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Surviving against all odds: Pachakutik's electoral support, mobilization strategies, and goal achievement between 1996 and 2019

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Citation

Dávila Gordillo, D. L. (2021, July 1). *Surviving against all odds: Pachakutik's electoral support, mobilization strategies, and goal achievement between 1996 and 2019*. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3185908>

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Issue date: 2021-07-01

4 The division of the indigenous voters: the Ecuadorian paradox of recognition

This chapter addresses one of the most common-sense explanations for Pachakutik's persistence: it is an ethnic party with a strong connection to the indigenous population and the indigenous social movement. Conventional knowledge about ethnic parties and their electoral support would guide us towards that explanation. The idea is that an ethnic party should get the support from the ethnic group it aims to represent as voting along ethnic lines is likely to ensure voters access to benefits or to be a form of self-affirmation (Birnir, 2007; Chandra, 2004; Horowitz, 1985; Posner, 2005). From this perspective, voting for ethnic parties can be akin to counting heads. Pachakutik should have *counted with these heads*.

The analysis of Pachakutik's electoral support in chapter 3 showed the party does not have apparent strongholds. This suggests the party lacks a core set of supporters, which is the opposite one would expect from an ethnic party. However, the data discussed in chapter 3 is aggregated to the district level, thus making it impossible to make inferences about the indigenous' voters' preferences. This chapter hence explores whether Pachakutik is a party that profits from ethnic voting. To do so, given the absence of individual-level data on indigenous' voters' preferences, I use the ecological inference method RxC (Rosen, Jiang, King, & Tanner, 2001) using the electoral data and self-identification census data at the parish level. I ran estimations for all national and subnational elections between 2002 and 2019. I found that Pachakutik does not receive the bulk of the indigenous' voters' support. On average, less than 25% of the indigenous voters in all cantons support Pachakutik's candidates in every election.

The lack of indigenous' voters' support counters the idea that the party's connection to the indigenous population may explain its persistence. This is a surprising finding, given the well-known initial relationship between the party, the indigenous movement, and the indigenous population in general. Therefore, in this chapter, I also explore one possible explanation for this disconnection.

I argue the indigenous population has become fragmented, which is evident when they split their votes amongst multiple parties. This fragmentation is connected to the recognition of the indigenous population as formed by numerous *pueblos* and nationalities. The state, per the indigenous population's requests, recognized these *pueblos* and nationalities and developed a system of benefits allocation using these categories. The *pueblos* and nationalities have, in turn, developed their own organizations, which they use to connect to the state and multiple


political parties. Pachakutik has become one of many parties that the indigenous' voters support (albeit most of these parties have no direct connection to the indigenous population), instead of the only one they support. I call this the paradox of recognition.

The chapter continues as follows. The first section discusses the extant research on ethnic voting and ethnic voting in Latin America and Ecuador. The second section discusses the research design and the data for the ecological inference and the historical analysis of the recognition processes. The third section discusses the indigenous support for Pachakutik's candidates for president and mayors between 2002 and 2019 using the ecological inference data. The fourth section discusses the fragmentation of the indigenous population. The fifth and last section brings together these previous two sections to discuss Pachakutik's indigenous' voters' support.

4.1 Ethnic voting

Ethnic voting is commonly understood to be either instrumental or expressive. The expressive theories of ethnic voting suggest that it is akin to "census voting," where what matters most is asserting oneself. Ethnic voting, from this perspective, relates to voters expressing their identities in the ballot box. This type of voting is a way of showing group allegiance and may take place even *against* voters' interests (Ferree, 2006, p. 804). Voters will support the party that represents them best. The criterion for vote choice is the party's and the candidates' allegiance to the voters' ethnic group. Figure 4.1 summarizes the model of expressive ethnic voting. The link is simple: members of an ethnic group will support the party formed by this group's members.


Figure 4.1 Model of expressive ethnic voting



In contrast, the instrumental theories of ethnic voting consider the possibility that not all co-ethnics will support a co-ethnic party. The idea is that ethnic voters will *calculate* the benefits they are likely to receive to make their choices. Therefore, ethnic voters will not support parties and candidates that do not deliver benefits (or are unlikely to do so). At the same time, ethnic voters might support non-co-ethnic parties when they are likely to receive benefits (Ichino & Nathan, 2013; Nathan, 2016).⁷⁷ These calculations also have a component of retrospective voting (Lindberg & Morrison, 2008). In this model of ethnic voting, ethnicity serves as an information shortcut that conveys information relating to the benefits linked to supporting a political party. Votes are not a form of self-affirmation; instead, voters cast their ballots responding to the stimuli of ethnic cues as information shortcuts about access to benefits.

Figure 4.2 summarizes the argument of the model of instrumental ethnic voting. It shows the “self-reinforcing equilibrium of ethnic favoritism” (Chandra, 2007, p. 85), where ethnic parties target ethnic groups using ethnic cues and ethnic groups send similar cues to parties to ensure access to benefits. The figure also shows that non-co-ethnic voters vote for ethnic parties when they can also access benefits.

Figure 4.2 Model of instrumental ethnic voting



⁷⁷ The types of goods and benefits voters get access to have an important effect over these calculations. If parties can build private goods delivery structures non-co-ethnic voting is less likely. Conversely, if parties offer club goods which can be limited geographically (to one region/district/neighborhood) but cannot be limited within (e.g. roads, water supply) non-co-ethnic voting is more likely (Ichino & Nathan, 2013; Nathan, 2016).

Both models expect an “ethnic pull” between voters and parties. Ethnicity is, however, not always the default shortcut voters employ. Individuals will resort to this shortcut only where ethnic identities are salient and politicized (Birbir, 2007, p. 603). Crucially, the presence of ethnic groups within a population does not immediately translate into politicized ethnic identities.

The construction of ethnic groups into viable categories or cleavages (for electoral targeting and benefits) requires: 1) organized individuals; 2) cultural frames that include a possible category or identity (self-identification); and 3) institutions that do not constrain ethnic organization (Chandra, 2005, p. 236; Mair & Bartolini, 2014, p. 234). Additionally, the size of an ethnic group can affect whether a particular identity becomes politicized or not. The politicization process can be triggered by 1) ethnic parties that aim to mobilize an ethnic group to ensure government access; 2) the state and its aim to organize the delivery of benefits; or 3) individuals seeking to access the state’s benefits. Notably, individuals who can potentially claim numerous ethnic identities may opt to rally around a single unified ethnic identity to secure benefits (Yashar, 2005).

There has to be a utility to the politicization of an ethnic identity. This utility is not static, however. As benefits are scarce, ethnic identities can begin to fragment (de Zwart, 2000, pp. 236–237). That is, individuals who use politicized identities (or organize around them) may choose to employ different identities in the hopes of receiving further benefits (de Zwart, 2005, p. 156). Setting aside individuals’ preferences, organizations may also affect an ethnic identity’s utility as the means to receive benefits. A new political party (or multiple parties) could incentivize individuals organizing into ethnic groups. Moreover, the state can play an essential role in this process; by, for example, incentivizing (or deterring) the use of a politicized ethnic identity to access benefits (Chandra, 2005; de Zwart, 2000; Posner, 2005). Hence, the expected ethnic pull between an ethnic party and an ethnic group should not be taken as a given. Ethnic identities – even those politicized – are not necessarily fixed.

4.2 Ethnic voting in Latin America and Ecuador

Latin America’s ethnic diversity is well known. Numerous indigenous groups inhabit the region. However, only at times and in few cases, these groups’ ethnic identity is a relevant predictor for their voting preferences (Hirsland & Strijbis, 2019, p. 2027; Moreno Morales, 2015, p. 122). For ethnic cues to affect the preferences of ethnic voters in the region, the ethnic

identities need to be politicized, and these need to be used by viable ethnic parties (Madrid, 2005; Van Cott & Birnir, 2007).

The cases of Ecuador and Bolivia are considered examples of ethnic voting in the region. The two countries have relatively large indigenous populations, and both have political parties directly linked to the indigenous populations (Madrid, 2012). These connections and the well-known electoral victories of these parties inform the idea of ethnic voting in Bolivia and Ecuador. Nonetheless when scholars address ethnic voting in these two countries, the indigenous groups are often characterized as a unitary group despite their known diversity (see, for example, Mijeski & Beck, 2004, 2008; Rice, 2011; Rice & Van Cott, 2006).⁷⁸

These analyses often brush over the diversity that characterizes the indigenous population in Ecuador and Bolivia. The indigenous population in these two countries can be defined at two levels: 1) a macro level where all groups share a single indigenous ethnic identity, and 2) a micro-level where each group has a distinctive ethnic identity. The effect of this diversity on ethnic voting in these countries has yet to be fully comprehended. Nonetheless, recent research in Bolivia by Hirseland and Strijbis (2019) found that the macro-level ethnic identity does not exert an inescapable pull for all indigenous peoples. Instead, they found that the highland indigenous voters who identify as *Aymara* responded to this ethnic identity. According to the estimations, 80% of the *Aymara* voters supported Evo Morales' MAS. In contrast, the lowlands indigenous voters responded to a regional (non-ethnic) identity (Hirseland & Strijbis, 2019, p. 2022).

