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Bureaucratic politics in neopatrimonial settings: types of appointment and their implications in Ghana

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**BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS IN NEOPATRIMONIAL SETTINGS: TYPES OF
APPOINTMENT AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS IN GHANA**

Proefschrift

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de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,
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DEDICATION

This thesis is especially dedicated to the memory of my late parents, Sheikh Abubakar Iddris Abdallah (Afa Abu) and Ruhiya Abubakar Ibrahim, for their inspiration. Without them, there is no way I would have succeeded in my academic pursuits. My late father, affectionately called *Afa Abu*, was more than a blessing as he pushed and supported me to pursue higher education despite a series of challenges. Indeed, he was my pillar. Pursuing a PhD was all he ever wanted for me, and throughout this journey, his memory and desire to see me acquire a PhD were the motivation that kept me going.

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SUMMARY

A compelling number of consequential dynamics within the civil service are perceived to fundamentally underpin the attitudes and behaviour of bureaucrats, and this remains vital within the arena of bureaucratic politics, the concern of this study. Most extant bureaucratic studies or literature usually addresses subjects related to the incidence of patronage, the merit-principle, complementarity and bureaucratic reform or efficiency, etc. While there exist abundant scholarly discussions usually focused on these subjects, there remain some critical gaps. One of such gaps is related to a comprehensive inquiry into the consequences of types of bureaucrats' appointments. To close this gap, this study sought to ascertain the implications of types of bureaucrats' appointments on the attitude and behaviour of civil servants. Precisely, this study's omnibus hypothesis stipulates that the type of bureaucrats' appointment in the civil service shapes attitudes and behaviour.

To empirically test this argument, the study methodologically adopts a mixed-method approach and combines data from a survey of bureaucrats (N=274) with qualitative in-depth interviews with bureaucrats, principals, development practitioners and experts within and without the bureaucracy. This was aimed at establishing the extent to which bureaucrats' type of appointment influences their attitude and behaviour. Specifically, the study sought to determine whether bureaucrats appointed through merit demonstrate more autonomous attitudes in the bureaucracy; patronage-based appointees exhibit more loyalty to their patrons and hybrid appointed bureaucrats, more responsiveness? Answers to these questions were aimed at appreciating the influence of the type of bureaucrats' appointment on their attitudes and behaviour within the bureaucracy.

The results of the analyses conducted in this study showed a positive association between merit-based appointees and bureaucratic autonomy, thus supporting our initial hypothesis. The findings, however, seem to impugn mainstream discourses regarding the

underlying impact of the merit processes on bureaucrats' autonomy. In general, there has been a tendency of both academics and policy-makers to assume that merit-based appointments considerably guarantee autonomous attitudes and behaviour. However, the findings of this study show that regardless of how meritoriously a bureaucrat is appointed, his/her autonomy is limited due to a myriad of conflating factors espoused in this thesis.

Secondly, the study found that patronage-based appointments were positively associated with a bureaucrats' sense of loyalty whilst hybrid appointments were found to be positively associated with responsiveness. Indeed, whilst the general theoretical predictions are that patronage considerations considerably impact loyalty and responsiveness, the findings of this research suggest that such loyalties or political responsiveness are not absolute, due to other regulatory mechanisms such as legal, constitutional, administrative fiats and competing interests. Furthermore, these findings support the class of scholars who call into question the orthodox view in bureaucratic politics that patronage is automatically negative because this study finds otherwise. The study's findings consequently add to discussions on the need to consider not only the extent to which patronage is dispensed but where, how, why and under what circumstances it is deployed. In doing so, the study moves beyond the monistic conception of patronage as being negative to encompass its beneficial outcomes as argued by Grindle (2012), McDonnell (2017) and Toral (2019).

On the extent to which demographical variables such as gender, age, type of institution and level of appointment impact autonomy, loyalty and responsiveness, the various hierarchical linear regressions conducted reveal that only level of appointment and type of bureaucratic institution were found to be significantly impactful to autonomy and loyalty respectively. Besides, the key interviews conducted among purposively selected stakeholders such as politicians, experts, academics and bureaucrats complemented the findings from the quantitative analysis, especially regarding the extent of bureaucrats' autonomy, loyalty and responsiveness. Regarding the role of networks (social, political and economic) in impacting

bureaucrats' attitudes and behaviour, the study found that the networks that bureaucrats belong to have appreciable levels of influence over their attitudes and behaviour. These findings have wider ramifications for the country since all government development agenda are contingent on the attitudes and behaviour of bureaucrats who are tasked with their efficient and responsive implementation.

The autonomy of bureaucrats may insulate the civil service from parochial or political interests whilst bureaucratic loyalty when harnessed appropriately, may also lead to the effective implementation of the principal's agenda even in the face of impediments. As cited in this thesis, Rasul & Rogger (2013) and Rasul, Rogger & Williams (2017) found that allowing greater bureaucratic autonomy positively impacts bureaucrats' attitudes and efficiency than strict monitoring and provision of incentives. Similarly, high levels of bureaucrats' responsiveness enhance efficiency. In contrast, a completely subjugated bureaucrat, through patronage – loyalty arrangements, may exacerbate bureaucratic deficiencies and corruption which would have negative implications for service delivery and development programmes.

In the end, by way of reform, the study proposes the need to consider legal-constitutional and policy measures or amendments that would formally accommodate appointment practices that go beyond the merit-principle or regime to include patronage or hybrid considerations. This study supports Grindle (2012), McDonnell (2017) and Toral's (2019) argument that when harnessed appropriately, patronage can be beneficial to enhancing bureaucratic efficiency. Given the current political and bureaucratic dynamics and reconciling it with the findings of this study, it is concluded that if the Ghanaian bureaucratic system continues to insist on pure merit-based appointments devoid of patronage considerations, such a regime will remain utopian and less expedient. Therefore, political principals and policy-makers may have to exercise caution by re-examining the repercussions of stipulating only a merit appointment regime at the theoretical level whilst at the practical level, patronage factors pervasively play key roles through subtle and overt backdoor schemes.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- **ARPS-** Aborigines Rights Protection Society
- **CAGD-** Controller and Accountant General's Department
- **CEO-** Chief Executive Officers
- **CD-** Chief Director
- **CPP-** Convention Peoples Party
- **CSSPS-** Computerized School Selection Placement System
- **D.G-** Director-General.
- **EC-** Electoral Commission
- **EFSHSP-** Emergency Free Senior High School Projects
- **FSHS-** Free Senior High School
- **GEA-** Ghana Employers' Association
- **GRA-** Ghana Revenue Authority
- **GSS-** Ghana Statistical Service
- **GWCL-** Ghana Water Company Limited
- **IDEG-** Institute for Democratic Governance
- **IMF-** International Monetary Fund
- **LGBT-** Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transvestite
- **MD-** Managing Director
- **MMDA-** Metropolitan Municipal and District Assemblies
- **MOC-** Ministry of Communication
- **MOE-** Ministry of Education
- **MOF-** Ministry of Finance
- **MOH-** Ministry of Health
- **MP-** Member of Parliament
- **MLNR-** Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources
- **MLGRD-** Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development
- **NAL-** National Alliance of Liberals
- **NCA-** National Communication Authority
- **NCBWA-** National Congress of British West Africa
- **NDC-** National Democratic Congress
- **NLC-** National Liberation Council

- **NPP**- New Patriotic Party
- **NPM**- New Public Management
- **NRC**- National Redemption Council
- **NYEP**- National Youth Employment Programme
- **OEQ**- Own Educational Qualification
- **OGM**- Own General Merit
- **OGP**- Own General Patronage
- **OHCS**- Office of the Head of Civil Service
- **OPE**- Own Pass-work Experience
- **PAT**- Principal-Agent Theory
- **PCEQ**- Perception of Civil Servant's Colleagues' Educational Qualification
- **PCPE**- Perception of Civil Servant's Colleagues' Pass-work Experience
- **PCT**- Public Choice Theory
- **PDC**- People Defence Committee
- **PFP**- Popular Front Party
- **PGM**- Perception of General Merit
- **PGP**- Perception of General Patronage
- **PNDC**-Provision National Defence Council
- **PNP**- Peoples National Party
- **PPA**- Public Procurement Authority
- **PSC**- Public Services Commission
- **PSM**- Public Service Motivation
- **PS**- Principal Secretaries
- **PTA**- Presidential Transition Act
- **QOG**- Quality of Governance
- **SHSIP**- Senior High School Intervention Projects
- **SMC**- Supreme Military Council
- **SSA**- Sub-Saharan Africa
- **TDL**- Talent Discovery Limited
- **TUC**- Trades Union Congress
- **UG**- University of Ghana
- **UP**- United Party

- **UGCC**-United Gold Coast Convention
- **WB**- World Bank
- **WDC**- Workers Defence Committee
- **YEA**- Youth Employment Agency

DECLARATION

No part of this thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification in this or any other university.

Signed

Abdul-Nasir Abubakar

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CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

What is more complex is how the civil servant is expected to accommodate the changes created by regular movements in political leadership...There is no doubt a natural conflict of interest, created particularly in our local setting where divergent opinion is seen as anti-government. Compliance with the policies of a particular government or politician also creates a delicate situation for most civil servants, particularly the senior ones as such work ethic is misconstrued as allegiance to a particular political grouping. Ironically the civil servant is expected to show unfettered allegiance to all governments. The existing bureaucracy within the civil service structure is also perceived as deliberate delay tactics and frowned upon by politicians. (Speech delivered by former President J.J Rawlings at the Quadrennial National Delegates Congress of the Civil and Local Government Staff Association in Cape Coast, Wednesday, January 12, 2011).

Reference is made to a sunny but regular day of July 27, 2019, making good on my routine, I logged onto *myjoyonline.com*, a leading online news portal in Ghana, to apprise myself with the latest news bulletin only to notice an intriguing banner headline: “*Management, political interference leading to revenue loss – Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA) Workers Cry*”. The main contents of this news item revealed that middle and lower bureaucrats of the main revenue collecting body of Ghana, the GRA, as part of their labour union activities, held a staff durbar where the media were invited to shine a light on what they perceived as the irregular appointment of personnel whose competence is in doubt due to their poor performance. These bureaucrats bemoaned the irregular processes used in appointing those (political) bureaucrats; this created enmity among staff, especially since these appointees, in turn, appoint their cohorts as clearing agents who mostly exploit loopholes in the *exemptions regime* to clear goods at Ghana’s ports.

According to the staff, this situation breeds conflict of interests since those who secure their appointments on a silver platter “think that they should help or work for their godfathers or

superiors at the detriment of the state”. In this bulletin, the secretary of the national union of GRA Workers, Mr. Ken Tweneboa-Kodua revealed that they were poised in sending notices to the political class to put a stop to the practice of ordering (political) bureaucrats to discharge and release impounded contraband goods, failing of which “we will name and shame those who engage in excess political interference in our work.” The cry of the GRA worker’s union was only one of many similar predicaments in the complex politico-administrative context within which Ghanaian bureaucrats operate – an environment which pits them against reconciling various levels of interests, i.e. national interest, political interest and/or personal interest.

Earlier, the country rose to a different broadcast of a game-changing publication widely reported in the Ghanaian media on June 24, 2019, regarding a Supreme Court (SC) ruling. The ruling emanated from a case initiated by a private citizen, Mr Theophilus Donkor and his counsel, Mr Godwin Edudzi Tamakloe on January 4, 2017, regarding the dismissal/reassignment of all public Chief Executive Officers (C.E.O.), Director-Generals (DG) and some Chief Directors (CD) by the ruling government after they won elections in 2016, in accordance with the Presidential Transition Act (PTA) of 2012 (Act 845 amended in 2016). The bulletin specified that the ruling of the SC repealed section 14 of the PTA which requires “Chief Executives or Director-Generals (however described) of public boards or corporations to cease to hold office upon the assumption of office by a person elected as president of the Republic of Ghana, the same is hereby declared to be unconstitutional and void for being in contravention of articles 190 and 191 of the Constitution.”

The ruling held that the practice whereby top bureaucratic principals such as CEOs are asked “to step aside during a change of government was unconstitutional” and that “per Article 190 Clause 1(b) of the 1992 Constitution, public corporations were part of the public services of Ghana and, therefore, such persons were bureaucrats whose appointments were protected by the constitution.” It also held that the appointment of such bureaucrats was governed by article 195 of the constitution and their “removal must, therefore, be done per the terms and conditions of their

contract of engagement, or it must be justified, as stipulated in Article 191 (b) of the constitution.” These two instances within an epoch of two months (June and July, 2019) changed the dynamics of discussions within the Ghanaian public service arena regarding the conduct of bureaucrats in Ghana and, equally, generated interesting debates and discourses concerning the relationship between political principals and bureaucrats.

As the saying goes, “a problem identified is half-solved”, the above-cited examples illustrate part of the compelling context and dynamics which inform the choice of this study in Ghana. That is, to investigate the politics of bureaucratic appointments in Ghana by focusing on the type of civil servants’ appointments (patronage, merit, hybrid) and its consequences on civil servants’ attitudes and behaviour in the bureaucracy. Some scholars argue that as the executing agents, civil servants are expected to faithfully and zealously pursue the interests and agenda of their principals as long as they remain at post (Levitan, 1942; Gupta, 2001; Bryner, 2003; Dunn, 2004; Hill, 2005). As succinctly stated by Levitan (1942: 14), a civil servant has a “basic requirement of loyalty to a superior and... in a democracy, an additional obligation of loyalty... to the majority decision.”

However, this argument is contested by other scholars since the nature of the relationship between political principals (agenda-setters) and civil servants (agenda-implementers) has been a subject of considerable debate in bureaucratic studies (Poocharoen, 2012). The Wilsonian thesis on the subject-matter is seminal for this debate. Its long-held contention was that administration as a discipline is distinct from politics: “the field of administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics...; administrative questions are not political questions” (Wilson, 1887: 18). Weber (1968) also argued for a dichotomy between politics and the bureaucracy, albeit in a reverse direction of Wilson. This is because Weber argued that politicians are incapable of curtailng bureaucratic power, for which reason he insisted that it was essential that bureaucracy and politics are dichotomised (Weber, 1919; 1968).

However, an equally distinct but influential class of scholars argued that it is not practicable to separate the bureaucracy from politics or vice versa and that their connection could best be portrayed as complementary rather than dichotomous. Scholars such as Waldo (1948), Appleby (1949), Frederickson (1976), Svara, (1998; 1999; 2001) and Overeem (2005), through various arguments, maintained that it is impossible to expressly separate politics from bureaucracy. According to Waldo, any separation between politics and the bureaucracy is simplistic and that "...it had become common to refer to the politics administration dichotomy as an outworn if not ludicrous creed" (Waldo, 1987: 93). Frederickson (1976) even argued that since civil servants utilised their value judgments regarding public interests, politics and bureaucracy cannot be separated. Indeed, Gladieux (1952: 174) posited that while he "deplores, as do all thoughtful observers, the introduction of political influence in employment matters, I think it too much to expect in a dynamic democracy it will ever be possible to remove politics completely from public appointments. We can only seek to minimise this factor."

Towards a settlement of the above debates, Ingraham & Ban (1986; 2007) translated these broad arguments into three main bureaucratic management models: neutral competence, responsive competence and managerial competence. Ingraham & Ban (1986) explained that the neutral competence model argued for the functional separation of politics from bureaucracy, by carving out policy-making as the exclusive preserve of elected officials and political appointees while career expertise and longevity of bureaucrats compensate for political instability and change. Concerning the responsive competence model, a premium is placed on professional responsiveness to political direction. In this sense, professional competence and longevity do not necessarily compensate for political influence but are rather deployed as a means to achieve political goals.

The third cluster of managerial competence emphasises neither neutrality nor political influence, but pure professional competence and expertise. This model is similar to neutral competence; the difference, however, is related to its reliance on private-sector techniques in

the delivery of public interests. Ingraham & Ban's (1986) classification failed to settle the debate, except that it untangled the nuances of the discourse from a managerial perspective. Considering these broad debates coupled with the understanding from Mosher & Kingsley (1936) that an efficient government is only possible through responsive bureaucratic personnel; and Riccucci's (2007) argument that nothing fundamentally shapes the realm of government than its bureaucratic personnel, it is conceivable why the question of how and who is appointed into the bureaucracy have long attracted significant interest among scholars and policy-makers (Wilson, 1887; Weber, 1919; Dahlström, Lapuente & Teorell, 2012).

Indeed, much of the extant literature suggests that how civil servants are appointed into the bureaucracy can have significant consequences on their attitudes and other range of development outcomes (World Bank, 1993; Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2006; Iyer & Mani, 2008). Several scholars have maintained that democracy thrives on competent and responsive delivery of public services by bureaucrats (Freedman, 1978; Rourke, 1992). In pursuit of this goal, varied government interventions by way of reforms (e.g. New Public Management - NPM) have centred on how to effectively and efficiently deliver on public goods and services in neo-patrimonial settings. As stated by the immediate past president of Ghana regarding bureaucratic efficiency during a political principal's swearing-in ceremony:

It can't be business as usual. We must learn to think outside the box and see how things can be done more efficiently than they've been done in the past. You must not follow the usual ways of carrying out your duties with the pretext 'That is how we have always done it' but rather be challenged that you can do it better and more efficiently in the interest of the people of Ghana... The bureaucracy has taken an adverse effect on delivery and so you must be able to cut down on the unnecessary bureaucracy but still do it within the framework of the law and regulations (Swearing-in by John Mahama on Wednesday, 30 January 2013 at the Castle-Osu).

One of the means to achieve this responsive and efficient delivery of public goods has

much to do with the role of human resource management systems within bureaucracies since it is the repository through which recruitment, appointment, promotion and retention of the appropriately qualified and dedicated bureaucrats are processed (Kellough & Selden, 2003). Bureaucrats, when appointed, are entrusted with the responsibility of executing government agenda (Hays & Kearney, 2001). However, bureaucratic personnel management issues have always proven to be challenging regardless of political or administrative history (Kellough & Selden, 2003). McAllister & Rose (1983:534) have long reminded us that such challenges are associated with the democratic arena, where bureaucratic personnel operate along “...the articulation of competing demands and about the authoritative resolution of competing demands by government” or “...the intersection of competing values” (Kellough & Selden, 2003: 166).

Constant competing values to reconcile political values with administrative ones for efficient delivery of public services within the bureaucratic space primarily inform the extent to which administrative discretions, responsibilities and/or political oversight are exercised (Ingraham, 1987; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Kellough & Selden, 2003). Substantial attention has therefore been focused on the growing incidence of varied civil service appointment types deployed by elite principals aimed at accomplishing various interests within government systems (Rourke, 1992; Iyer & Mani, 2008). Focusing on bureaucrats whose routine job is to implement the principal’s interest and agenda, the study seeks to investigate what influences bureaucrats’ attitudes and behaviour and in particular, establish whether these attitudes and behaviour are a consequence of their appointment types or not.

Based on evidence from 35 developing countries, Rauch & Evans (2000) indicate that merit-based appointments are an important determinant of performance and control of corruption. Oliveros & Schuster’s (2018) study also advances the argument that merit-based appointments curb corruption and political services by bureaucrats, while enhancing work motivation. Reports by the World Bank (WB) also attribute the economic development success of the East Asian

“Tigers” to merit-based appointments (World Bank, 1993). According to Evans & Rauch (2000), meritocracy is essential in building a capable and professionalised civil service to stimulate development. As indicated by the World Bank (1997), merit-based civil service helps in bringing together reputable bureaucrats who are motivated by prestige for good work performance to propel development. To Rauch & Evans (2000), Lewis (2008) and Gerber & Gibson (2009), merit systems with professional bureaucrats efficiently produce public goods like contract enforcement, education, security and public infrastructure that benefit the vast majority of citizens, regardless of who controls the public office. Proponents of meritocracy (Aucoin, 1997; Kanyane, 2006) argue that embracing a culture of merit-based appointment and promotion is best practice since patronage breeds prejudices and deters accountability, transparency and the advancement of national interest.

Yet, other scholars and advocates link patronage-based appointments within bureaucracies to beneficial outcomes in the forms of economic performance and democratic development (Linz & Stepan, 1996; Kaufmann *et al.*, 2006; Lambsdorff, 2006; Iyer & Mani, 2008; Grindle, 2012; Kopecký *et al.* 2012; McDonnell, 2017; Toral, 2019). Kopecký & Scherlis (2008) argue that in the European political settings, patronage appointments are seen more as vital organisational and governmental resources than detrimental political benefaction between principals and loyalists. This is because patronage appointments may not be dispensed as a mechanism to just reward loyalty, but also to exercise control over an increasingly fragmented bureaucracy needing competent trustees to map out government policies into outcomes; thereby, serving as a tool for good governance (Krause, Lewis & Douglas, 2006; Corinna & Escartin, 2014).

From a prudent perspective, a third model for bureaucratic appointment is advanced by some contemporary public administration researchers known as the hybrid/complementarity model (Peters & Pierre, 2004). This is a situation where merit selection criteria are combined (subtly or overt) together with political and personal considerations (Matheson *et al.*, 2007). Peters & Pierre (2004) posit that the contemporary incentive for political principals to make efforts to

control the bureaucracy emanates from the waning of orthodox political control mechanisms of bureaucrats occasioned by New Public Management (NPM) reforms through delegation and deregulation. Yet, these political principals are accountable and responsible to the electorate regardless of their lack of control under autonomous bureaucracies (Peters & Pierre, 2004). Therefore, scholars such as Osborne & Gaebler (1992), Ingraham *et al.* (1995) and Thompson & Riccucci (1998) underscored the need for a new paradigm which accommodate the situation where administrative and political fiats (which are different) can come together in a mutually supportive way in the pursuit of public interest. That is, a situation where “compliance coexists with independence; accommodation of political interest along with a commitment to shape and promote the public interest; deference to political principals along with adherence to the law; and appreciation of politics along with support for professional standards” (Svara, 2001: 179).

Evidently, current bureaucracies, seem to have a mix of patronage and professional civil servants even though the circumstances under which principals create these bureaucrats may vary (Huber & Ting, 2015). Putnam (1973; 1975) argued that hybrid civil servants are theoretically conceived to operate with pluralistic interests. They are aware of legitimate differing interests; therefore, are conscious of “political realities” and treat political influences on policy-making as legitimate. This explains why performing economies in the developed world including the U.S, U.K, China, Malaysia, Japan and South Korea may appear to have a mixture of patronage, merit and hybrid appointments in the civil service. For example, in the U. S, approximately 3,000 (0.25%) senior civil servants are patronage appointees capped at 10% of total executive appointments while the rest are expected to be merit-based (Orac & Rinne, 2000). Burns (2007) reports that despite political affiliates in China making up 5% of the country’s population, they occupy 80% of the bureaucracy while the rest are expected to be merit-based.

However, in SSA, the phenomenon of having various types of appointment is rooted in neopatrimonialism, colonial legacies and political history. For instance, Ghana’s (neo-patrimonial) history reveal that the country was bequeathed with a merit-based civil service by the British

colonial regime (Muwanga-Barlow, 1978; Amonoo, 1981; McSheffrey, 1983; Adamolekun, 2002). However, despite this merit-based legacy, there have been evidence and manifestations of other types of appointment such as patronage and hybrid (Kopecký, 2011; Sigman, 2015; Brierley, 2018). As argued by Ekeh (1975), this is because the experiences of colonialism in Africa have led to the emergence of two publics instead of one public (as in the case of Western countries) and that many of Africa's political woes are due to the relationship between these two publics namely "the primordial public" and "the civic public".

According to Ekeh (1975), the primordial public realm comprises aboriginal groupings, ties and sentiments which influence and determine an individual's public behaviour which may impinge on public interest. On the other hand, there is the civic public realm which is based on civil laws and structures like the constitution and the bureaucracy. It is historically associated with the colonial administration and has become identified with popular politics in post-colonial Africa (Ekeh, 1975). In Ekeh's (1975) postulation, the most outstanding characteristic of the African political situation is that the same actors simultaneously operate in both the primordial and civic publics and that the relationship between the two publics foments the unique situation that has come to characterise African bureaucratic institutions and politics.

Similarly, Clapham (1985: 49) argued that politics and patronage in Africa were due to neo-patrimonialism, and it was "the most salient type of authority" in the third world because it "corresponds to the normal forms of social organisation in pre-colonial societies." Bratton & van de Walle (1997: 62) asserted that "although neo-patrimonial practices can be found in all polities, it is the core feature of politics in Africa...Whereas personal relationships occur on the margins of all bureaucratic systems, they constitute the foundation and superstructure of political institutions in Africa". Bratton & van de Walle (1997) further buttressed this point by claiming that the pervasiveness of patronage in African bureaucracies was fuelled by features of political systems such as presidentialism and networks which are characteristics of neo-patrimonialist regimes. These arguments within the SSA context constitute the foundation for various types of bureaucratic

appointments.

Although there are many assumptions about the consequences of having varied appointment practices on the attitudes and behaviour of civil servants, direct scientific research is modest, especially in Ghana. This is because to the best of the researcher's knowledge, no studies have specifically looked at the nexus between appointment types and their consequences on bureaucrats' attitudes and behaviour in Ghana. Meanwhile, it is important to know the level of influence that a type of appointment may have on bureaucratic attitudes and behaviour because of its unswerving relevance to the performance of both the entire bureaucracy and, by extension, national development (Niskanen, 1971; Weber, 1997; Haque 2007). Hence, this study moves beyond extant literature to address this gap by obtaining novel data to assess the consequences that the types of appointment may have on bureaucrats' attitudes and behaviour.

1.2 Research Aim and Questions

This study seeks to contribute to the discourse on the extent to which types of civil service appointments shape the attitudes and behaviour of civil servants in neo-patrimonial settings, with a focus on the Ghanaian experience. An important caveat is that even though this research establishes the depths of Ghana's types of civil service appointments, it does not extensively focus on them since that has been amply established by extant research (Kopecký, 2011; Ayee, 2013; QOG, 2015; Brierley, 2017). Instead, it focuses on exploring the consequences that these established types of appointments may have on bureaucrats' attitudes and behaviour. Despite the widely held theoretical view in a corpus of public administration literature about the consequences of the types of civil servants' appointment on attitudes and behaviour, the empirical evidence is marginal in emerging democracies such as Ghana and, by extension, SSA.

Regarding the specific attitudes and behaviour of concern, the study focuses on the nature and level of bureaucrats' autonomy, loyalty, responsiveness and to whom. This is because, notwithstanding the design of Ghana's civil service to be apolitical with the goal of public interest,

the service is rife with politics, personal interests and considerable levels of polarisation (Fridy, 2007; Gyekye, 2008; Abdulai, 2009; Ayelazuno, 2009; Ayee, 2009, 2013; Whitfield, 2011; Gyimah-Boadi & Prempeh, 2012). It is, therefore, vital to understand why civil servants, despite their apolitical cloak, demonstrate varied attitudes and behaviour. This is especially when such attitudes and behaviour are in contravention with their professionalism and, in particular, to determine whether the route (type) of appointment influences such attitudes and behaviour. The justification or purpose of this study is, therefore, aimed at closing the gap between assertion and empirical research.

In this study, we aim to (in)validate the theoretical and conventional view in extant literature that within the Weberian bureaucracy, merit-based appointments influence bureaucrats' autonomy (Weber, 1919; 1948; 1968; Johnson & Libecap, 1994; Rauch & Evans, 2000; Dahlström *et al.*, 2012; Cooper, 2018). Secondly, the study aims to ascertain the theoretical postulation that under bureaucratic politicisation, bureaucrats' loyalty is significantly influenced by patronage-based appointments (Johnson & Libecap, 1994; Goetz, 1997; Du Gay, 2000; Kopecký *et al.* 2012; Veit & Scholz, 2016). Finally, the study aims to determine the extent to which hybrid-based appointments induced by NPM reforms shape bureaucrats' level of responsiveness (Appleby, 1949; Friedrichson, 1976; Waldo, 1987; Svava, 1999, 2000; Peters & Pierre, 2004; Page, 2007).

Based on the omnibus hypothesis that the type of a civil servant's appointment will influence his/her attitudes and behaviour within the bureaucracy, the overarching research question this study seeks to answer is "To what extent does type of appointment (merit, patronage, hybrid) influence the attitudes and behaviour (autonomy, loyalty, responsiveness) of civil servants in Ghana?" This broad question is supported by the following specific questions; 1. How does merit-based appointments increase bureaucrats' autonomy? 2. To what degree does patronage-based appointments increase bureaucrats' loyalty? 3. To what extent does hybrid-based appointments increase bureaucrats' responsiveness? 4. Are there any attitudinal and behavioural distinctions

between merit, patronage and hybrid appointees? Finally, does the civil servants' network, if they are members, play any role concerning the various interests pursued in the bureaucracy?

These questions have been addressed in this study through the analysis of the novel data gathered. In addition to the empirical data, the study has also drawn on theories such as Public Service Motivation (PSM), Principal-Agent (PAT), Public-Choice (PCT) and NPM theories to aid in unravelling and offering interpersonal theoretical explanations and nuances regarding bureaucrats' attitudes and behaviour. It also explores the specific ways in which types of appointment (politics of appointment) may shape the autonomy, loyalty and responsiveness of bureaucrats. While all these theories can be applied to analyse the attitudes and behaviour of civil servants, they differ in their points of interest.

From the public service motivation perspective, the emphasis on bureaucrats' attitudes and behaviour is placed on the desire to serve the public interest (Perry & Wise, 1990). It explains and predicts why merit bureaucrats through their attitudes and behaviour desire to serve the overall public interest. Its adherents argue that the theory generally consists of intentions, attitudes, behaviour "that motivate individuals to service the public interest" (Bright, 2008: 151). This study, therefore, draws on the theory's explanation that merit bureaucrats are predominantly motivated by their desire to prioritise the public interest as a basis for their attitudes and behaviour in the course of performing their duties; hence, functioning with a mind-set of neutral competence.

From the principal-agent perspective, the focus of interest is that of the principal (superior), where one entity (the principal) appoints another (the bureaucratic agent) to act in his or her interest (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Moe, 1984). Moe (1984) argues that inherent in the principal-agent relationship within the civil service is the issue of delegation by a principal to an agent (subordinate). Within the context of this study, patronage appointed bureaucrats are conveniently characterised as agents of the principals who facilitate their appointment. The study, therefore, draws on the concepts' provisions to explain and predict that patronage and hybrid bureaucrats may behave the way they do by loyally or responsively prioritising their principals' interests due

to the fiduciary obligations imposed by PAT arrangements. Furthermore, it also provides us with the basis as to why patronage bureaucrats will prioritise their principals' interests even if it amounts to an affront on the conventions and dictates of the bureaucracy.

In contrast to the Principal-Agent perspective is the Public-Choice perspective which focuses on the self-centred attitudes and behaviour of bureaucrats (Moe, 1984; Starr, 1989; Felkins, 2013). This study borrows from the theoretical arguments of Public-Choice advocates to contend that bureaucrats "...feel, even if subconsciously, that one of their major functions is that of supporting [them]selves" (Tullock, 1965: 126). Since the theory essentially preaches loyalty to self, the study hypothesises that regardless of how bureaucrats are appointed, some bureaucrats may be motivated by such subjective interests as job security, income, influence, self-esteem and reputation (Niskanen, 1973). The final theory employed in this study, as noted earlier, is NPM. As we know, NPM is a reform agenda that seeks to tap into management models of best practice to improve bureaucratic efficiency. Given its focus on efficiency and productivity, this study draws on NPM's amalgamation of political and professional considerations to theoretically explain the motivation of hybrid bureaucrats relative to their attitudes and behaviour in the bureaucracy. All these theories espoused above represent research traditions that have historically appeared to hold contrasting viewpoints on the face-value. However, recent scholarship tends to demonstrate that they are not necessarily alternative approaches, they can operate in mutually reinforcing ways to comprehensively explain the dominant motivations for civil servants' attitudes and behaviour.

1.3 Case Selection: Why Ghana?

Some scholars argue that the nature of democratic regimes, i.e. the relationship between the executive, legislature and judiciary, is foundational to bureaucratic appointment politics, with specific distinctions between parliamentary, presidentialist and semi-presidentialist systems. Research on constitutional democracies around the world suggests varying levels of differences

within these tripartite regimes relative to key institutional attributes (McCormic, Hague & Harrop, 2019). Moe & Caldwell (1994: 172) emphasised the transcendental nature of the choices between any of these regimes by stating that “when nations choose a presidential or parliamentary form, they are choosing a whole system, whose various properties arise endogenously... out of the political dynamics that their adopted form sets in motion...”. Despite the differences between these types of regimes, other scholars argue that democratic political systems are perhaps less significant since particularistic attitudes and behaviour has historically been observed in all types of polities within the context of bureaucratic appointment politics (Kopecký, 2011) and that semi-presidential constitutions are similar to parliamentary and presidential ones (Cheibub *et al.*, 2013). Even though notable cases of particularistic exchanges cut across political systems and democratic regimes, political systems are still essential to the theoretical examination of bureaucratic politics in Ghana because of the powers they bestow on the executive and principals to appointed bureaucrats.

To examine Ghana as a case, considering Eckstein (1975), George & Bennet (2005), and Gerring’s (2007) classification of case studies, the country can be considered as a typical or representative case. This is because, its political and bureaucratic dynamics mirror those of emerging democracies within the context of neo-patrimonial regimes in SSA which constitutionally stipulate a merit-based Weberian bureaucracy on the one hand and the other, sanction-wide powers of bureaucratic appointments to the executive (Asante & Gyimah-Boadi, 2004; Ayee, 2013). The Ghanaian case, therefore, exemplifies a broader pattern of constitutional paradoxes in neo-patrimonial regimes where its findings can have good external validity and potential generality to (in)validate the hypotheses. The argument is fully elaborated below.

Ghana’s 1992 constitution stipulates concentration of political power in the president; this confirms Bratton & van de Walle’s (1997: 63) claim that “the concentration of political power in the hands of one individual” is a key factor underpinning Africa’s neo-patrimonial regimes. Even though Ghana’s civil service appointment practice traces its roots to both pre and post-colonial

regimes, which mirror the broader pattern in SSA, the concentration of appointing authority to the executive (elites) in particular, does foster undue influence, especially in appointment decisions through diverse strategies in the civil service. Fox *et al.* (2011: 26) argue that this executive dominance has “created a parallel system of political patronage in which members of the winning party are rewarded for their allegiance”. That is, bureaucratic appointment politics in Ghana is associated with the concentration of power in the executive, where political principals may reward party activists, repay political debts, perpetuate personal loyalties and preserve political ideologies and affiliations via state jobs (Flinders & Mathews, 2015).

Indeed, regarding the executive powers, the study notes that Ghana’s 1992 constitution, under article 195 (1), stipulates wide presidential and executive discretionary powers in the appointment of all bureaucrats (defined by Article 190 of the constitution), presenting fertile grounds for the executive to influence bureaucratic personnel appointment. When the president often exercises such powers, the professionalism of the bureaucracy is potentially diluted with political agents or clienteles of democratic politics. Additionally, those who are the “most senior public sector bureaucrats” are also typically appointed by a presidential fiat bestowed by the constitution, most often based on parochial political criteria rather than pure merit (Hirvi & Whitfield, 2015; Ayee, 2019). For example, the country report on human rights practices produced by the United States Department of State - Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour (2018: 13) stated that “The June ouster of the electoral commission chairperson [and her deputies] and the president’s subsequent stacking of the Electoral Commission with persons considered to be biased in favour of the ruling party raised questions about whether the body might be used to stifle voter registration among the opposition’s base.”

The irony is that the same constitution also stipulates an independent and professionalised Public Services Commission (PSC) mandated to ensure that appointment into the public services of Ghana is guided by the principles of merit and transparency under Article 195. It further provides an emphasis on a merit-based professional civil service devoid of politics and

discrimination while promoting public interest under Article 196 (Chapter 14 of 1992 Constitution). The country would later exacerbate this constitutional paradox in 2012 by enacting, through an act of parliament, a Presidential (Transition) Act 2012 (Act 845) touted as a legal blueprint to govern the transition of political power in the country. Inherent in the act (845) was the provision for the dismissal of all CEOs, Director-Generals, Managing Directors (MD), etc. of state-owned institutions upon the assumption of office by a newly elected President of the Republic of Ghana. The provisions in Act 845 only compounded the constitutional atrocities unleashed by the legal regime to the plight of bureaucrats in Ghana.

The political elite religiously clung to the Act (845) and the already precarious constitutional ambiguities to influence bureaucrats in a highly charged competitive political climate and an increasingly polarised atmosphere. This made a mockery of article 191 (b) of the Ghanaian constitution, which states that “a member of the public service shall not be dismissed or removed from office or reduced in rank or otherwise punished without a just cause.”

So severe was the application of the provisions contained in Act 845 by the political elite that on January 4, 2017, a private citizen, Mr Theophilus Donkor and his counsel, Mr Godwin Edudzi Tamakloe initiated an SC judicial review of the constitutional interpretation of Article 195 of the constitution. In its ruling of June 2019, the SC of Ghana held that the replacement of such bureaucrats (CEOs, DGs and heads of public corporations, statutory boards and authorities, as well as the governing boards of such institutions) was unconstitutional. They added that “per Article 190 Clause 1(b) of the 1992 Constitution, public corporations were part of the public services of Ghana and, therefore, such persons were bureaucrats whose appointments were protected by the constitution.” It, therefore, effectively repealed Section 14 of the Presidential Transition Act 2012 (Act 845 as amended in 2016) as unconstitutional and void for being in contravention of Articles 190 and 191 of the Constitution.

This was the first landmark ruling in favour of curtailing presidential powers of appointment and/or dismissal within the context of bureaucratic appointments as similar cases

brought before the court in the past were dismissed. Reminiscent in recent history are previous separate suits brought by the Ghana Bar Association and a broadcast journalist to the SC in 2016 on the appointment of justices of the SC and the chairman and members of the Electoral Commission. The SC threw out the suits contesting how the President appointed the justices of the SC and the chairperson of the Electoral Commission (EC). The seven-member panel, in a unanimous decision, held that even though the President was mandated to seek advice, he was not bound by the advice of bodies such as the judicial council and the council of state in making appointment decisions.

Yet, this partial extrication of the legal web through the June 2019 SC ruling did not cure all the ills of the constitutional paradox of Ghana's political system which bestows on the President (with political motives) a wide range of appointing powers. It is instructive to note that in neo-patrimonial democracies where systems are relatively weak, although there may be structural checks and balances to the president's appointing powers such as a judicial review or parliamentary veto in approving or rejecting such appointments, there are inadequate or compelling motivations to check presidential abuse of appointments from such bodies when due processes are not complied with.

From a relational perspective, the legal relationship between political principals and bureaucrats is also defined by the 1992 constitution and other legal documents (The Republic of Ghana, 1992; 1993; 1994). In one breath, it prohibits bureaucrats from engaging in partisan politics since Article 94 (3b) of the 1992 constitution lists civil servants and chiefs as ineligible to engage in partisan politics. The preclusion of bureaucrats in political partisanship is also implicit in Article 191 of the constitution, which insulates them from "victimisation, discrimination, dismissal, removal, reduction in rank and punishment without just cause." Therefore, their engagement in partisan politics undermines their protection. Under Chapter 24 of the Constitution, bureaucrats ought to avoid compromising themselves by being entangled in the conflict of interest situations in the performance of their bureaucratic functions. A bureaucrat's involvement in partisanship

creates potential conflicts of interest situations.

However, even though it is enshrined in civil service law as well as the Civil Service code of conduct (1993), in particular Section 69 (1) of the Civil Service Law, PNDC Law 327, 1993 that “a civil servant may form or join any association”, section 69 (2) prohibits bureaucrats from associations where membership conflicts with the performance of their duties as civil servants. Besides, the constitution also stipulates in Article 21 that all citizens have the right to form or join political parties and participate in political activities in a free and democratic society while article 55 gives every citizen of voting age the right to join a political party. However, exercising these rights by joining political parties and being patronised may create avenues for conflict in the bureaucracy.

The net effect of these paradoxes has led to the evidence of increased partisan political participation by bureaucrats since the return to democratic governance in 1993 (Ayee, 2013). Furthermore, the ambiguity and technical decision of Ghana’s SC in 2000 further blurred the lines of a dichotomy between politics and administration, exposing it as a myth. According to Ayee (2013), in the election year of 2000, the NDC had approved Kofi Opoku-Manu, the Chief Director (CD) of Ministry of Finance (MOF), and Joseph Oteng-Adjei, a Director at Ministry of Mines and Energy, as parliamentary candidates for Asante-Akyem North and Bosomtwe constituencies, respectively. This positioned them in active politics. The NPP contested the decision of the NDC at the SC in a case known as *New Patriotic Party v. the National Democratic Congress and Others* (Civil Motion No. 36/2000) on June 8, 2000. It sought a declaration that the action was inconsistent with and in contravention of the constitution, particularly Article 94(3b). On November 21, 2000, the SC, by a majority decision, held that the NDC’s nomination of Opoku-Manu and Oteng-Adjei did not constitute an act but only an intention. The decision, therefore, failed to clarify whether bureaucrats could participate in partisan politics or not (Ayee, 2013).

These legal provisions under the constitution of Ghana and other acts of parliament as well as the SC rulings are the footings of the complex relationship that has mired and defined the

dynamics between political principals and the bureaucrats. The overall net effect of the paradoxical legal framework and instruments has led to profound politics regarding bureaucrats' appointment which, according to Ayee (2009), has created a situation where bureaucrats either openly engage in politics or take political appointments, blurring their supposed dichotomy. Many observers such as Wereku (2008), Ayee (2013, 2019) and IDEG (2019) believe that the failure of Ghana to have a relatively strong merit-based professional civil service devoid of patronage and politics as emphasised by a part of the constitution is due to this legal paradox. This presents us with intriguing questions regarding Ghana's political and bureaucratic culture because, despite the limitations of the civil service, it is still the primal vehicle for governance without which the organs of government would cease to function.

Like many other SSA countries, Ghana as a neo-patrimonial regime is expected to be receptive to patronage appointments especially under a wide range of executive powers of appointments. But this condition, when juxtaposed with the country's constitutionally established apolitical (Weberian) bureaucracy, is a recipe for tension and crises. These competing provisions or contradictions provide a fertile battleground for exploring the consequences of types of appointments on bureaucrats' attitude and behaviour. Following from the above constitutional puzzle, it is therefore noteworthy to select and investigate Ghana as a case. As a neo-patrimonial democratic country in the sub-region, the findings of this research will inform and provide insights for other neo-patrimonial countries with similar constitutional crises while reconciling findings with existing theories within the context of emerging democratic governance in Africa. Since Ghana is also considered as a shining example of democratic governance in SSA and has been repeatedly touted as "an example to the rest of Africa on successful democratic practice" (World Bank, 2009; Sigman, 2015), her experiences have the potential of presenting us with useful insights concerning the theoretical expectations of democracy's value in promoting civil service professionalism and national development. For example, Peters (1995), in his examination of bureaucracy, argued that the separation of powers and authority within the branches of government in democracies produce

administrative systems which make the exercise of control a major issue; thereby, breeding fertile grounds for tensions within the bureaucracy.

Also, according to Golden's (2003) constituency service model, politicians create opportunities to serve constituents and meet their electoral goals by deliberately creating a bureaucracy that is inefficient through dispensing appointments in the civil service to their agents. Ghana is also typical of the countries in the sub-region where sustained national growth and poverty reduction at the national level have been modest while the increased politicisation of the civil service has been accompanied by low bureaucratic efficiency. This reflects the case of the entire SSA. As Carino (1992) pointed out, bureaucracy is a tool for principals as they pursue social, economic and political objectives either for their benefit or on behalf of and frequently in collusion with particularistic interests rooted outside the bureaucracy. It is, therefore, strange that so far, analyses of attitudes and behaviour of bureaucrats as a result of how they are appointed has eluded scholarly scrutiny from researchers and policy-makers within neo-patrimonial settings.

1.4 Ghana's geographic, political and bureaucratic profile.

Ghana is geographically located in West Africa, bordering the Gulf of Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire and Togo with a land area of 238,391 km² (92,100 sq. mi). The country has a population of 24,658,823 (2010 population and housing census) and a projection of 30,284,301 in 2019 (Ghana Statistical Service - GSS, 2019). Politically, Ghana as a colony secured its first impression of parliament (Legislative Council) in 1850 with members selected by the British colonial administration to primarily comprise the governor and at least two other persons appointed by the colonial administration (Ward, 1948; Bennion, 1962). This legislative council's primary responsibility was to enact ordinances and laws necessary for the peace and governance of the colony. It could also be seen more as an advisory body since it lacked supervisory powers over the colonial government (Ward, 1948; Bennion, 1962). Various

agitations against the colonial authorities led to varied concessions from the colonial regime until it culminated in gaining independence in March 1957 (Bourret, 1960). After independence, the country witnessed four different republics i.e. first republican constitution of 1960, the second republican constitution of 1969, the third republican constitution of 1979 and the fourth Republican constitution of 1992. The occasional military interventions in Ghanaian politics curtailed the life of the first three republics until constitutional governance was finally restored under the fourth republic with the promulgation of the 1992 Constitution.

Ghana has historically practised alternative political systems at specific interludes of its democratic dispensation. According to McCormic *et al.*'s (2019) classification of electoral and governmental systems, Ghana's political systems between the periods of 1957-1960 and 1969-1972 is classified as parliamentary. Based on the same classifications by McCormic *et al.* (2019), the country also practised presidential systems between the periods of 1960-1964 and 1979-1981 while it practised a one-party system in 1964-1966. The current hybrid or semi-presidential system began in 1993 with a unitary form of government. Examining Farrell's (1997) distinctions between electoral systems, it can be determined that Ghana's president is elected through a *majoritarian* (50% plus 1) electoral system and is subject to *the two-ballot systems procedure* where when no candidate wins a majority on the first ballot, the top two leading candidates go for a second run (*runoff systems*). However, for the parliamentary elections, a *single-member plurality* or the '*winner-takes-all*' or *first-past-the-post* system is adopted, where the winner is the candidate receiving the highest votes, i.e. whether this is a plurality (more votes than any other candidate) or a majority (more than 50%) (Farrell, 1997; Farrell & Carter, 2009 and McCormick *et al.*, 2019). A parliament runs for a four-year term.

Currently, about 24 political parties are registered with the Electoral Commission (EC) of Ghana, the body that oversees the conduct of elections in Ghana (Electoral Commission, 2019). Since the fourth republic, two major political parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) have occupied about 96% of the seats in Parliament,

with the remaining 4% being shared among three other parties and independent MPs (Electoral Commission, 2019).

Ghana's 1992 republican constitution provides both the legal and structural frameworks regarding how various institutions (state or otherwise) and individuals ought to function and co-exist. The constitution requires that a majority of the ministers of state in Ghana be appointed from parliament (article 71 of the 1992 Constitution). The principle of separation of powers is nonetheless a central feature of the 1992 constitution which is intended to foster the separation of powers and provide checks and balances. However, this principle seems undermined by the constitutional provision of the majority of ministers being sitting members of parliament (MP), that is the fusion of the executive and legislature. The independence of the judiciary is also restricted because there is no upper limit to the number of justices of the SC that can be appointed by the president.

Currently, Ghana's parliament is unicameral and is composed of 275 seats. The MPs are elected on a four-year term basis; however, there is no limit on the number of terms a representative can serve. The parliament is led by a speaker who is not an MP but must possess the qualifications to stand for elections as an MP (Constitution, 1992). An MP who is elected as the speaker must resign his seat as a member as happened in 2013 when Emmanuel Doe-Adjaho had to resign as an MP after he was elected the speaker of the 6th parliament. The speaker also chairs a five-member parliamentary service board.

Ghana has had significant experiences with political life, being interspersed with civilian and military rules. However, since the return to constitutional rule in January 1993, there has been political stability as demonstrated by eight successive national-level elections which were held in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020. There have also been seven successful full-term parliaments with the eighth parliament due to expire in January 2025. The NPP and the NDC have had an alternation of power both at the presidential and the

parliamentary levels in 2001, 2009 and 2016, thus qualifying Ghana as a consolidated democracy per Samuel Huntington's (1991) "two-turnover test". Since 1993, the winner of the general elections (political party) wins both the presidential election and a parliamentary majority. The first two elections were won by Jerry John Rawlings-led NDC while the next two were won by the John Agyekum Kuffuor-led NPP. The subsequent two were won by the NDC's Prof. Atta Mills and John Mahama in 2008 and 2012 respectively whilst the 2016 and recent 2020 election were won by NPP's Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo. The 2020 parliamentary election results indicate that the NPP and an independent MP currently constitute a majority with 138 seats (50.1%) and the NDC in minority with 137 seats (49.9%).

Concerning Ghana's ethnic profile, an estimated number of ninety-two separate ethnic groups exist. These groups are often classified into larger groups, namely Akan (49.1%), Mole-Dagomba (16.5%), Ewe (12.7%), Ga-Adangbe (8.0%), Guan and Gurma (8.3%) and a host of other minor ethnic groups amounting to 5.4% of the population (GSS, 2010; Langer, 2009: 535). This complex mix of ethnicity is vital to the dynamics of the politics of bureaucratic appointments in Ghana and its implications for attitudes and behaviour because it "has allowed political and cultural entrepreneurs to exploit divisions and sub-classifications to suit their purposes" (Asante & Gyimah-Boadi, 2004:15). Boone (1994) and Arriola (2009) argued that one of the features of politics in SSA is the integration of ethnic and regional elites as a means to discourage likely opponents from rallying and to distribute patronage to the clients and agents they represent. According to Abdulai (2012), the phenomenon of ethnicity and regionalism in Ghana is almost synonymous as the country's regional boundary structures are largely fashioned along ethnic lines.

Administratively, Ghana is divided into 16 regions with 254 Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs). Each region has a regional coordinating council headed by a regional minister who is appointed by the president to supervise decentralised structures such

as the metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies under his jurisdiction. At the local level, the MMDAs are the highest political authority(ies). Membership of these assemblies is obtained via two routes, i.e. 70% of elected members to represent their electoral areas and 30% government nomination in consultation with the traditional authorities in each district. The MPs for constituencies which fall under the various MMDAs are ex-officio members of these assemblies without voting rights. These MMDAs are led by Chief Executives who are nominated by the president and approved by the assemblies and can pass by-laws to regulate various activities under their purview.

Concerning the bureaucratic population of Ghana, some definitions are useful. According to the 1992 Constitution, the public services of Ghana include the civil service; judicial service; audit service; education service; prisons service; parliamentary service; health service; statistical service; national fire service; customs, exercise and preventive service; internal revenue service; police service; immigration service; legal service; public corporations other than those set up for commercial ventures; public corporations established by this constitution and such other public services as parliament may prescribe (Republic of Ghana, 1992). Thus, essentially, Ghana's bureaucracy derives its mandate from the 1992 Constitution of the fourth republic. Its functions are detailed in the legislation but mainly it is the machinery or vehicle through which government policies are formulated and implemented (PNDCL. 327).

The term bureaucracy in this study, however, mostly refers to the higher and lower tiers of the civil services of Ghana listed under Chapter 14 of the 1992 constitution. The population of this research, therefore, primarily refers to civil servants currently comprising of 36 sector ministries (OHCS, 2019). Accordingly, the term 'bureaucrats' mainly include personnel of these civil service outfits who should ordinarily be appointed, posted/transferred and promoted under the law through the Office of the Head of the Civil Service (OHCS). These civil servants or bureaucrats would thus for example encompass Chief Directors, management, junior staff

and special political appointees within the service who may have been appointed by the executive through the PSC or OHCS. Since the main objective of this study is to contribute to the discourses related to the politics of types of appointments, the influences between political heads and bureaucrats regarding appointments and their expected attitudes and behaviour is central. Indeed, Svava (2001:176) argued that “relationship between [bureaucrats], on one hand, and political leaders and the public on other hand...and the proper role of [bureaucrats] in the political process have been the subject of considerable debate”. The restriction of this study to the civil services is, therefore, suitable as it is the intersection between professionalism and politics. It is also an arena for entanglement between professional and political bureaucrats on the one hand and political heads and politicians (with vested interests) on the other.

Furthermore, the public sector as an institution is the second-largest employer, accounting for 7.6% of Ghana’s employment-population (GSS, 2016). The private sector accounts for 74.4% of the economically active persons out of which the private informal sector accounts for 52.5% while the private formal sector accounts for 22.9% (GSS, 2016). The majority of workers enter the informal economy which is the largest employer, absorbing about 88% of the labour force (Labour Market Profile, 2016). However, focusing on the civil service, only 1.3% of the 7.6 % share of the public sector is engaged in the Civil Service (GSS, 2016). This reveals that Ghana’s public service employment rate is below the average rates for developing countries (8% - 30%).

Despite significant turbulence, the world’s share of public service remains high, at approximately 30% with a breakdown of about 22% in developed market economies, 40% in transitional countries and between 6% and 30% in developing countries (Hammouya, 1999; OECD, 2017). In Ghana, a little over one in every five workers (22.5%) is an employee, and the main sectors of employment are private, public and not-for-profit organisations (GSS, 2016). The employment-to-population ratio is 75.4%, with the majority of the currently

employed persons (68.7%) engaged in vulnerable employment (GSS, 2016). According to the GSS (2016), the working population of the country is dominated by people with no formal education as well as those with basic (primary and middle school) education. Ghana's 2016 labour market profile estimates the country's unemployment at 6.4% as up to 300,000 prospective job seekers are introduced to the job market pool every year. Of this, only about 2% find jobs in the formal sector (Labour Market Profile, 2016). Yet, Amoako (2008) found that the Ghanaian economy, in terms of employment outcomes, had created nearly three million jobs between 1991 and 2006 for the 24 - 64 age group (Amoako, 2008).

