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Permanent change? the paths of change of the European security organizations

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Chapter 5

Chapter 5. The Path of Widening

5.1 Introduction

Immediately after the end of the Cold War, the necessity of a new European security architecture encompassing NATO, the OSCE, the EU, the WEU and the Council of Europe to achieve stability and promote a division of labour was specifically stated by NATO and the OSCE.¹ This endeavour started a web of relationships between new members, partners and interaction between security organizations within the European security architecture.

This path of widening, together with the path of broadening addressed in Chapter 4, is discussed in this chapter. As was explained in Chapter 2, widening is defined as a path of horizontal integration, approached in this research by a broad definition of widening, including memberships and partnerships. Consideration is given to the questions of how and why change has led to a widening of the European security organizations. As in Chapter 4, therefore, the security organizations are analysed separately and in comparison in their path of widening, showing what the level and form of this path of change comprise, what the results are and what the variation is between the security organizations in their path of widening, and how this can be explained.

5.2 The Concept of Widening: From Regional to Global Organizations

The second path of change in this research, widening, is defined more extensively than solely full membership of state actors. Widening also includes forms of membership and partnership among state and non-state actors.

To analyse this path of change, form and level are applied as the indicators of widening based on the framework as elaborated in Chapter 2. The starting point of the analysis of each organization will be the foundation, or, in institutionalist terms, the creation, of the organization and from there, through process tracing, the development of the path of widening from 1990 onwards will be analysed.

The form of widening for international organizations can be categorised into several features. Form can be categorised into geographical expansion, varying from a regional to a global coverage. Furthermore, widening can be categorised in different forms of membership and partnership, ranging from ad-hoc cooperation to association to full membership with a possibility of opt-in or opt-out variants for policy areas. Consequently, three groups of actors are analysed in which the path of widening can be distinguished.

1. Full or partial membership, with opt-in and opt-out variants, varying from formal to less formal membership, varying in policy areas and completed with no, with low or with high institutionalized structure.
2. Partnership, varying from formal to less formal partnership, varying in policy areas and completed with no, with low or with high institutionalized structure.

1 NATO Strategic Concept, 1991.

3. Cooperation between security organizations (interaction), varying in policy areas and completed with no, with low or with high institutionalized structure.

In addition, organizations are established on a system of open or restricted membership which is based on specific criteria set by the organization. In other words, membership can be inclusive or exclusive. Furthermore, states can become full or associated members of different organizations simultaneously, a so-called cross-institutional membership. As well as states, organizations can cooperate and interact with each other.

Second, these different forms of widening can vary in their institutionalization, referred to as the level of change. Institutionalization is based on political and/or juridical agreements, completed with a non, low or high institutionalized structure. In this research, therefore, widening is broadly defined as encompassing the accession of new member states and partnering with states and organizations (the interaction between organizations). The path of widening will be observed both within and between NATO, the EU and the OSCE. These different forms of widening and the level of institutionalization of this path of change are addressed in the sections below.

5.3 The NATO Path of Widening

5.3.1 Introduction

The first NATO summit after the end of the Cold War at Rome in 1991 led to the initiative of a framework addressing European security ‘...The challenges we will face in this new Europe cannot be comprehensively addressed by one institution alone...’² NATO approached cooperation and dialogue within Europe as ‘...the key security question facing the West...’³ It was acknowledged that dialogue and cooperation within Europe and beyond was made possible after the end of the Cold War. In addition, it was agreed that the OSCE, the EC, the WEU and the UN ‘...have an important role to play.’⁴ A first step to cooperative security, as expressed by NATO, indicating relations with states and organizations. This section examines the questions of how and why change has led to a widening of NATO. This specific NATO path of widening will be analysed by focusing on the form and level of widening, addressing membership, partnership and interaction between NATO and other actors from 1990 onwards.

5.3.2 Membership

From a Western European Organization to Enlargement within the OSCE Area

The end of the Cold War set off a new road to enlargement and partnership for NATO. The first NATO summit after the Cold War was the Rome Summit in 1991, which stated

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2 NATO Strategic Concept, 1991, par. 3.

3 Glaser, C. L., ‘Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe’, *International Security* 18, summer 1993, p. 10.

4 NATO Strategic Concept, 1991, par. 34.

the necessity of a pan-European architecture after the fall of the Warsaw Pact (WP). It was decided that the OSCE should be strengthened to enhance this European security architecture.

The following NATO Summit in Oslo supported and enabled OSCE crisis management operations, on a case-by-case basis, to address the crisis in the Balkans. The possibility was also created for the OSCE to address other crises as a result of the emerging grey zone that originated from the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the WP.⁵ Furthermore, as well as addressing a European security architecture, it was stated that formal and practical relations with other security organizations, such as the UN and the WEU, were necessary.

NATO was thus one of the first organizations within the European security architecture that called for cooperation and dialogue with new states. The first concrete steps to enlargement, initiated by cooperation and dialogue schemes with former adversaries outside the NATO area, led to the initiative of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), instigated by the US Bush administration.⁶

NATO enlargement was based on a flexible concept of membership as stated in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty (1949).⁷ This flexible approach refers to the 'light' criteria that NATO stated and was labelled as an 'open-door policy', aiming at a flexible approach to contribute '...to the security of the North Atlantic area...'.⁸ The concept of the open-door policy has ruled NATO enlargement for decades, claiming that '...NATO's ongoing enlargement process poses no threat to any country. The policy itself is aimed at promoting stability and cooperation, at building a Europe whole and free, united in peace, democracy and common values....'.⁹ The NATO approach to enlargement, cooperation and dialogue in the beginning of the 1990s, as a collective defence organization, was therefore to build security and stability within the wider Europe.

After the first declarations of the need for cooperation and dialogue after the end of the Cold War, criteria for becoming an actual member of NATO were settled in the 'Study on NATO Enlargement' of 1995, and have changed little since then.¹⁰ The aim of this study was to enhance security and extend stability, initiated by the US in close cooperation with Germany.¹¹

5 North Atlantic Council, Oslo Summit, June 1992.

6 Including 16 NATO member states and 22 former WP members and SU republics. Predecessor of EAPC, 20 December 1991.

7 NATO Washington Treaty, 1949, Article 10.

8 *Idem*.

9 Study on NATO Enlargement, September 1995, par.4, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24733.htm?, accessed 1-7-2018.

10 *Ibid*, whole document.

11 Before becoming a full member, candidates participate in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), NATO, 'Membership Action Plan', 1999, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27444.htm?, accessed 1-7-2018. Combined with the so-called Perry Principles, articulated by the US Secretary of Defense William Perry, from February 3, 1994, to January 23, 1997 under the Clinton administration.

To join the Alliance, nations were expected to respect the norms and values of the North Atlantic Treaty (1949) and to meet political, economic and military criteria.¹² These criteria, although they included material and procedural conditions, were grounded in non-legally binding terms.¹³

NATO enlargement has always been decided on a case-by-case basis, which left the decision-making power with the member states in the NAC. As a result of this ad-hoc decision-making, a differentiation between candidates was established, giving some nations earlier membership than others.¹⁴ The path of accession of states started with an invitation to begin an intensified dialogue with the Alliance about their aspirations and related reforms.

With regard to the level of widening, full membership provided representation in the NAC and other political and military decision-making bodies and protection under Article 5.

NATO has been an intergovernmental organization from its foundation, where the implication of NATO's Article 5 '...as they deem necessary...' and the system of 'costs lie where they fall' ran as a red line through the structure of the organization. This resulted in differentiation between members, which will be explored below.

The political conditions of NATO membership did not contain hard criteria like the EU's Copenhagen criteria, but rather moral expectations such as the drive for good governance, the rule of law, democracy, economic collaboration and wellbeing, in line with Article 2 of the Washington Treaty.

The military criteria, such as interoperability with other NATO members, played a marginal role.¹⁵ There were no strict demands in qualitative or quantitative force targets or other military capabilities.¹⁶ While the aim of harmonisation and interoperability with regard to enlargement was described in the NATO study on enlargement, with regard to the form of enlargement NATO members varied in their defence expenditures, capabilities and contribution to NATO-led operations, leading to a differentiated membership.

The first move towards enlargement had been a combination of a political and moral deed, offering new states the foresight on democracy, prosperity, security and defence together with an attempt to rebalance the European equilibrium and expand US and European influence.

12 The Perry Principles contained four principles that underpinned NATO's past success: collective defence, democracy, consensus, and cooperative security. Applied to enlargement this meant that; new members must have forces able to defend the Alliance; be democratic and have free markets, put their forces under civilian control, protect human rights, and respect the sovereignty of others: accept that intra-Alliance consensus remains fundamental; and possesses forces that are interoperable with those of existing NATO members.

13 These criteria include a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy; fair treatment of minority populations; a commitment to resolve conflicts peacefully; an ability and willingness to make a military contribution to NATO operations; and a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutions.

14 Study on NATO enlargement, 1995, Chapter 1.

15 *Ibid.*, par. 43 and 44.

16 Schimmelfennig, F., 'The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 39.

The driving forces and initiatives for enlargement after the end of the Cold War mainly came from the US and Germany.¹⁷ The US reasoning behind enlargement in the beginning of the 1990s was, on the one hand, ‘...the historical debt for letting East-Central Europe fall into the sphere of influence of the SU in the 1940s...’¹⁸ and ‘...a genuine desire to reduce security anxieties of Central and East European states by including them in a broader security community’.¹⁹ On the other hand, US interest was to stabilise Europe after the end of the Cold War, as a result of the incorporation of Germany, the Balkans wars and the position of Russia in the European security architecture.²⁰ Furthermore, it would help the US to control the framework of European security in relation to the expanding EU together with preventing Eastern European states from seeking other possible security guarantees.²¹ Either way - and strongly promoted by the US President Clinton - US security was linked to European security, and enlargement, cooperation and dialogue would be the key to this security link according to the US.²² Within the US Congress, the belief was that ‘...no matter how it is packaged, current scenarios for NATO expansion entail an anti-Russian element.’ Another aspect of US interest in enlargement was the possibility of withdrawal of forces from Europe, in order to become more active in other parts of the world.²³ At the same time, there was a ‘... widely held belief that expansion is the most effective means of sustaining NATO and, thereby, of maintaining a vital US role in European security relations’.²⁴

Along with the US, enlargement was of interest to Germany. As a result of Germany’s unification in 1990, its historical roots with the eastern and central European area and its central geographical position in Europe, the country played an important role in the enlargement debate. NATO enlargement could stabilise Germany’s geographical position.²⁵ Furthermore, it could prevent Russian dominance in the region and simultaneously give Russia a place in the European security architecture, by strengthening the OSCE as was stated by NATO in 1990.

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- 17 Sloan, S. R., ‘Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 194.
 - 18 Dunay, P., ‘The Changing political geography of Europe. After EU and NATO enlargements’, p. 77, in: Tardy, T., (eds.) ‘European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external dynamics’, Contemporary Security Studies, Routledge, Oxon, Great Britain, 2009.
 - 19 Ruggie, J. G., ‘Consolidating the European Pillar: The key to NATO’s future’, The Washington Quarterly, January 7, 1997, p. 109.
 - 20 Sarotte, M. E., ‘1989. The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe’, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2014, p. 1-10; Sloan, S. R., ‘Defense of the West. NATO, The European union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 103-106; Sloan, S. R., ‘Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 103-106.
 - 21 Andrews, D. (ed.), ‘The Atlantic Alliance under Stress. US-European relations after Iraq’, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 239.
 - 22 Speech by President Clinton, 22 October 1996.
 - 23 Solomon, G. B., ‘The NATO enlargement Debate, 1990-1997’, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, The Washington Papers 174, Washington D.C., 1998, p. 122.
 - 24 Ruggie, J. G., ‘Consolidating the European Pillar: The key to NATO’s future’, The Washington Quarterly, January 7, 1997, p. 109.
 - 25 Schimmelfennig, F., ‘The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 47-49.

Besides these ambitious member states, once the initiative for enlargement was put on the agenda, the main impetus for enlargement within NATO came from the officials who were pushing and setting the agenda of the member states.²⁶

Enlargement

At the Madrid Summit in 1997, NATO invited Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to become members, although twelve countries had applied for NATO membership.²⁷

The US administration was interested in inviting five states, including Slovakia, but the US Congress and most of the European members, except for France and Italy, were less enthusiastic due to the possibility of a strained relationship with Russia.²⁸ Nevertheless, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined NATO in May 1999. This is usually referred to as the first round of enlargement.

The second round of enlargement, which was debated with nine states from the former WP, was initiated at the Washington Summit in 1999. The finalisation of these debates resulted in NATO's second round of enlargement in 2004, also called 'the big bang', including the Baltic states and states from the Western Balkans.²⁹ With that, NATO's comprehensive and indivisible approach to security, dating from the end of the Cold War, resulted in a collective defence organization covering more than half of the OSCE area in 2004.

After the first and even more after the second round of enlargement, however, the Allies became more divided towards NATO's open-door policy. Not only the political strategic arguments relating to the position of Russia were on the table, but also burden sharing among the newcomers and differences in threat perception. In contrast with the earlier political and moral arguments of the 1990s, member states were arguing that 'conventional forces can be easily divided among allies, and those used to protect one particular Alliance territory cannot be used at another border at the same time. If because of enlargement a larger border or area has to be protected, conventional forces are subject to consumption rivalry in the form of force thinning'.³⁰ For some of the 'old' members, 'new' members diluted rather than strengthened NATO military power and effectiveness, increasing security risks and alliance costs.³¹ Nevertheless, Albania and Croatia were invited as members in 2009. After the second round of enlargement at the Bucharest Summit in 2008, it was announced that Ukraine and Georgia could become members of NATO, but without mentioning a final date.³² This US initiative for Georgia and Ukraine was highly delicate and was eventually blocked by Germany and France. Both countries were in favour of cooperating with Russia within the security architecture, not excluding Russia, as it was

26 Ibid, p. 45.

27 Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Croatia, Georgia and Ukraine.

28 Schimmelfennig, F., 'The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 236-242.

29 The Baltic states, Slovakia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania.

30 Schimmelfennig, F., 'The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 22.

31 Ibid, p. 45-46.

32 North Atlantic Council, Bucharest Summit, April 2008.

against their own interests to annoy Russia.³³ As for Russia, the offer of NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine was the ultimate provocation of NATO enlargement and was regarded as a declaration of war.³⁴

After the Crimea crisis of 2014, at the Wales Summit, the pledge for Ukraine to become a NATO member was not repeated again. Though full membership of Ukraine and Georgia was no longer on the agenda, increased defence cooperation was initiated and a possibility was created for individual NATO allies to cooperate militarily with Ukraine.³⁵ Consequently, NATO's enlargement door remained open, but lost its attraction within the Alliance as a result of the discord between the members. In 2014 in Wales, the intention was expressed to strengthen the cooperation with the EU and to renew cooperation with the OSCE for coordinating further enlargement.³⁶

Differentiated Membership

The enlargement path of NATO created an internal variation of different forms of membership within the organization. This differentiated form of membership was already the case before the big bang of enlargement of the 1990s. This internal variation was comparable to the EU opt-in and opt-out variants of membership. Due to historical legacies, disagreement about leadership or, at the other end of the spectrum, lack of armed forces, differentiation can be found in the use of armed forces, the membership of NATO organs and its decision-making power and participation in Article 5 or crisis management operations. The variations in form can be found specifically in the case of Iceland, France, Germany and Luxembourg. During the Cold War, Germany's military contribution to NATO was implemented incrementally. After the German unification in 1990, Germany's position was strengthened, advocated by the Bush administration. Nevertheless, it was simultaneously restricted by Germany's own constitution and by those opposing the strengthening of Germany's position in NATO. Ever since 1967, France had not participated in the NATO military command structures. As a result, President De Gaulle withdrew France from the military structures. In 1996, President Chirac attempted to become a full member of NATO's Military Committee, proposing that NATO's southern command be passed from American to European leadership.³⁷ This proposal stranded in 1997 in the NAC after US refusal. More than ten years later, the French President Sarkozy appealed to the American Congress and in 2009 France re-entered NATO's military structure.³⁸

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- 33 Sloan, S. R., 'Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain', Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 234-236.
- 34 International diplomatic crisis between Georgia and Russia began in 2008 and led to the outbreak of the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 and the 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas dispute.
- 35 NATO-Ukraine cooperation: NATO, 'Relations with Ukraine', 2017, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm#. NATO-Georgian cooperation: NATO, 'Relations with Georgia', 2017, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_38988.htm, accessed 12 July 2018.
- 36 NATO Wales Summit, September 2014.
- 37 Irondelle, B., Merand, F., 'France's return to NATO: the death knell for ESDP?', *European Security* Vol. 19, No. 1, March 2010, p. 32.
- 38 10 March 2009.

