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2. The Mainstream Approaches through Liberal Peace: The International and Local Dynamics of Liberal International State, Nation and Peace Building

Introduction

Debates about the meaning of international statebuilding can be traced to the colonial period and European state formation, while modern state building began in the late 20th century with the establishment of the United Nations. The rebuilding of Germany and Japan after World War II and the later outbreak of conflicts in the Balkans, Asia, and Africa reinforced the significance of international state building, although failures and disappointments gave rise to a lot criticism of this agenda. This chapter reviews the theoretical state of the art on the topics of post-conflict reconstruction processes, namely state, peace and nation building.

To this end it begins with classical state formation theory, before moving on to 'problem solving theory' (liberal peace theory explained on statebuilding and peacebuilding section). All the approaches have the same goal in mind, though seeking to improve state and peace building with different arguments, procedures and on the basis of different evidence. However, they were built as lenses for state building analysis at different periods and are thus confronted with different shortcomings. The theories will be looked at with the following questions in mind: What are the international and local perspectives of international state, peace and nation building, and how do they compare? Regarding future global crises and insecurities, how do the theories reconcile the tension between local developments and international authority? How do they view the negotiations of mandates and goals for the purpose of inclusive and progressive reconstruction? Thus the chapter will focus on the advantages and shortcomings of each theory (except post liberal theory that is described in the next chapter) and highlight what falls outside their scope, particularly where it concerns local experiences.

This chapter also explains the link between state, peace and nation building in post conflict countries and the different theoretical perspectives on these processes. It describes them in an attempt to lay down few general theoretical conceptions in the field to be taken into account when analyzing the case study however it does not provide a specific theoretical framework to be followed in order to avoid influencing the data with preconceived conceptions and let the data speak for themselves as suggested by grounded theory methodology. The chapter presents a two-fold argument. Firstly it reminds that state building will continue, as it is essential to prevent spreading of international security threats from fragile zones as Fukuyama argues. Secondly, peace building complements state building since none of them can be suc-

cessful in long term, if implemented separately. Thirdly, nation building, meaning establishing a sense of commonness/togetherness, is also an essential component for establishing successful and sustainable state and peace building. Thus without nation building, both state and peace building cannot be achieved in long term. Further it draws attention to the different theoretical explanations of these processes, arguing that liberal peace proved to be failure due to the bad record in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia and others. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the significance and limitations of liberal peace, amongst others for the analysis of dependencies across different areas of post-conflict politics and the relation between the process of building states and nations and the maintenance of peace. The dissertation's case study of Kosovo will be used for illustrative purposes.

The Origins of State Formation

The Peace of Westphalia marks not only the end of the Thirty Year's War, but also the beginning of European state making and the modern nation state more generally. The War, fought predominantly for religious reason and in a struggle for territory between empires, ended with many peace agreements, the most significant ones being the Treaty of Augsburg and the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 (Elden, 2009, p. 200). The Treaty of Westphalia introduced a new political era based on the modern nation state with a presumption of 'non-interference' in domestic affairs and 'equal sovereignty' (Elden, 2009, p. 201). The Treaty entitled the newly established state entities with absolute sovereignty, including the right to declare war and peace, create laws and new alliances, regulate taxes, and maintain an army and a territory. To sum it up, the end of the religious wars gave rise to the establishment of the modern European state system with the ratification of the Treaty of Westphalia.

It is important to note that the city-states had existed even before the Treaty of Westphalia, for instance in the Fareast, Mesopotamia, and also in the famous city-states of Athens and in Italy. The main difference between the city-states and the current states lie in the type of democracy which was employed. In the city-states, democracy was embraced in an original, thus direct and participatory form, especially in Athens, whereas nowadays states are of the liberal or representative kind.[1] The elected officials are supposed to respect and work within the 'rule of law' framework (Held, 1992, p. 12). However, not all city-states embraced the participatory democracy. Over time city-states weakened and were incorporated in other states or empires. Nowadays only few city-states remain such as the Vatican and the Monaco.

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[1] Direct/participatory democracy refers to a form of democracy where citizens directly express their interests and influence on the government and its regulations, whereas representative democracy refers to citizens having their interests represented through a much smaller amount of representatives through vote.

In addition, processes of decolonization and secession for the purpose of self-determination became the prevalent form for state formation during the 19th and 20th century. Between the 15th and the 20th century, the world was structured around empires as various European powers (France, Great Britain, Spain and Portugal) expanded territorially, first in North America and other parts of the world, and at the end of the 19th century, mainly on the African continent (Elden, 2009, p. 202). In these processes, the European political model was exported to the rest of the world, surviving even the process of decolonization. In Africa, decolonialization implied independence from the colonizers, but the boundaries they had set usually remained. The Organization of African Unity embraced the principle of *uti possidetis* (what is currently yours you can maintain) to guide the process of decolonization (Elden, 2009, p. 229). The resulting problems are still visible on the African continent.

In Europe, after the breakup of the empires during the First World War, boundaries were redrawn in several Treaties (ie Brest-Litovsk, Versailles, St. Germain-en-Laye and of Trianon). Woodrow Wilson advanced the idea of self-determination, meaning that each distinct group could rule their territory (K. J. Holsti, 1996, p. 53), though he later on acknowledged 'his own ignorance of the practical application' of the principle (K. J. Holsti, 1996, p. 53). Its application started as of 1919 with the Treaty of Versailles intending to give independence to natural communities based on religion and language, give voice to the suppressed people and as such achieve perpetual peace (K. J. Holsti, 1996, pp. 52–53). This approach produced problems as it created around 30 million people without their own state, that is, minorities (K. J. Holsti, 1996, p. 54). As empires collapsed, many new independent states were created, including artificial ones such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. On the other continents, the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire gave rise to many new states. The ongoing conflicts in Israel/Palestine and Iraq date since then (Elden, 2009, p. 230). The arbitrariness of the redrawing of boundaries with the Treaty of Versailles dissatisfied some, with Harold Nicolson, a member of the British delegation in the conference stating that "it is appalling, those three [Wilson, Lloyd George, and Georges Clemenceau] ignorant and irresponsible men cutting Asia Minor to bits as if they were dividing a cake" (Moynihan, 1993, p. 102). Holsti summarizes as follows the basic contradictions that were created back then:

> The fundamental problem was that the new states that based their theoretical right to rule over a community defined in terms of language or some other "natural" attribute, actually had to rule over populations characterized by ethnic, language, cultural, and religious diversity (Holsti, 1996, p. 55).

Despite its contradictory application, the principle of self-determination continued to be the basis for popular claims even after the end of Cold War. The break up of Yugoslavia established new states based on the federations former republics, with the exception of Bosnia and Kosovo (Elden, 2009, pp. 203–204). Questions remain also open concerning territories such as Abkhazia, Taiwan, Transnistria, Tibet, Chechnya and others.

On the origins of the state, Elden argues that the emergence of private property, towns, cities and the shift of the power to middle class resulted in a strengthening more of national rather than local markets, therefore leading to a centralization of the state (Elden, 2009, p. 206). The emergence of capitalism goes hand in hand with the rise of the modern state, as there was increasing emphasis on taxable assets of land and people. In addition, as Parsons notes, the rapid decline of feudalism at that time it was inevitable that a new form of society would emerge, respectively the modern society (Parsons in Tilly, 1975, p. 614).

Discussions on the origins of state formation, its nature, power and rule go as far back as to the works of Webber, Gramsci and others (Sharma & Gupta, 2006, p. 45). Webber argues famously that the state is based on 'monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory" (Weber, 2004, p. 33). Moreover, the state in the modern times is governed by rational legal rules created by rulers, which are supposed to be obeyed by everyone. These norms are implemented by a bureaucracy, which in modern states should be fully developed. According to Weber, the benefits of such a state bureaucracy is that '[it] destroyed structures of domination which were not rational" but he also questions it as a new system of domination which limits the autonomy of people and social change (Weber, 2006, p. 70). In sum, Weber's understanding of the state emphasizes the monopoly of violence, territory, law and legitimacy, community and bureaucracy. In addition, Rosenau points to the international role of the state as being the result of a 'function of relations between a particular population and the rest of the world' (Tilly, 1975, p. 622).

In contrast, Gramsci tackles the question of "how to reconstruct the state apparatus of the ruling group, an apparatus which disintegrated as a result of war?" (Gramsci, 2006, p. 71). According to Gramsci, civil society is very important in this phase. Mainly in advanced countries, civil society resists the impositions of economy and the structure (Gramsci, 2006, p. 74). Thus it is a structure that resists and improves the state. The state, on the other hand, aims always to reinforce the support among society of the ruling classes:

> every State is ethical in as much as one of its most important functions is to raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level, a level (or type) which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development, and hence to the interests of the ruling classes (Gramsci, 2006, p. 78).

A political and cultural hegemony is maintained through education in schools, by courts as well as private initiatives and activities. Most importantly, "[t]he State does have and request consent, but it also 'educates' this consent, by means of the political and syndical associations; these, however, are private organisms, left to the private initiative of the ruling class" (Gramsci, 2006, p. 78). Gramsci argues further that the legislature, judiciary and executive are part of the hegemony to 'different degrees' (Gramsci, 2006, p. 77). State and civil society ex-

tend to each other's terrains and civil society can revitalize the state including the economic domain to a certain amount in the reconstruction period after war.

Tilly's analysis of state formation in Europe shed light on the shortcomings of state making, pointing out the possible limitations on exporting the European model to the rest of the world. Firstly, identifying the general conditions that contributed to European state making and the transformation of territories into nations, Tilly put down the following list:

> (1) the availability of extractable resources; (2) a relatively protected position in time and space; (3) a continuous supply of political entrepreneurs; (4) success in war; (5) homogeneity (initial or created) of the subject population; (6) strong coalitions of the central power with major segments of the landed elite; (7) the high cost of state-building; (8) the intimate connection between the conduct of war, the building of armies, the extension and regularization of taxes and the growth of the state apparatus; (9) the large role of alternating coalitions between the central power and the major social classes within the subject population in determining the broad forms of government; and (10) the further effect of homogenization –or its absence- on the structure and effectiveness of government (Tilly, 1975, pp. 632–3).

