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Permanent change? the paths of change of the European security organizations

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Chapter 7

Chapter 7. Cross-path Comparison: A Comparative Perspective between the Paths of Broadening, Widening and Deepening

7.1 Introduction

The security organizations of the European security architecture, NATO, the EU and the OSCE, are to a certain extent quite different organizations and maybe as a result difficult to compare. Nevertheless, these three organizations act in the same security environment and overlap in members, partners and tasks. So, why not link and compare these organizations in their paths of change? A comparative method of analysis is ‘making the researcher aware of unexpected differences, or even surprising similarities, between cases. Comparison brings a sense of perspective to a familiar environment and discourages parochial responses to political issues’.¹ In other words, comparing the dynamics of change between the security organizations could reveal surprising variations.

In this research, the paths of change of the different security organizations are analysed separately as well as in comparison, analysing the possible interrelationship between these paths. The previous chapters analysed the separate paths of change of the selected security organizations and provided a cross-case comparison between NATO, the EU and the OSCE within the specific paths of change. This chapter presents a cross-path comparison of the key findings between the paths of change and their possible mutual relationship. Cross-path analysis can show that broadening of the tasks of one organization could lead to deepening of the institutional structure of another organization. Additionally, widening can affect deepening and broadening because, geographically and institutionally, the features of an organization can expand with the multiple forms of cooperation of other organizations, as was elaborated on in Chapter 2. The reason for cross-path comparison is thus the possible empirical linkages between the paths, which could bear theoretical consequences.² Furthermore, as was also discussed in Chapter 2, these consequences could be positive, meaning increased cooperation, but also negative, resulting in uncooperative dynamics or de-institutionalization. The underlying motive for this approach is to aim for a more complete picture of the observed paths of change and their possible drivers. This chapter thus seeks to address the comparative part of the main question of this research: how and why have the paths of the security organizations changed their institutional structure in comparison with each other?

Finally, the influence of the possible drivers on the paths of change will be addressed, although only the key findings based on the larger picture given in Chapters 4 to 6.³

1 Hopkin, J. ‘Comparative methods’, in: Marsh, D., Stoker, G., ‘Theory and Methods in Political Science’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 249.

2 Börzel, T. A., ‘Mind the gap! European integration between level and scope’, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Routledge, April 2005, p. 220.

3 The elaboration on the key findings drawn from Chapters 4 to 6 does not exclude other possible important findings of the research.

7.2 Consistent or Conflicting Paths of Change

From the previous chapters, it became clear that the paths of broadening, widening and deepening of the security organizations showed variations in the adoption of authority, autonomy, mandates, memberships and partnerships while acting at regional and global levels. In all three paths, different and similar forms of cooperation were observed, within and between the paths. The opposites of broadening, widening and deepening have been observed as well.

At first sight, change has been a story of growth in the multilateral European security architecture, in the form of broadening, widening and deepening. One way or another, all three organizations changed and obtained new tasks, members and partners and enhanced or even created new organs. After the end of the Cold War, broadening and widening of NATO, the EU and the OSCE addressed the need for an answer in response to the changed security environment, aided the search for legitimacy and survival and extended the zone of peace for all members. The adoption of new tasks, such as crisis management and engagement programmes with new partners, broadened and widened the scope of NATO's, the EU's and the OSCE's mandate. At the beginning of the 1990s, the adoption of crisis management tasks by NATO fulfilled the replacement of the collective defence task that had become less relevant. For the OSCE, crisis management fulfilled the need for a regional UN after the East-West détente and collapse of the WP. The creation of the EU's security and defence policy also fulfilled the desire of some EU members of the construction of 'No European Monetary Union (EMU) without a European Political Union (EPU)',⁴ as some of the members emphasized the long-desired autonomy from US leadership and some aimed at the development of a European pillar within NATO.

Nevertheless, there have also been periods of crisis and stagnation in all three paths of change, separately and in relation to one another. There were various reasons for stagnation or even crisis, such as disagreement between the member states or (in)capable organizations which resulted in a takeover of tasks by other organizations or organs. In other words, the analysis of international cooperation should not be confused with its celebration, meaning the paths of change did not always result in a positive outcome.

