

Cover Page



Universiteit Leiden



The handle <http://hdl.handle.net/1887/42940> holds various files of this Leiden University dissertation

Author: Mazepus, Honorata

Title: What makes authorities legitimate in the eyes of citizens? : an investigation of perceived legitimacy in different political regimes

Issue Date: 2016-09-14

What makes authorities legitimate in the eyes of citizens?

An investigation of perceived legitimacy in different political regimes

Cover design by Florian van Leeuwen

Printed by EZBook

What makes authorities legitimate in the eyes of citizens?

An investigation of perceived legitimacy in different political regimes

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van

de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,

op gezag van Rector Magnificus prof. mr. C.J.J.M. Stolker,

volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties

te verdedigen op woensdag 14 September 2016

klokke 16:15 uur

door

Honorata Mazepus

geboren te Słupsk (Polen) in 1985

Promotor:

Prof. dr. A.W.M. Gerrits

Co-promotor:

Prof. dr. I.C. van Biezen

Promotiecommissie:

Prof. dr. H. te Velde

Dr. M.F. Meffert

Prof. dr. V. A. Schmidt, Boston University

Dr. Guy Ben-Porat, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Abstract

The thesis ‘What makes authorities legitimate in the eyes of citizens? An investigation of perceived legitimacy in different political regimes’ presents a comparative study into political legitimacy. The thesis examines what factors contribute to perceiving political authorities as legitimate by individuals socialized in different political regimes. Using experimental vignettes and original survey data, the thesis investigates to what extent normative qualities of political authorities (moral features) play a role in citizens’ evaluations of these authorities. Moreover, this thesis challenges the claim that citizens in non-democratic regimes have unique or special expectations about political authorities. It does so by comparing the factors influencing perceived legitimacy of governments in different political regimes: two post-Soviet non-democracies (Russia and Ukraine) and old and new democracies in Europe (France, Netherlands, and Poland). The findings in all five countries support the theoretical model of a citizen who is concerned with both her personal material well-being and the fairness of authorities. The factor that had the largest positive effect on perceived legitimacy across countries was distributive justice—fairness in providing goods and services across the individuals in a society. Furthermore, respondents’ beliefs about what makes political authorities legitimate were similar across the five countries and suggest that for evaluating legitimacy, the output aspects of governing (e.g. welfare, order, and stability) are less important than the input (e.g. elections, trust, representation) and throughput aspects (e.g. fair procedures, legality, transparency, and integrity of authorities).

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to thank my supervisors, André Gerrits and Ingrid van Biezen, for giving me the opportunity to set off for this academic adventure. Secondly, I would like to thank my colleagues and fellow PhD candidates who helped me to become a better scholar and to feel at home in Leiden. Big thanks to Elisabeth Dieterman and Anne Heyer for our stimulating discussions about legitimacy, their help with coding the results and reading my texts, and most importantly, their friendship. For sharing their academic and private time I thank also Wouter Veenendaal, Mariano Alvarez, Mariana Perry, Camila Jara Ibarra, Håvar Solheim, Soledad Valdivia Rivera, Margarida Borges, Michelle Carmody, Luzia Helfer, Femke Bakker, and Natasha and Tatyana.

For reading and discussing parts of my project and for encouraging me to go forward with it, I would like to thank Michael Meffert, Carsten Sauer, Jojanneke van der Toorn, Tom Louwerse, Daniela Stockman, Patricio Silva, Peter Schmidt, and Lee Seymour. I would like to thank Magnus Feldmann for his excellent and inspiring course on Comparative Research Design at the University of Bristol and for our continuing collaboration.

Collecting data in different countries takes a lot of planning, translating, recruiting, coordinating, printing, stapling, distributing, scanning, and data entering. For their enormous help in these matters I would like to thank Agata Mazepus, Marcin Piechocki, Paweł Stachowiak, Paweł Laidler, Marcin Grabowski, Justyna Zadarko (Polish sample), Henk Kern, Femke Bakker, Niels van Willigen, Adriaan van Veldhuizen, Max Bader (Dutch sample), Tadeq Quillien, Helena Miton, Florian van Leeuwen (French sample), Olena Czemodanova, Oleksandr Pronkevych, Jaroslav Dansyenko (Ukrainian sample), Ekaterina Dergunova, Ekaterina Lytkina, Alexis Belyanin, Inna Devyatko, Mikhail Mironyuk, Svetlana Bankovskaya, Valeri Ledyayev, Tatiana Karabchuk (Russian sample), Lauri van Oosterom, and Tessa van Valen (Dutch and French samples).

To my parents, Jadwiga and Jerzy, and sister, Agata, who have supported and encouraged me throughout the process: *dziękuję!* Our online conversations always make me feel like I'm closer to home. I also thank my new family: Peter for taking me for runs to stay fit, Bärbel for Kaffee und Kuchen to recover, and Nienke, Vincent, Ivo, and Rosa for all the fun times.

And finally, I thank the person without whose support and criticism this project wouldn't be possible—Florian van Leeuwen. Thank you for believing in me and for sharing your thoughts, ideas, and skills.

Contents

List of Figures.....	vi
List of Tables	viii
Introduction	1
Legitimacy: concept and relevance	1
Comparing perceived legitimacy in different regimes	3
Perceived legitimacy, trust, or support?	5
Three ways to explore factors influencing perceived legitimacy	7
Chapter 1. Perceived Legitimacy: The Concepts and Theories	9
1.1. Approaches to legitimacy, levels of analysis, and dimensions of legitimacy	12
Normative and descriptive approaches to legitimacy	12
Levels of analysis in social sciences and dimensions of legitimacy	14
Democratic bias and research into legitimacy	20
1.2. Concept definition and theories of legitimacy	26
Definitions of the concept	26
Theory of legitimacy: Legitimacy among other resources of power.....	28
1.3. Perceived legitimacy and its antecedents: theoretical model and hypotheses ...	31
Factors influencing perceived legitimacy: a causal model	34
Perceived legitimacy in different regimes: a comparative model	43
Summary of research questions and hypotheses	46
Chapter 2. Methodology	49
2.1. Comparative study of perceived legitimacy	49
Hybrid regimes: Russia and Ukraine.....	49
Democracies: Poland, Netherlands, and France	52
2.2. Sample	55
2.3. Survey.....	56
Experimental vignette.....	59
Open question study	62
Correlational study	68
Chapter 3. Comparative Study of Factors Influencing Perceived Legitimacy across Different Political Regimes	69

3.1. Theory, definitions and hypotheses	70
3.2. Experimental vignette method.....	72
3.3. Results of the experiments.....	74
Netherlands.....	74
France	78
Poland.....	81
Ukraine	86
Russia	90
3.4. Comparative analysis.....	97
3.5. Discussion	104
3.6. Conclusion.....	107
Chapter 4. What makes political authority legitimate? An analysis of ideas about legitimacy in the Netherlands, France, Poland, Ukraine, and Russia	110
4.1. Results	114
Results of representational coding.....	114
4.2. Comparison of the representational codes.....	121
4.3. Comparison of the hypothesis-guided codes	129
4.4. Conclusions	131
Chapter 5. Cross-country study of perceived legitimacy of the current political authorities	136
5.1. Comparative descriptive data	140
5.2. Multiple regression analysis	145
5.3. The Netherlands.....	145
5.4. France	150
5.5. Poland.....	155
5.6. Ukraine	161
5.7. Russia	167
5.8. Comparative discussion and conclusions	173
Chapter 6. General discussion and conclusions.....	181
Summary of results.....	181
Main results	181
Differences between individuals socialized in different regimes	185

Theoretical and methodological contributions	188
Implications for further research	190
References	193
Appendices	206
APPENDIX A. Definitions of legitimacy	207
APPENDIX B: Survey	217
APPENDIX C: Participant instruction	222
APPENDIX D. Comparison of the online and pen-and-paper samples	223
APPENDIX E. Higher education institutions attended by Russian respondents....	226
APPENDIX F. Versions of the vignette	242
APPENDIX G. Coding scheme development and inter-coder reliability establishment	275
APPENDIX H: Manipulation checks	283
APPENDIX I: Factor analysis of perceived legitimacy items.....	284
APPENDIX J: Assessment of the homogeneity of variance	285
APPENDIX K: Frequency tables for analysis in Chapter 4.	286
APPENDIX L: Cronbach's α for the 3-item SES scales.	296
APPENDIX M: Effects of manipulation from the vignette experiment on perceived legitimacy of the real institutions	297
Nederlandse Samenvatting	299
Curriculum vitae	304

List of Figures

Figure 1.1. Levels of legitimacy assessment.

Figure 1.2. Factors determining the type of power transfer.

Figure 1.3. Factors influencing perceived legitimacy tested in this study: economic rewards (outcome favourability), dependence, distributive justice (based on the principles of need and equality), procedural justice (voice), and socialization (in different countries).

Figure 3.1. Factors influencing perceived legitimacy tested in this study: personal outcome, dependence, distributive justice, procedural justice, and socialization (in different countries).

Figure 3.2. The Netherlands: Mean perceived legitimacy for all 16 conditions.

Figure 3.3. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the distributive justice \times positive outcome interaction.

Figure 3.4. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the distributive justice \times procedural justice interaction.

Figure 3.5. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the procedural justice \times dependence \times positive outcome interaction.

Figure 3.6. France: Mean perceived legitimacy for all 16 conditions.

Figure 3.7. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the procedural justice \times distributive justice interaction.

Figure 3.8. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the distributive justice \times positive outcome interaction.

Figure 3.9. Poland: Mean perceived legitimacy for all 16 conditions.

Figure 3.10. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the distributive justice \times positive outcome interaction.

Figure 3.11. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the dependence \times positive outcome interaction.

Figure 3.12. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the dependence \times positive outcome \times procedural justice interaction.

Figure 3.13. Mean perceived legitimacy scores for all 16 conditions to describe the procedural justice \times distributive justice \times dependence \times positive outcome interaction.

Figure 3.14. Ukraine: Mean perceived legitimacy for all 16 conditions.

Figure 3.15. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the procedural justice \times distributive justice interaction effect.

Figure 3.16. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the positive outcome \times distributive justice interaction effect.

Figure 3.17. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the positive outcome \times dependence interaction effect.

Figure 3.18. Russia: Mean perceived legitimacy for all 16 conditions.

Figure 3.19. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the procedural justice \times distributive justice interaction effect.

Figure 3.20. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the distributive justice \times positive outcome interaction effect.

Figure 3.21. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the dependence \times positive outcome interaction effect.

Figure 3.22. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the dependence \times distributive justice interaction effect.

Figure 3.23. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the interaction of dependence \times positive outcome \times distributive justice interaction effect.

Figure 3.24. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the dependence \times distributive justice \times procedural justice interaction effect.

Figure 3.25. Mean perceived legitimacy scores across all conditions in five countries.

Figure 3.26. Mean difference between perceived legitimacy score when procedural justice was present and when procedural justice was absent in five countries.

Figure 3.27. Mean difference between perceived legitimacy score when distributive justice was present and perceived legitimacy score when distributive justice was absent in five countries.

List of Tables

Table 1.1. Levels of analysis and dimensions of legitimacy

Table 1.2. Dimensions of legitimacy according to David Beetham and operationalization by Bruce Gilley.

Table 1.3. Resources of power and the type of power transfer.

Table 2.1. Comparison of regimes: evaluations by different institutions and projects

Table 2.2. Numbers of answers to the open question.

Table 2.3. List of representational and hypothesis-guided codes (used in the last coding phase).

Table 2.4. Hypothesis guided codes: representational codes according to input, throughput, output criteria.

Table 3.1. Results of factorial ANOVA for perceived legitimacy (N = 379, adjusted $R^2 = .300$).

Table 3.2. Factorial ANOVA for perceived legitimacy (N = 323, adjusted $R^2 = .217$).

Table 3.3. Factorial ANOVA for perceived legitimacy (N = 437, adjusted $R^2 = .221$).

Table 3.4. Factorial ANOVA for perceived legitimacy (N=425, adjusted $R^2=.466$).

Table 3.5. Factorial ANOVA for perceived legitimacy (N=929, adjusted $R^2=.243$).

Table 3.6. Results of factorial ANOVAs for each country (full model).

Table 3.7. Factorial ANOVA for perceived legitimacy on the merged dataset (N = 2493, adjusted $R^2 = .268$).

Table 4.1. Rank orders of codes (all answers).

Table 4.2. Ten most frequent answers in the Netherlands, France, Poland, Ukraine, and Russia (answers from all positions).

Table 4.3. Ten most frequent first answers in the Netherlands, France, Poland, Ukraine, and Russia (the most important characteristic of legitimate authorities).

Table 4.4. Frequency of dimensions per country (answers from first positions only).

Table 4.5. Frequency of legitimacy dimensions per country (answers from all positions).

Table 5.1. Items measuring perceived legitimacy of the government, parliament, courts, and president.

Table 5.2. Independent variables: survey questions.

Table 5.3. Scale consistency and mean scores for perceived legitimacy for the government, parliament, courts, and president in the Netherlands, France, Poland, Ukraine, and Russia.

Table 5.4. Means and standard deviations for predictors in all samples.

Table 5.5. The Netherlands: Linear model of predictors of the current government's perceived legitimacy.

Table 5.6. The Netherlands: Linear model of predictors of the current parliament's perceived legitimacy.

Table 5.7. The Netherlands: Linear model of predictors of the current courts' perceived legitimacy

Table 5.8. France: Linear model of predictors of the current government's perceived legitimacy

Table 5.9. France: Linear model of predictors of the current parliament's perceived legitimacy

Table 5.10. France: Linear model of predictors of the current courts' perceived legitimacy

Table 5.11. France: Linear model of predictors of the current president's perceived legitimacy

Table 5.12. Poland: Linear model of predictors of the current government's perceived legitimacy

Table 5.13. Poland: Linear model of predictors of the current parliament's perceived legitimacy

Table 5.14. Poland: Linear model of predictors of the current courts' perceived legitimacy

Table 5.15. Poland: Linear model of predictors of the current president's perceived legitimacy

Table 5.16. Ukraine: Linear model of predictors of the current government's perceived legitimacy

Table 5.17. Ukraine: Linear model of predictors of the current parliament's perceived legitimacy

Table 5.18. Ukraine: Linear model of predictors of the current courts' perceived legitimacy

Table 5.19. Ukraine: Linear model of predictors of the current president's perceived legitimacy

Table 5.20. Russia: Linear model of predictors of the current government's perceived legitimacy

Table 5.21. Russia: Linear model of predictors of the current parliament's perceived legitimacy

Table 5.22. Russia: Linear model of predictors of the current courts' perceived legitimacy

Table 5.23. Russia: Linear model of predictors of the current president's perceived legitimacy

Table 5.24. Comparison of "specific" predictors across countries (see text for explanation).

Table 5.25. Comparison of "general" predictors across countries (see text for explanation).

Introduction

Legitimacy: concept and relevance

If politics is about ‘who gets what, when, and how’ (Lasswell 1950), then legitimacy is about the transfer of power from citizens to those who get to decide about politics. In other words, legitimacy is a characteristic of authorities who have the right to make decisions. Why are citizens more willing to accept some people as political authorities over others? What contributes to their evaluations of political authorities? And do people in different countries have different ideas about who should rule over them and why? The conditions that authorities need to fulfil so that citizens voluntarily transfer power to them and recognize their legitimacy are the subject of this thesis.

Legitimacy is an intangible quality and a complex concept and it is used and interpreted in many different ways. A search for publications containing the term ‘legitimacy’ in a media database returns over 73,000 results just for the period of one year. Even more results are returned for the search of the word ‘legitimate’—over 280,000¹. The list of results illustrates the scope of uses and understandings of the term. An article in *The Nation* identified the delivery of better lives to Chinese people as the basis of the Communist Party’s legitimacy (‘Economic miracle built on pollution’ 2015). The author of a *Daily Star* article recognized the need of the UN Security Council backing for military action against ISIS being legitimate (Sachs 2015). *The Independent Online* pointed to the use of a humanitarian crisis in Eastern Ukraine by the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics to pressure the UN to recognize their legitimacy (Losh 2015). An article in *The East African* linked the stalemate of the Doha Round of negotiations with the decrease of the World Trade Organization’s legitimacy (Mehta 2015). *The Toronto Star* questioned the legitimacy of charges brought against a Canadian journalist arrested in India (Welsh 2015). *The Federal Register* (2015) reported the revision of standards of gift acceptance by Federal employees in the United States, which ‘affect the perceived integrity of the

¹ The searches were completed on 29 November 2015 using Factiva database and they included the mentions of legitimacy and legitimate in all publications (including additional blogs and boards) between 1 November 2014 and 29 November 2015.

2 Introduction

employee or the credibility and legitimacy of the agency's program'. *The Wall Street Journal* published an article by the president of Sierra Leone who emphasised the need to increase the legitimacy of Sierra Leone's government after the Ebola outbreak (Koroma 2015). An article in *The Irish Times* reported the undermining of legitimacy of the courts by the new Polish government and president (Scally 2015). *Metro Canada* informed about 'the recognition of the legitimacy of the use of cannabis as a medicine' in Ontario (Service Torstar News 2015). Finally, *The Times* discussed Daniel Radcliffe's legitimacy as an actor (Turner 2015).

These are only a few examples of publications from the last days of November 2015 but each of them carries a different meaning of the word 'legitimacy': the source of power, the right to military intervention, the recognition as a state, a justification of arrest, the effectiveness of an international organization, the approval of actions, trust in a government, the validity of institution's decisions, the legality of products, and the characteristics that make a person suitable for a certain role (even not a political one).

These examples illustrate the plethora of interpretations of legitimacy used in the public debate and the prevalence of the concept in contemporary commentaries on social and political reality. Moreover, the examples show that the different uses point to different objects of legitimacy (policies, laws, actions, institutions), different actors that can grant legitimacy to these objects (population within a country, the UN, courts), and different functions of legitimacy (power to carry out actions, and recognition of decisions). Finally, these examples show that there are various criteria for achieving legitimacy (economic prosperity, effectiveness, trustworthiness, certain other personal characteristics).

Furthermore, legitimacy seems relevant for the relations between citizens and their governments. For example, the two waves of protests in Ukraine starting in 2004 and 2013 show that issues related to legitimacy are important to citizens and can affect power relations between the state and citizens. These protests illustrate that citizens may desire that authorities acquire power in a way that is perceived as legitimate; e.g. via free and fair elections, the violation of which was the main concern of the Orange Revolution in 2004-2005. These protests also show that citizens may desire that

authorities exercise their power in a way that is perceived as legitimate; Ukrainians disappointed with the conduct of President Yanukovich mobilized and protested against the abuse of power and corruption in 2013-2014. These examples suggest that perceived legitimacy can influence the stability of political authorities and their ability to exercise power.

Therefore, this thesis focuses on the various criteria that political authorities need to fulfil to be perceived as legitimate by citizens. By concentrating on citizens perceptions of political authorities, this thesis investigates perceived legitimacy. For the purpose of this investigation, I have defined perceived legitimacy as an attribute ascribed to a political authority by individuals on the basis of evaluating the authority's normative qualities, which results in a willingness to voluntarily transfer political power to this authority. This thesis aims to (1) *establish what are the normative criteria on the basis of which citizens ascribe legitimacy to political authorities*, and (2) *explore the differences and similarities of these criteria across regimes types*.

Comparing perceived legitimacy in different regimes

This research project began with a set of questions regarding legitimacy of hybrid regimes—regimes that combine elements of democratic and autocratic rule. There is a growing body of research trying to find out what kind of legitimation strategies are used by leaders and elites in hybrid regimes to stay in power and engender legitimacy (Holbig and Gilley 2010; Gerschewski 2013; Grauvogel and Von Soest 2014; Sandby-Thomas 2014; Von Soest and Grauvogel 2015; Mazepus *et al.* 2016; Morgenbesser 2016). It is assumed that political authorities in democracies draw their legitimacy mainly from the electoral procedures through which they are designated to rule by the population, whereas legitimacy of hybrid and authoritarian regimes is believed to be based prevalingly on the delivery of good living standards and goal-achievement in general (e.g. Rigby and Fehér 1982, pp.10–11; White 1986; Palma 1991, p.57; Holmes 1993). Another related issue that research of hybrid regimes explores is the contribution of these strategies to the regimes' stability and the extent to which these strategies differ from the ones used by other political regimes (Gerschewski 2013; Kailitz 2013).

4 Introduction

Building on the literature analysing legitimation strategies used by elites in non-democracies, this thesis investigates the differences in political legitimacy between hybrid regimes and democracies from the perspective of citizens. Instead of focusing on the claims to legitimacy and the strategies used by authorities to convince citizens of their right to rule, it investigates perceived legitimacy, i.e., how citizens in these regimes evaluate and perceive the authorities. If one assumes that hybrid regimes use different strategies than democratic (and authoritarian) regimes to obtain legitimacy, one may also assume that citizens socialized in these different political systems use different criteria to evaluate political authorities' legitimacy and, as a consequence, are convinced by different arguments and characteristics of political authorities when voluntarily delegating power to them. If they are not, that would mean that either the strategies used by the authorities do not resonate with the citizens, that the criteria for legitimacy do not differ much across regime types, or that these strategies are to achieve goals different than legitimacy (e.g. increase support). To what extent do individuals living in different political regimes differ when it comes to the expectations they have from political authorities? Compared with citizens socialized in democracies such as the Netherlands, do citizens socialized in non-democracies such as Russia require other qualities to perceive their rulers as legitimate?

Socialization can affect peoples' eating habits, behaviour in public, and dress-codes, which differ across societies and cultural groups. In other words, growing up in a certain environment influences to some degree preferences for things as diverse as diet, personal space, and clothing style. Similarly, political socialization is believed to shape the scope of political orientations that a young person could acquire within a given society. Knowledge about political institutions and their designated authority and duties, about the way citizens and the state institutions interact, and about the formal and informal procedures guiding the behaviour of political authorities and citizens is passed on by teachers and parents, and is shaped by early experiences of political life. While '(...) what makes power legitimate in one society may differ from others, and that the criteria in one may be rejected by another (Beetham 1991, p.6), it is not clear to what extent the ideas about how a political system ought to function (i.e., ideas about an ideal political system) differ across countries and what might cause these differences.

Contrary to the assumption about large differences between values of people in different societies, there is evidence, for example, that a common belief in the uniqueness of Russian character—which is used often by Russian political elites to justify non-democratic institutions—is not in line with evidence from cross-cultural research into personality traits (Allik *et al.* 2011). Although Russians may believe that they have exceptional personalities and that because of that their nation ‘cannot be understood by reason’², Russians do not differ substantially from global averages when it comes to personality.

Following from this debate about socialization and from the research on legitimation strategies of non-democratic regimes, the two aims of this project mentioned above can be phrased as questions: (1) *What makes political authorities legitimate in the eyes of citizens?* and (2) *Do people socialized in different political regimes have different expectations about political authorities that rule over them?* Therefore, the three studies included in this thesis examine whether citizens in different regimes use similar or different criteria to judge political authorities’ legitimacy.

Perceived legitimacy, trust, or support?

Some scholars are sceptical about the usefulness of the concept of legitimacy (Hyde 1983; Przeworski 1991) and have argued that the concept adds little or no explanatory value to political science research. However, in my view, when defined precisely, legitimacy can be a useful tool for analysing people’s attitudes towards authorities. It seems to me that legitimacy is not the same as support, because support for political authorities can be based on instrumental motives (e.g. “This government benefits me materially, so I support it”), whereas legitimacy appears to be based on normative grounds. For example, Abulof (2015) argued that one cannot “buy” legitimacy. Trust, on the other hand, although perhaps closer to the meaning of perceived legitimacy, does not encompass all aspects of legitimacy. Especially the willingness to transfer power to the authorities and their right to take decisions and rule are the aspects of legitimacy that go beyond trust. Even if one trusts another person, it does not mean that

² Fyodor Tyutchev (1803-1873): Russia cannot be understood with the mind alone./No ordinary yardstick can span her greatness:/She stands alone, unique –/In Russia, one can only believe.’

he or she considers that person legitimate and having the right to make political decisions in their name. Other aspects of legitimacy that relate to the transfer of power are at play here too, for example, the way the power is obtained, its legality, and the scope of competences. Therefore, the concept of legitimacy has a distinct meaning and might add to the explanation of the evaluations of political authorities and the expectations that people have from them.

Finding the right definition and operationalization of political legitimacy is not straightforward. Especially because perceived legitimacy is at the centre of much current research, it is not easy to identify a consensual, suitable operationalization that will go beyond trust or support for political institutions. Trust and support are usually the variables used in empirical studies to measure (perceived) legitimacy. In this thesis, the variables used to measure perceived legitimacy include questions similar to often-used questions about trust and support and additional questions asking directly about legitimacy, the right of authorities to take decisions, willingness to protest against these decisions, and willingness to transfer power to the authorities.

A possible way to investigate whether perceived legitimacy is reflected in the evaluation criteria of citizens is by testing in the same study several different factors that can influence citizens' judgments of authorities—i.e., including both instrumental (e.g. material gains) and normative factors (e.g. justice) in one model. If in such a study only instrumental motives would play a role in the evaluations of political authorities, then this would suggest that legitimacy (defined as an attribute based on normative qualities) actually does not exist. However, if normative factors would affect evaluations of political authorities, then this would be an indication that legitimacy (defined as an attribute based on normative qualities) is present in citizens' judgments of political authorities. All three empirical studies presented in this thesis show that citizens evaluating political authorities are not only concerned with instrumental gains and outputs delivered by the authorities, but also take into account the fairness and justice of these authorities. The results suggest that there exists something like legitimacy that can be studied empirically and that legitimacy and the factors influencing judgments about it are distinct from related concepts such as support or trust.

Three ways to explore factors influencing perceived legitimacy

The three empirical studies presented in this thesis explore criteria used by citizens to judge legitimacy of political authorities. The data for all three studies come from one survey conducted in five countries. Each of these studies tries to answer the research questions (*What makes political authorities legitimate in the eyes of citizens?* and *Do people socialized in different political regimes have different expectations about political authorities that rule over them?*) in a different way and explores different aspects of perceived legitimacy.

The first study evaluates the effects of theoretically identified factors on the perceived legitimacy of a hypothetical government in a vignette experiment. It aims to be a test of the causal effects of two normative factors (distributive justice and procedural justice), an instrumental factor (personal outcome), and dependence on perceived legitimacy. To assess the effects of the theoretically identified factors across political regimes, the same vignette experiment was conducted in five countries: the Netherlands and France (two old democracies), Poland (a new post-communist democracy), and Ukraine and Russia (two post-communist hybrid regimes). In the study, the effects of the factors and their interactions were compared across countries to test hypotheses about differences between citizens in different regimes.

The second study examines perceived legitimacy in a different way. While the first study examines theoretically identified factors, the second study aims to identify other criteria used by citizens for evaluating political authorities' legitimacy. The second study does so through the analysis of answers to an open question about the most important characteristics of legitimate political authorities. This study thus provides an opportunity to identify other (additional) criteria used by citizens for evaluating legitimacy than those included in the first study. Moreover, it allows for a comparison of conceptions of legitimacy held by citizens socialized in democratic and hybrid regimes and a search for differences in their criteria for evaluating political authorities. Are elections the most important criterion of legitimacy in democracies? Are elections also deemed important in hybrid regimes? Is it enough to win elections to be considered legitimate or does the right conduct of authorities constitute a more

important dimension of legitimacy according to citizens? Can elected leaders lose legitimacy ‘through illegal and/or unconstitutional actions’ (Niland 2015)?

The third study, in contrast to the first and second, focuses not on perceived legitimacy of hypothetical authorities, but on the perceived legitimacy of real and current political institutions. The third study investigates to what extent evaluations of current political authorities are based on general ideas about how the political system ought to function (what principles the system should be based on) and to what extent they are based on evaluations of the functioning of the current institutions. These two categories of variables might be used by citizens to assess the legitimacy of political authorities. Depending on consensus about either the general ideas regarding the preferred regime type or the performance of institutions, either set of variables might explain more variance in perceived legitimacy in different political regimes. In other words, this study examines whether a possibly weaker consensus about the superiority of a democratic system contributes to the explanation of perceived legitimacy of hybrid regimes.

Summary

This project contributes to the research of legitimacy by exploring citizens’ (rather than elites’ and scholars’) conceptions of legitimacy. Moreover, it contributes to theory building by testing how several factors influence perceived legitimacy in diverse political contexts (i.e., different regimes types). Finally, this research informs about the similarities and differences in the mechanisms of evaluating political authorities between citizens socialized in democracies and hybrid regimes.

Chapter 1. Perceived Legitimacy: The Concepts and Theories

‘(...) the basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige’ (Weber 1964, p.382)

The question why people accept authority of others and follow rules imposed on them constitutes the core of many studies of legitimacy. The main reference point in social sciences research of legitimacy is Max Weber’s typology of bases of political legitimacy and his work on how political orders can be sustained. According to Weber, there are three pure types of legitimate domination based on three sources of legitimacy. First, traditional legitimation of patriarchs and princes based on sanctity of traditions; second, charismatic legitimation of war lords, plebiscitarian rulers, or political party leaders based on ‘devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person’ (Weber 1978, p.215); and third, legal-rational legitimation ‘exercised by the modern ‘servant of the state’’ (1947, pp.78–79) based on laws and rules. This classification emphasizes the sources of legitimacy available to rulers in different historical contexts.

Moreover, as the introductory quote illustrates, Weber equated legitimacy with a belief in the authority’s right to exercise power. According to this descriptive perspective, any political authority can be legitimate as long as subordinates believe in its legitimacy. This definition of legitimacy in terms of beliefs has been elaborated and restated by many social scientists. Among others, Lipset (1959, p.86) emphasised the role of belief in his definition of legitimacy, which he understood as ‘the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper for the society’. Similarly, Dahl (1956, p.46) thought of legitimacy as ‘a belief in the rightness of the decision or the process of decision making’. Also Friedrich wrote that legitimacy can only be achieved if ‘there exists a prevalent belief as to what provides a rightful title to rule’ (1963, p.237). In line with

Almond and Powell's (1966, p.18) definition, any power can be legitimate 'if a belief in its justifiable use exists'. This is not an exhaustive list of belief-based definitions of legitimacy, but it illustrates the wide-spread understanding and impact of the Weberian treatment of legitimacy.

Weber, however, discussed legitimacy not only in terms of beliefs. Four other meanings of legitimacy can be found in his work: legitimacy as a *claim* for the right to rule, as a *justification* for an existing form of political domination, as the *promises* to contribute to the well-being of the population, and as the *self-justification* by the ruling strata of their privileges (Bensman 1979, p.31) . In fact, although Weber defined legitimacy in terms of beliefs, he devoted much more of his work to the authorities' claims to legitimacy than to the conditions under which the claims are fulfilled according to the subordinates (Bensman 1979, pp.17–48). Hence, the specification of what the belief in legitimacy is supposed to be based on was left out of Weber's theory.

Usually, empirically oriented scholars make a choice of either following Weber's understanding of legitimacy, rejecting it as circular or tautological (authorities are legitimate when people believe in their legitimacy), or amending it in order to better reflect the contemporary political context (Beetham 1991, pp.3–15). It was, however, Weber's idea of legitimacy that became the reference point for descriptive studies of legitimacy, conducted usually by historians, political scientists, and sociologists. In this thesis a descriptive approach will be used to investigate perceived legitimacy, because it allows focusing on the beliefs and evaluations of political authorities by citizens. The main purpose of using the descriptive approach, however, will not be to explore the claims, justifications, promises, and self-justifications communicated by those who want to obtain or have power, but to explore and compare the criteria used by citizens when evaluating legitimacy of political authorities.

As many, if not most, social sciences concepts, legitimacy remains an essentially contested one (Gallie 1955). Searching for an answer to the question of what is legitimacy, we find endless literature that either explicitly or implicitly touches upon the concept. Legitimacy is an object of study in philosophy, political science, law, sociology, psychology, and international relations. The purpose of theories of legitimacy is to explain a certain type of relation between authorities and subjects. In

general, legitimacy is a notion used to understand why individuals and groups accept the authority of others. The multiplicity of understandings and operationalisations of the concept of legitimacy reflects its complexity yet, at the same time, leads to confusion about what the concept really represents. There are scholars of political science who described legitimacy as a ‘murky’ (Horne 2009, p.401) or ‘mushy’ (Huntington 1991, p.46) concept because of the plethora of definitions. Others pose stronger objections pertaining to the lack of construct validity (Booth and Seligson 2009, pp.6–7), insufficient evidence of the consequences of legitimacy (for example, for regime stability in Przeworski 1986, p.52), conflating definitions of legitimacy with its consequences (O’Kane 1993), and tautology of the theory once it is operationalized (Grafstein 1981, p.52). Some scholars warn that legitimacy is a residual container, to which researchers can point when they need an explanation of variance in people’s obedience of laws and authorities that is not accounted for by specific motives such as fear, expediency, habit, or conformity (Hyde 1983, pp.386–387). Following Hyde’s argument, if motives based on legitimacy beliefs lack any distinctive features, the concept does not carry any explanatory value and cannot be a basis for any (predictive) theory. Moreover, treating legitimacy as a residual container that simply accounts for all the cases of compliance that do not fit in any other category is not a satisfactory conceptualization either.

Beside these critiques of the concept of legitimacy, statements like ‘Legitimacy is a key resource for every political system’ (Hurrelmann, Krell-Laluhová, Lhotta, *et al.* 2005, p.121), ‘legitimacy can claim to constitute, not merely an important topic, but the central issue in social and political theory’ (Beetham 1991, p.41), and ‘What is meant by legitimacy or legitimate authority? That is the master question of politics.’ (Crick 1959, p.150) re-occur regularly in various fields of scientific inquiry. Moreover, scholars are continuously refining definitions and conceptualizations of legitimacy and searching for the right operationalisations.

Although the jury is still out on the extent of empirical consequences of legitimacy (e.g. to what extent legitimacy contributes to the stability of political regimes), the concept is undeniably of concern to any discipline dealing with the power relations between authorities and subordinates. The strength of the explanatory

potential of legitimacy, however, depends on the analytical precision with which the concept is defined. In turn, arriving at this precision is the biggest challenge when setting off to research questions pertaining to legitimacy of (political) authorities and systems. This chapter provides an overview of the approaches to study legitimacy and the consequences it has for the concept definition. It concludes with a definition and theories of perceived legitimacy that are at the core of this research project and will be used and tested in subsequent chapter.

1.1. Approaches to legitimacy, levels of analysis, and dimensions of legitimacy

Normative and descriptive approaches to legitimacy

What seems to unite most definitions of legitimacy is their reference to norms and moral aspects of the exercise of power. Scholars of legitimacy take, however, two distinct approaches that pertain to norms: a Kantian normative (prescriptive) approach or a Weberian descriptive approach (Beetham 1991, pp.3–15; Bjola 2008, pp.629–630). In the first approach, authorities are judged according to pre-set (ideal) moral standards, whereas in the latter approach they are judged on the basis of the norms regulating the exercise of power in a given society or shared by a specific population. In other words, ‘Legitimacy is often presented as both an observable historical situation, and as a moral relationship’ (Barker 1990, p.13).

The ‘descriptive school’ is concerned with historical situations, whereas the ‘normative school’ aims to set ‘some benchmark of acceptability or justification of political power or authority and—possibly—obligation’ (Peter 2014). The distinction runs roughly between disciplines: with sociology, political science and history taking regularly the descriptive view on legitimacy, and philosophy, political theory and law usually taking the normative view.

Several examples of influential works using the descriptive approach to legitimacy are an assessment of legitimacy of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe in comparison with the regimes in Western Europe (Rothschild 1977), a cross-national study of the loss of legitimacy and breakdown of democratic regimes in Europe and Latin America (Linz and Stepan 1978), an analysis of relations between societies and authorities in Southeast Asia (Alagappa 1995), and a comparison of the

levels of regime legitimacy cross-country using survey data (prevalingly from the World Values Survey) and data from several other institutions (Gilley 2009). Examples of works using normative approach to legitimacy include a philosophical search of conditions under which political authorities create moral duty to obey them (Rawls 1993), discussions of the link between moral justification and legitimacy (Raz 1985; Simmons 1999), and a treatment of legitimacy as independent from the obligation to obey (Buchanan 2002).

Although the distinction between descriptive and normative approaches to researching legitimacy is the most common one, the two approaches sometimes overlap. Firstly, there are scholars who postulate a conception of legitimacy that combines descriptive and normative elements, which would not ignore the validity of historical context, but also transcend justifying authorities behaviour only with the historical setting within which they operate (Peter 2014). Among these are Habermas (1979, 1996) with his conception of legitimacy grounded in deliberative democracy and Bjola (2008), whose conception of legitimacy of actions in international relations aims to bridge analytical and normative approaches by making legitimacy dependent on the process of deliberation in the decision-making. Also Beetham's approach is a combination of normative and descriptive approaches (Peter 2014). Beetham (1991, p.16) suggested evaluating legitimacy of authorities according to three dimensions: authorities' compliance with established rules, the justification of these rules in terms of beliefs shared by people in a given society, and evidence of consent by the subordinate to the particular power relation. Through these three dimensions, Beetham (1991, p.11) elaborated Weber's definition of legitimacy by saying that 'power relationship is not legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy, but because it can be justified in terms of their beliefs'.

Secondly, the normative and descriptive approaches overlap because 'the normative suppositions of the first [normative school] are embedded in the second [descriptive school]. The normative inclination towards democracy guides research in the direction of studies of the opinions of voters and of the efforts of government to influence these' (Barker 2000, p.8). This overlap between descriptive and normative approaches is strongly present within political science and it affects the view on

legitimacy—or rather illegitimacy—of non-democratic regimes, and will be discussed in more detail below.

Levels of analysis in social sciences and dimensions of legitimacy

In general, in social sciences there are two main perspectives used to study legitimacy (Weatherford 1992): macro (top-down) and micro (bottom-up). In the studies from the macro perspective—‘taking the perspective from above’—the institutional system and formal institutions are the centre of analysis: assessment focuses on answering what are the rules of gaining power, is there a possibility of citizen interest representation within the system, who are the citizens that are represented (e.g. consensual or majoritarian system; Scharpf 1998), is there a system of checks and balances in place, are there mechanisms that make a government accountable. In studies from the micro perspective—‘taking the perspective from grassroots’—legitimacy is assessed on the basis of citizens’ evaluations and the focus is on whether the institutions and procedures are perceived as rightful and fulfilling their purposes by citizens.

Using a macro approach, political scientists usually follow a list of theoretically pre-determined criteria of evaluation of a regime and assess regimes’ legitimacy treating these criteria as objective standards. Social scientists in this tradition try to define standards for legitimate authorities and are less concerned with subjective perceptions of citizens—they ‘do argue more or less explicitly that the beliefs of citizens at any given time are not essential information for determining the system’s legitimacy’ (Weatherford 1992, p.150). In this way, social scientists that assess legitimacy on the institutional level are somewhat similar to normatively oriented philosophers searching for minimal criteria of acceptability of political authorities.

Within the micro perspective, we can distinguish between studies interested in a subjective assessment of legitimacy of political regimes—usually aggregated public opinion of citizens—and individual level assessments concerned with the mechanisms and factors that explain the evaluations of political authorities and granting of legitimacy. While the assessments on the subjective level, similarly to the institutional level, are concerned with establishing the degree of legitimacy of political regimes in

general (e.g. Gilley 2009), the assessment on the individual level is more concerned with the causal explanation of perceived legitimacy (e.g. Tyler and Caine 1981, Tyler 2003, Tyler 2001, Van der Toorn, Tyler, Jost 2011)—how do individuals weigh factors characterizing political authorities against their personal situation when they evaluate authorities (see Figure 1.1). Moreover, the studies interested in the individual assessment focus more on the expectations of citizens rather than their opinions.




Figure 1.1. Levels of legitimacy assessment.

The studies also focus on different dimensions of legitimacy that can be referred to as input, output, and throughput (Scharpf 1998, 2003; Schmidt 2013). This distinction has its roots in Easton's political system analysis (1957, p.384), who distinguished three elements of political system : input (demands and support), processes within a political system, and outputs (policy decisions.) Input legitimacy is concerned with the conditions that a political system provides to link authorities' actions and the 'authentic preferences of citizens'(Scharpf 1997, p.19). Thanks to the input, the authorities reflect (or ought to reflect) the values, norms, and needs present in society. Output legitimacy deals with the effectiveness of the authorities in achieving common goals and solving common problems (Scharpf 2003). Throughput legitimacy is concerned with the quality of the governance process (Schmidt 2013, p.2). Adding

throughput to the two initial dimensions of legitimacy suggested by Scharpf (2003), completes the list of potential dimensions for evaluating legitimacy of democratic political institutions: output is about governing for the people, input is about governing by (and of) the people (usually referring to representation through a vote in elections), and throughput is about governing with the people (Schmidt 2013, p.3).

Table 1.1 presents how different dimensions (input, output, and throughput) of legitimacy can be analysed on different levels (macro and micro). The macro analyses of input ask questions dealing with what are the right legal-institutional arrangements and how the power relations should be regulated: either according to the moral standards or theoretical models. Here the assessments happen on the level of abstract universal rules (philosophy) or expert and scholar judgments (social science). The macro analyses of output focus on what a legitimate system and legitimate authorities ought to deliver, i.e. the ideal outputs judged on the basis of macro level (aggregated) indicators (e.g. security, economic growth, or protection of human rights). By the same token, the assessments of throughput on the macro level deal with the questions of what are the appropriate processes that the institutions and political authorities ought to use.

Table 1.1. Levels of analysis and dimensions of legitimacy.

	Macro level	Micro level
Input	What are the right institutions?	What do the citizens think about the current institutions? What are the institutions preferred by citizens?
Output	What should the system/authorities deliver?	How do citizens evaluate what the institutions deliver? What do citizens think the institutions should deliver?
Throughput	How should the political system/authorities operate?	What do citizens think about the operation of the political system/authorities? How would the citizens like the system/authorities to operate?

In turn, studies of the micro level focus on the three dimensions from the perspective of citizens. As mentioned above, they emphasize two different aspects of

citizens' perspective (see Figure 1.1). Researchers interested in the subjective assessments investigate the opinions of citizens about the authorities and institutions, whereas researchers interested in the individual level assessments focus on the ideals of and expectations towards the authorities and institutions (Table 1.1). The former ones want to arrive at the aggregate legitimacy score for a country awarded by its citizens, the latter ones are more interested in understanding perceived legitimacy—what is the basis of legitimacy granting, and what are the priorities that citizens set for political authorities to grant them legitimacy.

Following from this, on the micro level, the analyses of input focus on the evaluations of political institutions by citizens and their opinions about what political system is the appropriate one. The research is concerned with, for example, people's preferences for democratic or other type of governance, direct democratic or expert decision-making processes, the type of leadership and electoral system. The assessment of output legitimacy on the micro level deals with the perception of the outputs that the political system and authorities deliver as perceived by citizens. These evaluations can go hand in hand with the expert macro-output evaluations, but can also diverge from the more objective indicators. For example, despite the objective indicators showing steady economic growth, citizens of a particular country can be much more sceptical about the state of economy. And, vice versa, citizens might perceive developments in their country as positive (or at least express such views) despite the objective increase of inflation and poverty. Another type of question answered by the studies of the micro-output type are what do citizens think legitimate authorities should be delivering and the priorities set for the outputs expected from them. The micro-throughput assessments concern the opinions of citizens about how well the procedures work and what procedures should characterize their relation with institutions and authorities.

For the subjective assessments on the micro level (Figure 1.1), surveys of public opinion to evaluate how well the authorities guard citizens' rights (justice/fair treatment) and deliver desired outcomes across society (distributive justice) are the main method of inquiry. Hence, the government is evaluated by citizens themselves, the opinions expressed in representative surveys are aggregated, and the legitimacy scores for political regimes calculated. The score, however, still depends on the exact

criteria of evaluation assigned to each dimension of legitimacy and on the operationalization of the variables used to create a legitimacy score (see below an example of Gilley's subjective assessment of legitimacy).

Political psychologists are concerned primarily with the individual assessments on the micro level (Figure 1.1.) and motivations that people have to support certain institutional arrangements or submit to particular political authorities. Their primary goal is not to aggregate these subjective preferences to inform about the general level of legitimacy of a political system or authorities. Hence, their object of study is not aggregated/absolute legitimacy (of the whole system) but perceived legitimacy. The studies on the individual level explore the mechanisms and causal links behind the factors affecting individuals' judgments about authorities' rights to rule. Through the focus on individuals and the use of methods common in social psychology (such as experimental methods), this approach allows to explore the whole scope of potential preferences that shape individuals' opinions about the authorities, various motivations, and interactions between them.

Moreover, by focusing on the individual level and on perceived legitimacy (rather than legitimacy) it is possible to explore what criteria of evaluation are important for citizens when granting legitimacy to political authorities. More specifically, it is possible to explore the ideas of citizens about what the best institutional arrangements should be (democratic or not), what characteristics legitimate authorities should have, what the duties of institutions and authorities according to citizens are, and what procedures they ought to use. The ideas of citizens about how the political system and state-society relations ought to be have received little attention from scholars (Abulof 2015).

Although public opinion research examines ideas of individuals, to measure legitimacy, public opinion surveys typically use standardized questions with pre-determined answer options and often with a certain democratic bias (e.g. questions about people's satisfaction with democracy or evaluation of their state's respect for human rights; see section below for a more detailed discussion of democratic bias in studies of legitimacy). This may limit public opinion surveys in the scope of ideas that they examine (Hurrelmann, Krell-Laluhová and Schneider 2005, p.4). Across regime

types, citizens may have particular criteria on the basis of which they ascribe legitimacy to political authorities and different reasons for positive evaluations of authorities.

Furthermore, public opinion surveys typically are not concerned with the mechanisms that shape the citizens' views of authorities, i.e., they are not concerned with folk political philosophy. Although folk political philosophy is not a common term in political science, I will use this term to explain the topic of investigation. If scholarship on what constitutes good political organization is the study of political philosophy, for example defined as 'philosophical reflection on how best to arrange our collective life—our political institutions and our social practices'(Miller 2016), then scholarship of people's reasoning and intuitions about what constitutes good political organization might be called folk political philosophy. I define folk political philosophy as the study of ordinary citizens reflections on how the political system is organized and how it is ought to work. Such a use of the term folk political philosophy is analogous to how anthropologists and psychologists use terms like folk biology and folk physics (or intuitive physics) to refer to the study of people's beliefs and reasoning about the biological entities and physical objects (see Wilson and Keil 1999, pp.317–319 and 577–579).

Taking such a folk political philosophy perspective seems fruitful for studying value-based legitimacy. Levi, Sacks and Tyler (2009, p.356) distinguish between value-based legitimacy concerned with the 'sense of obligation or willingness to obey authorities' and behavioural legitimacy understood as 'actual compliance with governmental regulations and laws. There is not much research into value-based legitimacy from the perspective of individuals although 'moral thinking about politics is not the prerogative of philosophers and scientists; social actors, endowed with reflexivity, do it too' (Abulof 2015, p.8). Unlike typical studies of public opinion, my studies of folk political philosophy are not concerned with comparing the opinions of people across countries, but aim to illuminate the system of judgments that people use when evaluating authorities. In other words, my primary focus is not on *what* opinions about the political system people express (e.g. the degree to which they evaluate their government as legitimate), but on their ideas about *how* the political system ought to

function that produce these opinions. In my view, taking such a folk political philosophy perspective is suitable to investigate how people reason about and justify the presence and influence of political authorities, regimes, and systems. Through this, I build on the work of Carnaghan (2007, 2010) who approached citizens as ‘political analysts’ in her intensive interviews with ordinary Russians.

By applying a folk political philosophy perspective I have combined elements of both approaches to legitimacy discussed above. I have incorporated elements of the descriptive approach by putting people’s beliefs at the centre of analysis and assuming that legitimacy results from citizen’s subjective evaluations of authorities. I have also incorporated elements of the normative approach by exploring what kind of ‘benchmark of acceptability or justification of political power or authority and—possibly—obligation’ (Peter 2014) individuals have. At the centre of this thesis are questions about the citizens’ conceptions of legitimacy, their ideas about what constitute the input, throughput, and output dimensions of legitimacy, and the antecedents of perceived legitimacy (i.e., value-based legitimacy, rather than its consequences or behavioural legitimacy).

Because my studies aim to assess what conditions political authorities need to satisfy to be attributed legitimacy by citizens, I focus on how individuals attribute legitimacy to authorities. This means that my studies examine perceived legitimacy and do not attempt to evaluate the overall or objective legitimacy of a given regime. Such study of the individual-level processes might help avoid the (liberal-) democratic bias that often characterizes the institutional and subjective assessments of legitimacy (Figure 1.1). Possibly, such an individual-level approach might contribute to the comparative study of legitimacy.

Democratic bias and research into legitimacy

Social scientists frequently narrow down the applicability of the concept of legitimacy to countries with democratic regimes. Using Sartorian vocabulary (Sartori 1970), the intension of the concept is more detailed and the extension is more limited. The intension (connotation) is ‘the collection of *properties* which determine the things to which the word implies’, whereas the extension (denotation) is ‘the class of *things* to

which the word applies' (Sartori 1970, p.1041). In the case of legitimacy, the concept is often defined with multiple properties and as a consequence the range of cases (the class) fulfilling all of them is smaller. This narrower understanding of legitimacy can be linked to the development of modern liberal democracies in the Western world and the rejection of other forms of rule that are considered morally unjustified. Therefore, legitimacy is often seen as an attribute of authorities only in the liberal-democratic context (Linz 1988; Habermas 1996). Consequently, when using democratic criteria to evaluate and compare the degree of legitimacy from the macro perspective (on the institutional level), it is unavoidable that countries with non-democratic regimes are judged by scholars and experts as having a deficit of legitimacy or being fully illegitimate. This would mean that countries that end up on the top of the regimes' ranking—the most democratic ones—are the most legitimate as well. Using democratic criteria to assess the legitimacy of the regimes often ignores the preferences of citizens, who might perceive their own regimes differently than the experts. Moreover, the scales used to categorize political regimes such as Freedom House or Polity IV use different criteria to score the regimes, and therefore rate the regimes of the same countries differently; i.e. 'Freedom House and Polity IV come to (...) different conclusions about the level of democracy in several countries in the world' (Högström 2013, p.218).

Other macro level studies investigate legitimation strategies of political institutions and authorities. This body of research addresses the 'claims to legitimacy' as understood by Weber (Bensman 1979, p.31). The legitimation strategies of authoritarian and hybrid regimes (regimes that are characterized by relatively competitive elections and many authoritarian measures to limit pluralism and dissent in society) rather than legitimacy are the object of increasing number of studies: from the evaluations of the bases of communist legitimacy in Eastern Europe to the assessment of legitimation narratives of contemporary Russia, shifts in legitimation strategies in post-Soviet Eurasia, and comparing different legitimation strategies in non-democratic states (Rigby and Fehér 1982; Di Palma 1991; Holmes 1993; Sil and Chen 2004; Feklyunina and White 2011; Gerschewski 2013; Kailitz 2013; Brusis *et al.* 2016; Mazepus *et al.* 2016; Morgenbesser 2016; Von Soest and Grauvogel 2016).

Legitimation, however, is not equivalent to legitimacy. The difference is crucial, because legitimation does not necessarily entail legitimacy, although it aims to achieve it.

Legitimation involves strategies used by political authorities to justify their right to rule in front of citizens, elite groups, international community, and themselves (Barker 2001). There are many modes of legitimation used by political authorities (Brusis 2016). One of the common forms of legitimation is rhetoric of incumbents and other individuals or groups trying to gain political power. The rhetoric of (potential) authorities aims to convince citizens that they have the right to rule over them on the basis of certain procedures and laws, tradition, or comparative advantage over other (potential) authorities with regards to outcomes that they can secure and values and norms they represent. These justifications are attempts at gaining legitimacy and they ‘must be distinguished from the judgements made about the legitimacy of that authority by those persons toward whom commands for compliance are directed’ (Uphoff 1989, p.300). Furthermore, as Hyde (1983, p.389) noted, legitimation is not a sufficient proof of the existence of legitimacy as ‘[Political] Elites could be attempting to induce something that does not exist’. On other occasions, elites can be justifying their right to rule with incomplete or false information and hide their inability to deliver what they have promised to citizens. They might also be simply unable to convince a larger audience about the validity of their justification. To be effective, however, these legitimation claims have to come in the shape of ‘arguments that are able to establish a moral duty to obey (...) collectively binding decisions even if they conflict with individual preferences’ (Scharpf 1998). To my knowledge, there are no empirical studies that compare the legitimation strategies of democratic regimes with the legitimation strategies of non-democracies.

One of the most important empirical studies that compares legitimacy (rather than legitimation) of countries with different political systems is the work of Gilley (2009). In his study of legitimacy in 72 countries, the author takes the micro perspective and creates legitimacy scores predominantly on the basis of subjective assessments. Gilley adopts Beetham’s (1991) main argument stating that there are three dimensions of legitimacy that need to be analysed all together to be able to formulate a

judgement about legitimacy of a political system. Moreover, according to Beetham, legitimacy ‘is not a single quality that a system of power possesses or not, but a set of distinct criteria, or multiple dimensions, operating at different levels, each of which provides moral grounds for compliance or cooperation on the part of those subordinate to a given power relation’ (1991, p.20). The three listed dimensions are legality of the authorities, justifiability of rules in terms of values and beliefs, and consent of the governed. The legality of authorities as a dimension of legitimacy means that the power needs to be ‘acquired and exercised in accordance with established rules’ (Beetham 1991, p.16). The second dimension of legitimacy is that the power ‘can be justified in terms of beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinate’ assumes that the legitimacy depends on the ‘beliefs current in a given society about the rightful source of authority; about what qualities are appropriate to the exercise of power and how individuals come to possess them; and some conception of a common interests (...) that the system of power satisfies’ (Beetham 1991, p.17). The final dimension of legitimacy is concerned with the demonstrations of subordination to the rulers—‘actions expressive of consent’ (Beetham 1991, p.18).

To illustrate how using these criteria can introduce democratic biases, Table 1.2 shows empirical application (operationalization) of Beetham’s ideas about legitimacy by Gilley (2006, 2012). If legitimacy scores are based on such criteria as a vote in free and fair elections and evaluation of human rights performance, it is implicitly assumed that the preferred and legitimate system of rule is liberal democracy in which the vote in free and fair elections and human rights are decisive for legitimacy. In other words, it is assumed that the current belief is that liberal democratic values provide justification for the authorities rule. This becomes problematic when the study aims to compare the evaluations of authorities and institutions by citizens socialized in different political regimes. It automatically introduces an assumption that citizens in all (non-) democratic regimes have a preference for multiparty system and human rights, therefore these are the right designators of legitimacy. Furthermore, this assumption about democracy can be problematic (see, e.g. Carnaghan 2010) and the universality of understanding of individual human rights and the importance of particular rights in different cultural

contexts is rather controversial (Donnelly 1982, 1984; Kausikan 1993; Freeman 1995; Howard 1995). Gilley's study is an example of how the normative suppositions about legitimacy are embedded in its empirically-oriented (descriptive) assessment. According to Barker (2000, p.8) , 'The normative predisposition towards democracy guides research in the direction of studies of the opinions of voters and of the efforts of government to influence these' and Gilley's study shows how difficult it is to completely separate the ideas about legitimacy from democratic rules. Even in such a conceptually thorough and impressive study the bias cannot be completely avoided. The tensions and connections (Beetham 1991, pp.243–250) between the (macro) philosophical debates and (micro) empirical perspective on the one hand and the availability of systematic empirical evidence without democratic bias on the other represent the main challenge for scholars studying legitimacy in comparative perspective.

Studies on the individual level using experimental methods can to some extent avoid democratic bias if in the design of experiments they do not assume the preference for democratic form of government. They can also explore the causal links between various factors and legitimacy, as well as interactions between included factors. This thesis uses experimental vignettes to search for causal links between values and perceived legitimacy. Moreover, it explores how individuals in different regimes justify the right to rule of authorities: what exactly are the normative criteria on the basis of which the authorities can be considered as rightful in different societies. The main limitation of experimental studies is that often they are not conducted on representative samples (which is the advantage of the study mentioned above), but they compensate with providing knowledge about the causal mechanisms behind evaluations of political authorities and the ideas about legitimacy, which can be very informative as well. The methods and data used for this thesis are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.

Table 1.2. Dimensions of legitimacy according to David Beetham and operationalization by Bruce Gilley.

Dimension	Beetham (1991); definition	Beetham (1991); suggested operationalization	Gilley (2009); online appendix, p. 4 Used variable	Gilley (2012, p.698) Used variable
Legality (rules)	Power is legitimate if it is acquired in accordance with established rules (p.16)	Separation of powers: Independence of judiciary from the legislative and executive branches (p.123)/ additional condition— independent media (p.124)	Confidence in police	Confidence in justice system
	-	Obtaining power according to the rules; e.g. free and fair elections based on full suffrage	-	-
	Power is legitimate if it is exercised in accordance with established rules (p.16)	Effective subordination of the military to civilian control (p.124)	Confidence in civil service	-
Justification	-	Commitment from the side of the authorities to uphold the rule of law (p.126)	Evaluation of state respect for individual human rights	Perceived respect for human rights
	‘Power is legitimate to the extent that the rules of power can be justified in terms of beliefs shared by the dominant and subordinate’ (p. 17)	Provision of physical security/ Chronic failure at defence (security issues)	Satisfaction with democratic development	Confidence in civil service
	‘Power must be seen to serve recognisably general interest, rather than simply the interest of the powerful’ (p.17)	Satisfying general rather than only particular or sectional interests (chronic corruption, growing inequality, unequal treatment/discrimination/patronage) (p.142-145)	Evaluation of current political system	Rating of how democratically the country is being governed
	-	Providing economic social welfare (expanding duties of the state) (p.140)	Satisfaction with operation of democracy	-
	-	-	Use of violence in civil protest	Sum of security legitimacy (repression) and political legitimacy (exclusion)
Consent	‘... demonstrable expression of consent on the part of the subordinate to the particular power relation in which they are involved, through actions which provide evidence of consent.’ (p.18)	Voting in elections (directly expressing consent) (p.151-152) (assumption of choice/competition)	Voter turnout in national legislative elections	Voter turnout in national legislative elections
	‘positive actions taking place in public’, (p.150)	Mobilization: participation in political activity at the grass-root (p.151)	Quasi-voluntary taxes compliance	Taxes on income, profits and property as a percentage of central government revenues less social contributions

1.2. Concept definition and theories of legitimacy

Theories of legitimacy are very difficult to test. The difficulties with testing are caused by imprecise definitions of legitimacy. According to Gurr (1970, pp.19–20), for a theory to be a subject of empirical testing it has to fulfil two necessary and two desirable (additional) conditions. A social science theory should have clear definitions and be falsifiable (necessary conditions) and, preferably, it should be able to identify relevant variables at various levels of analysis and be applicable to a large universe of events (desirable conditions). While theories of legitimacy seem to be applicable (or at least applied) to a relatively large universe of events, they are often difficult to falsify, and do not always provide clear definitions that help to identify all the relevant variables.

Definitions of the concept

The first challenge in the study of legitimacy is to define legitimacy. Not many definitions actually state what legitimacy is—instead they describe what being legitimate means or what the sources and consequences of legitimacy are. The definitions vary from stating that legitimacy is a belief (Dahl 1956, p.46; Fraser 1974; Linz 1988), quality of a regime (Merelman 1966, p.548), ‘the compatibility of the results of governmental output with the value patterns of the relevant systems’ (Stillman 1974, p.42), and ‘institutional loyalty’ (Gibson *et al.* 2005a, pp.188–189), to treating legitimacy as ‘the complex moral right to impose decisions on others’ (Simmons 1999). The multiplicity of definitions causes discrepancies in theories of legitimacy and leads to conceptual confusion (see Appendix A for a selection of definitions of legitimacy).

Moreover, as mentioned above, treating legitimacy as a belief follows arguably the most influential definition of legitimacy, namely Weber’s definition (1978, p.213), which states that legitimacy of authorities is derived from ‘the belief in its legitimacy’. This definition, however, can lead to circularity in thinking about legitimacy, when it does not specify where this belief comes from, i.e. what are the specific grounds and

reasons that people have to hold their beliefs. When there is no mention of the conditions that the authorities need to fulfil to engender the belief in legitimacy, achieving legitimacy may be reduced to the effective public relations campaigns of the governing elites (Beetham 1991, p.10).

As already shown above, in the scholarly debate within political science multiple components of legitimacy were distinguished and many studies of legitimacy have emphasized the multi-dimensional nature of the concept (Friedrich 1963, p.234; Stillman 1974, p.39; Easton 1975a; Beetham 1991; Alagappa 1995, pp.11–30; Scharpf 1998). However, the lack of consensus on how many dimensions the concept of legitimacy has and what these dimensions encompass leads to different definitions and difficulties in operationalization. For example, Alagappa (1995) names four elements/dimensions of legitimacy: shared values and norms, conformity with established rules, proper use of power, consent of the governed. Booth and Seligson (2009, pp.547–548) recognized seven dimensions of legitimacy: existence of political community, support for core regime principles, evaluation of regime performance, system support, support for regime institutions, support for local government, and support for political actors. As mentioned above, Scharpf (2003) distinguished between input and output dimension of legitimacy and Schmidt (2013) expanded the list with the third dimension—throughput. Without a consensus about the number of dimensions and what they are supposed to represent, the critics of legitimacy research have reasons to claim that legitimacy is a residual container concept. Moreover, the lack of consensus and sometimes clarity on what legitimacy entails makes replication of studies very difficult. For example, Gilley's replication of his own study assigns different variables to different dimensions of legitimacy in 2012 than in 2009 (see Table 1.2).

In line with Gerring's (1999) views on social science concept formation, a good concept has to balance out eight criteria³, among which there are at least three that are especially relevant for improving the definition of legitimacy, i.e. parsimony, coherence, and differentiation. A good conceptualization of legitimacy needs to be

³ The eight criteria are (1) familiarity, (2) resonance, (3) parsimony, (4) coherence, (5) differentiation, (6) depth, (7) theoretical utility, and (8) field utility.

more precise and concise about the list of defining attributes of legitimacy (parsimony), their relations (coherence), and distinctiveness of legitimacy from other concepts such as trust and support (differentiation). In many cases, to solve the above mentioned problems with the concept of legitimacy, five questions could be helpful. First of all, 'what is legitimacy?' Is it an attribute of authorities, their right, or a belief of citizens? The second question is 'what is the object of legitimacy?'. For example, following Easton (1965), political community, regime, or authorities can be an object of legitimacy. Next question is 'who assesses authorities and grants legitimacy?'. Are these scholars, philosophers, elites, individuals, majority, minority, or citizens in general? Moreover, in any socio-political context there needs to be a reference to the sources of legitimacy, hence the fourth question is 'what are the grounds of legitimacy?'. Sources and causes of legitimacy identified by scholars are multiple: law, tradition, or charisma (following Weber's (1978, p.215) typology), elections, competence, performance, or fairness. An additional question that could solve the circularity problem of legitimacy theory is 'what are the expected consequences of legitimacy?'. Testing the theory of legitimacy can be more fruitful if the researchers are clear about its influence on stability of regimes and authorities, trust, participation in civil society, or tax compliance.

Theory of legitimacy: Legitimacy among other resources of power

Next to precise definitions of the concepts, the second necessary condition for a good theory (Gurr 1970, pp.19–20) is the possibility to falsify it. Legitimacy of a regime is often analysed retrospectively when a regime has had already collapsed. As noted by Rothschild (1977, p.496) 'It is easy to be wise after the event and to find, say in 1918 or 1959 that the Russian Tsarist or French fourth republican regimes had earlier exhausted their legitimacy'. If the break-down of a regime is a sign of illegitimacy, the opposite, i.e. existence of a regime, is not the proof of its legitimacy. In terms of good theory, the collapse of a regime is not a sufficient condition to make judgments about the preceding presence of legitimacy. Moreover, it makes the testing and falsification of the theory impossible. Alternative approaches use voter abstention, protests and demonstrations as a sign of decrease of legitimacy, however, the opposite—voting and

the lack of protest—does not necessarily confirm legitimacy of a system, because it can simply be a sign of either compulsion, apathy, lack of alternatives, or fear of coercion. Situating legitimacy in the context of other resources of power and causes of stability can help to solve the falsifiability problem.

Political legitimacy is one of many sources of power. Power can be defined as ‘the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action’ (Weber 1947, p.180). In other words, power is ‘the ability to achieve our purposes’, it is ‘unevenly distributed’ (Beetham 1991, p.43), and implies influence ‘over other man’ (Friedrich 1963, p.160). Aristotle named several modes of assuring compliance of people, i.e. force, distribution of rewards, education, or a combination of these. Rothschild translated them into coercive, utilitarian, and normative techniques of rule (1977, p.488). Political legitimacy, the normative mode of assuring compliance, is therefore always connected to the exercise of power (Beetham 1991). While the understanding of other resources of power (i.e. economic resources, social status, information, and physical force) is clearer, the role of legitimacy is far less transparent.

In the systematisation based on the works of Weber (Uphoff 1989, p.306), legitimacy represents a resource of legitimate power that produces normative compliance of the ruled (Table 1.3). Hence, legitimacy is based on different reasons to transfer power to political authorities than economic resources, social status, and information (instrumental/utilitarian reasons) and physical force (coercive reasons). Legitimacy is achieved thanks to normative considerations by the ruled: it concerns an interaction between the authorities and society on the level of moral values.

Linking the motivations to transfer power to authorities to the problem of falsifiability, legitimacy should be equated neither with voluntary compliance with authorities’ orders nor with stability of regimes. This is true for two reasons. Firstly, voluntary compliance can be driven by different motives, such as economic and non-economic rewards. For example, clientelism is a good example of strategy that can mobilize support and result in voluntary compliance (Rose *et al.* 2011), but it is based on the provision of ‘material resources as quid pro quo for political support’ (Stokes 2007) accompanied by threats of defection. Hence, clientelism is not contributing to

the transfer of power based on the normative criteria—which is a requirement of legitimacy—but rather on the personal gains or fear of punishment. Similarly, stability can be achieved thanks to coercion, system of rewards and punishments, lack of imaginable and feasible alternatives, collective action problem, or conformity (Marquez 2016, pp.10–13). If these are the reasons behind the compliance, it is not an effect of ‘a moral duty to obey’, but of instrumental gains. In short, support and compliance can be forced or bought from individuals, whereas legitimacy cannot. Secondly, ‘a moral duty to obey’ is a belief rather than action. Hence, the belief should not be conflated with action that might be expected to result from this belief—actions are more situational and depend on other factors aside the belief itself.

Table 1.3. Resources of power and the type of power transfer.

Resources of power	Type of power	Type of power transfer
Economic resources	Reward power	Utilitarian/instrumental compliance
Social status	Referent power	
Information	Expert power	
Physical force	Coercive power	Coercive compliance
Legitimacy	Legitimate power	Normative compliance
Authority	Political power	Political compliance (combination of other types of compliance)

Source: Adapted from Uphoff (1989, p.306); based on French and Raven 1959; Etzioni 1961; Ilchman and Uphoff 1969.

To sum up, placing legitimacy (back) within the theory of resources of power and possible motivations people may hold to obey, support, and to legitimize authorities shows that legitimacy cannot be considered in isolation from these other motivations and cannot simply be equated with stability of a regime. The norms and values that political authorities need to represent to be recognized as legitimate—factors influencing perceived legitimacy—are the main theme of this dissertation and the specific theoretical model used here is discussed in the subsequent section.

1.3. Perceived legitimacy and its antecedents: theoretical model and hypotheses

This project is concerned specifically with perceived legitimacy. Hence, it is not aiming to say anything about legitimacy of a state in general or to evaluate a whole regime using an ideal standard such as liberal democracy or other theoretical or philosophical constructs. This project aims to evaluate whether the following working definition of legitimacy is a useful one: *perceived legitimacy is an attribute ascribed to a political authority (or its representative) by individuals on the basis of evaluation of their normative qualities and resulting in a willingness to voluntarily transfer power to these authorities.*

The working definition emphasizes the normative qualities (moral standing) of authorities as the basis for legitimacy judgments, because as mentioned above in the discussion of the resources of power, citizens can support a regime for many reasons. They can express support because of fear of coercion or because of personal rewards received in return for support. Granting legitimacy, however, is based on the positive evaluation of the moral standing of the authorities—evaluation as just or unjust. Legitimacy should result from a normative compatibility of the values promoted by the authorities with the views and beliefs of citizens, which is what Beetham (1991, p.17) refers to as ‘justifiability in terms of beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinate’. Therefore, it seems to be at least theoretically possible to distinguish between involuntary obedience (which is caused by the fear of coercion), voluntary support that can result from instrumental gains (such as economic rewards, information, or social status), and, arguably, the highest form of acceptance of authorities, namely perceived legitimacy, which is caused by the positive normative evaluation of authorities (see Figure 1.2). In practice, all these motives interact and (possibly) depending on the particular context of political socialization, contribute to the assessment of authorities by citizens. Therefore testing different motives (e.g. instrumental and normative) against each other can help us determine to what extent the authorities enjoy support or legitimacy in the eyes of citizens.




Figure 1.2. Factors determining the type of power transfer.

The working definition makes clear that the approach to study legitimacy in this project is attitudinal rather than behavioural. The focus is on the process of shaping the evaluations of authorities by an individual and his or her normative assessment of the authorities. Perceived legitimacy could be understood as *covert legitimacy* (Easton 1965, pp.153–170). While *overt legitimacy* concerns the behaviour/actions (an observable that does not inform us about the underlying motivations though), the *covert legitimacy* concerns the attitudes/sentiments (Easton 1965, pp.153–170). Using Easton’s categorization, the covert (perceived) legitimacy and motivations people hold when judging authorities’ legitimacy are in the centre of this project. This approach fits also with the studies by Tom Tyler, who tests psychological models of authorities’ assessment: ‘viewing subjective judgments on the part of the public about the actions of the police and the courts as central to the effectiveness of legal authorities’ (2003,

p.285). Perceived legitimacy as the recognition of the authorities' right to rule based on the evaluation of certain moral standards that individual citizens are committed to links up with Easton's (1965, p.278) understanding of legitimacy as 'a strong inner conviction of the moral validity of the authorities or regime'. However, because of a plethora of uses and interpretations of the term 'legitimacy' and multiple and often confusing definitions of it, it seems useful to clarify also what is not meant as legitimacy here.

First of all, legitimacy is not equivalent with diffuse support for a political system defined as 'a reservoir of support—frequently described as patriotism, love of country, loyalty, and the like' (Easton 1965, p.125). Neither is it the same as diffuse support defined as a preference for certain institutional arrangement or 'attachment to political objects for their own sake' (Easton 1975a, p.445). The use of the concepts of legitimacy and diffuse support is inconsistent (Fraser 1974, p.121) and sometimes legitimacy and diffuse support are conflated. However, Easton (1965, p.278) himself wrote about legitimacy not as an equivalent to but as one of the major sources of diffuse support:

The inculcation of a sense of legitimacy is probably the single most effective device for regulating the flow of diffuse support in favour both of the authorities and of the regime. A member may be willing to obey the authorities and confirm to the requirements of the requirements of the regime for many different reasons. But the most stable support will derive from the conviction on the part of the member that it is right and proper for him to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regimes.