5.3.3 Partnership

Regional NATO

As well as full membership of NATO, part of the NATO agenda at the beginning of the 1990s concerned the question of how a political-military organization, with an exclusive membership based on the concept of collective defence, could contribute to security in the whole of Europe. As the London Summit (1990) declared 'We recognise that, in the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbours. NATO must become an institution where Europeans, Canadians and Americans work together not only for the common defence, but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship'.³⁹ As well as offering membership, NATO answered this question by installing low institutionalized cooperation frameworks. This approach of flexible, differentiated and modest institutionalized cooperation frameworks was first achieved by the installation of the NACC in 1990. Together with OSCE widening, as will be discussed in this chapter, the NACC was one of the first frameworks of widening within the European security architecture.

The NACC provided NATO with three goals. With the NACC, a wider concept of security was put on the agenda. The NATO mandate broadened, engaging NATO with not only military issues within its scope of tasks, but also with the democratisation of armed forces, emergency planning and financial aspects with partners.⁴⁰ Furthermore, the NACC's main goal was a forum for dialogue and cooperation without a reference to full membership, which meant the NACC could be viewed as a good alternative for full membership. Driven by the enlargement debates within NATO after the Cold War, NACC proved to be the first step towards differentiated cooperation. Finally, NACC was created as one of the measures to include non-members in political discussions which were on the NATO agenda, but outside the main decision-making body: the NAC. As a result, parallel engagement and decision-making came into being. However, key decision-making and consultation continued to be done inside the traditional alliance structures and alliance policy, the NAC, before presenting issues outside NATO, the NACC.

With regard to the level of institutionalisation of partnership, the structure of the NACC was not purely military, in contrast with NATO's internal structure, but composed of more broadly issues. Cooperation and interoperability were not the only aims of the NACC, as the concept of security was approached more broadly from the beginning of the 1990s, as stated by the Rome Summit of 1991. Finally, there was no agreement on the aim and purpose of the program of cooperation and dialogue with the former WP countries. In the middle of the 1990s, the US Clinton administration, the continuing driving force behind cooperation and dialogue, stated that the NACC could lead to membership of some

39 Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council; 'The London Declaration', 05 July-06 July, 1990, withdrawn 19-10-2017.

40 For an elaboration: NATO, 'North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation', 1991, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23841.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 13 July 2018.

participating countries. The reasoning behind this US plea was ‘to do for Europe’s East what it did for Europe’s West’ and simultaneously to encourage aspirant members to political, economic and military reforms and enlarge the zone of peace as a possible result; the NATO concept of cooperative security.⁴¹ Nevertheless, other allies were not convinced of the need to move so quickly and did not want to disturb the existing European balance of power with Russia, as advocated by France. Next to this geopolitical argument, some member states, such as Germany, were interested in NATO enlargement to strengthen Europe economically by enlarging ‘the democratic and free market area in the post-Cold War world’.⁴² Others argued that cooperation and dialogue could contribute to relieve the allies’ burden against the background of declining defence budgets and distant, complex and expansive missions.⁴³

Apart from the installation of the multilateral NACC, as a pre-stage to the first round of NATO enlargement in 1999, Russia and NATO signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, lightly institutionalized by the establishment of a Permanent Joint Council (PJC).⁴⁴ This was an act between a state and an international security organization. As a separate alignment and different from the other cooperation programmes, the NATO-Russia Founding Act included possibilities for political and military cooperation. The aim was that ‘the member States of NATO and Russia will, together with other States Parties, seek to strengthen stability by further developing measures to prevent any potentially threatening build-up of conventional forces in agreed regions of Europe, to include Central and Eastern Europe’.⁴⁵ NATO declared in the Act to have no intentions for the permanent placement of nuclear, military forces or infrastructure within the new member states.⁴⁶ The Act also included a commitment to strengthen the OSCE and referred to the OSCE’s work on the security model in the era of post-Cold War detente. The NATO-Russia cooperation was strengthened in 2002, preceding NATO’s second enlargement round of 2004, by the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC).⁴⁷

At the end of the 1990s, differentiation of membership and partnership was extended with bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

41 Schimmelfennig, F., ‘The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 236-242.

42 Sloan, S. R., ‘Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University press, Manchester, 2016, p. 111.

43 Daalder, I., Goldgeier, J., ‘Global NATO’, *Foreign Affairs*, September/October, 2006, p. 6.

44 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, Paris, France, 27 May 1997.

45 Idem.

46 Idem.

47 The NRC evolved into a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action. More than 25 working groups and committees have been created to develop cooperation on terrorism, proliferation, peacekeeping, theatre missile defence, airspace management, civil emergencies, defence reform, logistics, scientific cooperation for peace and security: NATO-Russia Council, ‘About NRC’, n.d., available at: <https://www.nato.int/nrc-website/en/about/index.html>, accessed 3-7-2018.

Multilateral cooperation was conceptualised by the European Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC),⁴⁸ again initiated by the US Clinton administration,⁴⁹ which replaced the NACC. The aim was to improve interoperability among member states and partner forces. This placed NATO at the centre of the European security architecture.

Bilateral cooperation was introduced by the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative, established in 1994. The aim of PfP was to support states in their transformation of the armed forces, and did not automatically imply membership. PfP was supposed to be the answer to the debate between the sceptics and supporters of enlargement. The compromise entailed the agreement that with PfP no commitment was made to membership and active engagement in PfP was expected for a possible future membership. Membership would be decided upon on a case-by-case basis. All in all, the criteria for enlargement did not include hard demands, as detailed above.

With regard to the level of multilateral cooperation, PfP was institutionalised with a Planning and Review Process (PARP) in the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC), which included a possibility for PfP countries to contribute to NATO operations, as was the case in Kosovo and Bosnia.⁵⁰ This marked a shift from solely multilateral cooperation to the inclusion of bilateral cooperation. Cooperation was established in the form of Individual Partnership Programs (IPPs) and differentiation with the PARP.⁵¹

Enlargement with new members, supported by the US and strengthening the European pillar within the Alliance, was perceived by the NATO members as a relevant achievement.⁵² Nevertheless, NATO's second round of enlargement, which included the Baltic States and states from the Western Balkans, necessitated a more structured approach to the preparation of the aspirant states who wanted to become members. This was the result of the debates that arose after the first enlargement round between the allies with regard to the geographical span and the criteria used. As the US was a strong advocator of NATO enlargement, a further strengthening of partnership programmes was introduced with the Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 1999. Not only did the MAP require and structure the conditionality of defence reform, it also included a yearly preparation to qualify for membership and contained subjects that were related to politics, economy, defence, finance, intelligence and legal requirements.⁵³ Nevertheless, the MAP was built on PfP and likewise did not include automatic membership, though it did promise cooperation beyond the PfP concept. Furthermore, the MAP did not substitute for full participation in PfP's planning and review process.⁵⁴ For example, Cyprus, as a member of the EU, is not

48 Formerly established at the NATO meeting with partners in Sintra, Portugal, May 1997.

49 In 2017 the EAPC included 50 members and partners of NATO.

50 Many PfP countries participated.

51 NATO, 'Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process', 2014, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_68277.htm, accessed 27 February, 2018.

52 Paris, 27 May 1997.

53 NATO, 'Membership Action Plan (MAP)', 1999, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27444.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 10 July 2018.

54 Sloan, S. R., 'Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain', Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 126.

yet a NATO member or a member of the PFP, as a result of the dispute with Turkey. The MAP therefore resulted in a further differentiation of NATO's path of widening.

All in all, partnership and cooperation were further enhanced with the EAPC and PFP. However, around 2010 the EAPC included fifty members and partners in total, which hardly provided an effective opportunity for discussion and dialogue. As with the other international organizations in this research, due to all the cooperation initiatives, a heterogeneous group emerged which led to debates and informal dialogue alongside the formal and institutionalised fora. Furthermore, the EAPC as 'an institution...', played an important role but never became an important factor in NATO's decision-making process'.⁵⁵ Secretary-General Rasmussen pleaded for the possibility of differentiation of high and low levels of institutionalization, depending on the sort of partnership.⁵⁶ Similar to the PFP programme, or the 29+N formula,⁵⁷ with very different memberships and partnerships. As a result, flexibility and differentiation were embedded within NATO by institutional design, but could at the same time be hampered by political differences within the alliance and between the alliance and its partners. For instance, over the years, NATO had to deal with multiple vetoes exercised by Turkey and its critics over partnership activities with Israel.⁵⁸ In addition, regarding operations and cooperation with partners, intelligence sharing remained an issue between members and non-members. NATO's operational headquarters, Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe (SHAPE), was reluctant to share information, although it had gradually begun to share its military planning, exercising and implementation procedures.⁵⁹ At the other end of the spectrum, the troop-contributing partner states demanded the right to have a say in NATO matters and to be appropriately represented in the command structure, as they supported NATO operations. With this, according to some, partnership resulted in a political minefield.⁶⁰ The programmes of dialogue and cooperation thus resulted in different levels and forms of cooperation.

Together with the debates between the allies with regard to the completion of partnership, enlargement and partnership also resulted in debates between EU and NATO; on the one hand because of the overlap of members and possible consequences for the NATO collective defence guarantee and, on the other, because of the non-EU states that were NATO members, but linked to the EU by association agreements, such as Turkey.

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55 Ibid, p. 116.

56 Secretary General Rasmussen, 2009.

57 Cooperation of NATO as an international organization with a state like Russia or Ukraine.

58 Turkey had vetoed Israel's participation in NATO exercises, as well as its presence at a NATO Summit, May 2011, in protest of the 2010 Gaza flotilla raid by Israeli commandos, in which nine Turkish activists were killed. Furthermore, Turkish-Israeli relations further deteriorated after the 2011 UN report justifying the Mavi Marmara marine assault, which resulted in Turkey expelling the Israeli ambassador and suspending military cooperation. For an elaboration on Turkey-Israel relations see: Arbel, D., 'The U.S.-Turkey-Israel Triangle', Brookings Institution, Analysis Paper, number 34, October 2014.

59 Wallander, C. A., 'Institutional assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War', International Organisation, volume 54, Issue 04, September 2000, p. 722-723.

60 Flockhart T. (eds.), 'Cooperative Security: NATO's Partnership Policy in a Changing World', DIIS Report, 2014:01, Copenhagen, p. 136.

Furthermore, ever since the Berlin Plus agreements of 2003, NATO and the EU were politically and operationally linked. The US and the Atlantic-orientated EU members in particular were motivated 'by concerns that if EU enlargement was allowed to proceed... significantly ahead of NATO's own enlargement process, then what US officials had called underlapping security guarantees might develop'.⁶¹ Before the EU Treaty of Lisbon (2009) and its mutual defence clause, the EU certainly lacked the necessary security guarantees and NATO could be drawn into conflicts unintentionally.⁶²

Global NATO

Apart from NATO's cooperation with partners in the OSCE area at the beginning of this century, US and British governments had a global vision on NATO's mission. This was illustrated by initiatives for partnerships that provided multilateral legitimation for actions in global conflict prevention and crisis management operations.

The US had already initiated the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD)⁶³ in 1994 and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)⁶⁴ in 2004, as well as PFP and EAPC. These concepts were comparable but nevertheless different, as the MD concept was bi- and multilateral in contrast with the ICI.

At the Riga Summit of 2006, the US and the UK proposed the establishment of a global partnership programme, at least including Australia and Japan as a result of their participation in NATO's ISAF operation. This initiative was supported by the NATO organization. Secretary-General Rasmussen suggested turning NATO into a global forum for security and dialogue instead of cooperation with solely European states.⁶⁵ Proponents of strong cooperation with partners worldwide were in favour of a partnership or even membership of NATO, as these partners did contribute to the ISAF operation.

The hesitation or even resistance towards an ever growing NATO came from two sides. On the one hand, there were those that were afraid of a global NATO weakening the Article 5 guarantee. This concern was especially present in the states surrounding Russia. These opponents preferred relations between new partners and NATO to be hierarchal, granting NATO a right of first refusal if it should come to Article 5 operations.⁶⁶ On the other hand, there were those who were not interested in a global NATO, as they were convinced that this would result in competition with the UN and the EU. Germany and France, as

61 Smith, M. A., 'EU enlargement and NATO: The Balkan experience', p. 7 in: Brown, D., Shepherd, A. K., 'The security dimensions of EU enlargement. Wider Europe, weaker Europe?', Manchester University Press, 2007.

62 Kamp, K. H., Reisinger, H., 'NATO's Partnerships after 2014: Go West!', NATO Research Division, No. 92, Rome, 2013.

63 NATO, 'Mediterranean Dialogue', 2017, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52927.htm, accessed 20 May 2018.

64 NATO, 'Istanbul Cooperation Initiative', 2017, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52956.htm, accessed 20 May 2018.

65 'NATO in the 21st Century: Towards Global Connectivity', Speech by NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen, at the Munich Security Conference, 7 February 2010.

66 Sloan, S., 'Is NATO Necessary but Not Sufficient?', p. 270, in: Aybet, G., Moore, R. R., 'NATO in search of a vision', Georgetown University Press, 2010.

advocates of this view, strived for operational cooperation, but not institutionalization of cooperation even up to the political strategic level worldwide.⁶⁷

However, in the margins of the ISAF operation, NATO started dialogue and cooperation with Japan, Australia, South Korea and New Zealand. It was even suggested that these states be given a say over decisions in operations in which they were involved.⁶⁸ The Partners across the Globe (PATG) initiative was created at the Lisbon Summit and adopted in 2011 in Berlin.⁶⁹ It was a bilateral cooperation programme, as different interests among the partners called for different cooperation schemes. At the time of the Lisbon Summit in 2010, relations between the NATO member states and Russia were in a period of détente. NATO pleaded for the implementation of the OSCE principles of confidence-building measures, putting the OSCE and the European security architecture back on the agenda again.⁷⁰ This NATO Summit was attended by the Russian President Medvedev. At that time, NATO and Russia even intensified cooperation in areas where mutual security interests were at stake, such as Afghanistan, non-proliferation, piracy and terrorism.⁷¹

After 2010, the interest in enlargement and partnership changed. Even the US interest had changed from enlargement to engagement⁷² with countries outside the OSCE area, such as China, India and Australia.⁷³ However, this change in interest not only occurred between the members, as explained above, but also within the many and differentiated partner groups.

As the group enlarged, the interests of the partners themselves differed more and more within the NATO cooperation programmes. For instance, Australia's interest was cooperation on countering new threats such as terrorism, not the need for financial and military support that concerned the 'old' partners. The NATO partners from outside the OSCE territory could not therefore be compared with the partnerships inside the OSCE territory, as they were not in a transition period as a result of the end of the Cold War. The new partners had different levels of ambition towards the Alliance and not all of them strived for full membership, as the focus was on ad-hoc operational cooperation, exchange of information, training and education and exercises.⁷⁴

Another group of partners, the MD and ICI group, cooperated mostly bilaterally with NATO, because the interests among these partners differed too much. The contribution

67 Until 2008, these partners were referred to as contact states. At the Bucharest Summit, 2008, the *partners across the globe* initiative was launched. This partnership programme included political cooperation at staff level and operational and bilateral cooperation: information, exchange, training and exercise. From 2010 these programmes were stalled under the (PPC).

68 Daalder, I., Goldgeier, J., 'Global NATO', *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2006, p. 6.

69 PATG group includes: Afghanistan, Australia, Colombia, Iraq, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand and Pakistan.

