Public administration in Tanzania

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Public administration in Tanzania

Current issues and challenges

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Foreword

Dr. Josephat Stephen Itika

For the past three decades Tanzania has embarked on a number of policy reforms and strategies to reduce poverty and promote economic growth. The most fundamental strategies taken started with the Civil Service Reform Programmes in the early 1990s, followed by Public Service Reform Programmes I and II and Local Government Reform Programmes I and II. These formed part of the foundations of the development of policy objectives envisioned in the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP), as developed from the macro policy ambitions founded under the Millennium Development Goals 2015 and Tanzania Vision 2025. The ultimate goal of these strategies has always been to achieve a high level of socio-economic transformation and growth by effective institutions of governance capable of meeting the needs of Tanzania as a middle-income country by 2025.

Although throughout the years a lot of groundwork has been done towards this goal, particularly in terms of creating an enabling environment for strong institutions of governance through continuous human resource capacity development, there have been indications of dissatisfactions with the outcome of such initiatives. For example, the Key Result Area 6 of the Public Service Reform Phase II emphasized the importance, required interventions, and expected outcomes of leadership capacity development in the public service as part of strengthening public service delivery and accountability. Similarly, the Local Government Reform Programme II, which was devoted to decentralization through the devolution of powers, authority and responsibility from the central government to the lowest levels possible, has among others focused on capacity building in leadership development, organization and human resource development. The underlying philosophy has been to ensure full utilization of human capital potential.

From the LGRP II perspective, strengthening leadership in local authorities must involve reviewing and clarifying the roles of different employees and building their capacity to lead others as a prerequisite to achieving the objectives of the National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction. The other area of capacity development is organisational and human resource development in Local

Government Authorities (LGAs). The focus has been on building the capacity of technical and managerial staff in LGAs to set standards for staff and services in order to improve performance and ultimate service delivery.

However, notwithstanding the possible improvements made up until now, the Annual Synthesis Report (2009/2010), which assessed the performance of Local Government Authorities as a precondition for their entitlement of Capacity Building Grants (CBGs), shows an increase in failure rates of performance targets. Data in the Capacity Utilization Report January-December 2008 for Capacity Building Grants shows that the main causes for failure center on leadership, organization and human resource management. These factors contributed to the late submission of quarterly reports to the Prime Ministers' Office, Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG), to unharmonized Capacity Building Grants, to the limited role of human resource officers in capacity building planning, and to an inadequate output/outcome/impact assessment. Similarly, Training Needs Assessments conducted by Mzumbe University in 2008 and 2009 show that heads of departments and sections have an inadequate capacity to manage staffing functions. For example, one of the objectives of the human resource management capacity-building component under LGRP I was to decentralize human resource management functions to heads of departments and sections while the human resource officers remain in advisory and support roles. This would have enhanced human resource management functions including recruitment, training, performance appraisal and development of appropriate reward systems. However, human resource structures in local authorities are still highly centralized.

This book is a result of a joint project between the School of Public Administration and Management of Mzumbe University and the University of Groningen in the Netherlands under the generous support of the Dutch government through The Netherlands Organization for International Cooperation in Higher Education (Nuffic), which started in 2010. The general objective of the project was to build the university's capacity to support the Tanzanian government in achieving the ambitions envisaged in decentralization by devolution to local authorities.

Readers will note that the book is divided into four major themes. They are human resource management, public administration and leadership, institutional and organizational development and service delivery. As explained earlier, these four themes fit very well within the focus of Local Government Reform Programme II: building capacity not only of those who are employed but also of students who will be employed by both central and local government institutions. Capacity-building entails enabling current and future employees of local authorities to identify and analyse problems, make rational choices, formulate solutions,

and implement actions designed to achieve the set objectives based on the decentralization by devolution framework. It means creating space for the strengthening of leadership, organization and management of human resources. Since people receive public services through local authorities that employ more than 60% of the Tanzanian workforce, it is anticipated that, if effectively disseminated to all key stakeholders and internalized, knowledge in this book will make a significant contribution to the quality of staff and institutional governance and will ultimately improve service delivery.

I wish to encourage all students, particularly those who intend to work in the public sector, to read this book and indeed take a personal copy for reference because it unearths practical lessons based in a Tanzanian context that can hardly be obtained elsewhere. Those who are already working in the public sector and particularly in local authorities will also find it very insightful and refreshing, inciting desire to do things better for the good of our people and institutions.

Let me take this opportunity to express my heart-felt appreciation for a job very well done. As we all know, writing a book is a serious undertaking that requires the passion and commitment of all team members at all times. Special thanks should go to the Dutch Government through Nuffic for financing the project and to Professor Dr. Ko de Ridder and Dr. Albertjan Tollanaar from the University of Groningen and Dr. Stella Kinemo from Mzumbe University for steering the wheel together. Prof. Dr. Ben Emans from Hanze University, Dr. Rudie Hulst and Dr. Bas van Gool from VU University have been very instrumental in supporting the team with capacity building for research and writing. Thank you very much. Finally, last but not least I wish to thank the stream leaders, researchers, reviewers, publisher and support staff from all partner institutions for making the dream of producing this book a reality.

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Abbreviations

ACT	Agricultural Council of Tanzania
AMCOS	Agricultural Marketing Cooperative Societies
ANSAF	Agricultural Non-State Actors Forum
CBT	Cashew nut Board of Tanzania
CDO	Community Development Officer
CDTF	Cashewnut Development Trust Fund
CU	Cooperative Union
DbyD	Development by Devolution
DED	District Executive Director
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HRM	Human Resource Management
LGA	Local Government Authority
LGRP	Local Government Reform Programme
MP	Member of Parliament
NBC	National Bank of Commerce
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NMB	National Microfinance Bank
NSGRP	National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty
PCS	Primary Cooperative Society
PMO-RALG	Prime Minister's Office-Regional Administration and Local Government
SACCOS	Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies
SIDO	Small Industry Development Organization
TANECU	Tandahimba Primary Cooperative Society
TCMB	Tanzanian Cashew Marketing Board
Tsh	Tanzanian shilling
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pasific
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
URT	United Republic of Tanzania
VC	Village Chairperson
VEO	Village Executive Officer
WRS	Warehouse Receipt System

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African public administration at work

Ko de Ridder, Ben Emans, Rudie Hulst & Albertjan Tollenaar

Introduction

Good public administration is a core requirement for development, as all the literature agrees. The more difficult question is: what constitutes good public administration? What kind of public governance enhances development in the third world, more specifically in Africa and even more specifically in Tanzania? There is a temptation to borrow from near and far neighbours. Donor countries and NGO's offer their own versions of good public administration, based on their own experiences. Text books on different specialized topics in public administration find their way from the developed into the developing countries. Of course there is nothing wrong with learning from the experiences elsewhere, both good and bad. But there is a catch. Administrative expertise is unlike physical technology in the sense that it cannot just be implemented and applied anywhere, without consideration for a societal context. Mobile phone technology for instance works the same, whether it is utilized in The Netherlands or in Tanzania. Public administration on the other hand is very much a cultural phenomenon, embedded in the social fabric of the society it serves. The implementation of administrative good practices from elsewhere requires that they are adapted and geared to the specifics of the recipient country. In the end it is the social and public environment that determines the effectiveness of such transplants. Beyond that, a national system of public administration will have to innovate and improve also by de-

veloping its own indigenous ways and means for shaping and operating public institutions.

This state of affairs offers quite a challenge for academic public administration, in particular for teaching public administration and training future public officials. In the average African country, and certainly also in Tanzania, public administration educational programs primarily make use of text books from abroad, notably from Western countries. Too often it is taken for granted that notions, concepts and tools that do fit the administrative culture of origin are straightforwardly applicable on the receiving end as well. Thus students of public administration may end up with a perception of the subject that does not fit the administrative realities in their own country. To put it bluntly: there is a risk that a student of public administration in Africa might very well gain a better understanding of the local government system in Great Britain or the USA than in Tanzania or Nigeria. The teaching and studying of public administration in Africa should be about African public administration. The challenge then is to extract the core insights from public administration scholarship around the world and make them applicable to gain a better understanding of indigenous governance issues.

This book is an attempt to do just that. Actually, it is the second attempt. Four years ago, in 2011, staff members of the Mzumbe School of Public Administration and Management (SoPAM), in cooperation with scholars from the University of Groningen, published a book under the title: *Theories and Stories* (Itika, De Ridder & Tollenaar 2011). That book discussed a number of core concepts of the public administration discourse, connected with case stories derived from the Tanzanian administrative reality. The present volume is building on that experience. The cases in *Theories and Stories* were not originally written to test a concept or an administrative approach in the Tanzanian public realm. They were selected because they offered a good illustration of how a general concept could be applied for a specific Tanzanian situation. The present book is based on original studies, for which a theoretical approach or notion was the starting point. In fact, the activities leading up to the writing of the papers in this book were a trajectory of consecutive steps, starting with case study research and ending up with casting original case study material into the mould of a chapter in a text book.

In the remainder of this first chapter we will discuss the different steps that lead up to this book in some more detail.

From case research to educational case

Cases selection: administrative cases in a DbyD environment.

The overarching theme of this project is Decentralization by Devolution. In Tanzania, DbyD is a huge transformation program that has been developed and implemented over the last 15 years. Development has been sluggish, implementation was slow and fragmented and results up to now are ambivalent. This is not unusual, as far as public administration reform programs all over the world go. Beyond that, decentralization is a public administration concept with many foreign roots and a variety of interpretations. The Tanzanian variety as it resulted from these many years of development and implementation has not been chartered in detail yet. The intention of the project was to take stock of DbyD achievements in four selected areas, and make an inventory of the way decentralized institutions actually work.

The approach chosen required the selection of four specific PA areas in which DbyD could effectively be studied. The areas selected are four current issues in Tanzanian public administration that are within the areas of expertise of the staff of the School of Public Administration and Management of Mzumbe University. SoPAM wishes to play a leading role in these specific areas, both academically and in terms of transferring knowledge to the practitioners of public administration. For that reason financial issues were left out. The project set out with the following four topics: 1) public administration and leadership, 2) organizational and institutional development, 3) human resource management and 4) service delivery management. For each of these topics, researchable cases had to be chosen. For the first topic, the staff team responsible picked ‘leadership at the village level’ as the specific subject for a number of case studies. According to all policy documents, ‘leadership’ is considered as a crucial factor for the success of the DbyD policy. While in a complementary PhD study the focus is on leadership at the district level, the village level was considered appropriate for case studies in the framework of this project.

For the second topic, organizational and institutional development, the team zoomed in on one institutional issue, politico-administrative relations at the district level. The Tanzanian district, the core of local government, is still in a state of flux. Decision making at the district level can only be done well if politicians and bureaucrats have established some sort of rapport. The team set out to map the politico-administrative landscape at the district level, doing case studies in two districts.

The third topic, human resource management, was transformed into a more specific object of research: the relationship between DbyD and HRM at the district level. Many HRM decisions are still made centrally, in the ministry of local

government. Districts do have some leeway however, in a number of areas. The team wanted to know what room the district administration has to conduct its own human resource management and how that room is being used.

The team responsible for the fourth topic, service delivery management, zoomed in on twee two rather differing cases, of which one made it to this volume. The first case was in the policy area of health management, the second was about (local) government involvement in the processing of crops, more particularly cashew nut crops. In the management of crop processing many conflicting interests are involved and government tends to be involved in order to reconcile these interests in an even-handed way, creating a fair deal for all concerned. The case of the cashew nut crops seemed particularly promising because fairly recently new institutions at the district level had been put in place for the fair administration of crop handling.

Issues with case studies

Case study research is a particularly completed approach to social research. It has the advantage that the social reality under study can be presented in rich detail, as opposed to quantitative strategies that are far more reductionist in nature. A disadvantage is that there are no clear cut cook book like recipes available that inform the methodology to be applied. There are good handbooks however that offer lots of useful pointers and directives. For the methodology applied in this project, the research teams used Yin's book on case study research (Yin 2013). Still, all kinds of methodological decisions had to be made. Three methodological issues are highlighted here: the transformation of theories, the accessibility of data sources and the problems of data processing.

Theories

Data collection in a case study needs to be focused. From the bewildering variety in social reality that information has to be extracted that is required for answering the research question. Theory is the tool to reduce the complexity and facilitate the creation of some order in the chaos of reality. Good theories help to focus on what is important for understanding and not to be distracted by triviality. Good theories expose how different phenomena relate to each other. Good theories, in short, are an indispensable tool for any description or analysis of administrative reality. Still, theories are abstractions – a presentation of reality but certainly not reality itself. There is a gap to be bridged between the abstract ideas contained in the theory and the concrete phenomena of everyday administrative life. Moreover, the challenge in this particular research was to bridge the gap between theories based on experiences in the Western World and the realities of Tanzanian public administration. More precisely, the challenge was to select from the vast

literature those theoretical notions that might fit the research questions concerning the four topics outlined in the previous section.

For the research into leadership of officials at the local level, the research team drew upon the established literature on leadership styles and applied the dichotomy of transactional and transformational leadership to qualify the behaviour of the local leaders. The charge here was to find out whether the tools for observation as developed for leadership behaviour in western urbanized societies would work in the context of Tanzanian villages. The team that had set out to analyse the issue of the relationship between the counsellors and the bureaucrats at the district level, could fall back on a vast literature from all over the world. They came up with a model that highlights three distinct forms in which politico-administrative relations may manifest themselves, from which they derived a set of indicators to observe the real world. Beyond that, they became interested in the subjective perceptions politicians and administrators entertained about each other. The HRM team took its lead from both the literature on decentralization and on personnel management, in order to create a frame work in which district HRM practices could be captured as a function of central-local relations. For the analysis of the cashew nut crop processing, the research team selected the theoretical notion of coproduction to make sense of both the institutional arrangements and the actual practices in the field.

Access

Data collection for case research in administrative practices requires adequate access into administrative institutions and processes, for observation, for the analysis of documents and for conversations with the persons involved. Administrative organizations greatly vary in the accessibility for research. In Tanzania, the problems involved in gaining access are burgeoned by the long distances, the difficult roads and the complex communications. The research teams succeeded in tackling the problems involved by using their personal networks in the administrative system of Tanzania. All staff members involved are university teachers, and many if not most of their former students found their way into the practice of public administration. Personal networks proved a valuable resource for the opening up the system for data mining.

Data processing

The data retrieved from the field still formed unorganized clusters of information that required a thorough analysis in order to answers the research questions. In order to do so, the theoretical notions that guided the research, were transformed into sets of trays, each representing a variable. Each tray then was filled with the data that matched the variable. This procedure provided the researchers with an

ordered set of data from which the administrative processes and institutions under scrutiny could be described and analysed. The outcome of the data processing was laid down in a case study report for each of the four research projects (Kinemo et al. 2015, Mafuru et al. 2015, Mfaume & Kunkuta 2015, Mwakasangula et al. 2015).

Transforming cases research into educational cases

A research report is not the same as an educational case. It rather takes quite a transformation to derive an educational case from the material contained in the research report. An educational case is a story. The story has a limited time frame and is concerned with just one incident, one decision or one organization. Still, the educational case is rich in detail. It comes as close to making a snapshot of administrative reality as possible. What makes a good educational case? First of all it has to be based on good research: the rendering of the facts has to be reliable. Furthermore, the story needs to be told systematically. Rich detail is fine, but all detail needs to be functional for getting the meaning of the story across. It has to be clear what the intention of the case is: what theoretical notion it is supposed to illustrate; what type of analyse it is intended to evoke, etc.

A good educational case has at least three utilities in the class room.

1. Course material often is primarily theoretical; it defines, categorizes, enumerates, explains. Educational cases offer the real life story that not just shows or illuminates the theoretical expositions. Particularly for that large slice of the student body that has not been actively out in the field educational cases offer indispensable glimpses of the administrative reality that the text books are explaining.
2. Educational cases offer illustrative material for understanding concepts, theories, process models etc. Theories are lenses, that make it possible to view reality in a certain way, to analyze and to explain. Educational cases present opportunities for the student of public administration to practice the use of such analytical tools.
3. Educational cases are the instrument of choice for interactive teaching. Cases present topics for class room exercises. Answering questions about how incidents in the case could occur or about factors that may or may not be important for explaining what happened, will sharpen the analytical skills of the student of public administration. Furthermore, case material can be questioned in philosophical and ethical terms, engender class room debate about what constitutes good governance in this case and in general.

The cases in this volume are written by public administration scholars from Tanzania. They are all teaching courses in public administration and public management. Most of them have lots of experience with the realities of development administration and governance, as a consultant, a researcher or a civil servant. They bring African public administration into the class room.

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2

Decentralization of Human Resource Management in Tanzanian governmental organizations

Stella Kinemo, Emmanuel Ndikumana, Hamisi Kiyabo, Venance Shillingi, Moses Kwayu & Peter Andrea

Introduction

In 1999 The Tanzanian government launched the Local Government Reform Program I (LGRP I), the aim of which was first and foremost decentralization. The ambition underlying it was, and still is, to improve local administrations by transferring discretionary power to district and urban authorities with regards to several issues, including administration (PMO-RALG 2009). Human Resource Management (HRM) stands out as an area that should particularly be affected by the program. HRM, the management of people in an organization, encompasses managerial practices such as the recruitment, selection, rewarding, promotion, training and development of employees (for the ins and outs of these practices in the African context, see Itika 2011). The enhancement of the HRM autonomy of local (district/urban) authorities would be highly beneficial, according to the spirit of LGRP I. The HRM in local government organizations would benefit from it, and eventually the overall performance of those organizations would be in-

creased. In the present chapter this particular development - the decentralization of governmental HRM - is critically examined. More specifically, two issues are identified and discussed. The first one is the actual degree of HRM decentralization in the Tanzanian Local Government Authorities (LGAs) of today. As will be seen, the state of affairs is still characterized by centralization rather than decentralization, in spite of the initial LGRP ambitions. The second issue to be discussed is the whole of the outcomes, both positive and negative, that may be expected to result from HRM decentralization. An analysis of these outcomes may help to answer the question of which HR functions are best performed by a decentralized governmental structure and which are best performed by a centralized structure. The underlying assumption is the commonly held view that decentralization has its advantages as well as disadvantages (Pollit & Bouckaert 2000; Shafritz et al. 2001; Tessema et al. 2009).

In the first section of the chapter the legislation that sets the stage for HRM decentralization is outlined. As is the case in the chapter as a whole, the concept of HRM-decentralization is split up into the decentralization of 1) employee selection & retention, 2) employee rewarding, and 3) employee training & development. These three practices together are considered to cover, by and large, the whole range of crucial HRM responsibilities. The second section, which is based on what is known from academic literature, gives an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the decentralization of HRM practices. In the third section the subject matter of the previous sections is examined from the perspective of people for whom the HRM of local authorities forms part of their daily work. It recounts the experiences of civil servants (including HR managers) and council members in two LGAs. Those experiences add authenticity to statements made in the preceding sections. In the fourth and final section, the contents of the other sections are integrated into the conclusions that can be drawn.

Actual degree of HRM decentralization: the rules

The rights and responsibilities of Local Government Authorities are demarcated in a number of legislative texts (see Table 2.1). The human resource management of Local Government Authorities is enacted within the setting created by this body of legislation. The consequences for the decentralization of 1) recruitment & selection, 2) rewarding, and 3) training & development are outlined in the following.

Table 2.1 Legislative texts demarcating rights and responsibilities of Tanzanian LGAs

Mainland legislation	• Government (Urban Authorities) Act 1982 • Local Government Finance Act 1982 • Urban Authorities (Rating) Act 1983 • Regional Administration Act 1997 • Local Government Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 199910 • Amendments to these laws that formed part of the Local Government Reform Program, from 1999
Zanzibar legislation	• Zanzibar Municipal Council Act 1995 • District and Town Councils Act 1995

Recruitment & selection

Generally speaking, the procedures for recruitment and selection in Local Government Authorities are predominantly centralized (controlled by the Central Government). This is especially the case regarding the recruitment and selection of civil servants in managerial positions. These are firstly the District Executive Director (in District Authorities) and the Town/Municipal/City Director (in Urban Authorities), and secondly the Heads of Departments. Typical departments headed by the latter are, for example, those for education and culture, trade and economic affairs, health and social welfare, planning and finance, and personnel and administration. The appointment of those civil servants is straightforwardly a matter of centralization. The president directly appoints city council directors whereas the minister responsible for local governments appoints directors of town, municipal, and district councils as well as the heads of departments all over the country. The actual recruitment work is done by a central government agency called the Public Service Recruitment Secretariat (PSRS) which was established in accordance with Section No. 29 (1) of the Public Service (Amendment) Act, No. 18 of 2007. The Act mandates the Secretariat to conduct the recruitment processes of public servants within the public service. Recruitment and selection procedures are furthermore governed by a number of statutes including the Public Service Act No.8 of 2002 as amended by Act No.18 of 2007, Public Service Regulations 2003, Public Service Scheme 2003, as well as employment guidelines and establishment circulars.

In the procedures for the recruitment and selection of employees other than directors and heads of departments the local authorities themselves play a role. That is not to say, however, that they are as a rule entitled to make appointment decisions. On the contrary, it is still the central government who decides in many instances. In the case of the appointment of teachers, for instance, the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training is still responsible for the whole recruitment and selection process. The statutes that apply to the appointments of directors and

heads of departments (see above) apply furthermore no less to the appointments of other employees. The local authorities are, however, involved in decisions regarding selection and recruitment in that they are the ones who identify vacant posts and propose budgets for fulfilling those posts. Overall, however, the state of affairs can evidently not be characterized as being decentralized. An appropriate qualification would be, say, '95% centralization'. Only in the recruitment of lower cadre temporary employees have the local authorities some autonomy.

Rewarding

As is the case with recruitment and selection, the rewarding of civil servants of Local Government Authorities is regulated in a mainly centralistic way. To begin with, the local authorities have no say in the design of pay systems (salary scales, salary levels, retirement benefits schemes) for their employees. According to the Public Service Pay and Incentive Policy 2010, it is the role of the (central) government to develop a total reward system in the public service (which includes local governments). A number of central government agencies are involved in this process, including the President's Office for Public Service Management, the Prime Minister's Office for Regional Administration and Local Government, and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs. The latter ensures that public service pay is systematically enhanced in an affordable and sustainable manner. In sum, the making of pay systems for civil servants in Local Government Authorities is a matter of unqualified centralistic decision making. That is not to say that the practice of rewarding is entirely centralized, because this practice involves more than making pay systems. It also involves the application of those systems.

The application of pay systems includes, to begin with, decision-making regarding salary increases for employees. According to the Standing Orders of 2009 those decisions are at the discretion of the central government. Setting aside prescribed annual increments for which public servant are eligible, no increase in salary may be authorized without the explicit approval of the Permanent Secretary (Establishments). The local authorities only play a role in the first phase of the decision-making process. They submit salary increase proposals upon the recommendation of employee supervisors. This part of the reward practice can thus be qualified as moderately decentralized.