Most importantly, he points out that the European state making experience included the struggle of various groups of people for their own interests against other groups, thus unintentionally promoting the formation of nation states. In Tilly's own words:

> [S]mall groups of power-hungry men fought off numerous rivals and a great popular resistance in the pursuit of their own ends, and inadvertently promoted the formation of national states and widespread popular involvement in them (Tilly, 1975, p. 635).

This process reflects a bottom-up process of state building in the European context that effectively contradicts the current top-bottom state making processes promoted in post conflict states. In addition, Tilly insists that political rights were curtailed as the formation of national states went along (Tilly, 1975, p. 613). Ordinary people resisted to the state power (Tilly, 1975, p. 613). There were constant changes in every section undergoing political transformation (Tilly, 1975, p. 613). In sum, the state making period abounds with failures, bloodshed and suppression of political rights:

> immense conflict, uncertainty, and failure […] attended the building of national states everywhere in Europe (Tilly, 1975, p. 610). We see a widespread suppression of political rights and participation by the state-makers, we see recurrent crises of authority (both public and private) from the early days of state-making, frequently as a direct consequence of state-making (Tilly, 1975, p. 625).

Thus, crises in new, still forming states are predicted to be more dangerous, the known example being European countries, which went through severe crises during state making. As a result only few of them survived until today. Similarly, Verba argues that it took a long time to Western states to solve the problems of identity, legitimacy, participation and distribution, while new national states are expected to do it in a much shorter time span (Verba in Tilly, 1975, p. 611). This, in turn, shows that conflict and instability are part of state making which

is also experienced in developing countries. At the same time, however, it raises the question whether there has been any progress informed by the European experience before the 20th century. The relapse of developing countries into conflict needs also to be assessed in the light of the potential and the threats posed by that technology and other innovations have brought in the 20th and 21st century.

Furthermore, it has been argued that the powerful and participatory state came into existence as the Industrial Revolution and growing national markets had undermined traditional authorities in private sphere, creating demands for more political rights and equality. State makers, the governing elites at the time, had concentrated the authority in the public sphere but had left the private sphere almost unchanged (Benedix in Tilly, 1975, p. 625). Tilly acknowledges the convenient long-term effects of financing states armies, cities and policing (Tilly, 1975, p. 611). He notes that the state progress depended on the "coalitions of classes involved in modernization which eventually turn out to be crucial" (Tilly, 1975, p. 631).

Tilly also took into account external factors influencing state building. He points out the significance of alliances, the standing of a state in international forums, and the influence of 'changing international structure of power' (Tilly, 1975, p. 625). From the European experience, the governments' strength, durability, effectiveness, and responsiveness was only weakly related to each other, slightly depending on wealth and complexity of population and "more strongly affected by the class coalitions, past and present, supporting a particular state's government, and by the relationship of that state to the whole system of states" (Tilly, 1975, p. 613). Furthermore, state formation is influenced by interest groups which benefit certain clients that might be either international or local:

> The simultaneous development of a nationwide authority, a corps of public officials formally insulated from "extraneous" influences, and the plebiscitarian tendencies in the political realm are accompanied by the development of functionally defined, organized interests. The efforts of public officials to obtain support, information and guidance from the relevant "publics" are matched point for point by the efforts of organized interests to influence government actions so as to benefit their members or clients (Benedix in Tilly, 1975, p. 624).

According to Tilly, the general conclusion was that the state was an 'unintended outcome' that resulted from 'coercion and extraction' (Tilly, 1975, p. 634).

Tilly also takes into account the models created by Lucian Pye, Gabriel Almond and others of 'crises of political development' which deal with crises, problems or challenges experienced by entities during the political development along with institutional solutions. They list the challenges and institutional solutions, including: (i) *penetration*, referring to the creation of administration (tax, manpower), public order, infrastructure, emergency action and defense; (ii) *integration*, referring to the creation of rules on the equal division of offices, benefits resources among different political and cultural sectors; (iii) *participation*, including voting for

groups of population and protection of opposition, (iv) *identity* referring to the creation of media, schools, as well as 'rituals and symbols (myths, flags, songs)', (v) *legitimacy,* referring to the establishment of confidence in - and loyalty to - political institutions and of the compliance with rules; and (vi) *distribution*, meaning the creation of social services and measures, 'income equality equalization through progressive taxation and transfers between poorer and richer localities' (Rokkan in Tilly, 1975, pp. 608–609). The model covers elements essential to understanding the different political problems and how they affect state making. The theory also reveals that the 'more rapidly and simultaneously' the challenges occur, the higher 'the likelihood of intense conflict, breakdown and disintegration' (Tilly, 1975, p. 609). Tilly concludes against this background that European states have more political experience, and thus less conflict, when compared to developing world countries. The main consequence is that conflict in developing countries is part of a normal evolution of state making, as has become clear in European history.

Considering the limitations at that time, Tilly thus argued that a new theory of state making must: (1) include 'a particular kind of unit: a territory, a population, a state, a dynasty or something else, but something specific', (2) when treating the political transformation, the unit of analysis must relate internal changes to changes in its relationship with the 'rest of the world', (3) experiences in the unit must be explicit, advanced in 'open-ended and prospective fashion' and (4) move away from enlisting the conditions under which stable democracies emerge 'toward the task of specifying what paths away from, say, traditional kingship are likely and what affects the probabilities that one or another of these paths will actually be followed' (Tilly, 1975, p. 635). He also calls for a theory that has 'more room for expansion, domination, conflict and destruction' for analysing contemporary state making. Furthermore, he concluded that European state making offered two more explanations '(1) the diffusion of a certain pattern of government among the richer countries of the world; and (2) the imposition of that standard pattern of government on the rest of the world by richer powers." (Tilly, 1975, p. 613) Lastly, by focusing on single national states and on the decisions within the reach of its mangers, meaning governing elites, a lack of attention has been paid to the analysis of the national and international structures of power, the view from below, and the paths to alternatives that managers do not desire (Tilly, 1975, pp. 620–621). The current research seeks to take in greater account these aspects, insofar as they emerge from the grounded theory analysis.

Finally, his analysis show that the European historical state formation experience can assist in understanding the two main processes involved in the formation of new states, namely 'center-to-periphery and external-creation processes' (Tilly, 1975, p. 636). The first one refers to the expansive process to territories, populations, goods and activities until the points where territories are claimed by other strong centers or 'the costs of communication and control ex-

ceeded the returns from the periphery' (Tilly, 1975, p. 636). The second process points to the 'more or less deliberate *creation* of new states by existing states' (Tilly, 1975, p. 636), as for example in the aftermath of the dissolutions of federations like Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, Napoleon's creation of the Batavian Republic or the unification of Italy and Germany in the 19th century. In addition, the collaboration and acceptance of other states in the international system was important, even for the cases of Netherlands and Portugal, created by rebellion. Tilly observed these two points reinforced a movement 'toward a worldwide state system' (Tilly, 1975, p. 637). Systematically he identified the following events contributing to state making processes worldwide:

> the formation of few early national states in Europe amid a great variety of other political structures in Europe; (2) the mapping of most of Europe into distinct national states through wars, alliances and other maneuvers; [as in Italy] (3) the extension of political and economic domination from that European base to much of the rest of the world, notably through the creation of client states and colonies; (4) the formation– through rebellion and through international agreement– of formally autonomous states corresponding approximately to the clients and colonies; [as in Congo] (5) the extension of this state system to the entire world (Tilly, 1975, p. 637).

In addition, he argues that the formation of new states is 'a matter of convenience' (Tilly, 1975, p. 637). Europeans played a vital role in creating 'contemporary international state-system' and imposed the structure 'of their peculiar political institutions' (Tilly, 1975, p. 638). Those states that maintain European form of governance access the international system more easily. In light of the current research, this can serve as a point to identify whether new processes have been developed in the last periods.

Despite the ascendance of state making, he concludes that he was perhaps writing obituaries for the state. On one hand, he points out that the national state is decreasing its power towards regional fora's, potential of superstates like Europe or US, subnational regions, ethnic or racial groups. On the other hand, the strength of the divisions between these groups and the state might as well maintain the state. Thus strengthening the resistance of these groups might have an unintended result of strengthening the state as well. In addition, economic elements influence the formation of states, such as for instance Europe (though the federal European state is currently only a theoretical construct). The state will lose its significance if it remains "as an organization, controlling the principal means of coercion within a given territory, which is differentiated from other organizations operation in the same territory, autonomous, centralized and formally coordinated" (Tilly, 1975, p. 638). He concludes that the nation state might have been significant evolution in 18th and 19th century, but in the 20th century it might lose its significance, especially if assessed against its traditional definition including "the monopoly of coercion, the exclusiveness of control within the territory, the autonomy, the centralization, the formal coordination; even the differentiation from other organizations begins

to fall away in such compacts as the European Common Market". Thus Tilly states that the state is losing its 'universal significance' (Tilly, 1975, p. 638).

There are many critics of the idea of the territorial state. The first challenges lie with power and its necessity. Power places more importance on territory rather than community that resides, and it is problematic since the territory is scarce and cannot be expanded, hence it will be constantly re-divided (P. Anderson, 1974, p. 31). Thus the process of state making or the territorial state might have negative effects on long run on wellbeing and existence of the population in general or selectively, the ones under attack for territorial disputes. This occurs since the states are not likely to give up territory without struggle (Elden, 2009, p. 2012). At the moment, negotiations of territorial boundaries are ongoing in many parts of the world like Asia, Balkans and there are ongoing territorial wars in Middle East and Africa. In addition, the ideological wars on Islam and global terror are weakening and destroying some states.