Apart from delineating a difference between diffuse support and legitimacy, the above quote shows also that legitimacy is not only 'a quality that is ascribed to the norms and structures of a regime' but it can be assigned to authorities too (and other political objects like policies and laws; in Easton 1965, pp.286–287; Rothschild 1977, p.494; Gilley 2006, p.501). Nevertheless, these two are linked, because legitimacy of particular authorities—incumbents—can affect legitimacy of the whole system (Easton

1957, p.393, see also Table in 1965, p.287). This can happen in any political system, but seems to be even more pronounced in non-democratic (personalized) systems, where the leadership of the country is often associated with the system itself and embodies and shapes the institutional arrangement. In addition to the general doubt about citizens' capacity to separate their preference for a regime (political system) from particular outputs that the regime in place delivers and particular inputs it offers (Mishler and Rose 1996, p.556), the distinction between the authorities and the regimes in the case of authoritarian regimes becomes much more blurred and it has consequences for the citizens' perceptions of both. Similar problem occurs with investigating new political regimes (Mishler and Rose 1996). My goal here is to assess mainly the legitimacy of political authorities (and government specifically) and not the legitimacy of an abstract regime (type), although the role of general ideas about the preferred regimes type will be a part of investigation in Chapter 5. Moreover, the regime type was a selection criteria for the cases included in the study, as this thesis aims to investigate the differences in factors influencing perceived legitimacy across different political regimes.

Factors influencing perceived legitimacy: a causal model

As discussed above, legitimacy is one of and arguably the most precious resource of power. It makes people voluntarily acquiesce with authorities because of normative compatibility of the values promoted by the authorities with the views and beliefs of citizens. Studies of legitimacy and motivations identified several elements of this normative compatibility, however we know relatively little about which normative factors influence perceptions of legitimacy and how do they differ across regimes and societies. Several factors that cause the increase of perceived legitimacy of authorities were identified in empirically oriented studies in the field of social psychology. These factors are fairness in distribution of goods among individuals, fair procedures guiding the interactions between the authorities and individuals, following the rules of a community in which an individual was socialized, and the power-position of an individual relative to authorities, also called outcome dependence (Van der Toorn *et al.* 2011). With the exception of dependence, which is a less clear-cut factor, all these

motives have to do with communal rather than with instrumental personal good and are linked to the issues of justice. The reference to moral standards unites these motives as possible (albeit not all) predictors of perceived political legitimacy.

Personal outcome and normative explanations

In contrast to normative explanations that focus on justice, rational choice theory emphasises the role of personal economic gains (instrumental gains) in decisions of individuals and it predicts that transferring of power to authorities is based on a calculation of personal costs and benefits. The personal interest (understood mainly as material gains) is the primary interest of individuals and should play the most important role in the decision-making process. Also, it used to be a widespread notion in political science that people “generally care about ends not means; they judge government by results and are ignorant of or indifferent about the methods by which the results were obtained” (Popkin 1991, p.99). Therefore the first hypothesis following from the rational choice theory is: *Positive personal outcome increases perceived legitimacy of political authorities (H1)*.

However, Tyler and Caine’s (1981, p.643) overview of political science literature yielded ‘widespread anecdotal evidence’ of higher support for authorities and institutions that act ‘according to fair and impartial procedures’. In fact, since the 1990s also political science studies have been undermining the pure self-interest explanation of support for authorities and examples of studies in the democratic context emphasise the ‘dual utility function’ in the decisions about compliance and support, meaning that people are motivated both by normative reasons as well as instrumental ones (Levi 1991; Rothstein 1998; Wilking 2011). Similarly, psychological models of the citizen ‘suggest that citizens make normative judgments, rather than focusing upon whether they are personally benefited or harmed’ (Tyler *et al.* 1986, p.972). According to Tyler (1997, p.325), in opposition to rational-choice (resource-based) models⁴, ‘legitimacy theory’ predicts that people ‘seek evidence of integrity and caring when judging

⁴ For elaboration of economic models’ predicting citizens’ choices and their influence in political science see Tyler, Rasinski, and Griffin (1986). The self-interest assumption is at the heart of the economic theory of value. The subjective expected utility is in turn the main predictor of citizen’s behaviour in the economic theory of judgment.

authorities'. There is a growing body of studies providing evidence that legitimacy is enhanced by popular perception of authorities as just. These studies are mainly concerned with courts and laws, and police (Thibaut and Walker 1975; Tyler and Caine 1981; Gibson 1989; Tyler 1990; Tyler and Huo 2002; Sunshine and Tyler 2003).

To test the normative factors determining perceived legitimacy, empirical studies especially in the field of (social) psychology investigated the link between norms and values, perceptions of fairness of authorities and their evaluations. Studies showing an independent effect of fairness of procedures and outcome that is fair for the community are contrary to earlier research, which indicated that citizens focus primarily or exclusively on outcomes they personally get when evaluating authorities (Leventhal *et al.* 1980). According to the studies of normative motives, perceived justice of authorities increases positive evaluations of these authorities by citizens and, as a consequence, makes the odds for compliant behaviour of people higher. The two aspects of justice that feature in this body of literature are distributive and procedural justice (Leventhal 1980; Kluegel and Mason 2004, p.817). These two antecedents of perceived legitimacy together with outcome dependence and socialization will be tested in the first study of this dissertation to see to what extent they determine the perception of legitimacy of a government among the respondents (Figure 1.3). If only instrumental motivations would have an effect on the evaluation of political authorities, then one could speak of the presence of support, but not perceived legitimacy (see Figures 1.2 and 1.3).




Figure 1.3. Factors influencing perceived legitimacy/voluntary support tested in this study: economic rewards (personal outcome), dependence, distributive justice (based on the principles of need and equality), procedural justice (voice), and socialization (in different countries).

Procedural justice

Social order is built on the principle of procedural justice. In line with Leventhal (1980, p.5), procedural justice rule is defined as ‘an individual’s belief that allocative procedures which satisfy certain criteria are fair and appropriate’. In the context of granting legitimacy, procedural justice refers to people’s evaluations of procedures used by authorities as fair or unfair, right or wrong.

Tyler and Caine (1981, p.643) observed that political science research suggests ‘that support for authorities is more strongly dependent on acceptance of the belief that government leaders and institutions function according to fair and impartial procedures than upon outcomes received from the political system or specific government decision’. Their experiments and survey study showed that satisfaction with leaders was influenced by judgments about fairness of procedures in allocation of benefits irrespectively of the achieved outcomes.

The body of research on procedural justice has been growing in the past couple of decades within the field of social psychology (see (Tyler 2006)). A number of studies showed that legitimacy of laws and police increases when people experience fairness of procedures (Tyler and Caine 1981; Tyler 2001; Sunshine and Tyler 2003). Fairness of procedures usually refers to the fairness of decision-making process used by authorities. It is, however, comprised of several dimensions and can be operationalized in various ways, i.e. as providing opportunity to voice people's opinions about a particular matter (voice/public deliberation/participation), considerations of all the relevant information on the issue, following established formal rules guiding the decision-making process on a certain issue, neutrality and consistency of authorities across people and cases (unbiased and impartial decision-making), and treatment with dignity and respect (Thibaut and Walker 1975; Leventhal 1980; Tyler *et al.* 1985; Tyler and Rasinski 1991; Tyler 2000; Peter 2009). The importance of different criteria of procedural justice varies depending on the institution under evaluation, issue, dispute, or context (Tyler 1988, p.107).

At the same time, the role of deliberation processes has been emphasised in the political science discussions of conceptions of democracy (Manin *et al.* 1987; Miller 1992a; Habermas 1996; Bohman 1997; Dryzek 2009, 2010; Gutmann and Thompson 2009). Deliberation is 'a process of careful and informed reflection on facts and opinions, generally leading to a judgment on the matter at hand' (King 2003, p.25), which involves citizens in a discussion and provides them with an opportunity to voice their opinions and inquire about the issues that are decided on by the authorities. The deliberative practices link with the concept of procedural justice and with the throughput dimension of legitimacy (see p. 14).

On the basis of the theory of procedural justice the following hypothesis is formulated: *Procedural justice increases perceived legitimacy of political authorities (H2)*. To test whether the effect of procedural justice is dependent on personal gains (positive vs. negative outcome), a hypothesis about the interaction between these two factors is formulated based on rational choice theory: *The effect of procedural justice on legitimacy is stronger when individuals experience positive personal outcomes (H3)*

(i.e., when individuals experience negative personal outcomes, the effects of procedural justice on legitimacy are weak or absent).

Distributive justice

Another aspect of justice linked to citizens' evaluations of authorities is distributive justice. In line with the thesis of distributive justice, people are expected to 'be more willing to give power to legal authorities when they feel that those authorities deliver outcomes fairly to people' (Sunshine and Tyler 2003). Distributive justice however, can be seen either as an instrumental motive to comply with authorities, when the main focus of the subject is their own gain, or it can be understood as 'the fairness of the allocation of desirable outcomes across people' (Tyler 2012, p.345). Only the latter one represents a normative motive linked to legitimacy of authorities (see Figure 1.2). And although favourable outcome and distributive justice are related, they are clearly distinct (Tyler 1988, p.117). Gilley provides a good illustration of the difference between legitimacy and support based on personal interest: 'A citizen who supports the regime 'because it is doing well in creating jobs' is expressing views of legitimacy. A citizen who supports the regimes 'because I have a job' is not' (Gilley 2006, p.502).

Distributive justice can be seen also as encompassed in the idea of common good—'the conviction that there is something called the interest of the realm, the public, common, or national interest, the general good and public welfare, or the good of the tribe, of "our people"' (Easton 1965, p.312). According to Easton, the political authorities are supposed to promote and contribute to the common good and their failure to do so will diminish perceived legitimacy of a regime. Distributive justice refers to one aspect of the common good, namely the distribution of resources in a manner that helps the society as a whole (e.g. creation of jobs). Distributive justice can be based on different principles depending on the information available to the people, the type of group in which the distribution takes place, the particular situation, and socio-economic status of an individual. The main principles on which distributive justice can be based are equality, desert (equity) or need (Miller 1992b; DeScioli *et al.* 2014).

Similar to procedural justice, distributive justice has its link to Scharpf's ideas about legitimacy, specifically to what he calls 'output legitimacy'. One of the main goals of government is to achieve some sort of common interest. If the pursuit of the 'common purposes and dealing with common problems that are beyond the reach of individuals and families acting on their own' (Scharpf 2003, p.4) is positively evaluated by citizens, legitimacy of an institution increases. Following from this, if the goods and services are distributed in a way that serves the communal interest (rather than individual interests) and citizens do not experience strong relative deprivation (Gurr 1970), then the government will be normatively appreciated and will enjoy higher legitimacy. The research into distributive justice also addresses a question 'when those who are advantaged are willing to re-distribute resources to the disadvantaged' (Tyler 2000, p.119). Consequently, distributive justice is inherently linked with individuals' perceptions of their situation in comparison to the situation of others belonging to the same community (relative deprivation). The reflection on this relative situation is supposed to influence normative judgments of authorities. Studies by Van den Bos et al. (1997, 1998) showed that procedural justice had a different impact on outcome satisfaction depending on the presence or absence of fairness in distribution (equity).

A hypothesis following from the theory of distributive justice is: *Distributive justice increases perceived legitimacy of political authorities (H4)*. The same as in the case of procedural justice, to test whether the effect of distributive justice is dependent on personal gains (positive vs. negative outcome), a hypothesis about the interaction between these two factors is formulated based on rational choice theory: *The effect of distributive justice on legitimacy is stronger when individuals experience positive personal outcomes (H5)* (i.e., when individuals experience negative personal outcomes, the effects of distributive justice on legitimacy are weak or absent).

Outcome dependence

Apart from normative considerations of justice of authorities, the factor that could influence legitimacy judgments of authorities by citizens is their dependence on these authorities resulting from a disadvantageous position in the social system or specific situation. Dependence is a factor that is linked to both expectation of economic rewards

(instrumental/personal gains) and to distributive justice (normative/justice motivation) based on the principle of need. It is neither a clear cut instrumental motive nor a normative one. Despite the intuitive assumption that disadvantaged individuals—individuals experiencing some sort of negative inequality—will express their disapproval of the authorities, there is evidence that people who are powerless or highly dependent on political authorities express positive evaluations of these authorities. System justification theory offers an explanation of this phenomenon (Jost *et al.* 2003, 2004; Jost and Van der Toorn 2012).

According to system justification theory, people want to see their social system as fair and just. As a consequence, they are motivated to ‘defend, bolster, and justify prevailing social, economic, and political arrangements (i.e., status quo)’ (Jost and Van der Toorn 2012; see also Jost *et al.* 2004). According to Jost *et al.* (2003, p.14), ‘this means that they should often view systems and authorities as above reproach and inequality among groups and individuals as legitimate and even necessary’. This need for justification of the system seems to have significant effects on perceived legitimacy of authorities. Several studies showed that people who are dependent on the system (powerless) tend to legitimize it and approve the position of those who control those systems. Using Fiske and Berdahl’s (2007) vocabulary, individuals who depend on the authorities for their mental and physical health, safety, and economic well-being are in the *outcome dependent* situation (in other words, the authorities can exercise their power over them). The main hypothesis in the studies of outcome dependence is ‘that dependence on authorities for desired resources activates system justification motivation, and this contributes to the legitimation of power holders’ (Van der Toorn *et al.* 2011, p.128). Moreover, dependence contributes to the legitimation of political authorities independently from the outcomes that people receive from them. The tests of this hypothesis were conducted in educational, political, and legal setting. The political study was completed at the time of water shortage in California, which created a naturally occurring situation for measurement of perceived legitimacy of governmental authority responsible for water allocation decisions. The results of this study showed that people who felt very affected by the water shortage, evaluated the

authorities as more legitimate. In general, studies driven by the system-justification theory hypothesis provided evidence that people in dependent positions express acceptance of power differences, support status quo, and boost legitimacy of (unjust) power relations (Van der Toorn *et al.* 2011). The evidence, however, comes mainly from studies on American respondents. A cross-national comparison of perceptions of fairness in the workplace by Americans and Hungarians indicated that system justification levels are lower among the respondents from the post-communist new democracy (Van der Toorn *et al.* 2010).

Furthermore, there is evidence from large-N cross-country surveys that people belonging to high-status groups are more likely to see their governments as legitimate (Brandt and Reyna 2012; Brandt 2013). These divergent results might be partially explained by the way in which outcome dependence is operationalized. Brandt's studies use standard measures of social status such as gender, income, education, race, and social class, whereas in the studies by Van der Toorn the outcome dependence is situational and hence much more specific and contextualized. The present study contributes cross-cultural evidence to assess the viability of the system justification theory and specifically outcome dependence in predicting levels of perceived legitimacy. The hypothesis based on the system justification theory that will be tested in this project is: *Dependence on political authorities increases perceived legitimacy of the authorities (H6).*

Socialization/Politicization

Perceived legitimacy requires 'a generalized sense of identification with and feeling of obligation toward the regime that motivates citizens to comply' (Gurr 1970, p.185). This generalized sense of identification and obligation to comply with the rules of the regime is achieved through socialization (social learning). Political socialization according to Easton and Dennis (1980, p.7) refers to 'those developmental processes through which persons acquire political orientations and patterns of behaviour'. Easton (1965, p.208) linked socialization with legitimacy as contributing to the authorities' capacity to rule, which is 'closely connected to the presence of an ingrained belief,

usually transmitted across the generations in the socialization process, that the occupants of the political authority roles have a right to command and the other members of the system a duty to obey'. The assumption of Easton is that citizens (members of a system) are 'imperceptibly socialized' to believe in the political order's legitimacy and this belief is reinforced further in life (1965, p.280). Furthermore, 'As members of a society mature, they must absorb the various orientations toward political matters that one is expected to have in that society' (Easton 1975b, pp.397–398). Moreover, knowledge about political institutions and their designated authority and duties, about the way citizens and the state institutions interact, and about the formal and informal procedures guiding the behaviour of political authorities and citizens is passed on by teachers and parents, and is shaped by early experiences of associational and political life (e.g. Galston 2001; McFarland and Thomas 2006). Since political socialization is supposed to be deeply rooted in the political culture of every country, the ideas about how a political system should function and what the role of political authorities is may vary depending on the values promoted in a given society and through its education system. Moreover, the strength of different motives to support authorities held by citizens as well as the combination of methods used by authorities to gain legitimacy can vary from system to system (Easton 1965, p.185). Also, according to Inglehart (1988, p.1228) societies 'tend to be characterized by reasonably durable cultural attributes that sometimes have major political and economic consequences'. Although evidence on the individual level is rather anecdotal and scarce, the expectation is that evaluations of political authorities and the importance of different factors for these evaluations can be affected by the regime type in which an individual has been socialized. The specific comparative hypotheses following from socialization are formulated in the section below.

Perceived legitimacy in different regimes: a comparative model

The definition of perceived legitimacy as an attribute ascribed to political authorities by individuals on the basis of evaluation of their normative qualities and resulting in a willingness to voluntarily transfer power to these authorities allows for comparisons in different political and cultural contexts (Dogan and Pelassy 1990, p.3). In line with the

socialization/politicization theory, the sources and understanding of legitimacy can be culturally determined and the relation between citizens (subjects) and the state culturally prescribed. The influence of socialization in different political regimes can be reflected in the ideas about what makes authorities legitimate held by citizens in different societies.

According to Huntington (1991, pp.46–58), the survival and legitimacy of authoritarian regimes depends heavily on their economic performance, so this could result in citizens being more sensitive to receiving individual positive outcomes from the authorities. In the Soviet Union in the earlier totalitarian phase of the Communist Party's (CP) rule, the regime referred to terror and coerced mobilization while imposing ideology as the source of its right to rule. The authorities were convinced that they had the monopoly of 'Truth' and were guided by the superior knowledge about what is right for society (Di Palma 1991, p.50; Saxonberg 2004, pp.146–151, 2013, pp.59–60). In its post-totalitarian form (after the death of Stalin), the CP legitimized itself more on the basis of performance: it justified its rule through proclaimed "economic superiority" over the West, prosperity and improving living standards. Authoritarian regimes also rely heavily on fear—"the ultimate inducement that a regimes can use to compel individuals to comply with its demands" (Rose *et al.* 2011, p.21), so it is difficult to distinguish to what extent the normative motives (concerns with justice or ideology) or instrumental gains (individual economic rewards) were and are of importance for citizens' assessments of the authorities. However, if authoritarian legitimacy is believed to be performance-based, then positive outcomes from the authorities should be the basis of positive evaluations of these authorities. Therefore, a hypothesis regarding the influence of individual positive outcomes in non-democracies can be formulated: *The most important motives citizens have to grant legitimacy to/support authorities in non-democracies are of instrumental nature (H7).*

The legitimacy of democracies is based mainly on input: shared ideas about what the political system represents and relatively durable electoral procedures assuring representation of citizens' interests (Easton 1975, p.447). Moreover, in more recent works on legitimacy a strong link has been established between democratic legitimacy and the need for deliberation and participation of citizens (Manin *et al.*

1987; Miller 1992a; Habermas 1996; Bohman 1997; Dryzek 2009, 2010; Gutmann and Thompson 2009). Western democracies have in general higher levels of civic participation than, for example, post-communist new democracies (Howard 2003). Low participation and lower trust in institutions in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism is to a large extent linked to the past of forced participation and mobilization in these societies. The expectation is thus that participation and deliberation are more crucial to the conception of legitimacy among citizens of Western democratic countries than in post-communist democracies and non-democracies. So two comparative hypotheses based on these expectations are formulated: *'Procedural justice is a more important factor for perceptions of legitimacy among democratic citizens than among citizens socialized in new democracies and hybrid regimes (H8)'* and *'Citizen participation is more important for perceived legitimacy in old democracies (H9)'*.

Despite lower social engagement in political and civil processes, according to Kluegel and Mason (2004, p.817) also a strong preference for egalitarianism among citizens in post-communist countries is a legacy of the previous political system and makes citizens sensitive to fair economic distribution. Moreover, the salience of distributive justice was enhanced in this region by the initial results of transition from communism to capitalism and democracy, which increased social inequality and benefited the old *nomenklatura* more than average citizens. The increase of unemployment and inequality measured by the GINI coefficient meant a widening gap between the rich and poor and feelings of distributive injustice (Mason 2003). On the basis of these social developments and the results of the analysis of the International Social Justice Project data by Kluegel and Mason (2004), justice in economic distribution is expected to be more important for the perceived legitimacy among people in post-communist countries. Hence another hypothesis that will be tested in this project is: *'Distributive justice has a more important role in perceptions of legitimacy among citizens socialized in post-communist regimes than among citizens socialized in democracies (H10)'*.

Hybrid regimes seek confirmation of their right to rule through the institution of elections, which are usually seen as a defining attribute of democratic systems

(Gerschewski 2013), but these elections are characterized by controlled competition and manipulation. In fact, the role of elections in supplying legitimacy might be less important for domestic legitimacy than other factors—elections might be used merely to signal ‘that alternatives are unlikely’ (Marquez 2015). Authorities in hybrid regimes use various legitimation strategies to convince multiple audiences about the rightfulness of their rule. For example, in Russia multiple narratives are used by elites to justify the current political system as the most suitable one for the good of the nation. The common narratives are those of stability and order that should be the values guiding how the country is governed as well as references to exceptionalism of Russians and national values. These narratives find support from citizens as reflected by public opinion surveys (see Carnaghan 2010, p.155), but the implications of this are not clear. It is, for example, not sure whether the authorities’ ideas about what constitutes order are the same as the citizens’ ideas about it. Moreover we do not know if order (or nationalism) constitutes the grounds for granting legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. Therefore the last hypothesis that will be tested in this project is: *Stability and order are expected to be important for evaluations of legitimacy of political authorities in Russia (H11).*

Summary of research questions and hypotheses

The main purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to answering two questions: what factors contribute to perceived legitimacy and how do they vary across citizens socialized in different political regimes. The different political regimes under investigation are old democracies (France and the Netherlands), new post-communist democracy (Poland), post-communist hybrid regime in crisis (Ukraine), and post-communist hybrid regime with growing authoritarian tendencies (Russia). The choice of cases will be explained in Chapter 2.

The first empirical study investigates the causal links between four factors identified above—distributive justice, procedural justice, dependence, and personal outcome—and perceived legitimacy. It compares these links across five countries with different political regimes. In the study in Chapter 3 hypotheses H1-H8 and H10 will be tested. The second empirical study is concerned with citizens’ idea of legitimacy

and it explores the views of citizens socialized in different regimes about what should characterize legitimate political authorities. This study presented in Chapter 4 will try to find support for the hypotheses H7-H11 with a different method. The third empirical study researches the evaluations of real political authorities in each of the five countries and analyses the contribution of the ideas about what the political system should represent and how it actually performs to the explanation of perceived legitimacy (Chapter 5). It addresses hypotheses H2, H4, and H6 (see the list below).

Chapter 2 will discuss the methodology used in each of the three empirical chapters: the selection of cases, design of the studies, data collection procedures, sample, as well as some data organization procedures.

List of hypotheses:

H1: Positive personal outcome increases perceived legitimacy of political authorities (tested in Chapter 3).

H2: Procedural justice increases perceived legitimacy of political authorities (tested in Chapters 3 and 5).

H3: The effect of procedural justice on legitimacy is stronger when individuals experience positive personal outcomes (Chapter 3).

H4: Distributive justice increases perceived legitimacy of political authorities (Chapter 3 and 5).

H5: The effect of distributive justice on legitimacy is stronger when individuals experience positive personal outcomes (Chapter 3).

H6: Dependence on political authorities increases perceived legitimacy of the authorities (Chapters 3 and 5).

H7: The most important motives citizens have to grant legitimacy to/support authorities in non-democracies are of instrumental nature (Chapters 3 and 4).

H8: Procedural justice is a more important factor for perceptions of legitimacy among democratic citizens than among citizens socialized in new democracies and hybrid regimes (Chapters 3 and 4)

H9: Citizen participation is more important for perceived legitimacy in old democracies (Chapter 4).

H10: Distributive justice has a more important role in perceptions of legitimacy among citizens socialized in post-communist regimes than among citizens socialized in democracies (Chapter 3 and 4).

H11: Stability and order are expected to be important for evaluations of legitimacy of political authorities in Russia (Chapter 4).

Chapter 2. Methodology

2.1. Comparative study of perceived legitimacy

The main goal of this research project is to find and compare the criteria on the basis of which people attribute the right to rule to political authorities in different political regimes. To answer the research questions and test the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 1, I used three methods and conducted a survey in five countries to collect comparative data. To be able to say something about perceived legitimacy in hybrid regimes, I investigated them in a comparative perspective and included democratic cases in the case selection. In the choice of countries, I followed the diverse cases selection strategy to achieve variation on two variables: regime type and experience with communist rule (Gerring 2008, p.650). Since I am interested in differences between democratic and hybrid regimes, I selected contrasting cases: on one end I included two post-communist (and post-Soviet) hybrid regimes, namely Russia and Ukraine, on the other end there are two old democracies—the Netherlands and France. In between these contrasting cases there is a new post-communist democracy—Poland. Including Poland in the dataset allows for controlling for similarities between countries that share the communist past. Apart from the differences and similarities between the contrasting countries, I am also interested in the differences and similarities between the “relatively similar” cases (Dogan and Pelassy 1990, p.132), namely between old democracies, between post-communist countries, and between post-Soviet hybrid regimes.

Hybrid regimes: Russia and Ukraine

The debate on the ‘grey-zone’ regimes in democratisation studies and the proliferation of regimes that do not fall into the clear-cut categories of democracy and authoritarianism, led to conceptual stretching and confusion in taxonomies of regimes (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Armony and Schamis 2005). Scholars initially labelled these grey-zone regimes with adjectives indicating that they represent diminished types of democracy, e.g. defective, delegative, electoral, managed, and illiberal (Kubicek 1994; O’Donell 1994; Lipman and McFaul 2001; Zakaria 2003; Gilbert and Mohseni 2011). The trend in classifying these regimes changed in the 2000s when adjectives

were added to indicate diminished subtypes of authoritarianism, e.g. electoral, competitive, new, innovative, and deliberative (Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002, 2010; Ottaway 2003; Schedler 2006; Bogaards 2009; Bunce and Wolchik 2010; He and Warren 2011). Categorizing a country as one type of regime or the other depends on the criteria that are used to evaluate it.

Russia and Ukraine since the 1990s both were categorized as hybrid regimes—unconsolidated democracies or unconsolidated autocracies (Way 2005)—and many parallels were drawn between Ukraine’s transition from communism under Kravchuk (1991-1994) and Kuchma (1994-2004) and Russia’s under Yeltsin (1991-1999) and Putin’s early regime (from 1999). From the moment Putin started to introduce reforms that increased his powers, curbed competition, and led to the marginalization of democratic opposition, Russia’s and Ukraine’s paths started to diverge more visibly (Kuzio 2006). While Putin established the party of power—United Russia— which dominated the legislative institutions (Wilson 2009; White and Kryshtanovskaya 2011, p.558), in Ukraine this has never happened and each election reflected strong competition between two blocks that had their support bases in different regions: national-democrats oriented more towards the EU were supported by the Western and Central regions and the pro-Russian Communists/socialists were supported by the industrial regions in the East and South.

In Ukraine, the spectacular protests known as the Orange Revolution of 2004/2005 (Kubicek 2009, p.327) resulted in the re-vote of the falsified second round of presidential elections and the victory of Yushchenko, who became the president of Ukraine in January 2005. He was the politician running against the pro-incumbent candidate—Yanukovich. This, nevertheless, did not end internal battles between the two camps that have essentially two opposite visions of the development of the country (especially that Yanukovich’s Party of Regions won the parliamentary elections in 2006 and he became the prime-minister) as well as internal battles within the Orange camp between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko (who served as prime-minister in 2005 and 2007-2010). The conflicts within the Orange coalition, corruption, and the lack of improvement of the economic situation in the country made the young supporters of Maidan disillusioned about the government. Tymoshenko lost the run for presidency to

Yanukovych in 2010 and this began the reversal of the started democratizing reforms (Brudny and Finkel 2011, p.827). The crucial moment that led to another serious upheaval in Ukraine was the refusal by Yanukovych to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union in 2013. This caused another wave of protest, which turned into a confrontation between the security forces and the protesters. The events in the winter of 2013/2014 at Maidan had even more serious consequences this time, as Russia, who supported Yanukovych and his rejection of the closer association with the EU, used the moment of political and civic chaos to annex Crimea under a fabricated pretext of defending their compatriots (Russians living on the peninsula). Moreover, Russia has been (unofficially) supporting separatists from the Eastern and Southern regions of the country in their fight against the newly installed government in Kiev. The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine reported in June 2015 that the death toll in the conflict zone of Eastern Ukraine by conservative estimate has been 6,417 people (including 626 women and girls) and the number of wounded was 15,962 people (United Nations Human Rights 2015). Despite the Minsk ceasefire agreement from February 2015, the violence continues as Russia denies its involvement while escalating the hostilities between the separatists in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions and the pro-governmental forces (Kardaś and Konończuk 2015).

In this dynamic situation in both countries, the categorization of the regime becomes problematic and the regime scores change depending on the exact timing of data collection as well as the criteria of assessment. Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers 2013) classified Russia as anocracy with a score of 4 (open anocracy)⁵. Russia's score decreased from 6 to 4 in 2007 after 7 years of being in the category of democracies. The Polity IV score is a rather optimistic ranking for Russia. Freedom House⁶ ranks Russia as 'not free' since 2005 (2015) and Levitsky and Way (2010, p.371), based on civil liberties, elections, and playing field, categorized Russia as full authoritarian regime from 2008. According to The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU; 2011, 2014), Russia's democratic record deteriorated between 2011 and 2014 (it fell from the 117th to 132nd place of 167 countries) and it was classified as an authoritarian

⁵ The scale for Polity IV runs from 10 (full democracy) to -10 (autocracy).

⁶ Freedom House uses the scale from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free).

regime with overall score of 3.39 on the scale from 1—authoritarian, to 10—democratic. Also The Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BSTI) shows the trend towards authoritarian rule and in 2014 classified Russia as a moderate autocracy by comparison with highly defective democracy in 2012 (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016)⁷.

By comparison, Ukraine received a score between 6 and 7 between 1995 and 2013 from Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2013), which puts it in the category of (not full) democracies. Freedom House ranked Ukraine as free between 2006 and 2010 and as partially free from 2011 until 2015 (2015). Levitsky and Way considered it a democracy in 2008 (2010, p.371). The Economist Intelligence Unit (2011, 2014) classified Ukraine as a hybrid regime in 2011 and 2014, but its overall score fell from 5.94 (which was on the border between hybrid regime and flawed democracy) in 2011 to of 5.42 in 2014. The Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index ranked Ukraine's democratic performance the same in 2012 and 2014 with the score of 6.1 and classified it as defective democracy (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016).

These rankings indicate that in general both countries are considered as hybrid regimes that combine electoral mechanisms and other democratic institutions with authoritarian practices. Ukraine, however, throughout the 2000s moved in the direction of democracy (albeit not without setbacks), whereas Russia has been moving towards full authoritarianism.

Democracies: Poland, Netherlands, and France

Next to these two post-communist—and also post-Soviet—hybrid regimes, another post-communist case was included, Poland. Since 1989 Poland embarked on a transition to democracy. Poland is currently a member of the European Union and considered one of the examples of successful democratization. From the beginning of the 2000s, Polity IV gave Poland the highest score of 10—full democracy. Freedom House classified Poland as free already in 1990 and from 2005 assigned it the most positive freedom score. The Economist Intelligence Unit categorized Poland as a flawed democracy with the score of 7.12 in 2011 and with the score of 7.47 in 2014.

⁷ Bertelsmann Stiftung experts evaluate aspects of transformation on the scale from 10 to 8.5 (democracy in consolidation) on one side to below 4 (hard-line autocracy) on the other.

Poland was ranked very high in The Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (fifth most advanced transformation) and was categorized as democracy in consolidation in 2014.

The Netherlands is consistently placed among the most democratic countries in the world. It is a full democracy according to Polity IV, it has been considered free by Freedom House since 1973 (the first round of evaluation), and it is in the top ten of full democracies according to The Economist Intelligence Unit. France's regime record is similar to the Netherlands. It is a slightly lower ranked full democracy than the Netherlands and only in 2011 France was categorized by The Economist Intelligence Unit the same as Poland—flawed democracy—with the score of 7.77. These two cases represent old democracies, however with different political systems. While the Netherlands is a constitutional (parliamentary) monarchy, France is a semi-presidential republic. Choosing these two different old democracies, allows checking whether there are common legitimacy ideas and perceived legitimacy patterns that associated with the fact of being an old democracy.

Table 2.1 summarizes the discussed categorizations and characteristics of the regimes of the five countries selected for this study.

Table 2.1. Comparison of regimes: evaluations by different institutions and projects

	Russia	Ukraine	Poland	Netherlands	France
<i>Previous regime</i>	Communist/Soviet	Communist/ Soviet	Communist	Democracy	Democracy
<i>Current political system</i>	Presidential	Semi-presidential	Semi-presidential	Parliamentary	Semi-presidential
<i>Polity IV</i> -10 (autocracy) to 10 (full democracy)	1991-2000: open anocracy (1-5) 2000-2007: Democracy (6) 2007-2013: Open anocracy (4)	1991-1993: Democracy (6) 1994: open anocracy (5) 1995-2013: Democracy (6-7)	1991-2000: Democracy (6-9) 2001-2013: Full democracy (10)	Full democracy (10)	Democracy (9)
<i>Freedom House</i> 1 (most free) to 7 (least free)	1999-2005: partly free (4.5-5) Since 2005: not free (5.5-6.0)	1999-2005: partly free (3.5-4.0) 2006-2010: free (2.5) Since 2011: partly free (3.0-3.5)	Free since 1999 (1.0-1.5)	Free since 1999 (1)	Free since 1998 (1-1.5)
<i>EIU</i> 1(authoritarian) to 10 (democratic)	2006: hybrid regime (5.02) 2015: authoritarian (3.31)	2006: flawed democracy (6.94) 2015: hybrid regime (5.70)	2006: flawed democracy (7.30) 2015: flawed democracy (7.09)	2006: full democracy (9.66) 2015: full democracy (8.92)	2006: full democracy (8.07) 2015: flawed democracy (7.92)
<i>BSTI</i> 10 (democracy in consolidation) to 1(hard-line autocracy)	2006: highly defective democracy (5.7) 2015: moderate autocracy (4.4)	2012: defective democracy (7.1) 2015: defective democracy (6.8)	2006: democracy in consolidation (9.2) 2015: democracy in consolidation (9.5)	-	-

2.2. Sample

Because this project aims to test theories (instrumental vs. normative motives) as well as compare conceptions of legitimacy among citizens socialized in different regimes, the group of citizens that I selected for the investigation is the same in each country. I used student samples between the age of 16 and 25⁸. In each country I collected samples of students, because they are a comparable social category in the cross-cultural context: they come from similar backgrounds, have a similar social position (at least relative to other groups within their respective societies), more often than other groups use the internet as a source of information, and—most importantly—because of their similar age, they were equally recently socialized into their respective political communities. In this way many variables were kept constant and this allowed assessing the differences in the evaluation process to the different political contexts in which the respondents grew up. Students are a homogenous population, so they constitute a suitable population for experimental research, which is one of the methods used in this dissertation.

Also, student samples can be used for researching political attitudes and beliefs for several reasons. First, students are potential voters and typically participate in political and associational life. Second, they are a population that is on average more informed. Third, they have more sophisticated ideas about political systems and are more familiar with the concepts researched in this study (see Mintz *et al.* 2006, p.769). Also, they can be considered more representative of the public than the elites (Mintz *et al.* 2006). Some studies from the USA support this idea and suggest that the views of students and the general population overlap to a large extent and the distributions on the variables of interest to political scientists are very similar for students and general public (Druckman and Kam 2011, pp.51–52). In addition, students can be considered

⁸ In the Netherlands students were prevalingly recruited from history and political science programmes; in France they were recruited among others from economy and management, applied studies of foreign languages, sociology, political science, law, and art history; in Poland from journalism, economy, management, public administration, American studies, national security, international relations, and social communication; in Ukraine among others from history, linguistics, political science, languages, journalism, law, ecology, and engineering; in Russia students were recruited from the most diverse programmes ranging from university to professional education.

as future political leaders (Mickiewicz 2014). Lastly, students were the most accessible and the least costly group to sample, which allowed for collecting large samples from five countries.

Sampling from a student population has its limitations. The main issue is the limited possibility to generalize what the young people think to the whole society in their country. There is, however, growing evidence that effects of experimental studies conducted with convenience samples such as students or online opt-in samples, recruited with various software tools (e.g. Mechanical Turk) replicate with representative samples (Mullinix *et al.* 2015)⁹. Representativeness, however, is not the main purpose of this study. The student sample is suitable for the goals that this research wants to achieve, namely theory testing and cross-country comparison of a similar population. As mentioned above, thanks to the student sample it is possible to keep many variables constant and to investigate causal links using experimental methodology, as well as compare similar cohorts that were all socialized after the fall of the communist block and lived most of their lives in the 2000s. If there are striking differences in students' ideas about what constitutes a legitimate authority in hybrid regimes and if these differences reflect the ideas promoted by the regimes, this could imply that students are socialized to internalize different ideas about state-society relations. In other words, if socialization into different political culture matters for the establishment of values important for evaluating what is legitimate, then even students should mention some of these culturally-determined characteristics. For this reason, using a student sample is a powerful test of the political socialization theory. The choice for student samples thus allows for relatively straightforward comparative interpretation of the results.

2.3. Survey

The data was collected through a survey that was divided into three parts. The first part included a vignette experiment, in which students were asked to read a hypothetical story and answer several questions about the legitimacy of the government in the story.

⁹This is not to say that effects of any study conducted with student population can be replicated with representative samples or that they can substitute them.

Participants then answered manipulation check questions and basic demographic data including the study programme they were admitted to. The second part of the survey contained survey questions about respondents' political system preferences as well as evaluations of the actual institutions in their country. The last part of the survey contained a couple of open questions and three questions measuring the socio-economic status of participants (see the full survey in Appendix B).

The survey was administered as a pen-and-paper task in the Netherlands, Poland, France, and partially in Russia. Additional data in Russia was collected online and the Ukrainian sample was collected fully online. The hard-copy version and online version of the study were designed to make them as similar as possible. Even though the software allowed for more options of randomization in the online version than pen-and-paper version (e.g. randomization of all the questions), the decision was made to follow the most similar design in both versions, so the data remained comparable. Both the online and the pen-and-paper versions of the survey were preceded by instructions and informed about the possibility to leave or withdraw from the study at any time, that their responses were anonymous, and provided information about what was expected from participants if they proceed to the survey (see Appendix C).

To check whether the mode of data collection influenced the results, analyses were conducted to compare the online and pen-and-paper samples from Russia. The online and pen-and-paper samples were compared for the experimental vignette study (Chapter 3) and for the correlational study (Chapter 5). In general, in the vignette study (involving an evaluation of a hypothetical government) the level of perceived legitimacy was higher in the online sample than in the pen-and paper sample. All effects, however, had the same direction in both samples. The difference was in the magnitude of the effects; they were larger in the online sample than in the pen-and-paper sample (see Appendix D). Also the comparison of the online sample and the pen-and-paper sample for the correlational study showed that perceived legitimacy of three institutions (government, courts, and president) was higher in the online sample and also that all effects were in the same direction in both samples (for more details see Appendix D). The results of these analyses show that the results (observed effects of

manipulations, correlations between variables) were not caused by differences in the mode of data collection and did not affect inferences regarding the tested hypotheses.

The data collection in the Netherlands took place at the University of Leiden in September and October 2014. The French sample was collected at the University of Lyon in November and December 2014¹⁰. The data collection in Poland took place at universities and higher education institutions in Poznan and Krakow in May, June, and December 2014. The data collection in Ukraine was conducted using Qualtrics online survey software. Participants of the survey were recruited from universities in Kiev and Mykolaiv and completed the online survey between June and November 2014. The data collection in Russia was conducted using two methods. The first bulk of data was collected in May and June 2014 in a survey administered as a pen-and-paper task. The second bulk of data was collected in June and September-December 2014 using Qualtrics online survey software. For the pen-and-paper task, participants were recruited from the Higher School of Economics in Moscow and 303 responses were collected. To recruit additional participants, an online link to the survey was circulated on social networks for students by a research assistant based in Moscow. Participants of the online survey included in the analysis came from around 300 different universities and higher education institutions located in many regions of Russia (see Appendix E for the full list).

In each country the study was conducted in the native language of respondents and the questions were included or excluded only on the basis of applicability to a given political system (e.g. a set of questions about the president did not apply to the Netherlands). The English text was the basis for all translations, although the translators of the Ukrainian and Russian version consulted also the wordings in Russian and Polish, respectively. All translations were done or proof-read by native speakers and assured the closest similarity to the original while keeping it understandable in a specific national context.

¹⁰ This was several months before the terrorist attack on the offices of the French satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo in Paris on 7 January 2015 that led to a nation-wide protest.

Experimental vignette

Randomized experiments became a more prominent research method in political science in the last couple of decades (Druckman *et al.* 2006). Experiments are a research method that facilitates ‘causal inference through the transparency and content of their procedures, most notably the random assignment of observations (a.k.a. subjects or experimental participants) to treatment and control groups’ (Druckman *et al.* 2011, p.3). Thus, what distinguishes experiments from other research methods is the possibility to control the factors that influence participants of the experiment, i.e. the possibility to manipulate exactly the factors that the experimenter wants to manipulate. This kind of control is not present in either public opinion surveys (usually exploring correlational relations between variables) or interviews. Moreover, thanks to the experimental design, researchers have better tools to achieve internal validity by randomly assigning participants to different experimental conditions and to establish causality (which is often not the case with other methods), i.e. they can check whether the experimental stimulus indeed had an impact on the dependent variable. The lack of internal validity can render any study (not only experimental ones) useless; therefore the priority of any experiment is to make sure that the manipulation has an effect on the subjects and to ensure ‘experimental realism’ (Druckman and Kam 2011, p.44).

The type of experiment used to study perceived legitimacy in this project is the factorial vignette experiment¹¹. The aim of vignette experiments (and factorial surveys) is to ‘determine the underlying principles behind human judgments (or evaluations) of social objects’ (Rossi and Anderson 1982). A vignette ‘is a short, carefully constructed description of a person, object, or situation, representing a systematic combination of characteristics (Atzmüller and Steiner 2010, p.128). Factorial vignette experiments use stories (vignettes) to manipulate a set of variables (factors) in all their possible combinations and check the effect of these variables and their interactions on the dependent variable. This method allows for controlling the influence of selected factors on the dependent variable. It also allows providing context to the evaluation of, for example, political authorities by presenting a story with several variables that are

¹¹ It is also known as factorial survey. The term factorial survey is more often used in case of nationally representative studies.

expected to play a role when people judge the legitimacy and performance of institutions and politicians. This helps to establish external validity, because participants are confronted with a realistic story. Moreover, participants can weigh different aspects of the political process and their own situation before making a legitimacy judgment. The possibility of measuring the beliefs and perceptions after providing standardized, controlled, and carefully constructed context is considered one of the biggest advantages of vignette experiments (Finch 1987, pp.105–106).

The vignette text in the experiment conducted for this thesis described a hypothetical situation in which a government made a decision about helping the victims of a flood that had occurred in their country. In the vignette four factors (see Chapter 1) were manipulated each taking two levels: being strong/present (level 1) or being weak/absent (level 2). This 2 (procedural justice) $\times 2$ (distributive justice) $\times 2$ (dependence) $\times 2$ (personal outcome) design yielded 16 versions of the story. The same 16 vignettes were presented to students socialized in five different countries in their native language (see Appendix F for all 16 versions of the vignette in all languages). The survey was administered as a paper-and-pen task to students in the Netherlands, Poland, France, and Russia and online to students in Ukraine and Russia. The pen & paper version of the study was administered to students after or during larger lectures in the class-rooms with the help of lecturers. The samples were collected at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow and around 300 other universities and polytechnics across Russia (see the list of higher education institutions in Appendix E). In Poland the sample was collected at the universities in Poznan, Pila, and Krakow, in the Netherlands in Leiden, in France in Lyon, and in Ukraine in Kiev and Mikolayiv (in Southern Ukraine).

Each participant was presented with one vignette only so that all manipulations were between-subjects. Participants received an instruction explaining that the story they are about to read is a hypothetical one and that they should imagine that they and their families are in the described situation before answering the questions. The procedural justice manipulation was inspired by the manipulation used by Tyler and Caine (1981, p.650) in their study of endorsement of formal leaders, where the City Councilmen made a voting decision either based on a meeting with his

constituents or based on his own feelings. In the present experiment a governmental commission either organized a series of meetings with victims of the flooding during which they had a chance to talk about the damages they suffered and propose forms of help that the government could offer them or a governmental commission refused to meet with the victims. The manipulation of dependence on the help of the government referred to the loss the respondent and his family suffered because of the flooding: the respondent either suffered a marginal loss (the family lost only a car that they were using in the weekends) or the house and possessions of the family suffered damages and they had limited access to primary goods like food and other essentials. The manipulation of personal outcome referred to either reception of the governmental help or to its lack. The manipulation of distributive justice referred to whom the government offered their help—either providing the benefits to everybody who needed the help most or omitting certain groups.¹² To illustrate how the text of the vignette was constructed, below is one of 16 versions of the vignette used to manipulate procedural justice (present), distributive justice (present), dependence (absent), positive outcome (present).¹³

[**The same in each version**] There was a flooding in your region. The water is gone now. [**Independence from the authorities**] The house and most possessions of your family did not suffer damages. Your family has access to primary goods like food and other essentials. However, your family lost a car that you used in the weekends. [**The same in each version**] The government

¹² For reasons of keeping the vignettes internally consistent (and still keeping the balanced design of the experiment), the manipulation of outcome was slightly different in one combination of dependence and distributive justice. Because it was impossible for a distributively just government (distributive justice condition) to provide no help to the people who needed it the most (dependence condition), the help was provided (despite the negative outcome condition), but did not improve the material situation of the victims of flooding. The manipulation of distributive justice and negative outcome in this case was: ‘[**Distributive justice part 1**] Then the government decided to provide benefits for every flood victim whose house or crop fields were damaged. [**Negative outcome**] Although you will receive the benefit, it is useless. The benefit is not even close to the minimum that is needed to help your family to get back on their feet. [**Distributive justice part 2**] Also farmers from your region will receive this kind of benefits to compensate for the destruction of their crop fields that were the only source of income for their families.’ The manipulations in this shape were used in V13 and V14 (see Appendix F).

¹³ Pre-tests with international and Dutch students at the University of Leiden (N = 87) and a pre-test with Russian students at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow (N = 16) tested whether the manipulations have worked as intended. Short (15 min) informal focus groups with the students who completed the questionnaire helped to improve the phrasing and coherence of the manipulations.

has enough available resources to offer help. A governmental commission came to your region to estimate the damages and write a report. **[Procedural justice]** Before writing the report, the commission held a series of meetings with victims of the flooding. The victims had an opportunity to talk about the damages they suffered and propose forms of help that the government could offer them. Everybody got a chance to present their point of view and the report guided the decision of the government. **[Distributive justice part 1]** Then the government decided that every flood victim will receive a benefit in proportion to the losses they suffered. **[Outcome]** As a consequence, you will receive a benefit that will help you buy a car. **[Distributive justice part 2]** Farmers from your region will receive benefits to compensate for the destruction of their crop fields that were the only source of income for their families.

After reading the vignette, participants completed the following questions about perceived political legitimacy: 1) The government has the right to take this kind of decisions; 2) Decisions of this government should be respected; 3) I would trust this government; 4) I would like it, if in the future, this government made decisions on this type of issues that influence my life; 5) On the whole this government is legitimate; 6) I would be ready to protest against this decision of the government; 7) If this situation is representative of how the government acts, I would like this government to rule in my country. The following questions served as manipulation checks: 1) After the flooding, I was dependent on the government for help; 2) The way in which the government arrived at this decision was fair; 3) The decision of the government represented a fair distribution of help; 4) The decision of the government had a positive effect on my personal financial situation. For all questions participants indicated their answers on a 7-point scale from 1 = Fully disagree to 7 = Fully agree.

Open question study

The word legitimacy is used in many academic and public debates. It appears frequently in the press and other mass media. However, many scholars believe that using the word itself to ask a question about legitimacy to citizens is too confusing, too difficult, or too abstract. Legitimacy is a latent concept and scholars often debate and contest its meaning and devise proxies for empirical measurement. It is unclear to what extent the understanding of scholars coincides with the meaning assigned to the word

by broader educated audience, especially in cross-cultural context. While the proxies used so far might give indication about the trends in legitimacy, people's understanding of it could bring new insights into the weight of different supposed components of legitimacy. Following this approach, I conducted a study that could be described as a study of folk political philosophy, in which participants got a chance to answer an open question about what they think the most important characteristics of legitimate authorities are. On the basis of their answers, the research contributed to clarifying hierarchy in the dimensions of the concept in different political regimes.

Data and methodology: development of the coding scheme

Students from the Netherlands, France, Poland, Ukraine, and Russia answered an open question 'In your opinion, what characterizes legitimate authorities? Please list up to five characteristics in order of importance (1 = most important).'¹⁴ The same samples of students were used to analyse the open question answers as for the vignette experiment study. Participants could name up to five characteristics of legitimate political authorities in order of importance. In each country only a part of participants responded to the open question and only a portion of those gave all five answers (see Table 2.2).

¹⁴ The question was translated into five languages. In Dutch: Wat zijn volgens u de kenmerken van legitieme autoriteiten? Noem maximaal vijf karakteristieken in volgorde van belangrijkheid (1 = meest belangrijk). In French: Quelles sont les caractéristiques d'une autorité légitime? Veuillez lister jusqu'à cinq caractéristiques par ordre d'importance (1 = le plus important). In Polish: Czym charakteryzuje się władza posiadająca legitymizację? Proszę nazwać do pięciu cech w porządku od najważniejszego (1 = najważniejsza cecha). In Ukrainian: Чим, на Вашу думку, характеризується легітимна влада? Вкажіть, будь ласка, до п'яти характеристик, починаючи від найбільш важливої (1 = найважливіша риса). In Russian: Чем характеризуется легитимная власть? Пожалуйста, назовите до пяти характеристик в порядке важности (1 = самое важное).

Table 2.2. Numbers of answers to the open question.

Country	Answer 1	Answer 2	Answer 3	Answer 4	Answer 5	Total
Ukraine	271	254	218	160	118	1021
Russia	409	352	270	177	125	1333
Poland	269	251	212	173	141	1046
France	189	179	146	111	76	701
The Netherlands	292	271	224	152	110	1048

In the first round of coding each of two coders received a random sample of 10% of participants from one country who gave at least one answer to the question. Coder 2 received a 10% random sample of participants from the Netherlands and Coder 3 received a 10% random sample of participants from Poland. I coded both random samples (Coder 1). Coders 2 and 3 received an instruction, in which they were asked to code the answers in two ways.

First, the coders were asked to evaluate the surface meaning of the answers (a meaning the closest to the intention of the respondent) to make sure that we get a detailed picture of what kind of answers participants provided. This kind of coding is sometimes referred to as ‘representational coding’: using codes that represent what is ‘out there’ as closely as possible (Sapsford and Jupp 2006, pp.170–171). The idea behind this coding is to represent as closely as possible the answers of respondents while grouping these answers into categories (hence, reducing the number of answers). The difficulty is to find the right balance between the number of categories (codes) and the number of phenomena and ideas expressed by respondents.

Second, the coders were asked to interpret the answers from the theoretical point of view and categorize them according to the input, throughput and output aspects of legitimacy drawing on the work of Scharpf (2003) and Schmidt (2013) outlined above. The coders, who are familiar with the political legitimacy literature, received a brief description of each of the three categories¹⁵. This type of coding is

¹⁵ **Input:** is about governing by (and of) the people; in democracies usually referring to representation of interests through a vote in elections, in authoritarian regimes it could be, for example, ideology; Scharpf (2003). **Output:** is about governing for the people; Scharpf (2003). **Throughput:** is about governing with the people; emphasises the role of the quality of processes in decision-making, e.g. efficacy, accountability, transparency, inclusiveness and openness to interest intermediation (Schmidt 2013, p.3).

referred to as ‘hypothesis-guided coding’, in which a theoretical distinction guides the process of assigning specific codes (Sapsford and Jupp 2006, pp.170–171). There were three rounds of coding involving three coders and two rounds of discussion involving two coders that led to achieving reasonably high inter-coder reliability (see Appendix G for details regarding the development of the coding scheme).

In the final round Coder 1 and Coder 2 achieved 77.39% of complete agreement. Coder 1 and Coder 3 completely agreed about 81.73%. The final list of codes used to categorize the answers of respondents is presented in Table 2.3. The trade-off between keeping such a large number of codes and inter-coder reliability is discussed in more detail in Appendix F.

The hypothesis-guided code list is presented in Table 2.4. For the purpose of further analysis based on the theoretical distinctions between input, throughput, and output, the definitions of each of these aspects of legitimacy had to be specified. In this study, input was defined as the basis on which authorities are representing the people—it refers to the reasons people hold to designate others to act on their behalf. This includes the ways in which the interests of the citizens can reach (potential) authorities, who in turn can become their representatives, so any input of ideas or interest of citizens in the political process is included.¹⁶ Throughput refers to the process of the use of power and personal characteristics of authorities that influence how the authorities govern. Output was defined as including all (expected) results of governing—in other words, the outcomes of the use of power (Bovens 2005). The representational codes from Table 2.2 were assigned to the aspects of legitimacy that they fitted the most within. Table 2.3 lists the representational codes that were assigned to each of these aspects of legitimacy.

¹⁶ This understanding of input is close to Beetham’s ‘consent’ dimension of legitimacy in the modern state in its electoral and mobilizational forms (1991, pp.150–158).

Table 2.3. List of representational and hypothesis-guided codes (used in the last coding phase).

	REPRESENTATIONAL CODES	HYPOTHESIS-GUIDED CODES
1	ELECTIONS Reference to the choice of the people, free and fair elections, legally chosen	INPUT
2	JUSTICE Refers not to the actors/politicians, but to the system and how it operates, when the word 'justice' or 'righteousness' is used	THROUGHPUT
3	LEGAL VALIDITY/LEGALITY Constitutionality, being formed on the basis of law, lawfulness, refers to the legal acquisition of power—legality, following the laws, not breaking of the laws	THROUGHPUT
4	CHECKS & BALANCES Checks and balances between institutions, courts, acting within given authority, separation of powers, control by citizens	THROUGHPUT
5	EQUALITY When this exact formulation is given	THROUGHPUT
6	IMPARTIALITY Equal treatment, just treatment, objectivity, independence, not subject to pressures	THROUGHPUT
7	HONESTY/FAIRNESS Using 'fair-play' rules, sincere; can refer to some sort of distributive justice too, honesty/fairness of the actors/politicians; in general use the code when the word honesty/fairness is used	THROUGHPUT
8	TRANSPARENCY Openness, no corruption, clarity, transparency	THROUGHPUT
9	(DE FACTO) AUTHORITY Taking decisions, (being able to) making laws, executing decisions/laws, effectiveness	OUTPUT
10	RELIABILITY Doing things as promised, eliciting belief—credibility, completing postulates, trustworthiness	THROUGHPUT
11	ACTING FOR THE COMMON GOOD/FOR CITIZENS Acting not for their own interest, acting for citizens, altruism, selflessness	OUTPUT
12	TRUST/SUPPORT	INPUT
13	ACCEPTANCE/APPROVAL Recognition by citizens, acceptance, respect from citizens, obedience, no protest, voluntariness, consent	INPUT
14	SECURITY/ORDER/STABILITY Taking care of the state security	OUTPUT
15	EXPERTISE Knowledge, competence, experience necessary to take good decisions/actions	OUTPUT
16	REPRESENTATION Referring to the representation of certain interests, party's electorate	INPUT

Table 2.3 continues		
17	WELFARE/ECONOMIC PROSPERITY Referring to economic development, improvement of living standards, help to the poor etc.	OUTPUT
18	INTEGRITY References to moral standing/qualities and values, characteristics that make someone a good politician; used for moral qualities and characteristics that do not fit with other categories and are encompassed by the term integrity (including responsibility, truth-telling, respect)	THROUGHPUT
19	CITIZEN PARTICIPATION/CONSULTATION Turnout, referenda, civil society, consulting with citizens, deliberation, listening to the citizens, accessibility, rallies	INPUT
20	PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS & FREEDOMS Tolerance, freedom, respect for an individual	OUTPUT
21	DEMOCRACY When only the word 'democracy' or 'democratic' is used	INPUT
22	IDEOLOGICAL When a specific ideology is named (e.g. conservative, liberal, socialist)	INPUT
23	TRADITIONAL/RELIGIOUS	INPUT
24	EFFICIENCY Efficient way of acting, only about the process	THROUGHPUT
25	FOREIGN POLICY	OUTPUT
26	INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION	INPUT
27	NATIONAL INTEREST/ SOVEREIGNTY	OUTPUT
28	LEADERSHIP/CHARISMA References to leadership, the rule of strong leader, charisma	THROUGHPUT
29	PATRIOTISM/NATIONALISM National identity, national values, patriotic	OUTPUT
30	NATIONAL UNITY** Appeared in the French dataset several times	OUTPUT
31	OTHER**	OTHER

** If an answer did not fit in any of the listed categories, it was assigned the code 'other'.

*** The code 'national unity' was added by Coder 1 when coding the French sample (after the Polish and Dutch samples)

Table 2.4. Hypothesis guided codes: representational codes according to input, throughput, output criteria.

INPUT	THROUGHPUT	OUTPUT
1. Elections	1. Justice	1. (De facto) authority
2. Trust/support	2. Legal validity/legality	2. Acting for the common good/for citizens
3. Acceptance/approval	3. Checks & balances	3. Security/order/stability
4. Representation/pluralism	4. Equality	4. Welfare/economic prosperity
5. Citizen participation/consultation	5. Impartiality	5. Protection of individual rights & freedoms
6. Democracy	6. Honesty/fairness	6. Foreign policy
7. Ideological	7. Transparency	7. National interest/sovereignty
8. Traditional/religious	8. Reliability	8. Patriotism/nationalism
	9. Expertise	9. National unity
	10. Integrity	
	11. Efficiency	
	12. Leadership/charisma	

Note. International recognition did not fit within any of the aspect of legitimacy, as all other codes pertained to domestic politics and domestic capacity of authorities to act. This code had a very low frequency, so it was not problematic to exclude them from the analysis.

Correlational study

The third empirical study included in this project involves exploring the views of participants about the institutions in their country. Questions 1-39 (see Appendix B) were used to test the relation between the perceived legitimacy, views about how the ideal political system should look like and the evaluations of performance of the political regime in the fields linked to perceived legitimacy as defined in Chapter 1. This correlational study will analyse what drives the variance in perceived legitimacy scores in the five selected countries.

Chapter 3. Comparative Study of Factors Influencing Perceived Legitimacy across Different Political Regimes

Any political authority wants to be legitimate. Even the cruellest dictator needs at least a section of population to recognize their power, believe in his right to rule and the appropriateness of his decisions. Coercion—including the use of force—and distribution of rewards is believed to be a costly manner of making people comply with laws and support a regime. Relying on legitimacy—understood as a quality that secures voluntary transfer of power to authorities based on normative grounds—at least in principle, makes ruling easier and cheaper. Studies of perceived legitimacy of police and courts showed compelling evidence that a set of factors linked to fairness enhances favourable perceptions of political authorities. These studies, however, were conducted prevalently in the context of the USA and Western Europe. This chapter explores what makes people deem governments legitimate and what role justice plays against other motives in the evaluations of authorities. As mentioned in the theoretical and methodological chapter, the study presented here is a comparative one and it aims to test the influence of the same factors believed to influence the perception of legitimacy in different political regimes, i.e. two old European democracies (Netherlands and France), a post-communist democracy (Poland), a post-communist hybrid regime in crisis (Ukraine), and a hybrid post-communist regime with increasing authoritarian tendencies (Russia).

Citizens' willingness to transfer power to political authorities is often explained through alternative, though not mutually exclusive, models of authority-citizen relations. On the one hand there is a self-interested, oriented towards personal gain, and following the logic of the rational choice theory citizen interested mainly in the outputs provided by authorities. On the other hand, a community-interested, justice-oriented, and following the logic of a fairness-based psychological model citizen whose main concern are the fair distribution and procedures (Tyler *et al.* 1986). In this chapter, I will first test these two theories and explore the relationship between the two models of a citizen using a vignette experiment. As discussed in Chapter 2, this method

allows for a joint test of multiple factors outlined in the theoretical framework and for detecting causal relations between identified factors and perceived legitimacy. The second goal of this chapter is to assess whether the theory travels well across regime types. And finally, the third goal is to compare the effects of hypothesized factors and their interactions on perceived legitimacy evaluations by individuals socialized in different political contexts.

3.1. Theory, definitions and hypotheses

Legitimacy is a quality of authorities and regimes attributed to them by citizens. As explained in more detail in Chapter 1, to assess the factors influencing evaluations of authorities by citizens, I use the conception of legitimacy which focuses on the individual level processes, i.e. perceived legitimacy. Perceived legitimacy is defined here *as an attribute ascribed to a political authority (or its representative) by individuals on the basis of evaluation of their normative qualities and resulting in a willingness to voluntarily transfer power to these authorities*. Hence, perceived legitimacy can be understood as the recognition of the authorities' right to rule based on the evaluation of certain moral standards that individual citizens are committed to.

As discussed in Chapter 1, authorities can use different sources of power to make citizens acquiesce with them, comply with their decisions, and support their actions. Perceived legitimacy is treated as one of these resources; in particular, it is the resource of power based on the evaluations of normative qualities of political authorities. Other resources of power were discussed in Chapter 1¹⁷. The main normative factors that lead to the increase of perceived legitimacy of authorities were identified by social psychologist. These factors are distributive fairness and procedural fairness (Van der Toorn *et al.* 2011). Following from this, two hypotheses were formulated¹⁸:

¹⁷ Motives that lead to involuntary compliance (such as fear of coercion) are not tested here as they would be very difficult to manipulate independently in the vignette design. Moreover, the fear of coercion is related closer to the police, courts, and military (at least in democracies) than to the government that is the object of evaluation here.

¹⁸ Hypotheses numbers were assigned in Chapter 1 and the same numbers are used consequently throughout the dissertation.

H2: Procedural justice increases perceived legitimacy of political authorities.

H4: Distributive justice increases perceived legitimacy of political authorities.

In this study, the evaluations of justice of political authorities are tested against instrumental reasons—the improvement of personal material situation. In line with rational-choice theory, positive personal outcome should be the main driver behind the evaluation of political authorities and its absence should lead to lesser appreciation of factors such as procedural and distributive justice. Hence the third hypothesis is:

H1: Positive personal outcome increases perceived legitimacy of political authorities.

Moreover, the rational choice theory implies that personal outcome matters more for the evaluation of political authorities than normative considerations. Therefore, two following hypotheses can be formulated about the interactions between personal outcome and normative factors:

H3: The effect of procedural justice on legitimacy is stronger when individuals experience positive personal outcomes.

H5: The effect of distributive justice on legitimacy is stronger when individuals experience positive personal outcomes.

Dependence of the individual on the political authorities is another factor that is expected to influence perceived legitimacy and according to system-justification theory it should increase perceived legitimacy. However, as mentioned in Chapter 1, there is evidence that comparatively worse social situation might actually decrease legitimacy. The hypothesis about dependence is based on the system-justification theory's prediction:

H6: Dependence on political authorities increases perceived legitimacy of the authorities.

Moreover, political socialization is believed to influence what rules and behaviours are considered most important by citizens, therefore differences in evaluations of political authorities between citizens socialized in different political regimes are expected. Because political socialization cannot be manipulated, the same experiment was conducted in five different countries with similar group of citizens (students) to compare the effects of different factors on their perceived legitimacy. The set of hypotheses linked to the regimes type is as follows:

H7: The most important motives citizens have to grant legitimacy to/support authorities in non-democracies are of instrumental nature.

H8: Procedural justice is a more important factor for perceptions of legitimacy among democratic citizens than among citizens socialized in new democracies and hybrid regimes

H10: Distributive justice has a more important role in perceptions of legitimacy among citizens socialized in post-communist regimes than among citizens socialized in democracies

Each of the hypothesized factors has been discussed in more detail in Chapter 1 and Figure 3.1 shows the overview of factors tested in this study.




Figure 3.1. Factors influencing perceived legitimacy tested in this study: personal outcome, dependence, distributive justice, procedural justice, and socialization (in different countries).

3.2. Experimental vignette method

As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, the method used to investigate the impact of the five factors on perceived legitimacy was a vignette experiment. Four factors were manipulated in the story describing a hypothetical situation in which a government made a decision about helping the victims of a flood that had occurred in their country. Each of the manipulated factors had two levels: being strong/present (level 1) or being weak/absent (level 2). This 2 (procedural justice) \times 2 (distributive justice) \times 2 (dependence) \times 2 (personal outcome) design yielded 16 versions of the story. The

factors were operationalized in a hypothetical story about government's reaction to a flooding (see Chapter 2 for more details about operationalization). The same set of vignettes was presented to students in five countries in their native language (see Appendix F). The survey was administered as a paper-and-pen task to students in the Netherlands, Poland, France, and Russia and online to students in Ukraine and Russia.

As mentioned above, in each country we collected samples of students, because they are a comparable group in the cross-cultural context: they come from similar backgrounds, more often than other groups use the internet as a source of information, and—most importantly—because of their similar age, they were equally recently socialized into their respective political communities. In this way we kept many variables constant and were able to look for the differences in the evaluation process linked to different political context in which the respondents grew up. For more detailed discussion of the manipulations, operationalization and sample see Chapter 2. After reading the vignette, participants completed a questionnaire measuring their perceptions of legitimacy of the government in the story and whether the manipulations have been received as intended.

Prior to the analysis of the effects of the vignette on perceived legitimacy, I tested whether the manipulations used in the vignette text were effective and if the questions asked to evaluate perceived legitimacy made for a reliable scale. In all five countries answers to the manipulation check questions showed that all four manipulations worked in the intended direction and that the differences between the perceptions of the two levels of each manipulation were significant. The results of the t-tests are reported in Appendix H. The t-tests show that in different conditions participants perceived the stories presented to them differently and as intended.

I measured the dependent variable—perceived legitimacy—with seven questions: 1) I would trust this government; 2) If this situation is representative; 3) I would like it, if in the future, this government made decisions on this type of issues that influence my life; 4) Decisions of this government should be respected; 5) I would be willing to protest against this decision of the government; 6) On the whole this government is legitimate; 7) The government has the right to take this kind of decisions. All seven items were highly correlated with each other in all five countries

(see Appendix I). Principal axis factoring analysis showed that the items loaded highly on a single factor. Principal component analysis showed very similar results. The internal consistency of these seven items was good, Cronbach's α between .83 and .86, indicating that the scale is reliable. I computed the dependent variable, perceived legitimacy, as the average score for these seven items.

3.3. Results of the experiments

This section presents the results of the experiment in each country. It discusses all significant effects and interactions that were found and not only the hypothesised ones. This is to see whether the hypothesised effects are not confounded by other effects.

Netherlands

The data collection took place at the University of Leiden in September and October 2014. In total, 399 vignette responses were collected from students. The number of participants included in the analysis was 380 (responses from participants who were over the age of 25, or non-Dutch were excluded from analysis). Of the 380 participants, 149 were female and 214 were male (17 did not specify their gender). The average age of participants was 19.17 (min = 16, max = 25).

Figure 3.2 shows mean perceived legitimacy in all 16 conditions of the experiment. To assess effects of the manipulations, perceived legitimacy scores were analysed with a factorial ANOVA including all interaction effects. The ANOVA showed seven significant effects, including four main effects and three interaction effects, see Table 3.1. On average procedural justice increased perceived legitimacy from 3.53 to 4.14, distributive justice from 3.41 to 4.26, and positive outcome from 3.67 to 4.00. These main effects were in the predicted direction. Dependence decreased perceived legitimacy from 3.97 to 3.70 and the direction of the effect was opposite to the hypothesised one. There were significant two-way interactions of distributive justice \times procedural justice and distributive justice \times positive outcome. There was also a significant three-way interaction of procedural justice \times dependence \times positive outcome.




Figure 3.2. The Netherlands: Mean perceived legitimacy for all 16 conditions. Error bars show standard errors of the mean.

Table 3.1. Results of factorial ANOVA for perceived legitimacy (N = 379, adjusted R² = .300). Effects with p > .05 are not shown.

Factor/Interaction	F (1, 363)	p	Partial η ²
Procedural justice	37.92	< .001	0.10
Distributive justice	73.15	< .001	0.17
Positive outcome	10.57	.001	0.03
Dependence	7.15	.008	0.02
Procedural justice × Distributive justice	8.96	.003	0.02
Distributive justice × Positive outcome	25.57	< .001	0.07
Procedural justice × Dependence × Positive outcome	5.58	.019	0.02

Figure 3.3 shows that distributive justice increased perceived legitimacy in conditions with positive outcome. Distributive justice had a small effect on perceived legitimacy of the government when outcome was negative. This means that fair distribution of help to the victims increased positive evaluations of the government especially when participants also received help from the government that improved their material situation. Figure 3.4 shows the interaction effect of procedural justice

and distributive justice. Procedural justice increased perceived legitimacy in conditions with distributive justice. In other words, the ability to enter into discussion with the governmental commission increased perceived legitimacy when the help was distributed fairly to the victims of the flooding.




Figure 3.3. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the distributive justice × positive outcome interaction. Error bars show standard errors.




Figure 3.4. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the distributive justice × procedural justice interaction. Error bars show standard errors.

To interpret the three-way interaction of procedural justice \times positive outcome \times dependence, I examined pairwise comparisons for procedural justice across conditions of outcome and dependence. The two graphs on the left side of Figure 3.5 show that when participants were independent, procedural justice increased perceived legitimacy both in conditions of positive outcome (difference $M = 0.49$, $p = .013$) and negative outcome (difference $M = 0.97$, $p < .001$). The two graphs on the right side of Figure 3.5 show that when participants were dependent, procedural justice increased perceived legitimacy in conditions of positive outcome (difference $M = 0.73$, $p < .001$), but not in conditions of negative outcome (difference $M = 0.27$, $p = .178$). In other words, when participants were presented with a story in which their property was damaged and they did not have access to essential goods, being able to meet with the governmental commission and voice their needs increased positive evaluation of the government only if they received help from the government. If they did not receive help, the opportunity to voice opinions did not change perceived legitimacy of the government.




