

CHAPTER 3

Secularization Narratives in 1950s Europe

Sources, Characteristics and Effects

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Introduction

What secularization has in common with modernization and democratization is that it is increasingly referred to as a ‘grand’ or ‘master narrative’.¹ The phrase is indicative for a notable change in attitude towards the once near-obvious claim that religion in modern societies is subject to decline. Whereas historians until recently used secularization as an analytical category – writing confidently about the ‘secularization’ of science, education, politics, and so forth – such interpretations are now increasingly becoming an object of study themselves. Secularization, in other words, no longer serves as a lens through which historians write the history of religion, but is subjected to historical analysis itself. Indeed, it is seen as deserving historical attention precisely because it once was a powerful, near-hegemonic way of thinking about the fate of religion in modern societies.

‘Historicizing secularization’ can take different forms, though. Some historians and sociologists focus specifically on secularization theory – that is, the body of sociological theories, models and hypotheses about organized religion in modernizing societies that has collectively become known as the ‘secularization paradigm’. Secularization in this sense thus refers to the work of sociologists such as Bryan R. Wilson, David Martin and Karel

Notes for this section begin on page 94.

Dobbelaere, who during the 1970s successfully promoted the secularization paradigm among sociologists of religion.² Often, though not always, historicizing treatments of these sociologists' work is fuelled by scepticism about the plausibility of their secularization paradigm. In some cases, 'historicizing secularization' even openly serves the goal of relegating a once-powerful sociological paradigm to the realm of past theories and models.³

If 'historicizing secularization' in this first sense is of interest primarily to students of sociology and historians of the social sciences, social and cultural historians engaged in studying 'secularization narratives' usually cast their net much wider. Jeffrey Cox, for instance, argues that secularization was not just a sociological theory, but a word that was on everybody's lips, especially in the decades following the Second World War.⁴ On closer analysis, 'secularization' such as used by politicians, opinion makers and church leaders in these decades often served as shorthand for a 'grand narrative' about the dwindling relevance of organized religion in the lives of Western people since the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution. Its sweeping nature was what distinguished this popular secularization narrative from its sociological namesake, the 'secularization paradigm'. Indeed, when Wilson, Martin and Dobbelaere insisted on 'scientific' data collection and theoretical rigour, they did so precisely in order to dissociate themselves from sweeping, 'unscientific' generalizations about secularization.⁵

Yet 'unscientific' as secularization narratives may have been, they circulated as powerful templates for thinking about organized religion in media, parliaments, churches and trade union rooms throughout the Western world. Well before 'the religious crisis of the 1960s',⁶ these narratives taught people how to think about religion in modernizing societies. By framing their perceptions, secularization narratives not only described a changing reality, but also contributed to religious change, as Sam Brewitt-Taylor argues in an essay on the emergence of 'secularization' in the British media.⁷ For this reason, historians do not simply treat secularization narratives as 'popular' distillations of academic wisdom, or as markers of what Lutz Raphael calls a 'scientification of the social'.⁸ Rather, they study these stories as narrative templates that influenced social relations, political decisions and cultural codes by shaping people's understandings of the past, their perceptions of the present and their expectations for the future.⁹

An important implication of this new research focus is that histories of secularization can no longer be confined to great thinkers and influential books.¹⁰ Secularization narratives circulating outside of the academic realm, in political and civil society contexts such as churches, schools and parliaments, are then at least as interesting as academics talking about secularization. For if secularization narratives helped to shape reality by

framing people's perception of it, then this likely happened especially in settings where declining membership rates called for action, in institutions that wanted, or were expected, to bring their ideological foundations, admission requirements and course curricula 'in tune with the time', and in organizations that felt they had to reinvent themselves in changing religious and political landscapes.¹¹ This is not to say, of course, that philosophers and sociologists are less interesting objects of study than schoolmasters, political executives or clergy members. It is to argue, however, that the impact of secularization narratives can best be traced in realms where religious privileges were being challenged (parliaments), government funding had to be secured (schools), or people had to be prevented from filling out deregistration forms (churches).