Regarding Ghana's appointment legal regime, appointments into Ghana's public and civil services are legally sanctioned on the principle of merit and non-discrimination, pursuant to chapter 14 of the fourth Republican Constitution (Constitution of Ghana, 1992). The country's merit appointments procedure is also governed and regulated by the PSC framework which derives its mandate from both article 196 of the 1992 constitution and the PSC Act 482 of 1994 (PSC, 2015). This merit appointment regime is directly applicable to all public services covered under chapter 14, Article 190 of the 1992 republican constitution. Among other requirements, the regime stipulates equal treatment to all bureaucrats by applying the same standards and principles for staffing, human resource development and personnel capacity building tailored for service delivery needs (PSC, 2015).

Regarding security of tenure for bureaucrats, article 191 (a) and (b) of the 1992 Constitution stipulates that bureaucrats are protected and secured from arbitrary depositions and abuses as they shall not be victimized or discriminated against. It enjoins principals from capriciously discharging bureaucrats from office or reducing them in rank or any form of punishment without just cause. Indeed, article 199 (1) provides that bureaucrats tenure is secured until they come up for mandatory retirement from the bureaucracy at age sixty (60) or voluntary retirement at a minimum age of forty-five (45). However, notwithstanding the above

provision, a retired bureaucrat after age 60 may be re-engaged due to the exigencies of his/her role for a cumulative period not exceeding five years. Under the law, bureaucrats are entitled to pensions payable from both their contributions and consolidated funds from government which are exempt or not subject to tax.

Bureaucrats regardless of their political or social backgrounds are prescribed to be apolitical since they are required to serve all governments. For example, Article 26 (1) of the political parties' Act prohibits bureaucrats from party politics. The aim is to embrace the principles of merit, non-discrimination, transparency and fairness. Therefore, bureaucratic institutions ought to be structured to ensure that the right quality and quantity of persons are at post within the Ghanaian bureaucracy (PSC, 2015). Correspondingly, Article 195 (1) of the Constitution adjudicates the power to appoint persons to hold or act in an office in the bureaucracy in the President who acts following the advice of the governing boards or councils of the services concerned and in consultation with the PSC.

However, evidence suggests that party affiliation, ethnicity and other networks are influential factors in bureaucratic appointments despite the country's strong sense of nationhood (Asante & Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). Asante & Gyimah-Boadi (2004) note that although meritocratic principles such as experience and technical capacity ought to be the most important factors necessary for the appointment of people into the bureaucracy, there is evidence to suggest that premium is put on patronage factors as well. The literature further demonstrates that the fine line between the political and apolitical has tilted in the direction of the political and that bureaucrats who should be insulated from politics are manipulated by political elites (Ayee, 2013). Accordingly, bureaucrats and political principals in Ghana have come to believe that a non-politicised bureaucracy is a myth since it is part of the move towards securing greater responsiveness, accountability and effectiveness in service delivery (Ayee, 2013).

Additionally, the bureaucracy has also suffered a battered image with a high perception of

inefficiency in the eyes of the public, government and other stakeholders. The frequently pronounced criticisms against the civil service include excessive bottle-necks or red-tapism; indiscipline; inadequate human capacity and ineffective leadership; weak management practices (Ayee, 2001). It is also accused of a lack of appropriate vision or a clear sense of direction; leakage of government official information to unauthorised sources; low morale and general inefficiency and effectiveness to government policies and programmes (Ayee, 2001). Owing to this perception, Ghana has made various attempts to reform the service in line with the NPM ideals to make it more efficient and effective in carrying out its role (Ninsin, 1998; Ayee, 1999; 2000;). Following from the above account of the profile of the Ghanaian state, the next section will briefly look at the thesis structure.

1.5 Thesis structure

This thesis is composed of eight (8) chapters. Chapter One, which is the introduction, encompasses the background to the study, statement of the problem, research objectives, research questions, significance of the study, delimitations and organisation of the thesis. The review of the historical literature concerning Ghana's appointment traditions constitutes Chapter Two. Chapter Three centres on an overview of extant studies on bureaucratic appointments in Ghana which contributes to establishing the gaps in addressing the question of bureaucratic attitudes and behaviour relative to the types of appointment. The chapter also introduces the study's theoretical hypotheses to be tested in the empirical Chapters. That is, the Chapter fully examines the theoretical framework of this study to aid in addressing the research hypotheses. Chapter Four covers the research methodology and descriptive statistics. Specifically, it focuses on the research design, methods and procedures. It further presents and interprets the descriptive statistics of the study as a preliminary presentation of research findings.

The fifth Chapter which is the first of the empirical chapters concentrates on exploring the consequences of merit-based appointments on bureaucrats' autonomy. It establishes the

conventional direction of the hypothesis but also goes ahead to reveal that though merit factors such as qualifications are vital preconditions for appointment, they are predominantly insufficient to secure an appointment in the bureaucracy. Furthermore, it finds that though merit is significantly associated with autonomy, it does not necessarily guarantee a bureaucrats' autonomy. Chapter six continues with a focus on the influence of patronage-based appointments on bureaucrats' loyalty. It finds that bureaucratic appointments based on patronage factors such as personal connections or political considerations are significantly linked to bureaucrats' loyalty within the bureaucracy. It further makes the case that contrary to widely held perceptions that patronage is counterproductive, the idea of loyalty to the principal can enhance accountability to political principals who are ultimately responsible for the provision of public goods and services to the citizenry. Chapter Seven, the last of the empirical chapters, comprises the nexus between hybrid-induced bureaucratic appointments and responsiveness to the political principal. It specifically examines the extent to which hybrid bureaucrats are responsive to principals or government in the discharge of their duties. Chapter Eight, which is the final chapter, encompasses the conclusions and recommendations of the thesis.

CHAPTER TWO

DISSECTING APPOINTMENT TRADITIONS IN GHANA FROM THE PRE-COLONIAL ERA TO GHANA'S FOURTH REPUBLICAN GOVERNANCE.

2.1 Introduction

Nti (1978:3) tellingly argues that “one cannot explain change or continuity except in terms of history”. Based on this assertion, Ghana’s checkered bureaucratic appointments history is recounted by this study through the varying political regimes with its conflicting approaches to the politics of appointments in the bureaucracy. As indicated in Chapter One, the country had undergone four republics and four military interventions over the past six decades. These republics involved competitive elections albeit occasionally interspersed with military interventions. This kind of political history has contributed to shaping the predominant bureaucratic appointment practices deployed by the elite in the country’s bureaucratic history.

Recruitment or appointment into Ghana’s bureaucracy has had a long history, reinforcing the intensely political, competitive and polarised environment within which bureaucrats operate and the myth of the politics-administration dichotomy in Ghana (Ayee, 2013). A discussion of the account of the politics of appointment history of Ghana would, therefore, be adequately addressed by categorising its historical antecedents into a periodic account of the Ghanaian political history; thus, the pre-independence period up to 1957, post-independence period of 1957 – 1966, 1966 – 1992 and 1992 till date. This historical categorisation is significant because Ghana’s post-independence history has a checkered character defined by long periods of military interventions and punctuated by brief interludes of civilian rule under the second (1969-72) and third (1979-81) republics. Within this period of history, the country’s inability to sustain a government for 3 years without military intervention had profound ramifications for bureaucratic appointments. Therefore, it is impossible to have a meaningful historical account of the politics of appointment in Ghana without the context of the categorisation of the country’s political history. This is because

it was only in the early 1990s after a decade of quasi-military rule by the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) that the country evolved into a stable state. This culminated in the promulgation of a new constitution in 1992 and the relaunch or inauguration of another attempt at multiparty democracy. This ushered Ghana into a new dawn of democratic governance under the fourth republic. The next section, therefore, begins with Ghana's bureaucratic history from pre-independence.

2.2 Patrimonialism and pre-independence dynamics of patronage relations in Ghana.

To begin with the period of pre-independence (before 1957), analysts of Ghanaian politics suggest that the politics of bureaucratic appointments derived its underpinning from deep historical and structural roots, resulting in the continent's failure to establish a formal economy large enough to displace the informal economy (North *et al.*, 2009; Khan, 2010). According to North *et al.* (2009) and Khan (2010), public organisations in Africa failed to displace personalised networks within bureaucratic structures where meritocracy and due process were supposed to be celebrated while programmatic forms of party politics also failed to replace traditional patrimonial relations (Levy, 2014). Berman (1998: 305) argued that modern African ethnicity is "a social construction of the colonial period through the reactions of pre-colonial societies to the social, economic, cultural and political forces of colonialism." African states were historically saddled in alliances with local "Big Men", creating ethnically-defined administrative units linked to patron-client relations. Berman (1998) maintained that the colonial legacy of "bureaucratic authoritarianism", "pervasive patron-client relations" coupled with "complex ethnic fragmentation" had persisted up to post-colonial societies. Since then, patron-client networks have remained a core state-society linkage accounting for the "personalistic", "materialistic" and "opportunistic" character of African politics (Vansina, 1990). The relations of power in pre-colonial Africa were characteristically those of patrons and clients or principals and agents. This unquestionably wedged the merit-based approach that the colonial governments later attempted to establish for the purposes of

administration as a legacy to be bequeathed to the newly found independent states. In Berman's (1998: 310) view, "big men presided over intricate networks of agents involving reciprocal but unequal relations with small boys...".

The colonial state of the Gold Coast (now Ghana) was basically a reproduction of a systemic institution of political domination for control of areas and districts occupied mainly by peasants. This arrangement was linked to reflections of neo-traditionalist ideologies of patriarchal nature (Mozaffar, 1995). The observed model of political control in the colonial state was that of divide and rule, effectively curtailing revolt on a large scale (Mozaffar, 1995). According to Arriola (2009), this strategy was used as a means to discourage likely opponents from rallying by distributing patronage to clients and agents. Among the interrelationships in the colonial era, the most salient was European district administrators and local rulers, where these local rulers provided conduits between the colonial state and African societies with clear symptoms of patron-client and principal-agent relations popularly coined in political parlance as "indirect rule" (Vansina, 1990).

The European administrators patronised both local rulers and the emerging indigenous elite with streams of income which more or less served as a reward for cooperation and compliance (Berman, 1998). The disbursement of such patronage inducements reflected the "benefits" of colonial rule in the eyes of recipients; thereby, cementing their loyalties and consolidating the state as the source of benefits of development albeit with a partisan veil (Mozaffar, 1995). Most importantly, it established patron/client and principal-agent relations not only as the primary access to the state's resources but also, as in pre-colonial society, the relationship between ordinary people and the elite (Vansina, 1990). The local rulers, through their acquired wealth, also dispensed patronage inducements to their acquaintances and supporters while through the abuse of power, extorted or punished perceived detractors under their control (Berman, 1998). As principal clients of the colonial state, local rulers were the most powerful patrons within their locality and became

the architects of patronage networks in statures of eminence in a vicious cycle of dependence in colonial societies like the Gold Coast (Berman, 1998). These networks within the context of local administration were mostly ethnically defined (Berman, 1998).

Progressively, however, in the 19th century, with the advent of educated indigenes, an elite class emerged and became both prestigious and powerful, effectively changing the traditional patron-client relations of peasants and local rulers to new power relations and networks between the educated elite and the commoners. Eventually, the erstwhile Gold Coast in 1850 under British colonial rule through the elite established its own legislative council with the primary aim of advising the colonial Governor in crafting laws and ordinances (Bennion, 1962). The issue that dominated the elite at that time in the Gold Coast was, thus, the need for more representation in the legislative council to enhance their elitist or prestigious status as opposed to independence (Bennion, 1962).

It was then clear that the British colonial government's approach of governance fit into the "elite model" which focuses on the influence exercised by powerful individuals or groups; that is, power was concentrated in the hands of a privileged few (Cochran *et al.*, 2009). In definitional terms, Lasswell (1952) defines elite as those with the greatest status, prestige and access or control of values within polities. The "elite", in this context, refers to individuals who hold privileged positions in society or organisations (Fukai & Fukui, 1992). The elite used by the colonial government was thus "set apart from the rest of society by their pre-eminence in political and governmental hierarchies". The existence of the elite group, thus, suggests the existence of a hierarchy and an uneven distribution of politically and socially valuable resources (Fukai & Fukui, 1992). From the above, it can be deduced that the elite will always be the "minority" with privileged access to influence and resources. Within the Gold Coast context, patronage relations were not a prerogative of a single actor but different contending and interested elites with "power brokers" on the side. The historical narrative of the colonial African states was, therefore,

construed as authoritarian administrative machinery of control via the elite as opposed to a democratisation process (Ranger, 1993).

According to Kimble (1963), nationalism began to gain momentum around the end of the 19th century and early in the 20th century. It was fuelled by the formation of an elitist Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS) comprising of chiefs and lawyers and the National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA). This political mobilisation with the spirit of nationalism was formed with elitist youths such as J.B Danquah who was at the forefront (Apter, 1963). These elites began to press home certain demands like statuses in the colonial administration. This included the bureaucracy because, by this time of the colonial period, the top hierarchy of the bureaucracy was the preserve of the British while the educated indigenous elite whose services were required mostly occupied the lower echelons (Ayee, 1991).

Regarding human resource personnel base of the colony, educational establishments were essentially designed and restricted as a training hub for indigenes for the limited purpose of performing administrative roles. This did not include how to run capitalist enterprises; thereby, limiting opportunities to train these indigenes to serve the needs of the wider ordinary citizenry (Ranger, 1993). However, the widely held perception was that engagement with the colonial state came with risks and favours; that is, favours to multiple resources at the disposal of the elite and the state as well as the risks of its capricious penalties (Berman, 1998). These associated risks required mitigation through the support of the elite, hence, fostering the reciprocal dependence of agents seeking patrons and vice versa. This led to a “big man-small boy” politics in the colonial regime (Ranger, 1993). While networks in the colonial societies were also shaped by ethnic identities like the “Fante Confederacy” in the Gold Coast, the “politics of the belly” also emerged within the social relations of the colonial state (Bayart, 1993).

For the bureaucracy, these strategies employed by the colonial regime to administer the colony was simultaneously orchestrated along with the establishment of a British bureaucratic

system founded along the Weberian models of merit in the colonial administration of the Gold Coast. The colonial bureaucracy was initially lean and primarily focused on civil and local government services with a specific fiat to securing “Pax Britannica” or “British Peace” after the global hegemonic power tilted towards the British empire (Morris, 2002; Ayee, 2019). The civic arrangement of the colony was, therefore, heavily influenced by the British system of administration for obvious reasons, albeit with occasional modifications as and when nationalism and struggle for independence became more intense.

The first real structural attempt by the colonial regime towards a merit-based bureaucracy in the Gold Coast was witnessed when self-rule became imminent. Only then was a PSC established in 1951 to advise the colonial regime on issues relating to appointments in the bureaucracy, including the management of competitive entrance examinations into the civil service, transfers and the disciplinary control of public officers (Ayee, 2019). Thus, the structural foundation of Ghana’s professionalised and merit-based tradition was laid with the establishment of the PSC in 1951. As argued by Muwanga-Barlow (1978) and Adamolekun (2002), the bureaucratic system which was bequeathed to Ghana at independence was modelled per the Weberian concept. By independence, competitive elections between indigenous political foes began to reinvigorate deeper patronage relations within the public space, including the bureaucracy, since it became a basis for political support and access to the higher levels of influence (Young, 1986). Consequently, the solid unity demonstrated by the nationalist elite against colonialism in the pre-colonial era began to witness damaging cracks as these elites exploited the ethno-regionally based politics which began to emerge in the decolonisation era and became extremely antagonistic (Asante & Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).

In 1951, legislative assembly elections were held based on political parties and universal adult suffrage. Two political parties led by Dr J. B. Danquah and Dr Kwame Nkrumah of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) and the Convention People’s Party (CPP) respectively

contested the elections seeking to govern the country after the exit of colonial rulers. Eventually, Gold Coast became independent on the 6th of March 1957 with a new name *Ghana* under the leadership of Dr Kwame Nkrumah. Nkrumah's success was underpinned by the grassroots and the mass party character of the CPP as opposed to the UGCC of Dr J. B. Danquah which was perceived as elitist. Indeed, the era of the end of World War II marked the beginning of an age of political mobilisation that effectively ceased to be the exclusive preserve of the elite.

However, after independence, due to the nature of reciprocal relations in the pre-colonial era, during colonial rule and the politics preceding independence, attitudes and behaviour were seemingly influenced in the post-colonial bureaucracy as it became a financial reservoir for those who managed it and for the political principals who lead it (Bayart, 1993). The result was a clear extension of principal-agent networks to the very centre of the state apparatus, with their ramifying linkages reaching from the cabinet to the village, to produce what Bayart graphically describes as the rhizome state (Bayart, 1993). Currently, principal-agent or patron-client networks have travelled beyond the state to co-opt other social groups such as religious groupings (churches), trade unions, professional associations and other organisations which are trans-political communities that represent personal and secular interests in modern society (Ngunyi, 1995). Real-life governmental issues such as economic decline, reforms and the snail pace of how resources trickle down to the masses exacerbated reliance on patron/client relations in Ghana. The next section will endeavour to examine Ghana's bureaucratic appointment politics and history from independence to the end of the first republic in 1966.

Table 1:**Ideological Types of Bureaucratic Appointments in Ghana.**

Type of Appointment	Conceptual Features	Period
<i>Predominantly Merit</i>	<i>Inspired by Weberian Model</i>	<i>1951 - 1957</i>
<i>Predominantly Patronage</i>	<i>Inspired by Neopatrimonialism</i>	<i>1957 - 1992</i>
<i>Predominantly Hybrid</i>	<i>Inspired by NPM reforms</i>	<i>1993– till date</i>

2.3 The politics of bureaucratic Appointments Birthed by Nkrumah's *Africanisation Agenda*.

From independence under the first republic i.e. 1957 – 1966, as indicated earlier, the bureaucratic system that was bequeathed to Ghana from the British colonial regime at independence was modelled along with a Weberian bureaucracy (Muwanga-Barlow, 1978; Adamolekun, 2002). The bureaucracy was structured per a British merit-based model which was characterised by apolitical features such as professionalism, neutrality, impartiality and anonymity in the execution of the Ghanaian public interest (Amonoo, 1981; McSheffrey, 1983). Despite these features during the colonial rule, one predominant distinctive feature of the country's bureaucracy was that British expatriates dominated the top tiers of the bureaucracy while the indigenes were at the lower echelons. To this end, Dr Kwame Nkrumah, the new president in post-independent Ghana, undertook aggressive "Africanisation" of Ghana's bureaucrats aimed at reversing the trend of expatriate dominance. In the process, he effectively dismantled the merit-based system of appointments established by the colonial authorities.

That is, the Africanisation of the bureaucracy was aimed at substituting all colonials with loyal indigenes, particularly in the spheres of policy advice and formulation. This was complemented with significant increases in the salaries of indigene clerks and other bureaucratic

personnel (Appiah, 1979; Sigman, 2015). This exercise of substituting expatriates mostly at the top echelons of the bureaucracy with loyal indigenes ostensibly to eradicate remnants of colonialism through the Africanisation of the service became a defining moment in the Ghanaian bureaucratic history (Omaboe, 1966). According to Bennell (1982: 148), “in many respects, the Africanisation of the civil service became the most important political issue during the 1950s because the replacement of British bureaucrats by Africans was considered to be the fundamental precondition for the attainment of true independence”.

As a result, political principals under Nkrumah’s era sought to control both policymaking and bureaucratic management. This meddling of political principals also in turn ultimately created tensions, antagonistic relationships and mistrust between new political bureaucrats and career bureaucrats because career bureaucrats had, hitherto, carried themselves around with a feeling of superiority since their status was bestowed by law (Omaboe, 1966; Amonoo, 1981). This was partly due to the unconscious acceptance of the dichotomy by the career bureaucrats who claimed fiduciary powers for policy implementation (Adarkwa & Ohemeng, 2015). The relationship between politicians and bureaucrats was, therefore, defined in this context (Amonoo, 1981; Gyimah-Boadi & Rothchild, 1990). Politicians sought to become policymakers as well as implementers ahead of career bureaucrats, posing a master-servant relationship (Omaboe, 1966; Amonoo, 1981; Appiah, 2006; Ayee, 2013).

From independence, the ideological underpinnings of government projects and the speed with which the erstwhile Nkrumah government desired to execute those projects contributed to the patronage politics within the bureaucracy (Amonoo, 1981; Appiah, 2006). This is because the bureaucracy had been perceived by the incumbent political principals as an “uncooperative” bunch of technocrats deserving replacement with loyalists (Amonoo, 1981; Gyimah-Boadi & Rothchild, 1990; Appiah, 2006). Gyimah-Boadi & Rothchild (1990: 233) noted that Nkrumah resolved that “he would see to it that there were no ‘civil masters’ but ‘civil servants’ carrying out the policy

decided by the cabinet”. Because Nkrumah suspected bureaucrats and questioned their loyalty, he did all he could between the period of 1957 - 1966 to gain control over the bureaucracy through patronage (Amonoo, 1981; Ayee, 2001). He is reported to have stated his intention to eradicate disloyal bureaucrats even if by so doing he suffers some temporary dislocation as according to him, “disloyal civil servants are no better than saboteurs” (Nkrumah, 1961: 173). His inclination to establish and centralise control of bureaucratic institutions during his presidency compounded the HRM difficulties (Ayee, 1991).

By 1965, Nkrumah had concentrated power at the centre as a bureaucratic management strategy. To illustrate this point, he established the State Enterprises Secretariat whose hierarchy was filled with the political party faithful (Ayee, 2019). He further established a Civil Service Commission to coexist with the PSC (Clerk, 1972) but later curtailed the PSCs jurisdiction by excluding “all organisations other than the civil service and its powers as regards the appointments of heads and deputies of departments” (Nti, 1975: 170). He eventually dissolved the PSC and merged it with the Establishment Secretariat under complete political control (Muwanga-Barlow, 1978). Even worse, he co-opted bureaucrats into the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute (Ayee, 1991). The regime also cloaked itself with the ability to dismiss bureaucrats in situations of perceived disloyalty to the state or “the African project” (Ayee, 2001). Accordingly, the bureaucracy became a device used in attaining parochial political interests through appointed loyalists to the detriment of merit-based personnel or overall bureaucratic efficiency (Akinnusi, 1991). Some scholars of Ghanaian bureaucratic history painted a very bleak picture of those events to the point that Ayee (1991: 291) delivered a damning verdict on Nkrumah’s management of the bureaucracy as “...one [was] tempted to say that Ghana had become almost a classic example of an administrative system on the verge of collapse” via poor bureaucratic personnel practices.

By the time of the overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966, the relationship between bureaucrats and political principals was one of an uneasy tension (Amonoo, 1981). Gyimah-Boadi & Rothchild

(1990) reported that the regime was not keen to entrust the corporate and developmental responsibility to the old-line career-oriented (merit) bureaucrats since it regarded them as routine-minded, conservative and non-committed. Hence, it sought to limit merit-based professionals and bureaucrats to conservative or traditional routine functions while using patronage appointments to run much of the bureaucracy (Adarkwa & Ohemeng, 2015). This uneasy or toxic relationship between the Nkrumah regime and the bureaucracy contributed to the momentum which eventually saw the demise or military overthrow of the Nkrumah regime in 1966. Indeed, the period following the Nkrumah regime also marked another noteworthy epoch in Ghana's bureaucratic history. Therefore, the next section will focus on the conflated but significant brief and long periods of civilian and military rules from 1966 to 1992 and its impact on Ghana's bureaucratic appointment politics.

2.4 From NLC to PNDC – The flip-flops of personnel strategy for the bureaucracy.

The occurrences between the demise of the Nkrumah regime to the end of the PNDC era (1966 - 1992) can best be described as a roller-coaster relationship between bureaucrats and political principals. The government changed often, mainly through military takeovers, except when there were civilian administrations in 1969 - 1972 and 1979 – 1981 respectively. Corruption in the bureaucracy was perceived to be widespread, severely damaging its reputation, and this translated an already precarious situation into an abyss, especially under the succeeding military regimes (Adarkwa & Ohemeng, 2015).

The National Liberation Council – NLC (the military regime which overthrew Nkrumah) in 1966 was made up of top military and senior officers who assumed policy-making roles while other ranking military officers were appointed to run the bureaucracy and remain answerable to these top military commanders (Asante, 2005). However, it is argued that bureaucrats still retained some significant status during this period in terms of their relationship with their military principals. Of the relationship between political principals (military and civilian) and bureaucrats

before the PNDC days, Gyimah-Boadi & Rothchild (1990) noted that the succeeding ruling military and civilian regimes worked in collaboration with bureaucrats who maintained their influence from this association as professionals or experts. The NLC in some respects sought to depoliticise the service. It tried to establish a hearty relationship with the bureaucrats by replacing political appointees with career bureaucrats (Gyimah-Boadi & Rothchild, 1990) while economic policymaking also involved the technocrats and bureaucrats alongside the business community of the NLC's National Economic Council. According to Kosack (2012), the NLC government simulated the British since under that regime, bureaucrats were at the centre whilst the NLC ruled at the periphery via coalitions with chiefs and through centrally appointed bureaucrats.

The 1969 election which ushered in the second republic was fiercely contested between K. A. Busia's United Party (UP) and K. A. Gbedemah's National Alliance of Liberals (NAL) with profound characteristics. In the end, Busia's UP was victorious, and the politics of the bureaucracy which ensued are of significance to this study. The Busia regime (1969-1972) did not significantly vary from the NLC style of governance, i.e. technocrats dominating the government's economic team. However, these technocrats were from outside the bureaucracy, i.e. international development agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund - IMF (Libby, 1976). The policy-making arena was therefore reserved for political principals and technocrats from International development agencies, "resulting in the external co-optation of the policymaking process in Ghana" (Ohemeng, 2019: 221).

Moreover, the ethnic backgrounds of the two leading parties and the voting pattern did not help matters that unfolded after the 1969 election (Asante & Gyimah Boadi, 2004). Significantly, the disqualification of K. A. Gbedemah, an Ewe as the leader of the opposition NAL effectively reinforced the perception of marginalisation of Ewes within this era, especially under Busia's administration. This marginalisation was exacerbated by the deposing of senior military officers of Ewe origin in the Ghana armed forces (Asante & Gyimah Boadi, 2004). This was followed by

the discharge of 568 bureaucrats by the Busia regime apparently under the 1969 Constitutional transition provisions to address the widely held view that Ewes were more represented within senior bureaucrats of the civil service (Asante & Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). This redundancy and retrenchment exercise was perceived by Ewes as a deliberate targeting and exclusionary measure and only deepened the Ashanti-Ewe rivalries. Darkwa *et al.* (2006) maintained that this retrenchment exercise referred to in Ghanaian history as “Apollo 568” highly politicised the bureaucracy and further polarised the country. Critics of the policy contended that it was a clear case of political patronage as it was seen as “getting rid” of bureaucrats deemed to be foes of the incumbent political principals (Owusu, 1972; Amamoo, 2000).

This Asante-Ewe ethnic rivalry in the NLC and Busia-Progress Party regimes with bureaucratic appointment politics undertone was to later affect the next military government under Colonel Acheampong’s National Redemption Council (NRC) (1972-75) and Supreme Military Council I – SMC I (1975-78). In an attempt to ensure the ethnic and regional balance of the ruling Council, the Acheampong regime tried to foster de-politicisation and promote a merit-based professional civil service to avoid the mistakes of the Busia regime (Rothchild, 1978). In this regard, the NRC/SMC promulgated the “Redemption Charter” which sought to establish “party-less” politics in Ghana and a Union Government (Unigov) system characterised by military cum civilian power-sharing arrangements. These two strategies were thought to be a compromising position by the NRC/SMC between Nkrumah’s authoritarian rule and Busia’s multi-party civilian rule which was presented as an alternative under the auspices of the military regime (Chazan, 1983). However, Acheampong’s Unigov concept which aimed at promoting national unity, the professionalisation of the civil service and decreasing patronage politics and tensions through no-party politics was very disappointing (Asante & Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). The referendum in 1977 was supposed to validate the concept but turned out to be politically divisive and cemented the plot which culminated in a palace coup in 1979, ushering in SMC 2 under General F. W. K. Akuffo’s leadership (Chazan, 1983).

The multi-party election that was staged in 1979 virtually brought to the fore, once again, Ghana's ethnic constituency cleavages, with Ewes voting massively against the Popular Front Party (PFP) because of a perception that its candidate, Victor Owusu (an Ashanti) was ethnocentric (Asante & Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). The People's National Party (PNP), as well, gained popularity in the northern regions because its candidate, Dr Hilla Limann was considered a "native son" and that contributed to his success in the general polls. With this third force from the PNP driving its political muscle from the North, the Asante-Ewe rivalry had been temporarily curtailed in the third republic under the Limann-PNP administration. His regime was however short-lived with the military revolution of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) led by Flt. Lt. J.J. Rawlings.

The politics of bureaucratic appointments witnessed under the PNDC era recorded contentious relationships and tensions between political principals and bureaucrats which later culminated or coincided with the NPM reforms sweeping across the globe with support from the Bretton woods institutions. Before the PNDC, the bureaucracy had suffered from the economic plights that afflicted the country in the 1970s. The salaries of bureaucrats were weakened by rising inflation, and some civil servants exited the country for greener pastures (Herbst, 1993; Ayee, 2001; Werlin, 2003). Also, the bureaucracy's capacity to perform its routine roles was extremely constrained (Nti, 1980). Thus, "by 1981, the evidence pointed to a service which was beset with a myriad of capacity problems" (Appiah, 2006: 12). The next military government (PNDC) partly held the bureaucracy to account for the socio-economic and political woes the country was bedevilled with and characterised it as an "agent of imperialism and neo-colonialism" deserving redundancy as opposed to reform (Ayee, 1993: 28).

Generally, the bureaucracy was blamed for corruption, red-tapism, inadequate productivity, inefficiency and vestiges of neo-colonialism with undemocratic leadership (Appiah, 2006). The military regime, therefore, established revolutionary organs such as the People's

Defence Committees (PDC) and Workers Defence Committees (WDC) in various locations, including the bureaucracy. The WDCs were created to help in formulating and implementing government policies; however, their spirit and letter smacked of patronage in both character and policy execution (Ohemeng, 2019). Within this period, a significant number of bureaucrats were retrenched while others were prosecuted for corruption in public tribunals set up by the revolution (Hutchful, 1997; Adarkwa & Appiah, 2006; Ohemeng, 2015).

In the almost-eleven-year governance (1981 to 1992) of the military PNDC, a myriad of reforms and political changes affected bureaucrats and their relationship with political principals. This was especially when the regime signed up to the structural adjustment through economic recovery programmes occasioned by the Britton Woods institutions (IMF and WB). The Britton Woods institutions insisted on the adoption of the NPM approach. This practically returned the country to external co-optation of the policymaking process with international development agencies (Libby, 1976) while excluding bureaucrats from the discussions and implementation of programmes' core aspects (Hutchful, 1997). The NPM model sought to improve the management of resources in the bureaucracy with the insistence on merit rather than the length of service as the basis for promotion, the introduction of a performance appraisal system based on target setting and revision of the Civil Service Law. The signing of performance agreements and contracts with the respective ministries had remained an essential part of the appointment of top bureaucrats under the NPM reform. These tools were employed not only for efficiency but also to redirect bureaucrats to achieve the goals of their respective sectors (Ayee, 2000). The ensuing discussion will, therefore, focus on the NPM oriented civil service reform in Ghana since the beginning of democratic governance under the fourth republic and its role in the growth of a hybrid model regarding bureaucratic appointment strategies.

2.5 Ghana's 4th Republican Democracy & Bureaucratic Appointments under NPM Reform.

Ghana returned to constitutional rule in January 1993 when the fourth Republic was born.

Since 1992, the country has held seven successful multi-party elections. The peaceful transfer of power from the government of the NDC to the NPP following national elections in December 2000, the transfer of power again from the NPP to NDC in 2008 and vice versa in 2016 demonstrate how far Ghana has travelled along the path of democratic consolidation. These periods (2000, 2008 and 2016) have witnessed three alternating governments between the NDC and NPP so far between an interval of eight years in turn. Indeed, with these significant developments, Ghana passed Samuel Huntington's (1991) "two turnover test" of democratic consolidation whilst the country's democratisation is touted as one of the political success stories in Africa (Gyimah-Boadi 2008; Whitfield & Jones 2008). The ensuing discussion will, therefore, proceed to look at structural reforms and the politics surrounding the bureaucracy in Ghana since its return to constitutional democracy.

Within the context of bureaucratic reform politics, various stakeholders underscored that the fundamental barrier to the government's efficient performance was the persistent corruption, over-centralisation with undemocratic leadership occasioned by patronage (Appiah, 2006). Thus, "by 1981, the evidence pointed to a service which was beset with a myriad of capacity problems" (Appiah, 2006: 12). Under democratic governance, the government rolled out major reforms designed to invigorate efficiency in policy implementation while also redefining the mutual relationship between the bureaucrats and political principals. The proponents of reform believed that when government function is advanced from a business viewpoint, bureaucrats can flexibly and innovatively run the business of the bureaucracy for greater productivity (Kettl, 2012). The fundamental hypothesis of this viewpoint is embodied in the NPM propositions where the emphasis is placed on elements such as bureaucratic autonomy, decentralisation, deregulation and positive interpersonal attitudes and behaviour in bureaucratic management (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Under NPM, bureaucracies with political support, autonomy and clarity of goals are presumed to be responsive and effective (Wilson, 1989). Cohen (1998) argued that bureaucrats need freehand and political cooperation to manage with autonomy since this will afford them the

space to apply their skills, knowledge and abilities in the pursuit of public interest (Bowman & West, 2007). In favour of NPM ideals, Cohen (1998) further argued that the necessary political environment to trigger the efficiency of bureaucrats is increased autonomy, commitment and flexibility in the implementation of public policies and programmes.

In Ghana, however, scepticism about implications of the NPM reforms under its personnel deregulation system and the decreasing influence of the political principal over bureaucrats as a result of curtailed direct political appointments led to the amplification of a hybrid set of home-grown reforms. On the face value, propositions of NPM reforms weakened the political principal's traditional control mechanisms through patronage appointments as a result of personnel deregulation; this effectively reduced the traditional grip of political principals on bureaucrats (Peters & Pierre, 2004). Because politicians were still held accountable and responsible irrespective of the loss of control they suffered, it necessitated politicians to look for other ways of guaranteeing responsiveness by tempering with the traditional merit-based appointment processes. This resulted in the subtle and overt injection of political sensitivity criteria in appointing bureaucrats to elicit political responsiveness. While sceptics maintain that such reforms have opened the door for the political principals to slither in patronage appointments, Ingraham (1987) and Heclo (1988) argued that such appointments serve as a conduit through which the political principals exercise oversight responsibility for the bureaucracy. Ingraham (1987) maintained that since political appointments originate from the constitutional realities of the democratic process, such appointees who occupy key portfolios can exploit the nebulous nature of some aspects of the law to fulfil policy objectives of the political principal.

It is noteworthy to concede that past bureaucratic reforms under Busia (1969 - 1972) and Acheampong (1972 – 1978) experimented variations of hybrid appointments albeit at comparatively less pronounced or formal levels before the advent of homegrown NPM reforms which formalised the phenomenon. The new Ghanaian civil service law of 1993 thus provided the

legislative framework for the modified homegrown NPM reform programme as it fundamentally streamlined the structure of the bureaucracy. The law included the creation of the Head of Civil Service portfolio analogous to a ministerial rank which was distinct from the post of the secretary to the cabinet. It also included the re-designation of the position of Principal Secretaries (PS) as Chief Directors (CD) in charge of sector ministries and the OHCS. These CDs were appointed based on both merit and partisanship (Ohemeng, 2019).

Due to the criterion of merit and politics, the CD position was open to others from outside the bureaucracy as opposed to prevailing conventions in the bureaucracy (Ayee 1991; Barnes, 2014). Previously, only career bureaucrats were appointed as PS and beyond (Head of Civil Service). However, under the New Civil Service Law of 1993 which established the two positions (the head of civil service as well as the CD), both positions had effectively become quasi-professional and political, paving the way for persons from outside the bureaucracy to be appointed. The strategic nature of the position of CD within the bureaucracy was apparent since it was the interface between the political principals and bureaucratic employees (from top to rank and file). This reveals how vital it was that a CD is considered as responsive to the political principal and the current government. It also explained why hybrid considerations were applied.

For instance, in 1994, the norm of appointing career bureaucrats to head the civil service was flouted by the NDC (I) regime as the government appointed Dr Robert Dadoo (a *Ga* who was an executive of the Prices and Incomes Board, a subvented organisation) as the Head of the Civil Service (OHCS). This appointment initially sparked controversies in the media and protest within the service because he was not a career civil servant. Since then, the position of the head of the civil service has been a subject of both political and professional considerations. Not surprisingly, upon assumption of office in 2001, the NPP (I) regime asked Dr Dadoo to “proceed on leave” and to hand over to K. Obeng Adofo (an Akan and the CD of the OHCS) as the acting head of the OHCS until 2003 when the regime appointed Dr Alex Glover- Quartey (a *Ga*), as the substantive

head of the service (The Civil Service Journal Vol. 1 No.1, 2003).

Consequently, the homegrown NPM induced bureaucratic personnel reforms paved the way for principals to appoint their loyalists into portfolios formerly reserved for purely merit-based appointees. While critics argue that such appointments encourage abuses that probably exacerbate tension in the system and have a potential to reduce bureaucratic efficiency, many others argue that a hybrid system is essential to facilitate a government's effectiveness (Moe, 1985; Heclo, 1988; Cohen, 1998). Lorentzen (1985) argued that a thriving administration is fuelled by change and continuity in that while change is propelled by frequent turnover of political bureaucrats, the career bureaucrats sustain continuity. He further argued that external scrutiny is a necessary weapon to curb sabotage or complacency in the bureaucracy (Lorentzen, 1985).

To conclude on NPM and the hybrid model, there are still obvious concerns of political control over bureaucrats by politicians even under the NPM reforms; however, the challenge should not concern issues of legitimate oversight responsibility for the bureaucrats by principals through their loyalists, but rather how that legitimate right of the political principal has been exercised to commensurate with the ideals of bureaucratic accountability without abuses and excesses (Lorentzen, 1985; Aberbach & Rockman, 1988; Cohen, 1998). That is, the challenge is how to reconcile such reform initiatives to foster the political accountability of bureaucrats to principals rather than to worsen it. It, therefore, remains to be seen whether the hybrid model that the Ghanaian reform under NPM has amplified will manifest the envisaged outcomes of efficiency, and if so, how it impacts the attitudes and behaviour of bureaucrats and bureaucratic political responsiveness. It is in the context of this intriguing speculations that this study is conducted.

2.6 Chapter Summary

Chapter two has essentially recounted Ghana's bureaucratic appointments history through the lens of politics and regime change. From the review, it is evident that the country has experimented and transitioned between varied bureaucratic personnel strategies aimed at

efficiency and responsiveness. Certainly, the pre-colonial era was patrimonially driven between patrons and clients classically dominated by ‘big-men small-boy’ politics. Subsequently, the colonial period was however initially seen as elitist as few privileged educated elites gained access or space within the colonial administration and bureaucracy. However, with the establishment of the PSC in 1951, it essentially gave birth to the British modelled merit-Weberian bureaucracy in Ghana which failed to see the light of day after the exit of the colonialists. This is because the Nkrumah regime which led the country after independence prioritised regime loyalty through patronage over professionalism, thus effectively dismantling an efficiently established merit-based bureaucratic machinery which was viewed as an appendage of neo-colonialism.

Subsequently, successive civilian and military regimes attempted to customise their own bureaucratic personnel strategies aimed the efficiency. While these efforts may have been well-intentioned, the desired results were sub-optimal leading to the prescription of NPM by the Bretton woods institutions in Ghana. This led to a set of home-grown bureaucratic reform interventions and legal amendments that could best be termed as a ‘hybrid’ of merit and patronage strategies under the current fourth republican dispensation in Ghana. Based on this history and guided by the existing studies on Ghana and theoretical literature, the next Chapter conducts a theoretical review of these main types of bureaucratic appointments currently existing in Ghana. In this next Chapter, the review will relate the theoretical underpinnings of these types of bureaucratic appointments to the expected attitudes and behaviour at the theoretical level.

CHAPTER THREE

THEORIES OF APPOINTMENT AND BUREAUCRATS' ATTITUDES & BEHAVIOUR

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents and discusses the theoretical hypothesis that the type of bureaucrats' appointment (how bureaucrats are appointed) shapes their attitudes and subsequent behaviour. This is further cascaded into three hypotheses. Central to this discussion is the theoretical contention that merit-based appointed bureaucrats ought to demonstrate autonomous attitudes and behaviour which are motivated by a commitment to public service. The chapter further discusses the theoretical argument that patronage-based appointed bureaucrats ought to demonstrate loyal attitudes and behaviour towards their principals; this is motivated by Principal-Agent considerations. Finally, the chapter advances the theoretical argument that the dominant motivations for hybrid bureaucrats' responsive attitudes and behaviour, on the other hand, are underpinned by NPM reforms and aided by rational-choice considerations. Theoretically, therefore, while the types of bureaucratic appointments (merit, patronage, and hybrid) define how bureaucrats are appointed into the civil service; the Public Service Motivation, Principal-Agent, NPM and Rational-Choice theories explain the dominant motivations that shape these civil servants' attitudes which further produce outcomes such as autonomy, loyalty and responsiveness.

This chapter, therefore, examines the theoretical discussions related to these types of appointments and the dominant motivations for the attitudes and subsequent behaviour of bureaucrats. The first hypothesis advances the theoretical arguments regarding the influences between merit-based bureaucrats and their expected autonomy. It contends that merit appointees, motivated by the desire to serve the public as articulated by public service motivation theorists, are predominantly autonomous as they function as neutrally-competent bureaucrats. This hypothetical argument is informed by the expectation that once bureaucrats who desire to serve the public are appointed on merit and expertise-based processes without subjective considerations rooted outside

the bureaucracy, they will pursue the public interest and only subject to the remits of the law.

Also, the second hypothesis focuses on the postulation that patronage appointees, motivated by the desire to serve their principals as propounded by Principal-Agent advocates, ought to be loyal in pursuance of their principals' interests. This proposition is derived from the theoretical presumption that once bureaucrats are hired based on attributes such as trust, commitment or other forms of political, social, economic and network-relationships with the principal, these bureaucrats will serve the interests of their principals with loyalty and be subject to the direction of the principal. However, the third hypothesis examines the theoretical arguments regarding the relationship between hybrid-based bureaucrats and bureaucratic responsiveness. It argues that hybrid appointees, motivated by rational choices and armed with both professional and political craft, are predominantly responsive, and this influences their attitudes and behaviour as responsively-competent bureaucrats. This theoretical postulation is guided by the logical presumption that when bureaucrats are hired with sufficient attention to both professional and political credentials as inspired by NPM ideals, these bureaucrats, in their quest for efficiency, will navigate through the remits of rules and professionalism to meet political ends. Testing these three theoretical arguments has become very vital because of a dearth of evidence to empirically (in)validate these arguments in Ghana.

As discussed in chapter two, the history of Ghana's appointment practices revealed diverse appointment types in its bureaucratic dispensation despite the country's legal and institutional frameworks premised on only the merit-principle (Asante & Gyimah-Boadi, 2004; Kopecký, 2011). Congruently, several researchers (Kopecký, 2011; Ayee, 2013; Dahlström *et al.*, 2015; Sigman, 2015; Brierley, 2018) have all conducted various studies into the incidence of appointment practices in the Ghanaian bureaucracy using different variables. Yet, none of these studies has specifically investigated the relationships between the above-outlined hypotheses. To illustrate the non-existence of such studies, the first part of this chapter will examine these previous

but relevant studies and the lessons learnt from them. This examination will contribute toward establishing the foundation and revealing the gaps in addressing the question of bureaucrats' attitudes and behaviour relative to their type of appointment. The second part of this chapter proceeds to engage in detailed discussions and presents the three main hypotheses (Merit-autonomy, patronage-loyalty and hybrid-responsiveness theses) as a set-up for testing in the empirical chapters. The final part of this chapter devotes attention to clarifying the theoretical distinctions between the patronage-loyalty and hybrid-responsiveness theses and proceeds to conclude this chapter.

<i>Type of Appointment</i>	Table 2: Hypotheses and their theoretical Underpinnings.		
	Hypothesis 1	Hypothesis 2	Hypothesis 3
	Merit	Patronage	Hybrid
Theory	Public Service Motivation	Principal-Agent /Public-Choice	New Public Management
Attitudes & Behaviour	Autonomy	Loyalty	Responsiveness
Desired Bureaucracy	Apolitical	Predominantly Political	Politically-Responsive

3.2 A brief overview of bureaucratic appointment studies in Ghana.

Since the seminal work of Woodrow Wilson in the 19th Century, much interest and discussions have been generated in the field of bureaucratic studies. These interests have generally manifested in two forms, either through empirical studies or theoretical discussions. Ghana as a country has not been excluded from the equation of bureaucratic studies at the empirical level; such studies have informed researchers and policy-makers to understand Ghana's bureaucratic dynamics. It is, therefore, imperative to review and highlight some of the key empirical research conducted on bureaucratic appointments in Ghana to identify the gaps and draw lessons.

From the ethnic and regional inequalities perspective, Asante & Gyimah-Boadi (2004),

among other things, studied public perceptions regarding the influence of ethnic and regional factors in bureaucratic appointments. The study measured public opinion and attitudes regarding appointments into the Ghanaian bureaucracy using a qualitative approach. This qualitative study relied on interviews of 60 Ghanaian elite most of whom were employed in the bureaucracy. The study revealed that regardless of the need for experience and technical capacity (merit) in the bureaucracy, sectarian or patronage factors such as ethnicity were given significant attention (Asante & Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). At the same time, the study also found that bureaucratic appointments did not sufficiently reflect a regional balance, suggesting a sense of relative deprivation among the nation's ethnic and regional groups (Asante & Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). The study concluded that electoral competition exploited playing the "sectarian card" which inspired or influenced bureaucratic appointments to follow similar patterns.

From a political competition and bureaucratic appointments perspective, Kopecký (2011) looked at how emerging democracies like Ghana and South Africa exploited the state through party appointments across state institutions (different policy areas) using qualitative survey data of 45 key experts. It also delved into the theoretical proposition that robust party competition restrained patronage politics. The study, however, found that patronage in competitive democracies like Ghana is not lower per se than in less competitive party systems and that factors other than party competition contributed to this unpredicted observation. It also found that political parties dispensed patronage at virtually the same rates across policy areas. However, while this study established the extent of patronage appointments in Ghana, it did not focus on its consequences.

From the bureaucrats' behavioural perspective, Ayee (2013), in his study of bureaucrats under democratic governance, specifically looked at the politicisation of the bureaucracy in Ghana. Employing a desk study approach, the research focused on exploring the environmental, constitutional, legal, and political framework within which bureaucrats operate in Ghana since the country's return to constitutional rule in 1993. It looked at the involvement of bureaucrats in

partisan politics by reconciling the Ghanaian experience with other selected countries. Ayee's (2013) study found an increasing partisan politicisation of the bureaucracy and equal growing participation of bureaucrats in partisan politics. The study concluded that the dichotomy between politics and administration was a myth in Ghana.

Furthermore, the "Quality of Governance" project carried out by Dahlström *et al.* in 2015 examined the Ghanaian case when it measured the levels of meritocracy in selected countries. The study employed expert surveys to assess or measure the density of meritocratic scores across 157 countries. Out of a 28-point meritocracy index, Ghana scored 15.63, just marginally above the Sub-Sahara African average of 14.76. This somewhat average and precise measurement of the country's meritocracy rate caused the researchers to conclude that Ghana's bureaucracy is neither fully professionalised nor patronage-ridden.

Besides, from the state exploitation perspective, Sigman (2015) investigated the nexus between party financing and patronage appointments while examining state capacity to constrain or facilitate such exploitation in African democracies like Ghana and Benin. The underlying theoretical argument advanced by Sigman (2015) was that patronage-based appointment into the bureaucracy is primal to facilitating ways of party financing with dire repercussions for state developmental capabilities in African democracies. It also drew on the neopatrimonialist perspective to dissect forms of authority in African politics that effuse variations of state institutional capacity as opposed to the view that patronage is ubiquitously injurious to African states. The study combined data including comprehensive datasets of appointment and biographical information of cabinet ministers between the 1990s and 2013 with an original survey of over 500 bureaucrats in each country coupled with qualitative interviews with 60 state actors.

The study found that the political elite dispensed patronage beyond vote-buying to include a more fundamental goal of control over state resources by facilitating particularistic exchanges of goods and services for party financing. It, further, found that in polities where private capital is

less common, principals focused on patronage within the bureaucracy by leveraging on their political networks to gain access to state resources for party financing which have wider ramifications for state developmental capacity. It concluded that pervasive bureaucratic patronage appointments exacerbated bureaucratic technical deficiencies and further dissipated state resources in service to party financing. This was mainly through the recurrent evaporation of public resources for political use through undue subordination of bureaucracies.

Lastly, Brierley (2018) also conducted a study regarding the politics of development and corruption in Ghana by focusing on the delivery of public services (such as the construction of school and health facilities) to citizens by elite actors (political principals and bureaucrats). Particularly, the study had two main objectives: to understand why bureaucrats and political principals are predisposed to engage in misconduct in the selection and execution of contracts risking battered integrity (despite an institutionalised competitive procurement process) and secondly, to determine at what level merit and patronage-based appointments are dispensed in Ghana's bureaucracy. She adopted a mixed-method approach by combining data from an original survey with qualitative data from interviews with bureaucrats, politicians and other experts coupled with observational data from a new database.

Regarding the first objective, the study found that merit-based appointments accompanied by attractive bureaucratic compensation or amplified monitoring will fail to enhance the efficient delivery of services as long as political principals retain influence over bureaucrats' careers and means of livelihoods. On the second objective, the study found that stiff electoral competition discouraged principals from influencing senior bureaucratic appointments while at the same time encouraged patronage appointments at the lower levels. The study concluded that merit appointments may not be sufficient to curtail corruption because an unrestrained principal possesses sufficient motivations to circumvent due process to secure funds for party financing.

In examining the above extant studies on Ghana and other SSA countries, and to the best of the researcher's knowledge, it is clear that no studies have specifically looked at the nexus

between appointment types and bureaucratic attitudes and behaviour. Yet, there is a pervasive expectation that how bureaucrats are appointed will shape their attitudes and behaviour. There are equally significant scholarly theoretical postulations about the influence of bureaucratic appointments on attitudes and behaviour for which direct scientific empirical evidence is modest. Much of the arguments for merit, patronage or hybrid-based type of appointment is based on these expectations. For example, while principals expect patronage-based appointees to be loyal and help them to function, they inversely expect that merit-based bureaucrats can “successfully obstruct government policies, in particular, those policies that they [merit bureaucrats] perceive to threaten their personal, ideological and/or institutional interests” (Andersen, 2018: 254). To buttress this point in Ghana, the current ruling party (NPP) in their response to the opposition party’s (NDC) allegations of widespread patronage appointments was reported to have retorted that they “cannot appoint enemies to run government” (www.theghanareport.com, retrieved on April 17, 2020).

These expectations of desired attitudes and behaviour occasioned by the type of appointment of bureaucrats are contingent on the *ceteris paribus* assumption. However, since it is also realistic to anticipate that there may be countervailing factors that have the potential to disrupt these expectations, it is important to examine the level of influence that these types of appointment have on bureaucratic attitudes and behaviour in Ghana. This is especially relevant because of its unswerving consequences to the performance of both the entire bureaucracy and, by extension, national development (Niskanen, 1971; Weber, 1997; Haque 2007). Hence, this study moves beyond extant studies on bureaucratic appointment dynamics in Ghana and theoretical expectations to address this gap by obtaining novel data to empirically assess the influence of types of appointment on bureaucratic attitudes and behaviour. To do this, it was vital for the study to formulate viable research hypotheses worthy of testing. The next section of this chapter, therefore, presents the theoretical arguments establishing the research hypotheses by defining the theoretical relationship between independent variables of merit, patronage and hybrid (types of appointments)

and the dependent variables of autonomy, loyalty and responsiveness (attitudes and behaviour). The first theoretical argument to be reviewed in the ensuing paragraphs is, therefore, the relationship between merit-based appointees and their expected autonomy.

3.3 The Merit – Autonomy Thesis

This study's overarching hypothesis asserts that the type of civil service appointment shapes bureaucratic attitudes and behaviour, and this has been sub-divided into three hypotheses. The first hypothesis follows the theoretical or conventional view in extant literature that merit-based appointments influence autonomous attitudes and behaviour (Weber, 1919, 1948, 1968; Johnson & Libecap, 1994; Evans & Rauch, 2000; Grindle, 2012; Dahlström *et al.*, 2012; Cooper, 2018). Here, the study characterises the merit-autonomy thesis in the traditional sense of Weberian bureaucracy. Indeed, the foundation of the theory of meritocracy in bureaucratic studies is credited to Weber's (1919) study of bureaucracy despite earlier accounts or proposals for meritocracy by Charles Trevelyan and Stafford Northcote in 1854. The Northcote-Trevelyan report on bureaucratic recruitment and promotion in the UK stated that:

the great and increasing accumulation of public businesses and the... frequent changes which take place in the responsible administration are a matter of sufficient notoriety... the Government of the country could not be carried on without the aid of an efficient body of permanent officers, occupying positions duly subordinate to that of the Ministers who are directly responsible to the Crown and to Parliament, yet possessing sufficient independence, character, ability and experience to be able to advise, assist, and to some extent, influence, those who are from time to time set over them (cited in Mueller, 2009).

The advocacy for a merit-based bureaucracy was later advanced by Weber (1919) where he argued that establishing a “rational-legal authority” is the most desirous path to conduct the business of governance. In Weber's (1919) view, since the interests of the public and political principals or even bureaucrats themselves occasionally diverge, only an exclusively rule-based and neutrally

competent system of bureaucratic governance can ensure reliable and adequate levels of public service delivery. In Rocha's (2005) view, "from the moment we separate political activity from administrative activity, we can speak of Weber's legal-bureaucratic administration model." This theory provides a tremendous contribution to the discourse regarding the development of a career-based or professional body of bureaucrats insulated by legal statutes from the discretionary controls of principal-patrons. It advocates "neutral competence" as a defining characteristic of the civil servant.