Furthermore, there are challenges to the state identified by the liberal theory, which places significance on global governance and international institutions, which challenge the internal sovereignty of the state. When states join the international institutions, they do cease some of their rights to these institutions. For instance, the European Union members have extended part of their trade and development rights to the supranational European level. Negotiated are currently taking place on the possibility of a common foreign and defense platform. Similarly, states upon joining the World Bank (WB) or World Trade Organization (WTO) cease national rights on trade and apply WTO trade rules. Clearly the state system faces many challenges as Tilly predicted, even though its obituaries still have not been written. This calls for caution when new states are attempted to be build externally in developing world, if the significance of the state has declined. The present complex world system requires consequently perhaps a rethinking of the state system.

Liberal Statebuilding

Liberal Democracy and Market Economy

The eventual result of the state formation phase was that the state became the central unit of the world system. Even today, the state is still being promoted despite the fact that the process of establishment has proven to be conflictual and violent and that its aftermath is followed by violations of political rights, sometimes lasting for decades. But despite its negative repercussions during formation, the solution to problems in fragile zones is 'state building', which is seen as central to creating a sustainable peace.

To provide a basic definition, the modern state is an 'expression of power' consisting of 'institutions that provide certain functions and services' (Greener, 2012, p. 418). According to Greener, the most elementary components of contemporary states are that they

> are predominantly legal entities based on fixed territorial boundaries that emerge out of some sort of political settlement, claim some sort of legitimacy domestically and internationally, and include a political executive and separate, permanent and professional administrative structures to implement policy (Greener, 2012, p. 418).

Greener describes that there are two perspectives on the outcome of the state building process, an 'optimistic' one (in the sense that conflict will pass) and a 'pejorative' (though conflict is over not everything is well) (Greener, 2012, p. 418). In fact, it is also very difficult to conceptualize when conflict ends and when state and peace building efforts starts. Nowadays, rebuilding or building states involves a diverse set of tasks, both of political and technical nature.

Recent understandings of state building vary consequently, with the notion having become very wide. Usually, it is characterized by a common terminology including peace building, nation building, reconstruction, transition, international stabilization force, international administrations and other terms. Krause groups all these efforts under the general term "international state building and reconstruction efforts" (Krause, 2010, p. 157). He uses this term to describe the "efforts of international community of state and non-state actors towards building a state in a given society where state structures have been severely destroyed or compromised and where the political institutions, society and economy have to be re-constructed or constructed anew" (Krause, 2010, p. 157). Similarly, Call refers to contemporary state building as:

> actions undertaken by international or national actors to establish, reform, or strengthen the institutions of the state and their relation to society (which may or may not contribute to peace building) (Call, 2008b, p. 5).

Other academics understand state building in terms of institutional capacity building, following a Weberian model that sees the process as "constructing or reconstructing institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security" (Chandler, 2006, p.1). The concept includes a state that is capable of providing security, collecting revenues and managing expenditures (Call & Wyeth, 2008, p. 8). In this context, the institutionalization of the organizations is important for their survival, establishing prescribed roles and managed expectations (Call & Wyeth, 2008, p. 8). As a consequence, "sustainability does not depend on any single individual but on a shared commitment to the principles, procedures and goals of the institution" (Call & Wyeth, 2008, p. 8).

Currently existing fragile states like Somalia, Afghanistan, East Timor are usually characterized by the collapse of the institutional infrastructure (Fukuyama, 2006, pp. 3–4). Therefore Fukuyama, in turn, prescribes a model of state building emphasizing the creation of political and economic institutions based on the principles of democracy and free market, which are the necessary components of nation building (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 3). The means used for the promotion of new political institutions and economic development are aid and other means.

According to him, nation building[2] aims to 'construct a new political order in a land of new settlement without deeply rooted peoples, cultures, and traditions' (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 3). Fukuyama's model highlights in this context on the notions of *scope* - 'the different functions and goals taken on by governments' - and *strength* - 'the ability of states to plan and execute policies and to enforce laws cleanly and transparently' (Fukuyama, 2005, p. 9). Together, these are the requirements for states to run successfully from an institutional approach. This focus on state capacity in neoliberal institutionalism has also been reflected in current state building practice (Hameiri, 2010, p. 17). [3] Strength includes furthermore the ability to administer efficiently and with a minimum of bureaucracy, control corruption, and bribery, maintain a high level of transparency and accountability in government institutions (Fukuyama, 2005, p. 9). According to Fukuyama, the optimal set up for an effective state is a combination of a limited scope of state functions and strong effectiveness (Fukuyama, 2005, p. 10). The strength of state institutions is therefore generally more important than the scope of state functions (Fukuyama, 2004, p. 19). A good state institution is one that transparently and efficiently serves the needs of its clients, that is, the citizens of the state (Fukuyama, 2005, p. 26). According to Fukuyama, outside powers can negotiate and enforce ceasefire agreements. For instance, Britain created India (Fukuyama, 2006). Then the examples of post war reconstruction of Germany and Japan are provided. However the two latter states had the institutional framework on place thus occupiers did not do much work. Furthermore the transition from the past was gradual, in both cases only the top layer of officials involved with the former regime were purged, in Germany many returned into the institutional framework and similarly the Emperor stayed in Japan. However the occupying powers managed to establish democratic infrastructures with constitution making and economic reconstruction (Fukuyama, 2006).

Another aspect that plays a significant role is the design of the state, meaning the arrangement and allocation of state powers (Call, 2008b, p. 9). Since state building is aimed almost exclusively to the creation of liberal democratic political system, it is important to consider the separation of power between the legislative, the executive and the judicial branches as well as the differences between parliamentary and presidential models on the one hand, and unitary and federal types on the other.

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[2] To clarify, the American notion of nation building refers to the processes described here under the heading of state building, which is more commonly used in Europe to describe institutional and political reform. In the current research when Fukuyama is being referred to, what is at stake is essentially state building in the sense addressed in this dissertation.

[3] Call points out that 'state capacity is not simply service delivery but institutionalization of its various organizations' He adopts Keohane's definition of institutions as 'the process by which a cluster of activities acquires a persistent set of rules that constrain activity, shape expectations, and prescribe roles of actors' (Call, 2008b, p. 8).

How do all these different conceptions work out in practice? Robinson argues that "a series of changes in international politics – globalization, the end of the Cold War, changes in developmental discourse, alongside with the existence of a larger array of weak states since decolonialization – have created a dangerous situation in which the state building agenda has become *universalized* (Robinson, 2007, p. 11). In fact, the quest for such a universal solution to state building led to the reinvention of the state in the 1990s. The state became an infrastructural power functioning as 'a vehicle for controlling' processes related to economic growth (Robinson, 2007, p. 11). The consequence was that "development was market centered and [that] the state was to achieve its ends through 'good governance' rather than bureaucratic direction' (Robinson, 2007, p. 11). In other words, the framework has sought to promote not only (and actually to a lesser extent) the Weberian element of monopoly of force in a territory, but rather to assist in the establishment of markets.

According to the liberal theorists, the state is the ideal form of political organization as it can provide peace, security and development in the international system. State building should be therefore pursued actively in the future, to decrease the number of failed states which, by providing territorial spaces for criminals and terrorist, constitute a threat to international security (Greener, 2012, p. 417). To achieve this, the current liberal model of state building prescribes activities promoting "good governance, democracy, states and markets simultaneously" (Robinson, 2007, p. 14). Greener suggests that it "tries to embed certain Western or liberal democratic characteristics such as market economies, individual rights, political representation and the rule of law" (Greener, 2012, p. 420). This consensus among the liberal peace theorists about the two main processes, democratic governance and market oriented economy, is strong despite the fact that there are many contentious issues even within the theory (Paris, 2010, p. 337). Critical theorists similarly argue that liberal peace promotes essentially 'liberal democracy and market economy' (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p. 221).

All in all, state building is widely held to be one of the most pressing policy questions facing the international community. Call stresses that sustainable state building depends on whether institutional commitments are shared and whether the collective identities of the rebuilt states have been accommodated through state building. Fukuyama on the other hand emphasizes more institutional capacity and scope, while yet other academics focus on the promotion of norms and values abroad.

A more practical than theoretical contribution has been made by the Brahimi report which refers to state building as the effort of 'building effective systems and institutions of government' (Brahimi, 2007, p. 5). According to this UN report, it consists of a set of activities including constitution-making, the setting up of electoral processes and the rule of law, the achievement of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), and national reconciliation (Brahimi, 2007, p. 4). Contemporary state building consist thus of 'technical' activities

of the (re)building of democracy (constitution, electoral processes & offices of state), the rule of law (security and justice), reconciliation and economic system (taxation, etc) (Greener, 2012, p. 418). These activities aim to ensure sustainability and stability in the long term (Brahimi, 2007, p. 4). More recently, neoliberal state building has been applied focusing on two main premises, namely security and capital, for regional security and order. Since the state building notion is a complex notion and not easily definable, it is used in this dissertation to refer to the reconstruction of failed or weak states after war and under the auspices of the international community, that is, international organizations or coalitions of states. We now turn to the local ownership debate that focuses on the delicate balance between international and local governance in fragile states, degrees of international and local inclusion and the duration of internationals involvement. This is mainly due to the fact that state building has so far been described as oscillating

> between imposition of international preferences on the one hand, where decisions are appropriated and prescribed, and neglect on the other, where ambassadors and representatives merely observe and report, while venal government officials and rulers systematically destroy institutions. (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008, p. 8)

Reconstruction and Development through 'Local Ownership'

As explained so far, nation building contains four components or phases, namely peace enforcement, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction and long-term economic and political development. The first two components take priority, as they are the necessary conditions for the stabilization of the situation, which is a prerequisite for the other two. However, they are very distinct processes. Peacekeeping refers to intervening in a post-conflict situation when a ceasefire has already been agreed upon, with troop presence serving a symbolic and deterrent effect. In contrast, peace enforcement refers to military interventions against a party in order to end a conflict. In Kosovo, peace enforcement was undertaken at the initiative of NATO, which took the side of the Kosovo Albanians against the Serbian forces, ending the conflict with the Kumanovo Agreement. After Kumanovo, the peacekeeping stage began with the deployment of the UN interim administration mission, UNMIK, and the NATO peace support mission, KFOR. The goal of both peacekeeping missions seem to have been achieved, with the exception of the March 2004 riots. For more than 15 years, KFOR has succeeded in maintaining a good deterrent effect, except during this one incident.

