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Surviving against all odds: Pachakutik's electoral support, mobilization strategies, and goal achievement between 1996 and 2019

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6 Achieving goals: explaining Pachakutik's survival

This chapter explores Pachakutik's persistence from a goal achievement perspective. As discussed in chapter 3, Pachakutik's electoral trajectory and the party's resources (strength of the organization, size of the membership, and financial resources) are not enough to explain Pachakutik's persistence. Moreover, as chapter 4 discusses, the party's indigenous electoral support cannot be used to explain the party's survival either. The indigenous voters do not support the party as a block. Thus far, the analyses of the party's resources and the party's votes only highlight that Pachakutik's persistence is puzzling. Why would the party members continue to invest time and effort to develop an organization that offers so little pay-off from a perspective of votes and resources?

To explore Pachakutik's persistence from a goal-achievement perspective, I use the primary goal identification and goal achievement evaluation strategies introduced in chapter 2. I argue the party has pursued three different goals between 1996 and 2017. The party's primary goal between 1996 and 2002 was policy. Between 2002 and 2006, Pachakutik turned into an office-seeking party, and since 2006 the party turned into a value-infusion-seeking party. Pachakutik achieved its primary goals, i.e., surpassed its aspiration levels, during the 1998-2002 period, and all periods since 2006. The party's primary goals' changes and these goals' achievement, I argue, have had an important effect on Pachakutik's persistence.

This chapter continues as follows. First, I shortly discuss the data sources employed for the analysis. Second, I discuss the party's primary goal during each evaluation period. Third, I analyze how the party performed (i.e., whether it achieved its aspiration level or not) during each period. Lastly, I discuss Pachakutik's overall survival from a goal achievement perspective.

6.1 Pachakutik's goal achievement between 1996 and 2017 (the data)

I analyze the following periods (marked by presidential elections) 1996 -1998, 1998-2002, 2002-2006, 2006-2009, 2009-2013, and 2013-2017. As discussed in chapter 2, identifying a party's primary goal and analyzing a party's performance requires data from party leaders' interviews, party documents, and other types of resources created during the days and months before the beginning of electoral campaigns and during the campaigns. Moreover, the data of performance should come from the periods between elections.

I conducted 24 semi-structured interviews with party experts, party leaders, and party (former) members to generate the necessary data. When available, I also collected political parties' official documents (party manifestoes, organization charters, and working plans) and archival data from the electoral authority *Consejo Nacional Electoral* (CNE) and the national legislature *Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador*. Furthermore, I conducted archival work focusing on Ecuador's two major political publications, the magazine *Vistazo* and the daily newspaper *El Comercio*. *Vistazo* has two publications a month and follows the political processes in Ecuador closely. *El Comercio* has a daily specialized politics section. I looked at all publications of both sources between 1995 to 2017. I created a database of all editorials and short and long reports in these two sources that discussed Ecuadorian politics. Additionally, I used the magazine KIPU which brings together all indigenous related newspaper articles published in most Ecuador's national newspapers. I used all issues of KIPU between 1995 and 2017.

The data generated includes all three possible sources discussed in chapter 2: party leaders' statements (from interviews and statements from the corresponding periods), party documents produced before and during campaign periods, and lastly, data on how the party's setup their electoral campaigns (from the interviews and archival data). I analyze the data using the guidelines for the primary goal identification strategy discussed and the performance evaluation strategies discussed in chapter 2.

6.2 Pachakutik's primary goals between 1996 and 2017

In this section, I discuss Pachakutik's primary goals for each of the analyzed periods. As discussed in chapter 2, I combine the data from interviews, party leader statements, and party documents alongside data about the party's campaigns. I use the latter data to triangulate the party leaders' statements and identify the party's primary goal more accurately.

6.2.1 Pachakutik as a policy seeking party (1996-2002)

1996-1998

Pachakutik was a policy-seeking party between 1996 and 1998. The main policy interest in 1996, as the party entered the electoral arena, was constructing the plurinational state. The strategy to do so was straightforward, calling for a Constitutional Assembly (El Universo, 1996). This agenda item came from Conaie's political project (Van Cott, 2005, p. 110). The policy platform also included opposition to neoliberal policies, the protection and access to

land and water resources, and Ecuador's definition as a plurinational state. During the 1996 campaign (and the months prior), the party leaders, such as Luis Macas, emphasized the party would "promote new values, new attitudes, and new political practices" (Luis Macas as cited in *Diario Expreso*, 1996).

Pachakutik joined some electoral alliances during that period. As discussed in chapter 2, policy-seeking parties are not always likely to join alliances unless their partners have similar policy platforms or an agreement to advance the party's policies. Pachakutik's party leaders stressed that their alliances followed exactly that logic. The party leaders stressed they would only join electoral alliances with congenial partners such as subnational level independent movements. Moreover, the party leaders emphasized that they would not join any alliances with traditional parties as these were not their ideal partners. For the presidential race, Pachakutik joined Freddy Ehlers' independent movement *Nuevo País*. Arguably, his appointment was a sign of Pachakutik's interest in holding office. He was a well-known television presenter likely to attract many votes and, crucially, was not a party member. However, Luis Macas explained that Ehlers was "a progressive candidate able to answer and work for the indigenous movement proposals" (Macas as cited in Coello, 1996). That is, the party leaders considered Ehlers a candidate with whom the party shared a policy agenda.¹³⁶

Pachakutik's leaders' statements highlighted the party was a policy-seeking organization. I triangulated this data about the party's primary goal with data regarding the electoral campaign. Pachakutik's 1996 campaign shows almost all of the indicators discussed in chapter 2 as signs of a policy-seeking party. Table 6.1 summarizes the indicators expected of a policy seeking party and Pachakutik's campaign's characteristics.

Pachakutik's main programmatic content, in 1996, was borrowed from Conaie's manifesto and included most of its key elements already discussed. Because the 1996 election was the first one in which the party participated, there was no precedent to compare the party's campaign's programmatic content. Nevertheless, because there were similarities with Conaie's agenda, I report there was historical consistency.

The candidates presented in 1996 were a mixed group. Although Pachakutik presented its candidates as "*candidatos propios*" (Coello, 1996), many of these candidates were not – strictly speaking – party members. Nonetheless, the non-party members were part of social organizations affiliated with the party. For example, Napoleon Saltos was linked to the

¹³⁶In 2006 Pachakutik's leaders criticized Ehlers as having no political agenda other than getting elected. However, at the time he presented himself as head of a committed political movement that was congenial to Pachakutik's program. In that sense he was not only a vote-winning candidate.

Coordinadora de Movimientos Sociales and not officially a party member. Freddy Ehlers was also a candidate from a partner organization.

Despite the constant assertions that electoral alliances with traditional parties would not happen, and that alliances, in general, would only occur with congenial partners, Pachakutik did join an electoral alliance with a traditional party, *Izquierda Democrática* (ID). To explain this contradiction, Conaie leaders (on behalf of Pachakutik) clarified that they could not object to the other party's support as long as the party was not included in the ballot (El Telégrafo, 1996). ID was indeed not included, but Ehlers brought ID's sympathizers and party members to help him run his campaign, which shows that ID's support was not only external.¹³⁷

Table 6.1 Pachakutik's electoral campaign indicators: policy-seeking party (1996)

Electoral campaign indicators for Pachakutik as a policy-seeking party		
	If policy-seeking	Pachakutik (1996)
Campaign content	Programmatic (policy-oriented)	Conaie's agenda. Land, water, and resources protection. Opposition to neoliberal policies. Creation of a plurinational state.
Historical content	Similar programmatic content throughout the years	First campaign: content similar to Conaie's principles
Candidates	Activist candidates	Party members and activists from the social movements affiliated to the party
Alliances	Unlikely (unless partners are congenial)	Alliances only with congenial partners such as local level independent movements, and with <i>Izquierda Democrática</i> .
Campaign leaders	Activists	Party members and activists from the social movements affiliated to the party and ID members
Campaign strategies	Conventional: program-oriented	Conventional: program-oriented (with a special provision of the indigenous voters)

Lastly, the electoral campaigns were run primarily by party activists and members of the social movements linked to the party. A former member from ID who participated in the campaign in 1996 explained that it was clear that Pachakutik's members had no experience

¹³⁷ This included Rodrigo Borja's brother Francisco Borja, and ID's leader Andrés Vallejo.

running an electoral campaign. Still, they knew their content well (ID-2, 2018).¹³⁸ Pachakutik's candidates benefited from social movements' activists' knowledge about how to communicate with the electorate. The strategies included, amongst others, the use of two languages during campaign rallies. Ehlers' working plan would be presented by him in public events, while at the same time, a translator would deliver the same content using the local language (Diario Hoy, 1996). The content of this campaign was mainly policy-oriented.¹³⁹

Overall, the party's leaders' statements and the campaigns' set up show that Pachakutik's primary goal for this period was policy.

