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## **Surviving against all odds: Pachakutik's electoral support, mobilization strategies, and goal achievement between 1996 and 2019**

Dávila Gordillo, D.L.

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**Author:** Dávila Gordillo, D.L.

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## 5 Pachakutik's mixed and segmented strategies

Pachakutik's support at the subnational arena discussed in chapters 3 and 4 opens up a line of inquiry: how do the party and its candidates mobilize indigenous and mestizo voters' electoral support? In this chapter, I explore Pachakutik's mobilization strategies at the subnational elections, focusing on the mayor's elections of 2014.

To approach Pachakutik's complex system of mobilization strategies, I develop my own analytical framework. I build on extant mobilization strategies typologies and focus on programmatic, clientelistic, and symbolic mobilization strategies. Furthermore, I build on extant arguments of segmented mobilization strategies to develop a framework to understand how parties may combine these mobilization strategies (e.g., Luna, 2014; Thachil, 2014a). My analytical framework contemplates the possibility that parties may use any of the three types of mobilization strategies in a *pure* form (i.e., using a single mobilization strategy in all districts), in a *mixed* form (i.e., using two or more strategies together in all districts), or in a *mixed and segmented* form (i.e., using in some districts one combination of strategies and in other districts a different combination or even a *pure* strategy).

I apply this analytical framework to Pachakutik's candidates' mobilization strategies in the mayor's election of 2014. I analyze the working plans of each of the candidates to determine the type of strategy employed. To do this, I used Qualitative Content Analysis. I found the party mixes and segments strategies. It uses one pure strategy: programmatic in some cantons and nine different mixed strategies in other cantons. I complement the working plans' analysis by exploring the indigenous and mestizo voters' voting patterns in each canton. Overall, the party's candidates get electoral support from both mestizo and indigenous voters in all cantons. Nonetheless, mestizo voters supported the candidates most when: 1) they used symbolic candidate-based appeals (e.g., candidates' competence); 2) they used symbolic party-based appeals (e.g., the work of the party as an alternative to traditional parties); and 3) when they used symbolic generic-ethnic-based appeals (e.g., the need to bring together all communities and having a diverse local government).

This chapter continues as follows. The first section introduces the analytical framework and discusses the extant literature on parties' mobilization strategies. The second section discusses Pachakutik's mobilization strategies and how they have been presented in the literature. The third section introduces the research design and qualitative content analysis. The fourth section is a discussion of the different strategies the party's candidates employ. The fifth

section connects this chapter with chapters 3 and 4 and discusses Pachakutik's electoral support.

## **5.1 Political parties' mobilization strategies**

Political parties are known for employing different mobilization strategies to engage their voters and secure electoral support. The more widely studied types of mobilization strategies are the programmatic and clientelistic (including vote-buying) strategies. In addition to these, scholars have found parties employ other types of mobilization strategies. These mobilization strategies include symbolic strategies (Luna, 2014; Mustillo, 2016), ethno-populist strategies (Madrid, 2012), ethnic strategies (Lindberg & Morrison, 2008), and ascriptive characteristics strategies. (Resnick, 2014). This dissertation focuses on three of these mobilization strategies: programmatic, clientelistic, and symbolic mobilization strategies. This last category encapsulates other types of strategies identified in the literature (such as ethnic strategies and the ascriptive characteristics strategies).

Mobilization strategies can be defined by the type of pay-offs offered and the beneficiaries of these offers (Mustillo, 2016). Parties present these pay-offs and their beneficiaries in the form of appeals. Appeals represent the "reasons for citizens to offer their support to a party or politician" (Barr, 2009, p. 31). Appeals are thus the information, slogans, and electoral promises that political parties use to influence voters. Different appeals can be categorized as either programmatic, clientelistic, and symbolic.

When a party uses programmatic mobilization strategies, the party uses appeals that convey the idea of pay-offs independent of voters' support but dependent on the party's electoral victory (Mustillo, 2016, p. 31). These pay-offs are based on universalistic non-excludable goods. The appeals can include policy bundles, single policy proposals, or any form of ideological stance connected to the provision of universalistic non-excludable goods. Examples of these appeals are statements that stress the delivery of health services to the population or promise to improve education services.

When a party uses clientelistic mobilization strategies, the party's appeals will refer to targeted (excludable) public and private goods.<sup>120</sup> These appeals leverage access to public or private goods for a specific group of individuals.<sup>121</sup> I include vote-buying strategies within this

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<sup>120</sup> Programmatic appeals may also turn into clientelistic linkages once they are established. Candidates may campaign on universalistic policies that, when applied, are curtailed. However, my focus is only on the offers candidates make and not on whether or how they deliver these offers.

<sup>121</sup> This definition does not include a reflection on whether or how these offers are delivered. Usually, researchers work with definitions of clientelistic mobilization strategies that require parties to set up some sort of monitoring

category. These strategies refer to the use of appeals that deliver goods, before the election, in exchange for votes.<sup>122</sup> Examples of vote-buying appeals are any type of good delivery from a party (candidates) to voters that takes place during the campaign. In turn, clientelistic appeals include offers of services limited to a specific group of voters, e.g., building a school where only certain students will be accepted, such as bilingual education schools in rural Ecuador intended only for indigenous students.

Lastly, parties may use symbolic mobilization strategies. In general, symbolic appeals will encourage voters' expressive mobilization, i.e., the act of attaching oneself to a particular outcome, party, or candidate without a material pay-off as a reason (Schuessler, 2000). Symbolic appeals can relate to 1) the charisma of candidates and their competence; 2) the party's brand and the party's competence; and 3) ethnic identities or ethnic symbols.<sup>123</sup> An example of ethnic appeals may be a candidate's use of an ethnic language to deliver a speech. Party brand appeals may emphasize the party's name and slogan. Lastly, appeals that focus on a candidate's competence may focus on how they are the ideal person to *do the job*.

The conventional expectation regarding the use of any of these mobilization strategies has been that parties will use a single strategy to engage their voters and that using more than one strategy will create a backlash for the party (Kitschelt, 2000). However, recent research has found that parties often use more than a single strategy to mobilize voters and that this backlash may be less impactful than initially expected (Calvo & Murillo, 2019, 2014; Elliott, 2011; Gibson, 1997; Lindberg & Morrison, 2008; Luna, 2014; Madrid, 2012; Resnick, 2014; Taylor-Robinson, 2010; Thachil, 2014a; Wyatt, 2013). Nonetheless, multiple mobilization strategies have been studied mostly as a phenomenon found in individual parties' actions rather than a phenomenon that occurs systemically. Thus, few frameworks have been developed to understand how political parties use (or may use) multiple mobilization strategies (e.g., Luna, 2014).

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devices for electoral support as a necessary condition to identify clientelistic practices (Stokes, 2005). However, because I focus on mobilization strategies and not on the actual delivery of pay-offs post-election, I consider appeals as clientelistic when they are geared to provide excludable goods (public or private) to specific groups including patronage without considering the effective delivery of these offerings or the use of some sort of monitoring device for electoral support.

<sup>122</sup> Mustillo (2016) separates these two strategies into two different strategies.

<sup>123</sup> This list can always be updated and extended. What matters is that at the core the "symbolic appeals" do not convey by themselves material pay-offs.

### 5.1.1 The use of multiple strategies

The logic behind the use of multiple strategies is simple. Parties will employ multiple strategies to widen their pool of possible voters (Gibson, 2005; Luna, 2014; Thachil, 2014a).<sup>124</sup> Most arguments assert that parties will employ multiple mobilization strategies when they aim to mobilize their non-core-voters in addition to their core voters. To this end, parties have three different ways in which they may use multiple strategies. 1) Parties can mix two or more strategies to engage voters across all districts; 2) parties can segment their mobilization strategies per district, i.e., use one type of strategy in one district and use a second type of strategy in a different district; and 3) parties can mix *and* segment strategies, i.e., parties may employ two or more strategies in a single district (use a mixed strategy) while employing a different combination or a pure strategy in another district. Figure 5.1 presents the different forms in which parties may use multiple mobilization strategies across different districts.