70 Flockhart T. (eds.), 'Cooperative Security: NATO's Partnership Policy in a Changing World', DIIS Report, 2014:01, Copenhagen, p. 103-106.

71 NATO Strategic Concept, 2010, par. 23.

72 Stated at the second inauguration of US President Obama, 21 January 2013.

73 Howorth, J., 'Security and Defence Policy in the European Union', *The European Union Series*, 2nd edition, 2014, p. 140.

74 Shreer, B., 'Beyond Afghanistan NATO's Global Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific', Research Paper, NATO Defense College, Rome, no. 75, April 2012.

of the MD partners to NATO missions was limited, except for Jordan, who had been contributing to ISAF and the mission in Libya.⁷⁵

Furthermore, the different partnerships were built on two frameworks: one for policy consultations and one for operational decision-making. The first, the Political Military Framework for Partner Involvement in NATO-led Operations (PMF), decided upon at the Lisbon Summit,⁷⁶ was driven by partners' demands for the institutionalization of the consultation that was developed inside the ISAF operation. All operational issues were also considered in partner format, instead of on the basis of the primacy of a NATO format. With these group of partners, NATO had agreed to strengthen its institutional capacity to serve as a type of coalition-building vehicle.⁷⁷ The second framework was built much more flexibly and decided upon case by case, dependent on the operation.

All the different forms of partnerships were the result of the debates within the Alliance and between the Alliance and the partners and other international organizations, because of the different interests of all the actors involved. After 2010, the aim was for these different partnerships to be more structured, but in contrast many new initiatives were created. During the Wales Summit (2014), in the light of the Crimea crisis, new partners, states and organizations, were merged in an interoperability platform, the Partnerships and Cooperative Security Committee (PCSC), as a successor to the Political and Partnerships Committee (PPC), which was initiated in 2010.⁷⁸ This platform included enhanced cooperation with five states,⁷⁹ and these states would have authority to advise decision-making processes within NATO in the context of their troop-contributing efforts to NATO operations. However, this advisory consultation remained short of actual political decision-making.

Furthermore, it was decided, during the summits of Wales (2014) and Warsaw (2016), to strengthen bilateral cooperation with concordant countries, such as Finland and Sweden, as part of the EAPC.⁸⁰ Additionally, the Defence and Related Security and Capability Building (DCB) initiative was launched with the aim of contributing to capability building of willing partners.⁸¹ These included so-called packages, including strategic advice, stabilization and reconstruction institution-building or development of local forces, at

75 NATO, 'Operations and missions: past and present', 2017, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.htm, accessed 10 July 2018.

76 The PMF is one of the Partnership tools and is applied when a partner wishes to join a NATO-led operation. The PMF sets out principles and guidelines for the involvement of all partner countries in political consultations and decision-shaping, in operational planning and in command arrangements for operations to which they contribute.

77 Flockhart T. (eds.), 'Cooperative Security: NATO's Partnership Policy in a Changing World', DIIS Report 2014:01, Copenhagen, p. 135.

78 The PCSC meets in various formats: 'at 29' among Allies; with partners in NATO's regionally specific partnership frameworks, namely the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative; with individual non-member countries in '29+1' formats; as well as in '29+n' formats on particular subjects, if agreed by Allies.

79 Australia, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and Jordan.

80 Contributing to the NRF.

81 NATO, 'Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative', 2017, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132756.htm, accessed 2-3-2018.

the request of the partners. In addition, the Framework for the South⁸² and the PCSC were established.⁸³

So, although the idea was more about coordination and structuring⁸⁴ with partners and other international organizations, all these initiatives existed alongside each other; they were not vigorously or institutionally coordinated under the NATO umbrella, and were even negatively appreciated by some member states, as they feared a further widening of NATO's geographical span.

5.3.4 The NATO Path of Widening

NATO's path of widening can be seen as converging and diverging paths of widening. Converging, as partnership was strengthened, aiming for full membership. Many different relationship and cooperation programmes had been set up with this goal in mind. After the second round of enlargement, widening headed towards looser memberships and partnerships. The Alliance was in disagreement regarding the aim of cooperation, moral arguments or power projection, about a sound strategy of what to achieve and about the level and form of these partnerships. Institutionally, these cooperation programmes were not strengthened, and were even referred to as 'empty shells' by Mearsheimer;⁸⁵ a diverging trend.

In terms of membership, from its creation, NATO cooperation with external partners became more and more differentiated. This was a result of the increase in different concepts of cooperation and partnership and, even in the 1990s, it became clear that many countries would not become full NATO members in the end. To debate this and resist enlargement would be a *contradictio in terminis*, however. The idea behind enlargement was that in an environment dominated by instability, NATO's experience and assets as an organization for cooperation and integration among members could be expanded.⁸⁶ NATO could do for the former WP countries what it had done for Germany after the Second World War as a political and moral deed, offering new states democracy, security and defence. On the other hand, the concept of collective defence and cooperative security of NATO did not coexist. The aim of cooperation for reasons of stability conflicted with the fact that Alliance purposes remained linked to the external commitment of Article 5 as a collective defence organization.

Reflecting on the partnerships, likewise, a differentiation can be observed. Over the years, an extensive NATO partnership programme had been established, referred to by NATO as

82 A military centre for the Mediterranean was created including anti-terrorism measures at JFC, Naples.

83 Politico-military committee responsible for all NATO's programmes with non-member countries.

84 For an elaboration: Kamp, K. H., Reisinger, H., 'NATO's Partnerships after 2014: Go West!', NATO Research Division, No. 92, Rome, 2013.

85 Mearsheimer, J. J., 'Back to the Future; Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), p. 43.

86 Wallander, C. A. 'Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War.' *International Organization* 54, no. 4 (2000), p. 720.

cooperative security, including PFP, EAPC, MD, the ICI and the PATG programme. These programmes were always vigorously supported and often initiated by the US.⁸⁷

The Alliance had culminated and differentiated its forms of partnership. This differentiation provided NATO with different levels (i.e., layering) of cooperation. One group could be identified on the basis of the norms and values similar to those of the NATO allies. This cooperation could be applied to partner countries who share the same norms and values, such as democracy, freedom, stability and welfare. Another group could be categorised along the lines of cooperation from a single policy extending to multiple policies. A third group could be identified according to the contribution to NATO operations. Finally, partnership could be categorised along the lines of high and low levels of institutionalization.

From the end of the Cold War, NATO viewed three pillars as its main or most important tasks. One of them was enlargement and partnership, encapsulated in the NATO concept of cooperative security. These partnership programmes entailed multiple functions. On the one hand, partnership entailed stability, reform and democratisation. On the other, partnership represented the interests of the NATO organization and its allies. Partners could contribute operational capabilities that members lacked. Partnership, instead of membership and institutionalization, allowed the member states to deepen cooperation in fields of mutual interest, such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement, while denying them the decision-making power and the security guarantees⁸⁸ This resulted in bi- and multilaterally differentiating cooperation in the field of policy and in different ways of serving strategic interests for national security, which varied from interests in intervention to conflict areas to the necessity of burden sharing. Having said that, association with NATO and PFP, both institutional arrangements, reflected the superior bargaining power of the enlargement sceptics in the NATO organization vis-à-vis the few supporters of enlargement and the power asymmetry between the western organizations and the eastern candidates.⁸⁹

The crisis in Ukraine and Crimea in 2014 damaged the EAPC partnership of states in the former SU and their relationship with NATO, as some partners affiliated with Russia. This concerned the relationship with partners, but it also applied to members within NATO who were politically or economically linked to Russia. As a result of internal debates and diverging interests between the allies, the basket of cooperative security became fragmented and void, illustrated by the strategic partnership with Russia dating from 1997, which ended up in conflict. The Ukrainian conflict of 2014 had shown that the NATO's cooperative security task was perceived as a threat to Russia instead of a means for dialogue and cooperation.

Finally, reflecting on the concept of cooperative security within NATO, this was not conceptualised as the traditional approach, as was outlined in Chapter 2, or as the OSCE concept of cooperative security. In contrast, NATO defined the concept as a duty to be

87 Schimmelfennig, F., 'The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 23

88 Ibid, p. 50.

89 Schimmelfennig, F., 'The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 260-264.

engaged with global affairs, which was implemented in several partnership programmes.⁹⁰ With the NSC of 2010, NATO linked enlargement and partnership programmes directly to external risks and threats. The NSC implied ‘Solidarity and cohesion within the Alliance, through daily cooperation in both the political and military spheres, ensure that no single Ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them through collective effort to realise their essential national security objectives’.⁹¹

5.3.5 Conclusion

This section examined the questions of how and why change has led to a widening of NATO. NATO changed from a purely collective defence organization, during the Cold War in the transatlantic area, to a global security organization with a diversification in memberships and partnerships. This NATO path of widening can largely be divided into the following distinctive periods. The first phase, at the beginning of the 1990s, established multilateral cooperation heading for enlargement, as building blocks for the foundation of the European security architecture. The second phase, at the beginning of 2000, constituted a further development of multilateral as well as bilateral cooperation. This resulted in enlargement, partnerships and the first signs of differentiation between the partners in form and level of cooperation. The third phase further developed the differentiation and the setup of bi- as well as multilateral worldwide partnerships (not memberships). This last phase constituted a more ‘closed-door policy’ in contrast with the open-door policies of the major enlargement programmes from the 1990s. NATO enlargement had been an answer to the threats of the 1990s, but not to the threats thereafter.

5.4 The EU and its CSDP Path of Widening

5.4.1 Introduction

From the beginning of the European integration process, enlargement and partnership have been part of the EU. The end of the Cold War brought an even larger group of varied members and partners to the EU from around the globe. This section addresses the questions of how and why change has led to a widening of EU. The specific path of widening of the EU will be analysed in this section, focusing on the form and level of change as the indicator, and addressing membership, partnership and interaction between the EU and other actors from 1990 onwards.

■
90 NATO Strategic Concept, 2010, par. 4c; ‘Cooperative security. The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organizations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO’s standards’.

91 NATO, Strategic Concept, 2010, par. 8.

5.4.2 Membership

From a Western European Organization to Enlargement within the OSCE Area

After the end of the Cold War, the EU, like NATO, offered an open-door policy to new members from the former WP. The reasoning behind enlargement, from the side of the EU members, was largely the expansion of the internal market, the furthering of democracy and stability and the extension of a community based on similar norms and values. Although the Franco-German motor had been one of most important drivers behind the EU integration process, the two states were not always united in their views on enlargement. As one of the major powers within the EU, Germany was a proponent of enlargement due to its geographical position in the middle of Europe, historical ties with Eastern Europe and moral and political necessity. Furthermore, Germany had a vested interest in a stable and prosperous middle and Eastern Europe. In contrast, France was more hesitant, as it feared a diminishment of French interest and power and a diminishment of its politically and geographically central position in the EU. France's hesitation even resulted in the decision to subject further enlargement to French referenda.⁹² Along with France, other member states feared an increase in costs as a result of the newcomers, expecting demands on their share of the subsidies, the import of conflicts and the future relation with Russia, similar to the arguments of NATO members.⁹³

As a result, the 'old' members were not unanimous towards enlargement with new members, and the enlargement path of the EU started with political dialogue by association agreements with the former WP countries. Accession to enlargement was based on the so-called Copenhagen criteria, decided upon by the European Council in 1993: 'The associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the EU.'⁹⁴ These criteria were politically and legally stricter than the NATO criteria and referred to specific regulations, but not exclusive conditions.⁹⁵ Candidate countries which applied for full membership required the adoption of the *acquis communautaire*, the EU's incentive for membership. These Copenhagen criteria, divided into political and economic criteria, evolved over the years through political decision-making of the member states and European legislation.⁹⁶

92 Dunay, P., 'The Changing political geography of Europe. After EU and NATO enlargements', p. 76 in: Tardy, T., (eds.) 'European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external dynamics', Contemporary Security Studies, Routledge, Oxon, Great Britain, 2009.

93 For an elaboration on pro and contra arguments on enlargement policy: Schimmelfennig, F., 'The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 64-66.

94 Membership requires that candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. European Council, Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993.

95 Dunay, P., 'The Changing political geography of Europe. After EU and NATO enlargements', p. 76, in: Tardy, T., (eds.) 'European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external dynamics', Contemporary Security Studies, Routledge, Oxon, Great Britain, 2009.

96 European Council, Copenhagen, June 1993.

The first round of enlargement started in July 1997, like NATO, when the Commission presented the Agenda 2000.⁹⁷ The Commission recommended starting negotiations with Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia. This was followed by the December 1999 Council meeting in Helsinki, where these countries were given the opportunity to start accession negotiations in 2000. At the end of 2002, the negotiations were concluded, except for Bulgaria and Romania, who joined the EU in the second round of enlargement in 2007. Consequently, in December 2002, the Council accepted the conditions of the Commission to invite Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Malta and Cyprus were invited a year later.⁹⁸

After the big bang, the first enlargement round in 2004, the debate with regard to enlargement became more divided between the member states. The British and Scandinavian states in particular pushed for a common initiative to engage the eastern periphery, which was more related to their geographical interests. Furthermore, for the UK the interest in broadening the EU had always been as a counterbalance to deepening; the UK's reasoning was that more broadening would lead to less deepening.⁹⁹ On the other hand, although the south eastern part of Europe was already engaged in the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), the so-called Barcelona process¹⁰⁰, the French president Sarkozy initiated and pressed for stronger cooperation with the Mediterranean and launched the idea of a Mediterranean Union,¹⁰¹ which was implemented in 2008.¹⁰²

Alongside the advocates of widening, the Commission, the Council and the EP were strong driving forces behind enlargement. The Commission, initiating the Agenda 2000, and the EP were directly involved in the approval of enlargement, as they could use the assent procedure for treaties with third countries to press for political conditionality.¹⁰³ Much later, in line with the increasing lack of enthusiasm for enlargement, Juncker, the head of the Commission, announced a moratorium of five years on the enlargement programme in 2014.¹⁰⁴

After the end of the Cold War, therefore, the EU broadened in members and partners. As with NATO, the EU had an internal variation with different forms of membership from its creation. This is usually referred to as the possibility of opt-in and opt-out for almost all

97 European Commission, 'Agenda 2000: for a stronger and wider Union', COM 97, 15 July 1997.

98 It was pronounced by the Commission that Ukraine and Georgia were not ready for the EU and neither was the EU. Barosso, Chairman of the Commission, October 27, 2006.

99 For an elaboration on the position of the UK towards EU integration, see: Liddle, R., 'The Europe Dilemma: Britain and the Drama of EU Integration', Bloomsbury Academic, 2014.

100 European Council, Thessaloniki, June 2003.

101 Speech of French president Sarkozy during election campaign, 16 July 2007.

102 Including 42 states, July 2008. For an elaboration: Union for the Mediterranean, 'Who we are, what we do', available at: <https://ufmsecretariat.org/>, accessed 10-9-2018, and see: Gaub, F., Popescu, N., 'The EU neighbours 1995-2015: shades of grey', Chaillot Papers, no. 136, December 2015, p. 9.

103 Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., 'The European Union as a System of Differentiated Integration: Interdependence, Politicization, and Differentiation', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22: 6, 2015, p. 12.

104 Juncker, 14 July 2014.

policy areas, e.g., the Schengen area. This form of cooperation, referred to as a Europe of different speeds, core Europe or an inclusive or exclusive Europe,¹⁰⁵ extended after the Cold War. The different forms of cooperation extended within the policy domain of CSDP, which will be discussed in this chapter. Finally, in contrast with enlargement and association, the EU had to deal with the opposite of enlargement, the loss of members.

