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Beyond institutional blueprints: hybrid security provision and democratic practice in Mali

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Chapter 3

The party system and democratisation

From one-party dominance to one-coalition dominance.²⁴⁷
(1990-2012)

INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter briefly mentioned Mali's exemplary democratic transition in the early 1990s that followed three decades of authoritarian and predatory rule. Members of a National Conference jointly designed a democratic institutional framework that steered the country to multiparty elections in 1992. Associational life subsequently blossomed and many political parties officially registered. The democratically elected leaders respected political, civil rights, and guaranteed press freedom. At first sight, the transition thereby provided an ideal setting in which a balanced multi-party system could flourish that ensured robust popular participation, interest representation and executive accountability.

However, the Malian party system was characterised by prevailing patterns of one-party and one-coalition dominance, the (near) absence of a parliamentary opposition and persistently low levels of popular participation during the two decades that succeeded the democratic transition.

This chapter first provides an overview of this remarkable trajectory of the Malian party system. The following core part then aims to explain the endurance of one-party and one-coalition dominance in the Malian context. In line with the theoretical and operational outline, a complementary socio-cultural and institutional approach guides this analysis.

Well-known institutional factors in the literature include executive dominance, the electoral system and political parties' legislation. Together with the impact of international aid, these constitute critical factors that influenced the trajectory of a party system "from above." The chapter then moves to the wider socio-cultural context in which the multi-party system developed and assesses patterns of citizens' mobilisation and interest representation. The relevance of different social cleavages (e.g. class, ethnicity, religion, and region) for the support basis of Malian parties is explored.

²⁴⁷ This chapter constitutes a considerably extended version of a previous publication that was part of a comparative analysis of the remarkable endurance of one-party dominance across the African continent. Cf. Vliet, M. van (2013) 'Mali: From Dominant Party to Platform of Unity', in: ²⁴⁷ Doorenspleet, R. and Nijzink, L. (2013) *One-Party Dominance in African Democracies*, Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Factors identified by the editors based on a substantial review of the literature of relevance to the trajectory of one-party dominance in Mali are reflected in the operational framework of this thesis.

Furthermore, popular beliefs and citizens' expectations about the role and responsibilities of political parties also potentially influences the trajectory of one-party dominance. This certainly applies to Mali where President Touré repeatedly linked one-coalition dominance in the party system to the cultural virtues of consensus in Malian society. These are all factors that influence the trajectory of party systems "from below."

The conclusions reflect on how patterns of political participation and representation as shaped through the party system affected state legitimacy in the context of Mali's heterarchical order.

3.1. THE TRAJECTORY OF ONE-PARTY TO ONE-COALITION DOMINANCE

The Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA) secured two thirds of parliamentary seats in the 1992 elections and nearly four fifths in the 1997 polls. Similar to other countries on the African continent, a highly fragmented opposition equally characterised the Malian party system.²⁴⁸ ADEMA was therefore in a good position to win the next round of elections in 2002. The party controlled the presidency and had a majority of seats in parliament while the opposition was weak and divided. Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, opposition parties struggled to regain electoral terrain in the context of a dominant party system.²⁴⁹ The first two multi-party elections thereby provided a solid foundation for the emergence of a one-party dominant *system* in Mali, which arises once a political party maintains its dominance after three consecutive elections.

However, the 2002 elections failed to institute a one-party dominant system as ADEMA secured less than a third of the available seats. In the run up to the presidential elections, fierce competition between senior party representatives over the succession of President Konaré, who was forced to step down after completing his two terms in office, tore the party apart. A "reformist" faction within ADEMA internally sidelined former prime minister and party chairperson Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK). Together with a number of close allies, Keita decided to break away and formed his own political movement, which he later transformed into the party Rally for Mali (RPM). An entire network of national, regional and local party representatives jumped ship. IBK thereby effectively divided the ADEMA vote during the much-disputed first round of the 2002 presidential elections.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁸ Van de Walle, N. (2003) 'Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging Party Systems', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41(2): 297 – 321.

²⁴⁹ Bratton, M. and Van de Walle, N. (2002).

²⁵⁰ Boilley, P. (2002) 'Présidentielles Maliennes. L'Enracinement Démocratique?', *Politique Africaine*, 86: 171-182.

Prior to the second round, he mobilised his supporters against ADEMA – the party he had just broken away from – and thereby paved the way for independent presidential candidate Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) to win the presidential elections.²⁵¹ Re-aligning themselves with the likely winner, numerous senior ADEMA representatives openly supported Touré against their own candidate, Soumaila Cissé, in the run-up to the second round of elections. Obviously frustrated by this lack of support from his own party, he left ADEMA and created the Union for the Republic and Democracy (URD) in 2003. A considerable number of party representatives followed him too.²⁵² After these realignments, Touré indeed secured victory in the 2002 elections. These elections thereby illustrated a broader pattern identified by Cheeseman (2010), i.e. that so-called open seat elections, in which an incumbent ruler does not participate, appeared to pose particular challenges for ruling parties on the African continent.²⁵³ These challenges are often related to internal wrangles between persons and factions seeking to secure the party ticket for these elections.

The end of one-party dominance did not bring about a balanced party system with a strong opposition. In fact, one-coalition dominance merely substituted one-party dominance. ATT's electoral platform consisted of a broad and loose alliance of regional power brokers, a myriad of civic associations and some smaller parties. As an independent candidate, he lacked a solid support base in parliament. He therefore invited all main political actors to partake in a grand coalition on condition that they all accepted his authority. Following years of political polarisation, he reiterated the need for political stability and a unified socio-economic agenda. ATT legitimised one-coalition dominance in reference to core social values of unity, harmony and cooperation. These references were, however, also linked to a constellation of power relations and material interests. The grand coalition enabled President Touré to curtail alternative centres of political power and boosted his own authority. In addition, it allowed a wide range of political actors to secure access to state resources and nurture their support networks. Former opposition leaders gratefully accepted his invitation that (re-)established their access to the resourceful political centre and enabled them to nurture personalised support networks. Leading politicians of the ADEMA era also realigned with the new – politically independent – president who ruled based on full parliamentary consensus after the 2002 elections. Many of the political networks that had jointly operated under the institutional cover

²⁵¹ The elections were marked by serious irregularities, with 28 per cent of the votes annulled by the constitutional court.