Arguably, historians of secularization do not face particular methodological problems in shifting their attention from the academic to the public realm. Given the abundance of religious media in most European and North American countries, they do not have to fear a lack of source material. They do, however, face a challenge when it comes to understanding how secularization narratives could frame people's perceptions of reality, thereby simultaneously constructing and constraining what these people could think, say or do about religion. What features of those narratives contributed to this impact? If historians observe pastors in the 1950s talking about secularization and changing their worship style on Sunday mornings, how can they plausibly connect these observations or, more specifically, establish a causal connection between them? If secularization narratives prompted liturgical revision, how did they do that?

It is here that narrative analysis – the theme of this volume – comes in. Inspired by Hayden White's classic study of historical narratives in nineteenth-century Europe,¹² as well as Daniel Fulda's more recent 'historiographical narratology',¹³ this chapter argues that historians interested in unpacking the 'discursive power' exerted by secularization narratives might want to consider four questions:

- (1) What were the sources on which secularization narratives drew?
- (2) What sort of ideological agendas did they serve?
- (3) What effects did they achieve by narratively framing religious change in terms of secularization?
- (4) What were their 'metahistorical presuppositions about the nature of the historical field',¹⁴ or the assumptions about the nature of historical reality to which they were committed?

In what follows, I will clarify these questions, and illustrate their relevance by zooming in on two examples from 1950s Europe.¹⁵

Historicist Background

The first example comes from Leiden, the historic Dutch university town. Like many other churches in the country, the local Netherlands Reformed congregation – the mainstream Protestant domination, which included about a third of the local population among its members – had witnessed a marked increase in church attendance during the years of the Second World War.¹⁶ By the late 1940s, however, it seemed that urgency had diminished: the pews became emptier again. Worried about the prospect of further decline, the church council began to count, and by 1952 concluded that on average no more than 10 to 15 per cent of its members attended services.¹⁷ The council experienced these statistics as ‘very alarming’.¹⁸ It invited all elders and deacons to a meeting at which the local academy pastor, Klaus Oppenheimer, tried to shed light on the causes of ‘secularization’ – a phrase that by the 1950s had entered the periodical press as a synonym to ‘church attendance decline’.

The lecture given by Oppenheimer, a theologian of German descent who had fled the Nazi regime in 1934, was typical of the genre. In the best tradition of conservative cultural criticism, it held the emergence of a ‘mass society’ in nineteenth-century Europe as well as the rise of ‘materialist’ philosophies of life responsible for a rapidly growing spiritual vacuum. Like many other early commentators on secularization, Oppenheimer believed that philosophers and scientists had played an influential role in marginalizing Christian religion. By studying the world ‘as if God did not exist’ (*etsi deus non daretur*), they had propagated worldviews that left God out of the picture. Finally, Oppenheimer also pointed to the church’s neglect in responding effectively to external challenges: it had overall failed to recognize the social and intellectual needs of the present.¹⁹ Presumably, this fourfold diagnosis did not fill the church council with hope. If Oppenheimer was right, most of the factors causing secularization were beyond its reach of influence. This may explain why the council felt it could do nothing more than distribute a leaflet among all registered church members in Leiden, summoning them in passionate prose not to be absent ‘on the roll-call that is held every Sunday’.²⁰

If Oppenheimer’s story of increasing ‘materialism’, ‘mass society’ and ‘unbelief’ provides a classic example of a secularization narrative, what then were the sources from which Oppenheimer derived the template for his story? The author revealed his principal source in concluding that the four factors just mentioned had brought about ‘a new type of human being that has no memories of the God who has revealed himself in Jesus Christ and lives in a world utterly different from ours’. Oppenheimer continued:

This man has little knowledge, little memory, his mentality is materialistic. His intellect is poor. His ability for listening, attention, interest, contemplation, reflection is shrivelling . . . 'He no longer knows the depths of the spirit, of love, and of God's holiness'. . . With an eye to this man, the German theologian Bonhoeffer has argued that we now enter a 'religionless age' (*religionsloses Zeitalter*) . . . With an eye to him, Prof. Hoekendijk argues in his recent article on mission . . . that we live in a post-age, in the age of the emergence of the 'fourth man', who is post-Christian, post-ecclesial, post-bourgeois, and post-personal . . . Here we find the real cause of non-attendance, the decline in church attendance also in our congregation.²¹

