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## **Surviving against all odds: Pachakutik's electoral support, mobilization strategies, and goal achievement between 1996 and 2019**

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### **Citation**

Dávila Gordillo, D. L. (2021, July 1). *Surviving against all odds: Pachakutik's electoral support, mobilization strategies, and goal achievement between 1996 and 2019*. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3185908>

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**Note:** To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Cover Page



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**Author:** Dávila Gordillo, D.L.

**Title:** Surviving against all odds: Pachakutik's electoral support, mobilization strategies, and goal achievement between 1996 and 2019

**Issue date:** 2021-07-01



# Surviving against all odds:

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electoral support,  
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and goal achievement  
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Diana Dávila Gordillo



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Cover Design: Ce Larrea

Cover Layout: Ricardo Chávez

Print: Proefschriftenprinten.nl

Surviving against all odds:  
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and 2019

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van  
de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,  
op gezag van rector magnificus prof.dr.ir. H. Bijl,  
volgens besluit van het college voor promoties  
te verdedigen op donderdag 1 juli 2021  
klokke 16:15 uur

door

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Dr. Thomas Mustillo (University of Notre Dame)

Dr. Imke Harbers (Universiteit van Amsterdam)



## Acknowledgements

On March 22, 2016, I landed in the Netherlands to start my Ph.D. I expected that would be the beginning of a long, exhilarating, but lonely path. After all, I had come to the Netherlands to become an independent researcher. However, my Ph.D. path was anything but lonely, and this is thanks to all the people I mention here. You have all contributed to making this a joyous journey.

I would like to start by thanking my supervisory team, Maria, Frank, and Petr. You have been wonderful supervisors, truly the best. You were always there whenever I had questions about the dissertation and when I just needed a chat, a snack, or a drink. I am thankful to Maria for letting me get to know Lara and Jim, who greatly contributed to making me feel at home, and introducing me to her lovely Bulgarian friends, especially Milena. Frank and Petr were also always present and attentive to all my worries and needs. I have learned from my three supervisors how to navigate academia and life in general, and I am forever indebted.

My life at Leiden and the Institute would not have been the same without all of my colleagues, particularly Francesco Ragazzi, Nicolas Blarel, Rebekah Tromble, Djessie Lighart, Michael Meffert, Joop van Holsteijn, Huib Pellikaan, and Daniëlle Lovink. Dannie, your joyful presence and your “spin-doctor” abilities made everyday fun.

Numerous friends supported me along the way. Honorata Mazepus, my Polish better half, filled my weekends with food, wine, and laughs. We bonded over the weirdest thing – having husbands living abroad – and became the best of friends. I cannot leave out Florian van Leeuwen who helped us continue the tradition of running, happy eating, and shopping weekends. I was never lonely when I was with you guys. I am thankful to Wouter Veenendaal, who often joined us and has been one of the true believers that I would make it to the defense. Thomas Scarff, the host extraordinaire, you have been the best of friends and spoiled me to no end. Of course, this was only possible because Annemyn van Nieuwenhuyzen was a graceful and patient hostess. Jelena Kozowyk-Konjicija and Paul Kozowyk were always around. Tamara Pinos, Pierre-Elie Crouzet, and the growing Pinos-Crouzet family always offered an Ecuadorian home away from home.

Not everyone was with me in Leiden, but that did not mean they were not *there* for me. María Patricia Ordoñez provided support on-site and from Ecuador. Sebastian Vallejo, my partner-in-research, became my friend since our first conversation, and I would not have made it without him. Ernesto Calvo was not wrong when he suggested it be a good idea to meet. I will always be thankful for that and his support and help for chapter 4.

My non-academic friends, Olga, Anita, and my *reinos*, Teps and Claudia, gave me a line to earth. My families, the extended Dávila and Gordillo families, and the in-laws, the Moya, the Dobronski, and the Willis families were always supportive and celebrated each step of the way. My parents Diego and Beatriz, and my brothers Juan Diego and José Ignacio always believed in me, showering me with unquestioning love. And lastly, but most importantly, the one that was always there, Juan Fernando. You were my sunshine when skies were grey. Thank you for everything.

## Abstract

The Ecuadorian party, *Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik* (MUPP or Pachakutik), is a 24-year-old party with low levels of electoral support and scarce resources. Conventional theories of party survival cannot explain this party's persistence. Common wisdom predicts parties with both consistently low levels of electoral support and lack of resources will disband, but Pachakutik does not.

The lack of a theory that can explain Pachakutik's survival suggests that this party is unique, but it is not. In fact, Pachakutik is an example of a myriad of parties that inhabit party systems across the world. Why do parties with low electoral support and few resources persist? This dissertation addresses that question and introduces a theory of party survival that focuses on why parties may *choose* to survive, change, or disband. Parties can persist if they achieve their primary goal, and this may happen even when a party has scarce resources and low (or fluctuating) levels of electoral support. Parties pursue different primary goals – policy, office, or value-infusion – and, as such, evaluate goal achievement differently (in terms of their own aspiration levels based on prior performance).

The case of Pachakutik illustrates this theory and its mechanisms. First, Pachakutik is presented as a party with low levels of electoral support and scarce resources. Second, the party's connection to the indigenous population in Ecuador is explored. Conventional knowledge about the party suggests that this connection will determine the party's persistence, but my findings show that the party does not receive the undivided support of the indigenous voters. On average, only 25% of the indigenous voters' support goes to Pachakutik's candidates. Nonetheless, the party's candidates also receive support from mestizo voters, contributing to the party's overall vote count. This support is likely possible due to the party using multiple mobilization strategies to mobilize voters. The party's candidates employ different mobilization strategies, often together (mixed), in each district.

Lastly, the party's survival is analyzed from a goal achievement perspective. Pachakutik has pursued three different goals between 1996 and 2017. From 1996 to 2002, the party was a policy-seeking party. Between 2002 and 2006, the party turned into an office seeking party. From 2006 until 2017, the party turned into a value-infusion-seeking party. Pachakutik achieved its goal of policy advancement during the 1996-2002 period. The party changed its primary goal for the following period and failed to achieve its goal. Although the party had numerous office appointments during the early months of 2003, these did not last. Pachakutik finished the 2002-2006 period without reaching its goal while also losing multiple

party members. However, the party did not disband. Instead, the party leaders changed the party's primary goal and started to protect the party organization. Pachakutik has achieved the goal of infusing value to the organization between 2006 and 2017. In that period the party has grown, become more cohesive, and overall, the party organization's value has increased.

This dissertation combines qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis and rests on archival data, interviews, and quantitative data collected during over 11 months of fieldwork in Ecuador.

**Keywords:** Pachakutik, party survival, aspiration levels, goal achievement, ethnic parties, ethnic voting, Ecuador

## Samenvatting

*Overleven tegen alle verwachtingen in: Pachakutik's electorale steun, mobilisatiestrategieën, en doelrealisatie tussen 1996 en 2019*

De Ecuadoriaanse partij Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (MUPP of Pachakutik) is een 24-jaar oude partij die weinig electorale steun en schaarse middelen heeft. Conventionele theorieën over het voortbestaan van partijen kunnen het voortbestaan van deze partij niet verklaren. De gangbare opvatting is dat partijen met zowel consistent weinig electorale steun als een gebrek aan middelen zullen verdwijnen, maar Pachakutik doet dat niet.

Het gebrek aan een theorie die het voortbestaan van Pachakutik kan verklaren, suggereert dat deze partij uniek is, echter dat is niet het geval. In feite is Pachakutik een voorbeeld van talloze partijen die over de hele wereld in partijsystemen voorkomen. Waarom blijven partijen met weinig electorale steun en weinig middelen bestaan? Deze dissertatie gaat in op die vraag en introduceert een theorie over het voortbestaan van partijen die zich richt op de vraag waarom partijen ervoor kiezen om voort te bestaan, te veranderen, of zichzelf op te heffen. Partijen kunnen blijven bestaan als zij hun primaire doelstellingen bereiken, en dit kan zelfs gebeuren als een partij over weinig middelen en weinig (of fluctuerende) electorale steun beschikt. Partijen streven verschillende primaire doelen na - beleid, ambt, of waarde-infusie - en evalueren het bereiken van doelen verschillend (in termen van hun eigen aspiratieniveaus op basis van eerdere prestaties).

Het geval van Pachakutik illustreert deze theorie en de mechanismen ervan. Ten eerste wordt Pachakutik gepresenteerd als een partij met weinig electorale steun en schaarse middelen. Ten tweede wordt de band tussen de partij en de inheemse bevolking in Ecuador onderzocht. De bestaande kennis over de partij suggereert dat deze band bepalend zal zijn voor het voortbestaan van de partij, maar mijn bevindingen tonen aan dat de partij niet de onverdeelde steun krijgt van de inheemse kiezers. Gemiddeld gaat slechts 25% van de steun van de inheemse kiezers naar de kandidaten van Pachakutik. Desondanks krijgen de kandidaten van de partij ook steun van mestizo-kiezers, wat bijdraagt aan het totale aantal stemmen van de partij. Deze steun is waarschijnlijk mogelijk doordat de partij meerdere mobilisatiestrategieën gebruikt om kiezers te mobiliseren. De kandidaten van de partij gebruiken verschillende mobilisatiestrategieën, vaak samen (gecombineerd), in elk district.

Tenslotte wordt het voortbestaan van de partij geanalyseerd vanuit het perspectief van doelrealisatie. Pachakutik heeft tussen 1996 en 2017 drie verschillende doelen nagestreefd.

Van 1996 tot 2002 was de partij een *policy-seeking* partij. Tussen 2002 en 2006 was de partij *office-seeking*. Van 2006 tot 2017 was de partij een *value-infusion-seeking* partij. Pachakutik bereikte haar doel van beleidsbevordering in de periode 1996-2002. In de daaropvolgende periode veranderde de partij van hoofddoel en slaagde er niet in haar doel te bereiken. Hoewel de partij in de eerste maanden van 2003 tal van ambtsbenoemingen had, hielden deze geen stand. Pachakutik eindigde de periode 2002-2006 zonder haar doel te bereiken en verloor ook meerdere partijleden. De partij werd echter niet ontbonden. In plaats daarvan veranderden de partijleiders het hoofddoel van de partij en begonnen ze de partijorganisatie te beschermen. Pachakutik heeft tussen 2006 en 2017 het doel bereikt om waarde aan de organisatie toe te voegen. In die periode is de partij gegroeid, is er meer samenhang gekomen en is de waarde van de partijorganisatie toegenomen.

Deze dissertatie combineert kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve analysemethoden en is gebaseerd op archiefgegevens, interviews en kwantitatieve data verzameld tijdens meer dan 11 maanden veldwerk in Ecuador.

**Trefwoorden:** Pachakutik, voortbestaan van partijen, aspiratieniveaus, doelrealisatie, etnische partijen, etnisch stemmen, Ecuador

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## List of Acronyms

AECID	<i>Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo</i>
APRA	<i>Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana</i>
CFP	<i>Concentración de Fuerzas Populares</i>
CNE	<i>Consejo Nacional Electoral</i>
CNIPN	<i>Consejo Nacional para la Igualdad de Pueblos y Nacionalidades</i>
CODENPE	<i>Consejo de Desarrollo de las Nacionalidades y Pueblos del Ecuador</i>
Conaie	<i>Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador</i>
Conaice	<i>Confederación de Nacionalidades y Pueblos Indígenas de la Costa Ecuatoriana</i>
CONFENAIE	<i>Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana</i>
CONPLADEIN	<i>Consejo Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo para los Pueblos Indígenas y Negros del Ecuador</i>
COOTAD	<i>Código Orgánico de Organización Territorial, Autonomía y Descentralización</i>

COPEI	<i>Comité de Organización Político Electoral Independiente</i>
CREO	<i>Movimiento CREO – Creando Oportunidades</i>
CTI	<i>Circunscripciones Territoriales Indígenas</i>
DP-UDC	Democracia Popular – Unión Demócrata Cristiana
ECUARUNARI	<i>Ecuador Runakunapak Rikcharimuy</i>
EMELEC	<i>Empresa Eléctrica del Ecuador</i>
ENPS	Effective number of parties by seats
FEINE	<i>Consejo de Pueblos y organizaciones Indígenas Evangélicos del Ecuador</i>
FORMIA	<i>Proyecto Fortalecimiento de Municipios Indígenas Alternativos</i>
ID	<i>Izquierda Democrática</i>
MAS	<i>Movimiento al Socialismo</i>
MICC	<i>Movimiento Indígena Campesino de Cotopaxi</i>
MNTV	Multiple non-transferable votes
MPD	<i>Movimiento Popular Democrático</i>
MPAIS	<i>Movimiento Alianza PAIS - Patria Altiva i Soberana</i>



PJ	<i>Primero Justicia</i>
PR	Proportional Representation
PRIAN	<i>Partido Renovador Institucional de Acción Nacional</i>
PRE	<i>Partido Roldosista Ecuatorina</i>
PRODEPINE	<i>Proyecto de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas y Negros del Ecuador</i>
PSE	<i>Partido Socialista Ecuatoriano</i>
PT	Partido os Trabalhadores
PS-FA	<i>Partido Socialista – Frente Amplio</i>
PSC	<i>Partido Social Cristiano</i>
PSP	<i>Partido Sociedad Patriótica</i>
SENAIME	<i>Secretaría Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas y minorías étnicas</i>
TSE	<i>Tribunal Supremo Electoral</i>



# 1 Introduction

In October 2019, the Ecuadorian indigenous population took to the streets and paralyzed the country for almost ten days. This event resembled the well-known June of 1990 *levantamiento* (uprising) that, at the time, was the first display of the indigenous movement's strength and unity. The indigenous population's ability to coordinate these national *levantamientos* back in the 1990s and early 2000s pushed the state to backtrack austerity measures and even contributed to the ousting of two presidents. The 2019 *levantamiento* had an outcome similar to the previous *levantamientos*. After the confrontation, mostly localized in Quito, the government backtracked the austerity measures that had started the indigenous mobilization.



*Figure 1.1 Mural: Somos granos de la misma mazorca by David Sur. Painted in a house of the comuna Tocachi. Photo by the artist.<sup>1</sup>*

As the indigenous population and their supporters returned to their houses, having partially achieved what they aimed to achieve, two crucial questions popped up: was this a signal of the

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<sup>1</sup> David Sur allowed me to use this picture of his art free of cost. I can only repay his generosity thanking him once again.

indigenous movement's return to the political arena as a strong actor? And, what did this mean for the indigenous party Pachakutik<sup>2</sup>?

The 2019 *levantamiento* was a breath of fresh air for the otherwise dormant (often described as in crisis) indigenous movement. In the midst of the social unrest, an artist from Quito, David Sur, painted the mural “*Somos granos de la misma mazorca*” in the *comuna Tocachi* in response to the high levels of police brutality experienced by the indigenous population. He explained to me that it represented the unity of the indigenous population. They stood their ground together. The mural is also an allegory to the well-known words of the indigenous leader, Transito Amaguaña: “*Somos como la mazorca, si se va el grano, se va la fila, si se va la fila, se acaba la mazorca*” which translates roughly into “we are like the corncob, if one kernel is gone, the whole line is gone, if the line is gone, the corn cob is gone.” Transito Amaguaña's words referred to the necessary unity amongst the indigenous population and how their strength depended on this unity.<sup>3</sup> One of the indigenous leaders at the October 2019 *levantamiento*, Leonida Iza, also used these words. He reminded all of the indigenous movement's groups that they should not become loose kernels but stay in the corn cob (“*no podemos desgranarnos*”).<sup>4</sup>

The indigenous movement's strength has informed many of the arguments developed around the indigenous party Pachakutik, particularly those regarding the party's strength. The party was created in 1996 and entered the electoral arena as a *viable indigenous party*. To stick to the corncob metaphor, this was a party seen as the likely beneficiary of unity of the corn kernels. The party leaders stressed that it would concentrate the indigenous voters' support (Madrid, 2005; Van Cott & Birnir, 2007).

Pachakutik received enough electoral support to be granted international recognition during its first years. The party members were elected at national and subnational elections, and in 2002, the candidate the party supported was elected president. The party members' presence in the political arena was suggested to positively affect Ecuador's overall democracy (Van Cott, 2005, 2008). However, after 2006, Pachakutik's electoral support at the national level declined dramatically. The party went from receiving an average of 18.64% of the national vote in three elections (1996, 1998, and 2002) to an average of 4.06% of the national

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<sup>2</sup> The full name of the party is: *Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik* (MUPP or Pachakutik)

<sup>3</sup> As this dissertation was going into print, Guadalupe Llori, Pachakutik's legislator, was elected president of the Asamblea Nacional. On the day of Guillermo Lasso's inauguration (May 24, 2021), Llori's speech started with Transito Amaguaña's words.

<sup>4</sup> Leonidas Iza spoke to a group in Quito on October 15, 2019. Radio Latacunga posted a video of this on its Facebook page accessible here: <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=535273760349681>

vote between 2006 and 2017. This electoral support decline – also visible at the legislative elections – was taken as the first sign of Pachakutik’s impending breakdown (Beck, Mijeski, & Stark, 2011; Madrid, 2012).<sup>5</sup>

Between 2006 and 2019, the indigenous movement’s presence in the political arena also dwindled. Rafael Correa’s administrations (from 2006 to 2017) actively sought to hinder any actions from social movements, including the indigenous organizations. The government’s efforts were effective. In fact, until 2019, there was an absence of successful social organization and public demonstrations, especially from the indigenous population (de la Torre, 2013a, p. 29). As Carlos de la Torre (2013) argues, the indigenous movement was in crisis, “temporarily losing its capacity to engage in sustained collective action” (p. 28). Bringing back the metaphor of the corncob and the kernels, it was only in 2019 that it made sense to think of the indigenous population as unified (part of the corncob) rather than as a fragmented set of independent groups (a loose set of corn kernels). It had been years since the indigenous population had shown its organizational skills and capability to hold a whole country at a standstill.<sup>6</sup>

The party’s declining electoral support and the weak indigenous organization seemed to foretell the party’s end. Notwithstanding these omens of party breakdown, by 2019, when the *levantamiento* took place, Pachakutik was a party with an active presence in the Ecuadorian political arena. Despite receiving less than 4% of the national vote in every election since 2002, the party consistently won seats at the legislature and the governments of provinces, cantons, and rural parishes on every election.<sup>7</sup> In 2019, the party held five seats at the legislature (out of 137 seats). Moreover, it was the third party with the most elected candidates at the subnational elections, with over 663 party members elected as prefects, mayors, municipal council members, and parish council members.<sup>8</sup>

## 1.1 Pachakutik’s unlikely survival

Pachakutik is a 24-year-old party with a clear and active presence in the Ecuadorian political arena. However, the party’s persistence has gone undiscussed. More attention has been given

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<sup>5</sup> As I finished writing this dissertation in April 2021 Pachakutik’s electoral performance changed. The party’s presidential candidate, Yaku Perez, received 19.39% of the national vote finishing third in a very close race to the second round, and in total 27 of the party’s candidates received at seat at the National Assembly.

<sup>6</sup> While the indigenous movement organized a number of demonstrations between 2000 and 2019 the most consequential of these, before 2019, was the January 2000 *levantamiento* which contributed to the ousting of president Jamil Mahuad.

<sup>7</sup> Ecuador is divided administratively into 24 provinces, 221 cantons, and 1040 urban and rural parishes.

<sup>8</sup> See chapter 3, table 3.7 for a detailed overview of the number of party members elected at the subnational elections.

to the sharp decline of the party's electoral support in 2006 – explained by mestizo voters and mestizo party members abandoning the party (Madrid, 2012; Mijeski & Beck, 2011) – than to the consistency of the party's electoral outcomes at subnational elections or the slight increase in electoral support for the party's candidates at the national elections. The unspoken explanation for the party's electoral results has been the same used to explain the party's formation; Pachakutik stood on the strong indigenous movement's shoulders and thus should garner their electoral support.

However, as mentioned already, the indigenous movement was not effectively strong for much of the time Pachakutik has persisted. This opens up the question: what explains Pachakutik's persistence?

Extant knowledge about the party offers minimal clues about possible explanations for the party's longevity. As mentioned already, the party receives scarce electoral support. Moreover, the indigenous social movement, which could be taken as the purveyor of resources for the party organization, has been weakened for a long time. Additionally, the Ecuadorian political arena does not appear to have a particularly welcoming institutional set-up for weak parties to persist. Between 2006 and 2019, numerous political parties disbanded, including parties created before Pachakutik, such as the *Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano* (PRE), which lost its official registration in mid-2014.

Pachakutik is a party that persists despite having scarce resources and receiving low levels of electoral support. Conventional theories of party survival are at odds when tasked with explaining this type of party's persistence. The common wisdom would expect parties with low levels of electoral support to disband as their electoral failures become consistent (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000; Harmel & Robertson, 1985; Kitschelt, 1988; Levitsky, Loxton, & van Dyck, 2016; Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006; Morgan, 2011, 2018; Obert & Müller, 2017; Seawright, 2012; Tavits, 2008; Zur, 2019). Setting aside electoral support, Pachakutik's lack of resources (given the weakness of the indigenous movement) goes against the expectations of theories that explain party survival as likely when parties have access to different types of resources (Beyens, Lucardie, & Deschouwer, 2016; Bolleyer, 2013; Bolleyer & Bytzeck, 2013; Burgess & Levitsky, 2003; Casal Bértoa & Spirova, 2019; Cyr, 2017; Deegan-Krause & Haughton, 2018; Dolenc & Širinić, 2017; Grzymala-Busse, 2002; Kopecký & Mair, 2012; Rose & Mackie, 1988; Tavits, 2013).

The lack of a theory on party survival to understand Pachakutik's persistence suggests this party is unique. However, this is not the case. Pachakutik is, in fact, an example of a myriad of parties that inhabit party systems across the world. These are parties that persist with low

levels or fluctuating levels of electoral support and scarce resources. To name only a few cases in Latin America, Peru's *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA), Venezuela's *Primero Justicia* (PJ), Ecuador's *Izquierda Democrática* (ID) are all parties that persist with fluctuating levels of electoral support and scarce resources.

This type of parties (parties that persist with low or fluctuating levels of electoral support and with scarce resources) should garner more attention than the one they are currently receiving. These parties fulfill functions within the democratic arena (Cyr, 2017; Sartori, 1976). These are parties that can affect both elections and policy-making. As Bolleyer and colleagues (2019) state, “only new parties that contest more than a few elections can broaden the offer of the party system and may have a direct or indirect impact on policy-making, by entering government or by triggering shifts in the offer of mainstream parties” (p. 20). Moreover, these parties may offer important insight into organizational stability and longevity. Understanding their persistence's determinants is crucial for understanding their effects (and importance) on political systems.

In this dissertation, I introduce a theory that addresses why parties may choose to survive, change, or disband. I argue that parties can survive (or survive while adapting) when they achieve their primary goals and that these goals differ from party to party (Harmel & Janda, 1994). I approach political parties from a sociological perspective that emphasizes that parties are not only tools for ambitious politicians. Parties are complex and multidimensional organizations driven by group goals that participate in electoral processes and fulfill different functions within a democracy (Bawn et al., 2012, p. 571; Bolleyer et al., 2019, p. 20; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 5; Monroe, 2001, p. 21; Mudge & Chen, 2014, p. 310). I define persistent parties as those that 1) fulfill at least one of the different functions that parties execute in democracy and 2) present candidates to national and/or local elections after breakthrough. A party will be considered dead if it stops presenting candidates at any election (Bolleyer et al., 2019).

This thesis' argument does not differ much from the standard arguments about party survival, wherein parties are expected to disband as they stop achieving their (electoral) goals (e.g., Spirova, 2007). The difference is that instead of putting vote-maximization as the core (and only) goal parties pursue, I argue that parties can pursue different goals (see similar arguments in: Bolleyer et al., 2019; Deschouwer, 2009; Kitschelt, 1989), and that they will persist as long as they continue to achieve this primary goal. Parties may be policy-seeking, office-seeking, and parties may also seek to ensure their organizations' continuity (i.e., hold a

value-infusion goal).<sup>9</sup> Each of these goals may be achieved by different means. Thus, party persistence will not be determined solely by electoral outcomes or the resources parties can access. This dissertation's proposed theory is useful for explaining the persistence of parties that survive with low or fluctuating levels of electoral support and scarce resources.

I use the case of Pachakutik to illustrate this theory of party survival. This party is the perfect example of a party that persists with few resources and low levels of electoral support. This is, however, not immediately evident. The party is commonly regarded as relying heavily on the indigenous organization for its resources (linked to its roots). Therefore, in this dissertation, in addition to developing the theory of party survival, I take the necessary steps to demonstrate the party is indeed one with few resources and low levels of electoral support.

### **1.2 The organization of the book**

Chapter 2 introduces the theory of party survival discussed in this introduction. I first take stock of extant theories of party survival and argue that they are missing a crucial consideration: parties will need to choose to persist or disband. It is hence necessary to think through the decision-making process of political parties. I argue parties will decide to persist if they achieve their primary goal or if they are likely to achieve their primary goal, even if, at the moment of deciding, they have not achieved their primary goal. Achievement is conceptualized in terms of a party surpassing or reaching its aspiration level. Instead of expecting parties to be maximizers, I argue parties will be satisfiers aiming only to get a minimum acceptable level in terms of their goals. This chapter also introduces a method to identify a party's primary goal and a goal achievement evaluation method, necessary to understand parties' survival decision-making processes.

Chapter 3 introduces Pachakutik as a party that has persisted for over 24 years with scarce resources and low levels of electoral support. This chapter reviews the party's electoral performance at national and subnational levels and examines the party's organization's strength and resources. Furthermore, this chapter discusses Ecuador's political history, the evolution of party regulation in Ecuador and the party system to clarify Pachakutik's context between 1996 and 2020.

Chapter 4 addresses the most likely explanation for Pachakutik's persistence: its connection to the indigenous population. I explore this connection by focusing on the voting

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<sup>9</sup> I introduce this party primary goal in more detail in chapter 2. This goal relates to the party members' interest of ensuring the persistence of an organization *per se* and not only as a tool to pursue their own goals. This is done by infusing the organization with value and routinizing decision-making procedures.



patterns of the indigenous voters. The expectation was that if the party had a strong relationship with these voters, i.e., the indigenous voters supported the party as a block, then the party's survival could be explained as dependent on these voters' commitment to the party organization. Using the ecological inference technique to explore the indigenous voters' voting patterns, I find that less than 25% of the indigenous voters vote for Pachakutik's candidates at national and subnational elections. Pachakutik is not the recipient of Ecuador's ethnic vote, understood as the indigenous voters voting together.

Interestingly, the ecological inference estimations suggest no ethnic voting in Ecuador, as the indigenous voters appear to split their votes amongst multiple parties. I thus advance a possible explanation for the indigenous voters splitting their votes and argue this is due to the fragmentation of the *indígena* identity into *pueblos*<sup>10</sup> and nationalities. In short, I argue the indigenous population should not be taken as a single and unified group but as a loose set of independent groups.

Chapter 5 addresses one puzzling fact about Pachakutik's electoral performances: the party's stable support at the subnational elections, which seems to come from indigenous and mestizo voters alike. This chapter aims to answer the research question: how does Pachakutik mobilize indigenous and mestizo voters? I explore Pachakutik's mobilization strategies at the mayor's elections of 2014. I look into the working plans presented by the candidates and analyze them using qualitative content analysis. This analysis shows the party uses multiple mobilization strategies (programmatic, clientelistic, and symbolic ethnic-based, symbolic party-based, and symbolic candidate-based) to mobilize voters. I find Pachakutik's candidates employ different strategies, often together (mixed), in each district. Notably, the party does not always use symbolic ethnic-based appeals. In a little under 48% of the districts, the party's candidates do not use any form of symbolic ethnic appeals. I find Pachakutik's candidates' campaigns do not focus solely on indigenous voters. Instead, the party appears to concentrate as well on mestizo voters. This attention is arguably well received as the party's electoral support analysis shows mestizo voters consistently support the party's candidates.

Chapter 3, 4, and 5 set the scene to present Pachakutik as a party with low levels of electoral support and with scarce resources. Building on this, chapter 6 explores the party's survival from a goal achievement perspective. The party's persistence evaluation focuses on

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<sup>10</sup> Mark Becker (2011) asserts that a nationality comprises a group of people who share common customs, cosmology, and way of life and a *pueblo* refers to a population with an "ancestral relationship dating to the period of colonization or formation of the state that conserves their own institutions, customs, traditions, and territories"(2011, p. 5). Some authors have chosen to translate "pueblo" into "peoples", however because of the particular definition of pueblo, it is best not to translate it

the period between 1996 and 2017 and uses the party goal identification and goal achievement evaluation methods introduced in chapter 2. I argue the party has pursued different primary goals throughout the years. The party was a policy-seeking party between 1996 and 2002, turned into an office-seeking party between 2002 and 2006, and eventually transformed into a value-infusion-seeking party from 2006 until the present days. The party has achieved its primary goals during many of the periods of analysis, which contributes to the party's survival. The party surpassed its aspiration level during the 1998-2002 period (compared to its performance in the 1996 -1998 period), did the same during the 2009-2013 period (compared to the 2006-2009 period), and surpassed its aspiration level during the 2013-2017 period (compared to its performance during the 2009-2013 period).

Chapter 7 brings all elements from the other chapters together to discuss Pachakutik's survival as an illustration of the party survival theory introduced in chapter 2. I explore alternative explanations for the party's survival, such as the influence of ambitious politicians, the context in which the party persists, i.e., party regulation and the state's control over political parties, and the possible effect of other parties' disbandment. I argue these explanations are not enough to make sense of Pachakutik's persistence. Lastly, I discuss the importance of understanding the survival of parties like Pachakutik and possible avenues for further research.

### **1.3 The relevance of the research**

Although it is unorthodox to present the research's relevance after presenting the book's structure, this is necessary because of each chapters' multiple topics. This dissertation speaks to numerous research agendas.

First, this dissertation advances the overall research agenda on Ecuadorian politics and specifically research on Pachakutik. Research on Pachakutik stalled during the early 2000s (mostly after 2006) and has since then dwindled (Van Cott, 2005, 2008). This dissertation engages in a detailed analysis of Pachakutik's evolution, from its formation until current times focusing on the party's electoral performances at the national and subnational elections and its organizational resources' development. I make three important arguments: 1) Pachakutik's persistence cannot be linked solely to the support the party receives from the indigenous voters; 2) Pachakutik is an ethnic party that mixes and segments strategies across and within districts which likely contribute to the party's mestizo electoral support; and 3) Pachakutik is no longer a policy-oriented party.

Second, this dissertation also speaks to the scholarship on ethnic politics in Latin America and beyond. It highlights the need to take seriously the malleability of ethnic identities and the fact that it might be a mistake to look for an “ethnic pull” between a party and an ethnic group without first questioning the ethnic identity linking them. For research in Latin America, this means that research on the voting patterns of indigenous voters (ethnic voting) and how these voters interact with indigenous parties should be prefaced with a question addressing whether the ethnic identities connecting the party’s and the voters make sense (see, for example, Hirsland & Strijbis, 2019).

Third, this dissertation also contributes to the study of political parties’ mobilization strategies. This research agenda is slowly moving towards an understanding of parties employing multiple strategies at a time to mobilize voters (Calvo & Murillo, 2019; Halvorsen, 2019; Luna, 2014; Thachil, 2014a), against the common-place idea that parties will use a single strategy to mobilize voters (Kitschelt, 2000). The theoretical framework developed in chapter 5, and especially the conceptualization of how parties may use multiple strategies, contributes to expanding the tool-kit researchers have to understand this phenomenon.

Lastly, this dissertation focuses on the underdogs of parties, which are seldom at the center of any research agenda. These are parties often considered irrelevant, that rarely reach standard electoral support thresholds, or do not hold a specific number of seats at the legislature. However, these parties populate multiple party systems and are likely to affect those party systems and policy-making processes (Bolleyer et al., 2019). As these parties persist against all odds, studying their survival strategies can enrich our understanding of all parties’ organizational survival and their impact on party systems and elections.



## 2 Party survival: achieving goals

New parties are not a rare phenomenon. As elections loom, countless new parties join existing parties in their bids to get their candidates elected in both advanced and new democracies. Most of these new parties often fail to make it past that first electoral cycle. After the election, many new parties disband, alongside some older parties, – and do not present any candidates in the next election. By contrast, a different group of parties (new and older) attracts high levels of electoral support and continues to do so in follow up elections. These parties persist throughout the years and attract most of the scholarly attention in the discipline. There is a third group of parties between those parties that disband and those that attract high levels of electoral support and sail smoothly into the next elections. These are parties that continue to present candidates in follow up elections and fulfill at least one of a party's function in a democracy,<sup>11</sup> but do so without attracting high levels of electoral support. Although these parties are not rare, their persistence is an underexplained phenomenon.

The parties in this last group are generally expected to wither down and disappear due to their low levels of electoral support. Many of these parties do meet this fate and, after a second or third election, disband. Nonetheless, it is also the case that many of these parties survive<sup>12</sup> past common expectations. These parties remain actors in the democratic arena of both new and advanced democracies. However, although ubiquitous, these *persistent* parties have been empirically and theoretically ignored (exceptions are: Bolleyer, 2013; Bolleyer et al., 2019; Casal Bértoa & Spirova, 2019; Cyr, 2016, 2017). At times, some of these parties garner academic scholarship's attention, to be sure, but they do so based on some particular specific trait (e.g., see Deschouwer, 2009 on Belgian regionalist parties; and Kitschelt, 1989 on Green parties). In general, most of these parties remain understudied. In the Latin American context, examples of these parties – that persist despite low levels of electoral support – include (to name a few): Venezuela's *Primero Justicia* (PJ), Ecuador's *Izquierda Democrática* (ID), and Peru's *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA). These, incidentally, are some of the few parties from these persisting parties that have garnered scholarly attention.

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<sup>11</sup>The functions a party organization performs in a democracy are 1) serve as linkages between civil society and government, 2) participate in the public debate (shaping how citizens approach politics), 3) mobilize and represent their voters, contest elections, recruit and train political leaders, and 4) organize and coordinate government (Aldrich, 1995).

<sup>12</sup>For the purposes of this dissertation survival and persistence are interchangeable concepts. A party that persists/survives is one that continuously participates in electoral processes and fulfills at least one the functions political parties perform in democracies.

Why would a party such as these persist? As mentioned, extant research has yet to address these parties directly, and concomitantly suggest a theory on their survival. The literature on party survival has focused on the survival of new (and older) parties that attract high levels of electoral support (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000; Harmel & Robertson, 1985; Kitschelt, 1988; Levitsky et al., 2016; Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006; Morgan, 2011, 2018; Obert & Müller, 2017; Seawright, 2012; Tavits, 2008; Zur, 2019). Alternatively, other scholars have focused on party survival as determined by the resources parties hold: where more resources may contribute to political parties' survival (Bolleyer, 2013; Cyr, 2017; Tavits, 2013). The parties at the center of this dissertation do not resemble these parties. They receive either few votes during elections or hold non-linear electoral trajectories (i.e., have fluctuating levels of electoral support) and are, as such, arguably less likely to accumulate resources that could contribute to their survival. The question thus lingers: why would such parties persist?

In this dissertation I present a theory on party survival that can contribute to explaining why political parties – particularly those described – survive or disband. The theory focuses primarily on the political parties' decision-making process to persist or disband. The theory argues that parties can persist if they achieve their primary goal and that achieving this goal may happen even when a party has scarce resources and low (or fluctuating) levels of electoral support. To make this argument, I borrow from the literature on party behavior the idea that parties may pursue different primary goals. To this, I add the notion that as parties are different – with diverse primary goals – they will also have different aspirations and define success differently. This means that all parties' goal achievement should not be measured with the same yardstick, e.g., number of votes. Instead, parties evaluate their goal achievement by looking at their aspirations and whether they were met or not. This theory complements our extant knowledge about the impact of resources on parties' survival. The theory adds to the general idea that resources matter by arguing that not all resources will matter equally. Because parties pursue different primary goals, different resources are likely to affect goal achievement differently. The resources parties have, and their role in the party's survival, should be evaluated considering how these resources may contribute (or not) to a party's survival in light of its primary goal. Lastly, this theory of party survival also helps further comprehend how party regulation and electoral laws may favor or work against political parties' goal achievement.

The chapter continues as follows: first, I shortly discuss the extant literature on party survival and the argument of goal achievement as the driving force for persistence; second, I discuss the different goals that political parties may pursue and argue that these are: office,

policy, and value-infusion (survival); third, I discuss goal achievement and aspiration levels and how these influence parties' decisions to persist or disband. Lastly, I introduce strategies to identify political parties' primary goals and strategies regarding operationalizing aspiration levels and evaluating whether a party achieves its goals to understand party persistence.

## 2.1 Theories of party survival: votes and resources

The conventional literature on party survival focuses almost entirely on new parties and their electoral support as a determinant of party survival (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000; Harmel & Robertson, 1985; Kitschelt, 1988; Levitsky et al., 2016; Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006; Morgan, 2011, 2018; Obert & Müller, 2017; Seawright, 2012; Tavits, 2008; Zur, 2019). Survival is closely linked to relatively high levels of electoral support. New parties' survival (and older parties alike) depends on their ability to mobilize voters. This support may be achieved by different means. Parties may "fill [the] representational needs of the society" (Harmel & Robertson, 1985, p. 502), carving for themselves a new space, e.g., new electoral cleavage. Or, parties may be part of a "new" party family (Kitschelt, 1988) which caters to a specific constituency. Parties may cater to dissatisfied voters (Tavits, 2008, pp. 118–119) or take older parties' place by winning over a party's electorate. Older parties may, in turn, work to keep their voters satisfied adapting, if necessary, their programs to current issues of interest. Regardless of how it is done, the main argument is that sustained electoral support is a predictor of organizational persistence.<sup>13</sup>

The problem is that these vote-oriented theories of party survival are not useful to explain party survival outside the electoral arena. These theories assume that parties' electoral performances can be divided along a simple success/failure dichotomy. Electoral outcomes serve as proxy predictors of party organizations' persistence, where more support always means persistence, and low support always means breakdown. Yet, parties can have different electoral performance profiles, which may not easily fit this success/failure dichotomy. Political parties' electoral support often fluctuates, or in some cases, it may be constant but fall

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<sup>13</sup> The parties receiving the bulk of attention in these theories are those deemed examples of success. What makes a party worthy of analysis differs from researcher to researcher but most authors retain one key (albeit somewhat fuzzy) requisite: parties should be relevant. Definitions often start by establishing a minimum cut-off point: new parties should have participated in at least two consecutive electoral process. In addition, different measures of electoral support are added: some scholars use as cutting point the electoral threshold for legislative representation per country, while others determine different thresholds of electoral significance e.g. 2% of the national vote, 5% of the national vote, or a different percentage. These thresholds often aim to *only* capture serious contenders in the electoral arena.

under conventional thresholds of success (Mustillo, 2009). Importantly, parties can, and often do, persist despite having these electoral support profiles.

An alternative to the vote-oriented arguments of party survival are the theories that focus on parties' resources to explain survival (Beyens et al., 2016; Bolleyer, 2013; Bolleyer & Bytzek, 2013; Bolleyer et al., 2019; Burgess & Levitsky, 2003; Casal Bértoa & Spirova, 2019; Cyr, 2017; Deegan-Krause & Haughton, 2018; Dolenec & Širinić, 2017; Grzymala-Busse, 2002; Kopecký & Mair, 2012; Rose & Mackie, 1988; Tavits, 2013). The parties that survive are those better equipped to weather a crisis, which is often conceptualized as an electoral crisis. The resources theories highlight these as the primary resources helping political parties: private and public funding, party members (roots), and strong (and complex) party organizations.<sup>14</sup>

However, many parties that persist despite fluctuating or low levels of electoral support also have scarce resources. An example of these parties in Latin America is the Ecuadorian *Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik*. This party has survived for over 24 years with low levels of electoral support (as I discuss in chapter 3) and limited resources, e.g., no stable access to state funding, an almost non-existent party bureaucracy, and a small party membership.<sup>15</sup> This kind of parties persists in different forms and shapes. As mentioned, the best known of these parties in the region are those that at one point received high levels of electoral support. The Peruvian APRA, for instance, survived for years in an adverse system with low levels of electoral support and, in 2006, returned to the Peruvian presidency (McClintock, 2006). Like the Venezuelan *Comité de Organización Político Electoral Independiente* (COPEI), others do not make grandiose comebacks to national politics. Instead, they persist in subnational arenas with very little national electoral support (Cyr, 2016, p. 139). Others, by contrast, stay in the national electoral arena but with low levels of electoral support, e.g., the Ecuadorian parties *Izquierda Democrática* (ID), *Partido Social Cristiano* (PSC), and *Partido Sociedad Patriótica* (PSP). Even though the parties mentioned each had different types of resources, which indubitably played a role in how these parties survived (see : Cyr, 2017 for a discussion about APRA and COPEI), their overall persistence is difficult to explain using the extant (vote and resource-oriented) theories of party survival.

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<sup>14</sup>The list of these resources can be more extensive a detailed. For instance, the characteristics of a strong organization such as parties having branches at the subnational arena can also be listed separately. In addition, patronage appointments are also considered as important resources for survival (see: Kopecký & Mair, 2012)

<sup>15</sup> A common expectation is that Pachakutik's persistence is linked to the party's ethnic character and the ethnic (indigenous) support. I show in chapter 4 that this is not the case and that Pachakutik represents, from a vote-oriented perspective, a puzzling case of survival that cannot be explained as linked to indigenous voters' support.



## 2.2 Party survival and goal achievement

The logic underpinning the choice that parties make to persist is rarely spelled out.<sup>16</sup> The standard expectation is that parties persist as they are the necessary tools for ambitious politicians' goal-achievement plans (Aldrich, 1995). From this perspective, (leaders) goal achievement should lead to the persistence of the party organization. One of the few exceptions to the "no mention" of the logic behind persistence is Spirova (2007). She argues parties' (politicians) strategic decisions to persist, change (merge), hibernate, or disband are closely connected to whether the party achieved its goal (electoral target) during the previous elections *and* whether a party sees as possible to achieve its next goal (a similar or revised electoral target) at an upcoming election. Of course, the parties' choices are constrained by the parties' resources, organizational characteristics, and the system where they compete. This argument describes the simple mechanism behind a party's persistence: it is linked to goal achievement.


This idea about persistence and goal achievement is also employed, albeit not explicitly, by authors who focus on parties as goal-oriented organizations. Scholars concentrating on the party resources argument have conceptualized parties as more than tools for ambitious politicians' goal achievement. Parties are presented as goal-seeking organizations themselves (e.g. Bolleyer & Bytzek, 2013; Bolleyer et al., 2019; Kitschelt, 1989). The attention moves into party organizations (setting aside party leaders). Parties are conceptualized as able to have a life of their own. Parties are approached as complex and multidimensional organizations driven by group goals that participate in electoral processes and fulfill different functions within a democracy (Bawn et al., 2012, p. 571; Bolleyer et al., 2019, p. 20; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 5; Monroe, 2001, p. 21; Mudge & Chen, 2014, p. 310). Importantly, this approach to parties as goal-oriented organizations does not necessarily discount the importance of the agency of party leaders and ambitious politicians (Bolleyer, 2013; de Lange & Art, 2011; Enyedi, 2005; Van Dyck, 2018). Nonetheless, it signals that party organizations may exist disconnected from individual leader's preferences and become spaces where like-minded individuals come together to pursue a singular – no entirely individualistic – goal. This change is necessary to conceptualize the persistence of an organization that does not garner high levels of electoral support (Cyr, 2017, p. 12).

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<sup>16</sup> An exception is Yanai (1999) who argues party survival is linked to a party's role in maintaining and legitimizing the representative regime in which the organization exists. That is, parties persist as long as they continue to fulfill their functions in democracy.

Following this, I propose to consider party survival – and the decision-making process attached to this – as the result of a party’s evaluation of its primary goal’s achievement (or lack thereof). If a party achieves its primary goal, it is more likely to persist, and if it does not, it will more likely disband. It is also possible that after not achieving its primary goal, the party may continue to persist. In this case, persistence is likely to come accompanied by changes or adaptation on the party’s side (see figure 2.1).

*Figure 2.1 Party survival decision-making process*



### 2.3 Political parties' primary goals

As it is clear, the goals that parties pursue are crucial to understanding parties' persistence. The party survival literature, in general, defines parties' goals in terms of votes, following a Downsian perspective.<sup>17</sup> Yet, scholars have questioned the usefulness of following a “single goal model” to explain parties' actions. Models of party behavior that argue parties pursue a single goal, e.g., vote-seeking (Downs, 1957), office-seeking (Budge & Laver, 1986), or policy-seeking (Chappell & Keech, 1986), often struggle to explain parties' behavior that does not conform with their expectations.<sup>18</sup> By contrast, party behavior models that stress that parties

<sup>17</sup> Arguably, the ‘resources’ literature puts forth a different goal parties pursue: survival. Parties persisting after electoral setbacks are conceptualized as surviving (as opposed to being successful parties) waiting and working towards an opportunity to revive (electorally). This is, however, only a temporary goal, and parties are expected to go back to a vote-oriented goal eventually.

<sup>18</sup> The vote-maximization model for instance is unable to explain the cases of political parties that cater to small or fringe sectors of the electorate (not maximizing electoral support); in turn, the office-seeking models fail to account for the cases of parties showing office shyness (i.e. not joining governing coalitions) (Lijphart, 2012, p.

may pursue different goals (e.g., votes, office, policy, and intra-party democracy) are particularly useful to explain the diverging reactions to similar external shocks of otherwise similar parties (Harmel & Janda, 1994; Strom, 1990). Researchers have shown that parties' primary goals impact their behavior and how they react to external shocks, including electoral crisis, i.e., electoral support decline (Deschouwer, 2009; Evans, 2018; Harmel & Janda, 1994; Kitschelt, 1989; Pedersen, 2012a; Strom, 1990; Strom & Muller, 1999).

Nonetheless, there is no full agreement on the possible primary goals that political parties pursue. To be sure, most models emphasize that political parties will pursue: office, policy, and votes as their primary goals. This follows Strom's (1990) model of parties' primary goal. For example, Pedersen (2012b) explores whether political parties pursue any of the three goals in Strom's model. Yet, not all scholars agree on whether it makes sense to focus on all three goals. For example, Evans (2018) only focuses on office and policy seeking as possible goals parties may pursue. He argues that vote-seeking may not be relevant for all party systems and is left out of his research (Evans, 2018, p. 6). A second early model on political parties' primary goals adds to the three-way typology of goals a fourth, intra-party democracy-seeking (Harmel & Janda, 1994). However, this last goal has not been addressed extensively by the literature. Instead, the party persistence scholars have indirectly suggested political parties may pursue a different primary goal: the goal of survival. Cyr (2017) stresses party members may be interested in a party organization's endurance, even putting aside their electoral objectives (p. 12). Browne and Patterson (1999) highlight the fact that some parties may participate in elections to access the benefits of participation, such as state funding, that contribute to the organizational persistence of a party rather than participating in elections in the pursuit of electoral objectives (p. 260). Bolleyer and Ruth (2018) stress that party members value their organization *per se* "rather than seeing it [the party] as a mere instrument to achieve a set of goals" (p. 290). Casal Bértoa and Spirova (2019) discuss parties may be satisfied with achieving enough electoral support to maintain their public funding and persist. And Levitsky (1998) argues that parties may have the goal to protect the organization's solidity (p. 79).

Going slightly against the conventional three-way typology of goals (votes, office, and policy), and taking on board the party persistence scholarship's insights, I suggest parties pursue three goals: office, policy, and value-infusion (or the goal of survival). I will define

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88); lastly the policy-seeking model is at odds when faced with cases of political parties joining coalitions with political parties that do not share their policy preferences.

each of these goals in the following paragraphs. First, however, it is necessary to discuss why vote-seeking is not included as a primary goal that parties may pursue.

Votes have no intrinsic value for political parties (Strom, 1990, p. 573). Parties have no use for votes *per se*.<sup>19</sup> Votes are only a means to an end (Muller & Strom, 1999, p. 9). What parties use is what votes afford them. For instance, votes can be transformed into seats at the legislature (which may be leveraged to access the benefits of office or advance public policy), or votes may afford parties access to state subsidies. Crucially, votes are not the only means for a party to achieve goals.<sup>20</sup> Vote-seeking is a goal that all parties share in as much participation in elections is a party organization's fundamental characteristic.<sup>21</sup> Vote-seeking should, therefore, not be considered a party's primary goal. Depending on a party's primary goal, votes' importance will be reduced or increased. In the end, parties may not avoid votes, as they participate in elections, but parties may choose not to sacrifice their primary goal for votes.