²⁵² Cissé suspected former President Konaré to have backed the candidature of Touré.

²⁵³ Cheeseman, N. (2010) 'African Elections as Vehicles for Change', *Journal of Democracy*, 21(4): 139-153.

of the dominant party now found their way back into business under a new label. While a formal classification of Mali's party system pointed to a dramatic change in the 2002 elections, a great deal of continuity was actually witnessed on the ground in terms of the centrifugal forces around the executive.

In the run-up to the 2007 elections, political parties confronted the question whether to field their own presidential candidate or to support the incumbent president's quest for a second term in office. Two major party splits had weakened ADEMA, but it still controlled more than 30 per cent of seats in parliament and its political networks covered almost the entire national territory. Yet, the incumbent president obtained a privileged access to state resources, appeared on national television more often than the weatherman did and was backed by the business community. Furthermore, the costs of political isolation in case of an electoral loss against the incumbent were considerable. Once condemned to the opposition benches, parties lose their valuable connections to the resourceful centre and, as a consequence, their support networks. ADEMA therefore opted for a "middle way" strategy. They acknowledged the limited chance of defeating incumbent candidate Touré. They therefore became a driving force behind the establishment of a "grand coalition" of more than forty political parties. This Alliance for Democracy and Progress (ADP) aimed to improve the position of political parties during a second mandate of independent President Touré. During ATT's first mandate, political parties obtained only a limited number of ministerial positions in comparison to the civic movements and personal affiliates of the president.²⁵⁴ By increasing their joint electoral weight in the run-up to the elections, the parties reinforced their control over key ministries after the elections to the detriment of civic associations and people from Touré's personal network. From that position of strength, they could subsequently start preparing the "open seat" elections in 2012. The 2007 elections and ADEMA's "middle way" strategy again revealed the major difference between an "open seat" election and electoral contests in which incumbents do participate. The ADP coalition indeed secured a solid electoral victory in 2007. One-coalition dominance thus prevailed during Touré's second mandate (2007-2012). It did not amount to a full parliamentary consensus as three small but vocal opposition parties also secured parliamentary representation.

Before examining the incentives "from above" that encouraged the endurance of one-party and one-coalition rule in Mali, the following section provides a brief historical background of the party that dominated the Malian party system during the 1990s. In contrast to many other

²⁵⁴ Baudais, V. and Chauzal, G. (2006) 'Les Partis Politiques et l'Indépendance Partisane d'Amadou Toumani Touré', *Politique Africaine*, (104): 61-80.

African dominant parties that obtained a lengthy historical track record as liberation or resistance movements, ADEMA was a young and weakly institutionalised dominant party.²⁵⁵

3.2. HISTORICAL LEGACY

ADEMA emerged out of the democratic movement that played a pivotal role in ending authoritarian rule in 1991, before it won the 1992 elections. The party's main constitutive blocks were: (1) the Malian Party of Labour (PMT); (2) the Malian Party for Democracy and Revolution (PMDR); and (3) the Committee to Defend Democratic Freedoms in Mali (CDLDM). Urban elites connected to Malians living in Senegal and France dominated the PMT. The trade unions constituted the party's main support basis in Mali.²⁵⁶ The most influential branch of the PMDR originated amongst Malians residing in the Soviet Union. In 1986, these two movements, together with CDLDM and several representatives of the former ruling party Sudanese Union-African Democratic Rally (US-RDA), established the National Democratic People's Front (FNDP). This broad platform, the Malian Student Association (AEEM) and the National Congress for Democratic Initiative (CNID), mobilised Malians against military rule in the early 1990s.²⁵⁷

The military regime violently put down a protest march in central Bamako in March 1991, a military coup led by Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) deposed General Moussa Traore.²⁵⁸ The movements that had cooperated in the framework of the FNDP decided to establish a political party, ADEMA, and divided National Executive Committee positions amongst themselves. The merger of these groups created a substantial electoral basis in the run-up to the 1992 elections. The new party attracted members of the educated elite at the local, regional and national level. Teachers and nurses occupied important positions in the party structures at the grassroots.²⁵⁹ After heated internal debates, the party also decided to co-opt numerous regional and local power brokers who had collaborated with the former regime.

²⁵⁵ Doorenspleet, R. and Nijzink, L. (2013).

²⁵⁶ In the early 1970s, the trade unions publicly demanded that the military return to the barracks on various occasions and hand over power to a civilian government. Many of their leaders were jailed by the Traore regime. Camara, B. (2001) 'Le Processus Démocratique au Mali depuis 1991. Entre Fragmentation de l'Espace Politique et Coalitions: Quels Sont les Impacts de la Démocratisation sur la Condition de Vie des Maliens', available at: <https://www.bakarycamara.ml/processus.pdf>.

²⁵⁷ For a more detailed analysis of the groups that were mobilised and the issues around which this popular protest was organised, see: Fay, C. (1995) 'La Démocratie au Mali, ou le Pouvoir en Pâturage', *Cahiers d'Études Africaines*, 35(137): 19-53.

²⁵⁸ Officially, 106 people were killed and 708 injured. See: Amundsen, I. (2002) 'Towards Democratic Consolidation: Party Politics in Mali', Paper presented to the African Studies Association 43rd annual meeting.

²⁵⁹ Diarra, C.O. (1991) *Vers la Troisième République du Mali*, Paris: l'Harmattan; Amundsen, I. (2002).

Already before the 1992 elections, significant tensions between the PMT and PMRD factions arose within ADEMA. While PMRD was a more intellectually and ideologically oriented movement, which had always kept its distance from the military regime, PMT representatives were more pragmatic and some, including President Konaré, had served as ministers under the military regime. The ensuing internal wrangles fuelled several breakaways and party splits, of which the creation of the Movement for the Independence, Renaissance and Integration of Africa (MIRIA) in 1994 by ADEMA's vice-president and a number of other senior PMT representatives was the most noteworthy.

This brief historical sketch provides some background to the demise of ADEMA as a dominant party in 2002. The young party was weakly institutionalised, faced considerable internal wrangles and had witnessed several breakaways before the major splits in the early 2000s. However, the main objective of this chapter is not to understand why ADEMA lost its dominance over the party system. The principal subject of interest is to unravel why one-party dominance and one-coalition dominance prevailed. The next section first examines several well-known institutional factors in the literature.