1998-2002

Pachakutik remained a policy-seeking party during the 1998-2002 period. As was the case in 1996, at the 1998 election, Pachakutik's policy platform was at the center of the campaign. Conaie's original agenda points were at the center of the policy platform of the party. The main difference was that this time the party was focused on executing these points rather than getting them into the national debate. The 1998 Constitution already had numerous of these agenda points included, albeit it did not include Ecuador's definition as a plurinational state. In the months leading into the 1998 elections, Pachakutik's leaders continued to argue that policy interests were their leading guiding lights for setting up the campaign and the criteria for all electoral alliances (El Telégrafo, 1998). For example, when Freddy Ehlers was announced as a presidential candidate, Napoleon Saltos, on behalf of Pachakutik, explained that the alliance was set up only after both organizations reached agreements about their policy platforms (Saltos as cited in El Telégrafo, 1998).

I triangulated the party's leaders' statements with data about the campaign's set up (see table 6.2). Pachakutik's campaign content once again followed the lines of Conaie's well-known program. The party's campaign policy platform was consistent with the previous policy platform. Interestingly, during this period, the party's actions showed a move towards a campaign set up slightly resembling an office-seeking party, especially regarding candidates' nominations and electoral alliances.

Pachakutik's candidates came from a more comprehensive network of electoral alliances than those from the 1996 election. In addition to traditional party members, like Nina

¹³⁸ This conversation related the fact that Pachakutik's campaign organizations would not allow ID personnel on stage at campaign's rallies.

¹³⁹ It is possible that in that year Pachakutik was already mixing and segmenting strategies as discussed in chapter 5. However, there is not enough data to explore this possibility as the party's campaign flew mostly under the radar of most national media outlets.

Pacari, the party's ticket also included candidates that were not part of the party. Such were the cases of León Roldós and Valerio Grefa.¹⁴⁰ The overall number of electoral alliances increased. However, these alliances were explained as necessary and as respecting the interests and priorities of the movement. As a party expert explained, the party's organization was horizontal and formed by many different organizations, which made it possible for the party to enter into multiple electoral alliances because it was only an "issue of expanding the wide core of the organization a little more" (EXP-3, 2018). Alliances were considered as an acceptable strategy for the party because these should only be with congenial organizations. Alliances in the 1998 campaign were framed as useful to advance the party's policy interests by bringing in other grassroots organizations' support.

Table 6.2 Pachakutik's electoral campaign indicators: policy-seeking party (1998)

Electoral campaign indicators for Pachakutik as a policy-seeking party		
	If policy-seeking	Pachakutik (1998)
Campaign content	Programmatic (policy-oriented)	Conaie's agenda. The application of the new Constitution and creating a plurinational state.
Historical content	Similar programmatic content throughout the years	Consistent campaign content (in a different form)
Candidates	Activist candidates	Party members and activists from the social movements affiliated to the party
Alliances	Unlikely (unless partners are congenial)	Alliances with congenial partners, an exception was Ehlers.
Campaign leaders	Activists	Party members and activists from the social movements affiliated to the party
Campaign strategies	Conventional: program-oriented	Conventional: program-oriented

Party members and party activists organized the campaigns alongside some non-party members. These non-members joined the campaign because many candidates were part of electoral alliances. Their inclusion suggests that the party was loosening its grip regarding its content. Nonetheless, the alliances were meant to be only with partners with similar platforms.

¹⁴⁰ Valerio Grefa had a difficult relationship with Pachakutik and negotiated with Abdalá Bucaram in 1996 for the creation of the Ethnic Ministry offering him the support of the indigenous population alongside Rafael Pandam (Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 50). Afterwards, Pachakutik denied the support of the indigenous population stating Grefa did not speak on their behalf. Nevertheless, he became Pachakutik's candidate to the legislature in 1998 and was elected.

Therefore, even if run by activists external to the party, the campaigns' policy content followed Pachakutik's policy platform's lines. Unfortunately, there is not subnational level data on this issue to ascertain what was the case exactly. Reports about the overall character of the 1998 campaign stress nonetheless that the party's usual strategies, i.e., contact with grassroots organizations, were used and that the content followed Pachakutik's policy lines.

On the whole, although Pachakutik's campaign in 1998 slightly diverted from the pure policy-seeking setup, it is still possible to assert that the party was a policy seeker during the 1998-2002 period. The party leaders' statements were clear in that regard; the party pursued policy.

6.2.2 Pachakutik as an office-seeking party (2002-2006)

Pachakutik turned into an office-seeking party for the 2002 election. The party leaders made this clear. Pachakutik's members wanted to "be the government" (Van Cott, 2005, p. 99). To this end, Pachakutik's leaders decided to support a non-party member candidate, Lucio Gutierrez.¹⁴¹ The party leaders presented the alliance as the opportunity for "the people to appoint who governs instead of the elites" (Virgilio Hernandez as cited in El Telégrafo, 2002). Electability was the main reason for the candidate's selection. Nina Pacari stressed that Pachakutik and PSP proceeded to "bring the programs [of the two parties] together and make necessary corrections" (Nina Pacari as cited in El Universo, 2002) only after the alliance was settled. In other words, Pachakutik's leaders, from the outset, acknowledged that the alliance was not necessarily a perfect match in terms of policy program.

Pachakutik's leaders' statements clearly showed that the party's primary goal had changed. This change was also evident in the electoral campaign's setup (see table 6.3). The campaign's content combined Pachakutik's policy platform, alongside candidate-based appeals and the alliance's brand appeals. The combination of appeals was, however, not applied equally in all provinces. The appointment of Gutierrez harmed the party organization's unity. The party branches in Cotopaxi, Cañar, and Carchi announced they would not join the alliance and thus presented their candidates under different alliances or single tickets (El Universo, 2002). Nina Pacari, at the moment, explained this was not necessarily negative. Each province

¹⁴¹ Pachakutik's leaders struggled between nominating two candidates of their own, Auki Tituaña (who had won notoriety as mayor of Cotacachi since 1996), or Antonio Vargas former president of Conaie. The first candidate was the epitome of the party's *own* with a good track record in office; the second, although another of the party's *own* candidates, was a more complex candidate who had joined the short-lived *triumvirato* (three way governing pact) after Jamil Mahuad's ousting and was criticized for it (Diario Expreso, 2002). Pachakutik's leadership and party members struggled to find an agreement. The third alternative was joining Lucio Gutierrez.

had specific needs that required different campaign plans. Thus the party's central office encouraged adapting the campaigns for each province's reality (Nina Pacari as cited in El Universo, 2002). The content of Pachakutik's campaigns thus turned into a diverse set of appeals combinations instead of a single policy-oriented set of appeals. Of course, the policy-oriented appeals resembled those employed during previous elections, but these appeals were only a small part of all the campaign appeals.

Table 6.3 Pachakutik's electoral campaign indicators: office-seeking party (2002)

Electoral campaign indicators for Pachakutik as an office-seeking party		
	If office-seeking	Pachakutik 2002
Campaign content	Symbolic (candidate and alliance/coalition oriented).	Programmatic appeal, candidate-oriented appeals, and alliance-oriented appeals
Historical content	Flexible / changing content (adapted to alliances)	Similar to the programmatic content, but this content represented only a small portion of all appeals.
Candidates	Office-holder candidates (most likely winner)	Party member and members of other parties
Alliances	Likely	With PSP and PS-FA for the presidential election and other independent movements for the legislative elections.
Campaign leaders	Professionals	Party members
Campaign strategies	High tech strategies: including new forms of media and information provision and polling to adjust the campaigns	Conventional strategies: following Pachakutik's usual strategies.

This change on primary goal also meant abandoning the use of party members or social organizations' members as candidates. Instead, the party contributed only partially with candidates (some of which were party members) to the legislative elections and agreed to support many candidates appointed by its new partner. Becker (2011) asserts these agreements (to use new candidates not linked to the party) also followed from Victor Hugo Cardenas' advice to the party's leaders in early 1998. His advice was for Pachakutik to enter into agreements to secure an impact on the country's politics (p. 59). Pachakutik's alliances were

hence multiple. The primary alliance was the one with PSP. Pachakutik presented candidates to the presidential office, the legislature's national seats, and some provincial seats alongside PSP. The party also joined alliances with the *Partido Socialista – Frente Amplio* (PS-FA) that supported the presidential candidate and also joined Pachakutik in some provinces for the legislative seats. Lastly, in other provinces, the party joined local movements.

Multiple appeals content aside, the campaigns followed Pachakutik's usual practices of connecting the candidates with the grassroots organizations. The reports of the campaign highlighted that Pachakutik's members directed these in the provinces.

The change in the party's primary goal is clear. The data from the electoral campaigns matches the party leaders' statements. Pachakutik became a policy-seeking party.

