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Localizing Local Theory:
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on State and Peace Building in Kosovo through Life Stories

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Summary

The importance of state and peace building is as high as ever: latest estimates classify over 60 states as either fragile or failing (Krause, 2010:6), encompassing more than two billion people. State failure entails massive flows of refugees, internally displaced people, child soldiers and grave abuses of women. The *UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* (2004) identified failing states as one of the main threats to global peace and stability. Yet, despite the increasing attention given to state building, the international community operating through international institutions, such as the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and the Office for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), have been criticized for its lack of legitimacy and consistency as well as its ‘top-down’ approach to the reconstruction. Prominent examples of post-conflict societies include Afghanistan, East Timor, or Kosovo (Jashari, 2007:76). It is claimed that such approaches do not accommodate the specific needs that arise from local contexts (Nagy, 2008). Wilde (2007, 2008) even identifies similarities between international state building policies and historical colonial arrangements.

This research revisits this criticism, exploring to what extent international narratives about the priorities, successes, and failures of state and peace building efforts experientially compare to local perspectives and what lessons these insights hold for future state and peace building processes in Kosovo. Put more simply, what are the local and international perspectives and how do they compare? The main methodological and substantive innovations are guided by the following research sub-question: what do the experiences of local people in Kosovo as reflected in their biographies tell us about the process and the limitations of state and peace building? This research question mirrors the two-fold objective of this study, namely to explore local theories of state and peace building and to compare international and local perspectives on the subject. To answer the question, both local actors and international stakeholders are considered, featuring a comparison of the views of different groups, as well as between the established literature on the topic and the firsthand experience of local and international stakeholders. While it has not been applied in this field, the life stories approach deepens the understanding of the theoretical concepts and their varied meanings on the ground on the basis of diverse and large amount of data collected in Kosovo. Researching state and peace building through life stories and grounded theory represents an authentic, innovative and interdisciplinary methodological approach.

Turning to the findings, the chapter on state building suggests that more emphasis must lie on societal rather than institutional state building. The chapter on nation building suggests reconciling ethnic and civic nation building by re-incorporating nationalism. The chapter on peace building proposes to focus more on instrumental reconciliation fostering living together rather than living as separate communities. Theoretically, the thesis suggests to “localize” local theories of state, peace and nation building in two ways. On the one hand, the word refers to developing specific and concrete local theories rather than just hinting at their possibility at the meta-theoretical level as suggested by postliberal approaches. On the other hand, it means to be able to identify local theory in a place, thus “to localize” it, by using a life stories approach. The research finally deepens the understanding of the foreign policies and development strategies of post-conflict states and informs a set of innovative and empirically grounded recommendations to state and peace building policies. More concretely, this means that international institutions could integrate life story research in fragile contexts to improve their understanding of local priorities for each country, especially in early phases of their arrival.

Samenvatting

Staatsvorming en vredesopbouw zijn belangrijker dan ooit. Recente schattingen geven aan dat ruim zestig staten als zwak of mislukt worden beoordeeld (Kraus, 2010:6). Dit komt neer op gebied met een gecombineerd inwonersaantal van meer dan twee miljard mensen. Het mislukken van staten veroorzaakt enorme vluchtelingenstromen, binnenlandse bevolkingsverplaatsingen, het fenomeen kindsoldaten en ernstig vrouwenmisbruik. Het *High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* (2004) van de Verenigde Naties beoordeelt tekortschietende staten als een van de grootste bedreigingen voor vrede en stabiliteit op wereldschaal. Ondanks de toenemende aandacht voor staatsvorming is de internationale gemeenschap - dat wil zeggen internationale instituties als de Verenigde Naties (VN), de Europese Unie (EU) en de Organisatie voor Veiligheid en Samenwerking in Europa (OVSE) - zowel bekritiseerd vanwege een gebrek aan legitimiteit en beginselvastheid als vanwege haar 'top-down' benadering bij de wederopbouw van voormalige conflictgebieden als Afghanistan, Oost-Timor en Kosovo (Jasari, 2007:76). Er wordt gesteld dat dergelijke benaderingen geen aandacht hebben voor de specifieke noden van plaatselijke contexten (Nagy, 2008). Wilde (2007, 2008) bespeurt zelfs overeenkomsten tussen internationaal beleid ten aanzien van staatsvorming en koloniale arrangementen uit het verleden.

Dit onderzoek richt zich op deze kritiek en onderzoekt in hoeverre het internationale beeld van de prioriteiten, de successen, en het falen van vredes- en staatsopbouw experimenteel te vergelijken zijn met de lokale perspectieven, en welke lessen hieruit getrokken kunnen worden voor de vredes- en staatsopbouw in Kosovo. In andere woorden, in welke opzichten zijn de lokale en internationale perspectieven te vergelijken? De belangrijkste deelvraag is de volgende: in hoeverre geven biografieën van Kosovaren inzicht in het proces en de limieten van staatsopbouw? Deze onderzoeksvraag omvat de twee doelstellingen van deze studie, namelijk het onderzoeken van lokale theorieën over vredes- en staatsopbouw en het vergelijken van internationale en lokale perspectieven van dit onderwerp. Om deze vraag te beantwoorden zullen zowel lokale als internationale actoren worden beschouwd. Ook worden zowel de standpunten van verschillende groepen vergeleken, als de literatuur over dit onderwerp en de ervaringen van internationale actoren. Hoewel het nog niet eerder toegepast is op dit onderwerp kan deze biografische benadering het begrip van theoretische concepten en hun verschillende betekenissen verdiepen op basis van de grootte en diversiteit van data verzameld in Kosovo. Het onderzoeken van vredes- en staatsopbouw met zowel een biografische als een theoretische benadering is daarom een authentieke, innovatieve en een interdisciplinaire methodologische benadering.

Wat de onderzoeksresultaten betreft, stelt het hoofdstuk over staatsvorming dat meer aandacht moet gaan naar maatschappelijke dan institutionele staatsvorming. Het hoofdstuk over natievorming stelt voor om etnische en burgerlijke natievorming te verzoenen door nationalisme opnieuw te integreren. Het hoofdstuk over vredesopbouw stelt voor om meer te focussen op een instrumentele verzoening die samenleven aanmoedigt, en niet het leven in gescheiden gemeenschappen. Op theoretisch vlak stelt deze thesis twee manieren voor om lokale theorieën over staat, vrede en natievorming te 'lokaliseren'. Dit woord verwijst enerzijds naar het ontwikkelen van specifieke en concrete lokale theorieën, in plaats van slechts te alluderen naar die mogelijkheid op metatheoretisch niveau, zoals post-liberale benaderingen doen. Het betekent anderzijds de mogelijkheid om lokale theorie te identificeren in een plaats, om het dus te 'lokaliseren', door het gebruik van de *life stories* benadering. Het onderzoek verdiept ten slotte ons begrip van het buitenlands beleid en van ontwikkelingsstrategieën van post-conflict staten en meldt een reeks innovatieve en empirische gefundeerde aanbevelingen voor

staats- en vredesoverleg. Concreet betekent dit dat internationale instellingen onderzoek gebaseerd op *life stories* kunnen integreren in fragile contexten om zo hun begrip van lokale prioriteiten voor elk land te verbeteren, voornamelijk in de vroege fase van hun aankomst.

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1. Introduction

The end of the Cold War with its change in the global balance of power, the alleged ideological triumph of liberalism, the rise of humanitarian intervention and the events of September 11 that led to the 'war on terror' are key to the elevated importance of statebuilding agenda (Greener, 2012, p. 415). Post conflict reconstruction is also closely linked to the increase of intra state conflicts and the necessity to rebuild war-torn territories. The rise in such kinds of conflict has in itself manifold causes, including the collapse of Yugoslavia, the post colonial state model, the increasing violence with Muslims, and the indirect consequences of globalization related to the spread of capitalism (Krause & Mallory IV, 2010, pp. 1–2). The importance of statebuilding is consequently as high as ever: latest estimates classify over 60 states as either fragile or failing (Krause, 2010, p. 6), with an overall population of more than two billion people. 1.5 billion live in conditions of conflict and insecurity, but international support has not resulted in meaningful improvements (OECD, 2012b). One out of four people in the world live in countries that are affected by violence and fragility (IDPS, 2013, p. 1), and it is predicted that by 2018 more than half of the world's poor population will live in fragile countries (IDPS, 2013, p. 1; OECD, 2014b). In other words, "in 2018 half of humanity and 2030 even two thirds of all human beings will be living in fragile states" (Costa & Hage, 2014). Slow progress in these countries in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) means that six out of the seven countries that have not accomplished one goal are fragile (OECD, 2014b). Still aid (29%) is decreasing and the financial progress through remittances (56%), foreign direct investment (15%) and domestic revenues (14%) remain insufficient (ibid). As of 2015, world actors aim to achieve 17 new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to end poverty in the next 15 years.

State failure entails humanitarian catastrophes, characterized by massive flows of refugees and internally displaced people, the employment of child soldiers and other grave abuses of human rights, particularly against women. As Fukuyama points out, "[s]tate-building is one of the most important issues for the world community... weak or failed states are the source of many of the world's most serious problems, from poverty to AIDS to drugs to terrorism" (Fukuyama, 2005, p. ix). The UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) identified failing states as one of the main threats to global peace and stability. The states confronted with such problems are in different conditions and are thus often grouped upon in terms of 'failed', 'collapsed', 'fragile', 'quasi', and 'shadow' states. All of the types are of significant importance in understanding global insecurities. Perhaps most importantly, in an post-Westphalian world, inter state wars increasingly are replaced by intra (internal)

state conflicts, meaning essentially that future wars will take place in weak states (K. J. Holsti, 1996). In addition, 'half of all civil wars result from post conflict situations gone wrong' (Collier, 2008, p. 103). Strengthening weak states is thus of utmost importance to prevent escalation of new and old conflicts. The international community engages thus directly in the (re)establishment of main state functions after the end of wars. Post conflict reconstruction becomes here an integral part of the international effort to minimize and contain violence and poverty and to prevent the re-emergence of conflict.

Reacting to the fact of selective interventions to prevent further violations of human rights in some countries (Kosovo) but not in others (Rwanda, Bosnia), former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan urged the world states to find unity and a solution on how to respond to systematic violations of human rights if humanitarian intervention (decreasing sovereignty) is not a viable option. Shortly after, the Canadian Government established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which issued the report *The Responsibility to Protect*, discussing the conditions under which states or international organizations could intervene to protect people from systematic violations of human rights. The report also laid out the obligations of the intervening powers after intervention, the so-called '*responsibility to rebuild*', focused on peace building, security, justice, reconciliation and development. In addition, the report issued guidelines on the behavior of intervening powers, including how to achieve local ownership and how to address questions of sovereignty and dependency of the territories (ICISS, 2001). The report makes the normative argument that intervening powers have the responsibility to rebuild once they engage in protection, formulating the expectation that they assist genuinely in promoting good governance and economic development. In practice, so it argued, a relapse of fragile states into war is very common. Since then the meaning of sovereignty has changed, bringing more involvement of foreign powers in countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq, with the attention shifting towards more protection of human rights and human security. The impacted states by post conflict reconstruction so far include Angola, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, Liberia, Lebanon, Macedonia, Mozambique, Namibia, Palestine National Authority, Sierra Leone, Somalia Timor Leste (Krause & Mallory IV, 2010, p. 1) and South Sudan. States coming out of the Arab Spring such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria are influenced as well.

Furthermore, the role of the state has recently changed due to globalization and growing interdependence and interconnectedness worldwide. Technology was central to this development, shortening distances and spreading information in very short times. The consequences of conflict and post-conflict instability thus spill over the border more readily impacting also developed countries. The need for reconstruction of weak states has become more prominent against this background. Yet, globalization challenges states also as such since 'flows of in-

formation, goods and energy around the world now transcend state boundaries' (Elden, 2009, p. 212). In remaking of spatial relations, new configuration of power rise (Elden, 2009, p. 214). These processes might create "new forms of political community which sever the links between sovereignty, territory, citizenship and nationalism" (Linklater, 1998, p. 213). However, Ghani and Lockhart claim that "[w]hile one half of the globe has created an almost seamless web of political, financial and technological connections that underpin democratic states and market-based economies, the other half is blocked from political stability and participation in global wealth" (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008, p. 3). The result for many of the latter countries are thus networks of criminality and violence, drugs and arms trade, especially in poor populations and uncontrolled territories (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008, pp. 3–4). Insecurities in dysfunctional states and the turn of people to such shadow networks produces in turn a systemic problem that represents "the most serious challenge to global stability in the new millennium" (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008, p. 4). Such instabilities are evidently located mainly in dysfunctional states where illicit networks find it easier to operate.

In addition, budgets are oriented further away from the development area and population needs. For instance, the world spent 1.75 trillion USD in military expenses in 2012, with increases especially in non-Western countries ("Military spending continues to fall in the West but rises everywhere else," 2014). The United Nations Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order, Alfred de Zayas recommended to governments to reduce military spending and re-orientate expenditures to population needs to promote a democratic and equitable international order:

Every democracy must involve civil society in the process of establishing budgets, and all sectors of society must be consulted to determine what the real priorities of the population are. Lobbies, including military contractors and other representatives of the military-industrial complex, must not be allowed to hijack these priorities to the detriment of the population's real needs (Zayas, 2014).

This would be fundamental to achieving both the post-2015 UN development agenda and post-conflict reconstruction. However, the population needs have so far not been taken into account in neither developing nor developed countries. Zayas notes as well that in the light of the global financial crises, austerity measures have touched social protection provisions rather than military industry. He suggests balancing the austerity in military by 10% for all countries and decreasing cuts in social protection in order to achieve the development agenda. The financial crises also made states less inclined to finance missions, led them to cut aid funds and move to a new agenda of 'tradebuilding' with these countries. In fact, costly international interventions abroad usually also lack support from public opinion (O. R. Holsti, 2009, p. 282). The developmental literature recognizes that a functioning state is necessary for the eradication of poverty (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008, p. 4). Economists acknowledge that it is a require-

ment for market stability and growth (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008, p. 4). In consequence, “solutions to our current problems of insecurity, poverty, and lack of growth all converge on the need for a state-building project” (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008, p. 4). State building has thus become one of the main policies of the international community in many developing states. Research on post conflict reconstruction refers in this context to the simultaneous implementation of state, peace and nation building efforts at different stages by different actors, including international and regional organizations, states, NGOs, and other civil society actors. Informal forums are also included such as G7, G8, G7+, G20. Non-state actors are in fact gaining prominence in post-conflict reconstruction, as can be seen from the growing involvement of private philanthropists, religious organizations, corporations, foundations, celebrity figures, diaspora and civil society organisations. New geopolitical realities lead also to the growing inclusion of BRIC countries in these processes and to direct South-South cooperation (Marshall, 2014). The first section of chapter V explains more in greater detail the specific mechanisms dealing with the reconstruction of fragile states and the new structures and agendas that have recently emerged in global level.

The Tension between International Authority and Local Developments

The state and peace building agenda is constantly changing to adapt to the new global environments to respond better in eradication of poverty and prevention of conflict. The involvement of many actors in fragile zones has certain implications that need to be briefly addressed. Despite the increasing attention given to state building by various governance mechanisms and new actors, the international community, especially international institutions such as the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and the Office for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), have been criticized for its lack of legitimacy and consistency and its ‘top-down’ approach to the reconstruction of post-conflict societies in Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, East Timor, or Kosovo (Aybet, 2010; Farrell & Gordon, 2009; Jashari, 2007; Menkhaus, 2007; Papagianni, 2007). In this thesis, the international community refers to actors that promote democracy in Kosovo, including the IOs listed above, foreign embassies and international NGOs. On the ground, there is a limited presence and involvement from states opposing democracy or the Western order, such as China and Russia with consular offices in Pristina (MFA, 2015). Furthermore, the interviewed international officials refer to themselves as international community. It has also been argued that the international community runs the danger of enforcing one uneasy package of ‘technocratic’ and ‘decontextualized’ answers (Nagy, 2008). It is claimed that such approaches do not accommodate the specific needs that arise from local contexts (Debiel & Lambach, 2009). More concretely, the usage of ‘technical templates’ for creating international administrative institutions runs the risks of not accommodating some of the specific needs that arise from local context (Nagy, 2008). There

is also lack of strategic forethought on exit strategies and nation building (Krause & Mallory IV, 2010, p. 3). Wilde even identifies similarities between international state building policies and historical colonial arrangements (Wilde, 2007, 2010). Furthermore the peace agreements have been concluded in West with ‘with a few local elites involved who have a controversial claim to represent local constituencies’ (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 764).

Furthermore accountability and responsibility of international territorial administrations is called into question (Caplan, 2005). In fact, Chandler argues that IOs actually undermine the prerequisites of successful state building and that they fail to take direct responsibility for their actions (Chandler, 2010b, p. 71). The international territorial administrations ‘policies are associated with international law’s claim to universality’ that is thought to be universally accepted, ignoring the colonial critique that suggests that a ‘set of values is being imposed on a population that does not share them’ (Wilde, 2010, p. 413). Similarly, Richmond points out that there is a tension in state and peace building as it ‘is embedded in a conflict between international norms, interests, neoliberalism and local legitimacy’ (Richmond, 2014a, p. 16). The current statebuilding practices are characterized as in “between imposition of international preferences on the one hand, where decisions are appropriated and prescribed, and neglect on the other, where ambassadors and representatives merely observe and report, while venal government officials and rulers systematically destroy institutions” (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008, p. 8). According to Richmond, the outcome of state and peace building reflects

neither local, socio-historical frameworks for legitimacy nor identity, and so command little loyalty. A range of local and transnational networks circumvent them in the long term, sometimes for peace, but also for profit, crime and predation. These represent states without meaning, reduced to a technocratic form of governmentality, which reflects positivist social science and mainstream economic bias propagated through Northern donors’ hegemonic weight (Richmond, 2014a, p. 16).

Chandler argues that local perspectives have not yet received enough attention in state building literature (Chandler, 2010a, p. 10). Similarly Caplan points out that the local context specificities are often not considered and that short term demands of international organizations are prioritized over the strengthening of local capacities (Caplan, 2004, 2012). The international organizations also do not specify in their mandates the relation towards locals. What is more, mission evaluations and reports are becoming increasingly politicized (Caplan, 2012, p. 318). The current statebuilding policies have caused a growing local ‘frustration and impatience’. In some countries this led to a hasty transfer of international to local authority without the countries having the necessary capacities (Caplan, 2012, p. 315).

Caplan suggests the involvement of locals in assessing progress and the effective implementation of statebuilding plans. It depends mainly on the local countries’ willingness and capacities ‘to come together, own and eventually drive the process forward’ (Caplan, 2012, p. 318). Devising a good post conflict reconstruction strategy that takes into account the local context

is very challenging given the high international presence, the executive authority in the territory and the conditions on the ground. On one hand, involving locals from the beginning might seem premature, on the other hand isolating them may hinder sustainable post conflict reconstruction (Caplan, 2012, p. 4). The international statebuilding plan needs to be clearly thought and planned along the process and it needs to ‘ensure mutual accountability’ (Caplan, 2012, p. 318). The external party (IO) has the power and decides on the involvement of locals since the beginning hence it depends upon the international community to take proactive steps to formulate their policies better. Hence this is not only a technical matter but also a political matter (Caplan, 2012, p. 315).

Thus practices of resistance to this form of statebuilding represent signs of a local turn beyond liberal peace agenda (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). The turn has been traced by looking into the local agency in peacebuilding in ‘everyday emancipation, political awakenings, resistance, questions about the role of the state and authority of international actors and donors, as well as the problems raised by the hierarchical state-system, ideological donor-system, the hidden arms trade and the goals of emerging donors’ (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 773). There are several factors contributing to the local turn including the crises of the liberal peace, the willingness of researchers to consider epistemologies and methodologies to examine the peace and conflict through the local perspectives despite that policy makers remain skeptic since locals are more conflict than peace oriented and are involved in ‘unacceptable’ normative practices. In addition, the local turn corresponds with the development field changes with inclusion of participation, local ownership, etc since the local so far is mainly ‘securitized and modernised’. Lastly the prominence followed due to rise of practitioners and academics from global South and the assertiveness of local actors (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, pp. 774–776). In this line, Richmond calls to open up ‘A research agenda [as it] is needed which engages with an understanding of the dynamics of the relationship between the liberal and the local, and of the interface between the two in terms of everyday life for local communities and actors, as well as for more abstract institutional frameworks’ (Richmond, 2009a, p. 576).

In practice statebuilding is being modified by the international community as more engagement by fragile countries is encouraged. One of the central aspects of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States adopted at the Busan Forum on Aid Effectiveness and endorsed by around 40 countries and international organizations aims to empower the weak countries themselves (OECD, 2013, p. 27). Firstly, it is committed to follow a vision based on the local initiatives, thus promote local ownership and leadership, facilitating “constructive state-society relations, and the empowerment of women, youth and marginalised groups, as key actors for peace” (IDPS, 2011, p. 1). The Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding established by over 40 donor and recipient countries and international organizations and the G7+

group of fragile states with the New Deal have recently stressed resilience, but this approach still needs to be assessed against results (Carbonnier, 2014, p. 47). The notions such as consultations, empowerment and ownership do not necessarily deliver in practice (Marshall, 2014). As argued earlier, success depends in fact on many factors. The same cautious evaluation needs to be applied to the recent shift of the international organizations and government policies from institutional to so-called 'thick' and 'resilient' approaches, especially due to the complex realities encountered in post-conflict reconstruction (Chandler, 2013; OECD, 2012a).

Offering different reactions, liberal theorists call for an improvement of the current approach, while critical theorists suggest rethinking more radically both local and international involvements. A few questions arise as a consequence: What are the international and local perspectives of international state and peace building, and how do they compare? What, if any, are the alternatives to the liberal peace model according to the theory, and the local and international perspectives? If state and peace building will exist in future to deal with global crises and insecurities, how to reconcile the tension between local developments and international authority? How can mandates and goals be negotiated to achieve inclusive and progressive reconstruction? What are the effects and impact of liberal peace theory on the ground in the case of Kosovo? How do the empirical facts in the Kosovo case fit into the general theoretical debate between the liberal and critical theorists?

The Case of Kosovo and the Research Approach

The first period of democratic institutional reform is both important and decisive for societies emerging from conflict since the basis for stability and democracy of a country rests on the effective (re-)establishment of basic state services in the sectors of politics, security, judiciary, economy and services. These reforms are often externally driven. Combined with other factors, especially the specific local context with its particular history, culture and individuals, reestablishing a functioning state becomes an even more complex task. As in other places, this ambition has been a major challenge in the case of Kosovo, though it is widely acknowledged as being critical for Kosovo's future development and integration in the European Union (Bieber, 2011). Early reforms after the war in 1999 were mainly undertaken by external actors, and specifically by the UN-led international interim administration (UNMIK) and other UN organizations, the EU, the OSCE, and KFOR. The UN created new institutions and pushed for institutional reform, gradually transferring responsibilities from to national or other international actors such as the EU. However, more than fifteen years after the international actors became involved for the first time, they retain key roles in Kosovo. KFOR provides thus security in the territory to contain ethnic tensions, the OSCE continues to observe and

organize the elections, and Kosovo is still receiving one of the highest development aids for economic reconstruction by the EU and other international donors.

Against this background, it seems questionable if international state and peace building is truly successful, even where and when the international community has been engaged for more than a decade. Kosovo is still facing problems regarding its international status, its borders, the integration of the Northern part, its accession into regional organizations (EU and NATO), visa liberalization, political accountability, fair and transparent elections, unemployment, freedom of media and speech, education, rule of law, institution building, corruption, and inter-ethnic reconciliation (Breznica, 2010, p. 10; UNMIK, 2014). Instead, Kosovo has become the basis of various criminal organizations. Rather than achieving full peace and security, it appears to have stagnated. While direct conflict has ceased, tensions remain between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs, especially in terms of reconciliation and integration (UNMIK, 2014). In fact, international actors took an incremental or “laissez-faire” approach, as the constitution was passed only a decade after the war and the status still remained undecided for a long period. The unresolved status of Kosovo has also had negative implications for Kosovo’s progress and statebuilding (Stahn, 2008, p. 312). This research uses the ambiguous and fragile context as it has emerged in Kosovo as the basis for an examination into the gaps of state and peace building approaches. With a population of less than two million, a high degree of international support, a history of international administration under UN auspices with a broad mandate, and large amounts of development aid compared to other fragile countries (the EU alone has contributed 2 billion EUR so far (see Coppieters in Michels, 2008; Paris & Sisk, 2008, p. 1). Kosovo represents a highly interesting and critical case study for post-conflict reconstruction.

Looking at the problems that Kosovo continues to face, one may doubt if the process of state and peace building has really progressed and if the country is stable. There seem to be a discrepancy between the doctrinal theories and goals adopted by IOs in Kosovo and the outcomes in the field. Yet, while the state-building process must be adjusted and reformed to deliver upon its objectives, it is unclear what sources will inform such amendments. As mentioned previously, general state-building theories remain limited especially because of their incompatibility with specific local contexts. Against the background of the theoretical debates and the practical challenges, there is a need to explore the experiences of the local community in the case of Kosovo in order to draw some lessons about the role of locals and international authorities in the reconstruction of the state and peace. More specifically, state and peace building in post-conflict countries will be explored from a local perspective in the state of Kosovo through a personalized approach, which focuses on life stories and biographies. Such a methodology has not yet been used in research on state and peace building as far as I know, but has been employed in other social sciences including international relations, sociology

and psychology (Goodley, Lawthom, Clough, & Moore, 2004, p. x). The starting point of this research is that the methodology can be applied usefully to the state and peace building phenomena and to better understand the local perspectives on it. Through life stories, this research seeks to shed light on local perspectives which might be something of a missing link in an area where extensive research has been conducted from the international perspective. Speaking the local languages assisted me in accessing interviews easily and receiving primary sources. The research will show the difference between the traditional literature on the topic and the first-hand experience of local and international stakeholders. This adds another, more authentic layer to the research that has been undertaken in international relations. The usage of an oral history, life stories, and sociological methodology, namely grounded theory, to analyze a political science challenge, namely state and peacebuilding, presents the interdisciplinary and innovative element of the research. In addition, it will be able to confront and inform the theory of state and peace building. It also seeks to inform empirical and normative research on state and peace building. The analysis of the local life stories approach in Kosovo provides a good basis for the generation of a more thorough understanding of the various facets of international and local state and peace dimensions which can be useful for future policies in Kosovo and possibly beyond.

Furthermore, the life stories methodology provides an in-depth framework of analysis for the phenomenon of post-conflict reconstruction. Since the study does not specifically aim to produce globally generalizable findings, the approach justifies the choice of a sole case study, and specifically Kosovo. The epistemological approach is thus comparable and in line with post-structuralist discourse analysis which “requires extensive knowledge of the case in question and which can therefore only be undertaken in small number of cases” (Hansen, p.11). Details on the most important stages and events in post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo are presented in chapter V.

While the literature described so far sought to provide a general impression of the relation between international and local state building, this research does not test or verify any particular theoretical model. It explores instead the extent to which international narratives about the priorities, successes, and failures of state building efforts experientially compare to local perspectives in Kosovo. Put more simply, what are the local and international perspectives and how do they compare? This concern is reflected in the following central research question: *To what extent do the international and local experiences and narratives about the conditions, actions, interactions and consequences of international state and peace building correspond and differ to one another and to established academic and policy frameworks?* The research question mirrors the two folded objective of this study, namely to explore local theories of state and peace building and compare the international and local perspectives. To answer the question, both local actors and international stakeholders are considered, featuring a

comparison of the views of different groups, as well as between the established literature on the topic and the firsthand experience of local and international stakeholders.

Methodologically, the research was undertaken in three phases. In the first phase, there was a comprehensive assessment of *international perceptions* and the main tenets of the international state and peace building discourse. Next to a literature review, 33 semi-structured interviews were conducted with individuals working in various international institutions and donor bodies. The objective was to clarify the views of post-conflict reconstruction implementation as held by individuals that played a significant role or had a profound knowledge of state and peace building in Kosovo, including former high ranked officials. The second stage confronted and compared the international assumptions to *local life stories*. This part is the research project's central innovation as it explores local perspectives on post-conflict reconstruction implementation through 28 life stories in Kosovo selected through snowball sampling, grounded theory, namely 'theoretical sampling', population criteria, involvement in post conflict reconstruction, interactions between international and local actors, availability and access (the approach is outlined in detail on chapter III and IV). The final stage included the dialectic *reassessment of international perceptions*, confronting international actors with the empirical findings of the life stories research. Some of the international stakeholders involved in the first stage of the research were meet again for this purpose. The main outcomes of the international and especially the local perspective were described, leaving the individuals space to reflect upon the results and its meaning for future state and peace building policies in Kosovo. Epistemologically, and as already mentioned, the research is situated in a post-structuralist framework, analyzing different, often conflicting stances on post-conflict reconstruction, nation-, peace- and state building. The interviews with international actors and locals were analyzed through grounded theory. The methodological approaches are described in greater detail in chapter III.

The Relevance of Life Stories Method for Local Alternatives

The life stories method has so far not been used in wider state building literature, but in international relations, sociology, psychology and transitional justice (Goodley et al., 2004; Leydesdorff, 2007). In international relations, it has been engaged by post-positivist scholars (Ackerly & True, 2006), for instance in feminist research (Elshtain, 1987). In *Women and War*, Elshtain inquires life stories and identifies the transversion of "the terrain between particular lives and loyalties and public duties" (Elshtain, 1987, p. 4). Inayatullah introduced in an edited volume an autobiographical approach, showing how "personal narrative influences theoretical articulations" (Inayatullah, 2011, p. x). All these contributors advocate strongly for an increased use of life story methods to address the high divergence between theory and practice (human experiences) and the pressing need to link both. Like Elshtain and Inayat-

tulah, this research uses an analytical framework which questions positivism as an uncritical approach to the study of social processes which does not engage with power constellations “behind the data” (Inayatullah, 2011, p. 24), thus excluding important findings from scholarship. In other words, there are messages in subtext that need to be explored. It reflects a concern with meanings and beliefs being essential to study social processes like state and peace building. Consequently, analysing state and peace building processes by looking at the life stories of local individuals means uncovering new and so far hidden findings about the processes, contributing in this way to an innovative understanding of state and peace building processes and implementation.

Thus the starting point of this research is that the life stories methodology can be applied usefully to the state and peace building phenomena on understanding the local perspective. Understanding local individuals’ life stories, history, and biographies can illuminate the process of state building as individuals’ experiences in their daily lives shape decision-making. Hence it is crucial to understand the individuals involved in the process of state and peace building and what has influenced them. As will be shown, lessons can be drawn from the personal history of Kosovo’s agents involved in the process of state and peace building, how they have impacted state and peace building and how history shapes the personal character of the agents, in turn again impacting on the state and peace building process. Each life story will contribute to a better understanding of the policy and process of the state and peace building, dealing not only with oppression but also with the resistance of local people. Life stories, their context, purpose and their telling, represent thus an empirically rich but at the same time open-ended methodology. The perceptions of local Kosovans who are involved in state and peace building are conveyed through using this approach that give specific accounts of state and peace building in Kosovo.

In fact, life stories focus on the description of the process of reform (featuring local people involved in that development) and the outcomes (focusing for instance on the ‘losers’ of certain reform projects). While this type of methodology has often been used to draw attention specifically on the completely marginalized, this project aims to include both local people outside the process of state and peace building and the ones that are an integral part ‘of the system’ as much also can be learnt from their life stories. Rather than a purely subaltern approach, this project thus reframes life stories in a more dialectic fashion. The combination of ‘hegemonic’ and ‘counter-hegemonic’ life stories sheds light on various aspects of the same phenomena, expanding the methodology in a more communicative, inclusive and meaningful fashion that can inform policy analysis as well. In addition, the local agents involved in the state and peace building process may be viewed as marginalized actors on a global scale when compared to the international hegemony. Lessons can be drawn from the personal history of the agents involved in the process of state and peace building in Kosovo. I focus on lo-

cal actors to enable a comparison between the perceptions of different groups, involved and affected by state and peace building, on the ground, and also to enable a comparison with the international groups.

So far, academic work on Kosovo has mostly used traditional research designs such as legal and institutional approach to state building. The traditional method has focused on aspects such as the mandates, consent, constitution framing, local ownership and other topics. In contrast, this research brings a different perspective to the analysis of the process of institution and peace building in post-conflict states by employing a different methodology, asking questions like: What can life stories tell us about the process of state and peace building as experienced by people working within and outside the system? What do their social and cultural understandings tell us about challenges to state and peace building processes? The scope of the topics is to a large extent determined by the biographies and the new or reimagined themes they advance on state- and peace- building. Abstract concepts and vocabulary such as constitutionalism, institutional engineering, democratization, international administration, internationalized statehood, or capacity-building are herein not taken for granted but reconsidered within the context of the particular lives of the people.

Furthermore, life stories will provide new theoretical directions for further research regarding the main ends, means, outcomes and challenges of post conflict reconstruction. This effort to ‘ground’ theory empirically has been seriously undertaken by different International Political Economy scholars like Scholte in relation to global democracy (Scholte, 2011). This study seeks hence to widen the existing conceptual framework inductively by using different life stories as the basis for a new and more contextual understanding of what international state and peace building means and substantiates the local turn approach in peacebuilding theory with rich empirical evidence.

To conclude, the usage of life stories as a methodology has no history in the field of state and peace building. This is one of the first contributions from the ground attempting to provide more data from the ground since it is empirically under-researched, especially through life stories. This study provides rich data which is easily accessible due to my knowledge of the languages spoken in Kosovo (Albanian is my mother tongue, and I understand and speak some Serbian). This allowed me to receive information easily and built the relationship with the interviewees much more quickly. However, as this thesis shows, it can potentially make a considerable contribution to research by demonstrating how people working inside and outside the process of state and peace building experience discourses and practices of exclusion. This thesis therefore argues that life stories are a good way to find out about local opinions and perspectives, that is, to localize local theories by informing them with context-based and case specific data. It shows the difference between the traditional literature on the topic and the first-hand experience of international and local stakeholders. This adds another, more

“grassroots” layer to the research that has been undertaken in international relations and international law. In addition, it will be able to confront and inform the theory of state and peace building.

Conclusion and Outline

Post-conflict reconstruction impacts many people around the world that are confronted with state fragilities and threats to peace and stability. This bottom-up research aims to uncover the contradictions of international post conflict reconstruction featuring (i) a comparison between international and local perspectives and (ii) attempting to develop a local theory of post conflict reconstruction. Researching state and peace building through *life stories* represents an authentic, innovative and interdisciplinary methodological approach. The personalized life story approach provides new insights for the assessment and future design of post conflict reconstruction missions. It adds a new layer of analysis to the state and peace building literature which could also be the basis of a future research agenda. The approach has also a broader societal relevance as it proposes a comprehensive view that articulates better both ‘international’ and ‘local’ perspectives. It contributes to the creation of concrete and contextualized responses and proposes lessons from a fragile state of Kosovo, potentially mitigating the negative side effects of state failure, including civil strife, inequality, injustice, insecurity, corruption, and poverty. Therefore one of the main objectives of the project is thus to challenge and expand the established thinking in state and peace building theory in order to inform a set of innovative and empirically grounded recommendations to state and peace building policies. The established policy debate is meant to be supplemented with a greater consideration of local contexts and actors. At the academic level, the research contributes to the understanding of local community on state and peace building through life stories, an approach so far not used in the state and peace building debate. In practical terms, the ambition is also to expand the knowledge available to international administrations working in post conflict countries. Finally, the research deepens the understanding of the foreign policies and development strategies of post-conflict states and raises new questions that may impact post conflict countries in the world.

The thesis is divided into chapters that point out the epistemological, methodological and theoretical frameworks applied in the research and the main findings based on the local and international perspectives on state and peace building in the Republic of Kosovo. The *first* chapter traces the current main approaches to state and peace building theory including the traditional and liberal peace. The *second* chapter presents the critical liberal peace and emerging local alternative frameworks. It also provides some considerations on the future directions of research in this area. The *third* chapter describes the epistemological and methodological framework used in the research, namely post-positivist approach and grounded theory, and it

explains how more established quantitative and qualitative approaches can be supplemented with a methodology that concentrates on local perspectives and life stories, geared to deepening our understanding of state and peace building and especially the developments on the ground. The *fourth* chapter presents the global governance mechanisms on state and peace building and the local governance mechanisms and developments in the case of Kosovo after the war.

The *following three chapters* present the findings. These chapters focus on three broad topics, namely state, peace and nation building, which emerged as grounded theory was applied on the international perspectives. In order to understand the differences and similarities between international and local perspectives, thus to make a comparison possible in the first place, these broad themes were used as a structure for the chapters. In other words, this division was chosen to enable a 'dialogue' between the perspectives, understand the different meanings of the processes by both groups and thereby increase the societal impact of the current research. While this choice can theoretically be criticized on the ground of possibly misrepresenting the local life stories, it can be justified on the ground of the breadth of the themes (which proved to be able to accommodate the variety of local perspectives) and its necessity as otherwise a comparative perspective would not have been possible. The *fifth* chapter compares the international and locals perspectives on state building and concludes that more emphasis must lie on societal rather than institutional building. The *sixth* chapter on nation building similarly compared both perspectives and suggests reconciling ethnic and civic nation building by incorporating back nationalism. The *seventh* chapter compares both perspectives on peace building and proposes to focus more on instrumental reconciliation fostering living together rather than living as separate communities. The *last* chapter concludes with several recommendations for the future engagement of both sets of actors.

An Overview of the Theoretical Approaches

2. The Mainstream Approaches through Liberal Peace: The International and Local Dynamics of Liberal International State, Nation and Peace Building

Introduction

Debates about the meaning of international statebuilding can be traced to the colonial period and European state formation, while modern state building began in the late 20th century with the establishment of the United Nations. The rebuilding of Germany and Japan after World War II and the later outbreak of conflicts in the Balkans, Asia, and Africa reinforced the significance of international state building, although failures and disappointments gave rise to a lot criticism of this agenda. This chapter reviews the theoretical state of the art on the topics of post-conflict reconstruction processes, namely state, peace and nation building.

To this end it begins with classical state formation theory, before moving on to ‘problem solving theory’ (liberal peace theory explained on statebuilding and peacebuilding section). All the approaches have the same goal in mind, though seeking to improve state and peace building with different arguments, procedures and on the basis of different evidence. However, they were built as lenses for state building analysis at different periods and are thus confronted with different shortcomings. The theories will be looked at with the following questions in mind: What are the international and local perspectives of international state, peace and nation building, and how do they compare? Regarding future global crises and insecurities, how do the theories reconcile the tension between local developments and international authority? How do they view the negotiations of mandates and goals for the purpose of inclusive and progressive reconstruction? Thus the chapter will focus on the advantages and shortcomings of each theory (except post liberal theory that is described in the next chapter) and highlight what falls outside their scope, particularly where it concerns local experiences.

This chapter also explains the link between state, peace and nation building in post conflict countries and the different theoretical perspectives on these processes. It describes them in an attempt to lay down few general theoretical conceptions in the field to be taken into account when analyzing the case study however it does not provide a specific theoretical framework to be followed in order to avoid influencing the data with preconceived conceptions and let the data speak for themselves as suggested by grounded theory methodology. The chapter presents a two-fold argument. Firstly it reminds that state building will continue, as it is essential to prevent spreading of international security threats from fragile zones as Fukuyama argues. Secondly, peace building complements state building since none of them can be suc-

cessful in long term, if implemented separately. Thirdly, nation building, meaning establishing a sense of commonness/togetherness, is also an essential component for establishing successful and sustainable state and peace building. Thus without nation building, both state and peace building cannot be achieved in long term. Further it draws attention to the different theoretical explanations of these processes, arguing that liberal peace proved to be failure due to the bad record in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia and others. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the significance and limitations of liberal peace, amongst others for the analysis of dependencies across different areas of post-conflict politics and the relation between the process of building states and nations and the maintenance of peace. The dissertation's case study of Kosovo will be used for illustrative purposes.

The Origins of State Formation

The Peace of Westphalia marks not only the end of the Thirty Year's War, but also the beginning of European state making and the modern nation state more generally. The War, fought predominantly for religious reason and in a struggle for territory between empires, ended with many peace agreements, the most significant ones being the Treaty of Augsburg and the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 (Elden, 2009, p. 200). The Treaty of Westphalia introduced a new political era based on the modern nation state with a presumption of 'non-interference' in domestic affairs and 'equal sovereignty' (Elden, 2009, p. 201). The Treaty entitled the newly established state entities with absolute sovereignty, including the right to declare war and peace, create laws and new alliances, regulate taxes, and maintain an army and a territory. To sum it up, the end of the religious wars gave rise to the establishment of the modern European state system with the ratification of the Treaty of Westphalia.

It is important to note that the city-states had existed even before the Treaty of Westphalia, for instance in the Fareast, Mesopotamia, and also in the famous city-states of Athens and in Italy. The main difference between the city-states and the current states lie in the type of democracy which was employed. In the city-states, democracy was embraced in an original, thus direct and participatory form, especially in Athens, whereas nowadays states are of the liberal or representative kind.¹ The elected officials are supposed to respect and work within the 'rule of law' framework (Held, 1992, p. 12). However, not all city-states embraced the participatory democracy. Over time city-states weakened and were incorporated in other states or empires. Nowadays only few city-states remain such as the Vatican and the Monaco.

¹ Direct/participatory democracy refers to a form of democracy where citizens directly express their interests and influence on the government and its regulations, whereas representative democracy refers to citizens having their interests represented through a much smaller amount of representatives through vote.

In addition, processes of decolonization and secession for the purpose of self-determination became the prevalent form for state formation during the 19th and 20th century. Between the 15th and the 20th century, the world was structured around empires as various European powers (France, Great Britain, Spain and Portugal) expanded territorially, first in North America and other parts of the world, and at the end of the 19th century, mainly on the African continent (Elden, 2009, p. 202). In these processes, the European political model was exported to the rest of the world, surviving even the process of decolonization. In Africa, decolonization implied independence from the colonizers, but the boundaries they had set usually remained. The Organization of African Unity embraced the principle of *uti possidetis* (what is currently yours you can maintain) to guide the process of decolonization (Elden, 2009, p. 229). The resulting problems are still visible on the African continent.

In Europe, after the breakup of the empires during the First World War, boundaries were redrawn in several Treaties (ie Brest-Litovsk, Versailles, St. Germain-en-Laye and of Trianon). Woodrow Wilson advanced the idea of self-determination, meaning that each distinct group could rule their territory (K. J. Holsti, 1996, p. 53), though he later on acknowledged 'his own ignorance of the practical application' of the principle (K. J. Holsti, 1996, p. 53). Its application started as of 1919 with the Treaty of Versailles intending to give independence to natural communities based on religion and language, give voice to the suppressed people and as such achieve perpetual peace (K. J. Holsti, 1996, pp. 52–53). This approach produced problems as it created around 30 million people without their own state, that is, minorities (K. J. Holsti, 1996, p. 54). As empires collapsed, many new independent states were created, including artificial ones such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. On the other continents, the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire gave rise to many new states. The ongoing conflicts in Israel/Palestine and Iraq date since then (Elden, 2009, p. 230). The arbitrariness of the redrawing of boundaries with the Treaty of Versailles dissatisfied some, with Harold Nicolson, a member of the British delegation in the conference stating that "it is appalling, those three [Wilson, Lloyd George, and Georges Clemenceau] ignorant and irresponsible men cutting Asia Minor to bits as if they were dividing a cake" (Moynihan, 1993, p. 102). Holsti summarizes as follows the basic contradictions that were created back then:

The fundamental problem was that the new states that based their theoretical right to rule over a community defined in terms of language or some other "natural" attribute, actually had to rule over populations characterized by ethnic, language, cultural, and religious diversity (Holsti, 1996, p. 55).

Despite its contradictory application, the principle of self-determination continued to be the basis for popular claims even after the end of Cold War. The break up of Yugoslavia established new states based on the federations former republics, with the exception of Bosnia and Kosovo (Elden, 2009, pp. 203–204). Questions remain also open concerning territories such as Abkhazia, Taiwan, Transnistria, Tibet, Chechnya and others.

On the origins of the state, Elden argues that the emergence of private property, towns, cities and the shift of the power to middle class resulted in a strengthening more of national rather than local markets, therefore leading to a centralization of the state (Elden, 2009, p. 206). The emergence of capitalism goes hand in hand with the rise of the modern state, as there was increasing emphasis on taxable assets of land and people. In addition, as Parsons notes, the rapid decline of feudalism at that time it was inevitable that a new form of society would emerge, respectively the modern society (Parsons in Tilly, 1975, p. 614).

Discussions on the origins of state formation, its nature, power and rule go as far back as to the works of Webber, Gramsci and others (Sharma & Gupta, 2006, p. 45). Webber argues famously that the state is based on ‘monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory’ (Weber, 2004, p. 33). Moreover, the state in the modern times is governed by rational legal rules created by rulers, which are supposed to be obeyed by everyone. These norms are implemented by a bureaucracy, which in modern states should be fully developed. According to Weber, the benefits of such a state bureaucracy is that ‘[it] destroyed structures of domination which were not rational’ but he also questions it as a new system of domination which limits the autonomy of people and social change (Weber, 2006, p. 70). In sum, Weber’s understanding of the state emphasizes the monopoly of violence, territory, law and legitimacy, community and bureaucracy. In addition, Rosenau points to the international role of the state as being the result of a ‘function of relations between a particular population and the rest of the world’ (Tilly, 1975, p. 622).

In contrast, Gramsci tackles the question of “how to reconstruct the state apparatus of the ruling group, an apparatus which disintegrated as a result of war?” (Gramsci, 2006, p. 71). According to Gramsci, civil society is very important in this phase. Mainly in advanced countries, civil society resists the impositions of economy and the structure (Gramsci, 2006, p. 74). Thus it is a structure that resists and improves the state. The state, on the other hand, aims always to reinforce the support among society of the ruling classes:

every State is ethical in as much as one of its most important functions is to raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level, a level (or type) which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development, and hence to the interests of the ruling classes (Gramsci, 2006, p. 78).

A political and cultural hegemony is maintained through education in schools, by courts as well as private initiatives and activities. Most importantly, “[t]he State does have and request consent, but it also ‘educates’ this consent, by means of the political and syndical associations; these, however, are private organisms, left to the private initiative of the ruling class” (Gramsci, 2006, p. 78). Gramsci argues further that the legislature, judiciary and executive are part of the hegemony to ‘different degrees’ (Gramsci, 2006, p. 77). State and civil society ex-

tend to each other's terrains and civil society can revitalize the state including the economic domain to a certain amount in the reconstruction period after war.

Tilly's analysis of state formation in Europe shed light on the shortcomings of state making, pointing out the possible limitations on exporting the European model to the rest of the world. Firstly, identifying the general conditions that contributed to European state making and the transformation of territories into nations, Tilly put down the following list:

(1) the availability of extractable resources; (2) a relatively protected position in time and space; (3) a continuous supply of political entrepreneurs; (4) success in war; (5) homogeneity (initial or created) of the subject population; (6) strong coalitions of the central power with major segments of the landed elite; (7) the high cost of state-building; (8) the intimate connection between the conduct of war, the building of armies, the extension and regularization of taxes and the growth of the state apparatus; (9) the large role of alternating coalitions between the central power and the major social classes within the subject population in determining the broad forms of government; and (10) the further effect of homogenization –or its absence– on the structure and effectiveness of government (Tilly, 1975, pp. 632–3).

Most importantly, he points out that the European state making experience included the struggle of various groups of people for their own interests against other groups, thus unintentionally promoting the formation of nation states. In Tilly's own words:

[S]mall groups of power-hungry men fought off numerous rivals and a great popular resistance in the pursuit of their own ends, and inadvertently promoted the formation of national states and widespread popular involvement in them (Tilly, 1975, p. 635).

This process reflects a bottom-up process of state building in the European context that effectively contradicts the current top-bottom state making processes promoted in post conflict states. In addition, Tilly insists that political rights were curtailed as the formation of national states went along (Tilly, 1975, p. 613). Ordinary people resisted to the state power (Tilly, 1975, p. 613). There were constant changes in every section undergoing political transformation (Tilly, 1975, p. 613). In sum, the state making period abounds with failures, bloodshed and suppression of political rights:

immense conflict, uncertainty, and failure [...] attended the building of national states everywhere in Europe (Tilly, 1975, p. 610). We see a widespread suppression of political rights and participation by the state-makers, we see recurrent crises of authority (both public and private) from the early days of state-making, frequently as a direct consequence of state-making (Tilly, 1975, p. 625).

Thus, crises in new, still forming states are predicted to be more dangerous, the known example being European countries, which went through severe crises during state making. As a result only few of them survived until today. Similarly, Verba argues that it took a long time to Western states to solve the problems of identity, legitimacy, participation and distribution, while new national states are expected to do it in a much shorter time span (Verba in Tilly, 1975, p. 611). This, in turn, shows that conflict and instability are part of state making which

is also experienced in developing countries. At the same time, however, it raises the question whether there has been any progress informed by the European experience before the 20th century. The relapse of developing countries into conflict needs also to be assessed in the light of the potential and the threats posed by that technology and other innovations have brought in the 20th and 21st century.

Furthermore, it has been argued that the powerful and participatory state came into existence as the Industrial Revolution and growing national markets had undermined traditional authorities in private sphere, creating demands for more political rights and equality. State makers, the governing elites at the time, had concentrated the authority in the public sphere but had left the private sphere almost unchanged (Benedix in Tilly, 1975, p. 625). Tilly acknowledges the convenient long-term effects of financing states armies, cities and policing (Tilly, 1975, p. 611). He notes that the state progress depended on the “coalitions of classes involved in modernization which eventually turn out to be crucial” (Tilly, 1975, p. 631).

Tilly also took into account external factors influencing state building. He points out the significance of alliances, the standing of a state in international forums, and the influence of ‘changing international structure of power’ (Tilly, 1975, p. 625). From the European experience, the governments’ strength, durability, effectiveness, and responsiveness was only weakly related to each other, slightly depending on wealth and complexity of population and “more strongly affected by the class coalitions, past and present, supporting a particular state’s government, and by the relationship of that state to the whole system of states” (Tilly, 1975, p. 613). Furthermore, state formation is influenced by interest groups which benefit certain clients that might be either international or local:

The simultaneous development of a nationwide authority, a corps of public officials formally insulated from “extraneous” influences, and the plebiscitarian tendencies in the political realm are accompanied by the development of functionally defined, organized interests. The efforts of public officials to obtain support, information and guidance from the relevant “publics” are matched point for point by the efforts of organized interests to influence government actions so as to benefit their members or clients (Benedix in Tilly, 1975, p. 624).

According to Tilly, the general conclusion was that the state was an ‘unintended outcome’ that resulted from ‘coercion and extraction’ (Tilly, 1975, p. 634).

Tilly also takes into account the models created by Lucian Pye, Gabriel Almond and others of ‘crises of political development’ which deal with crises, problems or challenges experienced by entities during the political development along with institutional solutions. They list the challenges and institutional solutions, including: (i) *penetration*, referring to the creation of administration (tax, manpower), public order, infrastructure, emergency action and defense; (ii) *integration*, referring to the creation of rules on the equal division of offices, benefits resources among different political and cultural sectors; (iii) *participation*, including voting for

groups of population and protection of opposition, (iv) *identity* referring to the creation of media, schools, as well as ‘rituals and symbols (myths, flags, songs)’, (v) *legitimacy*, referring to the establishment of confidence in - and loyalty to - political institutions and of the compliance with rules; and (vi) *distribution*, meaning the creation of social services and measures, ‘income equality equalization through progressive taxation and transfers between poorer and richer localities’ (Rokkan in Tilly, 1975, pp. 608–609). The model covers elements essential to understanding the different political problems and how they affect state making. The theory also reveals that the ‘more rapidly and simultaneously’ the challenges occur, the higher ‘the likelihood of intense conflict, breakdown and disintegration’ (Tilly, 1975, p. 609). Tilly concludes against this background that European states have more political experience, and thus less conflict, when compared to developing world countries. The main consequence is that conflict in developing countries is part of a normal evolution of state making, as has become clear in European history.

Considering the limitations at that time, Tilly thus argued that a new theory of state making must: (1) include ‘a particular kind of unit: a territory, a population, a state, a dynasty or something else, but something specific’, (2) when treating the political transformation, the unit of analysis must relate internal changes to changes in its relationship with the ‘rest of the world’, (3) experiences in the unit must be explicit, advanced in ‘open-ended and prospective fashion’ and (4) move away from enlisting the conditions under which stable democracies emerge ‘toward the task of specifying what paths away from, say, traditional kingship are likely and what affects the probabilities that one or another of these paths will actually be followed’ (Tilly, 1975, p. 635). He also calls for a theory that has ‘more room for expansion, domination, conflict and destruction’ for analysing contemporary state making. Furthermore, he concluded that European state making offered two more explanations ‘(1) the diffusion of a certain pattern of government among the richer countries of the world; and (2) the imposition of that standard pattern of government on the rest of the world by richer powers.’ (Tilly, 1975, p. 613) Lastly, by focusing on single national states and on the decisions within the reach of its managers, meaning governing elites, a lack of attention has been paid to the analysis of the national and international structures of power, the view from below, and the paths to alternatives that managers do not desire (Tilly, 1975, pp. 620–621). The current research seeks to take in greater account these aspects, insofar as they emerge from the grounded theory analysis.

Finally, his analysis show that the European historical state formation experience can assist in understanding the two main processes involved in the formation of new states, namely ‘center-to-periphery and external-creation processes’ (Tilly, 1975, p. 636). The first one refers to the expansive process to territories, populations, goods and activities until the points where territories are claimed by other strong centers or ‘the costs of communication and control ex-

ceeded the returns from the periphery' (Tilly, 1975, p. 636). The second process points to the 'more or less deliberate *creation* of new states by existing states' (Tilly, 1975, p. 636), as for example in the aftermath of the dissolutions of federations like Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, Napoleon's creation of the Batavian Republic or the unification of Italy and Germany in the 19th century. In addition, the collaboration and acceptance of other states in the international system was important, even for the cases of Netherlands and Portugal, created by rebellion. Tilly observed these two points reinforced a movement 'toward a worldwide state system' (Tilly, 1975, p. 637). Systematically he identified the following events contributing to state making processes worldwide:

the formation of few early national states in Europe amid a great variety of other political structures in Europe; (2) the mapping of most of Europe into distinct national states through wars, alliances and other maneuvers; [as in Italy] (3) the extension of political and economic domination from that European base to much of the rest of the world, notably through the creation of client states and colonies; (4) the formation- through rebellion and through international agreement- of formally autonomous states corresponding approximately to the clients and colonies; [as in Congo] (5) the extension of this state system to the entire world (Tilly, 1975, p. 637).

In addition, he argues that the formation of new states is 'a matter of convenience' (Tilly, 1975, p. 637). Europeans played a vital role in creating 'contemporary international state-system' and imposed the structure 'of their peculiar political institutions' (Tilly, 1975, p. 638). Those states that maintain European form of governance access the international system more easily. In light of the current research, this can serve as a point to identify whether new processes have been developed in the last periods.

Despite the ascendance of state making, he concludes that he was perhaps writing obituaries for the state. On one hand, he points out that the national state is decreasing its power towards regional fora's, potential of superstates like Europe or US, subnational regions, ethnic or racial groups. On the other hand, the strength of the divisions between these groups and the state might as well maintain the state. Thus strengthening the resistance of these groups might have an unintended result of strengthening the state as well. In addition, economic elements influence the formation of states, such as for instance Europe (though the federal European state is currently only a theoretical construct). The state will lose its significance if it remains "as an organization, controlling the principal means of coercion within a given territory, which is differentiated from other organizations operation in the same territory, autonomous, centralized and formally coordinated" (Tilly, 1975, p. 638). He concludes that the nation state might have been significant evolution in 18th and 19th century, but in the 20th century it might lose its significance, especially if assessed against its traditional definition including "the monopoly of coercion, the exclusiveness of control within the territory, the autonomy, the centralization, the formal coordination; even the differentiation from other organizations begins

to fall away in such compacts as the European Common Market”. Thus Tilly states that the state is losing its ‘universal significance’ (Tilly, 1975, p. 638).

There are many critics of the idea of the territorial state. The first challenges lie with power and its necessity. Power places more importance on territory rather than community that resides, and it is problematic since the territory is scarce and cannot be expanded, hence it will be constantly re-divided (P. Anderson, 1974, p. 31). Thus the process of state making or the territorial state might have negative effects on long run on wellbeing and existence of the population in general or selectively, the ones under attack for territorial disputes. This occurs since the states are not likely to give up territory without struggle (Elden, 2009, p. 2012). At the moment, negotiations of territorial boundaries are ongoing in many parts of the world like Asia, Balkans and there are ongoing territorial wars in Middle East and Africa. In addition, the ideological wars on Islam and global terror are weakening and destroying some states.

Furthermore, there are challenges to the state identified by the liberal theory, which places significance on global governance and international institutions, which challenge the internal sovereignty of the state. When states join the international institutions, they do cease some of their rights to these institutions. For instance, the European Union members have extended part of their trade and development rights to the supranational European level. Negotiated are currently taking place on the possibility of a common foreign and defense platform. Similarly, states upon joining the World Bank (WB) or World Trade Organization (WTO) cease national rights on trade and apply WTO trade rules. Clearly the state system faces many challenges as Tilly predicted, even though its obituaries still have not been written. This calls for caution when new states are attempted to be build externally in developing world, if the significance of the state has declined. The present complex world system requires consequently perhaps a rethinking of the state system.

Liberal Statebuilding

Liberal Democracy and Market Economy

The eventual result of the state formation phase was that the state became the central unit of the world system. Even today, the state is still being promoted despite the fact that the process of establishment has proven to be conflictual and violent and that its aftermath is followed by violations of political rights, sometimes lasting for decades. But despite its negative repercussions during formation, the solution to problems in fragile zones is ‘state building’, which is seen as central to creating a sustainable peace.

To provide a basic definition, the modern state is an ‘expression of power’ consisting of ‘institutions that provide certain functions and services’ (Greener, 2012, p. 418). According to Greener, the most elementary components of contemporary states are that they

are predominantly legal entities based on fixed territorial boundaries that emerge out of some sort of political settlement, claim some sort of legitimacy domestically and internationally, and include a political executive and separate, permanent and professional administrative structures to implement policy (Greener, 2012, p. 418).

Greener describes that there are two perspectives on the outcome of the state building process, an 'optimistic' one (in the sense that conflict will pass) and a 'pejorative' (though conflict is over not everything is well) (Greener, 2012, p. 418). In fact, it is also very difficult to conceptualize when conflict ends and when state and peace building efforts starts. Nowadays, rebuilding or building states involves a diverse set of tasks, both of political and technical nature.

Recent understandings of state building vary consequently, with the notion having become very wide. Usually, it is characterized by a common terminology including peace building, nation building, reconstruction, transition, international stabilization force, international administrations and other terms. Krause groups all these efforts under the general term "international state building and reconstruction efforts" (Krause, 2010, p. 157). He uses this term to describe the "efforts of international community of state and non-state actors towards building a state in a given society where state structures have been severely destroyed or compromised and where the political institutions, society and economy have to be re-constructed or constructed anew" (Krause, 2010, p. 157). Similarly, Call refers to contemporary state building as:

actions undertaken by international or national actors to establish, reform, or strengthen the institutions of the state and their relation to society (which may or may not contribute to peace building) (Call, 2008b, p. 5).

Other academics understand state building in terms of institutional capacity building, following a Weberian model that sees the process as "constructing or reconstructing institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security" (Chandler, 2006, p.1). The concept includes a state that is capable of providing security, collecting revenues and managing expenditures (Call & Wyeth, 2008, p. 8). In this context, the institutionalization of the organizations is important for their survival, establishing prescribed roles and managed expectations (Call & Wyeth, 2008, p. 8). As a consequence, "sustainability does not depend on any single individual but on a shared commitment to the principles, procedures and goals of the institution" (Call & Wyeth, 2008, p. 8).

Currently existing fragile states like Somalia, Afghanistan, East Timor are usually characterized by the collapse of the institutional infrastructure (Fukuyama, 2006, pp. 3–4). Therefore Fukuyama, in turn, prescribes a model of state building emphasizing the creation of political and economic institutions based on the principles of democracy and free market, which are the necessary components of nation building (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 3). The means used for the promotion of new political institutions and economic development are aid and other means.

According to him, nation building² aims to ‘construct a new political order in a land of new settlement without deeply rooted peoples, cultures, and traditions’ (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 3). Fukuyama’s model highlights in this context on the notions of *scope* - ‘the different functions and goals taken on by governments’ - and *strength* - ‘the ability of states to plan and execute policies and to enforce laws cleanly and transparently’ (Fukuyama, 2005, p. 9). Together, these are the requirements for states to run successfully from an institutional approach. This focus on state capacity in neoliberal institutionalism has also been reflected in current state building practice (Hameiri, 2010, p. 17).³ Strength includes furthermore the ability to administer efficiently and with a minimum of bureaucracy, control corruption, and bribery, maintain a high level of transparency and accountability in government institutions (Fukuyama, 2005, p. 9). According to Fukuyama, the optimal set up for an effective state is a combination of a limited scope of state functions and strong effectiveness (Fukuyama, 2005, p. 10). The strength of state institutions is therefore generally more important than the scope of state functions (Fukuyama, 2004, p. 19). A good state institution is one that transparently and efficiently serves the needs of its clients, that is, the citizens of the state (Fukuyama, 2005, p. 26). According to Fukuyama, outside powers can negotiate and enforce ceasefire agreements. For instance, Britain created India (Fukuyama, 2006). Then the examples of post war reconstruction of Germany and Japan are provided. However the two latter states had the institutional framework on place thus occupiers did not do much work. Furthermore the transition from the past was gradual, in both cases only the top layer of officials involved with the former regime were purged, in Germany many returned into the institutional framework and similarly the Emperor stayed in Japan. However the occupying powers managed to establish democratic infrastructures with constitution making and economic reconstruction (Fukuyama, 2006).

Another aspect that plays a significant role is the design of the state, meaning the arrangement and allocation of state powers (Call, 2008b, p. 9). Since state building is aimed almost exclusively to the creation of liberal democratic political system, it is important to consider the separation of power between the legislative, the executive and the judicial branches as well as the differences between parliamentary and presidential models on the one hand, and unitary and federal types on the other.

² To clarify, the American notion of nation building refers to the processes described here under the heading of state building, which is more commonly used in Europe to describe institutional and political reform. In the current research when Fukuyama is being referred to, what is at stake is essentially state building in the sense addressed in this dissertation.

³ Call points out that ‘state capacity is not simply service delivery but institutionalization of its various organizations’ He adopts Keohane’s definition of institutions as ‘the process by which a cluster of activities acquires a persistent set of rules that constrain activity, shape expectations, and prescribe roles of actors’ (Call, 2008b, p. 8).

How do all these different conceptions work out in practice? Robinson argues that “a series of changes in international politics – globalization, the end of the Cold War, changes in developmental discourse, alongside with the existence of a larger array of weak states since decolonization – have created a dangerous situation in which the state building agenda has become *universalized* (Robinson, 2007, p. 11). In fact, the quest for such a universal solution to state building led to the reinvention of the state in the 1990s. The state became an infrastructural power functioning as ‘a vehicle for controlling’ processes related to economic growth (Robinson, 2007, p. 11). The consequence was that “development was market centered and [that] the state was to achieve its ends through ‘good governance’ rather than bureaucratic direction’ (Robinson, 2007, p. 11). In other words, the framework has sought to promote not only (and actually to a lesser extent) the Weberian element of monopoly of force in a territory, but rather to assist in the establishment of markets.

According to the liberal theorists, the state is the ideal form of political organization as it can provide peace, security and development in the international system. State building should be therefore pursued actively in the future, to decrease the number of failed states which, by providing territorial spaces for criminals and terrorist, constitute a threat to international security (Greener, 2012, p. 417). To achieve this, the current liberal model of state building prescribes activities promoting “good governance, democracy, states and markets simultaneously” (Robinson, 2007, p. 14). Greener suggests that it “tries to embed certain Western or liberal democratic characteristics such as market economies, individual rights, political representation and the rule of law” (Greener, 2012, p. 420). This consensus among the liberal peace theorists about the two main processes, democratic governance and market oriented economy, is strong despite the fact that there are many contentious issues even within the theory (Paris, 2010, p. 337). Critical theorists similarly argue that liberal peace promotes essentially ‘liberal democracy and market economy’ (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p. 221).

All in all, state building is widely held to be one of the most pressing policy questions facing the international community. Call stresses that sustainable state building depends on whether institutional commitments are shared and whether the collective identities of the rebuilt states have been accommodated through state building. Fukuyama on the other hand emphasizes more institutional capacity and scope, while yet other academics focus on the promotion of norms and values abroad.

A more practical than theoretical contribution has been made by the Brahimi report which refers to state building as the effort of ‘building effective systems and institutions of government’ (Brahimi, 2007, p. 5). According to this UN report, it consists of a set of activities including constitution-making, the setting up of electoral processes and the rule of law, the achievement of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), and national reconciliation (Brahimi, 2007, p. 4). Contemporary state building consist thus of ‘technical’ activities

of the (re)building of democracy (constitution, electoral processes & offices of state), the rule of law (security and justice), reconciliation and economic system (taxation, etc) (Greener, 2012, p. 418). These activities aim to ensure sustainability and stability in the long term (Brahimi, 2007, p. 4). More recently, neoliberal state building has been applied focusing on two main premises, namely security and capital, for regional security and order. Since the state building notion is a complex notion and not easily definable, it is used in this dissertation to refer to the reconstruction of failed or weak states after war and under the auspices of the international community, that is, international organizations or coalitions of states. We now turn to the local ownership debate that focuses on the delicate balance between international and local governance in fragile states, degrees of international and local inclusion and the duration of international involvement. This is mainly due to the fact that state building has so far been described as oscillating

between imposition of international preferences on the one hand, where decisions are appropriated and prescribed, and neglect on the other, where ambassadors and representatives merely observe and report, while venal government officials and rulers systematically destroy institutions. (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008, p. 8)

Reconstruction and Development through ‘Local Ownership’

As explained so far, nation building contains four components or phases, namely peace enforcement, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction and long-term economic and political development. The first two components take priority, as they are the necessary conditions for the stabilization of the situation, which is a prerequisite for the other two. However, they are very distinct processes. Peacekeeping refers to intervening in a post-conflict situation when a ceasefire has already been agreed upon, with troop presence serving a symbolic and deterrent effect. In contrast, peace enforcement refers to military interventions against a party in order to end a conflict. In Kosovo, peace enforcement was undertaken at the initiative of NATO, which took the side of the Kosovo Albanians against the Serbian forces, ending the conflict with the Kumanovo Agreement. After Kumanovo, the peacekeeping stage began with the deployment of the UN interim administration mission, UNMIK, and the NATO peace support mission, KFOR. The goal of both peacekeeping missions seem to have been achieved, with the exception of the March 2004 riots. For more than 15 years, KFOR has succeeded in maintaining a good deterrent effect, except during this one incident.

The latter two stages, post conflict reconstruction and economic and political development are conceptually different (Fukuyama, 2006, pp. 232–234). Reconstruction refers to “restoration of war-torn or damaged societies to their pre conflict situation” (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 5). It thereby involves international actors to perform ‘functions [such] as providing health care, security, financial services, infrastructure rebuilding, and humanitarian assistance’

(Fukuyama, 2006, p. 234). Fukuyama describes the conditions when reconstruction would likely be successful:

Reconstruction is possible when the underlying political and social infrastructure has survived conflict or crisis; the problem is then the relatively simple matter of injecting sufficient resources to jumpstart the process, in the form of supplying food, roads, buildings, infrastructure, and the like (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 5).

On the other hand development is much more complex than reconstruction, referring to the “creation of new institutions and the promotion of sustained economic growth, events that transform the society open-endedly into something that it has not been previously” (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 5). In the past, economic planning (through ‘technical training’) and aid (through infrastructure and industrialization projects) were part of the standard packages for post conflict countries. The drawback of this approach was that the lack of legitimacy of the democratic government was ignored. As a result, donors were implicated in human rights abuses and the international community often failed to prevent relapse to war and violence, as for instance in Iraq (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 5). In addition, the development approach in 1950s and 60s provided solutions based on developed world despite that on the ground resources lacked. It was hoped that the lack of resources would simply be compensated by investment capital. This approach failing, the focus then shifted towards ‘education, population control, debt relief, and structural adjustment’ (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 6). In addition, with economic liberalism being promoted by the Reagan and Thatcher administrations in 1980s and 90s, there was a further reorientation towards the free market, deregulation, tax decrease, and privatization. According to Fukuyama, both of the approaches did not provide good solutions.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the focus shifted once again, this time to ‘institutions and governance’ but there is still a lack of knowledge on how to build institutions in the developing world (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 6). The idea of development implies that these political and economic institutions will be self-sustaining after the withdrawal of the external actors. Development is thus thought to be a process that demands “local ownership in the long run” (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 234), requiring external actors to envisage a viable ‘exit strategy’ and thus the “eventual weaning of local actors and institutions from dependence on outside aid” (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 7).

The complex interaction between locals and internationals is very significant for successful reconstruction and development. According to Fukuyama, both of the development strategies seem to have failed to create growth, especially in states with weak institutions and where local elites are ‘uninterested or incapable in managing the development process themselves’ (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 6). The other problem is that “the outside nation-builders get into the habit of ruling and making decisions, [that] and they are reluctant to allow their local protégés to make their own mistakes” (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 7). In addition, they ‘lack clarity about

their own impact on local populations' (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 7). While being a very important process, an overly lengthy reconstruction can also be counterproductive as it

can actually impede long-term development, because involvement by the international community can breed dependence and weaken local institutions. (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 234)

This is mainly due to the fact that a large amount of international actors, including militaries, aid organizations, and NGOs first take the driving seat in these processes due to the lack of local resources in the aftermath of war. This in turn impedes local capacity building since "what little capacity exists is undermined by the presence of foreigners richly endowed with both resources and capabilities" (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 7). In short, international stakeholders are constantly faced with challenges such as "weak institutions" or "uninterested" or "incapable" locals. At the same time, their involvement over a long period of time seem to produce a reluctance to hand in the decision making powers to locals, thus further weakening local institutions, producing dependence and undermining local capacities. The impact therefore is of course that it hinders long-term development, which then results in a long-term involvement of the international community. This vicious cycle sustains underdevelopment.

The distinction between development and reconstruction is often not very sharp since both processes are required in the aftermath of war. The main dilemmas are their balancing, timely support and the eventual exit. Bosnia is one example of unsuccessful development, as the international High Commissioner took over the governance functions, bringing about an international dependency instead of local independence. In addition, the internationals have lacked an exit strategy even though it was clear that the country might relapse to war if international actors exit (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 7). In practice, exiting can mean that certain government functions will not be immediately available for the population (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 7). For instance, with the exiting of US forces in Iraq, security services provided jointly by internationals and locals stopped as the locals were insufficiently prepared to provide them alone. The lack of development of local security capabilities in Iraq resulted in international, and more particularly US dependence. The latest failure of the US exit strategy is also reflected in the fact that Iraqi forces failed to defend the territory and provide security for their citizens as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) took control over substantive parts of the of the territory, essentially prompting the third intervention in Iraq (although the recent one is carried out only through air attacks). The early US exit undermined arguably all the state building efforts since it created a space for a new violent transnational group to take over and destroy what was already rebuilt. In terms of the state building stages in Iraq, peace enforcement has been successful for a short term, but failed again when a new armed group emerged. Development was of course also affected, and the reconstruction of the state to the situations before the intervention has not been achieved.

From Good Governance to Resilience

One of the main agenda points of development is good governance, which over time shifted from ‘being a selection criterion into an overarching objective of development cooperation activities’ (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 14). Similarly, Chandler argues that international actors have a “goal of developing and exporting frameworks of good governance” (Chandler, 2010a, p. 1). This occurs during the international state building which is a paradigm “through which the world is understood and engaged” and which is full of discourses and policy practices (Chandler, 2010a, p. 9). The promotion of good governance in post-conflict countries, meaning to establish a government that is responsible and transparent towards its citizens, as well as private and international organization, is hereby one of the most significant elements. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), for instance, supports “promoting good governance in all its aspects, including by ensuring the rule of law, improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling corruption, as essential elements of a framework within which economies can prosper” (Camdessus, 1996). The reduction of corruption is important as it undermines public trust in the government and hinders economic growth in the long term. The United Nations Development Programme provides a more comprehensive view by pointing out five principles of good governance:

Legitimacy and voice	Participation and consensus orientation
Direction	Strategic vision
Performance	Responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency
Accountability	Accountability and transparency
Fairness	Equity and rule of law

Table 1. Good Governance Principles (ESCAP, 2013)

Currently, human rights and civil society participation are not part of these principles, even though they were during the late 1990s (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, pp. 13–14). Good governance includes two main aspects, respectively the ‘management of rules governing human behaviour and decisions’ (rules and enforcement mechanisms) and secondly ‘exercise of power’ and its legitimacy (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 10). Thus the following elements are also measured when analysing good governance: the separation of powers, institutional checks and balances, representative public policy making, rule of law, oversight and control of institutions (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 11).

For example, the IMF argues that these principles need to derive from the institutions themselves since “integrity starts at home”, meaning internally in the institutions (IMF, 2013). Therefore these principles should as well be implemented from these institutions. IMF de-

mands transparency from the borrowing banks and governments through mechanisms of oversight, internal control and auditing. Internally, IMF established a Code of Conduct for the Staff and the Members of the Executive Board, an Integrity Hotline to protect the whistleblowers and an Ethics Office. Similarly, other international organizations have started to develop such transparency mechanisms, even if limited in scope.

Overall, reforms ‘cannot progress without addressing existing inequities’, thus ‘equity and legitimacy’ are central to the reform process (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 10). In addition, democratic deficits, social inequities and equality should be addressed. Ernstorfer and Stockmayer argue that ‘strategies, even if they are technically sound, will not be effective in the long run if they do not respect the rights of those affected, the interests of stakeholders or the legitimacy of institutions’ (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 10). One of the main criticisms of good governance that need to be addressed are that they are ‘too ideological’ and Western while ignoring the cultural context. In addition, donors themselves might not be upholding the same standards they impose on developing countries. Moreover, the concept is at times regarded as too technocratic and scientific, ignoring ‘political considerations of local economic, social and cultural politics’ (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 15). In trying to be comprehensive, they then often overburden the system. Thirdly, institutional or legal transplants from the developed world to countries under reconstruction have often not been successful, hence there has been a call to ‘return to basics’ (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 15), though even this call needs to be assessed against today’s circumstances. Ernstorfer & Stockmayer (2009, p. 17) argue also that governance needs to take into account the political, not only technical dimensions. However, they remain pessimistic about the future of good governance activities since

the conditions needed to turn these choices into strategies and finally into action are lacking: beneficiaries’ voices are weak, those in a position to wield power and influence are unlikely to share it, and processes which would increase leverage and/or promote collective actions are unknown or untried (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 22)

One among other suggestions on how to improve good governance is to develop capacity of individuals, groups, and organizations so that they can conduct their affairs sustainably (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 16). Capacities, however, are held not to be delivered and neither to be built, but to be ‘acquired’ over a long time. They are implemented through training personnel and restructuring institutions. Now initiatives shifted to ‘technical cooperation’, referring to development of individual and institutional capacities in the political context. The cooperation is based on norms and values such as ‘democratic order, the rule of law, human rights, a free market economy, social justice, transparency, accountability and participation’ (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 20). In order to increase the likelihood of success, each capacity development project should take into account participation and ownership, the role

of mediator, flexible mandates of technical cooperation, a holistic approach and realistic expectations about outcomes including failure (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 18). Success generally depends on the degree to which the international community succeeds to oversee reforms, bridge shortages, propose new reform strategies, fosters commitment to change, and identifies and mobilizes reform actors (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 18).

In enhancing the good governance projects, donors face mainly two main challenges. Initially, the results of the program need to be formulated together, but planning is often of limited use since some developments cannot be foreseen, especially political changes in a country. Similarly, the objectives of the reform processes need to be formulated at the beginning, but in practice there is a need to renegotiate these aspects constantly, together with indicators and methods of measurement. This procedure allows emerging themes to be captured in running projects. Furthermore, when incentives are created by the international community, they need to take into account the elements such as rent seeking and patronage, state capture and corruption, responsibility and accountability, responsiveness and political agency (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 19). It has also been suggested to employ multi-level approaches, multi-stakeholder alliances or cross sector donor harmonization (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 20).

Ernstorfer and Stockmayer argue that in the sectors where good governance was promoted, 'process and outcomes were positively affected'. They find specifically in their study that there is a positive result when capacity development has been employed for good governance. However, they argue that this process requires 'consistent strategies' of reforms in the public sector. They suggest to map the landscape and identify reform groups, conduct 'an open-minded actions-oriented investigation' for pro poor, develop conditions for mitigating reform risks, build relationships with local actors, pursue political dialogues and exclude conditionality if the actors resist conditionality. Otherwise, actors will not fulfill the conditions and poverty will remain. Lastly, they note that the time span for reform efforts is long especially when a more equitable distribution of power and resources is envisaged. Changes in the economy require 'permanent adjustments and reorientations of capacities' (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, pp. 28–29). Thus the aim is to support the demand side: civil society must produce information to hold officials accountable and media. At the same time, at the supply side, international actors must have 'a reasonable and transparent agenda [...] with expectations that can be achieved' (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 29).

The concept of good governance has been very prominent during the 1990s but has also been subject to criticism (Debiel & Lambach, 2009, p. 22). Chandler for instance claims that international statebuilding is geared towards overcoming institutional blockages, or changing the 'rules of the game', through turning bad governance into good governance (Chandler, 2010a, p. 6). The political processes follow from state building rather than from social dynamics on

the ground that could be the basis for the creation of a locally acceptable state. Chandler is thus against technical approaches based on a good governance agenda in fragile states. Instead, he points out how state building practices constitute highly invasive forms of external regulation (Chandler, 2006, pp. 1–25). State building forms of regulation are in his view, in the context of an ‘Empire in Denial’, attempts by Western states and international institutions to conceal the power which they wield and to evade accountability for its exercise. Chandler’s questions concepts including state building without sovereignty, the governance of government, the ethics of the empire, the West, which is exemplified by EU’s involvement in the Eastern Europe, and especially in Bosnia and Kosovo. Those techniques of evasions are also employed under the umbrellas of anti-corruption initiatives and the rule of law notion. Identifying the dilemma of local dependency, Chandler suggests that “international state building approaches insist on regulatory role of international institutions and suggest that locally derived political solutions are likely to be problematic” (Chandler, 2007, p. 71). More concretely, the international community prioritizes the frameworks of good governance over the domestic processes of government, a state that he refers to as ‘governance over government’. The main argument is that “political process is a product of state policies rather than constitutive of them” (Chandler, 2007, p. 71). The end goals of state building, democracy and political autonomy, are thus not taken into account during the process itself.

Cunliffe elaborates further on the argument concerning the evasion of responsibility. In terms of international standards and law, the international community tries to create policies that prevent violations of national or international law while excluding the possibility of being held responsible and accountable (see Cunliffe, Chandler and Pupavac). Firstly, immunities and privileges are offered by international law to protect international organizations and their employees. In addition, Cunliffe observes a shift of the quality of state sovereignty after the end of Cold War, meaning from less to more state sovereignty in 21st century. However, the content remains the same during both periods, as the international community tries to exercise “power without responsibility” (Cunliffe, 2007, p. 65). This new interventionism period takes place on the basis of the human rights framework and democratic governance that

allowed Western states to exercise power on behalf of people to whom they were not accountable – a process that reflected the degradation of human agency (Cunliffe, 2007, p. 65).

Secondly, IOs focus on reacting to urgencies, pursuing crises management rather than promoting viable solutions, thus allowing Western states to exercise power in developing states. But this form requires the international community to avoid the institutionalization of any mechanism of responsibility (Cunliffe, 2007, p. 66). The accountability gap in international organizations has generally been acknowledged, and with it the problems of remedies for locals (Wilde, 2007, 2010). This furthermore reinforces Wilde’s argument on the creation of

legitimacy through the forming of administrative missions, which allows them to engage in activities, in this case capacity building, that in their character do not assume any responsibility (Wilde, 2007, 2010). This results, as Robinson argues, in an approach where

[i]nternational sponsors of state-building projects set the terms and conditions under which their projects are conducted but at the same time undermine the prerequisites of successful state-building and fail to take direct responsibility for their actions (Robinson, 2007, p. 17).

More recently, the international community has moved away from fragility and good governance in statebuilding towards a “resilience” agenda, as already mentioned in the Introduction and as seen in New Deal, the European Report Development 2009, and European Commission strategies since 2012 (IDPS, 2013; Pospisil & Besancenot, 2014). Chandler argues that this shift

follows disillusionment with liberal internationalist understandings that Western or international actors could resolve problems of development, democracy and peace through the export of liberal institutions (Chandler, 2013, p. 276).

Essentially, the role of resilience is a sort “of apologia for the limits of international intervention, ideologically reifying the limits to transformation as internal products of the societies being intervened upon” (Chandler, 2013, p. 284). Chandler argues that local vulnerabilities and agency serve as a ground for evading responsibility of international stakeholders when engaging in state building. In addition, resilience plays an ideological role “in the rationalisation and legitimisation of a broad range of external policy interventions in the societal sphere, which at the same time offers an understanding of the limits to policy success or to societal transformation” (Chandler, 2013, p. 284). In short, the failures of state building led according to this view to the invention of resilience as a response to critiques of its liberal assumptions. Due to the emerging concentration on resilience,

societal practices and the ‘everyday’ have become a focal point of international intervention and legitimised on the basis of a relational understanding of the embedded subject (Chandler, 2013, p. 284)

The interesting point is that the bottom-up production of problems and solutions fits to both the ‘neoliberal understandings of the problem of rational agency and with radical or critical approaches to the liberal subject and liberal peace understandings’ (Chandler, 2013, p. 284). Within the agenda of resilience, bottom-up considerations have a higher likelihood of having a transformative effect. Still, Chandler argues that it is

problematic in that it remains entirely within the world of superficial appearances and ideologically erases structural constraints and power relations from the picture (Chandler, 2013, p. 284).

There are not many cases where the resilience agenda to development has been applied in practice. For instance, in assessing the European Union development cooperation in South Sudan, despite the inclusion of resilience in general European guidelines and strategies, in

practice, its implementation in country strategies and programs is problematic since explicit references to resilience are lacking (Pospisil & Besancenot, 2014).

In addition, there has been a change of wording of the United Nations missions in post-conflict areas lately. The naming of the missions changed compared from the ‘Interim Administration Mission’, UNMIK, as it was established in Kosovo in 1999, to a ‘Support Mission’ in Libya (UNSMIL), as established in 2014. In Libya, the UN deployed a mission complementary with national ownership to support the transition to democracy, promote the rule of law and human rights, and build the security sector and governance capabilities (UNSMIL, 2014). However, the tasks of both missions are quite similar. It thus remains to be seen whether the different name also signals a true change in post-conflict reconstruction practices or whether it represents a new form of evading responsibility, this time through changing the name of the missions. In conclusion, resilience offers a new concept that moves away from good governance, but it serves to a large extent the same purpose of legitimising external interventions by placing the subjects on the forefront of state building, thus sustaining a lack of responsibility and accountability. In the current case study of Kosovo, based on 61 interviews, none of international or local participants have directly referred to the notion. This illustrates that the policy changes are still not being implemented on the ground, which however also puts into doubt Chandler’s argument about it being used to cover hegemonic power relations by internationals in their everyday work.

Liberal Critique

The supporters of liberal statebuilding have been criticized from both the problem solving approach (that is, a positivist perspective) and from critical approaches. The following section summarizes the liberal positivist critique, whereas the next chapter will outline in depth the post liberal critiques. Firstly, they acknowledge its limitations, stating that some of its models have been ‘difficult’ and ‘unpredictable’ and that in some cases they produced ‘destabilising side effects’ (Paris, 2010, p. 337). For instance, Paris, even though himself a proponent, recognizes some of the limitations of liberal state building, conceding that state building can be in some cases

a form of Western or liberal imperialism that seeks to exploit or subjugate the societies hosting the missions...[and that] post-conflict operations of the past two decades have done more harm than good (Paris, 2010, p. 338)

The problem-solving approaches have given the following solutions to the challenges to current liberal state building. Fukuyama, a liberal theorist, takes an approach that is more of a ‘lessons learnt’ type, looking into what went wrong and suggesting concrete improvements to successive state building to avoid the same mistakes (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 14). First, he stresses that in the future those involved should be “far more cautious in undertaking such ambitious projects” (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 14). However as fragile states still pose problems to

the international system, powers cannot leave the industry of state building in the future (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 14). He suggests setting the priorities on those sectors of the state that need to be rebuilt most urgently at the beginning. By looking at the case study of Iraq, he proposes first to establish security for workers in the fragile zones and then move to the reconstruction of the political authority and the economy.

Of course, coordination, choices of coalitions (ie internationals), and resources are of significance as well (Fukuyama, 2006). Call observes similar gaps, in both theory and practice, in international civilian office capacities, a lack of donors as well as problems of coordination (Call, 2008b, p. 3). In practice, the international community, that is, the international organizations together with the most important states involved in state building processes, identified the inadequacy of institutional structures and construction efforts in post-conflict reconstruction, to which they responded by creating new departments and modifying older ones. The World Bank created a Post Conflict Unit and a Fragile States Unit. The United Nations created a Peacebuilding Commission, a Peacebuilding Fund and a Peace-building Support Office in the UN Secretariat. Moreover, states have taken their individual efforts to establish new departments to deal with these challenges. The issue of coordination between departments in particular has been prominent, for instance in the United States, leading to the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) (Call, 2008b, p. 4).