Membership and CSDP Cooperation

The establishment of the Copenhagen criteria in the 1990s did not involve any requirements in the ESDP area, basically because the ESDP itself was in a constructive phase and cooperation within the security area was first prioritised within NATO by the old members and the new aspirants.¹⁰⁶ Until 2000, the aspirant member states had had no problems with aligning their foreign and security policy to the EU, as it was linked to NATO. Neither did the US and EU member states at that time.¹⁰⁷

After the big bang of 2004, the EU's enlargement programmes required the adoption and fulfilment of the obligations of the *acquis* in relation to security and defence. The new members could be divided into two groups: the ones that had endeavoured to reform their armed forces, and the ones that had had to create new armed forces as some of them had been part of the former SU, such as the Baltics and Slovenia, and were not in possession of armed forces. Combined, this strengthened further differentiation among the members.¹⁰⁸

From the first enlargement round in 2004 and the building of ESDP, the new members complied with the EU-CSDP *acquis*, but with differentiating interests from the old members. These interests were focused on the OSCE area, the relation between the US and Europe and the position of Russia.¹⁰⁹ The new members' interests were not really prioritised by crisis management operations far from home, such as the Iraq war of 2003 and operations in Afghanistan and Africa. As in the case of the NATO enlargement path, the former WP countries were those that were mainly interested in mutual defence, which, until 2009, could not be provided by the EU. NATO membership was therefore predominant with regard to security and defence. On the other hand, there were those that were more interested in the broader approach of security of the EU and its global presence. The Baltic states, for instance, strictly separated the collective defence task and a broader approach to security between NATO and the EU. Although the EU adopted the mutual defence clause at the Lisbon Summit in 2009, most of the newcomers relied on NATO for collective defence guarantees provided by the US. This tendency was strengthened after the Crimea crisis of 2014.



105 Elaborated on in Chapter 2.

106 Dunay, P., 'The Changing political geography of Europe. After EU and NATO enlargements', p. 76, in: Tardy, T., (eds.) 'European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external dynamics', Contemporary Security Studies, Routledge, Oxon, Great Britain, 2009.

107 Dunay, P., 'The Changing political geography of Europe. After EU and NATO enlargements', p. 76, in: Tardy, T., (eds.) 'European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external dynamics', Contemporary Security Studies, Routledge, Oxon, Great Britain, 2009.

108 Shepherd, A. J. K., 'The implications of EU enlargement for the European security and defense policy'; Smith, M.A., 'EU enlargement and NATO: The Balkan experience', p. 7. In: Brown, D., Shepherd, A.K., 'The security dimensions of EU enlargement. Wider Europe, weaker Europe?', Manchester University Press, 2007, p. 28.

109 Idem.

All in all, in relation to CSDP, the new member states have contributed to EU military, police and justice missions and the European Union Battlegroup (EUBG).¹¹⁰

5.4.3 Partnership

Regional EU

From the beginning of the 1990s, along with the enlargement programme, the EU established a partnership programme, similar to NATO's partnership programmes, dealing with potential candidates divided into short- and long-term accession, high or low level of institutionalization and with states and regions. Several programmes were initiated by the EU, for cooperation and dialogue with states outside the EU. These programmes were geographically subdivided and labelled as the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA),¹¹¹ linked to the SAP,¹¹² which served as the basis for implementation of the accession process, and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP),¹¹³ which will be elaborated on below.

After the initial establishment of the enlargement programme, at the beginning of 2000, the EU became more interested in an association with the Balkans for different reasons. For one, the EU took over parts of the NATO missions in the Balkans.¹¹⁴ Furthermore, the EU's High Representative Solana, the former Secretary-General (SG) of NATO, had experience of and an interest in the Balkans. Furthermore, at the launch of ESDP at the end of the 1990s, stabilisation and reconstruction in the Balkans were presumed to be a good starting point for the EU's CSDP as a mission area under the umbrella of NATO. In 1999, therefore, the SAA focused on the Balkans and had bilateral programmes with each separate Western Balkan state, encompassing a broad area of policies, including political dialogue, security and justice.¹¹⁵ These agreements were built on the former agreements with the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), which were set up at the beginning of the 1990s. The aim of the SAA and SAP explicitly included provisions for future EU membership of the state involved. Both the SAP and the SAA provided the contractual framework for relations

110 Cyprus and Malta are excluded from ESDP operations.

111 The Stabilisation and Association Agreement constitutes the framework of relations between the EU and the Western Balkan countries for implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

112 The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) is EU's approach towards the Western Balkans, established with the aim of eventual EU membership, launched in June 1999 and strengthened at the Thessaloniki Summit, June 2003.

113 The ENP, launched in 2003 and developed throughout 2004, governs the EU's relations with 16 of the EU's closest Eastern and Southern Neighbours; Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine*, Syria, Tunisia and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Russia takes part in Cross-Border Cooperation activities under the ENP, but is not a part of the ENP.

114 In July 2003, the EU and NATO published a 'Concerted Approach for the Western Balkans'. In 2003, the EU-led Operation Concordia took over the NATO-led mission, Operation Allied Harmony, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This mission, which ended in December 2003, was the first 'Berlin Plus' operation. In 2004 following the conclusion of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU deployed Operation EUFOR Althea, which again operated under the 'Berlin Plus' arrangements. In Kosovo, the NATO peacekeeping force KFOR worked with the EU's Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX).

115 The first SAA negotiations started in 2000 with Macedonia and Croatia. The last negotiations for SAA status started in 2013 with Kosovo.

between the EU and individual states, which resulted in differentiated agreements, until their foreseen accession to the EU. This foreseen accession was in contrast with NATO's NACC, which did not involve automatic membership.

Global EU

After the big bang of 2004, the EU built and strengthened relations with neighbouring states that were no longer considered candidates for membership in the foreseeable future. For that purpose, along with the SAP and the SAA, associations were extended to the Euro-Mediterranean area and to the Caucasus and labelled as the ENP. The ENP was designed by Commission officials who had previously been in charge of enlargement and 'acquired tools for their new positions'.¹¹⁶ The ENP replaced the former Union with the Mediterranean or so-called Barcelona Process,¹¹⁷ which had previously provided the framework for the EU's relations with its Mediterranean neighbours in North Africa and West Asia. Like the SAA and the SAP, the ENP setup was differentiated by bilateral and multilateral association agreements, including those relating to CSDP policy.¹¹⁸ Unable or unwilling to offer the incentive of accession, the ENP offered the EU neighbours a strengthening of political and security relations and extended the EU market and acquis.¹¹⁹

As was the case with states that strived for membership, the Iraq crisis of 2003 led to some difficulties within the partner association programmes between the 'newcomers' and the old members. The new partners were interested in NATO's security guarantees and the comprehensive approach to security of the EU, as this was essential to them. Similar to NATO, the EU's enlargement and partnership led to disagreement between the member states in general regarding the approach towards association, specifically the approach towards countries like Kosovo and Macedonia,¹²⁰ as described above. As a result, a differentiated programme was adopted. In 2006, the Commission addressed three points, including the lack of EU effort to resolve conflicts in the region.¹²¹ According to Keukeleire and Delreux, this could be described as a general problem of the EU, and a flaw in the EU's structural foreign policy, to make the internal changes necessary to achieve a genuine foreign, security and defence policy and by refusing to change ENP into a programme with requirements that would offer genuine accession to membership of the EU.¹²² These debates did not disappear, and although the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) significantly changed

116 Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., 'The European Union as a System of Differentiated Integration: Interdependence, Politicization, and Differentiation', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22: 6, 2015, p. 18.

117 The Union for the Mediterranean consisted of 43 member states from Europe and the Mediterranean the 28 EU Member States and 15 Mediterranean partner countries from North Africa, Western Asia and Southern Europe. Founded on 13 July 2008 at the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean. The aim was the reinforcement of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Euromed) that was set up in 1995 as the Barcelona Process. See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/eu-enlargement_en, accessed 12 October 2019

118 Keukeleire, S., Delreux, T., 'The Foreign Policy of the European Union', *The European Union Series*, 2nd edition, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 2014, p. 250.

119 *Idem*.

120 *Ibid*, p. 244.

121 *Ibid*, p. 252.

122 *Ibid*, p. 261-262.

the institutional framework of the EU, the impact of enlargement and neighbourhood policy was less meaningful.

Another impact on the EU path of widening was the Russian response to NATO and EU enlargement, reflected in the Crimea crisis of 2014. Enlargement and neighbourhood policy faced resistance by non-democratic regional powers. Russia embarked on an anti-Western course both domestically and abroad, as it regarded democratic developments in its proximity as a geopolitical threat strengthening Western influence.¹²³ This resulted in a more differentiated approach to the neighbours, based on the 'more-for-more' principle.¹²⁴ Furthermore, in response to the annexation of Crimea, the EU had progressively imposed restrictive measures against Russia. These measures entailed diplomatic measures, demonstrated by G7 summits instead of a G8 summit excluding Russia and the suspension of negotiations over Russia's joining the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the International Energy Agency (IEA). This was followed by individual restrictive measures (freezing of assets and travel restrictions), restrictions on economic relations with Crimea and Sevastopol, economic sanctions and restrictions on economic cooperation.¹²⁵

With regard to Russia and Turkey, the EU made special arrangements. Russia did not want to participate in the ENP and aimed for bilateral cooperation, similar to the liaison with NATO. This was provided for in the EU-Russia strategic partnership of 2011.¹²⁶ In addition, although Turkey and the EU were linked through NATO and CSDP,¹²⁷ Turkey stayed out of the ENP process, as it had its own special agreement with the EU, which was stalled after a vote by MEPs to suspend negotiations with Turkey over human rights and rule of law concerns.¹²⁸

Subsequently, enlargement and association programmes such as ENP differed in several ways. Enlargement had an end state, which association programmes did not. Furthermore, states that were in the enlargement process were subject to EU terms and negotiations, in contrast with association programmes such as ENP, which differed per region, state and policies.¹²⁹

123 Tolstrup, J., 'Gatekeepers and Linkages', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 25, no. 4, 2014, p. 135.

124 In 2010 and 2011 the EU unveiled the 'more-for-more' principle; the aim was that the EU would develop stronger partnerships with those neighbours that made more progress towards democratic reform. See: Tolstrup, J., 'Gatekeepers and Linkages', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 25, no. 4, 2014, p. 126-138.

125 For an elaboration on, see: European Commission, 'Commission Guidance not on the implementation of certain provisions of Regulation (EU), No 833/2014, available at: https://europa.eu/newsroom/sites//newsroom/files/docs/body/1_act_part1_v2_en.pdf.

126 For an overview of the history of ENP: Johansson-Nogues, E., 'The EU and Its Neighbourhood: An Overview', in: Weber, K., Smith, M. E., Baun, M., 'Governing Europe's Neighbourhood. Partners or Periphery?', Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2015; Keukeleire, S., Delreux, T., 'The Foreign Policy of the European Union', The European Union Series, 2nd edition, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 2014.

127 For an elaboration on Turkey and EU accession process, see: Akgul, Acikmese, S., Triantaphyllou, D., 'The NATO-EU-Turkey trilogy: the impact of the Cyprus conundrum', *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Volume 12, 2012, p. 555-573.

128 MEP vote, 24 November 2016.

129 Gaub, F., Popescu, N., 'The EU neighbours 1995-2015: shades of grey', *Chaillot Papers*, no. 136, December 2015, p. 7.

Regional and Global Partnership and CSDP

With regard to CSDP policy and partnership, from 2003 several programmes and instruments were developed. So-called Framework Participation Agreements (FPA) with partner countries were adopted to facilitate their participation in CSDP missions and operations.¹³⁰ These partners participated in CSDP missions and operations, such as police missions and military operations, strongly backed by a NATO presence in the wider European area.

In 2013, the EU's CSDP launched a multilateral cooperation programme under the Eastern Partnership Council (EPC)¹³¹ and engaged with six Eastern Partnership countries covering exercises and training. These exercises and training programmes were financially supported by the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), launched in 2004.¹³² This initiative was followed by the capacity building in support of security and development (CBSD) initiative in 2015.¹³³ The aim at first was to build capacity and then to enhance the EU's role as a global actor, incorporating an EU-wide Strategic Framework for Stabilisation and Reconstruction and a legislative proposal for enhancing capacity building.¹³⁴ In addition, there were initiatives from the European External Action Service (EEAS) in cooperation with the EU's Commission.

At the end of 2016, 18 legally binding bilateral and international agreements had been signed, ranging from the larger Europe, to Asia, to Australia. Some partners had joined the EUBG,¹³⁵ participated in the EU mission in Kosovo, such as the US, or trained with the EU, such as China and Japan.

The primary objective of the EU member states and organs in cooperating in the field of CSDP with partners was to maximise CSDP operational activities.¹³⁶ The aim was to consolidate a comprehensive approach and implement the EU-NATO Warsaw Declaration.¹³⁷ Together with the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS), the Warsaw Declaration adopted a programme for capacity and resilience building in the Southern neighbourhood. Furthermore, with regard to CSDP missions and operations, the aim was to establish project cells, in which potential donors from member states and partner countries could support the EU's CSDP; an approach of differentiated and tailor-made cooperation with each partner. Within the CSDP domain, the EU had thus been developing partnerships in three main areas: missions, operations and capacity building. Two partners

130 The legal and political basis for third states to participate in missions and operations.

131 See: European Council/Council of the European Union, 'Eastern Partnership', n.d., available at: www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eastern-partnership/, accessed 5-4-2016.

132 See: EU Neighbours, 'The European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)', n.d., available at: <https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/policy/european-neighbourhood-instrument-eni>, accessed 4-7-2018.

133 The Joint Communication, April 2015.

134 Rehrl, J. (Ed.), 'Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union', Third edition, 2016, p. 177.

135 Some of the participating countries were Fyrom, Norway, Turkey and Ukraine.

136 Rehrl, J. (Ed.), 'Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union', Third edition, 2016, p. 174.

137 Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Warsaw Declaration, 8 July 2016.

had joined the EUBG and training.¹³⁸ CSDP partnership ranged from formal cooperation, for example the US participation,¹³⁹ and more flexible and informal forms of participation, such as the EU's partnership with Kosovo.¹⁴⁰

As a result of changes in the balance of power in Europe, due to the newly acquired position of Russia and the terrorist attacks that shook Europe,¹⁴¹ the EU partnership policy had to take into account that other powers now necessitated other regional geostrategic neighbourhood policies. After the intervention in Ukraine (2014) and the terrorist attacks on EU soil, it became clear that the technocratic approach of the EU towards partnership could no longer account for security and that it hampered the ENP, because the division between internal and external security was fading.¹⁴² The same development could be observed in the Mediterranean and Middle East region, because of the 'remarkable irrelevance of CSDP in the various crises and conflicts in this region'.¹⁴³ This was combined with the fact that 'Operations and missions only fit a quite limited and specific set of purposes',¹⁴⁴ which opened the door for the influence of other regional powers.

Hence the fact that, on the one hand, the enthusiasm of the 1990s and the beginning of 2000 had led to widespread cooperation schemes, institutionalized to a greater or lesser extent. On the other hand, these schemes could not always be labelled as effective structural foreign and security policy in the neighbourhood, as in the case of NATO. Along the way, disagreement between the EU member states increased, as a result of their different geographical interests regarding the approach of the neighbourhood policy. Unity within Europe scattered as a result of tensions with regard to the approach to the terrorist threat, budgetary difficulties, the EU-NATO relationship,¹⁴⁵ the lack of 'the membership carrot and the prospect of accession', and the rise and increasing presence of other structural powers in the region.¹⁴⁶

Differentiation within the Eastern Partnership was further enhanced by the geopolitical tension between the EU and Russia in their former 'shared neighbourhood', which developed more into a 'contested neighbourhood'.¹⁴⁷

138 China and Japan.

139 See: European Union External Action, 'Framework Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the participation of the United States of America in European Union Crisis Management Operations', 2011, available at: ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=8961, accessed 4-7-2018.

140 See: EEAS, 'Kosovo* and the EU', 2016, available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo_en/1387/Kosovo%20and%20the%20EU, accessed 4-7-2018.

141 Treaty on the European Union, Article J4.

142 Gaub, F., Popescu, N., 'The EU neighbours 1995-2015: shades of grey', Chaillot Papers, no. 136, December 2015, p. 10.

143 Keukeleire, S., Delreux, T., 'The Foreign Policy of the European Union', The European Union Series, 2nd edition, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 2014, p. 261.

144 Ibid, p. 271.

145 Blockmans, S., Faleg, G., 'More Union in European defence', Centre for European Policy Studies, February 2015, p. 8.

146 Keukeleire, S., Delreux, T., 'The Foreign Policy of the European Union', The European Union Series, 2nd edition, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 2014, p. 272.