The latter two stages, post conflict reconstruction and economic and political development are conceptually different (Fukuyama, 2006, pp. 232–234). Reconstruction refers to "restoration of war-torn or damaged societies to their pre conflict situation" (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 5). It thereby involves international actors to perform 'functions [such] as providing health care, security, financial services, infrastructure rebuilding, and humanitarian assistance"

(Fukuyama, 2006, p. 234). Fukuyama describes the conditions when reconstruction would likely be successful:

> Reconstruction is possible when the underlying political and social infrastructure has survived conflict or crisis; the problem is then the relatively simple matter of injecting sufficient resources to jumpstart the process, in the form of supplying food, roads, buildings, infrastructure, and the like (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 5).

On the other hand development is much more complex than reconstruction, referring to the "creation of new institutions and the promotion of sustained economic growth, events that transform the society open-endedly into something that it has not been previously" (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 5). In the past, economic planning (through 'technical training') and aid (through infrastructure and industrialization projects) were part of the standard packages for post conflict countries. The drawback of this approach was that the lack of legitimacy of the democratic government was ignored. As a result, donors were implicated in human rights abuses and the international community often failed to prevent relapse to war and violence, as for instance in Iraq (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 5). In addition, the development approach in 1950s and 60s provided solutions based on developed world despite that on the ground resources lacked. It was hoped that the lack of resources would simply be compensated by investment capital. This approach failing, the focus then shifted towards 'education, population control, debt relief, and structural adjustment' (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 6). In addition, with economic liberalism being promoted by the Reagan and Thatcher administrations in 1980s and 90s, there was a further reorientation towards the free market, deregulation, tax decrease, and privatization. According to Fukuyama, both of the approaches did not provide good solutions.

At the beginning of the 21ˢᵗ century, the focus shifted once again, this time to 'institutions and governance' but there is still a lack of knowledge on how to build institutions in the developing world (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 6). The idea of development implies that these political and economic institutions will be self-sustaining after the withdrawal of the external actors. Development is thus thought to be a process that demands "local ownership in the long run" (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 234), requiring external actors to envisage a viable 'exit strategy' and thus the "eventual weaning of local actors and institutions from dependence on outside aid" (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 7).

The complex interaction between locals and internationals is very significant for successful reconstruction and development. According to Fukuyama, both of the development strategies seem to have failed to create growth, especially in states with weak institutions and where local elites are 'uninterested or incapable in managing the development process themselves" (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 6). The other problem is that "the outside nation-builders get into the habit of ruling and making decisions, [that] and they are reluctant to allow their local protégés to make their own mistakes" (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 7). In addition, they 'lack clarity about

their own impact on local populations' (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 7). While being a very important process, an overly lengthy reconstruction can also be counterproductive as it

> can actually impede long-term development, because involvement by the international community can breed dependence and weaken local institutions. (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 234)

This is mainly due to the fact that a large amount of international actors, including militaries, aid organizations, and NGOs first take the driving seat in these processes due to the lack of local resources in the aftermath of war. This in turn impedes local capacity building since "what little capacity exists is undermined by the presence of foreigners richly endowed with both resources and capabilities" (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 7). In short, international stakeholders are constantly faced with challenges such as "weak institutions" or "uninterested" or "incapable" locals. At the same time, their involvement over a long period of time seem to produce a reluctance to hand in the decision making powers to locals, thus further weakening local institutions, producing dependence and undermining local capacities. The impact therefore is of course that it hinders long-term development, which then results in a long-term involvement of the international community. This vicious cycle sustains underdevelopment.

The distinction between development and reconstruction is often not very sharp since both processes are required in the aftermath of war. The main dilemmas are their balancing, timely support and the eventual exit. Bosnia is one example of unsuccessful development, as the international High Commissioner took over the governance functions, bringing about an international dependency instead of local independence. In addition, the internationals have lacked an exit strategy even though it was clear that the country might relapse to war if international actors exit (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 7). In practice, exiting can mean that certain government functions will not be immediately available for the population (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 7). For instance, with the exiting of US forces in Iraq, security services provided jointly by internationals and locals stopped as the locals were insufficiently prepared to provide them alone. The lack of development of local security capabilities in Iraq resulted in international, and more particularly US dependence. The latest failure of the US exit strategy is also reflected in the fact that Iraqi forces failed to defend the territory and provide security for their citizens as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) took control over substantive parts of the of the territory, essentially prompting the third intervention in Iraq (although the recent one is carried out only through air attacks). The early US exit undermined arguably all the state building efforts since it created a space for a new violent transnational group to take over and destroy what was already rebuilt. In terms of the state building stages in Iraq, peace enforcement has been successful for a short term, but failed again when a new armed group emerged. Development was of course also affected, and the reconstruction of the state to the situations before the intervention has not been achieved.

From Good Governance to Resilience

One of the main agenda points of development is good governance, which over time shifted from 'being a selection criterion into an overarching objective of development cooperation activities' (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 14). Similarly, Chandler argues that international actors have a "goal of developing and exporting frameworks of good governance" (Chandler, 2010a, p. 1). This occurs during the international state building which is a paradigm "through which the world is understood and engaged" and which is full of discourses and policy practices (Chandler, 2010a, p. 9). The promotion of good governance in post-conflict countries, meaning to establish a government that is responsible and transparent towards its citizens, as well as private and international organization, is hereby one of the most significant elements. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), for instance, supports "promoting good governance in all its aspects, including by ensuring the rule of law, improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling corruption, as essential elements of a framework within which economies can prosper" (Camdessus, 1996).

The reduction of corruption is important as it undermines public trust in the government and hinders economic growth in the long term. The United Nations Development Programme provides a more comprehensive view by pointing out five principles of good governance:

Legitimacy and voice	Participation and consensus orientation
Direction	Strategic vision
Performance	Responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency
Accountability	Accountability and transparency
Fairness	Equity and rule of law

Table 1. Good Governance Principles (ESCAP, 2013)

Currently, human rights and civil society participation are not part of these principles, even though they were during the late 1990s (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, pp. 13–14). Good governance includes two main aspects, respectively the 'management of rules governing human behaviour and decisions' (rules and enforcement mechanisms) and secondly 'exercise of power' and its legitimacy (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 10). Thus the following elements are also measured when analysing good governance: the separation of powers, institutional checks and balances, representative public policy making, rule of law, oversight and control of institutions (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 11).

For example, the IMF argues that these principles need to derive from the institutions themselves since "integrity starts at home", meaning internally in the institutions (IMF, 2013). Therefore these principles should as well be implemented from these institutions. IMF de-

mands transparency from the borrowing banks and governments through mechanisms of oversight, internal control and auditing. Internally, IMF established a Code of Conduct for the Staff and the Members of the Executive Board, an Integrity Hotline to protect the whistle-blowers and an Ethics Office. Similarly, other international organizations have started to develop such transparency mechanisms, even if limited in scope.

Overall, reforms 'cannot progress without addressing existing inequities', thus 'equity and legitimacy' are central to the reform process (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 10). In addition, democratic deficits, social inequities and equality should be addressed. Ernstorfer and Stockmayer argue that 'strategies, even if they are technically sound, will not be effective in the long run if they do not respect the rights of those affected, the interests of stakeholders or the legitimacy of institutions' (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 10). One of the main criticisms of good governance that need to be addressed are that they are 'too ideological' and Western while ignoring the cultural context. In addition, donors themselves might not be upholding the same standards they impose on developing countries. Moreover, the concept is at times regarded as too technocratic and scientific, ignoring 'political considerations of local economic, social and cultural politics' (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 15). In trying to be comprehensive, they then often overburden the system. Thirdly, institutional or legal transplants from the developed world to countries under reconstruction have often not been successful, hence there has been a call to 'return to basics' (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 15), though even this call needs to be assessed against today's circumstances. Ernstorfer & Stockmayer (2009, p. 17) argue also that governance needs to take into account the political, not only technical dimensions. However, they remain pessimistic about the future of good governance activities since

> the conditions needed to turn these choices into strategies and finally into action are lacking: beneficiaries' voices are weak, those in a position to wield power and influence are unlikely to share it, and processes which would increase leverage and/or promote collective actions are unknown or untried (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 22)

One among other suggestions on how to improve good governance is to develop capacity of individuals, groups, and organizations so that they can conduct their affairs sustainably (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 16). Capacities, however, are held not to be delivered and neither to be built, but to be 'acquired' over a long time. They are implemented through training personnel and restructuring institutions. Now initiatives shifted to 'technical cooperation', referring to development of individual and institutional capacities in the political context. The cooperation is based on norms and values such as 'democratic order, the rule of law, human rights, a free market economy, social justice, transparency, accountability and participation' (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 20). In order to increase the likelihood of success, each capacity development project should take into account participation and ownership, the role

of mediator, flexible mandates of technical cooperation, a holistic approach and realistic expectations about outcomes including failure (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 18). Success generally depends on the degree to which the international community succeeds to oversee reforms, bridge shortages, propose new reform strategies, fosters commitment to change, and identifies and mobilizes reform actors (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 18).