There has also been a wide criticism about the lack of cooperation between local and international actors and the inability of local actors to establish bilateral relations in the international system. Since it is difficult to adjust to institutional changes quickly, domestic and international structures are likely to cooperate less (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985; Gaubatz, 1996; Leeds, 1999). However, cooperation depends also on partnerships. In a post-conflict context, ‘partnerships’ are usually unbalanced, meaning that power lies with the international and not with the local actors (Greener, 2012, p. 419). The international community is the interested party, respectively IOs, bilateral donors, NGOs, “who have resources and motivations to shape other states” (Greener, 2012, p. 419). Furthermore, state building is theoretically an endogenous process in which international actors can assist, though “in practice there may be little in the way of shared local interest of capacity in post-conflict situations to drive the process within” (Greener, 2012, p. 419). In consequence, cooperation depends on partnerships that are usually unbalanced and the capacities of the locals.

Another shortcoming of international state building, the lack of exit strategies, and especially late and early exits (ie Afghanistan), is pointed out by Richard Caplan. He suggests to find better exit strategies in order to be successful in state building, not least by preventing local frustration. Caplan stresses in this context the need for a detailed planning of exit strategies during the early phases of interventions (Caplan, 2012).

Finally, Robinson claims that “whatever the problem, democratic statebuilding is the solution... it telescopes state development, democratic development and market development into simultaneous, or near simultaneous, process” (Robinson, 2007, p. 13). However, the simultaneous promotion of these three policies is problematic as it may distort any one of them and overburdens the decision-makers. For instance, democracy building can divert the attention away from markets and vice versa, for instance when elites or democratic majorities are not supportive of promoting market developments or property rights. One suggestion to tackle this dilemma, advocated for instance by Fukuyama, has been to sequence reforms, and this has indeed already occurred in Eastern Europe. Robinson also advocates for sequencing as otherwise states weakness will be perpetuated: “not only does building state, democracy and market at the same time run the risk of one or more of the process corrupting the others, it actually provides incentives for such behavior and hence for the ruination of all and the perpetuation of state weakness” (Robinson, 2007, p. 14).

In addition, public support for state building efforts in foreign countries has declined since the involvement of the international community in Afghanistan and Iraq (Krause & Mallory IV, 2010, p. 12). The willingness of the international community to assist immediately in new post-conflict contexts has also decreased, even though the most recent conflicts in the Middle East may lead to a reorientation. With the rise of ISIS in Middle East, public support for intervention has risen again, as exemplified by 71% of Americans support Obama’s airstrikes in Iraq (Balz & Craighill, 2014). Responding generally to the aforementioned problems, Krause and Mallory stress the need

to set clear directions, understand the context or available resources, produce timely, independent and recurring reviews, and change directions or plans throughout the operation (Krause & Mallory IV, 2010, p. 17)

Liberal Peace building: Democracy and Human Rights

Peace building is often being referred to as a synonym to state building. Indeed, it is one of the significant components of peace building (Goetze & Guzina, 2008, p. 319), as will be shown below. Many definitions and usages of state and peace building exist, as one author states, the relationship between peace building and state building is ‘complicated, contingent and context-dependent’ (Call, 2008b, p. 3). Peace building mainly refers to actions undertaken by ‘international or national actors to consolidate or institutionalize peace’ (Call, 2008b, p. 5). It thus aims to end and prevent a relapse to war through interventions, which rebuild institutions and promote national peace and foster the reconciliation between former adversaries. During the pre-conflict phase, peace building focuses on prevention, while during the conflict phase it recourses to military and humanitarian activities. After conflict, the aims and activities lie mainly on strengthening different state functions, which is where there is an overlap with statebuilding (e.g. political legitimacy, security, justice, economy) and reconciliation

agendas (Call, 2008b, p. 5; Goetze & Guzina, 2008, p. 319). But in comparison, peace building prioritizes the reduction of violence and securitization. Policy programs deal mainly security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Furthermore, one can identify initiatives concerning religion, such as inter-faith dialogue, and with gender, seeking to empower women. However, they also work on everyday issues like employment, education and youth.

In order to understand peace building, one must consider the notion of peace. Peace can take both negative and positive forms. Negative peace refers to the ‘absence of direct violence’ and implies a more or less permanent ceasefire (Call, 2008b, p. 6). Positive peace refers to presence of direct peace (cooperation), structural peace (equity, equality) and culture peace (peace and dialogue), and thus the ‘absence of structural violence’ which is ‘the non-intended slow, but massive suffering by economic, political and cultural structures’ (e.g. exploitation) and ‘cultural violence that legitimizes direct and/or structural violence’ (Galtung, 2007, pp. 30–31). The second one implies therefore the ‘eradication of poverty and inequality, accountable governance, democracy, respect for human rights, and a culture of nonviolence’ (Call, 2008b, p. 6). Yet, Call suggests to measure peace building more moderately by the lack of recurrence of warfare as well as some sustained, national mechanisms for the resolution of conflict – signified by participatory politics. Participatory politics does not equate to liberal democracy, but refers to mechanisms for aggrieved social groups to feel that they have both a voice and a stake in the national political system (Call, 2008b, pp. 6–7).

This understanding excludes states with stable but authoritarian and illegitimate governments. Building states aims to build peace in the long term. However, this need has been recognized only in the 1990s with failing states, such as the DRC and Haiti. Where a peace process is pursued that is aimed at security reform and human rights protection, strengthening states becomes a prerequisite for sustainable peace. As Call sums up, state building may assist peace building due to its

complementary relationship’ through developing sustainable mechanisms [justice, police or service delivery] for security and conflict resolution at the national level that should carry legitimacy in the eyes of the populace and of the outside world (Call, 2008b, p. 12).

In this way parties can resolve conflicts institutionally, meaning that state building could ‘reduce the incentives to seek basic goods outside established channels or through violence’ (Call, 2008b, p. 13). Furthermore, state building is supposed to ‘accelerate’ the withdrawal of international actors by ‘ensuring stability and popular support for an emergent regime’ (Call, 2008b, p. 13).

Still, tensions arise between the two processes often even though the end goals seem not conflicting at the first sight. The end goal of state building is to create ‘self-sustaining, legitimate, and effective states’, which are the cornerstones of peace building, which end goal is ‘self-

sustaining peace' (Call, 2008b, p. 13). The tension arises when the programs are implemented in accordance with the ends goals. More concretely, strengthening state institutions may harm peace building despite actors' best intentions in their involvement in post-conflict reconstruction. The harm can be seen on '(1) what externals actors fail to do, (2) what they do, and (3) how they do it' (Call, 2008a, p. 367). As Call observes, 'harm may result from inadequate international efforts, from blind or shortsighted international approaches, or from perversely self-interested international proclivities' (Call, 2008a, p. 367). In order to prevent this, he provides three main principles of 'doing no harm' in post-conflict settings. Firstly, the 'harm of neglect' refers to involvement driven by 'interests' that result in 'insufficient commitment' in terms of money or mandates, especially where such commitment 'could have curbed the behavior of corrupt elites'. The second, 'harm of excessive international presence and prerogatives', describes the 'privileging of short-term solutions over long-term needs' which undermines the strengthening of state institutions and the foundations of sustainable peace. More simply, this harm is caused by doing 'too much'. The last, the 'harm of blind interests' relates to international actors affecting local economy and the host state more generally. These effects are positive on the one hand as the high amount of aid and staff provide markets for products, but on the other hand they also create markets for 'sex industry, aggravate human trafficking, and [they] distort housing, food, and labor markets' (Carnahan et al. Call, 2008a, p. 369). In addition, IOs and donors draw qualified local staff by offering higher salaries, thus leaving the state with fewer capacities.

Among other general problems, international actors show also 'too little awareness of the state in their priorities and programming', channeling aid to beneficiaries and thus undermining the legitimacy of the state, establishing inappropriate rule of law priorities and showing lack of attention to legitimacy questions. In other words, international actors must consider 'the potentially adverse effects of their interventions' (Call, 2008a, pp. 367–370). However, that might be difficult since the international actors 'exhibit self-interested (often self-defeating) behavior, [whereas] national efforts to build state strength often result in exclusion, displacement, and death' (Call, 2008a, p. 385).

In addition, Call finds that there are six tensions between peace building and state building. According to the first tension, international actors must refrain from transferring too many powers too quickly to the new state to avoid sparking of renewed conflict. More specifically, a risk exists that the defeated armed group might resist the new state. One way to do this is to be more creative on finding solutions as to the providence of state functions. For instance, state powers could be substituted temporarily by substate or suprastate entities, including NGOs, IOs or other arrangements that could include the private sector as well.

To avoid the second tension, international actors must be careful to not bypass state institutions. Although it makes sense sometimes, it undermines state building in the end. Preexisting

institutions should not be dismissed as using old staff since they can increase legitimacy as argued earlier. In addition, the international community should prioritize and avoid short-term measures in order to avoid redeployment. The latter depends on how former enemies have redeveloped the relationship. Deployment of troops to keep peace has two implications, keeping peace but also does not contribute to state building and undermines peace building in long term. More practical recommendations are given such as using elections to remove corrupt elites. If elections are not successful, another option is to strengthen the legislature, judiciary and NGOs in the long term as another means of oversight and accountability. Thus Call argues that a balancing act between the first and second tension must be drawn because total transfer and total bypassing are two extremes that ought to be avoided.

The third tension arises between the Weberian system of meritocracy with ‘principles of peacemaking – compromise and power sharing – in order for peace to survive the short run and make sustainable statebuilding possible’ (Call, 2008b, p. 65). Put more simply, to build trust, the representation of groups susceptible to discrimination must be guaranteed, despite potential shortcomings in competency (ie ex-combatants) (e.g. Bosnia, Palestine). Since patronage and clientalism often prevail, Call suggests the international community to add ‘incentives for meritocratic criteria’. However, this suggestion underestimates how these preliminary and ‘balanced’ state structures can become permanent and thus problematic, causing institutional deadlock, corruption and elevated nationalism, as seen for instance in Bosnia and Kosovo.

The fourth tension is about the security forces. The absence of an inclusive and accountable strengthening of state security forces, so warns Call, are likely to ‘foster human rights abuses, political exclusion, state delegitimation, and even war’ (Call, 2008a, p. 377). For instance, social group defeated in elections may reignite war or the group in power may become involved in abuses. Hence ‘military criminal investigative capacities’, ‘internal affairs police unit’, ‘intelligence oversight mechanism’ must be strengthened.

The fifth tension relates to the dilemma of peace versus justice and sustainability. As Call states ‘appeasing spoilers in the interest of peace, while neglecting the development of a sustainable state, can strengthen the hand of repressive or authoritarian state rulers and jeopardize the sustainability of both the state and peace’ (Call, 2008a, p. 378). In many cases, the wish to maintain peace comes at the expense of state performance, including undesirable outcomes such as unaccountability, lack of oversight and corruption [e.g. Arafat’s government in Palestine].

Finally, there is the sixth problem that ‘transitional mechanisms that help resolve short-term problems for either peace or state capacity can later create difficulties for both’ (Call, 2008a, p. 378). More particularly, international transitional administrations ‘tend to freeze politics in ways that undermine the sustainability of long-term peace’ (Call, 2008a, p. 379). This point

relates to tension number three as well. Exclusion of armed groups may reignite war however its inclusion also diminishes legitimacy over time. Also often civil society may be left excluded due to inclusion and the interests of combatants. Mitigation strategies involve 'incorporation of civil society in peace negotiations and the linking of DDR' programs with 'projects to meet the needs of communities of displaced civilians'. It is also suggested to provide temporary capacity through hiring international actors, or support returned exiles that return only momentarily. In order to prevent lasting damage to the state building efforts, hired temporary capacity can be replaced with national ones especially in areas crucial for the long term development of state (Call, 2008a, pp. 374–379).

State building models do not fit to local contexts however 'state functions [legitimacy, security, economy, and justice] repeatedly prove to be essential to the viability of war-torn states' thus there is an essential link between those two processes (Call, 2008b, p. 13). The state functions are of context based importance as their importance may change depending on state's 'historical conditions' (Call, 2008b, p. 16). According to Call, the state should be understood as 'an arena of competition and sometimes cooperation among self-interested national elites, private actors, nongovernmental organizations, and international donors and organizations' thus as the 'central locus of social conflict', which therefore should not be treated as a platform to implement technical reforms (Call, 2008a, p. 385). In order to build effectively both peace and states, the international community should

strategize between negotiated deals and their consequences for a sustainable state; between capacity and legitimacy; between urgent short term measures and long term sustainability; international interests and recognition versus national interests and legitimacy; and between the interests of elites, especially combatants and of the population at large (Call, 2008b, p. 3).

Generally, peace agreements should be considered as mid points, not as end goals. Call questions the success of consolidating and keeping the peace through economic neoliberal policies, DDR programs, civil society and UN peacekeeping troops (Call, 2008a, p. 384). He also suggests focusing on coordination of civilian, military and policy instruments while taking into account the legitimacy of international actors rather than focusing only on traditional military approach.

The other important component of peace building is reconciliation. Several approaches are used to facilitate reconciliation, prominently discussed in the transitional justice field. Since transitional justice is very much linked to a legal perspective (McEvoy, 2007), peace is usually promoted through the judicial mechanisms, even though growing attention is also being paid to non-judicial ones. The rationale behind judicial mechanisms is to meet the 'duty to prosecute' individuals that have committed international crimes such as war crimes and crimes against humanity. Such prosecutions can take place either in national courts (including special chambers and local courts) or international ones (e.g. the International Criminal Court

or in *ad hoc* tribunals). The twofold long-term aim is in this context to bring justice to victims and to achieve a deterrent effect, showing that impunity is not an option.

At the same time, the landscape of peace building includes also non-judicial mechanisms such as political apologies, truth and reconciliation commissions and amnesties. Here, promoting reconciliation and peacebuilding is achieved by means other than prosecution of wrongdoers. The first two mechanisms, political apologies and truth and reconciliation commissions, concern the acknowledgment of events and facts, the admission of crimes, and the taking responsibility with a commitment to not repeat these in the future. They may also serve as a sort of reparation for victims (Medjouba, 2012, pp. 1–2). However, amnesties take a different form in absolving the wrongdoers and not holding them accountable for the committed crimes. Amnesties are very common in state building periods (Mallinder, 2008), even if they preclude a debate in the public sphere about the wrongdoings and contradict the rule of law (McAuliffe, 2010). Both international law and research on political practice are ambiguous in their guidance regarding when they are to be issued and effectively used in the state building period (Freeman, 2009). In fact, the contribution of transitional justice mechanisms to peace building is questioned by many as idealistic, lacking the potential to fulfill their stated purpose, and problematic in their implementation.

To resolve the tensions between state building and peace building, Call proposes a model that includes four elements: cognizance, context, sequencing, and patience. The first element refers to ‘anticipating the tensions and developing strategies to overcome them’. The second element refers to considering the specificities of the society when deciding upon sequencing and programs. The third refers to sequencing of state building and peace building efforts, that is

the need to sequence particular activities – such as issuing indictments for war criminals who can spoil the peace, forming a transitional government, ramping up public finance capacity, demobilizing combatants, rewriting the constitutions or foundational laws, holding local or national elections that may begin to mark the end of transitional authorities, reining in patronage-based leadership styles (or leaders) - so that they will not overturn the apple-cart of peace and send factions back to war’ (Call, 2008a, p. 386).

There should be an appropriate sequence so that trust, legitimacy and effectiveness grow simultaneously. The last element is patience as peace building takes ‘time, resources, hard work and good fortune’ (Call, 2008a, p. 386).

To conclude, state building is a political process that creates winners and losers which influence the state design and capacity. To manage the tensions between state building and peace building, it is important ‘to balance the twin imperatives of legitimacy and capacity, extending to both national and international institutions and processes’ (Call, 2008a, p. 267). In addition, building ‘contextualized states’ can facilitate peace if it leads to the inclusion of those relevant actors (such as regional organizations, transnational actors and local tribes) that have

taken over either partly or fully some of the state functions. Call sees the optimal role of the rebuilt state as mediator between various actors, being ‘a state sufficiently competent and legitimate to authorize, recognize, and regulate the functions of the institutions both below and above the state’ (Call, 2008a, p. 371). Thus state building is necessary, but in a different form than currently promoted only in order to avoid sparking of new violence (Call, 2008a, pp. 370–373). Furthermore, special attention must be paid to the reconciliation component of peace building.

To end with a quote from practice, during the concluding ceremony of the New Deal, the Deputy Finance Minister of Afghanistan, Dr. Mustafa Mastoor, summarized the interaction between peace and state building in the following words:

When international partners bypass our systems this can directly contribute to a continuance of conflict and fragility. Without peace our nations cannot deliver services that our people need to rise from poverty and without building strong state institutions to deliver these services, we cannot maintain peace (G7+, 2011, p. 1).

The Links to Nationbuilding

In many states, old tensions resurface even after conflict for various reasons including ethnicity, religion, race or class. Thus, apart from combining state and peace building to prevent old tensions from arising, one also has to inquire the advantages and disadvantages of promoting nation building in post war contexts.

To start with, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the word ‘nation’ which seems to be one of the most confusing and ‘tendentious’ in the political science and is hence not often used (Tilly, 1975, p. 6). Fukuyama conceptualizes nations as constituting “communities of shared values, traditions, and historical memory” (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 3). According to Elden, state and nation refer to different concepts, with the state being a ‘political unity’ whereas the nation is a ‘grouping of people’ (Elden, 2009, p. 202). Gellner argues similarly with Fukuyama that an element of a nation is sharing the same culture, meaning ‘a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating’ (Gellner & Breuilly, 2008, pp. 6–7). However he adds that a second important element is the recognition of ‘each other [people] belonging to the same nation’ since a nation emerges only ‘when the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership of it’ (ibid.). In addition, Smith summarizes the characteristics of nation state that legitimate nationalism:

Nation-states have frontiers, capitals, flags, anthems, passports, currencies, military parades, national museums, embassies and usually a seat at the United Nations. They also have one government for the territory of the nation-state, a single education system, a single economy and occupational system, and usually one set of legal rights for all citizens, though there are exceptions [e.g. citizenship rights for all and sometimes communal rights for special communities]. They also subscribe, tacitly or openly, quietly or vo-

ciferously, to a single ideology which legitimates the whole enterprise - nationalism (A. Smith, 1986, p. 228).

The notion of nation building, of relevance for our purposes, is understood differently by American and European academics. As explained earlier, American scholarship refers more to the process of state building, especially political and economic development, while the European concept denotes the attempts to reshape 'society or citizens' (Call, 2008b, p. 10). Call defines nation building as

actions undertaken, usually by national actors, to forge a sense of common nationhood (1) to overcome ethnic, sectarian, or communal differences; (2) to counter alternate sources of identity and loyalty; and (3) to mobilize a population behind a parallel statebuilding project (Call, 2008b, p. 5).

Call also stresses that national actors usually carry the process, although in practice one needs to assess whether international actors contribute as well and whether and in what way they should do so.

On the other hand, the UN has assisted in nation building for a long time, beginning with the decolonization mandates (e.g. Namibia, Western Sahara and East Timor) (Stahn, 2008). Stahn points out that some of the measures taken by the international community, international organizations and coalitions, have contributed to nation building (Stahn, 2008). Examples can already be found in the efforts of imperial powers to build nations in their colonies. More recently, international stakeholders have promoted nation building, for instance in Kosovo where UNMIK issued citizenship. In Bosnia, a federation was practically imposed by international community which however failed to achieve its goal of uniting the citizens (Stahn, 2008, pp. 405–406). But referring to the actions and strategy of the UN, Stahn explains that

the organisation [UN] generally avoided defining its responsibilities in the area of peacemaking in terms of nationbuilding. In some cases (e.g. Kosovo), the UN adopted measures which shaped the identity of a territory under administration (e.g. external representation, citizenship). Such measures were, however, primarily tied to functional goals of administration during the period of transition and not aimed at nationbuilding as such (Stahn, 2008, p. 406).

Nowadays, the circumstances of state building have changed, with many more actors being involved and with states lacking institutional infrastructure. External actors need to search for new means to promote political and economic reconstruction, so they begin to consider shaping the nations together with national actors. So far it has been usually implemented through technical administrative tasks. Another question is, however, whether the international community should engage in nation building.

Call for instance is skeptical of nation building attempts, arguing that identity cannot be manipulated through external programs or interventions. Nation building has in his view lost its credibility since the 1960s, leading him to conclude that "[l]arge-scale programs to redefine a society's allegiances and identities seem silly or self-defeating" (Call, 2008b, p. 11). In con-

trast, Fukuyama argues that nations can be built from outsiders through constitutionalism and democracy (Fukuyama, 2006, pp. 3, 99).

Call argues furthermore that nation building is no longer necessary for successful state building since multinational states have become more common and acceptable in the international world system and among external neighbors (Call, 2008b, p. 11). Essentially, the idea of a single nation state seems to lose relevance in nowadays complex world. Similarly, Smith argues that there is no nation state in the sense that 'the boundaries of the state's territories and those of a homogenous ethnic community are coextensive, and that all the inhabitants of the state possess an identical culture' (A. Smith, 1986, p. 229). In the 20th century, most homogeneous nation states were diversified by different nationalities that came to migrate as a reaction to globalization. Hence the 20th century has seen an evolution of state and nation identities, which have been shaped by multiculturalism.

Still, multiethnic states have several shortcomings. Smith recognizes the paradox of nation building. According to him, societies should in theory be homogenous, but in practice states do not need to be as they take many shapes, with the international system of states being satisfied with a kind of 'declaration of intent' to stay unified (A. Smith, 1986, p. 229). The ethnic divisions in such states can be a source of antagonism, especially when the largest group needs to accommodate a smaller group (A. Smith, 1986, p. 229). These divisions can result in violence and war. In conclusion, nation building attempts of international actors seem to have been unsuccessful in many recent cases (for example in Iraq, Somalia, and Kosovo), and it is questionable whether in the post-nation state era of multiethnicity this is achievable in the first place. Even though nation building is problematic for the abovementioned reasons, especially when promoted by international actors, international and local actors still recourse to it when it suits their interests. For instance, the international community promotes nation building, framing it as technical assistance or peace building in fragile states, whereas local actors pursue nation building through nationalist discourses based on ethnicity, religion, race, and economic protectionism.

Nationalism can be regarded as a backlash of a historical equating of state and nation building as one process. This 'Western myopia' is based mostly on the successful cases of England and France, which were later mirrored in Eastern Europe and the Third World. Although as mentioned earlier, Tilly attempted to fight this bias through showing that these "successful" cases of Europe were very violent. According to Smith, the problem is that ethnic homogeneity and institutions lack in these countries, so the western model 'cannot be transplanted' (A. Smith, 1986, p. 230). According to Smith, the model of the single nation state has even in the West not shown the best results. Problems of nationalism 'arise when ethnic homogeneity and cultural coextensiveness become desirable goals themselves' (A. Smith, 1986, p. 230). Even the majority of well-educated citizens 'are committed to nationalism even if only tacitly,

through exclusion and self-differentiation', lacking awareness of viable alternatives of 'culture and political existence'. He concludes therefore that there is 'no possibility of returning to a pre-nationalist era' (A. Smith, 1986, p. 230) and that erasing a process that has been so dominant for many decades is utopian. But if this is not possible, the questions arises how to combine nation and state building. What types of state and nation should be promoted to avoid relapse into war and destructive nationalism? Smith suggests to reconcile nation and state building by building enduring states along the concepts of 'solidarity and unity' (A. Smith, 1986, p. 230). Another proposal based on modernization theory claim that "successful states required a citizenry that identified itself with the state over other ethnic or religious allegiances: in other words, that state building required nation building" (C. Call & Wyeth, 2008, p. 11).

Common ideals about nationalism must be present in post-conflict contexts to serve as glue and to prevail over nationalism based on ethnic or religious differences. Many theories move beyond such nationalism, for instance cosmopolitanism which promotes a 'citizenship of the world', as well as related theories of global politics and regional identity (e.g. European).⁴ Moreover, globalization and the rise of information technologies alter national and cultural identities in transnational processes, arguably creating new forms of transnational identities and thus nationbuilding. For instance, the gradual development of a European identity has successfully held together nations that had deep animosities until the middle of the 20th century. Taking into account all these aspects, a starting point could be to promote mild forms of national identity that combine culturally specific identities with cosmopolitanism and modernism, hence as Smith proposes, 'community and solidarity'. However, promoting universal and regional notions has proven to be difficult due to their incomprehensivity and insensitivity to local cultures. In fact, many social groups perceive globalization and universal ideas negatively. In reconstructing national identities, special attention must still be paid to these aspects.

To conclude, it has been argued that state building always implies nation building activities as well (Lemay-Hébert, 2009). After all, both share the same characteristic as being, in the words of Anderson, 'imagined communities' (B. Anderson, 2006). But historically, nation states developed in 18th century, thus much later than states (Elden, 2009, p. 202). There are therefore reasons to assume that the development of national identities will take a longer time than state building. Both state institutions and society shape and define each other, hence it is

⁴ For more on cosmopolitan and global citizenship theories, see Gibernau on local citizenship; 'Defining European Identity and Citizenship' (Delanty, 1996, 1997); Eyben, R. and S. Ladbury (2006), 'Building effective states: taking a citizens perspective', Centre for Citizenship, Participation and Accountability; 'Democracy, Citizenship and Global City' (Isin, 2013) and 'Constructing a Global Polity' (Corry, 2013).

important to understand what type of reconstruction is being mediated (C. Call & Wyeth, 2008, p. 11). But while state building and nation building are strongly interlinked, literature seems to downplay the significance of this linkage for fragile states. Whereas the contribution of nation building to peace building is unclear, whether or not it may contribute depends on the context (Call, 2008b).

The importance of the relations between the aspects is illustrated by the effects of rising nationalism in Balkans, be it in Bosnia, where a political system based on ethnicity and destructive nationalism produced a weak state and a volatile peace, or in much more mundane everyday events. For instance, during a football match between Serbia and Albania on 14 October 2014 in Belgrade, a mass brawl occurred as a drone with the Greater Albanian flag landed on the pitch. Eventually the game was cancelled, as a secure match environment could not be reestablished. National identities play a crucial role in almost every political, social and economic context, which is why it is indispensable to get a better understanding of the dynamics of nation building when looking at state building and peace building.

Conclusion

To conclude, liberal conceptions of state and peace building focus on the development of state institutions, democratic governance and a market-oriented economy. Table 2 (next page) explains the basic assumptions, critiques and proposed modifications.

This chapter has elaborated on the links between state building, peace building and nation building. State building amounts to the reconstruction of political and economic institutions, which is theoretically important to prevent relapse into armed conflict. The international community in practice encountered many challenges during its implementation, so various possible modifications were put on the table. During state building, the international community has sometimes also been involved in nation building as for instance in Kosovo. The consequences of such a dual strategy remain to be seen. The state building processes may assist peace building even though it was shown that many tensions exist between the two. Most complexities are the result of state building and peace building being implemented simultaneously, where it becomes necessary to carefully balance and negotiate the goals of both. This is necessary in order to do no more harm to already fragile states. Nation building refers to the creation or shaping of national identities based on traits (culture, tradition, religion, language) that distinguish and separate one group from the others. As it is a very complex process, the international community takes in theory a distance from it, even though in practice it is still being implemented, as shown in Kosovo's case. Nation building that promotes nationalism is trying to be avoided. Some universal theories and globalization theory advocate a decrease or eradication of nationalism. Theoretically, at least, national identities that are of a more cosmo-

Liberal Peace	Builds upon liberal peace theory Democracy Free market Rebuilds democracy (constitution, electoral processes & offices of state) Rule of law (security and justice) Reconciliation Economic system (privatization, taxation)
Liberal Peace Problems acknowledged by Liberal Peace Theorists	Difficult Unpredictable model Destabilizing side effects
Liberal Peace Modifications by Liberal Peace Theorists	Strengthening the state strength and scope Strengthening the state design Strengthening the missions Sequencing the priorities (security before political and economic reconstruction) Building an institutional memory Learn lessons from the past Strengthen coordination Be careful on coalition choices Provide enough resources Prepare an exit strategy

Table 2. An extended version of the typology of liberal peace, borrowed from Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, pp. 232–233.

politan nature, based on local/global citizenship, community and solidarity will help in preventing relapse to war and nationalism. However in the Balkans, nationalism prevailed over the other theories. Thus these theories offer theoretically a potential to assist these processes but it remains to be seen in practice.

Lastly, peace building refers to achievement of negative or positive peace. The latter would be a long-term aspiration, whereas the earlier can often already be found in fragile states. Negative peace is usually satisfactory in fragile states even though further challenges will remain. Generally, it is assumed that successful state building contributes to peace building, while nation building may or may not facilitate it (Call, 2008b).

3. Critical Approaches: Post-Liberal Peace and the Local Turn

Introduction

Previous sections have presented some of the critique that question or aim to improve the effectiveness of the liberal peace theory. The main question of this chapter concerns: What, if any, are the alternatives to the liberal peace model according to the theory of post liberal peace? How to include local societies in state and peace building? This section outlines the ‘critical’ theories⁵, and especially scholarships on post liberal peace. These summarize and oppose liberal peace as

the overarching neoliberal ideology that merges security and development; ‘romanticizes the local’ as victims or illiberal; builds hollow institutions; designs economic life to reproduce assertive capitalism; equates peace with statebuilding; and assumes that interveners have privileged knowledge about peace issues. The paradigm is mobilized with a package of transformation policies (Pugh, 2013, p. 14).

Liberal state building scholarship is thus represented as a source of hegemony, undermining liberal social contract and treating locals colonially (Richmond, 2009a). It also ‘elevates elites and institutions over societies and everyday life’, while rendering questions of social justice absent (Richmond, 2009a, p. 586). Furthermore, it ‘fails to develop engagement with everyday life, local culture, identity, and the emotional and psychological issues arising in post-conflict situations’ (Richmond, 2009a, p. 569). Those are considered as ‘unintended consequences’ of the third approach of peace building and state building where ‘material power matters more than everyday life’ (Richmond, 2010, pp. 666–669). The critical theorists use peace and state building interchangeably. They criticize mainly liberal peace theorists such as Paris for arguing that ‘political liberalism is immutable and should be defended because there is no better universal objective’ (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 765). Post liberal theorists challenge this assumption.

One of the most difficult questions occupying post liberal peace theory is whether it should embark on a process of providing possible alternatives to liberal peace or

remain true to its *raison d’être*, by pointing out contradictions, engaging with strategic discourses, increasing context sensitivity from within, and extending imaginations beyond what is ‘possible’ to what is ‘desirable’ (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p. 233).

⁵ It usually refers to theoretical approaches of communitarian, social constructivism, critical international theory, post-modernism and post-colonialism and lately the post-liberal peace.

Some post liberal peace theorists argue that liberal peace ‘is already too loaded with imperfect and hegemonic connotations to be rescued at all’, but acknowledge also that since not engaging and leaving aside the discourse would also not contribute to peace, they have to engage with the concept nonetheless and attempt to modify (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p. 233). They consequently do not reject liberal peace but criticize it and search for alternatives that may include ideas of liberal peace as well.

Critical theorists focus on ‘everyday’ politics and security and propose to move away from binary distinctions between liberal and post-liberal as post-liberal peace essentially also works with ideas of liberal peace. They acknowledge that post-conflict countries have been shaped by the liberal peace and propose thus to rethink the conditions of liberal peace, open a ‘dialogue’ and include ‘other voices as part of social contract’ (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p. 222). Such reflections can be traced back to Kant’s original idea of liberal peace that prescribed the promotion of local democracy as ‘moral principles cannot be imposed by force’ (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p. 221). In other words, they argue that Kant would have not promoted the democracy and economic liberalization in the currently prevalent way. Finally, critical theorists acknowledge that local identity may be ‘fluid’ and contain both illiberal and liberal elements. Importantly, however, locals have agency and capacity, which is why it is necessary to have a ‘genuine engagement, in a non-hegemonic manner, with the local context, culture, history, needs, as well rights and institutions’ (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p. 222). They therefore do not aim to replace liberal peace but to find better alternatives to the current state and peace building problems, adopting approaches that ‘may include a mix of some liberalism, some context, some version of the state, etc., which collectively address security, rights, needs, identity, custom, culture, and institutions’ (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p. 222).

Other scholars argue similarly, Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh leads a master program on human security for Sciences Po and Olivier Richmond, Professor of International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Manchester, summarize the alternatives proposed by Kristoffer Liden, a senior research at PRIO: (i) ‘efficient liberal peacebuilding’, (ii) ‘non-interference’ and (iii) ‘indigenous peacebuilding’ which relies on local traditions and customary social and political institutions (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p. 233). However, these suggestions are still problematic due to ethical dilemmas that arise from not interfering in cases of extreme violence and international crimes. Another problem concerns the representation of the local as being embedded in a traditional culture, while they are also part of a globalized, international, and modern world and may aspire to the related values as well (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p. 233). Following this framework, the hybrid model including ideas of liberal and post liberal peace is put forward.

This chapter outlines the post liberal peace theory, which is inspired by critical approaches of communitarianism, social constructivism, critical international relations theory, postmodernism, and postcolonialism. The first section explores the different understandings of the state, comparing liberal and post liberal theories in this regard. Legitimacy questions which arise from peace and state building projects are tackled thereafter, followed by sections on the hybrid model and the local turn. Lastly, the chapter explores the limitations of the post-liberal peace approach as an alternative solution to the problems of state and peace building.

Critiques of State Reforms

Critical theorists point out that the liberal understanding of fragile states focuses on the ‘absence of effective state institutions needed to guarantee rights and security’, and therefore rebuilding institutions becomes a ‘priority’ and an ‘end’ in itself (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p. 221). This top process is supposed to reach ‘the bottom’ and thus to engage people in democratic processes and to establish a social contract. The focus of liberal state theory lies therefore more rather ‘on the state than society’ and on ‘the security and institutional frameworks as defined by neoliberalism and regional security, along with a secondary engagement with human rights and democracy’ (Richmond, 2014a). The main subjects of state building are states, which are represented in need for reforms. Post liberal peace theorists have challenged these assumptions on a number of counts.

First, rather than being a transformatory and emancipatory project, state building has arguably created ‘new systems and zones of exclusion’ (Richmond, 2014a, p. 17). As Chandler argues reforms are articulated in a neocolonial language through good governance, capacity building and other words. Richmond argues that the reforms failed due to unintended consequences:

appeared to crack, under pressure from its internal political, social and economic contradictions, from the global unintended consequences of unrestrained development and trade, from the strengthened but partly privatized, still weak, ‘failed’ and authoritarian states that had emerged (Richmond, 2014a, p. 17)

In addition, policies are seen as originating from a ‘narrow Northern context’, with only marginal modifications to the post-conflict countries (Richmond, 2014a, p. 17). They also focus predominantly on traditional international relations, state formation, which leads to the neglect of the ‘social and economic causes of conflict’ and the avoiding of ‘the role of inequality, injustice, discrimination and a lack of public services’ (Richmond, 2014a, p. 17). In addition, Richmond argues that international actors view the weak states as being caused by internal politics, so international actors assist and provide solutions that aim primarily to create liberal states while treating local politics as ‘dysfunctional’.

Wilde criticizes some policies of international organizations such as UN missions as overly similar to colonial arrangements (Wilde in Hehir & Robinson, 2007, p. 41). The former colo-

nies have achieved independent status nowadays, except the ones that wished to remain under the status of their former colonizers. This argument is further elaborated in the postcolonial literature focusing on subaltern experiences and processes of ‘othering’. For instance, the Westphalian state order is criticized for being represented as the only possible legitimate political order and for viewing the state as monopolistic (Beier, 2004, p. 84). Referring to the treatment of indigenous people around the world, Beier argues that indigenous people in the Americas have to some extent modified the process of the state making and constructions of the West, thus showing that the concept of state is changing over time.

For critical theorists, the role of the state is important, but for different reasons than in liberal peace theory. It has been proposed that the role of the state should be

to provide welfare and services and to uphold the social contract [bound between the people and elites and ensure that it is representative], but not as a territorially sovereign sponsor of nationalism, national interests, borders, and the interests of a dominant group of identity which take advantage of the over-focus on formal and institutional statebuilding (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p. 221).

In line with the liberal theory, the state is seen as a framework to protect human rights, although it is proposed not to impose human rights from above since they can much more effectively emerge from the bottom (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011).

Furthermore, the critical thinkers suggest moving away from templates of state building reforms. Rather than treating it as a technical issue, they suggest to look at it as a political process. Greener specifies that state building activities can often be found under the names of ‘capacity building’, ‘reconstruction’, ‘stabilisation or institution building’, but despite the language with its focus on capacity or technical expertise, state building remains

a political rather than merely technical process. Contemporary state-building is therefore not a neutral phenomenon: it promotes certain types of political, social and economic institutions and relationships to the exclusion of others (Greener, 2012, p. 419).

The consequences of looking at state building as a technical matter are seen in Kosovo and East Timor, where state building produced institutions unconcerned with local perspectives. More specifically, the focus of UNMIK in Kosovo on ‘administration and order’ supported a technical view “that resulted in the people and institutions that deliver these being seen as unresponsive to local views and inputs” (Dwan in Greener, 2012, p. 416). Others argue that ‘there is no one template of state or statebuilding’ (Papagianni, 2008, p. 67) and that the current situation is that “particular models of statehood are favored over others in the current rush to build or rebuild states” (Greener, 2012, p. 418). In other words, the international community runs the danger of enforcing one uneasy package of ‘technocratic’ and ‘decontextualized’ answers. More concretely, the usage of ‘technical templates’ runs the risks of not accommodating some of the specific needs of that arise from the local context (Nagy, 2008,

pp. 275–289). We now turn to the legitimacy gap that results from inadequate state reforms as illustrated in different post conflict countries.

The Legitimacy Gap in Post Conflict Countries

The main suggestion of post liberal peace theorists is to place legitimacy at the forefront of all processes of peace and state building, as it is supposed to contribute positively to both processes. After establishing immediate security, the reconstruction of ‘some form of legitimate political authority’ (Fukuyama, 2006, pp. 236–7) becomes essential. Such political authority comes traditionally from local and national elections, but other alternatives exist as well, as for example the local Jirga in Iraq. According to Rodney Barker, legitimacy is therefore understood as

precisely the belief in the rightfulness of a state, in its authority to issue commands, so that those commands are obeyed not simply out of fear or self-interest, but because they are believed in some sense to have moral authority, because subjects believe that they ought to obey (Barker, 1990, p. 11).

Call refers to legitimacy as “both to the normative acceptance and expectation by a political community that the cluster of rules and institutions that compose the state ought to be obeyed, as well as the degree to which the state is seen as the natural provider of core goods and services” (Call, 2008b, p. 14). Thus legitimacy refers externally to the acceptance and obedience to standards of international order and internally to a state’s ability to provide basic functions to its citizens (e.g. functioning security, law and economy). Call sees legitimacy as ‘resource or characteristic’ of a state that ‘cuts across all state functions’ (Call, 2008b, p. 14).

Newly established and fragile states have often a deficit of legitimacy, the exception being a government that came to power through a successful uprising. The concern in the latter cases is then the excess of legitimacy (Call, 2008b, p. 14). In reconstruction and development, and especially after armed conflict, international actors influence the situation through ‘legitimizing transitional regimes’ (Call, 2008b, p. 14). In other words, national actors need to acquire both internal and external legitimacy as reflected in the concept of ‘dual legitimacy’. According to Papagianni, the main sources of state legitimacy derive from performing four roles, namely bureaucracies and administration, institutions embedded in legal orders, embodiments of normative orders, as institutional arrangements which create national power balances (Papagianni, 2008, p. 51). In any concrete case, state legitimacy is very complex, varying between external and internal, which may sometimes contradict each other. Depending on public expectations and perceptions, some might consider a state illegitimate while others see it as legitimate, depending on the conflict, history, settlements and others (Papagianni, 2008, p. 51). For instance, Kosovo is considered legitimate by the Western powers such as the United States and its allies, but as illegitimate by Serbia, Russia, China and some others.

Another different but important aspect of legitimacy concerns the relation between internationals and locals. Lemay Hébert introduces the concept of 'bifurcation of the two worlds' to enhance the understanding of legitimacy gap debate between international and local actors (Lemay-Hébert, 2011). He argues that in post conflict countries, a social and political gap is created by the arrival of international actors which generates local resistance. International direct governance thus lacks legitimacy and is deemed inappropriate to address the post conflict challenges (Lemay-Hébert, 2011, p. 1824).

Perception plays an important part in the relation between local and international actors engaged in state building. Lemay-Hébert suggests that international administrations are losing legitimacy through the narratives of local resistance in the cases of Kosovo and East Timor, 'hinting at a paradox of state builders being deliberately and firmly isolated yet highly visible at the same time' (Lemay-Hébert, 2011, p. 1824). Drawing on other authors such as Orford, he thus inquires how voices of opposition are being silenced and how post-conflict reconstruction serves 'to obscure the power relations that intervention produces, and the exploitation that it enables' (Orford, 2003, p. 158).

The events that took place in East Timor and Kosovo are the principal illustrations of his argument. The different 'living standards' between local and international actors illustrate the 'exogenous character of international missions' (Lemay-Hébert, 2011, p. 1824). Lemay-Hébert coins the term of the 'white car syndrome' in Kosovo where UNMIK's usage of white jeeps represents the difference in social status. Jeeps are often symbols of wealth, empty promises, speeding around, even though the usage of jeeps is unnecessary in Kosovo due to the relatively good state of the roads (Lemay-Hébert, 2011, p. 1827). Locals will consider the usage of jeeps as an instance of symbolic violence since they often are used inappropriately which results in further alienation of the local population against the international community's presence. Power relations are not objective, but are rendered as legitimate in the view of the holder.

He argues that the prolonged stay of international administrations is not desirable. A social backlash or 'social anomie' are often the consequences of a prolonged stay of such kind, due to the incapability of internationals to create a relationship of trust between the people and government which continues to fuel the resentment of the locals (Lemay-Hébert, 2011, p. 1827). Furthermore rather than a heavy intervention, a 'light footprint' approach is preferred since it creates space for local development to proceed. He also calls for more consideration of intended and unintended impact and to treat locals not with 'arrogance' but genuine respect, as already suggested in the Brahimi report (Lemay-Hébert, 2011, pp. 1833–37).

Finally, Lemay-Hébert draws attention to the 'dual economy' created by the arrival of international actors, and which is expressed in salaries, higher prices, corruption, nepotism and prostitution. The post conflict reconstruction brings thus 'a culture of violence', reinforcing

the social tensions created by the intervention. The economic system may in consequence be transformed but not developed. A situation of financial and social apartheid is created where IOs and NGOs represent spaces of segregated interactions, which illustrate the exogenous character of state building. In East Timor, these dynamics are reflected in UN's staff accommodation in charter boats, indicating social distinction, and also with the establishment of UNTAET in the Governors' hotel, formerly occupied by the Indonesian administration, which has created resentment among locals. He also illustrates the clash of cultures between Western and Asian values (Lemay-Hébert, 2011).

Lemay-Herbert's view is build upon Donini's work, a development specialist, who summarizes the tensions between the two entities and the perceptions of locals towards internationals in post conflict zones:

The good news is that humanitarian values are present and resonate in all cultures. The bad news is that the baggage - modus operandi, management style, white car syndrome, personal behavior - that comes with the assistance is a source of considerable tension between 'outsiders' and 'insiders'. At best we are seen as competent, well-meaning and sometimes inconsiderate. At worst, as arrogant, culturally insensitive vectors of alien agendas (Donini in Lemay-Hébert, 2011, p. 1834).

The present research contributes to the understanding of the legitimacy gap between the two entities based on real events and life stories in Kosovo. Now we turn to the resulted hybrid peace in post conflict countries from the state and peace building approaches.

The Locally Built Peace

Hybrid Peace

The hybrid model is based on a combination of post-modern and post-colonial theory. It employs the notions of 'hybridity' and 'resistance' as 'unintended' processes that often emerge in the interactions between locals and others. Hybridity seeks to promote an 'empathic engagement with the everyday and local agency, [hence] a post-liberal peace may emerge which can better contextualize, hence legitimize, peacebuilding' (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p. 234).

In the hybrid model, 'the local is created already as a result of the intervention and is not identical to its self-representation', which means that both internationals and locals are formed together through a process of 'mutual re-mediation' (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p. 234). Most of the negotiations occur in 'Western bubbles' with locals 'who have a controversial claim to represent local consistencies' (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 764). At the same time, it is argued that 'there is no real 'local', as the world is globalized and networked' (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 765). In other words, local agency may be weak, but it may also be coopted by the interests of international actors, resulting in a

lack of capacity at the local level to combat the structural power wielded by elites or by colonialists, and to the fact that most local agency was in any case constitutive of and willingly complicit with colonialism, which is used in modern times to justify the governmentality associated with liberal peace building and state building (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 765)

In addition, approaches to state and peace building must be grounded on the context. The hybrid model identifies the main limitations of the state building models and the ‘need for any locally legitimate state to be grounded in its context’ (Richmond, 2014a, p. 1). The meaning of external ideas are actively constructed on the ground as external ideas ‘can only become meaningful in their contingent local meaning’ (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p. 234), the result being that ‘liberal institutions and norms are modified in each different context’ (Richmond, 2010, p. 685).

This perspective is supposed to ‘protect the weak and the hidden to a degree’ (Richmond, 2010, p. 692) since it returns agency to the suppressed, the subjects and objects of intervention, thus the local communities (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p. 234). That is despite perceptions that ‘localised rights, needs, and identity are often rebuffed as romantic, relativist or particularist, anti-democratic, anti-developmental, contravening youth and women’s rights, as well as human rights more generally’ (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 764). They suggest rather to focus more on ‘autonomy, democracy, rights, local ownership and the need to avoid harm’ since citizens view the state ‘as predatory’ (Richmond, 2014a, p. 16). Local actors would then not be seen as ‘passive recipients or active spoilers’ resisting reform since communities are flexible, adaptable but also ‘resist, subvert and ignore’ the liberal peace (Richmond, 2009a, p. 572; Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p. 234). Overall, hybrid peace aims at ‘reconciling local demands for democracy, development and human rights with aspirations for self-determination’ (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p. 234). Thus the international actors would be in a position to assist but without reproducing their hegemony.

In addition, it shifts from top-down to bottom-up state and peace building through ‘engaging societies, cultures and identities, going far beyond the institutions of statehood’ (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p. 234). In practice, the World Bank Report of 2013 includes social justice issues such as the empowerment of women and communities, economic welfare and hearing the voices of all groups (World Bank, 2013). Still focused mainly on states, attempts exist to involve civil society and non-state actors (World Bank, 2013, p. 11). However, the record so far seems unsatisfactory, especially as ‘[u]neffective civil society organizations fall short not only in their attempts to hold government accountable but also to provide channels for empowering the poor’ (Ernstorfer & Stockmayer, 2009, p. 25).

There are different theoretical understandings on how hybrid governance can emerge. Belloni summarizes a few of them:

[The game theory focuses on strategic relationship between local and international actors where] ones actions affect the other's perception and options. Path dependency theory calls for this understanding of local contexts while focusing on the impact of the choices made by international interveners. Likewise, the incentive/disincentive approach assumes a sender and a receiver, a policy sharper and a policy taker, and prioritized the former over the latter. The critical literature emphasizes the dissonance and even friction between international priorities and local realities (Belloni, 2012, p. 32).

Still, he argues that these theoretical stances do not describe how liberal actors may become hybridized themselves. Therefore he identifies three conceptual forms of hybrid peace governance. The first one prescribes that 'informal, traditional, and illiberal norms and practices may influence the working of formal democratic institutions', meaning that '[c]ustomary traditions seep into rule systems adopted by the state'. At societal level this may take the 'form of informal economic practices influencing the formal economy' such as corruption and grey economy which will hinder markets, production and allocation of goods and services, while still ensuring the livelihood of people. The second one refers to 'formal inclusion of local [traditional] institutions within the state apparatus', as illustrated by the *gacaca* trials in Rwanda. They are approved and funded by international donors to an extent that they represent indigenous practices in a limited sense. The second form also takes into account the inclusion of international non-state actors within domestic institutions that produce a different hybridity, since they attempt through their work to introduce liberal rule. This can be seen in the appointment of experts in key local institutions including courts, government, commissions, as well as in civil society, in project implementation and in capacity building. The third form can be found in contexts of increased violence, where actors may be asked to join the government in order to ensure more stability such as the warlords in Afghanistan. However, 'powerful self-interested actors can gain control over state institutions to exploit them to their own advantage and to the detriment of entire societies', as for instance criminal networks linked to ethnical or communal alliances in Kosovo (Belloni, 2012, pp. 25–26). Richmond confirms that 'a range of local and transnational networks circumvent [post-conflict states] in the long term, sometimes for peace, but also for profit, crime and predation' (Richmond, 2014a, p. 16).

Hybridity requires changes from both locals and internationals. Belloni sees two positive aspects in hybrid governance. The liberal approach results often in the election of non-liberal elites, which opens space for other groups of society. However Belloni fails to point out that actually non-liberal elites also close the spaces for other groups. It would therefore have the advantage of including in the process traditional bodies and other actors such as local NGOs, community groups, grassroots movements, and women. This would bring further legitimacy in the eyes of the local population, especially in the short term, though not always in the long

term (Belloni, 2012, p. 27). However, as each context is specific, adjustments will be necessary in these processes.

In the liberal model, local norms and traditions are either seen as 'hindering modernization and democratization or [as] empowered to operate within the liberal peace framework with expedient intentions'. Local actors are expected to participate, but hybridity goes even further in rejecting 'patronizing, top-down, state centric, technocratic, and assimilative version of peace in favor of a locally rooted understanding of peace resulting from the interactions, accommodation, and sometimes clash between a variety of different actors, norms, and institutions' (Belloni, 2012, p. 34). Furthermore, Belloni notes that hybridity offers an alternative from western social engineering and paternalism as illustrated by hierarchical binaries such as us/them, peace-loving/conflict-prone, democratic/transitional, advance/underdeveloped 'that conveniently fit the interests of power holders' (Belloni, 2012, p. 34). It represents a move towards democratization by engaging with local realities and identifying how the local resources can develop a locally engrained and sustainable political order.

The benefits of hybrid peace though have been acknowledged. Both peace and the state are to be built locally, 'perhaps individually in hidden and public spaces across a wide range of everyday life activities, though it may be 'enabled' internationally' (O. P. Richmond, 2013, p. 387). The post conflict countries would then subsequently adopt global norms and regimes, which then leads to a recognized representation in the international system:

This leads to everyday peace locally, and hybrid forms of state, so that the state may also then take up its position in the liberal international architecture and global markets, the UN system, as a 'good international citizen' (Richmond, 2014a, p. 17).

However hybrid peace carries assumptions such as

These are that all states think the same way, that all peoples have the same basic needs, norms and requirements, that institutions can be widely representative and that peace is more a result of internationally determined domestic norms and institutions that emerge from these confluences than determined by contextual and local needs, culture, history and identity (Richmond, 2014a, p. 17).

Richmond thus argues that concepts like hybrid peace 'maintain structural violence, fail to resolve the contradictions between local and international norms, and reflect outsourcing of colonial style rule' (Richmond, 2014b, p. 1). Power in hybridity produces both positive and negative aspects. Richmond's argument categorizes hybrid peace as resulting in negative peace, while his concept of 'everyday peace' promotes a positive peace which may come about if people locally and gradually resolve the contradictions.

Everyday Peace

The argument behind everyday peace approach is that the everyday life of citizens, entailing productive, consumptive, cultural and resistance activities, is often ignored as 'it is seen as a

site of alterity and of resistance, or worse, of apathy'. Locals remain silent either to maintain the space or because they are 'muted by international dominance and a liberal aversion to non-liberal symbolic productions' (Richmond, 2010, p. 686). Thus focusing on the everyday life of citizens has the potential to yield a better understanding as well as practical outcomes:

People are able to adapt and take ownership over structures and institutions so that they begin to reflect their own everyday lives rather than structural attempts at assimilation. This re-appropriation through the everyday then becomes a site of politics and represents a move from subjects to active citizens, from de-politicisation to self-government and self-determination (Richmond, 2009a, p. 571).

Richmond builds upon Certeau's work on the tactics of everyday life. The government created strategies and the people adopt tactical responses towards the former. For the strategy to continue, the government needs the people to become predictable and homogenous. Both the strategies and tactics do not meet with each other. The people become distant and engage either in assimilation or resistance (Richmond, 2009a, p. 572). The tactics can be hindered but are not influenced by material factors (ie money). These everyday tactics are 'more flexible and able to adopt more quickly' (Richmond, 2009a, p. 572).

In this case recipients (local beneficiaries) and agents (international community) would be able to relate to each other 'on an everyday, human level, rather merely through problem-solving institutional frameworks' (Richmond, 2009a, p. 565). In such a context, interactions would be based on 'empathy, respect and the recognition of difference' (Richmond, 2009a, p. 566). Deeper engagement is required not only with local ownership or participation, but also in terms of local-local interaction, meaning not facades of internationally sponsored locals (such as NGOs, civil society 'as opposed to 'uncivil society'), thus 'allow[ing] for genuine self-government, self-determination, democracy and human rights' (Richmond, 2009a, p. 566). Thus everyday may include 'resistance and politicization, solidarity, local agency, hybridity, and also of passivity and depoliticisation' and often is hidden (Richmond, 2010, p. 671).

Everyday peace is supposed to create everyday legitimacy. Essentially, if liberal peace would be more plural in the sense of including representatives of all actors 'at multiple levels, public, private, gendered and aged, and of multiple identities', the result could be a 'hybridised local identity' to counterbalance the international 'cosmopolitanism, with commensurate implications for its claimed boundaries, rules, rights, freedoms, and norms' (Richmond, 2009a, p. 567). It would provide a new social contract since the 'legitimacy would rest upon its provision of social, cultural, economic and political resources sufficient to meet the demands made upon it by its local, everyday, constituencies and an international community of which they should be a stakeholder. It would also rest upon an international social contract' (Richmond, 2009a, pp. 567–568).

As a consequence, ‘international forms of peacebuilding would be more likely to be participatory, empathetic, locally owned, and self-sustaining, socially, politically, economically, and environmentally’ (Richmond, 2009a, p. 573). It would provide means to negotiate between different interests and identities, ‘would be adaptable to changing circumstances and needs... justice and equity, and avoid violence both direct and structural’. It also may be a ‘counter-balance or supplant the liberal peace’s obsession with hard security, territorial sovereignty and statehood, and institutions-building over the everyday’ by refocusing on ‘needs at the civil level, rather than mainly on rights’ (Richmond, 2009a, p. 572). The everyday peace

more likely it would entail an everyday tactic of engagement between liberal states and non-liberal alternatives, or locally imagined polities that provided for political, economic, and social requirements in their immediate context – whereby the strategy approximates the tactic, the institutions responds to the characteristics of the local via an ethic of care (Richmond, 2009a, p. 572).

The main elements for enabling a just peace are to focus on the everyday with a global ethic of ‘care’ and ‘empathy’. The notion of ‘care’ goes back to Foucault’s work and has connotation of both morality and solidarity. It is related to freedom understood as ‘a condition of humanity in everyday terms relating to self-care and care for others’ (Richmond, 2009a, p. 574). The notion also represents ‘in the context of self-governance [...] a way of escaping, or moderating, the hegemonic tendencies of liberal social and political governance’ (Richmond, 2009a, p. 575). In other words, it is supposed to counter-balance international institutions and norms. In addition, taking an empathic approach to the local-local interactions would result in better state and peace building:

Power and resistance are entangled within liberal polities but empathy and an aspiration towards self-government, especially within a ‘deep civil society’ (the local-local) derived from a more empathetic engagement, offers a conceptual way forward without delving into a new grand narrative of ethics, and with an eye on the everyday as a contested site of identities, care, empathy, as well as interests (Richmond, 2009a, p. 575).

Still, the question remains as to who exactly is supposed to provide care or to promote such an approach (Richmond, 2009a, p. 573).

This would result on a ‘just peace’ (Allan and Keller) referring to the idea that justice is preferred through peace rather than war, by incorporating the understanding of peace from marginalized people. The everyday peace prioritizes free speech and the human rights of people rather than states and places recognition at the heart of peace, with reconciliation following up. By contrast, liberal peace building ‘offers obstacles to the recognition of certain others’, favors liberals and thus reproduces the process of marginalization (Richmond, 2009a, p. 573). Thus there are calls for

hybridised localized and internationalised praxes of peacebuilding to emerge that are more locally sustainable, resilient, and legitimate than what has been the result of the recently evolved liberal peacebuilding/statebuilding praxis (Richmond, 2009a, p. 572).

If internationals choose to engage through everyday peace: ‘they might ask of disputants at the many different levels of the polity what type of peace could be envisaged; what and how care might be provided, and what is needed to understand, engage and support everyday life?’ and then construe the liberal peacebuilding tenants such as rule of law, democracy and others based on the local input (Richmond, 2009a, p. 576). They would also understand local culture, think beyond liberal state mechanisms, give priority to local decision making, provide international support without introducing ‘hegemony, inequality, conditionality, or dependency’. The economic reform should be ‘determined locally’, based on welfare and empowerment of marginalized. The internationals may assist in free market reform and privatization on local consensus and ‘should introduce a socioeconomic safety net to bind citizens to peaceful polity... Otherwise, neoliberalism clearly undermines any social contract and leads to a counterproductive class system’ (Richmond, 2009a, p. 579). This leads to ‘liberal-local hybrid’ peace.

Furthermore, the concept of human security may assist despite that it has been developed into ‘liberal institutionalist form’ since through everyday, it may construe ‘an emancipatory focus’ (Richmond, 2010, p. 679). This would bring prosperous chances to those societies, which some ‘do not aspire to Western developed forms of liberalism’ (Richmond, 2009a, p. 580). Richmond calls to move towards peace formation to produce positive hybrid peace, which ‘may aid international actors in gaining a better understanding of the roots of the conflict, how local actors may be assisted, how violence and power-seeking may be ended or managed and how local legitimacy may emerge’ (Richmond, 2013, p. 379). Richmond argues that cases from Kosovo, Bosnia, East Timor show that locals may undermine reform and institution building which can be hijacked for nationalistic purposes, if internationals delayed or retained the powers (Richmond, 2009a, p. 575). Specifically, the situation in Kosovo contains ‘a level of discrimination, violence, inequality and marginalization which means ‘peace’ is far from empathetic or emancipatory’ (Richmond, 2014b, p. 14).

The Local Turn

As the previously described concepts suggest, there has recently been a shift in theory that has been described as a ‘local turn’, focusing on local dimensions of state and peace building on the basis of post-structuralist theory, scholarship from the global south and postcolonial theory. The thesis aims to deepen the local turn knowledge with empirical evidence resulting in an interdisciplinary project as it employs both historical and sociological methodologies. More specifically, the local turn derives from the works of critical scholars as mentioned in the earlier sections: critiques of state reform, and hybrid and everyday peace, which means that some of its content has already been described. Mac Ginty and Richmond argue more generally that

what happens at the local level is as important and far less well understood. Worse, it is quickly dismissed by those who wield unaccountable executive power at the international level (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 764).

Interest arose in the local dimensions of peace and state building together with the increased local 'assertiveness' and the 'loss of confidence' of external actors. The consequences are already seen on 'the nature and location of power' (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 763). The local turn theorists start with a 'methodology of and for peace, in its local, state and international contexts' (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 764).

Local turn theorists argue that there is a 'contradiction between local and international perspectives of what peace is and how it may be achieved' (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 764). The result is a 'contestation of conditions of emancipation across various locales [in the] international structure, its historical evolution, in power, understandings of rights, representations, norms, law and society' (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 764). Thus the local turn focuses and analyses critical and resistant agents and how they 'act to uncover or engage with obstacles, with violence, and with structures that maintain them' (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p. 764).

The interactions between the local and international activities in the post war period are explained as it follows. On one hand, during the immediate post war phase, locals need support as they 'may be confronted by the failure of their own historical peace-making institutions, and need help in repairing and redesigning them in their own context, mindful or regional or international contexts too' (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 773). On the other hand, internationals can be accused of a shock therapy approach, using the moment to reconstruct all institutions from the ground up. However, this approach is criticized as unethical and not empathetic, the effect being that it 'is damaging to lives and livelihoods, causes resistance, is anti-democratic, and undermines human rights' (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 773). It is a form of maintaining western hegemony, global hierarchy and inequality rather than addressing the 'causes of conflict'. It supports predatory global economy, 'removes local identity, community and thus historical context', and perpetuates 'global and local injustices'. Thus the 'West exercises structural and governmental power against the local, simultaneously preaching democracy, human rights, and accountability and assuming subaltern has little agency' (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 773).

Mac Ginty and Richmond point out that internationals are failing to produce any 'accountability to local subjects', which 'compromise[s] the ethics of peace building' and which is also problematic measured by international's own standards of human rights and democracy (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 779). They claim that there is an 'unwillingness to take seriously the local', especially when 'material, structural or identity inequalities' are denied in conflicts

with partitionist elements, such as in Cyprus and Kosovo. Thus the denial of agency serves to maintain the current liberal order, which is favorable to the global North:

Thus, the evidence is mounting that denying the local and its rights or historical identity, as well as preventing justice across the international, as well as history and society, is designed to naturalise the current international order, to de-emphasise historical injustice, inequality and social justice, and to maintain executive decision making power in the hands of a global elite which is Northern and transnational (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 779).

However public transcripts refuse to acknowledge

their accountability to local subjects or to refrain from naturalizing international and local hierarchies... Yet such public transcripts are often not supported in the private transcripts of the international civil service of professional and bureaucratic actors, donors, UN agencies, and INGOs involved in attempting to build peace and the state in the world's conflict zones, who also couch their roles in terms of local emancipation and empathy (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 779).

The local turn calls therefore for a 'light foot print' approach to peace and state building which also considers matters of social justice. In addition, they point out that 'resilient communities' are used as a cover to abandon universal goals and rights and to maintain 'good enough' governance and security'. Thus resilience serves to 'abrogate responsibility' from internationals 'while also acknowledging that local actors have agency and should have ownership' (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 780).

The local turn thus seeks to point out

how power circulates, and how legitimacy even in the most obscure local forums holds it to account. It maintains the possibility of emancipation and empathy in a local to global framework, drawing on the values, identity and the needs of its subjects, rather than on the 'benevolent' assumptions of national and global, Marxist, liberal or neoliberal elites, whose centralized narratives of peace and the role of a vanguard, international institutions or global markets have rarely delivered (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 780).

Furthermore, the local turn challenges western rationality, universality and modernization on the basis of accounts 'grounded in real-world events' (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 766). State and peace building and development are supposed to support rather than define its subjects. Local subjects represents different agencies that aim to identify and create conditions for peace, with or without international help. Sometimes legitimacy in local and international unites (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 769). Furthermore, as already explained in the section on everyday peace, the local population conducts

economic, cultural and or survival everyday tasks [that] may allow individuals and communities in villages, valleys, and city neighborhoods to develop common bonds with members of other ethnic or religious groups, to demystify 'the other' and to reconstruct contextual legitimacy (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 769).

In sum, the main elements used in local turn scholarship are local agency and hybrid peace, following 'an attempt to redefine what peace and legitimacy mean in different contexts, to

maintain everyday life, to gain autonomy, aspirations for social forms of justice, to express identity, and to engage with certain aspects of the liberal peace' (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 779) .

However, the literature also recognizes that it is necessary to not romanticize the local or the international, recognize the limits faced due to structural power and understand that local practices may be also 'discriminatory, exclusive and violent' (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 770). In fact, often 'local and hybrid institutions are weak or dysfunctional, corrupt or neo-patrimonial' as well as 'globalized and networked' (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 765).

In other words, the local is a conglomerate,

differentiated from the national and international, although of course any boundaries are blurred by the fact that all agency networked in an increasingly complex manner. The local is not necessarily exclusive of the national and international. Indeed, it is much less 'local' than imagined, and is the product of constant social negotiation between localised and non-localised ideas, norms and practices (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 770).

The local turn creates space for emancipation but requires radical changes:

the reconstitution of emancipation, via the everyday, in an empathetic frame [solidarity], in which subjects have agency [meaning we are all subjects]. Structural obstacles to peace can be better redressed, although this may demand radical solutions (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 770).

In practice, locals lack power when faced with violence. Although internationals have capacity and resources, they still often fail to mitigate local violence, meaning that it would be better to be engaged with locals 'to provide space [and] targeted action for peace to form locally', though not 'colored by interests, biases, or ideology because it then loses local consent and legitimacy' (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 771). This would move away from instrumental use of locals to a type of localism which 'is hardwired into conflict transformation as it emphasizes the need to address relationships between antagonists and the need to address conflict at the individual and community levels' (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 771). To reinforce a sustainable peace, the concept focuses on identities, attitudes and education system. Compromises based on historical context are at the heart of the attempt to promote liberal peace and political autonomy.

In addition, some efforts on local turn may not be genuine, whereas others convenient but possibly immoral. Mac Ginty and Richmond acknowledge that there are trends opposed to the local turn, such as 'the standardization of peace-building which is done at the expense of local approaches seen as 'deviating from the norm' (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 777). In contrast, a local turn would require 'policy makers, administrators and field-officers to put their subjects first (ie to engage with them at least as partners) and to find ways of preventing strategic, political, ideological or normative interests and preferences, drives by state elites, key donors or hegemonic states, from undermining the subjects' needs and rights in any peace

process' (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 778). Furthermore, a local turn would require the international community to recognize its 'universalism and rationalities associated with peace as local to itself' and acknowledge that 'a thin universalism' in practice is possible if all subjects recognize and represent the supposed aim of the liberal peace (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 778). For instance, Richmond points out that hybridity produced positive agency in Afghanistan and Kosovo since the Declaration of Independence in 2008 but not only positive thus there are agonistic terrains to be engaged (Richmond, 2009b). A third obstacle refers to the international standardized reporting formats which hinder to see the locals. The last obstacle is the fact that 'locals co-opted and neutralized by orthodox, internationally designed, funded and promoted approaches to peace building'. Material benefit is tempting for local officials and therefore an efficient tool for international to 'discipline' or 'tame' local actors, although locals have recently been more engaged in delaying, changing direction and negotiations with internationals (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 778). The making of hybrid liberal peace is seen in East Timor.

Proponents are aware that the local turn has been criticized as 'romantic, relativist or particularist, anti-democratic, anti-developmental, contravening youth and women's rights, as well as human rights more generally' (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 764). It has also been understood as opposing liberal peace, betraying social justice and rejecting the 'natural right of the North to intervene in the political formations in the South' (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 764). Colonial anthropology criticized the local turn due to the incapability of local agency to counteract with structural powers of colonialists in practice (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013).

However, Mac Ginty and Richmond argue that these critiques show the limits of Western understandings about peace, which inherently naturalize Western power with widespread global implications and dynamics (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 765). On the one hand, they argue that internationals face similar problems regarding representation, the interests they promote, their democratic credentials, accountability, and qualifications, their awareness of the historical power relations, as well as cultural, social, political, methodological and ethical issues. On the other hand, they argue that there is a growing local confidence since international institutions engage with local forms of legitimacy 'to mitigate the impact on everyday life of international interests and priorities attached to peace building and development', while local actors see liberal peace through international involvement as something to gain from if access were granted (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 766).

Mac Ginty and Richmond summarize the local turn as recognizing

diffuseness of power (even the 'normative' power of the UN, donors, and the EU) and its circulation, of the importance of culture, history and identity, the significance of local critical and resistance, of the unintended consequences

of external blueprints of rights and needs in everyday contexts (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 769).

Furthermore, the internationals perceive the locals as

endemically dysfunctional, contextually insensitive, disrespectful and distant, unaccountable interest-based, normatively biased, ideologically fixed, mercenary in its naturalization of capitalism and unwilling to address inequality or the historical injustices stemming from colonialism (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 772).

On the other hand the locals perceive liberal peace as:

ethically bankrupt, subject to double standards, coercive and conditional, acultural, unconcerned with social welfare, and unfeeling and insensitive towards its subjects (Richmond, 2009a, p. 557).

The local turn contributes thus essentially to ‘decolonisation of knowledge’ on peace, while opening a debate on power and social justice and ‘a possibility of a more expansive epistemology that is able to overcome the artificial conceptual boundaries imposed by the notion of state sovereignty’ (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 780). The move towards the ‘local’ ‘modifies or opposes the focus on the international, the state or governments, or indeed on ‘local’ as ill-trained liberals or non-liberals’ (Richmond, 2010, p. 671). They raise some crucial questions for further research regarding for instance the relation between power and peace in the emergence of an emancipatory peace. Varieties of local agency are one of the main elements of the local turn illustrated mainly by acts of compliance, resistance and non-participation of the local subjects (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013; O. Richmond, 2010). We will describe how are these agencies identified in post conflict situations according to post liberal peace.

Identifying Agency through Everyday Peace

The agency expressed through resistance, whether hidden or explicit, has potential to repoliticize the everyday and IR. It would result on the state and institutions shaped by everyday constructed at ‘the local level in contextual forms’ and global level (Richmond, 2010, p. 671). The *everyday* is used as an element to identify resistance. The best methods are through detailed and ethnographic ‘understanding of each other’s positions and contexts’ rather than security, institutional, statistical or trend based approaches. The everyday represents a mix of interactions, resistance, mediation, negotiation in the local context rather than a single communitarian or cosmopolitan ideas (Richmond, 2010, p. 688). It calls for recognition of the processes below as it

include[s] the recognition of the dynamics of the everyday, from the needs of communities and citizens in subsistence and customary settings, of tradition, history and non-liberal identities, of customary law, hereditary and tribal institutions, different notions about the use of ownership of land and property, of the role of the state, market or community/collective in providing services and so forth (Richmond, 2010, p. 890).

The main aim of the everyday is to

[enable] an examination of the hidden capacity of supposedly weak and marginal actors to negotiate the supposedly hegemonic liberal peacebuilding framework, through resistance, co-option or acceptance, towards a more resonant and localised form of politics. Such forms of resistance denote local agency and capacity, and indeed political mobilization and institutionalization (Richmond, 2010, p. 691).

The argument is that alternatives are there and that modifications of liberal agenda are ‘intellectually available and empirically observable’ (Richmond, 2010, p. 688). While it is possible to empower local agents, the question is whether ‘the local and the liberal tend to repulse each other, meaning that the hybrid is inevitably based on internal contradictions, or whether they are attracted to each other, in which case hybridity is based on the production of new political cultures and institutions paradigms’ (Richmond, 2010, p. 869). Everyday resistance can be linked to the basic needs and struggles for survival on aspects such as food, housing, security, and family.

Questions remain when studying the local agency, such as on what ‘the local and everyday should gain from research’, who and how local voices are selected, ‘[w]hat are the implications of ‘studying down’ from privileged positions’, how to be more cautious when researchers derive ‘ethical or universalizing responses’, how to manage the state between “‘going native’ or co-option”, how to deal with ‘the privileges of research ‘in the field’ and ‘common ‘rewards’ of research in the corridors of power or on the pages of ‘great’ texts’ (Richmond, 2010, pp. 671–672). These questions have been dealt mainly in the life stories and methodology chapter. So far individual attempts from locals to protect themselves against misrepresentation by researchers in Basque countries and Bosnia and Herzegovina have been identified (Kappler, 2013). In addition, the creation of Serbian parallel structures to those of Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo are viewed as local resistance to statebuilding in Kosovo (Van der Borgh, 2012). Thus the current research will investigate various forms of local agency identified in Kosovo.

Critique of the Post Liberal Peace

Liberal theorists have criticized the critical theories, and especially the post-liberal peace approach. For instance, Paris has called these critical theorists ‘hyper-critical’, presenting liberal peacebuilding as ‘fundamentally destructive or illegitimate’. He also criticizes them for not proposing alternatives and in fact as currently relying on the liberal peace framework (Paris, 2010, p. 338). Other critical theorists have also questioned the post liberal peace approach. For instance, Sabaratnam acknowledges their ‘anti-imperial’ orientation and ethic (‘exposing the tensions between norms and ethics of self-determination, democracy and sovereignty, and the neo-imperial interventionist discourses and practices that constitute the liberal peace’), but argues that despite their usage of concepts like ‘everyday’, ‘local’, and ‘subaltern’, they

‘failed to address systematically the deeper problems of ‘Eurocentrism’ in how we think and research the politics of international’ (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 2). She refers to Eurocentrism as

the sensibility that Europe is historically, economically, culturally, and politically, distinctive in ways which significantly determine the overall character of world politics [emphasis original] (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 3)

In fact, Sabaratnam exposes the ‘Eurocentric limits’ in the critical approaches which ‘close down rather than open up counter-hegemonic modes of thinking the international’ (Sabaratnam, 2013, pp. 2–3), implying that they ‘reproduce rather than challenge the intellectual Eurocentrism underpinning the liberal peace’ (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 1).

In her view, four features in critical approaches are particularly Eurocentric: (i) the ‘methodological bypassing of target subjects in research’, (ii) the ‘analytical bypassing of subjects through governmentality frameworks’, (iii) ‘ontologies of otherness’ and (iv) the group that has nostalgia for social contract, welfare democracy and the liberal political subject (Sabaratnam, 2013). The first aspect refers to the ‘tendency to exclude or marginalize consideration of the people targeted by its interventions from the analysis’ (Sabaratnam, 2013, pp. 6–7), citing as examples the works of critical academics such as Chandler, Zuam, Richmond, Franks and also Duffied (despite the latter’s efforts to ground global theories on case studies). She thus argues that they follow (even if unintentionally) the methodological habit of focusing only on Western agency and ignoring the people targeted by intervention, the result being that the literature ‘reproduces the tenets of old Eurocentrism [...] – the implied passivity, irrelevance or mysteriousness of the non-West – even as it tries to avoid them’ (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 8).

The second aspect refers to the analytical bypassing of the people targeted in interventions ‘as substantive political subjects, via critical accounts of global governance’ (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 8). Her critique is targeted in particular towards recent works focusing on a form of liberal governmentality as developed by Foucault, referring to a ‘productive technology of power which seeks to regulate life through its freedom – through the production of self-governing liberal subjects’ (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 8). Opposing Duffied’s work more specifically, Sabaratnam notes that the problem is the assumption that the South is governed ‘through the production of liberal subjectivity’ and that southern political figures are produced through ‘volition rather than coercion or loyalty’ as it is common in the West (Sabaratnam, 2013, pp. 9–10). Thus using Foucault’s notions of power and resistance on the global level ignore both the ‘historical angle’ and ‘positionality’. Besides Duffied, Chandler also uses the governmentality framework, which as Sabaratnam argues excludes and avoids analytical reflections on the ‘people targeted by interventions as political subjects’ (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 10).

The third type of Eurocentrism concerns the analysis of targeted people by interventions through Otherness, that is, ‘cultural distinctiveness and alterity’. It understands the West as

modern and the local as non-modern and non-Western in making an ‘ontological distinction’ between the notions of liberal-local, hybridity, resistance and the everyday (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 11). The everyday, local and agency ‘reclaims the customary and is not co-opted by the international’ where codes of customary law ‘becomes part of the new constitutional settlement’ (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 12). She notes that the analytical focus lies thus on the cultural differences between the two groups. Such problems have been pointed out in other contexts by postcolonial writers such as Bhabha, who prefer ‘pointing instead to the historically blurred, intertwined and mutually constituted character of global historical space and ‘culture’ (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 13).

The last aspect of Eurocentrism is the product of a nostalgia for social contract⁶, welfare democracy and the liberal political subject. Sabaratnam regards this as problematic since it advocates bringing back the ‘classical liberal framework of accountability through contract’. Alternatives such as the theory of the social contract, state-led social democracy, labour rights and so on ‘are framed in terms of and with references to such a past, and that there is little real difference between these visions and those that practitioners of intervention themselves hold’ (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 15).

She also agrees with critical thinkers that ‘there is no alternative’ to the liberal models but for different reasons than critical thinkers, which is that Eurocentrism ‘denies the possibility of any real political exteriority to this broad category of ideas’ (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 15). Furthermore, she concludes that the critical thinkers are

trapped in a ‘paradox of liberalism’, which on the one hand problematizes its biopolitics, cultural inappropriateness, neoliberal economic policies and unaccountability, but on the other responds to these problems through either some kind of middle ground or some kind of ‘proper’ liberalism of the past (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 16).

Notions of local ownership, participatory governance, multidimensional approaches, partnerships with aid countries etc. are the basis for these alternatives. However, the question remains whether these are culturally more appropriate or just another ‘efficient instrument of neo-colonial governance’ (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 16). As academics are used to think from a European perspective, it is impossible for them to think of something outside liberal peace as a response to poverty, conflict and crises. To ‘decolonise’ the analytical approach, she calls for a ‘re-politicisation of colonial difference’ which would offer an ‘alternative decolonizing approach to critical analysis through re-positioning the analytical gaze’ (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 1). Borrowing from Mignolo and Quijano, she defines the decolonial approach as a ‘re-engagement with that which Eurocentric thinking suppresses or discounts, thus ‘that which is exterior to the presumption of Western distinctiveness’ (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 17). Further-

⁶ Social contract refers to ‘restoring balance between powerful and less powerful actors’ with more everyday legitimacy (Sabaratnam, 2013, pp. 13–14).

more, she notes no space is untouched by colonial – modern thought. She stresses the “limiting character of colonial and Eurocentric epistemologies, and seeks to recover other sites for re-grounding the analytic gaze” (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 5).

Three strategies are suggested to create a “decolonial critical research” in state and peace building. Firstly, she calls to recover the historical political presence, “forms of power, rule and resistance which existed in the territories” while moving away from ideas of peace and democracy which are “new” to local people (Sabaratnam, 2013, pp. 17–18). This would bring different “ideas of values, issues and solidarities that constitute the pluralities of human political life”. She proposes to research various elements:

The historical appreciation must also be coupled with an understanding of contemporary political presences, including an engagement with key political concerns, oppositions, motifs, discourses and patterns of actions [in order to] read the interventions in a multi-sited way, and in terms of understanding complex impacts on the political life of the target society (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 18).

The second suggestion is to shift from researching alien culture to looking at processes of alienation, in other words to move away from a “culturalist” framework to a positional research. She argues that the notions of critical agency, resistance, empathy, care, and everyday focus on cultural difference which “replicate ontologies of civilization and race”. She instead proposes to:

re-politicise the field of actions in which different people operate. One key strategy in anti-colonial thought was not to focus on the ‘alien’ (i.e. incomprehensible, inauthentic) character of colonial rule but its ‘alienating’ character – i.e. its displacements, violence, silencing, humiliations and dispossession, which accrued to people as individuals and as a group. These included the epistemic violence done to symbols, social orders and knowledge. The point is that this becomes a *positional*, and thus political, story rather than a ‘culturalist’ one about ‘difference’ (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 19)

The positional critique needs to engage with the experience of people targeted by intervention, who are reduced to “objects of power”, are active and with also those who have some agency “through their involvement with particular structures” (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 19). Furthermore, this method requires reflexivity and “a commitment to the possibility for substantive engagement with the particular politics of the situation” (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 20). Thus she suggests to provide a better understanding of politics of international through “emphasizing the political content and context of human consciousness, meaning, and agency” (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 20).

The last recommendation focuses on decolonizing the notion of political economy through politicizing entitlements, dispossessions and accumulations. A decolonial political economy engages with the experiences of the beneficiaries of interventions and “interpret[s] the material effects of that intervention”. It attempts to move away from the capitalist structural tendencies and identify the politics of distribution. It also

requires an analysis that politicizes the various forms of entitlement, dispossession and accumulation that characterize the rationales for intervention and its distributive effects...[It challenges] the historical terms on which this dysfunctional political economy is made thinkable (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 21).

Furthermore, the everyday peace research agenda is very interesting but in practice, it is very difficult to assess what constitutes the local-local due to the current mix of global, regional and local identities. The local identities are fluid and mixed, hence the “deep civil society” (the local-local) categorization remains blurred. In addition, even if identified the local-local, researchers might have difficulties to access and also expose these groups to the academia and media since these groups may wish to remain hidden. Hence this research will not take into account the everyday peace in terms of local-local since it is difficult to identify, access and represent their experiences. If accessed and identified, this research prioritizes the ethical duty to care and no harm on participants.

However Richmond recognizes limitations and acknowledges that further research needs to follow. He points out three questions to be addressed: how to address obstacles that prevent internationals on engaging in local peace formation, how can the contextual obstacles that produce negative peace be removed and how can the peace formation that leads to positive hybrid peace be enabled? (Richmond, 2014b, p. 16). In addition, Belloni points out that questions remain on many aspects. For instance, it can be challenging for donors to translate this knowledge into the programs. He calls for further research on whether a hybrid peace is an alternative to liberal peace model; what type of hybrid peace is more likely to be developed locally and would be better for peace and stability (since representation often is poor), and which areas of liberal and post liberal are of mutual construction (Belloni, 2012, p. 35).

In addition, Mac Ginty developed indicators for measuring everyday peace, which could be used by IOs, NGOs, donors and states for reporting, inspired by sustainable development. He suggests moving away from narrow, technical indicators to locally based, non-prescriptive, reflexive and dynamic ones, safeguarded against elite capture (Mac Ginty, 2013). Usually, the creation of indicators for peace are proposed by liberal peace theorists, so it can be questioned whether post-liberal peace theorists wish to enforce a single package for the measurement of peace. Hidden power structures and some groups’ lack of access to such measurements are not taken into account. It may therefore be impossible to built contextually localized indicators without recreating some of the pitfalls. In addition, proposing indicators methodology while bypassing the local subjects’ methodologically would certainly reinforce Sabaratnam’s critique of the Eurocentric orientation of critical theorists.

To conclude, the current research will look on how liberal and local have been negotiated in Kosovo and what type of hybrid peace has been formed if there is one, and how did the liberal peace acquired local meaning? And whether peace is positive or negative? It will be looked

also on whether the everyday peace through notions of care and empathy, and similarly the hybrid peace, have potential to be employed by the local and international actors on the ground, what are the obstacles and how they could be removed.

Conclusion

Table 3, current theoretical views on peace and state building, as held by some of the main international relations theories are illustrated, and their suggestions according to each theory.

It is an extended version of table borrowed from Tadjbakhsh & Richmond (2011):

Theory Types	Peace/State Building Problems	Theoretical Potential Modifications
Communitarian	Assumptions about the universality of cosmopolitan values. The imposition of foreign moral and cultural agendas on host communities. Ignoring the community's intrinsic moral values, norms, informal institutions, etc. Too interventionary.	Aims and methods of peacebuilding must be in accordance with the practices, traditions and communities of the host-society within a sovereign state. Collective agency of the community/state. Respect for sovereignty of the state through non-interference.
Social constructivism	Construction of peace as a technical exercise. Neglect of ideational matters and identity.	Social forms of peace and state. Return of politics, history and sociology.
Critical International Theory	Hegemony. Conservative crusade. Lack of social justice. Not ambitious enough in terms of international responsibility.	Post-Westphalian sovereignty that rebuilds cosmopolitanism from below. Emancipatory peace. Pursuit of positive liberties in ways that recognize/do not hamper negative ones. Welfare. Justice. Recognition of the 'local' as a fluid space with agency, capacity to resist, and subjectivity.
Post-modernism	Social engineering with assumptions about the emancipatory potential of modernity, and mechanical rationality. Territorial sovereignty.	Engagement with differences through agnony, and new forms of representation for individuals. Removal of sovereign state.
Post-colonialism	Imperialism. Artificial juxtaposition of the local against the global. Associating the global with resistance and dominance. Problems of representation and self-representation of the subaltern.	Recognizing the hybridity of the post-colonial condition. Enabling the subaltern to speak. Engaging with context.

With combination of few elements from the theories above, the following post liberal peace theory resulted, however with limitations as outlined in the critique section:

Post Liberal Peace Theory	Critique
Combination of post-modern and post-colonial theory. Builds upon notions of ‘hybridity’, ‘resistance’ and ‘everyday’ which emerge ‘unintended’ between local and international interactions. The local is remediated with the international The meaning of external ideas are constructed on the ground. Returns agency to the suppressed. Aims at reconciling local demands for democracy, development and human rights with aspirations for self-determination. Shifts from top-down to bottom-up state and peace building. Returns to politics before ideology.	Alternatives are not precise. It requests a degree of social and political stability. Leads to malicious hybridity and accepts human rights violations. Response to the dominant liberal ideology. Underestimates the self-interest of external actors by expecting that external actors open up the space for hybridity, curb their ambitions and show empathy for moral/ethical reasons. Is based on Eurocentrism.

Table 4 Extended Typology of Theories and Critiques on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (Tadjabakhsh & Richmond, 2011, pp. 232–233)

Post-liberal peace theories can be seen as a reaction to the shortcomings of liberal peace as discussed in the previous chapter. The reconceptualization of state reforms began due to the inadequate liberal state reforms, including liberal political and economic institution-building. These theories propose moving towards a state that provides welfare, services and social contract. The current research attempts to add to the work of Goetze and Guzina, who argue that current research portrays concepts like peace, state and democracy as absolute and indisputable. Approaches that deal with these through problem solving, efficiency and political engineering turn out to be insufficient. Thus a new theory must be developed to analyze the “social construction of stateness” and to account for

the interaction between local and global actors, the micro- and macro perspectives as well as the simultaneity of success and failure of peace- and state building (Goetze & Guzina, 2008, p. 341).