Applying pay systems also includes granting specific incentives and benefits, supplementary to an employee's salary. Specific examples are compensations for housing or transportation costs and incidental bonuses. This part of the practice of rewarding is regulated in the same way as the salary increase part: local authorities apply for the grants and the central government decides to award them and provides the budgets. Only as regards the awarding of bonuses in cash, the

local authorities are to a certain extent autonomous. They are free to give those bonuses to selected employees, paying them from their own budgets.

With regard to the payment of temporary lower cadre personnel the local authorities do have some freedom, without the restrictions implied by the regulations outlined above. Given these regulations, however, the HRM practice of rewarding local government employees has to be characterized as a generally centralized arrangement overall. The local authorities are expected to perform the role of executors rather than initiators of payment policies.

Training & development

Compared to recruitment & selection and rewarding, training & development of local government employees is less strictly regulated and, as a consequence, more subject to decentralized decision-making. The ultimate goals of this HRM practice are listed in certain documents of the central government, such as the Training Strategy for LGAs 2010. Among those goals are the enhancement of competences that are needed for the functioning of personnel and the functioning of the organization as a whole, and an equal access to training opportunities for staff of all grade levels. By specifying objectives of training and development, the central government thus cements the outlines of the way that HRM practice has to be enacted. Viewed from that perspective, the arrangement can be called centralistic. The translation of the instructions into actual measures, however, is a responsibility of the local authorities themselves. With that, a truly decentralistic element is added to the arrangement. As long as their plans for training and development can be shown to fit in with the guidelines of the central government, the local authorities as a rule receive the budgets needed to implement those plans.

Advantages and disadvantages of HRM decentralization

The urge to decentralize governmental HRM, as it is subsumed in the Local Government Reform Program I (PMO-RALG 2009), is not a uniquely Tanzanian phenomenon. It has actually emerged globally in the past three decades as an element of generic public sector reforms (Tessema et al. 2009; Cayer 2004, Kearney 2003, World Bank 1999; Berman et al. 2001; Shafritz et al. 2001). One of the causes of this trend is unmistakably the fact that, especially in developing countries, the organizational arrangement of civil service HR departments tended to be overly and impractically centralized (Tessema 2005; Bennell 1994; Heady 1996). Amalgams of hierarchical and centralized arrangements based on rigid notions of legal authority and rationality produced the problems that are typical of large bureaucratic structures. Another cause may be found in the prevailing

contemporary political ideology with its reliance upon the beneficence of free market forces (Legge 1995). This ideology tends to embrace a decentralized governmental structure as the preferred vehicle for optimizing everything, including HRM functions. Causes like these can be said to explain the trend toward HRM decentralization but that is not to say, of course, that they also justify it. For the latter, an overview of the factual pros and cons of HRM decentralization is required. In the present section of this chapter such an overview is unfolded. Elaborating on views expounded in the literature, the advantages and disadvantages of decentralization of the HRM practices of recruitment and selection, rewarding, and development and training are outlined. Firstly, a couple of points will be made about the advantages and disadvantages of decentralization in general. Thereafter, the focus shifts to HRM decentralization.

The key argument for the decentralization of government systems in general is that local rather than central authorities are best equipped for making decisions about local affairs, as they have more knowledge of local circumstances that have to be taken into account (Hope 2001). Policies are assumed to become more flexible, innovative, responsive, and tailor-made through decentralization (Berman et al. 2001; Cayer 2004, Hays & Kearney 2001). Additionally, the policy-making process is expected to become more efficient, that is, less time- and resource-consuming due to shortened communication lines between decision-makers and involved parties (Hope 2001). There is also a downside to this model: an undeniable disadvantage of decentralized, compared to centralized, forms of policy making is that outside the centre it may be hard to hire and keep the expertise needed for high-quality decision making. It was actually, according to Wood (2000: 90), the lack of technical capacities on the part of local authorities that initially gave rise to the centralization of public services. All in all, the picture that arises is thus a mixed one, showing advantages as well as disadvantages of decentralized forms of government.

A number of studies focus on the HRM part of the picture. Berman, Bowman, West & Van Wart (2001) conclude that the flexibility of recruitment and selection operations benefits from decentralization conditions: non-standard solutions for finding new employees are more easily found if those who are responsible for the acquisition of personnel are familiar with situational particularities. A similar flexibility-through-decentralization principle applies, according to Berman et al. (2001) and Lavigna & Hays (2004), to the HRM tasks following recruitment and selection, that is, the tasks to keep, maintain, and develop employees once they are employed. The HRM practices of rewarding and training and development are the vehicles used to that end. Non-standard ways for rewarding, motivating, and supporting employees are claimed to be most easily detected and applied under decentralized conditions, where the responsible HRM officers are in close

contact with the involved workers. Other authors such as Cayer (2004), Hays and Kearney (2001), Coggburn (2005), and Selden et al. (2001), arrive at similar conclusions. Next to the enhanced flexibility, these authors also stress that a higher degree of responsiveness of HRM policies is made possible by decentralization. For instance, the probability that selection decisions match job requirements characteristic of the local situation is highest when the involved selection officer has firsthand knowledge of that situation. Local HR managers know how to customize practices to meet local HR needs.

Tessema et al. (2009), while being mainly in favour of HRM decentralization, also have an eye for its disadvantages. In their view, a central agency is needed to make sure that Human Resource Management performances across local and regional units all match up to fixed standards. This signifies the strategic role of the central government of setting standards and accordingly monitoring and evaluating the work that is done in the field. In a sense, this can be considered as another plea for HRM-decentralization, because central agencies will be more able to fulfil their strategic role adequately when they are freed from the responsibilities of daily HRM operations that are outside their own setting (Quah 2007; Cheema 2005; Jones 2001). For HR managers in the involved local and regional units those responsibilities are less burdensome.

In Tables 2.2-2.4 the above situation is translated into lists of tangible advantages and disadvantages of HRM-decentralization that are expected to be manifest in the daily operations of local government organizations (decentralization *dis*advantages being phrased as centralization advantages). This is done separately for the three HRM-practices of recruitment & selection, rewarding and training & development. For reasons of analytical clarity the tables are set up three-dimensionally: a distinction is made between advantages in terms of HRM-effectiveness, HRM-efficiency and HRM-fairness, respectively. The meaning of these terms are clarified below, beginning with HRM-effectiveness, along with a discussion of the table contents.

HRM-decentralization and HRM-effectiveness

As its name implies, Human Resource Management has to take care of 'human resources', that is: of employees. More specifically, the task of HRM can be defined as realizing and maintaining appropriate levels of the availability, the competency, the motivation, and the fitness of employees (Emans 2010). Discussing the advantages and disadvantages of HRM decentralization means above all addressing to what degree decentralization helps to perform that task effectively. That is what is called here HRM-effectiveness. Defined this way, HRM-effectiveness tends to be disappointingly low in developing countries, as is revealed by studies about the situation in those countries. The people recruited are

not always the best possible candidates (Cohen & Wheeler 1997), employed people are under-utilized (World Bank 1999), good performance is not promoted (Cohen & Wheeler 1997), and well-performing employees are badly retained (Budhwar & Debrah 2001; Kiggundu 1989). The question is whether HRM decentralization may help to improve this state of affairs.

Recruitment and selection practices are effective to the degree that the best possible people are recruited and selected in view of the organization's needs. As is articulated in Table 2.2, decentralized practices seem to be more advantageous in this respect than centralized ones, mainly due to the many opportunities available for making decisions that are in accordance with local circumstances and locally experienced organization needs. Candidates who are posted from central recruitment may lack the experience and commitment needed for work in peripheral and other regions, simply due to the fact that central recruiters are unfamiliar with the circumstances in those regions. On the other hand, in centralized practices attention is likely to be paid to other essential needs, that is, organization-overarching (national) needs. A further advantage of centralized practices, compared to decentralized ones, is that they tend to be manned by agents with better skills who can rely on a broader range of resources. Those agents, in contrast to their de-central colleagues, are well-equipped not only for the design of recruitment and selection methods but also for complex operations such as, for instance, the recruitment of teachers and other professionals countrywide. Compared to agents in remote areas they are obviously in a better position to do that job effectively. Without some form of centralization, the even distribution of employees to every corner of the country is hard to realize.

Similar conclusions can be drawn as to the practice of rewarding (see Table 2.3). The objectives of this specific practice, as it is worded in the Public Service Pay and Incentive Policy (2010), is to attract the right people for employment and to compensate employees appropriately. Appropriately means firstly in accordance with the work that is done and secondly in such a way that the involved employees become maximally motivated to perform well and to remain in the organization.

Table 2.2 Three-dimensional appraisal of (de)centralization of HRM in local government organizations: the practice of recruitment & selection

Dimension	*Advantages of decentralization (Pointing to disadvantages of centralization)*	*Advantages of centralization (Pointing to disadvantages of decentralization)*
HRM-effectiveness	• Optimal fit between qualifications of selected employees and organization-specific job requirements (job contents, job complexity) • Optimal fit between attributes of selected employees and the daily work context, including fellow colleagues • Flexibility: enrichment and improvement of standard recruitment procedures through making use of local opportunities • Procedural speed: vacant positions are timely filled because decisions do not need to wait for authorization by an external (central) agency • Procedural speed: vacant positions are timely filled because required adjustments of activities performed by involved actors can be implemented immediately	• Optimal fit between qualifications of selected employees and nationwide adopted standards of skills and competences of civil servants • Availability of highly skilled staff to perform complex tasks such as the design of recruitment and selection systems • Availability of resources needed for complex operations, such as nationwide recruitment • Preservation of the quality of recruitment and selection operations nationwide by means of monitoring and controlling devices to be uniformly applied throughout the country
HRM-efficiency	• Low process costs: the comparatively simple procedures, with involved actors working in one organization, demand (comparatively) little time and resources (‘not much red tape’)	• Economy of scale: staff needed for the design of recruitment and selection systems are concentrated in one (central) place; systems do not need to be invented by each single de-central unit
HRM-fairness	• No special merits	• Nepotism and tribalism barrier: decision-making by central agencies (which are not involved in local alliances) tends to be unaffected by improper feelings of loyalty towards specific (categories of) people

Local agents, due to the fine-tuning possibilities they have, are in a good position for achieving these objectives. Central agents, on the other hand, are indispensable for creating the basic conditions for the latter, due to the resources they have for maintaining the rewarding machinery, among other things.

Table 2.3 Three-dimensional appraisal of (de)centralization of HRM in local government organizations: the practice of rewarding

Dimension	*Advantages of decentralization (Pointing to disadvantages of centralization)*	*Advantages of centralization (Pointing to disadvantages of decentralization)*
HRM-effectiveness	• Adaptability of reward levels to locally specific requirements regarding the motivation and retention of employee categories • Adaptability of reward levels to the unique performance levels of individual employees • Adaptability of reward levels to specific needs of (categories of) employees • Flexibility through the incorporation of local specificities in negotiations regarding reward levels and related employee rights	• Adaptability of reward levels to norms and intentions inherent in the country's policies for building workforces in governmental organizations • Availability of highly skilled staff for designing and applying reward systems • Preservation of the quality of rewarding practices nationwide by means of monitoring and controlling devices that are uniformly applied throughout the country
HRM-efficiency	• Low process costs: the comparatively simple procedures (the involved actors working in one and the same organization) demand (comparatively) little time and resources	• Economy of scale: staff needed for the design of reward systems is concentrated in one (central) place; systems do not need to be redesigned by each single decentral unit
HRM-fairness	• Fine-tuning opportunities, resulting from being able to pay attention to delicate and/or more or less concealed circumstances that justify certain reward measures for individual employees	• Equal treatment of employees nationwide • Nepotism and tribalism barrier: decision-making by central agencies (which are not involved in local alliances) tends to be unaffected by improper feelings of loyalty towards specific (categories of) employees

In regards to the practice of training and development, conclusions are not altogether different: decentralization has enormous merits, although centralization

has certain merits as well (see Table 2.4). An instructive document on this subject is the Training Strategy for LGAs (2010), which contains a list of drawbacks to the way the training and development practice tends to be enacted.

Table 2.4 Three-dimensional appraisal of (de)centralization of HRM in local government organizations: the practice of training & development

Dimension	*Advantages of decentralization (Pointing to disadvantages of centralization)*	*Advantages of centralization (Pointing to disadvantages of decentralization)*
HRM-effectiveness	• Adaptability of training programs to the organization's need for employee competences, derived from the organization's own long-term policy making and personnel planning • Adaptability of training programs to the specific ambitions and possibilities of individual employees • Room for the development of tailor-made on-the-job training programs for employees	• Adaptability of training and development policies to the nation's ambition regarding capacity building in governmental organizations • Availability of highly skilled specialists for managing the selection of programs for training and development and for monitoring the quality of training providers • Preservation of the quality of training and development practices nationwide by means of monitoring and controlling devices that are uniformly applied throughout the country
HRM-efficiency	• Low process costs: the comparatively simple procedures for the allocation of training and development opportunities (the involved actors working in one and the same organization), demand (comparatively) little time and resources	• Economy of scale: staff needed for finding appropriate training and development programs, negotiating with the providers of those programs, and monitoring the quality of provided programs are concentrated in one (central) place
HRM-fairness	• Fine-tuning opportunities, resulting from being able to pay attention to delicate and/or more or less concealed circumstances that justify certain training & development investments for individual employees	• Equal treatment of employees nationwide • Nepotism and tribalism barrier: decision-making by central agencies (which are not involved in local alliances) tends to be unaffected by improper feelings of loyalty towards specific (categories of) employees

Three drawbacks in this list can be viewed as (unintended) results of the centralized nature of involved practices. In that sense, the document can be said to make a case for decentralization. Firstly, the authors of the document observe in some LGAs an over-emphasis on training activities linked to certificates and academic degrees at the expense of programs that focus on skills needed by employees in their daily work. An intensified involvement of local decision-makers might improve this situation. Through this, skills needed locally would come into view more easily. Secondly, existing capacity-building plans often fail to be based, according to the document, on organization-specific assessments of the training needs of employees. Local agents, compared to their central counterparts, are obviously in a better position to execute, understand, and use training needs assessments. Thirdly, there appears to be an overwhelming focus on a traditional classroom setup for training programs, far removed from the real-life professional environment. Only local agents are sufficiently familiar with the employees' work environment in order to be able to build training devices into that environment (training-on-the-job programs, as an alternative to class-room courses). In reducing the likelihood of these types of drawbacks, decentralization can thus be said to be indispensable for the promotion of training and development effectiveness, defined in the document as building a capacity to deliver an improvement in service.

The other side of the argument is that roles played by central government agencies are indispensable as well. Agents operating de-centrally are simply unable to do much of their work without the instruction, support, and advice of central agencies. For instance, the Training Strategy for LGAs document points to the importance of monitoring the quality of training providers. That is clearly an overarching LGA job, and is not suited for decentralization. Furthermore, training and development is a business in a complicated market of supply and demand. For navigating the market, that is, for finding the best training services for their employees, local governments will always be dependent on the expertise of specialists of the central government.

HRM decentralization and HRM efficiency

Practices are called efficient when desired results are achieved using a minimum amount of time and resources. This is another issue to note when weighing the pros and cons of HRM decentralization. One way to secure efficiency is to prevent complex processes from being split up into separate parts, with each part being managed by a separate actor. In an ideal situation a whole process is in the hand of one single actor. In that situation no time and money needs to be spend on inter-actor coordination. The technical term 'low process costs' applies to this. With regards to HRM in governmental organizations this is clearly a pro-

decentralization argument: the more tasks and responsibilities are concentrated within the local authorities, the less need there is of coordination of work between the central and de-central agents. In the Training Strategy for LGAs document, referred to above, the lack of this type of efficiency was marked as one of the drawbacks of existing training and development practices. As to the practices of recruitment and selection and rewarding the situation will not be different (see Tables 2.2-2.4).

Another type of efficiency that needs to be taken into account derives from the plain fact that expertise is expensive. For that reason, irrespective of other reasons that may make sense, it can be wise for local authorities to let experts in the central government do certain pieces of work as an alternative to hiring experts themselves to that end. Doing so is also a matter of sharing costs between those authorities. In Tables 2.2-2.4 this is referred to as the economy-of-scale advantage of centralization.

HRM decentralization and HRM fairness

More than other managers, HR managers serve two parties in the organization (Ulrich et al. 2007). On the one hand, they work for the organization as a whole. This part of their job was dealt with in the discussion of HRM effectiveness. On the other hand, they have to guard the interests of employees. This part of their job gives rise to an additional dimension to take into account when weighing the pros and cons of HRM decentralization: fairness. As defined by Jenkins (2012), fairness means, in short, equal opportunities for all employees. Worded in a more articulated way, this statement means that decisions that affect employees are fair when they are based on business- and policy-related criteria only, devoid of discrimination, arbitrariness and secrecy, and thus safeguard equal opportunities for all employees. With regard to recruitment and selection this means that all (categories of) eligible applicants get the same treatment, irrespective of their racial background and their personal relationships with decision makers. With regard to rewarding and training and development it means that the same set of criteria is used for all (categories of) employees. Those criteria can be anything; rewarding criteria may include an employee's job level, seniority, performance level and so on; criteria for providing training and development opportunities may include needs felt by the organization as well as needs of the employees themselves. The selection of those criteria is not a fairness issue. What counts is that chosen criteria, whatever they are, are consistently applied to the workforce as a whole.

For safeguarding fairness *across* local authorities some form of centralization is evidently needed, if only to prevent the development of systematic policy differences between districts (see Tables 2.2-2.4). A case in point is the availability of budgets. Under centralized conditions the central government can make sure

that investments in training and development are equal throughout the country. As to fairness *within* the workforces of local authorities the story is different. In making this happen, both centralization and decentralization have an advantage (see Tables 2.2-2.4). Local, compared to central, authorities are in a better position to respect the interests of their employees due to the fact that they can closely examine the particular situation of each employee. Central authorities, on the other hand, are less likely than their local counterparts to apply non-objective criteria as decision makers due to their distance to the particular field. Centralization helps to preclude tribalistic and other types of discrimination in the execution of HRM practices.

HRM at work: experiences in two LGAs

From the preceding sections two things have become clear. First, current legislation leaves, by and large, little room for HRM decentralization in Tanzanian Local Government Authorities (despite the initial ambitions of reformers that initiated decentralization programs in 1999). Second, the quality of HRM in Tanzanian LGAs in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness is best guaranteed through a substantial degree of HRM decentralization. The combination of these two conflicting realities seems to create an embarrassing situation for human resource managers and other members of LGA organizations. For them, decentralization is something badly needed and simultaneously difficult to attain. The question remains as to how this group of people experience this situation. In order to find answers, the authors of this chapter have conducted a study in two districts (Kinemo et al. 2015). Both districts were in Dodoma: the urban Dodoma Municipal Council and the rural Chamwino District Council. In the present section the key outcomes of this study are presented. The actual level of HRM-decentralization is described, as is, in relation to this, the experienced quality of HRM practices in use in the two districts. As to the latter, the concepts of effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness, as they were coined in the preceding section, serve as a descriptive framework. Furthermore, the setup of the section as a whole parallels the structure of the two preceding sections in that the research outcomes in regard to recruitment and selection, rewarding, and training and development are successively dealt with.

Experiences with recruitment and selection practices

Both in the Dodoma Municipal Council and in the Chamwino District Council the local managers have practically no influence on the recruitment and the selection of their staff. The centralization rules described in the first section of this chapter tend to be put into practice in full. The legislation does leave room, however, for certain local inputs regarding the recruitment and selection processes

and in Dodoma and Chamwino councilors and other actors do make use thereof indeed. This state of affairs gives rise to several problems according to the experiences of the people of Dodoma and Chamwino.

To begin with, there appear to be serious problems with effectiveness. The councils, due to their dependence on the central government for budget approval, cannot always get an adequate number of staff. Furthermore, Chamwino Council often finds it difficult to retain centrally recruited employees when they become unable to cope with rural circumstances, a typical outcome of poor selection decisions by central agencies. A specific example is that of a centrally selected driver who was apparently professionally inept. Another manifestation of ineffectiveness is that quite often vacancies remain unfilled for far too long as a consequence of the many recruitment and selection steps that have to be taken. A period of six months from defining an employment need to the actual employment of someone is not exceptional.

Local actors such as councilors are especially involved in the appointment of lower grade personnel. Remarkably, this was associated with recruitment and selection *in*effectiveness rather than effectiveness, because improper decision criteria were seen to infiltrate decision-making processes. Put bluntly, councilors used to demand their own relatives and friends to be selected. All in all, the effectiveness of recruitment and selection processes, as the people in the Dodoma and Chamwino districts experience them, thus tends to fall short of the expectations they have.

The Dodoma and Chamwino people likewise experience the *efficiency* of recruitment and selection processes to be low. The councils' dependency on central agencies and the resulting complexity of procedures generates several forms of *in*efficiency. The procedures not only take up much time, they also give rise to economic inefficiency because, in anticipation of the finalization of long-lasting appointment procedures, temporary workers may need to be employed using the funds of the councils themselves. In Chamwino a lot of money is invested further in the retention of employees who, inappropriately recruited by a central agency, are not comfortable with the circumstances of remote stations.

As to the *fairness* of the selection and retention processes the above-mentioned fact that councillors sometimes demand their own relatives and friends to be selected is relevant. It points to the existence of local forms of nepotism or possible tribalism. Furthermore, members of the Dodoma and Chamwino LGAs are often unaware of the reasons why candidates are hired when appointments are made by central agencies. Doubts about the nonexistence of nepotism at the central level are the result.

Experiences with practices of rewarding

In Dodoma and Chamwino salary systems are applied in the same way that they are applied elsewhere in the country. Decision-making power regarding things such as salary levels and the payment of salaries is thus entirely in the hands of central government authorities. Nationwide norms and standards maintain control. That is not to say that the rewarding practices in use in the two districts are devoid of decentralization elements. Those elements, though, relate to compensation in terms of non-salary benefits only.

The non-salary benefits that are given include material ones (incidental bonuses, allowances) and non-material ones (such as recommendation letters). The authorities in Dodoma and Chamwino provide those benefits to selected employees for three types of reasons. Firstly, they do so in order to reward and consequently promote excellent performance and hard working. Recommendation letters are provided to that end, but also bonuses in cash. In Dodoma, for instance, high-performing teachers can get 200,000 Tsh. Secondly, compensations for employees may form part of an attraction and retention strategy, especially in the Chamwino district. Clinical officers, for instance, are given a fully furnished house (not as a gift but for accommodation) in order to reduce unattractive employment aspects. The reason is scarcity: a shortage of staff forces the authorities to allocate budgets for this type of compensation. Thirdly, incentives offered can be based on the assessment of specific needs in specific areas. The Dodoma Municipal Council provides, for instance, motorbikes and fuel costs to extension officers and to staff in the administration department. Subsistence allowances for first-appointment staff and housing allowances for department heads are other examples of benefits in this category.

