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Permanent change? the paths of change of the European security organizations

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Citation

Mengelberg, S. N. (2021, April 15). *Permanent change? the paths of change of the European security organizations*. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3160749>

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Cover Page



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Author: Mengelberg, S.N.

Title: Permanent change? the paths of change of the European security organizations

Issue Date: 2021-04-15

Permanent Change?

The Paths of Change of the European Security Organizations

Sabine Nicole Mengelberg
March 2021

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ISBN: 9789493124110

Permanent Change?

The Paths of Change of the European Security Organizations

PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van
de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,
op gezag van rector magnificus prof.dr.ir. H. Bijl,
volgens besluit van het college voor promoties
te verdedigen op donderdag 15 april 2021
klokke 16.15 uur

door
Sabine Nicole Mengelberg
geboren op 15 september 1968
te 's-Gravenhage

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Dit proefschrift werd mede mogelijk gemaakt met financiële steun van het ministerie van Defensie.

For my Queen Mother

‘The tyranny of words is only slightly less absolute than that of men; but whereas elections, revolutions, or just the dreary passage of time can do away with human tyranny, patient analysis and redefinition are required to remedy the linguistic affliction’.

Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation State, 1964

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List of Abbreviations

ACO	Allied Command Operations
ACT	Allied Command Transformation
ACFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
BG	Battlegroups
CARD	Coordinated Annual Review on Defense
CBSD	Capacity Building in support of Security and Development
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CCD	Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence
CCDCoE	Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence
CCOMC	Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre
CEDC	Central European Defense Cooperation
CEEC	Central and Eastern European Countries
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces
CFI	Connected Forces Initiative
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHG	Civilian Headline Goal
CiO	Chairmen-in-Office
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Forces
CMPD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
CoE	Council of Europe
COSI	Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CPG	Comprehensive Political Guidance
CRO	Crisis Response Operations
CSBM	Confidence and Security Building Measures
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
DCB	Defense and Related Security and Capability Building Initiative
DCI	Defense Capability Initiative
EAPC	European Atlantic Partnership Council
EBAO	Effect Based Approach to Operations
EC	European Commission
ECAP	European Capability Action Plan
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West-African States
ECPF	European Civil Protection Force
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDA	European Defense Agency
EDAP	European Defense Action Plan
EDC	European Defense Community

EDF	European Defense Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EGF	European Gendarmerie Force
EMU	European Monetary Union
ENI	European Neighbourhood Instrument
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EP	European Parliament
EPC	Eastern Partnership Council
EPU	European Political Union
ESCD	Emerging Security Challenges Department
ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUBG	EU Battle Group
EUGS	EU Global Strategy
EULEX	European Rules of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUMC	EU Military Committee
EUMS	EU Military Staff
EUROPOL	EU Law Enforcement Agency
FAC	Foreign Affairs Council
FFG	Follow on Force Group
FNC	Framework Nations Concept
FPA	Framework Participation Agreements
FSC	Forum for Security Cooperation
GMI	Greater Middle East Initiative
HCNM	High Commissioner on National Minorities
HHG	Helsinki Headline Goal
HQ	Headquarters
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICI	Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
IFFG	Initial Follow-On Forces Group
IFOR	Implementation Force in Bosnia Herzegovina
IMS	International Military Staff
IO	International Organizations
IPP	Individual Partnership Program
IPSD	Implementation Plan on Security and Defense
IS	International Staff
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISS/EU	Internal European Security Strategy for the European Union
JEF	Joint Expeditionary Force
KFOR	Kosovo Force
LTM	Long Term Missions

MAP	Membership Action Plan
MC	Military Committee
MD	Mediterranean Dialogue
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
NAC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NORDEFECO	Nordic Defense Cooperation
NRC	NATO-Russia Council
NRF	NATO Response Force
NSC	NATO Strategic Concept
ODHIR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OHQ	Operation Headquarters
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSCE-CiO	Chairperson in Office
PaRP	Planning and Review Process
PATG	Partners across the Globe
PCC	Partnership Coordination Cell
PCSC	Partnerships and Cooperative Security Committee
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PJC	Permanent Joint Council
PMF	Political Military Framework
PPC	Political and Partnerships Committee
PPEWU	Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit
PSC	Political and Security Committee
RAP	Readiness Action Plan
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
PPEWU	Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit
RRF	Rapid Response Force
SAA	Stabilization and Association Agreements
SAP	Stabilization and Association Process
SFOR	Stabilization Force in Bosnia Herzegovina
SG	Secretary General
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe
SSR	Stabilization and Reconstruction
SU	Soviet Union
TCG	Trilateral Contact Group
TNT	Transnational Threats Department
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

US	United States
VJTF	Very High Joint Readiness Force
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WP	Warsaw Pact

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Part One

Context, Theories and Methods

‘He thought that, unlike most people, he had simply refused to let himself be brainwashed by newspapers, television, eschatologists and philosophies into believing that ‘in spite of everything’ this was an acceptable world simply because it existed. It would never become acceptable. Beloved maybe, acceptable never’.

Cees Nooteboom, Rituals, 1980

Chapter 1

Part One. Context, Theories and Methods

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 The International Security Cooperation Puzzle

‘As spring arrives, and people gather on patios again, Brussels remains a deflated and shabby city, a far cry from its glory days as an important European capital less than two decades ago. Yesterday, on the 1st of April 2031, an article in the newspaper covered the ongoing war between Poland and Hungary, and Great Britain and France’s involvement in the conflict. The article highlighted the role of the institutional decoupling of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), as well as the collapse of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in precipitating this fragmentation of Europe. What began with a financial crisis in the EU and Brexit was followed by the domino-like disintegration of European security architecture; the efforts of the founding fathers of European multilateralism had been in vain.’

The ugly scenario described above, one of a devastated Europe, is a spectre that haunts political and academic analysis of European security architecture. The idea of cooperation between empires and states is as ancient as it is difficult to bring to fruition. The desire for peace and security can be seen as part of human nature, but so too can be the ongoing struggle for power and independence. The post-Westphalian (1648) interstate order has been characterised by rivalry and conflict between states and the establishment of ad-hoc alliances in response to territorial disputes, trade interests, and nationalist, religious and ideological convictions. Ever since the Westphalian Peace was established, a paradox at the heart of relations between states has existed –for cooperation between states to be successful, states must give up some degree of authority to international institutions, thereby diminishing state sovereignty to some degree.

Originally, the principle of cooperation between states, in an effort to prevent war and create for peace and security, was explicated in the concept of ‘indivisibility of security’ by Kant in his essay ‘Perpetual Peace’.¹ Kant came to the conclusion that a peace alliance based on mutual recognition of the status quo (reciprocity) was required and was a consequence of the natural interdependence between states. According to Kant, a system was needed that would ensure that states that disturb the peace are called to order by a collective of states, coercively if necessary (the concept of collective security).

Nevertheless, up to the twentieth century, bilateral and multilateral cooperation between states was characterised by ad-hoc alliances, regulations and the occasional agreement, including the so-called Concert of Europe: the Vienna Congress of 1814 and 1815. In 1919, during the peace conference in Versailles and at the initiative of the American President, Woodrow Wilson, the League of Nations was founded, one of the

■
1 Kant, I., ‘Perpetual Peace’, Cosimo Classics, September 2010.

first intergovernmental organizations.² This League of Nations was a first step toward institutionalised international cooperation in the field of security. Unfortunately, it did not survive the sway of national interest that would result in the Second World War.

After the Second World War, cooperation between states was deemed necessary to preventing future bloodshed on the scale of what had just taken place. As a result, a second and stronger push for regional and worldwide cooperation arose. The concept of multilateralism emerged after the Second World War in relation to the establishment of the United Nations (UN), NATO, the Western European Union (WEU), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the European integration process.³ This concept is based on the idea of a global environment in which political, economic and security dependencies are institutionalised. In 1990, Keohane defined multilateralism as '...the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states'.⁴ Ruggie elaborated upon the concept, building on the principles of 'indivisibility' and diffuse reciprocity of international relations as '... an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of 'generalized' principles of conduct,..., which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any occurrence'.⁵

In the realm of international relations theory, research on the design of the international bipolar order carried out during the Cold War tended to converge either around the state-centric and balance-of-power theories put forward by Walt⁶ and Mearsheimer⁷ on the one hand and Mitrany's⁸ integration theory and Keohane and Nye's⁹ theory of interdependence on the other hand. Theoretical analysis of regional and world orders was, thus, highly subject to the confines of the great debate between realism and liberalism. The empirical design of international cooperation after the Second World War varied in terms of form and degree, but was limited to either intergovernmental or supranational regimes and was approached from a political or legal angle, especially when it came to security and defence.

-
- 2 The League of Nations was an intergovernmental organization founded by a Covenant on 10 January 1920 as a result of the Paris Peace Conference after the First World War. The principal aim was to maintain world peace, including preventing wars through the concept of collective security and disarmament and settling international disputes through negotiation and arbitration. The League of Nations was dissolved in 1946.
- 3 Though the concept has become commonly used, the academic discourse on multilateralism has been fragmented, as claimed by Koops. For an elaboration on the development of the concept, see: Koops, J.A., *The European Union as an Integrative Power? Assessing the EU's 'Effective Multilateralism' towards NATO and the United Nations*, Brussels University Press, 2011, p. 66-78.
- 4 Keohane, R. O., 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', *International Studies Quarterly*, 32 (4), December 1988.
- 5 Ruggie, J. G. (eds.), *'Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form'*, Columbia University Press, 1993.
- 6 Walt, S. M., *'The origins of Alliances'*, Cornell University Press, 1987, p. 199.
- 7 Mearsheimer, J. J., *'The Tragedy of Great Power Politics'*, New York: W. W. Norton, 2001.
- 8 Mitrany, D. 'A working Peace System', in: Nelsen, B. F., Stub, A. (eds.), *'The European Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration'*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014, p. 105-123.
- 9 Keohane, R. O., Nye, J. S., *'Power and Interdependence'*, Longman 2001.

After the end of the Cold War, institutionalised international cooperation increased in the so-called third wave of cooperation and institutionalisation, and as a result, international organizations have since grown dramatically. This is also the case in the area of security cooperation. From the very beginning, the collapse of the Soviet Union (SU) and the bipolar order resulted in a wealth of initiatives aimed at strengthening multilateralism and a liberal world order as an alternative to the bipolar order.¹⁰

A commitment to creating a multilateral order was brought to life with the initiation of a European security architecture, first referred to as such by the CSCE at the Paris Summit¹¹ in 1990¹². This pledge was followed by the advancement of several concepts by NATO and the CSCE.¹³ The intention was to link security matters between the existing security organizations to construct a 'security architecture' based on 'a framework of interlocking institutions'¹⁴ including NATO, the EU, the UN and the CSCE, leading to a division of labour to serve the goal of collaboration and cooperation of international organizations in the field of crisis management.¹⁵ 'Paris' was often compared to the Vienna Congress and the Conference of Versailles, as a result of the momentum that international law, interdependence and multilateralism expressed. The CSCE's 'Charter of Paris for a New Europe' declared the intention of its partners to create a new security order, one based on shared power instead of a balance of power. In other words, mutually reinforcing institutions.¹⁶ Another remarkable aspect of this order that would form its foundation was that it '...explicitly legitimated the interest of participating states in each other's internal affairs'.¹⁷ In particular in the first decade after the end of the Cold War, the dream of a multilateral institutional framework, based on a strengthened transatlantic relationship and division of labour in the OSCE¹⁸ area, came to fruition.

Initiatives to create a wider European security architecture emerged in several states and were forwarded by German politicians, like Genscher, Adenauer and Kohl, who sought *Westbindung* and, simultaneously, *Ostbindung*, alongside political leaders from the US, Russia

10 A liberal world order can be defined as an institutional order established in the aftermath of the Second World War. During the Cold War it was comprised of Western states and after the end of the Cold War it became a global order, with some exceptions. According to Ikenberry this order can be characterized as an open and rule-based order built around multilateral institutions, alliances, strategic partners and client states, where decisions are based on consent and organized around agreed rules and institutions that allocate rights and limit the exercise of power, see: Ikenberry, G. J., 'Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order', Princeton University Press, 2012.

11 In general, a summit of an international organizations is defined as a gathering of state and non-state actors of the members or partners of the various organizations.

12 CSCE, 'Charter of Paris For a New Europe' (presented at CSCE Paris Summit, November 1990), 1-29.

13 The development of the European security architecture will be elaborated further in Chapter 5.

14 NATO Strategic Concept 1991, par. 3.

15 The aim of the Vienna Congress was to provide a long-term peace plan for Europe by settling critical issues arising from the French revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1814-1815). The Conference of Versailles was the peace conference held after the end of World War I to set the peace terms for the defeated powers (1919-1920).

16 CSCE, 'The Challenges of Change', (CSCE Summit of Heads of State or Government 1992, Helsinki, July 1992), par. 23.

17 Garton Ash, T., 'Europe's Endangered Liberal Order', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 2, (March/April), p. 64.

18 The CSCE was institutionalised into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) at the Budapest Summit 'Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era' in December 1994. For convenience, the term 'OSCE' will be used in general.

and France who initiated and built a European security architecture. This architecture would have to accommodate the great powers, the US and Russia, and situate Germany within a strengthened European multilateral cooperation structure, not unlike such initiatives after the Second World War. Genscher's efforts were referred to as 'Genscherism', and were based on the idea that 'the task of the OSCE did not come to an end with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain, and the Organization remains a wonderful platform for shaping the future of Europe'.¹⁹ This emphasised the strong belief in the need for a European institutional umbrella for security matters under the auspices of the OSCE. Alongside German initiatives, were the visions of various American presidents, like that of President Bush, that sought to establish a European security architecture that would prevent war, link Eastern and Western Europe and, not least, make it possible for US troops to withdraw from Europe. Bush stated that 'grand strategy ... is based on the concept of containment of communism', and that it was incumbent upon the US to encourage a 'growing community of democracies anchoring international peace and stability, and a dynamic free-market system generating prosperity and progress on a global scale'.²⁰ These ideas were strengthened and expanded upon by his successor, the so-called 'Globalisation President', President Clinton, who argued that '...the follow up to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement, enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies', which defined NATO and EU enlargement programs for the decade that followed.²¹

From that point onward, cooperation within and between security organizations increased and changed, and took various forms at various levels. The security organizations encompassed by the European security architecture changed and broadened their scopes, especially with regard to regional crisis management activities and, eventually, adopting a worldwide perspective. These organizations also grew in terms of membership and network of partners and also deepened their institutional structure. After a single decade of what was seen as a 'new world order', Haftendorn, Keohane and Wallander stated that '...not only have quite a few security institutions persisted, some (such as NATO) have even acquired new functions'.²² As a result, the regional and world orders and international cooperation structures became much more complex than they were prior to and during the Cold War. Specifically, in the dense, institutionalised structures of the European security architecture, a variegated web of international cooperation existed, in different forms and at different levels. This resulted in the creation of a highly complex institutional security environment. These inter-states and inter-organizational cooperation patterns challenge the traditional dichotomy presented by the realist-liberal debate particularly in relation to the analysis of paths of change of international organizations.

19 Genscher H. D., Statement at OSCE Congress, 6 November 2009.

20 US President Bush before the end of the Cold War.

21 US President Clinton Strategy on Foreign Relations, made by the national security advisor Lake, September 1993.

22 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., 'Imperfect Unions, Security Institutions over Time and Space', Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 5.

The end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries coincided with a period of transition and new challenges. One of the first cracks in the transatlantic relationship was caused by the 'impotence' of the EU in the Balkan wars in the 90s, specifically the NATO Allied Force operation against Serbia, which presented a challenge to solidarity among NATO members.²³ As a result, subsequent interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003 were built on a framework of coalitions of the willing (and able) and the War on Terror failed to elicit long-lasting solidarity among allied parties.

A closer analysis shows that the end of the Cold War brought a shift in the balance of power between states and also affected the institutionalized international security cooperation status quo, both in Europe and across the world. On the one hand, the breadth of international governance increased in response to threats that had to be dealt with. From the 1990s onward, many crises and conflicts led to changes in the institutional make-up of the security organizations involved.²⁴ In line with the idea that 'form follows function', this may account for the observed variation in institutional form produced by responses to security threats.²⁵ On the other hand, many crises and conflicts simultaneously required a renewal or removal of elements of the existing European security architecture.

Furthermore, in addition to changes in the existing security architecture, this period also saw international security cooperation take place outside the context of institutionalised structures. More than a decade ago, American Secretary of State, Donald Rumsfeld, in his capacity as a representative of Europe's number one security ally, made the now infamous statement, '...it's not the coalition that determines the mission; it's the mission that determines the coalition'.²⁶ Coalitions of the willing and able, outside of the context of institutionalised cooperation, have been employed as an alternative to traditional alliances and have been seen in international operations in Kosovo(1999), Iraq (2003), Libya (2011) and Syria (2011).

It can thus be argued that the post-Cold War era led not only to building, but also breaking the sought-after European security architecture that would encompass a division of labour between NATO, the OSCE, the EU and the WEU as provided for in 'Paris'. All of these organizations were eager to be tasked with new security activities and roles in an effort to legitimise their existence, as well as their survival. This led each security organization to forge its own variegated path of change and to renew political and legal interaction between itself and other organizations.

As such, the security organizations within the European security architecture have adjusted and adapted their institutional design in response to the post-Cold War situation. In line with Haftendorn, Keohane and Wallander's argument, as mentioned above, one can conclude that the change in tasks and functions has led to strengthening of the

■
23 The 1999 NATO operation Allied Force was executed without a UN mandate which led to dissatisfaction among member states.

24 These conflicts and crises are subject matters of this research and will be elaborated in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

25 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., 'Imperfect Unions, Security Institutions over Time and Space', Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 7.

26 Rumsfeld, D., Washington Post, 18 October 2001.

organizations. Nevertheless, the ‘organizations-in-crisis literature’²⁷ or the question ‘Is the OSCE still alive?’²⁸ has had its fair share of attention in the press and has not gone unnoticed by policy makers and academics alike.

From the beginning of 2000, some politicians and academics claimed that the EU’s path of change had weakened. Political debate intensified and tension increased in response to a failed EU constitution (2005),²⁹ the direction and extent of future enlargement, economic and budgetary difficulties, the nature of border security and questions about the direction of law enforcement and legal cooperation. These challenges presented themselves against the backdrop of the realisation that the EU’s overarching aim of cross-border cooperation could not solve current transnational problems, like migration. Furthermore, the EU’s economic integration process did not automatically lead to a political union with a unified foreign and security policy or a European army. Additionally, criticism began to emerge from national political parties within member states,³⁰ ultimately resulting in a state leaving the EU in the context of Brexit.³¹ This existential crisis became somewhat fashionable, as other states and political parties suggested similar options for Greece (‘Grexit’)³² and the Netherlands (Nexit).³³

NATO, likewise, has experienced its own share of tension in dealing with a European capability deficit and disagreement among members on issues of enlargement, vision and missions; in other words, a lack of solidarity among members on many issues. Furthermore, according to critics, the OSCE has also failed to develop into a regional security organization, instead functioning as an umbrella over NATO and former WP states.

Finally, bureaucrats in Brussels were often faulted for this supposed crisis of the security architecture. The aforementioned organizations were said to be divorced from reality and had lost public support along the way, which damaged the endeavour to create a genuine architecture equipped to cope with threats and insecurity.³⁴ Clegg and Hardy described these trends as early as in 1999; ‘...on the outside the boundaries that formerly circumscribed the organization are breaking down... in ‘chains’, ‘clusters’, ‘networks’ and ‘strategic alliances’. On the inside, the boundaries that formerly delineated the bureaucracy are also breaking down as the traditional hierarchal structure changes leading to new organizational forms’.³⁵

27 This statement was derived from; Thies, W. J., ‘Why NATO Endures’, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009, p. 3-14.

28 Socor, V., ‘Is the OSCE Still Alive?’, Wall Street Journal, Nov 5, 2004.

29 The Dutch (1 June 2005) and the French (29 May 2005) voted ‘no’ in a consultative referendum on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.

30 European political doctrine that advocates disengagement from the EU and shows resistance towards the European integration process.

31 Brexit is the blending of British and exit, referring to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU after a referendum in June 2016 in which 51,9 % of the British people voted for leave.

32 Grexit refers to a Greek withdrawal from the Eurozone as a hypothetical scenario as a result of the Greek government-debt crisis in 2012.

33 Nexit refers to a possible scenario in which the Netherlands would leave the EU suggested by some Dutch political parties in 2017.

34 Elaboration in Chapter 5.

35 Clegg, S. R., Hardy, C., ‘Studying Organization: Theory and Method’, SAGE publications, 1999, p. 15.

Another crack in the European security architecture that appeared at the end of the 1990s was precipitated by new threats emerging from terrorism, ethnic confrontation, human rights violations, cyber-crime and attacks, large-scale immigration, an increase in organised crime, competition for energy resources, climate change and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Finally, the so-called return of geopolitics, prompted by the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, led to the increasingly isolationist stance taken by the US, which damaged the transatlantic relationship and strained the EU integration process as a result of political tension within EU states, between members and between the member states and the EU itself. This will be elaborated upon in what follows. There was even talk of a crisis of multilateralism; that Europe and the world were heading toward a system of fragmentation and the end of the Westphalian system; an era of post-multilateralism marking the end of the liberal world order.³⁶

Now, in the second decade of the 21st century, for some, the European security architecture cracked again as a result of the return of state power and geopolitics, which has brought the functioning of the multilateral order into question. Heisbourg states that the opposite of the Kantian world order emerged with the renaissance of the anarchic Hobbesian system, resulting in nationalism, radicalism, polarisation and fragmentation.³⁷ This not only because some of the bigger states choose to pursue national interest at the expense of institutionalised cooperation, but also because other actors have become important in the realm of international politics, diminishing state power on the battlefield, for example, with the increased prevalence of non-state actors, such as terrorists groups, and at the institutional level, as a result of the increasing influence of corporations, international organizations and their organs in addition to the far-reaching consequences of globalisation.

For some, this period is seen as being the beginning of a post-Western global order.³⁸ Some others, including political leaders of the greater powers, such as the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lavrov, have been enthusiastic about this prospect.³⁹ Prominent academics, such as Ikenberry⁴⁰, Freedman⁴¹ and Kissinger⁴² also agree that the liberal world order, as we know it, is under pressure. This has also been suggested by Mazarr⁴³ and Kagan: '...history has returned, and the democracies must come together to shape it, or others will shape it for them'.⁴⁴ Still others have challenged these statements, like German Chancellor Merkel, who has claimed just the opposite, that today's challenges can only be

36 Luce, E., *Financial Times*, 11 June 2018.

37 Heisbourg, F., 'War and Peace After the Age of Liberal Globalisation', *Survival*, 60:1, 2018, p. 214.

38 Zarif, M. J., speech to Munich Security Conference, 19 February 2017.

39 Russian minister of foreign affairs, speech to Munich Security Conference, 19 February 2017.

40 Ikenberry, J. G., 'Liberal Leviathan. The origins, crisis and transformation of the American World Order', 2012.

41 Freedman, L., 'The Future of War. A History', London, Allen lane, 2017.

42 Kissinger, H., 'World Order', Penguin Press, 2014.

43 Mazar, M. J., 'Testing the Value of the Post-war International Order', Rand Corporation, January 2018.

44 Kagan, R., 'The Return of History and the End of Dreams', Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2008, p. 86.

overcome by maintaining a multilateral order, which itself necessitates the strengthening of international cooperation.⁴⁵

Regardless of perspective, it is evident that the current state of the European security architecture is nowhere near what was intended at the OSCE Summit in Paris in 1990. After more than three decades of building the European security architecture, many cracks can be found in what has been built, leading some to conclude that the system of multilateralism is in crisis and a system of post-multilateralism is emerging.⁴⁶

At the same time, however, security organizations have survived many crises over the last seventy years. And, since the end of the Cold War, many policy initiatives have led to the broadening of the scope of tasks and a strengthening of the institutional structures of these organizations. There even continues to be debate about the possibility of establishing a European army.⁴⁷

The question is: do the developments reflected on above and the paths of change of the organizations encompassed by the European security architecture prelude the end of institutional cooperation and the end of multilateralism? Or is this the beginning of a new era of international security cooperation, with new forms of cooperation emerging at different levels? The aim of this research project is to discuss these issues and provide answers to the research questions as specified below.

1.2 Research Aim

Since the end of the Cold War, the security arena has been governed by an increasing number of security organizations and agreements between these organizations, both regionally and globally. In addition to increasing in number, these organizations have also seen changes in their design, activities and membership. Research on these paths of change over the past several decades has identified various drivers, processes and mechanisms at work in these paths, resulting in different explanations for change that has been observed. The focus of this research is the description, analysis and explanation of change as it related to European security organizations, as reflected upon above, both at the level of the individual organization and at the level of the European security architecture as a whole in the period between the end of the Cold War and 2016. The analysis starts with the end of the Cold War as a major game changer in terms of cooperative regimes between actors and ends after a period of 25 years. This constitutes a sufficient timeframe in which to study paths of change in relation to the selected security organizations.



45 German Federal Chancellor Merkel, speech to Munich Security Conference, 18 February 2017.

46 For instance: Acharya, A., 'The End of the American World Order', Polity Press, 2018.

47 Speech of French president Macron on a visit to the former Western Front in Verdun, 5 November 2018.

The cases selected for the analysis of the paths of change of security organizations are NATO, the EU and the OSCE.⁴⁸ These organizations display the highest degree of institutionalization and interaction and have overlapping activities, membership and partnership. Historically, these European security organizations, as cases in point, are politically and legally distinct and, as such, this may limit comparability. Although these organizations have overlapping activities and membership and they all interact, they differ to a certain extent as well in terms of history, mandate, autonomy and authority, legality, degree of institutionalisation, decision-making processes, membership and partnerships, operations and missions. Furthermore, NATO, the EU and the OSCE can all be defined as security organizations, as argued by Haftendorn, Keohane and Wallander.⁴⁹ However, while they all encompass aspects of collective defence and/or collective security arrangements, they define and interpret these arrangements differently. Nevertheless, NATO, the EU and the OSCE are security organizations within the European security architecture that resemble each other in terms of form and degree of institutionalization, have overlap in terms of membership and partnerships, interact with other organizations and, finally, have overlap in terms of activities and functions.

Change is the phenomenon that is analysed in this research project. The concept of change is operationalised as different 'paths of change', defined here as trajectories that involve broadening (scope of tasks), widening (enlargement and engagement with states and other organizations) and deepening (institutionalization).⁵⁰ The dynamics driving change involve state and non-state actors, which, for the purposes of this project, necessitates a combined research framework. Both state and non-state actors influence processes of change in the security environment and security architecture; mutual influence and specific mechanisms lead to changes in paths –broadening, widening and deepening the selected organizations in the context of the European security architecture. Non-state actors, such as international security organizations, are not regarded as 'empty shells' in this analysis. As is the case with other actors, they are regarded as actors in their own right, in line with Barnett and Finnemore, which will be elaborated in Chapter 2.⁵¹ Therefore, these actors can be subject separately to theoretical and empirical analysis and can be compared to one other, making them interesting subjects from an ontological standpoint.

The rationale behind this research project is the absence of a coherent, theoretically inspired description and analysis of these changes in the existing literature. Though literature exists that has dealt with aspects of this problem (to be discussed in detail in the literature review in Chapter 2), this analysis distinguishes itself not only by treating the individual security organizations separately, but also by comparing them to one another and devoting attention to their mutual interrelationship by means of cross-case comparison, between the organizations on one path of change and cross-path comparison,

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48 In this research, the UN, the EU, NATO and the OSCE are conceptualised as organizations in which organs are set up, exemplified by the NAC of NATO and the Commission of the EU, as will be elaborated in Chapter 2.

49 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., 'Imperfect Unions, Security Institutions over Time and Space', Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 22.

50 These paths will be elaborated in Chapter 2, section 2.5.

51 Barnett, M., Finnemore, M., 'The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations', *International Organization* Vol. 53, No. 4, 1999.

between the different paths of change, and with that the European security architecture itself. This thesis forwards the idea that the path of change of one organization can only be understood in the context of a broader comparative analysis of other organizations within the European security architecture: in this case, NATO, the EU and the OSCE.

Hence, the aim of this project is to explain how and why the institutional design of European security organizations has changed over time by analysing paths of change of the European security organizations individually, and in comparison to one another, based on a combined theoretical research framework. It is argued that the phenomenon of change in the selected security organizations cannot be understood without devoting due attention to the setting, and to comparison between security organizations in which the phenomenon is observed. Therefore, to identify the actors and mechanisms at play, the method of structured, focused comparison is applied here. The systematic reconstruction, analysis and comparison of the paths of change of the selected security organizations allows for sound, reliable and valid judgement with respect to whether or not the assumptions made are convincing.

1.3 Research Questions

Despite the range of research that has been done so far on the process of change of both NATO and the EU, and to a lesser extent the OSCE, our theoretical understanding of what drives these changes and what the mechanisms are that account for these changes, both individually and in comparison to each other, remains limited. Therefore, this research project focuses on the paths of change from the end of the Cold War, 1990, to 2016. The aim is to explain the observed variation within and between the selected security organizations over time. As such, the dynamics and events described above lead to the overarching research question: How and why have the European security organizations, namely the EU, the OSCE and NATO, changed in terms of broadening, widening and deepening individually and in comparison to one another as part of the European security architecture between 1990 and 2016?

The research question reflects the theoretical assumption of new institutionalism, as the analytical approach of new institutionalism to stability and change over time has always included formal rules and the institutional structure. This has been at the heart of the institutionalist debate. Furthermore, new institutionalism relies on many theoretical lenses that illuminate the ongoing debate around cooperation and conflict, and chaos and structure of the paths of change of organizations. This research project combines three theoretical lenses within new institutionalism; rational choice, historical institutionalism and constructivist institutionalism. These lenses combined are best equipped to account for the palette of different actors and mechanisms at work in the security and defence domain. A combination of these three lenses does not privilege either agent or structure and includes organizations and even the actors within organizations as autonomous actors, driving change in the national and international contexts.

Finally, as mentioned above, change is defined here in terms of paths that lead to broadening, widening and deepening. These paths of change will be analysed separately and comparatively in the context of the three security organizations, as it is assumed in this research that change in one organization can only be understood in the context of a comparative analysis of other organizations in the European security architecture, given that change yields different results in different contexts, and that there is significant overlap between the organizations in terms of tasks and members. For the purposes of this analysis, this comparative approach will be two pronged. The first analysis is a cross-case comparison, looking at the three security organizations within a singular path, either broadening, widening or deepening. The second involves a cross-path comparison between the three paths of change and the possibility of their being interrelated. As such, the main research question will be divided and will be addressed by answering the following sub-questions for each path of change within NATO, the EU and the OSCE individually and among the three organizations as a group: 1) At what level are the observed paths of change? What form do these paths take? 2) What concrete effects of the paths of change can be discerned? 3) What are the similarities and differences in and between the paths of change among the security organizations? 4) How can variation in the paths of change of the European security organizations be explained? These sub-questions will be answered in succession in Chapters 4 to 7, for each of the following paths of change, broadening (Chapter 4), Widening (Chapter 5), deepening (Chapter 6) and cross-path comparison (Chapter 7).

1.4 Research Strategy

The research questions presented above reflect the theoretical assumptions of institutionalism, as it pertains to political science. Institutionalism emphasises the role of (international) organizations and is characterised by the analysis of the 'world of institutions'. Peters goes so far as to claim that the roots of political science lie in the study of institutions.⁵² Institutionalism can be divided into old and new institutionalism. New institutionalism emerged in the 1980s with March and Olsen's seminal article.⁵³

Within political science, organizational change has been analysed and debated from different perspectives, varying from new institutionalism to integration theory and, a fairly new approach, inter-organizationalism.⁵⁴ Some of these debates are situated in the traditional levels of analysis, ranging from the state level to the international level; however, there are alternative approaches to the more state and structure-centric approaches stemming from realism and liberalism that can be categorised as being offshoots of constructivism.

The ongoing debate with regard to the survival of Cold War organizations, like the OSCE and NATO, after the end of the Cold War has dominated liberal and realist approaches to international relations for decades. For example, on the one hand, the realist understanding has been that NATO was in decline but enjoyed a renaissance after the Crimea crisis of 2014. On the other hand, those with a more liberal approach have argued that NATO has survived even after its *raison d'être* disappeared because NATO changed from an alliance into a security management institution, a different type of organization than one focused purely on collective defence, as claimed by Haftendorn, Keohane and Wallander.⁵⁵ Another explanation of the continued survival of organizations that have outlived their original purpose is that maintaining existing organizations is less costly than creating new ones and it is too expensive to disband them;⁵⁶ thus they persist in spite of a changed security environment.⁵⁷ This draws attention to drivers of observed paths of change that extend beyond function and form. Furthermore, the theory of (complex) interdependence put forward by Keohane and Nye has presented a challenge to more realist approaches to international relations, stating that, as a result of modernization, the degree and scope of interdependence and transnational linkages between states has increased, making military conflicts between these states less likely. Keohane and Nye argue that, as a result of this, control over these linkages and power have become more important and other important actors have emerged alongside states, including organizations and their

52 Peters, B. G., 'Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism', The Continuum International Publishing Group, New York, 2012, p. 1.

53 March, J. G., Olsen, J. P., 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life', The American Political Science Review, Vol. 78, Nr. 3, 1984.

54 Inter-organizationalism studies the relationship between international organizations and will be elaborated upon in Chapter 2.

55 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., 'Imperfect Unions, Security Institutions over Time and Space', Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 22.

56 Stated by historical institutionalism.

57 Peters, B. G., 'Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism', The Continuum International Publishing Group, New York, 2012, p. 77-82.

organs.⁵⁸ Constructivist approaches also acknowledge the increasingly important role of actors other than states as drivers of change in the international arena.⁵⁹

This research adopts new institutionalism as its theoretical lens and uses it to guide its overall approach to the analysis. The greater theory has developed into several approaches varying from historical institutionalism, which accounts for the most extensive body of empirical work within new institutionalism, to rational choice institutionalism and constructivism. New institutionalism can be considered a ‘...broad, if variegated, approach to politics...’ where ‘...institutions are the variable that explain most of political life, and they are also the factors that require explanation’.⁶⁰

In part as a result of an increase in the sheer number of international organizations, research on the international organizations as autonomous actors has been at the heart of the institutionalist debate.⁶¹ According to Djelic, institutionalism is not only about national institutions, but also concerns the international and inter-organizational levels.⁶² In light of this, ‘the dominance of a single model’ for one organization is no longer sufficient. Instead, a ‘multilevel and multilayered historical process’ is at play, characterized by ‘competing and conflicting actors involved in negotiating and the emergence of novel forms’.⁶³

The analytical approach of new institutionalism has always been stability, crisis and chaos and included rules and institutionalisation. This research project focuses on formal institutions or explicit agreements that specify the rights and obligations of governments and other actors.⁶⁴ The formal institutions that are analysed in this research project include the institutional setup of the European security architecture. For the purposes of this analysis, institutional setup and functioning is seen as more than a still photo taken at a specific moment in time. If we were to analyse an institutional setup as we would a photograph, there would be significant incongruity between the image as it appears and the developments taking place and choices being made in the background, or not, remain unseen. Organizations are more than just a simple projection of a rule-based order or rationally made choices. They are shaped by drivers and their interests. Indeed, organizations are both the result of power struggles and varied interests and are themselves involved in struggles for influence and power. As Keohane states, ‘...institutions do not merely reflect the preferences and power of the units constituting them; the institutions themselves shape those preferences and that power. Institutions are therefore constitutive

58 Keohane, R. O., Nye, J.S., ‘Power and Interdependence’, Longman 2001.

59 Barnett, M., Finnemore, M., ‘The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations’, *International Organization* Vol. 53, No. 4, 1999.

60 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, New York, 2012, p. 150.

61 Barnett, M. N., Finnemore, M., ‘Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics’, Cornell University Press, 2004, p. 6.

62 Scott, W. R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage Publications, 2012, p. 130.

63 Ibid, p. 131.

64 The definition of institutions ranging from formal to informal will be elaborated upon in Chapter 2.

of actors as well as vice versa'.⁶⁵ And in that struggle, international organizations are no different than national organizations. Organizations have power in the sense that they possess, to a greater or lesser degree, resources and capabilities and are more or less institutionalised and subject to related rules. They seek authorisation and legitimisation and, at the same time, aim to control and constrain behaviour and simultaneously support and empower activities and actors. Organizations are made up of people, groups, states and other actors and it is their interaction that influences or is influenced by the shape of the institutions under study. In other words, organizations create scope and structure, but they concurrently support and empower the scope of the different actors involved. The function of organizations is to provide stability and order, but they are simultaneously subject to processes of change, which is the phenomenon of interest here.

Hence, the ways in which various organizations are created and change, the way they may differ or come to resemble each other, extends far beyond the explanation a static picture could provide. The structures and functions of an organization speak volumes; they reveal the different drivers at work. Moreover, they influence and constitute these drivers, as well. The question is: which phenomenon is at play when we analyse their paths of change? Which is explained differently by various scholars in the new institutionalist literature.

The focus of the research presented here is the analysis of paths of change of security organizations in which the selected organizations are the main units of analysis. The various approaches within new institutionalism provide guidance and enable the analysis of change in organizations by linking past and present developments and treating various agents and structures as possible drivers of change. These new institutionalist approaches each put forward specific assumptions pertaining to the analysis of organizations; still, it is the 'world of institutions' that is the mantra that links these different approaches. All three perspectives focus on institutional and political structures that are of importance in analysing change in organizations and the possible outcomes of this change. As such, the analytical focus here is on organizations as the central components of the 'world of politics'. As Peters claims, '...the basic argument is that institutions do matter, and that they matter more than anything else that could be used to explain political decisions'.⁶⁶ The research presented here is based on that literature and derives its main concepts from a combination of different approaches within institutionalism. The choice was made to address rational choice, historical institutionalism and constructivist institutionalism, three of the mainstream approaches of new institutionalism to explain organizational change. As was mentioned earlier, these theoretical lenses illuminate the ongoing debate on cooperation and conflict, chaos and structure and the relative importance of different actors and mechanisms, including actors within organizations, in the context of driving change in national and international environments.

65 Keohane, R. O., 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', *International Studies Quarterly*, 32 (4), December 1988.

66 Peters, B. G., 'Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism', The Continuum International Publishing Group, New York, 2012, p. 184.

The intention is not to 'test' whether or not rational choice theory explains change in security organizations better than historical institutionalism, for instance. The intention is to combine the different aspects of these approaches to deal with the emergence of a complex institutional architecture in the security environment in which organizations broadened, widened and deepened in terms of activities, structure, membership and partnerships. With this in mind, the objective is to engage in academic bridge-building between opposing approaches by building a theoretical framework made up of different theoretical frameworks. Inspired by Streeck and Thelen, among others, the assumption here is that a combined analysis of organizational change is necessary.⁶⁷ This need for a combination of approaches was already identified by Roth in 1987, '...the several approaches should be viewed more as complementary rather than competitive explanations for political phenomena'.⁶⁸ Furthermore, Peters stated that '...none of these approaches can fully explain all political actions, and perhaps none should attempt to do so'.⁶⁹ Lowndes even explains that the strength of new institutionalism lies within its multi-theoretic character.⁷⁰ Hence, the different approaches within new institutionalism can be viewed as being more complementary than competitive.⁷¹ Relying on a combination of different lenses for the purposes of this analysis of change allows for a more complete understanding of the characteristics of different actors and interaction between these actors, and observed mechanisms than could be achieved by adhering to a strict division between the different lenses. Theoretical pluralism can strengthen new institutionalism, as each lens can benefit from interaction with another approach; each approach has something unique to offer in the analysis of paths of change of the selected security organizations.

In conclusion, the focus of this research project is change in the context of the European security architecture and the analysis presented here is guided by different approaches in an effort to capture the effects of various drivers and both the intended and unintended consequences of actions. This strategy extends beyond the general approach, which tends to focus on individual (security) organizations, using a single theoretical approach. With this multi-perspective strategy, the aim is to fill gaps in our understanding of organizational change. This will be elaborated upon in Chapter 2.

The research strategy comprises a multiple case study of three international security organizations. The analysis encapsulates the key or critical moments of change, which are listed in the corresponding treaties, strategies, operational texts, and political declarations and agreements.



67 Streeck, W., Thelen, K., 'Beyond Continuity. Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies', Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 3.

68 Roth, P. A., 'Meaning and Method in the Social Sciences: A Case for Methodological Pluralism', Cornell University Press, New York, 1989, p. 125.

69 Peters, B. G., 'Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism', The Continuum International Publishing Group, New York, 2012, p. 2.

70 Lowndes, V., 'Institutionalism', in: Marsh, D., Stoker, G., 'Theory and Methods in Political Science', Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 108.

71 In Chapter 2 an elaboration will be given on the complementary aspects of the different approaches within new institutionalism.

The thesis will proceed with an overview of research on international (security) cooperation and organizations in relation to the concept of change. This is followed by a selection of the major concepts and processes of change in security organizations, the research subject, that will be described, analysed and explained. To this end, the following topics will be discussed: international cooperation and organization, international security cooperation and, finally, international security organization.

Subsequently, on the basis of this overview of concepts, a conceptual and analytical framework will be distilled that will guide, order and structure the description and explanation. The independent variables selected allow for explanation of the variation in paths of change, defined here in terms of deepening, broadening and widening. This framework highlights the major drivers that produce variation in the institutional design precipitated by different actors and events emerging from/taking place within and outside the security organizations.

The paths of broadening, widening and deepening that encapsulate the major processes of change observed will be analysed comparatively among three interrelated security organizations (the selected cases). While the security organizations that have been selected differ to a certain extent, they share similarities and overlap in activities and membership, and act in the same security environment. As such, an analysis of change that is fundamentally comparative allows for the identification of patterns of convergence and divergence among the selected security organizations. This will be elaborated upon in Chapter 3. As discussed previously, change in one organization can only be understood in the context of a comparative analysis of organizations in the European security architecture, namely NATO, the EU and the OSCE. The comparative angle will be approached from two sides. The analysis will include a cross-case comparison, comparing the paths of change of the three, selected security organizations within a singular path either broadening, widening or deepening (i.e. Chapters 4, 5 and 6). The second comparison includes a cross-path comparison of the key findings related to the three paths of change and their (potentially mutually-reinforcing) relationship (i.e. Chapter 7).

1.5 Research Objectives and Relevance

Objectives

The objectives of this project are both theoretical and empirical. The research presented here deals with change in European security organizations acting in a complex environment, both at the level of the individual organization and in comparison to other organizations based on a multi-perspective analytical framework. The aim in choosing indicators of change, level and form respectively, is to provide an overview, based on key moments, with which to analyse change. The aforementioned analysis entails a particular focus on systematic comparison of the development of these security organizations and, thus, asks the how, when and why questions related to their paths of change. The purpose of this combined research framework is fourfold.

First, the framework allows for the analysis of the chosen paths of change of European security organizations (broadening, widening and deepening), comparison of these paths individually and in relation to one another and for the analysis of possible interlinkages between these paths. This comparative aspect is what serves to address the gap in the literature, as will be described in the research overview in Chapter 2, which deals with the analysis of international organizations in general and security organizations in the European security architecture in particular.

A second purpose is to make a contribution to the institutionalism literature by presenting a theory-driven research framework based on a combination of theories within new institutionalism that can explain change elicited by multiple drivers, e.g. state and non-state actors and mechanism-focused drivers. Some scholars have already suggested the need for a compilation of different approaches as opposed to the rigid, sometimes artificial, boundary that is set between more realist and liberal approaches to institutionalism. Because the European institutional security architecture is so complex and involves both state and non-state actors, a framework is needed that can account for a multiplicity of agents and structures that drive paths of change of international security organizations.

Third, the framework allows for the observation of the complete empirical lifecycle – creation, change and possible emergence of counter-movements or even demise – of the selected European security organizations; it allows us to look more closely at their existence, development, survival and the design of the European security architecture.

The fourth and final purpose is to assess whether or not the use of this combined research framework to analyse paths of change of security organizations is justified and fruitful in terms of building institutional theory.

In conclusion, the following main assumptions which will guide the data gathering and analysis of the paths of change of the selected security organizations are presented below:

1. The path of change of one organization can only be understood in the context of a broader comparative analysis of other organizations within the European security architecture, as it is assumed that they are positively as well as negatively linked.
2. Non-state actors, such as international security organizations, are not 'empty shells', but regarded as actors in their own right as they own capacities and power to influence paths of change in their struggle for legitimacy and survival.
3. The dynamics driving change involve state and non-state actors, which necessitates a combined research framework to account for the palette of different actors and mechanisms at work in the security and defence domain.

A final remark entails the remark that attention has to be paid to some of the limitations of the research framework. This analysis is not focused on the study of (security) policy issues and events within the setting of international cooperation. It is focused on the how and why questions related to the paths of change of security organizations, distilled

from the key moments of change, and to explain variation between the paths of highly institutionalised organizations that act in the same environment and bear similarities and differences in terms of their development.

Relevance

By addressing and answering the research questions, the aim of this analysis is to make a theoretical and empirical contribution to the academic debate on security organizations in general and the selected organizations within the security architecture of Europe, NATO, the EU and the OSCE. European and transatlantic security organizations and the inter-organizational webs that have emerged between them have experienced important changes and have had to deal with the accompanying challenges over the past three decades. In answering the research question as to how and why security organizations have changed over time and in conducting an analysis of the European security architecture more generally, this thesis covers important ground in the field of European security and organizational security studies.

Policy Relevance

The focus of this research project is the European security architecture, though the term 'European' is becoming less and less specific as the Netherlands and other European states increasingly have to deal with an elaborate web of global institutionalized cooperation.⁷² Within this wider security architecture, NATO, the EU and to a lesser extent the OSCE, are the most important security organizations in terms of foreign, security and defence policy in Europe and the Netherlands. In most European states, NATO is still seen as a successful and important alliance and the EU's CSDP is becoming more important in the Dutch context. And while the OSCE has seemingly declined in importance, its continued relevance was proven in the aftermath of the MH17 crash⁷³ and the prospect of there being an alternative for non-NATO and EU members is unlikely in the near future.⁷⁴ The development of these organizations has taken place alongside a virtually continuous process of internal change, crises and the emergence of new external threats and other actors. This is highly relevant in light of current uncertainties at the national, regional and international levels. Hopefully, the findings of this research can help policy-makers create tools for assessing, and maybe even predicting, major turning points and drivers of change that can have significant consequences in terms of the design and adaptation of organizations.

Furthermore, the proposed research is relevant to the European and Dutch armed forces, as these armed forces are engaged in the conduct of civilian and military missions



72 'Veiligheid in een wereld van verbindingen. Een strategische visie op het defensiebeleid', WRR rapport, Den Haag, 2017, hoofdstuk; 'Strategische Monitor 2017/2018', HCSS/Clingendael.

73 The MH17 crash in Ukraine on the 17th of July 2014. Already on the 18th of July the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission pre-positioned in Donetsk and the OSCE remained involved as a mediator between the different parties.

74 'Wereldwijd voor een veilig Nederland - Geïntegreerde Buitenland- en Veiligheidsstrategie, 2018-2022', Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 20 maart 2018.

and operations, under the auspices of NATO, the EU and/or coalitions of willing and able executed under NATO or EU flag.

Academic Relevance

The aim of this research project is to create and use a combined research framework based on different institutionalist approaches to analyse paths of change of the selected security organizations, both at the individual (organizational) level and comparatively. The reasoning behind this is that a combination of theories is best suited to solve the research puzzle and identify factors that cause or contribute to change. Change in the specific security organizations, especially when it comes to NATO and even more so the OSCE, at the individual level and at the inter-organizational level, and the related interaction between organizations remain under-theorised, as will be argued in Chapter 2. Furthermore, exogenous shocks like wars or crises, identified by some as the primary causes of change, are combined in a complex institutional security environment. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, in this environment, the distinction between what constitutes internal versus external security is somewhat blurry. This combined with the involvement of both state and non-state actors and the increasingly complex institutional design of organizations demands a framework for analysis that can cope with a variety of agents and structures that may drive change. As such, paths of change are analysed using a comparative method, cross-case and cross-path, to account for the fact that these organizations interact with one another. By accommodating the inclusion in the analysis of an array of different drivers (actors, structures and mechanisms that cause change), the black box between the different approaches of institutionalism will be opened and explored.

This analysis will contribute to the institutionalist literature in several ways. First of all, the findings presented here will increase our understanding of paths of change of security organizations within the European security architecture by analysing empirical data in the context of a research framework drawn from different approaches within institutionalism. Second, this research contributes to the development of different approaches within institutionalism by identifying complementary arguments and including agents (including non-state actors; agency is not seen as being limited to states), structures and mechanism as causes of change. Third, by using an institutionalist lens, this research extends beyond state-centric approaches to the analysis of paths of change in the area of international security cooperation. Finally, this research contributes to theories of institutional change and adaptation and approaches to the study of change specifically by developing a combined research framework with which to analyse change in different (security) organizations operating in the same policy and operational field.

An additional aim of this research project is to assess what the empirical cases of the paths of change of the EU, NATO and the OSCE can tell us about paths of change of international (security) organizations more generally. In being widely generalizable, these findings of this study make a theoretical contribution to challenging traditional conceptualizations of security organizations, based on collective defence and collective security.

Methodological Relevance

In addition to its policy and academic relevance, there are novel aspects of this study's methodological approach to analysing change in security organizations.

First, this study relies on a combined theoretical research framework, described above, based on the synthesis of three approaches to institutionalism in one framework. This framework is applied to three cases, individually and in comparison to one another, cross-case and cross-path. The benefit of comparative research is that it allows for the identification of patterns of convergence and divergence between security organizations that act in a shared security environment with overlapping (and divergent) activities, membership and partnerships and paths of institutionalization.

Second, the results of change are described, analysed and explained, after which the possible drivers are analysed. These findings are structured along the lines of the theory-based assumptions and are analysed using the method of structured focused comparison and process tracing. The method of structured focused comparison was selected as it is well-suited to research that involves comparative case studies analysed over time (sequences), as opposed to a single moment in time.

Finally, as was mentioned previously, this study is not intended to be a 'test' of whether or not rational choice theory explains change in security organizations better than, for instance, historical institutionalism. The intention is to combine the different, but complementary aspects of the approaches within new institutionalism.

1.6 Research Outline

The first step toward answering the research question is the presentation of the theoretical state of research on change in (security) organizations and different forms of security cooperation. For the analysis of paths of change of security organizations, the choice was made to rely mainly on institutionalist approaches. On the basis of these approaches, a theoretical framework has been designed to study change in the selected security organizations by way of paths leading to the deepening, broadening and widening of the institutional design of security organizations. This will be presented in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, the methodology will be discussed in further detail. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 will present the case material organized according to the paths of change operationalized as broadening, widening and deepening, concluding with a cross-case comparison within each path of change using process tracing. Additionally, in Chapter 7, the findings of a cross-path comparison of the security organizations will be presented. Finally, in Chapter 8, the theoretical explanations will be addressed, structured along the lines of the assumptions drawn from the theoretical framework that has guided this analysis. The research questions will also be answered, and the theoretical and policy implications of the study will be outlined.

Chapter 2

Chapter 2. Change in Security Organizations: The Research Framework

2.1 Introduction

‘A state of Peace among men who live side by side with each other, is not the natural state. The state of Nature is rather a state of War; for although it may not always present the outbreak of hostilities, it is nevertheless continually threatened with them. The state of Peace must, therefore, be established; for the mere cessation of hostilities furnishes no security against their recurrence, and where there is no guarantee of peace between neighboring States—which can only be furnished under conditions that are regulated by Law—the one may treat the other, when proclamation is made to that effect, as an enemy’.¹

As the aim of this research is to analyse and explain observed changes in European security organizations, the units of analysis, this chapter addresses how, why and by who or what these changes can be explained by the theoretical approach of new institutionalism within the field of political science. First, in section two, an overview of prior research on the security organizations that make up the European security architecture will be presented. Second, in section three, the relevant concepts will be addressed. These are, international security cooperation and organizations, respectively, and their paths of change, the main concept. Third, in section four, the debates on and development of new institutionalism, the theoretical lens that will be used to analyse the observations within the European security architecture, will be addressed. The focus is on three approaches within institutionalism, which all provide explanations of change. This part is a journey through the world of institutionalism that details the different approaches within institutionalism, specifically rational choice, historical institutionalism and constructivist institutionalism, as they all provide different lenses with which to explore paths and drivers of change. The overview of these approaches will be concluded with a discussion of the differences between these approaches and potential complementarity.

Finally, in section five, the research framework will be presented, which builds on and combines the theoretical lenses that will guide the empirical analysis and explanation.

2.2 Research on Change in European Security Organizations

2.2.1 Introduction

The growth of the complex international security environment, with multiple state and non-state actors and increasing international cooperation after the end of the Cold

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1 Kant, I., ‘Perpetual Peace’, Cosimo Classics, September 2010.

War, has led to an intensification of empirical and theoretical research on international organizations and their interaction. Many debates followed about the definition of international organizations and their possible actorness swinging between the realist, institutionalists and constructivist camps and everything in between.² Exemplified by Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner³, Ruggie⁴ and Duffield's seminal article on the necessity of defining international institutions.⁵ And the reaction from the realist 'camp' envisaged by Mearsheimer's unmistakable article 'The False Promise of International Institutions'.⁶ A brief overview of the major research on European security organizations follows below.

2.2.2 Research on Security Cooperation

In general, international security cooperation and security organizations have been subject to a fair amount of academic scrutiny. Moreover, compared to other security organizations, European security organizations and the interaction between these organizations have been well researched.⁷ The EU's foreign, security and defence policy, NATO's tasks after the end of the Cold War and EU-NATO cooperation have appeared prominently in the academic debate. Koops goes so far as to say that with regard to the EU, '...there are more academics than practitioners working on...security policy'.⁸

The research on European security organizations varies in its focus from general issues, like the existence and nature of security organizations, to descriptive analyses of policy initiatives, and single case studies of the institutional development, enlargement process, or the evaluation of civilian missions and military operations under the auspices of the EU's CFSP and E/CSDP and NATO. Furthermore, formal-legal aspects of international cooperation are addressed in the literature at length.⁹

In addition to issue-related research, many studies analyse different organizations separately using one theoretical framework.¹⁰ Examples include the extensive research

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- 2 For an overview, see: Fioretos, O. (eds.), 'International Politics and Institutions in Time', Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 2017, Chapter 1.
- 3 Katzenstein, P. J., Keohane, R. O., Krasner, S. D., 'International Organization and the Study of World Politics', *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4, 1998.
- 4 Ruggie, J. G., 'Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution', *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 3, Summer 1992, p. 561.
- 5 Duffield, J., 'What are international institutions?', *International Studies Review*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2007.
- 6 Mearsheimer, J. J., 'The False Promise of International Institutions', *International Security*, Vol.19, No. 3, Winter 1994/5.
- 7 Biermann, R., 'Towards a Theory of Inter-organizational Networking. The Euro-Atlantic Security Institutions Interacting', *The Review of International Organizations*, June 2008, Volume 3, Issue 2, June 2008, p. 151.
- 8 Koops, J. A., 'The European Union as an Integrative Power? Assessing the EU's 'Effective Multilateralism' towards NATO and the United Nations', Brussels University Press, Brussels, 2011, p. 88-89.
- 9 For an elaboration on legal aspects of NATO-EU cooperation, see: Reichard, M., 'The EU-NATO Relationship', 2006; Wessel, R. A., Wouters, J., 'Multilevel Regulation and the EU: the Interplay between Global, European, and National Normative Processes', 2008; Wessel, R., 'The Legal Framework for the Participation of the European Union in International Institutions', *Journal of European Integration*, 2011.
- 10 Rittberger, V., Zangl, B., 'International Organisation. Polity, Politics and Policies', Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006.

conducted by Kirchner and Dominguez¹¹ and the Barnett and Finnemore's research¹² that analyses organizations and their behaviour, viewing organizations as bureaucracies and their related behaviour or the research of Mahoney and Thelen conceptualizing change of institutions.¹³

2.2.3 Research on Security Organizations

As the research on EU's security and defence policy has been extensive, below a brief overview divided between the more realist, liberal and constructivist perspectives.¹⁴

First, EU's development as a security actor and the concept of European security¹⁵ has been contested by the more realist state centric academics claiming the denial of the EU as an effective global power. It was stated that the increase of EU's security and defence policy became possible because of US hegemony in the European security arena.¹⁶ Or driven by the 'big three' of Europe. In other words, the increase of EU's security and defence policy was the result of state power and thus will always remain intergovernmental.¹⁷ Another explanation has been the safeguarding of state sovereignty because of the existence of the EU.¹⁸

Second, within the liberal perspectives the construction of the EU, and European security, in general has been one of the most analysed subjects, focussing on the relation between states and the EU, the institutional dynamics, the mandate and specific issues like enlargement.¹⁹

11 Kirchner, E. J., Dominguez, R., 'The Security Governance of regional Organisations', Routledge, 2011.

12 Barnett, M., Finnemore, M., 'Rules for the world. International Organisations in Global Politics', Cornell University Press, 2004.

13 Mahoney, J., Thelen, K., 'Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency and Power', Cambridge University Press, 2009.

14 For an extensive overview, see: Hyde-Price, A., 'Realism: a dissident voice in the study of the CSDP', chapter 2; Jorgensen, K.E., Aarstad, A.K., 'Liberal, constructivist and critical studies of European security', chapter 3, in: Biscop, S., Whitman, R.G., 'The Routledge Handbook on European Security', Routledge Handbooks, 2013.

15 Cooper, R., 'The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century', Atlantic Monthly Press, 1 Jan. 2004.

16 For example: Mearsheimer, J. J., 'The Tragedy of Great Power Politics', W.W. Norton, New York, 2001; Kagan, R., 'Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order', Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2003; Hyde-Price, A., 'European Security in the Twenty-First Century: The Challenge of Multipolarity', Routledge, London, 2007; Rynning, S., 'Realism and the Common Security and Defence policy', Journal of Common Market Studies, 2010.

17 For example: Grieco, J., Powell, R., Snidal, D., 'The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation', The American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (Sep., 1993); Missiroli, A., 'European Security Policy: The Challenge of Coherence', Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev., 6, 2001.

18 Lindley French, J., 'In the shade of Locarno? Why European defence is failing', International Affairs, Volume 78, Issue 4, October 2002; Menon, A., 'From crisis to catharsis: ESDP after Iraq', International Affairs, Volume 80, Issue 4, July 2004.

19 Howorth, J., 'Decision-making in Security and Defence Policy: Towards Supranational Inter-governmentalism?', Cooperation and Conflict, Sage Publications, 2012; Vanhoonaeker, S., Dijkstra, H., Maurer, H., 'Understanding the Role of Bureaucracy in the European Security and Defence Policy: The State of the Art', European Integration online Papers, Vol. 14, 2010; Hofmann, S. C., 'CSDP: approaching transgovernmentalism?', in: Kurowska, X., Breuer, F. (eds.), 'Explaining The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy: Theory in Action', Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012; Menon 2011; Jorgensen, K. E., Aarstad, A. K., 'Liberal, constructivist and Critical Studies' of European security', in: Biscop, S., Whitman R. (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of European Security, Oxon: Routledge, 2012.

Finally, constructivist academics focussed on identity perspectives, emphasized EU's strategic culture²⁰ and stated the acceptance of the EU as an autonomous normative power.²¹

In general, it can be concluded that all theoretical approaches of political science are represented in the academic debate about the development of EU's security and defence policy, except for the integration theory of neo-functionalism and its logic of spill-over.²²

Likewise, NATO's political, institutional and military transformation from the end of the Cold War has been debated extensively²³ and many times NATO's *raison d'être* was questioned.²⁴

On the one hand, it was argued that theorizing the path of change of NATO has been poorly developed. For instance, '...most early work on the 'renaissance' of NATO focused on the potential consequences of NATO enlargement, crisis management and out of area operations. Relatively few studies have asked 'why' questions concerning the cause of these important changes'.²⁵ NATO, in contrast to organizations like the EU and the UN, has prompted only limited theoretical consideration. On the other hand, this was contested, for example by Webber who contradicted this supposedly undertheorized NATO's path of change.²⁶

Like the EU, the academic debate on NATO can be divided between realist²⁷, liberal²⁸ and constructivist perspectives.²⁹ Webber even plead for a necessity of theoretical pluralism

20 Meyer, C. O., 'Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms', *European Journal of International relations*, December 1, 2005.

21 Manners, I., 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', *Journal of Market studies*, 16 December 2002; Manners, I., 'Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: beyond the Crossroads', *Journal Of European Public Policy*, volume 13, 2006; Sijrsen, H. (ed.), 'Special issue: What Kind of Power? European Foreign Policy in Perspective', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 18 (8), 2006; Whitman, R. (ed.), *Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011.

22 Keukeleire, S., Delreux, T., 'The Foreign Policy of the European Union', *The European Union Series*, 2nd edition, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 2014, p. 326.

23 For example: Duffield, J., 'NATO's Functions after the Cold War', *Political Science Quarterly* 109, 1994-1995, p. 763-787; McCalla, R., 'NATO's Persistence after the Cold War', *International Organization* 50, Summer 1996, p. 445-475; Wijk, R., 'NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium. The Battle for Consensus', Brassey's, London, 1997; Wallander, C. A., 'Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War', *International Organization* 54, Autumn 2000; Kaplan, L., *NATO divided, NATO United*, Praeger, 2004.

24 For an overview of the NATO 'in-crisis-literature', see: Thies, W. J., 'Why NATO Endures', Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009, p. 3-14.

25 Barany, Z., Rauchhaus, R., 'Explaining NATO's resilience: Is International Relations Theory Useful?', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. me 32, Issue 2, 2011, p. 287.

26 For an extensive overview on theorizing NATO: Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., 'NATO's Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?', Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 32-46.

27 For example: Waltz, K., 'Structural Realism after the Cold War', *International Security*, Vol. 25(1), 2000; Kagan, R., 'Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order', Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2003; Rupp, R., *NATO after 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006.

28 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., 'Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions Over Time and Space', Oxford University Press, 1999; Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., 'The Rationale Design of International Institutions', *International Organization*, Volume 55, Issue 04, September 2001.

29 For example: Moore, R., 'NATO's Mission for the New Millennium: A Value-based-approach to Building Security', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 32 (1), 2002; Schimmelfennig, F., 'Functional Form, Identity-driven Cooperation: Institutional designs and effects in Post-Cold War NATO', in: Acharya, A., Johnston, A. I. (eds.), 'Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective', Cambridge, University Press, 2007; Risse-Kappen, T., 'Collective identity in a Democratic Community: The case of NATO', in: Katzenstein (ed.), 'The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics', New York: Columbia University Press, 1996; Sijrsen, H., 'On the Identity of NATO', *International Affairs*, Vol. 80 (4), 2004.

as NATO acts in a constant changing complex and uncertain world, which resulted in different roles.³⁰

Altogether, NATO has been viewed variously as an alliance that ‘balances’ a known source of power or threat; a ‘community organisation’ owing to the democratic identity of its members; or a special kind of alliance which has been subject to analysis that focuses on intra-alliance management (the problem of ‘free-riding’ and the alliance security dilemma of abandonment versus entrapment); and as an ‘international institution’ whose ‘portable assets’ have ensured its ongoing attractiveness to its members.³¹

Finally, only a handful of scholars analysed the path of change of the OSCE organization, theorizing the OSCE even less. Research on the OSCE has always been focused either on the functioning and efficiency of OSCE principles, its mission and its institutions³² or the analysis of the geopolitical balance of power and its implications for the OSCE as a cooperative security organization.³³

However, this literature does not explore the drivers and dynamics that underlie change in a truly comparative manner, based on a single set of indicators, which is the aim of this research. There is a lack of systematic analysis of how, when and why these security organizations have changed compared to one another. This is essential, as the organizations act in a shared environment and often have overlap in activities, functions and membership. In other words, if paths of change of organizations that are closely related to one another are not analysed using a comparative method, potential causes and dynamics of change may be neglected. As Duffield argues in his article on the nature of international organizations ‘...it may be unacknowledged variation in the nature of the institutions themselves rather than other factors that account for the patterns of outcomes that such studies seek to explain’.³⁴ Duffield goes on to say that ‘...the failure to recognise important variations in institutional forms can result in flawed research on the causes and consequences of international institutions, their development in practice and theoretical consequences’.³⁵ This highlights the need for comparative analysis, as argued here.

30 Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., ‘NATO’s Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 31-32.

31 Ibid, p. 22-30.

32 Exemplified by: Kemp, W., ‘OSCE Peace Operations: Soft Security in Hard Environments’, New York: International Peace Institute, June 2016; Hill, W. H., ‘OSCE Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping, Past and Future’, OSCE Security Days Event, National War College Washington DC., 16 September 2013; Lanz, D., ‘Charting the Ups-and-downs of OSCE Mediation’, in Security and Human Rights, Netherlands Helsinki Committee, Volume 27, Nos. 3-4, 2016.

33 Exemplified by: Shakirov, O., ‘NoSCE or Next Generation OSCE?’, Security and Human Rights 27, 2016.

34 Duffield, J., ‘What are international institutions?’, International Studies Review, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2007, p. 2.

35 Ibid, p. 16.

2.2.4 Research on Interaction between Security Organizations

The focus of this research is the analysis of change in security organizations individually and in relation to one another. Below, research on the interaction between security organizations will be analysed.

As a result of the increase in interaction between international organizations over the past several decades, a need has emerged to explore the level and form of the relationship and interaction between security organizations. Research on relations between different security organizations, labelled ‘inter-organizationalism’ and defined by Koops as ‘a process that can include cooperation and interaction, but also rivalry among international-organizations’.³⁶

Research on inter-organizational relations founded its roots during the Cold War by DiMaggio and Powell³⁷ and March and Olsen³⁸, who addressed processes of isomorphism between organizations.³⁹ From there the research further developed. Scott and Meyer criticized the narrow focus of either competitive or cooperative interaction between organizations and argued that capacities and institutional aspects were better able to explain interaction.⁴⁰ Streeck and Thelen argued that analysing institutions requires a relational approach ‘change can only be understood by focusing on the relationships among institutions’ defined as ‘institutional interconnectedness’.⁴¹ As far as the influence that organizations might have towards each other, Kelley argued that institutions do influence one another to an extent where they can modify the organizational structure or even trigger (possibly low intensity) processes of integration and change in the configuration of forces between them and the member states.⁴² Koops claimed that under certain circumstances institutions are even found to shape, sometimes strongly, both policies and policy-making processes even in ways unintended or undesired by member states.⁴³ According to Blavoukos ‘...either the two will become more permeable to one

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- 36 Koops, J. A., ‘The European Union as an Integrative power? Assessing the EU’s ‘Effective multilateralism’ towards NATO and the United Nations’, Brussels University Press, Brussels, 2011, p. 46.
 - 37 DiMaggio, P. J., Powell, W. W., ‘The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields’, *American Sociological Review*, vol 48, 1983.
 - 38 March, J. G., Olsen, J. P., ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life’, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 78, Nr. 3, 1984, p. 57.
 - 39 Institutional isomorphism can be defined as the process of homogenisation whereby organizations in similar environments either tend to resemble one another or to distinguish from one another, leading to cooperative or competitive isomorphism.
 - 40 Scott, W. R., Meyer, J. W., ‘The Organization of Societal Sectors: Propositions and Early Evidence’, in: Powell, W. W., DiMaggio, P. J. (eds.), ‘The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis’, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2012, p. 108-142.
 - 41 Streeck, W., Thelen, K., ‘Beyond Continuity. Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies’, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 15.
 - 42 Kelley, J., ‘International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions’, *International Organization*, Volume 58, Issue 3, July 2004, P. 425-457.
 - 43 Koops, J. A., ‘NATO’s Influence on the Evolution of the European Union as a Security Actor’, in: Costa, O., Jorgensen, K. E., ‘The Influence of International Institutions on the EU. When Multilateralism hits Brussels’, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, 2012, p. 155-185.

another and work in synergy or, in a model similar to ‘organizational Darwinism’.⁴⁴ In both cases international organizations will start to compete for power and conflicts will occur, as described by Biermann, who distinguished three categories of this pattern of inter-organizational cooperation.⁴⁵ Labelled by Brosig as the ‘cooperation or conflict dichotomy’.⁴⁶ Orsini gave several explanations to account for the likeliness of conflict or cooperation to occur between organizations.⁴⁷ In general, these explanations can be divided into relations based on interests; ‘the resource dependence theory’, or on relations based on norms and rules between organizations depending on their compatibility.⁴⁸

Another aspect of the developing theory of inter-organizationalism so far has been the analysis of overlap between organizations which has focused either on institutional mandates⁴⁹, membership⁵⁰ or resources. According to Hofmann, this overlap can be understood along all three dimensions while the degree of institutional overlap may vary along these three dimensions.⁵¹

These past decades, the main focus of inter-organizationalism as an approach has been the relationship between the EU and other organizations, raising the question of whether the EU influences or is being influenced and whether the interrelated organizations act in cooperation or competition with one another. Analysing ‘...the impact of the organizations and who influences who, who benefits, who constitutes and modifies, integration, cross-pillarisation and even change between EU institutions and between organizations were important topics of research’.⁵² On the one hand, this provided insight into the general nature of the relationship between the EU and NATO in terms of prospects for cooperation and competition. On the other hand, there has been surprisingly little focus on the influence that NATO and the OSCE have had on EU’s own evolution and ambition in the area of security and defence,⁵³ let alone on the relation between other international organizations. Furthermore, these works have been largely empirical, descriptive analyses of strategy, political decisions and/or operations of several security organizations,

44 Blavoukos, S., Bourantonis, D., ‘The EU Presence in International Organizations’, London, New York, Routledge, 2011, p. 177.

45 Biermann, R., ‘Towards a Theory of Inter-organizational Networking. The Euro-Atlantic Security Institutions Interacting’, *The Review of International Organizations*, Volume 3, Issue 2, June 2008.

46 Brosig, M., ‘Overlap and Interplay between International Organisations: Theories and Approaches’, *South African Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 18, 2011.

47 Orsini, A. (ed.) ‘The European Union with (in) International Organizations. Commitment, Consistency and Effects across Time’, Routledge, 2014, p. 8.

48 Idem.

49 Raustiala, K., Victor, D. G., ‘The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources’, *International Organization*, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Spring, 2004), p. 279.

50 Alter, K. J., Meunier, S., ‘Nested and Overlapping Regimes in the Transatlantic Banana Trade Dispute’, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Taylor & Francis, 2006.

51 Hofmann, S. C., ‘Why Institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.49, nr.1, 2011, p. 103.

52 Ojanen, H., ‘Inter-organisational relations as a factor shaping the EU’s external identity’, UPI Working Papers, 49, 2004, p. 9.

53 Koops, J. A., ‘The European Union as an Integrative Power? Assessing the EU’s ‘Effective Multilateralism’ towards NATO and the United Nations’, Brussels University Press, Brussels, 2011, p. 88.

exemplified by Moller's research. Moller has, himself, argued that '...the topic is rather an international organization (in the singular) and very little is published about organizations (plural), which are at most included as case studies for more general and abstract theories about multilateralism, regimes and alike'.⁵⁴ Additionally, inter-organizationalism has, thus far, rarely compared the institutional development of one organization to another on the basis of similar indicators.

The question could be raised as to what the theoretical basis is for the analysis of inter-organizational relations or so called inter-organizationalism; is it a phenomenon or a theory? Although, the research about the relations between international organizations, especially in the security domain, has been high on the academic research list, defining and theorizing this so-called inter-organizationalism is still lacking a theoretical and methodological framework.⁵⁵ Approaches on the interaction between organizations originate from different concepts, like regime complexity, institutional interaction, networking and overlap concepts. According to Koops, there is a need for a more comprehensive analysis of policy and theory-oriented research.⁵⁶ Ojanen argues that despite the growing number of insightful empirical case studies and the practical and empirical relevance of inter-organizationalism, '...there is still a considerable lack of systematic theoretical approaches and conceptual tools for analysing core features, main dynamics and key recurrent variables to the convergence of, as well as the cooperation and competition between international organizations'.⁵⁷ The extensive work on inter-organisational relations done by Biermann and Koops, in particular, has revealed an increase in '...empirical and policy-oriented interest, but relatively speaking a lack of a systematic investigation of conceptual and theoretical analysis'.⁵⁸ However, the relations between international organizations is still a young field of research, '...with many loose ends, haphazard imports from neighbouring disciplines to the field of International Relations (IR) and without the theoretical core which other IO research programs do have'.⁵⁹ In other words, theorizing systematically about evolution and causes of the observed results is complicated when trying to analyse and explain change. Hence, according to Biermann the analysis of paths of change of the security organizations, it's

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54 Moller, B., 'European Security. The roles of Regional Security Organisations', Ashgate, 2012, p. 43.

55 Biermann, R., Koops, J. A., 'Conclusion', in: Biermann, R., Koops, J. A., 'The Palgrave Handbook of Inter-organisational Relations in World Politics', Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

56 Koops, J. A., 'The European Union as an Integrative Power? Assessing the EU's 'Effective Multilateralism' towards NATO and the United Nations', Brussels University Press, Brussels, 2011, p. 439.

57 Ojanen, H., 'Inter-organizational Relations as a Factor shaping the EU's external identity', UPI Working Papers, 49, 2004, p. 3.

58 Biermann, R., Koops, J. A., 'Studying Relations Among International Organisations in World Politics: Core Concepts and Challenges', in: Biermann, R., Koops, J. A., 'The Palgrave Handbook of Inter-organisational Relations in World Politics', Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p. 2.

59 Biermann, R., Koops, J. A., 'Conclusion', in: Biermann, R., Koops, J. A., 'The Palgrave Handbook of Inter-organisational Relations in World Politics', Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p. 678.

changing nature and the detection of the causal mechanism of evolution should have a strong emphasis in future analysis; ‘decomposition is a key to reduce complexity’.⁶⁰

Hence, paths of change of organizations, their causes and consequences and how they relate to one another, have been under-researched thus far. Analyses that have been conducted tend to draw on what we know about national organizations and apply this to international organizations instead of engaging in systematic analysis at the international level. According to Biermann, analysis of the development of security organizations, how they change and what causes this change should be a focus of future research.⁶¹ Biermann also argues that dyadic analysis is essential to exploring interaction between security organizations, especially in relation to less-studied dyads like the UN and the OSCE, and the OSCE and the Council of Europe (COE). Though demanding, an additional, but essential, component of this research, according to Biermann, is the study of triads like that between the EU, WEU and NATO. This research has added value, particularly when it is conducted comparatively, as Yost’s research has shown.⁶²

2.2.5 Conclusion

Existing research on the individual paths of change of the security organizations and their interaction presents considerable flaws. The literature review presented above demonstrated that research is generally of a descriptive nature and is still focused on individual organizations and their specific relations with other security organizations. In contrast, there is a need for a comparative analysis of the paths of change of security organizations based on a systematic indicator-based analysis and explicit theoretical perspectives between two or more security organizations. By this effort, the aim is to address the observed flaws in the prevailing literature. Therefore, this research will combine different sub-approaches of new institutionalism into one research framework and analyse paths of change of security organizations in a comparative manner. This enables the analysis of the paths of change of the selected security organizations both individually and in comparison with each other and helps to address how and why change takes place. Research on the phenomenon of change and the research framework will be presented below.

2.3 Conceptualising Security Organizations

2.3.1 Introduction

International security cooperation comes in many different forms and varies in levels. In this section, the key concepts relevant to the analysis of paths of change will be discussed. Next, the theoretical approaches needed to analyse the varied cooperation schemes of security organizations and the deductively developed research framework for the analysis of change in security organizations will be presented. First, however, an

60 Biermann, R., ‘Towards a Theory of Inter-organizational Networking. The Euro-Atlantic Security Institutions Interacting’, *The Review of International Organizations*, Volume 3, Issue 2, June 2008, p. 1.

61 Ibid, p. 174.

62 Yost, D. S., ‘NATO and International Organisations’, *Forum Paper Series*, NATO Defence College, 2007.

overview of scholarly debate on defining international organizations, the level and form of international cooperation and the intra-paradigm debate within new institutionalism on the role of international security organizations in the international sphere, as actors in their own right, will be presented. This will be followed by a discussion of concepts that helps to understand change in international security organizations. The focus here is on the concepts of security, security cooperation, and security organizations, all of which are highly relevant to the analysis of paths of change of security organizations, as will be illustrated below.

2.3.2 *Defining International Organizations*

The units of analysis in this research are international security organizations. This term refers to a specific form of an international organization. Therefore, the more general concept of ‘international organization’ will be discussed in advance of addressing the more specific concept of ‘security organization’.

There is much debate in the realm of political science around the concept of international organizations. This is especially the case in relation to the conceptualisation of organizations, institutions and regimes. Being contested is the role and authority of international organizations – are organizations solely instruments of sovereign states or do they enjoy a role that extends beyond this. Are international organizations actors in their own right? According to Rittberger and Zangl, international organizations are a specific class of international institutions that can be categorised into two types: international regimes and international organizations. ‘Both types are international social institutions characterized by behavioral roles in recurring situations that lead to a convergence of reciprocal expectations’.⁶³ Institutions range from conventions (including state sovereignty) to regimes (such as the nuclear non-proliferation regime) to formal organizations (such as NATO).⁶⁴ Regimes relate to specific issue areas and organizations can be tasked with activities that span many issue areas. In general, international organizations tend to be seen as formal institutions. In other words, they are intergovernmental organizations that states have joined, contribute to financially and are ultimately responsible for decision-making. The aim, structure and decision-making procedures of the organization are specified in a charter, treaty or agreement.⁶⁵ International regimes, then, are another type of international interaction and can be defined as ‘...sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given issue area’.⁶⁶

Several scholars use terms like institution and organization more freely to refer to either institutions or organizations and sometimes even non-conventional international

63 Rittberger, V., Zangl, B., ‘International Organization. Polity, Politics and Policies’, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, p. 6-7.

64 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., ‘Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space’, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 2.

65 International organizations can be divided into cooperation between state actors (intergovernmental organizations) and between non-state actors (non-governmental organizations). This difference is underlined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties adopted, the 23rd of May 1969, which defines an international organization as an intergovernmental organization (art. 2, 1. (i)) excluding non-governmental organizations.

66 Krasner, S. D., ‘International Regimes’, Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 2.

organizations or to conceptualize international politics in more institutional terms.⁶⁷ Sometimes the concepts of organizations and institutions are distinguished and sometimes they are not, as institutions are often affiliated with organizations and both operate across international boundaries. Even within the theory of new institutionalism, no unambiguous definition can be found that indicates exactly what constitutes an international organization, institution or regime.⁶⁸ However, most scholars agree that international organizations and regimes can be seen as a ‘special case’ of institution at the international level.⁶⁹ As Streeck argues, interpretations of what an institution is are contested and may change over time.⁷⁰ In general, one can conclude that international institutions and organizations both refer to structured cooperation based on a(n) (in)formal, stable pattern of behaviour at the international level;⁷¹ this in contrast with regimes that are specific to particular issues areas.⁷² The theory of new institutionalism was, in fact, developed in part to analyse, define and explain the persistence and/or change of institutions.⁷³ Within the institutionalist literature, March and Olsen define an institution as a collection of norms, rules, understandings, and, perhaps most importantly, routines.⁷⁴ This is seconded by Haftendorn, Keohane and Wallander, who define institutions as ‘...a persistent and connected set of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behaviour roles, constrain activity and shape expectations’.⁷⁵ Duffield adds that any definition of an institution should

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- 67 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 160–161; Scott, W. R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage Publications, 2014, p. 56–58.
- 68 For an elaboration on the debate, see: Keohane, R. O., ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’, *International Studies Quarterly*, 32 (4), December 1988, p. 379–396; Simmons B. A., Martin L. L., ‘International Organizations and Institutions’, in: Carlsnaes W., Risse T., Simmons B. A., ‘Handbook of International Relations. Thousand Oaks’, Sage Publications, 2002, p. 192–211; Lowndes, V., ‘Institutionalism’, in: Marsh, D., Stoker, G., ‘Theory and Methods in Political Science’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
- 69 For an elaboration on similarities and differences between the concepts: Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P., Rittberger, V., ‘Theories of International Regimes’, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004; Koremonos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., ‘The Rational Design of International Institutions’, *International Organization* 55, 4, Autumn 2001, p. 761–799.
- 70 Streeck, W., Thelen, K., ‘Beyond Continuity. Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies’, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 8.
- 71 For an elaboration on the various definitions, see: Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., ‘Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space’, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 1–3; Pease, K. K. S., ‘International Organizations’, Pearson, United States, 2012, p. 2–5; Rittberger, V., Mayer, P., ‘Regime Theory and international relations’, Clarendon Press, 1993; Moller, B., ‘European Security. The roles of Regional Security Organizations’, Ashgate, 2012, p. 43–47; Koremonos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., ‘The Rationale Design of International Institutions’, *International Organization*, Volume 55, Issue 04, September 2001, p. 761; Scott, W. R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage Publications, 2014, p. 56–58.
- 72 For an elaboration on regimes, see: Krasner, S. D., ‘International Regimes’, Cornell University Press, 1983; Keohane, R. O., ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4, December 1988, p. 379–396; Rittberger, V., Mayer, P., ‘Regime Theory and International Relations’, Oxford University press, USA, 1993; Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P., Rittberger, V., ‘Theories of International Regimes’, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004.
- 73 Peters, G. B., *Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism*, The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 183.
- 74 March, J. G., Olsen, J. P., ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life’, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 78, Nr. 3, 1984, p. 21.
- 75 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., ‘Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space’, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 2.

encompass the possibility of being comprehensive and facilitate theoretical progress.⁷⁶ Because of the diversity of international organizations, Duffield contends that any definition ‘...should facilitate the differentiation and possibility to compare among specific forms in order to categorise them based on a theoretical framework, not just to list the different types of international organizations’.⁷⁷ Taking these aspects into consideration, Duffield provides the following definition of international organizations: ‘...relatively stable sets of related constitutive, regulative and procedural norms and rules that pertain to the international system, the actors in the system (including states as well as non-state entities) and their activities’.⁷⁸ This definition is adopted for the purposes of this research project and is built upon further, as focus here is on formal, international, institutionalised organizations as the unit of analysis. The potential ‘actorness’ of these organizations is also under scrutiny here. Hence, international organizations comprise sets of rules (varying in degree of formalisation) and norms that span national boundaries, they possess the capacity to act and respond to events and are not restricted to a single issue-area. They also have a formal organization (convention or treaty based) and may have state and non-state actors as members and partners.

Clarification is warranted here with regard to differences and similarities in definitions of organizations and the organs that they are made up of. In this research, various actors that have the ability to drive change are analysed and, therefore, a distinction is made between organizations and organs. The UN, the EU, NATO and the OSCE are conceptualised as organizations that comprise a variety of organs. Organs include, for example, the UN Security Council, the EU Commission and the North Atlantic Council of NATO.

2.3.3 *Form and Level of Cooperation in International Organizations*

The concept of an international organization described above reveals a variety of schemes of cooperation in level and form. The development and definition of these schemes will be elaborated upon below.

With regard to the level of cooperation, this varies alongside the degree of authority and autonomy that is transferred to an organization. Authority refers to the decision-making power of the organization with regard to security policy; whether its basis is political and/or legal; and where this authority falls on the spectrum of supranational and/or intergovernmental decision-making. Traditionally, a strict division can be made between intergovernmental and supranational cooperation. Intergovernmental cooperation does not require a transfer of sovereignty to an authority above the state; decisions are made by consensus. Consensus is then defined as the absence of any significant disagreement. Supranational cooperation implies decision-making that is partially or completely transferred to a higher authority, above the state, and that decisions are made by majority voting. Autonomy refers to the institutions within the organization that are strengthened or set up. In other words, the level of authority and autonomy that an organization possesses pertains to the level of deepening within that organization; this is one path of

76 Duffield, J., ‘What are International Institutions?’, *International Studies Review*, 2007, p. 7.

77 Ibid, p. 7-8.

78 Idem.

change that will be explained later. Furthermore, cooperation can vary in terms the scope of tasks, from those tasks related to a single issue to a wide variety of tasks transferred to an organization, either at a regional or global level. In other words, organizations may have a narrow or broad mandate, specifying tasks to be performed; this pertains to ‘broadening’ as another path of change to be explained in more detail in a subsequent section. Finally, cooperation can vary in terms of the membership and partnership of an organization; this is ‘widening’, the last path of change.

In short, a process of change that enhances international cooperation can lead to deepening, broadening and widening of an organization.⁷⁹ Accordingly, international organizations, from their creation, can differ in terms of several characteristics including task, rule, structure, the degree of institutionalisation, decision-making and flexibility of arrangements. Change can lead to differences in these characteristics and can change the original design of regional and global organizations.⁸⁰ Furthermore, the number of actors involved in an organization, either by way of full or partial membership, generate variance in terms of the degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity of member states and their preferences.⁸¹

These differentiated levels of cooperation can also differ in terms of the form in which the cooperation schemes are moulded. Flexible or differentiated cooperation⁸² refers to different pace or speed of cooperation within an organization, exemplified by opt-out and opt-in, two-speed Europe, multi-speed cooperation,⁸³ variable geometry and Europe à la carte⁸⁴ concentric circles, core groups and periphery, pooling and sharing, smart defence, different member- and partnerships, N+1 (x) or N-1 (x), and the concept of coalitions of willing and able, inside and outside institutionalised cooperation.

Consequently, international cooperation can produce different institutional designs of regional and global organizations.⁸⁵ Change can also lead to strengthening of the design of the organizations or further institutionalisation. In other words, change can lead to the establishment of institutions and tasks (institution building) and an increase in the activities and degree of cooperation within existing institutions, as well as in tasks, rules and new forms of cooperation and changes in membership and partnerships.⁸⁶



79 These levels of cooperation will be further addressed in section 2.5.

80 Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., ‘The Rationale Design of International Institutions’, *International Organization*, Volume 55, Issue 04, September 2001, p. 761-763.

