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Permanent change? the paths of change of the European security organizations

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Citation

Mengelberg, S. N. (2021, April 15). *Permanent change? the paths of change of the European security organizations*. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3160749>

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Issue Date: 2021-04-15

Chapter 2

Chapter 2. Change in Security Organizations: The Research Framework

2.1 Introduction

‘A state of Peace among men who live side by side with each other, is not the natural state. The state of Nature is rather a state of War; for although it may not always present the outbreak of hostilities, it is nevertheless continually threatened with them. The state of Peace must, therefore, be established; for the mere cessation of hostilities furnishes no security against their recurrence, and where there is no guarantee of peace between neighboring States—which can only be furnished under conditions that are regulated by Law—the one may treat the other, when proclamation is made to that effect, as an enemy’.¹

As the aim of this research is to analyse and explain observed changes in European security organizations, the units of analysis, this chapter addresses how, why and by who or what these changes can be explained by the theoretical approach of new institutionalism within the field of political science. First, in section two, an overview of prior research on the security organizations that make up the European security architecture will be presented. Second, in section three, the relevant concepts will be addressed. These are, international security cooperation and organizations, respectively, and their paths of change, the main concept. Third, in section four, the debates on and development of new institutionalism, the theoretical lens that will be used to analyse the observations within the European security architecture, will be addressed. The focus is on three approaches within institutionalism, which all provide explanations of change. This part is a journey through the world of institutionalism that details the different approaches within institutionalism, specifically rational choice, historical institutionalism and constructivist institutionalism, as they all provide different lenses with which to explore paths and drivers of change. The overview of these approaches will be concluded with a discussion of the differences between these approaches and potential complementarity.

Finally, in section five, the research framework will be presented, which builds on and combines the theoretical lenses that will guide the empirical analysis and explanation.

2.2 Research on Change in European Security Organizations

2.2.1 Introduction

The growth of the complex international security environment, with multiple state and non-state actors and increasing international cooperation after the end of the Cold

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1 Kant, I., ‘Perpetual Peace’, Cosimo Classics, September 2010.

War, has led to an intensification of empirical and theoretical research on international organizations and their interaction. Many debates followed about the definition of international organizations and their possible actorness swinging between the realist, institutionalists and constructivist camps and everything in between.² Exemplified by Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner³, Ruggie⁴ and Duffield's seminal article on the necessity of defining international institutions.⁵ And the reaction from the realist 'camp' envisaged by Mearsheimer's unmistakable article 'The False Promise of International Institutions'.⁶ A brief overview of the major research on European security organizations follows below.

2.2.2 Research on Security Cooperation

In general, international security cooperation and security organizations have been subject to a fair amount of academic scrutiny. Moreover, compared to other security organizations, European security organizations and the interaction between these organizations have been well researched.⁷ The EU's foreign, security and defence policy, NATO's tasks after the end of the Cold War and EU-NATO cooperation have appeared prominently in the academic debate. Koops goes so far as to say that with regard to the EU, '...there are more academics than practitioners working on...security policy'.⁸

The research on European security organizations varies in its focus from general issues, like the existence and nature of security organizations, to descriptive analyses of policy initiatives, and single case studies of the institutional development, enlargement process, or the evaluation of civilian missions and military operations under the auspices of the EU's CFSP and E/CSDP and NATO. Furthermore, formal-legal aspects of international cooperation are addressed in the literature at length.⁹

In addition to issue-related research, many studies analyse different organizations separately using one theoretical framework.¹⁰ Examples include the extensive research

- 2 For an overview, see: Fioretos, O. (eds.), 'International Politics and Institutions in Time', Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 2017, Chapter 1.
- 3 Katzenstein, P. J., Keohane, R. O., Krasner, S. D., 'International Organization and the Study of World Politics', *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4, 1998.
- 4 Ruggie, J. G., 'Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution', *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 3, Summer 1992, p. 561.
- 5 Duffield, J., 'What are international institutions?', *International Studies Review*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2007.
- 6 Mearsheimer, J. J., 'The False Promise of International Institutions', *International Security*, Vol.19, No. 3, Winter 1994/5.
- 7 Biermann, R., 'Towards a Theory of Inter-organizational Networking. The Euro-Atlantic Security Institutions Interacting', *The Review of International Organizations*, June 2008, Volume 3, Issue 2, June 2008, p. 151.
- 8 Koops, J. A., 'The European Union as an Integrative Power? Assessing the EU's 'Effective Multilateralism' towards NATO and the United Nations', Brussels University Press, Brussels, 2011, p. 88-89.
- 9 For an elaboration on legal aspects of NATO-EU cooperation, see: Reichard, M., 'The EU-NATO Relationship', 2006; Wessel, R. A., Wouters, J., 'Multilevel Regulation and the EU: the Interplay between Global, European, and National Normative Processes', 2008; Wessel, R., 'The Legal Framework for the Participation of the European Union in International Institutions', *Journal of European Integration*, 2011.
- 10 Rittberger, V., Zangl, B., 'International Organisation. Polity, Politics and Policies', Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006.

conducted by Kirchner and Dominguez¹¹ and the Barnett and Finnemore's research¹² that analyses organizations and their behaviour, viewing organizations as bureaucracies and their related behaviour or the research of Mahoney and Thelen conceptualizing change of institutions.¹³

2.2.3 Research on Security Organizations

As the research on EU's security and defence policy has been extensive, below a brief overview divided between the more realist, liberal and constructivist perspectives.¹⁴

First, EU's development as a security actor and the concept of European security¹⁵ has been contested by the more realist state centric academics claiming the denial of the EU as an effective global power. It was stated that the increase of EU's security and defence policy became possible because of US hegemony in the European security arena.¹⁶ Or driven by the 'big three' of Europe. In other words, the increase of EU's security and defence policy was the result of state power and thus will always remain intergovernmental.¹⁷ Another explanation has been the safeguarding of state sovereignty because of the existence of the EU.¹⁸

Second, within the liberal perspectives the construction of the EU, and European security, in general has been one of the most analysed subjects, focussing on the relation between states and the EU, the institutional dynamics, the mandate and specific issues like enlargement.¹⁹

11 Kirchner, E. J., Dominguez, R., 'The Security Governance of regional Organisations', Routledge, 2011.

12 Barnett, M., Finnemore, M., 'Rules for the world. International Organisations in Global Politics', Cornell University Press, 2004.

13 Mahoney, J., Thelen, K., 'Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency and Power', Cambridge University Press, 2009.

14 For an extensive overview, see: Hyde-Price, A., 'Realism: a dissident voice in the study of the CSDP', chapter 2; Jorgensen, K.E., Aarstad, A.K., 'Liberal, constructivist and critical studies of European security', chapter 3, in: Biscop, S., Whitman, R.G., 'The Routledge Handbook on European Security', Routledge Handbooks, 2013.

15 Cooper, R., 'The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century', Atlantic Monthly Press, 1 Jan. 2004.

16 For example: Mearsheimer, J. J., 'The Tragedy of Great Power Politics', W.W. Norton, New York, 2001; Kagan, R., 'Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order', Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2003; Hyde-Price, A., 'European Security in the Twenty-First Century: The Challenge of Multipolarity', Routledge, London, 2007; Rynning, S., 'Realism and the Common Security and Defence policy', Journal of Common Market Studies, 2010.

17 For example: Grieco, J., Powell, R., Snidal, D., 'The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation', The American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (Sep., 1993); Missiroli, A., 'European Security Policy: The Challenge of Coherence', Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev., 6, 2001.

18 Lindley French, J., 'In the shade of Locarno? Why European defence is failing', International Affairs, Volume 78, Issue 4, October 2002; Menon, A., 'From crisis to catharsis: ESDP after Iraq', International Affairs, Volume 80, Issue 4, July 2004.

19 Howorth, J., 'Decision-making in Security and Defence Policy: Towards Supranational Inter-governmentalism?', Cooperation and Conflict, Sage Publications, 2012; Vanhoonaeker, S., Dijkstra, H., Maurer, H., 'Understanding the Role of Bureaucracy in the European Security and Defence Policy: The State of the Art', European Integration online Papers, Vol. 14, 2010; Hofmann, S. C., 'CSDP: approaching transgovernmentalism?', in: Kurowska, X., Breuer, F. (eds.), 'Explaining The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy: Theory in Action', Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012; Menon 2011; Jorgensen, K. E., Aarstad, A. K., 'Liberal, constructivist and Critical Studies' of European security', in: Biscop, S., Whitman R. (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of European Security, Oxon: Routledge, 2012.

Finally, constructivist academics focussed on identity perspectives, emphasized EU's strategic culture²⁰ and stated the acceptance of the EU as an autonomous normative power.²¹

In general, it can be concluded that all theoretical approaches of political science are represented in the academic debate about the development of EU's security and defence policy, except for the integration theory of neo-functionalism and its logic of spill-over.²²

Likewise, NATO's political, institutional and military transformation from the end of the Cold War has been debated extensively²³ and many times NATO's *raison d'être* was questioned.²⁴

On the one hand, it was argued that theorizing the path of change of NATO has been poorly developed. For instance, '...most early work on the 'renaissance' of NATO focused on the potential consequences of NATO enlargement, crisis management and out of area operations. Relatively few studies have asked 'why' questions concerning the cause of these important changes'.²⁵ NATO, in contrast to organizations like the EU and the UN, has prompted only limited theoretical consideration. On the other hand, this was contested, for example by Webber who contradicted this supposedly undertheorized NATO's path of change.²⁶

Like the EU, the academic debate on NATO can be divided between realist²⁷, liberal²⁸ and constructivist perspectives.²⁹ Webber even plead for a necessity of theoretical pluralism

20 Meyer, C. O., 'Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms', *European Journal of International relations*, December 1, 2005.

21 Manners, I., 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', *Journal of Market studies*, 16 December 2002; Manners, I., 'Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: beyond the Crossroads', *Journal Of European Public Policy*, volume 13, 2006; Sijrsen, H. (ed.), 'Special issue: What Kind of Power? European Foreign Policy in Perspective', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 18 (8), 2006; Whitman, R. (ed.), *Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011.

22 Keukeleire, S., Delreux, T., 'The Foreign Policy of the European Union', *The European Union Series*, 2nd edition, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 2014, p. 326.

23 For example: Duffield, J., 'NATO's Functions after the Cold War', *Political Science Quarterly* 109, 1994-1995, p. 763-787; McCalla, R., 'NATO's Persistence after the Cold War', *International Organization* 50, Summer 1996, p. 445-475; Wijk, R., 'NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium. The Battle for Consensus', Brassey's, London, 1997; Wallander, C. A., 'Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War', *International Organization* 54, Autumn 2000; Kaplan, L., *NATO divided, NATO United*, Praeger, 2004.

24 For an overview of the NATO 'in-crisis-literature', see: Thies, W. J., 'Why NATO Endures', Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009, p. 3-14.

25 Barany, Z., Rauchhaus, R., 'Explaining NATO's resilience: Is International Relations Theory Useful?', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. me 32, Issue 2, 2011, p. 287.

26 For an extensive overview on theorizing NATO: Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., 'NATO's Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?', Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 32-46.

27 For example: Waltz, K., 'Structural Realism after the Cold War', *International Security*, Vol. 25(1), 2000; Kagan, R., 'Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order', Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2003; Rupp, R., *NATO after 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006.

28 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., 'Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions Over Time and Space', Oxford University Press, 1999; Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., 'The Rationale Design of International Institutions', *International Organization*, Volume 55, Issue 04, September 2001.

29 For example: Moore, R., 'NATO's Mission for the New Millennium: A Value-based-approach to Building Security', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 32 (1), 2002; Schimmelfennig, F., 'Functional Form, Identity-driven Cooperation: Institutional designs and effects in Post-Cold War NATO', in: Acharya, A., Johnston, A. I. (eds.), 'Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective', Cambridge, University Press, 2007; Risse-Kappen, T., 'Collective identity in a Democratic Community: The case of NATO', in: Katzenstein (ed.), 'The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics', New York: Columbia University Press, 1996; Sijrsen, H., 'On the Identity of NATO', *International Affairs*, Vol. 80 (4), 2004.

as NATO acts in a constant changing complex and uncertain world, which resulted in different roles.³⁰

Altogether, NATO has been viewed variously as an alliance that ‘balances’ a known source of power or threat; a ‘community organisation’ owing to the democratic identity of its members; or a special kind of alliance which has been subject to analysis that focuses on intra-alliance management (the problem of ‘free-riding’ and the alliance security dilemma of abandonment versus entrapment); and as an ‘international institution’ whose ‘portable assets’ have ensured its ongoing attractiveness to its members.³¹

Finally, only a handful of scholars analysed the path of change of the OSCE organization, theorizing the OSCE even less. Research on the OSCE has always been focused either on the functioning and efficiency of OSCE principles, its mission and its institutions³² or the analysis of the geopolitical balance of power and its implications for the OSCE as a cooperative security organization.³³

However, this literature does not explore the drivers and dynamics that underlie change in a truly comparative manner, based on a single set of indicators, which is the aim of this research. There is a lack of systematic analysis of how, when and why these security organizations have changed compared to one another. This is essential, as the organizations act in a shared environment and often have overlap in activities, functions and membership. In other words, if paths of change of organizations that are closely related to one another are not analysed using a comparative method, potential causes and dynamics of change may be neglected. As Duffield argues in his article on the nature of international organizations ‘...it may be unacknowledged variation in the nature of the institutions themselves rather than other factors that account for the patterns of outcomes that such studies seek to explain’.³⁴ Duffield goes on to say that ‘...the failure to recognise important variations in institutional forms can result in flawed research on the causes and consequences of international institutions, their development in practice and theoretical consequences’.³⁵ This highlights the need for comparative analysis, as argued here.

30 Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., ‘NATO’s Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 31-32.

31 Ibid, p. 22-30.

32 Exemplified by: Kemp, W., ‘OSCE Peace Operations: Soft Security in Hard Environments’, New York: International Peace Institute, June 2016; Hill, W. H., ‘OSCE Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping, Past and Future’, OSCE Security Days Event, National War College Washington DC., 16 September 2013; Lanz, D., ‘Charting the Ups-and-downs of OSCE Mediation’, in Security and Human Rights, Netherlands Helsinki Committee, Volume 27, Nos. 3-4, 2016.

33 Exemplified by: Shakirov, O., ‘NoSCE or Next Generation OSCE?’, Security and Human Rights 27, 2016.

34 Duffield, J., ‘What are international institutions?’, International Studies Review, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2007, p. 2.

35 Ibid, p. 16.

2.2.4 Research on Interaction between Security Organizations

The focus of this research is the analysis of change in security organizations individually and in relation to one another. Below, research on the interaction between security organizations will be analysed.