A dual legitimacy gap, pertaining to both internal and external dimensions, and a “social gap” between internationals and locals has been observed in post-conflict settings, leading to legitimacy crises (Lemay-Hébert, 2011). These crises reinforce a weak type of state and peace building. A more contextual legitimacy is instead needed, which could be established through hybrid or everyday peace, as suggested by post-liberal theorists, and which entails more negotiation between internationals and locals on the ground. The hybrid peace concept is assumed

to result in negative peace, whereas authors such as Richmond try to go even further than that through the idea of everyday peace. These theorists argue that a post liberal peace allows a hybrid type of liberal peace which surpasses existing institutional blueprints, returns to politics before ideology even that of liberalism, specifically “where negotiation, mediation, assistance, consensus, consent and reconciliation form the basis of any peace” (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p. 235). To make this possible, they rely on a local turn (that is, a genuine inclusion of locals) and local agency. Local agency expressed in compliance, resistance and non-participation can renegotiate the post war reconstruction which resulted so far on hybrid peace. However in many states neither hybrid or negative peace resulted such as in DRC. Everyday peace would be the preferred outcome according to post-liberal theorists which advocate for the inclusion of elements of empathy and care in the everyday activities of locals and internationals. Naturally, critiques have also been expressed about this approach, describing it as hyper critical, destructive, illegitimate and Eurocentric.

Post liberal peace may represent an alternative to the current liberal model, but it risks remaining a theoretical notion that has a questionable application in practice. The attempts to offer an alternative are limited and often tied to the criticized liberal framework. Problems of power politics and geopolitical changes remain acute, and incentives for external actors to adjust their behavior are slight. Only moral or contractual principles will be insufficient as liberal attempts to post-conflict reconstruction have proven. Change needs to be embedded structurally and the question would then be: who from the locals or internationals would take the lead towards this change? How can everyday peace be implemented by both actors? Power interests in international politics seem to be underestimated in this theoretical model. Even the “competition” resulting from the rise of the BRIC countries is unlikely to change peace and state building practice as these states are less interested in this agenda. In addition, similar practical problems as with liberal peace approaches can be raised concerning external oversight of money invested to manage the room for manipulation by the development agencies and other international actors. They may provide various forms of support for their local counterparts, but similar problems will arise with their continued engagement over a long period of time, which may result in local dependencies. Furthermore, there may be lack of incentives for both top and bottom actors to promote contextualized projects. The current thesis aims to contribute theoretically to a deeper understanding of the dual legitimacy and the notion of “bifurcation of two worlds”, as described by Lemay-Hebert, by looking at real world events and the perceptions about state and peace processes in Kosovo of the beneficiaries of the intervention, and identify how the liberal and post liberal peace theory acquire meaning in local contexts.

The Research Design

4. The Epistemological and Methodological Approaches: The Methodology of Local State and Peace Building through Life Stories

Introduction

The design for the implementation of the research is the main concern of this chapter. It begins by introducing the theoretical debates relevant for the present research, more specifically the debates on post-positivism, as well as the main critiques to positivism, that is, the third debate in international relations theory. The research takes a post-positivist, especially post-structuralist approach whose epistemological assumptions regarding truth, belief and meaning differ from positivist ones. The rational/positivist approach claims that valid scientific claims are based on knowledge and truth established through rigorous methodological guidelines, which distinguish science from belief. The second part of the discussion focuses on the post-positivist critique which rejects positivism as an uncritical approach to studying social phenomena. They claim that there are many things going on behind the data that are not being reported and are hence excluded from the scholarship. The sections below attempt to outline why the post-structuralist approach is chosen to study the post conflict reconstruction process in Kosovo. One of the main factors is that life stories try similarly to reveal uncovered messages. The narratives collected during the research as well as the resulting story seek also to destabilize common-sense understandings of post conflict reconstruction and to challenge “truths” that dominate the current discourses. The design aims to provide a broad understanding of post conflict reconstruction in Kosovo, covering most of the angles that the international civil servants and the local participants present.

The chapter also elaborates on the methodology of life stories, its importance and limitations for research in international relations. Seeking to expand the discourse analysis with this new methodological source, it describes in depth what life stories are, why they are used and what they add to the study of international relations. Most importantly, life stories are used for the first time to analyze the state and peace building processes. Thereafter, it will be clarified how interviews can be analyzed through grounded theory, which is a qualitative tool aiming to generate new theoretical approaches from qualitative data, and how the life stories as a methodological tool can be added more specifically to post-structuralist theory of international relations. Lastly, a twofold contribution is made by showing the importance of using for the first time life stories to deepen our understanding of state and peace building in Kosovo. Furthermore, I argue that adding life stories as a new source of analysis to traditional sources

such as open, structured or semi-structured interviews, newspapers, policy papers, official documents, archives, etc in international relations contributes to the search for new and hidden local meanings in political science, namely state and peace building theory. This interdisciplinary research based on life stories analysed through grounded theory, a historical and sociological methodological tool, was used to reveal dimensions of security challenges in post-conflict countries, as perceived by international and local individuals.

Post-Positivist Epistemology

Before moving to the specificities of the research design, it is necessary to clarify the relation between post-structuralist approaches and other key notions such as positivism and post-positivism, as well as differences between the latter. The present research takes a post-structuralist approach, which can be categorized as a post-positivist type of research. The following section borrows from different authors, including positivist, post-positivist and especially post-structuralists in order to illustrate the relevance of these theoretical debates.

Questions of knowledge, power and identity have been central to the discussions in international relations theory in the 21st century. The Third Debate, ranging since the mid-1980s and continuing until today, has made prominent the issues of science and disciplinary history in IR. The main concerns of this debate were the oppositions between explanation and understanding, positivism and post-positivism, or rationalism and reflectivism. Generally speaking, positivists claim that scientific research is characterized by systematic observation. Its origins can be traced back to the founding father of sociology, August Comte, who set the

aim [...] to develop a science of society, based on the *methods* of the natural science, namely observation. Its aim was to reveal the “evolutionary casual laws” that explained observable phenomena. His aspiration was that all sciences would have “a unified methodology” (S. Smith, 1996, p. 14).

Valid scientific claims must thus rest on “rigorous methodological guidelines” that allow us to distinguish between science and belief (Dunne, Kurki, & Smith, 2013, p. 22). “Regular patterns” are of significant importance for providing both “causal analysis” and “empirical validation”, and must consequently “avoid talking about ‘realities’ that cannot be observed” and stress upon “instrumental function of knowledge” (Dunne, Kurki, & Smith, 2010, p. 23).

By contrast, post-positivism rejects the assumptions of positivism. George explains the purpose and contribution of post-positivism by pointing out that it seeks

to help us understand more about contemporary global life by opening up for questioning dimensions of inquiry which have been previously closed off and suppressed; by listening closely to voices previously unheard; by examining “realities” excluded from consideration under a traditional (realist) regime of unity and singularity. Its purpose, reiterated: the search for “thinking space” within an International Relations discipline produced by and articulated through Western modernist discourse (George, 1989, p. 269).

The present research follows this objective that pertains also to post-structuralist approaches which are categorized under both post-structuralist and post-modernist accounts. Most notably, post-structuralism engages critically with the concepts of identity, representation, power and knowledge, and interpretation (Campbell, 2010, p. 213). Science, objective knowledge and universality are questioned through a focus on language, culture and history (Campbell, 2010, p. 234). It is important to note as well that it “sees critique as an inherently positive exercise that establishes conditions of possibility for pursuing alternatives” (Campbell, 2010, p. 235).

In his Presidential address of 1998 to the International Studies Association, “*Two Approaches*”, Robert Keohane reflects on the separation in IR theory between what he calls rationalist and reflective approaches, categories that largely correspond to positivism and post-positivism. According to Keohane there is a significant potential in the so-called “reflective approach” which focuses on the “impact of human subjectivities” and the “embeddedness of contemporary international institutions in pre-existing practices” (Keohane, 1988, p. 379). In other words, as Hansen points out, the approach stresses the “importance of identity, culture, norms, regimes and ideas” (Hansen, p.3). But Keohane also criticizes the reflective approach for failing to create a rigorous, empirical research agenda that could potentially synthesize with the rationalist framework. He thereby restates the critique that has traditionally been launched by positivists against post-positivist frameworks.

Many studies subscribing to the reflective approach present answers of political and theoretical questions through the analysis of “discourses”. Discourse replaces the distinction between theory and practice, meaning that it “blurs the dichotomy between reality and its textual representations” (Griffiths, 1999, p. 205). Hansen describes the discourse as “framings of meaning and lenses of interpretations, rather than objective, historical truths” (Hansen, p.6). Richard Ashley, a prominent post-positivist and post-structuralist, criticized in his engagement with the positivist view of IR theory the “technical rationality” of science (Griffiths, 1999, p. 207). Ashley thus formulates a critique of modern epistemological assumptions on the rationality of science and the dominance of economic and realist frameworks. The main assumptions of science include the distinction between object and subject, the functioning of theory and its usage as an instrument of discovery. Reflective approaches also aim to move away from dichotomies ‘(e.g. facts against values, objective knowledge versus subjective prejudice, or empirical observation in contrast to normative concerns)’ (Campbell, 2010, p. 228). The reflective, post-positivist approach suggests that knowledge is construed in relation to power and that facts can therefore be altered according to the needs of power.

The reflective approach thus aims to open new boundaries for a more diverse research agenda. In contrast to the rational approach, it avoids creating barriers, maintaining its initial demand to allow new research questions in opposition to Keohane’s suggestion to clarify and

agree upon one research agenda. However, Keohane's criticism on the lack of rigor has been taken into account by creating and refining scientific methods (one good example, discussed below, is Hansen's discourse analysis method to analyze foreign policy issues). This type of approach is consequently not "anti-science", but rather opposed to a "positivist" conception of science. According to Campbell, post-structuralism has been marginalized within IR as its claims have been misunderstood by positivists who have been concerned about the consequences of following this type of critical theoretical questioning (Campbell, 2010).

In addition, Ashley uses mainly the method of "deconstruction" to uncover approaches that through power/knowledge discourses create dichotomous categories and supposedly suppress opposition (Griffiths, 1999). Ashley thus seeks to undermine the (modern) hegemonic discourses of power/knowledge rather than replace them, with the following possibilities emerging:

practices might be resisted or disabled; boundaries might be put in doubt and transgressed; representations might be subverted, deprived of the presumption of self-evidence, and politicised and historicised; new connections among diverse cultural elements might become possible; and new ways of thinking and doing global politics might be opened up (Ashley, 1998, p. 254)

Another important goal of post-structuralists such as Ashley is to find the "structural/epistemological practices" that increase problems, calling to confront structures rather than permit them to structure and restrict possible answers (Griffiths, 1999, p. 252). They support consequently an agenda that would determine the causes of problems, confront these practices and surpass the limitations that characterize the solutions offered by positivist frameworks. The book *Discourses of Global Politics* (1994) by Jim George offers an account of such a critical approach to IR. His analysis of the discipline through a Foucauldian framework calls into question the discipline's overreliance on realism, showing its many errors, silences and omissions. Similarly, such an approach can be applied in the research on contemporary post-conflict reconstruction, its challenges and practices, highlighting the limitations of its solutions and identifying the errors made by dominant approaches such as realism. This thesis also inquires the dividing practices *between* local and internationals, and separately *within* international and local groups, aiming to identify such dividing practices and legitimate authorities, as well as to trace the historical evolution of state and peace building in Kosovo. Lastly, the structure and dynamics of state and peace building are assessed.

This sort of research can similarly be explained by reference to Andersen's notion of an *epistemologically over-determined* approach. Just like reflective approaches, this represents a critical perspective focused on the ways of knowing. According to Andersen, this type of research "is concerned with the observation of how the world comes into being as a direct result of the specific perspectives held by individuals, organizations, or systems" (Andersen, 2003, p. xiii). Epistemologically over-determined approaches claim that the world can be compre-

hended “as it is”. The goal is to ask questions through analytical strategies - not methods – and to look at the “observation of observations as observations”, as well as “to question pre-suppositions, to de-ontologise” and identify “which analytical strategies will enable us to obtain knowledge, critically different from the existing system of meaning” (Andersen, 2003, p. xiii). As in Foucault’s work, Andersen suggests that deconstruction can reveal “deeper” answers on international relations practices. But in fact, epistemologically over-determined research transcends any particular discipline as it “question[s] the evolution of different fields, their communicative closure on their own functions, the limited reflective ability of the individual fields, and their attachment with and detachment from other fields” (Andersen, 2003, p. xi). This sort of approach thus aims to contribute to the broadening of the discipline, in this case IR, by drawing on other disciplines. An interdisciplinary perspective to IR, borrowing especially from social theory, has firmly established itself even beyond post-structuralism, as can be seen in constructivist theorizing.

Finally, an important difference exists between the various approaches on the perspectives they take on the state. Realists and liberal IR scholars, especially in their “neo” versions, focus on the structure and dynamics of the international system. Realists consider the state to be the central actor in global affairs, while liberals acknowledge the decreasing importance compared with institutions (though not usually abandoning the unitary conceptions of the state). Post-structuralists however focus on the ontological and epistemological questions, calling into questions assumptions in IR scholarship. They are therefore more critical of the state, looking at “how the state came to be regarded as the most important actor in the world politics, and how the state came to be understood as a unitary, rational actor” (Campbell, 2010, p. 216). Adopting a post-positivist approach, Biersteker and Weber look at the state “as an identity or agent, and sovereignty, as an institution or discourse, as mutually constitutive and constantly undergoing change and transformation” (Biersteker & Weber, 1996, p. 11). Statecraft is consequently “not primarily about relations between different state units, but about the construction and reconstruction of the units” (Biersteker & Weber, 1996, p. 5). Neorealists hold therefore “a reproductive, but not a transformative logic” whereas shifting the focus to “the social construction of sovereignty would allow a richer analysis of the changing nature of sovereignty over time” (Biersteker & Weber, 1996, p. 6). In addition, “all components of state sovereignty – not only recognition, but also territory, population, and authority – are socially constructed and combined in specific historical contexts” (Biersteker & Weber, 1996, p. i). Finally, post-structuralists are concerned with “state’s historical and conceptual production, and its political formation, economic constitution, and social exclusions” (Campbell, 2010, p. 217). Following this framework, one of the central problems of uncritically assuming a unitary conception of the state is that things are going on “behind the data”, which are not being reported and thus excluded from the analysis. Thus special attention is paid to the study of

meaning and beliefs in social processes in order to unfold the “deep meaning” below the surface and by the observation of reality (Dunne et al., 2013, p. 23).

Aiming to identify the *taken for granted assumptions*, deconstruct the “common sense” views on state building, and give voice to excluded accounts during the process, this thesis will follow the tenets of a post-structuralist analysis to the issue of state and peace building in Kosovo. The methodology reflects the post-positivist concern for meanings and beliefs essential to the study of social processes and seeks to uncover new and so far hidden findings. To operationalize the approach, life stories analysed through grounded theory have been chosen as a methodology. The narratives collected during the fieldwork and the resulting story seek to destabilize established understandings of state and peace building and challenge assumptions that continue to dominate the current discourses of state and peace building.

To conclude, the post-positivist and post-structuralist approaches will be applied in this thesis to the phenomenon of state and peace building in Kosovo using interdisciplinary tools. The more common approaches to the analysis of state and peace building, that is, IR theory and legal studies, are complemented by sociological and historical methodological tools which provide data from the field and specific tools for analysis (namely grounded theory and life stories). The latter represents an interdisciplinary and original research approach. The links of post-structuralism to this methodology will be discussed in the sections below.

Introducing Life Stories

To start with a simple question: *what is a life story and what is its methodology?* A straightforward but preliminary answer might be that a life story is

the story a person chooses to tell about the life he or she has lived, told as completely and honestly as possible, what is remembered of it, and what the teller wants others to know of it, usually as a result of a guided interview by another (Atkinson, 1998, p. 8).

Similarly, Titon understands the life story as “person’s story of his or her life, or of what he or she thinks is a significant part of that life” (Titon, 1980, p. 276). The life story helps to understand the role the individual life “plays in the larger community” (Atkinson, 1998, p. 7). It is a personal narrative, a story of personal experience, and thus a subjective view of one’s life. Furthermore it “consists of all the stories and associated discourse units, such as explanation and chronicles, and the connections between them, told by an individual during the course of his/her lifetime” (Linde, 1993, p. 21). According to Atkinson, it consists of “important events, experiences and feelings” of life and covers “the time from birth to the present or before and beyond” (Atkinson, 1998, p. 8). Finally “the life story is fairly complete narrating of one’s entire experience of life as a whole, highlighting the most important aspects” (Atkinson, 1998, p. 8).

In fact, life stories express “our sense of self: who we are and how we got that way... how to claim or negotiate group membership... and touch on widest social constructions, since they make presuppositions about what can be taken as expected, what the norms are, and what common or special belief systems can be used to establish coherence” (Linde, 1993, p. 3). Life stories are pieces that one chooses to retell about everyday actions, behavior and words of a play in the garden or a theater, a party, a funeral or other events. Thus in wider societal context, life stories express “personal and collective pasts” bringing them into the present context “with each act of our lives [as] memories, experiences and collective values” (Atkinson, 1998, p. 8). Life stories uncover and express social experiences as well as the surrounding relationships and identify what shapes individuals and what constitutes their commonalities and differences. They have a deeply human element and foster an understanding of the self, both subjectively and objectively. Life stories urge us to recognize environments, revealing possible patterns of transformation, sometimes even fostering transformation processes and new responsibilities (Atkinson, 1998, pp. 25–26).

Narratives have a central place in “the search for fresh approaches to knowing and teaching” (Atkinson, 2001, p. 129). Stories “speak to us on a fundamentally human level” as they move beyond the personal into the collective reality (Atkinson, 2001, p. 122). They articulate at the same time “individual and collective, private and public, structural and agentic and real and fictional worlds” (Goodley et al., 2004, p. x). Life stories have the potential to occupy a central place in the generation of knowledge as the notions of identity are revealed in the situations of empowerment or alienation. However, so far life stories are often either taken-for-granted “truths” and thus ignored by the official discourse or they are replaced by the official discourse with “stories of a seemingly more plausible nature” (Goodley et al., 2004, p. x). Some grand narratives have been challenged though by local and personal narratives in the last decades.

Atkinson argues in this vein on the importance of life stories and local narratives that

We become fully aware, fully conscious, of our own lives through the process of putting them together in story form. It is through story that we gain context and recognize meaning. Reclaiming story is part of our birthright. Telling our story enables us to be *heard, recognized, and acknowledged by others. Story makes the implicit explicit, the hidden seen, the unformed formed, and the confusing clear* ((Atkinson, 2001, p. 125), authors emphasis).

In addition, Atkinson describes that the stories bring order into life: “It is a way to understand the past and the present more fully and a way to leave a personal legacy for the future” (Atkinson, 2001, p. 126). Life stories become complete when one succeeds in understanding the most important experiences over time and identify threads and links that connect different parts of life. Other life story researchers point out that

stories fundamentally capture the diverse and changing nature of individual and social lives at the start of the twenty-first century. Narratives are always politicised, structured, culturised and socialised. Questions remain about the political, structural, cultural and social arte-facts within life stories and their telling. Narratives may be our best hope of *capturing structures that continue to shape, divide and separate human beings* ((Goodley et al., 2004, p. x) authors emphasis).

Thus the aim of the life story is to capture the socially constructed nature of experiences, the language of the wider culture and the implied understandings of states, identities and political cultures. The approach is therefore often applied because dominant “political and cultural narratives are under attack by personalized and localized narratives” (Goodley et al., 2004, p. x). Life stories, their context, purpose and their telling, are thus an empirically rich but at the same time open-ended methodology. They belong to the category of qualitative research, and more specifically to narrative research and are mainly used when representing the experience of marginalized groups such as indigenous people, racial and ethnic groups, as well as women. As explained in the Introduction, the life stories are used also for the local elites since on a global scale they may be viewed as marginalized actors when compared to the international hegemony. The next section elaborates further on the disciplinary spread of life stories.

Historical Traces

The following subsection seeks to explain the evolvement of the narrative-biographical turn in the social sciences (Chamberlayne, Bornat, & Wengraf, 2002). The term life stories dates back to the beginning of 20th century (Linde, 1993). It has its origins in oral history, life history, and other ethnographic methods (Atkinson, 2001, p. 123). Life stories have been used across different disciplines such as anthropology, psychology, international relations, sociology, and transitional justice (Goodley et al., 2004, p. 56,88). Their spread started with studies in psychology and then it was traced in the folkloristic studies in late 1960s (Atkinson, 2001; Richard M Dorson, 1971; Kikhia, Hallberg, Bengtsson, & Savenstedt, 2010; Komulainen, 1999; Titon, 1980). A few studies in anthropology and sociology began employing the method at the beginning of the 1980s (Bertaux & Kohli, 1984; Dossa, 1994; Hutchison, 2010; Rubenson, Höjer, Johansson, & others, 2005; Schachter, 2010). In the late 1980s, there were some pioneering studies by feminist scholars using life stories in the field of international relations (Elshtain, 1987). They were also used for understanding war and causes of war (Alexander & McGregor, 2004; Anders, 2009; Elshtain, 1987; Herzog, 2004; Steans, 2008). While the usage of life stories decreased in the social sciences in the mid- and late 1980s, a renewed increase could be noted in the early 1990s and on, for instance in research on transitional justice on the mothers of Srebrenica and their dealing with the past (Phendla 2004; Sangster 1994; Leydesdorff 2007). Life stories as methodology utilized in the transitional justice literature advocate a bottom-up approach to the field such as creating collective mem-

ories outside court rooms through victims stories (Dembour & Haslam, 2004) and dealing with the past (Leydesdorff, 2007). In socio-legal research, there is an avocation for the usage of life stories on human rights discourse (Schaffer & Smith, 2004), especially in victims and ethnic conflict, minority rights (Engel & Munger, 2003), hate speech (Matsuda, 1989) and anti discrimination issues where there is a plea to acknowledge the importance of narratives from the members of a “majority race” (Delgado, 1987) . The creation, temporary rise and fall, and the final gradual and continuous establishment of life stories in narrative research as of the late 1980s deserves further attention.

A pioneering field using life stories has been psychology. Allport used personal documents of patients for instance to analyze personality development (1942). Murray also turned to life narratives to understand better personality development (2007). It is also believed that Sigmund Freud used life stories for his interpretations of psychoanalytic studies (Freud, 1957). In 1958, Erikson studied the lives of Luther and Gandhi connecting psychology with history and the evolution of ethics, specifically in analyzing how Gandhi mobilized politically and spiritually the Indian population (Erikson, 1975; Erikson, 1970). More recently, Polkinghorne and Atkinson have reintroduced the method of life stories, particularly in looking at the development of individual identity through different phases of life cycle (Atkinson, 1998; Polkinghorne, 1988).

Traces of life stories can also be found in folkloristic studies. Richard Dorson, a prominent folklorist called his observations during his fieldwork in Indiana and East Chicago a “personal history” (Dorson, 1982). He opened debates within the discipline such as if personal history is a part of traditional oral genre, and called for collection of more stories from life experiences in general. A decade later, the interest in collecting the experiences of ordinary people grew in the US, “especially blue-collar workers, racial and ethnic minorities, and women” (Titon, 1980, p. 276). Monographs and oral history contributed to the so-called “documentation decade” in 1980s. In addition, biographical research has been conducted on historical transition from socialism to post socialism in Eastern and Central Europe (Humphrey, Miller, & Zdravomyslova, 2003). According to Titon, however, many life stories were in this early stage more the work of the editor or interviewer who arranged the story (answers) according to the writing purposes. In other words, the informant only answered a series of questions while the author took “editing liberties” on specific elements for writing purposes that can result on “false claims” (Titon, 1980, p. 283). A story is however not a history which is why Dorson categorized these studies as “history of folk” (1982). Folk history relies on the interpretations of the personal documents and oral traditions. Another angle was taken back in the 1980s, as an attempt was made to define and develop life stories as *self-contained fiction* (Titon, 1980, p. 288).

According to folkloristic studies, the fieldwork of life stories involves “talking to people and finding out about their life” (Titon, 1980, p. 276). Attempts were made to distinguish life stories from other historical formats such as the biography, oral history, and personal history, or life history as it is used in anthropology (Titon, 1980, p. 280). However, life histories and life stories are used interchangeably in literature (Miller, 2011). A distinction made “between a life story and an oral history is usually emphasis and scope” (Atkinson, 2001, p. 125). Oral history focuses on specific events or issues whereas life story inquire the complete life of a person.

There has also been some employment in the fields of anthropology, sociology, business, and specific themes such as education and gerontology. In anthropology, life stories have been presented in different contexts, for instance in research on Yukon territory (Cruikshank, 2000), stories of China’s bottom social class (Yiwu, 2009), indigenous life histories from Native Americans (Ramírez & De, 2007). Life stories sometimes referred to as life histories date back to James Spradley’s work (Spradley, 1979). Similarly, in sociology they have been used to describe social change, individual identities, subjectivities and others (Bertaux & Kohli, 1984; Bruner, 2004; Kidder, 1992; Rice, 1992). In sociological studies, narratives such as life stories are not the only tool advocated, they also advocate the usage of biographical narratives (Bertaux, 1981; N. K. Denzin, 1989). The historical field produced several works of oral history similar with life stories (Chanfrault-Duchet, 1991; Geiger, 1990; Norquay, 1990; Sangster, 1994). Recently in entrepreneurship, marketing and leadership research, there has also been some advocacy for the usage of life stories (Popp & Holt, 2013; Ryan, 2001; Shamir & Eilam, 2005; Watson, 2009). Life stories have been prevalent in researching specific themes such as *education* from different perspectives. For instance, the academics on life stories looked at the underrepresentation of women in computing courses (Cox, Dickinson, & Parsons, 1994), the impact of children telling life stories as an educational method for efficient communication in classrooms (Higgins, 2012) and biographical approaches to education (Erben, 1998). They have been used also for the life review of elderly people, describing and transferring their experience and knowledge through stories (Blix, Hamran, & Normann, 2013; Coleman, 1999). The field of migration studies has also seen an increasing amount of ethnographic life stories to study different angles of migration. For instance, there has been analysis of the concept of autonomy in female Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands (Buitelaar, 2007), relations of gender and ethnicity (Lawson, 2000), or Jewish immigrant life stories in the United States (Mihuailescu, 2012).

In *international relations*, life stories have so far not been used in the state building literature, but in more general contexts such as identity loss and recovery of veterans and causes of war (P. Coleman & Podolskij, 2007; Suganami, 1997), particularly by post-positivist scholars (Ackerly & True, 2006) and feminist researchers (Elshtain, 1987). More specifically, story-

telling has been used to tackle questions that escape any immediately plausible answer, as for instance the causes and motives of war. Feminist IR scholar Maria Stern has used the method of life history through narratives or text in analyzing the experiences and struggles of Mayan women (Stern, 2005). Elshtain employs life stories to provide a feminist account of women and war in international relations (Elshtain, 1987). Her research methodology includes narratives in which she tells to the reader her life story. These authors introduced the ideas of how personal narratives are important when looking at broader historical arguments. In *Women and War*, Elshtain explains through life stories the exchange of “the terrain between particular lives and loyalties and public duties” (Elshtain, 1987, p. 42).

More recently, Inayatullah edited a book called *Autobiographical International Relations: I, IR*, which introduces an autobiographical approach to international relations (Inayatullah, 2010). Personal narratives are therein being linked to the larger context of world politics, culture and history. In other words, the book illustrates how individual stories influence theoretical standpoints. The contributors advocate strongly for more frequent usage of autobiographical methods since there is a high divergence between theory and practice and an imminent need to link both, as the forward of the book emphasizes:

These essays are autobiographical, but focused on the academic aspect of authors’ lives. Specifically, they are set within the domain of international relations/global politics. They are theoretical, but geared to demonstrate that theoretical decisions emerge from theorists’ needs and wounds. The theoretical precision, rather than being explicitly deduced, is instead immanent to the autobiographical and the historical/cultural narrative each author portrays. And, these essays are framed in historical/cultural terms, but seek to bind together theory, history, culture, and the personal into a differentiated and vibrant whole (Inayatullah, 2010, p. i).

Like Elshtain and most of the contributions in Inayatullah’s volume, this dissertation uses a post-structuralist framework for analysis. This methodology has been employed in wider post-structuralist approaches such as feminism and post-colonial theory. The contributors building on these theoretical frameworks have welcomed the use of life story as a means to close the gap between theory and practice (human experiences).

For research purposes, life stories can be used from other researchers as primary or secondary sources depending on the writing approach of life stories. They can be used for different research purposes. The benefit of this sort of short autobiographical approach is that one can find large amount of diverse data. Life stories therefore have a dual-usage purpose and are interdisciplinary as seen above (Atkinson, 1998, p. 2). Stories are universal, they have meaning, carry common elements and motives, understanding the essence of all humans by identifying common patterns (Atkinson, 1998, p. 5). Furthermore they focus on conflicts, resolutions, change and growth, important events and the shared values and beliefs (Atkinson, 1998,

p. 11). New elements for the individual's success and failures might emerge and most likely new themes related to larger issues might emerge as there are

submerged stories within life stories-those elements that could tell us more about the individual; specific theme or issues that relate to the larger issues of gender, class, and culture and whether there are any patterns that emerge or gender, class, and cultural underpinnings in the narrative (Atkinson, 1998, p. 20).

In fact, for the research in political science, they can explain, confirm or improve the models offered so far on political processes and other areas like people and groups attitudes, public policies, relations between NGO, states or international organizations, effective aid policies, foreign policies in pre conflict, conflict and post conflict era, etc. In legal sciences, it can be used for identifying new legislation needs, the gaps on the implementation of the legislative acts and possible solutions to the enforcement of legislative acts, the impact on the international criminal justice, the impact of hybrid judicial systems, the impact of tradition in legal system, on the possibilities of creation of responsibility and ethics on political class toward citizens and other areas depending on the research questions.

To conclude, one can see that life stories have been used across disciplines and that life story research can be used in different fields. This source can be adjusted to different research themes and needs. However, in political science and legal discourse it has been not used so frequently, even though there are many potential benefits. The benefits for the research are many as life stories have dual usage of primary and secondary documents, contain high and diverse amount of data compared to other research tools and provide new insights for the larger issues by understanding the diverse and changing personality of individuals and their social lives. There are also benefits for using life stories for the subject, such as fostering an understanding of the self, leaving behind a legacy, recognizing environments, revealing possible patterns of transformation, and sometimes even fostering new responsibilities, as well as giving a voice to the storytellers from marginalized groups. Life stories therefore include many important benefits not only for the storyteller but also for the research (Atkinson, 2001, p. 122).

The Methodology

Belonging to the wider methodological category of ethnography, life stories usually imply immersing oneself within the culture under investigation. The result is usually a narrative starting from the beginning of the life until the present as explained earlier. Generally the researcher's methodology follows an idiographic approach, which tackles the private, individual, and subjective aspects of phenomena rather than the public, general, and objective one. It can therefore be regarded as a hermeneutic, not a positivist approach, preoccupied with cap-

turing the meanings provided by a culture or person rather than measuring the presumably observable aspects of an individual.

The following questions are analyzed further in depth: What are the international experiences and narratives about conditions, actions/interactions and consequences of international state and peace building and to what extent do they correspond and differ from established academic frameworks? In other words, keeping in mind the general research question and the theoretical questions explained in the introduction, the following questions are analyzed further in depth: What are the local experiences and narratives about conditions, actions/interactions and consequences of international state and peace building and to what extent do they correspond and differ from established academic and policy framework, and how do they compare with the international experiences? The main methodological and substantive innovations of this thesis were guided by the following research sub-question: What do the experiences of local people in Kosovo as reflected in their biographies tell us about the process and the limitations of state and peace building?

A total of 62 interviews have been conducted for this project. The basis for the analysis of the international perspective on state and peace building in Kosovo are 34 interviews, conducted with current or former international civil servants mostly during the summer of 2012 (a few took place in 2013). The interviews were semi-structured, with the questionnaire included in Appendix A. For researching local perspectives to state and peace building leading to the identification of new factors and causalities, which have not yet been covered by the established state and peace building literature which is mostly concerned with the international perspective. The empirical material (28 life stories: 12 senior political officials and 16 NGO activists, religious movements officials, academics, retiree's, businessmen's, lawyers and diaspora) was used as a basis for an alternative and challenging account to state and peace building as a process. During the rest of the chapter, I refer to Atkinson's use of life stories to elaborate on the specificities of the life story method. The following section discusses in greater detail the data collection procedures through initial and theoretical sampling and data analysis through grounded theory.

Data Collection and Analysis through Grounded Theory

In developing novel understandings of the state and peace building phenomenon, this research pursues what Glaser and Strauss originally called "grounded theory" (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Its purpose is developing a theory through constant comparative method. It is the idea of developing theory on the basis of qualitative data. Unlike logically deduced theories, grounded theory methods "consist of systematic, yet flexible guidelines for collecting and analyzing qualitative data to construct theories 'grounded' in the data themselves" (Charmaz, 2006, p. 2). Following the "constructivist grounded theory" of Charmaz (2006, p. 131), this

research seeks to ensure that “researchers and participants co-construct the data through interaction” (Charmaz, 2011, p. 366) in order to create a local understanding of the practices of state and peace building.

While the collection of data is largely unproblematic in grounded theory, there has been some debate on the place of the literature review in the research process. Criticizing Glaser and Strauss’ original emphasis on grounded theory as a “tabula rasa” inquiry, Bulmer (1979, p. 667) argued that it is practically impossible to approach a given topic without previous conceptualizations. “Constructivist” grounded theorists have nowadays departed from the view that the process of data collection requires “theoretical innocence” on behalf of the research, proposing “theoretical agnosticism” as an alternative (Charmaz, 2011, p. 366). In the present case, the research includes in this vein the study of literature on international and local state and peace building throughout the research process. The theoretical categories and explanations were put to “rigorous scrutiny” (Charmaz, 2011, p. 366) not only for methodological reasons (that is, to accommodate the demands of grounded theory) but also to meet the research objectives and revise established conceptions of state and peace building. Furthermore the data collected in this research are qualitative and the aim is to create possibly an emergent theory of local state and peace building, therefore grounded theory is the most suitable methodology for this research design.

Data Collection

The Life Story Interview Process

Recounting life stories requires the collection of qualitative data through in-depth interviews. Similarly, grounded theory also necessitates intensive interviewing which is “open-ended but directed, shaped yet emergent, and paced yet flexible approach” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 29). The participants are informed, in the beginning and at the end of the interview, about the research objectives, methodologies, outcomes and the drafting of their life story. Each participant is met around one to two times depending on each storyteller for two to three hours, spread over a period of two or three months. However, there can be as many sittings as needed until all stages of life and state and peace building are covered. Literature states that interviews can last to two or three dozen hours, but then they usually are a written assisted auto-biography (Atkinson, 2001, p. 132). The first interview session began with unstructured interviewing to gain the trust and explore interests and concerns, asking general questions about origin, education, health, career, war, relationships, important life events and turning points. Rather than suggesting specific ideas, informants were invited to speak freely about their most important life phases. In next sessions, the discussion was guided to the relevant elements of participant’s life for the research question that were revealed during their most important life phases. The last session tested the participant’s view on the means, ends and challenges to state

and peace building as suggested by the established theory. However, the author made no suggestions on the relation between state and peace building and their turning points of life. The final meeting gave the possibility to reflect freely on the concepts of state and peace building scholarship and research.

The participants were advised to tell as much as possible about their lives and to provide a full and a true story. There were three main stages of life stories interview: (1) planning (preparing how and why the story can be beneficial); (2) conducting the interview (guiding the person while telling and recording), and (3) transcribing and interpreting the data (Atkinson, 2001, p. 131). Regarding the first stage, for the interviews, Atkinson provides a template of 200 questions that can be asked during these sessions, which are meant to be adjusted to the research theme. Some of these questions and guidelines for the interviews were employed in the research questionnaire adopted for the current research in Appendix III. The researcher could also adopt different *time frames*, depending on the particular research. Thus in researching state and peace building in Kosovo, a division was made between the periods before, during and after the war in 1999. The primary focus lied on the period after the war, which was separated in four further stages: (i) after the intervention; (ii) after the Ahtisaari plan; and (iii) after independence and (iv) after the political dialogue. However, an interviewer must remain flexible to adapt to specific circumstances (Atkinson, 2001, p. 130) and can transform the structure to the specific needs of the research. The aim was to create informal and conversational interview settings in which participants can express their views and engage the interviewer and her conceptions. Therefore, the interviewer added meanings and interpretations of their own that enrich the research process (Atkinson, 2001, p. 131). During the interviews, the storytellers retold their life story without interruptions according to time frames that allowed the most salient issues to arise from their own life understanding regardless time.

In the process of transcription, the interviewer's questions and comments were left out (Atkinson, 2001, p. 131), meaning that only the respondent's story was transcribed. The respondents have had a look at the transcript for purposes of review. The story is to remain as authentic as possible, relying on the wording of the interview. As suggested by Atkinsons, during the process of editing, repetitions and non-related comments need to be deleted to ensure the coherence and flow of the text. The transcripts were used for the state and peace building theory, introducing the stories and interpretation, and were then coded ("Data Analysis", see next sub-section).

Furthermore, this research aims to capture the voices and experiences of people whose agendas are often ignored by researchers. However, the researcher still tried to have no hand in writing of their stories but tries "to authentically capture their stories in meaningful and accountable ways" (Goodley et al., 2004, p. 59). Therefore the introductory piece was written by the researcher and approved by the storyteller, whereas the transcript was afterwards ana-

lyzed by the researcher. On the topic, the main emphasis in this research lies in the significance of a number of experiences of local people labeled as bureaucrat and non bureaucrat citizens, the ones involved in the process of state and peace building as well as persons experiencing it from the “outside”.

In the doing of life stories, the researcher guided the participant with questions about his or her life stories. The life story questions were used while maintaining a flexibility for different storylines and settings. According to the general life stories approach, the researcher is not “in control” of the story, and must accept that the storyteller is sometimes not willing to disclose information or does not provide the desired coherence. In Atkinson’s words, “[t]he storyteller has the final say in telling the story” (Atkinson, 2001, p. 135). The researcher does not intervene during the interview situations but interprets afterwards the individual’s choice of the type of story. The process of “hearing, understanding, and accepting without judgment” another’s story can be transformative (Atkinson, 2001, p. 126). If the interviewee recounts a certain inconsistencies in the story, the researcher asks questions and interprets it. Still, according to Atkinson, it is pertinent to give the person a chance to tell the story in the way the storyteller chooses. This provides more data than one might use but it provides a broader foundation of data to draw upon. This led to the data collection process which is based on grounded theory based on two phases, respectively initial and theoretical sampling, as well as snowball sampling and several other criteria based on population, involvement with the international community and others that are explained below.

Initial and Theoretical Sampling

While this research employed theoretical sampling during the fieldwork, it was necessary to be clear about the “initial sampling”, that is, the “point of departure” for the inquiry (Charmaz, 2006, p. 100). Several techniques and criteria are employed in the initial sampling phase such as snowball sampling technique, population criteria, life story criteria and access ones which are discussed in depth below. To start with, snowball sampling method was used to identify the “hard to reach populations” (Sadler, Lee, Lim, & Fullerton, 2010, p. 369) and it allows to accommodate the sensitivity of the topic (Browne, 2005, p. 47). In this case, the technique was used to approach participants initially and identify possible life stories. Snowball sampling makes use of the participants’ network to recruit other participants that might usually be hard to reach because they are either hidden, for example individuals who did not fit to the governmental profile and have thus been excluded in state and peace building process. It is a culturally sensitive technique that gives access to certain groups that are reluctant to give information because of the social and political consequences (Sadler et al., 2010, p. 369). In the present case, it was suitable to identify individuals involved in state and peace building since many of them had not been interviewed for academic purposes before. Snow-

ball sampling has also been referred to as “semi-self –directed, chain referral recruiting mechanism” (Sadler et al., 2010, p. 370).

The *snowball sampling technique* has advantages and limitations. Among the disadvantages is that the sampling is not random. Hence any conclusion reached might not be generalizable. However there are other advantages of snowball sampling technique especially for the sensitive topic at hand it can “help researchers to identify study participants where there are multiple eligibility requirements; this is particularly so when the study’s eligibility criteria involve characteristics that some people consider to be very private” (Sadler et al., 2010, p. 370). It also can “shorten the time and diminish the cost required to assemble a participant group of sufficient size” (Sadler et al., 2010, p. 370). One of the most useful advantaged for the current research through life stories is that

if one eligible person is identified, that person often can identify and recruit others to the study. A particular advantage of snowball sampling is its cultural competence and the inherent trust it engenders among potential participants. This helps to increase the likelihood that the identified person will agree to talk with the researcher or program coordinator (Sadler et al., 2010, p. 370).

Random sampling cannot be reconciled with the life stories method due to the danger of high refusal rates, the sensitivity of the research, and the fact that the result might be a sample that features less the marginalized voices which are particularly interesting in the present context. Furthermore, random sampling methods are usually required where large-N samples are the object of interest, whereas the interpretative research uses small-N, as is the case of this research. In this particular study, the snowball sampling has an advantage of identifying individuals suitable for the state and peace building research, who are likely to speak and more likely to disclose information about the reconstruction process which through random sampling would be impossible. As we explained earlier, this was the easiest the best way to reach individuals for the research purpose given the sensitivity of the topic, geographic location and political, social and economic consequences.

For instance, in a study on surgeons at the American College of Surgeons, Hoffman, an ethnographer had difficulties in *gaining access* to her interviews in the clinical department in question. In the initial phase, she received only superficial information from the informants. She subsequently altered her approach, using her husbands network (a surgeon himself) to have better access to information (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 48). Hoffman (1980 in Hammersley & P. Atkinson 2007) in a research with local elite on members of board of hospital directors in Quebec’ selected informants on the basis of social ties, beginning with direct personal contacts, and then asked those acquaintances to refer her to other informants. This strategy, she concludes, produced “more informative and insightful data” (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 48). The usage of *facilitative relationships* and also *gatekeepers* (the first

people which grant one access to the informants) are common in ethnographical research. They have also been employed in this research to access the relevant data.

The research aims to be representative and inclusive of different local viewpoints. Hence the choice of biographies is based on a number of different *population* categories. The focus lies on local actors to enable a comparison between the perceptions of different groups, involved and affected by state and peace building on the ground. The target group is divided equally between ethnical, gender and regional lines. Gender is less represented on the local life stories due to the low number of women involved in public life and the snowballing technique that provided for less women than men participants (5 out of 28 participants). Firstly, they are ten individuals involved in the process of state and peace building, respectively in decision-making, and another eighteen outside the system as such not involved in decision making to ensure diversity. The individuals within the system are based in national institutions, and embodied therefore an “insiders” experience as is commonly held by administrators, politicians, bureaucrats, translators, secretaries and commanders. Individuals outside the system are common people who experienced the results of state and peace building process, including for example retirees, teachers or farmers. However due to the weak influence of NGO’s, university and religious movement in the reconstruction process, they are considered as falling outside the governmental system as well. Secondly, their *life history shows a change or development*, as for instance in changes of their positions within the structure. The third criterion concerns the *frequent interaction of the local individual with internationals* only for the half of the interviewed group that are part of the system involved in the state and peace building process. Fourthly, the local individuals work on the issues that are addressed in this research directly, or have been impacted from these issues such as outsiders. The choice of individuals is also based on availability and willingness to participate in the research. The combination of these criteria brings about more diverse findings.

Furthermore, life story criteria are employed also in the initial sampling phase. Linde describes two criteria that the researcher needs to take into account (1993). The first one, an evaluative point, requires the storyteller to have reflective points about the lived life by the storyteller, thus it should not be a story with general points about the way the world is. (Linde, 1993, p. 21). The second criterion called, extended reportability, refers to events told by the storyteller, which need to be rare or run counter to societies expectations. Linde argues “An event is not reportable if it is something that happens everyday; to be turned into a story, an event must be either unusual in some way or run counter to expectations or norms” (Linde, 1993, p. 22).

As pointed out by Bryman, the improved version of grounded theory entails a specific set of procedures (Bryman, 2008, p. 541). One of those is “*theoretical sampling*” which refers to “seeking pertinent data to develop your emerging theory” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 96) until no

new theoretical insight can be gained (“theoretical saturation”). Grounded theory suggests, unlike random sampling that takes place prior to data collection, to pursue theoretical sampling as a continuous process by which samples are chosen:

Theoretical sampling is the process of data collection for generating *theory* whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyzes his data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 45).

In other words, theoretical sampling is a form of “purposive sampling” where samples are selected strategically in order to be relevant for tackling the research question (Bryman, 2008, p. 415). According to Charmaz, the researcher needs to “aim their data-gathering towards explicit development of theoretical categories derived from analysis” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 102).

The data was gathered by means of qualitative “unstructured” *interviews* which have the advantage of “giving insight into what the interviewee sees as relevant and important” (Bryman, 2008, p. 437). Using theoretical sampling to detect where data can be collected most effectively, grounded theory conducts in-depth interviewing “to explore, not to interrogate” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 29). More specifically, this means that questions must be “sufficiently general to cover a wide range of experiences as well as narrow enough to elicit and explore the participant’s specific experience” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 29). In line with the general approach in grounded theory, concepts and categories that have emerged from the data are incorporated in the questions in later interviews.

In fact, the initial sample is based on a general perspective of the research area, which is in this case the difference or convergence of international state and peace building theories from local state and peace building theories. Initially the first samples of life stories are coded, and the direction of the emerging local theory of state and peace building was developed. However if new categories emerge out of data for local state and peace building, then these categories are included in the results as well to complement and represent an accurate understanding of local state and peace building. If negative cases, specifically data not corresponding to the developed theory, are found out of data, the theory is revised and the data collection continues until “theoretical saturation” has been reached. The dilemma is therefore to identify whether “theoretical saturation” has been achieved (as mentioned earlier, saturation refers to the situation where no new or other information are received from the participants; see Sadler (2010, p. 370)). According to the theory, the data collection process ends when there is enough qualitative data to provide insights into the research question, meaning when there is no need for additional participants or information. The process of data collection stops at this point, and the process of data analysis starts. This method is justified in the present case as the research is not geared to generalizing findings to a population, but to question established theories empirically.

In this context, the selection of life stories was particularly relevant. To meet the research objectives, this study used 28 stories from Kosovo, a country in which the state and peace building process has lasted for more than a decade with the assistance of different international organizations, reflecting a variety of dimensions of state and peace building from different perspectives. Each life story has its distinct relevance for a better understanding of the policy and process of the state and peace building. Initially the sample of the stories was “kept open” as suggested by the theoretical sampling (Mason in Chambers, 2005, p. 98). Drawing on Chambers (2005) study sample of older widows, in the end 28 stories were chosen because of the large amount of data each story contains and the process of permission with the storytellers, the diversity of the stories, and no new data emerged, therefore there was no need to collect new stories (Chambers, 2005, p. 99). *Enough stories revealing similar patterns were collected to reflect the diversity of people and places (Yanow & Shea, 2006, p. 324). A state of theoretical saturation was achieved, when no new data emerged. The stories offered authentic thick descriptions, namely details about events, interaction, relationships and characters. 28 life stories were selected on the ground and in the diaspora since it is common in qualitative research to conduct in depth interviews in small numbers (Small 2009). Only the life stories that stood out for their ability to transfer the main threads across all other stories, and which were rich in details, were selected to be used in the subsequent chapters. Such exemplary life stories contain key elements of the main themes and create an emergent alternative based on local voices.* The qualitative data was gathered in extensive fieldwork. Each story is introduced when it is referred to for the first time with a description of storyteller biographies and how those stories and their interpretation emerged. Other materials have been incorporated as well, as for example information gathered in newspapers, documents and other observations.

Data Analysis and Interpretation

In processing of collected data, this project draws on the method of “coding” as described in the “grounded theory” methodology. “Coding” of the data refers in this context to “reviewing transcripts and/or field notes and giving labels to component parts that seem to be of potential theoretical significance and/or that appear to be particularly salient within the social worlds of those being studied” (Bryman, 2008, p. 542). The process of coding is thus the “pivotal link between collecting data and developing an emergent theory” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 46), beginning with “line-by-line coding” and leading to the development of theoretical concepts and then categories. The researcher has to make sure by “constant comparison” between the data and concepts/categories that the theoretical notions are a true product of the empirical data. The resulting theoretical categories and concepts can be used to develop a new theory. The Coding Level Pyramid (see Figure 1) illustrates this process graphically. After the process of putting together the story lines and recurring categories for the purpose of theory generation,

novel outcomes can emerge. The software toolkit NVIVO was used to analyze and code the data.




Figure 1: Coding Level Pyramid (Trochim, 2000)

Coding comprises three main phases of labeling relevant data with regard to the *research questions*. The first phase, *initial coding* aims to reduce the data. It codes *line by line* the statements of the participants in order to stay close to the meaning of the data and away from the preconceived notions. The coding focuses on verbs/gerunds ('ing') that reflect actions and processes and *in vivo* (participants special expressions). The following questions are primarily taken into account: "What is this data a study of?, What does the data suggest? Pronounce? From whose point of view? What theoretical category does this specific datum indicate?" (Glaser and Charmaz in Charmaz, 2006, p. 47). During the line-by-line coding, Charmaz suggests to ask the following questions to separate the data into categories and thus reveal the pertinent processes: "What process is at issue here? How can I define it? How does this process develop? How does the research participant act while involved in this process? What does the research participant profess to think and feel while involved in this process? What might his or her observed behavior indicate? When, why, and how does the process change? What are the consequences of the process?" (Charmaz, 2006, p. 51). Concepts are applied from the literature only if they fit, hence they should not be forced onto the data. Grounded theory tries to shift away from the existing conceptual framework. The initial coding stage results in an initial codebook with different labels.

The second phase, *focused coding* is more "directed, selective, and conceptual" where "the most significant or frequent initial codes" turn into categories to structure large parts of the data. The analytical frameworks (categories) are created only if they are relevant to the research question, literature and data, thus if they "make the most analytical sense to categorize

your data incisively and completely” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 57). In fact, new categories can be created based on the patterns of the data and repetitions on social reality. As a result, a code scheme emerges with main categories and subcategories. It is important to compare the data in order to define the codes properties. Thus this phase is concerned more with organizing the codes into categories and subcategories and defining their properties.

The third one, *axial coding* has the purpose “to sort, synthesize, integrate and organize large amounts of data and reassemble them in new ways after open coding” (Creswell in Charmaz, 2006, p. 60). It aims to create the structure by (i) possibly *identifying the major category*, (ii) linking and *showing the relation of the categories with subcategories* and (iii) *defining the properties and dimensions*. In axial coding the following questions are most pertinent: “when, where, who, why, how, and with what consequences” which describe the experience fully (Strauss & Corbin in Charmaz, 2006, p. 60).

In ordering the codes, Charmaz suggests not to employ any further set of specific terms as the relations of categories become visible from the data. Charmaz suggests thus a flexible and simple approach to data analysis, following the clues given by the empirical data. After initial and focused coding, she looks at (i) main dilemmas evolving around studied phenomena that the participants expressed in many interviews, (ii) identify the categories that represent these dilemmas, (iii) define the properties of these categories through comparing data that represent the same type of experiences, events, actions (when defining the categories keep in mind the 6 questions: what, when, where, who, why, whereby), (iv) the definitions might reveal new codes which can then be used to recode the data and look for if when, why and how and discover the new theory.

However Strauss and Corbin, and Kelle, suggest to use few questions “to make links between categories visible” (Strauss & Corbin in Charmaz, 2006, p. 61; Kelle, 2005). A scheme of statements is therefore created to classify them, link the categories and develop a theory of action: phenomena (what the study is about, the central question) that reflect the research questions; conditions (“circumstances or situations that form the structure of the studied phenomena”) reflect questions on why, where, how come and when; actions and interactions (participants routine or strategic responses to issues, events or problems to deal with the phenomena) reflect by whom and how; consequences (results of the actions and interactions of the phenomena) what happens because of these actions and interactions and solutions (Strauss and Corbin in Charmaz, 2006, p. 61; Kelly in Mortelmans, 2011). However the suggested questions put forward an analytical frame that may limit the discovery. The research employs the latter option due the large amount of data analyzed.

Most importantly in axial coding, *definitions* need to be devised for each category and subcategory to refine the categories, find links and develop the new theory. The definitions of categories and subcategories include indicators, properties/dimensions, relationships to other con-

cepts, subcategories, and other remarks. The definitions need to answer six general questions: what, when, where, who, why, whereby (Mortelmans, 2011). After the definitional scheme, it is suggested to look at the phenomena (what the study is about, the central question) and identify the patterns of construction of meanings, conditions, actions and interactions, consequences and solutions.

The last stage, theoretical coding is another step that is suggested by Glaser, helping to “move your analytical story into a theoretical direction” by presenting several coding families to connect the data (Charmaz, 2006, p. 63). This method has risks as it might lead to an over-reliance on categories that do not necessarily represent participants’ intentions, mainly since Glaser provides the coding families. However the ones that are relevant for the current research like agency, power, networks, narratives and biographies are not present in his coding families (Charmaz, 2006, p. 66). Therefore in theoretical coding Charmaz approach is employed. She suggests using theoretical codes that emerge from the data to deepen the analysis rather than predetermined theoretical codes. Charmaz herself uses a theoretical framework that reflects the data. This research verifies at a later stage if theoretical codes emerge which reflect a specific *theoretical model* already present in political, international relations or other literatures, but does not rely on a predetermined theoretical framework.

Initial Coding: Sentences lead to Codes

Focused Coding: Codes lead to Categories

Axial Coding: Defining and linking categories and subcategories, identification of a Central Category and development of a new theory (through conditions, actions/interactions and consequences of the main pattern)

Theoretical Coding: Usage of theoretical codes that emerge from the data

Table 5. Main Grounded Theory Developments on Different Stages

The *comparative method* is essential to all the stages. It involves an analytical processes of comparing different parts of the data for their similarities and differences (Charmaz, 2006, p. 54) and “strengthens your assertions about implicit meanings” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 68). To gain analytical insights, comparing similar or dissimilar events may define patterns and significant processes (Charmaz, 2006, p. 53). Comparisons are suggested between similar and dissimilar statements, incidents, events, interviews, happenings, experiences, situations and other relevant elements to the research. In order to enhance the comparison, it is necessary to look for “close-in” comparisons (concerning the boundaries of the comparators), “far out” (take two different phenomena and compare) and ask reversed questions (what would happen if it something did not exist) (Mortelmans, 2011). During the *focused coding* stage, comparisons

help identifying codes that might be “potential indicators of phenomena” (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 420). In *axial coding*, the comparison facilitates the identification of the major category, linking the categories and subcategories and defining their impacts and intensity. At the end to control the quality of the research, several issues are taken into account such as searching for negative evidence that contradicts the results. If found, “close in” and “far out” comparisons are used to assess whether alternative explanations exist.

In relation to a key feature of *life stories* is the exclusive right of the storyteller to have a final say about it. In order to keep the meaning of the story, have accurate generation of knowledge and for the application of research, the story is introduced and approved by the storyteller. The storyteller and the readers can interpret the story according to their experience and perspectives, as personal interpretations can be very important (Atkinson, 2001, p. 135). Furthermore, as suggested by Atkinson, during the interpretation of the stories, there is a need to think back to the story, on “what it mean[s]” and what one can learn from it. The next step is to identify the patters that are found in stories and “that are also found in the universal pattern” (Atkinson, 1998, p. 63), to met out the “connections, meanings and patters that exist in the story itself” (Atkinson, 1998, p. 64), and to identify the storytellers explicit and implicit statements (Atkinson, 1998, p. 65). Put simply, a good understanding of stories is “important for recognizing patterns and themes that connect the whole story”. The structure will follow an “overview of the story as a whole” and in depth study of turning points and moments of crises, the shaping from the other groups, culture and others and the missing local, historical or cultural background. This represents the way “how people see life”, “what is important to them” and “possible theoretical implications and what the storyteller might have meant by it” (Atkinson, 1998, pp. 66–73).

Reliability and Validity

It is important to clarify issues of reliability and validity for the process of data collection and analysis. Qualitative research is frequently confronted with critiques about subjectivity, difficulties of replication and generalization and lack of transparency. Not all of these objections can be fully dismissed given the research design employed by this thesis. Objectivity is not assumed given the post-structuralist framework explained earlier. *Objectivity or replicability* are facilitated by the detailed description of the *data collection procedure* and *analysis* method in this chapter. The conclusions attempt to show direct link to the *data evidence* and analyzes the material line by line in order to have less reflection of her position (Mortelmans, 2011). In terms of *reliability*, whether the research is free from misrepresentations/errors in the data, the following procedures are taken into account. The *research question* and the *researchers role* in gathering and interpreting the data are clearly defined, the *theoretical con-*

structs are attempted to be clearly defined and checked together with the *coding work* and *data quality* (Mortelmans, 2011).

Determining the reliability of a life story is always difficult. A life story is *reliable* if answers received at different times and places *correspond* to one another. *Validity* depends upon if the respondent tells the *truthful* answers. Evidently, different standards apply for quantitative research and for qualitative research (Atkinson, 2001, p. 134), the latter being the concern of this study. The aim of life stories is to receive as much elaborate information as possible and to get access to the insiders' viewpoint. Furthermore, the storyteller is considered an expert and authority with regards to his or her life, having lived these experiences, and must thus be assumed to have given a truthful account of the story. Still, there are a few means by which the consistency of a story can be checked in order to achieve a certain level of reliability and validity.

Internal validity is assured if the story is not contradictory in different parts. While there can be different reflective stances across time but within a story, there should be a certain consistency in the whole story. One technique used is to ask the storyteller to clarify earlier comments with the recent ones that seem to differ. *External validity* is if what the story tells to us conforms to what we already know. This is not an objective sought in the life stories. This research aims for unique and not already known insights into state and peace building, as explained earlier. The emphasis is consequently on internal rather than on external consistency. Furthermore, the research does not aim to generalize as "case studies are often only secondarily interested in producing generalizations [and] primarily seek to explain particular outcomes in specific cases" (Mahoney, 2007, p. 8). Following grounded theory, the goal of this research is therefore theory creation, finding new categorical explanations on state and peace building research. This does not altogether exclude the possibility of testing the external validity of the propositions emerging from this research, for example through a transfer onto other cases. However, Lincoln and Guba (1985) have argued that it is the responsibility of the researcher who wishes to "transfer" those findings to another setting to assess whether the findings are transferable (Yanow & Shea, 2006, p. 109). The researcher itself is responsible to provide sufficient thick descriptions so that other researchers can assess whether it's plausible to transfer these findings to another setting. Understanding the context and how various events connect helps other researchers to build on research findings they find trustworthy. Hence, the present research provides thick descriptions about specific context of the case study of Kosovo in the hope that they can raise insightful questions for researchers dealing with other post-conflict situations.

There are two *control measures*, namely corroboration and persuasion. The subjective corroboration is applied if the person agrees with the story when the transcript check is done, or if he wants to change his original story. External corroboration is achieved when a close rela-

tive of the respondents who is very familiar with the story of the person reads the life story and confirms the content (Atkinson, 2001, p. 135). Persuasion is another important measure that the researcher can check if the story seems “plausible”, “reasonable” and “convincing”, “compelling” and “stimulating”? (Atkinson, 2001, p. 135).

Validity designates whether the research design, the main questions and its variables accurately measure the studied phenomena. *Internal validity, trustworthiness* is described as “To what extent does the research design permit us to reach *causal conclusions* about the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable?” (Hoyle, Harris, & Judd, 2002, p. 33). Thus it is looked whether the results are trustworthy, how rich are the descriptions, are the results plausible, are concepts connected logically, are negative cases taken into account, are alternative explanations considered and whether the respondents found the results plausible (Mortelmans, 2011). This research focuses mainly on constitutive theory. There is a big debate among constructivists on the features of constitution and causation and the relations between the two (Lebow, 2009). Constitution, on the one hand, “addresses the question of who becomes actors [sic], how are they recognized as such and how they must behave to sustain their identities and status”, and includes “core beliefs, not only practices” linked to the creation and sustenance of a particular identity (Lebow, 2009, pp. 2–3). Causal logic, on the other hand, refers to “the why and how and aspires to explain physical and social phenomena” (Lebow, 2009, p. 3). Some constructivists like Wendt argue that causal and constitutive theories, though both explanatory, address different questions. He claims that both should exist independently in international politics (Wendt, 1998, p. 114). Others argue, however, that both logics are interdependent. Lebow suggest thus a concept of “constitutive casuality” which

theorises a necessary but insufficient condition for an outcome. Weaker forms of causal claims [...] offer ‘possible’ and insufficient conditions... Constitutive causality directs our attention not only to these underlying cognitive and visual frameworks, but also to the social processes and interactions, confluences, accidents and agency that mediate between them and outcomes that interest us (Lebow, 2009, p. 4).

Onuf argues that social rules are constitutive (meaning that they offer guidance) and regulatory (thus requiring compliance) at the same time, but that speech acts produce either the one or the other (or both) consequence depending on the use of language (e.g. verbs) (Onuf, 2012, p. 86). The present research seeks to reveal constitutive relations, describing outlining possible alternative perspectives, as they are constituted by particular identities.

External validity refers to the extent to which it is possible to *generalize* from the research sample to a wider population, but is less important for the current research since the goal of case studies analysis is not to generalize but understand cases in greater detail (Hoyle et al., 2002, p. 33). It still though looks whether the sample was accurately chosen in order to make

comparisons between groups/participants, whether the sample has sufficient theoretical diversity to guarantee a broader applicability in the case itself and whether the researcher defines the research scope. It discusses also whether the results are confirmed by other theories or research and indicates where the results need to be refined and whether the results are replicated in other studies (Mortelmans, 2011).

Using Life Stories in International Relations

There are many potential uses of life stories for international relations research. Each life story contains an individual view upon the norms, culture, identity and values, as well as a view on how the politics is and should be conducted, what the relations between different actors are and how they should be. Research using life stories can identify how a specific person perceives the current international order. How do they think that the international institutions, non-governmental organizations and other entities contribute to peace and conflict? How do people make sense of the current global changes such as shifts in the balance of power? In short, there are many ways that life stories could be used in international relations research, depending on the interest of the researcher.

For example, life stories could become a textual source to Hansen's approach to discourse analysis, in particular the "3 A and B" research model to identify dissent. According to Hansen, discourse analysis represents the method of choice for a post-structuralist analysis in international relations. The third research model has to be included in such an analysis, since

the ambition of discourse analysis is not only to understand official discourse, and the rest and representations which have directly impacted it, but also to analyze how this discourse is presented as legitimate in relation to the larger public and how it is reproduced or contested across the variety of political sites and genres (Hansen, 2006, p. 63).

Hansen emphasizes thus the importance of "less widely dispersed discourses", which might "intersect with and influence dominant representations in subtle ways and hence become important for the future" (Hansen, 2006, p. 63). For instance, Neumann reveals how new ideas firstly presented in marginal publications entered the public state debate in Russia (Neumann, 1996, p. 195). The problem is, however, that the marginal status of these texts makes it difficult to identify them. According to Hansen, the texts or objects of analysis in this model include marginal newspapers, websites, books, pamphlets and academic analysis. The inclusion of life stories to this list is not envisioned, but it is clear that the stories could be used to identify resistance, dissent and academic debates that are being excluded from the official discourse. After all, life stories have succeeded in different disciplines to identify local and marginalized ideas and give a platform to the silenced voices.

The narrative approach used by Hansen in the earlier mentioned model 3A focuses on the analysis of cultural representation as a means to recognize the reproduction of identities. She suggests reliance on materials such as film, photography, poetry, music as well as two forms

of literary non-fiction, namely travel narratives and memoirs (Hansen, 2006, p. 57). Life stories share some similarities with the latter two text types as they describe personal writings that draw significance from “personal encounters and experiences” (Hansen, 2006, p. 68). It is important to identify these experiences and retrospective reflections represented in personal encounters and cultural hermeneutics. In the end, Hansen advocates for the combination of different genres of texts when conducting a discourse analysis, including the identification of intersections (Hansen, 2006, p. 72).

Discourse analysis and life stories combine several forms of sources which are used across disciplines. Discourse analysis texts and life stories draw their authority from the same element, which is the authenticity of experiences, as in memoirs and travel writings. Thus adding life stories, a more localized narrative form, to the 3B model to identify dissent and resistance expands the reach of Hansen’s model of discourse analysis. However for the 3A model there is always a danger that travel writings, memoirs and if included life stories might be used with an ideological purpose to reproduce the dominant collective narrative that discipline and distance the other.

The works of Derrida and Foucault, from post-structuralist perspective, give further indication as to the relation between life stories as a methodological tool and discourse analysis. Derrida’s method of deconstruction states that each topic should be deconstructed gradually for gaining a better understanding of the researched phenomena. In this research, the state and peace building concept is deconstructed into smaller elements in order to understand it better. In Derrida’s words, “to deconstruct is to hold that no indivisibility, no automaticity, is secure” (Derrida, 2009, p. 309). Therefore, by analyzing at the indivisible components of reified researched phenomena, the invisible agenda behind the state and peace building becomes recognizable since every element is questioned during the deconstruction.

Derrida also places a significant importance to language and its usage, showing “a responsiveness to language transfer and transference, to the fact that there was, as he put it in French, *plus d’une langue*, meaning both *more* than one language and no more *one* language” (Hill, 2007, p. 23). By looking at language, one can identify the structures of power and politics, wider culture and their accompanying subjectivities on state, identities and political cultures. Weedon argues that

Language is the place where actual and possible forms of social organization and their likely social and political consequences are defined and contested. Yet it is also the place where our sense of ourselves, our subjectivity, is constructed... Subjectivity is produced in a whole range of discursive practices – economic, social, and political – the meanings of which are a constant site of struggle over power (Weedon, 1987, p. 21 in Goodley et al.).

Similarly, discourse analysis tries to identify “discourses that articulate very different constructions of identity and policy and which thereby separate the political landscape between

them” (Hansen, 2006, p. 47). For instance the basic discourses that “construct different Others with different degrees of radical difference; articulate radically diverging forms of spatial, temporal, and ethical identity; and construct competing links between identity and policy” (Hansen, 2006, p. 46). It also can identify other important elements by looking at different texts and analyzing the opposites and linking or delinking them.

According to Leslie Hill, Derrida suggests to analyze social phenomena in two different stages:

if the word deconstruction means anything at all, it should be understood as denoting the necessity of *both* these operations (*Po*, 56–7; 41–2): an inversion, by which a hierarchy is reversed (with speech, for instance, being seen to rely on traits, such as absence or repetition, that hitherto have been solely attributed to writing); *and* a displacement, by which the conventional concept of writing, though provisionally now dominant, is shifted, dismantled, and reinvented as something radically other. (Hill, 2007, p. 28)

Thus deconstructing a concept includes looking at the different elements through looking at and challenging the different elements and assumptions that constitute a concept and reversing the implicit logic. For instance, looking at the state and peace building phenomena through observing state failure means reversing the hierarchy. Furthermore, while state and peace building has so far been understood mostly as an international policy, the perspective is now being reversed to focusing on local understandings. Furthermore, the elements of displacement, can be looked through the concept of minority integration which is addressed in this research as a policy that actually creates division. The analysis are conducted by looking at the most popular texts of state and peace building, reports and interviews and trying to analyze them as something radically different from what is being written.

Similarly, in the analysis of life stories which offer information, a researcher captures the socially constructed nature of these experiences through individuals identity formation, reversed hierarchy, and also an understanding of the real other and the reinvented, as discourse analysis include it as well. Michael Foucault argues that

I would like to say ...what has been the goal of my work during the last twenty years. It has not been to analyze the phenomenon of power, nor to elaborate the foundations of such an analysis. My objective, instead, has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made into subjects. My work has dealt with three modes of objectification which transform human beings into subjects (Michel Foucault, 1982, p. 208).

Narratives reveal encounters between oppressive discourses and resistance, which is exactly what discourse analysis aims to identify. The stories seek to show the sense of struggle over power, subjectivity and knowledge. Comparable to some accounts of the benefits of the life story method, Burman and Parker (1993) argue that discourse analysis is a method that provides a social account of subjectivity. Rather than viewing subjectivity as being solely in the heads of individuals, discourse analysts turn to practices, texts, assemblages of knowledge,

documents, experiences and narratives of given social and cultural locations where subjectivities are being constructed. Discourse analysis allows us thus to make sense of the ways in which human beings are shaped, via the power of discourses, in given social and cultural backgrounds. This links directly to the research objective of this work which is to investigate the meaning of state and peace building in the lives of people involved on it through the analysis of life stories.

Foucault investigated throughout his work elusive practices of power such as “technologies of the body”, “disciplinary powers” and the “professional gaze”. He was interested in texts that illuminated some of these discursive practices. Such an approach fits with the original research question of interrogating social and cultural worlds through the story of persons involved in the process of state and peace building. Foucault famously wrote that where there is power there is also resistance (Foucault, 1977, p. 259). Life stories often reflect the resistance in the face of oppressive and exclusionary practices and institutions.

Depending on the preference of the observer, different approaches can be taken to discourse analysis. This study takes a reflective, critical approach to research. It adopts hence a post-structuralist epistemology and philosophical orientation, which “directs us to see the world in particular ways, and then make sense of what we see through the use of related theories” (Goodley et al., 2004, p. 94). For instance, there is a greater concentration on the meanings “behind” a certain topic in this sort of approach than in the simple observing the behavior. The narratives collected during fieldwork make it possible to destabilize common sense understandings of state and peace building and to challenge “truths” that have become reified, dominating the current discourses on state building.

To conclude, international relations (ie discourse analysis) and life stories can be well integrated as they share an epistemological framework, approaching language and subjectivity comparably. The relation between life stories and the works of Derrida’s method of deconstruction and Foucault’s conceptions of power illustrates this potential convergence. Life stories are suitable to reveal oppressive and exclusionary practices. In addition, life stories can be used to clarify the way the main discourse is represented and how it is being negotiated in a specific setting. Finally, the objectives of the 3B intertextual model of Hansen’s can be obtained by employing the life stories method, gathering information that has so far fallen outside the established discursive framework of state and peace building. In other words, it can contribute to the realization of the goals of the model identifying dissent, which is to identify local resistance in post conflict settings and dissent in cases of hegemonic academic debates.

Limitations of the Study: Ethical, Epistemological and Methodological Challenges

Life story research involves a highly personalized approach of gathering qualitative data. It therefore implies a number of dilemmas and ethical questions. The last section of this chapter

is consequently dedicated to the challenges of doing life stories on state and peace building. It discusses the aspects of *methodological persuasions*, that is “how we approach our subject matter, our stories and our narrators, participants or narrative subjects” (Goodley et al., 2004, p. 54). Thereafter a description of the concerns on doing life story research is offered, focusing on the issues of access, ethics, the writing process and the relationships with the informants. Furthermore, I address concerns about underlying epistemological assumptions, analyzing how stories can be “products of particular epistemological locations” (Goodley et al., 2004, p. 54). Finally, the methodology proposes a *commitment* to storytellers, which is the last aspect to be inquired in this chapter.

The research design envisions interviews of international individuals in order to have a view on their contribution to the process. However, since they are not the main focus group, their life stories are not being discussed for a number of reasons. Rather than discriminating against a category of people involved in the process, these reasons are methodological. Firstly, few international individuals have been involved in the process persistently and continuously for more than two years as they have temporary positions. Hence life story research on internationals would be less likely to bring about results that would be interesting for the topic of state and peace building in Kosovo. Furthermore, they do not seem a marginalized group whose embodied experience tells something about the state and peace building process. Semi-structured interviews are the more apt methodology for looking at the involvement of internationals whose experience in Kosovo was temporally limited. Finally, the research is geared to bring forward local perspectives since the views of international stakeholders are already represented in most of the works on state and peace building.

Ethical and Epistemological challenges: Authenticity, Subjectivity and Rights

One important question concerns the *intentions* behind the research, the representation and the authenticity of the story. Reconciling the needs of the storyteller and the research intentions is a challenge in this type of research as it is often the researcher who benefits and the participant who might feel exploited. The danger arises that the interviewee does not gain anything from the invested effort, time and trust, while the researcher does complete their research purposes on the basis of the information gained during the research process. The interviewees’ requirements need therefore to be taken into account to ensure that they have personal benefits of telling the story (see section I of this chapter), as well as the final say about the final product and the story that is published and disseminated.

Another important issue concerns the representation of the *voice*, which is interlinked with the *authenticity* of the story. This aspect concerns how storyteller and researcher influence each other. As a researcher one has the means to direct the discussion and the interviewee. The main question is however if the informant is telling the true story or if it is simply the story

the researcher might be looking for or that is socially acceptable. At the same time, the researcher might be imposing his or her own voice into the subject. However that is minimized since the interview is mainly flexible and open ended and the researcher is only to facilitate the telling of the life story. Furthermore, if trust is built, then there is less risk that a story will be fabricated. Also it is preferred to share the transcribed texts. This in turn helps the subjects to retain ownership over their life story. Atkinson argues that in this methodology real people are usually inclined to tell real stories regardless who is asking which questions (Atkinson, 2001, p. 133). In addition, the emerged story is most likely authentic as authenticity emerges from personal struggles and if the researcher understands the storyteller's frames of reference the story is most likely authentic (Lummis, 1988, p. 100). Furthermore, a field diary was kept after each interview to observe the practice of interviewing and take track of non-verbal communication, feelings and difficulties during interviews. These were sometimes discussed in the following interview.

This leads us to the epistemological questions that relate in the present context to the link between the story and the truth. Different views exist upon this issue, one claiming that the story is a sort of subjective truth and the other one stating that people distort the facts while telling. Despite criticism that stories might not represent the truth, the interest in the unique and local created a difference in the opinion on the use, value and meaning of life stories (Atkinson, 2001, p. 136). As this research adopts a reflectivist and post-structuralist approach (see section I of this chapter), the rigor of quantitative methods rigor is not required. Qualitative research includes a different scale of the validity. In all autobiographies and interviews, the researcher works towards building the trust and interpreting the story accordingly, as the participants cannot be put under oath. This means that while interpreting the narrative, the aim is not to generate a historical truth but a unique point of view (Atkinson, 2001, p. 135). The stories are valid on a small scale. Yet general patterns can be recognized among different storytellers.

The researcher's identity and *subjectivity* is interrogated critically in order to clarify the reasoning behind the writing of the story. Thus in each life story, there is an attempt to understand rather than judge or assume a stance over and against the story. The researcher is aware that representation, labeling and misunderstanding of lives and personal viewpoints are omnipresent dangers. Thus during the writing process, there is always questioning of one's and the respondents values and the discovery of the subject (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011, p. 210). On other words, there is a parallel questioning of the already held beliefs to break them through constant interrogation, inclusion of difference and also expansion of the understanding and thinking about various possibilities of human experience (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011, p. 211).

This research glorifies neither the local nor the international. It shows that both groups, locals and internationals, have been involved in both negative and positive processes after the war.

Moreover despite the animosities between the local groups, this research shows that the local does not imply being only "good", "bad" or "innocent" since there is a large variation in contrast to what is sometimes portrayed in literature. Some retain their old animosities, some seem to have moved forward peacefully, and some seem to be partly violent while rejecting foreign impositions. While the locals have experienced deep animosities, they still can be trusted to be the deliberative domain of peace building since they embody the experiences during and after war, most of which have not been violent. Since they understand the context and embody the consequences of war and peace between communities, they provide the necessary basis for any bottom-up effort that may facilitate sustainable peace building.

This led to another significant matter which is understanding the *complexities* of life stories and bringing more clarity to them. Atkinson suggests initially identifying if the storytellers see themselves vaguely or clearly. Do they tell who they see or who they wish to see? Clues are given, for example, in the correspondence of body language with wording. In Atkinson's view, the three main question concern "who am I?" (related to the content), "how am I?" (related to the construct of the storytelling), and "why am I?" (related to the meaning of the story). The answers may tell us about "the patterns, perceptions and process that contribute to our understanding of lives across time" (Atkinson, 2001, p. 133).

Some *ethical concerns* can be regulated by a general consideration of human rights and national guidelines, such as the Netherlands Code of Conduct for Scientific Purposes (VSNU, 2005). The code of conduct requires precision, reliability, verifiability, impartiality and independence. In addition, confidentiality clauses ensure the privacy rights of the storytellers if necessary. Candidates were informed of the ethical considerations that this research implies and were explained that their consent is required to realize the respective life story and also the semi-structured interviews with the international officials. Secondly, with regards to delicate information, the storyteller upon agreeing to participate in the research needs to give his or her informed consent. Anonymity is another option that storytellers can employ if they wish to remain unknown. Most of the interviews opted in for anonymity. In sum, the privacy rights of the storytellers were respected by providing information not only about the research and its purpose, but also by giving the opportunity to make decisions about the inclusion of aspects or the adoption of anonymity. In fact, all interviewees choose to remain anonymous, therefore pseudonyms are given for each participants. Only the supervisors know the real identity of the participants in the research. In addition, the participants were informed about the risks of participating on the research. All the above elements are included on the Consent and Confidentiality Agreement signed by the participants (See Appendix).

Fieldwork Challenges: Access to Data, Relationships and Language

Reflectivists argue that the data acquired is influenced by the researcher's standpoint and various aspects such as identity, gender, ethnicity and personal history (Davies & Spencer, 2010, p. 1). These elements influence in turn the way in which the research is understood, interpreted, conducted and reported. The position taken in this regards in this dissertation is a radical empiricist one which "refuses the epistemological cut between subject and object, that endows transitive and intransitive experiences with equal status, and that investigates the phenomena which the inductive methods of traditional empiricism were never designed to treat" (Davies & Spencer, 2010, p. 3). There include certain personal characteristics of the researcher such as gender, ethnicity and age, which are unchangeable. Their effects of these personal characteristics may vary. For instance, a minority storyteller may regard certain research assumptions as biased, favoring the majority. Furthermore a male storyteller may regard a feminist researcher as less serious and may attach less relevance to life stories which question gender assumptions. The former bias might also be because of age.

Another challenge for researchers is to maintain *working relationships* during the fieldwork, thus not neither too involved nor too distant in their interaction with the storyteller. While it is desirable that trust and understanding deepens, there are tools at disposal for keeping some distance. Meetings took place twice per week with each subject preferably for no longer than two hours. Respect was paid to the storytellers' choice to not speak about certain topics, however it was noted for interpretative purposes of the story later on. Consultations took place on the progress and experience of participating in this research and transcripts of earlier interviews were discussed. Relationships with other ethnicities are sometimes more difficult to manage, especially when combined with possible security risks present in the interviewed area.

A few techniques are employed to accommodate the attitudes of the storytellers, to prevent the storyteller challenging the research and the intentions of the researcher. The main ones are "impression management" and "managing marginality" (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, pp. 44–86). Impression management refers to different factors that shape the research like dressing similarly with subjects, alter the habits to reduce sharp differences, and monitor speech and demeanors (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, pp. 66–9). This is mainly because different settings require different presentations. Expertize and knowledge can be essential on establishing reciprocity, however if used, they need to be used carefully. Sociability is another essential tool or personal characteristic in fieldwork. Similarly, self-consciousness management is essential to find about the degree of disclosure which is appropriate in each case study. The researcher has "just as in many everyday situations, to suppress or play down personal beliefs, commitments, and political sympathies" (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 72). Thus he/she is supposed to show tact and sensitivity, even if he/she is tested for his/her beliefs. The man-

agement of disclosure is essential, especially when there are differences in opinion and attitude between the researcher and the storyteller, sometimes not known ones. Also what can be considered commonality in certain situations, can sometimes be interpreted as marking the difference (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 73). Impression, consciousness and disclosure management are essential during the fieldwork since their mismanagement can seriously damage the collection of data and the relationships with the storytellers.

In “managing marginality”, the relations in fieldwork require to maintain the communication, trust and gain the insiders and outsiders views. The researcher needs to, have access to the participants but also minimize close relationships, in order to maintain the analytical rigor. This position of marginality is difficult to maintain, and sometimes it can cause emotional and physical reactions in situations of uncertainty. It is called the “dysadaption syndrome” referring to feelings of incompetence, fear, anger and frustration. These feeling should be managed and dealt accordingly by engaging in pragmatic social interactions and never give the self to the moment (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 91). On a final note, field researcher should keep social and intellectual “distance” in order to produce the study effectively (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 90). Without such analytical distance, the account is likely to be only of autobiographical nature.

Conducting fieldwork in Kosovo presented a particular challenges to fieldwork in this study since it is my country of origin. Negotiating the distinction between home and fieldwork is difficult (Sultana, 2007, p. 377). Strong social ties existed to both the capital and the countryside. Certain differences such as education privileges and living in diaspora for many years affected the fieldwork as different groups considered me to be an insider or an outsider, with different advantages and disadvantages. The ambiguity of the position and the “in between” status brings about tensions and requires awareness and constant reflection during the fieldwork (Sultana, 2007, p. 377). Therefore it is important to keep the distance as well as be friendly, identify the research questions and maintain flexibility in order to have access to storytellers.

Furthermore, there are challenges to *communication and cooperation* as life story candidates might not cooperate. The research depends upon their ability to communicate and express their experiences which depends on language abilities and on trust. One method of sharing life stories may make these storytellers more willing to participate and create trust is by persuading them that sharing their life story is beneficial. As Atkinson states, among the benefits for the subject might be that “the interviewee gains a clearer perspective on personal experiences and feelings, which in turn brings greater meaning... one obtains greater self-knowledge, stronger self-image, and enhanced self-esteem, ... one shares cherished experiences and insights with others, can bring joy, satisfaction... releases certain burdens and validates personal experiences” (Atkinson, 2001, p. 127). One might realize that one has more in

common with others than initially thought, and one might see more clearly or differently the life story and perhaps inspire positive change in future.

This leads us to the question of language use and translation. Language is used creatively and not only descriptively as it “recognizes the constructive effects of language rather than language as a transparent medium for describing the world” (Goodley et al., 2004, p. 98). The challenges on communication are that the researcher lacks cooperation from the target group and also the research depends upon their ability to communicate and express. This problem can be overcome by assisting actively in telling the story with sharing the benefits of telling the story and gaining trust. However due to the knowledge of both local languages, Albanian and Serbian, and the international language of international officials, English, in this study language facilitated the relations with the participants. There are other concerns associated with the translation of the life stories, however, it is held that translation has power to reinforce cross-cultural relationships (Temple & Young, 2004, p. 174). The use of translators was minimized even when Serbian language was necessary to conduct interviews by translating only the parts that were not understandable to the researcher. In the execution of the research design, the participants check if the transcript fits to their ideas (in Albanian or Serbian) and can approve or change it with the help of a translator if necessary.

In sum, the role of the researcher is to facilitate people telling their stories in their own words. However, it is clear that the engagement of the researcher with knowledge generation and the requirements of research often influence the writing process. The storyteller’s subjectivity is checked with internal consistency measures. The life story and this study seek specificity, not generalization primarily, stressing the specific description and explanation of a few people rather than the representative generalities of a wider population. These studies are authentic not validating, meaning that they engage the authentic meanings of a story and its narrator rather than devising measures of preconceived concepts.

Conclusion

To conclude, the means of conducting the research were outlined in this chapter. It outlined the research design, focusing especially on epistemological and methodological questions. The post-structuralist framework is taken in this thesis as it incorporates the representations given by subjects with specific identities in international relations, namely the Kosovo’s local communities unheard voices are incorporated to deepen the knowledge of state and peace building processes. Methodologically, the main tool for analysis of state and peace building is grounded theory through life stories. Furthermore, the chapter provided a description of the data collection procedure of the mixed material, of the international interviews and the local life stories.

In addition, the chapter introduces the main methodology used for the local perspective, especially life stories. It has become clear that life stories are used across different disciplines to analyze pertinent and complex phenomena. Life stories “serve as excellent means for understanding how people see their own experiences, their own lives, and their interactions with others” (Atkinson, 2001, p. 137). The essence is that storytelling in the voice of the person is a timeless format as “setting and circumstances change but motives and the meaning they represent remain constant across lives and time” (Atkinson, 2001, p. 137). Adding this methodological tool to international relations (ie discourse analysis) will consequently help to understand foreign policy and make new connections and paths possible for future research, in international relations and in other disciplines.

With regard to the second question, so far the academic work on Kosovo has mostly used traditional research designs such as institutional and legal paradigms. The traditional method has focused on the international and national actors by analyzing mandates, consent, constitution framing, local ownership etc. Thus researching state and peace building in post-conflict societies through life stories represents a methodological innovation to the field. The local perspective yields insights that can inform theories of state and peace building and even deepen the common sense understanding of it. Indeed, it can be argued that local perspectives have not yet received enough attention when compared to the more established international angles. Thus in contrast with traditional research of state and peace building, this research tries to bring in a different perspective to the analysis of the process of institution and peace building in post-conflict states by employing a different methodology – grounded theory and life stories, a historical and sociological tool. This presents an inter-disciplinary research. In addition, the knowledge of the languages spoken on the ground facilitated the research as well as contributed to the current theories with data from the ground uncovering the local angles that have been under-researched so far empirically and providing a contextualized understanding of the case study.

Finally, the chapter has shown that the methodology has firstly been designed in the fields of anthropology, psychology and sociology but that it can be usefully applied to the discipline of international relations. On other words, life narratives can contribute to thinking in terms of theory, practice and policy of international relations. In the present case, I approach by these means the difficult state and peace building efforts that have taken place in the Balkans and, more specifically, in Kosovo. The next chapter introduces the global institutional developments regarding peace and state building and the local developments in the case study of Kosovo.