3.3. INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE

One-party dominance in Mali emerged after almost thirty years of one-party rule. Under previous authoritarian regimes, power was centralised in the hands of the president while boundaries between the ruling party and the state were blurred. This continued to be the case after the democratic transition. Executive dominance constituted a clear pattern of continuity from the authoritarian into the democratic era.²⁶⁰ Both Siaroff (2003) and Van Cranenburgh (2008) convincingly showed that Mali's "semi-presidentialism" label obtained little explanatory value about the actual degree of presidential power.²⁶¹ In fact, the Malian president had very few colleagues on the entire African continent with equally strong institutionally anchored powers. Mali's democratic regime could justifiably be referred to as "super-presidential" rather than semi-presidential. While the system was based on the French

²⁶⁰ Sears, J.M. (2007); Jourde, C. (2008) 'The Master is Gone, but Does the House still Stand? The Fate of Single-Party Systems after the Defeat of Single Parties in West Africa', in: Joseph Wong and Edward Friedman (eds.), *Political Transitions in Dominant Party Systems: Learning to Lose*, Abingdon, UK and New York: Routledge, pp. 75-90.

²⁶¹ Siaroff, A. (2003) 'Comparative Presidencies: The Inadequacy of the Presidential, Semi-Presidential and Parliamentary Distinction.' *European Journal of Political Research*, 42(3): 287-312. Cranenburgh, O. van. (2008) 'Big Men Rule: Presidential Power, Regime Type and Democracy in 30 African Countries', *Democratisation*, 15(5): 952-974.

constitution, the mandate vested in the executive was stronger in the Malian case. French advisors provided input to the draft constitution, which delegates of the National Conference discussed.²⁶² Cissé (2006) even regarded Mali's 1992 constitution as a pale copy of the French 1958 constitution.²⁶³ However, both political systems differ in several ways, especially with regard to the power balance between the executive and legislative branch of government. In Mali, for example, a two thirds majority in parliament was required to censure the government, whereas a simple majority can pass a vote of no confidence in France. The next chapter provides a more detailed analysis of executive – legislative ties in Mali. The most relevant point in the context of this chapter is that control over the presidency provided ruling parties and coalitions with considerable benefits and encouraged the endurance of one-party dominance.

Controlling an extremely powerful presidency indeed provided ADEMA major advantages compared to other parties and many opportunities to entrench its dominance. The party provided local and regional power brokers with jobs in the government administration and strategically distributed spoils of the state. ADEMA maintained a strong grip on key economic activities, particularly in the lucrative cotton and gold sectors. One group of senior ADEMA representatives was popularly known as the “clan CMDT”, as they occupied the strategic positions in the national cotton company. By the end of their second term in office, ADEMA controlled 90 per cent of the directorships of ministries and key management positions in public enterprises.²⁶⁴ ADEMA also obtained privileged access to state media. The national television and radio company (ORTM) extensively covered party activities and perspectives. This preferential treatment by the state media was most effective in the early years of the ADEMA government. The explosive growth of independent community radio stations slightly countered this advantage in subsequent years.²⁶⁵

Secondly, ADEMA greatly benefitted from the electoral system in place. The National Conference adopted a majoritarian system of closed party lists in both single- and multi-member constituencies (contingent on the number of inhabitants).²⁶⁶

²⁶² Massicotte, L. (2009) ‘Mapping the Road to Democracy: The National Conference of Mali 29 July to 12 August 1991’, Paper at conference ‘Changer la Donne Politique. Nouveaux Processus Constituants’, Québec, available at: http://www.cms.fss.ulaval.ca/recherche/upload/chaire_democratie/fichiers/mali_27082009_161330.pdf.

²⁶³ Cissé, A. (2006) ‘*Mali, Une Démocratie à Refonder*’, Paris: L’Harmattan.

²⁶⁴ Dante, L., Gautier, J-F., Marouani, M.A., Raffinot, M. (2001), ‘Institutionalising the PSRP Approach in Mali’, available at: <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/2197.pdf>, p.5.

²⁶⁵ Schultz, D.E. (1999) ‘In Pursuit of Publicity: Talk Radio and the Imagination of a Moral Public in Urban Mali’, *Africa Spectrum*, 34(2): 161-185.

²⁶⁶ Under the so-called two-round majority run-off system, if only a simple majority is obtained during the first round, the two top lists compete in a second round. The quorum is set at 60,000 inhabitants for a seat. See the Mali page of the Electoral Knowledge Network website for an historical overview and more in-depth analysis of the electoral systems in Mali, available at: http://aceproject.org/main/english/es/esv_ml.htm.

Vengroff (1993) demonstrated that under a system of proportional representation, ADEMA would have obtained 43 parliamentary seats, instead of the 73 seats it actually secured in the 1992 elections.²⁶⁷ The opposition, on the other hand, would have done much better if a system of proportional representation had been in effect. US-RDA would have secured 21 seats instead of the eight seats it obtained, whereas RDP would have won ten rather than six seats. Moreover, the fact that the presidential elections were organised a few months prior to the parliamentary elections also had an impact. It created strong incentives for local and regional power brokers to align themselves with the party that won the presidency and thereby further entrenched one-party dominance. Not surprisingly, electoral reforms became one of the main demands of an increasingly frustrated opposition following the first round of elections in the early 1990s. President Konaré accommodated some of these requests. The number of seats of the National Assembly increased from 116 to 147 and the number of single-member constituencies was reduced to the advantage of multi-member constituencies. The latter move benefitted smaller parties as it encouraged larger parties to establish electoral alliances in the run-up to elections.

Yet, the dominant party, ignoring protests by other parties, also used its parliamentary majority to allow the 1997 balloting to take place in a highly controversial context. They initially rushed a new electoral law through parliament in 1996, which the Constitutional Court subsequently annulled. ADEMA then initiated a process of inter-party dialogue and agreed to establish an Independent Electoral Commission. The Commission, however, proved unable to prepare the elections in the short time available. After a chaotic first round, the Constitutional Court saw no other option but to officially annul the results.²⁶⁸ The opposition parties demanded that all major problems related to the electoral process, such as the major challenge of an unreliable voters register, would be resolved before a new round of elections took place. ADEMA ignored this wish and set a date for new elections in just a month's time. Several opposition parties boycotted these elections and both President Konaré and ADEMA secured a substantial but controversial victory.²⁶⁹

²⁶⁷ Vengroff, R. (1993) 'Governance and the Transition to Democracy: Political Parties and the Party System in Mali', *Journal of Modern African studies*, 31(4): 541-562, pp. 555-56.