In enhancing the good governance projects, donors face mainly two main challenges. Initially, the results of the program need to be formulated together, but planning is often of limited use since some developments cannot be foreseen, especially political changes in a country. Similarly, the objectives of the reform processes need to be formulated at the beginning, but in practice there is a need to renegotiate these aspects constantly, together with indicators and methods of measurement. This procedure allows emerging themes to be captured in running projects. Furthermore, when incentives are created by the international community, they need to take into account the elements such as rent seeking and patronage, state capture and corruption, responsibility and accountability, responsiveness and political agency (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 19). It has also been suggested to employ multi-level approaches, multi-stakeholder alliances or cross sector donor harmonization (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 20).

Ernstorfer and Stockmayer argue that in the sectors where good governance was promoted, 'process and outcomes were positively affected'. They find specifically in their study that there is a positive result when capacity development has been employed for good governance. However, they argue that this process requires 'consistent strategies' of reforms in the public sector. They suggest to map the landscape and identify reform groups, conduct 'an open-minded actions-oriented investigation' for pro poor, develop conditions for mitigating reform risks, build relationships with local actors, pursue political dialogues and exclude conditionality if the actors resist conditionality. Otherwise, actors will not fulfill the conditions and poverty will remain. Lastly, they note that the time span for reform efforts is long especially when a more equitable distribution of power and resources is envisaged. Changes in the economy require 'permanent adjustments and reorientations of capacities' (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, pp. 28–29). Thus the aim is to support the demand side: civil society must produce information to hold officials accountable and media. At the same time, at the supply side, international actors must have 'a reasonable and transparent agenda […] with expectations that can be achieved' (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 29).

The concept of good governance has been very prominent during the 1990s but has also been subject to criticism (Debiel & Lambach, 2009, p. 22). Chandler for instance claims that international statebuilding is geared towards overcoming institutional blockages, or changing the 'rules of the game', through turning bad governance into good governance (Chandler, 2010a, p. 6). The political processes follow from state building rather than from social dynamics on

the ground that could be the basis for the creation of a locally acceptable state. Chandler is thus against technical approaches based on a good governance agenda in fragile states. Instead, he points out how state building practices constitute highly invasive forms of external regulation (Chandler, 2006, pp. 1–25). State building forms of regulation are in his view, in the context of an 'Empire in Denial', attempts by Western states and international institutions to conceal the power which they wield and to evade accountability for its exercise. Chandler's questions concepts including state building without sovereignty, the governance of government, the ethics of the empire, the West, which is exemplified by EU's involvement in the Eastern Europe, and especially in Bosnia and Kosovo. Those techniques of evasions are also employed under the umbrellas of anti-corruption initiatives and the rule of law notion. Identifying the dilemma of local dependency, Chandler suggests that "international state building approaches insist on regulatory role of international institutions and suggest that locally derived political solutions are likely to be problematic" (Chandler, 2007, p. 71). More concretely, the international community prioritizes the frameworks of good governance over the domestic processes of government, a state that he refers to as 'governance over government'. The main argument is that "political process is a product of state policies rather then constitutive of them" (Chandler, 2007, p. 71). The end goals of state building, democracy and political autonomy, are thus not taken into account during the process itself.

Cunliffe elaborates further on the argument concerning the evasion of responsibility. In terms of international standards and law, the international community tries to create policies that prevent violations of national or international law while excluding the possibility of being held responsible and accountable (see Cunliffe, Chandler and Pupavac). Firstly, immunities and privileges are offered by international law to protect international organizations and their employees. In addition, Cunliffe observes a shift of the quality of state sovereignty after the end of Cold War, meaning from less to more state sovereignty in 21st century. However, the content remains the same during both periods, as the international community tries to exercise "power without responsibility" (Cunliffe, 2007, p. 65). This new interventionism period takes place on the basis of the human rights framework and democratic governance that

> allowed Western states to exercise power on behalf of people to whom they were not accountable – a process that reflected the degradation of human agency (Cunliffe, 2007, p. 65).

Secondly, IOs focus on reacting to urgencies, pursuing crises management rather than promoting viable solutions, thus allowing Western states to exercise power in developing states. But this form requires the international community to avoid the institutionalization of any mechanism of responsibility (Cunliffe, 2007, p. 66). The accountability gap in international organizations has generally been acknowledged, and with it the problems of remedies for locals (Wilde, 2007, 2010). This furthermore reinforces Wilde's argument on the creation of

legitimacy through the forming of administrative missions, which allows them to engage in activities, in this case capacity building, that in their character do not assume any responsibility (Wilde, 2007, 2010). This results, as Robinson argues, in an approach where

> [i]nternational sponsors of state-building projects set the terms and conditions under which their projects are conducted but at the same time undermine the prerequisites of successful state-building and fail to take direct responsibility for their actions (Robinson, 2007, p. 17).

More recently, the international community has moved away from fragility and good governance in statebuilding towards a "resilience" agenda, as already mentioned in the Introduction and as seen in New Deal, the European Report Development 2009, and European Commission strategies since 2012 (IDPS, 2013; Pospisil & Besancenot, 2014). Chandler argues that this shift

> follows disillusionment with liberal internationalist understandings that Western or international actors could resolve problems of development, democracy and peace through the export of liberal institutions (Chandler, 2013, p. 276).

Essentially, the role of resilience is a sort "of apologia for the limits of international intervention, ideologically reifying the limits to transformation as internal products of the societies being intervened upon" (Chandler, 2013, p. 284). Chandler argues that local vulnerabilities and agency serve as a ground for evading responsibility of international stakeholders when engaging in state building. In addition, resilience plays an ideological role "in the rationalisation and legitimisation of a broad range of external policy interventions in the societal sphere, which at the same time offers an understanding of the limits to policy success or to societal transformation" (Chandler, 2013, p. 284). In short, the failures of state building led according to this view to the invention of resilience as a response to critiques of its liberal assumptions. Due to the emerging concentration on resilience,

> societal practices and the 'everyday' have become a focal point of international intervention and legitimised on the basis of a relational understanding of the embedded subject (Chandler, 2013, p. 284)

The interesting point is that the bottom-up production of problems and solutions fits to both the 'neoliberal understandings of the problem of rational agency and with radical or critical approaches to the liberal subject and liberal peace understandings' (Chandler, 2013, p. 284). Within the agenda of resilience, bottom-up considerations have a higher likelihood of having a transformative effect. Still, Chandler argues that it is

> problematic in that it remains entirely within the world of superficial appearances and ideologically erases structural constraints and power relations from the picture (Chandler, 2013, p. 284).

There are not many cases where the resilience agenda to development has been applied in practice. For instance, in assessing the European Union development cooperation in South Sudan, despite the inclusion of resilience in general European guidelines and strategies, in

practice, its implementation in country strategies and programs is problematic since explicit references to resilience are lacking (Pospisil & Besancenot, 2014).

In addition, there has been a change of wording of the United Nations missions in post-conflict areas lately. The naming of the missions changed compared from the 'Interim Administration Mission', UNMIK, as it was established in Kosovo in 1999, to a 'Support Mission' in Libya (UNSMIL), as established in 2014. In Libya, the UN deployed a mission complementary with national ownership to support the transition to democracy, promote the rule of law and human rights, and build the security sector and governance capabilities (UNSMIL, 2014). However, the tasks of both missions are quite similar. It thus remains to be seen whether the different name also signals a true change in post-conflict reconstruction practices or whether it represents a new form of evading responsibility, this time through changing the name of the missions. In conclusion, resilience offers a new concept that moves away from good governance, but it serves to a large extent the same purpose of legitimising external interventions by placing the subjects on the forefront of state building, thus sustaining a lack of responsibility and accountability. In the current case study of Kosovo, based on 61 interviews, none of international or local participants have directly referred to the notion. This illustrates that the policy changes are still not being implemented on the ground, which however also puts into doubt Chandler's argument about it being used to cover hegemonic power relations by internationals in their everyday work.

Liberal Critique

The supporters of liberal statebuilding have been criticized from both the problem solving approach (that is, a positivist perspective) and from critical approaches. The following section summarizes the liberal positivist critique, whereas the next chapter will outline in depth the post liberal critiques. Firstly, they acknowledge its limitations, stating that some of its models have been 'difficult' and 'unpredictable' and that in some cases they produced 'destabilising side effects' (Paris, 2010, p. 337). For instance, Paris, even though himself a proponent, recognizes some of the limitations of liberal state building, conceding that state building can be in some cases

> a form of Western or liberal imperialism that seeks to exploit or subjugate the societies hosting the missions…[and that] post-conflict operations of the past two decades have done more harm than good (Paris, 2010, p. 338)

The problem-solving approaches have given the following solutions to the challenges to current liberal state building. Fukuyama, a liberal theorist, takes an approach that is more of a 'lessons learnt' type, looking into what went wrong and suggesting concrete improvements to successive state building to avoid the same mistakes (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 14). First, he stresses that in the future those involved should be "far more cautious in undertaking such ambitious projects" (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 14). However as fragile states still pose problems to

the international system, powers cannot leave the industry of state building in the future (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 14). He suggests setting the priorities on those sectors of the state that need to be rebuild most urgently at the beginning. By looking at the case study of Iraq, he proposes first to establish security for workers in the fragile zones and then move to the reconstruction of the political authority and the economy.

Of course, coordination, choices of coalitions (ie internationals), and resources are of significance as well (Fukuyama, 2006). Call observes similar gaps, in both theory and practice, in international civilian office capacities, a lack of donors as well as problems of coordination (Call, 2008b, p. 3). In practice, the international community, that is, the international organizations together with the most important states involved in state building processes, identified the inadequacy of institutional structures and construction efforts in post-conflict reconstruction, to which they responded by creating new departments and modifying older ones. The World Bank created a Post Conflict Unit and a Fragile States Unit. The United Nations created a Peacebuilding Commission, a Peacebuilding Fund and a Peace-building Support Office in the UN Secretariat. Moreover, states have taken their individual efforts to establish new departments to deal with these challenges. The issue of coordination between departments in particular has been prominent, for instance in the United States, leading to the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) (Call, 2008b, p. 4).