At the end of 2016, a whole new picture of the European security architecture emerged. NATO's collective defence task was prioritised again. The OSCE was embroiled in a power struggle, which paralysed change and made the OSCE the guardian of the frozen conflicts trapped between the bigger powers. And the EU encapsulated all security tasks in particular, addressing security in every aspect.

Over the last three decades, therefore, it was observed that change either developed positively, resulting in an increase in the paths or, in contrast, negatively, resulting in a decrease in the paths, both of which will be explored in detail below.



4 One of the subjects of the negotiations between Germany and France after the 1989 revolutions resulting in the Maastricht Treaty was the subject of the 'politics-for-economics deal': no economic integration without political integration.

Positive Cross-path Influence

The paths of change, as observed in the previous chapters, have led to positive cross-path influences. The paths of broadening and widening of the security organizations have directly or indirectly led to deepening within all three security organizations. The path of widening brought all three organizations extended regional and even worldwide cooperation and geographical presence. Widening led to an intensity of negotiations and consultations resulting in agreements, either political or juridical. And again, this resulted in an increase in the creation or extended mandates of organs. The path of widening thus influenced the path of deepening, as a result of the many different memberships and partnerships. This led to differences in the path of deepening, in level and form, varying from high to low institutionalization, from bi- and multilateral agreements to opt-in and opt-out possibilities within and between the security organizations, which to a certain extent empowered cooperation in the defence realm. Moreover, a combination of bottom-up and top-down cooperation was observed in all paths of change. This was illustrated by the path of widening, which at first was a political decision, such as the NACC and ENP, but thereafter was negotiated and implemented mostly by the organizations' organs: a bottom-up approach, similar to the bottom-up approach of NATO's NRF and the EUBG. In contrast, differentiated top-down cooperation can be seen in the PESCO concept and the OSCE Minsk Group, either based on consensus or on bi- and multilateral⁵ decision-making.

For some states, these forms of cooperation, between states and between organizations, even resulted in an interconnectedness beyond sovereignty. This is illustrated by the Belgium/Netherlands cooperation or the German/Netherlands Corps, which links the armed forces, as they are no longer able to conduct operations without the other state; a marginal form of supranationalism.⁶ An even stronger example of linkage can be demonstrated by the political and juridical cooperation of the Belgium/Netherlands airspace protection.⁷

In addition, widening linked NATO, the EU and the OSCE geographically and organizationally. Between NATO and the EU, the linkage was the strongest in simultaneous regional partnership programmes from the beginning of the 1990s, followed by enlargement programmes from 1997 onwards and, again, simultaneous partnership programmes across the globe. Although these parallel programmes of widening did increase deepening, they were not coordinated or supported by a strong cross-institutional structure.

Furthermore, the extension of EU and NATO territory as a result of widening was directly linked to the OSCE territory, as the enlargement and partnership at first fell within the OSCE area. This geographical link coincided with other links, for instance an institutional link with Russia in the form of the NATO-Russia Council and the EU

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5 Cooperation on capability generation is increasingly taking place 'bottom-up' among the member states.

6 AIV advies: 'Gedifferentieerde integratie: verschillende routes in de EU-samenwerking', nr. 98, 24 november 2015.

7 From 2017, Belgian and Dutch air forces agreed to share surveillance and protection of the Benelux air space.

agreements with Russia. These links, at one time, strengthened the European security architecture.

Apart from a linkage as a result of the path of widening, the path of broadening of both the EU and NATO influencing other paths was observed as well. For instance, an operational linkage between NATO and the EU was created with the Berlin Plus agreement of 2003, as a result of creating and broadening the crisis management tasks of both organizations. Although in the first instance the Berlin Plus agreement prohibited the EU from building separate command structures or even adopting a common defence task, the common defence task of the EU created later in 2009 connected the EU permanently to NATO with additional institutional structures for the EU. Vice versa, NATO's limitation of an inclusive comprehensive approach with corresponding capabilities was linked to the broad approach, organs and capabilities of the EU in 2016.

