Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

'Namibia, land of the brave': selective memories on war and violence within nation building

Melber, H.; Abbink, J.; Bruijn, M.E.de; Walraven, K.van

Citation

Melber, H. (2003). 'Namibia, land of the brave': selective memories on war and violence within nation building. *Rethinking Resistance : Revolt And Violence In African History*. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/12908>

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)

License:

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/12908>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

‘Namibia, land of the brave’: Selective memories on war and violence within nation building*

Henning Melber

The limits to the memory of liberation are investigated with regard to the factors affecting a liberation movement in the process of achieving legitimate power in a post-colonial society. The case of Namibia is explored in the transition from anti-colonial resistance to comprehensive control, by the former liberation movement, over the state. The concepts of political rule, the state and democracy are tested against the impact of a liberation struggle in terms of the applied understanding of political dominance once access to power has been achieved. The political culture under a government with a record of liberation struggle suggests limitations to the implementation of democracy.

*Namibia, land of the brave,
freedom fight we have won,
glory to the bravery,
whose blood watered our freedom.*

These are the first four lines of Namibia’s national anthem. Its melody was composed and selected during a competition before independence in early 1990 and the words were added a few months later.¹ The anthem is evidence of the

* I am grateful to Reinhart Koessler for his comments on the draft manuscript of this chapter.

¹ These introductory lines led to some raised eyebrows and concerns among members of the white minority with regard to the extent to which the declared notion of national

pride of an emerging new nation placing itself on the map of sovereign states after more than a century of foreign occupation and continued resistance, including more than two decades of an armed liberation struggle. The introductory words also illustrate the legacy of this struggle for post-colonial development. Such legacies are nothing new, and far from typically African, but they also have a history on the continent.²

This chapter explores, presents and comments upon some visible features of a political culture affected by a militaristic orientation in the independent Republic of Namibia. This is not to say that Namibia is governed either by warlords or the military but the picture sketched by this overview highlights an aspect of Namibian society that, to my knowledge, has not yet been explicitly made a thematic subject, unlike in other societies in the region.³ It can be considered one of the historical, structural and psychological legacies of colonial rule, that an earlier study termed 'the violent heritage'.⁴

This heritage, from a dialectical point of view, shaped mentalities and ideologies not only among the colonizers but also among the colonized. There is a growing tendency to critically analyse the processes in which victims in the

reconciliation is taken so seriously by the newly elected political leadership of the country. They did not in fact contribute to eliminating their original worries in facing the fate of an endangered species, though subsequent experiences have so far not confirmed their fears. That these first lines bear striking resemblance to the concluding words in the United States national anthem, 'The Star Spangled Banner', did not occur to those confined to the Namibian perspective. But this is a healthy reminder that the subject of this chapter is clearly not typically African but is one of patriotism in nation-building processes all over the world.

² See, as impressive early evidence of coming to terms with such a history in the African context of decolonization, the essays on various topical subjects compiled in the volume by A.A. Mazrui, *Violence and Thought* (London & Harlow, 1969).

³ In particular the social history of Zimbabwe has in recent years produced a striking range of in-depth analyses dealing with the impact of the second *chimurenga* upon (post-)colonial identity formation and ideological discourse. See among more prominent recent examples the variety of contributions to the two volumes by N. Bhebe & T. Ranger (eds), *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War* (London, Portsmouth & Harare, 1995) and *Society in Zimbabwe's Liberation War* (Oxford, Portsmouth & Harare, 1996), and especially R. Werbner, 'Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun: Postwars of the Dead, Memory and Reinscription in Zimbabwe', in R. Werbner (ed.), *Memory and the Postcolony. African Anthropology and the Critique of Power* (London & New York, 1998).

⁴ D. Soggot, *Namibia: The Violent Heritage* (London, 1986). Soggot has been active as a South African-based lawyer for several years in Namibia defending those accused in political trials. His story reveals numerous atrocities and the kind of human rights violations notorious under Apartheid, which as a legacy to the post-colonial society shaped the mentality of both the colonizers and the colonized.

role of freedom fighters became perpetrators. Breaking such taboos is necessary in a debate that is dealing increasingly with the content of liberation and reflecting (if not questioning) the concept of solidarity of the past years and marks the end of the cultivation of 'heroic narratives'.⁵ Growing insight shows that armed liberation struggles were not a suitable breeding ground for the establishment of democratic systems of government after independence. The forms of resistance against repressive regimes were themselves organized along strictly hierarchical and authoritarian lines because otherwise they would have had little prospect of success. In this sense, the new societies bore the essential elements of the old system they had fought. Aspects of the colonial system reproduced themselves in the struggle for its abolition and subsequently in the concepts of governance applied in post-colonial conditions. They share the binary view of the colonial discourse of the past.⁶

Governments were formed by the anti-colonial liberation movements that had themselves been far from non-violent. They assumed control of the state machinery and reorganized themselves as political parties. The legitimacy to rule stemmed from their emergence from the decolonization process as democratically elected representatives of the majority of the people. Since then and with varying results (and sometimes with the use of further organized violence, as the case of Matabeleland illustrates), they have been able to strengthen their political dominance and maintain control over the state. This is true even though in Zimbabwe at present it can be seen that these governments may not last forever.⁷

The social transformation in these southern African societies shaped by a settler colonial brand, can at best be characterized as a transition from controlled change to changed control. The result is a new ruling political elite operating from commanding heights constructed in the particular context of the post-Apartheid societies and shaped by selective narratives and memories related to the war(s) of liberation. In this context, new traditions to establish an exclusive post-colonial legitimacy were constructed or invented under the sole authority of one particular agency of social forces. The 'mystification' of the

⁵ G. Harrison, 'Bringing Political Struggle Back in African Politics, Power & Resistance', *Review of African Political Economy*, 89 (2001), 390. See also R. Kössler & H. Melber, 'The West German Solidarity Movement with the Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa. A (Self-)Critical Retrospective', in U. Engel & R. Kappel (eds), *Germany's Africa Policy Revisited* (Münster & Hamburg, 2002).

⁶ See, for example, B. Ashcroft, *Post-Colonial Transformation* (London & New York, 2001), 21.

