



Universiteit  
Leiden  
The Netherlands

## **Bureaucratic politics in neopatrimonial settings: types of appointment and their implications in Ghana**

Abubakar, A.

### **Citation**

Abubakar, A. (2021, May 18). *Bureaucratic politics in neopatrimonial settings: types of appointment and their implications in Ghana*. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3176462>

Version: Publisher's Version

License: [Licence agreement concerning inclusion of doctoral thesis in the Institutional Repository of the University of Leiden](#)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3176462>

**Note:** To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Cover Page



Universiteit Leiden



The handle <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3176462> holds various files of this Leiden University dissertation.

**Author:** Abubakar, A.

**Title:** Bureaucratic politics in neopatrimonial settings: types of appointment and their implications in Ghana

**Issue Date:** 2021-05-18

PROPOSITIONS  
Accompanying the thesis

**BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS IN NEO-PATRIMONIAL SETTINGS: TYPES  
OF APPOINTMENT AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS IN GHANA**

1. The questions of how bureaucrats are appointed into the bureaucracy and to what effect have long attracted significant interest among scholars and policy-makers; yet, scholarship has not settled this puzzle in neo-patrimonial settings such as Ghana.
2. The effects of meritocracy in emerging democracies and authoritarian regimes are not necessarily dissimilar because, as this study suggests, principals have extensive discretionary controls over bureaucrats' careers in both regimes.
3. In neo-patrimonial contexts, patronage appointments shape the loyalty of bureaucrats' who are needed by principals to prosecute their interests within the bureaucracy.
4. Elite-principals use their influences over bureaucrats within the civil service environment to manipulate them in ways that can be both positive and negative.
5. Even though merit-based appointment process shapes the amount of autonomy exercised by bureaucrats its impact is weak; hence, the amount of autonomy exercised by merit appointees in Ghana is considerably limited.
6. Even though patronage bureaucrats are theoretically expected to be loyal to their patrons, evidence from this research suggests that such loyalties are not absolute due to factors such as legal restrictions and competing interests.
7. In this study, whereas both personal connections and political considerations have been confirmed as factors to measure patronage, the factor of ethnicity has been modestly disputed.
8. Hybrid appointees do not only shape bureaucratic responsiveness and efficiency, they also enhance accountability through sensitivity to their principals' interests.
9. Patronage appointees demonstrate more loyal attitudes and behaviour to their principals when compared with merit appointees; and display similar levels of responsiveness when compared to hybrid appointees but lower levels of autonomy when compared with merit appointees.
10. Combining perceptual instruments with real-life/personal circumstances of respondents to elicit primary data is fitting when measuring bureaucrats' attitudes and behavior.
11. The view that dispensing political patronage within bureaucracies is ubiquitously injurious to bureaucratic performance is a fallacy.
12. Bureaucrats signaling policy preference can influence the decision of politicians and the public.