Debates and crises experienced by the member states influenced the paths of change within and between the organizations as well. This can be seen in the example of the 2003 crisis between NATO and EU member states. Eventually, the intended intervention under the NATO umbrella in Iraq, initiated by the US and the UK, resulted in more flexible decision-making within NATO. Furthermore, the Chocolate Summit in 2003 attended by the four renegade European states striving for an autonomous European headquarters resulted in more autonomy for the EU.

The Crimea crisis of 2014 resulted in an increase in the linkage between NATO, the EU and even the OSCE in tasks and organs. On the one hand, this resulted in an increase in the division of labour and strengthened the OSCE, as the OSCE was the only organization to respond and act in these kinds of conflict where the others were not 'allowed'. On the other hand, interdependence between NATO and the EU increased, each complementing the other in their scope of policies through the combination of collective defence with broad security.

To a certain level, therefore, the OSCE, the EU and NATO have become complementary and mutually interdependent through the linkage of tasks and cross-geographical, organizational and institutional linkages; broadening, deepening and widening. This resulted in an increase of horizontal and vertical interdependency; horizontal interdependency because of the linkage of policies and tasks, and vertical interdependency because of the linkage of institutional structures and capabilities.

Negative Cross-path Influence

As well as a positive increase in cross-path influence, a more negative cross-path influence was observed as well. For the EU and NATO, to a certain extent, widening was a choice. For the OSCE, widening has never been a choice, as the new states that emerged after the end of the Cold War already fell within the OSCE area. The increase in the EU's and NATO's path of widening led to contrasting paths of deepening and to some extent broadening within the

OSCE, as the primary pan-European security organization.⁸ Enlargement even undermined the OSCE's path of deepening, not only as a result of the overlap of tasks and members with the EU and NATO, but also because of the result of a sometimes negative differentiation between members, candidates, non-candidates and organizations.

In addition, a distinction can be made in principle between the rights and obligations of full members, associated members and partners. However, as a result of differentiation between memberships as well as partnerships and the participation of non-member states in all sorts of operations, the result was an increase of deepening in the form of complex institutional structures or ad-hoc non-institutionalized structures. As a consequence, the demarcation line between members and partners often became blurred. This again led to differentiated institutional structures and the differentiated and complex appliance of mandates.

Furthermore, when NATO and EU enlargement had lost its dynamism in the first decade of the 21st century and engagement replaced enlargement by partnership, this resulted in even more differentiation among 'third' countries within the OSCE area. As a result, the OSCE area became more insecure, in contrast with the original aim of the extension of the zone of peace.⁹ However, to address these dynamics, the OSCE was not deepened sufficiently. The OSCE was not strengthened with the necessary capabilities for the ongoing frozen conflicts,¹⁰ such as the one in the Transnistrian region in Moldova.¹¹ Yet the OSCE remained the only alternative in the case of a flare-up of such conflicts. Nevertheless, widening of the EU and NATO undermined the building of the European security architecture, as was originally the aim, and enhanced differentiated regionalism and complex multilateral regional cooperation schemes.

Moreover, as a result of broadening of NATO, in the form of the crisis management tasks, and broadening of the EU in the form of a broad approach of security, backed-up by organs and financial capabilities, to a large extent they took over the completion of the OSCE's institutionalization and capabilities.

Finally, because of the paths of widening and broadening of both the EU and NATO, the respective collective defence and cooperative security task of NATO linked to the EU backfired. Enlargement and engagement meant integrating conflicts from outside and disagreement with partners in the OSCE. As a result, in contrast to the extension of the zones of peace, the aim at the end of the Cold War, zones of tension and conflict were incorporated for both organizations. An example was the EU and NATO membership of the Baltic States in 2004 and the Crimea crisis of 2014. Furthermore, it was observed that broadening of the collective defence task conflicted with the path of widening of the EU and NATO.

8 Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., 'Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union', Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 15.

9 Tardy, T., 'CSDP in action. What contribution to international security?' Chaillot paper, EU-ISS, No. 134, May 2015, p. 216.