Figure 5.1 The use of multiple mobilization strategies

Pure Strategies	Mixed Strategies	Segmented Strategies	Mixed and Segmented Strategies
District 1	District 1	District 1	District 1
District 2	District 2	District 2	District 2
District 3	District 3	District 3	District 3

How parties mix and segment their strategies will follow from the type of voters they aim to mobilize and their location (Luna, 2014). Parties will be more likely to use a mixed strategy in all districts when 1) districts are internally heterogeneous but similar across, and 2) the party aims to mobilize both its core and non-core voters in each district. In turn, in a country with internally homogenous districts but heterogeneous across, parties may opt to use

<sup>124</sup> This is because parties will not *need* to segment strategies if their core voters represent a majority or are likely to provide enough votes to win an election (Gibson, 2005). Chandra (2007) makes a somewhat similar argument although in the opposite direction. She stresses that parties target ethnic groups that are large enough to secure electoral victory (Chandra, 2007, p. 92). Parties will target minimum winning majorities and the electorate will likely also organize into groups this size. The arguments about strategy segmentation address the cases in which the core voters are not a minimum winning majority and thus *extra* votes are needed.

segmented strategies to target different voters in different districts. Lastly, in a country with heterogeneous districts (internally and across), parties are more likely to employ mixed and segmented strategies.

From the simple perspective of *how* parties may employ multiple mobilization strategies, parties could mix all three types of strategies (programmatic, clientelistic, and symbolic) and use them simultaneously to engage voters in a single district. Yet, scholars have argued that not all strategies may be successfully employed at the same time. The use of clientelistic and programmatic appeals, for example, may create an electoral backlash for parties (Kitschelt, 2000, p. 854). The backlash would arise as voters would be confused by the use of programmatic appeals (that focus on universalistic non-excludable goods) alongside particularistic appeals that would curtail access to those goods. It would be unclear to voters *why* a group within a constituency would be offered targeted pay-offs. It follows that some mobilization strategies may be costlier to mix than others. I call the mixing of particularistic (clientelistic and vote-buying) strategies alongside programmatic strategies: trade-off strategy mixing. By contrast, other strategies may be more fruitfully combined. Research on ethnic parties has, for instance, highlighted that political parties might combine ethnic appeals alongside programmatic appeals (see: Collins, 2004). Similarly, programmatic appeals may be combined with appeals focusing on a candidate's or a party's ability to deliver goods (Calvo & Murillo, 2019). I call the mixing of particularistic or programmatic strategies alongside symbolic strategies: non-trade-off strategy mixing.

## 5.2 Pachakutik's mobilization strategies

Research on how ethnic parties mobilize electoral support has shown that ethnic parties employ a wide array of mobilization strategies. Ethnic parties employ programmatic strategies and other strategies (Huber & Suryanarayan, 2016; Jones West, 2011; Van Cott, 2005). Ethnic parties have been found to combine different appeals to mobilize their voters, e.g., programmatic, clientelistic, and “ethnic linkages” (Lindberg & Morrison, 2008), programmatic, clientelistic, personalistic, and ascriptive characteristics appeals (Resnick, 2014), and “ethno-populist” strategies that include ethnic symbols, programmatic (ideological claims) and populist appeals (Madrid, 2012). These scholars have shown that in stark opposition to the conventional idea that ethnic parties employ – most of the time – clientelistic strategies (Chandra, 2011; Gunther & Diamond, 2003; Horowitz, 1985), ethnic parties often use multiple mobilization strategies.

Researchers focusing on Pachakutik, and defining it as an intrinsically ethnic party, have found that the party's candidates employ multiple mobilization strategies (Collins, 2004; Madrid, 2012; Mustillo, 2016; Van Cott, 2005). Moreover, some scholars have highlighted that Pachakutik's candidates employ strategies (considered contradictory) simultaneously, e.g., programmatic and personalistic appeals, as well as programmatic and ethnic (particularistic) appeals. Van Cott (2005) and Mustillo (2016) describe the party's strategies as ethnic programmatic. In turn, Madrid (2012) asserts the party used ethno-populist strategies ( a combination of ethnic appeals, programmatic appeals, and populist appeals) until 2006 and since then has moved to ethnic-centered programmatic strategies. Jones-West (2011, 2020) describes the party's strategies as programmatic with the often added use of personalistic and ethnic appeals. Lastly, Collins (2004), focusing on the party's strategies at subnational elections, describes the strategies as programmatic combined with ethnic appeals and candidate-centered appeals.

Table 5.1 summarizes the party's appeals as listed by these authors. The appeals are organized into three mobilization strategies' categories. Van Cott (2005) describes Pachakutik as a party combining programmatic and ethnic appeals. She asserts the programmatic appeals focused on land rights, bilingual education, indigenous rights, and indigenous' recognition. Van Cott (2005) further stressed that the symbolic appeals concentrated on the candidates' ethnic identities, including mestizo and indigenous' identities. Madrid (2012) also distinguishes two types of appeals. The first type of appeals is programmatic. These appeals focus on anti-establishment claims, neoliberal critiques, bilingual education, and land rights. The second type of appeals is candidate-centered (symbolic) and focuses on the candidate's ethnic identities (mestizo and indigenous).

Jones-West (2011, 2020) observes programmatic appeals (linked to the party's platform) and three types of symbolic appeals: party-centered, candidate-centered, and indigenous centered. The party-centered appeals, she asserts, can focus on 1) Pachakutik's brand or 2) the distance between the candidate and the party's brand, and even 3) Pachakutik's partner's brand. The candidate-centered appeals, in turn, focused on the candidate's reputation and the candidate's competence. The indigenous-centered appeals concentrate on 1) establishing a connection between the party and the indigenous population, e.g., "standing with" *indios*, or on 2) the candidate's indigenous' identity. Jones-West (2011) also identifies the use of vote-buying appeals (as the delivery of different goods during the campaign). The goods delivered were: soccer balls, meat, rice, beer, cane alcohol, wine, and cigarettes. Lastly, Jennifer Collins (2004) lists the programmatic appeals as focusing on development and

education projects and international funding for these projects. Collins (2004) identifies two types of symbolic appeals. The first type focused on the candidates as having a transparent work ethic and being accountable, efficient, and “able to deliver” (p. 51). The second type of appeals focused on a positive image of the indigenous’ identity and the use of indigenous symbols.

*Table 5.1 Appeals employed by Pachakutik’s candidates*

Authors	Pachakutik’s appeals		
	Programmatic	Symbolic	Vote-Buying
National arena			
Van Cott (2005)	Land rights Bilingual education	Candidate’s ethnic identities (mestizo and indigenous)	
Madrid (2012)	Anti-establishment claims Neoliberal critiques Bilingual education Land rights	Candidate’s ethnic identities (mestizo and indigenous)	
Jones West (2011)	Party platform	Party: Pachakutik’s brand Distance from the party’s brand Electoral alliance partner brand Candidate: Candidate’s reputation Candidate’s competence Indigenous: Ethnic connection (“standing with” indios) Candidate’s indigenous identity	Material goods (soccer balls, meat, rice, beer, cane alcohol, wine, and cigarettes)
Local arena			
Collins (2004)	Development and education projects International funding	Candidate: Candidate’s accountability Candidate’s efficiency and transparency Candidate’s ability to deliver Indigenous: Positive indigenous identity Indigenous symbols	

*Source: Constructed with data from Van Cott (2005), Collins (2004), Madrid (2012), and Jones West (2011)*

Extant research on Pachakutik's strategies highlights essential aspects of how the party and its candidates aim to mobilize voters. First, that Pachakutik employs more than a single strategy to mobilize voters, i.e., the party uses appeals from more than a single mobilization strategy; second, that it does not – or at least not in full – deploy the same strategy across all districts and electoral arenas (see: Collins, 2004; Jones West, 2011, 2020); and third that the appeals the party and candidates employ are also numerous and appear to change from district to district. There are some gaps in our knowledge, however.