The goal of office-seeking relates to a party's objective of holding "politically discretionary governmental and subgovernmental appointments" (Strom, 1990, p. 567). This should not be confused with an elective office (such as seats in the legislature). Office-seeking parties aim to control government portfolios and party members' appointments within the structure of the state. Office benefits may also include government contracts, preferential treatment, and any other rents accrue to political parties (Kopecký & Mair, 2012, p. 8; Strom & Muller, 1999, p. 6). A party with the primary goal of holding office will work towards "a

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<sup>19</sup> Empirically it is almost impossible to account for votes (as goals) and votes acquired as means for another goal. Consider as an illustration of the difficulties to differentiate votes as 'goals' and votes as 'means' the note to researchers using data from *The Party Change Project*: "Researchers who wish to maintain the distinction [between vote-seeking and office-seeking] as important in their research should be aware of our lower level of confidence in coding that particular distinction in our data" (Harmel & Janda, 1996, p. 8). The researchers and coders of the project found that parties alternate the goals of vote- and office-maximization regularly which makes an accurate empirical differentiation between the parties that pursue either goal almost impossible.

<sup>20</sup> A party may secure office appointments through agreements with other parties – these agreements could include withdrawing candidacies hence directly reducing the number of votes a party gets; parties may also advance policy through steering the public debate in favor or against policies even from outside the legislature; and, depending on the type of party regulations in a state, state subsidies may not depend on votes but solely on electoral participation.

<sup>21</sup> The importance of getting votes will increase or decline depending on the type of system in which parties operate, but it will remain as an underlying goal of securing means to achieve a party's primary goal. Arguably, focusing in votes (and vote maximization) has its benefits; chiefly, the possibility of developing simplified elegant models and being able to evaluate performance easily by counting votes. Moreover, in systems where holding office and guiding policy requires electoral support, e.g., two-party systems, votes may play a more important role at goal achievement. However, in as much the goals for which votes are considered "means to" are achievable without maximizing-votes it seems better to effectively focus on the other goals (holding office, and/or advancing policy) rather than in the number of votes a party achieves.

form of institutional control or of institutional exploitation that operates to the benefit of the party organization” (Kopecký & Mair, 2012, p. 7).

The goal of policy-seeking relates to a party’s interest to advance a specific set of policies. These parties emphasize “policy purity,” and they work to influence public policy. One stark difference between a policy-seeking party and an office-seeking party is that the former is less likely to sacrifice their policy stance to access office benefits (or form a government) while the latter is. This does not mean that policy-seeking parties will shy away from alliances or agreements with other political parties. They are likely to join electoral alliances or form government coalitions if their partners share their policy interests or promise to advance the party's policy. Policy-seeking parties have also been referred to as programmatic parties.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, other types of parties often associated with a policy-seeking goal are niche-parties, single-issue parties, and protest parties (Wolinetz, 2002, p. 150).

To differentiate the phenomenon of party survival from the goal of survival, I refer to this goal as the goal of *value-infusion*. A party that pursues this goal will work towards the organization’s persistence, ensuring its internal cohesion and the routinization of formal (or informal) practices (Freidenberg & Levitsky, 2006). These are party organizations and party members that work towards the organization’s persistence for the benefit of having an organization. By contrast, other parties’ members may maintain an organization to access office appointments or advance public policy. Arguably, Greene describes this kind of parties when he introduces his definition of “niche parties”<sup>23</sup> as “inward-looking organizations [that] follow a logic of survival,” and as parties that create organizations with internal cohesion, territorial presence, and small groups of partisans (Greene, 2016, p. 159). These are parties “designed to protect and reinforce their party’s identity”(Greene, 2016, p. 163).<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> This definition may be confusing, however. Parties may be referred to as programmatic for the sole reason that they engage their voters on programmatic issues while at the same time holding a different primary goal.

<sup>23</sup> Greene’s (2016) definition of *niche* parties is distinct from the conventional definitions of *niche* parties that emphasize the focused programmatic content of these parties’ platforms (Adams, Clark, Ezrow, & Glasgow, 2006).

<sup>24</sup> Greene’s definition of niche parties includes other specific characteristics of these parties that relate to the fact that – as he argues – these are most likely created under authoritarian regimes. Because of how specific these characteristics are, these do not fit well with the overall more generic idea of a goal-seeking party that aims to protect the party organization that I am advancing. Thus, I do not claim his definition is interchangeable with mine. I aim only to highlight that amongst other characteristics he is also stressing the interest of party organizations in surviving signaling that other scholars have indeed identified this specific goal as constitutive of some political parties.

## 2.4 Party survival: achieving goals

Each party will evaluate whether it has achieved its primary goal to decide on its persistence, persistence with a change, or its disbandment. Crucially, what it means for a party to achieve its goal should not be conceptualized as the same for all parties. Just as parties may pursue different primary goals, parties may have different aspirations regarding these goals (Harmel & Janda, 1994, p. 279).

This idea can be better understood by starting from the assumptions that political parties are boundedly rational, i.e., parties' decisions are constrained by the information that is available to them as well as their capabilities; and that parties are satisfiers, i.e., parties will decide on *good enough* outcomes (an aspiration) instead of searching for the most optimal (maximization) result. Satisficing organizations can judge outcomes by using reference points (aspiration levels) to assess achievement or failure (March & Simon, 1958). An aspiration level represents a dynamic point of reference that organizations may use to make choices and evaluate outcomes. Whenever an outcome is below an aspiration level, then the outcome can be deemed a failure (or unsatisfactory) and will likely trigger change (or adaptation to ensure eventual achievement) or trigger disbandment; by contrast, reaching the aspiration level or surpassing it will likely trigger continuity and be taken as a confirmation of *a job well done* (Cyert & March, 1963; Nielsen, 2014). Organizations adapt their aspiration levels (thus their dynamic characterization) based on retrospective experience (Cyert & March, 1963; Lant, 1992; Shinkle, 2012). For political parties, this can be summarized as: parties have goals for which they also have specific aspirations, which are used to evaluate outcomes and categorize them into satisfactory or unsatisfactory.

As boundedly rational and satisfiers, political parties will each have different aspiration levels regarding achieving their primary goal. Hence, party organizations and their aspirations will be unique because each will construct their aspirations based on their reality and prior performance. The theory on aspiration levels states that aspiration levels are commonly defined based on an organization's prior performance and the performance of peer organizations (Nielsen, 2014, p. 146), where the prior performance of the organization is more important than the performance of peer organizations (Washburn & Bromiley, 2012). This is because while peer performance may serve as a benchmark for comparison, each organization's performance may deviate to such a degree from its peers that forcing an expectation to meet this measure would produce inefficient expectations. Political parties, it follows, will likely develop their

aspiration levels based on their prior performance while keeping an eye on the performance of their peers.

The decision to persist, persist by adapting, or disband will follow from a party's evaluation of its primary goal achievement. The process is relatively simple. Having decided on its primary goal, a party will also develop its aspiration level (AL). After 'performing,' i.e., working towards its goal, the party will take its performance (P) and compare it to its AL. If P is equal or surpasses the AL, then the party will deem it has achieved its goal and is likely to choose to persist (following the same or a new goal). Conversely, if a party's performance does not equal or exceeds its aspirations, the party will not achieve its goal. That is:

$$P \geq AL = \text{goal achievement}$$

and

$$P < AL = \text{no goal achievement}$$

If the party has failed to achieve its primary goal, it will face two options. They will either decide to persist and work on what may be improved or adapted or decide to disband the organization.<sup>25</sup>

Aspiration levels will be adjusted after all performances (Lant, 1992, p. 625). The difference (positive or negative) between an aspiration level and actual performance is called *attainment discrepancy* (Lant, 1992, p. 625). When a party has surpassed its aspiration level in time  $t$ , the aspiration level of time  $t+1$  will likely be higher (aspiration level plus the attainment discrepancy) than the previous one. By contrast, if the party did not achieve its goal in time  $t$ , the aspiration level will be lower at time  $t+1$  (aspiration level minus the attainment discrepancy). Arguably, political parties can have a longer-term memory. The aspiration level could be constructed with information from a more extended period (even dating back to the political party's formation). However, it is more likely that the aspiration level's construction will be based on the most recent performance period. This is based on the availability heuristic, which states that memories' availability plays an essential role in decision-making. Subjects can better recall recent events than long past events (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, p. 1127). Therefore, the aspiration level of the period  $t+1$  will be equal to the aspiration level during period  $t$  plus (or minus) the attainment discrepancy. That is:

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<sup>25</sup> It is important to note that this process of decision making, while presented as "simple" may not be in fact simple. Intra-party power distribution matters greatly in decision making process and could hinder or speed up goal changes (Pedersen, 2010).

## Party survival: achieving goals


if  $P \geq AL$  in period  $t$ , then  $AL$  in period  $t + 1 = AL + \text{attainment discrepancy}$

if  $P < AL$  in period  $t$ , then  $AL$  in period  $t + 1 = AL - \text{attainment discrepancy}$

Parties will adapt their aspirations as their lives go by (as they achieve or fail to achieve their primary goals).

Parties' aspiration levels and their performance (achieving goals) will define a party's decision-making regarding persistence, persistence with adaptation, or disbandment (see figure 2.2). This decision-making will most likely take place before every electoral process. During the interelection period, parties will work towards achieving their primary goals. By the end of the interelection period, parties will evaluate their performance to determine if they will participate in the next elections or not. Parties will also decide whether to continue working in the same way they had or if the goal or the party's strategies are to be changed.


Figure 2.2 Party survival decision-making process with performance input.



This decision-making is an iterative process that will take place as long as the party persists. As shown in figure 2.3, a party will have a primary goal, an aspiration level (determined by its prior performance) during period  $t$ . The party will use this aspiration level to evaluate its performance during the same period and decide whether to persist, persist and adapt, or disband. As the party chooses to persist or persist and adapt, its performance during period  $t$  will determine its aspiration level for period  $t+1$  (by way of the attainment discrepancy). By the end of period  $t+1$ , the party will compare its performance against its aspiration level and once again decide on whether to persist or no.



Figure 2.3 Party persistence



The decision-making process will also be informed by the party's resources, the electoral system, and the party regulation set up by the state. These resources and institutional framework will contribute to the performance of a party – in terms of what is available for the party to achieve its goals. The resources and the institutional framework will also contribute towards the decision about a party's persistence. Party leaders may be inclined to keep the party going *because* it may be able to achieve its primary goal thanks to its resources or the system in which it performs.

Resources are paramount for all political parties' lives. Two of the key resources parties may have are party members and leaders. Party members' commitment may contribute to a party's decision to persist even after electoral setbacks because they may work to keep the organization alive (Tavits, 2013). Committed members are not easy to get, however. Parties need to invest in creating loyalty from their party members (Beyens et al., 2016, p. 262). Nonetheless, building a loyal following is easier when the party organization was not created from scratch. A party with roots in a previous organization is more likely to count with members and will have an easier time building a strong organization (Beyens et al., 2016; Bolleyer, 2013; Bolleyer & Bytzeck, 2013). Strong leaders are also important for party persistence. Against arguments that stress leaders can hinder the construction of strong party organizations (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Weyland, 1999), leaders may be central to a party's adaptation as they can guide and centralize the organization. Leaders can, moreover, determine the use of the available resources of the party to build a strong organization and ensure its persistence (Bakke & Sitter, 2015; Bolleyer, 2013; de Lange & Art, 2011; Grzymala-Busse, 2002; Van Dyck, 2018).

A strong party organization is also a crucial resource parties can have that will play a role in goal achievement and on the decision to persist (Bakke & Sitter, 2015; Beyens et al., 2016; Bolleyer & Bytcek, 2013; Cyr, 2017; Grzymala-Busse, 2002; Kopecký, Mair, & Spirova, 2012; Tavits, 2013; Van Dyck, 2017). A strong party organization is one that has committed members and party professionals, a strong and well-connected network of party branches, centralized bureaucracy, party locales (headquarters and branches), and holds regular party congresses (Basedau & Stroh, 2008; Cyr, 2017; Tavits, 2013; Van Dyck, 2017). Parties with more complex organizations are more likely to persist (Spirova, 2007, p. 30). However, building strong party organizations is costly, and it requires committed leaders and committed activists that are not too interested in short-term pay-offs (Cyr, 2017; Tavits, 2013; Van Dyck, 2017, 2018).

Party regulation and electoral rules have an important impact on the resources that parties can acquire and develop. Party regulation determines parties' access to public funding. This relates to funds for electoral campaigns and state subsidies for parties' day to day operations (van Biezen & Borz, 2011). Access to electoral funding may be crucial for party survival (Bolleyer, 2013, p. 80). For example, broadcasting access has a positive relationship with sustained electoral support and electoral participation (Bolleyer & Bytcek, 2013, p. 785).

Resources may contribute differently to parties' persistence, however. Some resources that may contribute to goal achievement may also hinder parties' persistence when they fail to achieve their primary goals. For example, extensive memberships may work well for policy seeking parties. These members are likely supporters of the policy the party advances and will hence work towards its advancement by any means possible, primarily mobilizing voters. These supporters may be crucial for a party's decision to persist after failing to achieve its goal of policy advancement as long as things stay the same. However, these committed members may impede a policy-seeking party's adaptation after goal achievement failure, mainly when it affects the purity of the party's policy goal. In turn, an extensive and committed membership may work against an office-seeking party both for goal achievement and the choice to persist after failure. The larger the pool of members that may expect office benefits, the more likely it is for party members to be dissatisfied and cause trouble. Moreover, these members may not be willing to stick around and support a party that does not achieve its goals, i.e., not delivering benefits.

A strong (and complex) party organization can also contribute or hinder party survival, especially when survival requires adaptation. A strong organization alongside committed members may help parties mobilize voters, which may be necessary for reaching electoral

thresholds to access state funding or get candidates elected. However, this same organization may also present challenges when survival requires adaption, especially after goal achievement failure (Levitsky, 1998).

Lastly, although funds may benefit all parties, how these funds are allocated can benefit some parties while harming others. The barriers to access these funds can impact parties differently depending on their organization and their primary goals. Electoral thresholds for state subsidies allocation will, in general, punish electorally weaker parties (Bakke & Sitter, 2015; Birnir, 2005; Casal Bértoa & Spirova, 2019). Nonetheless, parties with extensive activist members are less likely to suffer from a lack of resources than parties with a more professionalized staff that requires financial support.

Party survival is thus a tale of goal achievement and how parties weather failing to achieve their goals. Take two fictional examples, *policy-seeking* party “A” and an *office-seeking* party “B.” Both parties receive the same small percentage of electoral support in consecutive elections. Neither party got enough votes to qualify for state funding during the prior election. However, the electoral rules stipulate that all parties that present candidates for elections are given broadcasting access and funds for the campaign. Therefore, both parties can develop electoral campaigns. Both parties have lively organizations with party members committed to the primary goal of each party. For party “A” that means activist members focused on the party’s policy program, and for party “B” it means professional members interested in profiting from access to office appointment. After two electoral cycles without changes in the electoral support for the parties (receiving the same small percentage of votes), party “A” survives, and party “B” disbands. If we pay no attention to the parties’ differences in goals, we would be unable to explain the disbandment of party “B” as well as the persistence of party “A.” However, let’s take seriously that parties pursue different goals and that these goals affect how the party organizations are set up and what resources are more or less important for each party. Then, it is easier to explain the difference between the parties’ fates.

The primary goal of party “A” makes it more likely to persist than party “B” given their resources and the system in which they exist. First, the party members of “A” are activists and committed to advance the party’s policy agenda. These party members are likely to value the organization enough to contribute to its financial functioning. Moreover, they are also more likely interested in distributing information about the program and talking to voters. The electoral rules that provide funding for an electoral campaign can be instrumental: the party members may “spread the word” more widely using financial aid. This will inevitably affect the national public debate, which may contribute to the party’s goal achievement evaluation,

even if electorally the party is not performing well. By contrast, party “B” as an office-seeking party might be valued by its members in as much as it delivers benefits. Party members might not be interested in providing funds for the party’s day to day life. The campaign funding will help the party mobilize voters, and party members could be invested in getting more votes, as votes often help parties gain office benefits. However, the campaigns could be infructuous without committed activist party members, and the pay-off might be too limited (a small percentage of votes and few or non-office appointments). The office-seeking party is thus less likely to be able to achieve its goal. It follows then that party “B” is more likely to disband despite its initially strong organization.

Although fictional, this example helps ascertain the importance of considering the different goals that parties pursue when researching party survival. Combining the arguments about parties’ primary goals (and their achievement) and the extant knowledge about the importance of resources can help us understand why parties persist despite low levels of electoral support and scarce resources. As argued at the beginning of this chapter, these parties are many, yet theories about their persistence are scarce.

## **2.5 Strategies to identify parties’ primary goals and their achievement**

Applying this theory of party survival requires identifying a party’s primary goal and evaluating its performance at achieving that goal. I address each of these steps in this section and introduce strategies to identify a party’s goal and assess goal achievement.

### **2.5.1 Parties’ primary goals**

The first step, identifying a party’s primary goal, is rather difficult. Despite the pervasive usage of office-seeking and policy-seeking references to describe both political parties and their leaders in the literature, there is no standardized list of characteristics for these parties or their leaders. The idea of goal-seeking is often employed in models to estimate parties’ actions, such as coalition formation. Still, the parties themselves are not questioned on whether they are, effectively, pursuing any of these goals. More commonly, parties are defined as office seeking or policy seeking after analyzing their coalition strategies *and* their pay-offs (see for example: Debus & Gross, 2015; Evans, 2018). However, this strategy is not useful to identify the goals specific parties pursue in non-parliamentary systems and in cases of parties that remain in the opposition or receive scarce pay-offs. Moreover, parties may pursue different goals at different times, and this strategy is not the best to gauge these changes.

It is imperative to develop ways in which the primary goal parties pursue can be identified. Two critical issues need to be addressed: first, how to identify the primary goal of a party (what questions to ask and to whom), and second, when to do so (during what period). In short, the answer is that parties should be questioned directly (Strom & Muller, 1999). Hence the primary sources of data for this should be: interviews with party members. To complement and triangulate these answers – or in case direct questioning is impossible – researchers should look at documents and any form of records relating to the party and the party's actions, including how parties set up their electoral campaigns, produced during the days (or even months), produced before and during an electoral campaign.

Despite the many differences between political parties, they all have one common characteristic: all parties participate in elections.<sup>26</sup> During the days (or even months) before an election, parties are likely to show heightened activity. Parties reach out to the electorate, produce party manifestos, update the party's programmatic platforms, and increase their overall presence in the media. Moreover, during this extended period – particularly before campaigns start – parties will choose to persist or disband by evaluating their performance and making the necessary changes to the party's goal achievement strategies and even its primary goal. Although a party may disband at any point, it is often only when the party does not participate in an election that – absent alternative reports – a party is defined as gone. A party that develops an electoral campaign is hence a party that has evaluated its goal achievement and (if necessary) has taken steps to adapt its goals or strategies.

Therefore, the first step to identify a party's primary goal is to define the elections and inter-elections periods to research. Before and during an electoral campaign, parties (party leaders, candidates, members, etc.) are more likely to talk openly or provide hints about the party's primary goal. The next necessary step – if possible – is to speak to the parties (their leaders and members) and discuss the parties' primary goals in relation to the selected periods. In addition to this, or instead of this, researchers may work towards acquiring archival data which is likely to contain hints about a party's primary goal – particularly records of the parties' leaders' presentations in the media as well as documents (such as party manifestos) produced by the parties during the electoral campaign period and the days before the beginning of the

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<sup>26</sup>Of course, it is possible not all parties will participate in all elections (or at all electoral arenas). Nonetheless, the definition of persisting parties used in this dissertation requires parties to participate in elections to be considered for analysis.

campaign ( Hunter, 2010; Pedersen, 2012b; Wolinetz, 2002).<sup>27</sup> The following are the main “hints” that could be uncovered during the analysis of archival data and interviews:

In the case of *policy-seeking* parties, statements (and the documents) will revolve around the importance of their policy program and the need to protect the purity of the party’s policy position (Harmel & Janda, 1994; Hunter, 2010; Pedersen, 2012b, p. 898). These parties will avoid any type of electoral alliances with parties with a different programmatic agenda and are likely to talk about it (Hunter, 2010; Pedersen, 2012b, p. 901). The party leaders’ statements and the party’s documents are likely to discuss their opposition to join alliances with non-congenial partners or emphasize the policy agreements with a partner. It is essential to point out, nonetheless, that as Wolinetz (2002) emphasizes, these policies can either be “logically constrained or a loosely connected agglomeration of demands” (p. 50). Therefore, the policy goal does not necessarily require an entirely developed programmatic platform. It could be the case that parties pursue a single – even simple – policy principle. What matters is that this policy (goal) will structure the party’s actions and that this will be evident from the documents and leaders’ statements.

In turn, *office-seeking* parties are likely to make claims regarding *being* the government. These are parties open to join electoral and government coalitions and less likely to take issue with the partner’s policy platform (Duncan, 2007, p. 72; Hunter, 2010; Wolinetz, 2002, p. 150). Office-seeking parties are hence likely to show flexibility in terms of their platforms’ programmatic content to accommodate possible partners and mobilize a wider pool of voters (Lupu, 2016, p. 88; Wolinetz, 2002, p. 151). These parties are unlikely to discuss a partner’s programmatic platform when forming an alliance. For these parties, holding office appointments will be crucial, and therefore the parties’ actions will focus on securing these appointments (by any means possible).

Lastly, the *value-infusion-seeking* parties will focus on the party’s brand and the party organization itself. Statements and documents will focus on the *development* and *protection* of the party organization. The statements and the documents will follow the lines of “focusing on the party organization” and “building the party.” These are parties that will focus on their survival. Thus, many claims may also relate to ensuring that the party organization fulfills the requisites to maintain its legal registration and continues to work outside the electoral calendar.

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<sup>27</sup> One of the few systematic efforts to classify parties’ primary goals, *The Party Change Project* (Harmel & Janda, 1996), combined secondary data and data from electoral campaign strategies.

The goals that parties pursue have empirical implications. These are implications on how parties are governed, what parties (their members and leaders) convey to the press, and how parties conduct electoral campaigns. Therefore, the analysis of statements and party documents could also be triangulated with data about how these parties run electoral campaigns. These data sources (interviews, archival data, and campaign data) may be combined to develop a more reliable identification of the parties' primary goals. Nonetheless, the data from the documentation and party members' interviews should always be considered as outweighing data from the electoral campaigns in case of contradiction. Depending on the electoral system, votes may be more or less important for goal achievement. Hence, parties could develop campaign strategies geared to get as many votes as possible that could, in appearance, contradict parties' primary goals.

The empirical implications of primary goals on electoral campaigns relate to 1) the content of campaigns, 2) whether this content is similar or not to the previously employed content, 3) who are the candidates, 4) whether the parties join or express the intention of joining electoral alliances or governing coalitions, 5) who runs the campaigns, and lastly 6) what are the campaign strategies employed by each party. Table 2.1 summarizes the empirical implications of office-, policy-, and value-infusion seeking regarding how parties run their electoral campaigns. It is important to point out that these indicators fit with the ideal-typical image of *pure* policy-, office-, or value-infusion-seeking parties. As such, finding a party that runs campaigns fulfilling all of these indicators might not be easy. However, these indicators are fine-grained enough to cover most aspects of the parties' campaigns

If a party is a policy-seeking party, its campaign will deploy a programmatic (policy-oriented) campaign. This programmatic content will most likely be similar to the one deployed since the party's formation (with minor adjustments). The campaign will focus on the party's programmatic platform. Research shows that policy-seeking parties spend more resources on policy-oriented propaganda than candidate-oriented propaganda (Pedersen, 2012b, p. 903). The candidates will be party members but could also come from external organizations with similar principles and policy interests. Candidates should, in all cases, represent the party's programmatic content and be expected to follow the party's programmatic guidelines if elected (e.g., Brazil's Partido os Trabalhadores (PT) legislators; see Hunter, 2010, p. 23). I describe these candidates as *activist candidates*. In the case of electoral alliances (if the electoral rules permit them), these parties will avoid them unless the partners have congenial policy platforms. Activist party members will guide the campaigns. They are the most likely to be committed to the party's program and be the best suited to developing programmatic content. Lastly, these

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parties will more likely create campaigns that follow conventional strategies, emphasizing programmatic content.

*Table 2.1 Electoral campaign indicators of parties' primary goals*

Electoral campaign indicators of parties' primary goals			
	If policy-seeking	If office-seeking	If value-infusion-seeking
Campaign content	Programmatic (policy-oriented)	Symbolic (candidate and/or alliance oriented).	Symbolic (party brand oriented)
Historical content	Similar programmatic content throughout the years	Flexible / changing content (adapted to alliances)	Similar symbolic / party brand content throughout the years
Candidates	Activist (policy-focused) candidates	Office-holder candidates (most likely winner)	Party member candidates
Alliances	Unlikely (unless partners are congenial)	Likely	Unlikely
Campaign leaders	Activists (policy-focused)	Professionals	Party members
Campaign strategies	Conventional: programmatic platform oriented	High tech strategies: including new forms of media and information provision and polling to adjust the campaigns	Conventional: party brand-oriented

If a party is an office-seeking party, its campaign's programmatic content will likely be either vague or not consistently applied. This content is prone to be adapted, and parties are likely to dilute their brands as needed. Furthermore, these parties may also use symbolic appeals (candidate-oriented), or in the case of an electoral alliance, the campaign content could focus on the alliance's brand. Additionally, these parties' candidates will emphasize their openness to join governing coalitions. The candidates can be party members, but the most important selection criteria (even within intra-party democracy practices) will be electability. This makes the selection and appointment of candidates that are not part of the parties possible. These candidates will be whoever is the most likely to garner more votes and thus secure the party's goal achievement (Wolinetz, 2002, p. 153). The use of electoral alliances will be



possible as long as these are considered a good strategy to hold office with little attention to congenial programmatic platforms (Hunter, 2010, p. 39). Campaign leaders will be professional advisors (which could also be in-house advisors) that will help the party deploy the best campaign possible to achieve its goals and garner votes (Harmel & Janda, 1996; Hunter, 2010, p. 39; Pedersen, 2012b, p. 903). Lastly, these parties' campaigns will use different and innovative campaign strategies to engage with as many voters as possible and convey tailor-made appeals to each of the potential voters.

Lastly, if a party is a value-infusion-seeking party, its campaign will focus on symbolic (party brand) appeals. As was the case for the policy-seeking parties, these appeals should show stability (be the same as in previous elections). The candidates will more likely be party members. These parties are unlikely to bring in external candidates. The candidates will be representatives of the party and its brand. I refer to these candidates as party members (to differentiate them from the activist candidates of policy-seeking parties). These parties will not be prone to joining electoral alliances as these could hamper the parties' brand or the unity within the organization. The campaign leaders will be party members as these are the best prepared to focus on the party's brand. Lastly, the electoral campaigns will use conventional technologies and practices. These parties are not likely to invest in external advisors or innovative strategies as winning the elections and adapting to all kinds of voters is not necessarily crucial for their survival.

### **2.5.2 Evaluating goal achievement**

Political parties are likely to operationalize their primary goals in multiple ways. How parties operationalize their goals will have a direct impact on how they build their aspiration levels as well as on how they evaluate their performance. As discussed, parties will do this differently, which means that scholars will have to define how each party operationalizes their goals based on how they talk about their goals. Nonetheless, extant research on political parties and their behaviour provides some guidelines regarding what to expect. Table 2.2 summarizes some of the possible ways in which parties' primary goals may be operationalized.

Parties may operationalize policy-seeking in terms of the number of bill initiatives presented by the party's legislators or with their endorsement (Pedersen, 2012a). Parties may also focus on the number of bills passed at the legislature or the number of bills approved by the executive (with or without a veto) (Tsebelis & Alemán, 2005). In addition, policy-seeking parties may define their goals in terms of topics that become relevant within the public debate

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by introducing a topic into the discussions within the public arena inside or outside the legislature (Rasch, 2014). Lastly, policy seeking parties may focus on negative actions, i.e., blocking the passing of bills or steering the public debate away from a specific topic (Cox & McCubbins, 2005).

*Table 2.2 Indicators of goal achievement per parties' primary goals*

Policy-seeking parties	Office-seeking parties	Value-infusion-seeking parties
Number of bills proposed	Policy area, level, and number of ministerial appointments	Party meetings (per bylaws)
Number of bills passed	Policy area, level, and number of non-departmental agencies and commissions appointments	Formal registration continuity
Number of bills approved (by the executive)	Policy area, level, and number of executive institutions appointments	State subsidies' access
Steering the public debate (for or against an issue)	Government contracts and government rents	Party membership stability

In the case of office seeking parties, these parties are likely to operationalize their office goals as appointments within the state. Parties are likely to differentiate these appointments in terms of policy areas, the type of institutions in which party members and party nominees are appointed, and the level at which individuals are appointed. Following Kopecky and Spirova (2012) the state may be divided into: “Economy, Finance, Judiciary, Media, Military and Police, Foreign Service, Culture and Education, Health Care, and Regional and Local Administration” (p. 21). Parties will likely have particular preferences in terms of which policy area they are interested in. Secondly, parties will also care about the type of institutions in which they receive appointments. Government institutions may be split into ministerial departments (core civil service), non-departmental agencies and commissions, and executing institutions (Kopecký & Spirova, 2012, p. 21). Lastly, parties will also care about the level at which party members or nominees receive the appointments; for example: in the case of ministerial departments, these levels include the appointment of ministers, vice-ministers, department directors, and so on. Office-seeking parties will, in sum, operationalize their goals in terms of appointments, at specific levels, within specific types of institutions, and within a particular policy arena. Parties may also operationalize office-holding in terms of government contracts and government rents.

For value-infusion-seeking parties, goal achievement can be operationalized around formal and informal practices of parties outside the electoral schedule. That a party is valued on its own right will be reflected in the fact that the party has a life outside the electoral process. Therefore, the goal of survival may be operationalized in terms of whether the party members meet according to what is established in the organization's bylaws. In the case of parties that require state funding to maintain the organization, the goal may be operationalized in terms of whether the party receives or not state subsidies. This goal may also be operationalized in terms of party membership – whether the party's members stick to the party or not. Survival may mean many different things for different parties, and many of the markers of achievement may also fall within conventional expectations regarding parties, e.g., the party members meeting regularly. However, as discussed during the chapter, parties will operationalize goals and aspiration levels differently, and what may be average for one party could be a notorious achievement for another one.

With knowledge about a party's primary goal and how it is operationalized, it is possible to construct a party's aspiration level (by looking at a prior performance) in order to evaluate a recent performance. That is, it is possible to do a replication of sorts to understand the party's decision-making process. This can be done purely quantitatively by building indexes for comparison or via a combination of qualitative and quantitative data. For example, in the case of an office-seeking party, the comparison may be based on the number of office appointments allotted to the party during a previous period (aspiration level) considering all aspects discussed regarding operationalizations (policy arena, type of institutions, and level of appointment) against the number of appointments received during the evaluation period. In turn, for policy-seeking parties, the number of bill initiatives presented at the legislature or the number of laws passed during the previous period could be compared to the outcomes achieved during the period of evaluation. Conversely, suppose the party's focus was to steer the public debate into a specific topic. In that case, an analysis of the main issues of the public debate arena could be necessary (both for the construction of the aspiration level as well as to determine the performance). Lastly, for value-infusion-seeking parties, this comparison should focus on the organizational characteristics of the party and the differences between time  $t$  and time  $t+1$ . For instance, if the goal of the party is operationalized in terms of state subsidies, achievement may be evaluated in terms of receiving the subsidy. By contrast, the goal and the aspiration level may have been developed in terms of receiving a larger subsidy. Thus, the evaluation should be done by looking at the size of the subsidies.

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I apply these strategies to identify a party's primary goal and evaluate a party's primary goal achievement to understand Pachakutik's persistence in chapter 6.

### **3 Pachakutik's electoral performance and organizational resources (1996-2019)**

Pachakutik is the only political party founded in Ecuador in the 1990s that has continuously presented candidates for national and subnational elections up to the present day. Since its formation, the party's elected representatives and the party's leaders have become a fixture of the political debate. Pachakutik can be described as a long-lasting party (a 24-year-old party) with a well-known presence in Ecuadorian politics both inside and outside the electoral cycle. This party has also been defined as an "unsuccessful (flop) [party]" (Levitsky et al., 2016, p. 36). The argument behind this description is that Pachakutik has not achieved significant levels of electoral support (at least 10% of the national vote share) in five or more consecutive elections (Levitsky et al., 2016, p. 4).

These different yet equally accurate descriptions of Pachakutik suggest the party is an example of the type of parties introduced in chapter 2. These are parties that persist with low or fluctuating levels of electoral support and with scarce resources. The extant knowledge about Pachakutik makes it easy to affirm that the party is persisting despite low levels of electoral support. It is well known that it has received declining shares of the national vote at the presidential and legislative elections since 2006 (see, for example, Madrid, 2012; Mijeski & Beck, 2008, 2011). It is, however, unclear whether the party is one with few resources. There is a common idea that Pachakutik is a party with ample human resources (a dense network of affiliates) given its connection to the indigenous social movements (Van Cott, 2005, p. 99). This may have been true when the party was first created in 1996. However, since then, the Ecuadorian state has become more invested in regulating political parties and their resources, which has meant informal resources had to become formalized. This could have affected the party's resources. There is, however, no current comprehensive overview of the party's resources.

In this chapter, I show Pachakutik is an example of parties persisting with low or fluctuating levels of electoral support and scarce resources. The first section of the chapter provides a short overview of the Ecuadorian state, and then discusses the Ecuadorian party regulation and electoral laws, and the Ecuadorian party system between 1996 and 2020. This overview is helpful to understand Pachakutik's context. The second section discusses the party's electoral performance at the national and sub-national levels. This is a comprehensive overview of the party's electoral performances spanning through almost all elections in which

the party has participated. The third section discusses the party's formation, registration and re-registration, and the organization's resources, i.e., the party's staff, the party's members, the party's leaders, and the party's financial resources. The last section brings all of the others together to present Pachakutik as a persisting party with scarce resources and fluctuating levels of electoral support.

### **3.1 Ecuador**

Ecuador is an understudied case in political science. Although it has received some attention mostly due to the saliency of the indigenous movement in the early 1990s, in general it is not at the center of political science research. Therefore, it is pertinent to take some space to introduce the country. Ecuador is located in northwestern South America. It shares its northern border with Colombia, its eastern and southern borders with Peru, and the Pacific Ocean to the west. Geographically the country is divided into four regions. The first, the lowland (*Costa*) extends from the Pacific Ocean to the edge of the Andes mountains that traverse the country north to south. The highlands (*Sierra*) comprise the Andes mountains. The third region *Amazonia* extends from the outskirts of the Andes to the Amazon basin. The last and fourth region comprises the Galapagos Archipelago located 900km west from mainland. The maps used throughout the dissertation only show continental Ecuador.

Ecuador is currently divided administratively into 24 provinces, 221 cantons, and 1040 urban and rural parishes. It is a country with a rich pre-Columbian history. After being part of the Spanish colony in 1830 the Ecuadorian state was founded. It became unicameral presidential system, eventually turning into a bicameral presidential system, and lastly returning to a unicameral presidential system. The country has been plagued with political instability and was under a military rule between 1963 and 1966 and between 1972 and 1978. Since the return to democracy, while there has been no further military rule many presidents were ousted. The country has nonetheless achieved a certain level of political stability since 2006. In total between 1830 and 2020 Ecuador has had 20 Constitutions.

### **3.2 Party regulation**

In Ecuador, political parties have been considered a fundamental part of democracy since 1883. Legislation addressing parties' formation and regulating party organizations has increased throughout the years (Vela Puga, 2006). Since 1945, the Ecuadorian Constitution has included

articles relating directly to political parties. The states' management of parties has increased since then. This section focuses only on the period between 1979 and 2019.

### **3.2.1 Parties in the Constitution (1979-2019)**

Since the return to democracy in 1979, parties in Ecuador have been “constitutionalized,” meaning that the parties and the state have come closer (van Biezen & Kopecký, 2007). Ecuador has had three different Constitutions between 1979 and 2019: the 1979 Constitution, the 1998 Constitution, and the 2008 Constitution. These three Constitutions all regulate party organizations and keep them at the center of all democratic processes. The constitutionalization of parties in Ecuador follows a model of parties as public utilities. Parties are “crucial mechanisms for the realization of democratic values and principles, such as participation, representation, and the expression of the popular will” (van Biezen & Borz, 2011, p. 350).

The regulation of parties in Ecuador at the Constitutions and secondary legislation has been relatively stable (with no radical changes). Party regulation has consistently moved towards increasing the state's management of parties. The three Constitutions establish that democracy in Ecuador is linked to political parties as they are expected to articulate representation. Parties hold a central position in the Ecuadorian democracy.

The three Constitutions establish that parties are organizations protected by the state. Any citizen can start a new party (provided the new organization fulfills some requisites, including presenting a government program and developing a national organization). The Constitutions moreover establish that political parties can receive state subsidies. This right was extended to national independent political movements in the 2008 Constitution. In addition, the 2008 Constitution dictates that parties should have equal gender representation within their leadership, and parties should set-up internal democracy processes to appoint their leaders and select their candidates.

Parties are expected to maintain an active life outside government with lively organizations that ensure member participation, accountability, and internal democracy. Parties are moreover allowed to organize as the opposition to the sitting government. For parties within government, particularly those that hold seats at the legislature, the Constitutions establish that if these seats represent 10% of the legislature's seats, the party (or parties working together) may form a legislative block. The Constitutions also specify one of the functions of political parties as part of the democratic process: recruiting candidates. Since 1998, these candidates may be party members or non-members, i.e., independent candidates.

The three Constitutions establish boundaries between parties and state institutions. In particular, no party leaders can be appointed to the Judicial Branch. Furthermore, the 2008 Constitution specifies that the *Consejo Nacional Electoral* (CNE), the electoral management body, will be formed by appointees with no links to political parties. This went against the 1978 and 1998 Constitutions, which, instead, established these appointees should be representatives of (the most voted) political parties.

The Constitutions also have prescriptions relating to the judicial oversight of political parties and secondary legislation norming parties. All Constitutions establish judicial oversight for parties. The 2008 Constitution, in particular, reinforced the judicial oversight creating an Electoral Tribunal (*Tribunal Contencioso Electoral*). Until 2009, the secondary legislation that regulated parties in Ecuador was divided into three different laws: the electoral law (*Ley de Elecciones*), the party law (*Ley de Partidos*), and the electoral expenses law (*Ley de Control del Gasto Electoral y de Propaganda Electoral*). Since 2009, these three laws have been brought together into a single extended law known as *Código de la Democracia*.

### 3.2.2 Parties in secondary legislation

#### *Party law*

The *Ley de Partidos Políticos*, first published in 1978 and included since 2009 in the *Código de la Democracia*, is the main secondary law regulating political parties. This law and its multiple iterations (multiple articles have been amended and added throughout the years) have reflected the Constitutions' objectives of regulating political parties. The law has mostly established the requisites for the formal registration of political parties. The most important requisite for registration is the supporting signatures of 1.5% of the district's registered voters.<sup>28</sup> This law also establishes how parties can be de-registered. Parties may request their de-registration, or they may be de-registered by CNE for not fulfilling the law's requirements. Party registration and de-registration regulations are scaled up or down depending on the district in which parties are registered. Moreover, the law establishes the procedures for party mergers and discusses how party organizations should be organized.

The law also establishes that parties can receive state subsidies in addition to receiving funds from their members. Until 2009 the law established that only political parties that received 4% of the national vote in two consecutive elections were entitled to receive a state

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<sup>28</sup> Party registration in Ecuador can happen at the parish, canton, provincial, and national level. For each case new parties must present the supporting signatures of 1.5% of the registered voters in whichever district the party wishes to be registered.



subsidy. This meant that neither a national nor a local independent movement was entitled to this type of subsidy. This changed in 2009. The law now establishes that all national political movements and political parties can receive the subsidy (provided that they fulfill the requirements).

### ***Electoral law and Campaign Expense law***

The *Ley de Elecciones* and the *Ley del Gasto Electoral* are also part of the *Código de la Democracia*. Although these laws deal mostly with the practical aspects of elections, they also include important party regulation articles. In particular, the *Ley de Elecciones* establishes (since 1996) that political parties may join electoral alliances and thus present their candidates under shared tickets. The law establishes that these alliances can be organized locally, i.e., on a district per district basis, or nationally. Since 2009, the law adds further regulations for these alliances. Parties joining alliances are required to establish a management body, appoint leaders, and establish candidates' selection mechanisms. Since these changes were added to the law in 2009, a registered electoral alliance became subject to all parties' regulations.

The electoral and campaign expenses laws come together on the issue of who can be a candidate. As already mentioned, parties remain at the center of democracy and are thus defined as the conduits for representation. Until 2009 candidates could either be: 1) affiliated to a party, 2) sponsored by a party, or 3) be *independent candidates*. Since 2009 the law has eliminated the special provisions for registering independent candidates. All candidates have to be registered under a party name, even those not officially affiliated with a party. Moreover, all candidates have to be selected via internal democracy procedures. This means that, since 2009, parties returned to being the only means by which individuals may aspire to hold public office in Ecuador.

The laws not only establish who can be a candidate in terms of party affiliation but also in terms of gender. Since 1998, the laws (and the Constitution) established that gender parity was necessary. Between the years 2000 and 2009, the law required 30% of all candidates to be women. The required percentage of each party's women candidates had to increase by 5% in every election until reaching 50%. Since 2009 a zipper quota was established.

To sum this up, since 1979, political parties have become increasingly managed by the state. Political parties' state's management has evolved, from establishing registration requirements and specifying the parties' functions (such as candidate selection) to a detailed account of how party organizations should be set up and run. However, these regulations have

mostly focused on national-level organizations. In Ecuador, registering and maintaining a national level party organization is considerably more challenging than registering and maintaining local level organizations. As argued by van Biezen and Rashkova (2014) party regulation may deter new party formation (p. 901). Arguably, in the Ecuadorian case, party regulation deters new national party formation.

### 3.3 The Ecuadorian party system

#### 3.3.1 Methodological considerations

One of the main difficulties of studying the Ecuadorian party system is the large number of parties participating in elections. In addition to the many new parties (national and mostly local) created for every election, the number of competitors is compounded by electoral alliances.<sup>29</sup>

An alternative to deal with the ever-growing number of parties, particularly for longitudinal analyses, is to organize the parties and the alliances into categories. Using categories helps follow the trends of support for different party groups and simplifies narratives (moving away from long and often confusing lists of parties). Parties in Ecuador can be divided into three categories.<sup>30</sup> The first category is the *traditional parties category*. The traditional parties are national parties that participated in the first or the subsequent national elections since Ecuador's return to democracy in 1979.<sup>31</sup> The second category is the *non-traditional parties category*. The non-traditional parties are national parties that were not present at the first or the subsequent national elections since Ecuador's return to democracy. The last category is the *Movimientos Independientes (independent movements) category*. This category includes all political movements created after 1996 that have not received political parties' status (rights and duties). Pachakutik is a non-traditional party.

As many parties participate in electoral alliances, these also need to be allocated within the three categories.<sup>32</sup> To do this, I take into consideration the different partners within the

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<sup>29</sup> This is mostly due to the fact that parties may join different alliances in different districts: in 2017 there were in total 28 electoral districts (for the legislative elections) a party could – in theory – present candidates in all 28 districts under different electoral alliances and use a different one for the presidential candidate. In total one single party may effectively turn itself into 29 different parties.

<sup>30</sup> I build on Flavia Freidenberg's (2015) categorization of Ecuadorian political parties.<sup>30</sup> She divides the Ecuadorian political parties into two categories: *traditional parties* and *non-traditional parties*.

<sup>31</sup> The traditional parties are: *Izquierda Democrática* (ID), *Partido Social Cristiano* (PSC), *Democracia Popular* (DP-UDC), *Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano* (PRE), *Partido Socialista Ecuatoriano* (PSE), *Movimiento Popular Democrático* (MPD) and *Concentración de Fuerzas Populares* (CFP).

<sup>32</sup> How to deal with alliances depends on the type of analysis. For analyses centred on the number of votes parties receive, votes may be divided following what is established in the Ecuadorian electoral laws i.e., splitting votes

alliance. Suppose the alliance is between parties that belong to the same party category. In that case, the alliance is allocated to the same party category. Suppose the alliance partners are from different party categories. In that case, I assign the alliance to the party category of the partner with the larger number of seats at the legislature in that electoral year.<sup>33</sup> Using this rule ensures that the allocation of alliances considers the changes in political parties' relevance throughout the years.<sup>34</sup> Additionally, as my focus is on Pachakutik's performance, I assign all of the party's electoral alliances as part of the category Pachakutik.

I use these four categories (Traditional Parties, Non-Traditional Parties, Independent Movements, and Pachakutik) throughout the dissertation. Only in some cases, I refer to specific party names. When I do, I clarify to which party category these parties belong.

### 3.3.2 The Ecuadorian party system (1996-2019)

Before 1996 the Ecuadorian party system was controlled by traditional parties. Although voters were dissatisfied with the overall political class, often “punishing parties” by voting for the opposition, these “floating voters” consistently voted for traditional parties (Conaghan, 2003, p. 222).<sup>35</sup> This particular phenomenon meant that the party system could be described as volatile and inchoate while also controlled by the same set of parties (Sanchez, 2008, p. 326).<sup>36</sup> These parties established hidden cooperation patterns, which gave the system a form of institutionalization (Pachano, 2004). Traditional parties kept control over the party system and the government until 2002. These parties had almost absolute control over the country's government both at the subnational and the national arenas.

In 2002, the traditional parties' primacy declined. The first presidential candidate from a non-traditional party, Lucio Gutierrez, was elected. He embodied all that had characterized

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following past electoral performances of the partners. An alternative is also to split the votes equally between alliances' partners (e.g. Mustillo, 2009; Mustillo & Polga-Hecimovich, 2018).

<sup>33</sup> For example, in the case of the electoral alliance between PSC and an independent political movement MIFPPE from the election of 2002 I assign this alliance to the Traditional Party category. I do this because in 2002 PSC was the largest party in the legislature thus also the partner with the largest legislative block. If by contrast MIFPPE had a larger number of seats at the legislature on that year, I would have allocated the alliance to the Independent Movements category.

<sup>34</sup> Many parties that were once relevant, such as traditional parties, have become less relevant within the system receiving declining shares of the national votes. For instance, for the elections of 1996, 1998, and 2002, most electoral alliances that included at least one traditional party were re-categorized to the traditional parties' category. By contrast, from 2006 onward, it is more often that I allocate these alliances (with a traditional party partner) to other party categories.

<sup>35</sup> Conaghan makes a detailed analysis of the Ecuadorian party system between 1979 and 1992. By the early 1990s voters were unhappy with parties often recurring to voting for the opposition to “punish” other parties, (Conaghan, 2003, p. 222).

<sup>36</sup> These parties were: *Partido Social Cristiano* (PSC), *Partidos Roldosista Ecuatoriano* (PRE), *Izquierda Democratica* (ID), and the party *Democracia Popular* (DP-UDC)

anti-establishment politics in Ecuador. He was elected under the ticket of his new political party, *Partido Sociedad Patriótica* (PSP), and with the support of Pachakutik. At the legislative level, traditional parties continued to hold the majority of the seats, however. Gutierrez had to resort to building agreements with the traditional parties. Nonetheless, despite the traditional parties' continued presence, in 2002, the party system started to change.

The 2006 election of Rafael Correa, the ultimate outsider – despite his short stint as finance minister for Gutierrez's predecessor –, confirmed the end of the traditional parties' era. Correa ran with a robust anti-establishment platform. The electorate rewarded him. At the legislature, the traditional parties – together – held only 38% of the seats. For the first time, non-traditional parties held the majority of seats in Congress (52%).