⁷ See for a more detailed overview, H. Melber, 'From Liberation Movements to Governments: On Political Culture in Southern Africa', *African Sociological Review*, 6 (2002).

liberators plays an essential role in this process. What has been stated with regard to the ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe applies to Namibia's SWAPO too. It 'had since independence sought to ground the nation's identity as well as its own political legitimacy in the liberation war'.⁸

The evidence presented here is an attempt to collect and assess the impact of histories of war and violence on the post-colonial mental environment of Namibia, which still shapes and affects memories and their institutionalization in symbols, rituals and daily practices related to the present political culture and hegemony. By doing so, the significance of revolt and resistance in the history of Namibia and its utilization for the legitimacy of currently dominant patterns of rule under a previous liberation movement can provisionally be explored.⁹ This follows the appeal by Werbner:

The critique of power in contemporary Africa calls for a theoretically informed anthropology of memory and the making of political subjectivities. The need is to rethink our understanding of the force of memory, its official and unofficial forms, its moves between the personal and the social in postcolonial transformation.¹⁰

This exploratory effort does not claim to provide any definitive answers but seeks to offer some thought-provoking input on reflections on the current socio-political environment after more than a decade of Namibian independence. I suggest that the post-colonial reality reflects the contradictions and challenges predicted so convincingly by Artur Carlos Maurício Pestana, a former MPLA fighter. He published, under his *nom de guerre*, the notes he made in 1971 during his participation in the guerrilla war in the rainforest of the Cabinda front in Angola for the MPLA. As a novel and narrative it offers a remarkable degree of sensitivity and insight into the complexity (and limits) of social transformation subsequent to a situation of armed resistance against foreign colonial rule. As the commander of the guerrilla unit ('Fearless') explains to the

⁸ J. Alexander, J. McGregor & T. Ranger, *Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the 'Dark Forests' of Matabeleland* (Oxford, 2000), 254.

⁹ To that extent this chapter relates directly to the one by Jan-Bart Gewald in this volume (and *vice versa*). For other recent efforts to find a more systematic analytical context assessing the track record of the SWAPO liberation movement as the party in political power since independence, see H. Melber, 'The Culture of Politics', in H. Melber (ed.), *Namibia – A Decade of Independence, 1990-2000* (Windhoek, 2000) and H. Melber, 'Liberation and Democracy in Southern Africa: The Case of Namibia', in H. Melber & C. Saunders (eds), *Transition in Southern Africa – Comparative Aspects. Two Lectures* (Uppsala, 2001).

¹⁰ R. Werbner, 'Beyond Oblivion: Confronting Memory Crisis', in Werbner, *Memory and the Postcolony*, 2.

political commissar (‘New World’), for whom he ultimately sacrifices his life in battle:

We don’t share the same ideals. (...) You are the machine type, one of those who is going to set up the unique, all-powerful Party in Angola. I am the type who could never belong to the machine. (...) One day, in Angola, there will no longer be any need for rigid machines, and that is my aim. ...what I want you to understand, is that the revolution we are making is half the revolution I want. But it is the possible. I know my limits and the country’s limits. My role is to contribute to this half-revolution. (...) I am, in your terminology, adventurer. I should like the discipline of war to be established in terms of man and not the political objective. My guerrillas are not a group of men deployed to destroy the enemy, but a gathering of different, individual beings, each with his subjective reasons to struggle and who, moreover, behave as such. (...) I am happy when I see a young man decide to build himself a personality, even if politically that signifies individualism. (...) I cannot manipulate men, I respect them too much as individuals. For that reason, I cannot belong to a machine.¹¹

This conversation is more than fiction: it sets the parameters and social constraints for a post-colonial society with a history of armed resistance against settler colonialism in southern Africa – a society like that of present-day Namibia.

‘Let us die fighting’: Armed resistance as a historical continuity

In 1960 the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) was formed as a result of the organizational structures emerging during the 1950s among the contract workers from the northern part of Namibia – Ovamboland – a region named after its population.¹² Until the mid-1960s SWAPO was competing with

¹¹ Pepetela, *Mayombe* (London, 1996), 197-98.

¹² The different Ovambo communities form more than half of Namibia’s population and are the backbone and power base of SWAPO. The SWAPO narrative is thus strongly guided and influenced by an Ovambo perspective. This chapter, however, does not explore the regional-ethnic aspects and components of post-colonial national ideology in Namibia in depth. For a comprehensive official historiography on the liberation struggle and SWAPO’s role, see Department of Information and Publicity/SWAPO of Namibia, *To Be Born A Nation. The Liberation Struggle for Namibia* (London, 1981). Other semi-official historiographies include the scholarly works of two long-time SWAPO activists who graduated in exile from Oxford and Lund respectively: P. Katjavivi, *A History of Resistance in Namibia* (London, 1988) and K. Mbuende, *Namibia, the Broken Shield: Anatomy of Imperialism and Revolution* (Lund, 1986). Katjavivi has been the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Namibia since its

other anti-colonial organizations for a leadership role but its decision to launch an armed struggle as the ultimate means to liberate Namibia marked a turning point and paved the way for SWAPO's international and local recognition as the most relevant organization of the Namibian people to bring about independence. The subsequent steps to hegemony within the anti-colonial resistance were constituted by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3111 of 12 December 1973, recognizing SWAPO as 'the authentic representative of the Namibian people' and its amendment in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 31/146 of 20 December 1976 to be the 'sole and authentic' representative. It thereby endorsed the exclusive status and political monopoly of SWAPO in the ongoing negotiations on behalf of the Namibian people.

The armed struggle – as executed by SWAPO's military wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) – constituted a substantial if not decisive step towards legitimacy in this process.¹³ In principle decided upon in the early 1960s, it finally started after a ruling by the International Court of Justice in The Hague that denied the Namibian people a hearing on their right to self-determination on purely legal grounds. Its announcement on 18 July 1966 provoked a statement, released the same day by SWAPO's external headquarters (then in Dar es Salaam, later in Lusaka and finally in Luanda), declaring that: 'We have no alternative but to rise in arms and bring about our liberation'.¹⁴

The first military encounter between SWAPO insurgents and the South African army occurred on 26 August 1966 when the colonial forces attacked a guerrilla base at Omgulumbashe in Ovamboland (nowadays in politically correct post-colonial terminology more vaguely referred to as Northern Namibia). Subsequently, August 26 was commemorated by the United Nations as 'Namibia Day'. An editorial in the June/July 1968 issue of the SWAPO publication *Namibia News* illustrates the crucial element introduced with the armed liberation struggle to the historiography of SWAPO, which from now on could claim to represent the continuity of resistance by the people of Namibia against foreign occupation:

26 August is a day of commemoration for our people. One of our early uprisings against the Germans took place on this date and ever since the date has been

establishment in the early 1990s, while Mbuende was Deputy Minister of Agriculture, then SADC Executive Secretary and since 2000 a Member of Parliament.