147 Russia is promoting closer relations with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) as an alternative to further association and integration with the EU.

In order to coordinate the observed fragmentation between partners and members and between the different geopolitical stakeholders, the Commission and Parliament had formulated an ‘Eastern Partnership Plus’ approach for ‘associated countries that have made substantial progress on EU-related reforms to offer them the possibility of joining the customs union, energy union, digital union or even the Schengen area and abolishing mobile roaming tariffs’ in 2017.¹⁴⁸ These aspects are, however, beyond the scope of this research.

5.4.4 *The EU Path of Widening*

The EU path of broadening developed from full membership to a varied web of members and partners driven by various actors. This varied approach to cooperation in level and form had been an integral part of European integration from the creation of the EU.

Reflecting on the membership, from the beginning of the 1990s, the EU’s approach to multilateralism and a broader secure Europe motivated the path of enlargement which resulted in a big bang of new states in 2004. Enlargement and partnership have been one of the EU’s main pillars to expand the concept of multilateralism, as peace and security were indivisible, according to the EU. Nevertheless, similar to the NATO path of widening, this enthusiasm decreased due to changes in the security environment and variation in the interests of the member states with regard to enlargement. Furthermore, the EU’s CSDP showed an internal variation in membership, as in the other EU domains, with possibilities of opt-in and opt-out for mutual defence, crisis management operations and legal, institutional and financial policies. With the changes in the new security strategy of 2016, the instrument of PESCO could limit the sovereignty of states by choice, but again in a differentiated form, as will be explored in Chapter 6.

One of the most negative consequences of the EU’s enlargement and partnership programmes has been the Russian response to EU enlargement, as well as to NATO enlargement, reflected in the Crimea crisis of 2014. This led to debate between the EU states and changed EU enlargement and partnership programmes, as Russia remained a natural partner and a strategic player for the EU and some of its member states. This is simply because Russia is the EU’s largest neighbour, which was always reflected in extensive cooperation and exchange over the 25 years prior to the Crimea crisis. Russia has been a key player in the UN Security Council, the EU and Russia are important trading partners¹⁴⁹ and, not to be underestimated, a lot of European states are dependent on Russia for energy supplies.

Reflecting on the partnership programmes, these are also highly differentiated with various programmes of cooperation with neighbours and regions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral cooperation. This is illustrated by the many programmes: SAP, SAA, PCA, ENP and ENI, etc. These different concepts provided the EU with different levels and forms of partnership. In other words, differences in the level of institutionalization and differences in the forms of cooperation. As a result, partnership and cooperation were

148 European Parliament Newsroom, MEP’s want to reward reforms made by Eastern partners, accessed 15-11-2017.

149 Facts on EU-Russia trade see: Russia - Trade - European Commission (europa.eu), accessed 27-4-2020.

divided, there were flexible and differentiated partnerships which incorporated more or less formalisation in regional and global cooperation programmes. As well as the internal variation in membership, the EU had an external variation in its partnerships, including security and defence policy, comparable to NATO. With regard to association, there were official candidates¹⁵⁰ and potential candidates.¹⁵¹

Differentiation has thus become an integral part of cooperation with states and regions outside the EU. As cooperation and partnership were lacking the incentive of full membership by the more-for-more principle, it was based on the motivation of 'offering stronger partnerships and incentives to countries that make more progress towards democracy and good governance'.¹⁵² Finally, partnership replaced the aim of engagement with states by engagement with themes, cooperating on hybrid threats or refugees.

In short, during the heyday of enlargement in the 1990s, the goal was to deepen cooperation and integration and broaden the EU's reach across Europe. After the big bang of the 2000s the EU's open-door policy changed into a more closed-door policy towards new members, accompanied by stricter requirements. Nevertheless, cooperation in the CSDP area developed from there. Furthermore, in contrast with enlargement and association, the EU had to deal with various forms of opt-out. In addition, apart from coalitions within the organization and different opt-in and opt-out clauses, from 2016 onwards, CSDP had to deal with member states stepping out of the organizational structure, for example in the case of Brexit.

5.4.5 Conclusion

This section looked at the questions of how and why change has led to a widening of the EU. The EU widened with states from the former WP and associated with many partners, regionally as well as globally, with a diversification in the form and level of membership and partnership. The EU's path of widening can be divided into the subsequent main periods. The first phase established programmes for enlargement with firm requirements, based on the Copenhagen criteria of 1993. The second phase initiated less institutionalized partner agreements with states and regions not expected to become members soon. The third phase followed on from the previous one, combined with the aim of cooperation on themes, such as by terrorism, instead of cooperation with specific states.

5.5 The OSCE path of Widening

5.5.1 Introduction

The Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the founding act of the OSCE, was signed by 35 states in 1975. After the end of the Cold War, the OSCE grew extensively, mainly as a result of the implosion of the SU and the WP. After the fall of Communism, new emerging states were

150 Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia.

151 Kosovo and Bosnia.

152 Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., 'The European Union as a System of Differentiated Integration: Interdependence, Politicization, and Differentiation', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22: 6, 2015, p. 18.

actively invited to the OSCE Summit in Paris.¹⁵³ This section examines the questions of how and why change has led to a widening of the OSCE. The specific path of widening of the OSCE will be analysed with the form and level of change as the indicator, addressing membership, partnership and interaction between the OSCE and other actors from 1990 onwards.

5.5.2 *Participating States*

The Paris Summit in 1990 was retitled the Peace Conference of the Cold War. It was compared to the Conference of Versailles of 1919 or the Congress of Vienna of 1815 in its ambition to reshape Europe as a constitution for the European security architecture, encompassing all European states. An architecture where pluralist democracy and market economy would be combined with international law and multilateralism for the whole of Europe. Not long thereafter, the OSCE was enlarged with states from the former WP and SU.

From the beginning of the OSCE dialogue, the participating states had rights and obligations under the Helsinki Final Act (1975), e.g., to respect the democratic principles of governance, and were all signatories to these international agreements. Nevertheless, with reference to the membership criteria of an international organization in general, in contrast with NATO and the EU, the OSCE had no (juridical) adherence criteria and no organizational membership per se; all signatories to the Helsinki Final Act are participating states.¹⁵⁴ So, in contrast with the EU and NATO, states that joined the OSCE were called participating states instead of (full) members and without any legal underpinning.

The first and last big bang of enlargement for the OSCE took place at the beginning of the 1990s, which can be seen as the heyday of the OSCE. Together with Russia, the US initiated the European security architecture in Paris (1990). At that time, the US was mainly interested in keeping Russia together after the collapse of the SU and the WP, and in backing president Gorbachev, for fear of disintegration and chaos in the former WP countries.¹⁵⁵ Although there was no clear idea of how a so-called security architecture would be formed and institutionalized, the OSCE organization was the first security organization within Europe with a cooperative security aim and able to function as a regional security umbrella. Like the EU and NATO, the OSCE developed an internal, varied form of cooperation for the participating states. This was demonstrated by the decision-making procedure, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, and the contact groups focused on a specific conflict, institutionalized within the OSCE, such as the Minsk group.¹⁵⁶

5.5.3 *Partner States*

Although the OSCE's mandate with regard to security lies within the organization and a strict division was made between internal and external security, as the concept of cooperative security implies, the OSCE did cooperate with states outside the OSCE area.

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153 CSCE Paris Summit Declaration, 1990.

154 As the OSCE is a political based instead of treaty-a based organization. The states are called participating states instead of member states. In total the OSCE has 56 participating states, 1-1-2018.

155 Sarotte, M. E., '1989. The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe', Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2014.

156 OSCE, 'OSCE Minsk Group', n.d., available at: <https://www.osce.org/mg>, accessed on 12-8-2017.

Even before the end of the Cold War, the OSCE strengthened relations with states outside the organization in the Mediterranean area.¹⁵⁷

Apart from the enlargement of the OSCE with new states, after the end of the Cold War, the OSCE strengthened relations with other states outside its area. These alignments were called 'Partners for Cooperation', which benefitted from programmes comparable to those with OSCE participating states. These programmes of cooperation and dialogue were divided between the Mediterranean and Asian region and resulted in eleven privileged relations with Asian¹⁵⁸ and Mediterranean Partners,¹⁵⁹ some dating back as far as the Helsinki Final Act. Partners for Cooperation programmes encompassed the politico-military, economic, environmental and human dimensions of security. With regard to the OSCE crisis management tasks, Partners could send observers to OSCE election observation missions, perform as second mission members in OSCE field operations, visit any of the field operations, participate in exchanges of military and security information and visits to military facilities, all on a voluntary basis.¹⁶⁰ The aim of these partner programmes was to share information on relevant developments and areas of common concern with regard to common security challenges, ensuring a broad approach in OSCE's cooperation with partners, mainly driven by the US.¹⁶¹

As a result of the post-9/11 era, new threats to global security and the emerging EU and NATO paths of widening altered the OSCE path of widening. The OSCE shifted its focus from the greater European area to establishing an even stronger connection with Central Asia. This widening took place for reasons of countering the threat of terrorism, policing capability, and politico-military issues, such as small arms, light weapons, and destruction of arms and ammunition, in which the EU and NATO could not be engaged.¹⁶²

The OSCE cooperation with its Partners encompassed the full range of OSCE activities, but each group of partners engaged in specific issues of regional interest, which resulted in a differentiated tailor-made form of cooperation. The Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation were focused on anti-terrorism, border security, water management, environmental security challenges, migration management, intercultural and interreligious dialogue, tolerance and non-discrimination.¹⁶³ The Asian Partners were focused on the OSCE's CSBMs and the comprehensive approach.

Furthermore, the cooperation covered areas of transnational threats, managing borders, addressing transport issues, combatting trafficking in human beings, building

157 OSCE, 'Factsheet on OSCE Partners for Co-operation', 2011, available at: <https://www.osce.org/partners-for-cooperation/77951>, accessed 4-7-2018.

158 Japan (1992), Republic of Korea (1994), Thailand (2000), Afghanistan (2003) and Australia (2009). Mongolia (2004) and became a participating State in 2012.

159 Algeria, Egypt, Israël, Morocco and Tunisia were associated since 1975. Jordan became a Partner in 1998.

160 To become an OSCE Partner for Cooperation, a formal request is made to the OSCE Chairman. A consultation process follows, during which the 57 participating States take into consideration several factors. Partnership is decided upon by consensus.

161 A special focus of the US was the participation of the OSCE in Afghanistan.

162 OSCE, 'Asian Partners for Co-operation', n.d., available at: <https://www.osce.org/partners-for-cooperation/asian>, accessed 4-7-2018.

163 OSCE, 'Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation', n.d., available at: <https://www.osce.org/partners-for-cooperation/mediterranean>, accessed 4-7-2018.

democratic institutions and administering elections. In 2007, a Partnership Fund was created, which included a broad variety of issues.¹⁶⁴

5.5.4 *The OSCE Path of Widening*

At the beginning of the 1990s, as a result of its solitary position as a security organization in the wider Europe encompassing all states from the former WP and NATO, the OSCE had a strong position in the European security architecture.

Due to the enlargement of NATO and the EU from 1999 onwards, more than 36 of the 57 OSCE participating states had become members of NATO and/or the EU with much stronger capacities and funds, resulting in overlapping membership and leading to an obstructionist policy on the part of Russia.

Reflecting on the OSCE's path of widening, it can be argued that this path resulted in institutional and geostrategic weakening, not strengthening, of the OSCE. After the enlargement of NATO and the EU, it had been difficult for the OSCE to occupy a central role again within the European security architecture. Even so, the overlap between these organizations had led to contradictory tasks, obligations and even conflicts among states. As a result, the ability of the OSCE to carry out its tasks had been limited and its relevance diminished. Although not all states of the former WP had become full members of the EU and NATO, the OSCE was often accused of addressing peripheral issues instead of fundamentally affecting the landscape of European security. As Gheballi stated, the OSCE was acting as a subcontractor to NATO and the EU, an empty house for the stragglers.¹⁶⁵

On the other hand, the OSCE had been the only organization to balance the relationship between Russia and the West. As such, the OSCE had a historical advantage over NATO and the EU in terms of the participation of Russia. Tensions after the Crimea crisis of 2014 had overshadowed the benefits of the OSCE organization. Furthermore, the OSCE had been the organization in the security policy domain that provided a security cooperation framework for the states that did not become members of NATO or the EU.

5.5.5 *Conclusion*

In this section, the questions of how and why change has led to a widening of the OSCE was examined. Two main periods can be identified in the OSCE path of widening, entailing two themes: cooperation inside and outside the organization. The first period entails the big bang of widening with new states as a result of the collapse of the SU and the WP almost immediately after the end of the Cold War. The second period encompasses the alignment with other states and regions outside the organization, which also started at the beginning of the 1990s and widened from there.

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164 Including: border security and management, countering terrorism, migration management, tolerance and non-discrimination, media self-regulation, electoral assistance, combating trafficking in human beings, gender issues and environmental challenges.

165 Gheballi, V. Y., 'Where is the OSCE going? Present role and challenges of a stealth security organization', p. 68 in: Tardy, T., (eds.), 'European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external dynamics', Contemporary Security Studies, Routledge, Oxon, Great Britain, 2009.

From its creation, the OSCE has been the organization that geographically encapsulated the area from Anchorage to Vladivostok, which remained unchanged after the end of the Cold War. However, the collapse of the SU and the WP resulted in many more parties joining the organization, but stabilised after the first rounds of widening in the 1990s as a result of NATO and EU paths of widening and tensions between the larger powers. Finally, like NATO and the EU, apart from states allied to the organization, many states outside OSCE territory became partners of the OSCE.

5.6 Widening of Relations between Security Organizations

5.6.1 Introduction

In this section, the specific path of widening between the selected security organizations will be analysed by focusing on the form and level of widening, addressing interactions between them from 1990 onwards. Consideration will therefore be given to the questions of how and why change has led to widening between the security organizations and the development of a European security architecture.

On 9 November 1989, the Berlin Wall fell and heralded the end of the Cold War, which caused two major effects on the existing bipolar security structure of Europe. For one, the existing security organizations changed in task, form and membership or even ended altogether. Second, as well as these intra-organizational changes, inter-organizational linkages arose and developed from there. As a result, states became full or associated members of different organizations simultaneously, a so-called cross-institutional membership and, as well as states, organizations cooperated and interacted with each other and with states.

Directly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the idea arose of a European security architecture that would house all the states in the OSCE geographical area. The key actors in creating a post-Cold War order were the SU, France and the UK, but Germany and the US played a particularly significant role. All were searching for a new European order in terms of rebalancing the power relations in Europe, a new transatlantic architecture and a European security home. The questions underlying a new European security architecture were the position of the SU and the (former) WP states, the reunification of Germany, the transatlantic relation and a European security and defence identity. The key actors involved all proposed models for a new security architecture, but all were different. The differences were the result of specific interests, visions and strategies to accomplish a new security architecture that would include all actors and policies in their interest.¹⁶⁶

The driving forces of a European security architecture were the US President Bush and West Germany in the form of Chancellor Kohl. At first, the US President was campaigning for 'A Europe whole and free' even before the end of the Cold War, in which the whole of

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166 For an elaboration on the development of the European security architecture and specifically the models, see: Sarotte, M. E., '1989. The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe', Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2014, p. 9; Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., 'NATO's Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?', Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 2-4.

Europe would be governed by concepts of the liberal world order and multilateralism.¹⁶⁷ In this Europe whole and free, the US and the SU initially focused on the reunification of Germany and its position in a broader European architecture. However, on 12 November 1989 the US pressed for a German reunification including a NATO membership. On the one hand a difficult point for the SU, although on the other it was in the interest of the SU to keep the US military presence in Europe to prevent solitary German rearmament. So, the process of the reunification of Germany, together with NATO membership, was accompanied by an informal assurance that NATO forces and infrastructure would not move to the East. An assurance that has always been a guidance in US-Russia relations since the end of the Cold war, together with a 'no-first-use guarantee'.¹⁶⁸

The US and Germany proposed the idea of a reunified Germany to be integrated in NATO and accompanied this unification with the activities that were undertaken to strengthen the CSCE for a new balance in Europe.¹⁶⁹ On 31 December 1989, a few weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall, President Francois Mitterrand of France called for the creation of a European confederation.¹⁷⁰ France's interest lay in the preservation and strengthening of the political unity of the EU, the diminishment of US military dominance in Europe and a prevention of broadening of NATO together with the encapsulation of both of the Germanies. The alternative to NATO revival and widening for France was a European confederation under the umbrella of the CSCE,¹⁷¹ whereas the UK, in contrast, was a proponent of a strong transatlantic link, with an effective NATO.