A number of observations can be made as to the *effectiveness* of practices of rewarding on the whole. To begin with, the people in Dodoma and Chamwino have doubts about the effectiveness of the applied salary system (salary scales, salary levels). These doubts, though, are only partially associated with the fact that it is a system of the central government. A complaint is that the fixed salary levels fail to motivate the employees because salaries are paid irrespectively of work performance. Another complaint is that the rules underlying the salary system are inconsistent. Employees with a similar educational background but working in different organizations are differently salaried, as are employees working in the same organization but falling under different ministries. Complaints like these, however, are not exclusively applicable to centrally controlled systems. They refer to imperfections of the salary system as such and there is no reason to believe that decentralization would help to repair those imperfections. An exception may be the following imperfection of job-salary connections within the system. As experienced by the Dodoma and Chamwino people, complexity levels

and responsibility levels associated with jobs are not sufficiently reflected in salary levels. This may be due to the fact that the central authorities that decide salary levels are unfamiliar with the actual contents of jobs in local government organizations. Local authorities would be better equipped, then, to take care of this part of the salary system design.

Doubts also exist regarding the effectiveness of some de-central elements of the reward systems in use. One problem is that allowances, such as those made available by the Dodoma and Chamwino Councils, are always provided very late. Regardless of their purpose, this can only reduce their usefulness. Another problem is that the applied criteria for providing performance bonuses tend to be far from clear. Sometimes it is felt that loyalty, rather than high performance, is rewarded. For promoting excellence and hard work this is of course counterproductive. It thus seems that the local authorities are somehow poorly equipped to manage these practices. There is, however, the special case of recommendation letters. There are no complaints about the way that this type of reward is provided. Unfortunately it is not highly appreciated, because employees prefer tangible rewards.

Mostly positive things can be said regarding the *efficiency* of the reward system in Dodoma and Chamwino. The machinery for administrating salaries is known to work smoothly, with salaries mostly being paid on time. The involved central governmental agencies can apparently be relied on. Efficiency of the non-centralized elements of the reward system in use is not really an issue, given the low volume of those elements. The work associated with them is not that time and money consuming.

In analysing the *fairness* and unfairness of reward systems it makes little sense to pay attention to the formal rules underlying these practices such as the rules for linking salary levels to jobs and the rules for maximizing the amount of money available for performance bonuses. The fairness of those rules is always open to discussion and is furthermore unrelated to the involved level (central/decentral) of decision-making. What counts is the way the rules are applied. If they are transparently and consistently applied to all employees, unaffected by elements of discrimination, arbitrariness and secrecy, they are considered to be fair. As for that, the people in Dodoma and Chamwino have their doubts about the adequacy of the way performance bonuses are distributed. The fear is that loyal employees are privileged, which is not only counterproductive (as characterized above) but also discriminatory. It is perhaps hard for local authorities to refrain from that type of discrimination.

Experiences with training and development practices

Training and development practices are expected to solve problems. They need to close the gap between available and needed employee competences. Their infrastructure in the Dodoma and Chamwino districts is strictly split up into two distinct steps. The first one consists of the analyses of training needs (assessments of the training needs of employees and employee categories) and the preparation of training plans. Local managers do this part of the job. The second step, which is at the discretion of central agencies, involves the evaluation of submitted training plans and, more importantly, the provision of funds for the execution of plans once approved. This state of affairs is neatly in accordance with formal regulations (see first section of this chapter). It appears, however, to generate problems rather than solutions.

The *effectiveness* of the training and development practices in use, as Dodoma and Chamwino HR managers experience it, is hampered by a lack of connectedness of the two steps mentioned above. As a result of that lack, badly needed funds may not be allowed in full, or not in time, or piecemeal only. The decision-makers in the central government are apparently insufficiently aware of local concerns. As a consequence, the workforces in the two districts tend to be sub-optimally trained. Too few employees are actually trained.

Likewise, the *efficiency* of the work evidently suffers from the described state of affairs. Performing training need assessments, translating those assessments into training plans and, finally, submitting those plans in an orderly fashion is a demanding and bureaucratic job. Performing that job is a waste of time and money when there is no reasonable guarantee of funds.

There are no serious *fairness* problems associated with the described state of affairs, although the unpredictability of the decisions made by the central government may give rise, of course, to feelings of arbitrariness. Outcomes of decisions can therefore be felt to be unfair. In principle, rules are applied without any considerations other than formal, objective and impersonal ones. Furthermore those rules, disputable as they inevitably always are, are not inherently unfair by themselves. On the contrary, they assure that employees in Dodoma and Chamwino are not treated differently from their colleagues elsewhere in the country.

In the preceding section, a series of advantages were listed and associated with HRM-decentralization or HRM-centralization (Tables 2.2-2.4). Taken together, the research findings presented in this section show that many of the attributed advantages are clearly reflected in the experiences of HR managers and other members of the Dodoma and Chamwino LGAs. These people forthrightly recognize the disadvantages as well as the advantages associated with both centralization and decentralization. The research findings thus do not give rise to whatever revision of the contents of Tables 2-4 They do, though, suggest some

details that may be added. Most notably, a number of negative outcomes of HRM centralization, additional to the ones listed in the tables, came into view:

- (Effectiveness problem) Unresponsiveness of central agencies may result in insufficient numbers of employees hired.
- (Effectiveness problem) Unfamiliarity of central agencies with local circumstances may result in the appointment of employees who, being unfit for those circumstances, are hard to retain.
- (Effectiveness problem) As a consequence of the tardiness of central agencies' operations, vacancies sometimes remain unfilled for too long.
- (Effectiveness problem) Unresponsiveness of central agencies may result in an insufficient number of employees that are actually trained.
- (Efficiency problem) Local budgets sometimes need to be spent on filling temporary vacancies when budgets are made available too late by central agencies.
- (Efficiency problem) Local budgets sometimes need to be spent on retaining employees who, being appointed by central agencies, do not feel comfortable with local circumstances.
- (Efficiency problem) Local agents often invest time and money in the development of training plans that eventually fail to be approved by central agents.

Conclusions

Saying that HRM decentralization in Tanzanian governmental organizations is something worth to think about is an understatement, given the state of affairs depicted in the preceding sections. Firstly, it was shown that the existing legislation tends to imply a lot of limitations regarding the realization of HRM decentralization. Thereafter it was argued that the quality of HRM is endangered in several respects when those limitations are actually put into practice. Finally, a description of the situation in Dodoma and Chamwino made clear that the latter is indeed happening. At first sight, this state of affairs seems to call for another local government reform program, which will once more enlarge the discretionary power of local authorities: still more HRM decentralization, in short. Indeed, a conclusion that can be drawn from the facts collected in this chapter is that the human resource management of LGAs would benefit from a number of thoroughgoing decentralization measures, such as:

- A change of rules in such a way that recruitment decisions can only be made with the explicit consent of the local authorities, or even on the initiative of those authorities.
- A change of rules in such a way that local adaptations of reward systems in use become possible (salary levels becoming differently linked to jobs across districts).

- A change of rules in such a way that the task of taking care of the training and development of local civil servants is entirely transferred from the central government to the local governments.

Measures like these might indeed be beneficial, but it would be short-sighted to take them without simultaneously paying attention to a number of issues that fundamentally affect HRM quality in Tanzanian LGAs. These issues came into view in the preceding sections. Three of them are elaborated below and each of the resulting elaborations gives rise to the need for more measures to be taken in addition to extra decentralization measures.

1. Some indispensable contributions to the quality of local HRM can only be made through the centralization of decision-making. Thoughtless decentralization actions might only destroy those contributions. Firstly, in regards to HRM effectiveness, a central agency will always be needed in order to keep an eye on the way local authorities do their work. Secondly, in regards to HRM efficiency, it would be a waste of resources if local authorities were made responsible for tasks such as nationwide recruiting and nationwide negotiations with suppliers of training and development services. Finally, in regards to HRM fairness, only the influence of the central government can make sure that civil servants all over the country are treated alike. To safeguard the quality of local HRM in these respects, a number of centralized HRM tasks thus need to be solidified rather than weakened.
2. In regards to the fairness of HRM, local authorities may sometimes be liable to give in to forces that privilege certain people in the community. As a consequence, forms of tribalism and nepotism in the community are suspected and this plain fact could be a reason to curtail the power of the local authorities somehow. It would, however, make no sense to reduce the decentralization of HRM responsibilities to that end. Entitling central agencies instead of local authorities to make certain types of decisions would only relocate the problem and would furthermore generate new problems. Rather than *re*-centralization, the instalment of fairness inspectors who work independently of authorities could be a solution.
3. The most fundamental issue that complicates the regulation of HRM centralization and HRM decentralization is that civil servants find themselves in a situation of *dual-employment*. They actually have two employers. On the one hand, they are employees of their own local authority; on the other hand they are employed by the central government. By itself, this fact is already confusing. What makes things worse, however, is that the interests of the two employers do not always coincide. A local authority may, for instance, have reasons to want to appoint a certain official in its own district because of the spe-

cific competences of that person and the central government may simultaneously have reasons *not* to appoint that person there because those competences are needed elsewhere. There is a conflict of two equally respectable interests, then. In solving that type of conflict, measures in terms of HRM centralization or HRM decentralization can only fail. They would be in favour of the interests of one party at the expense of the interests of the other. A different type of solution is needed: one that helps to integrate local and central interests. It is too much to elaborate on this issue here. In any case, solutions should preferably not consist of new and meticulous demarcations of rights and responsibilities. Instead, recipes for optimizing co-decision making processes of local and central authorities are called for.

This chapter started by raising a couple of simple questions about HRM decentralization in Tanzanian governmental organizations. It ended by giving complex answers to these questions and, in addition to that, raising new questions. For the reader, this might be a discouraging and frustrating experience. Hopefully, however, the chapter made clear to him/her that simple answers will always run the risk of being false. Hopefully, the chapter provided him/her with concepts to be used when deliberating how to act. In fact, the chapter can be seen as a series of lessons learnt from decentralization efforts in the past. Viewed that way, it may serve to equip the makers of future policies to do their job, however puzzling the lessons may sometimes feel.

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Case 1 Career journey

Case

Mr. Juma Halid is a Teacher at Jitegemee Primary School. He was employed by the Chamwino District Council in 1983 as a Grade A Teacher. After working for one year he began the National Service Training, as it was compulsory for all government employees who had acquired post-secondary education. The Ministry of Defense and National Service posted him to Makutupora Training Camp where he was trained as an army recruit for 6 months. The last 6 months were spent on extracurricular skill training, which included animal husbandry and farming. He successfully completed the National Service Training and returned to his place of work.

After working for 2 years, Mr. Juma Halid felt that his knowledge and skills were depreciating. This perception stemmed from his dissatisfaction with the work environment, as he had been posted in a remote village with no educational and social amenities. While his major interest was reading, he found it difficult to engage in this activity as there was no access to requisite reading materials. He applied for a council scholarship to pursue a Diploma in Education Course. He was lucky enough to be among the few teachers whose applications were approved. He successfully completed his studies at Mpwapwa College and reported back to his employer. He was transferred from Jitegemee Primary School to Mwangaza Secondary School, which is 10 km from the town. He was happy with the progress he had made and the work environment was much better for him.

He got married in 1992. By 2002 his family had grown, having had 3 children. Owing to low pay in government schools, the standard of living became increasingly worse. He strongly believed that the future of his family could be bright if he pursued a career path other than education. In 2003 he arranged for an evening programme at the University of Dodoma (UDOM) to study a Bachelor's degree in Sociology. This training programme was a private arrangement and the employer was not aware of it. He was hesitant to report the matter to the Council since it was a course unrelated to his career. He struggled to pursue the sociology

degree while teaching. He was able to continue with his planned studies because he happened to have a financially secure uncle who decided to sponsor him, and he successfully graduated in 2009. Upon completion of the sociology degree he approached the Council's Human Resource Officer for a considered transfer from the Education Department to the Community Development Department. This request was turned down on two grounds, the first being that all employees had to follow the Council's Training Programme, and the second being that employees had to study in the specialties for which they were employed. The employer ordered him to resume his former teaching career.

Questions

1. What HRM decisions were made in this case?
2. To what degree is each of the decisions a matter of decentralization or centralization?
3. For each of the decisions identified, explain the advantages and disadvantages of HRM interventions in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and fairness.
4. Based on the experience of this case, are there reasons for modifying labor laws?

Case 2 A bird's eye view of the May Day Ceremony

Case

Like other employment institutions, LGAs in Tanzania make use of compensation tools in their attempts to develop employee loyalty and commitment. Councils give different packages depending on their resources. Some councils offer employee incentives based on the assessment of specific needs in certain places depending on available resources. For instance, motorbikes are provided to members of staff whose job descriptions involve travelling long distances on supervision trips. The officers are given a specified expense allowance to meet fuel and service costs for every week.

Other incentives offered by LGAs include a subsistence allowance for first appointment staff, a housing allowance for heads of departments, and a leave allowance for all employees. Some councils give monetary awards to the best performing schools as well as fully furnished staff houses. The assets, however, are not personal but belong to the council. Some councils offer recommendation letters in recognition of exemplary performance. However, this type of reward is invariably not much appreciated by employees. Employee preference is for tangible rewards such as money, furniture, etc.

One of the compensation tools that are used in some districts is the annual allocation of certain rewards to selected employees on the 1st of May (International Workers Day). As in the Tanzanian public sector, LGAs hold ceremonies on the 1st of May. The May Day ceremony involves an array of activities, ranging from leaders' speeches re-affirming organization commitment in spearheading employee rights and welfare to the aforementioned allocation of rewards.

Potential recipients of the May Day rewards are identified through the involvement of employees in their respective departments. Departments organize forums in which members of staff vote to elect hardworking employees. A few names are proposed from which the top three with majority votes are entitled to vie for the single award. The award is given both in terms of a certificate and a

monetary sum. The amount may be between 300 and 400 dollars. This indeed increases employee morale to boost the work ethic. Much as this procedure is expected to be upholded, the process can sometimes be hampered by employee campaigns to persuade fellow employees to vote for them. It is a pity that some supervisors can, at times, abuse their powers by appointing themselves as the best workers in order to gain recognition that they may not necessarily deserve. Influential workers are sometimes elected and recommended for prizes at the expense of truly industrious workers. In such circumstances, the election results do not necessarily give employees the rewards they deserve for their hard work and hence cause low employee morale.

Questions

1. What HRM decision(s) is/are made in the May Day case?
2. To what degree is that decision (are those decisions) a matter of HRM decentralization or HRM centralization?
3. As to the decision(s) identified, explain the advantages and disadvantages of the involved HRM practices in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, and fairness.
4. Generally speaking, do you think that the rewards given to staff on May Day are appropriate and satisfactory?
5. Do you think that the processes used by councils to reward employees on May Day are appropriate?
6. Based on this case study, can you identify reasons for modifying labor laws?

3

Tensions in politico-administrative relations in Tanzanian local government

Wilhelm Mafuru, Deogratias Mpenzi, Idda Lyatonga Swai, Oscar Tefurukwa, Orest Masue, Richard Ngowi & Wilfred Lameck

Introduction

The relations between local politicians and local administrators are considered important for the performance of Local Government Authorities (LGAs). Good collaboration among the councillors on one hand, and between the councillors and Director and Heads of Departments of the local administration on the other hand, is viewed as a prerequisite for the local authorities to realise their objectives (Daily News-Tanzania, August 28th, 2012). Despite the good intention of collaboration, Lyatonga (2006) notes some incidents that seem to indicate the existence of tense relations in local authorities. The author showed that divided interests, among other reasons, escalated the tensions and eventually led to conflicts which frequently delayed decision-making processes and hindered the implementation of policies and programs (Lyatonga 2006). It has also been the case that tensions tend to limit interaction and hinder mutual cooperation among the key actors (politicians and administrators) in LGAs, the consequence of which is LGAs fail to achieve their objectives. Likewise, conflicts have become widely reported and the revelation of the existence of such conflicts is seen through the

suspension of council directors, dissolution of councils and sacking of local government officials. For example, in 2002 the Prime Minister dissolved the Dar es Salaam City Council, and Directors in Kibaha, Mkuranga, Arumeru, and Dodoma councils were suspended as a result of tense relations and conflicts within the local government authorities (Leticia 2008).

Judging from these incidents, it appears that councillors and administrators in Tanzanian LGAs do not get along very well. But is this the real case, or are poor relations the exception and good relations the rule? This chapter sets out to address the following questions: what do politico-administrative relations in Tanzanian LGAs look like and how can they be explained? The answers presented here are based on research in two Tanzanian LGAs: Kinondoni Municipal Council and Mvomero District Council (see Mafuru et al. 2015).

To describe and explain the nature of politico-administrative relations in Tanzanian local government three ideal types or models are used. These ideal types of relations have been constructed from models frequently presented in the literature: the classical model, the village model and the adversarial model. In the light of these models, relations are described in terms of 1) the degree of interaction between councillors and administration, which refers to the intensity of their cooperation in the course of the day-to-day decision making process and the implementation of decisions, programs and policies; 2) the degree of intervention, which refers to the extent to which councillors and administrators interfere in each other's domain; and 3) the degree of conflicts, which refers to the extent to which irritation, rows and disputes occur between them. For the purpose of explaining relations between councillors and administrators, the focus is on their mutual perceptions, and the extent of their mutual trust and loyalty.

The subsequent sections of this chapter are organised as follows. The second section conceptualises politico-administrative relations as reflected in the literature, and discusses three ideal types of relations, namely the classical, the village and the adversarial model. Section three contains a description of the formal arrangements between councillors and administrators, their roles and functions as stipulated in legislation and guidelines. In sections four and five, the empirical data from the research are presented and analysed. The chapter ends with conclusions and reflections on politico-administrative relations in Tanzanian local government.

Conceptualising politico-administrative relations

The LGAs in Tanzania are not unique. There are many experiences that are more or less similar to those in other countries worldwide, despite the fact that some context-specific differences in practice between countries are inevitable. Ten-

sions between councillors and administrators are one of the most common features of LGAs in the world. Therefore, the politico-administrative relations in Tanzania can be conceptualised and analysed using general theories and models. Scholars of public administration and political science provide different models, which in this chapter are referred to as 'the ideal types of politico-administrative relations'. An ideal type being a theoretical construct consisting of a number of dimensions logically related to each other, which is used as the yardstick to describe the key features of a real situation or phenomenon.

We have selected three key ideal-types from the literature to provide a theoretical footing for analysing the relationship between councillors and administrators in Tanzania. These are the classical model, the village model and the adversarial model. The rationale for our choice of these three models is to capture as wide a picture as possible by including all kinds of variations in politico-administrative relations that reflect the real situation in the Tanzanian context. In the three subsequent sub-sections we will discuss these models, focusing on the characteristic features of each. Through the use of diagram, we will illustrate how the three models describe politico-administrative relations in the Tanzanian Local Government Authorities (see Figure 3.1).

The classical model

The classical model of politico-administrative relations stems from patriarchs of public administration science, for instance Weber and Wilson, and is characterized by a clear separation of roles between politicians and administrators, where the former concentrate on political decision-making and the latter on the neutral non-partisan execution of decisions (Campbell & Peters 1988; Overeem 2005; Rosenbloom 2008). Under this model, there is a low degree of interaction between the two parties, and politicians and administrators do not generally interfere in each other's activities. Administrators are informed about the decisions, programs and policies established by politicians and report to them about their implementation. Thus administrators are not involved in the actual decision-making regarding the policies despite the fact that their technical knowledge and expertise serve as a necessary input in the decision-making process. In this model, administrators are the ones responsible for policy implementation and enjoy a certain amount of discretion. Politicians, meanwhile, are expected not to interfere in the execution of policies, despite having the formal authority to do so. In the ideal sense it is expected for the administrators to respect the legitimate position and roles of politicians as the competent decision-makers (Aberbach, Putnam & Rockman 1981; Campbell & Peters 1988; Schreurs et al. 2011). A separation of roles can only function in practice if both parties have a clear perception of and respect for each other's roles. It also assumes that politicians trust that adminis-

trators are competent and willing to loyally execute political decisions, and that administrators believe that politicians are both competent and willing to make the right decisions in the interest of the community. A clear separation of roles and mutual respect and trust will result in a low level of conflict between politicians and administrators.

The village model

In the village model there is no clear separation of roles between politicians and administrators. Politicians and administrators frequently interact. They engage in discussions about political priorities and strategies, and both give their opinion on the implementation of political decisions: decision-making about politics and implementation are up to a certain point a joint enterprise. The model also implies that councillors and administrators intervene in the primary domain of the other. That is to say, politicians themselves will sometimes perform tasks that are administrative in nature, such as collecting taxes or acting as supervisors over the execution of projects, and administrators will undertake activities that are typically political in nature, such as acting as interest brokers between different social groups. Under the village model, together politicians and administrators form a closed community. The members of this community share norms and values. The community is characterised by the overlap of responsibilities and the lack of structurally dominant actors in the relationship. The village model presupposes mutual trust and respect and the loyal execution of decisions that are basically the outcome of common decision-making in the community. Given these characteristics, the level of conflicts between politicians and administrators will be low. Is it an ideal relationship? In the perception of Peters (1995), the author who developed the village model, the members of this community are the elites of the society, and although they may work for common goals these do not necessarily coincide with the general interest of society.

The adversarial model

The adversarial model features a permanent struggle for power whereby councillors and administrators try to gain or retain control over decision-making. Councillors strive to impose their policy priorities and intervene in the implementation of policies, while administrators try to protect their own priorities and make political decisions. The key assumption is that both councillors and administrators have their own individual goals and strive to maximize them. These goals may be motivated by (different) political affiliations, ideals, specific public interests or professional service morale (Peters 1995; Aberbach & Rockman 1976). They may also concern personal benefits, an assumption upheld by public choice scholars. For councillors, for example, to the aim would be to maximize votes

and win elections, which create benefits such as prestige and power (Downs 1967). On the other hand, personal benefits sought after by administrators would include a good salary and reputation, power and patronage, and other prerogatives pertaining to the office (Niskanen 1971).

As a general rule, the fact that councillors and administrators strive to maximise their different individual goals goes hand in hand with a lack of mutual trust and loyalty. As a result, mutual intervention in each other's primary domain can be expected to happen relatively frequently, as either party cannot expect the other to look after their interests. Misunderstandings and open or covert conflicts will occur with some frequency; genuine cooperation will be scarce. Which of the two parties will dominate the relationship; councillors or administrators? This depends on the resources available to each, as well as on mutual interdependencies and strategies used. In a nutshell, the adversarial model is characterised by political behaviour, where councillors and administrators try to maximise different personal or public interests.

Figure 3.1 An illustration of the three politico-administrative models



As mentioned earlier, the three models are ideal types. They can be used to assess the features of real-world relations between politicians and administrators. The real-world situation may not match exactly with any of the ideal types, but sometimes it may come close one of them. Most situations of the real world will, however, have just a few features of one or even two of the ideal types. One can use a

triangle to model the variation in the politico-administrative interaction patterns described above. Each of the corners of the triangle indicates an ideal interaction type. On the basis of empirical research, one may locate a real world situation somewhere in the triangle.