²⁶⁸ Two major problems became immediately apparent: the register of eligible voters was flawed and the electoral commission was unable to produce voter cards on time. See for a more detailed analysis: IFES (1997) 'Elections Législatives et Présidentielles de 1997, République du Mali', Election Monitoring Report, available at: <https://ifesworld.org/en/>.

²⁶⁹ In 1999, a national stakeholder conference managed to resolve some of the issues but the flawed electoral process of 1997 had, by then, already ensured the continuation of ADEMA's initial dominance.

Thirdly, the Political Parties Act influenced the trajectory of Mali's party system. The National Conference established minimal criteria for the registration of political parties, reflecting the desire to open up the political space after decades of one-party rule.²⁷⁰

Participants of the National Conference still fiercely objected public funding for political parties. Nevertheless, the government introduced it in 2000. Parties without representation in parliament became entitled to a basic amount of state funding. The Political Parties Act and the system of public funding of political parties thereby contributed to a fragmented party system.²⁷¹ More than 25 parties registered between April 1991 and December 1991. A decade later, 120 parties had received a registration card.²⁷² In parliament, nine smaller parties initially surrounded the dominant party, ADEMA. This number dropped to seven in 1997. This high level of fragmentation seems to have contributed to ADEMA's initial dominance.²⁷³ When ADEMA lost its dominant position in 2002, the fragmentation of the party system increased again. During the elections in 2007, 15 political parties gained parliamentary representation.

Finally, the presidential term limit strongly influenced the Malian trajectory of one-party dominance. Cheeseman (2010) revealed a broader trend across the African continent whereby ruling parties found it more challenging to secure victory in "open seat" elections as compared to those polls in which the president in office participated.²⁷⁴ It appeared to be much more problematic to maintain a grip on power, despite having privileged access to state resources, during open seat elections. The fact that the incumbent Malian President Konaré was not allowed to stand in 2002 not only created opportunities for opposition candidates, but also incited succession challenges within ADEMA that eventually led to a party split. ADEMA's dominant position indeed abruptly ended in the context of the 2002 open seat elections but was then, as noted above, substituted by one-coalition dominance.

In addition to the above institutional factors, the international context also contributed to the favourable context in which one-party or one-coalition dominance endured.

²⁷⁰ The procedure consisted of three simple administrative steps and excluded criteria related to national representation or organisational capacity.

²⁷¹ Baudais, V. and Chauzal, G. (2006).

²⁷² PPRCPP/NIMD (2004) 'Répertoire des Partis Politiques au Mali', The Hague: NIMD.

²⁷³ Samaké, M. (2007) *L'Expérience Malienne du Financement Public des Partis Politiques* (unpublished).

²⁷⁴ Cheeseman, N. (2010).

3.4. INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

International development aid, as shown in the introductory chapter, affects the power balance between the different branches of government on the receiving end. Mali obtained around three times more aid than other African developing countries in terms of the percentage of its GDP. Between 1967 and 2013, it secured an average of 15 per cent of its GDP from aid.²⁷⁵ The amount of aid received in the 1990s was more limited than during the 2000s, when worldwide campaigns for the Millennium Development Goals mobilised additional support. During the first decade of the new millennium, international donors supported Mali with approximately \$5.6 billion and aid covered around 25 per cent of all public expenses by the Malian government.²⁷⁶ Only an estimated one per cent of this support aimed to reinforce democratic institutions. Reviewing aid modalities in Mali, Van de Walle concluded that:

While the role of domestic institutional mechanisms of accountability seemed critically important to democratic consolidation, they appeared to be often ignored or undermined in Mali by the modalities of aid delivery.²⁷⁷

This section only briefly touches upon the most direct influences on one-party dominance. First, international donors did not stand up for key democratic principles at important junctures of Malian democracy. The 1997 elections constituted a striking example. The newly established Electoral Commission was largely unprepared to ensure a level playing field for all candidates and to adequately organise the polls in the short time frame that it was given. Even the voting register was outdated and incomplete. A request by Malian parties to postpone the elections was denied. A united block of opposition candidates then decided to boycott the polls. Nonetheless, donors readily accepted the results and quickly turned the page, despite their considerable financial contribution to the flawed electoral process.

²⁷⁵ Craven-Matthews, C. and Neglebert, P. (2018), p.13.

²⁷⁶ Walle, N. van de. (2012) 'Foreign Aid in Dangerous Places: The Donors and Mali's Democracy'. UNU-WIDER Research Paper WP2012/61; Bergamaschi, I. (2013) 'Mali: How to Avoid Making the Same Mistakes', *Africa in Fact*, N.10, available at <https://gga.org/>; Walle, N. van de (2012).

²⁷⁷ Walle, N. van de. (2012), p.11.

Jourde (2008) noted that:

Even a country like Mali, in which the legislative and presidential elections of 1997 were clearly unsatisfactory in terms of fairness and freeness, never faced any significant pressure. In fact, as the opposition parties boycotted an electoral contest they legitimately saw as too flawed, the president got re-elected with a “one-party style” score of 85% [...] and yet he was not the subject of the usual foreign “concerns” following the election.²⁷⁸

This seemed to reflect a broader pattern as donors refrained from taking measures in response to the apparent failure of the Malian government to implement (agreed upon) measures that would have bolstered domestic accountability, partly because cooperation in other areas was successful or the strategic interests at play.²⁷⁹ On a structural level, aid equally exacerbated executive dominance and further enhanced the position of the president:

Interventions intended to build up state capacity typically assist the ruler. While the intention may be to build an institution, the outcomes are typically to provide more resources to the ruler [...], and to create opportunities for patronage through institutions that provide employment, contracts and projects.²⁸⁰

The impact of aid not only stemmed from the amount of funding involved, but also from the working procedures between international donors and the Malian government. Much of the policy dialogue and monitoring of this cooperation primarily involved senior state representatives and international organisations. Institutions like the legislature played a marginal role and obtained limited access to information. Hence, decisions about key socio-economic policies and programmes primarily stemmed from a dialogue between donors and the government and not through a domestic democratic decision-making process. The next chapter provides a more detailed analysis of the impact of aid on executive – legislative ties.