Figure 3.5. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the procedural justice \times dependence \times positive outcome interaction. Error bars show standard errors.

France

The data collection took place at the University of Lyon in November and December 2014. In total, 430 vignette responses were collected from students. The number of participants included in the analysis was 327 (responses from participants who completed the questionnaire inattentively, were over the age of 25, or non-French were excluded from analysis; the French sample consisted of 47 respondents that stated a different nationality than French). Of the 327 participants 203 were female and 116 were male (8 did not specify their gender). The average age of participants was 18.6 (min = 16, max = 25).

Figure 3.6 shows the mean perceived legitimacy score in all 16 conditions. To assess effects of the manipulations, perceived legitimacy scores were analysed with a factorial ANOVA including all interaction effects. The ANOVA showed two significant interaction effects and three significant main effects (Table 3.2). On average procedural justice increased perceived legitimacy from 3.93 to 4.32, distributive justice from 3.76 to 4.5, and positive outcome from 4.00 to 4.30.




Figure 3.6. France: Mean perceived legitimacy for all 16 conditions. Error bars show standard errors of the mean.

Table 3.2. Factorial ANOVA for perceived legitimacy (N = 323, adjusted R² = .217). Effects with p > .05 are not shown.

Factor/Interaction	F (1, 307)	p	Partial η ²
Procedural justice	10.02	.002	0.03
Distributive justice	35.67	< .001	0.10
Positive outcome	4.69	.031	0.02
Procedural justice × Distributive justice	14.64	< .001	0.05
Distributive justice × Positive outcome	23.54	< .001	0.07

Figure 3.7 illustrates the interaction of distributive justice and procedural justice. The graphs show that procedural justice did not have an effect on perceived legitimacy in conditions with distributive injustice. There was no large difference in the evaluation of the government between participants who read a story in which the victims could voice their opinion and participants who read the story where they could not voice their opinion, if the distribution of help was unfair. Conversely, procedural justice increased perceived legitimacy in conditions with distributive justice (V1, V5, V9, and V13).




Figure 3.7. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the procedural justice \times distributive justice interaction. Error bars show standard errors.

Figure 3.8 illustrates the interaction of distributive justice and positive outcome. Like in the case of the Netherlands, distributive justice increased perceived legitimacy in conditions with positive outcome. Distributive justice had no effect on evaluations of the government when outcome was negative.




Figure 3.8. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the distributive justice \times positive outcome interaction. Error bars show standard errors.

Poland

The data collection took place at universities and higher education institutions in Poznan and Krakow in May, June, and December 2014. In total, 462 vignette responses were collected from students. The number of participants included in the analysis was 437 (responses from participants who completed the questionnaire inattentively, were over the age of 25, or non-Polish were excluded from analysis). Of the 437 participants 268 were female and 150 were male (19 did not specify their gender). The average age of participants was 21.17 (min = 18, max = 25).

Figure 3.9 shows the mean perceived legitimacy scores for all 16 conditions. To assess effects of the manipulations, perceived legitimacy scores were analysed with a factorial ANOVA including all interaction effects. The ANOVA showed seven significant effects, including three main effects and four interaction effects, see Table 3.3. The main effects were in predicted directions. On average procedural justice increased perceived legitimacy from 3.39 to 3.96, distributive justice from 3.32 to 4.03, and positive outcome from 3.38 to 3.97. The main effect of dependence was not significant. Both two-way interactions of distributive justice \times positive outcome and dependence \times positive outcome were qualified by the higher-order interactions. There was a significant three-way interaction of procedural justice \times dependence \times positive outcome, which was qualified by a significant interaction including all four factors: procedural justice \times distributive justice \times dependence \times positive outcome.




Figure 3.9. Poland: Mean perceived legitimacy for all 16 conditions. Error bars show standard errors of the mean.

Table 3.3. Factorial ANOVA for perceived legitimacy (N = 437, adjusted R² = .221). Effects with p >.05 are not shown.

Factor/Interaction	F (1, 421)	p	Partial η ²
Procedural justice	29.88	< .001	0.07
Distributive justice	44.70	< .001	0.10
Positive outcome	32.20	< .001	0.07
Distributive justice × Positive outcome	10.10	.002	0.02
Dependence × Positive outcome	4.16	.042	0.01
Procedural justice × Dependence × Positive outcome	8.61	.004	0.02
Procedural justice × Distributive justice × Dependence × Positive outcome	7.33	.007	0.02

To test the H6 (*Dependence on the authorities increases perceived legitimacy of the authorities*), I compared the impact of dependence across eight combinations of other factors. Figure 3.9 shows that dependence had no consistent impact on perceived legitimacy. In conditions with procedural justice and distributive justice, dependence increased perceived legitimacy when outcomes were positive, but decreased perceived legitimacy when outcomes were negative (see from the right side of Figure 3.9:

distributive justice + procedural justice, distributive justice + procedural injustice, distributive injustice + procedural justice). However, when both distributive justice and procedural justice were absent (most left graph in Figure 3.9: distributive injustice + procedural injustice), then dependence decreased perceived legitimacy when outcomes were positive, and increased perceived legitimacy when outcomes were negative.

Also in Poland the interaction of distributive justice and positive outcome was significant. Figure 3.10 shows that distributive justice increased perceived legitimacy when the outcome was positive. Distributive justice had a smaller positive effect on evaluations of the government when outcome was negative.




Figure 3.10. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the distributive justice \times positive outcome interaction. Error bars show standard errors.

The interaction between dependence and positive outcome was significant in Poland too. Figure 3.11 shows that dependence decreased perceived legitimacy when outcome was negative. In other words, if a person depended on the help from the government and did not get the help (V13-V16), they had less favourable view of this government than a person who did not depend on the help from the government and did not get the help either (V9-V12). Dependence had a smaller (and positive) effect when outcome was positive.




Figure 3.11. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the dependence \times positive outcome interaction. Error bars show standard errors.

As in the Dutch sample, to interpret the three-way interaction of procedural justice \times positive outcome \times dependence, I examined pairwise comparisons for procedural justice across conditions of outcome and dependence. The graphs on the left side of Figure 3.12 show that when participants were independent, procedural justice increased perceived legitimacy in conditions of negative outcome (difference $M = 0.88$, $p < .000$), but not in conditions of positive outcome (difference $M = 0.28$, $p = .196$). The graphs on the right side of Figure 3.12 show that when participants were dependent, procedural justice increased perceived legitimacy in conditions of positive outcome (difference $M = 0.9$, $p < .000$), but not in conditions of negative outcome (difference $M = 0.25$, $p = 0.24$).




Figure 3.12. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the dependence \times positive outcome \times procedural justice interaction. Error bars show standard errors.

To interpret the four-way interaction, I compared the outcome \times distributive justice interaction across the four combinations of procedural justice and dependence (see Figure 3.13). The four-way interaction was presented in this way to make possible the test of H5 (*The effect of distributive justice on legitimacy is stronger when individuals experience positive personal outcomes*). The graphs show how the interaction of distributive justice \times positive outcome plays out depending on the configurations of procedural justice and dependence.

Distributive justice increased perceived legitimacy when there was positive outcome in three of the graphs below (procedural injustice + dependence, procedural justice + independence and procedural justice + dependence). That is, in each of these graphs there was a relatively small effect of distributive justice when outcomes were negative. The only combination of factors where distributive justice increased perceived legitimacy when the outcome was negative was in the case of procedural injustice + independence, i.e., when respondents were independent from the help of the government and when they experienced fair procedures (the victims of the flood had an opportunity to express their opinions).




Figure 3.13. Mean perceived legitimacy scores for all 16 conditions to describe the procedural justice × distributive justice × dependence × positive outcome interaction. See text for details. Error bars show standard errors.

Ukraine

The data collection was conducted using Qualtrics online survey software. Participants of the survey were recruited from universities in Kiev and Mykolaiv (in the south of Ukraine) and completed the online survey between June and November 2014. In total, 930 people started completing the survey; the drop-out rate was 59 %. The number of participants included in the analysis was 425 (responses from participants who were over the age of 25, non-Ukrainian, or not studying at a Ukrainian university were excluded from analysis). Of the 425 participants 305 were female and 120 were male. The average age of participants was 19.8 (min = 16, max = 25).

Figure 3.14 shows the mean perceived legitimacy scores for all 16 conditions. To assess effects of the manipulations, perceived legitimacy scores were again

analysed with a factorial ANOVA including all interaction effects. The ANOVA showed seven significant effects, including four main effects and three interaction effects, see Table 3.4. The main effects of procedural justice, distributive justice, and outcome were in predicted directions. The main effect of the dependence was opposite to the hypothesised one; dependence had a negative effect on perceived legitimacy. On average procedural justice increased perceived legitimacy from 3.12 to 4.19, distributive justice from 3.03 to 4.28, and positive outcome from 3.33 to 3.98. The dependence decreased perceived legitimacy from 3.81 to 3.50. There were three two-way significant interactions of procedural justice \times distributive justice, distributive justice \times positive outcome, and dependence \times positive outcome.




Figure 3.14. Ukraine: Mean perceived legitimacy for all 16 conditions. Error bars show standard errors of the mean.

Table 3.4. Factorial ANOVA for perceived legitimacy (N = 425, adjusted $R^2 = .466$). Effects with $p > .05$ are not shown.

Factor/Interaction	<i>F</i> (1, 409)	<i>p</i>	Partial η^2
Procedural justice	106.36	< .001	.21
Distributive justice	144.40	< .001	.26
Positive outcome	38.64	< .001	.09
Dependence	9.12	.003	.02
Procedural justice \times Distributive Justice	4.80	.029	.01
Distributive justice \times Positive outcome	29.64	< .001	.07
Dependence \times Positive outcome	21.70	< .001	.05

Figure 3.15 illustrates the interaction effect between procedural justice and distributive justice on perceived legitimacy score. When procedural justice was present (people had the opportunity to voice their opinions) the government scored higher on perceived legitimacy than when it was absent (people did not have the opportunity to voice their opinions). This effect was magnified in the presence of distributive justice. Procedural justice increased perceived legitimacy more when distributive justice was present.




Figure 3.15. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the procedural justice \times distributive justice interaction effect. Error bars show standard errors.

Figure 3.16 shows the same pattern of interaction of distributive justice and positive outcome as in all the previously analysed countries. Distributive justice

increased perceived legitimacy more in conditions with a positive outcome, whereas it had smaller effect in conditions with a negative outcome.




Figure 3.16. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the positive outcome \times distributive justice interaction effect. Error bars show standard errors.

Figure 3.17 describes the interaction effect of outcome and dependence. Dependence decreased perceived legitimacy when outcome was negative. In other words, if a person depended on the help from the government and did not get the help, they had less favourable view of this government than a person who did not depend on the help from the government. Dependence had no effect on perceived legitimacy when outcome was positive.




Figure 3.17. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the positive outcome \times dependence interaction effect. Error bars show standard errors.

Russia

The data collection was conducted in May and June 2014 using pen and paper method and in June and September-December 2014 using Qualtrics online survey software. For the pen and paper version of the study, participants were recruited from the Higher School of Economics in Moscow and 303 responses were collected. To recruit participants for the online study, a link to the survey has been circulated on social networks for students by an assistant based in Moscow. In total, 3093 people started completing the online survey; the drop-out rate was 75 %. Participants of the online survey included in the analysis came from around 300 different universities located in many regions of Russia. The number of participants included in the analysis from both pen and paper and online survey was 934 (responses were excluded from the analysis if they came from participants who were over the age of 25, below the age of 16, non-Russian, or not based at a Russian university). Of the 934 participants 434 were female and 491 were male; 9 participants did not state their sex. The average age of participants was 20.21 (min = 16, max = 25).

Figure 3.18 shows the mean perceived legitimacy scores for all 16 conditions. To assess effects of the manipulations, perceived legitimacy scores were again analysed with a factorial ANOVA including all interaction effects. The ANOVA showed ten significant effects, including four main effects and five interaction effects

(see Table 3.5). The main effects of procedural justice, distributive justice, and outcome were in predicted directions. The main effect of the dependence was opposite to the predicted direction; dependence had a negative effect on perceived legitimacy. On average, procedural justice increased perceived legitimacy from 3.71 to 4.22, distributive justice increased perceived legitimacy from 3.49 to 4.44, and positive outcome increased perceived legitimacy from 3.75 to 4.18. On average, dependence decreased perceived legitimacy from 4.13 to 3.80. There were four two-way significant interactions: procedural justice \times distributive justice, distributive justice \times positive outcome, dependence \times positive outcome, and distributive justice \times dependence. These interactions were qualified by two significant three-way interactions of procedural justice \times distributive justice \times positive outcome and procedural justice \times distributive justice \times positive outcome.




Figure 3.18. Russia: Mean perceived legitimacy for all 16 conditions. Error bars show standard errors of the mean.

Table 3.5. Factorial ANOVA for perceived legitimacy (N = 929, adjusted $R^2 = .243$). Effects with $p > .05$ are not shown.

Factor/Interaction	$F(1, 913)$	p	Partial η^2
Procedural justice	42.44	< .001	.04
Distributive justice	144.94	< .001	.14
Positive outcome	29.52	< .001	.03
Dependence	17.93	< .001	.02
Procedural justice \times Distributive Justice	7.29	.007	.01
Distributive justice \times Positive outcome	28.95	< .001	.03
Dependence \times Positive outcome	14.97	< .001	.02
Distributive justice \times Dependence	6.37	.012	.01
Dependence \times Distributive justice \times Procedural justice	8.20	.004	.01
Dependence \times Distributive justice \times Positive outcome	6.64	.010	.01

Figure 3.19 shows the two-way interaction of procedural justice \times distributive justice. As in three other countries (in Poland this interaction was accounted for in a four-way interaction), procedural justice increased perceived legitimacy when distributive justice was present. This implies that participants that read the story in which the government consulted citizens about the help they need evaluated the government better if it also distributed help fairly to the victims of flooding.




Figure 3.19. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the procedural justice \times distributive justice interaction effect. Error bars show standard errors.

Another two-way interaction that was significant in Russia as in all the other countries was the interaction of distributive justice \times positive outcome. Figure 3.20 shows that distributive justice increased perceived legitimacy more when the outcome was positive than when the outcome was negative.




Figure 3.20. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the distributive justice \times positive outcome interaction effect. Error bars show standard errors.

There were two two-way interactions involving dependence that were significant in the Russian case: the interaction of dependence and positive outcome and the interaction of dependence and distributive justice. Figure 3.21 shows that dependence decreased perceived legitimacy when outcome was negative. So, if a person depended on the help from the government and did not get it, they had less favourable view of this government than a person who did not depend on the help from the government. Dependence had no effect on perceived legitimacy when outcome was positive.




Figure 3.21. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the dependence \times positive outcome interaction effect. Error bars show standard errors.

Figure 3.22 illustrates that distributive justice increases increased perceived legitimacy more when participants when independent than when they were dependent. This means that if the government distributed the help fairly, participants that were in the conditions in which they did not suffer a large property loss and had access to primary goods like food and other essentials perceived the government as more legitimate than those who were in the conditions in which they lost the house and have no access to primary goods.




Figure 3.22. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the dependence \times distributive justice interaction effect. Error bars show standard errors.

To interpret the three-way interaction of dependence \times positive outcome \times distributive justice, I examined pairwise comparisons for distributive justice across conditions of outcome and dependence. The graphs on the left side of Figure 3.23 show that when participants were independent, distributive justice increased perceived legitimacy both in conditions with negative outcome (difference $M = 0.93$, $p < .000$) and in conditions with positive outcome (difference $M = 1.38$, $p < .001$). The graphs on the right side of Figure 3.21 show that when participants were dependent, distributive justice increased perceived legitimacy in conditions with positive outcome (difference $M = 1.38$, $p < .000$) but not in conditions with negative outcome (difference $M = 0.12$, $p = .450$). In general, Figure 3.21 shows that distributive justice increased perceived legitimacy in all combinations of outcome, dependence and distributive justice, except when respondents were dependent and received a negative outcome.¹⁹

¹⁹ The story with this combination of factors represents one of the less plausible scenarios in practice.




Figure 3.23. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the interaction of dependence \times positive outcome \times distributive justice interaction effect. Error bars show standard errors.

Similarly, to interpret the three-way interaction of dependence \times procedural justice \times distributive justice, I examined pairwise comparisons for procedural justice across conditions of distributive justice and dependence. The graphs on the left side of Figure 3.24 show that when participants were independent, procedural justice increased perceived legitimacy both in conditions of distributive injustice (difference $M = 0.52$, $p = .001$) and distributive justice (difference $M = 0.49$, $p = .002$). The graphs on the right side of Figure 3.22 show that when participants were dependent, procedural justice increased perceived legitimacy in conditions of distributive justice (difference $M = 0.97$, $p < .001$) but not in conditions of distributive injustice (difference $M = 0.09$, $p = .576$).




Figure 3.24. Mean perceived legitimacy scores to describe the dependence \times distributive justice \times procedural justice interaction effect. Error bars show standard errors.

3.4. Comparative analysis

To facilitate the comparison of the results from the five countries discussed above, Table 3.6 shows the results of the full factorial ANOVA models for all five countries. The table shows that in all five countries distributive justice had the largest significant positive effect on perceived legitimacy. Procedural justice and positive outcomes had significant positive effects on perceived legitimacy in all five countries too. Dependence did not have a consistent effect on perceived legitimacy across countries.

The interaction effect that was significant in all five cases was the interaction of positive outcome and distributive justice. This interaction showed that distributive justice increased perceived legitimacy when personal outcome was positive. In other words, if participants' material situation improved as a result of the government's decision, then the effect of just distribution of help among the victim of the flood on perceived legitimacy increased significantly. Another significant two-way interaction that was found in four out of five countries was the interaction of distributive justice and procedural justice. Interestingly, the procedural justice increased perceived

legitimacy if distributive justice was present. This interaction revealed that when there was no distributive justice, the victims' opportunity to deliberate on their situation or its lack did not change the perceived legitimacy score. The two-way interaction between the positive (personal) outcome and procedural justice was not significant in any of the five countries.

The interaction of dependence and positive outcome was significant only in two hybrid regimes—Russia and Ukraine. The interaction showed the same pattern in both cases. Dependence decreased perceived legitimacy when the outcome was negative and it had no effect on perceived legitimacy when outcome was positive. This means that if a person depended on the help from the government (they had no access to essential goods and services and their property was destroyed) and did not get the help, they had less favourable view of this government than a person who did not depend on the help from the government (whose property did not suffer and who had access to essential goods and services) and did not get the help either.

The analysis of the results in each individual country showed that there are no clear differences between the old democracies, the new democracy, and the hybrid regimes in how the tested factors influenced perceived legitimacy. Three hypothesized factors were significant and worked in the same direction in each country: distributive justice, procedural justice, and positive outcome increased perceived legitimacy. Dependence on average decreased perceived legitimacy, but it did not have a coherent pattern and its main effect was significant only in three out of five cases (in the Netherlands, Ukraine, and Russia).

To test whether the hypothesized effects differed across the five countries, data from all five countries were analysed in one ANOVA²⁰. The model included the main effects of distributive justice, procedural justice, positive outcome, and dependence, the

²⁰ Combining datasets from different countries resulted in an unbalanced number of participants across countries. Because of the large sample size, the standard tests of homogeneity—Levene's test and Bartlett-Box F test for equality of variances were not useful. However, the homogeneity of variance was assessed with a scatter plot of residuals against the predicted values of perceived legitimacy (as suggested by Field et al. 2012, p.440). The plot does not show a strong systematic pattern (see Appendix J) and suggests that the assumption of the homogeneity of variances is not violated.

hypothesised interaction effects²¹, country variable, and the interactions with the country variable (Table 3.7).

²¹ To keep the model as powerful as possible (maximum degrees of freedom), only the hypothesized effects were included.

Table 3.6. Results of factorial ANOVAs for each country (full model).

Factor	NL		FR		PL		UA		RU	
	<i>F</i> (1, 363)	Partial η^2	<i>F</i> (1, 307)	Partial η^2	<i>F</i> (1, 421)	Partial η^2	<i>F</i> (1, 409)	Partial η^2	<i>F</i> (1, 913)	Partial η^2
Procedural justice	37.92***	.095	10.02**	.032	29.88***	.066	106.36***	.206	42.44***	.044
Distributive justice	73.15***	.168	35.67***	.104	44.70***	.096	144.40***	.261	144.94***	.137
Dependence	7.15**	.019	1.38	.004	0.13	.000	9.12**	.022	17.93***	.019
Positive outcome	10.57**	.028	4.69*	.015	32.20***	.071	38.64***	.086	29.52***	.031
Procedural justice \times Distributive justice	8.96**	.024	14.64***	.046	1.48	.004	4.80*	.012	7.29**	.008
Procedural justice \times Dependence	1.28	.004	3.60	.012	0.00	.000	0.12	.000	0.02	.000
Procedural justice \times Positive outcome	0.00	.000	0.03	.000	0.02	.000	2.67	.006	0.15	.000
Distributive justice \times Dependence	0.73	.002	0.21	.001	0.05	.000	1.73	.004	6.37*	.007
Distributive justice \times Positive outcome	25.57***	.066	23.54***	.071	10.10**	.023	29.64***	.068	28.95***	.031
Dependence \times Positive outcome	1.29	.004	2.32	.007	4.16*	.010	21.70***	.050	14.97***	.016
Procedural justice \times Distributive justice \times Dependence	0.87	.002	0.08	.000	0.08	.000	2.98	.007	8.20**	.009
Procedural justice \times Distributive justice \times Positive outcome	0.00	.000	0.07	.000	0.65	.002	1.15	.003	0.37	.000
Procedural justice \times Dependence \times Positive outcome	5.58*	.015	1.29	.004	8.61**	.020	0.10	.000	0.36	.000
Distributive justice \times Dependence \times Positive outcome	1.42	.004	2.13	.007	2.71	.006	1.61	.004	6.64*	.007
Procedural justice \times Distributive justice \times Dependence \times Positive outcome	1.93	.005	0.93	.003	7.33**	.017	1.45	.004	0.18	.000

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 3.7. Factorial ANOVA for perceived legitimacy on the merged dataset (N = 2493, adjusted R² = .268).

Factor/Interaction	<i>F</i> (1, 2458)	<i>p</i>	Partial η^2
Corrected model	27.84	< .001	.28
Procedural justice	169.88	< .001	.07
Distributive justice	345.54	< .001	.12
Positive outcome	87.56	< .001	.09
Dependence	21.875	< .001	.01
Country	13.23	< .001	.02
Procedural justice × Country	4.89	.001	.008
Distributive justice × Country	4.03	.003	.007
Dependence × Country	1.36	.245	.002
Positive outcome × Country	1.84	.118	.003
Distributive justice × Positive outcome	91.27	< .001	.04
Distributive justice × Positive outcome × Country	0.78	.54	.001
Procedural justice × Positive outcome	0.49	.49	.000
Procedural justice × Positive outcome × Country	0.45	.77	.001

Table 3.7 shows that country variable had a significant effect on perceived legitimacy ($F = 13.32$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .02$), which indicates that countries varied in the average level of perceived legitimacy across all conditions. On average Polish and Ukrainian participants evaluated the governments most negatively across all conditions and had very similar average score (see Figure 3.25): mean perceived legitimacy in Poland and Ukraine was $M = 3.67$. All other countries differed significantly from Poland and Ukraine and between each other. The Dutch participants on average evaluated the government for $M = 3.83$, and this score was significantly higher than the mean score in Poland ($p < .05$) and in Ukraine ($p < .05$). The Dutch average score was also significantly lower than the scores in Russia ($p < .03$) and France ($p < .001$). Russian participants on average evaluated the government in the hypothetical stories higher than Polish, Ukrainian, and Dutch participants with the mean perceived legitimacy score of $M = 3.98$. The French participants stood out as those with the highest mean perceived legitimacy score of $M = 4.13$. Figure 3.25 illustrates differences between the mean perceived legitimacy scores across all conditions in five countries.




Figure 3.25. Mean perceived legitimacy scores across all conditions in five countries. Perceived legitimacy was measured on the scale from 1 (lowest score) to 7 (highest score). Error bars show standard errors.

Table 3.7 shows that there were also differences in how two factors influenced perceived legitimacy cross-country. More specifically, the effects of procedural justice ($F = 4.89$, $p = .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .008$) and distributive justice ($F = 4.03$, $p = .003$, partial $\eta^2 = .007$) differed across countries. The comparison of mean differences in perceived legitimacy scores between conditions with procedural justice and conditions without procedural justice across five countries showed that in every country procedural justice increased perceived legitimacy. In other words, in all countries when victims of flooding had a chance to participate in a meeting with the governmental commission and voice their opinions about the help they need, the government was evaluated more positively than when the commission did not meet with the victims. The difference, however, was in the strength of the effect of procedural justice on perceived legitimacy. Figure 3.26 shows that in Ukraine the mean difference in perceived legitimacy between conditions with procedural justice and procedural injustice was bigger than in all the other countries. In other words, procedural justice had a significantly larger effect on perceived legitimacy in Ukraine ($M_{\text{difference}} = 1.05$, partial $\eta^2 = .04$) than in the Netherlands ($M_{\text{difference}} = 0.62$, partial $\eta^2 = .01$), Poland

($M_{\text{difference}} = 0.57$, partial $\eta^2 = .01$), Russia ($M_{\text{difference}} = 0.52$, partial $\eta^2 = .02$), and France ($M_{\text{difference}} = 0.43$, partial $\eta^2 = .004$).




Figure 3.26. Mean difference between perceived legitimacy score when procedural justice was present and when procedural justice was absent in five countries. Error bars show standard errors.

A comparison of mean differences in perceived legitimacy scores between conditions with distributive justice and conditions without distributive justice across the five countries showed that in every country distributive justice increased perceived legitimacy. This means that on average, participants in all countries gave higher score to the government that distributed the help fairly to the victims of flooding—provided benefits to those who most desperately needed the help. As with procedural justice, the difference between the five countries was in the size of the effect. Figure 3.27 shows that in the Netherlands, France and Poland the mean difference between perceived legitimacy in conditions with distributive justice and in conditions without distributive justice was very similar (in NL: $M_{\text{difference}} = 0.86$, partial $\eta^2 = .02$; in FR: $M_{\text{difference}} = 0.72$, partial $\eta^2 = .01$; in PL: $M_{\text{difference}} = 0.72$, partial $\eta^2 = .02$). In Russia ($M_{\text{difference}} = 0.98$, partial $\eta^2 = .07$) and Ukraine ($M_{\text{difference}} = 1.26$, partial $\eta^2 = .05$) the mean difference was larger than in democracies.




Figure 3.27. Mean difference between perceived legitimacy score when distributive justice was present and perceived legitimacy score when distributive justice was absent in five countries. Error bars show standard errors.

The effects of dependence and positive outcome did not significantly differ across countries. Also, the effects of hypothesised interactions of distributive justice with positive outcome and procedural justice with positive outcome did not differ significantly in the five analysed countries (Table 3.7).

3.5. Discussion

Scholars from various disciplines are interested in the evaluation mechanisms used by people to assess authorities. Political psychology and political science both investigate two different theories that offer explanations for granting legitimacy and support to political authorities, namely the rational choice model of citizen's behaviour and the normative common-good oriented model. In this study I tested hypotheses based on these two models of citizen in five different countries. Moreover, I compared how the previously identified factors influence perceived legitimacy of respondents whose

political socialization into different political regimes has shaped their assessment schemes.

Manipulation checks showed that the factors were manipulated as intended and the scale used to measure perceived legitimacy served as a reliable measure in all five countries. This allowed for testing the hypotheses.

The H4 (*Distributive justice increases perceived legitimacy of political authorities*) was supported. In all five countries distributive justice increased perceived legitimacy. Moreover, distributive justice had the largest significant effect on perceived legitimacy in all five countries. Also H2 (*Procedural justice increases perceived legitimacy of political authorities*) was supported. Procedural justice had a significant positive effect on perceived legitimacy across all cases. Because the main effects of distributive and procedural justice were significant, the results suggest that the normative factors matter for evaluations of political authorities and hence contribute to perceived legitimacy.

Moreover, the results of the experiments across the five countries supported the H1 (*Positive personal outcome increases perceived legitimacy of political authorities*). Receiving a positive personal outcome from the government consistently and significantly increased perceived legitimacy in the five countries indicating that the rational choice theory's prediction about the role that the positive outcome plays in evaluations of authorities is correct. What the experiments did show too, however, is that positive personal outcome did not have the strongest main effect of all the factors: distributive justice—fair distribution of help among the victims of flooding—increased perceived legitimacy the most. In all five countries there was a significant interaction of positive outcome and distributive justice, which supported the H5 (*The effect of distributive justice on legitimacy is stronger when individuals experience positive personal outcomes*). Across the analysed countries, distributive justice increased perceived legitimacy more when personal outcome was positive.

No support was found for the H3 (*The effect of procedural justice on legitimacy is stronger when individuals experience positive personal outcomes*) as the interaction between personal outcome and procedural justice was not significant in any of the countries under investigation. However, a significant interaction of procedural

justice with distributive justice was found in the analysis of four out of five countries (it was not found only in Poland). The interaction showed that procedural justice increased perceived legitimacy when distributive justice was present. If distribution of government's help was unfair, then having the opportunity to meet with the governmental commission and participate in a discussion either did not increase perceived legitimacy of the government or increased it to a smaller extent. In general, however, the results showed that participants socialized in old democracies, as well as in different post-communist regimes find having a voice in the decision-making process important.

The H6 (*Dependence on the authorities increases perceived legitimacy of the authorities*) was not supported either. Dependence did not have a consistent effect on perceived legitimacy: it had no effect on legitimacy in the French sample and had a significant main effect in the Dutch, Ukrainian and Russian samples. In the Polish sample it was a factor present in three interactions (Dependence \times Positive outcome, Procedural justice \times Dependence \times Positive outcome, and Procedural justice \times Distributive justice \times Dependence \times Positive outcome). In the Dutch sample dependence interacted with procedural justice and positive outcome. In the Russian sample dependence interacted with distributive justice and positive outcome. Contrary to the hypothesis, the main effects of dependence showed that being dependent on the government's help decreased perceived legitimacy in the Netherlands, Ukraine and Russia. This pattern was not reversed as part of the three-way interaction: in the Netherlands and Russia dependence either had no effect on perceived legitimacy or reduced perceived legitimacy. This effect is thus opposite to the hypothesis. In Poland, the effect of dependence was not consistent and in four out of eight conditions it decreased the perceived legitimacy whereas in the other four conditions it increased perceived legitimacy. Hence, the hypothesis was generally not supported.

The experiment tested also a set of comparative hypotheses, based on the assumption that being socialized in different political regimes can affect the role of different factors in the evaluations of authorities by citizens. The H8 (*Procedural justice is a more important factor for perceptions of legitimacy among democratic citizens than among citizens socialized in new democracies and hybrid regimes*) was

not supported. Procedural justice had a significant main effect in each country included in the analysis and it increased perceived legitimacy across the countries. The comparative analysis showed also that procedural justice had a significantly larger effect on perceived legitimacy in Ukraine than in other analysed countries. This indicates that the experiments did not find evidence in support of the hypothesis that procedural justice is more important in old democracies than in other regimes.

The H10 (*Distributive justice has a more important role in perceptions of legitimacy among citizens socialized in post-communist regimes than among citizens socialized in democracies*) was partially supported. Although distributive justice had the largest positive effect on perceived legitimacy in all five countries, its effect was significantly bigger in Ukraine and Russia. Considerations of fairness of the distribution of help were of larger concern to participants socialized in post-communist hybrid regimes.

I did not find support for the H7 (*The most important motives citizens have to grant legitimacy to/support authorities in non-democracies are of instrumental nature*), as there was no difference in the effect size of positive personal outcome between democracies and non-democracies. However, as mentioned above, distributive justice had the largest effect in the non-democratic regimes (Ukraine and Russia) showing that although personal outcome matters, the output aspect of legitimacy—fair distribution of help—was considered the most important quality of the government that affected the legitimacy score.

3.6. Conclusion

The results of the vignette experiments show that the theories about the factors influencing citizens' evaluations of political authorities are strong and travel well across different regime types (at least within Europe). The three factors predicted by the rational choice theory and a theory of justice-oriented citizen showed the same patterns in how they influenced perceived legitimacy of participants socialized in old democracies, a post-communist new democracy, a hybrid post-communist regime in crisis, and a post-communist hybrid regime with growing authoritarian tendencies. All participants cared about having the voice in the process of decision making by the

hypothetical government, they welcomed improvement of their material situation through governmental assistance, and most importantly, they were sensitive to fair distribution of help from the government. Dependence had no consistent effect on perceived legitimacy, but in general it either did not change perceived legitimacy or decreased it.

Moreover, in all countries positive personal outcome increased perceived legitimacy when the distribution of help of the government was fair. Interestingly, the lack of significant interaction between the positive outcome and procedural justice and the presence of the interaction of distributive justice and outcome suggest that in general the more important goal of having a voice and participation in deliberation is to arrive at a fair distribution rather than an individual favourable outcome. Following from this, it can be concluded that the two ways in which citizens are expected to evaluate political authorities were not mutually exclusive. The results supported the image of a community-interested, justice-oriented citizen who grants legitimacy to authorities because they take care of the common good (distributive justice) and listen to the people's opinions (procedural justice). The results also showed that the image of a self-interested, personal gain-oriented citizen cannot be rejected. Participants did care about their personal outcome—receiving help from the government resulted in a more favourable evaluation of the authorities. This means that both normative and rational-choice motives contributed to the evaluation of the government.

The differences expected to occur due to participants' socialization in different political regimes were not large. As mentioned above, the direction of significant effects was the same across samples from all regime types. However, the effect of distributive justice was significantly higher in the Ukrainian and Russian samples than in the democratic samples. This result implies that fair distribution of help by the government is a more salient issue in these hybrid regimes. It can be due to socialization and higher expectation on the side of citizens to receive fair distribution of goods and services. Moreover, the time of data collection in Ukraine can explain the strength of the effect of distributive justice—the data was collected during the months following Euromaidan, a series of protests that challenged the president of Ukraine—Yanukovich—and expressed discontent with the socio-political situation in the

country. According to Ryabchuk (2014, p.131), deeper underlying reasons behind the protests are of socio-economic nature rather than geopolitical or ideological divides that are emphasised by political leaders. The grievances of population towards political authorities are linked to the lack of effectiveness of governments' actions to solve the problems that are of the greatest concern for Ukrainians: rising prices for food, communal housing costs, unemployment, low wages and pensions, corruption, and crime (Ryabchuk 2014, p.130). The high awareness of these socio-economic problems in their society could have resulted in the strongest effect of distributive justice among Ukrainian participants. In the Russian case, the strong effect of distributive justice could be explained also by a comparatively high inequality of Russian society (according to the World Bank's data, Russia is the least equal society of all five analysed countries²²). Russians, especially living in the peripheries, are very concerned with their material well-being and sensitive to the issues of fair re-distribution (Busygina and Filippov 2015).

To summarize, the theoretical model combining the rational choice and justice-oriented motivations of citizens in their evaluations of political authorities works well. The results suggest that citizens' positive evaluations can be enhanced by instrumental incentives (personal positive outcome), but also that just behaviour on the side of political authorities (distributive and procedural justice) can lead to achievement of a higher level of support and increase perceived legitimacy. This pattern held independently from the regime type in which participants were socialized.

²² According to the World Bank (2012) Russia's GINI coefficient in 2012 was at 41.6. The GINI coefficient for other countries was: the Netherlands 28.0, France 33.1, Poland 32.4, and Ukraine 24.7.

Chapter 4. What makes political authority legitimate? An analysis of ideas about legitimacy in the Netherlands, France, Poland, Ukraine, and Russia

In the vignette experiment study in Chapter 3 I tested the influence of specific factors on perceived legitimacy in five countries. These factors have been identified by earlier studies of perceived legitimacy, but the previous studies measuring their influence on perceived legitimacy were usually limited to the context of one country. Here, the vignette experiment has been conducted in five countries in which the level of democracy varied and the importance of these factors was compared. Participants of the study all reacted to the same stories about a hypothetical government and evaluated the legitimacy of this government on the basis of the combination of four factors: personal positive outcome, dependence on the help from the government, distributive justice, and procedural justice. In short, this experiment showed that distributive justice had the largest effect on perceived legitimacy in each country, that procedural justice had a significant effect independent from the regime in which the participants were socialized, and that both instrumental (personal outcome) and normative (justice) motives were relevant when evaluating this hypothetical government in each country. Following from that, there were no large cross-country differences detected when it comes to the importance of the four manipulated factors. In each country a government was perceived as more legitimate when it distributed help in a just way, delivered personal positive outcomes, and gave people voice in decision-making process. Hence, political socialization in different regimes did not have a big influence on the evaluations of legitimacy. This does not mean, however, that political socialization does not play a role at all and that it does not lead to differences in what is considered to be the base of authorities' legitimacy in different regimes. There might be other factors that participants would normally take into account to evaluate the legitimacy of political authorities in their countries. In this chapter, I explore what these other factors are and compare them cross-country to learn whether the participants in different political regimes use other evaluation schemes to deem political authorities legitimate.

As shown in Chapter 1, various criteria of evaluation of legitimacy can be used within objective approaches to legitimacy. Similarly, within subjective approaches, different scholars use different factors that should be evaluated to arrive at a judgment about the state of legitimacy of a country, institution, or authority. Like in the vignette study, here too I use the subjective approach focusing on the individuals' evaluation criteria. By investigating the views of citizens about what makes authorities legitimate, this study could be described as a study into folk political philosophy (see Chapter 1, pp. 12-18). It tries to enhance our understanding of the system of judgments that people use when evaluating the right of others to rule—exercise power—over them. Taking the folk philosophy perspective is suitable to discover how people reason about and justify the presence and influence of political authorities, regimes, and systems.

In this chapter, I investigate what criteria young educated people find important for evaluations of political authorities' legitimacy in their countries. As in the vignette experiment, I compare the views of respondents from old European democracies (France and the Netherlands), a new post-communist democracy (Poland), and two hybrid regimes—one post-Soviet hybrid experiencing a political and economic crisis and one post-Soviet hybrid regime that steadily shows more and more authoritarian features (Russia). The comparison is based on the assumption that because culture, history and values vary across societies, we can expect that what citizens expect the political authorities to be like may vary across countries (Schmidt 2013, p.10).

Public opinion surveys often imply that citizens in the countries with authoritarian regimes might have a default preference for a more authoritarian rule and therefore they should find authoritarian leaders more legitimate. Especially in the context of Russia, scholars and observers of politics find outputs of political authorities such as order and stability to be more important for evaluations of authorities than democratic rights and freedoms (Sil and Chen 2004, pp.348–349). These observations are supported by public opinion surveys that consistently show that around 40 % of Russians are ready to trade, for example, their freedom of speech and the right to travel abroad for a normal salary and decent pension (Levada Center 2015). Scholars also emphasise the proneness of Russians toward authoritarian rule or strong leadership

(Hahn and Logvinenko 2008; summary of studies in Hale 2011). However, to what extent these preferences constitute criteria for perceived legitimacy is not clear for several reasons. Firstly, the phrasing of the survey questions often does not allow for other important characteristics of authorities to be evaluated simultaneously or in the context. Although it may be true that strong leadership is important for Russian citizens, we do not know whether this means that the leader does not need to go through the electoral process or can breach laws and limit other freedoms of citizens to achieve goals of order or financial security for citizens (Hale 2011). Although public opinion surveys can be very informative, the respondents never pick the legitimacy-granting attributes they could answer about, so we cannot be sure what the scope and importance of possible answers is. Moreover, we do not know how their requirements for legitimate authorities compare to citizens' in other countries. Secondly, the preference for order or strong leadership can be expressed because of the lack of viable or better alternatives in the current situation in the country (Holmes 2015, p.51). Therefore such data about preferences for strong leadership do not tell us enough about what constitutes an ideal legitimate authority according to the citizens. We cannot be sure that expressing a preference for, for example, an authoritarian leader means that this is a criterion which must be fulfilled for the leader to be legitimate or that it reflects norms or beliefs of citizens (Fleron 1996, p.236). It might simply be an expression of support driven by conformity, instrumental gains, or fear of violence (Marquez 2016). Considering the widespread rhetoric of democracy as well as easier access to information in today's hybrid regimes and (new) authoritarian systems, it is possible that the democratic criteria for evaluating political authorities prevail even there.

According to Huntington (1991, pp.46–58), the survival and legitimacy of authoritarian regimes depends heavily on their economic performance, i.e. their output. The legitimacy of democracies, by contrast, is based mainly on input: shared ideas about what the political system represents and relatively durable electoral procedures that assure representation of citizens' interests (Easton 1975, p.447). It is not sure, however, if citizens socialized in different political regimes differ in the emphasis they put on the input and output in their legitimacy evaluations. In this study, I compare the

criteria for evaluation of regimes used by respondents socialized in different political regimes and interpret the differences also using the input, output, and throughput distinction suggested by Schmidt (2013).

In an attempt to address the above issues dealing with perceived legitimacy, I asked students in Russia, Ukraine, Poland, the Netherlands and France an open question: ‘In your opinion, what characterizes legitimate authorities?’. Students were asked to name up to five characteristics in order of importance. To be able to analyse the answers, a coding scheme was created in order to organize the results and prepare them for the analysis and interpretation. The details about the procedures used to organize the data and information about the methodology are in Chapter 2 and Appendix G. Moreover, the lists with two types of codes assigned to the answers of respondents—representational and hypothesis-guided—are also in Chapter 2. Several hypotheses posed in Chapter 1 (see section 1.3) will be assessed using the data provided by respondents about their ideas on what constitutes a legitimate political authority:

H7: The most important motives citizens have to grant legitimacy to/support authorities in non-democracies are of instrumental nature

H8: Procedural justice (throughput) is a more important factor for perceptions of legitimacy among democratic citizens than among citizens socialized in new democracies and mixed regimes.

H9: Citizen participation (input) is more important for perceived legitimacy in old democracies.

H10: Distributive justice has a more important role in perceptions of legitimacy among citizens socialized in post-communist regimes than among citizens socialized in democracies

H11: Based on previous evidence, stability and order are expected to be important for evaluations of legitimacy of political authorities in Russia.

4.1. Results

This section presents the results of representational coding. 5148 answers provided by respondents from five countries were coded in a uniform way. Firstly, I present and discuss the results country by country. While reporting the results, I also discuss the coding choices that were made regarding specific words and phrases. Subsequently, I compare the results from all five countries in two ways: (1) I compare the frequencies of the representational coding; (2) I analyse and compare the frequencies of the hypothesis-guided coding.

Results of representational coding

The Netherlands

In the Netherlands, 1048 answers of respondents were analysed (see Table 1 in Appendix K). Most frequent answers (more than 7% of the answers) to the question about the characteristics of legitimate authorities were transparency (9.15%), elections (8.30%), legal validity/legality (7.16%), and checks & balances (7.06%). In the category of transparency most of the answers were expressed with the words such as openness, transparency, clarity, overtness. There were only six mentions directly related to corruption (6 of 96; 6.25%). The answers categorized as elections were often qualified by adjectives such as fair, free, and democratic (39 of 87; 44.83%).

The other frequent answers that constituted 5% or more of the entire sample were honesty/fairness (6.97%), impartiality (5.82%), (de facto) authority (5.73%), and representation/pluralism (5.06%). The category honesty/fairness included answers that used the words *eerlijk* and *eerlijkheid*. The category impartiality included answers such as ‘equal treatment’, ‘objectivity’, ‘independence’, ‘equality before the law’, and ‘not racist’. The category ‘(de facto) authority’ included all words and phrases that referred to the actual power to govern and to having the executive capacity. Some of the answers that were assigned to this category were ‘possesses power’, ‘ability to execute decisions’, ‘authority’, and ‘effective’.

The answers that were the least frequent (less than 1% of answers) were security/order/stability, acceptance/approval, welfare/economic prosperity,

traditional/religious, leadership/charisma, national interest/sovereignty, efficiency, ideological, international recognition, foreign policy, patriotism/nationalism, and national unity.

Respondents were asked to name the characteristics of legitimate authorities in order of importance, so the first answer reflects the most important characteristic of legitimate authorities. Table 2 in Appendix K shows the frequencies of answers given on the first position—the most important characteristic of legitimate authorities according to Dutch respondents. The answer given by far most frequently was elections—20.14% (59 of 292). The second most important characteristic of legitimate authorities was honesty/fairness, which was named by 9.22% of respondents (27 of 292). The next three most frequent answers were given all by 7.85% of respondents (23 of 292 each) and these were transparency, legal validity/legality, and reliability. Reliability was a category that included answers that expressed an expectation that the authorities will do what they promise (words and phrases such as ‘reliability’, ‘keep their promises’, and ‘do what they say’).

Codes that were assigned to the answers only once or not at all were expertise, acceptance/approval, leadership/charisma, traditional/religious, national interest/sovereignty, efficiency, ideological, international recognition, foreign policy, and patriotism/nationalism.

France

In France, 701 answers of respondents were analysed (see Table 3 in Appendix K). Most frequent answers to the question about the characteristics of legitimate authorities were elections (15.83%), justice (8.13%), citizen participation/consultation (6.56%) and integrity (6.42%). The word elections was often accompanied by an adjective or qualification such as ‘free and fair’, ‘universal suffrage’, ‘democratic’, ‘direct’, and ‘chosen by the majority’ (64 of 111 answers; 57,66%). Justice was a category that included answers that used the word *équité* and *juste*. ‘*Équité*’ translated to ‘equity’ refers to ‘the quality of assigning to each what he deserves by reference to the

principles of natural justice; impartiality²³. This is to differentiate the meaning from equality, which was expressed by the word ‘*égalitaire*’, although the two belong to the same field of meaning. The third most popular category was citizen participation/consultation at 6.56% and the fourth most frequent answer was integrity at 6.42%. Citizen participation/consultation included answers such as referendum, taking the opinion of the people into account, listening to the people, dialogue, and accessibility. The category of integrity included answers such as loyal, respectful, determined, responsible, and coherent.

The other common answers that constituted 5% or more of the entire sample, were acting for the common good/for citizens (5.71%), checks & balances (5.71%), (de facto) authority (5.42%), and representation/pluralism (5.28%).

The least frequent answers of French respondents (less than 1% of answers) were leadership/charisma, trust/support, honesty/fairness (*honnête*), national interest/sovereignty, national unity, patriotism/nationalism, ideological, traditional/religious, and international recognition. It is worth noting that the categories trust/support and honesty/fairness were in the top 10 most frequent answer in all the other countries, whereas in France they constituted only 0.71% and 0.57% respectively.

Table 4 in Appendix K shows the frequencies of the answers given on the first position—the most important characteristic of legitimate authorities. The answer that was given most frequently by French respondents was elections—46.03% (87 of 189) respondents named it as the characteristic of the highest priority for legitimacy, which is a much higher proportion of answers than in any other country. The second most important characteristic was justice, which was named by 8.99% of respondents (17 of 189). The next three most frequent answers were given by only 5.25% of respondents (10 of 189): integrity, representation/pluralism, and acceptance/approval.

There were many codes that were assigned to the answers only once or not at all. These codes were checks & balances, expertise, reliability, protection of individual rights and freedoms, leadership/charisma, honesty/fairness, welfare/economic

²³ Definition of the word *équité* in French: ‘Qualité consistant à attribuer à chacun ce qui lui est dû par référence aux principes de la justice naturelle ; impartialité’ (from the French online dictionary at <http://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/%C3%A9quit%C3%A9/30712>).

prosperity, national interest/sovereignty, national unity, patriotism/nationalism, ideological, traditional/religious, and international recognition. Elections clearly dominated among the answers, therefore other characteristics were not mentioned often as the most important characteristic of legitimate authorities.

Poland

In Poland, 1046 answers of respondents were analysed (see Table 5 in Appendix K). Most common answers to the question about the characteristics of legitimate authorities were trust/support (12.69%), justice (9.46%) and legal validity/legality (8.41). As in other cases, the code trust/support was assigned to the answers using the exact words ‘trust’ and ‘support’. Justice was a category that included answers that used the word ‘*sprawiedliwość*’ [spravedlivoshch] and (like in the case of Ukrainian ‘*справедливість*’ and Russian ‘*справедливость*’) designated reference to justice, justice system, social justice, or just behaviour. The third most popular category, legal validity/legality, included words and phrases such as ‘legality’, ‘law-abidingness’, ‘constituted according to the law’, ‘following the laws’, ‘consistent with the constitution’.

The other popular answers (5% or more of the entire sample) were integrity (7.46%), (de facto) authority (7.36%), acting for the common good/for citizens (7.07%), and elections (5.93%). Surprisingly and differently than in the other countries, elections were not among the top three popular answers.

The least frequent answers in the Polish sample (less than 1% of answers) were national interest/sovereignty, ideological, leadership/charisma, traditional/religious, foreign policy, welfare/economic prosperity, patriotism/nationalism, international recognition, and national unity.

Table 6 in Appendix K shows the frequencies of the answers given on the first position—the most important characteristic of legitimate authority. In Poland the largest percentage of respondents thought that trust/support is the most important basis of legitimacy of political authorities. The second most frequent answer listed on the first position was justice (41 respondents, 15.24%). The third top answer was elections, which was the only different category in the top three by comparison with the top three

most frequent categories in general. Almost a quarter of respondents (66 of 296) named elections as the most important characteristic of legitimate authorities (23.42%).

The least common answers given on the first position (less than 1% of participants) were representation/pluralism, security/order/stability, efficiency, leadership/charisma, transparency, checks & balances, equality, ideological, traditional/religious, foreign policy, welfare/economic prosperity, patriotism/nationalism, international recognition, national unity.

Ukraine

In Ukraine, 1019 answers of respondents were analysed (see Table 7 in Appendix K). Most common answers given by respondents to the question about the characteristics of legitimate authorities were transparency (11.09%), elections (10.89%) and integrity (10.79%). The category of transparency encompassed mainly answers of ‘transparency’, ‘openness’, and references to ‘no corruption’. The absence of corruption as an important characteristic of legitimate authorities was listed 47 times out of 113 (41.59%) words and phrases coded as transparency. Respondents who listed elections as an important characteristic of legitimate authorities in many cases added an adjective to specify what kind of elections are needed to secure legitimacy (85 out of 111; 77.27%). Among the most popular adjectives were fair, legal, free, and democratic. The answers coded as integrity referred to the moral standing and qualities and values that political authorities should have or represent. In general, these were characteristics that make someone a good politician that did not fit with any of the more specific codes. The most frequent words in this category were ‘responsibility’, ‘decency’, and ‘loyalty’.

Other answers that were frequently given by respondents from Ukraine were legal validity/legality (8.15%), acting for the common good (7.56%), honesty/fairness (6.48), trust/support (6.08%), and justice (5.10). Since there is some meaning overlap between honesty/fairness and justice, the coding needs some clarification. Each answer that pertained to justice, justice system, social justice, or just behaviour and was expressed by the word ‘справедливість’ [spravedlyvist’] was coded as justice, whereas each answer that pertained to the quality of being honest or fair(-play) and was

expressed by the word ‘честность’ [chesnist’] was coded as honesty/fairness. Despite the fact that semantically both words are very close to each other, they were often used by respondents as two different characteristics of legitimate authorities, i.e. frequently the same respondent named both of these qualities as separate characteristics they would require from legitimate authorities. Therefore, for the purpose of representational coding—keeping the codes as close to the answers of the respondents as possible—these two aspects of fairness were assigned separate codes.

The least popular answers (less than 1% of) were national unity, protection of individual rights and freedoms, welfare/economic prosperity, equality, ideological, international recognition, national interest/sovereignty, security/order/stability, and leadership/charisma.

Table 8 in Appendix K shows the frequencies of the answers given on the first position—the most important characteristic of legitimate authority. The largest percentage of respondents thought that elections (free, fair, democratic, and legal) are the most important basis of legitimacy of political authorities. More than a quarter of respondents (71 out of 271) named elections on the first position (26.20%). The second most frequent answer on the first position was honesty/fairness (29 respondents, 10.70%) and third was trust/support (27 respondents, 9.96%).

The least frequent answers given on the first position (less than 1% of participants) were exactly the same as the least frequent answers in general (Table 7 and 8 in Appendix I).

Russia

In Russia, 1333 answers of respondents were analysed (see Table 9 in Appendix K). Most frequent answers to the question about the characteristics of legitimate authorities were legal validity/legality (12.09), elections (11.71%) and a slightly less popular category of trust/support (7.21). The category of legal validity included words and phrases such as ‘legality’ ‘law-abidingness’, ‘lawfulness’, ‘following the laws’, ‘constitutionality’. This category included all notions referring to the legality of obtaining power (e.g. constitutionality, coming to power on the basis of laws) and all notions referring to the legality of behaviour of political institutions. The second most

common answer among Russian respondents was elections. As in the other cases, the majority of answers (101 of 156; 64.74%) were qualified with an adjective such as fair, free, democratic, legal, involving multiple parties, or without forgeries. The code trust/support in all cases was used when the exact words ‘trust’ and ‘support’ were used by respondents.

Other answers that were frequently given by respondents from Russia (5% or more of the answers), were transparency (6.64%), justice (5.71%), and acting for the common good/for citizens (5.48%). The code transparency was assigned to words like ‘openness’, ‘transparency’, ‘publicness’, and words and phrases linked to corruption (‘no bribes’, ‘no corruption’, ‘not corruptible’, ‘fight corruption’). There were 34 (39.53%) corruption related answers of 84 answers coded as transparency.

The least common answers in the Russian sample (less than 1% of answers) were international recognition, leadership (the category that included answers like ‘Putin’, ‘charisma’, ‘authoritarian’), security/order/stability, foreign policy, patriotism/nationalism, ideological, and traditional/religious.

Table 10 in Appendix K shows the frequencies of the answers given on the first position—the most important characteristic of legitimate authority. The largest percentage of respondents thought that elections (free, fair, democratic, and legal) are the most important basis of legitimacy of political authorities. Almost a quarter of respondents (99 of 409) named elections on the first position (24.21%) and also in the Russian sample it was clearly the dominant answer. The second most frequent answers on the first position were answers coded as legal validity/legality (62 respondents, 15.16%). Trust/support was on the third place among most popular answers and the last one that was mentioned by more than 10% respondents (52 respondents, 12.71%). In Russia the first three most frequent answers listed on the first position by respondents were exactly the same as the first three most frequent answers listed on all five positions.

The least common answers given on the first position (less than 1% of respondents) were the same as all least frequent answers in general. Moreover, less than 1% of respondents mentioned equality, expertise, reliability, representation/pluralism, and national interest/sovereignty.

4.2. Comparison of the representational codes

To compare the results from all five countries, Table 4.1 shows the rank orders of codes used to categorize all the answers (from all five positions). This table helps to identify the differences and similarities in the ranks of specific answers given by respondents. Table 4.2 shows the top ten most popular answers (from all positions). By providing percentages of the answers, Table 4.2 indicates to what extent the answers differed across countries. Answers pertaining to elections were the most frequent answers in general (looking at the total of answers from all five possible positions) only in France. France was also the only country, in which the most popular answer—elections—clearly dominated over the next frequently given answers. Elections were named 15.83% of the time, whereas the second most popular answer—justice—constituted 8.13% of the answers (difference of 7.7%). In all the other countries the difference between the top answer and the second most frequent answer was much smaller (between 0.38% in Russia and 3.64% in Poland), making elections clearly the most important answer in France. Elections, however, were important also according to the respondents from Ukraine (10.89% of answers), Russia (11.71%) and the Netherlands (8.30%), where it was the second most frequently given answer. Poland was the only country in which elections were not among the top two most popular answers: in Poland elections constituted 5.93 % of all the answers and were on the seventh position of most popular answers.

The answers that were the most frequent in Ukraine and in the Netherlands belonged to the category of transparency. In Ukraine transparency constituted 11.09% of all answers and in the Netherlands 9.15%. The distribution of answers categorized as transparency in these two cases differed though. In Ukraine 41.59% of answers coded as transparency, directly named the absence of corruption as the most important characteristic of legitimate authorities. In the Netherlands, only 6.25% of answers were directly related to corruption. In Russia, transparency was also ranked relatively high. It was the fourth most frequent answer making for 6.46% of the answers. Similarly to Ukraine, almost 40% of the answers were emphasising that legitimate political authorities should not be corrupt.

Table 4.1. Rank orders of codes (all answers).

Code	NL	FR	PL	UA	RU
Transparency	1	14	13	1	4
Elections	2	1	7	2	2
Legal validity / legality	3	11	3	4	1
Checks & balances	4	5	18	12	8
Honesty / fairness	5	24	11	6	12
Impartiality	6	10	13	15	12
(De facto) authority	7	7	5	9	10
Representation / pluralism	8	8	15	14	17
Integrity	9	4	4	3	7
Citizen participation / consultation	10	3	16	11	14
Reliability	10	16	10	15	22
Justice	12	2	2	8	5
Democracy	13	13	19	17	21
Acting for the common good / for citizens	14	5	6	5	7
Expertise	14	12	12	10	18
Other	16	16	8	21	9
Protection of individual rights / freedoms	17	18	16	19	16
Trust / Support	18	23	1	7	3
Equality	19	9	22	25	20
Security / order / stability	20	20	19	23	25
Acceptance / approval	21	14	8	13	11
Welfare / economic prosperity	22	21	27	19	15
Traditional / religious	23	29	25	28	28
Leadership / charisma	24	22	25	28	24
National interest / sovereignty	25	24	23	21	19
Efficiency	26	19	21	28	30
Ideological	26	28	24	27	28
International recognition	26	30	30	23	23
Foreign policy	29	30	27	28	26
Patriotism / nationalism	30	27	29	18	26
National unity	31	24	31	25	30

Note. Double (or triple) ranks (e.g. within a country two or three codes with the same rank number) mean that those codes were mentioned the same number of times in a sample.

In Poland, the most common answer was trust/support, which constituted 13.10% of the answers. This category was also popular in Russia, where 7.21 % of respondents said that a characteristic of legitimate authority is that people trust or support it. In Russia this was the third most popular answer. In Ukraine, trust/support constituted 6.08% of the answers and it was the seventh most frequent answer. In France and the Netherlands, trust/support was not among top ten answers provided by respondents (23rd and 18th answer respectively).

Legal validity/legality was among the most common codes in four out of five countries. In Russia, it constituted 12.09% of the answers and it was mentioned the most often (elections were only 0.38% less popular though). Legal validity/legality was the third most frequent answer in Poland (8.41%) and the Netherlands (7.25%) and it was the fourth and similarly popular category in Ukraine (8.15%). Only in France, legal validity/legality was not among the top ten most frequent answers (rank eleven).

Although legal validity/legality was not a common expression used to describe a legitimate authority in France, the second most frequently used word was justice, which has a meaning related to legal validity/legality category. Justice was the second most frequent answer in France (8.13%) as well as in Poland (8.41%). It was the fifth most frequent answer given by the Russian respondents (5.71%) and eighth by the Ukrainian respondents (5.10%).

The word justice and related phrases were not used often by the Dutch respondents, however, other codes touching upon similar themes were assigned frequently to their answers, such as mentioned above legal validity/legality and the words and phrases coded as impartiality (5.82%), which are also related to the theme of justice.

Integrity was among the top most frequent answers in all five countries. It was the third most frequent category in Ukraine (10.79%), the fourth in Poland and France (7.46% and 6.42% respectively), the seventh in Russia (4.95%) and the ninth in the Netherlands (4.96%).

Another answer that appeared in every sample was (de facto) authority. (De facto) authority was the fifth most popular answer in Poland (7.36%), the seventh in

the Netherlands and in France (5.73% and 5.42% respectively), and the ninth in Ukraine and Russia (4.91% and 4.13% respectively).

The category 'acting for the common good/for citizens' was emphasised by respondents in four countries: in Ukraine (7.56%), Poland (7.07%), France (5.71%), and Russia (5.48%). It was not among the top ten most frequent answers only in the Netherlands.

Instead, in the Netherlands, there was more emphasis on representation and pluralism (5.06%) and citizen participation and consultation (4.58%). The latter two types of answers were present also only in France, where citizen participation/consultation was the third most frequent answer (6.56%) and representation/pluralism was the eighth most frequent answer (5.28%). In all three post-communist countries representation/pluralism was named less often: in Poland it was ranked fifteenth (2.58%), in Ukraine fourteenth (2.36%), and in Russia seventeenth (2.40%). In the latter case, more answers pertained to majoritarian representation rather than to pluralism. Also citizen participation/consultation was not among the most popular codes in these three countries. It was ranked sixteenth in Poland (2.39%), eleventh in Ukraine (3.53%), and fourteenth in Russia (3.08%).

Table 4.2. Ten most frequent answers in the Netherlands, France, Poland, Ukraine, and Russia (answers from all positions).

	NL (N = 1048)		FR (N = 701)		PL (N = 1046)		UA (N = 1019)		RU (N = 1333)	
		%		%		%		%		%
1	Transparency	9.15	Elections	15.83	Trust/Support	12.62	Transparency	11.09	Legal validity/ legality	12.09
2	Elections	8.30	Justice	8.13	Justice	9.46	Elections	10.89	Elections	11.71
3	Legal validity/ legality	7.25	Citizen participation/ consultation	6.56	Legal validity/ legality	8.41	Integrity	10.79	Trust/Support	7.21
4	Checks & balances	7.06	Integrity	6.42	Integrity	7.46	Legal validity/ legality	8.15	Transparency	6.46
5	Honesty/fairness	6.97	Acting for the common good	5.71	(De facto) authority	7.36	Acting for the common good	7.56	Justice	5.71
6	Impartiality	5.82	Checks & balances	5.71	Acting for the common good	7.07	Honesty/fairness	6.48	Acting for the common good	5.48
7	(De facto) authority	5.73	(De facto) authority	5.42	Elections	5.93	Trust/Support	6.08	Integrity	4.95
8	Representation/ pluralism	5.06	Representation/ pluralism	5.28	Acceptance/ approval	4.11	Justice	5.10	Checks & balances	4.80
9	Integrity	4.96	Equality	4.42	Reliability	3.82	(De facto) authority	4.91	(De facto) authority	4.13
10	Citizen participation/ consultation	4.58	Impartiality	3.85	Honesty/fairness	3.35	Expertise	4.42	Acceptance/ap proval	3.83

Table 4.3 shows the differences between the most common first answers (the most important characteristic of legitimate authorities) in all five countries were not large either. Here, elections were named as the most important characteristic of legitimate authorities by the most respondents in Ukraine (26.20%), Russia (24.21%), France (46.03%), and the Netherlands (20.14%), but once again in Poland it was ranked lower—the third most popular answer (13.24%). Justice was the second most frequently named characteristic on the first position in Poland (15.24%) and in France (8.99%). In the Netherlands and Ukraine the second most frequently named characteristic was honesty/fairness (9.22% and 10.70% respectively), and in Russia legal validity/legality (15.15%). Trust/support was among the most frequent answers only in post-communist countries in the sample: in Poland it was mentioned the most often (23.42%), while in Ukraine and Russia it was the third most popular answer (9.96% and 12.71% respectively).

Table 4.3. Ten most frequent first answers in the Netherlands, France, Poland, Ukraine, and Russia (the most important characteristic of legitimate authorities).

	NL (N = 292)		FR (N = 189)		PL (N = 269)		UA (N = 271)		RU (N = 409)	
		%		%		%		%		%
1	Elections	20.14	Elections	46.03	Trust/Support	23.42	Elections	26.20	Elections	24.21
2	Honesty/fairness	9.22	Justice	8.99	Justice	15.24	Honesty/fairness	10.70	Legal validity/legality	15.16
3	Transparency	7.85	Integrity	5.29	Elections	13.75	Trust/Support	9.96	Trust/Support	12.71
4	Legal validity/legality	7.85	Representation/pluralism	5.29	Acceptance/approval	6.69	Transparency	7.75	Acceptance/approval	6.60
5	Reliability	7.85	Acceptance/Approval	5.29	Legal validity/legality	6.32	Legal validity/legality	7.38	Justice	5.87
6	Impartiality	6.83	Democracy	4.23	(De facto) authority	5.95	Justice	7.01	Acting for the common good	4.89
7	(De facto) authority	6.14	Acting for the common good	3.70	Acting for the common good	4.09	Acting for the common good	5.90	Honesty/fairness	4.40
8	Justice	5.46	Equality	3.17	Honesty/fairness	2.97	Acceptance/approval	4.06	Transparency	3.67
9	Democracy	5.46	Legal validity/legality	3.17	Reliability	2.97	(De facto) authority	3.32	(De facto) authority	3.18
10	Checks & balances	4.78	Citizen participation/consultation	2.12	Impartiality	2.23	Integrity	2.95	Integrity	2.93

To sum up, the scope of answers given by respondents did not differ much across the five countries. The specific words to talk about the legitimacy of authorities varied, but the general concepts that the answers referred to seemed to be very similar. In their conceptions of legitimacy, however, respondents prioritized the most important characteristics of political authorities slightly differently.

Two clear differences were detected between the old democracies and post-communist countries. Firstly, a bigger priority was given to trust/support by respondents from post-communist countries (Poland, Ukraine, and Russia), indicating that perhaps they experience political authorities in their countries as not trustworthy and not deserving the support. Another possible explanation is that a vote in election on itself does not necessarily indicate support or trust for particular political authority. It can be a sign of disappointment with incumbents or no viable alternatives: following Rose (1995, p.550), if ‘the choice offered is between more or less distrusted parties, then voters can only be ‘negatively represented’ by voting to turn the rascals out or keep the less unsatisfactory alternative in office’. By emphasising the importance of trust and support of citizens for the authorities as important characteristic for recognizing them as legitimate, they express the need of genuine preference for these authorities rather than voting for someone simply because they are the most acceptable option among all bad ones. Moreover, for respondents from the post-communist countries the idea of elections as purely ritualistic and meaningless act might be more salient, because of their parents’ experience with the communist involuntary mobilization (Palma 1991). Therefore, beside the procedures of free and fair elections, they express the need to be able to trust and support the authorities.

Secondly, in the old democracies citizen participation/consultation and representation/pluralism were emphasised more than in the post-communist countries. As hypothesised in Chapter 1, the communist past was linked to the lower level of activism and this effect might have spilled over also to the younger generations in these countries. By comparison with other post-communist countries, the percentage of mentions of citizen participation in Ukraine was higher. This can reflect the events that preceded the data collection—the mass protests referred to as Euromaidan that were attended by many students.

The French respondents stand out in their emphasis of elections and general suffrage as the most important characteristic of legitimate authorities. This is in line with the priority given to the idea of representative democracy rather than associational democracy, with the emphasis of the state mission to protect the general interest rather than particularist or group interests (Saurugger 2007). The Dutch respondents stand out as the only ones that did not mention acting for the common good as one of the most important characteristics of legitimate authorities. However, Dutch respondents emphasised ‘impartiality’ and ‘reliability’ more than respondents in other countries. In this way they focused on the characteristic of the individuals in power rather than the outcomes they should deliver. Having these characteristics though can be seen as a precondition to deliver the common good and act for the citizens’ benefit.

In the next step of the analysis of answers about legitimacy of political authorities, the codes were organized according to the input, throughput, and output dimensions of legitimacy. The next section compares the answers of respondents from the five countries using these hypothesis-guided codes.

4.3. Comparison of the hypothesis-guided codes

Another way to analyse the answers of respondents is to use the theoretical distinction between input, throughput, and output dimensions of legitimacy (see Chapter 1.1). To test whether the responses in different countries varied across this distinction, answers from the first position (see Appendix I) that belonged to each aspect were summed up according to earlier defined terms (see Table 2.3). The total frequencies are shown in Table 4.4. To test whether frequency distributions of the first answers differed across countries, I analysed frequencies with a Pearson’s Chi-square test. There was a significant association between the legitimacy aspects and country, $\chi^2(8) = 46.16, p < .001$. To assess which frequencies contributed to the association, I examined the standardized residuals (Field 2013, pp.726–746). Standardized residuals are an index how much the observed frequency in a cell deviates from the expected frequency for that cell based on the row and columns totals (i.e., the number of times a theme was mentioned across all countries and the total frequency for each country). Standardized residuals indicated that input was mentioned significantly less often (than

expected) in the Netherlands (std. residual = -3.04, $p < .01$) and significantly more often in France (std. residual = 3.43, $p < .001$), and that throughput was mentioned significantly less often in France (std. residual = -2.68, $p < .01$) and significantly more often in the Netherlands (std. residual = 3.34, $p < .001$). No significant cell deviations were observed for output, but the frequency of output in France (6.99%) was marginally lower than expected (std. residual = -1.92, $p = .055$).

Table 4.4. Frequency of dimensions per country (answers from first positions only).

	NL	FR	PL	UA	RU
Input	103 (35.40%)	121 (65.05%)	130 (49.24%)	125 (46.30%)	195 (48.51%)
Throughput	154 (52.92%)	52 (27.96%)	96 (36.36%)	112 (41.48%)	158 (39.30%)
Output	34 (11.68%)	13 (6.99%)	38 (14.39%)	33 (12.22%)	49 (12.19%)
total	291 (100%)	186 (100%)	264 (100%)	270 (100%)	402 (100%)

Table 4.5 shows the frequencies of answers from all positions organized according to the legitimacy dimension.

Table 4.5. Frequency of legitimacy dimensions per country (answers from all positions).

	NL	FR	PL	UA	RU	M%
Input	270 (26.60%)	246 (36.12%)	315 (31.47%)	281 (27.96%)	399 (31.54%)	30.74%
Throughput	593 (58.42%)	312 (45.81%)	475 (47.45%)	546 (54.33%)	621 (49.09%)	51.02%
Output	152 (14.98%)	123 (18.06%)	211 (21.08%)	178 (17.71%)	245 (19.37%)	18.24%
total	1015 (100%)	681 (100%)	1001 (100%)	1005 (100%)	1265 (100%)	

The results of cross-country comparison of frequencies of all answers align with the results of the test for the first answers. Throughput was mentioned most often by Dutch respondents (58.42%) whereas it was mentioned least frequently by French participants (45.81%). Also input results were similar: input was least frequently mentioned in the Netherlands (26.60%) and most frequently in France (36.12%). Some variation was observed for the frequencies of output with the highest frequency in Poland (21.08%) and the lowest frequency in the Netherlands (14.98%).

These results are in line with the findings based on representational coding. Once again the analysis showed that for the French respondents input—elections, representation, and citizen participation—were a priority requirement to be fulfilled by legitimate authorities. The Dutch respondents emphasised the throughput more, which included characteristics of political conduct such as impartiality, transparency, and professionalism. At the same time, they prioritized the output—acting for the common good, welfare, security, and protection of individual rights—less than respondents in other countries.