¹³ See T. Emmett, *Popular Resistance and the Roots of Nationalism in Namibia, 1915-1966* (Basel, 1999), 331-34.

¹⁴ Department of Information and Publicity/SWAPO of Namibia, *To Be Born A Nation*, 177.

remembered. On 26 August this year it is two years since we, the people of Namibia, entered a new phase in our fight against the racist white minority by launching our armed struggle. Until then we fought by non-violent means, but this brought us nothing but increased violence and brutality from our enemy. When we saw there was no way out – the last straw was the let-down by the world community in The Hague – we took up arms.

Namibia's history contains many accounts of armed uprising against foreign invaders. For instance, from 1904 to 1907 the Germans faced continuous revolts which were led by the dynamic chiefs, Maherero and Witbooi. The Germans met the resistance with what they called 'a war of extermination', during which they ruthlessly killed any Namibian they could find, whether soldier or civilian. When the war ended, the population in parts of our country was reduced by two-thirds. In 1917 another uprising took place, this time under the leadership of King Mandume. Mandume's men fought the Boers in the South and the Portuguese in the North. Although this revolt was crushed, we did not lose our determination to free our country from white overlordship. Today we are again engaged in an armed battle against our enemy, but this time we cannot be stopped until we have liberated Namibia from the white settler regime.¹⁵

With the armed struggle, SWAPO had entered a new stage in Namibian history. Not only did this add a further dimension to the efforts to bring about independence, but it also opened the way for its consolidation as the one and only decisive organization within the anti-colonial movement. It created the idea of historical continuity since the days of the early 'primary' anti-colonial resistance beginning in the late nineteenth century. This is clearly illustrated by the quotation above which underlines the direct links to the efforts of leaders among the Nama (Witbooi), the Herero (Maherero) and the Kwanyama/Ovambo (Mandume) under early colonial rule to resist foreign occupation by means of armed resistance too.

'Let us die fighting', a quote accredited to a letter by Herero Chief Samuel Maherero, in which he tried to convince the Nama Kaptein Hendrik Witbooi shortly before the first organized military attack on the German colonial authorities in 1904 to join the resistance, emerged during the 1980s as a catchphrase to link the contemporary struggle with the early history of armed anti-colonial struggle. It became popular as a result of a qualitatively new perspective within historical analysis, with subsequent prominent and also politically relevant impact.¹⁶ Maherero's letter, actually sent to the Kaptein of

¹⁵ Quoted from A. de Braganca & I. Wallerstein (eds), *The African Liberation Reader. Volume 2: The National Liberation Movements* (London, 1982), 5-6.

¹⁶ H. Drechsler, *'Let Us Die Fighting': The Struggle of the Herero and Nama against German Imperialism, 1884-1914* (London, 1980). The title of the German original (*Südwestafrika unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft*), a thesis published in the GDR in 1966 (and published in a revised version in 1984) did not make use of the quote. See on

the Rehoboth Basters and instead of being handed over to Witbooi passed on to the Germans, contained the following appeal, which allowed later analysis to suggest the emergence of a common interest and alliance during early anti-colonial resistance between hitherto divided groups:

I appeal to you, my Brother, not to hold aloof from the uprising, but to make your voice heard so that all Africa may take up arms against the Germans. Let us die fighting rather than die as a result of maltreatment, imprisonment or some other calamity.¹⁷

The claim to historic continuity was one of the things illustrated by the fact that *The Combatant*, the monthly organ of PLAN, in a later standard front cover header combined the images of Hendrik Witbooi and Tobias Hainyeko, a PLAN commander who was killed and praised as one of the fallen heroes.¹⁸

SWAPO's military activities were never as effective and successful as efforts on the diplomatic front. This was partly the result of the relative weakness of the combat units and the unfavourable geographical and geo-strategic conditions for guerrilla warfare in many parts of the country. It was at the same time at least as much Namibia's genuine status in terms of international law that resulted in special attention by the United Nations towards this 'trust betrayed'.¹⁹ It allowed for diplomatic offensives that other anti-

the relevance of Drechsler's study, also in current debate, the chapter in this volume by Jan-Bart Gewald.

¹⁷ Ibid. 143. For a more recent summary of the context of 'primary' resistance in the process of colonization, see H. Melber, 'Economic and Social Formation in the Process of Colonisation: Society and State Before and During German Rule', in C. Keulder (ed.), *State, Society and Democracy. A Reader in Namibian Politics* (Windhoek, 2000).

¹⁸ *The Combatant – The Monthly Organ of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN)* was published from 1980 onwards in mimeographed and stapled A4 format but changed its layout in the mid-1980s into a more sophisticated A5 format print version. The relevance of the armed struggle is also illustrated by the fact that *The Combatant* was among the SWAPO publications and periodicals (such as *Namibia News* and *Namibia Today*) with the longest continuity and ceased publication only at the end of 1988 with the ceasefire agreement and subsequent implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978).

¹⁹ *Namibia – A Trust Betrayed* had in fact been the title of a United Nations publication to explain the case in terms of international law. As a result, SWAPO received not only support from the majority of member states in the United Nations General Assembly, as already mentioned by its recognition as 'sole and authentic representative', but could subsequently claim observer status to the United Nations and was supported by a United Nations Council for Namibia, as well as a later established United Nations Institute for Namibia – both agencies collaborating closely with SWAPO or in the latter case even run by a considerable number of SWAPO cadres. For a recent comprehensive summary

colonial movements rarely had at their disposal. But without the existence of the armed struggle, the diplomatic and political successes as well as the internal mobilization of Namibians could not have been achieved to such a degree.

