. Although what Taqizadeh published in *Kaveh* was not in verse, he deliberately chose to use the style of this genre of poetry, using a debate between day and night or light and darkness to symbolise a distinction and a tension between tradition and modernity. In one of the articles, for instance, Taqizadeh used this style to highlight the contrast between how westerners described monkeys and how they were perceived in the Islamic world.¹⁰⁷⁶ In order to highlight the contrasting views, Taqizadeh juxtaposed two columns, each written from the point of view of one side of the debate. Qazvini's comments about Taqizadeh's attempts is illuminating since Qazvini was sharing his opinions contemporaneously and would have been fully aware of the perils of someone like Taqizadeh writing in such a style and about such topics at that time as well as recognising the temerity of Taqizadeh in discussing such controversial subjects which might easily enrage religious conservatives. Suggesting Taqizadeh might become the Voltaire of Islam, Qazvini writes:

...I greatly enjoyed the topic you have raised in *Kaveh* and in my opinion it is one of *Kaveh*'s most useful topics and it is definitely an original subject. Because to this day nobody has had either the courage or the temerity to even broach this subject. I think (if you are not thinking of going back to Iran) this subject must be elaborated further, and dealt with more courageously and you should repeat the work of Voltaire in ... (Islam).¹⁰⁷⁷ This means the same service that Voltaire did for Christianity you would do for ... (Islam). For how long should these monstrosities of Islam be covered up? For the past.... (1400) years, whenever someone has uttered anything

¹⁰⁷⁶ *Kaveh*, May 20, 1920.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Here there are three dots in the text. It is not known whether this is how it was written by Qazvini in the original text or whether it was added later by Iraj Afshar, the editor of the published letters, in order to avoid controversy. In any case, it would seem highly likely that the omitted word was actually "Islam".

against these heaped up fantasies, superstitions and darkness of ... (Islam), that person has been considered depraved, accused of heresy, been excommunicated and murdered. Now the power of the authorities of.... Is totally shattered but this darkness still hangs over the hearts of Muslims and has pitched a tent there. Eventually someone must be found who has the courage to say...¹⁰⁷⁸

In a letter, Taqizadeh also discusses this topic and makes his intentions clearer. He elaborates that he wants to criticise those contemporary Iranians who are following the knowledge of the Middle-Ages and who have not only failed to move forwards but, in fact, have moved backwards. He is critical of the fact that few traces remain of the works of the scholars of the early centuries of Islam and science and literature seem to have been forgotten. He states that the mistakes made by the learned men of the olden times have been repeated and even exacerbated by contemporary Islamic scholars. Interestingly Taqizadeh comments that some of the famous poets, historians and men of letters of the Qajar time, such as Reza Qoli Hedayat, E'temad al-Saltaneh and Mirza Taqi Sepher were not knowledgeable and even suggested they were charlatans. Among the ones Taqizadeh criticises is the famous Talebov who is widely believed to have had an impact, through his activities, on the awakening of people prior to the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. Contrary to mainstream opinions about Talebov, Taqizadeh believed his works were populist. He similarly criticises Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani and calls him the propagator of ignorance and impudence.¹⁰⁷⁹ He states that if Iranian scholars have written at all, it has been very little in the twentieth century, criticises their style as old fashioned and posits that there seemed to be few critical thinkers who could be considered to be on the same

¹⁰⁷⁸ It seems that this part is also omitted and has been replaced by three dots.

¹⁰⁷⁹ This is in contrast with what Fereydoon Adamiyat, the distinguished contemporary Iranian historian, has written about Kermani. He greatly praises Kermani and describes him as "The greatest thinker of nationalism, the harbinger of European civic knowledge and foundations, the critique of colonialism, the hatred of humanitarian religion. Pre-Constitutional Revolutionary thinker. Founder of Philosophy of Iranian History. One of the pioneers of modern wisdom in Iran ... a renowned national poet, critic of literary traditions, representative of literary criticism." Based on Adamiyat's positive depiction, Kermani became known as one of the most influential and revered figures who intellectually inspired the Constitution. However, Taqizadeh's comments about Kermani should be taken into consideration and offer an important contrast to the widely held positive opinions about this man in Iranian historiography. Adamiyat, *Andisheh-hay-e Mirza Aqa Khan-e Kermani*.

level as the Western scholars. Taqizadeh's criticism could have stemmed from the fact that Talebov was attempting to move towards modernity within a framework of Islam. Taqizadeh, on the other hand, was a staunch secularist who saw a need for a complete separation of politics and religion. Kermani was a committed Babi influenced by that religion's ideology and Taqizadeh would have equally been opposed to any suggestion that religion might be in the same arena as politics; there was no place for any religious influence in modernity's ideology, for Taqizadeh.

While in Germany during and after the war, Taqizadeh could not have failed to become aware of the increased presence of women in many facets of life due to the war situation. As was also witnessed in other European countries, with many men fighting and involved in the war efforts, women in Germany had begun to play a more active role in society. This must have influenced Taqizadeh and could account for the fact that his focus turned to women's rights and the role women might play in the modernisation of Iran. This is in contrast to many of his contemporary politicians and intellectuals who had not themselves witnessed women's increased prominence. The importance of this period in the emancipation of women in Europe has been addressed extensively, but less attention has been paid to the perception of this by Iranians. One example of an Iranian who had witnessed this in Germany at that time was Vahid al-Molk Sheybani, a friend of Taqizadeh. He recounts his impressions of being in Berlin during the war, noting the lack of men and increased presence of women: "The first thing which catches one's attention upon arriving in Berlin is the lack of people especially males. The young men are all serving in the army or at the front lines. Most jobs which were previously done by men are now being carried out by women. The post wagons and urban carriages are driven by women".¹⁰⁸⁰ This was in contrast to prior to the war when having a profession, especially for women from middle class and noble backgrounds, had been considered a slur on the good name of their families. These upper classes had suffered the most.¹⁰⁸¹ Here it should be mentioned that the lack of available marriageable men further facilitated the marriages between European women and Iranians. One obvious example is the marriage of Abol Hassan Hakimi to a German woman

¹⁰⁸⁰ Abd al-Hossein Sheybani, 137.

¹⁰⁸¹ Qobad Taqizadeh, *Alman dar Nim Qarn-e Akhir* [Germany; The Last Fifty Years] (Tehran, Ofset, 1965), 42.

whose husband was missing in the war. After a five-year wait they were eventually able to find out through the German Red Cross in Russia that he had died in war and thus Hakimi was finally able to marry the now widowed woman.¹⁰⁸² The marriages of Iranian men to European women could be an interesting area of further academic research.

In the new issues of *Kaveh* Taqizadeh dedicated more pages to reflecting on the situation of women in Iran and the necessity for them to be educated in order to help change the situation in Iran. The first article dedicated to the education of women was written by Jamalzadeh's Swiss wife, published under her Persian name "Zari Khanoum" which, unlike most articles about women in Iranian newspapers at that time which highlighted the role of women vis-à-vis the progress of society, emphasised the rights of women as human beings not as chattels or housekeepers. It also highlighted their right to be happy, liberated and financially independent and emphasises women's agency and their right to take ownership of their own destiny and their own happiness.¹⁰⁸³ These efforts were closely aligned to Taqizadeh's ideas of developing a modern state based on equal rights for all members of that state.

Another point which is worthy of mention and which Taqizadeh has referred to in *Kaveh* is the uneven process of modernisation in Iran and the disparity between the situation in the capital and that of the provinces. This disparity had had a long-standing influence on the modernisation of Iran. Taqizadeh is concerned about ensuring that what the inhabitants of Tehran applied to the capital, they also applied to the rest of Iran. Regarding the situation of women, he is also critical of the lack of consistency in the levels of education of women across the country. However, in *Kaveh* Taqizadeh celebrates the fact that more female Iranians are being educated in new style schools but also expresses his regret that the education of women, like many other things, has been limited to Tehran, whilst the provinces have been deprived of the same opportunities. Opportunities for female education throughout the whole country, not just in the capital, Taqizadeh feels, is

¹⁰⁸² Abol Hassan Hakimi to Taqizadeh in 10 July 1922, in *Nameh-hay-e Tehran*, ed., Afshar, 35.

¹⁰⁸³ "Asas-e Enqelab-e Ejtema'ei: Tarbiat-e Zanan," [The Origins of Social Revolution: Women's Education] in *Kaveh*, June 18, 1920.

a necessity if the modernisation of Iran is to be achieved.¹⁰⁸⁴ He comments that between Tehran and the provinces there is a vast difference in terms of culture, the extent of modernisation and security and many political leaders and intellectuals often ignore this fact. He notes that the Iranian government should not only be responsible for security and developments in Tehran but also in other parts of Iran. In short, he advocates for a powerful, stable central government whose members hold sufficient powers to plan and implement changes.¹⁰⁸⁵

On 30 March 1922, a special issue of *Kaveh* was published. In the editorial Taqizadeh explained about the financial problems of the newspaper but was hopeful that the newspaper should continue. Since he had been dispatched to Moscow as part of a government mission, he was unable to continue the work. He assured his supporters that the newspaper would begin publication again upon his return. However, this was a promise that he could not keep; *Kaveh* was never published again. Despite this, *Kaveh's* legacy remained. It would be remembered for ever as a pioneering paper that represents part of Iran's journey towards modernity.

Taqizadeh's editorial focus in *Kaveh* provides a perspective on his views on developments in Iran and his concerns about the country's slow progress towards modernity. The most pressing concerns for Taqizadeh were now the country's internal situation and the lack of a powerful central government which could maintain Iran's unity. This was different to previously, when he had considered foreign forces as the biggest threat to the sovereignty of Iran. In fact, it could be said that, while at the beginning of the Constitutional Revolution he had hoped that reform in the political system and the restriction of the intervention of any foreign powers in Iran might lead to Iran's development, after the end of the Great War his perspective changed and became more introspective. He had come to the belief that the problem mainly lay not with external factors but rather with issues within its own borders; Iran must first resolve its internal issues before it had any hope of successfully moving towards modernisation. In his own

¹⁰⁸⁴ *Kaveh*, May 21, 1920.

¹⁰⁸⁵ *Kaveh*, September 1, 1921.

words, “The British, the Russians nor the Ottomans were capable of completely destroying Iran. The biggest political, national and racial threats were, in fact, opium, alcohol, venereal disease and lack of physical exercise which were going to endanger the existence of Iran. All these threats could be easily addressed by widespread education.”¹⁰⁸⁶ Clearly, at this point, Taqizadeh is influenced by the theory of survival of the fittest; rather than political development his suggested approach is to focus on social maladies which according to him had paralysed the Iranian people. After having been previously determined to create change through political activities, he now believes political development could not take place without these social and cultural problems first being solved.¹⁰⁸⁷

Although *Kaveh* was attempting to target a wider audience, women among them, and both within and outside Iran, its financial situation was dire. Living in post-war Germany was becoming increasingly challenging. The post-war financial crisis made life difficult for people and Taqizadeh and his colleagues working in *Kaveh* had to face the vicissitudes of daily life. The post-war years for Germany were the gloomiest. Many families had lost their breadwinners. Food shortage, cold and hunger had made the situation even worse. Oil and bread had become so scarce that even the upper-class families struggled to afford these necessities. According to Jamalzadeh, both he and Taqizadeh, both of whom worked for *Kaveh*, did not have sufficient food and Taqizadeh was unable to sleep due to being so weak. Mahmoud Afshar describes Taqizadeh’s life in Berlin as being so difficult that he had to wear repaired shoes. During the same period, Iran was also witnessing fundamental changes.

7:14 The 1921 Coup

The Iranian government had lost most of its power outside the capital by 1920 and British and Soviet forces had control over most of Iran’s territory. A letter written to Taqizadeh by Mohammad Ali Badamchi may partly explain the unfavourable situation in Iran in 1921. Describing the situation of the country he writes: “The situation in Azerbaijan is becoming worse on a daily basis. Local insurgents are taking over the country. There is

¹⁰⁸⁶ *Kaveh*, September 1, 1921.

¹⁰⁸⁷ *Kaveh*, March 30, 1922.

no trace of central government. All over Iran, in particular in Azerbaijan, tyranny is rife and abusive chieftains reign. Marauding pillagers and Kurds are ransacking the villages. All the governmental forces which have consumed the country's finances and eaten up all the loans are now completely paralysed and have lost all control."¹⁰⁸⁸

On the Sunday night of 20 February 1921, 2500 Cossack soldiers departed from Gazvin, about 200 kilometres from Tehran. Under the command of Reza Khan (later known as Reza Shah Pahlavi) Tehran was occupied with little resistance. The recently appointed Prime Minister, Fatollah Akbar Sepahdar-e A'zam was deposed.¹⁰⁸⁹ Consequently negotiations began between Reza Khan and the Shah about the formation of a new government.¹⁰⁹⁰ It was said that Reza Khan wanted a strong administration, loyal to the Shah.¹⁰⁹¹ By taking control of the capital Reza Khan was able to imprison several former officials, among them Firuz Mirza Farmanfarma, the former Foreign Minister. The deposed Prime Minister, Sepahdar-e A'zam took refuge in the British Legation and was assured by Reza Khan of a pardon.¹⁰⁹² In the aftermath of the coup, Seyyed Zi'a al-Din Tabatabaei, a journalist, was appointed the new Prime Minister.

On 9 April, Seyyed Zi'a, at a dinner party held for foreign officials, laid out the foreign policy of his government. He declared that relations with Great Britain were now cordial, owing to the voiding of the Anglo-Persian agreement which had caused misunderstandings. Iran, he continued, depended on good relations with Russia and England. In addition, Iran had turned to America which had always previously opposed the Anglo-Persian pact for agriculture and to France for legal advisers. Iran had also contemplated employing Belgians and Swedes. On May 1, the British troops left Tehran just as a Russian mission entered.¹⁰⁹³ Seyyed Zi'a's cabinet lasted 100 days. During this period, it became evident that he was unable to implement plans ensuring British interests. As a result, the British minister in

¹⁰⁸⁸ Mohammad Ali Badamchi to Taqizadeh, 10 August 1921, in *Nameh-hay-e Mashrutiyat va Mohajerat*, 473.

¹⁰⁸⁹ The occupation of Tehran was affected with only about a dozen persons slightly wounded. "Keeps Order in Teheran," *The New York Times*, February 25, 1921.

¹⁰⁹⁰ "Persian General Occupies Teheran," *The New York Times*, February 23, 1921.

¹⁰⁹¹ "Persians to Defy Red," *The New York Times*, February 24, 1921.

¹⁰⁹² "Prince Jailed in Tehran," *The Washington Post*, February 27, 1921.

¹⁰⁹³ "Persia's New Alignment," *Current History (New York)*, 14(3), 526-7.

Tehran informed Ahmad Shah that they would no longer support Seyyed Zi'a and that he should be removed by the Shah.

During this period, Taqizadeh was witnessing these events from Germany whilst struggling to survive in the difficult situation of post-war Germany. According to Jamalzadeh the members of the committee had received a small amount of money from the Germans after the war to facilitate their return to their home countries. Some of the committee members invested this money to open a shop called "Persepolis". This grocer's shop was to sell pyjamas and open up business links with Iran and would once again provide a small income for Taqizadeh and his colleagues who had stayed to publish *Kaveh*. Unfortunately, this was not profitable and after a short time, the shop had to close.¹⁰⁹⁴ Taqizadeh was now seeking advice from his friends in Iran and considering returning to Iran. Yahya Dolatabadi in a letter to Taqizadeh writes that although he was looking forward to seeing Taqizadeh, he recommended he postponed his return. He adds that being assigned to a mission abroad would be Taqizadeh's best option. He complains about the political situation of Iran, suggesting that the time is not right for Taqizadeh's return.¹⁰⁹⁵ Mohammad Ali Foroughi similarly advised Taqizadeh to remain in Europe if he could. Like Dolatabadi he also believed that it would be better for Taqizadeh to be assigned a position outside Iran. Foroughi promised that he would do his best to aid him in this regard.¹⁰⁹⁶ It is in this context that the groundwork was laid for Taqizadeh to be assigned a task in Russia.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Jamalzadeh, "Man Jamalzadeh Darbareh-e Taqizadeh Shahadat Midaham" in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 46-7.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Yahya Dolatabadi to Taqizadeh, 11 February 1922 in *Nameh-hay-e Tehran*, ed., Afshar, 38-9.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Foroughi to Taqizadeh, 6 November 1921 in *Ibid.*, 49-50.

PART TWO
THE STATESMAN

Chapter Eight

Taqizadeh as Statesman and the Rise of Reza Shah

As stated in the previous chapter, his acceptance of a governmental position was a turning point in Taqizadeh's political life and as mentioned, Taqizadeh had pondered long and hard about it and discussed it with his friends before accepting it. He had had a hard decision to make, to side with the government and power or oppose it. Weighing up the situation, he decided to co-operate with and become a member of the government, opening a new chapter in his life. Taqizadeh was a pragmatist, always eager to put into practice what he had thought long about and theorised. As well as the personal reasons that were explained at the end of the previous chapter, under a new regime, although far from his ideal, by taking up this governmental post, Taqizadeh now saw an opportunity for himself to be able to actualise his thoughts and ideas. Later in this period, with the coming to power of Reza Shah, although Taqizadeh had opposed the ending of the Qajar dynasty and the introduction of Reza Khan as Shah, considering it unconstitutional, there was finally a clear prospect of some of his ideas being actualised. Quite probably he believed that by holding a post within the establishment, he would be able to moderate the dictatorial side of the regime and help steer it in the right direction. After the Great War, he strongly advocated that education should be prioritised in Iran, whilst being cognisant of the fact that this would have to be a gradual process.

His mission began with Russia, a power that he had always considered a threat to the sovereignty of Iran. But he went there now in an official capacity, representing his country to carry out negotiations with a new revolutionary regime in Russia.

8:1 Soviet Union Mission and the Trade Talks

In 1921 the Soviet Union signed four significant treaties with Iran, Ottoman Turkey, Afghanistan and Bukhara. These treaties revitalised independent nationalist movements in Iran, Ottoman Turkey and Afghanistan. The Torkamanchay Treaty, signed in 1828 between Iran and Tsarist Russia was still in force at the time of the Russian Revolution of 1917. However, following the Revolution, the Russian revolutionaries were eager to see their

Marxist-inspired ideology actualised. They wanted all treaties, conventions, accords and protocols previously signed with Iran, including the Torkamanchay Treaty to be terminated. When the new revolutionary regime's minister arrived in Tehran, he officially announced the ending of all the agreements. On 14 January 1918, the Foreign Minister of the new Russian government, Leon Trotsky, sent a letter to the Iranian legation in St. Petersburg confirming the termination of all the past agreements.¹⁰⁹⁷ Consequently a new treaty was signed between Iran and Soviet Russia on 26 February 1921, a few days after the coup led by Reza Khan and the formation of a new cabinet by Seyyed Zi'a.¹⁰⁹⁸ The treaty was signed between the newly assigned Iranian envoy in Russia, Ali Qoli Khan Moshaver al-Mamalek and two representatives of the government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, Georgii Vasilievich Chicherin and Lev Mikhailovich. The treaty had to be ratified by both parties within three months.¹⁰⁹⁹ The "Treaty of Friendship between Persia and the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic" was approved by the Iranian Parliament on 15 December 1921.¹¹⁰⁰ The first clause of the treaty thus abrogated the former arrangements between the former Russian Imperial government and Iran:

Accordingly, wishing to see the Persian people independent, flourishing and freely controlling the whole of its own possessions, the Government of the R. S. F. S. R. declares all treaties, conventions and agreements concluded by the late Czarist Government with Persia and tending to the diminution of the rights of Persian people completely null and void.¹¹⁰¹

This treaty of 1921 is a turning point in Russia's diplomacy in the East and the beginning of a new social order. It strongly criticises imperialism and promises that the Soviet Union will support Iranians to obtain their national rights. Among the other significant changes that this treaty brought to Iran was one concerning trade and business.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Hossein Makki, *Zendegani-e Siyasi-e Soltan Ahmad Shah* (Tehran: 'Elmi, 1944), 220-34.

¹⁰⁹⁸ For the full text of the agreement see: Hossein Makki, *Zendegani-e Siyasi-e Soltan Ahmad Shah* (Tehran: 'Elmi, 1944), 235-8. Also see: *Kaveh*: August 6, 1921.

¹⁰⁹⁹ "Persia's New Alignment," *Current History* (New York), 14(3), 526.

¹¹⁰⁰ Abdollah Mostofi, *Shareh-e Zendegani Man* (Tehran: Zavvar, 2011), 3: 188.

¹¹⁰¹ "Persia's New Alignment," *Current History* (New York), 14(3), 526.

According to the Iranian figures from 1906 / 7 to 1913 / 1914, Iran imported more from Russia than from any other country. Britain and India were second followed by the Ottoman Turkey, France and Germany.¹¹⁰² After the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the change of regime which had led to the instability of trade with Russia, the people of the northern provinces of Iran who had traded with Russia in the past were left in poverty and desperation. It was then that the importance of trade with Russia became apparent to the Iranians.¹¹⁰³ People who were affected began sending petitions and telegraphs, imploring the parliament and the government for a trade agreement with the newly established regime in Russia since the Soviet regime had closed the trade routes.¹¹⁰⁴ During 1921 trade talks with Russians were the focus of political life in Iran.¹¹⁰⁵ However, Soviet-Iranian trade was renewed in the spring of 1921, without any trade agreement.¹¹⁰⁶

Iranian businessmen in the past had been able to trade freely without government restrictions. Now, however, the new Soviet regime ensured that all trade was channelled through and regulated by the government, making it increasingly difficult for Iranians to continue trading with the Russians. This particularly affected goods, such as dried fruits, whose sole market had traditionally been Russia.¹¹⁰⁷ The Soviets wanted Iranian merchants to import only Russian-made products into Iran and not to export Iranian products through Russia to other countries.¹¹⁰⁸

Article 19 and 20 of the Russo-Iranian Treaty of 1921 outlined that the parties would resume commercial relations, although the fine details were to be finalised by a commercial convention. In January 1922, Moshir al-Dowleh became Prime Minister and announced

¹¹⁰² Marvin L. Enter, *Russo-Persian commercial relations, 1828-1914* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1965), 64.

¹¹⁰³ Before the Great War Russia ranked top of the countries which traded with Iran but after the war Britain took that position; its exports to Iran were three times that of Russia. For more detail about Iranian trade during this period see: *Kaveh*: February 21, 1920.

¹¹⁰⁴ Mohammad Ali Foroughi to Taqizadeh, 8 June 1923, in *Nomeh-hay-e Tehran*, ed., Afshar, 52. Regarding the complaints of businessmen and merchants see also: *Shafaq-e Sorkh*, November 2 & 5, 1922.

¹¹⁰⁵ Mikhail Volodarsky, *The Soviet Union and Its Southern Neighbours: Iran and Afghanistan 1917-1933* (Essex: Frank Cass & Co, 1994), 69.

¹¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 67.

¹¹⁰⁷ "Khoshkbar-e Iran va Rusieh [Iranian and Russian Dried Fruit]" in *Kaveh*, June 15, 1917.

¹¹⁰⁸ *Shafaq-e Sorkh*, September 7, 1922.

that a delegation would be sent to negotiate with the Russians.¹¹⁰⁹ Against this background, Taqizadeh was appointed by the Iranian government to negotiate the signing of an economic agreement with the Soviet Union. Taqizadeh had commented on the Russo-Iranian Treaty of 1921 in two issues of *Kaveh*; he believed one of the reasons he was considered suitable for this mission was because of his background knowledge of Russian and Iran agreements.¹¹¹⁰ According to Mojtehedī, another reason that Taqizadeh was chosen for this mission was the request from Iranians living in the Caucasus that Taqizadeh be sent to Russia to resolve the situation.¹¹¹¹

Although Taqizadeh was positive about this agreement and believed many of its articles guaranteed Iranian rights, he expressed his concerns about article six of the agreement.¹¹¹² According to this article, in the event of a third country intervening militarily or attacking Russia from Iranian soil, Russia had the right to send its troops into Iran. Taqizadeh believed this article was open to misinterpretation and could be problematic in the future. Taqizadeh's fears were to be realised when during the Second World War, the Red Army invaded Iran, referring to this article of the agreement to justify their occupation of Iran. Taqizadeh was sceptical, too, of article eleven; the Russians had previously prevented Iran from having a naval force in the Caspian Sea based on article eight of the Torkamanchay Peace Treaty of 1828 which stipulated that Russia's naval vessels were the only warships permitted in the Caspian Sea.¹¹¹³ Now, according to Taqizadeh, article eleven of the 1921 treaty, regarding the return of Iran's naval rights, was not explicit enough.¹¹¹⁴

¹¹⁰⁹ Sadreddin Moti' Esfahani, "Sayyid Hasan Taqizadeh: The Emergence of Modern Iran" (PhD. diss., New York University, 1981), 137, available online: <https://search.proquest.com/docview/303165529?accountid=12045> (accessed June 21, 2019).

¹¹¹⁰ In 1918 it was proposed by Hossein Qoli Khan Navab, the Iranian Minister in Berlin, that Taqizadeh be sent as the chargé d'affaires to Russia to defend the right of Iran in the peace negotiations between Russia and Germany. See: Hossein Qoli Navab to the Iranian Legation in Saint Petersburg, 12 February 1918 in *Nameh-hay-e Tehran*, ed., Afshar, 126-7.

¹¹¹¹ Mojtehedī, 199.

¹¹¹² *Kaveh*, August 6, 1921.

¹¹¹³ Hossein Makki, *Tarkih-e Bist Saleh-e Iran* [A Twenty-year History of Iran] (Tehran: 'Elmi, 1995), 7: 240-1.

¹¹¹⁴ Marvin L. Enter, 6.

Representing Iran in Russia was the first official position on behalf of the government that Taqizadeh would accept. According to Qazvini, Taqizadeh's acceptance of this position suggests that his experiences during his time in Europe had softened his previously more extreme idealism.¹¹¹⁵ But rather, after the unsuccessful attempts of the Democrat Party to create sustainable change and the closure of the Third Parliament, Taqizadeh had lost his previous leverage in Iran's political arena and this new role would allow him the opportunity to return to the forefront of the Iranian political scene. Significantly, as mentioned above, continuing to reside in post-war Germany had become increasingly difficult due to inflation and the rising cost of living, Taqizadeh was unemployed with no regular income and *Kaveh* was not profitable. Furthermore, he had plans to marry his long-time German fiancé. Financial pressures were thus mounting; he needed a secure, paid position and this was his chance to take one, temporarily, that would also enable him to keep his finger on the pulse of politics.

Taqizadeh left Berlin on 17 April 1922, reaching Moscow on 20 April.¹¹¹⁶ Later, a commission despatched from Iran joined him in Moscow.¹¹¹⁷ Ali Soheyli, who like Taqizadeh was from Tabriz, was Taqizadeh's personal secretary during this mission.¹¹¹⁸ Mirza Hossein Khan Manshoori from the Foreign Ministry, Mirza Rahim Khan Arjomand from the postal department and Gholam Hossein Khan Kayvan from the telegraph department were also missioned to Moscow to work with Taqizadeh.¹¹¹⁹ Taqizadeh first stayed in the Iranian legation in Moscow but, after a few days, the Russian government provided him and his staff with a relatively large and decent house.¹¹²⁰ The negotiations were difficult and initially no agreement was reached.¹¹²¹ During the negotiations supporters of the Soviet Union in Iran criticised Taqizadeh, accusing him of being against

¹¹¹⁵ Qazvini to Taqizadeh, Paris, 27 February 1922 in *Nameh-hay-e Paris*, ed., Afshar, 74.

¹¹¹⁶ *Shafaq-e Sorkh*, April 21, 1922 & June 1, 1922.

¹¹¹⁷ In his autobiography Taqizadeh mentions that he left Berlin in early 1922 and reached Moscow 26 April 1922. Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 190.

¹¹¹⁸ *Tufani*, 190. Soheyli later took important positions in the Iranian government and even became Prime Minister. Soheyli played an important role in protecting Taqizadeh's life during the reign of Reza Shah, when he was the deputy of the Foreign Minister. This was while Taqizadeh worked as the Iranian minister in Paris and was subjected to the rage of the Shah. Soheyli was Prime Minister in 1942 and from 1943-44.

¹¹¹⁹ Baqer Kazemi, 2: 133.

¹¹²⁰ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 190.