The classic model depicts a situation in which low degrees of intervention (interference) and interaction (cooperation) go hand in hand with a low number of conflicts between politicians and administrators. The village model depicts high degrees of interaction and intervention and low degrees of conflict between the two parties. The third ideal type, the adversarial model, portrays low degrees of interaction and high degrees of intervention and a relatively high level of conflict.

The formal arrangement of politico-administrative relations in Tanzanian LGAs

The legal framework mandates the local councillors as policy makers and the administrators as the implementers of policies and plans. These mandates are provided under section 118 (1) (a) and (b) of the Local Government (District Authorities) Act No. 7 of 1982. The Council has the function of formulating, coordinating and supervising the implementation of the district's development plans. Furthermore, the councillors are the overseers of the council and they have a responsibility to monitor and control the performance of bureaucrats. Administrators on the other hand have a responsibility to keep the councillors informed of all activities taking place in the council as stipulated in section 63, 73, 117 and 118 of LGA Act No.7 of 1982. This includes advising the councillors in decision-making and carrying out the day-to-day functions of the council.

Legislation explicitly forbids individual councillors to interfere in the administration of legal obligations, policies and plans decided on by the council. It is a criminal offence for a councillor to attempt to influence the director or any other member of staff or agent of the council not to enforce an obligation. The offence is punished by a fine or imprisonment of up to two years. Moreover, the councillors are guided by a code of conduct that regulates their behaviour and relationship with the bureaucrats (URT 2010). The code prohibits the councillors from interfering in the administration of the council or instructing any employee of the council without authorisation.

The formal rules in respect to the tasks and competences of councillors and administrators and the way they are supposed to behave towards each other clearly reflect the classical model discussed in Section 2. The council is responsible for policy making. It may delegate its responsibilities to standing committees, but membership of the committees for finance and administration and for education

affairs is restricted to council members, while other committees must consist of no less than two thirds of the members of the district council (Act. No. 7, S. 76). Council committees are decision-making bodies in which plans are discussed and scrutinized by councillors with the support and advice of administrators. However, passing the budget, amendment of the budget, passing development plans or establishing byelaws cannot be delegated to committees (United Republic of Tanzania 2005). The formal role of administrators is to inform and advise the councillors (policy makers and supervisors) and to implement council decisions. In this respect administrators are protected by law from interference from individual councillors in their day-to-day operations.

Description of politico-administrative relations in Tanzanian LGAs

In this section, using the dimensions of the ideal types developed in Section 2, we sketch a picture of actual relations between politicians and administrators in Tanzanian local government based on the research conducted in Kinondoni Municipal Council and Mvomero District Council.

Interaction

As indicated in Section 3, the law separates the functions of councillors and administrators. Administrators have an explicit mandate to advise the council concerning the decisions for which it is responsible. This mandate emerges from the technical competences in respective administrative fields of work, which the councillors are not legally obliged to have. Otherwise, administrators must submit themselves to the loyal execution of council decisions. The council is the only body with the formal authority make decisions regarding council matters and supervise their administration. However, the council is not supposed to engage itself in day-to-day implementation. These formal arrangements would suggest that interaction between councillors and administrators is limited.

The practice in Tanzanian local government reflects up to a certain point the formal separation of functions. Administrators prepare policies, plans and programs and table them for decision-making in the standing committees and the full council. They take the lead in the execution of council decisions and report on the implementation of plans and projects. Councillors discuss and decide on the proposals put forward by the administrators. This working relationship, where councillors and administrators have their own role, is not without problems in practice. This particularly concerns information provided by the administrators.

In respect to council meetings the law provides that councillors should be given documents in advance in order read them thoroughly. However, in practice there are indications that the documents reach councillors late. The councillors experience this situation as a denial of the right to be informed adequately in order to make informed decisions. Councillors voice their frustration in statements such as follows:

> 'Normally the administrators tend to circulate call messages one day before the occurrence of an important meeting of the council.'
> 'So there is poor communication between us, councillors, and our counterpart, the administrative officials. Most of the information comes to me in an ad hoc manner; their behaviour to frequently call for meetings that way makes me totally unprepared… I feel I am only used to pass things.' (Mafuru et al. 2015: 38)

However, these flaws in the timely provision of information regarding council meetings are especially manifest in the case of councillors from remote areas, so the sometimes-poor communication infrastructure seems to play a role. Other councillors are satisfied with the way they are informed by the administrators (Mafuru et al. 2015: 29-30).

An information problem also occurs in respect to the supervisory role of councillors. Legislation requires that councillors ensure the collection and proper utilisation of revenues. So openness on the collection and expenditure of revenues is of paramount importance. However, in some cases the practice indicates a lack of transparency. Councillors of Kinondoni Municipal Council reported that they were not informed correctly about the expenditures on projects such as the rehabilitation of roads (Mafuru et al. 2015: 40).

While part of the interaction between councillors and administrators seems to fit the classical model – although inadequate information by administrators sometimes hinders councillors in their role – the research also showed that a more intense interaction takes place. Sometimes councillors and administrators genuinely cooperate in policy-making, and councillors contribute to the implementation of programs and plans as if they were part of the administration. On occasions when councillors find draft plans or budgets developed by the administration to be substandard, they take on the development of alternatives themselves, which are then submitted to administrators for discussion. This type of cooperation was found in Kinondoni Municipal Council, where the majority of the council members hold first and second degrees, amongst them retired officers from the public service with a variety of expertise (Mafuru et al. 2015: 41). Councillors and administrators on occasion cooperate in order to implement projects decided on by the council. It was reported that councillors were directly involved in the collection of contributions and the day-to-day supervision of road construction (Mafuru et al. 2015: 50). Administrators acknowledge and appreci-

ate the role councillors can play in influencing and mobilising the population to contribute and in tackling local challenges to policy implementation.

All in all, while the interaction between councillors and administrators in part corresponds with the classical model, we can also find patterns of interaction that fit the village model. In the words of one of the councillors from Mvomero District Council:

> 'We are working together; we are receiving the technical and professional support of administrators. Such support enables us provide informed decisions and supervise implementation of the development activities such the construction of a secondary school, a dispensary, irrigation channels and a bridge in our ward. [...] In all decisions for the ward development, we are together for implementing the aimed projects' (Mafuru et al. 2015: 38).

Intervention

To what extent do councillors and administrators interfere in each other's domain, i.e. do they themselves engage in activities that, according to the formal separation of roles, belong to the competence of the other? The research in the two districts suggests that intervention is a widespread phenomenon.

As mentioned above, formal rules explicitly forbid individual councillors to interfere in the administration of legal obligations and policies and plans decided by the council. If individual councillors want to take up issues with the administration, procedure prescribes they do so through the District Executive Director or the Municipal Executive Director, and not otherwise. In practice, councillors normally and frequently approach heads of departments or other officials to get clarifications on particular issues, to promote projects for their wards, or to ask for assistance in solving problems that their community faces. Administrators are not pleased by this behaviour due to the fact that councillors do not follow procedure to seek audience with the Executive Director. It also happens that in such situations councillors put forward their political agendas (Mafuru et al. 2015: 56).

A practical example of an incidence of councillors intervening in the implementation of council decisions can be drawn from the Mvomero land eviction case. The council had decided to implement an effective land utilisation scheme that would consequently lead to the eviction of some people from their residential and farming land. The affected parties raised a lot of concerns especially due to the fact that, in the eyes of the councillors of the affected wards, the decision was taken too soon to permit people to prepare to move off the designated land. The councillors in question felt that it was first necessary to educate people on the benefits of the proposed land use plan and provide them with compensation and alternative settlement areas. They also felt that, being representatives of the people in their wards, they were obliged to defend the people's interests by adjourning the implementation. So, they mobilised their people to resist the evic-

tion. The administrators were not pleased by that action, and were of the opinion that the councillors were acting out of worries of lost confidence from their constituency and lost support in the forthcoming elections (Mafuru et al. 2015: 33).

The research also shows that administrators do not limit themselves to providing advice to the council and implementing council decisions. Administrators sometimes actively involve themselves in the political decision-making process. A practical example concerns discussions between the council and the administrators regarding budget allocations in Kinondoni Municipality for the fiscal year 2011/2012. The councillors preferred a budget allocation of 70% for development projects and 30% for recurrent expenditures, while the administrators preferred 60% for development and 40% for recurrent expenditure. It was difficult to reach an agreement, but after a long discussion the councillors agreed with the proposal put forward by the administrators (Mafuru et al. 2015: 42). Furthermore, on occasion, administrators seek the support of influential councillors to get projects approved by the council or to call in the assistance of the parent ministry in question.

> 'In some cases we find it very difficult to pass a certain issue through the council and we are sure the issue has a positive impact on the development of people, although it is of no political interest to Councillors. Then, we normally ask the parent ministry to direct the council to implement such issue even if the Councillors do not buy it.' (Mafuru et al. 2015:51)

Moreover, administrators sometimes conscientiously ignore council decisions. In some cases council decisions regarding the allocation of funds for development projects are not respected. Administrators decide to re-allocate the funds to other projects and councillors are not informed. Councillors consider such a diversion of funds to be a justification for unfinished development projects. It also raises questions about who the real decision-makers are.

> 'In Sinza, the budgets of 95 million and 102 million Tsh were allocated to the rehabilitation of the Shekilango road and the NIT road respectively. Nothing was done, although the work was reported done.'
> 'In fact the council meetings are just a formality. You pass decisions but other things are done. […] A good example is the last decision we made to build a normal market in Mburahati Ward; but we read in the newspaper that the Machinga complex shall be built instead. So what is this?' (Mafuru et al. 2015: 40)

So, the practice of politico-administrative relations is characterised by mutual intervention. Councillors actively interfere in the implementation of plans and policies by administrators, and administrators actively try to influence political decision-making and use their position to deviate from council decisions. This pattern fits the adversarial model better than the classical or village model.

Harmony or conflict?

When we ask the question whether the relations between councillors and administrators in Tanzanian local government are overall harmonious or discordant, there is no simple answer. Some councillors and administrators qualify the relationship as good in general; others claim the relationship is not good at all. However, if we look in more detail, tensions and conflicts seem to be part and parcel of politico-administrative relations in the municipalities included in the research, and this substantiates observations cited in the introduction of this chapter. They concern the lack of information provided by administrators, and the fact that administrators are not transparent about expenditures. They relate to the way administrators administer funds allocated to projects, which on occasion results in accusations of embezzlement and decisions to suspend administrators. They are caused by the interference of councillors in the implementation of plans and projects, up to actions that aim to hinder the execution of council decisions. Most of these tensions and conflicts seem to be related to the fact that the different roles of councillors and administrators, such as they are laid down in formal rules, are either not performed properly or are not respected. This takes us to the role perceptions of councillors and administrators.

Perceptions of councillors and administrators

The assumption is that the way councillors and administrators perceive their own role and the expectations and perceptions they have regarding each other's behaviour can contribute to our understanding of the politico-administrative relationship in Tanzanian local government.

The perceptions of councillors

How do councillors view their own role in local government? Interviews and focus group discussions with councillors in the two local government authorities included in the research indicate that councillors view themselves as the ones who are the overseers of all council matters and responsible for the wellbeing of the council in general. They see themselves not only as the formal decision-makers with respect to plans, projects, budgets and local regulations; they also consider themselves to be the supervisors of administrative staff and of the proper implementation of the development activities agreed in the council. This attitude was clearly shown by one councillor who participated in the focus group discussions when he stated the following:

> 'I am the chairperson of the social service committee; I represent the people and I am their voice and most important, I supervise the council administrative staff to ensure that they perform their duties according to the rules, laid down procedures and laws.' (Mafuru et al. 2015: 29)

Councillors expect administrators to respect the formal authority of the councillors and to be committed and loyal to them. They also expect administrators to be competent, i.e., to have the ability to achieve the desired results and to execute the policy directives, and the capacity to find creative solutions to implement the policy decisions in the best possible way within the given constraints. However some of the councillors are of the opinion that the actual behaviour of administrators does not meet these expectations.

In the first place councillors denounce the fact that administrators do not involve them in certain decisions and are not transparent about the implementation of council programs. Councillors in both municipalities complained that the administrators responsible for the councillors' capacity-building programs never involved them in the preparation and implementation of the programs. Councillors find it inadmissible that administrators are sometimes doing things at the ward level without involving them. The failure to provide timely information related to council meetings and the diversion of funds allocated to projects mentioned above is perceived as behaviour that does not fit the role of the administrator. The discontent about the behaviour of administrators on the part of the councillors goes hand in hand with a lack of trust in their intentions. To some degree, councillors view administrators as unethical and as individuals who lack patriotism, concentrate on their own benefits, and do not pursue the interest of the community. Councillors think administrators cannot be trusted to manage funds in a proper way.

Secondly, some of the councillors have the perception that the administrators are incompetent; they have a low opinion of the administrators' technical expertise and denounce their ability to implement the programs and projects decided by the council.

The research in the two local government authorities does not allow for general statements regarding whether the lack of trust in administrators is justified. However, if councillors are not content with the performance of local administrators and distrust their intentions and competence, it does provide one explanation for the fact that councillors tend to interfere with the activities of administrators as described in Section 4. Moreover, the combination of discontent and distrust from time to time is likely to result in outright conflicts between the council and the administration. Reference can be made to what happened in Mvomero District:

> In Mvomero District the Council informed the Regional Commissioner that they were not satisfied with the performance of the Executive Director and other administrators. It lamented that the administrators had grossly violated its directives. As a remedy, the Council recommended the immediate removal of the weak bureaucrats from the council. The Council demanded the former Council Chief Accountant, who had been transferred to another LGA, to be brought back and provide an explanation on the embezzlement of funds. Furthermore,

> the full Council had decided to suspend the Executive Director for the misappropriation of funds allocated for development projects and the failure to supervise these projects. In the same vein, stern measures befell on the Council Planning Officer and two accountants on the same allegation. (Mafuru et al. 2015:35)

The perceptions of administrators

How do administrators view their own role in local government? Administrators consider themselves professional experts responsible for the development of proposals for the council and their subsequent implementation, which is in line with legislative expectations concerning local government. In their view they are not only responsible for the technical aspects of proposals, but must also see to it that council decisions do not violate the procedures and guidelines laid down in legislation and central government policies. Moreover, they consider themselves responsible for the implementation of the strategic goals of the council (Mafuru et al. 2015: 33).

In line with the way administrators perceive their own role, they expect councillors to seriously consider the technical advice given by administrators, respect their proposals, and to be knowledgeable enough to understand and appreciate the proposals they put forward. Once approved, councillors should be committed to the agenda of the council and refrain from actions that may hinder its implementation. Moreover, they expect councillors to follow the procedures and codes concerning communication between councillors and administrators, which include the rule that all contact must be channelled through the head of administration, the Executive Director. Councillors should not involve themselves with direct supervision of the activities of administrators, as shown in the words of one administrator:

> 'Just imagine, me being a specialist in finance, do I need a councillor to supervise me in order to work?' (Mafuru et al. 2015: 43)

According to administrators councillors do not behave as expected. They ignore the technical advice of administrators when it suits them and frequently interfere in the daily activities of administrators. Councillors try to speed up the implementation of projects for their wards or, the other way around, seek to hinder the implementation of decisions that affect their wards: administrators consider them to step out of bounds and not respect their roles in the local arena.

Administrators show a deep distrust concerning the motives of councillors. They are seen as driven by individual political interests and by personal gains rather than by the interest of the community as a whole or by the goals laid down in strategic plans. In the words of administrators:

> 'Whenever we give councillors technical advice, they accept it to the extent it promotes them politically… if in their view it doesn't, they just see it as nothing and reject it.' 'They are

> self-interested individuals who only prepare themselves for the coming election. They fight for the allowances paid in the council committees.' (Mafuru et al. 2015: 34)

Administrators also perceive councillors to lack adequate knowledge of technical issues. However, it should be noted that these observations are directly related to the level of education of councillors. Administrators in Mvomero District, where the majority of councillors are only educated to a primary level, found that most of the councillors have inadequate knowledge to make decisions regarding, for instance, the approval of the council budget.

> 'Despite the councillors being individuals with great roles, their low education qualification is a problem. Maybe it is high time the education qualification be among the criteria for anyone who aspires to be a representative of the people, rather than, being able to read and write.' (Mafuru et al. 2015: 37)

Contrary to this, administrators in Kinondoni Municipality expressed their appreciation of the capacity of the present council, where the majority hold first and second degrees and are retired staff of the public and private sector. Nevertheless, they still had 'bad feelings, for no matter how good councillors are, their driving motive is very often to achieve political interests' (Mafuru et al. 2015: 41).

It was mentioned earlier that some councillors think they could do a better job running their own wards without the assistance of administrators. In the same way there are administrators who think local government would be better off without councillors. A number of administrators voiced this opinion:

> 'I still buy the idea of Nyerere in the 1970s where he preferred to have no councillors in local government. Frankly speaking, councillors do not do anything that staff cannot do.'
>
> 'I work with established rules and regulations […] and there is the watch dog of the government, the national audit office […] so, all in all, I don't buy the idea of working with or having councillors in the local government.'
>
> 'The Ward executive officers and Village executive officers are enough. We don't need councillors.'(Mafuru et al. 2015: 43-44)

Other administrators, who accept or appreciate the presence of councillors in local government, plead for a strict separation of roles. In their opinion councillors should primarily deal with party issues and leave the staff to manage the council without disturbing them. Still, others appreciate the fact that councillors can play a positive role in the implementation of policies and in solving local problems, but stress the need for the training of councillors so that they are aware of the procedures to be followed and will not hamper the decision-making process (Mafuru et al. 2015: 43-44).

Conclusions and reflection

This chapter set out to describe and analyse politico-administrative relations in Tanzanian local government using three ideal types provided in the literature: the

classical, the village and the adversarial model. The findings we obtained from the fieldwork show that the relationship between councillors and administrators does not simply fit into one of these ideal types.

There is no doubt that elements of the classical model are present. Up to a certain point councillors and administrators play their separate roles, the former concentrating on decision-making in respect to policies, plans and budgets, and the latter concentrating on preparing proposals and executing council decisions. However, the conditions for a fruitful classical relationship seem to be only partially fulfilled. Administrators do not always provide the necessary information, which hinders councillors when it comes to decision-making regarding policies and programs and exercising supervision over their implementation. Councillors on the other hand are not always equipped to properly estimate the value of the proposals and advice of administrators, which they have also been known to ignore due to what administrators consider individual political motives. Nevertheless, in general terms the legitimacy of councillors as decision-makers is not called into question, although some administrators think local government would be better off without them.

Furthermore, it is clear that the practice of politico-administrative relations in Tanzanian local government only partially fits the classical model. Councillors frequently engage in activities beyond their role as decision-makers and administrators do not confine themselves merely to the execution of council decisions. Sometimes the relationship takes on characteristics of the village model, showing genuine cooperation between equals. This is the case when councillors and administrators sit together to develop budget proposals, or when councillors lend active support to the implementation of projects in their ward by mobilising people to make contributions. The research suggests that this type of cooperation occurs when administrators and councillors are aware they depend on each other to make good decisions and carry out successful projects and when they mutually respect each other.

More than by genuine cooperation, however, the practice of local government seems to be characterised by mutual intervention. It is easy to see that elements of the adversarial model are present. Administrators act as players in the political game in their own right, trying to influence decision-making in the council and disagree with council decisions concerning the allocation of budgets. In the course of ensuring that their priorities are given maximum consideration during the implementation process, councillors frequently interfere with the executive actions of the administrators. It is exactly this invasion of the primary domain of the other – administrators playing politics, councillors interfering in administration, in a struggle to control the allocation of resources - that causes conflicts between the two parties.

So, what is our final conclusion with regard to the nature of politico-administrative relations in Tanzanian local government based on the empirical evidence we gathered from the field? We do not have a straightforward answer here. None of the three ideal types suggested in the literature was perfectly observed in the actual practice of local politico-administrative relations. This, then, leads us to position the Tanzanian LGAs' politico-administrative relations somewhere between the three models in the triangle presented in Section 2. Our research does provide a basis for some other observations.

In the two local governments involved in the research, we found there is little or no trust present between councillors and administrators. The lack of trust relates partly to the perceived competence of the other but more so to their perceived intentions. Administrators believe the actions of councillors are motivated by individual political interests, the promises they made to their constituencies, and personal gains; councillors suspect administrators use their position, skills and knowledge in order to accrue personal wealth and not for the development of the community. It is this structural lack of mutual trust that seems to be responsible firstly for the flaws in the way councillors and administrators fulfil their primary functions of political decision-makers and administrators and secondly for the interference of councillors in administration and of administrators in politics.

The findings in the two local governments involved in the research may not be representative of Tanzanian local government as a whole. But where relations between councillors and administrators are tense a lack of trust is likely to play a role. Our research suggests that education can contribute to the improvement of politico-administrative relations in local government. The training of councillors in legal and policy matters can help to create a level playing field in which politicians and administrators can interact on the basis of comparable knowledge and expertise. However, it may be even more important to educate both councillors and administrators about the respective roles in local government attributed to them by the legal and administrative system. A thorough awareness of their own role can help them to avoid overstepping their competences and intervening in the domain of the other, and a thorough awareness of the role of the other can contribute to understand and accept his behaviour. This way, education can help to build trust and respect between politicians and administrators, which seems paramount for the improvement of their mutual relations and, ultimately, for the performance of local government authorities.

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Case 1 Tears of a ward representative

Case

Mrs. Eliza Mtemi[1] represents one of the 22 wards of the urban Ilala Municipal Council in the Dar es Salaam Region. Mrs. Mtemi was an education officer and has served in districts in several regions of Tanzania. At the end of her career she became head of the department of education of Kinondoni Municipality. Now she is retired. She was one of the first women to be elected in Ilala Municipal Council on her own merit.

Mrs. Mtemi is very unhappy with the way development projects are planned and managed. As a ward councilor she is the chairperson of the Ward Development Committee. This committee is responsible for developing projects that relate to the ward and ensuring their implementation. However, she feels she cannot make decisions for her own ward because every plan has to be approved by the municipal council. Moreover, she has no authority over the council and ward officials and cannot influence the implementation of projects that are approved. The council has 22 wards and 120 streets, which it has failed to serve timely. She gives the example that, in the 2011/12 budget, the council approved six development projects for her ward and none of them were done. Underscoring the worst of the situation, she remarks that three streets in her ward depend on health services from the neighbouring two localities while the bridge between them is in disrepair. During rain seasons there is no connection between the two sides, thus the three streets suffer with poor access to health services. She has reported the matter to the head of the works department each year for the past three years, but the bridge has not yet been repaired. In 2014 she tabled the issue to the council committee responsible for public works, but the municipal executive director could not explain why the work had not been executed despite the fact that the council approved her proposal again in the 2012/13 budget. He just stated that central government had been slow in releasing the funds and that he himself decided which of the projects were the more urgent. Mrs. Mtemi suspects that some serious lobbying by councillors of other wards had been going on. Moreover, she

1. For the sake of anonymity the name of the councillor is made up. Her tears are genuine.

complains that council officials implement plans without involving ward- and street-level governments. For example, they decided to demolish two buildings in her ward without involving her. The people affected tried their best to resist the demolition and blamed her for not defending them. She feels caught in between. Citizens expect her to listen to their complaints, act as a mediator between them and the municipal government, and table their problems to ward and council officials for solutions but in practice it is almost impossible to influence the administration in its day-to-day operations.