Apparently, it was Johan Christiaan Hoekendijk, the newly appointed professor of Biblical theology, missionary work and practical theology at Utrecht University, who had been Oppenheimer's guide. Just a few months earlier, Hoekendijk had created a minor stir among theologians with an article that had radicalized the genre of secularization narratives to a hitherto unprecedented degree. Its key protagonist was the 'fourth man', or the average postwar industrial worker in a large, anonymous city, who had little-to-no affinity with traditionally bourgeois-oriented religious institutions. In Hoekendijk's portrayal, this was not a man who read books, cared about his children being baptized, or thought about eternal joy or woe. The 'fourth man' rather cared about his pay slip, the latest movies and the hours still separating him from the weekend. The 'fourth man', in other words, was not a 'personality' in a middle-class sense of the word – which explains why he was called by a number instead of a name. If the church was going to have a future, Hoekendijk added, it would have to adjust itself to this new sort of human being by abandoning its middle-class language, practices and attitudes.²²

Hoekendijk in turn had not himself invented the 'fourth man' image: he had borrowed it from Alfred Weber, the German sociologist cum philosopher of history who had depicted the history of humanity as divided in four evolutionary stages.²³ The details of Weber's periodization need concern us less than the historicist background of his argument. If historicism, in Friedrich Meinecke's classic definition, denotes a combination of 'development' and 'individuality' as key categories for conceptualizing change over time, then Weber's 'fourth man' was not only a typical product of conservative cultural criticism in Weimar Germany, but also a historicist construct.²⁴ More precisely, it was indebted to a historicist conception of history as a continuous course of development in which 'ages', characterized by distinct 'spirits' or 'ideas', could be distinguished.

Does this imply that Oppenheimer, the Leiden academy pastor, offered an analysis of secularization premised on historicist assumptions? This conclusion is less surprising than it may seem. Fuelled by experiences of war and postwar reconstruction, the 1950s was a decade that witnessed numerous

attempts at historicizing the present. Economists, political theorists and theologians alike searched for concepts to grasp what was new and distinctive about their situation. Viewed with hindsight, it is striking how many of these 1950s thinkers drew on historicist repertoires in characterizing their 'age' or 'era' as a 'phrase' or 'stage' in a linear course of 'development'. This is particularly apparent from the popularity of 'post' prefixes, as in 'post-capitalism',²⁵ 'post-industrial'²⁶ and 'post-traditional'.²⁷ Christian thinkers, likewise, began to designate their era as 'post-Christian'.²⁸ Although not all 'post' prefixes presupposed such full-fledged philosophies of history as Weber's, their portrayal of societal change in terms of successive stages characterized by distinct ideas or mentalities illustrates the enduring influence of historicist categories of thought, even after the so-called 'crisis of historicism'.²⁹

Ideological Implications

If Oppenheimer's example offers us a glimpse on the historicist background of secularization narratives in 1950s Europe (our first question), the ideological agendas underlying the genre as well as their impact on civil society agents (our questions two and three) can be illustrated with an example from 1950s Sheffield. Located in England's industrial north, Sheffield was home to a missionary initiative by the Church of England aimed at sharing the Gospel with steel industry workers who in large numbers had become alienated from the church. Known as the Sheffield Industrial Mission, this initiative was led by a chaplain who, not coincidentally, also became a founding father of secularization studies in the United Kingdom: Edward Ralph Wickham. As Hugh McLeod³⁰ and Callum Brown³¹ have argued, Wickham's *Church and People in an Industrial City*³² became a foundational text for an entire generation of historians and sociologists of religion, mainly because it offered a framework for historical analysis of religious affiliation that was as bold and sweeping as it was stimulating and thought-provoking.