First, it is unclear how these strategies are deployed, especially in the subnational arena. The current findings are contradictory; Jones West's (2011, 2020) work shows Pachakutik's candidates employ different strategies and appeals in other legislative districts. By contrast, Collins' (2004) work implies the party used the same combination of strategies in all subnational electoral districts. Collins' argument goes against what was discussed in Chapter 4 (that the party's electoral results at the subnational arena may be explained by the party's branches benefiting from their ability to engage with different local organizations and their needs). By contrast, Jones West's (2011, 2020) argument appears to be more in line with what was discussed in chapter 4.

The second gap in our knowledge relates to the actual appeals the party's candidates employ per district. Table 5.1 shows that the party and candidates use different strategies, combined differently, and with different appeals. Although there is some overlap, each author lists different sets of appeals. However, at the same time, each author appears to have covered all appeals employed by the party's candidates, which would imply that the variation on the appeals happens only from election to election rather than within a single election. Nevertheless, the idea of using segmented strategies (across districts) would suggest that not only parties employ different strategies across districts but also different appeals (linked to the same mobilization strategy) in different districts. Hence, it is necessary to research whether the party's candidates employ similar appeals across the board or if they use different in different districts. This is particularly relevant for the subnational arenas' campaigns and the use of symbolic (indigenous appeals). Chapter 4 discussed that the fragmented *indígena* identity required Pachakutik's candidates to engage with different indigenous groups with differentiated identities and different needs. It would follow that the party's candidates should relate to specific groups to mobilize voters, and hence variation on the symbolic ethnic-based appeals should be likely.

Researchers have not explicitly focused on who the party is aiming to mobilize. There is a lack of discussion on whether the mixed and segmented strategies follow the logic of

appealing to diverse core-voters or appealing to non-core-voters. To be sure, all of the authors studying Pachakutik's mobilization strategies highlight that the candidates can mobilize electoral support from both indigenous (expected core-voters) and mestizo voters (expected non-core-voters). This goes in line with the fact that Pachakutik's leadership has often highlighted the mestizo vote's importance. As Raúl Ilaquiche quoted in Madrid (2012) asserted, "with indigenous votes you can't win. You need white, mestizo, and urban votes" (p. 79).

Nonetheless, these authors (and in particular Madrid) stress that mestizo votes have dwindled as the years passed. Specifically, Madrid (2012) emphasizes that the party's candidates since 2006 have moved towards a more indigenous-centered campaign that would translate into fewer mestizos' votes. However, as discussed in chapter 4, the ecological inference estimates show that Pachakutik's candidates consistently receive mestizo votes. This would suggest the party's candidates may be actively engaging mestizo voters. Hence, it is clear that it is necessary to evaluate the party's mobilization strategies from this perspective.

To advance our knowledge on the mobilization strategies that Pachakutik's candidates employ and fill in the gaps in our knowledge (the type of strategies employed; the content of the appeals used and whether there is variation across districts; and whether it is possible to define a particular focus in terms of which the candidates' target) I focus on the 2014 mayor's elections in Ecuador.

### **5.3 Pachakutik in the municipal elections of 2014**

It is at subnational level elections where Pachakutik has performed at its best (electorally). This is also where the party has received support from indigenous and mestizo voters, as discussed in chapter 4. The mayor elections of 2014 offer an ideal setting to analyze Pachakutik's strategies in the subnational arena. Researching local elections in Ecuador is not easy. Data about the local elections are scarce. The national media rarely report the electoral campaigns in small cantons. Before 2009, it was almost impossible to gather systematic information about these elections without traveling to each of the 221 cantons to review local archives. In fact, given the unpredictable quality of these local archives, the only feasible solution for anyone wanting to research local elections and mobilization strategies would be to shadow candidates and campaign managers.

Nevertheless, since 2009 all candidates for mayor and prefect in Ecuador must present a working plan detailing the candidate's general and specific objectives regarding the

municipal office, the candidate's pledges (with technical criteria on implementation), and a diagnosis of the canton's state of affairs.<sup>125</sup> These mandatory documents offer the possibility to have a systematic account of all candidates' main pledges and are available upon request to the *Consejo Nacional Electoral* (CNE) as they are public documents.<sup>126</sup> The 2014 election was the second election in which all candidates were required to present these documents and the only one for which the documents are available. Hence, the working plans represent an excellent alternative to ensure systematic data, surpassing what archival work may provide.<sup>127</sup>

The candidates' working plans provide a bird's eye view of the intended appeals the candidates will employ during their campaigns, and concomitantly can be analyzed to determine the strategies used. The working plans, however, have some drawbacks. Specifically, because they are prepared before the beginning of the actual campaigns, the strategies and the appeals parties effectively deployed while campaigning – or the intensity with which these strategies and appeals were used – may have changed. Moreover, since these documents are prepared without direct interaction between candidates, parties may choose to amend their strategies or the appeals after the campaigns start in response to other candidates' campaigns. Nonetheless, changes in parties' strategies are difficult to grasp without studying (and trailing) each candidate. Therefore, despite the drawbacks, the working plans represent a rich source of information.

As these documents are extensive – ranging from 5 pages to over 40 pages – I used Qualitative Content Analysis to analyze them. This technique helps reduce and simplify a vast corpus of text into a more manageable form (Schreier, 2013). In this case, I used it to categorize the working plans' appeals into the types of strategies used. Pachakutik, in total, presented 90 working plans. Out of these, I coded and analyzed only 65. The missing 25 cases were left out of the analysis for different reasons. First, in the cases of cantons in the province Chimborazo (the cantons: Chambo, Cumanda, Guamote, Penipe, and Riobamba), the working plans presented in these cantons indicated that the candidate represented a different party (MPAIS).<sup>128</sup> Second, the working plans in the cantons La Maná from the province Cotopaxi and the canton Logroño from the province Morona were not available and could not be analyzed. Third,

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<sup>125</sup> This is established in article 13 de the *Código de la Democracia*.

<sup>126</sup> There are nonetheless some few cases in which the documents are not available due to processing problems e.g., the documents were not scanned in full by the local offices of CNE.

<sup>127</sup> I tried to collect systematic data on the local elections of 2014 using national media outlets. These outlets however do not report on these campaigns systematically and thus information is scarce.

<sup>128</sup> Pachakutik joined an electoral alliance in Chimborazo. However, in the cantons listed, the candidates claimed to *only* represent the party MPAIS, while in all other cantons, the working plans stated that the candidates represented both parties. I, therefore, only coded the latter cases.

I did not examine the working plans presented in the cantons from the provinces: Galapagos, Guayas, Manabí, El Oro, and Esmeraldas. Research has shown that there is a regional determinant in the provinces located on the coast of Ecuador. Voters and parties in these provinces behave differently there than in the rest of the country (Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 86). Moreover, in most of these cantons, the indigenous population represents less than two percent of the total population, which hinders the evaluation of the indigenous and mestizo voters' voting patterns. Therefore, I did not analyze the working plans of these cantons either.

### 5.3.1 Qualitative content analysis

Qualitative content analysis is helpful to describe – systematically – the meaning of qualitative material while reducing it. To this end, documents are evaluated using a coding frame. This coding frame allows for a reduction of the material into categories or subcategories.

This analysis's coding frame was devised to identify the different appeals that the party's candidates employed in their working plans. The coding frame was developed building on the definitions of the mobilization strategies discussed in section 5.1, i.e., programmatic, clientelistic, and symbolic, as main categories. Possible appeals linked to these categories were added, for reference, building on the extant knowledge about the appeals employed by Pachakutik's candidates and the coding of the contents of five working plans presented in 2014.