There has also been a wide criticism about the lack of cooperation between local and international actors and the inability of local actors to establish bilateral relations in the international system. Since it is difficult to adjust to institutional changes quickly, domestic and international structures are likely to cooperate less (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985; Gaubatz, 1996; Leeds, 1999). However, cooperation depends also on partnerships. In a post-conflict context, 'partnerships' are usually unbalanced, meaning that power lies with the international and not with the local actors (Greener, 2012, p. 419). The international community is the interested party, respectively IOs, bilateral donors, NGOs, "who have resources and motivations to shape other states" (Greener, 2012, p. 419). Furthermore, state building is theoretically an endogenous process in which international actors can assist, though "in practice there may be little in the way of shared local interest of capacity in post-conflict situations to drive the process within" (Greener, 2012, p. 419). In consequence, cooperation depends on partnerships that are usually unbalanced and the capacities of the locals.

Another shortcoming of international state building, the lack of exit strategies, and especially late and early exits (ie Afghanistan), is pointed out by Richard Caplan. He suggests to find better exit strategies in order to be successful in state building, not least by preventing local frustration. Caplan stresses in this context the need for a detailed planning of exit strategies during the early phases of interventions (Caplan, 2012).

Finally, Robinson claims that "whatever the problem, democratic statebuilding is the solution… it telescopes state development, democratic development and market development into simultaneous, or near simultaneous, process" (Robinson, 2007, p. 13). However, the simultaneous promotion of these three policies is problematic as it may distort any one of them and overburdens the decision-makers. For instance, democracy building can divert the attention away from markets and vice versa, for instance when elites or democratic majorities are not supportive of promoting market developments or property rights. One suggestion to tackle this dilemma, advocated for instance by Fukuyama, has been to sequence reforms, and this has indeed already occurred in Eastern Europe. Robinson also advocates for sequencing as otherwise states weakness will be perpetuated: "not only does building state, democracy and market at the same time run the risk of one or more of the process corrupting the others, it actually provides incentives for such behavior and hence for the ruination of all and the perpetuation of state weakness" (Robinson, 2007, p. 14).

In addition, public support for state building efforts in foreign countries has declined since the involvement of the international community in Afghanistan and Iraq (Krause & Mallory IV, 2010, p. 12). The willingness of the international community to assist immediately in new post-conflict contexts has also decreased, even though the most recent conflicts in the Middle East may lead to a reorientation. With the rise of ISIS in Middle East, public support for intervention has risen again, as exemplified by 71% of Americans support Obama's airstrikes in Iraq (Balz & Craighill, 2014). Responding generally to the aforementioned problems, Krause and Mallory stress the need

> to set clear directions, understand the context or available resources, produce timely, independent and recurring reviews, and change directions or plans throughout the operation (Krause & Mallory IV, 2010, p. 17)

Liberal Peace building: Democracy and Human Rights

Peace building is often being referred to as a synonym to state building. Indeed, it is one of the significant components of peace building (Goetze & Guzina, 2008, p. 319), as will be shown below. Many definitions and usages of state and peace building exist, as one author states, the relationship between peace building and state building is 'complicated, contingent and context-dependent' (Call, 2008b, p. 3). Peace building mainly refers to actions undertaken by 'international or national actors to consolidate or institutionalize peace' (Call, 2008b, p. 5). It thus aims to end and prevent a relapse to war through interventions, which rebuild institutions and promote national peace and foster the reconciliation between former adversaries. During the pre-conflict phase, peace building focuses on prevention, while during the conflict phase it recourses to military and humanitarian activities. After conflict, the aims and activities lie mainly on strengthening different state functions, which is where there is an overlap with statebuilding (e.g. political legitimacy, security, justice, economy) and reconciliation

agendas (Call, 2008b, p. 5; Goetze & Guzina, 2008, p. 319). But in comparison, peace building prioritizes the reduction of violence and securitization. Policy programs deal mainly security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Furthermore, one can identify initiatives concerning religion, such as inter-faith dialogue, and with gender, seeking to empower women. However, they also work on everyday issues like employment, education and youth.

In order to understand peace building, one must consider the notion of peace. Peace can take both negative and positive forms. Negative peace refers to the 'absence of direct violence' and implies a more or less permanent ceasefire (Call, 2008b, p. 6). Positive peace refers to presence of direct peace (cooperation), structural peace (equity, equality) and culture peace (peace and dialogue), and thus the 'absence of structural violence' which is 'the non-intended slow, but massive suffering by economic, political and cultural structures' (e.g. exploitation) and 'cultural violence that legitimizes direct and/or structural violence' (Galtung, 2007, pp. 30–31). The second one implies therefore the 'eradication of poverty and inequality, accountable governance, democracy, respect for human rights, and a culture of nonviolence' (Call, 2008b, p. 6). Yet, Call suggests to measure peace building more moderately by the lack of recurrence of warfare as well as some sustained, national mechanisms for the resolution of conflict – signified by participatory politics. Participatory politics does not equate to liberal democracy, but refers to mechanisms for aggrieved social groups to feel that they have both a voice and a stake in the national political system (Call, 2008b, pp. 6–7).

This understanding excludes states with stable but authoritarian and illegitimate governments. Building states aims to build peace in the long term. However, this need has been recognized only in the 1990s with failing states, such as the DRC and Haiti. Where a peace process is pursued that is aimed at security reform and human rights protection, strengthening states becomes a prerequisite for sustainable peace. As Call sums up, state building may assist peace building due to its

> complementary relationship' through developing sustainable mechanisms [justice, police or service delivery] for security and conflict resolution at the national level that should carry legitimacy in the eyes of the populace and of the outside world (Call, 2008b, p. 12).

 In this way parties can resolve conflicts institutionally, meaning that state building could 'reduce the incentives to seek basic goods outside established channels or through violence' (Call, 2008b, p. 13). Furthermore, state building is supposed to 'accelerate' the withdrawal of international actors by 'ensuring stability and popular support for an emergent regime' (Call, 2008b, p. 13).

Still, tensions arise between the two processes often even though the end goals seem not conflicting at the first sight. The end goal of state building is to create 'self-sustaining, legitimate, and effective states', which are the cornerstones of peace building, which end goal is 'self-

sustaining peace' (Call, 2008b, p. 13). The tension arises when the programs are implemented in accordance with the ends goals. More concretely, strengthening state institutions may harm peace building despite actors' best intentions in their involvement in post-conflict reconstruction. The harm can be seen on '(1) what externals actors fail to do, (2) what they do, and (3) how they do it' (Call, 2008a, p. 367). As Call observes, 'harm may result from inadequate international efforts, from blind or shortsighted international approaches, or from perversely self-interested international proclivities' (Call, 2008a, p. 367). In order to prevent this, he provides three main principles of 'doing no harm' in post-conflict settings. Firstly, the 'harm of neglect' refers to involvement driven by 'interests' that result in 'insufficient commitment' in terms of money or mandates, especially where such commitment 'could have curbed the behavior of corrupt elites'. The second, 'harm of excessive international presence and prerogatives', describes the 'privileging of short-term solutions over long-term needs' which undermines the strengthening of state institutions and the foundations of sustainable peace. More simply, this harm is caused by doing 'too much'. The last, the 'harm of blind interests' relates to international actors affecting local economy and the host state more generally. These effects are positive on the one hand as the high amount of aid and staff provide markets for products, but on the other hand they also create markets for 'sex industry, aggravate human trafficking, and [they] distort housing, food, and labor markets' (Carnahan et al. Call, 2008a, p. 369). In addition, IOs and donors draw qualified local staff by offering higher salaries, thus leaving the state with fewer capacities.

Among other general problems, international actors show also 'too little awareness of the state in their priorities and programming', channeling aid to beneficiaries and thus undermining the legitimacy of the state, establishing inappropriate rule of law priorities and showing lack of attention to legitimacy questions. In other words, international actors must consider 'the potentially adverse effects of their interventions' (Call, 2008a, pp. 367–370). However, that might be difficult since the international actors 'exhibit self-interested (often self-defeating) behavior, [whereas] national efforts to build state strength often result in exclusion, displacement, and death' (Call, 2008a, p. 385).

In addition, Call finds that there are six tensions between peace building and state building. According to the first tension, international actors must refrain from transferring too many powers too quickly to the new state to avoid sparking of renewed conflict. More specifically, a risk exists that the defeated armed group might resist the new state. One way to do this is to be more creative on finding solutions as to the providence of state functions. For instance, state powers could be substituted temporarily by substate or suprastate entities, including NGOs, IOs or other arrangements that could include the private sector as well.

To avoid the second tension, international actors must be careful to not bypass state institutions. Although it makes sense sometimes, it undermines state building in the end. Preexisting

institutions should not be dismissed as using old staff since they can increase legitimacy as argued earlier. In addition, the international community should prioritize and avoid short-term measures in order to avoid redeployment. The latter depends on how former enemies have redeveloped the relationship. Deployment of troops to keep peace has two implications, keeping peace but also does not contribute to state building and undermines peace building in long term. More practical recommendations are given such as using elections to remove corrupt elites. If elections are not successful, another option is to strengthen the legislature, judiciary and NGOs in the long term as another means of oversight and accountability. Thus Call argues that a balancing act between the first and second tension must be drawn because total transfer and total bypassing are two extremes that ought to be avoided.