From this foundation, many subsequent advocates for public service reform stressed that a professionalised bureaucracy which is usually manifested through merit-based appointments was needed because of the ills of patronage. They argued that patronage led to appointments of unfit personnel and that isolating the bureaucracy from politics resulted in efficient government performance (Mueller, 2009). According to Evans & Rauch (2000), although meritocracy is an insufficient condition for the state to develop, it is necessary and strongly needed to build a capable, career-oriented and professionalised civil service. Dahlström & Lapuente (2017: 2) also argued that appointment of bureaucrats based on "merit rather than political considerations are consequently important resources for high quality government." Indeed, extant research suggests that countries that run on meritocracies record appreciable rates of economic growth compared with those that do not (Evans & Rauch, 2000). The WB's 1997 World Development Report articulated the view that "making a meritocracy of the civil service helps bring in high-quality staff, confers prestige on civil service positions, and can do a great deal to motivate good performance" (World Bank, 1997: 92). It further argued that "where promotions are personalised or politicised, civil servants worry more about pleasing their superiors or influential politicians, and efforts to build prestige through tough recruitment standards are undercut" (World Bank, 1997: 93).

The definition of merit principle or meritocracy as a concept is, therefore, vital. McCourt

(2007) noted that it is not easy to define merit. According to Sen (2000:5), meritocracy is “essentially under-defined” because of the “varieties of meritocracy - some desirable, others possibly malignant” (Low, 2014: 49). Merit, Sen (2000) argued, is a conditional theory subject to what is considered to be just by society. This theory of meritocracy received much attention since the term was popularised by Young (1958) and is defined as a system where “...talent is the basis for sorting people into positions and distributing rewards” (Scully, 1997: 413).

Castilla & Benard (2010: 543) see meritocracy as a system where “everyone has an equal chance to advance and obtain rewards based on their individual merits and efforts, regardless of their gender, race, class or other non-merit factors.” Merit could also be defined as “the appointment of the best person for any given job” (McCourt, 2007: 5). Under bureaucratic systems of merit, once beyond a probationary period after appointment, civil servants are granted tenure with huge costs attached to dismissals (Johnson & Libecap, 1989). With meritocracy, bureaucrats are selected or appointed within a defined legal framework, rules or conventions where qualification, competence, expertise, seniority and other credentials are considered and are compensated for under a standardised reward system (Johnson & Libecap, 1994).

Proponents of meritocracy such as Weber (1919, 1948, 1968); Ritzer (1975); Andreski (1983), Johnson & Libecap (1994); Evans & Rauch (1999); Miller (2000); Henderson et al. (2007) and Dahlström *et al.* (2012) maintain that the merit-principle leads to professionalisation rather than the politicisation of the bureaucracy. They argue that recruitment (appointment) into the bureaucracy ought to be conditioned on qualifications, competence and relevant credentials regarding knowledge, skills and abilities referred to by Weber (1968) as the “expert-officialdom”. Rosenbloom (2008), in his study of bureaucracy, also argued for a bureaucratic apparatus that is devoid of politics since such political systems potentially serve as a bastion for patronage (Skowronek, 1982).

This theory reinforces the principle of equality and competence while rejecting all forms

of discrimination and unfairness through patronage, nepotism, and corruption. It is also based on the principle of equal opportunities, transparency and openness to all potential candidates irrespective of their peculiar demographics such as political affiliation, race, gender, class etc. (Dreyfus, 2010). Within the context of the civil service, its cardinal hallmarks are reflected in the principle of open selection, competition, a set of qualification standards and established recruitment processes as opposed to discretionary appointments into the civil service (Poocharoen & Brillantes, 2013). According to Grindle (2012: 266), “Weber outlines these characteristics to demonstrate that public officials in a modern bureaucracy pursue a career of administration and work as servants of the state, not of patrons, kings, or other individuals” and that bureaucrats are always recruited into the service as professionals or careerists. Thus, scaling down this theory to everyday practice within the civil service, meritocracy in appointment processes is commonly manifested in requisite educational qualifications, relevant work experience and expertise, passing psychological tests and interviews. Other meritocratic indicators include performance-based assessments (Poocharoen & Brillantes, 2013). According to Grindle (2012: 21), meritocracy in

...nonelected bureaucracy jobs are filled through a process of credentialing based on education, exams, or some other test of merit; in which a career ladder exists and is accessed through regularised demonstration of credentials of education, examination, tenure in office, or another form of assessing merit; in which tenure is secure barring malfeasance in office; and in which movement in and out is regulated and compensated. In such a system, the official performs duties for the state or the service, not for the patron. The rules of the game in this system are autonomy, formality and objectivity through regulations and procedures.

Merit-based appointments and promotions also guarantee that competent and experienced bureaucrats are rewarded with what they deserve (Huber & Ting, 2015). Conversely, meritocracy does not consider the bureaucracy as a source to exploit particularistic exchanges between

politicians and bureaucrats, nor is considered a usual “exchange of services for equivalents” (Weber, 1948: 198 - 199). Proponents of this theory advocate that governments and bureaucracies should embrace a culture of merit-based appointments and promotions since according to Kanyane (2006), a culture of patronage often breeds an atmosphere of playing safe, which is not conducive for accountability and is inimical/detrimental to the public interest.

According to Stark (2002), under such merit systems, political principals cannot promote civil servants or set up systems to do the same other than based on their qualifications and competence. Such meritocratic systems do not allow principals to engage in wholesale patronage by allowing principals to solely consider the political beliefs of individuals or civil servants in deciding who to place in what bureaucratic positions. That is, for bureaucrats in merit systems, personal beliefs are detached (Stark, 2002). Such bureaucrats are expected to demonstrate neutrality irrespective of their own beliefs and carry out the public interest. This is to say that as far as neutrality is concerned, interests other than that of the public are of no consequence, neither are any personal beliefs, except those with legality where it is the bureaucrat’s job to implement such (Stark, 2002).

Putnam (1973) contended that merit-based civil servants, thus, operate with a monistic conception (i.e. the ‘public interest’) with the conviction that problems can be resolved in terms of objective standards and technical practicality devoid of the preferences of political principals. Advocates of meritocracy also contend that these merit-based bureaucrats are motivated by the will to serve the public, which feeds into their functioning as neutrally-competent bureaucrats. This crucial notion of merit bureaucrats prioritising public interests is well advanced by *Public Service Motivation* (PSM) theorists. As advanced by Perry & Wise (1990), the PSM theory focuses on why bureaucrats, through their attitudes and behaviour, desire to serve the overall public interest. Thus, appreciating the main argument of PSM is relevant as it provides us with the motivations of bureaucrats to choose careers in the bureaucracy. Bright (2008: 151) maintains that PSM is

generally underpinned by “altruistic intentions that motivate individuals to serve the public interest” while in the view of Ben-Dor *et al.* (2008: 571), it consists of intentions, attitudes, behaviour and the motives inferred thereof.

According to Perry & Wise (1990: 368) PSM comprises of the motives of bureaucrats for their behaviour and is construed as “an individual's predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and organisations”. Brewer & Selden (1998: 417) define it as the “motivational force that induces individuals to perform meaningful public service” while Vandenabeele (2007: 547) sees it as “the belief, values and attitudes that go beyond self-interest or organisational interest, that concern the interest of a larger political entity and that motivate individuals to act accordingly...” Similarly, Rainey & Steinbauer (1991: 23) described PSM “as a general altruistic motivation to serve the interests of a community of people, a state, a nation, or humankind” while Taylor (2008: 67) sees it as a “cluster of motives, values, and attitudes on serving the public interest.”

From the above characterisation of PSM, Houston (2006: 67) notes that PSM is consistent with the orthodox view that choosing the bureaucracy for “employment is a calling, ... [where] bureaucrats are motivated by an ethic to serve the public and act out of a commitment to the common good rather than mere self-interest.” It mainly advances the notion that merit bureaucrats are servants who are committed to the public interest and motivated by a desire that is founded on altruism, benevolence and the quest of positive contribution to change. Indeed, Scott & Pandey (2005: 156) maintained that PSM represents “the idea of commitment to the public service, pursuit of the public interest and the desire to perform work that is worthwhile to society”. These bureaucrats mainly rely on “intrinsic rewards over extrinsic rewards” (Crewson, 1997; Houston, 2000; Kim 2006: 726).

Since merit bureaucrats are acknowledged to consider the public service as a calling, they are predicted to feel a sense of accomplishment (intrinsic reward) when they play a role to achieve

the public interest (Kim & Vandenabeele, 2010). They are also construed as predominantly willing to sacrifice personal interests and accept fewer rewards while giving more obligation to public service. Based on self-sacrifice, these bureaucrats are predominantly expected to behave in ways that are intended to positively shape public interest as a way of satisfying their personal needs. The more bureaucrats value public service as their motivation, the more likely they are to autonomously engage in attitudes and behaviour that benefit the public, even without noticeable rewards (Wise, 2000).

According to PSM theorists, a very crucial attitude and behaviour projected by merit bureaucrats, therefore, is autonomy from parochial interests of various actors which injures the public interest. Hyden, Court & Mease (2003) had argued that certainly, bureaucrats need a definite measure of autonomy from political principals as they cannot afford to be responsive to every political demand; therefore, a degree of autonomy is necessary especially in framing and executing required development policies. This is also because, the proponents posit that autonomous attitudes and behaviour of bureaucrats shape the extent of bureaucratic efficiency. Ruhil & Camoes (2003) and Mueller (2009) also argued that an autonomous and independent bureaucracy which appoints and promotes its personnel based on merit is often regarded as a cornerstone of good governance which often coincides with a trend towards more open democratisation. Since bureaucrats required autonomy to sufficiently pursue the public interest, what autonomy entails is vital to formulate.

In definitional terms, Evans (1995) defined autonomy as the ability of bureaucrats to be independent of private interests. Christensen (1999), however, defined bureaucratic autonomy as the formal exemption of top bureaucrats from full political supervision. Haftel & Thompson (2006: 256) conceived of autonomy as a focus on “independence” and defined bureaucratic autonomy as the “ability to operate in a manner that is insulated from the influence of other political actors”. Fukuyama (2013), also, defined bureaucratic autonomy as the manner in which political principals define objectives to bureaucrats who act as their agents.

To contextualise autonomy as a dependent variable of interest in this study, it is useful to point out Christensen's (1999) three dimensional distinctions of bureaucratic autonomy; that is, structural autonomy (alternative/competing levels of control), financial autonomy (budgetary space or restrictions) and legal autonomy (legal mandates by bureaucracies to make decisions). Whereas the above distinctions are meaningful with a potential to providing different perspectives in examining the value of merit to bureaucrats' autonomy, a caveat of this study is that it does not dwell on any specific type of autonomy as distinguished above: legal, structural or financial. Rather, the study basically explores how civil servants' appointment determine or shape the kind of autonomy they exercise.

Conventionally, civil servants in most political settings compete to set their own agenda, irrespective of the regime: democratic or authoritarian. A variety of agenda are usually defined in bureaucracies by principals who should typically set broad objectives for their agents, with a leeway to issue additional mandates, as well, regarding how these broad objectives should be executed (Fukuyama, 2013). Understandably, the fewer and broader the agenda, the more autonomy bureaucrats may possess. From this logic, it would mean that a fully autonomous bureaucracy is free from any political objective and, rather, independently define its own goals devoid of political dictation. On the contrary, a subordinated bureaucrat is micromanaged by the principal who controls and dictates his interests or objectives to the agent. For example, with respect to bureaucratic personnel appointment and promotion within a subjugated bureaucracy, the principal may dictate that certain individuals are appointed to key positions that the principal may regard as vital to prosecuting his interests or objectives within the bureaucracy.

Theoretically, merit processes of appointment are presumed to bestow on civil servants a significant degree of autonomy and are largely insulated from political or private control as policies are in place to ensure a secured tenure (so that whoever acquires power does not determine which civil servant gets to keep his job). According to Carboni (2010: 103), since political patronage

compels “the bureaucratic machine [to be] responsive” by obliging bureaucrats under patronage arrangements to dispense favours, a merit-based bureaucrat is liberated from such commitments. This is because his/her appointment is not conditioned by anything other than competence and merit. As Simon (1983) and Rose-Ackerman (1986) argued, principals ought to entrust sufficient authority and discretion to bureaucrats as possible, by placing faith on their values, expertise and resolve to deliver on public interests. McDonnell (2017: 504) also argued that sufficient bureaucratic autonomy facilitated efficient control of personnel and rewards and that autonomy does not only allow top bureaucrats to appoint competent and committed subordinates via merit criteria but also afford these bureaucrats the space to hold each other accountable based on agreed performance standards (Also see Grindle, 1997: 488). Evans (1995) further advanced the argument that when merit appointees are given career rewards, it fosters a sense of coherence which allow bureaucrats a certain autonomy even if they were not insulated from the public.

Carpenter (2001) further argued that bureaucratic autonomy offered bureaucrats the necessary insulation to enact and prosecute comprehensive public policies and programmes. He maintained that autonomy could be manifested in many positive ways including influencing the “... preferences of politicians and the organised public” (p. 15). In the end, bureaucrats’ preferences could become policy. According to Krause *et al.* (2006: 773), bureaucrats who are selected through meritorious processes “afford organisational stability and memory, as well as greater discretion to utilise their technical expertise.” Based on their convictions, these civil servants do not shy from going contrary to their principals to demonstrate competence in service to either the public or bureaucratic interests. Indeed, according to Cooper (2018), merit-based appointments is believed to improve bureaucrats sense of autonomy to candidly voice their opinions to their principals in the course of their work. Aberbach & Rockman (2006), in their in-depth study of the attitudes, values, and beliefs of top bureaucrats and elected officials, concluded that bureaucrats are trained professionals who should “speak truth to power”. Thus, the bureaucracy required autonomous bureaucrats who are hired through merit to foil the undesired

interests of principals (Pitschas, 2006).

Dahlström *et al.* (2012) asserted that autonomous bureaucrats are necessary to curb undesired behaviour such as corruption in the bureaucracy due to the reality of competing interests and actors in that arena. In their argument, they maintained that bureaucrats and political principals as different actors will serve as checks and balances on each other due to their heterogeneous nature and that as actors, they are likely to be confronted with a “collective action problem” when they attempt to conspire in shady interests. Therefore, an autonomous bureaucrat is a “residual-minimising” actor who counterbalances the more homogeneous interest of the political principal (Miller & Hammond, 1994: 23). From this theoretical logic, corruption, for example, may be curtailed not because autonomous bureaucrats are superior or “better” than political principals but because merit-recruited bureaucrats are simply “different”.

Aucoin (1997) had earlier argued that autonomous staffing by bureaucracies is necessary because experience has demonstrated that political involvement in appointments invites principals to think of bureaucrats as instruments in the service of partisanship. However, what politicisation eventually does in the civil service is that it leads to inadequate bureaucratic capacity coupled with a dearth of accountability on the delivery of public interests as the bureaucratic system becomes immoral and a democratic disease (Mamogale, 2014). In fact, Meyer-Sahling & Mikkelsen’s (2017; 2018) analysis of merit-based recruitment and bureaucrats’ attitudes reveals that merit recruitment is associated with less corruption, while politicization is associated with more corruption. Conversely, Rasul & Rogger (2013), for example, provided empirical evidence to buttress the argument that politicisation is detrimental when their study found that increasing bureaucrats’ autonomy from politics is positively associated with project completion rates in Nigeria. Similarly, Rasul, Rogger & Williams (2017) found that allowing greater autonomy is positively correlated with project completion in Ghana than ensuring the provision of incentives to bureaucrats and strict monitoring.

Rasul *et al.*'s (2017) findings in both Nigeria and Ghana upholds the argument for bureaucrats' autonomy and empowerment where great faith is placed on their professionalism and resolve to pursue the public interests. It is based on such faith put on bureaucrats' professionalism that article 296 and 297 (b) and (c) of Ghana's 1992 constitution provides bureaucrats with autonomy and discretionary power in the discharge of their duties as bureaucrats. However, Rasul *et al.*'s (2017) evidence is counter- supportive of the widely articulated view expressed by antagonists of bureaucratic autonomy that when bureaucrats are granted sufficient autonomy, they are more likely to prioritise their own, possibly illicit interests to the detriment of the public interest. Schick (1998: 127) warned that to grant bureaucratic autonomy in patrimonial settings without sufficient and efficient rule of law is a recipe for bureaucratic scandal by stating that "it would be foolhardy to entrust public managers with complete freedom over resources" without robust legal compliance mechanisms. Nonetheless, merit advocates discount the above argument by indicating that controlling bureaucrats (loyalty) through patronage appointments rather leads to shady deals and poor performance which are covered up or blamed on others when discovered.

In synergising the central argument of merit-autonomy hypothesis, this study proposes that aspects of *Public Service Motivation* as previously espoused explains the motivations for bureaucrats who prioritise the public interest to behave the way they do. This is because the intrinsic values of merit-bureaucrats drive them to prioritise the public interest as a basis of their attitudes and behaviour in the course of performing their duties. Within the bureaucracy, each bureaucrat has a set of "ends sought and sets [internal regulatory] constraints on the means used to pursue these ends" (Knoke & Wright-Isak, 1982: 216). Therefore, for a merit bureaucrat to advance any course of action based on his/her normative orientations of what is appropriate and acceptable (Kim & Vandenabeele, 2010), it presupposes that the merit bureaucrat's attitude or behaviour goes through an internal self-introspection guided by the public service considerations. In this regard, merit bureaucrats commit to serving the public interest especially since there are no commitments or *quid pro quo* conditions attached to their appointment other than competence and qualification.

This study, therefore, advances the theoretical argument that to ensure that the public interest is pursued, merit-based processes conditioned on qualification and experience ought to be adopted to appoint bureaucrats. This is because when bureaucrats are appointed based on merit, devoid of fiduciary obligations or interests rooted outside the public interest, it is predicted that these merit bureaucrats who have the profound responsibility of protecting and promoting the public interest will have the autonomy to function with neutral competence (Ingraham & Ban, 2007). Given these cogent arguments in theory regarding the effects of merit on bureaucrats' autonomy, this study foments a hypothesis suited for testing the influences of merit-based appointments on bureaucratic autonomy. That is:

H₁: The more merit-based the process of appointment is, the more likely it is that a bureaucrat will be autonomous in the performance of his/her duties.

In a nutshell, the above discussion demonstrates how proponents of Weberian bureaucracies argue that merit or professional bureaucrats pursue the public interests by efficiently producing public goods that include contract enforcement, education, security, public infrastructure etc. to benefit the public (Rauch & Evans, 2000; Lewis, 2008; Gerber & Gibson, 2009). It is based on these arguments that this study seeks to empirically test the above hypothesis in Ghana and, by extension, SSA. By contrast, there are equally compelling arguments and justifications in support of patronage as an effective means to secure political accountability through Principal-Agent arrangements. In fact, PSM advocates concede that aspects of PSM stipulate a sense of belongingness and identity which bring an inclination to sacrifice or loyally serve those identified interests. Furthermore, PSM's rational-choice perspective as advanced by Perry and Wise also suggests potential motives of bureaucrats that encompass pursuance of parochial interests which are not in keeping with the public interest since rational choices have been understood to contain self-interestedness (Perry & Wise, 1990; Perry 1996; 1997; Wise 2000; Kim & Vandenabeele, 2010). Therefore, since the merit-autonomy hypothesis does not address

why bureaucrats may pursue other interests within the bureaucracy such as that of the political principal, the next hypothesis draws on the Principal-Agent theory to advance theoretical arguments for why patronage bureaucrats may loyally pursue their principals' interests to the detriment of the public interest.

3.4 The Patronage – Loyalty Thesis

The second hypothesis of this study relates to the theoretical postulation that patronage-based appointments significantly influence bureaucrats' loyalty (Johnson & Libecap, 1994; Goetz, 1997; Du Gay, 2000; Kopecký *et al.* 2012; Veit & Scholz 2016). Proponents argue that patronage appointments may be dispensed for a variety of reasons by principals, chief among which is control over an increasingly fragmented bureaucracy (Kopecky *et al.*, 2012; Enns-Jedenastik, 2015). Historically, the roots of patronage appointments or particularistic exchanges in SSA have been traced to patrimonial societies. According to Weber (1968), patrimonial regimes are defined as systems where individuals possess complete authority and power in the context of traditional settings, where the commoners are not citizens of a given polity but extensions of the powerful individual's household or dominion; as such, their rights are defined only as set forth by the individuals (cited in Miguel & Zaidi, 2003). These powerful individuals reciprocally "ensure the political stability of the regime and personal political survival by providing a zone of security in an uncertain environment and by selectively distributing favours and material benefits to loyal followers not necessarily by citizenship of the polity but rather as the ruler's clients" (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997: 61).

With advent of modern and civilized governments, it became possible for scholars such as Weber to distinguish between "patrimonial" and "rational-legal" authorities as exemplified in meritocratic systems. Wherein the latter, laws are enacted to define and protect public interests from the discretionary powers of principals in the distribution of rights and privileges (Miguel & Zaidi, 2003). However, Weber's rational-legal system did not ensure the demise of

“patrimonialism” as it endured in the form of neo-patrimonialism, “the most salient type of authority” in SSA with patronage as a major feature (Clapham, 1985: 49).

Essentially, patronage’s foundational linchpin is hinged on reciprocal relations between patrons and their agents (clients), meaning an individual exerting his influence to assist or protect some other person, who then becomes his “client” or “agent” and in return provides certain services for him as patron or principal (Weingrod, 1968). “It is usually conceived of as a form of particularistic exchange between patrons and clients, which has existed in both traditional and modern societies, in both democratic and non-democratic regimes, in various types of organisations, and on local, regional, national, and even supranational level” (Kopecký *et al.*, 2012: 3). Patronage, thus, encompasses “the complex relations between those who use their influence, social position or other attributes to assist and protect others, and those whom they so help and protect” (Boissevain, 1966: 18). Its relationships are “economies of affection” that exchange political support for personalised favours and benefits (Lindberg & Morrison, 2008).

In definitional terms, the common understanding of patronage is thought of as “a political currency with which to purchase political activity and political responses from voters whose loyalty is ensured by an organisationally created web of jobs, favours, and payoff distributed at the discretion of political leaders” (Reid & Kurth, 1992). It could also be defined as the political allocation of posts in the civil service (Mueller, 2009). Atencia (2013) further defines patronage as a system of “appointing persons to government positions based on political support and loyalty rather than on merit, as measured by objective criteria”. However, in operationalising patronage in the context of this study, it will refer to the power of principals to appoint loyalists to bureaucratic posts (Kopecký & Scherlis, 2008) and a strategy pursued to secure loyalty and gain control over bureaucrats.

In this theoretical discourse, recent in-depth characterisation of patronage by contemporary scholars into two distinct kinds is useful; that is, patronage as a *reward* to supporters and/or

financiers and patronage as a *control* tool within bureaucracies (Kopecký & Scherlis, 2008; Kopecký *et al.* 2012). Thus, Kopecký *et al.* (2012) clustered patronage into *organisational* and *electoral* resources. This distinction between patronage as an *organisational resource* from patronage as an *electoral resource* is relevant given that the motivations for their respective deployment are dissimilar. The common understanding and application of patronage in most literature is patronage as an *electoral resource* (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007).

However, growing attention of scholarship has focused on patronage as an *organisational resource* which has emerged as a very vital dimension in patronage studies (Kopecký *et al.*, 2012). Patronage as an *electoral resource* is understood in literature as an exchange of various public goods for electoral support and party financing which is assumed to involve a relationship between a politician who uses own resources or resources gained through privileged access to the civil service to cement political support from constituents or group of potential supporters (Kopecký *et al.*, 2012). Thus, patronage represents a form of linkage politics through which political principals obtain electoral support in exchange for distributing benefits through state institutions (Kopecký *et al.*, 2012; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). In this regard, patronage is construed as clientelism because politicians (patrons) seek the support of clients (agents) characterised by unequal power status between the exchanging parties.

However, patronage as an *organisational resource* is theoretically formulated as a form of institutional *control* or compliance mechanism that operates to the benefit of the patron or principal (Kopecký *et al.*, 2012) and typically dispensed via appointment to positions within civil services (Sorauf, 1959; Muller, 2006). Patronage in this sense is not considered as an exchange for support but as a vital mechanism for administrative coherence and implementation of the principal's agenda (Parrado Díez, 2004: 253; Kopecký & Mair, 2006). As Richard (1974: 382) puts it "... the number of partisans nominated for office should be large enough to permit partisans to become involved in many aspects of government" to execute the principals' political agenda. In this

respect, patronage is not a form of vote gathering or establishing clienteles but more of shaping strategic coalition of networks within the bureaucratic space aimed at efficient governance (van Biezen & Kopecký, 2007).

By implication, patronage appointments may also occasionally be dispensed in the form of “getting rid” of bureaucrats perceived not to be getting along with the principal by appointing or posting them to other positions in less desirable locations (Kopecký *et al.*, 2012; Brierley, 2018). Under such arrangements, it is anticipated that a patronage appointee will carry out his/her tasks in the civil service in ways which fits with the will, belief and interests (agenda) of the principal. Hence, patronage, when restricted to the fine bracket of appointment into the civil service, is one of the most powerful instruments that principals can wield.

However, within neo-patrimonial political settings, the pre and post-electoral spoils or bargaining dynamics that subsist increase the prospects for principals to move beyond organising (control) purposes to engage in nepotism. This is more so during political transitions which invariably involve changes in the bureaucracy as well (Grindle, 2012). Principals under neo-patrimonial settings may, therefore, include nepotistic considerations based on the need to secure jobs for family, friends and some other form of social relationships or network to enhance their prestige, status or power (Ekeh, 1975; Bratton & Clapham, 1985; Van de Walle, 1997). This is especially compelling in SSA where the competition for bureaucratic appointments can be very stiff due to limited space while unemployment is pervasive. The drive for nepotistic appointments may even be enhanced by arguments from some political principals who maintain that efficiency requires loyalty “more than intellect, and [loyalty] could not be judged by formal examination” (Hennessy, 1989: 48). Thus, through nepotism in SSA, the potential for patronage appointments to persist through informal or social networks cannot be overlooked as it can also serve the *control* purpose.

The loyalty which may be gained through the various circumstances of patronage

appointments as espoused above have led to the negative theorization of patronage as state capture through discretionary control of public resources and personnel. According to Kitschelt & Wilkinson (2007: 2), such conceptions are based on transactional “inducements targeted to individuals/groups” who are known by principals to be responsive to such lures and who are “willing to surrender their [autonomy] for the right price.” Sigman (2015: 18) argued that where such patronage linkages are strong, bureaucratic “capacity is likely to suffer” given that the persistent linkages between patronage and weak institutions in neo-patrimonial settings are as a result of discretionary controls by principals. Indeed, Rose-Ackerman (1999) earlier indicated that these weak institutions pave way for illicit interests to be pursued thereby adversely affecting state developmental capacity.

However, a distinct class of scholars have discounted the above argument by rather theorizing the positive consequences of patronage especially under neo-patrimonial settings. For example, Grindle (2012: 23) argued that patronage systems do “not necessarily have negative consequences for the overall management of organizations” and have indeed positively impacted on “the construction of competence in government” (Grindle, 2012: 7). According to this view, patronage systems are driven by principals who “have the capacity to use their appointment power to attract highly qualified staffs to carry out specific policy initiatives” aimed at efficiency. Scholars such as Booth *et. al.* (2010), Booth & Golooba-Mutebi (2012) and Roll (2014) of the “developmental neo-patrimonialism” paradigm have also advanced the positive tendencies of patronage by basically confirming Grindle’s (2012) assertion that patronage is not automatically injurious. They rather theorize and highlight the dynamics under which patronage/neopatrimonialism can produce positivity. In the view of Booth & Golooba-Mutebi (2012: 382), such positivity is evident when the elite use patron-client or principal-agent relations to achieve “economic transformation and social development” by accessing and managing income and rents in a centralized way. From the principal-agent perspective, patronage as an *organisational resource* is construed as the power relations between the principal and the agent

because the appointed agent is required and motivated to implement interests and preferences of the principal within the bureaucracy.

Vital to the patronage-loyalty thesis, therefore, is the application of the Principal-Agent theory (Golden, 2000; Meier & Krause, 2003). This is because this theory emphasises on bureaucrats' (agents) compliant or loyal attitudes and behaviour towards executing a principal's interests. In simple terms, the theory stipulates that principals recruit agents to undertake actions on their behalf and have motivational structures that can manipulate these agents into compliance. According to Gailmard (2012), principals' incentive arrangement which induces or manipulates agents to behave in a desired manner constitutes a contract (formal or informal, oral or written) and that principals may even be able to spell out the benefits or costs agents are likely to earn. This influences agents' actions by facilitating or curtailing their attitudes and behaviour. According to Moe (1984: 756), the Principal-Agent theory is a manifestation of a relationship where "the principal, considers entering into a contractual agreement with another, the agent, in the expectations that the agent will subsequently choose actions that produce outcomes desired by the principal..." Within this context, patronage-based appointees are conveniently characterised as agents of their principals who facilitated their appointment. While principals are vested with the authority to define policies, agenda and interests, they also have the propensity to contract or appoint bureaucrats who are predisposed to implement those policies or interests defined by them.

Weber (1948), however, points out that there is a danger for political principals who change often to be dominated by bureaucrats due to their professional expertise and long service experience. This is more so when bureaucrats are opportunistic even under principal-agent arrangements and capable of leveraging on their expertise for personal gains (Wood & Waterman, 1991; Rourke, 1992). As Moe (1984: 756) noted:

The principal's decision problem is far more involved than simply locating a qualified person – for there is no guarantee that the agent, once hired, will in effect choose to pursue

the principal's best interests or to do so efficiently. The agent has his own interests at heart and is induced to pursue the principal's objective only to the extent that the incentive structure imposed in the contract renders such behaviour advantageous.

In this regard, a major risk in principal-agent arrangements is the agency problem manifested in self-interests as propounded by Public-Choice advocates (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Niskanen, 1973). According to Felkins (2013), the most important contribution of public-choice is that it recognises that individuals are usually motivated by self-interest. It advances assertions that politicians and civil servants seldom act altruistically (Schmidt, 2000) and that bureaucrats “act, at least, partly in their self-interest while some officials are motivated solely by their own self-interest” (Downs, 1967). Researchers such as Moe (1995), Bowornwathana (2006) and Painter (2004) view both principals and bureaucrats as self-utility maximisers whose fundamental priorities are vested in achievements and failures. Thus, Public-Choice adherents characterise bureaucrats as concerned with interests and decisions regarding their own interests of self-esteem, reputation, influence peddling and territorial control in the bureaucracy and not necessarily their principal's interest (Niskanen, 1973; Bryner, 2003; Gains & John, 2010; Poocharoen, 2012).

This theory further emphasises that the growing politicisation of the bureaucracy is worsened by these self-serving inclinations of civil servants within the bureaucratic space (Parson, 1999). In this regard, bureaucrats are seen as lacking dedication to the agenda that do not encompass their parochial interests (Wood & Waterman, 1991; Rourke, 1992). In situations where civil servants possess substantial influence, they use this influence through scheming and manipulation to pursue their preferred interests (Huber & Shipman, 2002; Moe, 2006). The implication in such circumstances is that principals can be reduced to “agent of the agents”, signalling an agency-problem, or a breakdown and failure of the top-down power relations as conceived by the principal-agent theory within the bureaucracy (Moe, 2006: 4; Boateng, 2014). This allows for the possibility of agents to thwart their principals' effort to control and direct them as their agents. Accordingly, if the attitudes and behaviour of agents do not conform to the interests

of their principals, it is because bureaucratic agents may have reneged on their contractual obligations to their principals (Golden, 2000). Bureaucrats behavioural shirking or slippage is, therefore, endemic but the principal may have to fiddle with institutional systems, processes and manipulate incentive structures to limit this shirking (McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, 1989).

To mitigate or avoid the breakdown of the Principal-Agent arrangements occasioned by Public-Choice influences or considerations, principals resort to securing their interests by insisting on loyalty from their agents as a criterion and requiring bureaucrats to commit or reach agreements on interests. Moe (1984) argues that since the principal-agent relationship involves delegation by a principal to the agent with the potential of conflict of interests (agency-problem), the principals' interest can only persist through the agent's loyalty to him/her. To foster this loyalty, when possible within democratic governance, principals of bureaucracies commonly appoint agents who are committed to them and in whom they have trust or have closer personal ties. Given that principals require loyalty from their agents to sufficiently pursue their agenda or interests, what loyalty entails is vital to outline.

To define bureaucratic loyalty, Bach & Veit (2018: 256) construe it as a "political and ideological proximity to government" and a collaboration between political principals and senior bureaucrats. Christensen's (1991) conception of loyalty is, however, seen as a situation where bureaucrats are positioned as instruments for the existing government: politicians rule and bureaucrats obey. Jacobsen (1960: 232; 2008) also characterises political loyalty as the expectation of the bureaucrat as an instrument of the principal's perspectives through the obligatory acceptance of principal's manifested or expressed will and active support in the design and implementation of the principal's interests.

Jacobsen (1960, 2008) argued that bureaucrats do not operate in social emptiness, therefore, they ought to promote political values and interests within the context of formulated policies expressed by principals who are assigned with the fiduciary trust (through elections) of promoting

and protecting the public interest. He cited an example that given the choice in appointing bureaucrats, a principal can stick with qualification and seniority; nonetheless, it will also be rational to seek a bureaucrat s/he knows will toil his/her full heart for and not against his/her interest. To quote, “it is quite clear that if I had the choice to work with a man who stood so close to my own view of interests and a man with a different worldview, I would choose the first, although the other was both a capable and completely loyal man.”

Recounting history, the question of how to efficiently deal with job openings within the echelons of the civil service became very immediate with the advent of the spoils system paving way for meritocracy within the American bureaucracy. This led Heclo (1988) to argue that deliberate moves were employed by politicians to ensure a balanced bureaucracy through political patronage. In defence of patronage, some scholars asserted that the co-existence of professional and patronage bureaucrats in the civil service is necessary for governmental efficiency (Moe, 1985; Lorentzen, 1985). According to Dahlström *et al.* (2012: 659), “relatively high levels of corruption may also be expected from an administration that consists exclusively of merit-based bureaucrats without control by agents with a different (e.g., political) nature.” Therefore, the relevance of political loyalty has become a global phenomenon sought from civil servants by governing principals ostensibly to secure a firm grip of their interests within the bureaucracy through patronage appointments.

Certainly, patronage civil servants are commonly appointed to hold influential portfolios within the policy process because they are expected to pursue the principal’s policy objectives or interests as loyal followers (Ingraham, 1987). Referring to Lewis’s (2009) argument, it is noted that since there are varied policy areas such as human resource management, policy-making, planning, monitoring & evaluations as well as budgeting and management of resources within bureaucracies, it is only fitting that these policy areas are coordinated, supervised and monitored by unquestionable loyalists of principals within the bureaucracy to help them achieve their

mandate or preferences and interests (Olsen, 2006).

The political loyalty motive for patronage appointments are usually determined based on political commitment and trust which are presumably inherent along political and social network lines including but not limited to friends, former colleagues & alumni, associates and political ideologists (van Thiel, 2012). By advancing trust-based relationships among political principals and bureaucrats, “the spoils system makes the bureaucratic machine responsive to the changing political environment”, and principals are predisposed to trust bureaucrats they appoint (Carboni, 2010: 103). Dirk & Ferrin (2002) argue that firmly established trust-based relationships elicit reciprocity of behaviour and attitude, and in the context of bureaucratic studies, bureaucrats serve as a conduit for information and influence peddling between the political authority and the entire rank and file of the bureaucracy (Yeager *et al.*, 2007). With trust, political heads are likely to vouch for the behaviour of their agents in terms of delegation or policy execution believing that they would behave the same way given the same information as the bureaucratic agents (Lupia & McCubbins, 2000). This trust is expected along the lines of loyalty but what is not immediately obvious or easy to conclude is the trade-offs or fiduciary reciprocity that are imposed and the nature of the favours, if any, that agents expect to gain. This arrangement can involve a bargaining bond where favours and services are traded between principals and agents (Cassese, 1999) as propounded by principal-agent theorists.

In harmonising the propositions of the patronage-loyalty hypothesis, therefore, this discussion has drawn on Principal-Agent arguments to explain the motivations for patronage bureaucrats to prioritise their principals’ interest as a basis for their loyal attitudes and behaviour even if it amounts to an aberration of the law. The arguments contend that patronage bureaucrats behave the way they do because of the fiduciary or contractual obligations imposed on them under principal-agent agreements and based on the process through which they were appointed as they are largely expected to remain loyal. Therefore, this hypothesis maintains that to ensure that the

principals' interests are loyally pursued, principals embrace overt or subtle subjective criteria conditioned on personal or political considerations and connections to appoint bureaucrats. This is because when bureaucrats are appointed based on patronage processes where fiduciary contractual obligations or interests may have been imposed, it is predicted that these patronage bureaucrats as loyal followers will be predisposed or inclined to promote their principals' interests. Thus, bureaucrats' loyalty is theoretically predicted to be secured through patronage appointments, where such appointees serve as the eye, ear and hand of principals (Mamogale, 2014). Thus, this study proposes to test the hypotheses that:

H₂: The more patronage-based the process of appointment is, the more likely a bureaucrat will be loyal to his/her patron.

Towards summing up the formulation on this H₂, the discussion notes that principals pursue various interests and policy objectives through their bureaucratic agents since these agents are expected to loyally follow them. Within robust bureaucratic settings, however, despite the requirements of loyalty of patronage bureaucrats to follow and serve their principals, these bureaucrats may or may not faithfully execute the interests or objectives preferred by their principals due to other bureaucratic factors such as competing interests, laws, formal rules and regulations. Every bureaucratic dispensation has rules and regulations which are usually designed to sanction attitudes and behaviour, establish guidelines, aggregate preferences and generate shared mutual expectations (Perry & Porter 1982; Rainey 1982; 1997; Carey, 2000). Pierson (2004), for instance, notes that the legal regime and institutional structures prescribed by constitutional arrangements place extensive, legally binding constraints on bureaucratic attitudes and behaviour. Bounded by these controls and compliance mechanism, patronage bureaucrats may eventually fail to loyally follow and execute all their principals' agenda as expected. Based on this anticipation, principals may also exercise the option or alternative of exploiting another means other than patronage appointments to influence bureaucrats' attitudes and behaviour through ex-

ante strategies. These include appointing bureaucrats based on hybrid considerations since as partners of the principals, such bureaucrats are expected to craftily exploit or manipulate legal provisions to meet the principals' objectives as responsive agents. Since principals are mandated to bring visions and interests to the bureaucracy whilst civil servants ought to equilibrate and accommodate those visions and interests, the hybrid bureaucrats' option as partners of principals is a viable one (Sotiropoulos, 1994). It is within this context that the third hypothesis is discussed in the ensuing paragraphs.

3.5 The Hybrid – Responsiveness Thesis

The third hypothesis of this study draws on ample literature which theorises that hybrid-based appointments shape bureaucrats' responsiveness (Appleby, 1949; Friedrichson, 1976, 1980; Waldo, 1987; Svara, 1999, 2000; West, 2005; Page, 2007; Ferrez, 2009). Wary about the excesses associated with the merit-principle and patronage, the search for a suitable type of appointment to secure bureaucratic responsiveness persisted. Indeed, adherents of the Weberian-merit bureaucracy argued that patronage bred a culture of inefficiency and corruption within bureaucracies and should, therefore, be frowned upon. Conversely, proponents of patronage appointments argued that Weberian-merit bureaucrats lacked political accountability and responsiveness to political principals (Kaufman, 1956; Skowronek, 1982; Mosher, 1982; O'Toole, 1984; Barret & Greene, 2005). Thus, the quest to insulate bureaucrats from the vagaries of political influences paradoxically produced counter-responsiveness to political accountability and a foremost cradle for tension between political principals and career bureaucrats (Aberbach & Rockman, 1988; Svara, 2001).

As Mosher (1982: 185) noted, "where political appointees invade too far the province of respective career services, there is a threat to substantive effectiveness and invitation to inefficiency and even scandal. Where the political appointees are driven out, there is a threat to the general interest in favour of special interests, to 'the public' in favour of self-directed or entrenched

bureaucracy”. Kaufman (1956: 1062) maintained that “just as the excessive emphasis on representativeness brought with it bitterly disappointing difficulties unforeseen by its advocates, so too the great stress on neutral competence proved to be a mixed blessing”. The above dilemma undoubtedly influenced a search for the right paradigm relationship between politics and professionalism, and this exercise under NPM reforms birthed what has come to be known by advocates as a *hybrid*. Thus, proponents of the hybrid approach contend that political loyalty under patronage systems or adherence to rules (red-tapes) under autonomous bureaucracies are presumed as outdated while promoting responsiveness in public management through hybrid reforms under NPM is seen as the ultimate (Pitts, 2005; Kettl, 2012).

These reforms between the 1970s and 1990s were occasioned by a myriad of bureaucratic capacity challenges where bureaucrats were largely considered as unresponsive, inefficient, corrupt, over-centralised and with undemocratic leadership (Appiah, 2006). To address these challenges, the Bretton woods institutions such as world bank and IMF introduced the NPM ideals to SSA countries under their various economic recovery programmes, which were hitherto, associated with industrialised OECD nations such as the UK, Australia and US. According to Stark (2002), when NPM is mentioned, what comes to mind are ideas such as competition between service providers; decentralisation of government bureaucracies; performance contracts and assessments, financial incentives for public servants and private-sector management techniques.

Nonetheless, this broad understanding of what NPM entails still generates “radically different, indeed conflicting goals” (Kettl 1995: 14) and even “disparate, and at times contradictory set of traits... Indeed, sometimes NPM seems like an empty canvas: you can paint on it whatever you like. There is no clear or agreed definition of what the new public management actually is ...” (Ferlie *et al.*, 1996:10). Some scholars contend that the NPM is nothing new but rather a set of repackaged managerial ideas that are drawn from earlier discourses in public administration (Thomas, 2000). Frederickson (1996: 269) also added to the scepticism about the originality of

NPM by asking whether “reinventing government [under NPM] is just old wine in new bottles”. Regardless of the above scepticism, the NPM model actually postulated the application of breaking up huge bureaucracies and disaggregating their separable functions into agencies, decentralising management authority within bureaucracies, introducing market type mechanisms to stimulate productivity and changing employment relations into performance-based incentives and contracts (Larbi, 2013).

Since patronage appointments into the civil service served as one of the most efficient ways through which principals exercised control and bureaucratic loyalty, these NPM reform strategies which curtailed direct patronage appointments weakened the principals’ traditional control powers and mechanisms over bureaucrats (Ingraham, 1987; Heclo, 1988; Lewis, 2009). Certainly, the problem political principals face under autonomous bureaucracies is how to control top bureaucrats while top bureaucrats are also faced with the challenge of persuading subordinates to carry out the desires of their principals (Tullock, 1965). Therefore, of paramount vitality is the political attitude and behaviour of bureaucrats concerning their interests and strategies in meeting the goals of principals (Santhitiwanich & Bowornwathana, 2014). Hence, as noted earlier, Peters & Pierre (2004) advanced the argument that the contemporary incentive for political principals to dedicate efforts to control the bureaucracy emanates from this waning of their orthodox control powers and mechanisms over bureaucrats occasioned by NPM reforms through delegation and deregulation which effectively dislocated their traditional grips.

Undoubtedly, bureaucratic autonomy from the control of political principals (Christensen, 1999) prescribed by some of the NPM provisions almost insulated bureaucrats from political reach. It is worth noting that under bureaucratic control theory, patronage strategies are deployed as a consequence of bureaucratic autonomy (Kristinsson, 2012) because political principals are held responsible regardless of their lack of control under autonomous bureaucracies. Such “paradoxical” control of appointments is usually construed as a political strategy aimed at addressing issues of political accountability in governance for outcomes that may appear to lie

beyond the direct influence or reach of principals (Kopecký & Mair, 2006: 9 - 10).

Despite the weakening of political principals' direct control mechanisms due to bureaucratic reforms, variations of the NPM model provided that the reforms it occasioned reconciled political interests with professional responsibility (Svara, 2001). The study notes that Weberian bureaucratic structures prescribe that principals are expected to define policies, assign responsibilities and evaluate results while bureaucrats ought to manage with autonomy and implement political plans through competence and private sector-oriented managerial logic and tools (Hood, 1991; Reborá, 1999). Nonetheless, "letting the managers" (Kettl, 1997: 456) with autonomy without political direction from principals has proven to be trickier because as Friedrich (1940: 2) noted, "an official should be as responsible for inaction as for wrong action; certainly the average voter will criticise the government [principal] as severely for one as for the other" since political principals are directly responsible to the public. Thus, principals are often held accountable for the quality of civil service delivery, even though they may lack control over the bureaucrats who implement or deliver. This situation between autonomy and accountability has created strong incentives for principals to pursue politically efficient public management reforms through compromises between politics and professionalism (Ingraham, 1987; Svara, 2001; Peters & Pierre 2004; Lewis 2008; Carboni, 2010; Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011; Niklasson 2013).

Wilson (1966: 371) had previously cautioned that although politics defined the agenda and programmes of the bureaucracy, "it should not be suffered to manipulate its officers". In other words, political interests should not necessarily take precedence over professional standards and vice versa (Ingraham, 1987). Ingraham (1987) further maintained that the bureaucracy and politics are two sides of the same coin in the context of governance; hence, professional and political actors must function in harmony as partners. In the opinion of Woodruff (1919), the bureaucrats and political principals "are two parts of the same mechanism, related in much the same way as two elements in one chemical compound whose combined qualities give the character to the substance"

(cited in Svara, 1998: 53). Thus, collective partnership and trade-offs between principals and bureaucrats are fundamental requirements for governmental responsiveness (Aberbach, Putnam, & Rockman, 1982; Ingraham, 1987; Svara, 2001; Mouritzen & Svara, 2001; Kettl, 2012).

According to Peter & Pierre (2004: 7), since NPM had “freed major parts of the bureaucracy from direct ministerial [political] control”, the challenge of insufficient control devices faced by principals to exert control over bureaucrats necessitated explorations for appropriate interventions which could engender political responsiveness. That is a situation which complemented both professional and political values (Aberbach *et al.*, 1981; Aberbach & Rockman, 1988; Svara, 2001). In support of this view, Enns-Jedenastik (2015) argued that while the dispersion of authority in the bureaucracy had made it more difficult for politicians to implement their agenda, politicians partly compensated for this by coordinating and controlling policy through more dispersed networks that included appointees that are loyal to their course.

Through aspects of the NPM reform, political principals resorted to infusing or combining political (non-merit) criteria with merit criteria in appointing civil servants. Out of this strategy, a justifiable scholarship soon emerged and advanced the theory of ‘hybridity’ in the bureaucracy, a convenient marriage between the opposing theories of merit and patronage (Svara 2001; Page, 2007). Scholars such as Enns-Jedenastik indeed argued that the incorporation of merit and non-merit criteria in appointing bureaucrats needed not to be frowned upon but understood as an adaptation strategy or an organisational tool for governance in the bureaucracy (Enns-Jedenastik, 2015).

In definitional terms, hybrid refers to a procedure in which merit appointment processes are mixed with political considerations, also referred to as political-hybrid. Another definition of hybrid is a situation where purely political appointments co-exist or coincide with professionally determined ones within the bureaucracy (Matheson *et al.*, 2007). However, this study adopts and operationalises hybrid as the consideration of both merit and patronage factors in the appointment

processes of bureaucrats. This model entails separate parts which come together in a mutually reinforcing way. According to Svvara (2001: 179), hybrid connotes:

...compliance along with independence; respect for political control along with a commitment to shape and implement policy in ways that promote the public interest; deference to elected incumbents along with adherence to the law and support for fair electoral competition; and appreciation of politics along with support for professional standards.

Svvara (2001) explains and recognises the complementariness of political and professional standards. According to Svvara (2001), players within the civil service arena may maintain dissimilar perspectives and values, but this does not suggest that the functions they carry out should necessarily overlap. Thus, the increasing fusion and partnership between political and bureaucratic interests in the echelons of the bureaucracy had been theoretically established (Aberbach *et al.*, 1981). Hybrid bureaucrats are theorised:

... to assess the likely political implications and ramifications of policy proposals; to consider a specific issue within the broader context of the government's programme; to anticipate and, where necessary, influence or even manipulate the reactions of other actors in the policy-making process... and to design processes that maximize the chances for the realisation of minister's substantive objectives' (Goetz, 1997: 754).

Goetz's (1997) exposition above reinforces the expectation of bureaucrats to possess prudent and political sensitivities to the principals' interests and to exert blatant or shrewd but legal efforts towards executing those (political) interests. According to Svvara (1999), hybrid civil servants ought to operate based on pluralistic interests with sensitivity to legitimate differing interests; thereby, concurring with scholars such as Putnam (1973); Friedrickson (1976) and Waldo (1987). Such bureaucrats are conscious of the "political realities" and treat influences of political principals

in the bureaucracy as legitimate since political values and policy processes are directly connected or linked to bureaucratic behaviour (Meier, 1997). Fisher (1975) maintained that hybrid civil servants, through their technical competencies, ought to establish commitment, tact and intelligence to create and sustain discourses among actors within the policy processes. In the opinion of Fox (1992), their expert knowledge and tact are deployed to cement points of divergence by coordinating and facilitating exertions that are aimed at responsiveness. Beard & Beard (1986: 112) also maintained that such hybrid bureaucrats have been couched as the “great moral stabilisers” and that the public interest is served when the bureaucracy is made up of men and women who can serve responsively. According to Goodsell (1992), hybrid bureaucrats are politically sensitive and can carry out their duties by not being mechanically restricted to the science of their profession but employing creative fashions to accommodate the changing needs of actors.

Expectedly, the attitudes and behaviour of hybrid bureaucrats draw on aspects of the *rational choice* theory as an underlying thrust to make inputs between the public interest and the parochial interests of principals. Rational choice advocates maintain that bureaucrats’ decisions and actions ought not to be strictly rule-based or absolutely amenable to principals. They should be grounded on calculating the costs and benefits and pursue that which maximises value (Perry, 2000). In March & Olsen’s (1989) view, two models can be linked with a rational choice: “logic of consequence” and the “logic of appropriateness”. Depending on the nature of the interests at stake, hybrid bureaucrats’ attitudes and behaviour may conform to the logic of consequence or from a logic of appropriateness. Consistent with the logic of appropriateness, Bandura (1977; 1986) argued that bureaucrats determine their attitudes and interests according to how consistent they are to their internal standards (appropriateness). Regarding the logic of consequence, instead of assessing different actions according to their appropriateness, the logic of consequence weighs costs and benefits in the traditional way we think about rational choice.

From the rational choice perspective, therefore, principals require bureaucrats to be

responsive to political interests; yet, these bureaucrats ought to be committed to professional standards, as well. It is only rational that a unique breed of bureaucrats is appointed to navigate along these tight ropes. This special breed (hybrid bureaucrats), based on their dual-faceted credentials, is envisaged to employ strategic skills to solve problems. By way of intrinsic motivation, hybrid bureaucrats may not only utilise achieved results but also find it satisfying and pleasing that their “mastery, identity, responsibility, and practical learning” has contributed to efficiency (Goodsell, 1992: 247). By so doing, hybrid approaches which preach convenient partnerships close the gaping lacunae between neutral competence and political obligations of accountability (Kearney & Sinha, 1988). Thus, hybrid bureaucrats are also theoretically presumed to bargain and compromise; yet, at the same time, advocate and even fight for preferences. While meritocratic civil servants are predominantly procedure and rule-oriented and patronage bureaucrats are sycophantic followers, hybrid civil servants are characterised as partners focused on the problem and programme-oriented interventions and interpretation of their role in the civil service. They are conceptually more relaxed, committed to values of pluralism and responsive to social needs and political demands. Fesler (1983) argues that hybrid bureaucrats as partners possess and have internalised ideas of adaptation to the political elite and are armed with the capacity to diplomatically decline improprieties by political principals in the name of public interests.

Regarding bureaucratic responsiveness, since the administrative agency must of necessity make value judgments (Friedrickson, 1976), it must be responsive to values which may include those that are far beyond what has been explicitly legally enacted (Simon, 1971). From the arena of politics and governance, responsiveness ought to be the highest goal, but to what extent is a matter of judgment. As Friedrich puts it, policies must meet both professional and political criteria for complete success; however, professional and political criteria are not always perfectly reconcilable (Friedrich, 1940). According to Matheson *et al.* (2007), in the quest for legitimacy, democracies contemplate the right balance between these two values that can be in uneasy tension;

i.e. fair and non-partisan bureaucratic service delivery and the responsiveness of civil servants to the interests of their principals, both subject to the law. Lee *et al.* (2010: 78) contend that since political and bureaucratic interests are occasionally bound to be in some tension, hybrid bureaucrats provide the “bridging function” with their dual faces of professionalism and political responsiveness although these two are not necessarily compatible in some cases (Almond & Powell, 1996).

In such instances, hybrid bureaucrats are compelled to circumnavigate through the appropriate balance between political and public interests. Goodsell (1992) further reiterates that this approach in the bureaucracy requires the application of tact, compassion and skill in dealing with actors and stakeholders of diverse backgrounds and interests within the bureaucratic environment. Van Theil (2012) maintains that civil servants have no choice but to work towards fulfilling the demands of political principals to be responsive. ‘Responsive Competence’ is therefore probably a more important requirement for civil servants than neutral competence (Sossin, 2006; Kopecký *et al.* 2012).

Considering bureaucratic responsiveness as a desirable output, Ingraham, Thompson & Eisenberg (1995) argue that the need for responsiveness, therefore, entails broadening the depths of political considerations in appointment processes within bureaucracies which complicate the distinction between professional and political roles and positions. Du Gay (2000) argues that the features or tenets of responsive competence dictate that values such as dedication and conformity to procedures as well as deferment to the principal as posited by the hybrid theory are virtuous components of consideration in the appointment processes of bureaucrats. This is to maintain and promote the citizens’ public interest thereby promoting democracy. Contrary to the belief that civil servants are rigid with respect to the application of rules, Cohen argued that hybrid civil servants are partners who rather adopt prudent approaches in confronting the certainties of the bureaucratic arena.