As a result of the increase in interaction between international organizations over the past several decades, a need has emerged to explore the level and form of the relationship and interaction between security organizations. Research on relations between different security organizations, labelled ‘inter-organizationalism’ and defined by Koops as ‘a process that can include cooperation and interaction, but also rivalry among international-organizations’.³⁶

Research on inter-organizational relations founded its roots during the Cold War by DiMaggio and Powell³⁷ and March and Olsen³⁸, who addressed processes of isomorphism between organizations.³⁹ From there the research further developed. Scott and Meyer criticized the narrow focus of either competitive or cooperative interaction between organizations and argued that capacities and institutional aspects were better able to explain interaction.⁴⁰ Streeck and Thelen argued that analysing institutions requires a relational approach ‘change can only be understood by focusing on the relationships among institutions’ defined as ‘institutional interconnectedness’.⁴¹ As far as the influence that organizations might have towards each other, Kelley argued that institutions do influence one another to an extent where they can modify the organizational structure or even trigger (possibly low intensity) processes of integration and change in the configuration of forces between them and the member states.⁴² Koops claimed that under certain circumstances institutions are even found to shape, sometimes strongly, both policies and policy-making processes even in ways unintended or undesired by member states.⁴³ According to Blavoukos ‘...either the two will become more permeable to one

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- 36 Koops, J. A., ‘The European Union as an Integrative power? Assessing the EU’s ‘Effective multilateralism’ towards NATO and the United Nations’, Brussels University Press, Brussels, 2011, p. 46.
 - 37 DiMaggio, P. J., Powell, W. W., ‘The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields’, *American Sociological Review*, vol 48, 1983.
 - 38 March, J. G., Olsen, J. P., ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life’, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 78, Nr. 3, 1984, p. 57.
 - 39 Institutional isomorphism can be defined as the process of homogenisation whereby organizations in similar environments either tend to resemble one another or to distinguish from one another, leading to cooperative or competitive isomorphism.
 - 40 Scott, W. R., Meyer, J. W., ‘The Organization of Societal Sectors: Propositions and Early Evidence’, in: Powell, W. W., DiMaggio, P. J. (eds.), ‘The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis’, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2012, p. 108-142.
 - 41 Streeck, W., Thelen, K., ‘Beyond Continuity. Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies’, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 15.
 - 42 Kelley, J., ‘International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions’, *International Organization*, Volume 58, Issue 3, July 2004, P. 425-457.
 - 43 Koops, J. A., ‘NATO’s Influence on the Evolution of the European Union as a Security Actor’, in: Costa, O., Jorgensen, K. E., ‘The Influence of International Institutions on the EU. When Multilateralism hits Brussels’, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, 2012, p. 155-185.

another and work in synergy or, in a model similar to ‘organizational Darwinism’.⁴⁴ In both cases international organizations will start to compete for power and conflicts will occur, as described by Biermann, who distinguished three categories of this pattern of inter-organizational cooperation.⁴⁵ Labelled by Brosig as the ‘cooperation or conflict dichotomy’.⁴⁶ Orsini gave several explanations to account for the likeliness of conflict or cooperation to occur between organizations.⁴⁷ In general, these explanations can be divided into relations based on interests; ‘the resource dependence theory’, or on relations based on norms and rules between organizations depending on their compatibility.⁴⁸

Another aspect of the developing theory of inter-organizationalism so far has been the analysis of overlap between organizations which has focused either on institutional mandates⁴⁹, membership⁵⁰ or resources. According to Hofmann, this overlap can be understood along all three dimensions while the degree of institutional overlap may vary along these three dimensions.⁵¹

These past decades, the main focus of inter-organizationalism as an approach has been the relationship between the EU and other organizations, raising the question of whether the EU influences or is being influenced and whether the interrelated organizations act in cooperation or competition with one another. Analysing ‘...the impact of the organizations and who influences who, who benefits, who constitutes and modifies, integration, cross-pillarisation and even change between EU institutions and between organizations were important topics of research’.⁵² On the one hand, this provided insight into the general nature of the relationship between the EU and NATO in terms of prospects for cooperation and competition. On the other hand, there has been surprisingly little focus on the influence that NATO and the OSCE have had on EU’s own evolution and ambition in the area of security and defence,⁵³ let alone on the relation between other international organizations. Furthermore, these works have been largely empirical, descriptive analyses of strategy, political decisions and/or operations of several security organizations,

44 Blavoukos, S., Bourantonis, D., ‘The EU Presence in International Organizations’, London, New York, Routledge, 2011, p. 177.

45 Biermann, R., ‘Towards a Theory of Inter-organizational Networking. The Euro-Atlantic Security Institutions Interacting’, *The Review of International Organizations*, Volume 3, Issue 2, June 2008.

46 Brosig, M., ‘Overlap and Interplay between International Organisations: Theories and Approaches’, *South African Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 18, 2011.

47 Orsini, A. (ed.) ‘The European Union with (in) International Organizations. Commitment, Consistency and Effects across Time’, Routledge, 2014, p. 8.

48 Idem.

49 Raustiala, K., Victor, D. G., ‘The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources’, *International Organization*, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Spring, 2004), p. 279.

50 Alter, K. J., Meunier, S., ‘Nested and Overlapping Regimes in the Transatlantic Banana Trade Dispute’, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Taylor & Francis, 2006.

51 Hofmann, S. C., ‘Why Institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.49, nr.1, 2011, p. 103.

52 Ojanen, H., ‘Inter-organisational relations as a factor shaping the EU’s external identity’, UPI Working Papers, 49, 2004, p. 9.

53 Koops, J. A., ‘The European Union as an Integrative Power? Assessing the EU’s ‘Effective Multilateralism’ towards NATO and the United Nations’, Brussels University Press, Brussels, 2011, p. 88.

exemplified by Moller's research. Moller has, himself, argued that '...the topic is rather an international organization (in the singular) and very little is published about organizations (plural), which are at most included as case studies for more general and abstract theories about multilateralism, regimes and alike'.⁵⁴ Additionally, inter-organizationalism has, thus far, rarely compared the institutional development of one organization to another on the basis of similar indicators.

The question could be raised as to what the theoretical basis is for the analysis of inter-organizational relations or so called inter-organizationalism; is it a phenomenon or a theory? Although, the research about the relations between international organizations, especially in the security domain, has been high on the academic research list, defining and theorizing this so-called inter-organizationalism is still lacking a theoretical and methodological framework.⁵⁵ Approaches on the interaction between organizations originate from different concepts, like regime complexity, institutional interaction, networking and overlap concepts. According to Koops, there is a need for a more comprehensive analysis of policy and theory-oriented research.⁵⁶ Ojanen argues that despite the growing number of insightful empirical case studies and the practical and empirical relevance of inter-organizationalism, '...there is still a considerable lack of systematic theoretical approaches and conceptual tools for analysing core features, main dynamics and key recurrent variables to the convergence of, as well as the cooperation and competition between international organizations'.⁵⁷ The extensive work on inter-organisational relations done by Biermann and Koops, in particular, has revealed an increase in '...empirical and policy-oriented interest, but relatively speaking a lack of a systematic investigation of conceptual and theoretical analysis'.⁵⁸ However, the relations between international organizations is still a young field of research, '...with many loose ends, haphazard imports from neighbouring disciplines to the field of International Relations (IR) and without the theoretical core which other IO research programs do have'.⁵⁹ In other words, theorizing systematically about evolution and causes of the observed results is complicated when trying to analyse and explain change. Hence, according to Biermann the analysis of paths of change of the security organizations, it's

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54 Moller, B., 'European Security. The roles of Regional Security Organisations', Ashgate, 2012, p. 43.

55 Biermann, R., Koops, J. A., 'Conclusion', in: Biermann, R., Koops, J. A., 'The Palgrave Handbook of Inter-organisational Relations in World Politics', Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

56 Koops, J. A., 'The European Union as an Integrative Power? Assessing the EU's 'Effective Multilateralism' towards NATO and the United Nations', Brussels University Press, Brussels, 2011, p. 439.

57 Ojanen, H., 'Inter-organizational Relations as a Factor shaping the EU's external identity', UPI Working Papers, 49, 2004, p. 3.

58 Biermann, R., Koops, J. A., 'Studying Relations Among International Organisations in World Politics: Core Concepts and Challenges', in: Biermann, R., Koops, J. A., 'The Palgrave Handbook of Inter-organisational Relations in World Politics', Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p. 2.

59 Biermann, R., Koops, J. A., 'Conclusion', in: Biermann, R., Koops, J. A., 'The Palgrave Handbook of Inter-organisational Relations in World Politics', Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p. 678.

changing nature and the detection of the causal mechanism of evolution should have a strong emphasis in future analysis; ‘decomposition is a key to reduce complexity’.⁶⁰

Hence, paths of change of organizations, their causes and consequences and how they relate to one another, have been under-researched thus far. Analyses that have been conducted tend to draw on what we know about national organizations and apply this to international organizations instead of engaging in systematic analysis at the international level. According to Biermann, analysis of the development of security organizations, how they change and what causes this change should be a focus of future research.⁶¹ Biermann also argues that dyadic analysis is essential to exploring interaction between security organizations, especially in relation to less-studied dyads like the UN and the OSCE, and the OSCE and the Council of Europe (COE). Though demanding, an additional, but essential, component of this research, according to Biermann, is the study of triads like that between the EU, WEU and NATO. This research has added value, particularly when it is conducted comparatively, as Yost’s research has shown.⁶²

2.2.5 Conclusion

Existing research on the individual paths of change of the security organizations and their interaction presents considerable flaws. The literature review presented above demonstrated that research is generally of a descriptive nature and is still focused on individual organizations and their specific relations with other security organizations. In contrast, there is a need for a comparative analysis of the paths of change of security organizations based on a systematic indicator-based analysis and explicit theoretical perspectives between two or more security organizations. By this effort, the aim is to address the observed flaws in the prevailing literature. Therefore, this research will combine different sub-approaches of new institutionalism into one research framework and analyse paths of change of security organizations in a comparative manner. This enables the analysis of the paths of change of the selected security organizations both individually and in comparison with each other and helps to address how and why change takes place. Research on the phenomenon of change and the research framework will be presented below.

2.3 Conceptualising Security Organizations

2.3.1 Introduction

International security cooperation comes in many different forms and varies in levels. In this section, the key concepts relevant to the analysis of paths of change will be discussed. Next, the theoretical approaches needed to analyse the varied cooperation schemes of security organizations and the deductively developed research framework for the analysis of change in security organizations will be presented. First, however, an

60 Biermann, R., ‘Towards a Theory of Inter-organizational Networking. The Euro-Atlantic Security Institutions Interacting’, *The Review of International Organizations*, Volume 3, Issue 2, June 2008, p. 1.

61 Ibid, p. 174.

62 Yost, D. S., ‘NATO and International Organisations’, *Forum Paper Series*, NATO Defence College, 2007.

overview of scholarly debate on defining international organizations, the level and form of international cooperation and the intra-paradigm debate within new institutionalism on the role of international security organizations in the international sphere, as actors in their own right, will be presented. This will be followed by a discussion of concepts that helps to understand change in international security organizations. The focus here is on the concepts of security, security cooperation, and security organizations, all of which are highly relevant to the analysis of paths of change of security organizations, as will be illustrated below.

2.3.2 *Defining International Organizations*

The units of analysis in this research are international security organizations. This term refers to a specific form of an international organization. Therefore, the more general concept of ‘international organization’ will be discussed in advance of addressing the more specific concept of ‘security organization’.

There is much debate in the realm of political science around the concept of international organizations. This is especially the case in relation to the conceptualisation of organizations, institutions and regimes. Being contested is the role and authority of international organizations – are organizations solely instruments of sovereign states or do they enjoy a role that extends beyond this. Are international organizations actors in their own right? According to Rittberger and Zangl, international organizations are a specific class of international institutions that can be categorised into two types: international regimes and international organizations. ‘Both types are international social institutions characterized by behavioral roles in recurring situations that lead to a convergence of reciprocal expectations’.⁶³ Institutions range from conventions (including state sovereignty) to regimes (such as the nuclear non-proliferation regime) to formal organizations (such as NATO).⁶⁴ Regimes relate to specific issue areas and organizations can be tasked with activities that span many issue areas. In general, international organizations tend to be seen as formal institutions. In other words, they are intergovernmental organizations that states have joined, contribute to financially and are ultimately responsible for decision-making. The aim, structure and decision-making procedures of the organization are specified in a charter, treaty or agreement.⁶⁵ International regimes, then, are another type of international interaction and can be defined as ‘...sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given issue area’.⁶⁶

Several scholars use terms like institution and organization more freely to refer to either institutions or organizations and sometimes even non-conventional international

63 Rittberger, V., Zangl, B., ‘International Organization. Polity, Politics and Policies’, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, p. 6-7.

64 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., ‘Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space’, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 2.

65 International organizations can be divided into cooperation between state actors (intergovernmental organizations) and between non-state actors (non-governmental organizations). This difference is underlined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties adopted, the 23rd of May 1969, which defines an international organization as an intergovernmental organization (art. 2, 1. (i)) excluding non-governmental organizations.

66 Krasner, S. D., ‘International Regimes’, Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 2.

organizations or to conceptualize international politics in more institutional terms.⁶⁷ Sometimes the concepts of organizations and institutions are distinguished and sometimes they are not, as institutions are often affiliated with organizations and both operate across international boundaries. Even within the theory of new institutionalism, no unambiguous definition can be found that indicates exactly what constitutes an international organization, institution or regime.⁶⁸ However, most scholars agree that international organizations and regimes can be seen as a ‘special case’ of institution at the international level.⁶⁹ As Streeck argues, interpretations of what an institution is are contested and may change over time.⁷⁰ In general, one can conclude that international institutions and organizations both refer to structured cooperation based on a(n) (in)formal, stable pattern of behaviour at the international level;⁷¹ this in contrast with regimes that are specific to particular issues areas.⁷² The theory of new institutionalism was, in fact, developed in part to analyse, define and explain the persistence and/or change of institutions.⁷³ Within the institutionalist literature, March and Olsen define an institution as a collection of norms, rules, understandings, and, perhaps most importantly, routines.⁷⁴ This is seconded by Haftendorn, Keohane and Wallander, who define institutions as ‘...a persistent and connected set of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behaviour roles, constrain activity and shape expectations’.⁷⁵ Duffield adds that any definition of an institution should

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- 67 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 160–161; Scott, W. R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage Publications, 2014, p. 56–58.
- 68 For an elaboration on the debate, see: Keohane, R. O., ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’, *International Studies Quarterly*, 32 (4), December 1988, p. 379–396; Simmons B. A., Martin L. L., ‘International Organizations and Institutions’, in: Carlsnaes W., Risse T., Simmons B. A., ‘Handbook of International Relations. Thousand Oaks’, Sage Publications, 2002, p. 192–211; Lowndes, V., ‘Institutionalism’, in: Marsh, D., Stoker, G., ‘Theory and Methods in Political Science’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
- 69 For an elaboration on similarities and differences between the concepts: Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P., Rittberger, V., ‘Theories of International Regimes’, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004; Koremonos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., ‘The Rational Design of International Institutions’, *International Organization* 55, 4, Autumn 2001, p. 761–799.
- 70 Streeck, W., Thelen, K., ‘Beyond Continuity. Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies’, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 8.
- 71 For an elaboration on the various definitions, see: Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., ‘Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space’, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 1–3; Pease, K. K. S., ‘International Organizations’, Pearson, United States, 2012, p. 2–5; Rittberger, V., Mayer, P., ‘Regime Theory and international relations’, Clarendon Press, 1993; Moller, B., ‘European Security. The roles of Regional Security Organizations’, Ashgate, 2012, p. 43–47; Koremonos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., ‘The Rationale Design of International Institutions’, *International Organization*, Volume 55, Issue 04, September 2001, p. 761; Scott, W. R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage Publications, 2014, p. 56–58.
- 72 For an elaboration on regimes, see: Krasner, S. D., ‘International Regimes’, Cornell University Press, 1983; Keohane, R. O., ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4, December 1988, p. 379–396; Rittberger, V., Mayer, P., ‘Regime Theory and International Relations’, Oxford University press, USA, 1993; Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P., Rittberger, V., ‘Theories of International Regimes’, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004.
- 73 Peters, G. B., *Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism*, The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 183.
- 74 March, J. G., Olsen, J. P., ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life’, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 78, Nr. 3, 1984, p. 21.
- 75 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., ‘Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space’, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 2.

encompass the possibility of being comprehensive and facilitate theoretical progress.⁷⁶ Because of the diversity of international organizations, Duffield contends that any definition ‘...should facilitate the differentiation and possibility to compare among specific forms in order to categorise them based on a theoretical framework, not just to list the different types of international organizations’.⁷⁷ Taking these aspects into consideration, Duffield provides the following definition of international organizations: ‘...relatively stable sets of related constitutive, regulative and procedural norms and rules that pertain to the international system, the actors in the system (including states as well as non-state entities) and their activities’.⁷⁸ This definition is adopted for the purposes of this research project and is built upon further, as focus here is on formal, international, institutionalised organizations as the unit of analysis. The potential ‘actorness’ of these organizations is also under scrutiny here. Hence, international organizations comprise sets of rules (varying in degree of formalisation) and norms that span national boundaries, they possess the capacity to act and respond to events and are not restricted to a single issue-area. They also have a formal organization (convention or treaty based) and may have state and non-state actors as members and partners.

Clarification is warranted here with regard to differences and similarities in definitions of organizations and the organs that they are made up of. In this research, various actors that have the ability to drive change are analysed and, therefore, a distinction is made between organizations and organs. The UN, the EU, NATO and the OSCE are conceptualised as organizations that comprise a variety of organs. Organs include, for example, the UN Security Council, the EU Commission and the North Atlantic Council of NATO.

2.3.3 *Form and Level of Cooperation in International Organizations*

The concept of an international organization described above reveals a variety of schemes of cooperation in level and form. The development and definition of these schemes will be elaborated upon below.