6.2.3 Pachakutik as a value-infusion-seeking party (2006-2017)

2006-2009

In 2006, Pachakutik changed once again its primary goal. The party turned into a value-infusion-seeking party. The changes within the party started with the mestizo members departing the party between 2005 and 2006. These former leaders argued the party was slowly turning into an ethnic-centered party (El Universo, 2006a). Those who left accused the leaders who remained in the party of refusing to listen to different views (El Comercio, 2006a). By contrast, the party leaders asserted that what mattered was unity within the organization and that those leaving were harming the organization. The party's legislators, Miguel López and Jorge Guamán, stressed that the organization had to get rid of those members that were not ideal members of the organization and "clean the house" to move forward (Lopez and Guamán as cited in El Universo, 2006b).

By early 2006, the party leaders had changed their discourse from discussing the importance of holding offices (or even advancing policy) to discussing party members' ideal characteristics and the importance of protecting the organization (Diario Hoy, 2006). The discussion of who could be a candidate shifted from who was the more electable candidate to who represented the party's values the best. These discussions lasted for the first half of 2006. Some of the party's members appeared to not coincide with the party's leaders and their focus on the best candidate for the party brand. Instead, they insisted on the candidate more likely to win. In the 2006 case, this candidate was Rafael Correa (El Comercio, 2005b). However, Pachakutik's leaders made a clear choice. The party eschewed electoral alliances and ran a

campaign with an indigenous candidate, Luis Macas.¹⁴² The party presented Macas as its “ideal candidate.”¹⁴³

However, the decision was questioned by some provinces' leaders who complained against the party's national leaders. To end the conflict, Pachakutik's central office gave freedom to the representatives of 13 provinces to support Correa's candidacy instead of requiring them to join Macas' campaign. The party's faction linked to the party's Political Council closed ranks behind the party's first indigenous presidential candidate and stressed the importance of their unity (El Comercio, 2006c).

Disputes aside, the change in focus within the party is clear. The disagreements highlighted that the party's core was focused on protecting the party's brand and the organization, while a faction was interested in holding office via votes. The faction interested in preserving the party's brand and behind Macas candidacy was the one in charge of the party and retained its name and headquarters. Therefore, I focus on their statements, which signal the party turned into a value-infusion-seeking party.

The way Macas' campaign and some legislators' campaigns set up their campaigns reflect this change in the party's primary goal (see table 6.4). The content of the campaigns focused on the party's brand of representing an alternative form of government, the need to change fundamentally the way the state was run, and the importance of diversity. Julio Cesar Trujillo's campaign (candidate to a provincial legislative seat) also had the party's brand as a core message (Jones West, 2011). However, this was not the case for all legislators' campaigns. As the party's central office had given liberty to the provincial branches to develop their independent campaigns and alliances, other candidates campaigned with mixed content (see Jones West, 2011). The party-brand content and some of the programmatic content were similar to the 1996 and 1998 campaigns' content.

The candidates were, in general, considered good representatives of the party's brand. Most of them self-identified as indigenous. Nonetheless, Pachakutik also put forth mestizo candidates, but only those that had remained committed to the organization, such as Julio Cesar Trujillo. Interestingly, even when 13 provincial branches chose to support Correa, only in two provinces the party used electoral alliances.

¹⁴² Macas had been presiding Conaie at the time. Under his direction Conaie had spearheaded a number of strikes or *levantamientos* to stop the negotiations for the TLC.

¹⁴³ Some of the possible candidates were the following: Nina Pacari, Auki Tituaña, Alberto Acosta and Julio Cesar Trujillo (El Comercio, 2005a).

The campaigns run by the party's central office, which included Macas' campaign and Julio Cesar Trujillo's campaign, used Pachakutik's traditional practice of using party activists to organize the campaigns. The province Cotopaxi's branch leaders were in charge of Macas' campaign (El Comercio, 2006b). Macas' campaign focused on practices that were known to party activists and entailed low monetary costs. Macas' campaign manager explained that the party used radios managed by social movements and directly contacted grassroots organizations (El Universo, 2006c).

The change in Pachakutik's primary goal is clear. Despite the organization's division, those in charge of the central offices changed the party's primary goal into value-infusion. The party leaders' statements and how the party set up the campaigns in 2006 showed this goal.

Table 6.4 Pachakutik's electoral campaign indicators: value-infusion-seeking party (2006)

Electoral campaign indicators for Pachakutik as a value-infusion-seeking party		
	If value-infusion-seeking	Pachakutik 2006
Campaign content	Symbolic (party brand oriented)	Symbolic (party brand-oriented and candidate oriented)
Historical content	Similar symbolic / party brand content throughout the years	Similar party brand to the 1996 and 1998 campaigns as well as some programmatic content
Candidates	Party member candidates	Party member candidates
Alliances	Unlikely	Few legislative level alliances (2)
Campaign leaders	Party members	Party members
Campaign strategies	Conventional: party brand-oriented	Conventional: party brand-oriented

2009-2013

Pachakutik continued to pursue value-infusion during the period between 2009 and 2013. In early 2009, Jorge Guamán, the then party leader, explained the party was in the process of rebuilding its organization looking into the future (Jorge Guamán as cited in El Comercio, 2009c). The 2009 elections were the first time since the party's formation Pachakutik did not

present a presidential candidate.¹⁴⁴ The party's leaders presented this choice as one of the tough choices the party made to protect itself. Guamán stressed the party would focus on building the party's political project from the ground-up, without other organizations' help (Guamán as cited in *El Comercio*, 2009c).

Pachakutik's leaders' statements, more so than in 2006, signaled the importance given to the party organization's protection. How the party's candidates' set up their campaigns reflected the value-infusion goal (see table 6.5). As mentioned already, this was the first election in which Pachakutik did not have a presidential candidate. Therefore, the subnational level branches organized the campaigns at the provincial level, and the national office organized the campaign of national legislators. The content of these campaigns focused on the party's brand and the candidates' competence; the candidates were introduced as representing the party's brand and interests. Most of the candidates had already represented the party in the legislature and the Constitutional Assembly in some cases. Thus, these candidates represented the party's brand that had not – as many others did – separated themselves from the party lines. Their campaigns were developed by their own teams and used the conventional practices of the party.

Table 6.5 Pachakutik's electoral campaign indicators: value-infusion-seeking party (2009)

Electoral campaign indicators for Pachakutik as a value-infusion-seeking party		
	If value-infusion-seeking	Pachakutik 2009
Campaign content	Symbolic (party brand oriented)	Symbolic (party brand and candidate's competence)
Historical content	Similar symbolic / party brand content throughout the years	Similar party brand content to the 2006 content.
Candidates	Party member candidates	Party member candidates and alliances
Alliances	Unlikely	Few legislative level alliances (8)
Campaign leaders	Party members	Party members
Campaign strategies	Conventional: party brand-oriented	Conventional: party brand-oriented

¹⁴⁴ There were nonetheless talks of possible candidates that included the names of Auki Tituaña, Luis Macas, and Alberto Acosta. After Acosta turned down the offer, Pachakutik's leader Jorge Guamán announced the decision to not present any candidate to the presidency (*El Comercio*, 2009b)

Pachakutik maintained its goal of value infusion leading into the 2009 election. The party leaders' statements were clear. The party was working on rebuilding itself. The type of campaigns and the candidates the party presented at the 2009 elections also reflected the party's primary goal.

2013-2017

Leading into the 2013 elections, Pachakutik was still working towards its survival. Nonetheless, the hard-line against presenting candidates in alliances had disappeared. For the 2013 elections, Pachakutik decided to join a wide-reaching electoral coalition. The coalition was named the *Coordinadora Plurinacional por la Unidad de las Izquierdas* and brought together multiple leftist parties in Ecuador, such as the *Movimiento Popular Democrático* (MPD), the independent movements *Motecristi Vive*, *Poder Popular*, *Movimiento Convocatoria por la Unidad Provincial*, and the party *Red Ética y Democracia*. The party leader, Rafael Antuni, nevertheless explained that this was a pragmatic choice designed to help the parties with no presence in some country regions. Moreover, this decision meant not to harm the party's integrity (El Universo, 2012a). Furthermore, the alliance was presented as organized around the party's principles and platform.

Pachakutik's choice and how the party's leader presented this choice suggest that the party aimed to mobilize as many votes as possible. As discussed in chapter 2, this is a goal (vote-seeking) that all parties share, but that is not necessarily a party's primary goal. Instead, parties pursue what these votes may afford them. For Pachakutik, a larger number of votes could ensure the party's continued access to state subsidies. Of course, it could also be argued the party's goal was holding office or advancing policy. However, the party's leaders' statements did not mention these goals.