In Ecuador, ethnic voting is equated to the *indígena* vote and the expected support for Pachakutik. This revolves around the idea that the indigenous population is organized in terms of a single identity: the *indígena* identity. This identity brought together multiple and diverse indigenous peoples' groups during the 1990s. It also gave way to the creation of the party Pachakutik. Yet, the indigenous population since the second half of the 1980s has consistently worked to achieve differentiated recognition, i.e., the recognition of the different *pueblos* and nationalities that form the indigenous population. The successful recognition of these *pueblos* and nationalities could mean the fragmentation of the *indígena* identity. Crucially, it could also mean a change in ethnic voting in the country.

Extant research has not addressed the possible fragmentation of the indigenous population in Ecuador. Scholars have focused on ethnic voting linked to the *indígena* identity.

⁷⁸ To be sure, these scholars do mention the heterogeneity of the indigenous groups, but they do so in passing. In general, they work from the assumption that the indigenous population is "a" group.

Importantly, their findings do not conform to the standard expectations, i.e., that the indigenous voters support Pachakutik *en mass*. Instead, indigenous voters appear to support different parties at different times. In parishes where the indigenous population is a majority, these voters support diverse candidates (including, but not limited, to Pachakutik's candidates) (Báez Rivera & Bretón Solo de Zaldívar, 2006; Madrid, 2005, p. 701; Sánchez Parga, 2013). To be sure, Pachakutik's candidates do often get support from the indigenous voters. However, this support is limited. Mijeski and Beck (2004, 2008, 2011) found that, on average, in 1996, around 30% of the votes cast by the indigenous voters were for Pachakutik's presidential candidate; in 1998, the percentage of votes declined to 20 %; in 2002, the proportion of votes increased to 46%; and in 2006, the percentage of votes declined again to 23%.

These findings suggest a possible disconnection between the indigenous voters and Pachakutik. These also signal that the indigenous voters' do not necessarily vote as a block. Despite these findings, the politicization (and the usefulness) of the *indígena* identity has not been questioned. In the following sections, I challenge the idea of the *indígena* identity as able to provide a reliable link between the party and the voters. I argue that the *indígena* identity has fragmented following different state incentives. I argue that, in a paradoxical turn, the claims for recognition of the indigenous population (and their achievement) have hampered the group's ability to retain the unity that helped them become a political actor in Ecuador. To be sure, the *indígena* identity is still used under certain circumstances to mobilize the indigenous population. Nonetheless, the indigenous population currently engages the state and different political actors from their differentiated independent groups. In other words, the indigenous population has transformed from a large and united, albeit diverse, group into a set of smaller minorities.⁷⁹ I argue that the indigenous population's voting patterns reflect this fragmentation.

4.3 Research design

To develop my argument about the limits of the connection between Pachakutik and the indigenous voters, I take two steps. First, I analyze the indigenous population's voting patterns at all national and subnational elections between 2002 and 2019 using the ecological inference method RxC (Rosen et al., 2001). Second, I analyze the fragmentation of the *indígena* identity into *pueblos* and nationalities by looking at the incentives for fragmentation coming from the state between 1996 and 2019.

⁷⁹ This argument is similar to Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui's (2010) argument about the division of the indigenous majority in Bolivia into a set of minorities (pp. 64 – 65).

4.3.1 Ecological inference data

The ecological inference method helps researchers overcome the problem of reaching conclusions about individual behavior without data gathered at this same level. For analyzing the indigenous population's voting patterns, I use election results (discussed in chapter 3) and census data at the lowest possible ecological level (parishes).⁸⁰ The 2001 Census showed that the indigenous population represented 6.8% of the total population and is spread out throughout the country. In turn, the 2010 Census found that the country's indigenous population grew and represented 7% of the national population while continuing to be spread out throughout the country's parishes.⁸¹

I matched the data from the 2001 Census with the election results of 2002, 2004, and 2006, and the data from the 2010 Census with the election results of 2009, 2013, 2014, 2017, and 2019. The data did not match perfectly. The main problem is that the electoral data reflects the country's administrative division in a more detailed way, while the censuses data do not.⁸² Table 4.1 summarizes the number of matched and dropped parishes per election. I used the matched data to estimate the indigenous voters' voting patterns for all elections at the canton level.⁸³

To report the estimations, I use the party categories introduced in chapter 3, keeping the data for Pachakutik's support separate.⁸⁴ In this chapter, I focus on the presidential elections of 2002, 2006, 2013, and 2017 and the elections of mayors of 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2017.⁸⁵ I

⁸⁰ It is important to point out that the percentage of the population in Ecuador that can be categorized as indigenous has been debated for years. In the late 1990s and early 2000s the indigenous movement leaders insisted the indigenous population in the country represented around 40% of the population (Mijeski & Beck, 2011; Pallares, 2002; Van Cott, 2005). However, no official data has been produced that reflects these percentages. Even the Integrated System of Ecuadorian Social Indicators (SIISE) in the year 2000 estimated that the indigenous population in Ecuador represented 14.5% of the national population. However, this estimation was produced based on expert reports rather than on actual survey data (Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 44). The first official census data available regarding the indigenous population in Ecuador was produced in 2001.

⁸¹ These estimates have been consistently challenged. One of the main critiques to the estimates is that they refer to self-identification data. The United Nations Report *Los pueblos indígenas en América Latina* (2014) explains that self-identification data is unreliable because the structural marginalization of the indigenous peoples by the state, enhanced by mistrust to government officials, often foster under-reporting of self-identifications. Additionally, the report stresses that the percentage of indigenous population that self-identifies as indigenous in the census is negatively influenced by the fact that the census offered as an option to self-identify as *mestizo*. Nevertheless, the Census is currently the only official and state sanctioned data on the percentage of the Ecuadorian population that self-identifies as indigenous. The data from the SIISE is no longer available.

⁸² For example, the censuses lump together all urban parishes from a canton into a single parish while the electoral data includes data for each independent urban parish.

⁸³ Ernesto Calvo helped me run the estimations in R. He wrote the original code to run the estimations of the 2014 elections. I made the necessary adjustments for each election.

⁸⁴ The full estimations on a party per party basis are available upon request.

⁸⁵ I analyzed all national and subnational elections between 2002 and 2019 using the ecological inference technique. The analyses of all elections are available on the online appendix (available at www.dianadavilagordillo.com)

do not report the estimations for all cantons in all elections, however. In the case of the presidential elections' estimations, I report estimations for half of the country's cantons on every election. In many cantons, the estimations are impossible because the indigenous population represents a too-small percentage of the population. In these cases, the estimations show that the indigenous voters in a canton split their votes equally amongst all parties, which is unlikely.⁸⁶ I, therefore, only use estimations that show some variation on the way votes were cast. In the mayors' elections, I report only the estimations for cantons where Pachakutik presented candidates (on average less than half of all cantons had a candidate from Pachakutik).

Table 4.1 Number of parishes employed in the EI estimations

	Year of elections							
	2002	2004	2006	2009	2013	2014	2017	2019
CNE parishes	1166	1177	1177	1185	1248	1255	1227	1232
Parishes used for EI	968	960	950	970	981	979	978	982
Number of dropped parishes	198	217	227	215	267	276	249	250

4.3.2 Fragmentation of the indigenous population data

I employ the qualitative data discussed in chapter 3 to develop the argument about the state's incentives for the *indígena* identity's fragmentation. I focus on the institutional structure of the Ecuadorian state established in 1996 to fulfill the indigenous population's request for differentiated recognition and how it evolved. I look into the laws, offices, and procedures set up by the state to incentivize the indigenous population's division into *pueblos* and nationalities. In this chapter I once again focused mostly on data from archival work: newspaper reports, government documents, and secondary literature. Interview data was added to further develop some points.

4.4 The indigenous voters' voting patterns

As discussed, the voting patterns of the indigenous voters have received some attention throughout the years. Crucially, scholars have struggled to find the expected connection

⁸⁶ For example, in a canton of the 2002 elections, the estimations showed that each of the 11 candidates received 7.6% of the indigenous voters' votes and also that 7.6% of the indigenous voters casted null votes, and the same percentage casted blank voters.

between Pachakutik and the indigenous voters. Given the absence of individual-level data, the ecological inference method offers the best possible way to examine the indigenous voters' voting patterns. To make sense of the estimations, I use as a baseline for comparison Mijeski's and Beck's (2004) findings for the presidential elections in 1996 where 32% of the indigenous voters supported Pachakutik's candidate. I take this as the minimum percentage of votes Pachakutik's candidates should receive to be characterized as recipients of ethnic voting. There are no available estimations or data regarding indigenous vote at the subnational level. Therefore, I use the same criteria (32% of the votes) for the mayor elections' analysis. As I discussed in detail the election outcomes in chapter 3, I focus only on the indigenous voters' and mestizo voters' voting patterns in the following sections.

4.4.1 Presidential elections

The EI estimations show that in 2002 approximately 31% of the indigenous voters cast ballots for Pachakutik's candidate, Lucio Gutierrez (see table 4.2). In 2006 the number of indigenous voters supporting Pachakutik declined, however. The EI estimations show that only 13% of the indigenous voters cast ballots for Luis Macas. In 2013 more indigenous voters supported the party than in the 2006 elections. An estimated 17% of the indigenous population's votes were for the party's candidate. In 2017 the indigenous voters' support for Pachakutik's candidate declined again. The party's candidate received only 12% of the indigenous population's votes.