Although the interests were scattered at the beginning of the 1990s, all key actors were coming to the same conclusion; Europe had to be rebuilt by a forum including the two Germanies plus the four powers: a so-called '4+2' mechanism under a pan-European house. For some, this would include NATO and the WP. For others, this pan-European house would replace both alliances.

A framework of European security organizations was indeed launched, including the so-called concepts of interlocking¹⁷² and mutually reinforcing organizations unified in a European security architecture. A framework would be created aiming at a division between the functional and geographical security roles of the security organizations, to promote interlocking or mutually reinforcing cooperation structures to emphasise the complementary nature of the various organizations: a division of labour.

The concept of a European security architecture was first coined by the NATO Summit in London on 5 and 6 July 1990, followed by the OSCE's Charter of Paris of 19 and 20 November 1990 and NATO's Strategic Concept of 1991, referring to a progression of 'a European Security Identity'.¹⁷³

167 Speech of US president Bush in Mainz, Germany, 31 May 1989.

168 NATO Strategic Concept 1990.

169 Sarotte, M. E., '1989. The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe', Princeton University Press, 2014,

170 New Year's address of French President François Mitterrand, 31 December 1989.

171 Sarotte, M. E., '1989. The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe', Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2014, p. 175.

172 Stated by NATO Secretary-General Werner, autumn 1990.

173 NATO Strategic Concept, Rome, 1991.

The CSCE Charter of Paris stated an inclusive pan-European framework based on a comprehensive and indivisible concept of security, shared values and commitment to active cooperation between its members, as it stated: 'With the ending of the division of Europe, we will strive for a new quality in our security relations while fully respecting each others' freedom of choice in that respect. Security is indivisible and the security of every participating State is inseparably linked to that of all the others. We therefore pledge to cooperate in strengthening confidence and security among us and in promoting arms control and disarmament'.¹⁷⁴ Together with the CSCE Helsinki Summit of 1992 this initiative was directly supported by the creation of institutions and was strengthened on the security and military side by the political-military CSBMs and the CFE Treaty of 1990, which were discussed in Chapter 4.

The linking of security matters between the security organizations became an endeavour for NATO as well, as the Strategic Concept of 1991 stated comprehensive and indivisible security: 'The Allies are also committed to pursue co-operation with all states in Europe on the basis of the principles set out in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. They will seek to develop broader and productive patterns of bilateral and multilateral co-operation in all relevant fields of European security... towards one Europe whole and free. This policy of co-operation is the expression of the inseparability of security among European states'. Furthermore, the 1991 Strategic Concept stated that a new European order necessitated multilateralism and an interlinking of institutional security cooperation: '...the Allies will support the role of the CSCE process and its institutions. Other bodies including the European Community, Western European Union and United Nations may also have an important role to play',¹⁷⁵ not to avoid alienating the SU at that time and, for that matter, some of the European allies.

Reality presented a different picture; CSCE was strengthened, NATO remained, changed and broadened, the two Germanies united and became a NATO member, the WP ended. NATO thus remained and, driven mainly by the US and West Germany, drew the contours of a new security architecture based on a framework of interlocking institutions between NATO, the EU, the UN and the CSCE.

From the OSCE Charter of Paris, the OSCE further developed the concept of mutually reinforcing institutions as a result of its intensive OSCE security model discussions in Budapest 1994 and Istanbul 1999. These summits sought to provide a framework for the collaboration and cooperation of international organizations in the field of crisis management.¹⁷⁶

The inter-organizational development from those first years of bilateral security cooperation between the security organizations will first be elaborated on below, after which the development of the European security architecture will be discussed.

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174 Paris Charter, 1990.

175 NATO Strategic Concept 1991, par. 29 and 33.

176 OSCE Summit Lisbon, 1996.

5.6.2 NATO and EU Cooperation

The most extensive interaction, in terms of broadening, widening and deepening, between security organizations within the European security architecture, has been the EU-NATO cooperation. This cooperation started with the merger of the WEU Petersberg tasks with the EU in 2007 and the EU and NATO acting in the same operational field in the Balkans, Africa and Asia. These events made it clear that institutional arrangements had to be made between NATO and the EU.

The initial plan for cooperation between the EU and NATO was launched in 1996 and again in 1999 at the NATO Washington Summit. NATO's strategic concept stated that 'the resolve of the EU is to have the capacity for autonomous action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged' and furthermore enabled 'ready access by the EU to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily'.¹⁷⁷ This resulted in a NATO-EU Summit in 2001¹⁷⁸, followed by a first meeting of the NAC and the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC). At NATO's Prague Summit in 2002, NATO-EU cooperation was confirmed and NATO and the EU were seen to 'share common strategic interests'.¹⁷⁹ One of the reasons was that the US wanted to monitor the quick institutional build-up of the EU's security and defence policy. For the Europeans, this initiative created access to NATO, and US, capabilities. Finally, in December 2002 at the EU-NATO Brussels meeting, an 'EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP' was issued and finalised in March 2003. A framework came into being with the so-called Berlin Plus agreements in the case of crisis management operations of the EU.¹⁸⁰ As a result, the EU gained access to NATO capabilities, such as the command structure, and the possibility of the exchange of classified intelligence information was created.¹⁸¹ From now on, there were several options for NATO and the EU to initiate crisis management operations: a NATO-only campaign, possibly with the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept, the Berlin Plus agreements¹⁸² where EU-led operations were supported by NATO,¹⁸³ the framework nation concept where a national headquarters could be multi-nationalised¹⁸⁴ and finally, in the context of the EU, a military headquarters at the EU Military Staff (EUMS).¹⁸⁵ Cooperation and institutional interlinkage took place at the level of foreign ministers, ambassadors, secretaries-general and the High Representative (HR) of the EU, military representatives and defence advisors. Furthermore, there were staff-to-staff meetings set up at all levels

177 NATO Strategic Concept, Washington Summit, April 1999.

178 24 January 2001.

179 NATO Prague declaration, 2002, par. 11.

180 Started on 16 December 2002 and concluded on 17 March 2003.

181 The underpinning line of this cooperation has always been the prevention of duplication of capacities; the 3 Ds stated by the US Secretary of State Madeline Albright in 2003; 'Decoupling', 'Duplication' and 'Discrimination' and the 'right of first refusal' for the Atlantic Alliance.

182 The first operation under the umbrella of Berlin Plus was the EU operation Concordia in Macedonia (2003) followed by operation Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina (2004), where the EU took over the command of NATO's operation SFOR.

183 If an EU mission is executed with NATO capacities and command structure., D-SACEUR has OPCOM.

184 Five EU member states deliver headquarters: UK, Greece, France, Italy and Germany. Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003 and 2004 is an example of this cooperation.

185 Reichard, M., 'The EU-NATO relationship. A Legal and Political Perspective', Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006, p. 92-98.

between NATO's International Staff and International Military Staff and the EU organs. Cooperation was further established by the presence of an EU planning cell at SHAPE in 2006. A NATO Permanent Liaison Team at the EU Military Staff has been operating since 2005. Nevertheless, until 2016, the Berlin Plus agreements were one-sided; NATO supporting the EU and not vice versa.

The abovementioned Berlin Plus agreements were initiated by the US and several European states. The concerns from the US towards the strengthening of the EU's CSDP in 1998 had led to Albright's famous warning about the three 'Ds',¹⁸⁶ which resulted in close NATO-EU cooperation to regulate the EU CSDP's autonomy with regard to security and defence policy. This point of view has always been supported by the UK and, from 2004, by Poland and a majority of the Central and Eastern Countries. In contrast, France was a strong proponent of EU autonomy in the field of security and defence policy, which was supported by French officials in their efforts to keep the organizations apart.¹⁸⁷ In 2009, the US asked the EU to return NATO's Berlin Plus in the form of a 'Berlin Plus in reverse' or 'Brussels Plus', but this request was not honoured.¹⁸⁸

Thirteen years after the Berlin Plus agreements, the EU and NATO outlined areas for strengthened cooperation¹⁸⁹ at the NATO Summit in Warsaw,¹⁹⁰ which were approved at the NATO foreign ministers summit at the end of 2016, including an implementation plan.¹⁹¹ Themes included cyber defence and improvement of intelligence sharing and logistics, as described above.

The themes of consultation between the two organizations have broadened and widened ever since 2003. Along with Russia, which has been high on the agenda since 2014, consultations have also covered the Western Balkans, Libya, Africa and the Middle East. Together with operations, capability development has been an area where cooperation has been essential. The NATO-EU Capability Group was therefore established in May 2003 to ensure the coherence and mutual reinforcement of NATO and the EU capability development efforts. Experts from the EDA and NATO contributed to this Capability Group, partly to address common capability shortfalls, such as improvised explosive device countermeasures and medical support. Staff were also ensuring transparency and complementarity between NATO's work on 'smart defence' and the EU's pooling and sharing initiative.¹⁹² Other cooperation issues included the combat of terrorism and the

186 US state secretary Albright, M., NATO summit, 8 December 1998.

187 Simon, L., 'The EU-NATO Conundrum in Context: Bringing the State Back in', p. 112, in: Galbreath, D., Gebhard, C., 'Cooperation or Conflict. Problematizing Organisational Overlap in Europe', Routledge, 2011.

188 WEU, 'The EU-NATO Berlin Plus agreement', European Security and Defence Assembly/Assembly of Western European Union, Assembly facts Sheet No. 14, Paris, November 2009.

189 Including hybrid threats, enhancing resilience, defence capacity building, cyber defence, maritime security, and exercises.

190 'Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization', NATO Press Release (2016) 119, July 8, 2016, www.nato.int, accessed July 10, 2016.

191 Meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Brussels, December 2016.

192 For an elaboration: Faleg, G., Giovannini, A., 'The EU between Pooling & Sharing and Smart Defence: Making a virtue of necessity?', CEPS Special Report, May 2012; Graeger, N., 'European Security as Practice: EU_NATO communities of Practice in the Making?', European Security, Volume 25, issue 4, 2016.

proliferation of WMD. NATO and the EU exchanged information on their activities in the field of protection of civilian populations against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attacks. NATO and the EU also cooperated in civil emergency planning, as detailed above.

From 2016, NATO and EU broadened the areas of cooperation, in particular with regard to hybrid threats, energy security and cyber defence.¹⁹³ NATO and EU staff consulted in order to identify the specific areas which could enhance cooperation in these fields. As a result, NATO and the EU concluded a Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defence,¹⁹⁴ which provided an inter-organizational framework for exchanging information and sharing best practices between emergency response teams and the adoption of a joint European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats.¹⁹⁵ This was followed by the EU-NATO joint declaration on strategic partnership signed at the NATO Warsaw Summit (2016). This declaration furthered reciprocal cooperation in relation to hybrid and cyber threats, for the first time strengthening actual EU-NATO cooperation after the Berlin Plus agreements of 2003. Further inter-organizational institutionalization was established with the EU Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, with NATO participation in the steering committee.¹⁹⁶

All these measures were thus mostly initiated and monitored by the organs of the organizations: the HR of the EU and NATO's Secretary-General. With regard to the cooperation between the EU and NATO organs, as in all inter-organizational cooperation forms, EU-NATO cooperation has always been based on staff-to-staff cooperation. It was never based on any legal treaty. As a result, ad-hoc staff-to-staff cooperation increased, usually, in the first instance, descending from cooperation in the operational field.

5.6.3 NATO and OSCE Cooperation

Although they are quite different security organizations, NATO and the OSCE can both be regarded as the founding fathers of the concept of the European security architecture with the 'Paris' (1990) and 'Rome' (1991) charters and declarations. In those days, their mutual interest could be found in the restructuring of institutional European frameworks and a rebalance of power interests, together with the survival of NATO searching for new tasks.

The framework for cooperation between the two organizations was formalised by the OSCE-CiO (Chairman-in-Office), the NAC, the EAPC and staff-to-staff arrangements. Political relations between NATO and the OSCE were governed by the Platform for Co-operative Security, which was launched by the OSCE in 1999 at the Istanbul Summit and was supposed to be a revival of the European security architecture. Via this platform, the OSCE could call upon the international organizations whose members adhere to their principles

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193 Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary-General of NATO, Warsaw, 8 July 2016.

194 February 2016.

195 See Chapter 6.

196 1 June 2017, Helsinki.

and commitments to reinforce their inter-organizational cooperation in order to restore democracy, prosperity and stability in Europe and beyond.

Rationally, due to the political rather than legal agreement underlying the OSCE organization, but most of all the partnership between both the US and Russia and the OSCE, institutional interaction between NATO and the OSCE was developed at a low institutionalized non-legal level. However, as a result of operating in the same security and domain areas and to a certain extent overlap in members and partners, their relationship was emphasised in a number of documents, such as the OSCE's Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century (2003)¹⁹⁷ and thematically addressed a broad area within the security and defence domain.¹⁹⁸

After 9/11, relations continued, reflected in the OSCE Ministerial Council and by the NATO Istanbul Summit (2004), which stated that 'NATO and the OSCE have largely complementary responsibilities and common interests, both functionally and geographically. NATO will continue to further develop co-operation with the OSCE in areas such as conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation'.¹⁹⁹ Although NATO and the OSCE often worked in the same area of operations, such as Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, their relations were not supported by a strong institutional or legal framework.

5.6.4 EU and OSCE Cooperation

The EU's signature was already included at the launch of the European security architecture, when the OSCE Charter of Paris was signed in 1990. The first inter-organizational agreement of the EU, along with the participating states of the OSCE, was the OSCE's Charter for European security in 1999. From there, the scope of cooperation between the OSCE and the EU was both broadened and deepened, also in terms of security and defence matters. Both the EU and the OSCE aimed for a multilateral order and strived for security and stability in the wider Europe. In other words, they shared a joint interest in their common principles of stability and prosperity laid down in their treaties and agreements, which resulted in strengthening their cooperation. EU member states make up half of the OSCE and contribute more than two-thirds of the OSCE budget.²⁰⁰

Cooperation between the EU and the OSCE was further developed in 2002, which resulted in 'The European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: The Shape of Future Cooperation'.²⁰¹ In 2003, cooperation between the OSCE and the EU was further enhanced with the declaration on conflict prevention,

197 OSCE, 'OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century', 2003, available at: <https://www.osce.org/mc/17504>, accessed 3 November 2016.

198 Combating transnational threats, including terrorism and cyber threats, border management and security, disarmament, small arms and light weapons, confidence- and security-building measures, regional issues and exchange of experience on the respective Mediterranean Dimensions. See: OSCE, 'NATO', n.d., available at: <https://www.osce.org/partnerships/111485>, accessed 3-4-2017.

199 NATO Istanbul Summit, June 2004, par. 17.

200 Stewart, E. J., 'Restoring EU-OSCE Cooperation for Pan-European Conflict Prevention', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 29, No. 2, August 2008, p. 267.