81 Pros and cons of homogenic and heterogenic organizations; Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., ‘The Rationale Design of International Institutions’, *International Organization*, Volume 55, Issue 04, September 2001, p. 770.

82 Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., Schimmelfennig, F., ‘Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union’, *Palgrave Macmillan*, 2013, p. 7-11.

83 Introduced by: Stubb, A., ‘A Categorization of Differentiated Integration’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (June 1996), p. 283-295.

84 Introduced by Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., Schimmelfennig, F., ‘Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union’, *Palgrave Macmillan*, 2013.

85 Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., ‘The Rationale Design of International Institutions’, *International Organization*, Volume 55, Issue 04, September 2001, p. 763.

86 Function and form (and the relationship between them) is important because it provides the basis for explaining variation in institutional form and the proposition about the causes and directions of institutional change which is elaborated in: Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., ‘Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space’, *Oxford University Press*, New York, 1999, p. 7.

At the same time, however, this research accepts that change does not automatically produce institutionalisation and strengthening of an organization. Change can also lead to dysfunction, resulting in de-institutionalisation, disintegration or fragmentation,⁸⁷ this in contrast to the broadening, deepening and widening paths of change identified in this research. De-institutionalisation, or breaking of the institutional structure, leads to ‘...the process by which institutions weaken and disappear’.⁸⁸ Breaking can affect the institutional design of an organization, or the authority, autonomy, mandate and tasks of the organization, and can also refer to the loss of members and partners. Furthermore, breaking also leads to loss of legitimacy and relevance of an organization.⁸⁹ Possible causes of de-institutionalisation are many⁹⁰ and will be referred to in this work where applicable.⁹¹

Finally, the different theoretical lenses chosen for the analysis of change address these changes in form and level differently which will be elaborated in section 2.5 and Chapter 3.

2.3.4 International Organizations as Actors in their own Right

Scholars of institutionalism state that states ‘...have become the great rationalizers of the second half of the twentieth century’⁹² and therefore determine the form and levels of conflict and cooperation at the international level between them. However, others in the field of institutionalism claim that non-state actors have become important players possessing power of their own. This debate around the ‘actorness’ of states and the role of other actors in eliciting change in international (security) organizations,⁹³ the units of analysis here, are addressed by institutionalism as well.⁹⁴ In this research it is argued that international organizations, comprised of various actors, operate as agents alongside states and, as such, are possible drivers of change. In other words, these organizations and institutions can be regarded as ‘actors in their own right’. This contention will be elaborated upon below.

A fundamental debate that has been ongoing throughout the history of social science research is that which deals with ‘structure’ versus ‘agency’. The debate has

87 For an elaboration on de-institutionalization and dysfunctional institutionalisation, see: Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 37; Scott, W.R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage Publications, 2014, p. 166.

88 Scott, W.R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage Publications, 2014, p. 166.

89 For an elaboration on legitimacy and the loss of legitimacy of organizations, see: Lipset, S. M., ‘Consensus and Conflict. Essays in Political Sociology’, New Brunswick Oxford, Transaction Books, 1985, p. 64; Scott, W. R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage Publications, 2014, p. 71-72; Scheuer, J. D., Scheuer, J. D., ‘The autonomy of change. A Neo-Institutionalist perspective’, Copenhagen Business School Press, 2008, p. 59.

90 Scott, W. R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage Publications, 2014, p. 166-167.

91 Ibid, p. 210.

92 Dimaggio, P. J., Powell, W. W., ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields’, American Sociological Review, vol. 48, 1983, p. 147.

93 This debate will be elaborated on in this chapter, when there is referred to international organizations, international security organizations are included.

94 For an elaboration on actorness of international organizations, see: Barnett, M., Finnemore, M., ‘The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations’, International Organization Vol. 53, No. 4, 1999, p. 1-10; Scott, W. R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage Publications, 2014, p. 49-52; Kirchner, E. J., Dominguez, R., ‘The Security Governance of regional Organizations’, Routledge, 2011, p. 1-7; Koops, J. A., ‘The European Union as an Integrative power? Assessing the EU’s ‘Effective multilateralism’ towards NATO and the United Nations’, Brussels University Press, Brussels, 2011, p. 97.

substantial implications for the very way in which social phenomena are studied. In the 1980s, the apparent dichotomy between agent and structure was reconciled by Giddens in his 'Structuration Theory', which provided a framework for analysing the relationship between structure and agency, the 'duality of structure'.⁹⁵ According to Giddens, agents and structures '...are not two independently given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality'.⁹⁶ Systems or structures refer to the framing of activities and relationships over time and space, integrating rules, relations and resources, and it is acknowledged that structures are both the product and platform of action. Agency then refers to '...an actor's ability to have some effect on the social world altering the rules, relational ties, or distribution of resources' and having causal power.⁹⁷ In other words, '...the debate refers to the question of whether the building of social science theory should start with the behaviour of individual agents or with the constituting and regulating functions of social structures'.⁹⁸ This debate on the ownership of action, who frames who or what, and the inseparability of agent and structure persists in the social sciences in general and in political science specifically.

Logically, within the theory of new institutionalism and in the analysis of organizations, a similar agent-structure debate took place. The early institutionalists focused on 'the ways in which institutional mechanisms constrained organizational structures and activities' and were therefore more focused on structure than on agency.⁹⁹ The institutionalists that followed focused on the mutual relationship between individuals, organizations and change, agents, and structures.¹⁰⁰ The debate within institutionalism with regard to the actorness of non-state actors continued; as Scott claims, 'all actors, both individual and collective, possess some degree of agency, but the amount of agency varies greatly among actors as well as among types of social structures'.¹⁰¹

The international arena is often seen as being in a state of anarchy, where power and conflict dominate international politics at the expense of stability and rules enforced by a supranational authority. According to this view, there is no arena in which stable organizations operate; organizations, it is argued, are wholly and existentially dependent upon the will of nation states. The theory that states cannot be influenced or ruled by any structural, coercive power other than that of the nation state remains a popular view in international politics. Organizations, then, are viewed as structures without any agency at all. Adherents of this viewpoint reason that prominent actors in political settings are individuals and, therefore, the only appropriate foci for analysis are individuals and their

95 Further elaboration on the subject: Giddens, A., 'The constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration', Polity Press, 2016; Archer, M., 'Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory', Cambridge University press, 1996, p. xii; Scott, W. R., 'Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities', Sage Publications, 2014, p. 93; Hay, M. C., 'Structure and Agency', in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds.), 'Theory and Methods in Political Science', Macmillan, 1995, p. 189.

96 Giddens, A., 'The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration', Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2016, p. 25.

97 Scott, W. R., 'Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities', Sage publications, 2014, p. 94.

98 Blatter, J., Haverland, M., 'Designing Case Studies. Explanatory Approaches in Small-N Research', Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 7.

99 Scott, W. R., 'Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities', Sage publications, 2014, p. 93.

100 Idem.

101 Ibid, p. 95.

behaviour and that entities like political parties, legislatures and so on, do not actually make decisions.¹⁰² If, theoretically, organizations cannot be regarded as political actors in their own right, they would have no ontological independence and are therefore not theoretically interesting. Nevertheless, international organizations, as agents and structures, have become popular topics of study. The sharpest debate between scholars of political science, has centred upon the question of whether or not ‘...international institutions really matter’¹⁰³ and whether or not organizations have agency, as was elaborated above.

Different theoretical viewpoints vary in their perspectives on whether or not international organizations can be regarded as political systems or actors similar to states. Krasner, Keohane, Rittberger and Mayer have argued for the acceptance of international organizations and regimes as actors in their own right.¹⁰⁴ Their reasoning for this is that states do not operate in a completely anarchical system, with clearly defined levels of acting. Rather, states link and connect with other actors through trade, for instance. Small or big, weak or strong, states influence one another and may even formalise their relationships in agreements and treaties resulting in organizations, formalised and less formalised, that execute their given powers. As a result, international institutional arrangements produce complex, multi-level governance agreements.¹⁰⁵ Some of these agreements and treaties even serve as administrations above states - supranational organizations – with regard to certain policy areas of national governments. According to Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, the rules of an international organization are accepted by states in order to reduce their own insecurity and transaction costs as well as unpredictability.¹⁰⁶ As such, these organizations both mould and are moulded by the behaviour of individual member states.¹⁰⁷ Peters refers to this as the ‘dance of diplomacy’.¹⁰⁸ States are willing to accept constraints on their behaviour if there are equal constraints applied to the other parties to the contract. The reason for this is that the apparent alternative, namely anarchy, is not an attractive one. ‘Even more than in domestic politics, any breakdown of these patterned interactions may have significant negative consequences for the actors involved; there are strong incentives to maintain the normative integration of international regimes and organizations’.¹⁰⁹ Consequently, international cooperation

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102 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 14.

103 Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., ‘The Rationale Design of International Institutions’, *International Organization*, Volume 55, Issue 04, September 2001, p. 761.

104 Krasner, S. D., ‘International Regimes’, Cornell University Press, 1983; Keohane, R. O., ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4, December 1988, p. 379-396; Rittberger, V., Mayer, P., ‘Regime Theory and International Relations’, Oxford University press, USA, 1993.

105 For an elaboration on the concept, see: Hooghe, L., Marks, G., ‘Multi-level Governance and European Integration’, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001; Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 160.

106 Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P., Rittberger, V., ‘Theories of International Regimes’, Cambridge University Press 1997, p. 37.

107 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 172.

108 Ibid, p. 162.

109 Idem.

does produce rules and structures. Some of these rules are self-imposed by states, like those inherent in the EU. Other rules are imposed by international organizations, by treaty, on member states, such as Article 5 of NATO. Still other rules are applicable between international organizations, like the Berlin Plus agreement (2003) between NATO and the EU's CSDP and involved states.

The acceptance of international organizations as independent actors has been reinforced by Barnett and Finnemore. In their view, '...international organizations can become autonomous sites of authority, independent from the state 'principals' who may have created them, because of power flowing from at least two sources. One source would be the legitimacy of the rational-legal authority they embody and the second would be the control over technical expertise and information'.¹¹⁰ Although international organizations are constrained by states, they are more than just the sum of interstate cooperation: '... the notion that they are passive mechanisms with no independent agendas of their own is not borne out by any detailed empirical study of an international organization that we have found'.¹¹¹ According to Barnett and Finnemore, '...autonomy exists when international organizations are able to act in ways not dictated by states'.¹¹² This does not mean that international organizations neglect the demands of states, but they can act for different reasons; in other words, 'correlation is not causation'.¹¹³ Furthermore, international organizations do set the agenda in their policy domain, as a result of their mandate, expertise and capacities and can compel states to comply. 'At times, IOs may actually shape the policy preferences of states by changing what states want. It matters who initiates policy and why'.¹¹⁴

As such, for the purposes of this research, international security organizations are seen as actors possessing actorness.¹¹⁵ The increase in the institutionalisation of the security environment and the increase in interstate and inter- and cross-organizational cooperation at the international level results in a 'dance'¹¹⁶ involving political and legal, cross-institutional engagement at different levels.

Hence, in this research international organizations are not regarded as empty shells, like Mearsheimer claimed¹¹⁷, or impersonal policy machinery manipulated by other actors.

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110 Barnett, M., Finnemore, M., 'The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations', *International Organization* Vol. 53, No. 4, 1999, p. 707.

111 Ibid, p. 705.

112 Barnett, M., Finnemore, M., 'Rules for the World. International Organization in Global Politics', Cornell University Press, 2004, p. 10.

113 Ibid, p. 11.

114 Idem.

115 For a further elaboration on the subject: Simmons, B. A., Martin, L. L., 'International Organizations and Institutions', in: Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T., Simmons, B. A (eds.), 'The Sage Handbook of International relations', London: SAGE, 2002, p. 193; Reinalda, B., 'Routledge History of International Organizations: From 1815 to the Present Day', Routledge, 2009, p. 9; Hurd, I. F., 'Choices and Methods in the Study of International Organizations', *Journal of International Organization Studies*, volume 2, 2011, p. 17 and p. 23.

116 Derived from: Peters, B. G., 'Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism', The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 162.

117 Mearsheimer, J. J., 'Back to the Future; Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), p. 43.

In contrast, international organizations are, alongside other actors, regarded as actors in their own right. Therefore, they can be theoretically and empirically analysed both separately and in comparison to one another, which makes them ontologically interesting subjects. The actors studied here, NATO, the EU and the OSCE, are the units of analysis - they possess authority, autonomy and resources. This acceptance of actorness allows for a broad focus on paths of change of these security organizations and the possible drivers behind change. This focus has been largely absent in the existing research, which has tended to focus on change in security organizations, as was addressed above. At the same time, it is worth acknowledging that 'international actorness' is not equal across the selected security organizations, as will be discussed further in Chapter 3.

2.3.5 *Security and the Security Environment*

As security organizations are the central focus of this research, the concept of security itself needs exploration before any institutionalised form of security cooperation can be conceptualised and analysed. The concept of security is dynamic and evolves within its environment. For example, the salience of issues on the political security agenda depends on how (in)security is perceived; whereas, for instance, cyber threats, terrorism and climate change are argued to be the most serious threats in the 21st century, conventional war between states has remained highly salient over the past century and may become a high priority again in the near future.

The analysis of security not only changes over time, but also changes when considered at the state, group and individual levels, and as a result of different security threats, varying from inter-state to intra-state, to the group or individual levels. Furthermore, the International Relations literature often refers to internal and external security and intra- versus inter-state conflicts.¹¹⁸ And it is not only the concept of security that is subject to change over time and at different levels; its substantive meaning is also contested. International security matters are traditionally explained on the basis of a military or political understanding of security, namely the survival of the state. Perceptions of security or insecurity are at the heart of the legitimisation of the use of force; but, more generally, drawing on the concept of security has paved the way for states to mobilise or assume special powers to deal with threats.

Hence, there are multiple understandings of security. Levy has identified more than 450 definitions of the concept of security.¹¹⁹ The concept has developed and moved far beyond the security and survival of the state. Security is an eclectic package of perceptions and definitions. 'Asking what security means raises questions about the philosophy of knowledge. Especially those concerned with epistemology, ..., ontology, ..., and method'.¹²⁰ According to Buzan, '...we look at a field which has some strikingly different pre-occupations both substantive and epistemological'.¹²¹ Differences in how the concept of

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118 Williams, P. D., *Security Studies. An Introduction*, Routledge, Oxon, 2018; Mingst, K., ArreguinToft, I. M., 'Essentials of International Relations', Norton & Co, 2016.

119 Terrif, T., 'Critical Reflections on Security and change', Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2013, p. 17.

120 Williams, P. D., *Security Studies. An Introduction*, Routledge, 2018, p. 6.

121 Buzan, B., Wilde, J., Waever, O., 'Security: A New Framework for Analysis', Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 8.

security is defined and conceived of by different actors, such as international organizations, states, groups or individuals, creates the need for specialised security strategies to be executed by international organizations or states (or other actors) to deal with these differences.¹²²

Complicating the analysis of security further, different actors, like states, have different security vulnerabilities depending upon their economic and military strength, geo-political location and so on. It is not helpful to try to separate security considerations from the world of politics. Scholars debate whether or not something is a security issue and argue that this is not decided solely by states, individuals, or international organizations, for that matter. Instead, it is an inter-subjective matter. In general terms, one can distinguish a difference between Atlantic and European perspectives and between individual European country perspectives, for instance, on the purpose of the military with regard to foreign and security policy.¹²³

Both realist and liberal scholars have played a role in increasing our understanding of the concept of security. In the eighties and nineties, a need arose for a broader perception of (in)security than one solely focused on war and the protection of the state against external threats. On the basis of their groundbreaking research, Buzan et al. categorise threats to states in three ways: threats to the idea of the state (nationalism), those to the physical foundation of the state (population and resources), and those to the institutional expression of the state (political system).¹²⁴ According to Buzan et al., ‘...fundamental political and normative decisions involved in defining security, always depend on the particular referent object, something that needs to be secured; the nation, the state, the individual, the environment or even the planet to internal/external locations’.¹²⁵ In other words, a strict distinction between internal and external security is not tenable.¹²⁶ Furthermore, insecurity is not the exclusive purview of the military and does not relate only to the use of force; it affects all sectors, which demands a broad conceptualisation of (in) security. This conceptualisation of security has been developed further since the 1990s, as a result of wars in Europe and Africa, and in response to the various security threats that extend beyond the conventional threat of hostile state(s).

Along the development of the (in-)security concept the concept of crisis management has developed as well. The scope of tasks and actors involved expanded, beyond the containment of military escalation labelled as the comprehensive approach and further along as an integrated approach.¹²⁷ Furthermore, in contrast to the more traditional concept

122 Williams, P. D., *Security Studies. An Introduction*, Routledge, 2018, p. 4-5.

123 Buzan, B., Wilde, J., Waever, O., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 31.

124 Buzan, B., Hansen, L., *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 9.

125 Buzan, B., Wilde, J., Waever, O., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 32.

126 For an elaboration on the sovereignty debate, see: Aarts, T., *Constructing Sovereignty between Politics and Law*, Routledge, 2012; Slaughter, A., *Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order*, *Stanford Journal of International Law*, 2004.

127 The comprehensive and integrated approach are two concepts debated within the states and institutions with regard to the scope of activities that should be performed. For an elaboration on the concepts of comprehensive and integrated approach, see: Major, C., Mölling, C., *More than Wishful Thinking? The EU, UN, NATO and the Comprehensive Approach to Military Crisis Management*, *Studia Diplomatica*, Volume 62, no. 3, 2009, p. 21-28; Pirozzi, N., *The EU's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management*, EU's Crisis Management Papers Series, The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, June 2013; Tardy, T., *The EU: from comprehensive vision to integrated action*, *European Institute for Security Studies*, February 2017.

of state security, the concept of human security has emerged.¹²⁸ The policy concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which states that ‘sovereignty is not supreme’,¹²⁹ and new organizations like the International Criminal Court (ICC) have followed in its wake.¹³⁰

As such, and following the research by Buzan, this analysis adopts a broad perspective of security that, in addition to the military aspects of (in)security, encompasses economic stability, governmental structures, energy supplies, science and technology, food and natural resources, and so forth. Furthermore, in addition to state actors, non-state actors are seen as actors that may cause (in)security and are therefore included in the analysis. Additionally, this research also accepts that the threat of (in)security extends beyond state borders to organizational borders, as security threats cut across many boundaries and, as a result, blur the division between internal and external security. In other words, in the Euro-Atlantic area, the line of division between what is external and what is essentially internal has ceased to exist because most conflicts here have erupted within and cross-border and not between states.

2.3.6 International Security Organization

As security organizations are the main units of analysis in this research, the concept of a security organization and the debates on defining security organizations will be elaborated upon below. The difference between international organizations and security organizations in general, and particularly in the neo-realist literature, lies in the absence of a central authority above states. It is assumed that security cooperation takes the form of pure intergovernmental or even ad-hoc cooperation solely for the purposes of forwarding the self-interest of the state.¹³¹ International security cooperation then lies at the heart of the state, often designated ‘high politics’, where state sovereignty rules. However, sovereignty has never been a fixed concept. According to some scholars, sovereignty varies in degree and form. Krasner makes a distinction between different forms and levels of sovereignty in contrast with the singular conceptualisation of traditional Westphalian state sovereignty.¹³² This debate was extended by Aalbers¹³³ and Slaughter who both claim that sovereignty is limited by the fact that ‘...states can only govern effectively by actively cooperating with other states’ and that ‘...the sovereignty debate can be summarised as being about balancing the need to increase the capacity to act against the need to preserve freedom of action’.¹³⁴ Today, an increase in international cooperation, in various forms

128 Williams, P. D., ‘Security Studies. An Introduction’, Routledge, 2018, p. 222; Barash, D. P., Webel, C. P., ‘Peace and Conflict Studies’, Sage Publications, United States of America, 2014, p. 421.

129 The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle was adopted in 2005 by the UN. R2P aims at the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The principle is based upon the underlying premise that sovereignty entails a responsibility to protect all populations from mass atrocity, crimes and human rights violations. The UN adopted this doctrine in the World Summit Document (A/RES/60/1), par. 138-139.

130 The International Criminal Court, founded on the first of July 2002, has the jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes as first described in the UN, ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, 1998.

131 Mearsheimer, J. J., ‘The Tragedy of Great Power Politics’, New York, W.W. Norton, 2001, p. 1-2.

132 Krasner, S. D., ‘Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy’, Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 3-4.

133 Aalbers, T., ‘Sovereignty. Evolution of an idea’, Review essay, *Acta Politica*, 2009, 44, p. 280-283.

134 Slaughter, A., ‘Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order’, *Stanford Journal of International Law*, 2004, p. 284.

and at various levels, is observed and described by Howorth as ‘intergovernmental-supranationalism’, especially in the security and defence domain.¹³⁵ So, in the context of international security cooperation within the European security architecture, some developments and debates centre around challenging the traditional concept of sovereignty. And although actual sovereignty has not been transferred from the state to security organizations, a strict division between state and organizational authority has always been subject to debate.

The term ‘security organization’ is defined by Haftendorn, Keohane and Wallander as an organization that is tasked with ‘...protecting the territorial integrity of states from the adverse use of military force; to guard states’ autonomy against the political effects of the threat of such force; and to prevent the emergence of situations that could only endanger states’ vital interests as they define them’.¹³⁶ However, as they elaborate, ‘...some institutions that deal with security are alliances, some are designed to manage conflict among their members (referred to as security management institutions) and some do both’.¹³⁷ This makes analysis, definition, and even comparison of security organizations more complicated. Haftendorn, Keohane and Wallander also argue that the post-Cold War situation has changed all security organizations, exemplified in the following quote ‘...in the contemporary case of NATO, it appears that an alliance is being transformed into a security management institution’.¹³⁸ This statement is also supported by Sloan and Thies.¹³⁹ Following this same line of argumentation, Williams claims that if a security organization is ‘an organization dealing with a wide range of threats’, it could be argued that every regional organization has some security component and consequently can be defined as a security organization. And, any attempt to promote cooperative and more predictable relations among its member states may be seen as a step towards building a more secure community as Deutsch’s intention was.¹⁴⁰ It was NATO’s core Article 5 commitment that prompted Deutsch to describe NATO as a security community in 1957, whose sense of community rested upon the extreme unlikelihood of violence or aggression between the alliance members and a sense of common purpose: solidarity. If this is the case, the only differentiation that can be made between security organizations in the European security architecture is one with regard to their membership. This will be explored in the context of this research.

According to Haftendorn, Keohane and Wallander with regard to the nature of organizations, ‘...for international organizations adaptation seems to be necessary to

135 Howorth, J., ‘Decision-making in Security and Defence Policy: Towards Supranational Inter-governmentalism?’, *Cooperation and Conflict*, Sage Publications, 2012.

136 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., ‘Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space’, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 2.

137 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., ‘Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space’, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 1.

138 Ibid, p. 22.

139 Thies, W. J., ‘Why NATO Endures’, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009, p. 287-308; Sloan, S. R., ‘Defence of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 330-342.

140 Williams, P. D., ‘Security Studies. An Introduction’, Routledge, Oxon, 2018, p. 140-141.

survival, ..., the ability of an institution to thrive, or even to survive, depends on its adaptability'.¹⁴¹ In addition, they stipulate that 'form follows function'; if change is to be successful, 'the relationship between function and institutional form is important for institutional theory because it provides the basis for explaining variation in institutional form'.¹⁴² This is important because a relationship exists between the form of an institution and its function; even if an organization was previously highly effective in terms of supporting cooperation within a particular set of relationships or coping with a particular set of obstacles, states will not adopt specific assets that are not cost-effective.¹⁴³ These insights are important to theorisation of international cooperation and organization because they provide the basis of explanations of variation in institutional form and of assumptions about the causes and direction of change.¹⁴⁴ Furthermore, as defining and, therefore, comparing security organizations has become more difficult, these insights are important to theorisation of the concept of security organization, as well.

As such, '...a regional security institution can be understood as an organization whose charter contains some explicit references to a security provision by member states and has some kind of formal mechanism dealing with conflict and its consequences. Such a mechanism would typically include the coordination of defence, security and foreign policy'.¹⁴⁵ Fawcett concludes that security organizations share some general characteristics, including a security provision coordinating defence; security and/or foreign policy; a formal mechanism dealing with conflict and its consequences; common foreign, security and defence instruments; and the ability to conduct its own operations (not only a military or peacekeeping component, but also the possibility of a civilian mission).¹⁴⁶

In short, this research defines a security organization, the unit of analysis, as an organization that has some kind of security component; a formal institutionalised mechanism that deals with threats and conflict and its consequences within and/or from outside the organization; coordinates defence and security instruments; conducts its own operations; and includes a military and civilian component.

2.3.7 International Security Cooperation

As was explained above, a security organization can be defined as a specific form of international organization that has a specific nature and focus. Like other international organizations, security organizations can be categorised by their function and goals, though these distinctions can overlap.

141 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., 'Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space', Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 12.

142 Ibid, p. 7.

143 Wallander, C. A., 'Institutional assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War', International organization, volume 54, Issue 04, September 2000, p. 709.

144 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., 'Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space', Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 7.

145 Fawcett, L., 'Regional Organizations', in: Williams, P. D., Security Studies. An Introduction', Routledge, 2018, p. 284.

146 Ibid, p. 296.

A first categorisation is a division of security organizations that deal with (in)security of their members when threats or risks emerge from within or outside the organization, referring to the so-called organizational territory as is defined in the treaty or agreement underpinning the specific organization. For instance, though Ukraine is a member of the Partnership for Peace program, it is not a full NATO member and is therefore outside NATO territory and can make no claim to protection on the basis of Article 5.

A second categorisation is based on the scope of competences and tasks. Security organizations can be categorised according to their tasks and how they relate to security. An organization's tasks may reflect a narrow perspective of security, purely dealing with the military aspects of (in)security, as NATO's collective defence task was from the beginning,¹⁴⁷ or a broad perspective on security, including all policies related to (in)security, as exemplified by the UN.

A third categorisation by which security organizations can be classified is their inclusivity. Some security organizations are set up in such a way as to involve all interested member states that feel threatened, such as the UN, or they may be more exclusive, meaning that states may exclude other states from membership due to political, economic, military, or geographical interests, as is the case with NATO.¹⁴⁸

The traditional concept of dealing with (in)security within an international organization, henceforth security organization, is the concept of collective security. In contrast, for security organizations that are focused on (in)security coming from outside the organization, the concept of collective defence applies.¹⁴⁹ Both concepts are applied differently in the 'the policy world' and the 'academic world'.¹⁵⁰ However, they do provide a framework with which to categorise security organizations. First, they do so by creating differentiation between security systems and international organizations in general. Secondly, in terms of security organizations in the European security architecture that, historically, were built on these concepts, the terms provide structure and may help explain observed variation in paths of change of security organizations from a comparative perspective. Thirdly, these concepts help reveal the consequences of organizational change. The different concepts of security cooperation will be elaborated upon below.

Collective Security

The first security cooperation concept is collective security. In employing a system of collective security, any state that is a member of the organization in question is dissuaded from acting in a manner likely to threaten peace, thereby deterring conflict. A collective

147 Though Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1949, Washington explicitly refers to a broad perspective on security.

148 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., 'Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space', Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 2.

149 Rynning, S., Schmitt, O., 'Alliances', in: Ghécui, A., Wohlforth, W. C., 'The Oxford Handbook of International Security', Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 653.

150 Waever, O., 'Cooperative Security: A New Concept?', p. 47, in: Flockhart T. (eds.), 'Cooperative Security: NATO's Partnership Policy in a Changing World', DIIS Report 2014:01, Copenhagen.

security system is based on the premise of the ‘indivisibility of peace’¹⁵¹, as Claude describes it, in contrast to the balance of power theory. In the ideal world of collective security, no state is excluded from the responsibility of maintaining peace and security, regardless of where or from whom the threat originates.¹⁵² A collective security system is a design for a more permanent world order and is not a pragmatic solution to a temporarily threat to world peace.

The theoretical development and operationalization of the concept of collective security, like that of collective defense, has resulted in debate with regard to the collective security system.¹⁵³ However, some common features can be distinguished. First and foremost, collective security is based on the principle of ‘one for all, and all for one’, which is often institutionalised and codified within a legal instrument of the organization. Secondly, in contrast to collective defence organizations, collective security involves an agreement between its members pertaining to threats or conflicts stemming from inside the organization. Such a threat is a potential act of aggression by a currently unidentified party to the agreement. By means of cooperation within the system, any threat or breach of the peace within the system is then met jointly by all other members. Measures can vary from diplomatic boycott to economic pressure and can even involve the use of coercive instruments, such as military sanctions or interventions to enforce the peace.¹⁵⁴ In other words, a collective security system entails a paradox, as it requires a certain amount of military power to prevent war. In an ideal world, there would be an authority above the state that would be empowered to enforce these measures. In the real world, especially with regard to military sanctions, the use of such measures runs counter to the generally accepted rules of international engagement between states based on the non-intervention principle deriving from state sovereignty, specified in Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Collective security arrangements differ in size and composition, and even include bilateral or multilateral arrangements. However, certain conditions must be met for a system of collective security to work. First of all, for deterrence to work, potential aggressors must believe in the capacity of (the members of) the organization to punish acts of aggression. Second, there must be a high degree of political consensus among the main

151 For an elaboration on the development of the concept of collective security, see: Claude Jr., I. L., ‘Collective Security as an Approach to Peace’, p. 294, in: *Classic Readings and Contemporary Debates in International Relations*, eds. Goldstein, D. M., Williams, P., & Shafritz, J. M. (Belmont, 2006), p. 289-302; Aleksovski, S., Bakreski, O., Avramovska, B., ‘Collective Security – The Role of International Organizations – Implications in International Security Order’, *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, Rome-Italy, Vol 5, No 27 December 2014, p. 274-282; Wilson, G., ‘The United Nations and Collective Security’, Routledge, 2016.

152 Claude Jr., I. L., ‘Collective Security as an Approach to Peace’, p. 293 in: *Classic Readings and Contemporary Debates in International Relations*, eds. Goldstein D. M., Williams P., & Shafritz, J. M., (Belmont, 2006), p. 289-302.

153 For an elaboration on the theory of collective security, see: Claude Jr., I. L., ‘Collective Security as an Approach to Peace’, p. 290-291, in: *Classic Readings and Contemporary Debates in International Relations*, eds. Goldstein D. M., Williams, P., & Shafritz, J.M., (Belmont, 2006), p. 289-302 and criticized by: Mearsheimer, J. J., ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, *International Security*, Vol.19, No. 3, Winter 1994/5, p. 26-37; Morgenthau, H. J., *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle For Power and Peace*, 1948, p. 293-306, 407-418; Organski, A. F. K., ‘World Politics’, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968.

154 Claude Jr., I. L., ‘Collective Security as an Approach to Peace’, p. 293 in: *Classic Readings and Contemporary Debates in International Relations*, eds. Goldstein, D. M., Williams, P., & Shafritz, J. M., (Belmont, 2006), p. 293.

powers within the organization and there must also be universality of membership (or at least (major) states must not be excluded). Third, there must be clearly defined criteria as to what constitutes an act of aggression, an agreed procedure to determine this and a central authority to establish it.¹⁵⁵ Fourth, a collective security system should be impartial; in other words, it should react in the same way to any aggressor within the system regardless of power or other considerations.¹⁵⁶

The first traditional system of international security cooperation that gained popularity in the twentieth century was the League of Nations, initiated by the US president Woodrow Wilson after the First World War in 1919.¹⁵⁷ The League was an alternative to the balance-of-power system and the (ad-hoc) alliances that reigned before. However, this security system did not survive, as it could not withstand the Second World War and the system of alliances that would emerge again. The second system of international security cooperation, the UN, was created after the Second World War¹⁵⁸, and is, to date, the example of a system of collective security that facilitates the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Cooperative Security

In addition to collective security as a system of community values, another similar system can be identified, namely cooperative security. A system of cooperative security, like collective security, aims to prevent war and crisis on the basis of the principle of indivisible peace (the Kantian system). However, there is one main difference between collective security and cooperative security. In a system of collective security, all states are united in a collective pact and are obliged to take action against any aggressor; this is not the case in a cooperative security system. A cooperative security system is based upon the idea of peaceful settlement of disputes, in contrast with collective security systems. The latter tolerates the right to use coercive instruments and even violence if necessary as a means of attaining peace under the purview of an international authority. Cooperative security involves activities that improve the broader security environment, but that fall short of the use of violence. It is based on the principles of comprehensive and indivisible peace.¹⁵⁹ Cooperative security can be defined as ‘...sustained efforts to reduce the risk of war that are not directed against a specific state or coalition of states’.¹⁶⁰

155 Delbruck, J., ‘Allocation of Law Enforcement Authority in the International System’, Duncker and Humblot, Berlin, 1995.

156 Claude Jr., I. L., ‘Collective Security as an Approach to Peace’, p. 296 in: *Classic Readings and Contemporary Debates in International Relations*, ed. Goldstein, D. M., Williams, P. & Shafritz, J. M. (Belmont, 2006), p. 289–302.

157 For an elaboration on the League of Nations, see: Northedge, F. S., ‘The League Of Nations: Its Life And Times, 1920–1946’, Holmes and Meier, 1986; Holsti, K. J., ‘Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648–1989’, Cambridge University Press, 1998, Chapter 8; Pedersen, S., ‘Back to the League of Nations’, *American Historical Review* 112.4, 2007, p. 1091–1117.

158 Envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945, Articles 42 and 43.

159 Carter, A. B., Perry, W. J., Steinbruner, J. D., ‘A New Concept of Cooperative Security’, *Brookings Occasional Papers*–October 1, Washington, 1992.

160 Cohen, R., Mihalka, M., ‘Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order’, *The Marshall Center Papers*, No. 3, April 2001, p. 29.

In practice, the cooperative security concept was only introduced after the end of the Cold War and reflected a shift in security and defence policy toward confidence-building security measures, arms control, a broader perspective on security, and a greater emphasis on multilateral cooperation.¹⁶¹ The aim was to prevent states from relying on deterrence and the use of military force by committing them to regulate their military forces and act in a transparent way with regard to military capabilities and investments. Achieving this aim was dependent upon mutual security reassurance through the establishment of consensus, institutions, rules, and regimes.¹⁶² The organization that most resembles a cooperative security system is the OSCE, which adopted the principles of cooperative security with the Helsinki Summit Declaration of 1992.¹⁶³

Collective Defence

The third concept that relates to (in)security is the concept of collective defence. As is the case with collective security, there are different definitions in the literature, but again some general characteristics can be observed.¹⁶⁴ The model of collective defence, as opposed to collective security, is a system of cooperation that only deals with threats coming from outside the system. This implies that threats coming from inside the organization's territory, irrespective of whether these are conflicts between member states or ones that emerge from within one or more member states, are not the formal responsibilities of collective defence organizations. Furthermore, in principle, collective defence organizations are only tasked to deal with military aspects of security. Finally, in collective defence organizations, contrary collective security organizations, membership is exclusive; non-members do not profit from the defence system.

There are two main characteristics that differentiate the nature of collective security from the nature of collective defence. The first is the indivisibility of the security of all its members. Secondly, cooperation is voluntary. Basically, cooperation between two or more states that are threatened from outside represents the formation of an alliance, as defined by Walt.¹⁶⁵ Alliances range from ad-hoc cooperation to a permanent, highly institutionalised organization. According to Walt, an alliance is '...a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states' and a '...commitment for mutual military support against some external actor in some specified set

161 Carter, A. B., Perry, W. J., Steinbruner, J. D., 'A New Concept of Cooperative Security, Brookings Occasional Papers-October 1, Washington, 1992.

162 Zagorski, A., 'The OSCE and Cooperative Security', Security and Human rights, 2010, nr. 1

163 OSCE Helsinki Summit declaration, 1992.

164 For an elaboration on collective defence and alliances, see: Walt., S. M., 'The Origins of Alliances', Cornell University Press, 1987; Snyder, G. H., 'Alliance Politics', Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1997; Wijk, R., 'NATO on the Brink of a new Millenium. The Battle of Consensus', Brasse's, 1997; Kaplan, L. S., 'NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance', Praeger, 2004; Weitsman, A., 'Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War', Stanford University Press, 2004; Thies, W. J., 'Why NATO Endures', Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009; Sloan, R. S., 'Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama', The Continuum International Publishing Group, New York, 2010; Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., 'NATO's Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?', Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 19-23.

165 Walt, S. M., 'The origins of Alliances', Cornell University Press, 1987.

of circumstances'.¹⁶⁶ Weitsman defines an alliance less restrictively as a 'bi- or multilateral agreement to provide some element of security to the signatories'.¹⁶⁷ In general, it can be concluded that alliances are externally oriented to enhance security of the members vis-à-vis external actors, as opposed to collective security arrangements, which enhance security of the members vis-à-vis each other. After the Second World War, by means of Article 51 of the UN Charter, the UN provided for the right of states to engage in self-defence and collective self defence against an armed attack. This article provided the foundation for collective defence organizations such as the former WEU, Warsaw Pact (WP), and NATO.¹⁶⁸

2.3.8 Conclusion

For the purpose of this analysis of the paths of change of security organizations, the key concepts of change of security organizations were discussed and disentangled, as were international cooperation, in terms of level and form, and international organizations, followed by security and security organizations. In what follows, the theoretical approaches within new institutionalism will be explored in relation to the analysis of change in international security organizations.

2.4 Theorising Change of Security Organizations

2.4.1 Introduction

Change in international (security) organizations, the main phenomenon of this research, takes many forms and many theoretical lenses may be applied to its analysis. According to the literature, there are clashing and complementary approaches to studying change. All these approaches draw attention to the significance of organizational form and function and, therefore, require different levels of analysis.¹⁶⁹

This section provides a discussion of the relevant debates and variety of approaches within new institutionalism that relate to the questions posed in Chapter 1. First, a short explanation will be provided of the development of institutionalism as a theory, which can be divided, roughly, into old and new institutionalism. This will be followed by a discussion of the three selected approaches within the theory of institutionalism, namely rational choice, historical institutionalism, and constructivist institutionalism.¹⁷⁰ and their explanation of how and why change takes place.

166 Ibid, p. 12.

167 Weitsman, A., 'Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War', Stanford University Press, 2004, p. 27.

168 Envisaged in article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949: 'Collective defence is a form of international cooperation in which all member states are expected but not obliged to collectively defend each other against a military threat or an attack from outside the territory'.

169 Scott, W. R., 'Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities', Sage Publications, 2014, p. 19.

170 For an elaboration on the many different approaches within new institutionalism, see: Roth, P. A., 'Meaning and Method in the Social Sciences: A Case for Methodological Pluralism', Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987; Ostrom, E., 'Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action', Cambridge University Press, 1990; Hall, Taylor, 1996; Peters, B. G., 'Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism', The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012; Scott, W. R., 'Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities', Sage Publications, 2014; Fioretos, O. (eds.), 'International Politics and Institutions in Time', Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 2017, p. 6-7.

After the explanation of each of the approaches separately, the differences between these approaches will be addressed.

2.4.2 History of Theorising Institutions and Institutional Thinking

Analysis of organizations and institutions is at the heart of many disciplines like political science and public administration and has produced multiple approaches. New institutionalism is one of such approach and the theoretical framework of this research is built upon different sub-approaches within new institutionalism. Therefore, before discussing the various approaches within new institutionalism, a short historical overview of institutionalism will be provided that summarises its origin, key debates, and the state of the art of new institutionalism – analysing the phenomenon of the ‘life’ of organizations.

Systematic thinking about political life and the nature of governmental institutions began with philosophers identifying and analysing institutions based upon their observations. This systematic analysis of institutions constituted the beginning of political science. Philosophers like Aristotle, Plato, Hobbes, and Montesquieu contributed to the analysis of institutions, giving rise to the contention that ‘political thinking has its roots in the analysis and design of institutions’.¹⁷¹

At the end of the nineteenth century, the scientific analysis of political and governmental institutions developed by Marx, Wilson, Weber, and Durkheim resulted in the emergence of the formal disciplines of political science and public administration. At that time, institutional theory analysed law and the central role of law in government. This method of research was mainly historical and normative, ‘...describing the so-called path to come to ‘good government’ in which the ‘right’ structure determined the legitimacy and effectiveness of a governmental institution’.¹⁷² Hence, the old institutionalists contributed descriptive insight into the ‘world of government’ by drawing conclusions from empirical investigation. This institutional and largely legal approach dominated political and social science until the 1950s. In reaction to the old institutionalists, rational choice theorists argued that there was more to political and social science ‘...than formal arrangements, decision-making’¹⁷³ and structures. As Selznick states, institutions are more than their structure and they adapt to their environment to survive, as legitimacy is crucial.¹⁷⁴

In the seventies, institutionalism was rediscovered and renewed by March and Olsen.¹⁷⁵ They claimed that the ‘...resurgence of concern with institutions is a cumulative consequence of the modern transformation of social institutions and persistent commentary from their observers. Social, political, and economic institutions have become larger, considerably more complex and resourceful, and *prima facie* more

171 Peters, G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism.’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 3.

172 Ibid, p. 7.

173 Lowndes, V., ‘Institutionalism’, in: Marsh, D., Stoker, G., ‘Theory and Methods in Political Science’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 90.

174 Selznick, P., ‘Foundations of the Theory of Organization’, *American Sociological Review* 13 (1), 1948, p. 25–35.

175 March, J. G., Olsen, J. P., ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life’, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 78, Nr. 3, 1984.

important to collective life'.¹⁷⁶ This complexity brought to institutionalism a mixture of management, political and organizational theories, resulting in the emergence of different schools. These schools ranged from the rediscovery of the value of 'the historical and comparative study of political systems', or historical institutionalism, and 'adapted rational choice models devised by economics to better explain the emergence and functioning of political institutions', rational-choice institutionalism,¹⁷⁷ to the analysis of the world outside the institution, prompted by the behavioural revolution of the fifties and sixties.¹⁷⁸ According to March and Olsen, new institutionalism is a mix of old institutionalism and new approaches; '...the new and the old are not identical, they are a blending of elements of old institutionalism into the new institutionalist styles of recent theories of politics'.¹⁷⁹ This 'blending' meant that '...the focus on institutions and the methods of the historian and the lawyer remain relevant, [but] implicit assumptions must give way to an explicit theory within which to locate the study of institutions',¹⁸⁰ which resulted in different approaches to institutional phenomena and greater variance in theoretical and methodological approaches.

As a 'best practice' of the old school, it was accepted 'that political structures shape political behaviour and are themselves normatively and historically embedded'.¹⁸¹ Building on this assumption, new institutionalists emphasised that political institutions played a more autonomous role in shaping political outcomes. They argued that 'the organization of political life makes a difference',¹⁸² that institutions 'are political actors in their own right'¹⁸³ and that they have the ability to shape other actors. In other words, institutions matter. Consideration of the impact of institutions on actors was later followed by the analysis of the interaction between institutions.¹⁸⁴ Furthermore, in addition to the political and legal formal rules described by the old institutionalists, new institutionalists, like constructivist institutionalists, focused '...on norms and values because they help to understand the functioning of an institution and give direction to its actors; the basis of behaviour in institutions is normative rather than coercive'.¹⁸⁵

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176 Ibid, p. 91.

177 Scott W. R., 'Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities', Sage Publications, 2014, p.18.

178 Peters, G., 'Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism', The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 15.

179 March, J. G., Olsen, J. P., 'The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders', *International Organization* 52, 4, Autumn 1998, p. 947-948.

180 Rhodes, R. A. W., 'Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability', Public Policy & Management, Philadelphia, US. Open University, 1997, p. 50.

181 Lowndes, V., 'Institutionalism', in: Marsh, D., Stoker, G., 'Theory and Methods in Political Science', Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 95.

182 March, J. G., Olsen, J. P., 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life', *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 78, Nr. 3, 1984, p. 747.

183 Ibid, p. 738.

184 Lowndes, V., 'Institutionalism', in: Marsh, D., Stoker, G., 'Theory and Methods in Political Science', Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 91.

185 Peters, B. G., 'Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism', The Continuum International Publishing Group, New York, 2012, p. 41.

All this resulted in a different methodological approach, one that contrasted with old institutionalists ‘...experimenting with deductive approaches that start from theoretical propositions about the way institutions work’.¹⁸⁶ In short, the debates within institutionalism resulted in an evolution of different theoretical approaches in which different perspectives on agents and structures and how they influence the life of organizations emerged. The three selected approaches for this analysis, rational choice, historical institutionalism, and constructivist institutionalism, will be elaborated upon below.

2.4.3 *Theorising the Concept of Change*

A Rational Choice Perspective on Change

The first new institutionalist approach of interest for the analysis of paths of change of organizations is rational choice. The central focus of the rational choice approach is the relationship between actors and organizations, and the way in which state preferences are guided and shaped in response to sanctions or incentives, otherwise known as the transaction-cost approach.¹⁸⁷ In other words, actors use institutions to maximize their utility. Institutions, then, are seen as a means of streamlining actors’ rational behaviour, which is primarily focused on utility maximisation. For rational choice theorists, institutions are equal to governance or rule systems and represent constructed orders established by actors to promote or protect their interests.¹⁸⁸ However, actors do face rule-based constraints imposed by the institutional environment that influence their behaviour. Struggles between the actors are based on contestation of these rules when one group of actors is able to gain leverage over another. Decision-making is explained through game theory,¹⁸⁹ as actors with power can overrule other actors.

The rational choice approach recognises that in real political life, the choices that are made by actors are not random; these choices are, in fact, stable because of the role that institutions play.¹⁹⁰ This stability in governmental processes can be explained ‘... by the ways in which rules or procedures and committee structures of legislatures structured the choices available to members’.¹⁹¹ The aim of analysis for rational choice scholars then becomes understanding structure and the role of institutions in providing this structure. Rational choice theory denies that institutional factors ‘produce behaviour’ or shape individual preferences, which they see as endogenously determined and relatively stable

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186 Lowndes, V., ‘Institutionalism’, in: Marsh, D., Stoker, G., ‘Theory and Methods in Political Science’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 95.

187 For an elaboration: Shepsle, K., ‘Rational Choice Institutionalism’, Harvard University Press, in: Rhodes, R. A. W., Binder, S. A., Rockman, B. A. (eds.), ‘The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions’, Oxford University Press, 2006.

188 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, New York, 2012, p. 48.

189 Williams, P. D., ‘Security Studies. An Introduction’, Routledge, Oxon, 2018, p. 43.

190 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, New York, 2012, p. 62–63.

191 Scott, W. R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage Publications 2012, p. 41.

(as they are determined by considerations of utility maximisation). Political institutions influence behaviour by affecting ‘the structure of a situation’ in which individuals select strategies for the pursuit of their preferences.¹⁹² Hence, for rational choice institutionalists, states are the most important actors and ‘...international organizations are instrumental associations designed to help states pursue their own goal more efficiently and formal international organizations are attractive to states because of two functional characteristics that reduce transaction costs: centralisation and independence’.¹⁹³

From the standpoint of rational choice, the creation of institutions is not an interesting subject of study. It is accepted that the design of an institution is simply there to minimise transaction costs, which would be significantly higher without these institutions in place. So, according to the rational choice approach, institutions have already been ‘designed’ as the result of a rational process aimed at reducing uncertainty. Institutions, it is argued, persist over time because they serve to reduce uncertainty and, as such, yield gains for the actors involved. With regard to the process of change, it is argued that the main engine of change is the pursuit of power. Change is driven by ‘...by conflicts and struggle to control valued resources, dominate markets and otherwise obtain power’.¹⁹⁴ Rational choice theorists argue that power struggles over the distribution of resources are the driving force behind change. Davis argues that ‘...institutional change resembles movements insofar as it involves the strategic framing of issues and interests, resources and coalition building’.¹⁹⁵

At the international level, rational choice theorists argue that the struggle for power between states is really a competition between different models of institutions. In other words, a certain model or organizational form may dominate different areas of cooperation between states. Organizations then have to compete with the particular interests of member states, which can result in the predominance of a relatively homogeneous organizational model and thus diminishes heterogeneity in organizational form. As Schneiberg argues, it is by no means guaranteed that these power struggles will result in the persistence of the most efficient institutional models, or that these struggles will lead to any institutional change at all, even when the organizational form is seen as being suboptimal.¹⁹⁶ Furthermore, the process of change may often include the rearranging or recombination of principles and practices in new and sometimes even creative ways, which can result in blending of new elements into pre-existing institutional arrangements that often have to be modified.¹⁹⁷ In other words, according to rational choice theorists, drivers of change have the capacity to influence different institutional designs that exist concurrently, meeting different needs, but all dealing with a certain policy area, like

192 Ostrom, E., ‘An Agenda for the Study of Institutions’, *Public Choice*, 48, 1986, p. 5-7, in: Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, New York, 2012, p. 52.

193 Schimmelfennig, F., ‘The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 19-20.

194 Campbell, J. L., ‘Institutional Change and Globalization’, Princeton University Press, 2004, p. 241.

195 Campbell, J. L., ‘Institutional Reproduction and Change’, Copenhagen Business School, Paper August 2007, p. 10-11.

196 Schneiberg, M., ‘What’s on the Path? Path Dependence, Organizational Diversity and the Problem of Institutional Change in the U.S. Economy, 1900-1950’, *Socio-Economic Review*, 2007, 5 (1) 47-80., p. 51.

197 Ibid, p. 76.

security. This may result in stabilisation or institutional overlap, as well as a mixture of institutional designs.¹⁹⁸

In short, the point of departure for rational choice theorists in analysing change is that the function of an organization is primarily to serve actors' interests in terms of reducing uncertainty. The central focus of rational choice theorists is the relationship between actors and institutions and the capability of actors and institutions to mutually guide and shape preferences by means of sanctions or incentives. Change then is caused by factors exogenous to the institution, such as the national interest of member states, and may result in the loss or gain of institutional legitimacy.

Change According to Historical Institutionalism

The second approach that will be used for the analysis of paths of change of organizations is historical institutionalism. Historical institutionalism can be explained as an evolutionary theory that traces '...the evolution of an institutional form and [asks] how it affects the actors' preferences and behaviour'.¹⁹⁹ In contrast to other institutionalist schools, historical institutionalism is based on historical reconstruction: 'Although individuals build these structures, there is no assurance that they will produce what they intend. Current choices and possibilities are constrained by past choices'.²⁰⁰ Historical institutionalism reasons on the basis of primary choices and the obligations that flow from the creation of an institution, which determines the development or the 'set up' of an institution. 'Policies are path dependent and once launched on that path they continue along until some sufficiently strong political force deflects them from it'.²⁰¹ Historical institutionalism deals with the questions of where institutions come from and when they were created, the so-called 'formative moment' and the path of the institution following that formative moment, not only the process itself and the possible outcome.²⁰² As Scott argues, '...institutions do not emerge in a vacuum; they always challenge, borrow from, and, to varying degrees displace prior institutions'.²⁰³ Institutions, once established, have a '...continuing effect on subsequent decision-making and institutional episodes'.²⁰⁴ In other words, "...the historical institutionalists do provide an avenue of looking at policy across

198 This process is also referred to as isomorphism. For reference: DiMaggio, P.J., Powell, W.W., 'The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 48, 1983.

199 Scott, W. R., 'Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities', Sage Publications 2012, p. 42.

200 Ibid, p. 39.

201 Krasner, S. D., 'Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics', *Comparative Politics* 16, 1984, in: Peters, B. G., 'Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism', The Continuum International Publishing Group, New York, 2012, p. 20-21.

202 See for evolution theories and organizational ecology: Hannan, M. T., Freeman, J., 'The Population Ecology of Organizations', *American Journal of Sociology*, Volume 82, Issue 5 (Mar., 1977), p. 929-964; Barnett, W. P., 'The Dynamics of Competitive Intensity', *Administrative Quarterly*, Vol. 42. No. 1, Mar., 1997, p. 128-160; Baum, A.S. C., Amburgey, T. L., 'Organizational Ecology', Rotman School of Management, Toronto, 2000.

203 For an elaboration on the concept of creation, see: Scott, W. R., 'Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities', Sage Publications, 2012, p. 114.

204 Scott, W. R., 'Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities', Sage Publications 2012, p. 25.

time, while other institutionalist approaches are more bound in time and even in space'.²⁰⁵ As such, historical institutionalism focuses on the nature and evolution of institutions and examines the ways in which these institutions shape or are shaped.

With regard to change, specifically, the phenomenon under study here, historical institutionalism assumes that institutions are resistant. The main focus of historical institutionalism is this persistence of patterns and organizations by virtue of their initial creation. Inspired by the old institutionalists, the basic idea is that institutions only change in so-called 'path-dependent' ways that flow from the formation and creation of an institution. Furthermore, it is argued that if they do change, it is not in response to shocks and will not take place quickly.²⁰⁶ Path dependency implies that early decisions related to institutional design create incentives as by-products that encourage actors to maintain policy and institutional choices that were made when the organization was created or in the context of follow-up developments. Path dependency is, therefore, the product of critical junctures or periods of time in which processes are set in motion that reduce the likelihood that alternative choices will be made, resulting in change or continuity of institutional form. In its domain, historical institutionalist scholars often compare political systems or particular policy areas and show how institutions become deeply embedded, producing path-dependent policy making.²⁰⁷

Furthermore, historical institutionalists argue that institutions change if their environment requires it. In other words, institutions depend on the legitimacy that stems from actors outside the institution; '...taking cues from their institutional environment as they construct their preferences and select the appropriate behavior for a given institutional environment'.²⁰⁸ Therefore, institutions behave according to a logic of appropriateness. According to Meyer, '...western institutional practices diffuse among nation states such that over time countries tend to converge on common institutional norms (that is a set of principles and practices) that are deemed appropriate and legitimate by their peers within the field'.²⁰⁹

The theory of historical institutionalism sees the process of change as follows: 'For most of its existence, an institution will exist in an equilibrium state, functioning in accordance with the decisions made at its initiation. But these points are not necessarily

205 Peters, B. G., 'Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism', The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 77.

206 According to Campbell the concept of path dependence refers to a process where contingent events or decisions result in organizations being established that tend to persist over long periods of time and constrain the range of options available to actors in the future, including those that may be more efficient or effective in the long run. In other words, latter events are largely, but not entirely, dependent on those that preceded them. See: Campbell, J. L., 'Institutional Change and Globalization', Princeton University Press, 2004, p. 4. According to Scott, path dependency lies in borrowing or displacing prior institutions. See: Scott, W. R., 'Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities', Sage Publications 2012, p. 114.

207 Krasner, S. D., (ed), 'International Regimes', Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983.

208 March, J. G., Olsen, J. P., 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life', The American Political Science Review, 1984, Vol. 78, Nr. 3, p. 746-747.

209 Meyer, J. W., Boli, J., Thomas, G.M., Ramirez, F.O., 'World Society and the Nation State', American Journal of Sociology, 1997, 103, (1) 144-181, p. 165.

permanent'.²¹⁰ Historical institutionalists define this as the concept of 'punctuated equilibrium', which is borrowed from Darwinian evolutionary theory and is intended to highlight the environmental dependency of institutional change. Evolution, or the concept of gradual change, is an important concept within historical institutionalism. This means that the basic structure of an institution will remain intact, but some changes are possible: '...not all of these changes will be functional for the actual delivery of the policy - some may be simply means of appearing to change in order to maintain the status quo, while attempting to satisfy political demands for change'.²¹¹ Furthermore, change can also be elicited by actors from within the organization (endogenous change). This is in contrast with the rational choice approach that sees change as being caused exclusively by exogenous factors. If this happens, the institution, it is argued, will adapt '...its own internal dynamics in order to preserve itself and to establish a new equilibrium'.²¹²

The argument that there is little or no scientific capacity to predict change is fundamental to the theory of historical institutionalism. According to Peters, this is why historical institutionalism is more descriptive than explanatory: 'This highlights the importance of the absence of a clear model of agency within the approach'.²¹³ So, while the design of an institution is on the research agenda of historical institutionalism, the analysis of change remains a difficult theme, in contrast to the rational choice approach. Design then is defined as '...the initial choices of policies and structures, design may be the selection of ideas that will motivate the institution during the remainder of its existence'.²¹⁴ According to historical institutionalism, there are different degrees of success in adaptation to change; highly-institutionalised systems that may have been capable of resisting pressures to change may actually change substantially, while less highly institutionalised systems may resist change. It is also argued that institutions can be strengthened and reinforced or be undermined; self-reinforcing institutions are those institutions that change the political environment in ways that make itself more stable. In contrast, self-undermining institutions are ones in which a previously stable institutional equilibrium is undermined.²¹⁵

In short, the basic considerations of the historical institutionalists with regard to organizational change are that organizations may change according to the logic of path dependency, but within a so-called punctuated equilibrium and if change does happen, it does so incrementally or evolutionarily. Historical institutionalists focus on the effect of institutions over time and include historical legacies because they argue that pre-existing structures shape and constrain actors, thereby preserving equilibrium.

210 Peters, B. G., 'Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism', The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 78.

211 Ibid, p. 80.

212 Ibid, p. 81.

213 Ibid, p. 89.

214 Ibid, p. 84.

215 Greif, A., Laitin, D. D., 'A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change', American Political Science Review, 98 (4), 2004, p. 633-652.

Change According to Constructivist Institutionalism

The third approach used here for the analysis of paths of change of organizations is constructivist institutionalism. After the end of the Cold War, scholars began to focus on the emergence and effectiveness of organizations. It was argued that there had been a lack of analysis of (international) organizations as actors in their own right.²¹⁶ This represented the emergence of the constructivist approach within institutionalism, with its focus on the emergence and life of organizations. Constructivist institutionalists claim that institutions influence actors' behaviour by shaping their values, norms, interests, identities, and beliefs.²¹⁷ In other words, 'ideas matter' to paths of change of institutions and the way institutions act based on norms of behaviour, as some ideas are considered more acceptable than others. Hence, this approach within institutionalism focuses on the role of ideas in the creation and process of change of institutions and the behaviour of different actors.²¹⁸ It is argued that rules and structures of an organization embody values and therefore power relationships even if they seem neutral at first sight.²¹⁹

The constructivist approach contends that the creation of an institution implies some degree of understanding among the participants about the existence and aim of the institution. This understanding, however, may come from argumentation and bargaining between these participants.²²⁰ After the institution is created, there may be periods of stability in which ideas and policy reach an equilibrium. But this stability may also become destabilised because the institution itself generally remains open to the recruitment of new members and, thus, ideas. With regard to change, the focus lies on explaining how institutions persist and exercise their influence over actors.²²¹ When an institution changes, the process is chaotic and hard to control and institutions '...increase capability by reducing comprehensiveness', in other words, they simplify life '...by ensuring that some things are taken as given in deciding other things'.²²²

The analytical question facing constructivists is, then, how and why institutions and their structures change. Their answer lies in an evolutionary model in which it is expected that institutions change and progress continuously. Existing rules are perceived as factors influencing both standardisation and variation. Variation is included here because there

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216 Park, S., 'International organizations and Global problems. Theories and Explanations', Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 26.

217 For instance, Hall whose work is also closely related to the development of historical institutionalism; Hall, P. A., 'Policy paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain', *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Apr., 1993), p. 275-296. Katzenstein, P. J. (ed.), 'The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics', Columbia University Press, 1996. And Adler and Barnett, who draw upon Deutsch classical work 'Security Communities' focussed on initiatives and policies instead of material gain and state utility. Adler, E., Barnett, M., 'Security Communities', *Cambridge Studies in International Relations*, October 28, 1998.

218 Wendt, A., 'Social Theory of International Politics', Cambridge University Press, 2012.

219 Lowndes, V., 'Institutionalism', in: Marsh, D., Stoker, G., 'Theory and Methods in Political Science', Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 95

220 Schmidt, V. A., 'Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse', *Annual review of Political Science*, 11 (1), 2008.

221 Lowndes, V., 'Institutionalism', in: Marsh, D., Stoker, G., 'Theory and Methods in Political Science', Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 105.

222 March, J. G., Olsen, J.P., 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life', *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 78, Nr. 3, 1984, p. 17.

are always areas of uncertainty in the interpretation and application of rules since ‘...rules are adapted by actors seeking to make sense of changing environments’²²³ and rules work by specifying ‘appropriate’ behaviour.²²⁴ Hence, while institutions may represent stable environments, these are environments in which ongoing discussion takes place, which may result in the reversal of stable patterns and fixed rules.²²⁵ In this sense, the constructivist institutionalist approach is more open to the prospect of change than any of the other approaches under scrutiny in this research are.

At a certain point, institutions must achieve a certain degree of stability, otherwise there would not be any change. According to the constructivists, change occurs in an incremental or revolutionary fashion depending on what is at stake for the actors in play. A stable equilibrium can be disturbed because one or more of the actors involved recognises that his or her ideas are not being executed or advanced through continued participation.²²⁶ Furthermore, it is argued by constructivists that the less structured an institution is, the less the institution is able to influence or even shape an individual. And, the variety of actors within the institution can be better managed if there is more internal homogeneity and, simultaneously, a high degree of exclusivity.

Finally, if change takes place, it is based on existing structures and can result in new combinations or in entirely new structures or even institutions. And with regard to institutional survival, the constructivists imply that it is necessary to maintain ‘...some openness to policy ideas and discourses that are not central to the status quo within the institution’, which means that the more open an institution is in terms of its action the more successful it is.²²⁷ As such, it may be that, as a result of this necessary openness and inter-activeness, different actors yield different outcomes in processes of change.

In contrast to the other approaches selected for this research, constructivists have a distinctive research focus on international institutions, which will be elaborated upon more extensively in this dissertation. The work of Barnett and Finnemore, in particular, became a prime example of the constructivist theory of international organizations and their possible autonomy.²²⁸ Constructivists aim to understand the organizational context by including ideas and identities of a diversity of actors like institutions and their organs, all regarded as actors in their own right. This approach takes the independent and autonomous nature of organizations into account and looks in and outside the black

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223 Lowndes, V., ‘Institutionalism’, in: Marsh, D., Stoker, G., ‘Theory and Methods in Political Science’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 105.

224 March, J. G., Olsen, J. P., ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life’, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 78, Nr. 3, 1984, p. 17.

225 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, New York, 2012, p. 113.

226 Hay, C., ‘Constructivist Institutionalism’, in: Rhodes, R. A. W., Binder, S. A., Rockman, B. A. (eds.), ‘Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions’, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.

227 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 124.

228 Exemplified by: Barnett, M. N., Finnemore, M., ‘The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations’, *International Organization*, Vol. 53, No. 4, 1999.

box of organizations and inter-state bargaining.²²⁹ The central aim of ‘...constructivist theorising of international organizations has been to understand how and why they behave the way they do and whether they are capable of change’.²³⁰ The analytical question for constructivists, then, is whether power is a result of self-interest of the organization or is based on its organizational culture.²³¹ According to constructivists, power stems from two sources: ‘the fact that international organizations are considered legitimate international actors on the basis of their rational-legal authority as bureaucracies; and their control over technical expertise and information’.²³²

Furthermore, constructivists analyse the behaviour of individuals within and outside institutions and argue that both individuals and organizations influence one another; therefore, institutions and individuals are connected. According to constructivists they include a very diverse group of politicians, civil and military personnel of a security institution, and other related national and international institutions. According to Barnett and Finnemore, who perceive international organizations as bureaucracies, ‘...bureaucracy is a distinctive social form of authority with its own internal logic’ and they emphasise ‘... the ability of an international bureaucracy, such as a secretariat, to behave in ways that are not explicitly intended by member states’.²³³ Because of that authority, ‘...bureaucracies have autonomy and the ability to change the world around them’.²³⁴ Furthermore, ‘... international organizations, ..., create new categories of actors, form new interests for actors, define new shared international tasks, and disseminate new models of social organization around the globe’.²³⁵ Perceiving international organizations as bureaucracies has consequences for the degree and level of institutionalisation, and variation in autonomy and authority. The organs, e.g. the organization’s staff, within the organization have ownership of specific information and can choose to provide this to other actors, e.g. member states.²³⁶ Another asset of these organs are the mechanisms and processes that make all institutions work: expertise, procedures for deliberation, decision-making, and implementation.²³⁷ Some scholars claim that ‘...these administrations perform specific functions, and their officials act as role players: they identify at least to some degree with ‘their’ institution entrenched as they are in institutional environments with specific

229 Nielson, D. L., Tierney, M. J., ‘Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform’, *International Organization*, Volume 57, Issue 2, 2003, p. 241-276.

230 Park, S., ‘International organizations and Global problems. Theories and Explanations’, Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 31.

231 Barnett, M. N., Finnemore, M., ‘The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organizations’, *International Organization* 53, 4, Autumn 1999.

232 Park, S., ‘International organizations and Global problems. Theories and Explanations’, Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 28.

233 Barnett, M. N., Finnemore, M., ‘Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics’, Cornell University Press, 2004, p. 10.

234 Ibid, p. 3.

235 Ibid, p. 193.

236 Wallander, C. A., ‘Institutional assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War’, *International organization*, volume 54, Issue 04, September 2000, p. 711.

237 Keohane, R. O., ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4, December 1988, p. 379-396, in: Derian, der, J., ‘International Theory: Critical Investigations’, Basingstoke Macmillan, 1995.

cultures (usually with an integrative mission). They are protective of their institutional status quo and do their best to expand their organizational resources if opportunities arise to do so. They may develop considerable policy autonomy by exploiting information to the disadvantage of member state governments'.²³⁸ This may also lead to the opposite situation, in which bureaucracies can cause inefficient, ineffective, repressive, and unaccountable mechanisms and processes.²³⁹

In short, constructivism can be regarded as a more inclusive approach in comparison to the other approaches dealt with in this research project. It is inclusive with regard to the analysis of structure, as well as agency in relation to the analysis of paths of change of international organizations. Constructivism is focused on the process of both creation of and change in institutions. Furthermore, analyses of the interaction between the actors involved is important to constructivism, as this determines the nature of the institution and its policy outcomes. As change is the phenomenon under study here, the constructivist approach is interesting, as it includes all possible actors and mechanisms on the basis of which to analyse change.

2.4.4 Consistency and Difference between the Approaches within New Institutionalism

In the sections above, three approaches of new institutionalism have been discussed: rational choice, historical institutionalism, and constructivist institutionalism. The chosen palette of these three approaches provides theoretical explanation of the phenomenon of change in international organizations and offers different and overlapping explanations of how and why organizations change. And, although the theory of institutionalism encompasses different approaches, built on distinctive assumptions regarding the analysis of organizations, their adherence to the 'world of institutions' as a mantra binds these approaches.

Stability, the opposite of change, is a defining feature of institutions and for some theories it is the starting point for analysis. Change, and thus instability, on the other hand, is explained differently by the various theoretical lenses of institutionalism. The way that change is conceptualised depends upon the role that the approach assigns to the actor or structure that causes change. In other words, it depends on the conceptualisation of the relationship between the individual and the institution under scrutiny. This debate within institutionalism justifies the approaches selected for the purposes of this research, as they all provide different explanations of institutional creation and change that include different actors and mechanisms. Hence, to understand how the different approaches deal with change, it is essential to identify differences, consistencies, and complementarities between them. As such, prior to presenting the research framework, an overview is provided of the similarities and differences between the selected approaches.

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238 Mayer, S., 'Embedded Politics, Growing Informalization? How NATO and the EU Transform Provision of External Security', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (August 2011), p. 311.

239 Barnett, M. N., Finnemore, M., 'The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organizations', *International Organization* 53, 4, Autumn 1999, p. 726.

Differences

With regard to creation, the selected approaches differ in their analysis and focus, as was elaborated above. This research acknowledges the importance of the process of creation to the analysis of European security organizations. The creation and design of an organization can be a difficult process in which compromises are required between the actors involved. Therefore, once organizations are established, it is possible that actors will be resistant to change due to procedural obstacles and the process of institutionalisation. ‘The more familiar and comfortable they become with it, the more hesitant they are to deviate from it’.²⁴⁰ On the other hand, if change is observed in selected organizations in terms of task and mandate, the question rises as to how, why and by what or whose means did these organizations change.

Change then, to some extent, is seen differently by the three selected approaches, in particular with regard to actorness and the actual process of change. The more realist approach, rational choice, claims that change in (international) organizations reflects a change in actors’ preferences. Organizations are primarily created to serve the interests of the states involved, which can result in strengthening cooperation among states to reduce transaction costs, or the alternative: competition, merger, or even organizational failure. In other words, the interests and priorities of states are decisive in shaping the mandate and tasks of organizations.

Conversely, according to constructivist institutionalism within institutionalism, organizations have the ability to influence or even enforce rules vis-à-vis other actors and the environment, in general. ‘For some visions of institutions this may be in order to have their adversaries constrained, while for others it may be a more normative explanation that individuals expect values and roles to be provided to them by the institutions they join’.²⁴¹ It is argued that change can be explained by the actions of state and non-state actors, processes, and mechanisms. Constructivist institutionalists explain change as being driven by all sorts of actors, including non-state actors or mechanisms.

The third approach, historical institutionalism, perceives change as a gradual or evolutionary (path-dependent) process.²⁴² In practice, organizations are perceived as being resistant to change; if they do change, this is a natural process governed by the concept of punctuated equilibrium, meaning the basic structure of an institution will remain the same in spite of nominal change. According to this approach, causes of change can be multiple, but, in terms of the explanation of what drives institutional change, there is little emphasis on the agent/actor side. Their focus lies on the when and how question of change, namely the process.

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240 Campbell, J. L., ‘Institutional Change and Reproduction’, *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Institutional Analysis*, Oxford University press, New York, 2009, p. 5.

241 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, *The Continuum International Publishing Group*, 2012, p. 174.

242 Thelen, K., ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’, *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.*, 1999, 2:369-404, p. 371.

Consistencies and Complementarities

The following consistencies can be observed between the different approaches.

For one, they all focus on institutional and political structures that are of importance to analysing the development of organizations. Within institutionalism, organizations are normatively and historically embedded.²⁴³ Another common denominator within institutionalism is the analytical focus on institutions as the central components of the ‘world of politics’. As Peters claims, ‘...the basic argument is that institutions do matter, and that they matter more than anything else that could be used to explain political decisions’.²⁴⁴ Within institutionalism, there are different approaches that argue that state actors shape the international political, social, and economic order. Nevertheless, the opposite is claimed to be true as well because although organizations are designed by actors, these actors operate within structural constraints imposed on their own actions by these organizations themselves.

There are also a variety of complementarities that can be observed between the different approaches. First, constructivists share a similar reading of interstate cooperation with the rational choice scholars. Rational choice’s agency-centred approach is, in fact, complemented by the constructivist claim that ‘...political culture, discourse and ‘the social construction of interests and identities matter’.²⁴⁵ For constructivists, it is interesting to trace the impact of ideas and the process by which certain ideas are accepted, becoming constative norms, and rejected. As ideas lead actors to make certain choices, the institutionalisation of ideas can reconstruct the interests of both state and non-state actors. Furthermore, within the security and defence policy domain, states have an important role to play; this is accounted for by rational institutionalists, but this does not mean that other actors have to be excluded from analysis. Constructivist scholars are more open to considering the impact of a diverse range of actors and their role in processes of change, which they argue are too focused on structural causes and material costs. However, within the constructivist approach, the focus is on the ideas, not so much on the interests, of the different actors. As the policy area of relevance here is high politics, dealing with the security and defence domain, the specific interests of state actors under scrutiny is significant. Finally, norms, values, and debates define interests of all actors and the policy outcomes and vice versa, which could link the approaches of rational choice and constructivist institutionalism. At some point, a common agreement on building or breaking the mandate and tasks of institutions is achieved; when this happens is an unanswered question within the constructivists approach.

Second, in contrast with the rational choice approach, historical institutionalists analyse international cooperation over time as ‘...the notion that institutions, once created,

243 Lowndes, V., ‘Institutionalism’, p. 101, in: Marsh, D., Stoker, G., ‘Theory and Methods in Political Science’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

244 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 184.

245 Risse, T., ‘Social Constructivism and European Integration’, in: Wiener, A., Diez, T., ‘European Integration Theory’, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005, p. 146.

are indeed ‘sticky’ and persist over time’.²⁴⁶ The analysis of institutions over time applies specifically to one of the most studied organizations included in this project, namely the EU, as ‘... much of the rational choice literature on the EU arguably underemphasises the central point of the early neo-functionalist literature, namely the concept of European integration as a process which does indeed unfold over time, often as a result of the unintended consequences of early integration decisions’.²⁴⁷ In the world of international institutionalised organizations, historical institutionalism has been used more than once to analyse the specific phenomenon of international cooperation. Hence, in contrast with the other two approaches included here, historical institutionalism’s unique emphasis on time allows for the longitudinal study of the process of international cooperation, as the cases selected date back to the Cold War.

Third, both the historical and constructivist perspectives adhere to the view that institutions can progressively take on a life of their own and exert influence both on the institutional process and on the outcome of these activities.²⁴⁸ For constructivists, in each step of institution building, ideas can be continuously causative, directing the process along.²⁴⁹ And this factor, ideas, can be connected ‘...to historical causes of an institutionalist logic of path dependence’, which to a certain extent necessitates a combination of constructivist and historical institutionalism.²⁵⁰ Hence, when analysing the process of change of international organizations based on a constructivist approach, incorporating the path-dependency approach of historical institutionalism has added value.

Fourth, constructivists emphasise specific mechanisms of international cooperation, like spill-over effects of integration theories, to analyse the process of change.²⁵¹ Though criticised,²⁵²

this mechanism, at the root of continuous causes of change, have been supplemented by historical causes identified by historical institutionalists, as well. Historical institutionalists see this mechanism as being a self-reinforcing institutional path.²⁵³

Finally, this research project treats not only state actors, but other actors and mechanisms as objects of study. In contrast with rational choice and historical institutionalists, institutions are not only comprised of structures. They are also seen as mechanisms by which individuals, organs and these institutions themselves achieve goals. These goals can vary, be more or less stable and may even be conflictual; this is in contrast

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246 Pollack, M., ‘The New Institutionalisms and European Integration’, in: Wiener, A., Diez, T., ‘European Integration Theory’, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005, p. 136.

247 Idem.

248 Howorth, J., ‘Security and Defence Policy in the European Union’, The European Union Series, 2nd edition, 2014, p. 34.

249 Parsons, C., ‘The Institutional Construction of Interests’, in: Nelsen, B. F., Stub, A. (eds.), ‘The European Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration’, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014, p. 292-293.

250 Ibid, p. 293.

251 Ibid, p. 291.

252 Rosamond, B., ‘The uniting of Europe and the foundation of EU studies: revisiting the neo functionalism of Ernst B. Haas’, Journal of European Public Policy, Routledge, April 2005.

253 Parsons, C., ‘The Institutional Construction of Interests’, in: Nelsen, B. F., Stub, A. (eds.), ‘The European Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration’, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014, p. 291.

with the rational choice and historical institutionalist approaches that argue that the end goal of an organization is stability and survival. As a result, according to the constructivists, the ideas of stability and survival can be agents of change within existing structures that may become fixed or obsolete.²⁵⁴

In conclusion, there is no grand theory of institutionalism because definitions, interpretations, and assumptions vary between the different perspectives, particularly when it comes to explaining institutional change. However, the palette offered by these three approaches together provides complementary theoretical explanations of the phenomenon of change of international security organizations and the question as to how and why they change by accounting for the role of different actors and mechanisms.

2.4.5 *The Road to a Combined Research Framework*

This analysis deals with multiple agents and structures because it is argued that state, non-state actors and mechanisms cause change. Therefore, different approaches to explaining change are taken into account; this is in contrast to analysing institutional change on the basis of a single approach to institutionalism.

The positions and relevance of state and non-state actors is a subject of debate within institutionalism. For one, states (as either full or partial members of organizations) play a crucial role in the process of organizational change in the realm of high politics, namely security and state sovereignty. Therefore, based on the rational actor assumption derived from rational choice theory, states are influential and important actors. On the other hand, within the rational choice approach, it is argued that international organizations are created to serve the interests of the state and to encourage cooperation between states by reducing transaction costs and insecurity.²⁵⁵ Nevertheless, this research sees international organizations as actors in their own right and in addition to states. The constructivist institutionalist approach lends credence to the idea that both states and non-state actors influence change.

Furthermore, different approaches within institutionalism focus on the organization as a unitary entity, not paying attention to the different components (organs, individuals and mechanisms) that make them up that might also influence change. In contrast, other approaches within institutionalism focus specifically on these actors. Constructivist institutionalists claim that organizations are made up of a variety of organs and that, over time, these organs may begin to complement one another ‘...to the extent that the functioning of one embraces the functioning of another’.²⁵⁶ Hall and Soskice argue that ‘...the interconnectedness of these institutions, ..., make it very difficult to change one institution because changing one implies changing others as well since they are tightly coupled. And changing one could undermine the benefits resulting from this institutional

254 Scharpf, F. W., ‘The Joint Decision Trap: Lessons from German federalism and European Integration’, *Public Administration* 66, 1988, p. 239-278.

255 Kirchner, E. J., Domínguez, R., ‘The Security Governance of regional Organizations’, Routledge, 2011, p. 7.

256 Campbell, J. L., ‘Institutional Change and Reproduction’, *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Institutional Analysis*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, p. 15.

complementarity'.²⁵⁷ Although different in their design and decision-making power, the security organizations under scrutiny are made up of many actors. These actors are also seen in the interaction between the organizations, exemplified by the Council and the Commission of the EU or the North Atlantic Council of NATO. Therefore, the different actors involved in European security organizations in this analysis are accepted as actors that influence processes and outcomes of change.

Additionally, research on the relationship between (security) organizations, referred to as inter-organizationalism in the literature, has emerged, which brings the analysis of actorhood of organizations and its organs one step further. As a result of the increase in interaction between organizations, new institutionalism takes into account the level and form of the interrelationship and interaction between security organizations, including political, legal and military aspects of this relationship. Constructivists, in particular, aim to understand the organizational context by including the ideas and identities of a variety of actors like institutions and their organs individually and in relation to each other; this approach looks both inside and outside the black box of organizations and inter-organizational bargaining.

In short, as change in international security organizations is the phenomenon under study here, the theory of new institutionalism provides common ground that is of interest when trying to form a more complete picture of the phenomenon of change in these security organizations. Simultaneously, the differences between the approaches are of as much importance as the similarities and need to be encapsulated in the analysis of paths of change of security organizations. Therefore, it is argued that a combination of the three approaches in a combined research framework addresses the shortcomings of each individual approach when analysing the path of change.

2.4.6 Combining New Institutional Approaches

Several scholars have attempted to combine different approaches by building on their similarities.²⁵⁸ Scharpf reasons that each approach separately is incomplete and that they should be combined to provide a more complete explanation.²⁵⁹ Peters agrees, stating that '...some blending of the strands of theory should be viewed more as complementary rather than competitive explanations for political phenomena'.²⁶⁰ In other words, none of the approaches can fully explain all possible processes observed and, as such, there is a need to combine several of the approaches to get a complete perspective on the structural characteristics of a political system. Likewise, according to Thelen, there is even evidence of an initial convergence in the different approaches.²⁶¹ Like Scharpf, Thelen criticises the

257 Idem. Derived from Hall and Soskice' research on the varieties of capitalism, claiming that change can only be understood by analysing the relationships among institutions. Hall, P. A., Soskice, D., 'An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism', p. 1-70, in: Hall, P. A., Soskice, D., (eds.), 'Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage', Oxford University Press, New York, 2001.

258 Hall, P. A., and Taylor, R., 'Political Science and the Three Institutionalisms', *Political Studies*, 44, 1996, p. 936-957.

259 Scharpf, F. W., 'Games Real Actors Play', Westview Press, 1997, p. 318.

260 Peters, B. G., 'Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism', The Continuum International Publishing Group, New York, 2005, p. 2.

261 Thelen, K., 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics', *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.*, 1999, 2:369-404, p. 371.

separation of theories, focusing either on the extent of change or the way in which change might take place: in an incremental or revolutionary fashion and by means of a critical juncture or path dependency.²⁶² In other words, the rigid, sometimes artificial boundaries between the three separate worlds of rational choice, historical institutionalism and constructivist institutionalism is questioned. Peters also suggests that a 'mixture' of the different approaches in which the boundaries are less defined might be helpful. 'We need not to choose between these approaches if we wish to understand institutional change of the security organizations over a longer period of time'.²⁶³ Overall, several scholars have identified the need for a more combined approach to analysing organizational change.²⁶⁴

In sum, this research project combines different new institutionalist approaches, as they all offer valuable arguments and theoretical explanations of change. Most social science theories are incapable of explaining a full process or outcome. There appears to be a need to bring together a range of variables and theories together in some form of 'causal reconstruction'.²⁶⁵ An emphasis on ideas, combined with an emphasis on structure put forward by other institutionalist approaches can provide a more complete interpretation of the complexities of institutional life than any individual approach can. Hence, it is argued here that while no one of the selected approaches performs well in isolation, when they are combined, they are well positioned to explain the research puzzle and help identify causal factors related to change.

2.4.7 Conclusion

To address the research question, the theory of institutionalism was chosen as a lens with which to analyse paths of change of the selected security organizations. Institutionalism offers an analytical focus on the 'world of organizations', which provides guidance and enables the analysis of change in organizations by linking past and present developments and combining various agents and structures. The intention is not to 'test' whether or not the selected approach of rational choice explains change in security organizations better than, for instance, historical institutionalism. The intention is to combine the different argumentation of the approaches to cover the complex institutional security environment and enable academic bridge-building between different perspectives with a theoretical framework that combines different aspects in a comprehensive analysis. This explains the choice of a research framework that includes aspects of rational choice, historical

262 Streeck, W., Thelen, K., 'Beyond Continuity. Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies', Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 3.

263 Peters, B. G., 'Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism', The Continuum International Publishing Group, New York, 2005, p. 2.

264 Exemplified by: Barnett, M. N., Finnemore, M., 'Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics', Cornell University Press, 2004; Streeck, W., Thelen, K., 'Beyond Continuity. Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies', Oxford University Press, 2005; Mahoney, J., Thelen, K., 'Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency and Power', Cambridge University press, 2009; Kirchner, E. J., Dominguez, R., 'The Security Governance of Regional Organizations', Routledge, 2011; Fioretos, O. (eds.), 'International Politics and Institutions in Time', Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 2017.

265 For an elaboration on the debate: Mayntz, R. (ed), 'Akteure, Mechanismen, Modelle: Zur Theoriefähigkeit makro-sozialer Analysen', Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag, 2002.

institutionalism, and constructivist institutionalism to analyze change in the European security organizations, with the aim of contributing to the theory of institutionalism.

2.5 The Framework for Explaining Change in Security Organizations

2.5.1 Introduction

Selecting security organizations as the main unit of analysis in this research project allows for the induction of analytical inferences from different new institutionalist approaches to explain the concept of change in security organizations, taking a broad perspective of possible actors and mechanisms drawn from these selected approaches. As such, the aim of this research is to explain paths of deepening, broadening and widening observed in European security organizations between 1990 and 2016. This is realised by explaining how and why European security organizations changed individually, and in comparison, to one another by analysing their paths of change. This section will first provide more detail on these paths of change and the specific definition of change in this research, namely broadening, widening, and deepening. Next, an explanation of the drivers of change that make up the research framework that guides this research will be provided.

2.5.2 Paths of Change

Broadening

The path of broadening is generally defined as expanding the scope of tasks of an organization.²⁶⁶ The literature identifies different ways of analysing task expansion.²⁶⁷ In this research project, the analysis of broadening is limited to change in the scope of tasks of security organizations, i.e. the policy areas in which the organizations are authorised to act. The functional scope can vary between authority over a single security policy issue and authority over an entire range of security policies.²⁶⁸ The starting point of the analysis is the different concepts of security organization, defined as collective defence and collective security organizations.

Broadening is measured by the categorisation of change in level and form. The form of broadening can vary from comprehensive to issue-specific tasks. This breadth of policy areas can also vary in terms of level, moving from ad-hoc to more institutionalised cooperation. Finally, it has to be mentioned that, in contrast with other research, this

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266Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., Schimmelfennig, F., 'Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union', Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 7-11.

267 Broadening is at the heart of neo-functional thinking; (the logic of) sectoral integration. The theory of neo-functionalism is one of the integration theories. Neo-functionalists expected the driving force of integration in one sector to create pressures for further integration within and beyond that sector, the mechanism of functional spill-over. Neo-functionalists theorised this logic of integration as a gradual, rational and self-sustaining process, a snowballing effect. See: Haas, E., 'The Uniting of Europe', Stanford University Press, 1958; Lindberg, L. N., Scheingold, S. A., 'Europe's Would-Be Polity', Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1970, p. 67-71; Börzel, T. A., 'Mind the gap! European integration between level and scope', Journal of European Public Policy, Routledge, April 2005, p. 218-219.

268Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., Schimmelfennig, F., 'Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union', Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 8.

research acknowledges broadening as a separate path, in addition to deepening and widening. This is because it can affect both deepening and widening and because it can occur independently in the absence of deepening and widening.²⁶⁹ In short, broadening is understood as the initial expansion of the scope of tasks of a security organization into new policy areas measured by the form and level of change. The path of broadening will be described empirically in Chapter 4.

Widening

The path of widening is broadly defined as a ‘...process of gradual and formal horizontal institutionalisation’ or a process of ‘geographical spill-over’, i.e. enlargement in terms of the accession of new member states.²⁷⁰ Here, in addition to the full accession of new member states, widening includes partnerships with state and non-state actors.²⁷¹ Widening in this sense is, thus, not restricted to the accession of outside states to the organization, but extended to the analysis of relations with outside states and international organizations. Widening is measured by the categorisation of change in level and form. The form of widening can vary in terms of the different forms of membership and partnership. These different forms of widening can also vary in their level of institutionalisation. In short, widening encompasses enlargement with members and cooperation with partners and organizations, as well as the level of institutionalisation. The path of widening will be described empirically in Chapter 5.