The programmatic appeals were defined as all offers of services and benefits that had universal beneficiaries and were contingent on the party's candidates' election. These included all content relating to protecting land rights, providing health services, and service provision (e.g., road improvement, drinking water services, and waste disposal services). In turn, clientelistic appeals were defined as those referring to public and private goods with specific (limited) beneficiaries. This included services provided solely to the indigenous population, e.g., offers of setting up bilingual education and the use of indigenous languages in public administration. The symbolic strategy was divided into three subcategories: ethnic-based, candidate-based, and party-based.

The symbolic ethnic subcategory was defined as relating to all appeals that included any reference to the *indígena* identity, the indigenous social movement, and to specific identities of the *pueblos* and nationalities. The coding frame allows for the further division of these appeals into low, medium, and high levels of ethnic content. References to plurinationalism, diversity, and alternative forms of government are coded as low-level ethnic appeals. Additionally, any reference to state-sanctioned data or laws that refer to the indigenous

population was also coded as low-level ethnic appeals.<sup>129</sup> The political arena is filled with this sort of appeals. These are found amongst Pachakutik's candidates and other parties' candidates' appeals and could be defined as constitutive of everyday political speech in Ecuador.<sup>130</sup> In turn, medium level ethnic appeals included references to the indigenous population in general, e.g., that the work is done for *pueblos* and nationalities, references to the indigenous identity of candidates, and references to the party as an indigenous representative (similar to what was reported by Jones West (2011) about candidates claiming to “stand with” the indigenous population). The high level of ethnic appeals, in turn, included the use of explicit ethnic symbolism such as the use of an indigenous language in the text (e.g., references to the good living concept in an indigenous language in Kichwa: *sumak kawsay* or in Shuar: *penker pujustin*). Additionally, references to specific *pueblos* and nationalities by name and location, e.g., *el pueblo Kañari*.

Symbolic candidate-based appeals are defined in the coding frame as referring to the candidate's competence, e.g., efficiency and transparency (Collins, 2004), a candidate's reputation, or a candidate's prior work, and the candidates' incumbency. Lastly, party-based appeals were defined as relating to mentions of the party's reputation, competence, characteristics, e.g., “a party that delivers” (Collins, 2004), and incumbency.

The coding frame employed diverges substantially from prior efforts to categorize Pachakutik's symbolic (indigenous, candidate-based, and party-based), programmatic, and clientelistic appeals. Traditionally, Pachakutik's programmatic appeals have been categorized as “ethnic” or “ethnic programmatic” because they are considered “traditional indigenous demands” (Becker, 2011; Lalander & Gustafsson, 2008; Madrid, 2008, 2012). These categorization efforts combined programmatic content alongside symbolic content. The coding frame employed here, by contrast, required the evaluation of the appeals based on the content and the beneficiaries and strived to disentangle the different types of appeals. Therefore, an appeal about “the defense of land rights” in prior coding frames would be categorized as “ethnic programmatic” because it is a key issue discussed by the indigenous social movement. By contrast, this appeal, following this coding frame, is categorized as programmatic. If the appeal was accompanied by a reference to ethnicity (indigeneity) or the population's diversity, the

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<sup>129</sup> Initially the second coder struggled to identify the difference between mentions of *pueblos* and nationalities as part of appeals, and references to state policies that represent more a case of repetition of policies than actual ethnic appeals. Moreover, the listing of these laws was included as part of the mandatory diagnosis section of the working plans so they can't hardly be taken as a form of appeal.

<sup>130</sup> The fact that these topics are pervasive in the political discourse in the country reflects the effects of the indigenous social movement and Pachakutik in the political arena. Nevertheless, because they have become so common and are used across the board by all politicians they should not be taken as actual explicit ethnic appeals.

coding frame required the appeal to be coded as programmatic *and* symbolic ethnic. An example of this case would be an appeal that states, “the defense of land rights is important to protect the population’s diversity.” Instead, if the defense of land rights appeal included references to a specific pueblo or nationality as recipients of the benefit, e.g., the defense of pueblo *Kañari*’s land rights, the appeal would be categorized as clientelistic (due to the nature of the recipients) *and* symbolic ethnic.

The data about the party’s candidates’ appeals in each canton was put into a matrix. A final evaluation of the party’s candidates’ strategies in each canton was created with this data. The final assessment reflects the *added* outcome of the coding. In short, the final evaluation reflects all aspects in which the appeals were coded as being present in the working plan. The use of ethnic appeals was re-coded into a dichotomous variable, making “low” equivalent to appeals not present and high and medium equivalent to appeals being present. This works in the following manner: Pachakutik’s candidate’s working plan in the canton Girón in the province Azuay was coded as using low-level ethnic appeals, programmatic appeals, and party-based appeals. The final evaluation of that canton’s working plan reflects this, and it was defined as using: a *mixed programmatic and symbolic (party brand) mobilization strategy*. In turn, the working plan from the candidate in the canton El Tambo in the province Cañar was coded as employing high-level ethnic appeals, plus programmatic and party-based appeals. Thus, the final evaluation reflects this and states the working plan used: *mixed programmatic, symbolic (ethnic-based), and symbolic (party-based) mobilization strategies*.

Two coders, employing the coding frame, coded all working plans. The second coder was a native Spanish speaker with some knowledge about indigenous politics but with no experience in Ecuadorian politics. Both coders worked independently and met to discuss their work after they were done coding all documents. There were discrepancies in 21 working plans out of the 65. These discrepancies were, however, not major. They mostly related to coding the ethnic appeals as medium level and high level. Since the final evaluation clustered together both categories into one, the discrepancies had no actual effect on the final assessment. As Schreir (2013) suggests, all other differences were discussed, and a final coding decision was agreed upon. The outcome reported in the next section represents the agreed-up coding of the working plans.

## **5.4 Pachakutik's mobilization strategies in the 2014 elections**

The subnational elections of 2014 took place on February 24. Approximately 82.67% of the registered voters cast votes in these elections. In total, 150 parties (counting electoral alliances separately) presented candidates for mayor. Out of these, only 59 parties (counting electoral alliances separately) had candidates elected for mayor. MPAIS and alliances had 69 candidates elected as mayors. MPAIS was the party with most candidates elected in the country. The second party with more candidates elected in 2014 was the party AVANZA, with 36 mayors elected. Pachakutik had 29 candidates elected, making it the third party with the most elected mayors. Pachakutik's candidates employed multiple mobilization strategies to mobilize their voters.

### **5.4.1 Pachakutik's candidates' working plans' appeals**

Pachakutik's candidates employed multiple appeals to engage their voters. Table 5.2 summarizes all the appeals used by the candidates in the 65 working planes analyzed.<sup>131</sup> There was variation in the appeals employed in different districts.

All working plans included programmatic appeals. The candidates in their working plans used 47 different programmatic appeals that focus on service provision and improvements to the administration. The appeals relate, in general, to changing or improving services such as education, agricultural services, waste disposal, public health, security, roads and public transport services, and territorial control.<sup>132</sup> Not all working plans include these 47 appeals rather only a subset of these appeals. Nonetheless, there is one appeal that is present in all working plans. This appeal was the provision of water services, including drinking water and wastewater disposal.

All appeals employed by the party's candidates resonate with the general claims that the indigenous movements had presented through the years: 1) access to drinking water and all other forms of water services; 2) protection and recognition of land rights; 3) protection and recognition of environmental rights; 4) the protection of natural resources; and 5) the provision of education and health services. Nonetheless, most of these appeals are not linked to specific indigenous content or specified as serving only that particular constituency. Consequently, these should not be qualified as ethnic-programmatic.