The Case Study

5. The Dominant Meanings of State and Peace Building in Kosovo: Global and Local Developments

Introduction

A historical account of both the global and the local, Kosovan developments in statebuilding are needed to understand the context of the chapters to follow. This chapter has a twofold aim, to describe the evolution of global governing mechanisms on state and peace building and the main historical events of the case study of Kosovo since the end of the war in 1999. Four main stages can be discerned in the state and peace building process, as divided by key events. The immediate post war period started in 1999 with Resolution 1244 and ended with the riots in March 2004 with Kai Eide's report. Later on Ahtisaari Plan was introduced as a solution, which was rejected by the Serbian counterpart. The declaration of independence in 2008 with creation of the International Civilian Office (ICO) marks the third main event, while the termination of supervised independence since 2012 with the closure of ICO heralded the last stage. This chapter summarizes the main changes on state building governance and the international involvement of various actors in these different stages together with their mandate changes. Despite the aims and efforts to create a sovereign and independent entity in theory (seen in public discourse and their mandates) and in practice (as reflected in establishment of local institutions), their high presence with executive mandates has entailed a prolonged period of foreign administration and non independence. It describes the evolution of initial mandates of international organizations significant to state building. We find that there are limitations to their involvement with executive mandates on the ground, which potentially undermines their efforts towards the creation of an independent entity of Kosovo from both the international and local actors. As a result of this mismatch between aspirations trying to establish an independent Kosovo and international involvement with lengthy executive mandate, a dependent entity was created in practice. To conclude both external and local actors seem to work towards a common goal, however the divergence on the means to achieve it differ which produces a political and legal vacuum and an unsustainable state that can be exploited by illicit networks, individual interests, regional powers and other actors. This historical timeline provides the context, evolution and evaluation of global and local developments of state and peace building. It adopts a traditional approach, mandate analysis, which will serve as a basis for the analysis of the international and local perspectives, which will be outlined in the following sections.

The Governance Mechanisms for Statebuilding in Fragile States

The United Nations System

Historically prevailing or occupying powers have undertaken governance of war torn territories. However they started to take the responsibility for reconstruction only after WWII, when the Allied Forces, and especially the United States, took an active role in the reconstruction of Germany and Japan. Over time and more frequently after the end of the Cold War, international territorial administrations began taking over this task, often under the auspices of the United Nations, which, representing the international community at large, is tasked to prevent conflicts and maintain peace, security and human rights. UN institutions are in many cases supported by IFIs and peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. Statebuilding has in this context become one of the main policy goals of international territorial administration among “dispute settlement, decolonization and the legitimation of intervention” (Stahn, 2008, p. 401). These were established by the UN with goal of statebuilding in a number of countries, and sometimes with multiple functions, including Cambodia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, Ivory Coast, East Timor, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Eastern Slavonia. In some instances, these missions are also involved in a broader goal of nationbuilding that aims to reshape the identity of a particular society towards a particular idea of a state and nation (Call, 2008b, p. 10). These attempts are seen in countries such as Eritrea, BiH, Iraq, and in decolonization missions such as Namibia, Western Sahara and East Timor.

In the case of UNMIK, the leading UN administrative institution in Kosovo, statebuilding is enlisted as a goal for the purpose of democratization and liberalization features on the mandate. However, the mandate could also have mentioned (i) nationbuilding due to the establishment of a special citizenship (Kosovar, previously known as Albanian) (Stahn, 2008). Through functional administrative goals (e.g. providence of state services) UNMIK tried to pursue nationbuilding without directly naming it as such in the mandate. UNMIK has also followed other policy goals such as (ii) territorial dispute settlement, that is, attempts to resolve the status (similar to the attempts to resolve the status of the Saar region after World War II). It also tried to neutralize the tension between the ethnic entities by facilitating the process of statebuilding. Another implicit policy goal is (iii) the legitimation of intervention, specifically producing a validating factor of the consequences of collective action in Kosovo. Thus UNMIK’s deployment in Kosovo was a means to validate the humanitarian intervention retrospectively (Stahn, 2008, pp. 401–409), similar to Afghanistan and Iraq where missions were also established after the international use of force. Some similarities can also be discerned between UNMIK and (iv) trusteeships that aimed at decolonialization, treating the territory as incapable and in need of assistance, acting on behalf of the territory (Kosovo decision makers) in local, regional and international platforms. In this case, foreign rather than

domestic interests are protected, with issues of representation and accountability arising, while UNMIK is under a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of the population of the territory involved (Stahn, 2008, p. 412).

Another institution prominent in promoting statebuilding and peacebuilding is UNDP that, among other programs, pursued the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals until 2015. UNDP seeks to facilitate democratic governance, including the development of institutions responsive to the needs of citizens, promote development, strengthen electoral and legislative systems, improve access to justice and access to public administration and develop the capacity for service delivery as the key for promotion of post 2015 (UNDP, 2014). They also promote a prevention and recovery approach on prevention of conflict, alleviating risks, addressing underlying causes of violence, reinforcing governance and the rule of law and short-term employment and poverty reduction. These issues have been addressed on statebuilding programs in Kosovo.

Recently UNDP is deeply concerned on how poverty affects fragile states. The UNDP (2013) report argues that the persistent and high poverty nowadays is a paradox, despite the poverty rates declined in world, growth has been increased from the emerging countries. Due to globalization the inequality is sustained since many countries are being closed from receiving ends of the growth. The countries facing statebuilding activities are the ones affected the most (UNDP, 2013, p. xi). In similar line, an OECD (2013) report pointed out that fragile states face structural problems such as poverty and capability traps (acknowledged by the literature). Therefore, it suggests to address the underlying causes of fragility to promote progress and recommends specifically expanding the understanding of fragility through a “thick” approach. The report calls thus to address these threats through deriving solutions based on (i) a multidimensional analysis in terms of transnational megatrends and local phenomena, (ii) finding the appropriate usage of aid in middle-income developing countries and (iii) country specific analysis in terms of resilience, state-society relations and external stressors (OECD, 2012a, pp. 103–104). The report suggests that the rapid shifts that affect the developing countries could be better anticipated and addressed in this way. The most recent report of OECD in February 2014 focuses on how to create better aid policies to finance development and on how to mobilize domestic revenue (OECD, 2014b), and highlights more concretely the regeneration of domestic revenues as a “cornerstone” of state building agenda.

A group of “fragile and conflict affected states”, G7+⁷ was instrumental on New Deal and is trying also to shape the post 2015 development agenda for United Nations (G7+, 2014). So

⁷ The G7+ group consists of only conflict affected states and is not related to the G7 group of major advanced economies concerned mainly with economic issues.

far the High Level Panel Report on the post-2015 UN Development Agenda and the UN System Task Team stress four core dimensions, namely environmental sustainability, inclusive social development, inclusive economic development, peace and security. The combination of fragile countries, G7+, Pacific island countries and the group of Portuguese-speaking African countries (PELOP) adopted the so-called Dili Consensus in 2012 which attempts to shape the global agenda by bringing fragile states to speak with one voice (G7+, Pacific Island Countries, & PELOP, 2012). These groups recognize that their focus lies particularly in the three areas of peace and security, justice and climate change. They argue that these areas were not adequately incorporated in the MDGs, the goals were oriented towards results and excluded the fundamental problems that fragile states face (G7+ et al., 2012). Lastly, the G7+ identifies the main challenges of fragile states and specifically suggests that post-2015 must include four major areas: inclusive economic growth, peace and state building, climate change and environmental management (G7+ et al., 2012). They reiterate that national ownership is important and that it should be “aligned but not subordinate to global goals” (G7+ et al., 2012, p. 1). They also advocate keeping but also revising the MDGs of health, education, women’s empowerment, water and sanitation, and global partnerships. To sum it up, the diverse groups seem to agree on the common concerns such as environment, peace and security and economy, however justice dimension comes in the agenda only when groups of Pacific island states and the Portuguese speaking countries in Africa join the discussion.⁸ They conclude that

With right policies, investments and global collective action on challenges beyond our control, we have the potential to build peaceful, vibrant, just, resilient, inclusive an sustainable economies and societies (G7+ et al., 2012, p. 2).

Furthermore they call for partnerships to be based on mutual trust rather than conditionality and to integrate parallel processes since there are “overburdened by the multiplicity of international agreements, policy commitments, and related implementation and reporting requirements” (G7+ et al., 2012, p. 1). The cooperation is based on regional, sub regional, south-

⁸More specifically in economic section, they argue for inclusive economic growth, pro-jobs and pro-poor, usage of natural resources with sustainable returns and finally drive development through “conducive policy and regulatory environments, trade and investment rather than aid”. Job creation is essential for youth unemployment and conflict and “with increasing urbanization, the shrinking of the informal economy and the weakening of traditional coping mechanisms, we must put in place social protection policies and programs that identify and support those suffering, including the elderly and people with disabilities.” (G7+ et al., 2012, p. 1) On political section, the fragile states also advocate improving the effectiveness of the state and its institutions, good governance which recognizing that peace is impeded by weak state capacity. The acknowledge that MDGs cannot be achieved in absence of peace, stability and rule of law and the development efforts need to be strengthened by universal principles of respect for human rights, fairness, justice and peace. Regarding the environment, one must hold account the countries contributing most, mitigate climate changes and build resiliencies against impacts that cannot longer be averted.

south to contribute to new development global framework together with G7+, pacific and sub regional institutions, the UN regional institutions, IFIs with an “intention to make our [fragile states] voices heard and build on New Deal to ensure development for all” (G7+ et al., 2012, p. 2). These group aims to shape the collective future and speak as one voice and to place peace at the heart of sustainable development (G7+, 2013, p. 1). The impact of their advocacy is already seen in PSGs two goals incorporation in the development agenda.

Recent Initiatives towards the Inclusion of Fragile States

Next to the work of the United Nations on fragile states, other actors such as various governments, international organizations and NGO also aim at stabilizing and preventing relapse to violence (Paris & Sisk, 2008, p. 1). Recently new actors on post conflict reconstruction such as knowledge and political platforms, foundations, religious and philanthropic organizations, and even academia and the media are taking significant roles in promoting state and peace building. The most prominent political platform that facilitates the understanding and rebuilding of fragile states is currently the *International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding* (IDPS), created in 2008 at the Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra, where fragile countries called for “an equal voice with development partners in establishing peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities” (IDPS, 2014b). IDPS was subsequently created with a “mandate to develop a set of peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives and an action plan for effective engagement in fragile states” (IDPS, 2014b). The initiative aims to change the practices of foreign involvement, share peacebuilding and statebuilding experiences, identify and implement “a set of peacebuilding and statebuilding goals to guide national and international interventions in conflict affected and fragile states” (IDPS, 2014a), as well as to build trust between all stakeholders. IDPS seeks to serve as a catalyzer for successful transitions from conflict and fragility and support “the global voice of fragile states, country led solutions and offers comprehensive approach to development and security issues” (IDPS, 2014a).

As the most significant political platform for statebuilding and peacebuilding, IDPS works closely with the G7+, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCF). G7+ represents a group of fragile states⁹ and is a platform for “collective advocacy by and for conflict-affected and fragile states worldwide” (IDPS, 2013, p. 1). They aim to shape the global agenda on dealing with fragile contexts in order to stop conflict, eradicate poverty and build nations through bottom-up approaches. The INCF is, by contrast, a subsidiary body of the OECD De-

⁹ Afghanistan, Burundi, Car, Chad, Comoros, Cote D’Ivoire, DRC, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, and Yemen (G7+, 2014).

velopment Assistance Committee which monitors the international communities engagement in fragile states (OECD, n.d.). On the other hand, there is the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) that facilitates dialogue between development partners and fragile states and works on innovative policy responses to conflict and fragility. It holds regular meetings between fragile states, developed states, civil society, international organizations and the banking sector. The main participants from the latter category are the African and the Asian Development Banks. Multilateral organizations such as the African Union, the European Union, the International Monetary Fund, the Organizations for Economic Co-operation and Development, the United Nations (represented by Peacebuilding Support and the UNDP) and World Bank are also represented. A wide range of countries from developed and developing states are engaged in the platform such as France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan and China. Ministerial level meetings are held once per year. The diversity of the participating partners that are willing to discuss the issue of statebuilding and peacebuilding promises a move towards a more coherent and inclusive approach to the issue.

The UN Millennium Declaration acknowledged that up to 5 million casualties had resulted from war, recognizing the need to create a UN “more effective in maintaining peace and security by giving it the resources and tools it needs for conflict prevention, peaceful resolution of disputes, peacekeeping, post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction.” (General Assembly, 2000, pp. 2–3). Nowadays the war casualties are 90% civilians, non-combatants, in conflicts such as in Kosovo, Afghanistan and others (Sivar in Brown & Langer, 2012, p. 260). Many other declarations and agreements have been signed on peacebuilding and statebuilding signalling a political willingness to engage, including the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile Situations (2007), the Kinshasa Statement (2008), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), the Dili Declaration on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (2010), the Monrovia Map (2011) which finally led to the signing of the New Deal in 2011 in Busan to bring more coherence and the aid transparency (Marshall, 2014). The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (New Deal) even aims at achieving a paradigmatic shift through the inclusion of G7+ countries to shape the global policies on peacebuilding, statebuilding and aid. On the concluding ceremony, the Deputy Finance Minister of Afghanistan, Mustafa Mastoor, states that “[w]hen international partners bypass (sic) our systems this can directly contribute to a continuance of conflict and fragility. Without peace our nations cannot deliver services that our people need to rise from poverty and without building strong state institutions to deliver these services, we cannot maintain peace” (G7+, 2011, p. 1). On looking forward locally and thinking globally, the Timor-Leste’s Finance Minister and Chair of the G7+ noted that “[w]e must now think global but act

local (sic) and allow our nations and partners in development to trial this New Deal on the ground” (G7+, 2011, p. 2).

The objective of the New Deal is to “Stop Conflict, Build Nations and End Poverty” (G7+, 2011, p. 1). The peacebuilding goals are supposed to facilitate the progress of MDGs in post conflict states, reduce inequality and poverty, and promote development among fragile states. The New Deal recognizes as the most common shortcomings of international actors in fragile contexts the fact that they often

bypass national interests and actors, providing aid in overly technocratic ways that underestimate the importance of harmonising with the national and local context, and support short-term results at the expense of medium- to long-term sustainable results brought about by building capacity and systems (IDPS, 2011, p. 1).

In addition, the New Deal points out that political dialogue conducted in these states “often failed due to lack of trust, inclusiveness, and leadership” and transitions lacked “country leadership and ownership” (IDPS, 2011, p. 1). The New Deal sets thus a new agenda for engagements in fragile states. Firstly, it sets five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals to track the progress in both the countries in question and at the global level. The goals are (i) *legitimate and inclusive politics*, fostering inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution, (ii) *security*, establishing and strengthening people’s security, (iii) *justice*, addressing injustices and increase people’s access to justice, (iv) *economic foundations*, generating employment and improve livelihoods, (v) *revenue & services*, managing revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery (IDPS, 2011, p. 2). Peace and Statebuilding Goals[PSG] are used to oversee progress in each country and support “inclusive and participatory dialogue” (IDPS, 2011, p. 2). Indicators for each goal have been established to monitor these goals, track progress and establish results. The perceptions of people are also supposed to be included in the results.

The New Deal proposes therefore different methods to engage in fragile contexts, with the new commitments to be divided in two parts, namely *focus* and *trust*. The significance of *focus* is that it renews the engagement method in fragile states which supports “country-led and country-owned transitions out of fragility” (IDPS, 2011, p. 2). Procedurally, each country undergoes a (i) *fragility assessment* to identify the causes and features of fragility as well as the sources of resilience,¹⁰ and (ii) develops a *national vision and plan* in line with fragility assessment and PSG priorities. Subsequently, agreement should be reached on a (iii) *compact* to implement the plan based on the country priorities as established by the donors and the state, as well as a *peer review mechanism* to use PSG for monitoring progress and support political

¹⁰ The assessment is guided by *fragility spectrum* developed by G7+.

dialogue and leadership (IDPS, 2011, pp. 2–3).¹¹ The second commitment, *trust*, aims to build confidence by “providing aid and managing resources more effectively and aligning these resources for results” (IDPS, 2011, p. 3). It also purports to increase (i) *transparency* in aid (ODA and non-ODA) through monitoring system devised by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), assessing aid against individual goals, strengthening national reporting and planning systems, and drawing from good practices of the G7+ and international benchmarks compatible with International Aid Transparency Initiative and solicit citizen’s view. Another important aspect is (ii) *risk-sharing* since engagement in fragile states continues, with joint donor risk mitigation strategies and joint mechanism to reduce and mitigate risks needing to be build. Furthermore, the New Deal aims to increase the (iii) *use and strengthening of country systems* by identifying oversight and accountability mechanisms through strengthening the public management system, judiciary and administrative capacities. Finally, it seeks to (iv) *strengthen capacities* in state and civil society in “balanced manner” and facilitate South-South exchange of fragility as well as (v) *timely and predictable aid* through simple and fast financial and procurement procedures, and a review of national legal framework.

The New Deal commits engaged countries to “undertake the necessary actions and reforms to implement it” (IDPS, 2011, p. 1), encompassing 35 countries including 15 fragile countries, 20 developed countries and a few international organizations. The new deal has been endorsed by some G7+ group countries including Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Afghanistan, Somalia, Timor Leste and Haiti (IDPS, 2014c). Members among the most influential developed countries count Australia, Canada, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and international organizations such as the African and the Asian Development Banks, the European Union (EU), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations Development Group and the World Bank (WB) (IDPS, 2014c). However, the success of the new deal will depend on the cooperation between these states and their willingness to implement the New Deal. Furthermore, the number of countries endorsing the New Deal is still comparably low, lacking endorsement from influential countries such as Russia, China, Brazil, India and South Africa. The success of the New Deal and the progress of the development in fragile countries depend on the consensus between the most influential countries in world politics that lacks in this case. During the negotiations conducted on the platform of the *Dialogue*, Russia is missing as it is not participating in the improvement of the conduct in fragile states, whereas China and Brazil, despite not endorsing the New Deal, still partake in the discussion.

¹¹ Through capacity development of government, civil society and institutions and promote youth and women.

In addition, the New Deal recognizes also that the long-lasting reconstruction processes in countries in transition require leadership and ownership, the building of mutual trust, the promotion of better state-society relations and the empowerment of marginalized groups. As stated in the New Deal, it is essential to build “confidence between people, communities, the state and international partners” (IDPS, 2011, p. 3). The New Deal members would like to deliver results quickly and continuously, while the G7+ will act as a “country-owned and country-led” global mechanism to monitor, report and identify new challenges in fragile contexts. The New Deal is likely to be implemented through the Dialogue starting with (i) *pilots* in first volunteer countries like Afghanistan, South Sudan, Timor-Leste and (ii) *reporting* on the delivery of goals on country and global levels. The implementation is supposed to take place during a trial period between 2012 and 2015. However, the Dialogue is meant to exist and work beyond the MDG 2015 framework (IDPS, 2011, p. 2).

According to the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), the challenges of fragile states can be tackled by focusing on three critical aspects of state society relations, namely the political settlement process (elite bargain, balance of power, centre-periphery),¹² state capability and responsiveness (security, justice, economic management, service delivery)¹³ and social expectations (perceptions and responsibilities)¹⁴. INCAF focuses on regional and global policy environments, the drivers for good and bad governance, and societal space. Legitimacy is placed at the heart of the statebuilding processes and is argued to be central for successful external interventions (OECD, 2014a).

Two years after the New Deal, the Third International Dialogue Global meeting acknowledged in a Washington Communiqué progress on the New Deal, especially in the implementation with the finalization of the Fragility Assessment by five countries, the signature of the Tokyo Accountability Framework for Afghanistan and a new partnership with Somalia (IDPS, 2013, p. 1). However, the Communiqué urged actors involved to translate the commitments into “concrete changes in behaviour and practice, in support to country-owned and country-led priorities, and consistent with national law and internationally agreed principles” (IDPS, 2013, p. 1). It also stressed the need to strengthen national ownership in relation to *Focus* commitments, pointing out its “huge transformative potential” for promoting development effectiveness, while underlining the need for persistence due to the long term nature of statebuilding and peacebuilding. Additionally, they commit to build indicators for the FOCUS and TRUST components (IDPS, 2013), use indicators to track progress and also conduct regular fragility assessment and monitor the implementation of the New Deal. They encourage

¹² Refers to rules of the game.

¹³ Refers to fulfilling effectively the functions.

¹⁴ Refers to what it should do.

engagement with new countries to spread the impact of the New Deal and inclusion of private sector actors and engage in the Global partnership for Effective Development Cooperation.

There are a few challenges to the new scheme. Governments in developing states are often unreliable, corrupt, undemocratically elected and prioritizing personal interests rather than statebuilding and peacebuilding. Conceding a central role to undemocratic governments as cooperating partners raises doubts regarding the likelihood of success of New Deal. The fragile states are undemocratic, outcomes of many governments are not promising and citizens are partly involved in the decision-making. Furthermore, the methodology used by countries to conduct their fragility assessment influences the way the results are viewed (this issue is being addressed in IDPS), raising the question if they also include the views of citizens or only the governmental perspective. In addition, the number of participating countries is low at the moment, with only five having participated in the Fragility Assessment so far (Sierra Leone, DRC, South Sudan, Liberia and Timor-Leste). Thus it remains to be seen in the future if the initiative will provide a suitable framework to evaluate fragility and monitor PSGs goals through indicators. They are found in Fragility Spectrum that can be adjusted accordingly by the country involved in the assessment. Fragile states took up the initiative positively, but with only five fragile states signing the deal and none representing the Balkans, shortcomings remain. The New Deal seems to target African and Asian fragile states rather than the European and Balkan ones. The New Deal could run into some of the difficulties with the most important fragile states such as Kosovo or Zimbabwe not participating, instead preferring their own current approach to state and peace building. It is not clear how those fragile states that are not involved in such cooperation will be dealt with in the future. Furthermore, cooperation is not binding and only few fragile states are members. The recommendations signed between developed and developing countries and donors, do thus neither confer legal powers nor create viable enforcing mechanisms. Despite its changes, the new structure is still limited and fragile to military conflicts due to its geographical scope, the political willingness of states to participate, the current composition of member states and the lack of legal powers. In short, inclusiveness is emphasised but still lacking. Questions remain on how to encourage, incentivize and increase participation of non-member states.

Regional and Other Actors

On the regional level as well, many efforts have been made to complement the multilateral initiatives of the United Nations and the Dialogue. In Europe, the EU has taken a prominent role in statebuilding alongside NATO after the Balkan wars. Not all regional organizations had to deal with large scale conflicts, therefore they lack involvement in different stages of statebuilding. Other reasons include low capabilities and organisational inefficiency. The following regional organizations are enlisted that could theoretically contribute to different stag-

es of statebuilding. In Africa, the African Union (AU)¹⁵ and the Southern African Development Community (SADC)¹⁶ are promoting peace and stability. In Asia, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)¹⁷, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)¹⁸ and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)¹⁹ could theoretically promote statebuilding since some of their principles overlap with the priorities in different stages of statebuilding. Lastly, in the Middle East, the Arab League (AL)²⁰ and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)²¹ have also tried to promote principles similar to the statebuilding agenda. The G20 and other “Gs” sometimes deal with these matters, mostly when the agenda is not filled with economic issues (Marshall, 2014). Furthermore, bilateral programs are being implemented by different states like United States (through USAID) or the United Kingdom (through DFID). Recently several private philanthropists and foundations have started to become active alongside corporations, NGOs and religious organization.

Scholarship and the media are thought to play an important role as well (Marshall, 2014). For instance, in the aftermath of the aggressive promotion of democracy abroad during the

¹⁵ Some of the objectives of the African Union are relevant to statebuilding, including ‘to promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural level’, ‘peace, security, and stability’, ‘democratic institutions’, ‘good governance’, and ‘popular participation’ (AU, 2014). In addition, the AU Peace and Security Department’s work overlaps with the four stages of statebuilding: peace enforcement and peace keeping through AU missions, and reconstruction and development through focusing on security, emergency assistance, political governance, socio-economic reconstruction, human rights, justice, and reconciliation and women. They further deal with security sector reform (SSR), disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and capacity development (Paceau, 2013).

¹⁶ SADC aims ‘to promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development’ through, amongst others, good governance, integration and durable peace and security. They are guided by principles of (1) sovereign equality of all member states, (2) solidarity, peace and security, (3) human rights, democracy and rule of law, (4) equity, balance and mutual benefit, and (5) the peaceful settlement of disputes (SADC, 2012). These are of varying but significant importance in different stages of statebuilding.

¹⁷ APEC focuses mainly on economic development, but it also works on transparency and anti-corruption that are overlapping with the statebuilding agenda (APEC, 2014).

¹⁸ One of the aims and purposes of ASEAN fall under the statebuilding stages of development and reconstruction (e.g. promotion of justice, rule of law and legitimacy). The second aim and purpose of ASEAN is specifically ‘to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law ... and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter’ (ASEAN, 2014).

¹⁹ The main goal of the SCO is, among others, to ‘mak[e] joint efforts to maintain and ensure peace, security and stability in the region, moving towards the establishment of a new, democratic, just and rational political and economic international order’ (SCO, 2013). Establishing democratic order overlaps with the aims of statebuilding however it is questionable the application of this goal in practice.

²⁰ This organization aims to enhance the cooperation between states in the region and provide collective security arrangements, although its record in has been poor in practice (Karns & Mingst, 2010, p. 212). Thus although theoretically it could contribute to statebuilding in Middle Eastern Arab states, the AL remains of marginal relevance for statebuilding (peace enforcement and peace keeping).

²¹ States should act in accordance, amongst others, with the following principle which are all part of the statebuilding agenda (e.g. good governance, democracy and rule of law): ‘Member States shall uphold and promote, at the national and international levels, good governance, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.’ (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, 2014)

George W. Bush years, it has been questioned if it is sensible to engage after war in foreign countries for the purpose of democracy promotion. Many journalists, NGOs and academics call for a different way of promoting the agenda of individual rights, freedom and democracy, including a more “honest”, “modest” and “generous” involvement of the US abroad, in contrast to the approach of the Bush government (Traub, 2009). Indeed, due to the financial crises and the shifting foreign affairs agenda during the Obama administration, the promotion of American interests abroad seems to have shifted to a more constrained approach (exemplified by the long non intervention period in Syria at the beginning of the conflict), even though military measures have been used in the intervention in Libya and in continuing drone strikes in Pakistan. In these cases, the importance of NGOs and journalists in documenting violations of human rights by all actors is visible. Personal philanthropists are as well attempting to lessen the suffering of people on the ground. In addition, the media plays an important role also in presenting functional states, especially in the West, as filled with opportunities, prosperous economies, and functioning political and social system. This shapes the expectations of populations in dysfunctional states, as their fragile states are keeping the people away from achieving the full potential of the “good life” (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008, p. 3).

Statebuilding in Kosovo: Historical Stages and Events

The Post War Emergency Reconstruction under UNSC Resolution 1244

Kosovo represents one of the last break up of the Yugoslavian federation. With the end of the Cold War, the republics within most of the federations wanted to become independent states (Macedonia, Montenegro and Slovenia became independent without war whereas Kosovo, Bosnia and Croatia with a war). However, the situation of Kosovo was different compared to other Yugoslav regions. As a result of the Tito regime's new constitution of 1974, Kosovo's status as an autonomous province was enhanced with an equal constitutional standing to the Yugoslav Federation's six constituent republics in all but name. The Milosevic regime dismantled Kosovo's autonomous status in 1989-90 (Krieger, 2001). At first not violent, the Albanians in Kosovo turned eventually into a military conflict in 1998. After the war in Bosnia and the refusal of Rambouillet Peace Agreement by the delegation of the FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) that was accepted by the Kosovo Albanian delegation, NATO started its airstrikes against the FRY. The bombardment achieved its desired outcome, Serbian forces withdrew after 78 days (Elden, 2009, p. 202). Meanwhile, negotiations were under way that, after the airstrikes, resulted on the Kumanovo Agreement. It was signed between the KFOR and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Republic of Serbia (RS). The conflict reached its endpoint with the passing of the Security Council *Resolution 1244* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, followed by the entering of KFOR ground troops as envisaged under the Kumanovo Agreement. The humanitarian intervention by NATO ended

the ethnic cleansing of Albanians, the exodus of Albanian and Serbian refugees, and the fighting between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and FRY forces. The Resolution decided further on the deployment of a security and civilian presence in Kosovo and outlined its responsibilities.

Generally, in the area of security, the main responsibilities included the prevention of renewed hostilities, demilitarization of armed groups, establishing a secure return environment for refugees and displaced persons, ensuring public safety and order, supervising de-mining until the civilian presence can take over the task, conducting border monitoring duties, coordinating the work with civilian presence and ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of IO staff (Security Council, 1999, p. 3). In fact, alongside Resolution 1244, the Kumanovo Agreement was thus instrumental for setting up a stable environment after conflict. Its purpose was to maintain the ceasefire and to provide a roadmap for the withdrawal of Serbian troops, which were now prohibited from re-entering “subject of a subsequent separate agreement” (“Military Technical Agreement,” 1999, p. 2; Security Council, 1999, p. 7). The UN Resolution 1244 authorized KFOR its deployment as the entity responsible for guaranteeing security for staff and all citizens in the Kosovo territory with *mandate* to use military force to ensure compliance with the Kumanovo Agreement. The agreement allowed KFOR subsequently to

operate without hindrance within Kosovo and with the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo.... [and *to take actions including*] the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance with this Agreement and protection of the international security force ("KFOR"), and to contribute to a secure environment for the international civil implementation presence, and other international organisations, agencies, and non-governmental organisations (“Military Technical Agreement,” 1999, pp. 1–2).

KFOR was given wide-ranging powers, including the possibility to use force, to guarantee the “compliance” with the Kumanovo agreement in three situations, namely to “enforce withdrawals of FRY forces, enforce compliance following the return of selected FRY personnel to Kosovo [and] provide assistance to other international entities...” (“Military Technical Agreement,” 1999, p. 6). Next to the mission’s comprehensive mandate, the commander has also extensive powers and the authority “without interference or permission, to do all that he judges necessary and proper, including the use of military force” (“Military Technical Agreement,” 1999, p. 5).²² KFOR has a right to coordinate with civilian or military authorities from both ethnicities as well. More particularly, the Resolution confirms that after the withdrawal, a limited number of Yugoslav/Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to

²² For instance when (i) the different forces refused to comply with the orders of the commander to remove, withdraw, or relocate (including weapons) and (ii) to order the termination of any activities that pose a potential threat to the parties involved (“Military Technical Agreement,” 1999, p. 6).

return in Kosovo to perform functions in cooperation with the international civilian and security presence such as marking and clearing minefields and maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites and key border crossings (Security Council, 1999, p. 6). In practice, KFOR defines their mission along the following lines:

- (i) contribute to a secure environment and ensure public safety and order, (ii) support and coordinate the international humanitarian effort and civil presence, (iii) support the development of a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic and peaceful Kosovo and (iv) support the development of the Kosovo Security Force (NATO, 2014)

In the civilian area, Resolution 1244 authorized the establishment of an international civil presence, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), in order

to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo (Security Council, 1999, p. 3).

As with its military counterpart, UNMIK's mandate was broad, including the establishment of provisional institutions and the rule of law, economic reconstruction, as well as support for humanitarian activities. During the after war period, UNMIK supported and controlled the development of provisional institutions, performed basic civilian administrative activities and organized the elections. At a later stage, it was expected that the provisional institutions would become stronger so that UNMIK would begin *transferring* responsibilities and only "overseeing" the development of the new institutions. In addition, UNMIK dealt with *economic reconstruction and the establishment of the rule of law*, maintaining civil order (e.g. develop local police forces, deploy international police), and protecting and promoting human rights. In the *humanitarian* area, it was to provide support and coordination for organizations involved on humanitarian and disaster relief aid, and to guarantee the safe return of refugees and IDPs (Security Council, 1999, pp. 3–4; "UNMIK Mandate," 2014). It also foresaw a political process to establish a framework providing "for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK" (Security Council, 1999, pp. 6–7). The Resolution also stipulated that negotiations for a political settlement should not "delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions" (Security Council, 1999, pp. 6–7; "UNMIK Mandate," 2014).

In practice, the territorial administration of Kosovo performed by UNMIK rested on four pillars: (i) humanitarian assistance led by the UNHCR, (ii) civil administration by the UNMIK, (iii) democratization and institution building by OSCE and (iv) reconstruction and economic development led by the EU. The first pillar was refocused after one year to the area of the rule

of law which, after independence, transferred to EULEX (UNMIK, 2014). The second pillar was transferred to the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) before independence, while the two last ones were coordinated with PISG and UNMIK. UNMIK highlights to have had difficulties in securing reconciliation and the integration of communities but to have facilitated “establishing and consolidating democratic and accountable Provisional Institutions of Self-Government and in creating the foundations for a functioning economy” (UNMIK, 2014).

Despite their relative success, the UN has still not left the country after 15 years of involvement. In terms of exit strategy, the Resolution initially envisaged a presence of 12 months with a possibility for renewal. It has been renewed several times so far. In fact, in 2001 the PISG were established under the UNMIK Constitutional Framework with the aim to strengthen these institutions and gradually transfer the competencies of UNMIK to PISG. UNMIK, together with the PISG, introduced the “standards for Kosovo”, which were endorsed by the UN Security Council in December 2003, to be implemented by both entities. They outlined the targets to be achieved in the areas of democracy, rule of law, freedom of movement, rights of communities, economy, property rights, dialogue and military capabilities (*Standards for Kosovo*, 2003), serving as the basis for evaluating the progress in Kosovo in order to proceed with the status solution. It should be noted that the standards were very high and unlikely to be met in one or two years, which meant in consequence that the status question would also be postponed for another four to five years. Local and international practitioners refer to this period as “standards before status” approach. From 2002, a parallel advisory process, the *Stabilisation and Association Process Tracking Mechanism (STM)*, was introduced by the European Commission in order to ensure that the implementation of standards by UNMIK and PISG are in line with EU practices. This mechanism functioned as an equivalent to the regular Stabilization and Association process that the other five countries in the Balkans had to fulfil before the EU membership. Kosovo’s disputed status precluded the regular process of stabilization and association that the other countries were pursuing.

Finally, the Resolution 1244 provided a comprehensive approach to *economic development and stabilization*, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. In the aftermath of the Kosovo War in 1999, the Stability Pact was established by international community (as conflict prevention strategy) and played a crucial role in the promotion of democracy, human rights and economic development to achieve stability and the integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, facilitate interethnic reconciliation and avoid the re-emergence of conflict. It served as a platform to bring together diverse actors including international powers such as the EU, the US, and Russia, as well as local governments of the former Yugoslav republics and international organizations involved in post-conflict reconstruction. The Pact’s secretariat and Working Tables coordinated donor activities and identified strategies to

tackle problems in South Eastern Europe (SEE). The Pact transformed into the Regional Co-operation Council (RCC) on 27 February 2008 with the same mandate to oversee the process of the implementation of SEE and support the European and Euro-Atlantic integration since the independence of Kosovo in 2008 which reflected a relatively successful development of the region (“About the Stability Pact,” 2014). The Stability Pact aimed, amongst others, *inter-ethnic reconciliation* as envisaged in Resolution 1244, which demanded full cooperation in the area of criminal justice of all parties, including the security presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). However, inter-ethnic reconciliation remains still a delicate issue in Kosovo. In terms of *accountability* of the UN, Resolution 1244 provided only a mechanism of political accountability through the Special Representative (SR). The SR controls the implementation of the civilian presence and coordinates the work between the civilian and security presence.

To conclude, Resolution 1244 as implemented through UNMIK, UNCHR, KFOR, OSCE, and the EU suspended the Yugoslav and Serbian authority in Kosovo and initiated the building of basic functions of a state in Kosovo and the institutional infrastructure for local governance. PISG was a catalyst for pushing the Kosovo issue, despite the suspension of the status questions and the uncertainty of what the territory of Kosovo will be in terms of sovereignty and statehood. The “standards before status” approach was not very favorable for the PISG due to the fact that implementing the standards takes a long time before the final status solution can be considered. This approach amplified already existing uncertainties concerning the status of the state and its relation to the Serbian Federation. Still, the EU adopted a special mechanism to harmonize Kosovo’s standards with the EU, implicitly preparing it for membership under a framework of stabilization and association similar to those in other Balkan countries. This reflected a willingness to engage with Kosovo as a separate entity.

The 2004 Riots and the Ahtisaari Plan

Shortly after the introduction of the “standards before status” approach by the UN Security Council in 2004, Kosovo Albanians began rioting against minorities after the drowning of three Kosovo Albanian boys at the bridge dividing the city of Mitrovica (HRW, 2004, p. 1). It was reported that Serbs had been responsible for these killings, even though the perpetrators remain unknown until today. The riots had both spontaneous and organized elements. The spontaneous part included the high turnout of 51,000 people, mainly young protesters starting from 17 March, which felt marginalized and frustrated with the stagnant economy. More organized actions were taken by Albanian extremist groups which helped in accelerating the violence (HRW, 2004, pp. 1–28). As a result, 550 homes and 27 monasteries were burned, 4,100 people belonging to minority groups displaced, 19 people killed (including eleven Kosovo Albanians and eight Kosovo Serbs), and thousands wounded (HRW, 2004, pp. 2–7).

Both national and international security forces were caught by surprise. The riots found them unprepared, inadequately trained and equipped, and with an insufficient capacity to react to protests. In fact, international and local security forces were themselves also under attack, which drew military resources from the protection of minorities (HRW, 2004, p. 24). In addition, since there were more casualties on the majority side, it appears that the general security situation was problematic for both the minority and majority, meaning that international security forces failed to protect both groups despite their mandate to provide a secure environment for all citizens. The collapse of security institutions during this incident called for a new approach to security in Kosovo as the promotion of a multi-ethnic Kosovo faced a challenge in the reignition of old animosities (HRW, 2004, p. 3). In addition, the riots have been seen as reflecting a failure of the PISG to promote inter-ethnic tolerance.

A year after the riots, Kai Eide, the Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General issued a report on Kosovo upon the request of the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, to prepare a comprehensive review “to assess whether the conditions are in place to enter into a political process designed to determine the future status of Kosovo” (Annan, 2005, p. 1). Eide’s report assessed the situation as fragile in terms of security, judiciary, economy and minority integration. He concluded that the international community must maintain its presence and also be careful on transferring competencies to local authorities, especially due to challenges that might arise from the possible take over of non-accountable political parties and clans. He suggested placing the EU in charge of the process, mostly because the organization held leverage, which UNMIK had already lost, based on the prospect of the integration of Kosovo into the EU. He suggested that the period of “political stagnation and widespread frustration” had given way to a period of expectation and dynamic development which should be maintained (Eide in Annan, 2005). Hence the sensitive political process of future status must continue as “there will not be any good moment for addressing [the status]... the time has come to commence this process” (Eide in Annan, 2005, p. 2,4). Kofi Annan endorsed his conclusions, appointing as a result a Special Envoy, Marti Ahtisaari, to lead the negotiations between the authorities of Kosovo and Serbia. The Contact Group issued ten principles for Ahtisaari as guiding points for the mediation.

The first UN mediated talks between Kosovo and Serbia took place in 2006 but failed. However, in the same year, the EU Commission issued a European Partnership to Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo, identifying main priorities for reforms and harmonization with the EU *acquis*, and establishing the basis for financial assistance. Kosovo adopted separately an “*Action Plan for the Implementation of the European Partnership*” which served as basis for further coordination between the EU and Kosovo (Tatham, 2009, p. 168). In addition, Martti Ahtisaari finalized his work by presenting the Kosovo Status Settlement Proposal, which became also known as the Comprehensive Status Proposal (CSP) or “Ahtisaari Plan” outlining

the requirements for a stable Kosovo. The Ahtisaari Plan includes comprehensive minority rights and regulates the mandate of the international presences with the end goals to be achieved before the full transition of responsibilities to Kosovo's authorities. Most importantly, Ahtisaari recommended an independence supervised by the international community.

The most central dimension of the Ahtisaari Plan is the integration and protection of minorities. More specifically, in terms of a political model, the Ahtisaari Plan recommended a multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo with a respect for the rule of law. Human rights and fundamental freedoms were supposed to be included in the Constitution. Furthermore, Kosovo should be allowed to conclude international agreements and seek membership in international organizations. With regards to minorities, the Plan offered comprehensive protection and promotion of their rights such as the protection of culture, language, education and symbols. It also envisaged a special mechanism of representation for minorities in the public institutions, and a right to not enact laws without the agreement of the majority of national minorities in Kosovo's Assembly. In addition, decentralization should provide minorities with "a high degree of control over its own affairs" (Ahtisaari, 2007, p. 2), creating new municipal competencies, autonomy in financial matters including funding from Serbia, partnerships with Serbian institutions and establishment of six new Serbian municipalities. A multi-ethnic composition was also to be created on all levels of the justice system. In terms of protection and promotion of religious and cultural heritage, the Plan proposed the demarcation of protective zones to prevent disruptive constructions, recognising "inviolability of its property, freedom from taxation and customs duty privileges" (Ahtisaari, 2007, p. 2). With regards to refugees and missing persons, it provided for their safe return, including possibilities of reclaiming property and demanded cooperation on the issue. The most important plans for the economy included transparent settlements of property claims, a continuation of privatization and a determination of Kosovo's share of Serbia's external debt. Finally, in the area of security, the Plan urged for local ownership through a multi-ethnic security system reflecting the ethnic composition of municipalities, as well as more minority power on the election of local station commanders in minority inhabited municipalities (Ahtisaari, 2007, pp. 1–3).

Regarding the international presence, the Plan suggested to limit mandates mainly to supervisory and supportive roles and to aim at transferring the responsibilities of international structures to local authorities. It requested the establishment of two new international entities, the first being an International Civilian Representative (ICR) to supervise the implementation of the Plan with authority to "annul decisions" and "sanction or remove public officials" that are not working towards the spirit of the plan (Ahtisaari, 2007). In addition, a European Security and Defence Policy Mission was to monitor all areas related to the rule of law, including police, judiciary, customs, penal institutions and others as necessary. Established international structures were to function as follows: NATO would provide security until the responsibilities

would be transferred to Kosovo security forces; the OSCE would monitor the implementation of the Plan, and UMMIK's mandate would expire after 120 days after which the transfer of their responsibilities to Kosovan authorities would have needed to be achieved. Lastly, the Plan requested the adoption of a new constitution in accordance with the plan, the holding of general and local elections and the determination of the ICR mandate by the International Steering Group for Kosovo (ISG) (Ahtisaari, 2007, pp. 3–4).

Despite the clear road map to ending the dispute between Kosovo and Serbia, a broad mandate for the protection and promotion of minority rights, and a clear exit strategy for the international community, Russia's threat to use its veto power in the Security Council prevented the passing of a Resolution endorsing Ahtisaari's plan. Serbia's strong rejection of the plan led to another round of talks, which were launched by a troika consisting of the US, the United Kingdom and Russia, but which failed again in 2007. The situation changed when the Assembly of Kosovo declared its independence unilaterally on 17 February 2008, followed by the ratification of a new Constitution for the Republic of Kosovo as the supreme law aspiring to be the basis of "a free, democratic and peace-loving country" (Kosovo, 2008, p. v). The Constitution entered into force in June 2008.

Granting Supervised Independence

On 28 February 2008, an International Steering Group (ISG) was formed to support the implementation of the Ahtisaari's Plan, comprised of twenty-five states that recognized Kosovo (ICO, 2008). However Serbia rejected the group's legitimacy as not having any basis in international law. In addition, to challenge the legality of the unilateral declaration of independence, Serbia petitioned the UN General Assembly to request an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice concerning the legality of the act. In 2010, the ICJ released its advisory opinion, concluding that the unilateral independence of Kosovo did not violate the general principles of international law or Resolution 1244. After six years of independence, the Republic of Kosovo had received 108 recognitions (some of the most important states are the United States, United Kingdom, Germany and others) from UN states out of 193 (Kosovo Thanks You, 2014). The ICJ's advisory opinion weakened the legal arguments of non-recognizing states that Kosovo had violated international law and had no legal standing. The status of the state has thus been less disputed afterwards (Smolar, 2013). However, despite the advisory opinion, a number of states still refuse to recognize Kosovo. Within the European Union, these states include Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Cyprus, mostly for internal reasons such as the possibility of a secessionist movement in their own states, but also due to their historical ties to Serbia (that's true for Greece, most notably), which rejects the independence of Kosovo. Other notable non-recognizers are Russia, the closest international ally of Serbia, and BRIC countries like Brazil, India and China.

At the same time, despite Serbia's opposition, the ISG continued to oversee the implementation of Ahtisaari Plan, appointing an ICR as the head the International Civilian Office (ICO), a supervisory body to implement the Ahtisaari Plan. The powers and authority of the ICO were outlined in the Ahtisaari Plan as explained in the earlier section. The appointed ICR was to serve simultaneously as the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) of the EU Office in Kosovo, as appointed by the Council of the European Union. The EUSR's role was to prepare Kosovo for an eventual integration into the EU and to coordinate the actions of the EU on the ground (International Civilian Office, 2012, p. 156). The ICR's appointment reflected a *pro independence* agenda, while the EUSR's appointment implied a neutral stance on status given that European Union member states were, as already mentioned, divided on the issue. The position as ICR/EUSR, based on two mandates with opposed stances on status, was carried out by Pieter Feith, and proved useful for the first two years, as it offered a progressive vision of Kosovo "towards democracy and statehood" (International Civilian Office, 2012). However, it has remained difficult for the ICO, specifically ICR to deal with the non-recognizers, local political elite manipulating the population by sending diverse messages, hence making the work of ICR more difficult, competing transatlantic demands of the EU and US, the lack of clear competence division between EU and ISG and low support from Brussels. Practically, as of 2010, the double-hat position was split to clarify the responsibilities and improve the cooperation. Still, challenges continued and the arrangement of the EUSR became very difficult due to the frictions in EU between non-recognizers and recognizers. The EUSR's own contractual arrangements were very short term, calling into question the existence of a long term strategy in Kosovo (International Civilian Office, 2012, pp. 60–62). Further reconfigurations among international actors followed after the declaration of independence which "rendered UNMIK ineffective and non-operational" (International Civilian Office, 2012, p. 32). UNMIK was consequently reoriented towards the "promotion of security, stability and promotion of human rights" (UNMIK, 2014). However, according to the ICO, in practice they are left with two tasks, that is, providing political reports and supporting Kosovo in taking up international obligations in regional as well as multilateral platforms (International Civilian Office, 2012, p. 25). Since the independence of Kosovo, the European Union has taken a proactive role in the management of Kosovo, while UNMIK has been less active. The EU works on the ground through two main structures, namely the EU Office in Kosovo and EULEX. The European Union Office in Kosovo, as a part of European External Actions Service (EEAS) and the European Commission, merged with the European Commission Liaison Office (ECLO) that used to deal with economic assistance under the Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), and the EUSR in 2009. The EUSR still maintains the function to support Kosovo's authorities, coordinate EU action and strengthen human rights and fundamental freedoms. The second main EU presence, EULEX, is a civilian mission under the Eu-

ropean Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) with executive powers along with a monitoring, mentoring and advising role on the *rule of law* in line with Resolution 1244. EULEX is mandated to assist

in progress towards sustainability and accountability and in further developing and strengthening [independent multi-ethnic police, judiciary and customs] free from political interference and adhering to international recognized standards and European best practices (The Council of the European Union, 2008, p. 93).

The “mentoring” role is meant mainly to promote the rule of law and ensure its maintenance on areas of importance for EU integration, such as the fight against corruption. EULEX has the executive powers to investigate, prosecute and decide on crimes relating to war crimes, terrorism, organized crime and corruption, inter-ethnic crimes, financial/economic crimes such property and privatization cases and other serious crimes (EULEX, 2014; Rupel, 2008). At the time of writing, EULEX was being downsized and a new international tribunal with an overlapping mandate had been established to deal with war crimes. According to Bernd Borchardt, the Chief of EULEX, the new court would deal with crimes during the 1998-1999 period, and investigate political crimes, the threatening and killings of witnesses in 2000 and 2001 and accusations of organ trafficking as first revealed in the Dick Marty’s report under the Council of Europe (“Tribunal Ndërkombëtar për Kosovën?,” 2014). In effect, this court will be the fourth international entity to deal with similar crimes, its predecessors being the ICTY, UNMIK and EULEX. The new court questions the success of EULEX to achieve its mandate, at the same time raising doubts about the usefulness of a new tribunal if three other international frameworks already had difficulties to deliver.

Since independence, some progress has been made regarding the Ahtisaari Plan on the development of Kosovo. Both the government and the ICO implemented the plan relatively successfully after more than three years, with the ICO assisting in the passing of several laws regarding the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan. The ISG closed the ICO in 2012, marking the end of supervised independence, with the following statement:

the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (CSP) had been substantially implemented, and noting that consistent with their commitments the Kosovo institutions have now passed packages of amendments to the Constitution and to primary legislation satisfactorily capturing the remaining elements of the CSP within the Kosovo Constitutional and legal framework, the International Steering Group today declares the end of the supervision of Kosovo’s independence, and the end of the mandate of the International Civilian Representative... With immediate effect, the CSP no longer exists as a separate and superior legal power, and the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo now constitutes the sole basis for the country’s legal framework (ISG in International Civilian Office, 2012, pp. 135–6).

After the end of supervised independence in September 2012, the principal ally of Kosovo, the US, in a statement made by the President Obama stressed that “[t]here is more work to be

done, as Kosovo's leaders now assume full responsibility for ensuring that the principles enshrined in its declaration of independence and constitution are realized for every citizen... Kosovo must also continue to engage constructively with its neighbours and work to resolve outstanding issues" (Obama in "International Steering Group passes sovereignty to Kosovo," 2012). On the other hand, the ICO stressed that "Euro-Atlantic cooperation would be critical to Kosovo's establishment as a viable state following its declaration of independence" (International Civilian Office, 2012, p. 56). As both the ICO and the US made their recommendations, the Kosovo government was already engaging in a technical dialogue with Serbia. The talks evolved subsequently into a political dialogue to resolve the remaining issues that were left unresolved by the Ahtisaari Plan, including the status of Northern Kosovo and the treatment of minorities. Furthermore, the path to the European Union was formally opened with the issuance in 2012 of the *Feasibility Study* for the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) between the EU and Kosovo, only one day after the end of supervised independence. The report said that Kosovo was ready to start the negotiations for the SAA. To conclude, the end of supervised independence with departure of ICO marked a progress for Kosovo, which thus was ready to enter into SAA negotiations following the EU Feasibility Study. However, the country was left with the remaining international presences, playing significant roles and wielding executive powers, including UNMIK, KFOR, EULEX and the OSCE. Kosovo lacks therefore still independence despite the end of supervised independence.

Ending the Supervised Independence

As mentioned earlier, in response to the ICJ's Advisory Opinion, Serbia requested another round of negotiations. The UNGA expressed its consent and asked the European Union (EU) to assist in the negotiations as "the process of dialogue in itself would be a factor for peace, security and stability in the region, and that dialogue would be to promote cooperation, achieve progress on the path to the European Union and improve the lives of the people" (UNGA, 2010, p. 2). The European External Action Service (EEAS) took a central role in the dialogue process. A technical dialogue led by Robert Cooper, European Union chief negotiator started in March 2011, even though it has been argued that the dialogue had a clearly political content from the very beginning (Bajrami, 2013, p. 5). The technical dialogue reached agreements, amongst others on the points of "the return of civil registries and cadastre records, on the freedom of movement of persons and cars, on the mutual recognition of diplomas, on customs stamps, and on the integrated management of the "border/boundary" crossings, as well as on Regional Cooperation" (Bajrami, 2013, p. 6). Regardless of the progress in these matters, others such as specifically regional cooperation, the customs stamps, the asso-

ciation of Serbian municipalities and the border demarcation with Montenegro remain difficult and unresolved.

The Regional Cooperation Agreement reached a consensus for Kosovo to sign agreements in the future and represent itself in meetings with an asterisk and a footnote reading: “This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSC 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence” (European Union, 2012, p. 1). This agreement was received with a lot of protest from the Self-Determination Party, which claimed that it undermined the Constitution. In addition, there are critical voices from the local MPs and experts arguing that the footnote hinders Kosovo in creating state attributes as it brings back into power Resolution 1244, which was replaced by the Declaration of the Independence (Bajrami, 2013; Kohanet, 2012a, 2012b). Overall, this development was perceived as a step back for Kosovo by civil society and the Self-Determination Party. Nowadays, Kosovo is represented with the footnote and sometimes the following text is added next to the footnote “unilateral declaration of the independence” in EU documents. It is argued by some MPs that this undermines the ICJ Opinion and that there is also a tendency to include the footnote in Kosovo legislation (Bota Sot, 2014). In practice, the footnote was meant to allow Kosovo’s participation in regional and multilateral platforms, but the Serbian delegation still refuses to be present in such meetings and conditions its own participation to hosts with the non-invitation of Kosovo (Bajrami, 2013, p. 8; Bota Sot, 2014). Moreover, the implementation of the custom stamps agreement posed difficulties as well. A Kosovo Albanian policeman was killed in July 2011 during an attempt to seize the control of customs points in the northern part of the country. Furthermore, Kosovo Serbs set barricades on roads and burned customs points (Baliqi, 2013, p. 4). As a result, the dialogue was interrupted several times. After the serious incidents in August and September 2012 with hand grenades being used against Kosovo Serb Police, shootings against EULEX vehicle, physical assault against two Kosovo Albanian and an old Kosovo Serb, shootings against Kosovo Albanian and stabbing of Kosovo Serb, UNMIK called for the parties to resume the negotiations and implement the already reached technical agreements (Council, 2013; UNSC, 2012).

The technical dialogue became an explicitly political dialogue after the end of supervised independence and several incidents, including the July killings. It started when both Prime Ministers of Kosovo and Serbia meet in Brussels on 19 October 2012. On 19 April 2013, both parties reached the “First Agreement on Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations” in Brussels which was described as “historic” by some (Smolar, 2013), aiming at the integration of the north into the existing political, judicial and security structures of the Republic of Kosovo. The agreement guaranteed specifically minority rights through the establishment of an Association of Serb majority municipalities in accordance with the laws of Kosovo. In the security area, it reassured that there would be (i) only one police force, the Koso-

vo Police, (ii) an integration of northern security structures into Kosovo ones, and (iii) a Police Regional Commander for the four northern Serb majority municipalities (Northern Mitrovica, Zvecan, Zubin Potok and Leposavic), appointed by them. In terms of the judiciary, the Agreement envisioned the establishment of a Serb majority panel of judges in the Appellate Court in Pristina, with a division of this court sitting permanently in northern Mitrovica. In terms of politics, it laid down a plan to hold municipal elections in the north in 2013 and requested both sides not to object or encourage others to object to the other's EU accession. Finally, it was agreed to continue discussing telecommunication, energy and to establish an implementation committee to this end (Vogel, 2013). Two more agreements were subsequently concluded in these areas.

In addition, to implement the dialogue agreement, an Amnesty Law was adopted which raised doubts concerning its potential impact on Kosovo's statebuilding and reconciliation efforts (Rrustemi & Baumgärtel, 2014). The law was adopted with the objective to pardon the minorities who had previously resisted the political, judicial and security system of Kosovo in order to integrate them. However, beneficiaries of the law were not only minorities but also the Kosovo Albanian majority as a broad range of crimes were pardoned. The law was received with much scepticism and protests, was twice returned to Parliament and went through a Constitutional Court review process that found parts of the law to be unconstitutional (Rrustemi & Baumgärtel, 2014). Civil society submitted a petition of 12,500 signatures and some legal experts argued that the implementation would be problematic "because there are many people who are charged and they will try to misuse [the law] in the context of criminal cases" (Korenica in Gashi, 2013; Peci, 2013). Fear of abuse were especially high for corrupt persons who hold high positions in Kosovo's industry and political structures, including government officials (Abdixhik, 2013).

Western governments, especially the US administration, recognized a "need to ensure wider support" and two out of three main opposition parties, the LDK and the AAK, endorsed the dialogue while only the Self Determination Party, rejected the dialogue (Bajrami, 2013, p. 10). On March 2013, the Prime Ministers of both states addressed the UNSC. PM Thaci noted some progress, and the problems faced by Serbia's proposal for territorial integrity and separate institutions for Serbs in Kosovo. On the other hand, the Serbian government noted that challenges remaining on the ground, especially concerning the human rights of Serb minority (Council, 2013). The European Union rewarded both states for the agreement that resulted from the dialogue, giving a starting date for accession talks with Serbia, thus agreeing to open the accession negotiations. Later on, the Council introduced the negotiations chapters dealing with amongst others with security, justice, and the economy. According to the former President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, it is chapter 35 most important for both countries concerning "the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina"

(European Integration Office, 2013), that will be the most challenging part of the negotiations. On the other hand, the EU launched the negotiations on the Stabilization and Association Agreement for Kosovo which are expected to be closed with an agreement in summer 2014, despite the country's disputed status (BIRN, 2013). Further progress on the EU membership path is conditioned upon the conclusion of a dialogue agreement by both states. In addition, both parties have been provided with financial assistance to reach its objective of EU integration. The EU has a separate Dialogue with the Government of Kosovo on visa liberalization and rule of law issues.

The technical and political dialogues were and are still received sceptically in different stages. Bajrami identifies in the technical dialogue a general "pattern of intentional delays in terms of implementation, mostly on the part of Serbia, which is now being reproduced in political dialogue agreements" (Bajrami, 2013, p. 9). Despite the scepticism of the civil society and some opposition leaders on many points, both the international community and local elites remain optimistic about the dialogue and its implementation. The period after the end of supervised independence was thus marked by the political dialogue agreement reached by Kosovo and Serbia. The dialogue still continues between both parties despite its challenges and it remains to be seen how it will influence the integration of minorities that have been isolated in the north for more than a decade and the future statebuilding of Kosovo.

Finally, the Kosovo issue has been treated from the beginning as a *sui generis*, a special case. During the post war period, the territory was administered by UNMIK, the EU created a special mechanism to overcome the status difficulties in order to cooperate, Ahtisaari Plan was implemented by ICO without approval of Serbia, the Dialogue Agreement is considered as necessary for future despite its shortcoming by EEAS and lastly the Amnesty law adoption was considered as a vital measure in order to continue with the dialogue by the ambassadors and EEAS. The main actions taken by the state are usually assisted by international organizations, rather than locally in an established democratic procedure. The policymaking in Kosovo seems therefore still to be based on an approach guided by an idea of "exceptionalism" (Sahin, 2009).

Conclusion

To conclude, the SC Resolution 1244 brought the conflict to an end and defined the main responsibilities of civilian and security missions and outlined the implementation process. While the war was successfully ended, Kosovo was left with an unresolved status, a minority problem, lack of basic state functions, divided cities, many refugees abroad, missing persons and killed civilians. During the post war period, international organizations were highly involved in various ways in assisting on rebuilding the territory. A few attempts were made to resolve the biggest problem, the political status, in order to maintain peace and stability in the

region and prevent a relapse into ethnic violence (as occurred briefly in 2004). Ahtisaari's efforts failed to secure Serbian support, but his Plan was implemented even without Belgrade's approval. EEAS efforts on the dialogue are still ongoing and are relatively successful in bringing both states further on the European path. Success depends on the stance that Serbia, Kosovo and EU member states maintain in implementing the Agreement on the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, which leaves some room for interpretation (meaning that for Kosovo Albanians it amounts to independence, while the EU and Serbs engaged merely not to block Kosovo's political bids). The EU is faced with a very difficult dilemma in the dispute as it is left only with two options to resolve this dispute without further conflict. The first, a parallel entrance for both states, is complicated by the fact that Kosovo lacks behind Serbia in its accession process. Thus either Serbia's entrance would be prolonged intentionally until Kosovo has caught up, or the EU steps up its support to strengthen Kosovo. In practice, however, this path is unlikely since accession is very slow as seen so far in the region. The second option is to accept Serbia as a member and create a special mechanism that puts legal restrictions on the voting for Kosovo's subsequent membership. This, however, is legally difficult and politically almost impossible since allies of Serbia can use their veto instead.

As mentioned earlier in the beginning, many actors have obtained executive powers through Resolution 1244 and thus been involved in the administration of the territory. The multiplicity of structures with executive and monitoring mandates in all functional areas of governance is unique since it continues even after the Declaration of Independence, the end of supervised independence, the ICJ judgment and the most recent agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. The Republic of Kosovo lacks statehood in practice even though it has theoretically been confirmed at these various events. During all stages of statebuilding, it was assumed that the international community focused its efforts on creating an independent and self-sustaining entity by providing the institutional set up and assisting in developing the main state functions. However, its own efforts have been undermined by a presence with executive mandates for longer than 15 years. Thus in practice, the international community's presence might have unintentionally created a dependent entity.

In the meantime, the unresolved situation was exploited by private actors including different transnational criminal networks, local stakeholders and internationals according to their preferences. The fact that there were diverging interests and not all committed to independence is seen by the outbreak of Kosovo Albanians and their frustration (e.g. March riots in 2004). Since the Kosovo Albanians were already the majority in the country supporting the independence and not receiving it even after 5 years from war and in deep economic crises proved alienation toward Serbs. Thus over time there has been a growing impatience among Kosovo

Albanians who felt that their plan for independence was in jeopardy, while international stakeholders took their time, as usual in conflict zones.

In terms of mandates, the international organizations mandates were clearly designed but during the implementation process, they sometimes did not achieve their goals, as in the cases of ICO or UNMIK on minority integration. KFOR maintained the security situation relatively peaceful, except when they failed to protect majority and minorities during the 2004 March riots. The mandates also lack provisions related to the participation and inclusion of local communities into the statebuilding process, and seem to be designed to achieve specific institutional goals without including the local dimensions, which is then often negotiated ad hoc. As seen for instance with the participation of Serbian minority in local and international structures. The under achievement of some organizations (EULEX, ICO, UNMIK) might be related to such piecemeal negotiations and to the unresolved status question.

Furthermore, as mentioned before the Kosovo issue has been treated from the beginning as a *sui generis*, a special case. In addition, preference is given to international decision making. The policymaking in Kosovo seems therefore still to be based on an approach guided by an idea of “exceptionalism” (Sahin, 2009). It still continues as special mechanisms are found to deal with the EU accession process, ICO establishment despite Serbian rejection and other instances. Thus, the case study of this research is one that is often regarded as unique and *sui generis* in all its statebuilding stages. In the following chapters it will be investigated further and in depth how the post conflict reconstruction process in Kosovo has been seen and evaluated by different actors. The next chapter turns to the perspectives of international civil servants and perceptions of local actors through life stories involved in Kosovo’s state building.

The Life Stories

6. The Life Stories on the State: Towards Societal “rather than Institutional” State Building

“We [international community] had all the ingredients [when they entered in 1999] high quality civil servants, money and enthusiasm...[but we failed]... A ‘naïve’, ‘colonialistic’, ‘paternalistic’ [process]”²³

“Imagine how painful and hurtful is the situation here, a person who has two healthy eyes must say that he is blind only because the others are”²⁴

Introduction

The life stories are salient for understanding the perceptions of the local communities about the new state of Kosovo which reveal the main differences and commonalities with the current theoretical conceptions and with the international perspectives as it will be shown below. Since state building is aimed almost exclusively at the creation of a liberal democratic political system, much attention is being paid on topics such as the establishment of a separation of power between the legislative, the executive and the judicial branches, differences between parliamentary and presidential systems, and unitary and federal types. The contemporary state building consists of (re) establishing democracy, economic order, DDR and reconciliation to ensure sustainability and stability in the long term.²⁵ The recent neoliberal state building focuses on security and capital for the establishment and maintenance of regional security and order. In response to state building challenges, liberal theorists propose revising the current framework, while critical theorists (highlighting a lack of legitimacy, autonomy, etc) suggest altering fundamentally the state building approach. Since existing literature has already dealt extensively with those, the focus of this chapter lies on other topics that have received less attention so far. In fact, certain aspects of state building as discussed in the literature such as

²³ Andreas

²⁴ Skender, p.20

²⁵ This is based on the chapter on mainstream theories of state and peace building that says: The Brahimi report issued by the United Nations argues that statebuilding consists of a set of activities including constitution-making, the setting up of electoral processes and the rule of law, the achievement of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), and national reconciliation (Brahimi, 2007, p. 4). Contemporary statebuilding consists thus of ‘technical’ activities of the (re)building of democracy (constitution, electoral processes & offices of state), the rule of law (security and justice), reconciliation and economic system (taxation, etc) (Greener, 2012, p. 418). These activities aim to ensure sustainability and stability in the long term (Brahimi, 2007, p. 4).

state functions (security, justice, administration), local ownership and corruption are overemphasized and receive disproportionate attention compared to presumed local needs as it will be shown with life stories.

The argument of this chapter based on the life stories is that the focus should shift from the end goal of institutional reconstruction to assisting the society to maintain (or recreate) a functioning social fabric, as much as possible preserving positive social practices that existed before the conflict. In this process the goals of state building must be adjusted for changes to successfully develop in the country. A balance between long-term and short-term goals is necessary. Thus rethinking the goals is important, as it is not only about security and privatization. Put simply, state building ought to be deeper. State building has so far focused on institutions and the state, which however, should be considered as the “final brick” on a rooftop. But the construction underneath should not be assumed. State building can only succeed when one has the pre-conditions, a functioning social fabric, on the basis of which one can create institutions. When society functions, institutions will follow. Therefore state building is a question of strategy and not only about security and institutions, which in themselves are clearly insufficient. This argument moves beyond Caplan’s argument that the local context and its specificities should be considered and the strengthening of local capacities prioritized, rather than focusing on the short-term demands of international organizations (Caplan, 2004, 2012). However, most missions are under pressure from taxpayers in the intervening countries in the short term, while reinforcing a society’s fabric takes a long-term commitment. Taxpayers interests need to be taken into account by informing them about the significance of contributing to statebuilding, such as the higher likelihood of preventing wars or instability and preventing the large migration to the developed countries.

Most importantly, the life stories in this chapter highlight that for strategies and initiatives of state building, the social fabric is particularly important. Investing in the social fabric offers an opportunity to deal with “unintended consequences” such as of liberal state building and “to develop engagement with everyday life, local culture, identity, and the emotional and psychological issues arising in post-conflict situations” (Richmond, 2009a, p. 569). As shown in the previous chapters, Richmond proposes to use everyday peace to engage with everyday life practices and activities of citizens and to dissolve the contradictions between locals, and local and the international community. This chapter shows that everyday peace alone is insufficient as the key to its achievement seems to be the social fabric rather than attitudes such as empathy and care. The local social fabric consists of various local social practices that must be identified, respected and incorporated as a part of an overall strategy. In local biographies in Kosovo, solidarity, family, professionalism, collectivity, respect, knowledge, and shared economy (meaning redistributive economy) seem to dominate as priorities among locals whereas the international community seem to attach more importance to state identification

towards Kosovo and professionalism. Similarly both sides urge to move away from materialism, nepotism, regionalism, negligence, corruption, political interferences, discrimination and impunity. Thus this chapter identifies commonalities of local and international practices and a middle way between critical and liberal theoretical approaches.

In contrary to the everyday peace conceptualization of the international community in the role of the facilitators, the life stories emphasize the necessity for the international community to engage with executive mandates. In addition, a focus on the social fabric provides a common focus point for the work of both international and local communities. It also moves away from the liberal theory, not only the critical theorists, by looking beyond setting up institutions. It also suggests shifting away from cooperating with local elites that have a criminal past, known as spoilers or stretchers in order to mitigate the unintended consequences of statebuilding. This chapter moves beyond this argument by arguing that in order to support an already existing and prior civic culture in Kosovo specifically, the focus must lie on education, whose importance is highlighted in the social practices in the local context through life stories. In contrast to locals highlighting education, statebuilders usually invest in “capacity building”. The scope of the thesis is short to discuss all of the other elements such as security, legal system and others. Education was chosen as the most striking example of a local priority as it emerged from the life stories, resonating also with my own experience in the field over last four years and being a Kosovo national.

In short, this chapter attempts to find the main commonalities and differences between international and local perspectives regarding the state of Kosovo, as reflected in the biographies/life stories of the so far unheard voices of the Kosovo local community. The findings are based on several life stories with local individuals and interviews with international officials.²⁶ Not all life stories concerning state building were used for this chapter given its limited scope. The choice fell on eleven life stories exemplifying the state building dynamics, which show similar challenges and priorities as seen in the other life stories. The life stories were chosen through snowball sampling, population criteria, involvement in post conflict reconstruction period, interaction with international community, access, availability and grounded theory.²⁷ The latter required theoretical sampling, which respectively necessitated using life stories that introduce new theoretical categories concerning the challenges to state

²⁶ The life stories used for this chapter arose from a comparative process with the other 28 life stories during several years of fieldwork. There are several life stories that experienced the post war reconstruction in Kosovo, the most difficult post socialist period with several social, economic and legal challenges and successes. Accounts of several life story participants whose interviews were conducted over five to six hours are used for this chapter. A pseudonym is used to ensure anonymity for the participants. For more information, please see the methodology chapter.

²⁷ For in depth information on sampling, please see the methodology chapter, section Initial and Theoretical Sampling.

building,²⁸ and which exemplify the challenges of state building at the institutional and individual level. Moreover, where participants dedicated their lives fully to state building, their stories were paid particular attention. Life stories that offered the ability to transfer the main threads and were rich in details were used in this chapter. Artan's life story is exemplary in reflecting common grievances about corruption, local and international elite dynamics and the general idea of state and nation. Arian's, Skender's and Edon's life stories complement Artan's life story. Albin Kurti's life story is an illustration of resistance to the current form of the state and the international/local dynamics during state building phase. Vera's narrative is crucial for understanding the current social fabric in Kosovo among ethnic groups but also regional and city differences. Genc's life story shows the economic challenges in the post war period, ie deepening inequalities and how they impact society. Rron, furthermore, explains the socio-political grievances in state building. Ben's life reflects the backlash created in social, economic as well as religious domain, as he aspires an Islamic state. Lastly Shkelqim's life story shows the inefficiencies in the system of education. It is used as an example to illustrate state building dynamics in one specific sector. All these stories portray a different view of state building in Kosovo. The chapter discusses significant differences and similarities between local and international actors in their visions of the state on the one hand, and local societal developments after the war on the other one. The section below explains the international perspectives based on semi-structured interviews.

The International Priorities: Critiques of Implementation

The Role of Internationals: Promoters of State Building

There are competing views on what the role of international community is in Kosovo, and more specifically whether it is contributing to state building or not. Some view the international community involvement as furthering the state building of Kosovo, whereas others view it only as building of functioning institutions without contributing specifically to state building. In the beginning, the involvement of the United Nation was justified in terms of security through UNSC Resolution 1244. It turned into “simply [an] extremely difficult mission”. The “aims [in the Res] could be very well justified but they were very ambitious in the very beginning also and they kept this ambitions until the end”.²⁹ Formally, UNMIK created the basis of independent institutions without preference for a special status, even though informally independence seems to have been promoted as Daryl and Salvatore reported in their interviews. Philip perceives the role of international community in state building as a sort of “referee”, contributing to institutional building, capacity building and nation building as the

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Salvatore

most crucial elements of state building. Metaphorically, he described the double role as “the lady who is giving birth to the child – a *midwife* – as there was certainly a *paternity* role”.³⁰

Thus the international community dealt with “facilitating and nurturing the steps and processes which led to the independence, and at the same time it was also in a way a blocking factor”.³¹ For instance, states not recognizing Kosovo’s independence in the EU or worldwide hindered the process more than they helped. Therefore not all the international community is engaged in state building.³² Parts of the UN and the EU regard Kosovo as a future member of the EU, but foresee the process to be “painful [as] it is not easy, it is not a gift you receive from some guy, it’s something you do yourself”.³³ While the institutional structure and the legal framework are present in Kosovo, non-recognition contributes to “fragility and poor economic development”.³⁴

In addition to states not recognizing independence, the international community was divided about whether to support building a state with an independent status or other models such as “autonomy or [being a] part of Serbia [as] everything could have worked”, this aspect being “one of biggest differences between international community” during the post war period. James, working for an international development organization argued that state building was the result but it was not the aim per se. Eric elaborates on the international community’s aims for Kosovo:

to enable the government of Kosovo to assert itself and emerge as a fully independent country, have relations with other countries, join regional organizations in order to join international organizations and they have been doing their utmost best in order to assist the Kosovo institutions to acquire the capacity to construct the usual factions of a state, and that should help them with their international up reach.³⁵

The aim was peace, stability and a possible long-term integration into the EU.³⁶ Jitske Hoogenboom from IKV Pax Christi argues that EU instruments are undermining the strength of the state that is hoping to build since (i) the Kosovo government engages in dialogue with the EU but not with its parliament, (ii) EULEX mandate allows Kosovo to discard its responsibilities, (iii) EULEX by not using the executive mandate when needed (ie high level corruption) decreased the trust in state building and (iv) by not being accountable to the people in Kosovo, EULEX is promoting double standards (Hoogenboom, 2011, pp. 14–15). Similarly, Salvatore expresses that the end game was “to achieve a country of stability with capable institutions and bureaucracy” through assisting the development of democratic institutions

³⁰ Philip

³¹ Philip

³² Daryl, p.6

³³ Eric, p.1

³⁴ Andreas, p.8

³⁵ Eric, p.1

³⁶ James, p.3

which “seem to have failed”.³⁷ Eric, an international organizations official, supports fully the international community’s involvement in Kosovo and mentions as the main objective “to enable the government of Kosovo to assert itself and emerge as a *fully independent country*, have relations with other countries, join regional organizations...[and] acquire the capacity to conduct the usual functions of a state”.³⁸ The focus of the EU seems to be more on the external aspects of legitimacy of the state, ie recognition rather than internal aspects such as building a functional state with functioning judiciary and security. In long term, this goes at the expense of the local population and trust in the state that can hinder as well the developments in the external aspects of the statehood.

Changes in the orientation on the status of the state exist due to a discrepancy between the international organization’s views on the status in mandate and in practice. These are affected by personal and organizational views on Kosovo’s desirable future status. In fact, personal preferences may affect and sometimes interfere with international organizations’ views. James indeed suggests that international officials often have “difficulties to distinguish between their personal preferences and professional mandates”. State building as a process is “emotional” and many international officials at some point “had to take a side because human beings are like that”. In addition, the international organizations orientation towards Kosovo’s future status is also influenced by the general views of the organization. James states that, having worked in his organization for a long time, he knows that “everybody has taken sides”. The organizations as well take sides as “you [as an organization] want to have clarity, is much easier to say I’m pro Republic of Kosovo”. Therefore it is problematic to maintain a neutral status in state and nation building processes. Once an international organization supports Kosovo as an independent entity, other challenges may arise, for example the non-cooperation of the Serbian minority. Maintaining status neutrality for an international organization is therefore in practice “quite heavy”.³⁹ Many international organizations are supposed to remain status neutral in Kosovo, as for instance EUSR, EULEX, UNMIK, and KFOR, the exception being the ICO that was in favor of independence.⁴⁰

Many international organizations and officials prefer their activities not to be referred to as “contributing to state building” but instead as “capacity building” (or in the case of EULEX promoting the rule of law). The main reason is that state building is regarded as being “too ambitious”. Legally, IOs are supposed be neutral and contribute to “member state building”, which are portrayed as not contributing to state building. For instance, Rudolf claims that the EULEX mission does not embark in state building, but acknowledges that in practice they are

³⁷ Salvatore, p.3

³⁸ Eric, p.1

³⁹ James, p.3

⁴⁰ Eric, p.1

“contributing to institutional building and capacity building”. He claims that EULEX cannot succeed in state building due to a lack in mandate and structure. EULEX is officially status neutral since they “help Kosovo authorities to perform their functions in line with the international and EU perspectives”. He justifies this approach by explaining that while “in the past people talked about nation building and now state building, these concepts are too ambitious to relate to international peace support mission”. Instead he highlights the promotion of the rule of law by assisting to create functioning institutions and develop the capacities required to enforce the rule of law.⁴¹ His second reason for EULEX not contributing to state building is that they refrain from working on the three main elements of the state: people, territory and a government. In contrary, capacity building targets improving the capacities of people working in a government or other sectors in a specific territory. However he argues that the element of government lacks full functionality since it lacks power “to execute the monopoly of legal power inside territory”. According to this view, EULEX may portray its role as not contributing to state building, as long as the state is not fully functional. He also claims that they “are not directly administrating Kosovo, [but] simply supporting in a supportive role” (unlike UNMIK).

However if EULEX attempts to create a functioning rule of law in the whole territory of Kosovo regardless ethnicity, they must improve the institutional capacities of the government to ensure the monopoly of legal power on the whole territory of Kosovo. In addition, the rule of law is one of the bases of democratic states, which EULEX is promoting through capacity building, thereby strengthening the prospective state even of a semi-recognized state structure and eventually helping to achieve a fully independent status. Lastly, even officially they promote Kosovo’s membership to the EU and therefore Kosovo state building, since until now only states are members of the EU and this practice does not seem to change.⁴² Thus, EULEX’s assistance may not be linguistically labeled as state building but in practice, it appears to contribute to liberal state building based on a democratic political order.

The only IO whose mandate contributed openly to the independence of Kosovo was the ICO that implemented the Ahtisaari plan which envisioned an independence supervised by the international community (the ICO & and the EUSR) until all criteria are fulfilled. Upon the completion of the plan, the ICO would declare the end of supervised independence, hand over all the competences to the Kosovo authorities and transfer supremacy to the Constitution of Kosovo as the supreme law of the country. In reality, their work towards state building in terms of external aspects such as recognition and status settlement more attention is given and had been slightly successful (recognitions are high but Kosovo lacks membership to the UN

⁴¹ Rudolf, p.1

⁴² Rudolf, p.1-2

and the status is still disputed), but in practice they contributed less to state building on the internal aspects, that is, in improving the state functions. The aim of the ICO was to supervise the governmental structures and identify whether they are “able to fulfill their mandate”. According to William, the ICO approach was in this context a light footprint approach, “keep[ing] its hands off and to just allow the state to do what it was doing, and not to really intervene or interfere”. It remains to be investigated further whether they intentionally allowed deterioration of state building or simply lacked resources. In fact, their approach could not substantially decrease abuse, corruption and non-independence of institutions (ie judiciary), despite the mandate to curb them. In practice, William argues that “a lot of these independent institutions have now become very political and ICO probably could have tried to ensure their independence”. Therefore, the light footprint approach is viewed by him as “a bit of a mistake”. In short, the ICO might have contributed to external state building but weakened the internal elements. William attributes these failures partly to education that is, the political science courses taught in universities where he and other employees learn that

the democratic processes don’t work so well at the beginning because they are still learning. And so the politicization of the independent institutions, I think are a natural part of the progression in state building. They may have started as independents; they’re going get political and hopefully they’ll become independent again.⁴³

Thus it seems like the university education makes officials more amenable and accepting of a possible deterioration of internal aspects despite their executive mandate to curb corruption and organized crime. Questions may be raised whether the administrators or IOs following a light footprint approach, who are not fulfilling their executive mandate to curb corruption, organized crime, by allowing independent institutions to become corrupt and deteriorate while maintaining executive mandate, which is given only in special cases where it is deemed necessary to take a heavy footprint approach, and it is approved from the member states, can be considered to be charged with negligence, indirect aid to corruptive behavior, activities and culture? Can the administrators individually or the IOs be held accountable politically and legally? The question of irresponsibility and unaccountability have so far been dealt with in the literature by Ralph Wilde, Gjylbehare Murati, Eric Brabandere and David Chandler, but not from the perspective on how to reconcile the tension between the implementation of a light footprint approach and maintenance of executive mandates.

In terms of the results of state building, if agreed that the international community more generally sought to contribute, competing views exist as well as to whether it failed or succeed. Andreas, a former international official in a high position, was critical of state building which he described as an “extremely ambitious and pretentious” notion:

⁴³ William, p.8

Nationbuilding usually starts on naïve footing. The state development has to come ultimately from within, there can be a little help from outside but the notion of the outside community creating a nation. That is very inflated and has proven to be impossible.... because of the Bosnia experience, which wasn't a happy one, many thought 'hey we are going to do better in Kosovo'. There was lot of *idealism, hope and aspirations* to begin with and because of the high expectations and lack of realism, the disappointments kicked in years after⁴⁴

This outcome is particularly notable as Kosovo was viewed as one of the places where statebuilding could have been successful: "We [the international community] had all the ingredients [when entering 1999] high quality civil servants, money and enthusiasm...[but we failed]".⁴⁵ Put differently, expectations were very high at the beginning but soon deteriorated. In addition, Kosovo's case is more problematic since in "some places you have a new state taking over responsibilities of [the] old country, [while] in Kosovo everything is young or new, the state, yes, but Kosovo as a country is incomplete".⁴⁶ In addition, Andreas stated that the international community allowed for the destruction of minority properties and even for killings after 1999, taking an overly lenient attitude towards Albanians to "harass" Serbs:

I remember saying to Thaci that they are 7% and you can look so good. Like you can be like Nelson Mandela "I appease and you are my brothers and that's all". They did not do it. There was so much resentment and bitterness from ethnic cleansing before and [the] old days of repression from Belgrade, that there was no tolerance towards the Serbs. We could have forced our hands on that issue better by having stronger rule of law imposed. In my first half year in 99, every night, every Serb house was on fire. We let [the] minority [down].⁴⁷

However, other interviewees supported the involvement of the international community, claiming that it assisted in a very positive manner.⁴⁸ For instance, Carlo concludes that Kosovo's state building went "relatively well" but that it is now "up to the people" to work on Kosovo's development. He views it relative to time as "it's a very long process, you [locals] cannot lead the country in few days, few years, needs centuries".⁴⁹

In sum, there seem to be a link between personal and organizational views that, depending on the individuals and organization's preferences, may improve or hinder the state building process. But there seem to be a consensus among international officials that supporting the independence of Kosovo creates an easier environment for international organizations on the ground. While some resisted to being labeled as contributing to state building, in practice IOs in their work do indirectly contribute to empowering the state. Thus, most IOs facilitated state

⁴⁴ Andreas

⁴⁵ Andreas

⁴⁶ Eric, p.1

⁴⁷ Andreas

⁴⁸ Kai, p.1

⁴⁹ Carlo, p.13

building in practice, by improving either external or internal legitimacy, even when officially their mandate differed, as most are status neutral. Non-recognizing states though delayed the process of state building in terms of external legitimacy, most notably by blocking the state to become a member of various IOs.

Local Culture and History Hindering State Building

Cultural Dimension

International interviewees identify several challenges on the ground in Kosovo, mainly a shift to materialism and the persistence of clans, family and regional interests over state interests. Other elements specifically mentioned were the high degree of political apathy, clientalism, exchange of favors and fraud. These problems are attributed to the local community due to local culture and history. James for example claimed that there is “a mentality of people doing things only for money”. Part of the problem is hereby that the international community is “paying people for everything”.⁵⁰ On the other hand, Stacey viewed corruption as being part of the local culture, claiming that internationals should not interfere with it as locals themselves should take the responsibility to eradicate it from their culture:

Corruption is an attitude that society has, it comes from what people are prepared to accept in their own society...I don't like it...Lot's of people like it, I think it's up to Kosovo to choose if it wants to keep those things in it's culture.⁵¹

The local community and especially its youth are viewed as experiencing an identity crisis, leading to a lack of collective identity and high presence of individuality: “identity is to see yourself as a whole, people really need to work for Kosovo, not only for themselves”. Individuals who are working only for a better collective future are perceived to have difficulties that result in frustration.⁵² Citizens understand their independence in opposition to Serbia rather than as their own independence as a community, promoting the state. Mathew describes how he views Kosovo Albanian community, which gives the impression of being “independent from Serbia but not [a] young, independent and future strong state of Kosovo and [...] one community [with a] responsibility to move forward”.⁵³ There are also high expectations from the state by the local citizens and a desire to profit from it: “what can I take from Kosovo, what can Kosovo give me?”, instead of a readiness to promote the state through “hard work”. Weak individual initiatives and the abovementioned phenomena are perceived as a lack of appreciation and gratitude for the international community's efforts to create the state: “Now there is a chance to create a state, where two people can live independent from Serbia, what

⁵⁰ James, p.9-10

⁵¹ Stacey, p.12

⁵² James, p.12

⁵³ Mathew, p.7

obviously is the biggest wish, I got that present, incredible, the possibility of creating the new home.”⁵⁴

In addition, most of the interviewees expressed the dominance of materialist, family, clan and regional interests instead of a national consciousness. Family values thus are prioritized over state values. For instance, Rachel criticized that locals involved in court cases of a close or extended family member, despite the conflict of interests, refrain from resigning from the case. According to her, everybody should “take a step further, you need to say, “ok this is my job, this is my family, it’s just different””⁵⁵ Mathew stated that locals still underline that “there is a Gashi family, there is a Berisha family and Krasniqi and Kastrati”.⁵⁶ Stacey mentioned deficiencies in the judicial system from the local culture of delaying case decisions and others pressuring to receive the case decisions by “picking up the phone and saying you really should decide the case”.⁵⁷ This is very prominent as Kosovo is a small country with a very integrated and connected population, which makes it very unpopular among individuals and political parties to take decisions that impact everyone. Stacey is very surprised with how well people are interconnected and the level of knowledge:

They will tell me what religion you are, they would tell me where you’re from, I’ve even had people tell me what your family did in the Second World War. They know all of your family policy, they know exactly what village you’re from, they know everything, that’s amazing. It’s such a small world here... a big village⁵⁸

She also claimed that there are “intentional delays” in working (ie finalising tasks) due to the culture which “you can’t excuse it”.⁵⁹ Moreover, internationals seem to face lots of excuses from local citizens regarding Kosovo’s lack of development such as: “we don’t have visa liberation, we can’t do something”.