Deepening

The path of deepening is broadly defined as an increase in the scope and level of cooperation and integration in terms of institution-building, democratic legitimacy, and policies.²⁷² It is understood as a process of ‘vertical integration’, incorporating the transfer of competences and shift of decision-making power from the national level to the level of the organization, or in other words, the distribution of authority and autonomy from the state to the organizational level.²⁷³ Deepening is measured in terms of level, comprising authority and autonomy, and the form referring to different forms of cooperation that can result in a build-up of power and organs of an organization. As such, deepening can be categorised into the level of institutionalisation and the form of international cooperation.²⁷⁴ In short, deepening

269 Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., Schimmelfennig, F., ‘Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 1, 7-11.

270 Ibid, p. 12; Miles, L., ‘Theoretical Considerations’, in: Nugent, N. (ed.), ‘European Union Enlargement’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. 264.

271 Inspired by Leuffen, Schimmelfennig and Rittberger who suggested the analysis of enlargement and engagement to take into account not only the formal members, but also informal members participation in international organizations, regimes and policies. In: Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., Schimmelfennig, F., ‘Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 15.

272 Ibid, p. 11-14.

273 Ibid, p. 1.

274 According to Haftendorn and Keohane, the function, degree and form (and the relationship between them) of change is important, because it provides the basis for explaining variation in form and the hypotheses about the causes and directions of change. In: Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., ‘Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space’, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 7.

accounts for an increase in the level and form of institutionalisation of the organization at the international level. This may result in the strengthening of the institutional design or the creation of new organs within the organization. The path of deepening of security organizations will be analysed in Chapter 6.

Generally speaking, these three paths have tended to be treated separately by scholars and consequently have been theorised separately. This neglects the possibility of there being a mutual relationship and interdependence between them, which can be considered a ‘missing link’.²⁷⁵ In this research, paths of change of different security organizations are analysed separately as well as in a combined fashion, with attention to the possible interrelationship between these paths. In other words, paths of change are analysed cross-case, comparatively between the three security organizations in the separate paths of change, and cross-path, meaning the paths of change are compared to one another. They are also analysed separately to be able to distinguish between levels and forms of change. Studying them together allows for us to capture how the broadening of tasks, for instance, might lead to deepening of the organizational structure.²⁷⁶ And, widening can affect deepening and broadening because, geographically and institutionally, the features of an organization can expand with multiple forms of cooperation with other state and non-state actors.²⁷⁷ So, the organizations vary within paths of change and between paths in terms of level, scope, memberships, and partnerships.

Furthermore, scholars have focused on the deepening, broadening, and widening of international cooperation; this assumes an automatic increase in level, scope, and membership of organizations. In this research, the two sides of the coin will be tackled in analysing the paths of deepening, broadening and widening, but the analysis will likewise address the counterparts of these paths, ones that lead to de-integration, de-institutionalisation, and fragmentation.

2.5.3 Explanatory Drivers of Change Derived from New Institutionalism

The paths of change described above do not provide an explanation of who or what drives these paths of change and how and why these changes have taken place.

The ‘who’ question in this research refers to all possible actors that have the capacity to elicit change, varying from state to non-state actors. In addition to state and non-state actors, new institutionalism identifies different processes and mechanisms that can cause change, as it is claimed that change is not always a direct consequence of an action by a state, that cover the question of who or what might instigate change.

Furthermore, the ‘how’ question refers to the variety of the paths of change of the security organizations themselves.

275 Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., Schimmelfennig, F., ‘Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 11.

276 Börzel, T. A., ‘Mind the gap! European integration between level and scope’, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Routledge, April 2005, p. 220.

277 Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., ‘Ever Looser Union? Towards a Theory of Differentiated Integration in the EU’, paper EUSA Conference 2011, p. 5-6.

Finally, the possible answers to the question of why change takes place, in other words the causes of change, are based on the selected approaches and their explanations of the causes and outcomes of change within new institutionalism.

In this section, the ‘who’ or ‘what’ question will be addressed.

The different actors and mechanisms that drive change, leading to paths of broadening, widening, and deepening of security organizations, are all derived from the selected approaches within the theory of new institutionalism and make up the proposed, combined research framework. In sum, the actors or mechanisms that drive change, elaborated upon above, can be distinguished on the basis of the different approaches within new institutionalism.

The first set of drivers are state-focused drivers. Institutionalism does highlight the choices of states, based on the rational-actor model, oscillating between conflict and cooperation in the international system to promote or protect their interests and reduce uncertainty. Security organizations act in the security environment, set in the context of high politics, which explains the identification of (member-) states as possible drivers of change. The focus of this research is on security and defence policy, as security organizations are the units of analysis. States play a crucial role in organizational change in the realm of security. Based on the rational actor assumption and derived from rational choice theory, state actors are seen as being driven by national interests, including the protection of sovereignty, territory, resources, and economic interests. To defend their interests, states use incentives or sanctions in their interaction with international cooperation structures; this is known as the transaction cost approach.

In addition to the state-focused drivers, other actors are identified in this research. Organizations are of interest and are seen as possible drivers of change. Agents and structures that reside within organizations are also seen here as possible drivers of change, this being derived from the constructivist institutionalist approach. These different actors determine their actions based on values and norms and are driven by power of their interests, including survival. Rules and structures then embody these values and norms, as well as power relationships.

Furthermore, in addition to actors, mechanisms can cause change as well, as proposed by historical institutionalism and constructivist institutionalism. Historical institutionalism states that change is path dependent, that organizations are historically embedded and ‘sticky’ from their creation, and that so-called critical junctures can lead to change. Though serious exogenous forces can cause change, in the end, this change will always result in a punctuated equilibrium and organizations survive by a logic of appropriateness. In other words, they need legitimacy derived from their environment in order to persist. Constructivist institutionalists explain change as being the result of (un-) intended dynamics and mechanisms that lead organizations to be politically and/or legally connected in a broad area of security issues.

Hence, the actors and mechanisms that cause processes of change are derived from the three strands of new institutionalism. These lenses have differences, similarities and even complementarities between their theoretical perspectives on explaining actors, processes and causes of change. It is argued here that within the international security environment,

the actors and mechanisms involved have an impact on the analysis of the paths of change of international security organizations; this requires a combined theoretical research framework. In this chapter the actors and processes of change elaborated on above and derived from the theoretical lenses that make up this framework, are illustrated in the table below (Table 2.1). This framework will be expanded with the causes and criteria for analysing change in Chapter 3.

Change	Actors	Process of Change
Rational choice institutionalism	State	Stable and unstable. Utility maximisation: change is instrumental and dependent on state interest.
Historical institutionalism	State and mechanism	Stable and path dependent. According to legitimacy of organization; the logic of appropriateness. Result of change is a punctuated equilibrium with possible critical junctures.
Constructivist institutionalism	State, non-state and mechanism	Chaotic and constant. Varies in form and level: from institutionalisation to de-institutionalisation.

Table 2.1: Combined research framework derived from the theoretical lenses of new institutionalism encompassing the actors and processes of change of organizations.

Finally, the execution of the analysis of the security organizations is sequential, divided into the separate analysis of the paths of change, the comparison of the separate paths of change (cross-case), and the analysis of the combination of the paths of change (cross-path). An analytical differentiation between the paths of change of the security organizations is helpful, as these paths not only vary according to security organization, but also according to the pace and direction of change induced by drivers and the possible influence of the organizations on one another, which will be elaborated upon in Chapter 3.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter presented the research framework that will be used to analyse security organizations within the European security architecture from the 1990s onwards. It is argued that crucial variables for explaining change are, in addition to state-focused variables, non-state actors, dynamics, and mechanisms, which are derived from different approaches of new institutionalism. As such, this research project will combine aspects of the different approaches to analyse change alongside the identified paths of change, based on a combined theoretical research framework. The paths of change that will be analysed, are labelled as deepening, broadening, and widening. Furthermore, it is argued that without recognising a distinction between drivers, dynamics and mechanisms at work on the paths of change of security organizations separately and comparatively, generalisable

observations on the interrelationship between the paths of deepening, broadening, and widening and their impact on the security organizations are difficult to make. Therefore, the comparative analysis of security organizations has a cross-case and cross-path character. This is a key asset of this research design.

From an analytical point of view, the aim is to explain change in European security organizations, which will enable theoretical reflections on the concept of change in security organizations, more generally, and on new institutionalism as an approach. In the following chapters, questions will be answered as to whether, how and why paths of change of security organizations have led to deepening, broadening, and widening.

Chapter 3

Chapter 3. Methodology

3.1 Introduction

Apart from a reliable and a valid methodology for the analysis of all kinds of phenomenon under investigation, any researcher should always take up the challenge to use new methods of analysis, as stated by Bennet ‘...qualitative researchers need to continue to work on techniques for reliably assessing the identities, preferences, and perceptions of actors that are of interest to constructivists, rational choice theorists, and political psychologists’.¹ The challenge of this research is to explain the dynamics of the paths of change of the European security organizations from 1990 to 2016 individually and in comparison with each other based on one research framework. To unravel the mechanisms at play, therefore, the method of structured focused comparison together with process tracing is applied. Systematically reconstructing, analysing and comparing the paths of change makes it possible to reach a sound judgement, reliable and valid, with respect to whether the stated assumptions account for a convincing logic.

This chapter outlines the methodological aspects of the research. First, the unit of analysis is explained. Second, the research strategy will be elaborated on, describing the applied multiple case study. This is followed by addressing the method of analysis, including a description of the applied method of structured focused comparison and process tracing. The chapter then concludes with an overview of the limitations of the research.

3.2 The Unit of Analysis

The international arena is observed as a domain of anarchy where states are the main actors, and usually the only actors with power, as claimed by some theories of political science, including different approaches within new institutionalism, which is the theoretical lens of this research. The basic question within institutionalism is related to the structure-agency division; the paradox that, although institutions are human creations, once they are created they constrain the activity of the individuals within them, perhaps even the individuals who created them.² As a result, the argument of international cooperation as the ultimate domain of anarchy has been countered by diverse scholars. This research accepts international organizations as actors in their own right as justified, as was elaborated on in Chapter 2. States do not act in an autarkic system; they cooperate and influence other state and non-state actors and formalise these relations with agreements or treaties. These treaties and agreements can bind national and international actors. Furthermore, apart from influencing national and international actors, international

1 Bennet, A., Elman, C., ‘Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield’, Comparative Political Studies, Sage Publications, 2007, p. 189.

2 Grafstein, R., ‘Institutional Realism’, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1992.

organizations can impose rules upon other actors and possess a certain amount of authority as a result of specific expertise and capabilities and can thus be accepted as a coercive power. This acceptance of international organizations (in this research, security organizations) as actors in their own right having agency allows a focus on their development as units of analysis.

Besides the agent-structure debate, another debate within institutionalism, as in other social sciences, is engaged with the level of analysis of social phenomena. Therefore, the accountability of the research framework, as described in Chapter 2, needs further elaboration regarding the levels of analysis that are utilized when assessing security organizations. When analyzing a specific phenomenon of an organization, in this research change, the level of analysis can be defined by the nature of the dependent variable, according to Scott 'the level of these unit(s) whose structure or behavior is to be explained'.³ The acceptance of international organizations as actors in their own right has consequences for the levels of analysis that need to be addressed. When analysing international organizations, scholars can differentiate between levels of analysis varying from the state, to the regional, to the world system level.⁴ As a result of an increasing web of variation in membership, cross-membership and interaction between international organizations, more often in the relevant literature an organization is also positioned at 'the intermeshing of multiple systems': the individual, the state, the organization and its organs and, finally, the inter-organizational system.

In order to analyse the different selected security organizations and their paths of change, this research adopts a multi-level analysis approach that differentiates between four levels:

1. The individual level, meaning the possible role of key individuals of states (such as presidents) and international organizations (such as the secretary-general of NATO).
2. The national level, the influence of key states within the European security architecture from the national to the organizational level and vice versa.
3. The organizational level, meaning the influence of the permanent organizations' organs, such as NATO's NAC or the EU's Commission. The analysis also includes the non-permanent and ad-hoc international setups such as contact groups or bi- and multilateral cooperation schemes.
4. The inter-organizational level, which refers to the influence and interaction between organizations and their organs, such as EU-NATO relations.

In this research, the efforts of analysing change in organizations within the European security architecture are related to the way these levels intermesh.⁵ Thus, in this research,

3 Scott, W. R., 'Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities', Sage publications, 2014, p. 203.

4 This analysis can be seen as an extension of the level of analysis approach, first popularized in the field of international relations by Waltz 'three images' approach, in: Waltz, K. N., 'Man, The State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis', Columbia University Press, 2018, on the three levels of analysis (international system, national and individual). For a more contemporary and differentiated approach towards evaluating for instance the EU as an international actor, see: Koops, J. A., 'The European Union as an Integrative Power? Assessing the EU's 'Effective multilateralism' towards NATO and the United Nations', Brussels University Press, Brussels, 2011, p. 34-39; Scott, W.R., 'Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities', Sage Publications, 2014.

5 For an elaboration, see: March, J. G., Olsen, J.P., 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life', The American Political Science Review, 1984, Vol. 78, Nr. 3, p. 57; Biermann, R., Koops, J. A., 'Studying relations Among International Organizations in World Politics: Core Concepts and Challenges', in: Biermann, R., Koops, J. A., 'The Palgrave Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations in World Politics', Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p. 3-5.

the analysis of international organizations, it is assumed that these agents are not by definition 'operating independently of each other' as separate systems; these levels could intermesh and operate in an 'open system' and possible dynamics between these levels are therefore taken into account.⁶ The aim is to assess the possible correlation (interconnectedness) between the levels and paths of institutional change.

Furthermore, relations and interactions take place at and across these different levels. These relations can be horizontal, which refers to interaction between equal organizations or national governments, or vertical, which refers to linkages between higher and lower levels of national and international authority. In other words, hierarchical.

In addition, in defining the levels relevant for this research, the key underlining dimension is the scope of the phenomenon it encompasses, whether measured in terms of space, time or numbers affected. In this research, space is reflected by the 'events' in the security environment. In other words, the analysis of how the developments, such as crises and conflicts from within or outside the European security architecture, at all four levels influence one another. Time is then reflected by the limitation from 1990 until 2016 and numbers are reflected by the chosen actors that influence or could be influenced.⁷

3.3 Multiple Case Study

In this research, the case study method was chosen. The case study method in this research is a comparative case study between three interrelated security organizations, which will analyse the phenomenon of their paths of change.⁸ The comparative case study is a research strategy that is often used in the field of political science and international relations.⁹ Its benefit is that it allows identification of patterns of convergence and divergence between the security organizations selected, as there is an observed lack of systematic analysis of how and why these security organizations have changed in comparison, as elaborated in the research overview of Chapter 2. Therefore, this research not only focuses on the path of change of each security organization separately, but comparatively as well, as possible causes and dynamics of change could be neglected. The comparative case study method can contribute to the theory of new institutionalism, as it could have implications on theory development and could 'establish, strengthen, or weaken historical explanations of a case'.¹⁰ Given the explorative nature of this research, and the complexity and richness of the context, a case study approach is the most appropriate research strategy.¹¹

The case study method comprises several potential weaknesses, as unfolded by George

6 Scott, W. R., 'Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities', Sage Publications, 2014, p. 105.

7 Ibid, p. 92.

8 George, A. L., Bennet, A., 'Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences', MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 69.

9 For an elaboration on this method: George, A. L. and McKeown, T. J., 'Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision-making', *Advances in Information Processing in Organization*, 2 (1), 1985; King, G., Keohane, R. O., Verba, S., 'Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research', Princeton, 1994; Yin, R. K., Pollack, M. A., 'International Relations Theory and European integration', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2001, p. 238.

10 George, A. L., Bennet, A., 'Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences', MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 109.

11 Ibid, complete work.

and Bennet.¹² However, the strength of the case study method includes conceptual validity, deriving propositions and exploring causal mechanism.¹³ Furthermore, its weaknesses can be contradicted by process tracing to test a theory's explanatory and predictive power where causal mechanisms are studied. Finally, although this research is a small-N study, this need not to be a limitation, as argued by Blatter and Haverland. Instead, case study research is very well suited to understanding perceptions and motivations, and tracing processes of change.¹⁴ Its limitation can be properly addressed by process tracing evidence.¹⁵

Case Selection

The process of case selection is crucial to making valid causal inferences, and one of the most important criteria for the case selection is its relevance to the research aim.¹⁶ For the method to collect the data required for the research aim, the method of process tracing was chosen to ask how a particular outcome (change of security organizations) came about and to uncover causal mechanisms posited by theoretical informed propositions.¹⁷ It is therefore important to select cases that gain¹⁸ 'a comprehensive overview over the temporal unfolding of the causal-process, the ability to provide a dense description of critical moments' and a plurality of cases with differences for the aim of comparison, within the conceptual frame of security organizations. At the same time, the cases must be as similar as possible within the context of the phenomenon to be analysed.¹⁹

Furthermore, the research of the paths of change of security cooperation and organizations is to some extent restricted by limited analysis, as the information provided is inexhaustible. This research therefore concentrates on a few selected cases, which allows a broader set of theoretical approaches to be taken into account and more complete empirical evidence to be collected.²⁰

Finally, this research tracks empirical developments over time and in a comprehensive approach, which, according to Haverland, makes it possible to explore two kinds of processes: the reconstitution of agents through social structures and vice versa.²¹ This method takes into account structure and agency, which is the aim of this research.

12 Possible weaknesses of case study method: case selection bias, lack of representativeness and potential lack of independence of cases, in: George, A. L., Bennet, A., 'Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences', MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 22-34.

13 George, A. L., Bennet, A., 'Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences', MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 19-22.

14 Blatter, J., Haverland, M., 'Designing Case Studies. Explanatory Approaches in Small-N Research', Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

15 George, A. L., Bennet, A., 'Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences', MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 27.

16 Ibid, p. 83.

17 Ibid, p. 153.

18 Blatter, J., Haverland, M., 'Designing Case Studies. Explanatory Approaches in Small-N Research', Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 25.

19 Idem.

20 Ibid, p. 8.

21 Idem.

The three cases selected in this research are intended to ensure sufficient variety to overcome the limitations as described above.

On the one hand, the selected international security organizations, the EU, NATO and the OSCE, represent similarities and differences. The following similarities between the selected units of analysis are of interest. First, all three of these organizations have the highest degree of institutionalisation, authority and autonomy worldwide in security policy. Second, these organizations have an overlap in member states and partnerships with states and organizations. Third, they have an overlap in tasks and functions, operations and missions. Fourth, they have political and/or juridical networks or cooperation agreements with states and other international organizations. Fifth, they act in virtually the same security environment as a result of overlapping territory, tasks and members. Finally, the concepts of security organizations, defined as collective defence and collective security, can be traced in all three selected cases.

On the other hand, although these organizations overlap in tasks, members and partnerships, to a certain extent they differ as well with regard to history, mandate, autonomy and authority, institutionalization, members and partners, operations and missions. As a result of the variety, these cases are expected to yield evidence of the mechanisms that have driven their paths of change at large as they reflect some key changes in their development and are as such well suited for explaining the underlying dynamics of change.

So even though the security organizations selected to analyse the paths of change are different to a certain extent, they show similarities and are linked as well. This research states that change in one organization can only be understood in the context of a comparative analysis of the other organizations of the European security architecture.

The research includes a variety of (comparative) case studies, consisting of both within-case and cross-case analyses. Chapters 4 to 6 consist of a comprehensive analysis of each organization separately, in terms of broadening, widening and deepening, to assess the character of their paths of change in terms of level and form. Furthermore, each chapter is concluded with a comparative analysis, empirical as well as theoretical, of the three security organizations. Then in Chapter 7, the findings of the cross-path comparison, empirical and theoretical, of the three security organizations will be presented.

Finally, some specific remarks should be made with regard to the selected security organizations, as part of the European security architecture. This architecture generally contains four international organizations, including the CoE. In this research though, the CoE is not included, as the CoE lacks elements of defence policy tasks and functions. Furthermore, the WEU used to be a part of the European security architecture as a separate unit, but will be addressed within the context of the EU, as the WEU has become an integral part of the EU.

In conclusion, the variations between the units of analysis as described earlier are theoretically interesting. Systematically reconstructing and comparing the paths of change of the security organizations will allow a comprehensive assessment to be reached with

respect to whether the assumptions account for a convincing logic. The methods for collecting the data required for the research strategy will be elaborated on below.

3.4 Research Methods: Structured Focused Comparison and Process Tracing

The analysis is performed by the method of structured focused comparison. To be more precise, a chronological comparative perspective on the variation of the paths of change between related international (security) organizations. In this research, the method of structured focused comparison is used because it can be applied to research which involves case studies that aim to analyse developments and dynamics over time (sequences), rather than static points in time. The analysis of critical junctures and path dependence, as is the case in this research, is sensitive to the identification of the timing of key turning points or game changers.²²

Furthermore, the method of structured focused comparison can be used for comparative case studies when the results of the individual cases are drawn together within a common theoretical framework, as is the method in this research. Below, the three substantive components of this method will be discussed.

Structured Focused Comparison

Structured

The method is structured, because the analysis of the case studies in this research refers to the systematic comparison of change, as these cases are analysed in a similarly structured way.

First, in every identified path of change, either broadening, widening or deepening, the same type of sub-research questions are asked, derived from the theoretically founded central research question, which leads to a standardisation of the research strategy. These sub-questions are the following for each path of change of the units of analysis, NATO, the EU and the OSCE: 1) At what level are the observed paths of change? What form do these paths take? 2) What concrete results of the paths of change can be discerned? 3) What are the similarities and differences in and between the paths of change among the security organizations? 4) How can variation in the paths of change of the European security organizations be explained?

Second, the collection of data for the analysis of change of the European security organizations is mainly based on data obtained from document analysis from primary sources together with secondary sources. To prevent an impressionistic exercise,²³ the analysis of the cases will be mapped along the institutional development and formal decisions, because this research states that the institutional framework is more than just a simple projection of a rule-based order, as elaborated on in Chapter 1. This mapping of

22 Pierson, P., 'Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics', *American Political Science Review*, volume 94, issue 2, 2000, p. 261-262.

23 Börzel, T. A., 'Mind the gap! European integration between level and scope', *Journal of European Public Policy*, Routledge, 12:2 April 2005, p. 220.

the paths of change of the selected organizations will be executed in the form of treaties, agreements, and so forth, together with a varied overture of expert assessments. Primary sources contain political speeches, ministerial minutes, policy documents and NATO treaties, strategies and summit declarations, EU treaties, Presidency reports, Council Secretariat texts, Parliamentary and Commission reports and OSCE agreements and summit declarations, together with the UN treaties and agreements of other relevant actors. The focus of interest, the path of change of the European security architecture, is established by means of a deductive qualitative content analysis of key policy and legal documents.²⁴ To support this approach, this research is based on data obtained from document analysis from primary sources together with secondary sources, as stated above. The added value is sought in the variation in written sources interpreted by a combined theoretical framework. This source material enables the analysis of developing political structures that affect political interest, influence and behaviour and vice versa. This method of analysis will serve to establish whether practice is in line with the theoretical framework. In addition, key member state decision-making documents that were prepared or published are taken into account. Secondary sources contain historical analysis and extensive literature research on all institutional changes for comparative analysis and process tracing.

Third, the context, as described in Chapters 4 to 7, largely described how the paths of broadening, widening and deepening of the security organizations changed and why these paths of international cooperation responded to the same events in the presented security environment.

Fourth, the method is structured, as the scope of the phenomenon, whether measured in terms of space, time or numbers, is similar in all three cases.²⁵ The analysis of all three cases starts with the end of the Cold War, as a major game-changer for schemes of cooperation between actors, and is concluded 25 years after the end of the Cold War. This gives a sufficient frame in time and space of the paths of change of the selected security organizations.

A final issue is the scope of analysis that is similarly applied to all three security organizations. Although the starting point of analysis is the end of the Cold War, the complete life cycle of the selected security organizations will not be ignored, including the analysis of their creation. This will be followed by the analysis of the paths of change, which can vary from strengthening to weakening of the organizations and finally to de-institutionalization or irrelevance or ending of organizations.²⁶

Focused

The phenomenon of change in security organizations is analysed from theoretical angles, as was mentioned in Chapter 2. This research is thus focused on a selection of specific

24 Kohlbacher, F., 'The Use of Qualitative Content Analysis in Case Study Research', *Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, 7 (1), 2006, p. 1-30.

25 Scott, W. R., 'Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities', Sage publications, 2014, p. 92.

26 Further elaboration on the subject: Scott, W. R., 'Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities', Sage Publications, 2014, p. 95.

data based on the research aim and the theoretically founded research question based on the theory of new institutionalism and a limited set of approaches within it, presented in Chapter 2.

The research method is also focused, because the research framework is built from specifically selected approaches within new institutionalism, because these security organizations act in a dense and complex institutional security environment comprising multiple actors where none of the approaches separately can adequately explain the paths of change. The European security architecture is therefore difficult to analyse by a one-size-fits-all theory to encapsulate the various drivers of change. These approaches were chosen as they cover various actors and mechanisms that could cause change. This method is applied to see whether the causal processes can be properly explained by the variation between the cases.

Finally, the research method is focused, as it analyses specific aspects of the cases, the indicators of the paths of change of the selected security organizations, which will be elaborated below.

Process Tracing

The institutional development of the selected security organizations are concrete examples of the high-level, but diverse, institutionalized security cooperation schemes which justified the choice for new institutionalism as the theoretical lens for analysis. The choice was to include competing and complementary theoretical explanations of three approaches within new institutionalism. Where rational choice uncovers a starting point for debating the interest of actors, historical institutionalism offers a chronological analysis of the narrative of institutional developments and formal decisions, and constructivism captures the norms and values behind a different palette of actors, their behaviour and decisions. This research thus analyses multiple agents and structures, as it is argued that states, non-state actors and mechanisms cause change.

Although the choice was made to address rational choice, historical institutionalism and constructivist institutionalism, three of the mainstream approaches of new institutionalism to explain change, the question arises as to why three theories instead of one? The analysis of international security and defence cooperation is traditionally situated in the realist approaches, and together with constructivist institutionalism these two offer competing as well as complementary theoretical frameworks to account for the actors and mechanisms driving the paths of change of the security organizations, as elaborated in Chapter 2. Historical institutionalism then focuses on the prominent feature of this research, the institutionalization of the security organizations through paths of broadening, widening and deepening, which represents a converged point where the two 'opponents' meet. Each approach posits particular causal mechanisms and, together with the process-tracing method, this research acquired the tools to confirm or reject the theoretically informed assumptions and to reveal possible causal paths and synthesize multiple causal chains.

As the research framework is built from three approaches within new institutionalism, another question concerns the explanatory power of these different approaches when

assessing security organizations of the European security architecture. In other words, do the causal mechanisms provided by the three approaches account for the observed paths of change? This research is to apply theoretical reflections to empirical phenomena so as to understand the security organizations and their much-debated paths of change, as well as to make possible contributions to the existing academic debates. In addition, regarding the various debates of how the European security architecture evolved, theoretical reflections on its development will cast light on the general developing architecture in the future as well as possible ideas to address the issue concerned, and this is also a way to strengthen the bridge between theory and practice.

Process-tracing analysis, studies 'the unfolding of an event over time' and scrutinizing 'the chain of events' provides explanations for the changes of the dependent variable(s) caused by the independent variable(s) and specifies the causal chain or chains between the independent and dependent variables, thereby answering the 'how' as well as the 'why' question.

Central to this approach is a theory-led interpretation of the cases. In other words, a thorough reflection on the relationship between empirical evidence and abstract concepts. It is assumed that empirical observations can be used as proof for the correctness of assumptions and for checking the relevance of concepts and theories in their empirical context.²⁷ So this research engages in a detailed assessment of empirical material in a way that allows conclusions to be drawn about more abstract concepts. Also, to uncover models and underlying mechanisms, this research combines cross-case and within-case analyses.

According to Panke, there are at least two requirements to utilize process tracing. One is to 'specify the causal mechanisms expected by each of the hypotheses'. The other is to 'specify indicators for the mechanisms'.²⁸ Indeed, the crucial factor that contributes to a credible testing of the assumptions is to have a clear prescription of the indicators of the causal chains offered by the theoretical explanations of change apart from the general criteria in form and level presented in section 2.5. Therefore, in the reconstruction of the paths of change, in addition to the who or what question elaborated on in section 2.3, the how or why questions were involved in these paths and will be analysed through the theoretically formed assumptions and criteria, which provided the focus of the research. And whether the causal mechanisms, suggested by the assumptions drawn from each theoretical approach, are present in the selected cases. Hence, this combined research framework, derived from the selected theoretical lenses of new institutionalism, encompasses the actors, processes and causes of change and the criteria to analyse the paths of change is presented below in Table 3.1 which extended Table 2.1 of section 2.5. Finally, the institutional developments of the selected cases make up the 'most likely' cases to analyse the theory of new institutionalism and can be advanced out of empirical practice

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27 Blatter, J., Haverland, M., 'Designing Case Studies. Explanatory Approaches in Small-N Research', Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

28 Panke, D., 'Process Tracing: Testing Multiple Hypotheses with a Small Number of Cases', in: Exadaktylos, T., Radaelli, C., 'Research Design in European Studies', the Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, 2012, p. 129.

and the proposed causal mechanisms based on the observed developments within the European security architecture and the results thereof.

Change	Actor	Process	Cause	Criteria
Rational choice institutionalism	State	Stable and unstable. Utility maximisation: change is instrumental and dependent on state interest. Institutional strengthening or weakening.	Interest of state. Events: cooperation or conflict. Transaction cost approach (incentives or sanctions). Distribution of resources.	Balance of state power. (in) Stable institutional development. Degree of institutionalization: intergovernmental.
Historical institutionalism	State, non-state and mechanism	Stable and path dependent. According to legitimacy of institution: the logic of appropriateness. Punctuated equilibrium with possible critical junctures. Institutional strengthening.	Legitimacy and interest. Events. Historical development. Interest of all actors. Existing institutional design.	Historical legacy. Stable institutional development. Influence of other institutions. Degree of institutionalization: intergovernmental and supranational. Variation in form and level within and between the institutions.
Constructivist institutionalism	State, non-state and mechanism	Chaotic and constant. Institutional strengthening or weakening.	Interest and legitimacy of actors. Events: cooperation or conflict. Strength and weakness of bureaucratic rules/structure, actors and processes. Values and norms. Old and new actors. Other actors: state and non-state.	Balance of state and organizational power. (in) Stable institutional development. Values and norms. Influence of other institutions, organs, officials and states. Variation in form and level inside and outside the institution. Degree of institutionalization: intergovernmental and supranational within and between institutions. Variation in form and level within, between and outside the institutions.

Table 3.1: Combined research framework derived from the theoretical lenses of new institutionalism encompassing the actors, processes and causes of change and the criteria to analyse the paths of change.

To analyse the paths of change of the selected security organizations the method of process tracing is applied for several reasons.

First, the world of international cooperation and conflict is unpredictable. International security prognostication and prescriptive research based on a single event is

therefore an unreliable basis for the validity and reliability of analysing phenomena in this environment. Consequently, analysing events over time with the method of process tracing is a more reliable and valid approach.

Second, a chronologic comparative analysis, tracing cases over time, helps to understand the paths of change of the security organizations by comparing these paths and discovering possible patterns and mechanisms.²⁹ The method of process tracing can be applied for within-case analysis as well as comparative case study analysis if the results of the individual cases are drawn together within a common theoretical framework, which is the case in this research.³⁰

Third, the method of process tracing is applied by tracing the links between possible causes and observed outcomes of change by examining histories, documents and other sources. This research comprises historical analysis linked to the analysis of relevant discourses. It also makes it possible to see whether the chosen approaches within new institutionalism apply to the cases.

Finally, process tracing can show whether the variation between the cases can be explained by the presented research framework.

In conclusion, by the application of process tracing, this research has the means to compare the paths of change of the security organizations and possibly discover new causal paths. Relying on a combination of different lenses for the purposes of the analysis of change allows for a more complete understanding of the characteristics of different actors, and interaction between these actors, and observed mechanisms than could be achieved by adhering to a strict division between the different lenses. Theoretical pluralism can strengthen new institutionalism, as each lens can benefit from interaction with another approach; each approach has something unique to offer in the analysis of paths of change of the selected security organizations. As was explained in Chapter 2, the intention is not to 'test' whether or not rational choice theory explains change in security organizations better than historical institutionalism, for instance. The aim is to combine the different aspects of these approaches to deal with the emergence of a complex institutional architecture in the security environment in which organizations broadened, widened and deepened in terms of activities, structure, membership and partnerships. With this in mind, the objective is to engage in academic bridge-building between opposing approaches by building a theoretical framework made up of different approaches.

3.5 Limitations

The primary goal of this research is the analysis of the paths of change of European security organizations in a comparative manner, based on one research framework inspired by the

29 Yin, R. K., 'Case Study Research. Design and Methods', Sage Publications, 2003, p. 125-127.

30 George, A. L., Bennet, A., 'Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences', MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 179.

theoretical approach of new institutionalism. Nevertheless, some remarks have to be made with regard to important limitations of this method.

First, the objective of this research is not to establish a new theory of institutionalism or one of its approaches, but to contribute to the approaches within the theory of institutionalism by combining them in one research framework, looking for their empirical differences and consistencies.

Second, the comparative perspective of this research can lead to more general insights regarding change of security organizations, but the analysis includes only three international security organizations, which makes a statistical generalisation concerning all security organizations difficult. However, with the research framework created in Chapter 2, there are clear possibilities for theoretical replication as developed by Yin.³¹

Third, although there are similarities between the selected security organizations as cases in point, as was elaborated above, some remarks have to be made with regard to the differences, as this could raise questions regarding the method of comparative analysis. One could say that analysing change of the selected European security organizations in a comparative manner is like comparing apples with oranges. In contrast with the claim accepting the units of analysis as actors in their own right, as described above, this so-called 'international actorhood' differs between the units of analysis, NATO, the EU and the OSCE, due to variations in the legal and political authority and autonomy, as well as various tasks and functions.

Fourth, the observations are drawn from key moments of change in time and possible game-changers for the paths of change of the selected security organizations in a sequence of 25 years. However, although predictions of the possible end of multilateralism and the end of the liberal world order are included, these observations and related conclusions are tentative, as not all key moments could be addressed, such as the marginal attention in this research to the election of US President Trump in 2016 and possible consequences for transatlantic relations, and the further development of Brexit for the EU and NATO as well.

Finally, in the search for a chronological narrative of the paths of change of the security organizations, interviews could contribute added value to reconstruct the policy-making process in order to explain important decisions. Then again, interviewing experts and elites as data gathering is often met with scepticism in political science.³² It is argued that it could present a biased picture that is drawn solely from the interpretation of a few people.³³ However, the approaches for data gathering, such as interviews, could contribute to a more complete picture of the analysis of change. These interviews could add to the understanding and interpretation of the primary and secondary sources used for this research and positions taken by different actors. They are therefore taken into account as one of the recommendations for further research in Chapter 8.

31 Yin, R. K., 'Case Study Research. Design and Methods', Sage Publications, 2003, p. 117.

32 Rathbun, B. C., 'Interviewing and Qualitative Field Methods: Pragmatism and Practicalities', in: Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., Brady, H. E., Collier, D., 'The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology', Oxford University Press, August 2008, p. 690.

33 George, A. L., Bennet, A., 'Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences', MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 95.

Part Two

Context, Cases and Analysis

‘How can you improve human nature until you have changed the system? The other; what is the use of changing the system before you have improved human nature?’.

George Orwell, 1984, 1949

Part Two. Context, Cases and Analysis

In the next part of this research the paths of change of the European security organizations will be analysed and the questions will be answered as to how and why change of the European security organizations has developed. The aim of part two is an overview and an in-depth analysis of the changes that occurred in the security organizations applying the theoretical framework that was offered in Chapter 2. The starting point of the chronological analysis of the paths of change are the key moments and institutional consequences. These changes will be analysed for each organization separately as well as in comparison, drawn from the founding documents and the follow-up in their respective treaties, political agreements and summits. The paths of change are reflected in the mandate and the process of institutionalization of an organization, or its opposite, as this research states that the mandate and institutional setup presents the choices that were made by the relevant actors involved.

Each chapter will follow the same structure, analysing the paths of change of the organizations separately and in a cross-case comparison within one path of change, either broadening (Chapter 4), widening (Chapter 5) and deepening (Chapter 6). Analysis and comparison are based on the same indicators and the results of the paths of change as observed. This is followed by a comparison between the different paths of change, either broadening, widening or deepening: a cross-path comparison (Chapter 7). In line with the method of process tracing and structured focused comparison, the paths are analysed chronologically, the same line of argument is presented, the same type of research questions are asked and the same type of data is used. These sub-questions are derived from the main research question: How and why have the European security organizations, namely the EU, the OSCE and NATO, changed in terms of broadening, widening and deepening individually and in comparison to one another as part of the European security architecture between 1990 and 2016?, leading to the following sub-questions for each chapter:

- 1) At what level are the observed paths of change? What form do these paths take?
- 2) What concrete effects of the paths of change can be discerned?
- 3) What are the similarities and differences in and between the paths of change among the security organizations?
- 4) How can variation in the paths of change of the European security organizations be explained?

Chapter 4

Chapter 4. The Path of Broadening

4.1 Introduction

From the OSCE 1990 Paris Summit onwards, the tasks for which the European security organizations were originally mandated broadened for all three international organizations. NATO broadened from a purely collective defence organization to an organization encompassing crisis management tasks as well as cooperation and dialogue with other actors. Europe's economic cooperation organization, the EU, adopted a security and defence policy, eventually even incorporating a mutual defence clause. The OSCE had encompassed a broad perspective on security from its creation and broadened its scope from there.

The first path of change is analysed within the concept of broadening. As explained in Chapter 2, broadening is defined as a change in the scope of tasks for which the security organizations are mandated, from narrow to broad security. The questions that need to be examined are how and why change has led to a broadening of the European security organizations. The security organizations are analysed separately and in comparison in their path of broadening. Consideration is given to what the form and level of this path of institutional change comprise, what the results are and what the variation is between the security organizations, and how this can be explained.

4.2 The Concept of Broadening; Conquering New Markets

The first path of change to be analysed encompasses the broadening of the European security organizations. This research defines broadening as the expansion of the scope of tasks (security and defence) into new policy areas, as was elaborated upon in Chapter 2. The units of analysis of this research are security organizations. Traditionally, security organizations can be divided conceptually into collective defence or collective security organizations. Two forms of security cooperation, but with clearly different tasks.

The starting point of the analysis of the path of broadening is these specific concepts in relation to the security organizations as they were established at their foundation. From there, the development of the scope of tasks will be analysed in terms of the variation of tasks, set out in treaties or agreement revisions which formally changed the allocation of tasks between the member states and the organization accompanied by the extent of (de-) institutionalization. The analysis of the path of broadening will be approached through process tracing and interpretation of the implementation of the concepts of the selected security organizations, addressing the change of the scope of tasks from 1990 onwards.

The path of broadening is measured by categorising change into form and level as indicators.

First, the form of broadening can be categorised as the scope of tasks an organization actually performs. The scope can vary from issue-specific all security- and defence-related tasks.

Second, these different forms of broadening can vary in their institutionalization, referred to as the level of institutionalization. This level can vary from informal to formal and high-institutionalized cooperation.¹ The categorisation in level thus refers to the organs that an organization has actually built, listed in the treaties, strategies, operational texts and political declarations.²

Hence, in this research, the analysis of the path of broadening incorporates the form and level of the scope of tasks transferred to the security organizations. These different forms of broadening and the level of institutionalization, observed within and between NATO, the EU and the OSCE, will be addressed below.

4.3 The NATO Path of Broadening

4.3.1 Introduction

In the Cold War, the two explicit examples of traditional collective defence organizations within the European security architecture were the WEU and NATO. In those days, collective defence was seen as an alliance in which Western states cooperated to defend themselves against an external threat by the SU and its collective defence organization, the Warsaw Pact (WP).³ These alliances identified with each other in their democratic and legal norms and values and in their common opponent: the SU. After the end of the Cold War, the adversary organization, the WP, ceased to exist, while NATO evolved from its original collective defence task. This section will examine the question of how and why change has led to the broadening of NATO.

4.3.2 Narrow Perspective on Security and Defence

The Creation of NATO: The Cold War

Both NATO and the WEU were created as traditional collective defence organizations, implying the indivisibility of security of all members, but in which cooperation is voluntary, as described in Chapter 2. At their foundation, the mandates of NATO and the WEU as collective defence organizations were based on Article 51 of the UN Charter,⁴ which,

1 Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., 'Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union', Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 3.

2 Börzel, T. A., 'Mind the gap! European integration between level and scope', Journal of European Public Policy, Routledge, April 2005, p. 220.

3 Although many collective self-defense treaties have been established after the end of the Cold War, see: Reichard, M., 'The EU-NATO relationship. A Legal and Political Perspective', Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 2006, p. 179.

4 Article 51, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, hereafter 'UN Charter'; 'Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.'

up to now, can be broadly interpreted, politically as well as legally.⁵ As a result, the variety in membership led to a divergent definition and interpretation of the concept of collective defence, regarding the obligation of member states to jointly defend each other against a military attack from outside the treaty area. NATO, including the US hegemon, does not actually oblige member states to assist another member state with military means or, for that matter, with any other means in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (1949).⁶ As Article 5 of the NATO Treaty states: 'The obligation of mutual assistance operates automatically. There is no need for it to be formally 'invoked'. Accordingly, 'Article 5 contains no more than the duty to offer aid and assistance, not the duty to accept it' or the obligation to implement it.⁷

The reasoning behind a lack of hard legal obligations of NATO's Article 5 was the US hegemony and its possession of most of the military means to deploy and consequently to protect other NATO allies. This gave the US a dominant position in the design of the alliance regarding the deployability of US military forces as an instrument of state sovereignty.⁸

One of the other reasons for a differentiation in obligations from the beginning was Germany's membership. Although Germany had already become a NATO member in 1955,⁹ rearmament and participation in operations led to critical debates within NATO and within Germany itself.¹⁰

Historically speaking, therefore, the alliance was there for political solidarity. NATO did not include (legal) supranational obligations in its mandate for US forces, or any other forces, to link up with the foreign and security policy of the other allies. NATO's aim was to create a community which rested upon the unlikelihood of violence or aggression between the alliance members and a sense of common purpose; solidarity, as was described by Deutsch in 1957 with the concept of security communities.¹¹ Therefore, although NATO has been a collective defence organization from its creation, one of the main reasons for its existence was to promote cooperative and more predictable relations among its member states. NATO depended on solidarity among the members, including institutionalization

5 For an elaboration on Article 51 of the UN Charter: Reichard, M., 'The EU-NATO relationship. A Legal and Political Perspective', Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 2006, p. 173.

6 Article 5, the North Atlantic Treaty, hereafter 'Washington Treaty', 1949; 'The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area'.

7 Reichard, M., 'The EU-NATO relationship. A Legal and Political Perspective', Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 2006, p. 190.

8 For an elaboration on the historical path of NATO Article 5, see: Reichard, M., 'The EU-NATO relationship. A Legal and Political Perspective', Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 2006, p. 180-183.

9 The Paris Agreements (1954): recognition of the Federal Republic of Germany as a sovereign state. Germany and Italy accede to the Brussels Treaty and the WEU. In 1955 Germany joined NATO.

10 For an elaboration on Germany's position within NATO during and after the Cold War: Longhurst, K., 'Stunde Null and the 'construction' of West German strategic culture', p. 25-50, in: Longhurst, K., 'Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy 1990-2003', University Press Scholar Ship, October 2004.

11 Deutsch, K. W. et al., 'Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience', Princeton University Press, 1957.

and the creation of military capabilities in parallel with norms and values: solidarity became the backbone of the NATO alliance.¹²

Within the other alliance of the European security architecture, the WEU, the concept of collective defence was likewise laid down in Article 5 of its founding treaty, the Treaty of Brussels (1948)¹³, and, similar to NATO, was based on Article 51 of the UN Charter.¹⁴ However, in contrast to NATO, the WEU Treaty did oblige states to assist one another. Nevertheless, though this obligation was written in the Treaty, in practice it did not have the military structure or back up of the US hegemon that NATO had.¹⁵ In the Cold War, the collective defence task remained the backbone of both organizations, although in practice was never invoked by either organization.

NATO's core task has always been its function as a collective defence organization, providing security against potential threats coming from outside the organization's territory. Consequently, NATO has never had a formal internal security task. In other words, NATO has never had a mandate for security and defence within the NATO Treaty area. Nevertheless, in the Cold War, NATO's internal security function consisted of a balancing act between Germany (whereby Germany was restricted in terms of becoming a military power) and the concerns of the French, the Belgians and the Dutch regarding Germany once again becoming a political and military power. Consequently, NATO did perform an intra-Alliance function in that respect, handling the balance of power by building institutions and capabilities and, as a result, linking the member states.¹⁶

After the Cold War

The end of the Cold War brought profound changes in the European security architecture such as the dismantling of the WP, restoration of sovereignty in Central and Eastern European states, the return of independence to the Baltic Republics, the departure of Soviet forces from Hungary and Czechoslovakia and a complete withdrawal from Poland and Germany by 1994 and the reunification of Germany. All these events generated a widespread expectation that NATO, as the opponent of the WP, would disappear.¹⁷ However, the opposite became the reality; NATO survived and as early as 1991 had redefined its core

12 Reichard, M., 'The EU-NATO relationship. A Legal and Political Perspective', Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 2006, p. 191.

13 WEU, 'Treaty Between Belgium, France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland', 1948, Brussels, hereafter 'Treaty of Brussels'.

14 Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty; 'If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power'.

15 For an elaboration on the Brussels Treaty Article 5, see: Biscop, 'De integratie van de WEU in de Europese Unie. Europa op weg naar een Europese Defensie Organisatie', Leuven, 2000; Eekelen, van, W., 'Debating European Security, 1948-1998', Den Haag, 1998; Bloed, A., Wessel, A., (red.), 'The Changing Functions of the Western European Union. Introduction and Basic Documents', Dordrecht, 1994; Duke, S., 'The Elusive Quest for European security: from EDC to CFSP', Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, p. 13-14.

16 Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., 'NATO's Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?', Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 26.

17 For an elaboration on the different views see Chapter 5, section 5.6.

tasks.¹⁸ One of the reasons for the survival of NATO was the Bosnian conflict of the early mid-1990s in Europe's backyard and the absence of an European reply, political or military, from the beginning. In the end, in a task other than collective defence, NATO performed better than the other organizations of the European security architecture: '...it had emerged with more credit than other international bodies such as the WEU, the European Union (EU) and the UN...'.¹⁹ Furthermore, NATO has traditionally been more than a facilitator of security in terms of capabilities, as solidarity had been NATO's backbone for the allies. In addition, Article 2 of the Treaty of Washington included democratic norms and values linked to security and defence of which the EU and the OSCE were not attractive alternatives in those days.²⁰ NATO therefore persisted as the pre-eminent security organization and command structure in Europe during the 1990s. The collective defence task remained NATO's core task, as stated in the new strategic concept of Rome in 1991: 'The maintenance of an adequate military capability and clear preparedness to act collectively in the common defence remain central to the Alliance's security objectives'.²¹ More importantly, this strategic concept broadened NATO's mandate, which permitted the Alliance to conduct a much wider range of tasks and adopted a broader concept of security stating that '... the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess...'.²² It was acknowledged that NATO should be capable of responding to a crisis beyond the concept of collective defence under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty: 'In the new political and strategic environment in Europe, the success of the Alliance's policy of preserving peace and preventing war depends even more than in the past on the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and successful management of crises affecting the security of its members...'.²³ This resulted in a broadening of tasks with a possibility of crisis management, in addition to collective defence, and supported by the possibility of a flexible institutional structure: '...our conventional forces will be substantially reduced as will, in many cases, their readiness. They will also be given increased mobility to enable them to react to a wide range of contingencies, and will be organised for flexible build-up, when necessary, for crisis management as well as defence...'.²⁴

In addition, not long after the first broadening of NATO tasks that were adopted in 'Rome', NATO performed several crisis management operations, as a result of the Balkan wars, exemplified by the Implementation Force in Bosnia Herzegovina (IFOR),

18 Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., 'NATO's Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?', Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 2-3.

19 Ibid, p. 4.

20 Article 2, Washington Treaty, 1949: 'The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them'.

21 North Atlantic Council, The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, November 1991, Rome, par. 30, Hereafter NATO Strategic Concept 1991.

22 NATO Strategic Concept 1991, par. 8.

23 NATO Strategic Concept 1991, par. 31.

24 NATO Strategic Concept 1991, par. 5.

the Stabilization Force in Bosnia Herzegovina (SFOR) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR).²⁵ As a result, crisis management operations became NATO's main operational tasks in the 1990s.

Out of Area

The broadening of NATO's mandate during the 1990s did not automatically lead to a geographical broadening of the scope of tasks. Although in legal terms Article 5 never restricted NATO geographically to the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO's mandate remained applicable in that specific area instead of worldwide as a result of disagreement between the member states with regard to the geographical scope of NATO and competition between the organizations.²⁶ The US, as a global power, had an interest in a global NATO, if only to support its own policies.²⁷ In contrast, some European states, such as France, preferred the UN and the EU to be the organizations with a global mandate. These states claimed that a collective defence organization such as NATO had neither the task nor the peace and stability capabilities required for a global task, whereas other organizations did possess such capabilities. This debate between the member states persisted throughout the 1990s.²⁸

Nevertheless, as a result of the operations in the Bosnian War in the 1990s and Operation Allied Force in 1999,²⁹ the out-of-area debate was on the table again, recapitulated by some as a question of going 'out of area or out of business'.³⁰ Operation Allied Force in particular led to debate between the NATO allies, because the operation was launched without the consent of the UNSC, as China and Russia vetoed any military action against Yugoslavia.³¹ France, a permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC), was not in favour of passing the UNSC resolution and mandate for operations. France favoured the UN as the organization for legitimizing international peace and stability and wanted the EU to be a future counterbalance to NATO's paths of broadening and widening. Germany had always been a strong proponent of UN legitimacy, as a result of its historical heritage. The United Kingdom (UK) had some reservations, though less than France, about bypassing the UN for mandating military interventions. And although the air campaign was executed, the disagreement between the member states remained. As a result, the NATO Kosovo air campaign of 1999 was seen as an exception and future decisions on out-of-area operations were to be made on a case-by-case basis, preferably with a UN mandate.

25 IFOR; Implementation Force in Bosnia Herzegovina from 1995. SFOR; Stabilization Force in Bosnia Herzegovina from 1996. KFOR; Kosovo Force, from 1999.

26 For an elaboration on the out-of-area issue, see: Thies, W. J., 'Why NATO Endures', Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009, p. 202-239.

27 Sloan, S. R., 'Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain', Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 111.

28 Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., 'NATO's Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?', Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 50.

29 NATO Kosovo air campaign, from March 24 to June 10, 1999.

30 The out-of-area or out-of-business phrase already dates from before the end of the Cold War: Sherwood Randall, E., 'The out-of-area debate: the Atlantic alliance and challenges beyond Europe', Rand corporation, 1985.

31 Sperling, J., Webber, M., 'NATO: from Kosovo to Kabul', International Affairs, Volume 85, Issue 3, May 2009, Pages 491-511.

However, the NATO strategy of 1999 did show that opinions and interests had changed and ‘placed no formal geographic limitations on NATO’s activities, nor did it identify a specific area of operations for those activities’.³² NATO was allowed to ‘undertake crisis management operations distant from their home stations, including beyond the allied territory’, mainly focusing on the Euro-Atlantic area.³³ From ‘Kosovo’ onwards, NATO expanded its territorial coverage debate step by step, accompanied by the path of widening. The September 2001 attacks on US soil in particular, which resulted in the ISAF operation in Afghanistan in 2003, gave NATO a global reach and will be elaborated on below.

Nevertheless, the debate between the member states about broadening NATO’s geographical span persisted. It was linked to NATO’s scope of tasks and competition with the other organizations of the European security architecture and the positions of their member states with regard to NATO’s mandate.

Collective Defence: The Article 5 Task

The end of the Cold War and the threat from the WP alliance had led to a reduction in the armed forces in Europe, the withdrawal of US troops from Europe and a diminishment of NATO’s conventional institutional structure: the headquarters (HQ). Crisis management operations as a result of the Balkan wars and the partnership and cooperation programmes became NATO’s day-to-day reality, instead of the conventional war threat coming from the East, which led to a new NATO Strategic Concept (NSC) in 1999.³⁴ This NSC incorporated the first broadening of the scope of the collective defence task. It was acknowledged that threats of a wider nature, exemplified by terrorism,³⁵ sabotage, organised crime and the disruption of the flow of vital resources, had become a threat to NATO that had to be taken into account, also in a global context.³⁶

Alongside a broadening of the collective defence task, the NSC of 1999 adopted the ambition of stronger and more flexible military capacities; the run-up to more flexible capabilities.³⁷ In the light of building more flexible capabilities to enable both crisis management and collective defence tasks, the Defence Capability Initiative (DCI)³⁸ was adopted to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations and improve the

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32 Sloan, S. R., ‘Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 148.

33 North Atlantic Council, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Washington DC, April 24, 1999. Hereafter NATO Strategic Concept 1999.

34 NATO Strategic Concept 1999.

35 For instance: The US embassy in Nairobi Kenya, was bombed on August 7, 1998. The USS Cole, a guided missile destroyer of the US Navy, was bombed by a suicide attack of the terrorist group Al Qaeda, 12 October 2000.

36 NATO Strategic Concept 1999, par. 24: ‘Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind.’

37 Ibid, par. 29.

38 NATO Strategic Concept 1999.

interoperability supported by institutionalization. This was initiated by the US, as it was in the US's interest to strengthen European capabilities.³⁹

The collective defence task, the backbone of NATO, was never invoked during the 1990s or, for that matter, the Cold War. The first time Article 5 was invoked was as a consequence of the 9/11 attacks on US soil.⁴⁰ It was initiated by the UK⁴¹ on 2 October 2001.⁴² Nevertheless, although the US welcomed the invocation of Article 5, the result of this invocation and subsequently the possible implementation of Article 5 was militarily (and as a result politically) very limited.⁴³ One of the reasons behind the 'light' invocation of Article 5 was that the US wanted to fight the 'War on terror' globally, which was in contrast to the interests of some of the European allies, as illustrated above. Furthermore, after the US experience of NATO's Operation Allied Force in Kosovo (1999), the US wanted to fight the 'War on terror' with a small coalition instead of all NATO allies.⁴⁴ As a result, the operation that was invoked after 9/11 was Operation Enduring Freedom, built as a coalition of the willing and able outside NATO, instead of a NATO operation. The first time in NATO's history that the collective defence task - NATO's political and military solidarity clause - was invoked did not therefore result in a stronger organization, and the solidarity between the allies was challenged.

Nevertheless, although some of the member states preferred not to rely on the Alliance to secure their interests, the attacks of 9/11 did lead to a renewed interest in Article 5. At the Prague Summit in 2002, the first summit after 9/11, the scope of NATO's mutual defence clause was broadened again in the wake of the NSC of 1999 and after the risk of terrorism had been added to Article 5; '...We underscore that our efforts to transform and adapt NATO should not be perceived as a threat by any country or organization, but rather as a demonstration of our determination to protect our populations, territory and forces from any armed attack, including terrorist attack, directed from abroad. We are determined to deter, disrupt, defend and protect against any attacks on us, in accordance with the Washington Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations...'.⁴⁵ This resulted in a change in NATO's collective defence task within the treaty, from conventional war to a broadening of

39 Carpenter, T. G., 'NATO's New strategic concept: coherent blueprint or conceptual muddle?', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 23:3, p. 7-28.

40 The attacks on 11 September 2001 were four coordinated terrorist attacks by the Islamic group of Al Qaeda against the US.

41 Reichard, M., 'The EU-NATO relationship. A Legal and Political Perspective', Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 2006, p. 187.

42 NATO Update, 'Invocation of Article 5 confirmed', 2001. Available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1001/e1002a.htm>, accessed 14-06-17.

43 Invocation of Article 5 after 9/11 led to the deployment of NATO's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) and the deployment of five NATO AWACS to support the US air force: Operation Active Endeavor. Initially an Article 5 operation in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the US. Terminated in October 2016 and succeeded by Operation Sea Guardian, set at the Warsaw Summit, 2016.

44 Sloan, S. R., 'Defense of the West. NATO, the European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain', Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 185-187.

45 North Atlantic Council, Prague Summit Declaration, November 2002, par. 4.

the scope of NATO tasks.⁴⁶ As well as the broadening of Article 5 as a result of 9/11, there was a diminishment of Article 6, linked to Article 5, as an armed attack was not directly the most imminent threat.⁴⁷

Solidarity: The Article 4 Task

Connected to Article 5 was Article 4 of the Washington Treaty.⁴⁸ During the Cold War, Article 4 was a consultation duty among the NATO allies and was initially conceived as a preceding stage to Article 5. Article 4 was understood as 'action taken by the Parties under Article 4 is designed to precede an invocation of Article 5 in the face of an escalating crisis, and thus directly linked to it'.⁴⁹ In that sense, a possible invocation of collective defence within NATO was approached incrementally: step by step. Like Article 2, which will be discussed below, Article 4 underpinned the claim that NATO was never just simply a military defence organization. Hence, from its creation, NATO's Article 4 implied that non-conventional threats were also among NATO's tasks, embracing a broader concept of security and implying a necessarily broader mandate together with the acknowledged values of cooperation and solidarity.

Directly after the Cold War, the NSC of 1991 stated: 'Never has the opportunity to achieve our Alliance's objectives by political means, in keeping with Articles 2 and 4 of the Washington Treaty, been greater. Consequently, our security policy can now be based on three mutually reinforcing elements: dialogue, cooperation and the maintenance of a collective defence capability. The use, as appropriate, of these elements will be particularly important to prevent or manage crises affecting our security'.⁵⁰

The first broadening of Article 4, like Article 5, was the NSC of 1999. The NSC pointed out that threats were much broader than solely an armed attack, which gave a broader responsibility to Article 4.⁵¹ The Lisbon Strategic Concept of 2010 again broadened the collective defence Article 5, as a direct conventional military attack on a NATO member was

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46 Gärtner, H., Cuthbertson, I. (eds.), 'European Security and Transatlantic Relations after 9/11 and the Iraq War', Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 135.

47 NATO Washington Treaty, 1949, Article 6: 'For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer'.

48 Article 4, Washington Treaty, 1949; 'The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened'.

49 Reichard, M., 'The EU-NATO relationship. A Legal and Political Perspective', Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 2006, p. 187.

50 NATO Strategic Concept 1991, par. 3.

51 NATO Strategic Concept 1999, par. 24; 'Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind'.

presumed less likely.⁵² In contrast, non-conventional threats emerged and consequently Article 4 developed in relation to the limited military scope of Article 5. Article 4 therefore became more important in relation to a broader security concept as a means to justify the broadening of all of NATO's scope of tasks and even out-of-area operations.⁵³

So, with regard to the broadening of NATO tasks after the end of the Cold War, Article 4 had been construed to cover NATO's new tasks, even with regard to the out-of-area debate, and the emergence of other actors in the security architecture.⁵⁴

The end of the Cold War and NATO's demanding crisis management tasks in the 1990s started the internal debate of NATO as a political actor. Some of the member states were proponents of broadening NATO's authority in international security and defence policy, as crisis management operations involved many actors and were at the same time mainly decided by contact groups. Another reason for enhancing NATO's political mandate was the perceived competition with the EU, because of the emergence of the EU as a security actor. A third party had been made up of NATO's officials, who aimed to enhance and broaden NATO's mandate, as Secretary General Rasmussen stated in 2009: 'NATO reached its full potential as a pillar of global security', which will be examined further in Chapter 6.⁵⁵ Others had a preference for NATO to be a purely military facilitator, as they worried about a diminishment of NATO's capabilities.⁵⁶

Throughout its history, Article 4 has been invoked by Turkey three times. The first time was in 2003 in relation to the Iraq War. The second time, in June 2012, was in relation to the shooting down of a Turkish military aircraft. The third occasion was in October 2012 after Syrian attacks on Turkey.⁵⁷ Furthermore, the Baltic states invoked Article 4 in March 2014 as a response to the extraterritorial crisis in Crimea (Ukraine). In all these cases, the consultation mechanism of Article 4 subsequently became more important, but the invocation of Article 4 did not lead to any Article 5 invocation or operation. Nevertheless, around 2005, it became clear that apart from the renewed attention for Article 5 after 9/11, Article 4 had become more important as a consultation mechanism between the allies as a result of the NATO path of broadening and widening, which necessitated more consultation and debate between an emerging heterogenic alliance.



52 North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept, 'Active Engagement, Modern Defense'*, Lisbon, November 2010.

53 Global NATO refers to expanding NATO protection by including all democracies around the world, such as: Australia, India, Japan. Daalder, I., Goldgeier, J., 'Global NATO', *Foreign Affairs*, Council on Foreign Relations, September/October, Vol. 85, No. 5 (Sep. – Oct. 2006), p. 105–113.

54 Reichard, M., 'The EU-NATO relationship. A Legal and Political Perspective', Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 2006, p. 100.

55 NATO Press conference, 3 August 2009.

56 For an elaboration on NATO as a political organization, see: Michel, L., 'NATO f: Au revoir to Consensus?' *National Defense University*, US National Defense University Strategic Forum, No. 2 August 2003; Hendrickson, R. C., 'NATO's Secretary-General: Organizational Leadership in Shaping Alliance Strategy', in: Aybet, G., Moore, R. R., 'NATO in search of a vision', Georgetown University Press, 2010; Mouritzen, H., 'In spite of reform: NATO HQ still in the Grips of Nations', *Defense & Security Analysis*, 18 October 2013, p. 346.

57 3 October 2012, artillery shell fired from Syria by the Syrian Army killed five and injured at least ten Turkish citizens in Turkey. 'Turkey-Syria border tension', *The Guardian*, London, retrieved October 5, 2012.

Collective Defence and the 'New Cold War'

The NSC of 2010 still assumed that the possibility of an interstate war in NATO's neighbourhood was not a threat. However, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, combined with its military operations in Eastern Ukraine, ended NATO's view on multilateralism, cooperation and dialogue and instead sparked fears for Russian expansionist ambitions. Consequently, the Wales Summit of 2014 adopted the concept of hybrid warfare, which necessitated a reaction should NATO be attacked: 'We will ensure that NATO is able to effectively address the specific challenges posed by hybrid warfare threats, where a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed in a highly integrated design'.⁵⁸

The crisis caused by the Russian intervention in Crimea also led to renewed attention for Article 5, which was on the agenda of the Wales Summit and its follow-up in Warsaw (2016). As a result, NATO's tasks were once again broadened with a non-conventional approach to the threats and it was agreed that hybrid and cyber attacks would be seen as equal to conventional attacks. Activation of Article 5 would therefore be required in such cases, broadening the content of Article 5,⁵⁹ while at the same time strengthening its conventional aspects.

Non-conventional meant hybrid warfare and cyber attacks, which were acknowledged as a fourth operational domain.⁶⁰ However, a joint definition of hybrid warfare, as a result of the debate of a strategy and common approach among the NATO allies, had been problematic due to the continuing conflict among the allies regarding NATO's tasks and priorities. In the end, an enhanced cyber defence policy was approved, which stated that cyber defence would become part of collective defence and, as a result, could lead to the invocation of Article 5.⁶¹ Nevertheless, it was acknowledged that NATO could not provide an adequate and complete response to cyber and hybrid threats on its own as a military organization lacking civil capabilities. Instead of competition, therefore, cooperation and alignment with the EU was intensified.⁶² The NATO Summit in Warsaw in 2016 outlined areas for strengthened cooperation in light of common challenges to the east and south, including countering hybrid threats, enhancing resilience, defence capacity building, cyber defence, maritime security and training exercises.⁶³ Over forty measures to advance NATO-EU cooperation in agreed areas were approved by NATO foreign ministers in December 2016. Close cooperation between NATO and the EU, not the OSCE, had become

58 North Atlantic Council, 'The Wales Declaration on the Transatlantic Bond', Wales Summit, September 5 2014. Hereafter NATO Wales Declaration 2014, par. 13.

59 NATO Wales Summit, September 2014, par. 13.

60 Hybrid warfare: NATO Wales Summit, September 2014, para 13. Cyberspace accepted as a domain of operations: NATO Warsaw Summit, July 2016, par. 70-71.

61 North Atlantic Council, 'The Warsaw Declaration on Transatlantic Security', Warsaw Summit, July 2016. Hereafter NATO Warsaw Summit 2016, par. 70-71.

62 See: Pindjak, P., 'Deterring Hybrid Warfare: A Chance for NATO and the EU to work Together?', Romanian Military Thinking, Jan-Mar 2015, Issue 1, p. 175-178; Giegerich, B., 'Hybrid Warfare and the Changing Character of Conflict', Connections, Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Spring 2016), p. 65-72.

63 Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Warsaw, 8 July 2016.

an important element in the development of an international comprehensive approach to non-conventional threats and crisis management, which required the application of both military and civilian means. This was in contrast to the Berlin Plus agreements, which were focused on military cooperation and a one-way cooperation procedure: from NATO to the EU. These will be discussed in Chapter 5.

The 2016 joint agreement was created to prevent competition and implied essential cooperation. From this point in time, the individual concepts of security organizations were linked and cooperation between EU and NATO was strengthened by the increase of institutionalization, cooperation and consultation at staff level and cooperation with the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. Nevertheless, most initiatives remained in the dialogue and intention sphere or even on an ad-hoc basis, not in strengthening institutionalization, which will be discussed below.

4.3.3 Broad Perspective on Security and Defence

The Creation of NATO: The Cold War

Since its foundation, NATO's concept of security has encompassed much more than purely military security, although NATO's scope of tasks was set up on the basis of a narrow military perspective. NATO's Article 2 of the Washington Treaty (1949) referred to peaceful norms and values, stability, welfare and well-being of the individuals living in the Treaty area and even worldwide, by means of strengthening cooperation and institutionalization. Although NATO remained the traditional collective defence organization during the Cold War, Article 2 mandated NATO with a post-Westphalian approach to international governance and opened the doors for further broadening of NATO's mandate.⁶⁴

After the Cold War

From the beginning of the 1990s, NATO broadened its tasks, with Article 2 providing its formal justification. In Rome, NATO adopted its first post-Cold War Strategic Concept,⁶⁵ which permitted the Alliance to conduct a wider range of tasks as a result of the adoption of a broader concept of security, as detailed above.⁶⁶ Furthermore, it was agreed in Rome that, as well as collective defence, dialogue and cooperation within Europe as a whole was necessary and that cooperation with the OSCE, the EC, the WEU and the UN 'may also have an important role to play'.⁶⁷ This was a first step towards NATO's concept of cooperative security and a NATO plea for a European security architecture, which justified enlargement and cooperation with other states and organizations, and which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

■
64 Article 2, Washington Treaty, 1949; 'The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them'.

65 NATO Strategic Concept 1991.

66 In contrast with the EU treaties, NATO strategic concepts are not legally binding, but political documents.

67 NATO Strategic Concept 1991, par. 34.

Broadening the Area of Operations

As outlined above, legally, there was never a need for NATO to find consent within the Alliance for out-of-area operations. Nevertheless, NATO allies did not agree on the extent of out-of-area operations and the debate lasted until the 9/11 attacks on US soil. After the 9/11 attacks, these debates jeopardized Alliance cohesion and solidarity and the US was supported in its view that NATO should go out of area. Hence NATO's decision '...to undertake crisis response operations distant from their home stations...' at the Prague Summit of 2002.⁶⁸ In practice, this meant an undefined broadening of NATO's territorial coverage for all operations, Article 5 as well as non-Article 5 operations. NATO was tasked with employability worldwide,⁶⁹ which thus ended the out-of-area debate.⁷⁰

In 2003, the concept of out-of-area operations moved beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, as NATO operations were conducted worldwide with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan, followed by operations in Africa and the Middle East.

Another impact of the 9/11 attacks was the traditional division between the internal and external tasks of a collective defence organization. Traditionally, a collective defence organization is one that deals with threats coming from outside the organization, which implies that threats or conflicts inside the organization's territory do not constitute a formal task, as was described in Chapter 2. There were diverging views on how and where to address the terrorists and terrorist attacks outside and inside NATO territory. Debates included the possibility of the organization's ownership of the mandate addressing attacks on home ground and abroad.⁷¹ For most of the allies, countering terrorism - committed on home ground - sat primarily within the national mandate, either civil or military, not that of the Alliance. This can be exemplified by the reaction of Spain and the UK to the Madrid terror attack of 2004 and the London terror attacks of 2005, which at the time had no direct consequences for the NATO mandate.

Broadening Collective Defence and Crisis Management Operations

Ever since the beginning of the 1990s, a debate has been ongoing between NATO allies with regard to the NATO scope of tasks of Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations, such as crisis management operations under UN and OSCE auspices.⁷² So-called non-Article 5 operations would lead to a broadening of NATO's mandate and this resulted in debates between the NATO allies.⁷³

68 Approved by NATO Defence ministers, Brussels, 12-13 June 2003.

69 NATO Defence ministers, Brussels, 12-13 June 2003: 'In order to carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed...'

70 Acknowledging that acts of terrorism, from whatever direction, posed a direct threat to NATO member states.

71 Sloan, S. R., 'Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain', Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 184-188.

72 As a result of the broadening of NATO's tasks, the new tasks were mostly referred to as crisis management operations, as did the WEU and EU (e.g. the Petersberg tasks), instead of peacekeeping which was the terminology used for UN operations. Later on, more often the term crisis response operations was used to include non-military tasks, like training.

73 For an elaboration on the diversity of the NATO tasks, see; Yost, D. S., 'NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security', United States Institute of Peace, 1999, p. 272-286.

From the Treaty and summits, a difference between Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations can be distinguished in the phrasing of Article 5: ‘...the attack from outside...’. What differed was the assumed automaticity laid down in Article 5, which could not be found in non-Article 5 operations; ‘Article 5 does not provide a mandate to act in the case of threats to the interests of the allies, only to deal with circumstances created by an attack on one of them’.⁷⁴ As explained above, Article 4 has always been regarded as a pre-stage to Article 5, taking into account the possibility to consult when dealing with a threat which could be broader than direct military attacks and simultaneously including military attacks.

A broader approach to non-Article 5 operations was subsequently adopted, as was stated in 2010: ‘NATO’s role in crisis management goes beyond military operations aimed at deterring and defending against threats to Alliance territory and the safety and security of Allied populations. A crisis can be political, military or humanitarian and can also arise from a natural disaster or as a consequence of technological disruptions’.⁷⁵ Though this broad perception on security was not backed up institutionally, by providing NATO with the necessary civil means, which will be elaborated on below. Articles 4 and 5 therefore meant the difference between territorial defence and expeditionary capabilities, which in practice were hardly mutually exclusive or contradictory.⁷⁶ The idea was that, in an increasingly globalised world, instability along NATO’s periphery was not without implications for the security of its members. For some of the NATO members, especially the former WP states, the problem would be the balance of priorities between Articles 4 and 5 and the necessity of NATO’s collective defence task.

Finally, with the Strategic Concept of 2010, which stated that ‘... the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low...’, a strict boundary between Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations was abandoned. It was concluded that if there was a need for a differentiation between the operations, this would be decided upon by the rationale for the operation, in other words case by case. ‘Allies decide on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including non-Article 5 response operations. Some operations may also include partners, non-NATO countries and other international actors. NATO recognises that the military alone cannot resolve a crisis or conflict, and lessons learned from previous operations make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management’, which broadened NATO’s mandate and flexibility in the choice for operations.⁷⁷

Even Broader than Collective Defence and Crisis Management Operations

After the broadening of NATO tasks in the 1990s, with crisis management and the lessons of the interventions in the Balkans and Afghanistan, a broader approach to security was

74 Sloan, S. R., ‘Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 150.

75 ‘Employing an appropriate mix of political and military tools to help manage emerging crises. NATO is an enabler which helps members and partners train and operate together’, Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Articles Crisis Response Operations, AJP-3.4(A), 15 October 2010.

76 NATO, ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations’, AJP-3.4(A), 15 October 2010.

77 NATO Strategic Concept, Lisbon 2010, par. 8-9.

again introduced in 2006 at the Riga Summit.⁷⁸ The ISAF operation proved the necessity for a compromise between the opponents and proponents within the Alliance of a more civil-military approach to the gap between NATO's division of military tasks and lack of civilian capabilities.

From the 1990s, there was a lack of consensus within the Alliance with regard to the scope and implementation of a broader NATO scope of tasks, including a comprehensive approach and cyber and hybrid tasks, as was stressed above. One of the priorities contested between the allies was to obtain the capability of a broader mandate and even civilian competences for NATO. To the allies of the former WP, it was necessary to focus on the Alliance's collective defence task, as security in the near area for these allies had the highest priority. These allies assumed that any other tasks were a distraction for NATO regarding budget, focus and capabilities and had no priority.⁷⁹ On the other hand, the US was in favour of a strong NATO crisis management capacity, including military and civil capabilities needed for the operations and in competition with other security organizations.⁸⁰ For other allies, who were members of both NATO and the EU, a distinct division of labour had to be achieved to create the European security architecture. These allies were not in favour of NATO adopting civilian capacities of crisis management or in favour of a related collective defence task or any other aspect that the EU already covered and which they regarded as an EU mandate and competence. Exemplified by France, who had always favoured the UN to be the responsible organization for worldwide security and the EU to develop a mandate in both mutual defence and crisis management operations. France therefore preferred NATO to remain a pure collective defence organization.⁸¹ France had always been a proponent of strengthening a broad EU CSDP, but not of NATO developing a broad range of civil and military capacities or the creation of additional institutional frameworks.⁸² Apart from the different interests of the member states, there were several organs within the NATO structure that were in favour of a broadened NATO. From the operations in 1990s and 2000 onwards, traditional collective defence was not the response that was needed for international security. Broadening the scope of NATO's mandate was necessary for the survival of NATO. As NATO's Secretary General Rasmussen stated: 'Many of the arguments put forth by the secretary general of NATO and other NATO representatives imply an understanding of NATO as a security organization' and accordingly 'NATO needs to take a

78 For an elaboration on the NATO comprehensive approach: Wendling, C., 'The Comprehensive Approach to Civil-Military Crisis Management: A Critical Analysis and Perspective', IRSEM, 2010; Sloan, R. S., 'Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama', The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010, New York; Hazelbag, L. J., 'De geïntegreerde benadering in Afghanistan: tussen ambitie en praktijk', Dissertatie, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, 2016, p. 359-376.

79 Coning, C., de, Friis, K., 'Coherence and Coordination. The limits of the Comprehensive Approach', *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, 15, 2011, p. 248-251.

80 Hofmann, S. C., 'Overlapping Institutions in the Realm of International Security: The Case of NATO and ESDP', *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 7, No. 1, Mar. 2009, p. 45-52.

81 Irondelle, B., Merand, F., 'France's return to NATO: the death knell for ESDP?', *European Security* Vol. 19, No. 1, March 2010; Fortmann, M., Haglund, D., Hlatky, S., von, 'France's 'return' to NATO: Implications for Transatlantic Relations', *European Security*, Taylor & Francis, 2010.

82 Holmberg, A., 'The changing role of NATO: exploring the implications for security governance and legitimacy', *European Security*, Vol. 20, No. 4, December 2011, p. 531.

broad approach towards its tasks, both internally and externally. It needs to develop further the comprehensive approach to security and cooperate and coordinate more with partners and actors of various kinds, both in the planning and conduct of operations'.⁸³

Finally, debates with regard to the broadening of NATO's tasks also included the concept of the effect-based approach to operations (EBAO) in relation to the comprehensive approach.⁸⁴ NATO officials, such as the secretary general, stated that it was in the interests of the mandate and survival of NATO to adopt an all-encompassing and politically strategic view of the comprehensive approach, while some of the states had tried to maintain a clear distinction between the EBAO and the comprehensive approach, using the EBAO as an internal NATO concept and the comprehensive approach as an international concept to which NATO could contribute.⁸⁵

The debate with regard to the acceptance of broadening NATO's mandate with a comprehensive approach and additional structures and capacities continued throughout 2010. Though collective defence remained the core task of the Alliance, it was approached from a broader perspective than that of a conventional or nuclear attack and it was acknowledged that the 'main risks and challenges' included instability arising from 'failed or failing states and regional crises and conflicts', which necessitated 'non-Article 5 crisis response operations'.⁸⁶ Therefore, 'to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including through non-Article 5 crisis response operations' the Alliance would pursue 'a comprehensive political and civilian and military approach'.⁸⁷ It can therefore be argued that the debates within the EU for a more comprehensive approach to security and defence were mirrored in NATO. As a compromise, a Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) was adopted at the Riga Summit in 2006.⁸⁸ This CPG involved a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments and focused on developing better operational coordination and consultation with a range of civil and military actors involved in the security arena, such as the UN and NGOs.⁸⁹ To NATO, this comprehensive

83 NATO Secretary General Rasmussen, August 3, 2009.

84 In NATO jargon at first more broad operations were referred to as 'Effect Based Approach to Operations' and 'Full Spectrum Operations' instead of a comprehensive approach.

85 Wendling, C., 'The Comprehensive Approach to Civil-Military Crisis Management: A Critical Analysis and Perspective', IRSEM, 2010, p. 41.

86 Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., 'NATO's Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?', Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 50.

87 The Comprehensive Political Guidance, November 2006, par. 5 and 6: 'The Alliance will continue to follow the broad approach to security of the 1999 Strategic Concept and perform the fundamental security tasks it set out, namely security, consultation, deterrence and defence, crisis management, and partnership.' Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_56425.htm, accessed 2-3-2018.

88 NATO Riga Summit Declaration, November 2006: 'In order to undertake the full range of missions, the Alliance must have the capability to launch and sustain concurrent major joint operations and smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response on and beyond Alliance territory, on its periphery, and at strategic distance; it is likely that NATO will need to carry out a greater number of smaller demanding and different operations, and the Alliance must retain the capability to conduct large-scale high-intensity operations'. Confirmed at the NATO Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, 2009.

89 NATO non-military operations: training Iraqi security forces, logistical support to the African Union in Darfur, Tsunami relief efforts in Indonesia, relief of the earthquake in Pakistan (2005) and hurricane Katrina (2006). AWACS protection for international sporting events like the Olympic Games in Greece 2004. In most of these operations NATO is backing the UN.

approach entailed civil-military cooperation, which did go further than the 2003 NATO doctrine of enhanced civil-military cooperation.⁹⁰ The CPG noted that the threats were broad in scope, ranging from support operations in cooperation with civil agencies through combat operations in cooperation with other international organizations.

NATO's CPG was therefore developed from 2006 onwards and a corresponding action plan was endorsed in 2008.⁹¹ In 2009, the CPG was confirmed at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit in the Declaration on Alliance Security⁹² and in 2010 the Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive was established. Consequently, as well as such eventualities as a military attack, the threat of terrorism and the spread of WMD were identified as the 'principal threats to the alliance'.⁹³

Although NATO had developed a comprehensive approach, the debates between member states with regard to the scope of the mandate of NATO's comprehensive approach paralysed NATO's ability to really move forward between 2004 and 2010 in this area of NATO tasks.⁹⁴ Experiences in Afghanistan showed the practical challenge of operating in a complex environment, as NATO '...feels itself forced to take on certain civilian tasks in the absence of civilian actors in the field...', although NATO was not always equipped to perform all the activities required.⁹⁵

The broadening of tasks raised another issue of discord between the NATO allies, for both Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations. As NATO operations functioned on the principles of burden sharing and 'costs lie where they fall',⁹⁶ as a result, some member states worried that financing costly pre-conflict and reconstruction activities would increase the NATO budget at the expense of other tasks. This budget question remained on the 'NATO table' as a subject of discussion.

As well as the adoption of NATO's comprehensive approach, accompanied by the debates between the member states as to how broad the scope of NATO tasks should be, a need for a comprehensive approach within the European security architecture resulted in inter-organizational cooperation. This was illustrated by the 2009 Strasbourg/Kehl Summit that highlighted a need for stronger coordination with the UN and the EU. This coordination

90 NATO Civil Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine, June 2003, AJP-9.

91 North Atlantic Council, Riga Summit, November, 2006, par. 20: 'We aim to strengthen our cooperation with other international actors, including the United Nations, European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and African Union, in order to improve our ability to deliver a comprehensive approach to meeting these new challenges, combining civilian and military capabilities more effectively. In our operations today in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, our armed forces are working alongside many other nations and organisations'. Confirmed at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, 2009.

92 North Atlantic Council, Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, 2009, par. 1: 'We aim to strengthen our cooperation with other international actors, including the United Nations, European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and African Union, in order to improve our ability to deliver a comprehensive approach to meet these new challenges, combining civilian and military capabilities more effectively.'

93 North Atlantic Council, Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, 2009, par. 56.

94 Rynning, S., 'NATO in Afghanistan. The Liberal Disconnect', Stanford University Press, 2012, p. 185.

95 Coning, C., de, Friis, K., 'Coherence and Coordination. The limits of the Comprehensive Approach', *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, 15, 2011, p. 249.

96 The 'costs lie where they fall principle' means that if a NATO country contributes to a NATO operation, it pays for these operations.

was, however, not adopted in a hierarchical setting, a division of labour, as some NATO member states disapproved. Furthermore, inter-organisational strengthening likewise led to competition between the organizations. For some key players within the European security architecture like France, NATO had always been perceived as a US-dominated organization. This perception was mirrored within the EU, where some officials were reluctant to expand the military role of the EU, as the EU had other tasks to perform and could deliver a much broader security approach than NATO. One example was the operation in Afghanistan from 2003 onwards, as EU officials were opponents of the EU working under NATO and US domination.⁹⁷

For that reason, therefore, although a broader approach was taken at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, the Summit likewise demonstrated that for a genuine comprehensive approach, NATO lacked the comprehensive capacity. Similar to 1991, as a compromise, NATO chose for the European security architecture to take a genuine comprehensive approach to the Euro-Atlantic security provision instead of a pure NATO approach. Consequently, the resolution of the debates between the NATO allies was the combination of acceptance of the necessity to cooperate with other actors in the field together with a comprehensive NATO approach with limited institutionalization and capabilities.⁹⁸ As a result, a European security architecture, involving necessary linkages between international organizations and multilateralism, was claimed by NATO to be essential. Nevertheless, interaction between international organizations was only formalised or institutionalized between NATO and other organizations at a minimal level, as will be explored in Chapter 5.⁹⁹

All in all, NATO adopted a broader approach to security and acknowledged formally that purely military operations would not win the peace. Simultaneously, it was accepted that NATO alone did not have the mandate or the capabilities to address all the problems inherent in conflict situations, resulting in the acknowledgement that to address conflicts, it was necessary to cooperate with other organizations.

After the Lisbon Strategic Concept

In 2010, the third strategic concept since the end of the Cold War was adopted, explicitly mentioning the three NATO tasks: collective defence, cooperative security and crisis management operations.¹⁰⁰

Apart from the internal debates, which were elaborated on above, this strategic concept did strengthen the acceptance of a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach, which was claimed to be necessary for effective crisis management.¹⁰¹ As a result, it was accepted that NATO could in principal participate, contribute or in some cases be the lead organization in all sorts of operations around the globe, which broadened NATO's

97 For an elaboration on EU officials and EU missions and operations, see: Smith, M. E., 'Europe's Common Security and Defence Policy. Capacity-Building, Experiential Learning, and Institutional Change', Cambridge University Press, 2017.

98 To date, NATO's definition of a comprehensive approach remains vague in terms of strategy and capacities.

99 Holmberg, A., 'The Changing role of NATO: exploring the implications for security governance and legitimacy', *European Security*, Vol. 20, No. 4, December 2011, p. 540.

100 NATO Strategic Concept, Lisbon 2010, par. 1.

101 Ibid, par. 8-9.

tasks again. Furthermore, the NSC of 2010 had led to a compromise between France and the US, with regard to a civil capability of NATO, which resulted in a small institutionalized civil-military capacity.¹⁰² This compromise had been used in NATO's intervention in Libya (2011), although thereafter it was not applied in France's intervention in Mali (2013), where the UN and the EU took over as France favoured these organizations and the EU was better equipped for the civil side of crisis management operations.

Hence the build-up of NATO's capacities, approached broadly, included the ability to monitor and analyse the international environment referred to as conflict prevention, the organization of an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability, the ability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones and also the capacity to identify and train civilian specialists from member states made available for rapid deployment. Though these initiatives concerned limited institutional development, the political implications were significant. As a result, NATO could be involved in complex situations (other than military conflicts) and NATO's scope of tasks was thus broadened, although linked to the EU.¹⁰³

As well as NATO's broadened tasks, Article 3 of the NATO Treaty became of interest again as a result of Russia's hybrid and cyber threats¹⁰⁴ and the intervention in Crimea in 2014. From 2016, along with Articles 2 and 4, Article 3 of the NATO Treaty¹⁰⁵ was put on the political agenda. Again, this resulted in debates with regard to the scope of the commitment or even obligation of the member states to strengthen their home defence, thus that of NATO territory, including transport, communications and basic supplies. In other words, the concept of resilience and the question of how to address resilience by the member states, was linked to Article 5. The aim of highlighting Article 3 was the link that emerged as a result of the threats in connection with Article 5, collective defence and mutual assistance, and the necessary capabilities. In other words, the assumed automatic obligation that states had, if they were a member of an alliance, to secure their national sovereign territory. With regard to a broad perspective of security and NATO's tasks, the renewed emphasis on Article 3 meant that an appeal could be made to capacities such as civil preparedness and cooperation with civil authorities, the private sector, other international organizations and partner states.¹⁰⁶

102 Ibid, par. 9.

103 Flockhart T. (ed.), 'Cooperative Security: NATO's Partnership Policy in a Changing World', DIIS Report 2014:01, Copenhagen, p. 134.