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<sup>131</sup>The full list with canton names is available in the online appendix (available at [www.dianadavilagordillo.com](http://www.dianadavilagordillo.com))

<sup>132</sup> The full matrix is available on the online appendix (available at [www.dianadavilagordillo.com](http://www.dianadavilagordillo.com))

The next set of appeals found in the working plans are the symbolic appeals, which were subdivided into ethnic-based, candidate-based, and party-based. These appeals are not included in all working plans.

The symbolic ethnic-based appeals can be subdivided into generic and specific appeals. The generic ethnic appeals make references to generic aspects of the indigenous identity. The working plans contain references to 1) the importance of “diversity,” 2) the need to ensure “inclusion for all [population groups]” as well as “the integration of all [population groups],” 3) the importance of maintaining the cultural identity of the population, and 4) the importance of protecting and preserving “ancestral values.” The second subset of symbolic ethnic appeals is more specific. These appeals refer to differentiated identities. These appeals hence mention different pueblos and nationalities by name, e.g., the protection of the cultural identity of the pueblo Kañari. Furthermore, there are references to the concept of “good living” or *buen vivir* in an indigenous language, either in Shuar or Kichwa. The languages are used based on the languages spoken by the indigenous population in specific cantons.

The party-based appeals were scarcer than the indigenous-based appeals. These appeals focused on the known principles of Pachakutik: *ama llulla*, *ama killa*, *ama shuwa* (do not lie, do not be lazy, and do not steal).<sup>133</sup> Other working plans spoke of the party as “an organization that advances participatory intercultural governing practices or alternative government” and about the party as the promotor of “new forms of development.” The party-based appeals in the working plans fit with the party’s longtime definition as an anti-establishment party and present the party as an alternative for the electorate that is different from traditional parties (Mijeski & Beck, 2011). These appeals focused on the party’s brand rather than its ability to deliver or the party as an incumbent.

The candidate-based appeals were even scarcer than the party-based appeals. These focused on the candidates’ prior experiences with references to the candidate’s academic achievements, prior work, and general life experience, i.e., the candidates’ work with the local population. These appeals also often included – albeit not always alongside the candidates’ prior experiences content – references to the candidates’ incumbency. The working plans referred to the candidates’ work as sitting mayors and how the experience was necessary for their re-election.

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<sup>133</sup> These content was not coded as symbolic ethnic even though the words are in Kichwa as they are linked to the party’s principles and are often presented as a form of party slogan.

Lastly, within the working plans, I found clientelistic appeals. These appeals resembled programmatic appeals with the difference that clear clients (benefits' recipients) were listed. The clientelistic appeals were uncommon. Only a few working plans included them. When they did, the clientelistic appeals focused on 1) the establishment of bilingual education programs which can only be accessed by the indigenous population in the canton; 2) direct offers of land rights recognition or infrastructure for specific groups of voters; 3) the inclusion of *indígena* quotas in public administration and health programs; and 4) the use of indigenous languages within the municipal services.

Table 5.2 Pachakutik's candidates' appeals employed at the 2014 elections.

Pachakutik's appeals		
Programmatic	Symbolic	Clientelistic
Addressing erosion.		
Basic services.	<i>Ethnic appeals generic:</i>	Bilingual Education
Education.	Diversity.	programs.
Encouraging citizen participation.	Inclusion (for all).	Land and
Food security.	Integration (of all groups).	infrastructure (with
Furthering decentralization.	" <i>Pueblos</i> and nationalities."	specific
Health.	Cultural identity.	beneficiaries).
Improving the economy.	Ancestral values.	<i>Indígena</i> Quotas.
Management of natural resources.	<i>Ethnic appeals specific:</i>	Health services for
Management of solid waste.	Specific <i>pueblos</i> and nationalities	specific population
Protecting the environment.	names e.g. <i>Cañari</i> .	groups.
Protection and improvement of agricultural activities.	Words in Kichwa.	
Protection of vulnerable groups.	Words in Shuar.	
Rescue heritage.	<i>Party based:</i>	
Road network improvement.	Principles of the party <i>ama llulla, ama killa, ama shuwa</i> (do not lie, do not be lazy, and do not steal).	
Tourism.	Pachakutik as an organization that advances participatory intercultural governing practices or 'alternative government.'	
Urban equipment.	Pachakutik as the promotor of "new forms of development."	
Water services.		
Coordination with the central government.		
	<i>Candidate based:</i>	
	Prior experience.	
	Incumbency.	
	The need for continuity.	

### 5.4.2 Pachakutik's candidates' mobilization strategies

Based on the appeals found in each of the working plans, it is possible to produce an overview of the mobilization strategies the candidates employed in each canton. Table 5.3 summarizes this information. The party's candidates used in total nine types of mixed mobilization strategies and one pure strategy. The pure strategy was the programmatic mobilization strategy. The mixed mobilization strategies all included programmatic appeals alongside different combinations of symbolic and clientelistic appeals.

*Table 5.3 Pachakutik's mobilization strategies at the mayor's elections of 2014 (by canton)*


Mobilization strategies	Number of Cantons	Percentage of cantons	Elected candidates
<i>Pure strategies</i>			
Programmatic	31	47.7	8
<i>Mixed strategies</i>			
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (candidate)	3	4.6	1
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (ethnic and candidate)/ Clientelism	2	3.1	1
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (ethnic and party brand)	2	3.1	2
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (ethnic, candidate, and party brand)	1	1.5	1
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (ethnic, party brand, and party incumbency)	2	3.1	2
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (ethnic)	13	20.0	6
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (ethnic)/ Clientelism	4	6.1	3
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (party brand)	5	7.7	1
Mixed Programmatic/Symbolic (ethnic and party incumbency)	2	3.1	1
Total	65	100.0	26

***Pure strategy: programmatic mobilization strategies***

In 31 out of 65 cantons, Pachakutik's candidates employed a pure strategy: a programmatic mobilization strategy. In total, out of the 31 candidates that only used programmatic appeals in their working plans, eight were elected. These working plans contained only programmatic appeals with no references to the candidate or the party other than the party's name and the candidate's name. Furthermore, these working plans also had no indigenous content. This is an important finding. Pachakutik's campaigns are expected to emphasize indigenous content. Yet, in 47.7% of all cantons where the party presented candidates, the working plans missed indigenous content.

Figure 5.4 plots the cantons where the party's candidates presented working plans with only programmatic appeals. The cantons with the thick black border are the ones in which the candidates were elected. The cantons are filled to represent the percentage of the indigenous population in each.

*Figure 5.2 Cantons where Pachakutik's candidates used programmatic mobilization strategies*




The use of only programmatic mobilization strategies by an ethnic party has not been considered at length by the literature on ethnic parties. There are nonetheless two possible explanations for a party's use of solely programmatic appeals. The first explanation focuses on the unnecessaryness of employing ethnic appeals. The idea is that when an ethnic group represents a majority of the population in a district, the ethnic party would not need to use ethnic cues. From this perspective, it could be possible Pachakutik's candidates opted out of symbolic ethnic appeals in the working plans because ethnicity might not be a determinant of the vote in these districts. However, this is not the case in the 31 districts where Pachakutik's candidates only used programmatic appeals. The average percentage of the indigenous population in these cantons is 20.12% of the total population. Moreover, in 14 cantons, the indigenous population represents less than 10% of the cantons' total population. Moreover, in only two cantons, the indigenous population represents more than 50% of the canton's total population.

The second possible explanation regarding the sole use of programmatic appeals focuses on using these appeals to mobilize all constituencies in a district (i.e., the core and non-core voters). As discussed in this chapter's section about the use of different mobilization strategies, parties may choose to water down programmatic appeals into a program that may satisfy core voters and non-core voters. It could thus be possible that Pachakutik's candidates, aware of the difficulty of being elected in these districts with only indigenous votes, chose to target both core and non-core voters by disconnecting programmatic appeals from ethnic content. Given the indigenous population's distribution in these cantons, the explanation of a diluted party program seems plausible. Moreover, it goes in line with what Pachakutik's leaders explained regarding local leaders as knowing their constituencies and how to secure votes (PK-2 and PK-3, 2017).

