



Universiteit  
Leiden  
The Netherlands

## **The United Nations and the Evolution of Global Values**

Spijkers, O.

### **Citation**

Spijkers, O. (2011, October 12). *The United Nations and the Evolution of Global Values*. *School of Human Rights Research Series*. Intersentia, Antwerpen. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/17926>

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)

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**Note:** To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

This chapter provides a definition of “global values” and briefly examines various aspects of this definition (1). It analyses the notion, underlying the concept of global values, that there is such a thing as a “global community” (2). A separate section is devoted to the discussion of the need for and rules of a global discourse to determine a set of global values. The reason why international law is the language *par excellence* to define values-based obligations is also explained, as well as the role of the international lawyer in using the norms of international law, especially the law based on the UN Charter, as an instrument for the promotion and protection of global values (3).

This chapter further makes some general comments on the substantive content of the list of global values. It provides an initial answer to the question: what are the world’s values? It also explains what is generally considered to inspire such a list and examines the way in which it is evolving (4). There are some comments on the allocation of responsibilities for action (5). Who is responsible for achieving global values, and how should this be done? This is followed by a conclusion (6).

### 1 A DEFINITION OF GLOBAL VALUES

There are many definitions of values, but no global or even widespread consensus on any of them. Therefore, although it is best not to rely too heavily on one particular definition of values, a definition may nevertheless serve as a starting point to explain the meaning of the concept as used in this study.<sup>1</sup>

Before presenting a definition of global values it is necessary to define the context in which global values operate.<sup>2</sup> Many books on values start by making a distinction between the concept of value in a normative sense and the use of the word “value” in a more economic sense. When the word “value” is used in the latter

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<sup>1</sup> Hart always suggested his students (including Michael Walzer) to “never define your terms”, with which he meant that one should not overemphasize the importance of definitions. See Marcel Becker, “In gesprek met Michael Walzer” (2008), p. 36.

<sup>2</sup> The concept of “values” derives its meaning from the way it is used in a particular discourse, and since there are many value-discourses, the word has many definitions. See *e.g.*, Nicolas Rescher, *Introduction to Value Theory* (1969). See also Schneider Report, *A la recherche d’une sagesse pour le monde: quel rôle pour les valeurs éthiques dans l’éducation?* (1987), p. 43.

sense, it simply refers to how much certain objects or goods are appreciated, and this is often measured in terms of *monetary* value.<sup>3</sup> This study is not concerned with the latter use of the term “value,” but rather with its normative use. Normative values constitute the core of global morality. They are based on a shared vision of an ideal world. All sorts of obligations are defined on the basis of this vision of an ideal world, and these must be seen to bring that ideal world closer to the real world.

The context in which values operate can be narrowed down even further. Some values are concerned with the way in which individuals should act in their daily lives, and prescribe or prohibit certain forms of behaviour. However, the values which constitute the object of this study are concerned not so much with the behaviour of individuals in their everyday lives, but rather with the behaviour of the actors responsible for international politics and decision making. The aim of this study is to find a set of global values which guide global decision making.

One suitable definition of values was proposed by Rokeach, a professor of social psychology, in his treatise on the nature of human values. This treatise was used as the conceptual basis for the Rokeach Value Survey (RVS), an elaborate classification system of values. Rokeach began by setting out certain criteria that any proposed definition of values should meet to be “scientifically fruitful.”<sup>4</sup> First, the definition must be “intuitively appealing yet capable of operational definition.” Secondly, it should clearly distinguish values from other concepts with which this concept is confused. Thirdly, any definition of values should avoid “circular terms that are themselves undefined.” Fourthly and finally, it should “represent a value-free approach to the study of values,” meaning that it should allow “independent investigators to replicate reliably one another’s empirical findings and conclusions despite [personal] differences in values.”<sup>5</sup> These are essential criteria or benchmarks for any meaningful definition of the concept of values.

Rokeach’s own definition of a value, which meets all these criteria, is as follows:

A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence.<sup>6</sup>

In order to modify this general definition of values in such a way that it accurately describes the specific kind of values that are the subject of this study, some of the key words in this definition are analysed in more detail.

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<sup>3</sup> See, e.g., Aligarh Muslim University, *Man, Reality, and Values* (1964), pp. 50-51.

<sup>4</sup> Milton Rokeach, *The Nature of Human Values* (1973), p. 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Idem*, p. 3.

<sup>6</sup> *Idem*, p. 5.

Values are presented as “beliefs.” It is not uncommon in the literature to consider that ethical thought consists of beliefs. For example, Isaiah Berlin described ethical thought – principally a set of values – as an expression of “beliefs about how life should be lived, what men and women should be and do.”<sup>7</sup> Such beliefs are by definition human inventions. To say that values are “beliefs” is basically to distinguish them from “facts”. Values, as a subcategory of beliefs, cannot be falsified in the way that facts can be falsified.<sup>8</sup> If someone decides not to share a certain belief, he or she is not *per se* mistaken.<sup>9</sup> Therefore it is difficult to reach a consensus on the definition of global values and the consequent obligations. After all, it is perfectly reasonable for there to be different views of the ideal world and different value systems. Disagreements about values cannot be settled, and there will have to be a dialogue on these values until some kind of consensus is achieved. Alternatively, one could agree to disagree.

Secondly, values are *enduring* beliefs. Rokeach added this word to his definition because he believed that “any conception of human values, if it is to be fruitful, must be able to account for the enduring character of values as well as for their changing character.”<sup>10</sup> In other words, values both last forever and continue to evolve all the time. It is because values change, rather than ever reaching the goal (the realization of all values), that “we seem to be forever doomed to strive for these ultimate goals without quite ever reaching them.”<sup>11</sup> The global values of the international community have evolved over time. At the same time, this evolution has not affected the essence of these values. This makes them “enduring” in the sense of the term as used by Rokeach.

Another interesting aspect is the inclusion of values both as a “mode of conduct” and as an “end-state of existence” in Rokeach’s definition. A distinction is often made between instrumental values, *i.e.* values referring to a desirable mode of conduct, and terminal values, values describing desirable end-states of existence.<sup>12</sup> This distinction is not without its opponents. Many critics point out that even end-state values are often defended as a means of achieving something else.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, the expression “end-state” is unfortunate because it gives the impression of a static

<sup>7</sup> Isaiah Berlin, “On the Pursuit of the Ideal” (1988).

<sup>8</sup> Hilary Putnam, *The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays* (2002); Henry Margenau, *Facts and Values* (1955).

<sup>9</sup> See also Bernard Williams, “Consistency and Realism” (1973).

<sup>10</sup> Milton Rokeach, *The Nature of Human Values* (1973), p. 6.

<sup>11</sup> *Idem*, p. 14.

<sup>12</sup> *Idem*, p. 7.

<sup>13</sup> For example, if someone does not agree that “peace” is a desirable end-state, one can try to convince this person by explaining that a peaceful world makes it possible for people to live in freedom, without the fear that whatever they construct might be destroyed the next day by rebel groups or the army. But if this person does not believe that to live in freedom is valuable, you have to find something that this person does find valuable and explain how the value of “peace” is a means to realizing that value. See also Richard Robinson, *An Atheist’s Values* (1964), pp. 33-35.

and unchanging state, which is contrary to the evolving character of values emphasized above. For these reasons, this distinction is not made in the present study.

Rokeach's definition refers to values as beliefs that a particular end-state is either "personally" or "socially" preferable to its alternatives. There are values with a "personal" focus and others with a "society-centred" focus. Another way to make that distinction is to divide values into "intrapersonal" and "interpersonal" values. While peace of mind may be a desirable intrapersonal end-state, world peace is an interpersonal end-state.<sup>14</sup> In the same vein, Oyserman made a distinction between values operating at the individual level and values operating at the group level. The latter set of values were defined as "scripts or cultural ideals held in common by members of a group: the group's "social mind"."<sup>15</sup> Robinson made a similar distinction when he divided values into personal and political values. Robinson's personal values included beauty, truth, reason and love; his political values included equality, freedom, tolerance, peace and justice, and democracy.<sup>16</sup> Since this study is concerned with the global values that guide global decision making, the focus is on the latter type, *i.e.* the political or "interpersonal" values.

Another important keyword in the definition is the word "preferable". The concept of "value" is presented in the definition as a relative concept, in the sense that values do not describe a perfect world in a void (a perfect idea in the Platonic sense), but rather it involves a preference between two or more actual possibilities. McDougal and Lasswell noted that "a value is a preferred event";<sup>17</sup> it cannot be put more simply than that. For example, there is a choice between peace and war, or between sustainable development and unsustainable development.<sup>18</sup> The preferred option is the one that is valued. Therefore "peace" is a value, and "war" is not, simply because peace is preferable. The global values that guide global affairs are often directly inspired by serious disasters and deprivation in the modern world. In that case, the values are not so much descriptions of an ideal, but are rather based on efforts to remove the most obvious evils from the present state of affairs, or at least to prevent such evils from happening again in the future.

As some of the values identified by Rokeach are excluded from the present discussion (such as personal values), the definition can be slightly modified:

<sup>14</sup> Milton Rokeach, *The Nature of Human Values* (1973), pp. 7-8.

<sup>15</sup> Daphna Oyserman, "Values : Psychological Perspectives" (2004), p. 16151. Individual values are defined, on the same page, as "internalized social representations or moral beliefs that people appeal to as the ultimate rationale for their actions."

<sup>16</sup> Richard Robinson, *An Atheist's Values* (1964).

<sup>17</sup> Myres McDougal, *Studies in World Public Order* (1987), p. 11. The part of this book that is referred to was written together with Harold Lasswell.

<sup>18</sup> Milton Rokeach, *The Nature of Human Values* (1973), pp. 9-10.

A value is an enduring belief that a specific state of existence is socially preferable to an opposite state of existence.<sup>19</sup>

After removing some of the words from the definition, it is now necessary to add a few new words. The aim is not to correct Rokeach's definition in any way, but to define more specifically the kind of values that are the subject of the present discussion.<sup>20</sup>

First, this study deals only with those values that guide global decision making. Therefore reference should be made to the state of existence of "the world," rather than that of one specific individual or of specific communities. This is a marked difference compared to the approach adopted by Rokeach. He focused his research on individual values, although he did include a world of beauty and a world at peace in his list. The fact that the focus is on the state of existence of the world does not mean that the health and well-being of the planet itself is at the heart of global values. It is the human inhabitants of the world who compare various states of existence of the world, and the criterion for preferring one possible end-state to another is the standard of living of all human beings in that world. The world is looked at from a "human perspective."<sup>21</sup> This perspective has actually been adopted by those in charge of global decision making. Whether this choice of perspective can be morally justified is another matter.<sup>22</sup>

Secondly, the definition should explicitly state that global values must be "globally shared." If the set of global values presented in this study were based on the beliefs of the author of this study, a small group of experts or a small group of nations, they could never actually guide global affairs.<sup>23</sup>

Thirdly, the definition should explicitly state that the values refer to "possible" worlds and not to options that are simply unattainable, like heaven on earth. Kekes defined values as "possibilities whose realization may make lives good."<sup>24</sup> The word "possibilities" is appealing, because it emphasizes that values describe a state of affairs which can be achieved. This aspect of values is often

<sup>19</sup> The words "or converse" were deleted because these words add nothing to the word "opposite".

<sup>20</sup> None of the changes in the definition is meant as an "improvement." Instead, it is meant to narrow down the values under discussion, and to give further clarification.

<sup>21</sup> Indeed, this is a form of "speciesism", meaning that animals, plants and the planet as a whole are looked at from a human-centered perspective. See Richard Ryder, "All beings that feel pain deserve human rights" (2005). However, that does not mean they are morally irrelevant. After all, it may be better, from a human perspective, to live in a world where animals are not mistreated and "tortured."

<sup>22</sup> The consequences of such a choice of perspective are most clearly visible when it comes to the environment (see Chapter V on Social Progress and Development, below).

<sup>23</sup> See further section 3 of Chapter II, below.

<sup>24</sup> John Kekes, *The Morality of Pluralism* (1993), p. 27. This is also the definition of values that is chosen by the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy in their report on *Waarden, normen en de last van het gedrag* (2003) [values, norms and the burden of behaviour], p. 54 and p. 65. One assumption that is not made explicit in the definition is the interpersonal aspect of values.

emphasized. For example, elsewhere it is suggested that values are “not abstract ideals beyond our reach but determinate, desirable actions anchoring on the process of the movement from the actual to the ideal stage.”<sup>25</sup> As the present discussion is about values guiding actual politics and decision making, the search for *attainable* preferences is essential.

Kekes’ definition is also interesting for another reason. It suggests that achieving all values results in a “good life.” The reference to the “good life” in the definition of global values provides a standard for comparing two states of the world and choosing the preferred one, i.e., that world in which the “good life” is guaranteed, or at least in which there is a better guarantee than in any alternative state of the world. Therefore it is helpful to take a closer look at what Kekes meant by a “good life”:

A life will be called here “good” only if it is both personally satisfying and morally meritorious. Either component alone would not be sufficient to make a life good. For personal satisfaction may be obtained at the cost of causing much evil, and the price of moral merit may be the frequent frustration of reasonable desires, and neither evil nor frustrated lives should be supposed to be good.<sup>26</sup>

Kekes applied his definition to human beings in their daily interaction with other human beings. For that purpose, it is perfectly justifiable to base a definition of values on the search for a “good life.” However, the definition that serves to guide the present discussion should include a guiding criterion for moral behaviour, not in the relationship between two individual human beings, but in global, political decision making. The term “good life,” as described by Kekes, is helpful only if the ultimate purpose of global decision making is to teach people how to live in such a way that all the world’s citizens are both “satisfied” and “morally meritorious.” But this sounds almost as if the ultimate purpose of the global ethic is a global “civilizing mission,” and that is not the intention.