4.4. Conclusions

This study of perceived legitimacy was concerned with the ideas about legitimacy of political authorities held by citizens socialized in different political regimes. Because political legitimacy is in the eye of the beholder, different agents—academics, politicians, leaders, citizens, ethnic groups, generations—can have different conceptions of legitimacy. This study researched students' conception of legitimacy in five different countries by focusing on their ideas about the most important characteristics of legitimate authorities. Moreover, political socialization literature and works on the different bases (sources) of legitimacy in different political regimes suggested that we might expect different conceptions of legitimacy across different countries. Therefore the second goal was to compare the content of perceived legitimacy in two old democracies, a new democracy, a hybrid regime in political crisis, and a hybrid regime with authoritarian tendencies.

First important conclusion from the process of coding of students' answers is that in all five countries similar concepts and themes were used to express what the

characteristics of legitimate authorities are. This implies that in the process of political socialization, similar ideas and words filled the concept of legitimacy. Moreover, the least popular answers were very similar across all cases. The issues linked to foreign policy, national identity, and patriotism were not the main criteria of legitimacy of political authorities.

Public opinion surveys and literature on regime survival suggested that the bases of legitimacy in non-democracies like Russia might be different than in stable democracies. This was not confirmed by the results of this study. Output—the aspect of legitimacy that included answers such as welfare, order, stability, acting for the common good, and answers expressing the power to execute decisions—was not the most important aspect of perceived legitimacy in any of the analysed countries. Hence, it cannot be concluded that it plays a larger role in the evaluations of legitimacy in non-democratic regimes than input or throughput and the H10 (*Distributive justice has a more important role in perceptions of legitimacy among citizens socialized in post-communist regimes than among citizens socialized in democracies*) was not supported. Moreover, the output category of legitimacy, which contained words that could indicate the importance of instrumental gains for the assessment of legitimacy, was not the largest category in any of the five countries, so H7 (*The most important motives citizens have to grant legitimacy to/support authorities in non-democracies are of instrumental nature*) was not supported either. Also H11 (*Based on previous evidence, stability and order (output) are expected to be important for evaluations of legitimacy of political authorities in Russia*) cannot be supported. However, if order is understood not as a preference for a strong leader, but for the rule of law, then the results can be interpreted as supporting this hypothesis. In Russia, the characteristic of legitimate authorities named most frequently by the respondents was legal validity/legality. Issues such as justice and impartiality ranked high on the list of answers too.

Throughput (fair procedures, legality, and integrity of authorities) and input (election, trust/support/and representation) were in general much more frequent answers than output in all five countries. It does not imply that output is unimportant for any evaluation of political authorities or cannot be more important for decisions such as what party a citizen is going to vote for. It rather implies that output is not as

important as throughput and input for the judgments concerning legitimacy of authorities. The findings about the throughput in general do not support the H8 (*Procedural justice (throughput) is a more important factor for perceptions of legitimacy among democratic citizens than among citizens socialized in new democracies and mixed regimes*). Issues such as transparency were mentioned most frequently in the Netherlands and in Ukraine. However, the content of this category varied between them. While words such as transparency and openness prevailed in the category of transparency in the Netherlands, the words expressing concern with corruption were much more common in this category in Ukraine. This shows that the general idea that transparency is important for legitimacy is shared, but what needs to be done to either achieve it (in Ukraine) or sustain/improve it (in the Netherlands) may differ depending on the current state of transparency in a given country and the most urgent political issues in the eyes of citizens. While in Ukraine and Russia ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain’ was underscored by respondents, making sure that authorities ‘act visibly and understandably, and report on their activities’ seems to have been more important in the Netherlands (Transparency International²⁴). What could potentially explain the high number of mentions of transparency by Dutch respondents is the practice of elite driven ‘politics behind closed doors’ and a demand to make some of the hidden processes more open, e.g. coalition formation, elections of mayors, information sharing. Corruption, on the other hand, is one of the problems that frustrates young people in Ukraine and one of the causes that some of them took to the streets in 2004-2005 as well as in 2013-2014. Perceptions of corruption of political authorities and bureaucracy are wide-spread also in Russia (Levada Center 2014).

Two main differences were found between post-communist countries and old democracies. First, although input was in general important in each country, the post-communist countries emphasised trust/support more than France and the Netherlands. In France, elections were the most frequently mentioned characteristic of legitimate authorities among the answers concerned with input. Second, a larger emphasis was given to citizen participation and consultation in the old democracies than in Poland, Ukraine, and Russia. This supports the H9 (*Citizen participation (input) is more*

²⁴ <https://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption#define>

important for perceived legitimacy in old democracies) and, in line with the earlier studies, can be explained by the experience of communism and the lack of willingness to engage in politics and social activism in the post-communist era.

A final point worth mentioning is the fact that the conceptions of legitimacy in each country contained multiple ideas linked to democracy and democratic rule. The most important characteristics of legitimate authorities were legal validity, elections, transparency, citizen participation and consultation, checks & balances, and representation and pluralism in different combinations in different countries. The emphasis on a specific aspect of democratic rule can be linked to the experience of either regime transition or regime functioning. For example, it is possible to imagine that citizens in a country that does not have free and fair elections (e.g. Russia), will prioritize the rule of law (legal validity/legality) that can secure the fairness of electoral process, whereas the elections themselves might be chosen as the most important characteristic of legitimate authorities where legality is more likely to be taken for granted (e.g. France). Similarly, as mentioned above, a bigger priority given to trust and support by respondents from post-communist countries (Poland, Ukraine, and Russia), might indicate that a vote in election on itself does not necessarily indicate support or trust for particular political authority. Hence, although the list of characteristics of democratic rule might be very similar according to citizens across the regimes, depending on the context in which these citizens operate, they might give greater value to different specific criteria of democratic or, in a broader sense, fair rule.

To sum up, this study provided a detailed picture of ideas about what characteristic legitimate authorities should have according to respondents in five countries under investigation. The respondents in all countries gave a set of answers that showed that they have rather nuanced views about what conditions should be fulfilled by political authorities to be recognized as legitimate. In general, most answers given in each country were concerned with the issues related to the process of governing—throughput—such as fairness/justice, impartiality, legality, transparency, and mechanisms of checks & balances, as well as with the personal traits of the authorities that can assure that the process of governing can be as such, namely integrity, reliability, and expertise. This implies that the full scope of throughput

variables should contribute greatly to perceived legitimacy evaluations in all five countries. The output characteristics were the least frequently mentioned criteria for legitimate authorities, which suggests that although it might be important for the stability of regimes, output does not seem to be the most important aspect of the legitimacy of authorities. Another way to think about it is that authorities that follow fair procedures and laws, who have integrity and skills, and who engage with citizens, are expected to be able to secure best and socially just outcomes.

Chapter 5. Cross-country study of perceived legitimacy of the current political authorities

After investigating whether theories of legitimacy travel well across different political regimes and comparing the conceptions of legitimacy in the Netherlands, France, Poland, Ukraine, and Russia, this study will focus on the criteria that explain the perceived legitimacy of real political institutions in these five countries. This study will test whether the variance in perceived legitimacy attributed to the political authorities by participants socialized in different political regimes can be explained with different sets of variables. To illustrate how the potential combinations of these different sets of variables could affect the variance in perceived legitimacy, three ideal-type country models are presented below.

Imagine country A in which there is a broad consensus within the society about what type of political system is preferred. In this country, people generally agree that the system should be democratic, free and fair elections ought to decide about who has the authority to rule, independent courts must make sure that politicians do not act beyond their authority, and fairness and the rule of law needs to guide the behaviour of institutions. Citizens in general consider democracy to be the obvious and right political system choice, which could be caused by a long democratic tradition or bad experience with other forms of government. Despite this consensus, the perceptions of performance and qualities of the current authorities vary widely. Therefore, the perceived legitimacy of the authorities is predicted by perceptions of their performance, rather than general ideas about how the system should work.

Now imagine country B in which there is a broad consensus about how poorly the current authorities perform. In general, citizens agree that the current authorities do not live up to their expectations, do not care for the interests of society at large, and do not treat citizens fairly. This general negative view of the authorities, however, does not translate into common ideas about the right political system for the country. There is no consensus about democracy being the preferred form of government. This can be a result of bad (or no) experience with democratic rules, disagreeing with the principles

of democracy, specific understanding of democracy, or a preference for another political system among some individuals. Therefore the variance in perceived legitimacy is explained by the general ideas about how the system should work rather than by evaluations of their actual performance.

It is also possible to imagine country C, in which citizens are divided on what is the right political system for their country, as well as on how well the current political authorities perform. In this case, the perceived legitimacy of the current authorities will be predicted by systemic preferences as well as by the evaluations of the performance of the authorities.²⁵

To assess which factors predict the evaluation of political authorities in different countries with democratic and non-democratic regimes, a survey was conducted with students in France, the Netherlands, Poland, Ukraine, and Russia (see Appendix B). Students responded to a set of general questions about democracy and democratic institutions and to a set of questions pertaining to their evaluation of the performance of the current political authorities. The questions were linked to the issues of procedural and distributive justice to test H2 (*Procedural justice increases perceived legitimacy of political authorities*) and H4 (*Distributive justice increases perceived legitimacy of political authorities*). Moreover, to check if dependence has an effect on perceived legitimacy if operationalized as socio-economic status, students answered three questions about their material situation and status (Appendix B, p. 188, Q46-Q48). Including the effect of socio-economic status on perceived legitimacy in the analysis allowed testing H6 (*Dependence on political authorities increases perceived legitimacy of the authorities/ The lower the socio-economic status, the higher the perceived legitimacy of the authorities*). Also, students answered several questions measuring their perceived legitimacy of the current institutions in each country (see

²⁵ Of course, it is also possible to imagine country D, in which, just as in country C, the citizens are divided on what is the right political system for the country and on the performance of the current authorities, but where these variables do not predict perceived legitimacy of the authorities. This would be possible if in country D perceived legitimacy is explained by some other (unknown) variables. Given that some of the variables included in the current study explained substantial variation in perceived legitimacy, I refrain from elaborating on country D.

Table 5.1). Using multiple regression, the role of different factors in predicting perceived legitimacy of current institutions was assessed.

Table 5.1. Items measuring perceived legitimacy of the government, parliament, courts, and president.

	Government	Parliament	Courts	President
1	The current government of my country is legitimate.	The current parliament of my country is legitimate.	Courts in my country are legitimate.	The current president of my country is legitimate.
2	I trust the current government of my country.	I trust the current parliament of my country.	Trust courts in my country.	I trust the current president of my country.
3	The current government has the right to make decisions that influence my life.	The current parliament has a right to make decisions that influence my life.	Courts have a right to issue judgments that influence my life.	The current president has the right to make decisions that influence my life.
4	I support the current government of my country.	I support the current parliament of my country.	*	I support the current president of my country.
5	I am willing to obey the current government of my country.	*	I am ready to obey the decisions of courts in my country.	I am willing to obey the president of my country.

* The question about obedience has not been asked in the case of parliaments, because it was decided that obedience relates more to the executive and judicial institutions rather than to the legislative institution. The question about support was not asked in the case of courts, because the support cannot be expressed through elections or membership in a supported political party. This was a deliberate choice linked to the limitations on the number of questions that I was allowed to include in the questionnaire. It did not seem to have negatively affected the reliability of the scales measuring perceived legitimacy of each institution.

As mentioned above, evaluations of the current institutions are based on general ideas about how the political system ought to function (what principles it should be based on) and on the actual functioning of the current institutions (Fraser 1974). Therefore two types of questions were asked to predict perceived legitimacy of institutions. The first type of questions measured the general preferences for political system and views about democracy and its elements, which focused on how the system and authorities ought to be. The second type of questions measured more specific evaluations of the present institutions, which focused on how the current system actually works (Table 5.2). Moreover, linking it with the vignette experiment study

(Chapter 3), each question had at its core the concept of democracy, procedural justice, distributive justice, or personal interests. Each question was also matched with the input, output, and throughput dimension of legitimacy to evaluate the commonalities with the answers about characteristics of legitimate authorities assessed in Chapter 4. Table 5.2 provides variable abbreviations used further in this chapter to refer to the general and specific views.

Table 5.2. Independent variables: survey questions.

Views	Variable abbreviation	Concept	Input / output / throughput
<i>General views</i>			
In general, democracy is the best functioning political system invented so far.	Democracy best	Democracy	Input
In general, political parties are important in representing the interests of citizens.	Parties important	Democracy	Input
Free and fair elections are the basis for a well-functioning political system.	Elections important	Democracy / procedural justice	Input
It is important that courts are able to stop other institutions from acting beyond their authority.	Courts should stop institutions	Democracy / procedural justice	Throughput
Political authorities should secure fair access to goods and services to all citizens.	Authorities should provide access	Distributive justice	Throughput
Political authorities should treat every citizen according to the procedures and laws.	Authorities should treat equal	Procedural justice	Throughput
Political authorities should secure equal chances for all citizens.	Authorities should provide equal chances	Distributive justice	Throughput
<i>Specific views</i>			
Socio-economic status	Socio-economic status	Instrumental gain	Output
The current political system of my country is democratic.	System is democratic	Democracy	Input

Table 5.2 continues			
The current government works for the benefit of all citizens rather than for the benefit of small elite.	Government works for everybody	Distributive justice	Output
The parliament of my country is able to stop the government from acting beyond its authority.	Parliament can stop government	Procedural justice	Throughput
Political parties in my country represent the interests of citizens well.	Parties represent citizens	Procedural justice	Input
Elections in my country are free and fair.	Elections are free and fair	Procedural justice	Input
The courts treat everyone the same in my country.	Courts treat equal	Procedural justice	Throughput
Courts in my country are able to stop the government from acting beyond its authority.	Courts can stop government	Procedural justice	Throughput
The parliament of my country is able to stop the president from acting beyond his authority	Parliament can stop president	Procedural justice	Throughput
The courts of my country are able to stop the president from acting beyond his authority	Courts can stop president	Procedural justice	Throughput
The current president works for the benefit of all citizens rather than for the benefit of small elite.	President works for everybody	Distributive justice	Output

5.1. Comparative descriptive data

Perceived legitimacy of each institution was measured with items listed in Table 5.1. Table 5.3 shows the results of the reliability testing of the perceived legitimacy scale constructed of these items for government, parliament, courts, and president (apart from the Netherlands). The internal consistency of the items measuring perceived legitimacy of each of the institutions for every country was good—Cronbach's α was sufficiently high, indicating that the scales were reliable. I computed the dependent variables, perceived legitimacy of each institution, as the average score for these items (see Table 5.3)

Dutch respondents were the most satisfied with their institutions by comparison with four other countries. In the Netherlands, the average score for all institutions was above 5 (on the scale from 1 to 7) and the standard deviations were the lowest, so the institutions were quite uniformly evaluated as legitimate. Courts had the highest perceived legitimacy of all institutions (5.78). Courts were evaluated the most positively of all institutions also in France and in Poland, received the second highest score in Russia (after the president), and had the lowest perceived legitimacy of all institutions in Ukraine. In France, the institution with the lowest perceived legitimacy score was the president, but all institutions received a score above 4. In Russia, only the parliament was evaluated below 4. All other institutions received a score higher than 4, with president having the largest perceived legitimacy score (4.80). In Poland, respondents were more critical about the government and parliament and evaluated them on average below the neutral point of the scale, whereas the president and courts had scores on the positive side of the scale. The results in Ukraine were mixed too; the president and the government were evaluated more positively, whereas the courts and the parliament received on average rather negative evaluations.²⁶

To provide an overview of the average views of respondents, Table 5.4 shows the mean answers and standard deviations for each independent variable (predictors) included in the analysis. According to this descriptive data, Russia stands out as the country with the lowest score on three general views about the political system: democracy is the best political system, parties are important, and elections are important.

²⁶ These evaluation differences may be linked to the fact that after Yanukovich fled the country, the new president has been chosen (in May 2014) and an inter-regnum pro-revolutionary government installed, but the parliament and courts have not been changed. The parliamentary elections took place at the end of October 2014, whereas the majority of the data for this study was collected before November 2014.

Table 5.3. Scale consistency and mean scores for perceived legitimacy for the government, parliament, courts, and president in the Netherlands, France, Poland, Ukraine, and Russia.

Country (sample N)		Government	Parliament	Courts	President
NL (380)	Cronbach's α	.87	.82	.89	
	M (SD)	N = 373 5.10 (1.11)	N = 374 5.14 (1.03)	N = 378 5.78 (1.02)	
FR (322)	Cronbach's α	.84	.85	.85	.86
	M (SD)	N = 296 4.31 (1.35)	N = 296 4.70 (1.31)	N = 299 5.48 (1.22)	N = 298 4.12 (1.45)
PL (437)	Cronbach's α	.78	.73	.77	.85
	M (SD)	N = 432 3.53 (1.20)	N = 434 3.78 (1.18)	N = 435 4.88 (1.20)	N = 433 4.44 (1.40)
UA (425)	Cronbach's α	.93	.88	.71	.92
	M (SD)	N = 409 4.58 (1.55)	N = 406 3.55 (1.52)	N = 407 3.20 (1.15)	N = 410 5.20 (1.47)
RU (934)	Cronbach's α	.89	.87	.77	.92
	M (SD)	N = 904 4.24 (1.46)	N = 891 3.80 (1.44)	N = 893 4.24 (1.24)	N = 904 4.80 (1.58)

Socio-economic status was measured with three questions (see Appendix B): material situation measured in what the family can afford, placement of the family's income on the scale from the lowest to highest in their society, and social position (class) from the bottom to the top of society (bottom three items in Table 5.4). The material situation of participants in the Netherlands and France was on average the best, whereas in Ukraine it was the worst. However there was similar amount of variance in the data in each country (SD between 0.92 and 1.08). The three items measuring socio-economic status were used to create a scale. The internal consistency of these items was good (Cronbach's α between .72 and .76; see Appendix L) indicating that the scale is reliable. I computed a variable for socio-economic status of a respondent as an average of these three items.

Table 5.4. Means and standard deviations for predictors in all samples.

Variable	NL	FR	PL	UA	RU
	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)
Democracy best	4.82 (1.65)	5.23 (1.68)	4.61 (1.83)	5.22 (1.66)	3.82 (1.74)
Parties important	5.25 (1.24)	4.75 (1.76)	4.17 (1.75)	4.36 (1.80)	4.04 (1.66)
Elections important	5.69 (1.47)	5.95 (1.51)	5.74 (1.50)	6.01 (1.34)	5.05 (1.67)
Courts should stop institutions	5.96 (1.16)	5.86 (1.41)	6.26 (1.18)	6.44 (1.03)	5.73 (1.46)
Authorities should provide access	5.42 (1.45)	6.25 (1.32)	6.07 (1.43)	6.49 (0.96)	5.73 (1.58)
Authorities should treat equal	6.01 (1.29)	6.46 (1.07)	6.58 (0.92)	6.58 (0.84)	6.10 (1.37)
Authorities should provide equal chances	5.96 (1.24)	6.42 (1.11)	6.25 (1.35)	6.61 (0.83)	5.84 (1.58)
System is democratic	5.53 (1.26)	5.27 (1.57)	5.31 (1.52)	3.87 (1.64)	3.94 (1.67)
Government works for everybody	4.62 (1.46)	3.58 (1.76)	2.57 (1.54)	3.74 (1.71)	3.35 (1.70)
Parliament can stop government	5.07 (1.47)	4.34 (1.68)	3.25 (1.67)	4.21 (1.71)	3.35 (1.75)
Parties represent citizens	4.43 (1.44)	3.11 (1.60)	2.38 (1.38)	2.31 (1.48)	2.84 (1.57)
Elections are free and fair	6.17 (1.02)	5.65 (1.61)	5.07 (1.76)	3.72 (1.76)	3.38 (1.84)
Courts treat equal	5.02 (1.51)	3.97 (1.87)	3.42 (1.69)	1.64 (1.07)	2.54 (1.61)
Courts can stop government	4.90 (1.50)	4.47 (1.67)	3.93 (1.78)	2.75 (1.73)	2.84 (1.65)
Parliament can stop president		4.22 (1.68)	3.93 (1.66)	4.25 (1.81)	3.10 (1.78)
Courts can stop president		4.33 (1.77)	4.14 (1.77)	2.65 (1.76)	2.82 (1.77)
President works for everybody		3.73 (1.80)	4.08 (1.76)	4.25 (1.73)	4.09 (1.84)
Material situation*	5.29 (0.92)	5.01 (1.03)	4.36 (0.98)	3.74 (1.02)	3.99 (1.08)
Income group*	6.57 (1.50)	6.07 (1.54)	5.61 (1.47)	4.99 (1.48)	5.31 (1.63)
Social status*	5.20 (1.10)	4.36 (1.08)	4.73 (1.06)	4.18 (1.09)	4.32 (1.16)

*Material situation was measured on a scale 1-6, Income group on a scale 1-10, and Social status on a scale 1-10. All the other variables were measured on a scale from 1-7.

5.2. Multiple regression analysis

I used multiple hierarchical regression to assess to what extent the perceived legitimacy of each institution was predicted by general preferences related to political system (step 1) and evaluation of the performance of the institutions (step 2). The results of these analyses are described in sections 5.3–5.7. Because respondents answered the questionnaire about their views on the real political system of their country after the experimental vignette, I first tested whether the hypothetical vignette presented to respondents influenced the perceived legitimacy of real institutions. Only in the case of the Netherlands significant effects of the vignette manipulations on perceived legitimacy of the real institutions were found (i.e., for the government and the courts). To control for these effects they were included in the regression models in the Netherlands in step 1; the general views were entered in step 2, and the specific views in step 3. Results of the ANOVAs testing the effects of the vignette manipulations on perceived legitimacy of the real institutions in all five countries are reported in Appendix M.

5.3. The Netherlands

Perceived legitimacy of the current government

Three specific predictors had a highly significant positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the government (see Table 5.5). The evaluation of the current government as working for the benefit of all citizens rather than a small elite had the largest effect on perceived legitimacy ($\beta = 0.46$). The evaluation of elections as free and fair had a positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the government too ($\beta = 0.21$). If participants thought that the parliament can check the government, the perceived legitimacy score of the government was higher ($\beta = 0.23$). Of the general predictors, there was only one that had a significant positive effect, namely if respondents thought that political parties are important in representing the interests of citizens, the perceived legitimacy of the government was higher ($\beta = 0.11$). The R^2 change in step 3 (.41) indicates that the evaluations of the performance of the government (specific views) explained substantial amount of variance in perceived legitimacy.

Table 5.5. Linear model of predictors of the current government's perceived legitimacy (N = 290, adjusted $R^2 = .60$, R^2 change step 1 = .03, R^2 change step 2 = .18, R^2 change step 3 = .41, df = 275).

	Predictors	b	SE	β
	(Constant)	1.11	0.36	
Step 1	Procedural justice	-0.16	0.08	
Step 2	Democracy best	0.04	0.03	0.06
	Parties important	0.10*	0.04	0.11
	Elections important	-0.02	0.04	-0.03
	Courts should stop institutions	0.02	0.04	0.02
	Authorities should provide access	0.01	0.03	0.01
	Authorities should treat equal	-0.02	0.03	-0.03
	Authorities should provide equal chances	-0.08	0.04	-0.09
Step 3	System is democratic	0.01	0.04	0.01
	Elections are free and fair	0.23***	0.05	0.21
	Parliament can stop government	0.17***	0.03	0.23
	Courts can stop government	0.04	0.03	0.05
	Government works for everybody	0.34***	0.03	0.46
	Socio-economic status	0.02	0.05	0.02

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. VIFs < 1.71. β is not reported for the effect in Step 1 as for this effect a change of 1 SD is not meaningful.

Perceived legitimacy of the current parliament

Three specific predictors had a significant positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the parliament (see Table 5.6). The evaluation of the elections as free and fair had the largest effect on perceived legitimacy of the parliament ($\beta = 0.33$). Respondents who evaluated the political parties as representing the interests of citizens well, had higher perceived legitimacy scores for the current parliament ($\beta = 0.28$). The ability of the parliament to stop the government when it acts beyond its authority had a positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the parliament too ($\beta = 0.24$). The same as in the case of the government, if respondents thought that in general political parties are important in representing the interests of citizens, the perceived legitimacy of the parliament was higher ($\beta = 0.12$). Another general predictor that had a significant effect on perceived legitimacy of the parliament was the attitude towards authorities' duty to secure equal chances to all citizens. If participants thought that the authorities should do so, then they supported the current parliament less ($\beta = -0.11$). The general view that courts

should be able stop institutions from acting beyond their authority had the smallest significant and positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the parliament ($\beta = 0.09$). In general, specific predictors had the largest effects on perceived legitimacy of the current parliament.

Table 5.6. Linear model of predictors of the current parliament's perceived legitimacy (N = 291, adjusted $R^2 = .53$, R^2 change step 1 = .23, R^2 change step 2 = .33, df = 278).

	Predictors	b	SE	β
	(Constant)	0.72	0.35	
Step 1	Democracy best	-0.01	0.03	-0.01
	Parties important	0.11*	0.04	0.12
	Elections important	0.01	0.04	0.02
	Courts should stop institutions	0.08*	0.04	0.09
	Authorities should provide access	0.02	0.03	0.03
	Authorities should treat equal	0.03	0.03	0.04
	Authorities should provide equal chances	-0.09*	0.04	-0.11
Step 2	System is democratic	-0.03	0.04	-0.04
	Elections are free and fair	0.34***	0.05	0.33
	Parliament can stop government	0.16***	0.03	0.24
	Parties represent citizens	0.20***	0.04	0.28
	Socio-economic status	0.08	0.05	0.06

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. VIFs < 1.76.

Perceived legitimacy of the current courts

The hierarchical regression model predicting perceived legitimacy of the current courts included the significant vignette manipulations (procedural justice and procedural justice \times outcome \times dependence interaction as well as all its components) in step 1 (see Table 5.7). Two specific predictors had a highly significant positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the courts. The perception of courts as treating everybody the same increased perceived legitimacy of the current courts ($\beta = 0.50$). Also, when respondents thought that the courts are able to stop the government from acting beyond its authority, they evaluated the courts more positively ($\beta = 0.23$). The only general significant predictor is the one about courts: if respondents thought that courts should be able to check other institutions, then they perceived the current courts as more legitimate ($\beta = 0.12$).

Table 5.7. Linear model of predictors of the current courts' perceived legitimacy (N = 293, adjusted $R^2 = .53$, R^2 change step 1 = .07, R^2 change step 2 = .18, R^2 change step 3 = .31, $df = 274$).

	Predictors	b	SE	β
	(Constant)	2.39	0.35	
Step 1	Procedural justice	-0.29	0.17	
	Dependence	-0.03	0.17	
	Outcome	-0.32*	0.16	
	Procedural justice \times outcome	0.23	0.23	
	Procedural justice \times dependence	-0.15	0.23	
	Outcome \times dependence	-0.22	0.23	
	Procedural justice \times outcome \times dependence	0.66*	0.33	
	Step 2	Democracy best	-0.03	0.03
Parties important		0.05	0.04	0.06
Elections important		-0.03	0.04	-0.04
Courts should stop institutions		0.10*	0.04	0.12
Authorities should provide access		0.02	0.03	0.03
Authorities should treat equal		0.06	0.04	0.08
Authorities should provide equal chances		3.5×10^{-3}	0.04	4.4×10^{-3}
Step 3	System is democratic	0.05	0.04	0.06
	Courts can stop government	0.15***	0.03	0.23
	Courts treat equal	0.32***	0.03	0.50
	Socio-economic status	-0.05	0.05	-0.04

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. For the continuous predictors VIFs < 1.74 . Including interactions of the manipulated factors in the regression yielded high VIF values for the dichotomous predictors (ranged from 3.80 to 7.08). However, this does not indicate multicollinearity. The VIF is not an appropriate index of multicollinearity for dichotomous predictors and their interactions (Cohen *et al.* 2003, p.425). β s are not reported for the effects in Step 1 as for these effects a change of 1 SD is not meaningful.

Conclusions

Respondents in the Dutch sample evaluated the current state institutions in their country very positively. The perceived legitimacy of institutions was high with courts evaluated as the most legitimate institution (Table 5.3).

From the general predictors the significant ones turned out to be those that referred more directly to the institution under investigation. The general predictor that mattered for perceived legitimacy of the current government and parliament was the view that political parties are important in representing the interests of citizens. In other words, if respondents thought that the political parties play an important role, they

attributed more legitimacy to the institutions that are constituted by political parties' representatives. For the courts, the view that courts should stop other institutions when they act beyond their authority was the only significant general predictor. The view that political authorities should secure equal chances for all citizens had a negative effect on the perceived legitimacy of the current parliament, which could indicate that the performance of the parliament does not match the expectations about what the parliament ought to be doing.

The specific predictors of legitimacy of institutions, focusing on their actual performance rather than what they ought to be and do, contributed strongly to the explanation of variance in perceived legitimacy scores. Five specific predictors had significant effects on perceived legitimacy of the institutions. The perception of elections as free and fair had the largest effect on perceived legitimacy of the parliament, indicating the importance of procedural justice and input aspect of legitimacy. Obtaining power in a legal and fair way by the parliament members was the most important predictor of their perceived legitimacy. Hence, perceived legitimacy of the legislature was designated mainly by the way in which it came to power—legitimate elections.

Whether the government was perceived as working for the common good had the largest effect on the perceived legitimacy of the government. Here the focus was on the distributive justice, so the output aspect of legitimacy. Moreover, it shows that according to Dutch respondents legitimate governing should be based on the principle of taking care of the interests of the whole society.

The most important predictor of perceived legitimacy of the courts was whether they were thought of as treating everybody the same. Not surprisingly, procedural justice (throughput aspect of legitimacy) was the most important predictor of perceived legitimacy of the judicial branch of power. This shows that, according to Dutch respondents, impartiality and fair processes are relevant for sustaining legitimacy of the courts. The other significant specific predictor related to procedural justice and throughput legitimacy was the division of powers in the state (checks and balances)—the ability of the legislative and judicial bodies to stop the government from acting beyond its authority.

Socio-economic status was not a significant predictor of perceived legitimacy in the Netherlands. It implies that either personal situation was not of importance for the evaluations of legitimacy, or respondents with the lowest socio-economic status are in a good enough situation to value the current institutions anyway.

The analysis of the Dutch sample shows that variables dealing with the actual performance of institutions are the most important factors contributing to perceived legitimacy. In each case, the variance explained by the specific factors was larger than the variance explained by the general factors. In other words, the more abstract ideas about democracy and how the political authorities ought to behave proved weaker at explaining the willingness to transfer power to political authorities. Although the type is not clear cut, the Dutch respondents resemble more the citizens of country A, in which their evaluations of the performance of the current institutions explain most of the variance in perceived legitimacy. The parliament was the only institution in which the general principles that should guide political authorities influenced perceived legitimacy, so in this case they reminded more the citizens of country C—where the variance in perceived legitimacy is explained by both general and specific evaluations of institutions. Those respondents who had more socialist views—supporting the idea that political authorities should secure equal access to goods and services to all citizens—were less favourable of the current parliament. This could be explained by the fact that at the time of the survey the largest political party in the parliament was a conservative-liberal political party (VVD). Therefore, those respondents who disagree with the principles of economic liberalism and support redistributive policies instead, granted less legitimacy to the parliament. The general views about democracy being the best system, however, did not influence perceived legitimacy of any of the analysed institutions.

5.4. France

Perceived legitimacy of the current government

Three specific predictors had a highly significant positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the government (Table 5.8). The evaluation of the current government as working for the benefit of all citizens rather than a small elite had the largest effect on

perceived legitimacy ($\beta = 0.53$). The evaluation of elections as free and fair had a positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the government too ($\beta = 0.14$). If participants thought that the parliament can check the government, the perceived legitimacy score of the government was higher ($\beta = 0.11$). No general predictors were significant. The R^2 change in step 2 (.41) indicates that the evaluations of the performance of the government (specific views) explained a lot of variance in perceived legitimacy.

Table 5.8. Linear model of predictors of the current government's perceived legitimacy (N = 219, adjusted $R^2 = .57$, R^2 change step 1 = .18, R^2 change step 2 = .41, df = 205).

	Predictors	b	SE	β
	(Constant)	0.53	0.45	
Step 1	Democracy best	0.02	0.05	0.02
	Parties important	0.01	0.04	0.01
	Elections important	0.06	0.05	0.06
	Courts should stop institutions	0.01	0.05	0.01
	Authorities should provide access	0.05	0.07	0.04
	Authorities should treat equal	-0.03	0.09	-0.03
	Authorities should provide equal chances	-0.01	0.09	-0.01
Step 2	System is democratic	0.07	0.06	0.08
	Elections are free and fair	0.14**	0.05	0.17
	Parliament can stop government	0.09*	0.04	0.11
	Courts can stop government	0.04	0.04	0.04
	Government works for everybody	0.42***	0.04	0.53
	Socio-economic status	0.10	0.08	0.06

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. VIFs < 2.57.

Perceived legitimacy of the current parliament

Three specific predictors had a significant positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the parliament (Table 5.9). The ability of the parliament to stop the government when it acts beyond its authority had the largest positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the parliament ($\beta = 0.25$). The evaluation of the elections as free and fair had similar effect on perceived legitimacy of the parliament ($\beta = 0.24$). The evaluation of political parties as representing the interests of citizens well had a significant effect on perceived legitimacy of the current parliament too ($\beta = 0.15$). A general predictor that had a significant effect on perceived legitimacy of the parliament was the view that the authorities should treat all citizens according to the procedures and laws ($\beta = 0.20$).

Table 5.9. Linear model of predictors of the current parliament's perceived legitimacy (N = 224, adjusted R² = .45, R² change step 1 = .30, R² change step 2 = .18, df = 210).

	Predictors	b	SE	β
	(Constant)	-0.13	0.50	
Step 1	Democracy best	0.08	0.05	0.10
	Parties important	0.09	0.05	0.11
	Elections important	0.01	0.06	0.01
	Courts should stop institutions	0.02	0.06	0.02
	Authorities should provide access	-0.06	0.08	-0.06
	Authorities should treat equal	0.25*	0.09	0.20
	Authorities should provide equal chances	-0.01	0.10	-0.01
Step 2	System is democratic	0.08	0.06	0.09
	Elections are free and fair	0.20***	0.06	0.24
	Parliament can stop government	0.20**	0.08	0.25
	Parliament can stop president	-0.02	0.08	-0.02
	Parties represent citizens	0.13*	0.05	0.15
	Socio-economic status	0.14	0.08	0.09

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. VIFs < 3.45.

Perceived legitimacy of the current courts

Three specific predictors had a highly significant positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the courts (Table 5.10). The perception of courts as treating everybody the same had the largest effect and increased perceived legitimacy of the current courts ($\beta = 0.46$). When respondents evaluated the current system as democratic, they perceived the courts as more legitimate ($\beta = 0.22$). Also, when respondents thought that the courts are able to stop the government from acting beyond its authority, they evaluated the courts more positively ($\beta = 0.15$). Socio-economic status was a significant predictor of perceived legitimacy of the current courts ($\beta = 0.14$). The only general significant predictor was the view that political authorities should secure equal chances to all citizens ($\beta = 0.16$).

Table 5.10. Linear model of predictors of the current courts' perceived legitimacy (N = 223, adjusted R² = .63, R² change step 1 = .37, R² change step 2 = .28, df = 210).

	Predictors	b	SE	β
	(Constant)	0.09	0.37	
Step 1	Democracy best	0.03	0.04	0.04
	Parties important	-0.02	0.03	-0.03
	Elections important	0.07	0.04	0.09
	Courts should stop institutions	0.06	0.04	0.07
	Authorities should provide access	0.08	0.06	0.08
	Authorities should treat equal	0.10	0.07	0.09
	Authorities should provide equal chances	0.18*	0.08	0.16
Step 2	System is democratic	0.17***	0.04	0.22
	Courts can stop government	-0.06	0.05	-0.08
	Courts can stop president	0.11*	0.05	0.15
	Courts treat equal	0.30***	0.03	0.46
	Socio-economic status	0.20**	0.06	0.14

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. VIFs < 2.99.

Perceived legitimacy of the current president

Of all factors included in the model, only two specific predictors had a significant positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the president (Table 5.11). The evaluation of the president as working for the benefit of the whole society and not a small elite increased the perceived legitimacy ($\beta = 0.57$). Also, the ability of the courts to stop the president from acting beyond his authority had a significant effect ($\beta = 0.16$).

Table 5.11. Linear model of predictors of the current president's perceived legitimacy (N = 220, adjusted $R^2 = .53$, R^2 change step 1 = .16, R^2 change step 2 = .40, df = 206).

	Predictors	b	SE	β
	(Constant)	0.02	0.50	
Step 1	Democracy best	-0.04	0.05	-0.04
	Parties important	0.05	0.05	0.06
	Elections important	0.10	0.06	0.10
	Courts should stop institutions	-0.06	0.06	-0.06
	Authorities should provide access	0.09	0.08	0.07
	Authorities should treat equal	0.04	0.09	0.03
	Authorities should provide equal chances	0.03	0.10	0.02
Step 2	System is democratic	-0.03	0.06	-0.04
	Elections are free and fair	0.11	0.06	0.12
	Parliament can stop president	0.02	0.05	0.03
	Courts can stop president	0.14**	0.04	0.16
	President works for everybody	0.46***	0.04	0.57
	Socio-economic status	0.13	0.09	0.07

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. VIFs < 2.63.

Conclusions

Respondents in the French sample were on average rather positive about their institutions. The government, parliament, and president received a score above 4 (middle point of the scale), while the courts got the highest perceived legitimacy score above 5.5 (Table 5.3).

In France, similarly to the Netherlands, most of the unique variance in perceived legitimacy was explained by the specific predictors. Again, the strongest predictor of legitimacy of the government was the perception that it works for all citizens and not for a small elite. Two strongest predictors of the perceived legitimacy of the parliament were the evaluation of the elections as free and fair and the ability of the parliament to check the government if it acts beyond its authority. The perceived legitimacy of the courts increased the most if respondents thought that they treat people equally. As in the case of the government, the strongest predictor of perceived legitimacy of the president was the evaluation whether the president works for the common good.

The results imply that distributive justice is the strongest predictor of the legitimacy of the executive institutions (the government and the president). So for these

institutions, the emphasis in the evaluations is on how fairly they deliver the outputs to society. For the legislative institution (the parliament) procedural justice had the strongest effect on perceived legitimacy, i.e. the fairness of elections (input aspect of legitimacy) and securing the checks and balances of the executive (throughput aspect of legitimacy). Procedural justice of the courts—whether they treat everyone the same—was the strongest predictor of their perceived legitimacy.

Like the Netherlands, France in general fits more with the description of country A. Only one general predictor had a significant effect on perceived legitimacy of the courts and the parliament. There were no significant effects of general predictors on the executive institutions and in no case the variance was explained by the preference for democracy. Instead, the variance in perceived legitimacy was driven by specific evaluations of how the institutions perform and what rules are actually applied by them. In other words, respondents had different assessment of how well the institutions perform.

5.5. Poland

Perceived legitimacy of the current government

Four specific predictors had a significant positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the government (Table 5.12). The evaluation of the current government as working for the benefit of all citizens rather than a small elite had the largest effect on perceived legitimacy ($\beta = 0.53$). The evaluation of elections as free and fair had a positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the government too ($\beta = 0.09$). If participants thought that the parliament can check the government, the perceived legitimacy score of the government was higher ($\beta = 0.07$). Also, the ability of courts to control the government had a significant positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the courts ($\beta = 0.09$). From the general predictors only one had a small significant effect, namely if respondents thought that political parties are an important in representing the interests of citizens, then they evaluated the current government better ($\beta = 0.10$). The R^2 change in step 2 (.39) indicates that the evaluations of the performance of the government (specific views) explained a lot of variance in perceived legitimacy.

Table 5.12. Linear model of predictors of the current government's perceived legitimacy (N = 389, adjusted $R^2 = .51$, R^2 change step 1 = .14, R^2 change step 2 = .39, df = 375).

	Predictors	b	SE	β
	(Constant)	0.66	0.37	
Step 1	Democracy best	-5.1×10^{-4}	0.03	-7.8×10^{-4}
	Parties important	0.07*	0.03	0.10
	Elections important	0.05	0.03	0.06
	Courts should stop institutions	-0.03	0.04	-0.03
	Authorities should provide access	0.02	0.04	0.03
	Authorities should treat equal	0.03	0.06	0.03
	Authorities should provide equal chances	-0.01	0.04	-0.01
Step 2	System is democratic	0.04	0.04	0.06
	Elections are free and fair	0.09**	0.03	0.14
	Parliament can stop government	0.07*	0.03	0.10
	Courts can stop government	0.06*	0.03	0.09
	Government works for everybody	0.42***	0.03	0.53
	Socio-economic status	-0.04	0.05	-0.03

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. VIFs < 1.66.

Perceived legitimacy of the current parliament

Three specific predictors had a significant positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the parliament (Table 5.13). The ability of the parliament to stop the government when it acts beyond its authority had the largest positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the parliament ($\beta = 0.35$). If respondents thought that the parliament can stop the government from acting beyond its authority, they perceived the parliament as more legitimate. Also, if respondents thought that the current political system is democratic, they gave higher legitimacy scores to the parliament ($\beta = 0.20$). The evaluation of political parties as representing the interests of citizens well had a significant effect on perceived legitimacy of the current parliament too ($\beta = 0.17$). A general predictor that had a significant effect on perceived legitimacy of the parliament was the view that in general political parties are important in representing the interest of citizens: if respondents agreed that indeed political parties are important, perceived legitimacy increased ($\beta = 0.20$).

Table 5.13. Linear model of predictors of the current parliament's perceived legitimacy (N = 392, adjusted R² = .37, R² change step 1 = .10, R² change step 2 = .29, df = 378).

	Predictors	b	SE	β
	(Constant)	0.82	0.42	
Step 1	Democracy best	-0.04	0.03	-0.06
	Parties important	0.08*	0.03	0.12
	Elections important	0.07	0.04	0.09
	Courts should stop institutions	-0.05	0.05	-0.05
	Authorities should provide access	-0.02	0.04	-0.02
	Authorities should treat equal	0.03	0.06	0.02
	Authorities should provide equal chances	0.04	0.04	0.04
Step 2	System is democratic	0.16***	0.04	0.20
	Elections are free and fair	0.06	0.03	0.08
	Parliament can stop government	0.25***	0.03	0.35
	Parliament can stop president	0.02	0.03	0.04
	Parties represent citizens	0.15***	0.04	0.17
	Socio-economic status	-0.04	0.06	-0.03

Note. VIFs < 1.67.

Perceived legitimacy of the current courts

Three specific and two general predictors had a highly significant positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the courts (Table 5.14). The perception of courts as treating everybody the same had once again the largest effect and increased perceived legitimacy of the current courts ($\beta = 0.37$). When respondents thought that the courts are able to stop the president from acting beyond his authority, they evaluated the courts more positively ($\beta = 0.20$). Also, like in France, whether respondents evaluated the current system as democratic had a positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the courts ($\beta = 0.10$). From the general predictors the view that courts should be able to stop other institutions from acting beyond their authority increased perceived legitimacy of the current courts ($\beta = 0.154$). The second general significant predictor that had an effect on perceived legitimacy of the courts was the view that political authorities should treat everybody according to the laws and rules ($\beta = 0.09$).

Table 5.14. Linear model of predictors of the current courts' perceived legitimacy (N = 390, adjusted R² = .44, R² change step 1 = .12, R² change step 2 = .33, df = 377).

	Predictors	b	SE	β
	(Constant)	0.81	0.39	
Step 1	Democracy best	2.0×10^{-3}	0.03	3.1×10^{-3}
	Parties important	0.04	0.03	0.05
	Elections important	0.02	0.04	0.02
	Courts should stop institutions	0.15**	0.05	0.14
	Authorities should provide access	0.01	0.04	0.01
	Authorities should treat equal	0.12*	0.06	0.09
	Authorities should provide equal chances	-0.01	0.04	-0.01
Step 2	System is democratic	0.08*	0.04	0.10
	Courts can stop government	0.07	0.05	0.11
	Courts can stop president	0.13**	0.05	0.20
	Courts treat equal	0.26***	0.03	0.37
	Socio-economic status	-0.03	0.06	-0.02

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. VIFs < 3.62.

Perceived legitimacy of the current president

Of all factors included in the model, only two specific predictors had a significant positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the president (Table 5.15). The evaluation of the president as working for the benefit of the whole society and not a small elite had the strongest significant effect on the president's perceived legitimacy ($\beta = 0.68$). Also, the perception of the elections as free and fair increased perceived legitimacy of the president ($\beta = 0.14$). The R² change in step 2 of the regression shows that most of the variance in perceived legitimacy of the president was explained by the specific predictors (.55).

Table 5.15. Linear model of predictors of the current president's perceived legitimacy (N = 388, adjusted R² = .62, R² change step 1 = .08, R² change step 2 = .55, df = 374).

	Predictors	b	SE	β
	(Constant)	0.55	0.38	
Step 1	Democracy best	-0.04	0.03	-0.05
	Parties important	0.03	0.03	0.04
	Elections important	0.02	0.04	0.02
	Courts should stop institutions	0.03	0.04	0.03
	Authorities should provide access	3.2×10^{-3}	0.04	3.4×10^{-3}
	Authorities should treat equal	0.10	0.06	0.06
	Authorities should provide equal chances	-0.04	0.04	-0.04
Step 2	System is democratic	0.06	0.04	0.06
	Elections are free and fair	0.11***	0.03	0.14
	Parliament can stop president	0.01	0.03	0.01
	Courts can stop president	0.04	0.03	0.06
	President works for everybody	0.54***	0.03	0.68
	Socio-economic status	-0.02	0.06	-0.01

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. VIFs < 1.72.

Conclusions

Polish respondents on average evaluated their current political authorities less positively than the Dutch and French respondents. The government and the parliament received a score below 4 (middle point of the scale), while the president and the courts got the score above 4, with the latter ones being the most legitimate institution in the eyes of respondents (Table 5.3).

The pattern of explanation of the variance in Poland was similar to the pattern in the Netherlands and France. There were more specific predictors affecting perceived legitimacy than general ones. A general factor that had relatively small significant effect on perceived legitimacy of both the government and the parliament was the view that political parties play an important role in representing citizens. Perceived legitimacy of the government was influenced by four specific predictors and again the evaluation of the government as working in the interest of everybody had the strongest effect. There were three specific predictors that had a significant effect on perceived legitimacy of the parliament, while the most variance in perceived legitimacy of the parliament was, like in France, explained by its ability to stop the government from acting beyond its authority. Three specific predictors had a significant effect on

perceived legitimacy of the current courts. The most variance was explained again by the evaluation of the courts as treating every citizen the same. The second largest effect was the ability of the courts to provide checks and to balance the power of the president. The general significant predictors were related to the evaluations of how the courts should function: the views that it is important for courts to be able to check other institutions and that authorities should treat citizens according to the rules and laws increased the perceived legitimacy of the courts. Once again, perceived legitimacy of the president was best explained by two specific predictors. The perception of the president as working for the common good had the strongest effect on the perceived legitimacy of the president.

Also in Poland, perceived legitimacy of the executive institutions was best explained by the perception of their performance as benefiting the whole society rather than small elite, so the results indicated the importance of distributive justice in the provision of outcomes. Checks and balances—the ability to stop the government from acting beyond its authority—was the strongest predictor of perceived legitimacy of the parliament. This result implies that procedural justice and the throughput aspect of legitimacy was important for the legislative body. However, the evaluation of the extent of democracy that is present in the current system had a significant effect as well, which shows that the considerations of the input aspect of legitimacy were important for perceived legitimacy of the parliament too. Once again procedural justice—treating all citizens the same—was the most important for the evaluation of legitimacy of the courts. Different general ideas about whether courts should be able to stop other institutions, like in the Netherlands, explained a part of the variance in perceived legitimacy too.

Most of the variance in perceived legitimacy was explained by specific views—evaluations of how the political authorities act. Poland, as the Netherland and France, reminded more the ideal type of country A, where the general views about what political system is the best did not explain perceived legitimacy of institutions and where the specific evaluations did.

5.6. Ukraine

Perceived legitimacy of the current government

Three specific and three general predictors had a significant effect on perceived legitimacy of the government (Table 5.16). The evaluation of the current government as working for the benefit of all citizens rather than a small elite once again had the largest effect on perceived legitimacy ($\beta = 0.69$). The evaluation of elections as free and fair had a positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the government ($\beta = 0.13$) and seeing the current political system as democratic had a positive effect too ($\beta = 0.11$). Ukraine is the first case in which the view that democracy is the best political system had an effect on the perceived legitimacy of the government. If respondents thought that democracy is the best political system, they saw the current government (of Yatsenyuk) as more legitimate ($\beta = 0.09$). If, however, respondents believed that the authorities should provide equal access to goods and services to all citizens, they evaluated the current government as less legitimate ($\beta = -0.10$). Also, the view that courts should be able to stop other institutions from acting beyond their authority increased perceived legitimacy of the current government ($\beta = 0.09$). The R^2 change in step 2 (.57) indicates that the evaluations of the performance of the government (specific views) explained more variance in perceived legitimacy, but the significance of three general factors implies that they are important too, as each of them explains unique (added) variance in perceived legitimacy.

Table 5.16. Linear model of predictors of the current government's perceived legitimacy (N = 341, adjusted $R^2 = .69$, R^2 change step 1 = .13, R^2 change step 2 = .57, df = 327)

	Predictors	b	SE	β
	(Constant)	1.16	0.60	
Step 1	Democracy best	0.09**	0.03	0.09
	Parties important	-0.04	0.03	-0.05
	Elections important	0.03	0.04	0.03
	Courts should stop institutions	0.14**	0.05	0.09
	Authorities should provide access	-0.17**	0.05	-0.10
	Authorities should treat equal	0.10	0.07	0.05
	Authorities should provide equal chances	-0.10	0.06	-0.05
Step 2	System is democratic	0.10**	0.03	0.11
	Elections are free and fair	0.10***	0.03	0.13
	Parliament can stop government	0.01	0.03	0.01
	Courts can stop government	-0.01	0.03	-0.01
	Government works for everybody	0.62***	0.03	0.69
	Socio-economic status	-0.09	0.06	-0.05

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. VIFs < 1.58.

Perceived legitimacy of the current parliament

Four specific predictors had a significant positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the parliament (Table 5.17). The ability of the parliament to stop the government when it acts beyond its authority had the largest positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the parliament ($\beta = 0.27$). Also, if respondents evaluated the elections as free and fair, they thought that the parliament is more legitimate ($\beta = 0.25$). The evaluation of political parties as representing the interests of citizens well had a significant effect on perceived legitimacy of the current parliament too ($\beta = 0.19$). The smallest significant effect was of the evaluation of the current political system as democratic: the government received a higher perceived legitimacy score from respondents who considered the current system democratic. The R^2 change in step 2 shows that most of the variance in perceived legitimacy scores of the parliament was explained by the specific predictors (.29).

Table 5.17. Linear model of predictors of the current parliament's perceived legitimacy (N = 341, adjusted R² = .31, R² change step 1 = .05, R² change step 2 = .29, df = 327).

	Predictors	b	SE	β
	(Constant)	0.91	0.90	
Step 1	Democracy best	-0.05	0.05	-0.06
	Parties important	0.02	0.04	0.02
	Elections important	-0.04	0.06	-0.04
	Courts should stop institutions	0.04	0.08	0.03
	Authorities should provide access	-0.02	0.08	-0.01
	Authorities should treat equal	-0.05	0.10	-0.02
	Authorities should provide equal chances	0.06	0.09	0.03
Step 2	System is democratic	0.12*	0.05	0.13
	Elections are free and fair	0.22***	0.05	0.25
	Parliament can stop government	0.24***	0.07	0.27
	Parliament can stop president	2.4×10^{-3}	0.06	2.9×10^{-3}
	Parties represent citizens	0.20***	0.05	0.19
	Socio-economic status	-0.05	0.09	-0.03

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. VIFs < 2.88.

Perceived legitimacy of the current courts

Only two specific predictors had a highly significant positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the courts (Table 5.18). As in all countries analysed above, the perception of courts as treating everybody the same had the largest effect and increased perceived legitimacy of the current courts ($\beta = 0.32$). Also, like in France and Poland, if respondents evaluated the current system as democratic they saw the courts as more legitimate ($\beta = 0.11$). None of the general predictors had a significant effect on perceived legitimacy of the courts, and R² change in step 2 shows that the variance in the perceived legitimacy scored is better explained by the specific factors (.23).

Table 5.18. Linear model of predictors of the current courts' perceived legitimacy (N = 342, adjusted $R^2 = .25$, R^2 change step 1 = .05, R^2 change step 2 = .23, $df = 329$).

Predictors		b	SE	β
	(Constant)	0.91	0.70	
Step 1	Democracy best	0.01	0.04	0.01
	Parties important	0.03	0.03	0.04
	Elections important	0.06	0.05	0.06
	Courts should stop institutions	0.11	0.06	0.09
	Authorities should provide access	-0.02	0.06	-0.01
	Authorities should treat equal	0.01	0.07	0.01
	Authorities should provide equal chances	-0.05	0.07	-0.04
Step 2	System is democratic	0.08*	0.04	0.11
	Courts can stop government	0.11	0.06	0.17
	Courts can stop president	0.08	0.06	0.12
	Courts treat equal	0.37***	0.06	0.32
	Socio-economic status	0.03	0.07	0.02

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. VIFs < 3.99

Perceived legitimacy of the current president

There were 3 specific and 4 general predictors that had a significant effect on perceived legitimacy of the president (Poroshenko; Table 5.19). The evaluation of the president as working for the benefit of the whole society and not a small elite had the strongest significant effect on the president's perceived legitimacy ($\beta = 0.76$). Also, the perception of the elections as free and fair increased perceived legitimacy of the president ($\beta = 0.11$). If respondents considered the current political system to be democratic, then the president's perceived legitimacy was higher ($\beta = 0.08$).

Three significant general effects were the same in the case of the government. If respondents believed that democracy is the best political system, they thought of the current president as more legitimate ($\beta = 0.08$). If, however, respondents believed that the authorities should provide equal access to goods and services to all citizens, they evaluated the current president as less legitimate ($\beta = -0.07$). Also, the view that court should be able to check and balance other institutions had a positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the president ($\beta = 0.08$). In addition to this three predictors, the view that elections are the basis for well-functioning political system, had a small effect on the perceived legitimacy of the president ($\beta = 0.05$). The R^2 change in step 2 of the regression shows that large part of the variance in perceived legitimacy of the president

was explained by the specific predictors (.61). However, the significance of four general predictors indicated that different ideas about how the political system should work influenced the perceived legitimacy of the president too.

Table 5.19. Linear model of predictors of the current president's perceived legitimacy (N = 341, adjusted $R^2 = .75$, R^2 change step 1 = .14, R^2 change step 2 = .61, df = 327).

	Predictors	b	SE	β
	(Constant)	1.41	0.52	
Step 1	Democracy best	0.07*	0.03	0.08
	Parties important	-0.04	0.03	-0.05
	Elections important	0.08*	0.04	0.05
	Courts should stop institutions	0.12**	0.04	0.08
	Authorities should provide access	-0.11*	0.05	-0.07
	Authorities should treat equal	0.06	0.06	0.03
Step 2	Authorities should provide equal chances	-0.10	0.05	-0.05
	System is democratic	0.07*	0.03	0.08
	Elections are free and fair	0.09**	0.03	0.11
	Parliament can stop president	-6.9×10^{-4}	0.02	-8.5×10^{-4}
	Courts can stop president	-0.01	0.03	-0.01
	President works for everybody	0.64***	0.03	0.76
	Socio-economic status	0.03	0.05	0.02

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. VIFs < 1.47.

Conclusions

Ukrainian respondents, opposite to the Dutch, French, and Polish respondents, evaluated the courts the worst of all of political institutions. They were also rather negative about the current parliament of their country. The new government of Yatsenyuk and the newly elected president Poroshenko were evaluated more positively (Table 5.3). These differences in evaluations of particular institutions were reflected in which predictors affected the legitimacy scores of the institutions.

The most variance in perceived legitimacy scores was explained again by the specific predictors—specific views had the largest effects on perceived legitimacy of the institutions. In the case of the parliament and courts the specific views were the only ones with significant effects. Differently than in stable democracies, however, there were many significant effects of general views affecting perceived legitimacy of the current government and the president. Three of them were the same in both cases:

the agreement with the statement that democracy is the best political system invented so far, the belief that the authorities should provide equal access to goods and services to all citizens, and the view that courts should be able to stop other institutions from acting beyond their authority. If respondents represented the view that political authority's duty is to secure equal access to goods and services, they perceived the current government and president as less legitimate. This general view did not have a significant effect in any other country analysed so far. This result can imply that those respondents who might have supported more pro-Russian ideas of the Party of Regions and hence the regime of Yanukovich, were less favourable of the more liberal and pro-European government of Yatsenyuk and president Poroshenko. Also, Ukraine is the first case in which the effect of the belief in democracy being the best political system was a significant variable. If respondents were more democratically oriented, they perceived the government and the president as more legitimate.

The strongest effects show similar patterns to the other countries analysed so far. The best predictor of the legitimacy of the executive institutions was whether they were perceived as working for the common good. This showed again that the distributive justice in providing outcomes to society is of the greatest concern for the evaluation of legitimacy of the government and president. Procedural justice—the ability to stop the government from acting beyond its authority and the fairness of elections were the strongest predictors of perceived legitimacy of the parliament. This result implies that throughput (checks and balances) and input (electoral process) aspects of legitimacy were important for respondents when they evaluated the legislative body. Consistently with the results in the Netherlands, France, and Poland, procedural justice—treating all citizens the same—was the most important for the evaluation of legitimacy of the courts.

The results in Ukraine show that respondents were less unanimous than in stable democracies about what kind of political system they prefer, more specifically to what extent democracy is the best system. This general predictor had a significant effect on two executive institutions. Also, unlike in stable democracies, the view that elections are important had a significant effect on perceived legitimacy indicating that there might have been more variability among respondents regarding the extent of

support for the idea of elections. Another interesting general effect that was significant is the view that authorities should provide equal access to services and goods. This general view was a significant predictor of legitimacy of the executive institutions only in Ukraine. Although specific views—evaluation of institutions' performance—were the strongest predictors of perceived legitimacy, the significance of the above mentioned general views shows that Ukraine, especially in the evaluations of the president and the government, suits better the description of country C, where the idea about what the political system ought to be like and the evaluations of the performance of the authorities explain perceived legitimacy.

5.7. Russia

Perceived legitimacy of the current government

Four specific and three general predictors had a significant effect on perceived legitimacy of the government (Table 5.20). Consistently with all the other countries, the evaluation of the current government as working for the benefit of all citizens rather than a small elite had the largest effect on perceived legitimacy ($\beta = 0.55$). The evaluation of elections as free and fair had a positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the government ($\beta = 0.17$), the ability of the parliament to stop the government from acting beyond its authority ($\beta = 0.10$), and seeing the current political system as democratic had positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the government too ($\beta = 0.11$).

In Russia, like in Ukraine, the view that democracy is the best political system had an effect on the perceived legitimacy of the government. However, in Russia the direction of the effect was reversed. If respondents thought that democracy is the best political system, they saw the current government (of Medvedev) as less legitimate ($\beta = -0.10$). If, however, respondents thought that authorities should treat all citizens according to procedures and laws, they saw the current government as more legitimate ($\beta = 0.20$). Also, the view that courts should be able to stop other institutions from acting beyond their authority slightly increased perceived legitimacy of the current government ($\beta = 0.06$). The R^2 change in step 2 (.53) indicates that the evaluations of the performance of the government (specific views) explained more variance in

perceived legitimacy, but as in Ukraine, the significance of three general factors imply that they are important too, as each of them explains unique (added) variance in perceived legitimacy.

Table 5.20. Linear model of predictors of the current government's perceived legitimacy (N = 733, adjusted $R^2 = .60$, R^2 change step 1 = .07, R^2 change step 2 = .53, df = 719).

Predictors		b	SE	β
	(Constant)	0.15	0.22	
Step 1	Democracy best	-0.08***	0.02	-0.10
	Parties important	0.04	0.02	0.04
	Elections important	0.04	0.03	0.04
	Courts should stop institutions	0.06*	0.03	0.06
	Authorities should provide access	-0.02	0.03	-0.02
	Authorities should treat equal	0.22***	0.03	0.20
	Authorities should provide equal chances	-0.01	0.03	-0.01
Step 2	System is democratic	0.05*	0.03	0.06
	Elections are free and fair	0.13***	0.02	0.17
	Parliament can stop government	0.09***	0.02	0.10
	Courts can stop government	9.7×10^{-4}	0.02	1.1×10^{-3}
	Government works for everybody	0.47***	0.03	0.55
	Socio-economic status	0.07	0.04	0.04

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. VIFs < 1.97.

Perceived legitimacy of the current parliament

Four specific predictors and one general predictor had a significant positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the parliament (Table 5.21). The ability of the parliament to stop the government when it acts beyond its authority had the largest positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the parliament ($\beta = 0.34$). Also, if respondents evaluated the elections as free and fair, they thought that the parliament is more legitimate ($\beta = 0.26$). The evaluation of political parties as representing the interests of citizens well had a significant effect on perceived legitimacy of the current parliament too ($\beta = 0.15$). Evaluation of the current political system as democratic was the specific predictor with the smallest significant effect: when respondents considered the current political system as democratic, they saw the parliament as more legitimate ($\beta = 0.09$). The general view that had a significant effect on perceived legitimacy of the parliament was

the view that authorities should treat all citizens according to procedures and laws ($\beta = 0.12$). The R^2 change in step 2 shows that most of the variance in perceived legitimacy scores of the parliament was explained by the specific predictors (.46).

Table 5.21. Linear model of predictors of the current parliament's perceived legitimacy (N = 737, adjusted $R^2 = .48$, R^2 change step 1 = .03, R^2 change step 2 = .46, df = 723).

	Predictors	b	SE	β
	(Constant)	0.57	0.25	
Step 1	Democracy best	-0.03	0.03	-0.03
	Parties important	0.01	0.03	0.01
	Elections important	-9.1×10^{-4}	0.03	-1.0×10^{-3}
	Courts should stop institutions	-0.02	0.03	-0.02
	Authorities should provide access	0.02	0.03	0.02
	Authorities should treat equal	0.13**	0.04	0.12
	Authorities should provide equal chances	3.6×10^{-3}	0.03	3.9×10^{-3}
Step 2	System is democratic	0.08**	0.03	0.09
	Elections are free and fair	0.21***	0.03	0.26
	Parliament can stop government	0.29***	0.03	0.34
	Parliament can stop president	0.03	0.03	0.04
	Parties represent citizens	0.14***	0.03	0.15
	Socio-economic status	0.09	0.05	0.05

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. VIFs < 1.98.

Perceived legitimacy of the current courts

Three specific, three general predictors, and socio-economic status had a significant effect on perceived legitimacy of the courts (Table 5.22). The perception of courts as treating everybody according to procedures and laws, as in all other countries, had the largest effect on perceived legitimacy of the current courts ($\beta = 0.27$). Also, like in France, Poland and Ukraine, evaluating the current system as democratic had a positive effect on perceived legitimacy of the courts ($\beta = 0.22$). If respondents thought that the courts can stop the government from acting beyond its authority, they evaluated the courts as more legitimate ($\beta = 0.18$). The socio-economic status had a small significant effect on perceived legitimacy of the courts ($\beta = 0.06$). The higher the social status of respondents, the more they thought of the courts as legitimate.

Like in the case of perceived legitimacy of the government, the view that democracy is the best political system had a negative effect on perceived legitimacy of

the courts. If respondents thought that democracy is the best political system, they saw the current courts as less legitimate ($\beta = -0.11$). Again if respondents thought that authorities should treat all citizens according to procedures and laws, they saw the current courts as more legitimate ($\beta = 0.19$). Also, the view that courts should be able to stop other institutions from acting beyond their authority slightly increased perceived legitimacy of the current courts ($\beta = 0.09$). The R^2 change in step 2 (.27) indicates that the evaluations of the performance of the government (specific views) explained more variance in perceived legitimacy of courts, but the significance of three general factors imply that they are important too.

Table 5.22. Linear model of predictors of the current courts' perceived legitimacy (N = 741, adjusted $R^2 = .29$, R^2 change step 1 = .03, R^2 change step 2 = .27, df = 728).

	Predictors	b	SE	β
	(Constant)	1.06	0.26	
Step 1	Democracy best	-0.08**	0.03	-0.11
	Parties important	0.02	0.03	0.02
	Elections important	0.02	0.03	0.03
	Courts should stop institutions	0.08*	0.03	0.09
	Authorities should provide access	0.02	0.03	0.02
	Authorities should treat equal	0.17***	0.04	0.19
	Authorities should provide equal chances	0.01	0.03	0.01
Step 2	System is democratic	0.16***	0.03	0.22
	Courts can stop government	0.14***	0.04	0.18
	Courts can stop president	0.03	0.03	0.05
	Courts treat equal	0.21***	0.03	0.27
	Socio-economic status	0.10*	0.05	0.06

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. VIFs < 2.26.

Perceived legitimacy of the current president

There were 3 specific and 2 general predictors that had a significant effect on perceived legitimacy of the president (Putin; Table 5.23). The evaluation of the president as working for the benefit of the whole society and not a small elite had the strongest significant effect on the president's perceived legitimacy ($\beta = 0.66$). Again, the perception of the elections as free and fair increased perceived legitimacy of the president ($\beta = 0.15$). If respondents considered the current political system to be democratic, then the president's perceived legitimacy was higher ($\beta = 0.06$).

Three significant general effects were the same in the case of the government. If respondents believed that democracy is the best political system, they thought of the current president as less legitimate ($\beta = -0.07$). If, however, respondents believed that the authorities should treat all citizens according to the same procedures and laws, they thought of the president as more legitimate ($\beta = 0.19$).

Table 5.23. Linear model of predictors of the current president's perceived legitimacy (N = 736, adjusted $R^2 = .67$, R^2 change step 1 = .08, R^2 change step 2 = .59, df = 722).

	Predictors	b	SE	β
	(Constant)	0.31	0.22	
Step 1	Democracy best	-0.06**	0.02	-0.07
	Parties important	-0.01	0.02	-0.01
	Elections important	0.01	0.03	0.01
	Courts should stop institutions	0.05	0.03	0.04
	Authorities should provide access	0.03	0.03	0.03
	Authorities should treat equal	0.23***	0.03	0.19
Step 2	Authorities should provide equal chances	-0.02	0.03	-0.02
	System is democratic	0.06**	0.03	0.06
	Elections are free and fair	0.13***	0.02	0.15
	Parliament can stop president	-9.4×10^{-4}	0.02	-1.0×10^{-3}
	Courts can stop president	0.01	0.02	0.01
	President works for everybody	0.58***	0.02	0.66
	Socio-economic status	0.07	0.04	0.04

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. VIFs < 1.95.

Conclusions

On average, Russian respondents were fairly satisfied with their institutions: all current political institutions received a score above 4 (midpoint of the scale) beside the parliament, which was evaluated rather negatively and got a score below 4. Not surprisingly, the current president had the highest average perceived legitimacy of all investigated institutions in Russia (Table 5.3).

Like in all other countries, the most variance in perceived legitimacy scores was explained again by the specific predictors—specific views had the largest effects on perceived legitimacy of the institutions. Differently than in stable democracies and similarly to the other hybrid regime (Ukraine), there were many significant effects of general views affecting perceived legitimacy of the institutions. For three out of four

institutions two or three general views were found significant. The effect that was found in the analysis of perceived legitimacy of all four institutions was the view that authorities should be treating all citizens according to procedures and laws. This effect could imply that respondents who are convinced by the rhetoric of order (understood, however, as following the established laws and procedures rather than random rules) often used by the Russian authorities and media, see the current Russian institutions as more legitimate.

The other general view that had a significant negative effect on perceived legitimacy of the government, the courts, and the president was the preference for democracy as the best political system invented so far. If citizens believed that democracy is indeed the best system, they saw these institutions as less legitimate. The reverse then was true as well: if the democratic system was a less preferred system, respondents considered the current institutions as more legitimate. This finding, however, was accompanied by the effect of a specific view that was found in the analysis of perceived legitimacy of all institutions. If respondents considered the current political system to be democratic, they thought of all the institutions as more legitimate. This finding could perhaps be explained by the fact that those respondents who support democracy as the most suitable political system have a different conception of what democracy is than those respondents who considered the current system democratic.

The strongest effects show similar patterns to all the other countries analysed so far. The strongest predictor of legitimacy of the executive institutions was whether they were seen as working for all citizens rather than for small elite. So, distributive justice in providing outcomes to society was of the greatest concern for the evaluation of legitimacy of the government and president. Procedural justice—the ability to stop the government from acting beyond its authority and the fairness of elections were the strongest predictors of perceived legitimacy of the parliament. This result implies that throughput (checks and balances) and output (electoral process) aspects of legitimacy were crucial for respondents when they evaluated the legislative body. Consistent with the results in all the other countries, procedural justice—treating all citizens the same—was the most important for the evaluation of legitimacy of the courts.

The results in Russia show that respondents were even less unanimous than in stable democracies and in Ukraine about what kind of political system they prefer. The two effects of democracy perceptions showed opposite effects on perceived legitimacy. The general view that democracy is the best political system decreased perceived legitimacy, whereas the opinion that the current political system is democratic increased perceived legitimacy of institutions. Although specific views—evaluation of institutions’ performance—were the strongest predictors of perceived legitimacy, the significance of the above mentioned general views shows that in Russia the variance in perceived legitimacy scores is also explained by the different views on the ideal political arrangement. Therefore, Russia fits more with the description of country C, where the variance in perceived legitimacy is explained by both specific and general predictors.

5.8. Comparative discussion and conclusions

The analysis of perceived legitimacy in the five selected countries showed several similarities and differences between the evaluations of political authorities. First of all, institutions in old democracies were on average perceived by respondents as more legitimate than institutions in the new democracy and in the two hybrid regimes.

Second, in all five countries the specific views—views about how well institutions perform—explained a larger part of the variance within perceived legitimacy. The specific predictors that had significant effects were to a large extent similar across countries (see Table 5.24). The most important and consistent predictor of perceived legitimacy of the executive institutions (government and president) was whether they have worked for the common good rather than a small elite (five out of five countries) and whether the elections are considered free and fair (four out of five countries). In both hybrid regimes (Russia and Ukraine) another significant specific predictor of perceived legitimacy of the executive was whether the current regime was evaluated as democratic. The most common predictors of perceived legitimacy of the parliament were whether the parliament can stop the government from acting beyond its authority (five out of five countries), whether political parties represent the interests of citizens well (five out of five countries), and whether the elections are free and fair

(four out of five countries). Perceived legitimacy of courts was predicted by their equal treatment of all citizens (five out of five countries) and the judgment of the political system as democratic (four out of five countries).