As Correa's regime advanced, the Ecuadorian party system transformed. As Mainwaring (2018) describes it, the party system collapsed (p. 9). The traditional parties lost their preeminence. A mix of new non-traditional parties and new independent movements replaced them. Correa's party *Movimiento Alianza PAIS - Patria Altiva i Soberana* MPAIS (a non-traditional party) held most of the legislative seats in 2009 and 2013 and gained control of a large portion of the subnational arena's offices.

This trend started to change in 2017, however. Correa's successor, Lenin Moreno, swiftly distanced himself from the former president (and his supporters) and joined conservative groups in Ecuador linked to traditional parties. In that year, traditional parties also regained some space at the legislature. This trend continued into the 2019 subnational elections. Many of the traditional parties that were considered almost defunct won seats. Alongside traditional parties, new non-traditional parties and independent movements have also entered the political arena.

### **3.4 National and subnational elections (1996-2019)**

This section reviews Pachakutik's electoral results between 1996 and 2019 at the national and subnational elections.

#### **3.4.1 National elections**

##### ***Presidential elections***

Ecuadorians have elected their presidents in 1996, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2009, 2013, and 2017. Presidents are elected using a qualified plurality method in two-round elections. A candidate

may be elected during the first round provided she receives more than 50% of the valid votes or receives more than 40% of the valid votes with a 10% margin of victory. Except for Rafael Correa in 2009, no other Ecuadorian president has been elected in a single round since 1979. Presidential elections have been held simultaneously with legislative elections since 1996.

Table 3.1 shows an overview of the most important data for the presidential elections between 1996 and 2017. The table includes the number of presidential candidates that competed in every election (on average nine candidates);<sup>37</sup> the voter turnout for every election (the average voter turnout for the presidential elections is 74.35%); the names of the parties that qualified for the second round; and, the name of the elected president and his party.

The presidents elected in 1996 and 1998 were members of traditional parties. Since 2002 no member of a traditional party has been elected. Only non-traditional parties' candidates have been elected between 2002 and 2017. No president elected between 1996 and 2002 finished their period in office. All three were removed from office following public demonstrations. Rafael Correa, elected for the first time in 2006, was the first president to serve a full term since 1996. Moreover, he was the first president to serve in three consecutive terms since the country's return to democracy.

Pachakutik presented its first presidential candidate in 1996 and has presented candidates in elections since then, except for the 2009 elections. The 1996 elections were notoriously positive for Pachakutik, with the party receiving 20.61% of the national votes and coming in third overall. While the party did not qualify for the second round, the strong showing was considered a testament to the indigenous movement's strength (Van Cott, 2005). In 1998, Pachakutik's candidate received only 14.5% of the national vote and came in fourth. In 2002 Pachakutik's candidate was the most voted candidate during the first round. He was elected president after the second round in 2002 with 54.8% of the national vote. However, the electoral alliance only lasted six months after the new president took office, which meant Pachakutik was never effectively in power. Table 3.2 and figure 3.1 summarize Pachakutik's candidates' electoral support.

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<sup>37</sup> The 1996 elections were the first ones in which independent candidates could participate. It was expected that many independent candidates would run for the presidency (and all other offices) after the law changed; however, the number of presidential candidates in 1996 and afterwards did not increase compared to the previous period (1979-1992). Between 1979 and 1992 the average number of presidential candidates was 9.

Table 3.1 Presidential Elections in Ecuador 1996 - 2017

	Year of presidential Elections						
	1996	1998	2002	2006	2009	2013	2017
Number of Candidates	9	6	11	13	8	8	8
Voter turnout (%)	71.71%	70.13%	64.24%	72.38%	75.90%	82.02%	83.10%
Second-Round							
Party 1	PSC	DP-UDC	PSP/MUPP	PRIAN	-	MPAIS	MPAIS
Party 2	PRE	PRE	PRIAN	MPAIS/PS-FA	-	CREO	CREO
Elected party	PRE	DP-UDC	PSP/MUPP	MPAIS/PS-FA	MPAIS*	MPAIS	MPAIS
President's name	Abdala Bucaram**	Jamil Mahuad***	Lucio Gutierrez****	Rafael Correa	Rafael Correa	Rafael Correa	Lenin Moreno

Source: Electoral data from Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) and Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE). Turnout data for the 1996 and the 1998 elections from International IDEA, Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

\*Rafael Correa was elected in the first round of elections in 2009.

\*\*Abdala Bucaram was removed from office after being declared mentally unfit to rule by the legislature on February 12, 1997. He was succeeded by the president of the National legislature Fabian Alarcon.

\*\*\* Jamil Mahuad resigned as president on January 21, 2000, after week-long public demonstrations spearheaded by the indigenous population and the military. He was succeeded by his vice-president Gustavo Noboa.

\*\*\*\* On April 20, 2005, the Ecuadorian legislature voted to remove Lucio Gutierrez from office on the grounds of abandoning office. This was preceded by more than seven days of public unrest and demonstrations in Quito. His vice-president Alfredo became the next president

In 2006 Pachakutik presented its first “party member candidate,” Luis Macas. Macas, who was also Pachakutik’s first indigenous presidential candidate, received only 2.2% of the national vote. Since then, the party’s candidates have received marginally more electoral support. In 2013 Pachakutik joined the electoral alliance *Unidad Plurinacional de las Izquierdas* to un-seat Correa. Despite bringing together most left-leaning opposition parties, Pachakutik’s candidate came in 6<sup>th</sup>, receiving only 3.3% of the national vote. In 2017 Pachakutik joined another electoral alliance with roughly the same characteristics as the 2013 alliance. The party’s candidate came in as a distant 4<sup>th</sup> with 6.71% of the national vote.

*Table 3.2 Presidential electoral results: Percentage of the national vote share received by Pachakutik and the parties that moved to the second round.*


Presidential Elections: percentage of the national vote share							
	1996 (%)	1998 (%)	2002 (%)	2006 (%)	2009 (%)	2013 (%)	2017 (%)
Run-off 1st	27.2	34.9		26.8	52.0	57.2	39.4
Run-off 2nd	26.3	26.6	17.39	22.8	28.2	22.7	28.1
MUPP	20.6	14.7	20.64*	2.2		3.3	6.7

*Source: Compiled with data from Consejo Nacional Electoral and Tribunal Supremo Electoral*  
 \* Pachakutik’s candidate, Lucio Gutierrez, was the candidate with the most votes in the first round of elections in 2002. He was elected president in the second round.

As it is clear, at the presidential elections, Pachakutik’s electoral support has declined since its breakthrough. Interestingly, at no point in time have the party’s candidates received upwards of “1 million votes” (Gonzalez, 1996) Pachakutik claimed to have by way of its links to Conaie. The only time the party was close to receiving 1 million votes was in 2002. However, these votes came from indigenous and mestizo voters and are not the one million votes promised by the indigenous leaders (Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 82). On the whole, between 1996 and 2017, Pachakutik moved from being a competitor to becoming almost irrelevant.

*Figure 3.1 Presidential Elections results from 1996-2017 (percentage of votes received by parties going to the run-off and Pachakutik)*

## Pachakutik's electoral performance and organizational resources (1996-2019)



Source: Electoral data from Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) and Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)

### Legislative elections

Pachakutik has also consistently presented candidates to the legislature. Ecuador's legislature was known as the National Congress from 1984 to 2009, and since then, its name was changed to National Assembly. Table 3.3 provides a detailed overview of all relevant data about the Ecuadorian legislative elections. The table includes data on the size of the legislature, the type of seats, the seat allocation formula employed to transform seats to votes, the voter turnout, the number of parties that presented candidates, the number of parties with seats, and lastly, the effective number of parties by seats (ENPS)<sup>38</sup>.

In 1996, the legislature was formed by 82 *diputados* (deputies). This number increased to 121 in 1998. The deputies were divided into national and provincial deputies. In 2002 and 2006, the legislature was reduced to 100 provincial deputies as national deputies' seats were eliminated. Since 2009 legislators are called assembly members, and these include national, provincial, and overseas representatives elected for a total of 124 seats. For the 2013 and 2017 elections, the total number of seats increased to 137.

<sup>38</sup> The ENPS was calculated using the Laakso-Taagepera Index (1979). All electoral alliances were counted as different parties.



Table 3.3 Legislative Elections in Ecuador 1996 - 2017

	Year of legislative elections						
	1996	1998	2002	2006	2009	2013	2017
Size of the Legislature (number of seats)	82	121	100	100	124	137	137
Type of Seats							
National	12	20	-	-	15	15	15
Provincial	70	101	100	100	103	116	116
Overseas	-	-	-	-	6	6	6
Seat allocation formula							
National							
Legislators	Hare, Largest	D'Hondt				D'Hondt	D'Hondt
Provincial	reminders						
Legislators (including overseas legislators)	Hare, Largest	Plurality	D'Hondt	Imperiali, largest	Imperiali, largest	D'Hondt	D'Hondt
	reminders			remainders	remainders		
Voter turnout (%)	71.71%	70.13%	64.24%	72.38%	75.90%	82.02%	83.10%
Number of parties with candidates	27	-	76	67	103	43	81
Number of parties with elected candidates	11	18	26	20	29	19	28
Effective Number of Parties by Seats	5.11	5.70	8.47	6.33	4.51	2.68	5.52

Source: Electoral data from Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) and Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE). No data is available for the number of parties with candidates in 1998. Turnout data for the 1996 and 1998 elections from International IDEA, Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Seat allocation formula data from (Mustillo & Polga-Hecimovich, 2018)

In 1996, national and provincial deputies were elected from either a single national district (magnitude 12) or 21 provincial districts (with district magnitudes ranging from 2 to 10 seats) using a closed-list proportional representation (PR) system. In 1998, national deputies were elected using a closed list PR (district magnitude 21). Provincial deputies were elected using multiple non-transferable votes (MNTV) from 21 districts (with district magnitudes ranging from 2 to 18 seats). Since 2002 legislators have been elected using the free list PR method (see table 3.3 for details on the formulas employed in each election). The number of districts has increased from 21 to 27, and the districts' magnitudes have also changed. The smaller districts continue to elect only two legislators, and larger districts elect up to 20 legislators.

The average voter turnout between 1996 and 2017 has been 74.21%. On average, 66 parties have presented candidates to the legislature. 2009 was the year with more parties competing. Interestingly, of these parties, only a few made it to the legislature. On average, only 21 parties got seats. Nonetheless, the seats were not evenly distributed. The ENPS shows that the fragmentation of the party system has fluctuated. On average, the ENPS was 5.47.

### ***Pachakutik in the legislature***

Pachakutik has presented candidates to the legislature since 1996, both for national and provincial legislators. Figure 3.2 presents an overview of the provinces in which Pachakutik presented candidates and where they were elected between 2002 and 2017.<sup>39</sup> In 2002 the party presented candidates in all provinces. Since then, the party has presented candidates only in some provinces, albeit it has also presented candidates at the overseas districts.

To explore in further detail Pachakutik's performance, I analyze the number of seats the party achieved in every election and the percentage of the national vote received by the party's candidates. I do the same for all other parties and present the data using the party categories discussed in the previous section. Table 3.4 summarizes, for each category, the number of seats (and percentage of seats) and the percentage of the national vote achieved by each party category. I used data from the *Tribunal Supremo Electoral* (TSE) and the *Consejo Nacional Electoral* (CNE) for the number of seats and data on votes from Polga-Hecimovich and Mustillo (2018).<sup>40</sup> It is essential to point out a slight mismatch between the electoral data


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<sup>39</sup> The maps in figure 3.2 reflect Ecuador's 2019 administrative division. That is, a total 23 continental provinces plus Galapagos (not shown in the map). In 2002, the two white spots in the map were part of the neighboring provinces.

<sup>40</sup> Mustillo and Polga-Hecimovich (2018) discuss the difficulties of calculating party support in free-list PR systems. They propose four approaches for counting votes and apply them to the Ecuadorian legislative elections.

and the seat allocation data. Polga-Hecimovich and Mustillo split the votes from electoral alliances equally between partners. By contrast, the number of seats reflects the alliance allocation rules discussed in the previous section. This leads to a slight mismatch between seats and vote percentages, especially for Pachakutik's results in 2013 and 2017.

*Figure 3.2 Provinces where Pachakutik presented candidates for legislators*



*Source: Built with data from Consejo Nacional Electoral. The maps reflect the 2019 administrative division of Ecuador.*

The data in Table 3.4 shows that traditional parties have lost their preeminence, particularly since 2006. Non-traditional parties have, by contrast, gained space, holding in 2013 around 86.1% of the legislature's seats. Nevertheless, it is necessary to point out that direct comparisons between traditional and non-traditional parties are somewhat unfair. The latter party category is continuously growing. In contrast, the traditional party category is static.

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I used their publicly available database with their preferred method for vote aggregation for each election and categorized parties to produce party category totals.

Table 3.4 Composition of the Ecuadorian Legislature between 1996 and 2017 by party category

Year	Independent Movements			Pachakutik			Non-traditional parties			Traditional parties		
	Seats (#)	Seats (%)	Votes (%)	Seats (#)	Seats (%)	Votes (%)	Seats (#)	Seats (%)	Votes (%)	Seats (#)	Seats (%)	Votes (%)
1996	4	4.9	-	8	9.8	-	-	-	-	70	81.7	-
1998	-	-	17.4	9	7.4	3.6	-	-	0.2	112	92.6	78.8
2002	3	3.0	12.6	14	14.0	5.4	14	14.0	20	69	69.0	62
2006	3	3.0	7.9	7	7.0	4	52	52.0	47	38	38.0	41.7
2009	12	9.7	15.2	4	3.2	2.7	85	68.5	58.6	23	18.5	23.6
2013	3	2.2	14.0	7	5.1	1.0	118	86.1	71.3	9	6.6	13.6
2017	4	2.9	21.3	7	5.1	2.7	108	78.8	55.4	18	13.1	20.6

Source: Electoral data (number of seats) from Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) and Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE). The seats of legislators elected under electoral alliances were added to the party category of the alliance's partner with the largest legislative block during the specific legislative period, except for Pachakutik. Pachakutik's seats reflect the number of legislators elected under the party's ticket (including alliances). Vote percentages from Polga-Hecimovich and Mustillo (2018)

Pachakutik's candidates, as was the case for the party's candidates at the presidential elections, have lost electoral support throughout the years. Nevertheless, this has not directly translated into lost seats. The party's electoral performance is dismal, to be sure. However, in the end, these votes have been enough to secure the party seats at the legislature consistently. The reduced national vote share can be explained as the byproduct of Pachakutik's choices, presenting candidates under electoral alliances.<sup>41</sup> Alliances have effectively reduced the number of votes allocated to the party. Table 3.5 summarizes the number of Pachakutik's candidates elected under alliances and single-party tickets.

*Table 3.5 Pachakutik's legislative seats between 1996 and 2017 (including legislators in electoral alliances).*


Pachakutik's legislative seats (1996-2017)				
Year	Seats (#)	Percentage (%)	Seats with Electoral Alliances (#)	Percentage (%)
1996	8	9.8	-	-
1998	6	4.9	9	7.4
2002	5	5	14	14
2006	6	6	7	7
2009	3	2.4	4	3.2
2013	1	0.7	7	5.1
2017	3	2.2	7	5.1

*Source: Based on data from the Consejo Nacional Electoral and Tribunal Supremo Electoral*

Figures 3.3 and 3.4 are helpful to visualize the support trends for each party category presented in table 3.4. Figure 3.3 plots the percentages of the national vote received by each party category, while figure 3.4 plots the percentage of seats achieved by each party category. Both figures show clear trends. Traditional parties lost votes and seats, while non-traditional parties won seats and votes. It is also clear how independent movements have been able to get electoral support across elections but seem not to overcome the effective electoral thresholds. By contrast, Pachakutik's candidates, despite receiving fewer votes, get more seats.


<sup>41</sup> The eight seats registered as elected under a single ticket in 1996 effectively represented the party's alliance with independent movement *Nuevo Pais*.

Figure 3.3 Proportions of the national vote share received by party category at the legislative elections (1998-2017)



Source: Built with data electoral data from Polga-Hecimovich and Mustillo (2018)

Figure 3.4 Composition of the legislature in Ecuador (1996-2017)



Source: Data from Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) and Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)

Pachakutik's electoral support has declined since 1996. Although the support change is not as steep as the decline at the presidential elections, it is clear that the party has become less

and less able to mobilize voters. Nonetheless, even with decreasing electoral support, the party has held on to multiple legislative seats (between 4 and 7). By and large, Pachakutik's accomplishments, especially regarding the number of seats, are impressive. Pachakutik is clearly a party with low levels of electoral support at the national elections. The party has received less than 5% of the national votes in the last four elections.

### 3.4.2 Subnational elections

In Ecuador, there are five different types of subnational officials elected in different electoral districts. These electoral districts follow the administrative division of the country. Twenty-three provinces elect prefects,<sup>42</sup> 221 cantons elect mayors and municipal council members, and 816 rural parishes elect parish council members. Table 3.6 summarizes the number of elected officials for each office in each election (1996-2019) and includes data on each election's voter turnout.

Subnational elections in Ecuador are *high stakes* elections.<sup>43</sup> As discussed in chapter 2, electoral laws that fortify subnational elections can be conducive to party persistence. Processes of decentralization, federalization, and regionalization can disperse political authority across electoral arenas, making subnational levels more appealing (Golder, Lago, Blais, Gidengil, & Gschwend, 2017; Schakel & Dandoy, 2013). Parties that perform poorly at national elections may still find encouragement to compete at lower levels.

Ecuador is a decentralized country. In 1998 the Ecuadorian government started an *à la carte* system of decentralization. Local governments could petition almost all of the central state's competencies with only a few exceptions, such as defense and foreign policy (Faust & Harbers, 2012; Ortiz Crespo, Bastidas Redin, & Burbano de Lara Vásconez, 2017).<sup>44</sup> Subnational governments were "able to acquire control over a substantial amount of financial resources" (Faust & Harbers, 2012, p. 71). In 2008 the government established guidelines for mandatory decentralization that reverted the 1998 model (Ortiz Crespo et al., 2017, p. 24). The

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<sup>42</sup> Ecuador has 24 provinces however the Galápagos provinces is governed differently than all other 23 provinces.

<sup>43</sup> Subnational elections in Ecuador do not conform with the second order election model (SOE). In this model, subnational elections are considered second-order as there should be "less at stake" compared to national elections (Reif & Schmitt, 1980, p. 9). The second order elections model also expects that these elections should yield lower voter turnout, and that small parties will perform better than national parties as voters can "risk" to support smaller parties (Clark & Rohrschneider, 2009; Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Van Der Eijk, Franklin, & Marsh, 1996).

<sup>44</sup> A key step was taken in 1997, when the "Law for the Decentralization of the State and Social Participation" and the "Law of 15%" were approved. The first law established decentralization as a core interest of the state, and the second law determined that 15% of the state revenues should be allocated to local governments, increasing considerably the access of local government to public resources (Van Cott, 2008, p. 36). The next year, the 1998 Constitution established that provinces and municipalities could apply for responsibilities being executed by the central government.

central government kept as exclusive competencies, amongst others, policies on education, health, social security, and housing.<sup>45</sup> Subnational governments could thus claim only a reduced set of competence. Nonetheless, the central government also formalized many local governments' competencies. This, in a way, compensated some of the losses of the local governments. On the whole, both models of decentralization have contributed to making local elections high stakes elections.

*Table 3.6 Subnational elections in Ecuador 1996-2019 (number of officials to be elected)*

	Year of subnational Elections					
	1996	2000	2004	2009	2014	2019
Number of officials elected						
Prefects	20	22	22	23	23	23
Provincial Council Members*	79	89	91	-	-	-
Mayors	200	215	219	221	221	221
Municipal Council Members*	830	887	893	1581	1305	1307
Parish Council Members**	-	3880	3960	3985	4079	4094
Voter Turnout %	71.71%	65.10%	70.33%	75.90%	82.67%	80.57%

*Source: Electoral data from Tribunal Supremo Electoral and Consejo Nacional Electoral. Turnout data of 1996 from International IDEA, Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.*

*\*Provincial council members and municipal council members were also elected on by-elections in 1998, 2002, and 2006.*

*\*\* Parish council members were elected for the first time in the year 2000.*

Pachakutik's leaders, from the outset, recognized the importance of these elections. The party presented candidates for prefects, provincial council members, mayors, municipal council members, and parish council members ever since its formation. Table 3.7 shows an overview of the number of candidates the party presented for every office and the number of elected candidates each year. In the following section, I focus on the elections of prefects, mayors, and parish council members.

<sup>45</sup> The full list of competencies can be found in article 261 of the Constitution.



Table 3.7 *Pachakutik in subnational elections: candidates and elected candidates*

	Year of elections					
	1996	2000	2004	2009	2014	2019
<b>Prefects</b>						
Seats	21	22	22	23	23	23
MUPP Candidates	9	15	14	12	12	18
MUPP Elected	0	5	5	5	5	5
<b>Provincial Councils</b>						
Seats	74	89	91	-	-	-
MUPP Candidates	47	67	67	-	-	-
MUPP Elected	12	15	22	-	-	-
<b>Mayors</b>						
Seats	198	215	219	221	221	221
MUPP Candidates	-	110	111	94	90	95
MUPP Elected	10	30	25	28	29	20
<b>Municipal Councils</b>						
Seats	819	887	893	1581	1305	1307
MUPP Candidates	-	534	545	743	592	633
MUPP Elected	45	113	118	137	123	119
<b>Parish Councils</b>						
Seats	-	3880	3960	3980	4079	4094
MUPP Candidates	-	1420	1815	1700	1700	1965
MUPP Elected	-	565	570	458	530	519

Source: Data from Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) and Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE).

### *Elections of prefects (provincial elections)*

Prefects are the publicly elected head of the provincial executive government. They are elected in simple majority single round of votes. Table 3.8 summarizes data for all prefect elections between 1996 and 2019. The table shows the number (and percentage) of prefects elected per party category and the candidates' national vote percentage. I used data from CNE and TSE for the table. Votes for electoral alliances were allocated following the same rules discussed earlier for the allocation of legislative seats.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>46</sup> This is different from what I did for the legislative votes as I used Polga-Hecimovich and Mustillo (2018) and they allocate alliances votes dividing them equally between partners. For the subnational elections I instead allocate alliances votes to party categories, and I allocate all votes for a candidate to these categories.

The prefect elections largely reflect the trends of electoral support for parties found at the national level. From 1996 to 2004, most provincial prefects were elected under the ticket of a traditional party. The presence of these parties declined in 2009, but they made a comeback in 2019. Non-traditional parties slowly gained over the seats from traditional parties starting in 2004. However, by 2019, these parties lost many of their seats. Independent movements presence has increased since 1996.

Pachakutik has presented candidates for prefect since 1996. In that year, the party had no candidates elected. Since the elections in the year 2000, five Pachakutik's candidates have been elected prefects at every election. However, the overall share of Pachakutik's candidates' national vote has never been higher than 7.5%. In 2009 and 2014, the party had its worst years, receiving precisely 4.8% of the national votes. Interestingly in 2019, the party's votes increased, albeit not the party's number of elected prefects.

Figures 3.5 and 3.6 plot the data from table 3.8. These figures highlight the changes in support for parties in the different categories and Pachakutik's stable results. Pachakutik stability is not linked to strongholds, however. Only two provinces have consistently elected Pachakutik's candidates as prefect since 2000: Cotopaxi and Morona Santiago. All other prefects have been elected in different provinces throughout the years. Many of these prefects also ran under electoral alliances.<sup>47</sup> Figure 3.7 plots the provinces where Pachakutik's candidates competed for the seat of prefect in every election (in light blue) and the provinces where the candidates were elected (in dark blue).

Despite the variation amongst the provinces where Pachakutik's candidates were elected, these provinces have one characteristic in common: they are sparsely populated. On average, only 4.15% of all registered voters in the country vote in each of these provinces. This explains, in part, the fact that Pachakutik's electoral support overall is relatively small even when the party's candidates are elected in multiple provinces.

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
<sup>47</sup> These provinces are: Bolivar, Orellana, Sucumbios, Imbabura, Tungurahua, Zamora Chinchipe, Pastaza, Napo, Azuay, and Chimborazo.

Table 3.8 Subnational elections: prefects elected between 1996 and 2019

Year	Independent Movements			Pachakutik			Non-traditional parties			Traditional Parties		
	Prefects (#)	Prefects (%)	Votes (%)	Prefects (#)	Prefects (%)	Votes (%)	Prefects (#)	Prefects (%)	Votes (%)	Prefects (#)	Prefects (%)	Votes (%)
1996	1	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	95	-
2000	2	9.1	-	5	22.7	-	-	-	-	15	68.2	-
2004	1	4.5	6.5	5	22.7	7.5	2	9.1	19.2	14	63.6	66.7
2009	5	21.7	19.9	5	21.7	4.8	11	47.8	68.2	2	8.7	7.1
2014	2	8.7	4.9	5	21.7	4.8	14	60.9	74.0	2	8.7	16.3
2019	4	17.4	35.8	5	21.7	6.9	4	17.4	25.8	10	43.5	31.6


Source: Electoral data from Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) and Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE). Prefects elected under electoral alliances were added to the party category of the alliance's partner with the largest number of elected prefects, except for Pachakutik. Pachakutik's number of prefects also includes candidates elected under an electoral alliance

Figure 3.5 Subnational elections: provincial prefects votes 2004-2019




Source: Electoral data from Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) and Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)

Figure 3.6 Subnational elections: provincial prefects 1996-2019



Source: Electoral data from Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) and Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)


Figure 3.7 Provinces where Pachakutik presented candidates for prefects



Source: Electoral data from Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) and Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)

Figure 3.8 is useful to understand the concentration of registered voters and the indigenous population's concentration in the provinces where Pachakutik's candidates were elected. In the map on the left, the provinces highlighted with black lines are where Pachakutik has had a prefect elected between 2000 and 2019. The color fill of each province represents the percentage of the indigenous population in the province. Pachakutik's prefects were often elected in the provinces with the highest percentages of the country's indigenous population. The right-hand side map shows that these provinces also have the smallest percentages of registered voters in the country. This map also shows that the largest concentration of registered voters can be found in the provinces of Pichincha, Guayas, and Manabí, where no candidate of the party has ever been elected.

Figure 3.8 Provinces where Pachakutik's candidates were elected prefects (2000-2019)



Source: Indigenous population data from the 2010 National Socio-economic census and registered voters' data from Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)

Pachakutik's performance at the provincial elections is impressive primarily due to the number of elected prefects throughout the years. However, Pachakutik does not seem to have strongholds. The five elected prefects in one year were rarely re-elected on the next. Pachakutik's candidates seem to perform differently in different provinces in every election. Intuitively, one would expect the party to receive consistent electoral support from the indigenous population. However, this is not the case. In every election, the party receives different shares of the provinces' votes. This indicates that there is no stable link between the electorate in these provinces and the party. The data shows that although the indigenous voters may support the party's candidates, they do not do so in every election, or at least not in proportions that would help the party's candidates get consistently elected.

### *Elections of mayors (municipal elections)*

More than 200 mayors have been elected in Ecuador every four and five years since the return to democracy.<sup>48</sup> Mayors are elected using the method of plurality. Table 3.9 summarizes data for all mayor elections between 1996 and 2019. The table shows the number (and percentage) of mayors elected per party category and the party's percentage of the national vote. I used data from CNE and TSE for the table. Votes for electoral alliances were allocated following the same rules discussed earlier.

The support trends for party categories resemble broadly the already discussed trends. Traditional parties held most of the mayoral seats until 2009. They received the lion's share of the national vote until that year as well. Non-traditional parties slowly won over the seats and votes. These parties peaked in 2014. Independent movements also gained space throughout the years, getting as many mayors as non-traditional parties in 2019. Traditional parties, as discussed already, also made a comeback in 2019, regaining seats and votes.

Pachakutik's performance is again stable. The party's candidates have been consistently elected throughout the years. Nonetheless, in terms of votes, the party's candidates have received fewer votes as the years advance. Figures 3.9 and 3.10 plot the data from table 3.9. The figures are useful to visualize the changes in electoral support for party categories. The figures show, in particular, Pachakutik's stability and the increasing support for independent movements.

Pachakutik's candidates for mayor, as was the case with the candidates for prefects, are rarely re-elected. At the cantonal level, Pachakutik has no strongholds. There is no single canton where the party has held control of the municipality during this period (1996-2019). The only canton where the party has had a mayor in five out of the six periods is the canton Taisha in Morona Santiago. In some other cantons, the party has held the mayoral seat in three out of the six periods. It is most common that the party does not hold the mayor's seat in a canton a second time.

Figure 3.11 shows the cantons where the party's candidates competed (light blue) and where candidates were elected in every election (dark blue).

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<sup>48</sup> Until the year 1996 the electoral system differentiated between mayors and municipal presidents. The title of "mayor" was used only for the person in charge of the municipal government of the larger urban cantons in the country such as Guayaquil and Quito. All other smaller cantons' government heads were called municipal presidents. Since the year 2000, all heads of the municipal government are known as mayors. To avoid unnecessary confusion, I only use the term mayor.


Table 3.9 Subnational elections: Mayors elected between 1996 and 2019

Year	Independent Movements			Pachakutik			Non-traditional parties			Traditional Parties		
	Mayors (#)	Mayors (%)	Votes (%)	Mayors (#)	Mayors (%)	Votes (%)	Mayors (#)	Mayors (%)	Votes (%)	Mayors (#)	Mayors (%)	Votes (%)
1996	5	2.5	-	10	5	-	-	-	-	185	92.5	-
2000	15	6.98	-	30	13.95	-	-	-	-	170	79.07	-
2004	12	5.48	2.9	25	11.42	7.2	50	22.83	17.4	132	60.27	72.5
2009	55	24.89	24.8	28	12.67	4.8	104	47.06	44.5	34	15.38	25.9
2014	21	9.50	17.2	29	13.12	4.2	141	63.80	59.6	30	13.57	19.0
2019	72	32.58	45.7	20	9.05	4.3	75	33.94	21.0	54	24.43	29.0

Source: Electoral data from Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) and Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE). Mayors elected under electoral alliances were added to the party category of the alliance's partner with the largest number of elected Mayors, except for Pachakutik. Pachakutik's number of Mayors also include candidates elected under an electoral alliance.




Figure 3.9 Subnational elections: Votes for mayors (2004-2019)




Source: Data from Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) and Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)

Figure 3.10 Subnational elections: mayors elected by party category (1996-2019)



Source: Data from Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) and Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)

Figure 3.11 Cantons where Pachakutik presented candidates for Mayor




Source: Data from Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) and Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)

Despite the absence of strongholds, Pachakutik holds around 10% of all mayoral seats throughout the years. The percentage of the national vote that the party receives continues to be small, however. One of the reasons for this seems to be the fact that the cantons where the party competes and wins are sparsely populated. Figure 3.12 shows two maps. The map on the left shows the cantons where a candidate from Pachakutik was elected between 1996 and 2019. Each canton is filled with color to reflect the share of the indigenous population in the canton. The map on the right shows the same cantons but is colored to reflect the registered voters' share in these cantons.

Figure 3.12 also shows one crucial fact about where Pachakutik's candidates are elected: candidates are both elected in cantons with indigenous majorities and in cantons with

indigenous minorities. This, added to the fact that only rarely the party has a mayor elected two times in the same cantons, highlights that the indigenous vote is not necessarily consistent for the party's candidates.

*Figure 3.12 Cantons where Pachakutik's candidates were elected as mayors (2000-2019)*



*Source: Indigenous population data from the 2010 National Socio-economic census and registered voters' data from Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)*

### ***Elections of parish council members (rural parishes elections)***

Rural parishes are the smallest administrative districts in Ecuador. Table 3.10 summarizes the number of seats (and their proportional equivalence) for each party category. This table does not include data on each party's vote share as parish council members are only elected in rural parishes. The added votes do not provide a national level snapshot of support.


*Table 3.10 Subnational elections: Parish (rural) council members elected between 2000 and 2019*

Year	Independent Movements		Pachakutik		Non-Traditional Parties		Traditional Parties	
	Seats (#)	Seats (%)	Seats (#)	Seats (%)	Seats (#)	Seats (%)	Seats (#)	Seats (%)
2000	339	8.7	603	15.5	12	0.3	2926	75.4
2004	254	6.4	570	14.3	917	23.2	2219	56.1
2009	1060	26.6	458	11.5	1726	43.3	741	18.6
2014	517	12.7	530	13.0	2670	65.5	362	8.8
2019	1319	32.2	519	12.7	1318	32.2	938	22.9

*Source: Electoral data from Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) and Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE). Parish council members elected under electoral alliances were added to the party category of the alliance's partner with the largest number of elected Parish council members, except for Pachakutik. Pachakutik's number of Parish Council members also include candidates elected under an electoral alliance.*

Over 75% of all council members in the year 2000 were elected under a traditional party ticket. These parties continued to hold the majority of the seats in the councils in 2004. The 2014 election was the worst for these parties as they achieved only 8.8% of all seats at the parish councils. In 2019, just as they did at the other subnational elections, these parties regained space. In turn, non-traditional parties consistently gained seats until 2014. As could be expected, independent movements have a larger presence at the parish councils than at other elected offices. In 2019 these political movements held as many seats as the non-traditional parties. Pachakutik, in turn, has maintained a stable presence at these councils holding on average 13 % of all parish council seats between the years 2000 and 2019 (see figure 3.13).

*Figure 3.13 Subnational elections: parish council members elected by party category (2000-2019)*



*Source: Data from Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) and Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)*

Pachakutik has a more stable presence at the parish councils than at the canton (mayors) and provincial (prefects) levels. Although the party's candidates are often elected in different parishes, their re-election rates (the party's) are higher than at any other subnational level elections (see table 3.11). On average, the party's candidates are elected in 271 parishes in every election. This is equivalent to close to 34% of all parishes in the country. Nevertheless,

only in 99 parishes have Pachakutik's candidates been elected consistently between 2000 and 2019. From election to election, around 70% of the parishes that already had Pachakutik's council members re-elected at least one of Pachakutik's candidates.<sup>49</sup> Nonetheless, it is essential to highlight that these are multi-member districts that can help a party get its candidates elected.

*Table 3.11 Number of Parishes where Pachakutik's candidates were elected and re-elected (2000-2019).*

Year	Total parishes with PK members		Parishes with PK members re-elected		New parishes with PK members elected	
	Parishes (#)	Proportion (%)	Parishes (#)	Proportion (%)	Parishes (#)	Proportion (%)
2000	245	31.6				
2004	242	30.6	146	60.3	96	39.7
2009	298	37.4	194	65.1	104	34.9
2014	266	32.7	223	83.8	43	16.2
2019	304	37.3	223	73.4	81	26.6

*Source: Electoral data from Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) and Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE). The number of parishes includes those in which Pachakutik's candidates were elected under an electoral alliance.*


Figure 3.11 plots the parishes where Pachakutik's candidates were elected in all elections in maps. The parishes colored in light blue are the ones in which the party's candidates were not elected. The ones colored in dark blue are the ones in which at least one candidate was elected. The maps show the consistent election and re-election rates of Pachakutik's candidates at the parish councils. Moreover, the maps show that Pachakutik's candidates mostly compete in parishes in the Highlands and the Amazonia regions.

The lack of apparent strongholds (only 99 parishes) further highlights that the expected connection between indigenous voters and the party and its candidates might be spurious. Pachakutik's candidates are not always elected in cantons and provinces with indigenous majorities. The same happens in the case of parishes (see figure 3.15). The party's candidates

<sup>49</sup> I focus here on whether a candidate (any candidate) from Pachakutik is elected in consecutive he same parish in t. Due to the number of candidates and the inconsistencies on the data from CNE it is difficult to determine the rate of candidate re-election.

are elected in parishes with indigenous majorities and parishes with indigenous minorities. The map on the left shows the parishes where Pachakutik's candidates were elected at any point between 2000 and 2019. Each parish is filled to represent the percentage of the indigenous population. On the right, the parishes are filled with the color representing the percentage of the registered voters. These two maps help see that, Pachakutik's candidates are often elected in parishes with small percentages of registered voters (although this is common for many parishes) and that these elected candidates may not be necessarily linked to the indigenous vote.


*Figure 3.14 Parishes where Pachakutik presented candidates for parish councils*



*Source: Data from Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) and Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)*



Figure 3.15 Parishes where Pachakutik's candidates were elected to the parish councils



Source: Indigenous population data from the 2010 National Socio-economic census and registered voters' data from Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)

Pachakutik is clearly a party with low levels of electoral support. At the subnational level, just as it was the case at the national level, the party receives few votes. Nonetheless, these few votes have a more significant pay-off at the subnational level than at the national level. Pachakutik has a constant and extensive presence within the subnational level elected officials.

### 3.5 Pachakutik as a party organization

Having discussed how Pachakutik performs electorally, it is necessary to discuss the party organization. The ethnic party Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik's (MUPP or



Pachakutik) was created in 1996.<sup>50</sup> The party's founding members were representatives of a very diverse *social alliance* comprised of leftist groups, syndicalist groups, and numerous smaller organizations connected to peasants' organizations, neighborhood organizations, and Cristian-left (liberation theology) organizations.<sup>51</sup> At the center of the alliance was the *Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador* (Conaie), considered Latin America's "strongest, oldest, and most consequential indigenous movement" (Yashar, 2005, p. 85).<sup>52</sup> Due to this social movement's primacy within the organization, Pachakutik has been considered an ethnic party from the outset. Nonetheless, the party leaders always contended that Pachakutik "represented the interests of all Ecuador's popular classes, [and] that it was not a political movement dedicated solely to the struggle for the country's indigenous peoples" (Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 40).

Several researchers have thoroughly analyzed Pachakutik's formation (e.g. Becker, 2010; Birnir, 2004; Mijeski & Beck, 2011; Van Cott, 2005). There was a combination of factors that contributed to the party's formation. First, the strength of the indigenous social movement;<sup>53</sup> second, the electoral system's openness (changes on the ballot entry requirements); and third,

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<sup>50</sup> The party's original name was *Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik – Nuevo País* (MUPP-NP). The party changed its name to *Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik* (MUPP) in 2012 when all political parties in the country had to re-register to be able to participate in electoral processes. The 1996 name reflects the fact that the party was registered under an electoral alliance between Pachakutik and the independent political movement *Nuevo País* also known as *Movimiento de Ciudadanos por un Nuevo País*. *Nuevo País* was a mestizo led political organization connected to Pachakutik's first presidential candidate Freddy Ehlers. In 1996, when Pachakutik was registered as a party, it was registered alongside the candidacy of Ehlers and thus the names of both organizations were merged. Both organizations, however, maintained a differentiation throughout the years. In fact, *Nuevo País* participated in the following electoral processes (from 1998 onwards) as an independent political movement. Because of this I prefer to use the shortened initials MUPP when referring to Pachakutik even when I refer to the party prior to 2012.

<sup>51</sup> Donna Lee Van Cott (2005) argues that these type of alliances took place in various countries in Latin America when cadres from diminished leftist parties joined ethnic parties (p. 38). The interesting aspect of these alliances, she asserts, is that for the first time in the region the ethnic organizations had the necessary strength and recognition to take in the experience of the cadres without tipping the power balance on the cadres' favor. In previous years the indigenous organizations had always been the minority partners within the alliances.

<sup>52</sup> This organization was formed in 1986 and brought together all other regional indigenous organizations in Ecuador like the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon (CONFENIAE), the *Ecuador Runakunapak Rikcharimuy* organization also known as ECUARUNARI (also known as the Confederation of the Kichwa Peoples of Ecuador), and the Confederation of Nationalities and Pueblos from the Coastlands of Ecuador (CONAICE). It was under Conaie's umbrella that the 1990s *levantamientos* in Ecuador were organized, thus making the organization into a major Ecuadorian political actor (Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 16). For a detailed overview of the early 1990s *levantamientos* see: Almeida et al. (1992); Becker & Tutillo, (2009); Pallares, (2002)

<sup>53</sup> The indigenous movement was slowly recognized as a political actor starting in the mid-1980s and gained more importance and recognition after the 1990s *levantamiento* (uprising). In June 4, 1990 the indigenous population blocked most of the Ecuadorian highland's highways in a well-organized move. This was the first ever *levantamiento* that had effectively paralyzed the country. The then president Rodrigo Borja was forced to negotiate with the movement leaders and agreed to deal with the most pressing demands of the group that included the resolution of land disputes, the recognition of indigenous territories, and issues related to access to health and the creation of a bilingual education project. Yet, Conaie eschewed electoral politics up until 1996. The organization had often asked the indigenous population to stay away from electoral politics insisting on the fact

Ecuadorian voters were dissatisfied with political parties, including leftist parties. Pachakutik came into being as the anti-establishment alternative that would bring together left-leaning voters *and* the indigenous voters. From the outset, the party leaders claimed Pachakutik was not a political party but a political movement. This was done to put some distance between the new organization and the traditional political parties. In this section, I focus on this organization's evolution. The party has not remained static. The horizontal organization created in 1996 has been replaced by a multitiered (complex) organization.

### 3.5.1 Data generation methods

Before advancing with the analysis, it is necessary to emphasize that it is difficult to measure or quantify the resources that parties have in Latin America and concomitantly gauge the party organizations' changes effectively. This is because parties in the region often have a weak institutional memory. Only rarely parties have accurate registries of their party members. Moreover, party activists' work is often obscured due to a lack of accountability and registries. It can also be the case that party leaders can over-report or under-report a party's capacity (Cyr, 2017, p. 82).

In the case of Pachakutik, most of this holds true. The party has struggled with a lack of institutional memory. One of the reasons, one of my interviewees explained, was that the party's headquarters had suffered several robberies. "We do not have archives; all of our data was stolen" (PK-1, 2017). In 2004, the party reported six computers were taken from the party's headquarters. Although no other similar events have been reported in the media afterward, the party officials – when I talked to them – often stressed they had no access to party archives. Aside from the party's archives, the state's institutional memory is also lacking. This compounds the difficulties of producing a comprehensive overview of a party's performance and evolution. The *Consejo Nacional Electoral* (CNE), which replaced the *Tribunal Supremo Electoral* (TSE), has reported not having all records of parties, including data on the electoral results before 2002 (GOV- 1, 2017 and GOV-2, 2020).<sup>54</sup> This makes research challenging but

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that the power of the indigenous organization resided on "actions not elections" (Freidenberg & Sánchez López, 1998, p. 70; Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 38). This phrase was used in 1992 when CONAIE called for abstention at the National elections (Freidenberg & Alcántara Sáez, 2001, p. 239). The position changed in late 1995. Leading this change was CONFENAIE which had started talks to support Freddy Ehlers' presidential candidacy (Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 40). Eventually Conaie responded to the pressure from CONFENAIE and decided to join electoral politics and form a new party.

<sup>54</sup> In one of my visits to CNE, officials reported most of the records had been moved to a warehouse and eventually lost to mold.

not impossible. There are different strategies to overcome these limitations. One of these is to use different methods of data generation to complement available information.

I employed the following data generation methods: interviews, archival work, and, when necessary, to contrast data, secondary sources. Between 2016 and 2020, I conducted over 30 interviews with Pachakutik's (former) leaders and party activists, key informants, party experts, government officials, and (former) leaders and activists of traditional parties that worked with Pachakutik's candidates directly or indirectly since the party's formation. As some of my interviewees preferred to be kept anonymous, all of the interviews have been anonymized. Appendix 1 contains a list of the interviews referred to in the text. Each interviewee was assigned a code in reference to their role/background, a number, and the year when the interview took place. Pachakutik's leaders, activists, and informants are referred to as PK plus a number and the year. Experts are referred to as EXP. Members of other parties are referred to as ID (for the party *Izquierda Democrática*) and PSC (for the party *Partido Social Cristiano*). Government officials are referred to as GOV. The interviews took place in Azuay, Cañar, Cotopaxi, Imbabura, and Pichincha and were conducted in Spanish.<sup>55</sup>

The archival work focused on media outlets and government data. I worked at the *Biblioteca Aurelio Espinosa Polit* and the *Biblioteca de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador (PUCE)* in Quito. At the Aurelio Espinosa Polit Library, I was granted access to their collection of hard copies of the newspaper *El Comercio* during the summers of 2017 and 2018.<sup>56</sup> I reviewed each *El Comercio* edition from January 1, 2001, to June 1, 2017. I took photographs of each page that contained editorial and short and long reports of all political processes. I cataloged and organized each of these photographs by date and transformed them into text-searchable pdfs. I returned to the archive during the summer of 2018 to re-take some of the photographs.

Through the *Universidad Católica del Ecuador* library, I had access to jpeg files of each page from the printed edition of *El Comercio* between January 1, 1995, and December 31, 2000. I reviewed these files, selected the pages with the same criteria applied to the newspaper's hard copies, transformed them into text-searchable pdfs, and stored them. At the University's library, I also reviewed all hard copies of the magazine *Vistazo* between 1995 and

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<sup>55</sup> Adding references to the exact location of the interviews could affect the anonymity of my sources, hence I only report the provinces where the cities I met my informants are located.

<sup>56</sup> The library director was kind enough to let me access the library underground archive during the summer months despite the fact that the library was officially closed for the summer break.

2017, took photographs, organized them by date, and transformed them into text-searchable pdfs.

Through the library of *Universidad Politécnica Salesiana*, I got access to scanned copies of the magazine KIPU which specializes in clipping newspaper articles from all printed press in Ecuador relating to the indigenous population between 1995 and 2020. With this, I constructed a substantial archive of printed press resources spanning the period of investigation.

The second set of archival work focused on government documents. For this, I worked with CNE officials through information requests regarding electoral results data, party registration documents, and any other documents about Pachakutik between 1996 and 2018. I also worked with officials from the *Archivo Biblioteca Juan León Mera de la Asamblea Nacional* through information requests focusing on, primarily, Pachakutik's legislators' work. I requested information about all bills proposed between 1996 and 2017, data on legislative blocks, legislative debates transcripts, and the reports presented by the electoral management bodies (TSE and CNE) to the legislature. All of the information was delivered via CDs (from CNE) and an external hard drive from the legislature's library. With this, I constructed a substantial archive of government data to piece together Pachakutik's life and Ecuadorian politics between 1996 and 2017.

For each chapter I used a different set of data. Thus, each chapter has a section where I explain the use of the data. For this chapter, and in particular this section, I mostly employed archival data (a combination of news media reports, party documents, government documents, and secondary literature). Where it was necessary, either to triangulate contradicting information or clarify certain elements I resorted to interview data.

### **3.5.2 Pachakutik's registration and re-registration**

Pachakutik has navigated its formal registration two times between 1996 and 2019. The first time when the movement was created and the second time in 2009 when, per the new Constitution, all political parties and political movements were required to re-register. On both occasions, officially, the party faced a similar set of registration requirements: a minimum number of signatures (1.5% of the registered voters' signatures), to have offices in at least half of all provinces in the country, and to have a government program, party statutes, and party symbols. However, research showed that in 1996 Pachakutik was partly exempted from these requirements, facilitating its registration. Pachakutik's registration was done following the

requirements for independent candidates. The party presented 100.000 support signatures (Lucas, 2015, p. 33). It was exempted from having to set-up offices in at least ten provinces (Van Cott, 2005, p. 118).

In 2009, by contrast, the party fulfilled all requirements and struggled greatly to do so. The requisite that challenged the party the most was gathering the signatures. “The organization was not ready to get the signatures. They struggled so much they had to get help from other parties. With the support from MPD,<sup>57</sup> they gathered the signatures.” (EXP-2, 2018).<sup>58</sup> Pachakutik’s leadership delivered the first batch of signatures in December 2011. The party reported a total of 250.000 signatures (Consejo Nacional Electoral, 2011). However, CNE did not recognize 66.000 of these signatures. Pachakutik had to go back into the field to collect new signatures. By late 2012 the party finally fulfilled all of its registration requirements, which in addition to the signatures included having offices in at least 12 provinces.

### 3.5.3 Pachakutik’s formal internal structure

The evolution of the party’s formal internal structure at the national and subnational level can be divided into four periods of time: the first spanning from 1996 to 1999, the second one from 1999 to 2005; the third between 2005 and 2016, and the fourth from 2016 to present time (see tables 3.12 and 3.13).