It could also be argued that international decision making is about ensuring a “normal life” for all the world’s citizens.<sup>27</sup> But what is a “normal” life? One can look at what all human beings value simply because they are humans. Kekes referred to primary values as values that “derive from the universal aspect of human nature.”<sup>28</sup> An analysis of human nature can focus on what human beings need simply to stay alive. In his search for a complete list of human values, Rokeach noted that “[i]t can be argued that the total number of values is roughly equal to or

<sup>25</sup> Aligarh Muslim University, *Man, Reality, and Values* (1964), p. 59.

<sup>26</sup> John Kekes, *The Morality of Pluralism* (1993), p. 8.

<sup>27</sup> Bart Landheer, “Ethical Values in International Decision-making: Remarks around the Conference” (1960), p. 8.

<sup>28</sup> *Idem*, p. 32-33. See also p. 38 onwards.

limited by man's biological and social make-up and most particularly by his needs."<sup>29</sup> Basic needs can be seen as the absolute minimum that is necessary for physical well-being. Miller similarly tried to define human values by looking, first of all, at biological needs. In his view,

Some needs are biologically derived: every living person needs food and shelter as a minimum and therefore places a basic value on securing them. Beyond the bare survival values come a host of those intended to provide the greater and greater realization of human potential.<sup>30</sup>

Although some of the higher values mentioned by Miller (such as poetry) may be less important than others, more is expected of a normal life than the fulfilment of the most basic needs, or "bare survival values". But what exactly constitutes a "normal life" differs from person to person, and depends only to a limited extent on the state of the world.

Descriptions of a good or normal life essentially consist of a set of values. For example, a normal life is defined as a life in which food, shelter and security are guaranteed. To define a normal life, it is necessary to define food, shelter and security. An approach which defines the set of values by referring to these general terms then becomes a circular approach.

There is another objection to using the terms "good life" or "normal life" in a definition of "global value." They both suggest that there is an end-stage, and that the aim is to reach that end-stage as quickly as possible. The use of these words suggests that as soon as all human beings lead a "good" or "normal" life, all global values have been realized and that should be the end of it. In actual fact, "[e]very good is not a final resting place but a stage in the never ceasing struggle for social progress."<sup>31</sup> It is thus preferable not to use an end-stage and instead to stick to a more relative notion of values. The search for global values is more like a never-ending comparison between the actual situation and "better" alternatives. In other words: the world's effort to strive for progress should not be seen as an attempt to achieve one supreme value ("a good life for all"), but rather as an attempt to achieve various different values, which together lead to a state of the world that is preferable to the current state of the world from the perspective of the human being. This search will never be completed. The state of the world can always be better than it is at the moment. Our beliefs about what can make the world a better place also evolve continuously. They do not focus on one super standard, such as a "good life" for everyone.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Milton Rokeach, *The Nature of Human Values* (1973), p. 11.

<sup>30</sup> Lynn H. Miller, *Global Order* (1990), pp. 10-11. Examples of such higher values are poetry (mentioned by Miller), and one may add such values as beauty, or love.

<sup>31</sup> Aligarh Muslim University, *Man, Reality, and Values* (1964), p. 59.

<sup>32</sup> See section on evolution of global values (4.3 of Chapter II), below.



All these insights lead to the following definition of global values:

A global value is an enduring, globally shared belief that a specific state of the world, which is possible, is socially preferable, from the perspective of all human beings, to the opposite state of the world.

Many other questions remain. For example, the question arises whether the definition suggests that global values should be seen from the perspective of individual human beings and not from the perspective of collectives, such as States or peoples. To avoid having to choose between the two perspectives, the intention was to define global values in such a way that both approaches are permissible. Another question is what the ideal language might be to express these “globally shared beliefs,” ensuring that the beliefs motivate the responsible actors to strive for the realization and promotion of these beliefs. What are the world’s values? What role do these global values actually play in global politics? All these questions are dealt with in subsequent sections in this chapter.

## **2 VALUES AS PREFERENCES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY**

The first of these remaining questions is the choice of perspective. According to the definition, a global value describes a preference from the “perspective of all human beings.” Does this mean that all individual citizens of the world have to share an identical set of preferences? Or is the reference to “all human beings” to be understood in a vaguer sense, as referring to the general preference of some kind of global community?

This study chooses the latter option. The world does not consist of isolated individuals. At least, that is not a viewpoint which is universally accepted. It is not necessary to interview every single person in the world. Instead, it is necessary to find those places where authoritative decisions are made on behalf of the global community as a whole. It is there that the world chooses between different possible futures. It is there that global values are defined.

This view suggests that the fate of the world is not decided as a result of a conflict between opposing value systems and interests. Instead, the assumption is that there is a collective and genuine attempt to look at the state of the world from a global perspective. Such a view makes great demands on the participants in this process. They must show consideration, not only for themselves and their own lives, but also for others, for the global community as a whole. The assumption here is not that such a viewpoint *ought* to be adopted, but that it actually *is*. This assumption clearly has its opponents. For example, according to Landheer, there is only one principle that *actually* operates at a global level, and that is the principle –

it is not a value – of coexistence.<sup>33</sup> He argues that values only operate within smaller communities.

As the assumption that values also operate at a global level is therefore not generally shared, an attempt is made to make it plausible. The following subsections examine the scope of values. They try to discover exactly what constitutes the community in which the values introduced in this chapter guide the search for a better world. As the definition of global values proposed above already shows, the suggestion is that this community is the community of all the world's citizens. To substantiate this claim, cosmopolitan ideas are examined (subsection 2.1), as well as the facts of globalization (2.2). Finally, the relevance of local communities in this global community is examined (2.3).

## 2.1 The global community as an ideal: cosmopolitanism

The assumption that there is a need for a set of global values, together depicting a preferred world from the perspective of all human beings in that world, corresponds well with the cosmopolitan discourse. This discourse might have European roots,<sup>34</sup> but Ribeiro is certainly right to state that “[t]he sentiments cosmopolitanism evokes are not restricted to the western world.”<sup>35</sup> They are universal. And in the end, cosmopolitanism is more of a sentiment than a fully-fledged theory.

The origin of “cosmopolitanism” can be traced back to Ancient Greece.<sup>36</sup> In the ancient world, there were two strands of cosmopolitanism: the Stoic version and the Cynic version.<sup>37</sup> Depending on whether one was a stoic cosmopolitan or a cynic cosmopolitan,<sup>38</sup> one believed in a solid world community or in a world of free individuals with no attachment to any community whatsoever.

<sup>33</sup> Bart Landheer, “Ethical Values in International Decision-making: Remarks around the Conference” (1960), p. 7.

<sup>34</sup> This fact is often highlighted. For example, the first sentence of an introductory article about the term in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences* reads: “Cosmopolitanism is a western notion.” See Antonio Sousa Ribeiro, “Cosmopolitanism” (2004), p. 2842.

<sup>35</sup> *Idem*, p. 2843.

<sup>36</sup> For a general introduction to cosmopolitanism, see Pauline Kleingeld, *Cosmopolitanism: entry for the Internet Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2006).

<sup>37</sup> *Idem*. See also Pauline Kleingeld, “Wereldburgers in eigen land: Over kosmopolitisme en patriotisme” (2005).

<sup>38</sup> In late eighteenth-century Germany alone, many thinkers have expressed many different (Stoic) cosmopolitan views. For an overview, see Pauline Kleingeld, “Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany” (1999).

The cynics, led by Diogenes of Sinope, claimed to be completely detached from any particular community.<sup>39</sup> When asked what *polis* he came from, Diogenes replied: “*kosmopolitês*” (citizen of the cosmos); thereby not only denying his ties to his hometown Sinope - the town from which he was banished - but at the same time emphasizing his ties to the universe.<sup>40</sup> This makes Diogenes a (self-professed) cosmopolitan. At the same time, Diogenes’ lifestyle and aphorisms do not show he believed that being a cosmopolitan involved universally shared solidarity and universally shared responsibility.<sup>41</sup> His idea of cosmopolitanism focused more on the *negative* aspect: a cosmopolitan is someone who has no national attachments or prejudices. This is why Diogenes can be called a *cynic* cosmopolitan. According to this version of cosmopolitanism, being a citizen of the world means being free and (officially) unbound. An examination of Diogenes’ life shows that being a cynic cosmopolitan can be a lonely business.<sup>42</sup> This cynic version of cosmopolitanism has not inspired many political philosophers, because it is more of an anti-theory, rather than a very constructive theory.<sup>43</sup> However, the sense of freedom at the heart of it can be found in the spirit of many cynical world travellers and cynical novelists.

Recent examples of cosmopolitan sentiments expressed by novelists can be found in the work of the Dutch novelist Gerard Reve, and the French author Michel Houellebecq. In *Op Weg naar het Einde*, Reve writes:

See here, to start at the beginning, the truth that made me free, but not at all contented. I suspected it for a long time, but now I know for certain: that I will never, no matter where, no matter how old I have become, find peace, and that I shall never see a region or city, which is not exhaustive because of its familiarity, since I will have seen everything, without exception, once before.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>39</sup> As most cynics, Diogenes of Sinope did not write much. His philosophy *is* his life style, and we know about his lifestyle because it has been described by others, especially by Diogenes Laertius in his book *The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers* (first half of the third century AD).

<sup>40</sup> Diogenes Laertius, *The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers*, Book VI: Life of Diogenes.

<sup>41</sup> Diogenes shows a complete disregard for official ties, such as taxes, respect for authority, etc. However, he shows a genuine concern for the fate of other human beings, especially (fellow) outsiders, regardless of their position etc. This is what makes him a cosmopolitan. See also Pauline Kleingeld, *Cosmopolitanism: entry for the Internet Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2006).

<sup>42</sup> The following anecdote may serve as an example of his loneliness: once Diogenes of Sinope was going into a theatre while everyone else was coming out of it; and when asked why he did so, he said: “It is what I have been doing all my life.” Diogenes Laertius, *The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers*, Book VI: Life of Diogenes. A similar combination of melancholy and endless travels one can find in the letters of Petrarch.

<sup>43</sup> This fact was cause for considerable anti-cosmopolitan sentiments. Pauline Kleingeld, “Wereldburgers in eigen land: Over kosmopolitisme en patriottisme” (2005), p. 4 quotes the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the *Dictionary of the Académie Française* 4th Edition (1762) as examples of negative attitudes towards cosmopolitanism. In the latter, one can find the following definition of “cosmopolite”: “Celui qui n’adopte point de patrie. Un Cosmopolite n’est pas un bon citoyen.” Clearly this is a definition of a cynic, not stoic cosmopolitan.

<sup>44</sup> The translation is my own. Gerard Reve, *Op weg naar het einde* (1963).

In *Plateforme*, Houellebecq writes:

Qu'avais-je, pour ma part, à reprocher à l'Occident ? Pas grand-chose, mais je n'y étais pas spécialement attaché (et j'arrivais de moins en moins à comprendre qu'on soit attaché à une idée, un pays, à autre chose en général qu'à un individu). [...] Je pris soudain conscience avec gêne que je considérais la société où je vivais à peu près comme un milieu naturel – disons une savane, ou une jungle – aux lois duquel j'aurais dû m'adapter. L'idée que j'étais solidaire de ce milieu ne m'avait jamais effleuré; c'était comme une atrophie chez moi, une absence.<sup>45</sup>

A society based on freedom and detachment alone is a very unhappy one.

According to the stoic version of cosmopolitanism, all the people in the world share a common rationality, common values and a common fate, despite their different cultural backgrounds, and this formally binds them, or ought to do so. This version of cosmopolitanism is *positive*, in the sense that it requires all men and women to do something, namely to create and sustain a common life and order.<sup>46</sup> The ideas of Zeno, the founder of the Stoics, are summarized as follows by Plutarch:

All the inhabitants of this world of ours should not live differentiated by their respective rules of justice into separate cities and communities, but [...] we should consider all men to be of one community and one polity, and [...] we should have a common life and an order common to us all, as a herd that feeds together and shares the pasturage of a common field.<sup>47</sup>

The stoic version of cosmopolitanism has flourished in political philosophy. Immanuel Kant is often seen as a cosmopolitan in this more positive, stoic sense.<sup>48</sup> In his lectures on anthropology, Kant wrote:

The character of the [human] species, as it is indicated by the experience of all ages and of all peoples, is this: that, taken collectively (the human race as one whole), it is a multitude of persons, existing successively and side by side, who cannot do without associating peacefully and yet cannot avoid constantly offending one another. Hence they feel destined by nature to [form], through mutual compulsion under laws that proceed from themselves, a coalition in a cosmopolitan society – a coalition which, though constantly threatened by dissension, makes progress on the whole.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>45</sup> Michel Houellebecq, *Plateforme : au milieu du monde* (2001), p. 339.

<sup>46</sup> See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, "Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism" (1997), p 6.

<sup>47</sup> Plutarch, *De Fortuna Alexandri*, First Oration, Paragraph 6.

<sup>48</sup> Martha C. Nussbaum, "Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism" (1997), pp. 1-25.

<sup>49</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798), para. 331. Kant hastens to add that the idea of a cosmopolitan society is "unattainable", but that it is an ideal that can guide us.

This describes a cosmopolitan society which ultimately includes all human beings. In our own time, cosmopolitans are calling for even more intense solidarity and cooperation, like a minimalist welfare State structure operating on a global level,<sup>50</sup> based on universal principles.<sup>51</sup>

Underlying all these suggestions is the idea that all human beings are equal and that they all relate to each other. In a sense, any cosmopolitan theory argues above all for the application, within that cosmopolitan society, of Kant's categorical imperative: "act as if your maxims were to serve at the same time as a universal law (for all rational beings)."<sup>52</sup> This imperative is basically the principle of reciprocity, and a cosmopolitan version suggests that you should treat others, *i.e.* all other world citizens, as you want to be treated yourself. Kant never suggested that this imperative was a philosophical invention. Rather, he presented it as a rule of thumb, or as an intuitive principle which most people already adopt in everyday life.<sup>53</sup>

As Railton noted, this intuition forms the basis of all law and legal reasoning. He rephrased the categorical imperative as follows:

Like ideal legislators, we [...] authorize ourselves to act by "making law," aware of the condition that we ought to be – even when we would prefer otherwise – subject to the very same law (the imperative is categorical).<sup>54</sup>

This type of solidarity and reciprocity is the positive aspect of cosmopolitanism, proposed by the stoic version. The challenge is to combine the cynic's sense of freedom with the stoic's sense of global solidarity, without completely ignoring the special bonds that people have with those close to them.