Figure 5.3 plots the values of the ecological inferences' estimations (from chapter 4) in a map highlighting the cantons where Pachakutik's candidates employed only programmatic appeals. On average, 32.42% of the indigenous voters in these cantons cast votes for Pachakutik's candidates. In turn, on average, 18.26% of the mestizo voters cast ballots for the party's candidates. Interestingly, in the cantons where Pachakutik's candidates were elected, the average mestizo vote increases to 40.24%, while the average indigenous vote increases to 53.39%. The map in figure 5.3 shows that Pachakutik's candidates were elected in the cantons where both the indigenous voters and the mestizo voters supported the party's candidate. This could suggest that a working plan free of ethnic appeals and focusing on programmatic appeals may mobilize mestizo voters alongside indigenous voters. Nevertheless, a pure programmatic

mobilization strategy seems not to have been overall effective as only in 8 cantons the candidates were elected.

*Figure 5.3 EI estimates of mestizo and indigenous votes cast in cantons where Pachakutik's candidates employed programmatic appeals*




***Mixed programmatic, symbolic, and clientelistic mobilization strategies***

In 34 out of 65 cantons, Pachakutik's candidates' working plans included multiple types of appeals. These mixed mobilization strategies included programmatic appeals and, in most cases, some symbolic appeals, and in a few other cases, clientelistic appeals. In total, 18 candidates out of the 34 who used different forms of mixed mobilization strategies were elected.

On average, in the cantons where the working plans included multiple appeals, the indigenous population represented 40.77% of the total population. In only five of these cantons, the indigenous population represented less than 10% of the total population. In total, in ten cantons, the indigenous population surpassed 50% of the total population.

Figure 5.6 plots the cantons' where Pachakutik's candidates presented working plans that included mixed appeals. The cantons with thick black borders are the ones where the party's candidates were elected. The cantons are colored to reflect the percentage of the population that is indigenous. As it is clear, Pachakutik's candidates used mixed strategies in cantons with higher percentages of the indigenous population compared to the cantons, where the party's candidates only used programmatic appeals (see figure 5.2).


*Figure 5.4 Cantons where Pachakutik's candidates employed mixed appeals*



The voting patterns of the indigenous and the mestizo voters in these cantons resemble the voting patterns in the cantons where the candidates employed a pure programmatic

mobilization strategy. On average, 32.98% of the indigenous voters cast votes for Pachakutik's candidates, while 25% of the mestizo voters did the same. Interestingly, the average of indigenous and mestizo votes in cantons where the candidates were elected did not increase in the same manner as the average votes did in the cantons where only programmatic appeals were employed, and the candidates were elected. In the cantons where Pachakutik's candidates were elected, on average, 36.9% of the indigenous voters cast ballots for these candidates. In turn, the average mestizo votes for the party's candidates was 33%. Figure 5.5 plots the cantons where Pachakutik's candidates presented working plans that employed mixed mobilization strategies colored to reflect the percentages of mestizo and indigenous votes the candidates received. The cantons with the thick black outline are the ones in which the candidates were elected.

*Figure 5.5 EI estimates of mestizo and indigenous votes cast in cantons where Pachakutik's candidates employed mixed appeals*



### ***Programmatic and symbolic ethnic-based mobilization strategies***

The most common mixed mobilization strategy employed was the programmatic and symbolic ethnic-based mobilization strategy. 13 out of the 34 working plans contained programmatic and symbolic ethnic-based appeals. In total, six candidates that used this mixed strategy were elected. In these 13 cantons, the working plans' programmatic content roughly resembled the one used in all other working plans that only employed programmatic appeals. There was nonetheless variation on the number of programmatic appeals contained in each working plan. The content of the ethnic appeals also varied per canton. Some working plans included ethnic-based generic appeals, and other contained ethnic-based specific appeals. The generic appeals focused on creating intercultural and inclusive local governments and integrating all diverse groups in the cantons. The working plans of 9 cantons included this type of appeals. The symbolic-based specific appeals mentioned each indigenous *pueblo* and nationality in the canton by name and often used indigenous languages in the text. Only four working plans included this type of appeals.

Table 5.4 summarizes data on each cantons' voting patterns of the indigenous and mestizo voters. The table also includes data on the indigenous and mestizo population in the cantons. The cantons in the table are organized by whether the symbolic-ethnic appeals in the working plans were generic or specific. Overall, on average, 39.26% of the indigenous voters' ballots were for Pachakutik's candidates, while 15.45% of mestizo voters' ballots were for the party's candidates.

The use of generic and specific symbolic ethnic-based appeals does not appear to follow a particular logic. The size of the indigenous population in a canton does not appear to affect the choice of symbolic-ethnic based appeals. Pachakutik's candidates (in their working plans) used generic and specific appeals in cantons with small percentages of the indigenous population and in cantons with large percentages of the indigenous population. Moreover, the choice doesn't seem to follow from whether the canton has a particular indigenous *pueblo* or nationality identity well developed or not. A case in point is the working plan presented in Cayambe, where the candidate was elected. The canton Cayambe has generally been at the center of indigenous activism (see: Becker & Tuttillo, 2009). Many indigenous leaders and members of Pachakutik were born in the canton. Most of this activism is linked to the *pueblo Kayambi*, and the candidate in (Guillermo Churuchumbi) has been an active leader of this *pueblo's* organization. Yet, this candidate's working plan used generic appeals instead of emphasizing the link to this specific *pueblo*. The working plans' appeals focused more on creating an intercultural community than addressing the *pueblo Kayambi* directly.

Furthermore, Churuchumbi often highlighted that the work would be done *for and by all people* from Cayambe. He emphasized unity amongst constituencies.

*Table 5.4 EI estimations of votes and percentage of indigenous and mestizo populations in cantons where Pachakutik's candidates employed mixed programmatic and symbolic ethnic-based mobilization strategies.*

Province	Canton	Status	Indigenous votes (%)	Indigenous population (%)	Mestizo votes (%)	Mestizo Population (%)
<b>Ethnic-based generic appeals</b>						
Cotopaxi	Pangua		34.58	9.99	14.57	76.8
Cotopaxi	Pujili		18.05	51.78	13.01	46.12
Imbabura	Otavalo		13.78	57.24	2.6	40.3
Loja	Saraguro	elected	60.56	34.81	19.42	63.46
Pastaza	Pastaza		20.56	35.22	1.71	59.55
Pichincha	Cayambe	elected	40.01	33.87	13.39	60.66
Sucumbíos	Cascales	elected	53.14	31.06	17.46	64.56
Zamora Chinchi	El Panguí		73.04	21.41	15.0	74.06
Zamora Chinchi	Yacuambi	elected	47.02	71.71	5.6	27.08
<b>Ethnic-based specific appeals</b>						
Cañar	Suscal	elected	34.17	76.73	21.99	21.73
Morona Santiago	Huamboya		35.77	82.85	5.49	15.66
Morona Santiago	Santiago		57.47	37.20	14.76	57.05
Pastaza	Arajuno	elected	22.3	94.70	55.91	5.04

The candidates and the party seem to have chosen what type of ethnic-based appeals to use as they developed each canton's campaigns. While the percentage of the indigenous

population in one canton may be a driver for choosing a particular set of ethnic-based appeals, my findings suggest high percentages of the indigenous population or a differentiated identity does not translate into the use of specific ethnic based-appeals. Instead, it seems the strategy selection depends more on local leaders and on which group of voters they aim to mobilize. Party experts I interviewed often stressed that one of the most important freedoms Pachakutik's national organization has granted to local branches is the freedom to build their campaigns following their local knowledge (PK-5, PK-6, 2018).