James believes that for the locals to take ownership, less international involvement would be required.⁶⁰ Therefore there are also calls to promote an ethical sense of interest and a state identification rather than an ethnic or clan one,⁶¹ since the non-identification with the state hinders state building:

the state is less important than the clan you know, ethnic identity or clan or family or group. And this is the problem, creating this sense of identification with the state, with the civil service, with the structures, authority, respect.⁶²

⁵⁴ Mathew, p.7

⁵⁵ Rachel, p.9

⁵⁶ Mathew, p.7

⁵⁷ Stacey, p.1-2

⁵⁸ Stacey, p.1-2

⁵⁹ Stacey, p.1-2

⁶⁰ James, p.13

⁶¹ Albert, p.5-6

⁶² Ramon, p.15

Changes are not expected to come about in a short period of time since they require unpopular decisions, moving from these negative values to more professional values. But there is skepticism that “they [locals] have probably not the discipline really”.⁶³ Others described the current situation in a more general way as “fear”, “loss of hope” but also “profiteering”.⁶⁴ James thus regards the current dysfunctionality of Kosovo amongst other reasons as beneficial for some groups that create money through it, leading him to conclude that many see change as undesirable:

It’s comfortable, it’s easy, they are making a lot of money from it, for whatever [activities] (...) or making a lot of money from leaving things the way they are and not improving things, you know?⁶⁵

Historical Dimension

Some of the failures of state building are attributed to the historical processes in Kosovo. One of the perceptions is that Kosovo Albanians are not “confident in themselves”. This is viewed as a result of having been “oppressed” for a long period.⁶⁶ In consequence, it is thought that citizens consider the state as “oppressive” due to the long period of subjugation in the former Yugoslavia. Rudolf says that citizens must reverse their perception of the state: “people need to understand that the state gives them liberty and freedom to conduct their activities like in the way they wanted too”.⁶⁷ For the internationals, this indicates that citizens are disconnected from the state.

The lack of democratic identity is perceived to be a result of socialism too. For instance, James explains the lack of functional civil society as based on “socialistic civil society and tradition”, meaning for him the practice of solving issues while being around in cafes. In practice, NGOs, capitalists, academics or government officials solve their issues in cafés if necessary and appropriate. According to him, open discussion is “not freely accepted” in Kosovo and if they evolve, they become very “radical” meaning overly heated. According to him, citizens promoting democracy are lacking. Despite the challenges, he considered this phase not as a problematic one since other states like Germany took very long to build institutions as well. However the size of territory and the scale of war crimes are smaller in Kosovo, as well as the local context of Germany is very different from Kosovo. Drawing a comparison with other difficult European experiences is thus presented as an excuse for the state builders for their lack of progress since each post-war reconstruction seems to experience difficulties. This reasoning may foster inaction to promote state building in positive way by fighting the negative phenomena.

⁶³ Rachel, p.9

⁶⁴ James, p.9-10

⁶⁵ Stacey, p.7

⁶⁶ Stacey, p.3

⁶⁷ Rudolf, p.3

Another encumbering element of the legacy of Communism seems to be the amount of staff in various sectors. Stacey for example laments that “[t]here’s a lot of unnecessary staff [which is a] legacy of communism because everybody needed a job, so we have to create stuff to do, in order to give people jobs”. She points out that these characteristics not only limit her everyday work but also raise questions about how much the international community can interfere to make changes. While she would like to eliminate unnecessary bureaucracy she fears that “the local community comes back and says, “hey this is who we are!”” According to her, the international community should have been more proactive in fighting these legacies of communism. Despite her skeptical view, she still understands that the international community turned a blind eye, as international policies require local approval: “I can remain silent, I mean you need people who agree, you need the local community to agree, else there is no point”.⁶⁸ The legitimacy of assisting and occupying forces is usually questioned except for UNMIK and KFOR at the aftermath of intervention. William suggests that the former Yugoslavian regime lacked legitimacy but that it was replaced by an “international regime that had even less legitimacy”.⁶⁹ Thus international community ignores issues of inefficiency in order to maintain local support and legitimacy for the case of lengthy involvement. Some interviewees even described the statebuilder’s legitimacy as non-existent. However, consenting to various local inefficiencies to maintain short-term legitimacy damaged the long-term legitimacy as the positive perception of international community by the local actors and population decreased. This will be shown in the following through life stories, which question the real intentions of international actors in the socio-cultural, professional and economic domain.

Education as Capacity Building

International actors emphasize the significance of education in a much-limited sense than the local community, namely in terms of capacity building. The latter is understood as “sitting side by side with a counterpart, both doing their [same] job” for a short or medium term period. Stacey viewed it as “invaluable”, stating that it really worked” when the point was reached that local employees needed no further assistance from the international community. However, after ten years, capacity building is also perceived as “interfering” and “enough” as the local community now wants “to stand on its own [feet]”.⁷⁰ Furthermore, it is held that there is now a high number of qualified and educated Kosovo Albanians. Rudolf stated that Kosovo has enough educated people since many people attend universities mainly because they cannot find a job. Rudolf regularly encountered well-educated people in his daily life: “when I walk around Pristina, I never have any trouble talking to people, either they speak

⁶⁸ Stacey, p.7

⁶⁹ William, p.1

⁷⁰ Stacey, p.7

English or German or something in between but there is such a large potential”.⁷¹ However Stacy held that the educated individuals she knows got there by their own efforts, not state efforts, as many of those she met overseas.⁷²

Other international officials are less positive on developments in education. For instance, Stacey evaluated that she “would like to have seen education prioritized more”.⁷³ She claimed that the backwardness in the education system stem from similar challenges as in state building as everything had “to be built from scratch”.⁷⁴ The education gap is viewed to be caused also by the “inferior education” given to Kosovo Albanians compared to the rest of the population during [the] Yugoslavian period.⁷⁵ In addition, Ramon pointed out to the lack of quality in private universities, stressing that investment in education would be important for long-term development. Ramon says, the international community aims to produce “a better quality of politicians” which may replace the old Albanian clan structures.⁷⁶ Similarly, James points out the relevance of long interventions to address the generational gaps and built new quality generations.⁷⁷ To conclude, education is not a central part of the international community’s agenda, neither do international officials seem too concerned about the education on the ground. Instead, concerns are expressed more in terms of capacity building and the education of future political elites.

The Local Priorities: Critiques on Strategy

Post War Disillusions: The Lack of Appreciation for Freedom and the State

Life stories point out the general local viewpoints. In fact, citizens are *disillusioned* with the current state of affairs in Kosovo. They believed after the war that the potential for positive change was very high. As Artan states, people had a lot of “*enthusiasm* [and therefore] we could have done something that others couldn’t”. Artan’s life story shows the viewpoints held by those who display a deep personal commitment to state building in Kosovo. However a nostalgia for Albania and a hope for an accession to Albania seems to be present which has been traced as well in the nation building chapter. To this phenomena less attention is given due to the scope of the chapter pertaining Kosovo’s rather than Albania’s state building. His close and extended family was persecuted during both world wars and afterwards, while he himself was an Albanian student and political activist and held as a prisoner over several

⁷¹ Rudolf, p.8

⁷² Stacey, p.3

⁷³ Stacey, p.4

⁷⁴ Eric, p.1

⁷⁵ Stacey, p.3

⁷⁶ Ramon, p.14

⁷⁷ James, p.7

years during the Yugoslavian period. He became a politician and military commander in the 1990s. From his perspective on politics after the war, it appears that

we are eating up our state before we've even created it in every aspect: economically, institutionally and even morally. Even the *enthusiasm* that our people had about the possibility of creating a new state which is a very important prerequisite [for state building].⁷⁸

The state has been created despite some high-level politicians not anticipating it: "Am I dreaming? Is this possible?" Thus the resulted state building of Kosovo seems to have caught in surprise the local politicians since they did not expect it. Artan says that since the state's creation, questions have been raised about whether the *sacrifices of the martyrs* have been in vein due to the non-functionality of the state, and if the current outcome would have been accepted by the martyrs:

If my friends that fell in the war for freedom saw what has become of this [state], I'm sure they would say "We are happy to die" but then if they saw the theft, the misuse of everything, it would poison them.⁷⁹

Similarly, Edon concludes that the generational sacrifices and "humiliations, insults, tortures in 1878, 1912, 1920, 1945, all the way to the period of Rankovic and Milosevic" do not merit the current political developments such as the uncompleted independence and corruption.⁸⁰

Artan based on his life experiences laments that the existing state is further away from the expected *European model*. Although his experience abroad was short in time, he measures the current state in terms of what locals actors could have created if a European model had been followed, finding that "[i]t would be on a different level [with] different morals, different dedication". He is very disappointed with the lack of dedication to statebuilding and the low willingness to contribute to it: "I suffer why aren't we working on that at least". We could do even more, because in the Netherlands people are not ready to make sacrifices for their country like people here, although this is diminishing quickly".⁸¹

Regarding the role of the international community, some locals view it as beneficial for the purposes of military intervention but much less for reconstruction purposes. Artan for instance alleged that they cooperate only with servile people, who are being manipulated and obey solely to remain in power. In his view, these local or international "spoilers" endanger the state building process. Thus some parts of the local community become more critical towards international actors due to their perception that they maintain "*spoilers*" in power. Artan described this process as he had experienced it in his political everyday life, with spoilers telling him that

⁷⁸ Artan, p.17-18

⁷⁹ Artan, p.17-18

⁸⁰ Edon, p.10, his life story is explained in depth in the following section.

⁸¹ Artan, p.17-18

we know this is wrong, but there is no sense [to change it]”. They are internationals and whatever they say we do, and I think that the syndrome of adapting to the international stance, often by simplifying the internal stance in various forms, presenting it as “this is what Washington thinks”, “this is what London thinks”, “this is what Brussels thinks” etc. is maybe more influential. A conviction has been created that if someone shows and gives in for everything then it is easier for them to have a career in politics.

On the other hand, if somebody opposes, contests, struggles, only “with arguments” “it gives you the impression that they are excessive, rigid”. Artan claims that some internationals are “corrupted people” and “manipulators” that found their local partners in Kosovo. This resonates with critical theorists that are sceptical of a general dichotomy between local and international actors as both sides interact and even come together when motives and needs are shared. The resulting “mixed” group of international and local actors hold agency for pursuing their own preferences, further widening the gap between citizens and the state. Artan pointed out that they found “a very fitting playing field” in the sense of “a lack of state and democratic control”. This is seen to lead to a further deterioration of state building.

In fact, state builders depend on local partners but negative unintended consequences may occur when local actors become state building “spoilers”, who prefer or threaten to fight rather than compromise (Barnett & Zürcher, 2009). Except spoilers and accommodators, another category is devised, state building “*stretchers*” to describe the groups that accommodate to the international policies to continue to remain in power, by making non-credible threats targeted toward locals or internationals as shown above by Artan’s life story. The threats are not credible since as the groups are mildly powerful as their capabilities and resources are limited, like former KLA group, compared to the spoilers are who are very powerful groups, like Taliban. Despite being mildly powerful, the international community accepts the threats at the expense of the pressing local population needs. Among potential reasons of the international community for cooperating with stretchers seem to be the light footprint approach, maintenance of regional security, and that the future agreements are more easily negotiated with the adversaries. The continuance of cooperation seems to be ensured through pressuring them with stretchers current and/or criminal past. The *unintended consequences* are that state building “elevates elites and institutions over societies and everyday life”, while rendering questions of social justice absent (Richmond, 2009a, p. 586). Therefore it is important to recognize that “supporting the development of a civic culture of democracy, rule of law, and tolerant pluralism, statebuilders can at least attenuate the negative side effects of [statebuilding]” (Narten, 2009, p. 262). Moving beyond this argument by shifting the focus to the social fabric, unintended consequences could be decreased.

Moreover, Arian viewed the post war period as a lost chance for Kosovo Albanians. His life story shows a commitment from the beginning to the nation and the state. He migrated during 1990s and applied for asylum in Europe, where he then initially worked as a construction

worker, a work he always saw as a means to save money for education. For couple of years he remained in construction work, went to the university and supported family members at home. When the war started, he lost a close family member, which strengthened his commitment to Kosovo even more. After the war, he started to work at the university and for a short period at the government of Kosovo, trying to contribute to state building. Then, however, he was sacked, in his view for political purposes, prompting a return as a university professor to a renowned university in Europe, where he still remains.

Arian observed a *lack of appreciation for the state, freedom and opportunity* among the local actors and the population. His view is informed by his experience working with what he regards as an irresponsible government. He describes the contrast of experiences in Kosovo before and after the war. During the Serbian occupation, he described how he was assaulted, robbed, and humiliated by the Serbian police when he travelled back to Kosovo, whereas today he does not suffer physical attacks from Kosovo police. He travels “freely and without fear”. He therefore proclaims that “we have to build our own country” as one should not take for granted today’s *freedom*.⁸²

Arian regarded today’s freedom as “lucky” since *geopolitics* was on the Kosovo Albanian’s side. In fact, he argues that Albanians were dealing with an “unequal opponent”. As the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo took place, “the whole world rose up” for a very small country whereas in other countries like Syria, interventions to begin took a long time despite the humanitarian costs.⁸³ On this basis he argued that appreciation for the state should have been higher since the international community “trod over all the international conventions and intervened and we really should have been more caring for ourselves”. In addition, a high per capita amount of money was invested in Kosovo through aid and credit. Kosovo Albanians should have made the best but missed the chance. They “didn’t make the best of this”.⁸⁴

In addition, Skender⁸⁵ points out that historically Kosovo Albanians lived, willingly or unwillingly, in different government systems. A *regime change* took place between the “ultra-socialist system” during the Yugoslav period and the “extreme democratic system” after the war. On a critical note, Yugoslavia is historically not regarded as ultra Communist but quite moderate in this sense. It is interesting to note that he regarded both forms of government as “extreme”. He recognizes that shifting from one system to the other may pose difficulties,⁸⁶

⁸² This resonates to Galtung’s peace theory, where negative peace is achieved in *security* terms, freedom from direct violence. However exceptions to freedom of movement are present when traveling to the Northern Kosovo, where Albanians generally refrain to travel due to potential Serbian attacks. Serbs are as well reluctant to travel outside the Northern Kosovo or their enclaves. See peacebuilding chapter for more information.

⁸³ The interventions had not begun when the interview was taken.

⁸⁴ Arian, p.18

⁸⁵ His life story is described in the education section since his life story is more salient for that section.

⁸⁶ Skender, p.6

but he views as illegitimate the *destruction* of socialist property and other important sites after the war in “the name of new system, democracy”. The latter refers to individuals destroying different communist building, who argue that since democracy won these building are no longer necessary and accepted. According to him, this destructive pattern will provoke further harmful behavior by successive regimes. He explained that

whomever came to power destroyed the prior system. Okay, it can be that the system or the governing is not good but that doesn’t mean the successor has to destroy all what was built before, because if we do that, we give example to our successors when they come to say this is nothing, destroy it. In the traditional nations, things with traditions are saved with carefulness and jealousy because it is heritage.⁸⁷

Lastly, visionaries of state and nation existed even at the beginning of 20th century, although mainly for a “greater Albanian” nation. Due to the cultural heritage, it would have been important to consider their visions as well, which were also partly created by the large diaspora population. For instance, Sami Frasheri wrote a book *Albania - What it was, what it is, and what it will become*. However, Skender, a politician, is skeptical and wonders how is it possible that 100 years ago excellent visionaries existed while nowadays they cannot be found among locals or the diaspora. He says “Albanians had the most intelligent people for their country [then] as compared to 100 years later [now]”.⁸⁸

However, Albin Kurti from the “Self-Determination” Party had a very clear vision of an ideal state of Kosovo. According to him, his party promotes Kosovo's freedom as the population is currently subject to external influences. It was the international influence, which presumably returned Serbia to the negotiation table to find a lasting solution for Kosovo even though independence had already been declared and the tensions with the Kosovo Serbian community could have been resolved without Serbia. As the international community returned Serbia to play a part in Kosovo’s political process, it thus undermined its independence.⁸⁹ He hopes to return Kosovo to a “developmental state”⁹⁰, thus changing the governance system. This vision attempts to connect in an organic way the *developmental* state with a state of *justice* and a *social* state.⁹¹ It would prioritize production over finances, trade and services, even though this does not imply that the last three branches of the economy would be neglected. A social state would seek to realize as much as possible the idea of equality. The state of justice would be enabled through a fair legal system, meaning that *courts* would offer impartial justice to the citizen and fight corruption, while the *rights* of citizens would also help to maintain the fair system. This three-pronged vision has in Albin Kurt’s view the potential to bring about

⁸⁷ Skender, p.7

⁸⁸ Skender, p.6

⁸⁹ Albin Kurti, p.20

⁹⁰ He means development as generally working for the state, thus his notion differs from the development notion in the literature.

⁹¹ Albin Kurti, p.11

the “third” Republic of Kosova and real independence from the international and Serbian influence.⁹² He notes that even highly developed countries such as France went through similar evolutions, having had five republics. He seeks its realization despite being disillusioned with the resulted state of Kosovo, as he believes that there is a high likelihood to establish the third Republic in Kosovo.⁹³ This state vision represents one that is based on social justice.

In addition, Skender points out that a nation needs three types of citizens, respectively fighters, philosophers and economists since all will “sacrifice or keep a nation alive”.⁹⁴ These are portrayed as lacking in the post war period. On a critical note, some citizens may choose to sacrifice for the nation whereas others not. The citizens that do not sacrifice may prefer an alternative, like maintain the old regime or a semi autonomy rather than fighting for keeping the nation alive. Even though the international officials claimed that a state building vision lacked, the section highlighted some negative processes occurring in the post war period while forming the state but also that some citizens had a general vision of the state. The following section explains the main significant elements for the promotion of state building as perceived by the local actors.

The Social Fabric

The social fabric and society seems to be vital for local actors, similar to the arguments of the international actors. Vera suggests to Kosovo Albanians to turn inwards for reflection and self-assessment and give up on the habit of blaming others such as Serbs, EULEX, and UNMIK. She calls for *turning the focus towards the local* deficiencies in order to “return to ourselves, work with ourselves”. While she acknowledged that this is a difficult process due to the current value system, she expects a “catharsis” as “things will come into their place theoretically, but it needs time.” She expressed optimism “since we do not have where else to go. People will grow tired of this chaos”.⁹⁵ This positive development may result from changing the social fabric, rolling back the negative social practices that have emerged after the war including excessive materialism, intolerance, unprofessionalism and arrogance. Instead, she hopes for the reemergence of positive social values that held society together before war such as solidarity, tolerance, family and professionalism.

Liberal state building literature deals mainly with improving the legislative framework to fight unprofessionalism, corruption and nepotism. Fukuyama proposes for instance to strengthen the state by improving transparency and promoting anti-corruption initiatives and

⁹² Albin Kurti explains that the first republic was established with the first declaration of independence on 2 July 1990 while the second one was created on 17 February 2008 with the second declaration of independence.

⁹³ Albin Kurti, p.11-12

⁹⁴ Skender, p.1-2

⁹⁵ Vera, p.19

rule of law (Fukuyama, 2005, p. 9). On the other spectrum, critical theorist such as Lemay-Hébert attach the presence of this phenomena to the arrival of international actors (Lemay-Hébert, 2011). Negative side effects arise since the end goals of state building, democracy and political autonomy, are not taken into account during the process itself. The perceptions revealed by the life stories suggests that this type of behavior became more prominent after the war due to the drastic social changes caused by the arrival of groups with excessive resources. As internationals and some locals benefitted from this situation, gradually more importance was attached to material values (despite the large gap between the rich and the poor) rather than to family, solidarity or professionalism. Nevertheless, local individuals work towards breaking this pattern in everyday life. Among the most important domains are education, social justice and equality. This resonates with arguments provided by “local turn” scholars which argue that matters of social justice play a big stake in these processes (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 780). As seen, Albin Kurti introduced the developmental state concept while others like Rron and Genc seek to provide an example of professionalism. Various life stories in the sections below point to reviving the societal fabric and basic state functions on which local efforts could focus, such as education and health.

The Economic Dimension: Rising Materialism and Unprofessionalism

Some accounts portray the after-war period as a time of extreme change. Rron explains the fast shift in moral, ethical and social norms as follows:

You say something [good] to them and then, behind your back, they say, ‘he is a fool’... [O]nce a person was appreciated by what they had in their brains and their hearts, now a person is appreciated by the *money* in his pocket or by what kind of car he has. You have the *jeep*, you are a king. They don’t look anymore at what kind of person he is, if he has a good heart.⁹⁶

The conclusion to be drawn from these views is that in everyday life in Kosovo, there are many *competitive persons and capital maximizers* who pursue profit not only through legal but also through corruptive means.

Values of collectivity and solidarity were weakened while materialism became more prevalent. Genc, born in Kosovo, completed his studies (including a doctorate) in the West and returned before the war to assist the Albanian cause. He worked on reconciliation between Albanians, hosted Albanians and Serbs during the last war, and is now committed to fighting negative trends in Kosovo’s society. More concretely, he promotes *spiritual reconciliation* among Albanians as the post-war period proved to be very difficult, referring to cultural and economic unrest rather than direct violence. He underlines that material questions became prominent in different social strata after the war: “Who is *earning more*? Who is *working more*? Who is having more *power* through his *capital*, through the *parties*?” In his view, Al-

⁹⁶ Rron, p.2

banian clans are the same as the political parties. He explains the barriers created by clans that turned into political parties: “If you don’t belong to my clan, then you are not anything to me, you don’t belong to my party, then you are not related to me”. However, he still hopes that individuals will return to the values and virtues as only they will “keep us alive [which] is not only to be physically alive”.⁹⁷ Genc concludes that

all this capital and all this agony [after the war] materialized us excessively. It made people return promptly to *egoism, egocentrism, careerism*, and we forgot that *fraternized and together*, we have confronted everything [before the war]

The modern individual is portrayed as greedy and unfulfilled since “even if you give everything, it looks [to the greedy men] little”. However, Genc himself claimed to be committed to returning to older more social collective values: “I live for an ideal, I live for an ideal that my population slowly gets back to ideas and ideals”.⁹⁸ On a critical note, some social practices before the war can be considered nowadays not progressive from Western perspective (ie women rights, children rights and others).

In addition, Artan, a politician, pointed out that Kosovo Albanians have always been open, hard-working and helpful financially and morally. But after the war, citizens’ *support for in Kosovo institutions and trust diminished*. For instance, members of the diaspora are not any more likely to contribute in financial terms which was markedly different before the war:

If Kosovo would need a fund for doctors, our people were ready to sell everything just to make that happen. We have disappointed our people. We have created the impression that we worry more about *ourselves* than them because we *deceive* them whenever we can. We *damage* their assets. We play *games* with their land.⁹⁹

Nevertheless, there are viable solutions as Albin Kurti points out. For instance, the “Self-Determination” Party recently shifted its political focus from international accountability to socio-economic dimensions of post-war reconstruction. That is their political agenda is being accentuated less from the political systems of governance, international administration, nationalism and critique of unaccountability.¹⁰⁰ In this context, Albin Kurti points out the increased inequality and the disconnect between the *rich and the poor* in Kosovo who might “speak in Albanian to each other but they do not mutually agree”, thus creating “two parallel worlds”. He claims that even political or moral thoughts are likely to differ between different economic classes. Money, so he alleges, conditions their thinking. He further claims that the international’s *neoliberal privatization* strategies contributed to widening the gap between the

⁹⁷ Genc, p.14

⁹⁸ Genc, p.13-14

⁹⁹ Artan, p.17-18

¹⁰⁰ Albin Kurti, p.10-11

rich and the poor.¹⁰¹ They are deepening their focus on the socio-economic dimension of the state policies and criticizing their opponents. In economic terms, he suggests a *developmental state* as explained in the section above.¹⁰² His Party's seeks to promote his economic development strategy through actions such as returning protest and demonstration within the Assembly. Initially extra-parliamentary opposition, he claims that they did not enter the parliament to "show off" but to promote their ideas and to confront "the regime" rather than "accommodate" as opposition. The aim is to use the "struggle and face" concept as a manifest, meaning confrontation, political program and governance alternative. They managed to enter the Parliament as the third political party. They are currently the most active opposition party calling for developmental economic programs. Shkodran, a human rights activist says that this political party continues to face resistance from both the government and the international community, which try to cause problems to the Party and blame it.¹⁰³

The Social/Cultural Dimension: Shifting Away From Individuality to Collectivity, Professionalism and Knowledge

Everyday peace theory emphasizes negotiation and mediation in the local context instead of single ideas (communitarian or cosmopolitan) (Richmond, 2010, p. 688). It calls for the recognition of the processes that will be mentioned below as everyday dynamics emerge "from the needs of communities and citizens in *subsistence and customary settings, of tradition, history and non-liberal identities*, of customary law, hereditary and tribal institutions, different notions about the use of *ownership of land and property, of the role of the state, market or community/collective* in providing services and so forth" (Richmond, 2010, p. 890). In the case of Kosovo, the inclusion of the revealed cultural and social practices of collectivity, family, solidarity, tolerance, respect, professionalism and knowledge could substantiate the general propositions advanced in the everyday framework as developed by critical theorists.

The *family* nucleus is argued to be under threat due to economic poverty, media and politics. Mira, an NGO employee, says that she lacks a normal life as a result of the "propaganda", as she labels, in the media and in politics. This is despite the fact of having accomplished in her life what she wished for such as creating a family, educating herself and her children, acquiring a job, and buying a home in Northern Kosovo.¹⁰⁴ In her everyday life, she developed specific strategies to protect her family: "We never talk about politics at our home, never, never, never... we do not watch the news actually... because you will always be in stress because you do not hear anything good". According to her, this helps her family to remain "normal"

¹⁰¹ Albin Kurti, p.9-10

¹⁰² Albin Kurti, p.20

¹⁰³ Shkodran, p.19-20

¹⁰⁴ Mira, p.1

when compared to other friends' children who watch news with their families.¹⁰⁵ Her "normality" amounts to not becoming "super nationalist" in Northern Kosovo.

In addition, individuality seems to prevail over collective values. Skender who traveled, lived and met various people around the world believes that individual interests divide humanity. However, he hopes that people will return to altruism.¹⁰⁶ On the other hand, Rron labels the turn to individuality as "backwards" since his family became fragmented, self-interested and less related as compared to the pre-war period. Both sides of family seem to lack the time to meet.

Nevertheless, in everyday life, some individuals still promote *family and professional values* since the family is perceived to be a "moral institution",¹⁰⁷ enabling the transfer of values from one to another generation. For instance, the main values transferred from Vera's grandmother are "do not lie, do not steal, do not spread words, do not mind the others, mind your business, work hard, be honest". Children's like Vera, who grew up during the Yugoslav time learned how to work, travel and learn foreign languages mostly from their grandparents as the parents were frequently working. Grandparents thus became the role models for many children.¹⁰⁸ Other interviewees focus more on professionalism. For instance, Edon intentionally delayed his PhD graduation for two years in order to have his title represent accurately the findings. He added two chapters that prolonged his graduation despite that the supervisor did not consider them necessary. He prioritized professionalism and personal values over corruptive, negligent and unprofessional practices.¹⁰⁹ His life story during the pre-war period suggests that professional and *altruistic* values may have been more dominant than corruption. He worked for Mother Teresa Association, a medication depot where a high amount of money was present. He said that he was "*happy*" to be "able to help someone."¹¹⁰ However, he does raise concerns over the misuse of funds by the people in charge.

The concept of *individualism* is criticized by some interviewees since individuals are conditioned by their political, social and economic background. Ylber for instance considers himself above all as an individual belonging to collectivity. Individualism is thus "a kind of *naivety*" as individuals are restricted by the circumstances they live in. Accordingly, *free will* is limited as these circumstances may change:

It's constant that I was born here [Prishtina], constant is that I had two parents, both Albanian. Constant is that both parents are engineers. I also was oriented towards mathematics. These all are things that conditioned me. At the end, it doesn't remain much for free will, you know when you see all of

¹⁰⁵ Mira, p.2

¹⁰⁶ Skender, p.6

¹⁰⁷ Skender, p.4

¹⁰⁸ Vera, p.20

¹⁰⁹ Edon, p.15

¹¹⁰ Edon, p.16

these things. I am born in Prishtine, lived the childhood in "Aktash"... these are the things that have conditioned me.¹¹¹

He claimed that there is a deep mistrust among the masses but also in the promotion of specific leaders by both local and international actors. But he believes on *change* through the masses and social dynamics rather than instigated by specific individuals.¹¹² For Eremal, who pursued a career as a political advisor throughout his life, the restoration of social and moral values seems very significant. He hopes that the state improves the functionality of the legal system, and secondly that the state uses the *individuals*, especially successful Albanian *diaspora* to promote state building.¹¹³ Another aspect of social and cultural changes after the war as highlighted by Genc is the acceleration of what becomes "superficial" *communication*. Based on his life experience, he wishes citizens to return to "inter-human, interpersonal, inter-sex, original communication" in order to promote "coexistence and cooperation".

Everyday socio-cultural clashes occur with *international officials* working on the ground. For instance, Rron returned immediately for the war in Kosovo, and shortly after the war to Pristina after living in the diaspora for eight years as a refugee, where he managed to receive a Bachelor degree. In the aftermath of war, one of the initiatives he took was to clean the walls of racist Serbian graffiti in Pristina. He explains:

I made people clean the Cyrillic letters [with racist messages] on the walls all around Pristina. I also started to clean them by myself, and once I remember some British guy saw me and thought I wanted to break into a shop, and I told him that I was cleaning the letter because you don't understand them anyways [and contained racist messages]. All this was unforgettable

This incident resulted in a heated debate between the two where the international official understood neither the necessity of erasing the graffiti nor the implications of the war context. Afterwards Rron felt the need to return to Western Europe. This example might hint the *disconnect between local citizens and international officials*, which may be caused by the international officials ignorance toward local *history and language* that may result in an alienation of locals by the internationals. In this case, the lack of knowledge of the context of war in Kosovo is striking as the incident occurred in the immediate aftermath of war.¹¹⁴ This resonates with arguments presented by Lemay-Hébert, a critical theorist, about the "bifurcation" of local and the international worlds as explained in the theory section.

Local interviewees raise concerns also about the efficiency of the UN's heterogeneous staff policy. Skender points out that each administrator had a different approach to governing the various municipalities in Kosovo, all culturally distinct from the Albanian one. For example

¹¹¹ Ylber, p.17

¹¹² Ylber, p.18

¹¹³ Eremal, p.22-23

¹¹⁴ Rron, p.14-15

in [a town in Kosovo] we had an administrator from Japan and the examples that he took, he took them from his country. While in Prizren there was an Indian who made a regulation for the people who beat animals to be punished with [a fee of] 1000 EUR.¹¹⁵

As the poverty level in Kosovo was and remains high, animals and more specifically street dogs were uncontrollable after the war. In fact, several children were killed by street dogs until as late as the end of 2014 (Index, 2014). The punishment thus appears disproportionate to the citizens and inadequate in local circumstances. Different UN governing styles like these deepened alienation felt by locals of the international community as they felt not taken seriously in their economic situation, history, or their social and cultural norms.

Other stories confirm the general lack of cultural values in post war period. For instance, Genc based on his embodied life experiences in Kosovo views the current spiritual and *cultural* life as “very poor” as there were more meetings when we were under the Serbs.¹¹⁶ Similarly, Shkelqim says *public* and *private* social life is poorly developed as well.¹¹⁷ Similarly, Dardan believes that “no values are being respected and cultivated. We had tolerance as a nation [towards others but also between themselves] and that didn’t come to express itself [after the war]”.¹¹⁸

To conclude, hopes to return to ideals and values based on collectivity, humanity and solidarity are present in Kosovo, and so are local hopes to decrease the levels of individualism and materialism. Locals feel that alterations to the social fabric need be introduced, for instance through the education system, to create a *robust* society with norms. In addition, international officials are alleged of neglecting local citizens due to their lack of social, cultural and historical knowledge. As a result, the divide between local population and the international community gradually increased.

The Religious Dimension: A Reaction toward International and Local Impositions

As already outlined, the divide between the state and its citizens increased in the post-war period. Many perceive that institutions are governed by state building “stretchers” who are supported and maintained in power by the international community. The combination of low trust of citizens in institutions, high poverty rates, inequality and the rising significance of materialism and individualism in the post-war society facilitated the creation of religious groups who some regard as responsible and honest in comparison to the political class. They consequently earned the trust of a part of the population. This further deepened the differences in Kosovo Albanian society and resulted in long-term challenges including the radicali-

¹¹⁵ Skender, p.8

¹¹⁶ Genc, p.14

¹¹⁷ Shkelqim, p.14

¹¹⁸ Dardan, p.3

zation of some citizens. Around 300 Kosovo Albanians have joined the fight of ISIS in Syria and Iraq (Rexhepi, 2015). Critical theories treat religious components only insofar as they are part of peace building. They argue that religious organizations have been ignored rather than considered as an “alternative basis for peace and order” (Richmond, 2014b, p. 4). Richmond notes that Karzai argued that in the case of Afghanistan, liberal democracy might be achieved only if it respects local religion as well as identity, tradition and society. The example of Kosovo resonates with these ideas. It shows that religious organizations have been ignored but also that they are created against the background of social and/or cultural backlashes from local actors. From the perspective of these religious groups, these are caused by newly introduced cultures and failed institutional state building. The movements presented themselves as more legitimate than the local government or international authority and as aligned with the local needs and context. Shkelqim, a retiree from education sector, following closely the religious developments in his home village and in Pristina, views that while Sunni and Shia groups existed before the war, Muslims of Wahhabi denomination appeared only after the war. This sect is presumed to have arrived through Middle Eastern humanitarian organizations. Shkelqim saw the means these organizations used to approach citizens. He said that they constructed religious buildings, provided aid and money, but also food to the people in villages and cities.¹¹⁹ In times of political and economic insecurity, the religious organizations offer a spiritual alternative, but do not necessarily reflect democratic values. The case of Kosovo is special in the sense that religious radicalization of Kosovo Albanians is something recent as families are mostly not practicing Muslims contrary for instance to Bosnians whose religious affiliations are stronger. 90 percent of the population is Muslim, the rest are mostly Catholics and Orthodox (Carpenter, 2002).

The following section elaborates on the interrelation between three elements, namely social/national identity, economy and religion. It presents the life story of Ben which exemplifies the religious challenges in the post-war period which are closely tied to cultural and economic challenges. Beni is a Kosovo Albanian born to a middle class, non-religious family. He was educated in the former Yugoslavian system in various Republics, where he later also worked. He fought in all Yugoslav wars in the 1990s, firstly for Croats, then Bosnians and lastly for Albanians because he was trained as a soldier in the FRY army. After the war, he decided to return to Kosovo after the war to assist in post-war reconstruction. Soon after, he focused on defending cultural values, meaning Islam, because of the perceived lack of respect towards Islam as a religion and the threat posed to it by international and local actors. He established a movement to protect the religious rights of the local community believing on Islam in the face of perceived economic and cultural injustices. More concretely, as will be

¹¹⁹ Shkelqim, 20-23

shown in this section through Beni's life story, the Islamic movement "Join" aims to protect social and economic rights. Beni appeared confident that through the movement the socio-economic rights will "undoubtedly be accomplished". The movement has a *social* dimension that includes religious aspects presumably reflecting the national identity, and an *economic* dimension, which refers to delivering services to people in need. Interestingly, he uses the term "economic rights" but in practice only states provide rights to citizens, not social movements.

Generally, their main *aim* is to "to influence people's awareness [and] to *offer young people an opportunity*" to achieve their social and economic ambitions within the movement. While Beni insists that it does not actively *recruit*, he later on states that their recruitment efforts are limited due to the possibility of prospective members being attacked by communities and/or national and international actors: "We don't recruit a lot [mainly since] people get attacked very quickly". They usually target young men. The norm is for the *leader* of the movement "to be the oldest one and all the others [to] be younger, especially in leading positions". At the time of writing, their priority was on horizontal expansion rather than "participating in elections and winning votes". Thus their main *target* is to engage the *youth* in the movement.

Resistance to the movement by the local and international authorities is expressed mostly through *interrogations and office searches*. Beni argues that the movement is confronted with a constant pressure from Kosovo's Police and EULEX, which interrogated members about their activities and interests, but also about whether Kosovo is "a secular state" or "Europe", alleging members of "radicalism" and of being "fundamentalists" and "Taliban". Eventually, the movement in long term aspires to act as a political party to promote the religious dimension of national identity in the national assembly.

Beni drew lessons from experiencing the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, claiming that "knowing the human horrors, suffering and injustice which I, as a soldier, learned, experienced in wars, the *humanitarian aspect* is above everything else". He participated in an action to free a Muslim city where several workers died. After his unexpected survival, he started working for the Join movement. He expresses that he would still assist non-Muslims due to his humanitarian motivations. While he wants to be "in the service of Islam and in protection of the rights of Muslims", he expects "only challenges and punishment" and no "privileges or benefits". He expects his vision to start materializing only after twenty years, but is certain that "[it] will triumph".¹²⁰

¹²⁰ Beni, p.27

Beni, who was a highly ranked soldier, claims that his personal motivation to promote social and economic equality developed from the corruptive practices he witnessed during the war and from which he presumably refrained due to his religious beliefs:

I could have made millions during the war, like I gave it to others... I mean I have *signed* them, but I have always feared Allah and the Day of Judgment. I don't want to take what doesn't *belong* to me. We don't steal, don't betray, don't deal with tenders, racketeering and blackmailing. We are not *afraid* of the Americans, or the Dutch, or the Arabs, or the Russians or anyone else.

He alludes that these practices have been present in the post-war period as well. Two other life stories of Rron and Niko, who witnessed similar corruption, focus on the improvement of the judicial and parliamentary system, whereas Beni turned to religion to fight these negative practices. Beni believes that the movement can offer economic prospects to the youth and prevent them from engaging in such practices.¹²¹ However, he fails to recognize the legal implications of being complicit in these practices even though he admits to have signed off money for the current billionaire elite in Kosovo. His religious belief seem to fail to prevent wrongdoings and engagements in the negative economic practices, since it seems to allow him on religious grounds to aid others (i.e. sign the cash checks) to acquire funds on unjust or illegal grounds. In other words, it hints that facilitating or providing the means for a wrongdoing, in this case a technical signature, may be religiously right, as long as one is not the recipient of the monetary funds. On a critical note, aiding a financial crime remains a legal wrongdoing and punishable in a democracy if sufficient evidence is available.

For him, the Islamic dimension provides the movement with legitimacy as it corresponds to the local needs that have emerged after the war: "It is based on fair judgment, social and economic equality, justice for everyone without taking into account the [political] functions [and economic status]". This, it is argued, can be achieved only if initiated from the bottom up. Beni's main strategy focuses thus on individual *moral and other justice tools*. He claims that economic equality can more easily be promoted through Islam than other means since its moral code is based on the "principle of sharing" that can benefit humanity:

I have a need for five jeeps, but I would not take them all for myself. Three I would keep for myself but two I would give to you, not to keep for myself five and for you none, and then to say look: how good I am and how strong. Not like that.¹²²

In fact, the movement claims to provide an alternative to a capitalist model that focuses on profit rather than on economic equality among classes or citizens. While claiming to be only local, this Albanian movement also has leaders and followers in Turkey and plans to expand further to Albania, Macedonia and Preshevo as they think that they "have to offer this to Ko-

¹²¹ Beni, p.24-26

¹²² Beni, p.24-26

sovars anywhere they are, as much as we can penetrate”.¹²³ Thus they seem involved in recruitment abroad but not in Kosovo. Whether this possibly international Albanian grassroots movement relates to other global Islamic movements against the West has not yet become clear.

The Cultural/Political Aspect: Shifting from Discrimination, Democracy, and (some) Human Rights to Religious Tolerance

Beni's views also seem to originate from his perceived discrimination of the diaspora. In his opinion, the Albanian diaspora is treated as a “second class” citizen despite their achievements in Europe or other regions. He therefore believed that this movement could provide an alternative to the diaspora as well. Furthermore, he recognized that when a society faces many challenges, citizens are more likely to turn to religion since “people are connected to something supernatural”, meaning people become religious in hard conditions. Other interviewees like Shkelqim, Rron and others also have family discussions about religion. Shkelqim points out that during the Serbian regime, Islam was persecuted, as “they didn't let the religious people work”, making him hide certain practices such as religious fasting.¹²⁴ However, Beni argues that the same practices have continued even after war although in a different shape. He believes that the human rights of the Muslims are being violated, as religious people are discriminated once they have been *recruited* to work for the movement:

I haven been employed here for fourteen years, just because I practice religion publicly and because I identify with it publicly and defend it publicly. They won't let me work. You can imagine how much this has damaged me, personally and my family emotionally and financially.

Therefore he presents several demands by the “Join” movement portrayed as moderate ones. Beni explained that they wish the essentials of Islam to function in Kosovo. For example, they request to allow discussing Islam and its religious learning in school, and to permit wearing the headscarf as a religious practice in public institutions.¹²⁵ Moreover, he fears that new technologies will erase the Albanian and religious identities by relying too much in the mainstream technology, which is why the movement stresses *physical and mental security and empowering the locals* emotionally and in resources, teaching them “not to envy, not to feel inferior, not to be underdeveloped, not to be ignorant, to read and learn and not to wish to live in camps in the West [as] second class citizens”.

In addition, he described Pristina's war *monuments, sculptures, buildings, street names and events* as discriminatory towards the Muslim community. For example, the main boulevard of Pristina is named after Mother Teresa (a famous Catholic humanitarian worker of Albanian

¹²³ Beni, p.24-26

¹²⁴ Shkelqim, p.25-26

¹²⁵ Beni, p.22

origin) and her sculpture together with Skenderbeu's (famous hero of Albanian origin) sculpture are displayed. Beni also assessed the building of the cathedral in the city center of Pristina negatively. According to him, these monuments, sculptures and buildings deny the real identity of Kosovo's society in presenting it as Christian when, in reality, 90 percent of the population are Muslim (although there is no official data of how many individuals among those actively practice religion). According to him, these elements may influence the public image of the state, thus changing it from Muslim to Christian. He says that foreigners who "might not know Kosovo, may think it's Christian". He dislikes also the historical Albanian heroes of Christian belief.¹²⁶

Beni's thinking is shaped by the assumption that the West persists that *democracy* must prevail over other forms of governance which he challenged, believing that it causes discrimination. Following his line of reasoning, freedom of religion seems insufficient to prevent religious discrimination. He is obviously contradictory on the alternatives. He expressed that the Muslim alternative, Sharia law, is not currently held to be an option due to little knowledge: "We don't want a Sharia state, I don't even know it, I'd like it but I'm not yet there".¹²⁷ Later during the interview, he became more frank about Sharia law, acknowledging that the establishment of Sharia was an aim and that "laws are changeable" as they "are made by people". Arguing that the "greater good" may be understood differently within a society. He stated that they cannot impose their ideas as they "cannot say what is best for you", but only "what is best for me". On critical note, they seem to impose ideas since he said "what's best for us" which excludes them/the others. He recognizes that the West considers Sharia inappropriate but he also raises questions why Westerners do not question democracy:

Why don't we say that democracy is dangerous? Communism is dangerous.
[It's because democracy] is not dangerous to them [West]. They say it is not dangerous [but] [t]hey have chosen it themselves.

In his view, Western states seek to assimilate the citizens of Kosovo by imposing their culture on to them. According to Beni, the Netherlands is for example "attempting to import and even finance wrong things" under the name of human rights and freedoms such as the sexual orientation (homosexuality), (legal) cohabitation and women's rights. He considers these issues "more or less disputable".¹²⁸

Another aspect Beni raised is the attitude of some international military personnel in Kosovo towards religion. He had conversations with German and Swedish members of KFOR, where one of the officers told him that "Islam is fundamentalist". Beni then replied: "Don't ever say that word. Not only in Kosovo but even when you go outside of Kosovo, you can't say that

¹²⁶ Beni, p.24

¹²⁷ Beni, p.25

¹²⁸ Beni, p.20-22

either”. In response, they only stared at him, which may have been a denial toward his statement or a reflection act. Contrary to allegations of fundamentalism, Beni regards Islam as very peaceful: “In Islam the best thing is the average. Everything that is excessive is dangerous, is not good. Islam is not about covering my wife and not allowing her to go to school or work or to not have any rights”.¹²⁹ He was also personally attacked on a visit in a European country for sports. Since he is involved in both sports and religion, he received comments in the media by other Muslims and even death threats: “You should be killed, you should not be allowed to work”. Intolerance towards individuals practicing their religion seems to be even higher on the Internet.

Resistance of the movement toward the *state* may increase, as Beni states that he feels under assault from the Kosovo government. However, he believes that resistance towards Islam comes also from the West. Extremist Islam (including Al Qaeda) which nowadays gains ground in the Middle East is, according to him, a product of the West which aims to damage Islam and “indirectly to constrain Islam’s penetration to the West which was advancing in big steps”. He believes that most of the Muslim believers are sincere but that leaders may be “something else”.¹³⁰ The *possibility* of radicalization of the movement after a couple of decades was rejected since “no religion has anything radical within it” referring to Islam, Christianity and Judaism. However, Beni noted that individuals can themselves be “radical, violent, murderous, criminals” regardless of religion, even if religions in themselves are peaceful.¹³¹

Finally, it needs to be considered that concerns are also expressed by the Christian community that some Islamic groups might harm Albanian “harmony” among religions and the population more generally, as shown by Genc’s life story. Even his Muslim colleagues feel threatened by groups that are not members of the formal Islamic community of Kosovo. Religious influences can also be observed in the education system by Shkelqim’s life story. He was contacted by religious organizations to invest in building schools that resulted in newly constructed school in the capital. The religious donators remained in the school and held religious sermons despite the non-religious contractual obligations with Shkelqim on behalf of the Ministry of Education. He rejected cooperating with some of these religious organizations for school donations as they seemed suspicious to him.

Education: A Long-Term Investment for State Building

In contrast to the international organizations officials’ focus on capacity building, the local actors stress the role of education to maintain social cohesion and continuity among the local population. Therefore this section suggests investing in long-term goals by investing on edu-

¹²⁹ Beni, p.27

¹³⁰ Beni, p.28-31

¹³¹ Beni, p.27

cation. Emphasizing education as part of the good social fabric dates back to the legal philosopher, John Fennis and many other individuals. He argues that education is important. He views education as the “real formation” of people about “which are the things that I count most serious for us human creatures” (Finnis, 2011, p. 408). According to him since education lacks in times of war, humans should spend most of the time attributing to education in times of peace. Differently put, education is seen as a basic need, cluster of moral responsibilities. For Fennis, the basic forms of good for humans are vitality of life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experiences, sociability, practical reasonableness and religion (Finnis, 2011). Therefore education is valued in the Western society.

Similarly, local actors stress much more education as one of the basic elements for state and nation building. Skender’s life story is very special. He migrated from a village of Kosovo to Europe with his parents. Since during the war his mainly male family members and others were killed, he returned to provide security to the remaining members of the family. Despite the family tragedy, he believes that changes might occur. He was educated abroad as his family attached great significance to educating their children as much as possible, and he returned to Kosovo where he finalized his PhD after the war. His grandfather, a teacher, once told him: “don’t stay [abroad] for no purpose, do something, learn their language and culture and study there, you can’t spend your life by being a [physical] worker”. He acknowledged that thanks to his grandfather’s advice, he finished a professional school while being abroad before the war. In his conversation with his grandfather, the double function of education becomes clear, namely to educate the population to improve the internal situation but also to promote state building externally. Thus education’s role is viewed as a mean of positive state representation, its promotion and strengthening. In other words, the aim is to achieve the independence for Kosovo Albanians through education:

My son, it is better to be a land-worker with a degree than without a degree and do the same, you are working on your land and a foreign traveler comes, and you sit and talk to him, then after you finish the talk that traveler goes back to his country and says: ‘that nation deserves freedom!’ And if he goes to the mayor and the mayor doesn’t know how to articulate a sentence, the traveler [will] say that they deserve the situation they are [in] because they are not educated.

According to Skender, there are three main pillars of stagnation that require attention to national elements: *education, health and work ethic*. He states it as follows:

I would say that for a democratic society, three things are very important: to have a *quality education* [because] if we have a quality education, we know how to take care of our health and if we have a quality education we know how to work... And the result is there, and all this is very good for our country

Inefficiencies in education result in the emergence of “bubbles”, meaning of isolated social groups.¹³² For instance, Vera’s life story is one of a local Kosovo Albanian woman, educated half of her life abroad in renowned universities, who decided to return to Kosovo to invest herself in civil society and to create better opportunities for future generations. She observed during her five-year work how social groups were gradually being created, not in terms of wealth but education. For instance, within the scope of her NGO work, she interacted every-day with various people around Kosovo and encountered problems in understanding them: “Communication between people, I even today have problems to communicate with the people that are not from Prishtina or not only from Prishtina but that are not of my surrounding”.¹³³ Therefore she suggests investing in education to create educated elites:

“We need to drill hard boards”. We need not only a façade, a cover and then when you penetrate inside you find an incredibly big void. It would be useful to have such people as well, but there should be an *elite with genuine substance*. There is always a group, a core where you could blindly catch a good element. You could have a second circle, but you need to create a good strategy so that you can always have reserves¹³⁴

Her opinion, which resonates with the international perspective as well, could have been influenced by her long education abroad. Furthermore, many members of the NGO sector share the preferences of the international community, being dependent on their donations.

Similarly, Rron’s life story exemplifies individual’s experiences who received higher education in a university abroad, returned to Kosovo to fight with the KLA during the war, and remained afterwards working with their own businesses with temporary stays abroad. He found that the level of the university education is lower in Kosovo, which decreases the cultural progress of Kosovo Albanian society.¹³⁵ Arian similarly emphasized education as a means to promote state building. According to him, to change the current fragile situation, investment in education is a priority as it “creates the basis” and lays a “healthy foundation” for a state¹³⁶ through the investment in human capabilities such as engineers, computer scientists and doctors. In the long term, education may influence voter awareness, demands for accountability and could even achieve specifically the much-needed electoral reform “the way which we [locals] vote will be reformed”.¹³⁷ Currently, citizens by “investing” in education may challenge nepotism, but the latter can be changed also through private market since competition occurs between professional people.¹³⁸ Thus, according to local actors, education has a realistic potential to emancipate society. However, as each society has a level of uneducated peo-

¹³² Vera, p.19

¹³³ Vera, p.19

¹³⁴ Arian, p.19 (emphasis added)

¹³⁵ Rron, p.26

¹³⁶ Arian, p.3

¹³⁷ Arian, p.15-16

¹³⁸ Arian, p.18

ple, a completely educated society with higher university degrees may not be a possibility and neither necessary in practice. Therefore achieving qualitative primary and secondary education may need to become a priority, with at least one well-functioning university since not all members of a society will be highly educated.

Providing education falls into the state's primary responsibilities. The interviewees claimed that professors educated in the former Yugoslavia were better educated and that the students that they taught during the 1990s were also more advanced than today's generations. The retirement of these professors left a vacuum in the education system, a lack of qualified staff. One of them is Shkelqim, who studied in the Yugoslav system and has by now retired.¹³⁹ On the other hand, Rron himself was also a student of the parallel system during the 1990s. He claimed that the Yugoslavian system was better than the current one: "the schools, we started to learn in houses and the quality went down from that time. It remains the same, it is going down since the 90s"¹⁴⁰. In addition, highly qualified individuals still remain part of the diaspora like for instance Arian who is a lecturer in Europe and was himself educated abroad in the Western system. Arian explains that the education system is currently managed by individuals who earned "their doctorates recently", meaning that they are less qualitative degrees. Thus if managers who received an inadequate education are responsible for developing the state's educational policies and for evaluating the new generations, the likelihood is very high that the quality of the education system will decrease further.¹⁴¹

Minority communities also regard education as very significant for state building. For instance, Gjin's life story shows that he has been educated in higher universities in Yugoslavia and after the war in Europe and Asia. He currently owns a private enterprise and contributes to the minority group through organizing and participating actively in political, educational and cultural activities. He also highlighted the importance of education, having taught without monetary compensation after the war: "not as a hobby, as I did it for education since I have taught a lot. I think education constitutes one of the most important foundations of a nation".¹⁴² Nonetheless, he expressed his dissatisfaction with the lack of higher education in the Bosnian language. As a result, his children moved abroad for higher education, which he found to be "a big problem".¹⁴³ As many Bosnians may not have the financial means to send their children abroad, the likelihood of the Bosnian youth in Kosovo remaining without higher university education remains high.

¹³⁹ Arian, p.20

¹⁴⁰ Rron, p.26

¹⁴¹ Arian, p.20

¹⁴² Gjin, p.11

¹⁴³ Gjin, p.11-12

Thus, education seems to have been of high importance for all members of the society regardless of their ethnicity before the war, and the same value is still being attached to education nowadays. Many interviewees were hopeful of future developments on the basis of existing capacities. They hope that the professional and intellectual capacities which are present but presently not used will facilitate the economy, the legal system, urban planning, education and health.¹⁴⁴ Edon, another life story interviewee claims that the consequences of poor education will reflect in 15-20 years, whereas the economic consequences are already evident. Therefore it is imperative to give priority to education.

Education Inefficiencies due to the International Community

Generally, local interviewees and life stories convey the impression that the introduced education policies are experimental without prior knowledge of whether they would work or not. Rather than suitable to the local context, they often display tendencies to forcefully impose the UN administration policies without prior consultations. This section offers a critique consistent with the “local turn” in theory, claiming that the local experiences have been ignored and neglected, and that policies often are unfit to the local contexts, as shown in anti-corruption and capacity building strategies.

The following sections on education challenges for international and local actors draw mainly from Shkelqim’s life story, which shows the relevance of education before and after the war. He himself grew up in a peasant family, but education was appreciated and promoted by his father and other family members. After finalizing high school, he went to Pristina to pursue a university degree, after which he taught in several villages and cities. During the most oppressive times of Serbian occupation in the 1990s, and more specifically from 1991 until 2001, he was the leader of the parallel Albanian educational system. Before and after, he worked as a school inspector. While now retired, he still actively contributes to NGOs helping to maintain Pristina’s urban planning as a city and advises a private high school. His life story shows a continuous dedication and commitment to improving education during all stages of Kosovo’s development, including the Communist period under Tito, the oppression by the Milosevic regime and the after-war period where several educational reforms were introduced.

The UNMIK’s “Experimental” Educational Reform: General Limitations

After a long period of consultation with informed individuals in the education sector, reforms were introduced by UNMIK after the war but were not followed through in terms of implementation. Shkelqim, who has been involved in the reforms personally, states that “in the juridical point of view, it was well done, and the formal side was correct but it was not put into practice”. He also pointed out the limitations of the introduced reforms, which were incoher-

¹⁴⁴ Valon, p.12

ent since their focus was on *specific target group* of pupils and school years instead of targeting more generally all school years and pupils. The Kosovo education system joined the European Bologna system, though without substantive preparation. Shkelqim claimed further that the “teachers reform” was not been finalized but stopped halfway. Some reforms needed to be introduced for pre-school levels, whereas the introduced reforms targeted only older pupils, his conclusion being that “we’re still suffering the consequences of this kind of reforms”. Shkelqim viewed reforms as “experimental” and compares them to another viewed experiment, NATO’s intervention for the first time in history with no troops on the ground, only through air strikes conducted in Kosovo. This is viewed as another experiment in Kosovo. Despite these failures, he hoped for the international community to consider the *lessons learned* in Kosovo’s education reform.

Thereafter, Shkelqim portrayed the education reform and the international-local struggle as a “war experiment”, remarking that UNMIK was disinterested in education from the beginning and not concerned about the “quality of the education, the teachers qualifications or the success of the students”. For instance, physical and mental capacities of teachers are important in order to assess the suitability of persons for the job. Before the war, the parallel Albanian education system, although “only” financed by the diaspora and the people on the ground, had a medical commission, which assessed whether teachers were capable to perform. After the war, this was not taken over by UNMIK.¹⁴⁵ Further limitations are outlined in the following sub-sections.

International Impositions: Tendencies of Imposition

The life story interviews reveal that imposing tendencies were visible in the assumption of international actors that nothing had existed before their arrival and that everything needs to be built anew in education system. For instance, Shkelqim views positively the high efforts of Europeans to integrate the Kosovar system of education into the European structures of education. However the international actors faced difficulties accepting that the education system was present before the war and that they could improve it instead of building it anew. Their main assumption is that the education system needs to be built from scratch. This results in tensions in the cooperation between highly experienced local elites and international actors, which are in fact in charge of educational policies. Shkelqim describes personal confrontations when he sought to protect previous achievements in the sector:

[The UN and the donors] tried to reject everything that happened in the past and to start everything from the base..., we were in conflict with them. But at the end, they agreed that our system of organization was at a very high level, including all the regulations, plans and programs.

¹⁴⁵ Shkelqim, p.9

In other words, the locals had the tendency to ignore the UNMIK regulations. This, on the other hand, created an impression with the UNMIK's chief of the educational department that even in the past regulations had never been applied and that education was indeed in need of substantial reform. Shkelqim recalled his personal conversation with the UNMIK's chief of education department who "said that you had regulations but didn't apply them", which Shkelqim rejects this as "a very naive opinion". He pointed out that the individuals which the international community chose to cooperate were not always well-informed about the education sector and that such wrong assumptions were created due to "misinformation" about the functioning of the educational system in the past. Much later, UNMIK's office began to understand the situation and to become more willing to find local competent people to discuss further action in the education sector. This decision displays tendencies to disregard existent work, presume that there was no existing system and introduce new measures without taking into account the past system. Moreover, there seem to be a preference for the selection of local individuals that are less knowledgeable, more obedient and accommodating rather than more knowledgeable and critical of international policies. This results in tension between local and international actors and finally in a loss of legitimacy on the eyes of the local actors who are knowledgeable in the education sector. Similarly, this reflects disconnect between the two actors as described by Lemay-Herbert in his concept of the "bifurcation" of two worlds, describing the gap which is created upon the arrival of internationals. It can be observed in different "living standards", the creation of a dual economy and the resulted social backlash or "social anomie", which are often the consequences of a prolonged stay. This inherently leads to a legitimacy crisis (Lemay-Hébert, 2011).

Similar processes are identified in the international community's efforts to centralize the education system in the attempt to curb corruption. So far, policies of centralization have been promoted to strengthen supervision and thus to avoid the misuse of funds. The state is highly involved in everyday financial tasks of the schools "including the weekly number of classes for a teacher, the realization of the curriculum and the level of revenues for the teachers". Shkelqim finds the high involvement of the state to be unnecessary since there is enough intellectual staff, which can supervise the director and other managers. Furthermore, there are several guidelines from the Department of Education that can be followed if specific damages occur or if there is a need for new items for everyday school needs. Thus the likelihood of abuse from schools would be low. Most strikingly, Shkelqim based on his education expertise gained during several decades, completely questions whether the aim of the centralization reforms can be achieved, namely curbing corruption, as even in the current centralized system, there are concerns over possible corruption in this tender on the municipal level in

Pristina. There is a doubt that the chief of the municipal department for education has gained a percentage of the amount.¹⁴⁶ This shows that current reforms to curb corruption through centralization may not be efficient since even on the central level corruption may exist. Centralization therefore seems to not lessen the corruption, it also decreases the efficiency of the schools since it unnecessarily slows down processes that require central approval although there are clear guidelines provided already by the Department of Education. Therefore Shkelqim suggests moving towards a decentralization of school budgets, that is providing in practice a financial account to each school.

Regarding capacity building, a large amount of international actors, including NGOs, take the driving seat in capacity building processes due to a lack of local resources in the aftermath of war. This, however, in turn impedes local capacity building since “what little capacity exists is undermined by the presence of foreigners richly endowed with both resources and capabilities” (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 7). Furthermore, the capacity building framework of international administrations does not assume any responsibility (Wilde, 2007, 2010). Both of these observations resonate with the literature in critical approaches. Chandler argues that capacity building approach exists as a means to interfere in the internal affairs of post-conflict countries, that it renders the post conflict states responsible for their own failures and evades the responsibility for the international actors. It focuses on, and promotes non-material development and hence reinforces global inequalities. Chandler further argues that “policy goals are not the right process of governing, as their implicit instrumentality will throw up unintended [negative] results”, thus neither capacity building, or democracy can be goals themselves (Chandler, 2010a). However, there is little doubt that capacity building initiatives have some impact, but that they are “difficult to pin point down and are prone to over or under estimation” (Crudden, 2000, p. 511).

Shkelqim’s life story, by contrast, suggests investing directly in education without intermediaries such as NGOs. The reason behind it is that NGOs are often unauthorized, and even if authorized and of high reputation like international organizations, they can become involved in the abuse of funds through projects that exist technically however offer no practical societal impact in substance. According to this life story, the main aim of NGOs seems to acquire and spend funds rather than produce results on the ground. Thus investing money in capacity building through NGOs seems to not be an appropriate mean to promote state building in Kosovo. He explains that some trainings were implemented through foreign NGOs that “came to train” teachers in Kosovo. Some organizations did “good” trainings but others did “only the formal side of the project”, meaning ticking the box for the activities but in practice not producing quality while acquiring the money. For example, the International Labor Organiza-

¹⁴⁶ Shkelqim, p.6-7

tions (ILO) works on a program combatting forced work in children. However, as Shkelqim points out, “[t]hey are implementing a program for more than five years and they are doing nothing, just spending money, without concrete results”.¹⁴⁷ Shkelqim’s life story and his direct involvement with NGOs in education sector after war illustrates the high skepticism toward capacity building projects and NGOs work, which is viewed as pursuing solely the aim of receiving funding, resulting in a lack of results on the ground, superficial projects and sometimes even the abuse of funds.

Education Inefficiencies due to the Local Community

Negative Political Interferences in Education Quality

A lack of evaluation criteria and intellectual independence are seen to hinder the quality of university education in Kosovo. Several shortcomings are illustrated in the life stories. According to Shkelqim’s life story, the quality of education was higher in the Albanian parallel education system during the Serbian occupation as compared to the post-war period.¹⁴⁸ Other factors contributing to decreased education quality are, as Edon’s life story shows, a lack of intellectual independence, and even negligence and fraud through the existence of fake diplomas. Edon has been educated in the former Yugoslavian system, has taught at the University of Pristina before the expulsion of the Albanian staff at the end of 1980s and continued to teach in the parallel Albanian system thereafter. After the war, he continued teaching at the university where he personally experienced deficiencies while holding also several political posts. As a member of the intellectual class, he expressed dissatisfaction with non-independent academics, arguing that “[t]hey [academics] sold their skin cheap. I don’t mean in the physical selling of the skin but in one form they surrendered in the face of the political changes because they didn’t maintain their identity”. This stems from the assertions that intellectuals after the war provided various diplomas to soldiers, policemen, politicians and other interested individuals. For him, it is not understandable how intellectuals became politicized and how they surrendered in the face of political pressure, since they had also faced challenges while being educated in the former Yugoslavia. As a result, the academics failed to fulfill the demands of science due to their involvement in politics, military, police or other sectors. The earning of scientific titles and professorial advancements are two areas where the corruption in the system becomes most obvious.¹⁴⁹ As a result of the *abuse of power* in the education system through obtaining *fake degrees*, where “even their spouses, bodyguards and drivers obtained PhDs diplomas”, a new political elite is created. This political elite continues to

¹⁴⁷ Shkelqim, p.6-7

¹⁴⁸ Shkelqim, p.13

¹⁴⁹ Edon, p.17-18

damage the higher education since they have more power since they work as a group.¹⁵⁰ He predicted a hyperinflation of diplomas and an adverse effect on the job market due to a lack of planning between the university and job market needs.¹⁵¹ The new elite will continue abusing the power also in other sectors, not only education.

In addition, Shkelqim points out that the criteria's for student evaluation and admissions have decreased because of the recent creation of *many private universities*. However, Rron points out another potential reason for the low student admission criteria which is that the *government intended to decrease the number of unemployed individuals in statistics as students are not counted as unemployed*. This, in turn, allowed the government to be more negligent about the unemployment problem. Rron explains that one of the adverse effects of this policy, as "some years ago, one student used one computer, and now there are seven students using one computer".¹⁵²

Professorial *job admittances and promotions* are also highly politicized. The political influence decreases hereby the education quality when highly qualified professors leave the public university. Kushtrim's life story exemplifies these issues. He was educated in different former Yugoslavian Republics and elected as a high profile official in the former Yugoslavian Republic. After the war, he taught at the University of Pristina, where he also applied for a job promotion, hoping to move to the level of professorship, that he did not however receive. The rejection for career advancement signaled to him that change may be impossible at the public university since he had already been excluded other times due to political interferences and despite having the highest qualifications, including a doctorate, which especially after the war was rare in Kosovo. As a result of these barriers, he resigned from his public university job. He views the rejection positively as he would have not been able to implement his personal progressive ideas that would have not been able to advance among the heavily politicized staff at the public university. He was initially disappointed with the political leaders, Hashim Thaci and Ramush Haradinaj, whom pressured the professors. Later on, his disappointment shifted to an outrage towards the professors who were supposed to be intellectually independent. He furthermore concluded from his own experience that neither the university nor the society was ready for reforms, which led him to establish a private college and to transfer the staff that was already working for him to there.

Despite Kushtrim's initiative, one of the reasons for the decreased education quality seems to be the recent proliferation of *private* universities. This development appears to be in the interest of the political elite for political campaigns as new educational policies license several new private universities. More concretely, these measures are a part of election campaigns in

¹⁵⁰ Edon, p.18-19

¹⁵¹ Edon, p.19

¹⁵² Rron, p.26

cities where the new universities were established.¹⁵³ On the other hand, Shkelqim argues that establishing a university in each city in small Kosovo is unnecessary, as there is already a shortage of qualified staff and quality teaching in the public sector, meaning that private universities will face similar challenges.¹⁵⁴ The private universities might promote localism in different cities and thus undermine the social and cultural harmony in longer term.¹⁵⁵ In addition, Edon claims that private universities produce diplomas without merit as education is being commercialized. In other words, private universities in Kosovo are viewed as places for purchasing academic degrees.¹⁵⁶ Thus these universities could undermine the cultural ties also with the homeland of Albania not only within Kosovo.

Lastly, cooperation with international universities is very important for the reputation of local universities and the improvement of education quality. Cooperation between an international university in Western Europe and the local university, the University of Pristina, appears to be very difficult to be established. Arian, a highly qualified diaspora member has been rejected by the Pristina University (see life story as explained above). However despite the failed attempt, he is still optimistic that the “doors will be re-opened”¹⁵⁷ and he seems adamant to contribute to the development of the state.

The Unwillingness of Kosovo’s Government to Use Knowledge

Some interviewees described the Kosovo government metaphorically as a “puppet” or “marionette” government.¹⁵⁸ The life story of Kastriot seems to show commitment to the new state, nation, professionalism and equality. Kastriot grew up in a wealthy family for Kosovo standards. He studied in former Yugoslavia and worked in Kosovo. Several initiatives exist to send local citizens abroad for their studies after the war. Kastriot as one of the beneficiaries was educated in the United States. He describes this experience as very helpful as it “opens your eyes and makes you see things differently”.¹⁵⁹ Upon return, Kastriot’s contract was terminated although it was supposed to be renewed automatically.¹⁶⁰ The termination grounds were described as “national romanticism” referring to the process when the ruling party takes advantage and appoints political Directors through whom, the political leaders manage the rest of employment decisions, as the life story of Kastriot shows that not affiliated individuals

¹⁵³ Edon, p.19

¹⁵⁴ Shkelqim, p.26

¹⁵⁵ Shkelqim, p.26

¹⁵⁶ Edon, p.19

¹⁵⁷ Arian, p.3

¹⁵⁸ Vera, p.12

¹⁵⁹ Kastriot, p.3-4

¹⁶⁰ Kastriot, p.4

with the ruling party are more likely to be rejected for employment.¹⁶¹ He had to reapply for the same position, which he received after submitting a complaint at the UN.¹⁶²

Kastriot then legally became a staff member but in everyday work life, he was excluded from contributing. Frustrated he explains how he experienced a

non-readiness for cooperation from the side of my bosses. They tried to keep me at a *distance* in every possible way. *Every proposal, idea, [the bosses] rejected*, and I see no relevant reason why they would do that [*author italics*].¹⁶³

Moreover he said that seniors “paralyze you” and leave no room for maneuver.¹⁶⁴ In the longer term, unprofessionalism and the rejection of having recourse to existing knowledge resources would damage the state institutions. In such a non-cooperative environment, it may be impossible to use resources to increase performance. Despite these challenges, Kastriot still plans to remain in Kosovo.¹⁶⁵ In his view, locals did not lack professional aspects such as knowledge, institutions but the “readiness in the implementation of professional knowledge”. According to him, institutions are reluctant to use knowledgeable individuals. Similar views as Kastriot’s are echoed by the individuals who describe themselves as development “promoters”.¹⁶⁶

In contrast to Kastriot’s life story that views the role of the international community as positive, being able to re-instate order and fairness in work place by taking executive decisions, the everyday peace conceptualizes the international community in the role of the facilitators. As shown by the life story, a focus on the social fabric may necessitate the international community’s need to produce executive decisions when it is for general interest of the locals and internationals to avoid policies that might threaten the community’s social harmony and/or co-existence. Everyday peace provides the flawed impression of that is possible for policy makers to allow locals to built locally what they wish. However, a “laissez-faire” approach without interventions may not be feasible in an interconnected world.

Among other concerns, *interference* of the *international community* contributes to the maintenance of *dependency and the lack of decision-making*. Arian’s life story explains that even though the Serbian administration before the war was “hated”, citizens still worked, whereas employees today behave more indifferently.¹⁶⁷ Another point of criticism refers to the *silencing* by the government of Kosovo of knowledgeable individuals *through their removal from high positions*. For instance, former President Fatmir Sejdiu claims that he re-

¹⁶¹ Kastriot, p.4

¹⁶² Kastriot, p.4

¹⁶³ Kastriot, p.4

¹⁶⁴ Kastriot, p.5

¹⁶⁵ Kastriot, p.8

¹⁶⁶ Kastriot, p.1

¹⁶⁷ Arian, p.16

signed from his position after the Constitutional Court decision requested him to resign but he believes that indirectly he was forced to resign by “those who expected me to remain in the position of the President and to stay quiet about other necessary processes that Kosovo was supposed to go through”.¹⁶⁸

Other life stories point out other elements that are significant for reforming education. Eremal claims that the abuse of power in the government is presumably high.¹⁶⁹ On the other hand, Vera, the human rights activist, claims that there is a lack of *ownership, capacity, institutional tradition, expertise, meritocracy* and presence of *nepotism*.¹⁷⁰ She also reported, a presence of work inferiority among local governmental officials towards other individuals educated abroad due to a lack of experience seems to be present as well.¹⁷¹ Government officials frequently travel to Albania, which, despite its own delayed development, is viewed as a role model and example.¹⁷² Vera for instance does not rely on government employees to finalize their work as the knowledgeable individuals are obstructed while others do not know. Presumably, most employees in the government are hired due to nepotistic links and/or on a partisan rather than a meritocratic basis. Over the years, she said that she has encountered only two employees that were hired based on merit.¹⁷³ From these life stories, it becomes clear that the management of human resources is far from optimal and be based on personal, family or political preferences, whereas the system of values and positive criteria seems less prevalent, if not absent. Despite the need for quality education and qualified staff, even where it exists, the government employs strategies to maintain a division between the educated officials and those appointed through nepotism or partisanship, thus hindering progress on the level of state functioning.

To conclude, in contrast to locals highlighting education, state builders usually invest in “capacity building”. This, in a sense, is a short-term concept with similar nature, geared towards entering and leaving post war zones as soon as possible rather than investing in education as a long-term objective. The prioritization of capacity building over education is somewhat puzzling given that in western society, education is clearly positively marked as well but they seem to attach less importance to it in *other* territories than their own. Local life stories show that capacity building is sometimes equated to a wasting of funds that would be better spend in education or to combat corruption. Still, liberal theorists promote capacity building despite its flaws since it’s viewed as one of the important means to fill the gap of local capacities in order to build sustainable development, even though shortcomings are identified. Critical the-

¹⁶⁸ Fatmir Sejdiu, p.3

¹⁶⁹ Eremal, p.22

¹⁷⁰ Vera, p.12

¹⁷¹ Vera, p.18

¹⁷² Vera, p.19

¹⁷³ Vera, p.12-13

orists criticize capacity building activities strongly since it is viewed as a frame allowing state builders to engage while not assuming any responsibility (Chandler, 2006, 2010a). For example, EU's involvement in Kosovo may be mired as a neocolonial power (Chandler, 2010a). Wilde argues that this is possible since the causes of problems in failed states are presented to be the local factors (Wilde, 2007, 2010). This can be seen in the appointment of experts in key local institutions including courts, government, commissions and in civil society organizations.

In fact, investment in education as a long-term goal would be more likely to have preferred and intended consequences, a functional state and institutions through assisting to maintain a good social fabric promoting tolerance, rule of law and democracy. Kosovo's society has attached a high importance to education from the Yugoslavian time until today. A functioning society, social interactions and cohesion are missing partly since the level of education decreased compared to the pre war period according to the life stories. This is mainly due to the low quality of education, as provided for example by private colleges, and a culture of state builders to rebuild everything from the ground up while ignoring the local experiences. In Kosovo, a parallel education system existed before the war, which appeared to have been better. Other positive aspects as highlighted by local actors include *institutions, commitment, mentality and initiatives* despite fewer resources that were available in education system. In addition, as education was also a priority in socialist Yugoslavia, it was arguably better. While human resources are present in the current administrative and academic sectors, they are not nourished as state builders seemingly prefer not to rely on what is already present in a country. They failed by ignoring the former experiences, the existent human capacities and neglecting aspects like education in post war period that contributed to weaker social cohesion. The education example shows that good cultural practices and intentions were present but that the international community failed to channel them well. The discussion of education appears particularly relevant as both local and international actors identify a similar obstacle to state building in Kosovo: society is crumbling, people are not involved, positive social practices are lost.

To reinforce a sustainable state and peace, good social identities, attitudes and practices are required. Education provides a powerful tool to influence these as both international and local actors acknowledge. In fact, education may assist as well to mitigate violence that can deteriorate state building. Since in practice, locals lack power when faced with violence. Although internationals have capacity and resources, they still often fail to mitigate local violence. In state building, it is argued that it would be better to engage with locals to form the state locally, not orientated towards interests, biases or ideology, as then legitimacy disappears. The same argument holds for peace building in the critical theory literature (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 771).

Conclusion

The first section presented the various perspectives of members of the international community on state building processes in Kosovo. Generally, they resist linking their actions to state building as it draws media attention even though some argue that the contrary is the case and that state building

is more boring, it's slower, it's less sexy. It doesn't hit the media headlines and once the conflict is over, the guns are silent, people think 'oh well it's ok, nobody is getting killed. It's alright'.¹⁷⁴

State building in Kosovo is high neither on the agenda of the international community nor in the media as "political attention goes from crisis to crisis". International officials' view of state building is in many cases one of *disappointment*, as is the feeling of citizens and donors. State building is perceived as a difficult, long and complicated process that, in the eyes of some individuals lacks humility. Self-criticism by international officials is also observed as some regard it as "naïve", "colonialistic" and "paternalistic" as it needs to arise from the bottom and locally rather than being created by internationals. In the beginning, expectations were high among members of the international community who were both enthusiastic and resourceful but in the end, the local terrain proved to be more difficult than expected as everything was "young or new"¹⁷⁵. Some regarded state building as having been *successful* in Kosovo, but acknowledged that it is a long-term process.

Furthermore, in some official and private accounts one can observe a denial among the international actors, especially IOs, to *contribute to state building*. IOs contributing to "capacity building" rejected that they contribute to Kosovo's state building despite that their contribution may in fact strengthen the state. As representatives of the United Nations, the European Union and other organizations remain divided regarding the legal status of Kosovo, development and full recognition of its independent status remain curtailed. However, IOs seem to employ strategies to overcome the difficulties that arise from partially unresolved status question. Those in favor of independence contribute openly to the state building and perceive themselves as "mid wife" who facilitated the birth of Kosovo, whereas those taking a neutral stance contribute less openly. In personal conversations with the officials of the second category, it appears that it is easier for their IOs to operate like this in Kosovo. In addition, individual officials' preferences about the status influence in turn the positions of the organizations and hence ultimately the outcomes.

Obstacles perceived by international officials in the local terrain are often attributed to *social/cultural practices*, which are labeled as culture and related to the history of socialism.

¹⁷⁴ Ramon, p.5

¹⁷⁵ Eric

Negative cultural practices identified by officials in the society include materialism, clientalism, exchange of favors, corruption, and prioritization of clans, family and regional over state interests. Intentional delays at work (ie delaying court cases due to sensitivity or personal motivations) are perceived to originate from these cultural practices. A presence of fear, loss of hope and an interest of profiteering groups to maintain instability suggest to them that implementing changes might be difficult and time-consuming. International officials wish for a return to more ethical norms such as an identification with the state and society instead of materialism or nepotism. Strikingly, local life stories identify similar social problems. However, the proposed solutions and strategies differ. Locals hope to return to a promotion of collective values such as respect, tolerance, sharing, knowledge, which could then “spill over” to the identification with the state.

In the perspective of international officials, obstacles are furthermore attributed to *history*, and more specifically to socialism. The latter is presumed to have influenced cultural practices as well. In this sense, the length of Serbian occupation and repression is regarded as having brought about several challenges in the post-war period such as a lack of collective confidence, democratic identity and efficiency. Sometimes, the international community glances over these ongoing shortcomings in order to maintain legitimacy in Kosovo.

Differently from the international officials, the local community perspectives as revealed by life stories views *socialism* under Tito as having *promoted collective confidence*. For instance, many individuals were educated in other former Yugoslav Republics during Tito’s time, which is therefore viewed as a period of empowerment for the Albanians, while socialism during the Rankovic and Milosevic era are viewed as disempowerment. Viewing failures of state building and democracy as socialism’s legacy represents a liberal narrative, which differs from the local narratives. Secondly, contrary to the international officials views that locals were not supporting human rights and democracy, identification with *democracy and human rights* was very high. Citizens were working collectively to promote independence based on these principles. The local community’s identification towards democracy and collectivity is shown in the life stories, which also reveal disillusion with general processes after the war and introduction of democracy.

Furthermore, the priorities of local community as seen in life stories differ in terms of strategy and language. In contrast to the international officials’ focus on institutions, the focus is on maintaining or recreating the social fabric. Local actors as shown in life stories consequently prioritize *education* as a means to long-term state building, with some presenting it as the most important area for that purpose. The international community on the other hand includes education only in terms of capacity building or educating generations of political elites. However, statebuilding requires in depth reforms due to the prevalence of negative societal practices such as excessive materialism, nepotism, corruption, discrimination, unprofessionalism

and radicalization. Ultimately, so it is argued, since both minority and majority value education, it can be used as a tool to foster identification with the state. The education discussion hints towards a blind spot of international actors which, while crafting reforms and introducing experiments in developing countries, maintain tendencies of imposition, have a lack of local knowledge and do not sufficiently collaborate with locals. To be sure, local actors are also responsible for shortcomings in the education system such as a lack of evaluation criteria for students and professorial appointments, political interferences in human resource questions, establishment of private universities and outdated curriculum's. These political interferences also obstruct the education of individuals abroad and initiatives where they seek to implement the acquired knowledge through non-cooperation, sabotage and/or layoffs.

Call argues that including the relevant actors (ie regional organizations, transnational actors and local tribes) can facilitate building "contextualized states" and peace since they may have taken over either partly or fully some of the state functions (Call, 2008a, p. 371). Empirical data, namely life stories, reveal that educated individuals from FRY or the West are among those relevant actors to be included in state building. It would therefore be significant to prioritize *education over capacity building* projects as the prior provides the basis of a functioning society and may contribute to rebuilding the social fabric of the state.

Theoretically, Lemay-Hébert argues that the different social status is reflective of a symbolic violence of international community towards local communities (Lemay-Hébert, 2011). This process enhances the legitimacy of religious movement as shown in the last part of the chapter. The founding member of the movement critiques excessive corruption and materialism and suggests instead moving to an economic system of sharing. Internal legitimacy of the newly founded states also seems to be lacking due to its inability to provide basic functions to its citizens, which paves the way for an alternative religious movement. In the face of local and international illegitimacy, the movement tries also to reach the diaspora.

Against this background, one can conclude that the international community needs to pay more attention to the social and cultural everyday life values in Kosovo such as collectivity, respect, solidarity, family, professionalism and knowledge. Some individuals lost these values, however the ones that kept them may be considered for further promotion in society as role models. Locals as presented in the life stories in this chapter envision a social state that prioritizes social justice, quality of life and education, production, and better intellectual and political elites. The respect and maintenance of the social fabric needs to be promoted from the beginning in order to achieve sustainable state building. One way of achieving this would be to gradually introduce changes to the education system, which offers opportunities for persons to learn to co-exist, respect and collaborate in fragile societies. In other words, the end goal of state building should be to facilitate the reconstruction of society through education gradually rather than simply focusing on institutions, security and promoting privatization.

The combination of life stories with grounded theory methodology to study the state and peace building offers several new theoretical implications. Theoretically, the presented vision above is thus quite distinct from the liberal approaches that promote securitization and liberalization, offering instead a more reconciliatory approach between the local and international actors. It combines former positive and “newer” liberal values which are also hardly promoted through mere short-term “capacity building” due to its short-term goals. Although contrary to critical approaches, the argument here concerns interventions in the social fabric rather than everyday activities, which offer rather little strategic guidance for policy makers. A “laissez-faire” approach is not feasible either, as post-conflict settings are tense and notoriously unstable. Education offers one specific field of possible and promising interventions according to local actors to stabilize the post-war situations, train the young generations and create a sustainable social fabric on which institutional state building can be based. Evidently, power imbalances need to be addressed, ensuring participation of various groups on the school, municipal, regional and state level.

7. The Life Stories on the Nation: Bringing Back instead of Containing Nationalism in Nationbuilding

Introduction

Understanding various perceptions of nation building among the local and international actors is essential for stabilizing, managing and preventing future conflicts. This chapter analyzes the different perceptions of nation building between and within local and international actors in the case of Kosovo and assesses the impact of differing perceptions on the everyday life of local individuals. It argues that the divergent perceptions of nation building as revealed by the life stories are in fact hindering the development of Kosovo as a state and a nation. Their negative impact is illustrated through life stories in which Kosovo Albanians encounter discrimination by internationals and local Serbians when they insist on maintaining their Albanian identity instead of adopting solely a Kosovar one, and on empowering themselves. This results for instance in local resistance toward international involvement in “everyday work life”. This chapter suggests that the containment of ethnic national identity hinders state, peace and nation building.

The word “nation” is often avoided since it is viewed as the most confusing and “tendentious” in the political science (Tilly, 1975, p. 6). Fukuyama theorises nations as including “communities of shared values, traditions and historical memory” (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 3). Others like Elden view the state as a “political unity” whereas the nation is a “grouping of people” (Elden, 2009, p. 202). Gellner argues that sharing a similar culture¹⁷⁶ represents elements of a nation and nationalism (Gellner & Breuilly, 2008, pp. 6–7). Amongst most important elements of nation is also the recognition of “each other [people] belonging to the same nation” (ibid). Smith argues that the nation state legitimates nationalism by various elements like “frontiers, capitals, flags, anthems, passports, currencies, military parades, national museums, embassies and usually a seat at the United Nations” (Smith, 1986, p. 228).¹⁷⁷ The case of Kosovo suggests that the elements of culture are neglected in the process of nation building since they are associated with nationalism, which presumably must be avoided in post conflict countries according to the international perspectives.

¹⁷⁶ ‘a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating’ (Gellner & Breuilly, 2008, pp. 6–7)

¹⁷⁷ ‘They also have one government for the territory of the nation-state, a single education system, a single economy and occupational system, and usually one set of legal rights for all citizens, though there are exceptions [e.g. citizenship rights for all and sometimes communal rights for special communities]. They also subscribe, tacitly or openly, quietly or vociferously, to a single ideology which legitimates the whole enterprise - nationalism.’ (A. Smith, 1986, p. 228)

The notion of nation building is moreover differently understood by American and European academics (Fukuyama, Cynthia, Watson, Patterson). Nation building is associated with the process of state building (political and economic development) in the American scholarship, whereas reshaping the “society or citizens” refers to the European scholarship (Call, 2008b, p. 10). Call defines nation building as “actions undertaken, usually by national actors, to forge a sense of common nationhood” (Call, 2008b, p. 5).¹⁷⁸ He emphasize that national actors normally carry the process. This chapter assesses whether international actors contribute as well and whether and in what type they should do so.

The efforts to build nations after the 20th century focus mainly on civic nation building through promotion of common legal duties and rights for all members, a common economy with territorial mobility for all members, legal equality among members, territorial boundaries, historic territory, common civic culture and ideology (values and traditions). On the other hand, ethnic nation building is based on blood, descent with main features of national identity such as historic territory or homeland, common myths and historical memories and a common mass public culture, language and customs (Polese, 2011; A. Smith, 1991). These two different notions overlap with each other and with the state. For instance, elements of civic and ethnic nation building (or a combination of them) are used to construct new states, as it will be shown in the following sections.

The evidence from the life stories, in this case locals in Kosovo, show that in their examination of the process of nation building, they rely on various discourses. One group of locals focuses on supporting a two state solution due to the pressure from big powers and sacrificing the Albanian unification idea at least temporarily. The common belief as revealed by the life stories is that Albanian nation would unite in the European Union once both Kosovo and Albania have entered. They express this in many ways. State building is prioritized over unification. There are opposing views to this discourse. Other local groups prioritize their original Albanian identity acquired when they were born and aim to unite with Albania. They prioritize ethnic nation building over international state building and civic nation building. According to them, history has shown that the Balkans cannot overcome conflict easily. If these two states are not united, two semi functional states will remain in the Balkans. Furthermore the Albanian minority problems will remain and the Albanian influence will be minimized in Balkans. They view the European Union more as an imposer rather than as assisting in finding a solution. On the other hand, the Bosnian minorities envy the Albanian’s better situation to acquire two states.