The third tension arises between the Weberian system of meritocracy with 'principles of peacemaking – compromise and power sharing – in order for peace to survive the short run and make sustainable statebuilding possible' (Call, 2008b, p. 65). Put more simply, to built trust, the representation of groups susceptible to discrimination must be guaranteed, despite potential shortcomings in competency (ie ex-combatants) (e.g. Bosnia, Palestine). Since patronage and clientalism often prevail, Call suggests the international community to add 'incentives for meritocratic criteria'. However, this suggestion underestimates how these preliminary and 'balanced' state structures can become permanent and thus problematic, causing institutional deadlock, corruption and elevated nationalism, as seen for instance in Bosnia and Kosovo.

The fourth tension is about the security forces. The absence of an inclusive and accountable strengthening of state security forces, so warns Call, are likely to 'foster human rights abuses, political exclusion, state delegitimation, and even war' (Call, 2008a, p. 377). For instance, social group defeated in elections may reignite war or the group in power may become involved in abuses. Hence 'military criminal investigative capacities', 'internal affairs police unit', 'intelligence oversight mechanism' must be strengthened.

The fifth tension relates to the dilemma of peace versus justice and sustainability. As Call states 'appeasing spoilers in the interest of peace, while neglecting the development of a sustainable state, can strengthen the hand of repressive or authoritarian state rulers and jeopardize the sustainability of both the state and peace' (Call, 2008a, p. 378). In many cases, the wish to maintain peace comes at the expense of state performance, including undesirable outcomes such as unaccountability, lack of oversight and corruption [e.g. Arafat's government in Palestine].

Finally, there is the sixth problem that 'transitional mechanisms that help resolve short-term problems for either peace or state capacity can later create difficulties for both' (Call, 2008a, p. 378). More particularly, international transitional administrations 'tend to freeze politics in ways that undermine the sustainability of long-term peace' (Call, 2008a, p. 379). This point

relates to tension number three as well. Exclusion of armed groups may reignite war however its inclusion also diminishes legitimacy over time. Also often civil society may be left excluded due to inclusion and the interests of combatants. Mitigation strategies involve 'incorporation of civil society in peace negotiations and the linking of DDR' programs with 'projects to meet the needs of communities of displaced civilians'. It is also suggested to provide temporary capacity though hiring international actors, or support returned exiles that return only momentarily. In order to prevent lasting damage to the state building efforts, hired temporary capacity can be replaced with national ones especially in areas crucial for the long term development of state (Call, 2008a, pp. 374–379).

State building models do not fit to local contexts however 'state functions [legitimacy, security, economy, and justice] repeatedly prove to be essential to the viability of war-torn states' thus there is an essential link between those two processes (Call, 2008b, p. 13). The state functions are of context based importance as their importance may change depending on state's 'historical conditions' (Call, 2008b, p. 16). According to Call, the state should be understood as 'an arena of competition and sometimes cooperation among self-interested national elites, private actors, nongovernmental organizations, and international donors and organizations' thus as the 'central locus of social conflict', which therefore should not be treated as a platform to implement technical reforms (Call, 2008a, p. 385). In order to build effectively both peace and states, the international community should

> strategize between negotiated deals and their consequences for a sustainable state; between capacity and legitimacy; between urgent short term measures and long term sustainability; international interests and recognition versus national interests and legitimacy; and between the interests of elites, especially combatants and of the population at large (Call, 2008b, p. 3).

Generally, peace agreements should be considered as mid points, not as end goals. Call questions the success of consolidating and keeping the peace through economic neoliberal policies, DDR programs, civil society and UN peacekeeping troops (Call, 2008a, p. 384). He also suggests focusing on coordination of civilian, military and policy instruments while taking into account the legitimacy of international actors rather than focusing only on traditional military approach.

The other important component of peace building is reconciliation. Several approaches are used to facilitate reconciliation, prominently discussed in the transitional justice field. Since transitional justice is very much linked to a legal perspective (McEvoy, 2007), peace is usually promoted through the judicial mechanisms, even though growing attention is also being paid to non-judicial ones. The rationale behind judicial mechanisms is to meet the 'duty to prosecute' individuals that have committed international crimes such as war crimes and crimes against humanity. Such prosecutions can take place either in national courts (including special chambers and local courts) or international ones (e.g. the International Criminal Court

or in *ad hoc* tribunals). The twofold long-term aim is in this context to bring justice to victims and to achieve a deterrent effect, showing that impunity is not an option.

At the same time, the landscape of peace building includes also non-judicial mechanisms such as political apologies, truth and reconciliation commissions and amnesties. Here, promoting reconciliation and peacebuilding is achieved by means other than prosecution of wrongdoers. The first two mechanisms, political apologies and truth and reconciliation commissions, concern the acknowledgment of events and facts, the admission of crimes, and the taking responsibility with a commitment to not repeat these in the future. They may also serve as a sort of reparation for victims (Medjouba, 2012, pp. 1–2). However, amnesties take a different form in absolving the wrongdoers and not holding them accountable for the committed crimes. Amnesties are very common in state building periods (Mallinder, 2008), even if they preclude a debate in the public sphere about the wrongdoings and contradict the rule of law (McAuliffe, 2010). Both international law and research on political practice are ambiguous in their guidance regarding when they are to be issued and effectively used in the state building period (Freeman, 2009). In fact, the contribution of transitional justice mechanisms to peace building is questioned by many as idealistic, lacking the potential to fulfill their stated purpose, and problematic in their implementation.

To resolve the tensions between state building and peace building, Call proposes a model that includes four elements: cognizance, context, sequencing, and patience. The first element refers to 'anticipating the tensions and developing strategies to overcome them'. The second element refers to considering the specificities of the society when deciding upon sequencing and programs. The third refers to sequencing of state building and peace building efforts, that is

> the need to sequence particular activities – such as issuing indictments for war criminals who can spoil the peace, forming a transitional government, ramping up public finance capacity, demobilizing combatants, rewriting the constitutions or foundational laws, holding local or national elections that may begin to mark the end of transitional authorities, reining in patronage-based leadership styles (or leaders) - so that they will not overturn the apple-cart of peace and send factions back to war' (Call, 2008a, p. 386).

There should be an appropriate sequence so that trust, legitimacy and effectiveness grow simultaneously. The last element is patience as peace building takes 'time, resources, hard work and good fortune' (Call, 2008a, p. 386).

To conclude, state building is a political process that creates winners and losers which influence the state design and capacity. To manage the tensions between state building and peace building, it is important 'to balance the twin imperatives of legitimacy and capacity, extending to both national and international institutions and processes' (Call, 2008a, p. 267). In addition, building 'contextualized states' can facilitate peace if it leads to the inclusion of those relevant actors (such as regional organizations, transnational actors and local tribes) that have

taken over either partly or fully some of the state functions. Call sees the optimal role of the rebuilt state as mediator between various actors, being 'a state sufficiently competent and legitimate to authorize, recognize, and regulate the functions of the institutions both below and above the state' (Call, 2008a, p. 371). Thus state building is necessary, but in a different form than currently promoted only in order to avoid sparking of new violence (Call, 2008a, pp. 370–373). Furthermore, special attention must be paid to the reconciliation component of peace building.

To end with a quote from practice, during the concluding ceremony of the New Deal, the Deputy Finance Minister of Afghanistan, Dr. Mustafa Mastoor, summarized the interaction between peace and state building in the following words:

> When international partners bypass our systems this can directly contribute to a continuance of conflict and fragility. Without peace our nations cannot deliver services that our people need to rise from poverty and without building strong state institutions to deliver these services, we cannot maintain peace (G7+, 2011, p. 1).

The Links to Nationbuilding

In many states, old tensions resurface even after conflict for various reasons including ethnicity, religion, race or class. Thus, apart from combining state and peace building to prevent old tensions from arising, one also has to inquire the advantages and disadvantages of promoting nation building in post war contexts.

To start with, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the word 'nation' which seems to be one of the most confusing and 'tendentious' in the political science and is hence not often used (Tilly, 1975, p. 6). Fukuyama conceptualizes nations as constituting "communities of shared values, traditions, and historical memory" (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 3). According to Elden, state and nation refer to different concepts, with the state being a 'political unity' whereas the nation is a 'grouping of people' (Elden, 2009, p. 202). Gellner argues similarly with Fukuyama that an element of a nation is sharing the same culture, meaning 'a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating' (Gellner & Breuilly, 2008, pp. 6–7). However he adds that a second important element is the recognition of 'each other [people] belonging to the same nation' since a nation emerges only 'when the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership of it' (ibid.). In addition, Smith summarizes the characteristics of nation state that legitimate nationalism:

> Nation-states have frontiers, capitals, flags, anthems, passports, currencies, military parades, national museums, embassies and usually a seat at the United Nations. They also have one government for the territory of the nation-state, a single education system, a single economy and occupational system, and usually one set of legal rights for all citizens, though there are exceptions [e.g. citizenship rights for all and sometimes communal rights for special communities]. They also subscribe, tacitly or openly, quietly or vo-

ciferously, to a single ideology which legitimates the whole enterprise - nationalism (A. Smith, 1986, p. 228).

The notion of nation building, of relevance for our purposes, is understood differently by American and European academics. As explained earlier, American scholarship refers more to the process of state building, especially political and economic development, while the European concept denotes the attempts to reshape 'society or citizens' (Call, 2008b, p. 10). Call defines nation building as

> actions undertaken, usually by national actors, to forge a sense of common nationhood (1) to overcome ethnic, sectarian, or communal differences; (2) to counter alternate sources of identity and loyalty; and (3) to mobilize a population behind a parallel statebuilding project (Call, 2008b, p. 5).

Call also stresses that national actors usually carry the process, although in practice one needs to assess whether international actors contribute as well and whether and in what way they should do so.