Mrs. Mtemi explains that the ward as an administrative unit supervises the collection of revenue as part of its jurisdiction. The ward- and street-level governments raise complaints about the status of revenue collections in their wards. According to current financial regulations, the ward collects taxes if the levy does not exceed 50,000 Tsh. Taxes with levies of over 50,000 Tsh are collected by council administrative officials (trading officers) and not ward officials. The regulations do not allow the ward to use its own revenues: the ward must submit collected revenues to the district of which the district retains 75%. These revenues are spent on the implementation of general council plans and not on the specific plans of the ward from which the revenues were obtained. She believes that revenue collection would be much more effective if the street level were to be involved. The leaders and officials working at the street level have lots of local knowledge and can locate the possible areas for increasing the revenue base. Moreover, the population would be much more motivated to contribute and the ward officials to collect if everybody knew that the revenues would be spent for the benefit of the ward.

Overall, the councillor is of the opinion that the municipal executive director has failed to implement the decisions of the full council. She wants more autonomy for the wards, both to decide on development plans and projects and to secure their implementation. She also wants to be the decision maker regarding how to raise and spend revenues for the development of her own ward.

Questions

1. What is the picture that arises with respect to the actual roles of councillors and officials in policy development, decision-making, and policy implementation?
2. With which of the three models discussed in this chapter does the actual division of labour between councillors and officials correspond?
3. How appropriate do you judge the roles played by councillors and officials?
4. What is your position with respect to the councillor’s claim for more autonomy for the ward?

Case 2 Land eviction in Mvomero

Case

The late 1990s were known as the era in which the national land use plan emerged in Tanzania. The plan dictates that each portion of land should be set for a specific use. In the plan, the district of Mvomero is never left untouched and the council has been obliged to review the way land is being utilised and check whether it is in line with the requirements of the land use plan initiative. Areas set as residential should be used for that purpose and likewise those set for agricultural and pastoralist purposes are to be utilised in accordance with the aims for which they are judged suitable. This also applies to the reserved lands such as forests and conservation areas. In the reserved land and conservation areas, human activities such as the keeping of agriculture and livestock are either restricted or completely prohibited. The plan envisages that it is the duty of the district authorities to ensure that protected land is not encroached upon and remains free from any human activity. This includes the authority to forcefully evict those who occupy such reserved lands. Local governments must ensure that the eviction orders are promptly issued and adequately implemented.

The villages of Mela, Wami-Sokoine, and Kambala in Mvomero district have been at the centre stage of the eviction practice. Last year, the district security committee visited the villages and ordered the District Executive Director to revise the district land use plan and submit a report regarding the matter. The DED referred the matter to the district land office, which developed the land use plan and its content. The report was then submitted to the district security committee. After receiving the district land use plan, the district security committee ordered the eviction of invaders present in the areas set aside as forest reserves. Sekilindi, the famous local politician in the area, explained that certain parts of Mela, Wami-Sokoine, and Kambala, which were normally used for agriculture and livestock keeping, had to be vacated as a consequence.

The Mela village chairman pointed out that local leaders were not involved in planning the eviction and did not play any role in the local mobilization process. He stated that the news came as a surprise to them and that they could not imagine what would happen to the local communities. Neither the district security

committee nor the council officials explained the significance of preserving the conservation land or the requirement of the communities to leave the areas in advance. The police field force unit simply appeared one day, which created a scene like a battlefield. The chairman of Wami-Sokoine village posed a question as to why such chaos, to the extent of putting the police force at the front line of the eviction practices, was needed. The local leader also questioned where the evicted people would go given the fact that they had been living in the so-called forest reserves for decades.

The local politician at Mela alleged that the police had impounded about 385 cows belonging to a member of the local community. During a follow-up, the community member found only 303 cows to be in police custody. Yet, it transpired that a payment of 30,000 Tsh per impounded cow had to be made before their release. On top of that, the community member was required to officially declare that he and all members of his household would move out of the village, as the area for grazing had already been set aside for forest reserves. The Mela chairperson raised a number of questions. In the event of their eviction, where would the family go? Children have been registered in the village school, what would be their fate? Which came first, human beings or forest reserves? The chairman at Kambala village pointed out that the eviction order was land-grabbing from its planning to implementation. It was the unilateral decision of the district security committee that controlled the practice.

As it turned out, the quest to protect the conservation areas was agreed by both the council members of the security committee and district officials. However, they differed in their approaches. As opposed to the government officials, the politicians rejected the use of force to evict people from their homes. The councillors felt that the officials had overstepped their authority, and feared that the council would be held accountable for the excessive use of violence and for any damage caused. The official from the district secretariat, on the other hand, hinted that the land use plan did not need politicking. For any failure regarding its implementation as a central government directive, accountability would go directly to the government officials and not to the politicians.

Questions

1. What roles did the councillors, district officials, and village leaders play in this case?
2. Based on the evidence presented, what is your opinion on the communication between councillors and village leaders and between councillors and district officials?

3. If it was decided that the use of violence was excessive, and that villagers should be compensated for damages to their property (i.e. the loss of cattle), who would have to be held responsible for the compensation?
4. What would be the right way to plan and implement land evictions? What would be an appropriate role for district councillors, local leaders, and officials?

4

Village leadership and good governance in Tanzania

Eliza Mwakasangula, George Igulu, Anosisye Kesale & Denis Kamugisha

Introduction

Good governance is important for the development of communities because it puts forward a set of principles necessary to realize social and economic development. The concept of good governance, to be elaborated hereafter, serves as the starting-point of this chapter. One of the good governance principles is effective participation of the people in decision-making activities: the more the people are effectively involved in the matters that affect their lives, the better the governance outcomes are expected to be. This chapter is about conditions that have to be fulfilled in order to realize high levels of citizen participation, and thus good governance, in Tanzanian villages.

One of the possible conditions for good governance is leadership. It is assumed that villages need good leadership: the kind of leadership that will effectively influence the willingness of the people and the community at large to contribute towards the decision-making and realization of common goals. Therefore, the question addressed is: what type of village leadership is required in order to secure good governance? Leadership has always carried a different meaning to different people. In this chapter the term leadership is taken to refer to *the pattern of behaviour of the individual(s) holding political/administrative positions in the government through election or appointment* (Mutahaba 2012). The essence of

leadership is the influence the leader has over followers or subordinates. Effective leaders are expected to have a constructive type of influence over their followers or subordinates.

The aim of this chapter is to show how the behaviour of village leaders influences villagers' willingness to contribute to the realization of goals at the village level. To achieve this, the chapter starts by examining the concept of good governance and its applicability in the village setup. It then continues to elaborate on the concept of leadership; leadership behaviour and its possible theoretical link to good governance is specifically discussed. The second part of the chapter examines the actual influence of the behaviour of leaders on community participation, drawing on experiences from four selected villages. It also discusses a number of conditions, (the leader's education and experience and the culture in the village) that may enhance or diminish leadership effectiveness.

The concept of good governance

The concept of good governance is not new in the field of public administration (Kamugisha 2013). The idea of good governance gained more and more attention in Africa, particularly in the Sub Sahara Africa, during the last decade of the 20th century. According to Santiso (2001), the aim of the good governance model was to address the dismal and inefficient management of public affairs in Africa, including the inadequate management of aid and the unfortunate government commitment in service delivery and endemic corruption, among others. Good governance was viewed as a key determinant of any government to bring about sustainable economic development (Santiso 2001; World Bank 1992).

Definitions of good governance

There is no single agreed-upon definition of good governance. Numerous scholars have presented a list of definitions. Malunde (2008) views the phrase 'good governance' as a concept that calls for a system of public management that is open, transparent, responsive and accountable to the people or citizens. For Dunn (1986), the phrase embraces effective government institutions. Hyden (1992) sees the concept of good governance as 'the conscious management of regime structures with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the public realm.' In a nutshell, he acknowledges the importance of institutions in managing public affairs. According to UNDP (2000) the phenomenon covers the processes, mechanisms and institutions in which citizen and civil group play a part. This definition carries with it the interface between actors (i.e. state, private and citizen) involved in managing public affairs at different levels of government.

This chapter uses the UNDP conception as an operational definition, for it covers aspects of process, mechanisms and institutions in the management of public concerns. The World Bank (1989) supports this notion. The World Bank finds good governance embedded in the governance process, which encompasses standards such as accountability, participation, rule of law, human and civil rights and transparence. Malunde (2008) and UNESCAP (cited in Mfaume 2011) give an account of eight features of good governance, namely: participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity and inclusiveness and efficiency and effectiveness. In this chapter the focus is on one of these features: participation, in the sense of the contributions of the members of a community towards a common goal.

Participation as a key component of good governance

According to Cornwall (2008), participation has more than one meaning and form. Participation is concerned with how different people and groups in society are involved in the governance process. It shows the manner in which stakeholders are effectively involved in the governance process (Musalem & Aziz 2011). The true concept of participation covers all decision-making avenues, particularly those that affect people, directly or indirectly, of all socio-economic and political circles. Farrington and Martin (2010) indicate that participation has to exist alongside the decentralization of decision-making at a grassroots level. Community ownership develops through true participation. Kamugisha (2011) indicates that true participation can inculcate a sense of ownership. Grassroots participation in all matters goes a long way toward the building of a citizenship mentality (Gaventa & Valderrama 1999). The resulting sense of ownership increases citizen awareness and the accountability of the public servants and administrative systems (Farrington & Martin 2010). This scenario is captured in the Tanzanian village setup indicated below.

Good governance and the village setup in Tanzania

In Tanzania, village governance is a part of the local governance structure. Local governance in Tanzania refers to three key items or levels as defined and distinguished in the *Local Government Reform Agenda 1996 - 2000*: first, it is about institutional *empowerment* through the creation of suitable systems and structures. Second, it is about the creation and enhancement of *transparency and accountability* in the management of institutions. Finally, it is about increasing the *influence of citizens and civil society* organizations on public institutions (URT 1996).

There are thirteen good governance principles guiding public services in Tanzania. These principles of good governance have been stipulated in the National Framework adopted in 1999, as indicated in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 Governance principles in Tanzania

1	The Constitution ensures and adheres to the doctrine of separation of powers and political stability
2	An efficient and effective legislature
3	Security of persons and property
4	Accountability, transparency and integrity in the management of public affairs
5	Rule of law
6	Electoral democracy
7	Protection of human rights and freedom
8	Efficiency in the delivery of services by public officials
9	Participation of citizens in political, economic and social decision-making
10	An informed and skilled society that is aware of and ready to legitimately defend its rights and freedoms and to hold its governors accountable
11	Decentralization of government and the bringing of public services closer to the end user
12	Empowerment of local councils and communities through devolution of powers and functions, public participation and financial decentralization
13	Promotion of gender equity and equality

Some of the principles (such as numbers 2 and 3) involve desired outcomes of governance, whereas other principles (6 and 9 to 13) refer to essential attributes of the relationship between power holders and citizens. The common denominator of the latter is the notion of citizen participation and involvement. Connecting this notion with good leadership at the village level, one might say that good governance requires, first of all, that the village leadership develops and shapes exactly that notion in everyday village administration. Good leadership takes into account the principles of good governance and, most directly so, the principles that touch upon the relationship with citizens. It is from that perspective that, in the sections to come, the issue of leadership and good governance will be discussed.

The concept of leadership

Leadership is a term that is widely and commonly used among different communities. People talk about leaders and their leadership styles in day-to-day life. There are leaders who have been known for their good leadership, just as there are leaders who have been known for their bad leadership. Although the term is widely used, there is no one single agreed on definition of leadership. A literature review on the definition of leadership shows that the concept has been defined

either in terms of what the leader does, that is, the behaviour shown by the leader, or in terms of what the leader has, that is, personal traits or in terms of the influence the leader has on followers (Yukl 1989; Bass 1990; Winston & Patterson 2006). This chapter adopts the definition in terms of behaviour (Mutahaba 2012). This definition is adopted because it reflects the nature of village leadership. Village leaders, namely the village chairperson and the village executive director, are elected and appointed respectively to hold leadership positions in the village government.

The behaviour of the leader is very important in determining how followers react or respond to what leaders want them to do. Behaviour is a source of influence that the leader can use over followers. Leadership behaviour is all about the actions of the leader. These actions can be seen or observed when the leader performs duties and interacts with followers. What can be observed from leaders includes behavioural traits such as the way the leader talks to followers, what the leader does, how the leader uses time, how the leader interacts with followers and how he or she makes followers act, to mention just a few.

There are many different types of leadership behaviour that have so far been identified by different researchers (Yukl 2002 2012). In recent years the classification of leadership behaviour into *transformational and transactional behaviour* has gained much popularity (Bass 1985; Yukl 2002). Transformational and transactional leadership behaviours reflect two different behaviours that influence or appeal to their subordinates.

Transactional leader behaviour is based on the exchange relationship between the leader and the subordinates (Kuhnert & Lewis 1989; Yukl 2002). In this exchange relationship, the leader offers subordinates what they want in return for compliance with what the leader wants (Yukl 2002). Transactional leadership behaviour can take on different forms: *Contingent reward, active management by exception,* and *passive management by exception*:

i. *Contingent reward*: the leader set goals and performance standards and provides tangible or intangible rewards for the performance achieved
ii. *Active management by exception*: the leader closely monitors performance of subordinates and takes corrective action as they arise
iii. *Management by exception-passive:* the leader intervenes only when problems become serious.

Transactional leadership behaviour is viewed as a top-down leadership style, primarily involving the directing and commanding of followers.

Transformational leadership behaviour, on the other hand, motivates subordinates by making them aware of their importance in the organization. The transformational leader achieves this by appealing to subordinates' inner values and higher-order needs that make them committed to and enthusiastic toward organizational performance (Yukl 2002). Dimensions of transformational behaviour are *charisma, individual stimulation,* and *individual consideration.*

i. *Charismatic leadership*: the leader is a role model and inspires subordinates through his/her vision, integrity, decisions, reputation and performance
ii. *Intellectual stimulation*: the leader challenges subordinates' ways of thinking and doing things. He/she encourages subordinates to be innovative and visionary in addressing organizational problems and goals
iii. *Individualized consideration:* the leader recognizes and pays personal attention to the needs, aspirations, and potential of individual subordinates. He/she gives personal advice, coaching and opportunities to grow and develop.

There are many studies that explore the relationship between transformational leadership and different dimensions of leadership effectiveness (Nguni et al. 2007; Judge & Piccolo 2004; Walumbwa et al. 2005; Avolio et al. 2004). The overall argument is that there is a positive relationship between transformational leadership and subordinates' satisfaction with the leader, job satisfaction and organizational commitment.

From the above explanation, one might deduce that transformational leadership to a large extent coincides with leadership that conforms to the principles of good governance. It further allows for the assumption that transformational village leadership will have a positive influence on the willingness of villagers to contribute towards the realization of village development projects. However, it could just be that in the context of Tanzanian villages transactional leadership or some combination of transformational and transactional leadership is the most effective. The empirical findings that are presented in the next sections will shed some light on this issue.

Village leadership institutions in Tanzania

The structure of the village government leadership in Tanzania is made up of a Village Chairperson (VC), a Village Executive Officer (VEO) and sub-village/hamlet chairpersons who are also members of the village council. The village leaders perform numerous functions. The village chairperson is the top leader of institutions of governance in the village. S/he chairs village council and

assembly meetings. The Village Executive Officer (VEO) administratively assists the chairperson both for planning and for executing approved policies (Njunwa 2005). The VC is obliged to promote the social welfare and economic wellbeing of the people by planning and coordinating activities. S/he must maintain peace, order and good governance within the village, encourage village residents to undertake and participate in communal enterprises, make bye-laws which are applicable within the village and give assistance and advice to the villagers in various legal and productive activities such as agriculture and forestry, among others (Mustafa 2008; Max 1991).

The chairperson is elected from the village population by the villagers themselves and he/she must be a permanent citizen of the village, a member of a political party and capable of reading and writing in Swahili. S/he assumes office with a tenure of not more than five years, and he/she may be re-elected to lead for another period of five years. S/he is accountable to villagers and is not directly employed by the district council. The villagers can overthrow the VC by casting a vote of no confidence.[2]

The VEO is employed by the District council as a public servant and together with other functions he/she works as a secretary to the village council of which he/she is also a member. S/he performs all functions of the village council. S/he ensures the collection and proper utilization of village revenues, prepares and presents revenue and expenditure reports and participates in making village bye-laws (Max 1991).

Villagers elect hamlet chairpersons within their respective hamlets. They are members of a political party and permanent residents of a village. They become members of the village council due to their positions (Njunwa 2005; Mustafa 2008). Some of the functions they perform include the mobilization of the residents for development activities such as the maintenance of general cleanliness in the area. They are also responsible for resolving disagreements or conflicts that may arise amongst the residents. Common problems that are dealt with are disagreements over inter-household lines, spouse misunderstandings, drunken residents who disturb the peace, as well as cases of theft and sexual abuse (Njunwa 2005). However, cases that demand higher expertise are normally submitted to the respective Mtaa/Village government committees for further action.

The hamlet (*kitongoji*) leader may appoint a committee of three persons from amongst the residents of the hamlet to advise him/her on issues relating to the hamlet. He or she may also appoint one of the residents to act as secretary. The

1. The elections of village leaders and sub-villages (*vitongoji*) as well as the sub-ward committees in urban areas (*mitaa*) are guided by clauses in the Local Government Authorities Acts No. 7 and 8 of 1982. Section 30(4) of the Local Government Act (District Authorities) No.7 of 1982 empowers the Minister responsible for Regional Administration and Local Government (RALG) to issue regulations for elections of vitongoji and mitaa chairpersons as well as their respective committee members.

hamlet does not have any legislative or decision-making powers. It operates rather as a forum for mobilizing community participation and support than as an organ of administration (Mustafa 2008).

Leadership experiences in four villages

The Tanzanian legislation considers the participation of villagers to be an important element of good governance. Rules concerning local government decision-making are stipulated in amendments to the Local Government Act No. 7 of 1982, especially in Act No. 6 of 1999. The role of village leadership as given above is thought to be imperative in enhancing effective participation of villagers. Therefore it is worthwhile to take a close look at leadership practices at the village level and see to what extent local leaders do indeed promote citizens' participation and which factors influence the effectiveness of the leadership the local leaders exert. This section and the following provide a description and analysis of leadership practices of the village executive officers in four villages, based on a research by Mwakasangula et al. (2015). The leadership of village chairpersons will not be discussed. To qualify leadership practices, the concepts of transactional and transformational leadership are applied.

Table 4.2 Village features

District	Village	No. of hamlets	No. of Households	Village government members
Rungwe	Kazi-A	2	254	20
	Kazi-B	5	2322	25
Babati	Chemba-A	4	771	25
	Chemba-B	4	849	25

The case descriptions are derived from the findings of a study on leadership in four villages in Tanzania. The study was performed by staff members of the Public Administration and Management faculty of Mzumbe University (Mwakasangula et al. 2015). Data for that study were collected through observations and interviews. The villages studied[3] are Kazi-A and Kazi-B in Rungwe district and Chemba-A and Chemba-B in Babati district. Table 4.2 presents some features of the villages.

2. The names of the four villages are fictional so as to conceal their true identity and ensure confidentiality.

Leadership behaviour and participation in the villages

Kazi-A village

The VEO at Kazi-A village was a young woman in her late twenties. Her approach to leadership was highly defensive. She did not call meetings regularly to involve the community in various issues. As one of the respondents pointed out,

> 'There is a problem of conducting meetings in this village. […] Our leader does not call meetings frequently as it is required by law. […] Very few people attend, that is why we fail to discuss and reach consensus on important matters of our village.'

The VEO was blamed for not being open and transparent. She failed to share reports on village income and expenditure. In the words of one community member,

> 'Our leader is not cooperative; she does not want to share information with us. She doesn't want to give us reports on how much we get from district council, how much we should contribute as a village. She has never read to us the revenue and expenditure reports.'

Her followers were not attending the general village meetings and they were unwilling to contribute to the building of a school. It was typical, too, of the leadership style of this VEO to intimidate the people into refraining from enquiring about village affairs. As one of the respondents put it,

> 'We do not know of the issues the VEO is dealing with. They are forcing us to participate in every development activity in this village, but when we ask them about the contributions of the (district or village) government for those activities we get no response. We are never told how much we get from the district as support for the development activities in our village. That is why we are not ready to support them on development issues.'

The VEO herself believed that the community was not forthcoming and willing to participate in development activities. She said,

> 'Villagers are not participative at all, they will reject whatever you tell them, when you call for a meeting they do not attend and when the decision is made in those meeting they disagree.'

In order to implement various decisions and activities she employed militia (*Mgambos)* to enforce people to contribute funds and abide to decisions. This use of force made her quite unpopular in the village. The village accomplished very little in terms of development projects.

The leadership behaviour of VEO of Kazi-A can be characterized as leaning towards a negative transactional approach, typified by the use of coercive power, lack of transparency and a poor relationship between the VEO and community. Community participation was poor.

Kazi-B village

The VEO of Kazi-B village was a male in his fifties. His level of education was to Standard Seven. He was an experienced administrator: he had worked in vari-

ous villages as VEO. His approach to leadership was to use meetings. He called meetings regularly and used these meetings to discuss and plan various activities in the village. He also read out the reports of revenues and expenditures before the community. These reports were later printed and placed on noticeboards for the people to read for themselves. As one of the respondent put it,

> 'Every month our leader displays the revenue and expenditure of our village and he allows us to ask some questions (contrary to other villages). […] We don't see why we shouldn't support him.'

He was effective at convincing and mobilizing the community towards different activities. For example, the VEO and the villagers reached a decision in the village assembly to build a village office, a village market and a secondary school; all are constructions considered very useful for the development of the village. The community liked him and appreciated his leadership. As one of the respondent pointed out,

> 'For sure we are lucky to have this leader. […] He knows our problems and our contribution, as he involves us in every stage of each project carried on by our village.'

The VEO's leadership behaviour made him accomplish many things at the village. The village had a good village office, a good secondary school, a warehouse to store crops and an open market. These facilities were all accomplished through the participation of the community in contributing funds and other resources.

The leadership approach of this VEO can be qualified as *transformational*. The leader involved the community in decision-making and implementation. The leader was transparent in his day-to-day activities and invited questions and comments from the community.

Chemba-A village

The VEO of Chemba-A was a male in his forties. His education was to secondary school level and a certificate diploma in local government. The VEO was closely working with his village chairperson. He was well organized. He used a logbook to write down his schedule of activities and plans to be accomplished. He called the meetings as per the requirement of the law and read the reports on revenues and expenses to the community. He had a strong persuasive power and an ability to mobilize the community towards accomplishing various activities in the village.