¹¹²¹ From Indian Office to Sir P. Loraine, 12 October 1922 TNA: FO 371/7835.

the Soviet regime. *Shafaq-e Sorkh* [Red Dawn], however, believed that Taqizadeh was simply defending the interests of his own country against the monopoly of trade that Russia wanted to impose on Iran.¹¹²² Sympathisers of the Soviet Union blamed Taqizadeh for the lack of success of the negotiations. In addition to being instructed by the Iranian government, Taqizadeh had also corresponded personally with businessmen in Iran and had first-hand knowledge of the situation.¹¹²³ Negotiations were interrupted in November 1922. But with the fall of the government of Qavam-al Saltaneh, who was regarded as an anglophile, the negotiations reopened. As British diplomatic correspondence shows, the British followed these talks with great interest. A British document explains the reason for the Russians interrupting the talks: “The Russians broke off negotiations not because they were unable to come to an agreement on the actual subject of the treaty, but on the pretext that, in view of the bad relationship existing between Persia and Russia, they did not wish to proceed further in this matter”.¹¹²⁴ At this point, despite the suspension of negotiations in November 1922, Taqizadeh decided to stay in Moscow “in case the Russians may show a disposition to reopen this matter.”¹¹²⁵ According to Hodgson, Taqizadeh’s theorised that, although the Russians were eager to conclude an agreement, they believed they had been unsuccessful in persuading Iran to agree. The coming to power of a new government had allowed them the opportunity of restarting the discussions without losing face, despite the fact that they had only recently declared it impossible, he believed. Taqizadeh was especially determined to wait in Moscow for a beneficial outcome as he was aware that if the negotiations were unsuccessful, it would be highly disadvantageous for Iran, especially as Sweden, Germany and Finland had already successfully negotiated agreements with Russia. Taqizadeh feared that Iran would be left in an embarrassing situation and it would be an added personal embarrassment for Taqizadeh himself.¹¹²⁶

As Taqizadeh himself stated, the Russians were dissatisfied with him during this mission, believing he was too strict and did not listen to his own government in Tehran.

¹¹²² *Shafaq-e Sorkh*, August 28, 1922.

¹¹²³ See for instance: Baqer Sharoudi’s letter to Taqizadeh in *Shafaq-e Sorkh*, November 19, 1922.

¹¹²⁴ R.M. Hodgson to The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 20 February 1923 *TNA*: FO 371/9026.

¹¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

According to Taqizadeh, this caused the Russian's unwillingness to accept that Taqizadeh might play a diplomatic role in Iran's dealings with Russia in later days.¹¹²⁷ There were other issues which made reaching an agreement between the two countries challenging. Soviet Russia was determined to concede as little as possible to Iran. The Baku oilfields, where large numbers of Iranian labourers were employed was a key area over which Iran did not want to lose influence. In Azerbaijan Iranian's rights were not secured and Iranians were being taken advantage of by the Soviets; the labourers did not have access to their earnings in hard cash. Iran wanted this issue resolved; Soviet Russia ignored it, instead propagating Communist propaganda among the labourers. Iran was also eager to ensure religious freedom for Iranian labourers in Baku. Again, the Bolsheviks did not give in to this demand and refused to guarantee the freedom of the Muslim clergy to practise their religion without constraints.¹¹²⁸ As a British diplomatic document reveals, Russians were resolute that they wished to avoid any arrangements which allowed Iranians to trade; they wanted Russian-backed control over trade in order to prevent the Iranian private sector from being able to trade independently. The Russo-Iranian negotiations were difficult; at times it had seemed as if there was little hope of any agreement being reached and negotiations had been suspended on several occasions. In mid-December 1922, a telegram from Taqizadeh suggested that he believed the Russians were delaying negotiations due to Russia's involvement in other similar negotiations, a lack of staff and New Year's holidays.¹¹²⁹ The British who had been monitoring the progress of the negotiations with keen interest, had a very different view, believing the real reasons to be far more serious. They were of the opinion that the Russians were looking for any excuse to break off negotiations and "march in troops".¹¹³⁰ British documents show that the Iranians had sought advice from British officials who had opined that some of Russia's demands were "preposterous and no sane government should accept them" and that the Iranian Prime Minister might even have to resign.¹¹³¹ By later December 1922, regarding the discussions, Taqizadeh had had to "admit that further progress is impossible" after the Russians had

¹¹²⁷ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 211.

¹¹²⁸ Sir P. L. Loraine to Eastern Department Foreign Office, 13 September 1923. *TNA*: E9144, FO 371/9026.

¹¹²⁹ Minutes of a meeting, 6 January 1923, *TNA*: FO 371/7835.

¹¹³⁰ Sir P. Loraine, 20 December 1922, *Ibid*.

¹¹³¹ Sir P. Loraine, 20 December 1922. *TNA*: FO 371/7835.

adopted an even firmer stance. Taqizadeh went as far as to threaten the Russians that he would return to Tehran, taking all his staff with him.¹¹³² As a British diplomatic report states, Taqizadeh's "demand for his passports produced a sudden change of attitude in the Russian Commission which at once signified its readiness to put forward a new proposal to serve as a basis for further discussion".¹¹³³ According to the report, the main difficulty up until that point had been the monopoly of foreign trade and Russia's demand that while in Iran any Russian officials employed by Vneshtorg, the Moscow-based People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade, should benefit from diplomatic status and immunity.¹¹³⁴




Figure 16: Taqizadeh (third from the right) at the negotiation table with the Russians

The negotiations were lengthy and complicated, lasting a year and a half. Despite all the problems, the wording of a draft of the agreement was finally agreed upon. Taqizadeh was about to sign the agreement when the cabinet in Iran suddenly changed. Moshir al-Dowleh (Mirza Hassan Pirnia), the new Prime Minister, was not in favour of signing the agreement

¹¹³² R.M. Hodgson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 17 June 1923, FO 371/9026.

¹¹³³ Ibid.

¹¹³⁴ Ibid.

and so in August 1923 Taqizadeh left Moscow for Berlin, assigning someone in his place. Mohammad Ali Foroughi, Foreign Minister, later wanted to send Taqizadeh to Russia to sign the agreement. A telegram from Taqizadeh, in response to a telegram addressed to him from the Iranian Foreign Ministry, indicates his reluctance to return to Moscow. He writes, "You requested me to return at an early date. Certainly, should conditions prove favourable I would be ready to return to Moscow for the purpose of signing the treaty. But as long as there is no hope of reaching an agreement and the Russians are not prepared to hold further conferences, no useful purposes would be served by my sitting in Moscow in a state of idleness".¹¹³⁵ However, later when conditions were deemed more suitable for the signing of the agreement, it was assumed that sending Taqizadeh again to Moscow would arouse suspicion among the Russians that the new government under Sardar Sepah also wanted to delay and might be using this to buy time. Commenting on Taqizadeh's efforts during his Russian mission, Foroughi wrote to Taqizadeh admitting that he never thought the negotiations would go so well and praising Taqizadeh for the sterling job he had done and the great service he had done his country.¹¹³⁶

Upon Taqizadeh's return to Germany once the Russian mission had come to an end, politics would take a back seat temporarily as, perhaps for the first time, Taqizadeh allowed events in his personal life to take precedence; at the age of 45 he married.

¹¹³⁵ Taqizadeh to Foreign Ministry in Tehran, 20 August 1923, *TNA*: FO 371/9026.

¹¹³⁶ Mohammad Ali Foroughi to Taqizadeh, 26 February 1924 in *Nameh-hay-e Tehran*, ed., Afshar, 62.



Figure 17: Taqizadeh (second from left) with the other members of the Russian mission

8:2 Marriage

Little is known about the details surrounding Taqizadeh's marriage or indeed his personal life. He was a very private man who gave little away about any personal relationships he might have had either with his future wife or any other women prior to his marriage at the age of 45. One can, thus, only speculate from sparse sources, such as Taqizadeh's private correspondence or acquaintances' narratives, about his married life. It was apparently whilst staying in Germany during the Great War that Taqizadeh met Edith von Jung, the daughter of Max and Bertha von Jung (later known as Young) whom he later married. Edith had been born in Magdeburg, Germany on 26 September 1895 to a middle-class family. At the time of their wedding, she was 28 years old and seventeen years younger than Taqizadeh. Taqizadeh had seemingly first made her acquaintance during his stay in Berlin and a good while before their marriage. We learn some details about the early stages of the relationship from Parviz Kazemi.¹¹³⁷ An Iranian student whom Taqizadeh was helping to study in Germany, he had met Edith in Berlin and gives some further relevant information about the young woman and her family:

¹¹³⁷ It seems likely that, as was customary at that time for middle and upper-class society in Europe, Taqizadeh took Kazemi with him as a chaperone. It was not considered appropriate for a single man to visit the house of a prospective wife unaccompanied.

One Sunday evening he [Taqizadeh] took me with him to one of the well-known wide streets of Berlin called Kaiserdamm and rang the bell of a house on the second floor. The door was opened by a pretty girl with golden hair and white complexion who welcomed us and invited us in. We entered the dining room, where a middle-aged lady and a tall well-built man: the girl's parents received us warmly. After being served tea and chatting a little, most of which I barely understood (because I had only just begun learning German) we left the house. It was in this way that for the first time in my life, I made the acquaintance of a respectable middle-class German family....¹¹³⁸

One entry in the diary of Karl Süßheim (1878-1947) shows that Taqizadeh was well acquainted with his wife long before their marriage:

Taking the train from Munich to Garmisch on August 5, 1918, the famous Liberal Taqizadeh was... in the same railway car [as I was]. He had been accompanied by his mistress all the way from Berlin. We had been friends in Istanbul at Yusuf Akçura's. In 1912-1913, we had exchanged some letters about Sayyid [Seyyed] Hasan's will, but had not been in touch since that time, that is, for the past five-and-a-half years. I was reading the Persian periodical, *Kave[h]*, which I had received in the morning mail. The *Kave[h]*'s editor-in-Chief is Mirza Sayyid [Seyyed] Taqizadeh. He was standing at my side and sat down opposite me with his beloved. The woman, familiar with Mirza Sayyid [Seyyed] Taqizadeh's affairs, saw that I was reading the *Kave[h]*, and looked alternately at me and at her gentleman. This went on for some time. After we had been traveling for an hour, Mirza Sayyid [Seyyed] Taqizadeh came towards me and asked in German: "You are Süßheim, aren't you?" There upon, we talked with each other for

¹¹³⁸ Parviz Kazemi, "Khaterati Chand az Taqizadeh [Some Memories about Taqizadeh]," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 114.

another hour. Since we had been acquainted in Istanbul, he had been in Iran and has been living for three years in Berlin. I thought that Christian Beck had gone to Iran but now I heard from him that this was not at all true.¹¹³⁹ Christian Beck is apparently translating articles from *Kave[h]* into German for the German Government, but he speaks only a little Persian. His calligraphy, however, is excellent and the periodical's name on the front page is in Christian Beck's hand. Quite a few Iranians are living in Berlin. Only 40 of them are politicians.¹¹⁴⁰



Figure 18: Taqizadeh and Edith Van Jung in Berlin

There are even scarcer instances of any mention of other personal relationships Taqizadeh may have had prior to his marriage. One example appears in a letter from

¹¹³⁹ "Reference (probably) to Sebastian Beck (1878-1951), Iranist; worked for the Intelligence Agency for the Orient (*Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient*) in Berlin (1915-1921) and was censor for Persian and Turkish letters, cf. W. Björkman, 'Sebastain Beck', in ZDMG 105 (1951), 1-5, 1."

¹¹⁴⁰ Barbara Flemming, Karl Süsseim, Jan Schmidt, *The Diary of Karl Süsseim: 1878-1974* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2002), 167-8.

Rasoulzadeh dated 19 February 1924. Rasoulzadeh, after congratulating Taqizadeh on his marriage, reminds him of the time they had lived together and writes some lines which may indicate Taqizadeh's vague interest in a woman in Istanbul: "Now that my house is in "charso qapi" [Çarşıkapı district of central Istanbul] every day when I pass her house opposite the Atiq Pasha I remember Farah's apartment. When I see the teaching advertisement, it awakens the memory of your teacher in my mind."¹¹⁴¹

The fact that Taqizadeh and Edith remained married until his death, with Edith nursing him throughout his old age, would suggest that theirs was a marriage of love. This is further supported by the references of several of the couple's acquaintances to the mutual affection and respect that the couple had for each other. 'Isa Sadiq, a close friend of Taqizadeh, describes Edith as a woman with angel-like characteristics who remained loyal to Taqizadeh all her life through good times and bad.¹¹⁴² Mojtehedī also recalls that she had asserted she stayed beside Taqizadeh in both good times and in sickness and would remain nursing him.¹¹⁴³ Manoocher Mohandes, a relative of Taqizadeh and grandchild of Mohammad Ali Tarbiat, who had worked as Taqizadeh's personal assistant also certifies that his wife cared deeply for Taqizadeh.¹¹⁴⁴ Taqizadeh dedicated his well-researched and internationally renowned book *The Old Iranian Calendars* to his wife: "To my wife who from the beginning till the end of the years, throughout my turbulent life and in all circumstances, has been my carer and my lovely and loyal confidante". The book is at the same time dedicated to the soul of Ali Mohammad Tarbiat whom Taqizadeh called his spiritual offspring.¹¹⁴⁵

Whatever the motivation behind Taqizadeh's marriage, at that time, whether in Turkey or Germany or any other European country, it would have been difficult for Taqizadeh to meet eligible Iranian women whom he might have married, due to the social restrictions on

¹¹⁴¹ Mohammad Amin Rasoulzadeh to Taqizadeh in *Tufani* ('Elmi), 471.

¹¹⁴² 'Isa Sadiq, "Taqizadeh" in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 5.

¹¹⁴³ Mojtehedī, 356.

¹¹⁴⁴ Interview with Manoocher Mohandes, 06/10/2014.

¹¹⁴⁵ Taqizadeh, *Ghahshomari dar Iran-e Qadim* [The Old Iranian Calendars] (Tehran: Ketabkhaneh-e Tehran, 1937).

Iranian women's travel.¹¹⁴⁶ Here it should be added that Taqizadeh's other close friends and colleagues, such as Qazvini, Jamalzadeh and Navab, also chose to marry European women. Little is documented about intercultural marriages of Iranians during that period, but interfaith marriages of European women would not have been without some difficulties. The circumstances of the War and the fact that Taqizadeh was a well-respected political figure who worked closely with the Germans would no doubt have helped make their marriage more acceptable.

The marriage of Taqizadeh and Edith took place in Berlin on October 1923.¹¹⁴⁷ In line with Islamic law, Edith's marriage gift was 100 Toman, which she certified she had received from Taqizadeh at the time of marriage.¹¹⁴⁸ This indicates that their marriage was carried out according to Islamic law. The fact that she also changed her name from Edith to Atiyeh (meaning 'gift' in Arabic) would suggest that she converted to Islam.¹¹⁴⁹ Mojtehedī quotes Taqizadeh's niece, Razeyyeh Ordoubadi, as commenting that Edith was proud of being a Muslim and revered the first Shia Imam Ali. While staying in Iran she apparently never missed an opportunity to visit the holy shrine in Qom. According to Mojtehedī, Razeyyeh had narrated that during a visit to Edith by some German ladies during Christmas, Edith had made it clear that now, as an Iranian, she celebrated Norouz and as a Muslim also other Islamic festivals.¹¹⁵⁰ However, Edith did not follow the Islamic dress code and did not cover her hair in public. In addition, as narrated by Taqizadeh's relative in Tabriz, she kept dogs which were considered unclean according to Islamic rules.

¹¹⁴⁶ Yahya Dolatabadi has made references to the difficulty of Iranian women travelling to Europe and the fact that respectable women could not travel unaccompanied.

¹¹⁴⁷ On 25 November 1923, Qazvini, in a letter to Mohammad Ali Foroughi, writes that after returning from Moscow Taqizadeh had married a German girl whom he previously knew in Berlin. From this reference we can date Taqizadeh's marriage as October 1923. Qazvini to Foroughi, 25 November 1923, in *Nameh-hay-e Mohammad Qazvini be Mohammad Ali Foroughi va Abbas Eqbal Ashtiyani*, eds. Iraj Afshar and Nader Motallebi (Tehran: Tahori, 1394), 82.

¹¹⁴⁸ Taqizadeh to Jamalzadeh, 4 August 1961, in *TINA*: 280000033.

¹¹⁴⁹ According to Homa Katouzian, upon marriage to Taqizadeh, Atiyeh became a naturalised Iranian citizen and converted to Islam. See: Homa Katouzian, *Iran: Politics, History and Literature* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 57.

¹¹⁵⁰ Mojtehedī, 356.

The couple were childless. Mojtehedī writes that Taqizadeh had asked to adopt his youngest sister's daughter but his sister had refused.¹¹⁵¹ Taqizadeh had a close relationship with the family of his wife and during the time Taqizadeh and his wife stayed in Iran, her family would come visit them in Iran.



Figure 19: Taqizadeh with his wife

What we can gather from Taqizadeh's correspondence is that, after his marriage, he was still living in Berlin and considering returning to Iran. He stood as a candidate in the elections for the Fifth Parliament. That is to say, at the time that Sardar Sepah was in power Taqizadeh was considered a political heavyweight and whether or not he should return to Iran was being considered and discussed in earnest by those of many different political persuasions. For example, a remaining letter from Abd al-Hossein Teymourtash to Taqizadeh is one document which encourages him to return to Iran. Teymourtash, a member of parliament in the Second Parliament, argued that the situation of Iran at that time necessitated Taqizadeh's return. He wanted Taqizadeh to return and establish a strong

¹¹⁵¹ Mojtehedī, 21.

party in Iran which would be an independent power against the increasing influence of the socialists who were inspired and supported by the Soviet regime in Iran.¹¹⁵²

In a letter to Taqizadeh, Foroughi, the Foreign Minister, who had not previously been very optimistic about Taqizadeh's return stated that, "Elections are taking place in Tehran. You will be amongst those elected. Of course, you should not refuse. But whether or not you should come back to Tehran, on that I cannot give my opinion".¹¹⁵³ He further explained that, although the situation was different from that of two years ago, it was important to wait and see who the other members of parliament were as he was not sure whether the current cabinet would remain in power. Foroughi, who had promised to find a job for Taqizadeh outside Iran had offered Taqizadeh the opportunity to go to Moscow, this time as the Iranian Chargé d'affaires. Despite thinking that Taqizadeh's time in Russia would not be so pleasant, he was of the opinion that since Taqizadeh had had previous experience in Russia, it would be better than the uncertain position in which he now found himself. He also suggested that having a stable job in Europe, though not perfect, was better than nothing. The decision to offer him the post in Russia came after consultation with Sardar Sepah, the Prime Minister. Foroughi's letter suggests that Taqizadeh considered this position to be beneath him and thus he refused it. Foroughi continued that he had sought to secure a job for him in the League of Nations but had been unsuccessful. Again, in response to Taqizadeh's inquiry about coming back to Iran, he mentions that he could not guarantee that it would be a good idea considering the political situation of the time and the fact that Taqizadeh might find himself in a parliament which was not as independent as he had hoped. His final advice to Taqizadeh was that if he was able to find a permanent position abroad, he should take that. He ended the letter by offering him a temporary unofficial position in Britain.

8:3 British Mission

With the coming to power in Britain of a Labour government formed by Ramsey McDonald there were hopes in Iran that Britain's policy towards Iran would become more

¹¹⁵² Sardar Mo'ezam Khorasani (Teymourash) to Taqizadeh, 4 November 1923 in *Nameh-hay-e Tehran*, ed., Afshar, 15-8.

¹¹⁵³ Mohammad Ali Foroughi to Taqizadeh, 8 June 1923 in *Nameh-hay-e Tehran*, ed., Afshar, 55.

amicable. According to a confidential British diplomatic record dated 28 March 1924, the Iranian Minister in London had informed the British government that he had received a telegram from Iran giving news of the appointment of Taqizadeh, who was at that time in Berlin, as the Iranian official delegate to the Wembley Exhibition. The telegram added that the task of Taqizadeh would be to “get into personal touch with the Prime Minister to endeavour to bring about relations between Great Britain and Persia.” The Iranian Minister in London was instructed to introduce Taqizadeh to the Secretary of State when he arrived in Britain. In his autobiography Taqizadeh mentions that after Reza Khan had become Prime Minister, he was suspicious of British intentions towards Iran. Reza Khan wished to send to London someone who would be capable of ascertaining Britain’s intentions towards Iran and one who could convince the recently elected Labour government in Britain to respect Iranian autonomy over its own affairs. Taqizadeh was deemed suitable for this mission as he maintained friendships with some Labour Party MPs. Foroughi, Foreign Minister at the time, sent a telegram informing Taqizadeh that he had been appointed to the mission and sent 1000 Lira to cover expenses. Taqizadeh accepted the mission and took Ali Soheyli, his personal assistant in Moscow, with him to Britain. Taqizadeh had no official title and this could explain his lack of success in his attempts to meet with the British high-ranking officials; a Foreign Ministry memorandum indicated that Taqizadeh’s mission should be discouraged and that there should be no non-British attendees at the Wembley Exhibition.¹¹⁵⁴

The British were well aware that Taqizadeh had been actively engaged with the Germans against the British and had more recently been involved in negotiating with the Russian government over customs tariffs and other issues. Taqizadeh’s intention was to meet the very highest-ranking British politicians. He wrote to Arthur Ponsonby, the then Deputy British Foreign Minister: “I would like, certainly, to have the honour of meeting the leading men of the present British Government and to have a conversation with them about the questions relating (*sic*) my country. In this respect I had an (*sic*) special desire to meet his Excellency the Prime Minister...”¹¹⁵⁵

¹¹⁵⁴ Memorandum by Mr. Churchill, 28 March 1924 in *TNA*: FO 371/10154.

¹¹⁵⁵ Taqizadeh to Ponsonby, 18 June 1924 in *TNA*: FO 371/10154.

Despite his best efforts, Taqizadeh managed only to meet a lower ranking British Foreign Ministry counsellor of the Eastern department, Lancelot Oliphant. Oliphant had previously worked in Iran as Third Secretary in Tehran between March 1909 and October 1911. Oliphant, in a memorandum, writes about his meeting with Taqizadeh:

Taki Zadeh [Taqizadeh], the Persian Nationalist, who before and during the war was violently anti-British, has been in this country for some weeks. He desired to see Mr. Ponsonby who, however, was too busy to receive him and requested him to come and see me. He paid a visit yesterday of an hour and a half and set forth his view at considerable length. He stated that he was about to return to Tehran to take his seat in the Majlis and remarked that he would be glad to know the gratitude of His Majesty's Government towards his country....¹¹⁵⁶

What Oliphant writes in the rest of his memorandum implies that Taqizadeh may have been concerned about a possible alliance of Russia and Britain against Iran, similar to what had happened in the past. Oliphant also writes that he “gave the other side of the medal” and put forward Britain's perspective. Britain, he commented, was aware of the “strong opposition in the Majlis to granting a concession to the Standard Oil Company so long as the Anglo Persian Oil Company were co-operating with them” which would discourage the British from developing “economic relations with Persians” as Taqizadeh was clearly pressing for.¹¹⁵⁷

Interestingly, Oliphant ends the memorandum by writing that Taqizadeh “may very likely play a big role in Persian politics in the future” and suggests that Taqizadeh's “influence in the Majlis” should be followed closely by the British.¹¹⁵⁸ Since Reza Shah controlled the Parliament with a strong hand, Taqizadeh's influence in the Parliament was not perhaps as significant as Oliphant and, indeed, Taqizadeh himself would have hoped for.

¹¹⁵⁶ Memorandum by Mr. Oliphant, 19 June 1924 in Ibid.

¹¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

It is notable that during this mission Taqizadeh again crossed paths with the English political activist and scholar Edward Browne who tried to help Taqizadeh by introducing him to British politicians, journalists and other influential people in Britain who might have been able to aid Taqizadeh in achieving his task. Browne also heavily edited and corrected the English version of the memorandum Taqizadeh had prepared to hand to the British officials which outlined the Iranian requests and Iran's expectations of Britain.¹¹⁵⁹

Unable to meet the British Prime Minister, Taqizadeh wrote a memorandum to British officials. Taqizadeh's goal, as expressed in the cover letter to the memorandum, was to obtain "a clear idea of the British policy in Persia as well as putting before the British statesmen the Persian point of view about the best means and ways to secure a good relationship and a sincere friendship between the two countries."¹¹⁶⁰ The 10-page memorandum was both frank in its criticism of British policy towards Iran and obsequious, requesting British government support for Iran and leniency in its financial demands towards the country. Taqizadeh, giving a brief history of the Anglo-Iranian relationship, pointed out that Iranians had had a positive image of the British until the 1907 agreement, when the British turned a blind eye to the Russian interventions in Iranian affairs. He requested that, like the Soviet regime, the British government also release Iran from the old concessions conceded by the previous Shahs, arguing that since these concessions had not been approved by the Iranian parliament, they were unconstitutional. The other issue Taqizadeh raised in the memorandum was the right of the Iranian government to build a railway which had been previously sabotaged by the Russians and the British. Taqizadeh also made clear his expectations that as part of the negotiations between the Russians and British, the interests of Iran would not be violated. A further issue he raised was the consular interference in the judicial affairs of Iran by stating that Great Britain was "retaining the primitive old system of foreign office courts, created a century ago by the humiliating Russo-Persian Treaty of 1828."¹¹⁶¹ It is clear from correspondence that Taqizadeh and his requests were not looked on favourably; he was described as "biased

¹¹⁵⁹ Browne to Taqizadeh, Cambridge, 24 April 1924 and June 1924, in *Nameh-hay-e Edward Browne be Taqizadeh*, eds., Zaryab and Afshar, 156-9 and 134-35.

¹¹⁶⁰ Taqizadeh to Ponsonby, 18 June 1924 in *TNA: FO 371/10154*

¹¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

(sic) and ill informed” by a British diplomat who recorded his displeasure at Taqizadeh’s opinions and suggestions: “Taqizadeh’s memorandum follows the old familiar lines of criticism and shows I fear that the writer has learned very little during his long stay in Europe.”¹¹⁶² Taqizadeh writes that he did his utmost to negotiate with the British and convince them to assist Iran.

8:4 Return to Iran

A British diplomatic record dated as early as July 1920 reveals that the Iranian Prime Minister had invited some constitutionalists living abroad to return to Iran, among them Taqizadeh. It seems that the British were concerned about the return of Taqizadeh although the documents note that the German Minister in Tehran considered the return of Taqizadeh to Tehran “very desirable”. The British believed that Taqizadeh was invited back due to “the possible holding of new elections and impending meeting of Parliament” and this worried them. The British document adds that it was not desirable for Taqizadeh to work openly with the constitutionalists.¹¹⁶³

As mentioned, judging by remaining correspondence, Taqizadeh weighed up the pros and cons of returning to Iran. He hesitated because of the political situation there and sought advice from his friends about whether the situation was suitable for him to come back to Iran. Among his friends, Qazvini believed that the cessation of *Kaveh* and Taqizadeh’s return to politics would be disastrous. He noted that just a single issue of *Kaveh* was as valuable as all the years Taqizadeh had fought for the Constitution in Iran. He believed that if *Kaveh* was published for the next two or three years it would revolutionise the Iranian way of thinking and be a valuable weapon in the fight against superstition.¹¹⁶⁴

Taqizadeh was elected as a member of the Fifth Parliament with 4508 votes from Tehran.¹¹⁶⁵ This time he accepted the position of Member of Parliament and returned to

¹¹⁶² Diplomatic communication on Anglo-Persian Relations by Mr. Churchill, 20 June 1924 in *TNA: FO* 371/4921.

¹¹⁶³ To Mr. Norman, telegram, 30 July 1920 in *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶⁴ Qazvini to Taqizadeh, Paris, 11 July 1920 in *Nameh-hay-e Paris*, ed., Afshar, 41.

¹¹⁶⁵ Mojtehed, 202.