It is for these reasons that hybrid proponents maintain that principals “need civil

servants who are in agreement with their stance and who are personally loyal, if not necessarily partisan” to work with due to trust to explore ways of implementing their decisions (Peters & Pierre, 2004: 7). Proponents argue that one major characteristic of good governance is a partnership between political and bureaucratic leaderships that are innovative and promote participation, trust, consensus building and responsiveness (Hyden, *et al.* 2003; Demir, 2009; Dasandi, 2014). Thus, whereas the hybrid theory does not necessarily suggest flawless synergies between principals and bureaucrats concerning either their goals or interests, it does stipulate partnership and the employment of dialogue to accomplish an overarching good. In such a scenario, neither political interest nor professionalism is preferred as both are construed as components of a necessary process; thereby, complementing each other (Ingraham & Ban, 1988).

In the context of a delegation, hybrid bureaucrats represent a risk-reduction device where low-cost, high-trust partnerships are birthed and nurtured. In this regard, the hybrid is seen as a conduit within the context of delegation that is linked from voters to stakeholders tasked with policy implementation (Muller, 2000). This allows the civil servant to have some political awareness and sensitivity. Therefore, principals who “seek control over the structures and processes of government”, prioritize “responsive competence” over “neutral competence” (Moe, 1985: 239). Based on the above theoretical arguments in favour of the responsiveness of hybrid bureaucrats, this study sets out to test the third hypothesis that:

H₃: The more hybrid-based the process of appointment is, the more likely it is for a bureaucrat to be responsive to legitimate political interests.

It is worth noting that this study makes a theoretical distinction in its hypotheses between politically responsive attitudes and behaviour induced by hybrid appointments (where professional qualifications and political/personal considerations are factored), and loyal attitudes and behaviour induced by patronage appointments (where even non-partisan individuals with connections or

networks are cronies of their bureaucratic principals). The relevance of this distinction is that while the former may display responsiveness with regards to due-process and sensitivity to the principal's political interests, the latter's compliance is expected to be rooted in absolute loyalty to the principal's interests regardless of even if those interests are incompatible with or detrimental to the public interest. Thus, the distinction is that whilst a patronage appointee is construed as a loyal follower, a hybrid appointee is perceived as a responsive partner and participant.

A common argument usually in favour of patronage appointments is the view that greater control by principals through bureaucratic loyalty enhances political accountability and responsiveness to secure substantive policy agenda. However, when patronage bureaucrats unquestionably follow the interests of their principals, based on reasons advanced by both Principal-Agent and Public-Choice enthusiasts, they also have the potential to hurt both the bureaucracy and the public interests. According to Golden (2003: 189), bureaucrats who are typically appointed on patronage processes due to their loyalty provide principals with "extensive opportunities to engage in bureaucratic corruption" and that whilst the consequences of the patronage-loyalty arrangement may not have been fore planned, certainly "the interactions and behaviour that underpinned it were strategic and self-serving." Notwithstanding the injury these corrupt deals may cause, principals exercise their power and authority to protect or shield these disciples from the consequences of their attitudes and behaviour which are usually detrimental to the public interests.

Hybrid bureaucrats, on the other hand, as partners of principals in pursuing viable political interests are conscious and subject their own actions to "the rule of law" as opposed to "the rule of the principal". Therefore, principals have a choice between loyal followers on the one hand and responsively competent partners with professional and political sensitivities on the other hand. These are tasked with interests and agenda implementation. Whereas hybrid bureaucrats are predominantly expected to advise, critique and (may) improve before they implement a

(politically) decided agenda, loyal bureaucrats are predominantly expected to comply without question, which has far-reaching ramifications for the bureaucracy.

In the meantime, most critics of the patronage - loyalty thesis contend that overreliance on loyalists undermines the principals' ability and effectiveness to accomplish things (Campbell, 1986; Dickinson, 1997) since loyalists "clutter the message" (Light, 1995: 167). More so, when competent bureaucrats are excluded in favour of loyal followers, it potentially leads to poor decisions and implementation (Dickinson, 1997). For these reasons, Campbell (1986: 19) had earlier argued that principals ought to seek partnership by appointing hybrid bureaucrats or what he termed as "workable mix" bureaucrats with the requisite professional competence albeit *politically aware* as opposed to being *politically active* to effuse responsiveness and "policy competence". In this regard, Moe (1985: 239) argues that principals should prefer responsiveness "that is developed and adopted in the light of political needs." Thus, between the two extremes of apolitical delivery and dominant loyalty, hybrid bureaucrats as partners and unique breeds can attempt to implement desired priorities by successfully navigating through professional technicalities to meet political demands. It is based on the theoretical distinctions discussed above that an empirical enquiry is conducted in the subsequent Chapters.

3.6 Chapter Summary

This Chapter has examined the theoretical relationship between the theory of Weberian-merit bureaucracy, PSM and bureaucrats' autonomy. It has also theoretically reviewed the linkages between political patronage, Principal-Agent/Public Choice theories and bureaucrats' loyalty whilst, the relationship between hybrid appointments, NPM and bureaucrats' responsiveness has also been reviewed. Based on the Chapter's review, it has been demonstrated that these types of appointments (merit, patronage & hybrid) can be theoretically established as alternatives within the bureaucracy. In deploying patronage appointments, apprehensions of widespread inefficiencies come to the fore whilst in deploying merit, political accountability to principals are raised. To maintain the right

balance through reforms aimed at efficiency, some critics argue that such a system “is bound to generate conflict and distrust” (Aberbach *et al.*, 1981; Skowronek, 1982; Mosher, 1982; O’ Toole, 1984; Dresang, 2007:25). Given the goal of empirically studying the Ghanaian case, the next Chapter focuses on the methods used by this study to establish the empirical evidence regarding the extent and influence of these determined types of appointments on bureaucrats attitudes and behaviour.

CHAPTER FOUR

STUDY METHODOLOGY AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

4.1 Introduction

This study sets out to provide scientific evidence regarding the consequences of types of bureaucratic appointments on attitudes and behaviour of bureaucrats within the civil service of Ghana. In doing that, the study deploys both theoretical and empirical approaches to conduct this scientific inquiry. By way of structure, the Chapter comprises of two main parts. The first part deals with the methodology and details the empirical techniques and strategy adopted to conduct the enquiry. These methods include the study design; types of data; survey measures and data collection instruments, survey sampling, data collection and quantitative data processing. Using these methods, its overarching significance has been that it has provided a bases to discuss and draw conclusions on the consequences of types of bureaucratic appointments in Ghana. The second part follows from these methods and contains the descriptive statistics coupled with initial findings of the data collected. The details of this Chapter is, therefore, as follows in the ensuing sections.

4.2 Study Design: Evaluating consequences of types of appointments on attitudes in Ghana.

In what follows, the Chapter empirically measures the consequences of types of appointment on bureaucrats' attitudes and behaviour. In doing this, it adopts a mixture of both qualitative interviews and quantitative survey methods to capture “the multiplicity of meanings, representations and practices” (Smith, 2001: 24) of generating primary data. The locus of this design emanates from the objectives of the study. It mainly combines data of an original survey questionnaire (N=274) of civil servants with data from key informant face-to-face interviews (N=29). While simple random sampling has been used to select respondents for the survey,

purposive sampling is used to select the key informants within and without the ranks of the civil service while also employing a snowball technique for the face to face interviews.

Unlike many bureaucratic studies which mainly focuses on establishing the extent of merit or patronage practices within various political and bureaucratic settings (Kopecký, 2011; Kopecký *et al.*, 2012), this study has moved beyond the incidence of varied appointment practices, i.e. merit, patronage and hybrid models to explore their consequences on attitudes and behaviour (autonomy, loyalty and responsiveness). Given this objective, the study is justified in employing mixed-methods. Mixed or multiple-methods can be explained as the employment of two or more research methods in studying a phenomenon (Creswell, 2003; Singleton & Straits, 2005). In this context, the study combines quantitative survey questionnaires with qualitative in-depth interviews because as Flick (1999) argued, good research often requires the use of a combination of both quantitative and qualitative approaches. By combining the in-depth interviews with survey data, it affords this study both quantifiable data, in-depth discussions and examples regarding the consequences of types of bureaucrats' appointments on their attitudes and behaviour. The findings and conclusions of this study are therefore drawn from the analyses of data from more than one research approach.

To generate adequate discussions on the results and findings of this research, the study further applies a convergent design approach which integrates the findings from the quantitative survey data with findings from the qualitative interview. It is instructive to note that both types of data have been collected around the same time using similar research instruments (see appendix 5 & 6). After separately analysing both types of data, the study applies the results in a complementary and integrated fashion in the discussion section, by jointly using both types of data to provide validation for each other and also create the foundation for conclusion of the study.

The benefits of this approach are two-fold. The qualitative in-depth interviews allow the study to seek expert experiences, opinions and evaluations on the types of bureaucratic appointments and their implications on bureaucrats' attitudes and behaviour in Ghana. On the other hand, the use of survey questionnaire aids in the specific quantification or measurement of the variables; that is the appointment of bureaucrats themselves and that of their colleagues into the civil service as well as their attitudinal and behavioural consequences thereof. Thus, the mixed-method (survey questionnaires with in-depth face-to-face interviews) is deliberately employed to elicit both real experiences and perceptions (opinions) of bureaucrats and other experts regarding appointment types and their implications on attitudes and behaviour.

Regardless of the merits of this design, some methodologists have maintained that it is not without disadvantages. Such disadvantages include but are not limited to criticisms that it is time-consuming, costly and riddled with replication difficulties (Greene, Caracelli & Graham, 1989). Indeed, this study has been confronted with time and cost-related hurdles but were successfully surmounted. Additionally, some critics argue that the underlying assumptions which underpin the deployment of mixed-methods can be misunderstood or at best inaccurately interpreted by researchers. Some researchers also tend to simplify the phenomenon under investigation to synthesise their results (Sale, Lohfeld & Brazil, 2002). Despite these criticisms, the relevance of mixed-methods to this study has been immensely appreciated on complementary grounds. Some proponents of mixed-methods have maintained that "...the fact that these approaches are incommensurate does not mean that mixed-methods cannot be combined in a single study if it is done for complementary purposes" (Sale *et al.*, 2002: 50). This assertion of complementarity of the mixed-methods is the justification for its deployment.

4.3 Types of Data

The gathering of data relied on two main types – secondary and primary. Regarding the secondary data or desk study, the research explored relevant data from the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) and the Office of the Head Civil Service (OHCS). Other relevant information and data

previously published by other researchers concerning Ghana's bureaucracy such as Kopecký (2011) and that of the Quality of governance project (2015) were relied upon where necessary. Concerning the primary data collected from the field, the research population was drawn from Ghana's main bureaucracy, i.e. sector ministries located in the capital city of Ghana, Accra. It is, however, useful to indicate the rationale for the focus of this research in the capital. Essentially, bureaucrats from the sector ministries in Accra have proximity or direct working relationships with influential political and bureaucratic principals where significant interests regarding the execution of various agenda take place. According to Johnson & Libecap (1994), there are three (3) distinctions of civil servants, namely 1) political appointees at the top positions of the civil service; 2) senior/middle career officials who also hold senior positions in the bureaucracy and 3) the rank-and-file career workforce.

Johnson & Libecap (1994) contend that these three groups may have "different incentives for policy administration and operate under different constraints within the bureaucracy"; yet, they are all civil servants engaged in executing the interests of government or principals. Since this research is designed to explore the consequences of varied appointment practices on bureaucratic attitudes, the characteristics of street-level civil servants are, therefore, as important as those of top civil servants. Furthermore, even though the politics of bureaucratic appointment is ubiquitous in Ghana, it is perceived that principals deploy it differently across sectors, institutional types and hierarchical levels of bureaucrats. Many observers believe that in Ghana, patronage would be severer in, say, the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) which has patrimonial characteristics than the Ministry of Health (MOH) which has a professional veil.

Therefore, evaluating the politics of appointments across different sectors, institutional types and different hierarchies is expected to shine a light on the nuances so far unnoticed by interested scholars and policy-makers who may assume that bureaucracies are a homogeneous entity. For instance, De Winter (2006) and Gwiazda (2008) among others used policy areas as the first criterion of distinction to conduct an in-depth observation of patronage practices based on the

hypothesis that principals appoint with different purposes and on a different scale in different policy areas. Dahlström *et al.* (2015) however argued that selecting specifically relevant sector ministries within the bureaucracy for a study regarding the politics of appointment is a matter usually not settled easily in advance.

Nonetheless, the choice of sector ministries for the survey in Ghana was considered along the theoretical lines of the hypotheses, i.e. professional/technical bureaucracies, patronage/political bureaucracies, hybrid bureaucracies and OHSC. Thus, the main field sites were four bureaucratic institutions comprising of MOH (perceived professional bureaucracy), the MLGRD (perceived to be pierced with patronage considerations and political behaviour), the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources (MLNR) [perceived to be a hybrid bureaucracy] and the OHCS, representing a bureaucratic regulator with supervisory oversight responsibilities where key informant interviews were also conducted alongside the examination of secondary data. These bureaucracies were also chosen purposively to reflect sectoral diversity with different characteristics to generalise the findings of the research. More precisely, the survey concentrated on respondents' experiences at their sector ministries (as used by Evans and Rauch, 1999) and the perception of their colleagues more generally (as used by Dahlström *et al.*, 2015).

Respondents were, thus, drawn from Accra (the seat of Government and capital of Ghana which hosts all the sector ministries' Headquarters and their substantive ministers with their deputies). In Ghana, almost all the sector ministries and their personnel are housed within a hub or nucleus location named '*Ministries*'. However, it is worth noting that some respondents are substantive civil servants from departments or agencies within these four (4) selected bureaucracies but were posted or seconded to their headquarters located at the ministries where they were randomly selected to answer the questionnaires at the time of conducting the survey. This secondment and/or posting is a common practice within the civil service of Ghana which usually occurs for various reasons related to patronage and merit factors as would be discussed later in the empirical chapters of this research.

It is intriguing to note that even though Ghana is formally practising a decentralised governance system, it remains an illusion because the power structure and relations of the bureaucracy seem to be centralised in Accra while regional and district authorities can hardly even be described as semi-autonomous (Abdulai, 2012). According to Debrah (2014: 62), civil servants working in the periphery i.e. regional and district levels “continue to depend on their institutional headquarters in Accra for administrative instructions” and continue to be appendages of the national headquarters rather than being autonomous. Despite the official authorisation to attract, retain and build their own human and organisational capacity, the recruitment, placement, transfer, discipline and retirement of civil servants working remotely from the seat of government (capital) remain mostly with the central bureaucracy, i.e. the head of the civil service and their parent ministries in Accra (Ayee, 2008; Debrah, 2014).

The domineering influence of the central bureaucracy over civil servants who work at the sub-national level is pervasive. Significant levels of decision-making and power play regarding how political or governmental policies and interests should be executed are retained at the capital. This situation of concentration of powers at the centre (Abdulai, 2012) is evendire to the point that some designated middle-level and junior officers at the main ministries possess significant influences regarding interests’ execution than the top and senior officers located at the regional and district levels (periphery) due to their proximity to the centre. Since a considerable amount of power and influence is peddled at the main ministries in Accra and all the levels of hierarchies are represented at the main ministries coupled with the fact that the population of the main ministries are representative of all the echelons of civil servants in the country, this study elicited respondents and key informants of the survey and interviews respectively from the capital.

4.4 Survey Measures and Data Collection Instruments

In theory, this research hypothesised the normative view that merit-based appointments shape bureaucrats’ autonomy (Weber, 1919, 1948; 1968; Johnson & Libecap, 1994; Evans &

Rauch, 2000; Dahlström et al., 2012; Cooper, 2018) while patronage-based appointments significantly shape their loyalty (Johnson & Libecap, 1994; Goetz, 1997; Du Gay, 2000; Kopecký et al. 2012; Veit & Scholz 2016). The third hypothesis also argued that hybrid-based appointments shape bureaucrats' responsiveness (Appleby, 1949; Friedrichson, 1976; Waldo; 1987; Svara, 1999, 2000; Page, 2007; Kopecký et al. 2012). In constructing the research instruments to measure the above-hypothesised variables of interest, the study took into consideration evidence that some past bureaucratic studies relied on measuring perceptions (perceptual data) to determine the effects of types of bureaucratic appointment as argued by Yang & Pandey (2009). The perceptual approach, however, differs from the data collected by Evans & Rauch (1999; 2000) because whereas Rauch & Evans (2000: 56) asked respondents to state their factual experiences regarding meritocracy, other authors such as Dahlström et al. (2015) employed the perceptual approach.

Generally, scholars have adopted either one of these two methods to measure their variables in bureaucratic studies. The perceptual approach which relies on asking experts their perceptions and opinions has the advantage of being cost-efficient in contacting a handful of experts. This approach is, however, often criticised for being biased and error-ridden since what people perceive are not necessarily the realities on the ground (Yang & Pandey, 2009). It is, also, often criticised because of the use of different benchmarks by various experts when making their assessments. However, some scholars contend that the focus should not necessarily be on the approach but rather whether the circumstances under which the perceptual strategy has been deployed is feasible. In defence of perceptions and opinions, Dahlström et al. (2015) argued against factual approaches by indicating that even experts are often rarely in a position to accurately state factual responses with precision; thereby, suggesting that the factual approach elicits informed guesswork from respondents. Thus, some respondents may have selective memory of past events or experiences, making their verdicts tricky.

However, specifically looking at this study, the novelty about the constructed

questionnaire is that the perceptual approach is combined with real-life experiences and personal circumstances of respondents to elicit primary data. This is to lessen the gaps associated with any approach by comparing information from respondents with data collected from key informants or with existing data sourced from primary and secondary sources. The study further gauge a respondents' reliability by considering the position and experience of the respondent. This is necessitated because the data regarding the hypotheses under study is either virtually non-existent or difficult to access and, more importantly, given the sensitivity of the subject matter coupled with the abundance of normative assumptions in the literature, both real-life experiences and perceptions of relevant actors are considered fitting (Aberbarch & Rockman, 1997; Waterman, Rouse & Wright, 1998; Yang & Pandey, 2009). As Yang & Pandey (2009: 338) argued, the "psychological process salient to the analysis of decision making and individual behaviour" is efficiently digested through real-life experiences and perceptions. Nonetheless, the risk of socially desirable responses is not completely avoided by this study when perceptual data is combined with real-life experiences.

Within the public administration sphere where the perceived political environment is considered to have significant implications on the attitudes of career civil servants and how the bureaucracy works, such approaches are usually appropriate (Yang & Pandey, 2009). In support of the measurement approaches of both real-life experiences and perceptions, Simon (1953:236) argued that "environmental forces mould organisations through the mediation of human minds" while the activities requiring political control such as "restrictions of mandates, budget cutbacks, and curtailment of discretion are difficult for public managers to misperceive" (Yang & Pandey, 2009: 338). From the above, it is justifiable, therefore, for this study to devise measurement tools which contain both real experiences and perceptions of respondents and key informants regarding the influence of types of civil servants' appointment on attitudes and behaviour. Based on this strategy, the study developed instruments (questionnaire and interview guide) along real experiences as well as perceptual lines to obtain responses from key informants and respondents

for quantitative and qualitative purposes.

4.4.1 Survey Paper-to-Pencil Questionnaire

In developing the survey paper-to-pencil questionnaires as an instrument for this study, the study borrowed from the conceptual basis of Evans & Rauch (1999; 2000) on Weberian bureaucracies, the New Public Management and administrative “impartiality” tools and the underlying theoretical arguments of patronage (Kopecký *et al.*, 2012) to operationalise the appropriate variables within the questionnaire design.

The study measured bureaucrats’ merit, patronage and hybrid (independent variables) as well as their autonomy, loyalty and responsiveness (dependant variables). It also measured demographic variables such as gender, age, educational qualification, occupation, policy area, type of employment, level of employment and the region of origin; all these variables are predicted to have an impact on the phenomenon being studied. These variables were measured using a combined number of 45 items from a variety of modified pedestals for this study. Thirty-seven (37) items explicitly targeted the main variables (merit, patronage, hybrid, autonomy, loyalty and responsiveness) and were measured based on a 7-point Likert-type scale (see Appendix 5). The respondents were requested to rate the extent of their affirmation or otherwise to categorical statements structured along the Likert-type scales.

Likert-type scales are commonly used in social sciences like psychology and political science studies based on survey questionnaires (Hinkin, 1998). Like any other tool, contentious issues surround its form especially regarding the sum or response categorisation (Hinkin, 1998). Since past conventional Likert-type scale comprised of 5 intervals or response categorisation, successive designs which have modified the scale points have been questioned. Yet, Hinkin (1998) argued that upward modifications enhance accurate benchmarks and derived variance. In terms of structure, the survey questionnaire contained a preamble stating the purpose for which the study is being conducted. The preamble also reiterated the voluntary nature of participation

and reassured respondents of 100% anonymity and confidentiality. The questionnaire was divided into sections A, B and C with six (6) main questions. Section A contained two (2) main questions with ten (10) items indicated for rating and aimed at measuring the types of bureaucrats' appointment and that of their colleagues into the civil service. The ten (10) items were rated on a Likert-type scale of 1-7 ranging from 1 – being Not Important at all to 7 – being absolutely important.

Section B also contained three (3) main questions with twenty-seven (27) items aimed at measuring the normative and empirical view of respondents regarding the variables of autonomy, loyalty and responsiveness. The twenty-seven (27) items were also rated on a Likert-type scale of 1-7, where 1 is Not Important at all and 7, Absolutely Important and another scale of 1-7 ranging from 1 – strongly disagree to 7 – strongly agree where applicable. Finally, section C contained one main question with eight (8) items aimed at measuring the demographical features and characteristics of respondents such as gender, age, the region of origin etc. In all, the questionnaire had 45 lines of items measuring six independent and dependent variables (3 each) as well as demographical information regarding the consequences of type of bureaucrats' appointment. The questionnaire was piloted and responses from this pilot were used as a check to gauge the appropriateness, user-friendliness and internal validity as a data-gathering instrument. The pilot survey resulted in minor recalibrations of the questionnaire and since some changes were made after the pilot study, data from the pilot was not included in the final data for analysis. This standard questionnaire was then administered. In all, two hundred and seventy-four (N=274) responses were relied upon for analysis from the four (4) civil service institutions in Ghana.

4.4.2 Scale Reliability Test for Quantitative Instrument

To examine whether the multiple-items (questions) used to measure merit, patronage, hybrid, autonomy, loyalty and responsiveness as the variables of interest were consistent and 'hang

together', a scale reliability test using Cronbach alpha coefficient was conducted. According to Elliott & Woodward (2016), a scale reliability test is a measure used to examine the agreement between multi-item variables to determine consistency among scored items. It is an important measure in determining how well the implementation of some coding or measurement system works (Elliott & Woodward, 2016). Nunnally (1978) argued that a satisfactory level of reliability is contingent on what purpose and how a measure is being used but recommended sufficient reliability at .70 or higher. However, Hair *et al.* (2010) considered a Cronbach's alpha reliability minimum values of 0.60 to 0.70 whilst DeVellis (2003) also suggested that, ideally, the Cronbach alpha coefficient of a scale of 0.70 or above indicates substantial reliability of the data. Values less than 0.70 signify that there exist incorrectly scored items. The scale reliability test for the multi-item variables in this study was found to have acceptable reliability (Cronbach alpha coefficient = 0.736).

There was, also, a disaggregation of the result using the various predictors of the hypothesised variables, merit, patronage and hybrid. This was important in the study because conglomerating the results together can lead to the disregard of germane trepidations that may exist within the various predictors of the hypothesised variables. From the disaggregated results, it was found that the Cronbach alpha coefficient of the scale reliability test for the multi-item predictors of the patronage-based appointment route was the highest (0.821), followed by that of the merit-based appointment route (0.759) and the hybrid-based appointment route (0.712). On the average, therefore, the scale reliability test for the multi-item predictors for all the hypothesised variables in this research have substantial reliability based on the reliability classification.

4.4.3 Qualitative Interview Guide

Concerning the qualitative instrument, an interview guide was developed for the conduct of interviews. In terms of structure, the interview guide contained a preamble stating the purpose for which the study was being conducted (see Appendix 6). The preamble also reiterated the

voluntary nature of participation and reassured interviewees of 100% anonymity and confidentiality. Given the sensitive nature of the study, it was ethically determined not to directly divulge key informants' places of work, titles or names. The guide had four (4) main questions. Question one (1) contained five (5) items with the specific aim of seeking the opinion and experience of the key informants regarding types of bureaucrats' appointments by listing factors such as personal connections, political considerations, educational qualification, past work performance and ethnic background. The informants were requested to speak to these listed factors.

Question two (2) sought information from these key informants to ascertain whether in their opinion it was important that certain general principles were applied in the work of civil servants and from their experiences, whether such principles indeed applied in Ghana. These principles include bureaucrats' autonomy; discretion; the independent interpretation and application of civil service rules, regulations and procedures. The other principles include the advancement of principals' justifiable interests; downplaying personal justifiable interests; advancing office's justifiable interests; always prioritising the interests of superiors who helped in bureaucrats' appointment; never prioritising social network interests in performing duties and, finally, always prioritising all the bureaucratic institutions' interests.

The third (3) question looked at whether in the experience of these key informants, they thought that the type of civil servants' appointment influenced their attitude and behaviour on the job? The fourth question sought to establish whether, in their expert opinion, Ghana was predominantly practising merit, patronage or hybrid-based type of appointment and which type, in their expert opinion they would recommend for the country. Finally, comments and views outside the interview guide were received where necessary. In all, the interview guide had 4 main questions with about sixteen (16) items which the key informants were requested to speak to. Responses to these questions invariably addressed the six main independent and dependent variables which were simultaneously measured through survey standards.

4.5 Sampling for Survey, In-depth Interviews and data collection.

Quantitative research emphasises on the essentiality of selecting a sample which is representative of the population (Karasar, 1999). This is because it will be too expensive and time-consuming to attempt to survey an entire population; therefore, a representative sample size which enables reliability and generalisation of the research is usually recommended (Henn *et al.*, 2006:16). The aim is to apply the relationship obtained among variables of the sample to the general or the entire population. Given that the total population of the civil service in Ghana is over four thousand (4000), this study adopted sampling as an approach. However, gauging an appropriate sample from bureaucracies can be a tough task largely because of the levels of heterogeneity and complexities located within those bureaucracies (Hays & Sowa, 2006). However, using Yamane's (1967) sample formula with a margin of error of 5%, a confidence level of 95% and an estimated response rate of 70%, the optimum sample size for the field survey was aimed at three hundred (350) respondents. Since the quantitative data aimed at measuring the type of bureaucrat's appointment to demonstrate its consequences on attitudes and behaviour of civil servants, a total of four hundred (400) questionnaires were sent out to the selected ministries for the collection of primary data.

The simple random sampling technique was used to select respondents for the survey in the selected bureaucracies discussed in the study area section. Each of these ministries had both technical/professional and support/non-technical functional personnel such as those with the Human Resource, Monitoring & Evaluation, Audit, Procurement and Finance departments. Because the personal circumstances and experiences of all the broad categories of bureaucrats were relevant to this study, no attempt was made to discriminate in terms of targeting respondents. The simple random selection used also ensured the chances of equal selection and avoided the pitfalls of self-selection and sampling bias while enhancing external validity. Regarding the data collection, since appreciable response rates in bureaucratic studies is nothing short of a headache (Cycyota & Harrison, 2006), the study adopted the traditional form of paper-

to-pencil data collection in the hopes of securing acceptable response rates. This is because, within the Ghanaian context, a web-based survey which would require respondents to voluntarily complete survey questions via the internet is potentially more challenging due to costly, inadequate and poor internet connectivity. In the end, out of the 400 questionnaires sent out, two hundred and seventy-four (274) were duly completed and retrieved. This, therefore, gave a response rate of 68.5%.

The study further relied on Jick's (1979: 606) argument that surveys were more meaningful only when "interpreted in light of critical qualitative information..."; therefore, the second part of the study design was related to conducting qualitative face-to-face key informant interviews. This was employed to provide an in-depth exploration and explanation of the consequences of types of bureaucrats' appointment. The sampling procedure for the in-depth interviews was the purposive approach which covered key stakeholders including those within and without the bureaucracy. The specific informants who were interviewed included political appointees and special aids, labour union experts, public sector employment consultants, academics and researchers of the civil service as well as top civil servants in Ghana. These were identified by partly applying a snowballing technique. The key informants interviewed were contacted as a result of their knowledge and experiences with Ghana's varied bureaucratic appointment practices and their consequences from a varied context. This was to ensure fair and balanced representation and solicitation of relevant in-depth information from all stakeholders within and without the bureaucracy. While the survey sampling was restricted to personnel within the country's bureaucracy, the in-depth interviews were extended to relevant experts working outside the bureaucracy as well. These two types of data were collected almost concurrently, but worth noting that key informants who were purposively selected for the in-depth interviews were not sampled for the administering of the survey questionnaire.

Concerning the appropriate sample size for the interview data, various qualitative

studies and methodologists argue that qualitative samples must be sufficient to ensure that all of the relevant facets of the research are uncovered. They must also avoid large sample sizes which may lead to “repetitive” and “superfluous” data (Mason, 2010). Bearing in mind these factors, maintaining the appropriate balance in this study meant employing the concept of “saturation” where the collection of new data does not add value or new information to the subject of inquiry (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This study’s in-depth face-to-face interviews reached a saturation point at 29 interviews. However, the 29 interviews conducted for this study also fell within the range prescribed by methodologists who place numerical caps to qualitative interviews. According to Morse (1994), 30 - 50 interviews is adequate for qualitative research while Bernard (2000) proposes samples between 30 - 60 interviews but Creswell (1998) suggests 20-30 while Guest & Johnson (2006) recommended a minimum of 15 interviews as acceptable in qualitative research. All these recommendations on qualitative research sample size were consistent with Ritchie *et al.* (2003) who posited that qualitative samples often “lie under 50” and that saturation could be achieved at a low level; generally, it does not need to be greater than 60 participants (Morse, 1994; Creswell, 1998). This study, therefore, conducted 29 face-to-face in-depth interviews.

Being semi-structured, the aim of the interviews was two-pronged: to obtain a broad understanding of the types of appointment practices within Ghana’s bureaucracy and to understand whether those appointment practices had any bearing or consequences that shaped bureaucrats’ attitudes and behaviour (autonomy, loyalty, and responsiveness). Since respondents were reassured that all the data collected were based on strict confidentiality and are to be strictly used for academic purposes only, direct quotes and statements from them were acknowledged as such; however, with the utmost observation of anonymity as no direct credit was indicated or given by name to the sources. To further safeguard the anonymity of responses, given the sensitive nature of some of the interview content, vague portfolios of interviewees and titles were used to describe their background where necessary. The in-depth interviews were suitable in

addressing questions of attitudes and behaviour especially in sensitive and confidential studies such as consequences emanating from appointment types. This is because qualitative studies allow for “rapport building which provides a comfortable atmosphere for participant disclosure” (Hinnink *et al.*, 2011). The interviews conducted in this study also facilitated opportunities for networking (Barruch & Holtom, 2008) and sought more explanations to responses that needed further clarity. In doing so, more experience was gained at first hand from key informants and experts’ point of view regarding the consequences of civil service appointments on attitudes and behaviour in Ghana.

According to Brower, Abolafia, & Carr (2000), the opportunity of a researcher to capture all relevant perspectives of accounts encompassing official and unofficial versions in an enquiry is a key feature of qualitative studies. They also note that the researcher’s experience and questions which generate relevant information are sometimes dependent on some elusive environmental observations that systematically shape perceptions and attitudes. Conducting these interviews, therefore, helped in gaining more insights and understanding in two areas. First, concerning the topic under study by directly observing the environment, demeanour and disposition of key informants and where possible, complementing interview data with existing cases or observations gleaned from other interviews and second, concerning human behaviour based on how people are willing to grant audiences depending on what is at stake. The information gathered through the in-depth face-to-face interviews allowed for the contextualisation of the survey results and gave a more detailed account of the manipulations that civil servants face from their principals and that shape their attitudes and behaviour.

4.6 Generating Survey Data - Descriptive Statistics.

The survey data collected was edited and entered into the SPSS software for analysis. Care and deliberate efforts were made to systematically label and enter the data to minimise errors while computing the various items into their respective independent and dependent

variables for analysis. For the independent variables, merit was measured using educational qualification and past-work performance or experience as items from the questionnaire. To specifically determine the dominant types of appointments in Ghana's civil service, a frequency distribution of responses table was generated by transforming and categorising all the indicators (dependent and independent) across all the levels of rating (1-7) into the three main types of appointments as well as the 3 attitudes and behaviour respectively. For example, a respondent rated educational qualification 7 to the question of what influenced his/her appointment into his current position in the civil service while rating all the other items listed in the same question (political consideration, personal connections, ethnic background and past work performance) below 4 (varying degrees of not important). Based on this response, such a respondent was categorised as a merit appointee.

Also, from the questionnaire, patronage was measured using political considerations, personal connections and ethnic background. Similarly, those respondents who rated one or more of the patronage items at 5 and above while at the same time rating the merit items below 4 (varying degrees of not important) were categorised as patronage appointees. Lastly, the hybrid was measured based on a combination of all the items for merit and patronage (educational qualification, past-work performance, political consideration, ethnic background and personal connections). In this sense, it implied that respondents rating both merit and patronage items 5 and above simultaneously were categorised as hybrid appointees since, in their responses, both merit and patronage items were rated at varying degrees of importance. The frequency distribution of responses is detailed in Table 3.

Table 3: Type of Bureaucratic appointment

Colleagues	Frequency	(%)	Own	Frequency	(%)
Merit	53	19.3	Merit	71	25.9
Patronage	53	19.3	Patronage	45	16.4
Hybrid	153	55.8	Hybrid	144	52.5
Missing	15	5.4	Missing	14	5.1
Attitudes and behaviour of bureaucrats					
Colleague	Frequency	(%)	Own	Frequency	(%)
Autonomy	70	25.5	Autonomy	59	21.5
Responsiveness	55	20	Responsiveness	73	26.6
Loyalty	136	49.6	Loyalty	131	47.8
Missing	13	4.7	Missing	11	4
Total = 274		100	Total = 274		100

For measuring the dependent variables from the questionnaire, autonomy was measured using the specific items of autonomy from superiors, the exercise of discretion as well as independent interpretation of civil service rules and regulations. Regarding responsiveness, the items used as measurements from the survey questionnaire were; advance superior's justifiable interests, downplay personal justifiable interests as well as advance the office's justifiable interest. Lastly from the questionnaire, loyalty was evaluated by these parameters: prioritise the interest of superiors who helped in the current appointment, never prioritise the interest of social networks and always prioritise office interests. Using the same criteria of categorisation for the types of appointment, the dependent variables (autonomy, loyalty and responsiveness) and the frequency distribution of the responses were also determined as indicated in Table 3.

Furthermore, since the variables were rated using multiple items, mean index scores (a compound measure that aggregates multiple items) were calculated for each variable of both independent and dependent variables. The mean values or mean index scores allowed for the computation and transformation of the items (indicators) into single values for each variable set out in the hypothesis for testing. The mean index score for merit was calculated by computing the means for both the educational qualification and past-work performance of each respondent. For example, one respondent rated both educational qualification and past work performance 6 and 7 respectively on the scale of 1 – 7; therefore, the mean was determined to

be 6.5 suggesting that the merit score for the respondent was 6.5.

Additionally, the mean index score for patronage was also determined by computing means for political considerations, ethnic background and personal connections. The same procedure was applied in calculating the index score for the hybrid. Autonomy was determined by calculating the values scored by respondents to the specific items to arrive at the mean for autonomy items from the questionnaire (autonomy from superiors, exercise discretion and independently interpret and apply rules). The mean index score for loyalty was determined by computing the values scored by respondents to specific items (prioritise the interest of superiors, never prioritise the interest of social networks and always prioritise office interests). Lastly, the index-score for responsiveness was also calculated by computing the means of the following: advance superiors' justifiable interest, downplay personal justifiable interest and advance office's justifiable interest. This process of calculating the mean scores afforded the study to have single values for all the independent and dependent variables for analytical testing.

The frequency distribution presented in Table 3 reveals very interesting dynamics among respondents concerning the hypotheses of the study. Firstly, the distribution shows response variations between respondents' individual experiences and the perception they hold about their colleagues. To illustrate this, the frequency responses for merit indicate that while about 26% of respondents believe that their appointments were based purely on merit factors, they believed that only 19.3% of their colleagues were appointed purely on merit factors, suggesting almost 7% variation. This could be interpreted to mean that respondents usually witness more patronage induced appointments of their colleagues than they witness about themselves. It may also be interpreted that respondents viewed themselves as more deserving or qualified to be appointed to their current positions than their colleagues. A final interpretation could be that it may simply be a case of socially desirable responses from

respondents about themselves than their colleagues.

Similarly, the frequency responses for patronage show that while about 16.4% of respondents believe that their own appointments were based purely on patronage factors, a higher percentage of 19.3% was recorded for their colleagues. As earlier indicated, this could be interpreted to mean that the respondents usually witness more appointments of their colleagues on patronage grounds than they witness about themselves. In other words, they see themselves as more deserving and qualified to be appointed to their current positions than their colleagues. A similar trajectory is observed with the responses for hybrid appointees as well. Whereas 52.5% saw themselves as hybrid appointees, an upward percentage of 56% was recorded for their colleagues.

However, the frequency distribution for the dependent variables revealed intriguing observations. Whereas respondents for responsiveness as a dependent variable followed the trend above, where 26.6% stated that they are responsive in the execution of their duties as compared to a disproportionate percentage of 20 for their colleagues, the distribution for the other two variables (autonomy and loyalty) was interesting. For loyalty, the frequency distribution shows that respondents' loyalty was 47.8% whilst their colleagues' loyalty was almost 50%. The implication of these percentages could be that respondents saw their colleagues as more loyal to their principals therefore could be interpreted to mean that their colleagues were more predisposed to oblige to unconventional requests than themselves. However, for autonomy, the distribution reveals that respondents' percentage was 21.5% whilst their colleagues' was 25.5%. This means that respondents tend to see their colleagues as more autonomous than themselves. This is consistent with the belief of respondents that they are not given the free hand to operate with neutral-competence as they should.

Therefore, the general interpretation of the dependent variables is that respondents see themselves as more responsive but less loyal and autonomous to their superiors than their

colleagues in the bureaucracy. An interpretation of the entire frequency distribution of responses for the survey revealed that respondents tend to see themselves in a somewhat positive light than their colleagues in the bureaucracy, except for the case of autonomy, where the distribution of responses suggests that bureaucrats believe that their colleagues are somewhat more autonomous than they are.




Figure 1: A bar chart of the Frequency distribution of responses

Another interesting finding from the frequency distribution is shown in Figure 1 above. Given the conventional view that patronage appointments influence bureaucrat's loyalty, the expectation is that a low percentage for patronage appointees (average of 17%) ought to correspond with a low percentage for loyalty as well, per the linear relationship theoretically hypothesised in Chapter three. However, the percentage of loyalty was higher (at an average of 49%). Similarly, the distribution revealed high percentages for hybrid appointees (average of 54%) as shown in Figure 1 but a comparatively lower percentage for responsiveness (average of 23.3%). The interpretation of this situation can be soundly speculated to imply that the data shows a high percentage for loyalty (49%) because both hybrid and patronage appointees tend

to demonstrate loyalty to their principals since there is a common denominator of patronage considerations among them. This will invariably explain why even though the hybrid is hypothesised to influence responsiveness as a dependent variable, responsiveness recorded a lower percentage (23.3%). This could also mean that hybrid bureaucrats' responses are fragmented since some display loyalty whilst others display responsiveness. The high percentage for loyalty as a dependent variable is also explained or aided by the fact that merit respondents believe they lack appreciable autonomy. It, therefore, connotes that they loyally succumb to their principals even if they do not like it. Concerning the hypothesis of merit and autonomy, apart from the response variation between respondents' and that of their colleagues, the correlation of the frequency percentage between the two variables are not significantly dissimilar. Given these scenarios depicted in the interpretation of the frequency distribution data, the next section will endeavour to examine the specific survey demographical data.

4.7 Survey Demographical data

According to data from the OHCS (2019), the current total number of civil servants in Ghana stands at four thousand six hundred and eighty-four (4684). It has a male population of two thousand eight hundred and fifty-two (2,852), representing about 60% and a female population of one thousand eight hundred and thirty-two (1832), representing approximately 40% of the total population of civil servants. Records from the OHCS (2019) also reveal that there are two thousand nine hundred and fifty-six (2956) professional (officer-level) civil servants with at least a bachelors/first degree or above within the various hierarchies and ranks of the civil service while another one thousand six hundred and five (1605) were sub-professionals with various diplomas, SSCE and BECE where necessary within the junior ranks of the civil service. These figures correspond to 63% and 34% professional and sub-professional classes respectively. Regarding the age distribution of the civil service, the distribution reveals that about three hundred and fifty-eight (358 or 7.6%) were aged between 20-29, one thousand seven hundred and fourteen (1714 or 36.5%) aged between 30-39, one

thousand three hundred and one (1301 or 27.7%) aged between 40-49 and one thousand two hundred and eighty-six (1286 or 27.4%) aged between 50-59 while twenty-four (24 or 0.51%) were aged above 60+ (OHCS, 2019). These demographical characteristics constitute the population of Ghana's civil service at the time of this study.

However, reconciling the above-mentioned demographical data with results of this study's survey data obtained in respect of the gender distribution, age groups and region of origin, its representativeness is quite fascinating. The survey data revealed an appreciable gender balance among respondents of almost 1:1 male-female ratio as shown in Table 4. While the survey data indicated a 53% to 46% male to female balance respectively, records of the OHCS (2019) revealed a male population of 60% and a female population of approximately 40% of the total population of the bureaucracy. Given that the female representation in both the survey data and the actual data from the OHCS reveal a significant female representation (40% and above), it suggests that the gender ratio of the civil service population is navigating towards a balance. This may be indicative that bias or discrimination in civil service appointments along gender lines is less profound than other SSA countries, especially since the female literacy rate is still considerably lagging in Ghana.

Table 4. Gender, Age and Region of Origin

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent
Sex	Female	127	46.4	46.4
	Male	147	53.6	53.6
Age Group	20-29	106	38.7	38.7
	30-39	110	40.1	40.1
	40-49	45	16.4	16.4
	50-59	11	4	4
	60 and above	2	0.7	0.7
Region of Origin	Northern Region	19	6.9	6.9
	Central Region	27	9.9	9.9
	Upper East	7	2.6	2.6
	Greater Accra	58	21.2	21.2
	Ashanti Region	51	18.6	18.6
	Volta Region	43	15.7	15.7
	Brong-Ahafo	18	6.6	6.6
	Eastern Region	32	11.7	11.7
	Upper west	7	2.6	2.6
	Western Region	12	4.4	4.4
	Total	274	100	100

Regarding the age distribution, the data from OHCS (2019) revealed that 72% of civil servants were aged between 20 and 49 years while the remaining 28% were 50 years and above. It is, however, striking that according to the OHCS (2019) data, only 28% are within the age bracket of 50 and above. This is because given that civil servants enjoy the security of tenure; it would not have been surprising to realise a higher percentage which would have suggested an ageing workforce within the civil service. However, the age distribution from the survey as shown in Table 4 indicate that 95% of the respondents were aged between 20 and 49 years while the remaining 5% accounted for those aged 50 and above. This suggests that 23% of potential respondents from the age bracket of 50 and above did not answer the questionnaire. This implies that a youthful to mid-age distribution within the civil service responded more to the survey even though they were not specifically targeted. Thus, bureaucrats who are 50 years and above appear to be under-covered since they were comparatively less represented.

This, however, may not be surprising because, in Ghana, those typically above 50 years and naturally approaching the mandatory retirement age of 60 years may be preoccupied with preparations towards their departure and other livelihood priorities than responding to questionnaires. Fortunately, however, the views of that class of bureaucrats (50 and above) may have been adequately captured in the qualitative in-depth interviews. This is because, although they were not specifically targeted for the qualitative data, most key informants within the bureaucracy were very senior bureaucrats, who due to security of tenure, longevity of service and seniority are predominantly in the above 50 age bracket and approaching retirement. It is for this reason the survey's skewed response based on age should not be a cause for concern.

Regarding region of origin, as at the time of administering the survey, the country comprised of 10 administrative regions (now 16), and the data contained respondents who originated from all the 10 administrative regions of Ghana. It is important to state that currently, the country carved 6 more regions out of the 10; hence, now totalling 16. The region of origin was included in the survey to indirectly determine the ethnic distribution of the civil servants

since asking respondents directly about their ethnicity seemed quite sensitive. The use of regional origin to determine Ghana's ethnic representation in the survey is fairly appropriate because all the 10 administrative regions of Ghana were largely carved out along ethnic lines (Abdulai, 2012). Thus, it was safe to say that ethnicity and regionalism were almost synonymous in the Ghanaian context. The use of regional origin was therefore aimed at eliciting responses about ethnic distribution as far as possible because experience has shown that a Ghanaian civil servant will be more predisposed and comfortable to give an honest answer to a question about his region of origin than his or her ethnicity. From Table 4, Greater Accra, Ashanti and Volta regions recorded comparatively high percentages (21.2%, 18.6% and 15.7 % respectively) which fairly mirrors both ethnic literacy rates, power and influence as well as ethnic population and proximity to the national capital city where sector ministries are located (Abdulai, 2012).

Since this research was also interested in the level of professionalism within the civil service and, by extension, the level of meritocracy, respondents were asked to indicate their educational qualification and level of hierarchy within the service. This is because Ghana's civil service requires a minimum academic qualification of first degree to be appointed into a professional position. Records from the OHCS (2019) revealed that about 63% of civil servants acquired at least a bachelors/first degree and above within the various hierarchies and ranks of the civil service. Among the civil servants surveyed, those who held qualifications equivalent to or above first degree and placed at varying professional levels within the civil service career ladder amounted to 88.7% as shown in Table 5. These qualifications and positions were consistent across all the policy areas and civil service institutions surveyed. From Table 5, about 66.4% were either mid-career or at the directorate career ladder while 30% were within the junior management (still considered senior officers) ladder or band, summing up to 97%.

Table 5. Educational qualification and Level of Employment

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Level of Employment	Deputy/Asst. Director	50	18.2	18.2	18.2
	Mid-Level Officer/Manager	132	48.2	48.2	66.4
	Junior Officers	84	30.7	30.7	97.1
	Other	8	2.9	2.9	100
	Total	274	100	100	
Educational qualification	Diploma/SSCE/BECE	31	11.3	11.3	11.3
	Degree (Bachelors)	175	63.9	63.9	75.2
	Postgraduate (Masters)	57	20.8	20.8	96
	PhD	6	2.2	2.2	98.2
	Professional Qualification	5	1.8	1.8	100
	Total	274	100	100	

The data also indicated that 98% possessed academic qualifications ranging from sub-degree to PhD. Even though the similarity in percentages between academic qualification and career position (97%, 98%) does not necessarily confirm merit in the bureaucracy, it does strongly suggest that at a minimum, Ghana's bureaucracy complies with the academic qualifications required for professional positions before appointment into various hierarchies. This also means that the survey respondents were more representative of senior and professional level bureaucrats by a margin of about 25% than non-professional or junior staff. Thus, while the sub-professionals with various diplomas, SSCE and BECE qualifications and, where necessary, no qualifications at all were 34% in the OHCS data (2019), there were only 11.3% of them represented in the survey data. This does not necessarily suggest bias or over-representation but simply a reflection of the predominance of bureaucrats with relevant academic qualifications within Ghana's civil service.

Furthermore, from the survey data as indicated below in Table 6 which contains the type of employment, policy areas and occupation, approximately 76% of the respondents described themselves as employees of mainstream ministries while 85% of the respondents described themselves as career civil servants. The specific field sites within civil service comprised of MOH (perceived professional civil service), MLNR (perceived Hybrid/semi-professional). The third field site was the MLGRD which is perceived to be riddled with patronage appointments. The final field site was OHCS as the central regulator with supervisory responsibilities over civil service institutions in Ghana. As indicated in table 6, the response rate from these selected policy areas is an average of 27% except for OHCS which recorded 14%. These institutions were also chosen purposively to reflect sectorial diversity with different characteristics. This was also in part to facilitate external validity and generalise the findings of the research to the entire bureaucracy of Ghana.

Table 6. Type of Employment, Policy Areas and Occupation.

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid %	Cumulative %
Policy Area	Natural Resources	76	27.7	27.7	27.7
	Health	69	25.2	25.2	52.9
	Local Government	78	28.5	28.5	81.4
	Head of Civil Service (OHCS)	39	14.2	14.2	95.6
	Others	12	4.4	4.4	100
Type of Employment	Central Government	52	19	19	19
	Sector Ministry	156	56.9	56.9	75.9
	Department or Agency	56	20.4	20.4	96.4
	Others	10	3.6	3.6	100
Occupation	Career Civil Servant	233	85	85	85
	Political Aide/Advisor/Consultant	19	6.9	6.9	92
	Politician	7	2.6	2.6	94.5
	Other	15	5.5	5.5	100
	Total	274	100	100	

4.8 Descriptive Statistics of the survey data

This part presents the descriptive statistics of the data obtained. To achieve the objectives of this study, the descriptive data collected were interpreted to form an integral part of the study's analysis. As noted earlier, the data obtained for the variables involved in the research were from administering a standard close-ended 7-Point Likert-type scales questionnaires to two-hundred and seventy-four (N=274) civil servants from three ministries and OHCS based on the type of civil service institution and policy areas. For this study, the statistical measures which were relied upon to compute further statistical testing were 1) Measures of Central tendency, 2) Measures of Variability (Dispersion) and 3) Measures of Divergence from Normality (see Table 7).

Table 7. Descriptive Statistics

		<u>Independent variable</u>			<u>Dependent variable</u>		
		Merit	Hybrid	Patronage	Autonomy	Responsive	Loyalty
N	Valid	274	274	274	274	274	274
	Missing	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mean		4.8978	4.4624	4.1721	4.3303	4.3516	4.5967
Median		5	4.4	4.1667	4.3333	4.3333	4.5
Mode		7	4.40 ^a	3	3.83	3.83	4.67
Std. Deviation		1.4401	1.10421	1.60897	1.19782	0.91825	1.0291
Skewness		-0.37	0.113	-0.192	-0.075	0.11	-0.001
Std. Error of Skewness		0.147	0.147	0.147	0.147	0.147	0.147
Minimum		1.5	1.6	1	1	2	1.83
Maximum		7	7	7	7	6.67	7

For the independent variables, as evident from Table 7, the range for merit was a *minimum* of 1.5 and a *maximum* of 7. The value of the mean, median, mode for merit were 4.89, 5.00 and 7 respectively. The mode is higher than the mean and median. This indicates that the distribution is negatively skewed with high scores for merit. The standard deviation which accounts for the average distance from the mean or dispersion is calculated as 1.4 suggesting a somewhat convergence around the mean. This suggests that results from the survey data could be interpreted to denote that merit-based appointments are common in the

Ghanaian civil service as would be discussed in chapter 5. Comparing the mean of responses for merit which is 4.8 to the midpoint based on the 7 points Likert-type scale, the data is interpreted to imply noteworthy merit appointments within Ghana's bureaucracy (Coakes & Steed, 2001). Pullin and Haidar (2003) argue that any result significantly different from the midpoint can only be positive or negative to the variable being tested.

Regarding patronage, the range was a *minimum* of 1 and a *maximum* of 7 whilst the mean, median, mode values were 4.1, 4.1 and 3 respectively with a negative skewness value of -.192 indicating a near symmetric data. Symmetric distribution is normally not a skewed distribution, but this negative skewness of -.192 is almost negligibly skewed distribution indicating average scores for patronage which does, however, indicate the incidence of patronage-based appointments in Ghana's civil service (expatiated in chapter 6). The standard deviation or dispersion which accounts for the average distance from the mean is calculated as 1.6, also suggesting a relative closeness around the mean. Comparing the mean of responses for patronage which is 4.1 to the midpoint from the 7 point-Likert scale, the data is interpreted to indicate the incidence of patronage appointments within Ghana's bureaucracy (Coakes & Steed, 2001) because Pullin & Haidar (2003) note that any result significantly different from this midpoint can only be positive or negative to the variable being tested.

Regarding hybrid, the range was a *minimum* of 1.6 and a *maximum* of 7 while the values of the mean, median and mode were 4.46, 4.40, and 4.40 respectively. For this data, multiple values for mode existed but the table showed the least mode, meaning the mode is higher than the mean and median. This indicates a skewed data with fairly high scores for hybrid as well. This also confirmed the obvious hybrid appointments within the civil service as detailed in chapter 7. The standard deviation which accounts for the average distance from the mean or dispersion was calculated as 1.1, suggesting a relative convergence around the mean. For all the three independent variables, the difference between the mean, median and mode could be considered marginal indicating that the distribution was near normal. Hence, it can be

interpreted that the selected sample is representative of the population. This ascertains the phenomenon of merit, patronage and hybrid factors as means of appointment into Ghana's civil service albeit at varying degrees. This is elaborated in the empirical chapters. This was also confirmed by the ANOVA conducted using the survey data.

With respect to dependent variables, as evident from Table 7, the range for autonomy was a *minimum* of 1 and a *maximum* of 7. However, the values of the mean, median and mode for autonomy were 4.3, 4.3 and 3.8 respectively. The mean and median were the same while mode is lower with a negative skewness of -.75, indicating a near symmetric data. The standard deviation which accounts for the average distance from the mean or dispersion is calculated as 1.1, suggesting a relative convergence around the mean. This indicates that the distribution is almost converged around the mean, and in this case, it indicates that Ghanaian civil servants do exercise a marginal level of autonomy in the execution of their duties as would be seen in Chapter 5. This was confirmed by the inferential statistics (regression analysis to be discussed later) conducted where the r square is low although with a significant p-value.

However, for Loyalty, the range was a *minimum* of 1.83 and a *maximum* of 7 while the mean, median, mode values were 4.5, 4.5, and 4.6 respectively with a negative skewness value of -.001. This symmetric distribution showed the incidence of Ghanaian civil servants possessing a sense of loyalty to their principals as espoused in chapter 6. This was also confirmed by the inferential statistics (regression analysis) conducted through the r square values recorded with a significant contribution. The dispersion or standard deviation which accounts for the average distance from the mean is calculated as 1.0, suggesting a relative convergence around the mean. This, also, means that Ghanaian civil servants demonstrate loyalty to their principals in a significant way.

In the case of responsiveness, the range was a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 6.67 but the data also indicated mean, median, mode values for responsiveness as 4.3, 4.3, and 3.8 respectively. The mean and median are the same while mode is lower with a positive skewness

of .11 also indicating a near symmetric data. This symmetrical distribution could be interpreted to mean that Ghanaian civil servants are responsive to their principals. This was also confirmed by the regression analysis conducted through the r square values recorded with significant contributions. The standard deviation which accounts for the average distance from the mean or dispersion is calculated as 0.91, also suggesting a relative convergence around the mean. For all the three dependent variables, the difference between the mean, median and mode could be considered marginal, indicating that the distribution is near normal. Hence, it is sufficient to say that the selected sample is adequate for the study. The skewness of the data is fairly symmetrical; thus, revealing that distribution is averagely clustered around the median but tilted towards the upper limit of the scale. This generally shows a moderately upwards phenomenon of autonomy, responsiveness and loyalty as bureaucratic attitude and behaviour of Ghana's civil service albeit at slightly varying severity. This means that survey respondents confirm the significance of autonomy, loyalty and responsiveness as common attitudes and behaviour of bureaucrats in Ghana.

To conclude, the reflections from this initial interpretation of the descriptive data seem to suggest that the theoretical predictions regarding the influence of bureaucratic appointment strategies on bureaucrats' attitudes and behaviour is fundamentally sound. While they may appear to be some curious revelations such as the high frequencies of hybrid appointments and loyalty (even though they are not the hypothesised relationship), the emerging picture is quiet profound. Also, the averagely upper means recorded from the mid-point of the Likert-type scale can only confirm the incidences or noteworthy occurrences of all the variables of interest within the Ghanaian bureaucracy. It is hoped that the further interrogation of these initial findings through the subsequent inferential analyses will settle this curiosity in the empirical Chapters.

4.9 Chapter Summary

This Chapter has examined the methods and descriptive statistics of the study. The first part has presented the study design, types of data, data collection instruments and sample design of the study. It has also illustrated how the primary data was generated. Thus, the Chapter recounts this study's reliance on mixed-methods as a design to generate both quantitative (survey questionnaire) and qualitative (purposive interview) data. It also captures the study's strategy of using both primary and secondary data where necessary. More importantly, the Chapter justifies its sampling strategy and proceeds to describe how the primary data gathered were categorised, transformed, computed, interpreted and analysed.

The second part of this Chapter has essentially examined the initial data (frequency distribution) obtained through the descriptive statistics. Mainly, this data reveal interesting findings while confirming that merit, patronage and hybrid are certainly, the types of bureaucratic appointments deployed in Ghana. It has also provided us with categorical measurements and data percentages of merit, patronage, hybrid, autonomy, loyalty and responsiveness. Given this preliminary data, the subsequent empirical Chapters relies on inferential statistics to establish the statistical relationships, significance, direction and magnitudes which are the bases for the discussions of hypotheses set up for testing. Thus, in the ensuing Chapters, the inferential statistics provides us with a basis for detailed analyses and discussion regarding the influence of types of appointments on bureaucrats' attitudes and behaviour.

CHAPTER FIVE

WEBER'S HOLLOW TREATISE: THE REALITY OF A SUBJUGATED BUREAUCRAT.

5.1 Introduction

Chapter 3 of this study has already examined the theoretical discourses related to how bureaucrats' appointment is expected to shape their attitudes and behaviour. This was further cascaded into three main hypotheses. The first hypothesis discussed the theorisation in the literature that merit-based appointments influence autonomous attitudes and the behaviour of bureaucrats (Weber, 1919, 1948, 1968; Johnson & Libecap, 1994; Evans & Rauch, 2000; Dahlström *et al.*, 2012; Cooper, 2018). Here, the theory posited the merit-autonomy argument in the traditional sense of Weberian bureaucracy. Thus, it envisaged an ideal bureaucracy where bureaucrats are selected based on technical qualifications and competence and are personally autonomous and subject to authority only within a defined area (Fukuyama, 2013). Regarding bureaucrats' autonomy, Ingraham & Moynihan (2003: 183) argued that bureaucratic conventions and laws "have always had a split personality" which fuels the obstinate apprehensive relationship between political principals and bureaucrats. This is because these laws promote both bureaucrats' autonomy from politics and bureaucrats' accountability to political principals.

Certainly, one of the theoretically established cardinal pillars of the Weberian bureaucracy is the prescription that bureaucrats ought to be autonomous agents whose only objective is to impartially implement or pursue public interest and are only accountable to the law. Consequently, one of the presumptions of the Weberian bureaucracy is that a merit-based appointee will promote the public interest than one who is appointed through patronage considerations. Therefore, while political principals may feel entitled to the loyalty of bureaucrats in terms of support for their priorities and interests, merit appointees would consider that such an entitlement mentality by principals is nothing more than an impediment to their professional autonomy and legitimacy (Aberbach & Rockman, 1988; Rourke, 1992; Ingraham *et al.*, 1995). It is, therefore, theoretically

expected that merit bureaucrats will try to demonstrate independent attitudes and behaviour from political principals in the execution of their duties. This is why this chapter sets out to examine the theoretical hypothesis that *‘the more merit-based the process of appointment is, the more likely a bureaucrat is to be autonomous.’*

In testing all the hypotheses of this study, regression analysis is employed as an inferential statistics measure to examine the relationship between the independent variables (merit, patronage and hybrid) and dependent variables (autonomy, loyalty and responsiveness). Regression inferential analysis has been adopted because it is the most standardised approach to test and examine the relationship or association between variables of interest (Schneider, Hommel & Blettner, 2010; Chatterjee & Hadi, 2012). Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure that there were no violations of the assumptions of regression such as large sample size, linearity, normality, homoscedasticity and multicollinearity. Consequently, different levels of linear regression analyses have been employed to undertake quantitative examinations of the survey data whereas thematic analyses have been deployed to analyse the qualitative in-depth interview data. The regression analyses were conducted on data derived from an index-score of responses to multi-item variables administered to measure the variables of interest. For example, the independent variable of merit appointees was measured using educational qualification and past-work performance or experience while autonomy as a dependent variable was measured using three specific items: independence from principals, the exercise of discretion and independent interpretation of civil service rules and regulations. These were all rated on a scale of 1-7 by respondents in a standard questionnaire.

In terms of analysis, this study’s formulated hypotheses have been tested using p-values. The p-value is the level of significance within a statistical hypothesis test representing the probability of the occurrence of a given event while the smaller p-value is construed as stronger evidence in favour of the alternative hypothesis (Fisher, 1966). However, regarding establishing the relationship or association between the variables of interest, derived values are used to

determine the actual influence or relationship which ranges between 0 and 1 for a positive relationship and 0 and -1 for a negative relationship. Using the merit-autonomy hypothesis as an example, a derived value of 0 will indicate no impact of merit over autonomy whilst a derived value of 1 will indicate an absolute impact of merit processes on bureaucrats' autonomy.

Concerning effect sizes (R^2), they are usually quantitative measures of magnitude between a tested independent and dependent variable(s) where the r-square of a model is the proportion of variance (%) in the dependent variable that is explained by the independent variable. Therefore, as a rule of thumb for interpreting the strength or impact of a relationship based on its r-squared value, the absolute value of the r-square is used to make such predictions (Cohen, 1988). The closer the effect size is to the value of 1, the stronger the relationship between two variables. By the same logic, the closer the effect size is to 0, the weaker the influence of the two variables. This study adopts Cohen's (1988, 1992) classification of the r square (R^2) or the coefficient of determination which can be classified into three, namely small, medium and large size effects. Cohen argued that for social or behavioural science studies using surveys, an r-square value between 0.1 to 0.3 is weak whilst r square values of 0.3 to 0.5 are moderate. Furthermore, an r-square value of 0.5 and above is measured as having a strong effect relationship (McLeod, 2019). Based on these statistical analytical techniques and interpretations, the ensuing discussion delves into an in-depth empirical evaluation of whether merit appointees exercise their professional autonomy as expected of them.

Following from the above, the rest of the Chapter empirically examines five main findings. The first argument discusses the finding that merit indeed shapes bureaucrats' autonomy and that as merit increases, so would the level of autonomy. However, despite the positive relationship between merit appointees and autonomy, their autonomy is found to be weak. This suggests that hardly does merit processes of appointment lead to considerable autonomy of bureaucrats in Ghana. On the flip side, neither are principals' control over bureaucrats' attitudes and behaviour automatically counter-productive. The second discussion of this chapter is related to the finding that against dominant theoretical expectations, merit bureaucrats demonstrate positive loyalty to

principals albeit at unencouraging levels. The reasons for such findings are sufficiently articulated in the discussion. Thirdly and more interestingly, the chapter also discusses the finding that merit bureaucrats are more responsive than they are autonomous to political principals, suggesting that any expectation of political unresponsiveness from merit appointees is unrealistic or, at best, not supported by evidence on the ground. The fourth discussion of the chapter relates to the finding that merit bureaucrats' level of appointment has a bearing on the amount of autonomy they exercise whilst other factors such as type of bureaucracy, ethnicity, gender and age have no significant effect. Furthermore, the fifth point of the chapter briefly discusses the implications of these outcomes on some normative or theoretical arguments. The final part of this Chapter comprises of Chapter summary which draws vital conclusions based on the findings of this Chapter's hypothesis.

5.2 The Discourse of Merit Appointees' level of Autonomy in Ghana

To conduct statistical analyses to be able to engage in the discourse of merit appointees' level of autonomy in Ghana, both a one-way ANOVA and standard linear regression analyses were conducted to examine the relationship between an omnibus merit-based predictor and the exercise of autonomy by bureaucrats. The one-way ANOVA was run to compare the groups to establish whether there were differences among appointment types studied or not (Appendix 1). To do this, there was a disaggregation of appointment routes into factors which influenced respondents' current appointment into the civil service and that which influenced respondents' colleagues' current appointments into the civil service. The results showed that there existed a statistically significant difference at five per cent ($p < 0.05$) level between the three appointment routes: $F(3, 271) = 67.388$, $p < .05$. Post-hoc comparisons employing the tuckey-HSD test revealed that the mean score for merit-based appointment route ($M = 1.34$, $SD = 0.71742$) was significantly different from patronage-based appointment route ($M = 2.18$, $SD = 0.69076$) and the hybrid-based appointment route ($M = 2.651316$, $SD = 0.69301$).

To examine whether variations in appointments existed in terms of respondents' colleagues' current appointment into the civil service, another ANOVA was performed. The results here, as well, were statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha level: $F(3, 271) = 65.516$, $p < .05$. Post-hoc comparisons using the tuckey-HSD test for the category of colleague civil servants also showed that the mean score for merit-based appointments ($M = 1.6866$, $SD = .89119$) differed significantly from patronage-based appointments ($M = 2.2791$, $SD = .59062$) and hybrid-based appointments ($M = 2.7817$, $SD = .52072$). This reveals that the factors which influenced the appointments of civil servants into the civil service are virtually dissimilar and that there are civil servants who come into the service through merit-based appointment routes; others, through patronage-based routes and some, through the hybrid-system of appointment.

A further multiple regression analysis was conducted using the factors which explain the omnibus merit-based predictor (educational qualification and work experience), to examine the distinctive relationship between these factors and the exercise of autonomy by civil servants. This was to ascertain the unique contribution of each of the items that informed the omnibus merit-based predictor. These factors include civil servant own educational qualification (OEQ), Own past-work experience (OPE), perception of civil servant colleague's educational qualification (PCEQ) and perception of civil servant colleague's past-work experience (PCPE). The summary of the regression results is presented in Table 8.

Table 8: A summary of Merit-Autonomy Regression results

Variable(s)	Mean (μ)	Std (X)	($\rho_{X,Y}$) with Merit	R-square (R^2)	b	β
Autonomy	8.5912	2.29543	.218*			
Omnibus Merit	19.5912	5.76023	.218*	0.047	0.087	0.218
Multiple Regression results of Merit-based factors						
OEQ	5.2409	1.76878	.142*		0.03	0.023
OPE	4.4818	2.00951	.169*		0.069	0.061
PCEQ	5.3759	1.66661	.160*		0.123	0.089
PCPE	4.4927	2.08473	.191*		0.125	0.113
Whole Model				12.2		
Controlled Model				0.052		
Standard Linear Regression						
Loyalty	41.1788	8.56824	.134*	0.018		
Responsiveness	38.7737	7.90603	.260*	0.068		

* Significant correlation at $p < .05$

As can be seen, Table 8 depicts the results of bivariate simple linear, multiple and hierarchical regressions based on the study's survey data from Ghana's bureaucracy. Through the bivariate linear regressions conducted, the Table shows results of values for the correlation between the omnibus merit as an independent variable and the hypothesised dependent variable of autonomy ($\rho_{X,Y} = .218$) as well as other non-hypothesised dependent variables like loyalty (.134) and responsiveness (.260). The table also contains multiple-regression results of values for factors which explain merit (merit predictors i.e. OEQ, OPE, PCEQ, PCPE) as an independent variable. As it can be seen from the table, each of these merit-based predictors is positively and significantly correlated with the autonomy principle, indicating that the merit-based predictors or variables tend to influence the level of autonomy exercised by civil servants in the execution of their duties. The standard multiple regression model with all the four predictors produced $R^2 = .049$, $F(4, 269) = 3.498$, $p < .08$. Also, all the four independent predictors had significant positive regression weights, portraying that civil servants with merit-based background appointments were expected to have a certain level of autonomy in the exercise of their civil service duties.

The table also contains hierarchical regression results after controlling for the influence of variables such as age, sex, level of appointment, type of appointment, policy area, educational qualification, type of institution and ethnicity (region of origin). Other statistical results captured in the table include the Mean (μ) of various variable relationships, standard deviations, *alpha* and *beta* values as well as R^2 (coefficient of determination) of the various regression models conducted (.049, .052, .018 and .068). These results contained in Table 8 have been used together with results from the thematic analyses of the in-depth interviews to engage in the ensuing discussion regarding the influence of merit on bureaucrats' autonomy.

From Table 8, the central outcome is related to the finding of a positive relationship between the omnibus merit-based predictor and the autonomy criterion, demonstrating that civil servants who come into the service through merit-based processes exercise a certain level of autonomy in performing their duties. The standard linear regression model with the omnibus predictor produced $R^2 = .047$, $F(1, 273) = 13.55$, $p < .05$. This illustrates that as the level of merit increases, so does the level of autonomy. Nonetheless, the implication of this results also indicates that although merit-based processes influence the level of autonomy exercised by bureaucrats in the execution of their duties, it does not expressively indicate that these appointees are considerably autonomous. This is because while the results confirm the theoretical expectations or direction between merit appointees and the autonomy they exercise, its impact is found to be a weak one in Ghana ($\rho_{X,Y} = .218$). Thus, the outcome of the empirical test establishes that merit processes of appointing bureaucrats are insufficient in allowing them ample autonomy in the performance of their duties as theorised. Whilst this weak impact may be unexpected, it should not be surprising. This is primarily because in most bureaucratic dispensations, more so under neo-patrimonial regimes, neither do bureaucrats determine the assignments they undertake nor have space to independently function; therefore, it is unstartling that merit appointees are not absolutely autonomous.

Civil servants under neo-patrimonial settings usually retain insufficient space to define their own agenda regardless of whether the bureaucratic dispensation is patronage-inclined or not (Schattschneider, 1960). Jacobsen (2006: 304) articulated the hierarchical relationship between principals and bureaucrats “as a division of labour between” principals and bureaucrats based on their respective mandates which also determine the extent of their autonomy or subordination. Since policies and agenda go through agenda-setting and formulation, adoption, implementation, evaluation and termination (Smith, 2003), these phases are accomplished by both principals who define the agenda and bureaucrats who implement them; but, may not follow systematically as outlined above.

Indeed, insights from the thematic analysis conducted on the qualitative in-depth interviews of this study reinforce the above finding (see appendix 7). For example, a key informant from MLNR stated succinctly that “your superior gives you what you are supposed to do and you have limited space to do things on your own [yet] you are not doing everything by the dictates of your superior” (Interviewee 1, 28th September 2018; MLNR). This interviewee’s assertion alludes to the reality that despite instructions and directions handed down from principals to execute certain assignments, bureaucrats retain discretion as to how the rudiments of those assignments can be carried out.

Nonetheless, this key informant argued that principals still subjugate bureaucrats in their line of duty by citing an example regarding the training of bureaucrats in his bureaucracy. The key informant made the point that regardless of his resolve as a bureaucrat in-charge of training to apply professional standards and rules, he is sometimes pressured by his superiors to engage the services of their (principals) cronies from outside the bureaucracy as training facilitators instead of using their own internal trainers to train employees. Accordingly, these principals insist on awarding “consultancies” to their associates irrespective of the availability of the bureaucracy’s own “better qualified” and experienced internal trainers. This instance

cited by the informant shows that implementation within the civil service is largely instructive; so, the autonomy principle cannot be absolute because top bureaucrats always direct interests and instructions from the top and down the organisational ladder. Another informant argued that merit bureaucrats are not sufficiently capable of autonomous attitudes and behaviour because Ghana's bureaucracy:

hasn't got the men and women who can autonomously undertake critical government function on their own...[and] ... that an external entity somewhere will have to intervene in their day to day functions, ... We seem to have gotten ourselves in a situation where politics trumps everything in this country and political establishments want to have their way and have so successfully been able to trump civil service procedures and rules. To a large extent, politics has managed to destroy the confidence of all the civil servants. So, you now have a situation where the civil servants defer to the political establishments (Interviewee 13, 3rd October 2018; Labour Research).

Due to requirements of oversight accountability on the one hand and autonomy from direct control by principals on the other (Ingraham & Moynihan, 2003), bureaucrats intermittently find themselves in a quandary because, some superiors pursue certain interests which they [bureaucrats] deem undesirable; yet, they succumb to pressures due to requirements of accountability. As argued by an interviewee, they (bureaucrats) "have to keep quiet and let such decision go through. However, if a new political regime comes into power, it will be the responsibility of the bureaucrat to justify and explain why certain things that he/she probably have [kicked] against previously, are happening" (interviewee 26, 9th October 2018; University of Ghana [UG]). Insights from the in-depth interviews indicate that principals sometimes become overbearing in their intrusion during policy execution due to the political and social currencies at stake. Certainly, one of the fundamental justifications to why bureaucrats require autonomy is to safeguard public interests because from time to time,

principals' request civil servants to act in ways that are deemed to be non-beneficial; yet, "the system does not really allow them to be autonomous [as] it restrains them" (Interviewee 28, 7th October 2018; HR Consultant).

Indeed, Table 8 provides an inversely profound picture of the extent of the merit bureaucrats' autonomy. This can be seen as the study's use of a standard linear regression to test the relationship between merit and dependent variables other than the hypothesised dependent variable (loyalty and responsiveness). This produced intriguing findings. The objective of this test was to help ascertain whether it was even necessary to theoretically advance the arguments that certain dominant attitudes and behaviour are associated with only specific types of civil service appointees. A vital finding from the regression results shows that the omnibus merit-based predictor had a positive correlation with the loyalty and responsive attitudes and behaviour as shown in Table 8. The standard linear regression model with the merit-based predictor on loyalty produced $r^2 = .018$, $F(1, 273) = 4.948$, $p < .027$. Unsurprisingly, however, merit bureaucrats' impact on loyalty is weaker (.134) than the normal hypothesised relationship with autonomy (.218).

In practical terms, this means that even though merit appointees also exercise a certain level of loyal attitudes and behaviour in the exercise of their duties, the level of loyalty they demonstrate is not as impactful as demonstrated by patronage appointees (Chapter 6). This is understandable within the Ghanaian context because as merit bureaucrats are concerned about the public interest, they will be demonstrably less enthusiastic in offering considerable loyalty to principals whose interests may be parochial and have the potential of hurting the public interest. Yet, these merit bureaucrats are compelled to showcase the level of loyalty they can offer even if grudgingly due to obligations of commitment imposed on them by the oath of office and concerns over career disruption or victimisation.

Similarly, and perhaps more interesting and noteworthy are the findings from the results of the standard linear regression conducted to test the relationship between merit appointees and political responsiveness. The results also illustrate a positive and significant association between merit and responsiveness, only that the relationship value is less than the hypothesised relationship between hybrid appointees and their level of responsiveness as would be seen in Chapter 7. The standard linear regression model with the merit-based predictor on responsiveness produced $R^2 = .068$, $F(1, 273) = 19.736$, $p < .05$. In practical terms, what this implies is that it is a validation that merit appointees demonstrate politically responsive attitudes and behaviour in the exercise of their duties. However, the intriguing observation about these results is that the impact of responsiveness demonstrated by merit bureaucrats is stronger (.260) than the impact of the originally hypothesised variable of autonomy (.218). This is noteworthy in terms of the study's theoretical characterisation of merit bureaucrats since the results show that despite their type of appointment, merit bureaucrats are more politically responsive than being autonomous in the discharge of their duties.

Indeed, a governance expert from IDEG argued that since the civil service is a bureaucratic institution with a hierarchical structure, it will always follow command and control power relations and structure between superiors and subordinates; hence, bureaucrats' autonomy will be minimal whilst political responsiveness will be appreciable. In the informants' opinion, as the bureaucracy tries to forecast the likely occurrences that are to happen, it sets rules and regulations to be followed, coupled with following the directions of the various principals along hierarchical lines; therefore, little room is left for individual autonomy.

This finding is not unique as Brierley (2018), in her study of the Ghanaian bureaucracy, had also similarly found that "meritocratically" appointed civil servants are unable to curtail their principals' illicit interests because principals retain greater ability to manipulate the

careers of bureaucrats; this has made it more likely for bureaucrats to appear responsive. She specifically cited an example that in cases of competitive procurement processes and pro-poor approaches to development, bureaucrats condone the illicit attitude and behaviour of political principals which encouraged corruption. Based on this study's qualitative data, a key informant argued that even though in industrialised countries, merit bureaucrats "...vindicate themselves by developing a positive attitude towards work and are more competitive to protect their careers which leads to production", under post patrimonial settings, unfortunately, "[although] the merit-based systems are the best, we cannot have a 100% ..." positive attitudes to protect the public interest. Bureaucrats can only protect their jobs when they are less autonomous or subjugated to their principals in the performance of their duties (Interviewee 28, 7th October 2018; UG).

Another informant indicated that when merit-based appointees "get frustrated in one way or the other and realise that to rise within the ranks, they must begin to be seen as belonging to a certain political group, they also begin to conform" (Interviewee 13, 3rd October 2018; Labour Research). What this does to Ghana's modelled Weberian bureaucracy is that instead of being autonomous, bureaucrats rather become subjugated to principals or in the alternative, those bureaucrats who are unable to relinquish their autonomy and think that they have better options elsewhere eventually leave, thereby robbing the bureaucracy of critical talents.

Certainly, under neo-patrimonial regimes, it is not astonishing when merit bureaucrats are unable to exert sufficient autonomy due to some commitments and prescriptions under the bureaucracy's code of conduct. This subjugation is more so when coupled with career concerns of these merit appointees besides their neo-patrimonially inclined systemic restriction. In effect, while the constitutionally established Weberian bureaucracies legally cloth bureaucrats with autonomy, in practical terms, they are semi-autonomous at best. In instances where principals do not exert pressures or control, cautious merit appointees still exercise a significant

level of restraint. In fact, an interviewee concisely indicated that when bureaucrats are granted space to be autonomous from political pressures and influences under neo-patrimonial settings, in practice, they tend to exercise what is termed as “self-censorship [as] many bureaucrats are almost always afraid that if they are not seen to be dancing to the tune of their political masters, they are likely to suffer one consequence or the other” due to partisan polarisation and persecution (Interviewee 26, 9th October 2018; UG). Therefore, some bureaucrats think twice by deploying self-censorship because exercising any kind of autonomy or discretion that leads to undermining the principal’s interest can be damaging to their careers and means of livelihood.

Another key informant also echoed similar sentiments by indicating that most civil servants prioritise protecting themselves and their careers by shelving their discretionary power, particularly under public procurement instances since bureaucrats have been scapegoated in the past for being reckoned to have violated procurement laws. Ghanaian merit appointees are, therefore, concerned that in the exercise of their autonomy and discretion, they might infringe on special interests which would pit them against victimisation; hence, the need for self-censorship. To quote an interviewee, such “public-choice concerns” by bureaucrats lead to “retooling ourselves to be robotic - you know this is what has been done, this is the precedents so let us follow the precedents. This kind of undermines our ability to think outside the box or be innovative because we fear the repercussions of what will come if we are unable to exercise the autonomy and discretion in the right manner” (Interviewee 27, 9th October 2018; UG).

A very recent case in point is the current President’s (Nana-Addo Dankwa) directive for the country’s independent Auditor-General to proceed on a contentious 123 working days accumulated leave through a letter dated June 29, 2020. This was because of public disagreements between the Auditor-General and the office of the president. These disagreements emanated from the belief by the executive that the Auditor-General, through his

work, was sabotaging the current government, especially since he was appointed by their predecessors on December 30, 2016, just seven days before they left office. In a letter dated July 03, 2020, contesting the directive to proceed on leave, the Auditor-General accused the president of “bad faith” and indicated that the decision was as a result of the president’s belief that “the Auditor- General’s work is embarrassing the government” since it was public knowledge that the senior minister of the regime was a subject of his audit work over alleged shady transactions and payments for no work done.

He concluded by appealing to the president to review his decision since it had “serious implications for the constitutional independence of the office of the Auditor-General”. But, in a rather long response to the letter of the Auditor-General, the president, among other issues, advised the Auditor-General to desist from attempting to interpret the law since, in the president’s opinion, the Auditor-General was incompetent in that respect. He further went ahead to increase the accumulated leave days granted to him from 123 working days to 167 working days which was sure to keep him away from office for a significant long time, if not forever.

Interestingly, barely 48 hours after the Auditor-General’s initial decision, the newly appointed Ag. Auditor- General issued a letter dated July 2, 2020, to the presidency exonerating the senior minister (who was the main subject of the controversies) of any wrongdoing. Unsurprisingly, the deposed Auditor-General failed to resort to the courts because of the widespread belief of political control over the courts by the executive through the president. This typical example cited between the Auditor-General and the executive is a common occurrence between bureaucrats and principals and, is usually witnessed by colleague bureaucrats. Such occurrences encapsulate their plight; hence, they relinquish exercising considerable autonomy against principals as expected of them to protect their careers and means of livelihoods.

The career and livelihoods apprehensions entertained by merit bureaucrats are, thus, based on past evidence of persecution due to bureaucratic polarisation along with allegations of sabotage from principals who have a way of getting rid of bureaucrats whose “face doesn’t fit”. Other ample narrations from the in-depth interviews conducted in this study disclose past accounts of situations where bureaucrats who attempt to assert the public interest from that of principals in the exercise of their professional autonomy have faced open confrontations. This has often led to tension or frosty relationships between principals and bureaucrats as bureaucrats are sometimes subjected to victimisation if they fail to comply with the principals’ will. Such tensions have frequently led political principals or top bureaucrats to request for or cause the transfers or postings of such bureaucrats out of a ministry or bureaucracy because they are perceived to be difficult to work with.

An interviewee indicated that it is common for a political principal to cause the transfer/posting of a chief director of a powerful ministry like the ministry of finance “to a much inferior ministry like the ministry of information or fisheries, which is an indirect way of demotion. So, in reality, the whole notion of autonomy is very minimal as far as the Ghanaian civil service is concerned” (Interviewee 26, 9th October 2018; UG). These scenarios continue to be reported in the media and whilst this is not surprising, its frequency is a source of concern for what it means for bureaucrats’ autonomy as articulated by proponents such as Weber. Taking cues from such victimisations of colleagues, whether appointed through merit or not, most bureaucrats may relinquish their constitutionally granted autonomy in favour of pleasing their principals to avoid career jeopardy.

The “self-censorship” attitude is even more pronounced as merit bureaucrats are conscious of the fact that bureaucrats’ careers within the civil service landscape under post-patrimonial democracies can be notoriously tenuous. Therefore, the general resolve of most Ghanaian bureaucrats including meritocratically appointed ones is the acceptance that the

structural hierarchies within civil services are control mechanisms designed to limit their individual autonomy and discretion. Once they have superiors as bureaucrats, they consciously or unconsciously accept that they cannot be absolutely autonomous and that they can only suggest or whisper their advice “but at the end of the day, the final decision is not yours to make, it is for the higher upstream – yours is to suggest or advice” (Interviewee 2, 1st October 2018; MLNR).

Scaling down the merit bureaucrats’ autonomy discussions to various hierarchies within the bureaucracy, findings from the in-depth interviews reveal that the question of autonomy is not only vital between principals and bureaucrats but among bureaucrats who vary from one level to another and from one department to another. This is because of the hierarchical nature of bureaucrats occupying various positions at various levels with varying authorities (command structure) and interests. Indeed, Fukuyama (2013) argued that there can be a manifold of principals in a bureaucracy with equal legitimacy to give potentially overlapping and absolutely conflicting directives with diverse interests. A key informant noted that “his style [of leadership] is that he gives you the work and emphasises on the results irrespective of how you go about the work, his interest is about the results so don’t come and give him excuses”. However, there are other examples where subordinate bureaucrats complain about their principals because when they (lower bureaucrats) exercise discretion, their superiors feel undermined.

While the above point reveals differences in style, the general understanding of individual autonomy in the Ghanaian bureaucracy is that there is some form of restriction and subjugation. Just as the institution goes through red-tapeism in the quest to achieve its objective, so too do individual bureaucrats go through red-tapes in carrying out their mandates or performing their duties. Understandably, the systemic and structural arrangement of the civil services worldwide fuels a cycle of delegating from top bureaucracy to the bottom but

authoritarian principals may abuse their power by retaining more discretionary and decision-making power than delegating them. This rarely allows individual bureaucrats to exercise real autonomy in the course of their duties. For example, since the civil service is a hierarchical structure, bureaucrats, in executing their duties, may not, on their own, contact the minister's office but rather would have to go through their immediate principals. As articulated by an interviewee:

You may have your own way of doing things but the structure or the system will not allow you [which] ... kills one's initiative by trying to come out with your own innovative ideas as to how to improve upon the sector's work. Because you are asked to do the rudimental aspect of the work and you have to follow the structure from the top, even if you have a better innovative way, you still have to follow the structure, so, until we incorporate individual ingenuity or creativity as to how people should use their initiative, we cannot really have autonomy... because where the decision ends you have no control over it (Interviewee 5, 28th September 2018; MLNR).

The situation stated above affects civil service delivery because as an interviewee states, “there is a long chain of systems, processes or structures and in dealing with civil servants, I have realised that taking an individual decision is really a big problem and a challenge” (Interviewee 28, 7th October 2018; HR Consultant). This interviewee maintained that sometimes, when you engage bureaucrats regarding certain projects to be executed, “they have to refer you to their bosses, and there will be several other references [to other bosses and procedures] - and finally come back to the button again... because of the fear of being punished along the line in case a decision does not go in line with the political will of the sitting government”. This limits the bureaucrats' approach to work and their eventual autonomy. It also implies that whereas the findings of the influence of merit on autonomy generally follow the expected direction as setup in the hypothesis ($R^2 = 0.047$), it does not meet the conventional levels of strong impact as

classified by Cohen (1988, 1992). To explain this unexpected level of impact, it can be soundly speculated that the underlying theoretical presumptions between merit and autonomy may have been exaggerated. It may also have been that the constructs used to measure them may not have been exhaustive to capture all the relevant dimensions of these variables of interest.

5.3 The Effect of Level of Appointment of Merit Bureaucrats on Autonomy.

In testing the H₁, the study endeavoured to ascertain whether factors such as level of appointment, type of appointment, gender, age, policy area, level of education, type of institution etc. have any effect on a merit appointees' autonomy. This is because various studies and scholars in the past suggested that these factors can affect how certain attitudes and behaviour are played out in the bureaucracy (Rourke, 1992; Chandra, 2001, 2005; Asante & Gyimah-Boadi, 2004; De Winter, 2006; Gwiazda, 2008; Scherlis, 2010; Kopecký, 2011; Kopecký *et al.*, 2016). For instance, Asante & Gyimah-Boadi (2004) argued about the influence of ethnicity on bureaucratic appointments which affected the regional balance in the Ghanaian civil service. In support of the ethnicity thesis, Chandra (2001, 2005) also argued that principals usually make “overt appeals to ethnic identity, align themselves openly with some ethnic groups and exclude others, seek to build uniform ethnic blocs across constituencies and states and attempt to mobilise these blocs by weaving the demands for political and material benefits into a larger narrative of identity and status; thus, making ethnicity a central coalition weapon even within bureaucracies.”

To test the influence of these factors, therefore, hierarchical regression was employed to examine the ability of an omnibus merit-based appointment standard to predict the level of autonomy exercised by civil servants in the execution of their duties after controlling the influence of level of appointment, type of appointment, policy area, educational qualification, type of institution, age, gender and ethnicity (See Appendix 2). These controlling variables – the level of appointment, type of appointment, policy area, educational qualification, type of

institution, age, sex and ethnicity (region of origin) were entered at step 1, explaining 7% of the variance in the level of exercised autonomy. After entry of the merit-based independent variable at step 2, the total variance explained by the model as a whole was 12.2%, $F(9, 265) = 4.058, p < .05$ (see Appendix 2). This means that the merit-based independent variable explains an additional 5.2% of the variance with regards to the level of autonomy exercised by civil servants in the execution of their duties after controlling for age, sex, level of appointment, type of appointment, policy area, educational qualification, type of institution and ethnicity (region of origin), $R^2 \text{ change} = .052, F(1, 273) = 15.482, p < .05$.

The results showed that variables such as age, sex, type of appointment, policy area, educational qualification, type of institution and ethnicity (region of origin)] made no unique contribution despite arguments made by past studies regarding such relationships. Interestingly, however, only two variables made statistically significant contributions to the level of autonomy exercised by civil servants. In order of importance, they are merit-based appointment route (beta = .234) and level of appointment (beta = -.244). Thus, the results revealed that civil servants coming into the service through merit-based processes and their level of appointment or position within the bureaucracy determine the level of autonomy they exercise in the performance of their duties. This implies that the minimal autonomy exercised by merit bureaucrats could be largely attributed to top bureaucrats. This finding of significance regarding the level of merit bureaucrats' appointment and their autonomy confirms what some scholars in past studies had demonstrated, that the level of a bureaucrat's appointment may play a significant role. In examining this nexus between the level of appointment and a bureaucrat's autonomy at the quantitative level, insights gleaned from the qualitative interviews (see appendix 7) synergised the findings from the survey. This is because it proved that depending on the level of appointment, a bureaucrat may exercise some measure of autonomy in performing his/her duties, especially at the senior level, in contrast with the middle or lower-level bureaucrats.

Reinforcing this finding, an expert informant maintained that the minimal bureaucratic autonomy available is exercised by top bureaucrats in whom most powers and authority are vested; “they can deliberate and then decide discretionally as to what to do. But, at the lower level, you follow the instructions and orders of your superiors, so the exercise of discretion is minimal because, everything you do, you must report to your superior for approval before you can finally execute it” (Interviewee 21, 3rd October 2018; IDEG). As clearly put by another interviewee, “delegation is one of the things that you can say is working but as far as autonomy is concerned, you can’t apply it throughout the ladder”. He further indicated that in some instances “the exercise of discretion, to a large extent, reside with the management level... otherwise, if you are just part of a team or directorate, exercising autonomy is very limited” (Interviewee 15, 3rd October 2018; OHCS).

Thus, within the context of the level of appointment of bureaucrats vis-a-vis autonomy, a key informant (senior governance expert) concluded that per experience, bureaucratic discretions are exercised by senior bureaucrats than their subordinates and that “subordinates always try to do what their superiors tell them to do – you must satisfy the superior’s desires... The politician comes in with an agenda that he/she wants the civil servants to help him/her achieve. In that vein, the politicians direct or control the directives... [bureaucrats] are compelled to satisfy the interest of their political superiors” (Interviewee 21, 3rd October 2018; IDEG). Furthermore, another key informant (mid-level bureaucrat) maintained that “when you finish your work, you still have to go and discuss it with your superiors... and they will look at it to see whether it is in their interest or not in their interest because they promised people as to what they will do for them and you must make sure your work is aligned with that agenda” (Interviewee 9, 1st October 2018; MLGRD). Similarly, another informant from the ministry of health submitted that although the days where they had to be micromanaged are over, because of the performance contracts and management objectives they sign with their principals, these principals still:

Try to see how he/she can keep you going in terms of coaching on the job... and then comes in to make sure that you are going along the right path and he/she is only interested in the output at the end of the day. But, how you get it done, most of the times you are given some level of autonomy (Interviewee 6, 27th September 2018; MOH).

This is understandable because matters related to the technical implementation of agenda and interests are much more nuanced and less interesting to political principals or superiors; therefore, in bureaucracies where most of their activities are professional or technically biased, principals may be comparatively less interested in micro-management. But when matters of political interest to principals are being implemented, it is not entirely left with bureaucrats simply because it is a predominantly technical matter; some level of surveillance is done. For example, in SSA where unemployment is a nagging issue, principals have interests in job creation and concerns for loyalty so when it comes to appointments, they become interested and try to influence those to be appointed especially from certain constituencies.

Furthermore, another informant from the MLNR cited, as an example, that given his/her job schedule, s/he exercises autonomy and discretion, for example, when it comes to the technical aspects of how to select and restore “degraded forest reserves through enrichment planting” but “do I have the discretion to identify the right contracts or contractor to execute it? At that point, because it includes money and some other considerations, I may not be allowed to exercise my discretion, so you may identify what needs to be done but as to who does it, that is influenced.” S/he also gave an account of how s/he was once summoned to a minister’s office and the offence was that:

I have gone out of my way to target his party people to the extent that the previous day I had gone to seize illegally sawn lumber, which belongs to the sister of the then chief of staff. Therefore, I should immediately go and release the lumber. What do we do in such a case? 95% of civil servants will go ahead and release it. But I told them that I seized those lumber together with so many other ones so, there is no way I can return them to her and as far as I am concerned, they are now assets of the state... and that is the situation of civil servants, we have made the politicians so powerful, and they are such over-bearing over civil servants that it makes it very difficult for the average civil servant to be very independent in interpreting and applying rules and procedures the way they should (Interviewee 4, 27th September 2018; MLNR).

This quotation essentially reiterates the complex dilemma that some senior merit bureaucrats face and how some choose to exercise their autonomy when confronted with compelling choices and decisions.

Moreover, another informant recounted how an employee misconducted herself and was found punishable by a competent committee of enquiry, the penalty for which was recommended by the committee to be summary dismissal. However, she was only suspended due to influence from principals who directed the committee to review their recommendation to “suspension”. The informant lamented that so overt is the practice of parochial interests and politicisation that in some instances “civil servants mount the stage to campaign but are sometimes fired just after the scene. They will come back [to bureaucracies] as political principals to deal with the people who fired them” (Interviewee 16, 1st October 2018; OHCS). Thus, ample evidence gathered by this study establish that political principals (to a large extent) and top bureaucrats (to a small extent) always have influence especially because middle to lower bureaucrats are accountable to them. This situates them in a position to evaluate, review, modify or redirect. Circumstantially, autonomy is also contingent on the personality traits of

the principals that civil servants work with. In quoting an informant from MOH, s/he pointed out that the Ghana Health Service is designed to be apolitical, devoid of political interference; yet:

if we have a Director-General who sees himself as a technocrat, he will definitely allow all others the needed autonomy [but] when he wants to force you to do something that you think is not in-line, you have the right to put your view in writing as a response to his directives...[i.e.] the subordinate being assertive in insisting that though I'm working under you, I have to be given the needed space to operate as a professional and not to be dictated to (Interviewee 6, 27th September 2018; MOH).

Generally, the findings of this chapter imply that whereas merit appointees may possess the requisite competencies and presence of judgement to exercise real autonomy, they work on the basis that “their superior is asking them to do such but not what they think is right, so autonomy is not there and lower bureaucrats are not given the chance to be independent”. Some observers of bureaucratic politics in Ghana maintain that the direct usurping of bureaucratic autonomy was minimal in the past but has been on the ascendancy in recent times. This is especially common regarding “issues of procurement, appointments, promotions and disciplinary sanctions” and particularly more pronounced when political principals have preferences between bureaucrats as to who should handle what assignment (Interviewee 16, 1st October 2018; OHCS).

According to Reddick (2012: 9), while private sector principals give their subordinates reasonable flexibility and autonomy especially in taking initiatives and risks, public bureaucrats possess “low managerial autonomy” which means that they are less autonomous to address situations they confront and are, therefore, risk-averse. In the exceptional instances where narrow autonomy is exercised by bureaucrats devoid of external influences in line with policies and procedures, such autonomy is constrained to senior bureaucrats. Indeed, frontline

bureaucrats hardly possess any autonomy or discretion but rather pursue what:

is coming from the top, they have no objections than to adhere to what their bosses have told them to do even though it may not be in line with the policies and procedures. Sometimes, influences from the top affect the way civil servants take decisions whether or not it is in line with policy and procedure, they don't really look at that but what they look at is how to satisfy the will of their bosses or where the instructions are coming from (Interviewee 28, 7th October 2018; HR Consultant).

Fukuyama (2013) argued that ideally, principals should set broad objectives for agents; yet, principals also give many other directives as well regarding how the broad objective should be executed. For example, the principal may direct that certain individuals are appointed to certain positions since the ability to engage politically attuned cronies to key roles within bureaucracies constitutes a vital regulatory mechanism (Flinders and Mathews, 2015). When such influences are exercised within the bureaucracy by political principals, bureaucrats' autonomy as a core feature in Weber's (1919) characterisation of the bureaucrats' becomes hollow.

Considering Elmore's (1985) elements of efficient implementation, only the definition of tasks and objectives that appropriately reflect the principals' agenda should be retained by the principal. Nevertheless, principals in the Ghanaian case sometimes usurp bureaucrats' autonomy and discretion of allocating tasks and performance standards to subordinates as well as management controls which hitherto were devices retained by senior bureaucrats to hold their subordinates accountable for their performance. While this situation appears to be unconventional, Christensen (1999) argues that the discussion of bureaucrats' restrained autonomy by political principals should be normal because principals should guide bureaucrats, and civil servants appointed based on merit should not be exempted from answering to these principals as they (bureaucrats) are obliged to comply with their (principals') directives. Christensen (1999) further maintained that political principals also possess the authority to

withdraw their delegated authority to merit bureaucrats within the bureaucratic hierarchy and sometimes even apply such authority to interests covering specific individuals outside the bureaucracy and private corporations.

Certainly, this Chapter's evidence of a weak impact of merit processes on bureaucrats' autonomy is largely attributable to political principals' overbearing influence on bureaucrats. However, this finding is in stark contrast to Weber's (1919; 1968) postulation that political principals are too weak to curb bureaucratic power for which reason he insisted on a dichotomy between politics and administration. This study notes that Weber had argued that bureaucrats ought to operate impartially and remain politically neutral from the political engagements which render politicians incapable of restricting bureaucratic power. In support of this argument of Weber, a key informant with political orientation argued that what most observers are not privy to is that principals are more careful when dealing with civil servants. This is because they believe that bureaucrats "run the system, and when you want to bulldoze your way in, they can set you up. So politicians respect civil service especially where civil servants insist that certain things must be done – politicians are more willing to give up" (Interviewee 24, 7th October 2018; Jubilee House). This key informant argued that his personal experiences and encounters in the bureaucracy suggest that political principals are receptive to bureaucrats' guidance as opposed to the popular belief that bureaucrats unquestionably succumb to the political will of their principals.

However, the overwhelming evidence from this Chapter is rather pointing to the fact that if there should be any dichotomy between politics and administration, it should be because merit bureaucrats are too weak to curb the power of political principals. In fact, in situations where principals pretend to allow bureaucrats real autonomy, there is evidence from the ground which show that they (political principals) are quick to step in when there is a reasonable belief that bureaucrats' autonomy or discretionary powers are exercised in a manner that is

detrimental or politically inexpedient to their interests. This is because political principals believe that they are ultimately accountable or held responsible for their stewardship to the electorates and cannot offer bureaucratic autonomy or discretion as an excuse for why certain political interests were unmet. For instance, a typical instance where political principals intervene to curtail bureaucrats' autonomy and discretion is cited at Ghana's ports and harbours where when bureaucrats realistically and autonomously value the goods (duties and charges to be paid), "politicians step in to manipulate or influence the exercise of bureaucratic discretion just because they perceive it to be detrimental to their political fortunes" (Interviewee 24, 7th October 2018; Jubilee House).

This example lends credence to the argument that bureaucrats possess "little autonomy to be able to do the day to day activities they have been tasked to do because there is so much political interference [due to] suspicion and mistrust between principals and bureaucrats over the years" (Interviewee 27, 9th October 2018; UG). This suspicion and mistrust have lingered in the public space in Ghana to the point where confidential documents from ministries including minutes of cabinet meetings have been occasionally leaked to the public domain. These leakages are ostensibly intended to derail or shine a light on the parochial interests of principals which bureaucrats perceive to be detrimental to the public. In such cases of leakages, political principals suspect and accuse bureaucrats not appointed by them of sabotage. With this level of suspicion, principals either "change, replace the leadership of the civil service when they come to government or they try as much as possible to exercise [strict] oversight control and accountability through strict surveillance, censorship and deploying 'communist tactics' ostensibly to curtail bureaucrats' autonomy" (Interviewee 26, 9th October 2018; UG).

In the view of the Chairperson of Ghana's PSC, limiting or curtailing bureaucrats' autonomy can, thus, be attributed to this mistrust which is partly fuelled by the partisan colouration of the bureaucrats themselves which has been on the ascendancy in Ghana. Bridget

Katsriku (the chairperson of the PSC) lamented that the overt partisan activities of civil servants are a bane to the country's development, and this has seriously compromised the bureaucracy's autonomy. She stated that "in recent years, we have witnessed a significant departure from the civil and local government services' values, including transparency, objectivity, accountability, professionalism, political neutrality etc. This is gradually eroding the stature and character of the services". She placed the blame squarely on the adulterated merit appointment processes with partisanship leading to "deep-rooted" mistrust by the incoming principals and appointees who, most times, attempt and succeed in bringing in their people to occupy some key positions. When such appointments made by the current principals are successful, "these people who are brought in then occupy the civil servants' position and become civil servants by default; [but], cannot be considered politically neutral".

Regardless of the competence and qualification of such bureaucrats, their autonomy is compromised, and when there is a change in regime, some disillusioned bureaucrats will then create problems for these (political) bureaucrats ostensibly to write past wrongs and extend their share of goodwill and favours from the current principals. An informant pointed out that if bureaucrats were autonomous, "we wouldn't have instances where if there is a change of government, there is a significant shift of bureaucrats across board" (Interviewee 26, 9th October 2018; UG). To draw the curtains on this discussion, the next section will endeavour to reconcile the above discussion of the findings as an outcome with the long-held normative or theoretical arguments regarding merit processes and bureaucrats' autonomy.

5.4 Implications of the Discussion on Normative Theory

The entire discussion of this Chapter has so far focused on the evidence that although merit processes influence the autonomy of Ghanaian merit bureaucrats, its impact on autonomy seems to be minimal. However, the ensuing discussion will engage in a brief normative argument as an outcome of the above empirical findings in this Chapter. Indeed, Christensen

(1991) had earlier contended that since civil servants are delegated with the responsibility of policymaking and execution, their autonomy will be limited because they ought to reconcile the execution of their bureaucratic functions with the interests of their political principals. This argument is consistent with Hummel (2008) as he delivered a spirited treatise in support of a restrained bureaucrat to the detriment of his professional autonomy. In his discussion, Hummel (2008) stated two contrasting positions about merit bureaucrats (neutral competence) in the classical sense and argued that this was contradictory or, at best, misunderstood.

The first position was that merit bureaucrats are socially and culturally sensitive beings who deal with people and are accustomed to their socio-cultural values while also susceptible to social feelings like anyone else. At the same time, the second normative position was that these merit bureaucrats are trained professionally under neutral competence to treat people as cases with efficiency. In his evaluation of the above contrasting positions, Hummel (2008) characterised the argument that bureaucrats are vulnerable to social and cultural phenomena as a misrepresentation. He argued that rather, they are a unique breed of characters with no souls and heads because they lack communication even though they seek to shape and inform, and by their reasoning process, they are like robots automated to follow only rationality rather than merging rationality with common sense (Hummel, 2008; Boateng, 2014). On the other hand, he maintained that neutral competence assumed a dictatorial approach to “society, politics and government” as opposed to delivering services while deferring to government and politics (Hummel, 2008: 9). The insistence on neutral competence through technical rationality in the bureaucracy and the special emphasis on expertise and intelligence undermine moral and ethical responsibilities because “professional ethics, co-opted by a culture of technical rationality, offers little assistance in avoiding administrative evil” (Adams & Balfour, 2005: 207).

In view of this characterisation by Hummel, some advocates have maintained that every autonomous bureaucrat should have limitations on the exercise of his independence for good reason. This is because absolute autonomy can become a destructive tool against the principal for which reason there must be mechanisms to limit the exercise of such autonomy. Therefore, it is argued that political principals can subordinate or control bureaucrats in forms such as redirecting or reshaping bureaucrats' decisions to meet the current needs of the time, or even retool bureaucrats to engage in what they were supposed to do, as opposed to what is personally beneficial to themselves. For example, Ghana's electoral commissioner is a constitutionally crafted autonomous bureaucrat but in invoking her autonomy, she is not at liberty to flout or violate other laws; say, procurement or electoral laws. When she does, as it was reported in 2017, political principals must override her autonomy to ensure that justice is served and due processes, followed.

While scholars maintain that bureaucrats' autonomy is necessary for service to the public, Fox & Cochran (1992) argue that there is the propensity for autonomy (neutral competence) to metamorphose into an excuse where bureaucrats exercise power to the detriment of the public interest. Proponents of restrained bureaucrats argue that since bureaucrats are human beings who may have public-choice considerations, there is the propensity that in exercising their autonomy, they may pursue personal interests or go overboard. Dahlström *et al.* (2012) report that even though both principals and bureaucrats typically need to collude to prevent or promote corrupt behaviour, significant levels of empirical evidence regarding corrupt behaviour has been recorded from autonomous bureaucracies consisting of exclusively merit-based bureaucrats who are independent of political agents.

To illustrate this, Nakamura (2001) and Lapuente (2007) reported on the recurrent criticisms about corruption and opaqueness by autonomous bureaucrats of authoritarian states such as Spain and Japan. In those bureaucracies, merit-based bureaucrats were not only

influential actors, but also autonomous in policy-making and implementation. When neutral competence assumes such epic proportions, Kearny & Sinha (1988: 551) posit that the bureaucracy becomes “government of the technocrats, by the technocrats, and for the technocrats”. This is because these bureaucrats can assume on their own and determine what constitutes public interest without recourse to other stakeholders (Mosher, 1982; Hummel, 2008). In this regard, bureaucrats mould themselves into powerful machines of rationalisation and self-utility maximisers to the extent of becoming unaccountable and unresponsive to the citizens of the polity they claim to serve (Dahlström *et al.*, 2012).

This indicates that some bureaucrats, regardless of their merit-based appointment, may dabble in corrupt behaviour, suggesting that autonomy in itself may not be a virtue nor be enough to prevent shady attitudes and behaviour. To cure such shady attitudes and behaviour, principals may have to trigger subjugating mechanisms by restraining bureaucrats’ autonomy. As clearly articulated by an expert informant, “there is a clear difference between control and then dictatorship i.e. where you still allow bureaucrats the right to work autonomously but exercise a little bit of oversight [by] directing them to do the right thing, this is very different from where you want them to execute your personal interest rather than what is right” (Interview 27, 9th October 2018; UG). If this is the case, controlling bureaucrats should not be considered counter-productive but as a vital alternative intervention to stem political inefficiency.

5.5 Chapter Summary

From the aforementioned results and discussions, this chapter reveals that merit-based appointments indeed shape or influence the level of autonomy exercised by bureaucrats in the execution of their duties and that as the level of merit increases, so do bureaucrats’ autonomy. However, the evidence examined in this chapter also reveals that the autonomy of merit bureaucrats is somewhat weak since the amount of autonomy they exercise is considerably limited. Indeed, the evidence reveals that the minimal autonomy allowed bureaucrats is

predominantly exercised by top bureaucrats. Moreover, since the findings establish that principals can restrain bureaucrats' autonomy, it certainly defeats the idea of a dichotomy between administration and politics in Ghana. This is because once principals influence the conduct of bureaucrats, politics and administration is essentially conflated. This, therefore, agrees with the position of scholars such as Putnam (1973); Friedrickson (1976); Waldo (1987) and Svava's (1999, 2001) who argue that bureaucrats should accommodate "political realities" and treat influences of political principals as legitimate.

Also, despite the popular thesis by researchers that merit processes of appointment produce autonomous bureaucrats who are necessary for the state to develop and control corruption, this chapter found otherwise. In the Ghanaian case, merit-based bureaucrats can hardly shape the bureaucracy into an autonomous one devoid of influence from the elite due to a variety of factors discussed. Key among the reasons is the neo-patrimonial systemic design where the principal has enormous influence over merit bureaucrats' careers and means of livelihoods. This is to say that the effect of merit-based appointments in emerging democracies and authoritarian regimes are not necessarily dissimilar.

Additionally, whereas both educational qualification and work experience have been found to be appropriate items to measure merit, their correlation with autonomy is also found to be significant. Furthermore, it was found that merit-based bureaucrats are not just restricted to the exercise of autonomy but that they also possess some level of loyalty and responsiveness. More so, the Chapter finds that given the arguments in support of or against the autonomy of bureaucrats, it would seem that the best argument would lie somewhere in the middle; that is, an appropriate degree of bureaucratic autonomy that responds to the needs of the public or is independent enough to respond to public interests. For example, bureaucracies tasked to provide high-quality services in health or education may require considerable regulation and critiques from political principals. Indeed, an appropriate autonomous bureaucrat should be able to make judgment calls as to when

and where to engage in collaborations and partnerships with political principals in service delivery as opposed to being absolutely independent. So, while bureaucrats may require shielding from political and social influencers, they also need to be subordinated to public goals and aspirations which are systematically entrusted to political principals, albeit on temporary basis. However, how political principals use this fiduciary trust from the public can be a subject-matter for a separate investigation. These stated findings will be revisited in chapter eight (8) where the general conclusions and lessons drawn from this chapter will be discussed further. In the interim, the next chapter will empirically examine the patronage-loyalty hypothesis as set-up in chapter 3.

CHAPTER SIX

THE PATRONAGE-LOYALTY TREATISE: A MIXED BLESSING

6.1 Introduction

Referring to previous theoretical discussions concerning how the types of bureaucrats' appointments are expected to shape their attitudes and behaviour, this study's second empirical Chapter examines the theoretical argument that patronage-based appointments expressively impact bureaucrats' loyalty (Johnson & Libecap, 1994; Goetz, 1997; Du Gay, 2000; Kopecký *et al.* 2012; Veit & Scholz 2016). In Chapter 3, the theoretical argument advanced regarding the patronage-loyalty thesis is that patronage appointments are mostly dispensed by principals because they desire control over bureaucrats or, by extension, the bureaucracy (Kopecky *et al.*, 2012; Enns-Jedenastic, 2015). This theoretical discussion posits a politicised bureaucracy where bureaucrats who are selected on basis of patronage will be predominantly loyal to their principals since their continued survival in the bureaucracy will be largely contingent on the survival of their principals as well. Thus, when bureaucrats are appointed through patronage processes, loyalty to their principals rather than the bureaucracy itself may protect their continued engagement (Johnson & Libecap, 1994; McCarty, 2004; Gingerich, 2013). In other words, bureaucrats may have motivations to carry out the will of their appointing principals even when such actions are incongruous with the public interest or spirit of the law.

As Levitan (1942: 14) argued, bureaucrats owe an "obligation of loyalty" to superiors, and within a patrimonial context, loyalty is assured when bureaucrats are appointed through patronage. Thus, within bureaucracies, it is theoretically postulated that principals will enjoy more loyalty from patronage appointees in the execution of their responsibilities and in pursuance of prioritised interests than with merit appointees who are expected to function with a mind-set of neutral competence. This is especially envisaged in neo-patrimonial contexts where principals do not only

have the power to appoint but also to post/transfer/dismiss/demote/sideline; thereby, retaining discretionary control over bureaucrats' careers.

This makes bureaucrats' loyalty and compliance to the principals' interest synonymous with their secured livelihood (Cornell & Grimes, 2014). It is, therefore, theoretically argued that patronage appointees will try to dedicate efforts to prioritise the interests and agenda of their principals in the execution of their duties. This is why this Chapter sets out to empirically examine the theoretical hypothesis that "*The more patronage-based the process of appointment is, the more likely a bureaucrat is to be loyal*". The ensuing discussion, therefore, delves into an in-depth empirical evaluation of the consequences of patronage-based appointments on bureaucrats' loyalty. Based on results obtained from the data gathered, this Chapter discusses five (5) main findings.

The first discussion focuses on the finding that patronage appointments have a positive and appreciable impact on loyalty, except that the loyalty is not an absolute one. This suggests that indeed, patronage bureaucrats in Ghana demonstrate noteworthy loyal attitudes and behaviour towards their principals. The second and more interesting finding discussed is related to the finding that patronage bureaucrats are as responsive as they are loyal to their political principals. This suggests that the distinction between loyalty and political responsiveness at the empirical level are blurred. Also, against the study's expectation, patronage bureaucrats are found to demonstrate some marginal autonomy towards their principals. The circumstances for such findings are adequately discussed in the main text. The third argument examined the finding that the type of bureaucracy has a bearing on the amount of loyalty patronage bureaucrats can exercise whilst other factors such as level of appointment, ethnicity, gender and age have no significant effect on the amount of loyalty a patronage bureaucrat can demonstrate.

The fourth discussion however focuses on the benefits and costs of the patronage-loyalty arrangements in the bureaucracy within the Ghanaian context. It adduces evidence that against the popular narrative that patronage appointees are undesirable, they can actually be beneficial.

Nonetheless, the discussion also articulates their tribulations. The fifth finding discusses the role networks (political, social, economic) play regarding patronage bureaucrats' loyal attitudes and behaviour. The final section, which is the Chapter summary, draws vital conclusions based on the findings of this Chapter. In going forward to deal with details of these outlined findings, the opening aspect of the ensuing section is devoted to briefly recapturing some methodological issues after which it combines both the presentation of the results and discussions of the findings in an integrated fashion.

6.2 Give-and-take: The Patronage for Loyalty Romance.

The introduction of this Chapter has already addressed the theoretical set-up between patronage appointees and their expected loyalty to principals. The ensuing discussion therefore empirically examines whether indeed patronage bureaucrats can exhibit loyalty as expected of them. In doing this, both a one-way ANOVA and standard linear regression analysis were conducted to examine the relationship between an omnibus patronage-based potential predictor and the exercise of loyalty by bureaucrats. The one-way ANOVA was run to compare the groups and establish whether there were differences among the appointment types studied (Appendix 1). To do this, there was a disaggregation of appointment routes into factors which influenced respondents' current appointment into the civil service and that which influenced respondents' colleagues' current appointment into the civil service. The results showed that there existed a statistically significant difference at five per cent ($p < 0.05$) level between the three appointment routes: $F(3, 271) = 67.388$, $p < .05$. Post-hoc comparisons employing the Tuckey-HSD test revealed that the mean score for patronage-based appointment route ($M = 2.18$, $SD = 0.69076$) was significantly different from merit-based appointment route ($M = 1.34$, $SD = 0.71742$) and hybrid-based appointment route ($M = 2.651316$, $SD = 0.69301$).

To examine whether variations in appointments existed in terms of respondents'

colleague civil servants' current appointments into the civil service, another ANOVA was performed. The results here, as well, were statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha level: $F(3, 271) = 65.516, p < .05$. Post-hoc comparisons using the tuckey-HSD test for the category of colleague civil servants also showed that the mean score for patronage-based appointments ($M = 2.2791, SD = .59062$) differed significantly from merit-based appointments ($M = 1.6866, SD = .89119$) and hybrid-based appointments ($M = 2.7817, SD = .52072$). This implies that the factors which influenced the appointment of civil servants into the civil service are distinct and that there are civil servants who come into the service through patronage-based appointment processes separately from merit-based and hybrid types of appointment. Furthermore, various levels of regression analyses were employed to conduct the quantitative examination whereas thematic analysis was used for the qualitative interviews (seen in chapter 4). Regarding the regression analysis, a summary of results regarding the effect of patronage appointments on bureaucrats' loyalty is shown in Table 9 below.

Table 9: A summary of Patronage-Loyalty Regression results

Variable(s)	Mean (μ)	Std (X)	($\rho_{X,Y}$) with Patronage	R-square (R^2)	b	β
Loyalty	41.1788	8.56824	.364*			
Omnibus Patronage	25.0328	9.65384	.364*	0.133	0.323	0.364
Multiple Regression results of Patronage-based factors						
Loyalty	4.5967	1.02912				
Gen. Personal Connection	9.4051	4.06632	.292*		0.04	0.159
Gen. Political Connection	8.4088	3.73981	.309*		0.051	0.184
Gen. Ethnic Background	7.219	4.13635	.209*		0.015	0.062
Whole Model				18.3		
Controlled Model (r^2 change)				0.093		
Standard Linear Regression						
Autonomy	39.0766	9.99073	.196*	0.038		
Responsiveness	38.7737	7.90603	.299*	0.089		

* Significant correlation at $p < .05$

These results are derived from the mean index-score of responses to the multi-item variables administered to measure patronage as an independent variable using three items: personal connections, political considerations and ethnic affiliation. On the other hand, loyalty

as a dependent variable was as well measured using three specific items: always prioritising the interest of superiors who helped in bureaucrats' appointment, never prioritise the interest of their social networks and always prioritise all the interests of the bureaucratic institution in performing official duties. They were all rated on a scale of 1-7 by respondents to a standard questionnaire. As indicated in chapter 5, p-values are employed to indicate the direction of relationships while the effect size of r square is used to determine the impact or the extent of influence (McLeod, 2019).

Table 9 depicts results obtained from the different levels of standard linear regression analyses conducted such as bivariate simple linear, multiple and hierarchical regressions based on the survey data. Through simple linear regressions, the Table shows results of values for the correlation between the omnibus patronage as an independent variable and the hypothesised dependent variable of loyalty ($r_{X,Y} = .364$) as well as other non-hypothesised dependent variables of responsiveness ($r = .299$) and autonomy ($r = .196$). The table also contains standard multiple-regression results or values for factors which explain patronage (networks): personal connections, political networks and ethnic affiliations of appointees. Interestingly, these indicators are found to be positively and significantly correlated with the loyalty demonstrating that civil servants who are appointed through patronage-based predictors or networks tend to influence the level of loyalty exercised by civil servants in the execution of their duties. The standard multiple regression model for the three indicators produced $R^2 = .116$, $F(3, 271) = 11.847$, $p < .005$.

The Table further illustrates that the contributory weight of both a personal connection and political consideration was more noteworthy than the contribution of ethnic affiliation. This confirms the frequency distribution data cited in Chapter 4 where a sizeable number of respondents rejected the assertion that their appointment or that of their colleagues' was influenced by ethnic considerations. Thus, considering the factors of the omnibus patronage

independent variable, whereas the results reveal that the contribution of personal connections and political considerations are positive and notable, the contribution of the ethnic background of bureaucrats as a contributory factor to patronage, though positive, was barely noteworthy.

Furthermore, the table contains hierarchical regression results after controlling for the influence of variables such as age, sex, level of appointment, type of appointment, policy area, educational qualification, type of institution and ethnicity (region of origin). Other statistical results captured in the table include the Mean (μ) of various variable relationships, standard deviations, alpha and beta values as well as R^2 (coefficient of determination) of the various regression models conducted. Altogether, these results have been used together with results of the in-depth interviews to engage in the ensuing discussion regarding the influence of patronage on bureaucrats' loyalty.

As contained in Table 9, the omnibus patronage-based predictor shows a positive and significant relationship with the dependent variable, loyalty. The standard linear regression model with the omnibus patronage predictor produced $R\text{ Square} = .133$, $F(1, 273) = 41.610$, $p < .005$. What this finding illustrates is that patronage-based appointments actually shape or influence the level of loyalty exercised by patronage appointees and that as the level of patronage increases, so does the level of loyalty to their principals in the execution of their duties. It also reveals that patronage appointees demonstrate appreciable levels of loyalty, except that it is not at the optimum level ($\rho_{X,Y} = .364$). That is, the empirical evidence implies that regardless of the commitment and loyalty of patronage appointees as the henchmen of principals who execute their agenda or interests, these patronage bureaucrats face constraints in doing so.

Whilst an absolutely strong impact is anticipated considering the theoretical argument advanced between patronage bureaucrats and loyalty, this finding should not be seen as unexpected. This is because, in most bureaucratic dispensations, neither bureaucrats nor their principals have the absolute authority and discretion to undertake any assignment or agenda

without paying sufficient attention to legal provisions or regulations as well as environmental checks and balances from perhaps competing players within the bureaucratic space. As noted earlier, despite sufficient evidence of direct patronage appointment practices, Ghana's bureaucracy is constitutionally established along a Weberian model with inherent compliance and control mechanisms. Therefore, it may not be unanticipated that patronage bureaucrats are not found to be exceptionally loyal to their principals due to these structural frameworks or controls as well as other conflating factors including competing loyalties (to other patrons elsewhere).

This finding is further validated by a separate regression test on the relationship between patronage appointed bureaucrats and dependent variables other than the hypothesised variable. The objective of this test was to ascertain whether it is appropriate to theoretically advance the argument that only loyal attitudes and behaviour are predominantly associated with patronage appointees. Therefore, a standard linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between the patronage-based type of appointees as a potential independent predictor and the dependent variables, autonomy. The outcome of this test may have explained why the patronage bureaucrats' loyalty is not found to be absolute.

The result was both vital and interesting as the analysis revealed that the omnibus patronage-based predictor had a positive correlation with the autonomous attitudes and behaviour as shown in Table 9. The standard linear regression model with the patronage-based predictor on autonomy produced $R^2 = .038$, $F(1, 273) = 10.830$, $p < .05$. Unsurprisingly, however, patronage bureaucrats' impact on autonomy is weaker (.196) than the normal hypothesised relationship with loyalty (.364). In practical terms, this finding reveals that patronage bureaucrats also exercise a certain level of autonomy in the exercise of their duties for which reason their loyalty is not found to be absolute. However, the weight of autonomy demonstrated by patronage appointees (.196) is not found to be as impactful as the weight of

autonomy demonstrated by merit appointees (.218) as was discussed in chapter 5. This also implies that despite their allegiance to principals, patronage appointees still sometimes exercise discretion against pursuing their principals' interests due to a myriad of countervailing factors. This is especially when principals attempt to pursue unconventional interests within the bureaucracy. Without any compelling career threat from principals, these patronage bureaucrats are more likely to be circumspect if the execution of their principals' unorthodox interests has the potential of hurting their reputation.

Similarly, another interesting result was obtained from the standard linear regression conducted between the omnibus patronage-based appointment predictor and bureaucrats' political responsiveness (see Table 9). The results illustrate a positive and significant correlation with responsiveness, only that the correlation value is less than the hypothesised relationship between hybrid appointees and their level of responsiveness as would be discussed in chapter 7. The standard linear regression model with the patronage-based predictor on responsiveness produced $r^2 = .089$, $F(1, 273) = 26.610$, $p < .05$. In practical terms, this finding reveals that patronage bureaucrats, apart from loyalty, also demonstrate politically responsive attitudes and behaviour in the exercise of their duties.

However, the intriguing observation about this result is that the impact of responsiveness demonstrated by patronage bureaucrats has a closer impact (.299 [almost 3]) to the originally hypothesised variable of loyalty (.364) as classified by Cohen. This is noteworthy in terms of the study's theoretical characterisation since the results show that despite their type of appointment, patronage bureaucrats are also politically responsive as they are loyal. What this essentially shows is that perhaps the theoretical distinction between responsiveness and loyalty evaporates at the empirical level. This suggests that these two can be synonymous in practice. If this is the case, it implies that patronage bureaucrats can also be plausibly hypothesised with political responsiveness and not exclusive to loyalty.

Certainly, the case that patronage appointments are a ubiquitous phenomenon where principals typically manipulate appointments to control attitudes and behaviour or to sustain clientelistic networks has been well articulated by theory and past research. Hence, the finding by this study that patronage appointees are indeed loyal to their patrons is only a confirmation of an existing assertion in Ghana, especially under neo-patrimonial settings which is crystalised by fragile bureaucracies and ambiguous/overlapping legal instruments. The ironic situation about most SSA countries such as Ghana is that whereas their bureaucratic setup is fashioned along Weberian and meritocratic principles, in practice, it is pierced with these patronage-loyalty tactics and arrangements.

Recounting the overview of Ghana's bureaucratic legal regime, it was seen that separate legislations have led to overlaps, fragmentation and turf wars with an emerging picture suggesting a multiplicity of voices (Ayee, 2019). This situation is usually exploited to exert influences in the bureaucracy by appointing loyalists to civil service posts in pursuance of various interests. This is so because such overlaps or ambiguities create loopholes which principals exploit. By such exploitations, principals hardly need to flout legal regulations to appoint loyalists. As a result, sufficient evidence in the Ghanaian bureaucracy reveals permeating contract appointments made by principals to their cronies and henchmen as bureaucrats, consultants, special assistants or political aides across board. These appointees are sometimes clothed with more power and influence than even senior bureaucrats holding top positions. The circumstance which occasions this is that often, principals are mindful of the fact that the bureaucratic legal framework guarantees the security of tenure which inhibits principals from arbitrarily dismissing untrusted or disloyal bureaucrats. They, therefore, explore side-lining or transferring such bureaucrats and bring in loyal bureaucrats, special advisors, assistants or aids in their stead.

Insights from the in-depth interviews conducted (see appendix 7) buttress this assertion as a key informant lamented that these patronage appointees are seldom more qualified than existing

bureaucrats, yet they “would rather be taking bigger salary packages than the civil servant who actually does the work” (Interviewee 26, 9th October 2018; UG). In these instances, principals have unleashed these discretionary appointments, especially with promotions, postings and transfers to the point that such discretions become the rule, not the exception. Generally speaking, therefore, hardly do political principals encounter strict restrictions without exploiting loopholes to appoint their preferred loyalists in the Ghanaian context.

Further details from the in-depth interviews (appendix 7) articulate these sentiments as a key informant from the OHCS argued that in the Ghanaian civil service, every principal is “trying to build a colony. So, there is a deliberate attempt to appoint people who buy into your ideology and promote your interest... Once the person comes on board, he feels indebted to the people who got them appointed and...try as much as possible to promote their interest” (Interviewee 16, 1st October 2018; OHCS). While this is the case, the interviewee indicates that some bureaucrats who are appointed per the patronage criterion sometimes try to be professional. But, the informant maintained that from experience over the years, the rate at which the patronage-loyalty romance is trendy in the bureaucracy is alarming because bureaucrats are frequently requested by principals who influenced the positions they occupy to dispense certain favours or interests and “...it is difficult to turn your back on that person” (Interviewee 16, 1st October 2018; OHCS).

Another key informant noted that loyalty by patronage bureaucrats is a natural phenomenon and that is why it is vital “that people are appointed based on merit through a fair and transparent system. A system where somebody [appoints and] promotes another, the person feels obliged to the one who promoted him/her, therefore, tries to please the person in another way. That is what our political elites like” (Interviewee 4, 27th September 2018; MLNR). Whilst this is the case, some have argued that patronage-loyalty arrangements should not be frowned upon. Rather, what is important to concede as normal is that principals worldwide ought to have loyalists within the bureaucracy and that “almost all civil service systems have some level of political involvement in

personnel matters that are considered appropriate” (Orac & Rinne, 2000; Peters & Pierre, 2004: 2). The Ghanaian case should, therefore, not be an exception.

Insights from the in-depth interviews further contain evidence to establish that patronage appointees are loyal because their appointments are considered as “indebtedness” to principals. They are, therefore, committed to prioritising their interest. As argued by a key informant, “it is a form of returning the favour” under reciprocal arrangements in the traditional sense of principal-agent obligations (Interviewee 28, 7th October 2018; HR Consultant). Another informant from MLNR bluntly stated that “yes, if you put food on my table why would I bypass you? 90% of the time, we have people wanting to pursue the agenda of their superiors especially when they are the ones who help get the appointments for them” (Interviewee 2, 1st October 2018; MLNR). Accordingly, patronage bureaucrats attempt to advance the interests of their patrons and in the face of politicisation of the bureaucracy, patronage bureaucrats have been subjugated to the interests and the shady aspirations of the political principal. That is, patronage bureaucrats pursue directions that are potentially counter-productive to the interest of the bureaucracy and sometimes leverage on their institutional memory to show political principals how they can successfully exploit the state.

Similarly, in Ghana, patronage bureaucrats appointed by principals devote a significant amount of effort to sustain their political principals in power by promoting “the interest of the party or [principal] that brought me first with the intention that regime sustainability will perpetuate my stay in the office” (Interviewee 27, 9th October 2018; UG). This is because of the belief or likelihood that a failure of the principal and eventual loss of power suggests the likelihood of being side-lined (at the minimum). That is, patronage bureaucrats believe that in the absence of their patrons or godfathers, they are at risk of losing their positions in the bureaucracy “and so, they will do everything to ensure that the patrons’ interest is advanced” to keep themselves within the service (Interviewee 13, 3rd October 2018; Labour research). This

is primarily because how these bureaucrats are appointed makes them vulnerable in a regime change. These expressions are not significantly different from the eastern European context where Kopecký & Scherlis (2008) found that weak bureaucracies within the context of competitive political systems accommodate waves of patronage appointees hired by principals who assume leadership of bureaucracies ostensibly to ensure loyalty.

From a sustainable livelihood perspective, a key informant from the University of Ghana argues that patronage appointees tend to put in a lot of effort to serve the interest of those who positively influenced their appointments by promoting their interest to “sustain their own source of livelihood”. He argued that whilst the World Bank extensively discusses the idea of elite capture, he thought that Ghana, as a country, is rather experiencing what he termed as “vigilante capture”. This is a situation where party foot soldiers devote efforts and risk their lives to aid a party or principals into power with the entitlement mentality that they ought to benefit from their sacrificial labour through appointments into state bureaucracies. Accordingly, such party faithful, when appointed, channel all their loyalties to the government and party as opposed to the public interest:

So sincerely speaking, I do think if an individual help to get you into the civil service, you... working to enhance the interest of the individual and open more opportunities for the individual than you will do for the state. In similar manner, if a government comes into power and helps you to be recruited into the civil service, your most important objective will be to help that government to continue to be in power so that you will also sustain your livelihood (Interviewee 27, 9th October 2018; UG).

The point made by this informant suggests that principals and bureaucrats mutually benefit because as principals secure loyalty through patronage appointments, so too do those patronage bureaucrats personally benefit. In fact, ample evidence from key informants indicates that patronage bureaucrats' loyalty to their principals have contributed to either protect or accelerate careers, and that compatibility with principals is very influential for career speed. To survive

in the system and sustain their means of livelihood, bureaucrats who occupy sensitive positions such as that of the chief directors especially have to “show loyalty and commitment to the government in power [because] if a chief director is perceived to be non-cooperative, the principal easily requests for him/her to be changed” and since some of the appointments are by contract for two years, “it may not be renewed” upon expiry. For other “career civil servants who rise to the level of directorship, mostly the worst... is to request that they are posted out or... sidelined” (Interviewee 18, 3rd October 2018; OHCS).

A key informant argued that patronage bureaucrats benefit from their loyalty when principals protect and promote their careers to earn additional income. This is because, in jurisdictions such as Ghana where bureaucrats are not well remunerated and can be side-lined, it is conceivable that patronage appointees will take the opportunity to loyally serve their principals. They do so by aligning themselves to secure career growth and earn more income as loyalty to principals’ directives can be advantageous. Therefore, when bureaucrats behave in ways to please their bosses, at the back of their minds, the element of individual personal gains is actively spinning since the “benefits will trickle to their personal level by pleasing their boss” (Interviewee 27, 9th October 2018; UG). From this context, some bureaucrats in Ghana are loyal to their bosses not because they so much wish to see these bosses succeed but because they want to “please or enrich themselves” (Interviewee 27, 9th October 2018; UG).

In another context, loyalty in Ghana sometimes compel principals to look the other way (turn a blind eye) to improprieties of their agent-bureaucrats or, in the alternative, harass perceived hostile bureaucrats for disloyalty. An interviewee indicated that scenarios of shielding or harassment are common within the top echelons of Ghana’s bureaucracy where bureaucrats are occasionally requested to manipulate documentation or reports of enquiries that can potentially embarrass principals. In such instances, loyal compliance to such requests necessitates reciprocal protection by principals whereas non-compliance potentially leads to

harassment. This demonstrates part of the reason why principals will go to great lengths to engage in patronage appointments. In this context, patronage may be understood as the infusion or infiltration of loyal bureaucrats ready to undercut due process or willing to engage in illegal practices (where necessary) to save principals from embarrassment or pursue vested interests of their principals.

An example related to loyal bureaucrats undercutting due-process is cited by an informant when they were tasked as a civil society to inspect a road project being constructed in Techiman (the capital of Bono East Region in Ghana). As part of a team, he embarked on a site visit to the project location and to their dismay, they could not see any ongoing road project as presented on paper. They were further told by residents that the road had never been constructed. The nature of the “project site” in itself, as they saw it, did tell the entire story. However, after their return trip to the capital (Accra), their checks from the ministry of finance revealed that some two tranches of payments had been made in respect of that road project and was expected to have been completed in 2013. It later came to light through further enquiry on the matter that:

The contract was signed but the road was switched [diverted] from the one village [location] to another village [location]. Apparently, some powerful [principals] and chiefs were able to connive with bureaucrats at the Ghana Highways Authority to change the [beneficiary location]. So, in the context where the state is weak and where the state is not delivering to the needs of everybody, people retreat to those social interests and are able to advance the interest of those groups (Interviewee 13, 3rd October 2018; Labour Research).

This example goes a long way to buttress the argument that patronage bureaucrats circumvent due-process due to loyalty towards meeting special interests of their principals

within bureaucracies. Indeed, an informant indicated that “when you are trying to take a decision or prioritising where an intervention should go to, the political class will come and tell you that he/she wants his/her constituency to be favoured. So, [loyalty to] networks really play as far as our work is concerned” (Interviewee 17, 30th September 2018; OHCS). In return, these principals either deliberately shield these bureaucrats when they are to be held accountable for their unconventional attitudes and behaviour or look the other way so that their shady deeds can be covered up.

Under Ghana’s democratic dispensation, the 1992 constitution stipulates that all bureaucrats at the senior level be appointed by the president of Ghana in consultation with the governing boards (where necessary) on the advice of the PSC. This provision is for good reason, and that is to maintain control over bureaucrats who implement government business so that the presidential agenda will not be thwarted by disloyal bureaucrats. The rationale for this constitutional arrangement is plausibly informed by the need for loyalty because political principals led by the president ought to be responsive to the public. That is, democracy is promoted when the president and other officers of the executive appoint or at least influence the appointment of bureaucrats to be certain of loyal compliance to their agenda. According to a key informant, this constitutional arrangement is also encouraged as much as possible to avoid situations where bureaucrats can decide to put in more commitment or less commitment depending on the political principal in power as “some [can demonstrate] lackadaisical attitudes because he/she doesn’t believe in the political party in power” (Interviewee 26, 9th October 2018; UG). Because the constitution envisages some of these scenarios, principals typically show concern for the amount of loyalty bureaucrats exercise depending on how sensitive or critical the type of bureaucracy they work in is. This ushers us to the next section of this Chapter.

6.3 The Effect of Type of Bureaucracy on Patronage Appointees' Loyalty.

A vital enquiry examined by this chapter is related to whether factors such as level of appointment, type of appointment, level of education, type of institution etc. had any impact on a patronage bureaucrats' loyalty. To make this determination, hierarchical regression was employed to examine the ability of an omnibus patronage-based appointment standard to predict the level of loyalty exercised by civil servants after controlling for the influence of level of appointment, type of appointment, policy area, educational qualification, type of institution, age, gender and ethnicity (Appendix 3). Thus, level of appointment, type of appointment, policy area, educational qualification, type of institution, age, sex, and ethnicity (region of origin) were entered at step 1, explaining 9% of the variance with civil servants' loyalty to patrons.

When patronage-based independent variable was entered in step 2, the total variance explained by the model was 18.3%, $F(9, 265) = 6.541, p < .005$. This implies that the patronage-based independent variable expounds an additional 9.3% of the variance with regards to the level of loyalty civil servants have towards patrons who helped in their current appointment after controlling for age, sex, level of appointment, type of appointment, policy area, educational qualification, type of institution and ethnicity (region of origin), $R^2 \text{ change} = .093$, $F(1, 273) = 30.128, p < .005$. The type of bureaucracy and patronage-based independent variables were the only two variables with a significant statistical contribution to exercising loyalty. Substantially, they are patronage-based appointment routes ($\beta = .330$) and type of institution ($\beta = -.121$).

This implies that whilst the type of bureaucracy impacts on patronage bureaucrats' loyalty, variables such as age, sex, level of appointment, type of appointment, educational qualification and ethnicity (region of origin)] do not make any distinctive contribution. Therefore, this discussion argues that bureaucrats coming into the service through patronage-based processes and the type of bureaucracy they are employed in determines the extent to

which these bureaucrats can demonstrate loyalty towards their principals. This should not be unexpected because in chapter 4, the frequency distribution of the data had shown that bureaucrats from MLGRD were more susceptible to demonstrating loyalty than bureaucrats from MLNR and those from MOH.

Indeed, responses from the in-depth interviews equally validate this revelation that patronage bureaucrats from MLGRD and MLNR appear to demonstrate more loyalty to their principals than MOH. These findings may be attributed to the extent of politicisation and/or professionalisation associated with these bureaucracies. Admittedly, these bureaucracies notably possess distinctive features which may have contributed to this finding. For example, whereas political issues can be pushed to significant limits within the MLGRD and MLNR, same cannot be said of MOH because of its extreme technical or professional nature. Similarly, whilst the MLGRD is predominantly used to dispense patronage to reach certain political constituencies due to its nature, such overt attempt at the MOH may immediately lead to a scandal with dire repercussions for life and death. This finding, therefore, coincides with conventional wisdom regarding the reach of patronage and to what extent loyalty will be preferred over professional standards. To this end, instead of a narrow discussion regarding the implication of patronage on the type of bureaucracy, perhaps, it will be more useful to widen the discussion to encapsulate the consequences of patronage-loyalty arrangement. This is to holistically examine whether it is a blessing or a curse, at least, from the Ghanaian perspective.

6.4 The Patronage-Loyalty Romance: A blessing or A curse?

Some scholars are rife with the rhetoric that patronage-loyalty relationships among political principals and bureaucrats are detrimental for a myriad of reasons. Chief among the reasons is that it impedes the prosecution of the public interest in favour of parochial interests where principals fail to hold their henchmen and cronies accountable for their inadequacies. Proponents of the Weberian model of bureaucracy argue that bureaucratic efficiency and effectiveness is attained

when bureaucrats are insulated from political manipulations while ensuring that professional standards are dispensed (Weber, 1922; Johnson, 1982; Evans & Rauch, 1999; Carpenter, 2001; Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017). Inherent in the Weberian model, therefore, is the idea that political interests are counter-productive, illicit and short-term, even if relevant, whereas a professionalised approach composed of technical and capable bureaucrats preclude detrimental short-term political objectives and rent-seeking.

On the flip side are the neopatrimonialist advocates whose crux is drawn from the principal-agent model, where the relationship between political principals and bureaucrats is hinged on fiduciary trust and loyalty and expressed through contractual arrangements in the form of delegation of interests to be executed by bureaucrats (Tullock, 1967; Moe, 1984). Advocates of these relationships articulate a marked separation of roles where principals present their interests for their appointees to follow through; yet, the principals are expected to use their authority and influence to protect these patronage bureaucrats when the need arises.

Part of the evidence gathered by this study has shown that under Ghana's fourth republican dispensation, successive political principals acquire full authority especially after winning elections to storm bureaucracies with their henchmen and interests. According to Abdulai & Mohan (2019:18), Ghana's fourth republic has witnessed "significant disruptions among bureaucrats, as chief directors and other people in management positions, are often replaced with new appointees during political transitions." Unlike Denmark, where bureaucrats adapt to and loyally serve every elected government regardless of its political colour (Christensen, 2006), the dispensation in Ghana and for that matter, SSA suggests otherwise. This is because when new principals assume office, they are inclined to distrust the bureaucrats they meet in the service. This is rooted in the notion that those bureaucrats were hired by their predecessors for which reason they are likely not be loyal or unmotivated to faithfully serve them as their new principals.

In both cases, principals are suspicious and simply think they cannot rely on the faithfulness

of those bureaucrats; therefore, they attempt to incorporate loyal bureaucrats that they can personally vouch for and trust to execute sensitive assignments. As Ayee (2008: 30) argued, apprehensions for “personal loyalty and trust” inform these arrangements. Against this background, and based on the quantitative regression analyses that found that patronage appointees demonstrate loyalty to prosecute their principals’ interests, the ensuing discussion examines its pros and cons. This critique mainly draws from the qualitative data with empirical examples to assess the instances where the deployment of the patronage-loyalty relationship has proven to be a blessing (beneficial) or a curse (non-beneficial).

6.4.1 The Blessing

In examining the blessings of patronage within the Ghanaian bureaucracy, this discussion recounts the opening remarks of a presidential staffer under the current NPP government who, argued that political principals enter into a social contract with the public in a democracy when the citizens elect principals into government. This is with the expectation that political promises will be delivered. Therefore, political principals being aware of the terms of their contract with the public:

look out for people who can help [us] to execute some of those promises. Loyalty to the government [therefore] is non-negotiable in the hiring processes because every government would be interested in assembling the people who are fully aligned to the vision of the government and who will give out their best to support the government to ensure that within their given mandate some of their promises are met, so loyalty is key to the government – it’s an essential requirement (Interviewee 24, 7th October 2018; Jubilee House).

Insights from the in-depth interviews reinforce this point made by the presidential staffer where virtually every political principal assuming office in Ghana seem to have this

orientation and attitude. However, this is not peculiar to Ghana as most SSA countries with chronic financial and human constraints find that exclusively merit-based processes of appointing bureaucrats are insufficient to locate and motivate politically sensitive as well as efficient bureaucrats (Toral, 2019). If merit appointees are insufficient to efficiently prosecute political mandates in developing countries, then it stands to suggest why patronage appointees are deployed to prosecute political agenda. Indeed, Grindle (2012: 23) advanced the argument that patronage appointments do not automatically birth “negative consequences for the overall management of” bureaucracies but have rather on occasion enhanced “the construction of competence in government” (Grindle, 2012: 7). This study suspects that among other factors, it is based on these defences that some Ghanaian principals have resorted to exploiting their “capacity to use their appointment power to attract...staffs to carry out specific policy initiatives” in such a manner that positively impacts bureaucratic efficiency (Grindle, 2012: 261).

Evidence from this Chapter indeed points to such exploitations where principals locate and incentivise bureaucrats who are not only able to loyally execute but sometimes pull through complex and unconventional agenda. In Ghana, an example is cited regarding the implementation of a politically charged Free Senior High School policy (FSHS) which was a flagship campaign promise of the NPP government. This policy is in line with a constitutional provision of universal access to education for all; however, due to inadequate infrastructure and resources, this constitutional provision had been deferred by successive governments until the NPP used it to campaign for election. After winning and given the popularity of the policy among the electorate, it became difficult for the NPP principals to renege on the promise although issues of inadequate infrastructure and resources were ever more apparent.

According to a key informant, due to the vitality of this policy to the current political principals, they had no choice but to scout for loyal bureaucrats to figure a way to implement it. Given the anticipated exacerbation of infrastructural constraints that was imminent due to

increased enrolment since it was a feeless policy, these loyal bureaucrats who were purposely appointed to ensure that this policy was implanted, leveraged on their previous experiences in other jurisdictions to devise “the double-track system”. The double-track system is more or less a semester-based alternation of color-coded tracks of the senior high school students as an interim measure to contain enrolment increase from 260, 210 students to 424,092 in the first term of the 2017/2018 academic year reflecting an increase of about 63% (Mensah, 2019). The double-track system where the increased number of students used the available infrastructure in turns, therefore, helped in containing the enrolment numbers while the government made frantic efforts to close the infrastructure gap under the “emergency senior high school intervention projects – SHSIPs”.

According to an informant from government, bureaucrats working under the education ministry are under an obligation of loyalty to ensure that the FSHS policy is implemented efficiently and sustained and that all the challenges associated with it are addressed. The informant maintained that:

The political actors whom you see as the superiors would not allow any civil servant to undermine that policy. So, it is either you are inclined to it or you move out of the system because it is a policy that the government is desirous of implementing and there are examples of people who have been sanctioned as a result of actions that political superiors deemed as undermining of the policy. We have seen headmasters suspended because they took certain decisions which were clearly not in conformity with the policy objectives of FSHS because when government said free, government meant free. But, we have seen instances where headmasters were taking fees from parents and in such situations, political principals stepped in and ensured that those headmasters were punished (Interviewee 24, 7th October 2018; Jubilee House).

From this informant’s point of view, what this implies is that loyal bureaucrats are necessary

to principals in the delivery of public interests from an electoral accountability perspective. Indeed, the argument that patronage-loyalty is vital for service delivery is not a novelty as earlier scholars such as Sorauf (1960), Weingrod (1968) and Grindle (2012) had already underscored the deployment of patronage in ways that can ensure positive outcomes and enhance political accountability to the public.

Furthermore, when patronage bureaucrats' networks and connections to political principals are positively harnessed, patronage can be immensely valuable. A case in point is related to the design of a massive afforestation programme (25,000 hectares of plantations annually) by forestry bureaucrats which had been shelved for close to 3 years due to lack of political will. However, when new principals were ushered into office after a change in government in 2017, the forestry bureaucrats led by their Chief Conservator of Forests leveraged on their political/social connections and clout within the new government to secure the political buy-in and got the programme implemented in 2018. As a result, close to 70,000 youth were hired on contract to accomplish the planting, while a substantial amount of degraded landscapes was restored through the reforestation exercise. A significant increase in the country's forest cover is anticipated while climate change, as well, is mitigated through carbon sequestration.

From this example, it can be deduced that through political patronage between bureaucrats and political principals, three-pronged benefits were attained: employment generation (means of livelihoods), restoration of Ghana's forest cover and climate change mitigation. This kind of exploiting or leveraging of patronage bureaucrats for beneficial outcomes can be conveniently classified under the concept of upward embeddedness as articulated by Toral (2019). According to Toral (2019: 6), applying the concept of upward embeddedness affords us with "a more positive view of bureaucrats' political connections than existing models of bureaucratic patronage allow."

Similarly, advocates of the patronage-loyalty thesis argue that within civil service systems, patronage bureaucrats record frequent interactions and dealings with their principals than non-patronage bureaucrats; this enhances efficiency and rapid delivery of public interests. Since the bureaucracy must, of necessity, make value judgments (Friedrickson, 1976), frequent consultation and collaborative interactions between principal and bureaucrats can facilitate responsive public values beyond those that are explicitly enacted into law. In this sense, patronage enhances bureaucrats' access to both tangible and intangible resources especially when their attitudes and behaviour are aligned to their principal's priorities and incentives. For example, in Ghana, given the interest of current political principals in implementing the NPP government's flagship programme of FSHS policy coupled with the commitment of loyal bureaucrats at the ministry of education in seeing the policy to fruition, the education ministry continues to receive the highest budgetary allocation. Thus, principals provide greater resources for bureaucrats (agents) who faithfully execute the former's policy preferences (ex-post incentive).

In the 2019 fiscal year, for instance, GH¢11.2billion was allocated to the education ministry, "an increase of 20.9% over the previous year with an amount GH¢ 1.5billion constituting 13.11% is earmarked for goods and services. With a global average of about 5%, Ghana spends over 6% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on education and currently, the proportion of GDP and budgetary expenditures on education in Ghana is one of the highest in the world" (GhanaWeb, 2019). It is also an open secret in Ghana today that contractors and suppliers who are allies and clients of influential principals keenly lobby or are granted contracts and supplies from the ministry of education because the ministry has been well resourced (GHC 1.5 billion) to the point that they do not delay in the payment of their debts (contracts and supplies).

Grapevine information suggests that the procurement processes deployed for prospective contract bidding at the ministry are only symbolic or cosmetic as supplies or

contracts are allotted to clients of principals. Yet, the procurement processes are still used by loyal bureaucrats in a way only to ratify what has been politically predetermined or awarded. Loyal bureaucrats orchestrate, execute and cover these transactions without loopholes within the bureaucracy. While this may appear shady on the face value, it is beneficial because it enables the efficient and timely supply of goods and services to promote education in Ghana. In this context, the ends justify the means.

This argument is sustained by Brierley's (2018) study of Ghana's bureaucracy when she found that since autonomous bureaucrats sometimes pose difficulties to political principals by insisting on rules and procedures, principals usually enlist loyalists through patronage who are ready to indulge and condone with principal. These loyal bureaucrats sometimes pursue or circumvent established practices, if necessary, to attain political ends. This goes to buttress the point that patronage bureaucrats' loyalty and access to principals help to mobilise and coordinate other bureaucrats to facilitate the use of tangible and intangible resources provided by principals for the delivery of their interests.

Another vital blessing of the patronage-loyalty romance is its deployment for surveillance purposes to check attitudes and behaviour in the bureaucracy. As a strategy, principals appoint competing agents and induce them to 'spy' on their colleagues and report improprieties. In the alternative, principals entice subordinate patronage appointees to provide information about their immediate superiors' attitudes and behaviour by dangling in their faces, opportunities for career advancement into management positions (Breton & Wintrobe, 1982). As argued by a key informant, bureaucrats' attitudes and behaviour towards work speak volumes of the kind of intention or the kind of loyalty and patriotism they have. According to him, some bureaucrats in Ghana:

come to work very late and go home very early, they sit at the offices either doing something different or what they are not tasked to do, they are playing games or on

their phones and people come there to queue the whole day and they won't even attend to them. So, you can see clearly in their attitude towards work but you can also see clearly that most of them work [seriously when principals] monitor them, once the monitoring mechanism is removed, they do something else... (Interviewee 27, 9th October 2018; UG).

From this viewpoint, patronage bureaucrats constitute surveillance or monitoring devices for principals, potentially enhancing the principals' oversight checks on bureaucrats. This indirect monitoring offered by patronage appointees does help to rein-in truancy and improve bureaucratic efficiency. Weingast & Moran (1983) had earlier argued that direct monitoring of bureaucratic action by principals themselves is not necessarily the most economic or effective system of control. In effect, through patronage, principals implicitly steer bureaucrats from straying off the path they have set regardless of the absence of their direct monitoring. In Ghana, the National Youth Employment Programme - NYEP (amended into Youth Employment Agency (YEA) by an Act 887 in 2015), for example, has been used by successive governing political parties as a vehicle to dispense patronage appointments to their grassroots supporters or party youth as reward. To monitor and ensure that party grassroots are accommodated in such appointments by the YEA, all regional and district youth organisers of the ruling party are usually appointed as regional and district coordinators of the YEA. This is usually done so as to coordinate and control grassroots party loyalists' recruitment into the various YEA modules. Thus, by dispensing the patronage-loyalty strategy this way, ruling parties deploy their patronage architecture to monitor and pursue their interests regarding youth employment.

Additionally, the patronage-loyalty strategy further augments bureaucratic accountability to principals, by facilitating both formal and informal sanctions and rewards. By deploying patronage bureaucrats who are mindful of the discretionary powers possessed by

their principals to either improve or curtail their careers and means of livelihoods, these bureaucrats are motivated to comply with their principals' interests, which enhances political responsiveness to the principals' mandate. As seen earlier, the Ghanaian bureaucratic system allows for the power of personnel alteration or reshuffle to rest with principals. An informant from the MLNR argued that:

Generally, subordinates will try as much as possible not to incur the displeasure of their superiors because in the public service, if you have a superior who has a beef with you, he can frustrate you. And frustration can come in different ways; not given the requisite resources to work, being transferred, being denied of promotion or pay rise. Therefore, subordinates are usually worried of this and they try to toe the line of their superiors (Interviewee 4, 27th September 2018; MLNR).

Other informants argued that in the Ghanaian bureaucracy, when bureaucrats fail to be accountable to principals, “the whole concept of political witch-hunting will never let you [bureaucrat] loose... you will account for it, so I think the fear of punishment far outweigh the benefits and praise that you get in doing the right thing so people tend to account to their principals” especially under patronage-loyalty arrangements (Interviewee 27, 9th October 2018; UG). As Gulzar & Pasquale (2017: 164) argued, bureaucrats can be reluctant towards their responsibilities “but are motivated to work by politicians who may take punitive action against them” especially under neo-patrimonial settings where bureaucrats can be punished by principals either for disloyalty or rewarded for loyalty.

A very similar argument to the above point has been made by other key informants where patronage appointees loyally execute their principals' directives and agenda because of career insecurity since patronage appointees are mindful of how tenuous their appointments can be. Under such arrangements, principals can secure efficiency and avoid sabotage. An

interviewee recounted that a top bureaucrat from the ministry of education who had misgivings about the implementation of the FSHS policy stated that:

A bureaucrat in my institution [MOE] who is very much aware that this free senior high school policy that the government is implementing is not the way to go about it, would you be able to speak freely and write to the minister that the free SHS model you are implementing is not good? The implication of what you wrote would be that you are more or less sacking yourself from the job because the politician has become so committed to that particular agenda that you just have to keep quiet and follow it, even if you don't believe in it. So, to some extent, you will see that bureaucrats even in cases [where] they have specific differences from what their political masters actually prefer, they will shelve their personal interest and please their political masters (Interviewee 26, 9th October 2018; UG)

This exposition of the informant suggests that with principals having power over bureaucrats' careers, most principals are not shy to apply these tactics in varying degrees to ensure loyalty. They may even manipulate bureaucrats' as they may not be entirely trust them particularly given the suspicion that they can derail principals' agenda or interests.

Finally, another advantage of deploying patronage-loyalty tactics is that it also allows principals to work with trustworthy bureaucrats as argued by Dirks & Ferrin (2002). One of the obvious benefits of the trust strategy is that it decreases the need for direct monitoring while avoiding the need to negotiate complex or contradictory priorities between unsynchronised actors. To cite an example from the MOE regarding trust, reference is made to a huge public outcry reported in the media over a poorly implemented computerised school selection placement system (CSSPS) for SHS students. Due to poor placements of prospective SHS students rolled out by the ministry for 2019/2020 academic year, there was a huge public backlash. A former principal currently belonging to the opposition accused current principals

that due to their trust issues, they directed their loyal bureaucrats at the Ghana education service to change the old CSSPS software system three months to the start of the placements and is reported to have quizzed that “...why change the software three months to such a major exercise?”

In his assessment, the CSSPS challenges were further exacerbated due to a decision by principals to replace key bureaucrats at the CSSPS secretariat with new bureaucrats, to quote him: “Why do we virtually have to replace experienced hands at the CSSPS Secretariat? I would have thought that at least they will keep the experienced hands.” However, the justifications of the principals from the education ministry for replacing the software and existing bureaucrats at the CSSPS secretariat was that the CSSPS placements was a politically hot issue and to avoid sabotage, they had to replace experienced hands with trusted and loyal hands. In their view, any controversy over the CSSPS placements was going to be politically costly or suicidal to the current principals, hence the need to put their own men in place. As Lupia & McCubbins (1994) had earlier observed, “to avoid the pitfalls of a delegation, the principal must either pick a good agent or learn enough to protect her interests”. It was in the context of Lupia & McCubbins’s argument that principals from the MOE caused their loyalists to take over the above assignments. To draw curtains on the discussions regarding the blessings of the patronage-loyalty thesis, the above discussions demonstrate that patronage-loyalty arrangements can be beneficial and enhance control of bureaucrats within bureaucracies. It has the potential to deliver on a myriad of goals including but not limited to public and personal interests of bureaucratic principals who run the day to day administration of the bureaucracy. Yet, the suspicion of sceptics concerning patronage-loyalty strategies as detrimental is ever more imminent, which the study now turns its attention to.

6.4.2 The Curse

As we already suspect, the patronage-loyalty strategy can also be damaging. For critics, the latter part of the 20th century has increasingly witnessed political patronage and power

influence within bureaucracies, suggesting a significant rise in politics as opposed to neutral competence. First and foremost, among the various curses of the patronage-loyalty tactics is the evidence of its adverse impact on bureaucrats' motivation because:

we have people who do not have the necessary qualifications or who do not have the necessary experience coming in and they are coming in based on connections or political influence...90% per cent of the times too, they come and they become your bosses, so, it is demoralising especially when you know that you have qualified officers in [the bureaucracy] who could have easily occupied those roles, it is demoralisation but we are expected to deal with it, and we try to deal with it (Interviewee 2, 1st October 2018; MLNR).

Regrettably, various civil service reforms in Ghana have so far failed to seriously address the question of adequately motivating bureaucrats to improve on their service delivery (Ohemeng, 2010). Several key informants expressed different levels of frustration concerning the impact of patronage-loyalty tactics in Ghana on the motivation of bureaucrats. Antagonists of this type of arrangements argue that when unmerited personnel are appointed to positions in the bureaucracy, it hurts the motivation of observing careerists. This is especially so when patronage appointees receive special treatment while their own (careerists) prospects for advancement founded on the principle of merit appear bleak. The disappointment about this issue in Ghana is that there seems to be no momentous effort in addressing these costs of patronage by political principals. In reality, the lack of motivation occasioned by patronage-loyalty arrangements has, therefore, seriously affected not only the morale of Ghanaian civil servants but also bureaucratic superiors' ability to truly rein-in underperforming bureaucrats.

For reasons of security of tenure, such underperforming bureaucrats become liabilities to the bureaucracy and the state since they are remunerated with public funds. Furthermore, some have argued that the bureaucracy becomes less attractive when its leadership become

dominated by agents of principals. Since career progression is a luring incentive for bureaucrats, patronage appointments, therefore, distort the career prospects which invariably have a bearing on attracting and retaining bureaucrats. The preference of principals to work with patronage appointees due to loyalty than career bureaucrats, thus, impede the recruitment of merit-based competent career bureaucrats. This affects productivity. Since the bureaucracy represents an important link between politics and state capacity, by employing patronage appointees or politicising the bureaucracy, patronage undermines opportunities for the bureaucracy to successfully pursue development and improve the provision of public goods and services in response to the needs of the citizenry. This is because political appointees to career positions usually possess inadequate prerequisite experience and competencies needed for effective implementation (Fesler, 1983).

Thus, patronage-loyalty engagements can stunt the development of Ghana by disregarding merit and qualifications as bases for choosing bureaucrats capable of fashioning strategies for the benefit of the public. Similarly, there are instances where some principled bureaucrats have even deliberately diplomatically declined to accept offers to certain key positions because such positions are perceived to be prone to political influence. By subjecting such positions to political control, it serves as a disincentive for careerists who value the security of tenure to accept promotions to those positions.

Delving deeper into the ills of patronage, a key informant placed the problem at the doorstep of principals by arguing that it is sad that many of the principals in Ghana's bureaucracy do not even understand why they are appointed for public service. The interviewee cited an example of principals representing certain institutions on governing councils of particular public bureaucracies. The informant argued that many of them believe that they are appointed to serve certain interests and not the institution whose council they sit on. The informant maintained that this ought not to be the case because, "once you are made a member

of a board of an organisation, your first interest is to the interest of the organisation you are a board member of and not the institution that you were picked from” (Interviewee 4, 27th September 2018; MLNR). The key informant further argued that in other jurisdictions, when it comes to filling public service positions especially governing boards and councils, it is advertised through a merit-based system to fill these positions. Therefore, he wondered why in the case of Ghana:

...we still have a situation where the president nominates and appoints people to go and sit on boards. I have been in this organisation long enough to see people who know next to nothing, they even come and you can see that they have no intention to learn about it, and the next day, they all start running after permits or they want to supply something under procurement. Until we fix this issue from the top – because they are supposed to oversee what is happening in the organisation – they always come to seek individual or personal interests. We have a system where everybody tries to satisfy their self-interest or some other prioritised interest and the organisation is left with no other interest, and an organisation cannot move forward under such a system. That is the biggest problem we have under the public service system in Ghana, some people are there because they think that it is because of their political party – ‘my political party is in power, so it is time to chop’. So, they come and are looking for opportunities to make money and not to work (Interviewee 4, 27th September 2018; MLNR).

This point connects with the evidence that patronage-loyalty arrangements encourage the intrusion of partisanship and corruption into official assignments because patronage bureaucrats are generally loyalists of principals. Due to personal connections and political considerations, patronage bureaucrats have limited assertive capacity to curb political corruption; thereby presenting corruption as a price to patronage and loyalty. This is obvious because of the thinking by patronage appointees that their survival within the bureaucracy is

largely tied to their principals; therefore, they are motivated to engage in whatever activities that will ensure continued goodwill or favour from these principals. Due to loyalty, numerous incidences of collusion between bureaucrats and their principals in Ghana have had a devastating toll on the national purse and the country's reputation in the fight against corruption, which is deemed as a curse of patronage.

While scholars such as Kristinsson (2012) argue that patronage as corruption or nepotism is coincidental, other scholars such as Meyer-Sahling & Mikkelsen (2017; 2018) maintain otherwise. The Ghanaian case, indeed, demonstrates that loyalty is the lifeblood linking patronage to corruption. This is because principals typically need loyal bureaucrats to successfully collude in corruption. Collusion to execute corruption is, therefore, mostly contingent on loyalty and trust. To demonstrate this point, a few examples will be cited. For starters, a famous case of collusion that culminated into one of the biggest corruption scandals in Ghana's political scene is what has become known as the "Woyomegate scandal". In 2010, one Alfred Agbesi Woyome (a known financier of the then ruling party, the NDC) was paid GHC51 million (about USD 26,153,846 [GHC1.95=USD1]) by the state as judgment debt without a valid claim in contract or law. This case typically encapsulated the conscious collusion between principals, bureaucrats and political clients (party financiers) in an intricate web to rob the public purse.

The payment was effected under the guise of a business agreement in 2006 between Ghana government and Waterville Holdings (a foreign company with local partners). The debacle implicated a myriad of actors including previous and current political principals and bureaucrats during whose tenure the contract was supposed to have been signed and those whose tenure payment was effected after a default judgement was entered. The case led to the resignation of Betty Mould Idrissu, the then minister of education who approved of the transaction as attorney-general and also, the dismissal of Martin Amidu, the then attorney-

general and minister of justice who succeeded Mrs Iddrisu for alleged insubordination to the then-president over the matter.

The “Woyomegate” scandal even led to the establishment of a commission of inquiry into judgement debt payments while a legal suit was pursued and finally determined at the supreme court of Ghana. Submissions at the commission of enquiry was an opening of a *Pandora’s box*. It revealed multitudes of collusions between principals and patronage bureaucrats as successive principals and bureaucrats counter-revealed illegal judgment debts paid by their opponents (Ayee, 2013). That is, the justice Apau judgement debt commission exposed the despicable cases of collusion between Ghana’s bureaucrats, their principals and party financiers who drained the country’s coffers through corrupt deals (Ninsin, 2018). This example confirms Carino’s (1992) argument that the bureaucracy is a tool for principals as they pursue social, economic and political objectives either for their benefit or on behalf of - and frequently in collusion with particularistic interests rooted outside the bureaucracy.

In 2018, another scandalous collusion between principals and bureaucrats was reported in the media by GhanaWeb (2018), that the then ruling party (NDC) in 2010 used part of a \$175 million loan facility meant to build hospitals to conduct election-related research. It emerged that the MOH under the NDC diverted a portion of the loan facility into researching its chances of securing re-election in 2016 through a subcontract awarded to a UK- based SCL Social. Subsequently, SCL Social was paid \$6 million to undertake a nationwide survey to provide relevant research for electoral purposes where Rojo Mettle-Nunoo, the then deputy minister of MOH was appointed as head of the project steering committee. This alleged shady arrangement was facilitated by patronage bureaucrats at MOH who covered up this illicit arrangement. Mr Mettle-Nunoo later confirmed that SCL Social gathered crucial campaign intelligence through the research. Upon enquiry by the media, the NDCs defence was that when the report of the research was presented to the party by the minister and his team, the party did

not interrogate them on how funding for the research was secured. This case is still being dealt with by the country's Special Prosecutor of corrupt public officers.

In 2019, undercover investigations conducted by a journalist, Manasseh Azure Awuni, also revealed that Talent Discovery Limited (TDL), a company incorporated in June 2017, had secured abnormal government contracts through restrictive tendering and instead of executing the contracts, sold them to third parties for execution at juicy rates. It was later revealed that the owner of the company was Adjenim Boateng Adjei (AB Adjei), the topmost bureaucrat at Ghana's public procurement authority (PPA), an outfit which approves all government contracts. Between 2017 and 2019, all the 8 contracts TDL won were through restrictive tendering, implying that when TDL is involved in a contract bid, the majority shareholder and director of the company is the same principal who supervised the approval processes. The company had also been shortlisted for 5 restrictive tendering contracts and the PPA board confirmed that the company was brought to the PPA on 14 occasions for restrictive tendering approvals. The country's office of the special prosecutor of corrupt bureaucrats and principals, therefore, commenced work regarding the conduct of the top bureaucrats of the PPA and their accomplices.

Similarly, in May of 2018, IMANI Ghana, a civil society think-tank began alerting the public regarding a decision by the Ministry of Communications (MOC) in collusion with its technical bureaucrats from the National Communications Authority (NCA), to award a 10-year contract worth nearly \$180 million to an entity known as Kelni GVG. The purpose was to prevent tax evasion by telecom operators by contracting Kelni GVG to monitor telecom operators to ensure that the right amount of revenue is realised from that industry. However, according to IMANI, over a decade of evidence gathered in Ghana indicates that the country has never been able to apply the Kelni GVG type of technology to improve revenue collection, despite their huge costs. Regardless of the pressure from IMANI Ghana, the attitude and

behaviour of the ministry's principals and their top bureaucrats suggested a culture of impunity. According to IMANI, in the face of lack of conducive "public interest litigation in Ghana, especially when the issue at stake involves multiple layers of bureaucratic misconduct, we were not surprised to hear" a settlement between the parties without commensurate sanctions meted out to the political principals and their bureaucratic agents in this sordid robbery (IMANI Ghana, 2018). The minister is still at post with no single bureaucrat losing his job over the scandal. Yet, in IMANI Ghana's view, the value-for-money issues raised against the contract are unresolved. They described it as a "sham arrangement designed solely to rape Ghana" (IMANI Ghana, 2018). This reiterates Darhlstrom *et al.*'s (2012) argument that principals and bureaucrats typically need to collude in promoting corrupt behaviour in the bureaucracy.

According to transparency international, corruption is prevalent in the Ghanaian bureaucracy and governance processes and is often accompanied by inadequate accountability due to political patronage (Rahman, 2018). Political corruption and bureaucratic ineptitude are, therefore, considered as part of the most significant costs and threats to efficient governance (Stiftung, 2018). To quantify the monetary cost of patronage-loyalty tactics, a study by IMANI found that Ghana loses more than US \$3 billion a year to corruption aided under patronage-loyalty arrangements. The country's Auditor-General, Daniel Yaw Domelevo also stated that the various ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) lost over GHc5.1 billion in just four years (2014 – 2018) through various financial irregularities without commensurate action from political principals to sanction culpable bureaucrats due to patronage factors. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2017) indicates that Ghana ranks as the eighth most deteriorated country on the continent in overall governance, having declined by -1.5 points in the last 10 years partly due to political patronage and corruption. Ghana's bureaucracy is, therefore, viewed as riddled with corruption scandals (Stiftung, 2018).

One of the reasons why Ghanaian bureaucrats may be entwined in these types of

corruption is that instead of instituting deterrent restrictions, principals and patronage bureaucrats are rather driven to siphon resources to meet their financial obligations from their constituents, clients or family members (Brierley, 2018). As reported by De Graaf & Huberts (2008: 646) “because of loyalty and solidarity, colleagues are hesitant to report suspicions of another’s corrupt activities”. In addition to loyalty, as Brierley (2018) argued, patronage bureaucrats condone or enable corrupt attitudes and behaviour to counter the risk of principals messing with their careers and livelihoods; thus, they expose the negative consequences of patronage-loyalty tactics among actors.

In Ghana, the fact that patronage clients without the requisite track record or experience in project execution can win public procurement contracts over qualified companies as cited in the PPA-TDL corruption case ought to be puzzling. This is because Ghana’s procurement legislation includes numerous safeguards to ensure value by promoting competitive tendering. Yet, patronage and loyalty factors provide answers as to why bureaucrats as agents of principals administer procurement processes in ways to grant contracts to inexperienced clients. What this implies is that loyalty and commitment are vital to facilitating projects than just qualification and experience. The phenomenon of companies belonging to or associated with various principals winning projects without the requisite experience is quite prevalent in Ghana. As Brierley (2018) indicated, the influence of principals is even more pronounced under competitive bidding processes where these principals interfere in procurement transactions to drive projects towards their clients or cohorts. Thus, when possible, principals cause patronage bureaucrats to manipulate and award projects to their clients or cohorts who (clients) in turn aid in financing these principals. When these clients fulfil their side of the bargain, it enhances their likelihood of being awarded more contracts or projects (Sigman, 2015). Accordingly, principals in Ghana are financed through the corrupt allocation of development projects on contract while both principals and bureaucrats also benefit personally from such shady arrangements through side payments and kickbacks (Sigman, 2015; Brierley, 2018).

In sum, this section argues that high levels of patronage-loyalty arrangements in neo-patrimonial regimes seem to heighten organisational problems such as demotivation, unprofessional attitude and behaviour, technical incompetence, abuse of state resources for private or political purposes, corruption and excessive control over the civil service. Policy decisions and the allocation of personnel with appropriate abilities can be distorted while the uncertain tenure of bureaucrats also brings about instability, discontinuity, fragmentation and loss of institutional memories with occasional loss of focus and direction (Hodder, 2009). Additionally, cynicism is created where appointments or promotions quickly attract suspicion since there is the belief that bureaucrats have political backers, heightening the incentive for principals to interfere and for bureaucrats to seek such interference (Hodder, 2009).

This atmosphere in the bureaucracy may lead other bureaucrats to pose undesired attitudes and behaviour including the rigid application of existing frameworks. This include inflexible application of qualifications and standards to avoid political infiltration of their ranks or creating their own semi-exclusive networks. This is achieved by closing ranks and circumventing qualification standards and selection procedures in favour of their own, or to keep out those who may threaten their interests. These challenges have wider ramifications for bureaucrats' attitudes and behaviour as well as development programmes in SSA. Regardless of the price of patronage-loyalty arrangements as discussed above, it still has its blessings in bureaucracies and as Beard & Beard (1986: 112) argued, bureaucracies need men and women who are trained to serve with loyalty as "great moral stabilisers".

6.5 Loyalty to Bureaucrats' Networks

The main sources through which patronage-loyalty tactics are dispensed are through networks. It is argued that networks are structures of interdependence involving multiple actors or organisations where relationships are not necessarily subordinated to each other in some hierarchical arrangement. They are arenas of exchange where bureaucrats gain and facilitate or

even circumvent rules to cooperate as members (O'Toole, 1997; Kaufman, 2001; Kreis-Hoyer & Grünberg, 2006). Within the Ghanaian context, bureaucrats' networks are mostly manifested in their political, social and ethnic affiliations as well as personal connections. This is why this study primarily employed political, personal and ethnic networks as factors to determine patronage bureaucrats and their level of loyalty.

Earlier in Table 9, the level of contribution to patronage appointees' loyalty by each of these networks or patronage-based factors was determined. It is interesting to find that these networks which facilitate patronage bureaucrats' appointments are found to be positive and significantly correlated with the loyalty (regression model with the three indicators produced $R^2 = .116$, $F(3, 271) = 11.847$, $p < .005$). As noted, the analysis showed that the contributory weight of both a personal connection and political consideration were more noteworthy than the contribution of ethnic affiliation. Thus, considering the networks which facilitate patronage appointments in Ghana, whereas the contribution of personal and political networks is significant and positive, the contribution of ethnic networks of bureaucrats as a factor in Ghana was almost contestable.

As indicated by an informant, "for the tribal factor, it seems the least, I mean from my observation. If it is the political affiliation... that exists but the tribal factor is almost fading" (Interviewee 10, 1st October 2018; MLGRD). That is, appointing civil servants into bureaucratic positions based on ethnic affiliation though significant is comparatively less pronounced. In the occasional instances that ethnicity plays a key role, it is covertly done along with consideration for other competent factors. As succinctly put by an informant from the MLNR "it will be difficult to say that [ethnicity] does not exist. But even if it does, it is not significant" (Interviewee 4, 27th September 2018; MLNR). Part of the reason why ethnicity may be downplayed is that principals can hardly deploy ethnic factors in decision making without it being noticed. Such overt ethnic bias is thus likely to negatively affect the principal in the long run at least within the Ghanaian context. This trend is not unexpected because

Ghana's long-standing political culture stresses on national unity and ethno-regional inclusivity which has contributed to explain the country's relative political stability in SSA (Langer, 2009; Hammerstad, 2011).

Despite the above finding regarding ethnicity, the unique contribution of each of these three specific networks for the omnibus predictor of patronage is positively correlated to the value of bureaucrats' loyalty, suggesting that personal connections, political considerations and ethnic backgrounds influence the level of loyalty exercised by civil servants in the execution of their duties. The evidence adduced shows that bureaucrats' loyalty to the networks they belong to lead to bias and certain expected attitudes and behaviour. As noted by an interviewee, there are situations where certain decisions are made and it is clear that civil servants have "retreated into some smaller social enclaves like their tribes, church and professional bodies" (Interviewee 13, 3rd October 2018; Labour research).

Delving into the role these networks play concerning loyalty, for instance, insights from some informants advance the argument that most civil servants in Ghana do not see themselves working for State more than working for the networks they belong to. It is argued that a Ghanaian civil servant would most likely secure the interest of his/her networks and feel happy with a sense of belongingness than pursuing public interest because of identity, self-esteem, power and influence. A key informant argued that when some bureaucrats approach their daily assignments, they do not forget the fact that as Ghanaian citizens, they belong to networks as well.

Under such situations, all that those bureaucrats do, be it employments, promotions, contracts award, giving out favours and so on, they are guided carefully by strong network considerations and will use other powers (such as politics, wealth, power or old school boyism or girlism) to peddle influence. Some informants even argue that when bureaucrats do not demonstrate loyalty and commitment to their network interests, they are referred to as "bad sons and daughters" (Interviewee 23, 11th October 2018; UG). Therefore, bureaucrats' loyalty

to their networks compels them to play certain roles in their various bureaucratic offices that would rather promote the interests of their networks than the state. While networks may create greater opportunities for discretion, the loyalty required of them by their network can also constrain that discretion since it may bind the civil servant to attitudes and behaviour expected by members of the network (Tullock, 1965).

For example, even though the results of this study generally indicate that patronage appointees through ethnic affiliations is subtle, its influences on loyalty seem overt. Indeed, Ekeh (1975) cited an example that when a bureaucrat is a treasurer for both his bureaucracy and his/her hometown association, he/she is more likely to manage the hometown association's financial resources better than the finances of his bureaucracy. He will most likely engage in financial misappropriation in his bureaucracy (sometimes in service to ethnic loyalties) which he would not dare to do with his hometown's finances. This is because "he/she sees him/herself as belonging to the hometown of an ethnic group more than being a Ghanaian" (Interviewee 23, 11th October 2018; UG). This line of argument suggests strong loyalties of patronage bureaucrats "who believe that their ethnic groups are more important than being Ghanaians and will do everything for their ethnic group even if it means hurting the Ghanaian state – they will sacrifice Ghana for their ethnic group, this is very common" (Interviewee 23, 11th October 2018; UG).

An informant from MLNR argued that "it is more of a networked world we find ourselves in and you are tempted most of the times to want to help out the person you know. As human beings especially, you will want to be in the good books of your social networks, just in case you need their help in the future. So, you would want to court their favour by doing what they ask of you" (Interviewee 2, 1st October 2018; MLNR). In a similar vein, another informant argued that as a bureaucrat, given the opportunity to influence the location of a health facility for example, due to loyalty to his social network, he would rather "direct the project to where it will benefit my people; hence, the religious or ethnic background will influence my

decision” (Interviewee 5, 28th September 2018; MLNR).

While these networks are generally informal, they influence bureaucrats’ attitudes and behaviour and sometimes cause these bureaucrats to exploit public resources to service them. Indeed, principals benefit or suffer from such informal networks. A case in point in Ghana where principals have suffered from bureaucrats’ loyalty to their social or religious networks will be cited. It is the quagmire the current NPP government found itself for allegedly receiving \$ 22 million funding contingent on a pledge to the U.N and other IDAs that it will pursue a curriculum of “comprehensive sexuality education” for young children from age four (4) and above via the Ghana education service (GES). Bureaucrats who disagreed with the curriculum characterised it as an insidious or subtle LGBT campaign issue and leaked the information to their religious networks (churches, mosques). These social and religious networks, in turn, mounted stiff opposition to the government’s move. This single behaviour of civil servants through their social networks effectively unsettled an entire government. This was due to the ramifications for their re-election chances because the public rejection and outrage against introducing LGBT issues to kids was stiff; yet, the political principals had already received the funds and committed themselves to their donors.

This situation is however not new as erstwhile principals have been dislocated in the past under similar circumstances. This is partly the reason why sometimes, principals have sought to gain loyalty by appointing bureaucrats from notable influential networks ostensibly to forge informal coalitions with those networks of the appointed bureaucrats (Geddes, 1994). This seems logical because bureaucrats are sometimes able to influence the stance of their social and sub-political groupings regarding political issues pursued by their principals. Therefore, establishing and maintaining loyal ties with some networks through patronage bureaucrats secures for principals’ informal connections with such networks as a prudent mechanism of control. This is more so in the context where the state is weak and not delivering to the needs of everybody. People retreat to social interests and can advance the interest of

those networks or secure appointments into the civil service because they belong to a certain network.

In the opinion of a key informant, the whole concept of networks influences a great deal, especially how appointments are made, for satisfying social network interests as well as towards loyal implementation of directives. He cited that for example in Ghana, there are some traditional secondary schools (Achimota school, Presec, Wesley girls etc.) which being an alumna of enhances your chances of getting a job quicker than others. This is because alumni who have already been placed in positions of influence within the bureaucracy subscribe to codes of loyalty which requires them to facilitate the recruitment of young graduates of their alma Mata into the bureaucracy. Once they get in through that route, they are also obliged to sustain it “so over the years, people will definitely kill to go to those schools because they think once you come out of school, you add up to the network and it will help you to be recruited into the system and you also have to help others to get recruited later on and also work to enhance the interest of the system that brought you there” (Interviewee 27, 9th October 2018; UG).

Specifically, members of networks even informally advertise or spread the news of vacancies or placement opportunities to colleagues (e.g. golf club members), and such informal network advertisements are even more pronounced and carry weight in terms of referrals and recommendations than coming in through the regular means. In Ghana, most times, vacant positions are even announced in those “informal networks before they are even put up in the public domain – so seriously speaking, those kinds of networks influence the level to which we perform and we perform to please those core groups of people because they have helped us to profit” (Interviewee 27, 9th October 2018; UG).

There are also anecdotal cases where vacancies in the bureaucracy are reserved for relatives of principals and bureaucrats as they come up for retirement. The potency of networks to be able to get things done because of loyalty requirements is, therefore, vital; so, within the

Ghanaian context, people even join networks “basically because of these things, that when they are in a problem, they come to help. People think that getting a job you need to join an association” (Interviewee 15, 3rd October 2018; OHCS). This point is manifest as it is evident that certain ethnic groups are predominant in the bureaucracy than others; for example, Ewes and Akans dominate the bureaucracy not necessarily because they are the most qualified or educated, but because they have strong networks with binding loyalty requirements to assist other members of their networks to gain entry. Similarly, the Akyems are noted for dominating the law fraternity and have been accused of hijacking the Ghana law school and admitting candidates from their networks into the law school each year.

In line with the network argument in the Ghanaian case, this research finds a connection in multiplicity of micro- allegiances and loyalties across the top, middle and lower bureaucrats through a chain of principals. These principals connect originally unrelated but interconnected bureaucrats and influence how well their interests are executed. Noticeably, the drivers for patronage arrangements or tactics are not limited to senior bureaucrats but across the three bureaucratic levels distinguished by Johnson & Libercap (1994). As opined by an informant from the MLGRD, political principals appoint top bureaucrats due to loyalty inspired by the intent of ensuring that their agenda will be prosecuted, and these top bureaucrats in turn also recruit their own men (even by demanding posting of specific bureaucrats to their outfits) or remove bureaucrats not appointed by them and replacing them with those who can be personally trusted. This does not end there as those middle-level bureaucrats, in building their crews, also apply the trust and loyalty criteria to select their teams; hence, the trust and loyalty criteria is cascaded down the chain of command to the very bottom.

This is to say that as political principals deploy patronage appointees in search of loyalty and obedience, so do bureaucrats across the various levels of authority or command (top, middle, lower) assemble their subordinates through their own networks to also ensure loyalty and obedience. An interviewee argued that “...people are really working for their godfathers”

(Interviewee 9, 1st October 2018; MLGRD). Regardless of the level or type of bureaucratic institution, an interviewee maintained that “working with your own people” who are loyal to you guarantees effective and efficient results. As succinctly couched by an informant “in our part of the world everybody has a godfather and ethically under no circumstance would I disappoint my godfather or whoever influenced my employment or recruitment. I will definitely work for his interest and serve the interest of principals who helped to appoint him by being more loyal” (Interviewee 5, 28th September 2018; MLNR).

From the above discussions, the effects of networks on patronage-loyalty arrangements under patrimonial circumstances are very essential as they lead to the execution of various interests based on network lines. It has, shed lights on how patronage bureaucrats deliver through a network of relationships among political principals and how bureaucrats prioritise reciprocal services for each other based on network loyalty.

6.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter has empirically examined the theoretical hypothesis that patronage-based appointments shape or influence the loyalty exercised by bureaucrats in the execution of their duties. Based on this theoretical postulation, discussions in this chapter has established that indeed patronage processes yields loyal bureaucrats who are necessary for bureaucratic control and pursuance of vested interests. While patronage appointees are theoretically expected to be absolutely loyal to their patrons, the findings of this study show that patronage bureaucrats’ loyalty is not unconditional. The discussion also portrays an understanding of why patronage bureaucrats cannot be unconditionally loyal to their principals due to a variety of factors that include legal restrictions and competing interests among actors.

This is to say that the influence of patronage in emerging democracies and other regimes can vary because whereas patronage appointees, despite their resolve, are restricted by legal

provisions under legal-constitutional and democratic settings, same may not be said under authoritarian regimes. Additionally, whilst both personal connections and political considerations are determined to be appropriate items to measure patronage, the item of ethnicity has been contested by some respondents. Also, their correlation with loyalty is noteworthy. It is also the finding of this Chapter that patronage bureaucrats are not just restricted to the display of loyalty as they also possess a notable measure of responsiveness and a less notable level of autonomy. It is further concluded that given the arguments in support of or against patronage bureaucrats, it would seem that the best argument can be determined by the circumstances under which patronage-loyalty arrangements are deployed or frowned upon. So, while patronage bureaucrats may require checks from the system, they may also need to be loyal to the aspirations of principals who are entrusted with the mandate of the public interest. The concluding discussions regarding these findings are revisited in chapter 8. The next chapter is, however, dedicated to examining the empirical relationship between hybrid based appointments and political responsiveness.

CHAPTER SEVEN

POLITICAL RESPONSIVENESS: A FUSION OF “CHALK AND CHEESE”.

7.1 Introduction:

The third and final hypothesis formulated by this study relates to the theorisation that hybrid-based appointments shape bureaucrats' responsiveness (Appleby, 1949; Friedrichson, 1976; Waldo, 1980, 1987; Svara, 1999, 2000; West, 2005; Page, 2007; Ferrez 2009). Proponents of the hybrid model posit that a sound combination of politics and professionalism produces responsive governance. Advocates of bureaucratic reforms through NPM maintain that principals need competent but loyal bureaucrats who may not be necessarily partisan but competent to implement politically responsive agenda (Peters & Pierre, 2004). Here, the expectation is that since political principals are held accountable by the voting public by way of elections or re-elections into government, it is only fitting that principals appoint professional bureaucrats with political lenses to responsively accomplish civic interests or agenda on behalf of the voting public. Based on this expectation, this chapter sets out to empirically examine the theoretical hypothesis that *“The more hybrid-based the process of appointment is, the more likely a bureaucrat is to be responsive”*. The subsequent discussion has, therefore, conducted an empirical assessment regarding the actual effects of hybrid-based appointments on bureaucrats' responsiveness. Grounded on the results obtained from the data gathered, this Chapter discusses four main findings.

The first discussion focuses on the empirical relationship between hybrid appointees and political responsiveness, autonomy and loyalty. Here, the study finds that hybrid appointees have a positive and appreciable association with responsiveness, except that it is not an absolute one. Similarly, these hybrid appointees are also found to be demonstrably autonomous as well as loyal under different circumstances which are explored in detail. The second discussion of this chapter is related to the empirical evidence that hybrid appointments are the most predominant type of bureaucratic appointment in Ghana and explores why this is the case. The third examination of this

Chapter, however, discusses the advantages of hybrid appointments as well as the risks associated with it whilst the fourth discussion summarises the key findings of the chapter.

7.2 Complementarity and Hybrids: Towards bureaucratic responsiveness.

The opening paragraph of this Chapter has recounted the theoretical formulation of the hypothesis between hybrid appointees and their expected responsiveness. The subsequent discourse, therefore, engages in an empirical discussion regarding the extent of hybrid bureaucrats' level of responsiveness as theoretically postulated. To do this, an index-score of responses to the multi-item variables was used to determine hybrid appointees as an independent variable using a combination of merit and patronage indicators. However, responsiveness as a dependent variable was measured using three specific items: advancing superiors legitimate or justifiable interests in performing duties, downplaying personal justifiable interests in performing duties and finally, advancing office's justifiable interests in the performance of duties. These were all rated on a scale of 1-7 by respondents in a standard questionnaire.

As stated in the previous empirical chapters, the p-values were used to determine the direction of the relationship while the r square was deployed to ascertain its impact. To discuss the key findings from the survey and interview data regarding the effects of hybrid appointments on bureaucrats' responsiveness, the chapter relied on a one-way ANOVA, regression and thematic analyses to inform the discussions. The one-way ANOVA was run to compare the groups to establish whether there were differences among appointment types studied or not (Appendix 1). To do this, there was a disaggregation of appointment routes into factors which influenced respondents' current appointment into the civil service and that which influenced respondents' colleagues' current appointments into the civil service. The results showed that there exists a statistically significant difference at five per cent ($p < 0.05$) level between the three appointment routes: $F(3, 271) = 67.388$, $p < .05$. Post-hoc comparisons employing the tuckey-HSD test revealed that the mean score for hybrid-based appointment route

(M = 2.651316, SD = 0.69301) was significantly different from merit-based appointment route (M = 1.34, SD = 0.71742) and patronage-based appointment route (M = 2.18, SD = 0.69076).

To examine whether variations in appointments existed in terms of respondents' colleague civil servants' current appointments into the civil service, another ANOVA was performed. The results here, as well, were statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha level: $F(3, 271) = 65.516, p < .05$. Post-hoc comparisons using the tuckey-HSD test for the category of colleague civil servants also showed that the mean score for hybrid-based appointments (M = 2.7817, SD = .52072) differed significantly from merit-based appointments (M = 1.6866, SD = .89119) and patronage-based appointments (M = 2.2791, SD = .59062). This implies that the factors which influenced the appointments of civil servants into the civil service are distinct and that civil servants who come into the service through hybrid-based appointment processes are different from merit-based and patronage type of appointees. Regarding the examination of the relationship between hybrid appointees and responsiveness, the summary of statistical analyses regarding the effects of hybrid appointments on bureaucrats' responsive attitudes and behaviour is shown in Table 10 below.

Table 10: A summary of Hybrid-Responsiveness Regression results

Variable(s)	Mean(μ)	Std (X)	(pX,Y) with Hybrid	R-square (R ²)	b	β
Responsiveness	38.7737	7.90603	.397*			
Omnibus Hybrid	44.6241	11.04209	.397*	.157	0.284	0.397
Multiple Regression results of Hybrid-based factors						
Responsiveness	38.7737	7.90603				
General Patronage factors	25.0328	9.65384	.299*		0.253	0.309
General Merit factors	19.5912	5.76023	.260*		0.374	0.272
Standard Linear Regression						
Autonomy	39.0766	9.99073	.279*	.078		
Loyalty	41.1788	8.56824	.388*	.151		

* Significant correlation at $p < .05$

Table 10 contains results obtained from the different levels of standard linear regression analyses conducted such as bivariate simple linear, multiple and hierarchical regressions based on the study's survey data gathered. Through simple linear regressions, the table shows results

of values for the correlation between the omnibus hybrid as an independent variable and the hypothesised dependent variable of responsiveness ($\rho_{x,y} = .397$) as well as other non-hypothesised dependent variables of loyalty ($= .388$) and autonomy ($= .297$). The table also contains standard multiple-regression results for values of factors which explain hybrid: general merit factors and general patronage factors. Interestingly, these indicators are found to be positively and significantly correlated with responsiveness, demonstrating that civil servants who are appointed through hybrid-based predictors tend to influence the level of responsiveness exercised by civil servants in the execution of their duties.

The standard multiple regression was also adopted to evaluate the association between the factors that explain hybrid-based appointment, i.e. the merger or combination merit and patronage factors and the dependent variable of responsiveness. Both general patronage (all patronage items) and general merit (all merit items) had significant positive regression weights with responsiveness. It, however, shows a higher contributory weight of patronage factors (.299 almost 3) compared with the merit factors (.260), suggesting that the contribution of patronage considerations of hybrid appointees to political responsiveness is higher than the contribution of merit factors to their responsiveness. The multiple regression model of the two predictors – merit and patronage – produced $r^2 = .163$, $F(2, 272) = 26.433$, $p < .005$.

Furthermore, the table also contains hierarchical regression results after controlling for the influence of variables such as age, sex, level of appointment, type of appointment, policy area, educational qualification, type of institution and ethnicity (region of origin). Other statistical results captured in the table include the Means (μ) of various variable relationships, standard deviations, alpha and beta values as well as r^2 (coefficient of determination) of the various regression models conducted. These statistical results have also been integrated with results of the in-depth interviews in a complementary fashion to engage in the ensuing discussion regarding the influence of hybrid appointees on bureaucrats' responsiveness.

Using both standard linear regression and multiple linear regression analyses, an

evaluation of how hybrid appointments predict responsiveness was conducted. Standard linear regression was employed to evaluate the omnibus relationship between the hybrid- criteria of appointment and responsiveness in the civil service. The results from Table 10 demonstrate that the hybrid appointment model is positively and significantly correlated with the responsiveness criterion, meaning that bureaucrats who are employed based on the hybrid type of appointment in the civil service are responsive to the directives of their principals in the execution of their duties. The linear regression model with omnibus hybrid predictor produced $r^2 = .157$, $F(1, 273) = 50.790$, $p < .005$.

What this finding essentially implies is that as the level of hybridity increases, so does the level of responsiveness. The finding also indicates that hybrid bureaucrats demonstrate appreciable levels of political responsiveness in the execution of their duties, except that their responsiveness is not unquestionable. The statistical evidence indicate that hybrid bureaucrats may be able to influence, alter or reject some instructions of their principals. This is expected given that hybrid appointees in paying sufficient attention to legal, professional and technical requirements may occasionally be constrained in being responsive when confronted with unconventional instructions or interests from principals. As principals also trust that hybrid appointees are loyal to them owing to the role they [principals] played in their appointment, they sometimes put forward pure political or parochial interests for execution which are sometimes declined by these hybrid appointees. This is especially the case when these hybrid bureaucrats are circumspect about their legal remits, their reputation as well as professional integrity in the bureaucracy. Thus, it is understandable when hybrid appointees as professional bureaucrats with political lenses are not found to be absolutely responsive to their principals.

The above finding is also reinforced by a separate regression analysis regarding the relationship between hybrid appointees and dependent variables other than the hypothesised dependent variable of responsiveness. As indicated in previous chapters, the objective of this test is to be able to ascertain whether it is theoretically fitting to advance the argument that

responsiveness is predominantly associated with only hybrid appointees. The results indicate that the hybrid-based predictor has a positive correlation with autonomous and loyal attitudes and behaviour as shown in Table 10. This finding inversely clarifies why hybrid bureaucrats' responsiveness is not absolute. The standard linear regression model with the hybrid-based predictor on autonomy produced an $R^2 = .078$, $F(1, 273) = 22.962$, $p < .005$.

As expected, hybrid appointees' impact on autonomy is weaker ($=.279$) than their normally hypothesised relationship with responsiveness ($=.397$). In reality, therefore, hybrid bureaucrats exercise a certain level of autonomy in the exercise of their duties for which reason their responsiveness is not found to be absolute; yet, their share of responsiveness is found to be notable based on Cohen's classification. Interestingly, however, the weight of autonomy demonstrated by hybrid bureaucrats ($=.279$) is more impactful than the autonomy demonstrated by merit appointees ($=.218$) as discussed in chapter 5. The implication of this finding is that despite hybrid appointees' predisposition and sensitivity to the political interests of their principals, they do not indiscriminately comply with political and most probably unconventional interests.

Indeed, insights from key informants (based on the in-depth interviews - see appendix 7) reveal that hybrid appointees demonstrate the level of autonomy they do because it will take an unwise hybrid bureaucrat to blindly pursue the interests of their principals especially if it can be detrimental. This is because hybrid bureaucrats "may have difficulties in naming the patron who instructed them to engage in unconventional ventures due to the risks of victimisation" (Interviewee 23, 11th October 2018; UG). Therefore, since hybrid bureaucrats are rational beings, they occasionally evaluate the situation and choose to advance expedient interests. This is obviously why they demonstrate some level of autonomy to the detriment of the principal's interest.

The fact that the impact of hybrid appointees' autonomy outweighs that of merit

appointees also suggests that principals grant hybrid appointees more autonomy and are more willing to heed to their counsel due to trust and loyalty than they would do with merit appointees. This should not be astonishing because when principals assume office in the bureaucracy, they are susceptible to view merit bureaucrats or bureaucrats not appointed by them with suspicion. This is especially the case with top bureaucrats who might have enjoyed a close working relationship with the principals' predecessors. To this end, it would seem perfectly reasonable why principals will grant hybrid bureaucrats more autonomy than merit appointees (who they suspect). Indeed, further empirical results from this study explain the goodwill enjoyed by hybrid appointees as they are trusted to be more loyal than merit bureaucrats. The standard regression analysis conducted regarding the relationship between hybrid appointees and dependent variables other than the hypothesised dependent variable of responsiveness found that the hybrid appointees had a positive correlation and significance with loyalty as shown in Table 10. The standard linear regression model with the hybrid-based predictor produced an $R^2 = .151$, $F(1, 273) = 48.259$, $p < .005$. Indeed, the impact of loyalty demonstrated by hybrid appointees was weightier ($=.388$) than merit appointees ($=.134$). In practical terms, this means that hybrid appointees' loyalty to their principals is very noteworthy.

Due to the loyalty elements in hybrid bureaucrats' appointment through patronage, it is understandable that they will be demonstrably enthusiastic in offering considerable devotion to principals. This is especially the case under legitimate situations where these appointees can leverage or manoeuvre to prosecute justifiable or legitimate demands. Yet, these hybrid appointees are also compelled, when necessary, to defer to legal and conventional bureaucratic practices to avoid scandals. These circumstances of loyalty offer justifications and plausible explanations regarding why hybrid bureaucrats can enjoy autonomy than merit bureaucrats. While merit bureaucrats are usually put under surveillance or marginalisation due to insufficient trust or political loyalty in the eyes of principals, hybrid bureaucrats are allowed sufficient space to operate.

The regression results or findings of notable autonomy enjoyed by hybrid appointees can, therefore, be attributed to the significant amount of loyalty and trust they enjoy with their principals. This is because, under the circumstances of loyalty, principals are predisposed to grant hybrid appointees autonomy and discretion. As argued by Lupia & McCubbins (2000), principals are likely to vouch for the attitudes and behaviour of bureaucrats in terms of delegation or policy execution believing that they would take the same course of action given the same information. This was succinctly couched by McDonnell (2017: 498) when he argued that “significant discretion [autonomy] is only tolerated where loyalty is assured”. The partnership between principals and hybrid appointees does, therefore, positively engender political responsiveness, efficiency and performance when principals have a satisfactory view of loyalty and trust of hybrid bureaucrats. This allows them to exercise professional discretion with assignments that sometimes include unconventional ones (McDonnell, 2017: 498).

Scholars of the new “developmental neo-patrimonialism” paradigm have underscored the positive effects of a combination of merit (competence) with political alignments (hybrid appointees) by maintaining that subtle political considerations in appointing qualified professional bureaucrats are desirable. According to this school of thought, this is because when it comes to the functions of bureaucrats, two key variables matter, and one without the other can result in catastrophe. As advanced by an interviewee, “competence is very important and loyalty is more crucial, so, we need a combination of competence and loyalty” (Interviewee 26, 9th October 2018; UG). Based on these arguments, Ghanaian principals, at a minimum, deploy hybrid appointees believing that the probability of securing political responsiveness is boosted while mitigating the risk of adverse selection on their part when they opt to hire pure patronage appointees predominantly based on loyal considerations alone.

A key informant from MLNR argued that for principals to achieve responsive competence, principals must work with bureaucrats “loyal to them because if your subordinates are not loyal to you, lots of things would be going on without your knowledge...you need people to tell you what’s

happening, so even though we talk about cronyism and patronage [negatively], it is not that it is always bad” (Interviewee 29, 15th October 2018; MLNR). The argument here is that it is not necessarily the case that principals prefer to work with their own people *per se* but because they require available and reliable personnel to work with. But these principals can only safely trust the information shared by loyalists, and loyalists, are secured within the bureaucracy when patronage is in the equation.

7.3 The Predominance of Hybrid Appointees in Ghana.

Proponents of hybridity such as Mosher (1982: 185) maintain that hybrid appointees are suitable in avoiding the problems associated with exclusive merit or patronage bureaucrats. To verify this, this Chapter empirically examines the predominance of hybrid appointments and their rationale within the Ghanaian context. The evidence adduced in chapter 4 (shown in the frequency distribution) reveal that hybrid appointees are more predominant in Ghana’s bureaucracy than exclusively merit or patronage-based appointees. Same could be true of other SSA countries given the politico-administrative dynamics prevalent in these neo-patrimonial settings. As noted by one expert informant regarding which type of appointment is predominant in Ghana, s/he argued that “...it is plainly a hybrid system. There is no single public sector agency that recruits purely based on patronage and you will not also find any public service institution that recruits entirely based on meritocracy, it is a blend” (Interviewee 26, 9th October 2018; UG). In the view of another interviewee from sociological expertise, the informant argued that given the inherent patrimonial and Weberian characteristics of the Ghanaian bureaucracy, Ghana’s bureaucratic system is a hybrid system and that:

whether I recommend or not, Ghana will practice it for a long time to come [because] the country cannot follow a purely meritorious based system of employing people...the fact is as it has been in the past, the Ghanaian is employed based largely upon hybrid method – you are qualified but some additional motivation supports your application to get you an

employment (Interviewee 23, 11th October 2018; UG).

A common explanation offered by informants for the circumstances under which hybrid bureaucrats are predominant is that in neo-patrimonial settings like Ghana, while consideration for an appointment is underway, political, social and sometimes economic networks appeal to their acquaintances who are in a position to influence those appointment decisions. This results in a high probability that the familiarity will enhance the chances of some over other competitors even in situations where technocratic competence matters a great deal. However, they maintain that when bureaucrats' appointment is influenced by familiarity, it does not imply that it is "a substitute of competence". But rather, it may indicate that it plays a complementary role. This is because, at the end of the day, "individuals must possess the requisite qualifications before they are allowed to enter the system" through subjective considerations (Interviewee 24, 7th October 2018; UG).

According to a key informant:

one would say that in Ghana loyalty alone cannot earn you an appointment whether in civil service or public service – at the end of the day, the question has to do with is the person qualified for the job and politicians are fully aware of that – no matter how a person is loyal to the government, if the person does not possess the requisite qualification, he certainly does not have a place in public or civil service. So from loyalty to the political regime to qualification and everything, one can say that even though there is patronage, no doubt about that – at the end of the day qualification matters because the politician who is to push you into the public or civil service would have to prove that you are indeed qualified to play the role the regime intends to assign to you, so it is certainly a hybrid system' (Interviewee 24, 7th October 2018; Jubilee House).

This argument suggests that whilst personal networks can open the door for [prospective] bureaucrats, it is their qualification which eventually clinches the deal. In fact, there are several

instances where attempts to get cronies appointed have failed upon further scrutiny of their academic qualifications. The key informant continued that, “politicians are [therefore] mindful and would not insist that unqualified people are hired into the system simply because they are aligned to the ruling party” (Interviewee 24, 7th October 2018; Jubilee House).

Furthermore, with the advent of NPM which sought to curtail direct patronage practices in SSA, Ghanaian principals resorted to hybrid tactics because they still require political responsiveness from an increasingly fragmented bureaucracy. As earlier cited, the problem faced by political principals when dealing with autonomous bureaucrats is one of political responsiveness. Since merit appointees are presumed to function with a mindset of neutral competence, principals strive to apply not only qualification but also personal or political compatibility criteria as the test to securing political responsiveness in a constantly turbulent arena. There is ample evidence to argue that Ghanaian principals sometimes successfully impress on hybrid bureaucrats by “redirecting them or reshaping their decisions to meet the current needs of the time” (Interviewee 27, 9th October 2018; UG). By such actions, hybrid bureaucrats and principals mutually benefit when both of them can efficiently work together under “I scratch your back, you scratch mine” arrangements.

Under Ghana’s Weberian modelled bureaucracy, even though bureaucrats are ideally set up to professionally function autonomously, they are still required to defer to the political principal in terms of accountability. While autonomy may thwart such expectations, hybrid bureaucrats offer a middle ground as they apply their skills and expertise to function in a way that accommodates political interests. In their bid to be responsive to their principals’ directives, hybrid bureaucrats, as partners, find common grounds “to justify” the legitimate directives and interests of their principals in the bureaucratic space (Interviewee 8, 27th September 2018; MOH). This is why Putnam (1973; 1975) argued that political bureaucrats (hybrid) operate with pluralistic interest and are conscious of “political realities” and treat political influences by principals as legitimate.

Insights from key informant interviews (appendix 7) further disclose that Ghanaian hybrid bureaucrats can demonstrate responsiveness to their principals by maintaining “a fine blend between doing things at whims of their supervisors’ interests but in line with the existing policies” (Interviewee 6, 27th September 2018; MOH). Some of this study’s key informants and experts with political orientation have argued that whilst pure patronage bureaucrats may be undesirable, pure merit appointees can also be catastrophic. They maintain that for efficient bureaucratic performance, therefore, although civil servants’ technical competence is necessary, it can be insufficient to drive organisational performance; hence, must be accompanied with a certain commitment usually elicited along patronage-network lines.

As noted by an expert, some bureaucrats give off their best not because of their commitment to the public or bureaucratic interests *per se*, but due to their personal relationship or commitment and their desire to see their principals succeed. He maintained that some bureaucrats behave in conformity to the resolve that “you are my boss and I do not want you to fail”. Given that this level of personal loyalty has significant implications for bureaucratic attitudes and behaviour, any attempt to rule out patronage factors in favour of pure meritocratic appointees has the potential of running political responsiveness into glitches and complications. Recounting the arguments of Knoke & Wright-Isak (1982), they maintained that bureaucrats’ attitudes and behaviour can be influenced by affective bonding to serve their principals. Kim & Vandenabeele (2010) also argued that bureaucrats may identify with their principals and their sense of oneness with those they identify with brings a willingness to professionally serve their interests.

Likewise, some informants argue that once a political party is elected with its manifesto “it has a direction it wants to tow and there are certain positions, especially the top management... it is good that they bring somebody who believes in the ideas – who appreciate the issues and want to toe the line of the government of the day” to ensure political responsiveness (Interviewee 17, 30th September 2018; OHCS). Governments come with visions but these visions only become reality if competent and politically attuned [hybrid] bureaucrats implement it. Occasionally,

existing bureaucrats may be unable to implement some of these visions because “they call for new education, new orientation and new exposure” (Interviewee 18, 3rd October 2018; OHCS). Some of the competent personnel capable of executing such visions may be located in the private sector, in academia or research institutions (outside the civil service). Therefore, it is only fitting that the reality of hybrid appointments is acknowledged unless principals are placing “square pecks in round holes, that is where the problem is”. However, if for instance:

The president appoints a minister of finance, who was a manager/owner of a Databank or financial institution, he/she [may] merit that, and is going to give good results. But, if you go and bring a journalist to be a minister of finance or an adviser to economic planning, that one is purely putting round pecks into square holes. So, we must make a distinction, when a politician brings an expert into a field, that one we should not [frown upon], though the mode of appointment is wrong but the person is qualified, so he/she is likely to deliver. But, if the mode of appointment is wrong and the personnel coming in is also out of place, then that is when we have a disaster” (Interviewee 3, 27th September 2018; MLNR).

From a practical viewpoint, the above argument suggests that in neo-patrimonial regimes, experts and observers have come to acknowledge that hybrid considerations in appointments are a reality. Ferrez (2009) and Sigman (2015) argued that even in advanced democratic countries like the US, purely merit-based appointees can be considered as endangered species in the bureaucracy. This is because in the world of politics and bureaucratic efficiency, principals are unable to withdraw to the sidelines whilst some mechanical processes are deployed to select bureaucrats who these principals are required to work with to meet political goals or interests. Instead, principals participate or influence appointment decisions by subtly fusing patronage- based factors with merit ones within the bureaucracy in the anticipation that such tactics will engender bureaucrats’ political responsiveness.

Indeed, some key informants further argued that depending on the type of bureaucracy or

level of appointment, merit factors such as qualification and experience tend to carry more weight because “you either pay attention to meritocracy or kill the institution. But, for lower-level staff, you can do a blend” (Interviewee 26, 9th October 2018; UG). This argument was validated by a hierarchical multiple regression conducted (r^2 change = .135, $F(2, 272) = 14.235$, $p < .005$) which revealed that merit-based appointment route (beta = .289) and patronage-based appointment route (beta = .265) made statistically significant contribution to the appointment of hybrid bureaucrats. As can be seen, the weight of merit factors (.289) was more than patronage factors (.265) in appointing hybrid bureaucrats. This, therefore, indicates that merit considerations for appointing hybrid bureaucrats outweighed patronage considerations; yet, both impact the level of responsiveness exhibited by hybrid appointees in the performance of their duties.

Regarding the type of bureaucracy, the findings indicate that the extent of hybridity and level of responsiveness by bureaucrats, among other factors, can depend on the type of bureaucratic institution. Considering Ghana’s ministry of finance (MOF), for example, this is a specialised bureaucracy where a specific type of expertise is extremely crucial to ensure the functionality of the entire Ghanaian state; therefore, patronage and political connections should not supersede competence and qualification. According to a key informant who also conducted a study at the ministry:

there is strong evidence that educational qualifications matter a big deal, but, what is even more important is practical experience. People are recruited based on ‘who you know’ but, these factors only play a complementary role – they don’t substitute the role that competence or educational qualifications will actually play. And you can easily understand the reason why because, if there is no effective budget and the finance minister does not function, it means that there is no Ghanaian state. So, depending on the importance of a particular civil service institution, you will find these factors playing out differently (Interviewee 26, 9th October 2018; UG).

This indicates that while patronage considerations are usually factored, merit factors are seldom completely compromised or short-changed at the MOF. To practically illustrate this, an example is cited of the current finance minister who deployed hybrid strategies to assemble trusted loyalists. In assembling the team to help him deliver his mandate, the minister, among other strategies, appointed his known associates from his private bank (Data Bank) in addition to party allies from within the ranks of the ministry to occupy strategic positions. For example, in May 2017, the minister as the chief principal of the ministry elevated the chief economic officer to director of budgets and the chief budget analyst to director of public investment division. He also reassigned his loyal personal technical advisor to the director of the financial sector division of the MOF. Furthermore, he posted out all perceived politically tainted bureaucrats capable of sabotage to less desirous portfolios such as reassigning the then Controller & Accountant General appointed by his predecessor (political opponent) to the finance ministry without any portfolio.

In addition to the above, in January 2019, the finance minister promoted his politically known allies to strategic and influential positions. He reorganised top bureaucrats in the ministry by creating two new coordinating directorship positions to deputise the Chief Director and appointed or filled them by promoting qualified bureaucrats known to be sympathetic to him and his party (NDC Press Conference, 2019). It was reported that the minister further “supplanted a number of highly-qualified and seasoned technocrats, and in their stead, placed middle-level cronies from databank to occupy top roles responsible for implementing government’s economic and financial policies” (NDC Press Conference, 2019). Among other examples, the minister is reported to have appointed key erstwhile databank employees into the MOF. They include Ernest Akore, a former non-executive director at Databank, who is now a board member of the GRA under the ministry; Felicia Gyamfi Ashley, a former HR manager at databank who is now a member of the entity tender committee of the MOF, Ntiwaa Daaku Kwakye, also a former staff of databank who has also been fixed at the MOF and Mr Sampson Akligoh, the current director of the financial sector division of the MOF. Mr Akligoh was

actually the vice-president at databank and held the post of head of research and fixed income strategy at the same bank before being drafted into the ministry by the current finance minister.

By employing this strategy, the finance minister announced his confidence, trust and loyalty as well as their technocratic competence since their political thoughts are aligned to his priorities. He concluded that the MOF was “poised to be more professional, efficient, ethical and responsive to all stakeholders and to transform Ghana beyond aid” (Ken Ofori-Atta, Minister of Finance, 2019). So, while in other bureaucracies, pure patronage appointments are more prevalent, hardly do technical or professionalised bureaucracies like the MOF compromise on competence in appointing at, say, the directorship levels. These are levels where incompetence cannot be hidden. As articulated by an expert informant about these specialised bureaucracies, “what you will expect essentially is that the extent to which ethnicity and political connections will play a role in determining who gets appointed there, would much more likely be less than what you will see in a ministry like education” (Interviewee 26, 9th October 2018; UG). This argument seems to be supported by the example from the MOF that both educational qualifications and experience matter but so do trust and loyalty.

Interestingly, after this hybrid induced appointments by principals of the finance ministry, since 2017, Ghana’s economy has been currently touted as one of the best performing economies in the world by the IMF and World Bank. The IMF projected a “growth rate of 8.8% in its world economic outlook, which would make Ghana the fastest growing economy in the world in 2019. Last year [2018], the country’s economy grew by 5.6%, putting it in the sixth position”. This stellar performance of the Ghanaian economy is attributable to a responsive and efficient MOF team organised along a hybrid model.

This practice of elevating politically sensitive but qualified bureaucrats to strategic positions within bureaucracies as well as fusing in loyal professionals are hybrid tactics deployed to achieve responsiveness. Ayee (2013), in examining the politicisation of Ghana’s bureaucracy

under democratic governance, underscored the deployment of hybrid tactics by principals through bureaucrats' open signals of their political or ideological leanings which usually earns them career speed if their party win power or suffer career deathblows when their party is vanquished after an election. As clearly stated by the chairperson of PSC "some civil and local government staff are joining parties and engaging in active political activities, attending political rallies, standing for elections in the primaries while still holding office," she said, adding "the irony is that even when such staff lose the primaries, they have the audacity to remain at post."

While the above example from MOF demonstrates that hybrid appointees' responsiveness is related to the type of bureaucracy, other key experts argue that hybrid appointees' responsiveness is also contingent on their hierarchical level in the bureaucracy where "at the management level, certain interests are served". At the operational facet of middle to lower levels, bureaucrats are mostly expected to comply with instructions from above (Interviewee 6, 27th September 2018; MOH). This argument is acceptable since it is evident that usually, middle to lower-level bureaucrats typically possess inadequate mandate to gain them any influence over interests except those handed down the ladder by principals through the hierarchical chain of command. Thus, while top hybrid bureaucrats can have the mandate and political sensitivity to pursue their principals' legitimate interests, the same may not be said about the middle to lower hybrid bureaucrats. This is because since policy implementation within the civil service is largely instructive, top hybrid appointees who subscribe to the interests of their patrons mostly cascade or trickle down specific instructions from the top - down the organisational ladder. Most often, those lower bureaucrats oblige to those instructions of their immediate principals.

It is, therefore, understandable that some informants argue that the hierarchical levels of political principals and top hybrid bureaucrats affords them the space to influence and ensure that their will is executed. Besides, middle to lower bureaucrats are accountable to political and bureaucratic principals who are situated in a position to evaluate, review, modify or redirect their

work. While Johnson & Libecap (1994) define bureaucratic hierarchical distinctions, these distinctions do not suggest autonomy but rather, an institutional arrangement that ensures a cycle of delegation from the top to the bottom of the bureaucracy to fuel responsiveness. Breton & Wintrobe (1982), therefore, argue that hybrid/political bureaucrats, as partners, have access to principals where they conclave and fashion out arrangements of interest delegation that is executed to perfection.

These distinctions, thus, hardly allow middle and lower-level bureaucrats to exercise autonomy outside the interests of their principals (political & bureaucratic) in the course of their duties, except for responsiveness. Since the civil service is a hierarchical structure, bureaucrats, in executing their duties, may not contact the political principal's office by themselves but go through their immediate principals who are tasked with mapping political wills into outcomes (Corina & Escartin, 2014). The subsequent discussion briefly evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the hybrid-responsiveness arrangements.

7.3.1 The Strengths

In examining the positive effects of political responsiveness hybrid bureaucrats provide to principals in the bureaucracy, this study alludes to evidence cited under the MLNR. This is related to one of the politically charged issues affecting Ghana as a country with dire political ramifications, i.e. illegal small-scale mining also known as “galamsey”. This menace was one of the sticky points in the country's electioneering campaign in 2016. Due to widespread youth unemployment, erstwhile Ghanaian principals had battled with and had been unable to curb the practice of indiscriminate illegal mining which polluted the country's water bodies, destroyed ecosystems and killed thousands of youth as a result of its hazardous operations. The sector evolved into a highly intertwined or intricate web of covert and overt operations with varying degrees of legal violations (Teschner, 2012). It was also bedevilled with “political leniency and law enforcement corruption” which led to a booming illegal small-scale mining system under

abysmal government control (Teschner, 2012: 308).

However, the current political principals based on the advice and efforts of hybrid bureaucrats such as the chief director and other directors under the MLNR pursued a devised blueprint to end the menace by regularising the practice into a responsible, environmentally-friendly and sustainable one. In no time, significant progress or successes had been recorded by political principals who appointed politically sensitive technocrats into an “inter-ministerial task-force against illegal mining”. After putting a moratorium on the menace using heavy military as a first measure, it crafted detailed legislation and operational remedies to regularise the practice to accommodate the livelihood needs of those engaged in the “*galamsey*”. It also aimed at preserving the integrity of the country’s environment and water bodies.

These bureaucrats, as the professional and technical implementers of the task, facilitated the establishment of community mining schemes which registered over a hundred cooperatives in *galamsey*-prone districts made up of over 4000 trained artisanal mining graduands (MLNR, 2019). A monitoring system was also put in place which included district mining committees at the various mining districts whilst about 500 mining guards were trained to man the aforementioned offices. They were provided with logistics like vehicles, motorbikes, drones and mobile communication gadgets. To this end, the current political principals have been highly commended for their responsive intervention to both the general interests of the citizenry and the parochial interests of hitherto illegal small-scale miners who were poised to punish political principals in the next general election for taking away their means of livelihoods.

This example lends credence to the assertion that elected principals are often held accountable for public services delivered even when they are not the direct implementers. Perhaps the political accountability to the electorate incentivised principals to employ hybrid bureaucrats to provide political responsiveness because these principals sensed that the repercussions will be adverse unless a positive and dramatic intervention took place. As Friedrich (1940) once argued, “an official should be as responsible for inaction as for the wrong action; certainly, the average

voter will criticise the government as severely for one as for the other since political executives are directly or indirectly responsible to the electorate”.