On the other hand, the UN has assisted in nation building for a long time, beginning with the decolonization mandates (e.g. Namibia, Western Sahara and East Timor) (Stahn, 2008). Stahn points out that some of the measures taken by the international community, international organizations and coalitions, have contributed to nation building (Stahn, 2008). Examples can already be found in the efforts of imperial powers to build nations in their colonies. More recently, international stakeholders have promoted nation building, for instance in Kosovo where UNMIK issued citizenship. In Bosnia, a federation was practically imposed by international community which however failed to achieve its goal of uniting the citizens (Stahn, 2008, pp. 405–406). But referring to the actions and strategy of the UN, Stahn explains that

> the organisation [UN] generally avoided defining its responsibilities in the area of peacemaking in terms of nationbuilding. In some cases (e.g. Kosovo), the UN adopted measures which shaped the identity of a territory under administration (e.g. external representation, citizenship). Such measures were, however, primarily tied to functional goals of administration during the period of transition and not aimed at nationbuilding as such (Stahn, 2008, p. 406).

Nowadays, the circumstances of state building have changed, with many more actors being involved and with states lacking institutional infrastructure. External actors need to search for new means to promote political and economic reconstruction, so they begin to consider shaping the nations together with national actors. So far it has been usually implemented through technical administrative tasks. Another question is, however, whether the international community should engage in nation building.

Call for instance is skeptical of nation building attempts, arguing that identity cannot be manipulated through external programs or interventions. Nation building has in his view lost its credibility since the 1960s, leading him to conclude that "[l]arge-scale programs to redefine a society's allegiances and identities seem silly or self-defeating" (Call, 2008b, p. 11). In con-

trast, Fukuyama argues that nations can be built from outsiders through constitutionalism and democracy (Fukuyama, 2006, pp. 3, 99).

Call argues furthermore that nation building is no longer necessary for successful state building since multinational states have become more common and acceptable in the international world system and among external neighbors (Call, 2008b, p. 11). Essentially, the idea of a single nation state seems to lose relevance in nowadays complex world. Similarly, Smith argues that there is no nation state in the sense that 'the boundaries of the state's territories and those of a homogenous ethnic community are coextensive, and that all the inhabitants of the state posses an identical culture' (A. Smith, 1986, p. 229). In the 20th century, most homogenous nation states were diversified by different nationalities that came to migrate as a reaction to globalization. Hence the 20th century has seen an evolution of state and nation identities, which have been shaped by multiculturalism.

Still, multiethnic states have several shortcomings. Smith recognizes the paradox of nation building. According to him, societies should in theory be homogenous, but in practice states do not need to be as they take many shapes, with the international system of states being satisfied with a kind of 'declaration of intent' to stay unified (A. Smith, 1986, p. 229). The ethnic divisions in such states can be a source of antagonism, especially when the largest group needs to accommodate a smaller group (A. Smith, 1986, p. 229). These divisions can result in violence and war. In conclusion, nation building attempts of international actors seem to have been unsuccessful in many recent cases (for example in Iraq, Somalia, and Kosovo), and it is questionable whether in the post-nation state era of multiethnicity this is achievable in the first place. Even though nation building is problematic for the abovementioned reasons, especially when promoted by international actors, international and local actors still recourse to it when it suits their interests. For instance, the international community promotes nation building, framing it as technical assistance or peace building in fragile states, whereas local actors pursue nation building through nationalist discourses based on ethnicity, religion, race, and economic protectionism.

Nationalism can be regarded as a backlash of a historical equating of state and nation building as one process. This 'Western myopia' is based mostly on the successful cases of England and France, which were later mirrored in Eastern Europe and the Third World. Although as mentioned earlier, Tilly attempted to fight this bias through showing that these "successful" cases of Europe were very violent. According to Smith, the problem is that ethnic homogeneity and institutions lack in these countries, so the western model 'cannot be transplanted' (A. Smith, 1986, p. 230). According to Smith, the model of the single nation state has even in the West not shown the best results. Problems of nationalism 'arise when ethnic homogeneity and cultural coextensiveness become desirable goals themselves' (A. Smith, 1986, p. 230). Even the majority of well-educated citizens 'are committed to nationalism even if only tacitly,

through exclusion and self-differentiation', lacking awareness of viable alternatives of 'culture and political existence'. He concludes therefore that there is 'no possibility of returning to a pre-nationalist era' (A. Smith, 1986, p. 230) and that erasing a process that has been so dominant for many decades is utopian. But if this is not possible, the questions arises how to combine nation and state building. What types of state and nation should be promoted to avoid relapse into war and destructive nationalism? Smith suggests to reconcile nation and state building by building enduring states along the concepts of 'solidarity and unity' (A. Smith, 1986, p. 230). Another proposal based on modernization theory claim that "successful states required a citizenry that identified itself with the state over other ethnic or religious allegiances: in other words, that state building required nation building" (C. Call & Wyeth, 2008, p. 11).

Common ideals about nationalism must be present in post-conflict contexts to serve as glue and to prevail over nationalism based on ethnic or religious differences. Many theories move beyond such nationalism, for instance cosmopolitanism which promotes a 'citizenship of the world', as well as related theories of global polities and regional identity (e.g. European).[4] Moreover, globalization and the rise of information technologies alter national and cultural identities in transnational processes, arguably creating new forms of transnational identities and thus nationbuilding. For instance, the gradual development of a European identity has successfully held together nations that had deep animosities until the middle of the 20th century. Taking into account all these aspects, a starting point could be to promote mild forms of national identity that combine culturally specific identities with cosmopolitanism and modernism, hence as Smith proposes, 'community and solidarity'. However, promoting universal and regional notions has proven to be difficult due to their incomprehesivity and insensitivity to local cultures. In fact, many social groups perceive globalization and universal ideas negatively. In reconstructing national identities, special attention must still be paid to these aspects.

To conclude, it has been argued that state building always implies nation building activities as well (Lemay-Hébert, 2009). After all, both share the same characteristic as being, in the words of Anderson, 'imagined communities' (B. Anderson, 2006). But historically, nation states developed in 18th century, thus much later than states (Elden, 2009, p. 202). There are therefore reasons to assume that the development of national identities will take a longer time than state building. Both state institutions and society shape and define each other, hence it is

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[4] For more on cosmopolitan and global citizenship theories, see Gibernau on local citizenship; '*Defining European Identity and Citizenship*' (Delanty, 1996, 1997); Eyben, R. and S. Ladbury (2006), '*Building effective states: taking a citizens perspective*', Centre for Citizenship, Participation and Accountability; '*Democracy, Citizenship and Global City*' (Isin, 2013) and '*Constructing a Global Polity*' (Corry, 2013).

important to understand what type of reconstruction is being mediated (C. Call & Wyeth, 2008, p. 11). But while state building and nation building are strongly interlinked, literature seems to downplay the significance of this linkage for fragile states. Whereas the contribution of nation building to peace building is unclear, whether or not it may contribute depends on the context (Call, 2008b).

The importance of the relations between the aspects is illustrated by the effects of rising nationalism in Balkans, be it in Bosnia, where a political system based on ethnicity and destructive nationalism produced a weak state and a volatile peace, or in much more mundane everyday events. For instance, during a football match between Serbia and Albania on 14 October 2014 in Belgrade, a mass brawl occurred as a drone with the Greater Albanian flag landed on the pitch. Eventually the game was cancelled, as a secure match environment could not be reestablished. National identities play a crucial role in almost every political, social and economic context, which is why it is indispensable to get a better understanding of the dynamics of nation building when looking at state building and peace building.

Conclusion

To conclude, liberal conceptions of state and peace building focus on the development of state institutions, democratic governance and a market-oriented economy. Table 2 (next page) explains the basic assumptions, critiques and proposed modifications.

This chapter has elaborated on the links between state building, peace building and nation building. State building amounts to the reconstruction of political and economic institutions, which is theoretically important to prevent relapse into armed conflict. The international community in practice encountered many challenges during its implementation, so various possible modifications were put on the table. During state building, the international community has sometimes also been involved in nation building as for instance in Kosovo. The consequences of such a dual strategy remain to be seen. The state building processes may assist peace building even though it was shown that many tensions exist between the two. Most complexities are the result of state building and peace building being implemented simultaneously, where it becomes necessary to carefully balance and negotiate the goals of both. This is necessary in order to do no more harm to already fragile states.Nation building refers to the creation or shaping of national identities based on traits (culture, tradition, religion, language) that distinguish and separate one group from the others. As it is a very complex process, the international community takes in theory a distance from it, even though in practice it is still being implemented, as shown in Kosovo's case. Nation building that promotes nationalism is trying to be avoided. Some universal theories and globalization theory advocate a decrease or eradication of nationalism. Theoretically, at least, national identities that are of a more cosmo-

Liberal Peace	Builds upon liberal peace theory
	Democracy
	Free market
	Rebuilds democracy (constitution, electoral processes & offices of state)
	Rule of law (security and justice)
	Reconciliation
	Economic system (privatization, taxation)
Liberal Peace Problems acknowledged by Liberal Peace Theorists	Difficult
	Unpredictable model
	Destabilizing side effects
Liberal Peace Modifications by Liberal Peace Theorists	Strengthening the state strength and scope
	Strengthening the state design
	Strengthening the missions
	Sequencing the priorities (security before political and economic reconstruction)
	Building an institutional memory
	Learn lessons from the past
	Strengthen coordination
	Be careful on coalition choices
	Provide enough resources
	Prepare an exit strategy

Table 2. An extended version of the typology of liberal peace, borrowed from Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, pp. 232–233.

politan nature, based on local/global citizenship, community and solidarity will help in preventing relapse to war and nationalism. However in the Balkans, nationalism prevailed over the other theories. Thus these theories offer theoretically a potential to assist these processes but it remains to be seen in practice.

Lastly, peace building refers to achievement of negative or positive peace. The latter would be a long-term aspiration, whereas the earlier can often already be found in fragile states. Negative peace is usually satisfactory in fragile states even though further challenges will remain. Generally, it is assumed that successful state building contributes to peace building, while nation building may or may not facilitate it (Call, 2008b).