¹⁷⁸ ‘(1) to overcome ethnic, sectarian, or communal differences; (2) to counter alternate sources of identity and loyalty; and (3) to mobilize a population behind a parallel statebuilding project’ (Call, 2008b, p. 5)

Compared to some local actors life stories, internationals focus mainly on European integration as the main tool for stabilizing the region. Nation building is understood as stabilization and prevention of direct wars between parties in the region. They reject the countries and parties that promote nationalism or identify further with ethnic national identities, which is not acceptable within the EU framework. On the other hand, they acknowledge Serbia's destabilizing role in the region through the manipulation of the minorities in the Republika Srpska and Northern Kosovo. This resonates with local concerns expressed by the local group's life stories supporting unification with Albania. The international community expects political changes in Serbia that would presumably result in a more realistic assessment of the situation. New talks about the region's political development are foreseen. This international perspective complements the group of locals supporting the EU as a main tool for achieving Kosovo's statehood, and possibly at a later stage the national unification under the EU umbrella. However, both lack a vision of how to deal with ethnic national identity and nationalism before and when entering into the EU.

Theoretically, the case of Kosovo illustrates the difficulties of creating and maintaining a multi-ethnic state in the 21st century and argues that ethnic national identity should not be suppressed but viewed as complementary rather than in competition with civic national identity. In Kosovo, the notion of a European identity had emerged primarily among local political elites life stories using EU integration as a tool for national unification. Lastly, proposals by Richmond and other scholars of post-liberal peace theory for a combination of liberal ideas with a respect for culture and local identities are observable to a limited extent. While the notions of respect for culture and identity seem to lack in practice by a group of international community, the utilization of liberal ideas for local purposes, achieving Albanian national unification through EU integration, appear nonetheless to be present among a group of local political elite.

The findings are based on several life stories with local individuals and interviews with international officials.¹⁷⁹ They assess the various perceptions on nation building, and in the case of the life story interviews, their everyday impact.¹⁸⁰ Therefore life stories are used to inform nation building in Kosovo. They provide the much-needed perspective from below, the view of the local actors. Not all life stories concerning nation building were used for this chapter given its limited scope. The choice fell on the ones exemplifying the nation building dynam-

¹⁷⁹ The life stories used for this chapter arose from a comparative process with the other 28 life stories during several years of fieldwork. There are several life stories that experienced the post war reconstruction in Kosovo, the most difficult post socialist period with several social, economic and legal challenges and successes. Accounts of several life story participants whose interviews were conducted over five to six hours are used for this chapter. A pseudonym is used to ensure anonymity for the participants. For more information, please see the methodology chapter.

¹⁸⁰ This has been explained in depth in the life stories section in the methodology chapter.

ics. Around nine life stories were chosen through snowball sampling, population criteria, involvement in post conflict reconstruction period, interaction with the international community, availability, access and grounded theory.¹⁸¹ According to grounded theory, a significant attention is given to theoretical sampling that aims to introduce new theoretical concepts to the current scholarship.¹⁸² Furthermore, life stories that offered the ability to transfer the main threads and were rich in details were used in this chapter. Artan's life story exemplifies issues of ethnic identity and territory. Fisnik's life story describes the issues relating to mystification of the Albanian identity and the role of small states in decision making. Ylber's life story expresses that ethnic identity continues to matter in a multi-ethnic state. Shkodran's and Gjin's life stories delve into the topic of differences between minorities and the Albanians and the double standards in their treatment. Faruk's life story describes the imposition of national symbols in Kosovo by the international community. Lastly, Vera's narrative exemplifies how the past biases against Kosovo Albanians still dominate the current nation-building agenda. These are contrasted with the international perspectives. The following sections analyze the international perspectives on nation building, local variations, local everyday responses to Albanian empowerment and resistance. In the last section I summarize the findings, which indicate that the containment of ethnic national identity hinders state, peace and nation building. The context of Kosovo is determined by international nation building. Ethnic nation building may instead be viewed complementary to civic nation building, which has been exclusively promoted in recent years.

International Perspectives: Nation Building through EU Integration

Reluctance to Label the International Involvement as Nation Building

Both official sources and private conversations show scepticism about the international involvement in Kosovo and its contribution towards state and nation building. For instance, Rudolf argues that the EU mission is contributing to capacity building which, once Kosovo becomes a member of EU, can retrospectively be labelled as state building. The main reason for this is that state and nation building

concepts are too ambitious to relate to international peace support mission. We are contributing to rule of law, and we are doing it by helping them to create proper institutions, proper capacities, to enforce rule of law, and that is basically our job.¹⁸³

Similarly, Stahn shows that the UN refrains from framing the activities as nation building but in practice they are involved in nation building:

¹⁸¹ For in depth information on sampling, please see the methodology chapter, specifically the section on Initial and Theoretical Sampling.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Rudolf, p.1

the [UN] organisation generally avoided defining its responsibilities in the area of peacemaking in terms of nationbuilding. In some cases (e.g. Kosovo), the UN adopted measures which shaped the identity of a territory under administration (e.g. external representation, citizenship). Such measures were, however, primarily tied to functional goals of administration during the period of transition and not aimed at nationbuilding as such (Stahn, 2008, p. 406).

Similarly, Lemay Hébert argues that state building always implies nation building activities (Lemay-Hébert, 2009). All these assessments illustrate the difficulties and complexities of labelling the tasks of international missions, which appear differently in policy and on the ground. In Kosovo, the main international civil servants describe their indirect attempts to nation building as pursued by European Union and NATO.

However, Daryl, a high rank international official, reveals that in Kosovo there is a lack of Kosovar identity since international's created the civic nation, therefore locals "don't feel identified". The state's symbols stripped from the Albanian identity are represented as neocolonial: "People here are Albanians first, not Kosovar first. Have you seen or heard a Kosovo Anthem, have you seen only the Kosovo flag? It's an embarrassment; it's a piece of neo-colonial (...) [fashion]". Despite main international officials denying involvement in nation building, Daryl claims that internationals, Americans, prepared the independence of Kosovo: "This declaration of independence, the document (...) the guest list, the speeches, the order of the people. It's all done by the Americans, how can you identify with that?". However this mainly seems to occur due to the lack of appropriate leadership in Kosovo:

you and your people are much too immature you don't know how to behave. You go about everything in as if you are fifteen. Grow up and do this right and you can be the best leaders of society but if you're going to be a bunch of anarchists, I don't want to have anything to do with you. I mean their tactics may be fascist at times, yes, but they have more in common with anarchists.¹⁸⁴

The EU Integration: A Tool for Managing Nationalism

The Balkan states, all the states including Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, Croatia are viewed in twenty-five years traveling freely as European citizens. Following this reasoning the local identities should be forgotten, and the priority must be given to promotion of European citizenry:

So forget about this (ethnicity) is medieval by now and simply focus on being an European citizen... you should be explaining people that this (is important), helpful if you would accept the situation, would easily grow out into a much better situation.¹⁸⁵

International civilian officials view the EU as a means to overcome nationalism in Kosovo and former Yugoslavia. That stems from the idea that the former Yugoslavia (FRY) was es-

¹⁸⁴ Daryl, p.3

¹⁸⁵ Rafael, p.8

entially already a small type of multi-ethnic union, providing to some extent a collective identity based on tolerance and equality. According to Andreas, while the FRY “wasn’t the ideal”, it would have been very promising for the region if it had not been disintegrated. Essentially if

the Serbs had not been so overreaching and dominating the military and government, and if they had been adequate, decent civilization and Kosovo had been given the equal status like with the others, then Yugoslavia might have survived and it would have been very good.¹⁸⁶

Although the dissolution of the FRY led to several wars in Balkans, people’s perceptions of FRY are nonetheless mostly positive (see Tim Judah (2000) for more and the data below). Therefore Andreas proposes to frame EU ideals along the lines of a Yugoslav identity to Balkan population in order to succeed in EU integration: “a prestigious international country... was a decent [country] and that intellectual past is still there, so it was great nostalgia sort of a dream. Perhaps that dream could be sold by the EU”.¹⁸⁷

The main reason why this argument may not work is that risks are still present. The Balkan states have borders that are arbitrarily designed. They cut through ethnic groups, they leave minorities (Brubaker), and in particular, they are problematic in Kosovo. As Andreas says, it is still problematic in Kosovo since nationalism appears: “It is disappointing and it has an ethnic overtone, ... the borders are still arbitrarily drawn ... unless is all elevated to higher European integration”. Considering the remaining tensions in Bosnia, Macedonia and other parts of the Balkans, the only solution to mitigate nationalism and these risks is integration to the EU. He concludes that initial efforts were “naïve” in nation building and “no one wants to return to warfare that is obvious, [but it] is disappointing how nationalism has made such a way”.¹⁸⁸

The Role of Serbia: Hindering the Development of the Region and Integration

At the end of the war, Serbia did not recognize the separation of Kosovo. Serbia, the homeland state for the largest minority in Kosovo (Serbian), Kosovo and the international community negotiated Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence in 2008: “after four years of hard negotiations there was no alternative [than giving] to Kosovo people independence”.¹⁸⁹ The question arises in this case what Serbia got in return if they were involved in the negotiation, which still remains an open question. The independence of Kosovo has been negotiated by democratic states. The international official states that the Serbian leadership had been respectful of wishes of strongest democracies in the world including United States of America,

¹⁸⁶ Andreas, p.3

¹⁸⁷ Andreas, p.3

¹⁸⁸ Andreas, p.3

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

United Kingdom, Germany and Italy to allow Kosovo's independence. This resonates with the democratic peace theory where democratic states, in this case the US and the EU, engage in promoting liberal democracy, and even creating presumably a liberal democratic state of Kosovo. According to Andreas, upon the declaration of independence, Serbian leadership recognized that Kosovo was practically lost and would not become a part of Serbia. In practice, Serbia competes for Kosovo rhetorically and at the EU facilitated Dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia.

Despite the successful negotiations, which allowed Kosovo to declare its independence, the nationalism of Serbia remains a major problem. Andreas says that the presence of KFOR is not required in Kosovo, but it remains due to the problems in the north related to "an element that comes from Belgrade", respectively "some nationalistic messages". The same elements reach Republika Srpska as well. The hope of Andreas is that political changes will follow government changes in Serbia. Even government change, which was hoped by international civil servants to change the situation, only led to the election of a "more nationalistic" leadership. Andreas points out that Serbia will have difficulties entering the EU unless "nationalistic messages" decrease. In other words, the EU no longer accepts members that are problematic and would receive Serbia only under the conditions that it becomes "a normal state and not a source of nationalism".

On the other hand, Kosovo is not progressing since Kosovars are locked in confrontation with Serbia and therefore "unable to govern themselves". Again, the anticipated solution is hoped to derive from the EU Dialogue, which aims at the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. The interviewee indicates that one of the primary goals towards this end is the removal of parallel institutions whose presence is in contravention with EU practice. Questions are also raised regarding whether Northern Kosovo will become "a frozen conflict", even though the international civil servant suggests that such a scenario cannot be allowed given the central geographical location of Kosovo in South Eastern Europe. With much depending on Serbia's political choices, the international community is seeking to prevent Northern Kosovo from becoming a frozen conflict through the current Dialogue. Still, the hope is for Belgrade to come to a more "realistic assessment of what Serbia needs in the future", which could lead to a new kind of "serious talks about the political regions".¹⁹⁰

Kosovo's Self Determination Party Inhibits its own Success with Unification Aims

On the ground, a political party still promotes Albanian unification, as for instance the Self-Determination (SD), which was originally a social movement. Rudolf regards the party as very promising, addressing national, economic and social issues (such as corruption, privati-

¹⁹⁰ Albert, p.4

zation, international interference). However, he identifies nationalism and the aim of reunification as inhibiting its success, which could be considerable “if they can turn this energy and creativity they have, specially as a street movement [...] to something positive and inclusive”. Somewhat contradictory, this international civil servant also argues that SD always fights “against something”. He points out that in the 21st century, nationalism is not acceptable and that the EU conditions countries to not pursue nationalist policies, which could already be seen in the internationals’ view on Serbia. This condition is mainly directed towards the mother state, the logic being that a mother state “would not sacrifice” EU’s membership for border changes for reunification.¹⁹¹

To conclude, the international perspective on nation building focuses mostly on the EU membership to contain nationalism in the region. Both Serbia and Kosovo display nationalist tendencies, as exemplified by the SD, interviews, Serbia’s aims and interfering politics through minorities in Northern Kosovo and the Republika Srpska. Regional development depends upon Serbia’s decision to move forward to the EU. However, it is important to recognize that the EU membership of Albania, Serbia and Kosovo is a long-term goal that may take decades. Geopolitical changes, EU failure to deliver its promises or Balkan countries failing to deliver may all compromise this strategy.

Andreas, a well-informed and involved international official developing the future policy of the NATO and the EU administration, signalled new talks for the region. Still the Kosovo government’s sole focus on dialogues might further deteriorate the situation on the ground. The political apathy will continue. Population’s disappointments may increase their migration attempts to Europe. In addition, the EU talk rounds fatigue may inhibit their success. Furthermore, one of the civil servants claims that “EU is not effective”.¹⁹² Lastly, political changes occur very fast. Given the recent arisen interest of Russia and Turkey in Balkans, and specifically the Russian assertiveness in world affairs, the EU membership carrot may become contestable in keeping stability and managing nationalism in Kosovo and Serbia.

Local Variations

Albanian Nation and State Unification through European Union: Prioritizing State Building of Kosovo while Maintaining Nation Building as Albanian

The life stories of local elites supporting the state solution of Kosovo, which also abandoned the request to join Albania, realize that time has changed and adopt strategically the liberal point of view supporting Kosovo. Thus the viewpoints below resonate with parts of post-liberal peace theory, which suggests that local actors will adopt liberal ideas when it seems

¹⁹¹ Rudolf, p.5

¹⁹² Andreas, p.6

beneficial, if access is granted by the international community (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 766). Specifically, the hybrid local rather than local–local actors, use the language of hegemon and “these agencies may be more than mimicry, but they offer a politics less than local self-determination, and may reconfirm hegemonic power” (Richmond, 2010, p. 678). Local actors prioritizing Kosovo’s state building due to geopolitical necessities represent the hybrid local in Kosovo.

This group of locals as life stories reveal also abandoned the idea of a single nation state as the time has passed, they are no longer acceptable in international affairs and less likely due to migration. Therefore Kosovo Albanians should move with time: support Kosovo as a state and abandon the idea to join the Albanian territory. Similarly, Call suggests that multinational states have become more common and acceptable in global platforms and therefore nation building is no longer necessary for successful state building (Call, 2008b, p. 11). In addition, there are no longer nation states representing “homogenous ethnic community... that all the inhabitants of the state possess an identical culture” (A. Smith, 1986, p. 229). On other words, the single nation-states’ idea seems to decrease its significance in globalized world since different nationalities migrate. Following this line of argumentation, multiculturalism seems to prevail. The following sections describe the life stories of the hybrid local group, representing parliamentarians.

Ethnic Identity and Territory

Identities of citizens in Kosovo vary. Some identify themselves simultaneously as Kosovar and as Albanian. On the one hand, some feel both Kosovar and Albanian as Artan says “I am Kosovar but I am Albanian”.¹⁹³ The latter, Artan’s life story exemplifies the ethnic identity and territory issues. He was educated during the former Yugoslavian period. He was an Albanian student, political activist and held as a prisoner over several years. His close and extended family was persecuted during both world wars and afterwards. He joined the KLA in 1990s, and he focuses after the war mainly on politics. On the other hand, Edon’s life story provides many insights for this topic as well. He was educated in the former Yugoslavian system, taught in the Albanian system before the war and continued teaching at the university and held several political posts after the war. He acknowledges that “[y]ou cannot feel like an Albanian citizen since when we go there we feel as Kosovan citizens”. Still, he feels to belong to both identities: “we were born and raised with [it] and nobody can deny me that I am an Albanian. Now, we have Kosovan passports and we live in a territory that used to be the

¹⁹³ Artan, p.13

Northern part of Albania but for me it is [only] currently a country". In the end, he feels "Albanian as well as Kosovar".¹⁹⁴

Edon, from his work experience believes that a primary role should be given to the state and then the nation, where the latter will be united in the European Union. He points out that in practice Albanians "are already united, considering that the Kosovan citizen moves freely to Albania and vice versa without any documents or control, so it's simply an administrative crossing rather than a border crossing".¹⁹⁵ Artan highlights that he had been active as an MP "in the process of building bridges of cooperation with Europe and the world, with the aim to be part of it but while maintaining our traits, our identity and our dignity".¹⁹⁶

Shkelqim based on his life story experiences suggests a combined integration of the economy, language and culture that can be achieved under the EU umbrella.¹⁹⁷ Shkelqim studied in the Yugoslav system, contributed to the Kosovo Albanian political awakening through creating the Albanian parallel education system and continued working on it after the war. Being now retired, his experience and life story provides many interesting insights. Arguments for a territorial reunification are therefore "absurd" because "nation formation is more ancient than a state formation" and relates to "a wider, deeper and more important feeling" that is not restricted in "time and space". In contrast, the concept of the state formation is temporary and "narrow" since it is mostly concerned with elements of territory and borders. It includes also elements such as "symbols, constitution" and others. While the nation formation has the "history, tradition, culture, language, big personalities that gave importance to the so-called identity and personality of a population".¹⁹⁸

On the other hand, Genc completed his studies (including a doctorate) in the West and returned before the war to assist the Albanian cause. He worked on reconciliation between Albanians, hosted Albanians and Serbs during the last war, and is now committed to fighting negative trends in Kosovo's society through spirituality, while working for a religious organization. Being now almost retired, his experience and life story provides many interesting insights. Genc thinks that "it will be good for us [Albanians] to work on this prism". According to him, a promotion of nation formation would lead to a more solid state formation process. If the nation is based on positive ideas, then that may contribute to the stability of the region: "as much as somebody is a good Albanian, he will be a good citizen of Kosovo or Albania, Montenegro or Macedonia. After all he is Albanian". Recent attempts to weaken the Albanian

¹⁹⁴ Edon, p.27

¹⁹⁵ Edon, p.26

¹⁹⁶ Artan, p.13

¹⁹⁷ Shkelqim, p.24-25

¹⁹⁸ Shkelqim, p.24-25

identity are consequently viewed as dangerous through questioning the historical figures.¹⁹⁹ For Genc, state formation represents essentially a sub-question of nation formation. His hope is that Albanians cease questioning their national figures and begin investing in their national identity and

in the feeling of belonging to the Albanians. Via this feeling we enrich each other and enjoy the feeling: I'm Albanian and you are Albanian, so in this aspect you are a part of my life and I am the part of your life. The feeling of a common body, common history, common tradition, common culture, personalities, heroes, of the wonderful resistance that we had over centuries of our survival starting from back then until recently - I think that this should be the basis in which we form our identity and personality.²⁰⁰

The Kosovar identity in contrast is viewed as "a wrong invention to replace the national [one]". Genc in fact views promoting Kosovar identity as a temporary phase in the decades while Serbia dominates in the region. In addition, he supports nation formation since borders were imposed by powerful states. If they did not exist, the world would be shared by all populations:

before the Albanian lands come together, heads and hearts should join first. Heads and hearts since the land is not divided. The whole earth is one, but people divided it, states divided it, rulers and dictators divided it and put up borders. These borders that we often have in our Albanian mind and hearts, we should tear them down, and we will tear them down when the head and the heart tears them down and when we go towards the spiritual and cultural unity on what is the nation dining table.²⁰¹

Of course, Genc still acknowledges the reality that state formation exists. Kosovo's state formed through democracy brought in fact freedom and benefits for all Albanians. In practice, one can now

go to Tirana, go to Pristina, go to Skopje, go to Podgorica or anywhere else, so it can be said that President Rugova's dream has been realized. Who would have imagined a Kosovo open towards both Albania and Serbia, where we can go to Tirana and Belgrade, willing to create a kind of equilibrium. Not that Albanians are the same with Serbs, but democracy opened streets and communication paths in work, society, economy with the whole world.

He views Kosovo as an actor that may assist the democratic processes in Western Balkan.²⁰²

Other life story interviews share Genc's solidarist view about the world borders, even though for other reasons. For instance, according to Edon whose life story was explained in the earlier chapter, the region's states are no longer "ethnically pure". Serbia lost precisely because of this ideology. Since there will be no ethnically pure states, Kosovo should abandon the idea

¹⁹⁹ Genc, p.20-22

²⁰⁰ Genc, p.20-22

²⁰¹ Genc, p.20-22

²⁰² Genc, p.20-22

of unifying with Albania and focus on state building. Furthermore, many citizens of one state live in other states in Balkans:

A number of Bulgarians live in Serbia, a number of Bulgarians live in Romania, a number of Turks live in Bulgaria, a number of Romanians live in Slovakia or vice versa - so there is no ethnically pure country. It would be desirable but it is not feasible.

In the future, there will not be also a country populated by only one population or one ethnic group. According to Edon, this is the main reason why the international human rights regime was established: to guarantee the rights of minorities and other ethnicities in a foreign country.²⁰³

The development of a common language is significant for nation building processes as it is one of the central claims to a nation's uniqueness. There are fears that the Albanian nation might dissolve due to frictions in the language. In practice, these frictions have existed for a long time thus the threat of the language dissolution is low despite the coming changes in the region. But Albanians fear its dissolution since the Greek language disappeared long time ago. Shkelqim argues therefore that

language must make a progress and we should work to progress it. We must have a unified language, a very flexible culture, the organization of the joint activities [which are] not imposed, different competitions and festivals, the Albanian anthem and the single Albanian economical market. Like this, the nation is created itself.²⁰⁴

Exaggerations and The Myth of the Albanian History

Some life story interviewees argue that history has magnified Albanians, and hence they demand nation building, which does not match with the actual realities. Therefore state building of Kosovo is a good alternative to the Albanian nation state building. Albanians lack “a written history”, with present accounts representing an “ideological and emotional history” with different variations, but not based on facts. Fisnik’s life story is salient for this understanding. He was educated in the former Yugoslavian period, worked for the liberation of Kosovo through the peaceful political movement, LDK, and continued after the war being involved in politics in various political positions. His life story exemplifies the everyday challenges arisen from discussions when dealing with politics in Balkans. For instance, he brings forward his frequent joke about the Albanian bravery myth:

Skenderbeu damaged us, leaving us with the heritage of bravery, while in fact we are not as brave as it is thought we are. We glorified ourselves more than we should have and this has some negative repercussions in our behavior and in relation to the organization of the society and our families.

²⁰³ Edon, p.27

²⁰⁴ Shkelqim, p.24-25

Therefore he rejects the “clichés” and “stereotypes” as “there is not only black and white” such as “no heroic or non-heroic people or populations”. He argues that people are all the same, depending on the situation they find themselves, on the organizations they have taken part, the nature of the state organization, the environment, education and all the others things.

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However these are seen as recent attempts to weaken the Albanian identity, which are consequently viewed as dangerous. This refers in particular to attempts to deconstruct national Albanian hero figures such as Gjergj Kastriot Skenderbeu and Nena Tereze. Challenging Skenderbeu’s role might be very problematic as it is

the tie that binds [Albanians across] all centuries. This tie is our Christianity, culture and civilization as European Christians. Like it or not, it is our cradle in which we were born. Nobody is saying to go back to the cradle, but this is the cradle.

The questioning of Skenderbeu or Mother Teresa as Albanians constitute consequently “untruths and wrong dilemmas”, which are problematic as they may damage any future progress: “it sways our roots and we cannot have healthy branches if roots fluctuate or are damaged”.²⁰⁶ Fisnik views Albanians as having lost time and therefore calls them “a delayed nation”, a late bloomer. They also made “big mistakes” in the past as they entered and finished some processes a little bit later than the others in the region. Furthermore, Albanians are presented as very weak nation during peace period:

We are a strong nation, but we resist only in times of misfortune. In peace we don’t know how to behave, we are a bit wild, we become something different and this hurts to me a lot. We are not capable of appreciating what we have, we don’t appreciate what we have, where we were and where we are now.²⁰⁷

Big Powers Decide for Small States

Fisnik points out the role of big powers in drawing borders and therefore suggests promoting state building in Kosovo as currently state building in international community’s agenda. According to him

[W]e should know that first of all Albanians as a nation are a small nation, regardless of our conviction and imagination that we are an old nation, with a tradition and descendent from the Illyrians etc. Historical political developments have shown that we are a small nation. We can magnify ourselves in song, in poetry, in literature but the international political reality throughout various periods has shown that we are small. The fate of small nations lies in the hands of the big nations. Because at the end of the day political maps are determined in various big international summits where small nations don’t participate but only the big ones.

²⁰⁵ Fisnik, p.21-22

²⁰⁶ Genc, p.20-22

²⁰⁷ Fisnik, p.21-22

However, some of the Albanian literature criticizing various local regimes has been written in exile by authors like Faik Konica, Naim Frasheri and others (Elsie, 2001, 2012). Literature is viewed as a lens of people's history. Still, Fisnik believes in realism and the power politics. According to him, Albania was unfortunate after the Second World War to fall in the isolated Communist block while Kosovo in his view fortunately fell in the more moderate communist part. Currently, since the European Union is ready to accept various groups, he supports a two state solution:

At this moment, I think it is more reasonable to create two states than to strengthen the nation. Because the political developments in Europe are such that everybody wants to be integrated into Europe. I think that our nation's unification should happen after we join the European Union.²⁰⁸

Prioritizing Albanian Unification

However some local actors including parliamentarians, retirees and NGO representatives, resonate with the primordial theory of nation building which views ethnicity as fixed, and prefer ethnic nation building over civic and/or at least inclusion of ethnicity in the civic nation as the following section shows. Ylber's life story expresses it. He was educated in the former Yugoslavian period and was a student and political activist. He was held for several years in prison. After the war, he continued to contribute to Kosovo's formation through a social movement. Recently he joined a political party. Therefore his life story is very important for providing further insights from another perspective, respectively an activist perspective. He in inquiring his own identity rejects the type of nationalism that says "firstly I am a man then an Albanian", thus the solidarist view expressed by some interviewees above. Instead, he maintains to be "firstly Albanian and a human". Ylber opposes the other type since people differ:

Human rights fundamentalists are fascinated with the ocean of red babies in maternity, when they have been born, endlessly, all cry alike, some kind of impersonal solidarity. Imagine maternity, around 200 babies are crying identically, and you say: we are all the same, we all are people. But later on they differentiate into Albanians, Serbians, Dutch, British, Irish, French, German. Look now how they are, are they the same?

To describe further the concept of difference, he compares the death of a baby with that of an older person:

I cannot have respect for a person that is twenty years old in the same way as for a three days old baby. I do have more respect for a twenty-year-old man. When the baby dies, I don't feel more sorry than when a twenty years old dies, isn't it so?

He concludes that the human rights concept is subversive, as human beings develop differently depending on the locality:

²⁰⁸ Edon, p.26

This "I am a human first and then an Albanian" paradoxically, in the name of human rights, that seems to be something to which a lot of importance needs to be paid... as a being of a higher order. You are born and become, you cannot have the same respect for the seed as for the pear. I'm interested to eat the pear, but I'm not interested in what you planted three years ago, you know.

In other words, his argument is that "those who want to emphasize human rights in fact, end up somehow violating them conceptually". He describes the first moments of his life in an Albanian family to illustrate his connection to the Albanian identity:

I think when I have been born; I have been born in the hospital of Prishtina, here. After my mother took me, she started to bring me up, she dangled me, two Albanian parents - "Open your mouth". I was a frail child; I passed much of my childhood in hospital... I don't remember myself, but my grandmother, my mother and pictures tell me. And, namely, I already have been Albanian, the lullabies - "Nina nëna", the language. When in an Albanian family a child is born, and, the Albanian language, rituals, customs, that children is already an Albanian on my conviction.

According to him there are three stages of human development. Firstly, there is birth when all babies are "monsters", then they grow up as Albanians in their families, and finally, in the last stage, they develop through individual initiative:

But over the years when I become ten years old, I said: I have to learn English a bit because it's interesting, the language, music, movies. Then I learned Serbo-Croatian, English. "Ah..." I said, "if I could read these books in English, in the original version", you know, Shakespeare. And I started learning to read, and I saw that being Albanian is not enough. And, I think that later on I became a man, because as an Albanian I was almost like a "monster". There is a certain analogy between the transfiguration of baby and a monster, there is something very abnormal there, you know, and so I think that as a baby, as a child I've been Albanian but I've been like a monster, and now with my efforts, I try to be human. That is to say, humanization is an effort of mine, and I don't know if I reached it yet.

Put simply, humanism emerges thus from the insufficiency of being Albanian:

which is in the level of a given fact, that you cannot change it. I cannot change it that I am Albanian, but not simply because of the blood ... I do not believe on that stuff, "Albanian blood..", I don't know what does that mean, but because of the language, customs, habits and the place where I live, and because of a kind of historic consciousness of the nation I belong to. However that's not enough to me.

Thus because of this insufficiency, he became interested in other languages, cultures, and histories and consequently became a man. The concept of the nation seems to him as a certain given situation in which the individual embraces the nation and at the same time "it's not sufficient for him". He expresses a tension between his various identities as a man-citizen, activ-

ist, and a member of a particular nation. Although they seem to coexist, they are “also a sequence of things”.²⁰⁹

Ylber points out that the diaspora gives positive impulses for change in Kosovo, their exposure to the rest of the world being an asset. This encourages them to look into the future, to become as equal as possible and comparable with developing nations and to forget the past. However, some citizens are already satisfied that there are no longer “constant killings”, meaning that the status quo is good. Ylber for instance aims for Albania/Kosovo to become a flourishing state in some decades that is comparable to EU nations. He finds it unjust that other small nations have better lives than Albanians. For instance, he draws a comparison between Denmark and Kosovo. He then raises the question “[W]hy they have to live so well and we so badly? Why don’t we live like them, why? What do they have more than us?” When he expresses this dilemma to others, his friends’ usual response is that one should not complain as things are fine compared to the time of Milosevic and Serbia, them being “glad to have survived”. However, he disagrees and aims for Kosovo to be as developed as some EU nations in a couple of decades. Put differently, his focus lies on “the equality with other nations rather than the slight positive difference to the bitter past”.²¹⁰ Ylber supports the unification of Albania and Kosovo since “they have a common background, one culture, one tradition and one language”.²¹¹

Shkodran’s life story reveals in depth insights regarding minorities, politics and other events of discrimination. He is a human rights activist with a judicial education. He is involved with protecting human rights of vulnerable communities and documentation of abuse, respectively the abuse of Kosovo Albanian human rights before the war and the Serbians and few Kosovo Albanians after the war. He worked and continues to work for the NGO sector. According to Shkodran, the issue of Albanian minorities living in Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia will remain problematic as long as the Albanian issue is unresolved. Currently, their rights are in his view not taken into account. Main countries such as Serbia (for Serbs) and Albania (for Albanians) must demand a respect for the minority rights in other countries (i.e. Macedonia, Montenegro, etc). But since Albania is a weak state with its own challenges, it cannot support Albanians living in other countries. According to Shkodran, other states in the region are taking advantage of Albania’s weakness and lack of unity by violating minority rights:

Serbia is taking this advantage by massively violating the human rights of Albanians in Preshevo Valley, by cleaning that part from Albanians. Montenegro on the other hand, in a repressive way is doing ethnic cleansing of Albanians after their independence even though Albanians were instrumental in Montenegro’s independence. Without the vote of Albanians, Montenegro

²⁰⁹ Ylber, p.28-30

²¹⁰ Ylber, p.35

²¹¹ Shkodran, p.13-14

would never get its independence. Because there was such a small difference between those who wanted Montenegro to become an independent state and those that wanted to stay with Serbia. You can see in Macedonia too that Albanians factually are divided, they more easily agree with a Macedonian party than among themselves. It is not that they do not understand each other but there is a kind of animosity between them. I am talking about BDI and PDSH²¹². And Macedonians are taking advantage of it.²¹³

Shkodran also believes on the Albanian unification since “it is a problem for Kosovo to exist as a state”.²¹⁴ Thus for regional stability

only Kosovo joining Albania guarantees stability, and without this neither Albania nor Kosovo will become a strong state. They will remain among the semi functional states, and will economically always depend on others like an ill person relies on his doctor.

They draw this conclusion from the Balkan’s, and more specifically Albanians complicated history in Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia.²¹⁵ Shkodran also views the Albanian division as a geopolitical issue, comparable to the divisions seen in the past in Germany and Vietnam.²¹⁶ According to him, since the consequences may be dangerous, it is important for Kosovo to join Albania to secure the functionality of both territories.²¹⁷

The Role of the EU: “Imposer”

Shkodran says that the EU conditions Albania to remain silent about the Albanian problems in the region and the possibilities for unification. This is problematic since if Albania was strong, “it would be like a guarantor, defender and supporter of the unification of all Albanians”. Currently, however, Albania is very weak, supporting its minorities abroad only superficially and through media while lacking a genuine interest in Kosovo. The EU, in contrast, is regarded as playing

a dirty game with Albanians by putting conditions on Albania to be constructive regarding the issue of Kosovo in order to be part of the integration processes. To be constructive means that Albania does not defend Kosovo and Albanians in Macedonia and the Preshevo Valley, and they accepted it.²¹⁸

There are already reported concerns that Kosovo may not join the EU because of Serbia’s position on the issue and its possible blockade in the EU voting system. In addition, there are concerns that Albanians might not be able to join the EU due to their Muslim religion, despite that most parts of the population are not practicing it. Shkodran has concerns that Christian

²¹² BDI [The Democratic Union for Integration] and PDSH [Democratic Party of Albanian] are political parties in Macedonia.

²¹³ Shkodran, p.13

²¹⁴ Shkodran, p.20

²¹⁵ Shkelqim, p.25

²¹⁶ Shkodran, p.13-14

²¹⁷ Shkodran, p.13-14

²¹⁸ Shkodran, p.13

Europe may continue refusing non-Christian members, already not accepting Turkey, which “has conditions better than some European states”. He says that “the EU wants to minimize the Islam factor in Balkan’s and increase the Christian factor”. A unified Kosovo and Albania would result in eight million Albanians in one state, which would then “become a factor. They do not want for us to become a factor since a majority of Albanians are Muslim. Now they are calling on some kind of Islamic war and they qualify you according to your religion”.²¹⁹ This as well shows how some Albanians see themselves as Muslims.

The Albanian Effect on Minorities

After describing how internationals and locals perceive Kosovo as a nation, this section explains how others [minorities] understand it. A Bosnian interviewee that shared his life story, born and living in Kosovo, has experienced the political changes in the region. Gjini has been educated in higher universities in Yugoslavia and after the war in Europe and Asia. He created a family, found a job in Kosovo’s public sector and finalized his education before the war. After the war, he continued with education, worked for the public sector and created a private enterprise. He contributes to the minority group through organizing and participating actively in political, educational and cultural activities. He also maintained a political post. According to him, Bosnians made “big mistakes” in history, “especially recently because we insisted at the religious component”. He claims that others pressured Bosnians to prioritize religion over the national component: “we are Muslims, we are brothers”. He looks upon the Albanian case with admiration and as an example to be emulated:

Look what the Albanians did! They always put at the first place the nation, and now we should learn from the Albanians, because for them the nation was more important than the religion. Now they have won, they have two and a half states, Albania on the one hand and Kosovo on the other, and a half state in Macedonia.

He stresses the fact that this was achieved in a short time, namely “a period of 100 years”. This contrasts notably to Fisnik’s belief shown earlier that Albanian nation is a delayed one. Bosnians thus feels treated unfairly and blames Bosnians: “With the religion element, we haven’t won anything”. This illustrates how other minorities may follow the Albanian path to promoting nation and state building. For Gjini, state and nation building processes were mutually reinforcing. According to Gjini, Bosnia has been divided for 100 years given that “when everyone formed the state and the nation, we could not”.²²⁰ On the other hand, Serbs treat Kosovo as a territory that has been separated from Serbia, where they continue to live despite the separation. However they do not feel connected to Kosovo as a new nation, but to Serbia as a nation. Mira accepts the political circumstances, which have led to the territorial separation,

²¹⁹ Shkodran, p.20

²²⁰ Gjini, p.12-13

and lives there. Yet she argues that history is repeating meaning that injustices towards Serbs continue. Therefore there seems to be a hope that once injustices towards Serbs decrease, Kosovo may be returned to the Serbian nation.

Local Everyday Responses to Albanian Empowerment and Resistance: Towards Containment of the Albanian Identity

When it comes to solving the national problem, the international community has reached a consensus that both Serbia and Kosovo must be integrated in the EU. The EU integration would dampen down their need to have a strong state as they could achieve all what they aspire through the EU. Among local actors, two competing understandings through life stories were revealed, one group pursues state building primarily and then nation building under the European Union, whereas the other group pursues nation building primarily and then state building. The latter's claim is that pursuing state building while suppressing nation building is unsustainable. Therefore now we turn to the theory of everyday peace, which deals with local everyday responses to the international actions. While local-international interactions are analysed in the literature on peace and state building process, critical theorists (especially the ones dealing with post liberal peace) have still not dealt with these interactions when discussing nation building. The interactions presented in this theoretical approach extend not only to state and peace building but also to the nation building processes. Richmond's concept of "everyday peace" may come about if people locally and gradually resolve their conflicts. The everyday life of citizens shows that locals remain silent to continue working or since they are "muted by international dominance and a liberal aversion to non-liberal symbolic productions" (Richmond, 2010, p. 686). Richmond proposes to focus on activities of everyday life for the international community and local actors which in turn would represent "a move from subjects to active citizens, from de-politicisation to self-government and self-determination" (Richmond, 2009a, p. 571). The local resistance is viewed as a result of the tension between liberal state building and democracy. According to the "local turn" literature, critical perceptions can be identified by local agency manifested in small-scale mobilization in everyday tasks (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013).²²¹ The next section provides some cases illustrating the interactions between and within locals and internationals and the local everyday responses to the competing claims on nation building, which resonate with the post liberal peace theory.

International Imposition of the Multi-ethnic State

Multi-ethnic states have several shortcomings. Smith, for instance, suggests that there is a paradox of nation building. Ethnic divisions always can become a source of tension that may

²²¹ For more information, please see the Local Turn section on Post Liberal Peace theory chapter.

lead to violence and/or war.²²² The life stories below confirm his point and show furthermore that this will be the case not only when the majority needs to accommodate to the minority groups preferences, but even when the majority has the power legally but still needs to accommodate heavily to the minority group due to the pressure of international community. The life story of Shkodran, an activist committed to defending human rights regardless of ethnicity provides some insights on the shortcomings of the multi-ethnic state. He has documented the Serbian and Kosovar war crimes before, during and after the war, including crimes committed against Roma and Serbs. He finds the idea of a multi-ethnic Kosovo to be “absurd”. Serbs would not be willing to return to Kosovo, as he concludes from his experience of registering them:

I was visiting them more than fifty times, I registered the displaced Serbs by saying to them, come back to Kosovo, you have your own place. But they always had excuses like, ‘no we will come back when Serb police and military comes back’.²²³

Since Kosovo is 90 per cent Albanian, he claims that it should not be a multi-ethnic state. However, it should fully respect the rights of minorities. He brings forward the idea that double standards have been introduced in Kosovo, saying that “there is no state in Europe that is a multi-ethnic state”:

It is without logic. For example, Kosovo has 92 per cent Albanians and to say that Kosovo is multi-ethnic state of Albanians, Serbs. No, my brother, Kosovo is a state of Albanians and other citizens that have all the rights according to international standards, according to minority [rights]. It should be like that.²²⁴

He points out that neither regionally in Balkans nor in Europe, multi-ethnic states formally exist. The case of a multi-ethnic Kosovo has been established due to dependency. Even the constitutions of the regions confirm homogeneity:

Serbia is Serb owned, and that’s it. Macedonia is a state of Macedonians, Montenegro of Montenegrins. Why Kosovo then is a state of communities? They do not do that for example that in their state, while they put that like a standard here.

Other Balkan states have a high number of minorities and are mono-ethnic states, while Kosovo has the lowest number of minorities, and is still established as a multi-ethnic state: “for example, Serbia has 30, up to 35 percent minorities. Macedonia has 40 percent Albanians and others, giving us less than 50 percent Macedonians. They could be multi-ethnic states rather

²²² “According to him, societies should in theory be homogenous, but in practice states take many shapes, with the international system of states being satisfied with a kind of ‘declaration of intent’ to stay unified (A. Smith, 1986, p. 229). Ethnic divisions in such states can be a source of antagonism, when the largest group needs to accommodate a smaller group (A. Smith, 1986, p. 229). These divisions can result in violence and war”. For a more detailed description of this argument, see mainstream state and peace building chapter p. 60.

²²³ Shkodran, p.20

²²⁴ Shkodran, p.16-17

than Kosovo. But they take advantage of our dependence”. According to Shkodran, this logic seems to fail since he claims that Kosovo is the most homogenous country in Europe regarding ethnical structure, more homogenous even than Poland, Slovenia and other states. This also reflects the high development of power sharing at least in law compared to the rest of the other states in the region. In practice, this reflects the risen tension from the usage of words in the Constitution. The Kosovo Constitution stipulates that The Republic of Kosovo “is a state of its citizens” and “is a multi-ethnic society consisting of Albanians and other Communities” (preamble and Art. 3) (*The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo*, 2008). However the Constitution of Serbia stipulates that it is a state of “Serbian people and all citizens” residing emphasizing Serbian ethnicity but not referring to the state as multi-ethnic (*Constitution of the Republic of Serbia*, 2006). This is despite that the number of minorities is similar with Kosovo’s case, since out of 7,498,001 total population, 6,212,838 are ethnic Serbs in Serbia (OSCE, 2008). This reflects the imposition of double standards on “multi-ethnicity” in the constitution of Kosovo by the international community. Theoretically this critique exemplifies the challenges already presented by the post liberal peace theory.

Double Standards on Minority Integration

An important part of the nation building efforts is the integration of all citizens without any discrimination or favoritism. Yet, we notice that the locals highlight the different standards used by international community regarding minority integration. More specifically, Serbian police officers boycotted the Kosovo institution. When Kosovo declared its independence, they resigned and did not perform their work since Serbia instructed them to withdraw from the Kosovo Police Service. Meanwhile, the government of Kosovo continued monthly payments for a year despite their absence. This example, revealed from Shkodran’s life story, was the topic of a personal conversation between Shkodran and a German official working in Kosovo. Shkodran argued that officers should have been laid off, while in fact after a year they were “begged” to return to their work. He asked the German official for his opinion:

He [the German official] said: ‘No, for us this is unacceptable, it cannot happen. I [Shkodran] asked him, ‘Why are you then saying to us to return Serbs that resigned while they [Serbs] say ‘We do not want to return to Kosovo since they declared independence, we serve only Serbia’, and hire back those persons?’ ‘It’s politics’, he [the German official] said.²²⁵

There are several responses from the international community, which are aimed at suppressing this local perspective or resistance. Shkodran personally, upon rejecting this standard, was categorized as being “against minorities” – an assessment which he rejects. Another very important element toward minority integration is the Serbian resistance toward integration. So

²²⁵ Shkodran, p.17

far a group of Serb minority employed the strategy to remain isolated in the North from the international community and Kosovo government. Similarly, the international community rejects their resistance and is negotiating the accession of North (granting them an association with more autonomy) within Kosovo in order to integrate in the nationalizing state, Kosovo. Similarly this critique exemplifies the challenges already presented by the post liberal peace theory.

Double Standards on Kosovar Identity

Shkodran life story also mentions a discussion with the former French Ambassador to Kosovo, Jean-Francois Fitou about the Kosovar identity. The international community attempts to strengthen the Kosovar identity and diminish the Albanian identity since 2008, after the declaration of independence. The following dialogue is very interesting because it shows how the locals tend to dissect the duplicity, real or imaginary, in the push of internationals for an solely Kosovar identity, excluding Albanian identity. Fitou, the French Ambassador claimed then that “now the Kosovo Albanians should not be recognized [meaning called] like Albanians but as Kosovar”. In turn, Shkodran replied “Fitou say that you are not French but a Chinese or German, then I will say that I am not Albanian but Kosovar”. Fitou in turn replied “No, I am French”. Shkodran explains “He [the ambassador] was feeling powerful like I am French”. Afterwards, Fitou called Shkodran “nationalist and imposing”.²²⁶ Shkodran claims that he is not nationalistic but “can’t fulfil any political request to Serbs if that is in contradiction to the Kosovo constitution or laws”. He can only help on human rights issues, employment and better services. There have also been other responses from the international community, international organizations, donors and embassies, such as stopping the funding schemes to NGOs:

if they disagree with you in something or they specify you as an organization that is against them, for example, since they communicate among themselves and share a common attitude. They never say that we are blocking it for this or that reason, and they give always a reason like, ‘No, there are no funds’ or ‘Our policies have changed’.

He says that he never became submissive regardless of any situation.

International Imposition on National Symbols and Borders

Faruk’s life story is salient on understanding the politics of national symbols. He was educated in the former Yugoslavian system and was as a student activist for Albanian rights. He served in jail and joined the peaceful movement to liberate Kosovo, LDK, and remained actively involved in politics since then. The life story of Faruk, who was actively involved in the independence of Kosovo, reveals the imposition of international actors on national sym-

²²⁶ Shkodran, p.17

bols as shown by his interactions with international community. Still using the Albanian ones in his own office, he states that the selection of the state symbols of Kosovo was

a unique challenge... with all the major obstacles. There was an extremely big pressure... starting from the national anthem, the national flag, the emblem, and in a way, I can realistically say a type of pressure that the symbols that only recognize the feelings of the majority will not be able to pass.

They created an international competition with set criteria for the creation of Kosovo's flag. The Presidency was the only institution that could keep its preferred symbols, regardless of the chosen flag. The flag of Dardania was used earlier in Kosovo, which was already used during Rugova's times.²²⁷

Another life story that is relevant for the topic is Shkodran's story. He explains the role of internationals in Kosovo as follows:

For example if you are in the car with me and I am driving it, I am the one that directs the car not you. You can advise me to go this way or that way but still I am the one that decides which way to go. And here they have the brakes in their hands... While for us it is a state issue, they come and say take it or leave it.

This shows the awareness of an identity imposed over local actors as well as the awareness of the disagreement with the internationals. Thus there is no ownership on this subject. In reaction to this patronizing governing style, Shkodran points out that changes are not possible to the national identity:

Natural Laws cannot be stopped [...]. What god created is permanent and forever. We cannot make it rain whenever we like, make it snow whenever we like, we for example can make an artificial track or lane with snow for hundred or two hundred meters but it is not real, same happens with this.²²⁸

Shkodran's rejection is motivated by the fact that the Albanian issue in the Balkans remains unresolved referring to Albanian minorities located outside the borders of Albania in Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro that are still struggling to claim and some maintain their minority rights. In addition, once Albanians defend themselves, so he claims, they are being patronized: "They [the international community] should have been protecting the independence since at least I am Albanian. They should solve the Albanian issue [...]. When we are defending it, they are trying to take our eyes out".²²⁹

Shkodran's personal stance was treated as problematic and nationalistic. The knowledge that he gained in decades of work protecting minorities in his state, can be regarded as "subjugated knowledge" in Foucault's terms which is regarded as less favourable, valuable and credible, in this case for internationals (Foucault, 1980). Upon rejecting the idea of a multi-ethnic

²²⁷ Faruk, p.6

²²⁸ Shkodran, p.17

²²⁹ Shkodran, p.17

Kosovo and the new Kosovar identity, and seeing the integration of police forces as a double standard, his person was discredited as being “against minorities” and “nationalist”. More concretely, the international community may stop NGO funding, thus forcing their closure since NGOs are donor driven in Kosovo. In Kosovo, it is very difficult to survive without international funding. Shkodran’s perspective, which he derived from decades of experience and knowledge in the human rights field, was discredited. His ambition to resolve the Albanian issue in Balkans is viewed as problematic even nowadays. However, despite the arrogant and dismissive international responses, he continues his resistance. Currently, there are no attempts to look at the factors behind the lack of progress and the possibilities for long-term solutions in Kosovo. This analysis suggests that in order to support the locals that have been subjugated, it is important to acknowledge the social impact of the international state building models and the possibility of resistance. Shkodran’s resistance is being contained by the local and international agendas.

Theoretically, Shkodran’s story reflects Lemay Hébert’s concept of the “bifurcation of the two worlds” which addresses the legitimacy gap debate between international and local actors (Lemay-Hébert, 2011). He argues that in post conflict countries, a social and political gap is created by the arrival of international actors, which provokes local resistance. More specifically, the aspect of legitimacy concerns the relations between internationals and locals as illustrated by Shkodran’s and Faruk’s life stories. They reflect the gap and contradiction in the perceptions of nation identity with some local actors holding an Albanian identity and international actors opposing it. Questions can be raised on whether this represents double standards since international actors do not themselves accept to be called differently, but insist and impose upon locals an alien representation despite resistance. As Lemay-Herbert, argues this gap produces further resistance, which is illustrated by Shkodran’s actions of claiming the right to Albanian identity in private and public conversations, despite the restriction of foreign funds for his NGO. These NGOs must engineer international actors’ plans. Lemay-Hébert argues that local resistance shows that the international administrations are losing legitimacy “hinting at a paradox of state builders being deliberately and firmly isolated yet highly visible at the same time” (Lemay-Hébert, 2011, p. 1824). Furthermore, denying local agency assists to maintain the current liberal order that is beneficial to the North (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 779). Lemay-Herbert questions whether it is inappropriate to address post-conflict challenges through international governance since it undermines its legitimacy. He suggests to counter the resulted social backlash or “social anomie” (Lemay-Hébert, 2011, p. 1827) with a more genuine consideration of impact and treatment of locals with respect (Lemay-Hébert, 2011, pp. 1833–37). Thus, the sections above substantiated the means to achieve local inclusion and respect as post liberal peace theories argue, such as by incorporating the historical identities (ethnic) in the nation symbols.

Inter-Ethnic Local Discrimination

Vera's life story explained in depth in the chapter earlier, a human rights activist, represents a similar set of challenges as she was also denounced as a "nationalist" upon trying to emancipate and promote the Albanian identity. Differently from Shkodran's story, however, the backlash came from Serbian citizens who are considered to belong to the liberal and educated strata of society. Vera grew up during the Yugoslav time where she learned how to work, travel and learn foreign languages. She finalized her education in Kosovo and she has worked with regional organizations in the region since she became an adult, the exception being the time when she studied abroad. The latter she did after the war in several Western universities in US and Europe on the field of human rights and politics. Upon return, she realized that Kosovo needs "to deal genuinely with the transitional justice" and the past, thus founded an NGO. Among her main motivations was to prevent others, and especially the Serbian government from speaking for Kosovo in regional platforms and to contribute to the Kosovar identity. However, she faced challenges both regionally and locally to open the NGO:

It was like a war on two sides. One inside, to establish the organization and to start with this kind of advocacy in order to convince people why we have to deal with this thing that in fact is a very difficult one. And on outside to say to the region, 'Stop! Kosovars will deal with Kosovo.' You did your job and thank you. We will cooperate in certain issues but leave us to do our job.

Vera's perspective is that civil society and generally citizenship needs to be developed from below as only local people know what the situation requires. In other words, it cannot be developed externally. To this, she has experienced various obstructive responses. The first were mainly for practical aspects such as securing appropriate amounts of funding. Organizations from the region initially felt threatened as there are too many. Her new organization thus threatened the funding of regional organizations, especially in Serbia, as their main focus lies on Kosovo and Bosnia:

Yes, Serbia. Just take into consideration how many organizations and NGOs basically survive from Kosovo. Kosovo is their bread and butter. Kosovo is everything to them. The majority of Serbian NGOs would not survive if Kosovo did not exist... Since you take a piece of cake [referring to funds], and that was when I saw that people are more donor-driven then... This is the way how they think, in terms of funds, power... since you take the power from them.

Other obstacles came more from the belief system that local Kosovars are unable to work for themselves, and thus the Serbian NGOs work for them: "There are organizations that see Kosovo and Bosnia too as a mind set now [mind set referring to they are identical]... We have to think for you since you do not know. We have to work for you since you do not know". This mind set created resistance and the desire among Kosovo Albanians to speak for themselves in regional platforms. Vera was sometimes able to change the dynamics in what she calls "sweet victories", even though "the war is still ongoing". She exerts pressure to prevent oth-

ers from speaking on behalf of Kosovo by showing that it has its own identity, which is different from the rest of region:

They do not want to accept it. They take it very hard. But this is a process as well. It was a challenge for me since it will take time for them to understand, that with Kosovo, Kosovars will deal with it... That is why I consider it to be a victory, a small but sweet victory. Since we achieved to get Kosovo into the process, we achieved to speak on our behalf. We achieved to make pressure such as when others used to speak on our behalf, we were stopping the work. And when they saw that we are stopping the work then they turned toward us. Kosovo is not Bosnia, neither Croatia, we have a different identity.

This occurs when some NGOs wish to control the region and therefore treat the rest of the organizations as unable and do their job. However, she rejects this attitude: "Sorry, we can take the best of you, we can take advices on this project, but you cannot do my job". Negative responses to her resistance towards prejudices by leading NGOs and her wish to emancipate Kosovo Albanians in regional platforms were present on a personal level as well. A very close friend of hers from the region considered that she was "becoming nationalist": "[The friend] considered that I'm not that liberal Vera as I used to be. And I am still liberal, extremely liberal. When I said that I have to do something since this is my identity".²³⁰ Vera's story shows that negative responses in the region arise when Kosovo Albanians decide to invest in their identity and speak for themselves.

In the literature, this life story could be understood as an attempt towards achieving local ownership. However, the idea of local ownership faces resistance not only by internationals as shown by Shkodran's and Faruk's stories, but also from the other ethnicities in the region. Similar to Shkodran, Vera's aim to contribute to the Albanian identity was understood by a Serbian intellectual friend as "becoming nationalist". These obstacles seem to be present for two main reasons, namely practical reasons such as competing NGOs wanting to secure more funding and prejudices that used to be present already before and during the Milosevic regime. They seem to persist nowadays, portraying Kosovo Albanians as uneducated and thus unable to speak for themselves, and as requiring to be represented by others. Vera's personal perspective was treated as a problematic turn to nationalism. The neglect of prejudices held by both regional and international actors suggests that there is still a presence of biases towards Albanians or Kosovars in the region. The Kosovo Albanian identity and the quest for local ownership seems to remain a problem for regional actors which still aim to suppress them by speaking on their behalf and doing their work. Resisting such prejudices is difficult. As Vera puts it, "[i]t is a permanent [underground] war". She acknowledges that obstacles are placed at all levels, but she continues to be motivated in her work. However, other individuals in Kosovo seem not interested to resist prejudices because "people are motivated to get a sala-

²³⁰ Vera, p.10-15

ry at the end of the month and that's it".²³¹ Vera's story is thus exceptional, and while her resistance may last, she points out that few others share her commitment. The life stories show consequently that social prejudices are still operating against the Albanian identity in the Balkans and that they influence local ownership over state building processes. This represents a serious challenge in solving the long-term problems in Kosovo and the Balkans more generally. Vera's story suggests therefore that it is important to find ways of acknowledging the ramifications of prejudices and the possibility of resistance. If local ownership is not acknowledged, cleavages will be reinforced between the different ethnicities in the region or between internationals and Kosovo Albanians.

This resonates with the post liberal peace theory arguing for inclusion of local voices. It also resonates with the "need for any locally legitimate state to be grounded in its context" (Richmond, 2014a, p. 1). It also substantiated how the local nation building is being negotiated and mediated on the local context with the example of rising inter-ethnic discrimination and resistance when ethnic national identities are emphasized. These theoretical perspectives together with the life stories show that approaches to nation building must be grounded in context.

Conclusion

The life story experiences in Kosovo inform theoretical discussions of ethnic nation building and civic as well. The "Western myopia" equating state and nation building as one process, successfully in England and France, was later mirrored in Eastern Europe and the Third World. Tilly showed that these cases were very violent. The life stories illustrate that there are pre-existing fixed identities and social prejudices against Albanians. Smith argues that the Western model "cannot be transplanted" since ethnic homogeneity and institutions lack in these countries (Smith, 1986, p. 230). Nationalism is challenged "when ethnic homogeneity and cultural coextensiveness become desirable goals themselves" (Smith, 1986, p. 230). The well-educated citizens are nationalistic as well "even if only tacitly, through exclusion and self-differentiation" since they lack knowledge of viable alternatives of "culture and political existence... [therefore there is] no possibility of returning to a pre-nationalist era" (Smith, 1986, p. 230). The empirical evidence, namely life stories, illustrate a growing will among Albanians toward maintaining and empowering the ethnic national identity as well as a growing resistance towards this process by the international community and other ethnicities. This rejection or marginalization of the Albanian ethnic national identity has provoked private and public resistance. As Smith acknowledges, nationalism will remain, therefore space needs to be given to ethnic national identities, as they cannot be erased.

²³¹ Vera, p.10-11

This goes against the modernization theory claim that “successful states required a citizenry that identified itself with the state over other ethnic or religious allegiances” (C. Call & Wyeth, 2008, p. 11). Many theories move beyond nationalism, such as cosmopolitanism, theories of global politics and regional identity (e.g. European).²³² Globalization and the rise of technology change national and cultural identities transnationally. For instance, the European identity that surpassed the old animosities is being promoted currently with Europeanisation efforts of Balkans. However, many social groups may perceive universal and regional notions negatively due to their incomprehensiveness and insensitivity to local cultures. Therefore when transplanting notions, special attention needs to be paid to the local context such as by including the ethnical national identities in nation building process.

The life stories show that both the international perspective and the local group supporting a two state solution fail to acknowledge these problems. They focus on security and power politics, a realist approach towards world politics rather than identity [national] and culture. In other words, in practice, security and institution building including EU integration are seen as the most significant issues by the internationals and the local group supporting a two state solution, whereas other locals supporting unification with Albania deal more with the problems of identity faced in everyday life. The latter resonates with a constructivist understanding of politics. Furthermore the current situation in Kosovo seems to be far removed from the tenets of post liberal peace theorists. They propose a combination of various streams of theory, amongst others realist and constructivist, to be used in post conflict situations as explained: “[Post liberal peace] may include a mix of some liberalism, some context, some version of the state, etc., which collectively address security, rights, needs, identity, custom, culture and institutions” (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p. 222).

The image of common perceptions and beliefs that arose from the international interviews support the EU integration as a solution to not only nation but also peace and state building, whereas the image of common perceptions that arose from everyday life stories show additional disputes in the nation building process between local and international actors and between various local ethnicities. An interesting pattern is observed among both groups, international and local (elite) respectively, where Albanian empowerment and local ownership is labelled as “nationalist”. This indicates containment of the Albanian ethnic identity over a regional or Kosovar civic identity, which may have counterproductive consequences on local empowerment and ownership and unintended consequences such as strengthening radical na-

²³² For more on cosmopolitan and global citizenship theories, see Gibernau on local citizenship; ‘*Defining European Identity and Citizenship*’ (Delanty, 1996, 1997); Eyben, R. and S. Ladbury (2006), ‘*Building effective states: taking a citizens perspective*’, Centre for Citizenship, Participation and Accountability; ‘*Democracy, Citizenship and Global City*’ (Isin, 2013) and ‘*Constructing a Global Polity*’ (Corry, 2013).

tionalism. The containment strategy silences local actors through humiliation or the cutting of donor funds. The silencing of the Albanian identity in the local population in Kosovo may result in a vulnerable nation building as well as European integration.

The last dilemma concerns whether the containment of Albanian national identity in everyday life and work by other ethnic groups and internationals, where the latter are assumed to be intellectual, will produce further nationalism among Albanians and Serbs in this fragile situation. It also raises questions about the actual impact of high levels of foreign interference on nation and state building. Strong local objections are observed about the multi ethnic form of the state and its symbols. In light of the foreign impositions, Albanian everyday containment, growing nationalism in Serbia and the rest of the region, Russia's assertiveness in global affairs as shown with attacks in Ukraine, the far away prospect of EU membership, and the instability in Turkey, it is questionable whether European Union integration can deliver in stabilization and nation building in that region.

Given this question on whether containing the Albanian ethnic national identity would produce negative peace or unintended consequences such as radicalization needs to be posed. Space needs to be given for this question. The life stories show that nation building is difficult to be reconstructed, as Walker Connor argued that neglecting ethnicity in nation building processes results in failure (Connor, 1972, 1993). Van Evera argues that ethnic identities cannot be easily reconstructed since they are reinforced when literacy rates are achieved. They are also reinforced by violent conflict and identities of non-immigrant ethnic groups are far more firmly fixed than immigrant identities. However alternatively the international community instead of marginalizing the Albanian identity may try to reshape it as Van Evera argues "while ethnic identities can seldom be transformed into new identities, theory can often be made more benign and efforts in this direction can bolster peace" (Van Evera, 2001, p. 1). This chapter also incorporates post-liberal peace theory, which suggests a combination of liberal peace theory with local cultures and identities, proposing to include nationalism amongst local culture in nation building process. For instance, elements of ethnicity could contribute to national anthems, flags, etc.

Lessons may be drawn from the historical peaceful coexistence of Albanians of different religions for the relations between ethnicities in today's Kosovo. Shifting the policy focus towards peaceful ideas such as "religious peaceful coexistence: may promote a more moderate understanding of "Albanianism" and mitigate the unintended consequences of the current containment strategy of the ethnic national identity. This also moves beyond the categorizations of Albanians during the war as "victims", "criminals" and others. Lastly, the recent demonstrations in Macedonia drew together Macedonian and Albanian ethnicities against the quasi-authoritarian regime of Macedonia despite attempts of the government to deepen cleavages and spark violence by attacking an Albanian family in Kumanovo. Furthermore, lessons

may be drawn from the findings that indicate a balanced nation building by including ethnic national identity culture represented by the national ethnic symbols, anthems, tradition and language. Furthermore, the life stories show that history must as well become part of nation building dialogue in order to reshape the already existing strong myths about identities. This illustrates that ethnic nation building may be viewed complementary to civic nation building. Taking into account all these aspects, a starting point could be to promote mild forms of ethnic national identity of Albanians, complementary to the civic national identity of Kosovars. This is mainly since one group of local actors accepts both identities, civic and ethnic. Promoting and accepting simultaneously the ethnic national identities of Albanians and Serbs and the civic national identity of Kosovo may allow the reconciliation of local identities and cultures with the new national civic identity of Kosovo. Marginalization of the local voices, respectively the ethnical national identities, does not guarantee successes as shown by growing empirical evidence on local resistance. Thus pursuing ethnic nation building as complementary to the civic nation building may contribute to sustainable nation building and peace. A mix of these could ensure that within states, societies coexist without falling back to war. In other words, nationalism is not bad per se, including important aspects such as culture, identity, tradition, language, which all can contribute positively to nation building. Still, it becomes negative when connotations of hate and discrimination are attached. Better social, economic and political situations in fragile countries could also prevent a falling back into destructive patterns of nationalism. In such a context, state building, nation building and peace building could be pursued in tandem. To conclude, the methodology of life stories provides new angles on nation building, identified as one of the main challenges by the local community, which were so far unexplored in theoretical and policy debates.

8. The Life Stories on Peace: Towards Instrumental Reconciliation: Balancing Moral and Instrumental Reconciliation on the Institutional and Individual Level

“Even if an Albanian has sexual intercourse with a Serbian female, [it] becomes politics here.”²³³

Introduction

Peace building²³⁴ refers to actions undertaken by “international or national actors to consolidate or institutionalize peace” (Call, 2008b, p. 5). The current chapter shows that, in addition to Call’s definition, not only institutional actors but also individuals play a significant role in peace building activities. These activities mainly seek to strengthen various state functions, thus creating an overlap with state building and reconciliation agendas (Call, 2008b, p. 5; Goetze & Guzina, 2008, p. 319). Similarly, Greener states that reconciliation is also an element of contemporary state building, consisting of the “technical” activities of (re)building democracy, the rule of law and the economic system (Greener, 2012, p. 418).²³⁵ In contrast, Rosoux argues that due to the “many ambiguities and shortcomings” associated with reconciliation, it should not be used as a key concept in peacemaking and stabilization (Rosoux, 2008). In contrast to Rosoux, this chapter based on life stories argues that reconciliation may contribute to state building and peace building if the dynamics of reconciliation at the institutional and individual level, in the public and private domains in Kosovo, can be understood. This chapter therefore focuses on analysing the second element of peace building, namely reconciliation, since the state building element has already been analyzed in the previous chapter.

In addition, the peace building literature comprehensively analyses the impact of policy programs at the institutional level, such as security sector reforms, disarmament, demobilization and the reintegration of former fighters in Kosovo (Barakat & Özerdem, 2005; Bernabéu, 2007; Özerdem, 2003). It also discusses policy initiatives such as inter-faith dialogue, initia-

²³³ Shkodran, p.13

²³⁴ Peacebuilding is defined in the mainstream theoretical chapter as “Peacebuilding aims to end war and prevent a relapse through various interventions, by rebuilding institutions, promoting national peace and fostering reconciliation between former adversaries.”

²³⁵ Please see the policy areas for each aspect of statebuilding: (re)building of democracy (constitution, electoral processes & offices of state), the rule of law (security and justice) and the economic system (taxation, etc.).

tives concerning gender and everyday issues like employment, education and youth. Current reconciliation research usually focuses on changes at the institutional level, which leaves the individual level under-researched. On the one hand, it addresses in detail judicial mechanisms such as criminal trials, which are of special importance for fulfilling the “duty to prosecute”. The latter aims to bring justice to victims and simultaneously achieve a deterrent effect. Special attention is given also to the non-judicial mechanisms, such as political apologies, truth and reconciliation commissions and amnesties, implemented at the institutional level. On the other hand, such research looks at political mechanisms, including power sharing mechanisms and institutional agreements. However, many consider it misguided to view transitional justice tools as having the potential to achieve peace building, seeing them as lacking the potential to fulfill their stated purpose and seeing their implementation as problematic. The following chapter therefore compares international perspectives, most of which highlight the institutional level, with local community perspectives on individual and institutional reconciliation. Special attention is hence paid to the individual level and to the local community’s perception of the impact of the international community’s involvement in reconciliation through life stories. This follows Ross’s argument that cross-cultural practices (that is, social practices that assist citizens to live together) also need to be addressed (Ross, 2003). Nadler points out that there is a lack of a body of knowledge on the theory of peace building and social-psychological research (Nadler, 2005). Ross proposes solutions to address the basic threats to identity and the intense sense of victimization expressed in cultural as well as political acts (Ross, 2003).

Turning to the case study, the Stability Pact aimed, among other things, at inter-ethnic reconciliation as envisaged in Resolution 1244, demanded full cooperation in the area of criminal justice by all parties, including the security presence, and the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). However, inter-ethnic reconciliation remains a delicate issue in Kosovo as it is shown in life stories. Many life story interviewees pointed out the need to improve institution building across the main state functions (security, justice and economic reconstruction), along with the need to address the impunity of perpetrators, truth telling and missing persons. In addition, the need for basic democratic functioning is emphasized as necessary for political stability and peace building. The (un)integration of Northern Kosovo and (un)reconciliation pose a high risk to the viability of peace and of the state of Kosovo. This chapter therefore addresses international and local perspectives on institutional efforts only briefly, as extensive research has already been conducted on this aspect.²³⁶ Instead it focuses in-depth on the individual level of reconciliatory efforts through life stories. The following

²³⁶ For more information, please consult articles by Jitske Hoogenboom, Nora Ahmetaj and Natasa Kandic.

questions are posed: How is reconciliation understood by the local community and the international community? What are their main differences and commonalities? How, why and when does reconciliation occur from these perspectives? What should be the first steps toward reconciliation and how it may impact peace building in the long term? This chapter thus aims to understand how the former enemies in Kosovo are moving forward with each other after the 1999 war. It argues that instrumental reconciliation is the first step toward moral reconciliation. This step promotes inter-ethnic cooperation at the individual and state levels, which intentionally or unintentionally dispels myths and restores dignity and a human view of the other, due to everyday inter-ethnic cooperation. Research in political science focuses on instrumental reconciliation at the institutional rather than the individual level. However, life stories from the local community reveal that instrumental reconciliation is also present at the individual level and in civil society.

To come to these understandings, three sociological tools were used to uncover in-depth knowledge of political science themes (peace, nation, state) usually studied from a realist/security perspective: the life story method for interviews, the snowballing method for data collection and grounded theory for analysis.²³⁷ This presents an inter-disciplinary and original research. The life story approach is used to provide an understanding of reconciliation at the individual level to exemplify the challenges of and solutions for instrumental reconciliation. It provides in-depth investigation through the life stories of individuals living in Kosovo's divided post-conflict society, people whose interaction and involvement with reconciliation is very political and personal. Around eight life stories were chosen through snowball sampling, population criteria, involvement in post conflict reconstruction period, interactions with international community, availability, access and grounded theory. The latter required theoretical sampling, which respectively necessitated using life stories that introduce new theoretical concepts concerning the challenges to reconciliation,²³⁸ and which exemplify the challenges of reconciliation at the institutional and individual levels. In addition, the life stories interview method was used for the first time as far as I know in the fields of peace building and reconciliation. This therefore contributes to the current body of literature in these fields, which lacks analyses of the kind that result from this innovative methodology and empirical research. The life stories that offered the ability to transfer the main threads and were rich in details were used in this chapter. Artan's life story exemplifies the non-reconciliatory initiatives passed in legislation that arose from the international community's policies as usually implemented by servile political elites. Mira's narrative describes the distorting role of Serbia's government in Northern Kosovo. Gjin's story discuss-

²³⁷ Please consult the methods chapter for more information on methodology.

²³⁸ Ibid.

es the unequal representation of minorities that impacts reconciliation among minorities. Vera's narrative is crucial for understanding the role of non-judicial mechanisms in promoting peace building. Dhurata's life story raises questions about the role of the international community in the Northern Kosovo and is used to uncover positive reconciliatory practices among NGOs and citizens. Mira's story similarly shows how myths can be questioned through the regular interaction between communities if the context allows it, as is the case in Kosovo with moderate levels of security. As will become clear below, the latter could be obtained in an easy and cost-efficient manner by involving researchers that speak the local languages.

Towards an Instrumental Approach to Reconciliation

Reconciliation is “fundamentally disjunctured and uneven” (Verdeja, 2009, p. 182). It is a process rather than a goal, and is thus “not linear, but a continuously evolving relationship between parties: at each stage a relapse into violence is possible” (Rosoux, 2008). Political reconciliation is understood as a complex process where two fragile processes exist in the same moment, former adversaries open up to each other but also question them. This is viewed as a never-ending process (Schaap, 2004). Delicacy is “required” at every step of reconciliation as it is

impossible to return the tree to its prior self, just as it may be impossible to reconcile fully following terrible events, but the belief in a healthy tree, strong in its foundation and confident in its branches, gives hope to the possibility of a better future (Verdeja, 2009, p. 185)

According to Lily Gardner Feldman (2012), the distinction between moral and instrumental reconciliation is that moral reconciliation deals with moral issues like values and friendship while instrumental reconciliation concerns business and economic relations and benefits derived from engaging in intrastate relations. Analyzing German foreign policy aimed at reconciliation and overcoming the legacy of the war, Feldman argues that motives transform from shared values and friendship to instrumental business and economic calculations. She observes that while German-French reconciliation presents a case of instrumental reconciliation, the German–Israeli case mirrors moral reconciliation (Feldman, 2012). Verdeja proposes a closer focus on discussion, deliberation and politics based on the democratic values of the “others” to achieve reconciliation, rather than “deep acceptance, or willful embrace of the “other”” understood as moral reconciliation (Verdeja, 2009, p. 181). Kelman argues that the “key is mutual acceptance of the other’s identity and humanity” (Kelman, 2008, p. 16). In other words, reconciliation

is, in its final calculus, about reintroducing former antagonists back into the same moral sphere and (2) that this requires an honest and sustained en-

gement with the past and with the moral issues surrounding perpetrators, bystanders, and victims (Verdeja, 2009, p. 25)

On the one hand, the liberal peace building approaches promote reconciliation through legal mechanisms (i.e. courts), institutional mechanisms (peace agreements and/or power sharing) and non-legal mechanisms (political apologies, truth and/or reconciliation commissions and amnesties). On the other hand, critical peace building approaches recognize the need to address reconciliation as part of peace building. To enable a just peace, the main requirement is to combine a focus on the everyday with a global ethic of “care” associated with morality, solidarity and “empathy” (Richmond, 2009a, p. 574). On other words, it may be understood as a freedom that may escape or moderate “the hegemonic tendencies of liberal social and political governance” (Richmond, 2009a, p. 575). Taking an empathic approach meaning dealing with local-local interactions with empathy and care may result in better peace building. Questions such as who must presumably provide care remain unanswered (Richmond, 2009a, p. 573). The understanding of peace from marginalized citizens would presumably be incorporated by the resulted Allan and Keller’s “just peace” (achieving peace by peace rather than war). The everyday peace focuses on free speech, human rights of people, recognition and reconciliation. They argue that on contrary, the liberal peace building rejects recognition of some “others”, prioritizes liberal groups and hence reproduces the process of marginalization (Richmond, 2009a, p. 573). The latter process may hinder reconciliation.

According to the post liberal peace theory, a hybrid liberal peace appears when politics is emphasized rather than institutional frameworks and “where negotiation, mediation, assistance, consensus, consent and reconciliation form the basis of any peace” (Tadjbakhsh & Richmond, 2011, p. 235). To enable a hybrid liberal peace, the genuine inclusion of locals, and their agency that may be in forms of compliance, resistance and non-participation, is necessary. So far most of the cases of post conflict reconstruction seem to have resulted on a hybrid peace (usually resulting on negative peace). However the post liberal peace theorists preferred outcome would be everyday or just peace resulting on positive peace. Several critiques arose developed in reaction to the everyday peace viewing it as illegitimate, Eurocentric, hyper-critical, understating the role of excessive international or local power and power politics in the current multipolar world.²³⁹ Following the reasoning of everyday peace, achieving reconciliation through the notions of care and empathy and the genuine inclusion of locals is the preferred result. However, many conditions that are under-researched by post-liberal peace theorists are necessary for it to occur. The instrumental reconciliation approach (which may also lead to moral reconciliation) may assist post-liberal peace theory in extending the understanding of how reconciliation may be achieved, and through what steps. These understand-

²³⁹ Please consult the post-liberal state and peacebuilding chapter for more information on the everyday peace and local turn.

ings derive from a combination of the empirical data collected in Kosovo and a theoretical framework originated in the psychological field.

The combination of the frameworks of (i) mutual trust and (ii) instrumental and moral reconciliation may take into account the former barriers to reconciliation in everyday life. Verdeja has developed a theoretical framework, which combines interest and identity approaches in order to understand the process of reconciliation. His framework consists of five concepts: public dissemination of truth about past atrocities, the accountability of perpetrators, public recognition and acknowledgment of victims, a commitment to the rule of law and the development of mutual respect among former enemies (Verdeja, 2009, p. 180). His model focuses on the principle of mutual respect between perpetrators and victims, implemented at the state or individual levels. His understanding of reconciliation presents “a condition of mutual respect between former adversaries that necessitates the reciprocal recognition of moral worth and dignity” (Verdeja, 2009, p. 180). In successful reconciliatory cases, new identities replace the older ones that contributed to the conflict, individuals see each other as “moral beings” and maintain the goals of “tolerance and respect”. In other cases, a lack of acceptance and forgiveness by the victims and a lack of acknowledgment of victims about the wrongdoings of the perpetrators will remain, but respect may prevail. This model is developed across four different levels: the political level (political leaders’ messages, often based on state legitimacy and stability rather than reflecting on responsibility), the institutional level (the functioning of state and legal responses), civil society and the interpersonal level (individual citizens). Actions at one level alone are insufficient for reconciliation, as various factors influence it.

This chapter focuses on how reconciliation is manifested at the individual/interpersonal level, since it also complements the methodology of life stories (Verdeja, 2009, p. 4). The individual level is important because of the variety of responses to past crimes shaped by the everyday experiences of individuals. Responses can range from vengeance, through resentment to forgiveness. Everyday experiences may assist in rebuilding societal relations through sustained personal interactions, resulting in the rehumanization of the other. These processes are full of distrust, anger, and fear, but Verdeja argues that *mutual respect* can develop. Forgiveness may not be possible, but mutual respect can serve as the cornerstone of new relations. His suggestions are more pragmatic, and expectations are limited since post conflict countries are filled with bitterness, threats of more violence, and emotional, material, political and social instabilities. Mutual respect does not require forgiveness from victims, but nor does it exclude the possibility of forgiveness. Thus it is significantly deeper than “mere coexistence” and is morally defensible (Verdeja, 2009, p. 168). It provides the “most basic commitment by individuals themselves to live within a shared moral sphere with their former adversaries” (Verdeja, 2009, p. 179).

To establish interpersonal reconciliation, a partial pardon is instead required. It can be “partial and offer a kind of acceptance of the perpetrator as an equal for the purposes of social coexistence without any deep requirement of deep ontological transformation on the part of victim and violator” (Verdeja, 2009, p. 169). It is more robust than thin coexistence, because even to consider pardoning there must be some acknowledgment of past wrongs and recognition of victims. The pardon is “premised on the belief that any stable and just future must focus on creating a common moral, political and social space for former enemies” (Verdeja, 2009, p. 172). Nevertheless, it does not excuse the perpetrators from responsibility. In this case, interpersonal relations are based on principles of mutual respect that balance the requirements of both victims and perpetrators. Respect “emerges from personal relations, from changes in attitudes and behavior, and from a willingness to accept others as moral equals, though not necessarily as friends or intimates” (Verdeja, 2009, p. 173). Therefore mutual respect emerges over time rather than in “one moment” since former enemies, through continued and sustained interaction, need to build trust by working together on common initiatives (Verdeja, 2009, p. 173). As a result, tolerance is created by establishing and nurturing relationships over time, even when differences are still part of the social background. Tolerance is based on notions of respect, of “recognition of the value of others, not because of their political views or identity but because of their status as beings carrying moral rights and that we have an obligation to recognize” (Verdeja, 2009, p. 170).

Generally, Verdeja argues that time alone is not sufficient for reconciliation. Victims must feel “hope” rather than that the future holds “fragile peace or continued impunity”, as then the sources of violence are contained rather than removed. It is essential for former enemies to work together to address the deepest causes of conflict. Political elites need to stress “unity” based on “justice and respect” rather than emphasizing differences. Individuals need to experience these changes in everyday life, thus respect and tolerance need to be practiced in everyday life (Verdeja, 2009, p. 175). The personal experiences of survivors must be told publicly, since this provides recognition to victims and also rehumanizes them as moral agents where “critical histories reframe history and bring stories of individuals to the fore, thus drawing the importance of human rights and the dignity of victims”. Commemoration ceremonies and memory sites are also important, since they serve as links “between individual experiences and social reflections on the past”. They could assist in combating the impunity and marginalization that often accompanies “victimhood” (Verdeja, 2009, p. 176). Material reparations due to poverty are also necessary. Care should be paid to reparations, since giving a small amount merely to silence the victims is not only irresponsible and insensitive but may also harm the process of reconciliation in the long run. Interpersonal reconciliation also requires institutional reforms (rule of law, transparency, accountability) and civil society must represent the needs of victims. When citizens have little trust in institutions, reconciliation is

unlikely to develop, as they may choose private vengeance instead. On the other hand, accountability “signals to the population what values should be protected in the new society” (Verdeja, 2009, p. 178). But the values of accountability and recognition “require more than merely legal enforcement” (Verdeja, 2009, p. 22). Leaders can also change the debate to confront the past in the public and private domains, providing reparations and apologies. Interpersonal reconciliatory efforts are sensitive to developments at other social levels, such as the political, civil society and institutional (Verdeja, 2009, p. 179).

Motives for reconciliation can be both pragmatic and moral (Rosoux, 2008). The approach suggested by the psychology professor Arie Nadler for assessing the different needs of adversaries provides two paths for intergroup reconciliation: socio-emotional and instrumental reconciliation. This distinction refers to various needs and motives at the individual level that can also have an impact at the state level. Socio-emotional reconciliation focuses on recognizing the “equal and worthy identity of each party”. Its goal is to integrate adversaries into a “we” feeling and to address the causes of conflict. This approach is revolutionary, and occurs after the completion of the cycle of apology and forgiveness by victims and perpetrators. This is similar to the understanding of moral reconciliation explained above. Instrumental reconciliation is the second path to reconciliation, focused on building trustworthy relationships between the parties. This approach involves evolutionary change through gradual learning in which former adversaries work together on several projects until they earn each other’s trust. For instrumental reconciliation to succeed, it is important to repeat the events regularly and in the correct order. The goal is “separation between the enemy parties” so that they can co-exist in a conflict free environment (Nadler & Schnabel, 2008, p. 43). Instrumental reconciliation is the first step towards socio-emotional/moral reconciliation. In fact, victims seek more “power and justice”, while perpetrators seek “acceptance and empathy”. In politics, apology-forgiveness may be perceived as a “springboard for further demands and accusations”. Under conditions of “double-victimhood” (where both parties claim the role of the victim) socio-emotional reconciliation is more difficult (Nadler & Schnabel, 2008, pp. 51–52). Therefore the forgiveness-apology cycle is difficult to achieve at the political/institutional level in the case of Kosovo, since both Serbs and Albanians perceive themselves as victims.

Also, this model may be inappropriate, since Verdeja has already shown that there are cases where forgiveness is not possible at the individual level. For some victims, forgiveness is viewed as a denial of self-respect and dignity. Therefore, the concept of mutual respect that promotes a robust integration of communities (Verdeja) is proposed to be central for instrumental reconciliation, rather than the mere co-existence in separate communities as Nadler argues. In other words, instrumental reconciliation may lead to mutual respect rather than mere co-existence. So far, the notion of instrumental reconciliation has been rarely used in political science. The case of reconciliation in Somalia has been analyzed through instrumen-

tal reconciliation from the institutional level perspective. According to Cobb and Yusuf, reaching a peace settlement in Somalia through power-sharing agreements at the national level and the truth telling/compensation model reveals assumptions that peace can be negotiated. Somalia still faces difficulties in creating sustainable peace at the national level using instrumental reconciliation. Instrumental reconciliation has been successful so far at the local level, but it cannot easily be transferred to the national level. Thus Cobb and Yusuf conclude that socio-emotional reconciliation is necessary in Somalia (Cobb & Yusuf, 2011, pp. 336–7). This paper does not take into account instrumental reconciliation on the interpersonal level in Somalia. Similarly, Lily Feldman, a political scientist analyzing German foreign policy aimed at reconciliation at the institutional/state level rather than the individual level, uses the model of reconciliation distinguishing moral and instrumental reconciliation (Feldman, 2012). This chapter therefore primarily focuses on understanding reconciliation, whether moral or instrumental, primarily at the interpersonal/individual level and only secondarily at the institutional level. This attempts to fill the gap already shown in the political science literature with empirical evidence from Kosovo, and to bridge the gap between the institutional and individual levels of reconciliation, and that between theory and practice, through life stories about reconciliation. It suggests that instrumental reconciliation can engage with the past while focusing on the present at the individual level, and does not necessarily lead to communities living as separate entities once they start cooperating and interacting with each other. Instead, if mutual self-respect is developed between the conflicting parties, the situation goes beyond mere coexistence, perhaps even leading to moral reconciliation. The following section presents the international perspective on reconciliation and peace building.

The International Perspectives on Reconciliation

International actors on the ground and in Brussels and New York seem to hold a common view on why the international community should engage in reconciliation in Kosovo. Regarding the general role of the international community, James, an international official working for a development organization said: “I still want to believe in good”. He views engagement in Kosovo as part of a common goal for the international community: humanity, human security, peace and EU integration. According to him, intervention in Kosovo and the continued engagement with Kosovo has two aspects: “global aspects of why countries intervened” and a humanitarian aspect.

Reconciliation and Peace through the European Union Integration

According to him, peace in the Balkan region seems to depend on the EU integration of Balkan states, the necessity of which is strongly emphasized and is backed by the United States. James provides several reasons for Kosovo to be integrated into the EU. First, EU states real-

ize that the “white spot on the EU map needs to be integrated basically from a historical and traditional point of view, that this is part of the EU”, thus “everybody in Kosovo has one common goal”. Secondly, the geographical location, specifically its proximity, plays an important role in accession to Europe and peace in the Balkans. He says that nobody wants a “crisis in your back yard”. He drew a comparison between Congo and Kosovo at the time of intervention, arguing that intervention in Congo was more necessary than in Kosovo due to the high scale of human rights breaches there. He believes that the international community did not intervene in Congo since it considered the situation “ok”, despite the situation there at all times being “much worse than it has ever been in Kosovo”. The international community also does not acknowledge that “it was a problem or really problematic”, since it is “so far away, it’s not part [of the EU]”. Thus the scale of human rights breaches seems to be less important than geographical proximity to the EU when interventions take place for the purpose of maintaining regional or world peace. James and his colleagues traveled to the FRY frontlines to see how the war developed:

I think it [intervention] has nothing to do with any particular friendship, it has nothing to do with Albanians, Serbs or whatever. It has to do with that humanitarian catastrophe being so close. It’s there, you can just go there. I was in Sarajevo in ‘97. There were people traveling with cars from humanitarian catastrophes to see where their frontlines were, where the problems were and things like that. So it’s very close, you can just go there, so I think the place is an incentive [for intervention and peace]

According to him, Americans “also want to have Kosovo in the EU” for two reasons: to take the problem out of hands and to help their allies achieve their aims, as “they are their friends and Kosovo wants to be part of the EU and that’s where they belong”.²⁴⁰

But there are also some national interests for some European states, i.e. Switzerland, Germany, Austria and others which host large numbers of the Albanian diaspora. James says that what “we shouldn’t underestimate the repatriation of Kosovo [Albanians]” since there is no “economic necessity” for these states to hold them. That is that we should not underestimate the likelihood that all the states hosting Kosovo Albanians will suddenly decide to repatriate them en masse, creating problems for Kosovo in reintegrating them. Furthermore, domestic politics pushes these states to deport more, as “how you talk about us, foreigners and repatriation” is a major issue in national elections.