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<sup>50</sup> Most present-day cosmopolitan philosophers use John Rawls' latest book, *The Law of Peoples* (1999), to argue against. In that book, Rawls decides not to apply his (domestic) theory of justice, *mutatis mutandis*, to the global community of individuals. There are many philosophers, some of them students of Rawls, who do apply Rawls' theory on a global level. See *e.g.*, Roland Pierik and Wouter Werner, "Cosmopolitanism, Global Justice, and International Law" (2005); Thomas W. Pogge, "An Egalitarian Law of Peoples" (1994); Andrew Kuper, "Rawlsian Global Justice: Beyond a Law of Peoples to a Cosmopolitan Law of Persons" (2000).

<sup>51</sup> Roughly speaking, these are the assumptions/principles: 1) the equality of all individuals; 2) the freedom of all individuals to choose how to live their life (restricted only by respect for the freedom of others); 3) the acknowledgment of personal accountability and responsibility of all individuals for the consequences of their decisions made in freedom; 4) consent and meaningful participation of individuals in collective decision-making processes that affect them; 5) some basic form of global solidarity. See *e.g.*, David Held, "Law of States, Law of Peoples" (2002).

<sup>52</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sittenn* (1785). Lynn H. Miller, *Global Order* (1990), p. 206 writes that this imperative can be applied both on an interpersonal as well as an interstate level.

<sup>53</sup> See Matthias Kaufmann, "Kantian Ethics and Politics" (2004), p. 8075.

<sup>54</sup> Peter Railton, "Ethics and Values" (2004), p. 4786.

An attempt to do this can be found in the ideas of humanism.<sup>55</sup> This clearly advocates a respect for the freedom of the individual, complemented by an appeal for global solidarity, organized in a global community. This combination is expressed in the Humanist Manifesto of 1973, as follows:

We deplore the division of humankind on nationalistic grounds. We have reached a turning point in human history where the best option is to transcend the limits of national sovereignty and to move toward the building of a world community in which all sectors of the human family can participate. Thus we look to the development of a system of world law and a world order based upon transnational federal government. This would appreciate cultural pluralism and diversity. It would not exclude pride in national origins and accomplishments nor the handling of regional problems on a regional basis. Human progress, however, can no longer be achieved by focusing on one section of the world, Western or Eastern, developed or underdeveloped. For the first time in human history, no part of humankind can be isolated from any other. Each person's future is in some way linked to all. We thus reaffirm a commitment to the building of world community, at the same time recognizing that this commits us to some hard choices.<sup>56</sup>

A cosmopolitan attitude essentially comes down to the belief that all human beings together constitute a community. This is not something one can argue for or against. It is more of a “cosmopolitan sentiment,” an intuition which can be shared – or not.

Cynical cosmopolitans demonstrate a feeling of detachment from any particular community, *i.e.* the sense that the world does not end at the border of one's local community. These cynical cosmopolitans often travelled around the world. But even someone like Kant, who never left his local community, can share this cosmopolitan sentiment and feel that there is no reason to be particularly attached to a particular local community and see the “outside world” as being alien.

The stoic cosmopolitans believe that, since the outside world is part of one's own world, one also has various responsibilities to the individuals living in that world. The Greeks did not elaborate much on how this sense of responsibility should influence behaviour, since their opportunities to influence global affairs were rather limited. These opportunities have grown exponentially since that time,

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<sup>55</sup> Humanism also suffers from the fact that, like cosmopolitanism, it has a Western origin. The manifestos that will be referred to below are made in the USA. And, according to the first words of the European Treaty, the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law have all developed from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe. *Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union*, published in the Official Journal of the European Union, C 115/15 (9 May 2008).

<sup>56</sup> *Humanist Manifesto II* (1973), 12th principle. See also *Humanist Manifesto III* (2003). The first Humanist Manifesto was written in 1933 by Roy Sellars and Raymond Bragg. The second Manifesto was written in 1973 by Paul Kurtz and Edwin Wilson. The third Humanist Manifesto was published in 2003 by the American Humanist Association. See Edwin H. Wilson, *The genesis of a humanist manifesto*, and Paul Kurtz, *Humanist manifesto 2000: a call for a new planetary humanism*.

and therefore it has become necessary to consider some organized or institutional ways of implementing the global responsibilities arising from the cosmopolitan sentiment.

These institutions have been referred to as a “cosmopolitan society” (Kant), a “world community” (Humanist Manifesto), or a “global community.” The two fundamental ideas of any such cosmopolitan order are that all human beings are equal and that their commonality leads to a set of rights and obligations which are universal, and are thus best expressed in universally valid laws (or “world law,” the term used in the Humanist Manifesto).<sup>57</sup>

## 2.2 The reality of the global community: globalization

In the previous section, cosmopolitan sentiments and theories were invoked to justify the global application of a value-based system of decision making. Philosophical exposés and theories were used to support the idea that the state of the world should be viewed from the perspective of all human beings in that world. The central question in this section is whether we *actually* look at the world from this sort of a cosmopolitan perspective.

In 2003, Kofi Annan, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, explained the need for global values as follows:

Every society needs to be bound together by common values, so that its members know what to expect of each other, and have some shared principles by which to manage their differences without resorting to violence. That is true of local communities and of national communities. Today, as globalization brings us all closer together, and our lives are affected almost instantly by things that people say and do on the far side of the world, we also feel the need to live as a global community. And we can do so only if we have global values to bind us together.<sup>58</sup>

Nowadays, as the world is getting smaller and many individuals actually interact with people from all over the world, the cosmopolitan view of the world as “a herd that feeds together and shares the pasturage of a common field” becomes more and more persuasive, to the point where it is being transformed from an idea into fact.

The common field is no longer divided into various parts. Individuals no longer have to justify their behaviour only to those who share the particular part of the field where they are grazing. Global cooperation has gone beyond the principle of coexistence, *i.e.* simply tolerating other herds being in fields elsewhere. In Peter Singer’s words:

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<sup>57</sup> For the notion of “world law,” see Otto Spijkers, “De notie van wereldrecht vóór, tijdens en na de oprichting van de Verenigde Naties” (2010).

<sup>58</sup> Kofi Annan, “Do we still have Universal Values?” (2003). See also Kofi Annan, *Global Values: The United Nations and the Rule of Law in the 21st Century* (2000).

Ethics appears to have developed from the behaviour and feelings of social mammals. [...] If the group to which we must justify ourselves is the tribe, or the nation, then our morality is likely to be tribal, or nationalistic. If, however, the revolution in communications has created a global audience, then we might feel a need to justify our behaviour to the whole world. This change creates the material basis for a new ethic that will serve the interests of all those who live on this planet in a way that, despite much rhetoric, no previous ethic has ever done.<sup>59</sup>

The revolution in communications referred to by Singer is only one aspect of the globalization that necessitates this new ethic. The world is flat, wrote Thomas Friedman,<sup>60</sup> and the fences that used to divide one grazing herd from another have weakened considerably. This is not a development of the last ten years. It began to take serious shape at the end of the Second World War. There is now a need to work out the global values to guide this flat world with its feeble fences, and to give globalization a human face.<sup>61</sup> The idea is clear: the world has become a global community not because of shared cosmopolitan sentiments, but because people actually interact with each other at a global level. And wherever and whenever people interact, they need a common set of values to guide their interaction.

As early as 1955, the American political scientist Quincy Wright foresaw the importance that this process of globalization would have on ethics. He distinguished four stages in the development of the “international ethic”.<sup>62</sup> Together, these four stages describe a kind of evolution from various irreconcilable and isolated local cultures into one universally shared culture. According to Wright, this evolution had to be completed for an international ethic to be established. In the initial stage of this evolution, “the value systems of the principal nations of the world differ, and are, in varying degree, inconsistent with one another.” This inconsistency is not problematic as long as these nations “coexist” and do not interact with each other. However, “the conditions of the modern world, by increasing the contacts between persons and social systems guided by divergent value systems, have developed these inconsistencies into conflicts of interest, of more or less intensity” (second stage). When nations with differing value systems *do* interact, conflicting value systems become apparent and problematic. Some common ground has to be found. As Wright wrote, “these contacts have resulted in

<sup>59</sup> Peter Singer, *One World: The Ethics of Globalization* (2002), p. 12.

<sup>60</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, *The World Is Flat: a Brief History of the Twenty-first Century* (2005).

<sup>61</sup> Willem van Genugten, Kees Homan, Nico Schrijver & Paul de Waart, *The United Nations of the Future: Globalization with a Human Face* (2006).

<sup>62</sup> International ethics is “the science relating the standards and values which individuals, governments, and international organizations believe they ought to observe in their decisions intended to influence international relations.” Philip Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations* (1955), p. 438.



the emergence of an embryonic, universal culture and of institutions and organizations for its interpretation and application, seeking to resolve inconsistencies and conflicts” (third stage). In the final stage of this evolution, “social observation and analysis indicate that value systems can be synthesized, and that philosophical insight and analysis can develop and continually reinterpret universal values to facilitate such synthesis.”<sup>63</sup> This last stage is the stage we find ourselves in at the moment. The biggest challenge in global decision making is therefore to find such a synthesis of values. Both Singer and Wright agreed on this in principle.<sup>64</sup>

Increasingly one can see references in the literature to the idea that we are all individuals living together in a “global village”. This term is not meant to convey a cosmopolitan ideal or even a metaphor. It is meant to be a description of reality. Mendlovitz, the director of the World Order Models Project, wrote in 1975:

As I see it, it is necessary to accept seriously not only the rhetoric but the reality of the term “global village.” The fact that the overwhelming majority of humankind understands for the first time in history that human society encompasses the entire globe is a phenomenon equivalent to humankind’s understanding that the globe is round rather than flat.<sup>65</sup>

This idea is also the starting point for Kofi Annan’s *We the Peoples*, a report he named after the first words in the United Nations Charter. In an attempt to answer the questions “who are we, the peoples?” and “what are our common concerns?,” Annan suggested that we all “imagine, for a moment, that the world really is a ‘global village’ — taking seriously the metaphor that is often invoked to depict global interdependence.”<sup>66</sup> After listing the problems this village (the world) has to cope with, Annan openly asked himself:

Who among us would not wonder how long a village in this state can survive without taking steps to ensure that all its inhabitants can live free from hunger and safe from violence, drinking clean water, breathing clean air, and knowing that their children will have real chances in life?<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> *Idem*, pp. 445-448.

<sup>64</sup> Wright did not believe that when he wrote the book, in 1955, the final stage of the evolution was already reached.

<sup>65</sup> Saul Mendlovitz, *On the Creation of a Just World Order* (1975), p. xvi. This language reminds one of the Copernican revolution, and indeed, in another article, Mendlovitz explicitly makes that comparison. See Saul Mendlovitz & Thomas Weiss, “The Study of Peace and Justice: Toward a Framework for Global Discussion” (1975), p. 155.

<sup>66</sup> Kofi Annan, *We, the Peoples: the Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-first Century* (2000), paras 51-52.

<sup>67</sup> *Idem*, para. 57.

It is difficult to see the world as a global village if one stays in a particular village for all of one's life. Not every human being has Kant's imagination. Only the truly privileged can live their lives as though the whole world were their oyster.<sup>68</sup>

Astronauts, some of the most privileged people in this world, are unique in the sense that they have actually *seen* the "global village" in its entirety with their own eyes. Astronauts have described their profound feelings when they first saw the earth from a distance. The first Dutch astronaut, Wubbo Ockels, expressed this as follows:

I remember that after ten minutes, we folded and put away our chairs. I had to go again, so I floated to the toilet. I passed by the door and looked through the round window. For the first time, I saw the world from outside. Well, that was a shock. It gives such impact. You have that huge perspective. It's really a shock. Gigantic. [...] During the trip, the more you look at the earth, the more you begin to love the earth. In a very deep sense. Our planet is in fact fascinatingly beautiful. But you also realize that a lot of mess is made on earth, which is also a spacecraft as it were. People do not realize how fragile spaceship earth really is.<sup>69</sup>

Almost all astronauts had this profound sensation when they first saw the earth in its entirety.<sup>70</sup> For those less fortunate, the idea that we live in a "global village" remains more abstract than for the astronaut. But if the people of Ancient Greece were capable of feeling part of a "common herd," it should also be possible for our own generation.<sup>71</sup>

If one accepts that we live in a "global village," or that the world is flat,<sup>72</sup> or, in less metaphorical terms, that globalization is a fact, then does this mean that values must be applied at a global level? The globalization of the media makes it possible for specific incidents occurring in a remote village to be broadcast all over the world, not infrequently causing a global outrage. The whole world sympathizes and to a certain extent identifies with the victims.<sup>73</sup> But others have pointed out that

<sup>68</sup> This expression is inspired by William Shakespeare, *The Merry Wives of Windsor* (1602), at the beginning of Scene II (A room in the Garter Inn).

<sup>69</sup> Keizer, "Het Grote Wubbo Ockels Interview," p. 57. The translation is my own.

<sup>70</sup> For other descriptions of such sensations, see a book called *The Home Planet*, which is essentially a collection of pictures from earth, some of them accompanied by quotes from astronauts describing the way they felt when they first saw the earth from outer space. See Kevin W. Kelley, *The Home Planet* (1988).

<sup>71</sup> We can refer to René-Jean Dupuy as an example of an international lawyer imagining looking at the world from the moon. See René-Jean Dupuy, *La communauté internationale entre le mythe et l'histoire* (1986), p. 177.

<sup>72</sup> For a counterargument to Friedman's argument, see e.g., Pankaj Ghemawat, "Why the World Isn't Flat" (2007). This debate is essentially about facts, not theories.