The party leaders, in 1996, presented the party as a horizontal nonhierarchical organization. The idea was that there should be little distance between the party members and the leadership (Freidenberg & Alcántara Sáez, 2001, p. 254). Between 1996 and 1999, Pachakutik did not have subnational level organizations. The national leadership dealt directly with provincial and cantonal social and indigenous organizations linked to existing *Organizaciones de Segundo Grado*<sup>59</sup> (Freidenberg & Alcántara Sáez, 2001, p. 256). The party organization mostly relayed on already existing local organizations, and these were considered

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<sup>57</sup> The party *Movimiento Popular Democrático* (MPD) is one of the few leftist parties that have been active in Ecuador since the return to democracy in 1979. This party re-registered in 2014 under a new name: *Movimiento Unidad Popular*

<sup>58</sup> The struggles of Pachakutik on its most recent registration put in perspective how the signature collection in 1996 has been reported. Lucas (2015) reports that the signatures were collected in a record time of one week (p. 33). Birnir (2004) stressed that the party did not struggle to collect signatures given the size of the indigenous population (p. 17). Yet, as Barczak (1997) noted, for a new party organization, lest an independent candidate, gathering over 100.000 signatures without a backing already developed organization can be considerably challenging (p. 114).

<sup>59</sup> The *Organizaciones de Segundo Grado* bring together different interest groups within and across indigenous and mestizo communities. These organizations serve many different functions (Martínez Valle, 2006, p. 110). Most importantly they have become the most common recipients of development resources and as such often serve as links between the population and different sources of funding for projects.

the party's local branches. This structure was replaced in 1998. Pachakutik's leaders argued the party needed a centralized organization that would protect party members from falling into corruption (Miguel Lluco in Freidenberg & Alcántara Sáez, 2001, p. 254).

In 1999, at the party's first National Congress, the national and subnational organizations were changed. At the national level, three different governing bodies were created: the National Congress, the Political Committee, and the Executive Committee (see table 3.12) (Freidenberg & Alcántara Sáez, 2001, p. 255). At the subnational level, provincial party branches were created. The provincial organizations mirrored the national level organizations. These included a Provincial Assembly, a Political Committee, and an Executive Committee. At the cantonal level, the party established a cantonal council formed by all grassroots organizations from the same canton. This structure lasted until 2005.

*Table 3.12 Pachakutik's national formal internal structure*

Pachakutik's national formal internal structure		
1999-2005	2005-2016	2016 -2021
National Congress	National Congress	National Congress
Political Committee	Political Committee	Political Committee
Executive Committee	Executive Committee	Executive Committee
	National Coordinator	National Coordinator
	Ethics Commission	National Sub-coordinators
	Gender Committee	Ethics and Discipline Committee
	National Youth Committee	Ombudsman office for party members
	Subnational Government Coordination Office	National Electoral office
		National Secretariat office
		Secretariat for the Formation, Education, and Training in Politics and Ideology

*Source: Compiled with data from the party's statutes and data from Freidenberg and Alcántara Saéz (2001).*

In 2005, the national level formal structure was extended to include two new committees (the gender and national youth committees), an ethics commission, and the subnational government coordination office. Additionally, the National Coordinator's office was officially included as part of the party's formal structure. At the subnational level, the party's structures were extended to the parish level. The provincial and cantonal offices

mirrored the national level organizations. The parish offices did the same except that there was no ethics committee set up at this level.

In the last period, from 2016 onward, the party organization became even more complex, including a party's ombudsman at both national and sub-national levels. Additionally, the party established overseas electoral offices.

*Table 3.13 Pachakutik's subnational formal internal structure*


Pachakutik's subnational formal internal structure			
	1999-2005	2005-2016	2016 -
Provincial	Provincial Assembly Political Committee Executive Committee	Provincial Assembly Political Committee Executive Committee Provincial Coordinator Ethics and Discipline Committee	Provincial Assembly Political Committee Executive Committee Provincial Coordinator Provincial Sub-coordinator Ethics and Discipline Committee Ombudsman office Provincial Electoral Office Provincial Executive office
Cantonal		Cantonal Assembly Political Committee Executive Committee Ethics and Discipline Committee Cantonal Coordinator	Cantonal Assembly Cantonal Coordinator Cantonal Sub-coordinator Ethics and Discipline Committee Ombudsman office
Parish		Parish Assembly Executive Committee Parish Coordinator	Parish Assembly Parish Coordinator Parish sub-coordinators Ethics and Discipline Committee Ombudsman office
Overseas			Electoral Overseas office

*Source: Compiled with data from the party's statutes and data from Freidenberg and Alcántara Saéz (2001)*

The evolution of Pachakutik's formal internal structure is clear. The number of national-level committees and offices has increased alongside the number of subnational

committees at the provincial, cantonal, and parish levels. This process has been accompanied by an expansion of the party's overall presence in Ecuador. Figure 3.16 includes two maps. The first map shows the parishes (filled with blue), cantons (outlined by a dark blue line), and provinces (outlined by a black line) where Pachakutik presented candidates at the subnational elections of the year 2000; the second map shows the same but for the 2019 elections. Taking candidates' presence as a sign of party branches' presence, these maps show how the party's branches have extended across the territory, especially towards the country's southern border.

*Figure 3.16 Pachakutik's subnational branches (subnational elections 2000 and 2019)*



*Source: Data from Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) and Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE).*



### 3.5.4 Pachakutik's leadership and National Congresses

Pachakutik has held in total nine national congresses since the first one in 1999. In each of these meetings, the party members elected the National Party Coordinator.<sup>60</sup> The meetings were held every two years, starting in 1999 until 2010. In the 1999 National Party Congress, Miguel Lluco was elected as the first coordinator of the party.<sup>61</sup> He was re-elected at the 2001 National Congress.<sup>62</sup> Gilberto Talahua replaced Miguel Lluco in 2003.<sup>63</sup> Talahua was re-elected in 2005. In 2007 Jorge Guamán was elected national party coordinator. He was replaced in 2010 by Rafael Antuni. Fanny Campos replaced Antuni in 2013. Campos had her tenure extended for a couple of months after the National Congress originally planned for late 2015 did not take place. In 2016 Campos was replaced by Marlon Santi. Santi was re-elected in 2019.

Pachakutik has never had a charismatic leader. Instead, several different leaders have – each in turn – been at the center of the party and worked as spokespersons. At the subnational level, according to the party statutes, provincial, cantonal, and parish coordinators have also been elected following a somewhat similar schedule starting in 2005. However, it is difficult to determine the level of alternation at these levels, and when these leaders were elected.<sup>64</sup>

### 3.5.5 Pachakutik's membership

The party's members elect Pachakutik's leaders at national congresses. The fact that these meetings have taken place consistently shows that the party has an active set of members. However, calculating the party's members' number and their involvement with the party is challenging. As mentioned already, the party lacks proper archives, and data about membership is almost non-existent.

The party is officially registered as having 159.344 members plus 804 “valid adherents.”<sup>65</sup> This number corresponds to the number of signatures required to register any

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<sup>60</sup> In these National Congresses the national sub-coordinators have also been elected. In 2001 Mario Echawua was elected. He was replaced by José Quenama in 2003. In 2005 the new sub-coordinator was Belisario Dahua. He was replaced in 2007 by Ricardo Carrillo. In 2010, Didimo Menendez become the party's sub-coordinator. In 2013 the place was taken by Cesar Gamboa and a second sub-coordinator. Since 2016, Cecilia Velazque has worked as Pachakutik's sub-coordinator alongside another sub-coordinator.

<sup>61</sup> Before Miguel Lluco, José María Cabascango worked as party coordinator although it is unclear how he was appointed.

<sup>62</sup> Before the 2003 Congress however, Miguel Lluco was ousted as he accepted to manage a trust fund created to manage the assets of the former *Empresa Eléctrica del Ecuador* (EMELEC).

<sup>63</sup> After a couple of months of acting as party coordinator, Talahua was officially elected by the National Congress in late 2003.

<sup>64</sup> The CNE since 2012 is in charge of also registering the subnational level party leadership yet I could not access official data on this matter.

<sup>65</sup> This is the number of signatures reported by CNE in the official documentation stating the registration of Pachakutik as a political party. The document is numbered *Notificación No. 000258* and dated April 3, 2012.

political party in Ecuador. Most political parties in the country report similar memberships.<sup>66</sup> This is because, as one official of CNE explained, “the law makes it that all parties have roughly the same number of members. No party reports more signatures than the strictly required. It is not a good measure of party membership” (GOV-1, 2017).<sup>67</sup>

The number of registered members at CNE is used to construct the party's selectorate list for the party's primaries. Data from these procedures are useful to gauge the number of party members who actively engage with the party assuming that voting at primaries reflects a general commitment. Data on these procedures is scarce, however. There is only data for the 2016 presidential candidate selection. Out of a total of 159,344 registered party members who could cast a vote, only 5,200 effectively did (El Telégrafo, 2016). This means that approximately only 3.25% of the party's total members effectively engaged with the party.<sup>68</sup>

### 3.5.6 Pachakutik's staff, locales, and funds

A subset of the *active party members* represents the party's staff.<sup>69</sup> These are individuals who work for the party at the national and sub-national offices. I could not ascertain the number of these party operatives, nor their exact location. Nonetheless, what I could establish was that Pachakutik does not have a centralized bureaucracy. Party members that contribute to the party's functioning are brought in with the party leaders (national and sub-national) and often leave when the leaders are replaced. The connection between the party staff and the leaders (at all levels) is based mostly on close personal relationships.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> The minimum number of signatures required for party registration in 2012 was 157,947 equivalent to 1.5% of the national registered voters. Yet, Pachakutik benefited from registering as a political movement which provided the party with leeway to present a slightly reduced number of signatures.

<sup>67</sup> There are additionally a number of problems with the registration of signatures and party members. A number of scandals about signature forgery have been reported all throughout Latin America (Cyr, 2017, p. 82). In Ecuador particularly, the original submission of Pachakutik's signatures was contested by CNE arguing many of these signatures were not valid. In fact, CNE did not accept a total of 66,951 signatures from the original submission of 212,096. Pachakutik eventually provided an extra 12,802 signatures in late September 2012 to secure its registration as a party (El Telégrafo, 2012).

<sup>68</sup> CNE has more recent data relating to the selectorate of Pachakutik. The electoral rules require CNE to verify these primary election procedures. In late 2018 CNE officers had to participate in these procedures so Pachakutik could register its candidates for local party leaders. The data however has not been released.

<sup>69</sup> In this section I do not focus on the party-in-government i.e. the legislative party. Nonetheless, during my interviews I was told that unlike other parties which staff their offices with more specialized party operatives, at the legislature the elected members of Pachakutik make their own choices. “I brought my own staff, they are not connected to the party” (PK-6, 2017). This is not the norm in the country, however. Parties like *Partido Social Cristiano* use more specialized personnel “I have worked for years with the party [at the legislature] and I am now an expert on all procedures at the legislature. The party works like this. I have worked for three different legislators” (PSC-1, 2020).

<sup>70</sup> The person manning the headquarters had a clear close relationship with one the party leaders I met in Quito.

Despite the staff's lack of professionalization and their continuous mobility, some party operatives working at the subnational levels have been able to work their way up to the national level organization. Fanny Campos, for instance, worked for the Imbabura branch before becoming the national sub-coordinator and later on the national coordinator. Similarly, Marlon Santi,<sup>71</sup> Miguel Lluco, and Rafael Antuni all developed their political profiles by first working in their provinces.

Pachakutik has – to my knowledge – only one well-known party locale, the national headquarters in Quito. There is no exact data on whether the party owns buildings at the subnational level. Most meetings at the subnational level are reported to have taken place (and I also determined through fieldwork) in locales linked to indigenous communities or social movements. For example, Pachakutik's Chimborazo branch met at the “*Casa Indígena de Riobamba*” to select the provincial party coordinators and committee members in 2014.<sup>72</sup> Similarly, Pachakutik's Cotopaxi branch consistently meets at the headquarters of the *Movimiento Indígena Campesino de Cotopaxi* (MICC). In turn, Pachakutik's Cayambe branch often meets at the *casa comunal* (town hall) of different indigenous communities. Pachakutik, it appears, has not been able to build a portfolio of party locales. However, the party's connection to local grassroots organizations has ensured the party members' access to spaces connected to the indigenous communities, thus compensating for private offices' absence.

The absence of locales likely affected the party staff's professionalization, especially in districts where the party has not been electorally successful. In the districts where the party's candidates have been elected, the party's operatives have been included as part of these offices' staff. Nonetheless, this is limited to party members who already had a relationship with the candidates. Only these party members have gained access to more professionalization opportunities, salaries, and offices (EXP-1, 2017, EXP-2, 2018). However, due to the already discussed low rate of the re-election of the party's candidates, this access to offices and state funds has been limited and not consistent.

Another issue that constrains staff's professionalization is access to funds. Pachakutik did not receive state funding from 1996 to 2009.<sup>73</sup> Until 2009, the party's resources were limited to party members' contributions *and* elected officials' contributions, who contributed

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<sup>71</sup> Santi was CONAIE's national coordinator before his election as national coordinator of Pachakutik.

<sup>72</sup> This is reported in another one of CNE's reports about the election of Pachakutik's provincial party leaders. This is data included in the document that summarizes the decisions taken by CNE's council on October 31, 2014. The document's number is *Acta Resolutiva No. 045-ple-cne-2017*.

<sup>73</sup> Pachakutik did get electoral campaign funds for all electoral processes between 1996 and 2009 as established by the electoral laws.

with a percentage of their salaries to the party's funding and still do so (PK-1, 2017). These private contributions were small and mostly employed to cover the party's staff and headquarters' expenses. Between 2010 and 2013, Pachakutik became a recipient of state funding. The party received upwards of a quarter of a million USD each year.<sup>74</sup> In 2014 and until 2018, CNE stopped paying Pachakutik, arguing that the party did not fulfill the requisites to be entitled to the subsidy. Pachakutik's leaders claimed this was not the case. In 2019 CNE changed its decision and transferred to Pachakutik USD 413.216,64.

### **3.6 The puzzle: Pachakutik's persistence.**

Pachakutik is a party that persists with low levels of electoral support and with scarce resources. At the national level, the party receives fewer votes than necessary to maintain formal registration, i.e., 4% of the national votes, with the number of votes declining with every election. At the subnational level, the number of votes is "stable," albeit it rarely surpasses the 4% mark. At this level, the party's electoral trajectory could be described as "flat" (Mustillo, 2009, p. 329). A flat trajectory for a party like Pachakutik is not necessarily surprising; this party is considered an ethnic party likely to garner consistent support from indigenous voters. The data suggest, however, that this might not be the case. The *tell-tale signs* of this type of electoral support are absent, e.g., clear strongholds and consistent re-election in districts with indigenous majorities. Instead, Pachakutik's 'successes' (understood as candidates' election) appear as almost haphazard. The party's candidates are elected in different districts year after year. These districts rarely have similar characteristics, e.g., some have high percentages of indigenous population, while others do not. Moreover, although the party presents candidates in almost the same districts year after year, the votes the candidates get in each district fluctuate. It is difficult to identify a core set of voters per district.

Pachakutik's haphazard electoral support at the subnational level, instead of providing clues regarding the party's survival, opens up more questions about the party. Is there a relationship between the party and the indigenous voters? Does the party receive the indigenous vote? Furthermore, given that the party's candidates are often elected in districts where the indigenous population is not a majority, how does the party mobilize non-indigenous (mestizo) votes?

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<sup>74</sup> In 2010 the party received USD 251.066, in 2011 the party received USD 367.269,03, in 2012 the party received USD 404.398,30, and in 2013: USD 557.968,05

Pachakutik's resources are multiple, but scarce. The party transformed from an almost horizontal organization in the late 1990s to a complex tiered organization with internal democracy and accountability procedures that expands throughout much of the Ecuadorian territory. In this process, Pachakutik has also established a consistent rotation of party leaders.<sup>75</sup> Nevertheless, the party's resources in terms of membership and infrastructure are limited, with few formal members and a lack of party locales. The organization's evolution analysis shows that the party created in 1996 has not remained static. The party's members and leaders have invested time and energy into it. Nevertheless, the party's active membership is small. Especially at the national level, the party seems to be run by a few members. At the subnational level, a similar phenomenon takes place. Few party members run the subnational branches. Although other members (not part of the officially appointed committees) participate in meetings and primary processes, it is difficult to determine whether their commitment to the party goes beyond these actions.<sup>76</sup>

Neither the number of votes the party receives nor its resources suggest a conventional story of survival. As discussed in chapter 2, persisting parties are often presented as precisely the opposite: parties with strong party organizations and maintaining relevant electoral profiles. It is clear hence that understanding Pachakutik's persistence requires an approach that moves away from solely focusing on parties' votes or in parties' resources. In the following chapters, I take that approach to understand this party's persistence and the questions that this chapter opened up.

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<sup>75</sup> Party leaders were initially elected every two years and since 2016 party leaders are elected every 3 years.

<sup>76</sup> Party meetings are fairly well attended. I participated in one of these meetings back in August of 2018 organized by the Cotopaxi branch and the room was at capacity with many persons not able to secure a seat. Notably, this meeting had been called to discuss the future subnational elections (that took place in 2019). The meeting was organized over 6 months prior to the start date for the registration of candidatures which could arguably signal the constant work of the party branches.



## 4 The division of the indigenous voters: the Ecuadorian paradox of recognition

This chapter addresses one of the most common-sense explanations for Pachakutik's persistence: it is an ethnic party with a strong connection to the indigenous population and the indigenous social movement. Conventional knowledge about ethnic parties and their electoral support would guide us towards that explanation. The idea is that an ethnic party should get the support from the ethnic group it aims to represent as voting along ethnic lines is likely to ensure voters access to benefits or to be a form of self-affirmation (Birnir, 2007; Chandra, 2004; Horowitz, 1985; Posner, 2005). From this perspective, voting for ethnic parties can be akin to counting heads. Pachakutik should have *counted with these heads*.

The analysis of Pachakutik's electoral support in chapter 3 showed the party does not have apparent strongholds. This suggests the party lacks a core set of supporters, which is the opposite one would expect from an ethnic party. However, the data discussed in chapter 3 is aggregated to the district level, thus making it impossible to make inferences about the indigenous' voters' preferences. This chapter hence explores whether Pachakutik is a party that profits from ethnic voting. To do so, given the absence of individual-level data on indigenous' voters' preferences, I use the ecological inference method RxC (Rosen, Jiang, King, & Tanner, 2001) using the electoral data and self-identification census data at the parish level. I ran estimations for all national and subnational elections between 2002 and 2019. I found that Pachakutik does not receive the bulk of the indigenous' voters' support. On average, less than 25% of the indigenous voters in all cantons support Pachakutik's candidates in every election.

The lack of indigenous' voters' support counters the idea that the party's connection to the indigenous population may explain its persistence. This is a surprising finding, given the well-known initial relationship between the party, the indigenous movement, and the indigenous population in general. Therefore, in this chapter, I also explore one possible explanation for this disconnection.

I argue the indigenous population has become fragmented, which is evident when they split their votes amongst multiple parties. This fragmentation is connected to the recognition of the indigenous population as formed by numerous *pueblos* and nationalities. The state, per the indigenous population's requests, recognized these *pueblos* and nationalities and developed a system of benefits allocation using these categories. The *pueblos* and nationalities have, in turn, developed their own organizations, which they use to connect to the state and multiple


political parties. Pachakutik has become one of many parties that the indigenous' voters support (albeit most of these parties have no direct connection to the indigenous population), instead of the only one they support. I call this the paradox of recognition.

The chapter continues as follows. The first section discusses the extant research on ethnic voting and ethnic voting in Latin America and Ecuador. The second section discusses the research design and the data for the ecological inference and the historical analysis of the recognition processes. The third section discusses the indigenous support for Pachakutik's candidates for president and mayors between 2002 and 2019 using the ecological inference data. The fourth section discusses the fragmentation of the indigenous population. The fifth and last section brings together these previous two sections to discuss Pachakutik's indigenous' voters' support.

#### 4.1 Ethnic voting

Ethnic voting is commonly understood to be either instrumental or expressive. The expressive theories of ethnic voting suggest that it is akin to "census voting," where what matters most is asserting oneself. Ethnic voting, from this perspective, relates to voters expressing their identities in the ballot box. This type of voting is a way of showing group allegiance and may take place even *against* voters' interests (Ferree, 2006, p. 804). Voters will support the party that represents them best. The criterion for vote choice is the party's and the candidates' allegiance to the voters' ethnic group. Figure 4.1 summarizes the model of expressive ethnic voting. The link is simple: members of an ethnic group will support the party formed by this group's members.

Figure 4.1 Model of expressive ethnic voting






In contrast, the instrumental theories of ethnic voting consider the possibility that not all co-ethnics will support a co-ethnic party. The idea is that ethnic voters will *calculate* the benefits they are likely to receive to make their choices. Therefore, ethnic voters will not support parties and candidates that do not deliver benefits (or are unlikely to do so). At the same time, ethnic voters might support non-co-ethnic parties when they are likely to receive benefits (Ichino & Nathan, 2013; Nathan, 2016).<sup>77</sup> These calculations also have a component of retrospective voting (Lindberg & Morrison, 2008). In this model of ethnic voting, ethnicity serves as an information shortcut that conveys information relating to the benefits linked to supporting a political party. Votes are not a form of self-affirmation; instead, voters cast their ballots responding to the stimuli of ethnic cues as information shortcuts about access to benefits.

Figure 4.2 summarizes the argument of the model of instrumental ethnic voting. It shows the “self-reinforcing equilibrium of ethnic favoritism” (Chandra, 2007, p. 85), where ethnic parties target ethnic groups using ethnic cues and ethnic groups send similar cues to parties to ensure access to benefits. The figure also shows that non-co-ethnic voters vote for ethnic parties when they can also access benefits.

Figure 4.2 Model of instrumental ethnic voting



<sup>77</sup> The types of goods and benefits voters get access to have an important effect over these calculations. If parties can build private goods delivery structures non-co-ethnic voting is less likely. Conversely, if parties offer club goods which can be limited geographically (to one region/district/neighborhood) but cannot be limited within (e.g. roads, water supply) non-co-ethnic voting is more likely (Ichino & Nathan, 2013; Nathan, 2016).

Both models expect an “ethnic pull” between voters and parties. Ethnicity is, however, not always the default shortcut voters employ. Individuals will resort to this shortcut only where ethnic identities are salient and politicized (Birbir, 2007, p. 603). Crucially, the presence of ethnic groups within a population does not immediately translate into politicized ethnic identities.

The construction of ethnic groups into viable categories or cleavages (for electoral targeting and benefits) requires: 1) organized individuals; 2) cultural frames that include a possible category or identity (self-identification); and 3) institutions that do not constrain ethnic organization (Chandra, 2005, p. 236; Mair & Bartolini, 2014, p. 234). Additionally, the size of an ethnic group can affect whether a particular identity becomes politicized or not. The politicization process can be triggered by 1) ethnic parties that aim to mobilize an ethnic group to ensure government access; 2) the state and its aim to organize the delivery of benefits; or 3) individuals seeking to access the state’s benefits. Notably, individuals who can potentially claim numerous ethnic identities may opt to rally around a single unified ethnic identity to secure benefits (Yashar, 2005).

There has to be a utility to the politicization of an ethnic identity. This utility is not static, however. As benefits are scarce, ethnic identities can begin to fragment (de Zwart, 2000, pp. 236–237). That is, individuals who use politicized identities (or organize around them) may choose to employ different identities in the hopes of receiving further benefits (de Zwart, 2005, p. 156). Setting aside individuals’ preferences, organizations may also affect an ethnic identity’s utility as the means to receive benefits. A new political party (or multiple parties) could incentivize individuals organizing into ethnic groups. Moreover, the state can play an essential role in this process; by, for example, incentivizing (or deterring) the use of a politicized ethnic identity to access benefits (Chandra, 2005; de Zwart, 2000; Posner, 2005). Hence, the expected ethnic pull between an ethnic party and an ethnic group should not be taken as a given. Ethnic identities – even those politicized – are not necessarily fixed.

## **4.2 Ethnic voting in Latin America and Ecuador**

Latin America’s ethnic diversity is well known. Numerous indigenous groups inhabit the region. However, only at times and in few cases, these groups’ ethnic identity is a relevant predictor for their voting preferences (Hirsland & Strijbis, 2019, p. 2027; Moreno Morales, 2015, p. 122). For ethnic cues to affect the preferences of ethnic voters in the region, the ethnic

identities need to be politicized, and these need to be used by viable ethnic parties (Madrid, 2005; Van Cott & Birnir, 2007).

The cases of Ecuador and Bolivia are considered examples of ethnic voting in the region. The two countries have relatively large indigenous populations, and both have political parties directly linked to the indigenous populations (Madrid, 2012). These connections and the well-known electoral victories of these parties inform the idea of ethnic voting in Bolivia and Ecuador. Nonetheless when scholars address ethnic voting in these two countries, the indigenous groups are often characterized as a unitary group despite their known diversity (see, for example, Mijeski & Beck, 2004, 2008; Rice, 2011; Rice & Van Cott, 2006).<sup>78</sup>

These analyses often brush over the diversity that characterizes the indigenous population in Ecuador and Bolivia. The indigenous population in these two countries can be defined at two levels: 1) a macro level where all groups share a single indigenous ethnic identity, and 2) a micro-level where each group has a distinctive ethnic identity. The effect of this diversity on ethnic voting in these countries has yet to be fully comprehended. Nonetheless, recent research in Bolivia by Hirseland and Strijbis (2019) found that the macro-level ethnic identity does not exert an inescapable pull for all indigenous peoples. Instead, they found that the highland indigenous voters who identify as *Aymara* responded to this ethnic identity. According to the estimations, 80% of the *Aymara* voters supported Evo Morales' MAS. In contrast, the lowlands indigenous voters responded to a regional (non-ethnic) identity (Hirseland & Strijbis, 2019, p. 2022).

In Ecuador, ethnic voting is equated to the *indígena* vote and the expected support for Pachakutik. This revolves around the idea that the indigenous population is organized in terms of a single identity: the *indígena* identity. This identity brought together multiple and diverse indigenous peoples' groups during the 1990s. It also gave way to the creation of the party Pachakutik. Yet, the indigenous population since the second half of the 1980s has consistently worked to achieve differentiated recognition, i.e., the recognition of the different *pueblos* and nationalities that form the indigenous population. The successful recognition of these *pueblos* and nationalities could mean the fragmentation of the *indígena* identity. Crucially, it could also mean a change in ethnic voting in the country.

Extant research has not addressed the possible fragmentation of the indigenous population in Ecuador. Scholars have focused on ethnic voting linked to the *indígena* identity.

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<sup>78</sup> To be sure, these scholars do mention the heterogeneity of the indigenous groups, but they do so in passing. In general, they work from the assumption that the indigenous population is "a" group.

Importantly, their findings do not conform to the standard expectations, i.e., that the indigenous voters support Pachakutik *en mass*. Instead, indigenous voters appear to support different parties at different times. In parishes where the indigenous population is a majority, these voters support diverse candidates (including, but not limited, to Pachakutik's candidates) (Báez Rivera & Bretón Solo de Zaldívar, 2006; Madrid, 2005, p. 701; Sánchez Parga, 2013). To be sure, Pachakutik's candidates do often get support from the indigenous voters. However, this support is limited. Mijeski and Beck (2004, 2008, 2011) found that, on average, in 1996, around 30% of the votes cast by the indigenous voters were for Pachakutik's presidential candidate; in 1998, the percentage of votes declined to 20 %; in 2002, the proportion of votes increased to 46%; and in 2006, the percentage of votes declined again to 23%.

These findings suggest a possible disconnection between the indigenous voters and Pachakutik. These also signal that the indigenous voters' do not necessarily vote as a block. Despite these findings, the politicization (and the usefulness) of the *indígena* identity has not been questioned. In the following sections, I challenge the idea of the *indígena* identity as able to provide a reliable link between the party and the voters. I argue that the *indígena* identity has fragmented following different state incentives. I argue that, in a paradoxical turn, the claims for recognition of the indigenous population (and their achievement) have hampered the group's ability to retain the unity that helped them become a political actor in Ecuador. To be sure, the *indígena* identity is still used under certain circumstances to mobilize the indigenous population. Nonetheless, the indigenous population currently engages the state and different political actors from their differentiated independent groups. In other words, the indigenous population has transformed from a large and united, albeit diverse, group into a set of smaller minorities.<sup>79</sup> I argue that the indigenous population's voting patterns reflect this fragmentation.

### 4.3 Research design

To develop my argument about the limits of the connection between Pachakutik and the indigenous voters, I take two steps. First, I analyze the indigenous population's voting patterns at all national and subnational elections between 2002 and 2019 using the ecological inference method RxC (Rosen et al., 2001). Second, I analyze the fragmentation of the *indígena* identity into *pueblos* and nationalities by looking at the incentives for fragmentation coming from the state between 1996 and 2019.

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<sup>79</sup> This argument is similar to Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui's (2010) argument about the division of the indigenous majority in Bolivia into a set of minorities (pp. 64 – 65).

### 4.3.1 Ecological inference data

The ecological inference method helps researchers overcome the problem of reaching conclusions about individual behavior without data gathered at this same level. For analyzing the indigenous population's voting patterns, I use election results (discussed in chapter 3) and census data at the lowest possible ecological level (parishes).<sup>80</sup> The 2001 Census showed that the indigenous population represented 6.8% of the total population and is spread out throughout the country. In turn, the 2010 Census found that the country's indigenous population grew and represented 7% of the national population while continuing to be spread out throughout the country's parishes.<sup>81</sup>

I matched the data from the 2001 Census with the election results of 2002, 2004, and 2006, and the data from the 2010 Census with the election results of 2009, 2013, 2014, 2017, and 2019. The data did not match perfectly. The main problem is that the electoral data reflects the country's administrative division in a more detailed way, while the censuses data do not.<sup>82</sup> Table 4.1 summarizes the number of matched and dropped parishes per election. I used the matched data to estimate the indigenous voters' voting patterns for all elections at the canton level.<sup>83</sup>

To report the estimations, I use the party categories introduced in chapter 3, keeping the data for Pachakutik's support separate.<sup>84</sup> In this chapter, I focus on the presidential elections of 2002, 2006, 2013, and 2017 and the elections of mayors of 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2017.<sup>85</sup> I

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<sup>80</sup> It is important to point out that the percentage of the population in Ecuador that can be categorized as indigenous has been debated for years. In the late 1990s and early 2000s the indigenous movement leaders insisted the indigenous population in the country represented around 40% of the population (Mijeski & Beck, 2011; Pallares, 2002; Van Cott, 2005). However, no official data has been produced that reflects these percentages. Even the Integrated System of Ecuadorian Social Indicators (SIISE) in the year 2000 estimated that the indigenous population in Ecuador represented 14.5% of the national population. However, this estimation was produced based on expert reports rather than on actual survey data (Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 44). The first official census data available regarding the indigenous population in Ecuador was produced in 2001.

<sup>81</sup> These estimates have been consistently challenged. One of the main critiques to the estimates is that they refer to self-identification data. The United Nations Report *Los pueblos indígenas en América Latina* (2014) explains that self-identification data is unreliable because the structural marginalization of the indigenous peoples by the state, enhanced by mistrust to government officials, often foster under-reporting of self-identifications. Additionally, the report stresses that the percentage of indigenous population that self-identifies as indigenous in the census is negatively influenced by the fact that the census offered as an option to self-identify as *mestizo*. Nevertheless, the Census is currently the only official and state sanctioned data on the percentage of the Ecuadorian population that self-identifies as indigenous. The data from the SIISE is no longer available.

<sup>82</sup> For example, the censuses lump together all urban parishes from a canton into a single parish while the electoral data includes data for each independent urban parish.

<sup>83</sup> Ernesto Calvo helped me run the estimations in R. He wrote the original code to run the estimations of the 2014 elections. I made the necessary adjustments for each election.

<sup>84</sup> The full estimations on a party per party basis are available upon request.

<sup>85</sup> I analyzed all national and subnational elections between 2002 and 2019 using the ecological inference technique. The analyses of all elections are available on the online appendix (available at [www.dianadavilagordillo.com](http://www.dianadavilagordillo.com))

do not report the estimations for all cantons in all elections, however. In the case of the presidential elections' estimations, I report estimations for half of the country's cantons on every election. In many cantons, the estimations are impossible because the indigenous population represents a too-small percentage of the population. In these cases, the estimations show that the indigenous voters in a canton split their votes equally amongst all parties, which is unlikely.<sup>86</sup> I, therefore, only use estimations that show some variation on the way votes were cast. In the mayors' elections, I report only the estimations for cantons where Pachakutik presented candidates (on average less than half of all cantons had a candidate from Pachakutik).

*Table 4.1 Number of parishes employed in the EI estimations*

	Year of elections							
	2002	2004	2006	2009	2013	2014	2017	2019
CNE parishes	1166	1177	1177	1185	1248	1255	1227	1232
Parishes used for EI	968	960	950	970	981	979	978	982
Number of dropped parishes	198	217	227	215	267	276	249	250

#### **4.3.2 Fragmentation of the indigenous population data**

I employ the qualitative data discussed in chapter 3 to develop the argument about the state's incentives for the *indígena* identity's fragmentation. I focus on the institutional structure of the Ecuadorian state established in 1996 to fulfill the indigenous population's request for differentiated recognition and how it evolved. I look into the laws, offices, and procedures set up by the state to incentivize the indigenous population's division into *pueblos* and nationalities. In this chapter I once again focused mostly on data from archival work: newspaper reports, government documents, and secondary literature. Interview data was added to further develop some points.

#### **4.4 The indigenous voters' voting patterns**

As discussed, the voting patterns of the indigenous voters have received some attention throughout the years. Crucially, scholars have struggled to find the expected connection

<sup>86</sup> For example, in a canton of the 2002 elections, the estimations showed that each of the 11 candidates received 7.6% of the indigenous voters' votes and also that 7.6% of the indigenous voters casted null votes, and the same percentage casted blank voters.

between Pachakutik and the indigenous voters. Given the absence of individual-level data, the ecological inference method offers the best possible way to examine the indigenous voters' voting patterns. To make sense of the estimations, I use as a baseline for comparison Mijeski's and Beck's (2004) findings for the presidential elections in 1996 where 32% of the indigenous voters supported Pachakutik's candidate. I take this as the minimum percentage of votes Pachakutik's candidates should receive to be characterized as recipients of ethnic voting. There are no available estimations or data regarding indigenous vote at the subnational level. Therefore, I use the same criteria (32% of the votes) for the mayor elections' analysis. As I discussed in detail the election outcomes in chapter 3, I focus only on the indigenous voters' and mestizo voters' voting patterns in the following sections.

#### 4.4.1 Presidential elections

The EI estimations show that in 2002 approximately 31% of the indigenous voters cast ballots for Pachakutik's candidate, Lucio Gutierrez (see table 4.2). In 2006 the number of indigenous voters supporting Pachakutik declined, however. The EI estimations show that only 13% of the indigenous voters cast ballots for Luis Macas. In 2013 more indigenous voters supported the party than in the 2006 elections. An estimated 17% of the indigenous population's votes were for the party's candidate. In 2017 the indigenous voters' support for Pachakutik's candidate declined again. The party's candidate received only 12% of the indigenous population's votes.

The estimations show a decline of the indigenous' support for Pachakutik's candidates, suggesting a lack of connection between the indigenous voters and the party's candidates. Even in 2006, when the party presented its first indigenous candidate, the indigenous voters did not coalesce. Instead, the indigenous voters supported other parties' candidates. Notably, the indigenous voters' support for any other party did not surpass the baseline percentage of ethnic voting (i.e., 32%). In 2006 the bulk of the indigenous' vote went to PSP. On average, 25% of the indigenous voters supported this party. In 2013 MPAIS received approximately 25% of the indigenous voters' votes.<sup>87</sup> In 2017 the bulk of the indigenous ballots went to the electoral alliance CREO/SUMA with their candidate Guillermo Lasso. This candidate received approximately 27% of the indigenous votes.<sup>88</sup> The rest of the indigenous voters' ballots during these elections was spread out between numerous candidates. Different candidates' support

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<sup>87</sup> The percentage of votes from the indigenous population for MPAIS was calculated with the EI estimates. The standard deviation of this mean is 0.19.

<sup>88</sup> The percentage of votes from the indigenous population for CREO/SUMA was calculated with the EI estimates. The standard deviation of this mean is 0.19.

shows that the indigenous voters do not vote as a block at the presidential elections. Instead, they split their support across multiple candidates.

*Table 4.2 EI estimations of the proportion of indigenous and mestizo voters casting ballots for Pachakutik, Traditional Parties, Non-Traditional Parties, and Independent Movements in the presidential elections of 2002, 2006, 2013, and 2017\**

Year	Pachakutik	Traditional Parties (added)	Non-Traditional Parties (added)	Independent Movements (added)
	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)
Indigenous voters				
2002 (n=105)	0.31 (0.24)	0.23 (0.14)	0.17 (0.09)	0.12 (0.07)
2006 (n=108)	0.13 (0.14)	0.21 (0.10)	0.40 (0.21)	0.13 (0.07)
2013 (n=109)	0.17 (0.18)	0.04 (0.03)	0.62 (0.18)	0.04 (0.03)
2017 (n=109)	0.12 (0.09)	0.07 (0.05)	0.54 (0.18)	0.13 (0.08)
Mestizo voters				
2002 (n=105)	0.30 (0.17)	0.28 (0.11)	0.17 (0.07)	0.09 (0.04)
2006 (n=108)	0.03 (0.03)	0.18 (0.07)	0.60 (0.13)	0.06 (0.02)
2013 (n=109)	0.06 (0.11)	0.01 (0.01)	0.82 (0.12)	0.01 (0.009)
2017 (n=109)	0.07 (0.05)	0.08 (0.04)	0.68 (0.10)	0.06 (0.03)

*Source: Means and standard deviations calculated based on EI estimations with data from the National Census of 2001 and electoral results from CNE.*

*\* The percentage of null votes and blank votes are not included in the table. With these columns, the rows add to 100% of the votes.*


Table 4.2 also includes data about the mestizo voters' voting patterns. In 2002 about 30% of the mestizo voters supported Pachakutik's candidate. In 2006, by contrast, only 3% of the mestizo voters supported Luis Macas. The decline in the number of mestizo votes in 2006



for Pachakutik and the fact that the mestizo population supported Pachakutik's candidate in 2002 is not entirely unexpected. Much has been said about non-indigenous voters' support for Pachakutik before 2002 due to *ethno-populist* strategies (see: Madrid, 2012). The argument stresses that after the party abandoned these strategies, both mestizo and indigenous voters stopped supporting the party. In 2013 and 2017, more mestizo voters supported Pachakutik's candidates compared to 2006. However, it is essential to point out that these were electoral alliances' candidates. This could have impacted the mestizo support, i.e., mestizo supporters may be voting for the other members of the alliance and not Pachakutik.

Figure 4.3 plots the data from table 4.2. The dark blue dot on each boxplot marks the mean value of the estimations. The figure shows a decline in Pachakutik's indigenous support from 2002 to 2006 and a slight increase in support for the party's candidates in 2013 and 2017. Moreover, the boxplots show that despite the average support for Pachakutik declined from 2006 onwards, in several cantons the indigenous voters supported Pachakutik as a block (indicated by the outlier dots).

Figure 4.3 Indigenous and mestizo voters' voting patterns in the presidential elections of 2002, 2006, 2013, and 2017.



These outliers suggest that there are some cantons where the indigenous voters do vote together. This has already been discussed by scholars focusing only on indigenous majority parishes (see: Báez Rivera & Bretón Solo de Zaldívar, 2006; Sánchez Parga, 2013). As was already acknowledged by these authors, there is no consistency in Pachakutik's candidates' support in these cantons. I explored each of the outlier cantons. No canton where the indigenous voters supported Pachakutik's candidates in one year similarly supported the party's candidate during the next election. The only pattern I found was that there is no pattern. The indigenous voters appear to vote together only at times, in different cantons, and for different candidates.

Figure 4.3 also shows that the indigenous voters split their votes between parties across different party categories. Notably, the indigenous voters' voting patterns are very similar to the mestizo voters' voting patterns. Notwithstanding, the indigenous voters have spread their votes more consistently across all party categories. In contrast, the mestizo voters have concentrated their votes amongst the traditional and non-traditional parties (including Pachakutik).

Overall, the EI estimations show that the indigenous voters do not vote as a block for Pachakutik or any other party at the presidential elections. The idea of ethnic voting in Ecuador, at this level, appears unfounded. The indigenous voters' voting patterns resemble the mestizo voters' voting patterns. They show, additionally, no consistency (in terms of support for a single party). It follows that it would be a mistake to think about the indigenous voters' connection to Pachakutik as a given. If this was the case, the indigenous voters should support the party's candidates in similar numbers across elections. Moreover, suppose the ethnic pull was present. In that case, the indigenous voters should have supported the indigenous candidate (Luis Macas) at higher rates than they did any of the mestizo candidates. Yet this was not the case.

#### **4.4.2 Municipal elections**

In the subnational arena, Pachakutik has more consistent electoral support than at the national arena. Yet, as discussed in chapter 3, Pachakutik appears not to have strongholds in this arena either, with candidates elected in numerous cantons with differing proportions of indigenous populations. This suggests that the generally expected connection between the indigenous voters and Pachakutik may not be present. The EI estimations show that the indigenous voters are not supporting Pachakutik's candidates as a block. Only rarely more than 32% of the

indigenous voters' ballots were for Pachakutik's candidates. Interestingly, the EI estimations also show that much of Pachakutik's candidates' support comes from mestizo voters.

Table 4.3 summarizes the EI estimations for all cantons in Ecuador with a Pachakutik candidate for mayor in 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019. The EI estimates show that Pachakutik's candidates in all elections received support both from the indigenous voters and the mestizo voters. Yet, the indigenous voters do not appear to have supported Pachakutik's candidates as a block. Except for 2014, on average less than 30% of the indigenous votes were for Pachakutik's candidates. As was the case at the presidential elections, the indigenous voters split their votes across parties in all party categories. In 2004 the candidates from the traditional parties received the bulk of the votes from the indigenous population. In 2009 and 2014, these votes went to the candidates from the non-traditional parties. In 2019 the majority of the votes went to candidates from the independent movements. In turn, close to 20% of the mestizo voters supported Pachakutik's candidates in every election. The mestizo voters, as the indigenous voters did, split their votes amongst parties in all party categories. These voters also supported mostly traditional parties in 2004, non-traditional parties in 2009 and 2014, and independent movements in 2019.

Figure 4.4 plots the data from table 4.3. The dark blue dots represent the mean percentage of votes cast by each group of voters. The figure shows that the indigenous voters support Pachakutik's candidates but also support other parties' candidates. Figure 4.4 is useful to see the remarkable similarity between the indigenous voters' voting pattern and the mestizo voters' voting pattern. Both groups' support for independent movements increases across the years. In turn, both groups' support for Pachakutik's candidates is somewhat stable, albeit the indigenous voters' support rarely reaches the minimum baseline level discussed (32% of the votes). The support for non-traditional parties increases until 2014 but decreases in 2019. Lastly, the support for traditional parties has declined since 2004.

Figure 4.4 also shows that, at times and in some districts (cantons), the indigenous voters appear to vote for Pachakutik's candidates as a block. Interestingly, this is also the case for mestizo voters in some cantons. As I did for the presidential elections estimates, I explored each of the cantons where more than 50% of the indigenous voters supported Pachakutik's candidates. I found that the indigenous voters in these cantons do not consistently support the party's candidates, nor do they always vote as a block. The cantons where the indigenous voters vote together are not the same across elections. Similarly, the cantons where the mestizo voters support Pachakutik's candidates as a block change from election to election. This suggests that

there may be different connections between indigenous and mestizo voters and the party's candidates they support, in addition to or despite Pachakutik's indigenous relationship.


*Table 4.3 EI estimations of the proportion of indigenous and mestizo voters casting ballots for Pachakutik, Traditional Parties, Non-Traditional Parties, and Independent Movements in the mayor elections of 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019.*

Year	Pachakutik	Traditional Parties (added)	Non-Traditional Parties (added)	Independent Movements (added)
	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)
Indigenous voters				
2004	n= 83 0.27 (0.19)	n= 78 0.32 (0.18)	n= 82 0.21 (0.16)	n= 12 0.11 (0.10)
2009	n= 80 0.27 (0.17)	n= 54 0.16 (0.16)	n= 80 0.29 (0.16)	n= 66 0.17 (0.12)
2014	n= 75 0.31 (0.21)	n= 35 0.12 (0.12)	n= 76 0.38 (0.19)	n= 32 0.18 (0.17)
2019	n= 83 0.23 (0.19)	n= 70 0.13 (0.10)	n= 81 0.27 (0.20)	n= 68 0.30 (0.22)
Mestizo voters				
2004	n= 83 0.20 (0.15)	n= 78 0.43 (0.20)	n= 82 0.23 (0.18)	n= 12 0.07 (0.07)
2009	n= 80 0.21 (0.16)	n= 54 0.16 (0.11)	n= 80 0.34 (0.15)	n= 66 0.25 (0.19)
2014	n= 75 0.20 (0.18)	n= 35 0.13 (0.15)	n= 76 0.51 (0.23)	n= 32 0.21 (0.17)
2019	n= 83 0.18 (0.18)	n= 70 0.21 (0.18)	n= 81 0.32 (0.21)	n= 68 0.26 (0.20)

*Source: Means and standard deviations calculated based on EI estimations with data from the National Census and electoral results.*

The indigenous voters do not support Pachakutik's candidates as a block at the subnational elections. The indigenous voters are also splitting their votes between multiple parties in this arena. This is consistent with what I found for the national elections. Overall, Pachakutik's electoral support is not only coming from the indigenous voters.

Figure 4.4 Votes cast by mestizo and indigenous voters for candidates for mayor in the elections of 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019



The EI estimations confirm what the electoral results data in chapter 3 suggested. Pachakutik's electoral support is not coming only from the indigenous voters. These voters only rarely support the party's candidates as a block. This finding, if not surprising, is unexpected. It goes against the conventional idea of this party. That Pachakutik's strength comes from the indigenous population.

That there is a disconnection between the indigenous voters and Pachakutik has not been addressed by scholars. At most, scholars have pointed out that schisms within the indigenous movement may cause Pachakutik's few indigenous' votes (Madrid, 2012, p. 102). However not wrong, the schism argument disregards the possibility that the division may not be only a phenomenon of the indigenous organizations. It may instead be a division of the indigenous population as a whole. In the next section, I argue that the indigenous population's fragmentation can explain the disconnection between Pachakutik and the indigenous voters.

## 4.5 The fragmentation of the indígena identity

### 4.5.1 The indígena identity

The *indígena* identity's politicization has been studied at length (see, for example, Albó, 1991; Becker, 2008; Pallares, 2002; Yashar, 2005). It would be impossible to do justice to the rich historical processes that gave way to the formation of the, as Pallares (2002) calls it, indio "macro identity" (p. 4) in only a section of the chapter. It is nonetheless necessary to discuss, at least briefly, how this ethnic identity was politicized.

A clear sign of the effective politicization of the *indígena* identity are the 1990's *levantamientos* (uprisings) when the indigenous population paralyzed Ecuador with blockades in highways taking over public squares and churches throughout the country. In June 1990, the indigenous population became a political actor in the country – a force to be reckoned with. This event and the subsequent *levantamientos* "marked the transition from campesinismo, or peasant politics, to indianismo" (Pallares, 2002, p. 4). All individuals who had been addressed as peasants or as members of different groups came together as a single unified group taking ownership of the ethnic identity: *indígena*.

This was an ethnic identity that had existed for long as part of the state's institutional framework. The *indígena* ethnic identity comes from the colonial time. During the colony, the Spanish administrative policies promoted a "horizontal integration of indigenous peoples." These administrative policies turned the whole of the indigenous population (a vast number of small groups) in what would be Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia territories, into a single group (Ogburn, 2008, p. 290).<sup>89</sup> Anyone from within this group was an *indio*. The Spanish administrative policies glossed over the fact that many of these *indios* came from different regions, spoke different languages, dressed differently, and had different traditions. The colonial administrators ensured the division of the population between the Spaniards and the *indios* creating the "*república de indios*" and the "*república de Españoles*" (Ogburn, 2008, p. 298). The creation of the *república de indios* did not mean the disappearance of the different groups that formed it. Within the *república de indios*, each group could maintain its own identity.

The division between the world of the *indios* and the world of citizens (that included Europeans and mestizos) lasted until the mid-1800s. In 1857, a few years after the Ecuadorian

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<sup>89</sup> This was the first time that the inhabitants of the Inca Tahuantinsuyu (which covered the land of modern-day Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and the southern parts of Colombia and the northern parts of Chile) were made into members of a single ethnic group. Despite all of the different groups being part of the Inca Empire, these individuals were not all Incas. They mostly retained their own ethnic distinctiveness as the Inca Empire was against horizontal integration of the population groups that were conquered (Ogburn, 2008)

nation-state was founded, the indigenous population was recognized as equal to all other state inhabitants (Guerrero, 1997). It was then that the indigenous identity was moved from the public sphere into the private sphere. The indigenous population – the *indios* – stopped existing as “an object of national state records and state concerns” (Pallares, 2002, p. 11). Ecuador became a mestizo country.

This process meant that the state often ignored the indigenous population. The indigenous population was no longer an administrative category employed in public policies. Nevertheless, in the private sphere and within the local *comunas*, the indigenous groups maintained their independent characteristics and identification. Moreover, since the early 1900s, the indigenous population’s groups have worked to ascertain themselves as political actors. The claims, similar across the board, were developed locally, however. There was very little interaction or help between *comunas* facing the same issues.<sup>90</sup>

The state further promoted these independent actions with the introduction of a corporatist citizenship regime. The state disincentivized the construction of networks. The *Ley de Comunas* approved in 1937 introduced the possibility of local autonomy for the indigenous *comunas* and promoted the registration of the *comunas* within the state (Yashar, 2005, p. 91). This gave way to the formation of “pockets of autonomy,” where the indigenous population’s groups developed and maintained their own identities (Yashar, 2005, p. 85). The autonomy was, however, an issue that should be achieved by each group. Therefore, during these years, the indigenous population’s groups organized themselves independently and became active in their political arenas but with little interaction between groups.

During the second half of the 1900s, there was a transition towards more wide-reaching indigenous organizations (see Becker (2008) and Pallares (2002) for a detailed overview). With the intervention of leftist organizations and the catholic church, the indigenous communities moved from “reacting to local and immediate forms of exploitation to addressing larger structural issues” (Becker, 2008, p. 12). As the years passed, the indigenous population started to create organizations that brought together different *comunas*. The organizations emphasized the “difference from the white- mestizo society as a point of departure in the quest for self-determination” (Pallares, 2002, p. 16; Yashar, 2005, p. 99).<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Most of the indigenous population lived in *comunas* linked to the *haciendas* or *huasipungos* and their claims were often connected to the poor working conditions, exploitation, and discrimination in place in each of the communities (Pallares, 2002, p. 12).

<sup>91</sup> These organizations include: the Shuar Federation created in 1964, ECUARUNARI (Ecuador Runacunapac Richarimui that means “the Ecuadorian Indian Awakens”) created in 1972, the *Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana* (CONFENAIE) created in 1980, and the *Coordinadora* (COICE) created in 1986

Conaie, the most important of these organizations, was created in 1986. Conaie brought together all other smaller organizations. Amongst the many objectives of this organization, a crucial one was “to combine all Indigenous peoples into one large pan-Indian movement dedicated to defending Indigenous concerns and agitating for social, political, and educational reforms” (Becker, 2008, p. 169).<sup>92</sup> Conaie was developed as the meeting point where all indigenous peoples’ differences would be replaced with a unified identity and the same goals.

By the end of the XXth century, the indigenous population coalesced around the *indígena* identity byway of Conaie. This unity was possible thanks to the construction of “trans-community networks” that connected communities with shared grievances. These groups also relied on acknowledging each community’s leaders as feasible representatives of the networks (Yashar, 2005, p. 132). Additionally, the members’ unity was based on the agreements over the importance of land rights where “the loss of land was tantamount to the loss of culture and indigenous identity” (Yashar, 2005, p. 133).

This process culminated in the 1990s *levantamientos*. As states, these uprisings represent the exact moment in which the indigenous population’s groups came together and acted together under a unitary ethnic identity (Almeida, Arrobo Rodas, & Ojeda Segovia, 2005, p. 54). The indigenous population turned into this new group: the *indígenas* – members of a unitary, cohesive, and coherent group. The strength and unity shown in June 1990, displayed back in 1992, and again in 1994 are a testament to the usefulness of the ethnic identity and how it could be used to mobilize the indigenous population as a whole (Becker, 2008, p. 184; Madrid, 2012, p. 74; Mijeski & Beck, 2004, p. 41; Van Cott, 2005, p. 99).

Following the displays of unity and strength, Pachakutik was created in 1996. As discussed in chapter 3, the party was created even though Conaie often talked against electoral processes. The expectation was that the indigenous population, the *indígenas*, would come together to support the party. This did not happen, however. The *indígenas* fragmented into smaller organizations around the *pueblos* and nationalities categories soon after the party was created.

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<sup>92</sup> The formation of these organizations was possible because since 1979 the Ecuadorian state had changed. With the return of democracy, the state was open to let the different organizations form, it enfranchised the indigenous population, and slowly (albeit often reluctantly) engaged with the indigenous population as a political actor. Officially the indigenous population was not barred from electoral participation. However, until 1979 illiterates were not allowed to vote, and the percentage of indigenous peoples that were illiterate was considerably high. In 1979 the law changed allowing illiterate individuals to vote and thus indirectly enfranchising an important segment of the indigenous population.



#### 4.5.2 Fragmentation through development projects: 1996-2007

The period between 1996 and 2007 represents the beginning of the process of fragmentation of the *indígena* identity. The approval of the 1998 Constitution marked this period. The Constitution established Ecuador was a pluricultural and multi-ethnic state. In article 88, the Constitution also stated that the indigenous population self-defined as formed by *pueblos* and nationalities. The Constitution recognized several collective rights for the indigenous population.<sup>93</sup> Following the Constitution's approval and the indigenous population's demands (through their multiple organizations), the government created new offices to attend to the indigenous populations' needs and enact the Constitution's changes.

The most consequential of these government offices was the *Consejo de Desarrollo de las Nacionalidades y Pueblos del Ecuador* (CODENPE).<sup>94</sup> This organization was the pillar of the state's offices that fostered the indígena identity division. CODENPE centralized most of the funds for the indigenous population's development projects and delivered them only to the groups organized as *pueblos* and nationalities.

CODENPE was managed by an Executive Director and an Executive Council formed by representatives from Conaie that represented the different *pueblos* and nationalities. Importantly, CODENPE's bylaws did not prescribe which were the *pueblos* and nationalities that would be included. These bylaws only stated that the *pueblos* and nationalities should be represented at the council. Conaie had to determine which groups would be included and ensure

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<sup>93</sup> Amongst other articles, article 84 lists the following collective rights guaranteed for the indigenous population: the right to maintain their customs, strengthen their identity, the protection of their community (ancestral) lands, the protection of natural resources well as the right to make use and administer them, the right to prior consultation before any mining projects are deployed in their lands. The article also includes protections for their agricultural practices, their organizational forms, their intellectual property, and their traditional medicine. It also grants them the right to bilingual education, to formulate development policies and the rights to state financing for these projects, and to participate in state organisms.

<sup>94</sup> Before, other organizations had been created but none satisfied the indigenous population. The administration of Sixto Durán Ballén (1992-1996) created the *Secretaría Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas y minorías étnicas* (SENAIME); Abadala Bucaram (1996-1997) despite his short time in office created the Ministry of Ethnic Affairs (*Ministerio Etnico*). and Fabián Alarcón (1998) created the *Consejo Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo para los Pueblos Indígenas y Negros del Ecuador* (CONPLAIDEN). All of these organizations were developed following the lead of the executive, without taking the indigenous input (Almeida et al., 2005, p. 106). Conaie's leaders in particular often complained about how these organizations only aimed to co-opt some sectors of the indigenous population (Lucero, 2008, p. 144). The creation of the Ministry of Ethnic Affairs was particularly difficult for the indigenous population. Although the Ministry was never a viable office because the funding and headquarters were never allocated, the creation of the Ministry highlighted the problems within the indigenous movement. The appointed Minister, Rafael Pandam, had bypassed the indigenous movement and negotiated his appointment directly with the elected president. These negotiations took place in the leading to the second round of the presidential elections. Pandam and Valerio Grefa had offered the indigenous electoral support to Bucaram and in exchange he had received the offer of his appointment. When the promise of support was made public, both CONAIE and Pachakutik denied Grefa and Pandam were speakers of the organizations and clarified they would not support Bucaram.

that these representatives' selection had taken place within their organizations (of the *pueblos* and nationalities) and following their procedures.

CODENPE was created to manage the funds and the projects stemming from the Project for the Development of Indian Peoples and Nationalities of Ecuador (PRODEPINE) funded by the World Bank. This project had a 50 USD million budget and lasted until 2004 (Uquillas & Van Nieuwkoop, 2003, p. 1). PRODEPINE targeted ethnicity and engaged with grassroots organizations as it aimed to: provide poverty alleviation, promote participatory practices (building social capital in the process), and create "coordination between governmental and non-governmental organizations" (Uquillas & Van Nieuwkoop, 2003, p. 14).<sup>95</sup> PRODEPINE stimulated the organization of the project's likely recipients into grassroots organizations linked to specific *pueblos* and nationalities. The different *pueblos* and nationalities could only become recipients *if* they had fully functioning organizations. PRODEPINE and the World Bank "worked only with organizations [with the] capacity to execute programs" (Lucero, 2008, p. 149). There was an inherent disparity between the recipients of the projects. Small nationalities from the *Amazonia* and many *pueblos* that were only starting to organize and ascertain their own differentiated identity had to develop their organizations in a rush. By contrast, other groups (e.g., Saraguro) who had already developed grassroots organizations could access the resources faster.<sup>96</sup>

The indigenous population reacted to the possibility of becoming beneficiaries of developing programs by following PRODEPINE's and CODENPE's requirements. In the process, many groups ascertained their indigenous identity's uniqueness to get a seat at CODENPE's council and become recipients of PRODEPINE's projects. The indigenous population's organization into these groups was not haphazard or a process of ethnogenesis, to be sure. For years, these groups had ascertained their differences and "great cultural diversity," which meant that they could develop clear and differentiated identities in a short period (Uquillas & Van Nieuwkoop, 2003, p. 20).<sup>97</sup> The process did not happen overnight, however.

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<sup>95</sup> The World Bank praised the *social capital* of the indigenous population mainly due to their organization around grassroots, second-tier (*Organizaciones de Segundo Grado*), regional, and national organizations. This social capital grounded the development of the program (Uquillas & Van Nieuwkoop, 2003, p. 11).

<sup>96</sup> The effect of the requirement of fully organized grassroots organizations has been one of the main criticisms towards PRODEPINE. The report from the Ecuadorian Government (2004) presented to the International Fund for Agricultural Development argues that PRODEPINE was developed thinking solely about the organizations of the Highlands indigenous which had an upper hand as they had for long developed their multilevel (local, regional, and national) organizations.

<sup>97</sup> With this I do not mean to minimize the processes of self-recognition that many of these communities have gone through. As an example, the *Kayambi pueblo* has a long historical background of asserting themselves as a unique group and political actor (see for example: Becker & Tutillo, 2009). The years under CODENPE represent only the culmination of long processes. For example, the individuals now known as the *Kayambi pueblo* were

As an expert explained, “the formation of an indigenous identity is linked to different forms of organization but also the search of each group’s history” (EXP-4, 2020). In some cases, groups’ identities, including the groups’ names or *pueblo* names, had not been adequately developed and required further work (research).<sup>98</sup>

CODENPE contributed to establishing new ways in which the indigenous *pueblos* and nationalities engaged with the state. Access to collective rights depended on adhering to a *pueblo*’s or a nationality’s group identity.<sup>99</sup> For example, the territory of a *comuna* had to be registered as a *pueblo* or as part of a *pueblo* or nationality to receive the state’s protection.<sup>100</sup>

The setup of CODENPE and PRODEPINE required the indigenous population to invest time and energy in developing independent organizations linked to *pueblos* and nationalities. Access to benefits depended on two things: 1) having a representative within the executive council of CODENPE, and 2) having a well-developed organization (that did not have to cover all members of the *pueblo* or nationality). These two requirements created divisions between and within the indigenous population’s groups. There was a competition between the groups to receive formal recognition from CODENPE to get a seat at the table. Besides, there were divisions within the groups as not all groups’ members (i.e., all communities) would become recipients of the development projects. This happened either due to the lack of a solid overarching organization or an overabundance of organizations within the same group (Almeida et al., 2005, p. 106). PRODEPINE was, therefore, not a panacea for the indigenous population. In fact, amongst the many critiques to the program, one stood out: PRODEPINE

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mostly referred to in relationship to the geographical location of its communities in and around the city Cayambe. The media reported their leaders as representatives of the *pueblo Cayambe*. It was only in the 2000s that the name *Kayambi* was used more consistently and publicly.

<sup>98</sup> Take for example the cases of the *pueblos* that form the Kichwa nationality. Until 2003, many of these *pueblos* had to still develop their specific name. Before 2003 they were not acknowledged by their own name but by reference to their geographical location e.g. *pueblo Cayambe* or *pueblo Cañar*. In the process of organizing, each of these *pueblos* embraced a more specific name. Although many of their names did not change e.g. *pueblo Otavalo* and *pueblo Saraguro*, other groups did ascertain a more specific name e.g. *pueblo Kayambi* and *pueblo Cañari*. It is important to point out that the names of the cities (e.g. Cayambe, Cañar, Otavalo, and Saraguro) are deeply linked to the names of the *pueblos* that have inhabited the regions long before the arrival of mestizo communities. Thus, it was not entirely wrong to refer to the *pueblos* in relationship to their geographical location.

<sup>99</sup> Nonetheless, on an individual basis claiming the *indígena* identity was enough to receive some form of affirmative action from the state.

<sup>100</sup> Take for example the case of the community Macaboa. This community, located in the coastal region of Ecuador, successfully claimed its self-identification as part of the *Manta-Wankavilka pueblo* in 2004 (Bauer, 2012). Because of the location of the community and the number of archeological remains found in the territory of the community, their claim was swiftly approved by CODENPE. With the recognition, the community Macaboa ensured the protection of their land and also received funding for community development from CODENPE. These benefits would not have been achieved without the definition of the *comuna* as part of an indigenous *pueblo* due to the fact that the funding managed by CODENPE focused only on ethno-development projects (Bretón Solo De Zaldívar, 2008).

failed to deliver tools for the development of the indigenous identity and instead promoted the strengthening of existing organizations and division within the indigenous identity (Maldonado Ruiz, 2006, p. 125).

CODENPE was, moreover, not entirely inclusive. Some indigenous groups were left outside the distribution of benefits. While many communities had advanced for years a self-determination process following Conaie's lead, many other communities had not. For example, in the province Chimborazo, many communities joined FEINE (the evangelic indigenous organization). This organization eschewed differentiated recognition based on ethnic identities. Instead, FEINE argued the indigenous population could be organized around unions and churches (Lucero, 2008, p. 150). FEINE was not part of CODENPE because any representative with a seat in the council had to be linked to Conaie. Therefore, access to benefits for the communities attached to this organization was almost non-existent.

The limited access to benefits created further divisions within the indigenous population's groups. It gave way to the intervention of actors outside the indigenous communities. After Pachakutik broke its alliance with Lucio Gutierrez in 2003, Gutierrez tried to reduce the influence of Conaie in the state and thus favored the work of organizations that had been left out of CODENPE. By then, FEINE's complaints had been reshaped into a matter of underrepresentation of its members (no longer around different organization forms). FEINE affiliates, located mostly in the province Chimborazo, received only one representative within the Executive Council of CODENPE as members of the *pueblo Puruhá*. FEINE considered this was unfair because some *pueblos* from the province Imbabura – with smaller populations compared to the population of the Chimborazo communities – had three representatives (one per *pueblo*: Otavalo, Cotacachi, and Natabuela) while the *pueblo Puruhá* had only one representative. FEINE argued that it would be better to sub-divide the *pueblo Puruhá* into different groups to increase its representation within CODENPE's executive council and the likelihood of becoming a project recipient (Massal, 2010, p. 20). Lucio Gutierrez, taking over the control of CODENPE in 2003, officially recognized the groups FEINE had been advocating for. The groups received multiple seats at CODENPE's council. The leaders of Conaie condemned the recognition of the groups calling the division of the *pueblo Puruhá* a form of "ethnocide."<sup>101</sup> In 2005, after Gutierrez was ousted, Conaie regained control over

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<sup>101</sup> Letter from Humberto Cholango President of ECUARUNARI to Lucio Gutierrez. The letter was made public in Conaie's web page and is accessible here: <http://www.llaacta.org/organiz/coms/com641.htm>

CODENPE.<sup>102</sup> Under the new administration, CODENPE reversed the recognition decision leaving the representatives of these communities once again outside the council and keeping only one representative for the *pueblo Puruhá*.

CODENPE and PRODEPINE changed the way benefits for the indigenous population were distributed and, in the process, accentuated the internal division of the indigenous population. The council had guidelines (although not clear) to register “new” *pueblos* and nationalities and actively worked towards ensuring most indigenous communities were linked to a *pueblo* or a nationality.<sup>103</sup> This was relatively easy as the indigenous population’s groups had long stressed their distinctiveness and cultural diversity even after joining the indigenous movement under the *indígena* identity.

In 2005 Conaie’s leaders denounced PRODEPINE. They claimed the program had fostered “the proliferation of Second-Order Organization aiming to become beneficiaries of the project, which caused the division of the nationalities and *pueblos*” (Toro, 2005). In addition, and acknowledging the division within their ranks, Conaie in 2005 opposed the extension of PRODEPINE into a second phase. The division had, however, taken roots and continued to expand.

### 4.5.3 State led fragmentation: 2007-2019

In 2006 Rafael Correa became Ecuador’s president. He immediately called for a Constitutional Assembly, which started work in late 2007 and delivered a new Constitution in 2008. The 2008 Constitution recognized the *pueblos* and nationalities as constitutive parts of the Ecuadorian population and declared Ecuador a plurinational state. The new Constitution also included the recognition of the indigenous languages Kichwa and Shuar as “official languages for intercultural ties.”<sup>104</sup> Additionally, the Constitution also expanded the articles dealing with the indigenous justice system.<sup>105</sup> The Constitution also maintained the collective rights contained

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<sup>102</sup> Lourdes Tibán (a long-time indigenous leader) was appointed Executive secretary. Tibán’s appointment was controversial. She was appointed by the new president Alfredo Palacio which went in direct contradiction to the statutes of CODENPE that established CODENPE’s members should select the director. Tibán argued that CODENPE was not in a position to select the director and they were facing exceptional times (El Universo, 2005)

<sup>103</sup> I refer to “new” because these *pueblos* and nationalities received official recognition. However, they were not new in the sense of an *ethnogenesis* process. The *pueblos* and nationalities could not be created out of thin air but were instead expected to have been built on traditionally known identities i.e. based on archaeological findings or historical data.

<sup>104</sup> This however was not entirely novel. In fact these languages had already been recognized in the 1998 Constitution and it is possible to trace references to the use of these languages and their recognition as part of the Ecuadorian culture back to the 1945 Constitution (Becker, 2011, p. 148)

<sup>105</sup> Officially, Ecuador has a plural justice system that includes the indigenous’ justice system. However soon after the Constitution was approved the state curtailed the issues these courts could address; nonetheless a certain level of independency was given to each community as each was allowed to carry their own processes.

in the 1998 Constitution for the *pueblos* and nationalities.<sup>106</sup> Lastly, the new Constitution introduced many different claims the indigenous population had been working on (including recognizing nature's rights).

The Constitutional process was marked by 1) a majority of representatives elected under the president's party ticket, and 2) the presence of indigenous population's representatives not elected under a Pachakutik ticket. Some of these representatives were elected under the president's party's ticket.<sup>107</sup> Monica Chuji and Pedro de la Cruz, whom Becker (2011) reports, saw joining Correa as the best way to change Ecuadorian politics (p. 133). Pachakutik only secured four seats out of the 124 seats in the Constitutional Assembly in 2007.

This constitutional text has been interpreted as a significant success for the indigenous population. Still, it has also grounded the further fragmentation of the *indígena* category. After its approval, many institutional changes took place, including the dissolution of CODENPE and new administrative processes that foster indigenous communities' further autonomy from national umbrella organizations. Continuing with the trend started in 1996, the Ecuadorian state under the new Constitution continued connecting public funding, development projects, and affirmative action to *pueblos* and nationalities. This deepened the fragmentation of the *indígena* identity.

The 2008 Constitution established that *Consejos Nacionales para la Igualdad* (National Councils for Equality) should replace organizations like CODENPE. Correa asserted it was time to end this type of corporatist policies and organizations. In 2009 he stopped the state's funding for CODENPE.<sup>108</sup> By 2009 the creation of these councils was notably underdeveloped,

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<sup>106</sup> This includes rights to their own identity, protection of their ancestral land, to participate in the state, the protection and nature and their natural resources, and the rights to prior consultation.

<sup>107</sup> Some former members of Pachakutik, members of Conaie, and leaders from other indigenous organizations joined Correa's party to get a seat in the Assembly and become indigenous representatives *without* Pachakutik's intervention.

<sup>108</sup> Along the lines of this criticism Correa also changed one of the most important offices for the indigenous population, the National Program for Bilingual Education Office, from an independent status to being part of the Ministry of Education. He criticized that CODENPE's resources had been directed only to one province, Cotopaxi, which was also the province from where the then head of the Council, Lourdes Tiban, was from (Dosh & Kligerman, 2009). Correa's critiques to CODENPE and its allocation of resources were not unfounded. Although CONAIE's members denied that 70% of the budget had been allocated solely to the province of the Executive Secretary (the province Cotopaxi), they also acknowledged the resources were indeed distributed at times amongst communities that did not have a highly indigenous population. In a letter written by former Constitutional Assembly Member Monica Chuji (who no longer supported the government) she stressed that CODENPE served important purposes even if at times it served the interests of only some. As CODENPE was managed by members of Conaie who were connected to Pachakutik often benefits would spillover to communities with connections to Pachakutik but not necessarily linked to specific ethnic identities. This pattern was mostly visible after PRODEPINE ended in 2005. Cases in point are the cantons that had a Mayor from Pachakutik during the 2004 and 2009 period. These municipalities benefited from the project for Strengthening Alternative Indigenous

however. This meant that CODENPE continued to exist, albeit with almost no recourses, until 2015. Only in 2014, the National Assembly approved the law that created the Councils.<sup>109</sup>

Between 2005 and 2015, CODENPE had the primary function of registering the organizations formed by the different *pueblos* and nationalities. This function was formalized and expanded in 2005 to centralize the registration of all *pueblos*, nationalities, and *comunidades*.<sup>110</sup> In 2015 the *Secretaría Nacional de Gestión de la Política* was assigned to register the *pueblos* and nationalities.<sup>111</sup> This, in effect, limited the input of wide-reaching indigenous organizations on the issue of recognition, as the process now takes place following each group's request (as opposed to through Conaie). Since April 2019, the *Secretaría Nacional de Gestión de la Política* was absorbed by the Ministry of Interior, which now retains the responsibility of registering the indigenous *pueblos* and nationalities organizations.

In 2016 the new *Consejo Nacional para la Igualdad de Pueblos y Nacionalidades* (CNIPN) (National Council for the Equality of *Pueblos* and Nationalities) started work finalizing the transition period with CODENPE. The CNIPN eliminated the executive council formed by representatives of the indigenous *pueblos* and nationalities with a new council. The new council was formed by five members representing different governmental offices (the executive, the judiciary, the citizen participation and social control office, the electoral authority, and the legislative bodies) and five civil society members. This new council effectively put an end to the role Conaie had as the mediator of the allocation of public benefits for the indigenous population. It is now up to each *pueblo* and nationality to engage the state and this organization directly.

There is, moreover, one particular service that the CNIPN provides that is distinct from the ones supplied by CODENPE. The CNIPN offers certifications for individuals' claims of being part of a *pueblo* or nationality.<sup>112</sup> According to the CNIPN, these certificates will be

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Municipalities (FORMIA) created in 2005 even despite having small indigenous population percentages.<sup>108</sup> After 2005, CODENPE became a source less directed benefits but nonetheless the most important source of benefits for the indigenous population and those connected to them.

<sup>109</sup> To continue working after the funding was limited by the state in 2009, CODENPE entered into an agreement with the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID) to prepare for the transition into the new National Council. The project (and funding) ended in 2015.

<sup>110</sup> The legal documents that established this were: *Decreto Ejecutivo No. 386* published in December 11, 1998 at the *Registro Oficial No. 86*; *Decreto Ejecutivo No. 108* published in June 15, 2005 at the *Registro Oficial No. 37*; *Decreto Ejecutivo No. 727* published in November 14, 2005 at the *Registro Oficial No. 144*; *Decreto Ejecutivo No. 1421* published in May 31, 2006 at the *Registro Oficial No. 281*; and the *Ley Orgánica de las Instituciones Públicas de los Pueblos Indígenas del Ecuador*.

<sup>111</sup> Correa signed a *Decreto Ejecutivo No. 691* in June 4, 2015.

<sup>112</sup> Individuals requiring these certificates need to fill the form available on this web page [http://www.pueblosynacionalidades.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/form\\_certificado\\_autoidentificacion\\_Rev.3.doc](http://www.pueblosynacionalidades.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/form_certificado_autoidentificacion_Rev.3.doc) They need to specify the *comuna* ,

necessary to access affirmative action within the state, primarily to ensure government jobs and public education scholarships.<sup>113</sup> Before, the state only required *pueblos* and nationalities to be formally organized to receive collective benefits. With this change, benefits for individuals have also become dependent on these formal organizations moving individuals further away from the indígena category and closer to their specific ethnic identities.

In addition to these institutional changes, between 2006 and 2017, Correa's administration also worked to divide and diminish social movements' strength, including the indigenous movements.<sup>114</sup> The primary strategy was to bypass Conaie by engaging with smaller organizations (Becker, 2011; de la Torre, 2013b). As discussed, the strength and number of these smaller organizations had increased since 1996. The leaders of these organizations were not only prepared to engage with the state. They had often already developed working relations with the state as beneficiaries of development funding.

One example of how the state bypassed Conaie and, in general, other larger umbrella organizations was the set up for the creation of *Circunscripciones Territoriales Indígenas* (CTI) or Indigenous Territorial Constituencies. CTIs represented the promise of land property recognition alongside autonomy, which was for long at the center of the indigenous population's claims.<sup>115</sup> The state developed plans to work directly with each community and urges communities to organize. In 2010, the government agreed on the necessary steps to formalize the creation of CTIs with 26 organizations from the *Amazonia* (representing each one community) bypassing regional umbrella-organizations and national umbrella-organizations (Ortiz T., 2015, p. 70).<sup>116</sup>

Correa's strategies also included what Conaie called "co-optation" strategies aiming to divide the movement. This strategy was the appointment of indigenous leaders to government

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*pueblo* and nationality to which the individual is part of. Additionally, the individual needs to add documentation proving they are effectively part of these groups. The documentation that is required is however not specified.

<sup>113</sup> These certificates have not become a crucial requirement yet. A specialist on public procurement explained, "it is enough for individuals to assert they are part of any *pueblo* or nationality" (EXP-5, 2020). Nonetheless, as these certificates have become institutionalized as well as the registration of all groups, it is likely they will become necessary in the future.

<sup>114</sup> Correa was not tolerant to any form of opposition and his government officials worked hard to stop all social protest. A report from Universidad Andina Simon Bolivar in Quito summarizes many of these instances between 2007 and 2012. The report is accessible here: <http://repositorio.uasb.edu.ec/bitstream/10644/3338/1/RAA-30%20CDES.pdf>

<sup>115</sup> The *Código Orgánico de Organización Territorial, Autonomía y Descentralización* (COOTAD), ensures political, administrative, and financial autonomy for *pueblos*, nationalities and crucially *comunas* or *comunidades indígenas*. Article 102 of this law ensures the state will finance "processes of formation, consolidation, and institutionalization of indigenous, afroecuadorian, and *montubio* territorial organizations".

<sup>116</sup> By October 2019 none of these indigenous communities had achieved this status (El Comercio, 2019).



positions.<sup>117</sup> The government targeted the leaders of local groups, eschewing larger organizations. In 2011, for example, Correa appointed Ricardo Ulcuango as the Ambassador to Bolivia. Ulcuango was a well-known indigenous leader, former Pachakutik legislator, and member of the *Kayambi pueblo*.<sup>118</sup> Correa also appointed Segundo Andrango, leader of FENOCIN and part of the *Otavalo Pueblo*, as Ambassador to El Salvador. Ceremonial announcements in the hometowns of the appointees accompanied the appointments. These signaled the specificity of the appointments honoring each of these *pueblos* in particular.

In 2014 the division of the indigenous population was clear. During May, June, and July of that year, the water resources law's (*Ley de Aguas*) debate and approval divided the indigenous population. Conaie and ECUARUNARI actively opposed the law and prepared a public demonstration to stop its approval (El Universo, 2014a). Both organizations staged a protest walking from the south part of the country towards Quito. Other indigenous groups, by contrast, supported the government. Amongst these groups was the Chimborazo Indigenous Federation. The group's leaders expressed their support for the *Ley de Aguas* with a pro-government demonstration (El Universo, 2014b). Notably, the Chimborazo Indigenous Federation is mainly conformed by the *pueblo Puruhá*, which, as discussed in the previous section, often complained about their lack of representation in CODENPE.

Nevertheless, this pueblo and its organization was (and is) officially part of Conaie and ECUARUNARI. However, on this issue, the group's leaders decided not to follow the invitation to join the demonstration against the government. Interestingly, on July 23, 2014, the government granted the Chimborazo Indigenous Federation new headquarters (Secretaría Nacional de la Gestión de la Política, 2014).

In 2015 the *indígena* identity's fragmentation became more evident. Antonio Vargas organized a meeting amongst different leaders of indigenous communities to "establish a dialogue with that state" (El Telégrafo, 2015). He stressed that the dialogue should be between the indigenous communities' leaders "directly with the pueblos and nationalities" and the government (El Telégrafo, 2015). Simultaneously, Conaie had formalized its position as opposition, which meant that direct talks between the organizations and the government were off the table. Vargas' meeting with the local leaders highlights by contrast that these leaders were willing to engage the state even if their larger umbrella organizations were against it.

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<sup>117</sup> The Government discourse was clear the foreign affairs minister Ricardo Patiño "announced that the government had decided to change its way of doing politics, and that it would begin to draw on the country's diversity by incorporating representatives from Ecuador's various nationalities into the diplomatic corps" (Becker, 2012, p. 82).

<sup>118</sup> Becker (2012) summarizes in detail Ulcuango's achievements as a leader of the indigenous movement.

By the end of Correa's time in office, the fragmentation of the *indígena* identity was evident. The indigenous groups – organized around *pueblos* and nationalities – were active in accessing state benefits through development projects. They were also actively engaging the state, at times even going against the larger indigenous organization, Conaie. The basis of those rewards was the acquiescence of the groups with government policies and not their self-identification. This created an incentives system that was not as straightforward as the one set up during the 1998-2008 period but equally effective. The system made it more profitable for the indigenous population to organize into smaller groups than to go back into a cohesive organization. Therefore, the indigenous population remained fragmented.

This fragmentation process and the importance of the differentiated identities are directly reflected in the National Censuses of 2001 and 2010. In the 2001 Census, the state asked the population whether they self-identified as “indígena.” It also included an open question regarding possible different identities within the group, i.e., respondents could name any differentiated identity (*pueblo* or nationality) they identified with. By 2010, as discussed, the differentiated identities had become institutionalized. The state again asked individuals to self-identify under different categories, including the indígena category but constrained the second question to the *recognized pueblos* and nationalities, offering two more options as answers: “other” and “ignored.” In total, 83% of the respondents that self-identified as indigenous located themselves within these differentiated ethnic identities.

#### **4.6 Pachakutik's support from a fragmented ethnic identity**

This section uses the *indígena* identity fragmentation argument to understand the scant indigenous support for Pachakutik's candidates at the presidential and mayor elections.

##### **4.6.1 The decline of ethnic voting at the presidential elections**

Pachakutik's candidates limited electoral support at the presidential elections of 2006, 2013, and 2017 has been explained as caused by 1) the strategies employed by other political actors (e.g., Lucio Gutierrez and his brother Gilmar Gutierrez, and Rafael Correa); 2) the Ecuadorian voters' disenchantment with established political parties including Pachakutik (Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 111); and 3) the internal disputes within Pachakutik and the problems between the indigenous movement's leaders and the party's leaders (Lalander & Ospina, 2012, p. 25; Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 112). All of these explanations – when brought together – offer a detailed picture of the multiple factors that may have contributed to Pachakutik's electoral

support decline. They touch upon crucial aspects of Ecuador's political life, such as the impact of strong outsider candidates (Gutierrez and Correa), the general disenchantment of Ecuadorian voters with political parties, and Pachakutik's internal problems. However, these explanations miss the importance of the unity (or lack thereof) of the *indígena* category, which sharpens these explanations when brought in.

The first explanation argues that different parties and candidates' strategies have contributed to Pachakutik's electoral decline. The examples often cited are the Gutierrez brothers' clientelist strategy in 2006 (Lalander & Ospina, 2012, p. 25; Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 112), and Rafael Correa's use of ethnic cues and Pachakutik's programmatic platform (Lalander & Ospina, 2012, p. 25; Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 112). Both explanations are developed differently, and thus I engage with each separately.

In 2006 news outlets reported that the Gutierrez brothers delivered shovels, picks, and computers to several indigenous communities and that the *comuneros* (members of the communities) stated they would "re-pay" them with votes (Mijeski & Beck, 2011, pp. 111–112). The following argument was simple: the indigenous voters responded to these clientelist offers hence abandoning Pachakutik and voted for Gutierrez. As discussed in section 4.4 in 2006, the brothers' party received the bulk of the indigenous vote. This could indicate that the clientelist schemes of these politicians had the expected effect on the voters. However, this argument ignores one crucial issue: the indigenous' movement and Pachakutik criticized the practices of politicians and political parties of co-opting the indigenous voters with gifts and promises of candidacies (Llásag, 2012, p. 121; Van Cott, 2005, p. 117). It was partly due to these practices that Conaie eschewed electoral politics during the early 1990s. In 1996, Pachakutik was presented as the perfect solution to the "co-optation problem" (Van Cott, 2005, p. 117). The idea was that even if other parties would continue employing these strategies, the indigenous voters already had a *viable* representative and would not be bought. The Gutierrez brothers' strategies were, therefore, neither new nor unexpected. The indigenous population had been the center of many clientelistic efforts and vote-buying initiatives for years. It had pledged not to fall into these schemes.

The success of clientelist schemes makes little sense if we maintain the expectation of the indigenous voters as a unitary group that condemned such practices. By contrast, the explanation works if the expectation shifts and the indigenous population is taken as fragmented. As I discussed, since 1998, each group (*pueblos* and nationalities) developed its leadership who engaged the state – and was also able to engage with other political parties – to secure benefits. The fragmentation of the *indígena* identity could contribute to indigenous

groups (e.g., *comunas*) to be more willing to vote for a candidate in exchange for goods. The perspective of a fragmented *indígena* population sharpens the argument about clientelist schemes and their effect.

The second explanation argues that Rafael Correa took over Pachakutik's main programmatic agenda and employed *indígena* cues, including speaking in Kichwa and wearing a poncho, to appeal to the indigenous voters during his campaign. (Lalander & Ospina, 2012, p. 25; Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 112). The use of the symbols and the program, it is argued, directly impacted Pachakutik's support making many of the party's supporters support Correa. Yet, Pachakutik's candidate in 2006, Luis Macas, was *the* indigenous candidate and used Pachakutik's and Conaie's original policy platforms. From the perspective of ethnic voting and the expected effect of ethnic cues and co-ethnic candidates, it would make little sense for the *indígena* community to support a non-co-ethnic candidate, even if he employed ethnic cues and a similar platform.

However, we know from extant research that indigenous voters in Latin America only support indigenous parties if they are viable representatives of a given ethnic identity. In their absence, these voters tend to spread their votes amongst leftist and non-traditional parties (Madrid, 2005). The fragmentation of the *indígena* community could affect the indigenous voter's evaluation of Pachakutik's viability as a representative. In turn, Correa could benefit from the fragmentation of the group as indigenous voters often opt for leftist or outsider candidates absent a viable indigenous party. Correa's use of programmatic offerings linked to the indigenous population's needs and the possibility of delivering these benefits could likely mobilize indigenous voters in a more significant number. Amongst a fragmented group, these appeals could have more weight than the *indígena* appeals of Macas. Moreover, as Correa's time in office advanced and the government delivered on the recognition demands and social benefits, indigenous voters supporting him throughout the years would not be unexpected.

As it is clear, the explanations that focus on the parties' and the candidates' strategies to sway indigenous voters benefit from the fragmented identity argument's addition. Only when this is considered the effect of clientelistic appeals and the use of indigenous symbols and cues over the indigenous voters becomes more plausible.

The argument about the fragmentation of *indígena* identity also reinforces the explanations that focus on the Ecuadorian electorate's general dissatisfaction with all conventional political parties (Cohen, 2017). This explanation stresses the electorate's overall dissatisfaction with all political parties (Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 111). Moreover, this entails taking indigenous voters' preferences as similar to the other Ecuadorian voters. However, this

directly contradicts most of the work on Pachakutik's electoral support that assumes the opposite: that the indigenous voters are distinct. This dissonance is fixed when we add to the argument about dissatisfaction the argument of a fragmented *indígena* community. The divided voters could very well have similar voting preferences to the mestizo voters. The ecological inference estimations discussed earlier show that the indigenous voters behave similarly to the mestizo voters. This explanation for Pachakutik's electoral support decline holds more water when combined with the idea of fragmented indigenous voters.

Lastly, Pachakutik's electoral decline has also been explained as linked to the party's internal division and schisms within the indigenous movement. Scholars have highlighted divisions between the grassroots organizations and the party leadership (Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 112) and a division within the movements (Conaie and Pachakutik) due to programmatic disputes between factions (Lalander & Ospina, 2012, p. 25). The *indígena* population division that I have discussed contributes to sharpening the understanding of these internal disputes as likely fueled by different groups' interests.

#### **4.6.2 Ethnic voting at the subnational elections**

The fragmentation of the indigenous voters can easily explain the scarce indigenous support for the party's candidates at the subnational level. As multiple indigenous identities are used in various districts, the party may not be the best representative everywhere. It is the support that Pachakutik's candidates do get that is difficult to understand. If Pachakutik and its candidates are not viable representatives of the indigenous voters, why would they still get their votes?

The answer is that Pachakutik and its candidates at the subnational arena engage more with differentiated identities than the party does at the national arena. At the subnational level, differentiated recognition mattered greatly. As an expert explained, "holding differentiated identities became a strategy or a tool to continue fighting [for recognition and access to benefits] especially at the local level. Being part of Conaie did not mean that they [the groups] could not open up to other actors" (EXP-4, 2020). The strengthened local organizations developed "the skills to negotiate with Pachakutik and other political parties" (EXP- 4, 2020). As a result, different groups established relationships with Pachakutik when the party's local

branch's discourse matched their preferences. Still, they also established a relationship with other parties when (and if) it was necessary.<sup>119</sup>

Pachakutik hence became one of the many parties the *pueblos* and nationalities organizations could engage. Since the party's local branches, from the outset, were given the freedom to develop their strategies, this meant that the interests of local leaders and local party branches could match up (even when the national organization did not work as a good representative of the interests of the group at a national level). Nonetheless, an expert explained, "this was not the rule. Everyone continues to search for quotas and access to the state, and many parties offer benefits to these groups. It depends on who leads the movements. The local leaders are vital. They make agreements with whomever necessary" (EXP- 4, 2020).

In sum, the experts and Pachakutik's members I interviewed highlighted two things regarding the relationship between the indigenous voters and political parties, including Pachakutik, at the subnational level. First, local leaders are crucially important. They define who becomes a candidate, with which party, and whom the community will support. Second, the organizations do not always have the support of all indigenous voters in a district. Instead, it is often the case that there are multiple organizations in one district. Lastly, Pachakutik's local branches had enough freedom to develop their own strategies and make electoral alliances with the necessary organizations. However, this does not mean that they would do so with the largest or more important organization in a district. These three factors contributed to Pachakutik's fluctuating electoral outcomes.

## 4.7 Conclusion

The Ecuadorian paradox of recognition refers to the unintended consequences of the indigenous population's claim for differentiated recognition. This aimed to ensure the recognition of political and economic rights for the indigenous population (Pallares, 2002, p. 213). However, in the process, the strength and usefulness of the *indígena* identity was lost. The differentiated recognition had a critical consequence for the indigenous population. Each group developed a leadership structure able to engage the state and secure benefits. Hence, each group also became less dependent on national umbrella organizations such as Conaie.

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<sup>119</sup> It is difficult to assert with certainty where and when this happened. There is little data available about how electoral alliances in provinces and cantons take place. For one, Pachakutik does not keep records of the negotiation processes and thus researchers can only know of "positive" outcomes when the alliances are registered for elections. Secondly, local leaders often shift and are difficult to track down. I had no luck at contacting local leaders that had any knowledge about how the local alliances were decided.

The fragmentation of the indigenous population affected electoral politics. Pachakutik was created under the idea of a unified, strong, and coherent indigenous movement that had the support of the indigenous population and would additionally attract the support of many non-indigenous organizations. However, as the category *indígena* fragmented, the population that self-identified with this party – arguably the core voters of Pachakutik– found their own political spaces independently (EXP-4, 2020).

I traced the fragmentation of the indigenous population between 2002 and 2019 in the previous sections. There was an evident decline in the number of indigenous voters supporting Pachakutik’s candidates as differentiated self-identification and benefits allocation processes advanced. Particularly at the national level, the indigenous voters have often voted for parties other than Pachakutik. At the local level, the voters’ fragmentation is not as evident – in terms of support for other parties – but this does not mean that the indigenous voters have not fragmented. Instead, the fact that more indigenous voters support the party’s candidates likely reflects what Pachakutik’s members, leaders, and commentators have often described as part of the party’s strength: its connection to the local arenas. Nonetheless, in both arenas, the voting patterns of the indigenous voters resemble the mestizo voters’ voting patterns, signaling an absence of an “ethnic pull” between the party, the candidates, and the indigenous voters.

Pachakutik’s survival cannot be *easily* explained by the party’s connection to the indigenous population. Although this is a common expectation, this chapter shows that the party’s relationship with these voters is feeble. The party is not the recipient of these voters’ undivided support. Pachakutik’s survival hence continues to be a phenomenon that requires further research.

This chapter also helps highlight one of the questions that chapter 3 opened up: how does the party mobilize mestizo voters? The EI estimations, particularly at the subnational level, show these voters support the party’s candidates in considerable numbers. Chapter 5 addresses this.





## 5 Pachakutik's mixed and segmented strategies

Pachakutik's support at the subnational arena discussed in chapters 3 and 4 opens up a line of inquiry: how do the party and its candidates mobilize indigenous and mestizo voters' electoral support? In this chapter, I explore Pachakutik's mobilization strategies at the subnational elections, focusing on the mayor's elections of 2014.

To approach Pachakutik's complex system of mobilization strategies, I develop my own analytical framework. I build on extant mobilization strategies typologies and focus on programmatic, clientelistic, and symbolic mobilization strategies. Furthermore, I build on extant arguments of segmented mobilization strategies to develop a framework to understand how parties may combine these mobilization strategies (e.g., Luna, 2014; Thachil, 2014a). My analytical framework contemplates the possibility that parties may use any of the three types of mobilization strategies in a *pure* form (i.e., using a single mobilization strategy in all districts), in a *mixed* form (i.e., using two or more strategies together in all districts), or in a *mixed and segmented* form (i.e., using in some districts one combination of strategies and in other districts a different combination or even a *pure* strategy).

I apply this analytical framework to Pachakutik's candidates' mobilization strategies in the mayor's election of 2014. I analyze the working plans of each of the candidates to determine the type of strategy employed. To do this, I used Qualitative Content Analysis. I found the party mixes and segments strategies. It uses one pure strategy: programmatic in some cantons and nine different mixed strategies in other cantons. I complement the working plans' analysis by exploring the indigenous and mestizo voters' voting patterns in each canton. Overall, the party's candidates get electoral support from both mestizo and indigenous voters in all cantons. Nonetheless, mestizo voters supported the candidates most when: 1) they used symbolic candidate-based appeals (e.g., candidates' competence); 2) they used symbolic party-based appeals (e.g., the work of the party as an alternative to traditional parties); and 3) when they used symbolic generic-ethnic-based appeals (e.g., the need to bring together all communities and having a diverse local government).

This chapter continues as follows. The first section introduces the analytical framework and discusses the extant literature on parties' mobilization strategies. The second section discusses Pachakutik's mobilization strategies and how they have been presented in the literature. The third section introduces the research design and qualitative content analysis. The fourth section is a discussion of the different strategies the party's candidates employ. The fifth

section connects this chapter with chapters 3 and 4 and discusses Pachakutik's electoral support.

## **5.1 Political parties' mobilization strategies**

Political parties are known for employing different mobilization strategies to engage their voters and secure electoral support. The more widely studied types of mobilization strategies are the programmatic and clientelistic (including vote-buying) strategies. In addition to these, scholars have found parties employ other types of mobilization strategies. These mobilization strategies include symbolic strategies (Luna, 2014; Mustillo, 2016), ethno-populist strategies (Madrid, 2012), ethnic strategies (Lindberg & Morrison, 2008), and ascriptive characteristics strategies. (Resnick, 2014). This dissertation focuses on three of these mobilization strategies: programmatic, clientelistic, and symbolic mobilization strategies. This last category encapsulates other types of strategies identified in the literature (such as ethnic strategies and the ascriptive characteristics strategies).

Mobilization strategies can be defined by the type of pay-offs offered and the beneficiaries of these offers (Mustillo, 2016). Parties present these pay-offs and their beneficiaries in the form of appeals. Appeals represent the "reasons for citizens to offer their support to a party or politician" (Barr, 2009, p. 31). Appeals are thus the information, slogans, and electoral promises that political parties use to influence voters. Different appeals can be categorized as either programmatic, clientelistic, and symbolic.

When a party uses programmatic mobilization strategies, the party uses appeals that convey the idea of pay-offs independent of voters' support but dependent on the party's electoral victory (Mustillo, 2016, p. 31). These pay-offs are based on universalistic non-excludable goods. The appeals can include policy bundles, single policy proposals, or any form of ideological stance connected to the provision of universalistic non-excludable goods. Examples of these appeals are statements that stress the delivery of health services to the population or promise to improve education services.

When a party uses clientelistic mobilization strategies, the party's appeals will refer to targeted (excludable) public and private goods.<sup>120</sup> These appeals leverage access to public or private goods for a specific group of individuals.<sup>121</sup> I include vote-buying strategies within this

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<sup>120</sup> Programmatic appeals may also turn into clientelistic linkages once they are established. Candidates may campaign on universalistic policies that, when applied, are curtailed. However, my focus is only on the offers candidates make and not on whether or how they deliver these offers.

<sup>121</sup> This definition does not include a reflection on whether or how these offers are delivered. Usually, researchers work with definitions of clientelistic mobilization strategies that require parties to set up some sort of monitoring

category. These strategies refer to the use of appeals that deliver goods, before the election, in exchange for votes.<sup>122</sup> Examples of vote-buying appeals are any type of good delivery from a party (candidates) to voters that takes place during the campaign. In turn, clientelistic appeals include offers of services limited to a specific group of voters, e.g., building a school where only certain students will be accepted, such as bilingual education schools in rural Ecuador intended only for indigenous students.

Lastly, parties may use symbolic mobilization strategies. In general, symbolic appeals will encourage voters' expressive mobilization, i.e., the act of attaching oneself to a particular outcome, party, or candidate without a material pay-off as a reason (Schuessler, 2000). Symbolic appeals can relate to 1) the charisma of candidates and their competence; 2) the party's brand and the party's competence; and 3) ethnic identities or ethnic symbols.<sup>123</sup> An example of ethnic appeals may be a candidate's use of an ethnic language to deliver a speech. Party brand appeals may emphasize the party's name and slogan. Lastly, appeals that focus on a candidate's competence may focus on how they are the ideal person to *do the job*.

The conventional expectation regarding the use of any of these mobilization strategies has been that parties will use a single strategy to engage their voters and that using more than one strategy will create a backlash for the party (Kitschelt, 2000). However, recent research has found that parties often use more than a single strategy to mobilize voters and that this backlash may be less impactful than initially expected (Calvo & Murillo, 2019, 2014; Elliott, 2011; Gibson, 1997; Lindberg & Morrison, 2008; Luna, 2014; Madrid, 2012; Resnick, 2014; Taylor-Robinson, 2010; Thachil, 2014a; Wyatt, 2013). Nonetheless, multiple mobilization strategies have been studied mostly as a phenomenon found in individual parties' actions rather than a phenomenon that occurs systemically. Thus, few frameworks have been developed to understand how political parties use (or may use) multiple mobilization strategies (e.g., Luna, 2014).

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devices for electoral support as a necessary condition to identify clientelistic practices (Stokes, 2005). However, because I focus on mobilization strategies and not on the actual delivery of pay-offs post-election, I consider appeals as clientelistic when they are geared to provide excludable goods (public or private) to specific groups including patronage without considering the effective delivery of these offerings or the use of some sort of monitoring device for electoral support.

<sup>122</sup> Mustillo (2016) separates these two strategies into two different strategies.

<sup>123</sup> This list can always be updated and extended. What matters is that at the core the "symbolic appeals" do not convey by themselves material pay-offs.

### 5.1.1 The use of multiple strategies

The logic behind the use of multiple strategies is simple. Parties will employ multiple strategies to widen their pool of possible voters (Gibson, 2005; Luna, 2014; Thachil, 2014a).<sup>124</sup> Most arguments assert that parties will employ multiple mobilization strategies when they aim to mobilize their non-core-voters in addition to their core voters. To this end, parties have three different ways in which they may use multiple strategies. 1) Parties can mix two or more strategies to engage voters across all districts; 2) parties can segment their mobilization strategies per district, i.e., use one type of strategy in one district and use a second type of strategy in a different district; and 3) parties can mix *and* segment strategies, i.e., parties may employ two or more strategies in a single district (use a mixed strategy) while employing a different combination or a pure strategy in another district. Figure 5.1 presents the different forms in which parties may use multiple mobilization strategies across different districts.

Figure 5.1 The use of multiple mobilization strategies

Pure Strategies	Mixed Strategies	Segmented Strategies	Mixed and Segmented Strategies
District 1	District 1	District 1	District 1
District 2	District 2	District 2	District 2
District 3	District 3	District 3	District 3

How parties mix and segment their strategies will follow from the type of voters they aim to mobilize and their location (Luna, 2014). Parties will be more likely to use a mixed strategy in all districts when 1) districts are internally heterogeneous but similar across, and 2) the party aims to mobilize both its core and non-core voters in each district. In turn, in a country with internally homogenous districts but heterogeneous across, parties may opt to use

<sup>124</sup> This is because parties will not *need* to segment strategies if their core voters represent a majority or are likely to provide enough votes to win an election (Gibson, 2005). Chandra (2007) makes a somewhat similar argument although in the opposite direction. She stresses that parties target ethnic groups that are large enough to secure electoral victory (Chandra, 2007, p. 92). Parties will target minimum winning majorities and the electorate will likely also organize into groups this size. The arguments about strategy segmentation address the cases in which the core voters are not a minimum winning majority and thus *extra* votes are needed.

segmented strategies to target different voters in different districts. Lastly, in a country with heterogeneous districts (internally and across), parties are more likely to employ mixed and segmented strategies.

From the simple perspective of *how* parties may employ multiple mobilization strategies, parties could mix all three types of strategies (programmatic, clientelistic, and symbolic) and use them simultaneously to engage voters in a single district. Yet, scholars have argued that not all strategies may be successfully employed at the same time. The use of clientelistic and programmatic appeals, for example, may create an electoral backlash for parties (Kitschelt, 2000, p. 854). The backlash would arise as voters would be confused by the use of programmatic appeals (that focus on universalistic non-excludable goods) alongside particularistic appeals that would curtail access to those goods. It would be unclear to voters *why* a group within a constituency would be offered targeted pay-offs. It follows that some mobilization strategies may be costlier to mix than others. I call the mixing of particularistic (clientelistic and vote-buying) strategies alongside programmatic strategies: trade-off strategy mixing. By contrast, other strategies may be more fruitfully combined. Research on ethnic parties has, for instance, highlighted that political parties might combine ethnic appeals alongside programmatic appeals (see: Collins, 2004). Similarly, programmatic appeals may be combined with appeals focusing on a candidate's or a party's ability to deliver goods (Calvo & Murillo, 2019). I call the mixing of particularistic or programmatic strategies alongside symbolic strategies: non-trade-off strategy mixing.

## 5.2 Pachakutik's mobilization strategies

Research on how ethnic parties mobilize electoral support has shown that ethnic parties employ a wide array of mobilization strategies. Ethnic parties employ programmatic strategies and other strategies (Huber & Suryanarayan, 2016; Jones West, 2011; Van Cott, 2005). Ethnic parties have been found to combine different appeals to mobilize their voters, e.g., programmatic, clientelistic, and “ethnic linkages” (Lindberg & Morrison, 2008), programmatic, clientelistic, personalistic, and ascriptive characteristics appeals (Resnick, 2014), and “ethno-populist” strategies that include ethnic symbols, programmatic (ideological claims) and populist appeals (Madrid, 2012). These scholars have shown that in stark opposition to the conventional idea that ethnic parties employ – most of the time – clientelistic strategies (Chandra, 2011; Gunther & Diamond, 2003; Horowitz, 1985), ethnic parties often use multiple mobilization strategies.

Researchers focusing on Pachakutik, and defining it as an intrinsically ethnic party, have found that the party's candidates employ multiple mobilization strategies (Collins, 2004; Madrid, 2012; Mustillo, 2016; Van Cott, 2005). Moreover, some scholars have highlighted that Pachakutik's candidates employ strategies (considered contradictory) simultaneously, e.g., programmatic and personalistic appeals, as well as programmatic and ethnic (particularistic) appeals. Van Cott (2005) and Mustillo (2016) describe the party's strategies as ethnic programmatic. In turn, Madrid (2012) asserts the party used ethno-populist strategies ( a combination of ethnic appeals, programmatic appeals, and populist appeals) until 2006 and since then has moved to ethnic-centered programmatic strategies. Jones-West (2011, 2020) describes the party's strategies as programmatic with the often added use of personalistic and ethnic appeals. Lastly, Collins (2004), focusing on the party's strategies at subnational elections, describes the strategies as programmatic combined with ethnic appeals and candidate-centered appeals.

Table 5.1 summarizes the party's appeals as listed by these authors. The appeals are organized into three mobilization strategies' categories. Van Cott (2005) describes Pachakutik as a party combining programmatic and ethnic appeals. She asserts the programmatic appeals focused on land rights, bilingual education, indigenous rights, and indigenous' recognition. Van Cott (2005) further stressed that the symbolic appeals concentrated on the candidates' ethnic identities, including mestizo and indigenous' identities. Madrid (2012) also distinguishes two types of appeals. The first type of appeals is programmatic. These appeals focus on anti-establishment claims, neoliberal critiques, bilingual education, and land rights. The second type of appeals is candidate-centered (symbolic) and focuses on the candidate's ethnic identities (mestizo and indigenous).

Jones-West (2011, 2020) observes programmatic appeals (linked to the party's platform) and three types of symbolic appeals: party-centered, candidate-centered, and indigenous centered. The party-centered appeals, she asserts, can focus on 1) Pachakutik's brand or 2) the distance between the candidate and the party's brand, and even 3) Pachakutik's partner's brand. The candidate-centered appeals, in turn, focused on the candidate's reputation and the candidate's competence. The indigenous-centered appeals concentrate on 1) establishing a connection between the party and the indigenous population, e.g., "standing with" *indios*, or on 2) the candidate's indigenous' identity. Jones-West (2011) also identifies the use of vote-buying appeals (as the delivery of different goods during the campaign). The goods delivered were: soccer balls, meat, rice, beer, cane alcohol, wine, and cigarettes. Lastly, Jennifer Collins (2004) lists the programmatic appeals as focusing on development and

education projects and international funding for these projects. Collins (2004) identifies two types of symbolic appeals. The first type focused on the candidates as having a transparent work ethic and being accountable, efficient, and “able to deliver” (p. 51). The second type of appeals focused on a positive image of the indigenous’ identity and the use of indigenous symbols.

*Table 5.1 Appeals employed by Pachakutik’s candidates*

Authors	Pachakutik’s appeals		
	Programmatic	Symbolic	Vote-Buying
National arena			
Van Cott (2005)	Land rights Bilingual education	Candidate’s ethnic identities (mestizo and indigenous)	
Madrid (2012)	Anti-establishment claims Neoliberal critiques Bilingual education Land rights	Candidate’s ethnic identities (mestizo and indigenous)	
Jones West (2011)	Party platform	Party: Pachakutik’s brand Distance from the party’s brand Electoral alliance partner brand Candidate: Candidate’s reputation Candidate’s competence Indigenous: Ethnic connection (“standing with” indios) Candidate’s indigenous identity	Material goods (soccer balls, meat, rice, beer, cane alcohol, wine, and cigarettes)
Local arena			
Collins (2004)	Development and education projects International funding	Candidate: Candidate’s accountability Candidate’s efficiency and transparency Candidate’s ability to deliver Indigenous: Positive indigenous identity Indigenous symbols	

*Source: Constructed with data from Van Cott (2005), Collins (2004), Madrid (2012), and Jones West (2011)*

Extant research on Pachakutik's strategies highlights essential aspects of how the party and its candidates aim to mobilize voters. First, that Pachakutik employs more than a single strategy to mobilize voters, i.e., the party uses appeals from more than a single mobilization strategy; second, that it does not – or at least not in full – deploy the same strategy across all districts and electoral arenas (see: Collins, 2004; Jones West, 2011, 2020); and third that the appeals the party and candidates employ are also numerous and appear to change from district to district. There are some gaps in our knowledge, however.

First, it is unclear how these strategies are deployed, especially in the subnational arena. The current findings are contradictory; Jones West's (2011, 2020) work shows Pachakutik's candidates employ different strategies and appeals in other legislative districts. By contrast, Collins' (2004) work implies the party used the same combination of strategies in all subnational electoral districts. Collins' argument goes against what was discussed in Chapter 4 (that the party's electoral results at the subnational arena may be explained by the party's branches benefiting from their ability to engage with different local organizations and their needs). By contrast, Jones West's (2011, 2020) argument appears to be more in line with what was discussed in chapter 4.

The second gap in our knowledge relates to the actual appeals the party's candidates employ per district. Table 5.1 shows that the party and candidates use different strategies, combined differently, and with different appeals. Although there is some overlap, each author lists different sets of appeals. However, at the same time, each author appears to have covered all appeals employed by the party's candidates, which would imply that the variation on the appeals happens only from election to election rather than within a single election. Nevertheless, the idea of using segmented strategies (across districts) would suggest that not only parties employ different strategies across districts but also different appeals (linked to the same mobilization strategy) in different districts. Hence, it is necessary to research whether the party's candidates employ similar appeals across the board or if they use different in different districts. This is particularly relevant for the subnational arenas' campaigns and the use of symbolic (indigenous appeals). Chapter 4 discussed that the fragmented *indígena* identity required Pachakutik's candidates to engage with different indigenous groups with differentiated identities and different needs. It would follow that the party's candidates should relate to specific groups to mobilize voters, and hence variation on the symbolic ethnic-based appeals should be likely.

Researchers have not explicitly focused on who the party is aiming to mobilize. There is a lack of discussion on whether the mixed and segmented strategies follow the logic of



appealing to diverse core-voters or appealing to non-core-voters. To be sure, all of the authors studying Pachakutik's mobilization strategies highlight that the candidates can mobilize electoral support from both indigenous (expected core-voters) and mestizo voters (expected non-core-voters). This goes in line with the fact that Pachakutik's leadership has often highlighted the mestizo vote's importance. As Raúl Ilaquiche quoted in Madrid (2012) asserted, "with indigenous votes you can't win. You need white, mestizo, and urban votes" (p. 79).

Nonetheless, these authors (and in particular Madrid) stress that mestizo votes have dwindled as the years passed. Specifically, Madrid (2012) emphasizes that the party's candidates since 2006 have moved towards a more indigenous-centered campaign that would translate into fewer mestizos' votes. However, as discussed in chapter 4, the ecological inference estimates show that Pachakutik's candidates consistently receive mestizo votes. This would suggest the party's candidates may be actively engaging mestizo voters. Hence, it is clear that it is necessary to evaluate the party's mobilization strategies from this perspective.

To advance our knowledge on the mobilization strategies that Pachakutik's candidates employ and fill in the gaps in our knowledge (the type of strategies employed; the content of the appeals used and whether there is variation across districts; and whether it is possible to define a particular focus in terms of which the candidates' target) I focus on the 2014 mayor's elections in Ecuador.

### **5.3 Pachakutik in the municipal elections of 2014**

It is at subnational level elections where Pachakutik has performed at its best (electorally). This is also where the party has received support from indigenous and mestizo voters, as discussed in chapter 4. The mayor elections of 2014 offer an ideal setting to analyze Pachakutik's strategies in the subnational arena. Researching local elections in Ecuador is not easy. Data about the local elections are scarce. The national media rarely report the electoral campaigns in small cantons. Before 2009, it was almost impossible to gather systematic information about these elections without traveling to each of the 221 cantons to review local archives. In fact, given the unpredictable quality of these local archives, the only feasible solution for anyone wanting to research local elections and mobilization strategies would be to shadow candidates and campaign managers.

Nevertheless, since 2009 all candidates for mayor and prefect in Ecuador must present a working plan detailing the candidate's general and specific objectives regarding the

municipal office, the candidate's pledges (with technical criteria on implementation), and a diagnosis of the canton's state of affairs.<sup>125</sup> These mandatory documents offer the possibility to have a systematic account of all candidates' main pledges and are available upon request to the *Consejo Nacional Electoral* (CNE) as they are public documents.<sup>126</sup> The 2014 election was the second election in which all candidates were required to present these documents and the only one for which the documents are available. Hence, the working plans represent an excellent alternative to ensure systematic data, surpassing what archival work may provide.<sup>127</sup>

The candidates' working plans provide a bird's eye view of the intended appeals the candidates will employ during their campaigns, and concomitantly can be analyzed to determine the strategies used. The working plans, however, have some drawbacks. Specifically, because they are prepared before the beginning of the actual campaigns, the strategies and the appeals parties effectively deployed while campaigning – or the intensity with which these strategies and appeals were used – may have changed. Moreover, since these documents are prepared without direct interaction between candidates, parties may choose to amend their strategies or the appeals after the campaigns start in response to other candidates' campaigns. Nonetheless, changes in parties' strategies are difficult to grasp without studying (and trailing) each candidate. Therefore, despite the drawbacks, the working plans represent a rich source of information.

As these documents are extensive – ranging from 5 pages to over 40 pages – I used Qualitative Content Analysis to analyze them. This technique helps reduce and simplify a vast corpus of text into a more manageable form (Schreier, 2013). In this case, I used it to categorize the working plans' appeals into the types of strategies used. Pachakutik, in total, presented 90 working plans. Out of these, I coded and analyzed only 65. The missing 25 cases were left out of the analysis for different reasons. First, in the cases of cantons in the province Chimborazo (the cantons: Chambo, Cumanda, Guamote, Penipe, and Riobamba), the working plans presented in these cantons indicated that the candidate represented a different party (MPAIS).<sup>128</sup> Second, the working plans in the cantons La Maná from the province Cotopaxi and the canton Logroño from the province Morona were not available and could not be analyzed. Third,

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<sup>125</sup> This is established in article 13 de the *Código de la Democracia*.

<sup>126</sup> There are nonetheless some few cases in which the documents are not available due to processing problems e.g., the documents were not scanned in full by the local offices of CNE.

<sup>127</sup> I tried to collect systematic data on the local elections of 2014 using national media outlets. These outlets however do not report on these campaigns systematically and thus information is scarce.

<sup>128</sup> Pachakutik joined an electoral alliance in Chimborazo. However, in the cantons listed, the candidates claimed to *only* represent the party MPAIS, while in all other cantons, the working plans stated that the candidates represented both parties. I, therefore, only coded the latter cases.

I did not examine the working plans presented in the cantons from the provinces: Galapagos, Guayas, Manabí, El Oro, and Esmeraldas. Research has shown that there is a regional determinant in the provinces located on the coast of Ecuador. Voters and parties in these provinces behave differently there than in the rest of the country (Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 86). Moreover, in most of these cantons, the indigenous population represents less than two percent of the total population, which hinders the evaluation of the indigenous and mestizo voters' voting patterns. Therefore, I did not analyze the working plans of these cantons either.

### 5.3.1 Qualitative content analysis

Qualitative content analysis is helpful to describe – systematically – the meaning of qualitative material while reducing it. To this end, documents are evaluated using a coding frame. This coding frame allows for a reduction of the material into categories or subcategories.

This analysis's coding frame was devised to identify the different appeals that the party's candidates employed in their working plans. The coding frame was developed building on the definitions of the mobilization strategies discussed in section 5.1, i.e., programmatic, clientelistic, and symbolic, as main categories. Possible appeals linked to these categories were added, for reference, building on the extant knowledge about the appeals employed by Pachakutik's candidates and the coding of the contents of five working plans presented in 2014.

The programmatic appeals were defined as all offers of services and benefits that had universal beneficiaries and were contingent on the party's candidates' election. These included all content relating to protecting land rights, providing health services, and service provision (e.g., road improvement, drinking water services, and waste disposal services). In turn, clientelistic appeals were defined as those referring to public and private goods with specific (limited) beneficiaries. This included services provided solely to the indigenous population, e.g., offers of setting up bilingual education and the use of indigenous languages in public administration. The symbolic strategy was divided into three subcategories: ethnic-based, candidate-based, and party-based.

The symbolic ethnic subcategory was defined as relating to all appeals that included any reference to the *indígena* identity, the indigenous social movement, and to specific identities of the *pueblos* and nationalities. The coding frame allows for the further division of these appeals into low, medium, and high levels of ethnic content. References to plurinationalism, diversity, and alternative forms of government are coded as low-level ethnic appeals. Additionally, any reference to state-sanctioned data or laws that refer to the indigenous

population was also coded as low-level ethnic appeals.<sup>129</sup> The political arena is filled with this sort of appeals. These are found amongst Pachakutik's candidates and other parties' candidates' appeals and could be defined as constitutive of everyday political speech in Ecuador.<sup>130</sup> In turn, medium level ethnic appeals included references to the indigenous population in general, e.g., that the work is done for *pueblos* and nationalities, references to the indigenous identity of candidates, and references to the party as an indigenous representative (similar to what was reported by Jones West (2011) about candidates claiming to “stand with” the indigenous population). The high level of ethnic appeals, in turn, included the use of explicit ethnic symbolism such as the use of an indigenous language in the text (e.g., references to the good living concept in an indigenous language in Kichwa: *sumak kawsay* or in Shuar: *penker pujustin*). Additionally, references to specific *pueblos* and nationalities by name and location, e.g., *el pueblo Kañari*.

Symbolic candidate-based appeals are defined in the coding frame as referring to the candidate's competence, e.g., efficiency and transparency (Collins, 2004), a candidate's reputation, or a candidate's prior work, and the candidates' incumbency. Lastly, party-based appeals were defined as relating to mentions of the party's reputation, competence, characteristics, e.g., “a party that delivers” (Collins, 2004), and incumbency.

The coding frame employed diverges substantially from prior efforts to categorize Pachakutik's symbolic (indigenous, candidate-based, and party-based), programmatic, and clientelistic appeals. Traditionally, Pachakutik's programmatic appeals have been categorized as “ethnic” or “ethnic programmatic” because they are considered “traditional indigenous demands” (Becker, 2011; Lalander & Gustafsson, 2008; Madrid, 2008, 2012). These categorization efforts combined programmatic content alongside symbolic content. The coding frame employed here, by contrast, required the evaluation of the appeals based on the content and the beneficiaries and strived to disentangle the different types of appeals. Therefore, an appeal about “the defense of land rights” in prior coding frames would be categorized as “ethnic programmatic” because it is a key issue discussed by the indigenous social movement. By contrast, this appeal, following this coding frame, is categorized as programmatic. If the appeal was accompanied by a reference to ethnicity (indigeneity) or the population's diversity, the

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<sup>129</sup> Initially the second coder struggled to identify the difference between mentions of *pueblos* and nationalities as part of appeals, and references to state policies that represent more a case of repetition of policies than actual ethnic appeals. Moreover, the listing of these laws was included as part of the mandatory diagnosis section of the working plans so they can't hardly be taken as a form of appeal.

<sup>130</sup> The fact that these topics are pervasive in the political discourse in the country reflects the effects of the indigenous social movement and Pachakutik in the political arena. Nevertheless, because they have become so common and are used across the board by all politicians they should not be taken as actual explicit ethnic appeals.

coding frame required the appeal to be coded as programmatic *and* symbolic ethnic. An example of this case would be an appeal that states, “the defense of land rights is important to protect the population’s diversity.” Instead, if the defense of land rights appeal included references to a specific pueblo or nationality as recipients of the benefit, e.g., the defense of pueblo *Kañari*’s land rights, the appeal would be categorized as clientelistic (due to the nature of the recipients) *and* symbolic ethnic.

The data about the party’s candidates’ appeals in each canton was put into a matrix. A final evaluation of the party’s candidates’ strategies in each canton was created with this data. The final assessment reflects the *added* outcome of the coding. In short, the final evaluation reflects all aspects in which the appeals were coded as being present in the working plan. The use of ethnic appeals was re-coded into a dichotomous variable, making “low” equivalent to appeals not present and high and medium equivalent to appeals being present. This works in the following manner: Pachakutik’s candidate’s working plan in the canton Girón in the province Azuay was coded as using low-level ethnic appeals, programmatic appeals, and party-based appeals. The final evaluation of that canton’s working plan reflects this, and it was defined as using: a *mixed programmatic and symbolic (party brand) mobilization strategy*. In turn, the working plan from the candidate in the canton El Tambo in the province Cañar was coded as employing high-level ethnic appeals, plus programmatic and party-based appeals. Thus, the final evaluation reflects this and states the working plan used: *mixed programmatic, symbolic (ethnic-based), and symbolic (party-based) mobilization strategies*.

Two coders, employing the coding frame, coded all working plans. The second coder was a native Spanish speaker with some knowledge about indigenous politics but with no experience in Ecuadorian politics. Both coders worked independently and met to discuss their work after they were done coding all documents. There were discrepancies in 21 working plans out of the 65. These discrepancies were, however, not major. They mostly related to coding the ethnic appeals as medium level and high level. Since the final evaluation clustered together both categories into one, the discrepancies had no actual effect on the final assessment. As Schreir (2013) suggests, all other differences were discussed, and a final coding decision was agreed upon. The outcome reported in the next section represents the agreed-up coding of the working plans.

## **5.4 Pachakutik's mobilization strategies in the 2014 elections**

The subnational elections of 2014 took place on February 24. Approximately 82.67% of the registered voters cast votes in these elections. In total, 150 parties (counting electoral alliances separately) presented candidates for mayor. Out of these, only 59 parties (counting electoral alliances separately) had candidates elected for mayor. MPAIS and alliances had 69 candidates elected as mayors. MPAIS was the party with most candidates elected in the country. The second party with more candidates elected in 2014 was the party AVANZA, with 36 mayors elected. Pachakutik had 29 candidates elected, making it the third party with the most elected mayors. Pachakutik's candidates employed multiple mobilization strategies to mobilize their voters.

### **5.4.1 Pachakutik's candidates' working plans' appeals**

Pachakutik's candidates employed multiple appeals to engage their voters. Table 5.2 summarizes all the appeals used by the candidates in the 65 working planes analyzed.<sup>131</sup> There was variation in the appeals employed in different districts.

All working plans included programmatic appeals. The candidates in their working plans used 47 different programmatic appeals that focus on service provision and improvements to the administration. The appeals relate, in general, to changing or improving services such as education, agricultural services, waste disposal, public health, security, roads and public transport services, and territorial control.<sup>132</sup> Not all working plans include these 47 appeals rather only a subset of these appeals. Nonetheless, there is one appeal that is present in all working plans. This appeal was the provision of water services, including drinking water and wastewater disposal.

All appeals employed by the party's candidates resonate with the general claims that the indigenous movements had presented through the years: 1) access to drinking water and all other forms of water services; 2) protection and recognition of land rights; 3) protection and recognition of environmental rights; 4) the protection of natural resources; and 5) the provision of education and health services. Nonetheless, most of these appeals are not linked to specific indigenous content or specified as serving only that particular constituency. Consequently, these should not be qualified as ethnic-programmatic.

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<sup>131</sup>The full list with canton names is available in the online appendix (available at [www.dianadavilagordillo.com](http://www.dianadavilagordillo.com))

<sup>132</sup> The full matrix is available on the online appendix (available at [www.dianadavilagordillo.com](http://www.dianadavilagordillo.com))

The next set of appeals found in the working plans are the symbolic appeals, which were subdivided into ethnic-based, candidate-based, and party-based. These appeals are not included in all working plans.

The symbolic ethnic-based appeals can be subdivided into generic and specific appeals. The generic ethnic appeals make references to generic aspects of the indigenous identity. The working plans contain references to 1) the importance of “diversity,” 2) the need to ensure “inclusion for all [population groups]” as well as “the integration of all [population groups],” 3) the importance of maintaining the cultural identity of the population, and 4) the importance of protecting and preserving “ancestral values.” The second subset of symbolic ethnic appeals is more specific. These appeals refer to differentiated identities. These appeals hence mention different pueblos and nationalities by name, e.g., the protection of the cultural identity of the pueblo Kañari. Furthermore, there are references to the concept of “good living” or *buen vivir* in an indigenous language, either in Shuar or Kichwa. The languages are used based on the languages spoken by the indigenous population in specific cantons.

The party-based appeals were scarcer than the indigenous-based appeals. These appeals focused on the known principles of Pachakutik: *ama llulla*, *ama killa*, *ama shuwa* (do not lie, do not be lazy, and do not steal).<sup>133</sup> Other working plans spoke of the party as “an organization that advances participatory intercultural governing practices or alternative government” and about the party as the promotor of “new forms of development.” The party-based appeals in the working plans fit with the party’s longtime definition as an anti-establishment party and present the party as an alternative for the electorate that is different from traditional parties (Mijeski & Beck, 2011). These appeals focused on the party’s brand rather than its ability to deliver or the party as an incumbent.

The candidate-based appeals were even scarcer than the party-based appeals. These focused on the candidates’ prior experiences with references to the candidate’s academic achievements, prior work, and general life experience, i.e., the candidates’ work with the local population. These appeals also often included – albeit not always alongside the candidates’ prior experiences content – references to the candidates’ incumbency. The working plans referred to the candidates’ work as sitting mayors and how the experience was necessary for their re-election.

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<sup>133</sup> These content was not coded as symbolic ethnic even though the words are in Kichwa as they are linked to the party’s principles and are often presented as a form of party slogan.

Lastly, within the working plans, I found clientelistic appeals. These appeals resembled programmatic appeals with the difference that clear clients (benefits' recipients) were listed. The clientelistic appeals were uncommon. Only a few working plans included them. When they did, the clientelistic appeals focused on 1) the establishment of bilingual education programs which can only be accessed by the indigenous population in the canton; 2) direct offers of land rights recognition or infrastructure for specific groups of voters; 3) the inclusion of *indígena* quotas in public administration and health programs; and 4) the use of indigenous languages within the municipal services.

Table 5.2 Pachakutik's candidates' appeals employed at the 2014 elections.

Pachakutik's appeals		
Programmatic	Symbolic	Clientelistic
Addressing erosion.		
Basic services.	<i>Ethnic appeals generic:</i>	Bilingual Education
Education.	Diversity.	programs.
Encouraging citizen participation.	Inclusion (for all).	Land and
Food security.	Integration (of all groups).	infrastructure (with
Furthering decentralization.	" <i>Pueblos</i> and nationalities."	specific
Health.	Cultural identity.	beneficiaries).
Improving the economy.	Ancestral values.	<i>Indígena</i> Quotas.
Management of natural resources.	<i>Ethnic appeals specific:</i>	Health services for
Management of solid waste.	Specific <i>pueblos</i> and nationalities	specific population
Protecting the environment.	names e.g. <i>Cañari</i> .	groups.
Protection and improvement of agricultural activities.	Words in Kichwa.	
Protection of vulnerable groups.	Words in Shuar.	
Rescue heritage.	<i>Party based:</i>	
Road network improvement.	Principles of the party <i>ama llulla, ama killa, ama shuwa</i> (do not lie, do not be lazy, and do not steal).	
Tourism.	Pachakutik as an organization that advances participatory intercultural governing practices or 'alternative government.'	
Urban equipment.	Pachakutik as the promotor of "new forms of development."	
Water services.		
Coordination with the central government.	<i>Candidate based:</i>	
	Prior experience.	
	Incumbency.	
	The need for continuity.	



### 5.4.2 Pachakutik's candidates' mobilization strategies

Based on the appeals found in each of the working plans, it is possible to produce an overview of the mobilization strategies the candidates employed in each canton. Table 5.3 summarizes this information. The party's candidates used in total nine types of mixed mobilization strategies and one pure strategy. The pure strategy was the programmatic mobilization strategy. The mixed mobilization strategies all included programmatic appeals alongside different combinations of symbolic and clientelistic appeals.

*Table 5.3 Pachakutik's mobilization strategies at the mayor's elections of 2014 (by canton)*


Mobilization strategies	Number of Cantons	Percentage of cantons	Elected candidates
<i>Pure strategies</i>			
Programmatic	31	47.7	8
<i>Mixed strategies</i>			
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (candidate)	3	4.6	1
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (ethnic and candidate)/ Clientelism	2	3.1	1
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (ethnic and party brand)	2	3.1	2
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (ethnic, candidate, and party brand)	1	1.5	1
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (ethnic, party brand, and party incumbency)	2	3.1	2
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (ethnic)	13	20.0	6
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (ethnic)/ Clientelism	4	6.1	3
Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (party brand)	5	7.7	1
Mixed Programmatic/Symbolic (ethnic and party incumbency)	2	3.1	1
Total	65	100.0	26

***Pure strategy: programmatic mobilization strategies***

In 31 out of 65 cantons, Pachakutik's candidates employed a pure strategy: a programmatic mobilization strategy. In total, out of the 31 candidates that only used programmatic appeals in their working plans, eight were elected. These working plans contained only programmatic appeals with no references to the candidate or the party other than the party's name and the candidate's name. Furthermore, these working plans also had no indigenous content. This is an important finding. Pachakutik's campaigns are expected to emphasize indigenous content. Yet, in 47.7% of all cantons where the party presented candidates, the working plans missed indigenous content.

Figure 5.4 plots the cantons where the party's candidates presented working plans with only programmatic appeals. The cantons with the thick black border are the ones in which the candidates were elected. The cantons are filled to represent the percentage of the indigenous population in each.

*Figure 5.2 Cantons where Pachakutik's candidates used programmatic mobilization strategies*




The use of only programmatic mobilization strategies by an ethnic party has not been considered at length by the literature on ethnic parties. There are nonetheless two possible explanations for a party's use of solely programmatic appeals. The first explanation focuses on the unnecessaryness of employing ethnic appeals. The idea is that when an ethnic group represents a majority of the population in a district, the ethnic party would not need to use ethnic cues. From this perspective, it could be possible Pachakutik's candidates opted out of symbolic ethnic appeals in the working plans because ethnicity might not be a determinant of the vote in these districts. However, this is not the case in the 31 districts where Pachakutik's candidates only used programmatic appeals. The average percentage of the indigenous population in these cantons is 20.12% of the total population. Moreover, in 14 cantons, the indigenous population represents less than 10% of the cantons' total population. Moreover, in only two cantons, the indigenous population represents more than 50% of the canton's total population.

The second possible explanation regarding the sole use of programmatic appeals focuses on using these appeals to mobilize all constituencies in a district (i.e., the core and non-core voters). As discussed in this chapter's section about the use of different mobilization strategies, parties may choose to water down programmatic appeals into a program that may satisfy core voters and non-core voters. It could thus be possible that Pachakutik's candidates, aware of the difficulty of being elected in these districts with only indigenous votes, chose to target both core and non-core voters by disconnecting programmatic appeals from ethnic content. Given the indigenous population's distribution in these cantons, the explanation of a diluted party program seems plausible. Moreover, it goes in line with what Pachakutik's leaders explained regarding local leaders as knowing their constituencies and how to secure votes (PK-2 and PK-3, 2017).

Figure 5.3 plots the values of the ecological inferences' estimations (from chapter 4) in a map highlighting the cantons where Pachakutik's candidates employed only programmatic appeals. On average, 32.42% of the indigenous voters in these cantons cast votes for Pachakutik's candidates. In turn, on average, 18.26% of the mestizo voters cast ballots for the party's candidates. Interestingly, in the cantons where Pachakutik's candidates were elected, the average mestizo vote increases to 40.24%, while the average indigenous vote increases to 53.39%. The map in figure 5.3 shows that Pachakutik's candidates were elected in the cantons where both the indigenous voters and the mestizo voters supported the party's candidate. This could suggest that a working plan free of ethnic appeals and focusing on programmatic appeals may mobilize mestizo voters alongside indigenous voters. Nevertheless, a pure programmatic

mobilization strategy seems not to have been overall effective as only in 8 cantons the candidates were elected.

*Figure 5.3 EI estimates of mestizo and indigenous votes cast in cantons where Pachakutik's candidates employed programmatic appeals*




### ***Mixed programmatic, symbolic, and clientelistic mobilization strategies***

In 34 out of 65 cantons, Pachakutik's candidates' working plans included multiple types of appeals. These mixed mobilization strategies included programmatic appeals and, in most cases, some symbolic appeals, and in a few other cases, clientelistic appeals. In total, 18 candidates out of the 34 who used different forms of mixed mobilization strategies were elected.

On average, in the cantons where the working plans included multiple appeals, the indigenous population represented 40.77% of the total population. In only five of these cantons, the indigenous population represented less than 10% of the total population. In total, in ten cantons, the indigenous population surpassed 50% of the total population.

Figure 5.6 plots the cantons' where Pachakutik's candidates presented working plans that included mixed appeals. The cantons with thick black borders are the ones where the party's candidates were elected. The cantons are colored to reflect the percentage of the population that is indigenous. As it is clear, Pachakutik's candidates used mixed strategies in cantons with higher percentages of the indigenous population compared to the cantons, where the party's candidates only used programmatic appeals (see figure 5.2).


*Figure 5.4 Cantons where Pachakutik's candidates employed mixed appeals*



The voting patterns of the indigenous and the mestizo voters in these cantons resemble the voting patterns in the cantons where the candidates employed a pure programmatic

mobilization strategy. On average, 32.98% of the indigenous voters cast votes for Pachakutik's candidates, while 25% of the mestizo voters did the same. Interestingly, the average of indigenous and mestizo votes in cantons where the candidates were elected did not increase in the same manner as the average votes did in the cantons where only programmatic appeals were employed, and the candidates were elected. In the cantons where Pachakutik's candidates were elected, on average, 36.9% of the indigenous voters cast ballots for these candidates. In turn, the average mestizo votes for the party's candidates was 33%. Figure 5.5 plots the cantons where Pachakutik's candidates presented working plans that employed mixed mobilization strategies colored to reflect the percentages of mestizo and indigenous votes the candidates received. The cantons with the thick black outline are the ones in which the candidates were elected.

*Figure 5.5 EI estimates of mestizo and indigenous votes cast in cantons where Pachakutik's candidates employed mixed appeals*



***Programmatic and symbolic ethnic-based mobilization strategies***

The most common mixed mobilization strategy employed was the programmatic and symbolic ethnic-based mobilization strategy. 13 out of the 34 working plans contained programmatic and symbolic ethnic-based appeals. In total, six candidates that used this mixed strategy were elected. In these 13 cantons, the working plans' programmatic content roughly resembled the one used in all other working plans that only employed programmatic appeals. There was nonetheless variation on the number of programmatic appeals contained in each working plan. The content of the ethnic appeals also varied per canton. Some working plans included ethnic-based generic appeals, and other contained ethnic-based specific appeals. The generic appeals focused on creating intercultural and inclusive local governments and integrating all diverse groups in the cantons. The working plans of 9 cantons included this type of appeals. The symbolic-based specific appeals mentioned each indigenous *pueblo* and nationality in the canton by name and often used indigenous languages in the text. Only four working plans included this type of appeals.

Table 5.4 summarizes data on each cantons' voting patterns of the indigenous and mestizo voters. The table also includes data on the indigenous and mestizo population in the cantons. The cantons in the table are organized by whether the symbolic-ethnic appeals in the working plans were generic or specific. Overall, on average, 39.26% of the indigenous voters' ballots were for Pachakutik's candidates, while 15.45% of mestizo voters' ballots were for the party's candidates.

The use of generic and specific symbolic ethnic-based appeals does not appear to follow a particular logic. The size of the indigenous population in a canton does not appear to affect the choice of symbolic-ethnic based appeals. Pachakutik's candidates (in their working plans) used generic and specific appeals in cantons with small percentages of the indigenous population and in cantons with large percentages of the indigenous population. Moreover, the choice doesn't seem to follow from whether the canton has a particular indigenous *pueblo* or nationality identity well developed or not. A case in point is the working plan presented in Cayambe, where the candidate was elected. The canton Cayambe has generally been at the center of indigenous activism (see: Becker & Tuttillo, 2009). Many indigenous leaders and members of Pachakutik were born in the canton. Most of this activism is linked to the *pueblo Kayambi*, and the candidate in (Guillermo Churuchumbi) has been an active leader of this *pueblo's* organization. Yet, this candidate's working plan used generic appeals instead of emphasizing the link to this specific *pueblo*. The working plans' appeals focused more on creating an intercultural community than addressing the *pueblo Kayambi* directly.

Furthermore, Churuchumbi often highlighted that the work would be done *for and by all people* from Cayambe. He emphasized unity amongst constituencies.

*Table 5.4 EI estimations of votes and percentage of indigenous and mestizo populations in cantons where Pachakutik's candidates employed mixed programmatic and symbolic ethnic-based mobilization strategies.*

Province	Canton	Status	Indigenous votes (%)	Indigenous population (%)	Mestizo votes (%)	Mestizo Population (%)
Ethnic-based generic appeals						
Cotopaxi	Pangua		34.58	9.99	14.57	76.8
Cotopaxi	Pujili		18.05	51.78	13.01	46.12
Imbabura	Otavalo		13.78	57.24	2.6	40.3
Loja	Saraguro	elected	60.56	34.81	19.42	63.46
Pastaza	Pastaza		20.56	35.22	1.71	59.55
Pichincha	Cayambe	elected	40.01	33.87	13.39	60.66
Sucumbíos	Cascales	elected	53.14	31.06	17.46	64.56
Zamora Chinchipe	El Pangui		73.04	21.41	15.0	74.06
Zamora Chinchipe	Yacuambi	elected	47.02	71.71	5.6	27.08
Ethnic-based specific appeals						
Cañar	Suscal	elected	34.17	76.73	21.99	21.73
Morona Santiago	Huamboya		35.77	82.85	5.49	15.66
Morona Santiago	Santiago		57.47	37.20	14.76	57.05
Pastaza	Arajuno	elected	22.3	94.70	55.91	5.04

The candidates and the party seem to have chosen what type of ethnic-based appeals to use as they developed each canton's campaigns. While the percentage of the indigenous



population in one canton may be a driver for choosing a particular set of ethnic-based appeals, my findings suggest high percentages of the indigenous population or a differentiated identity does not translate into the use of specific ethnic based-appeals. Instead, it seems the strategy selection depends more on local leaders and on which group of voters they aim to mobilize. Party experts I interviewed often stressed that one of the most important freedoms Pachakutik's national organization has granted to local branches is the freedom to build their campaigns following their local knowledge (PK-5, PK-6, 2018).

***Programmatic, clientelistic, and symbolic mobilization strategies***

In six cantons, the working plans combined programmatic and clientelistic appeals alongside different types of symbolic appeals. In two cantons (Alausí in the province Chimborazo and Limón Indanza in the province Morona Santiago), the working plans included programmatic, clientelistic, symbolic ethnic-based, and symbolic candidate-based appeals. In four cantons (Sigchos in the province Cotopaxi, Tiwintza and Taisha in the province Morona Santiago, and Zamora in the province Zamora Chinchipe), the working plans included programmatic, clientelistic, and symbolic ethnic-based appeals.

Clientelistic appeals roughly resembling programmatic appeals but directly mentioned the clients or beneficiaries of the benefits. In all six cases, the beneficiaries were members of the indigenous population. In Sigchos, for example, the beneficiaries were the indigenous population in the canton, and the offer was the establishment of a bilingual education school.<sup>134</sup> In Taisha, the working plan offered housing for the Shuar and Achuar communities. In Tiwintza, the working plan offered land for the community Kushapuk. In Zamora, the working plan offered multiple projects for the indigenous population ranging from quotas for indigenous doctors to land property recognition. In Limon Indanza, the working plan offered the construction of the “House for the Shuar Nationality.”

Alongside the clientelistic appeals, all working plans also included programmatic appeals that were different for every canton. Moreover, the ethnic-based appeals employed by the parties were all specific. Only in Limón Indanza and Alausí, the working plans included

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<sup>134</sup> The topic of bilingual education is pervasive in Pachakutik's candidates working plans, however only in the plan presented in Sigchos the implementation of bilingual education is offered. In all other cantons the already existing programs of bilingual education are only discussed. Therefore, the working plan from Sigchos was classified as using clientelistic appeals while others were not. Other researchers have categorized this appeal as programmatic, I categorize it as clientelistic as it can only serve a limited group within any canton.

candidate-based appeals. In both cantons, the candidate was presented as having the skills and the necessary prior experience to become mayor.

Table 5.5 summarizes the data about the indigenous and the mestizo voters' voting patterns in these cantons. On average, 46.89% of the indigenous voters cast votes for Pachakutik's candidates. In turn, on average, 28.1% of the mestizo voters cast votes for the party's candidates. Interestingly, the mestizo voters appear to support the party despite the use of clientelistic appeals that are not signaling them as direct recipients of the benefits. The use of clientelistic appeals has not been an often-discussed topic in the literature about Pachakutik's electoral strategy. As mentioned already, the party's strategies are considered ethnic-programmatic, which arguably hide the fact that the would-be programmatic appeals are often clientelistic.

*Table 5.5 EI estimations of votes and percentage of indigenous and mestizo population in cantons where Pachakutik's candidates employed mixed programmatic, symbolic ethnic, and clientelistic mobilization strategies*

Province	Canton	Status	Indigenous votes (%)	Indigenous population (%)	Mestizo votes (%)	Mestizo Population (%)
Chimborazo	Alausi	Elected	40.80	59.0	26.33	38.7
Cotopaxi	Sigchos	Elected	45.78	40.8	50.21	52.7
Morona Santiago	Limon Indanza		58.77	24.6	2.76	70.6
Morona Santiago	Taisha	Elected	69.87	95.8	23.76	3.8
Morona Santiago	Tiwintza	Elected	36.70	76.5	53.14	20.2
Zamora Chinchiipe	Zamora		29.43	8.6	12.42	86.9

***Programmatic, symbolic candidate-based, and symbolic ethnic-based mobilization strategies***

In six cantons, the working plans included a mix of programmatic and symbolic candidate-based appeals. These cantons are Guano in the province Chimborazo, Saquisilí in the province Cotopaxi, Antonio Ante in the province Imbabura, Centinela del Condor in the province Zamora Chinchipe, Nabón in Azuay, and Gonzalo Pizarro in Sucumbíos. In Saquisilí, the

working plan also included symbolic party-brand appeals and symbolic ethnic-based specific appeals. In two of the cantons – Nabón and Gonzalo Pizarro – the working plans combined programmatic, candidate-based, and ethnic-based appeals. Only three candidates that used these mixed mobilization strategies were elected. As was the case with all other working plans, the programmatic appeals resembled the ones discussed already.

The candidate-based appeals focused on the candidate's competence in all cantons. The working plans hence highlighted how good the candidate was to take over the position. In Guano, for example, the working plan stated that the candidate and his team had proven experience working for “economic development and planning” (my translation, Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (MUPP) & Movimiento Alianza País (MPAIS), 2013, p. 2). In Antonio Ante, in addition to the “work experience” of the candidate, the working plan stressed the candidate had worked “with the people” (Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (MUPP), 2013a, p. 29). In Centinela del Condor, the document focused on the candidate's prior experience as a provincial Council member (Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (MUPP), 2013b). In turn, the working plan presented in Saquisilí establishes the candidate as able to tackle the demands of being mayor. Lastly, the working plans presented in Nabón and Gonzalo Pizarro focused on the candidate's incumbency.

As mentioned, the working plan presented in Saquisilí included symbolic party-brand appeals and symbolic ethnic-based appeals in addition to programmatic and symbolic candidate-based appeals. The working plan emphasized that Pachakutik had been part of the municipal government since 1996 and worked to advance participatory practices. Furthermore, the working plan mentions that the bylaws of Pachakutik would guide the candidate's work. The working plan also includes specific symbolic ethnic-based appeals. The working plan refers to the “good living” concept using the words in Kichwa. Besides this, the working plan emphasizes the importance of developing an intercultural municipal government where the different *pueblos* and cultures residing in Saquisilí can integrate.

Table 5.6 summarizes the data about the indigenous and the mestizo voters' voting patterns in these cantons. On average, 21.89% of the indigenous voters supported Pachakutik's candidates. In turn, only 19.95% of the mestizo voters supported the party's candidates. Interestingly, in the cantons Guano and Nabón, where Pachakutik's candidates were elected, the EI estimations show that the candidate's primary support came from the mestizo voters. By contrast, in the canton Saquisilí, the candidate's support came mainly from the indigenous voters who supported the party as a block.

*Table 5.6 EI estimations of votes and percentage of indigenous and mestizo population in cantons where Pachakutik's candidates employed mixed programmatic, symbolic candidate-based, symbolic ethnic-based, and symbolic party-based mobilization strategies*

Province	Canton	Status	Indigenous votes (%)	Indigenous population (%)	Mestizo votes (%)	Mestizo Population (%)
Chimborazo	Guano	elected	6.58	13.23	42.71	84.40
Imbabura	Antonio Ante		15.54	17.82	5.83	77.59
Zamora Chinchipe	Centinela Del Condor		16.05	9.49	12.35	87.30
Cotopaxi	Saquisilí	elected	55.70	47.37	9.66	50.68
Azuay	Nabón	elected	17.44	31.68	33.43	66.53
Sucumbíos	Gonzalo Pizarro		20.05	26.20	15.72	66.59

***Programmatic, symbolic party-based, and symbolic ethnic-based mobilization strategies***

Lastly, in 9 cantons, Pachakutik's candidates' working plans contained a mix of programmatic appeals, symbolic party-brand appeals, and symbolic ethnic-based appeals. In seven cantons (Giron and Gualaceo in the province Azuay, Salcedo in the province Cotopaxi, Aguarico, and Francisco de Orellana in the province Orellana, Cañar in the province Cañar, and Pablo Sexto in the province Morona Santiago), the working plans included only programmatic and symbolic-party brand appeals. In two cantons (El Tambo in the province Cañar and Putumayo in Sucumbios), the working plans included symbolic ethnic-based appeals in addition to the party-based and programmatic appeals.

The ethnic-based appeals in the two cantons again could be classified into two subtypes. The specific appeals in the working plan from El Tambo mentioned the *Pueblo Cañari*. The generic appeals in the working plan in Putumayo made references to the indigenous population in the canton. Despite the differences in the ethnic appeals employed in El Tambo and Putumayo, the party brand appeals were similar in both cantons. The working plans referred to

the party's principles: *ama llulla*, *ama killa*, *ama shuwa* (do not lie, do not be lazy, and do not steal). The working plans referred to Pachakutik as the organization that advanced participatory intercultural governing practices also defined as 'alternative government'<sup>135</sup> (Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (MUPP), 2013c), and the documents also stressed Pachakutik is a party that promotes "new forms of development" (Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (MUPP), 2013d).