The estimations show a decline of the indigenous' support for Pachakutik's candidates, suggesting a lack of connection between the indigenous voters and the party's candidates. Even in 2006, when the party presented its first indigenous candidate, the indigenous voters did not coalesce. Instead, the indigenous voters supported other parties' candidates. Notably, the indigenous voters' support for any other party did not surpass the baseline percentage of ethnic voting (i.e., 32%). In 2006 the bulk of the indigenous' vote went to PSP. On average, 25% of the indigenous voters supported this party. In 2013 MPAIS received approximately 25% of the indigenous voters' votes.⁸⁷ In 2017 the bulk of the indigenous ballots went to the electoral alliance CREO/SUMA with their candidate Guillermo Lasso. This candidate received approximately 27% of the indigenous votes.⁸⁸ The rest of the indigenous voters' ballots during these elections was spread out between numerous candidates. Different candidates' support

⁸⁷ The percentage of votes from the indigenous population for MPAIS was calculated with the EI estimates. The standard deviation of this mean is 0.19.

⁸⁸ The percentage of votes from the indigenous population for CREO/SUMA was calculated with the EI estimates. The standard deviation of this mean is 0.19.

shows that the indigenous voters do not vote as a block at the presidential elections. Instead, they split their support across multiple candidates.

*Table 4.2 EI estimations of the proportion of indigenous and mestizo voters casting ballots for Pachakutik, Traditional Parties, Non-Traditional Parties, and Independent Movements in the presidential elections of 2002, 2006, 2013, and 2017**

Year	Pachakutik	Traditional Parties (added)	Non-Traditional Parties (added)	Independent Movements (added)
	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)
Indigenous voters				
2002 (n=105)	0.31 (0.24)	0.23 (0.14)	0.17 (0.09)	0.12 (0.07)
2006 (n=108)	0.13 (0.14)	0.21 (0.10)	0.40 (0.21)	0.13 (0.07)
2013 (n=109)	0.17 (0.18)	0.04 (0.03)	0.62 (0.18)	0.04 (0.03)
2017 (n=109)	0.12 (0.09)	0.07 (0.05)	0.54 (0.18)	0.13 (0.08)
Mestizo voters				
2002 (n=105)	0.30 (0.17)	0.28 (0.11)	0.17 (0.07)	0.09 (0.04)
2006 (n=108)	0.03 (0.03)	0.18 (0.07)	0.60 (0.13)	0.06 (0.02)
2013 (n=109)	0.06 (0.11)	0.01 (0.01)	0.82 (0.12)	0.01 (0.009)
2017 (n=109)	0.07 (0.05)	0.08 (0.04)	0.68 (0.10)	0.06 (0.03)

Source: Means and standard deviations calculated based on EI estimations with data from the National Census of 2001 and electoral results from CNE.


** The percentage of null votes and blank votes are not included in the table. With these columns, the rows add to 100% of the votes.*

Table 4.2 also includes data about the mestizo voters' voting patterns. In 2002 about 30% of the mestizo voters supported Pachakutik's candidate. In 2006, by contrast, only 3% of the mestizo voters supported Luis Macas. The decline in the number of mestizo votes in 2006

for Pachakutik and the fact that the mestizo population supported Pachakutik's candidate in 2002 is not entirely unexpected. Much has been said about non-indigenous voters' support for Pachakutik before 2002 due to *ethno-populist* strategies (see: Madrid, 2012). The argument stresses that after the party abandoned these strategies, both mestizo and indigenous voters stopped supporting the party. In 2013 and 2017, more mestizo voters supported Pachakutik's candidates compared to 2006. However, it is essential to point out that these were electoral alliances' candidates. This could have impacted the mestizo support, i.e., mestizo supporters may be voting for the other members of the alliance and not Pachakutik.

Figure 4.3 plots the data from table 4.2. The dark blue dot on each boxplot marks the mean value of the estimations. The figure shows a decline in Pachakutik's indigenous support from 2002 to 2006 and a slight increase in support for the party's candidates in 2013 and 2017. Moreover, the boxplots show that despite the average support for Pachakutik declined from 2006 onwards, in several cantons the indigenous voters supported Pachakutik as a block (indicated by the outlier dots).

Figure 4.3 Indigenous and mestizo voters' voting patterns in the presidential elections of 2002, 2006, 2013, and 2017.



These outliers suggest that there are some cantons where the indigenous voters do vote together. This has already been discussed by scholars focusing only on indigenous majority parishes (see: Báez Rivera & Bretón Solo de Zaldívar, 2006; Sánchez Parga, 2013). As was already acknowledged by these authors, there is no consistency in Pachakutik's candidates' support in these cantons. I explored each of the outlier cantons. No canton where the indigenous voters supported Pachakutik's candidates in one year similarly supported the party's candidate during the next election. The only pattern I found was that there is no pattern. The indigenous voters appear to vote together only at times, in different cantons, and for different candidates.

Figure 4.3 also shows that the indigenous voters split their votes between parties across different party categories. Notably, the indigenous voters' voting patterns are very similar to the mestizo voters' voting patterns. Notwithstanding, the indigenous voters have spread their votes more consistently across all party categories. In contrast, the mestizo voters have concentrated their votes amongst the traditional and non-traditional parties (including Pachakutik).

Overall, the EI estimations show that the indigenous voters do not vote as a block for Pachakutik or any other party at the presidential elections. The idea of ethnic voting in Ecuador, at this level, appears unfounded. The indigenous voters' voting patterns resemble the mestizo voters' voting patterns. They show, additionally, no consistency (in terms of support for a single party). It follows that it would be a mistake to think about the indigenous voters' connection to Pachakutik as a given. If this was the case, the indigenous voters should support the party's candidates in similar numbers across elections. Moreover, suppose the ethnic pull was present. In that case, the indigenous voters should have supported the indigenous candidate (Luis Macas) at higher rates than they did any of the mestizo candidates. Yet this was not the case.

4.4.2 Municipal elections

In the subnational arena, Pachakutik has more consistent electoral support than at the national arena. Yet, as discussed in chapter 3, Pachakutik appears not to have strongholds in this arena either, with candidates elected in numerous cantons with differing proportions of indigenous populations. This suggests that the generally expected connection between the indigenous voters and Pachakutik may not be present. The EI estimations show that the indigenous voters are not supporting Pachakutik's candidates as a block. Only rarely more than 32% of the

indigenous voters' ballots were for Pachakutik's candidates. Interestingly, the EI estimations also show that much of Pachakutik's candidates' support comes from mestizo voters.

Table 4.3 summarizes the EI estimations for all cantons in Ecuador with a Pachakutik candidate for mayor in 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019. The EI estimates show that Pachakutik's candidates in all elections received support both from the indigenous voters and the mestizo voters. Yet, the indigenous voters do not appear to have supported Pachakutik's candidates as a block. Except for 2014, on average less than 30% of the indigenous votes were for Pachakutik's candidates. As was the case at the presidential elections, the indigenous voters split their votes across parties in all party categories. In 2004 the candidates from the traditional parties received the bulk of the votes from the indigenous population. In 2009 and 2014, these votes went to the candidates from the non-traditional parties. In 2019 the majority of the votes went to candidates from the independent movements. In turn, close to 20% of the mestizo voters supported Pachakutik's candidates in every election. The mestizo voters, as the indigenous voters did, split their votes amongst parties in all party categories. These voters also supported mostly traditional parties in 2004, non-traditional parties in 2009 and 2014, and independent movements in 2019.

Figure 4.4 plots the data from table 4.3. The dark blue dots represent the mean percentage of votes cast by each group of voters. The figure shows that the indigenous voters support Pachakutik's candidates but also support other parties' candidates. Figure 4.4 is useful to see the remarkable similarity between the indigenous voters' voting pattern and the mestizo voters' voting pattern. Both groups' support for independent movements increases across the years. In turn, both groups' support for Pachakutik's candidates is somewhat stable, albeit the indigenous voters' support rarely reaches the minimum baseline level discussed (32% of the votes). The support for non-traditional parties increases until 2014 but decreases in 2019. Lastly, the support for traditional parties has declined since 2004.

Figure 4.4 also shows that, at times and in some districts (cantons), the indigenous voters appear to vote for Pachakutik's candidates as a block. Interestingly, this is also the case for mestizo voters in some cantons. As I did for the presidential elections estimates, I explored each of the cantons where more than 50% of the indigenous voters supported Pachakutik's candidates. I found that the indigenous voters in these cantons do not consistently support the party's candidates, nor do they always vote as a block. The cantons where the indigenous voters vote together are not the same across elections. Similarly, the cantons where the mestizo voters support Pachakutik's candidates as a block change from election to election. This suggests that

there may be different connections between indigenous and mestizo voters and the party's candidates they support, in addition to or despite Pachakutik's indigenous relationship.


Table 4.3 EI estimations of the proportion of indigenous and mestizo voters casting ballots for Pachakutik, Traditional Parties, Non-Traditional Parties, and Independent Movements in the mayor elections of 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019.