The VEO's leadership behaviour enabled him and his VC to get things done in the village. As one of the respondents put it,

> 'Before he came to our office it didn't look like this, also we used to walk a long distance fetching drinking water, but now we have drinking water around us we are proud of him despite of political challenges he is facing from the opposition party.'

The leadership approach of the VEO can be qualified as something between *transactional* and *transformational*.

Chemba-B village

The VEO at Chemba-B village was also a male. His education was to primary school level. As a leader he was selective regarding in which decisions to involve the community. However he had a strong persuasive power that gave him an advantage in getting the community to implement various decisions and projects in the village. He regularly called meetings but only allowed limited issues to be discussed, as pointed out by this respondent,

> 'He calls meeting and we attend but don't think we discuss all village issues. […] The good thing is that our village is doing better in development programs, thanks to our village leader because his ability is very high.'

So the villagers were inspired by his leadership skills and his ability to execute development activities. His only weakness was his inability to publish reports on revenues and expenditures: one of the respondents remarked,

> 'We are missing important information here, we haven't heard and see revenue expenditure for very long time. We know that it's our right to know that because we contribute our money.'

Despite this weakness the VEO was considered strong and able to make the community participate in the identified village projects. The leadership approach of the VEO can be qualified as something between transactional and transformational.

Factors contributing to leadership effectiveness in the four villages

One of the important questions in analyses of the leaders' behaviour is: what makes leaders effective, given a certain leadership style? Different answers can be provided in regard to this question. In the sections to come the influence of two factors that appeared to shape leadership effectiveness in the four villages are discussed. The first one is the educational background and professional experience of the leader. The second one is the culture of the villages.

Education, experience and leadership style

Kazi-B village

The VEO in Kazi-B village had many years of experience in leading people. He gained his experience as an administrator in different villages in Tanzania, performing the same function as a village executive officer. He had worked in Iringa region and Mbeya region and in these regions he had moved from one village to another. He was 52 years old and, considering his long working experience, he must have faced ups and downs during his career. Even though he was only educated to Standard Seven, his ability to lead people was very high and his performance was good. Through the mobilization of people and working in a team his village managed to build a village office and were doing very well in terms of contribution. For example, they contributed to building a secondary school and a warehouse for their agricultural products.

While he faced many challenges in his administration, as a leader he managed to overcome them and move forward. For example, the councilor of the ward to which Kazi-B belongs came from the opposition party. It was once decided that every family should contribute 10,000 Tsh for the purpose of building a school. But this councilor from the opposition party refused to accept this amount and instead proposed 3,000 Tsh. This was a big challenge to the village leadership, but in meetings the VEO succeeded in convincing the people to contribute the required amount of 10,000 Tsh, explaining to them the importance of building the school. Another example that shows how experience matters in leadership is the decision-making regarding the levying of a market tax. The VEO wanted a market tax of 3,000 Tsh paid by every person who sold products at the market. Again the opposition party claimed this was far too high, but the VEO managed to influence the people in the village meetings that it was the right amount to be levied.

Chemba-A village

The VEO of Chemba-A village, a male in his forties, had enjoyed a secondary education and held a certificate in local government administration from one of the local government training institutions in the country. According to the villagers' descriptions, the performance of this leader was good. The people regarded this leader's way of doing things as professional. His way of organizing work meant that his task was to mobilize people's participation in development activities. Furthermore, the VEO in Chemba-A village was highly experienced in issues concerning local government decision-making. He knew the inside culture

of the local administration and the challenges that emerged well. For example, the VEO was able to question the district executives about the transfer of funds to his village. He was able to negotiate the spending of the 20% fund that each village is supposed to get from the district after submitting revenue collections to the council. His level of education and long working experience as a VEO gave him the ability to negotiate with higher authorities regarding different matters emerging in the village. This leader was also able to mobilize people to construct a dam as a water reserve and convince people to have tap water from it. His effort provided many people in the village with tap water. This helped mothers who before that were travelling long distances in search of water. He also mobilized people to build a well-ventilated village office, bought village chairs, built a school and managed to construct a road which was passable throughout the year.

Chemba-B village

The VEO of Chemba-B also had an ordinary secondary school education with long experience in managing local government authorities as a VEO. His behaviour and performance was generally good. Although this VEO did not attend any higher learning institution, he was very good at mobilizing people and encouraging people to perform. This was evidenced by one of the villagers who said,

> 'We thank God for having good leaders in this village. Together the VEO and the village chairperson are doing a very good job. All these developments were possible because of their efforts, cooperation and ability to mobilize people to come and work together.'

The VEO's experience in leadership enabled him to solve many conflicts that occurred in his village. For example, there was an incident between farmers and pastoralists regarding land use. To resolve the issue, the VEO called a meeting of the quarreling parties, had them debate their differences and led them to reach consensus, thus resolving the conflict. Another example that highlighted his experience in leadership was a tax issue. Even though there were many political parties with differing opinions regarding taxes in his village, the VEO managed to reach consensus on the levy required and collect the necessary tax from his village. This made his people trust and respect him.

Kazi-A village

Thus the leadership in the three villages discussed so far was fairly effective. The data show that experience, more than education, greatly contributed to this effectiveness. The leadership shown by the VEO in Kazi-A village was rather different. The VEO from this village was a young lady in her twenties. This was her first time as VEO and she had no experience in leadership. Her level of education

was also low. At the time this research took place, she was alone in the office following the resignation of the village chairperson. Her lack of experience was apparent in the way she dealt with decision-making in the village. She lacked the competence to face challenges and solve conflicts in the village. She was unable to overcome the reluctance of her followers to perform development activities in the village. To make up for her lack of experience as a leader she used force. On top of that this village lacked a village chairperson. Together, these three factors (a low level of education, inexperience and the absence of village chairperson) go a long way in explaining the VEO's poor performance.

The influence of culture on leadership behaviour in the four villages

The culture of the environment is a second factor that may explain leadership behaviour. Culture here is understood as the set of beliefs about how to behave that prevail in a society. The concept comprises the values and norms concerning the social behaviour of a particular community. Culture may influence the behaviour of leaders and their style of management; the way the leader behaves is likely to be related to the culture of the society within which he/she is working. From the literature it is known, for instance, that patriarchal tendencies have framed women as inferior to men, particularly in areas of organization and management. As a result, few women compete for leadership positions at any level of an organization (Kamugisha & Ringo 2012).

The influence of culture on leadership behaviour was relatively evident in Kazi-A village. The village is located in the Mbeya region where women are considered weak and inferior compared to their male counterparts. The Kazi-A village had a young female VEO, who was ethnically not from the Mbeya region. These circumstances put her in a situation where she could not work freely or with confidence. Being a woman, the VEO had an extra challenge to overcome the values of the villagers, most of whom did not believe in female leaders. Exemplary for the patriarchal tendencies in the community was the following comment made by one the respondents: *'What can this little woman do for us?'* Seen from this angle, it is not surprising that the people in Kazi-A village distrusted their female leader. It can be argued that the VEO adopted the use of coercive power because of the unwillingness of the community to accept her as a leader. This leadership approach ensured at least the accomplishment of various council decisions and project implementations.

The influence of culture was not clearly observed in the villages of Kazi-B, Chemba-A and Chemba-B. These communities were also patriarchal societies but the VEOs in these villages were all male and descended from the same ethnic society that they were leading. In other words, the villagers and the VEOs shared the same norms and values. The influence of culture may not be visible here, but

it is quite apparent nevertheless that this congruency of values made it relatively easy for these communities to identify themselves with their leaders (cf. Van Knippenberg & Hogg 2003).

Conclusion

The main purpose of this chapter was to explore the relationship between leadership, good governance and factors that influence leadership behaviour. It was specifically intended to show how the behaviour of village leaders influenced community participation in development activities. The evidence available indicates that the more leaders behave transformationally, the better the chances for community participation in development activities at the village level. Transformational leaders were identified as mentors and good listeners, supportive, hardworking and transparent. The village chairpersons and village executive officers who were willing to listen to citizens' demands and to provide support and helping hand and who were hardworking and open about village affairs and village finances were the local leaders capable of winning the support of their citizens. Citizens then were willing and able to contribute funds and labor in the implementation of village projects.

Only one leader in the previous cases totally conformed to the transformational model, however. Two leaders showed a mix of transactional and transformational leadership behaviour. They did influence the people and succeeded in getting the community to participate in development activities. They were transparent and effective. They did not, however, involve the people a great deal in deliberation, in making choices and in setting priorities. Still, they accomplished a great deal together with the village community.

One village leader showed negative transactional behaviour. Indicators such as the use of harsh language in communication with citizens and the use of force in making citizens participate in village projects characterized her leadership style. She applied the stick rather than the carrot, and, in coercing rather than convincing the community into cooperation, gained little support for and participation in village projects. Citizens were then reluctant to attend meetings and to contribute funds for project implementation.

Leadership style is but one of many condition that influence leadership effectiveness and citizens' participation. This chapter examined the working of two other factors that possibly influence leadership effectiveness and subordinate participation: the experience and education of the leader and the culture of the community in which the leader is functioning. A long experience in public affairs, far more than a good educational background, appeared to enhance the leader's effectiveness, especially when persuading citizens to participate in decision-

making and contribute towards implementation. The 'culture' factor had a mostly negative effect: a community with a more patriarchal culture tended to reject its female leader.

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Case 1 Influence of leadership in development

Case

In the southern highlands of Tanzania there is a village located in the Mbeya region. For the purposes of this study, let's call it Chemba. Most of the people in the village are indigenous and engage in farming. Mostly they farm for subsistence while some extra agricultural products (especially bananas) are sold to generate an income. Other people engage in small farming businesses such as raising chickens. Most of the population earns less than $1.25 a day. Almost all people have completed primary school, and many, especially young people, have acquired a secondary school education, as the introduction of ward secondary schools has greatly enhanced the level of education. In this region there is a number of districts and wards and there are many villages.

In every village there is supposed to be a village chairperson (normally elected by villagers) and a village executive officer (appointed by the government). This case study is about the chairman of Chemba. This chairman was a farmer of about fifty years of age, and he was educated up to Standard Seven. He had two wives and several children, most of whom had completed Standard Seven. He had been in office for only five-year term. The community and the chairman are supposed to work together at the village level for the purpose of speeding up development. However this does not always happen, as sometimes the people in the community disagree with the chairman regarding what should be done and how to do it. This can develop into a conflict between the chairman and the community. If such a conflict is immanent, it takes strong leadership skills to make the development wheel continue to turn.

In the village of Chemba, people were not performing in terms of bringing development to the village. Whenever the leaders told them to contribute - to the building of a ward secondary school for example, or a village dispensary, or a village office - the villagers were unwilling and resisted. As a result the village

did not own any facilities. The local leader, the village chairman, did his best to create awareness of the importance of development activities but the responses were disappointing. Whenever he called a meeting to discuss different issues in the village the turnout was so small that it never met the quorum. Some villagers started complaining that the chairman failed to persuade his followers to attend meetings. As one of the village members said:

> 'There is a problem of conducting meetings in this village. […] Our leader does not call meetings as frequently as it is required by law. […] Very few people attend and that is why we fail to discuss and reach consensus on important matters of our village.'

The chairman complained:

> 'Villagers are not participative at all, they will reject whatever you tell them; when you call for meeting they do not attend and when the decision is made in a meeting they disagree.'

Then he asked himself how he could help people to respond to what the community needs and to participate in development activities in the village.

In response to the people's behaviour, the leader started to coerce them into cooperation. For example, he made them pay a contribution towards every project the village wanted to begin. Sometimes he even used military force (*mgambo*) to back up his demands. Sometimes he called community members into the ward office to ask them for statements as to why they didn't contribute to development activities, and sometimes he sent them to court. This made the life of these villagers miserable. One of the villagers pointed out:

> 'Our leaders are not cooperative; they always use force, they do not give us any room to discuss. They are always asking for us to contribute to village projects. What is the role of the government?' Another villager added: 'After all, the leaders do not share information with us. They do not want to give us reports on revenue and expenditure of this village, they neither give us information on how much we get from district council. This really disappointed us.'

Questions

1. Do you think there is good governance in the village? What elements of good governance are present and what elements are missing?
2. In regarding the behaviour of the village leaders, what elements of transformational leadership can you discern?
3. Regarding the behaviour of the village leaders, what elements of transactional leadership can you discern?
4. Why do you think the village leaders play the role of leader in the way they do? What factors might prevent them from modifying their leadership style?
5. Do you expect the leadership style adopted by the local leaders to achieve the effects they are looking for? Why?

6. From the point of view of promoting villager leadership and ensuring good governance, what modification of the displayed leadership behaviour would be desirable?

Case 2 ‘We will support him to the last point’

Case

Babati district is one of the districts that forms the Manyara region. The district has many villages but there is one village that is totally unique in terms of the execution of its development activities. The village has four *vitongoji* (sub-villages) with a total of 771 households. The village has 2666 residents, out of whom 1,010 are members of the general assembly. The economic activities carried out by the villagers are farming, owning small businesses, and keeping cattle. The majority of its people have attained primary school and ordinal secondary school. On top of that the villagers generally have a high civic education, which makes them very aware of all issues pertaining to life in the village. For the past five years the village has been struggling to plan and implement different socio-economic projects to enhance or improve the delivery of services in the village. The village is headed by a village executive officer (VEO).

The recent VEO had some unique attributes that helped him to work with the people of the community and to fulfil his duties and responsibilities most effectively. He was very experienced: he worked in three or four villages before he was transferred to his current village. He had learned to work with different people of various cultures. The VEO was a good communicator and was willing to listen to and talk with every person in the village regardless of age, gender and status. This quality helped him to entertain a good relationship with many villagers. Lastly, the VEO was always available in the village. This availability enabled him to provide support to the people whenever and wherever it was needed in both social and official matters of the village.

Over the last two years the village wanted to implement a number of projects for the purpose of improving the economic development of its people. Yet resources were limited, so the village had to select a few priority projects to be implemented. The VEO called the village assembly and asked the meeting to choose the projects that were most important to them, projects that, if implemented, would help to solve a problem they face. The villagers agreed to start

with a water project and decided to each contribute 10,000 Tsh to fund the construction. The VEO worked very hard to organize the construction of the water project. He gained a lot of appreciation for his efforts. As one village member said:

> 'Before he came to our village it didn't look like this at all. We used to walk a long distance for fetching drinking water, but now we have drinking water around us. We are proud of him that he is succeeding, despite political challenges he is facing from the opposition party.'

Every month until the building was completed, the VEO released reports on expenditures and revenue of the project and on the progress of the building process. Villagers cherished the efforts of the VEO, as one villager remarked:

> 'He is very good leader, to us he is like a gift from God, and we will support him to the last point because everything he decides is in our interest and because he engages us by giving timely information so we know everything he does.'

The VEO spoke in different public places where many people gathered in the village to discuss matters that were of interest to the villagers, such as markets and water taps. One community member commented:

> 'Our leader always is available to answer our questions, to support and share with us in social issues and government activities. He tries to show us that he is there for us and not otherwise.'

Questions

1. Do you think there is good governance in the village? What elements of good governance are present and what elements are missing?
2. In regarding the behaviour of the village leaders, what elements of transformational leadership can you discern?
3. In regarding the behaviour of the village leaders, what elements of transactional leadership can you discern?
4. From the point of view of promoting villager leadership and ensuring good governance, what modification of the displayed leadership behaviour would be desirable?

5

Institutionalized coproduction in the delivery of agricultural services: experiences from the cashew nut value chain in Southern Tanzania

Gustav Kunkuta & Paul Amani

Introduction: The cashew farmers' riot

Late in 2013 the cashew farmers in Southern Tanzania staged a daring riot that lasted for several days in protest of the delayed second payment for their cashews. According to a senior local government officer in one of the affected districts, the farmers had many grievances and a deep mistrust of the marketing of cashews, particularly regarding the way the cashews' price is determined. During the riot the farmers smashed public assets including vehicles and offices of the ruling party. The bureaucrats involved in the cashew nut sector had to run and hide for their safety. Those who were captured were injured, the lives of their families threatened and their assets vandalized. The unrest resulted in several arrests by the police. The riot took a dramatic turn when the protestors resorted to arson. Several homes and other properties of ministers, members of parliament and senior politicians with residences in the cashew producing districts were burnt down to ashes.

As observed by Mfaume & Kunkuta (2015), by these acts the farmers did not only seek to 'make a point' to the government about their unhappiness with the arrangements governing the cashew market but also to punish the people the farmers considered not to have acted in a manner that protected the interest of the cashew producers. Some international news organisations (CNN and the BBC) indicated that the 'war' was so intense that the government had to deploy a huge police force including surveillance police helicopters from the *de facto* capital of Tanzania Dar es Salaam, located over 500km from the riot zone. This riot and the on-and-off skirmishes between the cashew farmers and authorities that had been experienced over a number of years (Citizen 2014) potentially signal the limitations of the reform of the cashew nut sector. The reform introduced new institutional arrangements, establishing what can be considered a system of coproduction aimed at improving the livelihood of the farmers.

This chapter investigates whether the present institutional design of service delivery and production in the cashew nut sector in Southern Tanzania has improved the livelihood of the farmers. Specifically, it examines how the actions of various actors, governmental and quasi-governmental, have affected the actual delivery of agricultural services and the incomes of the smallholder farmers, considered to be the primary beneficiaries of the reform. The contribution of the chapter lies in its attempt to investigate the reality of the performance of coproduction as an approach to organizing and improving service delivery using the case of the cashew nut value chain in Tanzania. The analysis uses documented experiences and also some existing empirical research in Tanzania's cashew nut sector, including a research conducted by scholars of the School of Public Administration and Management of Mzumbe University (Mfaume & Kunkuta 2015).

The chapter contains six sections. After this introduction, the second section presents a brief overview of the cashew nut sector in Tanzania. The third section describes the old system of organising the cashew nut sector, leading to the fourth section that examines the reforms introduced in the sector in Tanzania. This section explores the actors and the design of the sector following the reforms and finally introduces the concept of coproduction in relation to the organisation of the sector in Tanzania. The fifth section discusses the reality of service delivery and coproduction in the cashew nut value chain in Southern Tanzania. This section the chapter investigates how the new institutionalisation of the sector and coproduction have affected the delivery of agricultural services and incomes of the smallholder farmers. The sixth section concludes the chapter, citing some policy implications to improve service delivery and coproduction in the cashew nut sector in Tanzania.

Brief overview of the cashew sector in Tanzania

The cashew industry is an integral part of Tanzania's agricultural sector, which employs more than 80% of the rural population (URT 2008). Cashew nuts are an important export crop, generating substantial foreign income for the country (UNIDO 2011: 11). Cashew farming is especially an important source of income and employment for smallholder and poor farmers in Southern Tanzania where Mtwara, Lindi and Ruvuma regions account for over 90% of Tanzania's cashew production (CBT 2010). According to UNIDO (2011: 7) over 500,000 households in the districts of Mtwara, Lindi and Ruvuma engage in cashew farming. Over 85% of the plantations owners are smallholder farmers with around one hectare of land (UNIDO 2011: 13).

The cashew production is therefore an important source of livelihood in Southern Tanzania. The sector is also a source of livelihood to a large number of farm labourers and local citizens involved in cottage processing and those employed in the retailing of the baked cashews. Over 80% of cashews exported from Tanzania are raw. It is estimated that if all cashews were processed in the country, over 750 million Tsh could flow to the rural communities in five years, which is roughly 3% of GDP (ANSAF 2012).

The Tanzanian cashew sector has made significant improvement, surviving near-collapse in the 1980s (Mitchell 2004). The production has increased steadily since the 1990s and through the 2000s.

Table 5.1 National cashews production statistics 2002 through 2012 in metric tons

Year	2002/3	2003/4	2004/5	2005/6	2006/7	2011/12
Mt	92,154	77,507	73,040	77,446	92,573	158,000

Source: CBT (2010); ANSAF, ACT & BEST-AC (2013); Rweyemamu (2004).

While some people have argued that the 'high prices for the raw cashews are the main reason for improved production' (UNIDO 2011: 12), others (Fitzpatrick 2012; Rweyemamu 2004) have attributed the increased production to market-based reforms, leading to increased uptake of farming technology by the farmers and to the availability of loans and investments. It is therefore interesting to assess the design of the cashew sector and, more precisely, the way the governmental actors provide services for the cashew farmers.

The corrupted old system of organizing the cashew sector

The cashew industry in Tanzania in the 1960s through 1980s was characterized by a plethora of actors. Besides the farmers and the buyers, the Cashew nut Authority, also known as the Cashew Marketing Board (TCMB),[4] the local government, the Primary Cooperative Societies and the Secondary or Regional Cooperative Unions played a role (Rweyemamu 2004). The National Cashew nut Authority was responsible for the overall regulation of procurement and marketing of cashews. The National Cashew nut Authority enjoyed wider powers including ensuring the development and sustainability of the cashew industry, providing policy recommendations to the government and also controlling the marketing and export of cashews (UNIDO 2011). The Primary Cooperative Societies (PCS) were expected to procure and ensure the availability of farm inputs, such as fertilizer, and financial services to the farmers. Alongside the Regional Cooperative Unions, the PCS actively participated in buying and selling the cashews to the National Cashew nut Authority.

Many private buyers bought the cashews directly from the farmers, offering very low prices (CBT 2010). Like the National Cashew nut Authority, the private merchants exported the cashews oversees, mainly to India. Local governments were responsible for agricultural extension services and coordinated, monitored and supervised the distribution of farm inputs.

Literature, for instance CBT (2008), indicates that this organisation of the cashew industry failed to safeguard the interests of the farmers: it functioned inefficiently at the expense of farmers. As Reyemamu (2004) noted, Tanzania's cashew sector did not support the farmers, who experienced:

> 'Inefficient and untimely supply of inputs, (…) frequent (policy and regulation) changes influenced by political decisions, lack of technical package, lack of storage facilities, transport problems and competition with other crops such as maize for (investment) resources.' (p. 15)

Jaffee (1995) stated that a combination of problems led to the near collapse of the industry in the late 1980s. A key problem was the increasing financial difficulties of the Primary Cooperative Societies, the Regional Cooperative Unions and the Tanzania Cashew Marketing Board, which resulted in large quantities of unsold nuts at the farm or village level at the end of the buying season. The producer's share of the export price fell to 25% in the 1986/87 season. Cashew processing

1. Its names have changed over time. Up to 1962, the procurement and marketing of cashews was carried out by private merchants acting as middlemen between producers and Indian buyers. In 1962 the Southern Region Cashew nut Board (SRCB) was set up and replaced in 1963 by the Southern Agricultural Products Board that was renamed the National Agricultural Products Board (NAPB) in 1964; in 1974 the Cashew nut Authority of Tanzania (CATA) took over the role of NAPB. In 1985, the Tanzania Cashew nut Marketing Board (TCMB) was formed to replace CATA. In 1993, the functions of TCMB were taken over by the Cashew nut Board of Tanzania (CBT) (Topper *et al.* 1998, in Sijaona 2002: 9). The CBT is re-established under Section 3(1) of Cashew Nuts Industry Act N0 18 of 2009.

factories were operating at a loss, and between 1985 and 1990 nine of the twelve factories closed. Local authorities contributed to the problems of the factories by preventing cashew shipments between factories, which would have facilitated processing (Fitzpatrick 2012; Rweyemaumu 2004). Fitzpatrick (2012) and Rweyemaumu (2004) further report that administrative and political bottlenecks obstructed and resisted the liberalisation of the cashew industry. For instance, in the 1991/92 season all private buyers and primary cooperative societies were required to sell the cashews to the Tanzania Cashew Marketing Board for export. This discouraged private buyers to engage in cashew buying, giving farmers limited options to sell their crops to other buyers (Jaffe 1995). While the Primary Cooperative Societies helped to collect and transport cashews to selling points, they appeared to be weak and barely capable of supporting farmers to procure the vital farm inputs. In particular, because of a lack of good financial management, they lacked creditworthiness with the local banks, rendering them incapable of paying the farmers a fair price for their products on time. Rweyemamu (2004) adds that local governments constrained the cashew industry by imposing high local levies, taking advantage of the resurgence of the cashew productivity in the early 1990s.