Regional and world security is another important aspect of Kosovo’s integration into the EU. For instance, it is very important for Romania, Bulgaria and Greece to maintain security in the Balkans due to their economic connections with Europe. If instability in the Balkans grew they would suffer direct economic damage.²⁴¹ Many other interviewees, including Patricia

²⁴⁰ James, p.2

²⁴¹ James, p.2

and Eric, see regional security and peace as similarly important.²⁴² Thus, the international community's aim is to create "a safe and secure environment for all Kosovars regardless of their ethnicity".²⁴³ According to James, the "priority is to build a place that does not produce security risks" and to prevent things going "wrong", since it is the "center of peace and stability". Thus, minimizing confrontation with "high security risks" is a priority. Currently, the military presence on the ground provided by KFOR, is very small. James points out that "the more you loosen the strings of supervision, the more you have to rely on local dynamics to be sustainable". Thus, the aims of providing security and maintaining peace are achieved through political stability, the functioning of the Assembly and regional cooperation. James indicates that Serbia has a strong influence over Kosovo's peace and security: "This matters more in Serbia than Kosovo". However, he emphasizes that it is important to "build something that functions, that can stand on its own feet" but he is also skeptical: "In theory ... this will work, but in reality this is different, we need to keep a close watch". Thus it seems that peace and security may be fragile in Kosovo.

In addition, Kosovo's state building is viewed as the best available means for creating peace in the Balkans. The goal was "peace, stability and possible long term integration into the EU".²⁴⁴ It is not only presumed that Kosovo's integration into the EU will achieve peace, but also that it will help nation and state building, as argued by the international officials in the last two chapters.²⁴⁵ Institutional initiatives are at the heart of discussions about peace and reconciliation.

Politicization of Reconciliation

After securing security, other tasks, such as reconciliation, can follow: "[the international community would] be able to do many of the other tasks much more smoothly, also including reconciliation, turning the page on the war".²⁴⁶ For Eric, it is important that the population shifts away from the emotional state that the war created: "the baggage of old feelings and bitter emotions left behind from that episode and the history of Serbia and Kosovo".²⁴⁷ Reconciling fully with Serbia and with Kosovo Serbs "would be very important".²⁴⁸ For Rohan

²⁴² Patricia, p.1

²⁴³ Eric, p.3

²⁴⁴ This has been already dealt in the statebuilding chapter: 'James argues that the 'biggest differences among the international community' are over how peace can be achieved through a state or other model such as autonomy within Serbia. In the case of Kosovo, the international community 'wants to build a state' but this was 'not the aim'. The goal was 'peace, stability and possible long term integration into the EU'.... Generally, it is hoped to bring peace by making a 'big push' to make Kosovo 'a member of EU'.'

²⁴⁵ James, p.7

²⁴⁶ Eric, p.3

²⁴⁷ Eric, p.3

²⁴⁸ Albert, p.6

and Milton, reconciliation and transitional justice resonate more with moral understandings of reconciliation:

you try to re-endorse those who have committed serious crimes against justice in the first place, but in a broader way you also try to bring a certain form of reconciliation. That means bringing perpetrators and victims together.

They perceive that judicial mechanisms are limited since they may be politicized, as observed with the transfer of Serbian war criminals, presumably linked to the IMF credit and aid packages.²⁴⁹ Rohan and Milton believe that UNMIK, the international community and the United States failed to foster reconciliation by “not investigating properly” war crimes “in the best possible way”, specifically cases of murder and disappearance. Serbians are more likely to initiate judicial proceedings regarding such cases than Albanians. According to them, after the war the international powers’ prejudices against Serbia led to “discrimination” and to “no support [being] given to Serbs; in the beginning everything was against the Serbs: international, world public opinion. It was certainly like that and with good reason and I think that you could also feel that within the UN”. In addition, they claim that the United Nations promoted double standards regarding justice implementation. International actors promised to bring justice to people since it’s “possible to bring everyone to justice” but “not in the way you would do it in a Western European country... something more could have been done”. Political interference in the judicial mechanisms for dealing with war crimes presumably stems from American power. Rohan and Milton believe that this irregular type of justice is “a bit easier to do under UNMIK” due to American power, as “Americans would not like to get involved in all these criminal cases, or they prefer to leave it like it is, I think it’s a missed, opportunity”. They presume that these processes occur across the whole Balkan region, not only in Kosovo.²⁵⁰

In addition, the establishment of EULEX is viewed as “not a coincidence”.²⁵¹ Despite the rationale that the EU institution may be subject to less American influence, the case of EULEX seems to show similar political interference as presumed with UNMIK. Carlos, who worked for EULEX, explained that the American Ambassador phoned to stop a house search and arrest in a high-level corruption and war crimes case. The reason provided by the Ambassador was that he needed some contracts to be performed for a company, and the criminal arrest would jeopardize his contracts. As a result, the arrest was delayed.

Furthermore, the impunity of the political elite due to the international community’s lack of willingness to investigate seems to hinder reconciliation. Presumably this reasoning prioritizes stability over justice, as Rohan and Milton explain. They distinguish two types of crimes in

²⁴⁹ Ramon, p.13

²⁵⁰ Rohan and Milton, p.7-8

²⁵¹ Rohan and Milton, p.7-8

Kosovo, crimes committed against Albanians and those in which non-Albanians are the victims. In their view, UNMIK's ability to deal with crimes against Albanians is limited, since "the people who did such things do not stay here [in Kosovo], they left immediately". As for crimes committed against non-Albanians, they presume that the international powers have identified some members of the political elite who could easily be caught. However, the political will to investigate the current political elite is lacking, as it seems necessary to maintain stability:

more or less we can imagine who committed these crimes with structures, which politically we know are very important for keeping stability in Kosovo and controlling this progress, you know, and then nobody dares really to go into this and I do not believe this is out of the records, I do not believe EULEX will achieve very much in this respect. Because this is [a] political problem, it's not a question of evidence against these people or will, but there are political aspects, which really create the problem²⁵²

Andreas adds that during his work in Kosovo after the war, international actors knowingly and willingly allowed Serbian and Albanian criminalization that even today seems to hinder reconciliation. He pointed out examples of Albanians demolishing houses and expelling Serbs. On the one hand, Andreas presumes that the rule of law regarding minorities failed in the aftermath of war, as "We have been too lenient on harassment by Kosovo Albanians". He recounted a personal conversation with a leader in which he attempted to convince him to work with Serbs and cease the threats:

I remember saying to [a leader] that Serbs are no threat to you. They are only 7% and you can be the most undisputed statesmen in Europe, you can look so good. You can be like Nelson Mandela "I want peace, you are my brother and let's all build this together"²⁵³

The leader rejected the offer because, due to "so much resentment and bitterness from ethnic cleansing before and in the old days of repression from Belgrade, there was no tolerance towards the Serbs". However, Andreas points out that the international community could have promoted better policies to protect minorities "We could have forced our hands on that issue better by imposing a stronger rule of law". He remembers the destruction of Serbian houses after the war being tolerated by the international community: "In my first half year in '99, every night there were fires all over Pristina. Every Serb house was on fire absolutely. It was so hard. So we let the minority [down]".²⁵⁴

On the other hand, he presumes that international actors also allowed the deterioration of the Serbs' situation "to continue for way too long". Thus the rule of law is essential not only in nation building but also to peace building and reconciliation, even though he acknowledges

²⁵² Rohan and Milton, p.8

²⁵³ Andreas, p.2

²⁵⁴ Andreas, p.2

that there is little trust in the rule of law and a lack of capacity, despite attempts by the international community to build it. He explains the establishment of the rule of law:

If there's lawlessness, nation building is affected, and it does not work because people have to believe in the rule of law. And in enforcement, because you can have law on the books, but there has to be a credible police and justice system, and we brought the international justices to coach and sit together with domestic judges, we tried all that, according to the book, and we did foster the domestic police also but that could have been more forceful.²⁵⁵

As a result, UNMIK "failed...bringing a sort of justice and again leaving communities to live together". The divisions within society still remain. Kosovo's future seems to be hindered by the UN's neglect of inter-ethnic reconciliation. Andreas says "[it's] a missed opportunity, because there is now the state of Kosovo which has bad relations with its neighbors, or at least with its biggest neighbor Serbia, and you could say the UN has not done enough to take measures to bring the two communities together again".²⁵⁶

Judicial Mechanisms Incompatible with Victims' Needs

A high level of skepticism is expressed by an international official, Stacey, about the value of judicial prosecutions in bringing justice and material reparations for victims. Stacey claims that locals have unrealistic expectations from the UNHRP, as according to her neither reparations nor justice can compensate for human suffering/loss. She also cynically hints that justice may be impossible for victims, despite being desired:

They need somebody to blame, and it would be nice to be able to blame somebody for the fact that you've lost your relatives. Their body wasn't discovered and all of that. That would be lovely. It'd be lovely too that it was somebody's fault. Doesn't change the fact that your relatives are not coming back, but it's just not possible.

She claims that victims who brought their cases to the Human Rights Advisory Panel (HRAP) had "unrealistic expectations", such as expecting to repair the damage. She believes that neither prosecutions nor material reparation would repair the damage already done: "there's nothing that's going to repair the damage that has been done here, no amount of money, no amount of reparation. It's time". According to Stacey, nothing can bring "satisfaction to anybody who has suffered", and "this is a horrible thing..., all this suffering, there's either nobody to blame or, no way to claim".²⁵⁷ However she acknowledges that "there wasn't a proper reconciliation process here and that's unfortunate". On a critical note, being involved in the prosecution of war crimes and maintaining a skeptical attitude towards prosecutions and reparations, it is doubtful whether these aims can be achieved through this attitude. In addition, Verdeja argues that time is insufficient for reconciliation. Some victims may prefer justice

²⁵⁵ Andreas, p.2

²⁵⁶ Rohan and Milton, p.8

²⁵⁷ Stacey, p.9

through prosecutions or material reparations to cope with their loss before opting for vengeance (which some do) (Verdeja, 2009).

The International Community's Unwillingness to Change and Other Limitations

In addition, reconciliation and peace building failures seem to develop from the lack of attention paid to reconciliation and the need to present Kosovo as a success case. Rohan and Milton claim that no criticism of ongoing processes in Kosovo was allowed, despite the suffering of citizens. This has been pushed by the

big powerful member states of [the] United Nations standing behind the whole intervention because for different political reasons they needed a success. Not necessarily a success that could be seen on the ground, but it must be a success.

This furthered the perception that “peace and success [happened in Kosovo] over the years, but it was not really that visible on the ground”. Rohan and Milton experienced difficulties when they expressed discontent with the international community’s approach to administering Kosovo after the war:

It was very difficult to pass any critical or negative message concerning this international enterprise [and] question its price. The people paying the price don’t matter. It must be a success.

Rohan and Milton’s view is that the political situation has not yet been solved. They conclude that there is no “big difference” compared to the situation in 1999. They recognize that the nature of the conflict has changed: “We don’t have people killed every day. We don’t even have killings among Albanians, as was the case some years ago. It also means that the internal political situation is now under control somehow”.²⁵⁸ However, Rebecca and Rachel consider that the international and local community [referring to the government elites] is uninterested in promoting changes, except the population: “no one was really interested in making a change, neither internationals nor of course the local community. The population wants the change, but the government doesn’t want a change, so it’s a case of keeping the status like before”. Following Galtung’s theory of peace, the international actors signal that negative peace has been reached, while positive peace is far from being achieved.

Other general limitations that create an un-sustainable peace are identified, such as the short length of involvement and the lack of local ownership.²⁵⁹ These limitations seem to have hindered not only reconciliation and peace building but also state and nation building, as argued in the earlier chapters. Lastly, economic incentives are important in peace building, but they can fail if reconciliation is not taken into account. Andreas shows that using only “economic incentives” to build Kosovo failed, despite post-conflict reconstruction being “very expen-

²⁵⁸ Rohan and Milton, p.6

²⁵⁹ James and Stacey.

sive”. He says that the international community “spent 100 times per capita more than what we spend in Afghanistan. 400 thousand military and so much money there in such a small place. It was highly unusual, such an effort”. He hints that failures can partly be blamed on the lack of attention paid to reconciliation, since “more could have been done on joint reconciliation”.²⁶⁰

Northern Kosovo as an Obstacle to Reconciliation

Kosovo currently faces four major peace building challenges at the institutional level, the gap between the state and its citizens, the lack of the rule of law, dire interethnic relations and the fraught relationship between Kosovo and Serbia (Hoogenboom, 2011, pp. 14–15). However the biggest challenge is the integration of Northern Kosovo, where Northern Mitrovica is located. The north is mainly Serb dominated, and serves as an example of the still unresolved tensions between the communities. The divided city of Mitrovica separates the southern and northern parts of Kosovo. To provide a short background, the city of Mitrovica was an ethnically mixed city inhabited by both Albanians and Serbs before the war. The military intervention undertaken on NATO’s initiative ended the conflict, and NATO took the side of the Kosovo Albanians against Serbian forces to protect civilians from expulsion, gross human rights abuses and war crimes. The French battalion of KFOR, NATO’s force in Kosovo, was located in Mitrovica. They placed a fence across the bridge connecting the northern and southern parts of the city. The reasons for this remain untold to the public, but it was more than likely a semi-political agreement based on a security rationale rather than being built semi-spontaneously, as revealed through interviews and life stories. After the war, the protests erupted on the Albanian side, following attempts to cross the bridge and reach the Serbian/northern side. The Kosovo Albanian political elite ended these protests after several days by dispersing the protest crowd with the support of international community. Since 1999, the bridge blockade has served the function of a wall dividing Mitrovica into southern and northern halves. As a result, the composition of the population changed after the war. Serbs inhabit the northern part (except for a few families in the Bosnian neighborhood) and only Albanians inhabit the southern part. The fence on the bridge has blocked freedom of movement, resulting in the only “divided city” in Kosovo. Northern Mitrovica is the political epicenter for Serbs in the north who organized a referendum in 2012. The outcome was a majority rejection of Kosovo’s government institutions, but both the Serbian and Kosovo governments proclaimed the referendum invalid.

The EU’s major focus lies on improving institutional relations between the states through dialogue and minority rights, however “support on reconciliation and building Serb-Albanian

²⁶⁰ Andreas, p.4-5

relations is limited” (Hoogenboom, 2011, pp. 14–15). Jitske Hoogenboom from IKV Pax Christi argues that Northern Kosovo is the biggest challenge. The inclusion of the north into Kosovo’s political structures has been the main theme of the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue started by the European Union in 2011, which resulted in the Brussels Agreement in 2013. The agreement foresees the abolishment of Serbian parallel structures and their integration into the rest of Kosovo. The Kosovo government agreed to provide Serbs with an autonomous space of governance within Kosovo’s system, which is highly decentralized. The first steps towards the realization of the agreement consisted of establishing common border management points, holding elections with the participation of Serbs, and passing a problematic amnesty law to the benefit of those who were involved in the parallel structures (Rrustemi & Baumgärtel, 2014). Furthermore, the agreement aims to create an Association of Serbian Municipalities.²⁶¹ The EU seems to be reluctant to increase its role in the north as “de facto they expect the division to stay” (Hoogenboom, 2011, pp. 14–15). The EU seem to be more interested in “stability and propping up the current leaders than in promoting sustainable change” which hinders reconciliation, and respectively state and peace building. She also argues that the failure of EULEX to use its executive mandate when necessary (i.e. in high level corruption) allows trust in state building to diminish, and that by not being accountable to the people of Kosovo EULEX is promoting double standards (Hoogenboom, 2011, pp. 14–15). Thus, the focus of the EU seems to lie more on institutional (i.e. dialogue) rather than individual approaches to reconciliation, which theoretically resonates with instrumental reconciliation at the institutional level.

Similarly, many international officials recognize that Northern Kosovo remains a challenge for reconciliation. Adena points out that UNMIK has played a hindering role in solving the problem, since UNMIK’s official stance is status neutral but in practice they “want to maintain the status quo”, the isolation of Northern Kosovo.²⁶² Also, access by international organizations to the north is limited. Daryl says that only UNMIK has access to the north, whereas EULEX is not present since their access is only “occasional”.²⁶³ KFOR is also present. Thus, the solution for the north falls more on the international community as they play the main role there since “Pristina has no authority in the north and is important too for the development of Kosovo”.²⁶⁴

The second factor hindering the solution of the problem of the north is the barrier installed by the French division of UNMIK, consisting of several barricades, which separates Southern

²⁶¹ In the life story, Artan fears that this may create an institutional deadlock in the Pristina parliament. He even compared it to the Bosnian setup, where Republika Srpska often halts political progress. For more information, see the local perspectives section.

²⁶² Adena, p.9

²⁶³ Daryl, p.1

²⁶⁴ Salvatore, p.4

and Northern Mitrovica. This not only hinders state building, but also peace building and reconciliation. Andreas views this as “the biggest mistake, because the population themselves were reconciliatory”. He experienced more reconciliatory efforts in Southern Kosovo enclaves, such as Caglavica, Gracanica and Pristina, but the north was a different case since “they [the French battalion] built a wall”. He could sense in his personal conversation with a French official that Serbs and the French see themselves “more [as] natural allies”.²⁶⁵ This may have been one of the reasons for placing the barricades/wall on the bridge, as Andreas argues. Furthermore James alludes that Belgrade supports the radical Serbs, who are portrayed as “very radical” and the bridge watchers. Therefore he considers that the wall and the conflicts on the bridge will continue since a common political consensus is lacking in Mitrovica and Northern Kosovo.²⁶⁶ James still views the barricades installed by the French division as necessary after the war but removable after two years. He saw a high presence of “security fear” after the war, which was more “imaginative than real”, but he believes that “you don’t need barricades to stop people going inside and outside, and people had to move on” after a couple of years. Thus the prolonged existence of the barricades/division produced “a mental barricade” which is problematic for reconciliation: “if you have barricades, that is already your mental barricade and that is transferred to reality and lasts too long. It is like a wall, how can you pass the wall?”. Therefore, he concludes that attempts to start reconciliation should have followed very early, meaning “to really cooperate with each other, and try to foster integration between both sides”.²⁶⁷

Andreas adds that currently the north “is delicate” and filled with resentment. His view is that “It was not easy to bring them together”. Common projects were rare. In a project launched after 2002/2003, he became aware that the Northern Mitrovica youth “were reluctant and they really didn’t see any perspective”. Thus he believes that international actors “could have started to revive the dynamic” but instead they ignored the northern problem from the beginning.²⁶⁸ Andreas considers that the international community would have been more successful if they had dealt with reconciliation at the beginning: “We could have done better if we had fixed ethnic rivalry”.²⁶⁹ Salvatore is also skeptical about the international community’s achievements in the north: “I don’t think that the international community has achieved a lot in making a multiethnic community”.²⁷⁰ Insecurity is still felt by Kosovo Albanians in the North. In 2007 James went to Northern Mitrovica with an Albanian colleague who had lived there before the war. She was forced to live in the south after the war due to the division, and

²⁶⁵ Andreas, p.4-5

²⁶⁶ James, p.5

²⁶⁷ James, p.5

²⁶⁸ Andreas, p.4-5

²⁶⁹ Andreas, p.4

²⁷⁰ Salvatore, p.3

“never went there [to Northern Mitrovica]”. He explains that she felt quite unsafe, despite being surrounded by international employees and in a cafe considered very safe by international officials.²⁷¹

Possible Solutions for the Northern Kosovo

Many suggestions have been made for improving the situation in Northern Kosovo and reconciling individuals from the North and South. Eric proposes that political rhetoric should provide positive messages about the north, resources gathered, and priority given to “creating a better future for the people” in the region. According to him, the international community should actively discourage the “high pitched narratives” by both sides that undermine the creation of an atmosphere that could encourage the success of dialogue. This would reverse the attitude of the Serbian political elite, since they would “connect themselves in a mature and statesmanlike attitude and drop some of the poison that they have released in the past in their public discourse towards Kosovo”. This approach would be more reconciliatory and might contribute to the “gradual normalization of relations”. He foresees normalization as a form of “peaceful coexistence at the beginning, leaving the issue of status and political loyalties aside”. The latter may be “full integration or some form of affiliation that would be acceptable to both parties”.²⁷² Furthermore, international actors have a positive view of institutional power sharing and the integration of southern and northern Serbs. Ramon institutionally suggests a “form of political power sharing which is as inclusive as possible” and an early engagement with enclaves, as the Kosovo government has done in the south. Local elections are viewed as a tool to promote reconciliation. Ramon views the Serbian community as divided, therefore the participation of southern Serbs who accept Kosovo in local government would be beneficial. He says that at least some southern Serbs “know that they have a future in Kosovo and are willing to participate”. This in turn assists the international community “to invest and also clearly helps the process of reconciliation to move ahead”. He also suggests that Kosovo Albanians develop projects, which “reach out for reconciliation [towards Serbs]”.²⁷³ Other suggestions include an economic boost so the opposing parties’ are encouraged to implement projects together. Andreas explains

I would insist on forcing reconciliation, you cannot force people to be friends but you can force people to be decent and respectful. That would bring them neutral trust, and give them all kinds of reasons to do things together, rewards, cooperation... continuing, so investing positively and discovering.²⁷⁴

²⁷¹ James, p.5

²⁷² Eric, p.3

²⁷³ Ramon, p.1-2

²⁷⁴ Andreas, p.8

The rationale seems to be that developing common projects creates responsibilities and benefits for adversaries that presumably may assist integration at an individual level. This reflects the idea of instrumental reconciliation that combines interests and thus encourages cooperation and may result in mutual respect or moral reconciliation.

Lastly, it is perceived appropriate to establish truth commissions in Kosovo “to show people what happened”. Ramon believes that this may be of help, since a common perception that war crimes prosecutions present “selective justice” is present among both communities. This is essential since “in the Balkans there is always this sense that I am the victim and the other guy you know is the (assassin), but of course the reality [differs]”. Instead, truth commissions may reveal that “nobody is impartial”, which may result in apologies since “I should also apologize and not just wait for the other guy to apologize to me”. This resonates with proposals to promote the understanding of truth and the public telling of stories that would recognize the victims but also break “historical myths”. This may also serve for educational purposes.²⁷⁵

To conclude, international officials’ representations on peace and reconciliation seem to prioritize security, placing it as a prerequisite for reconciliation and other peace building tasks. State building through EU integration seems to represent another tool for achieving reconciliation and peace. Trust on the institutional level through judicial mechanisms (prosecutions) for promoting reconciliation seems to be low. Justice is presented as politicized by American power and not as being pursued for the aim of maintaining stability in Kosovo. The current political elite was presumably involved in the past in committing crimes against both communities. Politicized justice and the impunity of the political elite may hinder the long-term sustainability of peace and reconciliation. In addition, the rule of law seems very important but has lacked support from the international community from the beginning. Negligence of the rule of law seems visible in the international community’s toleration of destruction and deaths after the war. Furthermore, the removal of the mental and physical barriers in the north seems very important for reconciliation, alongside the establishment of truth commissions. As a result, apologies may follow. Politically, great attention is paid to power sharing models, elections and the messages of leaders. On the individual level, the international community emphasizes the forceful development of projects through IOs as a key to reconciliation. The next section introduces local perspectives on reconciliation through life stories.

²⁷⁵ Ramon, 20-23

Local Perspectives

Deterring Reconciliatory Attempts at the Institutional Level

Call argues that local places are the “central locus of social conflict”, which therefore should not be treated as a platform for implementing technical reforms (Call, 2008a, p. 385). The life story data reveals similar conclusions regarding institutional reforms in Kosovo, such as decentralization. The latter reform is part of state building programs in fragile states, associated with providing minority rights, enhancing transparency, accountability and so on. The following section shows that the international community promotes instrumental reconciliation in Kosovo institutionally, living as a separate rather than as an integrated community. Implementing instrumental reconciliation at the institutional level as defined in the literature, which also seems to be implemented by international officials, arguably neglects the local context and history as revealed by local life stories. The life stories below reveal that before the war the communities lived and worked together, and there seems to be a willingness to resume the lifestyle of coexisting with each other. Promoting decentralization policies aimed at living separately along ethnic lines hinders the reconciliation process. These policies may result in alienation among the population and the political elites. Thus, implementing instrumental reconciliation, as defined by political scientists, can be counterproductive if the conditions on the ground are open for moral reconciliation. It may also alienate the local community from international reconstruction efforts, create and/or maintain deeper cleavages in already divided societies, and in the long-term cause communities to strongly resist integration. It may be called into question whether these decentralization policies even reflect any reconciliatory efforts. Instead, it is suggested that instrumental reconciliation should be promoted which is focused on and aimed at bringing communities closer to cooperation and integration rather than living as separate communities, for long-term sustainability. The latter leaves open the possibility that frequent interaction will lead to moral reconciliation. As Call argues, in order to effectively build both peace and states, the international community should:

strategize between negotiated deals and their consequences for a sustainable state; between capacity and legitimacy; between urgent short term measures and long term sustainability; international interests and recognition versus national interests and legitimacy; and between the interests of elites, especially combatants and of the population at large (Call, 2008b, p. 3).

A group of local actors, as revealed by life stories, affiliated mainly with the political elite argue that peace will also prevail through institutional approaches by joining the EU. However, there is interethnic distrust between Kosovo Albanians and the Serbian political elite at the political/state level. For instance, Kushtrim’s life story shows frequent interaction with the local and international political elite.²⁷⁶ He claims that Serbia’s “appetite cannot be known”.

²⁷⁶ His life story is explained in the statebuilding chapter.

Currently, there is “a nonstop production of tension and nationalism, political or social” that raises nationalism and increases political tension between both ethnicities.²⁷⁷ However, according to him, integration into the European Union could bring peace. Specifically, fast track integration for Kosovo, as with Romania and Bulgaria, would be very beneficial. This is based only on an expressed hope that Serbians would be more peaceful within Europe, but there is hesitance about a positive result (i.e. reconciliation) being achieved even through the EU: “things would be done in a more relaxed way and in the end they [Serbians] would say, after all we are all in Europe, maybe the situation like that would be different”.²⁷⁸

Now we turn to the next salient life story on understanding reconciliation at an institutional level, which is Artan’s story. His background has similarities with many individuals from Kosovo, including his level of poverty, his desire for education and his political activism. Artan comes from a poor family, as is the case with most individuals born in Kosovo in the 1950s. His family was also very patriotic and the extended families of both parents were politically prosecuted and some were killed. He was educated in the FRY, suffered torture and political manipulation in prison and fought for the Albanian side with the Rugovian approach (peacefully oriented/human rights and self-determination) for a while, later joining the KLA. The latter was defensively oriented aiming to end discrimination and injustice against the Albanian community through war. After the war, he became a member of parliament and he participates in veteran and literary meetings. In the parliament, he served on various commissions dealing with legal and judicial matters, the mandates of international mission, European integration, foreign relations and drafting the constitution. Thus, Artan’s life story discussed more in depth in the section below exemplifies the challenges faced by local actors at the institutional level in promoting policies of inter-ethnic cooperation and reconciliation.

Legislative Frameworks

Artan’s life story points out the challenges rising from the international community’s ambiguous role in promoting separate ethnic policies at the state level through legislative frameworks. He views this type of legislation as harmful to reconciliation and peace building in the long-term. Firstly, he perceives that the decentralization process failed to benefit Kosovo, and thus needs to be improved in order to provide better services to citizens, regardless of ethnicity. As a member of a parliamentary group on decentralization, Artan views the current decentralization process established along ethnic lines as hindering reconciliation and inter-ethnic cooperation due to non-practicality and the separation of Kosovo’s various communities. He describes the formations of municipalities along ethnic lines, as in the case of a village, which

²⁷⁷ Kushtrim, p.28

²⁷⁸ Kushtrim, p.28

had been attached to an Albanian municipality 2 km away for many years, but due to the decentralization process joined a Serbian municipality 30 km away instead:

a neighborhood in Gjilan is populated by Serbs. They need to be detached from Gjilan to become part of Novoberde, which is about 30 km away and this then is presented as decentralization. I am for decentralization to respect minority rights but if you detach the citizens of Gjilan from the center of Gjilan which is 2 km away, you damage Gjilan and the Serbian community and instead of bringing closer their reconciliation, you are creating their separation, their cantonization... I reject in principle this.

In addition, he points out that double standards are being applied in legislation for majority and minority communities, which may limit reconciliation in long term. For instance, he worked on the Law on the Use of Languages, which allows minority communities to name their localities, their streets etc. Each provision requires compliance with the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo but some dubious names are still given to streets despite being associated with war crimes. He says:

if a community in Gracanica say “we have the right to choose the name” and we respect, and “we want to name our locality ‘Karadzic’ or ‘Milosevic’”, then this needs to be reviewed because it clashes with the law, with the constitution, with the majority’s will and with the aim to create peace. So if you choose that, I will respect it, you can do whatever you like, but when a citizen passes by there instead of creating a feeling of amicability, it will create a bad feeling, reservation, etc.

In fact, the Serbian town of Ranilug in Kosovo proposed that some streets be named after “Serbian heroes” (Draza Mihajlovic²⁷⁹ and Milosevic²⁸⁰), who Albanians view as perpetrators of crimes. Mihajlovic’s name remained on a street sign for four years. After harsh criticism from Albanian newspapers, the street name was put under municipality review. Furthermore, Kosovo’s Ministry of Local Government Administration argued that naming a street “Milosevic” could not be implemented in practice. Lastly, Kosovo’s Cadastral Agency challenged the Ranilug municipality’s decision “because it contains names of streets that are considered unacceptable” (Collaku, 2015). In practice, the unacceptable street name remained in place for several years. This may have decreased the chances for reconciliation as it fuelled further alienation of Kosovo Albanians.

Similar concerns have been highlighted regarding double standards concerning the law on the protection of cultural monuments and areas for minority and majority monuments. In Kosovo, only Orthodox monuments are protected, hence Artan points out the inequality on protection of monuments: “why not Catholic and Islamic ones too? We should protect our cultural heritage, everybody’s heritage”. Moreover, he raises the question of why these monuments, which are religious, need to receive an ethnic connotation: “why should Orthodox monuments be

²⁷⁹ A WW II leader of the nationalist Chetnik movement.

²⁸⁰ Viewed by Kosovo Albanians as the initiator and perpetrator of war crimes in ‘99.

called “Serbian monuments’?”. Religious monuments are usually liturgical and belong to the believers who could be of different ethnicities. In Kosovo, there are Orthodox believers of different nationalities: Greek, Bulgarian, Russian and Albanian. As a result, the non-Serbian Orthodox believers may feel discriminated against due to the ethnic connotation given to the religious monuments.

There is also skepticism about the ratification of the amnesty law, which was part of the EU’s negotiation process between Kosovo and Serbia. According to Artan, there appears to be double standards stemming from “high international pressure” in the EU dialogue. He says that during the Rambouillet negotiations in 99, Kosovo Albanians were “obliged to pardon acts that are forgivable on both sides”, but Serbia “never forgave any of the war leaders”, since their files remain open. The Amnesty Law is seen as the second obligation placed by the international community on Kosovo Albanians to “forgive all those in the north who opposed the Republic of Kosovo”. He considers the law unfair, non-reciprocal and setting double standards for temporal reasons, pardoning post war crimes and not pre-war ones: “They decided to grant amnesty to everybody who participated in the armed conflict against the Republic of Kosovo, but they didn’t grant amnesty to those who participated in the liberation of Kosovo”. In addition, the amnesty law may strengthen criminal impunity regardless of ethnicity, as in practice all communities may claim to have committed crimes against the new Republic of Kosovo, in cases of smuggling, speculation, forgery or burning houses. If people committed crimes for economic/survival needs (supporting family due to the high poverty level), despite not wanting to oppose the Republic of Kosovo they will be obliged to say the contrary (that they opposed the state) in order to be pardoned. Artan says “if a Serbian admits to committing the same crime because they wanted to oppose the Republic of Kosovo, they get amnesty. So every Serbian businessman will now be obliged to say they have done so to oppose the independence of Kosovo”. In this case, even the southern Serbs, who are integrated and politically support the new state, are forced to say the contrary to receive a pardon. This may weaken Kosovo’s sovereignty. In addition, individuals who committed crimes for reasons of survival will need to cite opposition to the state in order to be pardoned since: “If they say I smuggled because my children needed to eat, they won’t be pardoned”. He is also afraid that this may have a spillover effect: “I am convinced that Bosnians, Montenegrins and even Albanians will do the same [say that they committed criminal acts in order to oppose the Republic of Kosovo]”. He personally discussed with some Albanian businessmen who said that “they will use the same excuse; they will say that they were pro-Serb and had political reasons because we’re talking about tens of thousands or even millions of Euros, a police file or imprisonment”. Similarly, it is argued that the amnesty law poses many risks and is short-sighted despite being legal (Rrustemi & Baumgärtel, 2014).

Artan life story reveals many cases when he himself was present at the ratification and negotiation of these laws, and describes some conversations and reflections created by a few private and public discussions with local and international actors. He describes Kosovo as being “full of such absurdities”, referring to the laws above. He perceives these presumably negative laws as a consequence of unequal power relations with the international community, resulting in the acceptance of potentially harmful laws. The latter may be at the expense of sustainable reconciliation and peace. He considers that the current situation is “a consequence of not having built partnership relations”. These laws are drafted “partly by foreigners” and afterwards imposed through a “servile political elite” by the international community. According to him, the servile political elite of Kosovo Albanians avoids questioning these laws, even though these models are being implemented and introduced into Kosovo for the first time without arguably harmonization with European standards. In addition, in personal conversation with internationals he questions why certain standards that are non-existent in Europe are being promoted in Kosovo:

Why do we need this? Do you have it in your own country?’ Find a model and we do it but if they tell me that you have to do it here, that Serbs must have rights that an Albanian doesn’t, I will ask them ‘Do you do this in your country, sir? No. So why are you providing this to me as a European standard when you don’t have this in the heart of Europe?’

According to him, individuals like him who oppose international suggestions face resistance and are considered “bad”, while individuals who support international suggestions, even if harmful to the state and peace building, are considered “good”, referring to the servile group. His friends view internationals as “allies”, to be “honored” and are “grateful” because of the “help” given to Kosovo. He agrees, but criticizes the unconditional support when laws are in conflict with Kosovo’s interests. Despite his friends’ acknowledgment of the flaws of international policy, they still offer unconditional support to international actors, whereas the international community resists the types of individuals posing critical questions. The servile locals are named stretchers, their characteristics and strategies, have already been discussed in depth in the state building chapter. The local stretchers “sign everything” suggested by the international community. This unconditional support to the international community is based on reciprocating the help given through the humanitarian intervention in 1999. Therefore, he believes that the current legislation has been informed “partly by foreigners, partly by our servility”, resulting in limitations that “you can’t find anywhere else”, which may have a long-term negative impact. Thus the servile category assists the international community in promoting laws, which are possibly harmful to reconciliation at the institutional level. He himself has “opposed” these laws, not only through discussions but also with written amendments, which have been overthrown (e.g. in the protection of cultural monuments regarding

ethnicity). According to him, the Orthodox churches are integral to Serbia's sovereignty according to the Kosovo law, which infringes the principles of UNESCO and Kosovo's sovereignty.

The Role of Serbia and the Minority Perspectives

Another layer of obstacles originating from Serbia at the institutional level is revealed by Artan based on his communication with the local and international community on minority integration. Artan adds that there are local actors instructed by Serbia to "set up traps wherever possible". Some Albanian groups oppose these individuals "without allowing it to come to a confrontation with the Serbian community [in Kosovo]". However, another group of Albanians who are "burdened [with war]" say to him that "Serbs do not merit anything, they made the war". He is especially concerned about the ethnic division that seems to be promoted in the negotiations with Serbia facilitated by the EU. He explains that a Special Customs Fund is requested by Serbia for the Serbian community, which may interfere in the internal functioning of Kosovo as a multi-ethnic society. He also brings up the inequality of treatment of minorities in Kosovo and Serbia. He raises the question of why it is not possible for Albanians in Serbia to receive a special fund like that received by Kosovo Serbs. For him, it seems that there are double standards in the resolution of the problem of the Serbian minority in Kosovo, in which Serbs are privileged while the Albanian minority in Serbia is ignored. This is viewed as a result of Kosovo's servile political elite.

Similarly to the perceptions of international officials, he considers that the normalization of relations with Serbia depends on Belgrade, since the problems within Kosovo stem from Belgrade, not Pristina. Concessions by Kosovo's political elite are viewed as damaging the image of Kosovo as it gives the impression that "Kosovo Albanians are the guilty ones while Serbs were righteous". He believes that concessions will continue, since the political elite wins politically from the international community and "get[s] praise". However, he is more interested in resolving the issue and negotiating an equal footing with Serbian government than being praised. These developments between Serbia and Kosovo strain relations between Kosovo Serbs and the Kosovo Albanian political elite:

I don't wish for them [Kosovo Serbs] to be repressed, I don't wish to take revenge against them, I wish for us to build the best model for the treatment of minorities. To treat them well, to integrate. We've always had a norm of understanding those that are weaker, but not for Serbia.

He even claims that Serbia has "never cared for Kosovo Serbs", nor "treated them seriously", but has "treated them as second class citizens or third" and "ruined their fate". Therefore he believes that Kosovo Serbs must be supported rather than punished. In addition, the Kosovo government should not allow the Serbian minority to become an "instrument of Serbia" against Kosovo's independence, since this is presumably Serbia's aim. He even claims that

the “Bosnization of Kosovo” is being undertaken through negotiations with Serbia. According to him, the Bosnization of Kosovo will not honor all the victims that died during the war, but will “block” Kosovo from moving forward, integrating or progressing. It is therefore essential to “understand each other correctly” and secondly “move forward quicker and better”. He also calls for caution when implementing such potentially harmful policies, and urges the international community to refrain from pressuring and imposing this type of political solution. The latter are viewed as hindering rather than promoting reconciliation. Despite the above skepticism expressed in Artan’s life story, his aim is to support the “process of building bridges of cooperation with Europe and the world, with the aim of being part of it, but while maintaining our traits, our identity and our dignity”.

At the same time, Mira, a Kosovo Serb women and the mother of two children, concurs with Artan’s views regarding the unequal treatment of Kosovo Serbs by Serbia. She prefers to move forward with Kosovo Albanians or relocate to other places, rather than relocate to Serbia, due to the possible discrimination her family may receive. She believes that Serbs in Serbia have negative perceptions of Kosovo Serbs. She claims that they would experience poor quality of life in Serbia, like life in Kosovo, and may experience difficulties in relocating:

So, if it’s not good, we are going to Serbia but how to go to Serbia when we do not have a job. You don’t have an apartment. So we would rather stay here than go to Serbia, because they don’t like us too much, because we are coming from Kosovo...Yeah it’s true....I would kill them...I would rather go to Istanbul to live than in Serbia... also, we still have problems, the same problems with water, electricity, and the economic situation is a disaster...we actually have the same problems. We [Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo] are suffering together from the same issues now.

Turning to the life story of Shkodran, described in the earlier chapter, who seems to have lost trust in the international community’s willingness to work for Kosovo Albanian interests and independence. He views the relationship between Kosovo and the West as paradoxical, attempting to help Kosovo rhetorically while helping Serbia in practice:

We depend on the West, while on one side we seek help from the West, on the other side we protect our back from Serbia. The West says ‘I will solve your issue’, while on the other side, they introduce Serbia.

He fears that the German model is being introduced into the Kosovo/Serbia conflict. Both German sides had their own state, recognized each other’s independent status, and afterwards their common interest was to unify and they did so. Therefore he concludes “that Albanians will reconcile with Serbs”.²⁸¹

In addition, the other minorities support institution-building to ensure the respect of minority rights and maintain peace but claim that the Serbian minority is being privileged over the oth-

²⁸¹ Shkodran, p.16-17

er minorities. For instance, Gjini²⁸² considers that peace occurs naturally when a state has strong independent institutions. He suggests focusing on institution-building since Kosovo lacks them. Due to Bosnia's non-recognition of Kosovo as a state²⁸³, the Bosnian minority faces everyday difficulties in Kosovo. Gjini's life story shows that Kosovo Bosnians cannot travel to Bosnia since they hold Kosovo travel documents. In fact, one of his children is unable to travel to Bosnia despite that his family is originally from there. He feels unsupported by Bosnia, since Bosnia lacks functioning institutions and since Bosnians lack a motherland or a national state to support minorities outside its border. He therefore views the position of the Bosnian minority in Kosovo as weak compared to the Serbian minority. The weak position of Bosnians in Kosovo is perceived as stemming from institution-building by the international community that sees discrimination between minorities as the "price" of peace. Gjini claims that there are double standards regarding minority rights, in practice not in the legal framework, for the sole purpose of maintaining peace and the convenience of the international community and system. He therefore, expresses fear for the Bosnians in Kosovo since the Serbian community may be favored over the Bosnian community by the Kosovo Albanian government and the international community, which presumably results in discrimination against Bosnians. He says:

In practice, I am myself afraid that the Serbs will be favored. 'Why?' For peace in the house because it is convenient for all, the West, Europe, just to have peace, it does not matter that they will have more.²⁸⁴

Northern Kosovo and the Question of Demilitarization

Furthermore, questions are raised over whether the international community backs Northern Kosovo's "isolation" politically and institutionally. The integration of Northern Kosovo is one of the main aims of the EU Dialogue, since the situation is considered fragile despite the high number of KFOR forces in that area. Dhurata's life story raises questions over whether there is a political consensus to tolerate high-level crime in the North, as the DDR should have been implemented in the whole territory of Kosovo, as stipulated in the Kumanovo Agreement. If KFOR has the authority to maintain security then she questions whether they are unwilling to contribute to a more secure environment. She explains the difference between everyday life in southern and northern Mitrovica, such as the lack of a functioning security and judiciary:

For example, if you arrested somebody [in the North] because they were shooting in the street and threatening people, the next day he would get out of jail. For example, they attacked a car in the middle of the day, even today,

²⁸² The relevance of Gjini's life story has already been described in the statebuilding chapter.

²⁸³ Specifically, the Serbian community blocks the recognition of Kosovo despite the wish of the Bosnian community to recognize Kosovo.

²⁸⁴ Gjini, p.12-13

you can park the car and block the street and nobody dares [to say something]. In the south if you do that, the car would be taken and you have to pay.

Dhurata claims that incidents have occurred regularly. The targeted individuals mainly originate from the south, but Serbs were also threatened and beaten “because they were doing business with Albanians”. In fact, she saw stones thrown at cars, and some of her friends started seeing and recognizing criminals after a while. Northern Kosovo is described as a dangerous environment:

There was a high level of [...] drug users in the north. This is another specificity because the borders are not controlled. You can get it even today. There are alternative ways, which you can bring anything you want, weapons or anything and that’s why it became more insecure. If you had a proper border ... and because that part was never demilitarized.

Based on her life experiences and interactions with KFOR, she claims that KFOR refrained from demilitarizing the north “because [they] didn’t dare to do their work in the north”. In fact, only a small area has been demilitarized. She personally asked a general at SHAPE/NATO “why KFOR couldn’t face bridge watchers?” The bridge watchers are unknown and sometimes criminal men maintaining security in the north, presumed to be under direction from Belgrade, who create many problems in Northern Mitrovica. She says that “he [the general] became nervous, he did not answer me but [he said] “you know, you are from Kosovo, it was not easy, we had to work with people diplomatically. It was not possible””. Thus she claims that KFOR applied their mandate differently in Northern and Southern Kosovo. She saw KFOR “sometimes patrolling with cars [in the north], not as they would do here in the South”²⁸⁵. This raises questions over whether the different application of the mandate in the north and the south was intended politically, since NATO had the power and capability to enforce the demobilization and demilitarization of the north as they did in the south. The north is the critical issue between Kosovo and Serbia, and its non-demilitarization and demobilization by KFOR may in the long term have maintained the segregation of the population between the north and the south and delayed the achievement of reconciliation, peace, nation and state building.

Towards Non-Judicial Mechanisms to Meet the Victims’ Needs

The life stories reveal skepticism over the judicial mechanisms promoting reconciliation. Criminal justice is viewed as insufficient for reconciliation purposes. Vera, a committed human rights activist dealing with transitional justice since the Balkan wars, explains that criminal courts are less appropriate for reconciliation, since they focus on “perpetrators” and their “guilt, not on the full picture of what happened”. Her life story reveals skeptical views to-

²⁸⁵ Dhurata’s life story.

wards the courts. She views courts as limited since they are “not interested in listening to the suffering of victims” and treat victims as “evidence against the perpetrators”, whereas the needs of the victims are different: “[they] need to be respected, they need to speak in public, they need to see that the other side understands and respects what happened to them”. She was involved in a trial where 250 crimes were recorded for a single perpetrator but he was charged with only 50 due to legal practicalities. The victims of the crimes not taken into account in this case will not receive justice.

She therefore advocates a truth telling commission in the Balkans, which is currently being set up. She claims that the initiative is bottom-up, but consultation and training is being provided by the ICTJ (International Center for Transitional Justice). She says: “they are basically in charge of theoretically advising how this has to be done”. The EU has also provided a budget for it. She explains that the establishing group allowed international officials to observe but not take an active part in meetings: “I am against internationals coming and interfering, since at first they are not prepared and secondly it has to be our initiative”.²⁸⁶

Similarly, Amanda another human rights activist whose life story shows deep commitment with the challenges of justice and reconciliation. After she spend seven years in court representing the families of victims started to think about the idea of a truth telling commission at the regional level. The aims are twofold: to bring justice to victims and to bring the experience of war closer to everyday life. She says it is important:

to listen to victims, to respect experiences, suffering, to create a historical record based on the stories of victims, facts... and show that people are equal, that all victims of war crimes deserve respect. [In addition] to break the silence, to stop talking about numbers, to know the names of the victims, to know civilians who were killed, to know the soldiers and policemen, their different situations... to create a Kosovo memory and to document the circumstances in which people ...[were killed]²⁸⁷

The governments seem to have been reluctant despite saying in conversations that they “support it but only because of EU pressure”. According to her, if the EU uses the stick and carrot, even though she does not prefer this approach, the truth telling commission will materialize. But she believes that because of the “normalization of relations” and the enlargement strategy, the EU will “put something under the carpet” on issues dealing with the past and reconciliation.²⁸⁸ She herself established an NGO to deal with these issues since it is important to “deal genuinely with the transition of justice and not allow others to do this for us” and it is vital for the “next generations” in Kosovo.²⁸⁹ Thus, non-judicial mechanisms seem to be preferred to judicial mechanisms for reconciliation purposes.

²⁸⁶ Vera, p.14

²⁸⁷ Amanda, p.6-7

²⁸⁸ Vera, p.13

²⁸⁹ Vera, p.9

To conclude, institutionally, efforts taken at the local and international levels, often enabled and pushed by the international community, seem to be perceived as hindering rather than promoting reconciliation, as seen in the discussions about the laws implemented in parliament, the EU Dialogue, Northern Kosovo and judicial mechanisms. However, top-down initiatives are recognized as important for dealing with areas of security and missing people.²⁹⁰ Non-judicial mechanisms like truth commissions seem to be preferred to judicial ones, since they seem more appropriate to the needs of victims and may assist future generations in dealing with the past among the human rights activists. They view the role of internationals only as pressurizing the government to accept the commission but they see no international role in its everyday tasks. The section below analyzes reconciliation at the individual level by firstly describing the theoretical background and then introducing the local life stories.

Fostering Reconciliation at the Individual Level through the Grassroots

Theoretically, the model prescribed by Professor Nancy Nadler based on her fieldwork with Israeli professionals working in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict provides four conditions for creating effective programs to achieve instrumental reconciliation. The first condition refers to purposefully and deliberately designing and maintaining equality in activities. In case equality is lacking in activities, they may be perceived by the other party as lacking sensitivity and empathy and may create impressions of dependency. Equality between adversaries can be built by creating equal and continuous involvement in projects from design to implementation or by using third parties. Such third parties must be viewed as an impartial valuable resource by both parties, and they may have an equalizing effect, since the power structure changes. The victims no longer feel dependent on or inferior to their former adversary, since both parties have to learn from the third party, whether it is a university or an IO. The second condition is building “interpersonal trust: the safety net” between individuals who trust each other and believe in the success of projects even when faced by crises and setbacks. This can be built gradually. The third condition refers to providing sensitivity to cross-cultural differences as the contrary can derail reconciliation. Although Nadler acknowledges that differences between people from the same culture may be greater than differences between cultures, she still argues that cultural background matters. Thus, one has to be careful to avoid misunderstandings when building international projects. Lastly, she suggests focusing on content, which must address real, pressing and common problems, otherwise projects may easily collapse. Thus it is essential to identify real problems and provide real solutions within a reasonable timeframe (Nadler, 2005, pp. 137–139).

²⁹⁰ Dhurata, p.15-16

Aiming to bridge the gap between the theory and practice of reconciliation, Aiken argues that models of social learning should be promoted in post conflict states. In unpacking reconciliation, both types instrumental and moral are needed. He argues that transitional justice should work in tandem with distributive learning on opportunities to tackle structural and material inequalities and unequal power relations. In order to achieve reconciliation, Aiken's model of social learning promotes three types of social learning: instrumental, socio-emotional and distributive. These are related to five social learning mechanisms: positive contact, transformative dialogue, truth, justice and amelioration of material inequalities. This model adds distributive learning to the other types discussed so far. The main mechanisms for promoting instrumental learning are "renewed positive interaction and communication across group boundaries". Quantity matters less than the nature and quality of interactions and the social context (Aiken, 2013, pp. 31–34). This resonates with the conditions provided by Nadler for instrumental reconciliation.

We now turn to Dhurata's life story as a more personal experience of both types of contentious reconciliation in post-war Kosovo. Dhurata'sⁱ story is used heuristically to uncover some of the current challenges that a group of local internally displaced people face in Kosovo. Before the war, she studied medicine in school alongside the Serbian community and like the other Albanians in Mitrovica lived her everyday life with other Serbs since the city was not divided. However, tensions between the communities rose before the war, and the Serbian and Albanian communities were segregated or expelled from inter-ethnic schools and the workforce. Born, raised and educated in high school in Northern Mitrovica, she was forced to move to Southern Mitrovica due to the war. Her life took a different direction to what had she expected before the war when she had dreamed of studying medicine and geology. Her apartment in the north was no longer accessible due to the separation of the city, forcing her to live in rented houses in the south. In order to return to Northern Mitrovica, her birthplace, she decided to work as an NGO activist in the divided city, a job she still holds today. Her encounters with a wide range of local and international political elites and citizens, including Serbs, are very unusual and are telling about power politics in Kosovo and the possibilities of reconciliation.

The war in Kosovo resulted in the expulsion of thousands of people like Dhurata, and she points out that the war was one of the most significant phases of her life. She shared a couple of moments, which illustrate the experience of being a refugee during the war. The first important moment was when she saw people being killed:

I think I was only two and a half meters away when a man, he was a father with two kids, I don't remember, but he just went to take some water in a place called Klina, in a small river and then they just shot him and then his wife wanted to run and we said 'no, they will kill you too!', so he was just left there.

She also had to use her limited nursing experience to care for her younger brother, who was wounded as a KLA fighter, because nobody else around could treat him. A similarly formative event for her was when the experiences of school and of being a refugee came together. On the border with Albania, she met one of her former professors on the fourth day of queuing at the border crossing, tired and without food. Seeing her former professor with old shoes hurt her a lot, and she did not know whether he would survive, due to the Serbian army practice of targeted killings of professors. At that moment she realized that suffering cannot be understood by others and she drew a comparison between when she read stories of the Holocaust and the suffering she herself experienced. She told her teacher:

My dear professor, I feel ashamed because I read a lot about holocausts but all the time I thought that, you know, that authors are exaggerating, then I said lucky me, I kept it only for myself, I didn't say it. Now I understand that nobody can ever describe suffering.

Such events evoked in her the feelings of perplexity and powerlessness that often accompany refugees fleeing war:

I had a feeling that everything is so, you know... and it hurts so much when you don't know if you will be ever able to come back, and you feel how small, in a way you are, how useless and helpless you are.

This period for her was a “struggle for survival” from which she managed to flee. Her life story shows that she returned to Kosovo after the withdrawal of Serbian troops. Dhurata described the immediate aftermath of the war as “one of the moments in which I didn't know what I was going to do, like I knew at the time I could do something and I wanted to do something, [but] I didn't know where to find [it]”. She found her first job as a theater instructor at an international donor organization, mostly working with traumatized children. She describes this work as unconscious self-therapy, which had already begun during the war when she had played with children while they were being held hostage. Soon, she moved on to work as a community center administrator, though she continued volunteer work with children. After a while, she came into contact with a Dutch couple in Mitrovica that had worked previously in Bosnia and Croatia. They claimed to be there “just to listen to what people had to say” in order to direct the focus of their activities. This surprised her since “everybody was coming and saying you have to do this, you have to do that”, because most donors were only interested in infrastructure. This resonates with the criticism of transitional justice and critical approaches, arguing that top-down solutions ignore local needs and are often implemented without consultation with locals.

Despite the general lack of ownership, this life story shows that it sometimes exists but may not be widespread. She successfully asked the Dutch couple to work in Mitrovica “because there is a lot to do here and nobody else is working with people, everybody builds houses”. This request was also a personal desire, as she was hoping to acquire “a job in order to live”

and sustain her family. As the oldest member of her family, this responsibility had fallen on her shoulders. At the same time, she continued to be disappointed by the fact that she could not return to her home as her apartment was occupied and KFOR did not allow her to enter Northern Mitrovica. During her first attempts to return with a group of displaced persons, French KFOR stopped them on the grounds of security since the situation “was so violent”. Seeing the obstacles, Dhurata realized that the only potential way to return was by cooperating and starting to listen and understand the Serbian community. So she began working with them through an NGO. This attitude and behavior change was personally very difficult for her due to her traumatic experiences during the war. How she managed to work with both communities is further examined below.

Instrumental Motives for Reconciliation

There are many reasons for cooperation with the other, such as personal interests, like returning to the houses where people used to live before the war. Dhurata, an internally displaced refugee, wanted to return home after the war: “I wanted to go home like everybody else. I think I became nostalgic”. She tried to go to the north with her sister to see her flat and pick up a few pictures and other things. No international organization helped her to pick up her items, so she went to the north with her sister. She was attacked in front of her flat:

[six] Serbian women, one of them was my neighbor. They actually attacked me and beat me and the worst moment was when these two [KFOR] soldiers were looking at me and I shouted: HELP!!! [they] just looked, they had weapons and they just pretended they didn't see me.

She sustained head injuries in the incident, and a vase was even thrown at her, although it luckily did not hit her on the head. When she saw that the KFOR soldiers were not going to help her, she shouted that she worked for an international organization, although in fact she did not. After a while, the son of a neighbor intervened in the attack and the women stopped attacking her. She remains very disappointed about this incident and she is unsure whether the war or this incident represents more of a disappointment for her. She says: “I didn't feel any pain anymore, that was something for me, I don't know if I was more disappointed here or earlier, in '99”. She is disappointed about the incident since she did not think that women could be so violent, and she is also disappointed at KFOR's failure to assist her as an unarmed woman who posed no risk.

Since then, she has lived with her family in nine different rented houses in the south, while the family which occupied her apartment in the north has paid nothing. She sent complaints first to the French gendarmerie and later to UN Habitat. She was initially offered the option of selling the apartment, but she refused to sell and opted for the house to be managed by UN-HABITAT. Once UNHABITAT identified the occupying family, they asked whether she wanted them to be expelled or to pay rent “like Albanians are paying in the South?” She opt-

ed for payment but has never received any money. According to her, the Albanian families which occupied Serbian houses for a few years were obliged to pay rent, since the international community could enforce the law in the south, whereas the Serbs did not since the international community did not enforce the law in the north. Later, the Kosovo Property Agency took over the tasks of UNHABITAT but they were also unable to enforce the law in the north. The situation remains much the same, and some but not all, displaced people have been forced to sell. In the south, a few houses have been built for IDPs but only for citizens who had land. Those, like Dhurata with apartments were excluded. Dhurata claims that a few IDPs who had connections with the government benefited from this program despite not owning land in the north, but she did not benefit from it. She claims that the requirement to own land “was unfair for citizens”. Now IDPs either live in expensive rented accommodation or in houses that they have managed to buy. Dhurata still rents. It seems that the institutional solutions for the property rights of IDPs provided by local or international actors failed due to a lack of capacity or unwillingness to enforce rules in Northern Mitrovica.

Dhurata started working with the Serbian community immediately after the war, as her internal rejection was surpassed by everyday economic needs:

we had these fights, internal fights, because I don't think that we really had the luxury to think and just because I had first of all to find a job in order to live

Her main initiative of “community building” in Mitrovica had the “aim to talk and work with people” as everyone else in '99 was investing in infrastructure, roads, houses and returnees. She only wanted to return to Northern Mitrovica as a citizen and also understand what happened from the Serbian perspective:

because I was born and lived there in the north. I wanted to go back home, so in a way I had to do something in order to get back [and] I had some questions that I really needed to answer, to hear from people from the other side, the Serbs ‘What did they have to say about what happened?’ I really needed this for myself

In addition, the life story below shows that inter-ethnic cooperation between women from the divided city occurred for economical needs. Turning to one of the everyday difficulties of Mira, a Serbian mother working for an Albanian NGO, is the bullying of her children at school because she works with Albanians. Her adolescent children are sensitive. One came home in the evening and asked her to explain why she works with Albanians:

When he started to go to high school there were some kids in his class who came from families dealing with politics, their fathers were in charge of something and they started to ask him where is your mother working? And from time to time, he comes and asks: “look at this, you know that my friend is asking where your mother is working”

As a response, she must sit for several evenings with her husband to talk to her children, explaining the reasons why she has to work with Albanians. The first reason provided refers to

history: Albanians and Serbs lived together in the past for many generations, thus it is normal to live and work together now:

I remember now what my mother and my father told me and my kids: that they lived together with Albanians, telling them “look at this...we lived together with Albanians” and this is it...so I told them this as well...in the previous time, I had colleagues as Albanians, my director was Albanian guy in [a company] ...we were happy... so history is repeating the things...so you should know that it’s simply nothing strange, for me it’s nothing strange ...and my son says “yes for me it’s nothing strange because my mother has worked with Albanians since 1999”

It appears that she works with Albanians because she needs to support her family financially and also because Serbia does not help her find a job in the Serbian community.

[She says to her child] “I had a job before the war. I had a salary from the Serbian government and now the Serbian government doesn’t care for me and your father”. He has a job, he is paid by Serbia but I’m not. They never found a job for me. They never found classes for me so how you will grow up just with one salary? We paid the rent for our house in that period. I didn’t have a salary. [She says to her child] “So Edin, can you imagine [life without me working]? I should do something.”

The last reason given to her child is that it is morally good or appropriate to work with Albanians as she is helping people. She considers this a “very important” reason since “I’m doing nothing bad”. The perceived good reasons for working with the other are: “doing humanitarian work, helping people, helping adults, helping women”. Despite her various reasons, her child was not fully convinced, but did not reject their mother for working with Albanians. The child said: “just tell me that you know better than me”.

In addition, Shkodran’s life story, involved in the north and south, presumes that communities reconcile when they have a common material interest. He claims that “The best way to arrange organized crime is between Albanians and Serbs”. Even political obstacles seem to decrease when “they only have their common material interest”.²⁹¹ Similarly, Gjin’s life story shows that successful businesses are built across communities, as he set up a private clinic after the war with an Albanian and still maintains it due to its success and high profitability. This leads to the understanding that only grassroots’ movements or purely individual initiatives work inter-ethnically, primarily due to personal interests and necessity rather than willingness to reconcile. The following section shows how placing different ethnicities (which might not agree with or like each other) in one work environment might have the unintended, positive consequence of instrumental reconciliation. Thus I argue that instrumental reconciliation occurs at the individual level, even when institutional attempts to reconcile communities fail due to the low priority in political agenda, lack of attention towards the local dynamics and the lack of participation by citizens. Grassroots and individual initiatives maneuver

²⁹¹ Shkodran, p.16-17

around it and engage successfully in reconciliation as is shown below through creating and sustaining mutual trust and respect, even in times of high insecurity.

Wild Mitrovica/Northern Kosovo: Breaking Myths in a Fragile Environment

The context of Mitrovica and the north after the war is very complex. The characteristics of Northern Kosovo, as described from the perspective of Dhurata, provide some insights into her work and her struggles in the north. Both Dhurata and Mira call Northern Mitrovica and the north generally “wild”. According to both, this is the best and most frequent term used to describe the lawlessness in security, the poor economy and the fragile social and inter-ethnic relations. In the literature, the term “wild” is not used to describe security or societal and economic relations but to describe justice. Verdeja uses the term “wild” to describe the process whereby justice is taken into the hands of citizens rather than exercised by institutions, which can quickly turn into “reciprocal violence” (Verdeja, 2009). However, Mira and Dhurata use the term “wild” to describe the generally fragile situation in the north, referring to the lack of security, the poor economy and the fragile social cohesion in everyday life. In fact, these unfavorable conditions might even bridge ethnic cleavages, since myths that only the other/enemy is “bad” may be broken. Citizens see that individuals within the group can be more destructive/bad than the other, respectively the Serbian bridge watchers became bad whereas the Albanian citizens in NGO’s became good, as the latter helped them dealing with Serbian threats.

For instance, Mira, a Serbian mother of several children, married and living in Northern Mitrovica, seems to have accomplished everything she wished for in her life: creating a family, educating herself and her children, having a job and buying a house. However, she still seems to lack normality due to the unstable situation in Northern Kosovo. She expresses a high level of distress and concern when describing frequent killings of young children and the rapes and killings of young girls. In addition, she claims that citizens in the north, including youth “fight a lot”. As a result, she feels very stressed and afraid as a parent. It seems that she does not even sleep until her children are at home. She claims that the crime rate has risen in the post war period. This situation has resulted in two important reflections.

On the one hand, she expresses that she might be forced to leave her current work with Albanian counterparts due to the high risk posed by unidentified local Serbian men armed and backed by Belgrade. She has been frequently stopped when crossing the bridge to travel to her work, located on the southern, Albanian side. She calls the questioning she undergoes from these men on the bridge “small interrogations”. The bridge watchers also take note of individuals who cross the bridge. She refers to them as “stupid”. In turn, she has developed strategies to deal with it, such as taking different routes and so on. However, she is skeptical as to whether this is sufficient to continue working with Albanians, due to the possible securi-

ty risks these armed men pose to her and to her family. Once her car was stolen, although she managed to regain it through her connections without paying a ransom, which is not common. The Kosovo Police expressed disbelief when she reported that she had regained her car without paying a ransom. These seem to be common forms of intimidation of Serbian citizens who cooperate with Albanians.

She describes the Serbian elite in the north as caring only about: “how much they receive, their salary, and who will win the elections”, not really about cooperation or reconciliation. She claims that they also “force” people to go to meetings in a parking lot in the middle of the night or day, when sometimes thousands gather after sirens announce the meetings. She thus has low trust in the political elites in the north, as they seem focused on their personal interests.

Mira also mentioned many deficiencies in the legal system. The dominance of high crime within the Serbian community apparently contributes to reconciliation with the other. Myths about Albanians are being slowly broken since it is not only the other which is “bad” or “enemy”, but individuals within the Serbian community may harm Serbians more than the others. Promoting the worsening of the situation in non-reconciled communities is morally indefensible, even if it seems to bring former enemies closer.

On the other hand, turning to the Albanian life story, Dhurata describes an encounter with her Serbian colleague in which the latter expressed a fear of traveling to work on the Albanian side since the bridge watchers take notes and interrogate her. She came to work and “was just crying” and said to Dhurata:

I’m afraid for my kids”... “I know [the person] but I don’t dare tell you, or anybody else” because she said this is the wild north and life is so cheap and then she asked: “Would you then allow me to come either later at work so they change [the shift at the bridge] or she could organize a way that somebody from the south would wait at the other bridge?”

Dhurata found a way to accompany her colleague to the north from then on, via another bridge. Another colleague of Dhurata, after many killings and rapes in the north, recognized that not only Albanians were harming Serbs. She said:

I don’t dare now to send my [child] to [sports] training. Where are the Albanians to blame now? Because nobody in this case could blame Albanians, they were in a pure Serbian area and then they arrested one of the boys but then after some time, he got released.

Dhurata also states that individuals can benefit financially, since it’s a “wild” zone economically:

you see so many cars without registration plates, you see even from Tito’s time, TM sometimes Titova Mitrovica, you see old KM, Kosovska Mitrovica and that’s kind of specific, and if you can just hide, you don’t pay any taxes, you just benefit, you don’t contribute let’s say to anything, so this is kind of wilding.

According to her, many people, including Albanians and Serbs “benefited from that illegal trade, also many politicians”. This shows the “best interethnic communication in that kind of dirty business”. She presumes that some Kosovo parliamentarians wish to maintain insecurity in the north since it’s beneficial for illegal business. They seem to own stonebreaker, oil, cigarettes and drinks businesses:

which is quite big. They do all the roads and highways and that is really good business. And then an MP from Pristina was registering that business together with a Serb from Leposavic in order to be one of the tender winners. There were also some kind of officials benefiting, not only citizens. Also the petrol companies even today, oil is cheaper in the north than in the south, because it’s not taxed and selling goods such as Plazma, we see Cola, cigarettes. For them it would be great if incidents happened from time to time so they can benefit illegally, continue their work and I think, you know, crime is crime, no matter from which side, I think they damaged a lot and they contributed even more to this wilding.

Mira’s and Dhurata’s experiences of wild Mitrovica complement the argument provided by Call about the tensions between peace building and state building. The fifth tension relates to the dilemma of peace versus justice and sustainability. As Call states, “appeasing spoilers in the interest of peace, while neglecting the development of a sustainable state, can strengthen the hand of repressive or authoritarian state rulers and jeopardize the sustainability of both the state and peace” (Call, 2008a, p. 378). In many cases, the wish to maintain peace comes at the expense of state performance, including undesirable outcomes such as unaccountability, lack of oversight and corruption. Mira’s and Dhurata’s life stories show that tolerating these radical groups may result not only in unaccountability, but also in organized crime and/or wild justice and the unintentional breaking of some war myths. This section seems to show that security needs to be prioritized but not through tolerating criminal groups, impunity and unaccountability, but rather by providing human security and working with individuals in the community in order to enable sustainable reconciliation and institution building. Prioritizing partners, i.e. Serbian criminal groups, and leaving the population at their hands may not be an available option for the international community to promote either security or reconciliation in Kosovo.

Breaking Myths through Grassroots Dialogue Based on Mutual Respect

Despite the security challenges, Dhurata developed some strategies for connecting with Serbs in order to work and achieve her aim to return to her home in the north. First, she says that it is easier for her to function in the north since she shares a commonality with the other internally displaced persons, as they discuss the common difficulties they face. They discuss together “losing properties and how it is. I could say yes I know, I’m one of you, so in a way I was accepted because I shared the same experiences”. Moreover, at her work, she arranged an open, American style office to develop trust between coworkers. She did so since they are

“not real offices but you could hear from one office to the other” building confidence by showing that all are treated equally:

if you are addressing a Serb, an Albanian, a Roma, internationals, whoever comes in the same way... So it was important that people know that me as a leader, I’m saying the same words in different languages, you know to different people, that helped a lot.

In addition, assessing security risks together with the Serbs enhanced trust between both sides. Serbs would sometimes not want to go to the south because “I cannot go because I’m afraid” then she had to estimate whether it was really a risk or “it was just a habit not to come to work”. Thus, she had to balance between risk concerns and work interests. In the north, after she was attacked, her Serbian colleagues would follow her and she would listen to their advice. She still relies on their advice to commute to the north, which she usually does every day.

Her Serb employees were also stigmatized, encountering threats when working with her. This in turn seems to have enhanced trust and cooperation between both groups as they would consult each other about traveling routes. Thus, the wild north brought many difficulties to her everyday work, since her Serb employees were pressured when they crossed the bridge to the south, being asked “What are you doing? Who do you work with?”. On the other hand, she was not pressured by Albanian citizens in Southern Mitrovica for cooperating with Serbs. She says that this was because everybody knew her and her war experience due to the small size of the city. She also had family ties with the KLA, which was against Serbs, thus giving her credibility with Albanian citizens. However, she was threatened when she worked on anti-corruption cases:

when I was working for this anti-corruption network, of course, I had a lot of threats, live, telephone, not to make public the names of some corrupt leaders. They threatened to rape me, calling in the middle of the night and in the morning and in the evening. Of course that was not easy because all my family was upset

While working with Serbs, she started listening to the Serbian community. There she realized that not all members of society were involved in crimes and that some shared the same principles as the victims. She says:

I started to understand some points of the people, not everybody was involved in the war, not everyone from the other side was involved in crimes and then by listening in a way and also by sharing, you also see that in a way, you find people from the other side that believe in the same principles, the same values as you, and then we started to work, to talk to people, to work with people

Dhurata also discussed the expulsion of Albanians from schools and everyday discrimination with a colleague. Her Serbian colleague ignored and refused to understand the discrimination of the other. She said “I’m really sincere, I didn’t see maybe I just didn’t care”. Apparently even her father also had problems with the Milosevic regime, but she stated that she “simply

didn't know". For Dhurata, it was "hard" to believe what her Serbian colleague said, but she continued to inquire further what happened in her everyday life. She asked her "What did you do, can you just tell me one day, what did you do?". The Serbian colleague responded "I woke up, I went to school, listened to music, went to a bar, and I did not see any Albanian neighbors". Her Serbian colleague conducted her everyday activities as if the other did not exist. Even if she saw them in the street, she greeted them with "hi and nothing happened". Dhurata questioned her further on how she could live in the same community and not see the discrimination. She asked: [when you met Albanians in the street] "You didn't ask them why they are not going to school" and she said: "No, I did not ask and maybe she said in a way I knew but my consciousness didn't allow me or something". This seems to show the everyday denial of discrimination of the other and inaction. Despite this, their work together continues. Dhurata considers that Serbs face difficulties understanding that humans are all equal, perhaps due to their previous privileged status, since Serbs were "raised with the [privileged] feeling", "a different energy", "belonging to a more powerful nationality", "you are kind of superior, you have everything". She maintains the belief that if the privileged party has never experienced discrimination, they can never really understand. Hence it will be difficult to change the Serbian mindset:

understand that we are all humans and no one is above the other, and in a way this might sound philosophical but in a way it's so simple. If you are not experiencing [discrimination] under your own skin, you can maybe never really understand.

Similarly when discussing the new reality of independent Kosovo, Dhurata recognized that her Serbian colleagues rejected it and were hoping for Serbia's return:

we ended up in some unpleasant discussions about this new reality, What does that mean? Because they still believe in Serbian institutions, maybe they will come back and that it will be the same like before.

Her Serbian colleagues disagreed about historical issues occurring in the late 1980's and 1990's and "ended up stuck somewhere in the fourteenth century". According to her, the Serbs would exaggerate about the Kosovo Liberation Army being a terrorist group. But she still maintains the view that it was "good because we talked". They agreed only on the question of minorities and that "we belong to Kosovo, Gazimestan". She recognized that they seemed prepared to speak about these issues early on. After working together for a while, they started to speak and respect the feelings of the others even though it was difficult:

It was difficult to break that kind of barricade that they had, this was something really... it's so difficult to find somebody unstressed after many years that could speak. Later we opened, we spoke and said let's speak our own history, how we were raised and how the others were raised. We started in a way to respect feelings because that was another challenge was for me, you know, I was really struggling a lot to respect the feelings because sometimes the work needed to be done

Her position was unique as she was accepted by both sides despite claiming that she would have joined the KLA if she had been a man. Dhurata was asked on a television show why she had not been in the KLA herself. She replied:

I'm a woman, because I don't like women in uniform and then they said if you had been a man would you have gone? I said yes. I would have gone and supported them because I had to defend my family and actually myself and then the family.

As a result, her colleagues were not happy but no real repercussions occurred. Later, she started to rise above the personal perspective in discussions and slowly learned to discuss these issues "because before it [talking] was so hard [but] since anyway you cannot solve it, just talking and arguing [helps]". Despite that, in reality her colleagues "would never agree" on historical questions, they found a common path for working together through agreeing to disagree, as "this is the way I managed to go on with my work". Her life story may indicate that mutual respect was developing from both sides despite their differences. Dhurata works actively on discussing with the others, mediation and the return process, viewed as the only means to reconcile.

On the other hand, Mira's life story shows that she faced difficulties because she worked with Albanians, including harassment, her car being stolen and her children being bullied at school. As a result, she realized that Albanians are not the "enemies" since it was not they who were committing vandalism and raping young girls, creating problems for the youth and high unemployment. She also appreciates the Albanian work team "they were very good and very nice and we had a very good time together" before the war and she still maintains the same opinion of them. The potential projects that seem to work on the ground from Mira's life story are those, which represent basic needs and individual benefits for both parties. She stresses that reasons for this include the fact that such projects make people "come together, to make some businesses for them" or help them. She has experience in banking, education and the health sector and has worked with marginalized groups such as poor people, women, children and youth.

Lastly, we turn to Vera's life story that is salient in understanding local ownership. She was educated abroad, reported on the Kosovo war and returned to work for an NGO focusing on reconciliation and dealing with the past, since she believes that only bottom-up initiatives will assist these processes. She says

It is a process that nobody can develop you if you do not want to develop... in the moments when I was down and very exhausted this was the logical argument that made me move on. Since nobody can develop your state or civil society. Since nobody knows better than you the way you breathe. And it is an organic process. It is an organic process and it needs go in organic manner from the bottom up.

She claims that Kosovo will not remain special. It will develop as: “We are not *sui generis*. It happened with others and it will with us, too”.²⁹² This belief helped her continue her work despite her personal reservations and the local and regional challenges. Personally, she struggles since her efforts will be seen only by the young generation: “our kids will see the different Kosovo”. Furthermore, she turned down a “well-paid job for a lower salary” at her current job. Thus, she considers that she is contributing to a more social cause, developing an organic civil society.²⁹³ Her life story shows that personal material condition seems to take second place to her personal ideals to promote state and civil society building while emphasizing local ownership.

This section explained how instrumental reconciliation at the individual level may prevail in very difficult and complex conditions. This furthers understanding of reconciliation from critical approaches focusing on everyday peace. Mac Ginty and Richmond argue that local subjects represents different agencies that aim to identify and create conditions for peace, with or without international help (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 769). Similarly, the life stories seem to show that the local community finds means to promote conditions for peace for instrumental motives, even in cases where the international community, with or without intent, supports policies that are detrimental to peace or state building. These policies include tolerating unaccountable and possible criminal groups, which hinder cooperation by NGOs with other communities as well as creating and maintaining barriers between communities on security grounds. Legitimacy at the individual level seems to remain more with local actors rather than with both local and international actors, as suggested by critical approaches. In addition, critical approaches argue that, in building everyday peace, the local population conduct

economic, cultural and or survival everyday tasks [that] may allow individuals and communities in villages, valleys, and city neighborhoods to develop common bonds with members of other ethnic or religious groups, to demystify ‘the other’ and to reconstruct contextual legitimacy (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 769).

The case of Kosovo shows that such interactions are necessary in order to promote instrumental reconciliation based on mutual respect at the individual level. These everyday tasks seem to focus primary on economic-material interests. They occur among marginalized groups (poor people, women, children, youth) and some criminal groups (illegal traders) both of which contribute to demystifying the other.

Prioritizing bottom-up initiatives for peace building through local-local civil society, i.e. not international NGOs or IOs, seems to be important in reconciliation. The staff of Dhurata’s NGO consists only of the various ethnicities living in Kosovo. They forgo visibility in the media in order to secure the success of the NGO on the ground. This resonates with Gram-

²⁹² Vera, p.9

²⁹³ Vera, p.10-15

sci's idea that civil society is very important in state building, but it extends the argument to reconciliation as well. However, civil society needs to be built locally and organically. The life stories of Vera, Mira and Dhurata²⁹⁴ seem to reflect the above view.

Verdeja argues furthermore that civil society is a means to achieving an end, reconciliation. It is considered key for challenging statist historical narratives and encouraging the recognition of victims through public discussions, but it is limited due to lack of interest or limited resources (Verdeja, 2009, p. 183). This section has showed that civil society might also promote individual/instrumental reconciliation by sharing everyday tasks and building mutual respect among ethnicities. Verdeja proposes to assist the various grassroots organizations, which promote inter-ethnic cooperation, viewed as a first step towards reconciliation. Critical theorists acknowledge the role of civil society in the peace building process and suggest including traditional bodies and other actors, such as local NGOs, community groups, grassroots movements, and women in this process. This would bring further legitimacy in the eyes of the local population, especially in the short term but not always in the long term (Belloni, 2012, p. 27).

Conclusion

On the one hand, international officials reveal that their perspective focuses on providing peace building and reconciliation through EU integration due to Kosovo's geographical location. The internal national interests of some EU countries with a high number of Kosovo Albanian residents are significant since their repatriation is crucial for local politics. Regional security is at the top of the international agenda and is viewed as a precondition for reconciliation. Special attention is paid by the international community to accepting perpetrators as a part of the community and bringing victims and perpetrators together rather than relying on retributive justice and judicial mechanisms in Kosovo. Justice is presented as politicized by American power and as not being pursued with the aim of maintaining stability in Kosovo, since the current political elite was presumably involved in committing crimes. Prosecutions, finding missing persons and material reparations for victims do not seem to be high on the international agenda. The rule of law is viewed as another essential precondition for reconciliation. Some officials recognize that allowing the Kosovo Albanian political elite to be criminalized with impunity in the aftermath of war hindered and still hinders reconciliation, as the international community failed to protect minorities, but also allowed the continued segregation and coercion of minorities in the aftermath of war.

Further shortcomings are recognized, such as the preference for engaging in short-term rather than long-term involvement due to financial limitations and political unwillingness to commit

²⁹⁴ Her life story is explained in depth in the statebuilding chapter.

in the long term due to criticism of “colonization” etc. There are two main shortcomings related to Northern Kosovo. First, international community organizations have limited access to the north as only UNMIK and KFOR can access the area. Second, the establishment of barricades on the bridge in Mitrovica by the French Battalion is viewed retrospectively as hindering reconciliation and being already unnecessary two years after the war. Suggestions for improving reconciliation focus mainly on sending positive messages to the Serbian minority, promoting peaceful co-existence, institutional power sharing mechanisms, boosting the economy, forcefully implementing inter-ethnic projects, establishing the truth and conveying it publicly by sharing individual stories. Forcing ethnic communities to work together resonates with instrumental reconciliation.

On the other hand, the life stories reveal reconciliatory attempts at the institutional and individual levels. At the institutional level, the policies promoted by the EU Agreement aimed at integrating the Serbian community seem to be perceived as hindering reconciliation. For instance, decentralization policies and the amnesty law are perceived as contributing to the separate existence of communities, as instrumental reconciliation prescribes. However on the ground, policies aimed at bringing communities together seem to be preferred. Potentially negative policies are enabled by the unconditional support provided by local servile elites to the international community, which uses them to sign agreements that may be detrimental to peace or reconciliation. The international community seems to avoid cooperation with any political elites that express resistance to or challenge such disintegrative policies. The international community seems to include the servile political elite in order to exert pressure in long term to achieve national, regional or international interests but exclude the incorporation of political groups that aim at the local development of Kosovo. The life stories reveal that the removal of the criminal/servile political class is a prerequisite for any successful governmental strategies aimed at inter-ethnic reconciliation. On the judicial mechanisms, the willingness of the political elite to persecute the perpetrators seems to be lacking, and even when it exists, the ability of judicial mechanisms to meet the needs of victims seems questionable. Therefore, an initiative to create a non-judicial mechanism, a truth-telling commission is ongoing but the political will to functionalize it seems to be lacking. Thus, reconciliation at the institutional level points more to inter-state reconciliation (Kosovo and Serbia) rather than contributing to reconciliation between communities on the ground. The instrumental reconciliatory policies targeted at states by the international community seem to further ethnic cleavages between communities on the ground. Therefore, it is suggested that top-down initiatives for reconciliation should promote the integrative existence of communities together instead of separate co-existence, as instrumental reconciliation theory suggests. The motives for reconciliation may be instrumental, however the target seems to be different in the case of Kosovo, since it prioritizes living together over separate co-existence.

On the individual level, Verdeja's model of reconciliation based on mutual respect seems to fit the case of Kosovo. The motives seem to resonate more with the instrumental rather than the moral type of reconciliation at the individual level. It refers more to the instrumental type of reconciliation, as reported in social psychology at the individual level rather than instrumental reconciliation at the institutional/political level. The latter refers mainly to power sharing, institutional and/or inter-state arrangements, which the international community seems to focus on. At the individual level, semi-forcing different ethnicities to work together on a project towards a common concrete goal seems to be a good way to promote gradual reconciliation (amongst individuals at least). Top-down international transitional justice policies might have to create such projects targeting basic sectors (health, education, banking), marginalized groups (women, children and youth) and/or profitability (businesses). In this way, by semi-forcing different groups to work together every day, instrumental reconciliation prevails due to personal interests, where mutual respect prevails and disagreement becomes part of agreement in every-day life. However, gradually, through frequent everyday interaction, war myths seem to decrease, leaving open the possibility for moral reconciliation to follow.

For instance, Dhurata's life story shows that her main personal concern was to return to her home in Northern Kosovo, which is why she decided to engage actively with the Serbian community. Facing many challenges at the beginning, she proved very determined to return, which forced her to tolerate differences of opinions about historical events [e.g. denial of discrimination against Albanians before the war] and the current situation. Thus she learned to cope with denial by Serbs in order to achieve her tangible aim to return to the north. She still engages in dialogue with the others to bridge differences and establish mutual respect towards the other. On the other hand, Mira's life story shows how economic needs are very important for the success of inter-ethnic projects, but also for former adversaries to recognize each other as human, reconsider negative myths and understand the other.

Dhurata's life story offers some more conclusions on the current state of Northern Kosovo, institutional and local attempts at reconciliation and promising local strategies. For instance, the property cases show how the institutional framework of all actors, including Serbs, internationals and Kosovans, was limited due to their non-cooperation, the unequal treatment of cases and the lack of enforcement power in the north. This created an open space for the interaction of illegal groups, but left citizens without means of support in matters of justice, the economy and security. Mira's life story reveals similar patterns of illegality and insecurity for citizens in the north. In addition, Dhurata's war experiences portray two very important dimensions. The first reflects the "struggle for survival" under extreme conditions, which made her feel powerless in such a situation. Second, drawing a comparison with the tragedy of the Holocaust, about which she had read but which she could not believe, she points out that others' experience of suffering is never fully understood. But if suffering cannot be fully grasped

and described by others, then questions emerge concerning the role of transitional justice mechanisms, often externally driven and their legitimacy in deciding on somebody's else suffering.

Concluding on the current situation regarding peace in Kosovo, it seems that it is negative rather than positive peace which is present.²⁹⁵ The positive peace seems to be lacking in Kosovo when structures that enforce ethnic divisions directly (bridge watchers) or indirectly (political policies), are still present in both north and south. In addition, Call suggests measuring peace building through participatory policies, which the life stories imply is necessary. At the individual level, marginalized groups (minorities, women) attempt to incorporate themselves in projects that may promote reconciliation through NGOs. However, they seem to lack access, involvement and representation through political elites at the national level. Political elites seem to represent their personal interests rather than citizens' interests. Call suggests that participatory policies be developed for peace building, referring to "mechanisms for aggrieved social groups to feel that they have both a voice and a stake in the national political system" (Call, 2008b, pp. 6–7). This seems to be necessary in the case of Kosovo, not only for peace but also for reconciliation.

The common representation revealed by the life stories is limited. It is acknowledged that individual stories are important, and the main aim is to open up further debates on the politics of reconciliation at the institutional and individual levels in Kosovo, the city of Mitrovica and the integration of Northern Kosovo. This research calls for further comparisons with other case studies to uncover the reasons and mechanisms behind successful reconciliation, to understand further the initiatives in the local context and identify the international community's institutional policies that may (un)intentionally harm reconciliation. This fragility of reconciliation and peace building should be reviewed with the findings in the nation building chapter that seem to point to an unsuccessful multi-ethnic state and the rise of nationalism. It would also be important to investigate religious reconciliation as deep animosities seem to have been created in the institutional as well as in the social fabric, as explained in the state building chapter.

In addition, specific questions arise about the impact of instrumental reconciliation, such as the kinds of conflicts, which arise when promoting this type of instrumental reconciliation based on mutual respect. So far, only grassroots and individual initiatives seem to contribute to successful reconciliation, even without international assistance. A "neutral" mediating

²⁹⁵ "Negative peace refers to the 'absence of direct violence' and implies a more or less permanent ceasefire (Call, 2008b, p. 6). Positive peace refers to the presence of direct peace (cooperation), structural peace (equity, equality) and culture peace (peace and dialogue). In other words, when positive peace is present, there should be a 'absence of structural violence'²⁹⁵ and 'cultural violence that legitimizes direct and/or structural violence' (Galtung, 2007, pp. 30–31)." in the Post Liberal Peace chapter, please consult it for more information.

body (e.g. Europe, universities or IOs) seems unnecessary in these grassroots initiatives (except as a donor), contrary to the suggestion in Nadler's study that a third party be used as it may have an equalizing effect. Further research could extensively examine the role of third parties in reconciliation at the individual and institutional levels. Other questions concern whether the instrumental reconciliation present in Kosovo at the individual level may have a trickledown effect at the broader societal and institutional level. Furthermore, questions of how durable it is at a societal level or in the longer term, if challenges arise, should be researched. Lastly, employing the life stories methodology to analyze peace building and reconciliation processes in the post-conflict period in the case of Kosovo provided new theoretical questions for future research and new policy recommendations as shown below.