Year	Pachakutik	Traditional Parties (added)	Non-Traditional Parties (added)	Independent Movements (added)
	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)
Indigenous voters				
2004	n= 83 0.27 (0.19)	n= 78 0.32 (0.18)	n= 82 0.21 (0.16)	n= 12 0.11 (0.10)
2009	n= 80 0.27 (0.17)	n= 54 0.16 (0.16)	n= 80 0.29 (0.16)	n= 66 0.17 (0.12)
2014	n= 75 0.31 (0.21)	n= 35 0.12 (0.12)	n= 76 0.38 (0.19)	n= 32 0.18 (0.17)
2019	n= 83 0.23 (0.19)	n= 70 0.13 (0.10)	n= 81 0.27 (0.20)	n= 68 0.30 (0.22)
Mestizo voters				
2004	n= 83 0.20 (0.15)	n= 78 0.43 (0.20)	n= 82 0.23 (0.18)	n= 12 0.07 (0.07)
2009	n= 80 0.21 (0.16)	n= 54 0.16 (0.11)	n= 80 0.34 (0.15)	n= 66 0.25 (0.19)
2014	n= 75 0.20 (0.18)	n= 35 0.13 (0.15)	n= 76 0.51 (0.23)	n= 32 0.21 (0.17)
2019	n= 83 0.18 (0.18)	n= 70 0.21 (0.18)	n= 81 0.32 (0.21)	n= 68 0.26 (0.20)

Source: Means and standard deviations calculated based on EI estimations with data from the National Census and electoral results.

The indigenous voters do not support Pachakutik's candidates as a block at the subnational elections. The indigenous voters are also splitting their votes between multiple parties in this arena. This is consistent with what I found for the national elections. Overall, Pachakutik's electoral support is not only coming from the indigenous voters.

Figure 4.4 Votes cast by mestizo and indigenous voters for candidates for mayor in the elections of 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019



The EI estimations confirm what the electoral results data in chapter 3 suggested. Pachakutik's electoral support is not coming only from the indigenous voters. These voters only rarely support the party's candidates as a block. This finding, if not surprising, is unexpected. It goes against the conventional idea of this party. That Pachakutik's strength comes from the indigenous population.

That there is a disconnection between the indigenous voters and Pachakutik has not been addressed by scholars. At most, scholars have pointed out that schisms within the indigenous movement may cause Pachakutik's few indigenous' votes (Madrid, 2012, p. 102). However not wrong, the schism argument disregards the possibility that the division may not be only a phenomenon of the indigenous organizations. It may instead be a division of the indigenous population as a whole. In the next section, I argue that the indigenous population's fragmentation can explain the disconnection between Pachakutik and the indigenous voters.

4.5 The fragmentation of the indígena identity

4.5.1 The indígena identity

The *indígena* identity's politicization has been studied at length (see, for example, Albó, 1991; Becker, 2008; Pallares, 2002; Yashar, 2005). It would be impossible to do justice to the rich historical processes that gave way to the formation of the, as Pallares (2002) calls it, indio "macro identity" (p. 4) in only a section of the chapter. It is nonetheless necessary to discuss, at least briefly, how this ethnic identity was politicized.

A clear sign of the effective politicization of the *indígena* identity are the 1990's *levantamientos* (uprisings) when the indigenous population paralyzed Ecuador with blockades in highways taking over public squares and churches throughout the country. In June 1990, the indigenous population became a political actor in the country – a force to be reckoned with. This event and the subsequent *levantamientos* "marked the transition from campesinismo, or peasant politics, to indianismo" (Pallares, 2002, p. 4). All individuals who had been addressed as peasants or as members of different groups came together as a single unified group taking ownership of the ethnic identity: *indígena*.

This was an ethnic identity that had existed for long as part of the state's institutional framework. The *indígena* ethnic identity comes from the colonial time. During the colony, the Spanish administrative policies promoted a "horizontal integration of indigenous peoples." These administrative policies turned the whole of the indigenous population (a vast number of small groups) in what would be Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia territories, into a single group (Ogburn, 2008, p. 290).⁸⁹ Anyone from within this group was an *indio*. The Spanish administrative policies glossed over the fact that many of these *indios* came from different regions, spoke different languages, dressed differently, and had different traditions. The colonial administrators ensured the division of the population between the Spaniards and the *indios* creating the "*república de indios*" and the "*república de Españoles*" (Ogburn, 2008, p. 298). The creation of the *república de indios* did not mean the disappearance of the different groups that formed it. Within the *república de indios*, each group could maintain its own identity.

The division between the world of the *indios* and the world of citizens (that included Europeans and mestizos) lasted until the mid-1800s. In 1857, a few years after the Ecuadorian

⁸⁹ This was the first time that the inhabitants of the Inca Tahuantinsuyu (which covered the land of modern-day Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and the southern parts of Colombia and the northern parts of Chile) were made into members of a single ethnic group. Despite all of the different groups being part of the Inca Empire, these individuals were not all Incas. They mostly retained their own ethnic distinctiveness as the Inca Empire was against horizontal integration of the population groups that were conquered (Ogburn, 2008)

nation-state was founded, the indigenous population was recognized as equal to all other state inhabitants (Guerrero, 1997). It was then that the indigenous identity was moved from the public sphere into the private sphere. The indigenous population – the *indios* – stopped existing as “an object of national state records and state concerns” (Pallares, 2002, p. 11). Ecuador became a mestizo country.

This process meant that the state often ignored the indigenous population. The indigenous population was no longer an administrative category employed in public policies. Nevertheless, in the private sphere and within the local *comunas*, the indigenous groups maintained their independent characteristics and identification. Moreover, since the early 1900s, the indigenous population’s groups have worked to ascertain themselves as political actors. The claims, similar across the board, were developed locally, however. There was very little interaction or help between *comunas* facing the same issues.⁹⁰

The state further promoted these independent actions with the introduction of a corporatist citizenship regime. The state disincentivized the construction of networks. The *Ley de Comunas* approved in 1937 introduced the possibility of local autonomy for the indigenous *comunas* and promoted the registration of the *comunas* within the state (Yashar, 2005, p. 91). This gave way to the formation of “pockets of autonomy,” where the indigenous population’s groups developed and maintained their own identities (Yashar, 2005, p. 85). The autonomy was, however, an issue that should be achieved by each group. Therefore, during these years, the indigenous population’s groups organized themselves independently and became active in their political arenas but with little interaction between groups.

During the second half of the 1900s, there was a transition towards more wide-reaching indigenous organizations (see Becker (2008) and Pallares (2002) for a detailed overview). With the intervention of leftist organizations and the catholic church, the indigenous communities moved from “reacting to local and immediate forms of exploitation to addressing larger structural issues” (Becker, 2008, p. 12). As the years passed, the indigenous population started to create organizations that brought together different *comunas*. The organizations emphasized the “difference from the white- mestizo society as a point of departure in the quest for self-determination” (Pallares, 2002, p. 16; Yashar, 2005, p. 99).⁹¹

⁹⁰ Most of the indigenous population lived in *comunas* linked to the *haciendas* or *huasipungos* and their claims were often connected to the poor working conditions, exploitation, and discrimination in place in each of the communities (Pallares, 2002, p. 12).

⁹¹ These organizations include: the Shuar Federation created in 1964, ECUARUNARI (Ecuador Runacunapac Richarimui that means “the Ecuadorian Indian Awakens”) created in 1972, the *Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana* (CONFENAIE) created in 1980, and the *Coordinadora* (COICE) created in 1986

Conaie, the most important of these organizations, was created in 1986. Conaie brought together all other smaller organizations. Amongst the many objectives of this organization, a crucial one was “to combine all Indigenous peoples into one large pan-Indian movement dedicated to defending Indigenous concerns and agitating for social, political, and educational reforms” (Becker, 2008, p. 169).⁹² Conaie was developed as the meeting point where all indigenous peoples’ differences would be replaced with a unified identity and the same goals.

By the end of the XXth century, the indigenous population coalesced around the *indígena* identity byway of Conaie. This unity was possible thanks to the construction of “trans-community networks” that connected communities with shared grievances. These groups also relied on acknowledging each community’s leaders as feasible representatives of the networks (Yashar, 2005, p. 132). Additionally, the members’ unity was based on the agreements over the importance of land rights where “the loss of land was tantamount to the loss of culture and indigenous identity” (Yashar, 2005, p. 133).

This process culminated in the 1990s *levantamientos*. As states, these uprisings represent the exact moment in which the indigenous population’s groups came together and acted together under a unitary ethnic identity (Almeida, Arrobo Rodas, & Ojeda Segovia, 2005, p. 54). The indigenous population turned into this new group: the *indígenas* – members of a unitary, cohesive, and coherent group. The strength and unity shown in June 1990, displayed back in 1992, and again in 1994 are a testament to the usefulness of the ethnic identity and how it could be used to mobilize the indigenous population as a whole (Becker, 2008, p. 184; Madrid, 2012, p. 74; Mijeski & Beck, 2004, p. 41; Van Cott, 2005, p. 99).

Following the displays of unity and strength, Pachakutik was created in 1996. As discussed in chapter 3, the party was created even though Conaie often talked against electoral processes. The expectation was that the indigenous population, the *indígenas*, would come together to support the party. This did not happen, however. The *indígenas* fragmented into smaller organizations around the *pueblos* and nationalities categories soon after the party was created.

⁹² The formation of these organizations was possible because since 1979 the Ecuadorian state had changed. With the return of democracy, the state was open to let the different organizations form, it enfranchised the indigenous population, and slowly (albeit often reluctantly) engaged with the indigenous population as a political actor. Officially the indigenous population was not barred from electoral participation. However, until 1979 illiterates were not allowed to vote, and the percentage of indigenous peoples that were illiterate was considerably high. In 1979 the law changed allowing illiterate individuals to vote and thus indirectly enfranchising an important segment of the indigenous population.

4.5.2 Fragmentation through development projects: 1996-2007

The period between 1996 and 2007 represents the beginning of the process of fragmentation of the *indígena* identity. The approval of the 1998 Constitution marked this period. The Constitution established Ecuador was a pluricultural and multi-ethnic state. In article 88, the Constitution also stated that the indigenous population self-defined as formed by *pueblos* and nationalities. The Constitution recognized several collective rights for the indigenous population.⁹³ Following the Constitution's approval and the indigenous population's demands (through their multiple organizations), the government created new offices to attend to the indigenous populations' needs and enact the Constitution's changes.