201 Address by Javier Solana, EU High Representative of the CFSP to the Permanent Council of the OSCE, September 2002.

crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation²⁰² and followed by the adoption of the Assessment Report on the EU's role vis-à-vis the OSCE by the Council of the EU.²⁰³ Institutionally, an EU delegation was situated in the OSCE headquarters and represented the EU member states within the OSCE, which often voted as a block. This institutionalization included staff meetings and visits. At the political level, this meant ambassadorial and ministerial EU-OSCE troika meetings. In 2006, the participation of the EU in the OSCE was formalised in the OSCE Rules of Procedure, which granted the EU a seat next to the participating state holding the rotating EU presidency. Furthermore, an EU-OSCE relationship was established between the OSCE field operations Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), as the EU and OSCE operated together more often in the OSCE area. Due to the states that did not overlap both organizations, areas of cooperation mostly included the civilian aspects of security, as the military aspects were too problematic.²⁰⁴

A framework of cooperation was therefore created at the political level,²⁰⁵ but was in practice mostly executed by staff-to-staff engagements between the organs and operations in the field. The EU could have played an essential role in the preservation and strengthening of the OSCE, as it could have bridged the gap between the US and Russia. However, the EU's preference lies more with the UN and its own proliferation for conflict prevention and stability activities than with the OSCE, which is considered 'an increasingly difficult arena in which to find consensus on Europe's security problems'.²⁰⁶

5.6.5 A Widening European Security Architecture

The 1990 OSCE Paris Summit was the first to address a European security architecture; a security system involving all countries of the greater Europe. This greater Europe included Russia and the successor states of the SU as well as the more Westward-oriented states of Central and Eastern Europe, together with the NATO allies.

The aim was to link security matters between the organizations in the OSCE area to construct a security architecture based on a framework of interlocking institutions, aiming at a division of labour between the security organizations and strengthening a multilateral system between NATO, the EU, the former WP countries and the OSCE.²⁰⁷

During the 1990s, several concepts were proposed for a security architecture, particularly by the US, Russia, the UK and the EU bloc of Germany and France together with

202 EU Council conclusions, November 2003.

203 EU Council conclusions, December 2004.

204 Judicial and police reform, public administration, anti-corruption measures, democratization, institution-building and human rights, media development, small and medium-sized enterprise development, border management and combating human trafficking and elections.

205 Consultations between the OSCE Troika, including the OSCE Secretary General, and the EU at both the ministerial and ambassadorial/Political Security Committee levels. Contacts between the Secretary General and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and other high-level EU officials. Annual staff-level talks on topical issues that are on each organization's agenda. See: OSCE, 'The European Union', n.d., available at: <https://www.osce.org/partnerships/european-union>, accessed 4-11-2017.

206 Stewart, E. J., 'Restoring EU-OSCE Cooperation for Pan-European Conflict Prevention', *Contemporary Security policy*, Vol. 29, No. 2, August 2008, p. 280.

207 NATO Strategic Concept, Rome Summit, 1991, par. 33 and 59.

NATO and the OSCE. Initiatives that were taken included mandating the OSCE in 1994 as the anchor of the European security architecture. It was stated that the OSCE would be 'a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management'.²⁰⁸ The idea was to legitimize the OSCE as the overall organization for peacekeeping operations executed by NATO, the WEU and the Russian CIS. The EU stepped in with the establishment of a security and defence policy from 1998 and with the ESS of 2003, stressing the foreign and security policy concept of 'effective multilateralism with its emphasis on establishing the EU as a multilateral 'front-runner' and as a key advocate of inter-organizational cooperation with the UN, the OSCE and NATO'.²⁰⁹

A security architecture unfolded, but not the one intended in 'Paris'. The architecture was more often referred to as a model of 'interlocking' organizations, and disturbed the relations between the US, Europe, Russia and the respective security organizations.

For one, the dissolution of Yugoslavia came too soon for the maturing of the CSCE, the former OSCE, and the UN's primary responsibility for crisis management had to be supported by NATO.

Furthermore, instead of the end of NATO, the idea of a Europe whole and free and the normative OSCE principles were combined with the sovereignty question. In other words, it seemed logical that states were free to choose their own security structures. Together with the US political and military presence in Europe, in 1993 the idea arose of an enlarging alliance and several countries of the former WP chose this option. At that time, the Russian president Yeltsin agreed that Poland could become a NATO member in the future, giving NATO a re-entrance into European security matters.²¹⁰ Russia agreed, because it was reassured that this would be under the umbrella of the pan-European security framework. However, a parallel programme to the development of a European security architecture arose together with the idea of NATO's PFP programme. This parallel programme widened when the EU stepped into the European security architecture, with its enlargement and partnership programme and the establishment of its security and defence policy.

As well as the paths of widening, cooperation between Russia and NATO was accomplished, as Russia participated in NATO-led operations in Bosnia, and the NATO-Russia Founding Act (1997) was established, including strengthened cooperation with regard to terrorism. However, widening of the EU and NATO did not lead to a stable or peaceful Europe. Instead, these were the roaring 1990s, as the wars in the Balkans, especially the war against Serbia in 1999, together with Russia's response to the instability in Chechnya²¹¹ challenged the European order. This European order was challenged many more times thereafter: including the question of Kosovo's status, which became an

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208 Budapest Summit Declaration, 1994.

209 Koops, J. 'The European Union as an Integrative Power? Assessing the EU's 'Effective Multilateralism' towards NATO and the United Nations', Brussels University press, 2011, p. 53.

210 For an elaboration: Asmus, R. D., 'Opening NATO's Door. How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era', Columbia University Press: New York, 2004.

211 Terrorist attacks from separatists and ethnic-based groups in Russia's North Caucasus and outside the North Caucasus increased between 2007-2010, exemplified by the bombing of the Moscow subway system March 2010, resulting in over 40 deaths and many injuries.

ongoing subject of dispute, the Iraqi invasion of 2003, which alienated Russia and NATO further, the widening of the EU and NATO, which overlapped the OSCE area and the US plan for deployment of anti-missile defence in Poland and the Czech Republic which, according to Russia, conflicted with the agreements made in the beginning of the 1990s.

Instead of interlocking, 'interblocking' institutions arose that frustrated each other and raised the question of which organization should be responsible for what. The reality became an order of organizations with overlapping tasks and members and partnerships. This is illustrated by the fact that all three had security platforms for the Middle East and Africa with overlapping goals and tasks. In addition, their respective officials debated the same issues in all these fora, without a decent system of consultation.²¹²

Regarding the organizational structure of the European security architecture, interactions between the related security organizations developed into a diversified path of widening and inter-organizational cooperation. In other words, the level of institutionalized structures had been moderated up to purely informal, mainly staff-to-staff cooperation, although the scope of areas in which the organizations consulted and cooperated had increased.²¹³

Furthermore, the observed interaction had mostly been bilateral between the security organizations, meaning from one organization to the other instead of an all-encompassing security architecture, as described above. The reasons were Russia's participation in the OSCE, a lack of capacities on the part of the OSCE and the need to simultaneously avoid competition or overlap between the organizations regarding their mandates, tasks and operations in the field. In other words, organizations interacted bilaterally because they needed each other in operations and missions and because of a similar enlargement trajectory which could not be achieved multilaterally. Bilateral, because multilateral interaction did not become reality. This is illustrated by the Berlin Plus agreement of 2003 between the EU and NATO, which was created because of operational requirements, as the EU and NATO were operating in the same area geographically and had an overlap in tasks. The same applied to the operations of the EU and the OSCE in the Balkans. However, a Berlin Plus structure between the OSCE and NATO or the EU was never established.

From 2010, the bi- and multilateral agreements increased between the security organizations because of the increasing threats in the security environment, such as terrorism on European home ground and the migration flows. It was acknowledged that these threats could not be handled by one single organization. The joint agreement between the EU and NATO in 2016 countering hybrid and cyber threats serves as an example.

The EU-NATO interaction, although not under the umbrella of the OSCE pan-European organization, has thus been the most extended form of cooperation in the European security architecture, due to the overlap of member states, of interests and of missions

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212 Ham, P., 'EU, NATO, OSCE: Interaction, Cooperation, and Confrontation', in: Hauser, G., Kernic, F., Routledge, London, 2006, p. 24.

213 Gowan, R., 'The EU and Human Rights at the UN, 2009 Annual Review', European Council on Foreign Relations, 10 September 2009.

and operations. In practice, this bilateral cooperation was mostly executed by inter-organizational cooperation between experts, organs and officials of the respective organizations.

In sum, although the OSCE was legitimised as the formal regional peacekeeping organization to mandate crisis management operations, a formal structure or hierarchy between the security organizations, as was the aim at the beginning of the 1990s, had never been established. The political intents of a Europe whole and free, with interlocking institutions, resulted in bilateral agreements between the organizations. There was no understanding as to who should take the lead or how tasks would be integrated or coordinated between the OSCE, the EU and NATO in areas such as deterrence, crisis management, conflict prevention, counter-terrorism or non-proliferation, etc.²¹⁴ The reasons behind the informality of a genuine security architecture first and foremost lay in a lack of consensus between the participating states.²¹⁵

The West's interest in a security architecture, apart from democracy and human rights, lay in the stabilisation of the wider Europe and, if necessary, the containment of Russia. Likewise, Russia's interest in the OSCE had always been to position the OSCE as a counterbalance to NATO. For Russia, the OSCE, although a quite different organization, created an opportunity for NATO to be replaced. The OSCE could then become the prominent organization within the European security architecture, as intended with the Charter of Paris (1990). Russia's aim was to have a strong position in this European security architecture.

The position of the OSCE as the prime regional security organization within the European security architecture was thus weakened at the end of the 1990s. Although cooperation between the OSCE, the EU and NATO strengthened again around 2010, this cooperation never developed into an architecture with a genuine institutionalized division of labour and interlocking organizations. It did, however, result in a web of ad-hoc bilateral cooperation schemes between organizations, organs and state and non-state actors.

5.6.6 Conclusion

The concept of a European security architecture was pitched at the beginning of the 1990s. Several ideas for a security architecture were advanced, particularly by NATO and the OSCE, to promote interlocking and mutually reinforcing cooperation structures for Europe. In this section, consideration is given to the questions of how and why change has led to a path of widening of interaction between the security organizations. The following main periods can be identified in the paths of inter-organizational relations between the security organizations, entailing two themes: multilateral initiatives and bilateral (in)formal cooperation. The first phase established the concept of a European security architecture. The second phase initiated several concepts within the organizations to build a security architecture, such as ESDI and CJTF. The third phase showed an increase

214 Duke, S., 'The EU, NATO and the Lisbon Treaty: still divided within a common city', *Studia Diplomatica*, 2011, p. 3.

215 Kemp, W., 'OSCE Peace Operations: Soft Security in Hard Environments', New York: International Peace Institute, June 2016, p. 4.

in bilateral cooperation between the organizations without the OSCE functioning as an umbrella for the wider European security architecture, as was intended at the beginning of the 1990s. Interaction between the security organizations was mostly on an informal basis with low institutionalized structures. The third phase added rivalry and hostility between the actors in the OSCE area and simultaneously strengthened cooperation between NATO and the EU.

In sum, a European security architecture built on a division of labour, as was intended at the beginning of the 1990s, was never formalised or accompanied with a deep institutional structure and changed into an overlapping network of states and organizations.

5.7 Organizations Adrift: A Cross-case Comparison on the Path of Widening

5.7.1 Introduction

The previous sections addressed the path of change of the selected security organizations. These paths of change, resulting in an institutional build-up of the security organization, are chronologically presented in the table below. This section looks at the questions of how and why the change of the path of widening has varied among the security organizations. The security organizations will be compared, addressing observed differences and similarities in the indicators of level and form in order to analyse the variation between the security organizations. In other words, the cases will be subjected to a cross-case comparison within the path of widening based on the research framework.

Widening of security organizations	NATO	EU	OSCE	IO-IO
Before 1990	Enlargement	Enlargement	Mediterranean partners since 'Helsinki' (1975)	
1990	NACC	CEEC	Initiative on partners for cooperation in Asian and Mediterranean region	
1991	Rome Summit: initiative on European security architecture, NACC		Initiative on European security architecture. Widening with former SU states	
1992	Oslo Summit; adoption OSCE CRO, link to other organizations		OSCE regional organization under UN charter	

1993		Copenhagen criteria for enlargement		
1994	Launch Pfp, MD			
1995	Study on enlargement	Barcelona process		
1996				EU-NATO Berlin arrangements
1997	Invitation states, NATO-Russia Founding Act (NRC), NACC=EAPC, Pfp extension; PARP	Initiative enlargement		
1999	Round 1 (3 states), invitation 9 states, PMF, MAP	SAP and SAA, build on CEEC		NATO-OSCE; Platform for Co-operative Security
2002	Strengthening NATO-Russia Council	Invitation 10 states		EU-OSCE, Berlin Plus agreement
2003		Invitation 2 states		UN-EU cooperation, EU-NATO cooperation and capability group, EU-OSCE declaration on conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, EU delegation in OSCE
2004	Round 2 (7 states), MD, ICI	Round 1 (8 states), initiative ENP, ENI		EU-OSCE framework, strengthening NATO-OSCE cooperation
2005				EU Cell at NATO SHAPE
2006	Dialogue with Japan, Australia, South Korea and New Zealand			Formal EU participation in OSCE; rules of procedure and cooperation institutional levels
2007		Round 2 (2 states)	Partnership Fund	UN-EU strengthening
2008	Invitation Ukraine, Georgia	Mediterranean Union (as well as SAP)		

2009	France full member, Albania and Croatia members			
2010	PPC, strengthening PMF			
2011	Adoption PATG	Relaunch ENP, EU-Russia strategic partnership		UN-EU strengthening
2013		EPC		
2014	Interoperability platform new partners, PCSC successor of PPC, strengthening cooperation with Finland, Sweden within PfP, DCB, framework for the South and PCSC	PCA, ENP, EP, ENI		
2015				UN-EU
2016		Brexit		EU-NATO joint declaration including support of partners

Table 5.1 Overview of key moments on the path of widening of the different security organizations.

5.7.2 Comparing the Paths of Widening of NATO, the EU and the OSCE

The security organizations NATO, EU and OSCE, as the units of analysis, are all regional organizations. The OSCE contains the largest number of participating states, as all member states of the EU and NATO participate in the OSCE. NATO and the EU almost overlap in members, but differ in aspects of neutrality and geography, for example in the case of Sweden and Turkey. Both the EU and the OSCE, as well as NATO, are legitimized by Article 53 of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, although NATO is primarily legitimized by Article 51 of the UN Charter as a collective defence organization.

The programmes of cooperation and dialogue, as a result of the end of the Cold War, resulted in enlargement processes for NATO, the EU and the OSCE from the beginning of the 1990s. Whereas the big bang of OSCE enlargement took place right after the fall of the SU and the WP, both NATO and the EU made their final decision on Eastern enlargement in 1997. This resulted in seven new NATO members and eight new EU members in the first and second enlargement rounds at the end of the 1990s. Since then the path of widening continued but developed into a more complex web of cooperation with state and non-state actors.

When comparing the paths of widening of the individual security organizations identified in this chapter, some key findings stand out.

Membership

For the OSCE as well as the EU, widening resulted in a larger sphere of activities, comprising a larger group of states and a broader domain of policy areas to be engaged with. In contrast to NATO, historically built on the bipolar system where threat was the very reason for its existence, the end of the Cold War resulted in questioning the *raison d'être* of NATO in the 1990s. NATO therefore combined cooperation and dialogue with the outside world, together with the task of defence and deterrence, resulting in a combination of collective defence and widening, defined by NATO as cooperative security. When Article 5 had become less important after the end of the bipolar era, enlargement and partnership addressed the need for the legitimacy of NATO. The EU also dealt with a power struggle concerning the wording as a security organization; the member states' interests differed with regard to the EU's creation as a security and defence organization.²¹⁶ These specific legitimacy aspects of enlargement had never been the case for the survival of the OSCE.

All in all, the 1990s saw great enthusiasm for enlargement of the security organizations with states from the former bipolar world order. This enthusiasm was inspired by the multilateral ideas of a Kantian world order, which gave birth to the concept of the European security architecture, initiated under the umbrella of the OSCE. A wave of democratisation occurred in the OSCE area and led to changes within the security organizations, strengthening the international legitimacy of liberal democracy with economic aid, political reform and good governance. This resulted in full membership of dozens of states to the different security organizations from 1991, when the OSCE was the first to open its doors, up to 2004 combined with special strategic partnerships of NATO and the EU, such as the founding acts with Russia and Ukraine.

For the EU and NATO, this enlargement dynamic stopped after the second big bang of enlargement, around 2004. The path of enlargement slowed for both the EU and NATO because of hesitation and dispute amongst the members as a result of differences in geostrategic and political strategic interests. Furthermore, the absence of performing and fully committed candidates and the setback in EU and NATO internal institutional development (widening without deepening) made some member states hesitant. For some of the EU and NATO members, this even resulted in an aversion towards enlargement.