Iran via Russia, landing in Anzali on 20 August 1925.¹¹⁶⁶ Despite his long stay abroad, Taqizadeh had maintained his popularity in Iran. In Qazvin about 3000 people had come out of the city to welcome him.¹¹⁶⁷ Upon his return, Taqizadeh would be faced with a pressing issue. During this period Reza Khan's activities were aimed at enabling dynasty change, carrying out a campaign against Ahmad Shah who was in Europe. Reza Khan as Prime Minister and commander-in-chief had previously tried to topple the Qajars and establish a republic in Iran though this had not been successful, mainly due to the opposition of the ulema. Reza Khan had interfered in the elections of the Fifth Parliament and having strong support, Reza Khan was expecting to be declared Shah. This is the situation Taqizadeh found as he set foot once again on Iranian soil. Taking up his seat in the Parliament, Taqizadeh found himself facing the important issue of dynasty change in Iran which required amendments to constitutional law. This was challenging for Taqizadeh as he believed this contravened the Constitution. He was clear in his opposition and suggested that better ways might be found. Although he was optimistic about Reza Khan's leadership and was content with the security that had now been established in the country, Taqizadeh may have sought to imply that a change of dynasty from Qajar to Pahlavi should be directed by a constituent assembly.¹¹⁶⁸

Taqizadeh has described this turn around in Iranian history in his autobiography.¹¹⁶⁹ His descriptions shed more light on the intentions of Reza Khan and Taqizadeh's own reaction towards those intentions. According to Taqizadeh, following his return to Tehran he had formed a close relationship with Mostofi al-Mamalek, Moshir al-Dowleh (Mirza Hassan Pirnia), Mosaddeq al-Saltaneh (later known as Doctor Mosaddeq) and Hossein 'Ala. As Taqizadeh states, Reza Khan had shown interest in co-operating with well-reputed people. Through the mediation of Haji Rahim Qazvini, a business man, the above-mentioned people together with Mokhber al-Saltaneh and Yahya Dolatabadi held weekly meetings with Reza Khan at Reza Khan's residence. According to Taqizadeh, the gist of Reza Khan's

¹¹⁶⁶ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 173.

¹¹⁶⁷ Baqer Shahrudi, "Be Monasebat-e Chahelomin Ruz-e Vafat-e Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh [On the Occasion of Fortieth day of Taqizadeh's Death]," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 30.

¹¹⁶⁸ Mojtehed, 205.

¹¹⁶⁹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 172-80.

demand was that he had worked hard to form an organised army and if his power was not guaranteed in his post, at any moment the Shah, by law, had the power to depose him. Reza Khan wanted reassurance that this would not happen. Taqizadeh mentions that numerous discussions were held about how to find a legal way to secure Reza Khan's position.¹¹⁷⁰

These discussions resulted in an official recommendation to the Parliament to secure the post of Reza Khan and his control over the armed forces. But Reza Khan, according to Taqizadeh, was still suspicious of the Crown Prince, Mohammad Hassan Mirza. Reza Khan gained more influence among the Members of Parliament and considered deposing Ahmad Shah. He eventually succeeded in doing so by bribing and threatening many of the parliament members, resulting in the official vote of 31, 1925. On that day the Fifth Parliament voted for the removal of Ahmad Shah and his power then passed to Reza Khan. Later a constituent assembly was formed, and Reza Khan was declared the new Shah. Taqizadeh was not a member of that assembly.

Only a few Members of Parliament opposed this move: Mostufi al-Mamalek, Moshir al-Dowleh, Hossein 'Ala, Mosaddeq al-Saltaneh and Taqizadeh himself. As Taqizadeh writes, Dolatabadi, for the most part, was in favour. On the day of the voting, 31 October, this group discussed their opposition. Taqizadeh was the first to give his opinions and express that the change of dynasty was unconstitutional. Taqizadeh's speech was brief and carefully worded. He considered the matter a crisis and suggested that a solution to this crisis should be well-measured and not rushed. He implied that haste could be interpreted as "pressure" from Reza Khan on the Parliament to proclaim him Shah. Taqizadeh knew that deep down the majority of Members of Parliament were against the idea of changing the dynasty but had accepted it under duress.¹¹⁷¹ Taqizadeh expressed his gratitude for the security that Reza Khan, as Prime Minister and commander of the armed forces, had established in the country. Taqizadeh highlighted his position as someone who was eager to protect the good of the country and Reza Khan. Taqizadeh also referred to the fact that he had been warned by other members against revealing his opposition to the Parliament

¹¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 174.

¹¹⁷¹ Ibid., 175.

as this could endanger his life. This highlights the absolute power of Reza Khan. Taqizadeh said that he loved Reza Khan more than himself but was at pains to express his opinion that it was not in Reza Khan's best interest to become Shah. Taqizadeh's suggestion is that the matter should be referred to a commission and that, in that way, a better and more lawful solution would be found. And at the end of his speech he again expressed his opinion that he considered the act to be against the constitution and therefore unlawful and against the good of the country. Taqizadeh immediately left the Parliament once his speech had been delivered.¹¹⁷²

What is clear from this speech is that despite his insecure position and his need for a job and income, Taqizadeh, as one of the veterans of the Parliament and someone who had worked towards the Constitution and who had been involved in preparing the draft of the supplementary law of the Constitution, was adamant that the law should be respected and staunchly defended the position of the Parliament as an independent establishment. He knew that this act would be a strong blow to the Constitution. On the other hand, however, Taqizadeh saw Ahmad Shah, despite his weakness as Shah, as someone who would respect the Constitution and did not want power to be in the hands of a sole individual.

Following Taqizadeh's speech, other members similarly put forward their points and left. After that neither Taqizadeh nor Mosaddeq or Moshir al-Dowleh attended the parliamentary sessions and were absent for about two months. The sitting of the Fifth Parliament was about to end. The group was faced with the question of whether they should continue attending parliamentary sessions or not. Taqizadeh and 'Ala decided to continue attending and Moshir al-Dowleh followed their lead. Mosaddeq was opposed to this and insisted that no-one should attend. Mosaddeq, who knew Taqizadeh and 'Ala were financially in a weak position which meant attending parliament would secure them some income, offered to pay their salaries if they did not continue to attend the Parliament. 'Ala and Taqizadeh resented his offer, refused it and thus continued attending the parliamentary sessions of the Fifth Parliament. They were later elected to the Sixth Parliament.¹¹⁷³

¹¹⁷² Proceedings of the Fifth Parliament, Session 211, 31 October, 1925.

¹¹⁷³ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 202-5.

The change of dynasty could be considered as one of the key events in the history of modern Iran. The shift from Qajar to Pahlavi rule was exceptional. Dynastic changes in Iran had usually taken place as a result of the rising up of a tribal chief or military commander and thereby the removal of the current ruler. Here, however, a new dynasty took charge without violence or bloodshed but for the first time through the Parliament. After Taqizadeh's return to Iran and his acceptance of the post of Member of Parliament, Taqizadeh was no longer the revolutionary fiery young man. He had become a mature politician who sided with neither the minority nor the majority, but was, in fact, an independent.¹¹⁷⁴

¹¹⁷⁴ *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 168.

Chapter Nine

Minister, Diplomat, Scholar and Senator

The previous chapter covered almost a decade of Taqizadeh's life, most of it spent outside Iran. At the start of this decade Taqizadeh had still believed that the establishment of a constitutional government would bring about favourable changes and would lead to modernisation, sovereignty and prosperity for Iran. Like many other intellectuals of the time, he was disappointed by the results. With the failure of the Democrat Party, Taqizadeh had had to accept that change through political process seemed impossible. The outbreak of the Great War brought new hope for Taqizadeh and this time he was optimistic that by taking advantage of the opportunities that the Great War had provided, Iran would be able to prosper, aided by its co-operation with the Germans. The war ended in defeat for the Germans and Taqizadeh was again disappointed not to see his hopes realised. This decade was key in the development of Taqizadeh's intellectual life. As he spent the war years working with the Germans, it had allowed him financial security and peace of mind whilst also providing opportunities for him to study and cogitate. Living in Germany, a country well on its way down the route of modernisation, had left Taqizadeh with strong ideas about how Iran might also be steered in the same direction. Seeing the advances of Germany utilising science, Taqizadeh was further convinced that a scientific approach was the only solution for the maladies of Iran. As he had always done whilst living outside Iran, Taqizadeh managed, through different means, to keep abreast of affairs in Iran. Publication of *Kaveh* was a turning point; it introduced a powerful discourse, laying out a roadmap for the modernisation of Iran. *Kaveh's* editorial had brought together some of the best minds of the Iranian diaspora. This together with his close contact with eminent European Orientalists also helped Taqizadeh to mature his thoughts and ideas.

Disillusioned by the inability to create change through politics, this time Taqizadeh shifted his focus to the education of the masses. Living in industrial Germany and influenced by the eugenics theory he was becoming more convinced that the country could be likened to a machine; and like the cogs in a machine that must all be well maintained in order for optimum performance to be achieved, all sectors of society needed to be in the

best shape for the country to be functioning successfully. Reflected in *Kaveh*, his theory was that until the masses were educated and understood the benefit of modernity, there was little hope of Iran making any progress towards modernity through political means.

With the ending of the Great War and the temporary cessation of the Russian interference in Iranian affairs, Taqizadeh, who had always felt that Russia was a bigger threat to Iran than Britain, believed that diplomacy could resolve Iran's problems with Britain. The coming to power of Reza Khan, who successfully brought some order and stability to the country, restored Taqizadeh's hope that the education of the masses could be achieved by a strong central government. The means to achieve this goal lay with schooling, the press and a focus on a unifying national language.

Taqizadeh was in favour of an independent government committed to and capable of organising and launching political and social reforms by lawful means. A powerful central government, he believed, could establish nationwide security, repair roads, boost trade, build factories and devote the lion share of the budget to education and the overall development of the country.¹¹⁷⁵ Thus, despite his disapproval of the deposing of Ahmad Shah and the ending of Qajar rule, he believed that with the coming to power of Reza Shah these changes could be materialised. As Abbas Zaryab Khoei put it, Taqizadeh was aware of the nature of both Oriental despotism and Western democracies and knew that the leap from three thousand years of despotism to a democracy, similar to that in Belgium on which the Iranian constitution was modelled, would be far from easy.¹¹⁷⁶ He hoped that a stable government equipped with organised institutions and written laws could eventually lead to the founding of a democracy in Iran by propagating public education and the building up of a strong economy. He knew that this was despite the fact that the government in Iran was lacking in such basics of Western democracies as the upholding of human rights and a free press.¹¹⁷⁷ Furthermore, almost concurrent with the establishment of a new regime in Iran, was the establishment by Ataturk of the new Republic of Turkey from the remnants

¹¹⁷⁵ Abbas Zaryab Khoei, "Taqizadeh Anchenan keh Man Shenakhtam [Taqizadeh as I knew him]," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 164.

¹¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

of the Ottoman Empire, launching the precise reforms that Iranian intellectuals such as Taqizadeh hoped for in Iran. The achievements of the reforms in Turkey may have convinced Taqizadeh that this was the path that Iran should also follow, with Reza Shah as a strong, authoritarian leader, just as Atatürk had demonstrated himself to be in Turkey. Discussing both Atatürk's and Reza Shah's leadership, leading scholars have commented that many of the "intelligentsia were prone to accept the view that only the ruling institutions co-ordinated by a potent and persuasive leader were able to instigate the overall needed change and reform in order to modernise the society".¹¹⁷⁸ All this likely convinced Taqizadeh to eventually decide to accept the governmental posts he was offered. Due to the increasing intervention of the government in the elections at that time, Taqizadeh was reluctant to become a Member of Parliament and the Shah was equally reluctant to have independent characters like Taqizadeh in the Parliament.

Against this background one should also consider that Taqizadeh's decision to co-operate with Reza Shah's regime was a gradual process and other elements such as his personal and financial situation also played a part in him accepting governmental positions. Following his return to Iran, Taqizadeh faced financial problems; when Reza Khan as the Prime Minister, had wanted to visit him, he was unable to provide facilities to host the leader and had no servants.¹¹⁷⁹ Later in life, he reflected on the fact that if he had been more financially secure, like Mosaddeq, he too would have been able to better maintain his dignity after voting against the ending of the Qajar dynasty.¹¹⁸⁰ Taqizadeh was still resentful that the coming to power of Reza Khan was not lawful and considered it unconstitutional. What can be understood from Taqizadeh's writings about this period of his life is that he was not happy with the change of the dynasty in Iran. But, despite all this, as mentioned, Reza Shah did bring about reforms that Taqizadeh also favoured. Taqizadeh would, in fact, as we will see, accept positions in Reza Shah's government, though he would later find Reza Shah's authoritarian rule unbearable. And when he found himself in

¹¹⁷⁸ Touraj Atabaki and Erik J. Zürcher, *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization Under Atatürk and Reza Shah* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 4.

¹¹⁷⁹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 174.

¹¹⁸⁰ Taqizadeh to 'Ala, 26 February 1944, in *Nameh-hay-e Landan*, ed., Afshar, 131-7.

a perilous position, Taqizadeh would choose to distance himself from the leader and reside abroad.

It is also important to mention that, although Reza Shah's authoritarian rule could not satisfy a person like Taqizadeh in terms of the constitutionalism, it had achieved much that Taqizadeh and other like-minded people could not have easily imagined would have been possible to achieve in such a short period. Under the authoritarian rule of Reza Shah, the country was rapidly transforming itself along the lines of European social patterns. The military reforms of Reza Shah had resulted in the building of a strong unified army which had established order and security and which guaranteed the authority of the central government. The army was transformed into a well-ordered and better educated fighting force, with some soldiers being sent abroad for training. Additionally, compulsory conscription had been introduced in 1925.¹¹⁸¹ As was previously referred to, having a strong army was, for Taqizadeh, one of the key elements necessary for a strong, independent country.

Reza Shah also managed to build a railway network which connected the south of Iran to its north. This was the dream many constitutionalists had had for Iran but it had never been actualised. Reza Shah had taken big steps in terms of educational institutions, establishing schools based on European models and the first university in Iran. This was of the utmost importance for intellectuals like Taqizadeh who believed that in the process of modern state building individuals should be developed and educated to have love and respect for Iran as a nation. The legal system of Iran was also changed which, as well as making it more secular, would take the legal system out of the hands of the clergy. It was the clergy who had traditionally controlled the legal system and who were among the strongest forces against Reza Shah.¹¹⁸² Reza Shah had managed to decrease the authority of the clergy in general. A British diplomatic report gives a picture of the situation in Iran

¹¹⁸¹ At the time of its implementation, compulsory conscription incited the public and protests were rife. Although in favour of a strong national armed force, Taqizadeh was opposed to the conscription law. *Tufani*, 185.

¹¹⁸² For more information about the legal reforms during this period see: Hadi 'Enayat, *Law, State, and Society in Modern Iran: Constitutionalism, Autocracy, and Legal Reform, 1906–1941* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

and gives a sense of the diminishing respect for the clergy in 1933 at the peak of Reza Shah's rule: "Forty years ago the Shia divines, both in Persia and Iraq, were men whose saintly lives commanded respect for their cloth, but, recently, they have been merely turban rascals, whose notorious manner of living has destroyed the respect of their flocks."¹¹⁸³ This was a great achievement in the eyes of the intellectuals who considered the clergy to be a huge obstacle to the modernisation of Iran.

Providing official education for women resulted in the emancipation of women and development of women's political movements.¹¹⁸⁴ Taqizadeh was an avid supporter of mass literacy which included both sexes.

The maintenance of security in the country also helped to improve communication networks and the building of and expansion of the road network and transportation system. This was overseen by the newly established Roads and Highways Ministry of which Taqizadeh was the first minister. As a result of the improved transport system, a more regular postal service had developed along with extended telegraph and later telephone communication and radio broadcast services which all extended the authority and control of the central government. An aviation transport system was also established with the help of a German company, Junkers, which under a five-year contract executed postal services between Tehran, Baghdad, Bushehr and Anzali.¹¹⁸⁵ It appeared that Iran was becoming a more modernised nation. Taqizadeh, now wearing the attire of a statesman, was more convinced than ever that authoritarian modernity could be practiced in Iran.

Along with the practical development of networks of roads, Taqizadeh also turned his attention to more cultural networks which he believed would help to unify the linguistically and culturally diverse population of Iran.¹¹⁸⁶ During the Reza Shah period, we witness

¹¹⁸³ Mr. Mallet to Sir John Simon, 1 August 1933, in *Iran Political Diaries 1881-1965* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997): 434.

¹¹⁸⁴ For more on women's political movements in Iran during this period see: Parvin Paidar, *Women and Political Process in Twentieth-Century Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

¹¹⁸⁵ Wipert Von Blucher, *Safarnameh-e Blucher* [Blucher's Travel Account], trans. Keykavous Jahandari (Tehran: Kharazmi, 1990), 152.

¹¹⁸⁶ Proceedings of the Eighth Parliament, session 102, 30 August 1932.

Taqizadeh's focus on issues such as language policy. Taqizadeh was trying to help to build an Iran whose identity was not based on religion and Shiism but based rather on Iranian culture, history and civilisation. This identity predominantly took Iranian ancient pre-Islamic history and the Persian language as a reference point. Now as a statesman he could actualise what he had previously professed in *Kaveh*, concerning making Ferdowsi the Iranian national poet. He supported a plan for building a mausoleum in Tus, Ferdowsi's birthplace and organising an international conference as a memorial to him. Some believed that the mausoleum was an attempt to rival the nearby shrine of the eighth Shiite Imam, Imam Reza.¹¹⁸⁷

This chapter continues to follow Taqizadeh's life and career from his trip to Philadelphia until his death. This period was a turbulent period for Iran; it includes the occupation of Iran by the Allies, Reza Shah's loss of power and the coming to power of the young crown prince, Mohammed Reza as the new Shah. The two key events of this period in which Taqizadeh himself played a significant role are the signing of the 1933 oil agreement to which Taqizadeh's name is inexorably linked and Taqizadeh's activities as Iranian Ambassador in London during the Second World War. After his return to Iran to take up a post as Member of Parliament, he faced strong opposition from the leftist movements in Iran. This, together with his advancing age and imminent retirement, marginalised his position in Iranian politics despite the fact that he held high profile positions such as Speaker of the Senate. Similar to the previous chapters, the aim of this chapter is to highlight and trace the developments of Taqizadeh's ideas for making Iran a modern and independent country, whilst at the same time focusing on his private life and its potential effects on his political career. Later in his life, despite holding important positions, Taqizadeh's role as an influential policy maker diminished although he was relatively well respected. Thus, after the Fifteenth Parliament, events in Taqizadeh's life are analysed in lesser detail.

In the aftermath of the Great War when Taqizadeh returned to Iran, he was a married man who was more interested in settling down and securing a comfortable life. It was also

¹¹⁸⁷ Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran*, 87.

important for him to have a respectable job. After Reza Shah declared himself the Shah, Taqizadeh was still reluctant to accept governmental jobs and preferred to take up posts outside Iran. He was still hopeful about continuing publishing *Kaveh* abroad and thus accepted the invitation to go to United States as the Iranian general commissioner for the Philadelphia exposition.

9:1 The Sesqui-Centennial International Exposition in Philadelphia

After the coming to power of Reza Khan and the establishment of improved stability in the country the time was now ripe to work on an image of Iran that many reform-minded Iranian intellectuals had dreamed of and aspired to; the image of a new country which looked towards the west as its role model, proud of its culture and pre-Islamic heritage and eager and ambitious to represent this image on the international world stage. The end of the Great War had begun a new era of global reawakening and reforming of many nations and ideologies. Now was the perfect opportunity for Iran to propagate this image particularly in more distant countries such as the United States. The United States was far less familiar with the history and cultures of Iran, had had far fewer dealings with the country and fewer preconceptions of Iran as a developing society than some of Iran's neighbouring regions and, thus, might be able to assist Iran in its journey towards modernisation. Iranian intellectuals and others considered the USA a neutral country which could help Iran and which, importantly, seemingly had no vested interests. This was particularly appealing for the new Iranian authorities. The Sesqui-Centennial International Exposition taking place in the USA was an event that would prove to be an excellent opportunity for Iran to show itself as a forward-looking nation, ready to become a player on a more international stage. Since Taqizadeh was a prominent figure connected to this event which was one which lay the groundwork for later business and political interactions between the two countries, it is necessary to look at this event in some detail.

The Sesqui-Centennial International Exposition was organised to celebrate the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America. Since the key events of the independence had taken place in Philadelphia, it was decided that Philadelphia would host the event. The primary purpose

of the exposition was “to afford the people of the United States and the people of the world an opportunity to meet in solemn celebration of one hundred and fifty years of American independence”.¹¹⁸⁸ Thus, invitations were sent to many other nations by the president of the United States, Coolidge, inviting them to participate in this exposition. Among the nations invited was Iran.

It was in the early months of 1926 that the Iranian government decided to participate in the international Exposition of Philadelphia.¹¹⁸⁹ Reza Khan had recently seized power in Iran, ending the rule of the Qajar dynasty, putting himself forward as the new Shah of Iran with plans to bring about the rapid modernisation of Iran. For the newly established regime, supported by a considerable number of intellectuals, this international exposition could be considered as a great opportunity to introduce the new face of Iran which was embracing its pre-Islamic heritage whilst also combining its existing Islamic identity with ambitions to progress as a nation. Thus, the government went to great lengths to ensure that the exposition was as big a success as possible.¹¹⁹⁰ For example, the cabinet had approved that any objects sent from Iran to the exposition would be exempt from customs duty and only those which were sold or remained there to be sold would be charged a custom fee.¹¹⁹¹

By participating in this exposition, the government was not so focused on short-term goals. It was hoped that in the long term it would benefit trade relations between Iran and the United States. The Iranian government believed participation in this international exhibition, taking place during the 150th anniversary of the United States of America’s independence, would allow US citizens to learn more about Iran. Iran was not very well known in the USA at that time and there were very few Iranian businessmen trading on a large scale with the United States. This exposition was important for Iran as it had the

¹¹⁸⁸ Erastus Long Austin, ed., *The Sesqui-Centennial International Exposition: A Record Based on Official Data and Departmental Reports* (Philadelphia: Current Publications, 1929), 10.

¹¹⁸⁹ Baqer Kazemi, 2: 360.

¹¹⁹⁰ Although the invitation had been given two years earlier, the Iranian government had acted with delay. See: Taqizadeh, “Amrika,” [America] in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh* (Tehran: Tus, 2014), 12: 143.

¹¹⁹¹ The government's bill for the Philadelphia Exposition was submitted to the Fifth Parliament and a budget request of 75 thousand Tomans was put forward. The government's proposal was approved, but due to the large number of other pressing issues which the parliament had to deal with, the proposal could not be enacted before the end of the Fifth Parliament. When the time came for the exposition to take place, the government allotted the amount from its own budget.

potential to strengthen Iran's business and political ties with the United States, a new global power.¹¹⁹² Preliminary steps had been taken to broaden relations between the two countries earlier. In late 1910 the Iranian parliament considered inviting American financial experts to organise the chaotic Iranian treasury. This was to encourage the hiring of experts from countries not influenced by the European powers which were involved in Iranian affairs and thus with no vested interests in Iran. As a result, a group of American advisers headed by William Morgan Shuster came to Iran in Spring 1911. Despite their positive performance and public approval, they soon had to leave Iran in December 1911 as a result of a Russian ultimatum. Later, in the early 1920s, when Hossein 'Ala', a close friend of Taqizadeh, was the Iranian Ambassador in Washington, he had tried to expand the relationship with the United States in different fields especially encouraging the oil industries there to invest in Iran's oil fields.¹¹⁹³ The decision was taken to expand the relationship with the United States in the hope of decreasing the monopoly that Russia and Britain had over the economy of Iran. Taqizadeh's acceptance of this mission to the Philadelphia exposition was with this hope in mind. Taqizadeh's favourable attitude towards the United States at this point made him a suitable candidate for this position.

And thus, the Iranian government selected Taqizadeh as the man to be sent to the United States as the Iranian general commissioner for the exposition to supervise the Iranian Pavilion. Baqer Kazemi who was the counsellor of the Iranian Embassy in Washington was responsible for its organisation and the assigning of a suitable place for the Iranian Pavilion.¹¹⁹⁴ According to Taqizadeh, Arthur Millspaugh, the American Administrator-General of Finances of Iran had suggested Taqizadeh for this post.¹¹⁹⁵ Iran had already expanded its co-operation with the United States by hiring an expert for mines and another for road construction. Taqizadeh was considered suitable for the post as he was an experienced politician and scholar familiar with the politics, business affairs, culture and history of Iran with connections to a wide network of people who could promote Iran in

¹¹⁹² Proceedings of the Sixth Parliament, Session 42, 16 December 1926.

¹¹⁹³ This was only in the five northern provinces of Iran which were exempt from the D'Arcy Concession of 1901. *Azar*, May 27, 1924.

¹¹⁹⁴ Baqer Kazemi, 2: 363.

¹¹⁹⁵ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 205.

the United States. He had also gained experience conducting the trade talks between Iran and the Soviet Union. Taqizadeh had a positive attitude towards the United States and saw it as a nation which could help to liberate Iran from the dominance of Russia and Britain. Following the defeat of Germany in the Great War, Taqizadeh had hoped that the United States would be the country to rely on to help modernise Iran. In a letter to Mahmoud Afshar, he expresses his positive opinion about the hiring of American financial experts in Iran and suggests that inviting the Americans to Iran with the offer of managerial positions was the right thing to do.

In addition to these reasons, Taqizadeh, who was in favour of the reforms launched by the new regime but had voted against the change of dynasty and of Reza Khan's appointment as Shah, was hesitant about remaining in Iran. Here was an opportunity for him to look to his future and consider whether he wanted to stay abroad or return to Iran where he would have to co-operate with the newly-established regime. Furthermore, it was now that the Fifth Parliament came to an end. And preparations for the elections for the next parliament in Tehran, which Taqizadeh had been monitoring, were also about to end. Taqizadeh had already planned to go to Berlin on personal business. Taqizadeh's father-in-law had died in Germany, his wife was not feeling well, and Taqizadeh preferred to be out of Iran for a while. In a speech Taqizadeh made following his return to Iran from the United States he mentioned that at first, he had been reluctant to accept the post because of the length of time he would have to reside in Philadelphia. In response the government had assured him that he could go after the official opening and return earlier on condition that he would accept the post.¹¹⁹⁶ Thus, Taqizadeh departed from Tehran on 20 April 1926, staying a short time in Berlin before setting off on his voyage to the United States. In his autobiography, Taqizadeh writes that even before he had been assigned the post for the exposition, he had already decided to leave Iran and go to Berlin. It was during his stay in Berlin that he received a telegraph informing him that he had been made Foreign Minister in the newly formed government. Taqizadeh did not, however, accept the post and continued his trip.¹¹⁹⁷ One reason that he did not accept the post was that he had already

¹¹⁹⁶ Taqizadeh, "Amrika," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh* (Tus), 12: 143.

¹¹⁹⁷ Taqizadeh, "Kholasaei az Sharh-e Hal-e Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh [Summary of a Life Story of Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh]," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 2: 263-4

been nominated as the Deputy of Tehran in the Parliament.¹¹⁹⁸ He chose to sit in parliament rather than working in a post for the government which he initially did not consider legitimate. Taqizadeh was a strong advocate for the Parliament and Constitution. From the very beginning he himself had helped to promote parliamentarism in Iran and still preferred to carry on his political life in the Parliament. Although he now wanted to continue his career as a Member of Parliament, he was of the opinion that MPs should be independent from the government. He saw it as a threat to the constitution and democracy that a Member of Parliament might be financially dependent on the government as this could lead to that MP being unable to openly oppose the government in the Parliament.¹¹⁹⁹ During the elections for the Sixth Parliament Taqizadeh had also witnessed the intervention of the government and this was a matter a concern for him as was the independence of the Parliament. Despite this, however, he still preferred not to work as a member of the cabinet. The invitation to represent the government in Philadelphia gave him the chance to weigh up all his options and, having done so, he decided it would allow him to continue in a more neutral position than if he had been directly involved in the Parliament.

And so Taqizadeh took the *Columbus* ocean liner from Hamburg to New York at the end of June on his way to the Philadelphia exposition. At this time Abd al-Hossein Taymourtash had been assigned the role of Court Minister and had persuaded Foroughi, the Prime Minister, to resign. Mostufi al-Mamalek had taken his place under orders from the Shah. Mostufi had made public the fact that Taqizadeh was his Foreign Minister but, as Baqer Kazemi has mentioned, when he sent a telegraph to Taqizadeh during the voyage to enquire whether or not he would visit the United States in an official capacity, Taqizadeh had replied that he would attend only as the general commissioner for the Philadelphia exposition. Taqizadeh rejected the position of Foreign Minister, despite the fact that some American newspapers reported that he had in fact taken up the post.¹²⁰⁰ Kazemi, however, had arranged to introduce Taqizadeh to the President and Foreign Minister of the United States. Kazemi had prepared a room for Taqizadeh in the Iranian Embassy in New York

¹¹⁹⁸ Mojtehedī, 210.