***Programmatic, clientelistic, and symbolic mobilization strategies***

In six cantons, the working plans combined programmatic and clientelistic appeals alongside different types of symbolic appeals. In two cantons (Alausí in the province Chimborazo and Limón Indanza in the province Morona Santiago), the working plans included programmatic, clientelistic, symbolic ethnic-based, and symbolic candidate-based appeals. In four cantons (Sigchos in the province Cotopaxi, Tiwintza and Taisha in the province Morona Santiago, and Zamora in the province Zamora Chinchipe), the working plans included programmatic, clientelistic, and symbolic ethnic-based appeals.

Clientelistic appeals roughly resembling programmatic appeals but directly mentioned the clients or beneficiaries of the benefits. In all six cases, the beneficiaries were members of the indigenous population. In Sigchos, for example, the beneficiaries were the indigenous population in the canton, and the offer was the establishment of a bilingual education school.<sup>134</sup> In Taisha, the working plan offered housing for the Shuar and Achuar communities. In Tiwintza, the working plan offered land for the community Kushapuk. In Zamora, the working plan offered multiple projects for the indigenous population ranging from quotas for indigenous doctors to land property recognition. In Limon Indanza, the working plan offered the construction of the “House for the Shuar Nationality.”

Alongside the clientelistic appeals, all working plans also included programmatic appeals that were different for every canton. Moreover, the ethnic-based appeals employed by the parties were all specific. Only in Limón Indanza and Alausí, the working plans included

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<sup>134</sup> The topic of bilingual education is pervasive in Pachakutik's candidates working plans, however only in the plan presented in Sigchos the implementation of bilingual education is offered. In all other cantons the already existing programs of bilingual education are only discussed. Therefore, the working plan from Sigchos was classified as using clientelistic appeals while others were not. Other researchers have categorized this appeal as programmatic, I categorize it as clientelistic as it can only serve a limited group within any canton.

candidate-based appeals. In both cantons, the candidate was presented as having the skills and the necessary prior experience to become mayor.

Table 5.5 summarizes the data about the indigenous and the mestizo voters' voting patterns in these cantons. On average, 46.89% of the indigenous voters cast votes for Pachakutik's candidates. In turn, on average, 28.1% of the mestizo voters cast votes for the party's candidates. Interestingly, the mestizo voters appear to support the party despite the use of clientelistic appeals that are not signaling them as direct recipients of the benefits. The use of clientelistic appeals has not been an often-discussed topic in the literature about Pachakutik's electoral strategy. As mentioned already, the party's strategies are considered ethnic-programmatic, which arguably hide the fact that the would-be programmatic appeals are often clientelistic.

*Table 5.5 EI estimations of votes and percentage of indigenous and mestizo population in cantons where Pachakutik's candidates employed mixed programmatic, symbolic ethnic, and clientelistic mobilization strategies*

Province	Canton	Status	Indigenous votes (%)	Indigenous population (%)	Mestizo votes (%)	Mestizo Population (%)
Chimborazo	Alausi	Elected	40.80	59.0	26.33	38.7
Cotopaxi	Sigchos	Elected	45.78	40.8	50.21	52.7
Morona Santiago	Limon Indanza		58.77	24.6	2.76	70.6
Morona Santiago	Taisha	Elected	69.87	95.8	23.76	3.8
Morona Santiago	Tiwintza	Elected	36.70	76.5	53.14	20.2
Zamora Chinchi	Zamora		29.43	8.6	12.42	86.9

***Programmatic, symbolic candidate-based, and symbolic ethnic-based mobilization strategies***

In six cantons, the working plans included a mix of programmatic and symbolic candidate-based appeals. These cantons are Guano in the province Chimborazo, Saquisilí in the province Cotopaxi, Antonio Ante in the province Imbabura, Centinela del Condor in the province Zamora Chinchipe, Nabón in Azuay, and Gonzalo Pizarro in Sucumbíos. In Saquisilí, the

working plan also included symbolic party-brand appeals and symbolic ethnic-based specific appeals. In two of the cantons – Nabón and Gonzalo Pizarro – the working plans combined programmatic, candidate-based, and ethnic-based appeals. Only three candidates that used these mixed mobilization strategies were elected. As was the case with all other working plans, the programmatic appeals resembled the ones discussed already.

The candidate-based appeals focused on the candidate's competence in all cantons. The working plans hence highlighted how good the candidate was to take over the position. In Guano, for example, the working plan stated that the candidate and his team had proven experience working for “economic development and planning” (my translation, Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (MUPP) & Movimiento Alianza País (MPAIS), 2013, p. 2). In Antonio Ante, in addition to the “work experience” of the candidate, the working plan stressed the candidate had worked “with the people” (Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (MUPP), 2013a, p. 29). In Centinela del Condor, the document focused on the candidate's prior experience as a provincial Council member (Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (MUPP), 2013b). In turn, the working plan presented in Saquisilí establishes the candidate as able to tackle the demands of being mayor. Lastly, the working plans presented in Nabón and Gonzalo Pizarro focused on the candidate's incumbency.

As mentioned, the working plan presented in Saquisilí included symbolic party-brand appeals and symbolic ethnic-based appeals in addition to programmatic and symbolic candidate-based appeals. The working plan emphasized that Pachakutik had been part of the municipal government since 1996 and worked to advance participatory practices. Furthermore, the working plan mentions that the bylaws of Pachakutik would guide the candidate's work. The working plan also includes specific symbolic ethnic-based appeals. The working plan refers to the “good living” concept using the words in Kichwa. Besides this, the working plan emphasizes the importance of developing an intercultural municipal government where the different *pueblos* and cultures residing in Saquisilí can integrate.

Table 5.6 summarizes the data about the indigenous and the mestizo voters' voting patterns in these cantons. On average, 21.89% of the indigenous voters supported Pachakutik's candidates. In turn, only 19.95% of the mestizo voters supported the party's candidates. Interestingly, in the cantons Guano and Nabón, where Pachakutik's candidates were elected, the EI estimations show that the candidate's primary support came from the mestizo voters. By contrast, in the canton Saquisilí, the candidate's support came mainly from the indigenous voters who supported the party as a block.

*Table 5.6 EI estimations of votes and percentage of indigenous and mestizo population in cantons where Pachakutik's candidates employed mixed programmatic, symbolic candidate-based, symbolic ethnic-based, and symbolic party-based mobilization strategies*

Province	Canton	Status	Indigenous votes (%)	Indigenous population (%)	Mestizo votes (%)	Mestizo Population (%)
Chimborazo	Guano	elected	6.58	13.23	42.71	84.40
Imbabura	Antonio Ante		15.54	17.82	5.83	77.59
Zamora Chinchipe	Centinela Del Condor		16.05	9.49	12.35	87.30
Cotopaxi	Saquisilí	elected	55.70	47.37	9.66	50.68
Azuay	Nabón	elected	17.44	31.68	33.43	66.53
Sucumbíos	Gonzalo Pizarro		20.05	26.20	15.72	66.59

***Programmatic, symbolic party-based, and symbolic ethnic-based mobilization strategies***

Lastly, in 9 cantons, Pachakutik's candidates' working plans contained a mix of programmatic appeals, symbolic party-brand appeals, and symbolic ethnic-based appeals. In seven cantons (Giron and Gualaceo in the province Azuay, Salcedo in the province Cotopaxi, Aguarico, and Francisco de Orellana in the province Orellana, Cañar in the province Cañar, and Pablo Sexto in the province Morona Santiago), the working plans included only programmatic and symbolic-party brand appeals. In two cantons (El Tambo in the province Cañar and Putumayo in Sucumbios), the working plans included symbolic ethnic-based appeals in addition to the party-based and programmatic appeals.