<sup>73</sup> A gruesome example is the global outrage after a 17-year-old girl was stoned to death in Iraq, an incident that was filmed. The story (and the footage) was all over the "blogosphere" and appeared in

globalization may have brought people closer together, only to make them realize how different they really are.<sup>74</sup> In response, one could point to Wright's theory and argue that a full synthesis of values has not yet been achieved, and that there are still some value conflicts that need to be resolved. But is this any different in a local community?

Recently, a survey of global values studied the actual existence of feelings of global solidarity. An examination of the extent to which there is a concern for other people's living conditions results in the following picture: 83% of the world population is concerned with the living conditions of their immediate family.<sup>75</sup> Only 29% are concerned with the living conditions of the people in their neighbourhood.<sup>76</sup> 25% are concerned about their fellow countrymen,<sup>77</sup> and 26% about all their fellow human beings.<sup>78</sup> It is clear that the biggest drop actually occurs when we move away from the family to the neighbourhood, not, as might be imagined, when State borders are crossed. When the State borders are crossed, we actually gain a percentage point. Therefore the conclusion is that State boundaries have very little impact on people's sense of solidarity. However, some of the data suggest that people do feel that they "belong" more to their nation than to the world in its entirety. For example, when asked to which geographical group they belong first of all, 41% of the world's citizens responded that it was their own locality, 34% said it was their country, 7% the world.<sup>79</sup> Furthermore, 56% of the world population was very proud of their own nationality,<sup>80</sup> and 75% would be willing to fight for their country (but not necessarily die for it!).<sup>81</sup> Therefore it must be concluded – if such surveys justify any conclusion at all – that nationalist sentiments are strong, even in a globalized world. The existence of nationalist sentiments is not *per se* a reason to refute cosmopolitanism. The next and final section explains how cosmopolitanism and nationalism can coexist.

For those who do not share the cosmopolitan sentiment or intuition, the choice between cooperating with distant others in an effort to solve global problems, or not trying to solve them at all by avoiding all contact with other communities, becomes a choice between two evils. To make this point, we refer to the grazing herd of the Stoics one last time. This time the metaphor comes from

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newspapers all over the world. Muller, "Jihad in Koerdistan na steniging van meisje", *de Volkskrant*, 10 May 2007 (frontpage).

<sup>74</sup> See Fred Halliday, "Global Governance : Prospects and Problems" (2000).

<sup>75</sup> E153 (Table), in Ronald Inglehart, *Human Beliefs and Values* (2004). Denmark (34), Finland (34) and the Czech Republic (30) are the exceptions.

<sup>76</sup> E154 (Table). Finland (8%) and Turkey (7%) are at the very bottom.

<sup>77</sup> E156 (Table).

<sup>78</sup> E158 (Table).

<sup>79</sup> G1 (Table). Jordan is the exception: 68% say the world, first of all.

<sup>80</sup> G006 (Table). At the bottom, we find the Netherlands (20%), South Korea (17%), Germany (17%), and Taiwan (15%).

<sup>81</sup> E012 (Table). Only 25% in case of Japan, but that is the exception.

Schopenhauer and the cosmopolitan sheep are replaced by slightly less cosmopolitan porcupines:

A company of porcupines crowded themselves very close together one cold winter's day so as to profit by one another's warmth and so save themselves from being frozen to death. But soon they felt one another's quills, which induced them to separate again. And now, when the need for warmth brought them nearer together again, the second evil arose once more. So that they were driven backwards and forwards from one trouble to another, until they had discovered a mean distance at which they could most tolerably exist.<sup>82</sup>

Of course, the porcupines prefer to form little groups consisting solely of those fellow porcupines they feel more closely related to. After all, love softens the pain of the quills. But as the world gets colder, and global problems get bigger, the need for all porcupines to stick together in one big group increases, whether they want to or not.

### 2.3 Local communities in the global community

When cosmopolitans call for a certain detachment from the local community, they do not mean to disregard the importance of communities altogether; they do not think of the world literally as one big family, or as a collection of detached and lonely individuals, like the 6,768,181,146<sup>83</sup> children of Diogenes, each and every one in their own barrel, without any community to belong to. It may be possible to find an “unhappy compromise,” as the porcupines did. As both the Stoics of Ancient Greece and many present day philosophers have often pointed out, one can be a cosmopolitan citizen and still find warmth outside the abstract “global neighbourhood.”<sup>84</sup> Even in a fenceless field sheep (or even porcupines) may choose to form little herds to find warmth, without disregarding the fact that they are sheep grazing in a field that belongs to all and needs to be shared by all.<sup>85</sup> Therefore, although this sounds contradictory, cosmopolitanism does not conflict with the existence of local communities.<sup>86</sup>

<sup>82</sup> One of the parables in Arthur Schopenhauer, *Parerga und Paralipomena* (1851), cited at Elizabeth Monroe Drews & Leslie Lipson, *Values and Humanity* (1971), p. 8. The translation is to be found in this book.

<sup>83</sup> The estimate is for July 2010, see *CIA Factbook*.

<sup>84</sup> The term was borrowed from Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighborhood* (1995).

<sup>85</sup> For a legal outline of cosmopolitanism as applied to the community of states, see Bruno Simma, “The Contribution of Alfred Verdross to the Theory of International Law” (1995), pp. 6-11. For a more philosophical discussion, see Kok-Chor Tan, *Justice Without Borders* (2004); David Miller, “Reasonable Partiality Towards Compatriots” (2005).

<sup>86</sup> Ribeiro remarks on p. 2842 of “Cosmopolitanism” (2004) that “[m]uch of the malaise and misunderstanding cosmopolitanism may provoke are related to its ambiguity, that is, its unique way of

Those proclaiming an institutional arrangement for a global community, do not discard the existence and moral relevance of local communities. According to Kant's Perpetual Peace, the cosmopolitan society should consist of a voluntary league of sovereign, republican states,<sup>87</sup> which he later called a permanent congress of states.<sup>88</sup> Kant believed that people were first and foremost citizens of their own particular State,<sup>89</sup> and supported the principle of non-intervention by one State in the affairs of another.<sup>90</sup> By prescribing a conditional form of universal hospitality as the central principle of the law of world citizenship ("Weltbürgerrecht"), Kant did allow the cynical cosmopolitan to wander around the globe and to exercise his right to visit ("Besuchsrecht") any place on this planet, but only to a limited extent.<sup>91</sup> Therefore the global community prescribed by Kant was based both on cosmopolitan solidarity and on the need for local communities to coexist.

This focus on peaceful coexistence meant that Kant was much more realistic than the more idealist cosmopolitans of Ancient Greece. However, according to some it was still not realistic enough. In response to Kant's ideas, Hegel wrote that Kant's *voluntary* League of Nations would be too fragile, as it would be ultimately based on agreements between all States' "own particular will." Therefore "if no agreement can be reached between particular wills, conflicts between States can be settled only by war."<sup>92</sup> Hegel did give cosmopolitans some hope: cooperation within a State was so successful because it was based on both common laws and a common culture (based upon family, civil society and the nation state). Together these constituted a shared ethical life, or "*Sittlichkeit*".<sup>93</sup> Without a shared culture, international legal obligations would remain too abstract

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uniting difference and equality, an apparent paradox of wishing to reconcile universal values with a diversity of culturally and historically constructed subject positions."

<sup>87</sup> Kant, *Zum Ewigen Frieden* (1795). On the interpretation of this treatise (*Zum Ewigen Frieden* mainly consists of a number of articles), much has been written. See e.g., Pauline Kleingeld, "Approaching Perpetual Peace: Kant's Defence of a League of States and his Ideal of a World Federation" (2004). See also, James Bohman & Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (editors), *Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Idea* (1997).

<sup>88</sup> Kant, *Die Metaphysik der Sitten*, Part II (Die Metaphysischen Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre), published in 1797, para. 61. These ideas have influenced the establishment of the League of Nations, which may be seen as the realization of Kant's ideas. For an assessment of this assumption, see, e.g., Samuel Rozemond, *Kant en de Volkenbond* (1930).

<sup>89</sup> See the second part of Pauline Kleingeld, "Wereldburgers in eigen land: Over kosmopolitisme en patriotisme" (2005).

<sup>90</sup> See Section 1 (Containing the Preliminary Articles for Perpetual Peace among States), Article 5, of Kant, *Zum Ewigen Frieden* (1795).

<sup>91</sup> See Kant, *Zum Ewigen Frieden* (1795), Third Definitive Article for a Perpetual Peace. See Pauline Kleingeld, "Kant's Cosmopolitan Law" (1998); Martha C. Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism" (1994); Lynn H. Miller, *Global Order* (1990), p. 14.

<sup>92</sup> See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (1821), paras. 333-334.

<sup>93</sup> *Idem*, paras. 330-360. One could specifically refer to the last sentence in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (1821): "In the state, the self-consciousness finds the actuality of its substantial knowledge and volition in organic development."

to form the basis of a world community.<sup>94</sup> Therefore, according to Hegel, it is only when all States develop a similar ethical life from within – and Hegel saw the German *Sittlichkeit* as the ideal – that a world league can be successful.<sup>95</sup> This is also reminiscent of Wright and Singer’s ideas: all that is needed in order for there to be a true global community is some kind of global synthesis of values, based on global laws and a global culture.

If one accepts that a global community is – and must be – more than just a patchwork quilt of communities tolerating one another’s existence, and cooperating only out of necessity, the question is whether a globally shared ethical life, as defined by Hegel, is actually possible. Can this develop, despite the existence of local communities?<sup>96</sup> It is a factual, not a conceptual question that constantly recurs in this study. According to some of the stoic cosmopolitans, the fact that we are all (rational) human beings, which no one can deny, is enough to bind us together.<sup>97</sup> But as Nussbaum explained, this abstract bond lacks the warmth of more traditional bonds:

Becoming a citizen of the world is often a lonely business. It is, in effect, as Diogenes said, a kind of exile - from the comfort of local truths, from the warm nestling feeling of patriotism, from the absorbing drama of pride in oneself and one’s own. [...] If one begins life as a child who loves and trusts its parents, it is tempting to want to reconstruct citizenship along the same lines, finding in an idealized image of a nation a surrogate parent who will do one’s thinking for one. Cosmopolitanism offers no such refuge; it offers only reason and the love of humanity, which may seem at times less colourful than other sources of belonging.<sup>98</sup>

The abstract nature of the global community and the concrete character of local communities mean that ordinary people become more attached to the latter. But even when the focus is on the local, the abstract bond based on a sense of common

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<sup>94</sup> Hegel did believe that all human beings are identical as human beings, but he also believed that this idea needed the concretization in the State. See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (1821), para. 209.

<sup>95</sup> Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (1817), Book 3, Para. 548. See also Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (1821), para. 340. On Hegel and cosmopolitanism, see also Steven V. Hicks, *International Law and the Possibility of a Just World Order* (1999), especially pp. 21-26, and Chapter Four: Hegel and Cosmopolitanism.

<sup>96</sup> Habermas has some doubts. See Jürgen Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation* (2001). See especially Chapter 4 on The Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy, pp. 58-112.

<sup>97</sup> But even if this fact alone would indeed be strong enough to bind us, it seems unlikely that a world state can be based solely on that. Even Kant says that the world can only get as far as a permanent congress of states, and this is mainly because it is impossible to point out or create a global central authority, without risking the danger of global despotism. Immanuel Kant, *Die Metaphysik der Sitten*, Part II (Die Metaphysischen Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre), published in 1797, para. 61.

<sup>98</sup> Martha C. Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism” (1994).

humanity could be a solid enough basis for some type of global cooperation and global solidarity. It is always possible to view the fate of fellow human beings in other places from the warmth of the family and local communities. A certain bias is acceptable, as long as we – all human beings – do not behave “as if our separate nations housed separate species.”<sup>99</sup>

It is in the concrete local communities that the abstract values of the global community can be fleshed out. If different cultural traditions express the same core values in different ways, this will lead to a kind of cultural diversity that must be celebrated and cherished, since it allows local communities to learn from the way in which the same values are implemented by others in different ways.<sup>100</sup> Cosmopolitan sentiments will be satisfied if the global community is allowed to monitor from afar whether all human beings are treated adequately from the perspective of the global synthesis of values. It is precisely because this is a global synthesis, that it is by definition of a vague and general nature, and must be elaborated and interpreted at a local level.

## 2.4 Conclusion

These philosophical reflections were intended to clarify the idea that a global value is a belief that a specific state of the world is preferable, *from the perspective of all human beings*, to an opposite state of the world. The italicized phrase should not be interpreted to mean that all individual citizens of this world have to share an identical set of preferences. Instead, the idea was that all human beings were in a sense united in a global community, and that this global community operated on the basis of a shared global ethic. The above subsections merely showed that it was intuitively plausible that there really is such a global community, and that there really is such a global ethic. What has not yet been explored is the content of this global ethic, and the way in which the global community expresses itself, and “acts out” this global ethic. This is explained below.

## 3 A GLOBAL DISCUSSION TO DETERMINE GLOBAL VALUES

According to the definition used in this study, global values are globally shared beliefs about a better world. Does that mean all individuals in this world must actually share a certain belief before it can be regarded as such? Or does it mean that a majority of all the world’s citizens must do so? A process of representative and authoritative global decision making must be found. Wherever it takes place,

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<sup>99</sup> Lynn H. Miller, *Global Order* (1990), p. 14.

<sup>100</sup> Kofi Annan, *Farewell speech as UN Secretary-General*, delivered at the Truman Library in the United States of America on 11 December 2006.

this process is the source of the international community's beliefs. This section contains some philosophical reflections on this process.

### 3.1 The need for a discussion that involves the entire global community

As values are beliefs and not facts, these values cannot be "found" in any particular place.<sup>101</sup> Therefore, when determining the values of the global community, it is useless to send a group of respected scientists into the world to examine the world's values in an objective and definitive way. Rather, a global discussion should be organized to endeavour to find universal agreement, *i.e.* a synthesis of values.