How the party set up the 2013 campaign contributes to confirming its primary goal was value-infusion (see table 6.6). The party's campaign content focused on the party's brand, the alliances' brand (which took many of the party's symbols), and the candidates' competence. This type of content mostly resembled the content used during the 2009 campaign. Most of the alliance candidates, especially those with a more extensive media profile, were all well-known members (or long-time supporters) of Pachakutik. The presidential candidate was Alberto Acosta. He was a supporter of Pachakutik from the outset (that joined Correa briefly between 2006 and 2008). Arguably, Acosta was Pachakutik's candidate. Moreover, Acosta had support from Conaie. This made him an alliance candidate different from the previous ones. Acosta

was a presidential candidate almost as close to the party as Luis Macas was in 2006. Acosta presented his candidacy as based on solid programmatic grounds negotiated amongst the alliance members, with an extensive portion of it including parts of Pachakutik's policy and party brand platform. Moreover, Acosta was often accompanied by Lourdes Tiban (long-time Pachakutik leader), a candidate for a legislature's national seat. The other legislative candidates were selected from local grassroots organizations linked to Pachakutik.

The campaign followed the usual guidelines of Pachakutik's campaigns. With scarce funding, the party's candidates made use of local leaders and local activists. Nevertheless, Acosta brought his own campaign manager, who was not part of Pachakutik (Rosero Ch, 2013). At the legislative elections, the candidates followed similar patterns as the 2009 candidates.

Bringing together Pachakutik's leaders' statements with the way the campaigns were set up, the party's primary goal (value-infusion) becomes more explicit. The party's campaign setup mostly follows what is expected from a value-infusion-seeking party. Nonetheless, at the same time, there are hints that the party aimed to mobilize as many voters as possible, which could suggest the party had other goals, such as holding office. Pachakutik's primary goal's profile for this period is hence not entirely clear.

Table 6.6 Pachakutik's electoral campaign indicators: value-infusion-seeking party (2013)

Electoral campaign indicators for Pachakutik as a value-infusion-seeking party		
	If value-infusion-seeking	Pachakutik 2013
Campaign content	Symbolic (party brand oriented)	Symbolic (party brand, alliance brand, and candidate oriented)
Historical content	Similar symbolic / party brand content throughout the years	Similar content: symbolic, party brand, programmatic, alliance content
Candidates	Party member candidates	Party member candidates and alliances
Alliances	Unlikely	Alliances at both presidential and legislative levels
Campaign leaders	Party members	Party members and partners
Campaign strategies	Conventional: party brand-oriented	New strategies (different from the social movement strategies) coupled with conventional strategies

6.3 Pachakutik's goal achievement between 1996 and 2017

6.3.1 The 1996-2002 period

The year 1996 marks the beginning of the most politically unstable period in the history of Ecuador. On July 7, 1996, Abdalá Bucaram was elected president. He took office on August 10, 1996, and was ousted on February 6, 1997, after public demonstrations. He was succeeded by Fabian Alarcón, who was the president of the legislature at the time. He stayed in power as acting president until 1998. In that year, Jamil Mahuad Witt was elected president. He was the former mayor of Quito and was a *Democracia Popular* (DP-UDC) party member. Mahuad led Ecuador through its worst political and financial crisis and was ousted on January 21, 2000. As Bucaram, Mahuad ousting followed a series of public demonstrations and social unrest with the indigenous population at the forefront. Mahuad was succeeded by his vice-president Gustavo Noboa who stayed in power until 2002.

The 1996-1998 period was the first time that Pachakutik participated in the legislature. It is difficult to determine the party's aspiration level for that period and whether it surpassed it. Nonetheless, given the party persisted, i.e., presented candidates at the next elections, the 1996-1998 performance can be used as the next period's aspiration level. Pachakutik surpassed its aspiration level during the 1998-2002 period.

Pachakutik's standing at the legislature was shaky from the outset, with a small block of 4 legislators. The party initially had eight seats at the legislature – given the number of elected candidates under the party's ticket. However, shortly after the legislature started work, four legislators joined the legislatures' majority led by the president's party *Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano* (PRE) (El Comercio, 1996a; Van Cott, 2005, p. 230).¹⁴⁵ After 1997, Pachakutik's block grew back to six members. Two of the legislators that left the party in 1996 were impeached (after Bucaram's ousting), and the appointed substitutes joined Pachakutik's legislative group.

During Pachakutik's first time in the legislature, the party's leaders' and legislators' main focus was to change Ecuadorian laws and the Constitution to ensure indigenous populations' recognition and rights. The party's focus was to present bill initiatives within the legislature and turning them into laws. Therefore, the party's performance can be

¹⁴⁵ Additionally, Pachakutik was officially entitled to receive three seats in the legislature's plenary given the, in theory, 8 seats of the block. Pachakutik was however only granted one seat. After this, the leader of the legislative block of PRE, as the president's party, offered Pachakutik their full three seats if Pachakutik's legislators supported PRE's candidate to the presidency of Congress. Pachakutik did not accept the exchange (El Comercio, 1996a). Luis Macas asserted it was Pachakutik's right to receive those seats and thus declined accepting the offer which he saw as a form of manipulation (El Comercio, 1996a).

operationalized in terms of the number of bill initiatives and how many of these became laws. Pachakutik's legislators sponsored 30 bill initiatives between 1996 and 1998, which were equivalent to almost 4% of the total number of proposals presented to the legislature during the period. Eight of these bill initiatives made it to the first debate and seven to the second debate at the plenary. In total, 6 of these proposals were approved and became laws. These six new laws represented approximately 3.08% of the total output of the legislature for the period.¹⁴⁶

The approved laws did not have specific recipients or beneficiaries. Two of the new laws had universal recipients. The first law, "*Garantía sobre el abastecimiento permanente de vacunas de insumos para el programa ampliado de inmunizaciones*," dealt with the unrestricted supply of vaccines for the national immunization program. The second law, "*Ley Reformativa a la ley de Maternidad Gratuita*," introduced changes to the law securing free Maternity and child care and emphasized breastfeeding's importance. The other four laws had specific recipients. One secured a lifelong pension to the indigenous leader Transito Amaguaña. The next was a law that created a university, the *Universidad Intercontinental*. The third established the creation of the province Orellana. And the last law was developed to protect and promote the province Cañar's industrial production and tourism industry.

The most significant accomplishment within the legislature was that Ecuador ratified the International Labor Organization (ILO) Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention No. 169 in May 1998 after a long campaign in Congress led by Miguel Llucio, one of Pachakutik's legislators. The legislators worked hard to get the ratification as it would contribute to improving legislation pertaining to the indigenous population in the country. Not all of Pachakutik's legislators' efforts paid off, however. Many important proposals were left in the party's docket. Amongst these, the law addressing the creation of the National Ombudsman, the reform to the agricultural development law, and the "*Ley de Aguas*" that dealt with the water resources and the water administration in the country.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁶ In total 752 proposals were presented, of these 195 became laws.

¹⁴⁷ During the 1996-1998 period, and perhaps because the party members were more used to negotiating directly with the executive rather than through the legislative branch of government (due to their prior experience at social movements), the party's legislators also engaged the executive outside the legislature. In 1996 Pachakutik's leaders met with president Bucaram. The legislators requested the creation of a Technical Office of Development Support for the indigenous population. They emphasized the government should allow the rural population to advise the government on their own local political authorities (El Comercio, 1996b). They were referring to the figure of *tenientes políticos*. These were representatives of the executive often appointed by the provincial governors who were in turn appointed by the executive. However, their requests were not addressed. By the time Bucaram was ousted, the Technical Office was not created and very few local political authorities were appointed using the input from the indigenous population. Moreover, Bucaram had created an Ethno-Cultural Ministry and appointed as Minister, a member of Pachakutik that had been negotiating with the executive by-passing the party, Rafael Pandam. Bucaram's ousting gave Pachakutik a second chance to regain strength and pursue its primary goal. The party did not focus solely on its primary goal, however. The party started to work towards holding

For the 1998-2002 period, Pachakutik's policy interests focused on advancing legislation to enact the new Constitution's articles that gave the indigenous population recognition and collective rights. During this period, Conaie announced it would separate from Pachakutik. The indigenous movement argued this separation would free Conaie to negotiate with any other political group and pressure the government without coordinating with Pachakutik (El Comercio, 1998). Therefore, Pachakutik was left alone at its work in the legislature.