The ethnic-based appeals in the two cantons again could be classified into two subtypes. The specific appeals in the working plan from El Tambo mentioned the *Pueblo Cañari*. The generic appeals in the working plan in Putumayo made references to the indigenous population in the canton. Despite the differences in the ethnic appeals employed in El Tambo and Putumayo, the party brand appeals were similar in both cantons. The working plans referred to

the party's principles: *ama llulla*, *ama killa*, *ama shuwa* (do not lie, do not be lazy, and do not steal). The working plans referred to Pachakutik as the organization that advanced participatory intercultural governing practices also defined as 'alternative government'<sup>135</sup> (Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (MUPP), 2013c), and the documents also stressed Pachakutik is a party that promotes "new forms of development" (Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (MUPP), 2013d).

The party-based appeals in the other working plans resembled the ones just described. All working plans presented in the cantons from the province Orellana discuss that the working plans were developed by individuals who "share the theses, [and] ideologies of Pachakutik" (Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (MUPP), 2013f). Moreover, these working plans stress that these documents were created to guide voters who agree with the party's principles. These working plans did not include the party's principles (directly) but discussed them nonetheless. Additionally, the working plan presented in the canton Gualaceo, despite not having the same wording (and absent the words in Kichwa), referred similarly to the party's principles and the party members' connection with the party's principles.

The case of the working plan from Salcedo is different. In this working plan, the appeals relating to the party brand do not refer to Pachakutik's brand but to the electoral alliance between Pachakutik and the local movement *Movimiento Alternativo de Trabajo Integral*. This alliance is presented as "having viable and concrete proposals that will solve the problems [of the canton]" (Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (MUPP), 2013e). This electoral alliance's candidate was elected a mayor of Salcedo and was the first candidate running under a Pachakutik's ticket ever elected in the canton.

Table 5.7 summarizes the data about the indigenous and the mestizo voters' voting patterns in these cantons. On average, 23.52% of the indigenous voters' votes were for Pachakutik's candidates. Surprisingly, on average, 40.57% of the mestizo voters' ballots were for the party's candidates. Table 5.7 shows that in the cantons where Pachakutik's candidates mixed programmatic appeals and symbolic party-based appeals, they performed consistently better amongst the mestizo voters than in those cantons where the candidates used ethnic appeals (except for Putumayo).

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<sup>135</sup> It is difficult to define clearly what Pachakutik means by *gobierno alternativo* (alternative government). Van Cott (2008) explains this referred to participatory and intercultural democracy (p. 2).

*Table 5.7 EI estimations of votes and percentage of indigenous and mestizo population in cantons where Pachakutik's candidates employed a mixed strategy of programmatic, symbolic ethnic-based, and party-based mobilization strategy*

Province	Canton	Status	Indigenous votes (%)	Indigenous population (%)	Mestizo votes (%)	Mestizo Population (%)
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (party brand)						
Azuay	Giron		10.21	0.57	24.20	94.69
Azuay	Gualaceo		4.93	5.36	9.47	88.23
Cotopaxi	Salcedo	elected	14.35	27.91	34.95	68.65
Orellana	Aguarico		22.96	77.41	90.80	20.14
Orellana	Fco. de Orellana		24.82	26.66	19.36	59.48
Cañar	Cañar	elected	43.14	39.03	31.11	57.53
Morona Santiago	Pablo Sexto	elected	16.07	48.44	69.97	47.39
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (ethnic and party brand)						
Cañar	El Tambo	elected	21.17	45.28	56.51	51.02
Sucumbíos	Putumayo	elected	40.69	25.91	28.76	64.01

### 5.4.3 Pachakutik's mobilization strategies across provinces

Table 5.3 summarizes Pachakutik's strategies at the provincial level showing that Pachakutik is a party that mixes and segments strategies at the provincial level. In most provinces, Pachakutik's candidates used mixed and segmented strategies. In each canton within the provinces, the party's candidates used different strategies' mixes alongside pure strategies in other cantons. Moreover, in two provinces, Bolivar and Tungurahua, the party's candidates employed pure strategies (programmatic strategies). Lastly, in Pastaza, the party's candidates used the same mixed strategy in all cantons. This mix was a mixed programmatic and symbolic-ethnic mobilization strategy.

These findings are in line with what the literature had discussed, i.e., that the party's candidates use ethnic, programmatic, party-based, and candidate-based appeals. Furthermore, I've shown that the party's candidates at the mayor's elections of 2014 used multiple appeals

in every canton and combined them differently. Pachakutik can hence be described as a party that mixes and segments strategies. Importantly, as these appear to be a rather systemic practice, the use of these mobilization strategies should not be taken as a reflection of Pachakutik being a movement with little control over candidates, thus making them “free” to do as they need (see Jones West, 2020 ). Instead, my findings suggest that segmented and mixed strategies are a characteristic of the party’s policy and approach to the subnational elections. The consistent emphasis on the subnational arenas has resulted in the development of practices of tailored mobilization strategies. Importantly, the mixed strategies do not contradict each other. Even when the candidates employ clientelistic appeals mixed with programmatic appeals, these are all coherent with the party’s overall narrative (aiding vulnerable groups, working towards inclusivity, and maintaining accountability practices).

*Table 5.8 Pachakutik’s mobilization strategies at the mayor elections of 2014 by province*

Province	Mobilization strategies
Azuay	Mixed and segmented strategies
Bolívar	Pure strategies
Cañar	Mixed and segmented strategies
Chimborazo	Mixed and segmented strategies
Cotopaxi	Mixed and segmented strategies
Imbabura	Mixed and segmented strategies
Loja	Mixed and segmented strategies
Morona Santiago	Mixed and segmented strategies
Orellana	Mixed and segmented strategies
Pastaza	Mixed strategies
Pichincha	Mixed and segmented strategies
Sucumbíos	Mixed and segmented strategies
Tungurahua	Pure strategies
Zamora Chinchipe	Mixed and segmented strategies

## 5.5 Conclusion

The mestizo voters' support for Pachakutik's candidates was described as puzzling in chapters 3 and 4. Most scholars have argued Pachakutik's candidates lost the mestizo vote as soon as the party started running indigenous candidates for the presidential elections, i.e., since 2006. However, the electoral results data from subnational elections suggested something different. That Pachakutik's candidates continue to receive mestizo support *and* crucially that the party's candidates are often elected in districts with indigenous minorities. This chapter addressed hence the lingering question, how does Pachakutik mobilize mestizo and indigenous voters?

Although who votes for the party is determined by several other variables, what a party does to mobilize voters matters. Hence, I focused on the party's candidates' mobilization strategies. I showed that Pachakutik takes an active role in mobilizing different voters in different districts. Pachakutik segments and mixes strategies. These strategies help the party engage the core (indigenous) and the non-core (mestizo) voters. I showed that the party's candidates do not consistently emphasize ethnic appeals, and when they do, this content is not always specific.

Moreover, I found the mobilization strategies most candidates mix are non-trade-off strategies, which are not likely to produce the electoral backlash. These mixed strategies can help the party mobilize a broader electorate. These findings also go against the conventional evaluation of Pachakutik as an ethnic-programmatic party (Collins, 2004; Van Cott, 2005), and the argument that Pachakutik has turned into an ethno-nationalist party that emphasizes ethnic appeals (Madrid, 2012). The use of mixed and segmented strategies goes against common arguments about ethnic parties, which emphasize the use of clientelistic appeals (Chandra, 2011; Gunther & Diamond, 2003; Horowitz, 1985).

Pachakutik's candidates' use of these mixed strategies does not appear to follow a particular logic, other than being set-up to appeal to as many voters as possible within each district. This, as already discussed in chapter 4, is defined in terms of the *freedom* that the national organization grants its branches. Arguably, this makes it possible for a branch to develop a campaign focusing on indigenous voters in one canton, while in the neighboring canton, the party's campaign stays away from indigenous-based appeals. Further research should focus on the effect of these adjacent campaigns.