‘To be born a nation’: The armed struggle as a midwife

The battlefield offered few, if any, victories over the South African forces of occupation. The war was waged mainly in the Angolan border area and on foreign soil. But however much a military victory might have boosted morale, defeats contributed to a growing identity in the struggle. Seen in this light, the ‘ravages of war’²⁰ did not only have a devastating impact on the further course of the struggle for liberation but also brought together the oppressed Namibian majority. The collective trauma of the Cassinga massacre hence symbolized not defeat but a determination to resist and to make sacrifices. This refugee camp in southern Angola was bombed – as the height of cynicism and in an obvious effort to sabotage the acceptance of the decolonization plan as defined in the United Nation Security Council Resolution 435 – on 4 May 1978 (Ascension Day) by the South African army.²¹ The several hundred victims (mainly women and children) have remained a symbol of the Namibian struggle for independence ever since.

The idea of martyrdom created in every case of violence exercised by the occupation army and police, both in exile as well as on the home front, in police cells and in the townships, added to the consolidation of resistance under the SWAPO banner. The glorification of resistance and sacrifices on the battlefield were articulated in numerous (often crude) praise poems published in SWAPO’s various publications. One, which gave the title to the only published anthology documenting the spirit of these days, ends with the following lines:

We fear not your beatings
Neither your brutal bombardments

and documentation of the role of the United Nations in the dispute, see L.C.W. Kaela, *The Question of Namibia* (London & New York, 1996).

²⁰ Described in some detail in B. König, *Namibia – The Ravages of War* (London, 1983) and D. Herbstein & J. Evenson, *The Devils are Among Us. The War for Namibia* (London, 1989).

²¹ The best accounts are A. Heywood, *The Cassinga Event* (Windhoek, 1994) and M.Y. Nangolo & T. Sellström, *Kassinga. A Story Untold* (Windhoek, 1995). As the titles show, Cassinga is also referred to as Kassinga.

For you cannot smash our strength
We so united and strong
Your flesh and heart we shall bear.²²

The same volume includes a poem about Cassinga, which ends with a similar appeal to the masses, reminding them of the legacy left behind by the dead and the obligation of survivors still suffering from oppression to fight for liberation:

They have died for our country,
They have died for our people.
Their blood is shed – but not in vain!
Their brightest sacrifice – won't be in vain!
The task is over to you and me,
The task is given to all of us,
We have to continue from where they ended,
Never betray their sacred blood!
Their blood is shed – but not in vain!
Their highest sacrifice – won't be in vain!
Ensure the success of the struggle!
Defend the revolution for the good of all!²³

Frantz Fanon's classification of this mode of expression is a relevant characterization of the 'midwife' function the armed struggle was able to assume in the creation of a national consciousness. For him, this 'literature of combat'

²² F. Tshirunga, 'It Is No More a Cry', in H. Melber (ed.), *It Is No More a Cry. Namibian Poetry in Exile* (Basel, 1982), 38.

²³ N. Wakolele, 'Kassinga', in *ibid.* 47. In the early 1980s, the author was a student at the United Nations Institute in Lusaka. When he died in the mid-1990s, he was Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information of the Republic of Namibia. Other authors of the 'literature of combat' included the current Namibian ambassador to Germany, Hinyangerwa Asheeke. I hereby admit to have actively disseminated the revolutionary pathos and phraseology of two decades ago without much of a critical distance, as the introductory essay to this aforementioned volume testifies: H. Melber, 'Colonialism, Culture and Resistance: The Case of Namibia', in *ibid.* As a member of SWAPO since 1974 and banned from entering Namibia after 1975 until independence, I was part of the dominant anti-colonial spirit in exile, propagating the gospel of the national liberation struggle with few or no doubts concerning the absolute moral superiority of the historical mission. While I do not see a reason to regret the commitment of the time or to revoke my affiliation to SWAPO and its goals and ideals of national sovereignty, I am having second thoughts on some of the issues then unnoticed by myself from today's perspective.

...calls on the whole people to fight for their existence as a nation. It is a literature of combat because it moulds the national consciousness, giving it form and contours and flinging open before it new and boundless horizons; it is a literature of combat because it assumes responsibility, and because it is the will to liberty expressed in terms of time and space.²⁴

Praise poems have remained a relevant mode of expression in the context of post-colonial Namibian culture and politics, though their content has changed from revolutionary pathos to other forms of similarly robust patriotism.²⁵ The socio-psychological impact of the armed struggle to the formation and consolidation of an emerging identity of a Namibian nation in combat for independence is an obvious message from the quoted documentary evidence and is also reflected in SWAPO's national anthem, the words of which followed the tune of 'Nkosi Sikeleli Afrika':

Honour to the heroes of Namibia
Glory to their blood and bravery
We give our love and loyalty
For their blood sustains us
To fight till victory!²⁶

The armed struggle was conceived as an integral part of the battle for liberation among the SWAPO activists by the early 1970s and considered to be a shared responsibility. Evidence of this is in one of the recommendations tabled by a report compiled after investigations into dissent and power struggles within SWAPO in the mid-1970s. The conflicts were a result of frustrations over issues related to the armed struggle, the relationship between the political and the military as well as the treatment of combatants.²⁷ The Commission of Inquiry emphasized:

²⁴ F. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (Harmondsworth, 1967), 193.

²⁵ Including a collection of praise poetry on President Sam Nujoma.

²⁶ Verse three of the national anthem, quoted from *SWAPO News and Views*, Special Issue, 1 (1989) 2, 52. Any resemblance to the first lines of Namibia's national anthem quoted at the beginning is of course not purely coincidental!

²⁷ The most detailed account so far on these internal tensions and conflicts are presented by C. Leys & J.S. Saul, *Namibia's Liberation Struggle. The Two-Edged Sword* (London & Athens, 1995) and L. Dobell, *Swapo's Struggle for Namibia, 1960-1991: War by Other Means* (Basel, 1998). Both studies offer the best explanatory and analytical framework so far for the legitimizing function of the armed struggle in SWAPO's strategy, relevant for substantial subsequent practices and their ideological justification.

the framework of the principle of armed struggle as being the only viable and effective means of achieving total liberation. Within this principle all SWAPO members are soldiers. As a rule all SWAPO officials should spend at least two months a year at the front.²⁸

Namibia's ultimate decolonization in a transitional phase with direct United Nations involvement during 1989/1990 was brought about by a combination of local, regional and global factors. The military aspect, though certainly not decisive, was one of them. SWAPO, in its efforts to underscore its claim to have been the ultimate force of liberation through the barrel of a gun, presented a different view in line with its self-image. This was expressed in what was probably the last issue of *The Combatant*, which for ten years published news from the battlefield on a regular basis:

...the intensification of the armed liberation struggle for the last 22 years has finally made South Africa seek a negotiated solution to Namibia's independence problem and avert a humiliating military defeat that would shatter its dreams of being the so-called regional superpower.²⁹

In fact, an emphasis on the military dimension attached to the liberation struggle almost derailed the transition to independence. On 1 April 1989, the day of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), many of the several hundred SWAPO combatants gathered in Northern Namibia were massacred in cold blood by South African troops in spite of a ceasefire agreement.³⁰ They were blamed for having invaded an area outside their originally confined (Angolan) bases in violation of the ceasefire agreement. South Africa claimed, on the basis of reconnaissance evidence, that PLAN insurgents had sneaked into Namibia to create the impression that they had been occupying bases inside the country (a fact which would have given additional support to SWAPO claims that it was playing a relevant military role by operating from Namibian territory). While SWAPO still officially denies that the PLAN fighters had been ordered only a few days earlier to move into

²⁸ 'Report of the Findings and Recommendations of the John ya Otto Commission of Inquiry into Circumstances which Led to the Revolt of SWAPO Cadres between June, 1974 and April, 1976', submitted 4 June 1976 to the SWAPO Central Committee at its meeting in Lusaka, Zambia, July 1976 (unpublished), 16. I am not aware, however, that this recommended rule was indeed applied.

²⁹ *The Combatant*, 10 (1988) 5, 7.

³⁰ A detailed but unashamedly biased pro-South African description of the events is offered by P. Stiff, *Nine Days of War. Namibia – Before, During and After* (Alberton, 1989).

Namibian territory, and vigorously refutes any other interpretation,³¹ serious evidence points in a different direction.³² Be that as it may, the hundreds of young men caught by surprise had to pay the highest price and sacrificed their lives on a battlefield that was no longer supposed to exist.³³

In the Republic of Namibia's first hours, the first (and so far only) president – who has also been SWAPO's president since its foundation – did not forget to remember the price of liberation paid by so many. He closed his inaugural speech with the following words:

Master of Ceremony, Sir, in accepting the sacred responsibility which the Namibian people have placed on me, as the first President of the Republic of Namibia, I would like to bow and pay homage to our fallen heroes and heroines, whose names Namibia's present and future generations will sing in songs of praise and whose martyrdom they will intone.

In conclusion, I move, in the name of our people, to declare that Namibia is forever free, sovereign and independent!³⁴

'Where others wavered': Post-colonial war narratives and militarism

It should come as no surprise that Namibia's society today still bears the scars of its violent colonial history. The official political discourse, with the national

³¹ See, for example, the surprisingly offending remarks in President Sam Nujoma's autobiography where he accuses Martti Ahtisaari as the highest United Nations official in charge of Namibian decolonization 'to be more concerned with his career at the United Nations than with his responsibilities towards the oppressed people of Namibia'. He further maintains that 'Ahtisaari's action betrayed our cause' and that he 'plotted'. S. Nujoma, *Where Others Wavered* (London, 2001), 396-97.

³² See the interview with Martti Ahtisaari, previously Head of the United Nations Council for Namibia, then in charge of the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG), in I. Soiri & P. Peltola, *Finland and National Liberation in Southern Africa* (Uppsala, 1999), 185-86.

³³ There are earlier sacrifices of a similar nature, though not the same dimension, on record. See the failed incursion by SWAPO combatants into Eastern Hereroland in the late 1970s, motivated by other deliberations than any chance for a military success. Jan-Bart Gewald's reference to this incident in his chapter in this volume indicates that the young people were sent to their death for reasons of political mobilization among the Herero.

³⁴ Quoted from the speech as reproduced in full length in Nujoma, *Where Others Wavered*, 447. Nujoma dedicated his autobiography 'to the gallant sons and daughters, heroes and heroines under the leadership of their vanguard SWAPO, and to those who struggled and sacrificed their precious lives for the total liberation of Namibia'.

liberation movement assuming the power of definition by seizing legitimate and democratically based control over the state as the elected Namibian government since then, reflects a continued affinity towards authoritarian structures required to wage war. The dominant narrative of post-colonial Namibia is presented here by means of several examples. It has been suggested elsewhere with reference to Zimbabwe's second *chimurenga* that the 'variety of appropriations of violence is the dating of events' and 'the memorising of dates of wars and battles (as well as biographies of great men – and women) as markers of history'.³⁵

Namibian independence started by choosing such a day: 21 March 1990 was agreed upon as Independence Day following a SWAPO suggestion to the Constituent Assembly to honour the memory of the Sharpeville massacre in South Africa by opting for this date. Though largely unknown in the public sphere in Namibia, it reiterates the liberation movement's commitment to remember victims of struggles in times of peace. On 4 May, Kassinga Day – a public holiday – marks the biggest single massacre of refugees in exile. Heroes Day on 26 August, introduced earlier as Namibia Day by the United Nations, is also a public holiday and commemorates the beginning of the armed struggle in Omgulumbashe (where a memorial has since been erected).³⁶ Human Rights Day on 10 December focuses, in the Namibian context, on the violent oppression in 1959 when police opened fire on those demonstrating against the planned forceful removal of black urban residents from the 'old location' in Windhoek to the new 'township' of Katutura, killing eleven people.³⁷

These national public holidays tend to be monopolized by SWAPO as the party in control of government. Their one-sided celebrations, including the display of party emblems by the head of state during official ceremonies,

³⁵ H. Schmidt, 'Neither War Nor Peace: Making Sense of Violence', in G. Elwert, S. Feuchtwang & D. Neubert (eds), *Dynamics of Violence* (Berlin, 1999), 219.

³⁶ It is also revealing that the Namibia Defence Force (NDF) runs a holding company with the registered name 'August 26'. It owns a diamond mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo, with an NDF general as the company's managing director.

³⁷ This incident marked a turning point in the history of the Namibian liberation struggle in as far as it contributed to the formation of SWAPO in early 1960 and the subsequent decision to ultimately resort to an armed struggle against colonial repression. See for documentary evidence, D. Ridgway, M. Jafta, N. Kautja, M. Oliphant & K. Shipingana, *An Investigation of the Shooting at the Old Location on 10 December 1959* (Windhoek, 1991) and an eyewitness account, J. Ya-Otto, *Battlefront Namibia* (London, 1982) in the chapter entitled 'The Windhoek Massacre', 34-54.