¹¹⁹⁹ Proceedings of the Fifth Parliament, 13 September 1925.

¹²⁰⁰ After Taqizadeh rejected the post, Moshaver al-Mamalek became Foreign Minister.

and on 1st July, 1926 went with Dr Arthur Upham Pope to welcome Taqizadeh.¹²⁰¹ Kazemi's impressions of meeting Taqizadeh for the first time are noteworthy; his impression was very positive. Having previously seen Taqizadeh in the First Parliament wearing the traditional attire of the clergy, Kazemi now witnessed the great transformation that Taqizadeh had undergone; here he now was dressed in western clothing and clean-shaven. Different from his first visit to the United States when he had had little money nor hope for the future, Taqizadeh now held an official position. He was now, in contrast, full of self-confidence and far more positive about the future of Iran.

What was particularly interesting for Taqizadeh about the exposition was the opportunity which it provided to introduce Iran as a homogenous country with a long history as a nation. It was an opportunity to unite the ancient glorious past of Iran with present-day Iran. Pope, as a leading American scholar of the Arts, an archaeologist and a historian of Iranian Arts, had a deep interest in and familiarity with both pre-Islamic and more contemporary Iranian art and architecture. He had previously met Reza Khan, when he was the Prime Minister and had impressed him.¹²⁰² Choosing Pope to design the "Persian Pavilion" in Philadelphia was a good choice for Taqizadeh. Together with Carl Ziegler a local architect, Pope designed the "Persian Pavilion" modelled on the Masjed-e Shah in Isfahan.¹²⁰³ Pope would go on to become Special Commissioner.¹²⁰⁴

As planned, together with Pope and Kazemi, Taqizadeh visited the Iranian Pavilion whilst it was under construction. But, probably the most notable event for Taqizadeh upon his arrival was his meeting the President of the United States. Taqizadeh was taken by Kazemi to meet President Coolidge on 3rd July. According to Kazemi, the President inquired from Taqizadeh about agriculture affairs in Iran and sent greetings to the

¹²⁰¹ Arthur Upham Pope (1881-1969), an American, was a leading scholar of arts, an archaeologist and historian of the Iranian arts. His most notable work was *A Survey of Persian Art* in six volumes. Pope influenced Reza Shah and this influence is manifested in the buildings constructed during the Reza Shah period, most importantly the building of the Mozehe-e Iran-e Bastan (Museum of Ancient Iran). See: <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/pope-arthur-upham>.

¹²⁰² Noel Siver, "Pope, Arthur Upham," *Encyclopedia Iranica*, online edition, 2005, available online: <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/pope-arthur-upham> (accessed 5 June, 2019).

¹²⁰³ Yuka Kadoi, ed., *Arthur Upham Pope and A New Survey of Persian Art* (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 84.

¹²⁰⁴ Austin, 83.

Shah. Taqizadeh met the Foreign Minister, Kellogg on the same day.¹²⁰⁵ He also visited the Congress and the Senate before going to Philadelphia to organise the Persian Pavilion.¹²⁰⁶ Taqizadeh stayed in the United States for about seven months.¹²⁰⁷

We do not know much about other possible activities of Taqizadeh during his stay in the United States but his activities in terms of the exposition were successful and consisted of many public and social appearances. The official date of the opening of the exposition was 31 May. International participants came from 19 Nations and 4 Colonies. There were highlights in the show. Most thought the Persian Pavilion stole the show.¹²⁰⁸ The Persian building was officially opened on October 6, 1926, with Taqizadeh acting as the commissioner general of the Iranian government.¹²⁰⁹ From the 4500 Americans and foreigners who were invited to attend the ceremony, about 1300 people turned up which, according to Taqizadeh, made it a great success in the United States.¹²¹⁰ A book about the exposition describes the Iranian building as one of the most beautiful and artistic buildings on the ground. Mirza Ali Akbar Kashef was assigned as honorary Commercial Attaché. He planned that all the antique objects would be collected by the Kashef trading company and sent to the United States.¹²¹¹ Kashef became the assistant of Taqizadeh in Philadelphia. Taqizadeh, Kashef and Kazemi sponsored Pope to also organise several art expositions in Philadelphia.¹²¹² The Iranian Pavilion was open for three months; Taqizadeh being present for one and half months. According to Taqizadeh, the Iranian products such as carpets and rugs in particular and silk products sold well, making a total of approximately 130,000 dollars before Taqizadeh's departure. One of Taqizadeh's biggest achievements was the fact that he managed to arrange for the Iranian Pavilion to be exempt from paying tax on what they sold. According to Taqizadeh, Iran managed to save 150,000 dollars because of that. He also emphasised that the total costs incurred while he was there were less than half

¹²⁰⁵ *New York Times*, July 5 1926.

¹²⁰⁶ Baqer Kazemi, 2: 387.

¹²⁰⁷ Taqizadeh, "S. H. Taqizadeh," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 7: 767.

¹²⁰⁸ <https://americasbesthistory.com/wfphiladelphia1926.html>

¹²⁰⁹ *Evening star*, October 5, 1926.

¹²¹⁰ Taqizadeh, "Amrika," [America] in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh* (Tus), 12: 151.

¹²¹¹ Baqer Kazemi, 2:366.

¹²¹² Kadoi, 84.

this amount.¹²¹³ That is to say, in his report Taqizadeh is at pains to emphasise that he had not initially been involved in the costs of this exposition for Iran. In fact, the costs were high and criticised by many for being excessive. However, Taqizadeh considered his mission to have been successful and believed it raised the profile of Iran in the United States.

One other person who was drawing the attention of the press in the United States was Zahra Khanoum Heydari. She was a native Iranian living in the United States who served her country as a member of staff for the Persia Building at the Sesqui-centennial. She had even gone to Washington as the guest of the National Education Association. She was the guest of several women's clubs and spoke for them.¹²¹⁴ Her particular work there was to install in the Persia Building examples of women's work in Iran. "She had the distinction of being the first Iranian woman to ever hold an official position in Iran. Zahra Khanoum's first position was that of an official in the department of public works, a department resembling the Department of the Interior in our country."¹²¹⁵ We do not know exactly whether Taqizadeh had played any role in the appointment of Zahra Khanoum but if what the United States' newspapers claimed was the case, then the first woman who had an official job in Iran in fact worked for Taqizadeh. One newspaper wrote that Zahra Khanoum "was introduced as the first woman of Persia to be permitted to go about the streets unveiled and the first woman to be dispatched by the Persian government to any country as a representative. She declared that the greatest need of Persian women is education. It is her desire to help establish schools for women and to create a market for work done by Persian women".¹²¹⁶ As is clear from this quotation, what is expressed here is in line with Taqizadeh's emphasis on education and the establishment of schools.¹²¹⁷ It is also representative of Taqizadeh's liberal attitude towards women as has been previously highlighted.

¹²¹³ Taqizadeh, "Amrika," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh* (Tus), 12: 151.

¹²¹⁴ *Evening Star*, October 17, 1926.

¹²¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, October 21, 1926

¹²¹⁷ Taqizadeh, "T'alim va Tarbiyat-e Nesvan" [The Education of Women] in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh* (Tehran: Tus, 2013), 76.

From a report Taqizadeh has written about his trip, it is clear that Taqizadeh had closely observed and reflected on the situation of women in the United States:

I must say that nothing made a stronger impression on me than the situation of women and I consider this to be the zenith of United States' civilisation. In my opinion, there is no other country comparable to the United States where women have achieved such a well-deserved and independent position. I know that some believe Russian women have progressed greatly, which is in fact true in its own way. However, the progress in each of these countries is significantly different in many aspects. In the United States women are afforded every human right, meaning they benefit from every political, social or economic rights. In particular, their independence and the fact that they are in employment and their participation in social, ethical, religious, political, scientific and literary activities is very noticeable. This independence in thought in combination with some degree of economic independence on one hand and moral and religious strength on the other hand have played a significant role in women's chastity and morals. In my opinion, family morals in that country are relatively stronger than in the other parts of the world.¹²¹⁸

This short passage reveals the importance that Taqizadeh assigned to the independence of women and their role in society. It is evident that Taqizadeh was at pains to highlight the fact that the independence of women did not necessarily equate to sexual freedom or promiscuity, but in fact could even strengthen family relationships and marriage. After his return to Iran, when he held governmental positions Taqizadeh was considered a supporter of and adviser for the women's movement. He was invited to social gatherings and delivered speeches about the role of women in society and their emancipation and pressed for women's education. Taqizadeh believed that each gender had a specific role and

¹²¹⁸ Taqizadeh, "Amrika," in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh* (Tus), 12: 159- 60.

responsibility in society. Taqizadeh left New York on 18 November on the Hamburg-American liner, Cleveland.¹²¹⁹ He stayed in Berlin until March 1927.



Figure 20: 1926 Persia Building, Sesqui-centennial International Exposition¹²²⁰

¹²¹⁹ *The New York Times*, November 18, 1926.

¹²²⁰ <https://www.phillyhistory.org/PhotoArchive/Detail.aspx?assetId=93110>



Figure 21: Taqizadeh in front of the Persia Building, raising the flag of the United States, Dedication Ceremony, 6 October 1926 ¹²²¹

9:2 Return to Iran

After returning to Berlin and joining the family of his wife there, Taqizadeh writes in his autobiography that he was reluctant at this point to return to Iran.¹²²² This might primarily have been because Taqizadeh had previously witnessed the seeming lack of independence of the Fifth Parliament and seen that the members were chosen by the government. He was an observer for the elections of the Sixth Parliament and knew that the elections were rigged and did not want to be part of such a parliament.¹²²³ But, at the same time, it was not easy for him to find employment abroad. According to Taqizadeh, Hossein ‘Ala’ had written to Taqizadeh telling him that he was missed in Tehran and Iran was bereft without him. Taqizadeh finally decided to return by plane to Iran, reaching there

¹²²¹ <https://www.phillyhistory.org/PhotoArchive/Detail.aspx?assetId=92623>

¹²²² Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 208.

¹²²³ Reza Shah “personally determined the outcome of each election and thus the composition of each Majles– from the Fifth to 1926 to the Thirteenth in 1940”. Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran*, 75.

on 21 March 1927. As he writes, not knowing where to go upon his return, he went to a hotel. After staying one night he wrote to a good friend, Hossein Parviz, to ask for advice about where to stay. Parviz suggested Hossein 'Ala's place where Taqizadeh would be able to invite people and talk to them. As Taqizadeh's wife, Edith, had not accompanied him to Iran it was easier for him to take up that suggestion. After staying there for a while, Edith, also arrived and they rented a house for themselves.¹²²⁴ As the new parliamentary elections approached, court interference increased greatly. Reza Shah was determined not to allow into the Parliament even one member who opposed him. Taqizadeh voiced his criticism of such acts in the Parliament, resulting in the police once again monitoring his movements.¹²²⁵

9:3 Financial Hardship

For almost seven months Taqizadeh sat at home without any source of income, waiting for an opening in his life. He describes this period of his life as being one of the most difficult in terms of financial hardship. He mentions that he had no income and no assets and when a guest arrived, he was forced to offer his gold watch as a pledge in order to be able to provide food for the guest.¹²²⁶ In his autobiography he admits that he had hoped that he might earn some money by arbitrating between a German businessman and Iranian merchant but this had brought nothing for Taqizadeh.¹²²⁷ During this period Taqizadeh with some of his like-minded friends, such as Hakim al-Molk, Hossein Qoli Navab, Hossein Parviz and Khalkhali Najm al-Molk had established a political party called Taraqqi [Progress]. Baqer Kazemi with the advice of Taqizadeh had also joined this party.¹²²⁸ The members of this party regularly gathered together. Taqizadeh sometimes gave talks about the forthcoming elections for the parliament at the gatherings of this party.¹²²⁹ According to Baqer Kazemi, the party soon faced difficulties when Teymourtash together with Ali Akbar Davar, Morteza Khan Firuz Mirza established a party called Iran-e Now which

¹²²⁴ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 208-9.

¹²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 182.

¹²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 183-4

¹²²⁷ *Ibid.*, 184.

¹²²⁸ Baqer Kazemi, 2: 416.

¹²²⁹ Baqer Kazemi, 2: 447.

sabotaged the success of the Taraqqi Party and forced the governmental employees to join their party.¹²³⁰

Taqizadeh, who was less involved in politics during this time and had more time for research, in the hope of earning some money signed a contract with the Ministry of Education to compile the short history of Iran from the Islamic period to the contemporary period. This was to be used as a textbook for high schools. Taqizadeh only finished a small section of this work. This was later published under the title of *Az Parviz ta Changiz* [From Parviz to Changiz]. It was not long before Taqizadeh returned to the world of politics once again.

Finally, whilst attending a funeral ceremony, Taqizadeh met Abdol Hossein Teymourtash the Court Minister of the Shah who had played a major role in Reza Shah's rise to power and was considered the second most powerful man in the country who offered him the post of governor of Khorasan. Taqizadeh initially refused the offer and said that he would not take up a governing position. Taqizadeh was advised by his friends, General Sheybani, who was close to the Shah and Mostofi al-Mamalek, to accept the job since not accepting it would insult the Shah who would think that Taqizadeh was reluctant to work with him.¹²³¹ The fact that Taqizadeh elaborates on his hesitancy to initially accept the role of governor, highlights his reluctance to co-operate with Reza Shah.¹²³² However, Taqizadeh eventually accepted the job, going to Mashad to take up the governorship of Khorasan.

9:4 Governorship of Khorasan

Taqizadeh went to Khorasan with full authority and acted as governor there.¹²³³ During his time in the governorship post he oversaw important cultural, administrative and security developments such as the construction of high schools and the implementation of

¹²³⁰ Ibid., 435.

¹²³¹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 185.

¹²³² Ibid., 184-6.

¹²³³ In his autobiography Taqizadeh states he was in Khorasan for six or seven months from February 1929 until August 1930. This would appear to be an inaccuracy. *Tufani*, 187

restrictions on the use of opium. He succeeded in suppressing the riots of Zolfaqar (Zolfo) and Qanbarali and importantly managed the affairs of the victims following the major earthquake which occurred during his time as governor of Khorasan.¹²³⁴

On 1 May 1929, an earthquake caused widespread destruction in Khorasan. The earthquake caused damage over a vast area and 160 villages were affected.¹²³⁵ An official report announced the death toll to be 2618 with many more injured and a large loss of villagers' sheep and cattle.¹²³⁶ On 5 May, Taqizadeh at the head of a group of officials of the province left Mashad in order to survey the damage and offer assistance to the victims in the affected villages. Taqizadeh had wide ranging jurisdiction over Khorasan.¹²³⁷ He took a team of physicians with him and distributed much needed provisions, in particular wheat, among the villagers.¹²³⁸ Taqizadeh also helped to establish a fund-raising committee to help the victims and collected a substantial amount of money.¹²³⁹ He had also sent groups of construction workers such as masons and carpenters to help with the rebuilding of the area.¹²⁴⁰ Together with The Red Lion and Sun Society of Iran, he organised a garden party to raise money for the victims.¹²⁴¹ Taqizadeh's visit to the victims of this natural disaster had a very positive effect.¹²⁴² Reza Shah had commented that the people of Khorasan were lucky that Taqizadeh was the governor at the time of the earthquake.

Probably working in Khorasan and visiting the different villages of that province further convinced Taqizadeh of his opinion that he had previously expressed in *Kaveh* that one of the major maladies of Iranians which hindered modernisation in Iran was the problem of addiction to opium. This harmful daily habit was extremely prevalent in Khorasan and most villages of the province. It was not only men but also women and children who were

¹²³⁴ Akram Sheybani, *Khorasan va Naqsh-e Ostandaran dar Doreh Pahlavi-e Aval* [Khorasan and the Role of the Governors during the First Pahlavi Era] (Mashad: Ahang Qalam, 2013), 149-59.

¹²³⁵ Abbas Masoudi, *Zelzeleh-e Shirvan 1308 Khorshidi: Yaddasht-hay-e Mosaferat-e Khorasan* [The Earthquake of Shirvan, 1308: Notes of Travel to Khorasan] (Mashad: Ansar, 1980), 155.

¹²³⁶ *Ibid.*, 156.

¹²³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²³⁸ *Ibid.*, 73.

¹²³⁹ *Ibid.*, 75.

¹²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 157.

¹²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 211.

¹²⁴² *Ibid.*, 198.

affected.¹²⁴³ This problem probably further highlighted for Taqizadeh the gap between the provinces and the capital and convinced him even more that, as he previously believed, education should be prioritised.




Figure 22: Taqizadeh depicted in a drawing, helping the victims of the earthquake in Khorasan¹²⁴⁴

9:5 Iranian Minister in London

On 3 June 1929, whilst Taqizadeh was still governor of Khorasan, Teymourtash wrote a confidential letter addressing Taqizadeh. In this letter, Teymourtash suggests that since it was highly likely that a Labour Government would come to power in Britain which would benefit Iran, it would be expeditious for Taqizadeh, as an experienced and wise diplomat, to go to London. Since Taqizadeh had had previous contact with the Labour Party, he already knew some of their politicians. Teymourtash requested that Taqizadeh go

¹²⁴³ Ibid., 243.

¹²⁴⁴ Hossein Bana'i, *Chand Pardeh az Zendegani-e Rejal-e Maruf-e Iran* [Some Episodes from the Life of the Famous Iranian Statesmen] (Tehran: Ruznameh-e Omid, 1945), 56.

to Tehran and make preparations for his new mission.¹²⁴⁵ But, before leaving Khorasan, Taqizadeh once again went and visited the earthquake-affected areas.¹²⁴⁶

Taqizadeh does not give further information in his autobiography about this mission in London, other than to mention that Reza Shah was hopeful that Taqizadeh could “prevent the British”.¹²⁴⁷ There is, however, a document remaining from him which gives the report of his meeting with Ramsey MacDonald, the British Prime Minister, in London on 2 September, 1929. Taqizadeh wrote that in the twenty-minute meeting, although the senior officials and the Prime Minister had good and sincere intentions concerning Iran, some of the more junior staff had an old-fashioned prejudice towards oriental people. Taqizadeh mentioned to the Prime Minister that issues concerning Iran should be given special attention and not left in the hands of those junior politicians. According to Taqizadeh, MacDonald called his Foreign Minister and recounted Taqizadeh request.¹²⁴⁸ It would seem that Iran wished to expel some British officials working in Iran who did not appreciate Reza Shah’s reformist endeavours. Taqizadeh had been sent to discuss that matter with the highest British authorities.

Interestingly, the *Manchester Guardian*, giving the news of the appointment of Taqizadeh as Iranian Minister in Britain, refers to his Turkish Azerbaijani origin and describes him as “a protagonist of transliteration of Persian into Latin characters”.¹²⁴⁹ In April 1931, Taqizadeh came back to Iran and was initially offered the position of Minister of Finance but, as Reza Shah realised, he was not eager to accept that position, the post of Minister of Roads and Highways was offered to him.¹²⁵⁰

9:6 The Minister of Roads and Highways

The Ministry of Public Benefits was divided into two separate departments, the Ministry of Roads and Highways and the Ministry of Finance. Taqizadeh was recalled from London

¹²⁴⁵ Teymourtash to Taqizadeh, 3 June 1929 in *Nameh-hay-e Tehran*, ed., Afshar, 132-4.

¹²⁴⁶ Masoudi, 153.

¹²⁴⁷ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 189.

¹²⁴⁸ Taqizadeh, *Tufani* (‘Elmi), 547-49.

¹²⁴⁹ The *Manchester Guardian*, July 31, 1929.

¹²⁵⁰ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 189.

and Foroughi from Ankara to lead these two ministries; on 16 April 1930 Taqizadeh was officially appointed as Minister of Roads and Foroughi as Finance Minister.¹²⁵¹ The Minister of Roads was a key position, considering the fact that, for Reza Shah, building new roads and especially the construction of the railway project was his priority. One of the first and most important tasks of Taqizadeh during this period was to deal with the railway construction project and with the German companies which were hired to carry out the construction. This resulted in the signing of two agreements on 31 July, 1930 with representative of the companies.¹²⁵² Taqizadeh held the position of Minister of Roads for a couple of months until, in Taqizadeh's own words, Reza Shah insisted that he accept a position in the Finance Ministry on 6 August 1931. For a short period Taqizadeh had to run two offices simultaneously but later dropped the post of Minister of Roads.

9:7 The Minister of Finance

Taqizadeh, as a member of the First Parliament had always advocated the modernisation of the finance system of Iran. He had supported the presence in Iran of American financial experts such as Morgan Shuster and Arthur Millspaugh. He was opposed to ending the mission of Millspaugh, believing that with his help, the country was well on the way towards modernisation of the financial system of Iran. On 1 August 1927, Taqizadeh requested in the Parliament that Millspaugh continue in his role. The efforts of Taqizadeh and other like-minded people were unsuccessful and Millspaugh had to leave the post. The position of Finance Minister was then given to Mirza Firuz Farmanfarma who was later tried and sentenced to death. Taking the position of Minister of Finance, Taqizadeh respected Millspaugh's legacy and still continued to advocate for receiving advice from foreign financial experts. Taqizadeh had no experience in finance, as a British diplomatic document boldly states, "Taqizadeh knows nothing of finance and his only qualification is his reputation for honesty and integrity. The appointment can then be for the sake of appearance and to give the Ministry a responsible head to whom the details of its internal

¹²⁵¹ Baqer Kazemi, 3: 146.

¹²⁵² For detailed information about the agreements of this period while Taqizadeh was Minister of Roads see: Baer Kazemi, 3: 216-51.

affairs can be referred for settlement”.¹²⁵³ Despite his lack of experience, though, as with all the roles he took on, Taqizadeh took the reins confidently. He diligently set about putting in place new reforms. Taqizadeh had already requested total control over Finance Ministry affairs which the Shah had agreed to.¹²⁵⁴ By doing this, Taqizadeh hoped the Court Minister, Teymourtash, would not interfere in the affairs of the Finance Ministry.¹²⁵⁵ As Minister of Finance, Taqizadeh strictly controlled the purse strings and completely overhauled how the Ministry operated. He ensured that work was carried out effectively, efficiently and cost-effectively. Taqizadeh himself points out that he had been so careful with the expenses that such a level of frugality had never been seen before in Iran.¹²⁵⁶ It was also during Taqizadeh’s tenure as Minister of Finance that Reza Shah ordered him to take back the money the British had paid to some Iranian officials to oil the wheels for the 1919 agreement. Taqizadeh followed the order and returned this money to the coffers.¹²⁵⁷ Taqizadeh, in a later lecture outlining the achievements of the Reza Shah period, referred to his role in maintaining stability and a balanced budget in Iran during his time as Minister of Finance:

I succeeded with the Shah’s unfailing support not only in paying regularly all the necessary public expenditures but also paying back and liquidating the Iranian foreign loans contracted before the constitutional period with one exception which had been contracted in 1910 with the approval of the parliament and which was being amortized regularly with reasonable

¹²⁵³ Coll 28/39 ‘Persia: Printed Correspondence 1929-1936’ [509v] (1029/1174) in *The Qatar Digital Library*: http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100055143738.0x00001e (accessed 8 April, 2020).

¹²⁵⁴ From the office of the Prime Minister to all the Ministries, 18 August 1930 in *TINA*: 310000449.

¹²⁵⁵ According to Ebrahim Safa’ei, upon the recommendation of Teymourtash, Taqizadeh had to give the monopoly of opium to Amin al-Tojar-e Esfahani who benefitted greatly from it. Ebrahim Safa’ei, *Tarikh-e Mashrutiyyat be Ravayt-e Asnad* [History of the Constitution based on Documents] (Tehran: Iranyaran, 2001), 715-16.

¹²⁵⁶ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 191.

¹²⁵⁷ The British had paid 400,000 Toman (120,000 Lira) to three people: to Vosouq al-Dowleh 200,000 Toman, to Saram al-Dowleh and Nosrat al-Dowleh 100,000 Toman each. See: Ibid, 171. The British had already received compensation for the cancellation of this agreement. See: Safa’ei, *Tarikh-e Mashrutiyyat be Ravayt-e Asnad*, 715.

interest and sinking fund. We also saved and gathered a substantial amount of gold as a reserve for the Iranian Bank notes.¹²⁵⁸

Since Taqizadeh was interested in history and culture, he was able to procure a large donation from a wealthy businessman who had made large sums of money from the government, preventing strain on the budget of the government. He handed over this money for the restoration of historical buildings in Isfahan.¹²⁵⁹ According to the German Ambassador in Iran who had personally met Taqizadeh, when he held the post of Finance Minister, Taqizadeh was without doubt the most capable man in the cabinet.¹²⁶⁰ But, some did not have the same favourable opinion. This period of his life was not without blemish; the oil agreement of 1933 would prove to be his “Achilles’ heel”.

9:8 The D’Arcy Concession and its Cancellation

The signing of the Oil Agreement of 1933 was one of the key historical events in Iran with which Taqizadeh is inextricably linked. Taqizadeh’s reputation suffered greatly because of this and the accusations aimed at him persist to this day. As Minister of Finance, as Taqizadeh himself mentioned, he had no other option but to sign the agreement; it is his signature which is written under the agreement. Signing an agreement which was not favourable to the national interests of Iran unleashed a storm of criticism against him in the summer of 1941 after the fall of Reza Shah. Before looking at this agreement in detail and Taqizadeh’s role in it, a brief background should be given.

On 28 May 1901, an exclusive concession had been granted to William Knox D’Arcy (1849-1917) for a period of 60 years for the exploration of natural gas and petroleum throughout Iran, an area covering 1,243,195 km² of territory.¹²⁶¹ In 1900, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, a former British Minister to Tehran, had contacted D’Arcy about investing in Iranian oil exploration. At the beginning of 1901 D’Arcy sent an envoy to

¹²⁵⁸ Taqizadeh, “The History of Modern Iran: Lectures Given in Colombia University,” in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 8: 231.

¹²⁵⁹ Sadiq, in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 6.

¹²⁶⁰ Von Blucher, 176.

¹²⁶¹ Mostafa Elm, *Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and its Aftermath* (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1992), 6.

Tehran and in May a concession to search for oil was obtained. Although D'Arcy had agreed to finance the search, by the end of 1903 he had spent £150,000 but had found no oil and £225,000 by May 1905. He was by now in a desperate financial position, funds had been exhausted. He began to negotiate with the French branch of the Rothschild family hoping to sell the concession but luckily on 20 May the British Burmah Oil Co. offered to buy it. D'Arcy accepted the offer and in return received 170,000 Burmah Oil shares and monies to cover his previous expenses.¹²⁶² The company, after some failed attempts, finally struck oil in Masjed Soleyman in the south of Iran, on 26 May, 1908.

The project then developed rapidly between 1908-1914, a period in which thirty wells were dug in Masjed Soleyman. The oil company began buying land from the Bakhtiari chieftains in order to expand the oil fields and drew up agreements with them which ensured that the Bakhtiyaris would provide security for the oil industry.¹²⁶³ Housing was built for the staff and a pipe line was constructed to carry the oil to Abadan where a large refinery and a modern port was built from which crude oil could be shipped to other destinations.

On the eve of the First World War, the British government had decided to buy fifty-one percent of the share (over £2 million worth of stocks of the company) because of the increasing importance of the oil for the British navy and to guarantee uninterrupted supplies of oil for the fleet.¹²⁶⁴ The company was considered British since the majority of the shares were held by the British government. The British government had assigned two representatives to the board of directors who had the right to veto decisions made by the company. In this way the British government had control over the company and in fact the concession was handed over to the British government. As R.W. Ferrier put it, "Most governments, consciously or not, believed that the hidden hand of the British Government

¹²⁶² David Carment, "D'Arcy, William Knox," in *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/darcy-william-knox-5882> (accessed 5 May, 2019).

¹²⁶³ Mostafa Fateh, *Panjah Sal Naft-e Iran* [Fifty Years of Oil in Iran] (Tehran: Chehr, 1956), 259-60.