104 Exemplified by the cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007.

105 NATO Washington Treaty, 1949, Article 3; 'In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack'.

106 Rühle, M., 'Deterrence: what it can (and cannot) do, NATO Review, 20 April 2015. <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2015/04/20/deterrence-what-it-can-and-cannot-do/index.html>. Accessed 1 April 2017; Shea, J., 'Resilience: a core element of collective defence', NATO Review, 30 March 2016. <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2016/03/30/resilience-a-core-element-of-collective-defence/index.html>. Accessed 1 April 2017. Brinkel, T, 'The Resilient Mind-Set and Deterrence', Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2017, Springer, 2017.

4.3.4 The NATO Path of Broadening

From its creation, NATO's core business has been collective defence, which has always remained the backbone of NATO. However, NATO's task broadened directly after the end of the Cold War, as crisis management operations were NATO's main activities from the 1990s.

Reflecting on NATO's collective defence task from the 1990s, Articles 4 and 5, as the prime articles of collective defence, were broadened, more closely linked and applied incrementally; case by case as a reaction to the events that unfolded. Although the content of Article 5 changed, for example by including terrorism as a threat, this broadening did not include homeland security, the internal NATO Treaty area. From 2014, however, the focus on resilience in Article 3 linked national security more closely to the NATO task of collective defence. Furthermore, NATO's prime task had never been invoked for the tasks for which it was mandated, due to debate amongst the members and the paradox that arose as a result of the combination of a broader institutionalized mandate and collective defence as deterrence.

Reflecting on the broadening of tasks other than collective defence, the change in threats from the beginning of the 1990s changed NATO's response to those threats, as a security organization with a broader mandate. Broadening was accomplished by acknowledging the scope of Article 2 and by incorporating non-Article 5 tasks: crisis management operations.

Formally, NATO embraced the concept of cooperative security, as defined by NATO, directly after the end of the Cold War and with the strategic concept of 1999, stating that '...The Alliance's role in these positive developments has been underpinned by the comprehensive adaptation of its approach to security and of its procedures and structures...'.¹⁰⁷ NATO's definition was to 'undertake crisis management operations distant from their home stations, including beyond the allies' territory'.¹⁰⁸

As every NATO strategic concept indicates, NATO's tasks were clearly divided into collective defence, crisis management operations and cooperative security,¹⁰⁹ although NATO's cooperative security concept was not comparable to the concept as was elaborated on in Chapter 2.¹¹⁰ NATO did embrace cooperative security and adopted a comprehensive approach concept, but this did not result in an internal security task as the traditional concept of cooperative security implies. For instance, NATO had no official role in the area of migration or in countering terrorism in the homeland of one of the member states.

107 NATO Strategic Concept, 1999, par. 3.

108 The 1999 Strategic Concept, the year of NATO's 50th anniversary, allied leaders adopted commitment of members to common defense and peace and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area. It was based on a broad definition of security which recognized the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the defense dimension. It identified the new risks that had emerged since the end of the Cold War, which included terrorism, ethnic conflict, human rights abuses, political instability, economic fragility, and the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery. The document stated that the Alliance's fundamental tasks were security, consultation and defense, adding that crisis management and partnership were also essential to enhancing security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

109 NATO Strategic Concept, Lisbon 2010.

110 NATO defines cooperative security as follows: 'The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organizations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO's standards'. NATO Strategic Concept, Lisbon 2010, par. 4c.

Security within the NATO territory was linked to the EU. Nevertheless, informally, NATO had an internal security task as an internal pacificator, preserving the solidarity and the norms and values as stated in Article 2 of the Treaty. This task was extended with the enlargement of new members, as the 'zone of peace' widened and implied a bigger area of responsibility, which linked the path of broadening to that of widening. So, reflecting on NATO's cooperative security task shows that it is permeated militarily in a restricted manner by cooperation, exercises, training and education, but did not evolve that much institutionally, nor is it supported by capabilities.

NATO's function as a security organization did therefore broaden incrementally over the last decades, albeit only slightly. For a genuinely broader approach to security, the choice was made to cooperate with other organizations, because NATO was not mandated with a broader scope of tasks as a result of the debates between the members states and competition between the organizations.

4.3.5 Conclusion

In short, this section examined the questions of how and why the path of change has led to the broadening of NATO. The analysis presented above on the way in which NATO has broadened shows that two main periods can be identified, entailing three themes: deterrence, crisis management and cooperation. In the 1990s, NATO adopted crisis management tasks and the NATO concept of cooperative security, whereby the collective defence task became less important.

In the new century, the collective defence task was broadened, though only slightly, and this was followed by the resurgence of the collective defence task after 2010. NATO has thus been transforming from a purely collective defence organization throughout the Cold War to an organization with a broader mandate including a broadened collective defence task, worldwide crisis management operations and a broader approach to security with a small civil military capability.

Nevertheless, due to the debates between the member states and the development of related security organizations, NATO's broadening of tasks was formally limited to the external security of the Treaty area. This meant a partial change of the traditional collective defence task, and for some tasks broadening was deemed necessary in cooperation with other international organizations.

4.4 The EU and its CSDP Path of Broadening

4.4.1 Introduction

A big change in the European security architecture was the arrival of the EU as a security actor. Although many attempts in the security and defence area had gone before within the European integration process, the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security pillar with the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) finally created the possibility for foreign and security policy. Next to NATO and the OSCE as security providers, the EU emerged as a security actor. Paradoxically, this started in 1992 and 1997 under the NATO and the WEU umbrellas with the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and the transfer of the WEU Petersberg tasks to the EU in 1992. This section examines the questions of how and why change has led to a broadening of the EU. The specific path of broadening of the EU will be analysed in this section, focusing on the form and level as indicators of the path of broadening, addressing the scope of tasks from 1990 onwards.

4.4.2 A Narrow Perspective on Security and Defence

The Creation of the EU: The Cold War

From the beginning of the European integration process, a defence component had been on the agenda of the European states and at the same time always led to a debate between these member states.¹¹¹ On the one side, the traditional transatlanticists, including the UK and the Netherlands, were in favour of NATO as the primary provider of defence. This group of states were afraid that the creation of an EU security and defence policy would result in putting the vital transatlantic security link at risk. On the other side, France and Germany have always been traditional proponents of an EU security pillar, including a 'D' in the build-up of the EU. The first European defence organization was the establishment of the Western Union in 1948 with the Treaty of Brussels and was renamed the Western European Union (WEU) to accommodate the rearmament of Germany in 1954. The Brussels Treaty had a similar clause as NATO's Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.¹¹² German rearmament was at first planned within the new setup of a European Defence Community (EDC) within the European integration process, a French initiative.¹¹³ In 1954, this plan failed as a result of the refusal of the French Parliament to ratify the agreement because of the supranational aspects.¹¹⁴

111 For an elaboration on the development of defence within the EU during the Cold War, see: Segers, M., 'Reis naar het continent. Nederland en de Europese integratie, 1950 tot heden', Prometheus, 2013; Middelaar, L., 'De passage naar Europa. Geschiedenis van een begin', Historische uitgeverij, 2009; Howorth, J., 'Security and Defence Policy in the European Union', The European Union Series, 2nd edition, 2014, p. 1-7.

112 Modified Brussels Treaty on 23 October 1954, Paris Accords, Article 5: 'If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power'.

113 The Treaty establishing the European Defence Community, also known as the Treaty of Paris, was signed on 27 May 1952, but rejected by the French and Italian parliaments. The treaty was based on the plan of the French prime minister Pleven ('the Pleven Plan').

114 For an extensive overview of the development of a defence component in the European integration process and the development of the WEU organization see: Eekelen, van, W., 'Debating European Security, 1948-1998', Den Haag, 1998; Bloed, A., Wessel, A., (red.), 'The Changing Functions of the Western European Union. Introduction and Basic Documents', Dordrecht, 1994; Duke, S., 'The Elusive Quest for European Security: from EDC to CFSP', Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, p. 13-14; Howorth, J., 'Security and Defence Policy in the European Union', The European Union Series, 2nd edition, 2014, p. 1-7.

From the eighties onwards, the WEU provided the platform for discussing European security and defence matters outside the EU, as defence debates within the EU were a no-go for the UK. At the same time, the Europeans felt the need to carry more of the burden for European security themselves in relation to the US. This even resulted in joint actions by the WEU in an operational role in the Gulf and Balkans wars.¹¹⁵

After the Cold War

The geopolitical events at the beginning of the 1990s, such as the fall of the communist regimes from 1988 to 1991, the withdrawal of American interest and troops from Europe, the Gulf war,¹¹⁶ the events that unfolded in Yugoslavia¹¹⁷ and the reunification of Germany, resulted in a balance of power exercise between the European powers. It became obvious that the European states were dependent on the US hegemon and its capabilities and incapable of acting autonomously.

Consequently, in the process leading up to the Maastricht Treaty, France and Germany proposed the creation of a common foreign and defence policy. The French president Mitterrand called for a political union which would include a foreign and security policy and even a common defence as a counterweight to the German reunification. And in 1992, with the Maastricht Treaty, a foreign and security pillar was created.

The Maastricht Treaty was a major breakthrough in the development of the EU as a security actor. The European states and the EU had to establish a position within a new European balance of power and security construction. Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) therefore stated that the EU had ‘...to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy’.¹¹⁸

However, actual defence cooperation was a bridge too far and was mentioned as a future objective of the EU, as Article J.4 of the TEU reads: ‘...common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence’.¹¹⁹ The future of the EU as a security actor therefore always remained an issue between the European allies, labelled by Howorth as the Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma.¹²⁰ These debates ranged between the option of an autonomous EU independent of NATO and the US to a complementary EU strengthening NATO within the European security architecture.

As a result, the European initiatives of Maastricht were not backed by any institutional developments or capabilities, especially not in the defence domain.

115 Actions in the Gulf from 1988-1990, followed by actions related to the war in Yugoslavia from 1992-1996, such as Operation Sharp Guard together with NATO in the Adriatic Sea, and actions in South-East Europe from 1997-2001 on the Danube together with the OSCE, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Croatia and Kosovo.

116 The Gulf War included a coalition of 35 states against Iraq in response to Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait and lasted from August 1990 to February 1991.

117 From June 1991, violent conflicts in Yugoslavia broke out as a result of several wars of independence and ethnic conflicts.

118 The Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, Maastricht, Article 2.

119 Ibid, article J.4.

120 Howorth, J., ‘Security and Defence Policy in the European Union’, The European Union Series, 2nd edition, 2014, p. 3.

The traditional opponents, the more transatlantic states, such as the UK and the Netherlands, feared competition with NATO if a genuine 'D' in the EU's scope of tasks and institutional structure was created. However, the traditional proponents, France and Germany, were in favour and several proposals saw the light of day with regard to a more common EU defence capability, but none of them was realised.¹²¹ A compromise between the Transatlanticists and Europeanists was found in Article J.4 of the TEU: 'The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications'. But then again, this article simultaneously linked any EU defence creation to NATO, as Article J.4 continued: 'The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework...'.¹²² This created the possibility for the WEU to develop into a defence pillar of the EU, but at the same time called upon the WEU to strengthen itself as a European pillar within NATO, which situated the WEU as an interlinkage between NATO and the EU.¹²³ This compromise, the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO, on the one hand allowed European forces to act in crisis situations, which were not in the interest of the US, and to use US assets via NATO. On the other hand, this was an opportunity for the US to keep European forces linked to the US.¹²⁴ The compromise would remain leading in US-EU defence relations, labelled as 'separable but not separate'. The concept of ESDI was further developed in 1996,¹²⁵ when the procedures were laid down, and with that became the precursor of the EU-NATO Berlin Plus agreements of 2003.¹²⁶

In 1998, the frustration over the Balkan wars in Europe's backyard increased a sense of actorness amongst the European powers. Europe's diplomatic and military impotence, in what was supposed to be a Europe whole and free, conflicted with the EU's normative basis. This frustration made it clear that the EU had to step up to expectations. The EU's CFSP was not equipped with an institutional framework or essential capabilities and, although the WEU had acted in some operations in the Balkans wars, it was clear that most European states were depending on the US and the US reluctantly supported the EU in the Balkan wars. The US expected the EU to improve its political willingness and capabilities for its own European security.¹²⁷ Furthermore, in Germany awareness was increasing that it was

121 For instance, the German-French proposal and four other members of the WEU to the EU IGC of 1997, see: Reichard, M., 'The EU-NATO relationship. A Legal and Political Perspective', Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 2006, p. 193-194.

122 Treaty on the European Union, Article J4.

123 For an elaboration on the development of the position of the WEU in relation to NATO and EU, see: Drent, M., 'A Europeanisation of the Security Structure. The Security Identities of the United Kingdom and Germany', Dissertation, University of Groningen, the Netherlands, 7 October 2010, p. 44-46.

124 Howorth, J., 'Security and Defence Policy in the European Union', The European Union Series, 2nd edition, 2014, p. 6.

125 NATO, 'Defence Ministers Meeting', Berlin, M-NAC-1(96)63, June 1996.

126 Howorth, J., 'Security and Defence Policy in the European Union', The European Union Series, 2nd edition, 2014, p. 6.

127 Keukeleire, S., 'Het buitenlands beleid van de Europese Unie: de diversiteit en praktijk van het buitenlands beleid en van de communautaire methode als toetssteen voor het externe beleid van de EG, het gemeenschappelijk buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid en het structureel buitenlands beleid van de EU', Kluwer, 1998, p. 367-459.

necessary to take a position in the EU's political and security domain and start participating in crisis management operations outside the NATO area.¹²⁸ In addition, in other areas of the European integration process cooperation broadened and deepened, strengthening the monetary union and the enlargement process, which resulted in a spill-over effect to the security and defence domain.¹²⁹ As a result, the UK and France proposed boosting European defence at a summit in 1998 in St. Malo, France.

St. Malo proved to be a big game changer and resulted in several initiatives, such as the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) aimed at the creation of military capabilities and the EU's mandate for crisis management,¹³⁰ but got nowhere near a common defence component. Nevertheless, the idea of a common defence never left the agenda and had much support from some founding member states within the EU as well as EU officials in the EU parliament and commission.¹³¹ For some, the concept of mutual defence felt like a natural identity of the EU, having a right to common defence as a result of the collective self-defence Article 51 of the UN Charter, as was the case for the WEU and NATO. For others, such as the US, the UK and the EU-neutral countries, this sense of a natural identity was not shared. Although the US and the UK have always been transatlantic-orientated, the US was in favour of a stronger Europe, but with a minimum of a defence component, and not in competition with NATO. Nevertheless, the US urged the British to engage in European defence. The UK, however, was at first not in favour of a European security and defence pillar as described above, but chose to be part of the security and defence pillar of the European integration process by supporting the CSDP. The UK switch towards European defence was stimulated by the US and was supposed to be a counterweight to the German-French axis in combination with the deepening of the monetary union.¹³²

On the European continent, the interests were scattered likewise. Historically, some EU member states did not agree on the development of the 'D' in CSDP, as a result of their neutral position, such as Denmark. The Scandinavian countries were in favour of a union without collective defence, as non-NATO members. The primacy of the Central and Eastern European states lay with NATO; they were hesitant because of a possible duplication with NATO. Furthermore, another argument relevant for these states was that European cooperation should be a facilitator, not a means of taking over the state: the EU was there to support the existence of the state after decennia of domination by the SU and the WP.

128 In 1997 the German constitution was changed.

129 The spill-over effect will be elaborated in Chapter 7.

130 See for an elaboration on the institutional development: Chapter 6.

131 Reichard, M., 'The EU-NATO relationship. A Legal and Political Perspective', Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 2006, p. 195-203.

132 For an elaboration on the position of the UK in the EU's CSDP, see: Wallace, W., 'Europe or Anglosphere? British Foreign Policy Between Atlanticism and European Integration, John Stuart Mill Institute, 2005. Oliver, T., Wallace, W., 'A bridge too far: The United Kingdom and the transatlantic relationship', in: 'The Atlantic alliance under stress: US-European relations after Iraq', Cambridge University Press, 2005. Wallace, W., 'The collapse of British foreign policy', *International Affairs*, 81(1), 2005, p. 53-68. Cornish, P., 'United Kingdom', p. 371-386, in: Biehl, H., Giegerich, B., Jonas, A., (Eds.), 'Security Cultures in Europe. Security and Defense Policies across the Continent', Springer, 2013.

Thus, before the realisation of the actual 'D' in the EU's security and defence policy, the EU started with the creation of a crisis management capacity, with the adoption of the HHG in 1999. Consequently, in contrast to NATO, the EU's mandate within the security and defence domain broadened at first with a crisis management task instead of a common defence task.¹³³

A New Century: Solidarity and Common Defence

After St. Malo, at the beginning of 2000, many ideas for common defence were put on the table. One of the ideas was a fourth defence pillar, launched around the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), to separate security and defence as proposed by the neutral states and the UK.¹³⁴ This idea contained the abolition of the WEU and the creation of a new defence pillar, which meant that the decision-making aspects of the WEU would be transferred to the EU, while the military functions would be subsumed into NATO, with the possibility for opponents to opt out. This idea was never realised, however. Another idea came from the so-called chocolate summit in 2003. During the Iraq crisis (2003),¹³⁵ four of the EU member states - France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg - proposed a separate EU military headquarters one month after the Berlin Plus agreements between NATO and the EU. This proposal heightened the tension between the US and some European states to a higher level than was already the case during the Iraq crisis. Predictably, the proposal was declined by the US.¹³⁶

The debates continued between the member states, and now and then escalated over the interpretation of the 'D'. It took almost two decades after 'Maastricht' to adopt a common defence clause in the EU treaties. France and Germany were at the core of a group of countries pushing for mutual defence, which started with Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, chairman of the Convention on the future of the EU in 2003. This convention started in turbulent times; as the EU path of widening stressed the EU's deepening, solidarity among the NATO allies was tested more than once, due to the crisis of UN legitimacy after the Kosovo invasion, the Iraq crisis and the US response to the 9/11 attacks, including the US strategy of pre-emptive strikes (2002).¹³⁷ As a result, Paris and Berlin pushed for a mutual defence commitment to be part of the constitution.¹³⁸ Opponents, the transatlanticists, the neutrals and NATO officials¹³⁹ argued that it would undermine the Alliance and that the EU would never be able to defend its own territory.

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133 Duke, S., 'The EU, NATO and the Lisbon treaty: still divided within a common city', 2011, p. 10.

134 Ibid, p. 11-12.

135 France, Germany and Belgium vetoed the US-UK Iraq invasion within the NATO Council, 11 February 2003.

136 Black, I., 'NATO bid to defuse EU defence row', The Guardian, 2003, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/oct/21/nato.politics>, accessed on 14 August 2017.

137 The pre-emptive strike concept dated from the Bush Doctrine (2001) which referred to various related foreign policy principles of US President George W. Bush: it contained the policy that the US had the right to secure itself against countries that harbour or give aid to terrorist groups.

138 French Minister Dominique de Villepin and German Minister Joschka Fischer, November 2003.

139 See for instance: Mayer, S., 'Embedded Politics, Growing Informalization? How NATO and the EU transform Provision of External Security', Contemporary Security Policy, Volume 32, No. 2, August 2011, p. 308-333.

However, though partially restrained by the US, the UK and the EU-neutral countries, the concept of common defence¹⁴⁰ was finally introduced with the mutual defence clause in the Treaty of Lisbon of 2009. The mutual defence clause, better known as Article 42.7, stated that ‘...Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter...’.¹⁴¹ With this, the possibility was created of military assistance from EU member states on national territory of other EU member states¹⁴² and, like NATO, within the framework of Article 51 of the UN charter. Article 42.7 had a strong resemblance to Article 5 of the Treaty of Brussels (1948).

In comparison with NATO’s Article 5, Article 42.7 was worded more strongly in legal terms. Article 42.7 referred to ‘all means in their power’, which can be understood to cover all possible EU and member state actions. Although it was agreed that it ‘shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States’, in reference to the role of NATO. Furthermore, ‘Lisbon’ obliged member states to provide ‘aid and assistance by all the means in their power’ and was thus expressed more persuasively than NATO’s Article 5, which only obliges each ally to take ‘such action as it deems necessary’.¹⁴³ In addition, from the beginning of ‘Lisbon’, the EU approach to common defence entailed a broader perspective on security in comparison to NATO. It was not built on a single military approach to insecurity or aggression; the identified tasks were much broader. For example, armed kidnapping of EU citizens would be interpreted as armed aggression, but not an armed attack. Likewise, armed aggression did not necessarily need the ‘imminent threat’ of an attack, implying that Article 42.7 allowed member states to take preventive countermeasures. With regard to the area of operations, either civil or military, from its creation, Article 42.7 was not limited to the transatlantic area, but was applicable worldwide from the outset. This was in contrast with the debates within NATO regarding the geographical scope of its Article 5, as detailed above. Consequently, the EU’s mutual defence clause was not collective defence in the classical sense; its scope was broader than just a military attack, also covering, for example, the protection of trade routes.

On the other hand, Article 42.7 did not result in an institutionalized military headquarters or assigned troops¹⁴⁴ and the unanimity rule prevailed.¹⁴⁵ So, the EU’s common defence was limited from the beginning with regard to strategy, planning and institutional building. Furthermore, Article 42.7 did not apply to all EU member states,

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140 Within the Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007, common defence is labelled as mutual defence.

141 The Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007, Article 42.7, the Mutual Defense Clause: ‘If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defense and the forum for its implementation’.

142 From June 2010, the WEU Treaty was cancelled and the WEU was abolished from June 2011 after one year’s postponement.

143 Except for Denmark and Sweden, with the general opt-out for mutual CSDP.

144 With the Treaty of Lisbon, the Petersberg tasks were enlarged with disarmament, military advice and assistance, conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation.

145 Treaty of Lisbon, 1997, Article 28 A4; ‘Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously’.

as some states, such as Sweden, chose to be neutral in the case of an armed conflict. Therefore, whereas NATO's Article 5 was the solidarity clause, the backbone of the Alliance, the EU's Article 42.7 allowed differentiation between the member states.

Finally, it was made clear in the EU's Article 42.7 that member states' commitments under NATO obligations would not be affected. And, although NATO's Article 5 was more restricted than Article 42.7 of the EU, this prioritised NATO over the EU with regard to common defence for member states that were members of both organizations. Consequently, the EU played a complementary role to the NATO task of common defence.¹⁴⁶

Supplementary to the mutual defence clause, a so-called 'solidarity clause' was introduced with the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, but not without debate.¹⁴⁷ On the one hand, the traditional anti-supranational states had difficulties with an internal security task of the EU. On the other hand, some member states and Brussels policymakers advocated that the threat the EU territory was facing was not so much a possible interstate conflict, but came from non-state actors such as terrorists, due to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Madrid (2004) and London (2005),¹⁴⁸ migration or were climate related. This solidarity clause, Article 222 of the Lisbon Treaty, stated that 'The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster.'¹⁴⁹ Article 222 was thus supposed to be the EU response to a terroristic attack, man-made or natural disaster, and envisioned other capacities and institutions, as well as military, including police and judicial cooperation within the Treaty area.

Some member states argued that a mutual defence clause alone could not include the broad range of crisis and disaster response capacities needed within the EU territory, especially with regard to the civil protection available to the EU. It was necessary to distinguish the EU from the concept of common defence aimed at threats from outside the territory, as Article 222 covered internal EU territory. For others, such as France, the solidarity clause would not entail a takeover of the EU organs of member states' homeland security in the event of, for instance, a terrorist attack. The solidarity clause had thus been subject to conceptual differences: solidarity in the sense that member states were obliged to take care of their homeland security, comparable to NATO's Article 3, or in the sense that member states would be obliged to assist one another.¹⁵⁰ As a result, the EU adopted a broader approach to territorial defence, but still made a distinction between an external and an internal provision of security.¹⁵¹ The main reasoning behind this distinction was the debate between the member states with regard to homeland defence and state sovereignty. Hence the fact that Articles 42.7 and 222 are meant to protect the territory of the EU, but govern two different situations: internal and external security.

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146 Sweden, Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland and Malta are not NATO members.

147 Parkes, R., 'Migration and terrorism: the new frontiers for European solidarity', EUISS, Brief 37, December 2015.

148 Declaration on combatting Terrorism, European Council, Brussels, 25 March 2004.

149 Treaty of Lisbon, 2009, Article 222.

150 At the Council meeting of 24 June 2014, further elaboration of the solidarity concept was implemented.

151 Duke, S., 'The EU, NATO and the Lisbon Treaty: still divided within a common city', 2011, p. 10.

In comparison, the EU's responsibility with regard to the solidarity clause lies within the EU territory is not part of the CSDP and therefore falls under the competence of the EU: the EU organs in contrast with the mutual defence clause. This meant supranational decision-making, with the Commission's instruments and budget at the EU's disposal. In contrast, the mutual defence clause has been embedded within the CFSP and is therefore intergovernmental under the authority of the Council, and thus the member states, with no explicit role for the other EU organs according to the Treaty of Lisbon.¹⁵² Furthermore, the competences of the solidarity clause were limited to the territory of the EU member states, whereas the EU's mutual defence clause has not been limited geographically, as it is there to protect the EU from threats from outside the EU territory.

In November 2015, after the terrorist attack in Paris, the EU's mutual assistance clause was invoked for the first time, and the last during this research, by the French president Hollande.¹⁵³ Although it would have been more appropriate to invoke Article 222, the internal security provision, this was not an option for France as this would have handed a major role to the European Commission. France therefore invoked Article 42.7, as the country was struggling to cope with its foreign military commitments in Africa while beefing up security at home in the wake of the attacks, and asked the rest of Europe to come to its assistance. Although the EU member states unanimously supported the French request, no further measures were taken.¹⁵⁴

4.4.3 Broad Perspective on Security

After the Cold War

With regard to a broad security approach, the Petersberg Declaration of 1992, which linked the WEU to the EU, was the EU's first step into crisis management. Thereafter, the WEU formed an integral part of the EU, tasking the EU to implement decisions and actions with crisis management implications.¹⁵⁵ From there, the crisis management task, mainly the civil side of crisis management, of the EU broadened and in 1997, at the European Summit in Amsterdam, the tasks were incorporated in the Maastricht Treaty. At the Helsinki Summit (1999), the Council stated that the EU could initiate missions '...where NATO as a whole is not engaged'.¹⁵⁶ With Helsinki, the 'S' of security and defence policy was finalised on paper.

Extensive Broadening

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152 For an elaboration on the involvement of the EU institutions in CSDP, see: Rehrl, J. (Ed.), 'Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union', Third edition, 2016, Chapter 2.

153 17 November 2015.

154 For an elaboration on the French invocation of Article 42.7, see: Biscop, S., 'The European Union and Mutual Assistance: More than Defence', The International Spectator, Taylor and Francis group, 2016.

155 Western European Union Council of Ministers, 'Petersberg Declaration', Bonn, 19 June 1992, II. Par. 4: Humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management. In 2002 the tasks were expanded with joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention task and post-conflict stabilisation. The Petersberg tasks incorporated; humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, which in 2002 were expanded with joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention task and post-conflict stabilisation, Article 43 of the Treaty of the EU.

156 Helsinki European Council Meeting, 10-11 December 1999.

Apart from the military side of crisis management, from the 1990s many initiatives were adopted on the civil side, broadening the EU's scope of tasks by treaties, strategies, institutionalization and capabilities. This was evidenced by the adoption of an EU framework on combating terrorism in 2001, followed by the EU counterterrorism strategy of 2005.¹⁵⁷ In 2002, at the European Council of Seville, a comprehensive approach was formally initiated, including contributions by both civil and military means.¹⁵⁸ A civilian aspect of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was further developed with the Santa Maria da Feira European Council Meeting,¹⁵⁹ which strengthened the development of civilian crisis management capabilities.¹⁶⁰ The EU's crisis management capabilities were further enhanced by the 2003 French proposal of a European Gendarmerie Force (EGF), which became fully operational in 2006.¹⁶¹

With regard to the institutionalization of the EU's civilian crisis management operations, the EU created a Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). CPCC is the operational headquarters for civilian CSDP missions.¹⁶² In addition, as well as the military Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999, a Civilian Headline Goal (CHG) for coordination of capabilities was initiated in 2008.¹⁶³ After Lisbon (2009), the Council institutionalized the internal security task of the EU by the creation of a Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI).¹⁶⁴ In addition, a so-called European Civil Protection Force (ECPF) was created, which was mandated for a terrorist attack or natural disaster within and outside EU territory.¹⁶⁵ Furthermore, as well as the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003,¹⁶⁶ which addressed threats from outside the EU, the Council adopted an Internal European Security Strategy (ISS) for the European Union, addressing threats within the EU.¹⁶⁷ This strategy addressed common threats such as terrorism, organised crime, cybercrime and disasters. As a result, the EU was strengthened in mandate, strategy and institutions with regard to the civil side of crisis management and combined military-civilian missions.

The 2009 Lisbon Treaty brought the EU even more far-reaching possibilities with regard to the internal and external security realm. 'Lisbon' strengthened the concept of a comprehensive approach to security with Article J.4 of the treaty stating that CFSP included

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157 Rehrl, J. (Ed.), 'Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union', Third edition, 2016, p. 114-118.

158 European Council, Seville Summit, 21-22 June 2002.

159 European Council, Santa Maria da Feira Summit, 19-20 June 2000.

160 These capabilities were identified in four civilian priority areas: police, strengthening the rule of law and civilian administration, civilian protection. Additional civilian priorities developed in later years, including support for the EU Special Representatives, monitoring and the set-up of civilian response teams.

161 Position of EGF towards EU and other international organizations elaborated on in Chapter 6.

162 European Council, Brussels, August 2007.

163 Rule of law (200 experts), governance, civil protection, police, monitoring of (pre/post) conflicts and support for EU special representatives.

164 This cooperation incorporates police cooperation and customs, protection of the borders and judicial cooperation, European Council, February 25, 2010, Article 71.

165 2 March 2010.

166 The ESS will be discussed in Chapter 6.

167 European Council, Brussels, 25-26 March 2010.

‘all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence’. As a result, Lisbon broadened the EU’s mandate further.¹⁶⁸ From 2010, the EU concept of crisis management was replaced by the terminology of crisis response, which included many aspects, like humanitarian, and a broader approach to crisis than solely military aspects.

A combined civil-military mandate, accompanied by strategy and capabilities, was further broadened by an EU cyber security strategy in 2013 with additional organs, which will be explored in Chapter 6. Together with this new strategy, the European Parliament (EP) and the Council adopted a cyber defence policy framework (2014) aimed at strengthening member states’ cyber defence capabilities in cooperation with partner countries and organizations, especially NATO.¹⁶⁹

In contrast to NATO, therefore, ESDP was first drafted and institutionalized as an organization with crisis management tasks, instead of common defence built on multinational civilian and military forces. In other words, the EU’s ESDP was built on the model of modular cooperation, which was retained within the defence policy of the EU.

A European Security and Defence Policy

From 2010, newly emerging threats inside and outside the EU had an impact on the EU’s security and defence domain. Examples were the Russian invasion in Crimea and an increasingly isolationist position of the US, which damaged transatlantic relations. The EU integration process itself was under pressure as a result of the different crises the EU had to deal with, ranging from the European debt crisis from 2009¹⁷⁰ to security threats as a result of terrorist attacks in France, Belgium and Germany¹⁷¹ and migration flows from 2010.¹⁷²

As a result, from June 2015 links were strengthened between the former strictly divided domains of internal and external security, and a renewed EU internal security strategy was adopted in 2015.¹⁷³ This strategy identified actions to strengthen the ties between CSDP and internal security affairs of the EU territory, initiated by the Civilian Headline Goal of 2010. Furthermore, this strategy focused on cooperation within the field of CSDP with regard to policy areas of civil and military aspects: freedom, security and justice.

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168 Crisis management task broadened with: joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue missions, military advice and assistance, conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post conflict stabilisation.

169 Rehrl, J. (Ed.), ‘Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union’, Third edition, 2016, p. 119-124.

170 The European debt crisis dated from 2009, when some of the eurozone member states (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Cyprus) were unable to repay or refinance their government debt under their national supervision without the assistance of other eurozone countries and the European Central Bank (ECB), European Central Bank (europa.eu), accessed 15 September 2017.

171 France had to deal with many terrorist attacks, but one of the most horrendous was the November 2015 Paris attacks where a series of co-ordinated attacks throughout France took place. The bombings in Belgium occurred at Brussels Airport in Zaventem and Maalbeek metro station in Brussels, 22 March 2016. Germany had to deal with several terrorist attacks, like the one in Berlin on the Christmas market, 19 December 2016.

172 EU Commission report, ‘Study on the Feasibility of Establishing a Mechanism for the Relocation of Beneficiaries of International Protection’, July 2010, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/docs/pdf/final_report_relocation_of_refugees_en.pdf, accessed 20 February 2015.

173 European Council conclusions, 16 June 2015.

A decade after the first security strategy of 2003, a new EU global strategy (EUGS) saw the light of day in 2016.¹⁷⁴ The strategy of 2003 and the revised strategy of 2008 had become outdated because of the division between the EU's external crisis management and its internal security activities. The aim was to combine soft and hard power instruments together in a joined approach. The new EUGS listed necessary actions, such as the concretization of ambitions and tasks, capabilities, tools and instruments, which will be discussed further in Chapter 6. The EUGS pleaded for strategic autonomy, as it stated that 'As Europeans we must take greater responsibility for our security... as well as to act autonomously if and when necessary. An appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe's ability to foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond its borders'.¹⁷⁵ The EUGS referred to the fact that 'full spectrum defence capabilities are necessary to respond to external crises, build our partners' capacities, and to guarantee Europe's safety'.¹⁷⁶

At the same time, the EUGS acknowledged that 'When it comes to collective defence, NATO remains the primary framework for most Member States. At the same time, EU-NATO relations shall not prejudice the security and defence policy of those Members which are not in NATO',¹⁷⁷ which conflicted with the concept of strategic autonomy aspired to by the EUGS.

The renewal of the EU strategy was mainly driven by the traditional European states striving for EU autonomy, but not without debate.

On the one hand, debates about the strategic autonomy of Europe had mainly resurfaced because of the US insistence that European governments should bear more responsibility for defence within the NATO organization. This argument was underlined by EU countries such as the UK and the Netherlands. The US demand for more European responsibility was accompanied by US distrust towards new EU security and defence initiatives, such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF), which will be explored in Chapter 6. On the other hand, the European distrust towards the US strengthened as a result of the US rebalancing of its interests directed at the Asian pacific and the US position on issues outside the transatlantic area, illustrated by the differences between the EU and the US in respect of the Iran nuclear deal.¹⁷⁸

To date, the EUGS plea for strategic autonomy is still under scrutiny in the academic and policy world. The debates vary between a supranational European army, including a nuclear deterrence capacity, and European forces strengthening the EU and NATO at the same time.¹⁷⁹

174 European Union, 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy', June 2016, available at: <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/3eaae2cf-9ac5-11e6-868c-01aa75ed71a1>, accessed 20 February 2015.

175 Ibid, p. 19.

176 Ibid, p. 10-11.

177 Ibid, p. 20.

178 The Iran nuclear deal was an agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran, the permanent members of the UNSC, Germany and the EU established in 2015.

179 Debates on the concept of strategic autonomy, see: Biscop, S., 'Fighting for Europe. European Strategic Autonomy and the use of Force', January 2019, available at: www.egmontinstitute.be/fighting-for-europe-european-strategic-autonomy-and-the-use-of-force/; Fiott, D., 'Strategic Autonomy towards 'European Sovereignty' in Defence?', The EU Institute for Security Studies, November 2018.

The broadening of the EU scope of tasks did not end with the adoption of the EUGS in 2016. In April 2016, the EU adopted a hybrid policy, including joint communication on countering hybrid threats in order to activate an EU response and to build on European solidarity, mutual assistance and the Lisbon Treaty. This hybrid policy was institutionalized by a hybrid fusion cell, a hybrid centre of excellence and support to the member states with regard to resilience and strategic communication for countering hybrid warfare.¹⁸⁰ The adoption of hybrid policy and its institutionalization was in connection with NATO, as was the creation of the cyber domain, which will be elaborated on in Chapter 6.

4.4.4 *The EU Path of Broadening*

The EU's CSDP path of broadening developed from an organization without a task in the security and defence domain to an organization with a mandate in the security as well as the defence domain. In other words, from the civil side of security, to crisis management operations to a common defence mandate. This path was built bottom-up, based on the experiences of missions and operations, and paradoxically in competition and, at the same time, linked to NATO.

From its creation, EU's CSDP followed a broad approach to security and defence, built on mainly civilian but also military aspects. The development of the EU as a civilian power has been easier than that of a military power, because of the assumed competition with NATO and because most of the civilian instruments, capabilities and funds were already developed within the EU from the Maastricht Treaty onwards, which can be explained by the functionalist logic that expects a spill-over effect from one policy domain to another.

Furthermore, as a consequence of NATO's primacy in the area of common defence, together with the existing overlap in member states, the EU's military development was linked to NATO's scope of tasks.

The EU's security and defence policy therefore developed step by step, incrementally, from a broad approach to security and, further down the road, included a mandate for common defence, albeit linked to NATO. On the one hand, this was a result of the scattered interests among the member states, which resulted in the aforementioned link and limited institutionalization of the EU's military command structure. On the other hand, driven by EU organs and as a result of the automatic integration process of the EU, a broadened mandate was accompanied by instruments and funds of the Commission, especially in the internal security domain, which was increasingly linked to the external domain of security and defence. In contrast with NATO, the EU included an internal and an external security mandate.

4.4.5 *Conclusion*

In this section, the questions were examined of how and why change has led to a broadening of the security and defence policy of the EU. From the analysis presented above, the subsequent main periods of change can be identified focusing on three themes: crisis management, adoption of military and civil tasks and a common defence clause.

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¹⁸⁰ Foreign Affairs Council, 'Council Conclusions on adoption of hybrid policy', 2016, available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2016/04/18-19/>, accessed 17 April 2017.

The adoption of the crisis management tasks at the beginning of the 1990s was followed by a broadening of the EU mandate, including both internal and external security. Crisis management then was followed by the adoption of common defence Article 42.7, legally stronger than NATO's Article 5, and combined with an internal security mandate: the solidarity clause, Article 222.

In the security realm, therefore, the EU's the creation of security and defence policy began with crisis management tasks based on a broad security concept. Due to the debates between the member states, the EU's CSDP was slowly and incrementally broadened with a common defence task. Furthermore, the EU adopted a mandate with both internal and external security, in contrast to the NATO and OSCE paths of broadening. Finally, in respect of crisis management and the civilian aspect of security, the EU had a more far-reaching mandate and more civil capabilities, institutions and funds than the other security organizations.

4.5 The OSCE Path of Broadening

4.5.1 Introduction

Ever since its founding in 1975, the OSCE has been built on the concept of cooperative security, as was described in Chapter 2, and a broad approach to security. On the one hand, this concerned the 'indivisible security', implying that security of one state cannot be at the expense of another. On the other hand, cooperative security entailed comprehensive security, which implies that security is not solely defined in military terms, but also includes economic, ecological and social factors. In addition, instruments against human rights violations and the repression of minorities were included in the framework along the way.¹⁸¹ This section examines the questions of how and why change has led to broadening of the OSCE. The specific path of broadening of the OSCE will be analysed in this section, focusing on the form and level as the indicators of that path, addressing the scope of tasks from 1990 onwards.

4.5.2 A Narrow Perspective on Security and Defence

The Creation of the OSCE: The Cold War

The OSCE has always been first and foremost an organization that has focused on security inside the organization's territory. Nonetheless, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 did make a link between peace and security in Europe and the world as a whole: 'Recognising the close link between peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole and conscious of the need for each of them to make its contribution to the strengthening of world peace and security and to the promotion of fundamental rights, economic and social progress and well-being for all peoples'.¹⁸²

¹⁸¹ Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Final Act, Helsinki 1975. Hereafter CSCE, Helsinki Final Act, 1975.

¹⁸² CSCE Helsinki Final Act, 1975.

Within the OSCE mandate, no defence aspects were adopted, as this has never been one of its objectives and was highly precarious between East and West. In contrast to NATO and the EU, the OSCE never had a mutual defence task, defending the partners of the organization against aggression or an attack from outside the territory. Furthermore, the OSCE had no military instruments for compliance or any command structure with which to enforce security among the OSCE states, in the event of a threat or attack from outside the OSCE area.

Originally, the OSCE mandate included three so-called 'baskets', which can be interpreted as policy domains in which the OSCE holds its mandate: cooperation in the political and military domain, the economic and environmental domain and the human domain.¹⁸³ So, while lacking military means, the OSCE did have a mandate in the military domain. This mandate was captured in its political and military dimension, the first basket, which required military transparency between the states participating in the Helsinki Final Act.¹⁸⁴ This task concerned arms control and military transparency and was mandated within the organization's territory, even though weapons of mass destruction had always been outside the OSCE area of responsibility. These activities in the military domain, under the umbrella of the OSCE process, included arms control among its members: the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).¹⁸⁵ In 1996, during the Lisbon Summit, the states that were party to the CFE Treaty signed an agreement to launch negotiations to adapt the CFE Treaty to the new security architecture. This CFE treaty limited the conventional weapons and postures of the members of the former two military alliances. In addition, in the light of the new world order in Lisbon and later at the Istanbul Summit,¹⁸⁶ the military pillar was strengthened by the development of political-military confidence and security building measures (CSBM), encapsulating all Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian states. However, not all states signed the Lisbon and Istanbul documents. The CFE treaty, for instance, was never ratified by the NATO countries on the grounds that Russia had not implemented its Istanbul commitments to withdraw its troops from Moldova and Georgia.¹⁸⁷

In practice, there has been a lack of existing mechanisms for 'hard' arms control in the OSCE area and under the OSCE mandate; in other words, legally binding limits and real transparency measures for non-compliance. In addition, conventional arms control had not been one of the highest priorities on the European security agenda, because other issues were demanding political attention, such as the Balkan wars, and arms control was regarded as an issue belonging to the Cold War era.

Finally, the CFE treaty was paralysed by the Russian withdrawal in 2007.¹⁸⁸ In response, NATO countries ceased to be bound by the CFE information exchange and inspection

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183 *Idem*.

184 See the CSBM's, CSCE Helsinki Final Act, 1975.

185 A legal document signed on 19 November 1990, by 22 countries from NATO and the former WP including the SU.

186 OSCE Istanbul Document 1999, 18-19 November 1999. Hereafter OSCE Istanbul Summit Declaration, December 1999.

187 NATO members refused to ratify the revised CFE accord until Russia fulfilled commitments it made to Georgia and Moldova when the adapted CFE Treaty was concluded at the OSCE Summit Istanbul, 1999.

188 Russia suspended its participation in the Treaty in 2007 as a reaction to the crisis in Georgia and Ukraine and the positions of the Baltic states as NATO members. From the Russian side, the suspension included the end of the limitation of the number of conventional weapons. See: Arms Control Association, 'The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty

obligations in 2011 and Russia again pulled out of the Joint Consultative Group in 2015. In addition, no progress was made in the CSBM relating to missile defence and sub-strategic nuclear weapons.¹⁸⁹

4.5.3 Broad Perspective on Security and Defence

The Cold War

From its creation, the OSCE had a broad perspective on security; it has always been its *raison d'être* based on the guiding principles stated in its founding act: the Helsinki Final Act (1975).

Although there was no notion of the concept of cooperative security in the CSCE documents until the Helsinki Summit of 1992, Helsinki called for the establishment of a new form of security cooperation between the participating states 'based upon cooperative and common approaches to security'.¹⁹⁰ Consequently, the security organization in this research that most resembles the concept of cooperative security, as defined in Chapter 2, is the OSCE.

As detailed above, the OSCE was from its creation built on two concepts relating to indivisible and comprehensive security, which implied a broader approach than solely the military domain and included the three policy domains. The approach to security within the OSCE has always been that '...all commitments were equally applicable across the OSCE area and where 'singularisation' of any particular situation was not acceptable and was strongly resisted...'.¹⁹¹ These policy domains, the OSCE mandate, were broadened at the end of the Cold War; this will be explored in more detail below.

After the Cold War: Broadening Cooperative Security

The first summit after the Cold war that further developed the OSCE's broad approach to security was the Paris Summit in 1990. 'We, the Heads of State or Government of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, have assembled in Paris at a time of profound change and historic expectations. The era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended'.¹⁹² Paris, as one of the first summits after the end of the Cold War, resulted in hope and initiatives for a new Europe.

With 'Paris', the OSCE concept of security broadened, capturing the norms and values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, economic liberty and responsibility, friendly relations among participating states, minority rights and free and fair elections.

and the Adapted CFE Treaty at a Glance', 2017, available at: <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/cfe>, accessed 17-09-2018. In March 2015, the Russian Federation announced that it had taken the decision to completely stop its participation in the Treaty.

189 For an elaboration on the status of arms control possibilities within the OSCE area: Kulesa, L., 'The Role of Arms Control in Future European Security', Security and Human Rights, Brill and Nijhoff Publishers, Volume 25, 2014, No. 2, p. 221-234.

190 CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, 'The Challenges of Change', 9-10 July 1992. Hereafter CSCE Helsinki Summit Declaration, 1992.

191 Lundin, L. E., 'Tearing Down Real and Cognitive Walls preventing OSCE Compassion for Human Security in South-Eastern Europe', Security and Human Rights, Brill and Nijhoff Publishers, Volume 26, 2015, No. 1, p. 110.

192 CSCE Paris Document 1990, 'Charter of Paris for a New Europe', Paris 1990. Hereafter CSCE Paris Summit Declaration, 1990.

Apart from underlining the primacy of democracy and free markets, the Paris Charter identified conflict prevention as a priority issue and singled out the OSCE as the key actor within the security architecture in this respect. Furthermore, 'Paris' started the institutionalization process of the OSCE, where the broadening of the scope of tasks was supported by new organs, as will be discussed in Chapter 6. Finally, 'Paris' was the first summit that addressed a so-called European security architecture and at which the concept of multilateralism was coined, reflecting the need for cooperation and interdependence between states and international security organizations.¹⁹³

At the beginning of the 1990s, the OSCE was at first perceived as the regional anchor of the European security architecture and 'Paris' was succeeded by the Helsinki Summit of 1992, which led to the 'Helsinki Document'.¹⁹⁴ One of the debates within the OSCE was the approach to settling the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, as the UN was tasked with a number of crises elsewhere, including those in Cambodia, Haiti, and Somalia.¹⁹⁵ Russia was not in favour of NATO deploying peacekeepers in the former WP area, even though the situation called for an international peacekeeping or peace-enforcing operation. In contrast, Western European countries did not want Russia to be given a 'free hand' in the former WP countries. Consequently, the idea of the OSCE becoming a regional mandatory organization under the political and legal umbrella of the UN for peacekeeping operations in the OSCE area at that time was shared by 'both' sides of the former iron curtain. 'Helsinki' declared the OSCE a regional organization under the auspices of the UN in the context of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The idea was that the OSCE would become a mandating or legitimising organization for peacekeeping operations by NATO, the WEU and the Russian Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). According to Helsinki, 'peacekeeping constitutes an important operational element of the overall capability of the CSCE for conflict prevention and crisis management intended to complement the political process of dispute resolution'.¹⁹⁶ This combined the possibilities for political and military conflict resolution, and involved civilian and/or military personnel, within and among the participating states of the OSCE.

However, some restrictions on how an OSCE peacekeeping mission would work in practice were laid down from the beginning within this OSCE mandate, as both parties distrusted each other with regard to additional intentions, especially regarding the fact that the mandate could be interpreted as a cover for 'third-party' peacekeeping. OSCE peacekeeping operations would not, therefore, entail enforcement action, but would require the consent of the states directly concerned, would be limited in duration and

193 CSCE Paris Summit Declaration, 1990.

194 CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, 'The Challenges of Change', 9-10 July 1992. Hereafter CSCE Helsinki Summit Declaration, 1992.

195 UN operations I and II (UNOSOM I) in Somalia was established from April 1992. The operation was a disaster for the UN as the ceasefire was ignored, the fighting continued and put operations at great risk.

196 CSCE Helsinki Summit Declaration, 1992. Chapter III, par. 17.

would be impartial. The parties would endeavour to ensure that any decision to deploy a peacekeeping mission was taken by consensus.¹⁹⁷

The idea of the OSCE as a mandating and legitimising regional organisation for peacekeeping under the auspices of the UN was further developed at the Rome Summit of 1993. It was agreed in Rome, albeit with caveats, that ‘the CSCE could consider, on a case-by-case basis and under specific conditions, the setting up of CSCE co-operative arrangements in order inter alia to ensure that the role and functions of a third party military force in a conflict area are consistent with CSCE principles and objectives’.¹⁹⁸ From there, the possibility of the OSCE as a regional security provider and enabler¹⁹⁹ remained part of the OSCE *acquis*.

Along with the broadening of the OSCE mandate, from 1991, the OSCE developed several CSBMs to foster stability and contain crises in the human and politico-military dimensions; three relating to human rights and one in the field of military security.²⁰⁰ In practical terms, this meant instruments and mechanisms, divided into control and emergency mechanisms, which will be set out in further detail in Chapter 6. Consequently, the core role of the OSCE could be described as promoter of security and preventer of conflict in the wider European area. Potentially, this gave the OSCE a scope in crisis management activities ranging from preventive diplomacy, peace-making (the peaceful settlement of disputes between states) and peace-building to assisting with post-conflict rehabilitation, with the exception of peace enforcement. Furthermore, institutionalization, OSCE mechanisms and instruments had been created to address different types of emergency situation in the political, military and pre-conflict, conflict resolution and post-conflict organization, dealing with violent and non-violent conflicts, legitimising the OSCE as the mandating organization for civilian or military peace observation, verification and even peacekeeping operations.

The Budapest Summit of 1994 finally mandated the OSCE to be the anchor of the European security architecture as ‘a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management’.²⁰¹

In practice, verification, monitoring, and observation missions have been undertaken, but a peacekeeping operation with military implications, under the auspices of the OSCE, has never been invoked.²⁰² Although the OSCE had already played a role in peacekeeping,

197 Kemp, W., ‘OSCE Peace operations: Soft Security in Hard Environments’, International Peace Institute, New York, June 2016, p. 3.

198 CSCE Rome Document 1993, ‘CSCE and the New Europe—Our Security Is Indivisible’, Rome 1993. Chapter II, par. 2. Hereafter CSCE Rome Summit Declaration 1993.

199 The OSCE could provide the mandate for organizations to undertake peacekeeping and if necessary the OSCE could provide a coordinating framework.

200 For an elaboration: OSCE, ‘History and Background of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) in the OSCE, 2004, available at: <https://www.osce.org/fsc/40035>, accessed 19-04-2017.

201 CSCE Budapest Document 1994, ‘Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era’, 21 December 1994. Hereafter CSCE Budapest Summit Declaration, 1994.

202 For an elaboration on the background of OSCE peacekeeping mandate: Kemp, W., ‘OSCE Peace operations: Soft Security in Hard Environments’, International Peace Institute, New York, June 2016, p. 3-4.

demonstrated by the verification mission in Kosovo,²⁰³ these operations and missions remained civil in nature. With regard to the OSCE path of broadening, therefore, there has never been an OSCE case of a military peacekeeping operation. This will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 6.

'Budapest' was followed by the Lisbon Declaration of 1996, which led to a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe in the 21st century,²⁰⁴ aimed at strengthening the European security architecture. In addition, the Istanbul Summit of 1999 adopted the Charter for European Security, which could be seen as a follow-up of the Paris Charter of 1990. Together, 'Paris', 'Lisbon' and 'Istanbul' formed the foundation of the OSCE organization that aimed to build a pan-European organization, whereby security in Europe in the wider area revolved around the OSCE.

Competitive Organizations

As a response to the new security threats at the end of the 1990s and the start of 2000, the OSCE adopted a Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century in 2003. This document, finalised in 2003, broadened the OSCE mandate again, to include terrorism, illegal migration and organised crime linked to illicit trafficking in human beings, drugs, small arms and light weapons.²⁰⁵ Although the document stated strategy, it lacked an action plan or guidelines according to which the OSCE could take action. Another shortcoming of the organization was the lack of sanctions or incentives, institutionally and financially to empower the OSCE in relation to the heterogeneous group of states.

Apart from broadening the OSCE mandate, encapsulating a growing, broad perspective on security accompanied by institutionalization, the continuing path of the EU and NATO enlargement had significant consequences for the OSCE. In response, Russia attempted to strengthen the OSCE in the new century, as Russia felt threatened by the enlargement processes of NATO and the EU and their increasing role in the former WP states, which, according to Russia, could potentially result in a diminishing role of the OSCE in the European security architecture and thus also of Russian influence. This was not only because of the number of states that became members of NATO and the EU, but also because of the broadening of the scope of tasks of these organizations and additional capabilities, which resulted in competition between the organizations.

One of the Russian counteractions was the initiation of what was known as the Corfu process from 2008, when the Russian president Medvedev initiated a restart of the OSCE dialogue and attempted to embed a discussion of political-military issues in a wider security context, including aspects of the human dimension.²⁰⁶ The proposal was the creation of a renewed OSCE replacing an ever broadening NATO and EU. Russia even suggested that this

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²⁰³ Established October 1998 and closed in June 1999.

²⁰⁴ See: OSCE, Lisbon Document, 1996, available at: <https://www.osce.org/mc/39539?download=true>, accessed 1-7-2018.

²⁰⁵ For further information: OSCE, 'OSCE Strategy to address threats to security and stability in the twenty-first century', 2003, available at: <https://www.osce.org/mc/17504?download=true>, accessed 1-7-2016.

²⁰⁶ Mosser, M. W., 'Embracing "Embedded security": the OSCE's understated but significant role in the European security architecture', *European Security*, 24:4, p. 589.

renewed OSCE be created without the participation of the US and Russia. Nevertheless, this idea failed to produce any conclusive results, as the 'West' disagreed with the notion of excluding the US from European security matters. In 2009, however, the Concept of Comprehensive and Co-operative Security was adopted as a result of a period of détente and the 'West' realized that the OSCE did have an added value in European security matters.²⁰⁷ One of the final Russian attempts to strengthen the OSCE was the 2010 Astana Ministerial Council Summit meeting, the first of its kind since the 1999 Istanbul Summit. 'Astana' installed a Commemorative Declaration. Towards a security Community,²⁰⁸ which elaborated on the comprehensive and cooperative concepts to strengthen the OSCE. The idea behind the declaration was a rebirth of the Charter of Paris, implying a rebirth of the idea of a European security architecture. This was followed by a Ministerial Council decision on 'elements of the conflict cycle, related to enhancing the OSCE's capabilities in early warning, early action, dialogue facilitation and mediation support, and post-conflict rehabilitation'.²⁰⁹ Nevertheless, around 2010, the Russian initiatives in strengthening the role of the OSCE in the European security architecture took a more modest form, as actual results were not forthcoming and Russia's interest was waning in international cooperation structures.²¹⁰

Paradoxically, in this period of post-Cold War détente, NATO's strategic concept of 2010 simultaneously emphasised and strengthened the position of the OSCE within the European security architecture.²¹¹ In addition, NATO declared its interdependence on the other security organizations within the European security architecture, as outlined above. As a result, however, the OSCE had no state(s) left to champion the organization. As US priorities lie with NATO, France had always been a proponent of a strong EU CFSP and CSDP, and Russia's enthusiasm diminished. Devastating for the OSCE, once the security pillar of Europe, especially in competition with other organizations.

As the OSCE had broadened its mandate within the OSCE area, after 2000 it likewise broadened its mandate outside the OSCE area. The OSCE had performed operations outside its area, for example by supporting Afghan elections.²¹² Although, as a cooperative organization, the missions and operations outside the OSCE area were not official OSCE policy, they should be regarded as case-by-case operations or even as exceptions.²¹³

207 OSCE, 'The OSCE Concept of Comprehensive and Co-operative Security. An Overview of Major Milestones', June 2009. Available at: <https://www.osce.org/cpc/37592?download=true>, accessed 1-7-2018.

208 OSCE Astana Commemorative Declaration 2010, 'Towards a Security Community', 1 December 2010. Hereafter OSCE Astana Ministerial Council Summit, December 2010, available at: <https://www.osce.org/mc/74985>, accessed 2-7-2017.

209 OSCE Vilnius Ministerial Council, 6 December 2011.

210 For an elaboration on the Corfu process: Kropatcheva, E., 'Russia and the role of the OSCE in European Security: a 'Forum' for dialog or a 'Battlefield' of interest?', *European Security*, 21:3, 2012, p. 370-394.

211 NATO Strategic Concept, Lisbon, 2010.

212 In 2004, 2005, 2009, 2010 and 2014 executed by the ODIHR deploying an election support team.

213 Galbreath, D. J., 'The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe', Routledge Global Institutions, 2007, Great Britain, p. 118.

Half Empty Glass

Before the Crimea crisis of 2014, in 2012 the OSCE was once again mandated with a broader approach to security, addressing new threats with the establishment of a so-called Transnational Threats Department (TNT).²¹⁴ The main purpose of the department was to improve coordination between the various OSCE structures, thus addressing one of the deficiencies of the different organs of the OSCE.

Nevertheless, after the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, the strengthening of the OSCE mandate was stalled as well as the security and economic dimension of the OSCE, or pillars, so to speak; as a result, the human dimension had become the core business of the OSCE. This was partly because the other pillars were not supported as OSCE core activities as they were too delicate to be handled by the inclusive OSCE, and partly because they had been taken over by the other two organizations of the European security architecture.

4.5.4 The OSCE Path of Broadening

From its creation, the OSCE has been the most explicit example of a cooperative security organization, as described in Chapter 2, in the European security architecture. The mandate of the OSCE, with regard to security policy, has been broader than both NATO and the EU's mandate, and still is in comparison to NATO. The OSCE dealt with both hard security (disarmament), emphasised by Russia, and soft security (human rights), emphasised by EU members. However, the focus on state security, by some parties, was not equally complemented by a broadening and strengthening of the OSCE with an institutional structure, funds and a mandate for sanctions.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the OSCE was considered to be the organization that could drive and foster the European security architecture, as the other organizations represented symbols from the past and did not provide the necessary mandate. Nevertheless, in the 1990s, the crisis in Yugoslavia and the UN debacle,²¹⁵ resulted in a takeover by NATO in the execution of crisis management operations and a firmer position of NATO in crisis management tasks within the European security architecture.²¹⁶ Furthermore, during the OSCE path of broadening, the former adversaries as the builders of the OSCE mandate and initiators of the European security architecture, Russia and the West, became adversaries again. In addition, the broad security mandate of the OSCE scattered its power and abilities. Consequently, as a backfire of OSCE's broad mandate, there has been a lack of cohesion in the wide range of activities performed by the OSCE. The scope of tasks has been all-encompassing, which did not help to harmonise the security interests of the various participating states and was not backed up by the necessary organs, capabilities, staff or funds.²¹⁷

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214 Encapsulating the following issues: terrorism, organised crime, cyber threats and illicit trafficking.

215 The UN mission in Yugoslavia, UNPROFOR, formed in February 1992 failed as attacks occurred against personnel and aircrafts, personnel was taken hostage, and finally on 12 July 1995 UNPROFOR failed to deter the Bosnian Serb attack on Srebrenica. After the Dayton Agreement UNPROFOR was followed by the NATO led force IFOR, from 20 December 1995.

216 For an elaboration on this process: Asmus, R. D., 'Opening NATO's Door, How the Alliance remade itself for a New Era', Columbia University Press, New York, 2002.

217 Ghebali, V. Y., 'Where is the OSCE going? Present role and challenges of a stealth security organisation', in: European Security in a Global Context', p. 63-66, in: Tardy, T., (eds.) 'European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external dynamics', Contemporary Security Studies, Routledge, Oxon, Great Britain, 2009.

The OSCE, as a norm-based cooperative security organization, lacked the right to use coercive instruments or sanctions if necessary, as a means to attain the peace within the bounds of its territory. Furthermore, although the OSCE had a formal mandate of crisis management operations, in contrast with the EU, this mandate was never invoked. In addition, the OSCE lacked a defence umbrella and consequential institutionalization in comparison with NATO and the EU's political, security, military and economic assets.²¹⁸ Finally, although the OSCE's mandate broadened directly after the end of the Cold War, accompanied with institutionalization and the explicitly announced need for a strategy (2003), a strategy and complementary action plan was never implemented. Hence the assertion that '...it actually confirms that coping effectively with the identified threats is beyond the reach...' ²¹⁹ of the OSCE.

The OSCE's path of broadening was developed but without strategy, sufficient capabilities or resources and, from 2000, without genuine political will of the participating states. After 2010, the political situation in the OSCE area could even be described as exhibiting a growing divergence of democratic values where the OSCE lacked a monitoring instrument or review mechanism, which left OSCE's core activities paralysed.²²⁰

4.5.5 Conclusion

This section looked at the questions of how and why change has led to broadening of the OSCE. From the foregoing analysis of the way in which the OSCE mandate broadened, the following main periods of change can be identified in the OSCE path of broadening, entailing two themes: broadening the scope of the OSCE mandate in cooperative security followed by a downsizing of implementation of the OSCE's scope of tasks. The 1990s could be considered the heydays of the OSCE, broadening in level and form. The OSCE broadened its mandate and scope of tasks, together with the assignment of the OSCE as the regional anchor of the European security architecture, through various summits and successive documents, even encompassing some defence matters. From the foundation of the OSCE, therefore, a more comprehensive approach was slowly integrated in the institutional setup of the OSCE, which combined broadening with deepening. In other words, the mandates that were given to the OSCE were actually institutionalized. Broadening was, however, followed by a period of disinterest among the major players, with a lack of strategy, capabilities and resources, down to outright rivalry.

4.6 Security and Beyond: A Cross-case Comparison on the Path of Broadening

4.6.1 Introduction

The previous sections discussed the paths of change of the individual security organizations. These paths of change, resulting in an institutional build-up of each security

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218 Ibid, p. 63.

219 Ibid, p. 64.

220 This was suggested by Switzerland in 2006, but not adopted by the other states.

organization, are chronologically presented in the table below. This section examines the questions of how and why change of the path of broadening has varied between the security organizations. These will be compared on the basis of observed differences and similarities in the indicators of level and form of change from 1990 onwards. In other words, the cases will be submitted to a cross-case comparison within the path of broadening based on the research framework.

Broadening of security organizations	NATO	EU	OSCE
Before 1990	Washington Treaty (1949)	WEU Brussels Treaty (1948)	Helsinki Final Act (1975)
1990			Paris Summit: European security architecture and multilateralism, conflict prevention, CFE
1991	Rome Summit: adoption of non-Article 5 operations, European security architecture, cooperation and dialogue		Development of crisis management mechanism
1992		Maastricht Treaty: CFSP and ESDP, crisis management operations via Petersberg Declaration	Helsinki Summit: CSCE as regional organization (Chapter VIII, UN Charter), peacekeeping organization
1993			Rome Summit, from 1991 to 1993 development of CSBMs
1994			Budapest Summit: OSCE legitimising organization for crisis management operations within European security architecture
1996			Lisbon Summit: strengthening of OSCE role in European security architecture, CFE and CSBMs
1997		Petersberg tasks incorporated in Treaty of Maastricht	
1998		St. Malo Summit (UK-FR)	

1999	Washington Summit: broader threat perception, including Article 4 and 5, DCI	Treaty of Amsterdam, HHG, military crisis management operations	Istanbul Summit: Charter for European Security as follow-up to 'Paris' and 'Lisbon'
2000		Adoption of civilian crisis management capabilities	
2001	Invocation of Article 5	Framework for terrorism	
2002	Prague Summit: Treaty change to Article 5, including terrorism. Formalisation of out-of-area Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations	Adoption of civil and military comprehensive approach	
2003		European Security Strategy, EGF	Broadening of mandate including terrorism, illegal migration and organised crime
2005		Strategy on countering terrorism	
2006	Riga Summit: intention to adopt comprehensive approach (CPG)		
2007		CPCC	Russian withdrawal from CFE
2008		CHG, revised ESS	Corfu process: Russian attempt to strengthen the OSCE
2009	Adoption of CPG	Treaty of Lisbon: mutual defence (Article 42.7), solidarity clause (Article 222), PESCO	Revised concept of comprehensive and cooperative security
2010	Lisbon Summit: institutionalization of civil-military capability in cooperation with other organizations, Article 5 and non-Article equality 5 operations, Article 4 and 5 link	Internal security strategy, COSI, ECPF	Astana Summit: rebirth 'Paris'
2012			Broadening of mandate; including new threats, adoption of TNT
2013		Cyber security strategy	

2014	Wales Summit: adoption of hybrid and cyber tasks, including Article 5	Cyber defence policy framework	
2015		Adjusted internal security strategy, invocation of Article 42.7	
2016	Warsaw Summit: NATO-EU cooperation comprehensive approach, re-entry of Article 3	EUGS. Hybrid policy including centre of excellence and fusion cell	

Table 4.1 Overview of key moments on the paths of broadening of the different security organizations

4.6.2 Comparing the Paths of Broadening of NATO, the EU and the OSCE

In this section, the paths of broadening of the individual security organizations will be compared. First, the development of the path of broadening relating to the narrow security perspective of the organizations will be compared, without reference to the OSCE. This will be followed by a comparison of the development of the broad security perspective of all three organizations.

A Narrow Perspective on Security

The analysis of the path of broadening on a narrow perspective on security and defence showed similarities and differences along the EU and NATO paths of change.

First, the EU's mutual assistance clause was linked to NATO's collective defence task by NATO's priority clause that had already been set in the Berlin Plus agreements of 2003. However, this link was not created vice versa, as the member states prioritised NATO as the ultimate collective defence organization. The most successful organization for the EU and NATO member states projecting the common defence task was NATO. As a consequence, the possibility of EU-NATO cooperation or, in contrast, a division of labour in the field of common defence remained vague. This could even lead to misuse, as illustrated by the invocation of the EU's Article 42.7 in the case of the attack on the Bataclan, which should have been addressed by Article 222 of the EU's Treaty of Lisbon.

Second, the EU does not possess the military strength of the US hegemon that NATO possesses or NATO's additional military command structure and capabilities. It could also be argued that, as long as this strength remains, the EU will be linked to NATO for conventional territorial defence. Moreover, although the EU's mutual defence clause is more strongly worded in the treaty than NATO's Article 5, it has restrictions for some of the member states, by choice.

Third, differences were observed in the institutionalized command and control structure of both organizations. Whereas NATO operated with a unified command structure, the EU operated with a differentiated and flexible command and control structure provided for by both the EU and NATO together with the member states. However, Article 5 of NATO and Article 42.7 of the EU are not mutually exclusive. They could be activated simultaneously

to bring about a coordinated EU-NATO response. The EU could, for example, work in partnership with NATO in border management and cyber security within and outside NATO and the EU.

A Broad Perspective on Security

The path of broadening of the EU, the OSCE and NATO on a broad perspective of security and defence showed similarities and differences as well.

First, from their creation, all three security organizations of the European security architecture defined security as a much broader concept than solely military security, although there has been no unequivocal definition of a comprehensive approach among the security organizations.²²¹ However, they all included a comprehensive approach in the security concept within their treaties and agreements and based their mandates on democratic norms and values. In this regard, all three selected security organizations can be regarded as normative and guardians of multilateralism. Nevertheless, these normative guidelines occasionally conflicted with the paths of broadening of the selected organizations. This was illustrated by the development of EU's defence policy, which conflicted with the idea of the EU as a normative power and a security community, for instance, in its path of widening. For NATO, the development of a comprehensive approach and cooperative security conflicted with its collective defence task. Although NATO broadened its tasks, they were not as inclusive as those of the EU. It was observed that the broadening of NATO's tasks beyond collective defence and the military side of crisis management was even linked to the EU in 2016.²²²

Second, from its creation, the principles of the OSCE Helsinki Final Act (1975) included a comprehensive security approach and the OSCE has always defined security in a more holistic manner in its policy and activities, but without a military component.²²³ The comprehensive part of the OSCE's definition of security goes much further than NATO's definition and, at first, the EU's definition. Nevertheless, through the first two decades of the 21st century, the EU has developed a comprehensive approach in treaties, tasks and capabilities which competes with the concept of the OSCE in performing its tasks. This is in contrast with NATO, which does address a broad security approach in Article 2 of the Washington Treaty and follow-up strategies, although in terms of its core tasks and capabilities, NATO mostly remained a defence organization. As a result, the focus of the EU's comprehensive approach has been on the development of the civil-military relationship between EU organs, whereas a comprehensive approach of NATO necessitated cooperation with other actors.

Third, it was observed that the implementation of a broader security approach required a strengthening of relations and coordination with other actors. However, as with all security organizations of the European security architecture, these relations were weakly

221 Holmberg, A., 'The Changing role of NATO: exploring the implications for security governance and legitimacy', *European Security*, Vol. 20, No. 4, December 2011, p. 540.

222 A comprehensive approach is defined differently between the organizations, see article: Wendling, C., 'The Comprehensive Approach to Civil-Military Crisis Management: A Critical Analysis and Perspective', IRSEM, 2010.

223 Mosser, M. W., 'Embracing 'embedded security': the OSCE's understated but significant role in the European security architecture', *European Security*, 2015, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 584.

institutionalized between the organizations. Most initiatives for broadening their mandates therefore came from the member states in relation to the other organization in many cases, but were further developed, executed and implemented by the officials of the organizations in missions and operations. Implementation of a broader security approach has often been the result of a battle for authority and autonomy between the organs of each organization leading to competition, or where actions have been complementary to one another, for example the EU's EULEX mission in Kosovo and NATO's KFOR operation.

Finally, because of the nature of the paths of broadening of the security organizations, a mixture of the concepts of collective, cooperative security and collective defence implemented by security organizations was observed. This mixture led to complementary and conflicting cooperation schemes and presented a different European security architecture than had been aspired to at the beginning of the 1990s. This is illustrated by the decisions taken at the NATO Summit in Wales (2014) in response to the Russian intervention in Crimea. A permanent placement of an institutionalized command structure and troops, as a deterrence tool towards Russia, could not be effected because Ukraine was a partner and not a member of NATO. Deterrence could not be effected either, because of the institutionalized relation, the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and the different interests of a heterogeneous group of allies.²²⁴ Furthermore, the EU's Article 42.7 of the Treaty of Lisbon was adopted in a security organization that was built on a broad security perspective, where internal security was mixed with external security, institutionally as well as in terms of capabilities. However, the EU's common defence article could never be self-sustainable, as it was linked to NATO's mutual defence clause. This interconnectedness intensified with the EU-NATO joint declaration on hybrid threats in 2016, accompanied by institutionalization. These hybrid threats carved right through the traditional division of collective defence on the one hand and collective and cooperative security on the other. By 2016, it was once again acknowledged by NATO, the EU and the OSCE that these threats could not be countered by one single security organization. The EU-NATO joint agreement was created to prevent competition and implied essential cooperation. It could be argued, therefore, that the European security model from the 1990s was on the table again, albeit in a different form.

Explaining the Paths of Broadening

This chapter analysed the paths of broadening of NATO, the EU and the OSCE individually and in comparison. The question is why the observed changes occurred and how this path theoretically can be explained.

The observed path of broadening evidently showed that states, acting in the domain of security and defence politics, influenced and decided upon cooperation schemes and created, changed or even ended institutionalized cooperation if this served their interest.

In the early 1990s, the aim was to create a European security architecture of interlocking institutions and a multilateral framework. However, it soon became clear to the hegemon in this intended architecture, the US, that replacement of NATO by a regional UN cooperative security organization, the OSCE, should not be pursued. The OSCE was not a military

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224 NATO Wales Summit, September 2014.

organization and strengthening or combining some kind of common defence agreement with Russia was not deemed desirable.²²⁵ As a result of the paths of broadening of the selected security organizations, the picture that emerged of the European security architecture was the following. After the debacle in the Balkans (1991-1995) and Somalia (1993), Europe and the US turned to NATO for military assistance in the Balkans, which took the form of Operation Allied Force (1999). From 2000 onwards, the operations in Afghanistan (2003) and Iraq (2003) were executed by a coalition of the 'willing and able' in combination with NATO and the EU for operations at the lower end of the spectrum of force. This scenario of the coalitions of willing and able, in combination with institutionalized security organizations, continued after the Arab storm, for example by the operations in Libya (2011) and Syria (2013). From 2013, the European states and the US turned to the EU to deal with security issues that implied a necessity for a broader approach, and to the OSCE for crises which none of the other two organizations were allowed or able to deal with, such as frozen conflicts and the Crimea crisis of 2014. Finally, states turned to NATO in the case of conventional threats, such as the 2014 crisis with Russia. This preference for a specific security organization, with a mandate for either collective defence or crisis management or a combination of both including additional capabilities, was driven by the shifts of interests of the member states and what the organizations had to offer, as explained by the rational choice institutionalists.

Another observation is the historical evolution of the paths of change. From its creation, NATO's 'constitutional' existence had been collective defence, which had enabled NATO to be of interest to states in need of deterrence capability. NATO's broadened its task with crisis management in the 1990s and 2000s. From 2014, NATO's original collective defence task was high on the agenda again; as a result of the path of broadening, however, collective defence was no longer comparable to the Cold War days and was linked to crisis management. Likewise, the EU path of change dealt with historical evolution, as claimed by the historical institutionalists, as the EU's origin lies in economic cooperation, and its venture into security and defence, and consequently its institutionalization, was built from there and offered a broader package of organs and capabilities than the security and defence domain alone could offer. Finally, the OSCE broadened its tasks in the field of cooperative security mainly in respect of human rights. Therefore, the scope of tasks of the OSCE did not broaden as much as that of the EU and the OSCE thus lost legitimacy when these tasks were not required.

Furthermore, although the selected organizations changed, they did not always change drastically in response to crises. The first time in NATO's history that the collective defence task - NATO's political and military solidarity clause - was invoked, as a result of the 9/11 attacks, did not result in a stronger institutionalized organization, and further down the road the solidarity among the allies was challenged. Although there had been some changes in mandate, tasks, instruments and institutionalization, the 9/11 event had not been ground-breaking for NATO's path of broadening. Likewise, although the Madrid terror

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225 Sloan, S., 'Is NATO Necessary but Not Sufficient?', in: Aybet, G., Moore, R.R., 'NATO in search of a vision', Georgetown University Press, 2010, p. 268.

attack of 2004 and the London terror attacks of 2005 had been critical junctures for the EU member states, the EU broadened gradually.

The analysis above of the observed paths of change cannot simply be explained by the more realistic approach within the new institutionalism. It was shown that states were not the only influencing actors in the field, as the implementation of the decisions that were made along the paths of broadening was ebbing away from the member states to the organs, specifically with regard to the complex crisis management tasks, which required cooperation with each other and many other actors in the field (e.g., the UN and NGOs).

Furthermore, as a result of broadening, missions and operations were more often than not coordinated by the organizations themselves, as explained by constructivist institutionalism, because coordination of these ad-hoc operations was required within and between the organizations. This necessitated specific expertise and capabilities on the part of the organs within and between the organizations.

Apart from the influence of the security organizations as actors, as a result of their expertise and capabilities, the EU and the OSCE focus on good governance, democratisation, judicial reform and development in all sorts of crisis management operations as normative powers and security communities, strengthened their attractiveness to state actors and as a result their actorness. Though NATO performed training activities and enabled the democratisation of armed forces, it was limited in the performance of the civil side of crisis management tasks.²²⁶

Moreover, to a certain extent the paths of broadening of the security organizations were linked, either positively or negatively, especially those of NATO and the EU; for example, the link between NATO's comprehensive approach and that of the EU and civil missions, which broadened NATO's scope. The OSCE path of broadening was negatively linked to those of the EU and NATO. In other words, the broadening of NATO and the EU did not strengthen but weakened the OSCE and the process of institutionalization among the three security organizations.²²⁷

Finally, whether one security organization was preferred above the other depended on several factors, including the preferences of key members, but also the attributes of an organization and the availability of alternatives. The territorial defence issues, for example, could best be dealt with by NATO or more recently by the EU. The OSCE has been the security organization for crises such as Ukraine and Georgia; conflicts situated on the European crossroads, frozen conflicts, or politically inconvenient conflicts within and between states. As a result, on the one hand the relevance and success of a security organization has indeed been dependent on state interests and membership. On the other hand, as well as state interests, the mandate and performance of security organizations, as actors, enabled them to be players in the field, depending on what they had to offer in terms of tasks, forms of cooperation, capabilities, funds and institutionalization. All this empowered

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226 Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., 'NATO's Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?', Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 26.

227 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., 'Imperfect Unions, Security Institutions over Time and Space', Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 198.

the organizations to influence the interests and the norms and values of states and other organizations.

In short, the paths of change of the security organizations have directly or indirectly led to a broadening of the scope of tasks beyond a point of no return. The observed differences in the paths of change of the scope of tasks, in level and form, has led to a difference in the relevance and legitimacy of these specific security organizations.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter looked at how and why change has led to a broadening of the European security organizations. The security organizations were analysed separately and in comparison in their path of broadening, measured according to the indicators of level and form of change.

The path of broadening changed from 1990 onwards and resulted in a varied course. From their creation, all security organizations of the European security architecture defined security in their treaties and agreements as a much broader concept than military security alone. Nevertheless, the new tasks or approaches (institutionalization) to insecurity differed and were the subject of debate, specifically with regard to the strategies, missions, tasks and mandates within the organizations. This resulted in a varied scope of mandate, tasks and institutionalization among the security organizations, including overlap, differentiation and linkage, where the concepts of collective defence, collective security and cooperative security were adopted but interpreted, institutionalized and applied differently by the individual security organizations. For NATO, collective defence remained its core business and cooperative security had been a means of survival to support this, whereas the OSCE adopted cooperative security as its *raison d'être*, but lacked capabilities and strategy. For the EU, they were both linked and had been a means to build the organization institutionally in the security domain.

Chapter 5

Chapter 5. The Path of Widening

5.1 Introduction

Immediately after the end of the Cold War, the necessity of a new European security architecture encompassing NATO, the OSCE, the EU, the WEU and the Council of Europe to achieve stability and promote a division of labour was specifically stated by NATO and the OSCE.¹ This endeavour started a web of relationships between new members, partners and interaction between security organizations within the European security architecture.

This path of widening, together with the path of broadening addressed in Chapter 4, is discussed in this chapter. As was explained in Chapter 2, widening is defined as a path of horizontal integration, approached in this research by a broad definition of widening, including memberships and partnerships. Consideration is given to the questions of how and why change has led to a widening of the European security organizations. As in Chapter 4, therefore, the security organizations are analysed separately and in comparison in their path of widening, showing what the level and form of this path of change comprise, what the results are and what the variation is between the security organizations in their path of widening, and how this can be explained.

5.2 The Concept of Widening: From Regional to Global Organizations

The second path of change in this research, widening, is defined more extensively than solely full membership of state actors. Widening also includes forms of membership and partnership among state and non-state actors.

To analyse this path of change, form and level are applied as the indicators of widening based on the framework as elaborated in Chapter 2. The starting point of the analysis of each organization will be the foundation, or, in institutionalist terms, the creation, of the organization and from there, through process tracing, the development of the path of widening from 1990 onwards will be analysed.

The form of widening for international organizations can be categorised into several features. Form can be categorised into geographical expansion, varying from a regional to a global coverage. Furthermore, widening can be categorised in different forms of membership and partnership, ranging from ad-hoc cooperation to association to full membership with a possibility of opt-in or opt-out variants for policy areas. Consequently, three groups of actors are analysed in which the path of widening can be distinguished.

1. Full or partial membership, with opt-in and opt-out variants, varying from formal to less formal membership, varying in policy areas and completed with no, with low or with high institutionalized structure.
2. Partnership, varying from formal to less formal partnership, varying in policy areas and completed with no, with low or with high institutionalized structure.

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1 NATO Strategic Concept, 1991.

3. Cooperation between security organizations (interaction), varying in policy areas and completed with no, with low or with high institutionalized structure.

In addition, organizations are established on a system of open or restricted membership which is based on specific criteria set by the organization. In other words, membership can be inclusive or exclusive. Furthermore, states can become full or associated members of different organizations simultaneously, a so-called cross-institutional membership. As well as states, organizations can cooperate and interact with each other.

Second, these different forms of widening can vary in their institutionalization, referred to as the level of change. Institutionalization is based on political and/or juridical agreements, completed with a non, low or high institutionalized structure. In this research, therefore, widening is broadly defined as encompassing the accession of new member states and partnering with states and organizations (the interaction between organizations). The path of widening will be observed both within and between NATO, the EU and the OSCE. These different forms of widening and the level of institutionalization of this path of change are addressed in the sections below.

5.3 The NATO Path of Widening

5.3.1 Introduction

The first NATO summit after the end of the Cold War at Rome in 1991 led to the initiative of a framework addressing European security ‘...The challenges we will face in this new Europe cannot be comprehensively addressed by one institution alone...’.² NATO approached cooperation and dialogue within Europe as ‘...the key security question facing the West...’.³ It was acknowledged that dialogue and cooperation within Europe and beyond was made possible after the end of the Cold War. In addition, it was agreed that the OSCE, the EC, the WEU and the UN ‘...have an important role to play.’⁴ A first step to cooperative security, as expressed by NATO, indicating relations with states and organizations. This section examines the questions of how and why change has led to a widening of NATO. This specific NATO path of widening will be analysed by focusing on the form and level of widening, addressing membership, partnership and interaction between NATO and other actors from 1990 onwards.

5.3.2 Membership

From a Western European Organization to Enlargement within the OSCE Area

The end of the Cold War set off a new road to enlargement and partnership for NATO. The first NATO summit after the Cold War was the Rome Summit in 1991, which stated



² NATO Strategic Concept, 1991, par. 3.

³ Glaser, C. L., ‘Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe’, *International Security* 18, summer 1993, p. 10.

⁴ NATO Strategic Concept, 1991, par. 34.

the necessity of a pan-European architecture after the fall of the Warsaw Pact (WP). It was decided that the OSCE should be strengthened to enhance this European security architecture.

The following NATO Summit in Oslo supported and enabled OSCE crisis management operations, on a case-by-case basis, to address the crisis in the Balkans. The possibility was also created for the OSCE to address other crises as a result of the emerging grey zone that originated from the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the WP.⁵ Furthermore, as well as addressing a European security architecture, it was stated that formal and practical relations with other security organizations, such as the UN and the WEU, were necessary.

NATO was thus one of the first organizations within the European security architecture that called for cooperation and dialogue with new states. The first concrete steps to enlargement, initiated by cooperation and dialogue schemes with former adversaries outside the NATO area, led to the initiative of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), instigated by the US Bush administration.⁶

NATO enlargement was based on a flexible concept of membership as stated in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty (1949).⁷ This flexible approach refers to the 'light' criteria that NATO stated and was labelled as an 'open-door policy', aiming at a flexible approach to contribute '...to the security of the North Atlantic area...'.⁸ The concept of the open-door policy has ruled NATO enlargement for decades, claiming that '...NATO's ongoing enlargement process poses no threat to any country. The policy itself is aimed at promoting stability and cooperation, at building a Europe whole and free, united in peace, democracy and common values....'.⁹ The NATO approach to enlargement, cooperation and dialogue in the beginning of the 1990s, as a collective defence organization, was therefore to build security and stability within the wider Europe.

After the first declarations of the need for cooperation and dialogue after the end of the Cold War, criteria for becoming an actual member of NATO were settled in the 'Study on NATO Enlargement' of 1995, and have changed little since then.¹⁰ The aim of this study was to enhance security and extend stability, initiated by the US in close cooperation with Germany.¹¹

5 North Atlantic Council, Oslo Summit, June 1992.

6 Including 16 NATO member states and 22 former WP members and SU republics. Predecessor of EAPC, 20 December 1991.

7 NATO Washington Treaty, 1949, Article 10.

8 Idem.

9 Study on NATO Enlargement, September 1995, par.4, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24733.htm?, accessed 1-7-2018.

10 Ibid, whole document.

11 Before becoming a full member, candidates participate in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), NATO, 'Membership Action Plan', 1999, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27444.htm?, accessed 1-7-2018. Combined with the so-called Perry Principles, articulated by the US Secretary of Defense William Perry, from February 3, 1994, to January 23, 1997 under the Clinton administration.

To join the Alliance, nations were expected to respect the norms and values of the North Atlantic Treaty (1949) and to meet political, economic and military criteria.¹² These criteria, although they included material and procedural conditions, were grounded in non-legally binding terms.¹³

NATO enlargement has always been decided on a case-by-case basis, which left the decision-making power with the member states in the NAC. As a result of this ad-hoc decision-making, a differentiation between candidates was established, giving some nations earlier membership than others.¹⁴ The path of accession of states started with an invitation to begin an intensified dialogue with the Alliance about their aspirations and related reforms.

With regard to the level of widening, full membership provided representation in the NAC and other political and military decision-making bodies and protection under Article 5.

NATO has been an intergovernmental organization from its foundation, where the implication of NATO's Article 5 '...as they deem necessary...' and the system of 'costs lie where they fall' ran as a red line through the structure of the organization. This resulted in differentiation between members, which will be explored below.

The political conditions of NATO membership did not contain hard criteria like the EU's Copenhagen criteria, but rather moral expectations such as the drive for good governance, the rule of law, democracy, economic collaboration and wellbeing, in line with Article 2 of the Washington Treaty.

The military criteria, such as interoperability with other NATO members, played a marginal role.¹⁵ There were no strict demands in qualitative or quantitative force targets or other military capabilities.¹⁶ While the aim of harmonisation and interoperability with regard to enlargement was described in the NATO study on enlargement, with regard to the form of enlargement NATO members varied in their defence expenditures, capabilities and contribution to NATO-led operations, leading to a differentiated membership.

The first move towards enlargement had been a combination of a political and moral deed, offering new states the foresight on democracy, prosperity, security and defence together with an attempt to rebalance the European equilibrium and expand US and European influence.