10 The term frozen conflict refers to a situation in which active armed conflict has ended, but no peace treaty or political framework has resolved the conflict.

11 Transnistria is an autonomous territorial region with a special legal status within the state of Moldova. It mainly consists of a Russian minority. A fight for independence started in March 1992 and was concluded by a ceasefire in July 1992. Transnistria is internationally recognised as a part of the state of Moldova.

So, although the OSCE, the EU and NATO have become complementary and mutually interdependent, the multilateral framework of European security has become more complex and fragmented. Bi- and multilateralism have increased within the security organizations as well as outside the security organizations and have led to much more ad-hoc and non-institutionalized cooperation schemes.

7.3 Explaining Paths of Change

As stated earlier, change of organizations set in the security and defence domain follows a certain amount of path dependency and international politics has always been guided, built and restrained by states defending their national interest and sovereignty. This research has shown that member states often varied in their response to the paths of change and furthered or hampered cooperation, which resulted in integrative and disintegrative dynamics, as explained by rational choice institutionalists. These differences were built on their interests, threat perception and goals to be achieved with international cooperation, which resulted in varied paths of change.

As was illustrated in this research, the growth of states as members or partners committed to the organizations, together with the broadening of the scope of policies, resulted in an increase of differentiated paths of deepening, both in level and form between proponents and opponents of cooperation. For the member states, the reasoning behind these differentiated paths of deepening varied. As was illustrated, politically driven arguments varied from national gain to, in contrast, a contribution to international security cooperation. And militarily driven arguments varied from enhancing capabilities with a smaller group of states to a preference for the composition of a specific exclusive coalition to conduct operations.

As was presented in the previous chapters, widening was well received amongst the member states of both the EU and NATO within the OSCE area at the beginning of the 1990s, especially when both broadening and deepening increased beyond the scope of the national interests of some of the member states. For these member states, widening even became the replacement and target to accomplish as a countermeasure for ongoing deepening and broadening paths. In other words, broadening and deepening resulted in more debate between the members, in contrast to widening, as illustrated by the position that the UK took in the EU and NATO, supporting widening as a countermeasure towards the other paths of change. This is comparable to the position that Turkey held in NATO, blocking the EU's CSDP strengthening, because Turkey was not likely to become an EU member in the short run.

Furthermore, if one path was strengthened within an organization, it was likewise strengthened in the other organization. In other words, the paths were linked. An example is the EU-NATO link on mutual defence. As some states objected to the adoption of a common defence task for the EU, a link was claimed in EU's Treaty of Lisbon, which led to the adoption of Article 42.7, prioritising NATO. And the adoption of a broader approach

to security within the EU influenced the adoption of a broader approach to security and defence within NATO. On the one hand, NATO's broad approach was limited and linked to the EU, because states such as Germany and France preferred the EU to be the organization with a broad approach towards security and defence rather than NATO. On the other hand, NATO did acquire some capacities in line with a broader approach due to lessons learned from NATO operations. In particular, the US and the UK preferred NATO to have a mandate which included broader capabilities than solely military.

However, apart from rational choice explaining the influence of state actors and the , the organizations' organs that were set up to coordinate and implement the paths of change took the lead in further broadening, widening and deepening, underlined by constructivist institutionalism. Due to differences between states or inabilities vis-à-vis the increase in missions and operations, the inter-organizational cooperation, the expertise and therefore power of the organs themselves increased. For instance, once the decision of widening was taken, EU and NATO organs took the lead in negotiations and agreements with third parties. Furthermore, the EU's operations and missions in particular were performed more often in coordination with NATO officials and organs than at the EU-NATO political level.