The most consequential of these government offices was the *Consejo de Desarrollo de las Nacionalidades y Pueblos del Ecuador* (CODENPE).⁹⁴ This organization was the pillar of the state's offices that fostered the indígena identity division. CODENPE centralized most of the funds for the indigenous population's development projects and delivered them only to the groups organized as *pueblos* and nationalities.

CODENPE was managed by an Executive Director and an Executive Council formed by representatives from Conaie that represented the different *pueblos* and nationalities. Importantly, CODENPE's bylaws did not prescribe which were the *pueblos* and nationalities that would be included. These bylaws only stated that the *pueblos* and nationalities should be represented at the council. Conaie had to determine which groups would be included and ensure

⁹³ Amongst other articles, article 84 lists the following collective rights guaranteed for the indigenous population: the right to maintain their customs, strengthen their identity, the protection of their community (ancestral) lands, the protection of natural resources well as the right to make use and administer them, the right to prior consultation before any mining projects are deployed in their lands. The article also includes protections for their agricultural practices, their organizational forms, their intellectual property, and their traditional medicine. It also grants them the right to bilingual education, to formulate development policies and the rights to state financing for these projects, and to participate in state organisms.

⁹⁴ Before, other organizations had been created but none satisfied the indigenous population. The administration of Sixto Durán Ballén (1992-1996) created the *Secretaría Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas y minorías étnicas* (SENAIME); Abadala Bucaram (1996-1997) despite his short time in office created the Ministry of Ethnic Affairs (*Ministerio Etnico*). and Fabián Alarcón (1998) created the *Consejo Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo para los Pueblos Indígenas y Negros del Ecuador* (CONPLAIDEN). All of these organizations were developed following the lead of the executive, without taking the indigenous input (Almeida et al., 2005, p. 106). Conaie's leaders in particular often complained about how these organizations only aimed to co-opt some sectors of the indigenous population (Lucero, 2008, p. 144). The creation of the Ministry of Ethnic Affairs was particularly difficult for the indigenous population. Although the Ministry was never a viable office because the funding and headquarters were never allocated, the creation of the Ministry highlighted the problems within the indigenous movement. The appointed Minister, Rafael Pandam, had bypassed the indigenous movement and negotiated his appointment directly with the elected president. These negotiations took place in the leading to the second round of the presidential elections. Pandam and Valerio Grefa had offered the indigenous electoral support to Bucaram and in exchange he had received the offer of his appointment. When the promise of support was made public, both CONAIE and Pachakutik denied Grefa and Pandam were speakers of the organizations and clarified they would not support Bucaram.

that these representatives' selection had taken place within their organizations (of the *pueblos* and nationalities) and following their procedures.

CODENPE was created to manage the funds and the projects stemming from the Project for the Development of Indian Peoples and Nationalities of Ecuador (PRODEPINE) funded by the World Bank. This project had a 50 USD million budget and lasted until 2004 (Uquillas & Van Nieuwkoop, 2003, p. 1). PRODEPINE targeted ethnicity and engaged with grassroots organizations as it aimed to: provide poverty alleviation, promote participatory practices (building social capital in the process), and create "coordination between governmental and non-governmental organizations" (Uquillas & Van Nieuwkoop, 2003, p. 14).⁹⁵ PRODEPINE stimulated the organization of the project's likely recipients into grassroots organizations linked to specific *pueblos* and nationalities. The different *pueblos* and nationalities could only become recipients *if* they had fully functioning organizations. PRODEPINE and the World Bank "worked only with organizations [with the] capacity to execute programs" (Lucero, 2008, p. 149). There was an inherent disparity between the recipients of the projects. Small nationalities from the *Amazonia* and many *pueblos* that were only starting to organize and ascertain their own differentiated identity had to develop their organizations in a rush. By contrast, other groups (e.g., Saraguro) who had already developed grassroots organizations could access the resources faster.⁹⁶

The indigenous population reacted to the possibility of becoming beneficiaries of developing programs by following PRODEPINE's and CODENPE's requirements. In the process, many groups ascertained their indigenous identity's uniqueness to get a seat at CODENPE's council and become recipients of PRODEPINE's projects. The indigenous population's organization into these groups was not haphazard or a process of ethnogenesis, to be sure. For years, these groups had ascertained their differences and "great cultural diversity," which meant that they could develop clear and differentiated identities in a short period (Uquillas & Van Nieuwkoop, 2003, p. 20).⁹⁷ The process did not happen overnight, however.

⁹⁵ The World Bank praised the *social capital* of the indigenous population mainly due to their organization around grassroots, second-tier (*Organizaciones de Segundo Grado*), regional, and national organizations. This social capital grounded the development of the program (Uquillas & Van Nieuwkoop, 2003, p. 11).

⁹⁶ The effect of the requirement of fully organized grassroots organizations has been one of the main criticisms towards PRODEPINE. The report from the Ecuadorian Government (2004) presented to the International Fund for Agricultural Development argues that PRODEPINE was developed thinking solely about the organizations of the Highlands indigenous which had an upper hand as they had for long developed their multilevel (local, regional, and national) organizations.

⁹⁷ With this I do not mean to minimize the processes of self-recognition that many of these communities have gone through. As an example, the *Kayambi pueblo* has a long historical background of asserting themselves as a unique group and political actor (see for example: Becker & Tutillo, 2009). The years under CODENPE represent only the culmination of long processes. For example, the individuals now known as the *Kayambi pueblo* were

As an expert explained, “the formation of an indigenous identity is linked to different forms of organization but also the search of each group’s history” (EXP-4, 2020). In some cases, groups’ identities, including the groups’ names or *pueblo* names, had not been adequately developed and required further work (research).⁹⁸

CODENPE contributed to establishing new ways in which the indigenous *pueblos* and nationalities engaged with the state. Access to collective rights depended on adhering to a *pueblo*’s or a nationality’s group identity.⁹⁹ For example, the territory of a *comuna* had to be registered as a *pueblo* or as part of a *pueblo* or nationality to receive the state’s protection.¹⁰⁰

The setup of CODENPE and PRODEPINE required the indigenous population to invest time and energy in developing independent organizations linked to *pueblos* and nationalities. Access to benefits depended on two things: 1) having a representative within the executive council of CODENPE, and 2) having a well-developed organization (that did not have to cover all members of the *pueblo* or nationality). These two requirements created divisions between and within the indigenous population’s groups. There was a competition between the groups to receive formal recognition from CODENPE to get a seat at the table. Besides, there were divisions within the groups as not all groups’ members (i.e., all communities) would become recipients of the development projects. This happened either due to the lack of a solid overarching organization or an overabundance of organizations within the same group (Almeida et al., 2005, p. 106). PRODEPINE was, therefore, not a panacea for the indigenous population. In fact, amongst the many critiques to the program, one stood out: PRODEPINE

mostly referred to in relationship to the geographical location of its communities in and around the city Cayambe. The media reported their leaders as representatives of the *pueblo Cayambe*. It was only in the 2000s that the name *Kayambi* was used more consistently and publicly.

⁹⁸ Take for example the cases of the *pueblos* that form the Kichwa nationality. Until 2003, many of these *pueblos* had to still develop their specific name. Before 2003 they were not acknowledged by their own name but by reference to their geographical location e.g. *pueblo Cayambe* or *pueblo Cañar*. In the process of organizing, each of these *pueblos* embraced a more specific name. Although many of their names did not change e.g. *pueblo Otavalo* and *pueblo Saraguro*, other groups did ascertain a more specific name e.g. *pueblo Kayambi* and *pueblo Cañari*. It is important to point out that the names of the cities (e.g. Cayambe, Cañar, Otavalo, and Saraguro) are deeply linked to the names of the *pueblos* that have inhabited the regions long before the arrival of mestizo communities. Thus, it was not entirely wrong to refer to the *pueblos* in relationship to their geographical location.

⁹⁹ Nonetheless, on an individual basis claiming the *indígena* identity was enough to receive some form of affirmative action from the state.

¹⁰⁰ Take for example the case of the community Macaboa. This community, located in the coastal region of Ecuador, successfully claimed its self-identification as part of the *Manta-Wankavilka pueblo* in 2004 (Bauer, 2012). Because of the location of the community and the number of archeological remains found in the territory of the community, their claim was swiftly approved by CODENPE. With the recognition, the community Macaboa ensured the protection of their land and also received funding for community development from CODENPE. These benefits would not have been achieved without the definition of the *comuna* as part of an indigenous *pueblo* due to the fact that the funding managed by CODENPE focused only on ethno-development projects (Bretón Solo De Zaldívar, 2008).

failed to deliver tools for the development of the indigenous identity and instead promoted the strengthening of existing organizations and division within the indigenous identity (Maldonado Ruiz, 2006, p. 125).

CODENPE was, moreover, not entirely inclusive. Some indigenous groups were left outside the distribution of benefits. While many communities had advanced for years a self-determination process following Conaie's lead, many other communities had not. For example, in the province Chimborazo, many communities joined FEINE (the evangelic indigenous organization). This organization eschewed differentiated recognition based on ethnic identities. Instead, FEINE argued the indigenous population could be organized around unions and churches (Lucero, 2008, p. 150). FEINE was not part of CODENPE because any representative with a seat in the council had to be linked to Conaie. Therefore, access to benefits for the communities attached to this organization was almost non-existent.