Wickham's framework took the form of a narrative of decline: it described the history of Christianity in Great Britain between 1800 and 1950 in terms of 'general overall decline of church-going'.³³ This narrative framework was not especially new: declining religiosity, especially in urban contexts, had been a rhetorical commonplace among eighteenth-century revivalist preachers and nineteenth-century clergy alike. Arguably, this helps to explain the success of Wickham's book. It became a landmark study, not because its narrative organization was innovative, but because it corroborated stereotypical views of religious decline with quantitative data, largely derived from nineteenth-century church statistics. In Brown's summary

description, Wickham's achievement was that he cemented 'the clerical myth of the unholy city, and of the irreligious working classes in particular', into modern scholarship.³⁴

What Wickham himself considered more important, however, was that his study of ever-growing non-affiliation provided seemingly solid historical justification for the missionary programme that he was carrying out in Sheffield. Tellingly, *Church and People in an Industrial City* concluded with a lengthy chapter on 'The Mission of the Church in an Industrial Society', in which Wickham explained what lessons could be drawn from his story:

[I]t suggests that the Church should be willing to submit herself to radical sociological self-examination, and take the conclusion into account for her own self-understanding and in the planning of her mission . . . For if there are sociological and conditioning factors intimately related to the likelihood or otherwise of man's belief in the Gospel, if some environments make response more probable and others more improbable, then it follows as night follows day that the Church must be acutely concerned with those conditioning factors, from the point of view of her missionary task.³⁵

Concretely, this meant that the church had to be present in factories and shops, and to support trade unions' fights for improvement of working conditions. It had to break down cultural barriers by exchanging the antiquated spaces of its classic church buildings for canteens and sports fields and by translating superannuated concepts like 'sin' into modern categories of 'guilt' and 'alienation' (key terms in the quasi-existentialist vocabulary of Wickham's liberal theological hero, Paul Tillich). On top of this, Wickham suggested that the church had to abandon its classic parochial structure in favour of more flexible networks, and to supplement traditional full-time clergy with lay preachers modelled on the French worker-priest (*prêtre ouvrier*) as well as with lay theologians, 'men of wisdom and good counsel who know the social temperature and have a finger on the social pulse'.³⁶

Secularization narratives, in other words, were not without consequences. Even more explicitly than Oppenheimer, Wickham assumed the subject position of a medical specialist whose diagnosis and treatment plan were based at least in part on a patient's case history. For both men, indeed, secularization narratives served as medical histories culminating in diagnosis and concrete suggestions for medical treatment. As Wickham put it:

[T]he disease is apparent; and only by understanding the history of the patient, how she got into this condition, and by a renewed understanding of her true function, can she be brought to health . . . The history of the case from the beginnings of industrialization is not good, but sound analysis suggests some surgical operations that are desperately urgent, the mental outlook if the patient is to be whole and function aright, and the tough environment she must adapt herself to if she is to regain her youth and escape the peaceful obscurity of old age.³⁷

In White's vocabulary, this is to say that secularization narratives were not only charged with 'ideological implications', but also (in some cases, at least) explicitly constructed with the aim of furthering reformist church-political agendas. Christian Smith is therefore right to draw attention to the political agendas implied in 'secularization' as an analytical category.³⁸ In mid-twentieth-century Europe, 'secularization' was a grand narrative told in answer to a question that was on the mind of growing numbers of church members: What can we do to counter church attendance decline? The felt urgency of this 'highly practical'³⁹ question explains why secularization narratives found a ready reception among clergy in 1950s Europe, and why both Protestant and Catholic churches at the time invested heavily in sociological analysis of the sort recommended by Wickham.⁴⁰

There was no contradiction, then, between Wickham browsing through nineteenth-century clippings in the Local History Department of Sheffield City Library or spending a sabbatical at the University of Sheffield to write a historical monograph and this same Wickham visiting factory workers around lunchtime and eating sandwiches while talking informally about 'the basic questions of existence' (a Tillichian phrase again). The missionary practices that gained Wickham's Sheffield Industrial Mission a reputation well beyond England⁴¹ grew out of, and were justified by, the secularization story told in *Church and People in an Industrial City*.⁴²

Metahistorical Assumptions

Neither Wickham's secularization narrative nor its practical implications for missionary work in Sheffield went unchallenged. Oppenheimer's 'fourth man' narrative also elicited critical response from theologians in the Netherlands Reformed Church. Interestingly, this criticism did not focus exclusively on policy issues like the extent to which film was an effective tool for evangelism, but raised more fundamental questions pertaining to the sort of 'realism' propagated by secularization narratives. This is to say, in White's terminology, that critics did not merely challenge plots, modes of argument, and ideological implications, but also, at a more penetrating level, metahistorical 'conceptions of the historical process', or assumptions about what history essentially is (a story of progress or just 'one damn thing after another?'), what sort of 'facts' and 'actors' are involved in it (can angels or devils be attributed with historical agency?), and, by implication, what counts as appropriate historical reasoning.⁴³

In the Netherlands, this type of criticism was voiced most strongly by the director of the Netherlands Reformed theological seminary, Hendrik Berkhof. Inspired by the dialectical theological movement that he had

encountered as a visiting student in 1930s Berlin – theologians like Karl Barth criticizing the Lutheran Church for sacrificing Christian faithfulness to cultural relevance and political conformism – Berkhof was suspicious of what Barth, in the second edition of his *Römerbrief*,⁴⁴ had called the ‘historicism’ and ‘psychologism’ of modern liberal theology. These labels referred to historical and psychological modes of thinking about God that, in Barth’s critical assessment, illustrated the all-too-human temptation to domesticate God into familiar categories of analysis.⁴⁵ If Berkhof, in response to Hoekendijk’s ‘fourth man’, complained about a ‘sociologism’ or ‘sociological myth’ permeating the 1950s Netherlands Reformed Church, this Barthian background helps to elucidate the target of his criticism. Berkhof was not afraid of sociologists, but sceptical of colleagues whose assessment of the church’s situation showed a greater faith in sociological analysis than in God, who cares for his church until the end of time. More specifically, Berkhof asked rhetorically how theologically sound was the worry about ‘marginalization’ of the church, which virtually all secularization narratives implied. Was there any reason for assuming that God preferred churches packed with name-Christians over small groups of people entrusting their lives to God? Consequently, was there any reason for looking back nostalgically to a supposedly golden age of faith in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, compared to which the present was inevitably found wanting?⁴⁶

About a decade later, similar questions were raised by Michael J. Jackson, Wickham’s successor as senior chaplain of the Sheffield Industrial Mission. Although Jackson had initially been a loyal disciple of Wickham, he underwent something like a theological conversion in the mid-1960s, which turned him into a sharp critic of the ‘Pelagianism’ that he detected in Wickham’s missionary approach (‘We are saved by our own efforts’). Not unlike Berkhof, Jackson questioned the metahistorical view underlying secularization narratives: ‘a view of history which sees the Church as an institution failing and receding since the Industrial Revolution’. He objected that this failure was measured against a quantitative standard that the church would do better not to accept as its own. For what really matters, from a theological perspective, is faithfulness to God; numerical success is secondary at best. Using church attendance as a marker of church vitality therefore amounts to distorting the Gospel, which in turn runs a risk of producing ‘a distorted Church or an organization where priorities are wrong or false purposes are served’.⁴⁷ Even more devastating was Jackson’s judgement about Wickham’s argument that ‘God’, ‘sin’ and ‘resurrection’ had to be translated into a modern idiom to be accessible to ‘modern man’. Jackson called this ‘dangerous nonsense’: it would warrant relegating God as revealed in Jesus Christ to a prehistoric phase of modern religiosity. Would such a religion still qualify as Christian?⁴⁸

Both critics, then, objected to what one might call the discursive power of secularization narratives. They did not care primarily about issues of historical accuracy – although Berkhof, a church historian by training, could not resist pointing out the danger of a presentist misreading of the historical record⁴⁹ – but about the genre’s normative assumptions (what are the church’s performance standards?) and the kinds of agency for which it allowed (was there any acknowledgment of God who cares for his church?). Their fear was that secularization narratives contributed to a ‘sociological’ understanding of the church, with the adjective serving as an equivalent to ‘empirical’, ‘horizontal’ or ‘excluding God’. Consequently, in their perception, secularization narratives were themselves secularized: they offered secular history instead of theologically informed accounts of the church’s pilgrimage through time.⁵⁰ This explains why the two critics were particularly worried about the influence that secularization narratives exerted in the church, and why both drew special attention to the spread of such narratives through widely read church periodicals and seemingly attractive missionary experiments.⁵¹

Conclusion

What does an historicization of secularization entail? Drawing on two examples from 1950s Europe, this chapter has argued that secularization was a narrative template that circulated not only among academics, but also among civil society agents who reflected with greater or lesser degrees of concern on the fate of religious institutions (churches, Christian schools, confessional parties) in cultural settings perceived as disadvantageous to their survival. The more historians trace the spread and use of secularization narratives outside the academic sphere in which such narratives have traditionally been studied, the more it becomes apparent that secularization stories were deeply embedded in contexts of religious and political disputes over the future of church and society.⁵² They served as means for analysis, as frames of reference, and as guides to action for people who sought to understand the past in order to shape the future.

This is why, for historians, the ideological implications of secularization narratives are especially relevant. If ‘secularization is not a *zeitgeist* but a process of conflict’,⁵³ ‘carried by some social actors and resisted by others’,⁵⁴ then historians may commit themselves to what Philip Gorski calls a ‘sociopolitical conflict model’⁵⁵ for understanding secularization. This model revolves around such questions as those raised by Christian Smith:

How did the activists define and interpret the existence of a problem that demanded action and change to remedy? How did they diagnose the sources of

that problem and define a prognosis that promised to solve it? How did actors in the struggle work to legitimate their framing of reality and to undermine their opponents' framings?⁵⁶

In addition, this chapter has proposed to focus research attention on the sources and effects of secularization narratives. In doing so, it has focused in particular on their metahistorical assumptions. These presuppositions regarding the nature of history turned out to be indebted to a historicist understanding of 'development' and 'individuality', especially in so far as secularization narratives depicted the present 'era' as a stage in a series of successive 'ages'. This historicist logic in turn allowed progressive pastors to argue that the church was 'out of tune' with the 'spirit of the age' and therefore needed radical reform. Also, it was this historicist account of history that most disturbed critics such as Berkhof and Jackson, with the effect that 1950s controversies over secularization were often inseparable from controversies over the 'nature' and 'meaning' of history. One might argue, therefore, that both the characteristics and the effects of secularization narratives in 1950s Europe were shaped by the historicist sources on which they drew.

This, finally, opens up a question that historians have not yet systematically pursued: how did historicist-inspired secularization narratives relate to other grand narratives with historicist underpinnings circulating in post-Second World War societies? Secularization belonged to a class of process terms that also included 'rationalization', 'individualization', 'bureaucratization' and, especially, 'modernization'.⁵⁷ Although it has been argued that historicism as defined in this chapter had disappeared by the end of the First World War,⁵⁸ many of these mutually dependent and mutually reinforcing categories actually drew on a historicist understanding of history as a linear and irreversible process of development that could be delineated into distinct stages.⁵⁹ This entanglement with other powerful process terms may help to explain the cultural power of secularization narratives, but also raises a follow-up question: Can modernization or individualization be analysed in the same way that this chapter has analysed secularization? And, if so, then to what extent did the sources, ideological agendas and metahistorical presuppositions of these grand narratives strengthen or modify each other? Perhaps the time has come for writing an entangled history of grand narratives circulating in post-Second World War Europe.