With regard to the level of cooperation, this varies alongside the degree of authority and autonomy that is transferred to an organization. Authority refers to the decision-making power of the organization with regard to security policy; whether its basis is political and/or legal; and where this authority falls on the spectrum of supranational and/or intergovernmental decision-making. Traditionally, a strict division can be made between intergovernmental and supranational cooperation. Intergovernmental cooperation does not require a transfer of sovereignty to an authority above the state; decisions are made by consensus. Consensus is then defined as the absence of any significant disagreement. Supranational cooperation implies decision-making that is partially or completely transferred to a higher authority, above the state, and that decisions are made by majority voting. Autonomy refers to the institutions within the organization that are strengthened or set up. In other words, the level of authority and autonomy that an organization possesses pertains to the level of deepening within that organization; this is one path of

76 Duffield, J., ‘What are International Institutions?’, *International Studies Review*, 2007, p. 7.

77 Ibid, p. 7-8.

78 Idem.

change that will be explained later. Furthermore, cooperation can vary in terms the scope of tasks, from those tasks related to a single issue to a wide variety of tasks transferred to an organization, either at a regional or global level. In other words, organizations may have a narrow or broad mandate, specifying tasks to be performed; this pertains to ‘broadening’ as another path of change to be explained in more detail in a subsequent section. Finally, cooperation can vary in terms of the membership and partnership of an organization; this is ‘widening’, the last path of change.

In short, a process of change that enhances international cooperation can lead to deepening, broadening and widening of an organization.⁷⁹ Accordingly, international organizations, from their creation, can differ in terms of several characteristics including task, rule, structure, the degree of institutionalisation, decision-making and flexibility of arrangements. Change can lead to differences in these characteristics and can change the original design of regional and global organizations.⁸⁰ Furthermore, the number of actors involved in an organization, either by way of full or partial membership, generate variance in terms of the degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity of member states and their preferences.⁸¹

These differentiated levels of cooperation can also differ in terms of the form in which the cooperation schemes are moulded. Flexible or differentiated cooperation⁸² refers to different pace or speed of cooperation within an organization, exemplified by opt-out and opt-in, two-speed Europe, multi-speed cooperation,⁸³ variable geometry and Europe à la carte⁸⁴ concentric circles, core groups and periphery, pooling and sharing, smart defence, different member- and partnerships, N+1 (x) or N-1 (x), and the concept of coalitions of willing and able, inside and outside institutionalised cooperation.

Consequently, international cooperation can produce different institutional designs of regional and global organizations.⁸⁵ Change can also lead to strengthening of the design of the organizations or further institutionalisation. In other words, change can lead to the establishment of institutions and tasks (institution building) and an increase in the activities and degree of cooperation within existing institutions, as well as in tasks, rules and new forms of cooperation and changes in membership and partnerships.⁸⁶



79 These levels of cooperation will be further addressed in section 2.5.

80 Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., ‘The Rationale Design of International Institutions’, *International Organization*, Volume 55, Issue 04, September 2001, p. 761-763.

81 Pros and cons of homogenic and heterogenic organizations; Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., ‘The Rationale Design of International Institutions’, *International Organization*, Volume 55, Issue 04, September 2001, p. 770.

82 Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., Schimmelfennig, F., ‘Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union’, *Palgrave Macmillan*, 2013, p. 7-11.

83 Introduced by: Stubb, A., ‘A Categorization of Differentiated Integration’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (June 1996), p. 283-295.

84 Introduced by Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., Schimmelfennig, F., ‘Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union’, *Palgrave Macmillan*, 2013.

85 Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., ‘The Rationale Design of International Institutions’, *International Organization*, Volume 55, Issue 04, September 2001, p. 763.

86 Function and form (and the relationship between them) is important because it provides the basis for explaining variation in institutional form and the proposition about the causes and directions of institutional change which is elaborated in: Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., ‘Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space’, *Oxford University Press*, New York, 1999, p. 7.

At the same time, however, this research accepts that change does not automatically produce institutionalisation and strengthening of an organization. Change can also lead to dysfunction, resulting in de-institutionalisation, disintegration or fragmentation,⁸⁷ this in contrast to the broadening, deepening and widening paths of change identified in this research. De-institutionalisation, or breaking of the institutional structure, leads to ‘...the process by which institutions weaken and disappear’.⁸⁸ Breaking can affect the institutional design of an organization, or the authority, autonomy, mandate and tasks of the organization, and can also refer to the loss of members and partners. Furthermore, breaking also leads to loss of legitimacy and relevance of an organization.⁸⁹ Possible causes of de-institutionalisation are many⁹⁰ and will be referred to in this work where applicable.⁹¹

Finally, the different theoretical lenses chosen for the analysis of change address these changes in form and level differently which will be elaborated in section 2.5 and Chapter 3.

2.3.4 International Organizations as Actors in their own Right

Scholars of institutionalism state that states ‘...have become the great rationalizers of the second half of the twentieth century’⁹² and therefore determine the form and levels of conflict and cooperation at the international level between them. However, others in the field of institutionalism claim that non-state actors have become important players possessing power of their own. This debate around the ‘actorness’ of states and the role of other actors in eliciting change in international (security) organizations,⁹³ the units of analysis here, are addressed by institutionalism as well.⁹⁴ In this research it is argued that international organizations, comprised of various actors, operate as agents alongside states and, as such, are possible drivers of change. In other words, these organizations and institutions can be regarded as ‘actors in their own right’. This contention will be elaborated upon below.

A fundamental debate that has been ongoing throughout the history of social science research is that which deals with ‘structure’ versus ‘agency’. The debate has

87 For an elaboration on de-institutionalization and dysfunctional institutionalisation, see: Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 37; Scott, W.R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage Publications, 2014, p. 166.

88 Scott, W.R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage Publications, 2014, p. 166.

89 For an elaboration on legitimacy and the loss of legitimacy of organizations, see: Lipset, S. M., ‘Consensus and Conflict. Essays in Political Sociology’, New Brunswick Oxford, Transaction Books, 1985, p. 64; Scott, W. R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage Publications, 2014, p. 71-72; Scheuer, J. D., Scheuer, J. D., ‘The autonomy of change. A Neo-Institutionalist perspective’, Copenhagen Business School Press, 2008, p. 59.

90 Scott, W. R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage Publications, 2014, p. 166-167.

91 Ibid, p. 210.

92 Dimaggio, P. J., Powell, W. W., ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields’, American Sociological Review, vol. 48, 1983, p. 147.

93 This debate will be elaborated on in this chapter, when there is referred to international organizations, international security organizations are included.

94 For an elaboration on actorness of international organizations, see: Barnett, M., Finnemore, M., ‘The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations’, International Organization Vol. 53, No. 4, 1999, p. 1-10; Scott, W. R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage Publications, 2014, p. 49-52; Kirchner, E. J., Dominguez, R., ‘The Security Governance of regional Organizations’, Routledge, 2011, p. 1-7; Koops, J. A., ‘The European Union as an Integrative power? Assessing the EU’s ‘Effective multilateralism’ towards NATO and the United Nations’, Brussels University Press, Brussels, 2011, p. 97.

substantial implications for the very way in which social phenomena are studied. In the 1980s, the apparent dichotomy between agent and structure was reconciled by Giddens in his 'Structuration Theory', which provided a framework for analysing the relationship between structure and agency, the 'duality of structure'.⁹⁵ According to Giddens, agents and structures '...are not two independently given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality'.⁹⁶ Systems or structures refer to the framing of activities and relationships over time and space, integrating rules, relations and resources, and it is acknowledged that structures are both the product and platform of action. Agency then refers to '...an actor's ability to have some effect on the social world altering the rules, relational ties, or distribution of resources' and having causal power.⁹⁷ In other words, '...the debate refers to the question of whether the building of social science theory should start with the behaviour of individual agents or with the constituting and regulating functions of social structures'.⁹⁸ This debate on the ownership of action, who frames who or what, and the inseparability of agent and structure persists in the social sciences in general and in political science specifically.

Logically, within the theory of new institutionalism and in the analysis of organizations, a similar agent-structure debate took place. The early institutionalists focused on 'the ways in which institutional mechanisms constrained organizational structures and activities' and were therefore more focused on structure than on agency.⁹⁹ The institutionalists that followed focused on the mutual relationship between individuals, organizations and change, agents, and structures.¹⁰⁰ The debate within institutionalism with regard to the actorness of non-state actors continued; as Scott claims, 'all actors, both individual and collective, possess some degree of agency, but the amount of agency varies greatly among actors as well as among types of social structures'.¹⁰¹

The international arena is often seen as being in a state of anarchy, where power and conflict dominate international politics at the expense of stability and rules enforced by a supranational authority. According to this view, there is no arena in which stable organizations operate; organizations, it is argued, are wholly and existentially dependent upon the will of nation states. The theory that states cannot be influenced or ruled by any structural, coercive power other than that of the nation state remains a popular view in international politics. Organizations, then, are viewed as structures without any agency at all. Adherents of this viewpoint reason that prominent actors in political settings are individuals and, therefore, the only appropriate foci for analysis are individuals and their

95 Further elaboration on the subject: Giddens, A., 'The constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration', Polity Press, 2016; Archer, M., 'Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory', Cambridge University press, 1996, p. xii; Scott, W. R., 'Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities', Sage Publications, 2014, p. 93; Hay, M. C., 'Structure and Agency', in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds.), 'Theory and Methods in Political Science', Macmillan, 1995, p. 189.

96 Giddens, A., 'The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration', Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2016, p. 25.

97 Scott, W. R., 'Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities', Sage publications, 2014, p. 94.

98 Blatter, J., Haverland, M., 'Designing Case Studies. Explanatory Approaches in Small-N Research', Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 7.

99 Scott, W. R., 'Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities', Sage publications, 2014, p. 93.

100 Idem.

101 Ibid, p. 95.

behaviour and that entities like political parties, legislatures and so on, do not actually make decisions.¹⁰² If, theoretically, organizations cannot be regarded as political actors in their own right, they would have no ontological independence and are therefore not theoretically interesting. Nevertheless, international organizations, as agents and structures, have become popular topics of study. The sharpest debate between scholars of political science, has centred upon the question of whether or not ‘...international institutions really matter’¹⁰³ and whether or not organizations have agency, as was elaborated above.

Different theoretical viewpoints vary in their perspectives on whether or not international organizations can be regarded as political systems or actors similar to states. Krasner, Keohane, Rittberger and Mayer have argued for the acceptance of international organizations and regimes as actors in their own right.¹⁰⁴ Their reasoning for this is that states do not operate in a completely anarchical system, with clearly defined levels of acting. Rather, states link and connect with other actors through trade, for instance. Small or big, weak or strong, states influence one another and may even formalise their relationships in agreements and treaties resulting in organizations, formalised and less formalised, that execute their given powers. As a result, international institutional arrangements produce complex, multi-level governance agreements.¹⁰⁵ Some of these agreements and treaties even serve as administrations above states - supranational organizations – with regard to certain policy areas of national governments. According to Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, the rules of an international organization are accepted by states in order to reduce their own insecurity and transaction costs as well as unpredictability.¹⁰⁶ As such, these organizations both mould and are moulded by the behaviour of individual member states.¹⁰⁷ Peters refers to this as the ‘dance of diplomacy’.¹⁰⁸ States are willing to accept constraints on their behaviour if there are equal constraints applied to the other parties to the contract. The reason for this is that the apparent alternative, namely anarchy, is not an attractive one. ‘Even more than in domestic politics, any breakdown of these patterned interactions may have significant negative consequences for the actors involved; there are strong incentives to maintain the normative integration of international regimes and organizations’.¹⁰⁹ Consequently, international cooperation

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102 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 14.

103 Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., ‘The Rationale Design of International Institutions’, *International Organization*, Volume 55, Issue 04, September 2001, p. 761.

104 Krasner, S. D., ‘International Regimes’, Cornell University Press, 1983; Keohane, R. O., ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4, December 1988, p. 379-396; Rittberger, V., Mayer, P., ‘Regime Theory and International Relations’, Oxford University press, USA, 1993.

105 For an elaboration on the concept, see: Hooghe, L., Marks, G., ‘Multi-level Governance and European Integration’, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001; Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 160.

106 Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P., Rittberger, V., ‘Theories of International Regimes’, Cambridge University Press 1997, p. 37.

107 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 172.

108 Ibid, p. 162.

109 Idem.

does produce rules and structures. Some of these rules are self-imposed by states, like those inherent in the EU. Other rules are imposed by international organizations, by treaty, on member states, such as Article 5 of NATO. Still other rules are applicable between international organizations, like the Berlin Plus agreement (2003) between NATO and the EU's CSDP and involved states.

The acceptance of international organizations as independent actors has been reinforced by Barnett and Finnemore. In their view, '...international organizations can become autonomous sites of authority, independent from the state 'principals' who may have created them, because of power flowing from at least two sources. One source would be the legitimacy of the rational-legal authority they embody and the second would be the control over technical expertise and information'.¹¹⁰ Although international organizations are constrained by states, they are more than just the sum of interstate cooperation: '... the notion that they are passive mechanisms with no independent agendas of their own is not borne out by any detailed empirical study of an international organization that we have found'.¹¹¹ According to Barnett and Finnemore, '...autonomy exists when international organizations are able to act in ways not dictated by states'.¹¹² This does not mean that international organizations neglect the demands of states, but they can act for different reasons; in other words, 'correlation is not causation'.¹¹³ Furthermore, international organizations do set the agenda in their policy domain, as a result of their mandate, expertise and capacities and can compel states to comply. 'At times, IOs may actually shape the policy preferences of states by changing what states want. It matters who initiates policy and why'.¹¹⁴

As such, for the purposes of this research, international security organizations are seen as actors possessing actorness.¹¹⁵ The increase in the institutionalisation of the security environment and the increase in interstate and inter- and cross-organizational cooperation at the international level results in a 'dance'¹¹⁶ involving political and legal, cross-institutional engagement at different levels.

Hence, in this research international organizations are not regarded as empty shells, like Mearsheimer claimed¹¹⁷, or impersonal policy machinery manipulated by other actors.

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110 Barnett, M., Finnemore, M., 'The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations', *International Organization* Vol. 53, No. 4, 1999, p. 707.

111 Ibid, p. 705.

112 Barnett, M., Finnemore, M., 'Rules for the World. International Organization in Global Politics', Cornell University Press, 2004, p. 10.

113 Ibid, p. 11.

114 Idem.

115 For a further elaboration on the subject: Simmons, B. A., Martin, L. L., 'International Organizations and Institutions', in: Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T., Simmons, B. A (eds.), 'The Sage Handbook of International relations', London: SAGE, 2002, p. 193; Reinalda, B., 'Routledge History of International Organizations: From 1815 to the Present Day', Routledge, 2009, p. 9; Hurd, I. F., 'Choices and Methods in the Study of International Organizations', *Journal of International Organization Studies*, volume 2, 2011, p. 17 and p. 23.

116 Derived from: Peters, B. G., 'Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism', The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 162.

117 Mearsheimer, J. J., 'Back to the Future; Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), p. 43.

In contrast, international organizations are, alongside other actors, regarded as actors in their own right. Therefore, they can be theoretically and empirically analysed both separately and in comparison to one another, which makes them ontologically interesting subjects. The actors studied here, NATO, the EU and the OSCE, are the units of analysis - they possess authority, autonomy and resources. This acceptance of actorness allows for a broad focus on paths of change of these security organizations and the possible drivers behind change. This focus has been largely absent in the existing research, which has tended to focus on change in security organizations, as was addressed above. At the same time, it is worth acknowledging that 'international actorness' is not equal across the selected security organizations, as will be discussed further in Chapter 3.

2.3.5 *Security and the Security Environment*

As security organizations are the central focus of this research, the concept of security itself needs exploration before any institutionalised form of security cooperation can be conceptualised and analysed. The concept of security is dynamic and evolves within its environment. For example, the salience of issues on the political security agenda depends on how (in)security is perceived; whereas, for instance, cyber threats, terrorism and climate change are argued to be the most serious threats in the 21st century, conventional war between states has remained highly salient over the past century and may become a high priority again in the near future.

The analysis of security not only changes over time, but also changes when considered at the state, group and individual levels, and as a result of different security threats, varying from inter-state to intra-state, to the group or individual levels. Furthermore, the International Relations literature often refers to internal and external security and intra- versus inter-state conflicts.¹¹⁸ And it is not only the concept of security that is subject to change over time and at different levels; its substantive meaning is also contested. International security matters are traditionally explained on the basis of a military or political understanding of security, namely the survival of the state. Perceptions of security or insecurity are at the heart of the legitimisation of the use of force; but, more generally, drawing on the concept of security has paved the way for states to mobilise or assume special powers to deal with threats.