²⁷⁸ Jourde, C. (2008) ‘The Master is Gone, but Does the House still Stand? The Fate of Single-Party Systems After the Defeat of Single Parties in West Africa’, in: Joseph Wong and Edward Friedman (eds.), *Political Transitions in Dominant Party Systems: Learning to Lose*, Abingdon, UK and New York: Routledge, pp. 75-90.

²⁷⁹ Dijkstra, G. (2018) ‘Budget Support, Poverty and Corruption: A Review of the Evidence’, EBA Report 04/2018, p. 61.

²⁸⁰ Waal, de A. (2009) ‘Fixing the Political Market Place: How Can We Make Peace Without Functioning State Institutions?’, 1 January 2010, (The Chr. Michelsen Lecture).

Aid equally reinforced the incentives political actors faced to rally around the executive. They had a strategic interest to be associated to – and influence the distribution of – all the development resources made available through the executive. Baudais and Chauzal (2006) contended that this particularly – but certainly not exclusively – held for those political elites who had been sidelined during the decade of one-party dominance under ADEMA.²⁸¹ The one-party coalition established under President Touré enabled them to reconnect with the formal centre of political gravity and its resources. These connections to the state played an important role in the efforts political parties undertook to mobilise and sustain their support base and to respond to the incentives they faced “from below,” as the following sections demonstrate.

3.5. SOCIAL CONTEXT

One of the most remarkable characteristics of Mali’s representative democracy, as an indirect system geared to ensure the expression of popular will, was the persistently low levels of popular participation recorded in successive elections. A mere 20 per cent of Malians participated in the elections throughout the 1990s and these figures only slightly increased during the following decade as voter turnout reached 26 per cent in the 2002 elections and 32 per cent in 2007.²⁸²

Malian citizens displayed limited interest in political affairs compared to citizens in other African countries. In fact, Mali revealed the lowest levels of political interest in any country surveyed in the Afrobarometer up until the year 2000. Very few people declared themselves to be “very interested” (10 per cent) or “somewhat interested” (24 per cent) in politics and government. Almost two thirds (64 per cent) proclaimed that they were simply “not interested.”²⁸³ Moreover, Malian citizens maintained very little contact with democratically elected officials in the period between elections compared to people in other West African countries. They raised most of their concerns with other power poles in society, like traditional (29 per cent) or religious leaders (per cent) rather than contacting a political party representative (9 per cent), a Member of Parliament (5 per cent) or central state representative (3 per cent).²⁸⁴ People also trusted traditional and religious leaders much more than political actors. In 2008,

²⁸¹ Baudais, V. and Chauzal, G. (2006).

²⁸² The data are taken from International IDEA’s Voter Turnout database, available at: http://www.idea.int/vt/survey/voter_turnout.cfm.

²⁸³ Bratton, M. Coulibaly, M. & Machado, F. (2000) ‘Popular Views on Good Governance in Mali’, Afrobarometer, March 2000. (Working Paper, No.9).

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

71 per cent indicated having a lot of trust in religious leaders and 65 per cent in traditional leaders while the ruling party, opposition and parliament obtained scores of respectively 21 per cent, 17 per cent and 32 per cent.²⁸⁵

Hence, the anchoring of Mali's "super-presidential" democratic regime into society seemed "super-limited." The above theoretical outline denoted political participation as the "elixir of life for democracy." In Mali, it seemed to characterise democracy's breathlessness instead. Most citizens were not mobilised through the party system but relied on alternative authorities in the context of Mali's hybrid political order. The remaining part of this section examines these restricted patterns of citizens' mobilisation and representation through the party system. It first assesses the relevance of different social cleavages (e.g. class, ethnicity, religion) in this regard.

Class

The previous chapter illustrated how a small group of "native" citizens, connected to the colonial administration and francophone education system, emerged as a dominant political class after independence. These linguistic and educational factors remained crucial socio-economic factors shaping – by restricting – patterns of political participation. Urban upper-middle-class francophone men dominated the National Conference that defined the institutional pillars Mali's democratic regime.²⁸⁶ French remained the official language and Van de Walle (2012) aptly noted that Mali was:

Among the very few democracies in having a majority of its citizens unable to speak the language of government and public administration.²⁸⁷

Education levels and illiteracy levels restricted political participation through the party system in a similar vein. Bleck (2011) revealed the well-known positive correlation between education, political knowledge and participation for the case of Mali.²⁸⁸ Even pupils attending primary school supported their parents in liaising with political and state representatives as a result of their ability to speak French. Yet, despite the considerable efforts undertaken after the democratic transition illiteracy rates remained sky-high and participation rates very low.

²⁸⁵ Afrobarometer 2008. 'Round 4, Survey Mali.'

²⁸⁶ Jourde, C. (2008) 'The Master is Gone, but Does the House still Stand? The Fate of Single-Party Systems after the Defeat of Single Parties in West Africa', in: Wong, J. and Friedman, E. (eds.), *Political Transitions in Dominant Party Systems: Learning to Lose*, Abingdon, UK and New York: Routledge, pp. 75-90.

²⁸⁷ Walle, van de N. (2012), p. 13.

²⁸⁸ Bleck, J. (2011) 'Schooling Citizens: Education, Citizenship, and Democracy in Mali', August 2011, Phd Cornell University.

The first democratically elected President, Alpha Oumar Konaré, made it a personal quest to support and improve the functioning of the education sector. Enrolment figures for primary schools indeed augmented from 26 per cent at the democratic turn to 36.4 per cent in 1999. Throughout the next decade, primary school enrolment further improved and attained 55.6 per cent in 2004 and then 75.4 per cent in 2010. However, this considerable progress in quantitative terms was not accompanied by qualitative improvements or significant advancements in superior levels of education. By the end of 2018, only a third of the Malian population was able to both read and write.

There was a particular disparity in terms of access to education and a wide range of other public services between the urban and rural areas.²⁸⁹ During the first two decades that followed Mali's democratic transition, the urban-rural divide widened significantly. Urban poverty rates dropped from 72.7 per cent (1989) to 37.2 per cent (2001) and 31.8 per cent (2006) but rural poverty remained almost unaltered. Differences between the capital city Bamako and the rural zones were particularly profound.²⁹⁰ This is certainly not to suggest a homogenous socio-economic urban setting. The previous chapter already illustrated the very different urban interests groups, including well-educated youth without jobs, petty traders, student and trade movements, which joined forces to oust the authoritarian regime in the early 1990s.