The party-based appeals in the other working plans resembled the ones just described. All working plans presented in the cantons from the province Orellana discuss that the working plans were developed by individuals who "share the theses, [and] ideologies of Pachakutik" (Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (MUPP), 2013f). Moreover, these working plans stress that these documents were created to guide voters who agree with the party's principles. These working plans did not include the party's principles (directly) but discussed them nonetheless. Additionally, the working plan presented in the canton Gualaceo, despite not having the same wording (and absent the words in Kichwa), referred similarly to the party's principles and the party members' connection with the party's principles.

The case of the working plan from Salcedo is different. In this working plan, the appeals relating to the party brand do not refer to Pachakutik's brand but to the electoral alliance between Pachakutik and the local movement *Movimiento Alternativo de Trabajo Integral*. This alliance is presented as "having viable and concrete proposals that will solve the problems [of the canton]" (Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (MUPP), 2013e). This electoral alliance's candidate was elected a mayor of Salcedo and was the first candidate running under a Pachakutik's ticket ever elected in the canton.

Table 5.7 summarizes the data about the indigenous and the mestizo voters' voting patterns in these cantons. On average, 23.52% of the indigenous voters' votes were for Pachakutik's candidates. Surprisingly, on average, 40.57% of the mestizo voters' ballots were for the party's candidates. Table 5.7 shows that in the cantons where Pachakutik's candidates mixed programmatic appeals and symbolic party-based appeals, they performed consistently better amongst the mestizo voters than in those cantons where the candidates used ethnic appeals (except for Putumayo).

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<sup>135</sup> It is difficult to define clearly what Pachakutik means by *gobierno alternativo* (alternative government). Van Cott (2008) explains this referred to participatory and intercultural democracy (p. 2).

*Table 5.7 EI estimations of votes and percentage of indigenous and mestizo population in cantons where Pachakutik's candidates employed a mixed strategy of programmatic, symbolic ethnic-based, and party-based mobilization strategy*

Province	Canton	Status	Indigenous votes (%)	Indigenous population (%)	Mestizo votes (%)	Mestizo Population (%)
<b>Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (party brand)</b>						
Azuay	Giron		10.21	0.57	24.20	94.69
Azuay	Gualaceo		4.93	5.36	9.47	88.23
Cotopaxi	Salcedo	elected	14.35	27.91	34.95	68.65
Orellana	Aguarico		22.96	77.41	90.80	20.14
Orellana	Fco. de Orellana		24.82	26.66	19.36	59.48
Cañar	Cañar	elected	43.14	39.03	31.11	57.53
Morona Santiago	Pablo Sexto	elected	16.07	48.44	69.97	47.39
<b>Mixed Programmatic/ Symbolic (ethnic and party brand)</b>						
Cañar	El Tambo	elected	21.17	45.28	56.51	51.02
Sucumbíos	Putumayo	elected	40.69	25.91	28.76	64.01

### 5.4.3 Pachakutik's mobilization strategies across provinces

Table 5.3 summarizes Pachakutik's strategies at the provincial level showing that Pachakutik is a party that mixes and segments strategies at the provincial level. In most provinces, Pachakutik's candidates used mixed and segmented strategies. In each canton within the provinces, the party's candidates used different strategies' mixes alongside pure strategies in other cantons. Moreover, in two provinces, Bolivar and Tungurahua, the party's candidates employed pure strategies (programmatic strategies). Lastly, in Pastaza, the party's candidates used the same mixed strategy in all cantons. This mix was a mixed programmatic and symbolic-ethnic mobilization strategy.

These findings are in line with what the literature had discussed, i.e., that the party's candidates use ethnic, programmatic, party-based, and candidate-based appeals. Furthermore, I've shown that the party's candidates at the mayor's elections of 2014 used multiple appeals

in every canton and combined them differently. Pachakutik can hence be described as a party that mixes and segments strategies. Importantly, as these appear to be a rather systemic practice, the use of these mobilization strategies should not be taken as a reflection of Pachakutik being a movement with little control over candidates, thus making them “free” to do as they need (see Jones West, 2020 ). Instead, my findings suggest that segmented and mixed strategies are a characteristic of the party’s policy and approach to the subnational elections. The consistent emphasis on the subnational arenas has resulted in the development of practices of tailored mobilization strategies. Importantly, the mixed strategies do not contradict each other. Even when the candidates employ clientelistic appeals mixed with programmatic appeals, these are all coherent with the party’s overall narrative (aiding vulnerable groups, working towards inclusivity, and maintaining accountability practices).

*Table 5.8 Pachakutik’s mobilization strategies at the mayor elections of 2014 by province*

Province	Mobilization strategies
Azuay	Mixed and segmented strategies
Bolívar	Pure strategies
Cañar	Mixed and segmented strategies
Chimborazo	Mixed and segmented strategies
Cotopaxi	Mixed and segmented strategies
Imbabura	Mixed and segmented strategies
Loja	Mixed and segmented strategies
Morona Santiago	Mixed and segmented strategies
Orellana	Mixed and segmented strategies
Pastaza	Mixed strategies
Pichincha	Mixed and segmented strategies
Sucumbíos	Mixed and segmented strategies
Tungurahua	Pure strategies
Zamora Chinchipe	Mixed and segmented strategies

## 5.5 Conclusion

The mestizo voters' support for Pachakutik's candidates was described as puzzling in chapters 3 and 4. Most scholars have argued Pachakutik's candidates lost the mestizo vote as soon as the party started running indigenous candidates for the presidential elections, i.e., since 2006. However, the electoral results data from subnational elections suggested something different. That Pachakutik's candidates continue to receive mestizo support *and* crucially that the party's candidates are often elected in districts with indigenous minorities. This chapter addressed hence the lingering question, how does Pachakutik mobilize mestizo and indigenous voters?

Although who votes for the party is determined by several other variables, what a party does to mobilize voters matters. Hence, I focused on the party's candidates' mobilization strategies. I showed that Pachakutik takes an active role in mobilizing different voters in different districts. Pachakutik segments and mixes strategies. These strategies help the party engage the core (indigenous) and the non-core (mestizo) voters. I showed that the party's candidates do not consistently emphasize ethnic appeals, and when they do, this content is not always specific.

Moreover, I found the mobilization strategies most candidates mix are non-trade-off strategies, which are not likely to produce the electoral backlash. These mixed strategies can help the party mobilize a broader electorate. These findings also go against the conventional evaluation of Pachakutik as an ethnic-programmatic party (Collins, 2004; Van Cott, 2005), and the argument that Pachakutik has turned into an ethno-nationalist party that emphasizes ethnic appeals (Madrid, 2012). The use of mixed and segmented strategies goes against common arguments about ethnic parties, which emphasize the use of clientelistic appeals (Chandra, 2011; Gunther & Diamond, 2003; Horowitz, 1985).

Pachakutik's candidates' use of these mixed strategies does not appear to follow a particular logic, other than being set-up to appeal to as many voters as possible within each district. This, as already discussed in chapter 4, is defined in terms of the *freedom* that the national organization grants its branches. Arguably, this makes it possible for a branch to develop a campaign focusing on indigenous voters in one canton, while in the neighboring canton, the party's campaign stays away from indigenous-based appeals. Further research should focus on the effect of these adjacent campaigns.



## **6 Achieving goals: explaining Pachakutik's survival**

This chapter explores Pachakutik's persistence from a goal achievement perspective. As discussed in chapter 3, Pachakutik's electoral trajectory and the party's resources (strength of the organization, size of the membership, and financial resources) are not enough to explain Pachakutik's persistence. Moreover, as chapter 4 discusses, the party's indigenous electoral support cannot be used to explain the party's survival either. The indigenous voters do not support the party as a block. Thus far, the analyses of the party's resources and the party's votes only highlight that Pachakutik's persistence is puzzling. Why would the party members continue to invest time and effort to develop an organization that offers so little pay-off from a perspective of votes and resources?

To explore Pachakutik's persistence from a goal-achievement perspective, I use the primary goal identification and goal achievement evaluation strategies introduced in chapter 2. I argue the party has pursued three different goals between 1996 and 2017. The party's primary goal between 1996 and 2002 was policy. Between 2002 and 2006, Pachakutik turned into an office-seeking party, and since 2006 the party turned into a value-infusion-seeking party. Pachakutik achieved its primary goals, i.e., surpassed its aspiration levels, during the 1998-2002 period, and all periods since 2006. The party's primary goals' changes and these goals' achievement, I argue, have had an important effect on Pachakutik's persistence.

This chapter continues as follows. First, I shortly discuss the data sources employed for the analysis. Second, I discuss the party's primary goal during each evaluation period. Third, I analyze how the party performed (i.e., whether it achieved its aspiration level or not) during each period. Lastly, I discuss Pachakutik's overall survival from a goal achievement perspective.

### **6.1 Pachakutik's goal achievement between 1996 and 2017 (the data)**

I analyze the following periods (marked by presidential elections) 1996 -1998, 1998-2002, 2002-2006, 2006-2009, 2009-2013, and 2013-2017. As discussed in chapter 2, identifying a party's primary goal and analyzing a party's performance requires data from party leaders' interviews, party documents, and other types of resources created during the days and months before the beginning of electoral campaigns and during the campaigns. Moreover, the data of performance should come from the periods between elections.

I conducted 24 semi-structured interviews with party experts, party leaders, and party (former) members to generate the necessary data. When available, I also collected political parties' official documents (party manifestoes, organization charters, and working plans) and archival data from the electoral authority *Consejo Nacional Electoral* (CNE) and the national legislature *Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador*. Furthermore, I conducted archival work focusing on Ecuador's two major political publications, the magazine *Vistazo* and the daily newspaper *El Comercio*. *Vistazo* has two publications a month and follows the political processes in Ecuador closely. *El Comercio* has a daily specialized politics section. I looked at all publications of both sources between 1995 to 2017. I created a database of all editorials and short and long reports in these two sources that discussed Ecuadorian politics. Additionally, I used the magazine KIPU which brings together all indigenous related newspaper articles published in most Ecuador's national newspapers. I used all issues of KIPU between 1995 and 2017.

The data generated includes all three possible sources discussed in chapter 2: party leaders' statements (from interviews and statements from the corresponding periods), party documents produced before and during campaign periods, and lastly, data on how the party's setup their electoral campaigns (from the interviews and archival data). I analyze the data using the guidelines for the primary goal identification strategy discussed and the performance evaluation strategies discussed in chapter 2.

## **6.2 Pachakutik's primary goals between 1996 and 2017**

In this section, I discuss Pachakutik's primary goals for each of the analyzed periods. As discussed in chapter 2, I combine the data from interviews, party leader statements, and party documents alongside data about the party's campaigns. I use the latter data to triangulate the party leaders' statements and identify the party's primary goal more accurately.

### **6.2.1 Pachakutik as a policy seeking party (1996-2002)**

#### ***1996-1998***

Pachakutik was a policy-seeking party between 1996 and 1998. The main policy interest in 1996, as the party entered the electoral arena, was constructing the plurinational state. The strategy to do so was straightforward, calling for a Constitutional Assembly (El Universo, 1996). This agenda item came from Conaie's political project (Van Cott, 2005, p. 110). The policy platform also included opposition to neoliberal policies, the protection and access to

land and water resources, and Ecuador's definition as a plurinational state. During the 1996 campaign (and the months prior), the party leaders, such as Luis Macas, emphasized the party would "promote new values, new attitudes, and new political practices" (Luis Macas as cited in *Diario Expreso*, 1996).

Pachakutik joined some electoral alliances during that period. As discussed in chapter 2, policy-seeking parties are not always likely to join alliances unless their partners have similar policy platforms or an agreement to advance the party's policies. Pachakutik's party leaders stressed that their alliances followed exactly that logic. The party leaders stressed they would only join electoral alliances with congenial partners such as subnational level independent movements. Moreover, the party leaders emphasized that they would not join any alliances with traditional parties as these were not their ideal partners. For the presidential race, Pachakutik joined Freddy Ehlers' independent movement *Nuevo País*. Arguably, his appointment was a sign of Pachakutik's interest in holding office. He was a well-known television presenter likely to attract many votes and, crucially, was not a party member. However, Luis Macas explained that Ehlers was "a progressive candidate able to answer and work for the indigenous movement proposals" (Macas as cited in Coello, 1996). That is, the party leaders considered Ehlers a candidate with whom the party shared a policy agenda.<sup>136</sup>

Pachakutik's leaders' statements highlighted the party was a policy-seeking organization. I triangulated this data about the party's primary goal with data regarding the electoral campaign. Pachakutik's 1996 campaign shows almost all of the indicators discussed in chapter 2 as signs of a policy-seeking party. Table 6.1 summarizes the indicators expected of a policy seeking party and Pachakutik's campaign's characteristics.

Pachakutik's main programmatic content, in 1996, was borrowed from Conaie's manifesto and included most of its key elements already discussed. Because the 1996 election was the first one in which the party participated, there was no precedent to compare the party's campaign's programmatic content. Nevertheless, because there were similarities with Conaie's agenda, I report there was historical consistency.

The candidates presented in 1996 were a mixed group. Although Pachakutik presented its candidates as "*candidatos propios*" (Coello, 1996), many of these candidates were not – strictly speaking – party members. Nonetheless, the non-party members were part of social organizations affiliated with the party. For example, Napoleon Saltos was linked to the

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<sup>136</sup>In 2006 Pachakutik's leaders criticized Ehlers as having no political agenda other than getting elected. However, at the time he presented himself as head of a committed political movement that was congenial to Pachakutik's program. In that sense he was not only a vote-winning candidate.

*Coordinadora de Movimientos Sociales* and not officially a party member. Freddy Ehlers was also a candidate from a partner organization.

Despite the constant assertions that electoral alliances with traditional parties would not happen, and that alliances, in general, would only occur with congenial partners, Pachakutik did join an electoral alliance with a traditional party, *Izquierda Democrática* (ID). To explain this contradiction, Conaie leaders (on behalf of Pachakutik) clarified that they could not object to the other party's support as long as the party was not included in the ballot (El Telégrafo, 1996). ID was indeed not included, but Ehlers brought ID's sympathizers and party members to help him run his campaign, which shows that ID's support was not only external.<sup>137</sup>

Table 6.1 Pachakutik's electoral campaign indicators: policy-seeking party (1996)

Electoral campaign indicators for Pachakutik as a policy-seeking party		
	If policy-seeking	Pachakutik (1996)
Campaign content	Programmatic (policy-oriented)	Conaie's agenda. Land, water, and resources protection. Opposition to neoliberal policies. Creation of a plurinational state.
Historical content	Similar programmatic content throughout the years	First campaign: content similar to Conaie's principles
Candidates	Activist candidates	Party members and activists from the social movements affiliated to the party
Alliances	Unlikely (unless partners are congenial)	Alliances only with congenial partners such as local level independent movements, and with <i>Izquierda Democrática</i> .
Campaign leaders	Activists	Party members and activists from the social movements affiliated to the party and ID members
Campaign strategies	Conventional: program-oriented	Conventional: program-oriented (with a special provision of the indigenous voters)

Lastly, the electoral campaigns were run primarily by party activists and members of the social movements linked to the party. A former member from ID who participated in the campaign in 1996 explained that it was clear that Pachakutik's members had no experience

<sup>137</sup> This included Rodrigo Borja's brother Francisco Borja, and ID's leader Andrés Vallejo.

running an electoral campaign. Still, they knew their content well (ID-2, 2018).<sup>138</sup> Pachakutik's candidates benefited from social movements' activists' knowledge about how to communicate with the electorate. The strategies included, amongst others, the use of two languages during campaign rallies. Ehlers' working plan would be presented by him in public events, while at the same time, a translator would deliver the same content using the local language (Diario Hoy, 1996). The content of this campaign was mainly policy-oriented.<sup>139</sup>

Overall, the party's leaders' statements and the campaigns' set up show that Pachakutik's primary goal for this period was policy.

### **1998-2002**

Pachakutik remained a policy-seeking party during the 1998-2002 period. As was the case in 1996, at the 1998 election, Pachakutik's policy platform was at the center of the campaign. Conaie's original agenda points were at the center of the policy platform of the party. The main difference was that this time the party was focused on executing these points rather than getting them into the national debate. The 1998 Constitution already had numerous of these agenda points included, albeit it did not include Ecuador's definition as a plurinational state. In the months leading into the 1998 elections, Pachakutik's leaders continued to argue that policy interests were their leading guiding lights for setting up the campaign and the criteria for all electoral alliances (El Telégrafo, 1998). For example, when Freddy Ehlers was announced as a presidential candidate, Napoleon Saltos, on behalf of Pachakutik, explained that the alliance was set up only after both organizations reached agreements about their policy platforms (Saltos as cited in El Telégrafo, 1998).

I triangulated the party's leaders' statements with data about the campaign's set up (see table 6.2). Pachakutik's campaign content once again followed the lines of Conaie's well-known program. The party's campaign policy platform was consistent with the previous policy platform. Interestingly, during this period, the party's actions showed a move towards a campaign set up slightly resembling an office-seeking party, especially regarding candidates' nominations and electoral alliances.

Pachakutik's candidates came from a more comprehensive network of electoral alliances than those from the 1996 election. In addition to traditional party members, like Nina

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<sup>138</sup> This conversation related the fact that Pachakutik's campaign organizations would not allow ID personnel on stage at campaign's rallies.

<sup>139</sup> It is possible that in that year Pachakutik was already mixing and segmenting strategies as discussed in chapter 5. However, there is not enough data to explore this possibility as the party's campaign flew mostly under the radar of most national media outlets.

Pacari, the party's ticket also included candidates that were not part of the party. Such were the cases of León Roldós and Valerio Grefa.<sup>140</sup> The overall number of electoral alliances increased. However, these alliances were explained as necessary and as respecting the interests and priorities of the movement. As a party expert explained, the party's organization was horizontal and formed by many different organizations, which made it possible for the party to enter into multiple electoral alliances because it was only an "issue of expanding the wide core of the organization a little more" (EXP-3, 2018). Alliances were considered as an acceptable strategy for the party because these should only be with congenial organizations. Alliances in the 1998 campaign were framed as useful to advance the party's policy interests by bringing in other grassroots organizations' support.

*Table 6.2 Pachakutik's electoral campaign indicators: policy-seeking party (1998)*

Electoral campaign indicators for Pachakutik as a policy-seeking party		
	If policy-seeking	Pachakutik (1998)
Campaign content	Programmatic (policy-oriented)	Conaie's agenda. The application of the new Constitution and creating a plurinational state.
Historical content	Similar programmatic content throughout the years	Consistent campaign content (in a different form)
Candidates	Activist candidates	Party members and activists from the social movements affiliated to the party
Alliances	Unlikely (unless partners are congenial)	Alliances with congenial partners, an exception was Ehlers.
Campaign leaders	Activists	Party members and activists from the social movements affiliated to the party
Campaign strategies	Conventional: program-oriented	Conventional: program-oriented

Party members and party activists organized the campaigns alongside some non-party members. These non-members joined the campaign because many candidates were part of electoral alliances. Their inclusion suggests that the party was loosening its grip regarding its content. Nonetheless, the alliances were meant to be only with partners with similar platforms.

<sup>140</sup> Valerio Grefa had a difficult relationship with Pachakutik and negotiated with Abdalá Bucaram in 1996 for the creation of the Ethnic Ministry offering him the support of the indigenous population alongside Rafael Pandam (Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 50). Afterwards, Pachakutik denied the support of the indigenous population stating Grefa did not speak on their behalf. Nevertheless, he became Pachakutik's candidate to the legislature in 1998 and was elected.

Therefore, even if run by activists external to the party, the campaigns' policy content followed Pachakutik's policy platform's lines. Unfortunately, there is not subnational level data on this issue to ascertain what was the case exactly. Reports about the overall character of the 1998 campaign stress nonetheless that the party's usual strategies, i.e., contact with grassroots organizations, were used and that the content followed Pachakutik's policy lines.

On the whole, although Pachakutik's campaign in 1998 slightly diverted from the pure policy-seeking setup, it is still possible to assert that the party was a policy seeker during the 1998-2002 period. The party leaders' statements were clear in that regard; the party pursued policy.

### **6.2.2 Pachakutik as an office-seeking party (2002-2006)**

Pachakutik turned into an office-seeking party for the 2002 election. The party leaders made this clear. Pachakutik's members wanted to "be the government" (Van Cott, 2005, p. 99). To this end, Pachakutik's leaders decided to support a non-party member candidate, Lucio Gutierrez.<sup>141</sup> The party leaders presented the alliance as the opportunity for "the people to appoint who governs instead of the elites" (Virgilio Hernandez as cited in El Telégrafo, 2002). Electability was the main reason for the candidate's selection. Nina Pacari stressed that Pachakutik and PSP proceeded to "bring the programs [of the two parties] together and make necessary corrections" (Nina Pacari as cited in El Universo, 2002) only after the alliance was settled. In other words, Pachakutik's leaders, from the outset, acknowledged that the alliance was not necessarily a perfect match in terms of policy program.

Pachakutik's leaders' statements clearly showed that the party's primary goal had changed. This change was also evident in the electoral campaign's setup (see table 6.3). The campaign's content combined Pachakutik's policy platform, alongside candidate-based appeals and the alliance's brand appeals. The combination of appeals was, however, not applied equally in all provinces. The appointment of Gutierrez harmed the party organization's unity. The party branches in Cotopaxi, Cañar, and Carchi announced they would not join the alliance and thus presented their candidates under different alliances or single tickets (El Universo, 2002). Nina Pacari, at the moment, explained this was not necessarily negative. Each province

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<sup>141</sup> Pachakutik's leaders struggled between nominating two candidates of their own, Auki Tituaña (who had won notoriety as mayor of Cotacachi since 1996), or Antonio Vargas former president of Conaie. The first candidate was the epitome of the party's *own* with a good track record in office; the second, although another of the party's *own* candidates, was a more complex candidate who had joined the short-lived *triumvirato* (three way governing pact) after Jamil Mahuad's ousting and was criticized for it (Diario Expreso, 2002). Pachakutik's leadership and party members struggled to find an agreement. The third alternative was joining Lucio Gutierrez.

had specific needs that required different campaign plans. Thus the party's central office encouraged adapting the campaigns for each province's reality (Nina Pacari as cited in El Universo, 2002). The content of Pachakutik's campaigns thus turned into a diverse set of appeals combinations instead of a single policy-oriented set of appeals. Of course, the policy-oriented appeals resembled those employed during previous elections, but these appeals were only a small part of all the campaign appeals.

*Table 6.3 Pachakutik's electoral campaign indicators: office-seeking party (2002)*

Electoral campaign indicators for Pachakutik as an office-seeking party		
	If office-seeking	Pachakutik 2002
Campaign content	Symbolic (candidate and alliance/coalition oriented).	Programmatic appeal, candidate-oriented appeals, and alliance-oriented appeals
Historical content	Flexible / changing content (adapted to alliances)	Similar to the programmatic content, but this content represented only a small portion of all appeals.
Candidates	Office-holder candidates (most likely winner)	Party member and members of other parties
Alliances	Likely	With PSP and PS-FA for the presidential election and other independent movements for the legislative elections.
Campaign leaders	Professionals	Party members
Campaign strategies	High tech strategies: including new forms of media and information provision and polling to adjust the campaigns	Conventional strategies: following Pachakutik's usual strategies.

This change on primary goal also meant abandoning the use of party members or social organizations' members as candidates. Instead, the party contributed only partially with candidates (some of which were party members) to the legislative elections and agreed to support many candidates appointed by its new partner. Becker (2011) asserts these agreements (to use new candidates not linked to the party) also followed from Victor Hugo Cardenas' advice to the party's leaders in early 1998. His advice was for Pachakutik to enter into agreements to secure an impact on the country's politics (p. 59). Pachakutik's alliances were



hence multiple. The primary alliance was the one with PSP. Pachakutik presented candidates to the presidential office, the legislature's national seats, and some provincial seats alongside PSP. The party also joined alliances with the *Partido Socialista – Frente Amplio* (PS-FA) that supported the presidential candidate and also joined Pachakutik in some provinces for the legislative seats. Lastly, in other provinces, the party joined local movements.

Multiple appeals content aside, the campaigns followed Pachakutik's usual practices of connecting the candidates with the grassroots organizations. The reports of the campaign highlighted that Pachakutik's members directed these in the provinces.

The change in the party's primary goal is clear. The data from the electoral campaigns matches the party leaders' statements. Pachakutik became a policy-seeking party.

### **6.2.3 Pachakutik as a value-infusion-seeking party (2006-2017)**

#### **2006-2009**

In 2006, Pachakutik changed once again its primary goal. The party turned into a value-infusion-seeking party. The changes within the party started with the mestizo members departing the party between 2005 and 2006. These former leaders argued the party was slowly turning into an ethnic-centered party (El Universo, 2006a). Those who left accused the leaders who remained in the party of refusing to listen to different views (El Comercio, 2006a). By contrast, the party leaders asserted that what mattered was unity within the organization and that those leaving were harming the organization. The party's legislators, Miguel López and Jorge Guamán, stressed that the organization had to get rid of those members that were not ideal members of the organization and "clean the house" to move forward (Lopez and Guamán as cited in El Universo, 2006b).

By early 2006, the party leaders had changed their discourse from discussing the importance of holding offices (or even advancing policy) to discussing party members' ideal characteristics and the importance of protecting the organization (Diario Hoy, 2006). The discussion of who could be a candidate shifted from who was the more electable candidate to who represented the party's values the best. These discussions lasted for the first half of 2006. Some of the party's members appeared to not coincide with the party's leaders and their focus on the best candidate for the party brand. Instead, they insisted on the candidate more likely to win. In the 2006 case, this candidate was Rafael Correa (El Comercio, 2005b). However, Pachakutik's leaders made a clear choice. The party eschewed electoral alliances and ran a

campaign with an indigenous candidate, Luis Macas.<sup>142</sup> The party presented Macas as its “ideal candidate.”<sup>143</sup>

However, the decision was questioned by some provinces' leaders who complained against the party's national leaders. To end the conflict, Pachakutik's central office gave freedom to the representatives of 13 provinces to support Correa's candidacy instead of requiring them to join Macas' campaign. The party's faction linked to the party's Political Council closed ranks behind the party's first indigenous presidential candidate and stressed the importance of their unity (El Comercio, 2006c).

Disputes aside, the change in focus within the party is clear. The disagreements highlighted that the party's core was focused on protecting the party's brand and the organization, while a faction was interested in holding office via votes. The faction interested in preserving the party's brand and behind Macas candidacy was the one in charge of the party and retained its name and headquarters. Therefore, I focus on their statements, which signal the party turned into a value-infusion-seeking party.

The way Macas' campaign and some legislators' campaigns set up their campaigns reflect this change in the party's primary goal (see table 6.4). The content of the campaigns focused on the party's brand of representing an alternative form of government, the need to change fundamentally the way the state was run, and the importance of diversity. Julio Cesar Trujillo's campaign (candidate to a provincial legislative seat) also had the party's brand as a core message (Jones West, 2011). However, this was not the case for all legislators' campaigns. As the party's central office had given liberty to the provincial branches to develop their independent campaigns and alliances, other candidates campaigned with mixed content (see Jones West, 2011). The party-brand content and some of the programmatic content were similar to the 1996 and 1998 campaigns' content.

The candidates were, in general, considered good representatives of the party's brand. Most of them self-identified as indigenous. Nonetheless, Pachakutik also put forth mestizo candidates, but only those that had remained committed to the organization, such as Julio Cesar Trujillo. Interestingly, even when 13 provincial branches chose to support Correa, only in two provinces the party used electoral alliances.

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<sup>142</sup> Macas had been presiding Conaie at the time. Under his direction Conaie had spearheaded a number of strikes or *levantamientos* to stop the negotiations for the TLC.

<sup>143</sup> Some of the possible candidates were the following: Nina Pacari, Auki Tituaña, Alberto Acosta and Julio Cesar Trujillo (El Comercio, 2005a).

The campaigns run by the party's central office, which included Macas' campaign and Julio Cesar Trujillo's campaign, used Pachakutik's traditional practice of using party activists to organize the campaigns. The province Cotopaxi's branch leaders were in charge of Macas' campaign (El Comercio, 2006b). Macas' campaign focused on practices that were known to party activists and entailed low monetary costs. Macas' campaign manager explained that the party used radios managed by social movements and directly contacted grassroots organizations (El Universo, 2006c).

The change in Pachakutik's primary goal is clear. Despite the organization's division, those in charge of the central offices changed the party's primary goal into value-infusion. The party leaders' statements and how the party set up the campaigns in 2006 showed this goal.

*Table 6.4 Pachakutik's electoral campaign indicators: value-infusion-seeking party (2006)*

Electoral campaign indicators for Pachakutik as a value-infusion-seeking party		
	If value-infusion-seeking	Pachakutik 2006
Campaign content	Symbolic (party brand oriented)	Symbolic (party brand-oriented and candidate oriented)
Historical content	Similar symbolic / party brand content throughout the years	Similar party brand to the 1996 and 1998 campaigns as well as some programmatic content
Candidates	Party member candidates	Party member candidates
Alliances	Unlikely	Few legislative level alliances (2)
Campaign leaders	Party members	Party members
Campaign strategies	Conventional: party brand-oriented	Conventional: party brand-oriented

### **2009-2013**

Pachakutik continued to pursue value-infusion during the period between 2009 and 2013. In early 2009, Jorge Guamán, the then party leader, explained the party was in the process of rebuilding its organization looking into the future (Jorge Guamán as cited in El Comercio, 2009c). The 2009 elections were the first time since the party's formation Pachakutik did not

present a presidential candidate.<sup>144</sup> The party's leaders presented this choice as one of the tough choices the party made to protect itself. Guamán stressed the party would focus on building the party's political project from the ground-up, without other organizations' help (Guamán as cited in *El Comercio*, 2009c).

Pachakutik's leaders' statements, more so than in 2006, signaled the importance given to the party organization's protection. How the party's candidates' set up their campaigns reflected the value-infusion goal (see table 6.5). As mentioned already, this was the first election in which Pachakutik did not have a presidential candidate. Therefore, the subnational level branches organized the campaigns at the provincial level, and the national office organized the campaign of national legislators. The content of these campaigns focused on the party's brand and the candidates' competence; the candidates were introduced as representing the party's brand and interests. Most of the candidates had already represented the party in the legislature and the Constitutional Assembly in some cases. Thus, these candidates represented the party's brand that had not – as many others did – separated themselves from the party lines. Their campaigns were developed by their own teams and used the conventional practices of the party.

*Table 6.5 Pachakutik's electoral campaign indicators: value-infusion-seeking party (2009)*

Electoral campaign indicators for Pachakutik as a value-infusion-seeking party		
	If value-infusion-seeking	Pachakutik 2009
Campaign content	Symbolic (party brand oriented)	Symbolic (party brand and candidate's competence)
Historical content	Similar symbolic / party brand content throughout the years	Similar party brand content to the 2006 content.
Candidates	Party member candidates	Party member candidates and alliances
Alliances	Unlikely	Few legislative level alliances (8)
Campaign leaders	Party members	Party members
Campaign strategies	Conventional: party brand-oriented	Conventional: party brand-oriented

<sup>144</sup> There were nonetheless talks of possible candidates that included the names of Auki Tituaña, Luis Macas, and Alberto Acosta. After Acosta turned down the offer, Pachakutik's leader Jorge Guamán announced the decision to not present any candidate to the presidency (*El Comercio*, 2009b)

Pachakutik maintained its goal of value infusion leading into the 2009 election. The party leaders' statements were clear. The party was working on rebuilding itself. The type of campaigns and the candidates the party presented at the 2009 elections also reflected the party's primary goal.

### **2013-2017**

Leading into the 2013 elections, Pachakutik was still working towards its survival. Nonetheless, the hard-line against presenting candidates in alliances had disappeared. For the 2013 elections, Pachakutik decided to join a wide-reaching electoral coalition. The coalition was named the *Coordinadora Plurinacional por la Unidad de las Izquierdas* and brought together multiple leftist parties in Ecuador, such as the *Movimiento Popular Democrático* (MPD), the independent movements *Motecristi Vive*, *Poder Popular*, *Movimiento Convocatoria por la Unidad Provincial*, and the party *Red Ética y Democracia*. The party leader, Rafael Antuni, nevertheless explained that this was a pragmatic choice designed to help the parties with no presence in some country regions. Moreover, this decision meant not to harm the party's integrity (El Universo, 2012a). Furthermore, the alliance was presented as organized around the party's principles and platform.

Pachakutik's choice and how the party's leader presented this choice suggest that the party aimed to mobilize as many votes as possible. As discussed in chapter 2, this is a goal (vote-seeking) that all parties share, but that is not necessarily a party's primary goal. Instead, parties pursue what these votes may afford them. For Pachakutik, a larger number of votes could ensure the party's continued access to state subsidies. Of course, it could also be argued the party's goal was holding office or advancing policy. However, the party's leaders' statements did not mention these goals.

How the party set up the 2013 campaign contributes to confirming its primary goal was value-infusion (see table 6.6). The party's campaign content focused on the party's brand, the alliances' brand (which took many of the party's symbols), and the candidates' competence. This type of content mostly resembled the content used during the 2009 campaign. Most of the alliance candidates, especially those with a more extensive media profile, were all well-known members (or long-time supporters) of Pachakutik. The presidential candidate was Alberto Acosta. He was a supporter of Pachakutik from the outset (that joined Correa briefly between 2006 and 2008). Arguably, Acosta was Pachakutik's candidate. Moreover, Acosta had support from Conaie. This made him an alliance candidate different from the previous ones. Acosta

was a presidential candidate almost as close to the party as Luis Macas was in 2006. Acosta presented his candidacy as based on solid programmatic grounds negotiated amongst the alliance members, with an extensive portion of it including parts of Pachakutik's policy and party brand platform. Moreover, Acosta was often accompanied by Lourdes Tiban (long-time Pachakutik leader), a candidate for a legislature's national seat. The other legislative candidates were selected from local grassroots organizations linked to Pachakutik.

The campaign followed the usual guidelines of Pachakutik's campaigns. With scarce funding, the party's candidates made use of local leaders and local activists. Nevertheless, Acosta brought his own campaign manager, who was not part of Pachakutik (Rosero Ch, 2013). At the legislative elections, the candidates followed similar patterns as the 2009 candidates.

Bringing together Pachakutik's leaders' statements with the way the campaigns were set up, the party's primary goal (value-infusion) becomes more explicit. The party's campaign setup mostly follows what is expected from a value-infusion-seeking party. Nonetheless, at the same time, there are hints that the party aimed to mobilize as many voters as possible, which could suggest the party had other goals, such as holding office. Pachakutik's primary goal's profile for this period is hence not entirely clear.

*Table 6.6 Pachakutik's electoral campaign indicators: value-infusion-seeking party (2013)*

Electoral campaign indicators for Pachakutik as a value-infusion-seeking party		
	If value-infusion-seeking	Pachakutik 2013
Campaign content	Symbolic (party brand oriented)	Symbolic (party brand, alliance brand, and candidate oriented)
Historical content	Similar symbolic / party brand content throughout the years	Similar content: symbolic, party brand, programmatic, alliance content
Candidates	Party member candidates	Party member candidates and alliances
Alliances	Unlikely	Alliances at both presidential and legislative levels
Campaign leaders	Party members	Party members and partners
Campaign strategies	Conventional: party brand-oriented	New strategies (different from the social movement strategies) coupled with conventional strategies

### 6.3 Pachakutik's goal achievement between 1996 and 2017

#### 6.3.1 The 1996-2002 period

The year 1996 marks the beginning of the most politically unstable period in the history of Ecuador. On July 7, 1996, Abdalá Bucaram was elected president. He took office on August 10, 1996, and was ousted on February 6, 1997, after public demonstrations. He was succeeded by Fabian Alarcón, who was the president of the legislature at the time. He stayed in power as acting president until 1998. In that year, Jamil Mahuad Witt was elected president. He was the former mayor of Quito and was a *Democracia Popular* (DP-UDC) party member. Mahuad led Ecuador through its worst political and financial crisis and was ousted on January 21, 2000. As Bucaram, Mahuad ousting followed a series of public demonstrations and social unrest with the indigenous population at the forefront. Mahuad was succeeded by his vice-president Gustavo Noboa who stayed in power until 2002.

The 1996-1998 period was the first time that Pachakutik participated in the legislature. It is difficult to determine the party's aspiration level for that period and whether it surpassed it. Nonetheless, given the party persisted, i.e., presented candidates at the next elections, the 1996-1998 performance can be used as the next period's aspiration level. Pachakutik surpassed its aspiration level during the 1998-2002 period.

Pachakutik's standing at the legislature was shaky from the outset, with a small block of 4 legislators. The party initially had eight seats at the legislature – given the number of elected candidates under the party's ticket. However, shortly after the legislature started work, four legislators joined the legislatures' majority led by the president's party *Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano* (PRE) (El Comercio, 1996a; Van Cott, 2005, p. 230).<sup>145</sup> After 1997, Pachakutik's block grew back to six members. Two of the legislators that left the party in 1996 were impeached (after Bucaram's ousting), and the appointed substitutes joined Pachakutik's legislative group.

During Pachakutik's first time in the legislature, the party's leaders' and legislators' main focus was to change Ecuadorian laws and the Constitution to ensure indigenous populations' recognition and rights. The party's focus was to present bill initiatives within the legislature and turning them into laws. Therefore, the party's performance can be

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<sup>145</sup> Additionally, Pachakutik was officially entitled to receive three seats in the legislature's plenary given the, in theory, 8 seats of the block. Pachakutik was however only granted one seat. After this, the leader of the legislative block of PRE, as the president's party, offered Pachakutik their full three seats if Pachakutik's legislators supported PRE's candidate to the presidency of Congress. Pachakutik did not accept the exchange (El Comercio, 1996a). Luis Macas asserted it was Pachakutik's right to receive those seats and thus declined accepting the offer which he saw as a form of manipulation (El Comercio, 1996a).

operationalized in terms of the number of bill initiatives and how many of these became laws. Pachakutik's legislators sponsored 30 bill initiatives between 1996 and 1998, which were equivalent to almost 4% of the total number of proposals presented to the legislature during the period. Eight of these bill initiatives made it to the first debate and seven to the second debate at the plenary. In total, 6 of these proposals were approved and became laws. These six new laws represented approximately 3.08% of the total output of the legislature for the period.<sup>146</sup>

The approved laws did not have specific recipients or beneficiaries. Two of the new laws had universal recipients. The first law, "*Garantía sobre el abastecimiento permanente de vacunas de insumos para el programa ampliado de inmunizaciones*," dealt with the unrestricted supply of vaccines for the national immunization program. The second law, "*Ley Reformativa a la ley de Maternidad Gratuita*," introduced changes to the law securing free Maternity and child care and emphasized breastfeeding's importance. The other four laws had specific recipients. One secured a lifelong pension to the indigenous leader Transito Amaguaña. The next was a law that created a university, the *Universidad Intercontinental*. The third established the creation of the province Orellana. And the last law was developed to protect and promote the province Cañar's industrial production and tourism industry.

The most significant accomplishment within the legislature was that Ecuador ratified the International Labor Organization (ILO) Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention No. 169 in May 1998 after a long campaign in Congress led by Miguel Llucio, one of Pachakutik's legislators. The legislators worked hard to get the ratification as it would contribute to improving legislation pertaining to the indigenous population in the country. Not all of Pachakutik's legislators' efforts paid off, however. Many important proposals were left in the party's docket. Amongst these, the law addressing the creation of the National Ombudsman, the reform to the agricultural development law, and the "*Ley de Aguas*" that dealt with the water resources and the water administration in the country.<sup>147</sup>

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<sup>146</sup> In total 752 proposals were presented, of these 195 became laws.

<sup>147</sup> During the 1996-1998 period, and perhaps because the party members were more used to negotiating directly with the executive rather than through the legislative branch of government (due to their prior experience at social movements), the party's legislators also engaged the executive outside the legislature. In 1996 Pachakutik's leaders met with president Bucaram. The legislators requested the creation of a Technical Office of Development Support for the indigenous population. They emphasized the government should allow the rural population to advise the government on their own local political authorities (El Comercio, 1996b). They were referring to the figure of *tenientes políticos*. These were representatives of the executive often appointed by the provincial governors who were in turn appointed by the executive. However, their requests were not addressed. By the time Bucaram was ousted, the Technical Office was not created and very few local political authorities were appointed using the input from the indigenous population. Moreover, Bucaram had created an Ethno-Cultural Ministry and appointed as Minister, a member of Pachakutik that had been negotiating with the executive by-passing the party, Rafael Pandam. Bucaram's ousting gave Pachakutik a second chance to regain strength and pursue its primary goal. The party did not focus solely on its primary goal, however. The party started to work towards holding



For the 1998-2002 period, Pachakutik's policy interests focused on advancing legislation to enact the new Constitution's articles that gave the indigenous population recognition and collective rights. During this period, Conaie announced it would separate from Pachakutik. The indigenous movement argued this separation would free Conaie to negotiate with any other political group and pressure the government without coordinating with Pachakutik (El Comercio, 1998). Therefore, Pachakutik was left alone at its work in the legislature.

The party had nine candidates elected for the 1998-2002 legislature. However, only six joined the party's legislative group.<sup>148</sup> Despite the reduced size of the party's legislative block, Nina Pacari was appointed as second-vice president of Congress for the 1998 -2000 period,<sup>149</sup> and Antonio Posso was second vice-president for the 2000-2002 period. Nina Pacari asserted that her appointment was important as it meant Pachakutik was securing support for laws necessary to enact the 1998 Constitution.<sup>150</sup> By 1999, however, the indigenous movement leaders criticized Nina Pacari and the rest of the legislative block. Former legislator Luis Macas asserted the party's legislators and Nina Pacari, in particular, failed to direct the legislative discussions towards the issues that mattered most to the population and the party. They had instead supported the debates of the government's priorities (Diario Expreso, 1999). Posso's vice-presidency has received notoriously less attention than Pacari's term.<sup>151</sup>

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office. As the appointment of Fabián Alarcón as interim president required support from Congress, Pachakutik exchanged its legislators' support for the following: the elimination of the Ethno-Cultural Ministry, the creation of an organization working for the development of the indigenous population, and the appointment of their selected representatives to the cabinet (El Comercio, 1997a). The party got some of these demands. The Ethno-Cultural Ministry was eliminated and the CONPLADEIN was created. Nina Pacari was appointed as executive secretary. Nina Pacari's appointment was questioned by the *Federación de Indígenas Evangélicos del Ecuador* (FEINE) because her appointment had not been previously agreed upon amongst the indigenous population organizations (El Comercio, 1997c). However, only two appointments of the other requested, were made. Julio Cesar Trujillo was appointed Ombudsman and Elsa Maria Castro was appointed as member of the Political Reforms Commission (El Comercio, 1997b). Julio Cesar Trujillo was appointed in early May 1997 and presented its official resignation in May 22, 1997 (El Comercio, 1997d)

<sup>148</sup> This meant the party's legislative block was as big as the one from the 1996-1998 period after Bucaram was ousted, however because the legislature had grown they represented only 5% of the seats, as opposed to the 7% they represented in the previous period.

<sup>149</sup> The appointment was heavily criticized because it meant that the party reached an agreement with the elected president's party *Democracia Popular* (DP-UDC), and the conservative *Partido Social Cristiano* (PSC). Van Cott (2005) reports that Pacari's appointment started a dispute between Pachakutik militants and the legislative block. Militants rejected the agreement with the conservative right, while the legislators evaluated the agreement as part of a strategy to succeed in Congress.

<sup>150</sup> Additionally, Pachakutik secured seats in the following committees: Social and Labor Committee, Social Security, Accountability, Indigenous Issues, and the wider codification and legislation committee.

<sup>151</sup> Pachakutik's legislators chose to be part of "a constructive opposition". This choice meant a division within the party. This decision meant disregarding the fact that Pachakutik and Conaie's demands following the National Bank Holiday in March 1999 had not been addressed. Amongst the agreements the executive promised to send to the legislature the request for the creation of a fund for the functioning of Council for the Development of Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador (CODENPE). Nina Pacari voiced these demands (El Comercio, 1999). Nevertheless, by January 2000 Pachakutik's legislative block changed positions and took to the streets with the indigenous organizations including the party's activists against Jamil Mahuad. The indigenous population played

The party's legislators presented 58 bill initiatives to the legislature, representing 6.1% of all initiatives presented during that period. Out of these, 16 made it to the first debate, and 15 to the second debate in the plenary. In total, ten became new laws. This is equivalent to 5.4% of the total output of the legislature.<sup>152</sup>

Seven of the approved laws had specific beneficiaries that included the provinces: Carchi, Cotopaxi, El Oro, and Imbabura.<sup>153</sup> The other three laws had universal beneficiaries and focused on 1) reforms to the Penal Code; 2) reforms to the law of Radio broadcast and Television; and 3) the approval of the "*Ley de Juntas Parroquiales*." This last law was particularly important for the indigenous population as it mandated the creation of parish councils in rural parishes. This law made local elections even more important for parties like Pachakutik, whose main supporters came from rural parishes.

Four important proposals for Pachakutik were left undiscussed, however. The law that proposed the official use of ancestral languages within the state, the proposal for the "*Ley de Aguas*" presented in 1996, a proposal to reform the "*Ley de Comunas*," and a proposal to manage and allocate competencies within the state's legal system to develop the indigenous justice system. Additionally, the party failed to submit the bill initiatives for the *Ley de Nacionalidades y Pueblos Indígenas*, *Ley del Sistema de Educación Intercultural Bilingüe*, *Ley de Circunscripciones Territoriales*, *Ley de Justicia*, and *Ley del Fondo Indígena*. These ill initiatives were discussed by Conaie with the head of the executive but never presented at the legislature.

Pachakutik's performance during the 1998-2002 period surpassed the 1996-1998 period (see table 6.7). The party had one crucial success at the legislature in every period. In the 1996-1998 period, this was the ratification of the ILO No. 196 Convention, and in the 1998-2002 period, this was the *Ley de Juntas Parroquiales*. Both had significant implications for the

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a pivotal role at the ousting of Jamil Mahuad at the streets. In Congress, and with the representatives of Pachakutik absent, Gustavo Noboa (Mahuad's vice-president) was appointed president. During Gustavo Noboa's administration Pachakutik's legislators continued to be part of the opposition.

<sup>152</sup> In total 957 proposals were presented and only 184 became laws.

<sup>153</sup> These included the following laws:

1. Condonacion de intereses generados por falta de pago de tarifas de agua de riego San vicente de Pusir, Montufar, Ambuqui, Santiaguillo, Cuambo, ubicadas en las provincias del Carchi e Imbabura.
2. Concede pensión vitalicia al señor coronel(r) Alejandro Romo Escobar.
3. Creación de la empresa de agua potable y alcantarillado, Emapa regional La Estancilla.
4. Condonación de intereses y otros recargos adeudados al instituto nacional de desarrollo agrario-inda, por los adjudicatarios de tierras.
5. Creación de la universidad estatal de Milagro
6. Creación de la universidad de Otavalo.
7. Reformatoria a la ley que crea el fondo de ayuda emergente para la rehabilitación socio económica y reconstrucción de la provincia del Cotopaxi.

advancement of the party's policy agenda. During the first period, Pachakutik presented only 4% of all initiatives presented at the legislature, while in the second, this number increased to 6.1%. The Congress discussed more of Pachakutik's bill initiatives in the first and second debates of the 1998-2002 period than during the first period. Moreover, the party had more approved initiatives in the second period, ten new laws equivalent to 5.43% of all laws approved, compared to the six laws approved between 1996 and 1998, equivalent to only 3.08% of the total output. Furthermore, Pachakutik's legislators were better able to navigate Ecuador's legislative politics during the second period securing appointments within the legislature that had not been possible during the first period. Overall, Pachakutik achieved its goal of policy advancement during the 1998-2002 period by surpassing its aspiration level.

*Table 6.7 Pachakutik's goal achievement 1996-1998 and 1998-2002*

Pachakutik's goal achievement (1996-2002)		
	Aspiration Level ( based on the 1996-1998 performance)	Period of evaluation (1998-2002)
Policy-seeking		
Proposals presented	30 (4%)	58 (6.1%)
Discussed in the first debate	8 (2.08%)	16 (4.94%)
Discussed in the second debate	7 (2.08%)	15 (5.81%)
Approved	6 (3.08%)	10 (5.43%)
Most important accomplishment	Ratification of the ILO No. 169 Convention	Approval of the Ley de Juntas Parroquiales
Extras		Pachakutik's legislators held the vice-presidency of Congress for the whole period.

