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Explanation and determination

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Curriculum vitae

Victor Gijsbers was born in Leiden on July 22nd, 1982. After completing his secondary education at the Utrechts Stedelijk Gymnasium (1993-1999), he studied physics and philosophy at Utrecht University, getting an MSc in Foundations of physics (cum laude) and an MA in Philosophy of the exact sciences, both in 2004. Since 2004 he has been working at the philosophy department of Leiden University, first as a PhD student and from 2008 onwards as lecturer (docent) in philosophy of science, philosophy of the humanities, and epistemology. He has also visited the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at Cambridge University in 2007, where he worked with Peter Lipton.

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the workshops of the Dutch-Flemish Network for Philosophy of Science and Technology; as well many more informal meetings. I fondly remember the many reading groups I had with Eric Schliesser, ranging as they did from James Ladyman to Jacques Derrida. I would also like to thank my former teachers, Jos Uffink and Janneke van Lith.

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