For it to be successful, this discussion should involve the whole of the international community. In the past, there were many examples of particular groups claiming to have found values that applied universally. Even today, Europe, as organized in the European Union, claims to have identified values that apply to everyone.<sup>102</sup> It is possible that the values that are most vividly expressed in a particular history and way of thinking are nevertheless universally applicable, and are or come to be universally shared.<sup>103</sup> Be that as it may, instead of taking for granted the universal validity of a group of values promoted by particular people, it is preferable to come up with a process for defining global values which is sufficiently inclusive. In that case, a particular value is a global value, not when a particular philosopher argues that the value ought to be adopted by all the world's citizens, but when the value can be shown, in fact, to be universally shared.<sup>104</sup> This is also the view of the Ghanaian philosopher Appiah, who states:

I want to hold on to at least one important aspect of the objectivity of values: that there are some values that are, and should be universal, just as there are lots of values that are, and must be, local. We can't hope to reach a final consensus on how to rank and order such values. That's why the model I'll be returning to is that of conversation – and, in particular, conversation between people from different ways of life.<sup>105</sup>

Who participates in this global conversation which determines our global values? If the inclusiveness of the process for determining global values is acted upon, the

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<sup>101</sup> On the objectivity of values, see also the fact/value debate, for example, Hilary Putnam, *The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays* (2002).

<sup>102</sup> See the first words of the *Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union*, Official Journal of the European Union, C 115/15 (9 May 2008).

<sup>103</sup> See Martti Koskenniemi, "International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal" (2005).

<sup>104</sup> See *e.g.*, Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (1651), Chapter XIII: Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as Concerning their Felicity and Misery.

<sup>105</sup> Kwame Anthony Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* (2006), p. xxi.



answer surely is everybody.<sup>106</sup> It is sometimes argued that the participation of all the world's citizens in defining and realizing values, and their participation in both local and global governance, is a value in itself, a value sometimes labelled as "participation" and sometimes as "democracy."<sup>107</sup>

The importance of this kind of inclusiveness, to the extent that it is practically feasible, cannot be overemphasized. One would have to agree with Robinson that it is strange to suggest that the layman needs professional philosophers to tell him or her what is valuable in his or her own life.<sup>108</sup> Although important people may serve as an inspiration, it is old-fashioned to state that "historically situated outstanding figures or institutions," such as "great moral personalities, prophets, philosophers, ideologists, intellectuals, scientists, artists, novelists, film directors, and institutions such as Churches, clubs, learned societies, research centres, universities, etc." serve as the exclusive "value producers."<sup>109</sup>

### 3.2 The need for rules of communication to ensure a genuine discussion

To ensure a genuine discussion about values, it is important to have rules of communication. This section describes these rules in very general terms. In subsequent chapters, especially the equivalent section in the chapter about the United Nations (Chapter III), these general rules are applied to existing political institutions.

A global discussion about values can only succeed if the participants understand that it is in their interest to voluntarily follow certain general rules, and accept the legitimacy of these rules. If everybody always agrees on the *outcomes* of the discussion, then the process by which the outcome was achieved will not be criticized very much. However, if no universal agreement on the outcome is guaranteed in advance, the legitimacy of the rules of the discussion becomes essential, in order for a small dissenting minority to nevertheless accept the outcome of the global discussion as an expression of a global consensus.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> Some global referenda on values have in fact been organized. For European values, see Loek Halman, Ruud Luijckx & Marga van Zundert, *Atlas of European Values* (2005). For global values, see the World Values Survey: <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org>.

<sup>107</sup> Falk referred to a discussion among the participants of WOMP on the issue "as to whether the goal of democratizing participation in authority structures within states and in the world system should be emphasized through the device of formulating a fifth value of participation or by being incorporated in the interpretation of the agreed four." See Richard A. Falk, "Contending Approaches to World Order" (1982), p. 161. See also Rajni Kothari, "World Politics and World Order" (1975), p. 50; this WOMP author does mention participation as a distinct value. Within the United Nations system, White regards "self-determination and democracy" as a distinct value. See Nigel D. White, *The United Nations system* (2002).

<sup>108</sup> Richard Robinson, *An Atheist's Values* (1964), p. 10.

<sup>109</sup> Rodilf Rezsóhazy, "Sociology of Values" (2004), p. 16155.

<sup>110</sup> Thomas Risse, "Global Governance and Communicative Action" (2004).

In his article in which he applied the rules of communicative action on a global level with great insight, Risse argued that in order for a global conversation to work, the participants should not put forward one sole aim, i.e., “to maximize or to satisfy their given interests and preferences.” Instead, they should be more open-minded and be “prepared to change their views of the world or even their interests in light of the better argument.”<sup>111</sup> The aim of the discussion is not to bargain for compromises in an attempt to secure one’s own self-interests, but to reach a reasoned consensus based on sound arguments.<sup>112</sup>

These rules alone do not guarantee that a reasoned consensus on global values will actually be achieved. As human beings are social beings, agreement may be facilitated by the fact that we *want* to reach such universal agreement. It is something we strive for. As Robinson noted, “[t]o find good what everyone else finds bad is apt to be uncomfortable or worse.”<sup>113</sup> This particularly applies when a lack of consensus means a lack of global action to tackle the world’s major problems and alleviate the worst human miseries.

At the same time, Robinson warned against an excessively strong response to unusual points of view. They should not be rejected without proper consideration:

Suppose a man to say that flowers are out of place in a garden, which should contain only trees and grass. Even if he gives no reason for this judgment we may be glad to hear it. It may strike us as a novelty worth considering. We may like to imagine ourselves maintaining such a garden and rejecting flowers, and to ask ourselves whether that would be a change for the better.<sup>114</sup>

Robinson’s point, *i.e.* that any contribution to the global conversation is valuable, is at least intuitively plausible. One could imagine a world without armies, or a world without international criminal courts and tribunals, or a world without state boundaries, or a world without the United Nations. In a global discussion, everything is worth considering. That is the idea.

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<sup>111</sup> *Idem*, p. 294. Many of these ideas on communicative action are based on Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* (1981).

<sup>112</sup> The difference between the two forms of negotiation is succinctly explained as follows: “Bargaining compromises refers to cooperative agreements through the give and take of negotiations based on fixed interests and preferences. Reasoned consensus refers to the voluntary agreement about norms and rules reached through arguing and persuasion.” Thomas Risse, “Global Governance and Communicative Action” (2004), p. 310.

<sup>113</sup> Richard Robinson, *An Atheist’s Values* (1964), p. 45.

<sup>114</sup> *Idem*, pp. 45-46.

### 3.3 Values and interests

These rules of global communication and decision-making can be criticized. One criticism is that the “rules of the game” should not be defined in terms of the rules for a fair and inclusive global discussion. That is not the aim of the conferences and other meetings where international decisions are made. These meetings are about finding ways to prevent conflicts between competing interests and some common interests which can be jointly realized. These discussions are not about values. Instead, they are – and ought to be – about interests. Even if decision makers claim to be guided by values, they are, in fact, guided by interests. For example, Mendlovitz wrote that “[o]f course, we know that national leaders more often than not pursue State *interests* (that is, the material and security goals of a given State) even when talking about global *values* (that is, ethically beneficial goals that pertain to humanity as a whole), and that moral claims are often made in a self-serving fashion by geopolitical rivals.”<sup>115</sup>

At first, it may appear that whenever politicians make a decision (*e.g.* to sign a treaty, or to go to war, or to do nothing), they are guided by particular interests, especially the national interest. The philosopher may be like a “poet who reflects in tranquillity upon past experience (or other people’s experience), thinking about political and moral choices already made.”<sup>116</sup> The politician does not have time for that. The politician must act, and act now. The reference to values, philosophy, ethics and legal theories is an *ex post facto* rationalisation for a particular decision. It is argued that it is not these ideas that determine the politician’s behaviour, but actually the interests at stake.<sup>117</sup>

Seeing interests and values as conflicting in this way is the result of a misunderstanding of what caused the conflict. The two conflicting elements are the local and the global aspects: the *national* interest versus the *global* interest, or the *national* values versus the *global* values.<sup>118</sup> It is possible to define the global interest, or the “human interest,” in terms of values, and in a goal-oriented way.<sup>119</sup> For example, Johansen defined the human interest as “the collection of goals and strategies that are consistent with and will advance the values of global

<sup>115</sup> Richard A. Falk, Samuel S. Kim & Saul H. Mendlovitz, “General Introduction” (1982), p. 2. Emphasis in the original.

<sup>116</sup> Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (2006, original 1977), p. xix.

<sup>117</sup> See Martti Koskeniemi, “By their Acts you shall know them... (And not by their Legal Theories)” (2004), pp. 839-851.

<sup>118</sup> See Robert C. Johansen, *The National Interest and the Human Interest: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy* (1980), in which the author assesses US foreign policy on the basis of the human interest, defined in terms similar to those of global values. See also Lynn H. Miller, *Global Order* (1990), pp. 74-75.

<sup>119</sup> On the importance of seeing values as goal-oriented, see also Christian Tomuschat, “Die internationale Gemeinschaft” (1995), p. 20.

humanism.”<sup>120</sup> What appears to be a conflict between values and interests, between philosophy and action, is in reality a dispute about the reach of one’s value system: do values apply equally to all the world’s citizens, or is the duty to act morally applicable only in relation to certain groups of people? For example, the “realist” accounts of international relations often adopt a rather restricted reach (Hobbes famously saw man acting as a wolf to other men), while “idealists” often give value systems a global reach, sometimes even extending to animals and plants.<sup>121</sup> The conflict occurs because politicians act from a *nationalist* perspective, while trying to justify their actions to the rest of the world from a *global* perspective.<sup>122</sup> This does not explain away the criticism, but it shows that the conflict is not between values and interests, but between a nationalist and global approach to international decision making. There is no reason to reject the nationalist approach. Even according to most cosmopolitans, it is perfectly justifiable for a decision maker to devote particular attention to the interests of his or her own group, as long as this does not lead to unreasonable costs for the rest of the international community.

### 3.4 The need for a discussion as a motivation for action

To prevent the global discussion about values from becoming an academic or philosophical discussion, the political relevance of the discussion must be ensured. It must be able to motivate action, in order to bring the real world closer to the ideal world, the ideal being defined by the totality of global values.

One of the principal ideas underlying this study is that, if the discussion about global values is phrased in the language of international law, the outcome of the discussion, a continuously growing collection of international legal norms and principles, can actually serve as an instrument to both define global values *and* encourage their global realization.<sup>123</sup> The most important international legal document resulting from this discussion is the United Nations Charter.

When value-based norms, such as the norms in the Charter, are considered to be instruments for the promotion of global values, they have to be interpreted in such a way that the instruments work as effectively as possible to achieve this. This has significant consequences for the study and practice of international law. Lawyers cannot be mere technicians, in the sense Kelsen that used the term. Just after the adoption of the UN Charter, Kelsen wrote that “it is not superfluous to

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<sup>120</sup> Robert C. Johansen, *The National Interest and the Human Interest* (1980) (emphasis in the original). See also Bruno Simma, “From Bilateralism to Community Interest” (1994), p. 233.

<sup>121</sup> See Richard Ryder, “All beings that feel pain deserve human rights” (2005).

<sup>122</sup> See Richard A. Falk, Samuel S. Kim & Saul H. Mendlovitz, “General Introduction” (1982), p. 2.

<sup>123</sup> This was also Tomuschat’s point of departure in Christian Tomuschat, “International law: ensuring the survival of mankind on the eve of a new century (general course on public international law)”, see esp. p. 23. See also Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, “International law for humankind: towards a new jus gentium (I): general course on public international law”, p. 84.

remind the lawyer that as a ‘jurist’ he is but a technician whose most important task is to assist the law-maker in the adequate formulation of the legal norms.”<sup>124</sup> As Walzer pointed out, this restricted view of what the lawyer is and what he does “has become in the age of the United Nations increasingly uninteresting.”<sup>125</sup> Such “technicians” fail to grasp the political context in which they operate. By restricting themselves to technicalities, “[t]he lawyers have constructed a paper world, which fails at crucial points to correspond to the world the rest of us still live in.”<sup>126</sup>

Confronted with value-based norms such as those of the UN Charter, some lawyers adopt a more interdisciplinary approach. These policy-oriented lawyers interpret the law in accordance with the values and goals the laws are made to protect. The most influential is Myres McDougal.<sup>127</sup> To put it briefly, McDougal believed that international law should not be studied as a collection of legally binding norms and their enforcement mechanisms. Instead of focusing on whether a certain norm is binding or non-binding, and on whether a certain enforcement mechanism is strong enough to secure compliance with binding norms, international law should be studied and used as an *authoritative language*, used by the international community as a whole, to discuss values and to come up with means to implement those values at the global level. International law is a *value-oriented jurisprudence*, a language which is used by chosen representatives of the international community (governments, diplomats, international judges and arbitrators, elements of the “UN family,” etc.), to make difficult choices based on shared values. This process of making choices is not restricted to the legal realm. It takes place in the larger context of international relations.<sup>128</sup>

Walzer noted that this interpretation of international law requires some imagination, “for the customs and conventions, the treaties and charters that constitute the laws of international society do not invite interpretation in terms of a single purpose or set of purposes.”<sup>129</sup> The United Nations Charter, by clearly listing its main purposes in value-based language, could be the exception to this rule.

<sup>124</sup> p. xiii, Hans Kelsen, *The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems* (1950).

This “rule of thumb” constitutes the basis of Kelsen’s pure theory of law, which aims to remove from (international) legal doctrine all extra-judicial elements. See Hans Kelsen, *Pure Theory of Law* (1967).

<sup>125</sup> p. xx of Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (Fourth Edition, 2006; original is of 1977).

<sup>126</sup> *Idem*, p. xxi.

<sup>127</sup> Myres S. McDougal, “Law School of the Future: From Legal Realism to Policy Science in the World Community” (1947), p.1352. Also cited on p. 565 of Frederick S. Tipson, “The Laswell-McDougal Enterprise: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity” (1973), no. 3.

<sup>128</sup> See also pp. 80-82 of Patrick Capps, *Human dignity and the foundations of international law* (2009), where the McDougal school is described.

<sup>129</sup> *Idem*.

Some of the policy-oriented lawyers go even further. They argue that the values are themselves part of international law. According to Walzer, these “policy-oriented lawyers are in fact moral and political philosophers,”

And it would be best if they presented themselves that way. Or, alternatively, they are would-be legislators, not jurists or students of the law. They are committed, or most of them are committed, to restructuring international society – a worthwhile task – but they are not committed to expounding its present structure.<sup>130</sup>

The best approach to the practice of law lies between the two extreme positions: the lawyer as technician and the lawyer as philosopher. This study certainly leans towards the policy-oriented approach. At the same time, Walzer’s warning has been taken to heart: the aim is not to describe an ideal framework, but rather to describe the actual law as recognized by the international community, in the context of the United Nations Organization.

There is nothing controversial about the idea of distinguishing a certain body of norms from the rest of international law on the basis of the fact that these norms aim to protect global values, and to give them a more prominent place because of that link.<sup>131</sup> At the same time, Danilenko rightly pointed out that community interests and moral values cannot be regarded as part of law, let alone part of “higher law,” without some form of approval within the recognized normative processes.<sup>132</sup> In a sense, the aim is therefore to look both at the “*substratum* of legal norms,” *i.e.* at “the beliefs, values, ethics, ideas and human aspirations” that form the foundation of international law,<sup>133</sup> and at the legal norms that have emerged through the formal and universally accepted rules of law-making.<sup>134</sup> The challenge is not to choose between a value-based international law and a State consent-based international law, but rather to reconcile the two approaches. Many scholars have already attempted such reconciliation. For example, in his treatise on international law Cassese made it his goal to

Combine the strictly legal method with the historical and sociological approach, to expound the dynamic of international law: in particular, to illustrate the tension between traditional law, firmly grounded in the rock of State sovereignty, and the

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<sup>130</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>131</sup> Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, “International law for humankind: towards a new *jus gentium* (I): general course on public international law” (2005), p. 35, and footnote 91 (page 56), and p. 57. See also Alfred Verdross, “Le fondement du droit international” (1927).

<sup>132</sup> Gennady M. Danilenko, ‘International Jus Cogens: Issues of Law-Making’ (1991), p. 46. See also Michael J. Glennon, ‘De l’absurdité du droit impératif (*Jus cogens*)’ (2006), p. 531.

<sup>133</sup> Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, “International law for humankind: towards a new *jus gentium* (I): general course on public international law” (2005), p. 177.

<sup>134</sup> See also Michael Byers, “Conceptualising the Relationship between *Jus Cogens* and *Erga Omnes* Rules” (1997), p. 212.

new or nascent law, often soft and hazy as a cloud, but inspired with new, community values.<sup>135</sup>

The next chapter (especially sections 2.4 and 3.5 of Chapter III) explains why the type of international law that is the subject of this study, *i.e.* the norms of the United Nations Charter and those contained in declarations of the United Nations General Assembly, can be considered as meeting the formal requirements of law making. However, the formal rules should not be applied too restrictively, as this would stand in the way of an effective use of international law as an instrument for the promotion and protection of fundamental values.

### **3.5 Conclusion**

As beliefs are not facts, a globally shared belief cannot be “discovered” by scientists. Therefore any list of global values proposed by a single scientist must be treated with suspicion. Instead, it is important to organize a discussion which is as inclusive as possible, in the sense that the entire international community can participate. Furthermore, this discussion should be a genuine search for a synthesis of values. If it is merely a discussion in which various actors try to persuade others to adopt their particular beliefs, the discussion will never reach its goal: a set of globally shared values to guide global decision making. Finally, the discussion should have a sense of urgency. It should be action-oriented. An inclusive and genuine character and the capacity to act as a motivation for action; these are the essential requirements of any global discussion.

## **4 A DESCRIPTION OF THE “PREFERABLE” WORLD**

For the sake of clarity and to gain a better idea of the subject of this study, a tentative list is provided of global values, based solely on an examination of the philosophical discourse (4.2). This is followed by some general remarks about the enduring nature of these values (4.3), and about the possibility of progress in our thinking about values (4.4). First, a few words will be devoted to the source of inspiration for these values (4.1).

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<sup>135</sup> Antonio Cassese, *International law* (2nd ed, 2005), Preface.

#### 4.1 Perceived shortages as the primary source of global values

According to the definition used in this study, a global value is a belief that a specific state of the world, which is possible, is preferable to an opposite state of the world. Therefore values are attempts to distinguish an ideal world from an opposite, less ideal, world. To describe the ideal world, it is necessary to have a good sense of what it is that is lacking in the present world. Only then is it possible to imagine a better, or “preferable,” alternative.

This exercise is motivated by an urgent sense of what is lacking, a sense that the state of the world could – and should be – better than it is now.<sup>136</sup> In order to define what is lacking in our world most clearly, the priority is to listen to those who directly experience this, because they are in the best position to define it.<sup>137</sup>

It is only possible to improve the actual state of the world by first defining exactly what is lacking.<sup>138</sup> It is much easier to reach universal agreement on what is lacking than on the more positive formulation of what the alternative ought to be.<sup>139</sup> The easiest way to find global values is to compare the current state of the world, focusing on what can be considered to be its major problems, with a world in which all these major problems have been solved – to the extent that this is possible. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck noted that there is a limited variation in value systems because “there is a limited number of common human problems for which all peoples at all times must find some solution.”<sup>140</sup> Friedrich von Weizsäcker made the same point. He wrote that

The more [values] indicate the absence of an evil, the clearer they become. In wartime the desire for peace, in hunger the desire of satiation, under foreign domination the will to emancipation – all these are immediately comprehensible.<sup>141</sup>

Tag referred to Moore’s list of social causes of all human misery: the ravages of war, poverty, hunger and disease, injustice and oppression, and persecution for holding dissident beliefs. This list provides a fruitful basis for a list of values, because it is difficult – though not impossible - to find a human being who does not

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<sup>136</sup> See also Bruno Simma, “From Bilateralism to Community Interest” (1994), p. 235.

<sup>137</sup> This includes “listening to the voices of the oppressed.” See Richard A. Falk, Samuel S. Kim & Saul H. Mendlovitz, “Voices of the Oppressed” (1982), p. 13.

<sup>138</sup> For such a problem-related approach to values, see Hilary Putnam, *The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays* (2002).

<sup>139</sup> See also Martti Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations* (2001), pp. 504-505.

<sup>140</sup> Florence Kluckhohn & Fred Strodtbeck, *Variations in Value Orientations* (1961).

<sup>141</sup> Carl-Friedrich von Weizsäcker, “A Sceptical Contribution” (1975), pp. 113-114. See also Saul Mendlovitz, *On the Creation of a Just World Order* (1975), p. xii-xiii.



believe that these are the sources of human misery that need to be urgently eradicated, to the extent that this is possible.<sup>142</sup>

At the same time, a certain state of the world can only be described as being “non-ideal” because it is possible to imagine what the ideal is. If one cannot imagine a peaceful world, then war cannot be considered an evil. Therefore an assessment of the major problems in this world is only half of the job. What is crucial is the capacity to imagine a better alternative. But one must start somewhere, and the best strategy is to start with a perceived lack, a vivid example of human misery, and continue by thinking of alternatives, adding details along the way. Many people respond emotionally when they are exposed to suffering and misery. This is the case even when the misery occurs in distant lands, and is only seen on television or read about in newspapers. These gut reactions are a good starting point for a positive quest for values.<sup>143</sup>

To summarize what has been said so far, reference is made to the work of Beres. He described the first part of the value finding process as follows:

After experiencing the realization that this [i.e. the actual world] is not “the best of all possible worlds,” scholars must begin to probe underneath their judgment. This brings them to specific values. Self-consciously or otherwise, these values spark the initial feeling of dissatisfaction. Without them, there can be no criteria by which to assess the adequacy of the extant system.<sup>144</sup>

How do we proceed when the world’s most pressing problems have been exposed and an intuitive alternative is imagined? If a world at war is generally perceived not to be the best possible world, and if there is a universal desire for a peaceful world, how can this lead to a definition of peace in more positive terms, rather than simply as “a world without war”? How can this serve as the inspiration for global strategies to implement this global value of peace in global politics and law-making?

As all human beings are used to looking at the world from a particular perspective, finding a positive formulation of global values requires a rather artificial way of looking at the world. It is necessary to look at the world like the astronaut who literally sees the earth as a “global village”. Most people cannot fly into space, and therefore need to use their imagination before they can adopt such a

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<sup>142</sup> Harry Targ, “Constructing Models of Presents, Futures, and Transitions” (1975), pp. 132-133. Reference is made to Barrington Moore, *Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery* (1973), p. 2. In this essay the argument is made that it is impossible to achieve universal agreement on a definition of happiness, but we can agree on what constitutes unhappiness. Falk refers to this essay approvingly in a footnote on p. 30 of Richard A. Falk, *A Study of Future Worlds* (1975).

<sup>143</sup> The term “gut reactions” was taken from Daphna Oyserman, “Values : Psychological Perspectives” (2004), p. 16150.

<sup>144</sup> Louis Beres, “Reordering the Planet” (1975), p. 52.

global point of view. This can be called a “philosophical enterprise”. Walzer described this enterprise with the help of a beautiful metaphor:

One way to begin the philosophical enterprise – perhaps the original way – is to walk out of the cave, leave the city, climb the mountain, fashion for oneself (what can never be fashioned for ordinary men and women) an objective and universal standpoint. Then one describes the terrain of everyday life from far away, so that it loses its particular contours and takes on a different shape.<sup>145</sup>

Only then is it possible to find global solutions to global problems, *i.e.* to find ways to bring the real world closer to the ideal world. However, as no global culture exists yet, Walzer’s “shape” is an abstraction, and therefore different from the way one is used to looking at more local forms of coexistence and cooperation.

Walzer wrote: “Our common humanity will never make us members of a single universal tribe” and “the crucial commonality of the human race is particularism: we participate, all of us, in thick cultures that are our own.”<sup>146</sup> This explains why people often have a tendency to use the way in which problems are solved in their own community to solve global problems. It also explains why people compare the institutional configuration of the international order with the constitutional order of their own State, even though the world will probably never be transformed into a State-like structure. But there is another way. When people from various local communities gather together frequently to discuss global problems and come up with global solutions, and such gatherings become institutionalized, a new, global culture can emerge slowly but surely, with a truly global perspective.<sup>147</sup> This is the basis of the global ethic, and of the list of global norms arising from that ethic.

## 4.2 A list of global values

The World Order Models Project (WOMP) drew up a list of the major problems confronting the world, which were used to produce a list of global values, or “world order values” as they were termed by that project. The concept of “world order” is based on Bull’s definition of that term:

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<sup>145</sup> Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice* (1983), p. xiv. Walzer does not wish to adopt such a viewpoint, since he immediately adds: “But I mean to stand in the cave, in the city, on the ground.”

<sup>146</sup> Michael Walzer, *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad* (1994), p. 83.

<sup>147</sup> See also Philip Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations* (1955), pp. 445-448. According to Walzer, we are not at this stage yet. In 1994, Walzer wrote that “[global] encounters are not – not now, at least – sufficiently sustained to produce a thick morality [of their own]. Minimalism leaves room for thickness elsewhere; indeed, it presupposes thickness elsewhere.” Michael Walzer, *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad* (1994), p. 19.

The order which men look for in social life is not any pattern or regularity in the relations of human individuals or groups, but a pattern that leads to a particular result, an arrangement of social life such that it promotes certain goals or values.<sup>148</sup>

The WOMP project then went on to look for these values. Mendlovitz, the Director of WOMP, explained the approach of the project as follows:

We were able to agree that humankind faced five major problems: war, poverty, social injustice, environmental decay and alienation. We saw these as social problems because we had values - peace, economic well-being, social justice, ecological stability and positive identity - which no matter how vaguely operationalized, we knew were not being realized in the real world. Our task then was to develop an analytic frame of reference that would provide us analytical tools for coming to grips with these problems so as to realize our values, which are termed world order values.<sup>149</sup>

Like Bull, the WOMP authors defined the concept of “world order” in terms of values, *i.e.* the values listed above.<sup>150</sup> Another book in the WOMP series by Falk contains the most detailed list and description of the WOMP-values. This list includes four of the five values mentioned in the quotation above; the value of positive identity was not on Falk’s list. The list is as follows:

The minimization of large-scale collective violence (calls for ending interstate war, nuclear deterrence and calls for disarmament);

The maximization of social and economic well-being (calls for the general improvement of the quality of life, above all, the elimination of poverty);

The realization of fundamental human rights and conditions of political justice (calls for the realization of individual and group dignity, and therefore including both the protection of human rights and group rights such as the elimination of colonial regimes);

The maintenance and rehabilitation of ecological quality in terms of pollution and resources (embraces both the containment of pollution and the conservation of resources for future generations).<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>148</sup> Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (1977), p. 4.

<sup>149</sup> Saul Mendlovitz, *On the Creation of a Just World Order* (1975), pp. xii-xiii. See also Saul Mendlovitz & Thomas Weiss, “The Study of Peace and Justice: Toward a Framework for Global Discussion” (1975), p. 150.

<sup>150</sup> See also Saul Mendlovitz & Thomas Weiss, “The Study of Peace and Justice” (1975), p. 157.

<sup>151</sup> Richard A. Falk, *A Study of Future Worlds* (1975), pp. 11-30.

The list is based on “the most severe inadequacies in the present world order system: war, poverty, oppression, and ecological decay.”<sup>152</sup> Although not all the participants in the project immediately agreed with the list of values, and although there was at times a slight variation in the list,<sup>153</sup> it has not changed fundamentally in the many books published by the project over the course of three decades.<sup>154</sup>

Apart from the WOMP project, reference can also be made to lists of global values proposed by various individual scholars. Miller’s list, for example, included minimizing cases in which violence is resorted to, the search for economic well-being, the enhancement of human dignity and respect for the environment.<sup>155</sup> White’s list included peace and security, justice and law, human rights, self-determination and democracy, the environment, and economic and social well-being.<sup>156</sup> McDougal and Lasswell’s list contained the following values: security, the allocation of wealth, respect for human dignity in terms of the articulation and implementation of human rights, enlightenment by increasing and sharing scientific and technological skills and know-how, well-being by maintaining optimum standards of safety, health and comfort, rectitude, and affection in the form of global solidarity.<sup>157</sup> Anne-Marie Slaughter listed greater peace and prosperity for all peoples, improvement of their stewardship of the earth and the achievement of minimal standards of human dignity.<sup>158</sup>

It is a problem to rely too much on lists of global values drawn up by individuals, even though the scholars referred to above all based their lists on thorough - and in some cases brilliant - reflection and research. Some scholars admitted that their list of values was only one of many possible end-states, based on preferences that were influenced by their own particular environment, culture and political preferences. For example, in his *Global Covenant*, David Held proposed a

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<sup>152</sup> *Idem*, p. 30.

<sup>153</sup> Von Weizsäcker refers to “peace, freedom, social justice, and prosperity” as WOMP values. See Carl-Friedrich von Weizsäcker, “A Sceptical Contribution” (1975), p. 111. Sakamoto refers to ecological balance, economic well-being, communication development, human development, and peaceful change. See Yoshikazu Sakamoto, “Toward Global Identity” (1975), pp. 191-192. Falk refers to peace, economic well-being, environmental quality, and social and political justice. See Richard A. Falk, “Toward a New World Order” (1975), p. 257. Johansen refers to “peace without national military arsenals”, “economic well-being for all inhabitants on the earth”, “universal human rights and social justice”, and “ecological balance”. See Roben Johansen, “The Elusiveness of a Humane World Community” (1982), p. 202.

<sup>154</sup> Especially in the last series, called *Studies on a Just World Order*, this list of values determines the skeleton of all the books in the series. See Richard A. Falk, Samuel S. Kim & Saul H. Mendlovitz (editors), *Toward a Just World Order* (vol. 1, 1982), Falk, Friedrich Kratchowil & Mendlovitz (editors), *International law* (vol. 2, 1985), and Falk, Kim, Donald McNemar & Mendlovitz, *The United Nations and a Just World Order* (vol. 3, 1991).

<sup>155</sup> Lynn H. Miller, *Global Order* (1990).

<sup>156</sup> Nigel D. White, *The United Nations system* (2002).

<sup>157</sup> See, e.g., Myres McDougal, *Studies in World Public Order* (1987), pp. 17-19 and pp. 32-36.

<sup>158</sup> Anne-Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order* (2004), p. 15.

list of global values explicitly based on social democracy: the rule of law, political equality, democratic politics, social justice, social solidarity and economic efficiency.<sup>159</sup> As a social-democratic model may not be universally shared, other promoters of global values preferred to express themselves in more general terms, in the hope that their list would be considered to be politically neutral. For example, in one of his speeches on foreign policy, Tony Blair spoke about the need for the globalization of the economy to be accompanied by a globalization of politics, which was a “common global policy based on common values.”<sup>160</sup> Even though he suggested that his values were “the values universally accepted across all nations, faiths and races, though not by all elements within them,” Blair’s choice of global values, and the absence of others, was not politically neutral. His values together defined a body of *freedom values*, values strongly inspired by the ideas of the enlightenment: the focus was on liberty, democracy, tolerance and justice.<sup>161</sup>

Certain manifestos or declarations can also be mentioned. According to Küng, the scholar behind the Global Ethic, this ethic provided “a minimal consensus relating to binding values, irrevocable standards and moral attitudes, which can be affirmed by all religions despite their “dogmatic” differences and should also be supported by non-believers.”<sup>162</sup> As his ethic met these demands for universality, it could be seen as a “consensus of values [which] will be a decisive contribution to overcome the crisis of orientation which has become a real problem worldwide.”<sup>163</sup>

The *Humanist Manifesto* is like a secular version of Küng’s global ethic. It could be described as a minimal consensus, affirmed by all non-religious people, which should also be supported by believers. The *Humanist Manifesto II* (1973), stated that “[w]e will survive and prosper only in a world of shared humane values,”<sup>164</sup> these values being, first of all, the “preciousness and dignity of the individual person,”<sup>165</sup> “renounc[ing] the resort to violence and force as a method of solving international disputes,”<sup>166</sup> the “cultivation and conservation of nature,”<sup>167</sup>

<sup>159</sup> David Held, *Global Covenant* (2004), p. 16.

<sup>160</sup> Tony Blair, “Clash about Civilizations” (2006). He said: “The defining characteristic of today’s world is its interdependence; that whereas the economics of globalization are well matured, the politics of globalization are not; and that unless we articulate a common global policy based on common values, we risk chaos threatening our stability, economic and political, through letting extremism, conflict or injustice go unchecked.”

<sup>161</sup> Tony Blair, “PM’s foreign policy speech - third in a series of three” (2006). For a critical response by an Islamic scholar, see Mohd Kamal Hassan’s lecture in Hans Küng, *Towards a Common Civilization: Public Lectures by Hans Kueng and Mohd Kamal Hassan* (1997), pp. 27-29.

<sup>162</sup> *Idem*, p. 7. See also Hans Küng, *Declaration toward a Global Ethic* (1993). The term “non-believers” sounds rather odd.

<sup>163</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>164</sup> *Humanist Manifesto II* (1973), “In Closing”.

<sup>165</sup> *Idem*, 5th principle.

<sup>166</sup> *Idem*, 13th principle,

and the reduction of “extreme disproportions in wealth, income, and economic growth [...] on a worldwide basis.”<sup>168</sup>

It is also possible to refer to global surveys, which ask a representative part of the world’s population about their list of global values.<sup>169</sup> It should be noted that no such survey has ever been conducted. Neither the Global Values Survey, nor any other survey, has ever asked the citizens of the world for a list of global values that guide global affairs. Some findings may be indirectly relevant. For example, 68% of the world population strongly agreed that their government should reduce environmental pollution, and 66% would use part of their income for the protection of the environment (56% would like to see an increase in taxes to prevent environmental pollution).<sup>170</sup> This suggests that the attainment of an ecological balance is a globally shared concern. 57% believed that more economic aid should be given to poorer countries, which indicates a call for social justice.<sup>171</sup>

These are just some of the examples of possible sources of global values. The similarities between all the lists is striking. In any case, the list of global values presented in this study is not based on a common denominator of all the lists of values referred to in the literature, but on United Nations resolutions and documents.

The suggested list of global values is the following: peace and security, social progress and sustainable development, human dignity, and the self-determination of peoples.<sup>172</sup> This list of values is based on the work of the United Nations, whose Charter identified these values as constituting the fundamental basis

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<sup>167</sup> *Idem*, 14th principle.

<sup>168</sup> *Idem*, 15th principle. Other values relate to the use of technology and communication (16th and 17th principle).

<sup>169</sup> Robinson has an interesting description of what the reader of a book on human values goes through. First of all, the reader discovers he already had his own list of values, and these values are simply reaffirmed by the philosopher. However, exactly because no such reader truly has a mind that resembles a *tabula rasa*, it is unavoidable that at some point the reader disagrees with what he reads. As this happens, “[f]rom being an earnest pupil [the reader] is liable to become an infuriated teacher” (P. 11, Richard Robinson, *An Atheist’s Values* (1964)). And the reader then “comes to see that what he really wanted from philosophers was not that they should lead him, but that they should lead others to adopt his convictions” (*idem*). See also Will Kymlicka, “Introduction: The Globalization of Ethics” (2007), p. 2.

<sup>170</sup> See B001, B002, and B003 (Tables), in Ronald Inglehart, *Human Beliefs and Values* (2004).

<sup>171</sup> *Idem*, E129 (Table).

<sup>172</sup> For the sake of coherence in this list of values, it might be better to replace “sustainable development” with “the well-being and dignity of the planet”. Then you would have the well-being and dignity of the individual, the well-being and dignity of the community (State), and the well-being and dignity of the planet. Such an approach is often suggested, for example, in the Earth Charter - see Mikhail Gorbachev, “The Third Pillar of Sustainable Development” (2005) - or in the Global Ethic - see Hans Küng, *Declaration toward a Global Ethic*, declaration adopted at the Parliament of the World’s Religions, Chicago 1993. However, the “well-being of the planet” is generally viewed as valuable from a human-centered perspective: it is valuable as our home, as our source for food and natural resources. The (philosophical) debate on our relationship with the planet is far from over.

of all its work.<sup>173</sup> The list is therefore not necessarily complete, in the sense that other potential candidates, such as democracy, the rule of law, and the preservation of the global commons, to name but a few suggestions, cannot be qualified at all as such. It all depends on one's definition of "value," and on one's focus. In this study, the focus of the United Nations, guided by its constitutive Charter, has been followed.

The next chapter argues that the United Nations provides a suitable forum for the kind of global conversation about values that was referred to above. The following chapters show that the outcome of that global discussion is a list of global values, *i.e.* a set of enduring, globally shared beliefs that a specific state of the world, which is possible, is socially preferable, from the perspective of the life of all human beings, to an opposite state of the world. It is argued that a world at peace, in which respect for human dignity and the self-determination of peoples is guaranteed, and in which the needs of the present generation are satisfied without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs, is an ideal – but possible – world.

### 4.3 The evolution of global values

Global values were referred to in the definition as "enduring" beliefs. This referred both to the enduring character of values, and to their changing character. The list of global values is not static, in the sense that a particular list of values has guided global affairs since the beginning of time, and will do so until the end of time. In fact, the opposite is true. Global values evolve over time.<sup>174</sup> Some behaviour which is now generally considered to be a violation of the moral code was very common, and was openly defended, only a few decades ago.<sup>175</sup> As Florini pointed out in her article on the evolution of international norms, the changes have sometimes been stunning:

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<sup>173</sup> The WOMP project looked extensively at the work of the United Nations Organization, but it was very much future oriented. The formulation of its "world order values" is not based on opinions expressed in authoritative documents of the past, such as UN resolutions. WOMP does not have philosophers as participants to the project, and it is difficult to find a chapter, in all of the WOMP-literature, discussing the concept of "value". This was also noted by Elisabeth Gerle in her study, *In Search of a Global Ethics: Theological, Political, and Feminist Perspectives based on a Critical Analysis of JPIC and WOMP* (1995), see especially p. 131. JPIC stands for Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation; this is a religion-based project.

<sup>174</sup> See also Aligarh Muslim University, *Man, Reality, and Values* (1964), p. 52.

<sup>175</sup> In 1950, one of the colonial powers (Belgium) defended colonialism at the United Nations General Assembly as a "systematic action taken by an advanced people with a view to helping the backward indigenous populations in their efforts towards political, economic, social and cultural progress." A/PV.392 (General Assembly plenary meeting of 10 November, 1950). The Belgian representative explained to the General Assembly what his country was doing in the Congo at that time.

Slavery, common for millennia, has virtually disappeared. Colonialism has given way to agreement on the right of self-determination. Aggression across recognized national borders, once a standard tool of state policy, now meets with international condemnation.<sup>176</sup>

One could go on: *sustainable* development, the equality of men and women, democratic government... these are all relatively modern value-based ideas, now considered to be self-evident. How can these drastic changes be explained? One way would be to refer to the fact that the balance of power has changed, *i.e.* the powerless and the oppressed have become powerful and have claimed their dignity, as part of an effort to enhance their power and security in international relations.<sup>177</sup> Even though the research into the balance of power goes a long way to explain changes in the discourse on global values, it does not provide the full answer to the question of why and how global values evolve. For example, can the change from colonialism to the self-determination of peoples be explained solely in terms of shifts in military and economic power? Many people do not think it can.<sup>178</sup> It is clear that a change in the hearts and minds of the powerful also played a role. Some scholars referred to the debate itself as the primary reason for change, even change in the real world.<sup>179</sup> Florini provided an unorthodox theory by comparing the evolution in international relations, guided by norms, with the biological form of evolution, guided by genes.<sup>180</sup> By describing in detail *how* global values have evolved over time in the framework of the United Nations, this study also aims to give an implicit answer to the question *why* such an evolution is possible.<sup>181</sup>

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<sup>176</sup> Ann Florini, "The Evolution of International Norms" (1996), p. 363. See also Lynn H. Miller, *Global Order* (1990), pp. 12-13, who remarks, in relation to slavery, that "what had been accepted by earlier generations as an economic necessity and therefore excluded from the moral agenda became unthinkable to their descendants" (p. 13).

<sup>177</sup> This focus in power and the perpetual search for security as determinative of how ideas and policies change is typical of the (neo)realist school. See Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (1948); and Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (1979).

<sup>178</sup> See James Crawford, *Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention* (2002).

<sup>179</sup> According to the constructivists, a look at shifts in the balance of power does not explain all changes in global values and norms, and thus one must look beyond power, to the argumentative discourse, and how ideas, norms and values determine state behavior. See, *e.g.*, Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999), who goes as far as to conclude that "it is through ideas that states ultimately relate to one another", and that "these ideas help define who and what states are." (p. 372)

<sup>180</sup> Ann Florini, "The Evolution of International Norms" (1996). This theory is somewhat more subtle than the "survival of the fittest."

<sup>181</sup> See Part II of this study.



#### 4.4. Global values and the belief in progress

Related to the issue of evolving values is the idea of progress. Although this is not always stated explicitly, one cannot help thinking, for example, when the prohibition of slavery is mentioned or the process of decolonization, that the world's ideas about values and international relations in general are not just *evolving*, but are *progressing* towards the ideal. We are making progress not only in the realization of our values, but also in our thinking about values. This belief in progress is very strong in the United Nations. For example, at a world conference on racism organized in 2001, all States acknowledged that "slavery and the slave trade are a crime against humanity and should always have been so."<sup>182</sup> Nowadays, there are very few people who would argue otherwise. It is now generally believed that our ancestors behaved in ways that cannot be justified and should be condemned retrospectively. This not only applies to slavery. It also applies to *apartheid* and genocide.<sup>183</sup> History is generally viewed with a sense of embarrassment. In the study of history, there is a tendency to wonder every now and again, how our forefathers could have committed such terrible acts.

Some philosophers have recently warned against this way of thinking. One of the most important is John Gray. He reminded us that we should not think that we are slowly going through a checklist of things to do to improve the world (such as abolishing slavery, prohibiting torture, prohibiting war, etc.), and that what is removed from the list will never reappear. He warned us that "[t]he gains that have been achieved in ethics and politics are not cumulative" and that "what has been gained can also be lost, and over time surely will be."<sup>184</sup> Therefore progress is an illusion, and like all illusions, we turn to it, not to understand the way the world works, but to give our own life meaning. In short: to write about global values as a story of progress, and to promote the realization of global values in the illusory belief that it is a way of perfecting the world, is essentially a way to give meaning to one's own life by giving one's own work a mythical or even missionary character.<sup>185</sup> The belief in progress and the realization of the human potential "in the here and now" then replace religious beliefs.<sup>186</sup>

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<sup>182</sup> Declaration, included in the *Report of the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance*, held in Durban (South Africa), between 31 August and 8 September 2001. UNDoc. A/CONF.189/12, para. 13.

<sup>183</sup> For *apartheid* and genocide, see *idem*, para. 15.

<sup>184</sup> John N. Gray, *Heresies: Against Progress and Other Illusions* (2004), p. 3.

<sup>185</sup> *Idem*, pp. 4-5.

<sup>186</sup> For example, in the *Humanist Manifesto I* of 1933, we can read that "Religious Humanism considers the complete realization of human personality to be the end of man's life and seeks its development and fulfillment in the here and now."

Such belief in progress is naïve.<sup>187</sup> This is not only because new evils continuously emerge, but also because values change, and what is generally believed to be a better world now will not automatically be considered as such by the next generation. A review of Gray's book in the British newspaper *The Guardian* started with the following description of a cartoon:

[One can see] a field of sheep all grazing peacefully, all, that is, save one wise ovine, who has lifted its head in appalled astonishment to cry out: "Wait! This is grass - this is grass we're eating!"<sup>188</sup>

One can easily picture the next angry young man to be the ovine (according to the reviewer, Gray is the ovine), calling for change at a time when it is generally believed that all shared values have been realized. Carl-Friedrich von Weizsäcker made a similar point when he remarked that "when after frightful periods of war a generation, with the help of technology, has achieved a situation that it conceives to be peaceful, prosperous, with freedom and some degree of justice, the next generation finds in it manipulation instead of freedom, injustice, hunger, and war." This leads the author to conclude that the "[b]attle is joined not over the verbally formulated values themselves, not really even over their order of priorities, but over their meaning and their content."<sup>189</sup> Not only does reality continue to evolve, but the content of the world's values evolve with it. And this will never end. Values are like the carrot on a stick, always placed a few centimetres in front of the donkey's nose. The donkey will forever chase the carrot, and this will make it move forward. But the donkey will never manage to grab and eat it.

## 5 RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE REALIZATION OF GLOBAL VALUES

Although this study focuses on defining global values, questions relating to the responsibility for realizing these values cannot simply be dismissed. After all, as noted above, the definition of values is not an academic exercise. It is intended to be action-motivated. It is meant to allocate responsibilities, and to oblige relevant actors to act.

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<sup>187</sup> The first *Humanist Manifesto* was written in 1933, just before the Second World War. Clearly this has led the humanist movement to become more realistic. In 1973, a new Manifesto (*Humanist Manifesto II*) was written, with a preface in which it noted that "[e]vents since then [*i.e.* since the adoption of the Humanist Manifesto in 1933] make that earlier statement seem far too optimistic."

<sup>188</sup> John Banville, "Beyond dentistry" (2004). In this new Manifesto, one still finds the same idea, *i.e.* that we must strive for a good life for all, here and now.

<sup>189</sup> Carl-Friedrich von Weizsäcker, "A Sceptical Contribution" (1975), pp. 113-114.

### 5.1 Who is responsible for promoting and safeguarding global values?

The question which has to be addressed at the end of this first chapter is: who is responsible for promoting and safeguarding global values? Participating in the process of defining values is – or should be – a responsibility for realizing these values, and an accountability towards those on whose behalf and in whose interest this is done.<sup>190</sup> It is partly for these reasons that it is not helpful to include values that are impossible to attain. For example, it makes no sense to derive from a list of values norms such as “there shall be no earthquakes,” or “human beings must not be allowed to die at all.” Human beings cannot prevent earthquakes entirely and cannot avoid death.<sup>191</sup>

The simple answer to the question of responsibility for the realization of global values is that the global community, however constituted, is responsible. This does not mean that everybody is responsible for the welfare of everybody else. People are first of all responsible for their own welfare, for the welfare of their own family, community, and so on. It was Nagel who gave this argument a sound philosophical basis. Nagel distinguished two moral standpoints:

From an *impersonal* standpoint, all lives matter equally; this means those lives that are immediately threatened must be immediately saved, and everybody has an immediate obligation to do so. Everybody always has the responsibility to save the lives of all his or her fellow human beings whenever these lives are endangered.

From a *personal* standpoint, one’s own life is more important than anyone else’s life. This is true for every human being. People should understand and respect that not only they themselves, but others too, prefer their own interests over those of others, and that they are morally entitled to do so.<sup>192</sup>

These two standpoints are equally valid, and, even though they seem contradictory, they must be adopted simultaneously. The easiest way to avoid conflicting obligations from arising each and every day is to delegate the duties arising from the impersonal standpoint to the collective, so that the individual can focus on the personal standpoint. This means that the collective must be given the resources to do so. At the national level, individuals delegate certain duties (and certain resources) to their State. In this way, the State can use the individual’s resources to care for all other citizens residing within that State, on that individual’s behalf. In the world as it is constituted today, it is clear that the main responsibility for

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<sup>190</sup> See also Richard A. Falk, *On Humane Governance* (1995), pp. 246-247. Falk sees (criminal) accountability of individuals as one of ten key dimensions of humane governance.

<sup>191</sup> On the example of the earthquake, Aligarh Muslim University, *Man, Reality, and Values* (1964), p. 57.

<sup>192</sup> Thomas Nagel, *Equality and Partiality* (1991). In Chapter 2 he focuses on the national level.

realizing global values lies with States. After all, that is the way in which the world order is constituted. It is a world of States, acting in international affairs on behalf of their own populations, together acting on behalf of all the world's citizens. Although the literature rightly recognizes a shift in responsibility away from the State to a plurality of actors, it generally also emphasizes the central role of the State.<sup>193</sup> One can imagine that in the future, States will delegate some of the global duties (and resources) to international organizations, such as the United Nations. However, that has not happened yet to any great extent. This also explains why the United Nations can be much more accurately characterized as a global deliberative organization, rather than as a global executive.

Despite the central role of the State, and despite the delegation of responsibilities from the individual to the State, individuals will always continue to have some responsibilities towards all other citizens themselves.<sup>194</sup> These responsibilities include taking a critical look at what the State is doing on their behalf and in their name. Individuals must find alternative ways of fulfilling their responsibilities towards all the world's citizens, if the State does not do so to a sufficient extent,<sup>195</sup> or if it makes the wrong choices.<sup>196</sup>

## 5.2 Global values as the driving force for global governance

A global value system helps global policy makers choose between alternative goals. A clear choice will in turn help to resolve conflicts and facilitate global decision making.<sup>197</sup> Global values “help us to define the state of the world, to evaluate the

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<sup>193</sup> The project became more and more modest in its suggestions for change as time moved on. First, the project based itself on the rather grandiose suggestions for constitutional change to be found in Grenville Clark & Louis Sohn, *World peace through world law* (1958), which aimed basically to vigorously revise the UN Charter so as to turn the United Nations into a world government. Then more modest suggestions were made in the second series of “preferred worlds”. In the final series, instead of suggesting grand designs suggested by the elite, it was decided to focus instead on the voices of the oppressed, and to help them achieve modest changes from below.

<sup>194</sup> See Declaration of Human Duties and Responsibilities, adopted by a High Level Group chaired by Richard J. Goldstone under the auspices of the city of Valencia and UNESCO, 1999.

<sup>195</sup> For example, the rich nations of the world promised to spend 0.7 per cent of their gross domestic product (GDP) for official development assistance (see, e.g., UN General Assembly Resolution 1524(XV) of 15 December 1960; resolution 2626(XXV) of 24 October 1970, and the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, para. 23), but only five countries complied so far: Denmark (0.84%), Luxembourg (0.81%), Netherlands (0.80%), Norway (0.92%), and Sweden (0.79%).

<sup>196</sup> Perhaps the State does not make the same choices as the individual would make. See e.g. Thomas Pogge, “Priorities of Global Justice” (2003). On the decision to bomb Kosovo (by NATO in 1999) and not alleviate millions of people from poverty, Pogge wonders: “If it makes sense to spend billions and to endanger thousands of lives in order to rescue a million people from Serb oppression, would it not make more sense to spend similar sums, without endangering any lives, on leading many millions out of life-threatening poverty?”

<sup>197</sup> See Milton Rokeach, *The Nature of Human Values* (1973), p. 14.

meaning of the world so defined, to explain the human condition, and to prescribe a correct line of action.”<sup>198</sup>

As global values are based on ideas of what constitutes a better world from the perspective of all the world’s citizens, they are above all about the humanization of global affairs. They are about the desire to actively build a future based on human needs. It is a natural development that whenever people interact frequently and as equals, a body of values to humanize this interaction emerges. For example, it is striking that with the increasing (economic) integration of Europe came the desire to formulate and formalize a list of European values that are in a sense distilled from various cultures and traditions within Europe.<sup>199</sup> The idea is not to wipe out the cultural differences that exist in Europe, but to value both Europe’s differences and common characteristics at the same time, and to humanize the European economy by injecting some common values into it. The slogan was: “Europe united in diversity”. This could be the global slogan too.<sup>200</sup>

Since it is generally believed that the global politics of the past have not been dominated by a search for a reasoned consensus, but rather by bargaining for compromises to secure particular interests, a former Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation summarized this suggested change in global policy (from bargaining on the basis of self-interest to a reasoned consensus on global values) in an attractive slogan: “less *laissez-faire* and more globalization with a human face.”<sup>201</sup> As the next chapter shows, the United Nations could provide some

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<sup>198</sup> Samuel S. Kim, *The Quest for a Just World Order* (1984), p. 22.

<sup>199</sup> Of this European abstraction exercise, Bernard-Henri Levy said: “European nations are bound within by history, by language, by culture, sometimes by skin color. The idea of Europe is to lift above all of that, to abstract from all the qualities that caused hate and war. It is very similar to the American identity, whose achievement is to unify all the disparate parts: people with different backgrounds, ideas, races and religions.” See Bernard-Henri Levy, ““Europe Has Lost Confidence” (2007).

<sup>200</sup> In the Berlin Declaration of 2007, one can read both that “we are enriched by open borders and a lively variety of languages, cultures and regions”, and that “European unification has made peace and prosperity possible [and] it has brought about a sense of community and overcome differences.” *Declaration on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome*, adopted by EU leaders in Berlin, on the 25 March 2007.

<sup>201</sup> Speech by Bert Koenders, at the Society for International Development’s 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary International Congress on 5 July 2007 in The Hague, Netherlands. See also, Willem van Genugten, Kees Homan, Nico Schrijver & Paul de Waart, *The United Nations of the Future: Globalization with a Human Face* (2006).

minimal formal leadership in this process,<sup>202</sup> not as a world government, but as a focal point in a process generally referred to as global governance.<sup>203</sup>

## 6 CONCLUSION

A definition of global value was sought in the academic literature of various disciplines, including philosophy, sociology and psychology. A suitable definition was found, which reflected the hypotheses on which this study is based. Global values were defined as a set of enduring, globally shared beliefs that a specific state of the world, which is possible, is socially preferable, from the perspective of the life of all human beings, to an opposite state of the world. This was based on a definition proposed by Rokeach, a social psychologist. As Rokeach used the definition in a different context, some modifications were proposed. These modifications led to some reflections on the sort of value we had in mind. Subsequently various elements of this definition were examined more closely. An attempt was made to make the idea that there is a global community which shares a limited set of beliefs at least intuitively plausible, and that the only way to “discover” such beliefs was through a discussion which was as inclusive as possible, in the sense that it involved the entire international community.

The following list of values was proposed: human dignity, the self-determination of peoples, peace and security, and social progress and development. It was explained that this list of values was mainly a result of a universally felt “lack of something” *i.e.* an urgent sense that there was something wrong with the world we actually live in. Attempts to define values are ways to imagine improvements of the present world conditions. This approach to the list of values also allows for it to constantly evolve. It could even be argued that the list of values serves to motivate the world to continuously “improve” itself, and that it therefore helps the world to continuously progress. Responsibility for implementing these ideas of progress in the actual world cannot be assigned to the world as a whole, because the world is without arms and legs. Therefore the responsibility must be distributed evenly over all the participants.

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<sup>202</sup> In determining what was required to keep the world together, the Commission on Global Governance called for two things: (1) “the broad acceptance of a global civic ethic to guide action within the global neighbourhood,” and (2) “courageous leadership infused with that ethic at all levels of society.” The Commission added that “without a global ethic, the frictions and tensions of living in the global neighbourhood will multiply; without leadership, even the best- designed institutions and strategies will fail.” Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighborhood* (1995), p. 47.

<sup>203</sup> Rosenau very clearly explained the difference between a global government and global governance: “Government suggests activities that are backed by formal authority, by police powers to insure the implementation of duly constituted policies, whereas governance refers to activities backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police powers to overcome defiance and attain compliance.” James N. Rosenau, “Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics” (1992), p. 4.

This chapter had a modest aim: the introduction of a few ideas and concepts, ensuring that they could be intuitively grasped and could be used in the rest of this study. Many of the topics addressed in general terms in this chapter resurface in the chapters on the United Nations.