¹²⁶⁴ Peter J. Beck, "The Anglo-Persian Oil Dispute," *Journal of Contemporary History* 9, no. 4, (October 1974): 123-151.

was to be detected behind most, not all, of the activities of the Company.”¹²⁶⁵ This was particularly a matter of concern for Russia which, together with Britain, had signed the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 relating to Iran.

After the Constitutional Revolution in Iran and the establishment of the Parliament dissatisfaction with the conditions of the oil agreement began to be voiced. The government's concerns grew as it became increasingly clear to more and more people that under the terms of the concession there was no possibility to change any of the articles of the agreement to make them more favourable to Iran's interests and, in fact, the oil company expressed no willingness to consider any amendments. As the increasing global value of oil together with the clearly unfavourable conditions of the concession became more evident to a wider public, the tension between the oil company and the Iranian government began to grow.¹²⁶⁶ This was not the only cause of increasing tensions between the Iranian government and the oil company.¹²⁶⁷ However, the major complaint of Iran over the D'Arcy Agreement was over Article 10 which specified that Iran should receive 16 percent of the net profit of the APOC. Iran's share was calculated by the company after deduction of various costs which were not related to Iran. This was the source of constant problems between Iran and the oil company. The Iranian Court Minister of Reza Shah, Teymourtash, spent four years conducting negotiations to solve this issue in a satisfactory manner but was unsuccessful.¹²⁶⁸ Three weeks after his appointment as the Minister of Finance, Taqizadeh joined the negotiations on 31 August, 1931.¹²⁶⁹

In 1932, APOC informed the Iranian government that the Iranian government's share of the oil revenue had been only three hundred and seven thousand Lira in the previous year, while in 1930 Iran's revenues had been four times that figure.¹²⁷⁰ On 26 July 1932,

¹²⁶⁵ R.W. Ferrier, *The History of The British Petroleum Company* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) 1: 202.

¹²⁶⁶ Foad Rouhani, *Tarikh-e Melli Shodan-e San 'at-e Naft-e Iran* [History of the Nationalisation of the Iranian Oil Industry] (Tehran: Jibi, 1973), 59.

¹²⁶⁷ For more details about these issues see: R.W. Ferrier, *The History of the British Petroleum Company* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 1: The Developing Years 1901-1932.

¹²⁶⁸ Javad Sheikh al-Eslami, ed., *So'ud va Soqout-e Teymourtash* [The Rise and Fall of Teymourtash] (Tehran: Tus, 2000), 154.

¹²⁶⁹ Sheikh al-Eslami, *So'ud va Soqout-e Teymourtash*, 175.

¹²⁷⁰ Mostafa Fateh, 291.

Taqizadeh was questioned about this oil issue and the income of Iran. Ali Dashti, one of the deputies, asked Taqizadeh why the government did not inspect the income of APOC. Taqizadeh in reply mentioned that one of the shortcomings of the D'Arcy Concession was the method used to calculate the amount to be paid to the Iranian government. He said this was an issue to be concerned about, that they would continue negotiations aimed at solving it and, if that was not possible, a different solution would be sought. On the 27 November 1932, the Iranian government cancelled the Anglo-Persian concession held by APOC.¹²⁷¹ According to Taqizadeh, who was part of the negotiation team, this was an unexpected decision taken independently by the Shah. Taqizadeh hastily prepared the letter of cancellation and sent it to the company:

The Iranian government has repeatedly brought to the notice of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company that the D'Arcy Concession of 1901 has not been safeguarding the concerns and interests of the Iranian government and the Iranian government deemed it necessary that the relationship between the Iranian government and the company be based on new ground rules which would protect the real interests of Iran. As stated repeatedly, there are no doubts about the shortcomings and faults of the D'Arcy Concession and the fact that it does not meet the interests of Iran. Evidently the Iranian government logically and justly cannot oblige itself to follow the terms of a concession which has been made before the establishment of the Constitution in the manner that these concessions were imposed or granted in those days. However, with the hope that the company would take the current necessities and situation of Iran into consideration and would secure the interests of Iran accordingly, the Iranian government had until now held back from implementing its rights to cancel the D'Arcy Concession. Unfortunately, in response to the patience of the Iranian government, not only were any practical steps not taken by the oil company to secure Iran's

¹²⁷¹ When the nation's name changed from Persia to Iran in 1935, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company became known as the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). Whilst the company operated in other parts of the world, in 1935, Iran was still the main scene of its operations. In 1954 the AIOC was re-named the British Petroleum Company.

interests but also as the development and expansion of the oil company increased, the interests of Iran were further overlooked. The Iranian government is therefore disappointed that the expected results have not been achieved by the means of negotiations and considers the only way to ensure the safeguarding of its interests is by the cancellation of the D'Arcy Concession. Based on the decision of the imperial government, this ministry, from this date, declares the D'Arcy Concession null and void. Furthermore, contrary to the past, if the oil company is now ready to meet the interests of Iran and can provide sufficient guarantees that its views are in line with the just and fair views of the Iranian government, then the Iranian government would willingly grant a new concession to the company.¹²⁷²

As is evident in this letter, the proposal for a new agreement is clearly suggested by the Iranian side. In his autobiography, Taqizadeh mentions that he had added the last line to the letter because he had heard the rumour that the government wanted to cancel the concession and agree a new one with the Russians. He was eager to prove that this rumour was incorrect. According to Taqizadeh, he had taken two copies of the letter to Reza Shah, one without the last line and the other including it. The Shah had approved both.¹²⁷³ The news of the cancellation of the concession was published in the newspapers of Iran. People were encouraged to celebrate the cancellation as a national victory by the government. Taqizadeh's intention was to do his duty and inform the Parliament on 1 December 1932, which he did. Unexpectedly, all the members of the Parliament approved it on the same day.

Upon hearing news of the cancellation, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company at once rejected Iran's right to cancel the agreement and asked for its withdrawal. In another step the British government threatened that if Iran did not withdraw its letter then the case would be referred to the court in the Hague. Iran refused but agreed that it should be referred

¹²⁷² Ebrahim Safa'ei, *Eshtebah-e Bozorg-e Melli Shodan-e Naft* [The Huge Error of Nationalisation of the Oil Industry] (Tehran: Ketabsara, 1992), 25-7.

¹²⁷³ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 196.

instead to the Council of the League of Nations where the British government acted on behalf of the oil company. When the Council met in February, both countries agreed that the proceedings should be postponed until the Council met again in May, but that in the meantime direct negotiations regarding a new concession would continue between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the Iranian government. Foroughi, the Foreign Minister; Taqizadeh, Finance Minister and Davar, Court Minister were part of the Iranian delegation which was responsible for conducting negotiations with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. John Cadman, the chairman of the company, also came to Iran and negotiations began. According to Taqizadeh, the negotiations were long and tiresome and the matter was discussed every day for over a month. Taqizadeh mentions that when they were close to an agreement the other side asked for the extension of the period of the concession which caused strong disagreement on the Iranian side.¹²⁷⁴ Reza Shah initially also disagreed with the extension but finally surrendered. The concession was extended by 32 years to the end of 1993. Taqizadeh had to sign the new agreement with a gold pen that the company had prepared. He states that he was “very weary” and could not sleep that night. He sent the gold pen to Reza Shah to imply that it was the Shah’s decision to sign the agreement; not Taqizadeh’s.¹²⁷⁵ This agreement is known as the “The Oil Agreement of 1933”.

9:9 The Oil Agreement of 1933 and its Consequences for Taqizadeh

From the twenty-seven articles of the agreement, the main points of the new agreement specified that Iran would receive its right from the share in two ways; one from the oil itself and the other from the income of the oil. From the oil that the company exported or sold in the local market, the Iranian government would receive four shillings per ton. From the net profit what was made was calculated in the following manner: after calculating the net profit, five percent of it was to be divided among the shareholders after which Iran would receive twenty percent of the remaining net profit. This arrangement was to safeguard the Iranian share in the event that the number of shareholders increased at a later date. The Iranisation of the workforce in the industry was one of the key articles since it ensured that

¹²⁷⁴ Ibid., 206-7.

¹²⁷⁵ Ibid., 209.

Iran would be able to operate the industry independently in the future.¹²⁷⁶ It was also agreed that Iran would receive from the oil company one million, six hundred thousand Pounds Sterling for previous disputes.¹²⁷⁷

It was not until Reza Shah was in power that anyone dared to criticise Taqizadeh openly. Following the resignation of the Shah and his departure from Iran, criticism of Taqizadeh began to surface.¹²⁷⁸ Among the numerous critics of Taqizadeh was Mohammad Mosaddeq who criticised Taqizadeh for not making public the details of the oil agreement before presenting it to Parliament. Mosaddeq had assumed that if Taqizadeh had made the bill public, the disadvantages of the oil agreement would have been evident and, thus, the general public would have reacted against it.¹²⁷⁹ Considering the temper and general countenance of Reza Shah, Taqizadeh's behaviour was bound to lead to trouble for him. Taqizadeh knew that doing this would have serious consequences for him and since the media was also controlled and censored by the establishment there was little hope that Taqizadeh would have been able to get away with it. To fully understand the Shah's attitude towards Taqizadeh's actions, we should look at letters addressed to Taqizadeh which remain from the office of the Shah. They are an indication of just how restricted Taqizadeh was as Minister of Finance, and just how little he was able to do without first seeking permission from the Shah. Taqizadeh had been accustomed to taking bills directly to Parliament to be made legal but the Shah was far from happy about this. In one letter sent some months before the oil agreement was drafted, the Shah had harshly reprimanded Taqizadeh, complaining that Taqizadeh had attempted to purchase gold without having sought permission from him and had directly asked Taqizadeh when he would finally submit to his authority.¹²⁸⁰ In his autobiography, Taqizadeh noted that the money that Iran had received from the oil revenue was deposited abroad and he suggested that it be used to purchase more gold. He had taken the suggestion to the cabinet to be discussed, in order

¹²⁷⁶ For the full text of the D'Arcy Concession and 1933 Agreement in English visit: <https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/bbm%3A978-3-658-00093-6%2F1.pdf>.

¹²⁷⁷ Mojtehed, 231.

¹²⁷⁸ Afshar Yazdi, 442.

¹²⁷⁹ Mohammad Mosaddeq, *Khaterat va T'amolât-e Mosaddeq* [Memoirs of Mosaddeq], ed., Iraj Afshar (Tehran: 'Elmi, 2006), 119.

¹²⁸⁰ Hossein Shokoh al-Molk (The Special Office of the Shah) to Taqizadeh, 11 September 1933 in *Nameh-hay-e Tehran*, ed., Afshar, 137-8.

that the next instalment of revenue be spent on gold. Upon hearing news of this, the Shah was furious; he wanted any matter concerning oil to be discussed solely with him and not with others, even members of the cabinet.¹²⁸¹

Taqizadeh was questioned about the cancellation of the D'Arcy agreement and the 1933 agreement and its process repeatedly but it seems that his replies were not satisfactory for many. A British Diplomatic report stated at the time:

It seems doubtful whether the real facts and motives which led to the dramatic cancellation of the D'Arcy Concession will ever be known. The Shah, Teymourache [Teymourash] and Taqizadeh, the Minister of Finance, all know a good deal about it, but even if they could be brought to give their personal versions it appears highly doubtful whether a satisfactory intelligible whole could be pieced together.¹²⁸²

On 14 September 1933, the government of Mokhber al-Saltaneh resigned and Taqizadeh's post as Minister of Finance came to an end.¹²⁸³ Concerning his removal from office, Taqizadeh writes that Reza Shah, without Taqizadeh's knowledge, had asked the Prime Minister, Mokhber-al Saltaneh, to resign and they had planned that every minister would also give his resignation separately. Taqizadeh refers to this gesture as a sign of respect for him by the Shah.¹²⁸⁴ As Taqizadeh states, Reza Shah had become suspicious of him since he had bought gold for the treasury and suspected that Taqizadeh was hiding from him the true amount of gold that they had. The Shah had ordered the new Finance Minister, Davar, to investigate the affairs of the Finance Ministry to ascertain whether Taqizadeh had indeed done anything wrong. Reza Shah no longer wanted Taqizadeh as Minister and he was sent abroad. Reza Shah was dissatisfied with Taqizadeh over two matters; one was the fact that Taqizadeh took every order of the Shah to the Parliament to

¹²⁸¹ Hossein Shokoh al-Molk (The Special Office of the Shah), 11 September 1933 in *Nameh-hay-e Tehran*, ed., Afshar, 137-8.

¹²⁸² Mr. Horace to Sir John Simon, Annual Report 1932 in *Iran Political Diaries: 1881-1965*, 276.

¹²⁸³ *The New York Times*, September 15, 1933.

¹²⁸⁴ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 190.

be certified and made legal, the second was that he had invested some of the income of the oil in gold.¹²⁸⁵ According to Taqizadeh, in a meeting with the Members of Parliament, Reza Shah had expressed his satisfaction with the financial position of the country. Someone present had then commented on the fact that it was the Minister of Finance who had managed to achieve this. Taqizadeh was well aware that Reza Shah would be displeased at the suggestion that someone else take credit for Iran's stable financial situation and writes about this in his autobiography. It seems that the Shah's clear displeasure had led Taqizadeh to attempt to placate him. In a parliamentary speech whilst still Minister of Finance, apparently referencing this, Taqizadeh announced that he would have preferred that his name not be mentioned in connection with the state of the country's finances. He continued that, in his opinion, it was crucial that all citizens be fully aware that it was in fact the head of the country, [the Shah], who must take credit for all achievements; he himself was simply carrying out his duty and should not therefore be given any credit for that.¹²⁸⁶ However, this appears to have done little to placate the Shah. Another interpretation could be that, since this happened after the controversial oil agreement of 1933, Taqizadeh was using the opportunity to also imply that he similarly should not be held responsible for the signing of that agreement; the responsibility for that, too, lay with the Shah.

Taqizadeh writes that, from this time on, he was more unpopular with Reza Shah. His unpopularity was further exacerbated by the fact that Reza Shah preferred to allocate budget to the military rather than invest in gold, which was Taqizadeh's preference whilst he was Finance Minister.¹²⁸⁷ According to Taqizadeh, Reza Shah later suspected that Taqizadeh had invested the money in gold in order to prevent Reza Shah from using the money to pay for arms and the military.¹²⁸⁸

The British, who were carefully observing Iranian affairs, were not fully aware of the reasons for Taqizadeh's falling out of favour with the Shah. A British diplomatic report

¹²⁸⁵ Hedayat, 400.

¹²⁸⁶ Proceedings of the Ninth Parliament, Session 15, 2 May 1933.

¹²⁸⁷ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 212.

¹²⁸⁸ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 212-3.

stipulates, “The chief reasons for the reconstruction of the Cabinet were probably the desire of the Shah to have a real Prime Minister now that Teymourache [Teymourash] was no longer there to hold the threads of the civil administration”. The same report, analysing the possible reasons for Taqizadeh’s dismissal, as well as taking into account the gold issue, states: “The exact reasons for the Shah’s discontent with Taqizadeh are uncertain...On the other hand, Taqizadeh himself is believed to have wished to retire for some time...”.¹²⁸⁹

Other statements suggest that Taqizadeh had given his official resignation to Reza Shah although it was not accepted since his ministers had no right to resign.¹²⁹⁰ In his autobiography Taqizadeh also mentions that he was unhappy with Reza Shah and eventually would leave the country and never return.¹²⁹¹ As events of his life unfolded, Taqizadeh would indeed spend a significant period of time outside Iran, beginning with his appointment in Paris.

9:10 Iranian Minister in Paris

Taqizadeh was in charge of the Iranian Embassy in Paris from January 1934 until August 1934. During this period, the Social Nationalist party was in power in Germany. An anti-Jewish policy was prevalent; life was becoming increasingly difficult for the Jews. According to the 1933 German law for the “Cleansing of the Civil Service”, officials who were not of Aryan descent were to be dismissed.¹²⁹² Those Jews working in important German affairs were now prevented from trading and owning a business and many had no choice but to flee the country. Among them were many scientists and educators who migrated to countries such as the United States and Turkey where they were welcomed for their expertise. Taking advantage of the situation, hundreds of Jews were employed on low wages in fields where they could contribute to the development of science and fine art. Those who had remained in Germany then scattered throughout Europe to countries such

¹²⁸⁹ Coll 28/67 ‘Persia. Annual Reports, 1932–’, British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/12/3472A, in *The Qatar Digital Library*, http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100056661166.0x0000a4?utm_source=testpdfdownload&utm_medium=pdf&utm_campaign=PDFdownload (accessed 31 March 2020).

¹²⁹⁰ Sheikh al-Eslami, 271-2.

¹²⁹¹ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 209.

¹²⁹² Bentwich Norman, *The Rescue and Achievement of Refugee Scholars, The Story of Displaced Scholars and Scientists 1933-1952*, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1953), 9.

as France, England, Switzerland, The Netherlands and Belgium in search of jobs. Jews had established organisations to assist other Jews in finding employment and relocating to other countries.¹²⁹³

Correspondence between the Foreign Ministry and the Iranian embassies in Europe reveals that there was a constant stream of Jews requesting Iranian visas and work permits. As the Ambassador of Iran in Paris, Taqizadeh was also involved in this. His letters to the Prime Minister's office of the time in Iran reveal that he saw this as a good opportunity, strongly believing that Iran's government should hire and make use of these people's expertise. He believed that Turkey had already benefitted by hiring educated migrants and that Iran should not delay in doing similarly.

To understand and trace Taqizadeh's stand on encouraging and inviting foreign experts to Iran, one can refer to an interview that Taqizadeh took part in after his return to Iran in September 1924. During the interview he commented that he believed one of the most important means of reform for Iran was to invite "civilised, hardworking and harmless migrants" from European countries who would be relocated in small groups throughout Iran and provided with the means to carry out agricultural work in order to establish exemplary villages which Iranians could later emulate. He used the example of the German migrants who had established settlements in the Russian Caucasus during the period of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great and who had played an important role in helping to modernise those parts of Russia and who were loyal to the Russian government.¹²⁹⁴ It should be noted that this idea was not original to Taqizadeh; exactly a century before Taqizadeh's comments, in 1824, Abbas Mirza, the Crown Prince and governor of Azerbaijan had given orders for announcements to be placed in the British

¹²⁹³ One international committee to help in finding jobs for Jewish academics was founded in Geneva. Another association was in London called "Academic Assistance Council" established in 1933. Some of its key funding figures were Sir William Beveridge; Lord Rutherford; John Maynard Keynes; A V Hill, Lionel Robbins; and Margery Fry. For further information see: Bentwich Norman, *The Rescue and Achievement of Refugee Scholars, The Story of Displaced Scholars and Scientists 1933-1952* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1953). The council continues its work as CARA (Council for Assisting Refugee Academics). For further information about CARA see (<http://www.academic-refugees.org/history.asp>).

¹²⁹⁴ Taqizadeh, "Yek Mosht Tasavorat-e bi Ed'a [Some Humble Thoughts]" in *Iran*, September 28 and October 1, 1924, republished in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh* 5:65-6

press and several other European countries encouraging Europeans to come to Iran with the same purpose. The announcement is lengthy but to highlight its similarity with what Taqizadeh was suggesting a century later it is worth quoting part of the beginning as published in an Australian newspaper:

As many families from European countries have lately resorted, some to America and New Holland, and others to Georgia and Daghistan, as settlers; his Royal Highness, Abbas Mirza, the Prince Royal of Persia, through the medium of his Minister at the Court of Great Britain, personally assures all those who may be inclined to take up their residence in his kingdom of Adzirebijan, of which the capital is Tabriz, that, on their arrival in the district of Sauvidgeboulough, he will immediately assign to them portions of land, with residences attached, and every requisite for their comfort and subsistence. The soil will yield abundant crops of wheat, barley, rice, cotton, and every species of fruit or grain they may choose to cultivate; and the produce of the country exceeds that of any other quarter of the globe. Besides receiving grants of land, such settlers shall, as long as they reside in Persia, be exempt from all taxes or contributions of any kind their property and persons be held sacred, under the immediate protection of the Prince himself, who further engages that they shall be treated with the greatest kindness and attention, and, as is the custom of Persia, be at full liberty to enjoy their own religious opinions and feelings, and to follow without control or interruption their own mode of worship. As all travellers who have visited Persia agree that it is the best climate under the sun.¹²⁹⁵

This project of Abbas Mirza was not successful. With his passing, his plans also died. It may be that Europeans were reluctant to come to Iran because of the lack of security in the country. We know that when Taqizadeh was young and living in Tabriz he had had the idea of establishing a village with his friend; but this had never been actualised. Now that the country had a powerful central government and security was established, Taqizadeh

¹²⁹⁵ *The Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser*, January 1, 1824.

now considered the time ripe to put similar ideas into action; to invite Europeans to take up employment opportunities in Iran. Whilst in the past large numbers of educated Europeans had not come to settle in Iran, now many more educated Europeans, in particular Jews, were eager to take up this opportunity, desperate to escape Nazi persecution. Many wrote to Taqizadeh as the Iranian Ambassador in Paris and even personally went to see him. Although other Iranian Ambassadors in Europe also recommended hiring Jewish Europeans, some were more hesitant than Taqizadeh to do so. Nader Arasteh, the Iranian Ambassador in Berlin, for example, was of the opinion that accepting Jews might have negative social consequences for Iranian society. According to the governor of Khorasan, although Jewish people might have moral and racial imperfections, some were well-educated and could be beneficial for Iran. There is also a letter at hand from Hossein 'Ala', the Iranian Minister in London, to Taqizadeh in which 'Ala' mentions that the Ministry of Education in Iran was considering hiring some of the German experts who were scattered throughout Europe and in particular in Britain or France for the medical and engineering faculties at the University of Tehran. 'Ala's letter reveals that Taqizadeh comprehensively researched about this matter and took part in negotiations concerning this with Lord Marley, a senior British Labour politician who was the Chairman of the Parliamentary Advisory Committee for the aid of Jews in Europe. Marley had even travelled to Paris to discuss about the Jewish migrants with Taqizadeh. 'Ala', aware of this, requested Taqizadeh to introduce and investigate the suitable candidates to be hired in Iran. What is clear from 'Ala's correspondence is that Iran had delayed acting on this matter and many experts were no longer available.¹²⁹⁶

When the French press wrote critically about Reza Shah, Taqizadeh was constantly requested by the Iranian government to put a stop to it. Since Taqizadeh could do nothing, the Shah became furious. The government made it clear that if Taqizadeh was unable to prevent the criticisms aimed at the Shah from being published, he would lose his position. Finally, Taqizadeh was suspended from his position. He handed over the Embassy to his deputy, resided in a hotel room for some time before moving to Berlin to join his wife who had gone there earlier. He was informed from Iran that Reza Shah was furious with him.

¹²⁹⁶ Hossein 'Ala' to Taqizadeh, London. 6 March 1935 in *Nomeh-hay-e Tehran*, ed., Afshar, 170-1.

He wrote an apologetic letter to the Shah but received no offer of a job.¹²⁹⁷ Taqizadeh was left with no income and had to borrow from friends to survive until a temporary mission was offered to him.

9:11 International Congress of Orientalists in Rome

The Nineteenth International Congress of Orientalists took place from 23 to 29 September 1935 in Rome. The Iranian government considered it to be important since the conference had a special focus on Oriental literature. Since Italy had showed a positive reaction to the 1000-year anniversary of Ferdowsi in Iran, the Iranian government wanted to reciprocate by sending distinguished representatives to the congress.¹²⁹⁸ Taqizadeh was a suitable candidate for this. This was also endorsed by Reza Shah.¹²⁹⁹ This was a significant move for Taqizadeh since the Shah was so displeased with him that, according to Taqizadeh, nobody dared to even mention his name. Now it seemed, Taqizadeh's name had been put forward as someone suitable for the post.¹³⁰⁰ This was good news for Taqizadeh and his friends and supporters in Iran. They telegraphed Taqizadeh and asked if he would accept the position. Taqizadeh's response was positive. The Iranian government also dedicated 10,000 Rial (1330.67 Reichsmarks) to send to Taqizadeh who was residing in Berlin at that time to finance his trip to Rome.¹³⁰¹ Taqizadeh's attendance at the Congress went down well since only he and one other person from Finland were officially representing their countries. Taqizadeh met many famous Orientalists there and gave presentations about Ancient Iranian calendars and chronology. After the Congress finished, Taqizadeh remained in Italy for a few days before returning to Berlin on 6 October, 1935.¹³⁰²

¹²⁹⁷ Taqizadeh to Reza Shah, Taqizadeh, *Tufani* ('Elmi), 786-7.

¹²⁹⁸ The Foreign Ministry to The Ministry of Education and Religious Foundation, 27 July 1935 in *TINA*: 297039839.

¹²⁹⁹ The Ministry of Education and Religious Foundation to Taqizadeh 19 August 1935 in *Ibid*: 297039839.

¹³⁰⁰ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 220-21.

¹³⁰¹ The Ministry of Education and Religious Foundation to The Iranian Embassy in Berlin, 20 July 1935 and The Ministry of Education and Religious Foundation to The Prime Minister, 26 June 1935 in *TINA*: 297039839.

¹³⁰² Taqizadeh's Report about International Congress of Orientalists in Rome to The Ministry of Education and Religious Foundation, 9 October 1935 in *The Iranian National Archives*: 297039839.

At this point, Taqizadeh may have thought that the Shah had forgiven him and soon another position would be offered to him. However, an article he wrote and which was published in the publication of the Education Ministry, “T’alim va Tarbiyat” [Learning and Education] once again caused trouble for him and angered the Shah. The Shah was furious that Taqizadeh had written that a “sword” should not intervene in affairs of the “pen”.¹³⁰³ In the article which Taqizadeh had written upon request of the Education Minister, he had criticised Farhangestan-e Iran [The Iranian Language Academy], based on the French Academy and established in 1935. Its duty was to preserve, promulgate and promote the Persian language.¹³⁰⁴ One of the tasks of this academy was the purification of the Persian language and the introduction of new words. This movement grew out of earlier ideas and discourse.

Beginning in the later part of the nineteenth century, educated government officials had begun to realise that the purity of Persian was becoming increasingly threatened by the growing use of words from other languages. As well as the Arabic and Turkish words which the Persian language had been adopting over centuries, new words from European languages began to be imported as contact with Europe and the Ottoman Empire increased.¹³⁰⁵ This was a particular concern because government officials had realised the technological supremacy of the Europeans and had begun to focus on European ideas and technology. Some had concluded that in order to maintain the independence of Iran against the powerful invading European nations, the technology they had developed must be learned and copied. The first step was to translate books in European languages into Persian. The inadequacy of Persian vocabulary to expressing new technological and scientific concepts and objects soon became evident. As assimilation of these new words increased, Iranian intellectuals, many of them expats living abroad, began to join the debate over the purification of the Persian language. Many who advocated for this reform in language belonged to a wider nationalistic movement which glorified the pre-Islamic

¹³⁰³ For more on this see: Taqizadeh, *Tufani* (‘Elmi), 562-77.

¹³⁰⁴ For more about Farhangestan and its history see: Mohsen Roustaei, ed., *Tarikh-e Nakhoshtin Farhangestan-e Iran* [The History of the First Iranian Language Academy] (Tehran: Ney, 2006).

¹³⁰⁵ Mehrdad Kia, “Persian Nationalism and the Campaign for Language Purification,” in *Middle Eastern Studies* 34, no. 2 (1998), 9-36.

heritage of Iran and which was critical of the adverse effect of Islam on Iran. Some, such as Jalal-al Din Mirza and Akhondzadeh, were strongly advocating for the purification of the Persian language. They believed that the backwardness of Iran was due to the invasion of Arabs and Islam although they rarely dared to openly criticise Islam. They considered the Persian language one of the last main vestiges of pre-Islamic Iran.

The movement to purify the Persian language, eliminating foreign words, had begun before the Constitutional Revolution in Iran. Following the establishment of the constitution, the movement gained momentum as Persian language was depicted as the unifying element of the many diverse ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups in Iran. As it became easier to express opinions, the revolution brought with it a boom in journalism and many more newspapers began publication. Many of these publications avoided the complicated official language which employed more Arabic words in favour of a simpler form of language which was closer to the language used by ordinary people. Discussion in the newspapers about language purification helped to consolidate the language purification movement.