12 The Perry Principles contained four principles that underpinned NATO's past success: collective defence, democracy, consensus, and cooperative security. Applied to enlargement this meant that; new members must have forces able to defend the Alliance; be democratic and have free markets, put their forces under civilian control, protect human rights, and respect the sovereignty of others; accept that intra-Alliance consensus remains fundamental; and possesses forces that are interoperable with those of existing NATO members.

13 These criteria include a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy; fair treatment of minority populations; a commitment to resolve conflicts peacefully; an ability and willingness to make a military contribution to NATO operations; and a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutions.

14 Study on NATO enlargement, 1995, Chapter 1.

15 Ibid, par. 43 and 44.

16 Schimmelfennig, F., 'The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 39.

The driving forces and initiatives for enlargement after the end of the Cold War mainly came from the US and Germany.¹⁷ The US reasoning behind enlargement in the beginning of the 1990s was, on the one hand, '...the historical debt for letting East-Central Europe fall into the sphere of influence of the SU in the 1940s...' ¹⁸ and '...a genuine desire to reduce security anxieties of Central and East European states by including them in a broader security community'.¹⁹ On the other hand, US interest was to stabilise Europe after the end of the Cold War, as a result of the incorporation of Germany, the Balkans wars and the position of Russia in the European security architecture.²⁰ Furthermore, it would help the US to control the framework of European security in relation to the expanding EU together with preventing Eastern European states from seeking other possible security guarantees.²¹ Either way - and strongly promoted by the US President Clinton - US security was linked to European security, and enlargement, cooperation and dialogue would be the key to this security link according to the US.²² Within the US Congress, the belief was that '...no matter how it is packaged, current scenarios for NATO expansion entail an anti-Russian element.' Another aspect of US interest in enlargement was the possibility of withdrawal of forces from Europe, in order to become more active in other parts of the world.²³ At the same time, there was a '... widely held belief that expansion is the most effective means of sustaining NATO and, thereby, of maintaining a vital US role in European security relations'.²⁴

Along with the US, enlargement was of interest to Germany. As a result of Germany's unification in 1990, its historical roots with the eastern and central European area and its central geographical position in Europe, the country played an important role in the enlargement debate. NATO enlargement could stabilise Germany's geographical position.²⁵ Furthermore, it could prevent Russian dominance in the region and simultaneously give Russia a place in the European security architecture, by strengthening the OSCE as was stated by NATO in 1990.

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- 17 Sloan, S. R., 'Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain', Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 194.
 - 18 Dunay, P., 'The Changing political geography of Europe. After EU and NATO enlargements', p. 77, in: Tardy, T., (eds.) 'European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external dynamics', Contemporary Security Studies, Routledge, Oxon, Great Britain, 2009.
 - 19 Ruggie, J. G., 'Consolidating the European Pillar: The key to NATO's future', The Washington Quarterly, January 7, 1997, p. 109.
 - 20 Sarotte, M. E., '1989. The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe', Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2014, p. 1-10; Sloan, S. R., 'Defense of the West. NATO, The European union and the Transatlantic Bargain', Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 103-106; Sloan, S. R., 'Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain', Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 103-106.
 - 21 Andrews, D. (ed.), 'The Atlantic Alliance under Stress. US-European relations after Iraq', Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 239.
 - 22 Speech by President Clinton, 22 October 1996.
 - 23 Solomon, G. B., 'The NATO enlargement Debate, 1990-1997', Centre for Strategic and International Studies, The Washington Papers 174, Washington D.C., 1998, p. 122.
 - 24 Ruggie, J. G., 'Consolidating the European Pillar: The key to NATO's future', The Washington Quarterly, January 7, 1997, p. 109.
 - 25 Schimmelfennig, F., 'The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 47-49.

Besides these ambitious member states, once the initiative for enlargement was put on the agenda, the main impetus for enlargement within NATO came from the officials who were pushing and setting the agenda of the member states.²⁶

Enlargement

At the Madrid Summit in 1997, NATO invited Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to become members, although twelve countries had applied for NATO membership.²⁷

The US administration was interested in inviting five states, including Slovakia, but the US Congress and most of the European members, except for France and Italy, were less enthusiastic due to the possibility of a strained relationship with Russia.²⁸ Nevertheless, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined NATO in May 1999. This is usually referred to as the first round of enlargement.

The second round of enlargement, which was debated with nine states from the former WP, was initiated at the Washington Summit in 1999. The finalisation of these debates resulted in NATO's second round of enlargement in 2004, also called 'the big bang', including the Baltic states and states from the Western Balkans.²⁹ With that, NATO's comprehensive and indivisible approach to security, dating from the end of the Cold War, resulted in a collective defence organization covering more than half of the OSCE area in 2004.

After the first and even more after the second round of enlargement, however, the Allies became more divided towards NATO's open-door policy. Not only the political strategic arguments relating to the position of Russia were on the table, but also burden sharing among the newcomers and differences in threat perception. In contrast with the earlier political and moral arguments of the 1990s, member states were arguing that 'conventional forces can be easily divided among allies, and those used to protect one particular Alliance territory cannot be used at another border at the same time. If because of enlargement a larger border or area has to be protected, conventional forces are subject to consumption rivalry in the form of force thinning'.³⁰ For some of the 'old' members, 'new' members diluted rather than strengthened NATO military power and effectiveness, increasing security risks and alliance costs.³¹ Nevertheless, Albania and Croatia were invited as members in 2009. After the second round of enlargement at the Bucharest Summit in 2008, it was announced that Ukraine and Georgia could become members of NATO, but without mentioning a final date.³² This US initiative for Georgia and Ukraine was highly delicate and was eventually blocked by Germany and France. Both countries were in favour of cooperating with Russia within the security architecture, not excluding Russia, as it was

26 Ibid, p. 45.

27 Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Croatia, Georgia and Ukraine.

28 Schimmelfennig, F., 'The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 236-242.

29 The Baltic states, Slovakia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania.

30 Schimmelfennig, F., 'The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 22.

31 Ibid, p. 45-46.

32 North Atlantic Council, Bucharest Summit, April 2008.

against their own interests to annoy Russia.³³ As for Russia, the offer of NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine was the ultimate provocation of NATO enlargement and was regarded as a declaration of war.³⁴

After the Crimea crisis of 2014, at the Wales Summit, the pledge for Ukraine to become a NATO member was not repeated again. Though full membership of Ukraine and Georgia was no longer on the agenda, increased defence cooperation was initiated and a possibility was created for individual NATO allies to cooperate militarily with Ukraine.³⁵ Consequently, NATO's enlargement door remained open, but lost its attraction within the Alliance as a result of the discord between the members. In 2014 in Wales, the intention was expressed to strengthen the cooperation with the EU and to renew cooperation with the OSCE for coordinating further enlargement.³⁶

Differentiated Membership

The enlargement path of NATO created an internal variation of different forms of membership within the organization. This differentiated form of membership was already the case before the big bang of enlargement of the 1990s. This internal variation was comparable to the EU opt-in and opt-out variants of membership. Due to historical legacies, disagreement about leadership or, at the other end of the spectrum, lack of armed forces, differentiation can be found in the use of armed forces, the membership of NATO organs and its decision-making power and participation in Article 5 or crisis management operations. The variations in form can be found specifically in the case of Iceland, France, Germany and Luxembourg. During the Cold War, Germany's military contribution to NATO was implemented incrementally. After the German unification in 1990, Germany's position was strengthened, advocated by the Bush administration. Nevertheless, it was simultaneously restricted by Germany's own constitution and by those opposing the strengthening of Germany's position in NATO. Ever since 1967, France had not participated in the NATO military command structures. As a result, President De Gaulle withdrew France from the military structures. In 1996, President Chirac attempted to become a full member of NATO's Military Committee, proposing that NATO's southern command be passed from American to European leadership.³⁷ This proposal stranded in 1997 in the NAC after US refusal. More than ten years later, the French President Sarkozy appealed to the American Congress and in 2009 France re-entered NATO's military structure.³⁸

33 Sloan, S. R., 'Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain', Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 234-236.

34 International diplomatic crisis between Georgia and Russia began in 2008 and led to the outbreak of the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 and the 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas dispute.

35 NATO-Ukraine cooperation: NATO, 'Relations with Ukraine', 2017, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm#. NATO-Georgian cooperation: NATO, 'Relations with Georgia', 2017, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_38988.htm, accessed 12 July 2018.

36 NATO Wales Summit, September 2014.

37 Irondelle, B., Merand, F., 'France's return to NATO: the death knell for ESDP?', *European Security* Vol. 19, No. 1, March 2010, p. 32.

38 10 March 2009.

5.3.3 Partnership

Regional NATO

As well as full membership of NATO, part of the NATO agenda at the beginning of the 1990s concerned the question of how a political-military organization, with an exclusive membership based on the concept of collective defence, could contribute to security in the whole of Europe. As the London Summit (1990) declared 'We recognise that, in the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbours. NATO must become an institution where Europeans, Canadians and Americans work together not only for the common defence, but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship'.³⁹ As well as offering membership, NATO answered this question by installing low institutionalized cooperation frameworks. This approach of flexible, differentiated and modest institutionalized cooperation frameworks was first achieved by the installation of the NACC in 1990. Together with OSCE widening, as will be discussed in this chapter, the NACC was one of the first frameworks of widening within the European security architecture.

The NACC provided NATO with three goals. With the NACC, a wider concept of security was put on the agenda. The NATO mandate broadened, engaging NATO with not only military issues within its scope of tasks, but also with the democratisation of armed forces, emergency planning and financial aspects with partners.⁴⁰ Furthermore, the NACC's main goal was a forum for dialogue and cooperation without a reference to full membership, which meant the NACC could be viewed as a good alternative for full membership. Driven by the enlargement debates within NATO after the Cold War, NACC proved to be the first step towards differentiated cooperation. Finally, NACC was created as one of the measures to include non-members in political discussions which were on the NATO agenda, but outside the main decision-making body: the NAC. As a result, parallel engagement and decision-making came into being. However, key decision-making and consultation continued to be done inside the traditional alliance structures and alliance policy, the NAC, before presenting issues outside NATO, the NACC.

With regard to the level of institutionalisation of partnership, the structure of the NACC was not purely military, in contrast with NATO's internal structure, but composed of more broadly issues. Cooperation and interoperability were not the only aims of the NACC, as the concept of security was approached more broadly from the beginning of the 1990s, as stated by the Rome Summit of 1991. Finally, there was no agreement on the aim and purpose of the program of cooperation and dialogue with the former WP countries. In the middle of the 1990s, the US Clinton administration, the continuing driving force behind cooperation and dialogue, stated that the NACC could lead to membership of some

39 Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council; 'The London Declaration', 05 July-06 July, 1990, withdrawn 19-10-2017.

40 For an elaboration: NATO, 'North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation', 1991, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23841.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 13 July 2018.

participating countries. The reasoning behind this US plea was 'to do for Europe's East what it did for Europe's West' and simultaneously to encourage aspirant members to political, economic and military reforms and enlarge the zone of peace as a possible result; the NATO concept of cooperative security.⁴¹ Nevertheless, other allies were not convinced of the need to move so quickly and did not want to disturb the existing European balance of power with Russia, as advocated by France. Next to this geopolitical argument, some member states, such as Germany, were interested in NATO enlargement to strengthen Europe economically by enlarging 'the democratic and free market area in the post-Cold War world'.⁴² Others argued that cooperation and dialogue could contribute to relieve the allies' burden against the background of declining defence budgets and distant, complex and expansive missions.⁴³

Apart from the installation of the multilateral NACC, as a pre-stage to the first round of NATO enlargement in 1999, Russia and NATO signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, lightly institutionalized by the establishment of a Permanent Joint Council (PJC).⁴⁴ This was an act between a state and an international security organization. As a separate alignment and different from the other cooperation programmes, the NATO-Russia Founding Act included possibilities for political and military cooperation. The aim was that 'the member States of NATO and Russia will, together with other States Parties, seek to strengthen stability by further developing measures to prevent any potentially threatening build-up of conventional forces in agreed regions of Europe, to include Central and Eastern Europe'.⁴⁵ NATO declared in the Act to have no intentions for the permanent placement of nuclear, military forces or infrastructure within the new member states.⁴⁶ The Act also included a commitment to strengthen the OSCE and referred to the OSCE's work on the security model in the era of post-Cold War detente. The NATO-Russia cooperation was strengthened in 2002, preceding NATO's second enlargement round of 2004, by the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC).⁴⁷

At the end of the 1990s, differentiation of membership and partnership was extended with bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

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41 Schimmelfennig, F., 'The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 236-242.

42 Sloan, S. R., 'Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain', Manchester University press, Manchester, 2016, p. 111.

43 Daalder, I., Goldgeier, J., 'Global NATO', Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2006, p. 6.

44 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, Paris, France, 27 May 1997.

45 Idem.

46 Idem.

47 The NRC evolved into a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action. More than 25 working groups and committees have been created to develop cooperation on terrorism, proliferation, peacekeeping, theatre missile defence, airspace management, civil emergencies, defence reform, logistics, scientific cooperation for peace and security: NATO-Russia Council, 'About NRC', n.d., available at: <https://www.nato.int/nrc-website/en/about/index.html>, accessed 3-7-2018.

Multilateral cooperation was conceptualised by the European Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC),⁴⁸ again initiated by the US Clinton administration,⁴⁹ which replaced the NACC. The aim was to improve interoperability among member states and partner forces. This placed NATO at the centre of the European security architecture.

Bilateral cooperation was introduced by the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative, established in 1994. The aim of PfP was to support states in their transformation of the armed forces, and did not automatically imply membership. PfP was supposed to be the answer to the debate between the sceptics and supporters of enlargement. The compromise entailed the agreement that with PfP no commitment was made to membership and active engagement in PfP was expected for a possible future membership. Membership would be decided upon on a case-by-case basis. All in all, the criteria for enlargement did not include hard demands, as detailed above.

With regard to the level of multilateral cooperation, PfP was institutionalised with a Planning and Review Process (PARP) in the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC), which included a possibility for PfP countries to contribute to NATO operations, as was the case in Kosovo and Bosnia.⁵⁰ This marked a shift from solely multilateral cooperation to the inclusion of bilateral cooperation. Cooperation was established in the form of Individual Partnership Programs (IPPs) and differentiation with the PARP.⁵¹

Enlargement with new members, supported by the US and strengthening the European pillar within the Alliance, was perceived by the NATO members as a relevant achievement.⁵² Nevertheless, NATO's second round of enlargement, which included the Baltic States and states from the Western Balkans, necessitated a more structured approach to the preparation of the aspirant states who wanted to become members. This was the result of the debates that arose after the first enlargement round between the allies with regard to the geographical span and the criteria used. As the US was a strong advocator of NATO enlargement, a further strengthening of partnership programmes was introduced with the Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 1999. Not only did the MAP require and structure the conditionality of defence reform, it also included a yearly preparation to qualify for membership and contained subjects that were related to politics, economy, defence, finance, intelligence and legal requirements.⁵³ Nevertheless, the MAP was built on PfP and likewise did not include automatic membership, though it did promise cooperation beyond the PfP concept. Furthermore, the MAP did not substitute for full participation in PfP's planning and review process.⁵⁴ For example, Cyprus, as a member of the EU, is not

48 Formerly established at the NATO meeting with partners in Sintra, Portugal, May 1997.

49 In 2017 the EAPC included 50 members and partners of NATO.

50 Many PfP countries participated.

51 NATO, 'Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process', 2014, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_68277.htm, accessed 27 February, 2018.

52 Paris, 27 May 1997.

53 NATO, 'Membership Action Plan (MAP)', 1999, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27444.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 10 July 2018.

54 Sloan, S. R., 'Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain', Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 126.

yet a NATO member or a member of the PfP, as a result of the dispute with Turkey. The MAP therefore resulted in a further differentiation of NATO's path of widening.

All in all, partnership and cooperation were further enhanced with the EAPC and PfP. However, around 2010 the EAPC included fifty members and partners in total, which hardly provided an effective opportunity for discussion and dialogue. As with the other international organizations in this research, due to all the cooperation initiatives, a heterogeneous group emerged which led to debates and informal dialogue alongside the formal and institutionalised fora. Furthermore, the EAPC as 'an institution...', played an important role but never became an important factor in NATO's decision-making process'.⁵⁵ Secretary-General Rasmussen pleaded for the possibility of differentiation of high and low levels of institutionalization, depending on the sort of partnership.⁵⁶ Similar to the PfP programme, or the 29+N formula,⁵⁷ with very different memberships and partnerships. As a result, flexibility and differentiation were embedded within NATO by institutional design, but could at the same time be hampered by political differences within the alliance and between the alliance and its partners. For instance, over the years, NATO had to deal with multiple vetoes exercised by Turkey and its critics over partnership activities with Israel.⁵⁸ In addition, regarding operations and cooperation with partners, intelligence sharing remained an issue between members and non-members. NATO's operational headquarters, Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe (SHAPE), was reluctant to share information, although it had gradually begun to share its military planning, exercising and implementation procedures.⁵⁹ At the other end of the spectrum, the troop-contributing partner states demanded the right to have a say in NATO matters and to be appropriately represented in the command structure, as they supported NATO operations. With this, according to some, partnership resulted in a political minefield.⁶⁰ The programmes of dialogue and cooperation thus resulted in different levels and forms of cooperation.

Together with the debates between the allies with regard to the completion of partnership, enlargement and partnership also resulted in debates between EU and NATO; on the one hand because of the overlap of members and possible consequences for the NATO collective defence guarantee and, on the other, because of the non-EU states that were NATO members, but linked to the EU by association agreements, such as Turkey.

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55 Ibid, p. 116.

56 Secretary General Rasmussen, 2009.

57 Cooperation of NATO as an international organization with a state like Russia or Ukraine.

58 Turkey had vetoed Israel's participation in NATO exercises, as well as its presence at a NATO Summit, May 2011, in protest of the 2010 Gaza flotilla raid by Israeli commandos, in which nine Turkish activists were killed. Furthermore, Turkish-Israeli relations further deteriorated after the 2011 UN report justifying the Mavi Marmara marine assault, which resulted in Turkey expelling the Israeli ambassador and suspending military cooperation. For an elaboration on Turkey-Israel relations see: Arbel, D., 'The U.S.-Turkey-Israel Triangle', Brookings Institution, Analysis Paper, number 34, October 2014.

59 Wallander, C. A., 'Institutional assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War', International Organisation, volume 54, Issue 04, September 2000, p. 722-723.

60 Flockhart T. (eds.), 'Cooperative Security: NATO's Partnership Policy in a Changing World', DIIS Report, 2014:01, Copenhagen, p. 136.

Furthermore, ever since the Berlin Plus agreements of 2003, NATO and the EU were politically and operationally linked. The US and the Atlantic-orientated EU members in particular were motivated 'by concerns that if EU enlargement was allowed to proceed... significantly ahead of NATO's own enlargement process, then what US officials had called underlapping security guarantees might develop'.⁶¹ Before the EU Treaty of Lisbon (2009) and its mutual defence clause, the EU certainly lacked the necessary security guarantees and NATO could be drawn into conflicts unintentionally.⁶²

Global NATO

Apart from NATO's cooperation with partners in the OSCE area at the beginning of this century, US and British governments had a global vision on NATO's mission. This was illustrated by initiatives for partnerships that provided multilateral legitimization for actions in global conflict prevention and crisis management operations.

The US had already initiated the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD)⁶³ in 1994 and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)⁶⁴ in 2004, as well as PFP and EAPC. These concepts were comparable but nevertheless different, as the MD concept was bi- and multilateral in contrast with the ICI.

At the Riga Summit of 2006, the US and the UK proposed the establishment of a global partnership programme, at least including Australia and Japan as a result of their participation in NATO's ISAF operation. This initiative was supported by the NATO organization. Secretary-General Rasmussen suggested turning NATO into a global forum for security and dialogue instead of cooperation with solely European states.⁶⁵ Proponents of strong cooperation with partners worldwide were in favour of a partnership or even membership of NATO, as these partners did contribute to the ISAF operation.

The hesitation or even resistance towards an ever growing NATO came from two sides. On the one hand, there were those that were afraid of a global NATO weakening the Article 5 guarantee. This concern was especially present in the states surrounding Russia. These opponents preferred relations between new partners and NATO to be hierarchal, granting NATO a right of first refusal if it should come to Article 5 operations.⁶⁶ On the other hand, there were those who were not interested in a global NATO, as they were convinced that this would result in competition with the UN and the EU. Germany and France, as

61 Smith, M. A., 'EU enlargement and NATO: The Balkan experience', p. 7 in: Brown, D., Shepherd, A. K., 'The security dimensions of EU enlargement. Wider Europe, weaker Europe?', Manchester University Press, 2007.

62 Kamp, K. H., Reisinger, H., 'NATO's Partnerships after 2014: Go West!', NATO Research Division, No. 92, Rome, 2013.

63 NATO, 'Mediterranean Dialogue', 2017, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52927.htm, accessed 20 May 2018.

64 NATO, 'Istanbul Cooperation Initiative', 2017, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52956.htm, accessed 20 May 2018.

65 'NATO in the 21st Century: Towards Global Connectivity', Speech by NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen, at the Munich Security Conference, 7 February 2010.

66 Sloan, S., 'Is NATO Necessary but Not Sufficient?', p. 270, in: Aybet, G., Moore, R. R., 'NATO in search of a vision', Georgetown University Press, 2010.

advocates of this view, strived for operational cooperation, but not institutionalization of cooperation even up to the political strategic level worldwide.⁶⁷

However, in the margins of the ISAF operation, NATO started dialogue and cooperation with Japan, Australia, South Korea and New Zealand. It was even suggested that these states be given a say over decisions in operations in which they were involved.⁶⁸ The Partners across the Globe (PATG) initiative was created at the Lisbon Summit and adopted in 2011 in Berlin.⁶⁹ It was a bilateral cooperation programme, as different interests among the partners called for different cooperation schemes. At the time of the Lisbon Summit in 2010, relations between the NATO member states and Russia were in a period of détente. NATO pleaded for the implementation of the OSCE principles of confidence-building measures, putting the OSCE and the European security architecture back on the agenda again.⁷⁰ This NATO Summit was attended by the Russian President Medvedev. At that time, NATO and Russia even intensified cooperation in areas where mutual security interests were at stake, such as Afghanistan, non-proliferation, piracy and terrorism.⁷¹

After 2010, the interest in enlargement and partnership changed. Even the US interest had changed from enlargement to engagement⁷² with countries outside the OSCE area, such as China, India and Australia.⁷³ However, this change in interest not only occurred between the members, as explained above, but also within the many and differentiated partner groups.

As the group enlarged, the interests of the partners themselves differed more and more within the NATO cooperation programmes. For instance, Australia's interest was cooperation on countering new threats such as terrorism, not the need for financial and military support that concerned the 'old' partners. The NATO partners from outside the OSCE territory could not therefore be compared with the partnerships inside the OSCE territory, as they were not in a transition period as a result of the end of the Cold War. The new partners had different levels of ambition towards the Alliance and not all of them strived for full membership, as the focus was on ad-hoc operational cooperation, exchange of information, training and education and exercises.⁷⁴

Another group of partners, the MD and ICI group, cooperated mostly bilaterally with NATO, because the interests among these partners differed too much. The contribution

67 Until 2008, these partners were referred to as contact states. At the Bucharest Summit, 2008, the *partners across the globe* initiative was launched. This partnership programme included political cooperation at staff level and operational and bilateral cooperation: information, exchange, training and exercise. From 2010 these programmes were stalled under the (PPC).

68 Daalder, I., Goldgeier, J., 'Global NATO', Foreign Affairs, September/October 2006, p. 6.

69 PATG group includes: Afghanistan, Australia, Colombia, Iraq, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand and Pakistan.

70 Flockhart T. (eds.), 'Cooperative Security: NATO's Partnership Policy in a Changing World', DIIS Report, 2014:01, Copenhagen, p. 103-106.

71 NATO Strategic Concept, 2010, par. 23.

72 Stated at the second inauguration of US President Obama, 21 January 2013.

73 Howorth, J., 'Security and Defence Policy in the European Union', The European Union Series, 2nd edition, 2014, p. 140.

74 Shreer, B., 'Beyond Afghanistan NATO's Global Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific', Research Paper, NATO Defense College, Rome, no. 75, April 2012.

of the MD partners to NATO missions was limited, except for Jordan, who had been contributing to ISAF and the mission in Libya.⁷⁵

Furthermore, the different partnerships were built on two frameworks: one for policy consultations and one for operational decision-making. The first, the Political Military Framework for Partner Involvement in NATO-led Operations (PMF), decided upon at the Lisbon Summit,⁷⁶ was driven by partners' demands for the institutionalization of the consultation that was developed inside the ISAF operation. All operational issues were also considered in partner format, instead of on the basis of the primacy of a NATO format. With these group of partners, NATO had agreed to strengthen its institutional capacity to serve as a type of coalition-building vehicle.⁷⁷ The second framework was built much more flexibly and decided upon case by case, dependent on the operation.

All the different forms of partnerships were the result of the debates within the Alliance and between the Alliance and the partners and other international organizations, because of the different interests of all the actors involved. After 2010, the aim was for these different partnerships to be more structured, but in contrast many new initiatives were created. During the Wales Summit (2014), in the light of the Crimea crisis, new partners, states and organizations, were merged in an interoperability platform, the Partnerships and Cooperative Security Committee (PCSC), as a successor to the Political and Partnerships Committee (PPC), which was initiated in 2010.⁷⁸ This platform included enhanced cooperation with five states,⁷⁹ and these states would have authority to advise decision-making processes within NATO in the context of their troop-contributing efforts to NATO operations. However, this advisory consultation remained short of actual political decision-making.

Furthermore, it was decided, during the summits of Wales (2014) and Warsaw (2016), to strengthen bilateral cooperation with concordant countries, such as Finland and Sweden, as part of the EAPC.⁸⁰ Additionally, the Defence and Related Security and Capability Building (DCB) initiative was launched with the aim of contributing to capability building of willing partners.⁸¹ These included so-called packages, including strategic advice, stabilization and reconstruction institution-building or development of local forces, at

75 NATO, 'Operations and missions: past and present', 2017, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.htm, accessed 10 July 2018.

76 The PMF is one of the Partnership tools and is applied when a partner wishes to join a NATO-led operation. The PMF sets out principles and guidelines for the involvement of all partner countries in political consultations and decision-shaping, in operational planning and in command arrangements for operations to which they contribute.

77 Flockhart T. (eds.), 'Cooperative Security: NATO's Partnership Policy in a Changing World', DIIS Report 2014:01, Copenhagen, p. 135.

78 The PCSC meets in various formats: 'at 29' among Allies; with partners in NATO's regionally specific partnership frameworks, namely the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative; with individual non-member countries in '29+1' formats; as well as in '29+n' formats on particular subjects, if agreed by Allies.

79 Australia, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and Jordan.

80 Contributing to the NRF.

81 NATO, 'Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative', 2017, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132756.htm, accessed 2-3-2018.

the request of the partners. In addition, the Framework for the South⁸² and the PCSC were established.⁸³

So, although the idea was more about coordination and structuring⁸⁴ with partners and other international organizations, all these initiatives existed alongside each other; they were not vigorously or institutionally coordinated under the NATO umbrella, and were even negatively appreciated by some member states, as they feared a further widening of NATO's geographical span.

5.3.4 The NATO Path of Widening

NATO's path of widening can be seen as converging and diverging paths of widening. Converging, as partnership was strengthened, aiming for full membership. Many different relationship and cooperation programmes had been set up with this goal in mind. After the second round of enlargement, widening headed towards looser memberships and partnerships. The Alliance was in disagreement regarding the aim of cooperation, moral arguments or power projection, about a sound strategy of what to achieve and about the level and form of these partnerships. Institutionally, these cooperation programmes were not strengthened, and were even referred to as 'empty shells' by Mearsheimer;⁸⁵ a diverging trend.

In terms of membership, from its creation, NATO cooperation with external partners became more and more differentiated. This was a result of the increase in different concepts of cooperation and partnership and, even in the 1990s, it became clear that many countries would not become full NATO members in the end. To debate this and resist enlargement would be a *contradictio in terminis*, however. The idea behind enlargement was that in an environment dominated by instability, NATO's experience and assets as an organization for cooperation and integration among members could be expanded.⁸⁶ NATO could do for the former WP countries what it had done for Germany after the Second World War as a political and moral deed, offering new states democracy, security and defence. On the other hand, the concept of collective defence and cooperative security of NATO did not coexist. The aim of cooperation for reasons of stability conflicted with the fact that Alliance purposes remained linked to the external commitment of Article 5 as a collective defence organization.

Reflecting on the partnerships, likewise, a differentiation can be observed. Over the years, an extensive NATO partnership programme had been established, referred to by NATO as

82 A military centre for the Mediterranean was created including anti-terrorism measures at JFC, Naples.

83 Politico-military committee responsible for all NATO's programmes with non-member countries.

84 For an elaboration: Kamp, K. H., Reisinger, H., 'NATO's Partnerships after 2014: Go West!', NATO Research Division, No. 92, Rome, 2013.

85 Mearsheimer, J. J., 'Back to the Future; Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), p. 43.

86 Wallander, C. A. 'Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War.' *International Organization* 54, no. 4 (2000), p. 720.

cooperative security, including PfP, EAPC, MD, the ICI and the PATG programme. These programmes were always vigorously supported and often initiated by the US.⁸⁷

The Alliance had culminated and differentiated its forms of partnership. This differentiation provided NATO with different levels (i.e., layering) of cooperation. One group could be identified on the basis of the norms and values similar to those of the NATO allies. This cooperation could be applied to partner countries who share the same norms and values, such as democracy, freedom, stability and welfare. Another group could be categorised along the lines of cooperation from a single policy extending to multiple policies. A third group could be identified according to the contribution to NATO operations. Finally, partnership could be categorised along the lines of high and low levels of institutionalization.

From the end of the Cold War, NATO viewed three pillars as its main or most important tasks. One of them was enlargement and partnership, encapsulated in the NATO concept of cooperative security. These partnership programmes entailed multiple functions. On the one hand, partnership entailed stability, reform and democratisation. On the other, partnership represented the interests of the NATO organization and its allies. Partners could contribute operational capabilities that members lacked. Partnership, instead of membership and institutionalization, allowed the member states to deepen cooperation in fields of mutual interest, such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement, while denying them the decision-making power and the security guarantees⁸⁸ This resulted in bi- and multilaterally differentiating cooperation in the field of policy and in different ways of serving strategic interests for national security, which varied from interests in intervention to conflict areas to the necessity of burden sharing. Having said that, association with NATO and PfP, both institutional arrangements, reflected the superior bargaining power of the enlargement sceptics in the NATO organization vis-à-vis the few supporters of enlargement and the power asymmetry between the western organizations and the eastern candidates.⁸⁹

The crisis in Ukraine and Crimea in 2014 damaged the EAPC partnership of states in the former SU and their relationship with NATO, as some partners affiliated with Russia. This concerned the relationship with partners, but it also applied to members within NATO who were politically or economically linked to Russia. As a result of internal debates and diverging interests between the allies, the basket of cooperative security became fragmented and void, illustrated by the strategic partnership with Russia dating from 1997, which ended up in conflict. The Ukrainian conflict of 2014 had shown that the NATO's cooperative security task was perceived as a threat to Russia instead of a means for dialogue and cooperation.

Finally, reflecting on the concept of cooperative security within NATO, this was not conceptualised as the traditional approach, as was outlined in Chapter 2, or as the OSCE concept of cooperative security. In contrast, NATO defined the concept as a duty to be

87 Schimmelfennig, F., 'The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 23

88 Ibid, p. 50.

89 Schimmelfennig, F., 'The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 260-264.

engaged with global affairs, which was implemented in several partnership programmes.⁹⁰ With the NSC of 2010, NATO linked enlargement and partnership programmes directly to external risks and threats. The NSC implied 'Solidarity and cohesion within the Alliance, through daily cooperation in both the political and military spheres, ensure that no single Ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them through collective effort to realise their essential national security objectives'.⁹¹

5.3.5 Conclusion

This section examined the questions of how and why change has led to a widening of NATO. NATO changed from a purely collective defence organization, during the Cold War in the transatlantic area, to a global security organization with a diversification in memberships and partnerships. This NATO path of widening can largely be divided into the following distinctive periods. The first phase, at the beginning of the 1990s, established multilateral cooperation heading for enlargement, as building blocks for the foundation of the European security architecture. The second phase, at the beginning of 2000, constituted a further development of multilateral as well as bilateral cooperation. This resulted in enlargement, partnerships and the first signs of differentiation between the partners in form and level of cooperation. The third phase further developed the differentiation and the setup of bi- as well as multilateral worldwide partnerships (not memberships). This last phase constituted a more 'closed-door policy' in contrast with the open-door policies of the major enlargement programmes from the 1990s. NATO enlargement had been an answer to the threats of the 1990s, but not to the threats thereafter.

5.4 The EU and its CSDP Path of Widening

5.4.1 Introduction

From the beginning of the European integration process, enlargement and partnership have been part of the EU. The end of the Cold War brought an even larger group of varied members and partners to the EU from around the globe. This section addresses the questions of how and why change has led to a widening of EU. The specific path of widening of the EU will be analysed in this section, focusing on the form and level of change as the indicator, and addressing membership, partnership and interaction between the EU and other actors from 1990 onwards.

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90 NATO Strategic Concept, 2010, par. 4c; 'Cooperative security. The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organizations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO's standards'.

91 NATO, Strategic Concept, 2010, par. 8.

5.4.2 Membership

From a Western European Organization to Enlargement within the OSCE Area

After the end of the Cold War, the EU, like NATO, offered an open-door policy to new members from the former WP. The reasoning behind enlargement, from the side of the EU members, was largely the expansion of the internal market, the furthering of democracy and stability and the extension of a community based on similar norms and values. Although the Franco-German motor had been one of most important drivers behind the EU integration process, the two states were not always united in their views on enlargement. As one of the major powers within the EU, Germany was a proponent of enlargement due to its geographical position in the middle of Europe, historical ties with Eastern Europe and moral and political necessity. Furthermore, Germany had a vested interest in a stable and prosperous middle and Eastern Europe. In contrast, France was more hesitant, as it feared a diminishment of French interest and power and a diminishment of its politically and geographically central position in the EU. France's hesitation even resulted in the decision to subject further enlargement to French referenda.⁹² Along with France, other member states feared an increase in costs as a result of the newcomers, expecting demands on their share of the subsidies, the import of conflicts and the future relation with Russia, similar to the arguments of NATO members.⁹³

As a result, the 'old' members were not unanimous towards enlargement with new members, and the enlargement path of the EU started with political dialogue by association agreements with the former WP countries. Accession to enlargement was based on the so-called Copenhagen criteria, decided upon by the European Council in 1993: 'The associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the EU.'⁹⁴ These criteria were politically and legally stricter than the NATO criteria and referred to specific regulations, but not exclusive conditions.⁹⁵ Candidate countries which applied for full membership required the adoption of the *acquis communautaire*, the EU's incentive for membership. These Copenhagen criteria, divided into political and economic criteria, evolved over the years through political decision-making of the member states and European legislation.⁹⁶

92 Dunay, P., 'The Changing political geography of Europe. After EU and NATO enlargements', p. 76 in: Tardy, T., (eds.) 'European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external dynamics', Contemporary Security Studies, Routledge, Oxon, Great Britain, 2009.

93 For an elaboration on pro and contra arguments on enlargement policy: Schimmelfennig, F., 'The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 64-66.

94 Membership requires that candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. European Council, Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993.

95 Dunay, P., 'The Changing political geography of Europe. After EU and NATO enlargements', p. 76, in: Tardy, T., (eds.) 'European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external dynamics', Contemporary Security Studies, Routledge, Oxon, Great Britain, 2009.

96 European Council, Copenhagen, June 1993.

The first round of enlargement started in July 1997, like NATO, when the Commission presented the Agenda 2000.⁹⁷ The Commission recommended starting negotiations with Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia. This was followed by the December 1999 Council meeting in Helsinki, where these countries were given the opportunity to start accession negotiations in 2000. At the end of 2002, the negotiations were concluded, except for Bulgaria and Romania, who joined the EU in the second round of enlargement in 2007. Consequently, in December 2002, the Council accepted the conditions of the Commission to invite Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Malta and Cyprus were invited a year later.⁹⁸

After the big bang, the first enlargement round in 2004, the debate with regard to enlargement became more divided between the member states. The British and Scandinavian states in particular pushed for a common initiative to engage the eastern periphery, which was more related to their geographical interests. Furthermore, for the UK the interest in broadening the EU had always been as a counterbalance to deepening; the UK's reasoning was that more broadening would lead to less deepening.⁹⁹ On the other hand, although the south eastern part of Europe was already engaged in the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), the so-called Barcelona process¹⁰⁰, the French president Sarkozy initiated and pressed for stronger cooperation with the Mediterranean and launched the idea of a Mediterranean Union,¹⁰¹ which was implemented in 2008.¹⁰²

Alongside the advocates of widening, the Commission, the Council and the EP were strong driving forces behind enlargement. The Commission, initiating the Agenda 2000, and the EP were directly involved in the approval of enlargement, as they could use the assent procedure for treaties with third countries to press for political conditionality.¹⁰³ Much later, in line with the increasing lack of enthusiasm for enlargement, Juncker, the head of the Commission, announced a moratorium of five years on the enlargement programme in 2014.¹⁰⁴

After the end of the Cold War, therefore, the EU broadened in members and partners. As with NATO, the EU had an internal variation with different forms of membership from its creation. This is usually referred to as the possibility of opt-in and opt-out for almost all

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97 European Commission, 'Agenda 2000: for a stronger and wider Union', COM 97, 15 July 1997.

98 It was pronounced by the Commission that Ukraine and Georgia were not ready for the EU and neither was the EU. Barosso, Chairman of the Commission, October 27, 2006.

99 For an elaboration on the position of the UK towards EU integration, see: Liddle, R., 'The Europe Dilemma: Britain and the Drama of EU Integration', Bloomsbury Academic, 2014.

100 European Council, Thessaloniki, June 2003.

101 Speech of French president Sarkozy during election campaign, 16 July 2007.

102 Including 42 states, July 2008. For an elaboration: Union for the Mediterranean, 'Who we are, what we do', available at: <https://ufmsecretariat.org/>, accessed 10-9-2018, and see: Gaub, F., Popescu, N., 'The EU neighbours 1995-2015: shades of grey', Chaillot Papers, no. 136, December 2015, p. 9.

103 Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., 'The European Union as a System of Differentiated Integration: Interdependence, Politicization, and Differentiation', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22: 6, 2015, p. 12.

104 Juncker, 14 July 2014.

policy areas, e.g., the Schengen area. This form of cooperation, referred to as a Europe of different speeds, core Europe or an inclusive or exclusive Europe,¹⁰⁵ extended after the Cold War. The different forms of cooperation extended within the policy domain of CSDP, which will be discussed in this chapter. Finally, in contrast with enlargement and association, the EU had to deal with the opposite of enlargement, the loss of members.

Membership and CSDP Cooperation

The establishment of the Copenhagen criteria in the 1990s did not involve any requirements in the ESDP area, basically because the ESDP itself was in a constructive phase and cooperation within the security area was first prioritised within NATO by the old members and the new aspirants.¹⁰⁶ Until 2000, the aspirant member states had had no problems with aligning their foreign and security policy to the EU, as it was linked to NATO. Neither did the US and EU member states at that time.¹⁰⁷

After the big bang of 2004, the EU's enlargement programmes required the adoption and fulfilment of the obligations of the *acquis* in relation to security and defence. The new members could be divided into two groups: the ones that had endeavoured to reform their armed forces, and the ones that had had to create new armed forces as some of them had been part of the former SU, such as the Baltics and Slovenia, and were not in possession of armed forces. Combined, this strengthened further differentiation among the members.¹⁰⁸

From the first enlargement round in 2004 and the building of ESDP, the new members complied with the EU-CSDP *acquis*, but with differentiating interests from the old members. These interests were focused on the OSCE area, the relation between the US and Europe and the position of Russia.¹⁰⁹ The new members' interests were not really prioritised by crisis management operations far from home, such as the Iraq war of 2003 and operations in Afghanistan and Africa. As in the case of the NATO enlargement path, the former WP countries were those that were mainly interested in mutual defence, which, until 2009, could not be provided by the EU. NATO membership was therefore predominant with regard to security and defence. On the other hand, there were those that were more interested in the broader approach of security of the EU and its global presence. The Baltic states, for instance, strictly separated the collective defence task and a broader approach to security between NATO and the EU. Although the EU adopted the mutual defence clause at the Lisbon Summit in 2009, most of the newcomers relied on NATO for collective defence guarantees provided by the US. This tendency was strengthened after the Crimea crisis of 2014.

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105 Elaborated on in Chapter 2.

106 Dunay, P., 'The Changing political geography of Europe. After EU and NATO enlargements', p. 76, in: Tardy, T., (eds.) 'European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external dynamics', Contemporary Security Studies, Routledge, Oxon, Great Britain, 2009.

107 Dunay, P., 'The Changing political geography of Europe. After EU and NATO enlargements', p. 76, in: Tardy, T., (eds.) 'European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external dynamics', Contemporary Security Studies, Routledge, Oxon, Great Britain, 2009.

108 Shepherd, A. J. K., 'The implications of EU enlargement for the European security and defense policy'; Smith, M.A., 'EU enlargement and NATO: The Balkan experience', p. 7. In: Brown, D., Shepherd, A.K., 'The security dimensions of EU enlargement. Wider Europe, weaker Europe?', Manchester University Press, 2007, p. 28.

109 Idem.

All in all, in relation to CSDP, the new member states have contributed to EU military, police and justice missions and the European Union Battlegroup (EUBG).¹¹⁰

5.4.3 Partnership

Regional EU

From the beginning of the 1990s, along with the enlargement programme, the EU established a partnership programme, similar to NATO's partnership programmes, dealing with potential candidates divided into short- and long-term accession, high or low level of institutionalization and with states and regions. Several programmes were initiated by the EU, for cooperation and dialogue with states outside the EU. These programmes were geographically subdivided and labelled as the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA),¹¹¹ linked to the SAP,¹¹² which served as the basis for implementation of the accession process, and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP),¹¹³ which will be elaborated on below.

After the initial establishment of the enlargement programme, at the beginning of 2000, the EU became more interested in an association with the Balkans for different reasons. For one, the EU took over parts of the NATO missions in the Balkans.¹¹⁴ Furthermore, the EU's High Representative Solana, the former Secretary-General (SG) of NATO, had experience of and an interest in the Balkans. Furthermore, at the launch of ESDP at the end of the 1990s, stabilisation and reconstruction in the Balkans were presumed to be a good starting point for the EU's CSDP as a mission area under the umbrella of NATO. In 1999, therefore, the SAA focused on the Balkans and had bilateral programmes with each separate Western Balkan state, encompassing a broad area of policies, including political dialogue, security and justice.¹¹⁵ These agreements were built on the former agreements with the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), which were set up at the beginning of the 1990s. The aim of the SAA and SAP explicitly included provisions for future EU membership of the state involved. Both the SAP and the SAA provided the contractual framework for relations

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110 Cyprus and Malta are excluded from ESDP operations.

111 The Stabilisation and Association Agreement constitutes the framework of relations between the EU and the Western Balkan countries for implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

112 The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) is EU's approach towards the Western Balkans, established with the aim of eventual EU membership, launched in June 1999 and strengthened at the Thessaloniki Summit, June 2003.

113 The ENP, launched in 2003 and developed throughout 2004, governs the EU's relations with 16 of the EU's closest Eastern and Southern Neighbours; Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine*, Syria, Tunisia and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Russia takes part in Cross-Border Cooperation activities under the ENP, but is not a part of the ENP.

114 In July 2003, the EU and NATO published a 'Concerted Approach for the Western Balkans'. In 2003, the EU-led Operation Concordia took over the NATO-led mission, Operation Allied Harmony, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This mission, which ended in December 2003, was the first 'Berlin Plus' operation. In 2004 following the conclusion of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU deployed Operation EUFOR Althea, which again operated under the 'Berlin Plus' arrangements. In Kosovo, the NATO peacekeeping force KFOR worked with the EU's Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX).

115 The first SAA negotiations started in 2000 with Macedonia and Croatia. The last negotiations for SAA status started in 2013 with Kosovo.

between the EU and individual states, which resulted in differentiated agreements, until their foreseen accession to the EU. This foreseen accession was in contrast with NATO's NACC, which did not involve automatic membership.

Global EU

After the big bang of 2004, the EU built and strengthened relations with neighbouring states that were no longer considered candidates for membership in the foreseeable future. For that purpose, along with the SAP and the SAA, associations were extended to the Euro-Mediterranean area and to the Caucasus and labelled as the ENP. The ENP was designed by Commission officials who had previously been in charge of enlargement and 'acquired tools for their new positions'.¹¹⁶ The ENP replaced the former Union with the Mediterranean or so-called Barcelona Process,¹¹⁷ which had previously provided the framework for the EU's relations with its Mediterranean neighbours in North Africa and West Asia. Like the SAA and the SAP, the ENP setup was differentiated by bilateral and multilateral association agreements, including those relating to CSDP policy.¹¹⁸ Unable or unwilling to offer the incentive of accession, the ENP offered the EU neighbours a strengthening of political and security relations and extended the EU market and acquis.¹¹⁹

As was the case with states that strived for membership, the Iraq crisis of 2003 led to some difficulties within the partner association programmes between the 'newcomers' and the old members. The new partners were interested in NATO's security guarantees and the comprehensive approach to security of the EU, as this was essential to them. Similar to NATO, the EU's enlargement and partnership led to disagreement between the member states in general regarding the approach towards association, specifically the approach towards countries like Kosovo and Macedonia,¹²⁰ as described above. As a result, a differentiated programme was adopted. In 2006, the Commission addressed three points, including the lack of EU effort to resolve conflicts in the region.¹²¹ According to Keukeleire and Delreux, this could be described as a general problem of the EU, and a flaw in the EU's structural foreign policy, to make the internal changes necessary to achieve a genuine foreign, security and defence policy and by refusing to change ENP into a programme with requirements that would offer genuine accession to membership of the EU.¹²² These debates did not disappear, and although the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) significantly changed

116 Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., 'The European Union as a System of Differentiated Integration: Interdependence, Politicization, and Differentiation', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22: 6, 2015, p. 18.

117 The Union for the Mediterranean consisted of 43 member states from Europe and the Mediterranean the 28 EU Member States and 15 Mediterranean partner countries from North Africa, Western Asia and Southern Europe. Founded on 13 July 2008 at the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean. The aim was the reinforcement of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Euromed) that was set up in 1995 as the Barcelona Process. See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/eu-enlargement_en, accessed 12 October 2019

118 Keukeleire, S., Delreux, T., 'The Foreign Policy of the European Union', *The European Union Series*, 2nd edition, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 2014, p. 250.

119 Idem.

120 Ibid, p. 244.

121 Ibid, p. 252.

122 Ibid, p. 261-262.

the institutional framework of the EU, the impact of enlargement and neighbourhood policy was less meaningful.

Another impact on the EU path of widening was the Russian response to NATO and EU enlargement, reflected in the Crimea crisis of 2014. Enlargement and neighbourhood policy faced resistance by non-democratic regional powers. Russia embarked on an anti-Western course both domestically and abroad, as it regarded democratic developments in its proximity as a geopolitical threat strengthening Western influence.¹²³ This resulted in a more differentiated approach to the neighbours, based on the 'more-for-more' principle.¹²⁴ Furthermore, in response to the annexation of Crimea, the EU had progressively imposed restrictive measures against Russia. These measures entailed diplomatic measures, demonstrated by G7 summits instead of a G8 summit excluding Russia and the suspension of negotiations over Russia's joining the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the International Energy Agency (IEA). This was followed by individual restrictive measures (freezing of assets and travel restrictions), restrictions on economic relations with Crimea and Sevastopol, economic sanctions and restrictions on economic cooperation.¹²⁵

With regard to Russia and Turkey, the EU made special arrangements. Russia did not want to participate in the ENP and aimed for bilateral cooperation, similar to the liaison with NATO. This was provided for in the EU-Russia strategic partnership of 2011.¹²⁶ In addition, although Turkey and the EU were linked through NATO and CSDP,¹²⁷ Turkey stayed out of the ENP process, as it had its own special agreement with the EU, which was stalled after a vote by MEPs to suspend negotiations with Turkey over human rights and rule of law concerns.¹²⁸

Subsequently, enlargement and association programmes such as ENP differed in several ways. Enlargement had an end state, which association programmes did not. Furthermore, states that were in the enlargement process were subject to EU terms and negotiations, in contrast with association programmes such as ENP, which differed per region, state and policies.¹²⁹

123 Tolstrup, J., 'Gatekeepers and Linkages', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 25, no. 4, 2014, p. 135.

124 In 2010 and 2011 the EU unveiled the 'more-for-more' principle; the aim was that the EU would develop stronger partnerships with those neighbours that made more progress towards democratic reform. See: Tolstrup, J., 'Gatekeepers and Linkages', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 25, no. 4, 2014, p. 126-138.

125 For an elaboration, see: European Commission, 'Commission Guidance not on the implementation of certain provisions of Regulation (EU), No 833/2014, available at: https://europa.eu/newsroom/sites//newsroom/files/docs/body/1_act_part1_v2_en.pdf.

126 For an overview of the history of ENP: Johansson-Nogues, E., 'The EU and Its Neighbourhood: An Overview', in: Weber, K., Smith, M. E., Baun, M., 'Governing Europe's Neighbourhood. Partners or Periphery?', Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2015; Keukeleire, S., Delreux, T., 'The Foreign Policy of the European Union', The European Union Series, 2nd edition, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 2014.

127 For an elaboration on Turkey and EU accession process, see: Akgul, Acikmese, S., Triantaphyllou, D., 'The NATO-EU-Turkey trilogy: the impact of the Cyprus conundrum', *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Volume 12, 2012, p. 555-573.

128 MEP vote, 24 November 2016.

129 Gaub, F., Popescu, N., 'The EU neighbours 1995-2015: shades of grey', *Chaillot Papers*, no. 136, December 2015, p. 7.

Regional and Global Partnership and CSDP

With regard to CSDP policy and partnership, from 2003 several programmes and instruments were developed. So-called Framework Participation Agreements (FPA) with partner countries were adopted to facilitate their participation in CSDP missions and operations.¹³⁰ These partners participated in CSDP missions and operations, such as police missions and military operations, strongly backed by a NATO presence in the wider European area.

In 2013, the EU's CSDP launched a multilateral cooperation programme under the Eastern Partnership Council (EPC)¹³¹ and engaged with six Eastern Partnership countries covering exercises and training. These exercises and training programmes were financially supported by the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), launched in 2004.¹³² This initiative was followed by the capacity building in support of security and development (CBSD) initiative in 2015.¹³³ The aim at first was to build capacity and then to enhance the EU's role as a global actor, incorporating an EU-wide Strategic Framework for Stabilisation and Reconstruction and a legislative proposal for enhancing capacity building.¹³⁴ In addition, there were initiatives from the European External Action Service (EEAS) in cooperation with the EU's Commission.

At the end of 2016, 18 legally binding bilateral and international agreements had been signed, ranging from the larger Europe, to Asia, to Australia. Some partners had joined the EUBG,¹³⁵ participated in the EU mission in Kosovo, such as the US, or trained with the EU, such as China and Japan.

The primary objective of the EU member states and organs in cooperating in the field of CSDP with partners was to maximise CSDP operational activities.¹³⁶ The aim was to consolidate a comprehensive approach and implement the EU-NATO Warsaw Declaration.¹³⁷ Together with the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS), the Warsaw Declaration adopted a programme for capacity and resilience building in the Southern neighbourhood. Furthermore, with regard to CSDP missions and operations, the aim was to establish project cells, in which potential donors from member states and partner countries could support the EU's CSDP; an approach of differentiated and tailor-made cooperation with each partner. Within the CSDP domain, the EU had thus been developing partnerships in three main areas: missions, operations and capacity building. Two partners

130 The legal and political basis for third states to participate in missions and operations.

131 See: European Council/Council of the European Union, 'Eastern Partnership', n.d., available at: www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eastern-partnership/, accessed 5-4-2016.

132 See: EU Neighbours, 'The European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)', n.d., available at: <https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/policy/european-neighbourhood-instrument-eni>, accessed 4-7-2018.

133 The Joint Communication, April 2015.

134 Rehrl, J. (Ed.), 'Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union', Third edition, 2016, p. 177.

135 Some of the participating countries were Fyrom, Norway, Turkey and Ukraine.

136 Rehrl, J. (Ed.), 'Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union', Third edition, 2016, p. 174.

137 Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Warsaw Declaration, 8 July 2016.

had joined the EUBG and training.¹³⁸ CSDP partnership ranged from formal cooperation, for example the US participation,¹³⁹ and more flexible and informal forms of participation, such as the EU's partnership with Kosovo.¹⁴⁰

As a result of changes in the balance of power in Europe, due to the newly acquired position of Russia and the terrorist attacks that shook Europe,¹⁴¹ the EU partnership policy had to take into account that other powers now necessitated other regional geostrategic neighbourhood policies. After the intervention in Ukraine (2014) and the terrorist attacks on EU soil, it became clear that the technocratic approach of the EU towards partnership could no longer account for security and that it hampered the ENP, because the division between internal and external security was fading.¹⁴² The same development could be observed in the Mediterranean and Middle East region, because of the 'remarkable irrelevance of CSDP in the various crises and conflicts in this region'.¹⁴³ This was combined with the fact that 'Operations and missions only fit a quite limited and specific set of purposes',¹⁴⁴ which opened the door for the influence of other regional powers.

Hence the fact that, on the one hand, the enthusiasm of the 1990s and the beginning of 2000 had led to widespread cooperation schemes, institutionalized to a greater or lesser extent. On the other hand, these schemes could not always be labelled as effective structural foreign and security policy in the neighbourhood, as in the case of NATO. Along the way, disagreement between the EU member states increased, as a result of their different geographical interests regarding the approach of the neighbourhood policy. Unity within Europe scattered as a result of tensions with regard to the approach to the terrorist threat, budgetary difficulties, the EU-NATO relationship,¹⁴⁵ the lack of 'the membership carrot and the prospect of accession', and the rise and increasing presence of other structural powers in the region.¹⁴⁶

Differentiation within the Eastern Partnership was further enhanced by the geopolitical tension between the EU and Russia in their former 'shared neighbourhood', which developed more into a 'contested neighbourhood'.¹⁴⁷

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138 China and Japan.

139 See: European Union External Action, 'Framework Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the participation of the United States of America in European Union Crisis Management Operations', 2011, available at: ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=8961, accessed 4-7-2018.

140 See: EEAS, 'Kosovo* and the EU', 2016, available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo_en/1387/Kosovo%20and%20the%20EU, accessed 4-7-2018.

141 Treaty on the European Union, Article 14.

142 Gaub, F., Popescu, N., 'The EU neighbours 1995-2015: shades of grey', Chaillot Papers, no. 136, December 2015, p. 10.

143 Keukeleire, S., Delreux, T., 'The Foreign Policy of the European Union', The European Union Series, 2nd edition, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 2014, p. 261.

144 Ibid, p. 271.

145 Blockmans, S., Faleg, G., 'More Union in European defence', Centre for European Policy Studies, February 2015, p. 8.

146 Keukeleire, S., Delreux, T., 'The Foreign Policy of the European Union', The European Union Series, 2nd edition, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 2014, p. 272.

147 Russia is promoting closer relations with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) as an alternative to further association and integration with the EU.

In order to coordinate the observed fragmentation between partners and members and between the different geopolitical stakeholders, the Commission and Parliament had formulated an 'Eastern Partnership Plus' approach for 'associated countries that have made substantial progress on EU-related reforms to offer them the possibility of joining the customs union, energy union, digital union or even the Schengen area and abolishing mobile roaming tariffs' in 2017.¹⁴⁸ These aspects are, however, beyond the scope of this research.

5.4.4 *The EU Path of Widening*

The EU path of broadening developed from full membership to a varied web of members and partners driven by various actors. This varied approach to cooperation in level and form had been an integral part of European integration from the creation of the EU.

Reflecting on the membership, from the beginning of the 1990s, the EU's approach to multilateralism and a broader secure Europe motivated the path of enlargement which resulted in a big bang of new states in 2004. Enlargement and partnership have been one of the EU's main pillars to expand the concept of multilateralism, as peace and security were indivisible, according to the EU. Nevertheless, similar to the NATO path of widening, this enthusiasm decreased due to changes in the security environment and variation in the interests of the member states with regard to enlargement. Furthermore, the EU's CSDP showed an internal variation in membership, as in the other EU domains, with possibilities of opt-in and opt-out for mutual defence, crisis management operations and legal, institutional and financial policies. With the changes in the new security strategy of 2016, the instrument of PESCO could limit the sovereignty of states by choice, but again in a differentiated form, as will be explored in Chapter 6.

One of the most negative consequences of the EU's enlargement and partnership programmes has been the Russian response to EU enlargement, as well as to NATO enlargement, reflected in the Crimea crisis of 2014. This led to debate between the EU states and changed EU enlargement and partnership programmes, as Russia remained a natural partner and a strategic player for the EU and some of its member states. This is simply because Russia is the EU's largest neighbour, which was always reflected in extensive cooperation and exchange over the 25 years prior to the Crimea crisis. Russia has been a key player in the UN Security Council, the EU and Russia are important trading partners¹⁴⁹ and, not to be underestimated, a lot of European states are dependent on Russia for energy supplies.

Reflecting on the partnership programmes, these are also highly differentiated with various programmes of cooperation with neighbours and regions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral cooperation. This is illustrated by the many programmes: SAP, SAA, PCA, ENP and ENI, etc. These different concepts provided the EU with different levels and forms of partnership. In other words, differences in the level of institutionalization and differences in the forms of cooperation. As a result, partnership and cooperation were

¹⁴⁸ European Parliament Newsroom, MEP's want to reward reforms made by Eastern partners, accessed 15-11-2017.

¹⁴⁹ Facts on EU-Russia trade see: Russia - Trade - European Commission (europa.eu), accessed 27-4-2020.

divided, there were flexible and differentiated partnerships which incorporated more or less formalisation in regional and global cooperation programmes. As well as the internal variation in membership, the EU had an external variation in its partnerships, including security and defence policy, comparable to NATO. With regard to association, there were official candidates¹⁵⁰ and potential candidates.¹⁵¹

Differentiation has thus become an integral part of cooperation with states and regions outside the EU. As cooperation and partnership were lacking the incentive of full membership by the more-for-more principle, it was based on the motivation of 'offering stronger partnerships and incentives to countries that make more progress towards democracy and good governance'.¹⁵² Finally, partnership replaced the aim of engagement with states by engagement with themes, cooperating on hybrid threats or refugees.

In short, during the heyday of enlargement in the 1990s, the goal was to deepen cooperation and integration and broaden the EU's reach across Europe. After the big bang of the 2000s the EU's open-door policy changed into a more closed-door policy towards new members, accompanied by stricter requirements. Nevertheless, cooperation in the CSDP area developed from there. Furthermore, in contrast with enlargement and association, the EU had to deal with various forms of opt-out. In addition, apart from coalitions within the organization and different opt-in and opt-out clauses, from 2016 onwards, CSDP had to deal with member states stepping out of the organizational structure, for example in the case of Brexit.

5.4.5 Conclusion

This section looked at the questions of how and why change has led to a widening of the EU. The EU widened with states from the former WP and associated with many partners, regionally as well as globally, with a diversification in the form and level of membership and partnership. The EU's path of widening can be divided into the subsequent main periods. The first phase established programmes for enlargement with firm requirements, based on the Copenhagen criteria of 1993. The second phase initiated less institutionalized partner agreements with states and regions not expected to become members soon. The third phase followed on from the previous one, combined with the aim of cooperation on themes, such as by terrorism, instead of cooperation with specific states.

5.5 The OSCE path of Widening

5.5.1 Introduction

The Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the founding act of the OSCE, was signed by 35 states in 1975. After the end of the Cold War, the OSCE grew extensively, mainly as a result of the implosion of the SU and the WP. After the fall of Communism, new emerging states were

150 Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia.

151 Kosovo and Bosnia.

152 Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., 'The European Union as a System of Differentiated Integration: Interdependence, Politicization, and Differentiation', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22: 6, 2015, p. 18.

actively invited to the OSCE Summit in Paris.¹⁵³ This section examines the questions of how and why change has led to a widening of the OSCE. The specific path of widening of the OSCE will be analysed with the form and level of change as the indicator, addressing membership, partnership and interaction between the OSCE and other actors from 1990 onwards.

5.5.2 Participating States

The Paris Summit in 1990 was retitled the Peace Conference of the Cold War. It was compared to the Conference of Versailles of 1919 or the Congress of Vienna of 1815 in its ambition to reshape Europe as a constitution for the European security architecture, encompassing all European states. An architecture where pluralist democracy and market economy would be combined with international law and multilateralism for the whole of Europe. Not long thereafter, the OSCE was enlarged with states from the former WP and SU.

From the beginning of the OSCE dialogue, the participating states had rights and obligations under the Helsinki Final Act (1975), e.g., to respect the democratic principles of governance, and were all signatories to these international agreements. Nevertheless, with reference to the membership criteria of an international organization in general, in contrast with NATO and the EU, the OSCE had no (juridical) adherence criteria and no organizational membership per se; all signatories to the Helsinki Final Act are participating states.¹⁵⁴ So, in contrast with the EU and NATO, states that joined the OSCE were called participating states instead of (full) members and without any legal underpinning.

The first and last big bang of enlargement for the OSCE took place at the beginning of the 1990s, which can be seen as the heyday of the OSCE. Together with Russia, the US initiated the European security architecture in Paris (1990). At that time, the US was mainly interested in keeping Russia together after the collapse of the SU and the WP, and in backing president Gorbachev, for fear of disintegration and chaos in the former WP countries.¹⁵⁵ Although there was no clear idea of how a so-called security architecture would be formed and institutionalized, the OSCE organization was the first security organization within Europe with a cooperative security aim and able to function as a regional security umbrella. Like the EU and NATO, the OSCE developed an internal, varied form of cooperation for the participating states. This was demonstrated by the decision-making procedure, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, and the contact groups focused on a specific conflict, institutionalized within the OSCE, such as the Minsk group.¹⁵⁶

5.5.3 Partner States

Although the OSCE's mandate with regard to security lies within the organization and a strict division was made between internal and external security, as the concept of cooperative security implies, the OSCE did cooperate with states outside the OSCE area.

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153 CSCE Paris Summit Declaration, 1990.

154 As the OSCE is a political based instead of treaty-based organization. The states are called participating states instead of member states. In total the OSCE has 56 participating states, 1-1-2018.

155 Sarotte, M. E., '1989. The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe', Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2014.

156 OSCE, 'OSCE Minsk Group', n.d., available at: <https://www.osce.org/mg>, accessed on 12-8-2017.

Even before the end of the Cold War, the OSCE strengthened relations with states outside the organization in the Mediterranean area.¹⁵⁷

Apart from the enlargement of the OSCE with new states, after the end of the Cold War, the OSCE strengthened relations with other states outside its area. These alignments were called 'Partners for Cooperation', which benefitted from programmes comparable to those with OSCE participating states. These programmes of cooperation and dialogue were divided between the Mediterranean and Asian region and resulted in eleven privileged relations with Asian¹⁵⁸ and Mediterranean Partners,¹⁵⁹ some dating back as far as the Helsinki Final Act. Partners for Cooperation programmes encompassed the politico-military, economic, environmental and human dimensions of security. With regard to the OSCE crisis management tasks, Partners could send observers to OSCE election observation missions, perform as second mission members in OSCE field operations, visit any of the field operations, participate in exchanges of military and security information and visits to military facilities, all on a voluntary basis.¹⁶⁰ The aim of these partner programmes was to share information on relevant developments and areas of common concern with regard to common security challenges, ensuring a broad approach in OSCE's cooperation with partners, mainly driven by the US.¹⁶¹

As a result of the post-9/11 era, new threats to global security and the emerging EU and NATO paths of widening altered the OSCE path of widening. The OSCE shifted its focus from the greater European area to establishing an even stronger connection with Central Asia. This widening took place for reasons of countering the threat of terrorism, policing capability, and politico-military issues, such as small arms, light weapons, and destruction of arms and ammunition, in which the EU and NATO could not be engaged.¹⁶²

The OSCE cooperation with its Partners encompassed the full range of OSCE activities, but each group of partners engaged in specific issues of regional interest, which resulted in a differentiated tailor-made form of cooperation. The Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation were focused on anti-terrorism, border security, water management, environmental security challenges, migration management, intercultural and interreligious dialogue, tolerance and non-discrimination.¹⁶³ The Asian Partners were focused on the OSCE's CSBMs and the comprehensive approach.

Furthermore, the cooperation covered areas of transnational threats, managing borders, addressing transport issues, combatting trafficking in human beings, building

157 OSCE, 'Factsheet on OSCE Partners for Co-operation', 2011, available at: <https://www.osce.org/partners-for-cooperation/77951>, accessed 4-7-2018.

158 Japan (1992), Republic of Korea (1994), Thailand (2000), Afghanistan (2003) and Australia (2009). Mongolia (2004) and became a participating State in 2012.

159 Algeria, Egypt, Israël, Morocco and Tunisia were associated since 1975. Jordan became a Partner in 1998.

160 To become an OSCE Partner for Cooperation, a formal request is made to the OSCE Chairman. A consultation process follows, during which the 57 participating States take into consideration several factors. Partnership is decided upon by consensus.

161 A special focus of the US was the participation of the OSCE in Afghanistan.

162 OSCE, 'Asian Partners for Co-operation', n.d., available at: <https://www.osce.org/partners-for-cooperation/asian>, accessed 4-7-2018.

163 OSCE, 'Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation', n.d., available at: <https://www.osce.org/partners-for-cooperation/mediterranean>, accessed 4-7-2018.

democratic institutions and administering elections. In 2007, a Partnership Fund was created, which included a broad variety of issues.¹⁶⁴

5.5.4 *The OSCE Path of Widening*

At the beginning of the 1990s, as a result of its solitary position as a security organization in the wider Europe encompassing all states from the former WP and NATO, the OSCE had a strong position in the European security architecture.

Due to the enlargement of NATO and the EU from 1999 onwards, more than 36 of the 57 OSCE participating states had become members of NATO and/or the EU with much stronger capacities and funds, resulting in overlapping membership and leading to an obstructionist policy on the part of Russia.

Reflecting on the OSCE's path of widening, it can be argued that this path resulted in institutional and geostrategic weakening, not strengthening, of the OSCE. After the enlargement of NATO and the EU, it had been difficult for the OSCE to occupy a central role again within the European security architecture. Even so, the overlap between these organizations had led to contradictory tasks, obligations and even conflicts among states. As a result, the ability of the OSCE to carry out its tasks had been limited and its relevance diminished. Although not all states of the former WP had become full members of the EU and NATO, the OSCE was often accused of addressing peripheral issues instead of fundamentally affecting the landscape of European security. As Ghebali stated, the OSCE was acting as a subcontractor to NATO and the EU, an empty house for the stragglers.¹⁶⁵

On the other hand, the OSCE had been the only organization to balance the relationship between Russia and the West. As such, the OSCE had a historical advantage over NATO and the EU in terms of the participation of Russia. Tensions after the Crimea crisis of 2014 had overshadowed the benefits of the OSCE organization. Furthermore, the OSCE had been the organization in the security policy domain that provided a security cooperation framework for the states that did not become members of NATO or the EU.

5.5.5 *Conclusion*

In this section, the questions of how and why change has led to a widening of the OSCE was examined. Two main periods can be identified in the OSCE path of widening, entailing two themes: cooperation inside and outside the organization. The first period entails the big bang of widening with new states as a result of the collapse of the SU and the WP almost immediately after the end of the Cold War. The second period encompasses the alignment with other states and regions outside the organization, which also started at the beginning of the 1990s and widened from there.

¹⁶⁴ Including: border security and management, countering terrorism, migration management, tolerance and non-discrimination, media self-regulation, electoral assistance, combating trafficking in human beings, gender issues and environmental challenges.

¹⁶⁵ Ghebali, V. Y., 'Where is the OSCE going? Present role and challenges of a stealth security organization', p. 68 in: Tardy, T., (eds.), 'European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external dynamics', Contemporary Security Studies, Routledge, Oxon, Great Britain, 2009.

From its creation, the OSCE has been the organization that geographically encapsulated the area from Anchorage to Vladivostok, which remained unchanged after the end of the Cold War. However, the collapse of the SU and the WP resulted in many more parties joining the organization, but stabilised after the first rounds of widening in the 1990s as a result of NATO and EU paths of widening and tensions between the larger powers. Finally, like NATO and the EU, apart from states allied to the organization, many states outside OSCE territory became partners of the OSCE.

5.6 Widening of Relations between Security Organizations

5.6.1 Introduction

In this section, the specific path of widening between the selected security organizations will be analysed by focusing on the form and level of widening, addressing interactions between them from 1990 onwards. Consideration will therefore be given to the questions of how and why change has led to widening between the security organizations and the development of a European security architecture.

On 9 November 1989, the Berlin Wall fell and heralded the end of the Cold War, which caused two major effects on the existing bipolar security structure of Europe. For one, the existing security organizations changed in task, form and membership or even ended altogether. Second, as well as these intra-organizational changes, inter-organizational linkages arose and developed from there. As a result, states became full or associated members of different organizations simultaneously, a so-called cross-institutional membership and, as well as states, organizations cooperated and interacted with each other and with states.

Directly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the idea arose of a European security architecture that would house all the states in the OSCE geographical area. The key actors in creating a post-Cold War order were the SU, France and the UK, but Germany and the US played a particularly significant role. All were searching for a new European order in terms of rebalancing the power relations in Europe, a new transatlantic architecture and a European security home. The questions underlying a new European security architecture were the position of the SU and the (former) WP states, the reunification of Germany, the transatlantic relation and a European security and defence identity. The key actors involved all proposed models for a new security architecture, but all were different. The differences were the result of specific interests, visions and strategies to accomplish a new security architecture that would include all actors and policies in their interest.¹⁶⁶

The driving forces of a European security architecture were the US President Bush and West Germany in the form of Chancellor Kohl. At first, the US President was campaigning for 'A Europe whole and free' even before the end of the Cold War, in which the whole of

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166 For an elaboration on the development of the European security architecture and specifically the models, see: Sarotte, M. E., '1989. The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe', Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2014, p. 9; Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., 'NATO's Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?', Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 2-4.

Europe would be governed by concepts of the liberal world order and multilateralism.¹⁶⁷ In this Europe whole and free, the US and the SU initially focused on the reunification of Germany and its position in a broader European architecture. However, on 12 November 1989 the US pressed for a German reunification including a NATO membership. On the one hand a difficult point for the SU, although on the other it was in the interest of the SU to keep the US military presence in Europe to prevent solitary German rearmament. So, the process of the reunification of Germany, together with NATO membership, was accompanied by an informal assurance that NATO forces and infrastructure would not move to the East. An assurance that has always been a guidance in US-Russia relations since the end of the Cold war, together with a 'no-first-use guarantee'.¹⁶⁸

The US and Germany proposed the idea of a reunified Germany to be integrated in NATO and accompanied this unification with the activities that were undertaken to strengthen the CSCE for a new balance in Europe.¹⁶⁹ On 31 December 1989, a few weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall, President Francois Mitterrand of France called for the creation of a European confederation.¹⁷⁰ France's interest lay in the preservation and strengthening of the political unity of the EU, the diminishment of US military dominance in Europe and a prevention of broadening of NATO together with the encapsulation of both of the Germanies. The alternative to NATO revival and widening for France was a European confederation under the umbrella of the CSCE,¹⁷¹ whereas the UK, in contrast, was a proponent of a strong transatlantic link, with an effective NATO.

Although the interests were scattered at the beginning of the 1990s, all key actors were coming to the same conclusion; Europe had to be rebuilt by a forum including the two Germanies plus the four powers: a so-called '4+2' mechanism under a pan-European house. For some, this would include NATO and the WP. For others, this pan-European house would replace both alliances.

A framework of European security organizations was indeed launched, including the so-called concepts of interlocking¹⁷² and mutually reinforcing organizations unified in a European security architecture. A framework would be created aiming at a division between the functional and geographical security roles of the security organizations, to promote interlocking or mutually reinforcing cooperation structures to emphasise the complementary nature of the various organizations: a division of labour.

The concept of a European security architecture was first coined by the NATO Summit in London on 5 and 6 July 1990, followed by the OSCE's Charter of Paris of 19 and 20 November 1990 and NATO's Strategic Concept of 1991, referring to a progression of 'a European Security Identity'.¹⁷³

167 Speech of US president Bush in Mainz, Germany, 31 May 1989.

168 NATO Strategic Concept 1990.

169 Sarotte, M. E., '1989. The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe', Princeton University Press, 2014,

170 New Year's address of French President François Mitterrand, 31 December 1989.

171 Sarotte, M. E., '1989. The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe', Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2014, p. 175.

172 Stated by NATO Secretary-General Werner, autumn 1990.

173 NATO Strategic Concept, Rome, 1991.

The CSCE Charter of Paris stated an inclusive pan-European framework based on a comprehensive and indivisible concept of security, shared values and commitment to active cooperation between its members, as it stated: 'With the ending of the division of Europe, we will strive for a new quality in our security relations while fully respecting each others' freedom of choice in that respect. Security is indivisible and the security of every participating State is inseparably linked to that of all the others. We therefore pledge to cooperate in strengthening confidence and security among us and in promoting arms control and disarmament'.¹⁷⁴ Together with the CSCE Helsinki Summit of 1992 this initiative was directly supported by the creation of institutions and was strengthened on the security and military side by the political-military CSBMs and the CFE Treaty of 1990, which were discussed in Chapter 4.

The linking of security matters between the security organizations became an endeavour for NATO as well, as the Strategic Concept of 1991 stated comprehensive and indivisible security: 'The Allies are also committed to pursue co-operation with all states in Europe on the basis of the principles set out in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. They will seek to develop broader and productive patterns of bilateral and multilateral co-operation in all relevant fields of European security... towards one Europe whole and free. This policy of co-operation is the expression of the inseparability of security among European states'. Furthermore, the 1991 Strategic Concept stated that a new European order necessitated multilateralism and an interlinking of institutional security cooperation: '...the Allies will support the role of the CSCE process and its institutions. Other bodies including the European Community, Western European Union and United Nations may also have an important role to play',¹⁷⁵ not to avoid alienating the SU at that time and, for that matter, some of the European allies.

Reality presented a different picture; CSCE was strengthened, NATO remained, changed and broadened, the two Germanies united and became a NATO member, the WP ended. NATO thus remained and, driven mainly by the US and West Germany, drew the contours of a new security architecture based on a framework of interlocking institutions between NATO, the EU, the UN and the CSCE.

From the OSCE Charter of Paris, the OSCE further developed the concept of mutually reinforcing institutions as a result of its intensive OSCE security model discussions in Budapest 1994 and Istanbul 1999. These summits sought to provide a framework for the collaboration and cooperation of international organizations in the field of crisis management.¹⁷⁶

The inter-organizational development from those first years of bilateral security cooperation between the security organizations will first be elaborated on below, after which the development of the European security architecture will be discussed.

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¹⁷⁴ Paris Charter, 1990.

¹⁷⁵ NATO Strategic Concept 1991, par. 29 and 33.

¹⁷⁶ OSCE Summit Lisbon, 1996.

5.6.2 NATO and EU Cooperation

The most extensive interaction, in terms of broadening, widening and deepening, between security organizations within the European security architecture, has been the EU-NATO cooperation. This cooperation started with the merger of the WEU Petersberg tasks with the EU in 2007 and the EU and NATO acting in the same operational field in the Balkans, Africa and Asia. These events made it clear that institutional arrangements had to be made between NATO and the EU.

The initial plan for cooperation between the EU and NATO was launched in 1996 and again in 1999 at the NATO Washington Summit. NATO's strategic concept stated that 'the resolve of the EU is to have the capacity for autonomous action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged' and furthermore enabled 'ready access by the EU to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily'.¹⁷⁷ This resulted in a NATO-EU Summit in 2001¹⁷⁸, followed by a first meeting of the NAC and the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC). At NATO's Prague Summit in 2002, NATO-EU cooperation was confirmed and NATO and the EU were seen to 'share common strategic interests'.¹⁷⁹ One of the reasons was that the US wanted to monitor the quick institutional build-up of the EU's security and defence policy. For the Europeans, this initiative created access to NATO, and US, capabilities. Finally, in December 2002 at the EU-NATO Brussels meeting, an 'EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP' was issued and finalised in March 2003. A framework came into being with the so-called Berlin Plus agreements in the case of crisis management operations of the EU.¹⁸⁰ As a result, the EU gained access to NATO capabilities, such as the command structure, and the possibility of the exchange of classified intelligence information was created.¹⁸¹ From now on, there were several options for NATO and the EU to initiate crisis management operations: a NATO-only campaign, possibly with the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept, the Berlin Plus agreements¹⁸² where EU-led operations were supported by NATO,¹⁸³ the framework nation concept where a national headquarters could be multi-nationalised¹⁸⁴ and finally, in the context of the EU, a military headquarters at the EU Military Staff (EUMS).¹⁸⁵ Cooperation and institutional interlinkage took place at the level of foreign ministers, ambassadors, secretaries-general and the High Representative (HR) of the EU, military representatives and defence advisors. Furthermore, there were staff-to-staff meetings set up at all levels

177 NATO Strategic Concept, Washington Summit, April 1999.

178 24 January 2001.

179 NATO Prague declaration, 2002, par. 11.

180 Started on 16 December 2002 and concluded on 17 March 2003.

181 The underpinning line of this cooperation has always been the prevention of duplication of capacities; the 3 Ds stated by the US Secretary of State Madeline Albright in 2003; 'Decoupling', 'Duplication' and 'Discrimination' and the 'right of first refusal' for the Atlantic Alliance.

182 The first operation under the umbrella of Berlin Plus was the EU operation Concordia in Macedonia (2003) followed by operation Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina (2004), where the EU took over the command of NATO's operation SFOR.

183 If an EU mission is executed with NATO capacities and command structure., D-SACEUR has OPCOM.

184 Five EU member states deliver headquarters: UK, Greece, France, Italy and Germany. Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003 and 2004 is an example of this cooperation.

185 Reichard, M., 'The EU-NATO relationship. A Legal and Political Perspective', Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006, p. 92-98.

between NATO's International Staff and International Military Staff and the EU organs. Cooperation was further established by the presence of an EU planning cell at SHAPE in 2006. A NATO Permanent Liaison Team at the EU Military Staff has been operating since 2005. Nevertheless, until 2016, the Berlin Plus agreements were one-sided; NATO supporting the EU and not vice versa.

The abovementioned Berlin Plus agreements were initiated by the US and several European states. The concerns from the US towards the strengthening of the EU's CSDP in 1998 had led to Albright's famous warning about the three 'Ds',¹⁸⁶ which resulted in close NATO-EU cooperation to regulate the EU CSDP's autonomy with regard to security and defence policy. This point of view has always been supported by the UK and, from 2004, by Poland and a majority of the Central and Eastern Countries. In contrast, France was a strong proponent of EU autonomy in the field of security and defence policy, which was supported by French officials in their efforts to keep the organizations apart.¹⁸⁷ In 2009, the US asked the EU to return NATO's Berlin Plus in the form of a 'Berlin Plus in reverse' or 'Brussels Plus', but this request was not honoured.¹⁸⁸

Thirteen years after the Berlin Plus agreements, the EU and NATO outlined areas for strengthened cooperation¹⁸⁹ at the NATO Summit in Warsaw,¹⁹⁰ which were approved at the NATO foreign ministers summit at the end of 2016, including an implementation plan.¹⁹¹ Themes included cyber defence and improvement of intelligence sharing and logistics, as described above.

The themes of consultation between the two organizations have broadened and widened ever since 2003. Along with Russia, which has been high on the agenda since 2014, consultations have also covered the Western Balkans, Libya, Africa and the Middle East. Together with operations, capability development has been an area where cooperation has been essential. The NATO-EU Capability Group was therefore established in May 2003 to ensure the coherence and mutual reinforcement of NATO and the EU capability development efforts. Experts from the EDA and NATO contributed to this Capability Group, partly to address common capability shortfalls, such as improvised explosive device countermeasures and medical support. Staff were also ensuring transparency and complementarity between NATO's work on 'smart defence' and the EU's pooling and sharing initiative.¹⁹² Other cooperation issues included the combat of terrorism and the

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186 US state secretary Albright, M., NATO summit, 8 December 1998.

187 Simon, L., 'The EU-NATO Conundrum in Context: Bringing the State Back in', p. 112, in: Galbreath, D., Gebhard, C., 'Cooperation or Conflict. Problematising Organisational Overlap in Europe', Routledge, 2011.

188 WEU, 'The EU-NATO Berlin Plus agreement', European Security and Defence Assembly/Assembly of Western European Union, Assembly facts Sheet No. 14, Paris, November 2009.

189 Including hybrid threats, enhancing resilience, defence capacity building, cyber defence, maritime security, and exercises.

190 'Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization', NATO Press Release (2016) 119, July 8, 2016, www.nato.int, accessed July 10, 2016.

191 Meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Brussels, December 2016.

192 For an elaboration: Faleg, G., Giovannini, A., 'The EU between Pooling & Sharing and Smart Defence: Making a virtue of necessity?', CEPS Special Report, May 2012; Graeger, N., 'European Security as Practice: EU-NATO communities of Practice in the Making?', European Security, Volume 25, issue 4, 2016.

proliferation of WMD. NATO and the EU exchanged information on their activities in the field of protection of civilian populations against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attacks. NATO and the EU also cooperated in civil emergency planning, as detailed above.

From 2016, NATO and EU broadened the areas of cooperation, in particular with regard to hybrid threats, energy security and cyber defence.¹⁹³ NATO and EU staff consulted in order to identify the specific areas which could enhance cooperation in these fields. As a result, NATO and the EU concluded a Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defence,¹⁹⁴ which provided an inter-organizational framework for exchanging information and sharing best practices between emergency response teams and the adoption of a joint European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats.¹⁹⁵ This was followed by the EU-NATO joint declaration on strategic partnership signed at the NATO Warsaw Summit (2016). This declaration furthered reciprocal cooperation in relation to hybrid and cyber threats, for the first time strengthening actual EU-NATO cooperation after the Berlin Plus agreements of 2003. Further inter-organizational institutionalization was established with the EU Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, with NATO participation in the steering committee.¹⁹⁶

All these measures were thus mostly initiated and monitored by the organs of the organizations: the HR of the EU and NATO's Secretary-General. With regard to the cooperation between the EU and NATO organs, as in all inter-organizational cooperation forms, EU-NATO cooperation has always been based on staff-to-staff cooperation. It was never based on any legal treaty. As a result, ad-hoc staff-to-staff cooperation increased, usually, in the first instance, descending from cooperation in the operational field.

5.6.3 NATO and OSCE Cooperation

Although they are quite different security organizations, NATO and the OSCE can both be regarded as the founding fathers of the concept of the European security architecture with the 'Paris' (1990) and 'Rome' (1991) charters and declarations. In those days, their mutual interest could be found in the restructuring of institutional European frameworks and a rebalance of power interests, together with the survival of NATO searching for new tasks.

The framework for cooperation between the two organizations was formalised by the OSCE-CiO (Chairman-in-Office), the NAC, the EAPC and staff-to-staff arrangements. Political relations between NATO and the OSCE were governed by the Platform for Co-operative Security, which was launched by the OSCE in 1999 at the Istanbul Summit and was supposed to be a revival of the European security architecture. Via this platform, the OSCE could call upon the international organizations whose members adhere to their principles

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193 Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary-General of NATO, Warsaw, 8 July 2016.

194 February 2016.

195 See Chapter 6.

196 1 June 2017, Helsinki.

and commitments to reinforce their inter-organizational cooperation in order to restore democracy, prosperity and stability in Europe and beyond.

Rationally, due to the political rather than legal agreement underlying the OSCE organization, but most of all the partnership between both the US and Russia and the OSCE, institutional interaction between NATO and the OSCE was developed at a low institutionalized non-legal level. However, as a result of operating in the same security and domain areas and to a certain extent overlap in members and partners, their relationship was emphasised in a number of documents, such as the OSCE's Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century (2003)¹⁹⁷ and thematically addressed a broad area within the security and defence domain.¹⁹⁸

After 9/11, relations continued, reflected in the OSCE Ministerial Council and by the NATO Istanbul Summit (2004), which stated that 'NATO and the OSCE have largely complementary responsibilities and common interests, both functionally and geographically. NATO will continue to further develop co-operation with the OSCE in areas such as conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation'.¹⁹⁹ Although NATO and the OSCE often worked in the same area of operations, such as Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, their relations were not supported by a strong institutional or legal framework.

5.6.4 EU and OSCE Cooperation

The EU's signature was already included at the launch of the European security architecture, when the OSCE Charter of Paris was signed in 1990. The first inter-organizational agreement of the EU, along with the participating states of the OSCE, was the OSCE's Charter for European security in 1999. From there, the scope of cooperation between the OSCE and the EU was both broadened and deepened, also in terms of security and defence matters. Both the EU and the OSCE aimed for a multilateral order and strived for security and stability in the wider Europe. In other words, they shared a joint interest in their common principles of stability and prosperity laid down in their treaties and agreements, which resulted in strengthening their cooperation. EU member states make up half of the OSCE and contribute more than two-thirds of the OSCE budget.²⁰⁰

Cooperation between the EU and the OSCE was further developed in 2002, which resulted in 'The European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: The Shape of Future Cooperation'.²⁰¹ In 2003, cooperation between the OSCE and the EU was further enhanced with the declaration on conflict prevention,

197 OSCE, 'OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century', 2003, available at: <https://www.osce.org/mc/17504>, accessed 3 November 2016.