Finally, the main differences concerned the significant general predictors. Table 5.25 shows that for the executive institutions, the hybrid regimes in Ukraine and Russia had more significant general predictors than democracies. In contrast, for the parliament and courts, democracies had more general predictors than hybrid regimes.

In the analysed democratic regimes, there was more influence of general predictors on perceived legitimacy of the parliaments and courts than on the executive institutions. This means that respondents in the Netherlands, France and Poland were more divided on the general rules in the case of non-executive institutions. For example, in the Netherlands and Poland perceived legitimacy of the parliament was explained by the extent of agreement with the statement that political parties are important in representing the interests of citizens. In other words, if respondents believed that political parties indeed play an important role, they attributed more legitimacy to the parliament.²⁷ Moreover, both in the Netherlands and Poland the extent of agreement with the statement that courts should stop other institutions from acting beyond their authority determined perceived legitimacy of the courts. Hence there is no uniform opinion about the scope of power that the courts should have and this influences the evaluation of the current courts. Therefore, I conclude that regarding the non-executive institutions, democratic countries were closer to the description of country C, where both ideas about the general arrangement of political system and evaluations of the performance of authorities vary and are responsible for the differences in perceived legitimacy.

There was only one significant general predictor that explained the variance in perceived legitimacy of the current governments in the Netherlands and Poland, namely the perception of political parties as important institution to represent citizens' interests. This is the same general predictor that was significant in the case of the parliament in these two countries. In general, however, general predictors did not

²⁷ In Poland this result is in line with the trend of growing antipathy towards political parties that governed the country in the last 15 years (Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej 2015). Perhaps a similar phenomenon would explain the result for the Netherlands.

explain the variance in perceived legitimacy of the executive institutions. The differences in their perceived legitimacy were explained prevalingly by the evaluation of the performance. Therefore, I conclude that regarding the executive institutions (governments and presidents) democratic countries matched the description of country A, in which the ideas about the preferred political system and the importance of free and fair elections did not explain differences in perceived legitimacy.

By contrast, in Ukraine the general views explained variance in perceived legitimacy of the executive institutions and not of the parliament and courts. In the case of the government and president, the view that authorities should provide equal access to goods and services to everybody had a negative effect, which implies that respondents who were more in favour of socialism/communism, considered the new liberal executives as less legitimate. Moreover, the preference for a democratic system had a significant positive effect on perceived legitimacy of these two institutions. Respondents were divided on what kind of political system is best for the country and these views had an effect on perceived legitimacy of the executive institutions. This means that Ukrainian respondents matched the description of citizens from country C when they evaluated their president and government, whereas they were closer to the model of country A when they evaluated the legislative and judicial institutions (Table 5.24 and 5.22).

Table 5.24. Comparison of “specific” predictors across countries (see text for explanation). If a predictor had a significant effect in a country this is indicated by a check mark (✓). Negative effects are indicated by a minus (-).

Institution	Predictor	Country				
		NL	FR	PL	UA	RU
Government	Government works for everybody	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Elections are free and fair	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Parliament can stop government	✓	✓	✓		✓
	Courts can stop government			✓		
	System is democratic				✓	✓
Parliament	Parliament can stop government	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Parties represent citizens	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Elections are free and fair	✓	✓		✓	✓
	System is democratic			✓		✓
Courts	Courts treat equal	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	System is democratic		✓	✓	✓	✓
	Courts can stop government	✓				✓
	Courts can stop president	NA	✓	✓		
	Socio-economic status		✓			✓
President	President works for everybody	NA	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Elections are free and fair	NA		✓	✓	✓
	System is democratic	NA			✓	✓
	Courts can stop president	NA	✓			

Russia was the country in which the highest number of significant effects for the general views was found (Table 5.25). Two common general effects that explained the variance in perceived legitimacy were the preference for democracy as the best political system and the view that political authorities should treat all citizens according to procedures and laws. The first general view had a negative effect on perceived legitimacy of the government, courts, and president (respondents who thought democracy is the best system saw the current institutions as less legitimate). Interestingly, this general view was accompanied by an opposite effect of a specific view regarding democratic performance (Table 5.24). In particular, if respondents considered the current political system to be democratic, they thought of all the institutions as more legitimate. As mentioned above, these opposite directions of

effects could perhaps be explained if respondents who support democracy as the best political system have a different conception of what democracy is than those respondents who considered the current system democratic. Another general view had a significant positive effect on perceived legitimacy of all institutions in Russia. When respondents considered it important for authorities to treat all citizens according to procedures and laws, they perceived all current institutions as more legitimate (Table 5.25). As mentioned earlier, this can be interpreted as an emphasis on order (understood as the rule of law) as an important aspect of political authorities' legitimacy.²⁸ Respondents from Russia were the closest to the description of citizens from country C, where political legitimacy is predicted both by preferences for the political system and assessments of performance of political institutions.

The analysis shows that the specific views explain most of the variance in perceived legitimacy of institutions in each country. The significant effects are similar across all the analysed regimes. The perception that executive institutions work in the interest of the whole society rather than for a small elite was consistently the strongest predictor of their perceived legitimacy. In other words, the perception of distributive justice in the provision of outputs by authorities increased their legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. Hence the H4 (*Distributive justice increases perceived legitimacy of political authorities*) was supported by the results of this study. Also, in each country, the more the courts were seen as treating everybody the same, the more legitimacy was ascribed to them by respondents. Thus, procedural justice—throughput—was the most important aspect of perceived legitimacy of the courts. In the case of the parliament, the input aspect of legitimacy as well as throughput affected perceived legitimacy. More specifically, the perception that the parliament can stop the government from acting beyond its authority (throughput/procedural justice), the perception of elections as free and fair (input/procedural justice) or the system as democratic (input/democracy), and the perception of political parties as representing the interests of citizens well (input/procedural justice) all had a positive effect on perceived

²⁸ This is in line with some interpretations of Putin's legitimacy as based on the provision of law and order, which are appreciated by the Russian citizens after their experience of chaos and disorder in the 1990s (Anderson Jr. 2013, p.133).

legitimacy of the parliaments. Procedural justice, thus, increased perceived legitimacy of institutions in all five countries and therefore H2 (*Procedural justice increases perceived legitimacy of political authorities*) was supported by the data.

Table 5.25. Comparison of “general” predictors across countries (see text for explanation). If a predictor had a significant effect in a country this is indicated by a check mark (✓). Negative effects are indicated by a minus (-).

Institution	Predictor	Country				
		NL	FR	PL	UA	RU
Government	Parties important	✓		✓		
	Courts should stop institutions				✓	✓
	Democracy best				✓	✓(-)
	Authorities should provide access				✓(-)	
	Authorities should treat equal					✓
Parliament	Parties important	✓		✓		
	Authorities should treat equal		✓			✓
	Courts should stop institutions	✓				
	Authorities should provide equal chances	✓(-)				
Courts	Courts should stop institutions	✓		✓		
	Authorities should provide equal chances		✓			
	Authorities should treat equal			✓		✓
	Democracy best					✓(-)
President	Democracy best	NA			✓	✓(-)
	Courts should stop institutions	NA			✓	
	Authorities should treat equal	NA				✓
	Authorities should provide access	NA			✓(-)	
	Elections important	NA			✓	

Dependence (operationalized as socio-economic status) did not have a significant effect on perceived legitimacy of institutions in most of the analysed cases. Also, the direction of the effect (even if not significant) was inconsistent across institutions and countries. For example, in Poland higher socio-economic status had a negative effect on perceived legitimacy (the higher the social status, the lower the perception of legitimacy), whereas in France it had a positive effect on perceived

legitimacy of all institutions (the higher the social status, the higher the perception of legitimacy) of all institutions. Moreover, the direction of the effect changed even within one country depending on the institution under investigation, e.g. in the Netherlands, higher socio-economic status had a positive (insignificant) effect on perceived legitimacy in the case of the government and parliament and a negative (insignificant) effect in the case of the current courts. Therefore the H6 (*Dependence on political authorities increases perceived legitimacy of the authorities/The lower the socio-economic status, the higher the perceived legitimacy of the authorities*) was not supported and more research into the relation between socio-economic status (and dependence) and perceived legitimacy of different institutions is needed.

Moreover, future research could explore the relation between evaluations of the political institutions and partisanship. Partisanship of respondents can influence their perceptions and assessment of political institutions. Moreover, some institutions can be more partisan (e.g. government, president, and parliament) than others (e.g. courts) and the perception of their partisanship could also vary across regimes. Although in the survey I asked a question about political views of respondents, I did not address the partisanship of respondents and institutions directly, therefore I could not control for its effects in my analysis.

To summarize, the analysis suggests that the extent to which the general views explain perceived legitimacy of institutions depends on the type of institutions and the regime type. In the case of democracies, different preferences for the arrangements within the political system (although not the type of the political system itself) explained the differences in the levels of perceived legitimacy granted by respondents to the legislative and judicial institutions. They did not explain much difference in the perceived legitimacy of the executive institutions. The perceived legitimacy of the executive institutions was mainly driven by the negative or positive assessment of their performance. The opposite was true for the hybrid regimes: the general predictors were more important in explaining perceived legitimacy of the executive institutions. Another main difference between democracies and hybrid regimes is that in hybrid regimes there was an effect of viewing democracy as the best system on perceived legitimacy of institutions whereas in democracies this predictor was not significant.

Also, Russian respondents were the closest to the description of citizens of country C of all the analysed countries. This means that among Russian respondents preference for democracy and ideas on how the system ought to work, as well as the evaluations of institutional performance were associated with the level of perceived legitimacy.

Chapter 6. General discussion and conclusions

What makes political authorities legitimate? The studies presented in this thesis indicate that in the eyes of citizens, the moral standing of the authorities is a very important characteristic that contributes to the willingness to voluntarily transfer power to them. All three studies showed that citizens socialized in different political regimes do not only care about personal rewards that they receive from the authorities, but also care about whether the authorities distribute goods and services fairly across society, use just and transparent procedures, and represent integrity, honesty, and reliability. The results of the studies showed that most citizens see acquiring power in a legal manner (through a victory in free and fair elections) as the basis for the voluntary transfer of power (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). Moreover, citizens are sensitive to how the rule is exercised, specifically if the decisions about ‘who gets what, when, and how’ are taken in a just way (Chapter 3, 4, and 5). Importantly, distributive justice had the largest positive effect on perceptions of legitimacy of authorities in both the experimental (operationalized as the distribution of help to the victims of flood in Chapter 3) and the correlational study (operationalized as working for the common good rather than small elite in Chapter 5).

Summary of results

This thesis aimed to contribute to understanding of the criteria used by citizens to judge political authorities’ legitimacy, to comparison of ideas about legitimacy in different political regimes, and to theory-building and methodology of research into political legitimacy. The three empirical studies reported in this thesis were conducted in five countries to achieve these aims. All of them provided results and insights that may guide future research of perceived legitimacy.

Main results

In the first empirical study of this thesis, the vignette experiment tested the causal relations between perceived legitimacy and instrumental and normative factors. The findings supported a model of a citizen that is concerned with both his/her personal

material well-being and fairness of institutions when evaluating political authorities. The results confirmed that citizens' evaluations of authorities become more positive with provision of instrumental incentives (personal positive outcome), but also that just behaviour on the side of political authorities (distributive and procedural justice) can do the same. Moreover, fair distribution of help was the most important factor influencing perceived legitimacy of the hypothetical government, showing that the extent of fairness in 'who gets what' aspect of politics is the core concern of citizens when granting legitimacy to authorities. Furthermore, citizens that experienced fairness of procedures—the possibility to consult the authorities and voice opinions—expressed higher level of legitimacy than citizens who did not. This finding illustrates that legitimacy is based not only on the evaluation of 'who gets what', but also on 'how' the decisions are taken. In this case, whether the hypothetical government consulted the citizens about their situation made a difference for their perceptions of legitimacy. The same patterns were observed across the regime types in which participants were socialized. In other words, the results showed support for the proposed theory of perceived legitimacy across different regimes.

The second study of this thesis explored the conceptions of legitimacy among respondents socialized in different political regimes. The analysis of answers to an open question about the most important characteristics of legitimate authorities showed that these characteristics are very similar across countries: similar concepts and themes were used to express what the characteristics of legitimate authorities are. These findings supported the view that normative characteristics of political authorities, and less the outcomes provided by them, are important for citizens when granting legitimacy. The analysis revealed that characteristics of authorities belonging to the input and throughput dimensions were mentioned more often by respondents than characteristics belonging to the output dimension. In other words, with regards to legitimacy, respondents were concerned about the way power is obtained by authorities, emphasized free and fair elections, and underlined the role of trust (input). Moreover, they were also concerned with the way power is exercised and listed personal characteristics and modes of conduct that they expected from authorities (throughput: fairness/justice, impartiality, legality, transparency, and mechanisms of checks &

balances). This implies that just winning elections does not yield a constant and lasting level of perceived legitimacy. To sustain legitimacy, political authorities need to show procedural and distributive fairness. This study, thus, corroborated the results of the vignette experiment and extended them with additional normative criteria that were listed as important for legitimacy by the respondents.

The correlational third study explored the factors influencing the perceived legitimacy of real institutions. Results supported the hypothesis that how political institutions perform matters the most for the perceptions of their legitimacy. The perception that executive institutions work for the interest of the whole society rather than for a small elite was consistently the strongest predictor of their perceived legitimacy. This indicated that distributive justice in the provision of outputs is important for the evaluation of real—not only hypothetical—institutions. This further corroborated the results of the vignette experiment, which showed the positive influence of fair distribution on perceived legitimacy as well. Moreover, in all countries the ability of parliaments to control governments as well as the quality of representation offered by political parties consistently explained perceived legitimacy of parliaments. This shows that respondents across countries (1) valued effective procedures serving as checks and balances on the executive institutions and (2) perceived parliaments as more legitimate if they thought that political parties are responding to the needs and values of citizens. These two findings show the importance of throughput and input for the evaluation of political institutions.

The results of all three studies show that the most important factors influencing perceived legitimacy across all five countries are distributive justice and procedural justice. In the experiment, distributive justice was operationalized as fair distribution of help. In the correlational study, the variable that measured distributive justice was the extent to which the executives were perceived as working for the benefit of all citizens rather than for the benefit of small elite. In both studies, the effects of fairness in the allocation of goods and services on perceived legitimacy were the largest of all tested effect. In the study of the conceptions of legitimacy, respondents expressed the importance of distributive justice by referring to acting for the common good or in the interest of all citizens. Words such as fairness/honesty and

equality, which are linked to the issues surrounding distributive justice, were also named frequently as important characteristics of legitimate authorities.

Also procedural justice had consistent positive effect on perceived legitimacy. It was operationalized in the experiment as giving voice to the citizens and in the correlational study as fairness of elections, checks and balances between different institutions, and equal treatment of citizens. Respondents expressed the importance of procedural justice in their answers to the open question about characteristics of legitimate authorities by referring to the rules that need to be followed to obtain power (free and fair elections), but also to checks and balances of authorities' conduct while in power, such as transparency, fairness, impartiality, and equal treatment. The experiment found a significant interaction between distributive and procedural justice in four out of five cases. The interaction showed that procedural justice increased perceived legitimacy when distributive justice was present. In other words, if distribution of government's help was unfair, then having the opportunity to meet with the governmental commission and participate in a discussion either did not increase perceived legitimacy of the government or increased it to a smaller extent. A possible interpretation of this interaction is that people expect fair procedures to lead to fair distribution of help and goods and services. Only then substantial increases in authority's legitimacy can be gained.

Following these consistent results it can be concluded that if authorities would like to increase their perceived legitimacy, they should strive to achieve distributive justice by including as many citizens as possible in the fair distribution of goods and services. Moreover, the results also suggest that a good way to achieve distributive justice is the application of procedural justice: impartiality, transparency (understood both as openness and no abuse of office for personal gain), giving voice to all the concerned parties, following laws, and guaranteeing equal treatment.

Furthermore, the responses to the open question exploring the ideas about legitimacy showed that in both democratic and non-democratic regimes students' conceptions of legitimacy and democracy were intertwined. For example, free and fair elections, which are a crucial component of the concept of democracy, were almost uniformly considered the basis for legitimate rule. Another component of democracy,

the rule of law, was also emphasized as a very important characteristic of legitimate authorities. The results of the three studies also suggest that it is possible that citizens in different regimes are primarily concerned with distributive and procedural fairness of regimes rather than democracy as an abstract form of government. In other words, citizens in their evaluations might focus on more specific desirable behaviors and characteristics of authorities and institutions rather than an aggregate judgment of the level of democracy. This seems plausible, because understanding of political processes in terms of fair division of resources and impartial treatment is more intuitive and less abstract than understanding in terms of presence or absence of democracy. In short, it does not matter whether we call a regime democratic or not, as long as the authorities and institutions treat people fairly. The primacy of concerns about distributive and procedural justice could thus explain the similarities in the conceptions of legitimacy in democracies and hybrid regimes.

Differences between individuals socialized in different regimes

Contrary to expectations, the differences in legitimacy evaluations due to respondents' socialization in different political regimes were not large. However, each study showed several differences that are worth elaborating on as they might provide a starting point for further investigation.

In the first study, the main differences identified between democracies and hybrid regimes were in the magnitude of the effects of distributive justice. In both hybrid regimes, Ukraine and Russia, the effect of distributive justice was significantly higher than in the democratic regimes. The result implies that fair distribution of help by the government might be a more salient issue in these hybrid regimes. This could be due to socialization: the communist legacy may have fostered higher expectations on the side of citizens to receive goods and services from state institutions. It could also be a reflection of the urgency of the problems connected to distribution of goods and services in Ukraine and Russia due to wide spread corruption and stark inequalities. The comparative analysis showed also that procedural justice had a significantly larger effect on perceived legitimacy in Ukraine than in the other analysed countries. This fits with the current developments in Ukraine: the waves of protests in 2004 and 2013

show that especially young citizens want to have their voice heard and that they are ready to express their discontent in mass demonstrations. The underestimation and disregard of the citizens' voices by the authorities in Ukraine led to an escalation of the conflict between citizens and the state.

The second study explored differences in the conceptions of legitimacy of respondents socialized in different political regimes. Although public opinion surveys and literature on regime survival suggested that the basis of legitimacy in non-democracies like Russia might be different than in stable democracies, this was not confirmed by the results of this study. Output—the aspect of legitimacy that included answers such as welfare, order, stability, acting for the common good, and answers expressing the power to execute decisions—was not the most important aspect of perceived legitimacy in any of the analysed countries. It does not mean, however, that outputs are not important for other kinds of judgments about political authorities (e.g. support) and for behaviour towards them (e.g. obedience, voting). It merely shows that the output aspects of governing are not as essential when evaluating legitimacy as input and throughput. Moreover, the analysis showed that French respondents emphasized input—elections, representation, and citizen participation—as a priority requirement for legitimate authorities more often than respondents from other countries. The Dutch respondents showed more emphasis on throughput, which included such characteristics of political conduct as impartiality, transparency, and professionalism.

Also, the second study showed that transparency was the most frequently named characteristic of legitimate authorities in both the Netherlands and Ukraine. However, the content of this category varied. Respondents in the Netherlands often referred to the category of transparency with words such as transparency and openness. In contrast, respondents in Ukraine often referred to transparency with words expressing concern with corruption. This shows that the notion that transparency is important for legitimacy is shared, but that what needs to be done to either achieve it (in Ukraine) or sustain and improve it (in the Netherlands) may differ depending on the current state of transparency in a given country and the most urgent political issues in the eyes of citizens. Respondents from Ukraine (and Russia) might have been mainly concerned with the level of the abuse of power for personal gains whereas respondents

in the Netherlands used words describing the need of transparency in terms of acting in a visible, open manner that can be observed and checked by citizens.

In the second study, two other differences were found between post-communist countries and old democracies. First, although input was important in each country, respondents from the post-communist countries emphasised trust/support more than those from France and the Netherlands. In France, elections were the most frequently mentioned characteristic of legitimate authorities among the answers concerned with input. Second, a larger emphasis was given to citizen participation and consultation in the old democracies than in the post-communist countries. This finding is in line with earlier studies (see Chapter 1, pp.39-40) that have linked the experience of communism with the lack of willingness to engage in politics and social activism (on a daily basis) in the post-communist era.

The third study found that institutions in old democracies were on average perceived by respondents as more legitimate than institutions in the new democracy and hybrid regimes. Moreover, the extent to which general views about the ideal political system (beliefs about how the system should work) explained perceived legitimacy of institutions depended on the type of institutions and on regime type. For respondents from democracies, some variance in perceived legitimacy of the legislative and judicial institutions was explained by different preferences for the arrangements within the political system (although not the type of the political system itself). However, these preferences did not explain much of perceived legitimacy of the executive institutions. The perceived legitimacy of the executive institutions was mainly explained by assessment of their performance. The opposite pattern was observed for hybrid regimes: the general predictors were more important in explaining perceived legitimacy of the executive institutions. Another difference between democracies and hybrid regimes was that in hybrid regimes perceived legitimacy of institutions was influenced by whether respondents viewed democracy as the best system, whereas in democracies this predictor was not significant. Also, among Russian respondents perceived legitimacy was associated with preferences for democracy and ideas on how the system ought to work, as well as the evaluations of institutional performance.

In sum, the differences in what makes authorities legitimate in the eyes of citizens from analysed countries were mainly differences of emphasis rather than of kind. Distributive justice was the strongest predictor of perceived legitimacy in all countries, but it was especially strong in the case of Russia and Ukraine—two countries where income inequality and the oligarchic appropriation of state resources are of biggest concern. This links with the finding that requirement for transparency of political authorities was often expressed by phrases such as ‘not corrupt’ in Ukraine and Russia. In other words, the results from hybrid regimes indicate that respondents recognize that the requirement of fair distribution cannot be met without getting rid of corrupt practices of political authorities. Moreover, stronger emphasis on trust and support in post-communist countries suggests that the process of building a trust-based relation between the citizens and political authorities might be ongoing in Poland, Ukraine, and Russia and that relying on elections as a source of input legitimacy, although necessary, might not be a sufficient condition for achieving full legitimacy.

Theoretical and methodological contributions

This thesis focused specifically on one level of analysis of legitimacy, namely the individual level. Taking this perspective contributed to the development of the concept of legitimacy in several ways. First of all, exploring how individuals think about political legitimacy and what criteria they use to evaluate the legitimacy of political authorities informs us about the ideals that people have regarding those who rule over them. In other words, these studies contributed to our understanding of what individuals think about legitimacy and what are the factors that they focus on when evaluating whether the authorities deserve to have power transferred to them. Moreover, understanding the conception of legitimacy that citizens have and its similarities and differences to the conception of legitimacy held by the elites, rulers, and scholars can contribute to the research of the effects of what is known as legitimation strategies used by the authorities. Understanding the normative expectations from legitimate authorities on the part of citizens is necessary to know whether the legitimation offered by the authorities is in fact congruent with what citizens expect from them. By checking whether the values promoted by the authorities are compatible with the

expectations on the moral standing of authorities we can arrive at a more complete assessment of legitimacy of political regimes.

Secondly, the studies presented in this thesis showed that finding out what criteria citizens use and especially what normative factors they take into account when judging political authorities, helps to sharpen the distinction between the concept of support and legitimacy. Making this differentiation is difficult and this study represents only one of the steps towards achieving it. The research presented here compared instrumental and normative factors' influence on judgments about political authorities and showed that the proposed definition of perceived legitimacy as based on the normative evaluations is a useful definition. Therefore, this research contributed to the pursuit of a more precise delineation of the meaning of legitimacy. This is necessary, if legitimacy is to be considered a distinct concept with explanatory value, which adds to the understanding of mechanisms behind the transfer of power from citizens to authorities.

Another theoretical issue that this thesis aimed to illuminate was the effect of (outcome) dependence on perceived legitimacy. Although dependence was effectively manipulated in the experimental vignette, its effects on perceived legitimacy were not consistent across five countries (Chapter 3). Contrary to the hypothesis derived from system justification theory that dependence on political authorities increases perceived legitimacy, the main effects of dependence showed that being dependent on the government's help decreased perceived legitimacy in the Netherlands, Ukraine and Russia. In Poland, the effect of dependence was not consistent and in France not significant and very small. Similarly, the results of the correlational study did not show clear patterns in the effect of dependence (operationalized as socio-economic status) on perceived legitimacy of different political authorities. In most cases its effect on perceived legitimacy was not significant and the direction of the effect was not always the same. Therefore, the prediction of system justification theory about the role of dependence in perceived legitimacy was not supported. Further cross-cultural investigation might explain why the effects of dependence found here are opposite to the predictions of system justification theory.

Finally, the vignette study contributed to the methodology of legitimacy. The experimental vignettes designed for this research project successfully manipulated the factors that were supposed to affect perceived legitimacy. Moreover, the vignettes allowed for conclusions about the causal links between the variables included in the model. In addition, the scale developed to measure perceived legitimacy in the vignette experiment showed high consistency and was a reliable measure across all five cases. In other words, the questions used to measure perceived legitimacy correlated strongly and loaded on one factor. Therefore this scale seems like a good tool for operationalizing perceived legitimacy that goes beyond trust and support.

Implications for further research

This thesis examined theoretically prescribed factors that have been claimed to influence perceived legitimacy and also explored what other factors might be important to citizens when granting legitimacy to political authorities. Respondents identified many aspects related to the exercise of power that they find crucial for legitimacy. On the basis of these results, the next step in researching legitimacy on the individual level could be testing of the causal links between these additional criteria of evaluation (e.g. aspects of elections, degree of corruption) and perceived legitimacy. The method of vignette experiments (or factorial survey) seems to be a suitable tool to further the understanding of the mechanisms behind legitimacy granting. Studies that include additional factors influencing perceived legitimacy could contribute to advancing theory of perceived legitimacy. Moreover, testing the same model in other countries and with different samples can further inform us about its strengths and shortcomings.

For the particular purpose of this study, student samples were used to explore differences across the regime types. Consequently, this study has its limitations. First of all, it is not clear whether the differences and similarities between regimes would be larger or smaller if samples used in the study would be drawn from different populations. One can imagine that characteristics of a particular sample might affect the criteria used to evaluate political authorities. For example, other potential homogenous groups from which samples could be drawn to study legitimacy are police corps and militaries. However, these elite groups differ from students (and other groups

within society) in several ways. They are often self-selecting to join these institutions, because they have a particular set of values and a specific idea about legitimacy of authorities. Moreover, they are trained and obliged to serve their country and be loyal to the state. Therefore, we might find that the conceptions of legitimacy differ either more or less across countries, if one uses samples of police or military rather than samples of students. Furthermore, these differences would be due to the particular characteristics of individuals joining police or military and specific effects of these institutions rather than general political socialization process in a particular regime. Also, there is some evidence that students' views are more representative of the public than the elites (see Chapter 2). By the same token, using samples of lower educated people across countries might yield different results and show either larger or smaller differences in what characteristics of political authorities are important across these regimes. In this case, however, larger cross-country differences in ideas about legitimacy might be attributed, for example, to the quality of lower education in a particular country (e.g. the quality of lower education in the Netherlands might be better than the quality of lower education in Ukraine) than to socialization in a particular regime. Therefore, for the purpose of testing the assumption that political socialization in different regimes affects ideas about legitimacy, student samples were suitable.

Nevertheless, using student samples might also affect the scope of cross-country differences detected in the study of legitimacy. One could assume that being educated for certain number of years and reaching the undergraduate level of studies might lead to a uniform idea about what legitimate authorities are like. This might be partially true as the differences in the ideas about legitimacy and in the factors contributing to legitimacy of authorities found in my studies were not large. Following similar steps of education could make the ideas about legitimacy converge and as mentioned in Chapter 2.2 students in general have more sophisticated ideas and more knowledge about political systems than other social groups. However, there are two reasons to believe that the detected similarities are not entirely due to the fact of using students in particular. Firstly, even scholars of legitimacy within one university often disagree on what legitimacy is, what dimension it includes, and what factors influence

it. This was also demonstrated in Chapter 1, where the diverse definitions and scholarly understandings of legitimacy were discussed. For this reason, it is unlikely that being a student is fully responsible for rather similar understanding of legitimacy across the regimes. Secondly, there are previous studies that suggest that students' political views are distributed similarly to the views of general public (Chapter 2), therefore there is no clear a priori reason to believe that all students across countries have the same views about legitimacy. This does not mean that comparing samples drawn from different populations across countries would not yield valuable results. On the contrary, comparisons of ideas about legitimacy between different social groups from democratic and non-democratic regimes can be very informative, provided the studies control for the factors relevant for the particular question of interest.

Another way of expanding on this research would be to conduct similar studies in different populations within one country (elites, students, workers, different ethnic groups). A comparison of the ideas of different groups within societies about what constitutes legitimacy and testing the effect of the same factors in these groups might illuminate societal cleavages and political polarization. A study exploring differences within one society could include different social groups and could fill the divide between research on legitimation strategies used by political elites and research of the perceptions of these authorities by citizens. By identifying what factors influence perceived legitimacy according to the elites and comparing these factors to other groups within society, we could learn whether there is a disparity between the conceptions of legitimacy of those with power and those who are influenced by it. In other words, we could learn to what extent the elite's strategies resonate with citizens or particular groups of citizens.

Furthermore, identifying the mechanisms that lead to formulating judgments about distributive justice and discovering how the conceptions of distributive justice might differ between diverse groups within and across societies might be a fruitful avenue for future research. Since fairness of distribution was the strongest predictor of perceived legitimacy, better understanding of fairness and how citizens arrive at their moral assessments of political authorities may contribute to the understanding of legitimacy.

References

- Abulof, U. (2015) “‘Can’t buy me legitimacy’”: the elusive stability of Mideast rentier regimes’, *Journal of International Relations and Development*.
- Alagappa, M. (1995) *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Allik, J., Realo, A., Möttus, R., Pullmann, H., Trifonova, A., McCrae, R.R., Yurina, A.A., Shebanets, E.Y., Fadina, A.G., Tikhonova, E.V. (2011) ‘Personality profiles and the “Russian Soul”’: Literary and scholarly views evaluated’, *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 42(3), 372–389.
- Almond, G., Powell, G.B. (1966) *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach*, Little Brown & Co: Boston.
- Anderson Jr., R.D. (2013) ‘Discourse and strategic continuity from Gorbachev through Putin’, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 46(1), 123–135.
- Armony, A.C., Schamis, H.E. (2005) ‘Babel in democratization studies’, *Journal of Democracy*, 16(4), 113–128.
- Atzmüller, C., Steiner, P.M. (2010) ‘Experimental vignette studies in survey research’, *Methodology: European Journal of Research Methods for the Behavioral and Social Sciences*, 6(3), 128–138.
- Barker, R. (1990) *Political Legitimacy and the State*, Clarendon Press: Oxford.
- Barker, R. (2000) ‘The long millennium, the short century, and the persistence of legitimation’, *Contemporary politics*, 6(1), 7–12.
- Barker, R. (2001) *Legitimizing Identities: The Self-Presentations of Rulers and Subjects*, Cambridge University Press.
- Beetham, D. (1991) *The Legitimation of Power*, Macmillan: Houndmills.
- Bensman, J. (1979) ‘Max Weber’s concept of legitimacy: an evaluation’, *Conflict and Control: Challenge to Legitimacy of Modern Governments*, 7, 17.
- Bertelsmann Stiftung (2016) ‘Transformation Index BTI’, available: <http://www.bti-project.org/index/status-index/> [accessed 10 Jul 2015].
- Bjola, C. (2008) ‘Legitimacy and the use of force: bridging the analytical–normative divide’, *Review of International Studies*, 34(4), 627–644.
- Bogaards, M. (2009) ‘How to classify hybrid regimes? Defective democracy and electoral authoritarianism’, *Democratization*, 16(2), 399–423.
- Bohman, J. (1997) *Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics*, MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts.
- Bohman, J., Rehg, W. (2014) ‘Jurgen Habermas’, in Zalta, E.N., ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, available: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/habermas/> [accessed 5 Sep 2014].
- Booth, J.A., Seligson, M.A. (2005) ‘Political legitimacy and participation in Costa Rica: Evidence of arena shopping’, *Political Research Quarterly*, 58(4), 537–550.

- Booth, J.A., Seligson, M.A. (2009) *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations*, Cambridge University Press: New York.
- Bovens, M.A.P. (2005) 'De verspreiding van de democratie', *B en M*, 32(3), 119–127.
- Brandt, M.J. (2013) 'Do the disadvantaged legitimize the social system? A large-scale test of the status–legitimacy hypothesis.', *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 104(5), 765.
- Brandt, M.J., Reyna, C. (2012) *Social Dominance or System Justification? - The Acceptance of Inequality and Resistance to Social Change as Unique System-Relevant Motivations*, SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2165690, Social Science Research Network, Rochester, NY, available: <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2165690> [accessed 4 Feb 2014].
- Brudny, Y.M., Finkel, E. (2011) 'Why Ukraine Is Not Russia Hegemonic National Identity and Democracy in Russia and Ukraine', *East European Politics & Societies*, 25(4), 813–833.
- Brusis, M. (2016) 'The Politics of Legitimation in Post-Soviet Eurasia', in Brusis, M., Ahrens, J. and Wessel, M.S., eds., *Politics and Legitimacy in Post-Soviet Eurasia*, Palgrave Macmillan: Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, 1–17.
- Brusis, M., Ahrens, J., Wessel, M.S. (2016) *Politics and Legitimacy in Post-Soviet Eurasia*, Palgrave Macmillan: Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire.
- Buchanan, A. (2002) 'Political Legitimacy and Democracy', *Ethics*, 112(4), 689–719.
- Bunce, V.J., Wolchik, S.L. (2010) 'Defeating Dictators: Electoral Change and Stability in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes', *World Politics*, 62(1), 43–86.
- Busygina, I., Filippov, M. (2015) 'The Calculus of Non-Protest in Russia: Redistributive Expectations from Political Reforms', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 67(2), 209–223.
- Carnaghan, E. (2007) 'Do Russians dislike democracy?', *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 40(1), 61.
- Carnaghan, E. (2010) *Out of Order: Russian Political Values in an Imperfect World*, Penn State Press: Pennsylvania.
- Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej (2015) *Sympatia I Niechęć Do Partii I Inicjatyw Politycznych*, 99/2015, Warsaw, available: http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2015/K_099_15.PDF.
- Cohen, J., Cohen, P., West, S.G., Aiken, L.S. (2003) *Applied Multiple Regression /correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: Mahwah, NJ.
- Collier, D., Levitsky, S. (1997) 'Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research', *World Politics*, 49(3), 430–451.
- Crick, B. (1959) *American Science of Politics: Its Origins and Conditions*, Routledge: London.
- Dahl, R.A. (1956) *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
- DeScioli, P., Massenkoff, M., Shaw, A., Petersen, M.B., Kurzban, R. (2014) 'Equity or equality? Moral judgments follow the money', *Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences*, 281(1797), 20142112.

- Diamond, L.J. (2002) 'Thinking About Hybrid Regimes', *Journal of Democracy*, 13(2), 21–35.
- Di Palma, G. (1991) 'Legitimation from the Top to Civil society', *World Politics*, 44(1), 49–79.
- Dogan, M., Pelassy, D. (1990) *How to Compare Nations: Strategies in Comparative Politics*, Chatham House: Chatham, N.J.
- Donnelly, J. (1982) 'Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights', *The American Political Science Review*, 76(2), 303–316.
- Donnelly, J. (1984) 'Cultural relativism and universal human rights', *Human Rights Quarterly*, 400–419.
- Druckman, J.N., Green, D.P., Kuklinski, J.H., Lupia, A. (2006) 'The growth and development of experimental research in political science', *American Political Science Review*, 100(4), 627.
- Druckman, J.N., Green, D.P., Kuklinski, J.H., Lupia, A. (Eds.) (2011) *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Druckman, J.N., Kam, C.D. (2011) 'Students as Experimental Participant', in Druckman, J.N., Green, D.P., Kuklinski, J.H. and Lupia, A., eds., *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 41–57.
- Dryzek, J.S. (2009) 'Democratization as deliberative capacity building', *Comparative Political Studies*, 42(11), 1379–1402.
- Dryzek, J.S. (2010) *Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance*, Oxford University Press: Oxford.
- Easton, D. (1957) 'An approach to the analysis of political systems', *World politics*, 9(3), 383–400.
- Easton, D. (1965) *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, Wiley: New York.
- Easton, D. (1975a) 'A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support', *British Journal of Political Science*, 5(4), 435–457.
- Easton, D. (1975b) 'A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support', *British Journal of Political Science*, 5(4), 435–457.
- Easton, D., Dennis, J. (1980) *Children in the Political System : Origins of Political Legitimacy*, University of Chicago Press: Chicago & London.
- 'Economic miracle built on pollution' (2015) *The Nation*, 29 Nov, available: <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=THENAT0020151129ebbt0000n&cat=a&ep=ASE> [accessed 29 Nov 2015].
- Etzioni, A. (1961) *Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations*, Free Press: New York.
- Federal Register (2015) 'Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch; Amendment to the Standards Governing Solicitation and Acceptance of Gifts From Outside Sources', *Federal Register: The Daily Journal of the United States Government*, 27 Nov, 74004.
- Feklyunina, V., White, S. (2011) 'Discourses of "Krizis": Economic Crisis in Russia and Regime Legitimacy', *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 27(3–4), 385–406.

- Field, A. (2013) *Discovering Statistics Using IBM SPSS Statistics*, Sage: Los Angeles, CA.
- Field, A., Miles, J., Field, Z. (2012) *Discovering Statistics Using R*, SAGE: London.
- Finch, J. (1987) 'The Vignette Technique in Survey Research', *Sociology*, 21(1), 105–114.
- Fiske, S.T., Berdahl, J. (2007) 'Social power', in Kruglanski, A.W. and Higgins, E.T., eds., *Social Psychology: A Handbook of Basic Principles*, Oxford University Press: New York, 678–692, available: <http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/2007-11239-029> [accessed 25 Jan 2015].
- Fleron, F.J. (1996) 'Post-Soviet Political Culture in Russia: An Assessment of Recent Empirical Investigations', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 48(2), 225–260.
- Fraser, J. (1974) 'Validating a measure of national political legitimacy', *American Journal of Political Science*, 117–134.
- Freedom House (2001) Russia: Country Report. Freedom in the World 2001 [online], available: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2001/russia> [accessed 10 Jul 2016].
- Freedom House (2015) Freedom in the World [online], available: <https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.Vdc2e5degqO> [accessed 21 Aug 2015].
- Freeman, M. (1995) 'Are there Collective Human Rights?', *Political Studies*, 43, 25–40.
- French, J.R., Raven, B. (1959) 'The Bases of Social Power', *Studies in social power*, 150, 167.
- Friedrich, C.J. (1963) *Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics*, McGraw-Hill: New York.
- Gallie, W.B. (1955) 'Essentially contested concepts', in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, JSTOR, 167–198, available: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4544562> [accessed 8 Sep 2014].
- Galston, W.A. (2001) 'Political Knowledge, Political Engagement, and Civic Education', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 4(1), 217.
- Gerring, J. (1999) 'What makes a concept good? A criterial framework for understanding concept formation in the social sciences', *Polity*, 357–393.
- Gerring, J. (2008) 'Cases selection for case-study analysis: qualitative and quantitative techniques', in Box-Steffensmeier, J.M., Brady, H.E. and Collier, D., eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, Oxford Handbooks Online, 645–684, available: <https://books.google.nl/books?hl=en&lr=&id=BpsLCx0SHtwC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=the+oxford+handbook+of+political+methodology&ots=WahhvYXiB4&sig=F9CImodlRVrzofHZpvgXdt-5mCA> [accessed 17 Aug 2015].
- Gerschewski, J. (2013) 'The three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation in autocratic regimes', *Democratization*, 20(1), 13–38.
- Gibson, J.L. (1989) 'Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Political Tolerance', *Law & Society Review*, 23(3), 469.
- Gibson, J.L., Caldeira, G.A., Spence, L.K. (2005a) 'Why Do People Accept Public Policies They Oppose? Testing Legitimacy Theory with a Survey-Based Experiment', *Political Research Quarterly*, 58(2), 187–201.

- Gibson, J.L., Caldeira, G.A., Spence, L.K. (2005b) 'Why do people accept public policies they oppose? Testing legitimacy theory with a survey-based experiment', *Political Research Quarterly*, 58(2), 187–201.
- Gilbert, L., Mohseni, P. (2011) 'Beyond Authoritarianism: The Conceptualization of Hybrid Regimes', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 46(3), 270–297.
- Gilley, B. (2006) 'The meaning and measure of state legitimacy: Results for 72 countries', *European Journal of Political Research*, 45(3), 499–525.
- Gilley, B. (2009) *The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy*, Columbia University Press: New York.
- Gilley, B. (2012) 'State legitimacy: An updated dataset for 52 countries', *European Journal of Political Research*, 51(5), 693–699.
- Grafstein, R. (1981) 'The Legitimacy of Political Institutions', *Polity*, 14(1), 51–69.
- Grauvogel, J., Von Soest, C. (2014) 'Claims to legitimacy count: Why sanctions fail to instigate democratisation in authoritarian regimes', *European Journal of Political Research*, 53(4), 635–653.
- Gurr, T.R. (1970) *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ.
- Gutmann, A., Thompson, D. (2009) *Why Deliberative Democracy?*, Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ.
- Habermas, J. (1979) *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, Polity Press: Cambridge.
- Habermas, J. (1996) *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*, MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts.
- Hahn, J.W., Logvinenko, I. (2008) 'Generational differences in Russian attitudes towards democracy and the economy', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 60(8), 1345–1369.
- Hale, H.E. (2011) 'The Myth of Mass Russian Support for Autocracy: The Public Opinion Foundations of a Hybrid Regime', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 63, 1357–1375.
- He, B., Warren, M.E. (2011) 'Authoritarian Deliberation: The Deliberative Turn in Chinese Political Development', *Perspectives on Politics*, 9(2), 269–289.
- Högström, J. (2013) 'Does the Choice of Democracy Measure Matter? Comparisons between the Two Leading Democracy Indices, Freedom House and Polity IV', *Government and Opposition*, 48(2), 201–221.
- Holbig, H., Gilley, B. (2010) 'Reclaiming Legitimacy in China', *Politics & Policy*, 38(3), 395–422.
- Holmes, L. (1993) *The End of Communist Power: Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis*, Polity Press: Cambridge.
- Holmes, S. (2015) in Przeworski, A., ed., *Democracy in a Russian Mirror*, Cambridge University Press: New York, 30–57, available: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=clqtCAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR13&dq=Przeworski,+A.+\(ed.\)+Democracy+in+Russian+Mirror&ots=itl0URKi78&sig=9bEPdQdXphHw9AMul4H0iPH0rgc](https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=clqtCAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR13&dq=Przeworski,+A.+(ed.)+Democracy+in+Russian+Mirror&ots=itl0URKi78&sig=9bEPdQdXphHw9AMul4H0iPH0rgc) [accessed 7 Jul 2016].
- Horne, C. (2009) 'A Social Norms Approach to Legitimacy', *American Behavioral Scientist*, 53(3), 400–415.

- Howard, M.M. (2003) *The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe*, Cambridge Univ Pr.
- Howard, R.E. (1995) 'Human Rights and the Search for Community', *Journal of Peace Research*, 32(1), 1–8.
- Huntington, S.P. (1991) *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, University of Oklahoma Press: Norman, OK.
- Hurd, I. (1999) 'Legitimacy and authority in international politics', *International Organization*, 53(2), 379–408.
- Hurrelmann, A., Krell-Laluhová, Z., Lhotta, R., Nullmeier, F., Schneider, S. (2005) 'The Democratic Nation State: Erosion or Transformation of Legitimacy. Is there a legitimization crisis of the nation-state?', *European Review*, 13(Supplement S1), 119–137.
- Hurrelmann, A., Krell-Laluhová, Z., Schneider, S. (2005) *Mapping Legitimacy Discourses in Democratic Nation States: Great Britain, Switzerland, and the United States Compared*, TranState working papers, available: <http://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/28274> [accessed 8 Sep 2014].
- Hyde, A. (1983) 'The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law', *Wisconsin Law Review*, (2), 379–426.
- Ilchman, W.F., Uphoff, N.T. (1969) *The Political Economy of Change*, University of California Press: Berkeley.
- Inglehart, R. (1988) 'The Renaissance of Political Culture', *The American Political Science Review*, 82(4), 1203–1230.
- Jost, J.T., Banaji, M.R., Nosek, B.A. (2004) 'A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo', *Political Psychology*, 25(6), 881–919.
- Jost, J.T., Pelham, B.W., Sheldon, O., Ni Sullivan, B. (2003) 'Social inequality and the reduction of ideological dissonance on behalf of the system: Evidence of enhanced system justification among the disadvantaged', *European journal of social psychology*, 33(1), 13–36.
- Jost, J.T., Van der Toorn, J. (2012) 'System Justification Theory', in Van Lange, P.A., Kruglanski, A.W. and Higgins, E.T., eds., *Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology: Volume Two*, SAGE: London, 313–343.
- Kailitz, S. (2013) 'Classifying political regimes revisited: legitimation and durability', *Democratization*, 20(1), 39–60.
- Kardaś, S., Konończuk, W. (2015) Minsk 2 - a Fragile Truce [online], OSW, available: <http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-02-12/minsk-2-a-fragile-truce> [accessed 23 Aug 2015].
- Kausikan, B. (1993) 'Asia's Different Standard', *Foreign Policy*, (92), 24–41.
- King, L.A. (2003) 'Deliberation, legitimacy, and multilateral democracy', *Governance*, 16(1), 23–50.
- Kluegel, J.R., Mason, D.S. (2004) 'Fairness matters: social justice and political legitimacy in post-communist Europe', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 56(6), 813–834.
- Koroma, E.B. (2015) 'A Post-Ebola Plan for Sierra Leone', *The Wall Street Journal (Europe Edition)*, 27 Nov, A13.
- Kubicek, P. (1994) 'Delegative democracy in Russia and Ukraine', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 27(4), 423–441.

- Kubicek, P. (2009) 'Problems of post-post-communism: Ukraine after the Orange Revolution', *Democratization*, 16(2), 323–343.
- Kuzio, T. (2006) 'Ukraine Is Not Russia: Comparing Youth Political Activism', *sais Review*, 26(2), 67.
- Lasswell, H.D. (1950) *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*, Peter Smith: New York.
- Levada Center (2014) Corruption of the Political System [online], available: <http://www.levada.ru/18-11-2014/korrupsiya-v-sisteme-gosudarstvennoi-vlasti> [accessed 1 Sep 2015].
- Levada Center (2015) Protest Potential and Opinion about the Authorities [online], available: <http://www.levada.ru/07-07-2015/protestnyi-potentsial-i-vospriyatie-vlasti> [accessed 30 Jul 2015].
- Leventhal, G.S. (1980) *What Should Be Done with Equity Theory?* [online], Springer, available: http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4613-3087-5_2 [accessed 25 Jan 2015].
- Leventhal, G.S., Karuza, J., Fry, W.R. (1980) 'Beyond fairness: A theory of allocation preferences', *Justice and social interaction*, 3, 167–218.
- Levi, M. (1991) 'Are there limits to rationality?', *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, 32(1), 130–141.
- Levi, M., Sacks, A., Tyler, T. (2009) 'Conceptualizing Legitimacy, Measuring Legitimizing Beliefs', *American Behavioral Scientist*, 53(3), 354–375.
- Levitsky, S., Way, L. (2002) 'The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism', *Journal of Democracy*, 13(2), 51–65.
- Levitsky, S., Way, L. (2010) *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*, 1st ed, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Lindgren, K.-O., Persson, T. (2010) 'Input and output legitimacy: synergy or trade-off? Empirical evidence from an EU survey', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 17(4), 449–467.
- Linz, J.J. (1988) 'Legitimacy of democracy and the socioeconomic system', *Comparing Pluralist Democracies*, 65–113.
- Linz, J.J., Stepan, A.C. (1978) *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore.
- Lipman, M., McFaul, M. (2001) "'Managed Democracy" in Russia', *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, 6(3), 116–127.
- Lipset, S.M. (1959) 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development', *American Political Science Review*, 53(1), 69–105.
- Losh, J. (2015) 'Ukraine crisis: Forgotten victims of the war in east of country speak out as vital UN lifeline runs out of funds', *Independent Online*, 28 Nov, available: <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=INDOP00020151128ebbs0048z&cat=a&ep=ASE> [accessed 29 Nov 2015].
- Manin, B., Stein, E., Mansbridge, J. (1987) 'On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation', *Political Theory*, 15(3), 338–368.
- Marquez, X. (2016) 'The Irrelevance of Legitimacy', *Political Studies*, 64(1_suppl), 19–34.

- Marshall, M.G., Jagers, K. (2013) *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1946-2013*, available: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm> [accessed 8 Mar 2013].
- Mason, D.S. (2003) 'Fairness Matters', *World Policy Journal*, (4), 48–56.
- Mazepus, H., Veenendaal, W., McCarthy-Jones, A., Vásquez, J.M.T. (2016) 'A comparative study of legitimation strategies in hybrid regimes', *Policy Studies*, 37(4), 350–369.
- McFarland, D.A., Thomas, R.J. (2006) 'Bowling Young: How Youth Voluntary Associations Influence Adult Political Participation', *American Sociological Review*, 71(3), 401–425.
- Mehta, P.S. (2015) 'Is time ripe to pull the plug on the WTO Doha Round issues?', *The East African*, 28 Nov, available: <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=EAAFRI0020151128ebbs0000d&cat=a&ep=ASE> [accessed 29 Nov 2015].
- Merelman, R.M. (1966) 'Learning and legitimacy', *The American Political Science Review*, 60(3), 548–561.
- Mickiewicz, E. (2014) *No Illusions: The Voices of Russia's Future Leaders*, Oxford University Press: Oxford.
- Miller, D. (1992a) 'Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice', *Political Studies*, 40, 54–67.
- Miller, D. (1992b) 'Distributive Justice: What the People Think', *Ethics*, 102(3), 555–593.
- Miller, D. (2016) Political Philosophy [online], *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, available: <https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/political-philosophy/v-1> [accessed 7 Mar 2016].
- Mintz, A., Redd, S.B., Vedlitz, A. (2006) 'Can we generalize from student experiments to the real world in political science, military affairs, and international relations?', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 50(5), 757–776.
- Mishler, W., Rose, R. (1996) 'Trajectories of Fear and Hope Support for Democracy in Post-Communist Europe', *Comparative Political Studies*, 28(4), 553–581.
- Morgenbesser, L. (2016) 'The autocratic mandate: elections, legitimacy and regime stability in Singapore', *The Pacific Review*, 0(0), 1–27.
- Mullinix, K.J., Leeper, T.J., Druckman, J.N., Freese, J. (2015) 'The generalizability of survey experiments', *Journal of Experimental Political Science*, 2(2), 109–138.
- Niland, P. (2015) Define 'legitimate' [online], *Kyiv Post*, available: <http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/op-ed/define-legitimate-402807.html> [accessed 28 Nov 2015].
- Norris, P. (2011) *Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- O'Donnell, G.A. (1994) 'Delegative democracy', *Journal of democracy*, 5(1), 55–69.
- O'Kane, R.H. (1993) 'Against legitimacy', *Political Studies*, 41(3), 471–487.
- Ottaway, M. (2003) *Democracy Challenged*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Washington, DC.
- Palma, G. di (1991) 'Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society: Politico-Cultural Change in Eastern Europe', *World Politics*, 44(1), 49–80.

- Peter, F. (2009) *Democratic Legitimacy*, Routledge: New York, NY.
- Peter, F. (2014) 'Political Legitimacy', in Zalta, E.N., ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, available:
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/legitimacy/> [accessed 5 Feb 2014].
- Popkin, S.L. (1991) *The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns*, University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
- Przeworski, A. (1986) 'Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy', in O'Donnell, G., Schmitter, P. and Whitehead, L., eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, The Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore.
- Przeworski, A. (1991) *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Rawls, J. (1993) *Political Liberalism*, Columbia University Press: New York.
- Raz, J. (1985) 'Authority and justification', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 3–29.
- Rigby, T.H., Fehér, F. (1982) *Political Legitimation in Communist States*, Macmillan and St Antony's College, Oxford: London.
- Rose, R. (1995) 'Mobilizing Demobilized Voters in Post-Communist Societies', *Party Politics*, 1(4), 549–563.
- Rose, R., Mishler, W., Munro, N. (2011) *Popular Support for an Undemocratic Regime: The Changing Views of Russians*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Rossi, P.H., Anderson, A.B. (1982) 'The factorial survey approach: An introduction', *Measuring social judgments: The factorial survey approach*, 15–67.
- Rothschild, J. (1977) 'Observations on political legitimacy in contemporary Europe', *Political Science Quarterly*, 92(3), 487–501.
- Rothstein, B. (1998) *Just Institutions Matter: The Moral and Political Logic of the Universal Welfare State*, Theories of institutional design 122667786, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Ryabchuk, A. (2014) 'Right Revolution? Hopes and Perils of the Euromaidan Protests in Ukraine', *Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*, 22(1), 127–134.
- Sachs, J.D. (2015) 'The West is partly responsible for the recent terrorist attacks', *Daily Star*, 28 Nov, available:
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=DSTAR00020151127ebbs00004&cat=a&ep=ASE> [accessed 29 Nov 2015].
- Sandby-Thomas, P. (2014) 'How Do You Solve a Problem Like Legitimacy? Contributing to a new research agenda', *Journal of Contemporary China*, 23(88), 575–592.
- Sapsford, R., Jupp, V. (2006) *Data Collection and Analysis*, SAGE: London.
- Sartori, G. (1970) 'Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics', *The American Political Science Review*, 64(4), 1033–1053.
- Saurugger, S. (2007) 'Democratic "misfit"? Conceptions of civil society participation in France and the European Union', *Political Studies*, 55(2), 384–404.

- Scally, D. (2015) 'Polish ruling party accused of gradual coup; Media and artists criticise crackdown on news outlets and controversial play', *The Irish Times*, 27 Nov, 10.
- Scharpf, F. (1997) 'Economic integration, democracy and the welfare state', *Journal of European public policy*, 4(1), 18–36.
- Scharpf, F. (1998) 'Interdependence and democratic legitimation', *MPIfG working paper*, 98(2), available: <http://hdl.handle.net/10419/41689> [accessed 10 Nov 2012].
- Scharpf, F. (1999) *Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?*, Oxford University Press: Oxford.
- Scharpf, F. (2003) *Problem-Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability in the EU*, MPIfG working paper, available: <http://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/41664> [accessed 9 Apr 2014].
- Scharpf, F. (2009) 'Legitimacy in the multilevel European polity', *European Political Science Review*, 1(2), 173–204.
- Scharpf, F.W. (2007) *Reflections on Multilevel Legitimacy*, MPIfG working paper, available: <http://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/41671> [accessed 31 Jan 2013].
- Schedler, A. (Ed.) (2006) *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*, Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, CO.
- Schmidt, V.A. (2013) 'Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and "Throughput"', *Political Studies*, 1–21.
- Service Torstar News (2015) 'Medical marijuana use now OK in Ontario's public places', *Metro Canada*, 25 Nov, 0.
- Sil, R., Chen, C. (2004) 'State Legitimacy and the (In) significance of Democracy in Post-Communist Russia', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 56(3), 347–368.
- Simmons, A.J. (1999) 'Justification and Legitimacy*', *Ethics*, 109(4), 739–771.
- Stillman, P.G. (1974) 'The Concept of Legitimacy', *Polity*, 7(1), 32–56.
- Suchman, M.C. (1995) 'Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches.', *Academy of management review*, 20(3), 571–610.
- Sunshine, J., Tyler, T.R. (2003) 'The role of procedural justice and legitimacy in shaping public support for policing', *Law & Society Review*, 37(3), 513–548.
- The Economist Intelligence Unit (2011) *The Democracy Index 2011: Democracy under Stress*, available: https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2011 [accessed 8 Mar 2013].
- The Economist Intelligence Unit (2014) *The Democracy Index 2014: Democracy and Its Discontents*, available: <http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy-index-2014.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=Democracy0115> [accessed 21 Aug 2015].
- The Economist Intelligence Unit (2015) 'Democracy Index 2015: Democracy in the age of anxiety', available: <http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=EIU-Democracy-Index-2015.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=DemocracyIndex2015>.
- Thibaut, J.W., Walker, L. (1975) *Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis*, L. Erlbaum Associates Hillsdale, NJ; New York, NY.

- Tost, L.P. (2011) 'An integrative model of legitimacy judgments', *Academy of Management Review*, 36(4), 686–710.
- Turner, J. (2015) 'Daniel Radcliffe: all grown up', *thetimes.co.uk*, 28 Nov, available: <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=TIMEUK0020151128ebbs0012x&cat=a&ep=ASE> [accessed 29 Nov 2015].
- Tyler, T.R. (1988) 'What is procedural justice—criteria used by citizens to assess the fairness of legal procedures', *Law & Society Review*, 22, 103.
- Tyler, T.R. (1990) *Why People Obey the Law*, Yale University Press: New Haven, CT.
- Tyler, T.R. (1997) 'The Psychology of Legitimacy: A Relational Perspective on Voluntary Deference to Authorities', *Personality & Social Psychology Review (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates)*, 1(4), 323.
- Tyler, T.R. (2000) 'Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure', *International Journal of Psychology*, 35(2), 117–125.
- Tyler, T.R. (2001) 'The Legitimacy of Institutions and Authorities', in Jost, J.T. and Major, B., eds., *The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relations*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 416–436.
- Tyler, T.R. (2003) 'Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law', *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*, 30, 357.
- Tyler, T.R. (2006) 'Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation', *Annual Review of Psychology*, 57(1), 375–400.
- Tyler, T.R. (2012) 'Justice Theory', in Van Lange, P.A., Kruglanski, A.W. and Higgins, E.T., eds., *Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology: Volume Two*, SAGE: London, 344–361.
- Tyler, T.R., Caine, A. (1981) 'The influence of outcomes and procedures on satisfaction with formal leaders.', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 41(4), 642.
- Tyler, T.R., Huo, Y. (2002) *Trust in the Law*, Russell Sage Foundation: New York.
- Tyler, T.R., Rasinski, K. (1991) 'Procedural justice, institutional legitimacy, and the acceptance of unpopular US Supreme Court decisions: A reply to Gibson', *Law and Society Review*, 621–630.
- Tyler, T.R., Rasinski, K.A., Griffin, E. (1986) 'Alternative images of the citizen: Implications for public policy', *American Psychologist*, 41(9), 970.
- Tyler, T.R., Rasinski, K.A., Spodick, N. (1985) 'Influence of voice on satisfaction with leaders: Exploring the meaning of process control', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 48(1), 72–81.
- United Nations Human Rights (2015) *Persistent and Grave Human Rights Violations in Spite of Relative Calm in Eastern Ukraine*, Geneva, available: <http://www.un.org.ua/en/information-centre/news/1870> [accessed 23 Aug 2015].
- Uphoff, N. (1989) 'Distinguishing power, authority & legitimacy: Taking Max Weber at his word by using resources-exchange analysis', *Polity*, 295–322.
- Van den Bos, K., Lind, E.A., Vermunt, R., Wilke, H.A. (1997) 'How do I judge my outcome when I do not know the outcome of others? The psychology of the fair process effect.', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 72(5), 1034.

- Van den Bos, K., Wilke, H.A., Lind, E.A., Vermunt, R. (1998) 'Evaluating outcomes by means of the fair process effect: Evidence for different processes in fairness and satisfaction judgments.', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 74(6), 1493.
- Van der Toorn, J., Berkics, M., Jost, J.T. (2010) 'System justification, satisfaction, and perceptions of fairness and typicality at work: A cross-system comparison involving the US and Hungary', *Social Justice Research*, 23(2–3), 189–210.
- Van der Toorn, J., Tyler, T.R., Jost, J.T. (2011) 'More than fair: Outcome dependence, system justification, and the perceived legitimacy of authority figures', *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 47(1), 127–138.
- Von Soest, C., Grauvogel, J. (2015) 'How Do Non-Democratic Regimes Claim Legitimacy? Comparative Insights from Post-Soviet Countries', *GIGA Working Paper*, 277, available: <http://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/publication/how-do-non-democratic-regimes-claim-legitimacy-comparative-insights-from-post-soviet>.
- Von Soest, C., Grauvogel, J. (2016) 'Comparing Legitimation Strategies in Post-Soviet Countries', in *Politics and Legitimacy in Post-Soviet Eurasia*, Palgrave Macmillan: Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, 18–46, available: http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137489449_2 [accessed 7 Jul 2016].
- Way, L.A. (2005) 'Authoritarian state building and the sources of regime competitiveness in the fourth wave: the cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine', *World Politics*, 57(2), 231–261.
- Weatherford, M.S. (1992) 'Measuring Political Legitimacy', *The American Political Science Review*, 86(1), 149–166.
- Weber, M. (1947) *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD: London.
- Weber, M. (1964) *The Theory Of Social And Economic Organization*, Free Press of Glencoe: New York.
- Weber, M. (1978) *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, University of California Press: Berkeley.
- Weber, M. (2009) *The Theory Of Social And Economic Organization*, Simon and Schuster.
- Welsh, M. (2015) 'Canadian journalist arrested in Punjab', *The Toronto Star*, 29 Nov, A3.
- White, S. (1986) 'Economic performance and communist legitimacy', *World Politics*, 38(3), 462–482.
- White, S., Kryshtanovskaya, O. 'ga (2011) 'Changing the Russian electoral system: inside the black box', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 63(4), 557–578.
- Wiling, J. (2011) 'The Portability of Electoral Procedural Fairness: Evidence from Experimental Studies in China and the United States', *Political Behavior*, 33(1), 139–159.
- Wilson, K. (2009) 'Party-System Reform in Democracy's Grey Zone: A Response to Moraski', *Government and Opposition*, 44(2), 188–207.

- World Bank (2012) GINI Index (World Bank Estimate) [online], available: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI/countries?display=default> [accessed 23 Nov 2015].
- Zakaria, F. (2003) *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad*, Norton: New York.
- Zelditch, M. (2001) 'Processes of Legitimation: Recent Developments and New Directions', *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 64(1), 4–17.
- Zelditch, Jr, M. (2001) 'Theories of Legitimacy', in Jost, J.T. and Major, B., eds., *The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relations*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 33–53.
- Zürn, M., Binder, M., Ecker-Ehrhardt, M. (2012) 'International authority and its politicization', *International Theory*, 4(1), 69–106.

Appendices

APPENDIX A. Definitions of legitimacy

Table A.1. Definitions of legitimacy.

Discipline	Author (year)	Definition of legitimacy	What is it?	Type of study
<i>Philosophy/ political theory</i>	Bernard Manin (1987, pp.351–352)	‘(...) the source of legitimacy is not the predetermined will of individuals, but rather the process of its formation, that is, deliberation itself’	Deliberation is the basis for legitimacy and legitimate policy Source/it is deliberation	theoretical/philosophical
	Allen Buchanan (2002, p.689)	‘... an entity has political legitimacy if and only if it is morally justified in wielding political power’	Legitimacy is independent from the obligation to obey of those upon whom the rules are imposed Being legitimate means being morally justified	theoretical/philosophical
	Jürgen Habermas (1979 and 1996)	‘Legitimacy means that there are good grounds for a political order’s claim to be recognized as right and just; a legitimate order deserves recognition. Legitimacy means a political order’s worthiness to be recognized.’(Habermas 1979, pp.5–6) His definition of legitimacy is grounded in deliberative democracy: ‘only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted’, Jürgen Habermas (1996, p.110) ‘citizens may regard their laws as legitimate insofar as the democratic process, as it is institutionally organized and conducted, warrants the presumption that outcomes are reasonable products of a sufficiently inclusive	Normative Kantian approach, definition linked to the theory of deliberative democracy and ideal communicative action Being legitimate/source: deliberation	theoretical/philosophical

deliberative process of opinion- and will-formation’ (Bohman and Rehg 2014)

<i>Philosophy/ political theory</i>	Joseph Raz (1985, p.8)	‘an authority is legitimate only if there are sufficient reasons to follow its directives’	Refers to normative reasons to recognize the authorities and obey them	philosophical
			Being legitimate	
	A. John Simmons (1999)	Distinction between justification and legitimacy (based on Locke)	Being legitimate does not imply being justified and vice versa	theoretical/philosophical
		‘ Justifying an act, a strategy, a practice, an arrangement, or an institution typically involves showing it to be prudentially rational, morally acceptable, or both. And showing this, in standard cases, centrally involves rebutting certain kinds of possible objections to it (...)’ (1999, p.740)	Legitimacy is a matter of degree	
		‘A state’s (or government’s) legitimacy is the complex moral right it possesses to be the exclusive imposer of binding duties on its subjects, to have its subjects comply with these duties, and to use coercion to enforce the duties’	(on the individual level it is dichotomous, but on the aggregate level the degree of legitimacy depends on the extent to which the right to rule is recognized by all or some groups)	
			Statement: legitimacy is the moral right to impose	
	Robert Grafstein (1981)	Institutional legitimacy: Legitimacy is a property of institutions not of individuals. Public-oriented approach: ‘Politics occurs among people, not within them’ (p. 55); ‘a legitimate institution secures obedience to its decisions by the very fact of having made them through appropriate institutional procedures’	Criticism of taking values and attitudes as a departure for legitimacy	theoretical/philosophical
			Property	
			Being legitimate	
<i>Social Psychology</i>	Tom Tyler (1997)	‘The belief that authorities are entitled to be obeyed’	Importance of procedural justice: ‘fair treatment by authorities of groups or organizations, leads to favourable views	empirical

			about the status of that group or organization, and through those views, to a greater willingness to view authorities as legitimate and to defer to them', Belief	
<i>Political science</i>	Robert A. Dahl (1956, p.46)	Legitimacy 'not in an ethical but in a psychological sense, <i>i.e.</i> , a belief in the rightness of the decision or the process of decision making'	Belief	theoretical
	Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence (2005b, pp.188–189)	Based on Easton, but treats legitimacy as a synonym of diffuse support: '(...) institutional loyalty—support not contingent upon satisfaction with the immediate outputs of the institution'	Source/Consequence	empirical, survey vignette experiment
	Joseph Rothschild (1977, p.497)	'(...) political legitimacy, like the bank's credit, is seen as implicit mandate from the public (depositors) to the regime and authorities (managers) to rule (invest) in an expected manner.'	Statement: mandate; Examples from the communist block (Poland, Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Western Europe)	theoretical with empirical examples
	Seymour Martin Lipset (1959, p.86)	'Legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper for the society'	Legitimacy, next to effectiveness, is one of two pillars supporting government. Legitimacy is affective and evaluative, whereas effectiveness is instrumental Statement: pillar? Beliefs/Sources	theoretical/historical-comparative
	David Easton (1965, p.237, 1975a, p.444 and 453-456)	Diffuse support is a 'reservoir of favourable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants'	In contrast to specific support, diffuse support is more durable, independent from short-term outputs, rooted in socialization processes (but also in experience, like specific support)	theoretical with empirical examples

Legitimacy

‘a strong inner conviction of the moral validity of the authorities or regime’ (Easton 1965, p.278)

“The conviction ‘that it is right and proper... to obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime’”

Beliefs: conviction

Legitimacy contributes to diffuse support

<i>Political science</i>			Statement: Quality, attribute	
	Richard Merelman (1966, p.548)	‘Legitimacy is a quality attributed to a regime by population’		theoretical
		‘A sense of moral rightness attributed to a regime’		
	John Fraser (1974)	Legitimacy ‘does not refer to whether authorities and structures follow some concrete set of objective legal rules but to the extent to which members of a political system believe that the authorities and structures are adequate to meet the members’ own expectations as to how the political system ought to behave’	Belief Legitimacy is a distinct concept from support (Factor analysis)	methodological/theoretical factor analysis
	Juan Linz (1988)	‘the belief that in spite of shortcomings and failures, the political institutions are better than any other that might be established, and therefore can demand obedience’	Only democratic systems are legitimate Beliefs	theoretical/historical/ with empirical examples
	Peter Stillman (1974, p.42)	‘is the compatibility of the results of governmental output with the values patterns of relevant systems; relevant systems are all the systems affected by the government: international system, the society, groups within the society, and individuals within the society Legitimacy is different from effectiveness and responsiveness: ‘For a legitimate government cannot effectively respond to demands that are self-destructive...’; ‘(...) legitimacy (...) is a long-term	Legitimacy is a matter of degree (‘varies along the continuum’); it is impossible to achieve a governmental output compatible with all the relevant systems; ‘some societies are so diverse that even low legitimacy is impossible’ (Stillman 1974, p.43)	theoretical/conceptual

responsiveness that maintains the value patterns of the society and its citizens and occasionally involves an immediately unpopular—but, in the long term, legitimate—policy.’ (p.52)

Sources: compatibility, responsiveness

<i>Political science</i>	Carl Friedrich (1963, p.234)	<p>When ‘a given rulership is believed to be based on good title by most men subject to it’</p> <p>Legitimacy can only be achieved if ‘there exists a prevalent belief as to what provides a rightful title to rule. If the community is basically divided on this matter, then no legitimacy is possible’ (Friedrich 1963, p.237)</p>	Beliefs	historical
	Muthiah Alagappa (1995, pp.29–30)	<p>‘Legitimacy is the belief by the governed in the ruler’s moral right to issue commands and the people’s corresponding obligation to obey such commands’</p>	<p>Legitimacy if an interactive process between ruled and ruler; cultivation of legitimacy is unending; shared beliefs; in established regimes, procedures are more important for legitimacy than performance</p>	historical/empirical
	David Beetham (1991, p.16)	<p>Power can be said to be legitimate to the extent that i) it conforms to established rules, ii) the rules can be justified by reference to beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinate, and iii) there is evidence of consent by the subordinate to the particular power relation</p>	Beliefs	<p>theoretical/ historical/with empirical examples</p>

			Legality	
			Beliefs	
			Consequences	
	M. Stephen Weatherford (1992)	Discussion of system-level and public opinion approaches to legitimacy	Development of a measure of legitimacy	conceptual/methodological
<i>Political science</i>	Bruce Gilley (Gilley 2009, 2012)	Based on Beetham: ‘a state, meaning the institutions and ideologies of a political system, is more legitimate the more that it holds and exercises political power with legality justification, and consent from the standpoint of all its citizens’ (Gilley 2009, p.11)	Being legitimate	empirical
	John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson (2005, p.538)	Following Easton: ‘citizens orientations of support for and trust in (or rejection of and mistrust of) the political regimes at its various levels;	Research into effects of legitimacy on political participation; study in a stable democracy (Costa Rica)	empirical , surveys
			Beliefs/Perceptions	
	Pippa Norris (2011)	Five dimensions/levels of support: 1) national identities; 2) approval of core regime principles and values; 3) evaluations of regime performance; 4) confidence in regimes institutions; 5) approval of incumbent office holders (from most diffuse to most specific) Norris makes a distinction between institutional confidence (represents a belief in the capacity of an	Focused on democracies: democratic deficit (e.g. dimension 2 refers to ‘agreement with core principles and normative values upon which the regime is based, including approval of democratic values and ideals ’ (2011, p.25); the word legitimacy is mentioned but not used	empirical/surveys

agency to perform effectively) and trust (reflects a rational or affective belief in the benevolent motivation and performance capacity of another party)

explicitly

Beliefs/Perceptions

Actually: support-focused

<i>Political science</i>	Achim Hurrelmann et al. (2005, p.121)	‘the acceptance of a specific political order by its own citizens and to the beliefs on which that acceptance is grounded’	Statement: acceptance and beliefs	empirical/print media discourse analysis
			Perceptions	conceptual
	Vivien Schmidt (2013)	Added <i>throughput</i> legitimacy to Scharpf’s input and output; legitimacy is defined as ‘the extent to which input politics, throughput processes and output policies are acceptable to and accepted by the citizenry, such that citizens believe that these are morally authoritative and they therefore voluntarily comply with government acts even when these go against their own interests and desires.’(Schmidt 2013)	Focus on the EU	conceptual/theoretical/ with empirical examples about the EU
			Being legitimate	
			Statement: acceptance	
	Rodney Barker (1990)	‘legitimacy is precisely the belief in the rightfulness of a state, in its authority to issue commands, so that those commands are obeyed not simply out of fear or self-interest, but because they are believed in some sense to have moral authority, because subjects believe that they ought to obey’(Barker 1990, p.12)	Belief	theoretical/with empirical examples

	Margaret Levi et al. 2009	Model 'legitimacy as a sense of obligation or willingness to obey authorities (value-based legitimacy) that then translates into actual compliance with governmental regulations and laws (behavioral legitimacy)'	Sense of obligation	theoretical/conceptual empirical/surveys/qualitative examples
<i>Sociology</i>	Max Weber (2009, p.382)	'the basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige'	The bases of legitimacy: tradition, charisma, legal-rational Belief, Sources	theoretical/conceptual/historical/with empirical examples
	Mark C. Suchman(1995, p.574)	'Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions'	Perceptions	
<i>Sociology</i>	Morris Zelditch (2001)	'something is legitimate if it is in accord with the norms, values, beliefs, practices, and procedures accepted by a group' (Zelditch, Jr 2001, p.33)	Being legitimate	review
<i>Law</i>	Scharpf (1998, 1999, 2007, 2009)	The starting point are 'legitimacy beliefs' and 'legitimizing arguments' Legitimacy 'has come to rest almost exclusively on <i>trust in institutional arrangements</i> that are thought to ensure that governing processes are generally responsive to the manifest preferences of the governed (<i>input legitimacy</i> , "government by the people") and/or that the policies adopted will generally represent effective solutions to common problems of the governed (<i>output legitimacy</i> , "government for the people") (Scharpf 2003) Input (government by the people; 'collectively binding	(Liberal) democratic legitimacy; the EU legitimacy (multi-level framework) Beliefs Being legitimate	theoretical/with empirical examples

		decisions should originate from the authentic expression of preferences of the constituency in question'), output (government for the people; 'collectively binding decisions should serve the common interest of the constituency') (Scharpf 1998), throughput legitimacy		
<i>Organisational science</i>	Leigh Plunkett Tost (2011)	'entities are judged to be legitimate when they are appropriate for their social context'	Legitimation judgements: instrumental, relational, and moral	theoretical/conceptual
Being legitimate				
<i>International Relations</i>	Corneliu Bjola (2008)	Deliberative legitimacy is 'the non-coerced commitment of an actor to abide a decision reached through a process of communicative action'	The approach trying to bridge analytical ('how actors coordinate their actions based on subjective interpretations of legal or moral worthiness of a particular decision') and normative approaches to legitimacy;	theoretical/conceptual
			Statement: commitment	
<i>International Relations</i>	Ian Hurd (1999, p.381)	Equated legitimacy with authority; Legitimacy 'refers to the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed. It is a subjective quality, relational between actor and institution, and defines by the actor's perception'.	Belief	empirical

Discipline	Author (year)	Definition of legitimacy	What is it?	Type of study
	Michael Zürn (2012, p.83)	Decoupled authority from legitimacy and these two constitute two layers of recognition; 'The first layer [authority] is the recognition that an authority is considered per se functionally necessary in order to achieve certain common goods' and the second layer, legitimacy, 'is the acknowledgement of the rightful exercise of authority in the context of a given stock of normative beliefs in a community. According to this view, political authority and rule are legitimate when the norms, rules, and judgments produced are based on shared beliefs about the common good and procedural fairness'	<p>Political authority 'is embedded in beliefs about how institutions exercising political authority must behave in order to advance the common good without compromising the freedom of the subjects unnecessarily. In return, subjects recognize in principle or in practice the right of the political authority to make decisions, even when these decisions are sometimes inconvenient or uncomfortable.' (2012, p.8)</p> <p>'political authority that includes the right to enforce binding decisions is the most demanding'</p> <p>Sources</p> <p>Beliefs, being legitimate</p>	theoretical/conceptual/ with empirical examples

APPENDIX B: Survey

Survey conducted in translated and political system-adjusted form in France, the Netherlands, Poland, Ukraine, and Russia

Students were administered one version of the vignette story and were asked to answer the following questions.