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Notes

1. Cox, 'Secularization'; Cox, 'Master Narratives'; Nash, 'Reconnecting Religion'; Borutta, 'Genealogie der Säkularisierungstheorie'; Clark, 'Secularization and Modernization'.
2. Tschannen, *Les theories de la sécularisation*.
3. Borutta, 'Genealogie der Säkularisierungstheorie'.
4. Cox, 'Secularization'.
5. Paul, *Secularisatie*, 71–91.
6. McLeod, *Religious Crisis*.
7. Brewitt-Taylor, 'Invention'.
8. Raphael, 'Verwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen'.
9. Paul, *Secularisatie*; Harrison, 'Introduction'; Hunter, 'Process, Program, and Historiography'; Morris, 'Strange Death'; Morris, 'Secularization'.
10. As is still the case in Swatos and Olson, *Secularization Debate*; Taylor, *Secular Age*; and Weyns, *Gedoofde kaarsen*.
11. Paul, 'Erfenis van Wickham'; Smith, 'Introduction'.
12. White, *Metahistory*.
13. Fulda, 'Historiographic Narration'.
14. White, *Metahistory*, 13.
15. This chapter draws and expands on Paul, 'Erfenis van Wickham'; and Paul, 'Sociological Myth'.
16. Kloek, 'Kerkbezoek 1952'; Vossers, 'Uit de gemeente'.
17. Vossers, 'Uit de gemeente'.
18. N.N., 'Uit de gemeente'.
19. Oppenheimer, 'Oorzaken der onkerkelijkheid' [parts 1 and 2].
20. N.N., 'Hervormde lidmaten krijgen folder over kerkbezoek'.
21. Oppenheimer, 'Oorzaken der onkerkelijkheid' [part 2], 2.
22. Hoekendijk, 'Rondom het apostolaat'.
23. Weber, *Kulturgeschichte als Kultursoziologie*; Weber, *Dritte oder der vierte Mensch*.
24. Meinecke, *Entstehung des Historismus*.
25. Dahrendorf, *Soziale Klassen*.
26. Riesman, 'Leisure and Work'.
27. Rostow, *Stages of Economic Growth*.
28. Petras, *Post Christum*; Ehrenberg, 'Nazi Religion'; Ehrenberg, 'Totalitarian World Revolution'; Demant, 'Christianity and Civilization'; Toynbee, 'Christianity and Civilization'; Toynbee, 'World and the West'; Lewis, *De Descriptione Temporum*; Vahanian, 'Post-Christian Era'.
29. Hunter, 'Secularization: The Birth'; Paul, *Secularisatie*.
30. McLeod, *Religion and the Working Class*; McLeod, *Religion and Irreligion*.
31. Brown, *Death of Christian Britain*; Brown, *Religion and Society*.
32. Wickham, *Church and People*.
33. *Ibid.*, 171.
34. Brown, *Death of Christian Britain*, 27.
35. Wickham, *Church and People*, 220.
36. *Ibid.*, 261.
37. *Ibid.*, 13.

38. Smith, 'Introduction', 1–96.
39. Wickham, *Church and People*, 7.
40. Ziemann, *Katholische Kirche*; Ziemann, 'Practical Sociologist'; Dols, *Fact Factory*; Dols, 'Of Religious Diseases'; Dols and Paul, *Pastoral Sociology*; Mittmann, 'Lasting Impact'; Morris, 'Enemy Within?'
41. Bagshaw, *Church beyond the Church*; Mantle, *Working-Class Priests*; McFarland and Johnston, 'Faith in the Factory'.
42. Although *Church and People in an Industrial City* did not yet use the word 'secularization', Wickham would appropriate it as a key term in subsequent publications: Wickham, 'What Should Be the New Look'.
43. White, *Metahistory*, 2.
44. Barth, *Römerbrief*.
45. McCormack, *Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology*, 248–49.
46. Berkhof, 'Tegen de bierkaai?'
47. Jackson, 'No New Gospel', 543.
48. *Ibid.*, 541, 543.
49. Berkhof, 'Tegen de bierkaai?', 38, 53–54.
50. *Ibid.*, 71–72.
51. Jackson, *Sociology of Religion*, 176–202.
52. Hunter, 'Secularization'; Hunter, 'Secularisation'.
53. Collins, *Sociology of Philosophies*, 595.
54. Chaves, 'Secularization', 752.
55. Gorski, 'Historicizing the Secularization Debate', 115–19.
56. Smith, 'Introduction', 31.
57. Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future*; Engerman et al., *Staging Growth*.
58. Bevir, 'Historicism'.
59. Joas, 'Gefährliche Prozessbegriffe'; Krech, 'Über Sinn und Unsinn'.

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