198 Combating transnational threats, including terrorism and cyber threats, border management and security, disarmament, small arms and light weapons, confidence- and security-building measures, regional issues and exchange of experience on the respective Mediterranean Dimensions. See: OSCE, 'NATO', n.d., available at: <https://www.osce.org/partnerships/111485>, accessed 3-4-2017.

199 NATO Istanbul Summit, June 2004, par. 17.

200 Stewart, E. J., 'Restoring EU-OSCE Cooperation for Pan-European Conflict Prevention', Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 29, No. 2, August 2008, p. 267.

201 Address by Javier Solana, EU High Representative of the CFSP to the Permanent Council of the OSCE, September 2002.

crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation²⁰² and followed by the adoption of the Assessment Report on the EU's role vis-à-vis the OSCE by the Council of the EU.²⁰³ Institutionally, an EU delegation was situated in the OSCE headquarters and represented the EU member states within the OSCE, which often voted as a block. This institutionalization included staff meetings and visits. At the political level, this meant ambassadorial and ministerial EU-OSCE troika meetings. In 2006, the participation of the EU in the OSCE was formalised in the OSCE Rules of Procedure, which granted the EU a seat next to the participating state holding the rotating EU presidency. Furthermore, an EU-OSCE relationship was established between the OSCE field operations Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), as the EU and OSCE operated together more often in the OSCE area. Due to the states that did not overlap both organizations, areas of cooperation mostly included the civilian aspects of security, as the military aspects were too problematic.²⁰⁴

A framework of cooperation was therefore created at the political level,²⁰⁵ but was in practice mostly executed by staff-to-staff engagements between the organs and operations in the field. The EU could have played an essential role in the preservation and strengthening of the OSCE, as it could have bridged the gap between the US and Russia. However, the EU's preference lies more with the UN and its own proliferation for conflict prevention and stability activities than with the OSCE, which is considered 'an increasingly difficult arena in which to find consensus on Europe's security problems'.²⁰⁶

5.6.5 A Widening European Security Architecture

The 1990 OSCE Paris Summit was the first to address a European security architecture; a security system involving all countries of the greater Europe. This greater Europe included Russia and the successor states of the SU as well as the more Westward-oriented states of Central and Eastern Europe, together with the NATO allies.

The aim was to link security matters between the organizations in the OSCE area to construct a security architecture based on a framework of interlocking institutions, aiming at a division of labour between the security organizations and strengthening a multilateral system between NATO, the EU, the former WP countries and the OSCE.²⁰⁷

During the 1990s, several concepts were proposed for a security architecture, particularly by the US, Russia, the UK and the EU bloc of Germany and France together with

■
202 EU Council conclusions, November 2003.

203 EU Council conclusions, December 2004.

204 Judicial and police reform, public administration, anti-corruption measures, democratization, institution-building and human rights, media development, small and medium-sized enterprise development, border management and combating human trafficking and elections.

205 Consultations between the OSCE Troika, including the OSCE Secretary General, and the EU at both the ministerial and ambassadorial/Political Security Committee levels. Contacts between the Secretary General and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and other high-level EU officials. Annual staff-level talks on topical issues that are on each organization's agenda. See: OSCE, 'The European Union', n.d., available at: <https://www.osce.org/partnerships/european-union>, accessed 4-11-2017.

206 Stewart, E. J., 'Restoring EU-OSCE Cooperation for Pan-European Conflict Prevention', *Contemporary Security policy*, Vol. 29, No. 2, August 2008, p. 280.

207 NATO Strategic Concept, Rome Summit, 1991, par. 33 and 59.

NATO and the OSCE. Initiatives that were taken included mandating the OSCE in 1994 as the anchor of the European security architecture. It was stated that the OSCE would be 'a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management'.²⁰⁸ The idea was to legitimize the OSCE as the overall organization for peacekeeping operations executed by NATO, the WEU and the Russian CIS. The EU stepped in with the establishment of a security and defence policy from 1998 and with the ESS of 2003, stressing the foreign and security policy concept of 'effective multilateralism with its emphasis on establishing the EU as a multilateral 'front-runner' and as a key advocate of inter-organizational cooperation with the UN, the OSCE and NATO'.²⁰⁹

A security architecture unfolded, but not the one intended in 'Paris'. The architecture was more often referred to as a model of 'interlocking' organizations, and disturbed the relations between the US, Europe, Russia and the respective security organizations.

For one, the dissolution of Yugoslavia came too soon for the maturing of the CSCE, the former OSCE, and the UN's primary responsibility for crisis management had to be supported by NATO.

Furthermore, instead of the end of NATO, the idea of a Europe whole and free and the normative OSCE principles were combined with the sovereignty question. In other words, it seemed logical that states were free to choose their own security structures. Together with the US political and military presence in Europe, in 1993 the idea arose of an enlarging alliance and several countries of the former WP chose this option. At that time, the Russian president Yeltsin agreed that Poland could become a NATO member in the future, giving NATO a re-entrance into European security matters.²¹⁰ Russia agreed, because it was reassured that this would be under the umbrella of the pan-European security framework. However, a parallel programme to the development of a European security architecture arose together with the idea of NATO's PFP programme. This parallel programme widened when the EU stepped into the European security architecture, with its enlargement and partnership programme and the establishment of its security and defence policy.

As well as the paths of widening, cooperation between Russia and NATO was accomplished, as Russia participated in NATO-led operations in Bosnia, and the NATO-Russia Founding Act (1997) was established, including strengthened cooperation with regard to terrorism. However, widening of the EU and NATO did not lead to a stable or peaceful Europe. Instead, these were the roaring 1990s, as the wars in the Balkans, especially the war against Serbia in 1999, together with Russia's response to the instability in Chechnya²¹¹ challenged the European order. This European order was challenged many more times thereafter: including the question of Kosovo's status, which became an

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208 Budapest Summit Declaration, 1994.

209 Koops, J. 'The European Union as an Integrative Power? Assessing the EU's 'Effective Multilateralism' towards NATO and the United Nations', Brussels University press, 2011, p. 53.

210 For an elaboration: Asmus, R. D., 'Opening NATO's Door. How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era', Columbia University Press: New York, 2004.

211 Terrorist attacks from separatists and ethnic-based groups in Russia's North Caucasus and outside the North Caucasus increased between 2007-2010, exemplified by the bombing of the Moscow subway system March 2010, resulting in over 40 deaths and many injuries.

ongoing subject of dispute, the Iraqi invasion of 2003, which alienated Russia and NATO further, the widening of the EU and NATO, which overlapped the OSCE area and the US plan for deployment of anti-missile defence in Poland and the Czech Republic which, according to Russia, conflicted with the agreements made in the beginning of the 1990s.

Instead of interlocking, 'interblocking' institutions arose that frustrated each other and raised the question of which organization should be responsible for what. The reality became an order of organizations with overlapping tasks and members and partnerships. This is illustrated by the fact that all three had security platforms for the Middle East and Africa with overlapping goals and tasks. In addition, their respective officials debated the same issues in all these fora, without a decent system of consultation.²¹²

Regarding the organizational structure of the European security architecture, interactions between the related security organizations developed into a diversified path of widening and inter-organizational cooperation. In other words, the level of institutionalized structures had been moderated up to purely informal, mainly staff-to-staff cooperation, although the scope of areas in which the organizations consulted and cooperated had increased.²¹³

Furthermore, the observed interaction had mostly been bilateral between the security organizations, meaning from one organization to the other instead of an all-encompassing security architecture, as described above. The reasons were Russia's participation in the OSCE, a lack of capacities on the part of the OSCE and the need to simultaneously avoid competition or overlap between the organizations regarding their mandates, tasks and operations in the field. In other words, organizations interacted bilaterally because they needed each other in operations and missions and because of a similar enlargement trajectory which could not be achieved multilaterally. Bilateral, because multilateral interaction did not become reality. This is illustrated by the Berlin Plus agreement of 2003 between the EU and NATO, which was created because of operational requirements, as the EU and NATO were operating in the same area geographically and had an overlap in tasks. The same applied to the operations of the EU and the OSCE in the Balkans. However, a Berlin Plus structure between the OSCE and NATO or the EU was never established.

From 2010, the bi- and multilateral agreements increased between the security organizations because of the increasing threats in the security environment, such as terrorism on European home ground and the migration flows. It was acknowledged that these threats could not be handled by one single organization. The joint agreement between the EU and NATO in 2016 countering hybrid and cyber threats serves as an example.

The EU-NATO interaction, although not under the umbrella of the OSCE pan-European organization, has thus been the most extended form of cooperation in the European security architecture, due to the overlap of member states, of interests and of missions

212 Ham, P., 'EU, NATO, OSCE: Interaction, Cooperation, and Confrontation', in: Hauser, G., Kernic, F., Routledge, London, 2006, p. 24.

213 Gowan, R., 'The EU and Human Rights at the UN, 2009 Annual Review', European Council on Foreign Relations, 10 September 2009.

and operations. In practice, this bilateral cooperation was mostly executed by inter-organizational cooperation between experts, organs and officials of the respective organizations.

In sum, although the OSCE was legitimised as the formal regional peacekeeping organization to mandate crisis management operations, a formal structure or hierarchy between the security organizations, as was the aim at the beginning of the 1990s, had never been established. The political intents of a Europe whole and free, with interlocking institutions, resulted in bilateral agreements between the organizations. There was no understanding as to who should take the lead or how tasks would be integrated or coordinated between the OSCE, the EU and NATO in areas such as deterrence, crisis management, conflict prevention, counter-terrorism or non-proliferation, etc.²¹⁴ The reasons behind the informality of a genuine security architecture first and foremost lay in a lack of consensus between the participating states.²¹⁵

The West's interest in a security architecture, apart from democracy and human rights, lay in the stabilisation of the wider Europe and, if necessary, the containment of Russia. Likewise, Russia's interest in the OSCE had always been to position the OSCE as a counterbalance to NATO. For Russia, the OSCE, although a quite different organization, created an opportunity for NATO to be replaced. The OSCE could then become the prominent organization within the European security architecture, as intended with the Charter of Paris (1990). Russia's aim was to have a strong position in this European security architecture.

The position of the OSCE as the prime regional security organization within the European security architecture was thus weakened at the end of the 1990s. Although cooperation between the OSCE, the EU and NATO strengthened again around 2010, this cooperation never developed into an architecture with a genuine institutionalized division of labour and interlocking organizations. It did, however, result in a web of ad-hoc bilateral cooperation schemes between organizations, organs and state and non-state actors.

5.6.6 Conclusion

The concept of a European security architecture was pitched at the beginning of the 1990s. Several ideas for a security architecture were advanced, particularly by NATO and the OSCE, to promote interlocking and mutually reinforcing cooperation structures for Europe. In this section, consideration is given to the questions of how and why change has led to a path of widening of interaction between the security organizations. The following main periods can be identified in the paths of inter-organizational relations between the security organizations, entailing two themes: multilateral initiatives and bilateral (in)formal cooperation. The first phase established the concept of a European security architecture. The second phase initiated several concepts within the organizations to build a security architecture, such as ESDI and CJTF. The third phase showed an increase

■ Duke, S., 'The EU, NATO and the Lisbon Treaty: still divided within a common city', *Studia Diplomatica*, 2011, p. 3.

215 Kemp, W., 'OSCE Peace Operations: Soft Security in Hard Environments', New York: International Peace Institute, June 2016, p. 4.

in bilateral cooperation between the organizations without the OSCE functioning as an umbrella for the wider European security architecture, as was intended at the beginning of the 1990s. Interaction between the security organizations was mostly on an informal basis with low institutionalized structures. The third phase added rivalry and hostility between the actors in the OSCE area and simultaneously strengthened cooperation between NATO and the EU.

In sum, a European security architecture built on a division of labour, as was intended at the beginning of the 1990s, was never formalised or accompanied with a deep institutional structure and changed into an overlapping network of states and organizations.

5.7 Organizations Adrift: A Cross-case Comparison on the Path of Widening

5.7.1 Introduction

The previous sections addressed the path of change of the selected security organizations. These paths of change, resulting in an institutional build-up of the security organization, are chronologically presented in the table below. This section looks at the questions of how and why the change of the path of widening has varied among the security organizations. The security organizations will be compared, addressing observed differences and similarities in the indicators of level and form in order to analyse the variation between the security organizations. In other words, the cases will be subjected to a cross-case comparison within the path of widening based on the research framework.

Widening of security organizations	NATO	EU	OSCE	IO-IO
Before 1990	Enlargement	Enlargement	Mediterranean partners since 'Helsinki' (1975)	
1990	NACC	CEEC	Initiative on partners for cooperation in Asian and Mediterranean region	
1991	Rome Summit: initiative on European security architecture, NACC		Initiative on European security architecture. Widening with former SU states	
1992	Oslo Summit; adoption OSCE CRO, link to other organizations		OSCE regional organization under UN charter	

1993		Copenhagen criteria for enlargement		
1994	Launch Pfp, MD			
1995	Study on enlargement	Barcelona process		
1996				EU-NATO Berlin arrangements
1997	Invitation states, NATO-Russia Founding Act (NRC), NACC=EAPC, Pfp extension; PARP	Initiative enlargement		
1999	Round 1 (3 states), invitation 9 states, PMF, MAP	SAP and SAA, build on CEEC		NATO-OSCE; Platform for Co-operative Security
2002	Strengthening NATO-Russia Council	Invitation 10 states		EU-OSCE, Berlin Plus agreement
2003		Invitation 2 states		UN-EU cooperation, EU-NATO cooperation and capability group, EU-OSCE declaration on conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, EU delegation in OSCE
2004	Round 2 (7 states), MD, ICI	Round 1 (8 states), initiative ENP, ENI		EU-OSCE framework, strengthening NATO-OSCE cooperation
2005				EU Cell at NATO SHAPE
2006	Dialogue with Japan, Australia, South Korea and New Zealand			Formal EU participation in OSCE; rules of procedure and cooperation institutional levels
2007		Round 2 (2 states)	Partnership Fund	UN-EU strengthening
2008	Invitation Ukraine, Georgia	Mediterranean Union (as well as SAP)		

2009	France full member, Albania and Croatia members			
2010	PPC, strengthening PMF			
2011	Adoption PATG	Relaunch ENP, EU-Russia strategic partnership		UN-EU strengthening
2013		EPC		
2014	Interoperability platform new partners, PCSC successor of PPC, strengthening cooperation with Finland, Sweden within PfP, DCB, framework for the South and PCSC	PCA, ENP, EP, ENI		
2015				UN-EU
2016		Brexit		EU-NATO joint declaration including support of partners

Table 5.1 Overview of key moments on the path of widening of the different security organizations.

5.7.2 Comparing the Paths of Widening of NATO, the EU and the OSCE

The security organizations NATO, EU and OSCE, as the units of analysis, are all regional organizations. The OSCE contains the largest number of participating states, as all member states of the EU and NATO participate in the OSCE. NATO and the EU almost overlap in members, but differ in aspects of neutrality and geography, for example in the case of Sweden and Turkey. Both the EU and the OSCE, as well as NATO, are legitimized by Article 53 of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, although NATO is primarily legitimized by Article 51 of the UN Charter as a collective defence organization.

The programmes of cooperation and dialogue, as a result of the end of the Cold War, resulted in enlargement processes for NATO, the EU and the OSCE from the beginning of the 1990s. Whereas the big bang of OSCE enlargement took place right after the fall of the SU and the WP, both NATO and the EU made their final decision on Eastern enlargement in 1997. This resulted in seven new NATO members and eight new EU members in the first and second enlargement rounds at the end of the 1990s. Since then the path of widening continued but developed into a more complex web of cooperation with state and non-state actors.

When comparing the paths of widening of the individual security organizations identified in this chapter, some key findings stand out.

Membership

For the OSCE as well as the EU, widening resulted in a larger sphere of activities, comprising a larger group of states and a broader domain of policy areas to be engaged with. In contrast to NATO, historically built on the bipolar system where threat was the very reason for its existence, the end of the Cold War resulted in questioning the *raison d'être* of NATO in the 1990s. NATO therefore combined cooperation and dialogue with the outside world, together with the task of defence and deterrence, resulting in a combination of collective defence and widening, defined by NATO as cooperative security. When Article 5 had become less important after the end of the bipolar era, enlargement and partnership addressed the need for the legitimacy of NATO. The EU also dealt with a power struggle concerning the wording as a security organization; the member states' interests differed with regard to the EU's creation as a security and defence organization.²¹⁶ These specific legitimacy aspects of enlargement had never been the case for the survival of the OSCE.

All in all, the 1990s saw great enthusiasm for enlargement of the security organizations with states from the former bipolar world order. This enthusiasm was inspired by the multilateral ideas of a Kantian world order, which gave birth to the concept of the European security architecture, initiated under the umbrella of the OSCE. A wave of democratisation occurred in the OSCE area and led to changes within the security organizations, strengthening the international legitimacy of liberal democracy with economic aid, political reform and good governance. This resulted in full membership of dozens of states to the different security organizations from 1991, when the OSCE was the first to open its doors, up to 2004 combined with special strategic partnerships of NATO and the EU, such as the founding acts with Russia and Ukraine.

For the EU and NATO, this enlargement dynamic stopped after the second big bang of enlargement, around 2004. The path of enlargement slowed for both the EU and NATO because of hesitation and dispute amongst the members as a result of differences in geostrategic and political strategic interests. Furthermore, the absence of performing and fully committed candidates and the setback in EU and NATO internal institutional development (widening without deepening) made some member states hesitant. For some of the EU and NATO members, this even resulted in an aversion towards enlargement.

Furthermore, in contrast to achieving stability, enlargement had also led to new security dilemmas after 2010, as it brought the EU and NATO under the umbrella of the OSCE cooperative security concept, instability and even crisis amongst the members and with the outside world, such as the Crimea crisis of 2014.²¹⁷ So the question arose as to whether enlargement had brought stability or instability.

From the 1990s, an enlargement scenario could be discerned within the European security architecture: first, a state became a member of the OSCE, followed by NATO

216 Schimmelfennig, F., 'The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 56.

217 Tardy, T., 'CSDP in action. What contribution to international security?' Chaillot paper, No. 134, May 2015, p. 214.

membership and, finally, EU membership was achievable at the end of the tunnel. Although NATO and EU enlargement were separate legal and political paths, these organizations were linked in their paths of widening.

Enlargement had an impact on the political and institutional relations between the European security organizations as pillars of the European security architecture. For one, because within all the organizations, larger and heterogeneous groups emerged. Another direct consequence of the enlargement of NATO and the EU was the emerging overlap of members with the OSCE; the membership became practically identical.²¹⁸ From the analysis above, some differences and similarities can be distinguished between the paths of widening.

Regarding the differences, NATO and – even more so – the EU have been more discriminating in their requirements towards accession than the OSCE. Furthermore, the enlargement of NATO and the EU had been more contested within and outside the organizations than that of the OSCE. Finally, as the enlargement process of the OSCE ended during the 1990s, the open-door policy of both the EU and NATO started and continued from there.

Regarding the similarities, within all three security organizations a differentiation is observed towards members. Within the security organizations there are different forms and levels of membership. First, differentiation of membership, for example the minus-1 formula of the OSCE and the NATO abstention possibility,²¹⁹ which will be explored in Chapter 6. Second, differentiation in NATO membership, comparable to the EU with the opt-in and opt-out procedure for the position of the ‘neutrals’ regarding Article 42.7 and the PESCO instrument.

Partnership

As well as enlargement, as one aspect of widening, all three organizations engaged in partnerships where again differences and similarities can be distinguished.

Regarding the differences, all three organizations vary in their form and level of formalisation of many different partnership forms created by NATO and the EU: ENI, ENP, PfP, EAPC, ICI etc. They encompass higher and lower levels of institutionalization, less or more formal engagement and differentiation in engagement of policies. The security organizations had both an overlap in partnerships and differed in their approach and strategy towards partnerships. For instance, with regard to the Ukraine crisis in 2014, where NATO had a military approach, the EU had a civilian, rules-based approach combined with sanctions, and the OSCE attempted to mediate between the conflicting parties with the Minsk process.

Reflecting on the similarities, NATO, the OSCE and the EU have been active in all kinds of partnerships, e.g. partnerships with states, regions or international organizations, which all gave them a global reach. These organizations began to create a diverse array of strongly or weakly institutionalized relationships ranging from observer status to some

²¹⁸ All the members of NATO and EU, either full members or associated, are OSCE partners.

²¹⁹ Exemplified by the engagement of NATO in Libya, 2011.

form of association²²⁰ and even positioning a network of worldwide embassies.²²¹ As a result, this led to mechanisms of relational and geographic spill-over, where organizations influenced each other with regard to the partnership policy. These mechanisms emerged in the commitment made in the context of NATO's PfP and EU cooperation programmes worldwide, involving similarities and differences regarding the formalisation of the engagement.

The Inter-organizational Path of Widening: A Permanently Changing Architecture

Along with an extensive regional and worldwide partnership, as described above, an increase in political interaction between the selected security organizations is observed. With regard to the path of widening of the relations between the security organizations within the European security architecture, some outcomes can be observed.

Although NATO and the OSCE stated the necessity of a security architecture in the 1990s, this was never institutionally established. Apart from the declarations made by the OSCE and NATO, a declaration encompassing all the security organizations, establishing a security architecture with a strategy and institutional structure and a genuine division of labour, was never framed. There was no formal hierarchy established between the organizations, apart from the fact that they all subscribed to the principles of the UN Charter. Several declarations were signed between the three organizations, such as the Berlin Plus agreements of NATO and the EU in 2003, but there were no formal linkages set between the decision-making bodies of their strategic and planning processes.

In addition, in their paths of change, NATO, the EU and the OSCE performed both overlapping and different tasks and encompassed overlapping members, as outlined above.

Along the path of widening, many different relationship and cooperation programmes had been set up, which led to a cross-institutional membership and partnership and had an impact on a supposedly all-encompassing European security architecture declared at the beginning of the 1990s. States became full or associated members of different organizations simultaneously, for example NATO's PfP programme and the OSCE's Partnership for Cooperation. At first, these partners contributed to the political legitimacy of NATO, the OSCE and the EU. Later, membership and partnership meant that both NATO and the EU were faced with various dilemmas with regard to bilateral, regional and global cooperation and the implication of the different forms of membership and partnership, as outlined above. Furthermore, these dilemmas had an adverse effect on the OSCE organization, as this diversification had a negative impact on the OSCE, creating conflict instead of stability.²²² Enlargement of the EU and NATO therefore undermined the OSCE cooperative umbrella, not only as a result of members and tasks overlapping with

220 Schimmelfennig, F., 'The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 1.

221 EU Treaty of Lisbon 2009, see Chapter 6.

222 Tardy, T., 'CSDP in action. What contribution to international security?' Chaillot Paper, No. 134, May 2015, p. 216.

the EU and NATO, but also because of the result of the differentiation between members, candidates, non-candidates, organizations and regions; states that were in or out.²²³

The 'Russia factor' had a much larger impact on the OSCE than EU and NATO enlargements to the East'.²²⁴ Although the OSCE could have taken a greater role to mediate between different actors within the European security architecture, this had not been the case. Partly because half of the OSCE states were members of the EU and NATO, who coordinated their policies and goals before OSCE meetings took place, and partly because of the irritation of Russia with regard to Western policies within the OSCE.

Another development along the path of inter-organizational widening was the loss of enthusiasm for enlargement. After 2000, full enlargement was replaced by partnership, far more informal, diversified and even less institutionalized with partners outside the organizations. Moreover, this led to differentiation among third countries and bilateral agreements between organizations and states into a diversified framework of negotiations. This differentiation of form and level of cooperation between members, candidates, non-candidates, organizations and regions undermined institution building of the selected organizations as a whole, and increased fragmentation and ad-hoc multi- and bilateralism outside the European security architecture.²²⁵

Finally, the EU and NATO membership and partnership were characterised by an 'incremental linkage', as they were mirrored and linked.²²⁶ This meant that if one organization moved forward towards cooperation or even enlargement, the other organization would reply with a similar move towards enlargement. At the same time, competition between NATO and the EU regarding enlargement and partnerships was also apparent, because if one was engaged with an actor, the other could not stay behind in this 'great game' of influence.²²⁷

Regarding the path of widening and civil and military operations, NATO and EU operational cooperation with partners outside the organizations had become a well-trying recipe. One example was the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, which included cooperation with Australia, New Zealand and Japan. In Libya (2011), Libyan rebel forces, backed by NATO in an operation initiated by France and the UK, finally captured Colonel Gaddafi and his government, which was replaced by the so-called National Transitional Council.²²⁸ In Mali, the EU's cooperation with the government was followed by the EU Framework Strategy for Sahel and its Regional Action Plan, including the Economic Community of West-African

223 Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., 'Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union', Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 15.

224 Dunay, P., 'The Changing political geography of Europe. After EU and NATO enlargements', p. 89, in: Tardy, T., (eds.) 'European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external dynamics', Contemporary Security Studies, Routledge, Oxon, Great Britain, 2009.

225 Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., 'Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union', Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 15.

226 Smith, M. A., Timmins, G., 'The European Union and NATO enlargement debates in comparative perspective: a case of incremental linkage?', *West European Politics*, 22:3, July 1999, p. 23.

227 Smith, M. A., 'EU enlargement and NATO: The Balkan experience', p. 7. In: Brown, D., Shepherd, A. K., *The security dimensions of EU enlargement. Wider Europe, weaker Europe?*, Manchester University Press, 2007, p. 11.

228 27 February 2011.

States (ECOWAS).²²⁹ However, this showed that operations, either civil or military, were mostly composed of ad-hoc coalitions outside the institutionalized framework and not strengthened or institutionalized within the European security architecture. Cooperation with partners in operations could be defined as a combination of the post-Westphalian system of international institutionalized cooperation and multilateralism, combined with a power- and interest-based composition of flexible ad-hoc coalitions in operations.

As a result of this variegated path of widening, the security organizations and the European security architecture were split into different centres referred to by Cassier as the 'clash of integration processes'.²³⁰ Furthermore, the different forms of partnership that were set up were 'poorly used and could rather be labelled as empty shells'.²³¹ The Alliance and the EU disagreed on the strategy required to achieve their aims regarding enlargement and partnership. As Schimmelfennig stated, for a longer period, NATO summits handled three baskets as the main ones, whereby one of them had always been enlargement and partnership, referred to by NATO as cooperative security. In reality, this basket was empty in several respects, one being the strategic partnership with Russia, which was not invoked during the Crimea crisis. Rather, the enlargement programmes of the EU and NATO, under the umbrella of NATO's cooperative security and dialogue, resulted in an increase in tensions between the East and West, with the highpoints in 2000, 2004 and 2014.²³²

In short, a diversified path of widening of the security organizations and the European security architecture led to different centres of power and interest.

Explaining the Paths of Widening

This chapter analysed the paths of widening of NATO, the EU and the OSCE and intra-organizational cooperation. The question is how the observed paths can be explained. One way or the other, the observed path of widening has been diverse. Widening brought many different paths of ad-hoc, formal and more informal institutionalization and varied forms of cooperation. In the first instance, states are the ones to decide upon enlargement and engagement with other states and organizations, as rational choice theory explains. Therefore, the decision to widen lay in the intergovernmental domain of all selected security organizations. The analysis showed that this state interest was geographically and politically varied and so was the development of the organizations' path of widening.

229 For the framework, see: Council of the European Union, 'Options paper for CSDP support to Sahel Joint Force', 2017, 11562/17, available at: www.statewatch.org/news/2017/nov/eu-eeas-csdp-options-paper-support-g5-sahel-7-17.pdf, accessed 3-9-2017.

230 Cassier, T., 'The Clash of integration processes. The shadow effect of enlarged EU on its eastern neighbours', in: Malfliet, K., Verpoest, L., Vinokurov, E. (eds), 'The CIS, The EU and Russia. Challenges of Integration', Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, p. 73-94.

231 Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., 'Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union', Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 14.

232 The Velvet and Orange revolution in respectively Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004) and the Crimea crisis (2014).

Furthermore, although inter-organizational cooperation increased, the European security architecture was not as it had been intended at the beginning of the 1990s, with a genuine institutionalized division of labour as a result of the diversified interests of the states.

First, with a non-formalized security architecture, states could take full advantage of the various institutional options open to them, which hampered the development of an efficient and more formal division of labour between the organizations if this was not in their interest. For instance, 'The US and Great Britain prefer these relations to be hierarchal, granting NATO a right of first refusal. The Dutch (and others) prefer all organizations to act on their institutional mandate and thus in coordination with each other'.²³³ France, Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium preferred a more limited mandate for NATO, with a primary task of collective defence. 'For them, the kinds of military crisis management tasks that the US wants NATO to assume should be handled by CSDP'.²³⁴

Second, although elements of multilateralism were observed, illustrated by Russian cooperation with NATO in the Balkan conflicts, competition between the organizations was observed as well: at different times and with different implementation schemes and decision-making levels.²³⁵

Third, an aversion among states could be discerned towards the allocation of capabilities and assets as a result of widening, because some states did not want to contribute to operations that were not in their interest or that duplicated institutional structures and capabilities that already existed in other security organizations.

According to Hofmann and Biermann, therefore, a European security architecture never matured as '...many institutions are created without explicit agreement on whether their main purpose is to strengthen or complement already existing institutions...' or other purposes for that matter.²³⁶ A certain amount of vagueness often purposely remained, implying that there was no overlap, no need for transparency or complementarity between the organizations. It was never specified, therefore, exactly what was meant by unnecessary duplication of organs or capabilities, or how overlap should be dealt with. This led to dissatisfaction among states that were not included, for instance Russia in relation to the OSCE, but also the US and Turkey in relation to the setup of the EU-EGF.²³⁷

Another observation was that widening was not a new adventure for the EU and NATO. Moreover, from their creation, this historical path had always been flexible in form and level due to historical legacies, such as in the case of Germany. The path of widening

233 Hofmann, S. C., 'Why institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2011, vol. 49, nr.1, p. 110.

234 Hofmann, S. C., 'Why institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2011, vol. 49, nr.1., p. 111.

235 For an elaboration, see: Biermann, R., 'Towards a Theory of Inter-organizational Networking. The Euro-Atlantic Security Institutions Interacting', *The Review of International Organizations*, Volume 3, Issue 2, June 2008; Hofmann, S. C., 'Why institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2011, vol. 49, nr. 1., p. 112.

236 Hofmann, S. C., 'Why institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2011, vol. 49, nr.1, p. 108.

237 The EGF will be explored further in Chapter 6.

was thus a familiar path, sometimes to strengthen European norms and values of multilateralism and sometimes to counterweight other paths such as deepening.

Furthermore, apart from state interest in widening their geographical scope of influence, whereby they could pick and choose their interaction as they deemed necessary, it can also be argued that widening as a path founded the legitimacy of the existing organizations. For instance, when NATO's Article 5 had become less important after the end of the bipolar era, enlargement and partnership addressed this need for legitimacy. Likewise, the EU path of widening offered the EU legitimacy even within security and defence policy, but further away from the power struggle of the wording as a security organization as the member states' interests differed.²³⁸

Finally, apart from state interest, the process of widening was driven by the promotion of European norms and values of regionalism and multilateralism by states as well as organizations, derived from EU treaties and summits, and NATO and OSCE summits.²³⁹ The feeling of morality between the US and the European continent was mutual regarding the obligation towards the Eastern European countries, offering new states the foresight on democracy and prosperity. In the 1990s, the US and the European countries were not interested in building new blocs as a replacement of the Cold War balance of power, and this idea lasted throughout the 2000s. Widening was built on the idea that cooperation and dialogue would contribute to stability and security in the wider Europe. OSCE, NATO and the EU built their paths of change as guardians of multilateralism. However, these ideas conflicted more and more between the members of the heterogeneous organizations, as explained by constructivist institutionalism; as a result, not all actors profited as much as others and the path of widening decreased.

Ultimately, as well as state actors, another big push factor for initiating, negotiating, implementing and sustaining the enlargement and partnership programmes consisted of the organs and the officials. It was clear that these actors influenced the agenda and enthused the member states, either positively or negatively. As a result of the differentiated membership and partnership programmes, specific expertise and duration were necessary to accomplish the agreements and criteria and the approval for further widening. Furthermore, enlargement and engagement were supposed to be in their interests, as it provided knowledge, legitimacy and power.

5.8 Conclusion

The questions this chapter addressed were how and why change has led to widening of the European security organizations. The security organizations were therefore analysed

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238 Schimmelfennig, F., 'The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 56.

239 Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., 'Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union', Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 16.

separately and in comparison, in their path of widening, measured by the indicators of level and form.

The path of widening of the three security organizations changed in form and level from 1990 onwards and brought a varied path. This path of widening started with dialogue and cooperation, initiated by the OSCE and NATO, and changed into enlargement accompanied by high and low institutionalization of the partnership programmes. This resulted in an increase of organizations composed of groups of heterogeneous states that vary in values and norms, geographical scope and political differences, interests and capabilities.

After the states were invited in the 1990s by both the EU and NATO, the enlargement momentum stopped and turned into an association and partnership dynamic and an increasing network of overlapping and differentiated partnerships. This development varied from solely cooperation to full membership to cooperation and alignment again, combining tailor-made bi- and multilateral cooperation and loose partnerships. Membership was thus replaced by partnership and interaction between the organizations in many different forms, with moderate institutionalization.

Chapter 6

Chapter 6. The Path of Deepening

6.1 Introduction

Security and defence policy deal with the survival of the state and are consequently domains of high politics. Traditionally, therefore, one major characteristic of any international organization that deals with security and defence policy concerns the categorisation of authority of an international organization; member states are expected but not obliged to take action, cooperation will never be forced by an authority higher than the state, principally illustrated by NATO's Article 5 in the Washington Treaty (1949) and Article 51 of the UN Charter. Nevertheless, organizations are regarded as actors in their own right in this research and strengthening an organization's mandate in combination with processes of institutionalization reflects the legitimacy and power of these organizations and therefore makes the path of deepening an interesting one.

As well as the paths of broadening and widening, addressed in Chapters 4 and 5, this chapter discusses the path of deepening as the last path of change. As was explained in Chapter 2, deepening is defined as vertical institutionalization; in other words, it concerns the strengthening of the institutional framework of the organization and its counterparts. The questions are examined as to how and why institutional change has led to the deepening of the European security organizations. The security organizations are analysed separately and in comparison, showing what level and form of the path of deepening comprises, what its results are and what the variation is between the security organizations, and how this can be explained.

6.2 The Concept of Deepening; Under Institutional Construction

Deepening can result in different levels and forms of institutionalization, as was explained in Chapter 2. Deepening is about strengthening the institutional framework of the organization. The analysis of the path of deepening of the selected security organizations starts with the creation of the organization and follows with the development of institutionalization from there.

The path of deepening is measured (indicators) by the categorisation into level and form as the indicators of the path of deepening, as elaborated upon in Chapter 2.

First, an elaboration on the level of deepening is presented, comprising authority and autonomy. Autonomy of organizations can be defined as the process of the setup or extension of organs and resources (staff or administrative capacities, capabilities, possibility for sanctions, funding), which all indicate the path of deepening. Authority can be defined as the shift of decision-making power rules and procedures, from the national level to the level of the organization, or put otherwise, the distribution of authority from state to organizational level, either formally or informally. Decision-making then refers

to the procedures by which decisions are taken as political and legal instruments and the agenda-setting power of an international organization. So, the level of deepening can be measured by the results of institutionalization. In other words, the path of deepening can result in formal or informal organizations and organs (ad-hoc or more permanently institutionalized), high or low institutionalization (the institutional structure or the setup of the institutional framework), top-down versus bottom-up decision-making (initiated by member states or other actors in the field), a centralised or decentralised organization (central or spread out), political and/or treaty-based organizations and finally a possible mix of intergovernmental and supranational cooperation.

Second, since the increase in international organizations after the end of the Cold War, different forms of cooperation within and between organizations can be observed. In general, these different forms can be labelled as modular cooperation where different speeds, methods and levels of cooperation are observed, as was described in Chapter 2.

6.3 The NATO Path of Deepening

6.3.1 Introduction

The communist threat coming from the SU directly after the Second World War drove the European states into an alliance with the US to back up their security interests. The alliance between the US and European states during the Cold War was based on the transatlantic bargain; to counterbalance the SU, to contain and involve Germany in European security cooperation, to share the US burden of the global leadership role, and to empower Europe as a strong partner after the destructive world wars. As stated by the first Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Ismay: 'To keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans under'.¹ As a result, NATO came into being in 1949, based on the Treaty of Washington.

This section examines the questions of how and why change has led to a deepening of NATO. NATO's specific path of deepening will be analysed in this section, focusing on the form and level as the indicators of the path of deepening from 1990 onwards.

6.3.2 Level of Deepening

The Creation of NATO: The Cold War

From its creation, NATO's mandate, laid down in the Washington Treaty, was not only deterrence and defence. According to the allies, NATO also had a role to play contributing to internal security, solidarity and cohesion, as stated in Article 2 of the Washington Treaty, which made NATO a 'security community' according to Deutsch.² Duffield stated that 'NATO has helped stabilise Western Europe, whose states had often been bitter rivals in the past. By damping the security dilemmas and providing an institutional mechanism for the development of common security policies, NATO has contributed to making the

1 Quote from first Secretary General of NATO, Lord Ismay.

2 Deutsch, K. W. et al., 'Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience', Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 5.

use of force in relations among the countries of the region virtually inconceivable.³ With its underlying military cooperation, NATO provided the principle of civilian democratic control to all European states that became members, under the umbrella of its Article 2.

As well as the security community that NATO provided, the organization created cooperation and interoperability in the military domain from 1952.⁴ The alliance provided internal assurance and stabilisation and avoided renationalisation of defence policy; interoperability has always been one of NATO's assets.⁵

During the Cold War, the Alliance deepened its structure from its creation and developed a well-institutionalized setup. The main function of these organs revolved around military cooperation, which over time became 'increasingly complex and subject to high levels of bureaucratisation'.⁶ Alongside the military committee and command structures, there were numerous committees within the sphere of political cooperation, such as the NAC and the Defence Planning Committee.⁷ Furthermore, the International Staff, composed of civil and military staff and headed by the secretary general, established another group of organs divided along functional divisions: defence planning, defence support, political affairs and scientific affairs.⁸ So although the NATO scope of tasks was limited, the structure was diversified and voluminous.

After the Cold War

After the end of the Cold War, as a result of the shift from the collective defence task, as NATO's main activity, to crisis management operations, new organs were created, such as the planning staff at SHAPE, accompanied by a crisis coordination centre responding to the new threats.⁹ NATO began to reshape its integrated command structure, which had been prepared for large-scale warfare, by reducing the number of major NATO headquarters from three to two and a reduction from sixty-five to twenty command headquarters, which finally led to a first revision of the complete NATO command structure in 1997.

After the enlargement rounds of 1999 and 2004, experience of numerous operations and the shock of 9/11, NATO's institutional structure changed again. For reasons of cohesion, solidarity and to enable more rapid consensus building and decision-making in response to enlargement, partnership and the changing security environment.¹⁰ The

3 Duffield, J., 'NATO's Function After the Cold War', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 109, No. 5, p. 767.

4 Establishment of secretary general and permanent military headquarter.

5 Wallander, C. A., 'Institutional assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War', *International Organization*, volume 54, Issue 04, September 2000, p. 723.

6 For an elaboration on the development of NATO's institutional structures during the Cold War: Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., 'NATO's Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?', Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 27; Sloan, S. R., 'Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain', Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016.

7 Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., 'NATO's Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?', Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 27.

8 Idem.

9 Sloan, R.S., 'Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama', The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010, New York, p. 132.

10 For an elaboration, see: Hendrickson, R. C., 'Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary General and Military Action After the Cold War', Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2006.

summit in Prague (2002), as a result of the 9/11 attacks, led to different measures, focusing on the strengthening of capacities, needed especially from the European allies. The NATO Response Force (NRF)¹¹ was initiated, deepening the rapid response capacity and widening the geographical span, as was the Prague Capability Commitment (PCC) for strengthening capacities.¹²

As well as capacities, NATO's institutional structure deepened, alongside the broadening of NATO's tasks. The Alliance as a whole acquired more autonomy compared to the Cold War period, due to 'the more functional orientation of the Alliance, its stronger focus on political aspects, and the multi-layered dimensions of new missions'.¹³ On the military side, Secretary-General Lord Robertson succeeded in establishing an agreement on the reform of the Headquarters. Furthermore, 'Prague' led to a change in the command structure in which Allied Command Operations (ACO, Brussels, Belgium) became the responsible HQ for operations, and Allied Command Transformation (ACT, Norfolk, Virginia, US) became the responsible HQ for conceptual transformation.¹⁴ Simultaneously, the number of committees, still structured on conventional warfare, was reduced and 'decision-making was decentralised to lower levels, giving the International Staff a greater say'.¹⁵ The position of the secretary-general was enhanced due to the 'more political alliance which increased requirements for the secretary-general to consult and promote consensus' and a policy board was established. These developments must be seen in the light of the ongoing debate between the member states regarding a more political NATO, as was explored in Chapter 4.¹⁶

Again, as a result of new threats and the experiences of the various crisis management operations, the deepening of the instructional structure evolved and in 2010 a new Division for Emerging Security Challenges (ESCD)¹⁷ was set up within the International Staff. Not only rapid response and decision-making, but the broadening of the NATO tasks needed an answer to the new security challenges. The aim was to focus on issues that the Strategic Concept of 2010 explicitly covered.¹⁸ Based on an action plan and the adopted comprehensive approach, as discussed in Chapter 4, on 4 March 2011 the Council agreed on an updated list of tasks for the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan.¹⁹ Furthermore, as a result of the broadening of tasks, the institutional structure was deepened with a Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre (CCOMC).



11 North Atlantic Council, Prague Summit, November 2002, par. 4a.

12 Ibid, par. 4c.

13 Mayer, S., 'Embedded Politics, Growing Informalization? How NATO and the EU Transform Provision of External Security', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (August 2011), p. 314.

14 NATO Prague Summit, November 2002, par. 4b.

15 Mayer, S., 'Embedded Politics, Growing Informalization? How NATO and the EU Transform Provision of External Security', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (August 2011), p. 313.

16 Mouritzen, H., 'In spite of reform NATO HQ still in the Grips of Nations', *Defense & Security Analysis*, 18 October 2013, p. 342-355.

17 A division that deals with non-traditional risks and challenges and will also provide NATO with a Strategic Analysis Capability to monitor and anticipate international developments that could affect Allied security.

18 NATO Strategic Concept, 2010.

19 March 2011, NATO.

The aim of the CCOMC was to bring together civilian and military expertise on crisis identification, planning, operations, reconstruction and stabilisation capabilities, as one of the instruments for preventive action.

The following Wales Summit agenda of 2014²⁰ was supposed to be the termination of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan. However, this summit was primarily overshadowed by the crises in Crimea and Ukraine. Not only was Crimea on the agenda, but other crises within and around NATO territory had to be addressed as well; terrorism, migration, the US requirement for a stronger European contribution to security and the crisis in the Middle East.²¹ As a result of different strategic interests and needs in response to the various crises, debates between Eastern and Western Europe and between the US and Europe increased. One of the issues was that the Russian threat was perceived as a traditional threat known to NATO and within its mandate, but the threats coming from the south, such as migration, necessitated a broader approach than solely the use of military capabilities.²²

All in all, the choice was made in Wales to renew the attention for NATO's task of collective defence and Article 5., Wales therefore coined the concept of reassurance for the Eastern members, translated into a readiness action plan (RAP), which included immediate reinforcement of NATO's presence in the eastern part of the Alliance.²³ This resulted in an increase of various forms of differentiated cooperation regarding flexible response and capacity building. The concepts of flexibility and modular cooperation were first introduced with the CJTF concept of the 1990s and the PCC of 2002.²⁴ Mostly, these initiatives were initiated by the US, requiring the Europeans to take more responsibility for their own security. This resulted in the reorganization of the NRF²⁵ and created an enhanced spearhead force, the Very High Joint Readiness Force (VJTF) as the high readiness element of the NRF.²⁶ The VJTF was set up for collective defence, but also strengthened the concept of differentiation and linked crisis management operations to collective defence, as was explained in Chapter 4. Furthermore, the NRF was initially designated for expedition warfare, but in Wales a further broadening and deepening of the mandate was adopted. Not only was the VJTF adopted on top of the NRF in Wales, a further differentiation was implemented with the Initial Follow-On Forces Group (IFFG). The IFFG was meant to consist

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20 NATO Wales Summit, September 2014.

21 Since 2011 an ongoing civil war in Syria and Iraq, which led to many refugees to Europe. The Persian Gulf crisis is the result of intensified military tensions between Iran and the US and European allies in the Persian Gulf region together with the tensions over the Iran nuclear framework from 2015, which was elaborated above.

22 Keller, P., 'Divided by geography? NATO's internal debate about the eastern and southern flanks', p. 59, in: Friis, K., 'NATO and collective Defense in the 21st century. An assessment of the Warsaw Summit', Routledge focus, 2017.

23 Aimed at reinforcement of NATO's collective defence since the end of the Cold War.

24 NATO Prague Summit, November 2002.

25 Doc. MC 477; description by Military Committee of seven scenarios in which the NRF could intervene, varying from evacuation and rescue operations to acting as the initial entry force in a hostile environment at the high end of the spectrum of force. The NRF has army, navy, air force and special forces components. The enhanced NRF will consist of up to 40,000 personnel which in contrast with the 2002 NRF consisted of about 13,000 personnel.

26 NATO Wales Summit, September 2014.

of high readiness forces that deployed quickly following the VJTF. Subsequently, the Follow-on Force Group (FFG) was initiated, but without this quick reaction component.²⁷

In line with modular cooperation in combination with strengthening NATO's capabilities, even more concepts were initiated; the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI),²⁸ aiming at training, education and exercises, and the multilateral Framework Nations Concept (FNC) and the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF),²⁹ based on the PCC initiative of 2002.

Finally, under the terms of the NATO-Russia Founding Act (2002), NATO was not permitted to station combat forces permanently in Eastern Europe, a red line in NATO-Russian cooperation. Nevertheless, with the consensus of the allies, the VJTF did take part in exercises in the eastern part of NATO. Furthermore, in 2015, a regional so-called Multinational Division Southeast in Romania had been established, spreading NATO's institutional structure and decentralising NATO's presence in Europe again.³⁰ But then again, although the NRF was also open to PFP countries, the VJTF concept was installed without the participation of PFP countries. Before 2014, the two worlds of NATO members and non-NATO-members were integrating more and more. From 2014 on, however, a division arose between the 'Article 5 world' and other NATO tasks and, consequently, its members. The idea of the VJTF was a very high readiness force a priori for a broad collective defence task, thus not including non-NATO members as a result of solidarity, intelligence sharing and possible conflicts due to the new threats.³¹

Of all the concepts with regard to modular and flexible cooperation, those of the JEF and the FNC were different, as they were outside the NATO framework. The FNC meant bottom-up cooperation based on the lead nation concept instead of the lead organization concept. The FNC was introduced by Germany in 2013, as an approach to joint capability development by clusters of nations and to emphasize Germany's and Europe's engagement with NATO.³² The core idea was to set up multinational units in which the bigger and more capable states could take overall responsibility for coordinating the contributions of smaller states in a capability package: the lead nation concept. The aim was to develop large units that were more capable and deployable for longer periods of time and that would provide a new impetus for multinational defence cooperation.³³

27 Abts, J., 'NATO's Very High Readiness Joint Task Force: Can the VJTF give new élan to the NATO Response Force?', NATO Research Paper no. 109, February 2015.

28 See: NATO, 'Connected Forces Initiative', 2016, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_98527.htm, accessed 3-9-2016.

29 A British initiative together with the Netherlands, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Norway outside NATO.

30 See: HQ MND-SE, 'Home Page', n.d., available at: <http://www.en.mndse.ro>, accessed 2-8-2018.

31 Kamp, K. H., 'The Agenda of the NATO Summit in Warsaw', Security Policy Working Paper No. 9/2015, Federal Academy for Security Policy.

32 Ibid, p. 304.

33 Nations participate jointly in the development of a coherent set of Alliance capabilities, facilitated by a framework nation. Linked to NATO shortfalls and capability targets they cluster around a lead nation. Two purposes: maintain existing capabilities and the multinational development of new capabilities in the medium to long term and establish a mechanism for collective training and exercises in order to prepare groupings of forces.

'Wales' was about readiness and responsiveness (training and exercise) as a reaction to the renewed Russian threat. For some allies, this was a game-changer in the European security architecture balance, putting Article 5 at the top of the agenda again and, in a way, representing a return to the flexible response strategy of the sixties.³⁴ Furthermore, the Wales summit reintroduced the importance of Article 5 with the reorganization of the NRF and the introduction of the VJTF. These were two of the many concepts to address the capability gap, but without the actual obligation of increasing capabilities.³⁵

On the one hand, the establishment of the 'Wales' NRF and VJTF were adjustments of existing structures and organizations, not an 'added military capability, but a reorientation of existing troops in an allied formation'.³⁶ On the other hand, all the initiatives of Wales strengthened modular and differentiated cooperation within NATO, as all these initiatives were built on multilateral cooperation and rotation schemes of NATO member states; inside and outside NATO and bi- and multilateral.

The follow-up summit, in response to the ongoing Russian threat, was the Warsaw Summit in 2016 entitled 'From reassurance to deterrence', operationalized by permanent rotating troops and multinational battlegroups,³⁷ which were implemented at the beginning of 2017 in the three Baltic states and Poland. These concepts again enhanced NATO's forward presence and strengthened the collective defence task of NATO on the basis of modular cooperation. This decision was a compromise between NATO allies in favour of enhancing the NATO presence in Russia's neighbourhood and the opponents, who were in favour of respecting the NATO-Russia agreements of 2002.³⁸ Germany, opposed to increasing the tension with Russia, had a strategic interest in dialogue and cooperation with Russia and pleaded for a revival of the NATO-Russia Council of 2002. Eventually, in line with prioritising collective defence again, the NATO allies guaranteed that any Russian aggression toward one or more of those allies would provoke a collective response.³⁹

Furthermore, during the Warsaw Summit, and as a follow-up to the Wales Summit, NATO adopted agreements on non-conventional threats as part of the NATO acquis. It was agreed that hybrid and cyberattacks would be seen as equal to conventional attacks and activation of Article 5 would therefore be required in such cases, broadening the content of Article 5.⁴⁰ Thus, cyberspace was adopted as a domain of operations, alongside land, air and sea; in response to that, it was institutionalized through the establishment of a Cooperative

34 The Flexible response strategy was a counterweight to the massive retaliation strategy. The strategy calls for mutual deterrence at strategic, tactical and conventional levels, to respond to aggression across the spectrum of war, not limited to nuclear arms.

35 Major, C., Molling, C., 'More teeth for the NATO tiger. How the Framework Nation Concept can reduce NATO's growing formation-capability gap', p. 33, in: Friis, K., 'NATO and collective Defence in the 21st century. An assessment of the Warsaw Summit', Routledge focus, 2017.

36 Ringsmose, J., Rynning, S., 'Can NATO's new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force deter?', p. 22, in: Friis, K., 'NATO and collective Defence in the 21st century. An assessment of the Warsaw Summit', Routledge focus, 2017.

37 Headed by the US, UK, Germany and Canada.

38 Ringsmose, J., Rynning, S., 'Can NATO's new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force deter?', p. 21, in: Friis, K., 'NATO and collective Defence in the 21st century. An assessment of the Warsaw Summit', Routledge focus, 2017.

39 NATO Warsaw Summit, July 2016, par. 15.

40 NATO Wales Summit, June 2016, par. 13.

Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCoE).⁴¹ Nevertheless, this did not result in a change to NATO's mandate. As in all operational domains, NATO's actions were defensive, proportionate and in line with international law. Finally, cyber was integrated into NATO's smart defence initiatives, although not as part of the NATO command structure.⁴²

In addition, as was elaborated on above, NATO's military posture was revised several times during its existence, including the NATO command structure, the NATO force structure, force generation, and the recreation of military manoeuvre. In light of the deteriorating security environment after 2014, at Warsaw and Wales, it was again agreed that its command structure be reviewed.⁴³ Adaptions included the improvement of the movement of military forces across Europe and the strengthening of logistical functions across NATO, similar to the set up of the EU's plans for the creation of the military Schengen area.⁴⁴

Decision-making within NATO

NATO's legal basis and mandate were founded purely on the 1949 Washington Treaty. That Treaty has not been altered significantly ever since.

The NATO institutional framework is not built on policy mandates by treaties, but strategic concepts in which the aims, strategies and capabilities are determined.⁴⁵ These strategic concepts are set approximately every decade; they specify the challenges and signify the strategies applied in response to the security situation but also the position of other organizations. New policies, operations, enlargement and partnership programmes are set in summit meetings once every two years. The strategic concepts are often combined with doctrines, in which the necessary capabilities to achieve the goals set in the strategic concepts are defined. NATO's strategic documents must be seen as reactive documents in response to the threats and challenges identified. Whereas the strategic concepts have become a part of strategic communication to the outside world, doctrines are limited in distribution.⁴⁶ So, although the NATO organization is based on a legal document, the strategies and policies are built by political summits, often referred to by scholars as policy and institutionalization by practice.⁴⁷

With regard to the decision-making procedure, as a prime collective defence organization, NATO has always been a traditional consensus-building organization, an intergovernmental organization where unanimity was required. Throughout its existence, NATO has developed norms and procedures for making and implementing decisions with regard to military operations and enlargement, as Article 10 of the Washington

41 NATO Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 'Fact Sheet', December 2017, available at: <https://ccdcOE.org/>, accessed 7-7-2018.

42 NATO Wales Summit, June 2016, par. 72-73.

43 NATO Warsaw Summit, July 2016, par. 37.

44 A proposal by the Dutch Minister of Defence, Hennis-Plasschaert, in 2017.

45 Since the end of the Cold War there have been three Strategic Concepts: 1990, 1999, 2010.

46 For an elaboration on doctrine; Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., 'NATO's Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?', Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 51-54.

47 Morillas, P., 'Institutionalization or Intergovernmental Decision-Taking in Foreign Policy: The Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty', *European Foreign Affairs Review* 16, Kluwer International, 2011.

Treaty prescribed.⁴⁸ In the light of NATO's tasks and unanimous decision-making, Article 4 encompassed a consultation duty in the event of a threat to the territorial integrity, political independence or security of the member states which preludes Article 5; a form of cascaded decision-making, as already explored in Chapter 4.

As an intergovernmental organization, decisions are made by the member states, institutionally framed in the NAC, chaired by the secretary-general. The NAC can meet at head of government, ministerial or ambassadorial level. Under the NAC is an elaborate committee system, which was built on a broad approach to security, including nuclear and cyber,⁴⁹ and consists of member state representatives. These committees are chaired by civil servants from the International Staff (IS).⁵⁰ One of the committees is the Military Committee (MC), which consists of the member states' chiefs of defence and is supported by the International Military Staff (IMS).⁵¹ In principle, the IMS is under member state control, since its seconded staff is rotated between Brussels and the national capitals. The NATO executive headquarters are supporting bodies, constrained and dominated by the member states.⁵² Although NATO's civil and command structure changed after the end of the Cold War, the number of employees and the annual budget have remained nearly constant.⁵³

So, decision-making within NATO formally required consensus and was built as an intergovernmental organization.⁵⁴ However, NATO's decision-making procedure of often led to disagreement between its allies. From the 1990s, decision-making deflected from consensus and sometimes changed into a consensus-minus-one voting system or a practice of abstention, which was not formally provided for in the Treaty. As a result, the consensus voting system itself was under debate on multiple occasions. In 2003, the US Senate passed a resolution to look for ways to enable NATO to act without full consensus and even to suspend difficult members from Alliance decision-making as a result of the crisis in Iraq (2003).⁵⁵ The least enthusiastic proponent for some kind of majority decision-making was, however, the US itself, as this would oppose US interest and sovereignty.⁵⁶ As Sloan stated, '...the consensus process clearly will need to be flexed from time to time, as it has been in the past, but it seems unlikely to be 'fixed'...'.⁵⁷

48 Wallander, C. A., 'Institutional assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War', *International organisation*, volume 54, Issue 04, September 2000, p. 724.

49 For an elaboration on NATO's committee structure, see: *Idem*.

50 International civil servants.

51 National civil servants.

52 International Staff (IS), International military Staff (IMS), Allie Command Operations (ACO) and allied Command Transformation (ACT), n.d., available at: <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/structure.htm> accessed 4-5-2017.

53 Mouritzen, H., 'In spite of reform: NATO HQ still in the Grips of Nations', *Defense & Security Analysis*, 18 October 2013, p. 348.

54 If there is no consensus there is no vote, or the member states are requested to explicitly approve a decision. If a government does not approve the proposal, it can object in writing to the secretary-general.

55 US Congress, *Congressional Record-Senate*, May 8, 2003, S5882.

56 For an elaboration on decision-making within NATO: Michel, L., 'NATO decision-making: Au revoir to Consensus?' *National Defense University, US National Defense University Strategic Forum*, No. 2 August 2003.

57 Sloan, S. R., 'In Defense of the West. The European union and the Transatlantic Bargain', *Manchester University Press*, Manchester, 2016, p. 340.

Along with the operations in the 1990s, the operation in Afghanistan from 2003 showed even more that 'ISAF's effectiveness was handicapped by the fact that some countries were unwilling to allow their troops to engage in areas and operations that would put them at greater risk'.⁵⁸ This was a result of the system of national caveats that member states placed on the use of their forces in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter. This implied that the level of constraints was tied directly to the national interests of a state in a particular mission and the level of risk a state was willing to take, which is inherent to intergovernmental decision-making.

One of the results of the obligation to consensus voting was the occurrence of political and military decision-making occasionally outside NATO, such as in the operation Iraqi Freedom of 2003. The US and the UK were strong proponents of military action against Iraq and Saddam Hussein, while some European allies were strong opponents.⁵⁹ This disagreement resulted in the military operation Iraqi Freedom being organized outside the Alliance without the burden of 'troublesome members', such as Germany and France, who were opponents of military action in Iraq.⁶⁰ Furthermore, during the 2003 Iraq War, six Allies refused to deliver troops to NATO's training mission, although they did allow other countries to provide troops and did not block the operation.⁶¹ Shortly after the Iraq War, Belgium, France and Germany publicly announced their opposition, allowing NATO to begin planning to provide military assistance to Turkey without the consent of the UN Security Council.⁶² Although in a later stage, NATO did assist the operation with training and advice, after which Afghanistan became the prominent model for NATO's contribution to security and stability.⁶³ However, NATO engagement in the early stage of the war in Iraq was not operationalized, due to disagreement between the allies, which caused a solidarity crisis within the Alliance.

Prior to the operation Unified Protector in Libya (2003),⁶⁴ which again caused discord within the Alliance, Germany abstained from the UN resolution that sanctioned the use of force against Libya.⁶⁵ Germany did not withhold consensus in the NAC, but chose for the abstention variant of decision-making, and did not participate in the coalition operation. Likewise, Turkey was not a proponent of another invasion by NATO of a state in the Middle East, after Iraq in 2003, and did not want France to be in charge of a possible operation,

58 For an elaboration on decision-making in the context of the ISAF operation; Grandia, M., 'Deadly Embrace? The Decision Paths to Uruzgan and Helmand', Dissertation, University of Leiden, the Netherlands, 2 April 2015; Sloan, S. R., 'In Defense of the West. The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain', Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, Chapter 7.

59 Sloan, S. R., 'In Defense of the West. The European union and the Transatlantic Bargain', Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 190-192.

60 Operation Iraqi Freedom: US led coalition operation started on March 20 until December 2011. NATO supported the mission under the provision of UNSC resolution 1546, with training and mentoring of the Iraqi security forces, under the political control of the NAC.

61 For an elaboration on the relation between the US and Europe during the Iraq crisis: Terrif, T., 'Fear and loathing in NATO: The Atlantic alliance after the crisis over Iraq', Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Volume 5, 2004, p. 419-446.

62 Sloan, S. R., 'Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain', Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 196.

63 NATO, 'Relations with Iraq', 2017, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_88247.htm, accessed 24-9-2018.

64 A NATO operation from 23 March 2011 enforcing United Nations Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973 concerning the Libyan Civil War and ended on 31 October 2011.

65 UNSC Resolution 1973, March 17th, 2011.

or the EU for that matter. In contrast, France was an opponent of a NATO operation as it preferred an EU-led operation.⁶⁶

Although tasks and members changed after the end of the Cold War, and decision-making with regard to operations sometimes led to NATO debates or even crises with regard to the participation of NATO allies, the consequences for the decision-making procedure with consensus had been modest. Many concepts for the alteration of the decision-making procedure had seen the light of day, but the implementation of these plans had been disappointing, again due to debates amongst the member states, as outlined above.⁶⁷

While during the Cold War period the supreme allied commander (SACEUR) could initiate an operation, a kind of pre-delegation authority, after the end of the Cold War decision-making was first conducted within the NAC, at member state level (political side), and then delegated to ambassadors with the consent of the national parliaments.

Over the years following the Cold War, SACEUR had less power to deploy NATO units. After the Russian invasion of Crimea (2014), the debate about the procedures of employability were on the table again and, at a meeting in June 2015, it was decided that these procedures be changed. Defence ministers agreed that 'to enhance the ability to respond quickly and effectively to any contingency, we have significantly adapted our advance planning. We have also adapted our decision-making procedures to enable the rapid deployment of our troops'.⁶⁸ The aim was to speed up political and military decision-making procedures by strengthening the authority of SACEUR for advanced deployment planning. Although in the end, the NAC (e.g. the member states) decided, for instance, to deploy the VJTF, SACEUR was authorised to order units to prepare for deployment awaiting a decision by the NAC, and thus a new concept for advanced planning was introduced.⁶⁹ This pre-delegation enabled SACEUR to act quickly if necessary, aimed at a preventive and deterrent effect. However, this was not a completely new procedure: NATO had used pre-delegation in the context of the nuclear deterrent during the Cold War and during its operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan.

The planning of operations, for instance in Kosovo and Bosnia during the 1990s, as the NATO's first crisis management operations, differed from traditional Cold War Article 5 planning, which was drawn up and organized a long time beforehand. 'There was no way to know far in advance what forces member states would send to the operation. This meant that NATO planners were forced to develop a variety of theoretical options to present to their political leaders and hope that forces would be made available to implement the option selected by NATO officials'.⁷⁰ NATO's secretary-general had played an important role

66 For an elaboration on the positions of the Allies towards the Libya operation, see: Michaels, J. H., 'Able but not Willing. A critical Assessment of NATO's Libya Intervention', in: Engelbregt, K., Mohlin, M., Wagnsson, C. (Eds.), 'The NATO Intervention in Libya. Lessons Learned from the Campaign', Taylor and Francis Group, 2013.

67 For an elaboration on NATO's institutions, see: Mouritzen, H., 'In spite of reform: NATO HQ still in the grips of nations', *Defense & Security Analysis*, 29:4, p. 345.

68 NATO Wales Summit, June 2015.

69 Meeting of the NATO Defence ministers, Brussels, June 2015.

70 Sloan, S. R., 'Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain', Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 150.

in shaping the strategic vision and an increasing institutional role since the end of the Cold War with regard to enlargement and out-of-area operations, and he could even be regarded as an independent agent within NATO shaping structure and tasks.⁷¹ Furthermore, with the increase of numerous and diversified crisis management operations, the expertise in preparation and conduct of operations and coordination between the different allies, partners and other international organizations became indispensable.⁷²

In the 1990s, the planning and conduct of crisis management operations lacked any experience, as NATO was mandated with Article 5 operations. Inherent to crisis management operations was the day-to-day reality that the threats and risks changed during these operations and became more diffuse. Practice had thus shown that every operation was implemented case by case, due to ever changing operational circumstances and participants. Likewise, the caveats and the member state prerogative principle of 'costs lie where they fall' played an important role. According to Sloan, the result of NATO's intergovernmental decision-making and the dependence on member states to provide NATO operations with capabilities resulted in decision-making, planning and the conduct of operations by NATO officials as a driving force of NATO operations from the (political) strategical level to the military tactical level.⁷³

Along with crisis management operations, the planning and conduct of rapid response operations required other elements with regard to decision-making. With the implementation of rapid response concepts like the NRF and VJTF, apart from the different national decision-making procedures, the decision-making procedures of NATO passed through a series of stages before they could be deployed and moreover involved different actors, which compromised decision-making while the aim had been rapid response decision-making.⁷⁴ Overall, among these actors were NATO's organs and staff which, due to their expertise, played an important role with regard to rapid response operations.⁷⁵

Hence intergovernmental decision-making by consensus was not always achieved and, as a result, NATO officials and organs played an important role in setting the agenda or influencing the decision-making. Already in the Kosovo campaign 'Flexing of NATO's consensus procedure could be implemented to ensure that NATO commanders are

71 For an elaboration on the role of NATO's secretary-general, see: Hendrickson, R. C., 'NATO's Secretaries-General: Organizational Leadership in Shaping Alliance Strategy', Chapter 3, in: Aybet, G, Moore, R. R., 'NATO in search of a vision', Georgetown University Press, 2010.

72 Sloan, S., 'Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain', Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016.

73 Idem; Grandia, M., 'Deadly Embrace? The Decision Paths to Uruzgan and Helmand', Dissertation, University of Leiden, the Netherlands, 2 April 2015.

74 Planning and conduct of decision-making procedure of the rapid response forces; 1. When a crisis escalates, the NAC, through the MC, instructs the SACEUR to explore deployment options. 2. The MC submits advice on the deployment options. 3. The NAC makes a decision based on this advice. 4. SACEUR draws up an operation plan elaborating on the option chosen by the NAC. 5. The MC gives its advice on the operation plan. 6. The NAC approves the operation plan and instructs SACEUR to initiate deployment. For an elaboration, see: Ringsmose, J., Rynning, S., 'Can NATO's new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force deter?', NUI Policy Brief, bind 15, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2016.

75 Advisory Council on International Affairs, 'Deployment of Rapid-Reaction Forces', No. 96, October 2015.

delegated sufficient authority to run a military operation without frequent resort to the North Atlantic Council for detailed guidance'.⁷⁶

As a result of the intergovernmental decision-making procedure, NATO developed several scenarios for decision-making in the case of Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations. First of all, the formal consensus decision-making procedure, including the consent of all the member states, was principally based on a UN, or for that matter OSCE, mandate. In addition to that, in practice a second scenario developed, where actions in support of crisis management operations were taken on the basis of a major power consensus or even outside that consensus. A third scenario was to execute operations without a UN mandate or even a major power consent, such as the operation Allied Force in 1999, although until now, Allied Force has been a unique situation.

Although tasks, members and forms of cooperation of NATO changed, over the years there have therefore been no significant changes in NATO's formal decision-making procedure, as for an intergovernmental organization consensus remained the starting point, but became flexible depending on the situation.⁷⁷ Formal change of the decision-making procedure could be prevented by a simple veto, which was not helpful for the member states who were proponents of changing the decision-making procedure formally. As a result, decision-making took place in other forms and levels, inside and outside NATO structures.

6.3.3 *Form of Deepening*

As well as the level of deepening as described above, NATO changed in different forms. The first step towards the initiative of differentiated cooperation within the Alliance after the Cold War was the ESDI. The idea of a common defence capability within Europe was introduced as part of the EU Treaty of Maastricht of 1992. On the one hand, the idea behind the ESDI concept was the possibility of a European pillar within NATO for European states to take the initiative for operations, with the consent of all the NATO states but not with the necessary participation of all the NATO states, mostly supported by France.⁷⁸ On the other hand, the ESDI could facilitate the opportunity for the European allies to assume greater responsibilities for defence within the Alliance, supported by the US in the light of the burden-sharing debate.

Another concept that was adopted after the end of the Cold War, with regard to modular cooperation, was the concept of CJTF, elaborated on in Chapter 4, adopted at the Brussels Summit in 1994.⁷⁹ The CJTF concept was based on ESDI and the idea was that flexible NATO structures and assets could be made available for future military missions

76 Sloan, S. R., 'Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain', Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 340.

77 Mouritzen, H., 'In spite of reform: NATO HQ still in the grips of nations', *Defense & Security Analysis*, 29:4, p. 352.

78 North Atlantic Council, 'Development of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) Within NATO', 1994, ESDI was created as a facilitating mechanism for an enhanced EU role in NATO.

79 Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, 10-11 January 1994, par. 1.

led by the WEU 'if NATO as a whole was not engaged'.⁸⁰ The CJTF concept implied that NATO and non-NATO forces could operate jointly, 'while always drawing on the mechanisms and structures provided by the Alliance as a whole', in other words together but not in membership for crisis management operations.⁸¹ The intention was to give NATO structures that were more flexible and forces that were more mobile for contingency operations. It is significant to mention that these operations required unanimous decision-making, but did not require the participation of all the members.⁸² The CJTF concept was also based on the concept of 'coalitions of the willing and the able', where states cooperate outside an institutionalized framework of an international organization.⁸³ Furthermore, the CJTF concept was, according to Ruggie, one of the most important steps in NATO's path of change. 'CJTFs contribute to diversifying NATO's mission, building a European security and defence identity within NATO, enhancing NATO's Partnerships for Peace with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the former Soviet republics and as a result, CJTFs have been a key factor in France's military rapprochement with NATO'.⁸⁴

The next step of differentiated and modular cooperation was the adoption of the NATO Response Force, the NRF, as was described above. The NRF was adopted at the Prague Summit of 2002 and was supposed to be deployable for both collective defence and crisis management tasks. This was in contrast with the 'deep military integration'⁸⁵ efforts of the Cold War days, encompassing all the member states⁸⁶ and based on inclusive NATO membership and decision-making. Finally, after years of capability shortfalls and political indifference with regard to the NRF, it became operational in 2006, but the employability situation hardly improved.

The reasoning behind the modular and more flexible defence cooperation between European countries was the strengthening of political ties and solidarity, the improvement of military capabilities (mainly of the European states), the deployment ability and interoperability, efficiency, the increase of heterogeneity of the Alliance as a result of enlargement and to reduce the unnecessary duplication of military assets and defence spending cuts.

Most of the initiatives for the concepts of modular cooperation came from the US. In response to the 9/11 attacks, US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, even stated that 'if NATO does not have a force that is quick and agile...then it will not have much to offer the world in the 21st century'.⁸⁷



80 Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council ('The Brussels Summit Declaration'), 11 January 1994.

81 Reichard, M., 'The EU-NATO Relationship. A Legal and Political Perspective', Ashgate, 2006, p. 114.

82 The Bosnian Peace Implementation Force is an example of a NATO operation under the flag of CJTF.

83 Kay, S., 'NATO and the Future of European Security', Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, p. 132.

84 Ruggie, J. G., 'Consolidating the European pillar: the key to NATO's future', *The Washington Quarterly*, January the seventh, 1997, p. 114.

85 NATO terminology.

86 Waever, O., 'Cooperative Security: A New Concept?', in: *Cooperative Security: NATO's Partnership Policy in a Changing World*, Flockhart T. (eds.), DIIS Report 2014:01, Copenhagen, p. 57.

87 US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, at NATO Defense Ministers meeting, Warsaw, September 2002.

As a result of the Chicago strategic concept of 2010, modular cooperation was enhanced with the concept of 'smart defence' and the concept of 'frontier integration'.⁸⁸ Like the NRF, smart defence enabled states to cooperate on a multilateral basis under the NATO flag. Furthermore, during the Chicago Summit, the 'Lisbon Capability Packages' were introduced, which identified critical capabilities, as a follow-up to the Prague Capability Commitment of 2002, and enabled the funding for several multinational and modular projects.⁸⁹ These capability packages were intended to force the member states to deliver the necessary capabilities. In practice, these shopping lists mostly remained paper shopping lists without the desired 'groceries'.

Apart from the increase in modular cooperation with regard to operational and capability development, the NATO operations exposed the same scenario. The operation in Libya of 2011 showed that NATO had become more and more an alliance 'of variable contributions and led to growing divisions among the members', as the initiation and execution of the operation was taken by different coalitions; paid for by the Americans and executed by the French.⁹⁰

After Russia's annexation of Crimea (2014), again the debate arose between the allies about the role and function of the different modular cooperation forms. Whereas the Eastern allies had a preference for deployment of the NRF for collective defence tasks, the Southern allies preferred the possibility of deploying the NRF for other tasks as well. Finally, at a meeting of ministers of defence in June 2015, it was decided that the NRF could be expanded.⁹¹

Allied Cooperation outside NATO

In contrast with modular cooperation within the Alliance, a trend had been noted of informal cooperation where states were looking for new forms and alliances of ad-hoc cooperation. This started with the setting up of contact groups during the crisis management operations in the 1990s, along with the institutionalized cooperation within organizations like the UN and NATO. This trend was continued with the choice of the Americans in 2001 to keep Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan (2001) outside the NATO framework. The choice for coalitions of willing and able to conduct operations was the result of different reasons: political indifference towards initiatives like the NRF, the desired freedom of action in operations, the increasing heterogeneity of the group of NATO allies due to enlargement, reservations of member states about the deployment of their own forces, with troop supply required simultaneously to the units of the NRF and EUBGs, which led to an overlap.⁹² All this highlighted that the actual deployment of the NRF had fallen short, just like the EUBG, of the high level of military ambition.



88 NATO, 'Smart Defence', 2017, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84268.htm, accessed 9-11-2017.

89 NATO Strategic Concept, 2010.

90 Sloan, S. R., 'Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain', Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 272

91 From 13,000 to 40,000 troops. Meeting of the NATO Defence ministers, Brussels, June 2015.

92 The NRF has been deployed several times, though not in military operations as originally the main task: providing support during the Afghan presidential elections in 2004, patrolling the skies of Athens during the Olympic games in 2004, providing humanitarian support operations in the US and Pakistan in 2005.

6.3.4 *The NATO Path of Deepening*

Reflecting on NATO's path of deepening, the organization changed in level and form, where broadening and widening was accompanied by deepening.

As well as being a military organization, NATO can be regarded as a political organization. From its creation, the Washington Treaty described NATO as a forum for consultation between the allies with respect to security and defence issues within the transatlantic area. This task broadened with the extension of the scope of tasks as well as with the dialogue and cooperation programmes after the end of the Cold War.⁹³ After all, decisions towards broadening and widening had to be made by consensus and required consultation between the member states. With the London declaration (1990), the intention was already to broaden NATO's political dimension. The traditional political mission was built on Article 2 of the Washington Treaty (1949): the defence of the western values and interests. As a consequence, NATO can also be judged as a norm- and value-based organization for the allies as well as the partners, where dialogue, cooperation and partnership were the aim. As Solana stated in 1999, 'What unites us are shared interests, not shared threats'.⁹⁴

Nevertheless, although NATO had become far more political than it had been during the Cold War in comparison to the EU's foreign and security policy, NATO had not evolved into a truly political organization. In contrast, NATO had mainly been about military cooperation, although not military policy cooperation, rather policy alignment. And although a more political NATO had been on the agenda, the political power of NATO declined due to contact groups for diplomatic and political dialogue, coalitions of willing and able for military operations and the large heterogeneous group of allies with diversified interests and capabilities. NATO's historical collective defence task, operating in the domain of high politics, fitted well within the consensus procedure. However, from the 1990s, complex operations such as KFOR and ISAF, the diversity of threats and the diversification of the allies' interests that NATO had to deal with led to numerous debates within the Alliance regarding the authority and autonomy of NATO. Diversity instead of unanimity and solidarity grew, and challenges with regard to decision-making, sovereignty and disagreement had to be overcome. The last decades proved that it was politically difficult to create international cooperation. Although NATO's path of deepening changed in level and form, NATO has not deepened much more since 2010, limited by its mandate and the diversity of member states' interests.

As a result, security related political consultations among the member states diverted internally and externally from the NATO organization. A split was made between routine consultation, placed under Article 4, and Alliance solidarity and military defence under Article 5, as discussed in Chapter 4. Furthermore, this resulted in a takeover of tasks by states instead of the organization, by modular forms of cooperation or even other international organizations.

93 Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., 'NATO's Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?', Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 27.

94 Secretary-General Solana press statement at the NATO Rome Summit, 25 January 1999.

Change within NATO is often described as a process of transformation⁹⁵ and NATO itself as a process-oriented organization in contrast with a rule-based organization. Policy and institutionalization are developed by practice: a hands-on organization. According to some, the method of change had not been streamlined or built on a strategic vision, but based on debate and incremental steps of change as a result of the operations and with that the development of the accessory institutional structures and capabilities.⁹⁶ In other words, tasks and structures were linked to the operations instead of long-term strategic interests and rationales. On the other hand, as political decision-making is required before the execution of operations, decision-making has led to a primacy of bureaucratic procedures, either military or civilian, instead of political attention and decision-making.

With regard to the form of the path of deepening, variable concepts of modular cooperation were integrated into NATO's path of change for decision-making, institutional structure, capability development and operations. Most concepts were initiated by the member states, especially the US, and were often further developed by NATO organs as NATO operations and members and partners increased. Nevertheless, most of the concepts were not executed as originally formulated or intended, for example, the NRF. Reflecting on NATO's path of deepening, NATO changed in level and form, where broadening and widening was accompanied by deepening.

6.3.5 Conclusion

This section examined the questions of how and why change has led to the deepening of NATO. From the analysis of NATO's path of deepening, the subsequent main periods of change can be identified. As NATO broadened its scope of tasks and members and partners, it was accompanied by change in its path of deepening, politically as well as military. Furthermore, along with institutional strengthening, NATO imported the concept of modular cooperation, either driven by states or organs.

Hence from the end of the Cold War, NATO deepening has led to institutional changes with regard to structure, decision-making, adjustments of the military structure, posture and necessary capabilities and the adoption of different forms of cooperation within the organization. Initiatives for change have come from member states and organs reacting to the security environment and other international actors: the EU. Not only has deepening led to a strengthening of the institutional structure, flexibilization and an increase in modular cooperation were observed at the same time, both inside and outside the organization. The latter has resulted in cooperation of coalitions outside the NATO structure and with other organizations.

95 For an elaboration; Korteweg, R., 'The superpower, the bridge-builder and the hesitant ally: How defence transformation divided NATO 1991-2008', 2011.

96 Palmer, D. R., 'Taking Stock, Looking Ahead. Two decades of NATO operations', 2012, available at: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2012/chicago/stock-looking-ahead/en/index.htm>, accessed 2-4-2017; Lindley French, J., 'NATO: The Enduring Alliance', Routledge, 2015.

6.4 The EU and its CSDP Path of Deepening

6.4.1 Introduction

The end of the Cold War gave an impetus to security and defence policy within the European integration process with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. The Treaty of Maastricht created a single institutional framework, the EU. The EU was built on a three-pillar structure, where foreign and security policy formed the second pillar, implying intergovernmental decision-making. Furthermore, reference was made to the possibility of a common defence in the future. So after decades of debate between the member states, the Treaty of Maastricht became the starting point for the development of a European security and defence policy. This section asks the questions of how and why change has led to the deepening of the EU. The EU path of deepening will be analysed in this section, focusing on the form and level as the indicators of the path of deepening from 1990 onwards.

6.4.2 Level of Deepening

Common Security and Defence Policy: After the Cold War

The new Europe, at the end of the end of the Cold War, was institutionalized with the Maastricht Treaty.⁹⁷ The unification of Germany, the withdrawal of American troops from Europe and the Balkan wars were some of the reasons for Europe to embark on a European foreign, security and defence policy.

‘Maastricht’ offered the EU possibilities for a genuine foreign, security and defence policy. First, from the start, it facilitated a comprehensive approach towards security, stating that the CFSP included ‘all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence’.⁹⁸ Second, the Maastricht Treaty introduced a new legal instrument, a possibility for a ‘joint action’ by the member states to support the CFSP decision-making processes.⁹⁹ This empowered the mobilisation of common EU assets, for instance from the Commission, for security issues. Third, the CFSP enabled a closer consultation and coordination process between member states on security policy and common objectives of the EU. This connected the EU security policy directly to other policies and thus adopted, from the start, a much broader approach to security issues.

From ‘Maastricht’ onwards, therefore, the EU operated a security policy. The US was in favour of a stronger Europe, as they expected this to result in burden sharing, whereas the British were opponents. Most of the ‘old’ European states on the continent were proponents of a European security and future defence pillar, except for the Scandinavian countries. The ‘new’ Central and Eastern European countries were likewise proponents of a European security and defence pillar, but as a facilitator not a takeover of the state;

■
97 Although the initiatives for a European army were launched before, like the Pleven Plan. The Pleven Plan was a French initiative of the premier in 1950 for a supranational European Defence Community, which was ultimately refused by the French assembly.

98 The Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, Maastricht, Article J4.

99 The Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, Maastricht.

the EU was there to support the existence of the state.¹⁰⁰ As a result of these differentiated positions together with a broader EU institutional heritage, the EU's security and defence policy changed constantly, swinging between supranational and intergovernmental traditions and developed under the umbrella of the NATO security guarantees, and linked the EU to NATO in capabilities and operations.

The operational starting point of Europe's step into the security arena was made by the Petersberg Declaration by the WEU in 1992, as discussed in Chapter 4.¹⁰¹ The European leaders agreed at 'Maastricht' that the WEU formed an integral part of the EU, tasking it to implement decisions and actions with defence implications.

Nevertheless, the Maastricht Treaty did not provide the EU with an institutional framework regarding security and defence policy, nor military capabilities, due to the differentiated positions of the states of interest. Furthermore, although the WEU became an integral part of the EU, a possible merger of the WEU into the EU did not find consensus among the member states at that time. The member states could not agree on the EU's relation to NATO with regard to Article 5 and the capabilities issue. The British and German governments saw ESDP as one institutional option among many and wanted the EU's ESDP to play a supportive role to NATO. In contrast, the French government insisted on the autonomy of CSDP.¹⁰²

As a result of the experiences of the EU and NATO member states in the Balkan Wars, the US military withdrawal from the European continent and the lack of an EU supporting institutional framework, the EU's ESDP was strengthened with the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997).¹⁰³

'Amsterdam' strengthened the relationship between the EU and the WEU and placed the broadened Petersberg tasks of the WEU under the ESDP.¹⁰⁴ The ambition of some EU member states for the EU was to be capable of autonomous operations, separate from NATO, although this aim was not shared by all EU member states.

However, to deepen the institutional structure it was agreed that the EU and the WEU would in future work institutionally closer together with the aim of possible integration and new arrangements were therefore provided. These included the adoption of institution building and new mechanisms regarding the decision-making process. The post of High

100 Segers, M., *'Reis naar het continent. Nederland en de Europese integratie, 1950 tot heden'*, Prometheus, 2013.

101 Humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management; Western European Union Council of Ministers, Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, 19 June 1992, II. Par. 4. In 2002 the tasks were expanded with: joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention task and post-conflict stabilisation.

102 For an elaboration on the position of France towards EU's CSDP, see: Michel, L., 'Cross-currents in French Defense and U.S. Interests', Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Perspectives, No. 10, Washington, D.C. April 2012; G., Biehl, H., Giegerich, B., Jonas, A., (Eds.), 'Security Cultures in Europe. Security and Defense Policies across the Continent', Springer, 2013; Schmitt, O., 'The Reluctant Atlanticist: France's Security and Defense Policy in a Transatlantic Context', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Taylor and Francis Group, 2016.

103 Although this did not provide a solution to the position of the neutral-observer states, like Denmark, which had an opt-out regarding defence policy ever since the Treaty of Maastricht, 1992.

104 Treaty of Amsterdam, amending the Treaty on European Union, 2 October 1997, Article J. 7.

Representative was installed to assist the Council and the Presidency with the preparation and implementation of policy decisions. For the first time, EU security and defence policy was given a 'face' for the inside and outside world. This institutionalization redressed the comment made by the American secretary of state Kissinger as to who should be called upon when Europe was needed.¹⁰⁵ The aim of the institutionalization of a CFSP coordinator in relation to the member states was to improve the visibility, clarity and efficiency of the CFSP, as the EU was often accused of being ineffective with regard to decision-making and internal rivalry of the organs.¹⁰⁶ In relation to that, a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) was institutionalized as a mechanism to provide the Council with an early warning capability and joint analysis capacity. In relation to decision-making, the concept of constructive abstention was introduced.¹⁰⁷ This mechanism made it possible for member states to abstain in a CFSP related vote without blocking a unanimous decision in the Council, an EU tradition spill-over to security and defence policy.

Building European Security and Defence

The summit between the British Prime Minister Blair and the French President Chirac in St. Malo was a boost for European security and defence cooperation.¹⁰⁸ This was a somewhat remarkable step from the British side, as they were not a strong proponent of European integration. Nevertheless, from the British perspective, the European security architecture was changing and a stronger EU was necessary as a European pillar of NATO. The UK saw a role as a bridge builder between the US and Europe and had to take a position in an ever-growing EU, as was described in Chapter 4. The British government therefore concluded that the EU had to take more responsibility, while simultaneously remaining the transatlantic link with the UK as an anchor.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, Prime Minister Blair favoured a policy of constructive engagement towards the European integration process in contrast with his predecessors. France, on the contrary, had been a proponent of an autonomous European security and defence policy to balance the US power in NATO and simultaneously complement NATO.

As a result of this summit, the first step was made towards autonomous action of the EU with credible military capabilities and inclusion of the Petersberg tasks. However, it was confirmed between the allies that these capabilities should not challenge the role of NATO, as it was stated the EU should act 'in conformity with the respective obligations in NATO', which actually linked the EU and NATO for the first time.¹¹⁰



¹⁰⁵ The debate still continues as to whether Kissinger actually made the statement.

¹⁰⁶ Lodge, J., Flynn, V., 'The CFSP After Amsterdam: The Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit', *International Relations*, Volume XIV, no. 1, April 1998, p. 7.

¹⁰⁷ As a general rule, all decisions taken with respect to the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy are adopted unanimously. However, in certain cases, an EU country can choose to abstain from voting on a particular action without blocking it. This could arise, for example, where the EU proposes to condemn the actions of a non-EU country.

¹⁰⁸ Franco-British St. Malo declaration, 4 December 1998.