Taqizadeh himself, in the second period of his newspaper *Kaveh*, dedicated a series of critical articles such as *Farsi-e Khan-e Valeadeh*, to the style and unnecessary or misuse of foreign words in Persian. The overall style of the *Kaveh* publication was novel and uncomplicated. By publishing some of the earliest writings by such writers as Jamalzadeh, considered one of the pioneers of a more simplified style of Persian writing, Taqizadeh made an important contribution to this movement. However, taking into account Taqizadeh's ideas about the Persian language, it can be seen that Taqizadeh believed the backbone of the unity of Iranians was their cultural heritage and language. At the same time, he believed that random changes to the language, based solely on personal taste and biased ethnic superiority, would inhibit the efficacy of the language. Essentially, he was opposed to any radical movement which would advocate for the purification of the language. Some of his predecessors as well as some contemporaries, such as Talebov and Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani, were similarly opposed to the radical purification of Persian.

Taqizadeh believed that this was a bad decision and would be detrimental to the Persian language. The words introduced by the academy had to be sanctioned by the Shah and would then become obligatory. In his article, Taqizadeh had declared that the decisions should be taken by expert professionals; the force of a “sword” should not interfere in this. News of this published article had infuriated the Shah. Once again, Taqizadeh had fallen out of grace.¹³⁰⁶

9:12 The School of Oriental Studies in London

After Taqizadeh was suspended from his position as the Iranian Minister in Paris he went to Germany for a while where his time was spent reading and researching. He tried to find a job in Germany to support himself and his wife but his efforts were fruitless.¹³⁰⁷ It is also possible that Taqizadeh’s experiences during the Great War in Germany had caused him to prefer not to stay in Nazi Germany. It was in this context that Taqizadeh decided to write a letter to Sir Denison Ross, the director, offering his services to the School of Oriental Studies in London: “Having learned from a friend that there is a possibility for my being useful there to the School of Oriental Studies I have tendered to-day my services by a telegram sent to you in the following words: ‘I tender my services as lecturer to the school gratis’.”¹³⁰⁸ He ends the letter expressing his hope that his offer would be accepted.

¹³⁰⁶ 221-2.

¹³⁰⁷ Taqizadeh to Reza Shah, 1 July 1940 in Taqizadeh, *Tufani* (‘Elmi), 788-93.

¹³⁰⁸ The original of this telegram, 11 December 1935, can be found in the personnel file of Taqizadeh of what is today The School of Oriental and African Studies in London (SOAS).




Figure 23: The telegraph Taqizadeh sent to the School of Oriental Studies London, offering his services for free. Source: Taqizadeh's personnel file, SOAS, London.

Ross, after receiving permission for Taqizadeh's arrival in Britain from the British Home Office, on 6 January 1936 sent an official letter to Berlin addressed to Taqizadeh: "...the Governing body of the School of Oriental Studies has been pleased to accept the offer you so kindly made of your services as Lecturer in Persian." He then informs him that the school re-opens after the vacation ends on 14th January and he should be there before that date in order to establish himself. He also enclosed an official document for Taqizadeh which would save him "from trouble on entering England".¹³⁰⁹ Taqizadeh, after receiving the news of his acceptance, on 6 January 1936 replies to Ross that he had begun immediately to make preparation for his departure from Berlin.¹³¹⁰ On 8 January Ross informs Taqizadeh by letter that the governing body of the school had anonymously passed a resolution which specified the terms of his appointment in 13 articles. Article 9 indicated that "There will be no salary attached to the appointment".¹³¹¹ On 30 December 1935, and even before the official issue date of the letter sent to Taqizadeh informing about his

¹³⁰⁹ Sir Denison Ross to Taqizadeh, 29 December 1935 in Taqizadeh's personnel file, SOAS University of London (School of Oriental and African Studies).

¹³¹⁰ Taqizadeh to Sir Denison Ross, Berlin, 6 January 1936 in Taqizadeh's personnel file, SOAS University of London (School of Oriental and African Studies).

¹³¹¹ Secretary of the School of Oriental Studies to Taqizadeh, 8 January 1936, in *Ibid*.

appointment, some solicitors sent a private and confidential letter to Ross, the Director of the school:

We understand that His Excellency Sayyid Hasan Taqizadeh has been appointed to a lectureship in Persian, but that no salary attaches to the office. Certain persons with whom we are in touch would like to make him a present, and perhaps you would kindly let us have his address in order that we can arrange with him how the payments are to be made.¹³¹²

In reply to this letter, further correspondence in reply to the solicitors, details that as Taqizadeh would not be in London before 14 January he still had no address. The letter suggests: "With regard to the manner in which he receives the money which has been provided for him by certain persons, I would suggest that payments be made in monthly instalment, such instalments to be paid in advance on the first day of each month, and that the instalment for January be paid on his arrival in England".¹³¹³ In a later letter the solicitors write to Ross that they would arrange that the monthly amount would be credited to the bank account Taqizadeh would open in England.¹³¹⁴ After the arrival of Taqizadeh in London, Ross writes another letter to the solicitors stating that Taqizadeh was unhappy about the way the payment of money was arranged. The letter states: "He would greatly prefer to be able to say that he had received it from the school account". Then Ross states that it would be better if they sent the money to him and he could personally hand it to Taqizadeh because, "He will then be able to say that he receives money from the Director and thus silence the curiosity of his friends. He is so anxious that what he receives should appear to be in payment for services rendered to the School".¹³¹⁵ The amount of salary he received from the unidentified source via solicitors is not mentioned in these documents but Taqizadeh himself has stated that he received annually eight hundred Lira, sixty a month.¹³¹⁶ Taqizadeh has never referred to these anonymous people who paid him this

¹³¹² Solicitors, F. Arnold Biddle, F. M. Welsford, M.D. Macduff, 21 December 1935 in Ibid.

¹³¹³ The School of Oriental Studies to Solicitors, in Ibid.

¹³¹⁴ Biddle, Thorne, Welsford & Gait Solicitors to Sir Denison Ross, 30 December 1935, in Ibid.

¹³¹⁵ Sir Denison Ross to Biddle, Thorne, Welsford & Gait Solicitors, 20 January 1935 in Ibid.

¹³¹⁶ *Tufani*, 224.

monthly amount. In his autobiography Taqizadeh has his own version of the story which does not match the documents in his personnel file in the school; his own account about his initial acceptance at the school even differs from the official documents. He writes in his autobiography:

After the 19th International Congress of Orientalists, I came back to Berlin. Once again, I spent some months there and was jobless until in late 1935, I received a telegraph from Sir Denison Ross, the Director of the School of Oriental Studies in London. He had asked if I wanted to teach Persian literature at postgraduate level. I gave a positive response, they invited me immediately and I arrived in London on 10 January 1936.¹³¹⁷

Possibly the reason for Taqizadeh not expressing the truth about how he landed this unsalaried teaching position is that he might have felt embarrassment at having had to actively seek a position which he felt was below him. Taqizadeh then continues and writes that he received a salary from the School of Oriental Studies although there is no mention of the solicitors. We can assume that his insistence to receive the money not from the solicitors but from the school was due to the fact that his movements and actions were being monitored by some Iranian communist and leftist intellectuals. Among these was one of the later founders of the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party and Taqizadeh's fellow-citizen, Khalil Maleki who he mentions in his autobiography:

The school could not offer much and we didn't earn a lot. We could just make ends meet. There was someone here (In London) from the Tudeh Party, (Khalil Maleki), who used foul language. He also slandered me. He was sent by the Tudeh newspapers to London. He had written that the fact that such a person had been teaching there, at the school, is just a pretext. In one place he also wrote that it was said that he (I) received sixty Lira! He wanted to say that I received one hundred thousand Lira. However, at that time in London anyone could live on sixty Lira; it was true with sixty Lira

¹³¹⁷ Ibid., 227.

we lived. We had taken a small apartment which had three rooms. We spent all this time there. They were not able to give more but it was fine. When I went there, I did not have even one penny. Life had become very difficult. It was a heavenly gift that all of a sudden, they wrote to me asking if I was willing to go there. I replied that I was. If I had not been desperate, I would not have accepted this offer because I consider it was below my dignity. But we were in a dire situation. I taught there for about six years.¹³¹⁸

We know that as soon as Taqizadeh took up governmental positions he was subjected to strong criticism by left-wing intellectuals and those who had a pro-Soviet Union stance. He was considered by some leftist activists as someone in Iran who was against the policies of the Soviet Union and instead favoured the interests of the imperialist states. This criticism began as early as 1922 when he took up his first governmental job to conduct trade negotiations with the Soviet Union and increased further while in the role of cabinet minister, he co-operated with Reza Shah's government. Even stronger criticism was directed at him when, as Finance Minister, he signed the Oil Agreement of 1933 which was considered an agreement in favour of the British. The treatment of the leftists by Reza Shah's regime, considering them a serious threat to the independence of the country, the imprisoning of their prominent members and the persecution of other members, further exacerbated the leftist movements' attacks against those who were seen to co-operate with the regime, among them Taqizadeh. Later, with the formation of Hezb-e Tudeh-e Iran [Party of the Masses of Iran] in 1941, these attacks were targeted in more organised ways against those the party did not favour. Khalil Maleki, who was sent to Germany by the Iranian government to study there, began his anti-regime activities whilst Taqizadeh was in Iran and co-operating with Reza Shah. Thanks to the severe censorship in Iran, Berlin had become a centre in which the leftist position had a strong hold and from which their own publication *Peykar* [Fight] was published, mostly by the students who were sent from Iran to study there. In *Peykar* one can trace the criticism of Taqizadeh regarding his participation

¹³¹⁸ Ibid., 227.

in the Iranian government and the policies advocated by the government. One policy which was particularly criticised in *Peykar* was the decision of the government about the settlement of the various nomadic tribes of Iran.¹³¹⁹ *Peykar* considered this policy to be harmful and unhelpful for the situation of the tribes in Iran. The newspaper was critical of Taqizadeh's statements in the Parliament as Finance Minister, although Taqizadeh's comments were misquoted and misrepresented in the publication.¹³²⁰ Taqizadeh was also criticised about other matters including the fact that he had not spoken out against the lack of freedom and censorship during this period.¹³²¹ On another occasion Taqizadeh was accused of faking import and export figures, as Finance Minister, in order to cover up the pro-British policy under the leadership of the Court Minister, Teymourtash. He was also ridiculed for the budget he had prepared in which the largest expenditure was dedicated to the military.¹³²² Considering the critical atmosphere of the time, it would not be surprising that Taqizadeh wished to distance himself from Germany, the hotbed of criticism against him, and that he should be at pains to avoid providing any opportunity for the leftist opposition to accuse him of receiving money from what they might perceive to be questionable sources.

No documents have come to light which suggest the exact amount of money Taqizadeh received as a present during this period. However, towards the end of 1936 the solicitors sent another letter to the Director of the school: "We are writing to inform you that exactly the same financial arrangements will be made during the year 1937 for His Excellency Sayyid Hasan Taqizadeh as have been made during the current year. The first payment will be made to his Bank on 1st January. We presume that you will notify His Excellency."¹³²³

¹³¹⁹ *Peykar*, April 20, 1931.

¹³²⁰ Proceedings of the Eighth Parliament, Session 7, 1 February 1931 in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh* (Tehran: Tus, 2011), 9: 101-5.

¹³²¹ *Peykar*, September 1, 1931.

¹³²² *Ibid.*, June 1, 1931

¹³²³ Biddle, Thorne, Welsford & Gait Solicitors to Sir Denison Ross, 21 December 1936, in Taqizadeh's personnel file, SOAS University of London (School of Oriental and African Studies).

Interestingly, in this letter there is no mention of the arrangement that Ross would give the money to Taqizadeh in person. The money was deposited directly into Taqizadeh's bank account. After his arrival in England, Taqizadeh might have realised that there was no danger in his receiving the money directly into his bank account. After 1937, there are no letters from the solicitors in Taqizadeh's personnel file, possibly because in 1937 the Director of the school, Denison Ross, was replaced by Ralph Lilley Turner. It could be that Taqizadeh did not want the new director to know about the financial arrangements organised by the solicitors and had thus asked that the money be paid into his bank account directly. In his autobiography Taqizadeh mentions that this money was enough to live on frugally and even sufficient to allow him to save a little. He even talks about a small house that his wife had bought with a mortgage in Cambridge and later another in London. According to Taqizadeh they later sold the houses before returning to Iran. Later, because of the Second World War, the school had to move to Cambridge and Taqizadeh spent most of his time in that city. Taqizadeh's school personnel file provides evidence that he was giving tutorial classes during the holiday time which allowed him to earn some extra income.

Although Taqizadeh states that he was satisfied with his situation, it seems that his situation was not as secure as he would have hoped. On 1 July 1940, he wrote a letter to Reza Shah explaining his situation, asking for forgiveness and enquiring about the possibility that a job might be referred to him. He was clearly worried about the turbulent situation in Europe and aware that life might be difficult for him as a foreigner in Britain.¹³²⁴ His request appears not to have been met and he continued work for the school.

Whilst working for the school in London, Taqizadeh was a colleague of Vladimir Minorsky, his old friend and other prominent orientalist scholars.¹³²⁵ Another

¹³²⁴ Taqizadeh to Reza Shah, 1 July 1940, in Taqizadeh, *Tufani* ('Elmi), 786-9.

¹³²⁵ For more about Minorsky (1877-1966) and his relationship with Taqizadeh see: Hassan Taqizadeh, "Payam be Majles-e Sugvari-e Minorsky, [Eulogy for Minorsky]" and "Darbareh-e Minorsky, [About Minorsky]" in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh* [The Essays of Taqizadeh] (Tehran: Tus, 2014), 13: 375-9.

scholar working in the School of Oriental Studies was Walter Bruno Henning, a German expert in Middle Iranian languages and literature.¹³²⁶ Notably, among the famous students of Taqizadeh in the school was Ann Lambton, who later became a well-known orientalist and a Persian Studies Scholar. Writing about Taqizadeh, she states that Taqizadeh had come to London, carrying out a job which was beneath him. She describes the close relationship between Taqizadeh and his wife and writes of the warm family nest they had created together.¹³²⁷

Being in Britain during the war gave opportunity to Taqizadeh's brother-in-law, Hans Joachim von Young, to seek refuge in Britain. There is no evidence of the reason he left Germany. Since this happened in the early years of the war, one could speculate that he was a political refugee. Taqizadeh, in an attempt to help the case of his brother-in-law who was interned in Britain, wrote to the Iranian Minister in London, Mohammad Ali Moqaddam, requesting assistance for him.¹³²⁸ Taqizadeh was fully prepared to guarantee that his "brother-in-law, who is a bonafide refugee, will abide by all the rules and regulations." The Home Office's response was negative.¹³²⁹ This would appear to be an indication that Taqizadeh did not have as much influence with the British as some have suggested. Nevertheless, his brother-in-law was later able to remain in Britain and become naturalised.¹³³⁰

¹³²⁶ Taqizadeh who believed a good dictionary of Persian was needed convinced the Iranian government to provide funds for the compiling of an etymological vocabulary of the new Persian language. This publication, however, was never completed. There are a series of published letters between Taqizadeh and Henning. *Scholars and Humanists: Iranian Studies in W.B. Henning and S.H. Taqizadeh Correspondence 1937-1966*, eds. Iraj Afshar and Touraj Daryaei (Costa Mesa, Calif: Mazda Publishers, 2009).

¹³²⁷ Ann Lambton, "Remembering Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh," in *Iran Nameh: Special Issue on Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh* 21, no. 1-2 (2003), 109-11.

¹³²⁸ Mohammad Ali Moqaddam to Mr. Baggally, London, 27 May 1940, in *TNA*: FO 371/25244.

¹³²⁹ Baggally to Mohammad Ali Moqaddam, 4 July 1940, in *Ibid.*

¹³³⁰ Certificate of Naturalisation, Hans Joachim von Young, 24 January 1947, in *TNA*: HO 334/201.

January 6th 1935

My dear Sir Denison,

I have received your letter of 29th. december last and I thank you for the acceptance of my offer as well as for the kind words you said in the same letter for me. Immediately I have started to make preparations for my departure from Berlin. There was much to do and to liquidate, but I am glad to say that I am now almost ready to leave. I hope to leave Wednesday the 8th. or Thursday the 9th. and to arrive in London 10th. of January. I will call on you the next day and will be at your disposal. I do not need to say that I have much to learn about the ways and methods of the works there and must try to be acquainted with them. Therefore I hope I may count upon your friendly guidance in this

Figure 24: Taqizadeh's letter to Sir Denison Ross. Source: Taqizadeh's personnel file, SOAS, London

Private & Confidential

20th January 1935

Dear Sirs,

I find that Sayyid Hasan Taquzadeh is not altogether happy about the manner in which it is proposed that he should receive the money. He would greatly prefer to be able to say that he had received it from the School account, I think it will meet his wishes if the payments are made directly to myself at the dates already agreed upon and I can hand the sum over to him personally. He will then be able to say that he receives money from the Director and thus silence the curiosity of his friends. He is so anxious that what he receives should appear to be in payment for services rendered to the School.

I shall be glad to hear if you approve this arrangement.

Yours faithfully,

Director.

Messrs. Biddle, Thorne, Welsford
& Gait,
22, Aldermanbury, E.C.2.

M' Welsford

Mutspolman 2525

Parham

Bank ?

Figure 25: Letter concerning Taqizadeh's wish to receive monies directly from the Director of the School of Oriental Studies rather than unidentified sources, in order to "silence the curiosity of his friends". Source: Taqizadeh's personnel file, SOAS, London.

9:13 The Occupation of Iran by the Allies

The beginning of the Second World War with the rapid advances of the Germans had convinced the Iranian leadership, especially the Shah and the Crown Prince, that the Germans would eventually have the upper hand in the war. Reza Shah's amicable relationship with the Germans and the German experts busy working in different fields in Iran had made the British sceptical and worried that possibly in the future, with further victories of the Germans in the East, Iran would co-operate with the Germans.¹³³¹ Ignoring the neutrality policy of Iran, the British and Soviet Union troops in a joint operation invaded Iran on 25 August 1941. The Iranian army could not resist and the Allies occupied Iran. Reza Shah was forced to resign and leave Iran. The Allies agreed that the Crown Prince Mohammad Reza Pahlavi should become the new Shah. Foroughi became Prime Minister and Soheyli Foreign Minister. Soheyli, having had a good relationship with Taqizadeh previously, wrote to him asking him to accept the post of Iranian Minister in London. After some hesitation Taqizadeh accepted the post. After the coming of the Allies and disintegration of the Iranian army, confusion and rioting was widespread. The security and peace of the previous twenty years had come to an end and local unrest especially among the tribes was rife. As Abbas Amanat has described this period: "The opening of the public space came with new ideologies, ranging from Marxist-Leninist to ultranationalist and Islamic extremist. A dose of demagoguery, covert and overt foreign influences, proxy politics, and the re-emergence after a brief interlude of the royal court and the army in the political arena all led to an atmosphere of distrust and conspiracy".¹³³² Coming back to the political arena in this period made Taqizadeh more vulnerable to this atmosphere of suspicion.

The Minister in London

Taqizadeh after resignation from the Oriental school took up his post as the Iranian Minister in London. This was a key position since British forces had occupied Iran and the Iranian Minister needed to be a skilled politician in order to represent Iran well and defend Iranian rights in Britain. Taqizadeh was well known and respected among the British

¹³³¹ The Germans were not the only reason that Britain was dissatisfied with the Iranian government; oil disputes also played a big role in creating distrust between Britain and Iran. For more on this see: Touraj Atabaki "The Battle to Conquer the World's Oil Empire," (Forthcoming).

¹³³² Abbas Amanat, *Iran: A Modern History* (Yale University Press, 2017), 502.

politicians and this was one reason he was chosen for this post.¹³³³ Another reason was that Foroughi at this point was not keen for Taqizadeh to be in Tehran where he might act as a rival and preferred him to remain abroad.¹³³⁴

The British legation in Tehran was of the belief that Taqizadeh “by far was the best possible successor to Foroughi as Prime Minister”.¹³³⁵ But Taqizadeh avoided accepting the post, using his bad health as an excuse. Later when Soheyli had taken up the position of Iranian Prime Minister, Reader Bullard, the British Minister in Tehran, again referred to Taqizadeh as the Britain’s preferred choice for Prime Minister: “It is doubtful whether Soheyli will ever be able to manage the Majlis...I therefore think we should make one more effort to secure Taqizadeh as Prime Minister. He is the only man about whose qualifications we, Soviet Embassy, Shah and Persian people are all agreed”.¹³³⁶ Since Britain maintained a military presence in Iran, it would have been advantageous for them to be able to deal with a man more acquainted with British affairs and with whom they in turn were more familiar. Taqizadeh’s position in London, however, was still a benefit to the British government, as well as being Taqizadeh’s preferred position. There are some who have suggested that these events in particular support the suggestion that Taqizadeh was in some way working for the benefit of the British rather than for his own country and rumours abounded that he had a special relationship with Britain. However, a close examination of events from all perspectives and a close reading of remaining documents help to refute these suggestions.

A “confidential and private” letter sent from Taqizadeh to the Court Minister of the time and a close friend of his, Hossein ‘Ala’, makes it clear that Mohammad Reza Shah had twice requested Taqizadeh to return to Iran, once in the early winter of 1942 to accept the position of Prime Minister.¹³³⁷ A couple of months later this request was repeated by the

¹³³³ Ali Soheyli to Taqizadeh, telegram, without date, in *Nameh-hay-e Landan*, ed., Afshar, 262.

¹³³⁴ Baqer Kazemi to Taqizadeh, Tehran, 26 October 1941 in *Ibid.*, 411.

¹³³⁵ Reader Bullard to the British Foreign Office, February 1942 in Reader Bullard, *Letters from Tehran: A British Ambassador in World War II Persia* (London: I.B Tauris 1991), 115.

¹³³⁶ Reader Bullard to the British Foreign Office, March 1942 in *Ibid.*, 124.

¹³³⁷ Taqizadeh to Hossein ‘Ala’, London, 21 January 1943 in *Nameh-hay-e Landan*, ed., Afshar, 27- 35.

Shah but Taqizadeh declined once again.¹³³⁸ He was later also offered the position of Minister of Finance.¹³³⁹ On all occasions Taqizadeh rejected the offers. The reason Taqizadeh gave for his rejection was his poor health. Taqizadeh reveals to ‘Ala’ that he suffered from an embarrassing problem, urinary incontinence or the loss of bladder control and gives a comprehensive record of his illness which he had apparently suffered with for years. He stated that due to his poor health he was unable to travel. However, there are, in fact, two possible further reasons for his reticence about returning to Iran. Firstly, following the gaining of power and influence by the Tudeh Party in the country after the Russians had occupied parts of Iran and the growing criticism towards Taqizadeh himself due to his perceived position as an anglophile in particular after his signing of the 1933 agreement, it is likely that Taqizadeh felt he would be too much of an easy target for vilification if he returned. Secondly, and what can be understood from the content of his letter is that Taqizadeh was well aware of the fact that the governments in Iran during that period were unable to hold power for any length of time and, thus, the government of Iran was unstable and somewhat in flux. He knew that if he returned to Iran to take up a position, his position itself would, in fact, be unstable and that his position as Minister in London was a far more secure job and one which he would be able to maintain for a longer period. In the letter Taqizadeh considers this lack of stability a danger for the country and comments on the need for the central government to be strengthened. The most notable part of the letter is Taqizadeh’s warning that to allow a military man to take power “could lead to the worst of mischiefs” and advises that the first priority should be the securing of the foundations of constitutionalism and democracy. It is evident from the letter that, unlike in the aftermath of the Great War when many intellectuals and among them Taqizadeh had welcomed the idea of a military man coming to power to bring security to the country, now, in contrast, having experienced the dictatorship of Reza Shah, Taqizadeh had clearly had a change of heart and was eager to ensure that the constitution would not now be brushed aside by a military man. Although Taqizadeh was in favour of authoritarian modernity, his main focus

¹³³⁸ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 242.

¹³³⁹ According to Ali Amini, when Qavam al-Saltaneh was the Prime Minister, Taqizadeh who was in London was asked to accept the post of Finance Minister but he rejected it. Ali Amini, Interview recorded by Habib Ladjevardi, 3 December 1981, Paris, France, Tape 1. Harvard Library: Iranian Oral History Project, available online: <https://sds.lib.harvard.edu/sds/audio/460344575> (accessed 4 April, 2020).

remained on the positives of bringing modernisation to the country, a mindset he had had from his earliest political awakenings and which he had vehemently maintained throughout his life.

Whilst Taqizadeh held the position of Minister in London, most of his friends or former colleagues in key positions, such as Soheyli and 'Ala', sought advice from Taqizadeh. Taqizadeh deemed it necessary in his correspondence to them to mention points about certain topics that he thought were crucial for the improvement of the situation. Therefore, what we are able to read in his remaining letters from his time as Minister in London contains key points regarding his ideology, changes in or continuity in his ideas and refers to matters related to challenging issues in Iran at that time. One of these issues was language policy. Following the period of Reza Shah, a strict policy had been imposed, enforcing the use of Persian language to act as a backbone of the new state of Iran in the aftermath of the Great war. Other languages spoken in Iran such as Azeri or Kurdish were not given any official status. After the fall from power of Reza Shah, there had been a backlash to this hegemonic policy. The enforcement of a policy of Persian monolingualism on a national population whose mother tongues varied and the deprivation of the right to be educated in their own languages, had now, with the lack of a central government, put in danger the integrity of Iran as a unified nation.

In a letter, responding to the possible danger of Arab unity Taqizadeh writes extensively about his ideas concerning language policy and nationalism and is worthy of discussion at length. Taqizadeh believed that Arab unification was an absurd illusion in imitation of the pan-Germanism, pan-Slavism and pan-Turkism of the first part of the twentieth century and could not be actualised in Iran for two reasons. First, most Arabs residing in different regions were still not independent and secondly, they still followed a traditional lifestyle and were not so developed. Taqizadeh believed that essentially the unification of Arabs was not harmful for states neighbouring the Arab countries such as Iran. He opined that if these countries were able to throw off the domination of western Christian countries which had been exploiting them, this would benefit the other Islamic states. Furthermore, in future these countries, both Arab and non-Arab, could unite and defend their territories together.

In terms of the danger of the idea of Arab nationalism for the Arabic people of Iran, he believed that as long as the Arab countries, unlike the developed nations of Germany, Britain, Japan or China, had not fully embraced scientific developments and were in a state of ignorant “dissolution”, then there was no threat from them. However, he opined, if the Arab states should one day become more modernised, then nothing would prevent the Arabs in Iran from joining arms with their fellow Arabs outside the country. Taqizadeh goes on to suggest two ways to prevent this, according to him: one would be a criminal act and unacceptable, the other would be to face the issue and by paying the necessary attention to it, resolve any potential issues. The first is to become a monolingual nation by eradicating different cultures and languages, enforcing, even under the threat of death, those who are different to accept one language and culture. According to Taqizadeh, this was what had been done to the languages of the Ottoman Empire when Turkish had been imposed as the sole national language after the loss of a major part of its land. It had become evident that the two or three million Kurds living within modern Turkey’s borders spoke a different home language; Turkey’s forces suppressed the use of their Kurdish mother tongue with fire and steel, blood was shed and the issue had still not yet been resolved.¹³⁴⁰

Taqizadeh, as Minister of Iran in London, was responsible for regulating affairs between Iran and Britain. Due to the military presence of Britain and its occupation of Iran by the Allies, affairs between the two nations were wide-ranging and of high importance. Taqizadeh was responsible for overseeing the protracted dealings between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the Iranian government and the British government and many other economic and political affairs. Some of the remaining correspondence from the period he was working as the Iranian Minister in London indicate the vast number of wide-ranging issues which were referred to Taqizadeh and with which he had to deal.¹³⁴¹ Though based in London, Taqizadeh’s duties also involved dealing with the situation of the deposed Shah, Reza Shah, whilst also being expected by the new Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, to

¹³⁴⁰ Taqizadeh, Letter to the Foreign Ministry, 8 June 1943 in *Nameh-e hay-e Landan*, 53-66.