The party had nine candidates elected for the 1998-2002 legislature. However, only six joined the party's legislative group.¹⁴⁸ Despite the reduced size of the party's legislative block, Nina Pacari was appointed as second-vice president of Congress for the 1998 -2000 period,¹⁴⁹ and Antonio Posso was second vice-president for the 2000-2002 period. Nina Pacari asserted that her appointment was important as it meant Pachakutik was securing support for laws necessary to enact the 1998 Constitution.¹⁵⁰ By 1999, however, the indigenous movement leaders criticized Nina Pacari and the rest of the legislative block. Former legislator Luis Macas asserted the party's legislators and Nina Pacari, in particular, failed to direct the legislative discussions towards the issues that mattered most to the population and the party. They had instead supported the debates of the government's priorities (Diario Expreso, 1999). Posso's vice-presidency has received notoriously less attention than Pacari's term.¹⁵¹

office. As the appointment of Fabián Alarcón as interim president required support from Congress, Pachakutik exchanged its legislators' support for the following: the elimination of the Ethno-Cultural Ministry, the creation of an organization working for the development of the indigenous population, and the appointment of their selected representatives to the cabinet (El Comercio, 1997a). The party got some of these demands. The Ethno-Cultural Ministry was eliminated and the CONPLADEIN was created. Nina Pacari was appointed as executive secretary. Nina Pacari's appointment was questioned by the *Federación de Indígenas Evangélicos del Ecuador* (FEINE) because her appointment had not been previously agreed upon amongst the indigenous population organizations (El Comercio, 1997c). However, only two appointments of the other requested, were made. Julio Cesar Trujillo was appointed Ombudsman and Elsa Maria Castro was appointed as member of the Political Reforms Commission (El Comercio, 1997b). Julio Cesar Trujillo was appointed in early May 1997 and presented its official resignation in May 22, 1997 (El Comercio, 1997d)

¹⁴⁸ This meant the party's legislative block was as big as the one from the 1996-1998 period after Bucaram was ousted, however because the legislature had grown they represented only 5% of the seats, as opposed to the 7% they represented in the previous period.

¹⁴⁹ The appointment was heavily criticized because it meant that the party reached an agreement with the elected president's party *Democracia Popular* (DP-UDC), and the conservative *Partido Social Cristiano* (PSC). Van Cott (2005) reports that Pacari's appointment started a dispute between Pachakutik militants and the legislative block. Militants rejected the agreement with the conservative right, while the legislators evaluated the agreement as part of a strategy to succeed in Congress.

¹⁵⁰ Additionally, Pachakutik secured seats in the following committees: Social and Labor Committee, Social Security, Accountability, Indigenous Issues, and the wider codification and legislation committee.

¹⁵¹ Pachakutik's legislators chose to be part of "a constructive opposition". This choice meant a division within the party. This decision meant disregarding the fact that Pachakutik and Conaie's demands following the National Bank Holiday in March 1999 had not been addressed. Amongst the agreements the executive promised to send to the legislature the request for the creation of a fund for the functioning of Council for the Development of Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador (CODENPE). Nina Pacari voiced these demands (El Comercio, 1999). Nevertheless, by January 2000 Pachakutik's legislative block changed positions and took to the streets with the indigenous organizations including the party's activists against Jamil Mahuad. The indigenous population played

The party's legislators presented 58 bill initiatives to the legislature, representing 6.1% of all initiatives presented during that period. Out of these, 16 made it to the first debate, and 15 to the second debate in the plenary. In total, ten became new laws. This is equivalent to 5.4% of the total output of the legislature.¹⁵²

Seven of the approved laws had specific beneficiaries that included the provinces: Carchi, Cotopaxi, El Oro, and Imbabura.¹⁵³ The other three laws had universal beneficiaries and focused on 1) reforms to the Penal Code; 2) reforms to the law of Radio broadcast and Television; and 3) the approval of the "*Ley de Juntas Parroquiales*." This last law was particularly important for the indigenous population as it mandated the creation of parish councils in rural parishes. This law made local elections even more important for parties like Pachakutik, whose main supporters came from rural parishes.

Four important proposals for Pachakutik were left undiscussed, however. The law that proposed the official use of ancestral languages within the state, the proposal for the "*Ley de Aguas*" presented in 1996, a proposal to reform the "*Ley de Comunas*," and a proposal to manage and allocate competencies within the state's legal system to develop the indigenous justice system. Additionally, the party failed to submit the bill initiatives for the *Ley de Nacionalidades y Pueblos Indígenas*, *Ley del Sistema de Educación Intercultural Bilingüe*, *Ley de Circunscripciones Territoriales*, *Ley de Justicia*, and *Ley del Fondo Indígena*. These ill initiatives were discussed by Conaie with the head of the executive but never presented at the legislature.

Pachakutik's performance during the 1998-2002 period surpassed the 1996-1998 period (see table 6.7). The party had one crucial success at the legislature in every period. In the 1996-1998 period, this was the ratification of the ILO No. 196 Convention, and in the 1998-2002 period, this was the *Ley de Juntas Parroquiales*. Both had significant implications for the

a pivotal role at the ousting of Jamil Mahuad at the streets. In Congress, and with the representatives of Pachakutik absent, Gustavo Noboa (Mahuad's vice-president) was appointed president. During Gustavo Noboa's administration Pachakutik's legislators continued to be part of the opposition.

¹⁵² In total 957 proposals were presented and only 184 became laws.

¹⁵³ These included the following laws:

1. Condonacion de intereses generados por falta de pago de tarifas de agua de riego San vicente de Pusir, Montufar, Ambuqui, Santiaguillo, Cuambo, ubicadas en las provincias del Carchi e Imbabura.
2. Concede pensión vitalicia al señor coronel(r) Alejandro Romo Escobar.
3. Creación de la empresa de agua potable y alcantarillado, Emapa regional La Estancilla.
4. Condonación de intereses y otros recargos adeudados al instituto nacional de desarrollo agrario-inda, por los adjudicatarios de tierras.
5. Creación de la universidad estatal de Milagro
6. Creación de la universidad de Otavalo.
7. Reformatoria a la ley que crea el fondo de ayuda emergente para la rehabilitación socio económica y reconstrucción de la provincia del Cotopaxi.

advancement of the party's policy agenda. During the first period, Pachakutik presented only 4% of all initiatives presented at the legislature, while in the second, this number increased to 6.1%. The Congress discussed more of Pachakutik's bill initiatives in the first and second debates of the 1998-2002 period than during the first period. Moreover, the party had more approved initiatives in the second period, ten new laws equivalent to 5.43% of all laws approved, compared to the six laws approved between 1996 and 1998, equivalent to only 3.08% of the total output. Furthermore, Pachakutik's legislators were better able to navigate Ecuador's legislative politics during the second period securing appointments within the legislature that had not been possible during the first period. Overall, Pachakutik achieved its goal of policy advancement during the 1998-2002 period by surpassing its aspiration level.

Table 6.7 Pachakutik's goal achievement 1996-1998 and 1998-2002

Pachakutik's goal achievement (1996-2002)		
	Aspiration Level (based on the 1996-1998 performance)	Period of evaluation (1998-2002)
Policy-seeking		
Proposals presented	30 (4%)	58 (6.1%)
Discussed in the first debate	8 (2.08%)	16 (4.94%)
Discussed in the second debate	7 (2.08%)	15 (5.81%)
Approved	6 (3.08%)	10 (5.43%)
Most important accomplishment	Ratification of the ILO No. 169 Convention	Approval of the Ley de Juntas Parroquiales
Extras		Pachakutik's legislators held the vice-presidency of Congress for the whole period.

**The percentages are calculated based on the total number of proposals presented, discussed, and approved in the legislature during the period of investigation.*

Common evaluations of Pachakutik's performance for these periods have focused on the party's electoral support. The period of 1998-2002 is often considered a bad period for the party as its overall national vote share decreased (see, for example, Mijeski & Beck, 2004).

Pachakutik's presidential candidate received only 14.7% of the national vote in 1998 compared to the 20.6% of the votes received in 1996. However, a party's national vote share represents only a snapshot of a party's goal-achievement process. Votes may contribute to a party's achieving goals, but they are not the only means. As discussed in this section, Pachakutik's performance during the 1998-2002 period surpassed the party's first-period performance despite its reduced national vote share. Pachakutik decided to continue participating in elections after achieving its goal. However, the party changed its primary goal.

6.3.2 The 2002-2006 period

In November 2002, the retired army Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez was elected president of Ecuador. He had been part of the January 2000 coup d'état that ended Jamil Mahuad's presidency. Lucio Gutiérrez was considered an outsider candidate. He was elected with Pachakutik's support. Soon after, he dissolved his agreement with Pachakutik and started working with the right-wing conservative party *Partido Social Cristiano* (PSC). By mid-April 2005, Gutiérrez's presidency ended. He was ousted via public demonstrations. This was the first middle class led presidential ousting in Ecuador's history and the first in recent years in which the indigenous social movements took a back seat. Gutiérrez was succeeded by his vice-president Alfredo Palacio. Lucio Gutiérrez ousting sparked a new trend in Ecuador: the rejection of traditional political parties that opened the door for the outsider candidate in 2006, Rafael Correa.

The 2002 elections were the most successful for Pachakutik in terms of elected candidates (Madrid, 2012; Van Cott, 2005). Pachakutik's presidential candidate was elected, and the party had 14 seats at the legislature. Five of these legislators were elected under a single ticket, and nine were elected in electoral alliances. Of these, six were elected with Lucio Gutiérrez's party, two with the socialist party *Partido Socialista Frente Amplio* (PS-FA), and one with the independent movement *Movimiento Ciudadanos Nuevo País*. Neither the number of elected legislators nor the fact that the party supported the new president was enough to help the party achieve its goal of holding office. The party could not hold on to any of the office appointments for which it sacrificed its policy-purity.

After the elections, Pachakutik declared itself as co-governing with Lucio Gutiérrez, which meant Pachakutik's presence in government (including cabinet and subcabinet appointments) was expected to be of equal proportion to the presence of the president's party officials (El Comercio, 2002; Lluco, 2004). This was how Pachakutik operationalized its primary goal: holding discretionary appointments. The party's aspiration level was to hold 50%

of all possible appointments. These appointments included cabinet seats, diplomatic appointments, and the directorships of different government offices. It was expected moreover that as directors and ministers were appointed, they would, in turn, be able to appoint their staff.

Pachakutik did not receive the expected number of appointments. The party received only four cabinet seats: Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, Education and Culture, and Tourism, out of 15; and one appointment (the Secretary of Planning and Social Dialogue) out of six possible national secretariates' directorships. Furthermore, the party received several appointments within multiple ministries and the diplomatic corps.¹⁵⁴ In total, Pachakutik received 86 confirmed appointments (reported in the appendix 2 by name and position). These appointments only represented 11% of the total political appointments Lucio Gutiérrez made that were considered key for the administration (El Comercio, 2003c). By contrast, Lucio Gutiérrez's party (PSP) held almost 52% of the total appointments.¹⁵⁵ Most importantly, even when the party received appointments, these appointees were surrounded by PSP appointees who would 'swamp' their work (Llucó, 2004). After August 2003, when the alliance between Pachakutik and Lucio Gutiérrez dissolved, all of these appointees left their offices.

When Alfredo Palacio became president in 2005, Pachakutik did not receive any political appointments back. Conaie negotiated the only important appointment for the indigenous population in 2005. This was the directorship of CODENPE, for which Lourdes Tibán was appointed. Additionally, although these were not strictly presidential appointments, the number of seats the party had at the Provincial Electoral Tribunals was reduced compared to the previous period. Although officially Pachakutik held 21 seats, just as during the 1998-2002 period, these seats were allocated both to Pachakutik and PSP. Therefore, Pachakutik effectively only had ten seats at the electoral tribunals (El Comercio, 2003a). Furthermore, at

¹⁵⁴ Nina Pacari was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luis Macas Minister of Agriculture, Rosa Maria Torres Minister of Education and Culture, and Doris Soliz Minister of Tourism. Additionally, a member of Pachakutik became the executive vice-president of Petroecuador (Llucó, 2004, p. 30). Augusto Barrera was appointed Secretary of Planning and Social Dialogue, Virgilio Hernandez was appointed undersecretary of the Internal Affairs Ministry. Lourdes Tibán was appointed undersecretary of Welfare, Mariano Curicama undersecretary of Housing, Victor Hugo Jijón as member of Petroecuador, and Lourdes Rodriguez as undersecretary of Tourism (El Comercio, 2003b). Moreover, Pachakutik supported Wilma Salgado as head of AGD (Agencia de Garantía de Depositos) the agency created to safeguard the Ecuadorian's money savings.

¹⁵⁵ This overview refers only to the appointments that were deemed crucial for public administration, namely cabinet seats, subcabinet seats, provincial governors and governmental office managers. Undoubtedly there were more appointments to less important offices and thus the percentages of governmental presence could potentially shift. However, there is no clear information about how they were allocated. Appendix 2 includes a more extensive (but not exhaustive) list of political appointments Pachakutik received.

the legislature, the party only headed one committee in Congress and was no longer part of the parties controlling Congress's presidency or vice-presidencies.

Pachakutik did not achieve its primary goal during the 2002-2006 period. The party received fewer appointments (11%) than expected (50% of all appointments), and these appointments lasted for less than six months. Pachakutik's performance during the 2002-2006 period is often characterized as a success due to Gutiérrez's electoral triumph and the total number of legislators elected during that period (Madrid, 2012; Van Cott, 2005). However, electoral results often provide only a snapshot of a political party's performance and, most importantly, are not always the best proxy for goal achievement. This is the case for Pachakutik's 2002 electoral results. Contrary to what could be expected, the party could not leverage the electoral support into goal achievement during the inter-election period.¹⁵⁶ Notably, after failing to achieve its goal, the party did not disband but decided to persist, albeit making crucial changes. These changes included reducing its membership and changing its primary goal.

6.3.3 The 2006-2009 period

The ousting of Lucio Gutiérrez in April 2005 signaled the dissatisfaction of the population with the Ecuadorian political class. The groups that took to the streets to call for the end of the Gutiérrez' administration also chanted "*Que se vayan todos*," which can be roughly translated into: everyone must go. The demonstrators referred to the Ecuadorian political class, including the sitting (Pachakutik's) legislators. This was the setup for the presidential elections of 2006. In those elections, a newcomer was elected president, Rafael Correa.

Correa, who started his political career as Alfredo Palacio's Minister of Finance, was elected as an outsider with no party platform and no legislative candidates. Much of his agenda reflected that former Pachakutik leaders and leftist cadres worked for his campaign (e.g., Virgilio Hernandez, Alberto Acosta, and Augusto Barrera). One of the central pledges of Correa's campaign was to call for a Constitutional Assembly. He fulfilled his promise after his appointment, and in November 2007, the Constitutional Assembly dissolved the National Congress. The Constitutional Assembly finished its work and reconstituted itself as a Transitional Legislative Commission until the national elections of 2009 took place.

¹⁵⁶ Pachakutik continued to work at the legislature although its legislative block also suffered from the alliance's end. An overview of the party's actions in the legislature during these periods is available in the online appendix (available at www.dianadavilagordillo.com).

The 2006-2009 period started with Pachakutik pursuing a new primary goal, infusing value to the party organization. The party held a National Party Congress in late 2005. This National Congress decided to further develop a formal structure of the party by changing its bylaws. For the first time, the party created an official tiered organization from the provinces to the parish levels. Additionally, the party increased the accountability mechanisms set up to control their elected officials and candidates. The party empowered its ethics committee in charge of party discipline (El Comercio, 2005c).

Following these changes, and after the 2006 elections, the party started working towards their implementation. It is difficult to assess the aspiration level for the party regarding this new goal. Arguably, the party aspired to set up the new lower-level organizations and get them to work. But it is unclear what this entailed. Therefore, this period can only be taken as the base-line period against which the next performances can be compared.

The party leaders and elected officials during the 2006-2009 period focused on developing the organization and protecting themselves. This meant that the party went against the advancement of some of its core policies to protect itself. A stark example of this is how in 2007, the party's legislators opposed one of the crucial elements of their policy agenda: Ecuador's definition as a plurinational state because it would hamper their time at the legislative.

Pachakutik's leaders and elected officials had, for years, insisted on the need for a Constitutional Assembly to address the definition of Ecuador as a plurinational state. In 2007 the opportunity of having a Constitutional Assembly appeared as Correa was fulfilling one of its campaign pledges. Pachakutik's legislators, however, did not support the Constitutional Assembly. Pachakutik's legislators joined the opposition to curtail the rights of the Constitutional Assembly Correa was proposing. The goal of these parties, including Pachakutik, was to protect their appointments to the legislature. Pachakutik's legislators' efforts worked directly against the party's policy platform. Instead, they worked towards maintaining their appointments, which for long – given the party's lack of access to state funding – were used to provide funds for the party.¹⁵⁷

In contrast, Conaie supported Correa's proposal as it offered the perfect opportunity to advance one of their more important claims: differentiated recognition. The legislature's parties

¹⁵⁷ A common practice amongst Ecuadorian political parties has been the "donation" of part of their elected officials' salaries to their parties. Pachakutik used these practices consistently (PK-1, 2017)

failed to curtail the Constitutional Assembly's powers, and in November 2007, the latter dissolved the Congress, and Pachakutik's legislators lost their seats.¹⁵⁸

After the effort failed and the legislators were sent home, the party organization continued to develop internally. At the public arena, however, the party practically disappeared. Although the party presented candidates to the Constitutional Assembly, the president's new party (MPAIS) took over the political arena. In turn, the indigenous organizations took to the streets intending to affect the Constitutional Assembly's outcomes. The 2008 Constitution included many of the indigenous organizations' proposals.

In late 2007 the party held its National Congress where Jorge Guamán was elected to replace Jorge Talahua. He did not have a particularly public persona. As the Constitution came about and the 2009 elections loomed, Pachakutik's leadership resurfaced to announce the party was working hard at setting up primary elections to select their future candidates. The party organization had been hard at work behind closed doors establishing the local offices. The party used these local offices to organize the primary elections. In one of his few public statements, the party's leader stressed that the party was working to consolidate its internal organization (El Comercio, 2009a). By the end of the 2006-2009 period, Pachakutik's organization had become more complex, and it had continued to maintain a lively organization outside the electoral calendar. Although it is difficult to assert whether the party surpassed its aspiration level, the party chose to persist and participate in the next elections.

6.3.4 The 2009-2013 period

In 2009 Correa was re-elected president. Between 2009 and 2013, Correa's party had almost 50% of the National Assembly's seats.¹⁵⁹ Correa's control of the legislature hindered the work of many opposition parties. Pachakutik had in total three candidates elected under the party's ticket and one elected under an alliance.¹⁶⁰ They joined the opposition in early 2010 after a

¹⁵⁸ The legislature was in session for a little under a year. In total during that period a total 434 bill initiatives were presented. Pachakutik sponsored 48 of which 1 was approved. This initiative was rather innocuous. It eliminated an item listing a possible violation of the Organic Law of land transport.

¹⁵⁹ The 2008 Constitution changed the name of the legislature from National Congress to National Assembly.

¹⁶⁰ The party's legislators aim to advance some of the party's core policies. Therefore, as soon as the legislature started to work Pachakutik joined the legislators from MPD and formed a legislative block of 10 legislators. This gave the parties access to a seat at the *Consejo de Administración Legislativa* (Legislative Administration Council - CAL), the office in charge of managing the legislative initiatives and assigning them to committees. The CAL is formed by 4 members who are chosen from the four largest political blocs and the president and vice-president of the national assembly. Pachakutik's newly formed block entitled the party legislators to a sit which was taken by Lourdes Tibán from 2009 to 2011, and later on by Francisco Ulloa from 2011 to 2013.

short stint as part of the majority (El Comercio, 2009d). The period ended with MPAIS continuing to hold control over the political arena.

Pachakutik continued to be a value-infusion-seeking party. As mentioned already, the party's leader Jorge Guamán stressed Pachakutik was in the process of rebuilding its organization looking into the future (Jorge Guamán as cited in El Comercio, 2009c). The 2009-2013 period presented an important hurdle to all political parties in Ecuador. The 2008 Constitution required all political parties in Ecuador to re-register by submitting the signatures (of affiliated members) equivalent to 1.5% of the country's registered voters. This number of signatures was a tall order for many organizations. Pachakutik struggled but managed to deliver its signatures in 2012.

The requirement of over 158.000 members' signatures to re-register was a difficult challenge for Pachakutik. The work Pachakutik focused on the 2006-2009 period concentrated on setting up local level offices, but this did not include thorough documentation – or registration – of party members. Therefore, as the deadlines for re-registration loomed, Pachakutik started canvassing for signatures. The party eventually managed to gather all necessary signatures and was officially re-registered in mid-2012. Pachakutik was able to leverage its local level organizations to get these signatures.

During the 2009-2013 period, Pachakutik continued to build its party organization and routinized its practices. In addition to the work made to collect the registration's signatures, the party continued to respect its non-electoral activities calendar. The party continued to hold its biennial National Congresses. In May 2010, the party's members met at the VI National Congress. In this Congress, Rafael Antuni replaced Jorge Guamán (El Comercio, 2010). After the meeting, Pachakutik's leadership announced that they were committed to “take on the reconstruction of the party organization” (SERVINDI, 2010).

Nonetheless, this did not mean everything was smooth for the party during this period. Long time leaders of the party: Miguel Lluco and Auki Tituaña, were ousted. Miguel Lluco's expulsion from the party was due to his decision to support Correa and his party (El Comercio, 2012). In turn, Auki Tituaña announced his intention to join the right-wing candidate Guillermo Lasso's presidential campaign (El Universo, 2012b).¹⁶¹

¹⁶¹ The separation was expected. Tituaña had removed himself from the political movement a few years earlier. In particular, he spearheaded a campaign against the 2008 Constitution while Pachakutik campaigned in favor. In the end Tituaña was unable to present his candidacy as vice-president because he was never officially expelled from Pachakutik. The law stated that he had to either be expelled from the party or disaffiliated from the party at least 90 days prior to the registration of his new candidacy. Pachakutik did not registered his expulsion and thus Tituaña was blocked from presenting his candidacy (El Universo, 2012c)

Their expulsion hence reflected the internal strength of the organization. Their expulsions signaled the solid core formed within Pachakutik, which refused electoral alliances with parties without the central organizations' support. The differences between the then leaders of the party and the one-time leaders Tituaña and Lluco were apparent. Both Lluco and Tituaña had done precisely the opposite the party required of its members. They joined organizations the party openly opposed.

Overall, it follows, Pachakutik continued developing its organization during the 2009 and 2013 period. Compared to the 2006-2009 period, the party surpassed its aspiration levels. The party maintained its strong organization by developing further the local level branches of the party. Moreover, the party continued holding its biennial National Congresses, keeping the organization outside the electoral calendar alive. Furthermore, and using the party's charter changes introduced in 2005, the party expelled some of its former leaders. This highlights an apparent unity amongst the sitting leaders. Lastly, between 2011 and 2013, Pachakutik received, for the first time, state subsidies. Pachakutik hence clearly surpassed its aspiration during this period. The party continued to persist after this.

6.3.5 The 2013-2017 period

In 2013, Correa was re-elected for the last time. At the legislature, his party received 73% of the seats. The party's legislative block was dubbed "*la aplanadora*" (the steamroller) as it would not need the support from any other party to advance Correa's agenda. The 2013-2017 period was a difficult period to advance policies in Ecuador. The number of seats held by the president's party increased, which meant that the executive's block could steamroll all initiatives with which they agreed or disagreed. Advancing policy outside the president's party's preferences was almost impossible. As Lourdes Tibán asserted, "nothing gets done or approved unless it is part of the president's plan" (Lourdes Tiban as cited in Zamora, 2016).¹⁶² Traditional and non-traditional parties struggled to persist, given the lack of votes cast for them and the difficulties parties faced to achieve their goals via alternative means, given Correa's total control of the state and all other government branches. Nevertheless, Pachakutik persisted.

At the beginning of the 2013-2017 period, Pachakutik held its VII National Congress, which again showed its routinized practices. In this Congress, Fanny Campos was elected as

¹⁶² The party presented 14 bill initiatives (equivalent to 4.02% of all initiatives presented during this period), and none of these were approved. The party received in total 7 seats at the legislature. While this outcome may look like a positive outcome because the party received overall more seats than in 2009, this reflects the opposite. In 2013, Pachakutik joined amongst other parties, the party MPD. Together, the two parties in 2009 held 10 seats at the legislature, in 2013 again together – but under an electoral alliance – the number of seats was reduced to 7.

the party's national coordinator.¹⁶³ 2013 was the last year in which Pachakutik received state subsidies. In 2014, CNE claimed Pachakutik had not achieved the necessary votes (4% of the national votes) to receive the subsidies. Fanny Campos was in charge of fighting the state's decision to stop the allocation of these funds. She was, however, not successful. In 2016, Marlon Santi replaced Fanny Campos as national party coordinator. He continued with the work she had started, albeit with the same negative results.¹⁶⁴

In 2016, the party updated its statutes to established an even more detailed organizational structure at all levels. Ethical committees were extended to the parish levels, and party members' ombudsmen were also appointed at all levels and branches. Additionally, the party continued to hold elections for local branch leaders and organize primary elections. Lastly, during the 2013-2017 period, the party had no notorious party members disaffiliations and did not expel any party members. Overall, Pachakutik surpassed its aspiration level. During the 2013-2017 period, Pachakutik continued to infuse with value its own organization and did it successfully.

Pachakutik surpassed its aspiration level in the 2013-2017 period. The party worked to routinize its practices even further, maintained the organization alive beyond the electoral calendar, and faced no major disaffiliations or had to expulse well-known party members. The only aspect in which Pachakutik's goal-achievement did not surpass its aspiration level was that the party stopped receiving state subsidies. Nonetheless, overall, Pachakutik continued to infuse with value its organization and hence achieved its goal.

6.4 Pachakutik: surviving against all odds

The goal achievement perspective to party survival requires a re-evaluation of a party's resources in light of their primary goal. These resources include, but are not limited to, the party's organizational resources such as staff, party members, party leaders, funding, and the votes a party receives in electoral processes.

During the 1996-2002 period, in which Pachakutik was a policy-seeking party, the party's organizational resources *and* the votes the party was able to garner were crucial. First, an extensive party membership – composed mostly of members of social organizations that partnered with the party – contributed significantly to spread the word about the party's policy platform. During the 1996 and 1998 campaigns, the party focused on its policy platform, and

¹⁶³ She had been one of the architects of the electoral alliance that supported Alberto Acosta's presidential campaign.

¹⁶⁴ In 2018 CNE revised the decision to not allocate funds and granted Pachakutik the subsidies once more.

given the scarce financial resources, the work of activists was essential to mobilize voters. This was particularly important for the party as it required votes to turn into seats at the legislature. Pachakutik achieved its goal of advancing policy during this period (1996-2002). The party managed to advance bill initiatives and alter the Ecuadorian political discourse, bringing to the fore issues of racial discrimination, the importance of recognition, and the importance of collective rights. The party performance by the end of these two periods contributed to the party's decision to keep going.

For the 2002-2006 period, party activists became less critical in spreading the word about the party's policy platform. Instead, they were essential to mobilize voters by any means possible. As discussed already, Pachakutik's primary goal changed from policy to office-seeking. Only votes would help the party achieve its office appointments. Votes hence become more important than party members. Financial resources also become more important during this period. The party's national congress discussed transforming the party into a full-fledged party organization to receive the state's subsidies and leaving behind its status as a political movement. However, in the end, the party members voted against that (Llucó, 2003). This clearly shows how different resources may be more or less useful for certain types of goals. Pachakutik did not achieve its primary goal during this period. To be sure, the party did manage to get a considerable number of votes, which brought the party close to reaching its aspiration level. However, the goal was impossible to achieve after the alliance with Gutierrez ended.

Despite failing to achieve its primary goal, Pachakutik's leaders chose to keep the organization alive. Pachakutik's persistence after the 2002-2006 failure followed from a time of reflection on the side of the party's leaders. They asserted it was time to look inwards. As discussed in chapter 2, goal achievement is not the only likely determinant of party survival. Parties may also choose to persist after a failure if achieving their primary goal in the next period is possible. Arguably, Pachakutik's persistence after the 2002-2006 failure to achieve its goal is an example of the party leaders considering that it was possible to re-build the party organization and protect it.

From 2006 onwards, the party's resources of committed activists and committed party leaders were crucial for the party. This does not mean, however, that votes became entirely unimportant. The party did require them. Votes were necessary to maintain the party's registration and access funding in the form of contributions from party members elected to public office. Therefore, Pachakutik continued to participate in electoral processes and work towards receiving as many votes as possible at the subnational elections – where the party has historically performed better. This is where using multiple mobilization strategies at the

subnational elections discussed in chapter 5 fits in. Candidates' using multiple mobilization strategies contributes to the party's overall persistence. It helps the party acquire the votes and the elected candidates necessary to maintain the party's registration and, since 2009, to receive the state's subsidies.

Since 2006, the party has been able to build a stronger organization through the years. This process has required resources, such as committed party members, committed leaders, and a minimum working organization that deploys and develops the necessary electoral campaigns to keep the party going. At the same time, achieving the goal has also contributed to creating even more resources, such as more – if still limited in number – party members and, importantly, thanks to the changes in party regulation, enough elected officials to ensure access to the state's subsidies.

Party survival is hence not only a matter of achieving goals as if this happened in a void. Goal achievement requires resources and is very much dependent on what else happens within the party system and within the party organization. Therefore, understanding party survival, particularly of parties with low levels of electoral support and scarce resources, requires evaluating all aspects of the parties.

6.4.1 Pachakutik's survival alternative explanations

Thus far, I have explained Pachakutik's survival from a goal achievement perspective. However, I have not discussed some possible alternative explanations for this survival. In this section, I present three alternative explanations for the party's survival and argue why they cannot be used instead of the goal achievement explanation.

An alternative explanation for Pachakutik's persistence could be the influence of ambitious politicians. These ambitious leaders are likely to keep the party organization alive to achieve their own goals. Although this explanation may apply to multiple other parties, it does not apply to Pachakutik. Pachakutik has never had a single charismatic leader using the organization towards her own objectives. As discussed in chapter 3, the party was initially devised as a horizontal organization that required consensus amongst the multiple partners to make decisions. This limited the ability of any leader to centralize the party's decision-making processes into a single person. Moreover, when the organization formalized a hierarchical structure, it retained a participatory decision-making system that weakened the National Coordinators' office's power. The party has, in general, maintained the configuration of a horizontal organization where most decisions are made through consensus.

This does not mean that the party has lacked ambitious politicians, however. Multiple party leaders have used the party to advance their personal goals. Nonetheless, as their power to stir the organization towards their preferred outcomes was limited, they eventually left the party. For instance, in late 2004 and early 2005, numerous mestizo leaders (such as Augusto Barrera, Virgilio Hernandez) left the party (Madrid, 2012, p. 104). They argued that the party was no longer pursuing their interests and had transformed into an ethnocentric party. The bottom line is that the party was not the place where they could pursue their own agenda. These former leaders joined Rafael Correa's political movement. Through that new party, they participated in elections and received political appointments. Another example of a party leader who left the organization to advance his own agenda was Auki Tituaña. He announced in 2012 that he would join Guillermo Lasso in his first bid for the presidency. Tituaña had put his name forth as Pachakutik's possible candidate for the presidency since 2002. However, he was never elected during Pachakutik's primaries.

Pachakutik's ambitious leaders left the party organization as soon as it interfered with their objectives. Arguably, if it was them keeping the organization alive, the organization would have crumbled after they left. However, this was not the case. Notably, the organization's life has not been carried over by new ambitious politicians replacing those who left. The national party coordinators, although likely to have their personal agendas, have not been the party's candidates but kept their work as party leaders independent from the electoral competition (the only exception was Miguel Lluco, who was a legislator in 1996-1998 and then became the party leader). Moreover, the party organization has worked hard to formalize its structure since 2006. This has strengthened the organization and curtailed any party leader's abilities to use the organization to advance her own agenda. As it is clear, Pachakutik's persistence cannot be explained as caused by ambitious politicians.

Another alternative explanation is that the party has profited from other parties' breakdowns. For instance, this could mean that the party could take over the electorate of parties that disbanded. This has, in fact, been argued as one of the reasons for Pachakutik's formation in 1996. Van Cott (2005) emphasized that Pachakutik's successful establishment was partly due to leftist parties' weakness. These organizations contributed to Pachakutik with their cadres and organizational know-how but, at the same time, were too weak to impose their agenda on the new organization. Moreover, in 1996, Pachakutik benefited from the general disenchantment of the Ecuadorian electorate with traditional parties. However, as the years passed, Pachakutik was no longer able to benefit from being the new party.

Pachakutik has become, to a certain extent, part of the old non-traditional parties within the party system. Pachakutik has turned into the party that loses support to new organizations. This was the case in 2006 when Correa presented himself as the new anti-establishment option. Correa was able to garner the support of most of the electorate during his time in office. Multiple political parties – even old established political parties – disbanded as their support dwindled, e.g., *Izquierda Democrática* (ID) and *Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano* (PRE). However, Pachakutik did not directly benefit from these parties' disbandment. As discussed in chapter 3, the party has not received more votes in recent years. The supporters of those parties shifted their support to Correa's party or other new parties. Pachakutik's survival hence cannot be explained by the party profiting from other parties' demise. In fact, from this perspective, the party's persistence becomes even more puzzling.¹⁶⁵

Lastly, another alternative explanation is that the party benefitted from an institutional framework that facilitates party persistence, e.g., no (or low) barriers to access state's subsidies and few requirements to maintain party registration. This is not the case for the Ecuadorian system. As discussed in chapter 3, party regulation in Ecuador constrains party persistence. First, the requirements to maintain registration are difficult to achieve, particularly for national-level party organizations. As shown in chapter 3, most of the registered voters in Ecuador are mostly located in two provinces, making it difficult for parties to garner large portions of the national vote share (required to maintain registration) if they underperform in these two provinces (Guayas and Pichincha). This is often the case for Pachakutik, which generally does better in provinces with few registered voters. Second, until 2009 the Ecuadorian state only provided state subsidies to national parties, which left Pachakutik without financial support from 1996 until 2009. Although the party did get access to these funds in 2009, the party had already survived some of its worst electoral performance by then. In sum, party regulation in Ecuador has consistently challenged Pachakutik's persistence. Although it may have contributed to the party's formation in 1996, afterwards it complicated the party's persistence.

6.5 Conclusion

In chapters 3 and 4, I discussed at length what makes Pachakutik's persistence puzzling. On the one hand, Pachakutik's electoral performances have been in constant decline since the party's first election (except for the 2002 election's outcomes). On the other hand, the party

¹⁶⁵ In the online appendix (available at www.dianadavilagordillo.com) I benchmark Pachakutik's performance against one of its peers, *Izquierda Democrática*.

organization is not one boasting with resources. More importantly, those resources often associated with the party, e.g., a large party membership (expected due to the indigenous population support), are more a mirage than a fact. Conventional theories of party survival would be hard-pressed to make sense of this party's survival.

The theory I introduced in chapter 2 argues that parties can persist if they achieve their primary goals even if they receive few votes or have fluctuating levels of electoral support. What matters is a party's primary goal and whether the party can achieve this goal, which is defined in terms of what the party expects to achieve. That is, parties do not need to *get everything*. Persistence is likely to happen when parties reach a minimum level of satisfaction *or*, in case of not reaching this level, parties can choose to persist while taking necessary steps to adapt and try again.

I have explored Pachakutik's persistence from this perspective and showed that the party's longevity may be explained by goal achievement. Party survival is better explained considering goals and their achievement. This perspective is useful to understand the survival of parties with scarce resources and low or fluctuating levels of electoral support such as Pachakutik.