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Ceasefires as bargaining instruments in intrastate conflicts: ceasefire objectives and their effects on peace negotiations

Sticher, V.

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Author: Sticher, V.

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Author: Valerie Sticher

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Propositions:

- 1) The less a conflict party cares about the opponent's gains, the better the chances of reaching an agreement.
- 2) If the past overshadows the future, there will not be peace.
- 3) Elites seek to shape perceptions because perceptions shape their bargaining space.
- 4) Talk is not cheap when there is a war of narratives.
- 5) To ensure an inclusive peace process, it may be necessary to start in a confidential, elite-based setting.
- 6) Leaders who reject a ceasefire may often be more committed to a peaceful settlement than those who accept it too readily.
- 7) Leaders who use a ceasefire to demonstrate strength tend to act in good faith.
- 8) An immature ceasefire can unravel a peace process and bring down a pro-settlement government.
- 9) As assessments of the outcome of a military approach to a conflict converge, leaders adapt their strategic goal: from creating a military advantage to pressing for concessions to increasing the chances of conflict settlement.
- 10) Hurting stalemates make a conflict ripe for negotiations; healing stalemates make it ripe for settlement.