Sears (2007) analysed the complexities of social class formation during the democratic era and distinguished a small "upper political elite" and "upper middle class" from an emerging middle class of petty bourgeoisie and the vast majority of rural masses (e.g. farmers, herders or fishers, migrant workers).²⁹¹ In a wider context characterised by a largely informal and predominantly agricultural economy with weakly organised interest groups, individual parties did not mobilise support along the socio-economic cleavage. The support base of Mali's main political parties was not at variance at all in terms of class. The policy manifestos of the leading parties, which all emerged from ADEMA, did not appeal to distinct socio-economic interests groups in society either. In fact, the Malian party system was not an arena where class-based interests were mobilised and expressed, rather it constituted an expression of upper-class dominance.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid*; Bleck, J. and Michelitch, K. (2015) 'On the Primacy of Weak Public Service Provision in Rural Africa: Malians Redefine 'State Breakdown' Amidst 2012 Political Crisis', Afrobarometer (Working paper No.155).

²⁹⁰ Walle, N. van de. (2012), pp. 13-15.

²⁹¹ *Ibid*. pp. 39-43.

Thurston (2018) noted that the Bamako-based political elite formed an exclusive:

Single broad network rather than rival camps offering the Malian people genuine choices about the future of the country.²⁹²

While there were some notable exceptions in this regard, it certainly reflected the general pattern encountered under one-party (1992-2002) and one-coalition (2002-2012) dominance. In sum, socio-economic factors strongly impacted – i.e. restrained – political participation. However, they did not constitute the main social cleavage around which political representation was shaped. The question remains, then, how did this small network of well-educated, francophone, urban political elite, mobilise rural support?

Ethnicity

Ethnic cleavages have played a prominent role in research on African political parties and party systems. Considering the ethnic heterogeneous character of many African polities, scholars expected the emergence of highly fragmented party systems after the introduction of multiparty democracy. However, “ethnic parties” hardly developed across the continent or in Mali. Several studies confirmed that the vast majority of parties could not be labelled as an “ethnic party.”²⁹³ Although Malinke people voted more often for RPM than any other party, the RPM obtained a much broader ethnic support base.²⁹⁴ While URD was sometimes considered to be a Songhai party, owing to the ethnic background of many of its senior party members, its actual support base revealed that it could not be classified as an ethnic party. The National Congress for Democratic Initiative (CNID) actually constituted the only party that did qualify as an ethnic party.²⁹⁵ During the 1990s, the dominant party, ADEMA, attracted supporters from different ethnic groups. No particular ethnic group considered the party to be “theirs.” In other words, in the context of a relatively heterogeneous society, ADEMA established itself as a multi-ethnic party. This reflected a broader trend on the continent where so-called ethnic congress parties – a multi-ethnic party based on an elite coalition between two or more ethnic groups – emerged

²⁹² Thurston (2018) ‘Mali’s Tragic but Persistent Status Quo’, p.18.

²⁹³ Basedau, M. and Stroh, A. (2009) ‘Ethnicity and Party Systems in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa’, Hamburg: GIGA (Working Paper, Nr. 100); Dowd, R.A. and Driessen, M. (2008) ‘Ethnically Dominated Party Systems and the Quality of Democracy: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa’, Afrobarometer (Working Paper no. 92); Cheeseman, N. and Ford, R. 2007. ‘Ethnicity as a Political Cleavage’, Afrobarometer (Working paper N.83); Posner, D. (2004) ‘Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa’, *American Journal of Political Science* 48(4): 849-863.

²⁹⁴ Basedau, M. and Stroh, A. (2009), p. 15.

²⁹⁵ Cheeseman, N. and Ford, R. (2007), p. 14.

as the most common type of party.²⁹⁶ However, the fact that ADEMA, as the dominant party, attracted support from different ethnic groups did not reveal much about *how* this mobilisation occurred. Highly personalised and geographically oriented relationships proved particularly influential, as the next section reveals.

Politics of proximity

An increasing number of empirical studies revealed the importance of geographical proximity as a factor shaping patterns of voter mobilisation across the African continent.²⁹⁷ In Mali, personalised clientelistic networks also influenced the relationship between political parties and local power brokers. In fact, support networks amidst local hierarchical structures constituted a decisive factor in voter mobilisation.²⁹⁸ In other words, informal ties between national elites and local traditional chiefs or other influential power brokers proved crucial for establishing and maintaining a support basis. In his dissertation on Mali's process of democratisation, Sears (2007) underlined that "the links to regions of origin are key to political mobilisation and economic redistribution."²⁹⁹

During the 1992 elections, for example, President Konaré won in all but nine constituencies. Not coincidentally, these nine electoral districts were the home constituencies of his direct competitors.³⁰⁰ Independence party US-RDA is marginalised on the political scene today but managed to keep one parliamentary seat in Timbuktu. Indeed, the hometown of its leader. As one party president explained:

Politics is first of all real knowledge of a social milieu', a 'reservoir of confidence,' and a "whole social network that puts itself at your disposal because you too have known how to be sociable and to be in symbiosis, in phase with society."³⁰¹

²⁹⁶ Erdmann, G. and Badeseau, M. 'Problems of Categorising and Explaining Party Systems in Africa', GIGA, January 2007 (Working Paper, No. 40).

²⁹⁷ Lindberg, S. and Morisson, M.K. (2005) 'Exploring Voter Alignment in Africa: Core and Swing Voters in Ghana.' *Journal of modern African Studies*, 43(4): 1-22; Erdmann, G. (2007) 'Ethnicity, Voter Alignment and Political Party Affiliation – An African Case: Zambia', Hamburg: GIGA (Working Paper no.4); Stroh, A. (2009) 'The Power of Proximity: Strategic Decisions in African Party Politics', Hamburg: GIGA (Working Paper No. 96).

²⁹⁸ Koter, D. (2009) 'Ties and Votes: Social Structure and Electoral Politics in Africa.' Paper presented at the meetings of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada.