Hence, there are multiple understandings of security. Levy has identified more than 450 definitions of the concept of security.¹¹⁹ The concept has developed and moved far beyond the security and survival of the state. Security is an eclectic package of perceptions and definitions. 'Asking what security means raises questions about the philosophy of knowledge. Especially those concerned with epistemology, ..., ontology, ..., and method'.¹²⁰ According to Buzan, '...we look at a field which has some strikingly different pre-occupations both substantive and epistemological'.¹²¹ Differences in how the concept of

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118 Williams, P. D., *Security Studies. An Introduction*, Routledge, Oxon, 2018; Mingst, K., ArreguinToft, I. M., 'Essentials of International Relations', Norton & Co, 2016.

119 Terrif, T., 'Critical Reflections on Security and change', Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2013, p. 17.

120 Williams, P. D., *Security Studies. An Introduction*, Routledge, 2018, p. 6.

121 Buzan, B., Wilde, J., Waever, O., 'Security: A New Framework for Analysis', Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 8.

security is defined and conceived of by different actors, such as international organizations, states, groups or individuals, creates the need for specialised security strategies to be executed by international organizations or states (or other actors) to deal with these differences.¹²²

Complicating the analysis of security further, different actors, like states, have different security vulnerabilities depending upon their economic and military strength, geo-political location and so on. It is not helpful to try to separate security considerations from the world of politics. Scholars debate whether or not something is a security issue and argue that this is not decided solely by states, individuals, or international organizations, for that matter. Instead, it is an inter-subjective matter. In general terms, one can distinguish a difference between Atlantic and European perspectives and between individual European country perspectives, for instance, on the purpose of the military with regard to foreign and security policy.¹²³

Both realist and liberal scholars have played a role in increasing our understanding of the concept of security. In the eighties and nineties, a need arose for a broader perception of (in)security than one solely focused on war and the protection of the state against external threats. On the basis of their groundbreaking research, Buzan et al. categorise threats to states in three ways: threats to the idea of the state (nationalism), those to the physical foundation of the state (population and resources), and those to the institutional expression of the state (political system).¹²⁴ According to Buzan et al., ‘...fundamental political and normative decisions involved in defining security, always depend on the particular referent object, something that needs to be secured; the nation, the state, the individual, the environment or even the planet to internal/external locations’.¹²⁵ In other words, a strict distinction between internal and external security is not tenable.¹²⁶ Furthermore, insecurity is not the exclusive purview of the military and does not relate only to the use of force; it affects all sectors, which demands a broad conceptualisation of (in) security. This conceptualisation of security has been developed further since the 1990s, as a result of wars in Europe and Africa, and in response to the various security threats that extend beyond the conventional threat of hostile state(s).

Along the development of the (in-)security concept the concept of crisis management has developed as well. The scope of tasks and actors involved expanded, beyond the containment of military escalation labelled as the comprehensive approach and further along as an integrated approach.¹²⁷ Furthermore, in contrast to the more traditional concept

122 Williams, P. D., *Security Studies. An Introduction*, Routledge, 2018, p. 4-5.

123 Buzan, B., Wilde, J., Waever, O., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 31.

124 Buzan, B., Hansen, L., *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 9.

125 Buzan, B., Wilde, J., Waever, O., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 32.

126 For an elaboration on the sovereignty debate, see: Aarts, T., ‘Constructing Sovereignty between Politics and Law’, Routledge, 2012; Slaughter, A., ‘Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order’, *Stanford Journal of International Law*, 2004.

127 The comprehensive and integrated approach are two concepts debated within the states and institutions with regard to the scope of activities that should be performed. For an elaboration on the concepts of comprehensive and integrated approach, see: Major, C., Mölling, C., ‘More than Wishful Thinking? The EU, UN, NATO and the Comprehensive Approach to Military Crisis Management’, *Studia Diplomatica*, Volume 62, no. 3, 2009, p. 21-28; Pirozzi, N., ‘The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management’, *EU’s Crisis Management Papers Series*, The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, June 2013; Tardy, T., ‘The EU: from comprehensive vision to integrated action’, *European Institute for Security Studies*, February 2017.

of state security, the concept of human security has emerged.¹²⁸ The policy concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which states that ‘sovereignty is not supreme’,¹²⁹ and new organizations like the International Criminal Court (ICC) have followed in its wake.¹³⁰

As such, and following the research by Buzan, this analysis adopts a broad perspective of security that, in addition to the military aspects of (in)security, encompasses economic stability, governmental structures, energy supplies, science and technology, food and natural resources, and so forth. Furthermore, in addition to state actors, non-state actors are seen as actors that may cause (in)security and are therefore included in the analysis. Additionally, this research also accepts that the threat of (in)security extends beyond state borders to organizational borders, as security threats cut across many boundaries and, as a result, blur the division between internal and external security. In other words, in the Euro-Atlantic area, the line of division between what is external and what is essentially internal has ceased to exist because most conflicts here have erupted within and cross-border and not between states.

2.3.6 International Security Organization

As security organizations are the main units of analysis in this research, the concept of a security organization and the debates on defining security organizations will be elaborated upon below. The difference between international organizations and security organizations in general, and particularly in the neo-realist literature, lies in the absence of a central authority above states. It is assumed that security cooperation takes the form of pure intergovernmental or even ad-hoc cooperation solely for the purposes of forwarding the self-interest of the state.¹³¹ International security cooperation then lies at the heart of the state, often designated ‘high politics’, where state sovereignty rules. However, sovereignty has never been a fixed concept. According to some scholars, sovereignty varies in degree and form. Krasner makes a distinction between different forms and levels of sovereignty in contrast with the singular conceptualisation of traditional Westphalian state sovereignty.¹³² This debate was extended by Aalbers¹³³ and Slaughter who both claim that sovereignty is limited by the fact that ‘...states can only govern effectively by actively cooperating with other states’ and that ‘...the sovereignty debate can be summarised as being about balancing the need to increase the capacity to act against the need to preserve freedom of action’.¹³⁴ Today, an increase in international cooperation, in various forms

128 Williams, P. D., ‘Security Studies. An Introduction’, Routledge, 2018, p. 222; Barash, D. P., Webel, C. P., ‘Peace and Conflict Studies’, Sage Publications, United States of America, 2014, p. 421.

129 The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle was adopted in 2005 by the UN. R2P aims at the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The principle is based upon the underlying premise that sovereignty entails a responsibility to protect all populations from mass atrocity, crimes and human rights violations. The UN adopted this doctrine in the World Summit Document (A/RES/60/1), par. 138-139.

130 The International Criminal Court, founded on the first of July 2002, has the jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes as first described in the UN, ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, 1998.

131 Mearsheimer, J. J., ‘The Tragedy of Great Power Politics’, New York, W.W. Norton, 2001, p. 1-2.

132 Krasner, S. D., ‘Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy’, Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 3-4.

133 Aalbers, T., ‘Sovereignty. Evolution of an idea’, Review essay, *Acta Politica*, 2009, 44, p. 280-283.

134 Slaughter, A., ‘Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order’, *Stanford Journal of International Law*, 2004, p. 284.

and at various levels, is observed and described by Howorth as ‘intergovernmental-supranationalism’, especially in the security and defence domain.¹³⁵ So, in the context of international security cooperation within the European security architecture, some developments and debates centre around challenging the traditional concept of sovereignty. And although actual sovereignty has not been transferred from the state to security organizations, a strict division between state and organizational authority has always been subject to debate.

The term ‘security organization’ is defined by Haftendorn, Keohane and Wallander as an organization that is tasked with ‘...protecting the territorial integrity of states from the adverse use of military force; to guard states’ autonomy against the political effects of the threat of such force; and to prevent the emergence of situations that could only endanger states’ vital interests as they define them’.¹³⁶ However, as they elaborate, ‘...some institutions that deal with security are alliances, some are designed to manage conflict among their members (referred to as security management institutions) and some do both’.¹³⁷ This makes analysis, definition, and even comparison of security organizations more complicated. Haftendorn, Keohane and Wallander also argue that the post-Cold War situation has changed all security organizations, exemplified in the following quote ‘...in the contemporary case of NATO, it appears that an alliance is being transformed into a security management institution’.¹³⁸ This statement is also supported by Sloan and Thies.¹³⁹ Following this same line of argumentation, Williams claims that if a security organization is ‘an organization dealing with a wide range of threats’, it could be argued that every regional organization has some security component and consequently can be defined as a security organization. And, any attempt to promote cooperative and more predictable relations among its member states may be seen as a step towards building a more secure community as Deutsch’s intention was.¹⁴⁰ It was NATO’s core Article 5 commitment that prompted Deutsch to describe NATO as a security community in 1957, whose sense of community rested upon the extreme unlikelihood of violence or aggression between the alliance members and a sense of common purpose: solidarity. If this is the case, the only differentiation that can be made between security organizations in the European security architecture is one with regard to their membership. This will be explored in the context of this research.

According to Haftendorn, Keohane and Wallander with regard to the nature of organizations, ‘...for international organizations adaptation seems to be necessary to

135 Howorth, J., ‘Decision-making in Security and Defence Policy: Towards Supranational Inter-governmentalism?’, *Cooperation and Conflict*, Sage Publications, 2012.

136 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., ‘Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space’, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 2.

137 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., ‘Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space’, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 1.

138 Ibid, p. 22.

139 Thies, W. J., ‘Why NATO Endures’, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009, p. 287-308; Sloan, S. R., ‘Defence of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 330-342.

140 Williams, P. D., ‘Security Studies. An Introduction’, Routledge, Oxon, 2018, p. 140-141.

survival, ..., the ability of an institution to thrive, or even to survive, depends on its adaptability'.¹⁴¹ In addition, they stipulate that 'form follows function'; if change is to be successful, 'the relationship between function and institutional form is important for institutional theory because it provides the basis for explaining variation in institutional form'.¹⁴² This is important because a relationship exists between the form of an institution and its function; even if an organization was previously highly effective in terms of supporting cooperation within a particular set of relationships or coping with a particular set of obstacles, states will not adopt specific assets that are not cost-effective.¹⁴³ These insights are important to theorisation of international cooperation and organization because they provide the basis of explanations of variation in institutional form and of assumptions about the causes and direction of change.¹⁴⁴ Furthermore, as defining and, therefore, comparing security organizations has become more difficult, these insights are important to theorisation of the concept of security organization, as well.

As such, '...a regional security institution can be understood as an organization whose charter contains some explicit references to a security provision by member states and has some kind of formal mechanism dealing with conflict and its consequences. Such a mechanism would typically include the coordination of defence, security and foreign policy'.¹⁴⁵ Fawcett concludes that security organizations share some general characteristics, including a security provision coordinating defence; security and/or foreign policy; a formal mechanism dealing with conflict and its consequences; common foreign, security and defence instruments; and the ability to conduct its own operations (not only a military or peacekeeping component, but also the possibility of a civilian mission).¹⁴⁶

In short, this research defines a security organization, the unit of analysis, as an organization that has some kind of security component; a formal institutionalised mechanism that deals with threats and conflict and its consequences within and/or from outside the organization; coordinates defence and security instruments; conducts its own operations; and includes a military and civilian component.

2.3.7 International Security Cooperation

As was explained above, a security organization can be defined as a specific form of international organization that has a specific nature and focus. Like other international organizations, security organizations can be categorised by their function and goals, though these distinctions can overlap.

141 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., 'Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space', Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 12.

142 Ibid, p. 7.

143 Wallander, C. A., 'Institutional assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War', International organization, volume 54, Issue 04, September 2000, p. 709.

144 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., 'Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space', Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 7.

145 Fawcett, L., 'Regional Organizations', in: Williams, P. D., Security Studies. An Introduction', Routledge, 2018, p. 284.

146 Ibid, p. 296.

A first categorisation is a division of security organizations that deal with (in)security of their members when threats or risks emerge from within or outside the organization, referring to the so-called organizational territory as is defined in the treaty or agreement underpinning the specific organization. For instance, though Ukraine is a member of the Partnership for Peace program, it is not a full NATO member and is therefore outside NATO territory and can make no claim to protection on the basis of Article 5.

A second categorisation is based on the scope of competences and tasks. Security organizations can be categorised according to their tasks and how they relate to security. An organization's tasks may reflect a narrow perspective of security, purely dealing with the military aspects of (in)security, as NATO's collective defence task was from the beginning,¹⁴⁷ or a broad perspective on security, including all policies related to (in)security, as exemplified by the UN.

A third categorisation by which security organizations can be classified is their inclusivity. Some security organizations are set up in such a way as to involve all interested member states that feel threatened, such as the UN, or they may be more exclusive, meaning that states may exclude other states from membership due to political, economic, military, or geographical interests, as is the case with NATO.¹⁴⁸

The traditional concept of dealing with (in)security within an international organization, henceforth security organization, is the concept of collective security. In contrast, for security organizations that are focused on (in)security coming from outside the organization, the concept of collective defence applies.¹⁴⁹ Both concepts are applied differently in the 'the policy world' and the 'academic world'.¹⁵⁰ However, they do provide a framework with which to categorise security organizations. First, they do so by creating differentiation between security systems and international organizations in general. Secondly, in terms of security organizations in the European security architecture that, historically, were built on these concepts, the terms provide structure and may help explain observed variation in paths of change of security organizations from a comparative perspective. Thirdly, these concepts help reveal the consequences of organizational change. The different concepts of security cooperation will be elaborated upon below.

Collective Security

The first security cooperation concept is collective security. In employing a system of collective security, any state that is a member of the organization in question is dissuaded from acting in a manner likely to threaten peace, thereby deterring conflict. A collective

147 Though Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1949, Washington explicitly refers to a broad perspective on security.

148 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., 'Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space', Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 2.

149 Rynning, S., Schmitt, O., 'Alliances', in: Ghécui, A., Wohlforth, W. C., 'The Oxford Handbook of International Security', Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 653.

150 Waever, O., 'Cooperative Security: A New Concept?', p. 47, in: Flockhart T. (eds.), 'Cooperative Security: NATO's Partnership Policy in a Changing World', DIIS Report 2014:01, Copenhagen.

security system is based on the premise of the ‘indivisibility of peace’¹⁵¹, as Claude describes it, in contrast to the balance of power theory. In the ideal world of collective security, no state is excluded from the responsibility of maintaining peace and security, regardless of where or from whom the threat originates.¹⁵² A collective security system is a design for a more permanent world order and is not a pragmatic solution to a temporarily threat to world peace.

The theoretical development and operationalization of the concept of collective security, like that of collective defense, has resulted in debate with regard to the collective security system.¹⁵³ However, some common features can be distinguished. First and foremost, collective security is based on the principle of ‘one for all, and all for one’, which is often institutionalised and codified within a legal instrument of the organization. Secondly, in contrast to collective defence organizations, collective security involves an agreement between its members pertaining to threats or conflicts stemming from inside the organization. Such a threat is a potential act of aggression by a currently unidentified party to the agreement. By means of cooperation within the system, any threat or breach of the peace within the system is then met jointly by all other members. Measures can vary from diplomatic boycott to economic pressure and can even involve the use of coercive instruments, such as military sanctions or interventions to enforce the peace.¹⁵⁴ In other words, a collective security system entails a paradox, as it requires a certain amount of military power to prevent war. In an ideal world, there would be an authority above the state that would be empowered to enforce these measures. In the real world, especially with regard to military sanctions, the use of such measures runs counter to the generally accepted rules of international engagement between states based on the non-intervention principle deriving from state sovereignty, specified in Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Collective security arrangements differ in size and composition, and even include bilateral or multilateral arrangements. However, certain conditions must be met for a system of collective security to work. First of all, for deterrence to work, potential aggressors must believe in the capacity of (the members of) the organization to punish acts of aggression. Second, there must be a high degree of political consensus among the main

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151 For an elaboration on the development of the concept of collective security, see: Claude Jr., I. L., ‘Collective Security as an Approach to Peace’, p. 294, in: *Classic Readings and Contemporary Debates in International Relations*, eds. Goldstein, D. M., Williams, P., & Shafritz, J. M. (Belmont, 2006), p. 289-302; Aleksovski, S., Bakreski, O., Avramovska, B., ‘Collective Security – The Role of International Organizations – Implications in International Security Order’, *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, Rome-Italy, Vol 5, No 27 December 2014, p. 274-282; Wilson, G., ‘The United Nations and Collective Security’, Routledge, 2016.

152 Claude Jr., I. L., ‘Collective Security as an Approach to Peace’, p. 293 in: *Classic Readings and Contemporary Debates in International Relations*, eds. Goldstein D. M., Williams P., & Shafritz, J. M., (Belmont, 2006), p. 289-302.

153 For an elaboration on the theory of collective security, see: Claude Jr., I. L., ‘Collective Security as an Approach to Peace’, p. 290-291, in: *Classic Readings and Contemporary Debates in International Relations*, eds. Goldstein D. M., Williams, P., & Shafritz, J.M., (Belmont, 2006), p. 289-302 and criticized by: Mearsheimer, J. J., ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, *International Security*, Vol.19, No. 3, Winter 1994/5, p. 26-37; Morgenthau, H. J., *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle For Power and Peace*, 1948, p. 293-306, 407-418; Organski, A. F. K., ‘World Politics’, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968.

154 Claude Jr., I. L., ‘Collective Security as an Approach to Peace’, p. 293 in: *Classic Readings and Contemporary Debates in International Relations*, eds. Goldstein, D. M., Williams, P., & Shafritz, J. M., (Belmont, 2006), p. 293.

powers within the organization and there must also be universality of membership (or at least (major) states must not be excluded). Third, there must be clearly defined criteria as to what constitutes an act of aggression, an agreed procedure to determine this and a central authority to establish it.¹⁵⁵ Fourth, a collective security system should be impartial; in other words, it should react in the same way to any aggressor within the system regardless of power or other considerations.¹⁵⁶

The first traditional system of international security cooperation that gained popularity in the twentieth century was the League of Nations, initiated by the US president Woodrow Wilson after the First World War in 1919.¹⁵⁷ The League was an alternative to the balance-of-power system and the (ad-hoc) alliances that reigned before. However, this security system did not survive, as it could not withstand the Second World War and the system of alliances that would emerge again. The second system of international security cooperation, the UN, was created after the Second World War¹⁵⁸, and is, to date, the example of a system of collective security that facilitates the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Cooperative Security

In addition to collective security as a system of community values, another similar system can be identified, namely cooperative security. A system of cooperative security, like collective security, aims to prevent war and crisis on the basis of the principle of indivisible peace (the Kantian system). However, there is one main difference between collective security and cooperative security. In a system of collective security, all states are united in a collective pact and are obliged to take action against any aggressor; this is not the case in a cooperative security system. A cooperative security system is based upon the idea of peaceful settlement of disputes, in contrast with collective security systems. The latter tolerates the right to use coercive instruments and even violence if necessary as a means of attaining peace under the purview of an international authority. Cooperative security involves activities that improve the broader security environment, but that fall short of the use of violence. It is based on the principles of comprehensive and indivisible peace.¹⁵⁹ Cooperative security can be defined as ‘...sustained efforts to reduce the risk of war that are not directed against a specific state or coalition of states’.¹⁶⁰

155 Delbruck, J., ‘Allocation of Law Enforcement Authority in the International System’, Duncker and Humblot, Berlin, 1995.

156 Claude Jr., I. L., ‘Collective Security as an Approach to Peace’, p. 296 in: *Classic Readings and Contemporary Debates in International Relations*, ed. Goldstein, D. M., Williams, P. & Shafritz, J. M. (Belmont, 2006), p. 289-302.

157 For an elaboration on the League of Nations, see: Northedge, F. S., ‘The League Of Nations: Its Life And Times, 1920-1946’, Holmes and Meier, 1986; Holsti, K. J., ‘Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989’, Cambridge University Press, 1998, Chapter 8; Pedersen, S., ‘Back to the League of Nations’, *American Historical Review* 112.4, 2007, p. 1091-1117.

158 Envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945, Articles 42 and 43.

159 Carter, A. B., Perry, W. J., Steinbruner, J. D., ‘A New Concept of Cooperative Security’, *Brookings Occasional Papers*-October 1, Washington, 1992.

160 Cohen, R., Mihalka, M., ‘Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order’, *The Marshall Center Papers*, No. 3, April 2001, p. 29.

In practice, the cooperative security concept was only introduced after the end of the Cold War and reflected a shift in security and defence policy toward confidence-building security measures, arms control, a broader perspective on security, and a greater emphasis on multilateral cooperation.¹⁶¹ The aim was to prevent states from relying on deterrence and the use of military force by committing them to regulate their military forces and act in a transparent way with regard to military capabilities and investments. Achieving this aim was dependent upon mutual security reassurance through the establishment of consensus, institutions, rules, and regimes.¹⁶² The organization that most resembles a cooperative security system is the OSCE, which adopted the principles of cooperative security with the Helsinki Summit Declaration of 1992.¹⁶³

Collective Defence

The third concept that relates to (in)security is the concept of collective defence. As is the case with collective security, there are different definitions in the literature, but again some general characteristics can be observed.¹⁶⁴ The model of collective defence, as opposed to collective security, is a system of cooperation that only deals with threats coming from outside the system. This implies that threats coming from inside the organization's territory, irrespective of whether these are conflicts between member states or ones that emerge from within one or more member states, are not the formal responsibilities of collective defence organizations. Furthermore, in principle, collective defence organizations are only tasked to deal with military aspects of security. Finally, in collective defence organizations, contrary to collective security organizations, membership is exclusive; non-members do not profit from the defence system.

There are two main characteristics that differentiate the nature of collective security from the nature of collective defence. The first is the indivisibility of the security of all its members. Secondly, cooperation is voluntary. Basically, cooperation between two or more states that are threatened from outside represents the formation of an alliance, as defined by Walt.¹⁶⁵ Alliances range from ad-hoc cooperation to a permanent, highly institutionalised organization. According to Walt, an alliance is '...a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states' and a '...commitment for mutual military support against some external actor in some specified set

161 Carter, A. B., Perry, W. J., Steinbruner, J. D., 'A New Concept of Cooperative Security, Brookings Occasional Papers-October 1, Washington, 1992.

162 Zagorski, A., 'The OSCE and Cooperative Security', Security and Human rights, 2010, nr. 1

163 OSCE Helsinki Summit declaration, 1992.

164 For an elaboration on collective defence and alliances, see: Walt., S. M., 'The Origins of Alliances', Cornell University Press, 1987; Snyder, G. H., 'Alliance Politics', Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1997; Wijk, R., 'NATO on the Brink of a new Millenium. The Battle of Consensus', Brasseys's, 1997; Kaplan, L. S., 'NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance', Praeger, 2004; Weitsman, A., 'Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War', Stanford University Press, 2004; Thies, W. J., 'Why NATO Endures', Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009; Sloan, R. S., 'Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama', The Continuum International Publishing Group, New York, 2010; Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., 'NATO's Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?', Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 19-23.

165 Walt, S. M., 'The origins of Alliances', Cornell University Press, 1987.

of circumstances'.¹⁶⁶ Weitsman defines an alliance less restrictively as a 'bi- or multilateral agreement to provide some element of security to the signatories'.¹⁶⁷ In general, it can be concluded that alliances are externally oriented to enhance security of the members vis-à-vis external actors, as opposed to collective security arrangements, which enhance security of the members vis-à-vis each other. After the Second World War, by means of Article 51 of the UN Charter, the UN provided for the right of states to engage in self-defence and collective self defence against an armed attack. This article provided the foundation for collective defence organizations such as the former WEU, Warsaw Pact (WP), and NATO.¹⁶⁸

2.3.8 Conclusion

For the purpose of this analysis of the paths of change of security organizations, the key concepts of change of security organizations were discussed and disentangled, as were international cooperation, in terms of level and form, and international organizations, followed by security and security organizations. In what follows, the theoretical approaches within new institutionalism will be explored in relation to the analysis of change in international security organizations.

2.4 Theorising Change of Security Organizations

2.4.1 Introduction

Change in international (security) organizations, the main phenomenon of this research, takes many forms and many theoretical lenses may be applied to its analysis. According to the literature, there are clashing and complementary approaches to studying change. All these approaches draw attention to the significance of organizational form and function and, therefore, require different levels of analysis.¹⁶⁹

This section provides a discussion of the relevant debates and variety of approaches within new institutionalism that relate to the questions posed in Chapter 1. First, a short explanation will be provided of the development of institutionalism as a theory, which can be divided, roughly, into old and new institutionalism. This will be followed by a discussion of the three selected approaches within the theory of institutionalism, namely rational choice, historical institutionalism, and constructivist institutionalism.¹⁷⁰ and their explanation of how and why change takes place.

166 Ibid, p. 12.

167 Weitsman, A., 'Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War', Stanford University Press, 2004, p. 27.

168 Envisaged in article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949: 'Collective defence is a form of international cooperation in which all member states are expected but not obliged to collectively defend each other against a military threat or an attack from outside the territory'.

169 Scott, W. R., 'Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities', Sage Publications, 2014, p. 19.

170 For an elaboration on the many different approaches within new institutionalism, see: Roth, P. A., 'Meaning and Method in the Social Sciences: A Case for Methodological Pluralism', Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987; Ostrom, E., 'Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action', Cambridge University Press, 1990; Hall, Taylor, 1996; Peters, B. G., 'Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism', The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012; Scott, W. R., 'Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities', Sage Publications, 2014; Fioretos, O. (eds.), 'International Politics and Institutions in Time', Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 2017, p. 6-7.

After the explanation of each of the approaches separately, the differences between these approaches will be addressed.

2.4.2 History of Theorising Institutions and Institutional Thinking

Analysis of organizations and institutions is at the heart of many disciplines like political science and public administration and has produced multiple approaches. New institutionalism is one of such approach and the theoretical framework of this research is built upon different sub-approaches within new institutionalism. Therefore, before discussing the various approaches within new institutionalism, a short historical overview of institutionalism will be provided that summarises its origin, key debates, and the state of the art of new institutionalism – analysing the phenomenon of the ‘life’ of organizations.

Systematic thinking about political life and the nature of governmental institutions began with philosophers identifying and analysing institutions based upon their observations. This systematic analysis of institutions constituted the beginning of political science. Philosophers like Aristotle, Plato, Hobbes, and Montesquieu contributed to the analysis of institutions, giving rise to the contention that ‘political thinking has its roots in the analysis and design of institutions’.¹⁷¹

At the end of the nineteenth century, the scientific analysis of political and governmental institutions developed by Marx, Wilson, Weber, and Durkheim resulted in the emergence of the formal disciplines of political science and public administration. At that time, institutional theory analysed law and the central role of law in government. This method of research was mainly historical and normative, ‘...describing the so-called path to come to ‘good government’ in which the ‘right’ structure determined the legitimacy and effectiveness of a governmental institution’.¹⁷² Hence, the old institutionalists contributed descriptive insight into the ‘world of government’ by drawing conclusions from empirical investigation. This institutional and largely legal approach dominated political and social science until the 1950s. In reaction to the old institutionalists, rational choice theorists argued that there was more to political and social science ‘...than formal arrangements, decision-making’¹⁷³ and structures. As Selznick states, institutions are more than their structure and they adapt to their environment to survive, as legitimacy is crucial.¹⁷⁴

In the seventies, institutionalism was rediscovered and renewed by March and Olsen.¹⁷⁵ They claimed that the ‘...resurgence of concern with institutions is a cumulative consequence of the modern transformation of social institutions and persistent commentary from their observers. Social, political, and economic institutions have become larger, considerably more complex and resourceful, and *prima facie* more

171 Peters, G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism.’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 3.

172 Ibid, p. 7.

173 Lowndes, V., ‘Institutionalism’, in: Marsh, D., Stoker, G., ‘Theory and Methods in Political Science’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 90.

174 Selznick, P., ‘Foundations of the Theory of Organization’, *American Sociological Review* 13 (1), 1948, p. 25–35.

175 March, J. G., Olsen, J. P., ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life’, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 78, Nr. 3, 1984.

important to collective life'.¹⁷⁶ This complexity brought to institutionalism a mixture of management, political and organizational theories, resulting in the emergence of different schools. These schools ranged from the rediscovery of the value of 'the historical and comparative study of political systems', or historical institutionalism, and 'adapted rational choice models devised by economics to better explain the emergence and functioning of political institutions', rational-choice institutionalism,¹⁷⁷ to the analysis of the world outside the institution, prompted by the behavioural revolution of the fifties and sixties.¹⁷⁸ According to March and Olsen, new institutionalism is a mix of old institutionalism and new approaches; '...the new and the old are not identical, they are a blending of elements of old institutionalism into the new institutionalist styles of recent theories of politics'.¹⁷⁹ This 'blending' meant that '...the focus on institutions and the methods of the historian and the lawyer remain relevant, [but] implicit assumptions must give way to an explicit theory within which to locate the study of institutions',¹⁸⁰ which resulted in different approaches to institutional phenomena and greater variance in theoretical and methodological approaches.

As a 'best practice' of the old school, it was accepted 'that political structures shape political behaviour and are themselves normatively and historically embedded'.¹⁸¹ Building on this assumption, new institutionalists emphasised that political institutions played a more autonomous role in shaping political outcomes. They argued that 'the organization of political life makes a difference',¹⁸² that institutions 'are political actors in their own right'¹⁸³ and that they have the ability to shape other actors. In other words, institutions matter. Consideration of the impact of institutions on actors was later followed by the analysis of the interaction between institutions.¹⁸⁴ Furthermore, in addition to the political and legal formal rules described by the old institutionalists, new institutionalists, like constructivist institutionalists, focused '...on norms and values because they help to understand the functioning of an institution and give direction to its actors; the basis of behaviour in institutions is normative rather than coercive'.¹⁸⁵

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¹⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 91.

¹⁷⁷ Scott W. R., 'Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities', Sage Publications, 2014, p.18.

¹⁷⁸ Peters, G., 'Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism', The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 15.

¹⁷⁹ March, J. G., Olsen, J. P., 'The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders', *International Organization* 52, 4, Autumn 1998, p. 947-948.

¹⁸⁰ Rhodes, R. A. W., 'Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability', Public Policy & Management, Philadelphia, US. Open University, 1997, p. 50.

¹⁸¹ Lowndes, V., 'Institutionalism', in: Marsh, D., Stoker, G., 'Theory and Methods in Political Science', Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 95.

¹⁸² March, J. G., Olsen, J. P., 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life', *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 78, Nr. 3, 1984, p. 747.

¹⁸³ Ibid, p. 738.

¹⁸⁴ Lowndes, V., 'Institutionalism', in: Marsh, D., Stoker, G., 'Theory and Methods in Political Science', Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 91.

¹⁸⁵ Peters, B. G., 'Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism', The Continuum International Publishing Group, New York, 2012, p. 41.

All this resulted in a different methodological approach, one that contrasted with old institutionalists ‘...experimenting with deductive approaches that start from theoretical propositions about the way institutions work’.¹⁸⁶ In short, the debates within institutionalism resulted in an evolution of different theoretical approaches in which different perspectives on agents and structures and how they influence the life of organizations emerged. The three selected approaches for this analysis, rational choice, historical institutionalism, and constructivist institutionalism, will be elaborated upon below.

2.4.3 *Theorising the Concept of Change*

A Rational Choice Perspective on Change

The first new institutionalist approach of interest for the analysis of paths of change of organizations is rational choice. The central focus of the rational choice approach is the relationship between actors and organizations, and the way in which state preferences are guided and shaped in response to sanctions or incentives, otherwise known as the transaction-cost approach.¹⁸⁷ In other words, actors use institutions to maximize their utility. Institutions, then, are seen as a means of streamlining actors’ rational behaviour, which is primarily focused on utility maximisation. For rational choice theorists, institutions are equal to governance or rule systems and represent constructed orders established by actors to promote or protect their interests.¹⁸⁸ However, actors do face rule-based constraints imposed by the institutional environment that influence their behaviour. Struggles between the actors are based on contestation of these rules when one group of actors is able to gain leverage over another. Decision-making is explained through game theory,¹⁸⁹ as actors with power can overrule other actors.

The rational choice approach recognises that in real political life, the choices that are made by actors are not random; these choices are, in fact, stable because of the role that institutions play.¹⁹⁰ This stability in governmental processes can be explained ‘... by the ways in which rules or procedures and committee structures of legislatures structured the choices available to members’.¹⁹¹ The aim of analysis for rational choice scholars then becomes understanding structure and the role of institutions in providing this structure. Rational choice theory denies that institutional factors ‘produce behaviour’ or shape individual preferences, which they see as endogenously determined and relatively stable

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186 Lowndes, V., ‘Institutionalism’, in: Marsh, D., Stoker, G., ‘Theory and Methods in Political Science’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 95.

187 For an elaboration: Shepsle, K., ‘Rational Choice Institutionalism’, Harvard University Press, in: Rhodes, R. A. W., Binder, S. A., Rockman, B. A. (eds.), ‘The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions’, Oxford University Press, 2006.

188 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, New York, 2012, p. 48.

189 Williams, P. D., ‘Security Studies. An Introduction’, Routledge, Oxon, 2018, p. 43.

190 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, New York, 2012, p. 62–63.

191 Scott, W. R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage Publications 2012, p. 41.

(as they are determined by considerations of utility maximisation). Political institutions influence behaviour by affecting ‘the structure of a situation’ in which individuals select strategies for the pursuit of their preferences.¹⁹² Hence, for rational choice institutionalists, states are the most important actors and ‘...international organizations are instrumental associations designed to help states pursue their own goal more efficiently and formal international organizations are attractive to states because of two functional characteristics that reduce transaction costs: centralisation and independence’.¹⁹³

From the standpoint of rational choice, the creation of institutions is not an interesting subject of study. It is accepted that the design of an institution is simply there to minimise transaction costs, which would be significantly higher without these institutions in place. So, according to the rational choice approach, institutions have already been ‘designed’ as the result of a rational process aimed at reducing uncertainty. Institutions, it is argued, persist over time because they serve to reduce uncertainty and, as such, yield gains for the actors involved. With regard to the process of change, it is argued that the main engine of change is the pursuit of power. Change is driven by ‘...by conflicts and struggle to control valued resources, dominate markets and otherwise obtain power’.¹⁹⁴ Rational choice theorists argue that power struggles over the distribution of resources are the driving force behind change. Davis argues that ‘...institutional change resembles movements insofar as it involves the strategic framing of issues and interests, resources and coalition building’.¹⁹⁵

At the international level, rational choice theorists argue that the struggle for power between states is really a competition between different models of institutions. In other words, a certain model or organizational form may dominate different areas of cooperation between states. Organizations then have to compete with the particular interests of member states, which can result in the predominance of a relatively homogeneous organizational model and thus diminishes heterogeneity in organizational form. As Schneiberg argues, it is by no means guaranteed that these power struggles will result in the persistence of the most efficient institutional models, or that these struggles will lead to any institutional change at all, even when the organizational form is seen as being suboptimal.¹⁹⁶ Furthermore, the process of change may often include the rearranging or recombination of principles and practices in new and sometimes even creative ways, which can result in blending of new elements into pre-existing institutional arrangements that often have to be modified.¹⁹⁷ In other words, according to rational choice theorists, drivers of change have the capacity to influence different institutional designs that exist concurrently, meeting different needs, but all dealing with a certain policy area, like

192 Ostrom, E., ‘An Agenda for the Study of Institutions’, *Public Choice*, 48, 1986, p. 5-7, in: Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, New York, 2012, p. 52.

193 Schimmelfennig, F., ‘The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 19-20.

194 Campbell, J. L., ‘Institutional Change and Globalization’, Princeton University Press, 2004, p. 241.

195 Campbell, J. L., ‘Institutional Reproduction and Change’, Copenhagen Business School, Paper August 2007, p. 10-11.

196 Schneiberg, M., ‘What’s on the Path? Path Dependence, Organizational Diversity and the Problem of Institutional Change in the U.S. Economy, 1900-1950’, *Socio-Economic Review*, 2007, 5 (1) 47-80., p. 51.

197 Ibid, p. 76.

security. This may result in stabilisation or institutional overlap, as well as a mixture of institutional designs.¹⁹⁸

In short, the point of departure for rational choice theorists in analysing change is that the function of an organization is primarily to serve actors' interests in terms of reducing uncertainty. The central focus of rational choice theorists is the relationship between actors and institutions and the capability of actors and institutions to mutually guide and shape preferences by means of sanctions or incentives. Change then is caused by factors exogenous to the institution, such as the national interest of member states, and may result in the loss or gain of institutional legitimacy.

Change According to Historical Institutionalism

The second approach that will be used for the analysis of paths of change of organizations is historical institutionalism. Historical institutionalism can be explained as an evolutionary theory that traces '...the evolution of an institutional form and [asks] how it affects the actors' preferences and behaviour'.¹⁹⁹ In contrast to other institutionalist schools, historical institutionalism is based on historical reconstruction: 'Although individuals build these structures, there is no assurance that they will produce what they intend. Current choices and possibilities are constrained by past choices'.²⁰⁰ Historical institutionalism reasons on the basis of primary choices and the obligations that flow from the creation of an institution, which determines the development or the 'set up' of an institution. 'Policies are path dependent and once launched on that path they continue along until some sufficiently strong political force deflects them from it'.²⁰¹ Historical institutionalism deals with the questions of where institutions come from and when they were created, the so-called 'formative moment' and the path of the institution following that formative moment, not only the process itself and the possible outcome.²⁰² As Scott argues, '...institutions do not emerge in a vacuum; they always challenge, borrow from, and, to varying degrees displace prior institutions'.²⁰³ Institutions, once established, have a '...continuing effect on subsequent decision-making and institutional episodes'.²⁰⁴ In other words, "...the historical institutionalists do provide an avenue of looking at policy across

198 This process is also referred to as isomorphism. For reference: DiMaggio, P.J., Powell, W.W., 'The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 48, 1983.

199 Scott, W. R., 'Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities', Sage Publications 2012, p. 42.

200 Ibid, p. 39.

201 Krasner, S. D., 'Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics', *Comparative Politics* 16, 1984, in: Peters, B. G., 'Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism', The Continuum International Publishing Group, New York, 2012, p. 20-21.

202 See for evolution theories and organizational ecology: Hannan, M. T., Freeman, J., 'The Population Ecology of Organizations', *American Journal of Sociology*, Volume 82, Issue 5 (Mar., 1977), p. 929-964; Barnett, W. P., 'The Dynamics of Competitive Intensity', *Administrative Quarterly*, Vol. 42. No. 1, Mar., 1997, p. 128-160; Baum, A.S. C., Amburgey, T. L., 'Organizational Ecology', Rotman School of Management, Toronto, 2000.

203 For an elaboration on the concept of creation, see: Scott, W. R., 'Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities', Sage Publications, 2012, p. 114.

204 Scott, W. R., 'Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities', Sage Publications 2012, p. 25.

time, while other institutionalist approaches are more bound in time and even in space'.²⁰⁵ As such, historical institutionalism focuses on the nature and evolution of institutions and examines the ways in which these institutions shape or are shaped.

With regard to change, specifically, the phenomenon under study here, historical institutionalism assumes that institutions are resistant. The main focus of historical institutionalism is this persistence of patterns and organizations by virtue of their initial creation. Inspired by the old institutionalists, the basic idea is that institutions only change in so-called 'path-dependent' ways that flow from the formation and creation of an institution. Furthermore, it is argued that if they do change, it is not in response to shocks and will not take place quickly.²⁰⁶ Path dependency implies that early decisions related to institutional design create incentives as by-products that encourage actors to maintain policy and institutional choices that were made when the organization was created or in the context of follow-up developments. Path dependency is, therefore, the product of critical junctures or periods of time in which processes are set in motion that reduce the likelihood that alternative choices will be made, resulting in change or continuity of institutional form. In its domain, historical institutionalist scholars often compare political systems or particular policy areas and show how institutions become deeply embedded, producing path-dependent policy making.²⁰⁷

Furthermore, historical institutionalists argue that institutions change if their environment requires it. In other words, institutions depend on the legitimacy that stems from actors outside the institution; '...taking cues from their institutional environment as they construct their preferences and select the appropriate behavior for a given institutional environment'.²⁰⁸ Therefore, institutions behave according to a logic of appropriateness. According to Meyer, '...western institutional practices diffuse among nation states such that over time countries tend to converge on common institutional norms (that is a set of principles and practices) that are deemed appropriate and legitimate by their peers within the field'.²⁰⁹

The theory of historical institutionalism sees the process of change as follows: 'For most of its existence, an institution will exist in an equilibrium state, functioning in accordance with the decisions made at its initiation. But these points are not necessarily

205 Peters, B. G., 'Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism', The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 77.

206 According to Campbell the concept of path dependence refers to a process where contingent events or decisions result in organizations being established that tend to persist over long periods of time and constrain the range of options available to actors in the future, including those that may be more efficient or effective in the long run. In other words, latter events are largely, but not entirely, dependent on those that preceded them. See: Campbell, J. L., 'Institutional Change and Globalization', Princeton University Press, 2004, p. 4. According to Scott, path dependency lies in borrowing or displacing prior institutions. See: Scott, W. R., 'Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities', Sage Publications 2012, p. 114.

207 Krasner, S. D., (ed), 'International Regimes', Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983.

208 March, J. G., Olsen, J. P., 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life', The American Political Science Review, 1984, Vol. 78, Nr. 3, p. 746-747.

209 Meyer, J. W., Boli, J., Thomas, G.M., Ramirez, F.O., 'World Society and the Nation State', American Journal of Sociology, 1997, 103, (1) 144-181, p. 165.

permanent'.²¹⁰ Historical institutionalists define this as the concept of 'punctuated equilibrium', which is borrowed from Darwinian evolutionary theory and is intended to highlight the environmental dependency of institutional change. Evolution, or the concept of gradual change, is an important concept within historical institutionalism. This means that the basic structure of an institution will remain intact, but some changes are possible: '...not all of these changes will be functional for the actual delivery of the policy - some may be simply means of appearing to change in order to maintain the status quo, while attempting to satisfy political demands for change'.²¹¹ Furthermore, change can also be elicited by actors from within the organization (endogenous change). This is in contrast with the rational choice approach that sees change as being caused exclusively by exogenous factors. If this happens, the institution, it is argued, will adapt '...its own internal dynamics in order to preserve itself and to establish a new equilibrium'.²¹²

The argument that there is little or no scientific capacity to predict change is fundamental to the theory of historical institutionalism. According to Peters, this is why historical institutionalism is more descriptive than explanatory: 'This highlights the importance of the absence of a clear model of agency within the approach'.²¹³ So, while the design of an institution is on the research agenda of historical institutionalism, the analysis of change remains a difficult theme, in contrast to the rational choice approach. Design then is defined as '...the initial choices of policies and structures, design may be the selection of ideas that will motivate the institution during the remainder of its existence'.²¹⁴ According to historical institutionalism, there are different degrees of success in adaptation to change; highly-institutionalised systems that may have been capable of resisting pressures to change may actually change substantially, while less highly institutionalised systems may resist change. It is also argued that institutions can be strengthened and reinforced or be undermined; self-reinforcing institutions are those institutions that change the political environment in ways that make itself more stable. In contrast, self-undermining institutions are ones in which a previously stable institutional equilibrium is undermined.²¹⁵

In short, the basic considerations of the historical institutionalists with regard to organizational change are that organizations may change according to the logic of path dependency, but within a so-called punctuated equilibrium and if change does happen, it does so incrementally or evolutionarily. Historical institutionalists focus on the effect of institutions over time and include historical legacies because they argue that pre-existing structures shape and constrain actors, thereby preserving equilibrium.

210 Peters, B. G., 'Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism', The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 78.

211 Ibid, p. 80.

212 Ibid, p. 81.

213 Ibid, p. 89.

214 Ibid, p. 84.

215 Greif, A., Laitin, D. D., 'A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change', *American Political Science Review*, 98 (4), 2004, p. 633-652.

Change According to Constructivist Institutionalism

The third approach used here for the analysis of paths of change of organizations is constructivist institutionalism. After the end of the Cold War, scholars began to focus on the emergence and effectiveness of organizations. It was argued that there had been a lack of analysis of (international) organizations as actors in their own right.²¹⁶ This represented the emergence of the constructivist approach within institutionalism, with its focus on the emergence and life of organizations. Constructivist institutionalists claim that institutions influence actors' behaviour by shaping their values, norms, interests, identities, and beliefs.²¹⁷ In other words, 'ideas matter' to paths of change of institutions and the way institutions act based on norms of behaviour, as some ideas are considered more acceptable than others. Hence, this approach within institutionalism focuses on the role of ideas in the creation and process of change of institutions and the behaviour of different actors.²¹⁸ It is argued that rules and structures of an organization embody values and therefore power relationships even if they seem neutral at first sight.²¹⁹

The constructivist approach contends that the creation of an institution implies some degree of understanding among the participants about the existence and aim of the institution. This understanding, however, may come from argumentation and bargaining between these participants.²²⁰ After the institution is created, there may be periods of stability in which ideas and policy reach an equilibrium. But this stability may also become destabilised because the institution itself generally remains open to the recruitment of new members and, thus, ideas. With regard to change, the focus lies on explaining how institutions persist and exercise their influence over actors.²²¹ When an institution changes, the process is chaotic and hard to control and institutions '...increase capability by reducing comprehensiveness', in other words, they simplify life '...by ensuring that some things are taken as given in deciding other things'.²²²

The analytical question facing constructivists is, then, how and why institutions and their structures change. Their answer lies in an evolutionary model in which it is expected that institutions change and progress continuously. Existing rules are perceived as factors influencing both standardisation and variation. Variation is included here because there

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216 Park, S., 'International organizations and Global problems. Theories and Explanations', Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 26.

217 For instance, Hall whose work is also closely related to the development of historical institutionalism; Hall, P. A., 'Policy paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain', *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Apr., 1993), p. 275-296. Katzenstein, P. J. (ed.), 'The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics', Columbia University Press, 1996. And Adler and Barnett, who draw upon Deutsch classical work 'Security Communities' focussed on initiatives and policies instead of material gain and state utility. Adler, E., Barnett, M., 'Security Communities', *Cambridge Studies in International Relations*, October 28, 1998.

218 Wendt, A., 'Social Theory of International Politics', Cambridge University Press, 2012.

219 Lowndes, V., 'Institutionalism', in: Marsh, D., Stoker, G., 'Theory and Methods in Political Science', Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 95

220 Schmidt, V. A., 'Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse', *Annual review of Political Science*, 11 (1), 2008.

221 Lowndes, V., 'Institutionalism', in: Marsh, D., Stoker, G., 'Theory and Methods in Political Science', Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 105.

222 March, J. G., Olsen, J.P., 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life', *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 78, Nr. 3, 1984, p. 17.

are always areas of uncertainty in the interpretation and application of rules since ‘...rules are adapted by actors seeking to make sense of changing environments’²²³ and rules work by specifying ‘appropriate’ behaviour.²²⁴ Hence, while institutions may represent stable environments, these are environments in which ongoing discussion takes place, which may result in the reversal of stable patterns and fixed rules.²²⁵ In this sense, the constructivist institutionalist approach is more open to the prospect of change than any of the other approaches under scrutiny in this research are.

At a certain point, institutions must achieve a certain degree of stability, otherwise there would not be any change. According to the constructivists, change occurs in an incremental or revolutionary fashion depending on what is at stake for the actors in play. A stable equilibrium can be disturbed because one or more of the actors involved recognises that his or her ideas are not being executed or advanced through continued participation.²²⁶ Furthermore, it is argued by constructivists that the less structured an institution is, the less the institution is able to influence or even shape an individual. And, the variety of actors within the institution can be better managed if there is more internal homogeneity and, simultaneously, a high degree of exclusivity.

Finally, if change takes place, it is based on existing structures and can result in new combinations or in entirely new structures or even institutions. And with regard to institutional survival, the constructivists imply that it is necessary to maintain ‘...some openness to policy ideas and discourses that are not central to the status quo within the institution’, which means that the more open an institution is in terms of its action the more successful it is.²²⁷ As such, it may be that, as a result of this necessary openness and inter-activeness, different actors yield different outcomes in processes of change.

In contrast to the other approaches selected for this research, constructivists have a distinctive research focus on international institutions, which will be elaborated upon more extensively in this dissertation. The work of Barnett and Finnemore, in particular, became a prime example of the constructivist theory of international organizations and their possible autonomy.²²⁸ Constructivists aim to understand the organizational context by including ideas and identities of a diversity of actors like institutions and their organs, all regarded as actors in their own right. This approach takes the independent and autonomous nature of organizations into account and looks in and outside the black

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223 Lowndes, V., ‘Institutionalism’, in: Marsh, D., Stoker, G., ‘Theory and Methods in Political Science’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 105.