The limited access to benefits created further divisions within the indigenous population's groups. It gave way to the intervention of actors outside the indigenous communities. After Pachakutik broke its alliance with Lucio Gutierrez in 2003, Gutierrez tried to reduce the influence of Conaie in the state and thus favored the work of organizations that had been left out of CODENPE. By then, FEINE's complaints had been reshaped into a matter of underrepresentation of its members (no longer around different organization forms). FEINE affiliates, located mostly in the province Chimborazo, received only one representative within the Executive Council of CODENPE as members of the *pueblo Puruhá*. FEINE considered this was unfair because some *pueblos* from the province Imbabura – with smaller populations compared to the population of the Chimborazo communities – had three representatives (one per *pueblo*: Otavalo, Cotacachi, and Natabuela) while the *pueblo Puruhá* had only one representative. FEINE argued that it would be better to sub-divide the *pueblo Puruhá* into different groups to increase its representation within CODENPE's executive council and the likelihood of becoming a project recipient (Massal, 2010, p. 20). Lucio Gutierrez, taking over the control of CODENPE in 2003, officially recognized the groups FEINE had been advocating for. The groups received multiple seats at CODENPE's council. The leaders of Conaie condemned the recognition of the groups calling the division of the *pueblo Puruhá* a form of "ethnocide."¹⁰¹ In 2005, after Gutierrez was ousted, Conaie regained control over

¹⁰¹ Letter from Humberto Cholango President of ECUARUNARI to Lucio Gutierrez. The letter was made public in Conaie's web page and is accessible here: <http://www.llacta.org/organiz/coms/com641.htm>

CODENPE.¹⁰² Under the new administration, CODENPE reversed the recognition decision leaving the representatives of these communities once again outside the council and keeping only one representative for the *pueblo Puruhá*.

CODENPE and PRODEPINE changed the way benefits for the indigenous population were distributed and, in the process, accentuated the internal division of the indigenous population. The council had guidelines (although not clear) to register “new” *pueblos* and nationalities and actively worked towards ensuring most indigenous communities were linked to a *pueblo* or a nationality.¹⁰³ This was relatively easy as the indigenous population’s groups had long stressed their distinctiveness and cultural diversity even after joining the indigenous movement under the *indígena* identity.

In 2005 Conaie’s leaders denounced PRODEPINE. They claimed the program had fostered “the proliferation of Second-Order Organization aiming to become beneficiaries of the project, which caused the division of the nationalities and *pueblos*” (Toro, 2005). In addition, and acknowledging the division within their ranks, Conaie in 2005 opposed the extension of PRODEPINE into a second phase. The division had, however, taken roots and continued to expand.

4.5.3 State led fragmentation: 2007-2019

In 2006 Rafael Correa became Ecuador’s president. He immediately called for a Constitutional Assembly, which started work in late 2007 and delivered a new Constitution in 2008. The 2008 Constitution recognized the *pueblos* and nationalities as constitutive parts of the Ecuadorian population and declared Ecuador a plurinational state. The new Constitution also included the recognition of the indigenous languages Kichwa and Shuar as “official languages for intercultural ties.”¹⁰⁴ Additionally, the Constitution also expanded the articles dealing with the indigenous justice system.¹⁰⁵ The Constitution also maintained the collective rights contained

¹⁰² Lourdes Tibán (a long-time indigenous leader) was appointed Executive secretary. Tibán’s appointment was controversial. She was appointed by the new president Alfredo Palacio which went in direct contradiction to the statutes of CODENPE that established CODENPE’s members should select the director. Tibán argued that CODENPE was not in a position to select the director and they were facing exceptional times (El Universo, 2005)

¹⁰³ I refer to “new” because these *pueblos* and nationalities received official recognition. However, they were not new in the sense of an *ethnogenesis* process. The *pueblos* and nationalities could not be created out of thin air but were instead expected to have been built on traditionally known identities i.e. based on archaeological findings or historical data.

¹⁰⁴ This however was not entirely novel. In fact these languages had already been recognized in the 1998 Constitution and it is possible to trace references to the use of these languages and their recognition as part of the Ecuadorian culture back to the 1945 Constitution (Becker, 2011, p. 148)

¹⁰⁵ Officially, Ecuador has a plural justice system that includes the indigenous’ justice system. However soon after the Constitution was approved the state curtailed the issues these courts could address; nonetheless a certain level of independency was given to each community as each was allowed to carry their own processes.

in the 1998 Constitution for the *pueblos* and nationalities.¹⁰⁶ Lastly, the new Constitution introduced many different claims the indigenous population had been working on (including recognizing nature's rights).

The Constitutional process was marked by 1) a majority of representatives elected under the president's party ticket, and 2) the presence of indigenous population's representatives not elected under a Pachakutik ticket. Some of these representatives were elected under the president's party's ticket.¹⁰⁷ Monica Chuji and Pedro de la Cruz, whom Becker (2011) reports, saw joining Correa as the best way to change Ecuadorian politics (p. 133). Pachakutik only secured four seats out of the 124 seats in the Constitutional Assembly in 2007.

This constitutional text has been interpreted as a significant success for the indigenous population. Still, it has also grounded the further fragmentation of the *indígena* category. After its approval, many institutional changes took place, including the dissolution of CODENPE and new administrative processes that foster indigenous communities' further autonomy from national umbrella organizations. Continuing with the trend started in 1996, the Ecuadorian state under the new Constitution continued connecting public funding, development projects, and affirmative action to *pueblos* and nationalities. This deepened the fragmentation of the *indígena* identity.

The 2008 Constitution established that *Consejos Nacionales para la Igualdad* (National Councils for Equality) should replace organizations like CODENPE. Correa asserted it was time to end this type of corporatist policies and organizations. In 2009 he stopped the state's funding for CODENPE.¹⁰⁸ By 2009 the creation of these councils was notably underdeveloped,

¹⁰⁶ This includes rights to their own identity, protection of their ancestral land, to participate in the state, the protection and nature and their natural resources, and the rights to prior consultation.

¹⁰⁷ Some former members of Pachakutik, members of Conaie, and leaders from other indigenous organizations joined Correa's party to get a seat in the Assembly and become indigenous representatives *without* Pachakutik's intervention.

¹⁰⁸ Along the lines of this criticism Correa also changed one of the most important offices for the indigenous population, the National Program for Bilingual Education Office, from an independent status to being part of the Ministry of Education. He criticized that CODENPE's resources had been directed only to one province, Cotopaxi, which was also the province from where the then head of the Council, Lourdes Tiban, was from (Dosh & Kligerman, 2009). Correa's critiques to CODENPE and its allocation of resources were not unfounded. Although CONAIE's members denied that 70% of the budget had been allocated solely to the province of the Executive Secretary (the province Cotopaxi), they also acknowledged the resources were indeed distributed at times amongst communities that did not have a highly indigenous population. In a letter written by former Constitutional Assembly Member Monica Chuji (who no longer supported the government) she stressed that CODENPE served important purposes even if at times it served the interests of only some. As CODENPE was managed by members of Conaie who were connected to Pachakutik often benefits would spillover to communities with connections to Pachakutik but not necessarily linked to specific ethnic identities. This pattern was mostly visible after PRODEPINE ended in 2005. Cases in point are the cantons that had a Mayor from Pachakutik during the 2004 and 2009 period. These municipalities benefited from the project for Strengthening Alternative Indigenous

however. This meant that CODENPE continued to exist, albeit with almost no recourses, until 2015. Only in 2014, the National Assembly approved the law that created the Councils.¹⁰⁹

Between 2005 and 2015, CODENPE had the primary function of registering the organizations formed by the different *pueblos* and nationalities. This function was formalized and expanded in 2005 to centralize the registration of all *pueblos*, nationalities, and *comunidades*.¹¹⁰ In 2015 the *Secretaría Nacional de Gestión de la Política* was assigned to register the *pueblos* and nationalities.¹¹¹ This, in effect, limited the input of wide-reaching indigenous organizations on the issue of recognition, as the process now takes place following each group's request (as opposed to through Conaie). Since April 2019, the *Secretaría Nacional de Gestión de la Política* was absorbed by the Ministry of Interior, which now retains the responsibility of registering the indigenous *pueblos* and nationalities organizations.

In 2016 the new *Consejo Nacional para la Igualdad de Pueblos y Nacionalidades* (CNIPN) (National Council for the Equality of *Pueblos* and Nationalities) started work finalizing the transition period with CODENPE. The CNIPN eliminated the executive council formed by representatives of the indigenous *pueblos* and nationalities with a new council. The new council was formed by five members representing different governmental offices (the executive, the judiciary, the citizen participation and social control office, the electoral authority, and the legislative bodies) and five civil society members. This new council effectively put an end to the role Conaie had as the mediator of the allocation of public benefits for the indigenous population. It is now up to each *pueblo* and nationality to engage the state and this organization directly.

There is, moreover, one particular service that the CNIPN provides that is distinct from the ones supplied by CODENPE. The CNIPN offers certifications for individuals' claims of being part of a *pueblo* or nationality.¹¹² According to the CNIPN, these certificates will be

Municipalities (FORMIA) created in 2005 even despite having small indigenous population percentages.¹⁰⁸ After 2005, CODENPE became a source less directed benefits but nonetheless the most important source of benefits for the indigenous population and those connected to them.