Furthermore, in contrast to achieving stability, enlargement had also led to new security dilemmas after 2010, as it brought the EU and NATO under the umbrella of the OSCE cooperative security concept, instability and even crisis amongst the members and with the outside world, such as the Crimea crisis of 2014.²¹⁷ So the question arose as to whether enlargement had brought stability or instability.

From the 1990s, an enlargement scenario could be discerned within the European security architecture: first, a state became a member of the OSCE, followed by NATO

216 Schimmelfennig, F., 'The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 56.

217 Tardy, T., 'CSDP in action. What contribution to international security?' Chailot paper, No. 134, May 2015, p. 214.

membership and, finally, EU membership was achievable at the end of the tunnel. Although NATO and EU enlargement were separate legal and political paths, these organizations were linked in their paths of widening.

Enlargement had an impact on the political and institutional relations between the European security organizations as pillars of the European security architecture. For one, because within all the organizations, larger and heterogeneous groups emerged. Another direct consequence of the enlargement of NATO and the EU was the emerging overlap of members with the OSCE; the membership became practically identical.²¹⁸

From the analysis above, some differences and similarities can be distinguished between the paths of widening.

Regarding the differences, NATO and – even more so – the EU have been more discriminating in their requirements towards accession than the OSCE. Furthermore, the enlargement of NATO and the EU had been more contested within and outside the organizations than that of the OSCE. Finally, as the enlargement process of the OSCE ended during the 1990s, the open-door policy of both the EU and NATO started and continued from there.

Regarding the similarities, within all three security organizations a differentiation is observed towards members. Within the security organizations there are different forms and levels of membership. First, differentiation of membership, for example the minus-1 formula of the OSCE and the NATO abstention possibility,²¹⁹ which will be explored in Chapter 6. Second, differentiation in NATO membership, comparable to the EU with the opt-in and opt-out procedure for the position of the ‘neutrals’ regarding Article 42.7 and the PESCO instrument.

Partnership

As well as enlargement, as one aspect of widening, all three organizations engaged in partnerships where again differences and similarities can be distinguished.

Regarding the differences, all three organizations vary in their form and level of formalisation of many different partnership forms created by NATO and the EU: ENI, ENP, PfP, EAPC, ICI etc. They encompass higher and lower levels of institutionalization, less or more formal engagement and differentiation in engagement of policies. The security organizations had both an overlap in partnerships and differed in their approach and strategy towards partnerships. For instance, with regard to the Ukraine crisis in 2014, where NATO had a military approach, the EU had a civilian, rules-based approach combined with sanctions, and the OSCE attempted to mediate between the conflicting parties with the Minsk process.

Reflecting on the similarities, NATO, the OSCE and the EU have been active in all kinds of partnerships, e.g. partnerships with states, regions or international organizations, which all gave them a global reach. These organizations began to create a diverse array of strongly or weakly institutionalized relationships ranging from observer status to some

218 All the members of NATO and EU, either full members or associated, are OSCE partners.

219 Exemplified by the engagement of NATO in Libya, 2011.

form of association²²⁰ and even positioning a network of worldwide embassies.²²¹ As a result, this led to mechanisms of relational and geographic spill-over, where organizations influenced each other with regard to the partnership policy. These mechanisms emerged in the commitment made in the context of NATO's PfP and EU cooperation programmes worldwide, involving similarities and differences regarding the formalisation of the engagement.

The Inter-organizational Path of Widening: A Permanently Changing Architecture

Along with an extensive regional and worldwide partnership, as described above, an increase in political interaction between the selected security organizations is observed. With regard to the path of widening of the relations between the security organizations within the European security architecture, some outcomes can be observed.

Although NATO and the OSCE stated the necessity of a security architecture in the 1990s, this was never institutionally established. Apart from the declarations made by the OSCE and NATO, a declaration encompassing all the security organizations, establishing a security architecture with a strategy and institutional structure and a genuine division of labour, was never framed. There was no formal hierarchy established between the organizations, apart from the fact that they all subscribed to the principles of the UN Charter. Several declarations were signed between the three organizations, such as the Berlin Plus agreements of NATO and the EU in 2003, but there were no formal linkages set between the decision-making bodies of their strategic and planning processes.

In addition, in their paths of change, NATO, the EU and the OSCE performed both overlapping and different tasks and encompassed overlapping members, as outlined above.

Along the path of widening, many different relationship and cooperation programmes had been set up, which led to a cross-institutional membership and partnership and had an impact on a supposedly all-encompassing European security architecture declared at the beginning of the 1990s. States became full or associated members of different organizations simultaneously, for example NATO's PfP programme and the OSCE's Partnership for Cooperation. At first, these partners contributed to the political legitimacy of NATO, the OSCE and the EU. Later, membership and partnership meant that both NATO and the EU were faced with various dilemmas with regard to bilateral, regional and global cooperation and the implication of the different forms of membership and partnership, as outlined above. Furthermore, these dilemmas had an adverse effect on the OSCE organization, as this diversification had a negative impact on the OSCE, creating conflict instead of stability.²²² Enlargement of the EU and NATO therefore undermined the OSCE cooperative umbrella, not only as a result of members and tasks overlapping with

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220 Schimmelfennig, F., 'The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 1.

221 EU Treaty of Lisbon 2009, see Chapter 6.

222 Tardy, T., 'CSDP in action. What contribution to international security?' Chaillot Paper, No. 134, May 2015, p. 216.

the EU and NATO, but also because of the result of the differentiation between members, candidates, non-candidates, organizations and regions; states that were in or out.²²³

The 'Russia factor' had a much larger impact on the OSCE than EU and NATO enlargements to the East'.²²⁴ Although the OSCE could have taken a greater role to mediate between different actors within the European security architecture, this had not been the case. Partly because half of the OSCE states were members of the EU and NATO, who coordinated their policies and goals before OSCE meetings took place, and partly because of the irritation of Russia with regard to Western policies within the OSCE.

Another development along the path of inter-organizational widening was the loss of enthusiasm for enlargement. After 2000, full enlargement was replaced by partnership, far more informal, diversified and even less institutionalized with partners outside the organizations. Moreover, this led to differentiation among third countries and bilateral agreements between organizations and states into a diversified framework of negotiations. This differentiation of form and level of cooperation between members, candidates, non-candidates, organizations and regions undermined institution building of the selected organizations as a whole, and increased fragmentation and ad-hoc multi- and bilateralism outside the European security architecture.²²⁵

Finally, the EU and NATO membership and partnership were characterised by an 'incremental linkage', as they were mirrored and linked.²²⁶ This meant that if one organization moved forward towards cooperation or even enlargement, the other organization would reply with a similar move towards enlargement. At the same time, competition between NATO and the EU regarding enlargement and partnerships was also apparent, because if one was engaged with an actor, the other could not stay behind in this 'great game' of influence.²²⁷

Regarding the path of widening and civil and military operations, NATO and EU operational cooperation with partners outside the organizations had become a well-trying recipe. One example was the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, which included cooperation with Australia, New Zealand and Japan. In Libya (2011), Libyan rebel forces, backed by NATO in an operation initiated by France and the UK, finally captured Colonel Gaddafi and his government, which was replaced by the so-called National Transitional Council.²²⁸ In Mali, the EU's cooperation with the government was followed by the EU Framework Strategy for Sahel and its Regional Action Plan, including the Economic Community of West-African

223 Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., 'Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union', Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 15.

224 Dunay, P., 'The Changing political geography of Europe. After EU and NATO enlargements', p. 89, in: Tardy, T., (eds.) 'European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external dynamics', Contemporary Security Studies, Routledge, Oxon, Great Britain, 2009.

225 Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., 'Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union', Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 15.

226 Smith, M. A., Timmins, G., 'The European Union and NATO enlargement debates in comparative perspective: a case of incremental linkage?', *West European Politics*, 22:3, July 1999, p. 23.

227 Smith, M. A., 'EU enlargement and NATO: The Balkan experience', p. 7. In: Brown, D., Shepherd, A. K, *The security dimensions of EU enlargement. Wider Europe, weaker Europe?*, Manchester University Press, 2007, p. 11.

228 27 February 2011.

States (ECOWAS).²²⁹ However, this showed that operations, either civil or military, were mostly composed of ad-hoc coalitions outside the institutionalized framework and not strengthened or institutionalized within the European security architecture. Cooperation with partners in operations could be defined as a combination of the post-Westphalian system of international institutionalized cooperation and multilateralism, combined with a power- and interest-based composition of flexible ad-hoc coalitions in operations.

As a result of this variegated path of widening, the security organizations and the European security architecture were split into different centres referred to by Cassier as the 'clash of integration processes'.²³⁰ Furthermore, the different forms of partnership that were set up were 'poorly used and could rather be labelled as empty shells'.²³¹ The Alliance and the EU disagreed on the strategy required to achieve their aims regarding enlargement and partnership. As Schimmelfennig stated, for a longer period, NATO summits handled three baskets as the main ones, whereby one of them had always been enlargement and partnership, referred to by NATO as cooperative security. In reality, this basket was empty in several respects, one being the strategic partnership with Russia, which was not invoked during the Crimea crisis. Rather, the enlargement programmes of the EU and NATO, under the umbrella of NATO's cooperative security and dialogue, resulted in an increase in tensions between the East and West, with the highpoints in 2000, 2004 and 2014.²³²

In short, a diversified path of widening of the security organizations and the European security architecture led to different centres of power and interest.

Explaining the Paths of Widening

This chapter analysed the paths of widening of NATO, the EU and the OSCE and intra-organizational cooperation. The question is how the observed paths can be explained. One way or the other, the observed path of widening has been diverse. Widening brought many different paths of ad-hoc, formal and more informal institutionalization and varied forms of cooperation. In the first instance, states are the ones to decide upon enlargement and engagement with other states and organizations, as rational choice theory explains. Therefore, the decision to widen lay in the intergovernmental domain of all selected security organizations. The analysis showed that this state interest was geographically and politically varied and so was the development of the organizations' path of widening.

229 For the framework, see: Council of the European Union, 'Options paper for CSDP support to Sahel Joint Force', 2017, 11562/17, available at: www.statewatch.org/news/2017/nov/eu-eeas-csdp-options-paper-support-g5-sahel-7-17.pdf, accessed 3-9-2017.

230 Cassier, T., 'The Clash of integration processes. The shadow effect of enlarged EU on its eastern neighbours', in: Malfliet, K., Verpoest, L., Vinokurov, E. (eds), 'The CIS, The EU and Russia. Challenges of Integration', Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, p. 73-94.

231 Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., 'Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union', Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 14.

232 The Velvet and Orange revolution in respectively Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004) and the Crimea crisis (2014).

Furthermore, although inter-organizational cooperation increased, the European security architecture was not as it had been intended at the beginning of the 1990s, with a genuine institutionalized division of labour as a result of the diversified interests of the states.

First, with a non-formalized security architecture, states could take full advantage of the various institutional options open to them, which hampered the development of an efficient and more formal division of labour between the organizations if this was not in their interest. For instance, 'The US and Great Britain prefer these relations to be hierarchal, granting NATO a right of first refusal. The Dutch (and others) prefer all organizations to act on their institutional mandate and thus in coordination with each other'.²³³ France, Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium preferred a more limited mandate for NATO, with a primary task of collective defence. 'For them, the kinds of military crisis management tasks that the US wants NATO to assume should be handled by CSDP'.²³⁴

Second, although elements of multilateralism were observed, illustrated by Russian cooperation with NATO in the Balkan conflicts, competition between the organizations was observed as well: at different times and with different implementation schemes and decision-making levels.²³⁵

Third, an aversion among states could be discerned towards the allocation of capabilities and assets as a result of widening, because some states did not want to contribute to operations that were not in their interest or that duplicated institutional structures and capabilities that already existed in other security organizations.

According to Hofmann and Biermann, therefore, a European security architecture never matured as '...many institutions are created without explicit agreement on whether their main purpose is to strengthen or complement already existing institutions...' or other purposes for that matter.²³⁶ A certain amount of vagueness often purposely remained, implying that there was no overlap, no need for transparency or complementarity between the organizations. It was never specified, therefore, exactly what was meant by unnecessary duplication of organs or capabilities, or how overlap should be dealt with. This led to dissatisfaction among states that were not included, for instance Russia in relation to the OSCE, but also the US and Turkey in relation to the setup of the EU-EGF.²³⁷

Another observation was that widening was not a new adventure for the EU and NATO. Moreover, from their creation, this historical path had always been flexible in form and level due to historical legacies, such as in the case of Germany. The path of widening

233 Hofmann, S. C., 'Why institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2011, vol. 49, nr.1, p. 110.

234 Hofmann, S. C., 'Why institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2011, vol. 49, nr.1., p. 111.

235 For an elaboration, see: Biermann, R., 'Towards a Theory of Inter-organizational Networking. The Euro-Atlantic Security Institutions Interacting', *The Review of International Organizations*, Volume 3, Issue 2, June 2008; Hofmann, S. C., 'Why institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2011, vol. 49, nr. 1., p. 112.

236 Hofmann, S. C., 'Why institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2011, vol. 49, nr.1, p. 108.

237 The EGF will be explored further in Chapter 6.

was thus a familiar path, sometimes to strengthen European norms and values of multilateralism and sometimes to counterweight other paths such as deepening.

Furthermore, apart from state interest in widening their geographical scope of influence, whereby they could pick and choose their interaction as they deemed necessary, it can also be argued that widening as a path founded the legitimacy of the existing organizations. For instance, when NATO's Article 5 had become less important after the end of the bipolar era, enlargement and partnership addressed this need for legitimacy. Likewise, the EU path of widening offered the EU legitimacy even within security and defence policy, but further away from the power struggle of the wording as a security organization as the member states' interests differed.²³⁸

Finally, apart from state interest, the process of widening was driven by the promotion of European norms and values of regionalism and multilateralism by states as well as organizations, derived from EU treaties and summits, and NATO and OSCE summits.²³⁹ The feeling of morality between the US and the European continent was mutual regarding the obligation towards the Eastern European countries, offering new states the foresight on democracy and prosperity. In the 1990s, the US and the European countries were not interested in building new blocs as a replacement of the Cold War balance of power, and this idea lasted throughout the 2000s. Widening was built on the idea that cooperation and dialogue would contribute to stability and security in the wider Europe. OSCE, NATO and the EU built their paths of change as guardians of multilateralism. However, these ideas conflicted more and more between the members of the heterogeneous organizations, as explained by constructivist institutionalism; as a result, not all actors profited as much as others and the path of widening decreased.

Ultimately, as well as state actors, another big push factor for initiating, negotiating, implementing and sustaining the enlargement and partnership programmes consisted of the organs and the officials. It was clear that these actors influenced the agenda and enthused the member states, either positively or negatively. As a result of the differentiated membership and partnership programmes, specific expertise and duration were necessary to accomplish the agreements and criteria and the approval for further widening. Furthermore, enlargement and engagement were supposed to be in their interests, as it provided knowledge, legitimacy and power.

5.8 Conclusion

The questions this chapter addressed were how and why change has led to widening of the European security organizations. The security organizations were therefore analysed

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238 Schimmelfennig, F., 'The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 56.

239 Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., 'Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union', Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 16.

separately and in comparison, in their path of widening, measured by the indicators of level and form.

The path of widening of the three security organizations changed in form and level from 1990 onwards and brought a varied path. This path of widening started with dialogue and cooperation, initiated by the OSCE and NATO, and changed into enlargement accompanied by high and low institutionalization of the partnership programmes. This resulted in an increase of organizations composed of groups of heterogeneous states that vary in values and norms, geographical scope and political differences, interests and capabilities.

After the states were invited in the 1990s by both the EU and NATO, the enlargement momentum stopped and turned into an association and partnership dynamic and an increasing network of overlapping and differentiated partnerships. This development varied from solely cooperation to full membership to cooperation and alignment again, combining tailor-made bi- and multilateral cooperation and loose partnerships. Membership was thus replaced by partnership and interaction between the organizations in many different forms, with moderate institutionalization.