¹³⁴¹ See: *Asnadi az Ravabet-e Iran va Englis*: 1320-1325 [Some Documents on Anglo-Iranian Relations: 1941-1945], ed., Behnaz Zarin Kelk, (Tehran: Sazman-e Asnad va Ketabkhaneh-e Melli Jomhori-e Eslami-e Iran, 2003).

facilitate contact between him and his father who had been exiled by the British.¹³⁴² Taqizadeh wrote that during his time as Minister in London he could save money and had quite an easy life; he could live rent-free; utilities were paid for and staff were at his disposal. However, his role as Minister in London was clearly politically a difficult one and one that came at a time of instability in Iranian politics and Anglo-Iranian relations in particular. Taqizadeh's failing health would not have made his job any easier. Whilst in London, there is also evidence that his ill health also affected other career opportunities for Taqizadeh. When the United Nations had been set up in San Francisco, Taqizadeh had been invited to head the Iranian delegation but had refused this position, again stating the reason to be ill health.

9:13 Northern Oil Concession and the Soviet Union

When the war was close to finishing in Europe, the Soviet government requested from the Iranian government Iran's northern oil concession in regions which were exempt from the southern oil concessions. Prior to the Russian request, the British and Americans had requested a similar concession. However, the Iranian Prime Minister, Mohammad S'aed, had rejected the requests under pressure from the nationalists in Iran who were in favour of the country's resources being assigned only by Iranians.¹³⁴³ Some preliminary investigations were undertaken in some oil-rich regions. Considering the importance of this request for Iran, S'aed decided to consult some senior Iranian statesmen: Taqizadeh, Ambassador of Iran in London, Hossein 'Ala', Ambassador to Washington and Mahmoud Jam the Iranian Ambassador in Cairo. They advised S'aed not to give any concessions until the end of the war.¹³⁴⁴ On 2 September, 1944 the cabinet held a meeting in which it was decided that until the global financial situation stabilised following the end of the war, the whole question of any oil concessions to any country should be suspended.¹³⁴⁵ Two weeks later a delegation headed by Sergey Kavtradze, Deputy Foreign Commissar of the Soviet

¹³⁴² Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 312.

¹³⁴³ Albert Gates, "Stalin's Hand of Empire Reaching into Iran Oil Fields," in *Labor Action* 8, no. 47, (1944), 3. Accessed 4 April, 2020).
<https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/glotzer/1944/11/iran2.htm>.

¹³⁴⁴ Mojtehed, 243.

¹³⁴⁵ Mohammad Sa'ed Maragheh, *Khaterat-e Siyasi-e Mohammad Sa'ed Maragheh* [Political Memoirs of Sa'ed Maragheh], ed., Baqer 'Aqeli (Tehran: Namak, 1994), 184.

Union arrived in Iran for negotiations regarding the northern oil fields.¹³⁴⁶ As soon as S'aed rejected the Russian proposal, the Russian press instigated a campaign against the rejection. The Russians criticised S'aed himself, accusing him and his government of supporting the fascists and opposing the Russians and the Allies. As representative of S'aed's government, Taqizadeh could not escape being tarred with the same brush.

Upon his return from London, Taqizadeh stayed in Iran from 23 September until 27 October 1944. While in Tehran, Taqizadeh was interviewed by the press. He commented that while in Britain he had only witnessed benevolence from the British politicians and that the independence of Iran was in line with British interests. This interview made the Tudeh Party leaders, who were suspicious about Britain, furious. From then on, the Tudeh Party's attacks on Taqizadeh increased.¹³⁴⁷ Taqizadeh came under attack in Tudeh Party meetings throughout the country. In many of these meetings, he was critically referred to as a spokesman of the British imperialist government.¹³⁴⁸ In one meeting he was accused of being a corrupt oil dealer.¹³⁴⁹ He was also accused of receiving payment from Britain.¹³⁵⁰ In another Party meeting, he was called a traitor to his own country.¹³⁵¹ Fereydoon Tavallali, member of the Shiraz Tudeh Party and later a famous poet who wrote for the Tudeh Party publications, called Taqizadeh "Abolfased Taqizadeh-e Landani". [Taqizadeh of London, father of all corruption]¹³⁵²

Many of these verbal attacks also stemmed from the role Taqizadeh later played defending the integrity of Iran when he was involved in the events surrounding the formation of the autonomous government of Azerbaijan which was backed by the Soviet Union. Taqizadeh's involvement in the conflict with the Soviet Union over Azerbaijan

¹³⁴⁶ Sa'ed Maraghei, 182.

¹³⁴⁷ Fereydoon Tavallali, *al-Tafasil* [Details] (Shiraz: Kanoun Tarbiat, 1969), 14.

¹³⁴⁸ The weekly Talk of the Tudeh Party and Labour Union in Kermanshah, 5 July 1946 in *Asnad-e Ahzab-e Siyasi-e Iran: Hezb-e Tudeh-e Iran* [The Documents of the Political Parties of Iran: The Tudeh Party of Iran], ed., Behrooz Tairani (Tehran: Sazman-e Asnad va Ketabkhaneh-e Melli-e Jomhori-e Eslami-e Iran, 2005), 829.

¹³⁴⁹ Talk in the Tudeh Party Club in Rasht, 8 February 1946 in *Ibid.*, 918.

¹³⁵⁰ Talk in the Tudeh Party Club in Rasht, 8 April 1946 in *Ibid.*, 926.

¹³⁵¹ Talk in The Tudeh Party Gathering in Malayer, 9 February 1946, in *Ibid.*, 1317.

¹³⁵² Fereydoon Tavallali, *Altafasil* [Details] (Shiraz: Kanun-e Tarbiat, 1969), 14.

which was referred to the Security Council of the United Nations could be considered one of the most significant political activities he played a part in.

9:14 Events in Azerbaijan

On May 1945, World War II came to an end in Europe with victory for the Allied Forces. Iranians, happy with this outcome, were now expecting that the Allies would withdraw their forces from Iran. According to the agreement Iran had with the Allies, after the war ended, the Allies were to withdraw their troops from Iran within six months. On 19 May 1945 the Iranian government sent a letter to the Russian Embassy in Tehran stating that now the war had ended, the presence of the Soviet army in Iran was not necessary and requested that their armed forces leave the country. Letters with a similar request were also sent to the British and United States Embassies.¹³⁵³ Despite the Iranian government request, whilst the British and United States' forces left Iran, the Soviet army continued to maintain a presence in the country and postponed the pulling out of its troops.

To continue to maintain its hold on Iranian Azerbaijan, the Soviet Union, in November 1945, supported the establishment of "Azerbaijan Milli Hokomati" [The National Government of Azerbaijan] with Ja'far Pishevari as its Prime Minister and leading figure. Pishevari was a communist from Iranian Azerbaijan who was arrested during the Reza Shah period and spent ten years in prison. Pishevari began launching reforms in Azerbaijan and ousted the officials of the central government. They disarmed the central government forces and the Gendarmarie and formed their own military force, spreading their influence throughout Azerbaijan. They set up a new judiciary system, launched land reforms and demanded taxes without approval of the central government in Tehran and the ratification of the Iranian Parliament.¹³⁵⁴ This caused a crisis in Iran and was considered a threat to the national integrity of Iran. Hakim al-Molk (Ebrahim Hakimi) the Prime Minister at the time gave a speech in the Parliament and declared that he would not allow the separation of one part of the country. This was while the Iranian government could not deploy any troops to Azerbaijan because of the presence of Soviet Union troops in that region. When the

¹³⁵³ Jamil Hassanli, *Azerbaijan-e Iran, Aghaz-e Jang-e Sard* [The Iranian Azerbaijan: Beginning of the Cold War] (Tehran: Tirazheh, 2008), 95.

¹³⁵⁴ For more about the Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan see: Atabaki, *Azerbaijan*.

Iranians decided to send troops, the Soviets prevented them from entering Azerbaijan. In Tehran the pro-Soviet Union Tudeh Party was putting pressure on the government in support of the Soviet Union's policies. The Iranian government had no choice but to take its complaint to the newly founded United Nations. The crisis of Azerbaijan was going to be the first confrontation between the Western bloc and the Soviet Union.

The United Nation was to hold its first session in London in January 1946. It was decided that any matters to be discussed had to be submitted prior to the formal proceedings. Hakimi, the Prime Minister, had asked Taqizadeh to prepare the Iranian complaint but the British were against the idea of Iran submitting the matter to the United Nations, considering the matter too serious to be dealt with in the newly founded organisation. According to Taqizadeh, they argued that this case could break the back of the incipient United Nation and the British Foreign Minister had personally requested that this complaint not be handed in.¹³⁵⁵ However, Taqizadeh at this time asked for advice from several western diplomats and the complaint was finally taken to the Security Council instead of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The complaint was submitted allowing Taqizadeh the opportunity to discuss in detail the Russian invasion and the reason for the complaint. This caught the attention of the world's press and was considered a momentous session for the United Nations and a test for the new organisation.¹³⁵⁶ Following many debates between Taqizadeh and Andrey Vyshinsky, the Russian representative, it was agreed that the two nations should discuss the matter and bring the matter to the Security Council if it was not resolved.¹³⁵⁷

On 19 February 1946, Qavam al-Saltaneh, the Iranian Prime Minister, travelled to Moscow. After two weeks stay in the Soviet Union and several negotiations with Stalin and the Russian Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, he returned to Iran. The main focus

¹³⁵⁵ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 234.

¹³⁵⁶ "Test for Charter: Persia's Complaint Before Security Council," in *The West Australian*, January 30, 1946.

¹³⁵⁷ To watch Taqizadeh's first appearance in the United Nations, see: <https://www.unmultimedia.org/avlibrary/asset/2082/2082439/>. The General Assembly opens the general discussion on the Report of the Preparatory Commission. Delegates make general remarks on the aims and ideals of the United Nations. 7th, 8th, and 9th Plenary Meetings of General Assembly: 1st Session.

of the negotiations there was the pulling out of Soviet forces from Azerbaijan. Stalin, however, had stipulated one condition; that the oil concession from northern Iran should go to the Russians. After the return of Qavam, the Soviet Ambassador in Iran pushed constantly for Iran to accept that condition and agree to the Soviets having the northern oil concession. Qavam, however, postponed any acceptance. With the support of the United States and Britain, Iran referred the case to the newly established Security Council of the United Nations again. Hossein 'Ala', the Iranian Ambassador in Washington, and Taqizadeh in London were both instructed to follow the case. After a while the Russian army withdrew its troops and shortly after, in late November 1946, the Iranian army launched its final attack against Azerbaijan and ended the one year rule of the National Government of Azerbaijan. According to Taqizadeh, the Americans played a major role in forcing the Soviets to leave Azerbaijan.¹³⁵⁸ As the crisis ended, the propaganda of the pro-Soviet activists against Taqizadeh increased because of the role he had played against the Soviet Union.

Anvar Khamaei writes that since public opinion considered Taqizadeh an anglophile, his failure in the negotiations was seen as the defeat of the policy of Britain in Iran.¹³⁵⁹ As Khalil Maleki reflects in his memoirs, it was considered necessary to oppose Taqizadeh and slander him in the leftist publications and meetings not because he was a reactionary character but simply because he was making critical remarks from London about the Soviet policies in Iran.¹³⁶⁰

9:15 Return to Iran from London and Membership in the Parliament

The period of the Fourteenth Parliament came to an end on 12 March, 1946. The Parliament was suspended for a period of about 16 months until the Fifteenth Parliament convened. During this period Qavam acted as Prime Minister. The order for elections was announced on 16 December 1946 immediately after the Democrat government of Azerbaijan came to an end and the central government took control of the province. The

¹³⁵⁸ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 239.

¹³⁵⁹ Anvar Khamaei, *Khaterat-e Siyasi* [Political Memoirs] (Tehran, Gofar, 1993), 460.

¹³⁶⁰ Khalil Maleki, *Khaterat-e Siyasi-e Khalil Maleki* [Khalil Maleki's Political Memoirs] (Tehran: Enteshar, 1989), 336. For a comprehensive account of Maleki's activities see: Atabaki, *Azerbaijan*, 71-98.

elections were supervised by the Iranian Democrat Party which Qavam al-Saltaneh had established. However, in Azerbaijan province most of the candidates were independent, among them Taqizadeh.¹³⁶¹ Taqizadeh in particular had gained popularity in Azerbaijan after his role in presenting the case of Iran in the United Nations and returning the province to Iran. Taqizadeh in his autobiography about this period writes:

Qavam al-Saltaneh had complete power, like a king. I was elected to parliament from Tabriz. Qavam al-Saltaneh did not want me to return to Iran because he had made everyone obey him. In his own words he did not want anyone in Iran more powerful than himself. Despite the fact that a law exists that no-one (government employees, diplomatic posts officials) could hold a position for more than five years, I was able to retain my position after the five-year period and even for six years. When I was elected, Qavam al-Saltaneh had discussed in a cabinet meeting that the law would be cancelled and a new one passed stipulating that it was now legal to remain in the post for ten years. But I said whatever the law, I am setting out to return, the people of Tabriz have elected me with enthusiasm and devotion....¹³⁶²

Qavam al-Saltaneh tried hard to prevent or delay the opening of the Parliament although most of its members had been elected in the winter. However, he eventually could delay no longer and the Parliament was opened with the Shah's speech on 16 July, 1947. In the summer of 1947, Taqizadeh was elected as the Member of Parliament from Tabriz and, after spending a couple of months in Switzerland, arrived in Tehran early autumn of that year and entered the Parliament.¹³⁶³ He was returning to Iran after an absence of nearly fourteen years. Taqizadeh was not a member of parliament after the Sixth Parliament, and

¹³⁶¹ Sa'ed Maraghei, 237.

¹³⁶² Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 243.

¹³⁶³ Mohsen Ra'is who replaced Taqizadeh was born in 1895 in Tehran and was educated in Iran and France. He worked for the foreign ministry from 1919 and from 1935 represented Iran in various posts in Europe. Before being appointed as Taqizadeh's successor, he was the Iranian Minister in Baghdad. Ra'is was recommended to the British officials as a very agreeable man who spoke good French. The British Foreign Ministry deemed him suitable for the position in London. Taqizadeh himself considered Ra'is to be one of the top men in the Iranian diplomatic service. Sir N. Butler August 1947, 1947, FO 371/62049.

it was during this period that the drama began with the British-Iranian Oil Company, which eventually led to the nationalisation of oil. Upon his return, Taqizadeh entered a space and environment that had changed completely from that he had previously experienced. The political climate was tense and hostile, extremist left and right factions were lined up and more newspapers and media were in the hands of the opposition. Taqizadeh found himself in a difficult position; he was struggling to find a place he fit into in the current political policies of groups within the powerful political parties.

In the Fifteenth Parliament many of the member's credentials were disputed and among them Taqizadeh's. The person who strongly opposed Taqizadeh's credentials was Abbas Eskandari, a member of the Democrat Party and loyal to Qavam al-Saltaneh. According to Mohammad Sa'ed, Eskandari was very knowledgeable, was the best speaker of the Parliament and by himself could answer the whole Parliament.¹³⁶⁴ In order to besmerch Taqizadeh's name, he used the Oil Agreement of 1933 against Taqizadeh and vehemently attacked him. Abbas Masoudi, a supporter of Taqizadeh, defended him and exonerated him from the accusations. In the end, Reza Zadeh Shafaq proposed that Taqizadeh's personal qualifications and his votes in the election be considered and that Taqizadeh should be allowed to reply about the agreement later upon his return. With this solution, Taqizadeh's credentials were approved. When Taqizadeh later attended the Parliament, he gave a comprehensive response to the Parliament concerning the issue of the agreement.¹³⁶⁵ On 27 January, during a debate with Abbas Eskandari, Taqizadeh delivered his famous speech about the Oil Agreement of 1933. Taqizadeh explained that he wished to explain the true facts about the oil concession. He praised Reza Shah's patriotism but also blamed him for the outcome. He noted that Reza Shah had suddenly cancelled the old concession, had involved himself directly in the negotiations and had given in to last minute pressure from the company to grant an extension of the concession. "No one," said Taqizadeh, "could stand against the will of the Almighty Ruler-there was no alternative and no one could foresee what the League of Nations' award would have been had the case been referred once again to that authority". He went on to say that he had played no part in the matter

¹³⁶⁴ Sa'ed Maraghei, 238.

¹³⁶⁵ Ibid,

except to sign and that if he himself had refused to sign, someone else would have done so in his place.¹³⁶⁶

This speech was quite unexpected and caused a public outcry. What Taqizadeh had said was referred to during the later movement of the nationalisation of oil in order to justify that the agreement was signed under duress and was thus not valid.¹³⁶⁷ Taqizadeh's admittance that he had signed an agreement under duress is unusual in Iranian contemporary history and many have praised his bravery and candour.

Events in the Parliament, Taqizadeh's speech and the refusal to hand over the northern oil concessions to the Soviets provided grounds for a demand for a better deal with the British. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOP) had full control over the oil-rich fields in the south of Iran. The Tudeh Party was also galvanising its supporters to demand the cancellation of the 1933 Oil Agreement. The Iranian nationalists were adamant that they wanted a renegotiation of the 1933 agreement and nationalisation of Iranian oil. The anti-colonialist atmosphere of the time was also a catalyst. In the Parliament under the leadership of Mohammad Mosaddeq, Taqizadeh's speech encouraged both the nationalists and leftists to demand the nationalisation of oil. On 4 February, the Shah was shot and wounded in an unsuccessful assassination attempt only one day after two thousand students had marched in front of the Parliament and demanded the cancellation of the Anglo-Iranian oil concession. "The students scattered leaflets charging that the concession had been renewed under duress. They demanded the trial of officials responsible for renewing the concession".¹³⁶⁸ It was presumed that the assassination attempt had been carried out by a Tudeh Party sympathiser and so the Tudeh Party was declared illegal by the Shah and some of its leadership were arrested. The Shah used the opportunity to demand the revision of the Constitution, asking to be granted the power to dissolve the Parliament. In July 1949

¹³⁶⁶ From Tehran to Foreign Office, 31 January 1949 in *The Qatar Digital Library*: Ext 5000/47(2), "Persian Situation: Miscellaneous Reports," IOR/L/PS/12/1224, available online: http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100054528044.0x000016 (accessed 8 April, 2020).

¹³⁶⁷ Anvar Khamaei, 713.

¹³⁶⁸ *The United Press*, February 5, 1949 in <https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/020549iran-assassin.html>, (accessed 8 April, 2020).

a hasty Constituent Assembly was formed and some amendments to the Constitution were made. The right to dissolve the Parliament was granted to the Shah. Commenting on that, Taqizadeh agreed with the Shah being granted this authority although he was not fully convinced about the matter.¹³⁶⁹ It is difficult to imagine that someone who had worked so hard for constitutionalism since the First Parliament would be easily satisfied with restrictions being placed on the power of the Parliament. The Shah sought advice from Taqizadeh but Taqizadeh writes that he was hesitant about this right being granted to the Shah.¹³⁷⁰ In order to restrict the power of the Parliament, the Shah also insisted on the opening of the Senate.

9:16 The Senate

When according to the constitutional law, the senate was formed on 9 February 1950, Taqizadeh was one of its elected members and was appointed as Speaker of the Senate. According to the Constitution, the Senate had the power to dissolve the Parliament (Majles). This was one of the main reasons the First Parliament and later parliaments had been reluctant to form a senate. According to Article 48 of the constitutional law, the only way that the Parliament could be dissolved was by two-thirds of the Senate members voting for it. Without a senate, no power could legally dissolve the Parliament and, in the absence of the Senate, whatever the Parliament approved would legally become law once the Shah had signed it.¹³⁷¹ Article 43 stipulated the number of members as 60. Article 45 declared that 30 of the members should be chosen by the Shah, 15 from Tehran, 15 from the provinces and the remaining 30 by the people, similarly 15 from Tehran and 15 from the provinces. The members could sit in the Senate for a maximum of two years.¹³⁷²

Taqizadeh was the Speaker of the Senate for about seven years, resigning from this post on 15 April, 1957. Taqizadeh was popular and well-respected among the senators. Unlike his earlier time in the First Parliament, he displayed a moderate stance in the Senate and put

¹³⁶⁹ Amanat, *Iran: A Modern History*, 657.

¹³⁷⁰ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 247.

¹³⁷¹ With the constitutional amendment of 1949 the Shah had gained the right to cancel the Parliament without referring to the Senate.

¹³⁷² The Senate convened for seven periods before it was finally closed down following the 1979 Revolution.

effort into encouraging co-operation between the Parliament and the government. His time in the Senate was a turbulent time in Iran. In the election of the Sixteenth Parliament Abd al-Hossein Hajir, the Court Minister of the Shah, was assassinated by a member of an extreme Islamic group and the elections in Tehran were cancelled. In the second round of elections Mosaddeq and his supporters were elected. Discussions over the nationalisation of oil were heated. Following some unstable governments, General Razmara as Prime Minister was also assassinated. Finally, Mosaddeq became Prime Minister and nationalised oil. The Senate approved the Parliament without debate on 20 March, 1951. Mosaddeq disliked Taqizadeh and had attacked him after his signing of the 1933 Oil Agreement. As a result, Taqizadeh gave up the Speaker's Chair when Mosaddeq came to the Senate and was replaced by one of his deputies.¹³⁷³

Mosaddeq, unhappy with the Senate, convinced the Parliament (Majles) to dissolve it. Taqizadeh remained at home following the dissolution of the Senate. After the coup d'état against Mosaddeq on 19 August 1953, Taqizadeh was elected to the Second Senate from Azerbaijan, continuing as a member until 15 April 1957. At the end of his career in the Senate Taqizadeh became dissatisfied with his position due to differences of opinion between him and 'Alam over such issues as human rights and the practice of torture and the exemption from tax of military personnel.¹³⁷⁴ The Shah wanted military personnel to be exempt from tax and insisted that this should be approved by the Senate. The Senate blocked the law and the press, influenced by the secret police, began to criticise the Senate. When Taqizadeh and other senators approached the Shah to express their opinion against the passing of the law, the Shah spoke forcefully against them. Taqizadeh's response to the Shah was to stress the point that although the Senate would support the Shah, if the Senate believed it was not in the best interests of the country, it would not simply pass any law that the Shah wanted. According to Taqizadeh, the Shah was put in a rather difficult position. However, the bill was eventually passed, despite the opposition of Taqizadeh and others in the Senate.¹³⁷⁵ As evidenced by Taqizadeh's tone in his autobiography, this must have been a bitter pill for Taqizadeh to swallow; he had fought hard for a restriction on the

¹³⁷³ Mojtehedī, 288-92

¹³⁷⁴ Taqizadeh, *Tufani*, 269.

¹³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 271-2.

powers of the monarchy and yet here was a clear example of the continuing marginalisation of constitutionalism.

9:17 The Senate Library

One of Taqizadeh's accomplishments as Speaker of the Senate was the establishment of a specialised library for the Senate. Taqizadeh, a true book lover, asked Abbas Zaryab Khoei whom he had met in the library of the Parliament when he was a member of the Fourteenth Parliament to become the first manager and to organise the Senate library.¹³⁷⁶ The budget of the library was initially maintained from assigning to it the fine every senator had to pay if he was late for a parliamentary session. If a Senator was one hour late, a day's salary would be cut and would be assigned for buying books. Later the Senate also assigned a budget for the library. The books were chosen in line with Taqizadeh's interests; mainly history and literature of Iran and Islamic civilisation. The senators were critical of this and believed the books of the Senate should be more focussed on law.¹³⁷⁷ Taqizadeh wanted this library to be for the use of top-level researchers only and did not want to publicise it too much.¹³⁷⁸ Taqizadeh had had a library at his home in Germany whilst publishing *Kaveh* and books from there were given to the Senate library. Zeki Velidi Togan, a well-known Turkish scholar and historian who had visited Taqizadeh and his wife in Germany and had kept in contact with Taqizadeh in later years, writes, "In their home on Leibniz Strasse, Taqizade[h] had an excellent library. This library from which I had borrowed books and benefited is today a part of the Iranian Senate Library in which he is also a member."¹³⁷⁹

9:18 Taqizadeh and Freemasonry

As mentioned in Chapter Four, from his first exile Taqizadeh had formed strong ties with some European politicians. This deepened his sense of belonging to an international community and encouraged his views that history was moving in the direction of progress,

¹³⁷⁶ Taqizadeh had a high opinion of Zaryab and recommended that he should receive a bursary to study in Germany.

¹³⁷⁷ Gholam Hossein Mirza Saleh, ed. *Goftogou ba Dr. Abbas Zaryab Khoei* [Interview with Dr. Abbas Zaryab Khoei] (Tehran: Farzan, 2002), 6.

¹³⁷⁸ Homa Afraseyabi "Mosahebeh ba Keykavos Jahandari [Interview with Keykavos Jahandari]," in *Payam-e Bahrestan* 2, no. 19 and 20, (2003), 11-6.

¹³⁷⁹ Ahmet Zeki Velidi Togan, *Memoirs: National Existence and Cultural Struggles of Turkistan and Other Muslim Eastern Turks* (North Charleston: CreateSpace, 2012), 439.

and that people of all nations should work in unity in order to further this progress. Two of the intellectuals who had a strong influence on Taqizadeh, Jamal-Din Asadabadi (Afghani) and Malkam Khan were practising freemasons and this may explain the fact that during his exiled period in Europe, Taqizadeh joined a masonic lodge. He may also have had some affiliations with Lozh-e Bidari-e Iraniyan [Awakening Iranian Lodge] before moving to Europe. We do not know exactly of which Lodge Taqizadeh became a member when he first went to Europe in 1908, but as the sources about freemasonry in Iran state, later in life Taqizadeh was a member of the German Lodge in Iran. According to Taqizadeh's file held by the Iranian secret police (SAVAK), Taqizadeh together with six other freemasons: Abdollah Endezam, Hossein 'Ala', Taqi Eskandani, Abol Hassan Hakimi and Dr. Theodor Vögel had established a club in Iran. This club corresponded with the United Grand Lodge of Germany and had persuaded them to give permission for the Iranians to open a branch of that lodge in Iran. The first lodge's name was "Mehr" [Affection]. Later, another lodge under the name of "Aftab" [Sun] was established, followed by a number of other lodges including "Setareh Sahar" [Morning Star] and "Nahid" [Venus]. According to the file on Taqizadeh in SAVAK, Taqizadeh was one of the key directors of these lodges. Later the lodges with which Taqizadeh's name was affiliated severed ties with international freemasonry lodges and established the Grand Lodge of Iran. Taqizadeh's name is mentioned among the leaders of the independent Grand Lodge of Iran.¹³⁸⁰

Esma'il Ra'in has presented Taqizadeh as one of oldest freemasons in Iran. He also claims that Taqizadeh had commented to him that all the regulations and administration system of the Iranian Parliament were copied from that of freemasonry lodges.¹³⁸¹ Ra'in even relates that the writing of a supplementary law to the Constitution was orchestrated by freemasons, Taqizadeh among them.¹³⁸² These kinds of claims attempt to mar Taqizadeh's image as an independent politician and constitutionalist and intellectual and instead paint him as an obedient member of a freemasonry lodge. In his published book

¹³⁸⁰ Iran's National Organization for Security and Intelligence (SAVAK) file on Taqizadeh in *Rejal-e Asr-e Pahlavi be Revayat-e Asnad-e SAVAK: Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh* [The Statesmen of the Pahlavi Era based on SAVAK Documents: Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh] (Tehran: Markaz-e Barresi-e Asnad-e Tarikhi-e Vezarat-e Ettela'at, 2004), 131-2.

¹³⁸¹ Ra'in, *Faramushkhaneh va Framasonery dar Iran*, 190.

¹³⁸² *Ibid.*, 197.

about freemasonry, Ra'in described nearly all the statesmen of the constitutional time as freemasons. Some believe that Ra'in was supported by Asadollah 'Alam, an ambitious politician who wanted to paint a picture of the older generation of politicians as being corrupt foreign agents who were responsible for the existing corruption in order to pave the way for himself and other younger up-and-coming politicians.¹³⁸³

Writing in his diaries, 'Alam does not hide his strong dislike of Taqizadeh. He describes him as an "extremely sinister person and an obedient servant of St James's Court and one of the main supporters of freemasonry in Iran." He expresses his anger about what Taqizadeh had said about his role in the Oil Agreement of 1933 and the fact that he had referred to the period of Reza Shah's leadership as a dictatorship.¹³⁸⁴ This opinion is particularly interesting because at the time of his writing 'Alam was very close to the Shah.¹³⁸⁵

Although Taqizadeh was indeed involved in freemasonry, a close inspection of his life proves that what he advocated in his political life was based on his own knowledge and experience and his deep understanding of the position of Iran on a global stage, rather than on any connection to freemasonry. Nevertheless, the critical accusations regarding his involvement in freemasonry had a deeply negative effect on his popularity among the ordinary people and even in the eyes of some intellectuals his image was tainted.¹³⁸⁶

9:19 Lectures at Colombia University

In the October of 1957, Taqizadeh was invited to Columbia University in the United States of America. He was received warmly and the news of his trip to the United States appeared in major newspapers. *Columbia Daily Spectator* described him as "equivalent of

¹³⁸³ Ebrahim Zolfaghari, *Qeseh-e Hoveyda* [The Story of Hoveyda] (Mo'seseh-e Motale'at va Pazhoesh-hay-e Siyasi, 2007), 239-53.