¹⁰⁹ Drent, M., 'A Europeanisation of the Security Structure. The Security Identities of the United Kingdom and Germany', Dissertation, University of Groningen, the Netherlands, 7 October 2010, p. 139-166.

¹¹⁰ Franco-British St. Malo declaration, 4 December 1998.

As a result of the events in the 1990s, as elaborated on above, numerous Council meetings were initiated, deepening the ESDP's institutional structures and crisis management capabilities. In Helsinki (1999), the European Council stated '...its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army'.¹¹¹ Furthermore, in Helsinki, the ESDP was given more substance by initiating its Headline Goal aimed at a European rapid reaction force.¹¹² Together with the Headline Goal, the Council initiated the modular concept of battlegroups (BG) within the field of crisis management operations, necessary for a rapid response capability and which members should provide in small forces at high readiness.¹¹³

As Europe had no adequate answer to the Balkan and Kosovo crises, the 2001 European Council meeting in Nice¹¹⁴ genuinely deepened and formalised the ESDP by integrating it into the EU's institutional structure. In 'Nice', the Political and Security Committee (PSC), was established as the central organ in the ESDP. The PSC was a permanent treaty-based body with a mandate to contribute to the definition of policies on its own initiative.¹¹⁵ And after the start of building a political and civilian institutional structure for security and defence policy, a military structure could not be overlooked. Hence the establishment of the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the Military Staff (EUMS), copied from NATO's institutional structure.¹¹⁶ Where the PSC was to 'exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations', the EUMC was the highest military body, which directs all military activities, in particular the planning and execution of military operations. The EUMS, under the High Representative and the EUMC, coordinates these military operations and missions.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, with the Treaty of Nice, the ESDP had officially taken over the tasks of the WEU, except for the mutual defence commitment of the Brussels Treaty (1954).

Finally in 2003, in response to the solidarity crisis that emerged between the US and some European states in the wake of the Iraq crisis (2003) and the threats and challenges referred to above, the need was felt to articulate a vision. And so High Representative Solana presented the first European Security Strategy (ESS): 'A secure Europe in a better world'. The ESS approached security in a comprehensive manner with a mixture of civilian and military instruments, way beyond the Petersberg tasks, covering all the aspects of foreign and security policy comparable to and in line with its institutional structure and

111 European Council, Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999.

112 A force of 50,000-60,000 troops, deployable within 60 days and sustainable for at least one year, by 2003, European Council, Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999. To be able to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 personnel capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks.

113 Joint and combined troops of 1000 up to 1500, deployable within 5 to 10 days.

114 Treaty of Nice, 26 February 2001.

115 Treaty on European Union, 1992, art. 38

116 Varwick, J., Koops, J., 'The European Union and NATO: 'Shrewd Interorganizationalism' in the Making?', in: Jorgensen, K.E., 'The European Union and International Organizations', Routledge, London, 2009, p. 116.

117 The institutional structure outlined in the annex of the Presidency Report of the Nice European Council, 2000.

widening EU's geopolitical scope.¹¹⁸ For the proponents, the ESS provided the opportunity to show the US that the EU was engaged with strengthening European security. For the opponents, the ESS provided the opportunity to show that the EU was active in an autonomous security and defence 'business'.

As a result of 'St. Malo', 'Helsinki' and 'Nice', the UK thus became a driving force behind the EU's defence policy and linked the EU to NATO. Furthermore, this provided the EU with an institutionalization of the security and defence policy, a combination of military and civilian crisis management tools and autonomous decision-making institutions within the security and defence domain.¹¹⁹

Further Building of European Security and Defence

After a decade of negotiating a European constitution,¹²⁰ with the intention of replacing the existing EU treaties as a result of the process of broadening, the Treaty of Lisbon was signed in 2009.¹²¹ The Treaty of Lisbon had a similar ambition to strengthen the EU by enhancing its institutional coherence and effectiveness. Furthermore, the EU's security and defence policy were given a prominent place in the Treaty and several institutional measures were taken.

One of the first changes of the institutional structure was the creation of the position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security,¹²² combined with the position of the Vice-President of the European Commission (the former Commissioner for External Relations), who became responsible for the CFSP and the CSDP.¹²³ This position became double-hatted, which linked security and defence policy to the broader EU policies¹²⁴ and gave the EU's foreign security and defence policy even more political visibility. An important step into deepening the CSDP, because until then the former ESDP High Representative had not had the same political, security and military tools that were available to NATO's Secretary-General. So, the EU 'copied' this position for the High Representative, with a mandate of highly intensive diplomatic power in the region.¹²⁵ Two positions, that of the High Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations, were thus merged and this symbolised the disappearance of the pillar structure from the

118 Security Strategy for Europe, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World', 2003. The implementation of the ESS of 2003 was reviewed in 2008: European Union, 'Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy- Providing Security in a Changing World', 2008, available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf, accessed 3 November 2016.

119 For an elaboration: Howorth, J., 'European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?', Chaillot paper no. 43, WEU-ISS, 2000; Ojanen, H., 'Participation and Influence. Finland, Sweden and the Post-Amsterdam development of the CFSP', Occasional Paper 11, The Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, January 2000.

120 The process of the European constitution was elaborated in Chapter 4, section 4.4.2.

121 This Treaty gives the EU a single legal personality (art.46A), previously enjoyed only by the European Communities.

122 Elected by the European Council by a qualified majority for a term of two and a half years.

123 At the Lisbon Summit it was decided to change the 'E' of European Security and Defence Policy into the 'C' of Common Security and Defence Policy.

124 A combination of the former post of High Representative of the so called second pillar of the CFSP and the CSDP and the commissioner of External Relations of the Commission.

125 Keukeleire, S., Delreux, T., 'The Foreign Policy of the European Union', The European Union Series, 2nd edition, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 2014, p. 246.

Maastricht Treaty, which brought all aspects of EU foreign and security policy under the roof of one treaty.¹²⁶

A second important change in the deepening of the EU foreign, security and defence domain was the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS).¹²⁷ The EEAS could be compared to a national Ministry of Foreign Affairs including a diplomatic service under the authority of the High Representative, but distinctive from the Commission and the Council Secretariat.¹²⁸ The EEAS was created to assist the High Representative and represent the EU outside Europe, also on foreign, security and defence issues.¹²⁹ The power of initiative, formerly held by the member states, became shared as a result of the new setup of the High Representative. The aim was to enhance institutionalization of the EU CFSP and CSDP by formalising a rule-governed action within an organization with budget, staff and permanent headquarters with the EEAS: 'The merging of the services dealing with external relations, in particular the Directorate General for External Relations of the European Commission and the Service of External Relations of the Council of the EU, has created a brand new institution under the control of the High Representative'.¹³⁰

A third change of the Lisbon Treaty entailed the decision-making procedures within the foreign, security and defence domain. With Article 31, the Treaty of Lisbon further developed decision-making procedures in relation to foreign, security and defence policy.¹³¹ As discussed previously, security and defence policy is usually decided unanimously. Nevertheless, some exceptions were made by dividing decision-making between civil and military missions and operations.

A fourth change involved the institutional structure, as 'Lisbon' formalized the existing institutional civil and military ESDP structure by the setup of the framework inside the treaties, such as the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), the CPCC and the EUMS, and became a part of the EEAS. Furthermore, with regard to the scope of missions,

126 As the HR also acts as Vice-President of the European Commission, this gave the European Parliament a say on his/her appointment, as the Commission is accountable to the Parliament.

127 The Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007, Article 13 A.

128 For an extensive overview on the institutional structures after 'Lisbon', see: Morillas, P., 'Institutionalization or Intergovernmental Decision-Taking in Foreign Policy: The Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty', *European Foreign Affairs Review* 16, 2011, Kluwer International, p. 254-255.

129 Representation consists of more than 130 posts, including former posts of the Commission.

130 Morillas, P., 'Institutionalization or Intergovernmental Decision-Taking in Foreign Policy: The Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty', *European Foreign Affairs review* 16, 2011, Kluwer International, p. 244-251.

131 Under Article 31 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the country that constructively abstains may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply this decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the EU. On matters not having military or defence implications, the Council may act by qualified majority, when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position on the basis of a decision or of a specific request of the European Council. However, if a member of the Council declares that, for vital and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, the Council may, acting by qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity (Article 31 TEU). The possibility of a blocking veto remains, even though a Member State has to offer some explanations to use it. Such explanations are not a deterrent of veto, if one Member State is determined to defend its interests, which diverge from those of the majority. It transpires that the CFSP method is an improved intergovernmental cooperation method, but not much more than that. Even with the improvements brought by the Treaty of Lisbon, the foreign and security policy cannot become a 'common policy' by the means put at its disposal.

'Lisbon' extended the Petersberg Tasks again.¹³² The European Defence Agency (EDA) was also formalized, to include a mandate of harmonising defence spending, supporting defence research and assisting member states to meet the capability commitments.¹³³

Fifth, with regard to deepening EU defence cooperation, two mechanisms were introduced to deepen and enhance political and military solidarity. The concept of common defence was introduced with the mutual defence clause, Article 42.7 of the Treaty. Furthermore, a solidarity clause was introduced as a result of the terrorist attack in Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005.¹³⁴

A sixth change of 'Lisbon' entailed an extension of modular cooperation, where different mechanisms of flexibilization within the security area were incorporated and which extended the concept of enhanced cooperation.¹³⁵ These mechanisms entailed PESCO,¹³⁶ which will be examined below, and the possibility for EU operations with a small group of member states¹³⁷ as well as the BG concept of 2004. These mechanisms offered the opportunity for a smaller group of states to develop capacities and perform crisis management operations if they were willing and able. The BG concept was a precursor to the PESCO mechanism, as were the Weimar (political)¹³⁸ and the Ghent and Bendefco (capacities) proposals.¹³⁹

A seventh change dealt with the financial support of CFSP and CSDP activities. The Treaty established a 'start-up fund' aimed at facilitating the urgent financing of initiatives of EU-led missions, which could not be charged to the Union budget.¹⁴⁰

Finally, a merger of the WEU and the EU took place. This was to be expected, as 'Maastricht' had already stated that the WEU would become an 'integral part of the development of the Union'.¹⁴¹ The WEU mandate was taken over by the EU, and the WEU as an organization was dissolved in 2011.¹⁴²



¹³² Including: joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation (art.28B).

¹³³ The Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007., Article 28D.

¹³⁴ Elaborated on in section 4.4.2.

¹³⁵ The Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007, Articles 42 (6) and 46, as well as Protocol 10, Article 1b, Protocol.

¹³⁶ Exceptions: decisions pertaining to permanent structured cooperation, the procedures for setting up and administering the 'start-up fund' or the appointment of the High Representative, are adopted by qualified majority. On the other hand, the unanimity rule remains when deciding on the launch of a mission. In practice, this means that states involved in permanent structured cooperation may not launch an operation on behalf of the EU without having the formal approval of all EU Member States.

¹³⁷ Based on the experience of operation Artemis, in support of the UN mission in Monuc, Congo. Operation Artemis; from June to September 2003.

¹³⁸ Informal trilateral cooperation between Poland, Germany and France since 1991.

¹³⁹ Rehrl, J. (Ed.), 'Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union', Third edition, 2016.

¹⁴⁰ The Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007, Articles 3 and 28.

¹⁴¹ The Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, Maastricht: Declaration on the Western European Union, I-declaration.

¹⁴² From June 2010 the WEU Treaty was cancelled and the WEU was abolished from June 2011 after one year postponement, closing the WEU organs.

All in all, the Lisbon Treaty strengthened EU's CSDP robustly and deepened the institutional structure and mandate beyond NATO's mandate.

After 2010

After more than a decade, a new security strategy saw the light of day in 2016: the EU Global Strategy (EUGS). There were several underlying reasons for the need of a new strategy after the 2003 strategy, and its improvement in 2008: the US strategic shift to the Pacific influencing the EU's responsibility, geopolitical changes, including Russia's intervention in Crimea (2014), combined with hybrid, cyber and terrorist threats inside and outside EU territory and the concern about a possible Brexit all necessitated a need for coordination of external action in combination with internal security activities and more European autonomy. Furthermore, some of the member states perceived a trend of fragmentation, duplication and differences in defence expenditure as a result of budget costs,¹⁴³ which endangered Europe's unity and highlighted the need for more integration. Hence, the EUGS was aimed at deepening and broadening the EU's security and defence policy, combined in the term 'strategic autonomy', enhanced by Art 42.7 and 222 of the Treaty of Lisbon and aimed at more cooperation with regions and other organizations.¹⁴⁴

All this created the ambition for more European autonomy and resulted in the deepening of the EU's security and defence domain.

First, a plan was drawn up listing operations that the EU should be able to perform, the Implementation Plan on Security and defence (IPSD), together with the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP)¹⁴⁵ of the Commission supporting member states as well as the European defence industry.

Furthermore, a defence research budget¹⁴⁶ was created and a review system for assessing member states' commitment to improve European capabilities labelled as the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)¹⁴⁷ monitored by the EDA. The EU's regular financing system of CSDP missions has always been complex and divided between civilian missions, which fall under the EU budget, and military, which are borne by the participating states of the operation.¹⁴⁸ This financing system was called the Athena mechanism. It was introduced for common funding in the CSDP area and was the opposite of NATO's 'costs lie where they fall' principle. This principle was applied in the EU's military operations. Although operations were paid for by the member states, some costs could be

¹⁴³ Novaky, N. I. M., 'Who Wants to Pay More? The European Union's Military Operations and the Burden Sharing Dispute over Financial Burden Sharing', *European Security*, Volume 5, 2016, Issue 2, 15 February 2016.

¹⁴⁴ European Union, 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy', June 2016.

¹⁴⁵ European Commission, 'European Defence Action Plan', 2016, available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/com_2016_950_f1_communication_from_commission_to_inst_en_v5_p1_869631.pdf, accessed 12 January 2017.

¹⁴⁶ For an elaboration, see: Fiott, D., 'EU Defence Research in Development', *ISSUE Alert*, 2016, available at: https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Alert_q3_Defence_research.pdf, accessed April 2017.

¹⁴⁷ For an elaboration, see: European Defence Agency, 'Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)', 2016, available at: [https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/coordinated-annual-review-on-defence-\(card\)](https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/coordinated-annual-review-on-defence-(card)), accessed 20 November 2019.

¹⁴⁸ Within the EU, military activities are called operations and civilian activities are missions.

financed by collective funding under the provisions of this Athena mechanism.¹⁴⁹ Together with the Commission's new EDAP, the European Defence Fund (EDF) was proposed. The EDF was built on two pillars: defence-related research and an increase in the EU's capabilities. As a result, the EDF enhanced the role of the supranational Commission within the EU's CSDP. The alteration of the EU's general financing system of CSDP activities was to enhance cooperation between member states and promote pooling of national defence capabilities and strengthen national markets through the EDF.¹⁵⁰

In addition, with the EUGS the PESCO mechanism of the Treaty of Lisbon was further enhanced.¹⁵¹ The implementation of PESCO during the trajectory from the Treaty of Lisbon up to 2017 was not without debate between the member states, due to issues of inclusion and exclusion, differentiation and possible supranational decision-making aspects, illustrated by the debates between France and Germany.¹⁵² As France was a proponent of a small and ambitious group of states with robust capabilities, Germany was an opponent of further differentiation within the EU and wanted a stronger inclusive approach, especially after Brexit and the numerous clashes within the EU.¹⁵³ The compromise was found by adopting PESCO as a process. The aim of PESCO was to establish defence cooperation by deepening interoperability and creating permanent multinational force packages, including jointly owned and operated strategic enablers, to achieve strategic autonomy. These aims were to be achieved in cooperation with NATO and the goal was to reawaken and deepen the ESDI pillar in NATO.¹⁵⁴ The membership of PESCO was on a voluntary basis, but the assessment for PESCO participants was obligatory and legally binding.¹⁵⁵ PESCO defined the commitments concerning both operational objectives and capability development. Nevertheless, the enactment of PESCO was mainly based on projects to which states can subscribe or not, again a case of flexibilization and freedom to engage. So in the end, PESCO was not there to establish integrated forces, a European army. The institutional deepening of PESCO will be monitored by the EDA, which will provide the assessor input on defence investments and capability development, together with the EEAS and the EUMS, who will provide the same for operational aspects.

149 Article 31 and 41 TEU, Council Decision 2008/975/CFSP of 18 December establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of EU operations having military or defence implications.

150 Beyond the scope of this research: on 7 June 2017 the Commission launched the proposal to boost European capabilities through the European Defense Fund with 5.5 billion per year.

151 Beyond the scope of this research: On 13 November 2017, 23 EU member states signed PESCO which was adopted by the EU Council at 11 December 2017 by 25 states. PESCO includes the traditional neutral states: Austria, Ireland, Finland and Sweden and excluding the UK, Malta and Denmark.

152 For an elaboration on the position of the EU member states towards PESCO, see: Bakker, A., Drent, M., Zandee, D., 'European Defence Core Groups. The Why, What and How of Permanent Structured Cooperation', Clingendael Policy Briefs, November 2016, available at: <https://www.clingendael.nl/publication/european-defence-core-groups>, accessed 6 February 2017; Biscop, S., 'European Defence: Give PESCO a Chance', *Survival*, vol. 60 no. 3, June–July 2018, p. 161–180.

153 November 2016.

154 For an elaboration on PESCO: Biscop, S., 'European Defence: Give PESCO a Chance', *Survival*, vol. 60 no. 3, June–July 2018, p. 161–180; Biscop, S., 'Differentiated integration in Defence: a plea for PESCO', *Insitituti Affari Internazionali*, 6 February 2017.

155 Outside the scope of this research: 13 November, the PESCO mechanism was adopted; Council conclusions on security and defence in the context of the EU Global Strategy, Council of the European Union, 14190/17, Brussels, 13 November 2017.

Finally, along with strengthening the EU's CSDP with the EUGS, cooperation with NATO was strengthened in 2016, which was explored in depth in Chapter 5.

All in all, EU security and defence policy was deepened in line with a possible European army and EU strategic autonomy. The latter has been called for enthusiastically more than once in the EUGS, stating that 'As Europeans we must take greater responsibility for our security... as well as to act autonomously if and when necessary. An appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe's ability to foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond its borders',¹⁵⁶ proclaimed more than once by the French President Macron.¹⁵⁷ And continued with the statement that 'full spectrum defence capabilities are necessary to respond to external crises, build our partners' capacities, and to guarantee Europe's safety'.¹⁵⁸ However, at the same time the EUGS acknowledged that 'When it comes to collective defence, NATO remains the primary framework for most Member States. At the same time, EU-NATO relations shall not prejudice the security and defence policy of those Members which are not in NATO',¹⁵⁹ which conflicts with the concept of strategic autonomy called for by the EUGS. The EUGS plea for strategic autonomy is still under scrutiny in the academic and policy world. The debates vary between a supranational European army, including a nuclear deterrence capacity, and European forces strengthening the EU and NATO at the same time.¹⁶⁰

Deepening Broad Security

With respect to the EU's mandate in the security and defence domain, it is essential to underline that the EU possesses both civilian and military ambitions, organs and instruments for crisis management. However, from their creation, the civilian and military structures have to a great extent remained different worlds. Nevertheless, over the years the EU developed mechanisms and institutional frameworks to increase coordination and cooperation between these separate worlds. To a certain degree, this has been in contrast with NATO development in the civilian domain, as discussed in Chapter 4, and with the OSCE development of military tasks and functions.

■
156 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe'. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016. eas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf, p. 19.

157 French president Macron Press Conference, Helsinki 30 August 2018. French president Macron on a visit to the former Western Front in Verdun, 5 November 2018.

158 European Union Global Strategy, 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe'. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, available at: eas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf, p. 10-11.

159 Ibid, p. 20.

160 Debates on the concept of strategic autonomy, see: Biscop, S., 'Fighting for Europe. European Strategic Autonomy and the use of Force', 2019, available at: www.egmontinstitute.be/fighting-for-europe-european-strategic-autonomy-and-the-use-of-force/ (January 2019); Fiott, D., 'Strategic Autonomy towards 'European Sovereignty' in Defence?', The EU Institute for Security Studies, (November 2018).

For one, in 2003, France and Italy proposed a multinational gendarmerie force,¹⁶¹ which became known as the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF).¹⁶² Although the EGF does not fall under the EU umbrella, in other words it is not accommodated within the EU institutional framework, it created a possibility to make use of police capacity in international crisis management varying from conflict prevention to enhancement of international stability worldwide. The EGF has now been employed for the EU, but also the UN, NATO and OSCE operations and missions, for military as well as civilian tasks, including intelligence sharing and stability policing.

Second, as early as 2002 a comprehensive approach was formally initiated, including contributions by military means (ESDP).¹⁶³ In line with capacity building, alongside the Helsinki military Headline Goal of 1999, several civilian Headline Goals (CHG) were also initiated. The first was set up in 2000, identifying policing, the rule of law, civil administration, and civil protection as the four priority areas for the EU. The CHG of 2008 added monitoring missions and support for the EU Special Representatives and emphasised the need to conduct simultaneous missions. Furthermore, it highlighted two additional focus areas for the EU: security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR).¹⁶⁴ The CHG of 2010 placed greater emphasis on civil-military cooperation in addition. The combination of civil and military instruments resulted in military operations and civilian missions and combinations of military-civilian missions, institutionally supported by a civil-military command structure under the Commission and the Council.¹⁶⁵

Third, in line with strategy development, along with the ESS (2003) concerning external security, the Council adopted an internal European security strategy for the EU, which concerned internal security endangered by threats such as terrorism, organised crime, cybercrime and disasters.¹⁶⁶

Fourth, in the wake of 9/11 and the terrorist attacks on Madrid (2004) and London (2005), the Treaty of Lisbon introduced a solidarity clause as explained in Chapter 4.¹⁶⁷ With the internal security strategy and the solidarity clause, the EU initiated a broader approach to security and envisioned other capacities in addition to military, including police and judicial cooperation.

Finally, these ambitions and mechanisms were supported by the development of an institutional framework and became a directorate of the EEAS. First, in 2003, a civil-military cell within the EUMS was created to conduct early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning. In 2007, an operations centre was established to provide for a

161 Meeting of European Union Defense Ministers, October 2003.

162 The implementation agreement was signed by the defence ministers of the five participating countries on 17 September 2004 in Noordwijk, the Netherlands. The EGF became fully operational in 2006. See: Eurogendfor, available at: www.eurogendfor.org, accessed 3-02-2015.

163 European Council, Sevilla, 21-22 June 2002.

164 Rule of Law (200 experts), governance, civil protection, police, monitoring of (pre/post) conflicts and support for EU special representatives.

165 Operations Centre, planning and a small headquarters.

166 Internal Security Strategy (ISS), 25-26 March 2010.

167 European Council, 'Declaration on Combatting Terrorism', Brussels, 25 March 2004.

command structure in situations where a joint civil-military response was required. For the planning of civilian missions a civilian planning and conduct capability (CPCC) was created in 2008,¹⁶⁸ followed by an enhancement of the cooperation between the civilian and military directorates within the Council with the civ-mil cell: the Crisis Management and Planning Department (CMPD) in 2009. For the coordination of EU member states' operational actions, related to the EU's internal security, the Council created a Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI).¹⁶⁹ In addition, a so-called European Civil Protection Force (ECPF) was created under the civil protection mechanism.¹⁷⁰ Finally, various organs and instruments were set up with regard to the provision of internal security, such as law enforcement, cooperation in the field of police missions and education, intelligence sharing and border security (Frontex).

In short, in the domain of internal security, the EU possesses different mechanisms and organs which embrace a wide scope of internal and external security provisions supported by an institutional framework for civil and military missions and operations and an institutional link between these two.

Decision-making

Like any other international security organization, EU decision-making in the security and defence domain is in principle intergovernmental and requires a unanimous decision by the Council, the representative body of the member states. However, EU decision-making in the internal security domain falls under supranational decision-making (qualified majority).

Nevertheless, along with the member states, the authority of the organs developed and they acquired their own responsibility and actorness. For instance, within the CSDP, member states share their leading role to initiate operations, either civil or military, with the High Representative and the EEAS. Hence the fact that the right of initiative has become a shared effort, likewise the creation of structures.¹⁷¹

Another aspect to be mentioned with regard to decision-making is the framing of CSDP decision-making, as the Treaty of Lisbon declared more than once '... The member States shall support...' and '... they shall refrain...';¹⁷² which made CSDP politically binding, but not legally so. Although the concept of constructive abstention was initiated, as mentioned above, a supranational mechanism for enforcement was never adopted: 'The Council and the High Representative shall ensure compliance with these principles'.¹⁷³ If no common

168 Operational Headquarters for the civilian CSDP Missions, August 2007.

169 Under this cooperation is police cooperation and customs, protection of the borders and juridical cooperation. European Council, February 25, 2010, Article 71.

170 For a terrorist attack or natural disaster, within and outside EU territory. See: European Commission, 'EU Civil Protection Mechanism', n.d., available at: ec.europa.eu/echo/what/civil-protection/mechanism_en, accessed 7-7-2018.

171 For an elaboration on EU and CSFP-CSDP institutionalisation, see: Vanhoonacker, S., Dijkstra, H., Maurer, H., 'Understanding the Role of Bureaucracy in the European Security and Defence Policy: The State of the Art', European Integration online Papers, Vol. 14, 2010; Vanhoonacker, S., Pomorska, K., 'The European External Action Service and agenda-setting in European Foreign Policy', *Journal of European Public Policy*, Volume 20, Taylor and Francis Group, 2013.

172 The Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007.

173 Ibid, Articles 25, 28 and 29.

position was to be found, it was not determined which line would be followed: consensus or abstention.¹⁷⁴

Like NATO, the EU's decision-making in the defence domain was intergovernmental and therefore decided upon by the member states, represented in the Council and supported by the Secretariat and the High Representative. Nevertheless, the Nice Treaty of 2001 extended the use of qualified majority voting, including international agreements under the second pillar.¹⁷⁵ Equally, the concept of enhanced cooperation, or in other words, differentiated or modular cooperation, was extended to the security and defence domain.¹⁷⁶ However, this did not have any military or defence implications, because the new EU candidate states preferred the collective defence clause of NATO and opted for NATO as the first responder and did not want to strengthen the EU's ESDP too much.¹⁷⁷

In addition, differentiated cooperation was introduced into EU's defence domain with the concept of battlegroups (BG) in 2004 in the wake of the French-British cooperation of EU operation 'Artemis' in the DR Congo (2003).

Even with the Treaty of Lisbon, CFSP and CSDP remained intergovernmental, as foreign and security policy 'is considered alien to supranationalism, as its ultimate purpose is conventionally seen to be the protection of the 'national interest'.'¹⁷⁸ Nonetheless, bottom-up cooperation, executed by the EU organs, and differentiated cooperation between the member states could be observed within the EU's security and defence policy. As Sjørnsen stated, foreign and security policy has been moved further away from its citizens' influence, because of fragmentation at the national and international level as a result of the complex institutional structure where multiple actors are deciding on the security policy. Furthermore, an increasing role of officials as part of the EEAS had been observed. This happened because of an increase in the EU working groups and the Council Secretariat, as a result of '...the increase of the thematic and geographic scope', 'the EU's capabilities in crisis management' and an increasing *esprit de corps*.¹⁷⁹ Howorth stated that although foreign and security policy has been situated in the intergovernmental pillar, CSDP has intergovernmental procedures but supranational practices. According to Howorth, even greater cooperation or integration is justified in security and defence policy.¹⁸⁰ This bottom-up process of institutionalization was already implied in the EU treaties. From the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) onwards, with the creation of the High Representative and increased staff within the Council and the Commission that dealt with external relations and security and defence policy, a complex institutional framework of

174 Best, E., 'Understanding EU Decision-making', European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, The Netherlands, 2016, p. 115.

175 Treaty of Nice, 26 February 2001.

176 Enhanced cooperation: if a number of Member States (at least eight are required – nine under the Lisbon Treaty) want to work more closely on a specific area, they are able to do so.

177 Teunissen, P. J., 'Strengthening the Defence dimension of the EU', *European Foreign Affairs review*, 4, 1999, p. 337.

178 Sjørnsen, H. (eds.), 'The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Quest for Democracy', *Journal of European Public Policy Series*, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London, 2012, p. 3.

179 Ibid, p. 28.

180 Howorth, J., 'Decision-making in security and defence policy: Towards supranational inter-governmentalism?', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Sage Publications, 2012, p. 449

the EU was built. Although the EU treaties set the overall framework for deepening the institutional structure, the Lisbon Treaty literally left details on the structure, organization and functioning of the EEAS to be determined at a later stage.¹⁸¹ EU officials 'exert most influence in the agenda-setting phase of the policy process and more influence in civilian than in military operations', because of a central position in policy making which allows them to be involved very early in planning.¹⁸²

Therefore, officials have contributed to the framing of missions, because of the absence of strong control mechanisms and doctrine. Military operations were planned in combination with NATO, built by EU and NATO experts and officials.¹⁸³ Civilian missions were planned by EU experts and officials, outside the range of national planners, both in Brussels.¹⁸⁴ As a result, institutional practice has implemented the Treaty of Lisbon by agenda setting and the management and conduct of operations and missions, such as the Haiti earthquake (2010) and the Flotilla crisis in Gaza (2010).¹⁸⁵

Forms of Deepening

Within the EU, differentiated or modular cooperation started with the Schengen Agreements and was deepened with the Maastricht Treaty (1992), which gave the opportunity of opting out for all policy areas, which was further established with the Treaty of Amsterdam.¹⁸⁶ The reasoning behind possibilities of differentiation and modular cooperation was inherent to the EU integration process to enable further cooperation or even EU-specific integration initiated by a smaller (core) group of member states, with the option of others joining at a later stage (the multi-speed concept). This led to the mechanism of enhanced cooperation.¹⁸⁷

With regard to the CSDP area, the concept of modular cooperation started with the BG concept, reiterated at the French-British Summit¹⁸⁸ based on their cooperation in the context of the EU operation Artemis in the DR Congo.¹⁸⁹ The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) incorporated several mechanisms to further cooperation for states that desire this,

181 Piris, J. C., 'The Lisbon Treaty. A legal and Political Analysis', Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 250.

182 Dijkstra, H., 'The Influence of EU officials in European Security and Defence', *European Security*, 21:3, p. 312.

183 Military operations are decided upon by the member states, civilian missions are decided upon the Council in combination with the EP.

184 Dijkstra, H., 'The Influence of EU officials in European Security and Defence', *European Security*, 21:3, p. 311-312.

185 Morillas, P., 'Institutionalization or Intergovernmental Decision-Taking in Foreign Policy: The Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty', *European Foreign Affairs review* 16, 2011, Kluwer International, p. 252.

186 Treaty of Maastricht 1992, Articles 20 and 326-334.

187 Enhanced cooperation can be submitted by a proposal of the European Commission at the request of at least nine member states. To block the cooperation a quantitative quorum is needed (the 'blocking minority' referred to in Article 16, paragraph 4 of the Treaty of Maastricht) and the non-participating members remain involved and can join at any time. The European Parliament is involved in the decision-making and as a result monitoring and accountability are in place. Though it is questionable as to whether MEPs from opt-out countries should have a say in the associated legislation. Finally, enhanced cooperation is governed by EU law and is therefore under the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. Hence the clear division of tasks and competences.

188 4 February 2003, Le Touquet, France.

189 Operation Artemis was the first EU autonomous military operation outside Europe and independent of NATO to the Democratic Republic of Congo in the summer of 2003.

elaborated on above, for example the PESCO mechanism. The PESCO mechanism is inclusive, meaning all member states can join, even at a later stage.

Like NATO, therefore, many concepts have been created for more flexible decision-making and modular deployment of troops within the EU, illustrated by the BG concept. Nevertheless, many of these concepts, comparable to NATO, have not achieved the expected target. In practice, the BG have not been deployed at all, due to inflexibility in continuity, limitation in size, lack of follow-on forces, lack of central military planning or operational command structure, and no joint financing.¹⁹⁰

Cooperation outside the EU

In addition to an increase in modular cooperation within the EU, there was also an increase in informal cooperation outside the organization. Member states have initiated many bi- and multilateral concepts to further cooperation and integration in the security realm between them, mostly employable for NATO as well as the EU. One such example is the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), a comprehensive defence framework established by the Nordic countries. The United Kingdom and France signed the Lancaster House Treaties, creating an unprecedented level of bilateral defence cooperation. The German-Swedish Ghent Initiative of 2010 was an effort to boost European capabilities in the broader spectrum. The six smaller Central European countries (Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia) founded the Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC) for both practical and political collaboration; and the Baltic (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg) and 'Visegrad Four' countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary) reinvigorated their defence cooperative frameworks established during the 1990s.¹⁹¹

6.4.4 The EU Path of Deepening

Reflecting on the EU's path of deepening, the EU changed in level and form, driven by different actors and, like broadening and widening, was built in a modular and incremental manner.

Since the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), the EU has become an organization of general political principles and constitutional goals, with an emphasis on human rights policy and conflict prevention, together with a broad approach to aid, trade, security and diplomacy. This overall approach was combined with specific institutes and instruments for security and defence policy that were established by a combination of bottom-up and top-down institutional deepening.

In contrast to NATO, the EU's CSDP was built on policy and treaties, although in close cooperation with or even dependency on other organizations. The EU developed an institutionalized foreign, security and defence policy, but has not been a complete

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190 'Europese Defensie samenwerking: soevereiniteit en handelingsvermogen', nr. 78, 10 februari 2012; 'Gedifferentieerde integratie: verschillende routes in de EU-samenwerking', AIV rapport, nr. 98, 24 november 2015.

191 Rehrl, J. (Ed.), 'Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union', Third edition, 2016.

provider of security and defence policy, as it was not in charge of military operations. These were executed by national or multinational headquarters or in combination with NATO. Furthermore, these military operations were executed on an ad-hoc basis, a process driven by practice. In addition, these operations were often a combination of civil missions and military operations rather than solely traditional military operations.

The institutionalization of the EU's 'D' in CSDP in particular was developed bottom-up, from crisis response operations to common defence, although in cooperation with other actors; either states or international organizations, necessary because operational infrastructure and capabilities were lacking. As a result, the EU depended on NATO, as illustrated by the operations in Bosnia and Kosovo.

As well as the dependence on other organizations, the EU process of institutionalization is a process by practice, implying that institutionalization depends on personalities, the procedures in the agenda setting, drafting of working papers and the response to crisis situations. This also accounts for the EU's CSDP, which was built as a work in progress, built on case-by-case experiences of operations and emerging crises within and outside Europe. Furthermore, the EU has an instrumental bottom-up approach building on issue-specific, technical international rules which fabricate the *acquis communautaire* and operations and missions.

Regarding the form of the path of deepening, the EU was built in a modular manner. Modular and flexible cooperation have been inherent to EU's institutional development process since the Schengen agreements.¹⁹² Security and defence cooperation were certainly no exception to this. It started in NATO with the ESDI concept and was integrated into the EU with the BG concept and PESCO in diverse and extended forms of modular cooperation at a later stage, inside and outside the organization.

6.4.5 Conclusion

This section looked at the questions of how and why change has led to a deepening of the EU, where the following main periods of change can be identified. First, the EU's security and defence policy was adopted in the 1990s. This was followed by an institutional creation including civil and military tasks and missions in a differentiated form, a top-down and simultaneously bottom-up process. From there, the CSDP deepened and included internal and external security and even common defence. The EU's security and defence path of change was not only driven by state and non-state actors, within and outside the organization, but also depended on these actors.

6.5 The OSCE Path of Deepening

6.5.1 Introduction

The OSCE originates from the beginning of the seventies and has been a process of dialogue between East and West. This process was laid down in the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and

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¹⁹² The Schengen Agreement is a treaty that was signed on 14 June 1985. The treaty led to the creation of Europe's Schengen area in which internal border checks have largely been abolished.

signed by 35 participating states, including the US and the SU. This founding act contained a Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, also known as 'The Decalogue' and enclosed ten points regarding sovereignty, non-intervention, territorial integrity, self-determination and human rights; all aspects of crisis management and a broad perspective on security.¹⁹³ From 'Helsinki' onwards, this process of cooperation and dialogue continued and the CSCE turned into an organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter after the Cold War. In this section, the questions of how and why change has led to deepening of the OSCE is discussed. The OSCE path of deepening will be analysed, focusing on the form and level as the indicators of the path of deepening from 1990 onwards.

6.5.2 Level of Deepening

After the Cold War

The collapse of the Eastern bloc and the disintegration of the SU boosted the number of participating states. All 'new' states joined the OSCE and as a result the OSCE consisted of 57 partner states and was sometimes referred to as the 'most' legitimate organization within the European security architecture.¹⁹⁴ This legitimization was perpetuated at the end of the Cold War, with the Paris Charter for a New Europe in 1990. This Charter aimed at a more formal organization instead of a series of conferences. 'Paris' immediately initiated the institutional development with a Secretariat and Conflict Prevention Centre.

From Paris, the OSCE developed its path of deepening. The Helsinki Documents of 1992 provided political, procedural and institutional regulation for the organization to enable preparation, deployment, and maintenance for peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, 'Helsinki' left room and flexibility for the details of any particular operation to be worked out by OSCE organs, specifically by the Permanent Council. From the beginning, there was already room for a bottom-up process of institutionalization comparable to the EU. Furthermore, the Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration was adopted, which created the possibility for the peaceful settlement of disputes amongst OSCE states.¹⁹⁵

The follow-up of 'Helsinki' was the Budapest Summit in 1994, which cast the OSCE as 'a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management'.¹⁹⁶ As was intended at 'Helsinki', this empowered the OSCE with a crisis management mandate, although not without debate about the question of who was to execute this mandate.¹⁹⁷

Furthermore, 'Budapest' deepened the process of institutionalization of the OSCE whereby mechanisms and instruments were created to back up the crisis management tasks. One of the first steps was the installation of a High Commissioner on National

193 CSCE, Helsinki Final Act, 1975.

194 Moller, B., 'European Security. The roles of Regional Security Organisations', Ashgate, 2012, p. 246.

195 See: OSCE, 'Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE', 1992, available at: <https://www.osce.org/cca/111409>, accessed 5-9-2016.

196 CSCE Budapest Summit Declaration, 1994.

197 Kemp, W., 'OSCE Peace Operations: Soft Security in Hard Environments', New York: International Peace Institute, June 2016, p. 1-4.

Minorities (HCNM),¹⁹⁸ in view of the erupting crises in Europe combined with ‘missions of long duration’ and in view of the process of much-needed democratization. The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security was also adopted, an instrument aiming for the peaceful settlement of disputes between states, which operationalised and broadened the concept of security.¹⁹⁹

The adopted mechanisms were created for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management in cases which required rapid reaction, to facilitate prompt and direct contact between the parties involved in a conflict, and to help to mobilize concerted action by the OSCE. These mechanisms were divided into control and emergency mechanisms.²⁰⁰ Control mechanisms included the Vienna risk reduction mechanism²⁰¹ and the Moscow mechanism.²⁰² The emergency mechanisms included the Berlin emergency mechanism²⁰³ and the Valetta mechanism.²⁰⁴ Neither the latter nor the Conciliation Commission have ever been used or activated.²⁰⁵ Furthermore, early warning and prevention measures, peaceful settlement of disputes and finally the Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration were adopted.²⁰⁶

Finally, ‘Budapest’ transformed the OSCE into an organization instead of a conference. The OSCE was declared a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, under the umbrella of the UN. All in all, the initial intention for the OSCE was to be an intergovernmental organization of solely dialogue and negotiations. Missions in the field, for instance, were not included at first; in the 1990s, therefore, the OSCE path of deepening was robust.

As a follow up to ‘Paris’ and ‘Budapest’, the summit in Lisbon of 1996 built further on the Security Model for Europe; the debates about a European security architecture. In Lisbon, this resulted in the Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe in the 21st century. The idea behind this OSCE Security Model was to broaden and deepen

198 For an elaboration on the HCNM: Mosser, M. W., ‘Embracing ‘Embedded security’: the OSCE’s understated but significant role in the European security architecture’, *European Security*, Routledge, 2015, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 591; Kemp, W., ‘OSCE Peace operations: Soft Security in Hard Environments’, International Peace Institute, New York, June 2016.

199 Revised in 2014.

200 See: OSCE, *Compendium of OSCE Mechanism and Procedures*, Sec.gal/121/08, 20 June 2008, available at: <https://www.osce.org/cio/32683>, accessed 12-3-2017.

201 The Vienna Mechanism of 1990 on unusual military activities allows for an emergency meeting of all OSCE participating states at the request of only one state: the Vienna risk reduction mechanism.

202 The Moscow mechanism allows rapporteur missions to be sent to a state even without the state’s permission.

203 The Berlin mechanisms allows for the convening of a special meeting within the OSCE framework with the consent of only 13 states, 1991.

204 The Valletta mechanism provides the selection of one or more individuals, from a register of qualified candidates maintained by the CPC, and in the setting-up of a OSCE institution for the peaceful settlement of disputes, responsible for advising the parties in their choice of an appropriate dispute settlement procedure. In addition, the Valetta mechanism helps the parties to find a solution to the dispute, for instance the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration may be used for those purposes 1991

205 For an elaboration on these mechanisms: Stenner, C., ‘Understanding the Mediator: Taking Stock of the OSCE’s Mechanisms and Instruments for Conflict Resolution’, *Security and Human Rights*, Volume 27, 2016, nos. 3-4, p. 261.

206 OSCE Council of Ministers Stockholm, part of the Decision on Peaceful Settlement of Dispute, 1992, available at: <https://www.osce.org/ccca/111409?download=true>, accessed 1-7-2018

the OSCE's mandate, aiming at a genuine European security architecture. Nevertheless, with the upcoming NATO enlargement and the rising tensions between Russia and the West as a result of the Balkan wars,²⁰⁷ 'Lisbon' did not set a strong security model, the first decline in building the European security architecture due to the diverging interests of the participating states.

The treaties about conventional arms within the OSCE area, the CFE treaties, were a path of deepening alongside the security model development. In Lisbon, the states that were party to the Treaty on CFE of 1990 signed an agreement to launch negotiations to adapt the treaty to the new security architecture.²⁰⁸

After 'Lisbon', the Istanbul Summit of 1999 adopted the Charter for European Security, which purported to be another attempt to further strengthen the aspirations of a security model. 'Istanbul' also adopted the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (ACFE) and CSBMs, striving for the containment of a possible confrontation within the OSCE area through regional arms control agreements and the CSBMs. The ACFE was never ratified by the NATO countries on the grounds that Russia had not implemented its Istanbul commitments to withdraw its troops from Moldova and Georgia.²⁰⁹

What was reaffirmed in Istanbul was OSCE's adopted capability of mandating and conducting peacekeeping operations, although debates between the participating states were numerous regarding the peacekeeping mandate status of the OSCE. These debates varied between reaching consensus about giving the OSCE an enforcement mandate, the specification of a conflict in which to exercise the peacekeeping mandate, and a key issue of command and control including what sort of capacity the OSCE itself should obtain in this respect.²¹⁰

Hence from 'Budapest' to 'Istanbul', the OSCE hosted many negotiations on the security model, including a Platform for Cooperative Security,²¹¹ which sought to provide the OSCE with a coordinating (non-hierarchical) role in respect of other European security organizations; a genuine European security architecture. Although the European security model documents were adopted, 'Istanbul' became the last summit with these kinds of aspirations.

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207 Since the Yugoslav crisis broke out Russia had been a member of the Balkans Contact Group, but tensions rose due to the NATO operations in the area. For the first time since the end of the Cold War Russia vetoed a Security Council resolution in 1999 as Russia had difficulty in agreeing to the idea of military action against its Serbian ally in the Balkans. Furthermore, Moscow did not want Kosovo to set a precedent for further interventions, especially not in its near abroad, like in Georgia. Russia's veto in the UNSC was a turning point in Russia's relations with the West.

208 Thirty states joined at the moment of signing the CFE agreement. Russia suspended the observance of its treaty obligations on July 14, 2007 and in March 2015, Russia announced that it had taken the decision to completely stop its participation in the Treaty.

209 See Chapter 4.

210 Hill. W. H., 'OSCE Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping, Past and Future', OSCE Security Days Event, National War College Washington DC., 16 September 2013.

211 See: OSCE, 'Operational Document- the Platform for Co-operative Security', 1999, available at: <https://www.osce.org/mc/17562>, accessed 2-2-2016.

In practice, the OSCE had never been involved in a peacekeeping operation under its own flag. Not so much because of the lack of personnel, technical or physical resources, but rather the lack of consensus between the participating states, which had mandated the OSCE themselves.²¹² Furthermore, the level of military transparency had remained comparatively high until 2014 and the arms control regime, as one of the driving forces of the OSCE institutionalization, had partly become outdated and a subject of debate as a result of the power struggle among the participating states.

In addition, modernising the Vienna document had not been successful either. Likewise, the Open Skies Treaty, finalised in 2002, resulted in disputes between states. As a result, a number of governments had significantly decreased their investments in the OSCE around the end of the twentieth century.²¹³ The three pillars of the OSCE military domain of arms control – the CFE, the Vienna document on CSBMs and the Open Skies Treaty, not all under the umbrella of the OSCE – thus either became outdated or were abandoned due to a lack of transparency and distrust.²¹⁴

Institutional Development in the 1990s

Apart from the multiple but disappointing attempts to build the OSCE as the prime European security organization, the level of the path of OSCE deepening did evolve in the 1990s due to annual meetings of foreign ministers. Several organs, mechanisms and instruments deepened the OSCE institutional structure. The OSCE's main decision-making body, the Permanent Council, the representation of the participating states, was assisted by a small Secretariat. This Council was empowered to debate any issue affecting the OSCE's mandate and has always been chaired²¹⁵ by one of the participating states. In addition, the Secretary-General's main task was to assist the Chairman of the Permanent Council. The Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) was principally concerned with issues relating to security policy and arms control and provided a platform for weekly discussions on security policy issues among the 57 states.

Furthermore, because of the conflicts in the Balkans and other frozen conflicts,²¹⁶ Europe had to find solutions to ethnic minority tensions and actual conflicts. The HCNM was therefore appointed. In combination with the HCNM, the ODIHR was installed as one of the three autonomous organs.²¹⁷ The ODIHR was installed to assist the former

212 Kemp, W., 'OSCE Peace Operations: Soft Security in Hard Environments', New York: International Peace Institute, June 2016, p. 4.

213 Zellner, W. (Co), 'Towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community. From Vision to Reality', IDEAS, 2012, p. 13.

214 See the principles or 'rule of cooperation' between the OSCE members in the 'Helsinki Decalogue', Helsinki Final Act, 1975.

215 The Chairmanship rotated on an annual basis and was chaired by one of the participating states. This Chairman was assisted by the previous and future Chairman in Office (CiO), the so-called Troika. The state that held the position of (the) CiO could request for missions to be carried out and could put topics, such as terrorism, on the agenda.

216 A frozen conflict is a situation in which active armed conflict has ended, but no peace treaty or other political framework resolved the conflict. As a result, legally the conflict can start again at any moment, creating an environment of insecurity and instability.

217 Often debated, but the activities of HCNM and ODIHR are not tied to consensus approval of the Permanent Council, though their heads and budget approval is, see: Dunay, P., 'The OSCE in crisis', Chaillot Paper, no 88, Paris, EUISSP, 2006, p. 30.

Communist countries in their transition process to democratic political systems through the promotion of free elections, for instance by training and providing observers. These two OSCE organs gained the most attention for OSCE activities.²¹⁸ The main institutional changes in the OSCE had therefore taken place by 1996.

Regarding the location of the organs, most of them were based in Central Europe. This illustrates the early intention of focusing on the regions 'East of Vienna' and moving the institutional centre of a European security architecture from the west to the middle of Europe. Furthermore, in contrast to the EU, but comparable to NATO, the OSCE organs were spread across Europe with the intention of creating a decentralised organization.²¹⁹

On the issue of staffing of the organs, the Charter of Paris of 1990 had set limits on staffing arrangements, which meant that '...the OSCE's 'centripetal' and 'centrifugal' forces remain restrained, it also impairs the organization's ability to operate, especially in terms of losing institutional knowledge'.²²⁰ As a result, though the ambitions were high, the OSCE had to cope with 'understaffing, lack of resources, and insufficient mandates (vague)... missions make up the lion's share of the budget' from the beginning.²²¹

The OSCE organs' mandate and freedom to act was more flexible, as was elaborated on above. ODIHR and HCNM 'can be considered at least somewhat 'autonomous'²²² from the organization and therefore from the participating states. The missions of ODIHR cover election monitoring and observation of national democratic processes; '...as a decentralised organization with an operational focus and light bureaucratic structures, ..., the OSCE has often demonstrated an outstanding capacity for rapid and flexible responses to emergency situations'.²²³ The ODIHR executed its missions of international monitors 'to activities that would otherwise be ignored'.²²⁴ Hence the fact that the participating states do not have full control over the activities of independent OSCE organs, which operate on the basis of their own mandates.²²⁵

The OSCE path of deepening was much debated between the participating states. The West's interest in changing the CSCE into the OSCE was to strive for stability in the East. Within the Central and Eastern states, the interests were mixed; states that later became members of

218 For an elaboration on the tasks of ODIHR; Mosser, M. W., 'Embracing 'Embedded security': the OSCE's understated but significant role in the European security architecture', *European Security*, Routledge, 2015, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 591.

219 OSCE handbook, 2016, secretariat of the OSCE, Vienna.

220 Galbreath, D. J., 'The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe', Routledge Global Institutions, 2007, Great Britain, p. 44.

221 Stewart, E. J., 'Restoring EU-OSCE Cooperation for Pan-European Conflict Prevention', *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 29, no. 2, August 2008, p. 268.

222 Galbreath, D. J., 'The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe', Routledge Global Institutions, 2007, Great Britain, p. 95-98.

223 Ghebali, V. Y., 'Where is the OSCE going? Present role and challenges of a stealth security organisation', p. 55, in: Tardy, T. (eds.), 'European Security in a Global Context', 2009, Routledge.

224 Mosser, M. W. 'Embracing 'embedded security': the OSCE's understated but significant role in the European security architecture', *European Security*, 24:4, p. 591.

225 Kropatcheva, E., 'Russia and the role of the OSCE in European Security: a forum 'for dialog or a Battlefield 'of interest?', *European Security*, 21:3, 2012, p. 373.

the EU and NATO were interested in democratic reform. States of the former Yugoslavia and the SU were more focused on state building instead of democratisation. On the other side, Russia was correspondingly interested in the OSCE, although for quite different reasons. For Russia, the OSCE created an opportunity to replace NATO and become the prominent organization within the European security architecture, as was Russia's intention with the Charter of Paris (1990) and to strive for a strong position in this European security architecture.

The New Age

As a response to the new security threats at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of 2000, the OSCE adopted a Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century in 2003. And, as discussed in Chapter 4, the document stated strategy, though an action plan through which action should be taken was not included. In 2008 and 2009, Russia initiated several proposals for deepening the OSCE in a pan-European security organization, but again with little result when Russian President Medvedev's proposal for a new European security model was rejected. Russia wanted the OSCE to act as an alternative to NATO's worldwide engagement, enlargement and PfP programmes. Russia judged NATO's and the EU's paths of broadening and widening as Cold War instruments.²²⁶ One of the final Russian attempts to strengthen the OSCE was the 2010 Astana Ministerial Council Summit meeting, which was elaborated on in Chapter 4.

Between 2011 and 2014, however, there was a period of détente between East and West, supported by some of the smaller and medium-sized states to strengthen the OSCE. The traditionally neutral states in particular were involved in supporting the OSCE, such as Switzerland, Austria and Finland, followed by Turkey and Germany.²²⁷ However, after 2010, Russia's interest changed from initiatives and agenda-setting to disinterest, leading to paralysis of the OSCE organs which it had created decades before.²²⁸

Since the Crimea crisis of 2014, the relationship between Russia and the West changed dramatically and the idea of the OSCE as the pivot of the European security architecture was lost. States were less engaged with the OSCE, which resulted in a lack of political leadership from the troika and the chairmanship. Furthermore, states were less interested in strengthening their commitment to transfer more political weight to the OSCE and the multi-year planning and budgeting meetings lost their importance too.

However, the Ministerial Council in Vilnius did strengthen the OSCE with the building of a mediation-support capacity in the OSCE secretariat. Mediation within the executive structures was institutionalised, for instance by the adoption of a Mediation Support Team

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226 Medvedev President of Russia, Berlin, June 2008.

227 Goetschel, L., 'Kleinstaat im multilateralen Umfeld der OSZE' in: Goetschel (ed.), 'Vom Statisten zum Hauptdarsteller. Die Schweiz und ihre OSZE-Präsidentschaft', Verlag Paul Hapt, 1996, p. 29-50.

228 Galbreath, D. J., 'The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe', Routledge Global Institutions, 2007, Great Britain, p. 62.

within the Conflict Prevention Centre.²²⁹ This capacity was neither superfluous nor too early, because in 2014 the OSCE took on the role of mediator between Ukraine, Russia and the separatists, the so-called Trilateral Contact Group (TCG). This resulted in, for instance, the 2015 Minsk Package of Measures,²³⁰ which provided a ceasefire and outlined steps towards a political resolution. A remarkable step, because the OSCE was both a formal participant within the TCG and a mediator through the position of the CiO and the Special Representative in the conflict. Furthermore, the OSCE was involved in these conflicts at a time when relations between Russia and the West were at an all-time low. Nevertheless, the OSCE 'represented the lowest common denominator and minimal consent that a multilateral organization on the ground and a forum for political negotiation was needed'.²³¹

Furthermore, the OSCE's role in the Transnistrian conflict²³² was strengthened due to the reactivation of the '5 plus 2 talks' in 2011 and in the South Caucasus and Georgia together with the UN and the EU. Likewise the OSCE was active in the South Caucasus and Georgia together with UN and EU representatives. Hence, the conclusion that the OSCE's activities and missions were often carried out in conflict areas in which the other security organizations were neither welcome nor interested.

A Participating Group of States

The group of states composing the OSCE developed into a large and very heterogeneous group, resulting in widely diverging interests. The US and Russia remained the dominant players in this European security architecture, which had a great impact on the OSCE. Russia had been one of the driving forces behind the concept of the Security Model of the 21st century and the institutionalisation of the OSCE.

Russia's main interest was the instrument of CSBMs, not the OSCE instruments for democracy and human rights, in contrast with the Western states. Russia had put the institutional reform on the OSCE agenda from the 1990s onwards, as a countermeasure to the deepening and widening of NATO and the clash between the West and Russia in 2014. At the same time, Russia was ambivalent about the role of the OSCE. On the one hand it fitted Russia's vision of what role the OSCE should play. On the other hand, according to Russia, the OSCE should strengthen in relation to the other European security organizations.²³³

229 See: OSCE, 'Mediation and Mediation Support', n.d., available at: <https://www.osce.org/secretariat/107488>, accessed 30 April 2018.

230 See: OSCE, Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements, 2015, available at: <https://www.osce.org/cio/140156>, accessed 13 September 2018.

231 Lanz, D., 'Charting the Ups-and-downs of OSCE Mediation', in Security and Human Rights, Netherlands Helsinki Committee, Volume 27, 2016, Nos. 3-4, p. 252.

232 The Transnistrian conflict was an armed conflict that broke out in November 1990 in Moldova between pro-Transnistrian forces (supported by Russia) and pro-Moldovan forces. A cease fire was declared on 21 July 1992, which has held. In 2011 talks were held under the auspices of the OSCE, Russia, Ukraine, the US, the EU and the UN.

233 For an elaboration on Russia's position towards the OSCE after the 2014 Crimea crisis; Shakirov, O., 'NoSCE or Next Generation OSCE?', in Security and Human Rights, Netherlands Helsinki Committee, Volume 27, 2016, Nos. 3-4, p. 290-308.

Russia accused the West of applying double standards, because the West focused on the former SU and the Balkans for instance, but did not include security issues in the West.²³⁴

In contrast, the US stalled OSCE deepening from the end of the 1990s due to the Russian military offensives in Chechnya and the presence of Russian forces in Moldova and Georgia.²³⁵ Although the US had been positive towards deepening the OSCE until 1996, the follow-up had been received with more ambivalence. For the US, NATO had always been the organization to deal with the 'hard' security issues of Europe due to the regular inability of the OSCE to achieve consensus, combined with its lack of resources. Nevertheless, in some cases the US was very much aware that the OSCE was the only organization that could act in conflicts in which Russia was engaged, such as the crisis in Ukraine.²³⁶

Apart from Russia and the US, as shifting adversaries within the OSCE, the EU member states mostly voted as a bloc on issues of decision-making and agenda-setting, which accounted for almost half of the OSCE states.²³⁷

From 2000, therefore, the tenor of the participating states towards the OSCE was that the organization was in decline despite a certain amount of success in the field of conflict prevention. The dual role of Russia as a mediator and sometimes a 'party', combined with the Western disinterest and the emerging role of the EU as a security actor, also contributed to this trend. This is illustrated by the 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict that was settled by the President of the EU Council instead of the OSCE Chairperson-in-office.²³⁸

The OSCE itself, as a result of criticism about insufficient support and institutionalization, instigated a reform programme to improve its effectiveness in 2005. This led to the report entitled 'Towards a More Effective OSCE', followed by the adoption of a framework decision on strengthening the effectiveness of the OSCE.²³⁹ Furthermore, a Rules and Procedures Handbook was adopted and implemented in 2006.²⁴⁰ There were some modest results, but those did not lead to recognition of the OSCE as a full standard international organization or reform of the less effective organs.²⁴¹

234 Ghebali, V. Y., 'The OSCE between Crisis and Reform: Towards a new lease of Life', Policy Paper no. 10, Geneva centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005, p. 13-15.

235 Stewart, E. J., 'Restoring EU-OSCE Cooperation for Pan-European Conflict Prevention', *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 29, no. 2, August 2008, p. 271.

236 Hopmann, T. P., 'The United States and the OSCE after the Ukraine Crisis', *Security and Human Rights*, Brill and Nijhoff publishers, volume 26, 2015, no. 1, p. 33.

237 EU voting in OSCE.

238 Lanz, D., 'Charting the Ups-and-downs of OSCE Mediation', in *Security and Human Rights*, Netherlands Helsinki Committee, Volume 27, 2016, Nos. 3-4, p. 248-249.

239 See: OSCE, 'Common Purpose, Towards a more effective OSCE', 2005, available at: <https://www.osce.org/cio/15805>, accessed 12-9-2017.

240 OSCE Ministerial Council Decision No. 17, 'Strengthening the Effectiveness of the OSCE', Ljubljana, 6 December 2005, MC/DEC/17/05, available at http://www.osce.si/mc-docs/mc_17_05.pdf, accessed 20-07-2017.

241 Ghebali, V. Y., 'Where is the OSCE going? Present role and challenges of a stealth security organisation', p. 65-66, in: Tardy, T., (eds.) 'European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external dynamics', *Contemporary Security Studies*, Routledge, Oxon, Great Britain, 2009.

Decision-making

At the beginning of the 1990s, the OSCE started off as an intergovernmental organization, where the voting system was based on consensus. Within the OSCE, this did not only refer to policy-relevant decisions, but also administrative decisions, in contrast with NATO and the EU.²⁴²

As a result of the number of participating states and the consensus voting system, dissatisfaction grew amongst the participating states. Although consensus within the OSCE was not the same as unanimity, 'for it allows states to go along with proposals with which they may not absolutely agree by merely refusing to object'.²⁴³ Nevertheless, one of the first issues within the path of OSCE deepening was the debate on the voting system of consensus. This resulted in a change of the voting system, even supported by the new states, entailing a consensus-minus-one rule. The rule was adopted at the meeting in Prague in 1992 and allowed the OSCE to adopt political measures against a non-complying member.²⁴⁴ This Prague document created the possibility for some exceptions, in which case decisions could be taken by consensus-minus-one, in order to accommodate action against a non-complying state. This was the first form of flexibilization within the European security architecture.²⁴⁵ The consensus-minus-one procedure was even expanded with the acceptance of the consensus-minus-two procedure in the same year.²⁴⁶ According to Mosser, 'Among OSCE participating states, consensus-minus-one was not as controversial as it might have appeared at first glance, not even among smaller states that ostensibly had the most to lose in a formal re-arrangement of voting procedures'.²⁴⁷ The aim of the procedure was to stop political instability and conflicts in the OSCE area through a more efficient decision-making procedure.²⁴⁸ All the states were in favour of the procedure, including Russia, because 'provisions should be made for convening emergency meetings of the OSCE Council'.²⁴⁹

Furthermore, a 'tacit approval (or silence) procedure was adopted, which made it possible for a decision to be adopted within a specific time limit, provided no objection was raised. This was often used by the decision-making bodies when adopting administrative,

242 For an elaboration on the development of decision-making within the OSCE: Mosser, M. W., 'Embracing 'embedded security': the OSCE's understated but significant role in the European security architecture', *European Security*, 24:4, p. 585.

243 Mosser, M. W. 'Embracing 'embedded security': the OSCE's understated but significant role in the European security architecture', *European Security*, 24:4, p. 585.

244 The Prague Document on Further Development of OSCE Institutions and Structures, January 1992.

245 The only application of this mechanism was May 1992 to suspend Serbia and Montenegro from further participation in the OSCE process.

246 Meeting in December 1992, the Council introduced the possibility of a decision being taken in accordance with the rule of consensus minus two in regard to the peaceful settlement of disputes.

247 Mosser, M. W., 'Embracing 'embedded security': the OSCE's understated but significant role in the European security architecture', *European Security*, 2015, 2015, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 586.

248 Up to now this option has only been used in 1992 when Yugoslavia was excluded because of its responsibility for various serious human rights violations.

249 Mosser, M. W., 'Embracing 'embedded security': the OSCE's understated but significant role in the European security architecture', *European Security*, 2015, 2015, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 586.

budgetary or operational decisions and particularly when officials were being appointed or their term of office extended'.²⁵⁰

Much later, at the Corfu meeting of 2009, the decision-making procedure of the OSCE was again put on the agenda. On paper, this led to another expansion of the consensus-minus-one voting system '...in that it no longer formally 'calls out' a participating state but rather places the state of inefficiency squarely on the shoulders of the organisation itself...'.²⁵¹ Nevertheless, 'Corfu' could also be considered as the antithesis of consensus-minus-one, in that its '...ostensible normative interpretation is thin cover for traditional, transparent instrumental use of power'.²⁵² Either way, with Corfu, the consensus-minus-one rule was extended. Although the consensus-minus-one and two decision-making procedures had made a difference during the conflicts in the 1990s, efficient decision-making within an organization of 57 states remained a challenge.

The process of decision-making itself, within the OSCE, took place at periodic summits of heads of state and yearly meetings of the Ministerial Council composed of delegates of the participating states. Apart from the lengthy decisions-making process with 57 states, the OSCE itself operated with many mechanisms. These mechanisms were separated from the decision-making cycle and were not hindered by the decision-making process associated with consensus requirement at the political level.²⁵³

All in all, decision-making within the OSCE had become flexible and decisions were made by the participating states and organs. Still, in practice it had turned out to be difficult to reach consensus and create mandates for field missions, which were often discontinued as a result.²⁵⁴

6.5.3 Forms of Deepening

Like NATO and the EU, within the OSCE a differentiation in the forms of cooperation is observed. As well as the different options for voting in the decision-making process within the OSCE, other forms of cooperation were at the heart of the matter. These were cooperative mechanisms, as described above, to facilitate a qualified majority to enable specific cooperative action. With these mechanisms, states were allowed to initiate action in bilateral or multilateral meetings.²⁵⁵ These mechanisms were activated frequently at the

250 The procedure has developed since the adoption, in November 1990, of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, which stipulates that it be used for the appointment of the first Director of each institution (paragraph 14 of the Procedures and Modalities concerning OSCE Institutions). Finally, the July 1992 Helsinki Decisions also make provision for the use of that procedure for the setting up of an ad-hoc steering group on a proposal from the Chairman-in-Office (Chapter I, paragraph 18).

251 Mosser, M. W., 'Embracing 'embedded security': the OSCE's understated but significant role in the European security architecture', *European Security*, 2015, 2015, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 589.

252 Idem.

253 Stewart, E. J., 'Restoring EU-OSCE Cooperation for Pan-European Conflict Prevention', *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 29, no. 2, August 2008, p. 268.

254 For example, the closure of the field office in Yerevan by Azerbaijan.

255 Except for the Vienna mechanism, which can be activated by a single state, the other mechanisms require a minimum of a qualified minority.

beginning of the 1990s (except for the Valetta mechanism), but this has declined since the late 1990s, sometimes even denying states the option to collaborate in OSCE missions.²⁵⁶

Furthermore, the field missions of the OSCE were numerous, but often not supported by any legal agreement or sufficient capabilities. More often, these deficits were filled by a single state or a group of states²⁵⁷ outside the OSCE or replaced by other international organizations.

Finally, multilateral cooperation at the political level with regard to efforts to find solutions in specific conflicts has been a concept of the OSCE from the beginning. In other words, contact groups within the organization. The Minsk Group, for instance, was involved in a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It is co-chaired by France, Russia and the US.

6.5.4 *The OSCE Path of Deepening*

From its creation, the OSCE had a normative focus, with high standards in relation to governance, rule of law and human rights.²⁵⁸ As a result, the OSCE can be considered a norm-based organization of democratic values, codified in the documents of 1975, 1990, 1999 and 2010. However, most of this comprehensive *acquis* of norms and values and additional organs was not implemented.²⁵⁹

After the end of the Cold War, the OSCE built new organs, adopted mechanisms and extended its mandate, staff and capabilities for operations and missions. Along with the normative focus, the institutional build-up of the OSCE took place in policy areas like the human dimension, such as the institutes of HCNM and ODHIR. In the early 1990s, the ideas for the OSCE were ambitious, as declared in the related OSCE documents. However, the development to support this institutional structure, such as staffing, capabilities and funds to accomplish these ambitions, lagged behind.²⁶⁰

The OSCE was composed of 57 states and was therefore a heterogeneous organization, which made compromise on the difficult issues problematic. One solution could have been the consensus-minus-one rule. However, according to Mosser, the consensus-minus-one had been 'weaponised', which resulted in the opposite of a deepening of the OSCE and did not lead to more efficiency, as was the intention.²⁶¹

The OSCE was empowered to play a primary role in the European security architecture. Nevertheless, deepening had not evolved since the Istanbul Summit of 1999. From 2000, the OSCE had become a victim of an international power struggle between the West and Russia. This was a result of EU and NATO enlargement and the conflicts in the Balkans, such as in

256 See: US Mission to the OSCE, 'Human Rights Abuses in Chechnya: 15 OSCE Countries invoke Vienna Mechanism', 2018, available at: <https://osce.usmission.gov/human-rights-abuses-in-chechnya-15-osce-countries-invoke-vienna-mechanism/>, accessed 12-9-2017.

257 Williams, P. D., 'Security Studies. An Introduction', Routledge, Oxon, 2018.

258 Mosser, M. W., 'Embracing 'embedded security': the OSCE's understated but significant role in the European security architecture', *European Security*, 2015, 2015, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 580.

259 Zellner, W. (Co), 'Towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community. From Vision to Reality', *IDEAS*, 2012, p. 11.

260 Hill, W. H., 'OSCE Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping, Past and Future', OSCE Security Days Event, National War College Washington DC., 16 September 2013, p. 1.

261 Mosser, M. W., 'Embracing 'embedded security': the OSCE's understated but significant role in the European security architecture', *European Security*, 2015, 2015, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 586.

Kosovo, where Russia and the US fundamentally disagreed. The debates between the states regarding the build-up of the OSCE resulted in a process of unfinished institutionalization. This caused the OSCE's operational institutes to perform with undue autonomy, under the guise of flexibility and pragmatism, and for states and other organizations to impose their own agenda. This was strengthened by excessive political autonomy of the Chairman in Office, the long-term missions (LTMs) and especially ODHIR's position, according to Ghebali.²⁶² A leading mediation role in conflicts was thus difficult to realize, as a result of the consensus-based organization, which included both the conflict and external parties. Nevertheless, the OSCE always had a strong field presence to gather information and at the same time facilitate important dialogues.

In contrast to NATO and the EU, the OSCE was never founded on a treaty, but was a politically based organization. The OSCE has therefore been more of a process than an organization, aimed at dialogue between East and West.²⁶³ According to Mosser, the fact that the OSCE has been a political organization meant that 'the decision-making and procedural rules were even more important to its function. The rules allow states to minimise transaction costs when interacting with each other, and to avoid endless renegotiation over what should be straightforward procedures. In the OSCE, however, the rules underpinned a structure that was designed to question the foundation of international security'.²⁶⁴ One positive aspect is the fact that non-legally binding organizations give states and organs more flexibility and freedom of movement with regard to decision-making and actions. However, flexibility can also lead to free-rider behaviour, if an organization does not have the power to force states or organs to act, for instance by means of a treaty, which was the case with the OSCE.

Furthermore, the OSCE lacked a strategy that specified goals and structures, the legal basis and capacities, a financing system and 'a politically empowered secretary-general and a political and professional secretariat'.²⁶⁵

In general, one of the problems for the OSCE has been the inherited competing principles of territorial integrity versus the right of self-determination from the Helsinki Final Act.²⁶⁶ Within the OSCE, it was made clear that the concept of cooperative security, human rights and inclusiveness conflicted with state sovereignty. This left the OSCE as a functionalist and specialist organization for the difficult, unsolvable conflicts in the OSCE

262 Ghebali, V. Y., 'Where is the OSCE going? Present role and challenges of a stealth security organisation', p. 68, in: Tardy, T., (Eds.), 'European Security in a Global Context', Routledge, 2009.

263 Holsti, K. J., 'International Politics: A Framework for Analysis', 7th international ed., Prentice-Hall International, 1994, p. 25.

264 Mosser, M. W., 'Embracing 'embedded security': the OSCE's understated but significant role in the European security architecture', *European Security*, 2015, 2015, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 584.

265 Ghebali, V. Y., 'Where is the OSCE going? Present role and challenges of a stealth security organisation', p. 65, in: Tardy, T., (eds.), 'European Security in a Global Context', Routledge, 2009.

266 Sargsyan, H., 'Syntheses of Common Challenges: Multifaceted Obstacle Course for the OSCE and all Parties Concerned', *Security and Human Rights*, Netherlands Helsinki Committee, Volume 27, 2016, Nos. 3-4, p. 520.

area, which was in contrast with the supposedly leading role of the European security architecture.²⁶⁷

6.5.5 Conclusion

In this section, the questions of how and why change has led to deepening of the OSCE is examined. Within the OSCE path of deepening, the following main periods can be identified. First, directly after the end of the Cold War, the OSCE deepened its institutional structure and instruments, with the aim of setting up the OSCE as the umbrella organization for the European security architecture. This period of deepening was followed by a period of tension and upcoming disinterest of the participating states, lacking solidarity, a common strategy, and the inability to provide the OSCE with accurate instruments and capacities. And, finally, disarray occurred between the participating states, resulting in disinterest and unwillingness to strengthen the OSCE.

As a result, dialogue and cooperation within the OSCE area was replaced by bi- and multilateral state blocs lacking organizational coordination. And though the OSCE could be seen as ‘the eyes and ears’ of the international community and could be regarded, in contrast to the EU and NATO, as a more comprehensive organization in terms of members as well as policies, the effect was a rebound and left the OSCE placed in the middle of conflicts. This to paralysis in the build-up of the organization as well as in the actions to be performed.

6.6 The Tower of Babel: A Cross-case Comparison on the Path of Deepening

6.6.1 Introduction

The previous sections discussed the path of change of the security organizations separately. These paths of change, resulting in an institutional build-up of the security organization, are chronologically presented in the table below. This section addresses the questions of how and why change in the path of deepening has varied between the security organizations. The security organizations will be compared, addressing observed differences and similarities in the indicators of level and form to analyse the variation between the organizations. In other words, the cases will be subjected to a cross-case comparison within the path of deepening, based on the research framework.

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²⁶⁷ Stewart, E. J., ‘Restoring EU-OSCE Cooperation for Pan-European Conflict Prevention’, *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 29, no. 2, August 2008, p. 268.

Deepening of security organizations	NATO	EU	OSCE
Previous to 1990	Creation 1949	Creation 1952	Creation 1975
1990			Paris Summit; European security architecture
1991	NSC, ESDI, start change structure; planning staff, crisis coordination centre, reduction HQ		
1992		CSDP, Petersberg declaration	Prague Summit; consensus minus 1+2, convention on conciliation and arbitration
1994	CJTF, C2 and HQ		CSCE=OSCE, Chapter VIII organization UN, HCNM, ODHIR, Code of Conduct, Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration. Institutional building of Council and parliamentary assembly. Crisis management task
1996	ESDI		
1997	C2 transformation	Strengthening Petersberg tasks, start institutional building, constructive abstention	
1998		St. Malo Summit; ESDP	
1999	NSC, HQ and C2	Treaty of Amsterdam, HHG (civil and military), crisis management, creation PSC/ COPS for missions, five national operational HQ	Istanbul, ACFE and strengthening CSBMs
2001		Treaty of Nice; institutionalisation PSC, EUMC, EUMS, EGF, ECAP. WEU=EU, except for Article 5	

2002	NRF, change institutional structure; committees, HQ, C2 split ACT-ACO, PCC		
2003	C2 reform; ACO and ACT	ESS, EDA, EGF	
2004		Civilian headline goal; counter terrorism coordinator, civilian response teams	
2006		BG	
2007		Strengthening Petersberg tasks, operations centre, CPCC, sitcen	
2008		CPCC, civilian HQ	
2009		Treaty of Lisbon; ESDP=CSDP, EEAS, HR, PESCO, Art 42.7 and 222, CMPD, CPCC	Corfu Summit, adjustment consensus minus 1
2010	NSC, smart defence, ESCD	Internal Security Strategy	
2011	CCOMC		mediation-support capacity
2013	FNC (Germany)		
2014	RAP, NRF extension, VJTF, IFFG, FFG, RAP, CFI, JEF		
2015	Multinational Division South-East		
2016	Cyber attacks under Article 5, CCD, C2 reform	EUGS IPSD, PESCO, EDAP, CARD, EDF, COSI, ECPF, CCD and involvement Commission	

Table 6.1 Overview of key moments of the path of deepening of the different security organizations.

6.6.2 Comparing the paths of deepening of NATO, the EU and the OSCE

The OSCE was founded at the beginning of the seventies as a process and transformed at the end of the Cold War into a permanent organization. From its creation, the OSCE was regarded more as a process than an organization, not an end state, aimed at dialogue between East and West.²⁶⁸ The institutional build-up of the OSCE was based on the



²⁶⁸ Holsti, K. J., 'International Politics: A Framework for Analysis', 7th international ed., Prentice-Hall International, 1994, p. 25.

policy areas for which the OSCE was mandated: the human dimension and minorities institutionally mirrored in the HCNM and ODHIR.

As in the case of the OSCE, EU integration was likewise regarded as a process. The final aim of the European integration process has always been under debate, varying from a federal organization, an ever deepening union, to an intergovernmental organization or what the French President Charles de Gaulle called a *Europe des États*, in which national sovereignty was the principal idea.²⁶⁹ With regard to security and defence policy, the EU had no pre-existing military competence before the launch of CSDP, in contrast to NATO. The EU's CSDP institutional design was drawn from the WEU, NATO, the OSCE and the UN and was built from there.²⁷⁰ From the beginning, therefore, there was no consensus between the member states with regard to the creation of a new international crisis management organization or its relationship with other international organizations in the European security architecture.

NATO's core business or aim as a security organization was laid down from the very beginning: solidarity between the member states as a means to deter threats from outside the organization. At first, NATO was built on the threats perceived. The aim was the preservation of status quo and stabilisation. After the end of the Cold War, NATO was adjusted in response to the security environment's need for a crisis management organization together with a compromise between the member states and links with other security organizations.

From the analysis of the path of deepening of the security organizations identified in this chapter, based on the indicators of level and form, some key findings stand out.

Level of Deepening

From their creation, all security organizations show a different model of politically or treaty-based organizations.

First, the OSCE contains a large group of states with a broad variety of geopolitical interests.

Furthermore, although the OSCE is a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the OSCE is a political and not a treaty-based organization.

In contrast, NATO was founded in 1949 by the international legally binding Treaty of Washington. This Treaty is composed of a total of 14 articles which have not been altered since, apart from an amendment to Article 5 after 9/11, which included terrorism as a possible threat. Nevertheless, NATO's path of deepening was built on political and military strategies. Decisions were established by so-called security concepts, which entailed agreements that were politically, but not legally based.

Finally, the EU and CSDP built its competences on treaties and amendments and developed from there. From these treaties, such as the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Lisbon Treaties, the competences and institutional structures for security and defence policy were built incrementally and sequentially, case by case, based on operations and missions.

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269 23 November 1959, Strasbourg.

270 Hofmann, S. C., 'Why institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2011, vol. 49, nr. 1, p. 106.

Regarding the authority of the security organizations, a number of observations can be distilled. Although the transfer of sovereignty to a security organization is not expected any time soon and intergovernmental decision-making is leading, the organizations in this research show a mixture of authority at different levels.

Many possibilities were created for decision-making with abstention, consensus-minus-one decision-making and modular and flexible decision-making within the organizations, either in the voting systems, in the form of more permanent cooperation, or in the form of ad-hoc cooperation, such as coalitions employed for an operation. These decision-making schemes were, on the one hand, initiated by the member states and on the other, driven by organs and officials from within the organization.

Regarding the autonomy of the security organizations, NATO and the OSCE can be considered traditional intergovernmental organizations, as the domain of security and defence is within the arena of high politics. Both organizations performed according to the sovereign principle of 'costs lie where they fall' in the case of operations and capability development. The issue of common funding for operations and capabilities has been on the agenda ever since their founding, but funding remained within the strict authority of the member states. No exceptions were made between capability development, operations and missions, and exercises and training. Although the EU has intergovernmental and supranational elements, depending on whether the policy resides under the umbrella of the Commission or the Council (or a mix), CSDP was intergovernmental. However, after the EU's new strategy of 2016, the EU Defence Fund of the Commission and the PESCO mechanism changed the intergovernmental aspect, in contrast with NATO and the OSCE. The EU's security and defence policy is moving towards majority voting and core groups for cooperation.

Form of Deepening

Along with the observed change in the level of deepening of international security cooperation, another finding from the path of deepening refers to the form of international security cooperation. An increase of modular cooperation was observed, which gave member states the possibility of cooperation with a smaller group, based on threat or policy perception.

The possibility of the EU concept of opting into or opting out of the Schengen agreement and the Treaty of Maastricht was further developed for crisis response operations as well as common defence. The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) incorporated the PESCO mechanism²⁷¹ and Article 42.7, with opt-in and opt-out possibilities. Lisbon was preceded

271 Biscop, S., Coelmont, J., 'Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence of the Obvious', Security Policy Brief 11, June 2010.

by many initiatives and followed by the bi- and multilateral concepts of the Weimar and the Ghent initiatives²⁷² and the Franco-British cooperation agreement of November 2010.²⁷³

NATO has been an 'opt-out organization' from the beginning, as Article 5 was built on modular cooperation as the founding act of NATO states '...as they deem necessary...'. Furthermore, NATO gave way to the idea of modular cooperation from 1994 onwards with the ESDI and the CJTF concept, followed by NRF, FNC and VJTF, which created a possibility for member states to act in a coalition within the institutional framework of the Alliance.

Likewise, the OSCE incorporated modular cooperation from the beginning regarding the decision-making system, execution of field missions, capabilities and finance, institutional mechanisms and even the political resolution of conflicts, for example, by the Minsk process.

Another observation was bottom-up and top-down cooperation. Bottom-up cooperation was illustrated by NATO's NRF and the EUBG. Top-down cooperation was illustrated by the PESCO concept and the OSCE Minsk Group, either with consensus top-down or bi- and multilateral²⁷⁴ decision-making. For some states, this resulted in an interconnectedness beyond sovereignty, as in the case of Germany and the Netherlands, as they were no longer able to conduct operations without the other state: a marginal form of supranationalism and an increased form of horizontal interdependency.

In short, modular cooperation, illustrated by plug-in and plug-out and double-hatted forces, has led to processes of top-down and bottom-up cooperation simultaneously. In addition, a combination of national and international forms of cooperation was observed: the FNC is national, NRF and PESCO are at international level and Berlin Plus is inter-organizational. As a result, the OSCE, the EU and NATO have become complementary and allied.

Apart from the observation of modular cooperation within the security organizations, the setting up and implementation of coalitions of willing and able outside the security organizations was observed as well. The initiative for international involvement and engagement, when a crisis occurred, most often came from the greater powers, structured in so-called coalitions of willing and able with partners that had the same interests and/or capabilities.

Member states of institutionalized organizations often chose informal instead of formal institutionalized cooperation, implying that member states were looking for other possibilities to operate outside the institutional frameworks they had set up themselves.²⁷⁵ Apart from contact groups like those for Syria, member states of NATO and the EU

272 The 'Ghent Initiative' of November 2010, by Germany and Sweden, to strengthen the *Pooling and Sharing* capacities within the EU. The 'Weimar Initiative' of February 2011 of France, Germany and Poland to strengthen EU's defence policy by initiating an EU headquarters.

273 The 'entente frugale', the two major military powers of the EU agreed on numerous cooperative measures to reduce defence spending while maintaining effectiveness.

274 Cooperation on capability generation is increasingly taking place 'bottom-up' among the member states.

275 E.g., Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan and Operation Unified Protector, Libya 2011 initiated by the UK and France and NATO providing the 'tools' and post-hoc legitimacy.

established a wide network of bi- and multilateral initiatives for cooperation, employable for both NATO and the EU, but not the OSCE.²⁷⁶ Furthermore, the concept of a smaller group of states to cooperate with was also integrated within the organizations, for example, the OSCE Minsk Group, in which only some states participated.²⁷⁷ This was not only the case for military operations, but also for civil operations (e.g., Mali, 2013). Multilateralism light, ad-hoc coalitions, clusters of cooperation and contact groups²⁷⁸ in the field of security are just a few phrases that have gained prominence in the last few years. It was no longer self-evident that operations were initiated within the formal institutionalized multinational frameworks of these organizations. In other words, 'it's not the coalition that determines the mission; it's the mission that determines the coalition...'²⁷⁹ Nevertheless, these coalitions of willing and able were most likely followed by the involvement of formal institutionalized organizations such as NATO, the EU or the OSCE in operations which '... return like a boomerang to either NATO or the EU in cooperation with the UN in any case in the form of a training or advisory mission...'²⁸⁰

Informal and de-institutionalized security cooperation did not only occur between states, but also between organizations. Instead of an institutionalized European security architecture set at the beginning of the 1990s, as was elaborated on in Chapter 5, inter-organizational cooperation increased mainly between organizations and on an informal or low institutionalized level.

In short, from the observed modular and informal cooperation, the form of organizations has become more fluid and new forms of international cooperation and organizations were observed. Clegg and Hardy described this trend as '...on the outside the boundaries that formerly circumscribed the organization are breaking down in 'chains', 'clusters', 'networks' and 'strategic alliances'.²⁸¹ On the inside, the boundaries that formerly delineated the bureaucracy were also breaking down as the traditional hierarchal structure changed, leading to new organizational forms. Although authority and autonomy were not directly transferred to the security organizations from the state, via the backdoor of the concept of modular cooperation diverging levels of decision-making were integrated in international security cooperation. Nevertheless, actual implementation of several modular cooperation initiatives, such as NRF and BG, were not activated.

276 The Nordic countries established a comprehensive defence framework called the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO); the UK and France signed the Lancaster House Treaties creating an unprecedented level of bilateral defence cooperation; six smaller Central European countries (Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia) founded the Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC) for both practical and political collaborations; and the Baltic (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), Benelux (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg) and 'Visegrad Four' countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary) reinvigorated their defence cooperative frameworks established during the 1990s. For an elaboration, see: Rehrl, J., F. Mogherini, H. Peter Doskozil, and C. Fokaides, eds. *Handbook on CSDP: The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union*. 3rd ed. Vienna, Austria: Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, 2016.

277 The Minsk Group spearheads the OSCE's efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, co-chaired by France, the Russian Federation, and the US.

278 Already the first contact group that was settled during the Balkan wars at the beginning of the 1990s.

279 According to the American Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, October 18, 2001.

280 Biscop, S., 'Peace without money, war without Americans: challenges for European strategy', *International Affairs*, 89, 2013, p. 1129.

281 Clegg, S. R., Hardy, C., 'Studying Organisation: Theory and Method', SAGE, 1999, p. 15.

Explaining the Path of Deepening

Deepening, the path analysed in this chapter, concerns the setting up of the institutional framework, the transfer of authority and autonomy and the decision-making procedures of an international organization. The organizations under scrutiny in this research are security organizations, all acting in the high politics of the security and defence domain. For that reason, increasing authority and autonomy or even the transfer of sovereignty to a security organization is not logical. In principal, intergovernmental decision-making is leading.

The analysis of the path of deepening in this chapter of all three organizations revealed an increase in flexible, also regarding decision-making, and modular cooperation even in the security and defence domain. It could be argued that the rationale behind modular cooperation was that if member states wanted to strengthen cooperation, this could best be initiated by a core group of member states. An option was included for others wanting to join at a later stage, labelled as inclusive cooperation conceptualised by the multi-speed concept, to be able to do so.

Initiatives for flexible and modular cooperation came partly from the member states. And this model of core groups within the organizations increased, either for decision-making, capability development or missions and operations.

The reasoning behind these initiatives varied from politically driven arguments for national gain or enhancement of the international security environment, to military arguments enhancing capabilities and to a preference of the composition of the coalition.²⁸² Examples are bi- and multilateral cooperation concepts such as the OSCE Minsk Group, EU PESCO, pooling and sharing within the EU and NATO's smart defence.