²⁹⁹ Sears, J.M. (2007), p. 156.

³⁰⁰ Vengroff, R. (1993).

³⁰¹ Party president Mamadou Bakary 'Blaise' Sangaré, quoted in Sears, J.M. (2007), p. 169.

Several political parties with a small, localised support base have been able to secure parliamentary representation over time. In such a context, political parties merely provided senior politicians with the institutional tools to maintain and nourish personalised and geographically concentrated support networks. Failure by the leader of a smaller party to nurture these networks often led to a re-orientation of clients towards another political entrepreneur. Fearing precisely that scenario, the leader of a smaller party active in the Mopti region decided to merge with ADEMA, thereby securing a continued flow of resources for his personalised network.³⁰² These highly personalised dynamics lay at the root of many party scissions and reconfigurations. As Bleck (2010) noted, Malian citizens did not strongly identify with a particular party and often switched parties.³⁰³

In sum, highly personalised bonds between urban elites and local power brokers, rather than institutionalised interactions through political parties, played an important role in shaping (restricted) patterns of voter mobilisation and representation along geographical lines. The following section provides a brief assessment of the role of religion, arguably one of the most important mobilising forces in Malian society.

Religion

Islam played a central role in the day-to-day life of a vast majority of Malian citizens and an increasingly important public role during the two decades that are the focus of this chapter. People relied on religious jurisprudence to regulate family affairs (heritage, marriage and disputes).³⁰⁴ Religion also played a key – if not leading – role in mass mobilisation in Malian society. Different Sunni and Sufi currents emerged over time and their leaders became strong voices in society with a significant influence in the public sphere. Anyone who ever attended religious gatherings led by one such leader, frequently organised in one of Bamako's football stadiums, witnessed the number of people they appealed to. Religion, in all its varieties, was firmly anchored in Malian society across the entire national territory, including the most remote rural areas. Yet, the official role of religion in Mali's formal democratic system is limited and restricted. The 1992 constitution anchored the "laïcité" of the Malian state, in accordance with its French counterpart. The predominantly urban francophone National Conference participants blocked an attempt to permit the creation of Islamic political parties. Religion, or different religious streams, also did not constitute a cleavage around which individual parties mobilised

³⁰² Personal communication party leader, August 2011.

³⁰³ Bleck, J. (2010).

³⁰⁴ Soares, B.F. (2006).

support. At times, religious leaders endorsed specific political candidates and actively raised support amongst their followers in the run-up to elections. Successive presidents and political actors also frequently consulted religious actors. In general, however, religious leaders maintained a certain distance from the electoral process and exerted their influence indirectly. As Lebovitch (2019) noted:

The history of Islamic organisations and activism in Mali since the colonial period is largely one of a pursuit of autonomy from the government, as well as indirect power through social influence and pressure rather than elections.³⁰⁵

Nevertheless, from that position, they actively participated in and shaped the outcome of public debates. Soares (2006) illustrated the proactive stance of religious leaders on several issues of morality, such as the opening of nightclubs and bars during Ramadan, the widespread practice of gambling, gender issues or the opening of a pornographic cinema in Bamako. This public role became ever more pronounced and visible after Mali's transition to democracy as many new media outlets became available.³⁰⁶ In the run-up to the 2002 elections, the public and political role of Islamic leaders further increased.³⁰⁷ During three mass rallies, they called upon their followers to support candidates who embodied "Islamic values." The next chapter provides another illustrative example of a highly effective campaign by religious leaders against a progressive Family Code adopted by the Malian parliament in 2009. Beyond issues related to public morality or the role of religion in society, religious leaders also played a prominent role in propagating matters related to governance in general and anti-corruption in particular.

Clearly, religion constituted a particularly strong mobilising force in Malian society. Not officially from *within* the formal democratic system or as a cleavage of individual party support; rather, more from the *outside* inwards, in an indirect yet certainly no less influential way. In this regard, Thurston (2013) aptly noted:

French-educated technocrats and career politicians may dominate elections and government bureaucracies, but Muslim preachers and leaders of mass-based religious organizations will continue to constitute powerful pressure groups [...].³⁰⁸

³⁰⁵ Lebovitch, A. (2019), p.9.

³⁰⁶ Soares, B.F. (2006).

³⁰⁷ Thurston, A. (2013).

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

This short reflection on the role of religion only adds to the restricted social anchorage of the party system in Malian society. Very basic but influential factors such as language, education and religion restrained political participation through the official intermediary channels. Indeed, Beck (2011) contended:

[I]n the democratic context, the Malian political landscape remains dominated by a Francophone-educated elite despite its majority Muslim population.³⁰⁹

The next section further explores the socio-cultural anchorage of the party system with a particular focus on prevailing popular beliefs and expectations of parties and politicians.

Political culture

Following Mamdani's (1996) seminal *Citizens and Subject*, the previous chapter highlighted the "bifurcated" nature of political domination during the colonial era and the different types of rule in urban (civilian) and rural (communitarian) areas. The urban-rural divide, as shown in the above, remained one of the most central cleavages in Malian society ever since. This also applied to popular perceptions about democracy and the role of political parties that considerably varied along the urban-rural divide. The Afrobarometer noted in 2000:

Any liberal interpretations are concentrated among urban, educated, non-poor groups. In this respect, Mali's urban elites, like other Africans, are adopting universal political values while its rural masses remain attached to indigenous, culturally specific conceptions of democracy.³¹⁰

Indeed, Mali's party system generally developed in a socio-cultural context in which virtues of cooperation, unity and consensus were widely shared.

³⁰⁹ Bleck, J. (2011) 'Schooling Citizens: Education, Citizenship, and Democracy in Mali', August 2011, Dissertation Cornell University', p. 54.

³¹⁰ Bratton, M. Coulibaly, M. & Machado, F. (2000), table 8.