Heroes' Acre (and detail of relief) on the outskirts of Windhoek, July 2002, just prior to its official opening
Photos by Henning Melber

motivated a political opponent to articulate public criticism in parliament.³⁸ In addition to these national public holidays, particular group memories contribute to aspects of regional-ethnic identity in a historical perspective. In Okahandja, the Herero commemorate their war against the Germans at the end of August.³⁹ So do the Witbooi Nama in Gibeon each year in October.⁴⁰ Kaptein Hendrik Witbooi, the leader they pay most prominent tribute to by re-enacting the war against the Germans, has been reproduced on the different Namibian dollar notes introduced as the country's own currency in the early 1990s.⁴¹

A monument outside the capital Windhoek complements the war memorial constructed in Omgulumbashe according to the declared aims of the political leadership in SWAPO. Plans for a Heroes' Acre have been implemented with the assistance of North Korea.⁴² The state's annual budget for 2001/2002 financed the construction work at a site in the direct vicinity of the military base of Luiperds Valley. Commentary in the local daily German newspaper characterized this project as a gigantic symbol of a late-nationalist triumph.⁴³ North Korean architects are also designing an Independence Museum to be built next to the Alte Feste (the colonial fort erected by the German Schutztruppe) and in close vicinity to both the Tintenpalast (the previous administrative

³⁸ A former SWAPO activist in exile (during the first five years of independence the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Trade and Industry) and since 2000 an elected parliamentary representative of the opposition Congress of Democrats tabled a motion in early April 2002. He blamed SWAPO, in the light of the recent Independence Day ceremonies, for using national commemorative events and public holidays for party propaganda and thereby acting against the spirit of national reconciliation. See M. Springer, 'Feier Missbraucht', *Allgemeine Zeitung* (Windhoek), 9 April 2002.

³⁹ See the chapter in this volume by Jan-Bart Gewald for a comprehensive analysis of the historical events and their psychological and political implications for Namibian politics.

⁴⁰ See R. Kössler, 'Tradition als Politische Strategie. Vom Witbooi-Fest zum Heroes Day in Gibeon, Namibia', in A. Eckert & J. Müller (eds), *Transformationen der Europäischen Expansion vom 16. bis 20. Jahrhundert* (Rehberg-Loccum, 1997), 62-74; R. Kössler, 'Rebuilding Societies from Below: Reflections on Heroes Day, Gibeon, October 1995', in R. Kössler, H. Melber & P. Strand, *Development From Below: A Namibian Case Study* (Uppsala, 2002).

⁴¹ The subject is further touched upon in Jan-Bart Gewald's chapter in this volume with reference to the monuments of three Namibian patriots from different regions and population groups unveiled in Windhoek in 2001, after the statue of Hosea Kutako had to remain covered under a layer of black plastic for several years.

⁴² See on the symbolic relevance of such a memorial site under Mugabe's ZANU-PF in neighbouring Zimbabwe (also erected with North Korean involvement), N.J. Kriger, 'The Politics of Creating National Heroes: The Search for Political Legitimacy and National Identity', in Bhebe & Ranger, *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*.

⁴³ E. Hofmann, 'Selbsterkenntnis', *Allgemeine Zeitung* (Windhoek), 6 February 2002.

offices of the German colonial authority, now the National Assembly) and the Christuskirche. The old colonial monument of the German equestrian Schutztruppenreiter, which has looked down from the hillside onto the centre of town for about 90 years, is to be moved, due to construction work, to a less prominent site a few hundred metres away.⁴⁴

Sam Nujoma, as the political father figure of Namibian independence, personifies in a marked and pronounced way the cultivation of the memories of the liberation war beyond such changes in infrastructure. Testimony to this is not only to be found in his autobiography, which ends with independence and words from one of his earlier speeches during the days of the struggle:

When the history of a free and independent Namibia is written one day, SWAPO will go down as having stood firm where others have wavered: that it sacrificed for the sacred cause of liberation where others have compromised.⁴⁵

The president's vivid memory of combat motivated him in May 2001 to a physical re-enactment of a war scene in front of a television camera when he was visited on his farm by a South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) team. The scenes, in which he throws himself to the ground and imitates shooting, are in stark contrast to the expectations of how an elder statesman ought to behave in public. To the embarrassment of State House, the pictures were included in a less than favourable profile of Namibia's head of state broadcast in neighbouring South Africa in a popular documentary series. Following official protests by the Namibian government on biased reporting, the film crew had to offer an apology.

The tendency towards glorification of the history of warfare for liberation (which by implication is for a just cause and hence tends to embrace affirmatively the dubious notion of a 'just war') is an obvious symptom in Namibian society today. It plays a relevant role in the current symbolism and rituals of the post-colonial political culture. (After all, the pictures in the controversial film documentary did indeed show the president.) It also allowed for a rather problematic treatment of the far-reaching decision to become militarily involved in ongoing conflicts beyond Namibia's borders (in the sense of showing little visible concern for the consequences). In August 1998 troops were sent to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where they came to the

⁴⁴ Ironically, some of the newly built manifestations of independence (including the Constitutional Court constructed in the mid-1990s close to the site of the future Independence Museum) bear some obvious resemblance to the Nazi architecture of Albert Speer.

⁴⁵ This quote is taken from the brochure *SWAPO Information on SWAPO: An Historical Profile* (Lusaka, 1978).

rescue of President Kabila. Since the end of 1999, Namibia has also been directly involved in the ongoing war in neighbouring Angola, where the Namibian army has been involved in fights with UNITA guerrillas. In neither case was parliament or the cabinet consulted, and decisions were taken solely by the head of state who is also in command of the army and entitled to act in the national interest.⁴⁶ In a parliamentary debate on the additional budget in November 1998, Namibia's foreign minister declared categorically that the debate over Namibia's intervention in the DRC had come to an end and labelled any further criticism as 'un-African'. The first soldiers officially returning from the Congo in June 2001 were honoured with a heroes' reception.⁴⁷ In his New Year's Message for 2002, President Nujoma deemed this military involvement a remarkable event:

I can state with pride that the gallant soldiers of the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) and other SADC Allied Forces showed great courage and bravery ... Our soldiers completed this task with honour and returned home in triumph...⁴⁸

'One Namibia, one nation'?