Questions to the story:

Below you will find a few statements connected to the decision that was taken by the government in the story you just have read. Assess the statements on the basis of this story. Please mark the box that best matches your opinion, where

1= Fully disagree, 4=Neutral, 7=Fully agree

- 1) To what extent do you agree that this decision was justified?
- 2) The government has the right to take this kind of decisions.
- 3) The government has taken the wrong decision.
- 4) Decisions of this government should be respected.
- 5) I would trust this government.
- 6) On the whole, decisions on matters like this affect the legitimacy of the government.
- 7) I would like it, if in the future, this government made decisions on this type of issues that influence my life.
- 8) On the whole this government is legitimate.
- 9) I would be willing to protest against this decision of the government.
- 10) If this situation is representative of how the government acts, I would like this government to rule in my country.
- 11) After the flooding, I was dependent on the government for help.
- 12) The way in which the government arrived at this decision was fair.
- 13) The decision of the government represents a fair distribution of help.
- 14) The decision of the government had a positive effect on my personal financial situation.
- 15) Age

- 16) Gender
- 17) Study programme
- 18) Year of study

Questions not connected to the story above

Please assess the statements below. Please mark the box that best matches your opinion, where

1= Fully disagree, 4=Neutral, 7=Fully agree

Government

- 1) The current government of my country is legitimate.
- 2) The current government has the right to make decisions that influence my life.
- 3) I trust the current government of my country.
- 4) I support the current government of my country.
- 5) The current government works for the benefit of all citizens rather than for the benefit of small elite.
- 6) I am willing to obey the current government of my country.

President (not asked in the Netherlands)

- 7) The current president of my country is legitimate.
- 8) The current president has the right to make decisions that influence my life.
- 9) I trust the current president of my country.
- 10) I support the current president of my country.
- 11) The president works for the benefit of all citizens rather than for the benefit of small elite.
- 12) I am willing to obey the president of my country.

Parliament and elections

- 13) The current parliament of my country is legitimate.
- 14) The current parliament has a right to make decisions that influence my life.
- 15) I trust the current parliament of my country.

- 16) I support the current parliament of my country.
- 17) The parliament of my country is able to stop the government from acting beyond its authority.
- 18) The parliament of my country is able to stop the president from acting beyond his authority. (Not asked in the Netherlands.)
- 19) Political parties in my country represent the interests of citizens well.
- 20) Elections in my country are free and fair.

Courts

- 21) Courts in my country are legitimate.
- 22) Courts have a right to issue judgments that influence my life.
- 23) I trust courts in my country.
- 24) The courts treat everyone the same in my country.
- 25) I am willing to obey the decisions of courts in my country.
- 26) Courts in my country are able to stop the government from acting beyond its authority.
- 27) Courts in my country are able to stop the president from acting beyond his authority. (Not asked in the Netherlands.)

Democratic institutions

- 28) In general, democracy is the best functioning political system invented so far.
- 29) In general, political parties are important in representing the interests of citizens.
- 30) Free and fair elections are the basis for well-functioning political system.
- 31) It is important that courts are able to stop other institutions from acting beyond their authority.
- 32) I am NOT satisfied with the way the political system works in my country.
- 33) The current political system of my country is democratic.

Fairness

- 34) Political authorities should secure fair access to goods and services to all citizens.
- 35) Political authorities should treat every citizen according to the procedures and laws.

36) The authorities should secure equal chances for all citizens.

37) Laws should be always obeyed even if one does not agree with them.

Views and experience

38) As a citizen I have/will have a duty to pay taxes.

39) As a citizen I have/will have a duty to participate in national elections.

40) Name your last experience with authorities (for example, with a bureaucrat, with a court, with local representative, with a political party, with police)

41) Would you say that this experience was: Very positive; Rather positive;
Neutral; Rather negative; Very negative

42) On average, your experience with political authorities so far was: Very positive;
Rather positive; Neutral; Rather negative; Very negative

43) In a few words, how would you best describe your political views (e.g. liberal, centrist, conservative, nationalist, social-democratic)?

44) In your opinion, what characterizes legitimate authorities? Please list up to five characteristics in order of importance (1= most important).

45) What do you consider the most important tasks of political authorities (name up to 5 in order of importance)? On the scale from 1 (poor) to 7 (excellent) how do you evaluate the performance of the current authorities of these tasks?

46) Which description reflects the material situation of your family best?

1) we have not enough money even for food

2) we have enough money for food, but we have not enough money for clothing and shoes

3) we have enough money for clothing and shoes, but we cannot afford house equipment (white goods)

4) we can afford house equipment (white goods), but we have not enough money to buy a new car

5) we have money to buy a car, but we cannot afford buying an apartment or a house

6) we do not experience any material difficulties; if we needed to, we could buy an apartment or house

47) In which income group does your family fit? 1 means a group with the lowest level of income and 10 means a group with the highest level of income in your country (Please mark one option).

48) On the scale from 1 (bottom of society) to 7 (top of society), where would you say you are in your society?

49) What is the source of legitimacy of the monarchy in your country (choose one option or more) (only in the Netherlands)

- 1) The monarchy is not legitimate
- 2) The monarchy does not need legitimacy because it has little power
- 3) Tradition
- 4) Continuity of the state and nation
- 5) The monarchy has a positive effect on the international relations and economy of my country
- 6) God
- 7) Other (name):

50) What is the source of legitimacy of the current king of your country (choose one option or more) (only in the Netherlands)

- 1) The king is not legitimate
- 2) The king does not need legitimacy because she has little power
- 3) Tradition
- 4) Continuity of the state and nation
- 5) God
- 6) His/her performance in domestic and international affairs (for example, trade relations, promotion of culture and education, etc)
- 7) His/her personal qualities
- 8) Other (name):

51) University

52) Nationality

53) Ethnicity (in Ukraine and Russia)

APPENDIX C: Participant instruction

Dear Participant,

This questionnaire is part of a study run by Honorata Mazepus from Leiden University in the Netherlands. Please take a moment to complete this questionnaire. Your participation in this study is voluntary and anonymous. It is not a marketing study or an intelligence test. There are no right or wrong answers. Completing of the study will take you about 10 to 15 minutes. If you decide not to participate in the study, please return this questionnaire to the experimenter.

The questionnaire consists of **two parts**.

First, please read the hypothetical story on the first page and imagine that you are in the situation that is described in the story. After carefully reading the story, please answer the questions that follow the story (“Questions to the story”). Please make your judgment on the basis of the information provided in the story and remember that this is a hypothetical situation. If needed, you can look back at the story when answering the questions. Please respond to each question by marking the number that best matches your answer, where **1 = Fully disagree** to **7 = Fully agree**. If you neither agree nor disagree, the appropriate response is **4 = Neutral**.

The **second** part of the study consists of a questionnaire that is not related to the story (“Questions not connected to the story above”). The questions in this part are about your views on the society you live in. In this part please answer honestly about your personal opinions and preferences. Again, apart from a few questions at the very end, the answer scale goes from **1 = Fully disagree** to **7 = Fully agree**, and with **4 = neutral**.

Remember that your participation is voluntary, and the study will not ask for identifying (personal) information, such as your name or email address. All your answers are anonymous. If you agree to participate, please start with the part one of this study. If you do not wish to participate, please return the questionnaire to the experimenter.

If you have any questions about this study, please contact Honorata Mazepus at h.mazepus@hum.leidenuniv.nl.

Thank you for your participation!

APPENDIX D. Comparison of the online and pen-and-paper samples*Vignette study (Chapter 3)*Table E.1. Results of factorial ANOVA of perceived legitimacy scores testing for differences between the online and pen-and-paper subsamples in the Russian case (N = 929, adjusted $R^2 = .27$)

Factor/Interaction	F (1, 897)	Partial η^2
Corrected Model	12.077***	.29
Intercept	8704.170***	.91
procJustice	29.399***	.03
distJustice	99.739***	.10
dependence	10.772**	.01
posOutcome	21.557***	.02
Sample	11.446**	.01
procJustice × distJustice	6.021*	.01
procJustice × dependence	0.117	.00
procJustice × posOutcome	0.327	.00
procJustice × Sample	2.952	.00
distJustice × dependence	3.392	.00
distJustice × posOutcome	25.479***	.03
distJustice × Sample	16.259***	.02
dependence × posOutcome	10.304**	.01
dependence × Sample	2.948	.00
posOutcome × Sample	4.112*	.01
procJustice × distJustice × dependence	4.345*	.01
procJustice × distJustice × posOutcome	0.001	.00
procJustice × distJustice × Sample	0.043	.00
procJustice × dependence × posOutcome	0.137	.00
procJustice × dependence × Sample	0.008	.00
procJustice × posOutcome × Sample	0.034	.00
distJustice × dependence × posOutcome	4.610*	.01
distJustice × dependence × Sample	1.599	.00
distJustice × posOutcome × Sample	0.901	.00
dependence × posOutcome × Sample	0.709	.00
procJustice × distJustice × dependence × posOutcome	0.230	.00
procJustice × distJustice × dependence × Sample	3.893*	.00
procJustice × distJustice × posOutcome × Sample	2.593	.00
procJustice × dependence × posOutcome × Sample	0.210	.00
distJustice × dependence × posOutcome × Sample	0.223	.00
procJustice × distJustice × dependence × posOutcome × Sample	0.027	.00

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Follow-up analyses for the significant effects for Sample showed that perceived legitimacy was significantly higher in the online sample ($M = 4.06$, $SE = 0.047$) than in the pen-and-paper sample ($M = 3.78$, $SE = 0.070$). There were three significant

interactions with Sample: Sample \times distributive justice, Sample \times positive outcome, and Sample \times procedural justice \times distributive justice \times dependence. Distributive justice had a larger effect on perceived legitimacy in the online sample (M difference = 1.18, SE = 0.094) than in the pen-and-paper sample (M difference = 0.50, SE = 0.139), but the direction of the effect was the same in both samples. Similarly, positive outcome had a larger effect on perceived legitimacy in the online sample (M difference = 0.56, SE = 0.094) than in the pen-and-paper sample (M difference = 0.22, SE = 0.139), with the direction of the effect being the same. To interpret the Sample \times procedural justice \times distributive justice \times dependence interaction, I tested for the procedural justice \times distributive justice \times dependence interaction in both subsamples. This three-way interaction was significant in the online sample, $F(1, 622) = 12.07$, $p = .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .019$, but was not significant in the pen-and-paper sample, $F(1, 275) = 0.01$, $p = .940$, partial $\eta^2 < .001$. This discrepancy might be explained by the smaller size of the pen-and-paper sample ($N = 291$), than the online sample ($N = 638$). This is because in the smaller pen-and-paper sample the model had less power to detect a weak interaction (the procedural justice \times distributive justice \times dependence interaction had a small effect in the model for the combined samples, $F = 8.20$, partial $\eta^2 = .01$). Nevertheless, with respect to the effects testing the hypotheses, the same patterns were observed in the online sample and the pen-and-paper sample.

Correlational study (Chapter 5)

To test for the effect of the mode of data collection on perceived legitimacy of the current institutions in Russia, a dummy variable coding for the online sample was added to the stepwise regression models for perceived legitimacy of the parliament, government, courts, and the president in step 3. In step 4, the interactions between the sample variable and the explanatory variables were added to the model. See Table E.2.

Table E.2. R^2 change for step 3 (with the sample variable added) and step 4 (with the interactions of sample and the other variables added) of the stepwise regression model.

Institution	R^2 change step 3	p	R^2 change step 4	p
Parliament	.002	.120	.012	.176
Government	.014	< .001	.013	.026
President	.011	< .001	.006	.411
Courts	.023	< .001	.012	.352

For predicting perceived legitimacy of the current parliament, the regression analysis showed no significant change in the explanatory power of the model (R^2) after adding the sample variable (step 3) and after adding interactions of sample with the other variables (step 4). For predicting perceived legitimacy of the president and the courts, the regression analyses showed a small significant increase in the explanatory power of

the model after adding the sample variable (step 3), but not after adding the interactions (step 4). The regression coefficients showed that Russian respondents who participated in the survey online (on average) perceived the president ($b = 0.47$, $SE = 0.095$) and courts ($b = 0.42$, $SE = 0.086$) as more legitimate than those who participated in the pen-and-paper survey. There were no significant interaction effects of the online sample on perceived legitimacy of the president and the courts (step 4). For predicting perceived legitimacy of the government, the analysis showed a significant (but small) increase of the explanatory power of the model after adding the sample variable in step 3 as well as a significant (but small) increase in the explanatory power of the model after adding the interaction terms in step 4. For step 3, the regression coefficient for sample showed that Russian respondents who participated in the survey online (on average) perceived the government as more legitimate than respondents of the pen-and-paper survey ($b = 0.44$, $SE = 0.086$). In step 4 there was a significant interaction effect of sample with the variable Government works for everybody ($b = 0.13$, $SE = 0.054$, $p = .015$). This means that (when keeping all other variables constant) the variable Government works for everybody was a stronger predictor of perceived legitimacy of the government in the online sample than in the pen-and-paper sample. Note that Government works for everybody was a significant, positive predictor also for respondents in the pen-and-paper sample ($b = 0.36$, $SE = 0.045$), so that for both subsamples the effects were in the same direction.

In summary, the associations between variables were very similar in the online and pen-and-paper samples.

APPENDIX E. Higher education institutions attended by Russian respondents**Russian higher education institutions²⁹:**

1. НИУ ВШЭ: Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»/ National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow)
2. РГППУ: Российский государственный профессионально-педагогический университет/ Russian State Vocational Pedagogical University (Yekaterinburg)
3. РЭУ им Г.В. Плеханова/Plekhanov Russian University of Economics (Moscow)
4. ННГУ (unn) им. Лобачевского/ N. I. Lobachevsky State University of Nizhny Novgorod
5. ВятГУ: Вятский государственный университет (Kirov)
6. СПб НИУ ИТМО/Saint Petersburg State University of Information Technologies, Mechanics and Optics (Saint-Petersburg)
7. ПетрГУ: Петрозаводский государственный университет /Petrozavodsk State University (Petrozavodsk)
8. ЮФУ: Южный федеральный университет/ Southern Federal University (Rostov-on-Don)
9. ТТИ ЮФУ - Южный федеральный университет/ Taganrogskiy Tekhnologicheskii Institut YuFU (Tagangor)
10. ПГУПС имени Александра первого: Petersburg State Transport University (Saint-Petersburg)
11. СПбГУ: Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет/ Saint-Petersburg State University (Saint-Petersburg)
12. УГТУ: Уральский государственный горный университет/ Ural State Mining University (Yekaterinburg)
13. МАИ: Московский авиационный институт/Moscow Aviation Institute (Moscow)
14. НТМТ: Нижнетагильский машиностроительный техникум/ Nizhnetagilskiy mashinostroitelnyu tekhnikum (Nizhny Tagil)
15. Вгу: Воронежский государственный университет/ Voronezh State University (Voronezh)
16. РАП: Российская академия правосудия/ Russian Academy of Justice (Moscow)
17. СГМУ: Саратовский государственный медицинский университет/ Saratov State Medical University (Saratov)
18. ЧелГУ: Челябинский государственный университет/ Chelyabinsk State University (Chelyabinsk)
19. СПбГАВМ: Санкт-Петербургская государственная академия ветеринарной медицины / Saint-Petersburg State Academy of Veterinary Medicine (Saint-Petersburg)
20. СПбГУП: Санкт-Петербургский Гуманитарный университет профсоюзов/ Saint-Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Sciences (Saint-Petersburg)
21. МУПОЧ Дубна: Международный университет "Дубна"/ Dubna University (Moscow)
22. АГУ: Алтайский государственный университет/ Altai State University (Barnaul)

²⁹ Online search was conducted to find out what the acronyms mean and whether the institutions exist.

23. ННГАСУ: Нижегородский государственный архитектурно-строительный университет/ Nizhny Novgorod State University of Architecture (Nizhny Novgorod)
24. НИУ БелГУ : Белгородский государственный университет/ Belgorod State University (Belgorod)
25. СИЭИТ: Сочинский Институт Экономики И Информационных Технологий/ Sochinskiy Institut Ekonomiki i Informatsionnykh Tekhnologii (Sochi)
26. Гумрф: Государственный университет морского и речного флота имени адмирала С.О. Макарова/ Admiral Makarov State University of Maritime and Inland Shipping (Saint-Petersburg)
27. СибГИУ: Сибирский государственный индустриальный университет/ Siberian State Industrial University (Novokuznetsk)
28. Горный: National Mineral Resources University (Saint-Petersburg)
29. МГТУ им. Н. Э. Баумана/Bauman Moscow State Technical University (Moscow)
30. СГТУ: Саратовский государственный технический университет/ SSTU: Saratov State Technical University (Saratov)
31. Самарский государственный экономический университет/ Samarskiy Gosudarstvennyy Ekonomicheskiy Universitet (Samara)
32. АГУ: Астраханский государственный университет/ Astrakhan National University (Astrakhan) or Алтайский государственный университет/ Altai State University (Barnaul) or Адыгейский Государственный Университет/ Adyghe State University (Makop)
33. АГАО им. Шукшина: Алтайская государственная академия образования имени В.М.Шукшина/Altai State Academy of V.M. Shushkin (Byisk)
34. Унн: Университет Натальи Нестеровой/University of Natalya Nesterova (Moscow)
35. Бгита: Брянская государственная инженерно-технологическая академия/ Bryanskaya gosudarstvennaya inzhenerno-tekhnologicheskaya akademiya (Bryansk)
36. Алт ГТУ имени И. И. Ползунова: Алтайский Государственный Технический Университет/ Altai State Technical University (Barnaul)
37. АМУУ: Амурский государственный университет/ Amur State University (Blagoveshchensk)
38. ВятГУ: Вятский Государственный Университет/ Vyatka State University (Kirov)
39. ВГУ: Воронежский государственный университет/ Voronezh State University (Voronezh)
40. Мирэа: Московский технологический университет/ Moscow Technological University (Moscow)
41. Волгоградский государственный социально-педагогический университет/ Volgograd State Pedagogical University (Volgograd)
42. ВИЭУП: Владикавказский институт экономики, управления и права/ Vladikavkazskiy institut ekonomiki, upravleniya i prava (Vladikavkaz)
43. ВлГУ имени А.Г. Н.Г. Столетовых: Владимирский государственный университет/ Vladimir State University (Vladimir)
44. ВФ РАНХиГС: Воронежский филиал Российской академия народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте Российской Федерации/ Voronezh Branch of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (Voronezh)
45. УрГПУ: Уральский государственный педагогический университет/ Ural State Pedagogical University (Yekaterinburg)
46. ПГНИУ: Пермский государственный национальный исследовательский университет/ Perm State University (Perm)

47. РГППУ: Российский государственный профессионально-педагогический университет/ Russian State Vocational Pedagogical University (Yekaterinburg)
48. Мгопу: Московский государственный открытый педагогический университет имени М.А.Шолохова/ Sholokhov Moscow State University for Humanities (Moscow)
49. РЭУ им. Г. В. Плеханова: Российский экономический университет имени Г. В. Плеханова / Plekhanov Russian University of Economics (Moscow)
50. ННГУ: Нижегородский государственный университет имени Н.И. Лобачевского/ N. I. Lobachevsky State University of Nizhny Novgorod (Nizhny Novgorod)
51. Горный Университет: The National Mineral Resources University (Saint-Petersburg)
52. Тогу: Тихоокеанский государственный университет/ Pacific National University (Khabarovsk)
53. ЧКИПТиХП: Челябинский колледж информационно-промышленных технологий и художественных промыслов/ Chelyabinsk College of Information and Industrial Technologies and Artisan Craftwork (Chelyabinsk)
54. НГУЭУ: Новосибирский Государственный Университет Экономики И Управления/ Novosibirsk state university of economics and management (Novosibirsk)
55. ЕАЛИ МГЛИУ: Евразийский лингвистический институт в г.Иркутске/ Irkutsk Eurasian Linguistics Institute (Irkutsk)
56. КПФУ: Казанский (Приволжский) федеральный университет/ Kazan Federal University (Kazan)
57. СГТУ: Саратовский государственный технический университет/ Saratov State Technical University (Saratov)
58. ЮУрГУ: Национальный исследовательский университет в Зеленограде/ State Research University in Zelenograd (Zelenograd)
59. ТУСУР: Томский государственный университет систем управления и радиоэлектроники/ Tomsk State University of Control Systems and Radio-electronics (Tomsk)
60. УГНТУ: Уфимский государственный нефтяной технический университет/ Ufa State Petroleum Technological University (Ufa)
61. МАМИ: Московский государственный машиностроительный университет/ Moscow State University of Mechanical Engineering (Moscow)
62. ТюмГНГУ: Тюменский государственный нефтегазовый университет/ Tyumen State Oil and Gas University (Tyumen)
63. ЧГСХА: Чувашская государственная сельскохозяйственная академия/ Chuvash State Agricultural Academy (Cheboksary)
64. РТПЛ: Радиотехнический профессиональный лицей/ Radio-technological Professional Vocational School (Saint-Petersburg)
65. МИР: Международный институт рынка/ International Market Institute (Samara)
66. Ргау-мсха: Российский государственный аграрный университет - МСХА имени К.А. Тимирязева/ Russian State Agricultural University (Moscow)
67. РГЭУ: Ростовский государственный экономический университет (РИНХ); Филиал РГЭУ «РИНХ» — г. Волгодонск/ Rostov State University of Economics Branch in Vogodonsk (Vogodonsk)
68. СпбГПУ: Санкт-Петербургский политехнический университет Петра Великого/ Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University (Saint-Petersburg)

69. МГУ: Московский государственный университет имени М. В. Ломоносова/ Lomonosov Moscow State University (Moscow)
70. УРФУ: Уральский федеральный университет имени первого Президента России Б.Н. Ельцина/ Ural Federal University (Yekaterinburg)
71. МАДИ: Московский автомобильно-дорожный государственный технический университет/ Moscow Automobile and Road Construction University (Moscow)
72. ОГУ: Оренбургский государственный университет/ Orenburg State University (Orenburg)
73. РГУНГ имени И.М. Губкина: Российский государственный университет нефти и газа имени И. М. Губкина/ Gubkin Russian State University of Oil and Gas (Moscow)
74. ИКИТ СФУ: Институт космических и информационных технологий СФУ/ Institute for Space and Information Technologies (Krasnoyarsk)
75. КГУ: Курский государственный университет/ Kursk State University (Kursk)
76. Красгму: Красноярский государственный медицинский университет/ Krasnoyarsk State Medical University
77. МГУПИ: Московский государственный университет приборостроения и информатики/ Moscow State University of Instrument Engineering and Computer Science (Moscow)
78. НИЯУ МИФИ: Национальный исследовательский ядерный университет «МИФИ» (Московский инженерно-физический институт)/ National Research Nuclear University MEPhI (Moscow)
79. Сгга: Сибирская государственная геодезическая академия/ Siberian State University of Geosystems and Technologies (Novosibirsk)
80. СГАУ: Самарский государственный аэрокосмический университет имени академика С.П. Королёва (национальный исследовательский университет)/ Samara State Aerospace University (Samara)
81. К(П)ФУ: Казанский (Приволжский) федеральный университет/ Kazan Federal University (Kazan)
82. ВЗФЭИ: Всероссийский заочный финансово-экономический институт/ All-Russian State Distance-Learning Institute of Finance and Economics (Moscow)
83. Новосибирский Государственный Технический Университет / Novosibirsk State Technical University (Novosibirsk)
84. ОргМА: Оренбургская государственная медицинская академия/ Orenburg State Medical University (Orenburg)
85. НИУ МЭИ: Национальный исследовательский университет МЭИ—Московский энергетический институт / National Research University MEI- Moscow Power Engineering Institute (Moscow)
86. Тюменский Государственный Нефтегазовый Университет/ Tyumen State Oil and Gas University (Tyumen)
87. КрасГАУ: Красноярский государственный аграрный университет/ Krasnoyarsk state agrarian university (Krasnoyarsk)
88. КНИТУ: Казанский национальный исследовательский технологический университет/ Kazan National Research Technological University (Kazan)
89. ТГУ: Томский государственный университет/ Tomsk State University (Tomsk)
90. Томский политехнический университет/ Tomsk Polytechnic University (Tomsk)
91. Институт космических и информационных технологий Сибирского федерального университета/ Institut kosmicheskikh i informatsionnykh tekhnologiy SFU (Krasnoyarsk)

92. АлтГПУ: Алтайский государственный педагогический университет/ Altai State Pedagogical University (Barnaul)
93. МЭФИ: Московский экономико-финансовый институт/ Moscow Economy and Finance Institute (Moscow)
94. ЧИ БГУЭП: Читинский Институт Байкальского Государственного Университета Экономики И Права/ Chita Institute of the Baikal State University of Economy and Law (Chita)
95. ВолгГТУ: Волгоградский государственный технический университет/ Volgograd State Technical University (Volgograd)
96. МГАУ им. Горячкина: Московский Государственный Агроинженерный Университет имени В.П.Горячкина/ Moscow State Agro-Engineering University (Moscow)
97. Кольский медицинский колледж/ Kolskiy Medical College (Apatity)
98. ХГУ: Хакасский государственный университет им. Н. Ф. Катанова/ Katanov Khakass State University (Abakan)
99. ПГУ: Пензенский государственный университет/ Penza State University (Penza)
100. Государственный Университет Аэрокосмического Приборостроения/ Saint Petersburg State University of Aerospace Instrumentation (Saint-Petersburg)
101. Иргунс: Иркутский государственный университет путей сообщения/ Irkutsk State University of Railway Engineering (Irkutsk)
102. Кубгту: Кубанский государственный технологический университет/ Kuban State Technological University (Krasnodar)
103. ТГМА: Тверская государственная медицинская академия/ Tver State Medical Academy (Tver)
104. ГУЗ: Государственный университет по землеустройству/ State University of Land Use Planning (Moscow)
105. НГТУ им. Р. Е. Алексеева: Нижегородский государственный технический университет / Nizhny Novgorod State Technical University (Nizhny Novgorod)
106. ЮРГПУ: Южно-Российский государственный политехнический университет / Platov South Russian State Polytechnic University (Novocherkassk)
107. Рссу: Российский государственный социальный университет / Russian State Social University (Taganrog)
108. Тульский Государственный Университет / Tula State University (Tula)
109. Институт Технологий и Бизнеса/ Institute of Technology and Business (Nakhodka)
110. Поволжский Государственный Университет Сервиса/ Volga State Service University (Ulyanovsk, Tolyatti, and Syzran')
111. Магнитогорский государственный университет / Magnitogorsk State Technical University (Magnitogorsk)
112. МГИМО: Московский государственный институт международных отношений / Moscow State Institute of International Relations (Moscow)
113. МФЮА: Московский финансово-юридический университет / Moscow Finance and Law University (Moscow)
114. ИНЭКА: Камская государственная инженерно-экономическая академия / Kama State Engineering and Economic Academy (Naberezhnye Chelny)
115. Дгау: Донской государственный аграрный университет / Don State Agrarian University (Persianovskiy)
116. Санкт-Петербургский Государственный Университет Технологии и Дизайна / Saint-Petersburg State University of Technology and Design (Saint-Petersburg)

117. КубГАУ: Кубанский государственный аграрный университет / Kuban State Agrarian University (Krasnodar)
118. МГУТУ: Московский государственный университет технологий и управления имени К. Г. Разумовского / Moscow State University of Technology and Management (Moscow)
119. МГУП печати: Московский государственный университет печати им. Ивана Федорова / Moscow State University of Printing Arts (Moscow)
120. Волгоградский энергетический колледж / Volgogradskiy energeticheskiy kolledzh (Volgograd)
121. Нгму: Новосибирский государственный медицинский университет / Novosibirsk Medical Institute (Novosibirsk)
122. КФУ: Казанский (Приволжский) федеральный университет / Kazan Federal University (Kazan)
123. РязГМУ им. Павлова: Рязанский Государственный Медицинский университет / Ryazan State Medical University (Ryazan)
124. МГТУ Станкин: Московский государственный технологический университет Станкин / Moscow State Technological University "Stankin" (Moscow)
125. СПбГУТ: Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет телекоммуникаций им. проф. М. А. Бонч-Бруевича / St. Petersburg State University of Telecommunications (Saint-Petersburg)
126. ЮУГМУ: Южно-Уральский государственный медицинский университет Министерства здравоохранения РФ / South Ural State Medical University (Chelyabinsk)
127. РГРТУ: Рязанский государственный радиотехнический университет / Ryazan State Radio Engineering University (Ryazan)
128. ПГСХА: Приморская государственная сельскохозяйственная академия / Primorskaya State Academy of Agriculture (Ussuriysk)
129. СГУПС: Сибирский государственный университет путей и сообщения / Siberian Transport University (Novosibirsk)
130. Башкирский Государственный Университет, Стерлитамакский филиал / Bahkirskiy State University, Sterlitamak branch (Sterlitamak)
131. ПНИПУ: Пермский национальный исследовательский политехнический университет / State National Research Polytechnical University of Perm (Perm)
132. УРГЭУ СИНХ: Уральский государственный экономический университет / Ural State University of Economics (Yekaterinburg)
133. Митхт: Московский государственный университет тонких химических технологий им. М.В. Ломоносова / Moscow State University of Fine Chemical Technologies (Moscow)
134. Пермский государственный научно-исследовательский университет / Perm State Research University (Perm)
135. МЭИ: Национальный исследовательский университет «МЭИ»/ National Research University «Moscow Power Engineering Institute» (Moscow)
136. Кгэу: Казанский Государственный Энергетический Университет / Kazan State Power Engineering University (Kazan)
137. БГТУ "ВОЕНМЕХ" им Д.Ф.Устинова: Балтийский государственный технический университет «Военмех» имени Д. Ф. Устинова / Baltic State Technical University "Voenmeh" (Saint-Petersburg)
138. Институт нефти и газа Сибирского Федерального Университета/ Institute of Oil and Gas at the Siberian Federal University (Krasnoyarsk)

139. 145) УрГУПС: Уральский государственный университет путей сообщения / Ural State University of Railway Transport (Yekaterinburg)
140. ИНЖЭКОН: Санкт-Петербургский государственный инженерно-экономический университет / Saint Petersburg State University of Economics (Saint-Petersburg)
141. МГМУ: Первый Московский государственный медицинский университет имени И.М. Сеченова Министерства здравоохранения Российской Федерации / I.M. Sechenov First Moscow State Medical University (Moscow)
142. ВОМК: Вологодский Областной Медицинский Колледж / Vologodskiy Oblastnoy Meditsinskiy Kolledzh (Vologda)
143. СибГУТИ: Сибирский государственный университет телекоммуникаций и информатики / Siberian State University of Telecommunications and Information Sciences (Novosibirsk)
144. СГА: Современная гуманитарная академия / Contemporary Humanitarian Academy (Moscow)
145. МФТИ: Московский физико-технический институт / Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (Moscow)
146. РНИМУ: Российский национальный исследовательский медицинский университет имени Н.И. Пирогова / Russian National Research Medical University (Moscow)
147. МГКЭиИТ: Московский государственный колледж электромеханики и информационных технологий / Moscow State College of Electromechanics and Information Technology (Moscow)
148. Челябинский Энергетический Колледж Им. Кирова / Chelyabinskiy Energeticheskiy Kolledzh Im.S.M.Kirova (Chelyabinsk)
149. ВСАГО Иркутск: Восточно-Сибирская государственная академия образования / Irkutsk State Pedagogical College (Irkutsk)
150. Увауга: Ульяновского высшего авиационного училища гражданской авиации / Ulyanovsk Higher Civil Aviation School (Ulyanovsk)
151. СПбГЭТУ «ЛЭТИ»: Санкт-Петербургский государственный электротехнический университет «ЛЭТИ» имени В.И. Ульянова (Ленина) / Saint-Petersburg State Electrotechnical University «LETI» (Saint-Petersburg)
152. ОмГТУ: Омский государственный технический университет / Omsk State Technical University (Omsk)
153. Красноярский ГПУ им. Астафьева / Krasnoyarsk State Pedagogical University named after V. P. Astafyev (Krasnoyarsk)
154. Московский государственный областной университет / Moscow Region State University (Moscow)
155. КВВАУЛ: Краснодарское высшее военное авиационное училище летчиков / Krasnodar Aviation High Military School (Krasnodar)
156. ГИТР: Гуманитарный институт телевидения и радиовещания / Humanities Institute of TV&Radio Broadcasting named after M.A. Litovchin (Moscow)
157. МГУПП: Московский государственный университет пищевых производств / Moscow State University of Food Production (Moscow)
158. ЮРГПУ (НПИ): Южно-Российский государственный политехнический университет (НПИ) имени М. И. Платова / South-Russian State Polytechnic University named after M.I. Platov (Novocherkassk)
159. ПГУ им.Белинского: Педагогический институт имени В. Г. Белинского Пензенского государственного университета / Penza State Pedagogical University (Penza)

160. Санкт-Петербургский государственный экономический университет / Saint Petersburg State University of Economics (Saint-Petersburg)
161. МПГУ: Московский педагогический государственный университет / Moscow State Pedagogical University (Moscow)
162. УГМУ: Уральский Государственный Медицинский Университет / Ural State Medical University (Yekaterinburg)
163. Якутский Государственный Университет / North-Eastern Federal University (Yakutsk)
164. НОИР: Национальный открытый университет России / National Open University of Russia (Russia)
165. Нки: Нижегородский коммерческий институт / Nizhegorodskiy kommercheskiy institut (Nizhny Novgorod)
166. Университет ИТМО г. Санкт-Петербург: Санкт-Петербургский национальный исследовательский университет информационных технологий, механики и оптики / ITMO National Research University (Saint-Petersburg)
167. ИУП: Институт управления и права / Institute of Managment and Law (not specified)
168. СПбГТИ(ТУ): Санкт-Петербургский государственный технологический институт (технический университет) / Saint Petersburg State Institute of Technology (Saint-Petersburg)
169. Санкт-Петербургский Университет МВД / Saint Petersburg University of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russian Federation (Saint-Petersburg)
170. Мгсу-миси: Московский государственный строительный университет-Московский инженерно-строительный институт / Moscow State University of Civil Engineering (Moscow)
171. Северный арктический университет им. Ломоносова / Northern Arctic Federal University of Lomonosov (Arkhangelsk)
172. СыктГУ: Сыктывкарский Государственный Университет / Syktyvkar State University (Syktyvkar)
173. ИСиА: Институт строительства и архитектуры / Institute of Constructio and Architecture (not specified)
174. ТПУ: Томский политехнический университет / Tomsk Polytechnic University (Tomsk)
175. РХТУ им Д.И. Менделеева: Российский химико-технологический университет имени Д. И. Менделеева / D. Mendeleev University of Chemical Technology of Russia (Moscow)
176. ОмГМА: Омская Государственная Медицинская Академия / Omsk State Medical Academy (Omsk)
177. Тусур: Томский государственный университет систем управления и радиоэлектроники/ Tomsk State University of Control Systems and Radio-electronics (Tomsk)
178. ЗабГУ: Забайкальский государственный университет (Чита) / Transbaikal State University (Chita)
179. ЮУрГУ: Южно-Уральский государственный университет / South Ural State University (Chelyabinsk)
180. СамГТУ: Самарский государственный технический университет / Samara State Technical University (Samara)
181. ВятГГУ: Вятский государственный гуманитарный университет (Киров) / Vyatka State University of HumanitiesWebsiteDirections (Kirov)

182. ЮУрГУ филиал в Златоусте: Южно-Уральский государственный университет / South Ural State University Zlatoust branch (Zlatoust)
183. Башкирский Государственный университет / Bashkir State University (Ufa)
184. Международная Ассоциация университетов (МАУ) / International Association of Universities (various locations)
185. СибАДИ: Сибирская государственная автомобильно-дорожная академия / Siberian State Automobile and Highway Academy (Omsk)
186. УлГТУ: Ульяновский государственный технический университет / Ulyanovsk State Technical University (Ulyanovsk)
187. УГАТУ: Уфимский авиационный технический университет / Ufa State Aviation Technical University (Ufa)
188. МГЮА: Московский государственный юридический университет имени О. Е. Кутафина / Kutafin Moscow State Law University (Moscow)
189. Югорский государственный университет / Yugorskiy gosudarstvennyy universitet (Khanty-Mansiysk)
190. Алтайский государственный технический университет им. И.И. Ползунова / Altai State Technical University Polzunova (Barnaul)
191. Мит: Московский институт теплотехники / Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (Moscow)
192. БФУ им И. Канта: Балтийский федеральный университет им. И. Канта / Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University (Kaliningrad)
193. МПСУ: Московский психолого-социальный университет / Moscow psychological-social university (Chelyabinsk)
194. Новосибирский Автотранспортный Колледж / Novosibirsk Transport College (Novosibirsk)
195. Железнодорожный колледж / Railway College (not specified)
196. ЮЗГУ: Юго-Западный государственный университет (Курск) / South-Western State University (Kursk)
197. ТГПУ: Томский Государственный Педагогический Университет / Tomsk State Pedagogical University (Tomsk)
198. Казанский Национальный Исследовательский Технологический Университет / Kazan National Research Technological University (Kazan)
199. МГУ им. Н. П. Огарева: Мордовский государственный университет имени Н.П. Огарева / Mordovian State University of N. P. Ogarev (Saransk)
200. УРАО: Университет российской академии образования / University of Russian Academy of Education (Moscow)
201. Спасск: Санкт-Петербургский архитектурно-строительный колледж / St. Petersburg College of Architecture and Civil Engineering (Saint-Petersburg)
202. ПМФИ: Пятигорский медико-фармацевтический институт / Pyatigorsk Medical and Pharmaceutical Institute (Pyatigorsk)
203. АГТУ: Астраханский Государственный Технический Университет / Astrakhan State Technical University (Astrakhan)
204. YSTU: Ярославский государственный технический университет / Yaroslavl State Technical University (Yaroslavl)
205. Спбпу: Санкт-Петербургский политехнический университет Петра Великого / Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University (Saint-Petersburg)
206. НГУ: Новосибирский государственный университет / Novosibirsk State University (Novosibirsk)

207. УрТИСИ: Уральский технический институт связи и информатики / Ural Technical Institute of Communications and Informatics (Yekaterinburg)
208. Политех города Пензы: Пензенский государственный университет / Penza State University (Penza)
209. ИАТЭ НИЯУ МИФИ: Обнинский институт атомной энергетики - филиал федерального государственного бюджетного образовательного учреждения высшего профессионального образования "Национальный исследовательский ядерный университет "МИФИ" / Obninsk Institute for Nuclear Power Engineering (Obinsk)
210. ИжГТУ им. М.Т. Калашникова: Ижевский государственный технический университет имени М.Т.Калашникова» / Izhevsk State Technical University of M.T. Kalashnikov (Izhevsk)
211. СЗИП СПГУТД: Северо-Западный институт печати Санкт-Петербургского государственного университета технологии и дизайна / Northwestern Institute of Press (Saint-Petersburg)
212. СПК: Сургутский Профессиональный Колледж / Surgut Porfessional College (Surgut)
213. УГМА: Уральская государственная медицинская академия / Ural State Medical University (Yekaterinburg)
214. Академия МНЭПУ: Международный независимый эколого-политологический университет / International Independent University of Environment and Political Science (Moscow)
215. СПбГУ: Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет / Saint Petersburg State University (Saint-Petersburg)
216. Северо-кавказский федеральный университет (Ставрополь) / North-Caucasus Federal University (Stavropol)
217. ТГПУ им. Л.Н. Толстого: Тульский государственный педагогический университет / Tula State Lev Tolstoy Pedagogical University (Tula)
218. Мтси: Московский технический университет связи и информатики / Moscow Technical University of Communications and Informatics (Moscow)
219. РГАТУ им. П.А. Соловьева: Рыбинский государственный авиационный технический университет имени П. А. Соловьёва / Rybinsk State Aviation Technical University of Solovyov (Rybinsk)
220. МГТУ ГА: Московский государственный технический университет гражданской авиации / Moscow State Technical University of Civil Aviation (Moscow)
221. КНИТУ-КАИ: Казанский национальный исследовательский технический университет имени А. Н. Туполева / Kazan State Technical University named after A. N. Tupolev (Kazan)
222. Морской государственный университет имени Невельского / G.I. Nevelskoi Maritime State University (Vladivostok)
223. РГПУ им. А. И. Герцена: Российский государственный педагогический университет им. А. И. Герцена / Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia (Saint-Petersburg)
224. ОмЮИ: Омская юридическая академия / Omsk Law Academy (Omsk)
225. МГПХА им Строганова: Московский Государственный Художественно-Промышленный Университет Им. С.г. Строганова / Stroganov Moscow State University of Arts and Industry (Moscow)
226. (Ранее) МГРИ: Российский государственный геологоразведочный университет — РГГРУ (Москва) / Russian State Geological Prospecting University (Moscow)

227. МИУ: Московский Институт Управления / Moscow University of Management (Moscow)
228. Финансовая академия при правительстве РФ / Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation (Moscow)
229. РГГУ: Российский государственный гуманитарный университет / Russian State University for the Humanities (Moscow)
230. КСТУ: Костромской государственный технологический университет / Kostroma State Technological University (Kostroma)
231. Московский государственный областной университет / Moscow State Regional University (Moscow)
232. СГЭИ: Столичный гуманитарно-экономический институт / Capital Institute of Humanities and Economy (Moscow)
233. МИПП: Московский институт предпринимательства и права / Moscow Institute of Enterprise and Law (Moscow)
234. Сзиу ранхиг: Северо-Западный институт управления РАНХиГС (Санкт-Петербург) / North-West Institute of Management (Saint-Petersburg)
235. СКГМИ: Северо-Кавказский горно-металлургический институт (Владикавказ) / North Caucasus Mining and Metallurgical Institute (Vladikavkaz)
236. СПбГЭУ: Санкт-Петербургский государственный экономический университет / Saint Petersburg State University of Economics (Saint-Petersburg)
237. ИГЭУ: Ивановский государственный энергетический университет / Ivanovo State Power Engineering University (Ivanovo)
238. ММВШБ МИРБИС: Московская международная высшая школа бизнеса «МИРБИС» / Moscow International Higher Business School MIRBIS (Moscow)
239. ИЭУиП: Институт экономики, управления и права (г. Казань) / Institute of Economics, Management and Law (Kazan)
240. КемТИПП: Кемеровский технологический пищевой промышленности / Kemerovo Institute of Food Science and Technology (Kemerovo)
241. БГУЭП: Байкальский государственный университет экономики и права / Baikal State University of Economics and Law (Irkutsk)
242. ВЛГАФК: Великолукская государственная академия физической культуры и спорта / Velikolukskaya Gosudarstvennaya Akademiya Fizicheskoy Kultury i Sporta (Velikiye Luki)
243. Тгнгу: Тюменский государственный нефтегазовый университет / Tyumen State Oil and Gas University (Tyumen)
244. Кировский педагогический колледж / Kirov Pedagogical College (Kirov)
245. НГПУ: Новосибирский Государственный Педагогический Университет / Novosibirsk State Pedagogical University (Novosibirsk)
246. СГУ им. Чернышевского: Саратовский государственный университет имени Н. Г. Чернышевского / Saratov Chernyshevsky State University (Saratov)
247. ДВФУ: Дальневосточный федеральный университет / Far Eastern Federal University (Vladivostok)
248. ДГИНХ: Дагестанский государственный институт народного хозяйства / Dagestan State Institute of National Economy (Makhachkala)
249. ПГЛУ: Пятигорский государственный лингвистический университет (ФГБОУ ВПО) / Pyatigorsk State Linguistic University (Pyatigorsk)
250. ИМСИТ: Академия маркетинга и социально-информационных технологий (г. Краснодар) / Academy of Marketing and Socially-Information Technologies (Krasnodar)

251. БГУ: Бурятский государственный университет / Buryat State University (Ulan-Ude)
252. Орский гуманитарно-технологический институт (ОГТИ)/ Orsk Institute for Humanities and Technologies (Orsk)
253. Удмуртский государственный университет / Udmurt State University (Izhevsk)
254. Воронежский государственный педагогический университет / Voronezh State Pedagogical University (Voronezh)
255. ПГУТИ: Поволжский государственный университет телекоммуникаций и информатики / Povolzhskiy State University of Telecommunications and Informatics (Samara)
256. ЧГТУ: Черкасский государственный технологический университет / Cherkasy State Technological University (Cherkasy)
257. Вва: Военно-воздушная академия имени профессора Н. Е. Жуковского и Ю. А. Гагарина (Воронеж) / Air Force Academy named after professor N. E. Zhukovsky and Y. A. Gagarin (Voronezh)
258. ВГСПУ: Волгоградский государственный социально-педагогический университет / Volgograd State Pedagogical University (Volgograd)
259. ВГУЭС: Владивостокский государственный университет экономики и сервиса / Vladivostok State University of Economics and Service (Vladivostok)
260. МГУПС (МИИТ): Московский государственный университет путей сообщения / Moscow State University of Railway Engineering (Moscow)
261. СПбГМТУ: Санкт-Петербургский государственный морской технический университет / State Marine Technical University of St. Petersburg (Saint-Petersburg)
262. ОмГПУ: Омский государственный педагогический университет / Omsk State Pedagogical University (Omsk)
263. НИТУ МИСиС: Национальный исследовательский технологический университет «МИСиС»/ National University of Science and Technology MISiS (Moscow)
264. РГТЭУ: Российский государственный торгово-экономический университет / Russian State University of Trade and Economics (Moscow)
265. СПбГУГА: Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет гражданской авиации / Saint Petersburg State University of Civil Aviation (Saint-Petersburg)
266. ПсковГУ: Псковский государственный университет / Pskov State University (Pskov)
267. Кптк: Кемеровский профессионально-технический техникум / Kemerovo Professional Technical College (Kemerovo)
268. Мгмсу: Московский государственный медико-стоматологический университет имени А. И. Евдокимова / Moscow State Medical Dental University of Evdokimov (Moscow)
269. БГТУ им.В.Г.Шухова: Белгородский Государственный Технологический Университет имени В.Г. Шухова / Belgorod State Technological University named after V.G. Shukhov (Belgorod)
270. УрГУ: Уральский государственный университет им. А. М. Горького / Ural State University of Gorki (Yekaterinburg)
271. ТТЭК: Тульский технико-экономический колледж от Тверской торгово-экономический колледж / Tula technical-economic college (Tula) or Tver trade-economic college (Tver)
272. ВолГУ: Волгоградский государственный университет / Volgograd State University (Volgograd)

273. Мси: Международный Славянский Институт / International Slavic Institute (Moscow)
274. ИФиЯК СФУ: Институт филологии и языковой коммуникации Сибирского федерального университета / School of Philology and Language Communication of Siberian Federal University (Krasnoyarsk)
275. ОГУ: Орловский государственный университет / Oryol State University (Oryol)
276. СПГИК: Санкт-Петербургский государственный институт культуры, ныне – СПбГУКИ / St. Petersburg State University of Culture (Saint-Petersburg)
277. МИЖ: Муниципальный Институт г. Жуковского / Municipal Institute of general Zhukov (Moscow)
278. СПбГАСУ: Санкт-Петербургский государственный архитектурно-строительный университет / Saint-Petersburg State University of Architecture and Civil Engineering (Saint-Petersburg)
279. СПбГУТ им.проф. М.А.Бонч-Бруевича: Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет телекоммуникаций им. проф. М.А. Бонч-Бруевича / Bonch-Bruevich Saint Petersburg State University of Telecommunications (Saint-Petersburg)
280. Московский промышленно-экономический техникум / Moskovskiy promyshlennno-ekonomicheskiy Tekhnikum (Moscow)
281. Дипломатическая Академия МИД РФ / Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow)
282. Мипкиф: Московский Издательско-Полиграфический колледж имени Ивана Федорова / Moskovskiy Izdatelsko-poligraficheskiy Kolledzh imeni Ivana Fedorova (Moscow)
283. МЭСИ: Московский государственный университет экономики, статистики и информатики / Moscow State University of Economics, Statistics, and Informatics (Moscow)
284. Московский Государственный Строительный Университет / Moscow State University of Civil Engineering (Moscow)
285. ЛГТУ: Липецкий государственный технический университет / Lipetsk State Technical University (Lipetsk)
286. ТвГУ: Тверской государственный университет / Tver State University (Tver)
287. КГТУ: Калининградский государственный технический университет / Kaliningrad State Technical University (Kaliningrad)
288. СПбГМУ им акад Павлова: Первый Санкт-Петербургский государственный медицинский университет им. И.П. Павлова / First Pavlov State Medical University of St. Petersburg (Saint-Petersburg)
289. Горный, СПб: Санкт-Петербургский горный университет / Saint Petersburg Mining University or National Mineral Resources University (Saint-Petersburg)
290. РНИМУ им. Н.И. Пирогова: Российский национальный исследовательский медицинский университет имени Н.И. Пирогова / Prigorov Russian National Research Medical University (Moscow)
291. КТК: Курганский Технологический Колледж / Kurgan Technological College (Kurgan)
292. МарГу: Марийский государственный университет / Mari State University (Yoshkar-Ola)
293. Мгпу: Московский городской педагогический университет / Moscow City Teacher Training University (Moscow)

294. НФИ КемГУ: Новокузнецкий институт (филиал) Кемеровский государственный университет / Novokuznetsk Institute (filial) of Kemerovo State University (Novokuznetsk)
295. Российская академия государственной службы (РАГС) / Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (Moscow)
296. Сибгму: Сибирский государственный медицинский университет / Siberian State Medical University (Tomsk)
297. РЭУ им. Плеханова: Российский экономический университет имени Плеханова / Plekhanov Russian University of Economics (Moscow)
298. ЮУГТК: Южно-Уральский государственный технический колледж / Yuzhno-Uralskiy Gosudarstvennyy Tekhnicheskiy Kolledzh (Chelyabinsk)
299. ЧиБГУЭП: Читинский институт Байкальского государственного университета экономики и права / Chita Institute of Baikal State University of Economics and Law (Chita)
300. ЯрГУ: Ярославский государственный университет / Yaroslavl State University (Yaroslavl)
301. ЧГУ: Чувашский государственный университет имени И.Н. Ульянова / I. N. Ulianov Chuvash State University (Cheboksary)
302. МИЭМ ВШЭ: Московский институт электроники и математики Национального исследовательского университета Высшая школа экономики / Moscow Institute of Electronics and Mathematics of the National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow)

Not-Russian institutions:

1. БГТУ: Белорусский государственный технологический университет / Belarusian State Technological University (Minsk)
2. БГУИР: Белорусский государственный университет информатики и радиоэлектроники / Belarusian State University of Informatics and Radioelectronics (Minsk)
3. БГМУ: Белорусский государственный медицинский университет / Belarusian State Medical University (Minsk)
4. БГПУ: Белорусский государственный педагогический университет имени Максима Танка / Belarusian State Pedagogical University of Maksim Tank (Minsk)
5. ВКГТУ: Восточно-Казахстанский государственный технический университет East Kazakhstan State Technological Univeristy (Ust'-Kamenogorsk)
6. КазНПУ им. Абая: Казахский Национальный Педагогический Университет имени Абая / Kazakh National University named after Abai (Almaty)
7. ТашГУ: Ташкентский государственный университет / National University of Uzbekistan (Tashkent)
8. Алматинский Филиал Московской Академии Труда и Социальных отношений / Almaty filial of Moscow Academy of Labour and Social Relations (Almaty)
9. Таврический Федеральный Университет им. В. И. Вернадского (Крым, Симферополь) / Tavrida National V.I. Vernadsky University (Simferopol)
10. Севастопольский строительный колледж / Savastopol Construction College (Savastopol)
11. СКГУ: Северо-Казахстанский государственный университет / North Kazakhstan State University (Petropavl)

12. КГМУ им. С.И.Георгиевского: Крымский государственный медицинский университет им. С. И. Георгиевского / Crimea State Medical University named after S. I. Georgievsky (Simferopol)
13. СевНТУ: Севастопольский национальный технический университет / Sevastopol State Technical University (Sevastopol)
14. НУБиП Украины: Национальный университет биоресурсов и природопользования / National University of Life and Environmental Sciences of Ukraine (Kiev)
15. Cégep du Vieux Montréal / College of General and Vocational Education (Montréal)
16. ДонНАСА: Донбасская национальная академия строительства и архитектуры / Donbas National Academy of Civil Engineering and Architecture (Makiivka)
17. ХТЭИ: Харьковский торгово-экономический институт КНТЭУ / Kharkiv Institute of Trade and Economics of Kyiv National University of Trade and Economics (Kharkiv)
18. Луганский национальный университет им. Тараса Шевченко / Taras Shevchenko University of Luhansk (Luhansk)
19. ХАИ: Национальный аэрокосмический университет имени Н. Е.Жуковского «Харьковский авиационный институт» / National Aerospace University – Kharkiv Aviation Institute (Kharkiv)
20. ГГУ им.Ф.Скорины: Гомельский государственный университет им. Франциска Скорины / Francisk Skorina Gomel State University (Gomel)
21. МГПК: Минский государственный политехнический колледж / Minsk State Politechnic (Minsk)
22. НТУУ КПИ: Национальный технический университет Украины «Киевский политехнический институт» / Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (Kyiv)
23. ДМА: Дніпропетровська медична академія / Dnipropetrovsk State Medical Academy (Dnipropetrovsk)
24. КНУ: Киевский национальный университет имени Тараса Шевченко / Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (Kyiv)
25. ДонНУ: Донецкий национальный университет / Donetsk National University (Donetsk)
26. БНТУ: Белорусский национальный технический университет / Belarusian National Technical University (Minsk)
27. ДГАЭУ: Днепропетровский государственный аграрно-экономический университет / Dnipropetrovsk State Agrarian-Economic University (Dnipropetrovsk)
28. Тартуский университет / University of Tartu (Tartu)
29. БелГУТ: Белорусский государственный университет транспорта / Belarusian State University of Transport (Gomel)
30. Национальный юридический университет имени Ярослава Мудрого / National University "Yaroslav the Wise Law Academy of Ukraine" (Kharkiv)
31. БГЭУ: Белорусский государственный экономический университет / Belarusian State Economic University (Minsk)
32. Национальная Металлургическая Академия Украины / National Metallurgical Academy of Ukraine (Dnipropetrovsk)
33. КазГАСА: Казахская головная архитектурно-строительная академия / Kazakh Leading Academy of Architecture and Construction (Almaty)

34. ГАТТ ДНТУ: Горловский автотранспортный техникум Донецкого национального технического университета / Gorlovka transport technicum of the Donietsk National Polytechnic (Gorlovka)
35. ХНУРЭ: Харьковский национальный университет радиоэлектроники / Kharkiv National University of Radioelectronics (Kharkiv)
36. ДНУЖТ: Днепропетровский национальный университет железнодорожного транспорта / Dnipropetrovsk National University of Rail Transport (Dnipropetrovsk)
37. КНУ Кривой Рог: Криворожский национальный университет / Kryvyi Rih National University (Kryvyi Rih)
38. КНЭУ: Киевский национальный экономический университет / Kyiv National Economic University (Kyiv)
39. КЭПИТ при Университете крок: Университет экономики и права "КРОК" / KROK University of Economics and Law (Kiev)
40. НТУ ХПИ: Национальный технический университет Харьковский политехнический институт/ Kharkiv Polytechnic Institute (Kharkiv)
41. НУК им. адм. Макарова: Национальный университет кораблестроения имени адм. Макарова / Admiral Makarov National University of Shipbuilding (Mykolaiv)
42. ХТЕИ: Харьковский торгово-экономический институт КНТЭУ / Kharkiv Institute of Trade and Economics of Kyiv National University of Trade and Economics (Kharkiv)
43. ТашГУ: Национальный университет Узбекистана/National University of Uzbekistan (Tashkent)
44. Международный университет «МИТСО»/International University (Minsk/Vitebsk/Gomel)
45. ВГТУ: Витебский государственный технологический университет/ Vitebsk State Technological University (Vitebsk)
46. ФЭУП: Факультет экономики и управления производством/ Faculty of Economy and Managment of Production (Odessa)
47. Национальный Фармацевтический Университет / Ukrainian Academy of Pharmacy (Kharkiv)
48. МГЭУ им. А.Д. Сахарова: Международный государственный экологический университет имени А.Д.Сахарова / International Sakharov Environmental Institute (Minsk)
49. ХНАГХ: Харьковская национальная академия городского хозяйства / Kharkiv National Academy of Municipal Economy (Kharkiv)

Not a university/higher education institution:

1. Интм
2. Кст
3. РУП (РАП)
4. НГХУ: Новоалтайское государственное художественное училище / Novoaltayskoye gosudarstvennoye khudozhestvennoye uchilishche (Novoaltaysk)
5. Сибирский Институт Черепицы
6. КиФСИН: Кузбасский институт Федеральной службы исполнения наказаний России / Kuzbasski Institute of Federal Service of Execution of Punishments in Russia (Novokuznetsk)

APPENDIX F. Versions of the vignette**V1: procedural justice, distributive justice, independence, positive outcome***English*

There was a flooding in your region. The water is gone now. The house and most possessions of your family did not suffer damages. Your family has access to primary goods like food and other essentials. However, your family lost a car that you used in the weekends. The government has enough available resources to offer help. A governmental commission came to your region to estimate the damages and write a report. Before writing the report, the commission held a series of meetings with victims of the flooding. The victims had an opportunity to talk about the damages they suffered and propose forms of help that the government could offer them. Everybody got a chance to present their point of view and the report guided the decision of the government. Then the government decided that every flood victim will receive a benefit in proportion to the losses they suffered. As a consequence, you will receive a benefit that will help you buy a car. Farmers from your region will receive benefits to compensate for the destruction of their crop fields that were the only source of income for their families.

Russian

В Вашем регионе было наводнение. Вода уже ушла. Жилье и имущество Вашей семьи не пострадали. Вы имеете доступ к основным продуктам питания и товарам повседневного спроса. Однако, Ваша семья потеряла свою машину, которой Вы пользовались в выходные. Правительство имеет достаточно ресурсов, чтобы оказать помощь. Правительственная комиссия приехала в Ваш регион, чтобы оценить ущерб и написать отчет. Перед тем как комиссия написала отчет, она провела ряд встреч с пострадавшими от наводнения. Пострадавшие имели возможность обсудить понесенный ущерб и предложить формы помощи, которую правительство могло бы им оказать. Все получили возможность изложить свою точку зрения и отчет комиссии был основанием для решения правительства. После этого правительство приняло решение о том, что каждый пострадавший от наводнения получит пособие в соответствии с понесенными потерями. В следствие этого решения Вы получите пособие, которое поможет Вам купить машину. Крестьяне из Вашего региона получают пособие для компенсации уничтоженных зерновых полей, которые являлись единственным источником дохода их семей.

Ukrainian

У Вашому регіоні була повінь. Вода вже зійшла. Житло і більшість майна Вашої родини не зазнали ушкоджень. Ви маєте доступ до продуктів харчування і речей першої необхідності. Однак, Ваша родина втратила машину, якою ви користувалися у вихідні. Уряд має достатньо ресурсів для допомоги постраждалим. Урядова комісія приїхала до Вашого регіону, щоби оцінити збитки і скласти звіт. Перед складанням звіту, комісія провела шерэг зустрічей з потерпілими. Вони мали можливість обговорити збитки, яких вони зазнали і запропонувати форми допомоги, яку би міг надати їм уряд. Усі мали можливість представити власну точку зору, а звіт комісії став підставою для рішення уряду. Уряд вирішив, що кожен потерпілий від повені отримає допомогу відповідну до зазнаних збитків. Внаслідок цього рішення Ви отримаєте допомогу, котра дозволить Вам купити нову машину. Фермери з Вашого

регіону отримають матеріальну допомогу як компенсацію за знищення оброблюваних земель, котрі були єдиним джерелом доходу для їхніх родин.

Polish

W Twoim regionie doszło do powodzi. Poziom wody już się obniżył. Mieszkanie i większość dobytku Twojej rodziny nie ucierpiały. Macie dostęp do żywności i produktów pierwszej potrzeby. Twoja rodzina straciła jednak samochód, którego używaliście w weekendy. Rząd ma dostatecznie dużo środków, by okazać pomoc powodzianom. Komisja rządowa przyjechała do Twojego regionu, by oszacować straty i napisać raport. Przed napisaniem raportu, komisja przeprowadziła spotkania z poszkodowanymi. Poszkodowani mieli możliwość przedyskutowania poniesionych strat i zaproponowania form pomocy, której mógłby udzielić rząd. Wszyscy dostali możliwość przedstawienia swojego punktu widzenia a raport komisji stanowił podstawę dla decyzji rządu. Rząd zdecydował, że każdy poszkodowany w czasie powodzi otrzyma zasiłek zgodnie z poniesionymi stratami. W skutek tej decyzji otrzymasz zasiłek, który pomoże Ci zakupić samochód. Rolnicy z Twojego regionu otrzymają zasiłki w ramach kompensaty za zniszczenia pól uprawnych, które stanowiły jedyne źródło dochodu ich rodzin.

French

Il y a eu une inondation dans votre région. L'eau s'est retirée depuis. Votre maison et la plupart des possessions de votre famille n'ont pas subi de dégâts. Votre famille a accès aux biens essentiels comme la nourriture. Cependant, elle a perdu une voiture que vous utilisiez les week-ends. Le gouvernement a suffisamment de ressources pour offrir de l'aide. Une délégation de l'administration est venue dans votre région pour évaluer les dégâts et écrire un rapport. En préalable à l'écriture du rapport, la délégation a organisé une série de réunions avec les victimes de l'inondation. Celles-ci ont eu la possibilité de témoigner des dégâts qu'elles ont subis et de suggérer des formes d'aide que l'administration pourrait offrir. Chacun pouvait exprimer son point de vue, et le rapport a guidé la décision du gouvernement. Le gouvernement a ensuite décidé que chaque victime de l'inondation recevrait une compensation en proportion des dégâts qu'elle a subis. En conséquence, vous recevrez une indemnité qui vous aidera à acheter une voiture. Les agriculteurs dans votre région vont recevoir des indemnités pour compenser la destruction de leurs champs, qui étaient la seule source de revenu pour leurs familles.

Dutch

Er was een overstroming in uw regio. Het water is nu geweken. Het huis en de meeste bezittingen van uw familie zijn niet beschadigd. Uw familie heeft toegang tot primaire goederen zoals voedsel en andere essentiële zaken. Echter, uw familie verloor wel een auto die u in de weekenden gebruikte. De regering heeft genoeg middelen om hulp te bieden. Een regeringsdelegatie kwam naar uw stad om de schade in te schatten en een verslag te schrijven. Voor het schrijven van het rapport, had de delegatie een reeks ontmoetingen met slachtoffers van de overstroming. De slachtoffers hadden de mogelijkheid om te praten over de schade die zij hadden geleden en zij konden voorstellen doen voor de vorm van hulp die de regering hen kon bieden. Iedereen kreeg een kans om zijn standpunt uiteen te zetten en het verslag was leidend voor de beslissing van de regering. De regering besloot toen dat elk slachtoffer van de overstroming een uitkering zal ontvangen in verhouding tot de geleden schade. Hierdoor zal u een uitkering ontvangen die u zal helpen een auto te kopen. Boeren in uw regio zullen ook een uitkering ontvangen ter compensatie van de vernieling van hun graanvelden, welke de enige bron van inkomsten zijn voor hun families.

V2: Procedural injustice, distributive justice, independence, positive outcome***English***

There was a flooding in your region. The water is gone now. The house and most possessions of your family did not suffer damages. Your family has access to primary goods like food and other essentials. However, your family lost a car that you used in the weekends. The government has enough available resources to offer help. A governmental commission came to your region to estimate the damages and write a report. The flood victims requested a meeting with the commission to talk about the damages they suffered and propose forms of help that the government could offer them. The commission did not arrange the meeting and wrote a report without including the voices of the victims. The report guided the decision of the government. Then the government decided that every flood victim will receive a benefit in proportion to the losses they suffered. As a consequence, you will receive a benefit that will help you buy a car. Farmers from your region will receive benefits to compensate for the destruction of their crop fields that were the only source of income for their families.

Russian

В Вашем регионе было наводнение. Вода уже ушла. Жилье и имущество Вашей семьи не пострадали. Вы имеете доступ к основным продуктам питания и товарам повседневного спроса. Однако, Ваша семья потеряла свою машину, которой Вы пользовались в выходные. Правительство имеет достаточно ресурсов, чтобы оказать помощь. Правительственная комиссия приехала в Ваш регион, чтобы оценить ущерб и написать отчет. Пострадавшие от наводнения попросили о встрече с комиссией, чтобы обсудить ущерб, который они понесли, и предложить формы помощи, которую правительство могло бы им оказать. Комиссия не организовала встречи с пострадавшими и написала отчет без учета мнения пострадавших. Отчет комиссии был основанием для решения правительства. После этого правительство приняло решение о том, что каждый пострадавший от наводнения получит пособие в соответствии с понесенными потерями. В следствие этого решения Вы получите пособие, которое поможет Вам купить машину. Крестьяне из Вашего региона получают пособие для компенсации уничтоженных зерновых полей, которые являлись единственным источником дохода их семей.

Ukrainian

У Вашому регіоні була повінь. Вода вже зійшла. Житло і більшість майна Вашої родини не зазнали ушкоджень. Ви маєте доступ до продуктів харчування і речей першої необхідності. Однак, Ваша родина втратила машину, якою ви користувалися у вихідні. Уряд має достатньо ресурсів для допомоги постраждалим. Урядова комісія приїхала до Вашого регіону, щоби оцінити збитки і скласти звіт. Потерпілі від повені звернулися з проханням організувати зустріч з членами комісії для обговорення зазначених збитків і висунення пропозицій щодо форм допомоги, яку міг би надати уряд. Комісія не організувала зустрічі і написала звіт без урахування думок постраждалих. Звіт комісії став підставою для рішення уряду. Уряд вирішив, що кожен потерпілий від повені отримає допомогу відповідну до зазначених збитків. Внаслідок цього рішення Ви отримаєте допомогу, котра дозволить Вам купити нову машину. Фермери з Вашого регіону отримають матеріальну допомогу як компенсацію за знищення оброблюваних земель, котрі були єдиним джерелом доходу для їхніх родин.

