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Ceasefires as bargaining instruments in intrastate conflicts: ceasefire objectives and their effects on peace negotiations

Sticher, V.

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Author: Sticher, V.

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PART THREE: CEASEFIRES AS BARGAINING INSTRUMENTS

In September 2002, peace talks between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army almost came to a halt when Khartoum withdrew in the wake of an attack on the Southern town of Torit. Political negotiations only resumed after parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding that put a ceasefire in place (Simmons and Dixon 2006, 24). Yet, despite an extension of the ceasefire, a renewed outbreak of fighting threatened to derail the talks in early 2003. The talks came "back from the brink" (ICG 2003, 1) after the parties signed an addendum to the Memorandum, adding measures such as a verification and monitoring team to the ceasefire that had previously been deemed largely ineffective. The strengthened ceasefire was extended repeatedly and remained in place until the parties reached a peace agreement in 2005.

The case of the Sudan North-South peace talks illustrates the key role ceasefires potentially play in reviving peace talks or allowing them to move forward. It also suggests that not all ceasefires are equal: the more comprehensive ceasefire appeared to be more effective than the ceasefire that lacked monitoring and verification mechanisms. Yet from existing research, we lack a systematic understanding of these relationships in intrastate conflicts: when and why do conflict parties use ceasefires, and with what purpose? And what role do agreement provisions play in making ceasefires last?

Part three of this thesis seeks to shine light on these questions. Building on the insights generated in part two, it theorizes *when* and *why* conflict parties use *what types* of ceasefires as part of a larger bargaining process.