Modular forms of cooperation had been in the interest of both sides of the Atlantic, for NATO as well as the EU. For the US, the arguments entailed reasons of political interest or burden-sharing aspects. For some of the European states, the arguments entailed autonomy and the desire to have a greater say in the transatlantic relationship.

Finally, it was observed that member states, if it was in their interest, opted for informal institutionalized cooperation or even de-institutionalized cooperation outside the security frameworks they had set up themselves, because of the increase in members or capability shortfalls.

Although cooperation in the security and defence realm 'breathes' state sovereignty, varied cooperation forms had already been observed from the creation of these organizations. The EU was built on opt-in and opt-out possibilities in form, authority and autonomy, for example in the case of the Schengen Treaty. This path dependency persisted within the security and defence realm. Likewise, NATO has been an opt-out organization from the beginning, as illustrated by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which was built on modular cooperation. This path dependency of flexible and modular cooperation was prolonged

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282 Major, C., Molling, C., 'More teeth for the NATO tiger. How the Framework Nation Concept can reduce NATO's growing formation-capability gap', p. 33, in: Friis, K., 'NATO and collective Defence in the 21st century. An assessment of the Warsaw Summit', Routledge focus, 2017.

after the Cold War with the EU's Treaty of Maastricht and Amsterdam and with NATO's ESDI and CJTF concepts and developed from there. And although the OSCE institutionalized after the end of the Cold War, this institutionalization was associated with modular cooperation from the beginning as well regarding the decision-making system, execution of field missions, capabilities and finance, institutional mechanisms and even the political resolution of conflicts. It was thus observed that along the path of deepening, the differences between the interests of the member states in their choice of institutionalized security cooperation was reflected in flexible and modular cooperation in all three organizations. Not in creating new organizations or ending the existing structures, but adjusting them to the changing environment. Prime examples are France, Germany and even the UK who, in various coalitions, have been the drivers behind the EU security framework,²⁸³ either unilaterally,²⁸⁴ bilaterally²⁸⁵ or multilaterally.

Furthermore, this path-dependent element, derived from historical institutionalism, of flexible and modular cooperation forms was not limited to cooperation within the security organizations; it was likewise observed between the security organizations, labelled as horizontal interdependency.

As argued above, many initiatives for modular cooperation were state driven, top-down, as the states could pick and choose their own coalitions for operations and strengthen their capabilities. However, it was shown that these initiatives also came from the organs and officials within the organizations, in other words bottom-up. Decision-making was decentralised to lower levels. This was illustrated by the strengthening of NATO's international staff and the enhancement of the position of the secretary-general, because of the increase in operations, members and partners. It can be argued that the officials, in NATO, the EU and the OSCE, already exerted influence from the agenda-setting phase of the policy process because of a central position in policy making and their expertise, which allowed them to be involved very early in the planning process up to the conduct of operations and missions.²⁸⁶ Another explanation of the organs as actors in their own right has been the absence of strong control mechanisms and organizational doctrine, together with the conduct of operations in a combined EU-NATO setting.²⁸⁷

Another aspect that constructivist institutionalism offers to explain paths of change is the more in-depth analysis of bureaucratic processes. It is argued that the less an institution is structured, the less it can influence or even shape other actors. And the variety of actors within the institution can be better managed if there is more internal homogeneity and simultaneously exclusiveness. The research illustrated that the OSCE organization, a large heterogeneous group lacked a joint identity and any sanctions or incentives, institutionally and financially, to empower the OSCE. Likewise, its scope of

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283 Biscop, S., 'Peace without money, war without Americans: challenges for European strategy', *International Affairs* 89: 5, 2013, p. 1141.

284 France was the driver behind operations in Libya, Syria and Mali.

285 St. Malo declaration, 4 December 1998 and its follow-up.

286 Dijkstra, H., 'The Influence of EU officials in European Security and Defence', *European Security*, 21:3, p. 312.

287 Military operations are decided upon by the member states, civilian missions are decided upon by the Council in combination with the EP.

tasks has been all-encompassing, which did not help to harmonise the security interests of the various participating states and was not backed up by the necessary organs, capabilities, staff or funds, which paralysed the organization in influence and actions.²⁸⁸

Finally, the EU and NATO have been two of the most institutionalized (security) organizations since the end of the Second World War. From its creation, the Alliance deepened its structure and developed a well-institutionalized setup, especially in the military domain. Likewise, for the EU, institutionalization has been its core business. With the 'entrance' of the EU into the security and defence realm, the same mechanism of institutional building was observed, related to the path of broadening or widening. This dynamic can be labelled as a neo-functionalist logic, which claims spill-over from other policy areas into the security and defence area, accompanied by institutionalization and thus legitimation, according to the constructivist institutionalist. Organizations are then regarded as actors in their own right and strengthening an organization's mandate in combination with processes of institutionalization reflects the legitimacy and power of these organizations.

6.7 Conclusion

This chapter addressed the questions of how and why change had led to deepening, and its possible opposite, of the European security organizations. Consequently, the security organizations were analysed separately and in comparison, in their path of deepening, measured by the indicators of level and form of change.

The paths of deepening, where change was analysed from 1990 onwards in form and level, presented a varied path. Deepening of the security organizations has led to a build-up and strengthening of the organizations, but it has also had the opposite effect as a result of the increase in bi- and multilateral cooperation schemes and operations executed by coalitions of willing and able, inside and outside the organizations. Furthermore, different and similar processes of deepening can be discerned, caused by states and other actors. Institutionalization occurred as a result of institutional legacy and binding treaties and agreements, in response to crisis and operations or because of other actors. Finally, the form of deepening changed after the end of the Cold War. Although change was initially intergovernmental, inclusive and homogeneous, gradually the path of deepening changed into a varied web ranging from opt-in and opt-out cooperation, to multi-speed concepts inside and outside the organizations and between the organizations.

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288 Ghebali, V. Y., 'Where is the OSCE going? Present role and challenges of a stealth security organisation', in: European Security in a Global Context', p. 63-66, in: Tardy, T., (eds.) 'European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external dynamics', Contemporary Security Studies, Routledge, Oxon, Great Britain, 2009.

Chapter 7

Chapter 7. Cross-path Comparison: A Comparative Perspective between the Paths of Broadening, Widening and Deepening

7.1 Introduction

The security organizations of the European security architecture, NATO, the EU and the OSCE, are to a certain extent quite different organizations and maybe as a result difficult to compare. Nevertheless, these three organizations act in the same security environment and overlap in members, partners and tasks. So, why not link and compare these organizations in their paths of change? A comparative method of analysis is ‘making the researcher aware of unexpected differences, or even surprising similarities, between cases. Comparison brings a sense of perspective to a familiar environment and discourages parochial responses to political issues’.¹ In other words, comparing the dynamics of change between the security organizations could reveal surprising variations.

In this research, the paths of change of the different security organizations are analysed separately as well as in comparison, analysing the possible interrelationship between these paths. The previous chapters analysed the separate paths of change of the selected security organizations and provided a cross-case comparison between NATO, the EU and the OSCE within the specific paths of change. This chapter presents a cross-path comparison of the key findings between the paths of change and their possible mutual relationship. Cross-path analysis can show that broadening of the tasks of one organization could lead to deepening of the institutional structure of another organization. Additionally, widening can affect deepening and broadening because, geographically and institutionally, the features of an organization can expand with the multiple forms of cooperation of other organizations, as was elaborated on in Chapter 2. The reason for cross-path comparison is thus the possible empirical linkages between the paths, which could bear theoretical consequences.² Furthermore, as was also discussed in Chapter 2, these consequences could be positive, meaning increased cooperation, but also negative, resulting in uncooperative dynamics or de-institutionalization. The underlying motive for this approach is to aim for a more complete picture of the observed paths of change and their possible drivers. This chapter thus seeks to address the comparative part of the main question of this research: how and why have the paths of the security organizations changed their institutional structure in comparison with each other?

Finally, the influence of the possible drivers on the paths of change will be addressed, although only the key findings based on the larger picture given in Chapters 4 to 6.³

1 Hopkin, J. ‘Comparative methods’, in: Marsh, D., Stoker, G., ‘Theory and Methods in Political Science’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 249.

2 Börzel, T. A., ‘Mind the gap! European integration between level and scope’, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Routledge, April 2005, p. 220.

3 The elaboration on the key findings drawn from Chapters 4 to 6 does not exclude other possible important findings of the research.

7.2 Consistent or Conflicting Paths of Change

From the previous chapters, it became clear that the paths of broadening, widening and deepening of the security organizations showed variations in the adoption of authority, autonomy, mandates, memberships and partnerships while acting at regional and global levels. In all three paths, different and similar forms of cooperation were observed, within and between the paths. The opposites of broadening, widening and deepening have been observed as well.

At first sight, change has been a story of growth in the multilateral European security architecture, in the form of broadening, widening and deepening. One way or another, all three organizations changed and obtained new tasks, members and partners and enhanced or even created new organs. After the end of the Cold War, broadening and widening of NATO, the EU and the OSCE addressed the need for an answer in response to the changed security environment, aided the search for legitimacy and survival and extended the zone of peace for all members. The adoption of new tasks, such as crisis management and engagement programmes with new partners, broadened and widened the scope of NATO's, the EU's and the OSCE's mandate. At the beginning of the 1990s, the adoption of crisis management tasks by NATO fulfilled the replacement of the collective defence task that had become less relevant. For the OSCE, crisis management fulfilled the need for a regional UN after the East-West détente and collapse of the WP. The creation of the EU's security and defence policy also fulfilled the desire of some EU members of the construction of 'No European Monetary Union (EMU) without a European Political Union (EPU)',⁴ as some of the members emphasized the long-desired autonomy from US leadership and some aimed at the development of a European pillar within NATO.

Nevertheless, there have also been periods of crisis and stagnation in all three paths of change, separately and in relation to one another. There were various reasons for stagnation or even crisis, such as disagreement between the member states or (in)capable organizations which resulted in a takeover of tasks by other organizations or organs. In other words, the analysis of international cooperation should not be confused with its celebration, meaning the paths of change did not always result in a positive outcome.

At the end of 2016, a whole new picture of the European security architecture emerged. NATO's collective defence task was prioritised again. The OSCE was embroiled in a power struggle, which paralysed change and made the OSCE the guardian of the frozen conflicts trapped between the bigger powers. And the EU encapsulated all security tasks in particular, addressing security in every aspect.

Over the last three decades, therefore, it was observed that change either developed positively, resulting in an increase in the paths or, in contrast, negatively, resulting in a decrease in the paths, both of which will be explored in detail below.



4 One of the subjects of the negotiations between Germany and France after the 1989 revolutions resulting in the Maastricht Treaty was the subject of the 'politics-for-economics deal': no economic integration without political integration.

Positive Cross-path Influence

The paths of change, as observed in the previous chapters, have led to positive cross-path influences. The paths of broadening and widening of the security organizations have directly or indirectly led to deepening within all three security organizations. The path of widening brought all three organizations extended regional and even worldwide cooperation and geographical presence. Widening led to an intensity of negotiations and consultations resulting in agreements, either political or juridical. And again, this resulted in an increase in the creation or extended mandates of organs. The path of widening thus influenced the path of deepening, as a result of the many different memberships and partnerships. This led to differences in the path of deepening, in level and form, varying from high to low institutionalization, from bi- and multilateral agreements to opt-in and opt-out possibilities within and between the security organizations, which to a certain extent empowered cooperation in the defence realm. Moreover, a combination of bottom-up and top-down cooperation was observed in all paths of change. This was illustrated by the path of widening, which at first was a political decision, such as the NACC and ENP, but thereafter was negotiated and implemented mostly by the organizations' organs: a bottom-up approach, similar to the bottom-up approach of NATO's NRF and the EUBG. In contrast, differentiated top-down cooperation can be seen in the PESCO concept and the OSCE Minsk Group, either based on consensus or on bi- and multilateral⁵ decision-making.

For some states, these forms of cooperation, between states and between organizations, even resulted in an interconnectedness beyond sovereignty. This is illustrated by the Belgium/Netherlands cooperation or the German/Netherlands Corps, which links the armed forces, as they are no longer able to conduct operations without the other state; a marginal form of supranationalism.⁶ An even stronger example of linkage can be demonstrated by the political and juridical cooperation of the Belgium/Netherlands airspace protection.⁷

In addition, widening linked NATO, the EU and the OSCE geographically and organizationally. Between NATO and the EU, the linkage was the strongest in simultaneous regional partnership programmes from the beginning of the 1990s, followed by enlargement programmes from 1997 onwards and, again, simultaneous partnership programmes across the globe. Although these parallel programmes of widening did increase deepening, they were not coordinated or supported by a strong cross-institutional structure.

Furthermore, the extension of EU and NATO territory as a result of widening was directly linked to the OSCE territory, as the enlargement and partnership at first fell within the OSCE area. This geographical link coincided with other links, for instance an institutional link with Russia in the form of the NATO-Russia Council and the EU

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5 Cooperation on capability generation is increasingly taking place 'bottom-up' among the member states.

6 AIV advies: 'Gedifferentieerde integratie: verschillende routes in de EU-samenwerking', nr. 98, 24 november 2015.

7 From 2017, Belgian and Dutch air forces agreed to share surveillance and protection of the Benelux air space.

agreements with Russia. These links, at one time, strengthened the European security architecture.

Apart from a linkage as a result of the path of widening, the path of broadening of both the EU and NATO influencing other paths was observed as well. For instance, an operational linkage between NATO and the EU was created with the Berlin Plus agreement of 2003, as a result of creating and broadening the crisis management tasks of both organizations. Although in the first instance the Berlin Plus agreement prohibited the EU from building separate command structures or even adopting a common defence task, the common defence task of the EU created later in 2009 connected the EU permanently to NATO with additional institutional structures for the EU. Vice versa, NATO's limitation of an inclusive comprehensive approach with corresponding capabilities was linked to the broad approach, organs and capabilities of the EU in 2016.

Debates and crises experienced by the member states influenced the paths of change within and between the organizations as well. This can be seen in the example of the 2003 crisis between NATO and EU member states. Eventually, the intended intervention under the NATO umbrella in Iraq, initiated by the US and the UK, resulted in more flexible decision-making within NATO. Furthermore, the Chocolate Summit in 2003 attended by the four renegade European states striving for an autonomous European headquarters resulted in more autonomy for the EU.

The Crimea crisis of 2014 resulted in an increase in the linkage between NATO, the EU and even the OSCE in tasks and organs. On the one hand, this resulted in an increase in the division of labour and strengthened the OSCE, as the OSCE was the only organization to respond and act in these kinds of conflict where the others were not 'allowed'. On the other hand, interdependence between NATO and the EU increased, each complementing the other in their scope of policies through the combination of collective defence with broad security.

To a certain level, therefore, the OSCE, the EU and NATO have become complementary and mutually interdependent through the linkage of tasks and cross-geographical, organizational and institutional linkages; broadening, deepening and widening. This resulted in an increase of horizontal and vertical interdependency; horizontal interdependency because of the linkage of policies and tasks, and vertical interdependency because of the linkage of institutional structures and capabilities.

Negative Cross-path Influence

As well as a positive increase in cross-path influence, a more negative cross-path influence was observed as well. For the EU and NATO, to a certain extent, widening was a choice. For the OSCE, widening has never been a choice, as the new states that emerged after the end of the Cold War already fell within the OSCE area. The increase in the EU's and NATO's path of widening led to contrasting paths of deepening and to some extent broadening within the

OSCE, as the primary pan-European security organization.⁸ Enlargement even undermined the OSCE's path of deepening, not only as a result of the overlap of tasks and members with the EU and NATO, but also because of the result of a sometimes negative differentiation between members, candidates, non-candidates and organizations.

In addition, a distinction can be made in principle between the rights and obligations of full members, associated members and partners. However, as a result of differentiation between memberships as well as partnerships and the participation of non-member states in all sorts of operations, the result was an increase of deepening in the form of complex institutional structures or ad-hoc non-institutionalized structures. As a consequence, the demarcation line between members and partners often became blurred. This again led to differentiated institutional structures and the differentiated and complex appliance of mandates.

Furthermore, when NATO and EU enlargement had lost its dynamism in the first decade of the 21st century and engagement replaced enlargement by partnership, this resulted in even more differentiation among 'third' countries within the OSCE area. As a result, the OSCE area became more insecure, in contrast with the original aim of the extension of the zone of peace.⁹ However, to address these dynamics, the OSCE was not deepened sufficiently. The OSCE was not strengthened with the necessary capabilities for the ongoing frozen conflicts,¹⁰ such as the one in the Transnistrian region in Moldova.¹¹ Yet the OSCE remained the only alternative in the case of a flare-up of such conflicts. Nevertheless, widening of the EU and NATO undermined the building of the European security architecture, as was originally the aim, and enhanced differentiated regionalism and complex multilateral regional cooperation schemes.

Moreover, as a result of broadening of NATO, in the form of the crisis management tasks, and broadening of the EU in the form of a broad approach of security, backed-up by organs and financial capabilities, to a large extent they took over the completion of the OSCE's institutionalization and capabilities.

Finally, because of the paths of widening and broadening of both the EU and NATO, the respective collective defence and cooperative security task of NATO linked to the EU backfired. Enlargement and engagement meant integrating conflicts from outside and disagreement with partners in the OSCE. As a result, in contrast to the extension of the zones of peace, the aim at the end of the Cold War, zones of tension and conflict were incorporated for both organizations. An example was the EU and NATO membership of the Baltic States in 2004 and the Crimea crisis of 2014. Furthermore, it was observed that broadening of the collective defence task conflicted with the path of widening of the EU and NATO.

8 Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., 'Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union', Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 15.

9 Tardy, T., 'CSDP in action. What contribution to international security?' Chaillot paper, EU-ISS, No. 134, May 2015, p. 216.

10 The term frozen conflict refers to a situation in which active armed conflict has ended, but no peace treaty or political framework has resolved the conflict.

11 Transnistria is an autonomous territorial region with a special legal status within the state of Moldova. It mainly consists of a Russian minority. A fight for independence started in March 1992 and was concluded by a ceasefire in July 1992. Transnistria is internationally recognised as a part of the state of Moldova.

So, although the OSCE, the EU and NATO have become complementary and mutually interdependent, the multilateral framework of European security has become more complex and fragmented. Bi- and multilateralism have increased within the security organizations as well as outside the security organizations and have led to much more ad-hoc and non-institutionalized cooperation schemes.

7.3 Explaining Paths of Change

As stated earlier, change of organizations set in the security and defence domain follows a certain amount of path dependency and international politics has always been guided, built and restrained by states defending their national interest and sovereignty. This research has shown that member states often varied in their response to the paths of change and furthered or hampered cooperation, which resulted in integrative and disintegrative dynamics, as explained by rational choice institutionalists. These differences were built on their interests, threat perception and goals to be achieved with international cooperation, which resulted in varied paths of change.

As was illustrated in this research, the growth of states as members or partners committed to the organizations, together with the broadening of the scope of policies, resulted in an increase of differentiated paths of deepening, both in level and form between proponents and opponents of cooperation. For the member states, the reasoning behind these differentiated paths of deepening varied. As was illustrated, politically driven arguments varied from national gain to, in contrast, a contribution to international security cooperation. And militarily driven arguments varied from enhancing capabilities with a smaller group of states to a preference for the composition of a specific exclusive coalition to conduct operations.

As was presented in the previous chapters, widening was well received amongst the member states of both the EU and NATO within the OSCE area at the beginning of the 1990s, especially when both broadening and deepening increased beyond the scope of the national interests of some of the member states. For these member states, widening even became the replacement and target to accomplish as a countermeasure for ongoing deepening and broadening paths. In other words, broadening and deepening resulted in more debate between the members, in contrast to widening, as illustrated by the position that the UK took in the EU and NATO, supporting widening as a countermeasure towards the other paths of change. This is comparable to the position that Turkey held in NATO, blocking the EU's CSDP strengthening, because Turkey was not likely to become an EU member in the short run.

Furthermore, if one path was strengthened within an organization, it was likewise strengthened in the other organization. In other words, the paths were linked. An example is the EU-NATO link on mutual defence. As some states objected to the adoption of a common defence task for the EU, a link was claimed in EU's Treaty of Lisbon, which led to the adoption of Article 42.7, prioritising NATO. And the adoption of a broader approach

to security within the EU influenced the adoption of a broader approach to security and defence within NATO. On the one hand, NATO's broad approach was limited and linked to the EU, because states such as Germany and France preferred the EU to be the organization with a broad approach towards security and defence rather than NATO. On the other hand, NATO did acquire some capacities in line with a broader approach due to lessons learned from NATO operations. In particular, the US and the UK preferred NATO to have a mandate which included broader capabilities than solely military.

However, apart from rational choice explaining the influence of state actors and the , the organizations' organs that were set up to coordinate and implement the paths of change took the lead in further broadening, widening and deepening, underlined by constructivist institutionalism. Due to differences between states or inabilities vis-à-vis the increase in missions and operations, the inter-organizational cooperation, the expertise and therefore power of the organs themselves increased. For instance, once the decision of widening was taken, EU and NATO organs took the lead in negotiations and agreements with third parties. Furthermore, the EU's operations and missions in particular were performed more often in coordination with NATO officials and organs than at the EU-NATO political level.

However, the research illustrated cooperation dynamics that can also be explained by the functionalist mechanism of spill-over¹² and Keohane's, Nye's and Deutsch's interdependence. Even more so, these mechanisms were not only observed in the EU, as intended by Haas and Rosamond, but likewise in NATO and the OSCE. Spill-over was observed with regard to policies (from one policy to another), in forms of cooperation, in membership and partnership and in the extension of a differentiated institutional structure in either broadening, widening or deepening. The spill-over effect turned out to be a driver between the organizations in their paths of change. For instance, if the EU changed in the paths of broadening and widening, these developments were likewise observed within NATO, and vice versa. Not only the process of political, institutional and operational isomorphism was observed, as described by Koops,¹³ but likewise the spill-over mechanism in all three paths of change: the EU's incremental path of broadening was to a certain extent unstoppable and pulled NATO along, and vice versa. Furthermore, the increase of the institutional security environment resulted in a shift of the collective defence, collective security and cooperative security tasks between the paths of change and between the organizations, as was discussed previously.

To a certain extent, constructivist institutionalism addresses bureaucratic processes of change by an increase or decrease of institutionalization, in new members or partners and in the powers that be. However, the observed spill-over dynamics of the theory of neo-functionalism, which can explain a certain amount of automatism in the paths of change, lacks attention in the bureaucratic analysis of the constructivist institutionalism.

12 Rosamond, B., 'The uniting of Europe and the foundation of EU studies: revisiting the neo-functionalism of Ernst B. Haas', *Journal of European Public Policy*, Routledge, April 2005, p. 245.

13 Koops, J. A., NATO's Influence on the Evolution of the European Union as a Security Actor', in: Costa, O., Jorgensen, K.E., 'The Influence of International Institutions on the EU. When Multilateralism hits Brussels', *Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics*, 2012.

These mechanisms can be defined as functional spill-over¹⁴ or political spill-over,¹⁵ or as dynamics of disintegration or 'spill-back', being the opposite of spill-over.¹⁶ Over the years, this mechanism of spill-over as a concept developed and resulted in many forms, such as vertical (linkage of institutional structure and capabilities) and horizontal (territorial extension) forms of spill-over.¹⁷

As a result of change, therefore, the dynamics of broadening, widening and deepening led to mechanisms of interconnectedness, spill-over and even interdependence between the security organizations. In some cases, it also led to their counterpart in the form of uncooperative dynamics or negative spill-over, if widening did not lead to deepening, for example.

7.4 Conclusion

In addition to the analysis of the separate paths of change of the selected security organizations in the previous chapters, this chapter presented a cross-path comparison between the paths of change and their possible mutual relationship. The question was: how and why have the paths of the security organizations changed in comparison with each other?

All in all, the dynamics described above presented a linkage between the paths of change. In some cases, they were exchanged for one another and in others they complemented each other. To a certain extent, NATO, the EU and the OSCE became complementary and mutually linked and sometimes interdependent, through tasks, members, partners and organs. This resulted in an increase of horizontal and vertical interdependency, either positively or negatively. These dynamics were initiated and decided upon by the member states. However, as well as state actors influencing the paths of change, it was observed that other actors and dynamics influenced the paths of change as well.

14 Functional spill-over occurs when cooperation in one sector or policy leads to cooperation in another sector or policy defined by: Jensen, C. S., 'Neo-functional Theories and the Development of European Social and Labour Market Policy', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2000, p. 72-73.

15 Political spill-over is initiated by political actors or interest groups striving for more cooperation to solve common problems. Jensen, C. S., 'Neo-functional Theories and the Development of European Social and Labour Market Policy', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2000, p. 76.

16 Schmitter, P. C., 'Ernst B. Haas and the Legacy of Neo-functionalism', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 2005, 12, 2, p. 257-258.

17 From the 1990s, neo-functionalism was modified and updated, see: Sandholtz, W., Sweet, A. S., 'European Integration and Supranational Governance', Oxford University Press, 1998; Rosamond, B., 'Theories of European Integration', Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2000; Sandholtz, W., Sweet, A. S., Fligstein, N., 'The Institutionalization of Europe', 2001; Schmitter, P. C., 'Ernst B. Haas and the Legacy of Neo-functionalism', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 2005, 12, 2; Sandholtz, W., Sweet, A. S., 'Neo-functionalism and Supranational Governance', paper, 2009; Nelsen, B. F., Stub, A. (eds.), 'The European Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration', Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014.

Part Three

Conclusions and Recommendations

‘Everyone behaves badly, given the chance’.

Ernest Hemingway, The Sun Also Rises, 1926

Chapter 8

Chapter 8. Conclusions

8.1 Security Cooperation in Europe: Permanent Change?

After more than two decades of hope for a better future settled in a multilateral world order and a genuine European security architecture, an often-heard credo has been that a multilateral order and the European security organizations themselves are in crisis. There has been even talk of a new world order where a system of post-multilateralism would rule. Another often-heard indication for an assumed crisis is that the 'Brussels' bureaucracy, of the EU as well as NATO, would not be in touch with the real world and had even damaged the endeavour of building a genuine architecture to cope with threats and insecurity.¹ Although NATO, the EU and the OSCE, as the pillars of the European security architecture, have changed, it has been regularly asserted that they have not managed to adapt enough or correctly to the changed security environment they faced, leading to a possible break-up of the European security architecture and, over and over again, the *raison d'être* of these organizations has been questioned. This situation was often interpreted as a presumed consequence of the ongoing struggle between the diverging security interests of state actors within the European security architecture or the inability and incompetence of the 'Brussels' institutions.

Simultaneously, ever since the end of the Cold War, the security organizations of the European security architecture survived many of the internal and external crises and adjusted through paths of broadening, widening and deepening, as this research illustrated. In fact, permanent paths of change could be observed in practice. These ongoing dynamics of security cooperation in practice have led to the main question that guided this research: How and why have the European security organizations, namely the EU, the OSCE and NATO, changed in terms of broadening, widening and deepening individually and in comparison to one another as part of the European security architecture between 1990 and 2016?

To answer the research question, the relevant concepts, the theoretical approach and framework for analysing change of security organizations, which were addressed in Chapter 2 and 3, will be summarized in this chapter. Next, the empirical findings that were observed in Chapters 4 to 7 will be addressed. This will be followed by the theoretical explanation of these findings based on the created theoretical framework. Together, these findings will answer the research question that instigated and guided this research. Empirical and theoretical inductions and deductions of the findings will then be formulated. Finally, conclusions together with recommendations for future research will be presented.

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 1 See: Heisbourg, F., 'War and Peace After the Age of Liberal Globalisation', *Survival*, Vol. 60, no. 1, Routledge, February-March 2018, p. 211-228; Luce, E., 'The Retreat of Western Liberalism', Atlantic Monthly Press, New York, 2017.

8.2 Analysing European Security Cooperation: Puzzling Form and Function

The aim of this chapter is to summarize the research observations and answer the research question. The phenomenon of this research, the line of analysis and the research approach together with the method of analysis to address the research puzzle will therefore be explained for each preceding chapter.

Chapter 2, at first, presented the theoretical state of the research on (security) organizations, followed by the main concepts that encapsulated the relevant aspects of international security cooperation that were important for the analysis of the paths of change of security cooperation: change, international organization, security cooperation and security organization.

For the analysis of the paths of change of the security organizations, new institutionalism was chosen as the theoretical lens. The research question reflected the theoretical assumption of new institutionalism, which centres around the analysis of the life of organizations. New institutionalism explicitly offers diverse approaches, varying from the more realist to the constructivist sub-approaches, addressing differences in agents and structures causing change of organizations, their world and life cycle. To answer the research question, this dissertation resorted to three approaches within new institutionalism: rational choice, historical and constructivist institutionalism, as they together include schemes of conflict and cooperation, chaos and structure between different actors and mechanisms, possibly driving change in an international environment. The philosophical base for applying the chosen approaches to unravel the puzzles of the world of organizations is the relationship between ontology (i.e., what is the world?) and epistemology (i.e., how can we know the world?). Via the epistemic instruments that these approaches have offered and that encapsulate the possible drivers of change, this research attempted to understand the phenomenon of change as inclusively as possible, meaning the inclusion of all possible drivers, agents and structures, causing change.

The subject of this research was the paths of change of three selected security organizations in the European security architecture. The focus was the analysis of the observed changes in the institutional framework because the institutional setup of an organization is presumed to be more than a static image in this research. Organizations are more than just a black and white projection of a world or the simple outcome of state interest. They are the result of power struggles and varied interests of different actors and, vice versa, they influence, control and constrain behaviour and also support and empower activities of all actors, as each of them struggles for legitimacy and power.

Derived from the various approaches within new institutionalism, the theoretical framework was created to tackle the paths of change. Change then was defined as deepening, broadening and widening, together with an inclusive pallet of possible drivers, agents and structures, to study the paths of change of the security organizations. This research framework fills a gap in the prevailing literature and presents an inclusive theoretical framework, as was elaborated on in Chapter 2. Finally, apart from this comprehensive framework, the research analysed the paths of change through a dual comparison: cross-case, whereby change of the security organizations was analysed within

their paths of change (Chapters 4 to 6), and cross-path, whereby change was analysed between the paths (Chapter 7).

The security organizations that were subject to analysis act in a complex institutional security environment, involving many state and non-state actors, different member- and partnerships and cross-institutional linkages between them. Therefore, to unravel the drivers and mechanisms at play, the method of structured focused comparison and process tracing were applied, as described in Chapter 3. Structured focused comparison and process tracing offered a method, including the criteria, to analyse key moments of change, windows of opportunity and possible game changers influencing the paths of change, which were drawn from the data collection to determine which drivers and interests were at stake. By these methods, the derived assumptions from the selected approaches of new institutionalism could be analysed consistently with the three selected cases - NATO, the EU and the OSCE - and will be explored in detail below.

Chapters 4 to 7 addressed the 'how' and the 'why' questions related to the causes of the observed paths of change, based on the sub-questions derived from the main research question. These chapters presented the case material organized respectively along the paths of change of each organization in terms of level and form and presented a cross-case comparison between the security organizations within each path of change. In Chapter 7, a cross-path comparison was made between deepening, broadening and widening of the paths of change.

Finally, this chapter will summarize the research findings and will address the research question based on the key findings of the observed paths of change in the previous chapters and, as a result, will provide a theoretical explanation of the observations. The combination of the selected approaches of new institutionalism offered the possibility to reveal a unique pattern of dynamics, drivers and mechanisms causing the paths of change.

8.3 Paths of Change of the European Security Organizations: A Never Ending Story

Derived from the analysis in Chapter 4 to 7, where the sub-questions were addressed, the following section will address the 'how' of the main research question by presenting the key findings of the paths of change of the observed security organizations.

At first, in response to the first and second wave of international cooperation from the 1990s, as was introduced in Chapter 1, a third wave of increasing international cooperation and institutionalization in the field of security and defence cooperation was observed, and international (security) organizations have grown extensively ever since in number, but also in tasks, scope of policies, memberships and partnerships, which this research has analysed.

Second, together with a geographical extension, resulting in more or less 'unlimited' organizations, and a broadening of the scope of tasks, the security organizations all showed an increase in differentiated cooperation in level and form. Levels of security cooperation, with regard to authority and autonomy, varied from high to low institutional cooperation together with incremental, bottom-up or top-down approaches and a mixture of intergovernmental and supranational cooperation, initiated either by states, organs

or organizations. The form of security cooperation developed in a wide variety: from regimes to organizations, from formal to informal cooperation, from intergovernmental to supranational cooperation, through inter-organizational cooperation and everything in between in bi- and multilateral modular forms. Furthermore, this resulted in a varied scope of tasks among the security organizations, where the concepts of security organizations, defined as collective defence, collective security and cooperative security, were mixed and exceeded their traditional scope. As a result, organizations became more fluid.² In other words, it was observed that change became a constant factor through the paths of broadening, widening and deepening, either positively or negatively.

Third, the paths of change were mutually linked, either positively or negatively. It was observed that the paths of change led to geographical, functional and institutional interconnectedness, interweaving and even interdependence through cross-institutional and cross-organizational linkages: politically, policy-wise as well as operational. The research showed that, as a result of the paths of change, for some aspects of security and defence policy, states and organizations were less capable of functioning without one another. This is illustrated by NATO's integrated approach connection to the EU, the EU's collective defence connection to NATO and the EU's operational link with NATO's command structure. This resulted in an increase of horizontal (tasks) and vertical (in institutional structure) interlinkage and interdependency, and the observation that these organizations to a certain degree have become autonomous processes no longer exclusively controlled by the states. Furthermore, this research found that there has been a great deal of variation in the '...effectiveness and persistence of international institutions...'.³ For instance, broadening of the scope of one organization's policy could result in a decrease of broadening and deepening in another organization, as the broadening of the EU supported by funds and infrastructure clearly affected the effectiveness of the OSCE.

Finally, along with an increase of institutionalized international cooperation, forms of less formal cooperation emerged, illustrated by ad-hoc cooperation, non-institutionalized contact groups, coalitions of the willing and able and bi- or multilateral cooperation beyond the existing security organizations.

Summing up, the outcome of the findings of Chapter 4 to 7 showed an increase in (complex) security cooperation schemes, within and outside the selected organizations, both in level and form, caused by various drivers. Furthermore, an expansion and even a mix was observed of the traditional concepts of security organizations: collective defence, collective security and cooperative security, questioning the adage of form follows function, which will be discussed below. In other words, this research observed a combination of an increased multilateral cooperative security architecture, together with a more traditional European order built on geopolitics, deterrence, ad-hoc alliances and a system of collective

2 Clegg, S. R., Hardy, C., 'Studying Organisation: Theory and Method', SAGE Publications, 1999, p. 15.

3 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., 'Imperfect Unions, Security Institutions over Time and Space', Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 5.

defence, excluding states, as a functional aim. This ended up in a peculiar combination of continuing multilateralism on the one hand, based on interlinkage and interdependence and built by states, organizations, organs and mechanisms, together with the battle for power, and ad-hoc alliance building based on self-interest of the state on the other. This observation contrasts with the concept of a security architecture built on multilateralism with a division of labour, or the opposite, namely a non-existing European security architecture replaced by a return of geopolitics.

8.4 Explaining the Paths of Change of the European Security Organizations: Clashing or Compatible Theories

Introduction

Now the time has come to theoretically explain the observed paths of change based on the research framework developed for this purpose. Derived from the analysis in Chapters 4 to 7, where the sub-questions were addressed, the following section will address the 'why' of the main research question by presenting the key findings of the paths of change of the observed security organizations.

One of the assumptions of this research was that the more realist theories are necessary to explain change of organizations acting in the international security and defence domain, but not sufficient. The starting point of this research was that the selected approaches of new institutionalism each explain a particular aspect of the paths of change and only together can explain the totality of the results.

In Chapter 1, it was stated that developments in the security environment and security architecture, caused by both state and non-state actors as well as specific mechanisms, led to changes along the paths of broadening, widening and deepening of the organizations in the European security architecture. It was assumed that the complex security architecture with overlapping members, partners and tasks were linked and interdependent. Acting in a complex institutional security environment necessitated a research framework that included all possible drivers of change.

Based on the research observations described above, a theoretical explanation will now be given by means of the arguments of the selected approaches of new institutionalism.

Rational Choice

International cooperation within the security and defence policy domain for creating, mandating and deciding upon change of international organizations has always been a matter for the state. Based on Article 51 of the UN Charter, 'Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence...', states are the sovereign actors in international relations, especially with regard to security and defence cooperation. Following that line of argument, one could say that Article 51 of the UN Charter lies at the heart of the rational choice theorists, where organizations are established by states to promote or protect their interests in a reduction of uncertainty, transaction-cost approach.

It was shown that NATO's change in tasks from collective defence to crisis management, as a response to the Balkan wars, and prioritising collective defence again as a result of the Crimea crisis in 2014 and the resurgence of Russia, had been due to states' decisions in response to these exogenous threats. The member states themselves decided whether to create, participate and support the schemes of international cooperation, which was recently demonstrated by the UK voting for Brexit.⁴

As rational choice theorists argue, the various reasons behind the observed paths of change, either strengthening or weakening organizations, are basically the result of state interest and action as these states deem necessary. These actions can vary from a joint reaction to a mutual crisis, threat or even attack, to a unilateral or bilateral action. An example of the latter was the UK-France initiative in Operation Unified Protector in Libya (2011), which later had implications for NATO and the EU. Or change has been a result of increasing international political, institutionalized and legal cooperation when problems, crises or threats to national interest could not be solved at a national level. This is illustrated by France's fluctuating position towards EU defence cooperation in response to Germany's political and economic dominance in Europe. In other words, France's national security and defence interest was at times better served by strengthening EU security and defence cooperation to maximize its own national utility: the transaction-cost approach.

Nevertheless, it was also observed that change did not only occur in response to the needs and interests of state actors. The question was often raised as to why NATO or the OSCE still existed, while their functions of collective defence, collective security or cooperative security were lost at certain moments in time, which the more realist theories within new institutionalism could not address. Did both organizations change in a sufficient manner to avoid termination by the member states or were there other dynamics in place? Nor can rational choice theorists sufficiently explain the way in which change shifted from top-down to bottom-up and from formal to more informal forms of cooperation, together with differentiated cooperation schemes, all caused by state actors and non-state actors as well.

Furthermore, it was shown in this research that apart from the struggle for interests, state actors were simultaneously inspired or voluntarily constrained by structural conditions of the organizations, as is claimed by other approaches within new institutionalism. These other approaches, which will be elaborated upon below, are advocates of a mixture of actors causing changes and adaptations of traditional institutional logics and decision-making procedures, as claimed by rational choice theorists.

Historical Institutionalism

Historical institutionalism was valuable for the analysis of organizations descending from the end of the Second World War. As a result, the very concept of a security organization could be scrutinized, and its life cycle analysed. This focus on the life cycle of the security

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4 At the time this research was written, the final outcome of Brexit and British participation in the EU's CSDP was not yet clear. The possibility is often proposed that the UK keep a link with the EU's CSDP as a logical consequence of the UK membership in NATO and the bi- and multilateral agreements between the UK and other EU members, like France and Poland.

organizations enabled the analysis of the full path of change and the evolution of the security concepts and their specific development within NATO, the EU and the OSCE in this research.

Although historical institutionalists perceive organizations to be inherently resistant to change, if they do change, this is accepted as a natural process based on the concept of a punctuated equilibrium, meaning the basic structure of an organization will remain the same. Indeed, collective defence and additional command structure had always remained the backbone of NATO's existence ever since its creation, and although NATO's mandate broadened, its military structure simply remained an adjusted alliance organization with an additional structure. Furthermore, not all tasks and functions of the three security organizations that were once adopted and politically or legally laid down in treaties and agreements were enhanced or even executed, such as the modular cooperation forms like the NRF and BG concept of both the EU and NATO, but they were never eliminated either.

A valuable contribution of historical institutionalism to address the research question was the analysis of the paths of change over time, which offered the opportunity to explore multiple (un)expected drivers. In other words, this research not only focused on the direct consequences of one catastrophe such as 9/11.

The path-dependent approach of historical institutionalism indicates a need for historical analysis. The case study analysis in Chapters 4 to 7 covered more than 25 years. Tracing cases over time helped to understand the comprehensive paths of the observed organizations. Furthermore, the observed paths of change and conjuncture of the selected organizations and their activities enabled a comparison of the findings, as the security organizations acted in the same security environment with overlapping members, partners and tasks. The comparative analysis of the cases over time enabled the identification of patterns of convergence and divergence within and between the security organizations.

The notion of path dependency emphasised political and policy continuities in the paths of change due to built-in structural dynamics. One example was the observed acceptance of structural conditions and moral expectations, such as solidarity, even when they led to constraint by states when they cooperate in an institutionalised international organization. Simultaneously, the argument of critical juncture stressed gradual but substantial reforms, such as the adoption of new members and tasks, sometimes directly in response to a crisis and sometimes not. Finally, it was shown that institutionalization cannot simply be labelled as an outcome, institutionalization entailed its own dynamics and empowered organizations as actors in their own right.

Still, the strength of historical institutionalism is also its weakness. The case study results indicated several deficiencies in the assumptions of historical institutionalism. The focus of historical institutionalism on continuity and stability, as the concept of path dependency and its multiple mechanisms⁵ imply, proved to be difficult when explaining the role of

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5 Keohane, R. O., 'Observations on the Promise and Pitfalls of Historical Institutionalism in International Relations', p. 326-329, in: Fioretos, O. (eds.), 'International Politics and Institutions in Time', Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 2017.

outside actors and mechanisms of exogenous and endogenous change or even shocks.⁶ It was observed that unexpected situations led to new developments within the paths, illustrated by the adoption of the EU's PESCO by almost all member states, implying more or less supranational cooperation within the defence realm, and the EU's adoption of a mutual defence clause. Another example is the broadening of NATO's backbone, Article 5, together with a renewed emphasis on Article 3 and civil capabilities, combined with the limitation of NATO in its scope of tasks and the necessary claimed linkage to the EU. Not all these observations could be explained by solid and deep historical roots, as claimed by historical institutionalism.

Constructivist Institutionalism

As well as the more historical and realist approaches within new institutionalism, constructivist institutionalism offered the opportunity to frame all actors' behaviour by analysing their norms and values related to the way in which organizations change. Moreover, constructivists claim that institutions influence actors' behaviour and shape their values, norms and interests by enhancing rules and structures and therefore power relationships. This is illustrated in this research by the strengthening of the EU's essence of multilateralism and the creation or enhancing of mechanisms like PESCO and the EDF (2016), together with the EU-NATO 2016 joint agreement, which were all created to prevent competition and implied essential cooperation at times when geopolitics returned after 2014. A return of geopolitics could jeopardize these organizations and make them more and more ad-hoc alliances, cooperating solely in specific policy domains like economic cooperation. The solution to a possible loss of legitimacy was thus the recipe of institutionalization driven by ideas that mattered as lifelines to the existence of the EU and NATO.

Moreover, in their paths of change, according to the constructivist approach, institutions are expected to constantly change and progress and this change can occur on an incremental or revolutionary basis, depending on the stakes at risk of the actors in play. Change became a constant factor because of continuing discussion and the struggle for national or organizational interest, with either positive or negative results. Stability could be disturbed, for instance, because one or more of the actors involved recognized that his or her ideas were not being executed or enhanced through continued participation, illustrated by the withdrawal of Russia as a driver for OSCE strengthening.

The above described approaches of new institutionalism perceive the observed organizations as black boxes. However, besides the state, constructivism accepts organizations as actors in their own right, as discussed in Chapter 2. Therefore, agents, mechanisms and structures that reside within the organization are also accepted as possible drivers of change, which enabled the analysis of bureaucratic processes along the selected paths of change. In this research, therefore, constructivist institutionalism provided the opportunity to analyse the role of the actors within an organization, which

6 Mahoney and Thelen have identified the pitfalls in HI and diversified different types of incremental change in: Mahoney, J., Thelen, K., 'Explaining Institutional Change', Cambridge University press, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

illustrated that these actors had the power to address and influence issues that align with values held by the organization, in combination with the organizations' expertise to frame their capabilities to solve problems. These actors are thus supposed to be driven by the struggle for survival and power within their organization.

The number of parties interested in these organizations increased and, as a result, security organizations have become more heterogeneous, leaving inside actors to pursue their own institutional interests.⁷ The EU's CSDP, the OSCE and NATO were not merely agreements between states: instead, they have become large organizations composed of many organs and thousands of officials and bureaucrats whose livelihood depends on the organizations' survival. It was illustrated that organizations have become corporate actors as well, with political interests, influencing the political agenda, and perceiving power as a result of expertise and aiming for survival. If survival required the linkage with another organization, then that would become the aim. Officials have attained a degree of autonomy, for instance because of their expertise, that allowed them to pursue goals that helped to keep the organizations alive, and they have become lobbyists for adapting new missions and roles.⁸ The NATO Chief of Defence Staff and the EU Military Staff influenced the political doctrine underpinning the behaviour of the EU and NATO in the realm of crisis management and the paths of enlargement and engagement with states and other organizations. Furthermore, with the increased complexity of operations, NATO's secretary-general acquired more power and had become a public figure with agenda-setting powers. This coincided with the involvement of the EU's supranational Commission and Parliament, which even obtained a supranational decision-making role within defence policy, as clarified by the EU's EUGS in 2016.

Finally, although constructivist institutionalism analyses the role of organizations themselves, in contrast to the other two approaches, some unexpected mechanisms surfaced for all three organizations regarding the observed bureaucratic processes.

For example, both broadening and widening within all three security organizations led to a need for building and extending organs, furthering the path of deepening. Political as well as functional spill-over mechanisms were therefore observed within paths of change of the selected organizations, as described in Chapter 7. Broadening of the EU's security and defence mandate started with crisis management tasks, but almost inevitably broadened with a solidarity clause and a collective defence task and deepened with institutional support as a result of the inherent EU integration process. Furthermore, as the EU and NATO mandates both broadened with crisis management, a comprehensive approach, hybrid and cyber mandates together with an overlap in members and partners, it became almost inevitable that they were to be institutionally linked. In addition, as the form and level of cooperation differentiated in one task, an adjacent sector followed. An example is NATO's multinational concepts of CJTF, NRF and VJTF, which were applied to

7 Hofmann, S. C., 'Why institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2011, vol. 49, nr.1, 2011, p. 111.

8 Keohane, R. O., 'International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory', Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989, p. 101.

crisis management as well as Article 5 operations. An emerging automatism of increasing cooperation between EU and NATO organs was also observed as a result of the linkages of their enlargement and engagement programmes, and finally their command structures as a result of interdependent operations.

On the negative side, unintended consequences also occurred. First, due to retaining Turkey's EU membership, Turkey now and then paralysed the EU's CSDP development, made possible as a result of the linkage between NATO and the EU. Second, although the reasoning behind enlargement and engagement had been stability, it also led to crises, such as those in Georgia and Ukraine, with negative consequences for NATO, the EU and the OSCE alike.

These bureaucratic processes were not only observed within the paths of change of the security organizations, but also between the organizations; positively as well as negatively. The EU's security and defence pillar was created with a broad mandate, which influenced NATO's path of broadening. On the other hand, the diminishing enthusiasm for NATO's enlargement, diminished likewise the EU's path of enlargement, and for both organizations the enlargement programmes were replaced by less formal alliances and partnerships, or even postponed or simply rejected.

In other words, several mechanisms of the neo-functionalist concept of spill-over as a result of institutionalization together with a conviction of norms and values, institutional interweaving, interdependence and interconnectedness, but likewise disintegrative mechanisms within (from one policy to another and likewise from one path to another) and between the organizations, were observed. These mechanisms lack the bureaucratic processes that constructivist institutionalism offers, leaving possible drivers of change untouched by not incorporating these dynamics of the system.⁹ This research labels these mechanisms as a new form of cross-organizational spill-over, and not only within the EU's path of integration, which could contribute to the approach of constructivist institutionalism to explain the bureaucratic processes in more depth.

Based on the empirical findings of the case, cross-case and cross-path analysis of the paths of change, table 8.1 outlines elements of each of the three approaches explaining the causation of the observed paths of change of the security organizations.

Causes of Change	NATO	EU	OSCE
Broadening	<p>Crisis management States Events Lack of OSCE/EU/UN capabilities Presence capabilities Organs Survival/legitimacy Widening</p> <p>Comprehensive approach States Events/operations EU spill-over Organs Survival/legitimacy Path dependency crisis management tasks</p> <p>Collective defence States Events Widening Lack of OSCE dialogue Path dependency</p>	<p>Crisis management States Events End WEU Lack of NATO/OSCE capabilities Organs Survival/legitimacy Presence resources Path dependency EU integration process Widening NATO/EU cooperation</p> <p>Comprehensive approach States Events/operations EU spill-over NATO spill-over Organs Widening</p> <p>Common defence States Events NATO spill-over EU path dependency integration process Widening</p>	<p>Crisis management States Events End WP/SU Lack of UN capabilities Path-dependent development of security architecture Organs OSCE/EU cooperation</p>
Widening	<p>Members End WP/SU States EU/OSCE spill-over Organs</p> <p>Partners States Events Closed-door enlargement Organs</p> <p>Inter-organizational cooperation Organs States Spill-over EU NATO/EU cooperation</p>	<p>Members End WP/SU States NATO/OSCE spill-over Organs</p> <p>Partners States Events Closed-door enlargement Organs</p> <p>Inter-organizational cooperation Organs States Spill-over NATO EU/NATO cooperation</p>	<p>Partners (Members) End WP/SU States OSCE path dependency</p> <p>Partners States Events</p> <p>Inter-organizational cooperation States Lack of capabilities Widening EU/NATO</p>

Deepening	Level States Organs Operations EU spill-over Widening/broadening	Level States Organs Missions/operations NATO spill-over Widening/broadening	Level States Organs Missions Widening/broadening
	Form States Organs Operations Spill-over EU NATO path dependency Widening/broadening	Form States Organs Missions/operations Spill-over NATO EU path dependency Widening/broadening	Form States Organs Missions Widening/broadening

Table 8.1 Causes of the paths of change of the European security organizations drawn from empirical and theoretical findings.

After the end of the Cold War, the European security arena became more and more complex in both agents and structures. Change involved many different actors, which resulted in complex institutional structures, within and between organizations. This was a result of an increase in state and non-state actors, a complex institutional design of organizations combined with an increase of authority and autonomy among the organizations, organs and staff, an overlap and differentiation in tasks and members between the organizations and simultaneously more interaction between the security organizations. The described paths of change thus showed that the developments in the European security architecture were caused by both state and non-state actors as well as specific mechanisms, as was argued in Chapter 1.

Approaching the paths of change of the security organizations from different theoretical perspectives, derived from the selected approaches of new institutionalism, proved to be complementary rather than competitive or substitutive. As suggested in Chapter 1, the prominent features of each theory were indeed salient. This includes rational choice focus on national interests and preferences, and national governments' role in the paths of change via debates, compromises and decisions. At the same time, historical institutionalism explored the heritages from the past into the present, and the outcomes observed were circumscribed by a certain number of the effects of path dependency. Finally, as well as state actors, other actors and mechanisms were likewise under scrutiny in this research. In contrast with rational choice and historical institutionalists, institutions are not only comprised of structures. They are also seen as actors, where dynamics are at play through which individuals and organs achieve goals. These goals can be variable and less stable and could even be conflictive, which is in contrast with the approaches of rational choice and historical institutionalists, who argue that the end goal of an organization is stability. As a result, according to constructivism the ideas of stability, but also survival, can be an agency of change within existing structures that were fixed or, its opposite, obsolete.

Combined, it has been proven that they presented a more complete framework to explain the observed paths of change, and their strengths and weaknesses complemented

one another and therefore increased the explanatory leverage of the research. So there were differences, but also links between the approaches; knowing how organizations were created and designed (historical institutionalism) provided valuable insights into the interests of state actors and their responses towards these organizations (rational choice) and other actors (constructivist institutionalism).

Finally, the adopted method of process tracing, emphasising critical sequences, provided the possibility to analyse key moments of the paths of change in time together with path dependency, providing an essential historical lens, which enabled the accomplishment of a comparative research over time.

In summary, the research framework and method of analysis uncovered various linkages and interdependences between the organizations, either positive or negative, that could not be analysed by a singular theoretical approach alone. In other words, the chosen comparative method and research analysis was important to analyse the paths of change of the selected organizations in the European security and defence realm. This research can therefore be seen as a plea for academic bridge-building between different perspectives, as was so often claimed by Keohane, Mahoney and Thelen, discussed in Chapter 2. Applying separate lenses - and the sometimes inflexible arguments of the separate worlds within new institutionalism - to a complex organizational structure like the European security architecture does not always achieve the desired effect. In other words, focusing on one type of driver causing change and thereby creating artificial dividing lines between the different paths in which change takes place does not account for the world of organizations these last decades in the third wave of international cooperation schemes after the Cold War. All selected approaches of new institutionalism together provided useful epistemic lenses and conceptual tools to understand and unravel the paths of change of the selected security organizations.

It can be concluded that states are the sovereign actors promoting and protecting their interests in the security and defence domain to reduce uncertainty for which the rational choice approach proved to be a valuable one, substantiated by historical institutionalism, as these organizations were built from the fifties onwards, which left its marks on the paths of change. However, precisely due to the increase of different actors, complex institutional structures, driven on norms and values in the European security architecture, constructivist institutionalism offered a more comprehensive approach to analyse the how and why question of change of these highly institutionalized security organizations and their functional and dysfunctional paths.

8.5 Change of Security Cooperation and Organizations: Two Worlds Apart-together

After the debate of the research question above, the assumptions that have steered this research will be further scrutinized below. The case studies of this research presented a mixture of the traditional division between pure intergovernmental and supranational cooperation in the security and defence area had been observed as a result of an

increasingly complex institutional security structure including many drivers of change. Over the last 25 years, it was observed that multilateralism had been strengthened. At the same time, state sovereignty prevailed together with an increased defence of state interest and geopolitics. In other words, a combination of national autonomy and striving for sovereignty together with regional and worldwide cooperation and interdependence was observed. This resulted in increasingly complex security institutional structures, in level and form, and an increase in cross-organizational cooperation coinciding with non-institutional cooperation and disintegrative cooperation; two sides of the same coin. The economist Rodrik conceptualised this as the trilemma of the world system; ‘...democracy, national sovereignty and global economic integration are mutually incompatible: we can combine any two of the three, but never have all three simultaneously and in full’. To a certain extent, this trilemma is applicable to the world of international security cooperation. What was observed was not a European security architecture with complementary organizations where the OSCE would function as a hierarchical umbrella over the residing security organizations, as was the aim in the 1990s. Given the various illustrations of competition and rivalry, together with interlinkage between the organizations, a more fluid environment of organizational cooperation was observed reacting differently (or similarly) to external, internal and inter-organizational drivers of change. What was observed was a hybrid security architecture, as a result of blended security cooperation in form and function, illustrated by the EU’s and NATO’s combination of multilateralism together with common defence. Not a division of labour, but a competitive and simultaneously complementary architecture: a linkage of labour. This tendency approaches Kant’s idea of international cooperation, by interlocking cooperation and interdependence; this was not only observed positively, however, but also negatively, as discussed earlier.

The conclusions of this research have an impact on the selected concepts that were scrutinized: change and security cooperation and organization, which will be elaborated on below.

First, for some of the approaches of new institutionalism, organizations are perceived as the opposite of change and are created to provide stability and promote peace in a world of chaos. Organizations are there for structure and stability; not change, illustrated by the approach of historical institutionalism. However, it can be concluded that change is here to stay and cannot only be explained by historical paths: change has become permanent and almost inevitable. Change occurs as a result of events, crises or conflicts, (un)broadening, widening and deepening of the organization or other organizations and actors in the field, integrative and disintegrative mechanisms and the ending of other related organizations, such as the WEU and the WP. Either way, the actors in this environment are subject to ever-changing conditions. So is the nature of these organizations and their development, where the modus of change has become a combination of a certain amount of path dependency combined with norms and values, mechanisms of spill-over and inter-organizational influence through broadening, widening and deepening which, to a certain extent, have become autonomous processes. Theorising along the traditional dichotomy of either a

bipolar, a multipolar or a fragmented world order does not cover all aspects of international security cooperation. Cooperation schemes have become blurred, neither including a supposed end-state of the European integration process, nor a NATO organization that will solely be a collective defence organization or primarily a crisis management organization. As a result, when analysing international security cooperation, the corresponding levels of analysis can no longer be divided between either individual, state or the international level. Nowadays, these levels blur, blend and overstretch these categorisations, which leads inevitably to interlocking organizations in a positive and negative way.

Furthermore, it was observed that change not only evolved as a logical consequence of alleged game changers such as 9/11, as stated by the realist approaches. Findings of the research showed that change of the organizations was also driven by the inherent consequences of either broadening, widening or deepening to one another, a certain amount of path dependency and spill-over mechanisms. This can be illustrated by the adoption of the mutual defence concept by the EU, yet most of the EU member states were under the NATO umbrella.

Second, the categorisation and definition of security organizations used in this research have become questionable. Questionable because, the analysed paths of change of the security organizations show both differences and similarities in tasks and functions and vary in drivers, which conflicts with Keohane's adage of 'form follows function'. As a result of intended and unintended consequences of dynamisms of change, like spill-over, within and between the different paths of change and between the organizations, a distinct relationship between the form of an organization and its function weakened. For one, form does not only follows function, or the reverse, solely as a result of the will and interest of the state, but likewise as a result of other drivers. Furthermore, the problem is that both form and function have become hybrid. Hybrid in form, as cooperation schemes vary from intergovernmental to supranational, and everything in between, from high to low institutionalization to informal cooperation and from bi- to multilateral cooperation schemes within and outside the security organization. Likewise, the analysed security organizations have become hybrid in function and tasks, as a result of broadening, and interaction, linkage or competition between the organizations or even take-over of tasks by other organizations. Hence the fact that the 'form follows function' adage needs debate and scrutiny within the security and defence realm.

Third, the strict traditional division of security organizations into the concepts of collective defence, collective security or cooperative security with which this research commenced has become problematic.

Traditionally, concepts that are based on the more Kantian concept of multilateralism clash inherently with concepts of collective defence, as NATO traditionally embodies. However, practice has shown an evolved mixture of these concepts through geographical and organizational widening and broadening, which resulted in a mixture of collective defence, collective security and cooperative security tasks of an organization, especially in the case of NATO and the EU. In other words, a contrast is observed between war and the primary

task of alliances (NATO's Article 5) and, to a certain degree, the tasks of widening and crisis management and response operations and the integrated approach of the selected security organizations as they developed. Likewise, the concept of a cooperative security organization which originally executes no tasks beyond its territorial reach contrasts with the observed organizations that geographically developed into organizations with a worldwide reach as a result of their paths of broadening and widening.

The developments observed bear consequences for the tasks, form and functions of the security organizations as well as for the national security providers, such as the armed forces. Although both sides of the traditional dichotomy between the more realist and constructivist approaches within new institutionalism address security cooperation, it became inherent to the way security cooperation developed that a contradiction emerged. What was observed was the domination of state sovereignty in the domain of high politics versus an automatism of varied cooperation schemes in level and form which led to institution building and strengthening of cooperation, interdependence and mutual linkages between the organizations. Simultaneously, this led to non-institutionalized cooperation, which did not always strengthen the states altogether in reverse as an automatism in the security and defence domain, contrasting the realist approaches. In sum, as a result of broadening of tasks and widening with members and partners, tasks and territory of interest crosscut traditional dividing lines of the concepts of collective defence and collective security with cooperative security.

8.6 Conclusion

The conclusion of this study is that by analysing the development of the paths of change of the European security organizations, individually and in comparison with each other, it was established and theoretically explained that, as a result of multiple actors and complex security cooperation schemes, change has become a permanent factor and a nearly self-sustaining concept. In more practical terms, the results indicate increasing but varied international cooperation, in form and level, and institutionalization through the paths of broadening, widening and deepening, both positively and negatively.

Theoretically, the results of this study support the case for the need to combine theoretical approaches of new institutionalism to analyse the complex world of security cooperation. In the security domain, not only the more traditional approaches need to be consulted, the results also demand an inclusion of other, sometimes unexpected, approaches in the security and defence domain. Hence the fact that not only the research has shown that multiple drivers influence the paths of change, but likewise, that multiple theories are useful to explain the paths of change.

Methodologically, the research method of process tracing provided the possibility to analyse the key moments of the paths of change individually and in comparison, which has proven to be essential for the cases selected, as the interlinkage between them was thus proven. Furthermore, the analytical differentiation of the operationalisation of the concept of change, by broadening, widening and deepening, has been helpful. Level and form of change also varied according to the pace and direction of change induced by these paths, which can potentially influence or hamper developments in other areas (spill-over effect). Without recognising such a distinction between tasks, mandates, members etc., together

with a comparison of their development and their possible linkage, whether that be a positive or negative comparison, general observations on the interrelation between the paths would be difficult to make.

8.7 Recommendations for Future Research

In 2019, NATO celebrated its 70th anniversary. The process of European integration has also been ongoing for almost 70 years and cooperation on security and defence matters within the wider Europe has continued for nearly 50 years. Nevertheless, the end of the European security organizations and the security architecture has, since their founding, also been predicted. Over the last decades, the 'NATO-in-crisis syndrome' and similar claims of the EU and the OSCE being in crisis are so often stated that it has maybe become 'a harmless cliché' or even an exaggerated proclamation. Again, since 2014, due to assumed geopolitical changes and cracks in the established multilateral institutional framework, fragmentation, implosion or even ending of these organizations has been predicted. If so, the question is, will this be a one-way journey into chaos, or will new forms of cooperation emerge? And will the debate on security cooperation be dominated by neo-realism again, predicting the end of NATO and so on, or will the debate take a U-turn this time and not exclude other theories?

This research has been a doctoral study, but also an attempt to probe the paths of change of the security organizations more deeply empirically and scrutinize the chosen theoretical approaches. Some theoretical, policy and methodological recommendations for further research on the concept of change and security organizations will therefore be suggested below.

Forms and Levels of Cooperation

This research exposed changes in schemes and models of (security) cooperation since the end of the Cold War. The pre-eminently sovereign domain of high politics proved to be more flexible than was foreseen. Schemes of multilateral cooperation were observed, combined with bilateral cooperation within and outside institutionalized structures, accompanied by inter-organizational cooperation. It has been proven that these trends have had an impact on traditional cooperation schemes in the security and defence domain. The question is whether modular cooperation and flexibilization are building or breaking the scope of policy and the institutional framework of the security organizations. Furthermore, as inter-organizational relations have become a complex interaction of dynamics and mechanisms and include different actors, interaction should be analysed not only as two-way traffic, but also including more directions. If the EU acts, some actions cannot be executed without the interpretation of the actions by other actors states as well as organizations. Finally, where are the paths of change heading? For instance, is the path of widening going to end in a closed-door policy or even a complete shutdown or will partnership and alignment take over?

Life Cycle of Security Cooperation

In this research, 'only' 25 years of analysis of the paths of change of the European security organizations were covered. Considering the ongoing debate about the liberal world order and the assumed expiry date of the scrutinized organizations, it would be of interest to enrich the findings in time and space and to take this research a step further and analyse the security organizations for the next five to ten years to observe whether the assumed breaking or implosion does indeed occur.

With regard to the life cycle of security organizations in general, it would be of further interest to include not only paths of change (as was the focus of this research), but also to include more emphasis on creation. Its opposite, the termination of international security cooperation, needs to be addressed as well. If NATO, the OSCE or the EU increase in strength, or the opposite (implode or even collapse), does this coincide or are these separate paths? And if so, are there differences or consistencies between these paths of change and is this comparable to the abolition of the WEU and the WP? And are ending paths simply the reverse of the analysed paths of broadening, widening and deepening and drivers or are other forces and mechanisms at stake? In other words, do the organizations change or do the drivers change; which will be first, the chicken or the egg, and does this generate other assumptions?

Expiry Date of the Security Concepts

A subsequent line of inquiry advancing the findings of this research would be the exposed mixture with regard to the security concepts of collective defence, collective security and cooperative security, especially in the case of NATO and the EU. A continuing analysis of the development of the tasks of the security organizations is recommended: will collective defence be replaced or complemented by other NATO tasks or will they all remain prominent? And, in addition, can a difference between collective defence, collective security and cooperative security still be made, theoretically as well as empirically?

From singular to linked Security Organizations

In addition, this research showed that decisions and actions that are taken in one organization have an impact on 'the other', either through broadening, widening or deepening or their opposites. Overlapping members and tasks increased, with both positive and negative consequences. This tendency did not create stand-alone organizations, quite the opposite! When analysing the development of NATO, the EU or the OSCE as separate organizations, therefore, including inter-organizational linkage has become almost inevitable. These findings also relate to the foreign, security and defence policy of member states, such as Dutch security and defence policy, which should not choose between the EU or NATO, the 'either-or' scenario, but should opt for both.

A Constructive Theoretical and Methodological Pandora's Box

With regard to the theoretical framework, the choice was made to apply three approaches of new institutionalism, with the aim of combining lenses that enable us to see the varied actors and mechanisms as possible drivers of change. In terms of broadening the scope of the findings, it would likewise be of interest to strengthen some of the selected approaches,

for instance by including other methods of data gathering, such as interviews, especially in the case of constructivist institutionalism.

Furthermore, including other approaches of new institutionalism to contribute to a more complete picture of the analysis of change is recommended, as every approach yields shortcomings as a result of the observed (un)intended mechanisms at play. This is illustrated by the added values of neo-functionalism. Through the observed mechanisms of spill-over in broadening, widening and deepening, it was made clear that the neo-functionalist's theory could also be applied to non-EU organizations and enrich the bureaucratic angle of constructivist institutionalism. Moreover, the analysis of inter-organizational cooperation proved a necessity for opening the box of varied academic approaches. Necessary because of the increase in multiple actors with influence involved in building and breaking the European security architecture. Academic bridge-building is therefore recommended when analysing inter-organizational cooperation, in contrast to specialisation or isolation amongst theories, which could contribute to inter-organizational research.

Additionally, the focus of this research has been on the European security architecture and its inhabitants. Needless to say, it would also be interesting to analyse the paths of change of other security organizations.

Finally, comparison enabled the identification of patterns of divergence and convergence. However, a general methodological problem of at least the dyadic comparative analysis of organizations is that organizations will always differ to some extent. The point of departure for the analysis of organizations therefore has to incorporate the fact that organizations always change in tasks, form and level, which could increase or decrease their diversity and should be taken into account when they are compared. Nevertheless, combining comparative research with structured focused comparison and process tracing in time and space has proven to be of added value.

Epilogue

Epilogue

My dissertation spans a quarter century, roughly from 1990 to 2016. The moment of writing is 2021, and looking back over the last few years it is evident that developments have not stopped. Again, the world order is challenged. The post-war multilateral system and the European security architecture, the OSCE, NATO and the EU, have come under scrutiny again. However, these organizations have survived many crises and conflicts for more than seventy years, as the title of my dissertation testifies.

The European security architecture has been dominated by two statements of American politicians for decades. First of all, former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's 'three D's' (1998), referring to future EU-NATO relation, contain no duplication, no decoupling, no discrimination. Though it was meant to prevent competition between NATO and the EU, which was especially feared by Trans-Atlantic states like the Netherlands, it foresaw a forthcoming battle between these two institutions. Second, former US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated that it is the mission that will determine the coalition, and not the other way around (2001), which yielded many flourishing initiatives for bi- and multilateral, and inter- and intra-, organizational cooperation schemes, such as BG, PESCO, Berlin Plus, NRF, VJTF, NG, JEF and EI2, often applicable for NATO, the EU and a possible coalition of the able and willing creating an *à la carte* security architecture.

Based on EU's Treaty of Lisbon (2009), the 2016 EU Global Strategy gave rise to more European initiatives and instruments followed by the Strategic Compass, whose aim is to further develop all these initiatives like, for instance, the completion of the mutual assistance clause, a military headquarters, the legally binding PESCO commitments and the financial instruments. After the 'Wales' (2014) and 'Warsaw' (2016) Summits, NATO has been reconsidering its tasks and heading for a new strategy, preparing NATO for 2030. Furthermore, since 2016 EU-NATO ties have become closer and closer by broadening and deepening their cooperation in many areas, such as terrorist, hybrid and cyber threats, military mobility, emerging disruptive technologies, resilience, building-up of capacities, research and development and so on. Once an intention or a commitment has been laid down in a political agreement or treaty, like PESCO, it is likely that developments follow from there. Hence, instead of the EU and NATO contradicting and competing with each other, they have become complementary, connecting and mutually reinforcing. A stronger EU, as a security and defence actor equipped with an extensive and varied civilian and military toolbox, results in a stronger NATO, and vice versa.

However, although EU and NATO cooperation has strengthened, the European ring of fire is by no means a pile of smouldering ashes, quite the opposite, as is evident from the rekindled conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan (autumn 2020), and the upsurge in democratic protests in Belarus (from August 2020), which clearly demonstrates OSCE's valuable position in the European security architecture.

Hence, the formerly-held idea of an empirical division of tasks among the various European security organizations has, at the same time, led to a theoretical division in analysing security and defence cooperation, creating a strict dividing line between collective defence and collective security organizations, on the one hand, and the forms and functions of security organizations, on the other. However, theories by nature perpetuate an observation and turn a situation into a rule, which brings me to the observation that, as a result of the changes noticeable in the European security architecture, theories on security cooperation in a broad sense are lagging behind the empirical developments that are taking place in a rush. Scholars debating security cooperation and integration theories, who solely apply these theories either to alliances or to the European integration process, tend to overlook new international cooperation forms. In other words, the empirical observations mentioned above engender new fields of theoretical research that have so far been left unexplored.

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Samenvatting (Summary)

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Nederlandstalige samenvatting behorende bij het proefschrift
'Permanent Change? The Paths of Change of the European Security Organisations'.

Als gevolg van oorlogen en conflicten zijn er na de twee grote wereldoorlogen in de vorige eeuw, wereldwijd veel vormen van internationale veiligheidssamenwerking ontstaan. In de Europese regio heeft zich dit vertaald in een Europese veiligheidsarchitectuur bestaande uit de Noord Atlantische Verdragsorganisatie (NAVO), de Europese Unie (EU) en de Organisatie voor Veiligheid en Samenwerking in Europa (OVSE).

Na de Koude Oorlog heeft deze Europese veiligheidsarchitectuur zich aangepast aan de nieuwe veiligheidssituatie die ontstaan was en zijn taken ervan uitgebreid, zijn vele nieuwe leden toegetreden, partnerschappen opgezet en is het institutionele raamwerk veranderd.

Ondanks deze veranderingen van de organisaties ten gevolge van de veiligheidssituatie, lijken er breuken en scheuren te zijn ontstaan in deze Europese veiligheidsarchitectuur. Van het begin af aan is er meerdere malen sprake geweest van crises binnen de Europese veiligheidsarchitectuur, maar vooral vanaf 2010 staat de macht van staten en het geopolitieke spel weer hoog op de agenda. Daarbij worden van academische, maar ook van beleidsmatige kant vragen gesteld over de houdbaarheid van de Europese veiligheidsarchitectuur en zelfs de huidige wereldorde.

Tegelijkertijd hebben de organisaties van de Europese veiligheidsarchitectuur sinds de Tweede Wereldoorlog menige crisis overleefd. Inmiddels bestaan de NAVO en het Europese integratieproces al meer dan 70 jaar en wordt er zelfs gediscussieerd over een Europees leger.

Bovenstaande bespiegelingen leiden vaak tot politieke en academische debatten over een mogelijk einde van geïnstitutionaliseerde samenwerking of, aan de andere kant, een nieuw tijdperk van internationale veiligheidssamenwerking. Deze reflecties hebben geleid tot het centrale vraagstuk van dit proefschrift, namelijk; Hoe en waarom zijn de Europese veiligheidsorganisaties, de NAVO, de EU en de OVSE veranderd, oftewel verbreed, verdiept of uitgebreid, individueel en in vergelijking met elkaar gedurende de periode van 1990 tot 2016?

Het doel van dit proefschrift is zowel een empirische als theoretische verklaring te geven voor de veranderingen binnen de Europese veiligheidsorganisaties vanaf het einde van de Koude Oorlog, door deze per organisatie en in vergelijking met elkaar te analyseren op basis van één theoretisch raamwerk.

Wereldwijd zijn er vele vormen van gouvernementele internationale (veiligheids-) samenwerking, maar in dit proefschrift is gekozen voor drie internationale veiligheidsorganisaties binnen de Europese veiligheidsarchitectuur: de NAVO, de EU en de OVSE. Alhoewel deze organisaties van elkaar verschillen in ontwikkeling, taak, lidstaten, mate van institutionalisering en missies en operaties vertonen zij tegelijkertijd

overeenkomsten. Deze verschillen en overeenkomsten zijn zowel theoretisch als methodologisch belangrijk voor de vergelijking die dit onderzoek nastreeft.

Het belangrijkste onderwerp van dit onderzoek is verandering van de veiligheidsorganisaties. Verandering is gedefinieerd als verbreding van taken (*broadening*), verdieping van de institutionele structuur (*deepening*) en uitbreiding met leden en partners (*widening*). Om de belangrijkste actoren en mechanismen achter deze veranderingstrajecten systematisch te kunnen analyseren zijn als indicatoren het niveau en de vorm van verandering gekozen voor alle drie de trajecten.

Een ander belangrijk onderwerp van dit onderzoek is het concept van veiligheidsorganisaties, traditioneel gedefinieerd als collectieve defensieorganisaties en collectieve en coöperatieve veiligheidsorganisaties. De drie gekozen organisaties voor analyse, NAVO, de EU en de OVSE, die verschillen en tegelijkertijd overeenkomen in vorm en functie vertonen alle drie kenmerken van deze concepten en zijn daarom interessant als analyseobject voor het concept van veiligheidsorganisaties.

Het denken over internationale (veiligheids-) samenwerking en organisaties, als tegenhanger van oorlog en conflict, heeft zich merendeels afgespeeld tussen de machtsgerichte realistische school en de liberalistische denkschool, waarin integratie en interdependentie theorieën centraal staan. De centrale vraag van dit onderzoek is benaderd vanuit de institutionele denkschool, omdat dit onderzoek zich richt op de analyse van de veranderingen van de institutionele structuur van de Europese veiligheidsarchitectuur. Dit onderzoek betoogt dat de manier waarop een organisatie en bijbehorende structuur wordt gecreëerd, verandert en soms eindigt, veroorzaakt wordt door verschillende actoren en mechanismen die daarmee de 'wereld van organisaties' beïnvloeden en bepalen.

De institutionele denkschool bevat vele verschillende sub-theorieën die aandacht besteden aan zowel statelijke als niet-statale actoren en mechanismen als mogelijke oorzaak van verandering, maar waar in ieder geval bovengenoemde 'wereld van organisaties' centraal staat. Om verschillende actoren en mechanismen te betrekken is in dit proefschrift binnen de institutionele denkschool gekozen voor de rationele-keuze benadering, het historisch institutionalisme en het constructivistisch institutionalisme die tezamen het theoretisch raamwerk vormen.

Dit raamwerk wil daarmee een bijdrage leveren aan de theorie van de institutionele denkschool. De intentie is niet om te 'testen' of de ene sub-theorie de geconstateerde verandering beter kan verklaren dan de andere. De intentie is om de verschillende aandachtspunten van de gekozen sub-theorieën te combineren. Dit onderzoek pleit derhalve voor academische *bridge-building* tussen traditioneel gezien verschillende en soms zelfs conflicterende theorieën binnen de institutionele denkschool.

De beweegredenen achter deze aanpak van het onderzoek zijn gelegen in het feit dat een dergelijke analyse van veranderingen van veiligheidsorganisaties binnen de bestaande literatuur ontbreekt. Alhoewel er veel onderzoek is gedaan naar de veranderingen van de genoemde veiligheidsorganisaties, onderscheidt dit proefschrift zich door deze verandering zowel per organisatie afzonderlijk als in onderlinge samenhang te

beschouwen. Dit is gedaan door middel van een vergelijking tussen de organisaties in één veranderingstraject (een zogenaamde cross-case analyse), en een vergelijking tussen de verschillende veranderingstrajecten (een zogenaamde cross-pad analyse). Uitgangspunt van dit onderzoek is dat het veranderingstraject van een organisatie niet geanalyseerd kan worden zonder een vergelijkende analyse te maken met andere organisaties binnen de Europese veiligheidsarchitectuur, omdat ze elkaar zowel positief als negatief beïnvloeden.

Een ander uitgangspunt achter de keuze voor een gecombineerd theoretisch raamwerk is dat de veranderingen van de Europese veiligheidsarchitectuur veroorzaakt worden door statelijke maar ook niet-statale actoren en mechanismen. In dit onderzoek worden niet-statale actoren, zoals internationale organisaties, niet beschouwd als lege hulzen, maar als actoren die beïnvloeden en bepalen. Daardoor kunnen de niet-statale actoren en mechanismen zowel empirisch als theoretisch worden geanalyseerd.

Kortom, een combinatie van bovengenoemde sub-theorieën is beter in staat de veranderingen in een complexe omgeving, met veel verschillende actoren en complexe institutionele structuren, te verklaren.

Vanwege de vergelijkende analyse van de veranderingstrajecten van de organisaties over een tijdsbestek van 25 jaar is ervoor gekozen om de methode van *structured focused comparison* en *process tracing* toe te passen. Dit helpt om historisch en systematisch de veranderingstrajecten van de veiligheidsorganisaties te reconstrueren, te vergelijken en te analyseren.

Uit het onderzoek is gebleken dat er zowel in positieve als negatieve zin veranderingen hebben plaatsgevonden tussen 1990 en 2016 in de Europese veiligheidsarchitectuur.

Ten eerste tonen de belangrijkste bevindingen van het onderzoek aan dat er, ondanks menige crises, sprake is van toenemende veiligheidssamenwerking. Door verbreding van taken, uitbreiding en verdieping van de structuur veranderen de geanalyseerde veiligheidsorganisatie in zekere mate onbegrensd.

Ten tweede vindt deze toename van samenwerking plaats op verschillende niveaus en in verschillende vormen. De verschillende niveaus omvatten een mix van nationale en internationale autonomie, variërend van informele tot formele samenwerking, zowel bottom-up als top-down en een combinatie van intergouvernementele en supranationale samenwerking in het veiligheidsdomein zelfs voor collectieve defensie organisaties. De verschillende vormen reiken van bi- tot multilaterale samenwerking, binnen en buiten de organisaties, tot aan inter-organisationale samenwerking.

Ten derde is gebleken dat het veranderingstraject van iedere organisatie, zowel positief als negatief, gelieerd is aan de andere organisatie door middel van verbinding en het zogenaamde spill-over effect. Dit heeft geresulteerd in geografische, functionele en institutionele verweving en zelfs interdependentie door cross-institutionele en inter-organisationale verbanden op politiek, beleidsmatig en operationeel terrein.

Tot slot, hebben de geanalyseerde veranderingstrajecten geresulteerd in een vervaging en vervlechting van de veiligheidsconcepten: collectieve defensie en collectieve en coöperatieve veiligheid.

Deze geobserveerde veranderingen binnen het spectrum van veiligheids- en defensiesamenwerking kunnen gedeeltelijk verklaard worden door de meer realistische sub-theorieën binnen de institutionele denkschool, maar bleken niet voldoende. Ook de andere theorieën van het theoretisch raamwerk van dit proefschrift namen een deel voor hun rekening van de geobserveerde veranderingstrajecten. Gebleken is dat deze benaderingen eerder aanvullend waren op de analyse van veiligheidsorganisaties, dan competitief of vervangend.

Kortom, de geanalyseerde veranderingstrajecten hebben een toename vertoond aan complexiteit in taken, leden en partnerschappen en institutionele structuur en hebben geresulteerd in fluide en hybride organisaties, veroorzaakt door zowel statelijke als niet-statale actoren en mechanismen. Deze constatering contrasteert met een veronderstelde Europese veiligheidsarchitectuur die gebouwd zou zijn op een duidelijke scheiding tussen vorm en functie van de verschillende veiligheidsorganisaties, zoals beoogd in de jaren negentig, maar eerder een in elkaar overgaande, hybride veiligheidsarchitectuur laat zien.

Acknowledgements

Acknowledgements

War, and its opposite, peace, have always been interesting subjects to me as they reflect, among other things, certain aspects of human nature, namely conflict, despair, cooperation and the need for solidarity. Inspired by books and movies, such as *Narziss and Goldmund*, *The Metamorphosis*, *The Deer Hunter*, and even *Jaws*, I tried to establish a clear line between, to use that hackneyed phrase, the good, the bad and the ugly. Other titles such as *Sophie's Choice*, *Camille Claudel* or *Rituals* made me aware of the impossible choices in life resulting from injustice or an artificial setting of rules. Others still, such as *Plenty*, *The Unbearable Lightness of Being* and *The Sun also Rises*, pointed at the imperfection of human nature. Already at an early age these titles led me to decide to study political science, with systems of national and international governance, war and peace and political powerplay as its central focus.

Though conflict is an inevitable aspect of the human condition, and sometimes necessary, survival can only be accomplished by cooperation. The intention of my attempt to compare three different security organizations was impossible in the eyes of many. For me, however, it has been a logical consequence of organizations founded on the very devastations caused by crisis and war, a natural linkage. As a response to war, cooperation has surely found its way in the European integration project. Its many forms of cooperation in one organization and its ditto theories developed over the last few decades have always intrigued me. And, as I found during my research, this does not only concern the EU, as it was not intended by Ernst B. Haas either. Hence, at my favourite chateau *Neercanne* (Maastricht, the Netherlands), the cradle of EU's Treaty of Maastricht (1992), EU's security and defence policy was founded, which eventually would change the whole European security architecture permanently and link together the EU, NATO and the OSCE.

Coming from the University of Amsterdam, I was quite unfamiliar with concepts such as war, the military and NATO. However, supervised by (then) Colonel Jan Kruidenier and Lieutenant General Jan Broeks, I was gently initiated into the military world, knowing in hindsight this experience could have been worse. Many pleasant colleagues, whose loyal support and enthusiasm I have always appreciated, followed their example.

Writing this dissertation, next to a fulltime job as well as a busy young family, was not always an easy road to travel. Therefore, I am grateful to the Netherlands Defence Academy for facilitating this research project and the PhD courses at the Netherlands School of Governance. At the same time I would like to thank my colleagues at the Netherlands Defence Academy, specially my colleagues at the War Studies Department, the Higher Staff and Command Course, fellow PhD-candidates and the international security studies section for whatever assistance they gave. In this respect, I would like to single out Jorg Noll, Maarten Rothman, Miriam Grandia and Trineke Palm for their theoretical and methodological support. Finally, I would like to thank the library staff and, in the final phase of materialising my dissertation, Merel de Hart of the multi-media section, together with the reproduction section of the Netherlands Defence Academy.

Much I appreciated having been able to share the vast experience of Prof. dr. Rob de Wijk, whom I have known from the beginning of my adventure in the defence domain and whose creativity, keen criticism and sense of humour have eased the way to this final point. Furthermore, I am grateful for the guidance of Prof dr. ir. Georg Frerks, whose patience, knowledge and skills at guiding a PhD-candidate gave me the confidence and strength to finalize this project.

Prof. dr. Joachim Koops, Prof. dr. Sven Biscop, Prof. dr. Theo Brinkel, dr. Laurien Crump and dr. Niels van Willigen formed the academic committee evaluating the result of my research. I have welcomed their advice, criticisms (which occasionally caused some hardship on my part) and, eventually, their positive verdict. I am especially grateful to Joachim and Niels for their time and substantive feedback. While I was finalizing this dissertation, with Prof. dr. Sophie Vanhoonacker, who coached me during my apprenticeship at the European Institute of Public Administration, joining, this project came full circle.

Closer to home, I am indebted to my own private army of amazons, who have stood by me from the outset, especially Dafna, Henriette, Annette and Margot, but also to the many amazons who have become intimate members of the female warrior race in recent years. Most of all I owe great gratitude to my parents, Anke Mengelberg-Thissen and Willem Mengelberg. A lawyer and an architect, who have always showered me with sound advice and guidance. From a young age I was taught the art of debate and to take on a critical approach to life and always question the logic of institutionalised structures. Their pride in me, and especially the endless support and efforts of my mother, has kept me going during this PhD project. Together we have always been three musketeers and therefore it is unbearable, and without any logic, that one of them did not live to see the end of this project.

And finally, I thank my menfolk Harm, Ruud and Mark, and their dearest, for being there and being the big brothers to my younger offspring Floris and Philip. Their sense of adventure, boldness and humour, without a doubt, inspires me every day and constitutes my joy of life. No question about it, I thank my buddy and opposite number, in many ways, Herman. Without his support I could not have completed this mission...

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Curriculum Vitae

Curriculum Vitae

Sabine Mengelberg (The Hague, September 15, 1968) studied political science at the University of Amsterdam, including an apprenticeship at the European Institute of Public Administration, and obtained her master's degree in 1995.

After the completion of her study, she worked at the Netherlands Defence College, followed by TNO Defence and Security and the Institute for Government Education for foreign affairs and defence. Then she took up the position of assistant professor at the War Studies Department of the Netherlands Defence Academy.

Her teaching includes bachelor, master and the middle and higher staff officers' courses on political science, public administration, international security issues and security cooperation with a specific focus on the European security architecture and she published books, book chapters, papers and articles in these domains. Next to her position at the Netherlands Defence Academy, she has been a PhD-candidate at the Department of Governance and Global Affairs at the University of Leiden.

She has given guest lectures for a variety of national and international organizations, including the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, the Dutch Atlantic Council, the *Rijkstraineeprogramma*, The European Security and Defence College (EU) and courses in the framework of bi- and multilateral NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.

Next to her academic career she has been a political advisor in several NATO exercises, a Dutch representative to the Academic Board of the European Security and Defence College (EU) and a member of the Advisory Council of the Dutch Atlantic Council.