However, the research illustrated cooperation dynamics that can also be explained by the functionalist mechanism of spill-over¹² and Keohane's, Nye's and Deutsch's interdependence. Even more so, these mechanisms were not only observed in the EU, as intended by Haas and Rosamond, but likewise in NATO and the OSCE. Spill-over was observed with regard to policies (from one policy to another), in forms of cooperation, in membership and partnership and in the extension of a differentiated institutional structure in either broadening, widening or deepening. The spill-over effect turned out to be a driver between the organizations in their paths of change. For instance, if the EU changed in the paths of broadening and widening, these developments were likewise observed within NATO, and vice versa. Not only the process of political, institutional and operational isomorphism was observed, as described by Koops,¹³ but likewise the spill-over mechanism in all three paths of change: the EU's incremental path of broadening was to a certain extent unstoppable and pulled NATO along, and vice versa. Furthermore, the increase of the institutional security environment resulted in a shift of the collective defence, collective security and cooperative security tasks between the paths of change and between the organizations, as was discussed previously.

To a certain extent, constructivist institutionalism addresses bureaucratic processes of change by an increase or decrease of institutionalization, in new members or partners and in the powers that be. However, the observed spill-over dynamics of the theory of neo-functionalism, which can explain a certain amount of automatism in the paths of change, lacks attention in the bureaucratic analysis of the constructivist institutionalism.

12 Rosamond, B., 'The uniting of Europe and the foundation of EU studies: revisiting the neo-functionalism of Ernst B. Haas', *Journal of European Public Policy*, Routledge, April 2005, p. 245.

13 Koops, J. A., 'NATO's Influence on the Evolution of the European Union as a Security Actor', in: Costa, O., Jorgensen, K.E., 'The Influence of International Institutions on the EU. When Multilateralism hits Brussels', *Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics*, 2012.

These mechanisms can be defined as functional spill-over¹⁴ or political spill-over,¹⁵ or as dynamics of disintegration or 'spill-back', being the opposite of spill-over.¹⁶ Over the years, this mechanism of spill-over as a concept developed and resulted in many forms, such as vertical (linkage of institutional structure and capabilities) and horizontal (territorial extension) forms of spill-over.¹⁷

As a result of change, therefore, the dynamics of broadening, widening and deepening led to mechanisms of interconnectedness, spill-over and even interdependence between the security organizations. In some cases, it also led to their counterpart in the form of uncooperative dynamics or negative spill-over, if widening did not lead to deepening, for example.

7.4 Conclusion

In addition to the analysis of the separate paths of change of the selected security organizations in the previous chapters, this chapter presented a cross-path comparison between the paths of change and their possible mutual relationship. The question was: how and why have the paths of the security organizations changed in comparison with each other?

All in all, the dynamics described above presented a linkage between the paths of change. In some cases, they were exchanged for one another and in others they complemented each other. To a certain extent, NATO, the EU and the OSCE became complementary and mutually linked and sometimes interdependent, through tasks, members, partners and organs. This resulted in an increase of horizontal and vertical interdependency, either positively or negatively. These dynamics were initiated and decided upon by the member states. However, as well as state actors influencing the paths of change, it was observed that other actors and dynamics influenced the paths of change as well.

14 Functional spill-over occurs when cooperation in one sector or policy leads to cooperation in another sector or policy defined by: Jensen, C. S., 'Neo-functional Theories and the Development of European Social and Labour Market Policy', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2000, p. 72-73.

15 Political spill-over is initiated by political actors or interest groups striving for more cooperation to solve common problems. Jensen, C. S., 'Neo-functional Theories and the Development of European Social and Labour Market Policy', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2000, p. 76.

16 Schmitter, P. C., 'Ernst B. Haas and the Legacy of Neo-functionalism', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 2005, 12, 2, p. 257-258.

17 From the 1990s, neo-functionalism was modified and updated, see: Sandholtz, W., Sweet, A. S., 'European Integration and Supranational Governance', Oxford University Press, 1998; Rosamond, B., 'Theories of European Integration', Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2000; Sandholtz, W., Sweet, A. S., Fligstein, N., 'The Institutionalization of Europe', 2001; Schmitter, P. C., 'Ernst B. Haas and the Legacy of Neo-functionalism', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 2005, 12, 2; Sandholtz, W., Sweet, A. S., 'Neo-functionalism and Supranational Governance', paper, 2009; Nelsen, B. F., Stub, A. (eds.), 'The European Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration', Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014.