A review of Michael Roll’s (2014) pockets of effectiveness in developing countries reveals that Roll’s argument basically confirms Grindle’s (2012) assertion about the progressive nature of hybrid appointees. This is because Roll (2014) offers significant indications of how bureaucracies function effectively in providing public goods and services in the predominantly dysfunctional or weak environments where principals leverage on political and professional considerations. The main thesis gleaned from his argument is that an efficient and convenient marriage of patronage (political considerations) and meritocracy (competence and organisational leadership) shape positive attitudes and behaviour which inform effective performance. This argument provides an answer to the question of why “these pockets of effectiveness” exist in predominantly inefficient environments by pointing to professional appointees with political lenses conveniently termed as the hybrid. Therefore, from neo-patrimonial settings where bureaucracies are found to be effective and efficient, these results are attributable to a shift from pure patronage practices to hybrid ones under NPM reforms. That is a situation where politically recruited professionals implement political interests as partners rather than followers.

Evidence from this research also shows that hybrid bureaucrats in the bureaucracy are also able to interpret bureaucratic legal regulations in a manner that satisfies their superiors’ point of view (Interviewee 21, 3rd October 2018; IDEG). A key informant indicated that while most principals and top bureaucrats take political decisions, hybrid bureaucrats interpret the rules in a way to “promote the justifiable interest of their principals” which affords them to be responsive to these principals (Interviewee 17, 30th September 2018; OHCS). This is because, conventionally, hybrid bureaucrats prefer to partner in executing their superiors’ interest as long as it reflects the goal of the organisation and sometimes even if it does not. Hence, this situation justifies the assertion that how bureaucrats are appointed “would have implications on how [they] behave” (Interviewee 26, 9th October 2018; UG).

7.3.2 The Costs

Even though the preceding discussion seems to advocate the appropriateness of hybrid appointees and their political responsiveness, they are not without risks and can actually be negative. Mathieson *et al.* (2007: 10) argued that even though “the objectives of political involvement in senior appointments are usually responsive policy and implementation rather than patronage in the form of jobs to party faithful or family members”, whether political appointments can realistically be restricted to the fine purpose of maintaining democratic control is questionable. Indeed, there are shreds of evidence in the Ghanaian case to indicate that hybrid bureaucrats have been occasionally abused and manipulated to execute the questionable interests of principals within the bureaucracy. As discussed in the previous empirical chapters, these manipulations happen because of the almost unlimited schemes principals wield over bureaucrats’ careers.

Indeed, under neo-patrimonial regimes, once principals have the powers to influence the careers and means of livelihoods of bureaucrats, these principals can always scheme to have their illicit interests prosecuted. Accordingly, it is common to witness hybrid bureaucrats within the Ghanaian bureaucratic space defend certain actions or interests “in a way that you can easily see that it is just a way of pleasing a particular political master... otherwise, there are certain things that appear quite obvious and that their explanations seem not to be making a lot of sense or logic” (Interviewee 26, 9th October 2018; UG). It is not surprising that hybrid bureaucrats sometimes also execute their principals’ illicit interests in the bureaucracy. The only difference as far as the type of a bureaucrats’ appointment is concerned is the severity of the manipulations as established in the regression analyses conducted.

For example, a hybrid appointee indicated that despite their competent advice, principals sometimes “compel” them to facilitate unconventional transactions because if they decline, they are likely to be sidelined or victimised. Accordingly, hybrid bureaucrats also:

dance to the tune of the politicians, knowing very well that what the politicians are bringing

is not the best but for fear of being victimised, [they] have to kowtow to what the politician is forwarding...so from my experience, some superiors give orders that are way out in terms of the standards set but because that person has control over you, it seems you have to justify it by all means (Interviewee 8, 27th September 2018; MOH).

This situation is part of the pessimism of sceptics who frown upon any form of subjective considerations (patronage) even alongside merit factors; an example is Kristinsson (2012). The argument was made that once the political shield for bureaucratic autonomy is pierced, appointments to the bureaucracy are likely to open not only to legitimate interests for governmental effectiveness and efficiency but to other compromised or parochial interests as well. Thus, the bureaucracy can be basically insulated not by regulations or technical arrangements, but by a political will in favour of bureaucratic autonomy.

Insights from the in-depth interviews of this study also illustrate another downside of hybrid bureaucrats; that is, the occasionally biased or tilted advice or information they give to their principals to influence decisions or direction to service their self-centred interests. A case in point is reported in the Ghanaian media regarding the advice of top bureaucrats working at GNPC to their principals to the effect that certain cash donations could be made by principals under the bureaucracy's social responsibility commitment, only to saddle those principals in a public crucifixion for dolling out public funds to political clients in the name of honouring social responsibility.

Furthermore, in some other instances, hybrid appointees initiate their own proposals which are informed by their deep-seated professional biases and information where the political principals may lack the know-how or information, time and skills to make an informed decision. In the end, principals rely on these trusted hybrid bureaucrats who have control over information and push home their personal preferences. As Miller & Moe (1983) argued, principals make decisions following the rule of thumb that trusted and loyal bureaucrats guide. Hybrid bureaucrats

have, therefore, used the trust they enjoy and their characterisation as professionals to successfully compete for influence in decision making (Kaufman, 2001).

Additionally, in their zealous bid to be politically responsive to their principals, hybrid appointees can be counter-productive or inimical to the interests of the bureaucracy or the public. A clear example of hybrid bureaucrats' implementation of their principals' preferences even in the face of glaring disagreement with many stakeholders is the current implementation of the country's FSHS policy. Sufficient evidence gathered from these stake-holders reveal that hybrid bureaucrats support principals' in:

...implementing it because that is what the political regime wants. And it is not as if free SHS is not good...but, the universalistic approach being adopted and the extent to which it is draining national coffers as well as creating other problems that are difficult to handle are some of the reasons why they are against it (Interviewee 21, 3rd October 2018; IDEG).

According to a key informant who was part of a team that worked on the current long-term educational sector plan for Ghana (2018 – 2030), their discussions with various stakeholders show that they have a lot of issues with the FSHS policy. But because trusted hybrid and patronage appointees advise the principals by telling them it is sustainable and drive its implementation, a culture of silence has taken over. Thus, the hybrid bureaucrats have sometimes utilised the goodwill they benefit from the principals to support push an unpopular agenda down the throat of the public.

7.4 Chapter Summary

The summary drawn from the above results and discussions on the influence of the hybrid criteria on bureaucratic responsiveness is that hybrid appointments do not only significantly shape bureaucratic responsiveness and efficiency, they also enhance accountability and governance of bureaucrats in the day to day running of the bureaucracy. The

discussion also shows that hybrid bureaucrats are the most predominant type of bureaucrats in Ghana. Furthermore, the discussions in this chapter show that hybrid bureaucrats demonstrate competent sensitivities to their principals' interests, with an understanding that under democratic governance, compliance to their superiors' directives and interests is ultimately being responsive to the will of the public. Additionally, whereas both merit and patronage considerations are determined to be appropriate complementary factors of hybrid appointees, the share of influence of patronage factors to hybrid appointees' responsiveness outweigh the contribution of merit factors to their responsiveness. However, the share of merit factors to appointing a hybrid bureaucrat marginally outweigh that of patronage.

It was also found in this Chapter that hybrid bureaucrats are not just restricted to responsive attitudes and behaviour, but that they also possess some level of autonomy (where necessary) and notable loyalty. It was further found that despite the arguments in support of hybrid tactics by principals in running bureaucracies, it is not without risks as zealous principals still possess the authority to compel hybrid bureaucrats to engage in inappropriate deals. Thus, in the end, as hybrid appointees are politically responsive, such responsiveness may lead to undesired repercussions for bureaucracies and the public's interest at large. Detailed conclusions about these findings are contained in the next Chapter.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSIONS

8.1 Introduction and Summary of Findings

The overarching research objective of this study has been to determine the extent to which types of civil service appointments shape bureaucrats' attitudes and behaviour in neo-patrimonial settings with a focus on the Ghanaian experience. In doing this, the study has empirically examined the relationship between types of appointments as independent variable, i.e. merit, patronage and hybrid and attitudes and behaviour as dependent variables, i.e. autonomy, loyalty and responsiveness. As justified in Chapter one, this was necessitated after a review of extant studies on Ghana and other SSA countries revealed that whereas there was anecdotal evidence of consequences, none of the studies specifically investigated the detailed consequences associated with the various types of bureaucratic appointments, especially relative to bureaucrats' attitudes and behaviour. Relying on both quantitative and qualitative research designs, this study closed this gap by adducing scientific empirical findings regarding the consequences (attitudes & behaviour) of typologies of bureaucratic appointments. These findings from the empirical enquiry which makes profound contributions to existing literature are, therefore, summarised in the ensuing paragraphs.

Generally, the study established that the types of bureaucratic appointments indeed engendered varied consequent attitudes and behaviour. In particular, the study found that the more a particular type of appointment is deployed, the more likely its hypothesised attitude and behaviour are to increase. Delving into specifics, the first empirical finding was discussed in chapter 5 which examined the hypothesis that the more merit processes are deployed, the more likely bureaucrats are to be autonomous. The results indeed established a significant and positive relationship between merit processes and bureaucrats' autonomy. It, however, showed that even

though merit-based appointments shaped or influenced the amount of autonomy exercised by bureaucrats in the execution of their duties, their impact was weak; hence, the amount of autonomy exercised by merit appointees seemed to be considerably limited. The findings also impugned the popular thesis by some researchers that merit appointments produce autonomous bureaucrats who are necessary for the state to develop and control corruption. This is because the Ghanaian case demonstrate that hardly are merit-based appointees autonomous enough to curtail their principals corrupt influences due to a myriad of factors. These factors include the systemic setup as well as career concerns under neo-patrimonial settings. That is to say that the effect of merit appointments in emerging democracies and authoritarian regimes are not necessarily dissimilar. This is because whereas principals may have extensive discretionary controls over bureaucrats' careers under authoritarian regimes, so do they possess overt and subtle influences over merit appointees' careers as well in emerging democracies. Another fascinating conclusion on this hypothesis is that merit bureaucrats, in addition to their restricted autonomy, also demonstrate some level of loyalty and responsiveness. This is understandable because as merit appointees' autonomy was found to be constrained, it inversely illustrated their potential for loyalty and responsiveness.

In chapter 6, the results of the second enquiry also followed the expected direction of the hypothesis that the more patronage processes are deployed to appoint bureaucrats, the more loyal those bureaucrats will be to their patrons. However, while patronage bureaucrats are theoretically expected to be absolutely loyal to their patrons, evidence from this research suggests that the impact was not absolute or extraordinary. This conclusion is drawn from an understanding of the findings that patronage bureaucrats cannot be unconditionally loyal to their principals. This is due to a variety of factors that include legal restrictions, competing interests among principals and personal interests of bureaucrats themselves. It is also generally ascertained based on the hypothesis tested that the arguments of scholars such as Kopecký *et al.* (2012); Corinna & Escartin (2014) and Ennser-Jedenastik (2014; 2015) that patronage influences loyal bureaucrats who are necessary for control/governance capacities as true within an emerging democratic context.

Additionally, whereas both personal connections and political considerations are ascertained to be appropriate factors to measure patronage, the item of ethnicity has been somehow questioned in Ghana. Based on the tested hypothesis, it is further concluded that patronage appointees are not just restricted to loyal attitudes and behaviour, but also display similar levels of responsiveness compared to their loyalty. However, while patronage bureaucrats exhibit some level of autonomy, it is comparatively less notable. Similarly, in chapter 7, the results ascertained the expected direction of the third hypothesis that the more hybrid processes are deployed to appoint bureaucrats, the more likely these bureaucrats are to be politically responsive to their principals. The finding of this chapter indeed established that hybrid appointees do not only significantly shape bureaucratic responsiveness, they also enhance accountability and efficiency. The study also adduced evidence that although hybrid appointees pay sufficient attention to the conventions and rules of the bureaucracy, they are equally conscious and sensitive to their principals' interests. It further found that whereas both merit and patronage considerations are determined to be appropriate complementary factors to deploy hybrid tactics, the influence of patronage factors on bureaucrats' responsiveness outweigh that of merit factors; yet, the share of merit factors to appointing hybrid bureaucrats faintly outweigh patronage factors. It was further established in this Chapter that hybrid appointees are not just restricted to responsive attitudes and behaviour, but also, they exhibit some level of autonomy and notable loyalty.

Based on Cohen's classification of effect sizes, although all the hypothesised relationships were statistically significant in the expected direction, none of the impacts or effect sizes was found to have absolute impact. Specifically, whilst the patronage-loyalty and hybrid-responsiveness were found to have medium or moderate impacts, the merit-autonomy impact was found to be weak. This situation could be methodologically explained in that first of all, the study relied on the Ghanaian bureaucracy as a representative case in SSA and collected data from 4 bureaucracies within the capital city of Ghana. Thus, the number of cases and sample size (274 respondents) could be deemed as low. For practical reasons, the case selection also focused on the capital (Accra) where

most influential principals and bureaucrats are located. It is also the arena where the power relations and structure of the bureaucracy is more concentrated, even though there exist regional and district authorities as noted by Debrah (2014: 62). However, perhaps, a broader scope beyond the capital may have produced larger data which may have facilitated a more comprehensive multilevel statistical analysis with the potential of effusing higher coefficients.

Secondly, another explanation for the low coefficients could be attributed to the standards of measurement (constructs). This is because the variables of interest investigated by this study could have been measured differently using different benchmarks (differs in the literature). While the study's measurements of the variables of interest were adequate or standard, they were by no means exhaustive. Hence, it can be soundly speculated that the underlying theoretical presumptions between the variables of interest upon which these measures were drawn may have been overly simplified or less exhaustive to capture all the relevant dimensions. The non-inclusion of other dimensions such as legal (ambiguities), bureaucratic code of conduct, political polarisation and other environmental dynamics suggests that a comprehensive alternative measurement could improve the possibility of higher coefficients in the statistical analysis. In this concluding discussion, it is vital, therefore, to admonish that these empirical findings must be interpreted cautiously or in the alternative, qualified by applying other factors that might account for the low coefficients recorded by this study. Nonetheless, evaluating and analysing the evidence from the novel data gathered by this study in Ghana has essentially established that the type of bureaucrats' appointment (how bureaucrats are appointed) indeed influences their attitudes and subsequent behaviour.

8.2 Contribution to existing literature.

Based on the study's findings, some concluding arguments are advanced with regards to contribution to existing literature. Firstly, recounting arguments made by proponents such as the World Bank (1997) that merit processes produce autonomous bureaucrats who are

necessary for the state to develop and control corruption, the Ghanaian case contests such claims. Similarly, Cooper's (2018) argument that merit-based appointments is believed to improve bureaucrats sense of autonomy to candidly voice their opinions to their principals in the course of their work could not be ascertained in the Ghanaian case. This study rather points to the fact that merit-based processes of appointing bureaucrats are insufficient to shape merit bureaucrats into strong autonomous ones capable of checking corruption and unconventional interests from their principals. The study concludes that unless the merit-based processes of appointing bureaucrats are dispensed within a broader meritocratic political and environmental framework, merit appointees may not be autonomous as expected.

Accordingly, the study concludes that merit appointees can only autonomously function as theoretically expected within a broader meritocratic framework which travels beyond the bureaucracy to encompass other constitutionally established bodies such as the courts, the media and other independent regulatory bodies. This is because these bodies are mandated to guarantee, protect and promote the rights of bureaucrats against abuses from principals. However, if bureaucrats discern that triggering their autonomy against their principals' parochial interests is likely to lead to persecution without adequate protection or cure from the courts, they are most likely to succumb and defer to political interests to protect their careers and means of livelihood. Referencing the example cited in Chapter five between the president and the auditor-general, the study notes that the deposed auditor-general failed to resort to the courts because of the inadequate systemic meritocracy in Ghana; coupled with the belief of political control over the courts by the political executive. This, in turn, typically encapsulates the Ghanaian bureaucrats' lack of confidence in the system for which reason they relinquish exercising considerable autonomy against principals as expected of them.

Indeed, whereas constitutionally mandated bodies such as the courts, the media (regulated by an independent national media commission) and the PSC are established to

protect bureaucrats from the arbitrary and capricious abuse from political principals, these bodies have themselves become subjects of political tampering (Ayee *et al.*, 2011). According to Ayee *et al.* (2011), the judiciary which is constitutionally mandated to possess sufficient autonomy to protect citizens including bureaucrats and promote checks and balances are subtly influenced by the executive (President). This is possible because, for example, the president has the power to appoint all “superior court judges” with additional unrestricted powers to nominate any number of Supreme Court judges (most of whom subtly signal ideological leanings or political compatibility before their appointment). This has the potential of compromising judicial independence.

Thus, this level of unbridled executive power fuelled by the country’s hybridisation and constitutional paradoxes of various provisions related to the arms of government have further weakened the concept of checks and balances in Ghana. This situation has led to executive dominance over bureaucrats. Referenced cases are the padding of the courts with sympathetic judges by the current executive coupled with the recent closure of fifty-seven (57) media houses perceived to be anti-government out of the 144 stations cited for various infractions by the MOC through the NCA. Indeed, the executive has subtly successfully resisted the independence of the media and has, therefore, sought to covertly limit access to information, thereby restricting transparency-promoting bodies. This has far-reaching ramifications for the judicial and media independence or activism. Perhaps, these occurrences have only served to renew bureaucrats’ sense of powerlessness or feelings of inadequate protection from the inadequate meritocratic system in Ghana.

Within the context of this study, this is crucial because the politicisation of the courts, the media and other constitutional bodies through patronage for *organisational resource* purposes guarantees substantial controlling influence by principals over these constitutionally mandated bodies and bureaucrats themselves. For example, when the behaviour of principals

become a subject of litigation due to bureaucrats exercising their professional autonomy to the displeasure of principals, “politicised judges” and silenced/intimidated media who are supposed to be civil rights “gatekeepers” may not deliver justice. Thus, principals successfully target or victimise bureaucrats for obstructing their parochial interests without dire consequences.

This is especially the case where delivering justice would imply overturning the aberrations of principals against bureaucrats which can be politically embarrassing to political principals. Notable scenarios of such litigations within the Ghanaian space have resulted in mixed outcomes which cause bureaucrats to play safe by totally avoiding the risk of clashing with political principals. Thus, despite the wheels of justice grinding slowly, the dilatory tactics orchestrated by principals at the courts can be frustrating while the burden of litigation appears to be emotionally and financially costly to bureaucrats. In the end, rather than focusing on increasing the merit appointments in Ghana, perhaps a more potent remedy would be to devote efforts to decrease politicisation and polarisation within constitutionally established bodies mandated to protect bureaucrats from abuse or victimization.

The study’s second broad conclusion also contests the arguments of scholars who conceive loyalty of patronage bureaucrats as instruments of obligatory obedience regarding principals’ will. These arguments advance the unbridled promotion of political values and interests within the context of formulated policies by principals as a way of promoting the public interest. However, this study’s findings contend that bureaucrats’ loyalty is not absolute; therefore, cannot be faithfully dispensed at all material times on all political values or interests. Indeed, the study has shown that although the Ghanaian constitutional, legal and institutional frameworks appear weak and have been occasionally manipulated through politicisation and patronage, these frameworks still check bureaucrats’ unbridled loyalty albeit at varying degrees depending on the type of institution and the interest at stake. This explains why despite strong

political will, principals and patronage bureaucrats sometimes face constraints in their pursuit of certain political interests within the bureaucracy. Thus, unless a legal or conventional loophole is identified and exploited to pursue certain interests within the bureaucracy, loyal bureaucrats appear handicapped even if they are committed to executing specialised interests.

Finally, aspects of this study lend credence to the class of scholars who argue that patronage-loyalty arrangements are not automatically detrimental. This is because evidence adduced by this study has established that patronage-loyalty arrangements, just like any other issue, have both benefits and costs. The results reveal that principals use their influences within the bureaucratic environment to manipulate bureaucrats in ways that can be both positive and negative. Thus, the study confirms arguments advanced by state capture theorists (negative effects of patronage) such as Rose-Ackerman (1999), Kitschelt & Wilkinson (2007) and Sigman (2015) on the one hand and on the other hand; developmental patrimonialism theorists (positive effects of patronage) such as Booth *et al.* (2010), Booth & Golooba-Mutebi (2012), Grindle (2012), Kopecky *et al.* (2012), McDonnell (2017) and Toral (2019).

The third profound conclusion of this study is that autonomous, loyal and responsive attitudes and behaviour are not exclusively restricted to only specific types of bureaucratic appointments or appointees. As was seen in the regression analyses of the empirical chapters, there were positive relationships and directions of all the variables of interest, regardless of the hypothetical relationships set out for testing, except that the impact, to a large extent, followed the theoretical expectations discussed in chapter 3. This is crucial because it seems to impugn the theoretical characterisation and discourses in the reviewed literature that appeared to suggest such exclusivities. Based on the findings of this study, we can rather modestly claim that it is safe to advance as these three theoretical hypotheses as the dominant expected mechanical relationships. This is because their linear relationships as set up in the hypotheses are not as exclusive as some of the theoretical literature seems to suggest. This, therefore, calls

for further theoretical interrogation regarding these hypothetical expectations because this study's findings suggest that any theoretical argument which exclusively associates specific types of bureaucratic appointments with only specific attitudes and behaviour can be misleading.

The fourth conclusion of this study touches on the theories on PSM, PAT, PCT and NPM. Although this study did not set out to test the validity of these theories, its findings have implications worthy of note in this concluding remarks. While these theories have been very vital to appreciate and explain the expected attitudes and behaviour of bureaucrats, some contentions are noted in light of the findings. As we know, the merit-autonomy hypothesis relied on the theoretical proposition of the public service motivation to offer the motivations for which merit bureaucrats are expected to prioritise the public interest. This is based on the presumption of no *quid pro quo* conditions attached to merit bureaucrats' appointment other than the public interests. Similarly, the patronage-loyalty hypothesis relied on the principal-agent and public-choice theories to offer motivations for patronage appointees to loyally comply with their principal's interests even if it amounts to an aberration of the law. In the third vein, the hybrid-responsiveness thesis also relied on NPM ideals to offer motivations for hybrid appointees' politically responsive attitudes in the pursuit of bureaucratic efficiency. Even though findings of this study broadly validated these theoretical arguments, it also revealed that in practice, regardless of the motivation for appointing bureaucrats, their ability to exhibit the attitudes and behaviour as predicted by these theories were constrained by a number factors.

For instance, whereas public service motivation may have theoretically helped to predict merit bureaucrats' attitudes and behaviour, the Ghanaian case showed that merit bureaucrats cannot absolutely pursue the public interest primarily due to ubiquitous politicisation and the semi-meritocratic environment. Similarly, while the findings showed that patronage and hybrid appointees certainly pursue their principals' interests as theoretically predicted, factors such as legal frameworks, professional ethics, structural checks and balances as well as competing

interests affected the extent to which principal-agent and public-choice considerations could solely motivate the attitudes and behaviour of patronage and hybrid appointees.

Therefore, the study concludes that regardless of the type of bureaucrats' appointment, most Ghanaian bureaucrats pursue the interests of principals or patrons due to either their commitment to see those principals succeed or concerns for careers and livelihoods. Thus, bureaucrats pursue principals' interests within the Ghanaian bureaucracy with the understanding that satisfying principals' interests afforded them [bureaucrats] career security and leverage with the potential for career growth and enhanced income. These two reasons for bureaucratic compliance and responsiveness to principals reinforced the theoretical arguments made by principal-agent and public-choice theories while questioning some aspects of public service motivation theory. This is because while commitment to see a bureaucrat's patron succeed is directly connected to principal-agent provisions, the expectation of job security, career advancement and enhanced income are individually self-centred objectives advanced by public choice enthusiasts. Unfortunately, the merit-autonomy and public interest argument advanced by public service motivation seem to be impugned. It is, therefore, the contention of this study that the theoretical arguments of principal-agent and public-choice theories certainly underpin serving Ghanaian principals' interests or the individual appointees' interests respectively. They are also the common motivating factors (as opposed to public service motivation) for bureaucratic attitudes and behaviour within bureaucracies in neo-patrimonial regimes.

From the aforementioned discussions, it can also be concluded that the idea of a dichotomy between administration and politics has been evidentially contested by this study. This is because since political principals can curtail or restrain merit appointees' expected autonomy while they allow notable discretions to patronage and hybrid appointees, coupled with the fact that they are in a position to influence bureaucrats' careers and livelihoods, it implies that politics and administration are empirically intertwined. Parts of the discussions of this

study underscore why Woodrow Wilson advocated for a dichotomy as there is ample evidence to conclude that Ghanaian principals are overbearing to bureaucrats. However, this study may largely settle with Gladieux (1952: 174) since he posited that while he deplores, “as do all thoughtful observers, the introduction of political influence in employment matters, I think it too much to expect in a dynamic democracy it will ever be possible to remove politics completely from public appointments. We can only seek to minimise this factor.”

Furthermore, the findings of this study contribute to the existing arguments of scholars who frequently invoke neo-patrimonialists’ explanations to argue that the relationship between principals and bureaucrats are shaped by “well-established norms of reciprocity” (Chabal, 2005: 21). That is, a situation where influences are dispensed in exchange for favours, which results in responsive or loyal attitudes and behaviour. Scholars of neo-patrimonialism contend that neo-patrimonialism is the principal mechanism which regulates political, economic and bureaucratic life in SSA such that “contemporary politics in Africa is best understood as the exercise of neo-patrimonial power” (Chabal, 2005: 21). The above concluding arguments on the contribution of this study’s findings suggest the need for further examination of some of the underlying arguments regarding how the types of bureaucratic appointments shape bureaucrats’ attitudes and behaviours in neo-patrimonial settings.

8.3 Policy implications

This section highlights some policy implications of the findings of this study. First, the findings of Chapter 5 suggest that even within the context of merit processes, the autonomy of merit appointees are marginal under neo-patrimonial environments like Ghana. There are certainly cogent reasons why bureaucrats need to be significantly autonomous as argued by Rauch & Evans (1999, 2000) and Dahlström *et al.* (2012). But, since this study found merit appointments to be insufficient to birth strong autonomous bureaucrats in Ghana, if adherents are still convinced that both merit-principle and bureaucrats’ autonomy are essential ingredients

for growth and development, policy-makers may have to consider a reform. The proposed reform ought to include legal-constitutional, systemic and institutional designs that may appropriately guarantee bureaucrats' autonomy. If not, policy-makers in Ghana may have to re-examine whether pure merit processes are empirically relevant to the country today as theoretically argued or that it is utopian as the findings of this study seem to suggest.

The second and third cluster of policy implications relate to the role of patronage and hybrid appointees' loyalty and responsiveness within bureaucracies. The study found that patronage considerations shaped appointees' loyalty which can be harnessed in very beneficial ways. Additionally, hybrid tactics which have elements of patronage considerations also significantly influenced bureaucrats' level of responsiveness which similarly have immense positive ramifications as shown in chapter 7. The evidence of this study, therefore, justifies impugning the conventional narrative that patronage considerations within bureaucracies are counter-productive and, as such, are undesirable. If patronage can be valuable as demonstrated in this study, the country may need to formally recognise and accommodate its beneficial outcomes. If this is so, the policy implication is that the Ghanaian bureaucracy will require institutional and legal-constitutional reforms to formally accommodate and rationalise healthy patronage considerations where necessary.

This is because the current legal-constitutional framework regarding the Ghanaian bureaucracy only stipulates the merit-principle. The patronage and hybrid arrangements deployed are usually informal or backdoor strategies dispensed through the exploitation of legal loopholes and ad hoc interpretations of questionable validity. However, the study maintains that such an approach to legalising patronage considerations also has the danger of exacerbating the already precarious ills of patronage in the bureaucracy. Corruption, for example, may worsen as patronage bureaucrats' may facilitate leaking state resources to patrons and private hands due to loyalty and commitment. Whatever the decision is, policy-makers and legislators

may have to fashion out systems, policies, procedures and change-management capacity-building programmes for bureaucrats. This is to improve responsive competence as the desired outcome and not neutral competence. Additionally, enhancing bureaucrats' capacity may be required for an efficient bureaucracy, even though, it will not be enough.

Additionally, this study recommends that there is a compelling need for stakeholders such as scholars and policymakers to look beyond the appointment type of bureaucrats to focus on whether bureaucrats are executing the desired public interests or not. For example, it is the contention of this study that the value of the merit-principle will mean nothing unless it allows bureaucrats to deliver on the public interest. By this logic, this research has no qualms with patronage or hybrid types of appointments in so far as they are responsive to public interests. This lends much credence to the adage that "the ends justify the means".

Furthermore, while principals may have sufficient incentives to manipulate bureaucrats, the evidence of this research show that this manipulation is not restricted to any particular type of appointment (even though the severity may vary). Neither does it mean that principals completely disregard the public interest and due processes at all material times. To strictly ensure responsiveness to the public interest, not only must we be concerned about the type of bureaucratic appointments, but also how appointees can execute the public interest which sometimes lie beyond meritocratic processes.

On the strength of the above policy implications, two broad reform proposals are made as a way forward to enhancing more efficient and responsive bureaucracy in Ghana. First, the reform agenda proposed earlier should be directed at forging an encompassing legal consensus on appointment practices beyond the current legally sanctioned practice of merit-principle. However, this study anticipates a challenge related to how such a consensus among the various stakeholders can be reached since discussions related to the best approach of appointing bureaucrats can generate passionate and divergent positions among stakeholders. Secondly, it

may seem, that after managing to reach such a broad legal-constitutional consensus, there must also be a committed coalition or will of stakeholders, especially elite-principals, to guard against abuses that may be triggered as a result of the “legalisation” of patronage appointments in bureaucracies. Drawing from Shefter’s (1994) thesis on coalition for bureaucratic autonomy, similarly, this study also prescribes that the insulation against patronage appointments abuse can only be protected by a coalition in favour of bureaucratic efficiency and not by regulations, technical arrangements or distributing favours. Shefter’s (1994) argument that once such a coalition is broken, the gates of the bureaucracy are likely to open to abuses is very compelling. However, these two suggestions, at face value, show that there will be no easy answer to settling the appointment dilemma and its consequences in Ghana and by extension SSA.

8.4 Suggestions for future research

This study poses significant implications for future research regarding the consequences of the types of bureaucratic appointments in neo-patrimonial regimes. For starters, given the potential availability of new information under similar context or even different contexts, it will be appropriate to experiment these findings in other jurisdictions to validate the consequences of types of appointments on bureaucratic attitudes and behaviour across other SSA countries. Where possible, it should include different bureaucratic institutions and hierarchies. Given that many other neo-patrimonial settings are also saddled with pervasive politicisation of the bureaucracy in SSA, potential future research would be to expand the number of bureaucracies to examine whether variations of appointment types across different policy areas will impact on bureaucratic attitudes and behaviour the same way as in the Ghanaian experience or that we may witness a different outcome.

Even though the literature review of this study suggests that the results may certainly apply to many other SSA countries since Ghana is a typical or representative case, especially of Benin

and South Africa, future research may, in the interim, focus on exploring the specific experiences of these countries. Consequently, it should take a comparative form; for example, a comparison of the Ghanaian experience to that of Nigeria. Future research could, as well, try to explain variations in terms of outcomes regarding the same variables of interests. For example, if increasing bureaucrats' autonomy leads to project completion rates in both Ghana and Nigeria (Rasul & Rogger, 2013; Rasul, Rogger & William, 2017), can same be established about the variables of interest (merit-autonomy, patronage-loyalty and hybrid-responsiveness) investigated by this study when studied in the two countries?

The results of this study indicate that principals manipulate bureaucrats' appointments with the expectation of influencing bureaucrats' attitudes and behaviour; therefore, future research could examine this assertion by developing other tools of measurement and constructs other than what has been used in this study. That is, potential future research could explore devising other factors of measurement that principals may have at their disposal beyond those deployed in this study. For instance, a future study may explore different dependent variables other than bureaucrats' autonomy, loyalty and political responsiveness in determining the consequences of appointment types. Alternatively, future potential research may consider exploring the influence of specific managerial tools such as postings/transfers, promotions or terminations as independent variables.

A notable challenge of this study was how to accurately measure a bureaucrat's actual type of appointment, his attitudes and subsequent behaviour thereof. This is because given that how bureaucrats are appointed into the civil service and their attitudes or behaviour is a sensitive matter, the constructs or measurements had the potential of eliciting socially desirable responses capable of affecting the validity or reliability of the findings. Even though this study developed its measurements in a way to minimise such risks, a better test of the variables of interest would be to directly elicit accurate and reliable responses to determine the types of appointments of bureaucrats

and how they influence their attitudes and behaviour on the job. A challenge in pursuing such a research agenda, however, would be the difficulty in securing honest responses about the bureaucrats themselves and not their colleagues.

Additionally, one of the characteristics of the study is related to the limited number of bureaucracies selected and the collection of data within one location (the capital city of Ghana – Accra), which was for strategic reasons. The benefit of this strategy is that data from a such homogenous location allow us to hold all other contextual dynamics constant, thus enhancing the reliability of the research findings. However, a wider selection of bureaucracies beyond the capital city where other civil service institutions are located with other contextual dynamics also has the potential of provoking different and profound discoveries.

Furthermore, scanning through the arguments of this study, one may get the impression that bureaucrats are pawns of their principals who manipulate them for both political and personal ends. While there is no doubt that this is mostly the case in Ghana, future research may explore the circumstances in which bureaucrats on their own also become so powerful, influential or unethical enough to solely engage in illicit behaviour such as extortion, taking bribes from citizens without collusion with their principals (Weber, 1968; Olken & Pande, 2012). Furthermore, the research question had a unilateral focus on the effects of (type of) appointments on attitudes and behaviour of bureaucratic agents. However, since H₂ relied on Principal-Agent relations to advance its arguments, it would not have been out of place to explore the effects on the principal as well because Principal-Agent relations are binary. A future research may therefore explore the binary consequences of both bureaucrats and principals as opposed to the current unilateral focus on the attitudes of bureaucrats alone. Additionally, future research may specifically explore the topic under investigation along gender lines to unearth any appointment bias per gender and establish any attitudinal or behavioural distinctions fuelled by a bureaucrat's gender.

Another limitation of this study is the bundling of all types of bureaucrats together without

distinctions between career and non-career bureaucrats or even political bureaucrats and non-political bureaucrats. This is because the bureaucrats discussed in this study are personnel employed in the bureaucracy who share a working relationship with principals regardless of their nature. It may, however, be useful to explore this topic along such distinctions. Therefore, future research may disaggregate and show variations of bureaucrats and determine how such variations affect the findings of the research. Closely related to this issue of a homogenous bureaucrat is the limitation regarding this study's concentration on the civil service as the unit of analysis. As noted in Chapter One, the civil service is just one aspect of the larger public service in Ghana. Similarly, it may be useful to examine the politics of bureaucratic appointments and its implications on bureaucratic attitudes and behaviour beyond the civil service to encompass the larger public service.

In sum, this thesis has explored the politics of types of bureaucratic appointments and their consequences on bureaucrats' attitudes and behaviour within neo-patrimonial settings. The overarching conclusion is that types of bureaucrats' appointment indeed influence their attitudes and behaviour. Another very profound conclusion of this study is that the type of bureaucratic appointment unleashed within neo-patrimonial bureaucracies has both benefits and costs (positive and negative). This implies that the most suitable bureaucratic appointment approach is dependent largely on some contextual and unique characteristics and complexities prevalent among political or bureaucratic environments. In neo-patrimonial settings or contexts where patronage politics remain widespread, the challenge of overcoming the elite's subtle influences to establish a pure merit-based bureaucracy is daunting. This is because policy-making and implementation processes and structures are still dominated by these privileged elites who pursue a myriad of interests within the bureaucratic space.

Efforts and strategies should, therefore, be aimed at reconciling the strengths of various appointment types while discouraging their weaknesses to build consensus towards a more efficient

and responsive bureaucracy that delivers on public goods and services. The overall findings of this study support such views. But it goes further to emphasise that while a broader bureaucratic appointment consensus matter for delivering on public interests, it is the context, contents and conditions of consensus that are especially critical in shaping the benefits of any appointment type deployed at any given time.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1

ANOVA					
Appointment modes					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	65.559	2	32.779	67.388	.000
Within Groups	121.120	249	.486		
Total	186.679	251			

Appendix 2

Model Summary: Hierarchical multiple regression of an omnibus merit-based appointment standard to predict the level of autonomy exercised by civil servants				
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.265 ^a	.070	.042	9.77899
2	.349 ^b	.122	.092	9.52227
a. Predictors: (Constant), Your Ethnicity (Region of Origin), Your Policy Area, Your Gender (Sex), Your Occupation, Your Educational qualification , Your type of Employment, Your Level of Employment, Your Age Group				
b. Predictors: (Constant), Your Ethnicity (Region of Origin), Your Policy Area, Your Gender (Sex), Your Occupation, Your Educational qualification , Your type of Employment, Your Level of Employment, Your Age Group , General Merit				

Appendix 3

Model Summary: Hierarchical multiple regression of an omnibus patronage-based appointment criterion on civil servants' loyalty to their patrons				
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.298 ^a	.089	.062	8.30048
2	.428 ^b	.183	.149	7.90522
a. Predictors: (Constant), Your Ethnicity (Region of Origin), Your Policy Area, Your Gender (Sex), Your Occupation, Your Educational qualification , Your type of Employment, Your Level of Employment, Your Age Group				
b. Predictors: (Constant), Your Ethnicity (Region of Origin), Your Policy Area, Your Gender (Sex), Your Occupation, Your Educational qualification , Your type of Employment, Your Level of Employment, Your Age Group , General Political Consideration, General Ethnic Background, General Personal Connection				

Appendix 4

Model Summary: Hierarchical multiple regression of an omnibus hybrid-based appointment model to predict the level of responsiveness				
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.236 ^a	.056	.027	7.79703
2	.437 ^b	.191	.160	7.24455
a. Predictors: (Constant), Your Ethnicity (Region of Origin), Your Policy Area, Your Gender (Sex), Your Occupation, Your Educational qualification , Your type of Employment, Your Level of Employment, Your Age Group				
b. Predictors: (Constant), Your Ethnicity (Region of Origin), Your Policy Area, Your Gender (Sex), Your Occupation, Your Educational qualification , Your type of Employment, Your Level of Employment, Your Age Group , General Merit, General Patronage				

Appendix 5

Civil Service Employee Survey

This survey is about how you and your colleagues experience and perceive how civil servants are appointed and how such appointments impact on the civil service. The objective of this survey is to collect data for academic research only, to be used exclusively to write a Doctoral Thesis. The survey is prepared by Abdul-Nasir Abubakar, an Employee of the Forestry Commission currently conducting PhD research at Leiden University, The Netherlands.

You are kindly requested to read these statements thoroughly and respond accordingly, however, you are free to skip a statement or question. Your participation is voluntary with 100% confidentiality; the survey will not ask for your name, nor will it connect individual responses with your person.

Thank you in advance for responding to the questions honestly and to the best of your ability.

Section A: On a scale of 1-7 please respond to the following statements from **1 – Not Important at all** to **7 - Absolutely important** by a tick mark.

1. In your opinion, how would you rate the following as a factor which influenced most of your colleagues current appointments into the civil service?

	<i>Not Important at all 1</i>	2	3	4	5	6	<i>Absolutely Important 7</i>
Personal connections							
Political considerations							
Educational qualification							
Past work performance							
Ethnic background							

2. In your opinion, how would you rate the following as a factor which influenced your own current appointment into the civil service?

	<i>Not Important at all 1</i>	2	3	4	5	6	<i>Absolutely Important 7</i>
Personal connections							
Political considerations							
Educational qualification							
Past work performance							
Ethnic background							

Section B: On a scale of 1-7, please respond to the following statements from **1 – Not Important at all** to **7 - Absolutely important** by a tick mark.

3. In your opinion, how important is it that the following general principles are applied in the work of civil servants in Ghana?

	<i>Not Important at all 1</i>	2	3	4	5	6	<i>Absolutely Important 7</i>
Autonomy from superiors in performing duties							

Exercise discretion regarding social network interests in performing duties							
Independently interpret and apply civil service rules, regulations and procedures							
Advance superiors justifiable interests in performing duties							
Downplay personal justifiable interests in performing duties							
Advance office's justifiable interests in performing duties							
Always prioritise the interests of superiors who helped in appointment when performing duties							
Never prioritise social networks interests in performing duties							
Always prioritise all office interests in performing duties							

4. In your opinion, please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following about most of your colleagues in the Civil Service:

	<i>Strongly Disagree</i> 1	2	3	4	5	6	<i>Strongly Agree</i> 7
They have autonomy from their superiors in performing their duties							
They exercise discretion regarding social network interests in performing their duties							
They independently interpret and apply civil service rules, regulations and procedures when performing their duties							
They advance their superiors justifiable interests in performing their duties							
They downplay their personal justifiable interests in performing their duties							
They advance their office's justifiable interests in performing their duties							
They always prioritise the interest of superiors who helped in their appointment when performing their duties							
They never prioritise the interest of their social networks in performing their duties							

They always prioritise all their office interests in performing their duties							

5. In your opinion, please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following about your own work in the Civil Service:

	<i>Strongly Disagree</i> 1	2	3	4	5	6	<i>Strongly Agree</i> 7
You have autonomy from your superiors in performing your duties							
You exercise discretion regarding social network interests in performing your duties							
You independently interpret and apply civil service rules, regulations and procedures when performing your duties							
You advance your superiors justifiable interests in performing your duties							
You downplay your personal justifiable interests in performing your duties							
You advance your office's justifiable interests in performing your duties							
You always prioritise the interest of superiors who helped you in your appointment when performing your duties							
You never prioritise your social network interests in performing your duties							
You always prioritise all your office interests in performing your duties							

Section C: Background/Bio Data

6. Please kindly indicate your most appropriate circumstances to the following statements:

i. Your Gender (Sex):

☐ Female

☐ Male

ii. Your Age group:

☐ 20 – 29

☐ 30 – 39

☐ 40 – 49

- ☐ 50 – 59
- ☐ 60 and above

iii. Your Educational Qualification:

- ☐ Sub Degree
- ☐ Degree (Bachelors)
- ☐ 2nd Degree (Masters)
- ☐ PhD
- ☐ Professional Qualification (Please specify).....
- ☐ Others (Please specify).....

i. Your type of Employment:

- ☐ Central Government
- ☐ Sector Ministry
- ☐ Department or Agency
- ☐ Other (Please specify).....

iv. Your Occupation:

- ☐ Career Civil Servant
- ☐ Political Aide/Advisor/Consultant
- ☐ Politician
- ☐ Other (Please Specify).....

v. Your Level of Employment:

- ☐ Deputy/Asst. Director
- ☐ Mid-Level Officer/Manager
- ☐ Junior Staff
- ☐ Other (Please Specify).....

vi. Your Policy area:

- ☐ Natural Resources
- ☐ Health
- ☐ Local Government
- ☐ Public Service Personnel Regulators (OHSC/PSC)
- ☐ Others (Please Specify).....

vii. Your Ethnicity (Region of Origin).....

viii. Questionnaire I.D. No.....

Appendix 6

INTERVIEW GUIDE AND QUESTIONS

This survey is about how you experience and perceive how civil servants are appointed and how such appointments impact on the civil service. The objective of this survey is to collect data for academic research only, to be used exclusively to write a Doctoral Thesis. The survey is prepared by Abdul-Nasir Abubakar, an Employee of the Forestry Commission currently conducting PhD research at Leiden University, The Netherlands. Your participation is voluntary with 100% confidentiality; the survey will not ask for your name, nor will it connect individual responses with your person.

- 1. In your opinion, how would you explain/describe the following as a factor which influence current appointments into the civil service?**
 - Personal connections
 - Political considerations
 - Educational qualification
 - Past work performance
 - Ethnic background
- 2. In your opinion, how important is it that the following general principles are applied in the work of civil servants and from your experience are they actually applied in Ghana?**
 - a. Autonomy from superiors in performing duties
 - b. Exercise discretion regarding social network interests in performing duties
 - c. Independently interpret and apply civil service rules, regulations and procedures
 - d. Advance superiors justifiable interests in performing duties
 - e. Downplay personal justifiable interests in performing duties
 - f. Advance office's justifiable interests in performing duties
 - g. Always prioritise the interests of superiors who helped in appointment when performing duties
 - h. Never prioritise social networks interests in performing duties
 - i. Always prioritise all office interests in performing duties
- 3. In your experience, do you think the means by which civil servants are appointed into the civil service influence their behaviour and attitude on the job?**
- 4. In your opinion and experience, would you say Ghana is a merit, patronage or hybrid based model of appointment and which model, in your expert opinion would you recommend for Ghana.**

Appendix 7

THEMATIC ANALYSIS OF QUALITATIVE DATA

Theme: Means of appointment into the civil service

Key Points

Educational qualification is primarily considered but not sufficient to influence appointment decisions
Political and personal connections enhance the chance of appointment after qualification
The type of bureaucracy and level of appointment affect the influence of patronage appointment
Qualification and past experience are insufficient without political/personal connections for appointment
Ethnic background is covertly considered but personal connections and political considerations are overt
Civil servants are appointed based on 'who you know' but only plays a complementary role and does not substitute qualifications and competence

Theme: Behaviour and attitudes of civil servants

Key Points

Civil servants appointed based on merit have limited autonomy i.e. depending on the circumstances
Civil servants appointed based on patronage prioritise the interests of their godfathers when necessary
Civil servants appointed based on patronage largely owe loyalty to their patrons as cronies.
Civil servants hired based on patronage exhibit symptoms of truancy
Civil servants appointed based on patronage feel obliged to help those who helped to appoint them
Civil servants appointed based on the merit principle tend to obey civil service rules
Civil servants appointed based on hybrid factors accommodate their godfathers interests within civil service rules/standards
Civil Servants regardless of their resolve to serve the interest of the organisation are controlled by the political elite depending the interests involved
Civil servants appointed based on patronage may flout rules/standards because they are sure of receiving protection from their godfathers.

Civil Servants circumvent conventions to pursue their principals' interests to secure, protect or promote their careers

Civil Servants pursue principals' agenda to avoid victimisation, sidelining or targeting

Civil Servants can hardly successfully contest or compete with principals' interest, hence they play safe

Theme: Responsiveness of civil servants to their principals

Key Points


civil servants carry out the assignments and directions of superiors
Occasionally civil servants advance organisational interests and not their superiors own
Civil servants attempt to advice(oral/written) superiors when their orders are in contrast with rules
Civil servants comply with superiors directives to protect their jobs and livelihoods.
Civil Servants are generally inclined execute their superiors legitimate assignments

Theme: Role of networks

Key Points

social networks is one of the sources of civil service recruitment
social networks are an informal way of advertisement for recruitment
social networks play some role in civil service decision making
There are occasions where social network bodies become political to affect civil service duties.
Certain social network as a collective serve as pressure/interest groups

KEYS:

1		Means of Appointment into the Civil Service
2		Responsiveness of Civil Servants to their principals
3		Behaviour and attitudes of civil servants
4		Role of Networks

Samenvatting

Hoewel er een omvangrijk academisch debat bestaat over patronage, het principe van verdienste, complementariteit en bestuurlijke hervorming of efficiëntie, bestaat er nog steeds een aantal belangrijke gaten in de literatuur. Één van die gaten betreft een uitgebreid onderzoek naar de gevolgen van de soorten aanstellingen van bestuurders. Om dit gat te dichten, poogt deze studie vast te stellen wat de implicaties zijn van soorten aanstellingen van bestuurders op de attitude en het gedrag van ambtenaren. De hoofdhypothese van deze studie is dat het soort aanstelling van bestuurders in de ambtenarij vormend is voor attitude en gedrag. Specifiek poogt deze studie te bepalen of bestuurders die zijn aangesteld op basis van verdienste een meer autonome attitude tentoonspreiden in het bestuur; of bestuurders die zijn aangesteld op basis van patronage meer loyaliteit tonen aan hun patronen; en bestuurders met een hybride aanstelling meer responsiviteit. Om dit empirisch te testen, gebruikt deze studie verschillende onderzoeksmethoden, waarbij data van een enquête onder bestuurders (N=274) worden gecombineerd met kwalitatieve diepte-interviews.

De resultaten van de analyses laten een positief verband zien tussen aanstellingen op basis van verdienste en bestuurlijke autonomie, waarmee de aanvankelijke hypothese wordt ondersteund. De bevindingen gaan echter in tegen het gebruikelijke idee dat aanstellingen op basis van verdienste een behoorlijke garantie bieden op autonome attitudes en gedrag, want de bevindingen laten zien dat, ongeacht de mate waarin verdienste de basis heeft gevormd voor de aanstelling van een bestuurder, zijn/haar autonomie beperkt is vanwege een veelvoud van in elkaar overlopende factoren die in deze studie worden onderzocht. Een tweede bevinding van deze studie is dat aanstellingen op basis van patronage een positief verband houden met een gevoel van loyaliteit bij bestuurders, terwijl hybride aanstellingen een positief verband houden met responsiviteit. Maar hoewel het algemene theoretische idee is dat patronageoverwegingen een behoorlijke invloed hebben op loyaliteit en responsiviteit, suggereren de bevindingen van dit onderzoek dat zulke loyaliteiten of politieke responsiviteit niet absoluut zijn, als gevolg van andere regelgevingsmechanismen zoals wettelijke, constitutionele, en bestuurlijke autorisaties en tegengestelde belangen. Verder ondersteunen deze bevindingen de groep wetenschappers die vraagtekens plaats bij het conventionele idee in politiek-bestuurlijk onderzoek dat patronage pertinent negatief is, want deze studie vindt iets anders.

Daarmee gaat deze studie voorbij aan de monistische opvatting van patronage als iets negatiefs en maakt ze ruimte voor de gunstige gevolgen van patronage, zoals betoogd door Grindle (2012), McDonnell (2017) en Toral (2019). De autonomie van bestuurders kan de ambtenarij afschermen van particuliere of politieke belangen, terwijl bestuurlijke loyaliteit mits op de juiste manier aangewend juist kan leiden tot effectieve implementatie van de agenda van de baas zelfs als er hobbels op de weg zijn. Rasul & Rogger (2013) en Rasul, Rogger & Williams (2017), in deze studie geciteerd, ontdekten dat het toestaan van meer bestuurlijke autonomie een positievere impact heeft op de attitudes en efficiëntie van bestuurders dan strenge monitoring en het bieden van incentives. Ook hogere niveaus van responsiviteit van bestuurders komen efficiëntie ten goede. Een bestuurder die daarentegen compleet onderworpen is, door patronage-loyaliteitsafspraken, zou bestuurlijke tekortkomingen en corruptie kunnen verergeren, wat negatieve implicaties zou hebben voor dienstverlening en ontwikkelingsprogramma's. Uiteindelijk stelt deze studie, bij wijze van hervorming, de noodzaak voor om wettelijk-constitutionele en beleidsmaatregelen en amendementen in overweging te nemen die formele mogelijkheden scheppen voor aanstellingspraktijken die voorbijgaan aan het principe van verdienste en ruimte maken voor patronageoverwegingen. Gegeven de huidige politieke en bestuurlijke dynamiek en in lijn met de bevindingen van deze studie, luidt de conclusie dat als het Ghanese bestuurlijke systeem blijft vasthouden aan puur op verdienste gebaseerde aanstellingen zonder enige ruimte voor patronageoverwegingen, een dergelijk regime een utopie zal blijven. Om die reden moeten politieke leiders en beleidsmakers wellicht voorzichtig zijn door opnieuw te kijken naar de repercussies van het bedingen van een regime van uitsluitend op verdienste gebaseerde aanstellingen op het theoretische niveau, terwijl patronagefactoren op het praktische niveau een belangrijke rol blijven spelen via subtiele en openlijke achterdeurconstructies.

Curriculum Vitae: Abdul-Nasir Abubakar

Abdul-Nasir Abubakar was born on December 3, 1984 in Tamale where he also had the privilege to complete his early education at Tishegu Anglican primary/junior high as well as Ghana senior high schools respectively. The senior high school certificate earned him a place at University of Ghana, Legon where he majored in Political Science and graduated in 2007 with a *first class*. Subsequently, he pursued an Msc. in Social Policy and Development from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) where he graduated in 2009 with a *merit* class. Furthermore, in October 2010, Abdul-Nasir pursued a certificate course in Human Resource Management at the business school of the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA). Similarly, in 2012, he pursued a Post-Graduate Diploma in Industrial Relations from the Association of Business Executives/Ghana Employers Association (London/Accra). In 2016, Abdul-Nasir registered as a PhD candidate of the Leiden University and begun his research at the Institute of Political Science.

In terms of awards, Abdul-Nasir was awarded full PhD research funding by the Ghana Education Trust Fund and the Leiden University (tuition fee waiver) from 2016 – 2020. He was also adjudged the Best Student (Highest Achiever) of the ABE/GEA Post-Graduate Diploma in Industrial Relations in June 2012 in Accra. Indeed, Abdul-Nasir had previously won the LSE Graduate Merit Award (£5,500) and the LSE Graduate Support Scheme (£19,860) in 2008. Additionally, he won the LSE Fredrick Meinheidt Scholarship as well as LSE Student Union Financial Support in 2009. In the year 2000, Abdul won the Best Islamic Studies Student during the Ghana senior high school Tamale's 40th anniversary speech and prize giving day.

Besides academic laurels, Abdul-Nasir has been working with Forestry Commission as a Human Resource practitioner with over (11) years working experience. As a Chief Human Resource Manager and head of department (FSD), he contributes to executing the strategic HR deliverables in alignment with the overall strategic imperatives of the Commission. This includes recruitment and selection, training and development, promotions and upgrades, postings and transfers, compensation and benefits, performance management systems, employee and Industrial Relations as well as discipline, depositions and pensions. Abdul-Nasir is a Member (MABE) of the Association of Business Executives (ABE), London, as well as an Affiliate member of the Institute of Human Resource Management Practitioners Ghana (IHRP), Accra. Abdul-Nasir is also a Member of the Board of Trustees, Forestry Commission Staff Terminal Benefit Scheme, (2017/Present).