9. Conclusion and Policy Implications: Localising Local Theories in State and Peace Building

“Kosovo was a perfect little laboratory for nation building. We could have done better. We did not do too bad.” (Andreas)

The objective of this dissertation was to introduce a methodological innovation using a socio-logically inspired, post-structuralist method and tool of analysis, namely grounded theory as revealed by life stories to analyze and understand what classically were realist concepts of security, state, peace and nation. Life story interviews with individuals who have experienced themselves the peace and state building processes are used primarily in the fields of oral history, sociology and psychology and were in this research employed for the first time in the international relations domain of peace and state building as far as I know. This represents an interdisciplinary research approach. The aim was to bridge the gap between theory and practice and inform the general frameworks with more specific empirical evidence from the ground, informed by both the international and local elites and marginalized groups. The life story method was also used for the first time to present local marginalized and privileged voices and to understand the local needs and priorities, which seems to be very valuable as a methodological tool to provide new alternatives and understandings of some of the most significant processes in fragile post-conflict environments. Through this methodology, new venues might emerge for the future research in various fragile environments. In addition, using local languages seems to be very valuable for the collection of rich empirical evidence that can nourish theories of state and peace building, especially when life stories are presented on the basis of interviews which provide particularly rich data sources.

The experimental approach of using life stories proved to be insightful for a theorization of local state and peace building, local agency and local resistance. While the life stories approach had not yet been implemented in this field, it proved to deepen our understanding of the varied meanings of everyday and theoretical concepts on the ground in Kosovo. Adopting a post-structuralist approach, this work offered an in-depth description of the case study of Kosovo in order to expose the diversity of subjective accounts. The revealed social patterns and perceptions from the experiences of individuals' lives and their interactions with various actors highlight the subjective motives and meanings of post-war experiences that differ from those presented in established international relations literature. The latter has so far focused on consent, power sharing and legal mandates that is insufficient to reveal local patterns.

Life stories were collected through snowball sampling which involves referrals to find interviewees and which is frequently used in sociology and qualitative research to reach marginalized citizens in particular. It is also suitable for obtaining samples willing to comment on sensitive and suppressed topics such as state and peace building and the role of the international community as viewed by the local community in Kosovo. As has become clear, many citizens who appreciate the international community publicly will reject their policies in private. Such findings could be obtained only by employing snowball sampling as used in this research. In addition, several other criteria have been used to sample the life stories including population, accessibility, availability, personal involvement in the post-conflict reconstruction period and interactions with international actors (to ensure the possibility of an analytical comparison). Furthermore, as suggested by grounded theory, theoretical sampling was used in the selection of the presented life stories in order to add new concepts and categories to the currently existing theoretical approaches. Since the present research focused on the case study of Kosovo, generalization was less of a priority compared to deepening the contextual understanding of the case as provided in the findings chapters. Furthermore, post-structuralist theory advocates for developing a deep understanding of the data "behind" a case study. Life stories offer such rich data, even taking into account the subjectivities of the individuals which, as the study shows, have a crucial influence on the current international and local political developments of post-conflict reconstruction.

The local perspective through this sampling of life stories yielded insights that can inform theories of state and peace building and substantiated critical approaches to peace and state building, different from the institution building approaches. In short, the post-structuralist life stories approach can be successfully applied to the discipline of international relations. Theoretically, the dissertation contributes to liberal peace theory (e.g. about ineffectiveness of decentralization programs at the expense of minority integration and reconciliation) while also reaffirming arguments of post-liberal peace theorists about the disconnect of liberal peace theories with local actors. It also addressed the limitations of post-liberal peace theories and their ambiguous relationship to local agency. In addition, the research enhances the understanding of the variations in liberal and post liberal peace, especially regarding how liberal peace acquires local meanings (in spheres such as instrumental reconciliation, professionalism, respect, education) and what resistance means locally and how it is manifested. Theoretically, it suggests "localizing" local theories of state, peace and nation building. The word "localising" has in this context a double meaning. On the one hand, it refers to developing specific and concrete local theories rather than just hinting towards their possibility at the meta-theoretical level. On the other hand, it means to actually identify local theory in a place, thus "to localize" it. One of the central claims of this thesis is that this can be achieved through the life stories methodology, while both liberal peace and post-liberal peace scholarship have so

far fallen short of it. Put simply, life stories are a good way to uncover local opinions and perspectives and to thus localize local theories.

Turning to the findings, as argued in the theoretical chapters, state and peace building will continue since they are essential to preventing the spreading of international security threats from fragile zones, as argued for instance by Fukuyama. In addition, it is important to recognize that power places more importance on territory rather than in the residing community (Anderson, 1974, p. 31). This is problematic since territory is scarce and cannot be expanded, hence it will be constantly re-divided (Anderson, 1974, p. 31). Thus the issues of nation, state and peace building will remain on the local and international agenda for some more time. In fact, despite Tilly's criticism that state formation in Europe was violent, the European state structure has been imposed on fragile states (Tilly, 1975, p. 638).²⁹⁶ Upon adaptation of the European forms of governance, local responses range from acceptance to resistance, where the latter sometimes leads to state and peace failure. It is therefore important to understand the local context empirically in depth to inform the theory and practice. Questioning whether nations and states in fragile environments are at all necessary, and suitable for creating and maintaining peace falls outside the scope of the thesis, but it can be investigated later on.

Most of the international civil servants identify as main challenges to state building aspects concerning the rule of law, emphasizing corruption and impunity, politicized justice, local ownership and economic underdevelopment, which is in accordance with the mainstream theoretical models on state building. In contrast with traditional theory emphasizing institutional building, some informants point to the difficulty of identity construction in Kosovo and future challenges such as resistance, further unrest and destabilization of the region. Another finding pertains to the culture of transparency, which some suggest is lacking in locals and internationals. Furthermore, the interference of foreign actors in domestic politics and transparency is identified as a step backwards for the development of the democratic system in Kosovo. Thus, while the theory has been satisfied as state structures are in place, the implementation of legal and political standards remains very difficult from a practical viewpoint.

State building is promoted despite the fact that IOs and INGOs involved in "capacity building" sometimes strongly deny their involvement in state building tasks. The establishment of special mechanisms dealing with Kosovo's statehood, not accepted by all EU members, was promoted in global and regional platforms to overcome the barriers caused by the disputed status and also for the IOs to function easily on the ground. Both international and local actors found the post-war terrain to be challenging for similar reasons, including social, cultural and historical elements. A return to what is labeled as "*ethics*" seems very important to both groups. This refers to ethical interests and identification with the state instead of materialism,

²⁹⁶ Please consult the mainstream theory chapter for more information.

individualism, nepotism, corruption, clans and clientalism. However, there is a difference in the strategies pursued to promote ethical interests. The international community focuses on developing institutional mechanisms, while local actors emphasize the relevance of the social fabric. More concretely, they focus on bringing back practices of respect, tolerance, sharing and knowledge, which may then turn into state identification. The history of Kosovo seems to be perceived by the international community as the reason for lack of collective confidence, democratic identity and efficiency in “statebuilding”, while the local community views the time under Tito’s communism as having promoted Albanian empowerment (this changed evidently during the Rankovic and Milosevic period). Identification with democratic values, human rights and collective initiatives was very high during the subsequent period of oppression. Thus it may be difficult to consider socialism unequivocally as a reason for the democratic failures in post-war Kosovo, as often pointed out by international actors. They also note that the current dysfunctional state may be attributed to a loss of hope and the advantages that profiteering groups wish to maintain. These elements are attributed to the local culture, which the international officials seem to regard as problematic and as contributing to state building failures. Furthermore, the example of education exemplifies the challenges arising from state building in Kosovo and disconnect between the international and local actors. For instance, long-term goals are preferred over short-term goals. Local actors prioritize education rather than capacity building projects to tackle the same negative phenomena, while the international actors highlight capacity building. Political interferences by the elite, who are supported in their positions in power to maintain security, undermine education, exemplifying the problems probably faced also in other state functions. The international community seems to *resist* alternatives that challenge the current political elite or order (secular or non-secular), reinforcing a cycle of further resistance and alienation by the local community. Interventions on the ground through providing quality education at schools and universities present an alternative to mediate and negotiate the local and internationally exported values in order to promote a more sustainable social fabric, which could provide the basis of a functioning society, maintain and create healthy social interactions and may contribute to social cohesion. This in turn would support successful state building.

Although internationals have capacity and resources, they still often fail to prevent or mitigate local violence, which is why it has been suggested that it would be better to engage with the locals “to provide space [and] targeted action for peace to form locally”, though not “colored by interests, biases, or ideology because it then loses local consent and legitimacy” (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 771). Furthermore, education could serve as a way to move away from an instrumental use of locals to a type of localism which “is hardwired into conflict transformation as it emphasizes the need to address relationships between antagonists and the need to address conflict at the individual and community levels” (Mac Ginty &

Richmond, 2013, p. 771). It may decrease violence if international community would attempt to limit violence by all actors involved in the conflict. In fact, international community should refrain from supporting an actor or group on the ground and hence choose to not disarm them since these groups may become source of conflict or stagnation in the future despite the high investment in education. Both communities should refrain from introducing a political and cultural hegemony through education in schools by involving all marginalized groups in state building process, neighborhood, city, village and regional levels. Especially marginalized groups not related to the ruling elite and civil society would have to be granted a place since revitalization of the state (including the economic domain) after war depends on wider marginalized society and groups including women, retirees, war victims, veterans and children. This would allow groups to relate to each other “on an everyday, human level, rather merely through problem-solving institutional frameworks” (Richmond, 2009a, p. 565). Ideally, in such a context, interactions would be based on “empathy, respect, the recognition of difference” and a global ethic of “care” (Richmond, 2009a, p. 574). Most importantly, the elements of empathy and care in local context of Kosovo mean amongst others professionalism, respect and tolerance. In practice, the regular interactions across different groups of the society may foster the deepening of relations on human level, as Richmond suggests. However, the power interests in post conflict environments must not be neglected, in order to allow empathy, professionalism and respect to arise. Therefore strengthening law and security alongside education for the purpose of societal engineering is essential to maintain the balance between vested power interests (local and international) and locally marginalized groups. This double track intervention may function since law and security emphasize punishing individuals contributing to societal disorder whereas education emphasizes prevention of societal disorder by creating and maintaining tolerant ideas and individuals. State building focused on social engineering may contribute to a sustainable nation and peace building.

The nation building chapter shows that international and local actors differ in their perceptions of the concept of the nation. While the international community promotes a civic nation, the local community prefers a more ethnic nation while respecting the civic elements. Local resistance against the international community is, vice versa, met by international resistance to local alternatives such as Albanian empowerment and local ownership, which is framed as “nationalist”. Strong local objections can be observed regarding the multi ethnic form of the state and its symbols. This presumed containment of the Albanian ethnic identity over a regional or Kosovar civic identity may have counterproductive consequences on local empowerment, ownership and unintended consequences such as a strengthening of more radical nationalism. The containment strategy indirectly silences local actors through humiliation or the

cutting of donor funds. The international and local group supporting the civic Kosovan identity and two state solution,²⁹⁷ the establishment of Kosovo and Albania, fail to acknowledge and mitigate the resulting problems by focusing on power politics and security and civic identity rather than ethnic identity and culture. In addition, questions arise about the actual impact of high levels of foreign interference that may result in a vulnerable nation building with fragile prospects as well as the EU integration. It remains to be seen whether the EU will actually deliver in terms of the country's stabilization. As Connor argued, neglecting ethnicity may undermine the state (Connor, 1972, 1993). Instead of ignoring national identities, the better approach may be to try to reshape it, in milder forms, promoting peaceful coexistence among ethnicities as it exists between various religions in Albania. This represents a historical example. In local context of Kosovo, promoting a "balanced" nation building means to balance the inclusion of ethnic and civic elements in institutional level, such as inclusion of national elements in the symbols and constitution of Kosovo. In addition, engaging on discussions about ethnic identities without prejudice in individual level may be beneficial for all societies living in Kosovo. Furthermore, it is important to engage in historical debates to form "local histories" together with all ethnic groups. Local resistance shows that marginalization does not guarantee success. Pursuing ethnic complementary to civic nation building may thus contribute to more sustainable outcomes. Nationalism becomes negative when connotations of hate and discrimination are attached, but where it promotes tolerance, respect, culture and a shared history it may assist in nation building and peace building. Furthermore, a better social, economic and political situation may prevent the falling back into destructive patterns of nationalism. Nation and peace building could be pursued in tandem. Balanced nation building may also strengthen state building as it may contribute to a common societal engineering.

Finally, the peace building activities after conflict focus mainly on the strengthening various state functions that shows the link between state building and reconciliation agendas (Call, 2008b, p. 5; Goetze & Guzina, 2008, p. 319). Strengthening states becomes a requirement for sustainable peace, specifically when peace processes aim at security reform and human rights protection. As Call sums up, state building may reinforce peace building due to its "complementary relationship", developing "sustainable mechanisms [justice, police or service delivery] for security and conflict resolution at the national level that should carry legitimacy in the eyes of the populace and of the outside world" (Call, 2008b, p. 12). Peace building focuses on reduction of violence and securitization. The enemies presumably turn to institutions to resolve conflicts rather than other channels. Call argues that state building could "reduce the incentives to seek basic goods outside established channels or through violence" (Call, 2008b,

²⁹⁷ Despite that the term is usually used for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it also fits to describe the current state formation of Kosovo, alongside Albania.

p. 13). In addition, state building may also “accelerate” the withdrawal of international actors by “ensuring stability and popular support for an emergent regime” (Call, 2008b, p. 13).²⁹⁸

The last chapter focused specifically on reconciliation as one of the main elements contributing to peace building. Some similarities and divergences are revealed between the local and international actors. The international perspective stresses the significance of EU integration to achieve peace due to Kosovo’s geographical location, the possibility of the repatriation of migrants and regional security. Local actors seem less positive about the institutional efforts provided by the EU Agreement to further peace and reconciliation at the individual and institutional level. Both international and local actors identify reconciliation as the biggest challenge facing Kosovo but their strategies to overcome divisions differ. International officials seem to suggest an approach focusing on establishing truth, integrating perpetrators and bringing together the victims and perpetrators rather than relying on judicial mechanisms, retributive justice and material reparations despite the fact that several institutional mechanisms have been established to deal with perpetrators (that is, the War Chambers, EULEX, ICTY, and in the future a special court). This seems to stem mainly from the perception that justice mechanisms are incapable and are being politicized through American interferences. They identify further shortcomings such as tolerating the Albanian political elite to terrorize the minorities immediately after the war, leading to radicalization and hence harming reconciliation in the long-term. Furthermore, the limited access to the Northern area seems to remain a challenge for reconciliation and the bridge dividing Mitrovica seems to be perceived as unnecessary. More attention ought instead to be given to the rule of law, economic development, institutional and power sharing mechanisms. The latter suggestions refer to instrumental reconciliation on the institutional level.

Yet, the local actors also seem divided on how to achieve reconciliation. The (resistant part of the) political elite points out that the EU Brussels agreement and decentralization policies at the institutional level may harm reconciliation in long-term as they promote separate co-existence instead of bringing communities together. These policies are facilitated by local political elites providing unconditional support to the international elite, believing that this is the price to pay for humanitarian intervention or fearing the revelation of their criminal pasts. The stance taken by the political resistance group and some individuals seems to be viewed as damaging reconciliation on the long run. Furthermore, the promotion of truth commissions is viewed to correspond better to victims’ needs than judicial mechanisms due to their politicization and inability to meet victim needs. The independence of judicial mechanisms needs improvement.

²⁹⁸ This represents a relevant summary of the peacebuilding theory for the purpose of concluding. For more information see: Liberal Peace building: Democracy and Human Rights.

Life stories reveal that on the individual level, reconciliation may often be more of an instrumental rather than of a moral type, thus reconciliation is present despite all the insecurities in Kosovo. In such cases mutual respect developed gradually over several years through working on inter-ethnic projects. This contrasts to top-down approaches that promote separate co-existence through law. Instead, it is suggested to promote reconciliation based on projects targeting specific sectors (health, education, banking), marginalized group (women, children, and youth) and profitability. In the North, Serbian individuals who cooperate with Kosovo Albanians are still confronted with difficulties, as they seem to face various threats due to a lack of security, rule of law and illegal groups. The weak integration of the Serbian minority in the North poses a challenge to state, nation and peace building. The Serbian minorities in the South are integrated in Kosovo's institutional structure.

Peace building complements state building since neither of them can in the longer term be achieved separately. Peace building refers to obtaining negative or positive peace, with the latter being a long-term aspiration, while the prior can often already be found in some fragile states. Only a re-orientation to more positive and peaceful values of the nation, eventually leading to nation building, would be a prerequisite for state and peace building in the long term. It seems that there can be no state building without nation building and vice versa. If the collective identity does not support the state, then both nation and state building will be fragile, but state building policies can change through engineering the collective identity including incorporating ethnic identities on the institutional and individual level, which in turn will support state and nation building. Finally, there can be no peace without state and nation building. While this may seem counterintuitive, it has been shown in the last chapter that with instrumental reconciliation occurring in practice, peace can gradually be achieved even in contexts of high nationalism. A nation may be based on respect and tolerance towards other identities and an acknowledgment of their worth through ethnic identity, resonating with reconciliation and peace building agendas. Reconciliation requires as well mutual respect, which in turn may result in successful, sustainable and long-term peace. On the other hand, local actors challenge the power politics and interests, which seem to serve for the benefits of the current ruling elite, calling for checks and balances and accountability by the international community. Verdeja argues on reconciliation that it is

impossible to return the tree to its prior self, just as it may be impossible to reconcile fully following terrible events, but the belief in a healthy tree, strong in its foundation and confident in its branches, gives hope to the possibility of a better future (Verdeja, 2009, p. 185)

This seems to be true for state, nation and peace building as well. Thus it is necessary to build healthy social practices through better education that promote respect, tolerance, professionalism and remove the power inequalities.

Amongst other general conclusions, the international community may need to refrain from intervening without understanding local priorities. Such reconstruction of states or nations has so far resulted in a backlash by the local community, meaning that the international involvement causes alienation, when their needs are neglected or ignored. Understanding local priorities is essential as it prevents alienation from the locals, allows local actors involvement in all spheres and contributes to peace and stability. Respecting local viewpoints seems also to be the main element necessary to achieve peace. While peace requires a functioning state, the latter in turn necessitates a degree of social cohesion or “society building”. State building should also reconcile the need for a nation in both civic and ethnic terms. Of particular significance for the local population is education, which offers possibility for social mobility upwards. Chapter VII shows that the emphasis on education dates back to the pre-war period and exists until today. The focus may need to shift from an almost exclusive focus on institution building to maintaining and reconstructing the social fabric of the local communities. The social fabric can serve as a metaphor to guide internationals in state, nation and peace building processes.

Furthermore, the international community seems to have denied cooperation to groups who do not share their viewpoints. This has furthered their alienation and created a servile political class which weakens the state capacities and breeds dependency. Both the local community and the international community demand a return to ethics. In a recent article, critical theorists, Olivier Richmond *et al.*, speaks about recovering political legitimacy from the intervention by re-recognizing and de-colonizing the local agency (Richmond, Kappler, & Björkdahl, 2015). A discussion over the “field”, meaning research on the ground, of researchers or policy makers reveals its “backwardness” and conflictual practices that legitimize a need for intervention (Richmond et al., 2015). A distance is maintained between the researcher and the local whose agency is discursively stripped. Many of the challenges mentioned above follow a similar pattern since international and local communities remain removed from one another. Furthermore, less dominant interventions by the international community seem to be preferred over excessive ones, which can result in a lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the local population. Richmond and others argue that excessive power, lack of legitimacy and high authority generate cycles of securitization rather than peace or order (Richmond et al., 2015).

Policy Implications

The life stories as a methodology to understand local needs and priorities proved to be a valuable and efficient academic methodology. However, in the cases of state, nation and peace building, its contribution may go beyond the academic sphere. The same methodology could also be applied by professional agencies such as international organizations, ministries, NGOs to understand, in a tentative and explorative way, where the local priorities are and where to

intervene and how. In fact, research can follow similar paths in the academic and the policy domain which both seek to reinforce peace and security processes. More concretely, this means that international institutions could integrate life story research in fragile contexts to improve their understanding of local priorities for each country, especially in early phases of their arrival. For instance, the case of Kosovo shows that one local priority lies in the education sector, the hope being that it could promote social cohesion and harmony, which in turn could strengthen the nation, state and peace. This view differs from the international community's perspectives focusing on process such as the rebuilding of institutions, security, the judiciary and the economy. While these are also important for the locals, the argument goes that with accurate education, social cohesion would have been maintained and that the state would have more likely functioned by now, in turn supporting efforts of peace as well as nation building.

Life stories could possibly be disseminated online and through the media, with civil society organizing events to discuss further their meaning and implications. Furthermore, one could suggest creating an online platform for the international community or local governments where personal experiences of locals are told publically and are stored there in accordance to data protection and privacy laws and in consultation and with consent of interviews. If individuals prefer to share their life stories, a contact point could be developed to organize interviews and to enable digital access. Academics, historians and political scientists could assist in this process. NGOs could show the life stories as movies, organize debates around them with the aim to open up taboos and the dialogue process on societal level, break the common myths towards enemies and move towards reconciliation. The televisions and radio stations could access them and contribute similarly like NGOs. The benefits of telling, sharing and discussing the life stories are various. They could assist to understand the failures of peace, state and nation building processes, break the myths about the other, or break the local alienation towards international community and vice versa, and further the understanding of topics and challenges that are significant for the past and/or present of fragile areas.

Furthermore, organizing roundtables with stakeholders such as randomly selecting citizens, NGOs, think tanks and international organizations can benefit by reflecting on how their involvement might affect those who are regarded as beneficiaries of statebuilding and peacebuilding, in particular in the case of Kosovo. The relevant questions in this context are how to implement decentralization and reconciliation programs and how to ensure local participation and legitimacy. These could be beneficial for promoting progress in other state functions in Kosovo including security, economy, the judiciary, education, health and other services. The roundtable results could be translated to the public and across various sectors (judiciary, security, education, industry) and/or disseminated in publicly available newspapers and journals,

thereby educating a wider audience about the effects of the involvement of developed states and organisations in Kosovo and the role of local actors.

Further recommendations concern accountability and democratic governance in Kosovo in both domestic and international actors, taking into account their identity and incorporating local ownership when dealing with post-conflict situations. Furthermore, local parliamentarians may initiate parliamentary hearing with IOs, foreign representatives or NGO's to discuss their involvement in the state.

Regarding state building, the main recommendations to policy makers concern strengthening the social fabric. This necessitates negotiation with domestic and international actors in order to take into account local identity, traditions and culture while gradually incorporating liberal values in education. International donors are urged to provide the same priority to education as they do for capacity building projects and institution building since education seems essential to provide the basis for a functioning society, create healthy social interactions and the creation of social cohesion. Changes can be introduced gradually in the primary and secondary education system through school curriculums among others targeting younger generations that can facilitate positive changes in the future and overcome current obstacles. Institutionally, it is suggested to reduce the amount of actors for clarity and transparency, which are currently deficient in Kosovo's state building.

In terms of nation building, the international community, instead of marginalizing the Albanian identity, should seek to work with it and to try to reshape it. Positive lessons may be drawn from the peaceful coexistence of Albanians with different religious backgrounds. Shifting the policy focus towards peaceful ideas such as "peaceful coexistence" or "culture" may promote a more moderate understanding of "Albanianism" and mitigate the unintended consequences of the current "ethnic containment" strategy. This also moves beyond the categorizations of Albanians or Serbs during the war as "victims" and "perpetrators". In other words, nationalism is not bad per se, including important aspect such as culture, identity, tradition, language, all of which can positively contribute to nation building. Still, it becomes negative with the rise of connotations of hate and discrimination. Recent demonstrations in Macedonia drew together ethnic Macedonians and Albanians in protest against the ruling regime of Macedonia despite attempts of the government to deepen cleavages and spark violence (allegedly attacking an Albanian family in Kumanovo). In such a context, ethnic nationalism is in tune and even complementary to civic nationalism. Therefore balanced nation building is proposed where ethnic identity is incorporated in state structures through symbols, in constitution and a historical dialogue is initiated.

The main proposals concerning peace building target the European Union as the most significant actor in Kosovo. Their future projects could focus on fostering inter-ethnic cooperation

between adversaries in Kosovo in cities or villages where no cooperation exists so far. A top-down approach could encourage (and to some extent even force) different groups to work together on an every day basis, thus promoting instrumental reconciliation. Projects could focus on offering employment in civil society, banks or basic services, which in the eyes of both groups seem to provide legitimate reasons to cooperate with each other. They seem also well perceived by the less reconciliatory individuals due possible material benefits. However, this proposal should be viewed with caution as a “neutral” mediating body like the European Union may impose conditions on projects for reconciliation that may make these grassroots initiatives international rather than local. This may hinder the already ongoing reconciliation process. Working with marginalized groups such as women, youth, children and working in domains such as education, health, and/or banking-loans sectors seems promising for reconciliation purposes. This could be achieved through humanitarian organizations, NGOs or even industry. However, it remains to be seen whether such purposive or instrumental interpersonal reconciliation is durable on a societal level on longer term. It is important to also include top-bottom initiatives for reconciliation, most notably decentralization, integrative EU dialogues, less impunity and more accountability, since without those, bottom-up process will falter, and even the already made progress might be undermined, as seen in the case of Northern Mitrovica. As Dhurata wonders, “[how] to treat all neighbors, like in a normal way, if you are [a] kind of a hostage of the situation”, referring to the situation in Northern Kosovo more generally. Lastly, careful solutions need to be crafted on the institutional level to avoid furthering ethnic cleavages, which is precisely what legal frameworks developed along ethnic lines seem to be doing now. Instead, they need to promote living together rather than separation along ethnic lines. This however does not imply ignoring the ethnic identity as argued in nation building chapter. The instrumental reconciliation may promote peace, but also strengthen the state and nation building.

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Appendixes

Appendix I: Life Story Interview Guidelines²⁹⁹

- Explain a bit about yourself.
- Explain the research project in political science focusing in post war period.
- Explain what life story is and that you would assist the person on telling the story.
- Explain the benefits of sharing a life story:
Among most prevalent benefits so far are “the interview gains a clearer perspective on personal experiences and feelings, which in turn brings greater meaning... one obtains greater self-knowledge, stronger self-image, and enhanced self-esteem,...one shares cherished experiences and insights with others, can bring joy, satisfaction.. releases certain burdens and validates personal experience” (Atkinson, 2001, p. 127) One realizes that one has more in common with others than initially thought, helps ones to see more clearly or differently the life story and perhaps inspire them for positive change, one understands the self-better and it might give a sense on how to give good endings to the story and finally “one derives from the past and present a clearer perspective on future goals” (Atkinson, 2001, p. 128).
- Ask: What would you put in the life story?
- Then if the person is relevant and is willing to participate in the research; distribute the life story card, questionnaire theme’s, the personal data sheet and explain and sign the consent and confidentiality agreement before proceeding with the life story interview.
- Continue with the interview or set up the date for the next sitting.
- Then, ask for drawing a timeline of his or her life that highlights the key life phases/events. Then discuss about the most important important life phases and ask to elaborate more on relevant phases for the research.
- You can ask for making a collage of his or her life on newsprint or poster paper that represents in some relative fashion the events, experiences, and feelings in words, symbols, and images.
- Ask for a CV as well to identify the work related trajectory.

²⁹⁹ The data provided here is mainly based on Atkinson’s work as cited above.

Appendix II: Life Story Analysis Guidelines

Step 1: Code in NVIVO and Organize the Codes

The coding will be done based on the main codes and subcodes below and other relevant codes that emerge from the data. For instance, Institution + EULEX + Perception + Idea + Others.

Initial & Axial Coding:

- Line by line (look for transitions & linguistic connectors)
- In vivo (specific expressions, everyone knows, innovative, terms for another group)
- Metaphors and analogies
- Themes (security, education, judiciary, elections, organized crime, corruption, religion, war, accountability, responsibility, etc)
- Institutions (Assembly, government, municipalities, political parties, NGOs, IOs, businesses, religious movements, criminal, etc)
- Actors: US, EU, Germany & Individuals (e.g. Thaci, Geraldini, etc)
- Conditions (economic, political, social movement, legal-judicial, cultural, climatic)
- Actions/Interactions (responses)
- Consequences
- Solutions
- Theory labels if relevant

Other Relevant Coding:

- Perceptions on Actors, Themes & Interactions, Consequences, etc, (Progressive, Neutral, Regressive, etc)
- Role (Facilitative, Decisive, Supporting, Principal)
- Group (Inclusion and Exclusion)
- Statements about International and Local
- Researcher Idea
- Quotes

Technical Coding:

- International Participant
- Local Participant

Write Memo's on elaborate ideas and link it to the Interviews and vice versa link the interviews section to the Memo (e.g. MEMO Education)

Possibilities for Comparisons

- Within local and international group and between
- Within governmental and non governmental (business, legal, security, ngo, religion & education) groups and between
- Within and between similar or dissimilar events, themes, institutions, interactions, interviews, situations and incidents
- Within and between perceptions
- Within and between interviewees' function, institution, category (governmental/non-

governmental & others), gender, age etc.

Analysis Guidelines

Step 2: Interview Summary with main aspects and summary of tentative answers to research questions

Questions to take into account: ‘when, where, who, why, how, and with what consequences’ in Glaser. In practice, write a summary for each interview (one A4, max 2), keeping in mind the main research question: What are the international and local perspectives of international state building, and how do they compare? What, if any, are the alternatives to the liberal peace model according to the theory, and the local and international perspectives? If state building will exist in future to deal with global crises and insecurities, how to reconcile the tension between local developments and international authority? How can mandates and goals be negotiated to achieve inclusive and progressive reconstruction?

The memo includes the following *aspects*: (i) the main themes and actors discussed, (ii) the main dilemmas and challenges that the participant encounters (as represented by the participant) and in relation to which actors; (iii) the responses to these challenges (strategies, responses, choices, actions) in relation to which actors; (iv) the consequences (results of actions) and for which actors; and (v) the proposed solutions for which actors from the participant and the researcher and quotes are added. At the end include a summary of the *tentative answers* to the research questions.

Step 3: Writing Two Storylines

After comparing the summaries/memos separately on internationals and locals, one needs to identify the main themes (storyline) as emerging from the five aspects, its relation to the other themes, and tell the story on what challenges locals or international face in relation to which actors, under what conditions they live and work, how do they interact with different actors, what are the consequences of their choices and actions on the ground, what are their suggested solutions and what can other alternative explanations be?

A note: look for cases that contradict the emerging theory and if none is found, then the theory can be reported. If there are, then the story needs to be checked again and reported accordingly. Lastly, both of the storylines will be related to the literature.

STEP 4: Comparing the Storylines and Writing Thematic Chapters

After analyzing separately the findings from the international interviews and the local interviews, a comparison will feature in a separate chapter. This will tackle the following questions: *To what extent do the international and local experiences and narratives about conditions, actions/interactions and consequences of international state building correspond and differ between each other and from established academic and policy frameworks?* More specifically:

- What are the Kosovo Albanian local perspectives on the international state building in Kosovo?
- What are the international practitioners perspectives on the international state building in Kosovo?
- How and what type of role does the international and local community play and which actors are the most important ones within these communities?
- Where and when do the locals and international agents of international state building correspond or differ?
- What are the main challenges in international state building in Kosovo from the local and international perspectives and how do they compare?
- How does the international community perceive the local community and vice versa?
- How do these two groups interact and how does the interaction affect state building?
- How do the fundamental differences or convergences of different actors among the international and local community affect state, peace and nation building?
- Why are certain actors, groups, individuals' included (excluded) from the process and how can the included (excluded) actors in decision-making be disintegrated (re-integrated)?
- How can the international and local community in practice promote state, peace and nation building in Kosovo?
- What are the alternatives that fit to the local context of Kosovo?

Appendix III: Life Story Analysis Sheet Sample

Events and experiences mentioned in life story:

Childhood: (Earliest memories, traumatic events, relationships)

Youth: (Puberty, mentor, relationships)

Adulthood: (Marriage, relationships)

Pre war:

Post war:

Cultural traditions: (celebrations, rituals, holidays)

Education: (High school, college, postgraduate, professional, community, technical, other)

Work:

Accomplishments in community:

Transitions and life changes: (moves, job, leaving home, stressful, difficult)

Dealing with loss: (death, divorce, illness, accident)

Major life themes/ strong threads, guiding motives:

Other important information:

Appendix IV: Preparatory Card for the Storyteller

A life story approach explanation card

A life story is “the story a person chooses to tell about the life he or she has lived, told as completely and honestly as possible, what is remembered of it, and what the teller wants others to know of it, usually as a result of a guided interview by another” (Atkinson, 1998, p. 8). On other words life story is a “person’s story of his or her life, or of what he or she thinks is a significant part of that life” (Titon, 1980, p. 276). It is a personal narrative, a story of personal experience, thus a subjective view of one’s life. According to Atkinson, it consists of “important events, experiences and feelings” of life and covers “the time from birth to the present or before and beyond” (Atkinson, 1998, p. 8). Life stories have a deeply human element and foster an understanding of the self both subjectively and objectively. On other words, it expresses “our sense of self: who we are and how we got that way... how to claim or negotiate group membership... and touch on widest social constructions, since they make presuppositions about what can be taken as expected, what the norms are, and what common or special belief systems can be used to establish coherence” (Linde, 1993, p. 3). Life stories uncover and express social experiences as well as the surrounding relationships and identify what shapes individuals and what constitutes their commonalities and differences. Life stories urge us to recognize environments, possible patterns of transformation, sometimes even fostering transformation processes and new responsibilities. They therefore include many important benefits (Atkinson, 2001, p. 122). Finally, “[t]he life story is fairly complete narrating of one’s entire experience of life as a whole, highlighting the most important aspects”(Atkinson, 1998, p. 8). It is a sort of assisted autobiography.

Appendix V: Life Story Themes for Questionnaire³⁰⁰

Birth and Family of Origin

- How would you describe your parents?

Cultural Setting and Traditions

- What are some early memories of cultural influences?

Social Factors

- Do you get along with your family members?

Education

- Was education important to you as a child, as a youngster? Before the war? Why? How? Did this change after war?

Love

- What did you use to do together with your family in your free time before the war? Did this change after war?

Work

- Did you have any dreams or ambitions as a child? As an adolescent? After war?

Major Life Themes – more focus

- What has been the most important learning experience in your life?

Retirement

- How do you find retirement?

Historical Events and Periods – more focus

- What are the main historical events that you remember?

Vision of the Future – focus more

- What is your worldview for the future?

Closure Questions

- Is there anything else that I need to know for your life? Before war and post war period?

³⁰⁰ These questions as well are based on various works of Atkinson (Atkinson, 1998, 2001).

Appendix VI: Storyteller Data Sheet

Name:.....
Gender:
Birth date:
Birthplace:
Current residence:
Ethnic background:
Religion:

Appendix VII: Life Story Questionnaire Samples³⁰¹

Shorter version:

- Where would you like to begin the story of your life?

I. Birth and Family of Origin

- What was going on in your family and country at the time of your birth?
- How would you describe your parents? What memories you remember most with your parents?
- What characteristic do you remember most about your grandparents? What memories you remember most with your grandparents?

II. Cultural Settings and Traditions

- What is the ethnic and cultural background of your parents? What are some early memories of cultural influences?
- What cultural values were predominant before the war? What cultural values were predominant in post war period? How did it impact you? How do they compare?
- What cultural values are still important to you today?
- What values of yours have you experienced as unmatching with the societal values before the war? And what societal values have you experienced as unmatching with your own values after war?
- What is the most important thing given to you by your family?
- What is the most important thing you have given to your community?
- Was community important to you before the war?
- Is a sense of community important to you now? Why? How your view has changed compared to the pre-war period? Do you remember any example?

III. Social Factors

- What do you remember most about growing up with, or without, brothers and sisters? Do you get along with your family members?
- What would you say was the most significant event in your life during childhood?
- What were some of your struggles as a child? Were you encouraged to try new things, or did you feel held back?
- What was the most trouble you were ever in as a teenager? The best part? The worst part?
- What was your first experience of leaving home like? Before the war? After the war?
- What special people have you known in your life?
- Were you in the military?
- Was ethnicity important to you as a child, as a youth? Before the war? Why? How?

³⁰¹ These questions have been borrowed from (Atkinson, 1998; Charmaz, 2006)

- When, if at all, did you first experience a change towards ethnicity in Kosovo? After the war?
- If so, what was it like? What did you think then? Could you describe the events that led to this change? What was going on in your life then?
- Is ethnicity important to you now?
- Was religion important to you as a child? If so, what was it like? What did you think then? Did it change after war? Could you describe the events that led to this change? Is religion important to you now and how it compares to pre-war period?

IV. Education

- What do you remember most about elementary and high school?
- How far did you go with your formal education? Why? How? What did you learn about yourself during these years?
- What has been your most important lesson in life, outside of the classroom?
- What is your view on the role of education in a person's life?
- Was education important to you as a child, as a youngster? Before the war? Why? How?
- When, if at all, did you first experience a change towards education in Kosovo after the war?
- If so, what was it like? What did you think then? Could you describe the events that led to this change? What was going on in your life then?

V. Love

- Do you remember the time you got married? How was it then?
- What is your partner like? What event do you remember mostly? What profession does your partner have?
- Do you have children? What are they like? Was it a struggle for you growing up the children? What professions do they have? What values or lessons do you try to transfer to them?
- How would you describe family and love before the war? What were the key events in your family before the war?
- When, if at all, did you first experience a change towards family and love concept in Kosovo after the war?
- If so, what was it like? What did you think then? Could you describe the events that led to this change? What was going on in your life then?
- Is there anything else about your partner and children that you would like to add?

VI. Work

- What did you want to be when you were in high school? Did you achieve what you wanted to, or did your ambitions change?
- How did you end up in the type of work you do or did? What is important to you in your work? Why do you do this work?
- How does decision-making at your work takes place? What guidelines you use?

- Have you experienced a conflict between what you wanted to implement and what you had to apply?
- How would you describe your work before the war? What were the key events in your work life before the war?
- When, if at all, did you first experience a change towards work in Kosovo after the war?
- If so, what was it like? What did you think then? Could you describe the events that led to this change? What was going on in your life then?
- Is there anything else about your work that you would like to add?

VII. Major Life Themes

- What were the crucial decisions in your life?
- What has been the most important learning experience in your life? (had to learn by yourself?)
- Have there been any grave mistakes in your life? How do you handle disappointment?
- Do you feel you have inner strength? Where does that come from? In what ways do you experience yourself as strong? How would you renew your strength, if you felt you were really drained?
- Are you satisfied with the life choices you have made?
- What have been your greatest accomplishments? What has been the happiest time in your life? The least happy?
- Is there anything in your experience of life that gives it unity, meaning, or purpose?
- How would you describe yourself to yourself at this point in your life? How do you feel about yourself at the age you are now?
- What has been the most inspiring experience you ever had?
- What matters the most to you now?
- Did you ever have any doubts about achieving your goal in life?
- Is the way you see yourself now significantly different than it was in the past? Before war? After war?
- What values would you not want to compromise?
- What do you see as the highest ideal we can strive for?
- What is your view on why there is suffering in the world?
- How would you describe your worldview? Before war? After war?

VIII. Retirement (if the interviewee already retired)

- What was retiring from work life for you? Did you miss work, or were you glad to leave it behind?
- What is the worst part about being retired? What is the best part? What do you usually do during the day now?
- Have all your children left home?
- Do you have grandchildren? Do you like spending time with them? What do you enjoy most about your grandchildren? What do you enjoy the least? What do you hope to pass on to your grandchildren?

IX. Historical Events and Periods

Political situation

- What was the most important historical event you experienced before the war? Do you remember what you were doing in any of the really important days in our history before the war?
- What was the most important historical event you experienced after the war? Do you remember what you were doing in any of the really important days in our history after the war? How would you compare it to the pre-war period?

Economic situation

- Was social class important in your life during childhood and now?
- How was the economic situation before the war? Has it changed after the war? What events led to this change? How did it impact you? How would you compare it with the pre-war period?
- What do you think of economic liberalization? How did it impact you?

Relations with people and groups

- With which people and groups you had the best relations before the war? What were the worst?
- With which people and groups you had the best relations after the war? What were the worst? How would you compare it to the pre-war period?
- Tell me about your thoughts and feelings about international community before the war? What happened when you learned about their entrance in 1999?
- What happened next? Who, if anyone, was involved? When was that? How were they involved?
- How, if at all, have your thoughts and feelings about international community changed since 1999? Tell me about how you learned to handle the post war period in Kosovo?
- Which internationals were the most important and which the least? Why? How? Before the war? After the war? How did they impact your life?
 - What is usual or unusual about them? Before the war? After the war?
 - What are their main successes or failures after the war?
- What were the relations with Americans before the war? After the war?
- What were the relations with Western Europeans before the war? After the war?
- What do you think are the main incentives, aims and ends for international community to rebuild Kosovo?
- What were the relations with locals (Albanians, Serbs and other minorities) before the war? Why? How? Which locals were the most important and which the least? Why?
- What were the relations with locals (Albanians, Serbs and other minorities) after the war? Why? How? Which locals are the most important and which the least? Why?
 - What is usual or unusual about them? Why? How did it impact you?
 - What are their main successes or failures on state building?
- Who is predictable and who is not from locals?
- Who is predictable and who is not from internationals?
 - How did the cooperation work out between internationals and locals, internationals and internationals, and locals-locals? What do you think played a role on cooperation between these groups?

- What role did diaspora play before the war? Did it change after the war? Could you describe the events that led to this change? How did it impact you? How would you compare it with the pre-war period?

State Building Period:

- Have you heard about “state building” as an idea and does it make sense to you?
- Tell me about how you came to experience the after war period in Kosovo?
- When, if at all, did you first experience difficulties in Kosovo after war?
- If so, what was it like? What did you think then? How did you react to it? Who, if anyone, influenced your actions? Tell me about how he/she or they influenced you.
- Could you describe the events that led up to the current situation in Kosovo?
- What positive changes have occurred in your life since 1999 and after independence?
- What negative changes, if any, have occurred in your life since 1999?
- Tell me how you go about it? How do you do?
- What contributed to the success or failure of this state? What was going on in your life during these successes or failures? How would you describe how you viewed state building before it happened and now? How if at all, has your view changed?
- As you look back on after war phase so far, are there any other events that stand out in your mind? Could you describe them? How did this event affect you? How did you respond to this event and the resulting situations?
- Could you describe the most important lessons you learned through experiencing after the war process in Kosovo?
- Where do you see yourself in two years [five, ten or more]? Describe the person you hope to be then. How would you compare the person you hope to be then and the person you see yourself as now?
- What helps you to manage the current situation in Kosovo? What problems do you encounter? Tell me the sources of these problems.
- Who has been the most helpful to you during and after the war? How has he or she been helpful?
- What do you think are the most important things to be done after the war? Why? How?
- How have you grown as a person since war? Tell me about your strengths that you discovered or developed through life. What do you value most about yourself now? What do others most value in you?
- After having these experiences, what advice would you give to someone who has just discovered that they have to go through the after war process?

Institutions (*ask the ones that were not answered earlier*)

- Were institutions important before the war and which ones? Why? How? What were the key events in relation to institutions before the war? Which institutions were most successful and which the least? How did it impact you?
- When, if at all, did you first experience a change of institutions in Kosovo after the war?
- If so, what was it like? What did you think then? Could you describe the events that led to this change? What was going on in your life then? How did the change impact you? How would you compare it with the pre-war period?

- Which institutions are important now after the war? Which institutions in Kosovo are most successful and which the least?
- Inquire on social services and welfare; infrastructure; health care; courts/legal system/justice/rule of law; municipality services; police services and security; employment services; energy services; environment; rural services and aid services.
- What did you think of the NGOs before the war? Did they change after the war? Could you describe the events that led to this change? How did it impact you? How would you compare it with the pre-war period?
- What did you think of the EU, UN and NATO institutions before the war? Did it change after the war? Could you describe the events that led to this change? How did it impact you? How would you compare it with the pre-war period?

Thinking critically

- What does accountability and its implementation mean to you? How would you describe the changes before the war and after the war towards accountability? How has it impacted you? Is it achieved and if not where does it lack?
- What does democratic (good) governance mean to you? How would you describe the changes before the war and after the war towards good governance? How has it impacted you? Is it achieved and if not where does it lack?
- What does transparency mean to you? How would you describe the changes before the war and after the war towards transparency? How has it impacted you? Is it achieved and if not where does it lack?
- What does democracy mean to you? How would you describe the changes before the war and after the war towards democracy? How has it impacted you? Is it achieved and if not where does it lack?
- What does identity construction mean to you? How would you describe the changes before the war and after the war towards identity construction? How has it impacted you? Is it achieved and if not where does it lack?
- What do human rights mean to you? How would you describe the changes before the war and after the war towards human rights? How it has impacted you? Is it achieved and if not where does it lack?
- Tell me about the role of women before the war? Did you see a shift of attitudes toward women after the war? What events were key in this shift? Tell me about your thoughts and feelings after you learned about women's representation in parliament. What happened next?
- Who, if anyone, was involved? When was that? How were they involved?
- What positive and negative changes have occurred since war in terms of gender relations?
- Do you think Kosovo has control over its own territory? What do you think of the interplay between sovereignty/autonomy of Kosovo, Serbs and the international community?
- One of the critiques is that state building is a colonial process, what is your view on it?
- What did peace mean to you and how would you describe it?
- What does peace building mean to you? Reconciliation?
- What does nation building mean to you?

- What does state building mean to you? Have I left any other theme important to you for the process of state building in Kosovo? Are there other factors contributing to state building in Kosovo? If you would improve state building, how it would look?
- Is there anything that you might not have thought about state building before that occurred to you during this interview?

X. Vision of the Future

- When you think about the future, what makes you feel most uneasy? What gives you the most hope?
- Would have you done in your life something different from what you did?
- What is your view on death? What do you want most to experience before you die? What three things would you like said about your life when you die?
- Do you have any advice or wisdom for the younger generation?

XI. Closure Questions

- Is there anything that we've left out of your life story?
- What are your feelings about this interview and all that we have covered?

Long version:

- Where would you like to begin the story of your life?

I. Birth and Family of Origin

- What was going on in your family and country at the time of your birth?
 - Are there any family stories told about you as a baby?
- How would you describe your parents?
 - How would you describe your mother's personality and emotional qualities?
 - How would you describe your father's?
 - What are some of the best and worst things about them?
 - What do you think you inherited from them?
 - What feelings come up when you recall your parents?
- What characteristic do you remember most about your grandparents?
 - What do you like most about them? What do you like least?
- What is your earliest memory? What memories you remember most with your parents/grandparents?

II. Cultural Settings and Traditions

- What is the ethnic and cultural background of your parents? What are some early memories of cultural influences?
 - What family or cultural celebrations/traditions were important in your life?
 - Was your family different from other families in your neighborhoods?
 - What cultural values were passed on to you, and by whom?
 - What beliefs or ideals do you think your parents tried to teach you?
 - What cultural values are still important to you today?
- What cultural values were predominant before the war? What cultural values were predominant in post war period? How did they impact you? How do they compare?
- What values of yours have you experienced as unmatching with the societal values as an adult before the war? And what societal values have you experienced as unmatching with your own values after war?
- What is the most important thing given to you by your family?
 - What is the most important thing you have given to your family?
- What is the most important thing you have given to your community?
 - Do you recall any legends, tales or songs about people, places, or events in your community? What is different or unique about your community?
 - Are you aware of any traditional ways that families built their buildings, prepared their food or took care of sickness?
 - What did your work contribute to the life and history of your community?
- Was community important to you before the war?
- Is a sense of community important to you now? Why? How your view has changed compared to the pre-war period? Do you remember any example?

III. Social Factors

- Were you encouraged to try new things, or did you feel held back?
- What do you remember most about growing up with, or without, brothers and sisters?
- Do you get along with your family members?

- What did you do with your parents together? Did you spend enough time together? What did you do with your siblings together?
- What was the saddest time for you? Before the war? In post war period?
- How was discipline handled in your family?
- What would you say was the most significant event in your life in your childhood?
 - Did you make friends easily?
- What were some of your struggles as a child?
 - What pressures did you feel as a teenager and where did they come from?
 - Were you athletic?
 - What clubs, groups, or organizations did you join?
 - Did you enjoy being alone? Before the war? After the war?
 - What did you do in your free time? What do you do now on your free time?
- What was the most trouble you were ever in as a teenager? The best part? The worst part?
- What was your first experience of leaving home like? Before the war? After the war?
- What special people have you known in your life?
 - Who shaped and influenced your life the most?
 - Who are the heroes and heroines, guides and helpers in your life?
 - Who most helped you develop the current understanding of yourself?
- Were you in the military? What was the experience like?
- Was ethnicity important to you as a child, as a youth? Before the war? Why? How?
 - Did it matter if your neighbors were of different ethnicity/religion as a child? Did you hang out with other ethnicities as a child back then? Did you attend events together? What did matter for you when choosing friends?
 - When, if at all, did you first experience a change towards ethnicity in Kosovo after the war?
 - If so, what was it like? What did you think then? Could you describe the events that led to this change? What was going on in your life then?
 - Is ethnicity important to you now?
 - Do you hang out with other ethnicities?

IV. Education

- What is your first memory of attending school?
 - Did you enjoy school at the beginning?
- What do you remember most about elementary and high school?
 - Did you have a favorite teacher? How did they influence you?
 - What are your best and worst memories of school?
 - What accomplishments in school you are most proud of?
- How far did you go with your formal education? Why? How?
 - What do you remember most about college?
 - What organizations or activities were you involved in school? In college?
 - What was the most important course you took in school or college?
 - What was the most important book you read?
- What did you learn about yourself during these years?
- What has been your most important lesson in life outside of the classroom?
- What is your view on the role of education in a person's life?

- Was education important to you as a child, as a youth? Before the war? Why? How?
- When, if at all, did you first experience a change towards education in Kosovo after the war?
- If so, what was it like? What did you think then? Could you describe the events that led to this change? What was going on in your life then?

V. Love

- Do you remember the time you got married? How was it then?
- How would you describe your time together with your partner?
- What is your partner like? What profession does your partner have?
- Do you have children? What are they like? What professions do they have? What roles do they play in your life?
- What values or lessons do you try to impart to them?
- Was it a struggle for you growing up the children? Do they share your values?
- How would you describe your family before the war? What were the key events in your family before the war?
- When, if at all, did you first experience a change towards family concept in Kosovo after the war?
- If so, what was it like? What did you think then? Could you describe the events that led to this change? What was going on in your life then?
- Is there anything else about your partner and children that you would like to add?
- Do love and work fit together in your life?

VI. Work

- Did you have any dreams or ambitions as a child? As an adolescent?
- Where did they come from?
- What did you want to be when you were in high school? Did you achieve what you wanted to or did your ambitions change?
- What were your hopes and dreams as you entered adulthood?
- What events or experiences helped you understand and accept your adult responsibilities?
- How did you end up in the type of work you do or did?
- Has your work been satisfying to you or has it been something you had to put your time into?
- What is important to you in your work?
- What comes the easiest in your work?
- What is the most difficult about your work?
- Why do you do this work?
- How does decision-making at your work take place? What guidelines do you use?
- Have you experienced a conflict between what you wanted to implement and what you had to apply?
- How would you describe your work before the war? What were the key events in your work life before the war?
- When, if at all, did you first experience a change towards work in Kosovo after the war?

- If so, what was it like? What did you think then? Could you describe the events that led to this change? What was going on in your life then?
- Is there anything else about your work that you would like to add?

VII. Major Life Themes

- What is most important to you about your spiritual life?
- What gifts (tangible or intangible) are still important to you?
- What were the crucial decisions in your life?
- What has been the most important learning experience in your life? (had to learn by yourself?)
- What did it teach you?
- Have there been any grave mistakes in your life?
- How have you overcome or learned from your difficulties? What is the greatest challenge of your life so far?
- How do you handle disappointment?
- Do you feel you have inner strength? Where does that come from? In what ways do you experience yourself as strong?
- How would you renew your strength, if you felt you were really drained?
- Are you satisfied with the life choices you have made?
- Is there anything you could change?
- What has been the happiest time in your life?
- What was the least enjoyable time?
- What have been your greatest accomplishments?
- Are you certain of anything?
- What are some things you hope you never forget?
- Is there anything in your experience of life that gives it unity, meaning, or purpose?
- How would you describe yourself to yourself at this point in your life? How do you feel about yourself at the age you are now?
- What is your biggest worry now?
- What has been the most inspiring experience you ever had?
- What one sentiment or emotion makes you feel deeply alive? What single experience has given to you the greatest joy?
- What matters the most to you now?
- What do you wonder about now?
- Do you feel at peace with yourself?
- How did you achieve this?
- What time of your life would you like to repeat?
- Is the way you see yourself now significantly different than it was in the past? Before war? After war?
- How would you describe your worldview? Before war? After war?
- What values would you not want to compromise?
- What do you see as the highest ideal we can strive for?
- Do you feel you are in control of your life?
- What is your view on why there is suffering in the world?
- Did you ever have any doubts about achieving your goal in life?

VIII. Retirement (if the interview already retired)

- What was retiring from work life for you? Did you miss work or were you glad to leave it behind?
- What do you usually do during the day now?
- Is there anything particular that you miss about work?
- What is the worst part about being retired? What is the best part?
- Have all your children left home?
- Do you have grand children? Do you like spending time with them? What do you enjoy most about your grandchildren? What do you enjoy the least? What do you hope to pass on to your grandchildren?

IX. Historical Events and Periods

Political situation

- What was the most important historical event you experienced before the war? Do you remember what you were doing in any of the really important days in our history before the war?
- What was the most important historical event you experienced after the war? Do you remember what you were doing in any of the really important days in history after the war? How would you compare it to the pre-war period?

Economic situation

- Was social class important in your life during childhood and now?
- How was the economic situation before the war? Has it changed after the war? What events led to this change? How did it impact you? How would you compare it with the pre-war period?
- What do you think of economic liberalization? How did it impact you?

Relations with people and groups

- With which people and groups you had the best relations before the war? What were the worst?
- With which people and groups you had the best relations after the war? What were the worst? How would you compare it to the pre-war period?
- Tell me about your thoughts and feelings about international communities before the war? What happened when you learned about their entrance in 1999?
- What happened next?
- Who, if anyone, was involved? When was that? How were they involved?
- How, if at all, have your thoughts and feelings about international community changed since 1999? Tell me about how you learned to handle the post war period in Kosovo?
- Which internationals were the most important and which the least? Why? How? Before the war? After the war?
 - What is their role in the earlier topics? Before the war? After the war?
 - What is usual or unusual about them? Before the war? After the war?
 - What are their main successes or failures on state building?
- What were the relations with Americans before the war? After the war?
- What were the relations with Western Europeans before the war? After the war?
- What do you think are the main incentives, aims and ends for international community to rebuild Kosovo?

- What were the relations with locals (Albanians, Serbs and other minorities) before the war? Why? How? Which locals were the most important and which the least? Why?
- What were the relations with locals (Albanians, Serbs and other minorities) after the war? Why? How? Which locals are the most important and which the least? Why?
 - What is their role in the earlier topics?
 - What is usual or unusual about them?
 - What are their main successes or failures on state building?
- Who is predictable and who is not from locals?
- Who is predictable and who is not from internationals?
 - How did the cooperation work out between international and locals, between internationals and internationals and between locals and locals? What do you think played a role on cooperation between these groups?
 - What role did diaspora play before the war? Did it change after the war? Could you describe the events that led to this change? How did it impact you? How would you compare it with the pre-war period?

State Building Framework:

- Have you heard about “state building” as an idea and does it make sense to you?
- Tell me about how you came to experience the after war period in Kosovo?
- When, if at all, did you first experience difficulties in Kosovo after war?
- If so, what was it like? What did you think then? How did you react to it? Who, if anyone, influenced your actions? Tell me about how he/she or they influenced you.
- Could you describe the events that led up to the current situation in Kosovo?
- What positive changes have occurred in your life since 1999 and after independence?
- What negative changes, if any, have occurred in your life since 1999?
- Tell me how you go about it? How do you do?
- What contributed to the success or failure of this state? What was going on in your life during these success or failures? How would you describe how you viewed state building before it happened and now? How if at all, has your view changed?
- As you look back on after war phase so far, are there any other events that stand out in your mind? Could you describe [each one] it? How did this event affect what happened? How did you respond to this event and the resulting situations?
- Could you describe the most important lessons you learned through experiencing after war process in Kosovo?
- Where do you see yourself in two, five, ten years? Describe the person you hope to be then. How would you compare the person you hope to be then and the person you see yourself as now?
- What helps you to manage the current situation in Kosovo? What problems do you encounter? Tell me the sources of these problems.
- Who has been the most helpful to you during after the war? How has he or she been helpful?
- What do you think are the most important things to be done after the war? Why? How? How have your experiences before affected how you handled the after war period?
- How have you grown as a person since war? Tell me about your strengths that you discovered or developed through life. What do you value most about yourself now? What do others most value in you?

- After having these experiences, what advice would you give to someone who has just discovered that they have to go through the after war process?

Institutions (ask the ones that were not answered earlier)

- Were institutions important before the war and which ones? Why? How? What were the key events in relation to institutions before the war? Which institutions were most successful and which the least? How did it impact you?
- When, if at all, did you first experience a change towards institutions in Kosovo after the war?
- If so, what was it like? What did you think then? Could you describe the events that led to this change? What was going on in your life then? How did the change impact you? How would you compare it with the pre-war period?
- Which institutions are important now after the war? Which institutions in Kosovo were most successful and which the least?
- Inquire on social services and welfare; infrastructure; health care; courts/legal system/justice/rule of law; municipality services; police services and security; employment services; energy services; environment; rural services and aid services.
- How were the NGOs before the war? Did they change after the war? Could you describe the events that led to this change? How did it impact you? How would you compare it with the pre-war period?
- How were the EU, UN and NATO institutions before the war? Did it change after the war? Could you describe the events that led to this change? How did it impact you? How would you compare it with the pre-war period?

Thinking critically

- What does accountability and its implementation mean to you? How would you describe the changes before the war and after the war towards accountability? How it has impacted you? Is it achieved and if not where does it lack?
- What does democratic (good) governance mean to you? How would you describe the changes before the war and after the war towards good governance? How has it impacted you? Is it achieved and if not where does it lack?
 - What does transparency mean to you? How would you describe the changes before the war and after the war towards transparency? How has it impacted you? Is it achieved and if not where does it lack?
- What does democracy mean to you? How would you describe the changes before the war and after the war towards democracy? How has it impacted you? Is it achieved and if not where does it lack?
- What does identity construction mean to you? How would you describe the changes before the war and after the war towards identity construction? How it has impacted you? Is it achieved and if not where does it lack?
- What do human rights mean to you? How would you describe the changes before the war and after the war towards human rights? How has it impacted you? Is it achieved and if not where does it lack?
- Tell me about the role of women before the war? Did you see a shift of attitudes toward women after the war? What events were key in this shift? Tell me about your thoughts

and feelings after you learned about women's representation in parliament. What happened next?

- Who, if anyone, was involved? When was that? How were they involved?
- What positive and negative changes have occurred since war in terms of gender relations?
- Do you think Kosovo has control over its own territory? What do you think of the interplay between sovereignty/autonomy of Kosovo, Serbs and the international community?
- One of the critiques is that state building is a colonial process, what is your view on it?
- What did peace mean to you and how would you describe it?
 - What does peace building mean to you? Reconciliation?
 - What does nation building mean to you?
- What does state building mean to you? Have I left any other theme important to you for the process of state building in Kosovo? Are there other factors contributing to state building in Kosovo? If you would improve state building, how it would look?
- Is there anything that you might not have thought about before that occurred to you during this interview?

X. Vision of the Future

- When you think about the future, what makes you feel most uneasy? What gives you the most hope?
- Would have you done in your life something different from what you did?
- What is your view on death? What do you want most to experience before you die? What three things would you like said about your life when you die?
- Do you have any advice or wisdom for the younger generation?

XI. Closure Questions

- Is there anything that we've left out of your life story?
- Do you feel you have given a fair picture of yourself?
- What are your feelings about this interview and all that we have covered?

Notes on historical events: the first world war, the second world war, the Tito regime, the Milosevic regime, revocation of autonomy in 1989, the fall of Berlin wall, the end of Cold War, 1999 war, arrival of UNMIK through 1244 Res, the 2004 incidents, Ahtisaari plan, the arrival of ICO and EULEX, 2008 declaration of independence, the ICJ decision on the legality of the declaration of independence, the end of supervised independence, political dialogue and its aftermath

Notes on decision - making: predictability, respect for good governance, short-term results or the long-term results.

Appendix VIII: Consent and Confidentiality Agreement

It is understood that the state building project through life stories approach conducted by the researcher, Arlinda Rrustemi at the University of Leiden, CDH aims to record and share the life stories of citizens in Kosovo and record the interviews of international officials to promote a deeper understanding of international and local state-building, therefore I would like to deposit my life story/interview for academic and historiographical research purposes. The life story/ interview is a result of one or more recorded-voluntary interviews with me.

It is understood that the University of Leiden, at the discretion of the Rector, allows researchers to listen to the tapes and read the transcripts and use them in connection with their work or for educational purposes. It is further understood that no portions of the tapes or transcripts may be used on other research except the current dissertation on any published form except by written permission of the Rector.

It is understood that there are some risks in life stories/interviews such as recalling negative experiences during one's life cycle.

Given the political sensitivity of the project, I would like to remain Anonymous when referenced.

It is understood that Leiden University will use proper care in handling, storing, and using the interviews. However, Leiden University shall not be liable for damages of any kind to the other Party.

It is understood that I can withdraw from the interview at any point during the interview.

Hereby I agree with the terms of the interview and the confidentiality agreement.

Name and date of birth:

Signature:

Appendix IX: International Stakeholders Questionnaire Guidelines

1. What was the most important historical event you experienced since you came to Kosovo? If there is more than one, how would you compare them?
2. If so, what was it like? What did you think then? How did you react to it? Who, if anyone, influenced your actions? Tell me about how he/she or they influenced you.
3. What positive changes have occurred since then? What negative changes, if any, have occurred since then?

I. Institutional section

4. Which institutions in Kosovo were most successful and which the least? In which institutions should the priority be placed since the beginning?
5. What do you think of the institutions in terms of social services and welfare, infrastructure, health care, the city/municipality, employment, energy, environment and rural services?
6. What is your view on the aid in Kosovo? Have they impacted your work?
7. What is your view on NGOs in Kosovo? Have they impacted your work?
8. What is your view on role of EU, UN and NATO institutions? How has its role impacted your work?

II. Thematic section

9. Which areas (rule of law, etc) of state building have been successful or not in Kosovo? On which areas should the priority be placed upon from the beginning?
10. Do you think Kosovo is in control of its territory? What is the interplay between sovereignty/autonomy and the international community?
11. What does security mean to you? How would you describe its impact?
12. What does rule of law mean to you? How would you describe its impact?
13. What does justice mean to you? How would you describe its impact?
14. What does economic liberalization mean to you? How would you describe its impact?
15. What do you understand under the term good governance and what role does it play?
16. Do you think there is enough accountability and transparency in the state building process, and if not where does it lack?
17. How do you see the promotion of good governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights in the future?
18. One of the critiques is that state building is colonial process, what is your view on it?

III. Relations with others

19. What is the role of local actors in state building and how would you describe it?
 - a. What are their main successes or failures on state building?
 - b. What is unusual about them?
20. What is the role of international actors in state building and how would you describe it?
 - a. What are their main successes or failures on state building?
 - b. What is unusual about them?
21. How did the cooperation work out between international and locals, between internationals and internationals and between locals and locals? What do you think played a role on cooperation between these groups? How predictable were these groups?

22. What about diaspora?
23. What are your main guidelines in decision-making? Are they more often based on short-term results or the long-term results?
24. Have you experienced a conflict between what you wanted to implement and what you had to apply in state building in Kosovo? What were the main obstacles you encountered?

IV. Theoretical section

25. What does peace mean to you and how would you describe it?
 - a. What does peace building mean to you and what are its practical implications in your work? Reconciliation?
 - b. What does nation building mean to you?
 - c. What does state building mean to you?
26. What do you think are the main incentives and aims for international community to rebuild Kosovo?
27. Which means and measures would you identify successful on state, nation, peace building and which ones not? What do you think are the main factors contributing and hinders state building in Kosovo?
28. What are the main ends of state building, and have they been redefined through time?
29. Could you describe the most important lessons you learned through your experience in Kosovo?
30. What do you think in priority wise, international community should take into account firstly in post war country?

V. Concluding section

31. Thinking critically, what would you have done suggested to be done differently in state building process personally in your work? In Kosovo? Generally in post conflict countries?
32. After having these experiences, what advice would you give to someone who has just discovered that they have to be deployed into a post war country? Tell me about your strengths and weaknesses that you discovered or developed here.
33. Is there anything that you might not have thought about before that occurred to you during this interview?

Appendix X: International Stakeholders Questionnaire

Semi-structured Interview

1. What do you understand under the term state building and what role does it play in your work?
2. How do you perceive the role of international community in state and peace building in Kosovo? Aims? Incentives? What are the main ends of state and peace building, and have they been redefined through time?
3. Which measures/means would you consider appropriate and inappropriate in state and peace building in Kosovo?
4. During your work, what would you consider as biggest success and shortcomings in state and peace building of Kosovo?
5. What are your main guidelines when you make decisions for the ground?
6. Do you consider your decisions more often based on short-term results or the long-term results?
7. Have you experienced a conflict between what you wanted to implement and what you had to apply in state building in Kosovo?
8. How did the cooperation work out between international and locals, between locals and locals, between internationals and internationals and between EU recognized and non recognized states? Did culture and tradition play a role?
9. Are the actors participating in state and peace building and are they predictable and where the outcomes predictable?
10. Do you think there is enough accountability in the state and peace building process, and if not where does it lack?
11. How do you see the promotion of good governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights in the future?
12. If you would improve state and peace building, how it would look?
If there is time left:
13. What do you see as the success and shortcomings of UN, NATO and EU integration policy in Balkans, Kosovo?
14. What do you think of the Kosovo and Serbia negotiations?
15. What does the negotiation process and its possible outcomes mean to you, Kosovo, Serbia, Balkans, Europe (recognized/not recognized) and other super powers?
16. Where do you see the successes and shortcomings of the EU/EEAS as facilitator? What are their final objectives and future plans?
17. How do you see the interplay between sovereignty/autonomy and the international community?

Appendix XI: Generic Questions³⁰²

Feeling level questions: (Getting to know the deeper meaning behind)

- What did that mean to you?
- How did that make you feel?
- How did you manage to get through that?
- I don't understand.
- You seem to be saying... (show appreciation to what is revealed to you),

Or

- What was that experience like for you?
- What happened next to you?
- Tell me more about that.
- Do you remember any example?

Descriptive questions: (grand tour responses)

- How would you describe your childhood?
- How would you describe your work?
- Different workplaces....

Structural questions: (at organization of knowledge or activities)

- What were some of the things you did as a child?
- ... things in different workplaces...

Contrast Questions: (Gets at dimensions of meaning)

- How was your childhood different from your adolescence?
- Experiences in different work places...

³⁰² The questions have been selected from the work of Atkinson (Atkinson, 1998).

Appendix XII: Interviews List

- 33 international actors (semi-structured interviews)

Gender		Job Function		Location		Time
Female	7	EU	10	New York	1	Summer 2012
Male	26	UN	8	Brussels	5	Summer 2013
		ICO	5	Pristina	26	Spring 2016
		NATO	3	The Hague	1	
		GIZ	3		33	
		OSCE	2			
		Ambassadors	2			

- 28 local actors (life stories)

Job Function		Gender		Ethnicity		Religion		Location		Date	
Governmental	13	Women	5	Minority	6	Non Muslim	8	Pristina	22	Summer 2013	24
Non governmental	15	Men	23	Majority	22	Muslim	20	Brussels	1	Spring 2014	4
								Mitrovica	2		
								Skype	3		

Appendix XIII: Curriculum Vitae

Arlinda Rrustemi

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Address: Weteringkade 124b
2515AT The Hague
The Netherlands

Email: arlindar@gmail.com
Mobile: +31627852307
Nationality: Dutch

EDUCATION

01/11/2012 – present	PhD Candidate in Political Sciences at Leiden University
01/02/2010 – 30/6/2011	LLM Public International Law at Utrecht University
01/09/2006 – 29/1/2010	BA (Hons) in Social Sciences at University College Roosevelt

PUBLICATIONS

Refereed Articles (2)

- A. Rrustemi and M. Baumgärtel (2014), 'Shooting in the Dark: Evaluating Kosovo's Amnesty Law and the Role of International Actors', *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law* 6(2), pp. 115-140.
- A. Rrustemi and M. Baumgärtel (2013), 'Lëvizja Vetevëndosje!: ¿Un Movimiento Social Contra-Hegemónico?', *Balkania: Revista de estudios balcanicos* 4, pp. 121-138.

Book Chapters (1)

- A. Rrustemi (2010), 'The ICC's First Decade: the Role of the Netherlands and Canada in the First Permanent International Criminal Court', in C. Steenman Marcusse & C. Verduyn (eds.), *Tulips and Maple Leaves in 2010: Perspectives on 65 Years of Dutch-Canadian Relations*, Barkhuis: Groningen.

Contributions to Newspapers (1)

- Open Democracy, *Should Serbia vs Albania have gone ahead in the first place?*, 30 October 2014, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/arlinda-rrustemi/should-serbia-vs-albania-have-gone-ahead-in-first-place>

Web (1)

- Leiden Safety and Security Blog, *How international Actors Unintentionally Contribute to Kosovo's Extremism: A Life Story Perspective*, 20 June 2015, <http://leidensafetyandsecurityblog.nl/articles/how-international-actors-unintentionally-contribute-to-kosovos-extremism-a>

Book Reviews (1)

- A. Rrustemi, January, 2016, H-Diplo, Elton Skendaj. *Creating Kosovo: International Oversight and the Making of Ethical Institutions*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014.

INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Conference Papers and Presentations (21)

- Nationbuilding Challenges in Kosovo*, Paper Presentation at Politicologenetmaal, Free University of Brussels, 2-3 June 2016

Semantics of Reconciliation, Paper Presentation at Reconciliation in Local Contexts and the Role of the International Community Workshop, Leiden University, 18 May 2016

Reconciliation and Peacebuilding in Kosovo, Paper Presentation at UCLouvain, 26 April 2016

The Implications of International Engagement in Kosovo's Statebuilding for Religious Radicalization, Conference Presentation at Association for the Study of Nationalities 2016 World Conference, University of Columbia, 14 April 2016

State and Peacebuilding in Kosovo, Paper Presentation at Exeter University, 19 March 2016

Statebuilding in Kosovo, Paper Presentation at Manchester University, UK, 9 March 2016

Nationbuilding Challenges in Kosovo at Free University of Brussels, 5 November, 2015

Incorporating Local Voices in Nationbuilding in Kosovo, Paper Presentation at Cegesoma/Brussels, 04 November 2015

Nationbuilding, Paper Presentation at New York University, US, 29 April 2015

Nationbuilding: Comparing International and Local Perspectives through Life Stories in Kosovo, Conference Presentation at Association for the Study of Nationalities, University of Columbia, US, 24 April 2015

Nation and Peace Building in Kosovo, Paper Presentation at New York University, US, 23 April 2015

Nationbuilding in Kosovo, Conference Presentation at Midwest Political Science Association, University of Chicago, 19 April 2015

Humanitarian Intervention, Paper Presentation at New York University, 1 April 2015

Purposive Reconciliation in Statebuilding and the Politics of the Divided City of Mitrovica, Paper Presentation at the Center for Historical Research and Documentation on War (CEGESOMA), Brussels, 17 December 2014

Life stories related to statebuilding and peacebuilding in Kosovo, presentation at the 'Oral History Workshop: Methodological challenges of collecting oral histories in South-Eastern Europe Erasmus Studio', Oral History Working Group Huizinga Institute, University of Amsterdam/NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Amsterdam, 12 September 2014

The Limits of EU Foreign Policy on the Kosovo-Serbia Negotiation through Life Stories, Conference Presentation at 'Oral History Conference', University of Barcelona, 10 July 2014

Reviewing International Statebuilding Theories, Conference Presentation at the ECPR Graduate Conference, University of Innsbruck, 5 July 2014

The Role of Political Elites on the Negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia, Conference Presentation at 'Peace-building processes in a postwar context: Reconstituting the 'National' and 'International' in the Western Balkans', University of Bremen, 24 October 2013

The Limits of the EU Foreign Policy on the Kosovo-Serbia Negotiations, Seminar presentation at Leuven International and European Studies, KU Leuven, 27 September 2013

The Politics of Statebuilding in the Republic of Kosovo, Conference Presentation at 'Exploring Leadership Roles for Local Peace and Global Justice', Campus The Hague & International Leadership Association, Leiden University, 16 May 2013

The Theory and Methodology of Life Stories: Expanding Discourse Analysis with Life Stories, Paper Presentation at the Center for Historical Research and Documentation on War (CEGESOMA), Brussels, 26 March 2013

International fellowships and courses (15)

01/02/2016 – present	Pristina University: Affiliated Researcher
15/05/2014 – present	European Peacebuilding Office (Brussels): Academic Friend
01/02/2013 – present	Centre for Historical Research and Documentation on War and contemporary War (CEGESOMA), Brussels: Visiting Researcher
01/07/2015 – 15/11/2015	Estonia, Tallinn University: Visiting Researcher
01/02/2013 - 31/08/2015	Free University of Brussels: Affiliated Researcher

01/03/2015 - 30/06/2015	New York University: Visiting Scholar, Leiden University Fund
22/09/2014 - 22/11/2014	Central European University: Visiting Scholar, LeidCeu
05/08/2013 - 30/09/2013	Leuven University: Visiting Scholar, Erasmus Mobility
01/06/2012 - 12/07/2012	The University of Cagliari: Visiting Scholar, Erasmus Mobility
2012/2013	Course on 'European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy', ISPE, Kosovo
Research stay in Balkans, Summer 2016	
Research stay in Balkans, Summer 2015	
Research stay in Balkans, Summer 2014	
Research stay in Kosovo, Summer 2013	
Research stay in Kosovo, Summer 2012	

International collaborations (11)

01/02/2016 – present	Pristina University: Affiliated Researcher
01/02/2013 - present	The Centre for Historical Research and Documentation on War and Contemporary War: Visiting Researcher
01/07/2015 – 15/11/2015	Estonia, Tallinn University: Visiting Researcher
01/02/2013 - 31/08/2015	Free University of Brussels: Affiliated Researcher
01/03/2015 - 30/06/2015	New York University: Visiting Scholar
22/09/2014 - 22/11/2014	Central European University: Visiting Scholar
05/08/2013 - 30/09/2013	Leuven University: Visiting Scholar
26/02/2013	Conference Organiser on The role of NATO and EU in international relations, Brussels, EU Commission
01/06/2012 - 12/07/2012	The University of Cagliari: Visiting Scholar
21/02/2012	Conference Organiser on The role of NATO and EU in global affairs, Brussels, EU Commission
20/06/2011	Conference Organiser on The Responsibility to Protect in Libya, Brussels, EU Commission

Short Contracts (2)

2012/2013	ISPE College, Course Lecturer for 'European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy', Kosovo
2014	International Alert, Consultant, Georgia

Affiliations (4)

1/2/2016 – present	Pristina University: Affiliated Researcher
15/05/2014 - present	European Peacebuilding Office: Academic Friend
01/02/2013 - present	The Centre for Historical Research and Documentation on War and Contemporary War: Visiting Researcher
01/02/2013-31/08/2015	Free University of Brussels: Affiliated Researcher

Trainings and Seminars (28)

02/2016	Participant in Education and Course Design, ICLON
26/10/2015 – 30/10/2015	Participant in Religion, conflict and violence, Oslo, Research School on Peace and Conflict
08/10/2015 – 10/10/2015	Participant in Interconnections of Finance and Security, Oslo, Research School on Peace and Conflict
11/2015	Participant in Active Teaching and Learning, ICLON
27/11/2014 – 11/12/2014	Participant in Testing and Assessment, ICLON

18/11/2014	Participant in Blended Learning, ICLON
31/10/2014 – 14/11/2014	Participant in Presenting Skills, ICLON
13/03/2014 – 14/03/2014	Participant in Using NVIVO for Qualitative Data Analysis, University of Ghent
03/2014	Participant in Ethnography, University of Ghent
10/03/2014	Participant in Critical Discourse Analysis: Philosophical Assumptions and Practical Applications, Free University of Brussels
28/02/2014	Participant in Strategies in Qualitative Data-Analysis from a Grounded Theory Perspective: From Coding Transcripts to Writing Output, University of Ghent
09/12/2013	Participant in Developing Interview Questions and Basic Interview Skills Perspective, University of Ghent
29/11/2013	Participant in Publishing your Article in a Scientific Journal, Free University of Brussels
22/11/2013	Participant in Narrative Analysis, Free University of Brussels
12/09/2013	Participant in Introduction to Basic Teaching, Leiden University
15/03/2013	Participant in Personal Effectiveness, Free University of Brussels
05/03/2013	Participant in Speed Reading, Free University of Brussels
05/2013	Participant at Qualitative Methods and the Study of Civil War, PRIO, Oslo
06/2012	Participant at Cambridge University on “Political Thought, Political Theory and Intellectual Theory”
05/2012	Participant at British International Studies Association on Bridging the Gap between Academia and International Practitioners on International Politics
01/08/2009 – 12/08/2009	Participant at Transitional Justice in South Eastern Europe by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and Pravnik
01/10/2008 – 31/01/2009	Participant at United Nations International Student Conference Amsterdam (UNISCA) by University of Amsterdam
2006	Participant in Balkan Peace Park Conference, ERA and BIRD, Mitrovica
2005	Participant in AIDS, First Aid and Negative Behavior in Society by Swiss Red Cross, Kosovo
2005	Participant in Debating by SFERA, Kosovo
2005	Participant in Writing Project Proposals by GTZ
2005	Participant in Information Technology by IDI, Kosovo
2001	Participant in Multi-ethnic Society by SOROS, RTANJ – Serbia and Montenegro

Other academic activities (20)

10/06/2016	Expert Commentator on “Rule of Law and Security in Eastern Europe”, MFA in Netherlands
2-3/06/2016	Panel Organiser on “Resurgent Nationalism in Eastern Europe”, Politicologenetmaal, Free University of Brussels
18/05/2016	Workshop Organiser on “Reconciliation in Local Contexts and the Role of the International Community”, University of Leiden
05/05/2016	Expert Commentator on “Strategies for De-radicalization through Education in Kosova”, Columbia University
31/03/2016	Panel Organiser on “Annexation of Crimea as an International Crime”, University of Leiden

22/03/2016	Seminar presentation on “Statebuilding in Kosovo: Comparing the International and Local Perspectives through Life Stories”, Leiden University
12/02/2016 – 13/02/2016	Seminar Presentation on “Challenges on Doing Oral History in Kosovo”, Tallinn University
09/12/2015	Conference Organiser on “Global Affairs: The Crises in Ukraine”, University of Leiden
26/10/2015 – 30/10/2015	Seminar Presentation on “Religion, Conflict and Violence”, Oslo, Research School on Peace and Conflict
08/10/2015 – 10/10/2015	Seminar Presentation on “Interconnections of Finance and Security”, Oslo, Research School on Peace and Conflict
02/2014 – 05/2015	Project Organiser, HORIZON 2020, INT 5: Rethinking European Union Crises Response Mechanisms
11/12/2014	Conference Co-organiser on “Global Affairs”, University of Leiden
26/02/2013	Conference Organiser, "The role of NATO and EU in International Relations", Brussels, EU Commission
01/03/2012	Panel Organiser, “The Eurocrisis and Europe’s Impact on the World Stage: Analysis of the European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2012”, The Hague, University of Leiden
21/02/2012	Conference Organiser “The Role of NATO and EU in Global Affairs”, Brussels, EU Commission
20/06/2011	Conference Organiser "The role of NATO and EU in international relations: Responsibility to Protect in Libya”, Brussels, EU Commission
01/10/2008 – 31/01/2009	Presentation at United Nations International Student Conference Amsterdam (UNISCA), University of Amsterdam
01/05/2006 - 06/05/2006	Project Organiser, “Different but Equal in Europe”, Youth Initiative for Human Rights in Kosovo
02/05/2005 - 08/06/2005	Project Organiser, Peace Camp: “Stop and Think”, Prishtina Youth Center
2005	Project Organiser, “A long walk for Peace”, Balkan Initiative for Reconstruction and Development

Journal Referee

International Journal of Transitional Justice
International Peacekeeping

Awards, Fellowships, Grants and Prizes (14)

2015 – 2016	Erasmus + at Cegesoma/Brussels	€1,200
2015	Jean Monnet ME Funding Award at Manchester University	£ 500
2015	Accommodation Grant, University of Oslo/PRIO	
2015	Accommodation Grant, University of Oslo/PRIO	
2015	Archimedes Foundation for research visit at Tallinn University	€1,725
2014	LU Fund for research visit at New York University	€1,800
2014	LeidCeU for a research visit at Central European University	€4,300
2013	Erasmus Mobility for research visit at KU Leuven	€3,450
2013	Accommodation Grant, University of Oslo/PRIO	
2012-2017	NWO Mozaik for PhD research at Leiden University	€200,000
2012	Erasmus Mobility for research visit at the University of Cagliari	€3,250
2006-2010	Rotary Club grant for BA at University College Roosevelt	€40,000
2009	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	€200
2008	Ministry of Education (Kosovo) grant for BA studies at UCR	€1,000
Total		€256,925

Invited lectures (15)

2016	Lecture, Peacebuilding through Life Stories, LU, Spring semester
2016	Lecture, Foreign Fighters and Terrorism in Kosovo, LU, Spring semester
2016	Lecturer, Humanitarian Intervention through Life Stories, LU, Spring semester
02/05/2016	Lecturer on Violent Extremism and the Impact of the International Community in Kosovo, Leiden University
26/04/2016	Lecture on Reconciliation and Peacebuilding in Kosovo, UCLouvain, Belgium
19/03/2016	Lecture on State and Peacebuilding in Kosovo, Exeter University, UK
09/03/2016	Lecture on Statebuilding in Kosovo, Manchester University, UK
05/11/2015	Lecture, Nationbuilding Challenges in Kosovo, Free University of Brussels, Belgium
04/11/2015	Lecture on Incorporating Local Voices in Nationbuilding in Kosovo, Cegesoma/Brussels, Belgium
29/04/2015	Lecture on Nationbuilding, New York University
23/04/2015	Lecture on Nation and Peace Building in Kosovo at New York University
01/04/2015	Lecture on Humanitarian Intervention, New York University
2015	Lecture on Foreign Fighters and Terrorism in Balkans, LU, Fall semester
2015	Lecture on Nationbuilding, Fall semester, LU
2015	Lecture on IR Theories, Spring semester, LU

Teaching Experience (15)

Teaching Assistant at Leiden University, courses:

2015 - 2016	Gateway to Global Affairs
2013 - 2014	Power Instruments
2012 - 2013	Foreign Policy and Diplomacy
2012 - 2013	Peace and Global Challenges
2011 - 2013	Multilateral Institutions
2011 - 2012	International Relations for LLM students

Co-lecturer at Leiden University, courses:

2016 - 2017	Power Instruments
2016 - 2017	Humanitarian Intervention and Peacebuilding
2015 - 2016	Power Instruments
2015	Introduction to International Relations
2013	International Relations for LLM students
2013	Multilateral Institutions
2013	Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

Lecturer:

2012 - 2013	ISPE College (Kosovo), course on 'European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy', Kosovo
2012	Leiden University, course on Peace and Global Challenges

Work Experience (16)

01/02/2016 - present	Pristina University: Affiliated Researcher
15/05/2014 - present	European Peacebuilding Office, Brussels: Academic Friend
01/02/2013 - present	Centre for Historical Research and Documentation on War and Contemporary War (CEGESOMA), Brussels: Affiliated Researcher
01/11/2012 - present	Researcher and Lecturer at Leiden University
01/02/2013 - 30/08/2015	Vrije Universiteit Brussels: Affiliated Researcher
01/03/2015 - 30/06/2015	New York University: Visiting Scholar
01/11/2010 - 31/06/2012	Leiden University: Research and Education Officer
01/04/2011 - 15/08/2011	International Criminal Court (External Relations Div.): Intern

15/04/2010 – 31/09/2010	International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia: Legal Intern
01/12/2008 – 31/01/2009	The Supreme Court of Kosovo: Legal Intern
01/05/2008 – 31/07/2008	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo: Legal Intern
01/07/2007 – 31/09/2007	Prime Minister's Office of Kosovo: International Affairs Intern
01/09/2005 – 31/10/2006	Kosova Youth Network: Board Member & Regional Coordinator
01/01/2006 – 31/09/2006	Youth Initiative for Human Rights: Project Assistant Volunteer
01/10/2006 – 31/02/2006	Kosova Academic Center: Cultural Assistant Volunteer
01/01/2005 – 01/12/2005	Prishtina's Youth Center: Acting Director

Additional Skills

Languages:	Albanian (native) English (full proficiency) Dutch (intermediate) French, Serbian (elementary)
Software:	MS Office, Mendley, NVIVO

Academic References

Prof. Dr. Rob de Wijk, Professor in International Relations, Leiden University (E-mail: RobdeWijk@hcss.nl)

Prof. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Kooijmans Chair for Peace, Law, and Security, Leiden University (E-mail: j.g.de.hoop.scheffer@fgga.leidenuniv.nl)

Prof. Dr. Carsten Stahn, Professor of International Criminal Law and Global Justice, Grotius Centre, Leiden University (E-mail: c.stahn@fgga.leidenuniv.nl)