Public opinion data revealed that Malian political culture is not a fertile breeding ground for political competition:

The Malian conception of democracy is largely communitarian. It centre on a set of political values such as equality and justice', 'mutual respect', 'unity' and 'working together.' [...] Malians prefer social consensus and national unity to political and economic competition.³¹¹

Likewise, two thirds of the Malian population took the view that "opposition parties should concentrate on cooperating with government and helping it develop the country," rather than "regularly examine and criticize government policies and actions."³¹² Moreover, the expectation that politicians take care of their followers prevailed over the notion of critical political scrutiny by Malian citizens. The importance of receiving tangible top-down assistance often overrides the provision of bottom-up accountability. Sears (2007) noted that:

While poorer Malians want more economic democracy, they generally agree with the paternalistic, authoritarian, and hierarchical norms, practices and institutions that could make such redistribution happen [...].³¹³

Other surveys revealed that large majorities of Malians did not to see a role for themselves in holding elected officials to account in the period between elections but delegated this responsibility to other political actors instead. Two thirds of the population endorsed the statement that "people are like children; the government should take care of them like a parent," while a third believed that "[g]overnment is like an employee; the people should be the bosses who control the government."³¹⁴ Clearly, patrimonial forms of (upwards) accountability prevailed over democratic forms of (downwards) accountability. Political elites faced particularly strong incentives "from below" to take care of and cater for the needs of their (restricted) geographical support base. In the eyes of Malian citizens, state legitimacy predominantly depended on the personal performance of individual political leaders.³¹⁵

³¹¹ Bratton, M. Coulibaly, M. & Machado, F. (2002) 'Popular Views of the Legitimacy of the State in Mali.' *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines* 36(2): 197-238, p. 208.

³¹² Afrobarometer, (2009) 'Popular Attitudes towards Democracy in Mali: A Summary of Afrobarometer Indicators 2001-2008', available at: www.afrobarometer.org.

³¹³ Sears, J.M. (2007), p. 512.

³¹⁴ Afrobarometer. 'Summary of Results: Round 4 Afrobarometer Survey in Mali', available at: www.afrobarometer.org.

³¹⁵ Bratton, M., Coulibaly, M. and Machado, F. (2002).

Rallying around the powerful executive constituted a strategic choice for political actors in such a context, certainly in light of prevailing popular perceptions against opposition politics and in favour of national consensus. This was exactly how President Touré justified and sold his grand parliamentary coalition. Touré contended that his consensual form of democracy was based on mutual consent, inclusivity and enabled constructive cooperation in the public interest. However, such a stance offered a much too static – and romanticised – interpretation of political culture and democratic practice. It obscured the lack of participation by a majority of Malian citizens and the narrow particularistic interests that dominated the party system. The next and final section provides a brief reflection on the impact of the party system upon state legitimacy in the context of Mali’s heterarchical order.

3.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The trajectory of one-party dominance in Mali has been quite extraordinary. Ever since Mali’s democratic transition in the early 1990s, strong “centrifugal” forces have characterised the party system as all main political actors persistently rallied behind a powerful executive. ADEMA dominated the party system during the first decade of multi-party politics. The “open seat” elections in 2002 marked the end of ADEMA’s dominance but a balanced party system with a strong opposition did not emerge; instead, a dominant coalition merely replaced the dominant party.

The Malian case, firstly, confirmed the impact of well-known institutional factors in enhancing the trajectory of one-party dominance “from above.” The particularly strong – historically rooted – powers vested in the presidency clearly expedited the endurance of one-party and one-coalition dominance. The electoral system also proved particularly advantageous to the emergence of one-party dominance in the polls of 1992.

Moreover, political leaders faced strong incentives “from below” that encouraged them to rally around the executive locus of political power. Opting for a role in opposition role was not a particularly attractive option from the point of view of a political leader in such an institutional and social context. Hence, one would expect one-party or one-coalition dominance to prevail in one form or another in the future. Chapter 6 provides a brief analysis of how the party system evolved during the post-coup period (2013-2018).

Finally, this chapter demonstrated that the party system did not make a significant contribution to (the “input side” of) state legitimacy during the first two decades following Mali’s democratic transition. The chapter revealed highly restricted patterns of political

participation and representation through the party system. Only a small minority of citizens participated in elections or maintained contact with party representatives. Very basic but influential factors such as language, education and religion contributed to the deep divide between political elites and the day-to-day life of most Malian citizens. Exclusive networks between national political elites and local power brokers primarily shaped political mobilisation and representation. Patrons prevailed over policies and personal ties trumped institutionalised partisan politics. The party system did not effectively bridge the state society divide. Most citizens, certainly across the rural areas, continued to rely on other power poles in Mali's heterarchical political order where indigenous and religious sources of legitimacy remained particularly influential.

In fact, the party system further exacerbated popular disillusionment with the state as many citizens increasingly contested the elitist pillars of politics. After two decades of multi-party democracy, an overwhelming majority of citizens felt that the country's political parties pursued only selfish interests.³¹⁶ During the 1990s, popular frustration with the elitist form of democracy advanced by ADEMA steadily mounted.³¹⁷ A decade later, people reproached political elites to take care of themselves more than anything else as corruption figures steeply mounted. Moreover, Malian citizens primarily pointed in the direction of their own political elites rather than foreign terrorists or Tuareg rebels in explaining the implosion of state authority in 2012.³¹⁸ At the local level, youngsters questioned the legitimacy of local powerbrokers who long monopolised ties with national political elites. De Bruijn and Both (2017), for example, illustrated that Fulani youngsters in central Mali gradually realised that neither their elites, nor the state had ever really done anything for them.³¹⁹ Yet, this chapter clearly revealed that Mali's party system did not provide accessible and effective intermediary political channels to raise and express such popular discontent. The next chapter extends this analysis and examines the role of the Malian legislature in holding an increasingly discredited executive branch of government accountable. Accountability constituted the third democratic pillar expected to reinforce state legitimacy together with political participation and representation. The chapter examines the performance of Malian parliamentarians in the years preceding democracy's decay in 2012.

³¹⁶ FES (2013) 'Mali-mètre N.03', available at: <http://www.fes-mali.org/index.php/mali-metre>; Whitehouse, B. (2013) 'Mali's Coup, One Year On', available at: <http://bridgesfrombamako.com/>.

³¹⁷ Results of an opinion poll, summarized by Sears (2007), pp. 188-9.

³¹⁸ Bratton, M. and Coulibaly, M. 2013. 'Crisis in Mali: Ambivalent Popular Attitudes on the Way Forward', *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, 2(31): 1-10.

³¹⁹ De Bruijn, M. and Both, J. (2017) 'Youth Between State and Rebel (Dis)Orders: Contesting Legitimacy from Below in Sub-Sahara Africa', *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 28(4-5): 779-798.