A new system of organising the cashews sector and coproduction

In the late 1980s the government reformed the cashew sector with the aim of reinvigorating the sector, in order to address the obstacles that had made Tanzania trail behind other cashew-producing countries and to protect the interests of the framers. The most important change regarded the introduction of administrative arrangements governing the procurement and marketing of cashews. The reforms proclaimed an involvement of the private sector in buying the cashews for processing and exporting purposes (UNIDO 2011). Via the reforms, the government attempted to define or redefine the roles of the various actors in the cashew value chain including the roles of the national authority, now addressed as the Cashew nut Board of Tanzania (CBT). The participation of the farmers shows elements of coproduction in the cashew sector. The description of actors and their roles in the current system of sector organization are presented next. The new design of the cashew value chain and the concept of coproduction are discussed thereafter.

Actors in Tanzania's cashew value chain

The current Tanzania cashew value chain is characterized by many actors, far more than in the pre-reform system of organizing the cashew sector briefly described above. As depicted in Figure 5.1, included are the producers, primary cooperative societies, warehouse operators, processors, vendors, and exporters

and also a plethora of service providers and governmental agencies are included. Their functions are summarised below.

Figure 5.1 The cashew nut value chain in Tanzania



Source: UNIDO (2011: 8), slightly modified and simplified by the authors.

i. Producers and primary and secondary cooperatives

Producers are the largest group of stakeholders in the cashew value chain. They include around 200,000 agricultural estate owners and over 700,000 smallholder farmers that own family cashew farms of less than two acres in size. They use both family and hired labour to plough, plant, weed, apply pesticides and harvest the cashews (Mfaume & Kunkuta 2015).

Many farmers are organized into over 200 Primary Cooperative Societies (PCS). They are membership-based and include the Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOS) and the Agricultural Marketing Cooperative Societies (AMCOS) (CBT 2010; UNIDO 2011). Through SACCOS farmers can access the credit they need to buy farm inputs and to finance other farming activities. The AMCOS supplies farm inputs such as fertilisers, pesticides and gunny bags.

The Primary Cooperative Societies collect and buy raw cashews from their member farmers and in turn sell them to buyers under the Warehouse Receipt System, discussed below. The PCS are members of specific Regional or Secondary Cooperative Unions. The Cooperative Unions assist the PCS to procure farm inputs required by their member farmers. They also support them in distributing farm inputs, securing credit finance for their member farmers, building cashew storage facilities close to the farms and organizing cashew marketing arrange-

ments via the WRS (UNIDO 2011). In addition, they work with the Cashew nut Board of Tanzania in cashew market analyses and setting indicative prices for each selling season (Fitzpatrick 2012).

ii. Warehouses, buyers, processors and vendors

Warehouses and their operations are part of the recent policy move known as the Warehouse Receipt System (WRS), which was introduced in the cashews sector in 2007 in order to improve the storage and marketing of cashews in a manner that benefits the farmers.

The cashew value chain is further characterized by small scale cashew processing. This is done in cottages (manually) and in a few processing plants with a limited capacity. Only 9 out of the 25 plants were working during the 2010-12 season (FAO 2012).

Selling is done in two ways. There are numerous vendors selling roasted cashews at the roadside, bus stops, and public gatherings, and in the streets and even to passengers in long distance buses. As described by UNIDO (2011), the cashew hawkers may operate individually or work for the middlemen who pay them an agreed fee for selling the cashews on their behalf. The vendors also include those selling baked cashews at supermarkets, which are a fairly recent addition to the cashew value chain in the country.

iii. Exporters and service providers

Besides selling on the Tanzanian market, the main trade is on the international market by exporters. Exporters may operate individually or represent offshore companies. They buy raw and processed cashews from warehouses during the auctioning season. The main destinations are Europe, the USA, the Middle East, Kenya and South Africa. India is an export destination for raw cashews. In India the raw cashews are processed and exported to other markets including the USA and Europe (FAO 2012).

To manage this process a number of institutions are involved. An important actor is the Cashew nut Board of Tanzania, which provides marketing information, regulates the production, marketing and export of the cashews, supervises extension services, supports the distribution of farm inputs by local governments, works with agricultural research and training institutions to promote productivity of the cashews and advises the government on cashew sector policy. Other actors are input providers, transporters and financial institutions that provide credit to cooperative societies.

The value chain: the cashews' procurement and marketing

The most remarkable change in the reform of the cashew sector has been the introduction of new rules governing the procurement and marketing of cashews that revolve around the Warehouse Receipt System (WRS) introduced by the Warehouse Receipt Act No. 10 of 2005 that came into effect in 2007. This system aims to modernize the entire cashew value chain from production to transportation, marketing, storage and export. The WRS is meant to enhance transparency in the marketing of cashews, encourage the production of quality cashews via the uptake of modern technology available in the sector, improve the quality of storage and cashew grading services and eventually enable the farmers to obtain good prices for their raw cashews via the open auction strategy (CBT 2008).

Under this system farmers sell all cashew nuts to Primary Cooperative Societies (PCS), hence eliminating the buyers and their middlemen who tended to directly go to villages and farms where they allegedly underpaid the farmers. The PCS make an advance payment of 60% of the indicative price to the farmers at their farm gates (UNIDO 2011). This is the first instalment of payment. The second payment is made after the PCS have sold their cashews. Thereafter, the cashew nuts are transported to designated or registered warehouses for storage. At the warehouses, the cashews are weighed and inspected to ascertain their quality.

Based on the timetable announced by the CBT the cashews are sold to processors and exporters by auction. The highest bidder gets the cashews. The WRS is meant to ensure that all cashews are auctioned at designated warehouses where a minimum price per a kilo of raw cashews set by the CBT is applied. This presumably forces the buyers to pay 'a good price' for the cashews, which (so the government says) leads to better earnings for farmers (ANSAF 2013).

Successful bidders make payments to a local bank that issues them a note of evidence of payment for cashews called the 'cashews release warrant', which provides a 'green light' for the buyer to collect cashews from the respective warehouses for local processing, retailing or exporting.

The concept, principles and degrees of coproduction

The key argument made in this part is that the design of the cashew value chain in Southern Tanzania is evocative of the concept of institutionalized coproduction, in particular because attempts have been made by the government to define, regulate, and coordinate the activities of governmental and nongovernmental actors in the cashew sector.

The concept of coproduction

The debate regarding the concept and practice of coproduction can be traced in the literature and studies of urban public service management by American scholars in the 1970s through 1980s. Coproduction, as defined by Sharp (1980) in Loffler (2009: 3), is:

> 'The recognition that public services are the joint product of the activities of both citizens and government officials.'

Whitaker (1980: 240) argues that public agents alone cannot bring about the desired improvements in the delivery of public services:

> 'The individual served is a vital "co-producer" of any transformation that occurs. Rather than an agent presenting a "finished product" to the citizen, agent and citizen together produce the desired transformation.'

Kiser & Percy (1980) argue that any effort to enhance the quality and quantity of public services must combine the contributions and/or resources of the 'regular producers', defined as professional or public agents, and those of 'consumer producers', that is, the citizens. Based on the above two types of service 'producers', Brudney & England (1983) defined coproduction as:

> 'The critical mix of activities that service agents and citizens contribute to the provision of public services.'

The regular producers provide professional services in the service process while the citizens (consumer producers) coproduce in various ways, including the mobilising and articulating of demands for services (Josh & Moore 2004) and also via the provision of labour and other resources.

While we agree with Loffler (2009) and the American authors referred to above who argue that the concept of coproduction is not new because many public services receive some contributions from both the agents and the service users, it is important to note that the concept of coproduction does also imply that the service user should adopt roles traditionally performed by public servants, for instance in the provision of education, healthcare, community security, sanitation and environmental management services.

Josh & Moore (2004) have added the term 'institutionalized' to the description of coproduction. This invokes the concept of institutionalized coproduction, defined as:

> 'The provision of public services (broadly defined, to include regulation) through a regular long term relationship between state agencies and organized groups of citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions.' (p. 31)

The idea of institutionalized coproduction adds the element of the *regulation* of relationships between the state agencies and organized groups in the delivery of public services. It does also imply the idea of the coordination of the activities of

the participants, described in literature as critical to improving the delivery of public services (Brudney & England 1983; Ostrom 1996; Whitaker 1980).

To sum up, the concept of coproduction questions the division of labour between the regular producers and the consumer producers. What activities should be performed by each part to improve both the quality and quantity of public services? What should be the balance of division of labour in a given service? These questions not only question the role of governmental and nongovernmental actors in any service area including the cashew value chain but also the outcome of the roles performed, particularly with regard to whether they bring the expected results to the primary beneficiaries: the citizens.

Principles of coproduction

Even if there is no consensus in the literature regarding the key elements of effective coproduction, some principles appear to be agreed upon (Boyle 2008; Needam 2009 in Loffler 2009: 5). First of all the service users are active participants rather than passive consumers. Secondly, there is a collaborative instead of a paternalistic relationship between the public agents and citizens. Thirdly, the organization of the services is aimed at the delivery of outcomes rather than the services themselves. A fourth element is that the community makes an input to the service delivery. This is related to the fifth element, that the community-based delivery may supplant or supplement delivery by public agents. Finally, the sixth element is that of shared benefits: both actors benefit from the service. Moreover, Pollitt, Bouckaert & Loffler (2007) see coproduction as involving the following: co-designing, co-deciding and co-evaluation of service delivery between the regular and consumer producers.

Degrees/forms of coproduction

There are different degrees or forms of coproduction (Brudney & England 1983; Loffler 2009). Each social service will show a certain variation in the amount of coproduction. In a minimum form the coproduction requires a provision of information by the service provider. This information empowers clients to assess the quality of the services provided. Annual reports, benchmarks and consumer groups are examples that are based on the active provision of information. A second layer of coproduction is that of actual involvement in decision-making by the clients. The clients have an institutionalized position in decision-making. Examples are the establishment of parents' committees in schools or the power to elect members to the board of the service provider. In the same vein the clients might even be able to vote for strategic choices in order to influence the service provision. Thirdly, coproduction could even imply a delegation of government tasks to the clients within a regulatory framework and support by the government. In this

mode the governmental interference is limited to creating a framework that enables groups in society to take up the responsibility to organize the provision of the service themselves. As an example, members of a local community might found a school. It is likely that the government will interfere via setting some criteria (e.g. regarding the curricula) and providing certain (financial) support.

Coproduction in the cashew sector

The Tanzanian cashew value chain can be characterized by a number of key services that together define the organization of the sector. First of all there is the task of regulating and developing the sector. Secondly there is the provision of credit to the farmers. Thirdly there is the provision of a variety of farm inputs. The fourth is the marketing of the cashews, including setting their price. Applying the concepts developed above, the design of the value chain shows that elements of coproduction provided by the services involved is shared by public actors such as the Cashew nut Board of Tanzania and local governments and private producers organized in Primary Cooperative Societies, AMCOS and Cooperative Unions. While price setting is conceived as a public responsibility, producers are involved to some extent as farmers can select their representatives in the Cashew nut Board of Tanzania. The provision of agricultural inputs and credits has been left to Cooperative Societies and Unions, the boards of which are selected by the farmers. All the public actors, and the private Cooperative Societies and Unions are supposed to provide relevant and usable information to the cashew farmers so that they can effectively assess the quality of services provided and accordingly demand accountability of managers for their actions.

Service delivery in the cashew nut value chain

This section examines whether the new institutional arrangements for the delivery of services in the cashew sector in Southern Tanzania have resulted in improved services and higher incomes for the farmers. The analysis examines the roles of respective actors and their outcomes in relation to the four key services mentioned above: the regulation and development of the sector, the provision of credit, the provision of agricultural inputs and the marketing of cashews.

The regulation and development of the sector

Tanzania's Cashew nut Industry Act No. 18 of 2009 mandates the Cashew nut Board of Tanzania, which is the only cashew board in the world, to perform many functions that shape the policy environment in the cashew sector: regulation and coordination of activities pertaining to farming, marketing, transportation, storage of cashews, regulation and control of the quality of cashews, collec-

tion, refinement and transmission of information regarding the cashew industry and advice to the government on policy and strategies for the development of the industry. The government policy on the cashew sector is unequivocal: to develop the sector both in production and value in terms of processing and also protecting the interests of the producers. However, recent studies on the sector have doubted the ability of the CBT to effectively discharge its mandate (UNIDO 2011). A key observation emerging from these studies is that the CBT lacks the capacity to modernize the cashew industry in that it lacks the sophistication necessary to effectively represent and promote national and local interests in international fora dealing with cashews. This view is well captured by Fitzpatrick (2012: 27):

> 'Tanzania is an important cashew country and should be represented in a confident and assertive manner which… the Board fails to do as an organisation. We also believe that the Cashew Board of Tanzania has not developed a market knowledge and understanding fitting of [sic] its role representing the Tanzanian sector abroad and promoting growth and development at home. The Cashew Board of Tanzania is difficult to contact. Senior staff... do not display knowledge of the sector abroad or the market. Symptomatic of this malaise is the strategic plan of the Cashew Board of Tanzania. It is not connected to any reality in its description of the World market – estimates of the world crop and of world consumption are very inaccurate and can only be based on old data.'

While the CBT may lack the capacity as alleged, studies (Mfaume & Kunkuta 2015; Rukonge 2013) also refer to politicization and bureaucratic interference as part of the factors compromising the sector. Anecdotal evidence suggest that the regulatory role of the CBT is fraught by political pressures exerted by the local and national political and bureaucratic elite who tend to use the sector to advance their own political and economic interests rather promoting interests of the producers. Fitzpatrick (2012: 22) observes that:

> 'Much of the regulation could be effective but it is so highly politicized as to render the institutions charged with [the] management of the sector unable to listen to the market but obliged to listen to short term political factors especially from local politicians.'

The author seems to suggest that the CBT does not always act or decide independently. Instead, its conduct and decisions are at times restricted to instructions from the central government and the local notables. In the latter case it is alleged that some public officials, including some at the ministerial level of government, engage in buying and exporting the cashews. Since some of them are also allegedly hired by some big business cartels they are unlikely to promote or call for a high price for the crop. Instead they will likely seek to buy cheaply for they have an incentive to do so. Anecdotal evidence suggests they achieve this by influencing or lobbying the CBT to set a low indicative price for the crop. If confirmed, this behaviour undermines the coproduction principle requiring fair play in terms of shared benefits between the public agents and the citizens.

Many studies (Citizen 2014; NMB 2013; Pass Trust 2013) have indicated that the cashew farmers are frustrated because of the lack of information provided to them. As established by Mfaume & Kunkuta's (2015) study, there is a huge information gap in the sector: the farmers are barely informed regarding how the CBT works or makes decisions. The sector is often mired in uncertainties about what to expect regarding the prices of the crop, precipitating conflict between the farmers and authorities (Fitzpatrick 2012). Though the cashew nut board publishes the indicative or minimum price for a kilo of raw cashews before the selling season starts, this information hardly reaches all farmers. The media used (website and newspapers) are not widespread among the farmers. Machira (2014) concludes that the lack of adequate and clear information regarding the payments for and price of cashews is the main reason for the riots experienced in 2013 and early 2014 in Lindi district where over 14 houses of public officials were destroyed by angry farmers. The NMB (2013) suggests that the CBT and local governments need to provide regular updates in order to keep all actors in the value chain, including the farmers, properly informed.

Two of the nine members of the CBT represent the cashew farmers. These representatives are directly appointed by the minister responsible for agriculture (URT 2009). Mfaume & Kunkuta's (2015) study reports that there is no indication that these representatives visit the farmers regularly to hear their views or explain to them the board's decisions. Even more striking is that these representatives are not known by most of the farmers. These findings suggest a weak coproduction with respect to the regulation and development of the cashew sector because it is devoid of some fundamental prerequisites: the effective provision of information, citizen participation in the decision making process and the planning and delegation of some tasks to the consumer producers: the farmers. In such situations the farmers are unlikely to command or mobilize an organized influence on the actions of public officials affecting their interests. Moreover, since they are not adequately informed they can neither effectively demand the accountability of the public agents in service delivery nor effectively demand the improvement of the quality of services in the sector.

The provision of credit

Farmers need credit to effectively invest in cashew production: purchasing farming equipment, procuring fertilizers and agrochemicals and meeting the labour cost. The main providers of credit finance are the National Microfinance Bank, the National Bank of Commerce and the Primary Cooperative Societies (SACCOS and AMCOS). The central government provides input subsidies of up to 50%. This funding does not go directly to the farmers, but to the Cashew nut Board of Tanzania to help PCS procure farm inputs, especially pesticides and

fungicides (UNIDO 2011). Some governmental bursaries approved by the National Assembly go to local governments under the District Agricultural Development Programme to facilitate agro extension services and the availability of improved seeds. Despite these, arrangements studies (NMB 2013; Pass Trust 2013) indicate that a lack of access to credit finance is one of the factors constraining the smallholder farmers from engaging in and improving the production of cashews.

The banks consider the farmers a high-risk category that lack acceptable loan security or collateral and hence can only extend credit to them via the SACCOS or AMCOS. Even when finance is made available to SACCOS and AMCOS (and the farmers) it may not be used in a manner that benefits the farmers. The diagnostic by UNIDO (2011) concluded that:

> 'Most farmers can only get credits through the cooperatives, which in many cases do not exactly represent their interests. (…) Finance received is often inappropriately managed by the farmers, cooperatives and processors.'

Noteworthy is that some recent research (NMB 2013; Towo & Kimaro 2013) has claimed that the introduction of the Warehouse Receipt System has improve farmers' access to credit, arguing that the farmers are able to present to the banks the papers indicating that their produce is deposited at the designated warehouses and use them as alternative collateral to obtain credit from the banks. Likewise, the SACCOS and AMCOS accept the cashews as security for the loans. However, none of the studies has provided concrete evidence of increased access to credit finance by the farmers. Mfaume & Kunkuta's (2015) study refers to many factors that limit the farmers' access to credit in the cashews sector: fear of debt, high interest rates charged by both the banks, SACCOS and AMCOS and also distrust of the cooperative societies by the farmers, who may use their 'ignorance' of the conditions attached to the credit to make money.

Empirical evidence (Mfaume & Kunkuta 2015; Fitzpatrick 2012) has shown very little coproduction in the provision of credit. Firstly, while the farmers are generally informed about where they can access the loans, they remain ill-informed about the conditions, criteria and implications of the loans. As revealed by Mfaume & Kunkuta (2015), many farmers feel that financial institutions are not transparent enough regarding the conditions of the loans and therefore some farmers end up signing for the loans while they do not fully understand their terms of repayment. Secondly, no study has produced evidence suggesting that farmers do influence the conduct or decisions of the cooperatives in which they are members. To some degree the national level via the specific legal instrument (the Cooperative Societies Act 2003) determines the modus operandi of the SACCOS and AMCOS. It also regulates the auditing of their accounts.

Even though members elect the boards of these institutions, experiences from across the country show that most of these boards lack competent leadership. Board members and leaders are often elected based on who they are rather than on their abilities. The SACCOS and AMCOS are weak financially, often because they are poorly managed. The leaders do not necessarily serve the interests of the members as some of them are known to have routinely misused the credit finance secured from the banks (Fitzpatrick 2012). Because of the poor track record of their performance they often lack the credibility to secure further loans from the banks. This renders them unable to effectively make credit available to their member farmers.

Provision of agro inputs

The cashew farmers need access to adequate supplies of inputs, particularly improved seeds, fertilizers, fumigation gear including spraying equipment and insecticides and fungicides to prevent and/or fight destructive pests and disease. The foregoing description of actors in the cashew value chain has referred to the role of local government to coordinate and PCS assisted by Cooperative Unions to procure and supply the inputs to their member farmers. A number of recent studies (Mfaume & Kunkuta 2015; UNIDO 2011; Rukonge 2013) have produced evidence suggesting that the inputs delivery system has continually failed to function in a timely manner such that the cashew farmers have continued to lack access to the right inputs at the right time. These studies stress that there continues to be a serious shortage of the key farm inputs and that whenever they are available they may not be the right type or the right amounts and when they are delivered late they are of no use. ANSAF (2013) argues that the lack of access to farm inputs is a far bigger problem and a more serious failure, putting the livelihoods of the farmers at grave risk, than the reported high price of the inputs despite the government subsidies. UNIDO's (2011) study concluded that:

> 'Application of inputs, particularly pesticides, is insufficient affecting productivity substantially. The existing credit institutions as well as cooperative societies do not provide sufficient finance to farmers to be able to purchase sufficient inputs.' (p. 12)

In addition to the high cost of inputs and untimely deliveries, the farmers complain of the poor quality of the agrochemicals supplied:

> 'Despite the fact that the Tanzanian Bureau of Standards approves importers and the products they propose to import.' (Fitzpatrick 2012: viii)

Documented evidence (Mfaume & Kunkuta 2015) suggests the key actors (local governments and PCS) have not addressed the historical failure of public agencies to improve farmers' access to the services they need to promote productivity. As stated above, Cooperative Unions and PCS are known to habitually experience financial difficulties and tend to lack creditworthiness and therefore the

banks do not give them substantial credit. As already stated, this may explain their inability to procure and deliver the necessary inputs to the farmers. This failure also compromises the quality of cashews. As observed by UNIDO (2011), the failure of the PCS to provide gunny bags forces the farmers to use old sacks and any other rugs they can find. This arguably leads to good cashews being downgraded and fetching a low price per kilo, translating into low earnings for the farmers.

In each financial year, local government authorities (LGAs) publish information on the distribution of farm inputs, indicating the types, amounts and cost of each agrochemical to be supplied. The farmers access this information directly from the local governments or from their PCS. As established by Mfaume & Kunkuta's (2015) study, the problem is that very often the actual supplies do not match the published information. The deliveries are usually not of the amounts, quality and types promised.

The prerogative of input supply is the preserve for PCS and LGAs. Indeed, the farmers do have a leeway of opting to procure the inputs from private suppliers, however they tend to be very expensive and therefore undercut or diminish their earnings. One plausible explanation for the persistent failure in the delivery of agro inputs in the sector is the lack of adequate coordination among the institutions responsible for this task. Another weightier explanation is that the PCS, including their boards, are not necessarily there to serve the interests of their member farmers. Some studies (Rukonge 2013; UNIDO 2011) have suggested that often the leaders of these organisations are there to pursue their own interests. At times, the PCS lack the flexibility to serve their members because their actions are subject to the directives of the national government via the Cooperative Societies Act (2003) that stipulates membership conditions, types and standards of services to be extended to the members.

The marketing of cashews

The Warehouse Receipt System designed for the marketing of the cashews involves the Primary Cooperative Societies buying the raw cashews at the gates of their members' farms where they make a first instalment of around 60% of the minimum price of a kilo of cashews. The second instalment is paid after the PSC sells the cashews via auction at designated warehouses. It is worth emphasizing that the regulation requires farmers to sell their cashews via their PCS, prompting a criticism that the prevailing single channel of selling denies the farmers a choice of buyers (NMB 2013; UNIDO 2011; Fitzpatrick 2012). The discussion has shown that, to ensure that the farmers get a fair price for their crop, the Cashew nut Board of Tanzania sets an indicative or minimum price per kilo of raw cashews. The Warehouse Receipt System not only aimed to eliminate the mid-

dlemen or private buyers who were known to have been paying a low price for the good quality cashews, but also to boost value through quality grading and storage of cashews at the warehouses.

Nevertheless, the prevailing marketing system puts the farmers in the background. They cannot negotiate the price themselves. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, their representation in the CBT appears to be weak. This contradicts the co-planning and co-decision-making principles of coproduction discussed in the previous section.

In assessing the effectiveness of the marketing of cashews, several studies (ANSAF 2013; UNIDO 2011; Rukonge 2013) refer to the high cost involved in the marketing of cashews with serious repercussions for the earnings of the farmers. These authors stress that the cost involved in the collection and transportation of cashews from the farm gates to AMCOS and further to warehouses undercuts the payment due to farmers. Fitzpatrick (2012) argues that compared with their counterparts in Ghana, cashew farmers in Tanzania face high costs in terms of administrative charges claimed by their PCS. The authors further observe that these administrative charges are not experienced in other cashew-producing countries in Africa.

Studies (ANSAF 2013; Mfaume & Kunkuta 2015) indicate that the farmers shoulder the ultimate cost faced by the PCS, buyers and exporters in the form of various charges and taxes. This translates into low earnings for the farmers because the buyers tend to decline to or (using various tactics including lobbying and the use of political patronage as anecdotal evidences suggest) avoid paying higher prices for the cashews during auctions, arguing they need to make up for the cost they face in the cashew procurement process, including the export tax reported to be second to none in Africa. According to Fitzpatrick (2012: 26):

> 'Export duty on in-shell cashews has increased from 3% to 10% and (since 2012) to 15% ad valorem or 160 Tsh/mt. Export duty on kernels is 1% with a 2 year exemption for new factories.'

Additional analysis by the author is compelling. He observes that while a kilo of raw cashews is bought for less than $ 0.33 in Tanzania (pre-WRS prices), a kilo of processed cashews fetches more than $ 8 when sold in Manhattan, USA. The author complains that the offshore processing and selling earn millions of dollars for those involved, but do not translate into better pay for the cashew farmers.

PCS, Cooperative Unions and buyers and/or exporters all take their share at the cost of the farmers. Often it is not clear what the exact justification for this cost is, since it refers to 'administrative costs' such as bank transfers and fees levied by the corporative unions for administrative expenses. Mfaume & Kunkuta (2015) reports that farmers are frustrated and feel used by those they allege to

be benefiting, first most and unfairly: CBT, PCS, CU, local governments and buyers and exporters.

As stated above, this mind-set explains the recent farmers' 'war' against what they consider to be an unjust cashew-marketing regime. Moreover, the marketing of cashews in Tanzania reflects a weak coproduction because the process is fraught by a lack of information. Fitzpatrick (2012: 26) is highly critical, saying:

> 'The cashew nut industry suffers from a lack of good quality information… There are no rigorously accurate estimates of crops… There are often conflicts between figures offered by the different sources. (…) [The] trade statistics and crop estimates contradict each other. (…) The cashew industry is typically driven by myth, rumor and adversarial relationships.'

Machira (2014) has echoed the above misgiving, indicating that the cashew farmers have been receiving contradictory information regarding the price of the cashews, thus brewing unnecessary tensions in the sector.

The foregone discussion has referred to the following experiences that arguably compromise the quality of coproduction vis-à-vis improving service delivery and livelihood of the smallholder farmers. Firstly, the CBT usually publishes the indicative prices on its website and also in newspapers that barely reach the farmers, meaning that the farmers tend have very little information, rendering them incapable of questioning the conduct of the public agents. Secondly, the farmers are poorly represented in the decision-making process in the sector. This makes them unable to muster the clout necessary to influence the decisions and actions of public actors in their favour. Thirdly, There is no evidence to suggest that the PCS and those involved in the marketing of cashews are there to safeguard or represent the interests of the farmers. As already stated, often these institutions do not work independently as they are at times driven by local and national politics, vested interests of the local and national elite and government directives promulgated in specific legal instruments.

Conclusion

The actual institutional design of the Tanzanian cashew sector contains elements of coproduction. According to the reviewed literature, coproduction promises a high quality of public services through the active involvement of citizen-consumers. The reform of the cashew nut value chain, involving the public regulation of the market and the participation of farmers in the provision of services, was expected to ensure the availability of high quality services so that the farmers would not relapse into poor farming methods and would get better prices for their product. For the system of coproduction to work effectively, it must meet a number of requirements. The regular service providers need to provide quality information that is timely, accurate and usable so that the farmers can objectively

assess the quality of services delivered to them, in order to be in the position to demand the accountability of public providers and be informed about the availability of services. The involvement of the farmers in decision-making is vital. This ensures the adoption of policies that improve the position of the farmers. Primary Cooperative Societies are expected to safeguard the interests their member farmers, for instance by ensuring farmers' access to the right inputs as and when required and at a fair price, paying the farmers a fair price for their cashews and also by effecting the second payment as agreed and without undue delay. The government via the Cashew nut Board of Tanzania should demonstrate a commitment to the reduction of transaction costs for farmers. This may involve reviewing, reducing and even abolishing some of the administrative fees. Financial institutions should deliver favourable financial services in a manner that supports the development of the cashew industry and benefits the farmers, for example by providing credit to the creditworthy AMCOS, which should in turn extend credit to their member farmers without charging exorbitant interest rates.

Based on the analysis provided in this chapter, the question as to whether there is coproduction in the cashew nut value chain. The answer is yes, but it is very rudimentary in that it is yet to sufficiently meet most of the basic criteria for effective coproduction to be claimed. The actual influence of the farmers is rather limited. The public providers (CBT and local government), alongside the providers representing the farmers (the PCS and Cooperative Unions), seem to be failing in their responsibility of ensuring the effective delivery of agricultural services required by the farmers. Information is not always available and when available it is of poor quality. Institutions give the farmers a certain influence, for example because members are elected. But in practice these members do not function as the representatives for the clients of the service provision. Moreover, the strong influence of the government in the organizational design of the service provision via the specific legal instruments hampers true self-provision. The organizations that seem to be based on 'self-provision' (like AMCOS and SACCOS) lack the means and formal competences to effectively discharge their mandates. For, as far as these organisations are examples of institutionalized coproduction, they at times appear to rely on the approval of the central government and to be under the influence of local and national vested interest groups. Overall, the mismatch between the design of the coproduction of agricultural services and the actual involvement of the clients might be the actual source of the expressed dissatisfaction of the farmers as accounted in the introduction.

The good news is that there is a scope for optimism. As reported by UNIDO (2011), the aforementioned high cost of cashews marketing administration of 35 to 43% of the total value of the farmers' produce has dropped to less than 20% since the 2011/2012 selling season. Moreover, the above limitations notwith-

standing, studies (Machira 2014; Mfaume & Kunkuta 2015; Towo & Kimaro 2013) have generally accepted that the introduction of the Warehouse Receipt System has to some degree positively impacted the prices offered to the farmers for their cashews. Evidence compiled by these suggest that the WRS has seen the farmers earn up to 1,200 Tsh per kilo of raw cashews ($ 0.75) compared to only 250 Tsh per kilo of cashews ($ 0.15) before the introduction of the WRS. UNIDO (2011: 13) argues that:

> 'Going back to the system where private buyers send their agents into the plantations is not an option, due to the lower prices farmers would then get.'

The value addition associated with the WRS regarding the quality storage and grading of cashews provided, as well as the indication of an improved uptake of technology among the farmers in that some of them are able to access credit finance via the WRS, are positive aspects that need to be recognized and promoted. Even better results could be achieved if the farmers become part of the decision-making process, engaging in co-planning and co-evaluation of service delivery results alongside the public providers. The overall conclusion of this chapter is that while the system of coproduction functions as it does, it has not led to an improved delivery of agro services but there are some signs that the farmers' earnings are improving.

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Case 1 The pitfall of coproduction in LGAs: local cashew nut processing by women in Kitama ward

Case

The local cashew nut processing group

Jiendeleze women's group is among many women's groups in *Kitama* ward formed on voluntary bases in 2010. Like many other women and youth groups in Tanzania, it was formed with the ambition to engage in income generating activities. The *Jiendeleze* group was formed in response to and heed of government calls to empower youth and women in order to realize objectives and outcomes specified in the *National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty - MKUKUTA II.* Among the strategies in MKUKUTA II is the economic empowerment of special groups such as women, young people and the disabled so that they can eradicate poverty. *Jiendeleze* women's group is comprised of 12 women between the ages of 20 and 35. Two members have attained secondary education (Form IV), the rest have primary education level (Standard Seven). The group has elected its chairperson, secretary and treasury. The group is situated about 7 km from the council and district headquarters.

Due to a problem with operating capital and low level of economic awareness, the group remained idle until 2012 when it decided to mobilize small capital that they could use to process (roast) cashew nuts. As the tension between farmers and government regarding the price and time of payment was rising, the decision of the group to start processing cashew nuts was partly a response to the regional and district leaders' campaign to calm farmers' rebellions. A few weeks before, farmers and a group of youths caused a road block on all major roads leading to Tandahimba district headquarters, burning and destroying government property and also burning shops and guesthouses in Tandahimba town. Police retaliated by using firearms and teargas. The conflict was caused by the unsatisfactory ex-

planations and conflicting answers from the district leadership, Tandahimba primary cooperative society, and the Cooperative Union (TANECU) regarding the delay of second and third instalments of payment for cashew nuts by the latter two organizations.

Despite the decision and ambition of Jiendeleze group to start processing cashew nuts as a project that could generate income for group members, they faced the challenge of raising initial capital that could be used to buy raw cashew nuts and processing utensils. Eventually, the group members decided that each member should contribute 5,000 Tsh as seed money that would form an initial capital and they would continue to raise more capital from other sources. With 60,000 Tsh in their hand, they decided to approach their ward councillor for additional support for capital. The councillor advised them to present their proposal to the council and explained to them that every year the council set aside a percentage of funds from the council's annual budget to support youth and women's economic and poverty alleviation initiatives. As support for the group initiative, the councillor wrote a recommendation letter to the council director.

Meeting the council registry clerk

The chairman and secretary of the group travelled to the council offices to present their proposal for financial and other support. At the reception, they were instructed to submit their letter and proposal for marking and filing. The council's registry clerk told them that their letter was received and they should follow up after one week for their reply. A week later, they travelled back to council office to get their reply. Again, they were told that they should be happy because officers were working on their proposal and therefore they should follow up again after another week. The clerk hinted that the process could go much faster if they knew a senior officer in person so that he/she could more closely follow up their matter. Unfortunately, no one among them was lucky to know any senior officers in person. They decided to go back to their councillor to seek his intervention to help solve the predicament. The councillor promised them that he would deal with the issue. A week later, the councillor phoned the group chairperson and told her that he had followed up their proposal and that they should go to the council office and meet with the community development officer (CDO) to have their matter handled.

Meeting the community development officer

The group chairperson and the secretary travelled to the council offices where they met the community development officer. The officer told them that their proposal was received and scrutinized and that the council had agreed to register their group as one of the income-generating initiatives that was in line to receive

the council's financial and material support. The CDO told them to be patient as they were preparing an official letter informing them on the decision and that they could collect the letter at the council registry office after three days. After three days, the group chairperson travelled to the council office and collected the official letter. The group met in one of the group members' houses to read the letter. Part of the letter was informing them thus:

> 'Please understand that your proposal has been approved, but because the council has many development priorities this year, the council will be un able to give a supporting hand in this financial year. That means your group request will be included as one of the top priorities in the next financial year. Please make close follow up so that the government's ambition of alleviating poverty through small and medium income generating initiatives as specified in the national strategy for growth and reduction of poverty - MKUKUTA IIS is realized. In the meantime your group is further advised to look for possibilities of securing credit facility from financial institutions.'

Financial institution frustrations

As the council had already decided and informed the *Jiendeleze* group about the impossibility of financially supporting the group to undertake their proposed income generating initiatives up to the opening of the cashew nut harvesting and marketing season in October, the group was still looking for alternative way of securing capital so that they could start implementing their proposed project. Disappointed by the council's decision, they decided to follow the advice of the council and approached the National Microfinance Bank (NMB) for a credit facility. The group leadership and the bank loan officers had a brief discussion. The bank officers advised the group to submit a written proposal detailing their business plan, management structure and the CVs of group leaders. Under guidance and assistance from a retired teacher, the group managed to prepare the proposal and in three days' time a proposal to the tune of 1,000,000 Tsh was presented to the bank for funding consideration. The loan officer told the group that the bank could be in a position to review their proposal within three working days and therefore they could come back for the bank's decision then. After three days, the group chairperson and the secretary returned to the bank to follow up their proposal. The loan officer informed the group that their proposal was good and was provisionally approved. He said that the final approval could be made after the group met the additional condition of either submitting a title deed of a property or submitting a certificate of property registered by MKURABITA.[5] An alternative condition was for the group to submit an official guarantee and commitment letter from the district council director. The group was unable to meet either of the two requirements of the bank and they could not get the loan.

1. MKURABITA is a property registration and formalization institution established by the government to assist poor citizens with simple procedures to register and formalize their properties.

The initiative and support by a Member of Parliament (MP)

It was already December, and marketing seasons approached their end. The group decided to approach their constituent member of parliament to present their proposal and request additional working capital.[6] The MP and *Jiendeleze* group discussed the matter and finally the MP agreed to extend non-conditional financial support of 100,000 Tsh to the group to enable them start their cashew-roasting project. The MP promised to connect the group to SIDO[7] for more financial and training opportunities. A week later, the group received an invitation along with other women's and youth groups to attend three days' training organized by SIDO that was intended to teach groups entrepreneurship skills and the technological skills of processing cashew nuts. The training graduation was followed by a ceremony in which the group was given 100,000 Tsh by SIDO as grant.

Start of the cashew nut processing project

By mid-December, the *Jiendeleze* group was able to secure 200,000 Tsh in addition to their initial 60,000 Tsh. With an initial working capital of 240,000 Tsh the group was able to buy a simple and SIDO-made cashew nut roaster and two bags (185 kg) of raw cashew nuts from farmers for 1,200 Tsh per kilo. The group spent 222,000 Tsh. The other 20,000 Tsh was used to buy other necessary utensils for the work.

After buying two bags of raw cashew nuts, the group set up a simple plant *(kijiwe)* at one of the member's family homes. Every member was responsible for collecting and bringing in firewood, coming ready to work and engage in deshelling (*kubangua*). They met daily after farming hours (around 3pm) and worked until sunset.

In the first batch, they managed to get 46 kg of kernels (roasted nuts). The cashew kernels were sold to buyers from Dar es Salaam who set up their trading station at the guesthouse they rented for that purpose in Tandahimba town. They sold the 46 kg for 7,000 Tsh per kilo and managed to make 322,000 Tsh. After paying for the transportation costs of the *boda boda* (motorbike used for commercial purpose) and the local sales fees collected by the council's clerk of 200 Tsh per kilo of sold kernels, the group was able to make a gross profit of 100,000 Tsh.

2. In Tanzania, it is a common practice for people to approach their constituency member of parliament and request financial support, and in most cases MPs feel obliged to extend support.
3. SIDO (Small Industry Development Organization) is a government organization established for the purposes of promoting the development of small industries in the country. It has offices in all regions and the key activities it undertake include imparting simple technology, capacity-building and support and offering small grants to small industrial initiatives.

The group negotiated with their buyer who agreed to give them an advance payment of 500,000 Tsh on the condition that they sell to him all they were going to process for the same price of 7,000 Tsh. They then had adequate capital to buy more raw cashew nuts from farmers. The group increased the number of roasting stations (kijiwe) from the initial two to three. The division of work was such that four group members were observed and managed one roasting station. The group also agreed to increase working time and decided to start work much earlier (around 1pm). The speed of the group in roasting the agreed amount would be the determining factor for going home early. With a total of 800,000 Tsh they managed to buy 660kg from farmers.

They roasted and managed to get 149 kg of kernel. This brought in 1,043,000 Tsh. The third round of processing and roasting was close to the end of the season and competition among buyers was already higher. The selling price was already increased to 8,500 Tsh per kilo and they sold 234 kg which gave them 1,989,000 Tsh. One day the commercial officer from the council visited the selling centre and demanded that everyone selling kernels showed their business license from the council and their taxpayer's registration certificate (TIN) from the Tanzania Revenue Authorities (TRA). No one among the people who came to sell their kernels had a business license or TIN. Commotion began and sellers organized themselves, flanked by a group of youths, and marched to the district commissioner's (DC) office to air their grievances. Their claims were centred on the fact that they were farmers and poor people who had decided to engage in economic activities for the purpose of gaining legal and legitimate income. The youth claimed that the council authority was forcing them to revert to criminal behaviour. The DC promised to take the matter to higher authorities.

The group continued with their cashew processing business and by the end of the season (February) the group brought the selling station more than 8 harvests. The group was motivated and happy with how they had progressed with their business, and by the time they closed the processing season they were able to collect a gross income of 5,271,000 Tsh.

From the income the group received, the group agreed that they should first set aside 500,000 Tsh as initial working capital for the collection and processing of cashew nuts in the next season. The remaining sum was shared equally among group members after paying for some items such as the wage of the young boys who were assisting them in de-shelling and collecting firewood. Every group member earned 320,000 Tsh in cash.

Questions

1. Who are the key actors in this case? What is the role they are expected to play?
2. What do you think is the cause of the women's group's problems?
3. What elements of co-production do you recognize? To what extent is there co-production?
4. If you were requested to advise the government, what would you recommend? How could the governmental system (including the cooperative society) support these initiatives?

Case 2 Cashew farming inputs in Southern Tanzania: a statement from a farmer

Case

> 'When you people who are not farmers of cashew nuts hear about cashew nut development you think the government brings it. You are cheating yourselves; but you can be excused, for the misconception, since you are not engaged in this business. You need to have very hard skin to remain a cashew farmer. If you are not patient you will likely quit the farming, or cut all cashew trees down, clear the area and grow other crops such as sesame, and maize instead.'

This is a blunt assessment by a farmer in Tandahimba district in Mtwara region, Southern Tanzania (2013) who was responding to a question posed to the farmers to describe what being in the cashew farming business meant.

Why did the farmer say so?

The farmer went on to describe the experiences he had with the supply of cashew farming inputs as follows:

> 'During the sales of cashew nut at the Agricultural Marketing Cooperative Societies (AMCOS), I indicated the type and amount of inputs I required for the next farming season. Some amount of money was deducted from my cashew sale and retained by AMCOS as an initial deposit for my order of the inputs. Thankfully they gave me a receipt for the deduction. The AMCOS stayed with my money until the beginning of the new season when they notified me to come over to their offices to collect the consignment of farming inputs. Now here is when the problem started. I was required to add some more money for what was explained by the officers in charge as the price rise, over and above the price previously agreed during selling of our cashew nuts.
>
> Another problem and even more frustrating was that instead of being supplied with the kind and amount of the inputs we ordered we were at times forced to accept and collect a different type of input. For example, I wanted sulphur dust but I was literally forced to accept and collect Thiovit and Karate watery spray. But I am used to sulphur dust because it brings better results and it is easy to use in our dust spray machines and more importantly you can use it in our district where we face an acute shortage of water. The question is why should someone force me to accept something I did not choose or agree to pay for? If you look critically, you will find that the products the suppliers bring to the AMCOS have a low demand in their stores. I believe they are also comparatively sold cheaply in the private shop outlets while AMCOS sell to us the same products at a higher price. This is unfair. Surprisingly, our

> council (local government authority) is there standing still while watching all these things happen; our AMCOS leaders attend the planning meetings convened by local government; they know that some of these products (cashew farming inputs) are ineffective in our environment, yet they accept them and force us to accept them too.'

The shady forces regarding the supply of cashew nut inputs: the role of the cashew nut Development Trust Fund

To better understand the dynamics regarding the supply of cashew nut farming inputs, a visit was made to a respective local government to hear the officers' take on the above subject. In what was a rare admission of mismanagement by a public official, a member of staff working in the district cashew nut coordination office was critical of the council (local government), saying that the role of the Cashew nut Development Trust Fund (CDTF) was questionable. The behaviour of those responsible for making decisions on the use of this fund was causing a lot of auditing queries to the council from the Controller and Auditor General (CAG). For example, in the 2012 audit report the CAG questioned the expenditure of 286,882,600 Tsh that was reportedly used by the council to purchase sulphur dust for cashew farmers in the district. The CAG insisted that the existing law required the council to receive the funds and use them to develop the production of the cashew nut crop. When the CAG was later told that the council did not receive the funds from Cashew nut Board of Tanzania (CBT and/or CDTF) as expected, he was surprised and questioned why the money had not been provided. Even when he inspected the amount of agro inputs the council should have receive from CDTF compared with the actual amount the council distributed to the farmers he saw a lot of variations, which made him sceptical and worried that the council may have been engaged in corrupt business. Last year (2012) the variation was up to 45%; this is inconceivable. The end result of this behaviour is the council loses credibility for the farmers and citizens at large. Further, these events precipitate conflict, feuds and clashes between the cashew farmers and government authorities.

Questions

1. Who are the key actors in this case? What is the role they are expected to play?
2. Which elements of co-production do you recognize?
3. To which extent is there co-production?
4. Why would the farmer say that he was 'forced' to accept the wrong inputs?
5. If you would have to assess the effectiveness of the design, what are the pitfalls and how would you advise the government to avoid these pitfalls?

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