224 March, J. G., Olsen, J. P., ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life’, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 78, Nr. 3, 1984, p. 17.

225 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, New York, 2012, p. 113.

226 Hay, C., ‘Constructivist Institutionalism’, in: Rhodes, R. A. W., Binder, S. A., Rockman, B. A. (eds.), ‘Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions’, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.

227 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 124.

228 Exemplified by: Barnett, M. N., Finnemore, M., ‘The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations’, *International Organization*, Vol. 53, No. 4, 1999.

box of organizations and inter-state bargaining.²²⁹ The central aim of ‘...constructivist theorising of international organizations has been to understand how and why they behave the way they do and whether they are capable of change’.²³⁰ The analytical question for constructivists, then, is whether power is a result of self-interest of the organization or is based on its organizational culture.²³¹ According to constructivists, power stems from two sources: ‘the fact that international organizations are considered legitimate international actors on the basis of their rational-legal authority as bureaucracies; and their control over technical expertise and information’.²³²

Furthermore, constructivists analyse the behaviour of individuals within and outside institutions and argue that both individuals and organizations influence one another; therefore, institutions and individuals are connected. According to constructivists they include a very diverse group of politicians, civil and military personnel of a security institution, and other related national and international institutions. According to Barnett and Finnemore, who perceive international organizations as bureaucracies, ‘...bureaucracy is a distinctive social form of authority with its own internal logic’ and they emphasise ‘... the ability of an international bureaucracy, such as a secretariat, to behave in ways that are not explicitly intended by member states’.²³³ Because of that authority, ‘...bureaucracies have autonomy and the ability to change the world around them’.²³⁴ Furthermore, ‘... international organizations, ..., create new categories of actors, form new interests for actors, define new shared international tasks, and disseminate new models of social organization around the globe’.²³⁵ Perceiving international organizations as bureaucracies has consequences for the degree and level of institutionalisation, and variation in autonomy and authority. The organs, e.g. the organization’s staff, within the organization have ownership of specific information and can choose to provide this to other actors, e.g. member states.²³⁶ Another asset of these organs are the mechanisms and processes that make all institutions work: expertise, procedures for deliberation, decision-making, and implementation.²³⁷ Some scholars claim that ‘...these administrations perform specific functions, and their officials act as role players: they identify at least to some degree with ‘their’ institution entrenched as they are in institutional environments with specific

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229 Nielson, D. L., Tierney, M. J., ‘Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform’, *International Organization*, Volume 57, Issue 2, 2003, p. 241-276.

230 Park, S., ‘International organizations and Global problems. Theories and Explanations’, Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 31.

231 Barnett, M. N., Finnemore, M., ‘The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organizations’, *International Organization* 53, 4, Autumn 1999.

232 Park, S., ‘International organizations and Global problems. Theories and Explanations’, Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 28.

233 Barnett, M. N., Finnemore, M., ‘Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics’, Cornell University Press, 2004, p. 10.

234 Ibid, p. 3.

235 Ibid, p. 193.

236 Wallander, C. A., ‘Institutional assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War’, *International organization*, volume 54, Issue 04, September 2000, p. 711.

237 Keohane, R. O., ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4, December 1988, p. 379-396, in: Derian, der, J., ‘International Theory: Critical Investigations’, Basingstoke Macmillan, 1995.

cultures (usually with an integrative mission). They are protective of their institutional status quo and do their best to expand their organizational resources if opportunities arise to do so. They may develop considerable policy autonomy by exploiting information to the disadvantage of member state governments'.²³⁸ This may also lead to the opposite situation, in which bureaucracies can cause inefficient, ineffective, repressive, and unaccountable mechanisms and processes.²³⁹

In short, constructivism can be regarded as a more inclusive approach in comparison to the other approaches dealt with in this research project. It is inclusive with regard to the analysis of structure, as well as agency in relation to the analysis of paths of change of international organizations. Constructivism is focused on the process of both creation of and change in institutions. Furthermore, analyses of the interaction between the actors involved is important to constructivism, as this determines the nature of the institution and its policy outcomes. As change is the phenomenon under study here, the constructivist approach is interesting, as it includes all possible actors and mechanisms on the basis of which to analyse change.

2.4.4 Consistency and Difference between the Approaches within New Institutionalism

In the sections above, three approaches of new institutionalism have been discussed: rational choice, historical institutionalism, and constructivist institutionalism. The chosen palette of these three approaches provides theoretical explanation of the phenomenon of change in international organizations and offers different and overlapping explanations of how and why organizations change. And, although the theory of institutionalism encompasses different approaches, built on distinctive assumptions regarding the analysis of organizations, their adherence to the 'world of institutions' as a mantra binds these approaches.

Stability, the opposite of change, is a defining feature of institutions and for some theories it is the starting point for analysis. Change, and thus instability, on the other hand, is explained differently by the various theoretical lenses of institutionalism. The way that change is conceptualised depends upon the role that the approach assigns to the actor or structure that causes change. In other words, it depends on the conceptualisation of the relationship between the individual and the institution under scrutiny. This debate within institutionalism justifies the approaches selected for the purposes of this research, as they all provide different explanations of institutional creation and change that include different actors and mechanisms. Hence, to understand how the different approaches deal with change, it is essential to identify differences, consistencies, and complementarities between them. As such, prior to presenting the research framework, an overview is provided of the similarities and differences between the selected approaches.

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238 Mayer, S., 'Embedded Politics, Growing Informalization? How NATO and the EU Transform Provision of External Security', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (August 2011), p. 311.

239 Barnett, M. N., Finnemore, M., 'The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organizations', *International Organization* 53, 4, Autumn 1999, p. 726.

Differences

With regard to creation, the selected approaches differ in their analysis and focus, as was elaborated above. This research acknowledges the importance of the process of creation to the analysis of European security organizations. The creation and design of an organization can be a difficult process in which compromises are required between the actors involved. Therefore, once organizations are established, it is possible that actors will be resistant to change due to procedural obstacles and the process of institutionalisation. ‘The more familiar and comfortable they become with it, the more hesitant they are to deviate from it’.²⁴⁰ On the other hand, if change is observed in selected organizations in terms of task and mandate, the question rises as to how, why and by what or whose means did these organizations change.

Change then, to some extent, is seen differently by the three selected approaches, in particular with regard to actorness and the actual process of change. The more realist approach, rational choice, claims that change in (international) organizations reflects a change in actors’ preferences. Organizations are primarily created to serve the interests of the states involved, which can result in strengthening cooperation among states to reduce transaction costs, or the alternative: competition, merger, or even organizational failure. In other words, the interests and priorities of states are decisive in shaping the mandate and tasks of organizations.

Conversely, according to constructivist institutionalism within institutionalism, organizations have the ability to influence or even enforce rules vis-à-vis other actors and the environment, in general. ‘For some visions of institutions this may be in order to have their adversaries constrained, while for others it may be a more normative explanation that individuals expect values and roles to be provided to them by the institutions they join’.²⁴¹ It is argued that change can be explained by the actions of state and non-state actors, processes, and mechanisms. Constructivist institutionalists explain change as being driven by all sorts of actors, including non-state actors or mechanisms.

The third approach, historical institutionalism, perceives change as a gradual or evolutionary (path-dependent) process.²⁴² In practice, organizations are perceived as being resistant to change; if they do change, this is a natural process governed by the concept of punctuated equilibrium, meaning the basic structure of an institution will remain the same in spite of nominal change. According to this approach, causes of change can be multiple, but, in terms of the explanation of what drives institutional change, there is little emphasis on the agent/actor side. Their focus lies on the when and how question of change, namely the process.

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240 Campbell, J. L., ‘Institutional Change and Reproduction’, *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Institutional Analysis*, Oxford University press, New York, 2009, p. 5.

241 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, *The Continuum International Publishing Group*, 2012, p. 174.

242 Thelen, K., ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’, *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.*, 1999, 2:369-404, p. 371.

Consistencies and Complementarities

The following consistencies can be observed between the different approaches.

For one, they all focus on institutional and political structures that are of importance to analysing the development of organizations. Within institutionalism, organizations are normatively and historically embedded.²⁴³ Another common denominator within institutionalism is the analytical focus on institutions as the central components of the ‘world of politics’. As Peters claims, ‘...the basic argument is that institutions do matter, and that they matter more than anything else that could be used to explain political decisions’.²⁴⁴ Within institutionalism, there are different approaches that argue that state actors shape the international political, social, and economic order. Nevertheless, the opposite is claimed to be true as well because although organizations are designed by actors, these actors operate within structural constraints imposed on their own actions by these organizations themselves.

There are also a variety of complementarities that can be observed between the different approaches. First, constructivists share a similar reading of interstate cooperation with the rational choice scholars. Rational choice’s agency-centred approach is, in fact, complemented by the constructivist claim that ‘...political culture, discourse and ‘the social construction of interests and identities matter’.²⁴⁵ For constructivists, it is interesting to trace the impact of ideas and the process by which certain ideas are accepted, becoming constative norms, and rejected. As ideas lead actors to make certain choices, the institutionalisation of ideas can reconstruct the interests of both state and non-state actors. Furthermore, within the security and defence policy domain, states have an important role to play; this is accounted for by rational institutionalists, but this does not mean that other actors have to be excluded from analysis. Constructivist scholars are more open to considering the impact of a diverse range of actors and their role in processes of change, which they argue are too focused on structural causes and material costs. However, within the constructivist approach, the focus is on the ideas, not so much on the interests, of the different actors. As the policy area of relevance here is high politics, dealing with the security and defence domain, the specific interests of state actors under scrutiny is significant. Finally, norms, values, and debates define interests of all actors and the policy outcomes and vice versa, which could link the approaches of rational choice and constructivist institutionalism. At some point, a common agreement on building or breaking the mandate and tasks of institutions is achieved; when this happens is an unanswered question within the constructivists approach.

Second, in contrast with the rational choice approach, historical institutionalists analyse international cooperation over time as ‘...the notion that institutions, once created,

243 Lowndes, V., ‘Institutionalism’, p. 101, in: Marsh, D., Stoker, G., ‘Theory and Methods in Political Science’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

244 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 184.

245 Risse, T., ‘Social Constructivism and European Integration’, in: Wiener, A., Diez, T., ‘European Integration Theory’, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005, p. 146.

are indeed ‘sticky’ and persist over time’.²⁴⁶ The analysis of institutions over time applies specifically to one of the most studied organizations included in this project, namely the EU, as ‘... much of the rational choice literature on the EU arguably underemphasises the central point of the early neo-functionalist literature, namely the concept of European integration as a process which does indeed unfold over time, often as a result of the unintended consequences of early integration decisions’.²⁴⁷ In the world of international institutionalised organizations, historical institutionalism has been used more than once to analyse the specific phenomenon of international cooperation. Hence, in contrast with the other two approaches included here, historical institutionalism’s unique emphasis on time allows for the longitudinal study of the process of international cooperation, as the cases selected date back to the Cold War.

Third, both the historical and constructivist perspectives adhere to the view that institutions can progressively take on a life of their own and exert influence both on the institutional process and on the outcome of these activities.²⁴⁸ For constructivists, in each step of institution building, ideas can be continuously causative, directing the process along.²⁴⁹ And this factor, ideas, can be connected ‘...to historical causes of an institutionalist logic of path dependence’, which to a certain extent necessitates a combination of constructivist and historical institutionalism.²⁵⁰ Hence, when analysing the process of change of international organizations based on a constructivist approach, incorporating the path-dependency approach of historical institutionalism has added value.

Fourth, constructivists emphasise specific mechanisms of international cooperation, like spill-over effects of integration theories, to analyse the process of change.²⁵¹ Though criticised,²⁵²

this mechanism, at the root of continuous causes of change, have been supplemented by historical causes identified by historical institutionalists, as well. Historical institutionalists see this mechanism as being a self-reinforcing institutional path.²⁵³

Finally, this research project treats not only state actors, but other actors and mechanisms as objects of study. In contrast with rational choice and historical institutionalists, institutions are not only comprised of structures. They are also seen as mechanisms by which individuals, organs and these institutions themselves achieve goals. These goals can vary, be more or less stable and may even be conflictual; this is in contrast

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246 Pollack, M., ‘The New Institutionalisms and European Integration’, in: Wiener, A., Diez, T., ‘European Integration Theory’, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005, p. 136.

247 Idem.

248 Howorth, J., ‘Security and Defence Policy in the European Union’, The European Union Series, 2nd edition, 2014, p. 34.

249 Parsons, C., ‘The Institutional Construction of Interests’, in: Nelsen, B. F., Stub, A. (eds.), ‘The European Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration’, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014, p. 292-293.

250 Ibid, p. 293.

251 Ibid, p. 291.

252 Rosamond, B., ‘The uniting of Europe and the foundation of EU studies: revisiting the neo functionalism of Ernst B. Haas’, Journal of European Public Policy, Routledge, April 2005.

253 Parsons, C., ‘The Institutional Construction of Interests’, in: Nelsen, B. F., Stub, A. (eds.), ‘The European Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration’, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014, p. 291.

with the rational choice and historical institutionalist approaches that argue that the end goal of an organization is stability and survival. As a result, according to the constructivists, the ideas of stability and survival can be agents of change within existing structures that may become fixed or obsolete.²⁵⁴

In conclusion, there is no grand theory of institutionalism because definitions, interpretations, and assumptions vary between the different perspectives, particularly when it comes to explaining institutional change. However, the palette offered by these three approaches together provides complementary theoretical explanations of the phenomenon of change of international security organizations and the question as to how and why they change by accounting for the role of different actors and mechanisms.

2.4.5 *The Road to a Combined Research Framework*

This analysis deals with multiple agents and structures because it is argued that state, non-state actors and mechanisms cause change. Therefore, different approaches to explaining change are taken into account; this is in contrast to analysing institutional change on the basis of a single approach to institutionalism.

The positions and relevance of state and non-state actors is a subject of debate within institutionalism. For one, states (as either full or partial members of organizations) play a crucial role in the process of organizational change in the realm of high politics, namely security and state sovereignty. Therefore, based on the rational actor assumption derived from rational choice theory, states are influential and important actors. On the other hand, within the rational choice approach, it is argued that international organizations are created to serve the interests of the state and to encourage cooperation between states by reducing transaction costs and insecurity.²⁵⁵ Nevertheless, this research sees international organizations as actors in their own right and in addition to states. The constructivist institutionalist approach lends credence to the idea that both states and non-state actors influence change.

Furthermore, different approaches within institutionalism focus on the organization as a unitary entity, not paying attention to the different components (organs, individuals and mechanisms) that make them up that might also influence change. In contrast, other approaches within institutionalism focus specifically on these actors. Constructivist institutionalists claim that organizations are made up of a variety of organs and that, over time, these organs may begin to complement one another ‘...to the extent that the functioning of one embraces the functioning of another’.²⁵⁶ Hall and Soskice argue that ‘...the interconnectedness of these institutions, ..., make it very difficult to change one institution because changing one implies changing others as well since they are tightly coupled. And changing one could undermine the benefits resulting from this institutional

254 Scharpf, F. W., ‘The Joint Decision Trap: Lessons from German federalism and European Integration’, *Public Administration* 66, 1988, p. 239-278.

255 Kirchner, E. J., Domínguez, R., ‘The Security Governance of regional Organizations’, Routledge, 2011, p. 7.

256 Campbell, J. L., ‘Institutional Change and Reproduction’, *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Institutional Analysis*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, p. 15.

complementarity'.²⁵⁷ Although different in their design and decision-making power, the security organizations under scrutiny are made up of many actors. These actors are also seen in the interaction between the organizations, exemplified by the Council and the Commission of the EU or the North Atlantic Council of NATO. Therefore, the different actors involved in European security organizations in this analysis are accepted as actors that influence processes and outcomes of change.

Additionally, research on the relationship between (security) organizations, referred to as inter-organizationalism in the literature, has emerged, which brings the analysis of actorhood of organizations and its organs one step further. As a result of the increase in interaction between organizations, new institutionalism takes into account the level and form of the interrelationship and interaction between security organizations, including political, legal and military aspects of this relationship. Constructivists, in particular, aim to understand the organizational context by including the ideas and identities of a variety of actors like institutions and their organs individually and in relation to each other; this approach looks both inside and outside the black box of organizations and inter-organizational bargaining.

In short, as change in international security organizations is the phenomenon under study here, the theory of new institutionalism provides common ground that is of interest when trying to form a more complete picture of the phenomenon of change in these security organizations. Simultaneously, the differences between the approaches are of as much importance as the similarities and need to be encapsulated in the analysis of paths of change of security organizations. Therefore, it is argued that a combination of the three approaches in a combined research framework addresses the shortcomings of each individual approach when analysing the path of change.

2.4.6 Combining New Institutional Approaches

Several scholars have attempted to combine different approaches by building on their similarities.²⁵⁸ Scharpf reasons that each approach separately is incomplete and that they should be combined to provide a more complete explanation.²⁵⁹ Peters agrees, stating that '...some blending of the strands of theory should be viewed more as complementary rather than competitive explanations for political phenomena'.²⁶⁰ In other words, none of the approaches can fully explain all possible processes observed and, as such, there is a need to combine several of the approaches to get a complete perspective on the structural characteristics of a political system. Likewise, according to Thelen, there is even evidence of an initial convergence in the different approaches.²⁶¹ Like Scharpf, Thelen criticises the

257 Idem. Derived from Hall and Soskice' research on the varieties of capitalism, claiming that change can only be understood by analysing the relationships among institutions. Hall, P. A., Soskice, D., 'An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism', p. 1-70, in: Hall, P. A., Soskice, D., (eds.), 'Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage', Oxford University Press, New York, 2001.

258 Hall, P. A., and Taylor, R., 'Political Science and the Three Institutionalisms', *Political Studies*, 44, 1996, p. 936-957.

259 Scharpf, F. W., 'Games Real Actors Play', Westview Press, 1997, p. 318.

260 Peters, B. G., 'Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism', The Continuum International Publishing Group, New York, 2005, p. 2.

261 Thelen, K., 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics', *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.*, 1999, 2:369-404, p. 371.

separation of theories, focusing either on the extent of change or the way in which change might take place: in an incremental or revolutionary fashion and by means of a critical juncture or path dependency.²⁶² In other words, the rigid, sometimes artificial boundaries between the three separate worlds of rational choice, historical institutionalism and constructivist institutionalism is questioned. Peters also suggests that a 'mixture' of the different approaches in which the boundaries are less defined might be helpful. 'We need not to choose between these approaches if we wish to understand institutional change of the security organizations over a longer period of time'.²⁶³ Overall, several scholars have identified the need for a more combined approach to analysing organizational change.²⁶⁴

In sum, this research project combines different new institutionalist approaches, as they all offer valuable arguments and theoretical explanations of change. Most social science theories are incapable of explaining a full process or outcome. There appears to be a need to bring together a range of variables and theories together in some form of 'causal reconstruction'.²⁶⁵ An emphasis on ideas, combined with an emphasis on structure put forward by other institutionalist approaches can provide a more complete interpretation of the complexities of institutional life than any individual approach can. Hence, it is argued here that while no one of the selected approaches performs well in isolation, when they are combined, they are well positioned to explain the research puzzle and help identify causal factors related to change.

2.4.7 Conclusion

To address the research question, the theory of institutionalism was chosen as a lens with which to analyse paths of change of the selected security organizations. Institutionalism offers an analytical focus on the 'world of organizations', which provides guidance and enables the analysis of change in organizations by linking past and present developments and combining various agents and structures. The intention is not to 'test' whether or not the selected approach of rational choice explains change in security organizations better than, for instance, historical institutionalism. The intention is to combine the different argumentation of the approaches to cover the complex institutional security environment and enable academic bridge-building between different perspectives with a theoretical framework that combines different aspects in a comprehensive analysis. This explains the choice of a research framework that includes aspects of rational choice, historical

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262 Streeck, W., Thelen, K., 'Beyond Continuity. Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies', Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 3.

263 Peters, B. G., 'Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism', The Continuum International Publishing Group, New York, 2005, p. 2.

264 Exemplified by: Barnett, M. N., Finnemore, M., 'Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics', Cornell University Press, 2004; Streeck, W., Thelen, K., 'Beyond Continuity. Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies', Oxford University Press, 2005; Mahoney, J., Thelen, K., 'Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency and Power', Cambridge University press, 2009; Kirchner, E. J., Dominguez, R., 'The Security Governance of Regional Organizations', Routledge, 2011; Fioretos, O. (eds.), 'International Politics and Institutions in Time', Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 2017.

265 For an elaboration on the debate: Mayntz, R. (ed), 'Akteure, Mechanismen, Modelle: Zur Theoriefähigkeit makro-sozialer Analysen', Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag, 2002.

institutionalism, and constructivist institutionalism to analyze change in the European security organizations, with the aim of contributing to the theory of institutionalism.

2.5 The Framework for Explaining Change in Security Organizations

2.5.1 Introduction

Selecting security organizations as the main unit of analysis in this research project allows for the induction of analytical inferences from different new institutionalist approaches to explain the concept of change in security organizations, taking a broad perspective of possible actors and mechanisms drawn from these selected approaches. As such, the aim of this research is to explain paths of deepening, broadening and widening observed in European security organizations between 1990 and 2016. This is realised by explaining how and why European security organizations changed individually, and in comparison, to one another by analysing their paths of change. This section will first provide more detail on these paths of change and the specific definition of change in this research, namely broadening, widening, and deepening. Next, an explanation of the drivers of change that make up the research framework that guides this research will be provided.

2.5.2 Paths of Change

Broadening

The path of broadening is generally defined as expanding the scope of tasks of an organization.²⁶⁶ The literature identifies different ways of analysing task expansion.²⁶⁷ In this research project, the analysis of broadening is limited to change in the scope of tasks of security organizations, i.e. the policy areas in which the organizations are authorised to act. The functional scope can vary between authority over a single security policy issue and authority over an entire range of security policies.²⁶⁸ The starting point of the analysis is the different concepts of security organization, defined as collective defence and collective security organizations.

Broadening is measured by the categorisation of change in level and form. The form of broadening can vary from comprehensive to issue-specific tasks. This breadth of policy areas can also vary in terms of level, moving from ad-hoc to more institutionalised cooperation. Finally, it has to be mentioned that, in contrast with other research, this

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266Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., Schimmelfennig, F., 'Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union', Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 7-11.

267 Broadening is at the heart of neo-functional thinking; (the logic of) sectoral integration. The theory of neo-functionalism is one of the integration theories. Neo-functionalists expected the driving force of integration in one sector to create pressures for further integration within and beyond that sector, the mechanism of functional spill-over. Neo-functionalists theorised this logic of integration as a gradual, rational and self-sustaining process, a snowballing effect. See: Haas, E., 'The Uniting of Europe', Stanford University Press, 1958; Lindberg, L. N., Scheingold, S. A., 'Europe's Would-Be Polity', Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1970, p. 67-71; Börzel, T. A., 'Mind the gap! European integration between level and scope', Journal of European Public Policy, Routledge, April 2005, p. 218-219.

268Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., Schimmelfennig, F., 'Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union', Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 8.

research acknowledges broadening as a separate path, in addition to deepening and widening. This is because it can affect both deepening and widening and because it can occur independently in the absence of deepening and widening.²⁶⁹ In short, broadening is understood as the initial expansion of the scope of tasks of a security organization into new policy areas measured by the form and level of change. The path of broadening will be described empirically in Chapter 4.

Widening

The path of widening is broadly defined as a ‘...process of gradual and formal horizontal institutionalisation’ or a process of ‘geographical spill-over’, i.e. enlargement in terms of the accession of new member states.²⁷⁰ Here, in addition to the full accession of new member states, widening includes partnerships with state and non-state actors.²⁷¹ Widening in this sense is, thus, not restricted to the accession of outside states to the organization, but extended to the analysis of relations with outside states and international organizations. Widening is measured by the categorisation of change in level and form. The form of widening can vary in terms of the different forms of membership and partnership. These different forms of widening can also vary in their level of institutionalisation. In short, widening encompasses enlargement with members and cooperation with partners and organizations, as well as the level of institutionalisation. The path of widening will be described empirically in Chapter 5.

Deepening

The path of deepening is broadly defined as an increase in the scope and level of cooperation and integration in terms of institution-building, democratic legitimacy, and policies.²⁷² It is understood as a process of ‘vertical integration’, incorporating the transfer of competences and shift of decision-making power from the national level to the level of the organization, or in other words, the distribution of authority and autonomy from the state to the organizational level.²⁷³ Deepening is measured in terms of level, comprising authority and autonomy, and the form referring to different forms of cooperation that can result in a build-up of power and organs of an organization. As such, deepening can be categorised into the level of institutionalisation and the form of international cooperation.²⁷⁴ In short, deepening

269 Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., Schimmelfennig, F., ‘Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 1, 7-11.

270 Ibid, p. 12; Miles, L., ‘Theoretical Considerations’, in: Nugent, N. (ed.), ‘European Union Enlargement’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. 264.

271 Inspired by Leuffen, Schimmelfennig and Rittberger who suggested the analysis of enlargement and engagement to take into account not only the formal members, but also informal members participation in international organizations, regimes and policies. In: Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., Schimmelfennig, F., ‘Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 15.

272 Ibid, p. 11-14.

273 Ibid, p. 1.

274 According to Haftendorn and Keohane, the function, degree and form (and the relationship between them) of change is important, because it provides the basis for explaining variation in form and the hypotheses about the causes and directions of change. In: Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., ‘Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space’, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 7.

accounts for an increase in the level and form of institutionalisation of the organization at the international level. This may result in the strengthening of the institutional design or the creation of new organs within the organization. The path of deepening of security organizations will be analysed in Chapter 6.

Generally speaking, these three paths have tended to be treated separately by scholars and consequently have been theorised separately. This neglects the possibility of there being a mutual relationship and interdependence between them, which can be considered a ‘missing link’.²⁷⁵ In this research, paths of change of different security organizations are analysed separately as well as in a combined fashion, with attention to the possible interrelationship between these paths. In other words, paths of change are analysed cross-case, comparatively between the three security organizations in the separate paths of change, and cross-path, meaning the paths of change are compared to one another. They are also analysed separately to be able to distinguish between levels and forms of change. Studying them together allows for us to capture how the broadening of tasks, for instance, might lead to deepening of the organizational structure.²⁷⁶ And, widening can affect deepening and broadening because, geographically and institutionally, the features of an organization can expand with multiple forms of cooperation with other state and non-state actors.²⁷⁷ So, the organizations vary within paths of change and between paths in terms of level, scope, memberships, and partnerships.

Furthermore, scholars have focused on the deepening, broadening, and widening of international cooperation; this assumes an automatic increase in level, scope, and membership of organizations. In this research, the two sides of the coin will be tackled in analysing the paths of deepening, broadening and widening, but the analysis will likewise address the counterparts of these paths, ones that lead to de-integration, de-institutionalisation, and fragmentation.

2.5.3 Explanatory Drivers of Change Derived from New Institutionalism

The paths of change described above do not provide an explanation of who or what drives these paths of change and how and why these changes have taken place.

The ‘who’ question in this research refers to all possible actors that have the capacity to elicit change, varying from state to non-state actors. In addition to state and non-state actors, new institutionalism identifies different processes and mechanisms that can cause change, as it is claimed that change is not always a direct consequence of an action by a state, that cover the question of who or what might instigate change.

Furthermore, the ‘how’ question refers to the variety of the paths of change of the security organizations themselves.

275 Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., Schimmelfennig, F., ‘Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 11.

276 Börzel, T. A., ‘Mind the gap! European integration between level and scope’, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Routledge, April 2005, p. 220.

277 Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., ‘Ever Looser Union? Towards a Theory of Differentiated Integration in the EU’, paper EUSA Conference 2011, p. 5-6.

Finally, the possible answers to the question of why change takes place, in other words the causes of change, are based on the selected approaches and their explanations of the causes and outcomes of change within new institutionalism.

In this section, the ‘who’ or ‘what’ question will be addressed.

The different actors and mechanisms that drive change, leading to paths of broadening, widening, and deepening of security organizations, are all derived from the selected approaches within the theory of new institutionalism and make up the proposed, combined research framework. In sum, the actors or mechanisms that drive change, elaborated upon above, can be distinguished on the basis of the different approaches within new institutionalism.

The first set of drivers are state-focused drivers. Institutionalism does highlight the choices of states, based on the rational-actor model, oscillating between conflict and cooperation in the international system to promote or protect their interests and reduce uncertainty. Security organizations act in the security environment, set in the context of high politics, which explains the identification of (member-) states as possible drivers of change. The focus of this research is on security and defence policy, as security organizations are the units of analysis. States play a crucial role in organizational change in the realm of security. Based on the rational actor assumption and derived from rational choice theory, state actors are seen as being driven by national interests, including the protection of sovereignty, territory, resources, and economic interests. To defend their interests, states use incentives or sanctions in their interaction with international cooperation structures; this is known as the transaction cost approach.

In addition to the state-focused drivers, other actors are identified in this research. Organizations are of interest and are seen as possible drivers of change. Agents and structures that reside within organizations are also seen here as possible drivers of change, this being derived from the constructivist institutionalist approach. These different actors determine their actions based on values and norms and are driven by power of their interests, including survival. Rules and structures then embody these values and norms, as well as power relationships.

Furthermore, in addition to actors, mechanisms can cause change as well, as proposed by historical institutionalism and constructivist institutionalism. Historical institutionalism states that change is path dependent, that organizations are historically embedded and ‘sticky’ from their creation, and that so-called critical junctures can lead to change. Though serious exogenous forces can cause change, in the end, this change will always result in a punctuated equilibrium and organizations survive by a logic of appropriateness. In other words, they need legitimacy derived from their environment in order to persist. Constructivist institutionalists explain change as being the result of (un-) intended dynamics and mechanisms that lead organizations to be politically and/or legally connected in a broad area of security issues.

Hence, the actors and mechanisms that cause processes of change are derived from the three strands of new institutionalism. These lenses have differences, similarities and even complementarities between their theoretical perspectives on explaining actors, processes and causes of change. It is argued here that within the international security environment,

the actors and mechanisms involved have an impact on the analysis of the paths of change of international security organizations; this requires a combined theoretical research framework. In this chapter the actors and processes of change elaborated on above and derived from the theoretical lenses that make up this framework, are illustrated in the table below (Table 2.1). This framework will be expanded with the causes and criteria for analysing change in Chapter 3.

Change	Actors	Process of Change
Rational choice institutionalism	State	Stable and unstable. Utility maximisation: change is instrumental and dependent on state interest.
Historical institutionalism	State and mechanism	Stable and path dependent. According to legitimacy of organization; the logic of appropriateness. Result of change is a punctuated equilibrium with possible critical junctures.
Constructivist institutionalism	State, non-state and mechanism	Chaotic and constant. Varies in form and level: from institutionalisation to de-institutionalisation.

Table 2.1: Combined research framework derived from the theoretical lenses of new institutionalism encompassing the actors and processes of change of organizations.

Finally, the execution of the analysis of the security organizations is sequential, divided into the separate analysis of the paths of change, the comparison of the separate paths of change (cross-case), and the analysis of the combination of the paths of change (cross-path). An analytical differentiation between the paths of change of the security organizations is helpful, as these paths not only vary according to security organization, but also according to the pace and direction of change induced by drivers and the possible influence of the organizations on one another, which will be elaborated upon in Chapter 3.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter presented the research framework that will be used to analyse security organizations within the European security architecture from the 1990s onwards. It is argued that crucial variables for explaining change are, in addition to state-focused variables, non-state actors, dynamics, and mechanisms, which are derived from different approaches of new institutionalism. As such, this research project will combine aspects of the different approaches to analyse change alongside the identified paths of change, based on a combined theoretical research framework. The paths of change that will be analysed, are labelled as deepening, broadening, and widening. Furthermore, it is argued that without recognising a distinction between drivers, dynamics and mechanisms at work on the paths of change of security organizations separately and comparatively, generalisable

observations on the interrelationship between the paths of deepening, broadening, and widening and their impact on the security organizations are difficult to make. Therefore, the comparative analysis of security organizations has a cross-case and cross-path character. This is a key asset of this research design.

From an analytical point of view, the aim is to explain change in European security organizations, which will enable theoretical reflections on the concept of change in security organizations, more generally, and on new institutionalism as an approach. In the following chapters, questions will be answered as to whether, how and why paths of change of security organizations have led to deepening, broadening, and widening.