¹³⁸⁴ Asadollah 'Alam, *Yaddasht-hay-e 'Alam* [Notes of 'Alam], Alinaqi 'Alikhani, ed. (Tehran: Ketabsara, 2001), 1: 369.

¹³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 6: 243.

¹³⁸⁶ The idea, propagated by some, that freemasonry had strong influence on contemporary Iranian history, is still a contentious issue. Taqizadeh's name is often linked to this alternative and controversial reading of this period of Iranian historiography. One of the most recent publications which explores this issue from a similar perspective is: Hossein Maleki *Naqshe-e Framasonha dar Tarikh-e Moaser-e Iran* [The Role of Freemasons in Iranian Contemporary History] (Tehran: Eshareh, 2008).

Senator Lyndon Johnson”.¹³⁸⁷ He was joining the university “as Adjust Professor in the Near and Middle East Institute”¹³⁸⁸ and was to participate “in two of the institute’s seminars, as well as advising students on Iranian affairs” for a semester.¹³⁸⁹ According to *The New York Times*, his talks, for only faculty members, dealt “with problems connected with the westernization of India, Pakistan, Iran and neighboring countries”.¹³⁹⁰ He also gave a lecture about the ancient Iranian prophet, Mani, and presented three lectures on “The History of Modern Iran”.¹³⁹¹ According to Mojtehedī, students assuming that the speaker of the Iranian Senate wanted only to praise the “current situation”, did not appear in large numbers to listen to Taqizadeh speak. Realising this misconception, Taqizadeh declared that he would speak only the truth. His later talks were attended by much larger numbers.¹³⁹² Taqizadeh stayed about seven months in the United States, towards the end of which, by official invitation of the United States’ government, he travelled to different states. He was received in Princeton University, Harvard and Yale Universities where he participated in discussions.¹³⁹³ In the political circles of Iran, it was rumoured that Taqizadeh had been invited by the American officials so that he could be consulted about Iranian affairs.¹³⁹⁴ In Washington Richard Nixon, the vice-president at the time, welcomed Taqizadeh warmly. Nixon, who had been in Iran before and who had been welcomed by the Iranian Senate, organised a visit of the United States’ Senate for Taqizadeh. Taqizadeh was introduced to the Senate by the leader of the Republicans in the Senate and was cordially welcomed.¹³⁹⁵ Taqizadeh was 79 years old at this time.

9:20 Taqizadeh in Old Age

Invitations for Taqizadeh to share his experience and knowledge continued even into his old age; he was clearly well-respected by many and invited to present and participate

¹³⁸⁷ *Columbia Daily Spectator*, October 23, 1957.

¹³⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹⁰ “Iranian Conducting Two Seminars Here,” in *The New York Times*, October 27, 1957.

¹³⁹¹ Taqizadeh, “The History of Modern Iran: Lectures Given in Colombia University,” in *Maqalat-e Taqizadeh*, 8: 195-256.

¹³⁹² Mojtehedī, 299-300.

¹³⁹³ Hassan Taqizadeh, “Sargozasht [Life Story],” in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 296-7.

¹³⁹⁴ Iran’s National Organization for Security and Intelligence (SAVAK) file on Taqizadeh, 6 February 1958 in *Rejal-e Asr-e Pahlavi be Revayat-e Asnad-e SAVAK*, 73.

¹³⁹⁵ *Ettela’at*, February 13, 1958.

in international cultural events. He headed the Iranian delegations at international congresses, including the Twenty-third International Congress of Orientalists in Cambridge in 1954 and the Munich International Congress of Orientalists in 1957.¹³⁹⁶ In the summer of 1962, colleagues and friends of Taqizadeh published a series of articles in the field of Iranian Studies and dedicated it to Taqizadeh. The book was presented to him in a ceremony at Cambridge University.¹³⁹⁷

Nevertheless, although it might be assumed that Taqizadeh had a peaceful and comfortable old age, remaining documents reveal that he experienced financial difficulties which led to him, unwillingly according to him, having to accept a job in the Senate.¹³⁹⁸ At the age of seventy-seven, in a letter to Jamalzadeh who had presumably advised Taqizadeh that it was perhaps the time to quit politics, Taqizadeh writes some lines which express his deep unhappiness about his financial situation. He states that working in the Senate was pointless drudgery and a job he had only accepted because he needed money to make ends meet. He continues that every morning he considers quitting the job and would not stay “even one hour in this kind of job” if he was not married and was not responsible for his wife. He mentions he would prefer any other non-political job even one that was less well-paid. He then describes his “eternal suffering” and wishes his life would soon end.¹³⁹⁹ He was also worried that he would have no pension since he had never been officially employed by the government. Taqizadeh clearly felt at this age that he was no longer of any use and had no power to influence the political situation that he was clearly unhappy with. Only nine years after his death, the Revolution of 1979 would prove what he had feared; that the political situation of the country was not heading in the direction he had hoped it would. The secular government based on a constitution he had fought so hard for was replaced by a religious autocracy.

¹³⁹⁶ Mojtehedī, 300.

¹³⁹⁷ *A locust's leg: Studies in Honour of S. H. Taqizadeh*, eds. Walter Bruno Henning, Ehsan Yar-Shater (London: Percy Lund, Humphries & Co., 1962).

¹³⁹⁸ For more about Taqizadeh's financial problems see: Hossein Pourbagheri, “Parishani-hay-e Mali-e Taqizadeh [Taqizadeh's Financial Difficulties],” in *Ghorub* 1, no. 4, (2017), 212-5.

¹³⁹⁹ Taqizadeh to Jamalzadeh, 21 January 1955, in *TINA*: 280000033.

Conclusion

Very soon after embarking on my own journey towards completing this study, I realised the sheer magnitude of the task I had set myself to achieve: attempting to explore more fully than had previously been done the role that Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh played in Iran's journey towards embracing modernity. From an early age, Taqizadeh's life was a seemingly unending quest for self-betterment which led him to develop his own beliefs around modernity and to strive to persuade others that if Iran was to raise its profile on the global stage, it was crucial that the nation itself move towards modernity. The aim of this research has been to shed more light on the development of this idea of modernity as part of the intellectual and political history of Iran by using Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh's biography as a mirror and by doing so to address some of the controversy surrounding him and his actions. It has traced the development of Taqizadeh as an individual as he worked towards his goals, striving to actualise his ideas and importantly set this within the historical context of Iran and at times within a broader geographical context. Compiling a biography of Taqizadeh has entailed dealing with a substantial and important part of the history of contemporary Iran as well as global events. A comprehensive understanding of Taqizadeh and the role he played in the history of Iran was not possible without delving deeply into this period and at points zooming out to examine key events of that time. At other points in the research, in contrast, it was necessary to zoom into the minutiae of some of the details of Taqizadeh's life in order to explore the reasons for and the manner in which he carried out his actions. This research is a combination of the weaving together of these finer points within events in a broader historical context. It is hoped that this has facilitated a better understanding of the individual and his actions as well as allowing an examination of a period of the intellectual history of Iran from a nuanced perspective. In this way this research has managed to manifest a more comprehensive understanding of Taqizadeh as a political figure, his intentions and his role and participation in the process of practising modernity in Iran.

The aim of this research was to expand the details surrounding certain key points in his life whilst including crucially important historical details of events in the region and beyond which were taking place simultaneously and which affected the trajectory of Taqizadeh's life and influenced his thought and opinions. Taqizadeh's life was bound up with his desire to seek a way for his nation to modernise itself and with an awareness which had been acquired thanks to increasing globalisation. Taqizadeh's life began as Iranians had found themselves facing the inevitable consequences of foreign countries' increasing power and the invasion of Iran's territories. This together with advances in means of communications meant that Iranians had begun to be able to compare themselves with those in other countries; they had an increasing awareness of what was happening beyond Iran's borders. This comparison for many who could comprehend the situation had led many Iranians, including Taqizadeh, to realise that Iran needed an urgent change; for this change to happen Iran needed not only to adapt itself to the new situation but also to survive as a country with its own identity, language, literature, religion and culture. This desire for change resulted in the development of a discourse of modernity specific to Iran. Taqizadeh's life revolved around the concept of change and as this research has detailed, he played a fundamental role in this process. Taking some basic elements of this concept from a number of his predecessors he developed his beliefs and ideas by reading, travelling, theorising and finally putting into practice those ideas he had developed. The Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906 which led to the opening of the First Parliament in Iran was the perfect opportunity for Taqizadeh to be able to practice what he had theorised. This opened the door to his lifelong political engagement and his later roles as a member of parliament and statesman.

Taqizadeh had a strong desire to influence the movement for change in Iran. He was able to do so in various ways: influencing the movement indirectly having educated himself by reading and researching about international happenings and sharing this knowledge with a wider public. Taqizadeh's humble background allowed him an insight into the psychology of the common people; he was skilful in expressing his thoughts and ideas in such a way that they would be easily understood and digested by not only intellectuals but also by the general public. As this research has shown, some of his strength in influencing

others and his popularity stemmed from the connection he could make with a broad spectrum of people. However, due to long periods of residence outside Iran, in particular in Germany where he was able to witness first-hand the top-down modernising of the country following its Bismarckian tradition, Taqizadeh's advocating for a bottom-up approach for Iran changed as he developed a strong belief in the importance and usefulness of universal laws of development which he tried to implement. This top-down approach led him away from solely wanting to represent the wishes of the common people and as his career path moved towards becoming a political statesman, his popularity began to wane and his opinions and actions came to be seen as more controversial. This research has highlighted some of the myths that have arisen as a result of some of his actions and seemingly opposing opinions about him have been addressed.

Taqizadeh's life journey took him from the strongly religious education of his youth to become an avid supporter of European civilisation and positivism. He saw peoples of the world placed at points along a spectrum of hierarchical standing, with Iran at one end and some other more industrialised and modernised countries at the other. He believed Iran had the potential to move along this cline but only with much effort and dedication. He firmly believed in human agency and, based on that, he worked hard and encouraged others to work similarly hard in order to achieve the goal of a modernised Iran. In the beginning he had believed this could be achieved through political means. However, through a process of trial and error and the rich experiences of his life, he came to realise that political modernisation was not possible without people having a comprehensive understanding of modernity. He, who had gone to extremes to create change through politics, gradually came to the realisation that the education of the masses was of prime importance. Convinced of this idea, Taqizadeh, who had been initially steadfast in his reluctance to co-operate with the ruling autocratic rulers, would later willingly accept governmental positions under a strong ruler and in that way contributed to the practice of authoritarian modernisation. He had seen that his previously idealistic views had not resulted in positive change and in fact he had witnessed a chaos in Iran. Now, he believed that under the security provided by an authoritative government his ideas might be able to be put into practice and this would be the first step towards democracy.

Taqizadeh will be remembered, in particular, for several important changes he helped bring about and the notable challenges he faced whilst working towards implementing those changes. Introducing a secular government to a society governed or highly influenced by religious authorities was not an easy task for Taqizadeh. Launching a European-inspired plan for development in a highly religious country where Islam was considered as the perfect religion with comprehensive rules for every aspect of life was a challenging task. He introduced a model of development for Iran which has had its own advocates and also opposition. Taqizadeh faced many serious challenges in pursuing this task. He faced strong accusations and had to live in exile for many years due to the strength of opposition against the reforms he was advocating. His residence abroad and his relationship with numerous foreigners, including politicians and scholars, made him vulnerable to accusations of being a spy or foreign subject. Although Taqizadeh has been presented by some as a man at the service of what they considered the imperialistic and corrupt West and as their ‘Trojan Horse’ in Iran, he can also be considered as a figure who sought to build a bridge between the civilisations, in the realm of politics, history as well as culture and literature.

His name is inextricably linked to the field of journalism in Iran, and in particular his founding of the *Kaveh* newspaper, one of the pioneering publications of the modern press in Iran. He wrote, encouraged and supported others who wrote on the subject of Iranian studies, using history, language and literature to help construct a unified nation.

Taqizadeh has become an icon of the model for the movement from tradition to modernity. He will be remembered by many for his transformation from a traditional clergyman following tradition to a modern man advocating science and scientific methodology. He also advocated for the use of more empirical based research in the field of humanities. His belief in human agency, too, sits in stark contrast to those who believe in fatalism and conspiracy theories. With his religious education and his constant study of the history of Iran he could find connection points to glue together the different periods of Iranian history and use this continuous narrative to help build the new identity for modern Iran.

Taqizadeh played an important role, too, in the fight for equal rights of all sectors of society. He was a pioneer in defending the rights of religious minorities and voiced his opinion for the emancipation of women. A native speaker of Azerbaijani Turkish himself and not opposed to multilingualism in essence, with a focus on moving Iran towards becoming a state that embraced modernity, Taqizadeh strongly advocated the idea of the Persian language as a unifying force for the building of a nation state. The insistence on a policy of monolingualism within a multicultural and plurilingual country could be argued to have encouraged the marginalisation of other languages and cultures in Iran. This matter of linguistic hegemony continues to be a divisive and sensitive issue in present day Iran.

Finally, he will be remembered as a man of principle and a gentleman. Although criticised for mistakes he made, Taqizadeh reflected on and learned from these mistakes or errors of judgement and notably had the strength of character to admit that, in hindsight, at times he may have been wrong. This courage to admit his mistakes is something exemplary among Iranian statesmen. Taqizadeh also stands out as a man who, although he might have disagreed with or even had a personal dislike for certain others, refrained from publicly maligning them or plotting against them; again, an exemplary personal characteristic in the field of politics that should act as a role model for others even today.

The research presented here has aimed to provide a more complete biography of Taqizadeh than has previously been produced, utilising some more diverse and newly discovered documents connected to both the personal and political narrative of his life. It may help those who later investigate Taqizadeh to have a richer and more nuanced understanding of the life and times of this leading figure, though I would suggest that no biography, no matter how comprehensive, can fully trace more than selected periods of its subject's life.

Throughout the research process, I aimed to remain neutral at all times, but the reader will be the judge of that; whilst words may be written in a neutral style, there is no such thing as complete objectivity in thought and inevitably the researcher's perspective may have crept in despite the best efforts to avoid that. For that, I must take responsibility.

However, as I followed Taqizadeh's journey through life and traced his developments in parallel with that of his country, my journey, too, has allowed me to develop as a researcher. Whilst Taqizadeh's journey came to an end with his passing in 1970, the journey into a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of his role in Iran's history has not yet reached its final destination. It is hoped that the present study has filled a substantial gap in the historiography of Taqizadeh and the Constitutional Revolution Movement and has gone some way towards demystifying some of the controversy surrounding his actions. However, much still remains to be uncovered, explored and analysed through other theoretical lenses. With Taqizadeh's unending perseverance and determination as a role model, this researcher's journey will continue.

Appendix



Figure 26: Taqizadeh with family members, courtesy of one of Taqizadeh's brother's family.



Figure 27: Taqizadeh (centre with cane) with his wife and other family members, courtesy of one of Taqizadeh's brother's family.

The ailing Taqizadeh had problems with his knees and towards the end of his life was confined to a wheelchair. He rarely complained about his situation and continued his routine of studying and research. However, as one of his acquaintance's recalls, towards the end of his life he had once tried to lift himself out of the wheelchair but realising he was unable to manage that, had expressed his wish to die and asked God for release.¹⁴⁰⁰

Taqizadeh's Death

Taqizadeh died on 28 January 1970, nine years prior to the 1979 abolishment of the Constitution by the new Islamic regime; a constitution he had dedicated his life to nurturing. He left only a house in Daroos which, according to Mahmoud Afshar, was land given to him as a present by Mokhber al-Saltaneh Hedayat.¹⁴⁰¹

¹⁴⁰⁰ Kazemi, "Khaterati Chand az Taqizadeh," in *Yadnameh*, ed., Yaghmaei, 117.

¹⁴⁰¹ Mahmoud Afshar, 'Nokteh-hayi Chand Piramoon-e Alat-e fe'l Shodan-e Taqizadeh dar Tajdid-e Qarardad-e Naft [Some Points Regarding Taqizadeh's role as a Puppet in the Oil Agreement]," in *Yaqma*, no. 352, (1977), 592.

Taqizadeh had worried about the future of his wife and her livelihood after his death. He was aware that she would have to work until an advanced age in order to secure an income and would not receive any pension since Taqizadeh had not fulfilled the conditions for receiving a pension which was completing thirty years of official governmental service and paying pension contributions.

Following Taqizadeh's death, the Senate held a minute's silence in his honour.¹⁴⁰² Taqizadeh's last public appearance was on the anniversary of the Constitutional Revolution in 1969. He had been the last remaining member of the First Parliament; a parliament in which he had passionately delivered his speeches, outlining his hopes for the modernisation of his beloved country.

Taqizadeh's body was first laid out in the Sepahsalar Mosque in front of the parliament building before being laid to rest. Taqizadeh's grave lies in the well-known Zahir al-Dowleh cemetery where many other famous politicians, artists and poets are also buried. Access to the cemetery is restricted, making it difficult to visit. His grave, notably, has few visitors unlike those of others which are nearby, such as the poetess Forough Farukhzad, whose grave is regularly decked with fresh flowers. In contrast, Taqizadeh's broken grave stone allows only weeds to poke through. It was for some years all but forgotten, his name almost undistinguishable. More recently, Taqizadeh's brother's family have hastily laid rough cement into which they have scratched the name Hassan Taqizadeh, hoping to prevent his grave being lost for ever. They had attempted to renew his grave properly but were not granted permission. Next to Taqizadeh's grave lies an empty plot, reserved for his wife Attieh. Her name and birthdate are engraved on it, though she is not buried there.

¹⁴⁰² *Ayandegan*, January 29, 1970.



Figure 28: The original gravestones of Taqizadeh (right) and his wife (left) in Zahir al-Dowleh Cemetery in the north of Tehran. Though a gravestone of his wife lies here, her body is in fact buried in Bournemouth, UK.



Figure 29: The original cracked and neglected gravestone of Taqizadeh



Figure 30: The current gravestone of Taqizadeh in Zahir al-Dowleh Cemetery which his brother's descendants have made. Since the authorities did not grant permission for a replacement gravestone, his family wrote this inscription themselves in cement to ensure the grave would not be lost.



Figure 31: The announcement of Taqizadeh's death written by his friend in Tabriz (Tabriz Central Library).



Figure 32: The announcement of Taqizadeh's death written by his family and friends in Tabriz (Tabriz Central Library).

Correspondence about Taqizadeh selling his Private Library¹⁴⁰³

Geneva 30 April 1962

My dear friend,

Your precious handwriting on the sale of his excellency Mr. Taqizadeh's library has been received. As I understand, this library has been traded for fifty thousand Tomans. I am convinced it is worth two or three times that price and this noble man has been satisfied with the minimum price. It is strange that the Iranian government and the treasury of our country are so poor that they cannot afford to pay this price. I cannot apprehend and I do not understand what the reason for stating that they could not pay such a price has been. If they had animosity and a history of personal grudge with the seller, we would think they were searching for excuses to prevent any help to the man. But no one would go for a fight with a fallen person. I don't think that this man has any enemies in the world. On the contrary, I think from the Shah to the Court Minister, Prime Minister to Minister of Culture, from the head of the university to the head of the Literature Faculty who has bought the library, they are all supporters of the seller. Therefore, I am very surprised that they cannot afford the price. We should see where the problem lies. In any case, for now I have written a letter to Dr. Siyasi, which is enclosed in the envelope with this letter. I beg you to take it in person and also read to him this letter that I have written to you and if again no solution is found, write to me so I can think about another solution. Maybe they would accept that they pay part of the price in cash and pay the rest in a few instalments every month. Or a bank or office or even a business company or even yet an individual among Taqizadeh's devoted friends would be ready to pay this amount and later receive it in instalments from the government.

Inform me about the result as soon as possible. If Mr. Taqizadeh was supposed to come to Europe for treatment, he is probably waiting for the deal to be sealed in order that he has sufficient funds for the trip and the treatment. I thank you from the bottom of my heart for the attention you pay to this matter, helping the helpless. May God reward you in return. I had a letter from your father. Some time ago he had sent me a poem that you see in the envelope. For the time being, a letter is attached for Doctor Siyasi. I beg you to take it to him in person and write to me if there is any other action that should be taken.

¹⁴⁰³ This letter is written by the contemporary Iranian writer Seyyed Mohammad Ali Jamalzadeh (1892-1997) to Iraj Afshar (1925-2011), scholar and bibliographer; both close friends of Taqizadeh. Notably, this letter highlights Taqizadeh's dire financial situation towards the end of his life. From Jamalzadeh to Iraj Afshar in *Nomeh-hay-e Zhenev* [Geneva Letters], eds., Mohammad Afshin Vafaei and Sharyar Shahindezhi (Tehran: Sokhan, 2009), 146-8.

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Samenvatting

Door de de Constitutionele Revolutie van 1906 vond er in Iran een historische verandering plaats: de absolute monarchie werd vervangen door een regering op basis van een grondwet. De gevolgen van deze revolutie waren niet alleen op nationaal niveau, maar ook wereldwijd merkbaar. Zelfs de politieke verhoudingen tussen enkele Europese grootmachten werden erdoor beïnvloed. Revoluties worden geboren uit ideeën en theorieën. De studie van de sleutelfiguren die deze ideeën verbreidden is een wezenlijk onderdeel van geschiedkundig onderzoek.

De theoretische basis van de Constitutionele Revolutie van 1906 ontwikkelde zich geleidelijk uit een opkomend discours, dat de veranderingen weerspiegelde die Iran door een toegenomen contact met de buitenwereld doormaakte. Deze veranderingen vonden plaats op een schaal die men nog niet eerder had ervaren. Beginnend met de koloniale ontwikkelingen in de zeventiende eeuw, was de achttiende eeuw getuige van de toenemende dreiging door Europese grootmachten. Omdat men contact met de wereld buiten het grondgebied van de islamitische staten steeds noodzakelijker achtte, werden islamitische landen gedwongen om een oplossing te vinden voor de overheersende macht van Europa. Nieuwe technologieën gaven naties de overhand, wie achterliep op het gebied van wetenschappelijke en technologische ontwikkelingen was duidelijk in het nadeel. Deze minder ontwikkelde landen moesten de ontwikkelingen eerst begrijpen voordat zij het probleem van de verbreiding van dit nieuwe gevaar konden aanpakken. De dreiging van deze nieuwe soort macht was niet gebaseerd op een religieuze ideologie, de kracht ervan vond zijn oorsprong in de wetenschap. Het duurde enige tijd voordat landen als Iran het onderscheid konden maken tussen macht ontleend aan wetenschappelijke ontwikkelingen en de macht van religie, en om te aanvaarden dat deze ontwikkeling mogelijk was voor alle mensen, ongeacht hun religie, ras of nationaliteit. De ontwikkeling in de richting van moderniteit werd gelijkgesteld aan Europese of westerse wetenschap, die als onverenigbaar werd gezien met een islamitische of niet-Europese identiteit. Dit leidde tot onenigheid en de geestelijken, die als taak hadden om de overtuigingen van hun volgelingen te vormen, moesten natuurlijk een standpunt

tegenover de veranderingen innemen. Sommige geestelijken hadden een reactionair standpunt, andere waren er eerder van overtuigd dat de nieuwe veranderingen noodzakelijk waren om de islam te laten overleven in landen waarvan de meerderheid van de bevolking moslim was. Niet alleen de geestelijkheid, maar ook politici, schrijvers, intellectuelen en anderen begonnen hun gedachten en ideeën over wat er gedaan moest worden in verband met deze veranderingen uit te drukken. Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh was één van hen.

Taqizadeh was één van de Iraanse intellectuele sleutelfiguren die een belangrijke rol speelden in het ontwikkelen en vormen van het discours in Iran. Het doel van dit onderzoek is daarom om een grondige en genuanceerde inschatting te geven van het leven en de carrière van Taqizadeh en hoe zijn leven ertoe bedroeg om de beweging naar verandering te leiden en te beïnvloeden. Taqizadeh was niet de enige intellectueel die zich inzette voor het discours van de moderniteit of *Tajaddod*, zoals er binnen een Iraanse context naar wordt verwezen. Taqizadeh is echter van bijzonder groot belang omdat hij - anders dan anderen - steeds ter plaatse bleef en ondanks vele obstakels zelden afweek van zijn doel om Iran op de weg naar de moderniteit te leiden. Dit onderzoek gebruikt de biografie van Taqizadeh als een spiegel om het discours van verandering in Iran zichtbaar te maken en analyseert zijn rol in en relatie tot dit discours. Taqizadeh had een lang leven: hij werd 91 jaar oud. Zijn leven (1878 - 1970) valt samen met een lange en belangrijke periode in de hedendaagse Iraanse intellectuele geschiedenis. Hij was getuige van de regering van zes sjahs en met vier van hen onderhield hij nauwe betrekkingen. Gedurende het leven van Taqizadeh vonden belangrijke veranderingen plaats in Iran en in de rest van de wereld, inclusief twee wereldoorlogen.

Taqizadeh was een politicus en intellectueel die veel werken over geschiedenis, cultuur en literatuur heeft nagelaten. Er zijn genoeg van zijn geschriften en opgetekende gedachten bewaard gebleven om zijn ideeën en daden tot een levende erfenis voor Iraanse intellectuelen te maken. In een land dat nog steeds verdeeld is over hoe het moet worden bestuurd, zijn de ideeën van Taqizadeh onderdeel geworden van een discours dat het verlangen uitdrukt om Iran te moderniseren. Er is niet altijd objectief over Taqizadeh

geschreven en er is veel polemieks over zijn plaats in de Iraanse geschiedschrijving. Sommigen ondersteunen de ideeën en gedachten van Taqizadeh; voor anderen, die de westerse democratie verachten, zijn diens ideeën daarentegen een voorbeeld van een benadering die uiteindelijk mislukte. Zij die de voorkeur geven aan de politieke islam beschouwen Taqizadeh nog steeds als een kwade vertegenwoordiger van het corrupte Westen. Radicalere personen zien hem zelfs als een werktuig van het Westen, een man die tot doel had de overgave van Iran aan het vijandige en niet-islamitische Westen zeker te stellen.

Hoewel er vele artikelen en monografieën bestaan die gebaseerd zijn op het leven van Taqizadeh, is er, misschien vanwege de controverse rond zijn persoon en daden, weinig gepubliceerd onderzoek dat het belang van zijn leven en werk voor de vorming van een Iraanse nationale identiteit, alsmede zijn cruciale rol in het verhaal van de moderniteit in Iran belicht. Dit onderzoek streeft ernaar de aandacht te vestigen op details van het leven van Taqizadeh en de invloeden daarop die eerder wellicht over het hoofd zijn gezien, en te voorzien in een objectief en genuanceerd verslag van zijn intellectuele erfenis in Iran en de reis naar de moderniteit van deze natie.

Deze studie naar het leven en de gedachten van Taqizadeh kan ook bijdragen aan een beter begrip van het hedendaagse Iran. Na de ervaring van twee revoluties in honderd jaar tijd wordt het Iran van vandaag de dag overschaduwd door een overheersend gevoel van verontrusting en onzekerheid over de toekomst. Geleerden en ook sommigen uit het grote publiek zoeken naar redenen die de huidige situatie waarin het land zich bevindt kunnen verklaren, in het bijzonder na de Iraanse Revolutie van 1979. Veel van het discours gaat over de vraag hoe het land wel of niet moet worden bestuurd en over de beste wegen voor zijn verdere ontwikkeling. Het bestuderen van het leven en werk van Taqizadeh kan bijdragen aan het geven van enkele antwoorden.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Hossein Pourbagheri was born in Tehran, Iran. He was educated in Tehran and later in Tabriz, where he received his Bachelor's and Master's Degrees in English Literature and Language. He completed a second Master's Degree in Middle Eastern Studies at Leiden University, Netherlands before beginning his PhD in the field of biographical historiography at the Institute of Area Studies at Leiden University.

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