*\*The percentages are calculated based on the total number of proposals presented, discussed, and approved in the legislature during the period of investigation.*

Common evaluations of Pachakutik's performance for these periods have focused on the party's electoral support. The period of 1998-2002 is often considered a bad period for the party as its overall national vote share decreased (see, for example, Mijeski & Beck, 2004).

Pachakutik's presidential candidate received only 14.7% of the national vote in 1998 compared to the 20.6% of the votes received in 1996. However, a party's national vote share represents only a snapshot of a party's goal-achievement process. Votes may contribute to a party's achieving goals, but they are not the only means. As discussed in this section, Pachakutik's performance during the 1998-2002 period surpassed the party's first-period performance despite its reduced national vote share. Pachakutik decided to continue participating in elections after achieving its goal. However, the party changed its primary goal.

### **6.3.2 The 2002-2006 period**

In November 2002, the retired army Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez was elected president of Ecuador. He had been part of the January 2000 coup d'état that ended Jamil Mahuad's presidency. Lucio Gutiérrez was considered an outsider candidate. He was elected with Pachakutik's support. Soon after, he dissolved his agreement with Pachakutik and started working with the right-wing conservative party *Partido Social Cristiano* (PSC). By mid-April 2005, Gutiérrez's presidency ended. He was ousted via public demonstrations. This was the first middle class led presidential ousting in Ecuador's history and the first in recent years in which the indigenous social movements took a back seat. Gutiérrez was succeeded by his vice-president Alfredo Palacio. Lucio Gutiérrez ousting sparked a new trend in Ecuador: the rejection of traditional political parties that opened the door for the outsider candidate in 2006, Rafael Correa.

The 2002 elections were the most successful for Pachakutik in terms of elected candidates (Madrid, 2012; Van Cott, 2005). Pachakutik's presidential candidate was elected, and the party had 14 seats at the legislature. Five of these legislators were elected under a single ticket, and nine were elected in electoral alliances. Of these, six were elected with Lucio Gutiérrez's party, two with the socialist party *Partido Socialista Frente Amplio* (PS-FA), and one with the independent movement *Movimiento Ciudadanos Nuevo País*. Neither the number of elected legislators nor the fact that the party supported the new president was enough to help the party achieve its goal of holding office. The party could not hold on to any of the office appointments for which it sacrificed its policy-purity.

After the elections, Pachakutik declared itself as co-governing with Lucio Gutiérrez, which meant Pachakutik's presence in government (including cabinet and subcabinet appointments) was expected to be of equal proportion to the presence of the president's party officials (El Comercio, 2002; Lluco, 2004). This was how Pachakutik operationalized its primary goal: holding discretionary appointments. The party's aspiration level was to hold 50%

of all possible appointments. These appointments included cabinet seats, diplomatic appointments, and the directorships of different government offices. It was expected moreover that as directors and ministers were appointed, they would, in turn, be able to appoint their staff.

Pachakutik did not receive the expected number of appointments. The party received only four cabinet seats: Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, Education and Culture, and Tourism, out of 15; and one appointment (the Secretary of Planning and Social Dialogue) out of six possible national secretariates' directorships. Furthermore, the party received several appointments within multiple ministries and the diplomatic corps.<sup>154</sup> In total, Pachakutik received 86 confirmed appointments (reported in the appendix 2 by name and position). These appointments only represented 11% of the total political appointments Lucio Gutiérrez made that were considered key for the administration (El Comercio, 2003c). By contrast, Lucio Gutiérrez's party (PSP) held almost 52% of the total appointments.<sup>155</sup> Most importantly, even when the party received appointments, these appointees were surrounded by PSP appointees who would 'swamp' their work (Llucó, 2004). After August 2003, when the alliance between Pachakutik and Lucio Gutiérrez dissolved, all of these appointees left their offices.

When Alfredo Palacio became president in 2005, Pachakutik did not receive any political appointments back. Conaie negotiated the only important appointment for the indigenous population in 2005. This was the directorship of CODENPE, for which Lourdes Tibán was appointed. Additionally, although these were not strictly presidential appointments, the number of seats the party had at the Provincial Electoral Tribunals was reduced compared to the previous period. Although officially Pachakutik held 21 seats, just as during the 1998-2002 period, these seats were allocated both to Pachakutik and PSP. Therefore, Pachakutik effectively only had ten seats at the electoral tribunals (El Comercio, 2003a). Furthermore, at

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<sup>154</sup> Nina Pacari was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luis Macas Minister of Agriculture, Rosa Maria Torres Minister of Education and Culture, and Doris Soliz Minister of Tourism. Additionally, a member of Pachakutik became the executive vice-president of Petroecuador (Llucó, 2004, p. 30). Augusto Barrera was appointed Secretary of Planning and Social Dialogue, Virgilio Hernandez was appointed undersecretary of the Internal Affairs Ministry. Lourdes Tibán was appointed undersecretary of Welfare, Mariano Curicama undersecretary of Housing, Victor Hugo Jijón as member of Petroecuador, and Lourdes Rodriguez as undersecretary of Tourism (El Comercio, 2003b). Moreover, Pachakutik supported Wilma Salgado as head of AGD (Agencia de Garantía de Depositos) the agency created to safeguard the Ecuadorian's money savings.

<sup>155</sup> This overview refers only to the appointments that were deemed crucial for public administration, namely cabinet seats, subcabinet seats, provincial governors and governmental office managers. Undoubtedly there were more appointments to less important offices and thus the percentages of governmental presence could potentially shift. However, there is no clear information about how they were allocated. Appendix 2 includes a more extensive (but not exhaustive) list of political appointments Pachakutik received.

the legislature, the party only headed one committee in Congress and was no longer part of the parties controlling Congress's presidency or vice-presidencies.

Pachakutik did not achieve its primary goal during the 2002-2006 period. The party received fewer appointments (11%) than expected (50% of all appointments), and these appointments lasted for less than six months. Pachakutik's performance during the 2002-2006 period is often characterized as a success due to Gutiérrez's electoral triumph and the total number of legislators elected during that period (Madrid, 2012; Van Cott, 2005). However, electoral results often provide only a snapshot of a political party's performance and, most importantly, are not always the best proxy for goal achievement. This is the case for Pachakutik's 2002 electoral results. Contrary to what could be expected, the party could not leverage the electoral support into goal achievement during the inter-election period.<sup>156</sup> Notably, after failing to achieve its goal, the party did not disband but decided to persist, albeit making crucial changes. These changes included reducing its membership and changing its primary goal.

### 6.3.3 The 2006-2009 period

The ousting of Lucio Gutiérrez in April 2005 signaled the dissatisfaction of the population with the Ecuadorian political class. The groups that took to the streets to call for the end of the Gutiérrez' administration also chanted "*Que se vayan todos*," which can be roughly translated into: everyone must go. The demonstrators referred to the Ecuadorian political class, including the sitting (Pachakutik's) legislators. This was the setup for the presidential elections of 2006. In those elections, a newcomer was elected president, Rafael Correa.

Correa, who started his political career as Alfredo Palacio's Minister of Finance, was elected as an outsider with no party platform and no legislative candidates. Much of his agenda reflected that former Pachakutik leaders and leftist cadres worked for his campaign (e.g., Virgilio Hernandez, Alberto Acosta, and Augusto Barrera). One of the central pledges of Correa's campaign was to call for a Constitutional Assembly. He fulfilled his promise after his appointment, and in November 2007, the Constitutional Assembly dissolved the National Congress. The Constitutional Assembly finished its work and reconstituted itself as a Transitional Legislative Commission until the national elections of 2009 took place.

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<sup>156</sup> Pachakutik continued to work at the legislature although its legislative block also suffered from the alliance's end. An overview of the party's actions in the legislature during these periods is available in the online appendix (available at [www.dianadavilagordillo.com](http://www.dianadavilagordillo.com)).

The 2006-2009 period started with Pachakutik pursuing a new primary goal, infusing value to the party organization. The party held a National Party Congress in late 2005. This National Congress decided to further develop a formal structure of the party by changing its bylaws. For the first time, the party created an official tiered organization from the provinces to the parish levels. Additionally, the party increased the accountability mechanisms set up to control their elected officials and candidates. The party empowered its ethics committee in charge of party discipline (El Comercio, 2005c).

Following these changes, and after the 2006 elections, the party started working towards their implementation. It is difficult to assess the aspiration level for the party regarding this new goal. Arguably, the party aspired to set up the new lower-level organizations and get them to work. But it is unclear what this entailed. Therefore, this period can only be taken as the base-line period against which the next performances can be compared.

The party leaders and elected officials during the 2006-2009 period focused on developing the organization and protecting themselves. This meant that the party went against the advancement of some of its core policies to protect itself. A stark example of this is how in 2007, the party's legislators opposed one of the crucial elements of their policy agenda: Ecuador's definition as a plurinational state because it would hamper their time at the legislative.

Pachakutik's leaders and elected officials had, for years, insisted on the need for a Constitutional Assembly to address the definition of Ecuador as a plurinational state. In 2007 the opportunity of having a Constitutional Assembly appeared as Correa was fulfilling one of its campaign pledges. Pachakutik's legislators, however, did not support the Constitutional Assembly. Pachakutik's legislators joined the opposition to curtail the rights of the Constitutional Assembly Correa was proposing. The goal of these parties, including Pachakutik, was to protect their appointments to the legislature. Pachakutik's legislators' efforts worked directly against the party's policy platform. Instead, they worked towards maintaining their appointments, which for long – given the party's lack of access to state funding – were used to provide funds for the party.<sup>157</sup>

In contrast, Conaie supported Correa's proposal as it offered the perfect opportunity to advance one of their more important claims: differentiated recognition. The legislature's parties

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<sup>157</sup> A common practice amongst Ecuadorian political parties has been the "donation" of part of their elected officials' salaries to their parties. Pachakutik used these practices consistently (PK-1, 2017)

failed to curtail the Constitutional Assembly's powers, and in November 2007, the latter dissolved the Congress, and Pachakutik's legislators lost their seats.<sup>158</sup>

After the effort failed and the legislators were sent home, the party organization continued to develop internally. At the public arena, however, the party practically disappeared. Although the party presented candidates to the Constitutional Assembly, the president's new party (MPAIS) took over the political arena. In turn, the indigenous organizations took to the streets intending to affect the Constitutional Assembly's outcomes. The 2008 Constitution included many of the indigenous organizations' proposals.

In late 2007 the party held its National Congress where Jorge Guamán was elected to replace Jorge Talahua. He did not have a particularly public persona. As the Constitution came about and the 2009 elections loomed, Pachakutik's leadership resurfaced to announce the party was working hard at setting up primary elections to select their future candidates. The party organization had been hard at work behind closed doors establishing the local offices. The party used these local offices to organize the primary elections. In one of his few public statements, the party's leader stressed that the party was working to consolidate its internal organization (El Comercio, 2009a). By the end of the 2006-2009 period, Pachakutik's organization had become more complex, and it had continued to maintain a lively organization outside the electoral calendar. Although it is difficult to assert whether the party surpassed its aspiration level, the party chose to persist and participate in the next elections.

#### **6.3.4 The 2009-2013 period**

In 2009 Correa was re-elected president. Between 2009 and 2013, Correa's party had almost 50% of the National Assembly's seats.<sup>159</sup> Correa's control of the legislature hindered the work of many opposition parties. Pachakutik had in total three candidates elected under the party's ticket and one elected under an alliance.<sup>160</sup> They joined the opposition in early 2010 after a

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<sup>158</sup> The legislature was in session for a little under a year. In total during that period a total 434 bill initiatives were presented. Pachakutik sponsored 48 of which 1 was approved. This initiative was rather innocuous. It eliminated an item listing a possible violation of the Organic Law of land transport.

<sup>159</sup> The 2008 Constitution changed the name of the legislature from National Congress to National Assembly.

<sup>160</sup> The party's legislators aim to advance some of the party's core policies. Therefore, as soon as the legislature started to work Pachakutik joined the legislators from MPD and formed a legislative block of 10 legislators. This gave the parties access to a seat at the *Consejo de Administración Legislativa* (Legislative Administration Council - CAL), the office in charge of managing the legislative initiatives and assigning them to committees. The CAL is formed by 4 members who are chosen from the four largest political blocs and the president and vice-president of the national assembly. Pachakutik's newly formed block entitled the party legislators to a sit which was taken by Lourdes Tibán from 2009 to 2011, and later on by Francisco Ulloa from 2011 to 2013.



short stint as part of the majority (El Comercio, 2009d). The period ended with MPAIS continuing to hold control over the political arena.

Pachakutik continued to be a value-infusion-seeking party. As mentioned already, the party's leader Jorge Guamán stressed Pachakutik was in the process of rebuilding its organization looking into the future (Jorge Guamán as cited in El Comercio, 2009c). The 2009-2013 period presented an important hurdle to all political parties in Ecuador. The 2008 Constitution required all political parties in Ecuador to re-register by submitting the signatures (of affiliated members) equivalent to 1.5% of the country's registered voters. This number of signatures was a tall order for many organizations. Pachakutik struggled but managed to deliver its signatures in 2012.

The requirement of over 158.000 members' signatures to re-register was a difficult challenge for Pachakutik. The work Pachakutik focused on the 2006-2009 period concentrated on setting up local level offices, but this did not include thorough documentation – or registration – of party members. Therefore, as the deadlines for re-registration loomed, Pachakutik started canvassing for signatures. The party eventually managed to gather all necessary signatures and was officially re-registered in mid-2012. Pachakutik was able to leverage its local level organizations to get these signatures.

During the 2009-2013 period, Pachakutik continued to build its party organization and routinized its practices. In addition to the work made to collect the registration's signatures, the party continued to respect its non-electoral activities calendar. The party continued to hold its biennial National Congresses. In May 2010, the party's members met at the VI National Congress. In this Congress, Rafael Antuni replaced Jorge Guamán (El Comercio, 2010). After the meeting, Pachakutik's leadership announced that they were committed to “take on the reconstruction of the party organization” (SERVINDI, 2010).

Nonetheless, this did not mean everything was smooth for the party during this period. Long time leaders of the party: Miguel Lluco and Auki Tituaña, were ousted. Miguel Lluco's expulsion from the party was due to his decision to support Correa and his party (El Comercio, 2012). In turn, Auki Tituaña announced his intention to join the right-wing candidate Guillermo Lasso's presidential campaign (El Universo, 2012b).<sup>161</sup>

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<sup>161</sup> The separation was expected. Tituaña had removed himself from the political movement a few years earlier. In particular, he spearheaded a campaign against the 2008 Constitution while Pachakutik campaigned in favor. In the end Tituaña was unable to present his candidacy as vice-president because he was never officially expelled from Pachakutik. The law stated that he had to either be expelled from the party or disaffiliated from the party at least 90 days prior to the registration of his new candidacy. Pachakutik did not registered his expulsion and thus Tituaña was blocked from presenting his candidacy (El Universo, 2012c)

Their expulsion hence reflected the internal strength of the organization. Their expulsions signaled the solid core formed within Pachakutik, which refused electoral alliances with parties without the central organizations' support. The differences between the then leaders of the party and the one-time leaders Tituaña and Lluco were apparent. Both Lluco and Tituaña had done precisely the opposite the party required of its members. They joined organizations the party openly opposed.

Overall, it follows, Pachakutik continued developing its organization during the 2009 and 2013 period. Compared to the 2006-2009 period, the party surpassed its aspiration levels. The party maintained its strong organization by developing further the local level branches of the party. Moreover, the party continued holding its biennial National Congresses, keeping the organization outside the electoral calendar alive. Furthermore, and using the party's charter changes introduced in 2005, the party expelled some of its former leaders. This highlights an apparent unity amongst the sitting leaders. Lastly, between 2011 and 2013, Pachakutik received, for the first time, state subsidies. Pachakutik hence clearly surpassed its aspiration during this period. The party continued to persist after this.

### **6.3.5 The 2013-2017 period**

In 2013, Correa was re-elected for the last time. At the legislature, his party received 73% of the seats. The party's legislative block was dubbed "*la aplanadora*" (the steamroller) as it would not need the support from any other party to advance Correa's agenda. The 2013-2017 period was a difficult period to advance policies in Ecuador. The number of seats held by the president's party increased, which meant that the executive's block could steamroll all initiatives with which they agreed or disagreed. Advancing policy outside the president's party's preferences was almost impossible. As Lourdes Tibán asserted, "nothing gets done or approved unless it is part of the president's plan" (Lourdes Tiban as cited in Zamora, 2016).<sup>162</sup> Traditional and non-traditional parties struggled to persist, given the lack of votes cast for them and the difficulties parties faced to achieve their goals via alternative means, given Correa's total control of the state and all other government branches. Nevertheless, Pachakutik persisted.

At the beginning of the 2013-2017 period, Pachakutik held its VII National Congress, which again showed its routinized practices. In this Congress, Fanny Campos was elected as

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<sup>162</sup> The party presented 14 bill initiatives (equivalent to 4.02% of all initiatives presented during this period), and none of these were approved. The party received in total 7 seats at the legislature. While this outcome may look like a positive outcome because the party received overall more seats than in 2009, this reflects the opposite. In 2013, Pachakutik joined amongst other parties, the party MPD. Together, the two parties in 2009 held 10 seats at the legislature, in 2013 again together – but under an electoral alliance – the number of seats was reduced to 7.

the party's national coordinator.<sup>163</sup> 2013 was the last year in which Pachakutik received state subsidies. In 2014, CNE claimed Pachakutik had not achieved the necessary votes (4% of the national votes) to receive the subsidies. Fanny Campos was in charge of fighting the state's decision to stop the allocation of these funds. She was, however, not successful. In 2016, Marlon Santi replaced Fanny Campos as national party coordinator. He continued with the work she had started, albeit with the same negative results.<sup>164</sup>

In 2016, the party updated its statutes to established an even more detailed organizational structure at all levels. Ethical committees were extended to the parish levels, and party members' ombudsmen were also appointed at all levels and branches. Additionally, the party continued to hold elections for local branch leaders and organize primary elections. Lastly, during the 2013-2017 period, the party had no notorious party members disaffiliations and did not expel any party members. Overall, Pachakutik surpassed its aspiration level. During the 2013-2017 period, Pachakutik continued to infuse with value its own organization and did it successfully.

Pachakutik surpassed its aspiration level in the 2013-2017 period. The party worked to routinize its practices even further, maintained the organization alive beyond the electoral calendar, and faced no major disaffiliations or had to expulse well-known party members. The only aspect in which Pachakutik's goal-achievement did not surpass its aspiration level was that the party stopped receiving state subsidies. Nonetheless, overall, Pachakutik continued to infuse with value its organization and hence achieved its goal.

#### **6.4 Pachakutik: surviving against all odds**

The goal achievement perspective to party survival requires a re-evaluation of a party's resources in light of their primary goal. These resources include, but are not limited to, the party's organizational resources such as staff, party members, party leaders, funding, and the votes a party receives in electoral processes.

During the 1996-2002 period, in which Pachakutik was a policy-seeking party, the party's organizational resources *and* the votes the party was able to garner were crucial. First, an extensive party membership – composed mostly of members of social organizations that partnered with the party – contributed significantly to spread the word about the party's policy platform. During the 1996 and 1998 campaigns, the party focused on its policy platform, and

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<sup>163</sup> She had been one of the architects of the electoral alliance that supported Alberto Acosta's presidential campaign.

<sup>164</sup> In 2018 CNE revised the decision to not allocate funds and granted Pachakutik the subsidies once more.

given the scarce financial resources, the work of activists was essential to mobilize voters. This was particularly important for the party as it required votes to turn into seats at the legislature. Pachakutik achieved its goal of advancing policy during this period (1996-2002). The party managed to advance bill initiatives and alter the Ecuadorian political discourse, bringing to the fore issues of racial discrimination, the importance of recognition, and the importance of collective rights. The party performance by the end of these two periods contributed to the party's decision to keep going.

For the 2002-2006 period, party activists became less critical in spreading the word about the party's policy platform. Instead, they were essential to mobilize voters by any means possible. As discussed already, Pachakutik's primary goal changed from policy to office-seeking. Only votes would help the party achieve its office appointments. Votes hence become more important than party members. Financial resources also become more important during this period. The party's national congress discussed transforming the party into a full-fledged party organization to receive the state's subsidies and leaving behind its status as a political movement. However, in the end, the party members voted against that (Llucio, 2003). This clearly shows how different resources may be more or less useful for certain types of goals. Pachakutik did not achieve its primary goal during this period. To be sure, the party did manage to get a considerable number of votes, which brought the party close to reaching its aspiration level. However, the goal was impossible to achieve after the alliance with Gutierrez ended.

Despite failing to achieve its primary goal, Pachakutik's leaders chose to keep the organization alive. Pachakutik's persistence after the 2002-2006 failure followed from a time of reflection on the side of the party's leaders. They asserted it was time to look inwards. As discussed in chapter 2, goal achievement is not the only likely determinant of party survival. Parties may also choose to persist after a failure if achieving their primary goal in the next period is possible. Arguably, Pachakutik's persistence after the 2002-2006 failure to achieve its goal is an example of the party leaders considering that it was possible to re-build the party organization and protect it.

From 2006 onwards, the party's resources of committed activists and committed party leaders were crucial for the party. This does not mean, however, that votes became entirely unimportant. The party did require them. Votes were necessary to maintain the party's registration and access funding in the form of contributions from party members elected to public office. Therefore, Pachakutik continued to participate in electoral processes and work towards receiving as many votes as possible at the subnational elections – where the party has historically performed better. This is where using multiple mobilization strategies at the

subnational elections discussed in chapter 5 fits in. Candidates' using multiple mobilization strategies contributes to the party's overall persistence. It helps the party acquire the votes and the elected candidates necessary to maintain the party's registration and, since 2009, to receive the state's subsidies.

Since 2006, the party has been able to build a stronger organization through the years. This process has required resources, such as committed party members, committed leaders, and a minimum working organization that deploys and develops the necessary electoral campaigns to keep the party going. At the same time, achieving the goal has also contributed to creating even more resources, such as more – if still limited in number – party members and, importantly, thanks to the changes in party regulation, enough elected officials to ensure access to the state's subsidies.

Party survival is hence not only a matter of achieving goals as if this happened in a void. Goal achievement requires resources and is very much dependent on what else happens within the party system and within the party organization. Therefore, understanding party survival, particularly of parties with low levels of electoral support and scarce resources, requires evaluating all aspects of the parties.

#### **6.4.1 Pachakutik's survival alternative explanations**

Thus far, I have explained Pachakutik's survival from a goal achievement perspective. However, I have not discussed some possible alternative explanations for this survival. In this section, I present three alternative explanations for the party's survival and argue why they cannot be used instead of the goal achievement explanation.

An alternative explanation for Pachakutik's persistence could be the influence of ambitious politicians. These ambitious leaders are likely to keep the party organization alive to achieve their own goals. Although this explanation may apply to multiple other parties, it does not apply to Pachakutik. Pachakutik has never had a single charismatic leader using the organization towards her own objectives. As discussed in chapter 3, the party was initially devised as a horizontal organization that required consensus amongst the multiple partners to make decisions. This limited the ability of any leader to centralize the party's decision-making processes into a single person. Moreover, when the organization formalized a hierarchical structure, it retained a participatory decision-making system that weakened the National Coordinators' office's power. The party has, in general, maintained the configuration of a horizontal organization where most decisions are made through consensus.

This does not mean that the party has lacked ambitious politicians, however. Multiple party leaders have used the party to advance their personal goals. Nonetheless, as their power to stir the organization towards their preferred outcomes was limited, they eventually left the party. For instance, in late 2004 and early 2005, numerous mestizo leaders (such as Augusto Barrera, Virgilio Hernandez) left the party (Madrid, 2012, p. 104). They argued that the party was no longer pursuing their interests and had transformed into an ethnocentric party. The bottom line is that the party was not the place where they could pursue their own agenda. These former leaders joined Rafael Correa's political movement. Through that new party, they participated in elections and received political appointments. Another example of a party leader who left the organization to advance his own agenda was Auki Tituaña. He announced in 2012 that he would join Guillermo Lasso in his first bid for the presidency. Tituaña had put his name forth as Pachakutik's possible candidate for the presidency since 2002. However, he was never elected during Pachakutik's primaries.

Pachakutik's ambitious leaders left the party organization as soon as it interfered with their objectives. Arguably, if it was them keeping the organization alive, the organization would have crumbled after they left. However, this was not the case. Notably, the organization's life has not been carried over by new ambitious politicians replacing those who left. The national party coordinators, although likely to have their personal agendas, have not been the party's candidates but kept their work as party leaders independent from the electoral competition (the only exception was Miguel Lluco, who was a legislator in 1996-1998 and then became the party leader). Moreover, the party organization has worked hard to formalize its structure since 2006. This has strengthened the organization and curtailed any party leader's abilities to use the organization to advance her own agenda. As it is clear, Pachakutik's persistence cannot be explained as caused by ambitious politicians.

Another alternative explanation is that the party has profited from other parties' breakdowns. For instance, this could mean that the party could take over the electorate of parties that disbanded. This has, in fact, been argued as one of the reasons for Pachakutik's formation in 1996. Van Cott (2005) emphasized that Pachakutik's successful establishment was partly due to leftist parties' weakness. These organizations contributed to Pachakutik with their cadres and organizational know-how but, at the same time, were too weak to impose their agenda on the new organization. Moreover, in 1996, Pachakutik benefited from the general disenchantment of the Ecuadorian electorate with traditional parties. However, as the years passed, Pachakutik was no longer able to benefit from being the new party.

Pachakutik has become, to a certain extent, part of the old non-traditional parties within the party system. Pachakutik has turned into the party that loses support to new organizations. This was the case in 2006 when Correa presented himself as the new anti-establishment option. Correa was able to garner the support of most of the electorate during his time in office. Multiple political parties – even old established political parties – disbanded as their support dwindled, e.g., *Izquierda Democrática* (ID) and *Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano* (PRE). However, Pachakutik did not directly benefit from these parties' disbandment. As discussed in chapter 3, the party has not received more votes in recent years. The supporters of those parties shifted their support to Correa's party or other new parties. Pachakutik's survival hence cannot be explained by the party profiting from other parties' demise. In fact, from this perspective, the party's persistence becomes even more puzzling.<sup>165</sup>

Lastly, another alternative explanation is that the party benefitted from an institutional framework that facilitates party persistence, e.g., no (or low) barriers to access state's subsidies and few requirements to maintain party registration. This is not the case for the Ecuadorian system. As discussed in chapter 3, party regulation in Ecuador constrains party persistence. First, the requirements to maintain registration are difficult to achieve, particularly for national-level party organizations. As shown in chapter 3, most of the registered voters in Ecuador are mostly located in two provinces, making it difficult for parties to garner large portions of the national vote share (required to maintain registration) if they underperform in these two provinces (Guayas and Pichincha). This is often the case for Pachakutik, which generally does better in provinces with few registered voters. Second, until 2009 the Ecuadorian state only provided state subsidies to national parties, which left Pachakutik without financial support from 1996 until 2009. Although the party did get access to these funds in 2009, the party had already survived some of its worst electoral performance by then. In sum, party regulation in Ecuador has consistently challenged Pachakutik's persistence. Although it may have contributed to the party's formation in 1996, afterwards it complicated the party's persistence.

## 6.5 Conclusion

In chapters 3 and 4, I discussed at length what makes Pachakutik's persistence puzzling. On the one hand, Pachakutik's electoral performances have been in constant decline since the party's first election (except for the 2002 election's outcomes). On the other hand, the party

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<sup>165</sup> In the online appendix (available at [www.dianadavilagordillo.com](http://www.dianadavilagordillo.com)) I benchmark Pachakutik's performance against one of its peers, *Izquierda Democrática*.

organization is not one boasting with resources. More importantly, those resources often associated with the party, e.g., a large party membership (expected due to the indigenous population support), are more a mirage than a fact. Conventional theories of party survival would be hard-pressed to make sense of this party's survival.

The theory I introduced in chapter 2 argues that parties can persist if they achieve their primary goals even if they receive few votes or have fluctuating levels of electoral support. What matters is a party's primary goal and whether the party can achieve this goal, which is defined in terms of what the party expects to achieve. That is, parties do not need to *get everything*. Persistence is likely to happen when parties reach a minimum level of satisfaction *or*, in case of not reaching this level, parties can choose to persist while taking necessary steps to adapt and try again.

I have explored Pachakutik's persistence from this perspective and showed that the party's longevity may be explained by goal achievement. Party survival is better explained considering goals and their achievement. This perspective is useful to understand the survival of parties with scarce resources and low or fluctuating levels of electoral support such as Pachakutik.



## 7 Conclusion

Political parties are ubiquitous to democracy.<sup>166</sup> They are organizations that serve as linkages between civil society and government; they participate in the public debate (shaping how citizens approach politics), mobilize and represent their voters, contest elections, recruit and train political leaders, and organize and coordinate government (Aldrich, 1995). Political parties, nonetheless, often come and go. Especially in regions like Latin America, where party replacement explains most of the electoral volatility (Cohen, Kobilanski, & Zechmeister, 2018, p. 1020), it is possible to trace the growing number of new political parties entering the electoral arena as well as the ever-increasing number of both new and old parties that leave the electoral arena. Nevertheless, not all parties come and go. Some become well known success stories, and others linger even with low levels of electoral support.

These are parties generally discounted and defined as irrelevant. However, these parties are not inconsequential. These parties' mere participation in electoral processes is likely to affect other parties' mobilization strategies. It is only after sustained presence that party organizations have an impact on political systems. Moreover, it is well known that a single seat at the legislature may be enough to make a party powerful or at least relevant. These parties hence deserve more attention than the one they are generally granted

This dissertation contributes to opening up a research agenda that addresses parties that survive against all odds. To continue with the references to Latin America's parties, the bulk of the literature consistently focuses on new party formation (Allison, 2006, 2016; Anria, 2013; Boudon, 2001; Bowen, 2011; Hunter, 2010; Madrid, 2010, 2012; Manning, 2007; Rosenblatt, 2018; Van Dyck, 2017). Only a few authors focus on long-lasting party building (see, for example, Levitsky et al., 2016). Yet, they focus only on parties with high levels of electoral support. Persisting parties that do not fulfill the criteria of electoral success are often left unaddressed. An exception to this trend is the work of Jennifer Cyr (2017). Cyr's work is helpful to synthesize the problem I have highlighted throughout this dissertation: "it is time to look beyond the dichotomy of continued national-electoral success or failure and examine the dynamic space that lies in-between" (Cyr, 2016, p. 125).

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<sup>166</sup> Parties, although ubiquitous, are sometimes absent in democracies. The works of Veenendaal (2016) and Levitsky and Zavaleta (2016) refer to some of these cases.

### 7.1 Surviving against all odds

One vital step to advance research on these parties is to understand their survival. I argue that party survival needs to be comprehended from the perspective of each party's decision-making process to persist, change, or disband. Parties make these decisions following the achievement (or possible achievement) of their primary goal. Parties – including those with scant resources and low levels of electoral support – will only persist if they choose to do so. Therefore, the study of party survival needs to take into account these decision-making processes. I approach political parties from a sociological perspective that emphasizes that parties are not only tools for ambitious politicians. Parties are complex and multidimensional organizations driven by group goals that participate in electoral processes and fulfill different functions within a democracy (Bawn et al., 2012, p. 571; Bolleyer et al., 2019, p. 20; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 5; Monroe, 2001, p. 21; Mudge & Chen, 2014, p. 310). Moreover, parties are “masters of their own fate in that they are capable of making organizational choices and using organization as a tool in the pursuit of their political goals” (Webb, Poguntke, & Scarrow, 2017, p. 319).

The conventional approaches to political parties' survival consistently eschew a discussion relating to why a political party would choose to persist. This omission can arguably be explained by their focus on parties that receive consistently high levels of electoral support (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000; Harmel & Robertson, 1985; Kitschelt, 1988; Levitsky et al., 2016; Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006; Morgan, 2011, 2018; Obert & Müller, 2017; Seawright, 2012; Tavits, 2008; Zur, 2019) or parties with resources (Beyens et al., 2016; Bolleyer, 2013; Bolleyer & Bytze, 2013; Burgess & Levitsky, 2003; Casal Bértoa & Spirova, 2019; Cyr, 2017; Deegan-Krause & Haughton, 2018; Dolenc & Širinić, 2017; Grzymala-Busse, 2002; Kopecký & Mair, 2012; Rose & Mackie, 1988; Tavits, 2013). Both groups of parties are likely to achieve their goals (or have the means to do so). Therefore, asking why they may choose to persist – or the logic behind this decision – could be unwarranted.

However, besides obscuring parties' decision-making processes, these approaches lump all parties together in terms of their primary goals. Parties are indirectly presented as aiming for the same – single – objective of maximizing their electoral support, which might not be the case. In fact, this perspective on parties' goals clashes with the arguments of researchers that focus on parties' behavior and the different goals that political parties pursue (D'Alimonte, 1999; Duncan, 2007; Evans, 2018; Harmel & Janda, 1994; Janda, 1990; Pedersen, 2012b, 2012a; Strom, 1990; Strom & Muller, 1999; Wolinetz, 2002). In this literature, parties are presented as able to pursue different primary goals. These goals determine

how the parties react to external shocks and their behavior. In this dissertation, I bridge these two research lines, combining the argument (indirectly discussed in the party survival literature) that parties survive as they can achieve their goals and the argument that parties pursue different primary goals.

This is a novel approach to party survival. It addresses the decision-making process parties go through before deciding to disband, change, or persist. The decision to persist follows from evaluating the achievement of their goals based on their aspiration levels. Parties that achieve their goals (or are likely to do so either by adapting their means or changing their goals) are more likely to decide to persist. This approach is instrumental in understanding the persistence of parties that do not conform to conventional electoral support and resource availability expectations. However, this does not mean that the theory of party survival presented here is only applicable to these parties. Quite the opposite, this theory of party survival and the methods of party goal identification and goal achievement evaluations introduced in chapter 2 are useful to understand all types of parties' survival.

The theory introduced in this dissertation hence contributes to a more precise understanding of party survival. It addresses the often-ignored survival decision-making process that parties go through. In addition, the methods of goal identification and goal achievement evaluation have applications beyond the analysis of party survival. As discussed in chapter 2, although parties are consistently referred to as office-seeking or policy-seeking, there is a lack of a method to identify the goals parties pursue. The methods introduced in chapter 2 fill in this gap in our knowledge. Lastly, this new theory of party survival contributes to clarifying the effects of different resources on party survival. Different resources will have a different impact on parties' survival depending on each party's primary goal

## **7.2 Ethnic voting in Ecuador, Latin America, and beyond**

The most common explanation used to make sense of Pachakutik's longevity is its connection to the indigenous population. The party is defined as an ethnic party built on the shoulders of a strong indigenous movement. In short, the party was expected to count on indigenous voters' support and rely on the social movement's resources to persist. This, I argued, does not apply to Pachakutik. I focused in particular on the expected votes the party should receive from the indigenous voters. Arguably, these votes could be taken as indicators of the party's indigenous populations' overall support. However, as I showed, the party does not have their support, and hence the party's survival cannot be explained as determined by this relationship. This finding

## Conclusion

required further reflection on the expected relationship between the indigenous population and ethnic parties in Ecuador.

Some scholars have already stressed that ethnic identity is, only at times, a relevant predictor of voting preferences in Latin America (see: Hirseland & Strijbis, 2019; Moreno Morales, 2015). However, it is more common to find that scholars leave unquestioned the link between the indigenous population in the region and parties that claim a connection to this population group (often based on the parties' ties to the indigenous population's social movements) (see, for example, Mijeski & Beck, 2004, 2008; Rice, 2011; Rice & Van Cott, 2006). The assumption of the unbreakable connection between voters and parties brushes over one crucial understanding of ethnic identities: ethnic identities are malleable and fluid. As ethnic identities may change or be mobilized (or not) by different individuals at different times, it is imperative to preface all work on ethnic voting by addressing whether the ethnic identity of interest will work as a shortcut for connecting voters and an ethnic party.

I argued and showed that Ecuador's indigenous population, often identified as *indígena*, has become fragmented into multiple *pueblos* and nationalities. This fragmentation can explain the low levels of indigenous' votes for Pachakutik's candidates. My findings align with findings relating to ethnic voting in Bolivia, where indigenous voters in different regions employ different identity shortcuts (Hirseland & Strijbis, 2019). This disconnection between an ethnic party and the expected targeted – ethnic – voters in these two countries suggests the connection between an ethnic party and ethnic voters is not inescapable. Ethnic identities may be more or less fixed depending on specific institutional contexts (Chandra, 2005, p. 245) or their usefulness (de Zwart, 2000).

This has important implications for the study of ethnic voting in Ecuador, Latin America, and beyond. Crucially, the need to explore the possible disconnection between ethnic parties and ethnic voters instead of expecting an unbreakable connection. This expands the already acknowledged fact that ethnicity matters where it has been politicized, but it is not a perfect formula to mobilize voters (Carlin, Singer, & Zechmeister, 2015; Dunning & Harrison, 2010; Huber & Suryanarayan, 2016; Lindberg & Morrison, 2008; Moreno Morales, 2015). I show that it is necessary to first “justify” the ethnic identity expected to connect voters and parties, as was already argued by Chandra (2001).

### 7.3 Mixed and segmented mobilization strategies

This dissertation also contributes to the study of political parties' mobilization strategies. This research agenda is slowly moving towards an understanding of parties employing multiple strategies at a time to mobilize voters (Calvo & Murillo, 2019; Halvorsen, 2019; Luna, 2014; Thachil, 2014a), against the common-place idea that parties will use a single strategy to mobilize voters (Kitschelt, 2000). Chapter 5 focuses primarily on three mobilization strategies: programmatic, clientelistic, and symbolic (ethnic-, party-, and candidate-based) and how these may be used. Parties may use the three mobilization strategies 1) in a pure form in all electoral districts; 2) mixed (two or more mobilization strategies) in all electoral districts; 3) segmented, i.e., using two pure strategies in different districts; or 4) mixed and segmented, i.e., using pure and mixed strategies in multiple districts. This framework expands researchers' tool-kits to study parties' mobilization strategies.

I used this framework to study Pachakutik's mobilization strategies. In addition to further illustrating the use of multiple mobilization strategies, my findings also have implications for the study of ethnic parties. The key limitation of conventional research on ethnic parties is that ethnic parties are commonly classified as clientelistic parties. This classification indirectly curtails the possibility of them using mobilization strategies other than clientelistic (Chandra, 2004, 2011; Gunther & Diamond, 2003; Horowitz, 1985). By contrast, an alternative view emphasizes that ethnic parties use diverse mobilization strategies to influence electoral support (Basedau & Stroh, 2012; Erdmann, 2004; Huber & Suryanarayan, 2016; Kendhammer, 2010; Lindberg & Morrison, 2008; Madrid, 2012; Resnick, 2014; Thachil, 2014b). My findings contribute to expanding this research agenda showing that despite Pachakutik being an ethnic party, its candidates only at times employ symbolic-ethnic mobilization strategies, and in even fewer cases, clientelistic mobilization strategies.

### 7.4 Ecuador politics, elections, and Pachakutik

This dissertation also makes important empirical contributions. It expands the available dataset of Ecuadorian elections by adding on the categorization of all parties and electoral alliances competing in elections between 2002 and 2019. Moreover, chapter 3 offers a summarized overview of these results, which can help understand Ecuadorian politics at a glance. Lastly, research on Pachakutik stalled during the early 2000s (mostly after 2006) and has since then dwindled (Van Cott, 2005, 2008). In this dissertation, I expand this existing knowledge by analyzing the party's evolution since its formation but with a particular emphasis on the 2006-

2019 period. Through that, we learn more about how the party developed and survived. This dissertation makes three important arguments about this party. First, Pachakutik's persistence cannot be linked solely to the party's support from the indigenous voters. Second, Pachakutik is an ethnic party that mixes and segments strategies across and within districts that likely contribute to the party's mestizo electoral support. And third, Pachakutik is a party that has pursued different primary goals: policy between 1996 and 2002, office-holding between 2002 and 2006, and value-infusion (survival) since 2006.

### **7.5 Directions for future research**

As mentioned already, parties that survive against all odds require further attention in the discipline. The first question that should be addressed is these parties' (and their primary goals) effect on electoral competition. As discussed in chapter 2, the goals that parties pursue have empirical implications for how parties are governed and how they set up electoral campaigns. For example, suppose the parties more likely to persist, with scarce resources and low levels of electoral support, are value-infusion-seeking parties. In that case, given that these parties often participate in electoral competitions only to ensure their survival, the electoral arena is not likely to be affected by their long-lasting presence. If, by contrast, it is policy-seeking parties that persist, electoral competition is more likely to be affected. These parties are likely to bring their policy issues into the public debate and hence influence other parties to take a position on the matter. By contrast, office-seeking parties may be more likely to have a reduced effect – just as value-infusion-seeking parties – given their interest to make themselves into good partners to acquire office appointments.

Another critical question that needs further research is these parties' impact on party regulation laws. Setting aside their specific primary goals, all of these parties are likely interested in working towards party regulation that limits new party formation and protects existing parties, e.g., set low or no barriers for state subsidies. Beyond party regulation, these parties may also affect policy-making. Policy-seeking parties, just as they may affect the offers of more established parties at the electoral arena, may also affect the public debate one in the legislature. Office-seeking parties may, by contrast, become crucial partners to create majorities as they are more likely flexible partners. Lastly, value-infusion-seeking parties could also be a partner for all provided that they can negotiate benefits for the party organization. The role these parties may take in the policy-making process needs to be better conceptualized.

Another important question for further research is the impact of the different types of resources that these parties have and their interaction with the goals. Although I have already addressed some of these aspects here, there is still much to understand. In particular, the effects of strong party leaders, a party's organization flexibility or lack thereof, and the party membership's size need further attention. There is much to learn still about these parties and their impacts on democracy. After all, the world is not only made of winners and losers; competitors also have a say in the game.





## **Appendix 1**

### ***List of interviews***

PK-1. 2017.	Personal Interview, June 2017
PK-2. 2017.	Personal Interview, June 2017
PK-3. 2017.	Personal Interview, July 2017
PK-4. 2017.	Personal Interview, July 2017
PK-5. 2017.	Personal Interview, July 2017
PK-6. 2017.	Personal Interview, July 2017
PK-7. 2018.	Personal Interview, August 2018
PK-8. 2018.	Personal Interview, August 2018
PK-9. 2018.	Personal Interview, September 2018
EXP-1. 2017.	Personal Interview, June 2017
EXP-2. 2018.	Personal Interview, August 2018
EXP-3. 2018.	Personal Interview, August 2018.
EXP-4. 2020.	Personal Interview, January 2020
EXP -5. 2020.	Personal Interview, January 2020
ID-1. 2018.	Personal Interview, August, 2018
ID-2. 2018.	Personal Interview, August, 2018
ID-3. 2018.	Personal Interview, August, 2018
ID-4. 2018.	Personal Interview, August, 2018
ID-5. 2018.	Personal Interview, August, 2018
ID-6. 2018.	Personal Interview, August, 2018
ID-7. 2018.	Personal Interview, August, 2018
GOV-1. 2017.	Personal Interview, June 2017
GOV-2. 2020.	Personal Interview, January 2020
PSC-1. 2020.	Personal Interview, March 2020



## Appendix 2

### *Pachakutik's political appointments during Lucio Gutierrez' administration*

#### **Office Appointments**

Ambassador / Embassy of Ecuador in Guatemala  
Ambassador / Embassy of Ecuador in Russia  
Ambassador / Embassy of Ecuador in Panamá  
Cultural attaché in Germany  
Cultural attaché in Italy  
Cultural attaché in Malacca  
Cultural attaché in Peru  
Cultural attaché in Switzerland  
Cultural attaché in Bolivia  
Political attaché in Perú  
Consul in New Mexico, USA  
Central Highlands Manager (Tourism)  
Civil Registry  
Coastal Region Manager (Tourism)  
Commissioner / Intendente de Policia  
Commissioner / Intendente de Policia  
Commissioner / Intendente de Policia  
Consulate of Ecuador in Cali  
Corporación Financiera Nacional  
Corporación Financiera Nacional  
Corporación de Desarrollo  
Corsicen  
Corsinor  
CREA  
Director of Rural Health Programs  
Director of Education  
Director of Immigration  
Director of local (Dirt and Gravel) Roads  
Director of Peasant Development  
Director of Water Resources  
Economic Advisor to the Presidency  
Ecorae  
Fondo de Inversión Social FISE (El Comercio, 2003d)  
Galapagos Islands Manager  
Governor  
Health Director

#### **Appointees**

Maria Angelina Vacacela (Saraguro)  
Mercedes Tixe (Puruhá)  
Jhon Alarcon (Panzaleo)  
Jorge Necpas (Kayambi)  
Segundo Chalus (Chibuleo)  
José Lema (Otavalo)  
Vicenta Chuma (Cañari)  
Cristina Gualinga (Kiwcha Pastaza)  
Miguel Angel Carlosama (Otavalo)  
Walter Uyungara (Shuar)  
Yolanda Terán  
Patricio Sanchez  
Roberto Montenegro  
Patricio Soto  
Alex Alajo  
Luis Acosta  
Manuel Mejía  
Jeny Narvaez  
Julián Anaguano  
Mariela Aburdi  
Nelson Pariño  
Alberto Toaza  
Fausto Rodríguez  
Carlos Fernández  
Jorge Hidalgo  
Diógenes Arias  
Rosa Cardens  
Fabian Lupera  
Roberto Quintero  
Ivan Cisneros  
Fernando Buendia  
Edwin Tibi  
  
Rodrigo Collaguaso  
Gonzalo Quiroga  
Vicente Naranjo  
Oswaldo Morales

## Appendix 2

INDA	Bolivar Beltran
INDA	Marco Morales
INDA	Roberto Montenegro
INECI Director	Juan Aulestia
Jefatura Política	Santander Quiñonez
Jefe Político	Asunción Andrade
Jefe Político	Joel Pelaéz
Minister of Education	Rosa Maria Torres
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Nina Pacari
Minister of Tourism	Doris Soliz
Ministry of Agriculture	Alejandro Alvarez
Ministry of Agriculture	Alfonso Coello
Ministry of Agriculture	Alfredo Flor
Ministry of Agriculture	Bolivar Sucozhaña
Ministry of Agriculture	Cristobal Romero
Ministry of Agriculture	Jorge Herrera
Ministry of Agriculture	Romulo Núñez
Ministry of Agriculture	Zoila Trujillo
Ministry of Education	Luis Montalvo
Ministry of Education	Manuel Calle
Ministry of Housing	Vinicio Roldán
Ministry of Housing	Gilberto Lema
Ministry of Tourism	Claudia Quishpe
Ministry of Tourism	Susana Oyagala
Ministry of Welfare	Esther Encalada
Ministry of Welfare	José Manuel Vega
Ministry of Welfare	Juan Moreta
Ministry of Welfare	Luis Maldonado
Ministry of Welfare	Vicente Aguilar
Minister of Agriculture	Luis Macas
National Director of Touristic Projects	Miguel Chavalier
National Director of Transit	Arturo Cabrera
ORI	Manuel Duy
ORI	Mario Grefa
ORI	Nelson Uyungura
Pacifictel	Luis Guamán
Petroecuador	Victor Hugo Jijon
Planning Manager (Tourism)	Edgar Pita
Post	Luis Yasaca
Post	Nancy Saquinga
Refinería	Carlos Arias
Regional Agriculture Director	Patricio Bravo
Regional Manager Banco de la Vivienda	Pedro Angumba

Regional Tourism Office  
Secretary of Planning and Social Dialogue  
Technical advisor at the Council of Culture  
Undersecretary of Welfare

María Zenteo  
Augusto Barrera  
Luis Sanchez  
Lourdes Tiban



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## Curriculum Vitae

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In July 2015, Diana graduated *cum laude* with a Master of Science in Political Science from Leiden University. She started her Ph.D. at the Institute of Political Science in March 2016 under the supervision of Prof. dr. Petr Kopecký, Dr. Maria Spirova, and Dr. Frank de Zwart. Diana has presented her research at a number of international conferences. Currently, she is working on turning this dissertation into publications and holds an appointment as a Lecturer from the Institute of Political Science at Leiden University.

2021