More than a decade after independence, many of the high-ranking political office bearers still have a track record as comrades dating back to SWAPO's formative years during the 1960s and 1970s. The situational application of militant rhetoric as a tool for inclusion or exclusion in terms of the post-colonial national identity is common practice. It demonstrates that the declared notions of national reconciliation and the slogan of 'unity in diversity' do not always receive the desired acknowledgement in terms of political pluralism and tolerance. Namibian identity is instead defined increasingly by those in power along narrow lines of definition and (self-)understanding. What has been suggested with reference to the understanding of post-independent power

⁴⁶ While he was chairing the United Nations General Assembly sessions in New York, his deputy minister, in an acting capacity, accused the print media in Namibia critical of Namibia's involvement in the Angolan conflict in January 2000 of being a 'fifth column' of UNITA and of damaging the country's reputation.

⁴⁷ See the eyewitness report by R. Kössler, 'Szenen einer Heimkehr. Siegesfeier auf der Independence Avenue in Windhoek', *afrika süd*, 4 (2001).

⁴⁸ 'Let's Look Back at the Great Events'. President's New Year Message, *Die Republikein* (Windhoek), 2 January 2002. Shortly afterwards, when a volcano erupted in the Congolese border area of Goma during late January 2002, the president publicly expressed his regrets that this human tragedy had taken place on enemy territory (implying that Namibia would not be able to offer any kind of humanitarian aid to the victims).

relations in neighbouring Zimbabwe has much relevance for the Namibian case too:

...whilst power relations had changed, *perceptions* of power had *not* changed. The layers of understanding regarding power relations, framed by socialisation and memory, continued to operate. ...actors had changed, however, the way in which the new actors executed power in relation to opposition had not, as their mental framework remained in the colonial setting. Patterns from colonial rule of 'citizens' ruling the 'subjects' repeated and reproduced.⁴⁹

This is reflected in a dichotomy of polarized perceptions along the 'we-they' divide. If you are not with SWAPO, you are considered to be an enemy. Given the blurred boundaries between party, government and state under a factual one-party system (with SWAPO having an overwhelming majority of votes allowing it to rule as it pleases) and the growing equation of the party being the government and the government being the state, any opposition or dissent is considered to be hostile and the person involved is branded an enemy of the people and the national interest.

The so-called ex-detainee issue is a classic case in point. This is a group of former SWAPO members who were detained in exile following various internal disagreements that led to mass repression. From the early 1980s onward, hundreds if not thousands were kept in dungeons in southern Angolan camps where they were tortured and executed as suspected South African spies.⁵⁰ Many did not survive. Most of the others were traumatized for the rest of their lives. Following their return to independent Namibia, they have not been rehabilitated, despite numerous efforts. Nor was SWAPO prepared to be held accountable on this issue of violating human rights in its own ranks during the struggle. Instead, the 'ex-detainees' continued to live under the stigma of being considered by many as traitors and collaborators with the Apartheid regime and directly or indirectly held responsible for the deaths of numerous Namibian refugees, combatants and political activists both at home and in exile. Their plight was brought to renewed public attention by the personal account of an external witness with moral credibility.⁵¹ It provoked a considerable reaction

⁴⁹ K.P. Yap, 'Uprooting the Weeds: Power, Ethnicity and Violence in the Matabeleland Conflict, 1980-1987', PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam (2000), 312-13 (original emphasis).

⁵⁰ See for a concise summary of the issue and its implications, G. Lamb, 'Putting Belligerents in Context: The Cases of Namibia and Angola', in S. Chesterman (ed.), *Civilians in War* (Boulder & London, 2001). For more details, see Leys & Saul, *Namibia's Liberation Struggle*.

⁵¹ S. Groth, *Namibia – The Wall of Silence* (Wuppertal, 1995). For detailed accounts on the subsequent controversies, see L. Dobell, 'Silence in Context: Truth and/or

from SWAPO. Advocates of attempts to seek reconciliation through open discussion were accused of acting against the national interest. A senior political activist and member of parliament in a public address at a rally in Northern Namibia (Ovamboland) encouraged the audience to burn the incriminating book that had raised the issue anew. The party released a public statement that it

cannot allow this country to be made ungovernable and be turned into a chaotic and lawless society by irresponsible, unpatriotic elements and foreign remainents (sic!) of fascism and apartheid.⁵²

Such an attitude displays striking similarities to the failure in neighbouring Zimbabwe to come to terms with the atrocities committed during the mid-1980s by the special units using violence against the civilian population on behalf of the central state authority by ZANU-PF in Matabeleland:

The metaphor of 'opening old wounds' was a powerful one, invoked by former Zapu and ZANU-PF politicians as well as by ordinary citizens and human rights groups. The 'wounds' stood as markers of a history of violence, inscribed on both individuals and the body politic; 'opening' them meant public probing. Whether they had ever healed, and hence stood to be 'opened', whether 'opening' them constituted a destructive or a healing act, were subjects of contention which begged a range of questions regarding the proper commemoration of the dead and appropriate ways in which history might be invoked in the present without 'tearing the nation apart'.⁵³

As a result of the new taboos, those reminding the new rulers of an 'unfinished business' of such a nature are the targets of personalized defamation campaigns with the aim to discredit the individuals, normally on the basis of accusations that they betrayed the struggle. One of the previous SWAPO members, who during the exile years was originally trained in the Soviet Union but then left the organization in 1980, has established a National Society for Human Rights (NSHR) in independent Namibia. It is accredited in an advisory status with the United Nations and cooperates with both Amnesty International and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The

Reconciliation in Namibia', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 23 (1997) and C. Lombard, 'The Detainee Issue: An Unresolved Test Case for SWAPO, the Churches and Civil Society', in I. Diener & O. Graefe (eds), *Contemporary Namibia. The First Landmarks of a Post-Apartheid Society* (Windhoek, 2001).

⁵² Media Statement by SWAPO Party on the so-called Detainee Issue, 12 March 1996, 1.

⁵³ Alexander, McGregor & Ranger, *Violence and Memory*, 259.

NSHR is a highly critical human rights watchdog and at times very negative (if not prejudiced) concerning government policy. It regularly raises publicly issues concerning individual cases of violence exercised by the army and police. The Namibian army's quarterly *NDF Journal* in its issue at the end of 2001 accused the NSHR director of having deserted the liberation struggle, disseminating lies and propaganda.⁵⁴

Other political opponents of SWAPO are similarly stigmatized. A previous guerrilla fighter, who after being captured spent several years on Robben Island, became a militant trade-union leader after his release. He was then appointed deputy minister and later ambassador to the United Kingdom before he articulated open dissent with the policy of the SWAPO leadership and resigned from his prestigious diplomatic post. After his subsequent suspension from the Central Committee, of which he was a member, he left the party and founded a new political opposition party campaigning for the parliamentary and presidential elections at the end of 1999. SWAPO responded with an orchestrated smear campaign, denouncing him personally as a former South African agent who had sacrificed the lives of his comrades in arms.⁵⁵ Other personalized attacks similar to the two examples just presented, aiming to discredit the individuals, disclose patterns of a war mentality that still guides opinion leaders in the former liberation movement.

While the constitutionally enshrined civic rights and political liberties that exist in Namibia are formally defined and coded essentials of a plural democracy, the dominant political culture does not support a vibrant civil society. Instead it divides the people along narrowly defined yardsticks of loyalty. A professor of public law involved in the process of drafting the Namibian constitution has hence described the hostility and intolerance displayed towards civil society actors as a worrying sign:

Lawyers assisting the inhabitants of Kaokoland in 1999 with respect to Government plans for a dam in the Kunene River (which would have flooded ancestral land) were severely criticised and their involvement equated with undermining Namibia's ideals. The same fate met academics writing critically about the elections of 1999. Such reaction may be indicative of personal intolerance; it unfortunately also reflects negatively on the political culture and lack of tolerance in society and the State apparatus.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ See the articles in *Allgemeine Zeitung* (Windhoek) of 24 and 25 January 2002.

⁵⁵ While SWAPO maintained that it was in possession of evidence to prove this accusation, it never explained why it had co-opted him into the upper echelons of the party and government structure after independence until his own articulation of dissent.

⁵⁶ G. Erasmus, 'The Constitution: Its Impact on Namibian Statehood and Politics', in Keulder, *State, Society and Democracy*, 99.

How issues can escalate under growing intolerance towards deviations from the increasingly narrow-minded national norm became obvious in August 1999. A secessionist Caprivi Liberation Movement (CLM), aiming at autonomy from Namibia, launched an unsuccessful attack in the isolated and marginalized northeastern part of the country, the Caprivi Strip.⁵⁷ This could be seen as an unrealistic response to failed integration in nation-building processes based more on the exclusion than inclusion of minorities. The desperate military attack culminated in the subsequent proclamation of a state of emergency for the first time in the history of the Republic of Namibia. The serious loss of any sense of reality on the side of the secessionists met its match in an over-reaction by the state and its security organs (the army and police).⁵⁸ A background article concluded that, in retrospect, the attack in the Caprivi led to a new stage of national chauvinism, guided by the primacy of the military.⁵⁹

On the basis of its quasi-monopoly of political power, SWAPO displays an exclusionist tendency, which defines nation building in terms of marginalizing 'the others' as enemies. Namibia remains – despite the liberation movement's earlier claims of fighting for 'one Namibia, one nation' to establish a post-colonial society characterized by 'unity in diversity' – a deeply divided society. Similar to what has been diagnosed with regard to neighbouring Zimbabwe, 'the postcolonial state has sponsored a whole complex of *elite* memorialism',⁶⁰ but by doing so at the same time has buried other relevant memories:

...the state has itself become the agent of nostalgia, for the sake of nation-building; heritage is state cultural policy, often in an anti-colonial appeal inventing tradition for an authentic past; (...)

⁵⁷ See for background information to the event, H. Melber, 'Grenzen einer Nation: Koloniale Territorien und Staatsentwicklung – das Beispiel Namibia', in *Geopolitik. Zur Ideologiekritik politischer Raumkonzepte* (Wien, 2001).

⁵⁸ Amnesty International reacted to the physical violence exercised by the state actors against the accused secessionists and the civilian population by articulating official concern over the violation of human rights. Local NGOs such as the Legal Assistance Centre and the National Society for Human Rights expressed public criticism on several occasions about the heavy-handed treatment of both civilians and arrested suspects. At the time of writing, more than a hundred prisoners accused of high treason had already been under arrest without trial for almost two and a half years, during which time several had died.

⁵⁹ G. Hopwood, 'Caprivi – A Year After', *The Namibian* (Windhoek), 2 August 2000. See also the account published by the Human Rights Committee of South Africa, *Namibia in Focus* (Johannesburg, 1999), 22–28.

⁶⁰ Werbner, 'Beyond Oblivion', 8.

Despite the weighty monumentalism or the substantial flow of material and immaterial tribute from the redistributive state to its honoured citizens, the commemoration of the nation is remarkably fragile. (...) Tensions emerge in a variety of ways, sometimes explosively subverting the carefully scripted course of state pomp and ceremony. The state theatrics, so full of impassioned appeals to higher moral bonds in the 'undying struggle for national freedom', are risky. ...the controversies over remembered identity and postwar trauma heighten as the postcolony itself transforms from an early period of triumphalism to a current one of widespread disaffection, subverting the regime's mandate and legitimacy.⁶¹

Namibia has not yet copied the two decades of post-colonial experiences of Zimbabwe as summarized in this diagnosis, but the writing is on the wall.⁶²

In mid-December 2001, President Sam Nujoma attended a street re-naming ceremony as the guest of honour in the coastal town of Swakopmund. This town with its particular German flavour had its main street named after Kaiser Wilhelm – an anachronism today. Some of the German-speaking business community rendered an unfortunate disservice to the meaning of reconciliation when they strongly objected to the overdue abandoning of such a colonial relict. In reaction to their protest, the president explained in his speech that the population of Namibia in an independent Namibia has to honour its currently recognized heroes – and he unveiled the new street name: Sam Nujoma Avenue.

⁶¹ Ibid. 1 & 8.

⁶² Evidence of this is also the embarrassing degree of uncritical solidarity with the Mugabe regime under ZANU-PF on the occasion of the presidential elections in Zimbabwe. For a summary of the SWAPO (and in fact Namibian government) position see H. Melber, 'Zimbabwe and "The Pitfalls of National Consciousness"', in H. Melber (ed.), *Zimbabwe and Beyond* (Uppsala, 2002).