Polish

W Twoim regionie doszło do powodzi. Poziom wody już się obniżył. Mieszkanie i większość dobytku Twojej rodziny nie ucierpiały. Macie dostęp do żywności i produktów pierwszej potrzeby. Twoja rodzina straciła jednak samochód, którego używaliście w weekendy. Rząd ma dostatecznie dużo środków, by okazać pomoc powodzianom. Komisja rządowa przyjechała do Twojego regionu, by oszacować straty i napisać raport. Poszkodowani w powodzi zwrócili się z prośbą zorganizowania spotkania z komisją w celu przedyskutowania poniesionych strat i zaproponowania form pomocy, której mógłby udzielić rząd. Komisja nie zorganizowała spotkania i napisała raport bez uwzględnienia głosów poszkodowanych. Raport komisji stanowił podstawę dla decyzji rządu. Rząd zdecydował, że każdy poszkodowany w czasie powodzi otrzyma zasiłek zgodnie z poniesionymi stratami. W skutek tej decyzji otrzymasz zasiłek, który pomoże Ci zakupić samochód. Rolnicy z Twojego regionu otrzymają zasiłki w ramach kompensaty za zniszczenia pól uprawnych, które stanowiły jedyne źródło dochodu ich rodzin.

French

Il y a eu une inondation dans votre région. L'eau s'est retirée depuis. Votre maison et la plupart des possessions de votre famille n'ont pas subi de dégâts. Votre famille a accès aux biens essentiels comme la nourriture. Cependant, elle a perdu une voiture que vous utilisiez les week-ends. Le gouvernement a suffisamment de ressources pour offrir de l'aide. Une délégation de l'administration est venue dans votre région pour évaluer les dégâts et écrire un rapport. Les victimes de l'inondation ont réclamé une réunion avec la commission afin de parler des dégâts subis et de suggérer des formes d'aide que l'administration pourrait apporter. La commission n'a pas organisé de réunion et a écrit un rapport sans prendre en compte les voix des victimes. Ce rapport a guidé la décision du gouvernement. Le gouvernement a ensuite décidé que chaque victime de l'inondation recevrait une compensation en proportion des dégâts qu'elle a subis. En conséquence, vous recevrez une indemnité qui vous aidera à acheter une voiture. Les agriculteurs dans votre région vont recevoir des indemnités pour compenser la destruction de leurs champs, qui étaient la seule source de revenu pour leurs familles.

Dutch

Er was een overstroming in uw regio. Het water is nu geweken. Het huis en de meeste bezittingen van uw familie zijn niet beschadigd. Uw familie heeft toegang tot primaire goederen zoals voedsel en andere essentiële zaken. Echter, uw familie verloor wel een auto die u in de weekenden gebruikte. De regering heeft genoeg middelen om hulp te bieden. Een regeringsdelegatie kwam naar uw stad om de schade in te schatten en een verslag te schrijven. De slachtoffers van de overstroming hadden om een ontmoeting met de delegatie gevraagd om te praten over de schade die zij hadden geleden en om voorstellen te doen over de vormen van hulp die de regering hen kon bieden. De delegatie regelde geen ontmoeting en schreef een verslag zonder daarbij de standpunten van de slachtoffers te betrekken. Het verslag was leidend voor de beslissing van de regering. De regering besloot toen dat elk slachtoffer van de overstroming een uitkering zal ontvangen in verhouding tot de geleden schade. Hierdoor zal u een uitkering ontvangen die u zal helpen een auto te kopen. Boeren in uw regio zullen ook een uitkering ontvangen ter compensatie van de vernieling van hun graanvelden, welke de enige bron van inkomsten zijn voor hun families.

V3: procedural justice, distributive injustice, independence, positive outcome***English***

There was a flooding in your region. The water is gone now. The house and most possessions of your family did not suffer damages. Your family has access to primary goods like food and other essentials. However, your family lost a car that you used in the weekends. The government has enough available resources to offer help. A governmental commission came to your region to estimate the damages and write a report. Before writing the report, the commission held a series of meetings with victims of the flooding. The victims had an opportunity to talk about the damages they suffered and propose forms of help that the government could offer them. Everybody got a chance to present their point of view and the report guided the decision of the government. Then the government decided that not everybody will be compensated for the damages they suffered. The benefits will be paid out only to persons whose houses and cars were damaged. As a consequence, you will receive a benefit that will help you buy a car. However, farmers from your region will not receive benefits to compensate for the destruction of their crop fields that were the only source of income for their families.

Russian

В Вашем регионе было наводнение. Вода уже ушла. Жилье и имущество Вашей семьи не пострадали. Вы имеете доступ к основным продуктам питания и товарам повседневного спроса. Однако, Ваша семья потеряла свою машину, которой Вы пользовались в выходные. Правительство имеет достаточно ресурсов, чтобы оказать помощь. Правительственная комиссия приехала в Ваш регион, чтобы оценить ущерб и написать отчет. Перед тем как комиссия написала отчет, она провела ряд встреч с пострадавшими от наводнения. Пострадавшие имели возможность обсудить понесенный ущерб и предложить формы помощи, которую правительство могло бы им оказать. Все получили возможность изложить свою точку зрения и отчет комиссии был основанием для решения правительства. После этого правительство решило, что не всем будет компенсирован ущерб, который они понесли. Пособия будут выплачены только тем лицам, чьи дома и машины были повреждены. В следствие этого решения Вы получите пособие, которое поможет Вам купить машину. Но крестьяне из Вашего региона не получают пособия для компенсации уничтоженных зерновых полей, которые являлись единственным источником дохода их семей.

Ukrainian

У Вашому регіоні була повінь. Вода вже зійшла. Житло і більшість майна Вашої родини не зазнали ушкоджень. Ви маєте доступ до продуктів харчування і речей першої необхідності. Однак, Ваша родина втратила машину, якою ви користувалися у вихідні. Уряд має достатньо ресурсів для допомоги постраждалим. Урядова комісія приїхала до Вашого регіону, щоби оцінити збитки і скласти звіт. Перед складанням звіту, комісія провела шерэг зустрічей з потерпілими. Вони мали можливість обговорити збитки, яких вони зазнали і запропонувати форми допомоги, яку би міг надати їм уряд. Усі мали можливість представити власну точку зору, а звіт комісії став підставою для рішення уряду. Уряд вирішив, що не всі отримають компенсацію зазнаних збитків. Матеріальна допомога буде призначена лише тим особам, котрі втратили своє житло і машини. Внаслідок цього рішення Ви отримаєте допомогу, котра дозволить Вам купити нову машину. Однак, фермери з Вашого регіону не

отримають компенсації за знищення оброблюваних земель, котрі правили за єдине джерело прибутку їхніх родин.

Polish

W Twoim regionie doszło do powodzi. Poziom wody już się obniżył. Mieszkanie i większość dobytku Twojej rodziny nie ucierpiały. Macie dostęp do żywności i produktów pierwszej potrzeby. Twoja rodzina straciła jednak samochód, którego używaliście w weekendy. Rząd ma dostatecznie dużo środków, by okazać pomoc powodzianom. Komisja rządowa przyjechała do Twojego regionu, by oszacować straty i napisać raport. Przed napisaniem raportu, komisja przeprowadziła spotkania z poszkodowanymi. Poszkodowani mieli możliwość przedyskutowania poniesionych strat i zaproponowania form pomocy, której mógłby udzielić rząd. Wszyscy dostali możliwość przedstawienia swojego punktu widzenia a raport komisji stanowił podstawę dla decyzji rządu. Rząd zdecydował, że nie wszyscy otrzymają zasiłek w ramach kompensaty za poniesione straty. Zasiłki będą wypłacane tylko tym osobom, których domy i samochody zostały zniszczone. W skutek tej decyzji otrzymasz zasiłek, który pomoże Ci zakupić samochód. Rolnicy z Twojego regionu, nie otrzymają jednak zasiłku w ramach kompensaty za zniszczenia pól uprawnych, które stanowiły jedyne źródło dochodu ich rodzin.

French

Il y a eu une inondation dans votre région. L'eau s'est retirée depuis. Votre maison et la plupart des possessions de votre famille n'ont pas subi de dégâts. Votre famille a accès aux biens essentiels comme la nourriture. Cependant, elle a perdu une voiture que vous utilisiez les week-ends. Le gouvernement a suffisamment de ressources pour offrir de l'aide. Une délégation de l'administration est venue dans votre région pour évaluer les dégâts et écrire un rapport. En préalable à l'écriture du rapport, la délégation a organisé une série de réunions avec les victimes de l'inondation. Celles-ci ont eu la possibilité de témoigner des dégâts qu'elles ont subis et de suggérer des formes d'aide que l'administration pourrait offrir. Chacun pouvait exprimer son point de vue, et le rapport a guidé la décision du gouvernement. Le gouvernement a ensuite décidé que les victimes ne seraient pas toutes automatiquement dédommagées. Les indemnités ne seront versées qu'aux personnes dont la voiture ou la maison ont été endommagés. En conséquence, vous recevrez une indemnité qui vous aidera à acheter une voiture. Cependant, les agriculteurs de votre région ne recevront pas d'indemnités pour les dédommager de la destruction de leurs champs, qui étaient la seule source de revenu pour leur famille.

Dutch

Er was een overstrooming in uw regio. Het water is nu geweken. Het huis en de meeste bezittingen van uw familie zijn niet beschadigd. Uw familie heeft toegang tot primaire goederen zoals voedsel en andere essentiële zaken. Echter, uw familie verloor wel een auto die u in de weekenden gebruikte. De regering heeft genoeg middelen om hulp te bieden. Een regeringsdelegatie kwam naar uw stad om de schade in te schatten en een verslag te schrijven. Voor het schrijven van het rapport, had de delegatie een reeks ontmoetingen met slachtoffers van de overstrooming. De slachtoffers hadden de mogelijkheid om te praten over de schade die zij hadden geleden en zij konden voorstellen doen voor de vorm van hulp die de regering hen kon bieden. Iedereen kreeg een kans om zijn standpunt uiteen te zetten en het verslag was leidend voor de beslissing van de regering. De regering besloot toen dat niet iedereen zal worden gecompenseerd voor de schade die zij hebben geleden. De uitkering zal alleen worden betaald aan personen van wie huizen en auto's werden

beschadigd. Hierdoor zal u een uitkering ontvangen die u zal helpen een auto te kopen. Maar boeren in uw regio zullen geen uitkering ontvangen ter compensatie van de vernieling van hun graanvelden, welke de enige bron van inkomsten voor hun families zijn.

V4: procedural injustice, distributive injustice, independence, positive outcome

English

There was a flooding in your region. The water is gone now. The house and most possessions of your family did not suffer damages. Your family has access to primary goods like food and other essentials. However, your family lost a car that you used in the weekends. The government has enough available resources to offer help. A governmental commission came to your region to estimate the damages and write a report. The flood victims requested a meeting with the commission to talk about the damages they suffered and propose preferred forms of help that the government could offer them. The commission did not arrange the meeting and wrote a report without including the voices of the victims. The report guided the decision of the government. Then the government decided that not everybody will be compensated for the damages they suffered. The benefits will be paid out only to persons whose houses and cars were damaged. As a consequence, you will receive a benefit that will help you buy a car. However, farmers from your region will not receive benefits to compensate for the destruction of their crop fields that were the only source of income for their families.

Russian

В Вашем регионе было наводнение. Вода уже ушла. Жилье и имущество Вашей семьи не пострадали. Вы имеете доступ к основным продуктам питания и товарам повседневного спроса. Однако, Ваша семья потеряла свою машину, которой Вы пользовались в выходные. Правительство имеет достаточно ресурсов, чтобы оказать помощь. Правительственная комиссия приехала в Ваш регион, чтобы оценить ущерб и написать отчет. Пострадавшие от наводнения попросили о встрече с комиссией, чтобы обсудить ущерб, который они понесли, и предложить формы помощи, которую правительство могло бы им оказать. Комиссия не организовала встречи с пострадавшими и написала отчет без учета мнения пострадавших. Отчет комиссии был основанием для решения правительства. После этого правительство решило, что не всем будет компенсирован ущерб, который они понесли. Пособия будут выплачены только тем лицам, чьи дома и машины были повреждены. В следствие этого решения Вы получите пособие, которое поможет Вам купить машину. Но крестьяне из Вашего региона не получают пособия для компенсации уничтоженных зерновых полей, которые являлись единственным источником дохода их семей.

Ukrainian

У Вашому регіоні була повінь. Вода вже зійшла. Житло і більшість майна Вашої родини не зазнали ушкоджень. Ви маєте доступ до продуктів харчування і речей першої необхідності. Однак, Ваша родина втратила машину, якою ви користувалися у вихідні. Уряд має достатньо ресурсів для допомоги постраждалим. Урядова комісія приїхала до Вашого регіону, щоби оцінити збитки і скласти звіт. Потерпілі від повені звернулися з проханням організувати зустріч з членами комісії для обговорення зазнаних збитків і висунення пропозицій щодо форм допомоги, яку міг би надати уряд. Комісія не організувала зустрічі і написала звіт без урахування думок

постраждалих. Звіт комісії став підставою для рішення уряду. Уряд вирішив, що не всі отримають компенсацію зазнаних збитків. Матеріальна допомога буде призначена лише тим особам, котрі втратили своє житло і машини. Внаслідок цього рішення Ви отримаєте допомогу, котра дозволить Вам купити нову машину. Однак, фермери з Вашого регіону не отримають компенсації за знищення оброблюваних земель, котрі правили за єдине джерело прибутку їхніх родин.

Polish

W Twoim regionie doszło do powodzi. Poziom wody już się obniżył. Mieszkanie i większość dobytku Twojej rodziny nie ucierpiały. Macie dostęp do żywności i produktów pierwszej potrzeby. Twoja rodzina straciła jednak samochód, którego używaliście w weekendy. Rząd ma dostatecznie dużo środków, by okazać pomoc powodzianom. Komisja rządowa przyjechała do Twojego regionu, by oszacować straty i napisać raport. Poszkodowani w powodzi zwrócili się z prośbą zorganizowania spotkania z komisją w celu przedyskutowania poniesionych strat i zaproponowania form pomocy, której mógłby udzielić rząd. Komisja nie zorganizowała spotkania i napisała raport bez uwzględnienia głosów poszkodowanych. Raport komisji stanowił podstawę dla decyzji rządu. Rząd zdecydował, że nie wszyscy otrzymają zasiłek w ramach kompensaty za poniesione straty. Zasiłki będą wypłacane tylko tym osobom, których domy i samochody zostały zniszczone. W skutek tej decyzji otrzymasz zasiłek, który pomoże Ci zakupić samochód. Rolnicy z Twojego regionu, nie otrzymają jednak zasiłku w ramach kompensaty za zniszczenia pól uprawnych, które stanowiły jedyne źródło dochodu ich rodzin.

French

Il y a eu une inondation dans votre région. L'eau s'est retirée depuis. Votre maison et la plupart des possessions de votre famille n'ont pas subi de dégâts. Votre famille a accès aux biens essentiels comme la nourriture. Cependant, elle a perdu une voiture que vous utilisiez les week-ends. Le gouvernement a suffisamment de ressources pour offrir de l'aide. Une délégation de l'administration est venue dans votre région pour évaluer les dégâts et écrire un rapport. Les victimes de l'inondation ont réclamé une réunion avec la commission afin de parler des dégâts subis et de suggérer des formes d'aide que l'administration pourrait apporter. La commission n'a pas organisé de réunion et a écrit un rapport sans prendre en compte les voix des victimes. Ce rapport a guidé la décision du gouvernement. Le gouvernement a ensuite décidé que les victimes ne seraient pas toutes automatiquement dédommagées. Les indemnités ne seront versées qu'aux personnes dont la voiture ou la maison ont été endommagés. En conséquence, vous recevrez une indemnité qui vous aidera à acheter une voiture. Cependant, les agriculteurs de votre région ne recevront pas d'indemnités pour les dédommager de la destruction de leurs champs, qui étaient la seule source de revenu pour leur famille.

Dutch

Er was een overstrooming in uw regio. Het water is nu geweken. Het huis en de meeste bezittingen van uw familie zijn niet beschadigd. Uw familie heeft toegang tot primaire goederen zoals voedsel en andere essentiële zaken. Echter, uw familie verloor wel een auto die u in de weekenden gebruikte. De regering heeft genoeg middelen om hulp te bieden. Een regeringsdelegatie kwam naar uw stad om de schade in te schatten en een verslag te schrijven. De slachtoffers van de overstrooming hadden om een ontmoeting met de delegatie gevraagd om te praten over de schade die zij hadden geleden en om voorstellen te doen over de vormen van hulp die de regering hen kon bieden. De delegatie regelde geen

ontmoeting en schreef een verslag zonder daarbij de standpunten van de slachtoffers te betrekken. Het verslag was leidend voor de beslissing van de regering. De regering besloot toen dat niet iedereen zal worden gecompenseerd voor de schade die zij hebben geleden. De uitkering zal alleen worden betaald aan personen van wie huizen en auto's werden beschadigd. Hierdoor zal u een uitkering ontvangen die u zal helpen een auto te kopen. Maar boeren in uw regio zullen geen uitkering ontvangen ter compensatie van de vernieling van hun graanvelden, welke de enige bron van inkomsten voor hun families zijn.

V5: procedural justice, distributive justice, dependence, positive outcome

English

There was a flooding in your region. The water is gone now. The house and possessions of your family suffered damages. Your family has limited access to primary goods like food and other essentials. The government has enough available resources to offer help. A governmental commission came to your region to estimate the damages and write a report. Before writing the report, the commission held a series of meetings with victims of the flooding. The victims had an opportunity to talk about the damages they suffered and propose forms of help that the government could offer them. Everybody got a chance to present their point of view and the report guided the decision of the government. Then the government decided that every flood victim will receive a benefit in proportion to the losses they suffered. As a consequence, you will receive a benefit that will help you and your family to get back on your feet. Also farmers from your region will receive benefits to compensate for the destruction of their crop fields that were the only source of income for their families.

Russian

В Вашем регионе было наводнение. Вода уже ушла. Жилье и имущество Вашей семьи пострадали. Вы имеете ограниченный доступ к основным продуктам питания и товарам повседневного спроса. Правительство имеет достаточно ресурсов, чтобы оказать помощь. Правительственная комиссия приехала в Ваш регион, чтобы оценить ущерб и написать отчет. Перед тем как комиссия написала отчет, она провела ряд встреч с пострадавшими от наводнения. Пострадавшие имели возможность обсудить понесенный ущерб и предложить формы помощи, которую правительство могло бы им оказать. Все получили возможность изложить свою точку зрения и отчет комиссии был основанием для решения правительства. После этого правительство приняло решение о том, что каждый пострадавший от наводнения получит пособие в соответствии с понесенными потерями. В следствие этого решения Вы получите пособие, которое поможет Вашей семье встать на ноги. Тоже крестьяне из Вашего региона получают пособие для компенсации уничтоженных зерновых полей, которые являлись единственным источником дохода их семей.

Ukrainian

У Вашому регіоні була повінь. Вода вже зійшла. Житло і майно Вашої родини пошкоджені. Ви маєте обмежений доступ до продуктів харчування та речей першої необхідності. Уряд має достатньо ресурсів для допомоги постраждалим. Урядова комісія приїхала до Вашого регіону, щоби оцінити збитки і скласти звіт. Перед складанням звіту, комісія провела шерэг зустрічей з потерпілими. Вони мали можливість обговорити збитки, яких вони зазнали і запропонувати форми допомоги,

яку би міг надати їм уряд. Усі мали можливість представити власну точку зору, а звіт комісії став підставою для рішення уряду. Уряд вирішив, що кожен потерпілий від повені отримає допомогу відповідну до зазнаних збитків. Внаслідок цього рішення Ви отримаєте допомогу, котра дозволить Вашій родині стати на ноги. Також фермери з Вашого регіону отримують матеріальну допомогу як компенсацію за знищення оброблюваних земель, котрі були єдиним джерелом доходу для їхніх родин.

Polish

W Twoim regionie doszło do powodzi. Poziom wody już się obniżył. Mieszkanie i dobytek Twojej rodziny ucierpiały. Macie ograniczony dostęp do żywności i produktów pierwszej potrzeby. Rząd ma dostatecznie dużo środków, by okazać pomoc powodzianom. Komisja rządowa przyjechała do Twojego regionu, by oszacować straty i napisać raport. Przed napisaniem raportu, komisja przeprowadziła spotkania z poszkodowanymi. Poszkodowani mieli możliwość przedyskutowania poniesionych strat i zaproponowania form pomocy, której mógłby udzielić rząd. Wszyscy dostali możliwość przedstawienia swojego punktu widzenia a raport komisji stanowił podstawę dla decyzji rządu. Rząd zdecydował, że każdy poszkodowany w czasie powodzi otrzyma zasiłek zgodnie z poniesionymi stratami. W skutek tej decyzji otrzymasz zasiłek, który pomoże Twojej rodzinie wstać na nogi. Również rolnicy z Twojego regionu otrzymają zasiłki w ramach kompensaty za zniszczenia pól uprawnych, które stanowiły jedyne źródło dochodu ich rodzin.

French

Il y a eu une inondation dans votre région. L'eau s'est retirée depuis. Votre maison et les possessions de votre famille ont subi des dégâts. Votre famille a un accès limité aux biens essentiels comme la nourriture. Le gouvernement a suffisamment de ressources pour offrir de l'aide. Une délégation de l'administration est venue dans votre région pour évaluer les dégâts et écrire un rapport. En préalable à l'écriture du rapport, la délégation a organisé une série de réunions avec les victimes de l'inondation. Celles-ci ont eu la possibilité de témoigner des dégâts qu'elles ont subis et de suggérer des formes d'aide que l'administration pourrait offrir. Chacun pouvait exprimer son point de vue, et le rapport a guidé la décision du gouvernement. Le gouvernement a ensuite décidé que chaque victime de l'inondation recevrait une compensation en proportion des dégâts qu'elle a subis. En conséquence, vous recevrez une indemnité qui aidera votre famille à se remettre sur pied. Les agriculteurs dans votre région vont recevoir des indemnités pour compenser la destruction de leurs champs, qui étaient la seule source de revenu pour leurs familles.

Dutch

Er was een overstroming in uw regio. Het water is nu geweken. Het huis en bezittingen van uw familie zijn beschadigd. Uw familie heeft beperkte toegang tot primaire goederen zoals voedsel en andere essentiële zaken. De regering heeft genoeg middelen om hulp te bieden. Een regeringsdelegatie kwam naar uw stad om de schade in te schatten en een verslag te schrijven. Voor het schrijven van het rapport, had de delegatie een reeks ontmoetingen met slachtoffers van de overstroming. De slachtoffers hadden de mogelijkheid om te praten over de schade die zij hadden geleden en zij konden voorstellen doen voor de vorm van hulp die de regering hen kon bieden. Iedereen kreeg een kans om zijn standpunt uiteen te zetten en het verslag was leidend voor de beslissing van de regering. De regering besloot toen dat elk slachtoffer van de overstroming een uitkering zal ontvangen in verhouding tot de geleden schade. Hierdoor zal u een uitkering ontvangen om u en uw familie te helpen er weer bovenop te komen. Boeren in uw regio zullen ook een uitkering ontvangen ter compensatie

van de vernieling van hun graanvelden, welke de enige bron van inkomsten zijn voor hun families.

V6: procedural injustice, distributive justice, dependence, positive outcome

English

There was a flooding in your region. The water is gone now. The house and possessions of your family suffered damages. Your family has limited access to primary goods like food and other essentials. The government has enough available resources to offer help. A governmental commission came to your region to estimate the damages and write a report. The flood victims requested a meeting with the commission to talk about the damages they suffered and propose preferred forms of help that the government could offer them. The commission did not arrange the meeting and wrote a report without including the voices of the victims. The report guided the decision of the government. Then the government decided that every flood victim will receive a benefit in proportion to the losses they suffered. As a consequence, you will receive a benefit that will help you and your family to get back on your feet. Also farmers from your region will receive benefits to compensate for the destruction of their crop fields that were the only source of income for their families.

Russian

В Вашем регионе было наводнение. Вода уже ушла. Жилье и имущество Вашей семьи пострадали. Вы имеете ограниченный доступ к основным продуктам питания и товарам повседневного спроса. Правительство имеет достаточно ресурсов, чтобы оказать помощь. Правительственная комиссия приехала в Ваш регион, чтобы оценить ущерб и написать отчет. Пострадавшие от наводнения попросили о встрече с комиссией, чтобы обсудить ущерб, который они понесли, и предложить формы помощи, которую правительство могло бы им оказать. Комиссия не организовала встречи с пострадавшими и написала отчет без учета мнения пострадавших. Отчет комиссии был основанием для решения правительства. После этого правительство приняло решение о том, что каждый пострадавший от наводнения получит пособие в соответствии с понесенными потерями. В следствие этого решения Вы получите пособие, которое поможет Вашей семье встать на ноги. Тоже крестьяне из Вашего региона получают пособие для компенсации уничтоженных зерновых полей, которые являлись единственным источником дохода их семей.

Ukrainian

У Вашому регіоні була повінь. Вода вже зійшла. Житло і майно Вашої родини пошкоджені. Ви маєте обмежений доступ до продуктів харчування та речей першої необхідності. Уряд має достатньо ресурсів для допомоги постраждалим. Урядова комісія приїхала до Вашого регіону, щоби оцінити збитки і скласти звіт. Потерпілі від повені звернулися з проханням організувати зустріч з членами комісії для обговорення зазнаних збитків і висунення пропозицій щодо форм допомоги, яку міг би надати уряд. Комісія не організувала зустрічі і написала звіт без урахування думок постраждалих. Звіт комісії став підставою для рішення уряду. Уряд вирішив, що кожен потерпілий від повені отримає допомогу відповідну до зазнаних збитків. Внаслідок цього рішення Ви отримаєте допомогу, котра дозволить Вашій родині стати на ноги. Також фермери з Вашого регіону отримають матеріальну допомогу як

компенсацію за знищення оброблюваних земель, котрі були єдиним джерелом доходу для їхніх родин.

Polish

W Twoim regionie doszło do powodzi. Poziom wody już się obniżył. Mieszkanie i dobytek Twojej rodziny ucierpiały. Macie ograniczony dostęp do żywności i produktów pierwszej potrzeby. Rząd ma dostatecznie dużo środków, by okazać pomoc powodzianom. Komisja rządowa przyjechała do Twojego regionu, by oszacować straty i napisać raport.

Poszkodowani w powodzi zwrócili się z prośbą zorganizowania spotkania z komisją w celu przedyskutowania poniesionych strat i zaproponowania form pomocy, której mógłby udzielić rząd. Komisja nie zorganizowała spotkania i napisała raport bez uwzględnienia głosów poszkodowanych. Raport komisji stanowił podstawę dla decyzji rządu. Rząd zdecydował, że każdy poszkodowany w czasie powodzi otrzyma zasiłek zgodnie z poniesionymi stratami. W skutek tej decyzji otrzymasz zasiłek, który pomoże Twojej rodzinie wstać na nogi. Również rolnicy z Twojego regionu otrzymają zasiłki w ramach kompensaty za zniszczenia pól uprawnych, które stanowiły jedyne źródło dochodu ich rodzin.

French

Il y a eu une inondation dans votre région. L'eau s'est retirée depuis. Votre maison et les possessions de votre famille ont subi des dégâts. Votre famille a un accès limité aux biens essentiels comme la nourriture. Le gouvernement a suffisamment de ressources pour offrir de l'aide. Une délégation de l'administration est venue dans votre région pour évaluer les dégâts et écrire un rapport. Les victimes de l'inondation ont réclamé une réunion avec la commission afin de parler des dégâts subis et de suggérer des formes d'aide que l'administration pourrait apporter. La commission n'a pas organisé de réunion et a écrit un rapport sans prendre en compte les voix des victimes. Ce rapport a guidé la décision du gouvernement. Le gouvernement a ensuite décidé que chaque victime de l'inondation recevrait une compensation en proportion des dégâts qu'elle a subis. En conséquence, vous recevrez une indemnité qui aidera votre famille à se remettre sur pied. Les agriculteurs dans votre région vont recevoir des indemnités pour compenser la destruction de leurs champs, qui étaient la seule source de revenu pour leurs familles.

Dutch

Er was een overstroming in uw regio. Het water is nu geweken. Het huis en bezittingen van uw familie zijn beschadigd. Uw familie heeft beperkte toegang tot primaire goederen zoals voedsel en andere essentiële zaken. De regering heeft genoeg middelen om hulp te bieden. Een regeringsdelegatie kwam naar uw stad om de schade in te schatten en een verslag te schrijven. De slachtoffers van de overstroming hadden om een ontmoeting met de delegatie gevraagd om te praten over de schade die zij hadden geleden en om voorstellen te doen over de vormen van hulp die de regering hen kon bieden. De delegatie regelde geen ontmoeting en schreef een verslag zonder daarbij de standpunten van de slachtoffers te betrekken. Het verslag was leidend voor de beslissing van de regering. De regering besloot toen dat elk slachtoffer van de overstroming een uitkering zal ontvangen in verhouding tot de geleden schade. Hierdoor zal u een uitkering ontvangen om u en uw familie te helpen er weer bovenop te komen. Boeren in uw regio zullen ook een uitkering ontvangen ter compensatie van de vernieling van hun graanvelden, welke de enige bron van inkomsten zijn voor hun families.

V7: procedural justice, distributive injustice, dependence, positive outcome***English***

There was a flooding in your region. The water is gone now. The house and possessions of your family suffered damages. Your family has limited access to primary goods like food and other essentials. The government has enough available resources to offer help. A governmental commission came to your region to estimate the damages and write a report. Before writing the report, the commission held a series of meetings with victims of the flooding. The victims had an opportunity to talk about the damages they suffered and propose forms of help that the government could offer them. Everybody got a chance to present their point of view and the report guided the decision of the government. Then the government decided that not everybody will be compensated for the damages they suffered. The benefits will be paid out only to persons whose houses and cars were damaged. As a consequence, you will receive a benefit that will help you and your family to get back on your feet. However, farmers from your region will not receive benefits to compensate for the destruction of their crop fields that were the only source of income for their families.

Russian

В Вашем регионе было наводнение. Вода уже ушла. Жилье и имущество Вашей семьи пострадали. Вы имеете ограниченный доступ к основным продуктам питания и товарам повседневного спроса. Правительство имеет достаточно ресурсов, чтобы оказать помощь. Правительственная комиссия приехала в Ваш регион, чтобы оценить ущерб и написать отчет. Перед тем как комиссия написала отчет, она провела ряд встреч с пострадавшими от наводнения. Пострадавшие имели возможность обсудить понесенный ущерб и предложить формы помощи, которую правительство могло бы им оказать. Все получили возможность изложить свою точку зрения и отчет комиссии был основанием для решения правительства. После этого правительство решило, что не всем будет компенсирован ущерб, который они понесли. Пособия будут выплачены только тем лицам, чьи дома и машины были повреждены. В следствие этого решения Вы получите пособие, которое поможет Вашей семье встать на ноги. Но крестьяне из Вашего региона не получают пособия для компенсации уничтоженных зерновых полей, которые являлись единственным источником дохода их семей.

Ukrainian

У Вашому регіоні була повінь. Вода вже зійшла. Житло і майно Вашої родини пошкоджені. Ви маєте обмежений доступ до продуктів харчування та речей першої необхідності. Уряд має достатньо ресурсів для допомоги постраждалим. Урядова комісія приїхала до Вашого регіону, щоби оцінити збитки і скласти звіт. Перед складанням звіту, комісія провела шерег зустрічей з потерпілими. Вони мали можливість обговорити збитки, яких вони зазнали і запропонувати форми допомоги, яку би міг надати їм уряд. Усі мали можливість представити власну точку зору, а звіт комісії став підставою для рішення уряду. Уряд вирішив, що не всі отримають компенсацію зазнаних збитків. Матеріальна допомога буде призначена лише тим особам, котрі втратили своє житло і машини. Внаслідок цього рішення Ви отримаєте допомогу, котра дозволить Вашій родині стати на ноги. Однак, фермери з Вашого

регіону не отримають компенсації за знищення оброблюваних земель, котрі правили за єдине джерело прибутку їхніх родин.

Polish

W Twoim regionie doszło do powodzi. Poziom wody już się obniżył. Mieszkanie i dobytek Twojej rodziny ucierpiały. Macie ograniczony dostęp do żywności i produktów pierwszej potrzeby. Rząd ma dostatecznie dużo środków, by okazać pomoc powodzianom. Komisja rządowa przyjechała do Twojego regionu, by oszacować straty i napisać raport. Przed napisaniem raportu, komisja przeprowadziła spotkania z poszkodowanymi. Poszkodowani mieli możliwość przedyskutowania poniesionych strat i zaproponowania form pomocy, której mógłby udzielić rząd. Wszyscy dostali możliwość przedstawienia swojego punktu widzenia a raport komisji stanowił podstawę dla decyzji rządu. Rząd zdecydował, że nie wszyscy otrzymają zasiłek w ramach kompensaty za poniesione straty. Zasiłki będą wypłacane tylko tym osobom, których domy i samochody zostały zniszczone. W skutek tej decyzji otrzymasz zasiłek, który pomoże Twojej rodzinie wstać na nogi. Rolnicy z Twojego regionu, nie otrzymają jednak zasiłku w ramach kompensaty za zniszczenia pól uprawnych, które stanowiły jedyne źródło dochodu ich rodzin.

French

Il y a eu une inondation dans votre région. L'eau s'est retirée depuis. Votre maison et les possessions de votre famille ont subi des dégâts. Votre famille a un accès limité aux biens essentiels comme la nourriture. Le gouvernement a suffisamment de ressources pour offrir de l'aide. Une délégation de l'administration est venue dans votre région pour évaluer les dégâts et écrire un rapport. En préalable à l'écriture du rapport, la délégation a organisé une série de réunions avec les victimes de l'inondation. Celles-ci ont eu la possibilité de témoigner des dégâts qu'elles ont subis et de suggérer des formes d'aide que l'administration pourrait offrir. Chacun pouvait exprimer son point de vue, et le rapport a guidé la décision du gouvernement. Le gouvernement a ensuite décidé que les victimes ne seraient pas toutes automatiquement dédommagées. Les indemnités ne seront versées qu'aux personnes dont la voiture ou la maison ont été endommagés. En conséquence, vous recevrez une indemnité qui aidera votre famille à se remettre sur pied. Cependant, les agriculteurs de votre région ne recevront pas d'indemnités pour les dédommager de la destruction de leurs champs, qui étaient la seule source de revenu pour leur famille.

Dutch

Er was een overstroming in uw regio. Het water is nu geweken. Het huis en bezittingen van uw familie zijn beschadigd. Uw familie heeft beperkte toegang tot primaire goederen zoals voedsel en andere essentiële zaken. De regering heeft genoeg middelen om hulp te bieden. Een regeringsdelegatie kwam naar uw stad om de schade in te schatten en een verslag te schrijven. Voor het schrijven van het rapport, had de delegatie een reeks ontmoetingen met slachtoffers van de overstroming. De slachtoffers hadden de mogelijkheid om te praten over de schade die zij hadden geleden en zij konden voorstellen doen voor de vorm van hulp die de regering hen kon bieden. Iedereen kreeg een kans om zijn standpunt uiteen te zetten en het verslag was leidend voor de beslissing van de regering. De regering besloot toen dat niet iedereen zal worden gecompenseerd voor de schade die zij hebben geleden. De uitkering zal alleen worden betaald aan personen van wie huizen en auto's werden beschadigd. Hierdoor zal u een uitkering ontvangen om u en uw familie te helpen er weer bovenop te komen. Maar boeren in uw regio zullen geen uitkering ontvangen ter

compensatie van de vernieling van hun graanvelden, welke de enige bron van inkomsten voor hun families zijn.

V8: procedural injustice, distributive injustice, dependence, positive outcome

English

There was a flooding in your region. The water is gone now. The house and possessions of your family suffered damages. Your family has limited access to primary goods like food and other essentials. The government has enough available resources to offer help. A governmental commission came to your region to estimate the damages and write a report. The flood victims requested a meeting with the commission to talk about the damages they suffered and propose preferred forms of help that the government could offer them. The commission did not arrange the meeting and wrote a report without including the voices of the victims. The report guided the decision of the government. Then the government decided that not everybody will be compensated for the damages they suffered. The benefits will be paid out only to persons whose houses and cars were damaged. As a consequence, you will receive a benefit that will help you and your family to get back on your feet. However, farmers from your region will not receive benefits to compensate for the destruction of their crop fields that were the only source of income for their families.

Russian

В Вашем регионе было наводнение. Вода уже ушла. Жилье и имущество Вашей семьи пострадали. Вы имеете ограниченный доступ к основным продуктам питания и товарам повседневного спроса. Правительство имеет достаточно ресурсов, чтобы оказать помощь. Правительственная комиссия приехала в Ваш регион, чтобы оценить ущерб и написать отчет. Пострадавшие от наводнения попросили о встрече с комиссией, чтобы обсудить ущерб, который они понесли, и предложить формы помощи, которую правительство могло бы им оказать. Комиссия не организовала встречи с пострадавшими и написала отчет без учета мнения пострадавших. Отчет комиссии был основанием для решения правительства. После этого правительство решило, что не всем будет компенсирован ущерб, который они понесли. Пособия будут выплачены только тем лицам, чьи дома и машины были повреждены. В следствие этого решения Вы получите пособие, которое поможет Вашей семье встать на ноги. Но крестьяне из Вашего региона не получают пособия для компенсации уничтоженных зерновых полей, которые являлись единственным источником дохода их семей.

Ukrainian

У Вашому регіоні була повінь. Вода вже зійшла. Житло і майно Вашої родини пошкоджені. Ви маєте обмежений доступ до продуктів харчування та речей першої необхідності. Уряд має достатньо ресурсів для допомоги постраждалим. Урядова комісія приїхала до Вашого регіону, щоби оцінити збитки і скласти звіт. Потерпілі від повені звернулися з проханням організувати зустріч з членами комісії для обговорення зазнаних збитків і висунення пропозицій щодо форм допомоги, яку міг би надати уряд. Комісія не організувала зустрічі і написала звіт без урахування думок постраждалих. Звіт комісії став підставою для рішення уряду. Уряд вирішив, що не всі отримують компенсацію зазнаних збитків. Матеріальна допомога буде призначена лише тим особам, котрі втратили своє житло і машини. Внаслідок цього рішення Ви

отримаєте допомогу, котра дозволить Вашій родині стати на ноги. Однак, фермери з Вашого регіону не отримають компенсації за знищення оброблюваних земель, котрі правили за єдине джерело прибутку їхніх родин.

Polish

W Twoim regionie doszło do powodzi. Poziom wody już się obniżył. Mieszkanie i dobytek Twojej rodziny ucierpiały. Macie ograniczony dostęp do żywności i produktów pierwszej potrzeby. Rząd ma dostatecznie dużo środków, by okazać pomoc powodzianom. Komisja rządowa przyjechała do Twojego regionu, by oszacować straty i napisać raport.

Poszkodowani w powodzi zwrócili się z prośbą zorganizowania spotkania z komisją w celu przedyskutowania poniesionych strat i zaproponowania form pomocy, której mógłby udzielić rząd. Komisja nie zorganizowała spotkania i napisała raport bez uwzględnienia głosów poszkodowanych. Raport komisji stanowił podstawę dla decyzji rządu. Rząd zdecydował, że nie wszyscy otrzymają zasiłek w ramach kompensaty za poniesione straty. Zasiłki będą wypłacane tylko tym osobom, których domy i samochody zostały zniszczone. W skutek tej decyzji otrzymasz zasiłek, który pomoże Twojej rodzinie wstać na nogi.

Rolnicy z Twojego regionu, nie otrzymają jednak zasiłku w ramach kompensaty za zniszczenia pól uprawnych, które stanowiły jedyne źródło dochodu ich rodzin.

French

Il y a eu une inondation dans votre région. L'eau s'est retirée depuis. Votre maison et les possessions de votre famille ont subi des dégâts. Votre famille a un accès limité aux biens essentiels comme la nourriture. Le gouvernement a suffisamment de ressources pour offrir de l'aide. Une délégation de l'administration est venue dans votre région pour évaluer les dégâts et écrire un rapport. Les victimes de l'inondation ont réclamé une réunion avec la commission afin de parler des dégâts subis et de suggérer des formes d'aide que l'administration pourrait apporter. La commission n'a pas organisé de réunion et a écrit un rapport sans prendre en compte les voix des victimes. Ce rapport a guidé la décision du gouvernement. Le gouvernement a ensuite décidé que les victimes ne seraient pas toutes automatiquement dédommagées. Les indemnités ne seront versées qu'aux personnes dont la voiture ou la maison ont été endommagés. En conséquence, vous recevrez une indemnité qui aidera votre famille à se remettre sur pied. Cependant, les agriculteurs de votre région ne recevront pas d'indemnités pour les dédommager de la destruction de leurs champs, qui étaient la seule source de revenu pour leur famille.

Dutch

Er was een overstroming in uw regio. Het water is nu geweken. Het huis en bezittingen van uw familie zijn beschadigd. Uw familie heeft beperkte toegang tot primaire goederen zoals voedsel en andere essentiële zaken. De regering heeft genoeg middelen om hulp te bieden. Een regeringsdelegatie kwam naar uw stad om de schade in te schatten en een verslag te schrijven. De slachtoffers van de overstroming hadden om een ontmoeting met de delegatie gevraagd om te praten over de schade die zij hadden geleden en om voorstellen te doen over de vormen van hulp die de regering hen kon bieden. De delegatie regelde geen ontmoeting en schreef een verslag zonder daarbij de standpunten van de slachtoffers te betrekken. Het verslag was leidend voor de beslissing van de regering. De regering besloot toen dat niet iedereen zal worden gecompenseerd voor de schade die zij hebben geleden. De uitkering zal alleen worden betaald aan personen van wie huizen en auto's werden beschadigd. Hierdoor zal u een uitkering ontvangen om u en uw familie te helpen er weer bovenop te komen. Maar boeren in uw regio zullen geen uitkering ontvangen ter

compensatie van de vernieling van hun graanvelden, welke de enige bron van inkomsten voor hun families zijn.

V9: procedural justice, distributive justice, independence, negative outcome

English

There was a flooding in your region. The water is gone now. The house and most possessions of your family did not suffer damages. Your family has access to primary goods like food and other essentials. However, your family lost a car that you used in the weekends. The government has enough available resources to offer help. A governmental commission came to your region to estimate the damages and write a report. Before writing the report, the commission held a series of meetings with victims of the flooding. The victims had an opportunity to talk about the damages they suffered and propose forms of help that the government could offer them. Everybody got a chance to present their point of view and the report guided the decision of the government. Then the government decided to provide benefits for every flood victim whose house or crop fields were damaged. The benefits will be paid out in proportion to the damage suffered. As a consequence, you will not receive the benefit and you will not be able to buy a car. Farmers from your region will receive benefits to compensate for the destruction of their crop fields that were the only source of income for their families.

Russian

В Вашем регионе было наводнение. Вода уже ушла. Жилье и имущество Вашей семьи не пострадали. Вы имеете доступ к основным продуктам питания и товарам повседневного спроса. Однако, Ваша семья потеряла свою машину, которой Вы пользовались в выходные. Правительство имеет достаточно ресурсов, чтобы оказать помощь. Правительственная комиссия приехала в Ваш регион, чтобы оценить ущерб и написать отчет. Перед тем как комиссия написала отчет, она провела ряд встреч с пострадавшими от наводнения. Пострадавшие имели возможность обсудить понесенный ущерб и предложить формы помощи, которую правительство могло бы им оказать. Все получили возможность изложить свою точку зрения и отчет комиссии был основанием для решения правительства. После этого правительство решило выплатить пособия потерпевшим, чьи дома или поля были повреждены. Пособия будут выплачиваться пропорционально потерям. В следствие этого решения Вы не получите пособия и не сможете купить машину. Крестьяне из Вашего региона получают пособие для компенсации уничтоженных зерновых полей, которые являлись единственным источником дохода их семей.

Ukrainian

У Вашому регіоні була повінь. Вода вже зійшла. Житло і більшість майна Вашої родини не зазнали ушкоджень. Ви маєте доступ до продуктів харчування і речей першої необхідності. Однак, Ваша родина втратила машину, якою ви користувалися у вихідні. Уряд має достатньо ресурсів для допомоги постраждалим. Урядова комісія приїхала до Вашого регіону, щоб оцінити збитки і скласти звіт. Перед складанням звіту, комісія провела шерег зустрічей з потерпілими. Вони мали можливість обговорити збитки, яких вони зазнали і запропонувати форми допомоги, яку би міг надати їм уряд. Усі мали можливість представити власну точку зору, а звіт комісії став підставою для рішення уряду. Уряд вирішив надати допомогу усім потерпілим

від повені, чис житло або поля були знищені. Сума допомоги буде пропорційною до зазнаних збитків. Внаслідок цього рішення Ви не отримаєте допомогу від держави і не зможете купити автомобіль. Фермери з Вашого регіону отримають матеріальну допомогу як компенсацію за знищення оброблюваних земель, котрі були єдиним джерелом доходу для їхніх родин.

Polish

W Twoim regionie doszło do powodzi. Poziom wody już się obniżył. Mieszkanie i większość dobytku Twojej rodziny nie ucierpiały. Macie dostęp do żywności i produktów pierwszej potrzeby. Twoja rodzina straciła jednak samochód, którego używaliście w weekendy. Rząd ma dostatecznie dużo środków, by okazać pomoc powodzianom. Komisja rządowa przyjechała do Twojego regionu, by oszacować straty i napisać raport. Przed napisaniem raportu, komisja przeprowadziła spotkania z poszkodowanymi. Poszkodowani mieli możliwość przedyskutowania poniesionych strat i zaproponowania form pomocy, której mógłby udzielić rząd. Wszyscy dostali możliwość przedstawienia swojego punktu widzenia a raport komisji stanowił podstawę dla decyzji rządu. Rząd zdecydował wypłacić zasiłki wszystkim powodzianom, których mieszkania i pola zostały zniszczone. Zasiłki będą wypłacane proporcjonalnie do poniesionych strat. W skutek tej decyzji nie otrzymasz zasiłku i nie będziesz mógł kupić samochodu. Rolnicy z Twojego regionu otrzymają jednak zasiłki w ramach kompensaty za zniszczenia pól uprawnych, które stanowiły jedyne źródło dochodu ich rodzin.

French

Il y a eu une inondation dans votre région. L'eau s'est retirée depuis. Votre maison et la plupart des possessions de votre famille n'ont pas subi de dégâts. Votre famille a accès aux biens essentiels comme la nourriture. Cependant, elle a perdu une voiture que vous utilisiez les week-ends. Le gouvernement a suffisamment de ressources pour offrir de l'aide. Une délégation de l'administration est venue dans votre région pour évaluer les dégâts et écrire un rapport. En préalable à l'écriture du rapport, la délégation a organisé une série de réunions avec les victimes de l'inondation. Celles-ci ont eu la possibilité de témoigner des dégâts qu'elles ont subis et de suggérer des formes d'aide que l'administration pourrait offrir. Chacun pouvait exprimer son point de vue, et le rapport a guidé la décision du gouvernement. Le gouvernement a ensuite décidé d'attribuer des indemnités à chaque victime de l'inondation dont la maison ou les champs ont subi des dégâts. Les indemnités seront versés en proportion des dégâts subis. En conséquence, vous ne recevrez pas d'indemnité et vous ne pourrez pas acheter de voiture. Les agriculteurs dans votre région vont recevoir des indemnités pour compenser la destruction de leurs champs, qui étaient la seule source de revenu pour leurs familles.

Dutch

Er was een overstrooming in uw regio. Het water is nu geweken. Het huis en de meeste bezittingen van uw familie zijn niet beschadigd. Uw familie heeft toegang tot primaire goederen zoals voedsel en andere essentiële zaken. Echter, uw familie verloor wel een auto die u in de weekenden gebruikte. De regering heeft genoeg middelen om hulp te bieden. Een regeringsdelegatie kwam naar uw stad om de schade in te schatten en een verslag te schrijven. Voor het schrijven van het rapport, had de delegatie een reeks ontmoetingen met slachtoffers van de overstrooming. De slachtoffers hadden de mogelijkheid om te praten over de schade die zij hadden geleden en zij konden voorstellen doen voor de vorm van hulp die de regering hen kon bieden. Iedereen kreeg een kans om zijn standpunt uiteen te zetten en

het verslag was leidend voor de beslissing van de regering. De regering besloot toen om een uitkering te geven aan elk slachtoffer van de overstroming van wie het huis of de akkers waren beschadigd. De uitkering zal worden uitbetaald in verhouding tot de geleden schade. Hierdoor ontvangt u geen uitkering van de regering en bent u niet in staat om een auto te kopen. Maar boeren in uw regio zullen een uitkering ontvangen ter compensatie van de vernieling van hun graanvelden, welke de enige bron van inkomsten zijn voor hun families.

V10: procedural injustice, distributive justice, independence, negative outcome

English

There was a flooding in your region. The water is gone now. The house and most possessions of your family did not suffer damages. Your family has access to primary goods like food and other essentials. However, your family lost a car that you used in the weekends. The government has enough available resources to offer help. A governmental commission came to your region to estimate the damages and write a report. The flood victims requested a meeting with the commission to talk about the damages they suffered and propose preferred forms of help that the government could offer them. The commission did not arrange the meeting and wrote a report without including the voices of the victims. The report guided the decision of the government. Then the government decided to provide benefits for every flood victim whose house or crop fields were damaged. The benefits will be paid out in proportion to the damage suffered. As a consequence, you will not receive the benefit and you will not be able to buy a car. Farmers from your region will receive benefits to compensate for the destruction of their crop fields that were the only source of income for their families.

Russian

В Вашем регионе было наводнение. Вода уже ушла. Жилье и имущество Вашей семьи не пострадали. Вы имеете доступ к основным продуктам питания и товарам повседневного спроса. Однако, Ваша семья потеряла свою машину, которой Вы пользовались в выходные. Правительство имеет достаточно ресурсов, чтобы оказать помощь. Правительственная комиссия приехала в Ваш регион, чтобы оценить ущерб и написать отчет. Пострадавшие от наводнения попросили о встрече с комиссией, чтобы обсудить ущерб, который они понесли, и предложить формы помощи, которую правительство могло бы им оказать. Комиссия не организовала встречи с пострадавшими и написала отчет без учета мнения пострадавших. Отчет комиссии был основанием для решения правительства. После этого правительство решило выплатить пособия потерпевшим, чьи дома или поля были повреждены. Пособия будут выплачиваться пропорционально потерям. В следствие этого решения Вы не получите пособия и не сможете купить машину. Крестьяне из Вашего региона получают пособие для компенсации уничтоженных зерновых полей, которые являлись единственным источником дохода их семей.

Ukrainian

У Вашому регіоні була повінь. Вода вже зійшла. Житло і більшість майна Вашої родини не зазнали ушкоджень. Ви маєте доступ до продуктів харчування і речей першої необхідності. Однак, Ваша родина втратила машину, якою ви користувалися у вихідні. Уряд має достатньо ресурсів для допомоги постраждалим. Урядова комісія приїхала до Вашого регіону, щоби оцінити збитки і скласти звіт. Потерпілі від повені

звернулися з проханням організувати зустріч з членами комісії для обговорення зазначених збитків і висунення пропозицій щодо форм допомоги, яку міг би надати уряд. Комісія не організувала зустрічі і написала звіт без урахування думок постраждалих. Звіт комісії став підставою для рішення уряду. Уряд вирішив надати допомогу усім потерпілим від повені, чиє житло або поля були знищені. Сума допомоги буде пропорційною до зазначених збитків. Внаслідок цього рішення Ви не отримаєте допомогу від держави і не зможете купити автомобіль. Фермери з Вашого регіону отримають матеріальну допомогу як компенсацію за знищення оброблюваних земель, котрі були єдиним джерелом доходу для їхніх родин.

Polish

W Twoim regionie doszło do powodzi. Poziom wody już się obniżył. Mieszkanie i większość dobytku Twojej rodziny nie ucierpiała. Macie dostęp do żywności i produktów pierwszej potrzeby. Twoja rodzina straciła jednak samochód, którego używaliście w weekendy. Rząd ma dostatecznie dużo środków, by okazać pomoc powodzianom. Komisja rządowa przyjechała do Twojego regionu, by oszacować straty i napisać raport. Poszkodowani w powodzi zwrócili się z prośbą zorganizowania spotkania z komisją w celu przedyskutowania poniesionych strat i zaproponowania form pomocy, której mógłby udzielić rząd. Komisja nie zorganizowała spotkania i napisała raport bez uwzględnienia głosów poszkodowanych. Raport komisji stanowił podstawę dla decyzji rządu. Rząd zdecydował wypłacić zasiłki wszystkim powodzianom, których mieszkania i pola zostały zniszczone. Zasiłki będą wypłacane proporcjonalnie do poniesionych strat. W skutek tej decyzji nie otrzymasz zasiłku i nie będziesz mógł kupić samochodu. Rolnicy z Twojego regionu otrzymają jednak zasiłki w ramach kompensaty za zniszczenia pól uprawnych, które stanowiły jedyne źródło dochodu ich rodzin.

French

Il y a eu une inondation dans votre région. L'eau s'est retirée depuis. Votre maison et la plupart des possessions de votre famille n'ont pas subi de dégâts. Votre famille a accès aux biens essentiels comme la nourriture. Cependant, elle a perdu une voiture que vous utilisiez les week-ends. Le gouvernement a suffisamment de ressources pour offrir de l'aide. Une délégation de l'administration est venue dans votre région pour évaluer les dégâts et écrire un rapport. Les victimes de l'inondation ont réclamé une réunion avec la commission afin de parler des dégâts subis et de suggérer des formes d'aide que l'administration pourrait apporter. La commission n'a pas organisé de réunion et a écrit un rapport sans prendre en compte les voix des victimes. Ce rapport a guidé la décision du gouvernement. Le gouvernement a ensuite décidé d'attribuer des indemnités à chaque victime de l'inondation dont la maison ou les champs ont subi des dégâts. Les indemnités seront versés en proportion des dégâts subis. En conséquence, vous ne recevrez pas d'indemnité et vous ne pourrez pas acheter de voiture. Les agriculteurs dans votre région vont recevoir des indemnités pour compenser la destruction de leurs champs, qui étaient la seule source de revenu pour leurs familles.

Dutch

Er was een overstroming in uw regio. Het water is nu geweken. Het huis en de meeste bezittingen van uw familie zijn niet beschadigd. Uw familie heeft toegang tot primaire goederen zoals voedsel en andere essentiële zaken. Echter, uw familie verloor wel een auto die u in de weekenden gebruikte. De regering heeft genoeg middelen om hulp te bieden. Een regeringsdelegatie kwam naar uw stad om de schade in te schatten en een verslag te

schrijven. De slachtoffers van de overstroming hadden om een ontmoeting met de delegatie gevraagd om te praten over de schade die zij hadden geleden en om voorstellen te doen over de vormen van hulp die de regering hen kon bieden. De delegatie regelde geen ontmoeting en schreef een verslag zonder daarbij de standpunten van de slachtoffers te betrekken. Het verslag was leidend voor de beslissing van de regering. De regering besloot toen om een uitkering te geven aan elk slachtoffer van de overstroming van wie het huis of de akkers waren beschadigd. De uitkering zal worden uitbetaald in verhouding tot de geleden schade. Hierdoor ontvangt u geen uitkering van de regering en bent u niet in staat om een auto te kopen. Maar boeren in uw regio zullen een uitkering ontvangen ter compensatie van de vernieling van hun graanvelden, welke de enige bron van inkomsten zijn voor hun families.

V11: procedural justice, distributive injustice, independence, negative outcome

English

There was a flooding in your region. The water is gone now. The house and most possessions of your family did not suffer damages. Your family has access to primary goods like food and other essentials. However, your family lost a car that you used in the weekends. The government has enough available resources to offer help. A governmental commission came to your region to estimate the damages and write a report. Before writing the report, the commission held a series of meetings with victims of the flooding. The victims had an opportunity to talk about the damages they suffered and propose forms of help that the government could offer them. Everybody got a chance to present their point of view and the report guided the decision of the government. Then the government decided that not everybody will be compensated for the damages they suffered. The benefits will be paid out only to persons whose houses were damaged. As a consequence, you will not receive the benefit and you will not be able to buy a car. Farmers from your region will not receive benefits to compensate for the destruction of their crop fields that were the only source of income for their families.

Russian

В Вашем регионе было наводнение. Вода уже ушла. Жилье и имущество Вашей семьи не пострадали. Вы имеете доступ к основным продуктам питания и товарам повседневного спроса. Однако, Ваша семья потеряла свою машину, которой Вы пользовались в выходные. Правительство имеет достаточно ресурсов, чтобы оказать помощь. Правительственная комиссия приехала в Ваш регион, чтобы оценить ущерб и написать отчет. Перед тем как комиссия написала отчет, она провела ряд встреч с пострадавшими от наводнения. Пострадавшие имели возможность обсудить понесенный ущерб и предложить формы помощи, которую правительство могло бы им оказать. Все получили возможность изложить свою точку зрения и отчет комиссии был основанием для решения правительства. После этого правительство решило, что не всем будет компенсирован понесенный ущерб. Пособия будут выплачены только тем лицам, чьи дома были повреждены. В следствие этого решения Вы не получите пособия и не сможете купить машину. Крестьяне из Вашего региона не получат пособия для компенсации уничтоженных зерновых полей, которые являлись единственным источником дохода их семей.

Ukrainian

У Вашому регіоні була повинь. Вода вже зійшла. Житло і більшість майна Вашої родини не зазнали ушкоджень. Ви маєте доступ до продуктів харчування і речей першої необхідності. Однак, Ваша родина втратила машину, якою ви користувалися у вихідні. Уряд має достатньо ресурсів для допомоги постраждалим. Урядова комісія приїхала до Вашого регіону, щоби оцінити збитки і скласти звіт. Перед складанням звіту, комісія провела шерэг зустрічей з потерпілими. Вони мали можливість обговорити збитки, яких вони зазнали і запропонувати форми допомоги, яку би міг надати їм уряд. Усі мали можливість представити власну точку зору, а звіт комісії став підставою для рішення уряду. Уряд вирішив, що не всі отримають компенсацію зазнаних збитків. Матеріальна допомога буде призначена тільки тим особам, котрі втратили своє житло. Внаслідок цього рішення Ви не отримаєте допомогу від держави і не зможете купити автомобіль. Також фермери з Вашого регіону не отримають компенсації за знищення оброблюваних земель, котрі правили за єдине джерело прибутку їхніх родин.

Polish

W Twoim regionie doszło do powodzi. Poziom wody już się obniżył. Mieszkanie i większość dobytku Twojej rodziny nie ucierpiały. Macie dostęp do żywności i produktów pierwszej potrzeby. Twoja rodzina straciła jednak samochód, którego używaliście w weekendy. Rząd ma dostatecznie dużo środków, by okazać pomoc powodzianom. Komisja rządowa przyjechała do Twojego regionu, by oszacować straty i napisać raport. Przed napisaniem raportu, komisja przeprowadziła spotkania z poszkodowanymi. Poszkodowani mieli możliwość przedyskutowania poniesionych strat i zaproponowania form pomocy, której mógłby udzielić rząd. Wszyscy dostali możliwość przedstawienia swojego punktu widzenia a raport komisji stanowił podstawę dla decyzji rządu. Rząd zdecydował, że nie wszyscy otrzymają zasiłek w ramach kompensaty za poniesione straty. Zasiłki będą wypłacane tylko tym osobom, których domy zostały zniszczone. W skutek tej decyzji nie otrzymasz zasiłku i nie będziesz mógł kupić samochodu. Również rolnicy z Twojego regionu, nie otrzymają zasiłku w ramach kompensaty za zniszczenia pól uprawnych, które stanowiły jedyne źródło dochodu ich rodzin.

French

Il y a eu une inondation dans votre région. L'eau s'est retirée depuis. Votre maison et la plupart des possessions de votre famille n'ont pas subi de dégâts. Votre famille a accès aux biens essentiels comme la nourriture. Cependant, elle a perdu une voiture que vous utilisiez les week-ends. Le gouvernement a suffisamment de ressources pour offrir de l'aide. Une délégation de l'administration est venue dans votre région pour évaluer les dégâts et écrire un rapport. En préalable à l'écriture du rapport, la délégation a organisé une série de réunions avec les victimes de l'inondation. Celles-ci ont eu la possibilité de témoigner des dégâts qu'elles ont subis et de suggérer des formes d'aide que l'administration pourrait offrir. Chacun pouvait exprimer son point de vue, et le rapport a guidé la décision du gouvernement. Le gouvernement a ensuite décidé que les victimes ne seraient pas toutes automatiquement dédommagées. Les indemnités ne seront versées qu'aux personnes dont la maison a été endommagée. En conséquence, vous ne recevrez pas d'indemnité et vous ne pourrez pas acheter de voiture. Les agriculteurs de votre région ne recevront pas d'indemnités pour les dédommager de la destruction de leurs champs, qui étaient la seule source de revenu pour leur famille.

Dutch

Er was een overstroming in uw regio. Het water is nu geweken. Het huis en de meeste bezittingen van uw familie zijn niet beschadigd. Uw familie heeft toegang tot primaire goederen zoals voedsel en andere essentiële zaken. Echter, uw familie verloor wel een auto die u in de weekenden gebruikte. De regering heeft genoeg middelen om hulp te bieden. Een regeringsdelegatie kwam naar uw stad om de schade in te schatten en een verslag te schrijven. Voor het schrijven van het rapport, had de delegatie een reeks ontmoetingen met slachtoffers van de overstroming. De slachtoffers hadden de mogelijkheid om te praten over de schade die zij hadden geleden en zij konden voorstellen doen voor de vorm van hulp die de regering hen kon bieden. Iedereen kreeg een kans om zijn standpunt uiteen te zetten en het verslag was leidend voor de beslissing van de regering. De regering besloot toen dat niet iedereen zal worden gecompenseerd voor de schade die zij hebben geleden. De uitkering zal alleen worden betaald aan personen van wie de huizen werden beschadigd. Hierdoor ontvangt u geen uitkering van de regering en bent u niet in staat om een auto te kopen. Boeren in uw regio zullen geen uitkering ontvangen ter compensatie van de vernieling van hun graanvelden, welke de enige bron van inkomsten voor hun families zijn.

V12: procedural injustice, distributive injustice, independence, negative outcome

English

There was a flooding in your region. The water is gone now. The house and most possessions of your family did not suffer damages. Your family has access to primary goods like food and other essentials. However, your family lost a car that you used in the weekends. The government has enough available resources to offer help. A governmental commission came to your region to estimate the damages and write a report. The flood victims requested a meeting with the commission to talk about the damages they suffered and propose preferred forms of help that the government could offer them. The commission did not arrange the meeting and wrote a report without including the voices of the victims. The report guided the decision of the government. Then the government decided that not everybody will be compensated for the damages they suffered. The benefits will be paid out only to persons whose houses were damaged. As a consequence, you will not receive the benefit and you will not be able to buy a car. Farmers from your region will not receive benefits to compensate for the destruction of their crop fields that were the only source of income for their families.

Russian

В Вашем регионе было наводнение. Вода уже ушла. Жилье и имущество Вашей семьи не пострадали. Вы имеете доступ к основным продуктам питания и товарам повседневного спроса. Однако, Ваша семья потеряла свою машину, которой Вы пользовались в выходные. Правительство имеет достаточно ресурсов, чтобы оказать помощь. Правительственная комиссия приехала в Ваш регион, чтобы оценить ущерб и написать отчет. Пострадавшие от наводнения попросили о встрече с комиссией, чтобы обсудить ущерб, который они понесли, и предложить формы помощи, которую правительство могло бы им оказать. Комиссия не организовала встречи с пострадавшими и написала отчет без учета мнения пострадавших. Отчет комиссии был основанием для решения правительства. После этого правительство решило, что не всем будет компенсирован ущерб, который они понесли. Пособия будут выплачены только тем лицам, чьи дома были повреждены. В следствие этого решения Вы не получите пособия и не сможете купить машину. Крестьяне из Вашего

региона не получают пособия для компенсации уничтоженных зерновых полей, которые являлись единственным источником дохода их семей.

Ukrainian

У Вашому регіоні була повінь. Вода вже зійшла. Житло і більшість майна Вашої родини не зазнали ушкоджень. Ви маєте доступ до продуктів харчування і речей першої необхідності. Однак, Ваша родина втратила машину, якою ви користувалися у вихідні. Уряд має достатньо ресурсів для допомоги постраждалим. Урядова комісія приїхала до Вашого регіону, щоби оцінити збитки і скласти звіт. Потерпілі від повені звернулися з проханням організувати зустріч з членами комісії для обговорення зазначених збитків і висунення пропозицій щодо форм допомоги, яку міг би надати уряд. Комісія не організувала зустрічі і написала звіт без урахування думок постраждалих. Звіт комісії став підставою для рішення уряду. Уряд вирішив, що не всі отримають компенсацію зазначених збитків. Матеріальна допомога буде призначена тільки тим особам, котрі втратили своє житло. Внаслідок цього рішення Ви не отримаєте допомогу від держави і не зможете купити автомобіль. Також фермери з Вашого регіону не отримають компенсації за знищення оброблюваних земель, котрі правили за єдине джерело прибутку їхніх родин.

Polish

W Twoim regionie doszło do powodzi. Poziom wody już się obniżył. Mieszkanie i większość dobytku Twojej rodziny nie ucierpiały. Macie dostęp do żywności i produktów pierwszej potrzeby. Twoja rodzina straciła jednak samochód, którego używaliście w weekendy. Rząd ma dostatecznie dużo środków, by okazać pomoc powodziarzom. Komisja rządowa przyjechała do Twojego regionu, by oszacować straty i napisać raport. Poszkodowani w powodzi zwrócili się z prośbą zorganizowania spotkania z komisją w celu przedyskutowania poniesionych strat i zaproponowania form pomocy, której mógłby udzielić rząd. Komisja nie zorganizowała spotkania i napisała raport bez uwzględnienia głosów poszkodowanych. Raport komisji stanowił podstawę dla decyzji rządu. Rząd zdecydował, że nie wszyscy otrzymają zasiłek w ramach kompensaty za poniesione straty. Zasiłki będą wypłacane tylko tym osobom, których mieszkania zostały zniszczone. W skutek tej decyzji nie otrzymasz zasiłku i nie będziesz mógł kupić samochodu. Również rolnicy z Twojego regionu, nie otrzymają zasiłku w ramach kompensaty za zniszczenia pól uprawnych, które stanowiły jedyne źródło dochodu ich rodzin.

French

Il y a eu une inondation dans votre région. L'eau s'est retirée depuis. Votre maison et la plupart des possessions de votre famille n'ont pas subi de dégâts. Votre famille a accès aux biens essentiels comme la nourriture. Cependant, elle a perdu une voiture que vous utilisiez les week-ends. Le gouvernement a suffisamment de ressources pour offrir de l'aide. Une délégation de l'administration est venue dans votre région pour évaluer les dégâts et écrire un rapport. Les victimes de l'inondation ont réclamé une réunion avec la commission afin de parler des dégâts subis et de suggérer des formes d'aide que l'administration pourrait apporter. La commission n'a pas organisé de réunion et a écrit un rapport sans prendre en compte les voix des victimes. Ce rapport a guidé la décision du gouvernement. Le gouvernement a ensuite décidé que les victimes ne seraient pas toutes automatiquement dédommagées. Les indemnités ne seront versées qu'aux personnes dont la maison a été endommagée. En conséquence, vous ne recevrez pas d'indemnité et vous ne pourrez pas acheter de voiture. Les agriculteurs de votre région ne recevront pas d'indemnités pour les

dédommager de la destruction de leurs champs, qui étaient la seule source de revenu pour leur famille.

Dutch

Er was een overstroming in uw regio. Het water is nu geweken. Het huis en de meeste bezittingen van uw familie zijn niet beschadigd. Uw familie heeft toegang tot primaire goederen zoals voedsel en andere essentiële zaken. Echter, uw familie verloor wel een auto die u in de weekenden gebruikte. De regering heeft genoeg middelen om hulp te bieden. Een regeringsdelegatie kwam naar uw stad om de schade in te schatten en een verslag te schrijven. De slachtoffers van de overstroming hadden om een ontmoeting met de delegatie gevraagd om te praten over de schade die zij hadden geleden en om voorstellen te doen over de vormen van hulp die de regering hen kon bieden. De delegatie regelde geen ontmoeting en schreef een verslag zonder daarbij de standpunten van de slachtoffers te betrekken. Het verslag was leidend voor de beslissing van de regering. De regering besloot toen dat niet iedereen zal worden gecompenseerd voor de schade die zij hebben geleden. De uitkering zal alleen worden betaald aan personen van wie de huizen werden beschadigd. Hierdoor ontvangt u geen uitkering van de regering en bent u niet in staat om een auto te kopen. Boeren in uw regio zullen geen uitkering ontvangen ter compensatie van de vernieling van hun graanvelden, welke de enige bron van inkomsten voor hun families zijn.

V13: procedural justice, distributive justice, dependence, negative outcome

English

There was a flooding in your region. The water is gone now. The house and possessions of your family suffered damages. Your family has limited access to primary goods like food and other essentials. The government has enough available resources to offer help. A governmental commission came to your region to estimate the damages and write a report. Before writing the report, the commission held a series of meetings with victims of the flooding. The victims had an opportunity to talk about the damages they suffered and propose forms of help that the government could offer them. Everybody got a chance to present their point of view and the report guided the decision of the government. Then the government decided to provide benefits for every flood victim whose house or crop fields were damaged. Although you will receive the benefit, it is useless. The benefit is not even close to the minimum that is needed to help your family to get back on their feet. Also farmers from your region will receive this kind of benefits to compensate for the destruction of their crop fields that were the only source of income for their families.

Russian

В Вашем регионе было наводнение. Вода уже ушла. Жилье и имущество Вашей семьи пострадали. Вы имеете ограниченный доступ к основным продуктам питания и товарам повседневного спроса. Правительство имеет достаточно ресурсов, чтобы оказать помощь. Правительственная комиссия приехала в Ваш регион, чтобы оценить ущерб и написать отчет. Перед тем как комиссия написала отчет, она провела ряд встреч с пострадавшими от наводнения. Пострадавшие имели возможность обсудить понесенный ущерб и предложить формы помощи, которую правительство могло бы им оказать. Все получили возможность изложить свою точку зрения и отчет комиссии был основанием для решения правительства. После этого правительство решило выплатить пособия потерпевшим, чьи дома или поля были

повреждены. Хотя Вы получите пособие, оно бесполезное. Оно далеко от нужного минимума и недостаточно, чтобы помочь Вашей семье встать на ноги. Крестьяне из Вашего региона получают такое-же пособие для компенсации уничтоженных зерновых полей, которые являлись единственным источником дохода их семей.