¹⁰⁹ To continue working after the funding was limited by the state in 2009, CODENPE entered into an agreement with the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID) to prepare for the transition into the new National Council. The project (and funding) ended in 2015.

¹¹⁰ The legal documents that established this were: *Decreto Ejecutivo No. 386* published in December 11, 1998 at the *Registro Oficial No. 86*; *Decreto Ejecutivo No. 108* published in June 15, 2005 at the *Registro Oficial No. 37*; *Decreto Ejecutivo No. 727* published in November 14, 2005 at the *Registro Oficial No. 144*; *Decreto Ejecutivo No. 1421* published in May 31, 2006 at the *Registro Oficial No. 281*; and the *Ley Orgánica de las Instituciones Públicas de los Pueblos Indígenas del Ecuador*.

¹¹¹ Correa signed a *Decreto Ejecutivo No. 691* in June 4, 2015.

¹¹² Individuals requiring these certificates need to fill the form available on this web page http://www.pueblosynacionalidades.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/form_certificado_autoidentificacion_Rev.3.doc They need to specify the *comuna* ,

necessary to access affirmative action within the state, primarily to ensure government jobs and public education scholarships.¹¹³ Before, the state only required *pueblos* and nationalities to be formally organized to receive collective benefits. With this change, benefits for individuals have also become dependent on these formal organizations moving individuals further away from the indígena category and closer to their specific ethnic identities.

In addition to these institutional changes, between 2006 and 2017, Correa's administration also worked to divide and diminish social movements' strength, including the indigenous movements.¹¹⁴ The primary strategy was to bypass Conaie by engaging with smaller organizations (Becker, 2011; de la Torre, 2013b). As discussed, the strength and number of these smaller organizations had increased since 1996. The leaders of these organizations were not only prepared to engage with the state. They had often already developed working relations with the state as beneficiaries of development funding.

One example of how the state bypassed Conaie and, in general, other larger umbrella organizations was the set up for the creation of *Circunscripciones Territoriales Indígenas* (CTI) or Indigenous Territorial Constituencies. CTIs represented the promise of land property recognition alongside autonomy, which was for long at the center of the indigenous population's claims.¹¹⁵ The state developed plans to work directly with each community and urges communities to organize. In 2010, the government agreed on the necessary steps to formalize the creation of CTIs with 26 organizations from the *Amazonia* (representing each one community) bypassing regional umbrella-organizations and national umbrella-organizations (Ortiz T., 2015, p. 70).¹¹⁶

Correa's strategies also included what Conaie called "co-optation" strategies aiming to divide the movement. This strategy was the appointment of indigenous leaders to government

pueblo and nationality to which the individual is part of. Additionally, the individual needs to add documentation proving they are effectively part of these groups. The documentation that is required is however not specified.

¹¹³ These certificates have not become a crucial requirement yet. A specialist on public procurement explained, "it is enough for individuals to assert they are part of any *pueblo* or nationality" (EXP-5, 2020). Nonetheless, as these certificates have become institutionalized as well as the registration of all groups, it is likely they will become necessary in the future.

¹¹⁴ Correa was not tolerant to any form of opposition and his government officials worked hard to stop all social protest. A report from Universidad Andina Simon Bolivar in Quito summarizes many of these instances between 2007 and 2012. The report is accessible here: <http://repositorio.uasb.edu.ec/bitstream/10644/3338/1/RAA-30%20CDES.pdf>

¹¹⁵ The *Código Orgánico de Organización Territorial, Autonomía y Descentralización* (COOTAD), ensures political, administrative, and financial autonomy for *pueblos*, nationalities and crucially *comunas* or *comunidades indígenas*. Article 102 of this law ensures the state will finance "processes of formation, consolidation, and institutionalization of indigenous, afroecuadorian, and *montubio* territorial organizations".

¹¹⁶ By October 2019 none of these indigenous communities had achieved this status (El Comercio, 2019).

positions.¹¹⁷ The government targeted the leaders of local groups, eschewing larger organizations. In 2011, for example, Correa appointed Ricardo Ulcuango as the Ambassador to Bolivia. Ulcuango was a well-known indigenous leader, former Pachakutik legislator, and member of the *Kayambi pueblo*.¹¹⁸ Correa also appointed Segundo Andrango, leader of FENOCIN and part of the *Otavalo Pueblo*, as Ambassador to El Salvador. Ceremonial announcements in the hometowns of the appointees accompanied the appointments. These signaled the specificity of the appointments honoring each of these *pueblos* in particular.

In 2014 the division of the indigenous population was clear. During May, June, and July of that year, the water resources law's (*Ley de Aguas*) debate and approval divided the indigenous population. Conaie and ECUARUNARI actively opposed the law and prepared a public demonstration to stop its approval (El Universo, 2014a). Both organizations staged a protest walking from the south part of the country towards Quito. Other indigenous groups, by contrast, supported the government. Amongst these groups was the Chimborazo Indigenous Federation. The group's leaders expressed their support for the *Ley de Aguas* with a pro-government demonstration (El Universo, 2014b). Notably, the Chimborazo Indigenous Federation is mainly conformed by the *pueblo Puruhá*, which, as discussed in the previous section, often complained about their lack of representation in CODENPE.

Nevertheless, this pueblo and its organization was (and is) officially part of Conaie and ECUARUNARI. However, on this issue, the group's leaders decided not to follow the invitation to join the demonstration against the government. Interestingly, on July 23, 2014, the government granted the Chimborazo Indigenous Federation new headquarters (Secretaría Nacional de la Gestión de la Política, 2014).

In 2015 the *indígena* identity's fragmentation became more evident. Antonio Vargas organized a meeting amongst different leaders of indigenous communities to "establish a dialogue with that state" (El Telégrafo, 2015). He stressed that the dialogue should be between the indigenous communities' leaders "directly with the pueblos and nationalities" and the government (El Telégrafo, 2015). Simultaneously, Conaie had formalized its position as opposition, which meant that direct talks between the organizations and the government were off the table. Vargas' meeting with the local leaders highlights by contrast that these leaders were willing to engage the state even if their larger umbrella organizations were against it.

¹¹⁷ The Government discourse was clear the foreign affairs minister Ricardo Patiño "announced that the government had decided to change its way of doing politics, and that it would begin to draw on the country's diversity by incorporating representatives from Ecuador's various nationalities into the diplomatic corps" (Becker, 2012, p. 82).

¹¹⁸ Becker (2012) summarizes in detail Ulcuango's achievements as a leader of the indigenous movement.

By the end of Correa's time in office, the fragmentation of the *indígena* identity was evident. The indigenous groups – organized around *pueblos* and nationalities – were active in accessing state benefits through development projects. They were also actively engaging the state, at times even going against the larger indigenous organization, Conaie. The basis of those rewards was the acquiescence of the groups with government policies and not their self-identification. This created an incentives system that was not as straightforward as the one set up during the 1998-2008 period but equally effective. The system made it more profitable for the indigenous population to organize into smaller groups than to go back into a cohesive organization. Therefore, the indigenous population remained fragmented.

This fragmentation process and the importance of the differentiated identities are directly reflected in the National Censuses of 2001 and 2010. In the 2001 Census, the state asked the population whether they self-identified as “indígena.” It also included an open question regarding possible different identities within the group, i.e., respondents could name any differentiated identity (*pueblo* or nationality) they identified with. By 2010, as discussed, the differentiated identities had become institutionalized. The state again asked individuals to self-identify under different categories, including the indígena category but constrained the second question to the *recognized pueblos* and nationalities, offering two more options as answers: “other” and “ignored.” In total, 83% of the respondents that self-identified as indigenous located themselves within these differentiated ethnic identities.

4.6 Pachakutik's support from a fragmented ethnic identity

This section uses the *indígena* identity fragmentation argument to understand the scant indigenous support for Pachakutik's candidates at the presidential and mayor elections.

4.6.1 The decline of ethnic voting at the presidential elections

Pachakutik's candidates limited electoral support at the presidential elections of 2006, 2013, and 2017 has been explained as caused by 1) the strategies employed by other political actors (e.g., Lucio Gutierrez and his brother Gilmar Gutierrez, and Rafael Correa); 2) the Ecuadorian voters' disenchantment with established political parties including Pachakutik (Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 111); and 3) the internal disputes within Pachakutik and the problems between the indigenous movement's leaders and the party's leaders (Lalander & Ospina, 2012, p. 25; Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 112). All of these explanations – when brought together – offer a detailed picture of the multiple factors that may have contributed to Pachakutik's electoral

support decline. They touch upon crucial aspects of Ecuador's political life, such as the impact of strong outsider candidates (Gutierrez and Correa), the general disenchantment of Ecuadorian voters with political parties, and Pachakutik's internal problems. However, these explanations miss the importance of the unity (or lack thereof) of the *indígena* category, which sharpens these explanations when brought in.

The first explanation argues that different parties and candidates' strategies have contributed to Pachakutik's electoral decline. The examples often cited are the Gutierrez brothers' clientelist strategy in 2006 (Lalander & Ospina, 2012, p. 25; Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 112), and Rafael Correa's use of ethnic cues and Pachakutik's programmatic platform (Lalander & Ospina, 2012, p. 25; Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 112). Both explanations are developed differently, and thus I engage with each separately.

In 2006 news outlets reported that the Gutierrez brothers delivered shovels, picks, and computers to several indigenous communities and that the *comuneros* (members of the communities) stated they would "re-pay" them with votes (Mijeski & Beck, 2011, pp. 111–112). The following argument was simple: the indigenous voters responded to these clientelist offers hence abandoning Pachakutik and voted for Gutierrez. As discussed in section 4.4 in 2006, the brothers' party received the bulk of the indigenous vote. This could indicate that the clientelist schemes of these politicians had the expected effect on the voters. However, this argument ignores one crucial issue: the indigenous' movement and Pachakutik criticized the practices of politicians and political parties of co-opting the indigenous voters with gifts and promises of candidacies (Llásag, 2012, p. 121; Van Cott, 2005, p. 117). It was partly due to these practices that Conaie eschewed electoral politics during the early 1990s. In 1996, Pachakutik was presented as the perfect solution to the "co-optation problem" (Van Cott, 2005, p. 117). The idea was that even if other parties would continue employing these strategies, the indigenous voters already had a *viable* representative and would not be bought. The Gutierrez brothers' strategies were, therefore, neither new nor unexpected. The indigenous population had been the center of many clientelistic efforts and vote-buying initiatives for years. It had pledged not to fall into these schemes.

The success of clientelist schemes makes little sense if we maintain the expectation of the indigenous voters as a unitary group that condemned such practices. By contrast, the explanation works if the expectation shifts and the indigenous population is taken as fragmented. As I discussed, since 1998, each group (*pueblos* and nationalities) developed its leadership who engaged the state – and was also able to engage with other political parties – to secure benefits. The fragmentation of the *indígena* identity could contribute to indigenous

groups (e.g., *comunas*) to be more willing to vote for a candidate in exchange for goods. The perspective of a fragmented *indígena* population sharpens the argument about clientelist schemes and their effect.

The second explanation argues that Rafael Correa took over Pachakutik's main programmatic agenda and employed *indígena* cues, including speaking in Kichwa and wearing a poncho, to appeal to the indigenous voters during his campaign. (Lalander & Ospina, 2012, p. 25; Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 112). The use of the symbols and the program, it is argued, directly impacted Pachakutik's support making many of the party's supporters support Correa. Yet, Pachakutik's candidate in 2006, Luis Macas, was *the* indigenous candidate and used Pachakutik's and Conaie's original policy platforms. From the perspective of ethnic voting and the expected effect of ethnic cues and co-ethnic candidates, it would make little sense for the *indígena* community to support a non-co-ethnic candidate, even if he employed ethnic cues and a similar platform.

However, we know from extant research that indigenous voters in Latin America only support indigenous parties if they are viable representatives of a given ethnic identity. In their absence, these voters tend to spread their votes amongst leftist and non-traditional parties (Madrid, 2005). The fragmentation of the *indígena* community could affect the indigenous voter's evaluation of Pachakutik's viability as a representative. In turn, Correa could benefit from the fragmentation of the group as indigenous voters often opt for leftist or outsider candidates absent a viable indigenous party. Correa's use of programmatic offerings linked to the indigenous population's needs and the possibility of delivering these benefits could likely mobilize indigenous voters in a more significant number. Amongst a fragmented group, these appeals could have more weight than the *indígena* appeals of Macas. Moreover, as Correa's time in office advanced and the government delivered on the recognition demands and social benefits, indigenous voters supporting him throughout the years would not be unexpected.

As it is clear, the explanations that focus on the parties' and the candidates' strategies to sway indigenous voters benefit from the fragmented identity argument's addition. Only when this is considered the effect of clientelistic appeals and the use of indigenous symbols and cues over the indigenous voters becomes more plausible.

The argument about the fragmentation of *indígena* identity also reinforces the explanations that focus on the Ecuadorian electorate's general dissatisfaction with all conventional political parties (Cohen, 2017). This explanation stresses the electorate's overall dissatisfaction with all political parties (Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 111). Moreover, this entails taking indigenous voters' preferences as similar to the other Ecuadorian voters. However, this

directly contradicts most of the work on Pachakutik's electoral support that assumes the opposite: that the indigenous voters are distinct. This dissonance is fixed when we add to the argument about dissatisfaction the argument of a fragmented *indígena* community. The divided voters could very well have similar voting preferences to the mestizo voters. The ecological inference estimations discussed earlier show that the indigenous voters behave similarly to the mestizo voters. This explanation for Pachakutik's electoral support decline holds more water when combined with the idea of fragmented indigenous voters.

Lastly, Pachakutik's electoral decline has also been explained as linked to the party's internal division and schisms within the indigenous movement. Scholars have highlighted divisions between the grassroots organizations and the party leadership (Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 112) and a division within the movements (Conaie and Pachakutik) due to programmatic disputes between factions (Lalander & Ospina, 2012, p. 25). The *indígena* population division that I have discussed contributes to sharpening the understanding of these internal disputes as likely fueled by different groups' interests.

4.6.2 Ethnic voting at the subnational elections

The fragmentation of the indigenous voters can easily explain the scarce indigenous support for the party's candidates at the subnational level. As multiple indigenous identities are used in various districts, the party may not be the best representative everywhere. It is the support that Pachakutik's candidates do get that is difficult to understand. If Pachakutik and its candidates are not viable representatives of the indigenous voters, why would they still get their votes?

The answer is that Pachakutik and its candidates at the subnational arena engage more with differentiated identities than the party does at the national arena. At the subnational level, differentiated recognition mattered greatly. As an expert explained, "holding differentiated identities became a strategy or a tool to continue fighting [for recognition and access to benefits] especially at the local level. Being part of Conaie did not mean that they [the groups] could not open up to other actors" (EXP-4, 2020). The strengthened local organizations developed "the skills to negotiate with Pachakutik and other political parties" (EXP- 4, 2020). As a result, different groups established relationships with Pachakutik when the party's local

branch's discourse matched their preferences. Still, they also established a relationship with other parties when (and if) it was necessary.¹¹⁹

Pachakutik hence became one of the many parties the *pueblos* and nationalities organizations could engage. Since the party's local branches, from the outset, were given the freedom to develop their strategies, this meant that the interests of local leaders and local party branches could match up (even when the national organization did not work as a good representative of the interests of the group at a national level). Nonetheless, an expert explained, "this was not the rule. Everyone continues to search for quotas and access to the state, and many parties offer benefits to these groups. It depends on who leads the movements. The local leaders are vital. They make agreements with whomever necessary" (EXP- 4, 2020).

In sum, the experts and Pachakutik's members I interviewed highlighted two things regarding the relationship between the indigenous voters and political parties, including Pachakutik, at the subnational level. First, local leaders are crucially important. They define who becomes a candidate, with which party, and whom the community will support. Second, the organizations do not always have the support of all indigenous voters in a district. Instead, it is often the case that there are multiple organizations in one district. Lastly, Pachakutik's local branches had enough freedom to develop their own strategies and make electoral alliances with the necessary organizations. However, this does not mean that they would do so with the largest or more important organization in a district. These three factors contributed to Pachakutik's fluctuating electoral outcomes.

4.7 Conclusion

The Ecuadorian paradox of recognition refers to the unintended consequences of the indigenous population's claim for differentiated recognition. This aimed to ensure the recognition of political and economic rights for the indigenous population (Pallares, 2002, p. 213). However, in the process, the strength and usefulness of the *indígena* identity was lost. The differentiated recognition had a critical consequence for the indigenous population. Each group developed a leadership structure able to engage the state and secure benefits. Hence, each group also became less dependent on national umbrella organizations such as Conaie.

¹¹⁹ It is difficult to assert with certainty where and when this happened. There is little data available about how electoral alliances in provinces and cantons take place. For one, Pachakutik does not keep records of the negotiation processes and thus researchers can only know of "positive" outcomes when the alliances are registered for elections. Secondly, local leaders often shift and are difficult to track down. I had no luck at contacting local leaders that had any knowledge about how the local alliances were decided.

The fragmentation of the indigenous population affected electoral politics. Pachakutik was created under the idea of a unified, strong, and coherent indigenous movement that had the support of the indigenous population and would additionally attract the support of many non-indigenous organizations. However, as the category *indígena* fragmented, the population that self-identified with this party – arguably the core voters of Pachakutik– found their own political spaces independently (EXP-4, 2020).

I traced the fragmentation of the indigenous population between 2002 and 2019 in the previous sections. There was an evident decline in the number of indigenous voters supporting Pachakutik’s candidates as differentiated self-identification and benefits allocation processes advanced. Particularly at the national level, the indigenous voters have often voted for parties other than Pachakutik. At the local level, the voters’ fragmentation is not as evident – in terms of support for other parties – but this does not mean that the indigenous voters have not fragmented. Instead, the fact that more indigenous voters support the party’s candidates likely reflects what Pachakutik’s members, leaders, and commentators have often described as part of the party’s strength: its connection to the local arenas. Nonetheless, in both arenas, the voting patterns of the indigenous voters resemble the mestizo voters’ voting patterns, signaling an absence of an “ethnic pull” between the party, the candidates, and the indigenous voters.

Pachakutik’s survival cannot be *easily* explained by the party’s connection to the indigenous population. Although this is a common expectation, this chapter shows that the party’s relationship with these voters is feeble. The party is not the recipient of these voters’ undivided support. Pachakutik’s survival hence continues to be a phenomenon that requires further research.

This chapter also helps highlight one of the questions that chapter 3 opened up: how does the party mobilize mestizo voters? The EI estimations, particularly at the subnational level, show these voters support the party’s candidates in considerable numbers. Chapter 5 addresses this.