Ukrainian

У Вашому регіоні була повінь. Вода вже зійшла. Житло і майно Вашої родини пошкоджені. Ви маєте обмежений доступ до продуктів харчування та речей першої необхідності. Уряд має достатньо ресурсів для допомоги постраждалим. Урядова комісія приїхала до Вашого регіону, щоби оцінити збитки і скласти звіт. Перед складанням звіту, комісія провела шерег зустрічей з потерпілими. Вони мали можливість обговорити збитки, яких вони зазнали і запропонувати форми допомоги, яку би міг надати їм уряд. Усі мали можливість представити власну точку зору, а звіт комісії став підставою для рішення уряду. Уряд вирішив, що допомогу отримає кожен, чие житло або поля були понищені. Хоча Ви і отримаєте допомогу від держави, це не матиме значення, оскільки її розмір є далеким від мінімуму, котрий дозволив би Вашій родині стати на ноги. Фермери з Вашого регіону також отримують цю допомогу в рамках компенсації за знищення оброблюваних земель, котрі були єдиним джерелом доходу їхніх родин.

Polish

W Twoim regionie doszło do powodzi. Poziom wody już się obniżył. Mieszkanie i dobytek Twojej rodziny ucierpiały. Macie ograniczony dostęp do żywności i produktów pierwszej potrzeby. Rząd ma dostatecznie dużo środków, by okazać pomoc powodzianom. Komisja rządowa przyjechała do Twojego regionu, by oszacować straty i napisać raport. Przed napisaniem raportu, komisja przeprowadziła spotkania z poszkodowanymi. Poszkodowani mieli możliwość przedyskutowania poniesionych strat i zaproponowania form pomocy, której mógłby udzielić rząd. Wszyscy dostali możliwość przedstawienia swojego punktu widzenia a raport komisji stanowił podstawę dla decyzji rządu. Rząd zdecydował, że każdy poszkodowany, którego mieszkanie lub pola zostały zniszczone w czasie powodzi otrzyma zasiłek. Chociaż otrzymasz zasiłek, jest on bezużyteczny. Daleko odbiega od minimum potrzebnego, by pomóc Twojej rodzinie wstać na nogi. Również rolnicy z Twojego regionu otrzymają takie zasiłki w ramach kompensaty za zniszczenia pól uprawnych, które stanowiły jedyne źródło dochodu ich rodzin.

French

Il y a eu une inondation dans votre région. L'eau s'est retirée depuis. Votre maison et les possessions de votre famille ont subi des dégâts. Votre famille a un accès limité aux biens essentiels comme la nourriture. Le gouvernement a suffisamment de ressources pour offrir de l'aide. Une délégation de l'administration est venue dans votre région pour évaluer les dégâts et écrire un rapport. En préalable à l'écriture du rapport, la délégation a organisé une série de réunions avec les victimes de l'inondation. Celles-ci ont eu la possibilité de témoigner des dégâts qu'elles ont subis et de suggérer des formes d'aide que l'administration pourrait offrir. Chacun pouvait exprimer son point de vue, et le rapport a guidé la décision du gouvernement. Le gouvernement a ensuite décidé d'attribuer des indemnités à chaque victime de l'inondation dont la maison ou les champs ont subi des dégâts. Même si vous allez recevoir l'indemnité, elle est inutile. L'indemnité est très loin du minimum qu'il faudrait pour aider à remettre votre famille sur pied. Les agriculteurs de votre région vont

également recevoir ce type d'indemnité pour dédommager la destruction de leurs champs, qui étaient la seule source de revenu de leur famille.

Dutch

Er was een overstroming in uw regio. Het water is nu geweken. Het huis en bezittingen van uw familie zijn beschadigd. Uw familie heeft beperkte toegang tot primaire goederen zoals voedsel en andere essentiële zaken. De regering heeft genoeg middelen om hulp te bieden. Een regeringsdelegatie kwam naar uw stad om de schade in te schatten en een verslag te schrijven. Voor het schrijven van het rapport, had de delegatie een reeks ontmoetingen met slachtoffers van de overstroming. De slachtoffers hadden de mogelijkheid om te praten over de schade die zij hadden geleden en zij konden voorstellen doen voor de vorm van hulp die de regering hen kon bieden. Iedereen kreeg een kans om zijn standpunt uiteen te zetten en het verslag was leidend voor de beslissing van de regering. De regering besloot toen om een uitkering te geven aan elk slachtoffer van de overstroming van wie het huis of de akkers waren beschadigd. Hoewel u de uitkering zal ontvangen, is deze nutteloos. De uitkering komt niet in de buurt van wat nodig is om uw familie te helpen er weer bovenop te komen. Ook boeren in uw regio zullen een uitkering ontvangen ter compensatie van de vernieling van hun graanvelden, welke de enige bron van inkomsten voor hun families zijn.

V14: procedural injustice, distributive justice, dependence, negative outcome

English

There was a flooding in your region. The water is gone now. The house and possessions of your family suffered damages. Your family has limited access to primary goods like food and other essentials. The government has enough available resources to offer help. A governmental commission came to your region to estimate the damages and write a report. The flood victims requested a meeting with the commission to talk about the damages they suffered and propose forms of help that the government could offer them. The commission did not arrange the meeting and wrote a report without including the voices of the victims. The report guided the decision of the government. Then the government decided to provide benefits for every flood victim whose house or crop fields were damaged. Although you will receive the benefit, it is useless. The benefit is not even close to the minimum that is needed to help your family to get back on their feet. Also farmers from your region will receive this kind of benefits to compensate for the destruction of their crop fields that were the only source of income for their families.

Russian

В Вашем регионе было наводнение. Вода уже ушла. Жилье и имущество Вашей семьи пострадали. Вы имеете ограниченный доступ к основным продуктам питания и товарам повседневного спроса. Правительство имеет достаточно ресурсов, чтобы оказать помощь. Правительственная комиссия приехала в Ваш регион, чтобы оценить ущерб и написать отчет. Пострадавшие от наводнения попросили о встрече с комиссией, чтобы обсудить ущерб, который они понесли, и предложить формы помощи, которую правительство могло бы им оказать. Комиссия не организовала встречу с пострадавшими и написала отчет без учета мнения пострадавших. Отчет комиссии был основанием для решения правительства. После этого правительство решило выплатить пособия потерпевшим, чьи дома или поля были повреждены. Хотя Вы получите пособие, оно бесполезное. Оно далеко от нужного минимума и

недостаточно, чтобы помочь Вашей семье встать на ноги. Крестьяне из Вашего региона получают такое-же пособие для компенсации уничтоженных зерновых полей, которые являлись единственным источником дохода их семей.

Ukrainian

У Вашому регіоні була повінь. Вода вже зійшла. Житло і майно Вашої родини пошкоджені. Ви маєте обмежений доступ до продуктів харчування та речей першої необхідності. Уряд має достатньо ресурсів для допомоги постраждалим. Урядова комісія приїхала до Вашого регіону, щоби оцінити збитки і скласти звіт. Потерпілі від повені звернулися з проханням організувати зустріч з членами комісії для обговорення зазначених збитків і висунення пропозицій щодо форм допомоги, яку міг би надати уряд. Комісія не організувала зустрічі і написала звіт без урахування думок постраждалих. Звіт комісії став підставою для рішення уряду. Уряд вирішив, що допомогу отримає кожен, чие житло або поля були понищені. Хоча Ви і отримуєте допомогу від держави, це не матиме значення, оскільки її розмір є далеким від мінімуму, котрий дозволив би Вашій родині стати на ноги. Фермери з Вашого регіону також отримують цю допомогу в рамках компенсації за знищення оброблюваних земель, котрі були єдиним джерелом доходу їхніх родин.

Polish

W Twoim regionie doszło do powodzi. Poziom wody już się obniżył. Mieszkanie i dobytek Twojej rodziny ucierpiały. Macie ograniczony dostęp do żywności i produktów pierwszej potrzeby. Rząd ma dostatecznie dużo środków, by okazać pomoc powodzianom. Komisja rządowa przyjechała do Twojego regionu, by oszacować straty i napisać raport. Poszkodowani w powodzi zwrócili się z prośbą zorganizowania spotkania z komisją w celu przedyskutowania poniesionych strat i zaproponowania form pomocy, której mógłby udzielić rząd. Komisja nie zorganizowała spotkania i napisała raport bez uwzględnienia głosów poszkodowanych. Raport komisji stanowił podstawę dla decyzji rządu. Rząd zdecydował, że każdy poszkodowany, którego mieszkanie lub pola zostały zniszczone w czasie powodzi otrzyma zasiłek. Chociaż otrzymasz zasiłek, jest on bezużyteczny. Daleko odbiega od minimum potrzebnego, by pomóc Twojej rodzinie wstać na nogi. Również rolnicy z Twojego regionu otrzymają takie zasiłki w ramach kompensaty za zniszczenia pól uprawnych, które stanowiły jedyne źródło dochodu ich rodzin.

French

Il y a eu une inondation dans votre région. L'eau s'est retirée depuis. Votre maison et les possessions de votre famille ont subi des dégâts. Votre famille a un accès limité aux biens essentiels comme la nourriture. Le gouvernement a suffisamment de ressources pour offrir de l'aide. Une délégation de l'administration est venue dans votre région pour évaluer les dégâts et écrire un rapport. Les victimes de l'inondation ont réclamé une réunion avec la commission afin de parler des dégâts subis et de suggérer des formes d'aide que l'administration pourrait apporter. La commission n'a pas organisé de réunion et a écrit un rapport sans prendre en compte les voix des victimes. Ce rapport a guidé la décision du gouvernement. Le gouvernement a ensuite décidé d'attribuer des indemnités à chaque victime de l'inondation dont la maison ou les champs ont subi des dégâts. Même si vous allez recevoir l'indemnité, elle est inutile. L'indemnité est très loin du minimum qu'il faudrait pour aider à remettre votre famille sur pied. Les agriculteurs de votre région vont également recevoir ce type d'indemnité pour dédommager la destruction de leurs champs, qui étaient la seule source de revenu de leur famille.

Dutch

Er was een overstroming in uw regio. Het water is nu geweken. Het huis en bezittingen van uw familie zijn beschadigd. Uw familie heeft beperkte toegang tot primaire goederen zoals voedsel en andere essentiële zaken. De regering heeft genoeg middelen om hulp te bieden. Een regeringsdelegatie kwam naar uw stad om de schade in te schatten en een verslag te schrijven. De slachtoffers van de overstroming hadden om een ontmoeting met de delegatie gevraagd om te praten over de schade die zij hadden geleden en om voorstellen te doen over de vormen van hulp die de regering hen kon bieden. De delegatie regelde geen ontmoeting en schreef een verslag zonder daarbij de standpunten van de slachtoffers te betrekken. Het verslag was leidend voor de beslissing van de regering. De regering besloot toen om een uitkering te geven aan elk slachtoffer van de overstroming van wie het huis of de akkers waren beschadigd. Hoewel u de uitkering zal ontvangen, is deze nutteloos. De uitkering komt niet in de buurt van wat nodig is om uw familie te helpen er weer bovenop te komen. Ook boeren in uw regio zullen een uitkering ontvangen ter compensatie van de vernieling van hun graanvelden, welke de enige bron van inkomsten voor hun families zijn.

V15: procedural justice, distributive injustice, dependence, negative outcome***English***

There was a flooding in your region. The water is gone now. The house and possessions of your family suffered damages. Your family has limited access to primary goods like food and other essentials. The government has enough available resources to offer help. A governmental commission came to your region to estimate the damages and write a report. Before writing the report, the commission held a series of meetings with victims of the flooding. The victims had an opportunity to talk about the damages they suffered and propose forms of help that the government could offer them. Everybody got a chance to present their point of view and the report guided the decision of the government. Then the government decided that not everybody will be compensated for the damages they suffered. The benefits will be paid out only to persons whose crop fields and cars were damaged. As a consequence, you will not receive the benefit that would help you and your family to get back on your feet. However, farmers from your region will receive the benefits to compensate for the destruction of their crop fields that were the only source of income for their families.

Russian

В Вашем регионе было наводнение. Вода уже ушла. В Вашем регионе было наводнение. Вода уже ушла. Жилье и имущество Вашей семьи пострадали. Вы имеете ограниченный доступ к основным продуктам питания и товарам повседневного спроса. Правительство имеет достаточно ресурсов, чтобы оказать помощь. Правительственная комиссия приехала в Ваш регион, чтобы оценить ущерб и написать отчет. Перед тем как комиссия написала отчет, она провела ряд встреч с пострадавшими от наводнения. Пострадавшие имели возможность обсудить понесенный ущерб и предложить формы помощи, которую правительство могло бы им оказать. Все получили возможность изложить свою точку зрения и отчет комиссии был основанием для решения правительства. После этого правительство решило, что не всем будет компенсирован понесенный ущерб. Пособия будут выплачены только тем лицам, чьи зерновые поля и машины пострадали. В следствие

этого решения Вы не получите пособия, которое могло бы помочь Вашей семье встать на ноги. Но крестьяне из Вашего региона получают пособия для компенсации уничтоженных зерновых полей, которые являлись единственным источником дохода их семей.

Ukrainian

У Вашому регіоні була повінь. Вода вже зійшла. Житло і майно Вашої родини пошкоджені. Ви маєте обмежений доступ до продуктів харчування та речей першої необхідності. Уряд має достатньо ресурсів для допомоги постраждалим. Урядова комісія приїхала до Вашого регіону, щоби оцінити збитки і скласти звіт. Перед складанням звіту, комісія провела шерег зустрічей з потерпілими. Вони мали можливість обговорити збитки, яких вони зазнали і запропонувати форми допомоги, яку би міг надати їм уряд. Усі мали можливість представити власну точку зору, а звіт комісії став підставою для рішення уряду. Уряд вирішив, що не всі отримають компенсацію зазнаних збитків. Матеріальна допомога буде призначена лише тим особам, оброблювані землі і машини котрих були ушкоджені. Внаслідок цього рішення Ви не отримаєте виплати від держави, що могло би допомогти стати на ноги Вашій родині. Фермери з Вашого регіону, проте, отримають компенсації за знищення оброблюваних земель, котрі правили за єдине джерело прибутку їхніх родин.

Polish

W Twoim regionie doszło do powodzi. Poziom wody już się obniżył. Mieszkanie i dobytek Twojej rodziny ucierpiały. Macie ograniczony dostęp do żywności i produktów pierwszej potrzeby. Rząd ma dostatecznie dużo środków, by okazać pomoc powodzianom. Komisja rządowa przyjechała do Twojego regionu, by oszacować straty i napisać raport. Przed napisaniem raportu, komisja przeprowadziła spotkania z poszkodowanymi. Poszkodowani mieli możliwość przedyskutowania poniesionych strat i zaproponowania form pomocy, której mógłby udzielić rząd. Wszyscy dostali możliwość przedstawienia swojego punktu widzenia a raport komisji stanowił podstawę dla decyzji rządu. Rząd zdecydował, że nie wszyscy otrzymają zasiłek w ramach kompensaty za poniesione straty. Zasiłki będą wypłacane tylko tym osobom, których pola uprawne i samochody ucierpiały. W skutek tej decyzji nie otrzymasz zasiłku, który mógłby pomóc Waszej rodzinie wstać na nogi. Rolnicy z Twojego regionu otrzymają jednak zasiłki w ramach kompensaty za zniszczenia pól uprawnych, które stanowiły jedyne źródło dochodu ich rodzin.

French

Il y a eu une inondation dans votre région. L'eau s'est retirée depuis. Votre maison et les possessions de votre famille ont subi des dégâts. Votre famille a un accès limité aux biens essentiels comme la nourriture. Le gouvernement a suffisamment de ressources pour offrir de l'aide. Une délégation de l'administration est venue dans votre région pour évaluer les dégâts et écrire un rapport. En préalable à l'écriture du rapport, la délégation a organisé une série de réunions avec les victimes de l'inondation. Celles-ci ont eu la possibilité de témoigner des dégâts qu'elles ont subis et de suggérer des formes d'aide que l'administration pourrait offrir. Chacun pouvait exprimer son point de vue, et le rapport a guidé la décision du gouvernement. Le gouvernement a ensuite décidé que les victimes ne seraient pas toutes automatiquement dédommagées. Les indemnités ne seront versées qu'aux personnes dont les champs ou la voiture ont été endommagés. En conséquence, vous ne recevrez pas l'indemnité qui vous aiderait à remettre votre famille sur pied. Cependant, les agriculteurs

de votre région recevront une indemnité pour les dédommager de la destruction de leurs champs, qui étaient la seule source de revenu pour leur famille.

Dutch

Er was een overstroming in uw regio. Het water is nu geweken. Het huis en bezittingen van uw familie zijn beschadigd. Uw familie heeft beperkte toegang tot primaire goederen zoals voedsel en andere essentiële zaken. De regering heeft genoeg middelen om hulp te bieden. Een regeringsdelegatie kwam naar uw stad om de schade in te schatten en een verslag te schrijven. Voor het schrijven van het rapport, had de delegatie een reeks ontmoetingen met slachtoffers van de overstroming. De slachtoffers hadden de mogelijkheid om te praten over de schade die zij hadden geleden en zij konden voorstellen doen voor de vorm van hulp die de regering hen kon bieden. Iedereen kreeg een kans om zijn standpunt uiteen te zetten en het verslag was leidend voor de beslissing van de regering. De regering besloot toen dat niet iedereen zal worden gecompenseerd voor de schade die zij hebben geleden. De uitkering zal alleen worden betaald aan personen van wie akkers en auto's werden beschadigd. Hierdoor zal u geen uitkering van de regering ontvangen die u en uw familie zou helpen er weer bovenop te komen. Maar boeren in uw regio zullen een uitkering ontvangen ter compensatie van de vernieling van hun graanvelden, welke de enige bron van inkomsten voor hun families zijn.

V16: procedural injustice, distributive injustice, dependence, negative outcome

English

There was a flooding in your region. The water is gone now. The house and possessions of your family suffered damages. Your family has limited access to primary goods like food and other essentials. The government has enough available resources to offer help. A governmental commission came to your region to estimate the damages and write a report. The flood victims requested a meeting with the commission to talk about the damages they suffered and propose forms of help that the government could offer them. The commission did not arrange the meeting and wrote a report without including the voices of the victims. The report guided the decision of the government. Then the government decided that not everybody will be compensated for the damages they suffered. The benefits will be paid out only to persons whose crop fields and cars were damaged. As a consequence, you will not receive the benefit that would help you and your family to get back on your feet. However, farmers from your region will receive the benefits to compensate for the destruction of their crop fields that were the only source of income for their families.

Russian

В Вашем регионе было наводнение. Вода уже ушла. Жилье и имущество Вашей семьи пострадали. Вы имеете ограниченный доступ к основным продуктам питания и товарам повседневного спроса. Правительство имеет достаточно ресурсов, чтобы оказать помощь. Правительственная комиссия приехала в Ваш регион, чтобы оценить ущерб и написать отчет. Пострадавшие от наводнения попросили о встрече с комиссией, чтобы обсудить ущерб, который они понесли, и предложить формы помощи, которую правительство могло бы им оказать. Комиссия не организовала встречи с пострадавшими и написала отчет без учета мнения пострадавших. Отчет комиссии был основанием для решения правительства. После этого правительство решило, что не всем будет компенсирован понесенный ущерб. Пособия будут

выплачены только тем лицам, чьи зерновые поля и машины пострадали. В следствие этого решения Вы не получите пособия, которое могло бы помочь Вашей семье встать на ноги. Но крестьяне из Вашего региона получают пособие для компенсации уничтоженных зерновых полей, которые являлись единственным источником дохода их семей.

Ukrainian

У Вашому регіоні була повінь. Вода вже зійшла. Житло і майно Вашої родини пошкоджені. Ви маєте обмежений доступ до продуктів харчування та речей першої необхідності. Уряд має достатньо ресурсів для допомоги постраждалим. Урядова комісія приїхала до Вашого регіону, щоби оцінити збитки і скласти звіт. Потерпілі від повені звернулися з проханням організувати зустріч з членами комісії для обговорення зазнаних збитків і висунення пропозицій щодо форм допомоги, яку міг би надати уряд. Комісія не організувала зустрічі і написала звіт без урахування думок постраждалих. Звіт комісії став підставою для рішення уряду. Уряд вирішив, що не всі отримають компенсацію зазнаних збитків. Матеріальна допомога буде призначена лише тим особам, оброблювані землі і машини котрих були ушкоджені. Внаслідок цього рішення Ви не отримаєте виплати від держави, що могло би допомогти стати на ноги Вашій родині. Фермери з Вашого регіону, проте, отримають компенсації за знищення оброблюваних земель, котрі правили за єдине джерело прибутку їхніх родин.

Polish

W Twoim regionie doszło do powodzi. Poziom wody już się obniżył. Mieszkanie i dobytek Twojej rodziny ucierpiały. Macie ograniczony dostęp do żywności i produktów pierwszej potrzeby. Rząd ma dostatecznie dużo środków, by okazać pomoc powodzianom. Komisja rządowa przyjechała do Twojego regionu, by oszacować straty i napisać raport. Poszkodowani w powodzi zwrócili się z prośbą zorganizowania spotkania z komisją w celu przedyskutowania poniesionych strat i zaproponowania form pomocy, której mógłby udzielić rząd. Komisja nie zorganizowała spotkania i napisała raport bez uwzględnienia głosów poszkodowanych. Raport komisji stanowił podstawę dla decyzji rządu. Rząd zdecydował, że nie wszyscy otrzymają zasiłek w ramach kompensaty za poniesione straty. Zasiłki będą wypłacane tylko tym osobom, których pola uprawne i samochody ucierpiały. W skutek tej decyzji nie otrzymasz zasiłku, który mógłby pomóc Waszej rodzinie wstać na nogi. Rolnicy z Twojego regionu otrzymają jednak zasiłki w ramach kompensaty za zniszczenia pól uprawnych, które stanowiły jedyne źródło dochodu ich rodzin.

French

Il y a eu une inondation dans votre région. L'eau s'est retirée depuis. Votre maison et les possessions de votre famille ont subi des dégâts. Votre famille a un accès limité aux biens essentiels comme la nourriture. Le gouvernement a suffisamment de ressources pour offrir de l'aide. Une délégation de l'administration est venue dans votre région pour évaluer les dégâts et écrire un rapport. Les victimes de l'inondation ont réclamé une réunion avec la commission afin de parler des dégâts subis et de suggérer des formes d'aide que l'administration pourrait apporter. La commission n'a pas organisé de réunion et a écrit un rapport sans prendre en compte les voix des victimes. Ce rapport a guidé la décision du gouvernement. Le gouvernement a ensuite décidé que les victimes ne seraient pas toutes automatiquement dédommagées. Les indemnités ne seront versées qu'aux personnes dont les champs ou la voiture ont été endommagés. En conséquence, vous ne recevrez pas

l'indemnité qui vous aiderait à remettre votre famille sur pied. Cependant, les agriculteurs de votre région recevront une indemnité pour les dédommager de la destruction de leurs champs, qui étaient la seule source de revenu pour leur famille.

Dutch

Er was een overstroming in uw regio. Het water is nu geweken. Het huis en bezittingen van uw familie zijn beschadigd. Uw familie heeft beperkte toegang tot primaire goederen zoals voedsel en andere essentiële zaken. De regering heeft genoeg middelen om hulp te bieden. Een regeringsdelegatie kwam naar uw stad om de schade in te schatten en een verslag te schrijven. De slachtoffers van de overstroming hadden om een ontmoeting met de delegatie gevraagd om te praten over de schade die zij hadden geleden en om voorstellen te doen over de vormen van hulp die de regering hen kon bieden. De delegatie regelde geen ontmoeting en schreef een verslag zonder daarbij de standpunten van de slachtoffers te betrekken. Het verslag was leidend voor de beslissing van de regering. De regering besloot toen dat niet iedereen zal worden gecompenseerd voor de schade die zij hebben geleden. De uitkering zal alleen worden betaald aan personen van wie akkers en auto's werden beschadigd. Hierdoor zal u geen uitkering van de regering ontvangen die u en uw familie zou helpen er weer bovenop te komen. Maar boeren in uw regio zullen een uitkering ontvangen ter compensatie van de vernieling van hun graanvelden, welke de enige bron van inkomsten voor hun families zijn.

APPENDIX G. Coding scheme development and inter-coder reliability establishment

The first round of coding (R1) was exploratory and aimed to establish what kind of answers the participants gave, whether the answers fit in any broader categories, and whether it is possible to code the answers according to the input-throughput-output distinction. The inter-coder reliability was low in this first exploratory round of coding. In the representational coding procedure of the Dutch sample, Coder 1 and Coder 2 coded 34.23% of answers differently and were not sure about the code or coded partially the same 6.31% of answers³⁰. Coder 1 and Coder 2 were in complete agreement in 59.46% of cases. The hypothesis-guided coding was more problematic and Coder 1 and Coder 2 were not sure about the right code or only partially in agreement for 40.54% of the answers. Coder 1 and Coder 2 did not agree on 21.62% of codes and achieved complete agreement only in 37.84% of cases.

In the same round of coding (R1), Coder 3 coded a sample of answers from the Polish dataset. In the representational coding, Coder 1 and Coder 3 coded 34.86% of answers differently and were not sure or in partial agreement about less than 1% of answers. Coder 1 and Coder 3 were in complete agreement in 64.22% of cases. Coder 1 and Coder 3 disagreed about 34.86% of the codes in the hypothesis-guided coding and were not sure about the right code or in partial agreement about 9.17% of the codes. Coder 1 and Coder 3 were in complete agreement in 55.97% of cases.

The rather small inter-coder agreement in the representational coding was due to the fact that the coders differed in what categories they created (categories were not established beforehand) and in some cases they decided to create either broader or narrower categories than the other coders. The hypothesis-guided coding showed that theoretically distinct aspects of legitimacy such as input, throughput, and output did not easily encompass all the answers of respondents and were not precise enough to guide the coding of the answers. Moreover, the answers often could be categorized in more than one aspect (e.g. input *and* throughput). This led to rather low inter-coder reliability in the hypothesis-guided coding.

After the first round of coding Coder 1 and Coder 2 compared their coding and discussed the problems with coding. We discussed several codes that could be split to make sure that we preserve distinctions that were made by respondents when they named characteristics of legitimate authorities (for example, answers with similar connotation such as honesty/fairness, justice, and equality). Also, we decided that there is a group of answers that pertained to the personal characteristics that make people in office suitable for their post. This groups of answers included ethical and moral considerations as well as character traits such as being hard-working and responsible. We decided to code such answers in the category 'integrity'. Another group of answers that clearly emerged from the responses referred to the rights that the authorities have (right to decide, to take actions, to make laws) and having the actual power. Coder 2

³⁰ The label partial agreement/not sure was used to count cases in which two coders provided more than one possible code to categorize an answer and one of these codes was provided by two coders. The same label was used in cases when one or both coders did not know how to code the answer (usually expressed by the question mark).

suggested assigning the code ‘(de facto) authority’ to these words. The third group that emerged from the words used by the respondents referred to the wish of the authorities to work for the citizens/society/nation. Coder 1 suggested assigning the code ‘acting for the common good/for citizens’ to these words. A problematic set of answers was linked to the issues of the rule of law. Respondents gave multiple answers pertaining to the legality of authorities, their lawfulness (following the laws), constitutional validity, institutional checks and balances, and impartiality (equal treatment). Respondents often used words and phrases that could be assigned multiple codes related to the issues of the rule of law, justice, or equality. At this stage we decided to put these answers in separate categories.

In regards to the hypothesis-guided coding, the most problematic answers to code for the input-throughput-output distinction were the personal traits of political authorities, the words relating to honesty/fairness and justice, and words indicating the need for citizen involvement in the political processes. All of these words could fit into more than one aspect of legitimacy. For example, citizens’ involvement (words and phrases such as ‘possibility to participate’ and ‘good listeners of the people’) seemed to fit either in the category of input legitimacy (‘rule by the people’) or in the category of throughput (‘rule with the people’) which, among others, refers to the participatory decision-making process and deliberation. We agreed to assign double codes in cases like these (e.g. input/throughput). After the meeting, Coder 1 made a draft-list of possible representational codes that would serve as a reference point and gave it to the coders.

Table G.1. Coding rounds: Establishing inter-coder reliability

	<i>Coding R1</i>		<i>Discussion 1</i>	<i>Coding R2</i>	<i>Discussion 2</i>	<i>Coding R3</i>		<i>Final coding</i>
Representational	C1&C2	C1&C3	C1&C2	C1&C2	C1&C2	C1&C2	C1&C3	C1
Disagreement	38 34.23%	38 34.86%	Discussion of differences in codes, problematic words & phrases, creation of a preliminary list of codes.	11 11.34%	Further refinement of codes, discussion of overlaps, refinement of the list of codes.	15 17.85%	19 18.27%	Final refinement of the list of codes; coding of the full samples from all countries with attention to the emergence of new groups.
Partial agreement/ not sure	7 6.31 %	1 0.92%		13 13.40 %		4 4.76%	-	
Complete agreement	66 59.46 %	70 64.22%		73 75.62 %		65 77.39%	85 81.73%	
Total coded	111	109		97		84	104	
	<i>Coding R1</i>		<i>Discussion 1</i>	<i>Coding R2</i>	<i>Discussion 2</i>	<i>Coding R3</i>		<i>Final coding</i>
Hypothesis-guided	C1&C2	C1&C3	C1&C2	C1&C2	C1&C2	C1&C2	C1&C3	C1
Disagreement	24 21.62%	38 34.86%	Discussion of difficulties with coding according to the input-throughput-output distinction; attempt to draw differences between them.	9 9.28%	Discussion of re-occurring problems and assigning of the hypothesis-guided codes to the representational codes.	-	-	Refining the list of codes to make the analysis possible.
Partial agreement/ not sure	45 40.54%	10 9.17%		32 32.99%		-	-	
Complete agreement	42 37.84%	61 55.97%		56 57.73%		-	-	
Total coded	111	109		97		-	-	

In the second round of coding (R2), Coder 2 coded a new 10% random sample of Dutch respondents. Coder 2 used the preliminary list and the recommendations we arrived at after the discussion. Coder 1 and Coder 2 disagreed only about 11.34% of cases that they categorized as representational coding. The percentage of partial agreement and cases that they were not sure about was at the level of 13.40%. Coder 1 and Coder 2 agreed in 75.62% of cases. The level of differences in the hypothesis-guided coding was very low too—9.28%, however, the level of partial agreement and codes that coders were not sure about stayed rather high at 32.99% and therefore the level of complete agreement increased only to 57.73%.

The second round of coding improved the inter-coder reliability especially in the procedure of representational coding. The inter-coder reliability improved between Coder 1 and Coder 2. However, the percentage of partial agreement and codes that the coders were not sure about remained large in the procedure of hypothesis-guided coding between Coder 1 and Coder 2.

To refine the representational codes and to improve the reliability of hypothesis-guided coding, Coders 1 and 2 met for the second discussion. After consulting the differences, the coders decided to refine the codes pertaining to the rule of law. The three codes created for the words and phrases that refer to different aspect of the rule of law were: ‘legal validity/legality’ (a code used for words and expressions that indicate the legality of obtaining power by authorities as well as acting in accordance with laws), ‘checks & balances’ (a code used for words that indicate the need of separation of powers, presence of different institutions—including courts, accountability of the institutions in front of each other and in front of the people, and limitations on the political authorities’ powers), and ‘impartiality’ (a code used for words that indicate equal treatment, treatment of everybody according to the same rules). In addition, to keep a detailed picture of answers given by respondents, the codes ‘justice’, ‘honesty/fairness’, ‘equality’ stayed on the list of codes for the answers in which these exact words were used. Moreover, the code ‘protection of individual rights & freedoms’ was created to be assigned to answers pertaining to human rights and non-intervention of the authorities in the private lives of citizens. Coder 1 and Coder 2 also decided to proceed with matching the representational codes and the hypothesis-guided codes, and created a version of the list of codes (see Table G.2).

Because of unresolvable problems with categorization caused by different ideas about how to distinguish between input, throughput, and output³¹, some of the representational codes were initially assigned two hypothesis-guided codes.

³¹ These different ideas are also reflected in the literature on the topic. For example, in Schmidt (2003), deliberation, involvement of NGOs, and citizen consultation is treated as an element of throughput, whereas in Lindgren & Persson (2010) it is treated as an element of input.

Table G.2. List of representational and hypothesis-guided codes (used in the last coding phase).

	<i>REPRESENTATIONAL CODES</i>	<i>HYPOTHESIS-GUIDED CODES</i>
1	ELECTIONS Reference to the choice of the people, free and fair elections, legally chosen	INPUT
2	JUSTICE Refers not to the actors/politicians, but to the system and how it operates, when the word ‘justice’ or ‘righteousness’ is used	THROUGHPUT/OUTPUT
3	LEGAL VALIDITY/LEGALITY Constitutionality, being formed on the basis of law, lawfulness, refers to the legal acquisition of power—legality, following the laws, not breaking of the laws	INPUT/ THROUGHPUT
4	CHECKS & BALANCES Checks and balances between institutions, courts, acting within given authority, separation of powers, control by citizens	INPUT/ THROUGHPUT
5	EQUALITY When this exact formulation is given	THROUGHPUT/OUTPUT
6	IMPARTIALITY Equal treatment, just treatment, objectivity, independence, not subject to pressures	THROUGHPUT/OUTPUT
7	HONESTY/FAIRNESS Using ‘fair-play’ rules, sincere; can refer to some sort of distributive justice too, honesty/fairness of the actors/politicians; in general use the code when the word honesty/fairness is used	THROUGHPUT/OUTPUT
8	TRANSPARENCY Openness, no corruption, clarity, transparency	THROUGHPUT
9	(DE FACTO) AUTHORITY Taking decisions, (being able to) making laws, executing decisions/laws, effectiveness	OUTPUT
10	RELIABILITY Doing things as promised, eliciting belief—credibility, completing postulates, trustworthiness	TBD*
11	ACTING FOR THE COMMON GOOD/FOR CITIZENS Acting not for their own interest, acting for citizens, altruism, selflessness	OUTPUT
12	TRUST/SUPPORT	INPUT
13	ACCEPTANCE/APPROVAL Recognition by citizens, acceptance, respect from citizens, obedience, no protest, voluntariness, consent	INPUT
14	SECURITY/ORDER/STABILITY Taking care of the state security	OUTPUT

15	EXPERTISE Knowledge, competence, experience necessary to take good decisions/actions	OUTPUT
16	REPRESENTATION Referring to the representation of certain interests, party's electorate	INPUT
17	WELFARE/ECONOMIC PROSPERITY Referring to economic development, improvement of living standards, help to the poor etc.	OUTPUT
18	INTEGRITY References to moral standing/qualities and values, characteristics that make someone a good politician; used for moral qualities and characteristics that do not fit with other categories and are encompassed by the term integrity (including responsibility, truth-telling, respect)	TBD*
19	CITIZEN PARTICIPATION/CONSULTATION Turnout, referenda, civil society, consulting with citizens, deliberation, listening to the citizens, accessibility, rallies	INPUT/THROUGHPUT
20	PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS & FREEDOMS Tolerance, freedom, respect for an individual	THROUGHPUT/OUTPUT
21	DEMOCRACY When only the word 'democracy' or 'democratic' is used	INPUT/THROUGHPUT/OUTPUT
22	IDEOLOGICAL When a specific ideology is named (e.g. conservative, liberal, socialist)	INPUT
23	TRADITIONAL/RELIGIOUS	INPUT
24	EFFICIENCY Efficient way of acting, only about the process	THROUGHPUT
25	FOREIGN POLICY	OUTPUT
26	INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION	INPUT
27	NATIONAL INTEREST/ SOVEREIGNTY	OUTPUT
28	LEADERSHIP/CHARISMA References to leadership, the rule of strong leader, charisma	INPUT/THROUGHPUT
29	PATRIOTISM/NATIONALISM National identity, national values, patriotic	OUTPUT
30	NATIONAL UNITY *** Appeared in the French dataset several times	OUTPUT
31	OTHER **	OTHER

* TBD (to be determined) indicated that the coders agreed that they do not know yet what hypothesis-guided code should be assigned to this category

** If an answer did not fit in any of the listed categories, it was assigned the code 'other'.

*** The code 'national unity' was added by Coder 1 when coding the French sample (after the Polish and Dutch samples)

For example, the word ‘justice’ could refer to the procedure of being treated justly, according to the rules (throughput), but it could also refer to the justice of the outcome, when the emphasis would be made on the social justice or just distribution (output). In the process of debating the hypothesis-guided codes we arrived at the strategy of eliminating the code (input, output, or throughput) that fitted the least with the representational code.

The list of representational codes was used by all three coders in the third round of coding (R3), in which Coder 1 and Coder 2 coded another 10% random sample of answers from Dutch respondents and Coder 1 and Coder 3 coded another 10% random sample of answers from Polish respondents. Since the hypothesis-guided codes were now already assigned to the representational codes, coders were asked to categorize answers according to representational codes only.

In the final round Coder 1 and Coder 2 disagreed about 17.39% of cases, but the level of codes that they were not sure about or got partially correct was only 4.76%. This resulted in 77.39% of complete agreement between Coder 1 and 2. Coder 1 and Coder 3 disagreed about 18.27% cases and completely agreed about 81.73% raising the inter-coder reliability to acceptable level. Some answers were too ambiguous or fit into more than one category and so limited further increasing the agreement between coders. For example, the answer ‘not racist’ could be assigned a code ‘impartiality’ as well as ‘protection of individual rights & freedoms’, the answer ‘equal rights (human rights)’ could be assigned the code ‘equality’, ‘impartiality’ or ‘protection of individual rights & freedoms’. Another example is a more elaborate answer ‘economically small differences, assistance to the poor in order to create more equality -> more financial support + better custody’ which was coded as ‘equality’ by Coder 1 and as ‘welfare/economic prosperity’ by Coder 2. In the end, Coder 1 decided to keep the separate codes despite their overlaps and make adjustments (combine or split categories) at the stage of interpretation. Keeping a large number of representational codes (31 codes on the final list) is the main reason for not reaching higher inter-coder reliability. The choice here, however, is a trade-off between higher reliability and preserving the meanings of the detailed and often nuanced answers provided by the respondents. Also, if during coding of the answers of Russian, French, and Ukrainian respondents new groups of answers emerged that did not fit in the prescribed codes, new codes were created (for example, when coding the French answers a code ‘national unity’ was added).

The hypothesis-guided code list was refined as well. For the purpose of further analysis based on the theoretical distinctions between input, throughput, and output, the definitions of each of these aspects of legitimacy had to be specified. For the purpose of this study, input was defined as the basis on which authorities are representing the people—it refers to the reasons people hold to designate others to act on their behalf. This included the ways in which the interests of the citizens can reach (potential) authorities, who in turn can become their representatives, so any input of ideas or interest of citizens in the political process is included.³² Throughput refers to the

³² This understanding of input is close to Beetham’s ‘consent’ dimension of legitimacy in the modern state in its electoral and mobilizational forms (1991, pp.150–158).

process of the use of power and personal characteristics of authorities that influence how the authorities govern. Output was defined as including all (expected) results of governing; in other words, the outcomes of the use of power. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 (see main text) list the final organization of representational and hypothesis-guided codes.

APPENDIX H: Manipulation checks

Table H.1. Results of t-tests for effects of the manipulations on responses to the manipulation check questions.

	<i>Manipulation</i>		Mean difference	Cohen's <i>d</i>	<i>p</i>
	Present M (n)	Absent M (n)			
The Netherlands					
Distributive justice	4.07 (193)	2.43 (183)	1.638	1.05	< .001
Positive outcome	4.76 (191)	2.36 (186)	2.396	1.64	< .001
Procedural justice	4.17 (189)	2.87 (189)	1.299	0.81	< .001
Dependence	4.97 (187)	3.13 (190)	1.841	1.15	< .001
France					
Distributive justice	4.34 (163)	2.68 (149)	1.653	0.94	< .001
Positive outcome	4.66 (142)	2.52 (173)	2.970	1.26	< .001
Procedural justice	4.34 (159)	2.80 (148)	1.540	0.86	< .001
Dependence	4.81 (155)	3.83 (157)	1.169	0.56	< .001
Poland					
Distributive justice	3.82 (209)	2.31 (225)	1.512	0.89	< .001
Positive outcome	4.91 (214)	1.94 (221)	2.970	1.99	< .001
Procedural justice	3.46 (218)	2.79 (214)	0.674	0.37	< .001
Dependence	4.96 (214)	3.79 (218)	1.169	0.63	< .001
Ukraine					
Distributive justice	4.14 (209)	2.34 (215)	1.799	0.96	< .001
Positive outcome	5.01 (219)	1.89 (206)	3.125	2.02	< .001
Procedural justice	4.31 (222)	2.25 (203)	2.060	1.17	< .001
Dependence	4.91 (211)	3.98 (213)	0.929	0.47	< .001
Russia					
Distributive justice	4.45 (456)	2.81 (470)	1.639	0.95	< .001
Positive outcome	4.80 (461)	2.72 (466)	2.079	1.14	< .001
Procedural justice	4.31 (469)	3.02 (454)	1.285	0.71	< .001
Dependence	5.20 (450)	3.69 (477)	1.510	0.86	< .001

APPENDIX I: Factor analysis of perceived legitimacy items

In all five cases the principal axis factoring analysis showed that the items loaded highly on a single factor (one factor with Eigenvalue > 1). For the factor analysis participants with missing data were excluded listwise.

Table I.1. Factor analysis of perceived legitimacy items

		Factor 1				
		NL	FR	PL	UA	RU
1	I would trust this government	.819	.793	.787	.826	.819
2	If this situation is representative of how the government acts, I would like this government to rule in my country.	.781	.747	.750	.857	.776
3	I would like it, if in the future, this government made decisions on this type of issues that influence my life.	.714	.615	.771	.793	.776
4	Decisions of this government should be respected.	.680	.556	.528	.737	.680
5	I would be willing to protest against this decision of the government.	-.618	-.610	-.670	-.661	-.623
6	On the whole this government is legitimate.	.590	.671	.424	.589	.538
7	The government has the right to take this kind of decisions.	.587	.542	.611	.655	.659
% of variance explained		55	51	51	60	56
N		357	287	404	420	897

Cronbach's α for the 7-item perceived legitimacy scales was: NL .86; FR .83; PL .84; UA .89; RU .87. Note that Ns for Cronbach's α are lower than the sample size because not all participants responded to all 7 items and α is computed over cases with complete data only.

APPENDIX J: Assessment of the homogeneity of variance

To assess the ANOVA assumption of the homogeneity of variance I examined residuals.




Figure J.1. A scatter plot of residuals against predicted values of perceived legitimacy.

APPENDIX K: Frequency tables for analysis in Chapter 4.

Table K.1. Frequency of answers from all positions: the Netherlands.

Rank	Code	Frequency	%
1	Transparency	96	9.15
2	Elections	87	8.30
3	Legal validity/legality	76	7.25
4	Checks & balances	74	7.06
5	Honesty/fairness (<i>eerlijkheid</i>)	73	6.97
6	Impartiality	61	5.82
7	(De facto) authority	60	5.73
8	Representation/pluralism	53	5.06
9	Integrity	52	4.96
10	Citizen participation/consultation	48	4.58
10	Reliability	48	4.58
12	Justice (<i>rechtvaardigheid</i>)	45	4.29
13	Democracy	41	3.91
14	Acting for the common good/for citizens	40	3.82
15	Expertise	40	3.82
16	Other	31	2.96
17	Protection of individual rights and freedoms	28	2.67
18	Trust/Support	23	2.19
19	Equality (<i>gelijkheid</i>)	20	1.91
20	Security/order/stability	10	0.95
21	Acceptance/approval	9	0.86
22	Welfare/economic prosperity	7	0.67
23	Traditional/religious	6	0.57
24	Leadership/charisma	5	0.48
25	National interest/sovereignty	4	0.38
26	Efficiency	3	0.29
26	Ideological	3	0.29
26	International recognition	3	0.29
29	Foreign policy	2	0.19
30	Patriotism/nationalism	1	0.10
31	National unity	0	0.00
Total		1048	100

Table K.2. Frequency of answers from the first position: the Netherlands.

Rank	Code	Frequency	%
1	Elections	59	20.14
2	Honesty/fairness (<i>eerlijkheid</i>)	27	9.22
3	Transparency	23	7.85
3	Legal validity/legality	23	7.85
3	Reliability	23	7.85
6	Impartiality	20	6.83
7	(De facto) authority	18	6.14
8	Justice (<i>rechtvaardigheid</i>)	16	5.46
8	Democracy	16	5.46
10	Checks & balances	14	4.78
10	Representation/pluralism	14	4.78
12	Trust/Support	8	2.73
13	Acting for the common good/for citizens	7	2.39
14	Citizen participation/consultation	5	1.71
15	Protection of individual rights and freedoms	4	1.37
16	Integrity	3	1.02
16	Equality (<i>gelijkheid</i>)	3	1.02
16	Security/order/stability	3	1.02
19	Other	2	0.68
19	Welfare/economic prosperity	2	0.68
21	Expertise	1	0.34
21	Acceptance/approval	1	0.34
21	Leadership/charisma	1	0.34
22	Traditional/religious	0	0.00
22	National interest/sovereignty	0	0.00
22	Efficiency	0	0.00
22	Ideological	0	0.00
22	International recognition	0	0.00
22	Foreign policy	0	0.00
22	Patriotism/nationalism	0	0.00
Total		292	100

Table K.3. Frequency of answers from all positions: France.

Rank	Code	Frequency	%
1	Elections	111	15.83
2	Justice (<i>équité, juste</i>)	57	8.13
3	Citizen participation/consultation	46	6.56
4	Integrity	45	6.42
5	Acting for the common good/for citizens	40	5.71
5	Checks & balances	40	5.71
7	(De facto) authority	38	5.42
8	Representation/pluralism	37	5.28
9	Equality (<i>égalitaire</i>)	31	4.42
10	Impartiality	27	3.85
11	Legal validity/legality	25	3.57
12	Expertise	23	3.28
13	Democracy	22	3.14
14	Acceptance/approval	21	3.00
14	Transparency	21	3.00
16	Other	20	2.85
17	Reliability	20	2.85
18	Protection of individual rights and freedoms	18	2.57
19	Efficiency	13	1.85
20	Security/order/stability	9	1.28
21	Welfare/economic prosperity	7	1.00
22	Leadership/charisma	6	0.86
23	Trust/Support	5	0.71
24	Honesty/fairness (<i>honnête</i>)	4	0.57
24	National interest/sovereignty	4	0.57
24	National unity	4	0.57
27	Patriotism/nationalism	3	0.43
28	Ideological	2	0.29
29	Traditional/religious	2	0.29
30	International recognition	0	0.00
30	Foreign policy	0	0.00
Total		701	100

Table K.4. Frequency of answers from the first position: France.

Rank	Code	Frequency	%
1	Elections	87	46.03
2	Justice (<i>équité, juste</i>)	17	8.99
3	Integrity	10	5.29
3	Representation/pluralism	10	5.29
3	Acceptance/approval	10	5.29
6	Democracy	8	4.23
7	Acting for the common good/for citizens	7	3.70
8	Equality (<i>égalitaire</i>)	6	3.17
8	Legal validity/legality	6	3.17
10	Citizen participation/consultation	4	2.12
10	Efficiency	4	2.12
12	Other	3	1.59
12	Security/order/stability	3	1.59
14	(De facto) authority	2	1.06
14	Impartiality	2	1.06
14	Transparency	2	1.06
14	Trust/Support	2	1.06
18	Checks & balances	1	0.53
18	Expertise	1	0.53
18	Reliability	1	0.53
18	Protection of individual rights and freedoms	1	0.53
18	Leadership/charisma	1	0.53
18	Honesty/fairness (<i>honnête</i>)	1	0.53
19	Welfare/economic prosperity	0	0.00
19	National interest/sovereignty	0	0.00
19	National unity	0	0.00
19	Patriotism/nationalism	0	0.00
19	Ideological	0	0.00
19	Traditional/religious	0	0.00
19	International recognition	0	0.00
19	Foreign policy	0	0.00
Total		189	100

Table K.5. Frequency of answers from all positions: Poland.

Rank	Code	Frequency	%
1	Trust/Support	132	12.62
2	Justice (<i>sprawiedliwość</i>)	99	9.46
3	Legal validity/legality	88	8.41
4	Integrity	78	7.46
5	(De facto) authority	77	7.36
6	Acting for the common good/for citizens	74	7.07
7	Elections	62	5.93
8	Acceptance/approval	43	4.11
8	Other	43	4.11
10	Reliability	40	3.82
11	Honesty/fairness (<i>uczciwość</i>)	35	3.35
12	Expertise	34	3.25
13	Impartiality	28	2.68
13	Transparency	28	2.68
15	Representation/pluralism	27	2.58
16	Citizen participation/consultation	25	2.39
16	Protection of individual rights and freedoms	25	2.39
18	Checks & balances	16	1.53
19	Democracy	13	1.24
19	Security/order/stability	13	1.24
21	Efficiency	12	1.15
22	Equality	11	1.05
23	National interest/sovereignty	9	0.86
24	Ideological	7	0.67
25	Leadership/charisma	6	0.57
25	Traditional/religious	6	0.57
27	Foreign policy	5	0.48
27	Welfare/economic prosperity	5	0.48
29	Patriotism/nationalism	3	0.29
30	International recognition	2	0.19
31	National unity	0	0.00
Total		1046	100

Table K.6. Frequency of answers from the first position: Poland.

Rank	Code	Frequency	%
1	Trust/Support	63	23.42
2	Justice (sprawiedliwość)	41	15.24
3	Elections	37	13.75
4	Acceptance/approval	18	6.69
5	Legal validity/legality	17	6.32
6	(De facto) authority	16	5.95
7	Acting for the common good/for citizens	11	4.09
8	Honesty/fairness (uczciwość)	8	2.97
8	Reliability	8	2.97
10	Impartiality	6	2.23
10	Citizen participation/consultation	6	2.23
12	Other	5	1.86
12	Expertise	5	1.86
12	Protection of individual rights and freedoms	5	1.86
15	Democracy	4	1.49
15	National interest/sovereignty	4	1.49
17	Integrity	3	1.12
18	Representation/pluralism	2	0.74
18	Security/order/stability	2	0.74
18	Efficiency	2	0.74
18	Leadership/charisma	2	0.74
18	Transparency	2	0.74
23	Checks & balances	1	0.37
23	Equality	1	0.37
25	Ideological	0	0.00
25	Traditional/religious	0	0.00
25	Foreign policy	0	0.00
25	Welfare/economic prosperity	0	0.00
25	Patriotism/nationalism	0	0.00
25	International recognition	0	0.00
25	National unity	0	0.00
Total		269	100

Table K.7. Frequency of answers from all positions: Ukraine.

Rank	Codes	Frequency	%
1	Transparency	113	11.09
2	Elections	111	10.89
3	Integrity	110	10.79
4	Legal validity/legality	83	8.15
5	Acting for the common good/for citizens	77	7.56
6	Honesty/fairness (<i>чесність</i>)	66	6.48
7	Trust/Support	62	6.08
8	Justice (<i>справедливість</i>)	52	5.10
9	(De facto) authority	50	4.91
10	Expertise	45	4.42
11	Citizen participation/consultation	36	3.53
12	Checks & balances	32	3.14
13	Acceptance/approval	26	2.55
14	Representation/pluralism	24	2.36
15	Impartiality	21	2.06
15	Reliability	21	2.06
17	Democracy	20	1.96
18	Patriotism/nationalism	16	1.57
19	Protection of individual rights and freedoms	10	0.98
19	Welfare/economic prosperity	10	0.98
21	National interest/sovereignty	8	0.79
21	Other	8	0.79
23	International recognition	5	0.49
23	Security/order/stability	5	0.49
25	Equality	3	0.29
25	National unity	3	0.29
27	Ideological	2	0.20
28	Traditional/religious	0	0.00
28	Leadership/charisma	0	0.00
28	Efficiency	0	0.00
28	Foreign policy	0	0.00
Total		1019	100

Table K.8. Frequency of answers from the first position: Ukraine.

Rank	Code	Frequency	%
1	Elections	71	26.20
2	Honesty/fairness (<i>чесність</i>)	29	10.70
3	Trust/Support	27	9.96
4	Transparency	21	7.75
5	Legal validity/legality	20	7.38
6	Justice (<i>справедливість</i>)	19	7.01
7	Acting for the common good/for citizens	16	5.90
8	Acceptance/approval	11	4.06
9	(De facto) authority	9	3.32
10	Integrity	8	2.95
11	Democracy	7	2.58
12	Patriotism/nationalism	5	1.85
12	Reliability	5	1.85
12	Representation/pluralism	5	1.85
15	Citizen participation/consultation	4	1.48
15	Expertise	4	1.48
15	Impartiality	4	1.48
18	Checks & balances	2	0.74
19	National unity	1	0.37
19	Other	1	0.37
19	Protection of individual rights and freedoms	1	0.37
19	Welfare/economic prosperity	1	0.37
23	Equality	0	0.00
23	Ideological	0	0.00
23	International recognition	0	0.00
23	National interest/sovereignty	0	0.00
23	Security/order/stability	0	0.00
23	Leadership/charisma	0	0.00
23	Traditional/religious	0	0.00
23	Leadership/charisma	0	0.00
23	Efficiency	0	0.00
23	Foreign policy	0	0.00
Total		271	100

Table K.9. Frequency of answers from all positions: Russia.

Rank	Code	Frequency	%
1	Legal validity/legality	161	12.09
2	Elections	156	11.71
3	Trust/Support	96	7.21
4	Transparency	86	6.46
5	Justice (<i>Справедливость</i>)	76	5.71
6	Acting for the common good/for citizens	73	5.48
7	Integrity	66	4.95
8	Checks & balances	64	4.80
9	Other	56	4.20
10	(De facto) authority	55	4.13
11	Acceptance/approval	51	3.83
12	Honesty/fairness (<i>Честность</i>)	49	3.68
12	Impartiality	49	3.68
14	Citizen participation/consultation	41	3.08
15	Welfare/economic prosperity	39	2.93
16	Protection of individual rights and freedoms	36	2.70
17	Representation/pluralism ³³	32	2.40
18	Expertise	25	1.88
19	National interest/sovereignty	21	1.58
20	Equality	18	1.35
21	Democracy	17	1.28
22	Reliability	16	1.20
23	International recognition	12	0.90
24	Leadership/charisma	11	0.83
25	Security/order/stability	9	0.68
26	Foreign policy	6	0.45
26	Patriotism/nationalism	6	0.45
28	Ideological	3	0.23
28	Traditional/religious	3	0.23
30	Efficiency	0	0.00
30	National unity	0	0.00
Total		1333	100

³³ In the category representation/pluralism there are more answers that are about majoritarian representation rather than about pluralism.

Table K.10. Frequency of answers from the first position: Russia.

Rank	Code	Frequency	%
1	Elections	99	24.21
2	Legal validity/legality	62	15.16
3	Trust/Support	52	12.71
4	Acceptance/approval	27	6.60
5	Justice (<i>Справедливость</i>)	24	5.87
6	Acting for the common good/for citizens	20	4.89
7	Honesty/fairness (<i>Честность</i>)	18	4.40
8	Transparency	15	3.67
9	(De facto) authority	13	3.18
10	Integrity	12	2.93
11	Checks & balances	8	1.96
11	Impartiality	8	1.96
13	Democracy	7	1.71
13	Other	7	1.71
13	Welfare/economic prosperity	7	1.71
16	Citizen participation/consultation	5	1.22
16	Protection of individual rights and freedoms	5	1.22
18	Equality	4	0.98
18	Expertise	4	0.98
20	National interest/sovereignty	3	0.73
21	Reliability	2	0.49
21	Representation/pluralism	2	0.49
21	Traditional/religious	2	0.49
24	Ideological	1	0.24
24	Leadership/charisma	1	0.24
24	Patriotism/nationalism	1	0.24
25	Foreign policy	0	0.00
25	International recognition	0	0.00
25	National unity	0	0.00
25	Security/order/stability	0	0.00
25	Efficiency	0	0.00
Total		409×	100

Note: × 408 people entered an answer on position one, but one person gave a double answer that was categorized into two different categories, therefore the total is 409.

APPENDIX L: Cronbach's α for the 3-item SES scales.

NL .73 (N = 255); FR .72 (N = 183); PL .74 (N = 373); UA .77 (N = 341); RU .76 (N = 753). Note that Ns for Cronbach's α are lower than the sample size because not all participants responded to all 3 items and α is computed over cases with complete data only.

APPENDIX M: Effects of manipulation from the vignette experiment on perceived legitimacy of the real institutions

Table M.1. Results of ANOVAs predicting legitimacy scores of institutions from full models with the four factors (and all interactions) manipulated in the vignette experiment. Note that only when the full model was significant ($p < .05$) individual factors were examined and controlled for.

	Outcome (legitimacy score)	Model Adjusted R ²	Model p	Control for vignette manipulations?	Significant effects	p	Predictors included in regression to control for vignette manipulations
NL	Government	.033	.027	Yes	Procedural justice	.001	Procedural justice
	Parliament	.019	.110	No			
	Courts	.036	.019	Yes	Procedural justice Procedural justice × Dependence × Outcome	.020 .010	Procedural justice Dependence, Outcome, Procedural justice × Dependence, Procedural justice × Outcome, Dependence × Outcome, Procedural justice × Dependence × Outcome
FR	Government	-.024	.919	No			
	Parliament	-.027	.947	No			
	Courts	-.022	.893	No			
	President	-.039	.998	No			
PL	Government	-.004	.587	No			
	Parliament	.015	.120	No			
	Courts	.020	.073	No			
	President	.013	.157	No			

	Outcome (legitimacy score)	Model Adjusted R ²	Model p	Control for vignette manipulations?	Significant effects	p	Predictors included in regression to control for vignette manipulations
UA	Government	-.005	.612	No			
	Parliament	-.024	.379	No			
	Courts	.018	.105	No			
	President	-.003	.533	No			
RU	Government	.001	.418	No			
	Parliament	.005	.272	No			
	Courts	-.014	.968	No			
	President	.003	.339	No			

Nederlandse Samenvatting

Wat maakt autoriteiten legitiem in de ogen van burgers?

Een onderzoek naar waargenomen legitimiteit in verschillende politieke regimes

Als politiek gaat over wie wat krijgt, wanneer en hoe, dan betreft legitimiteit de overdracht van macht van burgers naar degenen die beslissen over politiek. Legitimiteit is dus een kenmerk van de autoriteiten die het recht hebben om beslissingen te nemen. Waarom zijn burgers bereid om bepaalde personen als politieke autoriteiten te accepteren? Welke variabelen beïnvloeden hun evaluaties van de autoriteiten? Hebben mensen in verschillende landen verschillende ideeën over wie hen zou moeten regeren? De voorwaarden waaraan autoriteiten moeten voldoen zodat burgers hen zien als legitiem en vrijwillig de macht aan hen overdragen zijn het onderwerp van dit proefschrift.

Het proefschrift heeft zijn oorsprong in een aantal vragen over de legitimiteit van hybride regimes—regimes die elementen van democratisch en autocratisch bewind combineren. Een groeiende hoeveelheid onderzoek probeert te ontdekken wat voor strategieën leiders en elites in hybride regimes gebruiken om aan de macht te blijven en legitimiteit te behouden. Doorgaans wordt aangenomen dat de politieke autoriteiten in democratieën hun legitimiteit hoofdzakelijk putten uit de electorale procedures (waardoor zij zijn aangewezen om te regeren). Ook wordt aangenomen dat de legitimiteit van autoritaire en hybride regimes grotendeels gebaseerd is op de garantie van een goede levensstandaard voor de burgers.

Dit proefschrift onderzoekt de overeenkomsten en verschillen tussen hybride regimes en democratieën in legitimiteit vanuit het perspectief van de burger. In plaats van te concentreren op de strategieën van autoriteiten om legitimiteit te verkrijgen, onderzoekt dit proefschrift waargenomen legitimiteit. Dat wil zeggen, de nadruk ligt op hoe de burgers in deze regimes autoriteiten waarnemen en evalueren.

Als men aanneemt dat verschillende regimes (hybride, autoritair, democratisch) verschillende strategieën gebruiken om legitimiteit te verkrijgen, dan veronderstelt men ook dat burgers die gesocialiseerd zijn in deze verschillende politieke systemen verschillende criteria gebruiken om de legitimiteit van autoriteiten te evalueren. (Bijvoorbeeld, verschillende argumenten en kenmerken van de politieke autoriteiten overtuigen de burgers om macht over te dragen.) Als burgers in verschillende regimes niet verschillende criteria zouden toepassen, dan zou dat betekenen dat de gebruikte strategieën van sommige autoriteiten niet resoneren bij de

burgers, of dat deze strategieën gericht zijn op andere doelen dan legitimiteit (bijvoorbeeld stabiliteit).

Het proefschrift presenteert drie empirische studies. De studies verkennen de criteria die door burgers worden gebruikt om de legitimiteit van de politieke autoriteiten te evalueren. Tergelijkertijd testen de studies of de volgende definitie van legitimiteit nuttig is: *legitimiteit is een kenmerk toegeschreven aan een politieke autoriteit (of zijn vertegenwoordiger) door een individu op basis van een evaluatie van normatieve kwaliteiten en wat resulteert in een bereidheid om vrijwillig macht over te dragen aan deze autoriteit.*

De studies proberen twee specifieke onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden: *Wat maakt politieke autoriteiten legitiem in de ogen van burgers? En, Hebben mensen die gesocialiseerd zijn in verschillende politieke regimes verschillende criteria om politieke autoriteiten te beoordelen?* Elke studie probeert deze vragen op een andere manier te beantwoorden, door verschillende aspecten van legitimiteit te onderzoeken. De data voor de drie studies komen uit een origineel vragenlijstonderzoek uitgevoerd in vijf landen: twee oude democratieën (Nederland, Frankrijk) en drie post-communistische landen, waaronder een nieuwe democratie (Polen) en twee hybride regimes (Rusland, Oekraïne).

De eerste studie is een vignet experiment naar de effecten van instrumentele en normatieve factoren op de legitimiteit van een hypothetische overheid. De resultaten van respondenten uit de verschillende landen ondersteunen een model van een burger die zowel persoonlijk materieel welzijn en de eerlijkheid van instituties in acht neemt bij de beoordeling van politieke autoriteiten. De resultaten toonden dat wanneer een overheid een instrumentele uitkomst verschaftte (een positieve uitkomst voor de respondent in materiële zin), dit een positief effect had op de evaluatie. Wanneer de overheid handelde op een rechtvaardige manier (dat wil zeggen, uitkomsten verschaffen via een eerlijke verdeling en eerlijke procedures) dan had dit ook een positief effect op de evaluatie. Een eerlijke verdeling van hulp was de belangrijkste factor van invloed op de legitimiteit van de hypothetische overheid. Daarbij, respondenten die een overheid beoordeelden die een eerlijke procedure hanteerde (mogelijkheid tot inspraak) beoordeelden de overheid als meer legitiem dan respondenten die een overheid beoordeelden die oneerlijke procedures hanteerde. Deze resultaten suggereren dat legitimiteit niet alleen is gebaseerd op de evaluatie van wie wat krijgt, maar ook op een evaluatie van hoe zulke besluiten worden genomen.

De tweede studie onderzocht de criteria voor legitimiteit op een andere manier. De analyse betreft antwoorden op een open vraag naar de belangrijkste kenmerken van legitieme autoriteiten. De resultaten toonden dat in de vijf landen deze kenmerken zeer

vergelijkbaar waren, soortgelijke concepten en thema's werden genoemd als kenmerken van legitieme autoriteiten. In hun antwoorden verwezen de respondenten naar de manier waarop macht wordt verkregen (zij noemden bijvoorbeeld vrije en eerlijke verkiezingen) en naar de manier waarop macht wordt uitgeoefend (zij noemden persoonlijke kenmerken en verwachtingen—eerlijkheid, rechtvaardigheid, onpartijdigheid, wettigheid, transparantie, en controlemechanismen). Deze resultaten ondersteunen de stelling dat normatieve kenmerken van belang zijn voor het toekennen van legitimiteit. De resultaten suggereren dat het winnen van verkiezingen op zichzelf geen garantie is voor duurzame legitimiteit. Om legitimiteit te behouden moeten politieke autoriteiten procedurele en distributieve rechtvaardigheid tonen.

De derde studie onderzocht de factoren die de legitimiteit van bestaande instellingen beïnvloeden. De resultaten ondersteunen de hypothese dat legitimiteit het meest wordt beïnvloed door de prestaties van politieke instituties. De perceptie dat uitvoerende instellingen werken voor het belang van de hele samenleving (in plaats van voor een kleine elite) was steeds de sterkste voorspeller van legitimiteit. Dit suggereert dat rechtvaardigheid van verdeling van belang is voor de evaluatie van de politieke instituties. Deze resultaten komen overeen met de resultaten van het vignet experiment, in beide studies had een eerlijke verdeling een positieve invloed op de legitimiteit van autoriteiten. De resultaten lieten ook zien dat in alle landen de legitimiteit van het parlement gerelateerd was aan het vermogen van de parlementen om de regeringen te controleren en aan de kwaliteit van de vertegenwoordiging van politieke partijen.

Over het geheel genomen suggereren de drie studies dat in de vijf onderzochte landen, rechtvaardigheid wat betreft verdeling en procedures de belangrijkste factoren zijn voor legitimiteit. Daarbij toonde de eerste studie een significante interactie tussen eerlijke verdeling en eerlijke procedures in vier van de vijf landen. De interactie was zo dat het effect van eerlijke procedures afhankelijk was van de aanwezigheid van een eerlijke verdeling. Als de verdeling van hulp oneerlijk was, dan had procedurele rechtvaardigheid een zwakker effect op de legitimiteit. Een interpretatie van deze interactie is dat mensen verwachten dat eerlijke procedures leiden tot een eerlijke verdeling van hulp, goederen of diensten. En dat alleen wanneer aan deze verwachting wordt voldaan, procedurele rechtvaardigheid de legitimiteit van een autoriteit verhoogt.

Op basis van deze resultaten kan men een voorstel formuleren: Als autoriteiten verlangen om hun legitimiteit te vergroten, dan moeten ze streven naar distributieve rechtvaardigheid door zoveel mogelijk burgers te laten deelnemen in de eerlijke verdeling van goederen en diensten. De resultaten suggereren dat procedurele rechtvaardigheid een effectieve manier is om legitimiteit te vergroten: onpartijdigheid, transparantie, inspraak voor alle betrokken partijen, toepassen van wetten, en het

garanderen van gelijke behandeling, dragen bij aan een eerlijke verdeling en vergroten de legitimiteit.

De verschillen in criteria voor het evalueren van legitimiteit die toe te schrijven zijn aan de socialisatie van respondenten in de verschillende politieke regimes waren niet groot. Hoewel er verschillen waren in de observaties van de vijf landen, waren dit eerder verschillen in accent dan verschillen van aard. Elke studie toonde enkele verschillen die een uitgangspunt verschaffen voor verder onderzoek.

In de eerste studie waren de belangrijkste verschillen tussen democratieën en hybride regimes te vinden in de grootte van de effecten van de distributieve rechtvaardigheid. In beide hybride regimes, Oekraïne en Rusland, was het effect van de eerlijke verdeling groter dan het effect van eerlijke verdeling in de democratische regimes.

In de tweede studie verschilden de post-communistische landen van de oude democratieën op twee manieren: (1) Respondenten uit post-communistische landen benadrukten vertrouwen in en steun voor de overheid meer dan respondenten uit de oude democratieën (die in plaats daarvan verkiezingen benadrukten). (2) De respondenten uit de oude democratieën benadrukten inspraak en overleg meer dan respondenten uit de post-communistische landen.

De derde studie liet zien dat de mate waarin algemene opvattingen over het ideale politieke systeem (opvattingen over hoe het systeem zou moeten werken) legitimiteit voorspelden, afhankelijk was van het type instelling en het type regime. Voor respondenten uit democratieën kon de legitimiteit van de wetgevende en rechterlijke instanties gedeeltelijk worden verklaard door verschillen in algemene opvattingen over het ideale systeem. Echter, deze algemene opvattingen verklaarden nauwelijks de legitimiteit van de uitvoerende instanties. (De legitimiteit van de uitvoerende instellingen werd voor een groot deel verklaard door evaluaties van hun prestaties.) Het tegenovergestelde patroon werd waargenomen voor respondenten uit hybride regimes: De legitimiteit van de uitvoerende instellingen werd voor een groot deel verklaard door opvattingen over hoe het systeem zou moeten werken. Een ander verschil tussen democratieën en hybride regimes was dat in hybride regimes de legitimiteit van instituties kon worden verklaard door percepties van democratie als het beste politieke systeem, terwijl in democratieën deze variable geen voorspellende waarde had.

Verder onderzoek zou de tekortkomingen van het huidige onderzoek kunnen behandelen. Voor het specifieke doel van dit proefschrift waren de respondenten in de vijf landen studenten, om zo de gevolgen van socialisatie in de verschillende landen te onderzoeken. Als gevolg hiervan lenen de waargenomen resultaten zich niet voor een

generalisatie naar hele samenlevingen. Verder onderzoek zou een grotere diversiteit van respondenten kunnen werven, of zou respondenten uit verschillende delen van een samenleving (elites, arbeiders, verschillende etnische groepen) kunnen vergelijken. Zulk onderzoek zou beter in staat zijn verschillen binnen een samenleving te onderzoeken en zou kunnen bijdragen aan het verklaren van maatschappelijke breuklijnen en politieke polarisatie.

Curriculum vitae

Honorata Mazepus was born on 9 November 1985 in Słupsk (Poland). She attended high-school in Słupsk (II Liceum Ogólnokształcące im. Adama Mickiewicza) and obtained an MA degree in International Relations with focus on Eastern Europe at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań (2004-2009). She also received an MSc degree with distinction in Political Science Research Methods from the University of Bristol (2010-2011). Honorata has worked on her PhD thesis at the Institute of History and Institute of Political Science at Leiden University between September 2011 and September 2016. She was affiliated with the Political Legitimacy Research Profile. Honorata has taught several courses at Russian Studies, Leiden University College, and Political Science including Russian Politics, Introduction to International Relations and Diplomacy, and Statistics. After her PhD defence, Honorata will work as a post-doctoral researcher at the Institute of Public Administration at Leiden University on the EU-STRAT project funded by the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme.